

AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS**by Arthur Blanchette.**

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INTRODUCTION

This is an introduction to psychoanalysis. It is divided into four parts, each of which has a particular purpose. The first part introduces Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis; the second portrays his work, the essence of psychoanalysis; the third studies his background and that of analysis; the fourth examines his philosophy and that of his school. The whole attempts to localize psychoanalysis in the field of human knowledge both scientific and philosophical.

As its title implies, the present work is far from complete. The reason for this is simple. Psychoanalysis is now a universal science. It is much more than the therapeutic method of its early days. It has become a method of psychological analysis of both the normal and abnormal mind; a theory of the neuroses, of art, ethnology, religion, logic sociology, biology; a school of psychology; and even a philosophy of life. To completely and adequately describe each of these phases would require a universal competence which unfortunately the author does not possess, and which very few analysts themselves possess...

He has introduced psychoanalysis mostly in those topics in which he himself was best prepared, its psychology and philosophy, which in reality are its essential features, the other

being mostly applications, digressions or diversions.

Freudian analysis is at times a crude subject to treat, and to describe it properly one must not be afraid to wallow in a bit of intellectual mud. The crudeness of psychoanalysis concerns chiefly the topic of sex and the libido. Psychoanalysis is certainly not pansexual, yet the deep salaams made by its adepts before the altars of sex have done much to validate its most salacious notoriety.

In this phase of its teachings, while attempting to preserve as much human dignity and self-respect as possible, the author has preferred to be scientifically accurate. He has tried to explain sex and the libido in as psychoanalytically objective a way as is still compatible with moral principles and decency.

Some of the author's deductions concerning the scientific and philosophical aspects of psychoanalysis may seem somewhat daring. With regards to these, he asks the reader to refer immediately to the conclusion of this work where they are to be found in schematic form. He requests the reader to examine them before commencing study of this thesis. May these results, in their own simple way, help clarify the scientific and philosophical muddle in which psychoanalysis has made man wallow and show psychoanalysis in the completely equivocal and destructive role that it plays on the stage of contemporary thought.

Because of the vast number of references required by the first two parts of this thesis, in which are presented Freud's life and the principal tenets of psychoanalysis, the writer has found it necessary to adopt the usual reference-procedure of the commentators of analysis. This consists in references in abbreviated form, the key to which follows.

FREUD'S WORKS

- AS An Autobiographical Study, London, Hogarth, 1935.²
 BPP Beyond the Pleasure Principle.²
 CTS Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.²
 EI The Ego and the Id.[†]
 GPE Group Psychology and Ego-Analysis.[†]
 HPM The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.²
 ID The Interpretation of Dreams.²
 IL Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, London, George Allen and Unwin, 7th Impression, 1943.[†]
 IV Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.[†]
 OP On Psychoanalysis, (Ueber psychoanalyse) a series of 5 lectures given by Freud in Worcester, in September 1909.
 PEL The Psychopathology of Everyday Life.²
 TT Totem and Taboo.²
 WRU Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious.²

² These works are to be found in The Basic Writings of S. Freud, edited by A.A.Brill, New York, Random House, 1938.

[†] These works are to be found in A General Selection from the Works of Freud, edited by J.Rickman, London, Hogarth,¹

Nota: References to works by other authors will be given according to the customary methodological practices.

PART ONE

PSYCHOANALYSIS:ITS FOUNDER

CHAPTER I

THE BIRTH OF AN ILLUSION

On the 6th of May, 1856, in a village of Czechoslovakia, then a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a child was born. This child was destined to foster one of the greatest revolutions yet seen in modern times in the realm of science, but who then could have foretold that little Sigmund Freud would later cause such turmoil.

Freud was born in Freiburg, Czechoslovakia, of Jewish parents. When he was four years old, they migrated to Vienna, the capital of the dual Hapsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary, justly renowned for its atmosphere of science, intellectualism, and liberal thought.

Young Freud studied in various Viennese Lyceums during his youth, where his superior intellectual ability and his love of work brought him complete success in his studies. He was always the first in his class and only at the University of Vienna, where he matriculated in 1873 at the age of 17, did he permit himself a few negligent moments, as he called them, in order to undertake private research in physiology in von Brücke Institute of Physiology while still a student in the University

After the usual studies required in his day, he obtained his doctor's degree in medicine in 1881 at the age of 25. This achievement, in his esteem, was quite tardy, but was perhaps occasioned by his active interest in various fields of neurophysiological research to which he devoted much time while still studying the necessary subjects of his medical curriculum. He was a familiar sight in the neurophysiological laboratories of the Institute of Physiology of the University of Vienna².

Here he worked under the guidance of those able masters, von Brücke and Meynert for a period of almost six years during the late 70's. This influence of subject matter, masters, and interests is not to be passed over lightly. We shall see later that this period of his life was of the utmost importance in determining his future thought and career.

Thus in the late 70's, young Freud was studying such orthodox laboratory subjects as the dissection of frogs, and fishes, and writing papers on such calm topics as the embryology of the nervous system. This neurological research hardly permits any augury of the tempestuous psychological revolution that was to take place less than 20 years later.

In spite of his interest and his success in the domain

²AS p.15.

of neurological surgery, financial difficulties obliged him to renounce his work in the Institute and in 1882, the year following his graduation from the medical school, he commenced his internship in the General Hospital, the Allgemeine Krankenhaus³.

Here he continued his neurological research and upon discovering that he was very little interested in the various specialties that medicine then had to offer except that of psychiatry, he chose the nervous diseases of the brain and the various mental ailments as his major topic of study.

It is perhaps wise, here, to forewarn the reader of the general atmosphere concerning hysteria and the neuroses reigning in the faculties of medicine in the latter half of the 19th Century, for it differs greatly from that commonly found in contemporary clinics.

At that time, the science of neurology and neurophysiology was still in the embryonic stage, and psychiatry, as understood among contemporary psychologists, was virtually nonexistent. It was the generally accepted medical tradition that all diseases, whether of the mind or of the body, were necessarily somatic in origin⁴. Thus, if one suffered from hysteria, a purely mental ailment, the doctor consulted would invariably attempt to trace the symptoms back to some bodily

³ AS p. 16.

⁴ OP p. 4.

ailment or brain lesion. In short, it was the age of the scalpel, castor oil and the triumph of pathology.

This was the era of physical therapy, of Virchow and anatomy in general. To have attributed to mental diseases a cause, mental in nature, would have been the equivalent of throwing a bombshell into the quiet studies of the learned professors of the day. To Freud must go, in great part, the merit of having exploded the bomb.

Freud was educated in this somatic tradition and it is only later that he threw off the shackles which bound him, to proclaim the psychogenesis of the various neuroses and their independence from purely somatic causes.

But to return to young doctor Freud interned in the Allgemeine Krankenhaus, we find him still working in the fields of neurophysiology and psychopathology, attempting to cure the various mental diseases by the methods of his day.

In 1885, while still at the General Hospital and at work with v. Brücke in the Institute, he heard of Jean Charcot, the famous Parisian psychiatrist, who was using hypnosis with considerable success in treating the nervous diseases and psychic disorders⁵.

Freud resolved to go to Paris and study with the great Frenchman. He inveigled his master, v. Brücke, into obtaining for him a scholarship which permitted him to spend a year with

5 AS p. 20; HPM p. 937.

Charcot at La Salpêtrière.

This Parisian interlude made such a strong impression upon him that it cannot be passed unnoticed. It is common historical lore today that Freud attributed many of his basic notions concerning sex and the sex life to his work with Charcot in Paris.

After his sojourn in Paris, he returned to Vienna. In 1886, he "married the young girl who waited for me in a far-off city longer than four years." He thereupon halfheartedly entered private practice and research while remaining privatdozent at the University⁶.

It was after his return to Vienna that he commenced his real work in the realm of hysteria and psychopathology⁷. He began making use of hypnosis and the ideas which he had learned from Charcot, but upon attempting to demonstrate these methods to his colleagues, he met with considerable opposition. They were still accustomed to treat such ailments with cold baths, electro-therapy, tonics, sedatives and other somatic means.

Undaunted by their coldness, he continued to use hypnosis as the basis of his therapeutic method. He achieved some success by hypnosis, but the results were not too gratifying, as it was not always possible for him to hypnotize all of his patients.

6 AS p. 23.

7 AS p. 25; HPM p. 944.

Thinking that his lack of success with hypnosis was due to a personal deficiency in method, he brought one of his patients to Bernheim, the great hypnotic expert of Nancy, in 1889. Nancy was then one of the foremost European centers for research in the spheres of hypnosis and suggestion.

It was here that he learned of the more intimate mechanisms that govern hypnosis⁸. To this trip he also attributes his first ideas concerning the unconscious and man's psychic apparatus. In this respect, Freud's trip to Nancy surely did not prove to be fruitless in spite of the fact that Bernheim did not succeed in hypnotizing his patient.

Some years before these foreign visits, Freud had made the acquaintance of Doctor Josef Breuer, a well known Viennese medical practitioner, who was to influence greatly Freud's scientific career⁹. Breuer was a physiologist of enviable reputation, whose later work and theories on the semi-circular canals and the sense of equilibrium and rotation-perception are still commonly accepted today (Mach-Breuer theory of rotation-perception, 1897).

Their long friendship is of the utmost importance to the subsequent development of psychoanalysis, for it is out of this friendship and collaboration that many of the basic principles of psychoanalysis were born. During their lengthy discussions,

⁸ AS.p. 29.

⁹ AS.p. 32.

Breuer one day related to Freud a case which he himself had undertaken and cured by hypnosis during the period from 1880-1882, while Freud was still with v. Brücke at the Institute.

This case is so unique in psychoanalysis that it is well worth relating. The patient, whose name was Anna¹⁰, was a young girl of 21 years, of exceptional talent and education. Breuer found her to be suffering from the usual neurotic symptoms of inhibitions, contractures and other psycho-somatic disorders characteristic of the neuroses.

He mentioned to Freud that he had found it possible to make these symptoms disappear if he could induce Anna to give verbal expression to the phantasies and obsessions which troubled her. He found that hypnosis constituted an admirable method by which he could make the young girl talk of her ailments and disorders. In this way, he freed Anna from many of her symptoms.

He then proceeded to elaborate this fundamental idea into a private therapeutic technique. Out of this rudimentary method were subsequently developed the highly specialized techniques of psychoanalysis, for Breuer had inadvertently come upon the relation between the various hysterical symptoms and the unconscious factors underlying them. Of this idea, psychoanalysis was destined to make great use in later years.

¹⁰ AS pp. 33-35.

To better describe this discovery, the words of the American analyst, Brill, are most apt:

The significance of the case (Anna) lay in this fact, that in her waking state the patient knew nothing about the origin of her symptoms, but once hypnotized, she immediately knew the connection between her symptoms and some of her past experiences. All symptoms were traceable to experiences during the time when she had nursed her father (a period of great emotional stress for Anna). Moreover, the symptoms were not arbitrary and senseless, but could be traced to definite experiences and forgotten reminiscences of that emotional situation¹¹.

Or as de la Vaissiere has put it:

Le symptôme morbide était donc le résidu mnémique d'un trauma psychique qui n'avait pu se décharger au dehors; il avait disparu (de la vie consciente), lorsque la reviviscence sous hypnose de la scène traumatique avait donné à l'émotion l'occasion de s'extérioriser¹².

An interesting illustration of this curious phenomenon took place when Breuer made the following disorder disappear. Anna had been subjected for six months to a most trying phobia. She refused to drink liquid substances of any sort¹³.

Through the talking out process, as Breuer then called his method, he learned that Anna had seen her tutor's dog drinking out of a family glass. This she considered particularly revolting, however, she had refrained from comment out of fear, dismissing the entire episode from her mind.

Breuer hypnotized Anna and during hypnosis made her drink out of a glass while talking of the incident. He then proceeded

¹¹ A.A.Brill, Introduction to the Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, New York, Random House, 1938, p. 28.

¹² J. de la Vaissiere, s.j., La théorie psychanalytique de Freud, Paris, Gabriel Beauchesne, 1932, p. 15.

¹³ OP p. 6.

to awaken her, glass in hand, and the phobia disappeared, for she could now consciously connect the apparently forgotten incident of the dog drinking out of a glass, which was the cause of her phobia, with the conscious experience which had led to the forgetting of the episode. This insight into forgotten traumatic scenes Breuer thought to be the solution to curing the neuroses.

Breuer stated that it would be possible to cure people of neurotic symptoms if only they could be made to give verbal expression to their symptoms and phantasies which had originally been based upon impulses that had had to be foregone because of a conflict between the individual and his surroundings¹⁴.

Upon these original findings of the early 80's, Breuer continued to elaborate. By the time he began collaborating with Freud, he had come to many interesting theoretical considerations which were to be of the utmost importance in determining Freud's future course.

This collaboration commenced in the late 80's and continued into the 90's of the last century. After Freud's trip to Nancy, where he learned further of the therapy of hypnotic suggestion, he commenced to use Breuer's methods in his own research. He noted that his own findings tended to corroborate those of Breuer.

¹⁴ AS p. 38.

Partly as a result of this, he asked Breuer to make a report with him on the results of his method, while he, Freud, would make a similar report concerning his own successes¹⁵. Their joint paper appeared in 1893, under the heading Ueber den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänomene.

It is generally accepted that Breuer wrote the chapters on theory in the first works of this collaboration where already such terms as repression, abreaction, psychic mechanisms, conversion, and interpretation, with which psychoanalysis was to abound in later years, had found their way¹⁶. At this early date, what was subsequently to become known to the scientific world as psychoanalysis, was called the "cathartic method", as it served to purge the spirit of its ills¹⁷.

Two years after the appearance of their first paper, the famous Studien über Hysterie was published. In this work, the cathartic method underwent various changes, developments, and improvements. The emphasis upon sex was much more pronounced than in their first publication.

However, a few months prior to the appearance of the Studien, Breuer and Freud separated. The decisive reasons for this parting of the ways are still obscure. Freud states that it was due to divergencies of opinion concerning various points of theory¹⁸. Brill claims that it was due to lack of preparation and interest on Breuer's part in the field of the neuroses and

¹⁵ AS p. 37.

¹⁷ AS p. 38; HPM p. 934

¹⁶ AS. p. 37; HPM p. 934.

¹⁸ AS. p. 40.

psychopathology in general¹⁹. Woodworth, the dean of American psychology, states that Breuer was unwilling to accept some of the more daring of Freud's assertions concerning sex and that moreover he had had a rather trying experience with one of his feminine patients who fell in love with him during a series of treatments. According to Woodworth, the abreaction would have been too great²⁰. Freud was never greatly preoccupied with this aspect of his technique and continued his researches alone.

The findings and writings of Freud and Breuer were not given a very sympathetic reception by their contemporaries in the field. This coolness was due not only to their psychogenetic views concerning the neuroses, but also to some of their daring assertions with regards to sex.

Nevertheless, after 1895, the year of their separation, Freud worked on alone. He entered into a period of ten years of solitude which proved in the end most fruitful. In this period, until the year 1905 or thereabouts, he wrote the basic works of what was to become known as psychoanalysis, and during this decennium psychoanalysis itself was born²¹.

Henceforth, the life of Freud is patterned upon that of

Note: Abreaction in psychoanalysis signifies the process of working off or discharging a pent-up emotion or a disagreeable experience by living it through again, in speech, action or feeling, usually in the presence of the psychoanalyst.

¹⁹ A.A.Brill, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁰ R.S.Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, New York, The Ronald Press, 1931, p. 131.

²¹ AS p. 101.

his school. In this decade of solitude he had written his principal works, transformed his methods, abandoned hypnosis as a method of therapy and substituted for it that of free-association, and had introduced to psychopathology sex, childhood, wit and the dream world. In general he had rounded out his methods, perfected his techniques and elaborated his basic theories²².

These appeared at the turn of the century in a series of works with most attractive and dynamic titles. They embody the results of his ten years of solitary research and constitute the very basis of psychoanalysis. They are: The Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, and Wit and its Relations to the Unconscious.

It is interesting to note that among the six publications which the American analyst, Brill, considers to be basic among the works of Freud, these four are included²³.

Perhaps the most notable fact of this period was the abandoning of hypnosis and the substitution in its stead of the method of free association²⁴. It can be said that psychoanalysis was built upon the ruins of hypnosis. Freud himself, after having used for years the word "cathartic" to describe his method now invented a new name for his system, calling it psychoanalysis perhaps to show the far-reaching changes which had occurred in

²² AS pp. 48, 72; HPM p. 943.

²³ A.A.Brill, op.cit.

²⁴ AS pp. 72-74.

his thought, or perhaps to declare his independence²⁵.

After publication of his treatise on the dream work (Die Traumdeutung) in 1900, the theories of the Viennese physician commenced to enjoy a restricted popularity among the more liberal circles of Vienna. He slowly became a chef d'école who was to achieve in the latter years of his life such greatness as to become a shining star in the psychological universe surrounded by hundreds of satellites in all of the countries of the world²⁶.

The first official recognition of psychoanalysis to come from science, surprisingly enough, was bestowed upon Freud by foreigners. Nul n'est prophète dans son pays. The Swiss psychiatrists at the Clinic of Psychiatry in Zurich opened their doors to the teachings of Freud. Both Bleuler, director of the Clinic, and Jung, once a disciple of Freud and later founder of an independent school, smiled favourably upon the findings of their Viennese confrere.

Because of this recognition²⁷, and because of the ever increasing popularity of psychoanalytical theories, it was judged wise to hold an International Congress of Psychoanalysts. This took place in Salzburg, Austria, in the early months of the year 1908. The principal result of this Congress was the birth of the

²⁵ AS p. 53.

²⁶ HPM p. 946.

²⁷ AS p. 88; HPM p. 947.

first psychoanalytical review, necessary to reunite the many publications of the various analysts who were most active at this time.

In psychoanalytical history, this period is the era in which Freud was surrounded by such collaborators as Jung, Adler, Riklin, Abraham, Meier, Stekel, the Hungarian Ferenczi, the American, Brill, and the Canadian, Ernest Jones, then of the psychiatric department of the University of Toronto²⁸.

The year 1909 was no less momentous in the history of Freud's life. It marks the official introduction of Freudism to the United States. Stanley Hall, the ever active organizer, and then President of Clark University, had invited Freud to Worcester to give a series of lectures introducing the new method²⁹.

In the United States, psychoanalysis has enjoyed much popularity and considerable success. It is of interest to note that in the Anglo-Saxon countries psychoanalysis has been far more popular than it has been in the Latin countries. A study of the various factors determining this dichotomy would be a most pertinent topic to treat, and without doubt a most revealing

²⁸ AS p. 97; Brill, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁹ Nota: "In the autumn of 1909, Jung and myself were invited by President Stanley Hall, of Clark University, to take part in the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Clark University, by giving some lectures in German...The five lectures that I improvised at Worcester then appeared in English in the American Journal of Psychology; later on, they were printed in German under the title 'Ueber Psychoanalyse'." (HPM p. 950). The writer's reference to this series of lectures is indicated by the letters --GP-- 'On Psychoanalysis', a translation of the above.

one also, which could undoubtedly be traced to the cultural and religious backgrounds of the peoples concerned. At any rate, the success of psychoanalysis in the United States must have surpassed all Freud's greatest expectations³⁰.

Henceforth, psychoanalysis "had arrived", and Freud, as a king upon his throne, could not only guide his school according to his desires, but could also watch it develop, reach its zenith, and commence a long, slow process of disintegration and decline.

Freud, as did Louis XIV, lived too long. Had he died in 1910, he would have been hailed as the most popular founder of any of the schools that modern psychology has yet seen arise, whereas during his 83 years, he himself witnessed the separation of his school into many subdivisions and ramifications.

The first divisions took place in the years that immediately followed his trip to the United States. Carl Jung, one of his first and most brilliant disciples, broke with him in 1912. Jung founded a school of his own called Analytical Psychology. This school retains many of the basic psychoanalytical notions, but gives less prominence to sex³¹.

The following quotation not only gives us a view of the secession, but also a remarkable insight into Freud's temperament:

Jung boasted, in a letter to me from America, that his modifications of psychoanalysis had overcome the resistances (in this instance, 'resistances' can be taken to mean unconscious prejudices) to it in many persons, who hitherto wanted to know nothing about it. I replied that this was nothing to boast about, that the more he sacrificed of the hard won

truths (sex, in this instance) of psychoanalysis, the less resistances he would encounter³².

During the previous year, Alfred Adler, another proto-disciple, also declared his independence. He founded, in 1911, the school of Individual Psychology which emphasizes the complexes of inferiority and superiority, the will to power, in man life, rather than the hegemony of sex and the libido³³.

In spite of these setbacks, the general popularity of "orthodox" psychoanalysis continued unabated. Psychoanalysis then entered a period of more specialized research and polemical discussion. The mere mention of the scientific and philosophical battles waged on the scarred fields of analysis is in itself a tribute to Freud. He at least made men think!

Freud himself continued to study, to write and to defend his early findings, without, however, considering it necessary to revise many of the conclusions arrived at during the first years of psychoanalysis. He was ever reediting his earlier works and during this period he personally made many important contributions to the theory of psychoanalysis, while also extending its scope to embrace the arts, ethnology and anthropology. All this was accomplished despite the fact that he had then reached old age.

He pursued his work with his usual indefatigability, in spite of his age and a long illness. On the eve of his death,

³² HPM pp. 970-971.

³³ HPM p. 970.

he published his last work, Moses and Monotheism. This volume in itself represents most fittingly his love of work and constitutes an admirable example for the intellectual world.

Freud lived in Vienna until 1938. When Anschluss took place in the spring of that year, he left his beloved Vienna and followed the path of exile, spending his last year in London with his son Ernst. His writings and his race were "taboo" in Germany, both having served to light many a pyramid of fire.

Shortly after his arrival in London, he fell seriously ill. His resistance to fatigue and illness, which throughout life had been almost superhuman, disappeared rapidly. On the 23rd of September, 1939, Sigmund Freud had lived.

CHAPTER II

A MODERN CONJUROR

It is impossible to study Freud's life and work without becoming interested in the man himself, his qualities and faults, his physique and personality. These topics become all the more engaging when we stop to consider the revolution which Freud has caused in psychopathology and the popularity currently enjoyed by his teachings.

Sigmund Freud was of small stature, the Napoleon of modern psychology. He was small, but in no way can we say that he was a weak man. His energy and the amount of his intellectual output were tremendous, until the very last years of his life.

Of Freud's physique, one of his disciples, Fritz Wittels, has spoken in these terms: (the traits were noted when Freud was in his 50's)

Freud is a middle-sized man, a bit frail, who nevertheless is most energetic...His eyes are not of that luminous type that so often characterize great men; yet these eyes of deep brown did often resemble stars sweeping haughtily and enigmatically along the horizon¹.

Should we arbitrarily choose the generic term of middle age as representing Freud's zenith, we would note that even at the age of 50 he preserved an air of continual youth, one of his most remarkable characteristics².

1 F. Wittels, Freud: Man, Doctrine and School, quoted by J. de la Vaissiere, op. cit., p. 44.

2 This chapter is based upon various findings and observations of the author, including biographical data noted during lectures at the Psychological Clinic of Harvard University. The physical study of Freud is based upon a group of photographs which picture Freud from the age of 35 years until 80.

We would also note that he had just begun to lose a few strands of his very dark brownish-black hair, and that his beard, always well kept, was steel-grey in colour. This beard camouflaged what is popularly called a "stubborn" chin, here disregarding the scientific lack of objectivity of such opinions.

His most notable facial feature was undoubtedly his eyes. From under a pair of inwardly slanting and not too luxurious brows there appeared a gaze that was very soft and decidedly the center of attraction of his noticeably oval face. Very little escaped his scrutiny.

His nose would, no doubt, make one think of Cyrano's, in diminutive proportions, of course. An arched curve, commencing at a very fine base, and ending with wide distended nostrils, gave it a very distinctive aspect. A nose, shrewd and cunning, the littérateur would say.

His lips, making a furtive appearance from behind the silver screen of his beard and moustache, were horizontal, thin and hard, those popularly associated with the ascetic. They were typical of his general appearance, also, which was always inclined towards slenderness of features and musculature.

Freud, as did Aristotle, always kept himself expertly groomed. He seemed to have a certain predilection for dark suits, white shirts and dark cravats of solid colours. He

always wore a vest upon which rested a heavy gold watch chain, and on the ring-finger of his right hand he wore a large gold ring. One of his most pleasant passions, psychoanalysis excluded, was a good cigar.

Freud's physique, while not being worthy of comparison with that of an Adonis, was quite attractive. He did not possess a dominating bodily structure. He would pass unnoticed in a crowd, and in a reunion, his eternal cigar or cane would serve to distinguish him from his colleagues.

But if his physique were quite commonplace, his personality and mind were unique. He was also possessed of a keen sense of humour. This last is well illustrated by his works and his lectures which greatly resemble a lively chat between professor and pupils, spiced with pleasant anecdotes and witty puns. However the most common subject of Freud's wit was more often than not the traditional psychology of Fechner, Wundt, and Ebbinghaus, whose teachings he attacked mercilessly.

His was a mind that had a gift for drama which pervaded his entire person and dominated his thought. His dramatic talent was well served by what is commonly known as a dashing and daring intellect which considered an obstacle as a challenge and criticism as an incentive. His was not the mind of a genius, yet he had at times shrewd insights into many of the foibles of human nature.

His intellectual capacity being duly recognized, the most

dominant of his psychic gifts was certainly his will power. Whereas Galton would overcome a difficulty with a brilliant thrust of insight, a coup de génie, Freud vanquished an obstacle by sheer weight of intellectual output, determination, and unfortunately at times by wishful thinking and blind thrusts of personal convictions and hypotheses.

His rugged determination was well reflected in his relations with his disciples and pupils. He was forever a dictateur de doctrine brooking neither opposition nor individual thinking among his entourage. This may be one of the causes of the many ramifications and defections that psychoanalysis has undergone since its birth³.

His determined love of work was decidedly his outstanding characteristic. For nearly a half century he adhered to a strict daily régime, the results of which are contained in his multiple writings. A statistical study of the number of pages that he wrote or revised every day during his long life would be most revealing.

Freud would begin his day about 9:00 a.m. He would labour through morning and afternoon virtually without interruption, analyzing the patients who came to him for treatment; he often performed as many as eight, nine and even ten analyses in one day.

³ Among the more notable of these defections are those occasioned by the departure of Adler, Jung, Stekel and Rank.

He would listen patiently to each for an hour, without taking any notes, storing all the associations, dreams and phantasies of the patient in his memory which was almost photographically faithful. This task must have required an almost Herculean strength of will.

After his analyses, he would dine and then dedicate the rest of the evening to study and composition, retiring in the early hours of the morning. The literary results of this régime are astonishing, greatly resembling in volume the productivity of these monastic giants of the Middle Ages.

The vastness of scope of these works is remarkable, even bewildering, and some of the insights he achieved are uncanny, but it proved to be Freud's Achilles' heel. Actual control of his undertakings seems to have slipped from his grasp in later years. In this respect, Freud in his writings never appears the cool scientist in his laboratory, calculating, observing and verifying natural phenomena. Had he spent time controlling his hypotheses, the extent of his works would have rapidly dwindled.

Freud was the armchair strategist pushing his armies of theories against the enemy, making brilliant tactical thrusts and sallies, far from the stark realities of the battlefields of human nature. In his works, he resembles the mystical visionnaire, making theories and hypotheses appear at the stroke of his rod. He invents, he proclaims, but never does he verify.

Nor does he appear as the prudent philosopher wisely and slowly observing the rock of reality and upon this rock building the solid structure of the first principles of reason. Were he a philosopher, Freud would undoubtedly be compared to the impetuous Abelard, knight-errant of wisdom, ever in quest of adversaries against which to perfect his intellectual armament.

Woodworth has nicely summed up these traits:

Yet I should not say, in view of all his writings, that his temper is exactly that of the scientific man. He appears more as a seer than as an investigator, certainly more as a fertile inventor of hypotheses than as a cold-blooded tester of hypotheses. He seems to have followed a maxim which he received from Charcot, to immerse himself in the facts, especially the baffling facts, in the hope that illumination would come. When illumination did come, as it evidently came often to Freud, it came with great force and assurance, and appeared to him as much more than a hypothesis for further testing. As you read Freud's books, you are struck with the abundance of what, if you think a moment, are seen to be hypotheses. You could find enough of them on certain pages to keep a group of research workers busy for a year testing them out. But Freud passes serenely on and gives you about as many more on the next page⁴.

A sample page of any of Freud's works soon reveals the qualities of and the flaws in his manner of thinking, and gives a clear insight into his convictions of the worth of psychoanalysis.

Freud speaks to his readers ex cathedra, fully convinced of the truth of what he is saying. His is a rule by decree in which reality has become bent to his will. Yet the chief characteristic of this dictator is his sincerity. His conviction in

4 R.S.Woodworth, op.cit., pp.141-142.

the truth and objectivity of his "facts", for Freud's theories and hypotheses are always facts, is astounding. He seems to consider his theories unquestionable and his methods above reproach.

These are surely not the qualities that make for the good scientist. In this respect, Freud is assuredly not a scientist, nor are his ways of thinking at all scientific. His thought as is his style, is most diffuse. His phrase is most fluent, very dynamic and attractive. However, in spite of its fluidity, at a certain point the reader becomes lost and must retrace his steps in order to find the main path of argumentation again.

It is extremely easy to read a chapter of any one of Freud's works and remember some outstandingly brilliant passages here and there. It is however exceedingly difficult to remember the general sequence and basic ideas of the chapter itself. One must read an entire chapter many times before grasping its full significance. This diffusion and obscurity of presentation certainly do not make for the true scientist.

Freud was neither scientist nor philosopher. He was the zealous neophyte of modern thought, who, as the Arabian Caliphs of old, charged across the mountains and deserts of modern science brandishing the sword of the true faith that is psychoanalysis.

Among the vast number of dogmatic truths which he

which he preached, in one alone did he excel. This was Sex. His eloquence in sex knew no limits; nor did the topic itself in Freud's mind. His entire life and thought seem irremediably dominated by sex. The real reason for this will undoubtedly remain unknown forever.

Freud claims that his concepts of sex were forced upon him as a result of his observations⁵. All his patients, he says, presented sexual abnormalities, therefore in typical Freudian fashion, he concludes that sex must be a dominant factor, not only of the abnormal individual but also of normal people.

In this respect Freud seems to have been possessed of a most unfortunate love for unwarranted generalizations based upon extremely insecure foundations. He also appears to accept as facts the weakest and most outlandish of analogies which in truth seem to have little foundation in reality.

One of Freud's chief and most consistent logical deficiencies, many examples of which we shall soon see, is his lack of distinction between a post hoc and a propter hoc, of which the above-mentioned identification of abnormal and normal is not an unusual result.

Nevertheless, let not these technical deficiencies pejoratively influence the reader's opinions concerning Freud's

5 AS pp. 58-62; HPM pp. 936-937; IL pp. 300ff.

personal integrity and exemplary family life. Freud was personally an extremely honest man. His was an exceedingly kind and benevolent nature with a certain tinge of pessimism to it.

His family virtues were above reproach. He was an excellent son, and in turn an ideal father of domestically virtuous and unimpeachable character. He dutifully raised and educated his family which he loved sincerely and whose love was reciprocated.

Yet his life was seemingly a contradiction. Personally he was kind, calm, peaceful, self-possessed and charitable, yet his school, as never a school before it, occasioned one of the most vicious and tempestuous polemical battles that the modern world of science or philosophy has yet witnessed.

For some, Freud was the prophet, the voice of the Goddess, Science. For others, he was the diabolical visionary, intent solely upon the destruction of mankind. Yet had Freud himself been consulted, he would surely have replied that his sole aim was the good of mankind.

Nevertheless his teachings still remain unaccepted by the vast majority of contemporary thinkers, notwithstanding the fact that modern science and philosophy have made some use of the ideas taught by psychoanalysis. Psychopathology owes to Freud a great debt for having recognized the psychogenesis of the various neuroses.

However, among modern psychologists, psychoanalysis has always retained something of its unorthodoxy. This is due no doubt to the fact that analysis is far removed from the field of laboratory experimentation. Nevertheless, laboratory psychology itself has benefited to a certain extent of the emphasis placed by psychoanalysis upon the unconscious factors of man's life, his instincts and emotions.

George Humphrey, the psychologist of Queen's University, has described Freud's peculiar position among modern psychologist and has justly paid tribute to him in these terms:

All psychologists acknowledge the debt we owe him, in spite of the fact that some believe that he is not justified in saying that all mental processes have a definite cause, and that many claim that he has exaggerated certain parts of his theory, when he states that all dreams express a wish. A large number do not believe in his theory of the unconscious, but all admit that psychology will be different, and better, as a result of his stimulating speculations and observations. Which is, after all, the highest praise that can be given to one who calls himself a psychologist⁶.

This apparent nonacceptance of his teachings at the hands of official psychology and the ostracism which he and his followers have sustained in their struggles, Freud himself undoubtedly would consider a fitting tribute to his labours and an estimable crown for his ambitions.

6 G. Humphrey, The Story of Man's Mind, New York, The New Home Library, 1942, pp. 285-286. Nota: The author does not agree entirely with all of Doctor Humphrey's assertions, but presents them nevertheless as the opinions of one of the foremost leaders of the official psychology of our times.

PART TWO

PSYCHOANALYSIS: ITS ESSENCE

CHAPTER III

PSYCHOANALYSIS DEFINED

The science of psychology is one of the youngest of the sciences of mankind, being a product of the modern mind. One of its most noticeable characteristics is its many ramifications, presently called schools, each interconnected to a certain extent with the others, yet each distinct in its own way. Of these branches of modern psychology, psychoanalysis constitutes one of the earliest and most extensive developments.

Psychoanalysis is chiefly the result of the research and theorizing of one man, the Viennese physician, Sigmund Freud, who founded this school at the turn of the century. The principal findings and tenets of psychoanalysis were made known to the scientific and philosophical world during the first decades of the 20th Century, while psychoanalysis as a school came into its own in Vienna in 1908¹.

At the present time, psychoanalysis as a constituted body of theories and therapeutic techniques "has arrived", in the modern meaning of that term, although the length of its

1 AS p. 88; HPM p. 947.

"stay" is a highly problematical and hypothetical question.

The most characteristic of the general traits which serve to distinguish psychoanalysis from the other schools of psychology is assuredly its subject matter and the firm possession which it has established over a particular realm of psychological lore, its more instinctive, emotional and primitive aspects. This has done much to merit for psychoanalysis the name of "Depth Psychology"².

In view of the fact that psychoanalysis has succeeded in giving fairly satisfactory accounts of some of the lesser known mechanisms of man's psychic make-up, his instincts and emotions, it is no longer wise to pass it by with a mere nod of the head or a shrug of the shoulders.

When one considers the popularity of psychoanalysis, and the way in which many of its terms have slipped into the everyday vocabulary of even the ordinary man of the street, such an attitude becomes untenable. It is a fait accompli that psychoanalysis has, albeit unfortunately, become one of the major schools of modern psychology whose influence has been widespread.

Today, the following terms can be found on the lips of almost any individual, who for the most part, unless he is philosopher, scientist or littérateur, will be absolutely unaware of their origin.

2 HPM p. 958.

We often hear in ordinary conversation the words, complex, repression, inhibition, sublimation, unconscious, and the like; they and many more are to be found in all the standard English dictionaries, and now constitute a formal part of nearly every modern language.

This influence, therefore, has been extended to many fields other than scientific or philosophical, a feat which very few other schools of modern thought have been able to accomplish. What then is the nature of these teachings which have achieved such widespread notoriety among scientists and laity alike?

Psychoanalysis, as the reader must already have deduced from the preceding pages, is primarily a school of medical psychology, intimately related to both psychiatry and psychology, although of late it has come to include many other branches of human knowledge, such as physiology, anthropology, philosophy, ethnology, religion and sociology.

The universality of its extension in the realm of science and philosophy is due in great part to the fact that psychoanalysis attempts to explain not only the workings of the normal but also those of the abnormal mind. This aim is understandable only if psychoanalysis is first considered as a therapeutic method which started within medicine and psychiatry, but which finally expanded into a school of psychology³.

³ AS p. 129; HPM pp. 933, 955; IL cf. Introduction.

The decisive factor in both psychoanalytical theory and therapy is the dynamic nature which it has bestowed upon the unconscious. In order to better reach this unconscious, Freud invented various special techniques which made it possible for him to retrace the unconscious sources of the neuroses and cure them.

He applied these therapeutic techniques to normal individuals as well in an attempt to explain their behaviour as manifested by such phases of unconscious activity as forgetting, slips of the tongue, wit, dreams or phantasies which characterize man's everyday life, but which are not studied by ordinary psychology.

It was due to the research accomplished in these particular fields that psychoanalysis finally expanded into its present form. Today, psychoanalysis is not only a school of medical psychology, but a school of thought which pretends to possess the key and explanations to the very nature of man and his most intimate mysteries. Psychoanalysis claims to be able to explain man's most inherent psychic and bodily mechanisms, his desires, his urges, culture, religion, art, philosophy, science and political life⁴.

The vastness of its scope is self-evident. Psychoanalysis is not only a school of psychiatry or psychology with

⁴ CTS pp. 568, 625; IL p. 290; OP 1st, 3rd, and 5th lecture.

a particular therapeutic method. It is also a genetic theory, a method of investigation, a psychological theory, a sociological, ethnological and anthropological theory, a physiological, psychiatric and medical theory, an artistic, cultural and philosophical theory, if this be possible. In other words, psychoanalysis is a doctrine and a method, a science and a philosophy, an art and a religion⁵.

This may sound absurd to the reader and the philosopher of good sense, yet it is the absolute truth, and only psychoanalysis, among modern schools, can boast of such a universality of extension and boundaries unlimited. Yet in spite of the vastness of its structure, psychoanalysis rests upon a very few pillars.

One of these is the human mind and the explanations which psychoanalysis has given it. This present introduction to psychoanalysis is concerned chiefly with the analytical teachings of the individual mind, from which in truth have sprung all of its subsequent elaborations.

One of the most noticeable features of this theory of the human mind, one which influenced all its theoretical and practical conclusions alike, is the fact that at birth, psychoanalysis was a therapy which attempted to explain and cure the psychoneuroses.

⁵ Franz Alexander, The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis, New York, Norton, 1936, pp. 21, 28, 32, 47, 50, 131, 137, 252.

This therapy made use of many daring innovations. It was based upon a psychogenetic view of the neuroses which implied that psychic ailments should be treated by psychic methods. Freud invented two very striking psychic methods of investigation which he called free association and interpretation. Both these methods remain to this day the fundamental techniques of psychoanalytical therapeutics.

Now it soon becomes evident to anyone who is familiar with the techniques of free association (letting the mind wander freely upon certain topics until the essential clue or nucleus is found) and interpretation (finding, by use of free association, the real meaning of certain psychic phenomena, such as dreams, wit or hysterical symptoms)⁶, that they are based upon absolutely essential postulates, the acceptance of which alone makes these techniques of practical utility.

The method of free association tacitly implies acceptance of at least three basic postulates, all of theoretical nature, although not necessarily interrelated, if free association as practised by psychoanalysis is to be used as an instrument of therapy.

The first is that free associations (the psychic material born of the process of associating freely) are causally interlinked one with the other; the second, that the human psychic apparatus and personality are stratified into separate and disconnected layers; and third, that nothing is really ir-

⁶ AS pp. 72-75.

revocably forgotten.

The reader will ask why these are necessary to free association and to psychoanalysis, for he shall have noted their decidedly deterministic and evolutionary nature. The explanation is quite simple.

The first postulate is evident from the very definition of psychoanalytical free association itself. Freud invented free association to reach the psychic causes of the neuroses. At the time of treatment, these psychic causes could be none other than memories related somehow in the individual's mind with his past life. It is obvious that they could not be actual events consciously present to the patient's mind, for in this way, no neurosis could possibly develop.

Therefore, in order to reach these underlying causes, he had to at least tacitly assume that the associated ideas to which his technique gave birth, although not immediately connected with these forgotten memories, must have something to do with them. They must be causally interrelated. If not, how could the real source of trouble be reached?

This, of course, implies that psychoanalysis is essentially deterministic in its outlook on psychic phenomena. The second and third postulate of psychoanalytical therapy thoroughly round out our definition of psychoanalysis and its scope by showing that it is not only deterministic in nature but emphati-

cally evolutionary in principles.

Upon further examination of the psychoanalytical technique of free association, it becomes evident that in order to make practical use of this invention in dislodging forgotten memories and lost incidents, Freud had to believe not only in the possibility of resurrecting them, given the proper means, but also in their very existence.

How could he efficiently make use of a technique of free association if he did not assume the storing-up of lost memories in some "region" or "layer" of the human mind? This immediately implies the stratification of the human psyche and the lifelong nature of forgotten memories, for how else can it be explained that these forgotten incidents of past life remain hidden and dormant in the mind, yet fully evocable (as hypnosis and free association prove them to be)? These lost memories must then be somewhere in the mind and not irrevocably forgotten.

It is quite interesting to note that all these basic postulates of psychoanalysis and its method have become subsequently better known to scientific and philosophical circles under the various headings of psychoanalytical determinism, the psychic triad (layers in the human psychic apparatus called Id, Ego, and Super-ego) and have given birth to various theories such as repression and resistance, and above all the art of interpretation.

The immediate outcome of such a position as implied by the method of free association to both the normal and abnormal mind leads invariably to the unconscious and results in making Freud consider man's psychic life as a series of superimposed layers. These layers cover each other in such a way that the individual is not aware of the memories of the previous layer and so on with each predecessor. It is only through hypnosis and above all free association that insight can be achieved⁷.

This layer-fication of the human psychic apparatus was ultimately to lead to the psychic triad of psychoanalysis. In this way, the method of free association and the techniques of psychoanalytical therapy can be said to contain virtually the entire theory, for in them are dormant the most fundamental of analytical principles.

Already are manifest the evolutionary determinism, the psychic dynamism and the unrestricted tendency towards generalization so characteristic of psychoanalysis and from which were to spring all its subsequent theoretical developments.

From all that has been said about psychoanalysis, it is obvious that psychoanalysis is much more than a school of psychology or psychiatry. Psychoanalysis claims to be as vast

7 EI pp. 245ff; PEL p. 103.

as the unconscious of which it was born. As the unconscious is virtually unlimited in scope, so psychoanalysis claims for itself the same prerogatives. As the unconscious is the secretive and mysterious explanation to man's past, so psychoanalysis claims to possess the key to man himself for psychoanalysis holds the key to the unconscious!

CHAPTER IV

THE REALM OF THE ID

One of the most profound mysteries of this world is mankind itself, and of the mysteries of mankind, none has more intrigued the common man and the greatest thinkers alike, since the days of Saint Augustine, than that portion of our mind which is today called the unconscious.

That there exists a "region" in our mind of which we are totally unaware is a fact which has enjoyed much popularity during the past fifteen hundred years, yet it is only recently that this particular field has been re-discovered and exploited to any considerable extent.

As is usual with recent discoveries and events, reports are at times quite vague and conflicting. It is therefore to be expected, according to the customary trends of contemporary psychology, that many diverging descriptions concerning the nature and functions of the unconscious have been proclaimed and upheld.

Unfortunately, in this exposé of the nature of psychoanalysis and its principal tenets, we cannot delve into the value of these respective doctrines notwithstanding their inherent interest. Psychoanalysis alone must hold our complete attention.

Psychoanalysis arose out of the depths of human nature.

It was not born of the lofty principles of wisdom and was not weaned on such food as the intellect, the will and the higher mental processes of man. Psychoanalysis came from below; it is the psychology of the unconscious, born of the irrational tendencies of the science and philosophy of the last century.

Freud came upon the unconscious in the early stages of his career. This discovery appears to have been the logical sequence of many events and influences, chief of which were his visits to Charcot and Bernheim in France, his own work in the field of psychoneurosis, his collaboration with Breuer, and above all the general trends of the science and philosophy of his day.

Yet if he learned in the early days of his career of the existence of a part of the human mind over which man exercises no control, it is only in his later years, after extensive research in the realm of wit, dreams, and the neuroses, that he finally presented to the world his theories concerning its nature.

These appeared in the first decades of the 20th Century, commencing with the publication of Die Traumdeutung in 1900, on through the years to Das Ich und das Es which appeared in 1923 in Europe and was introduced to the English speaking world in 1927.

The genesis of Freud's interest in the unconscious was

not in the least whimsical on his part. Quite to the contrary, should the reader recall the first of Breuer's cases¹, and Freud's visits to the French psychiatrists, it readily becomes apparent that the unconscious was virtually thrust upon him as one of the essential elements of his therapeutic technique and his psychogenetic theory of the neuroses.

The Freudian unconscious is a peculiar unconscious. Its nature is quite different from that taught by most psychologists². Its name is das Es, from the German neuter pronoun meaning "it." Its name in English is the Id³.

It was first conceived of by Freud as the recipient of all the forgotten incidents which memory has not within immediate grasp; to these initial contents were subsequently added the instincts, urges, emotions and drives of man. It first appeared as an inaccessible layer or region in which were to be found man's lost memories and forgotten incidents, but soon expanded to the point of becoming the explanation and source of man's psychic life⁴.

1 Refer to page 7ff.

2 Nota: In the strictly Freudian sense, the unconscious characterizes certain dynamic processes which do not reach consciousness in spite of the fact that they are possessed of effective intensity, and which cannot be brought into conscious experience by any effort of the will or act of memory. The unconscious as described by official psychology is not in the least dynamic but rather static in nature which is the recipient of latent thoughts which do not necessarily strive to re-enter consciousness.

3 The term "Id" was introduced into English in 1924.

4 CTS pp. 747, 753; EI pp. 245-246; ID pp. 490, 510, 542; IL pp. 249, 301.

This layer-fication of the human psyche is somewhat similar to the geological stratification of the soils and sub-soils of the earth⁵. Freud was never opposed to borrowing ideas and words from the physical and physiological sciences in order to explain his own theories. His choice of metaphors causes one to think of the Id as a "place", a "storehouse" for lost memories and repressed incidents.

The Freudian unconscious is in fact a storehouse, and a very lively one indeed. It is also a heavily guarded storehouse which is protected by ever vigilant guards⁶. It is a small universe of its own, self-sufficient, domineering, arrogant, at times whimsical, and notoriously ill-bred and untamed. It is the Doctor Jekyll of man⁷.

The contents of the Id are quite disreputable, for it is the home of the instincts, urges, emotions and desires of man to which Freud has given an uncontrollable and irresistible nature. It is indeed a strange place where are congregated man's most basic processes, both physiological and psychological⁸.

Freud has given to the Id a most dynamic role to play. From the very beginning he seems to have been dominated by the idea that man's conscious life is the net result of a conflict

5 FEL p. 103.

6 EI p. 253; ID p. 480; IL p. 114.

7 CTS p. 575.

8 EI p. 262; ID p. 539; IL p. 382.

and his psychic life the outcome of an interplay of mechanisms possessed of mutually opposed forces. This internal struggle is the effect of a very dynamic psychic energy which is inherent in the Id⁹. Its name, of course, is the libido to which the next chapter has been dedicated.

This last conception of the Unconscious and its nature is evidently Herbartian¹⁰, and Drobischian¹¹. More simply described, it means that the instincts within the Id and the memories which seek haven there, continue to enjoy a life of their own whence they seek to penetrate into the conscious layer of man's mind¹².

In this respect, Freud's unconscious storehouse is a decidedly noisy place, whose inmates are gifted with strength and energy to make themselves heard. It has been said of the contents of the Id that they make a devil of a racket and pound on the walls until they are heard!

The Id, then, is that place in which are lodged the instincts and with them the repressed memories which have found their way to that abode. Since psychoanalysis maintains that the Id is the home of repressed incidents, it is only logical for us to ask of analysis why this should take place.

9 CTS pp. 610-611; ID pp. 446, 483-484, 508; IL pp. 293, 312.

10 B. Rand, Classical Psychologists, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1912, pp. 395ff (Herbart) and 432ff (Drobisch).

11 B. Rand, op. cit., pp. 432ff.

12 ID pp. 484, 539; IV p. 83; OP p. 16.

The answer to this question immediately places us in the midst of some of the most fundamental Freudian metapsychological conceptions such as the Ego, the censor, later called the Super-ego, and the dynamic mechanisms of repression and resistance.

It can be said that Freud's was an eminently lively conception of man's mind in which evolved full of life and energy the most diverse of mechanisms and in which played and at times wrought havoc the most bizarre of entities.

The Ego is usually taken to mean the psychoanalytical equivalent of consciousness characterized by the individual's awareness of his own thoughts and also of outward reality¹³. This metapsychological entity, therefore, is not too difficult to envision¹⁴.

However, the mere mentioning of a psychic censor immediately entails many difficulties and questions. The censor of what? Over what realm does he reign? What is he like and what are his functions¹⁵.

Of course, what Freud has called the endopsychic censor should not be taken to mean a little man who works somewhere in

13 EI p. 267ff; IL p. 295. Nota: The Ego, as we shall see in the chapter reserved for the psychic triad is something more than consciousness in psychoanalysis. It is that part of the Id which has become aware of reality, and it also houses the sub conscious.

14 Metapsychology has come to mean the loftiest of psychoanalytical psychological theories as embodied in the Id, Ego and Super-ego.

15 ID p. 480; IL pp. 114, 249.

our mind and pours barrels of black ink over unwarranted ideas. An anthropomorphic conception such as this would be most misleading.

Freud considers the censor as a special psychic barrier, the keeper of the threshold of consciousness, that partition which separates man's conscious life from that of which he is not wholly aware. The existence of this barrier or censor is in complete logical harmony with his theories of energetic dynamism, because if the instincts of the Id and repressed memories are to be barred from consciousness, they can be kept in leash only by some opposing force. This force is the censor, a sort of intellectual watch dog¹⁶.

This censorship leaves us in the presence of two powers at play, the one which bars entrance of lost memories from consciousness, the other which compelled their disappearance. The name of the former is resistance, of the latter, repression.

Repression is that curious mechanism which makes memories disappear from consciousness¹⁷. In psychoanalytical therapy, therefore, repression is of the utmost importance, for without this disappearance of traumatic incidents, its entire theoretical structure of the neuroses crumbles to the ground¹⁸. In psychoanalysis, the neuroses are generically held to be the

¹⁶ In later years the censor was identified with the Super-ego, one of whose functions is endopsychic censorship. The Super-ego, as we shall see in the chapter reserved for the psychic triad, is the critic of the Ego (consciousness), the barrier of the Id-drives (instincts, urges and repressed material) and is also a sort of unconscious conscience (seat of morality).

¹⁷ IL pp. 248ff.

¹⁸ HPM p. 939; IL pp. 297, 303.

exclusive result of repressed incidents of traumatic nature¹⁹

In itself, repression is not entirely new nor is it originally Freudian, in spite of the Viennese doctor's assertions to the contrary. Various philosophers had mentioned the existence of this peculiar phenomenon many years before Freud. The most noteworthy anticipations are those of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

Friedrich Nietzsche, in Jenseits von Gut und Bösen, speaks of repression in these terms. "I did that", says my memory. "I could not have done that", says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually -- the memory yields²⁰." For Nietzsche, repression is the result of a conflict between memory and pride. In psychoanalysis, it is of interest to note, repression and even forgetting is also the outcome of a struggle, a conflict between forces of a very different nature, however, in which is involved the entire psychic apparatus that Freud has given man.

Arthur Schopenhauer, the great pessimist of Dantzig, also mentioned the phenomenon of repression many years before Freud's birth. When the passage in Schopenhauer was called to Freud's attention by one of his disciples, Rank, Freud persisted in maintaining the absolute originality of his findings in spite of the anticipation²¹.

19 HPM p. 939; IL p. 232; OP p. 7.

20 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bösen, 68th Apophthegm and Interlude.

21 HPM p. 939.

The psychoanalytical phenomenon of repression, or voluntary forgetting, takes place when consciousness itself, (the Ego), ejects into the unconscious (the Id) some event or memory of traumatic nature, and with the aid of the censor (the Superego) keeps this potential source of disagreeableness a prisoner in the Id²².

It is a commonly accepted fact that we tend to forget more rapidly than usual those events which have been unpleasant, whereas the more agreeable memories often linger in our mind for years. However, it is doubtful whether the Freudian explanations of repression and forgetting in general, with their interplay of mechanisms and entities, really objectively solve the problem.

In the light of such modern discoveries as retroactive inhibition and its effects upon learning and retention, it becomes improbable that Freud's theories of "forgetting because we want to" are really objective. Forgetting is evidently more complex than a simple wish to forget, or an interplay of subjective entities²³.

Nevertheless, in psychoanalysis, this interplay of mechanisms and entities by which the Ego represses traumatic incidents by obliging them to seek refuge in the Id, where they are kept under constant vigilance, is an absolute doctrinal and therapeutic necessity.

22 ID p. 532; IL p. 249ff; PEL p. 39.

23 ID pp. 470-485; PEL pp. 37, 44, 95-96.

Once lodged in the Id, these apparently dormant memories become really dangerous, because of the energy inherent in them. Because of this energy and dynamism, they immediately contrive to make their presence felt in devious ways, because the censor impedes their direct passage into consciousness.

One of the more drastic ways which these repressed events lodged in the Id make their presence felt is through the appearance of neurotic symptoms. If this be true, neurosis is therefore a compromise solution of an inner conflict between the Id and the Ego, with the help of the censor, or also the indirect method of expression of a repressed urge or incident.

This indirectness of expression is due to the influence of the psychic censor, whose duty it is to see that no direct entrance is made into consciousness by traumatic incidents, instinctive urges or drives of which the Id is the haven. The Id, because of this, has been described by Freud as a veritable Hell which seeks to dominate the Ego by every means at its disposal²⁴.

This places man in front of a most unpleasant and trying alternative: either repression and neurosis, or no repression and continual mental stress. The situation however is not untenable, for it is possible to reach the repressed material by free association, and also to divert the psychic energy towards normal solutions. This occurs during the process of sublimation

24 EI p. 245; ID p. 480; IL pp. 119-120, 303-305.

by which the instinctual energy of the Id and the Id-drives are diverted towards socially acceptable ends²⁵.

By letting the patient's mind wander freely about its domain, through free association, it becomes possible to locate the source of trouble lodged in the Id, for, according to Freud, a chain of associated ideas pertaining to a symptom must invariably lead back to the cause of the mental disorder itself²⁶.

But a curious phenomenon arises during the process of free association, as we told. The chain of associations is often broken. The patient, while wandering from one idea to another, one event to a second, suddenly stops. His mind is a blank. He evidently cannot or will not proceed.

Upon the most urgent insistence of the analyst, the patient strives to continue. He attempts to fill the blank in his mind. With much effort he finally succeeds in doing so, bringing to light associated ideas and memories of a highly disagreeable nature. He has apparently broken down a barrier, somewhere in his mind.

This peculiar phenomenon is called resistance in psycho-analysis²⁷. It has been called resistance, perhaps for want of a better term, but undoubtedly because of the censor-barrier, the logical cause of the resistance for Freud.

25 Nota: In the chapter Sex and Sublimation, we treat more fully of sublimation and its role.

26 IL p. 21; EL p. 35, and above all pp. 150ff.

27 EI p. 246; IL pp. 243ff; OP pp. 14, 18.

Resistance is of the utmost importance to analysis. The entire Freudian method of therapeutics is aimed at breaking down this inner barrier of which the patient is totally unaware, in spite of his conscious efforts to continue associating ideas²⁸. Resistance is a totally unconscious phenomenon. The patient is aware only of its effects, i.e. the broken chain of associations and the blankness of his mind.

Psychoanalytical resistance is a most difficult phenomenon to explain. All that is visible is the fact that the patient has stopped talking, because for some reason or other his chain of free associations has been broken.

The ordinary observer would simply say that the patient has stopped associating, or that an apparent loss of memory has taken place. Psychoanalysis, however, has postulated the existence of an actively resisting mechanism unconsciously impeding the progress of a chain of associations which otherwise would have caused an unpleasant event to emerge into consciousness.

This entire process Freud has termed a fact²⁹. However, resistance with its interplay of mechanisms and entities is not the obvious fact Freud pretends it to be. The only tangible fact is the broken chain of associations and the patient's silence. All the rest, unconscious urges of repressed psychic material lodged in the Id, censorship and barrier, psychic dyna-

28 EI p. 252; HMP p. 939; IL p. 243.

29 HPM p. 939. "The facts of transference and resistance."

mism, and psychic triad, is really nothing more than theory, or at best a hypothesis the plausibility of which is far from being an obvious "fact" or turgid truth.

Nevertheless repression and resistance constitute two of the basic pillars upon which rest psychoanalytical therapy and its underlying theories. Without these unconscious mechanisms, psychoanalysis as a method would not exist and as a theory would be greatly incapacitated. The entire metapsychological structure of psychoanalysis would have to be revised and in particular the dynamism inherent in the Id.

There is more to repression and resistance than appears at first sight, for it can quite pertinently be asked whence comes the energy which permits this unconscious barrier or censor to operate and whence does the repressed idea or incident derive its urges to re-enter consciousness?

For Freud, as for anyone who considers man in such a grossly material way, there can be but one answer, the instincts and instinctive dynamism. As psychoanalytical therapy was found to lean heavily upon repression and resistance, so its entire structure of man's psychic life will be found to rest upon instinctive dynamism, sex and sublimation.

The realm of the Id was seen to band together many of the most important Freudian entities and mechanisms. Of the Id were born psychoanalytical therapy, repression and resistance.

Above all, the Id is the home of the instincts out of which spring all man's energy and accomplishments. The Id is therefore the key to psychoanalysis, for it opens the door that leads down most intricate passes and defiles to the very heart of psychoanalytical theory.

It is with regret that the author acknowledges the introductory briefness with which the roles of the censor and the Id and Ego were here depicted. This procedure is justifiable only in the light that both Id and Ego, along with the Super-ego, the instincts, the dream-world and sex in psychoanalysis will be reviewed presently.

CHAPTER V

SEX AND SUBLIMATION

It is of the Id that the Freudian man is born. This may seem strange, but it is none the less true, for the Id alone accompanies the child into this world as it crosses the threshold of life and it is upon the Id that are subsequently built man's psychic¹ life and his moral principles.

The Freudian child makes its appearance in this world, possessed of an Id, replete with irresistible instincts, urges and drives of a grossly materialistic and uncontrollable nature. Out of this polymorphous mass of matter, the child must build his spirit, as strange and contradictory as this may sound to the ears of the philosopher of good sense.

Perhaps for this reason alone, if for no other, psychoanalysis has been called the Psychology of the Depths. In direct contrast to its teachings stand those of nearly all the more orthodox schools of modern psychology, which in spite of many shortcomings still insist upon treating man as man, and not as brute.

In psychoanalysis, the logical and exclusive seat of

1 Nota: The term psychic, in psychoanalysis, has a much broader and more comprehensive meaning than in ordinary psychology. In psychoanalysis, psychic has come to include all the psychic activities of man, plus all the bodily functions and physiological processes which psychoanalysis claims to be not only related to, but essentially concomitant with human psychic activity itself, such as the physiological organism of man, the instincts, and of course, man's dynamic instinctual energy. This extension of the term psychic into the physiological realm of man is due to the Freudian Id (home of the instincts) and the concepts of sublimation, sex and the libido which we are about to study.

the instincts is the Id². The Id alone accompanies the child into this world. The Freudian child comes into this world as a tiny bundle of urges intent only upon pleasure and self-gratification³.

Of course, this little bundle of instincts is not aware of itself nor its activity. Being of the Id, its instincts remain totally unperceived by consciousness, the advent of which takes place only much later⁴.

We soon find the instincts and urges with which the Freudian child is born making themselves manifest. The child, through its instinctive impulses, seeks nothing more than the satisfaction of its immediate wants and capricious whims, and we read in psychoanalytical writings that this first period of life, in which the instincts appear in pure form, is dominated exclusively by the "pleasure principle"⁵.

The pleasure principle (lustprinzips) is really nothing more than its name implies. It embodies what, for Freud, is the irresistible instinctual impulse to gratification and pleasure, egotistic happiness and self-indulgence, characteristic of the Freudian man throughout his entire life, but most evident in the child.

2 IL pp. 301, 344; IV p. 85.

3 EPP p. 193; IL p. 299.

4 EI pp. 248ff.

5 EPP p. 163; IL p. 299.

Of course, the categorical imperative of the pleasure principle and the irresistible dictates of the instinctual Id-drives cannot continue unabated throughout the entire life. It soon becomes necessary to curb these impulses and whims, because of various environmental influences, contact with the desires of other beings and reality in general, all of which make necessary the adaptation of the instincts to environment.

This process of instinctual adaptation to reality is called acceptance of the "principle of reality" to which the individual must ultimately submit if he wishes to lead a normal life⁶.

It is important to note that in this initial adaptation of the egotistic instinctive urges to the forces of environment, Freud never once appeals to the existence of higher motives such as intellectual insight and judgment, charity, or self-sacrifice. Quite to the contrary, this adaptation appears as unpleasant, virtually thrust upon the wayward instincts by environment. Never once is there an appeal to reason⁷.

Adaptation of the instincts to the reality principle, therefore, does not change their nature in the least. They remain as tyrannical and irresistible as before, only their freedom of action and manifestation has been hampered. They must seek satisfaction by means other than direct indulgence.

6 BPF p. 164; IL p. 299.

7 BPF p. 165.

Therefore, by adaptation to reality, nothing is essentially changed in the basic attitude of the individual towards pleasure and self-gratification. He will continue to seek personal satisfaction by every means at his disposal. This is of the utmost importance when we stop to consider the fact that the neuroses, in psychoanalysis, are held to be the results of devious manners of instinctive gratification, as are wit, dreams, phantasies and the like.

The end, pleasure, thus remains the same, only the means of satisfaction differ⁸. In this light, the principle of reality appears essentially egotistic inasmuch as it means nothing more than the enforced adaptation of the instincts to environment. Yet in spite of this restriction, psychoanalysis maintains that the instincts invariably gratify themselves, albeit by indirect means.

Psychoanalytical instincts are therefore essentially hedonistic, exclusively egotistic and not in the least subject to personal conscious voluntary control but unwillingly adapted to environment. Upon further perusal of psychoanalytical teachings, we find that these instincts appear to be solely physiological in nature, being of the Id; and that they directly exclude the existence of intellectual habits or potentialities in man⁹.

⁸ BFP p. 163; IL pp. 298, 307.

⁹ IL p. 277; IV p. 81; TT p. 908; A.A. Brill, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

Moreover, the Freudian instincts are absolutely "amoral", not in the least subject to the laws of morality, for they precede morality and are the basis of morality. Out of the instincts and their drives is born the Super-ego¹⁰. The Super-ego is the essence of psychoanalytical morality. Both it, and the instincts are unconscious. In this sense, the instincts are assuredly amoral. This may sound absurd, but it is none the less orthodox analytical doctrine.

The amorality of the instincts in psychoanalysis holds a secondary rank compared to that of instinctive dynamism. The instincts as described by psychoanalysis are not only irresistible, and tyrannical, but are also possessed of a definite cycle of activity, marked by periods of accumulation of energy, inevitable discharge, and rest¹¹.

The cycle of their activity is so arranged as to favour instinctual explosion in every way possible. During the quieter phases (latent) characterized by instinctual abstinence, energy constantly accumulates. During the final stages of this period, everything that is associated with the ends of the instincts, predominantly sexual, takes on a particular tinge which further favours the accumulation of energy. At this stage even "neutral" objects may serve to start the mechanism of instinctual discharge.

Once aroused, instinctual tension tends to increase in

¹⁰ EI pp. 253ff. Of this topic the next chapter treats extensively.

¹¹ CTS p. 610; ID p. 508; IL pp. 53, 238, 301.

vehemence until the accumulated energy can no longer be held back, a "discharge" becoming inevitable. This discharge takes place through indulgence in the instinctual urge¹².

We read in Freud that delay is possible, at times desirable, for increased pleasure may be obtained by this process..., but that total denial is absolutely impossible¹³. This is a hedonistic and materialistic doctrine of the instincts if ever there was one. It implies the complete triumph of matter and the absolute hegemony of the physiological in man.

It is therefore not surprising to hear that the instincts never become conscious. Being of the Id, they are totally unconscious. The instincts of psychoanalysis are the direct negation of consciousness. The individual whose instincts are aroused is conscious only of the end which he wishes to achieve (the end to which the instincts themselves are destined) and the image which the instinctual urges present to consciousness (after by-passing in this way the vigilance of the censor) in order to entice him. The dynamic energy of the instincts themselves remains unconscious, as does its activity prior to indulgence¹⁴.

This unconscious irresistible organization of interior psychic instinctual activity in man often places him in front of

12 IL pp. 302, 307, 335; IV pp. 81, 83.

13 IL pp. 265, 268, 299.

14 ID pp. 301, 303, 312; IV pp. 84-85.

most trying dilemmas. Environment at times might be strong enough to dictate the enforcement of a delay or a complete momentary denial, whereas their very nature implies that the instincts cannot be forever denied satisfaction and self-gratification¹⁵.

How then can a solution be found if serious trouble is to be avoided? There are two solutions offered by psychoanalysis, one normal, the other abnormal.

We are already familiar with the abnormal solution which is embodied in repression, the cause or at least one of the causes of neurosis. Repression and the instincts are very intimately related, for the instincts constitute much of the repressed material lodged in the Id.

The instincts are one of the causes of repression inasmuch as they place the Ego (consciousness) in an impasse from which it tries to escape. This impasse is environment on the one hand which opposes instinctual indulgence, and the instincts themselves on the other. In this way, the Ego is the mediator between the Id and environment. If the Id-drives become too powerful, of necessity the Ego must repress them in order not to come into conflict with environment. That is the story of repression now set into its real context¹⁶.

Repression is thus the abnormal and unsatisfactory solution to the duel between Id and environment. What is the more

15 IL p. 312.

16 EI p. 246; IL p. 249.

satisfactory answer to the problem? The proper answer, the only answer that a Freudian will give or can give, is sublimation.

By sublimation, the problems of the Ego, caught between the Id-drives and environment, are afforded a happy solution. Sublimation is a strange phenomenon. It is essentially a trick. It is the trick by which the instincts manage to achieve satisfaction in spite of consciousness, the censor, and environment. It is a masterful piece of artifice and must surely have been very dear to Freud.

The process of sublimation consists in substituting for the original hedonistic and egotistic end of an instinct, another, more readily acceptable to the Ego, the Super-ego and environment. Sublimation is thus essentially a substitution, a diversion¹⁷.

Sublimation is the result of a compromise-solution by which the energy generated by the instincts (called cathexis, chief of which is the libido, or the libidinal urges¹⁸) is diverted from its proper instinctual end and applied to another which is more suitable to environment.

In this way, the instincts achieve satisfaction by indirect means which do not come into conflict with either the Ego or environment. To the contrary, they are set to work for the

17 CTS pp. 568, 625-626; IL p. 290; IV p. 86.

18 EI pp. 255, 264-265; ID pp. 493; OP p. 30.

welfare of both, because the ends to which the original instinctive urges are deflected are embodied in the arts, sciences, religion, philosophy and culture of man, or which the libidinal impulses are the cause and driving force.

Let not the reader be surprised, for this conclusion is of the severest logical rigidity. It is the only possible outcome of any theory which gives to the instincts such a strategic position in man's psychic and bodily structure.

Through sublimation, the war between the instincts, the Ego and environment (which here includes morality and conscience), is solved by permitting the instinctual energy to be expressed in channels acceptable to society. This is done without any stress, tension or neurotic symptoms.

Sublimation, as a theory, is quite difficult to accept for reasons which shall soon be seen; but as a concrete phenomenon it becomes a rare oddity. This is due to the fact that it is of recognized difficulty to sublimate hunger or thirst, actual reproductive urges or deficient sex glands. In this respect it is most widely used in the sense that an individual can forego some specific gratification, provided he can find another outlet for his pent-up instinctual tensions. This outlet will have to afford him equal satisfaction¹⁹.

19 G.W.Allport, Personality, a Psychological Interpretation, New York, Henry Holt, 1937, p. 185. Nota: This above-mentioned practical application is of some use in Differential Psychology, but it should be remembered that it is no longer psychoanalytical sublimation in pure form.

These practical aspects of sublimation are quite far removed from the purely theoretical concept of unconscious instinctual energy being deflected towards socially acceptable channels. It should therefore be noted that sublimation is essentially a theory in psychoanalysis.

This peculiar theory is not without shortcomings. In itself, it sins primarily against one of the first principles of metaphysics, that of proper portion and relation between cause and effect. This is self-evident because it makes of the instincts, which are singular, material and physiological in nature, the source and cause of the arts, sciences, culture and philosophy of man, all of which are highly intellectual and psychological in nature.

Sublimation, however, is not only philosophically incomplete, it is also scientifically incomplete. The mature normal personality is a far more complex structure than merely the product of a redirected instinctual urge, an unallowable wish, which have been diverted to socially acceptable channels²⁰.

In spite of these deficiencies, sublimation of the instincts has remained one of the basic elements of the Freudian theory. It has not been judged worthy of revision or correction by Freud who preferred to extend its influence and scope rather than limit its applications. This he felt necessary because he deemed it fit to make of sublimation the outlet

20 G.W.Allport, loc. cit.,

of unspent libidinal energy whose breadth and importance he was continually expanding.

The principal source of sublimated instinctual energy and impulses is sex, or the libido. In psychoanalysis, sex, and the energy which this particular instinct develops, called the libido, do not appear as an isolated instinct such as hunger or thirst. They are linked most intimately with all of the instincts of man, of which they are the dominant feature²¹.

Moreover, sex in psychoanalysis has come to mean love in all its manifestations; it has invaded childhood and of course the loftiest of man's intellectual productions by way of sublimation²².

To the sexual group of instincts, Freud has given the name "libido", as opposed to other instincts called instincts of the Ego (primarily destined to the conservation of the Ego). Upon this first antagonistic instinctual dichotomy of Ego and libido, Freud further elaborated by designating the instincts of the libido as eros, the life instincts, to which he opposed Thanatos, the death instinct²³.

21 CTS pp. 553, 610ff; IL pp. 263, 345. Nota: It is unwise to consider psychoanalysis and sex as univocally identified. However, the prominent part played by sex on the stage of psychoanalysis has certainly warranted its reputation of prima donna. All told, Freud and the analysts have written more about sex than all of the other schools of modern psychology and philosophy combined.

22 OP p. 33.

23 BPP pp. 181ff; EI p. 261; IL p. 344; IV p. 85.

Eros and libido therefore mean sex in the most comprehensive scope of the term, and not merely sex as it is usually found in physiology, biology, reproduction and things kindred; Eros and the libido, in psychoanalysis, have the universality enjoyed by being in Thomistic metaphysics.

Moreover, the sexual instincts, those of the libido, are that group which seeks gratification in objects outside the organism itself. Those of the Ego are directly related to the individual. It is for this reason, undoubtedly, that all persons and things other than the individual himself or herself are known in psychoanalysis as "object-libido"²⁴.

The libido is thus the master-key of the universe within and without man inasmuch as it refers to every aim, end and object which man can achieve. However, it is really much more than this in reality. The libido is that energy which makes, which drives man to seek the aims, ends, and objects to be achieved, because it is libidinal energy which is sublimated to the exclusion of the less dynamic Ego instincts.

This position implies directly that psychoanalysis considers all interest and love for outward objects, either animate or inanimate, as decidedly sexual in nature, and it is to this attitude, no doubt, that is due the rather salacious reputation that psychoanalysis enjoys in groups both scientific

24 CTS p. 625; IL pp. 350, 380.

and plebeian.

This psychoanalytical concept of psychosexuality is therefore meant to cover every aspect of man's life. It is a sort of diffused energy which permeates the entire individual and is to be found in his every action, whether psychic or physiological inasmuch as it has relations with both. Of course, it is most manifest in the sexual phases and processes themselves, but its influence can also be felt in the arts and sciences.

The libido, as conceived by psychoanalysis, can best be explained by listening to Freud himself:

The concept of libido is a force of variable quantity by which processes and transformations in the spheres of sexual excitement can be measured. We thus formulate for ourselves the concept of libido-quantum, the psychic representative of which we designate as the ego-libido. But this ego-libido can only become conveniently accessible to psychoanalytic study if its psychic energy is invested or occupied in sexual objects; that is, if it becomes object-libido. We can see it then as it concentrates and fixes itself on objects, or as it leaves those objects and passes over to other, from which position it directs the individual's sexual activity.

These lines were written when the libido-theory was first proposed to the scientific world in 1905. Freud has not found it fit to make any alterations during the course of the years²⁵.

Brill, the American analyst, has commented upon this paragraph in the following terms:

In psychoanalysis libido signifies that quantitatively changeable and not at present measurable energy of the sex-

25 CTS p. 610.

ual instinct which is usually directed to an outside object. It comprises all those impulses which deal with love in the broad sense. Its main component is sexual love; and sexual union is its aim; but it also includes self-love, love for parents and children, friendship, attachments to concrete objects, and even devotion to abstract ideas²⁶.

As we can now readily see, the libido and libidinal energy are meant to cover a scale of human activities whose very vastness is astounding. Not only does it govern the life of the adult, his friendship, his attachments and even his devotion to abstract ideas, but also invades the realm of childhood. This last aspect of the libido is called infantile sexuality in psychoanalysis²⁷.

Infantile sexuality in psychoanalysis is a curious phenomenon which must be studied in the light of the libido, otherwise it becomes nonsensical. It is based upon one of the aims of the libido which is destined to afford pleasure, in particular, sexual pleasure. In psychoanalysis, there is but one pleasure, sexual pleasure.

In this respect, all infantile activities which afford pleasure, such as thumb-sucking, all sucking in general, rubbing, and the like, are ascribed as sexual. Furthermore, in psychoanalysis, the various zones linked with such activities are called erogenous zones with which sexual pleasure in the child is intimately linked. In this way are accounted for such

26 A.A.Brill, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

27 CTS p. 580ff.

terms and zones as oral, urethral and anal²⁸.

Freud affirms that the child has a full sexual development of its own which gives rise to sexual pleasures analogous with those of the adult. Freud also considers the child a polymorphous pervert who is in fact more subjected to the urges of sex than adults, because in childhood the pleasure principle is not yet curbed by or adapted to reality²⁹.

However, the psychoanalytical theories concerning infantile sexuality as such are not absolutely necessary to comprehension of the general teachings of Freudism. Infantile sexuality appears more as a result of Freud's general concept of psychosexuality than as a distinct topic in itself. It is but a phase of the libido.

En passant, though, one is tempted to put forth the question that if all libidinal energy is destined to objects outside the individual, and if its chief aim is sexual union, how then can infantile sexuality be libidinal? Each and every one of the activities described by Freud as being sexual; each and every one of the zones to which are ascribed erogenous childhood pleasures, either oral, anal, or urethral, are within the organism of the child itself. It is a curious contradiction which Freud never bothered to explain.

However, to return to the instincts and the libido, it is evident, in view of the overwhelming importance of the libido

28 CTS PP. 585, 589, 591.

29 CTS p. 592; IL p. 261.

and the all-embracing role of psychosexuality in analysis there is not much left for the instincts of the Ego or the death instinct to do.

Freud himself never showed much interest in the Ego-instincts stating merely that they are the non-sexual instincts, less important than those of the libido³⁰. In view of the secondary role which the Ego-instincts are allotted in analysis, they do not appear as essential to general comprehension of the psychoanalytical instinctual teachings themselves.

Nor does the instinct of death, which Freud later opposed to Eros (the amalgamation of all the life-giving instincts, therefore sex and the libido included). The death instinct implies nothing more than its name. It means that man is urged to death much in the same way he is driven to a meal when hungry. In psychoanalysis, man is a being destined to die, not because of an accident, nor because of cell-deficiency or atrophy, nor because of the essential mortality of created matter, but because of an unconscious instinctual striving which drives him to it³¹.

Another item of passing interest to the theoretician intent upon a general outline of psychoanalysis, but of major importance to the therapist, is the development of the libido throughout life³².

The libido-development of man follows a definite trend

30 IL p. 294.

31 BFP pp. 183, 185.

32 IL p. 274.

throughout life. In childhood it is characterized by such activities as lead to auto-eroticism, followed by a latent or dormant period between childhood and puberty. It finally emerges from puberty as the ruler of the entire life of the adult, both physiological and psychological.

This development of the libido, however, adds nothing to the basic theories of psychoanalysis relative to the drives and instincts of man. It serves only to illustrate how soon the Freudian child becomes the slave of sex.

The all-importance of psychosexuality in analysis becomes more revealing when we consider that it is essentially libidinal energy which is sublimated. In this respect, the concept of sublimation now appears in its true context as the result of diverted libidinal energy whose original aim (procreation, sexual union or indulgence) has been replaced by some other end or object which is used as a means of gratification. Sublimation is therefore libidinal energy deflected into socially acceptable channels.

This diversion of libidinal energy is due to the presence of the censor, the Super-ego. In this respect, the Super-ego now appears as the key, or at least one of the keys to human activity in its role as master of the sexual Id-drives.

To the vigilance of the Super-ego, the vehemence of the Id, and the sternness of reality is due the following topic

which is most intimately linked with sex in psychoanalysis. This topic is symbolization and symbols which in psychoanalysis have come to mean images and objects which represent in vast and at times astounding majority sexual urges and activities.

Freudian symbolization enjoys much notoriety today, due mainly to its salaciousness. It is chiefly the result of his therapeutic method³³, inasmuch as the great length of psychoanalytical treatment by way of free association made necessary the finding of ways to attack the unconscious indirectly. It is thus that symbols, and their immediate objects dream and wit, have found their way into psychoanalysis.

However, it must be remembered that symbolization is not only the result of analytical therapeutics. It is also the outcome of much theory among which sex and the libido rank high, for it is only in the light of his sexual teachings that Freud could have given to his symbols almost exclusively sexual scope and importance³⁴.

It is regrettable that here we must return to notions mentioned in preceding chapters and unfortunately anticipate others which are to be explained in the following, but Freud's system is such as to discourage any successfully logical or chronological attempt of portrayal.

33 NOTA: In this chapter we shall not consider the therapeutic use and elaboration of symbols in psychoanalysis. This has been reserved for our chapter on psychoanalytical therapy (Chapter VII). Here, we limit our study to symbolization in its chief manifestation, rather its more common manifestation, dreams.

34 ID pp. 368ff.

Freud has divided the human psychic apparatus into layers each of which has its proper functions. The first is the Id which contains the instincts and repressed material; the second is the Ego which is consciousness and thus related to the environment; the third is the Super-ego, the censor and keeper of the threshold of consciousness. These are the primary functions of the psychic triad³⁵.

It becomes evident, in view of these functions, that if the instincts of the Id are to present themselves to the Ego, consciousness, in order to obtain self-gratification, they must do so in suitable attire, otherwise they will be banished by the Super-ego, or repressed by the Ego itself. Because of this interplay of mechanisms, the existence of symbols now becomes obvious in psychoanalysis. Symbols are the raiment that the Id-drives assume in order to by-pass the censor³⁶;

It is during the transit of the unallowable instinctive urges over the threshold of consciousness that symbolization takes place. It is here that the censor reigns supreme. His task is to see that the Ego shall be visited only by the most proper of instincts clothed in acceptable garments. The censor therefore holds the keys to symbols, repression, dreams and wit alike.

³⁵ Nota: An entire chapter has been allotted to the psychic triad and its functions (Chap. VI).

³⁶ ID pp. 474, 480.

It so happens, however, that the vigilance of the censor is not always whole-hearted. It sometimes relaxes, perhaps in order to recuperate its forces. This relaxation occurs mostly during sleep, but sometimes during wakened life³⁷. It is then that the instincts lead the gay life³⁸.

Ordinarily, the Super-ego automatically prevents any unacceptable instinctive drive or illicit idea from penetrating directly into consciousness without the individual being in the least aware of this process of elimination. During sleep, however, the instincts rouse themselves and make their presence felt under the disguise of dreams by which they by-pass censorship.

Seeing that during sleep censorship is not abolished completely, but still exercises some of its prerogatives, dreams are therefore really nothing more than the distorted results of less rigidly censored desires which have been frustrated during waking life³⁹.

Should these frustrated desires enter consciousness in their true light, they would renew the possibility of conflict

³⁷ Nota: The appearance of wit, which in psychoanalysis is essentially an emotional discharge, takes place when censorship is momentarily relaxed during wakened life. Freud describes au long et au large the psychogenesis of wit in the fourth chapter of Wit and its Relations to the Unconscious.

³⁸ ID pp. 480, 510.

³⁹ BFP p. 182; GPE p. 232; OP pp. 22-23.

and dilemma which would lead to neurosis. In view of this, the instincts have to make their entrance into consciousness, because of slackened yet vigilant censorship, in the guise of symbols, distorted visual images or dreams, which in some weird way represent the original instinctual impulses that crave satisfaction because of their essentially dynamic nature.

That is the psychoanalytical story of the origin of dreams in man. Dreams are therefore unrealized, frustrated instinctual urges or wishes of everyday life which achieve satisfaction in symbolic form⁴⁰.

The basic material of the dream, the instinctive urges, is therefore entirely unconscious⁴¹. It appears in consciousness in dream form, as the lightning-like series of absurd visual images which Freud has called symbols. This had led Freud to believe that the dream is really not the dream, but only the result of the dream!

In other words, the dream, or that which the dreamer witnesses during sleep is the "manifest" phase of the dream, its "manifest contents", whereas the real cause of the series of visual images is to be found in the unconscious, for the unconscious houses the "latent content", the real meaning of the dream which has become veiled in its manifest content to by-pass the Super-ego, and its censorship. The "manifest" con-

40 ID pp. 319ff.

41 ID pp. 238ff, 501.

tent of the dream is therefore nothing more than the symbol of the latent content which is to be found on the other side of the threshold which separates the Ego from the Id⁴².

In the light of this theory, if one succeeds in unveiling the meaning of the manifest content of the dream, one holds not only the key to the meaning of dreams themselves, but above all to the entire structure of the unconscious. By interpreting these dream images (symbols), one lays the Id open to inspection. For this reason, Freud has called dreams and their symbolic contents, the via regia which leads to the unconscious⁴³.

All this, however, is one of the most beautiful logical fallacies which Freud ever constructed. His theories are the most blatant petitio principii yet erected by modern science. This is obvious for how could Freud expect to discover anything in dreams which his doctrines of sex, the psychic triad and instinctive dynamism had not already put there and made necessary?

Dream symbols and the manifest dream contents are nothing more than the inevitable result of a pre-established theoretical idea of psychic censorship, whereas the distinction between both manifest and latent dream contents is but the logical outcome of a preconceived belief in the layer-fication of the human psyche. Not one of these psychoanalytical premises is an obvious fact; rather, each is at best a mere hypothetical assumption.

⁴² EI p. 246; GPE p. 218; ID pp. 319ff; IL pp. 96ff; TT p. 880.

⁴³ ID p. 540.

Freud has done nothing more than inject into the dream world many of his most basic theories concerning man's psychic life and then proclaim that dreams are not only in conformity with his theories but also prove them to be true!

Nevertheless Freud set out to interpret the meaning of the manifest content of the dream in view of reaching the latent meaning (dream thought) and cause of the manifested images. The method he used for this purpose was free association, applied to the manifest content of the dream.

Freud was not deterred by the fact that free association was primarily destined to discover ideas and memories which had disappeared from consciousness through repression; nor was he bothered by the thought that free association was a therapeutic instrument used exclusively with his neurotic patients. In spite of these obstacles, he applied his technique to dreams which are normal phenomena in which nothing has been really forgotten.

Applying free association to the manifest content of the dream, he succeeded in dislodging many unconscious facts, urges and ideas which he at once assumed to be associated with the latent content of the dream. However, upon linking this material uncovered by association with the manifest dream itself, he soon found that it was meaningless in itself. It had to be interpreted, for in his opinion there existed no obvious

connection between the two as far as significance was concerned⁴⁴.

He set out interpreting the significance of both the dream images and the dislodged unconscious ideas. From his extensive research in this field he concluded that dreaming of certain specific objects or activities (in the manifest content of the dream) invariably meant that corresponding desires in the Id, which had been frustrated, were now being fulfilled; and that moreover each object of the manifest dream content symbolized a corresponding object in the Id.

Curiously enough, the vast majority of these manifest dream images and objects of symbolic nature which he "interpreted" were taken to signify sexual processes! Thus if one dreamt of going to the dentist in order to have a tooth extracted, this manifest content of the dream was taken to mean, rather was "interpreted" as being castrative in significance, whereas if one dreamt of being asleep in a room, it was taken to signify a wish to sleep with a woman, a room being interpreted as the symbolic manifestation of a woman and the onirocritical equivalent of the fair sex in the dream world⁴⁵.

In this light, the manifest dream contents or symbols are essentially wish-fulfilments of frustrated instinctual urges of everyday life which have had to be foregone because of enviro-

44 ID p. 370.

45 ID pp. 371, 388n.

onmental factors⁴⁶. It is not surprising to find that the wish-fulfilments of the Freudian dream are of an almost exclusively sexual nature, just as were the manifest dream symbols and images. Therefore both manifest and latent dream contents now appear as phases of sex and the libido⁴⁷.

Furthermore, because of the dynamism of the libidinal urges and the force of censorship, it is equally logical to hear that the more absurd the manifest content of the dream is (having been more highly subjected to censorship) the more meaningful to analysis it really is, for its absurdity can vary only in proportion with the rigidity of censorship⁴⁸.

In the early years of psychoanalytic research, Freud was quite intransigent about dreams being exclusively wish-fulfilments⁴⁹. In later years, however, he admitted that fear must also be taken into account in the dream work (inasmuch as the repetition-compulsion or the automatism of repetition is a tacit acknowledgement of the presence of fear in dreams). Fear and the repetition-compulsion became necessary to explain various nightmares (which he first attempted to explain as wish-fulfilments) and the dreams of neurotic patients who incessantly repeat the traumatic scenes or incidents which led to the onset of their ailments⁵⁰.

46 IL pp. 107-113.

47 ID pp. 497ff.

48 AS p. 81; ID pp. 427-428, 480; OP pp. 22-25.

49 ID pp. 208-216.

50 BIP pp. 180-181.

This latter addition to his theories (repetition-compulsion) partially bridges the gap which separates his theories concerning the nature of the dream from the commonly accepted ideas⁵¹, which admit of the possibility of dreams arising out of extraneous stimuli, internal sensations, fear, wishes or other emotional behaviour, but which are opposed to reducing the dream to a common denominator such as the Freudian wish-fulfilment. In the estimation of modern psychology, the psychic life of man, and in particular the dream world, is far too complex to be reduced to one simple factor.

The reader must now be asking himself why the author has taken such pains in lengthily portraying the psychoanalytic theories concerning man's dream life. His reasons for this are not merely whimsical, for the psychoanalytical conceptions of the dream serve to illustrate in anticipation some of the conclusions which the writer wishes to stress in the chapter reserved to theory and therapy in psychoanalysis.

There exists no more beautiful example of the admixture of theory and fact in psychoanalysis than that afforded by the Freudian theories of the dream-work, which rest exclusively upon a logical petitio principii which has been given the exterior apparat of scientific methodology.

It thus becomes apparent in these few pages that Freud

⁵¹ R. Dalbiez, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, Toronto, Longmans, 1941, Vol. I, p. 64

has caused sex to expand into a vast arc which covers the entire range of human activities. Sex has invaded the realm of wit, the arts and the sciences. It is the master of the dream world. It is the essence of man, and it is the core of psychoanalysis.

This attitude, no doubt, has a few elements of truth in its quagmire or better still morass of error. Freud seems to have recognized the influence that instincts may possess in determining the course of human life. He quite rightly emphasized the importance of the instincts in man. Yet the character and role which he has made them play are so far removed from reality as to make not only themselves but reality itself utterly incomprehensible and absurd.

He has shrewdly noted the practical importance of sex in the everyday life of man and some of his insights are uncanny. Yet the all-embracing scope which he has bestowed upon the sexual instincts has caused him to sin mortally against some of the most important principles of scientific methodology and metaphysical reasoning. Freud appears to have been hallucinated by sex and the libido to the extent of considering man merely as an object-libido. Sex, no doubt, is important, but surely it cannot be all-explaining.

CHAPTER VI

A PSYCHIC TRIANGLE

That the ancients should have considered the triangle a most fascinating geometrical structure and that Pythagoras should have thought the numeral 3 perfect and divine in origin could not have duly influenced the subsequent opinions of medieval philosophers or modern scientists. Nevertheless, the fact remains that man has been divided into three much more often than into any other numerical value.

Strangely enough, the metapsychology of Freud is tripartite. "Metapsychology" is an uncommon term, even in psychoanalysis. By this word, Freud originally meant

a method of approach according to which every mental process is considered in relation to three coordinates which I (Freud) described as dynamic, topographical, and economic respectively; and this seemed to me to represent the furthest goal that psychology could attain¹.

However, Freud's metapsychology has come to mean the psychoanalytical theories concerning the nature of man's mental apparatus as dissected into an Id, Ego and Super-ego, in particular, and the more theoretical and doctrinal issues with regards to the human psyche in general.

The psychic as viewed by analysis is a most fascinating realm in which romp many fascinating entities. It is the home

¹ AS p. 109. The term 'Metapsychology' is also explained in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 162.

of such beings as the Id, the Ego and the Super-ego, which are served by a myriad of devices, mechanisms, and subordinates, such as dreams, wit, repression, resistances, the instincts, sublimation, complexes of various sorts, totems and taboos. It contains all these and many more.

The Freudian metapsychology houses a fast-moving world peopled with exotic creatures who perform in the strangest of costumes; they are often spoken of, they excite much comment, and they are always mentioned in esoteric language.

The psychic life of man, as it appears in psychoanalysis, has very little in common with the same portion of man as it is viewed by the other psychologies. With its Id, Ego and Super-ego, psychoanalysis stands completely aloof.

The ordinary research of modern psychology, other than analytical, in the realm of the human psyche is centered about such topics as learning, brain functions, location of responses, intelligence, the measurement of intelligence, testing in general, attention, perception, sensation, memory, and the study of the higher mental processes as a group by way of the orthodox laboratory or introspective methods which represent the after-birth of the old psychophysik.

Yet once the bridge is crossed into the kingdom of psychoanalysis, the so-called psychology of psychologists, the psychic life of man becomes a strange new world. At present, this world

is not entirely new to the reader. He is already familiar with many of its terms, and also possesses some knowledge of its various functions. However the reader is now asked to forget as much as he can of these previous topics and more restricted theories of psychoanalysis in order to penetrate with unhampered freedom into its innermost sanctum that he may consider in itself the psychic triad from which springs human life.

Unfortunately, as with all mysteries, it is not possible to contemplate this triad in its essence without a basic admixture of analogy and references to knowledge already acquired. However, our goal is the summit of the metapsychic triangle in its purest form. Once this has been achieved we shall be better armed to judge of analysis itself.

Of this psychic triangle the Id is the base. As the reader will readily recall, the Id accompanies the child into this world and develops with it. Primarily, the Id is the home of the instincts and the source of all of man's physiological and psychological life. Its dynamic energy is the raison d'être of repression and resistance. It is the explanation of wit and dreams, and it constitutes the basis of sublimation, the arts and sciences. It is the core and the nucleus of man's life. It is the unconscious².

The Id is man's first possession, for it is the lawless

2 EI pp. 250, 254, 261, 265; ID pp. 525-527; IV p. 85.

chaos which the child brings into this world with him, unorganized, untrained, intent exclusively on gratifying its needs. In the Id, the pleasure-principle reigns supreme³.

The Id is composed of the sum total of primitive urges and impulses, elementary instincts and basic drives. It is active, animal, infantile, non-logical, and sexual. Nothing that takes place in the Id is conscious⁴. It is replete with dynamic instinctual energy. It is the home of the repressed, and the libido. It is the driving force of man⁵.

In spite of the fact that both the instincts and the repressed material of man are housed in the Id, its internal structure is unitary, unlike that of the Ego which is bipartite.

However as the child grows older, the Id, or part of it, comes into contact with reality. Environment shakes its head in opposition to its dictatorial urges. To meet the exigencies of inexorable reality, the Id must learn to curb its tendencies and modify or adapt itself to environment. This adapted or modified part of the Id becomes the Ego⁶.

The Ego is therefore that fragment of the Id which has come into contact with environment and the dictates of the reality-principle. It is that part of the Id which possesses awareness of reality, understanding that undivided attention to the satisfaction of all wants and whims may prove disastrous.

3 BPF p. 163; EI p. 251; ID p. 542; WRU p. 754.

4 R. Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 405.

5 EI pp. 245-251.

6 EI p. 250; IL p. 299.

The Ego thus appears essentially as a mediator between the Id and environment.

The Ego represents reason and sanity in contrast to the Id which contains the passions and emotions⁷. The Ego is therefore the seat of sensation, perception, representation and awareness of the external world in the mind. It is the abode of thought and intellection. It is consciousness.

However not all of the Ego is conscious. It is subdivided into two distinct portions, one of which is the "pre-conscious", better known as the sub-conscious⁸.

The sub-conscious part of the Ego --Freud prefers the term pre-conscious-- contains those psychic elements which are capable of voluntary recall, yet not actually present before consciousness itself. They are forgotten for the time being, but can readily be recalled at a moment's notice. The contents of the pre-conscious are thus distinguished in this way from those of the Id which are buried in oblivion and beyond voluntary recall.

It is in this pre-conscious part of the Ego that is done all of the "unconscious thinking" and intricate intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous concentration and which spontaneously present admirable solutions to consciousness, much to the pleasant surprise of the individual concerned⁹.

7 EI p. 251.

8 EI pp. 245-246, 248.

9 EI p. 252.

The Ego therefore is partly conscious and partly unconscious or pre-conscious. It is aware of itself and reality, of the Id and the instincts. In its task of bringing the external world to bear on the Id, the Ego holds the key to the neuroses, standing as it does at the crossroads of the nether-world and the outer-world. For this reason, the Ego is the souffre-douleur of man's psyche. It is as a tiny rowboat thrown about on the storm-tossed sea of human instincts and emotions, human passions and vicissitudes.

The Ego has indeed many storms to weather, torn as it is between the lawlessness of the Id and the sternness of environment. Its principal stabilizer is sublimation by which is diverted unspent libidinal energy and its chief means of defense is repression¹⁰.

By means of repression, the Ego dismisses from itself into the Id, the great storehouse of the repressed, various unpleasant or unallowable incidents occasioned by a conflict between the instincts and environment should these remain unsolved or undiverted to some other end¹¹. These repressed incidents are therefore an important part of the Id which, in this light, appears to be separated from the Ego by repression itself and the consequent resistances of the Super-ego¹².

10 EI p. 246; IL p. 248.

11 Nota: Analytical therapy considers the neuroses, (transference neuroses: hysteria, obsessions, compulsions etc.) as the outcome of a conflict between the Ego and the Id; the narcissistic neuroses leading to paranoia, schizophrenia etc., as the result of a struggle between the Ego and the Super-ego; and the psychoses proper as the result of a conflict between the Ego and the outer-world, environment.

12 R. Dalbiez, op. cit., p. 407.

The Ego is like a man on horseback who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider seeks to do so with his own strength while the Ego uses borrowed forces¹³. Noteworthy among these borrowed forces is that generated by the Super-ego.

The Super-ego is the most unique of Freudian metapsychological creations and is at best a paradox. It is virtually impossible to localize the Super-ego in the human psyche. Its most logical seat is the threshold of consciousness between the Ego and the Id, yet it often hovers over the Ego inasmuch as it is the ego-ideal, and it frequently resembles the Id inasmuch as its principal functions are totally unconscious¹⁴.

Its chief functions are those of censorship and resistance. In the early days of psychoanalysis, the Super-ego was often called the censor, the endopsychic censor, the guardian of sleep and the watchdog of consciousness¹⁵.

Because of this, the Super-ego should not be regarded as a little man with a broom who sweeps away those objects which he considers improper or unpleasant! The Super-ego is much more than that.

The Super-ego is the sum-total of conventional ideas, social laws, moral rulings, religious teachings, and in general,

13 EI p. 251.

14 EI p. 252; IL pp. 242-247.

15 ID p. 480.

the entire ethical training of the individual. It is the seat of conscience and self-criticism, of the sense of guilt and shame. It is the source of mental punishment; it is the master of the triad. As the Id is non-moral, the Super-ego is hyper-moral. It is morality¹⁶.

The total functions of the Super-ego are consequently most complex. All, however, appear to be more or less preventive and prohibitive in nature inasmuch as the Super-ego impedes the direct passage of the Id-drives into consciousness, obliging them to become vested in symbols and phantasies¹⁷.

However, the Super-ego is not the conscience of the human being in the ordinary sense of the word. It is something less and something more. Although it may resemble it to a certain extent inasmuch as it is the source of shame, guilt and self-punishment, the Super-ego lacks completely that sense of objective values inherent and firmly infixed in the first principles of morality and practical intellect.

In its moral activity, the Super-ego never stops to consider the propriety or impropriety of an action as based upon the universal truths of ethics, such as this principle, good must be done, evil avoided. Rather its moral activity and consequent sense of guilt and punishment appear as the result of the Ego's not being able to attain the high standards that its

16 EI pp. 253-260; ID pp. 368, 480-484; IL pp. 303-6.

17 EI pp. 252, 279.

"ideal" has set for it. The Freudian conception of morality is highly subjectivistic and grossly materialistic.

To the Super-ego, Freud gives the prime function of preserving individual consciousness from unpleasantness¹⁸. The individual in this way becomes not only the seat of morality, but morality becomes essentially individualistic inasmuch as the pleasure or displeasure of each individual Ego is upheld as the criterium of shame, self-criticism and punishment and morality in general.

The origin of this entity in Freud's works is extremely easy to trace, but extraordinarily difficult to explain. The Super-ego is the direct offspring of the Oedipus Complex¹⁹.

The Oedipus Complex has enjoyed much notoriety since its initial appearance in the Interpretation of Dreams in 1900. All are familiar with Sophocles' tragedy, Oedipus Rex, in which the hero unwittingly slays his father, and marries his mother, begetting children of her. When he learns of his actions, he puts out his eyes in expiation for his crimes²⁰.

Freud has used the name Oedipus Complex and the basic ideas of patricide and incest which constitute the nucleus of the Greek bard's tragedy to describe what he claims to be an essential and universal tendency in man, rooted in the most fundamental instincts of his nature.

These basic instincts are held to be one of patricide

18 BPF p. 171; GFE p. 232.

19 AS p. 109; EI p. 258.

20 ID pp. 307-310; TT pp. 907-908.

and one of incest which incessantly urge the child to kill his father and possess his mother in the more carnal sense of the word. The converse, called the Electra Complex, is applicable with certain restrictions to the little girl²¹.

Freud means more precisely that the Oedipus Complex and its feminine counterpart represent basic instinctual patricidal and incestuous tendencies infixed in the Id, which seek self-satisfaction and indulgence.

The Oedipus Complex therefore represents an unconscious libidinal urge and love for the parent of opposite sex and unconscious hostility amounting to a death wish towards the parent of the same sex²².

The Super-ego therefore appears to be a modified part of the Id, inasmuch as its source is to be found in the incestuous longings of the Id. However it is also an outcome of the child's Ego, for it is essentially the result of the child's first contact with the social and marital laws, the principle of reality (in a broad sense), in which the child finds out that in view of parental opposition, it is not wise to indulge indiscriminately in instinctual urges or desires of a more carnal nature!

This process of indulgence in patricidal and incestuous drives is further complicated by the fact that the child really

21 EI p. 257; OP pp. 33-35.

22 Maslow and Mittelmann, Principles of Abnormal Psychology, New York, Harper, 1941, p. 339.

loves his parents. This love gives rise to a most trying situation.

The difficulty of the situation is embodied in the fact that the child really loves his parents, the boy having attached himself to his father as his "model", his "ideal", and the little girl has identified herself with her mother. Complete identification of self and ideal has taken place²³.

But soon the child learns that full possession of the opposite parent is not possible because of parental disapproval itself. Because of this, the adored father ideal becomes a hated rival for the boy, a rival for the possession of his love object (mother) who is consequently denied him. The counterpart of this situation somewhat similarly confronts the little girl²⁴.

This causes a terrible conflict to arise within the child. The father becomes alternately the object of the little boy's love (father-ideal) and hate (father-rival to possession of the mother)²⁵. The situation comes to a head around the fourth or fifth year of age, according to Freud, after the oral and anal erotic stages of libidinal development.

23 Nota: In psychoanalysis, identification signifies an unconscious mental process which expresses itself in the form of an emotional tie with other persons or situations in which the subject behaves as if he were the person with whom he has this tie. For examples of this analytical phenomenon, cf. PEL p. 81 and for theoretical background, GFE pp. 214-215.

24 AS pp. 64-65; EI p. 256; IL p. 174.

25 IL p. 369.

This consequently increases the child's interest in its parents since the child's love life and sex life have achieved more complex and perfect development with the abandoning of the anal erotic stages (chiefly narcissistic) and the subsequent onset of genital predominance²⁶.

This increased genital development occasions the appearance of much sterner resistance on the part of the parents (mostly the father). Even the child's auto-erotic practices (childhood masturbation etc.,) are now severely condemned. Repression is the only solution²⁷. The child cannot go on indefinitely wanting to possess his mother, nor can he constantly see in his father a hated rival, because he really loves his father. Therefore the child must repress his illicit desires.

By repressing his unallowable urges, the child not only renounces all impulses of carnally possessing his mother (or father), but also adapts to himself the rudimentary precepts that he has just learned, chiefly from his father, that it is unlawful to covet one's mother and wish to kill one's father.

Around these two primitive laws is built the nucleus of the Super-ego, the psychoanalytical core of man's conscience and moral precepts! Psychoanalytical morality is made the

26 AS pp. 63-68; IL pp. 273-281.

27 OP p. 35.

outcome of an irrational, instinctive, incestuous, subjective, Id-drive which is totally unconscious²⁸! A skewed foundation for morality if ever there was one.

Should the Oedipus situation be improperly solved, Freud claims that the child will invariably develop a neurotic disposition which will assuredly predetermine the advent of a neurosis in later life. In this respect the Oedipus Complex is also a highly important therapeutic complex in psychoanalysis inasmuch as it holds the key to the predisposed nervous disposition and temperament favourable to the onset of neurotic symptoms²⁹.

That is the story of the Super-ego and the Oedipus Complex. It depicts the birth of morality and the neuroses. However the Super-ego is much more than the seat of morality and the raison d'être of various neurotic symptoms. It is the very essence of man.

The Super-ego is the hall mark of the human race. It serves to distinguish man from all other mortal beings, because these beings are not possessed of the high mental evolution and moral codes which accompany the birth of the Super-ego. This

28 EI p. 258.

29 AS p. 102; CTS p. 617n; OP p. 34. Nota: The genetic origin of the Oedipus Complex in psychoanalysis is to be found in dreams, in which the dreamer has sexual intercourse with his mother, and in which he is chased away by the father exercising as it were his marital rights. This idea is the outcome of Freudian interpretation of the dreams of some of his neurotic patients, and the material (dream images) were of course highly veiled and symbolic in nature. For this origin, the author refers the reader to The Interpretation of Dreams, ID, pp. 393-394.

evolution is made possible because it is the Super-ego which is the crux of man's interest in abstract ideas and ideal goals by which are sponsored the arts and sciences, philosophy, religion and the loftier achievements of man³⁰.

This is the result of sublimation by which the unconscious urges and promptings of the Id are "desexualized" and their energy elevated to socially acceptable outlets. The Super-ego thus appears as the unseen hand and the unsung hero of sublimation, the arts and the sciences of man³¹.

In view of the nature which Freud has bestowed upon the Super-ego, it is not hard to understand why he considers religion as a non-value, or why he makes of the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist the result of a primitive tribal totem-feast³²: The Super-ego is in direct sequence with his philosophy which is a sheer unmitigated materialism.

The Super-ego is the last angle of the triangle, but surely it is not the least. Its influence is universal. It erects its barriers against the Id, controlling it by its resistances; it rules over the Ego, harassing it by its ideals; it is the power behind symbols, phantasies, wit and the dream world; it is the raison d'être of sublimation, the arts and sciences; its dictates are final in ethics and morality. Yet it is false.

30 EI pp. 255, 259, 270; IL p. 290.

31 EI p. 265; OP p. 42.

32 AS p. 126; GFE p. 229.

The Super-ego cannot be an objective concept, nor a true one, for many reasons of which the following two are most noteworthy; first, the Super-ego is the very negation of the outward reality of society and ethics which it is said to maintain; and second, it is based upon a false premise, inasmuch as it assumes the child to know things which it does not, and makes it desire things which it does not know.

The Super-ego is the negation of morality and society, for how can it be explained that the Super-ego is both the cause and the effect of society and morality? This is exactly what Freud has made of his entity.

Freud gives birth to the Super-ego through the experiences which the child absorbs from his parents. This in turn gives birth not only to an endless chain (for, whence comes the Super-ego of the parents, and so on until the arrival of man on this earth) but also presupposes for the entire structure of the psychic triad the existence of a pre-established society prior to man's arrival on this earth. No sane ethnologist would dare make such an assertion.

The Super-ego also makes the child desire things, the nature of which it does not know in the least; for how can it be explained that a sexually undeveloped child may desire full carnal possession of the opposite parent? Nil volitum nisi prae-cognitum holds true for the child as it does for the adult. Truth

knows no age limits. Truth transcends the human life span³³.

The metapsychology of Freud, of course, can be accepted only if his basic philosophical assumptions are also accepted. These are the god, Matter, subjectivism, and an essentially monistic and anthropomorphic outlook on the universe in general. Granted these, the Id, Ego and Super-ego may exist. Denied, they fall, and with them psychoanalysis.

The Id, Ego and Super-ego have unfortunately come to signify the unconscious, the conscious and the moral part of man. This is due in great part to the influence of orthodox psychology which still separates man's psychic life from that of his body. However this division of unconscious, conscious and moral life conventionally associated with psychoanalytical doctrines is most unobjective. It should not be encouraged in the least not only because psychoanalysis does not make this separation, but above all because it tends to hide behind the cloak of scientific and philosophical respectability a doctrine of the most pernicious nature and an error of most drastic consequences.

³³ Note: The child's desires for carnal possession of its mother, and the objective impossibility of wanting something the nature of which is unknown offers Freud no difficulties whatsoever. The carnal desires of the Oedipus Complex are totally unconscious, and in the unconscious all desires are ever-actual. Freud's Id knows no potency. It is ever actual (actus) as we shall see in our chapter reserved for his philosophical shortcomings. In this respect, Freud can speak quite readily of the child-man, or the child-adult. In other words, the unconscious of the child knows what it is desiring, in spite of the fact that the Ego is unaware of its nature. Freud's Id is a remarkable refuge, in more ways than one!

This error becomes self-evident when we stop to consider the fact that in psychoanalysis the psychic triad of Id, Ego and Super-ego embodies not only man's psychic life but includes in this psychic life as an essential and integral part, man's physiological urges and drives as well.

These three entities contain not only his moral, spiritual and intellectual life, but above all his instinctive, material, bodily urges, impulses and drives of an exclusively physiological nature, all of which are to be found in the Id, the base of the triangle.

This identification or rather elevation of physiology into the realm of psychology should not be forgotten. In this respect, Freud's metapsychology appears more as a metaphysiology, and this is one of the most noticeable of psychoanalytical shortcomings which serves remarkably well to illustrate the elementaristic bias of Freud's weltanschauung.

The weltanschauung behind the psychic triangle is the exaltation of matter, the hegemony of atoms, and the negation of the spirit. Only in an elementaristic world can psychoanalysis thrive.

CHAPTER VII

PATHOLOGIST'S UTOPIA

"The mystic sees the ineffable and the psychopathologist the unspeakable¹." Freud was both mystic and psychopathologist, and the outcome of his visions has been a psychological Utopia whose sole objectivity seems to repose in the imagination of its author. Psychoanalysis is like the desert mirage, with a remote basis of fact which has been dramatically supplemented by fancy and wishful thinking.

The Utopia that is psychoanalysis is both a doctrine and a method, a doctrine of normal and abnormal psychology and a therapeutic method. Both are so intimately linked each with the other that it is virtually impossible to separate them. Both have so much in common as to make all clear-cut and distinct description unfeasible.

As the reader must already have noted in the preceding chapters which were given over to the study of the more basic theories of psychoanalysis at every possible occasion therapeutic facts seemed to creep inadvertently and un auspiciously into the text.

It is not the author's intention by any chance to give the theories of Freud a suitable occasion to venge themselves

1 W. Somerset Maugham, The Moon and Sixpence, Chap. I.

that the present chapter has been written. Nevertheless it represents an attempt to describe with the least amount of theory possible the more therapeutical aspects of psychoanalysis and the techniques of which it makes use to cure the psychoneuroses.

Psychoanalysis, before being a psychological theory, was a therapeutic method, the aim of which was to cure the psychic ailments of man and in particular the psychoneuroses. In his attempts to cure his patients, Freud first made use of hypnosis, as we have already seen. In spite of a relative success in dislodging from the precincts of his patients' minds many lost memories and traumatic incidents which he considered to be the cause of neurosis, Freud soon learned that it was not possible to hypnotize every patient.

His trip to Nancy not having proved fruitful in this respect, he continued using hypnosis as a therapeutic method while commencing to collaborate more actively with his friend Breuer. His work with Breuer taught him the fact that if he could manage to make his patients "talk out" their difficulties, it would be possible to effectuate a cure.

This method was called the cathartic method and the talking out process, abreaction. At this time, Freud, as Charcot, Bernheim and Breuer, thought that the neuroses were the effect of isolated traumatic incidents which had been repressed because

of a conflict between the individual and his environment². Freud therefore looked for single incidents not thinking at that time that an entire chain of traumatic events could have been the cause of psychoneurosis³.

After Breuer's defection, caused by an unexpected abreaction, Freud dropped hypnosis completely and further developed his method of talking out which he subsequently called the technique of free association.

Free association, in psychoanalysis, is used as a substitute for hypnosis in order to circumvent the patient's resistances by encouraging him to let his mind wander freely, without any restraint whatsoever, over the symptoms and disturbances with which he is troubled, in an attempt to reach the source of his ailment⁴.

Free association, therefore, is a sort of voluntary day-dreaming on a particular topic. It is not free in the true sense of the word. The associations of the patient must be restricted to the general scope of his symptoms and should not be concerned with subjects of general conversation, the weather, politics and things kindred unless they are linked with his symptoms.

It should not be thought that the technique of free association is an absolutely aimless and random monologue; nor

2 OP pp. 7-8.

3 IL p. 303.

4 AS p. 72; IL p. 243; OP p. 20.

should it be thought that the analyst's role is one of pure passivity⁵. Much to the contrary, although the patient does most of the talking, the presence of the analyst as guide and above all interpreter surely influences the tenure of the psychoanalytical hour itself and the therapy in general. This influence is most apparent towards the end of analysis when transference takes place⁶.

It is self-evident that the technique of free association is undeniably slow and any therapy based upon such a method will be long in producing effective results. Some analyses have been prolonged six years and the usual minimum of time required by analysis is at least a year. This length of treatment explains why Freud was constantly on his guard for some means of accelerating his technique.

His desires of shortening the length of his therapeutic method account for the presence of dreams, wit, and symbols in psychoanalysis, for they afforded him with excellent means to bring about a flank attack upon the Id, since much of the dream and wit material arises out of the unconscious.

To the dream world he applied his method of free association. This is still a most important part of the technique of the psychoanalyst who submits each item of the dream to an extensive study in an attempt to come upon the underlying cause

5 IL pp. 88, 242-244; OP p. 21.

6 AS pp. 75ff; IL pp. 370ff.

of his patient's neurosis⁷.

Freud found that the material dislodged from his patients by free association was of a suppressed nature heavily shrouded in symbols. He also found that these repressed desires and complexes were in great majority sexual in import⁸. Instead of being perturbed by the fact, he continued to emphasize the scope and importance of sex in both the neuroses and man until the subject finally achieved the all-embracing character which it now enjoys.

The extent of the sexual phases of psychoanalysis was greatly broadened by the therapeutic invention and use of symbols. By use of the symbols, psychoanalysts came to look upon certain objects as found in dreams and wit as symbolic of certain definite sexual processes and desires. Interpretation of these dream symbols made it possible to further shorten therapeutic treatment inasmuch as Freud assumed these symbols to represent unconscious or repressed libidinal urges lodged in the Id⁹.

Of course, Freud did not bother with verifying his position with regards to the all-importance of sex in man. He took this feature of his teachings much for granted giving to the vast majority of these symbols sexual meaning and libidinal import.

7 ID pp. 188-207; IL pp. 88-114; OP p. 21.

8 ID pp. 391-392; IL pp. 129-131.

9 ID pp. 368ff; IL pp. 125ff.

These sexual symbols, of course, postulate the existence of a supporting theoretical background the nature of which we have seen to be the censorship exercised by the Super-ego over the instinctual urges of the Id and its libidinal drives¹⁰. If censorship be denied, the raison d'être of symbols ceases to exist.

Symbols are therefore the disguises assumed by the Id-drives in order to hoodwink the censor whose duty it is to prevent their direct passage into the Ego.

The Freudian symbols, in vast majority of sexual significance, are reducible to these two basic ideas. What is long, straight, or elongated, such as a pen, a snake, a knife, or a rifle, symbolizes the male organ of copulation; whereas what is hollow, cubic, or receptacle-like in structure, such as a room, a hallway, a bottle, represent the female genital organs¹¹.

In Die Traumdeutung, therefore at a very early date in the history of psychoanalysis, Freud had already elaborated a multitude of symbols, all of which represented in some way or another certain types of sexual activity and even specific sexual organs and parts of their intimate anatomic structure.

For instance, if a person dreams of a dense forest, or a hill, a Freudian analyst will invariably state that the dream

10 ID p. 480; IL p. 125.

11 ID pp. 371-375; IL pp. 129-133.

embodies a wish related somehow with the crines pubis or the mons Veneris respectively, and had the patient dreamt of mounting a flight of stairs his dream would invariably be taken to represent a desire for active coitus¹².

The therapeutic use of symbols now becomes clear. If a patient constantly dreams of mounting stairs, the analyst will tend to encourage him to let his mind wander freely on the topic of sexual copulation in its more traumatic phases of rape, seduction, incest or in any sexual incident in which he or she might have been the victim in an attempt to retrace to such an event, or even the phantasy of such an event, the repressed causes of the patient's symptoms. Symptoms are thus chiefly destined to the discovery of hidden desires or complexes which underly the patient's neurosis.

The subjective nature of both symbolism and interpretation is self-evident. The fact that Freud has garbed his symbolic dream objects and images in the raiment of sex testifies eloquently in favour of such arbitrary procedures of subjectivism as can most frequently be found in psychoanalysis.

However Freud was not in the least perturbed by this feature of his teachings. He continued to treat the neuroses with added gusto and intent. By means of free association and by use of dream symbols and interpretation, he was able to uncover many repressed incidents, make his patients relive them in a verbal or emotional way (abreaction), and cure hysterical

12 ID p. 379.

symptoms of all sorts.

Yet, at times, he found that patients who had been supposedly cured would return to him with slightly different neurotic symptoms, and he also noticed that frequently his analyses brought him back into the earliest years of childhood and infancy¹³.

Freud, therefore, came to the conclusion that he was not delving deeply enough into his patients' past lives, that there must be earlier symptoms underlying the entire neurosis and that recent traumatic incidents were only additions made to an already predisposed neurotic temperament which had been so inclined by previous events¹⁴.

He probed deeper and deeper into the past lives of his patients and found himself being carried into the very first years of childhood. Of course, by free association, he did not succeed in disinterring all the events which had taken place in childhood, but those he did uncover led him to believe that the real roots of the neuroses were to be found in the childhood life of his patients¹⁵.

In typical Freudian fashion, he found that his analyses uncovered many incidents of sexual nature in early childhood¹⁶.

13 IL p. 261. Note: It is of interest to note that free association itself is an endless process which can go on for the life span of an individual, broken momentarily by sporadic blanks which Freud has termed resistance. Perhaps for this reason alone was Freud carried back to early childhood.

14 IL pp. 287ff, 303.

15 ID pp. 495-498; IL p. 303.

16 Note: Another example of analytical admixture of fact and theory.

Apart from infantile sexuality, his analyses of this period produced many strange results. For instance he noted that the early childhood of man has its own sexual development (known as the libido-development¹⁷), and its own love life, in which the love of the child seems to be directed primarily to its own person¹⁸, (Narcissism).

He also found that the infantile urges and desires of the child tend to remain repressed and unchanged throughout life, that only their means of expression differ, persisting in symbolic phantasies, dreams, and similar psychic behaviour throughout adult life¹⁹, (Persistence of Infantile Impulses).

He further remarked that neurotic patients appeared to return to a particular period of infantile libidinal development and that psychoneurotic symptoms invariably represent in symbolic form previous phases of libidinal organization²⁰, (Fixation and Regression).

These therapeutic facts and findings serve well to illustrate the crucial importance which Freud has placed upon the role of infantile sexuality in the genesis of the neuroses. A psychoanalytical neurosis invariably can be traced in some way or another to early childhood and the childhood solution to the Oedipus' solemn and unperceived intrigues and incestuous

17 CTS pp. 582-584; IL p. 274.

18 CTS p. 560n; IL pp. 347ff; TT p. 876.

19 CTS pp. 626-628; IL p. 303.

20 CTS p. 628; ID pp. 485ff; IL pp. 283ff.

urges²¹.

However, childhood was not considered by Freud as a stumbling-block which was the exclusive cause of the psycho-neuroses. Rather, he made active use of this period in effectuating therapeutic cure, for he remarked that the patient's attitude towards the analyst during analysis was the re-experience of his attitudes towards his parents in the first years of his life²².

By reviving this emotional aspect of the child, at the time in which the traumatic incidents were thought to have taken place, Freud found it was possible to cure his patient more readily. This resurrection had become necessary for it was impossible for him to revive by free association all the events and lost memories of childhood. Had he been able to do this, it would have been possible for him to reach the real source itself, granted, of course, that his theories are correct.

His object, therefore, was to make the adult relive the emotions of his childhood by making him conscious of them and convincing him of the fact that they are due to repressed childhood incidents. This procedure of suggesting to his patient

21 Nota: Both psychoanalysis and psychiatry place much emphasis upon the childhood period of life; however psychoanalysis emphasizes the more sexual phases of this period whereas psychiatry appears preferably to stress its educational, emotional (not instinctive) and general tenure, placing particular importance in the necessity of proper up-bringing, good environment and care.

22 AS p. 77; IL pp. 367-375.

that his emotional attitudes really reflected childhood emotional reactions, Freud called transference. Transference thereby appears as the emotional attitude of the patient towards the analyst, which reflects his emotional attitudes towards his parents, other persons or objects, at the time of the traumatic events which represented the first in a series of happenings which were ultimately to favour the development of the patient's pre-disposed neurotic temperament²³.

A few paragraphs from Freud will undoubtedly help the reader to comprehend more fully the significance of this concept in psychoanalysis.

In every analytic treatment there arises, without the physician's agency, an intense emotional relationship between the patient and the analyst which is not to be accounted for by the actual situation. It can be of positive or of negative character and can vary between the extremes of a passionate, completely sensual love and the unbridled expression of an embittered defiance and hatred. This transference -- to give it its shortened name -- soon replaces in the patient's mind the desire to be cured....

Yet it would be senseless to try to evade it (transference; for an analysis without transference is an impossibility....

This transference is made conscious to the patient by the analyst, and it is resolved by convincing him that in this transference-attitude he is re-experiencing emotional relations which had their origin in his earliest object-attachments during the repressed period of his childhood²⁴.

Transference²⁵, therefore, marks the end of psychoanaly-

23 IL pp. 279ff, 303, 369ff.

24 AS pp. 75-79.

25 Nota: Transference is not the exclusive reaction of the fair sex only to the therapeutic treatment of psychoanalysis. Transference is also found in men. (Cf. IL p. 370).

tical therapeutic treatment. After the patient has been weaned from the trying incidents of his childhood and above all from his abnormal emotional reactions, he is again capable of coping with reality. This is possible because he has been made conscious of the source of his disorders which were dormant in the repressed layers of the Id²⁶.

This is assuredly one of the most important phases of transference, this making the patient conscious of the cause of his neurotic symptoms. The insight achieved by the patient is the culminating factor of psychoanalytical therapy and constitutes the final goal of all analytic treatment.

This insight leads the patient to the very first causes of his psychoneurotic symptoms which Freud claims to be none other than phases of repressed infantile sexuality²⁷. The ultimate source and real cause of the psychoneuroses are to be found in the childhood sexual experiences of the neurotic patient who had dismissed them from consciousness during that early period of life, but which continued to enjoy life and vitality in the Id throughout the years²⁸.

Therefore in psychoanalysis repression alone is not sufficient cause for the development of a neurotic personality, nor is sexuality itself fully adequate. The real cause has to be repressed infantile sexuality. This has led Freud to coin

26 ID p. 507; IL p. 380.

27 ID p. 495; IL p. 303ff.

28 Nota: Repressed infantile sexuality is in direct keeping with his teachings of instinctual dynamism, the libido and the Id-drives.

the very famous psychoanalytical dictum, "in a normal sex life no neurosis is possible"²⁹.

Therefore the three phases are absolutely essential for the genesis of the psychoneuroses. Of course, the precise way in which a neurosis eventually makes itself manifest is due in great part to the patient's surroundings, his past life, even his physical build and whims³⁰. However, whatever be the form which the neurotic symptoms assume, they invariably symbolize the inner psychic conflict of the psychic triad as expressed by repressed infantile sexuality.

Neurotic behaviour, in psychoanalysis, is essentially symbolic. It is anagoric of the conflict raging within the neurotic patient's psyche, and in psychoanalysis, the neuroses are viewed as the disguised and abnormal fulfilment of a wish, a wish to fall ill. This wish to fall ill is the essence of the psychoanalytical viewpoint concerning the psychoneuroses³¹.

It is therefore a sort of masked compensation by which the individual achieves the satisfaction of his repressed libidinal desires and pent-up Id-drives³². In this respect, the psychoneuroses resemble dreams and dreams themselves have been called the neurotic behaviour and activity of normal persons³³.

The neuroses in this light appear to make use of much

²⁹ Nota: The idea of normalcy applied to the sex life is a most difficult notion to grasp. It is hard to conceive the Gauss Curve of Normal Probability applied to the human sex life! Freud himself never bothered to explain what he meant by such an idea, nor what the normal sex life really is.

³⁰ IL pp. 286-308.

³¹ IL pp. 226, 260, 302, 343.

³² Franz Alexander, op. cit., p. 79; IL pp. 302, 383.

the same procedures and mechanisms as do dreams. The neuroses therefore are essentially abnormal wish-fulfilments whereby the repressed libidinal urges of the Id achieve satisfaction in symbolic symptomatic form after having by-passed in this way the vigilant censor, the Super-ego!

However strange such a theory of inner psychic conflict may seem, it is orthodox psychoanalytical doctrine. Yet it becomes extremely difficult to understand how a patient who strives to gratify his suppressed instinctual impulses (granted that he does so), and hoodwink the vigilance of an endopsychic censor, manages to do so by means of hysterical blindness, glove anaesthesia, brachial paralysis, or moral scruples and religious obsessions.

This, however, offers no difficulty for Freud. He reasons that hysterical blindness, for instance, is a marvelous method of escape, an excuse to forego responsibilities, an excellent source of pity; and that paralysis constitutes a definite advantage through illness...the blind are to be pitied and helped...the paralyzed are helpless and free from responsibilities³³!

Freud's is a strange way of thinking in which human behaviour appears to be distorted and tortured so that it might fit into the narrow straitjacket of a pre-conceived theoretical idea of what the neuroses should be like, instead of what they are.

33 IL pp. 320ff.

The influence of preconceived theories is manifest not only in its teachings concerning the essence of neurotic behaviour and its driving forces, but above all in the way in which the psychoneuroses are classified by psychoanalysis. The analytical method of classification of the neuroses seems to be a direct offspring of its theories concerning the neuroses; even their names are taken from those of some of its doctrinal elaborations.

Classifications are a highly arbitrary procedure in any subject, and in psychopathology, they become not only arbitrary but virtually impossible in view of the great complexity of the subject matter itself. At present, there is no complete and definite classification of the psychic disorders of man and psychopathologists are unanimous in stating that those existent should not be adhered to too rigidly³⁴.

The old classification of hysteria, neurasthenia and psychasthenia (Janet) has become somewhat outmoded. The general trend today seems to consist in dividing the mental ailments of man according to their psychic or somatic causes, into neurosis and psychosis respectively, with considerable amounts of over-

³⁴ Nota: Even the terminology of contemporary psychiatric classifications undergoes annual amendments and changes. This is shown by the fact that the American Psychiatric Association meets almost every year in order to study its terminology and classification of the psychic ailments.

lapping in their various symptomatic manifestations³⁵.

In view of the fact that some of the neuroses appear to be somatic in origin, the words psychoneurosis and neuro-psychosis are sometimes substituted each for the other. This substitution further indicates the complexity and difficulty of psychoneurotic and psychotic classifications.

Even the psychoanalysts and their commentators do not seem to be in complete accord on the topic of psychoanalytical classification, and Freud's views have changed considerably since the early days of analysis³⁶.

35 Maslow and Mittelman, op. cit., pp. 363ff.

36 Dalbiez, for instance, (op. cit., I, p. 271) states: "Here we may see both the differences and the resemblances between the three psychoneuroses: hysteria, anxiety psychoneurosis, and obsessional neurosis."

Brill, the American analyst, (op. cit., p. 12) writes: "This whole process constitutes the picture of the neuroses, or rather of the transference neuroses, which comprise hysteria, anxiety hysteria, and the compulsion neuroses, in contradistinction to the so-called narcissistic neuroses, melancholic depressions, and to the psychoses...in which the underlying mechanisms are somewhat different."

Blondel (La Psychanalyse, Paris, Alcan, 1924, p. 65) écrit: "Mais son rôle (la libido) n'est pas le même suivant qu'il s'agit d'une névrose actuelle, d'une névrose de transfert, ou d'une névrose narcissique."

Franz Alexander, (The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis) speaks of transference neuroses, organ neuroses and conversion hysteria, whereas Warren (Dictionary of Psychology) defines as pertaining to psychoanalysis the actual neuroses, the narcissistic neuroses, and the transference neuroses.

Freud himself, in his later works, (On Narcissism, 1914), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Ego-analysis, speaks of transference neuroses, traumatic neuroses, actual neuroses, and war neuroses.

In view of all these diverging opinions, it is evident that the author is surely not in a position to risk a final classification of the neuroses as found in psychoanalysis.

For instance, in Die Traumdeutung (1900) and in Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex (1905), Freud writes of the transference neuroses, and defensive neurosis, whereas in his later works he still speaks of the transference neuroses as a group, but no mention is made of defensive neurosis. Instead, he emphasizes the narcissistic neuroses, the compulsion and actual neuroses, the traumatic and war neuroses, and anxiety hysteria³⁷.

The general psychoanalytical tendency of classification today seems to favour a tripartite division based upon inner psychic conflicting mechanisms³⁸. In this sense, we have the transference neuroses, (the easiest to treat in psychoanalysis), the actual neuroses, and the narcissistic neuroses.

The transference neuroses comprise the various hysterias and hysterical symptoms (tics, contractures, hysterical blindness and paralysis, the various hysterical anaesthesias, all of which are purely psychic in origin) and the compulsion neuroses (phobias and obsessions), which are due exclusively to a conflict between the Id-drives and the Ego³⁹.

The actual neuroses are that group which are physical or somatic in origin, yet accompanied by psychological effects and concomitant disorders. They are that group in which the individual symptoms cannot be further reduced or explained by psychological analysis.

Hypochondria is a good example of an actual neurosis.

37 OTS p. 611n; ID pp. 305-306,

38 GPE p. 244.

39 EI p. 247; A.A. Brill, op. cit., p. 12.

It is an ailment which is intimately linked with bodily processes and biological functions but which also occasions the appearance of very serious psychic disorders. This group, also, is born in some way of a conflict between the Ego and the libido, although the mechanisms of manifestation and onset are somewhat different than those of the transference neuroses⁴⁰.

The last group is embodied in the so-called narcissistic neuroses. The narcissistic neuroses are not quite so frequent as the transference or the actual neuroses in pure form, that is, as a neurosis. However, they are found far more frequently in the mental hospitals in the form of the various psychoses and paranoid states of which the narcissistic neuroses appear to be milder phases⁴¹.

They are the result of a conflict between the Ego and the Super-ego in which an impoverished Ego is overwhelmed by its Super-ego and loses contact with reality⁴². The libido consequently regresses to a very early phase of genital development characterized mostly by exaggerated self-love (Narcissism).

Homosexuality is often used by psychoanalysis as an example of the narcissistic neuroses, whereas schizophrenia in its final stages represents the complete triumph of the Super-ego

40 IL p. 350.

41 Nota: The narcissistic neuroses of psychoanalysis and the psychoses of psychiatry are apparently contradictory, for psychiatry claims the psychoses to be somatic in origin, whereas psychoanalysis makes of them the outcome of a conflict between the Ego and the Super-ego, two purely mental entities.

42 IL pp. 351-353; A.A.Brill, op. cit., p. 12.

and the Ego's complete loss of contact with reality. The narcissistic neuroses appear to be beyond the actual scope of psychoanalytic therapy at least in their extreme manifestations in which the patient is no longer aware of his environment. All lack of awareness of environment makes the analyst's contact with the patient virtually impossible, especially in view of the fact that his techniques, free association, rapport and transference, are inapplicable in such instances⁴³.

This study of psychoanalytical neurotic classification is not complete and is, of course, quite tentative in nature. In presenting it, the author wishes only to stress the crucial position occupied by the theory of inner psychic conflict and conflicting psychic mechanisms in psychoanalytic therapy. Without this supporting theoretical basis, the very structure of the neuroses in psychoanalysis becomes meaningless.

This is the story of psychoanalytical therapy. It is undoubtedly schematic in form and cursory in nature. Of this the writer is much aware. However he hopes to have conveyed in this chapter a short but objective outline of analytical therapy which will be sufficient to permit the reader to surmise, at least, the position which psychoanalytical therapy holds in the complete framework of Freudian analysis.

⁴³ Nota: In its treatment of schizophrenic patients contemporary psychiatry is now making use of drug-therapy (injecting into the patient graduated doses of insulin, metrazol, or other drugs), also called the shock therapy, in order to hasten the recovery of the patient. Shock therapy seems to be based on the idea that the feeling of death in the patient serves to momentarily bring him back to his senses.

The author is also aware that this exposition of psychoanalytic theory and therapy is highly schematic in form and general in scope. Many items, which perhaps should have been more completely described have been treated of briefly, while other points have been stressed which perhaps should have received but cursory mention.

However, it was the present writer's aim to convey only the general atmosphere of psychoanalysis itself, and the principal tenets of its doctrine and method. In order to do this, various items such as sex, the libido, the psychic triad and its mechanisms, had to be emphasized to the detriment of other features of analysis.

The first two parts of this work are thus manifestly incomplete as a detailed exposition of psychoanalysis itself. Such, however, was not the goal of the author. His sole intent was to present a précis which should be sufficient to comprehension of the general tenure and salient features of Freudian thought in order to better grasp its philosophical positions. This he hopes to have done and sincerely wishes that his efforts may serve as a suitable introduction to the riddles and enigmas of psychoanalysis and as an indicative description of its false philosophical background and tendencies, and of the insecure basis of its scientific methodology, the realm of which we are about to enter.

PART THREE

PSYCHOANALYSIS: ITS BACKGROUND

CHAPTER VIII

LIFE IN OLD VIENNA

The appearance of psychoanalysis upon the contemporary scientific horizon was not an event of purely hazardous nature, nor was it entirely the result of the deus ex machina intuitions of its founder, Sigmund Freud.

Quite to the contrary, the appearance of a school called psychoanalysis was heralded years before its actual birth took place and was forecasted as the logical and inevitable sequence of a complexity of various factors of philosophical, scientific, political, social, moral and religious nature.

These last statements may sound exaggerated, but it soon becomes apparent upon examination of the disastrous trends taken by modern science and philosophy that the advent of psychoanalysis was inevitable.

In view of these same trends, the theory and therapy of psychoanalysis could not have been other than they are. They were the child of their age and the victim of their environment which unfortunately they did not transcend, for these were the times of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Virchow, Darwin, Spencer, Comte and Taine, a very bleak age indeed if viewed from the perspective of the philosophia perennis.

Some years before the advent of psychoanalysis, Leo XIII had proclaimed the revival of the Scholastic principles, but as yet these were but a drop in the philosophical bucket. Outside ecclesiastical circles, the philosophy of the schoolmen was still an unknown quantity, ordinarily scoffed at and scorned.

The general attitude of the times was one most unpropitious to objective philosophical reasoning and sane metaphysical speculation. In philosophy, subjectivism, voluntarism, anti-intellectualism and materialism had achieved complete hegemony; in science, the billiard-ball complex, matter, evolution, and rationalism, had triumphed completely.

Of course, among the more learned circles, eclecticism was held up as an ideal to be achieved and among some thinkers a notable degree of tolerance was to be expected. Liberalism of thought was the key-note of the period. To be a liberal thinker, then as now, was considered a great accomplishment, although liberalism is usually applied to politics and diplomacy.

Of the great European capitals in which these ideas were rampant, Vienna must of necessity be included, for Vienna was in that age one of the brilliant luminaries of European science, philosophy, and diplomacy. It was the Vienna of the Hapsburgs, the capital of the Dual Empire, the light-hearted city by the Danube¹.

¹ Nota: This chapter is based upon many interviews with a person of the German Rhenish provinces who, before migrating to Canada, had spent the early years of his life in Southern Germany and old Austria-Hungary during the years in which psychoanalysis was born and with which this chapter and study are chiefly concerned.

The fortunes of Vienna in the last half-century have not been too prosperous. The Vienna of today is shorn of all its old glory, the glory which once so ably upheld the banner of the true faith in the courts of Europe. Its fate has been cruel. The once powerful capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has seen its political, economic and intellectual influence dwindle to a mere trickle, but there was a time when things were not thus.

The Vienna of the 80's was surely not thus. During the latter decades of the last century, the Viennese intellectual life was among the highest in the world. Its medical schools had won international repute. It could boast of its musicians, philosophers, psychologists, biologists, chemists, and other men of science, as could few countries in the same period.

Austria, then as now, was regarded as a stronghold of Catholicism. It was then, politically, the nucleus of a large Empire of ethnically unrelated peoples. Moreover, it was considered to be one of the great cultural centers of its day in Europe.

The Great War changed its political, and diplomatic status. However there was one thing it could not change, its reputation of being a patron of the arts, sciences, philosophy, and culture. In the last years of the 19th Century, Vienna held this tradition in high respect.

The Viennese prided themselves in being a la page in philosophy, the sciences, the arts and literature. The lectures of famous professors and renowned statesmen were eagerly attended. It is even said that the salons de beauté had on hand heavy volumes of Schopenhauer, Hegel, Goethe or Schiller to help the Viennese ladies while away the hours spent in quest of beauty!

There must have been much snobbishness in these pretensions, but nevertheless in the genteel circles it was deemed an essential prerequisite to be well read on most any subject and the members of the upper social classes had to be acquainted with the more serious authors, no matter how difficult.

These are the characteristics of the so-called genteel or intellectual circles of Vienna, the milieu in which Freud moved. They should not be taken to cover the entire population, in vast majority Catholic, simple and unpretentious, and not in the least imbued with the snobbish intellectualism, liberal eclecticism and general broadness of outlook characteristic of the intelligentsia who in reality were skeptical about anything religious or supernatural. Few in the higher social strata were believers in the true sense of the word; nominally many were Catholic, but in truth, most were independent in thought and indifferent to religion.

In spite of these shortcomings, Vienna was indeed an

interesting place to live in during the years before its eclipse, where lectures, conferences, state and ecclesiastical ceremonies were patronized and attended by the great men of the age.

In circles such as these moved Brentano, Meinong, von Ehrenfels, the psychologists; Virchow, Rokitanski, the pathologists; Meynert and v. Brücke, the physiologists; Werner, the Neo-Scholastic; even the musicians Johann and Richard Strauss; and of course, Freud.

Freud spent 80 years of his life in Vienna, arriving there at the age of four and leaving in exile a few months before his death. This long sojourn in the great metropolis must have surely left its mark on Freud. It is incredible to think that Vienna exercised no influence whatsoever upon Freud, his personality and thought.

Life is a process of give and take, in which more often than not environment is the giver. Freud and Vienna can be no exception to this general law. In this respect, there are many factors to be considered concerning Freud's life in Vienna. He was virtually born there; he was educated in its schools; and took a degree in medicine in its University.

It is impossible to imagine that he could have spent fourscore years of his life without absorbing some of the ideas current in the Vienna of his day, some of the teachings of his masters, or some of the accepted traditions of his times.

It remains to be seen elsewhere how his masters in medicine, biology and physiology, influenced his thought². Here we must restrict our scope to the topic of the general influences which environment causes to seep into the crevices of one's mind, such as ideas and opinions of social import, religion, or political questions, without one's necessarily being aware of their constant infiltration.

If we are to make a fairly thorough study of Freud's system, it is essential for us to keep Vienna and its general environmental factors in view. Their influence must have decidedly left grooves and traces in Freud's mind not only during his formative years in the Viennese Gymnasiums and Lyceums, to say nothing of his years spent in the classrooms and laboratories of the University, but also upon the adult physician must they have left their mark.

A notorious feature of the programs of higher education dispensed by the Viennese educational system, and one which was to greatly influence Freud's thought was an utter lack and disregard for religious training. Exactly how widespread, apart from the University, and other centers of higher learning, this regrettable trend was, the author has not been able to accurately ascertain. However, it is certain that Freud's religious

² Nota: Chapter X is consecrated to the task of describing the scientific background of psychoanalysis and the influence of his immediate teachers in anatomy and physiology.

training was of the most rudimentary. His stay in the Viennese schools and his curriculum in the Faculty of Medicine of the University do not seem to have done much in altering this initial deficiency.

Freud was not only a professed free thinker in religion, he also lacked even the rudiments of education in its principles. This lack must be strictly taken into account if a just appreciation of the influences that came to play in Freud's later life and in the development of psychoanalysis is to have a fairly objective basis.

Throughout his entire life, Freud seems to have been prejudiced against religion and subjected to the most virulent anti-religious bias. It is not surprising therefore to find that one of the most noticeable deficiencies of psychoanalysis is its utter disregard for the spiritual values of man, whether religious or psychological. Without a doubt the restricted atmosphere in which he lived in Vienna, and his early training and subsequent studies in its University, where scientific rationalism reigned supreme, had much to do with this. The circles in which Freud moved were far from propitious to the spiritual and supernatural.

That Freud lived a restricted existence in his early days as a student is mentioned in his own works³. This is due

3 AS p. 14.

in great part to the attitude of the Viennese towards the Jewish element of the city. The Viennese were not Jew-baiters in the present sense of the word. To the contrary, there existed in Vienna a notable degree of tolerance for the Jews and a goodly amount of freedom for all creeds and races, although friction at times was inevitable.

The Jews, on the whole, were tolerated by the general public. However, in the higher social circles, Jews were highly respected, if they had achieved fame of some sort in the field of science, the arts or letters, in politics or finance. This respect was bestowed upon them only after they had "arrived", in the social sense. In the years following his arrival, Freud spoke with considerably bitter and biting censure of this stratification of society into castes with regards to the Jewish population of Vienna.

Jewish students were certainly not persecuted by their Aryan confreres. However, they appear to have been segregated somewhat from the remainder of the student body. They could not participate in the organizations of the general student body, yet they were not left destitute. They had clubs and activities of their own. Nevertheless, they were seemingly ostracized as a group.

This ostracism undoubtedly influenced Freud's way of thinking. He was a proud youth and a brilliant student who

objected to being considered inferior to his Aryan companions, many of whom were his intellectual inferiors, just because of his race⁴.

This attitude tended to make of Freud the solitary thinker and the independent worker. It is most apparent in his early years of private practice when he first commenced his research in the neuroses and when his findings were received with cold aloofness on the part of his colleagues⁵. This attitude of the Viennese must surely have something to do with Freud's lack of contact at times with the outside world of science and the findings of even his colleagues and collaborators.

It may also have influenced his personality to the extent of making him a dictator among his own disciples most of whom were non-Jews, although he was personally a kindly man. It is rumored that many of the subsequent divergences between Jung and Freud, and between Adler and Freud, and Stekel, Rank and Pfister, were due to this factor.

The point, however, is the fact that Freud's Jewish ancestry and the attitude of the Vienna of his day towards its Semitic population must be taken into account among the influences which formed Freud's personality and surrounded the cradle of psychoanalysis.

4 AS p. 14.

5 AS p. 15. Note: Of the coldness of his colleagues and the attitude of distrust to be found in the University with regards to some of its Jewish professors, Freud speaks with some bitterness in The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 219.

Apart from being snobbish in its tastes, liberal in its thoughts, rationalistic in its attitudes towards the supernatural, the Vienna of the upper classes was decidedly Victorian in its outlook on sex.

In the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic worlds, sex has always been considered a touchy topic, whereas in the so-called Latin countries, or in the Orient, sex is spoken of much more freely and the sex life is much more frank and open. Both views have their qualities and faults.

In Southern Germany and old Austria, sex was decidedly "taboo" in the better circles. It was a topic to be whispered about and not openly spoken of. The attitude of even biology and medicine reflected this popular tendency. Even in science, sex was literally an unknown factor.

Sexual disorders and aberrations had been known to science for some time, but no systematic attempt had as yet been made to study, diagnose and treat them. This is not hard to understand. In view of the general attitude of the times, it would have required to overcome with one blow the widespread attitude of secrecy rampant in science with regards to sex the work and findings of several geniuses of the first magnitude gifted with an indomitable will and an independent trend of mind unafraid of the opprobrium of public and scientific censorship.

Men of this sort were Havelock Ellis, Krafft-Ebing, and

Freud. They were not geniuses, but they were possessed of that spirit of reaction necessary to foster an intellectual revolution with regards to sex, which is still somewhat fettered to the old Victorian traditions even in our scientific world.

Freud's was a peculiar mind. He was that type of thinker to whom opposition becomes a stimulus and contradiction a challenge. Highly independent in thought, subjective and determined in opinions, and ruggedly personal in his outlook on life, he loved to be different as long as he himself was convinced of the objectivity of his ideas and the truth of his mission. Unfortunately, Freud's criterium of objectivity would hardly be recognized as such by workers of more scientific bent!

The author cannot affirm with finality that the general Victorian attitude towards sex in the Viennese circles in which Freud moved can be counted as a directing influence in his ways of thinking and as a guide in his therapeutic research. It is nevertheless a plausible hypothesis if we take into account Freud's personality and his peculiar logic.

Should the Viennese attitude towards sex not be capable of exact location in the list of influences which came to play upon Freud's mind, there is however one that can, one in which Freud was a true son of his city of adoption, a worthy child of his times. This, when linked with several other factors such as the libido and man's place in the universe, has resulted in

the very inferior position in which psychoanalysis places women and the general pejorative attitude which analysis assumes when it treats of the fair sex.

This inferiority of women is one of the most noticeable characteristics of psychoanalytical teachings. In Freud's works, women appear as decidedly inferior creatures, inferior in every way to man, except one, sex.

Freud is wont to consider women as sex objects for men. She is an object-libido whose existence is justified only in her relations to man as a source of carnal satisfaction and as a reproductive organism. This position of inferiority is most readily notable in the Freudian theories concerning infantile sexuality; for instance, the Oedipus Complex, the castration complex, penis envy and various other phases of Freudian concepts pertaining to childhood⁶.

Besides the influence of Vienna, there are, of course, other factors which have to be considered with respect to this peculiar trait of feminine inferiority. Account must be taken in this instance of Freud's own philosophy which often approaches the most unmitigated paganism, and of course, the possible influence of some of Schopenhauer's misogynistic diatribes which might have seeped into Freud's mind by way of his environment⁷.

6 CTS p. 595; IL pp. 267-309.

7 Note: Psychoanalysis is indebted to Schopenhauer to an extent that most analysts care to acknowledge, and goodly doses of his teachings are to be found in some of the most intimate mechanisms of psychoanalysis. This influence of Schopenhauer will be viewed in the next chapter.

Freud, in his writings, reflects the spirit of his age, for in the early days of psychoanalysis it was still a man's world when one could keep a mistress and be excused for the fact whereas the mistress herself was considered a social outcast.

It was a world in which man was still considered the superior of woman in both intellect and physique. The sphere of activity then allowed women was restricted to the trilogy of Kinder, Kirche und Küche, recently resurrected by the Nazi ideologists.

This general attitude could not but have been known to Freud, who could not but otherwise have been influenced by it⁸. It is a peculiar trait of man to generally accept the ideas of the society in which he lives. Rather, it is the general characteristic of a society to have its ideas seep into the minds of its members and become a part of their psychological make-up without their ever becoming aware of the infiltration. Man is the victim of his environment as much as he is its maker, if not more so.

Freud must have necessarily been influenced by these socially accepted conditions, although to what extent is of course impossible to ascertain. Yet a man must reflect his

⁸ Nota: The attitude towards women in the Austrian social set-up was a bit more liberal than that of the Prussian, Hanoverian or Northern German. Women in Vienna enjoyed more freedom than did their northern sisters, however their position with regards to man was still decidedly inferior.

times. It is what transcends time, what is universal in a man's writings that lives on after his death; truth alone remains. That is the secret to the power that is Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas'.

Any attempt to retrace the general environmental influences which have come to play upon a man's thought requires of necessity the elaboration of hypotheses. The author readily admits the hypothetical character of some of his assertions presented in these pages. However these hypotheses are based upon the fact that a man cannot spend 80 years of his life in a city without feeling its presence and having some of its culture, background, ideas and opinions seep into his own life.

It is probable that Vienna greatly influenced Freud's thought in various ways other than those mentioned in the chapter. It is partly to offset this deficiency that the following chapters have been written. However the author does maintain that the ideas current in Vienna in the last decades of the 19th Century and the first decades of the 20th must of necessity have found their way into Freud's mind and become a part of him, because they appear in his works.

This infiltration was as inevitable as that which occurs daily to each and every one of us. Man's thought is of necessity moulded by his environment. Freud, however, has maintained the complete scientific and philosophical originality of many of his

teachings, even in the face of overt proof of actual anticipation⁹. Only Freud could have done this.

Nevertheless Freud was the victim of his age and environment just as is every human being since the days of Adam. His life in Vienna was the scene of an interplay of active influences of which the great investigator of the unconscious was not in the least aware! Nature had taken this way to avenge herself!

Nature is like the cold marble flanks of the Sphinx. It is only by the universal truths that the really great thinkers tear from her sides that they achieve immortality, and it is only through those rare insights into the realm of truth which Freud achieved in some of his more lucid moments that his name will live and come to be known to posterity. Truth alone transcends environment.

9 HPM p. 939.

CHAPTER IX

A MANTLE OF PESSIMISM

A mantle of pessimism cloaked the philosophy of the last years of the 19th Century. Under its ample folds were hidden the various pernicious tendencies which became manifest in the latter Victorian age and which dominated philosophical thought until the end of the first great war.

The metaphysical and psychological schools born of the efforts of the men of philosophy of this age were drastically anti-intellectualistic and irrationalistic in trends, subjectivistic in outlook and decidedly materialistic in principles and background.

A child of these times was psychoanalysis, whose cradle was completely enveloped in this mantle. Among its remote ancestors, we note the philosophers Herbart, Hume and Schopenhauer who were themselves deeply steeped in the traditions of the influential giants that were Kant, Leibnitz and Descartes.

Among its more immediate ancestors, its family tree numbered men no less important: von Hartmann, Darwin, Comte, Ribot and Taine, the precocious John Stuart Mill and the lofty Spencer, Fechner the mystic, and even the great composer, Richard Wagner; whereas the cradle itself was surrounded by a bevy of doting relatives: Nietzsche, Heidegger, the youthful Husserl, William James, Bergson, the colossal Wundt, the wary Breuer, and the ascetic and imposing McDougall.

An interesting and blue-blooded pedigree indeed, with a family tree which brightly sparkled with the brightest lights of "official" philosophy. Launched into life in the 90's by luminaries such as these, psychoanalysis at its very birth was assured of a noteworthy and successful career.

In spite of the prominent part played by philosophy in the development of psychoanalysis, and despite the fact that many of Freud's theories seem to have been inspired by the philosophical trends of his day, Freud himself was not a philosopher. By training and interest he was exclusively a physician bred in the elementaristic atmosphere of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Vienna.

Freud even "denied himself the pleasure" of reading philosophy so that he might not be influenced by the thoughts of others while accomplishing his own research¹. Nor have we any reasons to doubt the truth of his assertions.

In view of this denial, we are left with but two possibilities in retracing the genesis of the philosophical ideas manifest in psychoanalysis: first, Breuer,² second, Vienna itself and the times and circles in which he lived during the years when he was struggling to put psychoanalysis on its feet in the world of science.

If Freud had little interest in philosophy, Breuer to

1 HPM p. 939, and above all, AS pp. 109ff.

the contrary was of philosophical bent. According to Allers, he was a member of the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna and was moreover very well versed in the philosophy of his day and of his immediate past. Allers also states that Breuer had read the works of Herbart with whose teachings he was particularly well acquainted. This Herbartian interest on Breuer's part is of the utmost importance, for many of the most basic of psychoanalytical theories are singularly Herbartian in nature².

That Breuer exercised some influence on the thought of young Freud during the early days of psychoanalysis is a most plausible hypothesis. Undoubtedly many of the theoretical and philosophical assumptions necessary to the development of the "cathartic method" were due in great part to Breuer.

However it is not always necessary to have read the works of the great philosophers themselves, or to have had direct contact with them or their disciples, to be influenced by their ideas. The ideas propounded by the great thinkers seep into the world of practical thought and action in many ways and come to be known and accepted by hundreds of people who have never read their works, many of whom are undoubtedly unaware of the very origin of their opinions.

The influence of environmental factors at play is one of prime importance in disseminating the ideas of the great

² R. Allers, The Successful Error, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1940, p. 224.

thinkers and undoubtedly account for the peculiar flavour of many of the theoretical assumptions and philosophical ideas with which psychoanalysis abounds.

In spite of the fact that Freud had no philosophical interests whatsoever, his system is possessed of a very definite philosophy, the origin of which concerns us in this chapter³. This philosophical background has roots which dig deeply into the remote past of European philosophical traditions.

Of these early foundations we will say little, paying more attention to those more modern thinkers whose teachings actively influenced the thought of Freud and the development of psychoanalysis to the point of actually antedating by a hundred years, at times, some of the most "original" of his inventions.

One of the most noteworthy anticipations of one of psychoanalysis' most essential and characteristic theoretical elaborations is to be found in the writings of a man who died many years before Freud was born.

His ideas are rampant in psychoanalysis and cover the entire gamut of Freud's teachings from the dynamic psychic triad replete with conflict, repression and resistance, to the very instincts and emotions themselves. This author is known as the father of modern scientific pedagogy, Johann Friedrich Herbart, (1776-1841).

³ Note: An examination of the philosophy of psychoanalysis and its shortcomings is to be found in Chapter XI.

The Freudian psychic structure with its conflicts, dynamic energy, resistances, repression and thresholds, is singularly Herbartian in nature. Herbart taught that mental functions were to be treated as being forceful and dynamic in essence; that ideas are possessed of energy and come into relation each with the other through struggle and conflict; that a systematic theory of the conscious and unconscious is necessary; that this theory should be dynamic in nature; and that ideas may be repressed from consciousness.

Herbart also mentioned in his teachings that ideas, as they are repressed or as they leave consciousness, cross a threshold and once beyond this threshold their dynamic energy makes them attempt to rise into consciousness again⁴.

This is a reasonably similar picture of the human psyche as viewed by Freud. Herbart's teachings are most characteristic of the Freudian Id and the dynamic functions which he has attributed to it. Freud, therefore, seems to have made use of, although no doubt unknowingly, of ideas, terms, principles and mechanisms which were originally Herbart's.

Herbart's dynamism is virtually identical with that of Freud and seems to have enjoyed widespread application in psychoanalysis. It ranks extremely high among the influences which

⁴ Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, extracts of which are to be found in Rand's Classical Psychologists, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1921, pp. 395-416.

came to play upon Freud's thought for the entire Freudian metapsychology is based upon dynamic inner conflict and opposing psychic forces. Herbart was among the first to propound such an idea of psychic dynamism in modern philosophy. In this way, Freud's similar notions can be traced back in one way or another to the teachings of Herbart.

Allers has an interesting statement as to how Herbart's ideas found their way into psychoanalysis. Breuer was well acquainted with them, as were Freud's teachers of physiology, v. Brücke and Meynert. Under such able guidance, it is not surprising that these Herbartian principles seeped into Freud's way of thinking, and consequently his school⁵.

A year after Herbart's death, another German philosopher published a work containing ideas which in many respects antedate some of Freud's most original teachings. Neither he nor his works are well known today in spite of the popularity which both enjoyed in the 40's and 50's of the last century.

Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch (1802-1896) was a prominent Leipzig logician whose name is virtually forgotten today. In his writings, he also spoke of the inhibition, suppression and resistances of ideas, thresholds of consciousness, and dynamic psychic energy and activity, much as had Herbart before him.

However, he seems to have been wont to extend Herbart's

5 R. Allers, op. cit., pp. 226-227.

purely psychic dynamism into the realm of the instincts when he spoke of the strivings of the instincts and emotions, feelings and desires⁶. However, Drobisch was still too much the philosopher to pay much attention to this particular phase of his teachings.

He appears rather as a link in the chain which was ultimately to lead to instinctive dynamism or dynamic instinctivism so characteristic of psychoanalysis, modern psychology and physiology.

The fact remains, however, that the ideas of psychic dynamism, inner psychic conflict, resistance and repression, and even instinctive strivings, were known to the philosophical world many years before Freud's birth. By the time Freud commenced his own research in psychopathology these ideas must have deeply influenced psychological thought and opinions.

Of course, the dynamism of both Herbart and Drobisch is much more restricted than that of Freud. Theirs was purely psychic in nature and scope. However many scores of years had passed between the writings of Herbart and Drobisch and the research of Freud.

During the interval the ideas of dynamic mental energy described by Herbart had become so extended as to embrace not

⁶ Drobisch, Empirische Psychologie nach naturwissenschaftlicher Methode, Hamburg und Leipzig, 1842, extracts of which are to be found in Rand, op. cit., pp. 432-448.

only psychic energy but instinctive energy as well. This extension was due in great part to the writings of the German physician Griesinger⁷, and to the elementaristic trends infused into science by the positivism of Comte. However, even in this respect, Freud's instinctive dynamism can be traced back to its Herbartian origin.

Though Herbart's and Drobisch's mention of repression and psychic inhibition had been brief, the topic is far more elaborate in the works of one of their near contemporaries, whose popularity in Freud's time was most widespread.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), the great pessimist, towers over the philosophy of the latter half of the 19th Century as did over music the imposing figure of Richard Wagner (1813-1883).

Schopenhauer's was a philosophy of extreme subjectivism, rabidly anti-intellectualistic in trend, which was given over to the examination and exaltation of the more irrational and illogical elements of human nature such as the emotions, feelings and instincts of man. His is the philosophy "that lay down the principle that the innermost kernel of existence is a blind, undisciplined, never resting, and never satisfied want⁸."

This "kernel" is quite characteristic of psychoanalysis

⁷ Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1938, p. 135.

⁸ H. Höffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1924, pp. 214ff.

and were we not aware of its origin, we could quite easily attribute it to the fertile pen of Doctor Freud.

We have already seen how Rank brought to Freud's attention Schopenhauer's anticipation of the mechanism of repression and Freud's pretensions of originality⁹. The fact remains, however, that in spite of Freud's claims to originality, and priority, repression was anticipated many years before Freud's birth and not only by Schopenhauer, but by Herbart and Drobisch as well. The sources of this anticipation do not testify highly in favour of repression.

Schopenhauer's influence was not restricted to his mention of repression only. His influence in psychoanalysis has been rampant and the shadow of the mighty Schopenhauer may be seen lurking in many a nook and cranny of psychoanalysis. The ideas of Schopenhauer are most evident with regards to the crucial importance which psychoanalysis places upon the instincts in man's life.

If the Freudian ideas of instinctive energy can be retraced to Herbart, their insatiable and irresistible nature seems to have originated in Schopenhauer's diatribes. Of course, it must be remembered that post hoc does not in the least mean propter hoc. It is quite possible that Schopenhauer's doctrines, in spite of their priority, exercised no influence

9 See page 45.

whatsoever upon Freud. However, in view of the circumstances and the widespread popularity enjoyed by Schopenhauer's ideas, this does not seem very plausible.

Schopenhauer was most explicit in his teachings concerning man's instincts. He analysed them with much assiduity and spoke of them with much eloquence. He even gave them a home, and this home is the unconscious! He also gave them a guide, the will.

"The will expresses itself here in the lowest grade (the instincts) as blind striving, an obscure impulse, inarticulate, and far from susceptible of being directly known", was written by none other than Arthur Schopenhauer in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819).

In the same work we find such typical passages as these: "The inner being of unconscious nature is a constant thriving... without rest"; "the sexual impulse also proves itself the decided and strongest assertion of life"; "for all love, however ethereal it may bear itself, is rooted in the sexual impulse alone." (The italics are the author's)¹⁰.

These lines concerning the instincts could well have been written by Freud whose teachings they antedated by nearly a century. Schopenhauer spoke of the instincts in terms such as these in 1819. It is not surprising that they should have

¹⁰ Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, New York, Random House, 1928, pp. 214, 240, 252, 273.

found their way into psychoanalysis in 1890 when the teachings of Schopenhauer were at the height of their popularity.

The philosopher of Dantzig, however, was not alone in influencing the Freudian doctrines concerning man's instincts. Many of his pupils seem to have also had their hand in the psychoanalytical stew.

The contemporary Existential school of German philosophy, of which Schopenhauer is an ancestor, offers us another plausible hypothesis as a source of inspiration for one of the more recent instinctive innovations of Freud, the death instinct.

The topic had been broached by Schopenhauer himself in vague terms. However, it was given definite shape in the writings of the modern German Existentialists, Martin Heidegger (1889-) and Karl Jaspers (1883-), who were both influenced by Husserl, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer.

It is again a working hypothesis to state that their teachings concerning a death instinct, (the counterpart of the Freudian death instinct), which made their appearance during the Great War and immediately after, might well have influenced the same notion in psychoanalysis¹¹. Strangely enough, the psychoanalytical death instinct was born and nurtured at about that time, also.

Psychoanalysis is indebted to Schopenhauer to an unusual

¹¹ Nota: For the nature of the psychoanalytical death instinct see Chapter V, p. 67 and also BPP pp. 183, 185. The concomitant appearance of a death instinct in both the Existential and psychoanalytical schools at least is indicative of a general trend towards irrationalism and anti-intellectualism of thought in which psychoanalysis participated.

extent. This debt was further increased by the teachings of one of Schopenhauer's closest disciples. The influence exercised by Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) upon Freud's Id is not to be passed over casually. In his Philosophie des Unbewussten, v. Hartmann has directly anticipated some of the most intimate mechanisms and functions of the Freudian Id.

In this respect, the unconscious of Freud appears to be the direct descendant of the petites perceptions of the mighty Leibnitz (1646-1716), as taken up by Herbart and his psychic dynamism, Schopenhauer and his blind voluntarism, and finally by v. Hartmann, the latter's disciple.

The teachings of these philosophers concerning the unconscious were theoretical in nature and certainly not clinical as were those of Freud, Charcot, Janet or Morton Prince, the Boston psychiatrist. The subject matter was the same, however, and certain similarities were inevitable between the intuitions and observations of the philosophers and the investigations and findings of the scientists.

But to return to the Philosophie des Unbewussten, we find that v. Hartmann claims the unconscious is the sine qua non of association of ideas, the source of feeling and emotion in man and the home of the instincts¹². Every one of these functions which v. Hartmann reserves for the unconscious is to be found in the Freudian Id.

12 H. Höffding, op. cit., pp. 532ff.

It would be wise to mention that the Philosophie des Unbewussten, which achieved phenomenal success -- a short 20 years saw the appearance of no less than ten editions of the work -- was published in 1869 when Freud was only 13 years old.

At the time of Freud's solitude (1895-1905), v. Hartmann's ideas must have been well known in the scientific and philosophical circles of Vienna, to say the least. They must assuredly have served to mold the mentality of their times with regards to the general nature and structure of the unconscious.

Schopenhauer and his satellites were not alone among the German philosophers to exercise influence over Freud and psychoanalysis. Account must also be taken of the tragic Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who, during his moments of lucidity and when not tortured by an incessant migraine and psychic ailment, wrote his masterpieces of German literature which unfortunately are not masterpieces of objective philosophy.

The exaltation of Nietzsche and his superhuman ideas can be found in many psychoanalytical crevices. The influence of Nietzsche's thought upon psychoanalysis has been somewhat neglected by the various exponents and opponents of Freud who appear more attracted to the person of Schopenhauer than to

that of Nietzsche.

This is regrettable but quite easily explained. Schopenhauer's popularity was undoubtedly more widespread during the early days of psychoanalysis than was that of Nietzsche, because of the latter's later arrival on the scene of European philosophy and the allegorical and imaginative poetical prose in which he couched his ideas.

Yet Nietzsche's lessons as voiced by Zarathustra seem to have found their way into many specific recesses of analytic theory. They can be easily detected in psychoanalytical repression and resistance, and also in sublimation. These lessons undoubtedly served to give to the Id, Ego and Super-ego their particular anti-intellectualistic flavour just as they have surely contributed to the hedonistic nature of psychoanalytical philosophy.

In some of his works, and in particular in his opus magnum, Also Sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche has alluded to the above-mentioned points of psychoanalytical theory in various passages extremely picturesque in nature.

We have already mentioned how he forcefully described repression as the outcome of a struggle between pride and memory¹³. There are also other passages which allude to repression in Zarathustra.

For instance, when Nietzsche pictures "the intoxicating

13 See page 45.

joy it is for the sufferer to look away from his suffering and forget himself. Intoxicating joy and self-forgetting...¹⁴," (41), he seems to directly imply voluntary forgetting, which is a phase of repression, and also the psychoanalytical theory of the wish to fall ill.

In other passages, when he laments with Zarathustra menaced by "Woe who saith: 'Hence! Go! Away, thou woe!' But everything that suffereth wanteth to live, that it may become mature and lively and longing," (469) he depicts forcefully repression and the dynamic life of repressed material as it strives to re-enter consciousness.

It is quite possible during the interval of ten or so odd years which separated the appearance of Zarathustra from that of the joint papers of Doctors Breuer and Freud (1893-95) that the idea of repression as found in Nietzsche's pages (and also in the works of Herbart, Drobisch and Schopenhauer, although pictured somewhat differently by these authors) had become quite widespread. If Nietzsche, an immediate contemporary of Freud, speaks of repression as a conflict, and Freud himself does also, the idea of repression and inner psychic inhibitive mechanisms must have been quite current, cela va sans dire.

As definite allusions to repression can be found in Zarathustra, so also can they be found concerning resistance.

14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, Leipzig, Druck und Verlag von C.G.Naumann, 1904. The numbers in parentheses, v.g. (41), should be taken to mean p. 41 etc.

In one significant passage, Zarathustra, terrified, cries out in answer to an unheard voice: "Then was there once more spoken unto me without voice: 'Thou knowest it, Zarathustra, but thou dost not speak it!' -- And at last I (Zarathustra) answered like one defiant: 'Yea, I know it, but I will not speak it!' Then was there again spoken to me without voice: 'Thou wilt not, Zarathustra? Is this true? Conceal thyself not behind thy defiance!'" (216)

And for sublimation there can be found significant supporting passages such as the following found in Jenseits von Gut und Bösen:

Whether we call it "civilisation" or "humanising" or "progress," which now distinguishes the European; whether we call it simply, without praise or blame, by the political formula: the democratic movement in Europe -- behind all the moral and political foregrounds pointed to by such formulas, an immense physiological process goes on, which is ever extending¹⁵.

And of the psychic triad which is chief among psycho-analytical theories: "Thy Self laugheth at thine ego, and its proud prancings...I am the leading string of the ego, and the prompter of its notions." "The Self saith to the ego: 'Feel pain!' And thereupon it suffereth and thinketh how it can put an end thereto." (47) "Mine ego is something to be surpassed." (52) These verses picture ideas which are much akin to Freud's as embodied in the Id and Ego¹⁶.

¹⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bösen, Chapter VIII, Essay 242.

¹⁶ Note: Nietzsche even uses the German neuter pronoun -Es- to signify the unconscious. Freud called his work on the triad Das Ich und das Es.

Nietzsche was writing such poetic thoughts as these when Freud had not yet visited Charcot in Paris. They thus had many opportunities of seeping into the current thought of German philosophers, scientists and people by the time that Freud was ready to publish his findings.

The author is aware of the length of this analysis of Nietzsche's possible influence upon Freud's thought, but he deems it essential. When projected upon a philosophical background such as that provided by Nietzsche's teachings, the theoretical assumptions of psychoanalysis and its philosophical tenets appear more readily in their true light, one of hedonism, godlessness and sheer paganism. All these traits unfortunately have also penetrated deeply into the way of thinking of the German people, the Übermenschen, the Supermen of today.

Nietzsche, therefore, can quite readily be entered on our list of influences which might have been brought to bear upon the searching mind of Sigmund Freud in his quest for explanations of man and his nature.

There is yet another trend of thought, of capital importance, which might also have exerted pressure upon Freud. It is not so much an influence as a general philosophical tendency of the late 19th and early 20th Century. It is perhaps due to this trend that psychoanalysis owes its life and liveli-

hood today.

This particular trend of philosophical thought was initiated towards the end of the last century by a young German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) when he first applied the word Phänomenologie to an entire system of philosophy with the appearance of his Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1881.

Husserl attempted to consider the individual as a unit, an entirety, a whole and tried to seize the individual nature in its completeness. This idea, while not exactly new, has had widespread repercussions not only in philosophy, but also in psychoanalysis and psychology¹⁷.

The immediate offspring of phenomenology in psychology is the old Austrian school of the *Gestaltqualität* (Brenano, Meining and von Ehrenfels) and its younger exponent the modern Gestalt school of psychology, founded in Berlin in 1912 by Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka¹⁸.

The idea of unity permeates both the philosophy and psychology of phenomenology, and this idea of unity is also to be found in psychoanalysis. In their own biased way, the analysts do attempt to give a complete picture of man, his life and his relations to environment. It is perhaps due to the teachings of Husserl that analysis still lives, for it is from this current of unity in great part that flows the lifeblood

17 Nota: The idea is certainly not new. Thomas Aquinas succeeded in presenting a more complete picture of man than Husserl or any contemporary phenomenologist in either philosophy or psychology more than 700 years ago.

of psychoanalysis.

It must not be thought, however, that the German philosophers were alone in exercising influence upon the doctrines of Freud and that they hold exclusive rights upon psychoanalysis. Their presence has been deeply felt in psychoanalysis. This is no doubt due to the greater proximity existing between both.

Yet the influence of German philosophy is not exclusive for it is possible to retrace in psychoanalysis various doctrines which smack not only of the German, but of the French, English and American philosophical traditions as well.

Of the foreign ancestors of psychoanalysis, perhaps the most important is David Hume and the English association traditions which he greatly fostered. David Hume (1711-1776), the Scottish agnostic and associationist, is no doubt more widely known because of his Treatise of Human Nature and his having placed association on its feet than as a possible ancestor of psychoanalysis. However, both Freud and Hume had at least this in common. Both had difficulty in grasping the fallacy of the statement post hoc, ergo propter hoc.

Yet Hume's influence, by way of British associationism, has been decidedly felt in analytical circles inasmuch as the basic ideas of association and free association, psychic determinism of which Hume is one of the earlier exponents, and mental

stratification are essential assumptions of psychoanalytical theory and therapy.

Association philosophy no doubt made its way to the continent through evolution, Darwin and Spencer to a great extent. It might also have reached psychological circles in Vienna through the writings of Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), the French psychologists and philosophers such as Taine or Comte who were well acquainted with British empirical traditions, or by the German, Austrian or English scientists themselves.

Ribot, however, did much to make English philosophical and psychological thought known on the continent in his La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine (1870), and no doubt many of the continental European notions concerning associationism are due to him.

Associationism was the peculiar philosophical result of British empirical thought. Before its death -- the blow being given by James Ward in that most famous of encyclopedia articles, Psychology, in the 9th Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1886, -- associationism had governed English thought for nearly two hundred years.

Until the days of Ward (1843-1925) association was meant to be the ultimate explanation of the psychic life of man, both conscious and unconscious. This broad scope was based upon the assumption that associations are unlimited, potential-

ly unlimitable, in number, eternal in life (that is, as viable as the individual himself), and universal in scope. Human intellection was explained through the blendings of these associations with the contents of experience and association was held to be the prime source of ideogenesis.

Upon the arrival of evolution, things changed somewhat. British associationism became evolutionary, that is, to this general background were added the ideas of interlinking psychic stratification and evolutionary development not only of the material or biological world but also of the realm of human psychology¹⁹.

Every one of these ideas is to be found in psychoanalysis. The most noticeable are those of the stratification of the human psyche and the universality, eternity and evocability of associated ideas. All are basic postulates of psychoanalysis without acceptance of which psychoanalysis as a theory and as a therapy falls irretrievably.

It is quite possible that Freud came into contact with these ideas during his stay in France. Ribot was still living and had recently published La psychologie anglaise contemporaine the ideas of which must have been known to the circles in which

¹⁹ Nota: Of the scientific applications of association and their influence upon psychoanalysis, the following chapter treats.

Freud moved, and Taine was then interested in associationism, physiological psychology, the origin of language and children.

These interests of the French philosopher Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) should not be considered meaningless. He was then at the height of his psychological writing (De l'intelligence - 1870). New editions of this work appeared frequently prior to Freud's visits to France and it is only logical to assume that the ideas propounded by Taine must have been the subject of discussion of many of the French psychologists.

Since Ribot was writing of English psychology during those years, and Taine's main psychological interests then appear to have been associationism and physiological psychology, it is quite possible that British psychological traditions came to Freud by way of Taine and Ribot and his sojourns in France. This is surely not an unpalatable hypothesis.

It is quite acceptable in the circumstances to assume that associationism and its principles came to Freud during his visits in the French capital and Nancy. Yet he is indebted to France for other noteworthy features of his system and among his creditors, Comte and Bergson rank high.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) very nearly succeeded in making of philosophy a science! He must of necessity be included in our survey of the thinkers whose ideas have been afforded a place of singular honour in psychoanalysis and who have

bestowed upon analysis the stamp of their thought.

En passant it is of interest to note that two of Freud's intellectual ancestors, Comte and Nietzsche, died unfortunate deaths while subjected to incurable psychic ailments.

Comte, the great positivist, desired to make of philosophy an exact science and of science the real and only explanation of the universe. Science was to be the last court of appeal for both material and spiritual affairs beyond which there was nothing but superstition and shibboleth.

His influence was widespread, manifest above all in the elementaristic and deterministic attitude of the scientists of the latter half of the 19th Century, the "billiard-ball era" of which we have yet to speak.

Comte's influence had much to do with the determinism found in science before the advent of nebular physics, Einstein, Bohr, Rayleigh, Rutherford, relativity and the quanta²⁰. The change of heart occasioned in physics by these men took place long after Freud had delved into psychoanalysis and his school had arrived a number of years before the final proclamation of "indeterminism" in physics and the quantum theory.

Psychoanalysis is rigidly deterministic in nature. Were

²⁰ Nota: Of modern physics and the quantum theories, both Eddington and Greenwood have treated lengthily. The author suggests The Nature of the Physical World, London, J.M.Dent, 1935, by Eddington (especially chapters II,IX,X,XIV) and Prolegomenes a la Théorie des Quanta, Les Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1942, by Professor Greenwood, (especially part I).

it not for the deterministic position of Freud with regards to mental phenomena in general, and free association, the dream work, wit and the psychopathology of everyday life in particular (lapsus linguae, calami, memoriae) psychoanalysis would be inane and meaningless. All these studies are based upon the assumption that every psychic phenomenon has a cause, that hazard is unwarranted in psychology and decidedly out of place, that freedom of the will and liberty are an illusion and that psychic "indeterminism" is an impossibility²¹.

This, however, was also the attitude of the science of his day and Freud seems to have done nothing more than participate in the general trends of his times. When anatomy, physiology, medicine, physics, biology, chemistry and psychology were rigidly deterministic, what could one expect of psychoanalysis?

Of course determinism is not intrinsically and necessarily a fault. Chemistry is of necessity a highly deterministic science which fortunately preaches no philosophy as often do the psychologists, astronomers and physicists. However, determinism in psychology is a fault of the first magnitude, for it assails directly one of the most basic philosophical principles, that of freedom of the will.

Here again Freud can be said to have been victimized

21 PEL pp. 150ff.

by his times and especially by the strictly deterministic ideas of Auguste Comte. However these times in France also gave birth to another philosophical tendency which is quite manifest in both modern philosophy and psychology, and very evident in psychoanalysis.

Its author, or at least chief exponent, is the French thinker Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Bergson, willingly or not, started a trend of thought among modern philosophers and psychologists which has enjoyed considerable vogue. It is his élan vital.

Bergson's vitalism conveys somewhat the idea found in Freud's doctrines of the instincts. Their tension, their motion, their cycles, their life force, all resemble to a certain extent the élan vital of the French thinker.

No doubt Freud was completely unaware of the teachings of his French coreligionist. Nevertheless their respective ideas seem to indicate an identical trend of thought in the history of human ideas, the one in philosophy, the other in psychopathology.

It is interesting to note that Freud and Bergson were subjected to somewhat the same philosophical influences, although the dissimilar training of each undoubtedly accounts for the divergencies in the final outcome of their respective intellectual ruminations.

It would be most inconsiderate towards the analysts, however, to restrict the influences which came to play upon their universal science to the small continent of Europe. To do them full justice one must span the oceans to North America which Freud himself visited in 1909.

The similarity which exists between the teachings of Freud with regards to man's emotional behaviour and those of William James (1842-1910), the popular Harvard philosopher, is well worthy of mention. In this particular instance account must also be taken of the research of the Danish investigator, Carl Georg Lange (1834-1900), co-founder of the James-Lange theory of emotional behaviour.

This theory was most popular towards the end of the last century. It is admirably summed up in one of James' masterful paradoxes: "We do not cry because we are sad, we are sad because we cry!" In more technical language this means that emotions are nothing more than the conscious reflex or reaction to physiological stimuli.

These physiological changes and stimuli include emotional expressions and conduct such as facial and bodily contractions, habitual musculature reactions to emotional situations and the like which accompany the emotion and serve to outwardly manifest it.

When Freud writes: "He who sees a satiated child sink

back from the mother's breast and fall asleep with reddened cheeks and blissful smile, will have to admit that this picture remains typical of the expression of sexual gratification in later life²²," he is obviously thinking in terms of the James-Lange theory of emotional behaviour.

Freud does not seem to have stopped to consider the possibility that this outward emotional expression of the child might have been in itself the manifestation of an entirely different emotion; nor did he bother himself with the possibility that reddened cheeks and blissful smile might have been caused by some purely organic stimulus other than the sexual impulse, for instance, facial muscular activity, reaction to the warmth of the mother's breast or body, or countless other stimuli.

Freud's reasoning appears to respect the ordinary laws of logical reasoning from effect to cause²³. However in this instance, such a procedure is extraordinarily difficult to substantiate or justify for many reasons of which the great

22 CTS p. 586.

23 Note: Freud's conclusion inferred from his premises is about as valid as this one: If a patient is given a dose of insulin, he will be highly excited and erratic. Here we have a patient who is highly excited and erratic. Therefore it is safe to affirm that he has been given a dose of insulin! There are thousands of reasons for being excited and erratic in this world other than insulin. The sexual conclusion of Freud, in this instance, is but another example of his constant intermingling of fact and theory. The fact has become a sexual fact not because of itself, but because of Freud's theory.

difficulty of judging the exact nature of an emotion from its purely outward manifestations is an excellent practical illustration. Anyone who has been confronted with a series of photographs picturing emotional expression will readily admit this.

However, there is a much more important reason for doubting of the validity of Freud's reasoning concerning emotional behaviour apart from purely practical difficulties or deficiencies of theory. It is an argument propounded by many physiologists themselves and has done much to cause the James-Lange theory to fall into disrepute.

This physiological theory upholds the fact that all emotional behaviour occasions the same bodily changes in the subject's sympathetic nervous system and reflex mechanisms. If this be true, how can Freud possibly come to the conclusion that reddened cheeks and blissful smile invariably mean sexual enjoyment in a child who has just been breast-fed²⁴? Only a preconceived theoretical assumption concerning sex makes such

24 *Nota:* This entire treatise of emotional behaviour and the fact that some physiologists claim that all outward emotional behaviour occasions the same inward changes are presently actively discussed and defended by various authors. It is not the author's intent to take sides in this acrid controversy occasioned by the findings of the physiologist, Cannon, who has used them to fight the James-Lange theory. His statements that all emotional behaviour, whatever its outward manifestations, is alike in its inward bodily changes have caused considerable furor in both physiological and psychological circles. Cannon's ideas are to be found in his Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, 1st Edition, 1915, 2nd Edition, 1929, and in Feelings and Emotions: Wittenberg Symposium, 1928. His findings have done much to favour the impopularity of the James-Lange theory in the contemporary world. For the history of the controversy, the author suggests: Boring's History of Experimental Psychology, Murphy's Historical Introduction, Allers' The Successful Error, and George Humphreys' The Story of Man's Mind.

a conclusion possible.

How these ideas might have reached Freud in Vienna, of course, is impossible to ascertain. James published in Mind in 1884 and Lange in Copenhagen in 1885²⁵. A German translation of his work appeared in Leipzig in 1887 (Ueber Gemüthsbewegungen). Publication of the German work therefore antedated Freud's earliest major writings by at least 13 years. During the interval Lange's ideas undoubtedly enjoyed some popularity in Germany and might possibly have reached Freud indirectly.

This last statement is at least in general keeping with Freud's elementaristic and deterministic ways of thinking and his interests in the physiological phases of instinctive and emotional behaviour. However, the author presents this last study of influences which came to bear upon Freud and trends which are reflected in psychoanalysis as a pure hypothesis the usefulness of which serves mostly to illustrate what theories have done to facts in psychoanalysis.

As a summary of all these philosophical influences which have made their presence felt in psychoanalysis and of which Freud may or may not have been aware, we might say that psychoanalysis is a curious rehash of German dynamic irrationalism, subjectivism and anti-intellectualism in general, to which were added the spice of French positivism and its resulting scientific determinism and the heavy staple foods of English

²⁵ Wm. James, Mind, 9, 1884, pp. 188-205; C. Lange, Om Sindsbevoegelse, Copenhagen, 1885.

association psychology, evolution and clinical traditions of a stratified human psyche.

Psychoanalysis is evidently the child of its times, for it reflects to a remarkable degree all the general trends of the great thinkers of its age and those of its immediate past. Unfortunately, most of these traits were of a most pernicious nature above which psychoanalysis did not rise.

How these tendencies ultimately managed to seep so deeply into psychoanalysis, we cannot answer. Environment and Freud alone hold the keys to the problem.. Nevertheless all men reflect the environment in which they move and in this sense all men are its victims. To the general rule, psychoanalysis unfortunately has not been an exception.

CHAPTER X

SCIENCE TRIUMPHANT

The physics of the latter Victorian have been humourously described by Eddington (1882-1944) as the science of the "billiard-ball" atom, whereby he chastizes the physicists of that age for their purely materialistic and deterministic outlook towards the universe¹.

Unfortunately, the influence of the billiard-ball was not restricted to physics alone. Psychology, chemistry, biology, physiology, anatomy, have all had their billiard-ball era from which some are just recovering and of which others still undergo the attraction.

This attraction to matter was no doubt due to a reactionary process on the part of science in its struggles to break away from its philosophical shackles of idealism and proclaim its independence as a separate entity in the world of human knowledge.

However, the hand of Auguste Comte and his Cours de Philosophie Positive have often been seen as the guiding principle of the scientific methodology of that age. Of Comte and his philosophical influence we are already aware; nevertheless it is wise to remember that positivism and its attempts to make science the master-key of the universe were most important in

¹ Sir A.S.Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, London, J.M.Dent, 1935, pp. 24, 251.

molding the scientific attitude of the period in which this chapter is most interested, the 80's and 90's of the last century.

These were days of triumph for science and of degrading degeneration and defeat for metaphysics which Maritain has evoked in his words grandeur et misere de la métaphysique². The great men of these days were neither philosophers, theologians, poets nor artists, but mathematicians, physicists, astronomers, chemists, psychologists, biologists, anatomists: Gauss, Lobatchevski, Bolyai, Weissmann, Pasteur, Koch, Morgan, Curie, Becquerel, de Broglie, Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Titchener, Hall, Cattell, Haeckel, Virchow, Helmholtz, Maxwell, Pavlov.

This was not the age of philosophy, but that of science whose guiding principles were evolution, rigid determinism, a cult for the material and tangible, and a general disregard for the invisible and spiritual.

Of this age, Freud was a child. Since his earliest youth he had been enveloped in this particular atmosphere and subjected to its influence. His entire University training was but a repetition of the scientific credo of his day. It is not surprising therefore that traces of the scientific attitude of those times with respect to natural phenomena should be reflect-

2 Jacques Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, Chapitre I.

ed in his works and in the traits of his school³.

The Vienna of the latter days of the 19th Century was the home of many great scientists and one of the foremost centers of medical research in Europe. Unfortunately, in spite of its more religious background and atmosphere, Vienna was not an exception to the general scientific trends of its times. The scientific attitude of Vienna was that of Berlin, London, Paris or Stockholm.

This influence of science is most apparent in the determinism which is rampant in psychoanalysis and which Freud himself asserted to be one of the pillars of psychoanalysis⁴. Freud's scientific weltanschauung is not only deterministic, what is more, he considers undeterministic science an impossibility.

Freudian determinism is very easily traced to the scientific trends of his age. He was deeply steeped in these traditions which must have come to him in great part during his stay at the Institute of Physiology of the University and during his internship in the Allgemeine Krankenhaus.

From v. Brücke and Meynert under whom he studied in the Institute and from his other professors of medicine in the Uni-

3 Nota: Again the author suggests both Eddington and Greenwood. Both have given excellent outlines of the scientific attitude of the Victorian age in their respective works: The Nature of the Physical World, (Eddington), and Prolégomènes à la Théorie des Quanta, (Greenwood).

4 PEL pp. 150ff.

versity he learned the ordinary medical topics of his day. At that time the medical curriculum consisted mostly in a thorough training both in anatomy (the medicine of the last third of the 19th Century was emphatically anatomical) and in the principles of scientific methodology (which in those days was rigidly deterministic).

It could not have been otherwise since all medical ailments were conceived as results of organic causes or bodily lesions. Anatomical analysis itself, favoured by perfected microscopes and the X rays' recent arrival, was considered to be a great achievement for experimental and empirical science.

Freud and Breuer were subjected to these ideas throughout their entire medical training. They were taught that true science had to be deterministic; that there could exist but one type of causality, efficient⁵; that free will was a philosophical shibboleth; and that all ailments, even the psychic disorders, were anatomical in origin. In view of these general trends and influences, it is fully evident why the teachings of psychoanalysis reflect greatly the methodological attitude of the days of its birth.

Apart from determinism, the science of the last third of the 19th Century was characterized by another widespread tendency from which it is just recovering. This trend is embod-

⁵ Nota: Of determinism and its relations to efficient causality exclusively, the next chapter treats.

ied in materialistic evolution's broad sweep over the continent of Europe.

Evolution was the keynote of its day. To give an evolutionary explanation to natural phenomena was the cherished goal of every scientist and scientific worker. This attitude caused the simple biological theories of Darwin to invade almost every branch of human knowledge and psychoanalysis was not exempt from its influence.

This general scientific background of evolutionary determinism was the chief factor which caused psychoanalysis to steer its peculiar course on the seas of science. However, its influence upon psychoanalysis made itself felt mostly in the way in which it inspired various individual investigators in psychopathology, psychology and physiology who in turn greatly determined the development of psychoanalytical theory and therapy.

Two of the most essential of Freudian theories appear to have been brought into the world by such a process of scientific midwifery. This is manifest in the Freudian inclination to stratify the human psychic apparatus unrestrictedly into many layers and his firm belief in the eternity and evocability of memories.

The idea of a human psyche stratified into layers is first found in the works of the English neurophysiologist Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) whose teachings represent in great

part the English psychopathological clinical tradition and who profoundly affected psychology by his doctrines of the evolutionary strata of the human brain and mind⁶.

Of course, how the teachings of John Hughlings-Jackson found their way into Freud's system is beyond the reach of certainty. The only plausible solution is the already mentioned Freudian sojourns in France where he undoubtedly met men who were acquainted with the ideas of French and English science and who must have left their mark upon the young student. However, the fact remains that the Freudian psyche is stratified, as is that of Hughlings-Jackson whose teachings have had much influence in modern psychopathology.

If the idea of psychic stratification is difficult to retrace in the path which it followed to reach Freudian analysis, that of the dynamic life and long existence of memories, forgotten ideas and repressed incidents is somewhat easier⁷.

This idea may even be centralized in the person of a man who undertook his monumental research in the field of memory and forgetting not too far from Freud's Viennese offices just a few years before Freud graduated from the University.

The idea that memories are preserved intact throughout lengthy periods is one of the conclusions arrived at by the

⁶ J. Hughlings-Jackson, The Factor of Insanities, 1894. Jackson seems to have elaborated the idea of "psychic levels" found in the works of Condillac and Cabanis. (Murphy, op.cit., p.3;

⁷ Here, we consider the purely scientific aspects of this doctrine which has already been described in our philosophical studies of the last chapter (Chap. IX).

genial and patient Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909). Ebbinghaus accomplished his long solitary investigations during the period between 1879-1884 and published his findings in 1885 in his classic of modern psychology Ueber das Gedächtnis.

One of Ebbinghaus' specific points concerned forgetting in its relations to memory. He found through use of nonsense syllables that forgetting is most rapid immediately after learning (the curve of forgetting descending rapidly on the graph). After increasing intervals of time, however, he noted that forgetting decreased slowly seemingly reaching a plateau beyond which it was no longer possible to forget (the curve of the graph now tapering off and proceeding to infinity).

This finding, and the fact that Ebbinghaus found it easier to relearn obviously forgotten nonsense syllable and poetry learned years before, make one think of the Freudian postulates concerning the limitations of forgetting and the possibilities of recall. There exists much similarity between the two.

Freud may or may not have been aware of the work of Ebbinghaus. It is quite likely that he wasn't in the least aware of it. Yet it was not necessary for him to have come into personal contact with the results of Ebbinghaus' research to have been influenced by his conclusions. Ebbinghaus published in 1885, whereas Freud and Breuer wrote their joint papers only in the mid-90's and Freud's most prolific solitude occurred at

the turning point of the century.

This interval of at least ten years was sufficient for the spreading of Ebbinghaus' teachings which were couched in a most attractive literary style greatly conducive to the widespread propagation of ideas. Because of his fluent and piquant phraseology, Ebbinghaus has been called the James of German psychology.

Whatever the popularity of his style may have been, it is none the less plausible to mention the psychologist of Berlin as a possible source of inspiration for Freud's postulated ideas that memories are eternal and given the proper methods evocability is always possible.

The fact remains, however, that in the phases of his doctrines concerning the psyche, association, and in his technique of free association, Freud's ideas are very much akin to those of two men of science of his time, the Englishman Hughlings-Jackson, and the German Hermann Ebbinghaus⁸.

The similarity of ideas in the realm of science does not confine itself to the above-mentioned two. Among the Germans whose weight must inevitably have made itself felt in the scientific world of his day was the great psychologist of Leipzig, Wilhelm Wundt, who largely determined the subject matter and methods of psychological experimentation throughout Europe

⁸ Nota: It is not our task here to point out either the qualities or the faults of their ideas. Of these our following chapter treats.

and America.

The amount and scope of the work undertaken by the founder of the Leipzig laboratory are tremendous, and his influence has been felt the world over wherever laboratories of psychology have been founded.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and his immediate psychological forebear Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887) who is conventionally called the "founder" of modern scientific psychology because of the methods he evolved in his Elemente der Psychophysik published in 1860, gave psychology a foothold as a science and also greatly determined its early subject matter which is reducible to these two basic ideas, introspection and the contents of consciousness.

For more than 20 years after the foundation of the Leipzig laboratory (1879), psychology and psychologists were occupied by the introspective study of the contents of consciousness. These were the days of Titchener, Ladd, Hall, Sanford, James, Cattell, Jastrow, in the United States; Baldwin in Canada; Külpe, Brentano, Messer, Ach, Galton, Watt, Müller, Bain, Meinong, Benussi, and of course, Wundt, Ebbinghaus and Fechner in Europe; the days before the advent of the "newer" psychologies, Hortic, Gestalt, Behaviourism and the like.

This emphasis upon the contents of consciousness, and the introspective study of the higher mental processes, (memory, imagination, perception, intellection, volition, etc.,) must

have left a widespread trail of influences behind it. The thought and methods of a generation of founders cannot go unperceived by its contemporaries in other fields.

One of the most noticeable traits of psychoanalysis is the fact that it is given over, almost exclusively, to analysis and examination of the contents of consciousness, or rather to the analysis and examination of the contents of the unconscious once these have been made conscious.

Because of this feature, psychoanalysis requires constant use of the method of introspection on the part of its patients, so much so that if the patient cannot introspect (this being frequently the case with schizophrenic patients) analysis itself and all its therapeutic inventions are useless.

No doubt neither Wundt nor Fechner ever dreamed of such romantic and dashing roles for their subject matter as those invented by Freud. Nor could they think that their simple introspective methods would assume the brilliant garb of the technique of free association and its use of symbols, dreams, and classical phraseology.

Without a doubt Freud himself was not aware of the source of his ideas when he set about elaborating his various therapeutic techniques. Rather he seems merely to have used in his own psychopathological research the then used methods of psychological experimentation⁹.

⁹ Nota: Nor is it our task to here criticize Freud for having "borrowed" methods from psychology, for this is really not a fault in this instance but serves well to further illustrate how dependant Freud was upon his time and the ideas then current.

Let not the reader think that Freud did nothing more than unconsciously borrow ideas from his contemporaries when elaborating his own system. He was undoubtedly influenced by many ideas current in his day of which he was not entirely aware, but there was also much personal work, research and subsequent inventions of his own. Many of his theories and therapeutic techniques are purely personal and in spite of their erroneous and insecure foundations they are none the less personal¹⁰.

The deterministic laboratory methods of the psychology of Wundt, given over to the study of the contents of consciousness and the higher mental processes, not only represented the general laboratory trend of the day in psychology, but also left their unmistakable mark upon psychoanalysis. In this, however, psychoanalysis was but the child of its age and unfortunately no better than its times.

Not only had these laboratory methods penetrated every recess of human knowledge, those of scientific elementarism had also. This peculiar feature of the science of the last century (which is still with us to a certain extent) may or may not have had its origin in the doctrines of Kant (1724-1804). However, elementarism in science was most rampant at the time of Freud and overtly manifest in the Law of Parsimony of Lloyd

¹⁰ Nota: v.g. symbols and symbolization, the dream work, the psychopathology of everyday life, wit, and countless others.

Morgan which admirably summed up this general trend and which seems to have greatly influenced Freud's teachings concerning the instincts of man.

This elementaristic feature of science was most apparent in physiology which then claimed to hold the explanations not only of the physical structure of man but also of his psychological life. In this way, the subject matter and contents of physiology, with its reflexes and functions, (with which are closely linked the instincts and emotions), came to be looked upon as the real solution to man's psychological problems and the ultimate basis of his psychic life. Physiology had extended itself into psychology and psychology had become physiological¹¹.

In view of this general scientific attitude, Freud's broad concept of the instincts and libidinal energy enmeshed in man, both in the realm of the physiological and psychological, becomes more readily understood. It is but one of the logical consequences of scientific elementarism whose chief role is to metamorphose the physical into the spiritual, efface the gap between the two and make of the spirit a phase of matter.

This age, however, did not produce faulty doctrines

¹¹ Note: Of elementarism as one of the philosophical and scientific shortcomings of psychoanalysis Chapter XI treats extensively.

and pernicious influences exclusively! To the contrary, some of the schools born in this period reflected definitely encouraging and truthful teachings which had they been propounded prior to Fechner's Elemente (1860) in which he infused goodly doses of his personal philosophy of psychophysical parallelism would have surely served as a steadier foundation for psychophysics than did the teachings of both Fechner and Wundt with their insecure philosophical backgrounds.

This school was that of Act Psychology founded by the Austrian thinker Franz Brentano whose training in Aristotelianism would have served modern psychology in good stead had it lent a more attentive ear to his teachings.

If one forces his powers of imagination somewhat, it becomes apparent that there is a little afterglow of the Aristotelian in Freud. This seeming contradiction in terms is one of the most interesting features of psychoanalysis.

Freud has recognized during the course of his long life at least two distinct truths which through his explanations became so clouded in a mire of error as to emerge incomprehensible.

These truths are man's quest for happiness (Freud invariably uses the German word lust, pleasure...) and his fundamental division of the psychic life of man into three parts, what he calls the Id, Ego and Super-ego, and what Aristotle more clearly, more completely and more objectively entitled the

vegetative, sentient and intellectual souls of man.

It is most interesting to attempt to trace this tripartite Freudian division of man's psychic apparatus to its possible source. If it is to be at all attributed to Aristotle or Aristotelian influence, it can be the exclusive result of the teachings of Franz Brentano only¹².

Franz Brentano (1838-1917), the brilliant and tragic Austrian psychologist, reminiscent of Abelard with respect to both his qualities and faults, was the only founding father of modern psychology who was well versed in the philosophy of Aristotle and the Schoolmen.

His own school of modern psychology, Act Psychology, and its immediate offspring the Austrian (Graz) school of the Gestaltqualität developed by his pupils Christian von Ehrenfels and Alexius Meinong, can justly trace its ancestry to Aristotle¹³.

Brentano's most important work, in which are found the basic principles of Act Psychology is his Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte which appeared in 1874. At least 20 years separated Brentano's works from those of Freud, and during the

12 Nota: Act Psychology emphasizes the importance of psychological activities and processes (faculties in Scholastic rational psychology) rather than psychological contents, or the contents of these activities.

13 Nota: Gestaltqualität is a German word which means form--quality; the attribute of having a pattern or configuration. The principal outcome of the Austrian school of the Gestaltqualität of v. Ehrenfels and Meinong has been Wertheimer's Gestalt school (1912). Gestalt is a term which means configuration and as a school implies the attempt to seize psychological behaviour as a whole.

interval, Viennese intellectual circles must have become cognizant of the Aot psychologist and his teachings. Not only did he write his works in Vienna, but he lived there as well. He also taught in Vienna and at nearby Würzburg, the home of Külpe, Ach, Watt, Messer and imageless thought.

The hypothesis, if not probable, is at least possible, although the basic idea of threefold division once grinded by Freud's intellectual mill ultimately emerged as a flour of unrecognizable substance requiring much imaginative daring and good will to make it palatable¹⁴.

However, the men of science of the Teutonic nations were not alone in incurring the debt of psychoanalysis. The importance of Freud's visits to France must of necessity be emphasized for it is in France that he claims to have had first infused into his mind the idea which won him such universal notoriety among fellow practitioners and laity alike.

The idea, of course, is sex and its supposed sire is the great Jean Martin Charcot (1825-1893), the neuropsychiatrist of La Salpetriere, who achieved such fame in psychiatric circles for his use of hypnosis as a therapeutic treatment and his belief in the psychic origin of certain of the mental diseases.

¹⁴ Nota: Of course, the origin of the previously mentioned Freudian doctrines concerning the quest for happiness, characteristic of man, can come only from the hedonistic teachings of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche. Chapter XIII, in a comparative study of the teachings of Freud and Thomas Aquinas, treats of this topic extensively.

Freud spent considerable time with Charcot in Paris in the mid 80's and to this stay he attributes his interest in the importance of sex in man.

The most emphatic passages in Freud concerning this topic read:

The idea (sex) for which I was held responsible had not at all originated with me. It had come to me from three persons, for whose opinions I entertained the deepest respect: from Breuer himself, from Charcot and from Chrobak, the gynecologist of our University...All three men had imparted to me an insight which, strictly speaking, they had not themselves possessed. Two of them denied their communication to me when later I reminded them of it; the third (Charcot, who died in 1893) would have also done so had it been granted me to see him again.

Charcot said suddenly (during an interview with a friend and in Freud's presence, where they had been discussing the neurosis of a virgo intacta whose husband had been impotent for years) and with great vivacity: Mais dans des cas pareils, c'est toujours la chose génitale, toujours, toujours, toujours. (Freud then asked himself). Yes, but if he knows this, why does he never say so¹⁵?

Breuer, for whom we have reserved a separate section of this chapter, and Chrobak, the Viennese gynecologist, are also cited as possible origins for this interest in sex. What is less widely known, however, is the fact that Arthur Schopenhauer had mentioned sex in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819) in terms that, should their exact origin be unknown, could quite readily be attributed to the fertile imagination of Freud.

For instance we read in Schopenhauer: "The sexual impulse also proves itself the decided and strongest assertion of

15 HPM pp. 937-938.

life." And elsewhere; "For all love, however ethereal it may bear itself, is rooted in the sexual impulse alone." This last sentence is remarkably Freudian, yet it was written one hundred years before Freud's major works¹⁶.

We have already seen how Schopenhauer's teachings may have reached Freud. However, it is well to remember that, although Freud might have been greatly influenced by Charcot, Breuer or Chrobak, the general atmosphere in the philosophical circles of Germany and Austria with regards to the instincts was decidedly in favour of the ways of thinking of Schopenhauer and his blind and anti-intellectualistic voluntarism. This environment must have made itself felt upon Freud's thought even before his work with Breuer and his trips to France.

This is of the utmost importance for it further reveals how dependant psychoanalysis is upon its times and the teachings then current in the world. With a background such as that provided not only by the philosophers of his day, but also by that of the science of that age, the deterministic and evolutionary materialism of the last years of the 19th Century, Freud's psychoanalysis was indeed off to a bad start in the light of objective truth.

The fight for and against the importance of sex in man, and in the widest sense of the word the instincts in gen-

¹⁶ Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, New York, Random House, 1928, pp. 240, 273.

eral, has been the subject of voluminous literature. The scientific and philosophical setting of this struggle makes it one of the most interesting battlefields of modern thought.

Before the advent of Watson and the Behaviouristic cohorts¹⁷, most scientists readily recognized the existence of a detailed multitude of instincts and attributed a goodly portion of man's behaviour to his instincts. After Watson, there remained but three: love, fear and rage!

In complete juxtaposition with the ultra-scientific and objective psychological methods of John Broadus Watson (1878-) founder of currently popular Behaviourism and the psychologist of psychology without a soul, must appear the theoretical and at times mystical hypotheses and theories of psychoanalysis and its exaltation of the instincts.

Yet strangely enough both schools are but applying in their wordy way the guiding principle of Lloyd Morgan's "law of parsimony", which enjoyed much vogue in the latter years of the 19th Century and the early years of the present. It sums up remarkably well all the antedating scientific trends with regards to the instincts.

The law of parsimony as found in Lloyd Morgan's Introduction to Comparative Psychology, 1894, (p. 53) reads to the effect that "in no case may we interpret an action as the out-

¹⁷ J.B. Watson, Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It, 1913.

come of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale."

The elementaristic flavour of Morgan's law is overwhelming. It is the complete exaltation of those "faculties which stand lower in the psychological scale", whereas it represents an utter disrespect for man's "higher psychical faculties."

Its evolutionary basis is also obvious, as it embodies the general tendency of making the higher mental processes and more complex functions of man evolve from the exercise of lower functions upon which they are made to depend.

These were the days when evolution and elementarism had asserted their hegemony over the instincts and had made them mount the lofty summits which lead to man's mind. It is not surprising therefore that these traits are manifest in psychoanalysis into which Morgan's law of parsimony fits with remarkable precision.

In psychoanalysis, the instincts not only explain instinctive and emotional behaviour in man, but also reach far up into the heights of his rational conduct and functions, transcending their own material and sentient nature by means of sublimation. Psychoanalysis is the complete triumph of the instincts over reason, the irrational over the rational, and the brute over the human being.

This age, however, was not only the heyday of the instincts, it was also a great age for the urges, drives, élans and trieben. One of the most revealing of coincidences yet to occur in modern psychology as indicative of simultaneity in trends of thought was the practically concomitant birth of two schools which emphasize the importance of drives in the human being. They are the schools of psychoanalysis and that of Hormic Psychology, both founded or made public to the world of science in 1908, the one by Freud, the other by McDougall (1871-1938).

Most likely there is no mutual influence existing between the two, one which emphasizes the importance of sex in man, the other underscoring that of purpose. The purposive nature of Hormic Psychology is much akin to the teleological teachings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and Scholasticism¹⁸. The simultaneity of this dual foundation is of course coincidental, but it serves well to illustrate the general tendencies of modern scientific psychology in which psychoanalysis has fully participated.

We have reserved for the end of this topic our considerations of Josef Breuer, to a great extent the co-founder of

¹⁸ Nota: The Aristotelian teleology is so similar to that of McDougall that the late professor of Duke University has been accused by his fellow psychologists of being more the philosopher and less the psychologist. However, it is the author's conviction that McDougall's Hormic Psychology represents a beneficial trend in modern psychology. Hormic Psychology was "founded" with the appearance of McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology in 1908. McDougall is also known as the father of modern social psychology.

psychoanalysis whose crucial influence upon analysis is often overlooked.

Breuer's collaboration with Freud should not be mentioned merely as a historical fact, but should also be taken to imply all the influences which several years of collaboration invariably cause to arise between co-workers. Two men cannot conceivably work together for years without each influencing the thought of the other.

Josef Breuer was a physiologist of repute whose name is associated with that of Ernst Mach, (1838-1916) the physicist and physiologist (who also delved into psychology), because of their joint work in the realm of equilibrium and the perception of rotation as a function of the non-auditory labyrinths of the inner ear. The Mach-Breuer theory of rotation-perception (1897) is generally accepted today and for this alone Breuer would be assured of a worthy niche in the hall of fame of science.

However, Breuer was a man of broad interests which included philosophy, psychiatry, physiology, physics, and even linguistics, it is said. Freud's philosophy owes much to Breuer, but to this the preceding chapter was devoted, and of course as the reader already knows, many of the therapeutic innovations of psychoanalysis are in great part due to him.

Prior to their separation in 1895, Breuer seems to have been the guiding light of the pair of collaborators. This

was perhaps due to his greater age, reputation and experience. To him also are due the first theoretical considerations of their joint publications (many ideas of which were borrowed from Herbart), and the technique of "talking-out", subsequently known as the cathartic method which finally emerged as the technique of free association¹⁹.

The "cathartic method", the ideas of "abreaction", dynamism and thresholds, that of transference (of which Breuer could be called the proto-martyr!), and the term "mechanism" can be traced in one way or another to Breuer. It is evident that a substantial portion of analytic theory and therapy is involved in these terms. In view of this, Breuer's influence cannot be looked upon as insignificant.

By training Breuer seems to have been more the scientist than Freud. Proof of this is to be found in his collaboration with Mach. Freud, had he had the necessary background and education would have been a wonderful poet or novelist a la Proust. However he brought with him into science his romantic nature, the outcome of which has been psychoanalysis.

Just before the appearance of their second joint paper, Studien über Hysterie (1895), Breuer separated from Freud and returned to private research and practice. We already have seen various reasons as to why this separation took place. The

¹⁹ AS p. 37. Note: Allers is also of this opinion. See The Successful Error, chapter XII.

author in his various readings concerning the topic has come upon the following text which is most revealing:

All too easily one gets into the habit of thought of assuming behind a substantive a substance, of gradually understanding by consciousness an entity. If then, one has got used to employing local relations metaphorically, as, e.g., 'Subconscious', as time goes on an idea will actually develop in which the metaphor has been forgotten and which is as easily manipulated as a material thing. Then mythology is complete²⁰.

This is an admirable statement which becomes really astonishing when its author is known. It was made by no less a person than Doctor Josef Breuer, the one-time collaborator of Freud!

If this be so, it is no longer surprising that a separation took place between both colleagues. Breuer seems to have recognized Freud's tendency towards speculation and mythical disregard for objective facts and undoubtedly refused to continue. This is surely not an unplausible hypothesis.

It is unfortunate that Freud was so given to intellectual vagabonding in the realm of theory. Had he been more sedate, his findings would have been less spectacular and no doubt less popular but ultimately more helpful to humanity.

But Freud was Freud in whose person were infused the most regrettable trends of modern philosophy and science. Had he not been possessed of a speculative and imaginative nature

²⁰ Breuer and Freud, Studien über Hysterie, 2te Aufl. 1909, p. 199, cited by A. Wohlgemuth, A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1923, p. 51.

these influences would surely not have taken the disastrous turn so characteristic of psychoanalysis.

However Freud's was a mind that was completely dominated by flights into psychopathological fancy and obsessed by irresistible love for the goddess of speculation. The unfortunate fruit of this union has been the school of medical psychology, deterministic in nature, materialistic in principles, godless in outlook and hedonistic in morals which has come to be known as psychoanalysis. Most successfully fostered by a pernicious scientific and philosophical background psychoanalysis could not have been other than it is.

PART FOUR

PSYCHOANALYSIS: ITS PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER XI

A MIRAGE AND ITS GUILT

Psychoanalysis was at best a restricted psychology, an imperfect science, a destructive philosophy and a pernicious ethical system based upon faulty logical premises. Thus will read the epitaph-verdict of future historians contemplating the ultimate resting place and last mortal remains of what was once proudly arrogant psychoanalysis.

During its long eventful life, since the momentous days of its birth until its last death throes, there became manifest in psychoanalysis many undeniable deficiencies which completely justified this sentence and condemnation on the part of the men of science and philosophy of the future generations.

At birth, the true nature of analysis lay dormant as does that of the baby in its cradle, unaware of its environment or its heredity. Psychoanalysis was born into an environment the essence of which we have seen. It was also possessed of a heredity the poor quality of which we know. At the very moment it stepped into this world, psychoanalysis was already heavily burdened with tremendous handicaps which do not make for long life.

During its early years these innate shortcomings developed rapidly under the guidance of their mentor, Sigmund Freud, who added to them many of his own faults and deficiencies of which we are also aware. The result of this fusion has been psychoanalysis, the guile of which we shall attempt to unmask.

One of the most obvious of psychoanalytical shortcomings, one which appeared very early in its existence, is its relative lack of contact with the outer-world, be it scientific or philosophical. Psychoanalysis is a school of medical psychology, yet it has few relations with either medicine or psychology. Why is this? The answer is quite simple.

Psychoanalysis is not a true science. It greatly lacks in some of the most important features of scientific method without which a branch of human knowledge cannot be real science but only the illusion of science. This peculiar characteristic of the science called psychoanalysis is due in great part to the blind narrow-minded subjectivism and fanaticism which was instilled into it by its founder.

Psychoanalysis is not a true science, nor can it ever be one, for it does not and cannot possibly submit its findings, its subject matter and its conclusions to the general verification of the scientific world.

The experiments of the physicists, the electrolyses of

the chemists, the observations of the biologist, the calculations of the astronomer, even the white rats of the psychologist, are facts or based upon facts which may be controlled, reproduced, repeated, and verified by any worker with sufficient training within or without the field. This is not so in psychoanalysis.

The findings of psychoanalysis cannot be verified, nor can an analysis be duplicated. The data of analysis are unobtainable, unverifiable and uncontrollable by the scientific world in general for the simple fact that the raw data of an analytical hour are not only the personal associations of the patient but also and above all the interpretations of the analyst himself.

The only possible way of controlling both and mostly of verifying the objectivity of the interpretations of the analyst (if this be possible...) would be by means of radionic recordings. This in itself is not feasible because of the great length of psychoanalytical treatment. When one considers how much can be said in an hour, the impracticality of recordings during a year's time becomes obvious.

The world of science has only the testimonials of the analyst upon which to rely. This means nothing more than trusting his word concerning the success of his methods and the objectivity of his interpretations.

The only logical outcome of this situation is the subordination of objective science to subjective opinions, thus making of science the mere pawn of personal opinions and of reality the mere projection of individual thought.

This subjectivistic nature so characteristic of psychoanalysis is a deficiency of the first magnitude in the field of science. Of course there do exist some sciences which are more dependant upon the subjective findings of their respective investigators than others. This trait is to be found to a certain extent in the so-called natural sciences (those sciences not directly reducible to mathematical or quantitative form, such as psychiatry, anatomy, zoology, botany, physiology, and in great part psychology).

This "irreducibility" of some of the natural sciences to mathematical formulae is used by analysis as an argument in favour of its own subjective methods. However, the analysts do not seem to be aware of the fallacies of their reasoning. In the so-called natural sciences facts remain facts none the less, observable by all, controllable and verifiable by all the field in spite of the subjective observations of each individual worker.

In the natural sciences, no theoretical elaborations are needed to explain the facts and phenomena observed. In psychoanalysis, however, when the analyst observes his facts

and attempts to interpret them, he does so in the light of his theoretical background. In these circumstances, facts (or raw data) no longer remain facts but become in reality projected theories.

This subjective tendency is obvious in the therapeutic techniques of psychoanalysis. To anyone who is aware of the real nature of Freud's symbolization and interpretation, it becomes evident that during treatment the analyst chooses and interprets among the associations of his patient only those which he thinks important or which are shown to be so by his theoretical background and supporting assumptions concerning symbols, wit, dreams and sex in the neuroses.

In this way, objective science must invariably become the subordinate of subjective methods. This is most apparent in a comparative study of Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian methods of analysis. When free association is used in these schools the resulting interpretation of the associated data invariably differs, becoming threefold because of the divergencies of their respective theoretical backgrounds.

The free associations of a single dream, if interpreted separately by representatives of the schools of Freud, Jung or Adler, inevitably give rise to three different interpretations. This is due to the differing theoretical assumptions of each; Freud interpreting in the light of sex and the

libido; Jung in view of his concepts of total vital energy in man; and Adler with respect to his complexes of inferiority and superiority, his will to power.

This is surely not the case in true science where facts remain facts in spite of divergencies of theoretical opinions on the part of the investigators.

For instance, in physics light is said to travel at a rate of speed amounting to 300,000 kilometers per second. The fact that the observing physicist upholds the corpuscular or wave theory of light transmission will in no way alter the speed of the light transmission itself. Light will always travel at 300.000 kilometers per second whether the physicist likes it or not.

The same is true in psychophysiology. In psychophysiology, the rate of speed of the nervous impulse in man remains 123 meters per second increasing in geometric proportion at a ratio of about 1.06 for every degree centigrade, whether the investigator be an elementarist, evolutionist, or creationist in physiology, or a behaviourist, functionalist or gestaltist in psychology.

This is not the case in psychoanalysis where fact becomes fact only inasmuch as it is so deemed by an underlying theory. This becomes obvious when one submits the facts of psychoanalysis to even a cursory analysis and examination. Let us

consider, for instance, the fact of resistance¹.

Resistance on the part of the patient, according to Freud, is that fact which occurs when the patient's chain of free associations is broken and progress is impeded until an obstacle-barrier (the censor, Super-ego) is removed, or overcome. After the removal of this psychic barrier, the associations reveal invariably trying and traumatic material².

This is a beautiful example of the intermingling of objective fact with subjective theory, so characteristic of psychoanalysis. The only fact is the broken chain of free associations. All the rest (barrier, Super-ego and censorship) is theoretical hypothesis which Freud has assumed to exist (and finally come to accept as self-evident) but which is decidedly difficult to ascertain in reality.

The fact of the broken chain of associations might be explained just as easily and perhaps more plausibly by referring to fatigue, momentary distraction, psychic "indeterminism" or other ways, rather than postulating an inner psychic conflict of mutually opposed entities such as the Id, Ego and Super-ego. The fact of resistance is not a fact at all, but

1 HPM p. 939. Nota: The following chapter (Chap. XII) contains an examination of various other facts of psychoanalysis viewed mostly in the light of analysis' constant intermingling of fact and theory of which resistance is a remarkable example.

2 IL pp. 248-250. Nota: Kindly refer to previous chapters of this work, in particular Chapter IV.

sheer subjective theory dressed in the garb of a fact.

This subjectivistic methodological aspect of psychoanalysis is linked most intimately with another serious deficiency embodied in the restricted psychological theory of analysis. Psychoanalysis is an utterly restricted psychology, because of a completely restricted philosophy.

Among the sciences, psychology is the most closely related with philosophy. Its subject matter (material object) is much the same as that of rational or philosophical psychology. However, in view of the distinct formal objects of both, there exists an essential difference between the two. Because of the similarity of their respective subject matter, it is to be expected that two points of view, one scientific, the other philosophical, will undubitably arise concerning many topics especially those not beyond the reach of scientific method.

In the light of objective truth, these two points of view should never be self-contradictory; rather each should complete the other. However, this is not often the case in the contemporary world of scientific psychology as all the schools of modern psychology are in a sense restricted psychologies, restricted by false philosophical conceptions of man and his universe.

For instance, behaviourism excludes consciousness from its field of investigation. Why? Because it does not admit

the existence of a soul (the raison d'être of consciousness). Of course, the existence of a soul in man is essentially a conclusion of philosophical nature. Such a conclusion cannot possibly be arrived at by true scientific methodology and laboratory procedure.

In this way, the behaviourist cannot have come to the above-mentioned exclusion of man's soul and consciousness from the scope of psychology by his own laboratory methods. He must have assumed this among his philosophical postulates, otherwise such an exclusion is logically incoherent. It is not surprising thus to find that behaviourism which omits consciousness from its subject matter is but a phase of elementaristic materialism which also emphatically denies the existence of a soul in man.

This same characteristic of restricted subject matter is found in psychoanalysis. In the foregoing chapters, the reader must have come to notice that psychoanalysis never mentions the existence of a soul in man; that little heed is paid to intellection, the will and higher mental processes; and that on the contrary much ink is spilled over the emotions and the instincts.

Furthermore he has remarked the complete disregard of psychoanalysis for the freedom of the will; its utter contempt for the first principles, not only of the speculative, but also the practical intellect; its lack of consideration for reason;

and its grossly deficient studies of the rational and intellectual functions of man.

The subject matter of psychoanalytical psychology is most restricted. It is content with studying primarily the instincts, the emotions, the unconscious and in general the more irrational phases of man's nature to the exclusion of his higher mental processes³.

Secondarily, psychoanalytical psychology treats of such topics as sublimation, of groups, the child, or in general all those subjects pertaining to applications or consequences which analysis attributes to the instincts, emotions and the unconscious.

In psychoanalytical psychology, there is very little place for man's rational behaviour. There is place only for such topics as can be successfully treated under the heading of instinctive dynamism in the most irrational sense of the term. Freud's psychology is restricted exclusively to consideration of those topics which come under the aegis of man's sentient soul alone⁴. This can be the result of but one cause, a philo-

3 Nota: Freud might argue that psychoanalysis is surely not a restricted psychology, but an indeed universal one, because of the universality of the instincts and the libido, which even become intellectual and spiritual by means of sublimation. Be that as it may, here we restrict our considerations to objective philosophy and reality which recognizes the unbridgeable gap which exists between matter and spirit (the which gap Freud has bridged by an essentially material mechanism - sublimation).

4 Nota: This is one of the conclusions arrived at by the author in his comparative study of Freud and Thomas Aquinas (cf. Chap. XIII). The psychology of psychoanalysis is restricted entirely to those topics which Saint Thomas treats of under the heading of man's sentient soul.

sophy with which psychoanalysis is alone compatible, - a sheer unmitigated materialism.

It is not hard to prove that psychoanalysis is a thorough-going materialism. We have already directly implied this conclusion in our preceding studies concerning the scientific and philosophical background of analysis, then confining our views to its more historical setting rather than to the nature of psychoanalytical philosophy itself.

However, psychoanalysis is not materialistic solely because of its background. It is materialistic in itself and the key to this materialism is its various phases of determinism, elementarism, instinctivism, and subjectivism of the most hedonistic flavour.

Psychoanalysis is a school of thought which pays deep homage to the most rigid of determinisms. This is not in the least difficult to prove. We have already seen that Freud himself has proudly upheld the banner of psychological determinism as being the real symbol and achievement of the true scientific spirit⁵. It is because of Freud's deterministic weltanschauung in great part that materialism is so rampant in psychoanalysis.

Determinism in psychoanalysis is intimately related with the technique of free association. Determinism, in fact,

⁵ PEL pp. 150ff. Nota: We have already described to a great extent the determinism of psychoanalysis in some of our preceding chapters, especially Chapters III, IX, and X.

is the core of psychoanalytical free association⁶, and consequently of the therapeutic method of analysis itself. Free association is used by Freud to reach the unconscious causes of mental states, the associated ideas themselves rising somehow out of the unconscious.

Because of this, he believes each association to be causally linked with its immediate predecessor which in turn is causally linked with its predecessor until the primary association source is reached⁷. A genetic outlook such as this is essential to any therapy which makes use of free association in the manner of psychoanalysis.

When this causal nexus between associated ideas is examined more closely, it soon becomes evident that it is none other and can be none other than efficient in nature⁸. Efficient causality in the therapeutic technique of psychoanalysis is the only causality which is ever recognized and mentioned because it is the only one which is compatible with a rigidly deterministic outlook on psychic phenomena.

6 Nota: The author uses "psychoanalytical free association" here in order to distinguish the analytical technique from free association as it is used by other schools of psychology for widely diverging purposes, v.g. as in experimental studies of the phenomenon of retroactive inhibition, the Rorschach tests, or other experimental uses.

7 Nota: See Chap. III concerning the postulates of psychoanalytical free association.

8 Nota: That is, the causal nexus of psychoanalytical free associations as they arise out of the unconscious during treatment.

In a deterministic world, one event invariably determines the incidence of another and so on until the present, making it possible in this way to retrace any phenomenon to its immediate forebear. In a world such as this, there can exist but one type of causality and this type is efficient causality⁹.

Interest in efficient causes to the exclusion of all others immediately restricts the scope and breadth of any psychology. Where there exists only efficient causality, there can exist no freedom of choice (for all incidents are but the necessary outcome of their antecessors); there can be no real teleological behaviour in the higher mental plane (for this involves freedom of choice); nor of course any formal or material causation (materialistic determinism is the very negation of these).

In therapeutic treatment a deterministic position may prove quite convenient at times. In psychoanalytical therapy such a position becomes essential, for if one is going to use free association exclusively in order to retrace the causes of mental ailments, one must believe in the widespread applicability and efficacy of efficient causation, otherwise how can one

9 Nota: Final causality on the higher mental level (not the instinctive behaviour of animals destined to fulfill a purpose by the Creator) implies active intellectual insight into a problem to be solved or an end to be achieved. An insight such as this cannot exist on the purely unconscious level of psychic activity with which psychoanalytical free association is primarily concerned in its therapeutic aims. The Id knows no active intellectual comprehension of problems; it is fully unconscious.

be sure of reaching the association-source and original cause of the psychic disorder?

Freud does not seem to have been aware of the obvious fallacy of his reasoning when he applied efficient causality to the exclusion of all others to the realm of psychology. Rather, he seems to have been completely unaware of the existence of other types of causality. He appears to have applied in psychoanalysis the methods of physiology, anatomy and medicine where, of course, efficient causality reigns supreme. In the inanimate world, the principle of final causation exists only in a rudimentary way as animal instincts destined to fulfill a purpose or as the laws of nature established by the Creator. In this realm there is no final causality in the true sense of the word for there is no intellectual insight into aims and ends to be achieved.

However, in the world of man's psychic activity there do exist events, incidents, and general behaviour which do not necessarily imply the intervention and presence of efficient causality alone. Rather they require absolutely the presence of the principle of teleology or final causation if any insight at all is to be obtained and a logical explanation be given them.

Psychoanalysis does not categorically deny the existence of final causality. However, in psychoanalysis, its applications have been so restricted as to make its existence virtually

impossible. Freud has permitted final causation to make a very cursory appearance on the stage of psychoanalysis, not in a psychological role, but as the prima donna of man's physiological processes only.

This becomes manifest in the crude way in which he destined the instincts, the libido and the Id to fulfill the exigencies of the pleasure principle, to drive man towards the ends to which the libido is destined to carry into effect, and accomplish the aims of man's animal urges.

It is the final causality which Saint Thomas reserves for the infra-rational world, the sentient soul of man. The psychoanalytical notion of causality in general and final causation in particular is therefore essentially incomplete for it does not in the least imply active purpose and intellectual insight into goals to be achieved.

Final causation in psychoanalysis has remained rooted in the realm of instincts and physiology. Because of this, Freud never speaks of its presence in the higher mental processes of man. The reason for this omission is very simple. He cannot do so and still remain true to his rigid determinism.

Should he do so, the only possible outcome would be the complete destruction of his technique of free association and of his genetic outlook on mental phenomena. This becomes even more apparent when we stop to consider the fact that psychoanalysis is mostly concerned, not with the contents of the free

associations themselves but only inasmuch as they will lead to the association-source dormant in the unconscious. In other words, psychoanalysis is interested only in the causal nexus between associations and not the associations themselves.

In this lies the chief fallacy of Freud's ideas concerning free association. He has considered this nexus between associations as being exclusively efficient; he has not even considered the possibility of its being final or teleological. This efficient determinism is indeed an incomplete outlook on psychic phenomena.

Many associations and associated ideas are undoubtedly causally interlinked with specific incidents and events. That this occurs is undeniable and the reader should be able to recall many personal idea-associations of this type which he can consciously retrace to a definite causal source.

Many of our associations, however, are no longer traceable to their original source, time and memory making their presence inexorably felt. Yet there are certain ways in which to learn that the associated ideas of an individual are causally linked with an event, or object.

For instance, when an examiner finds that a person is continually associating the word black with automobile, whereas the great majority of the population invariably associates with the colour black its opposite on the achromatic scale, white, he may safely conclude that the word black (stimulus-word) has

assuredly something to do with a black automobile in this person's mind.

He is now in presence of a fact of association. This fact is the word black associated with automobile. If the examiner then proceeds to state that this association is due to efficient causality alone (as is the case in the genetic outlook of psychoanalysis), he is now leaving his fact aside and entering the realm of theory, mingling either personal or scholastic hypotheses with his fact.

When he does this, he is going far beyond the scope of his fact, for how can he be sure that the association is due to efficient causality only? Such a conclusion is not only incomplete, it is also far beyond the limits of scientific methodology for the simple reason that the association black with automobile equally well implies that the individual concerned may have been hit by a black sedan (efficient causation), or may ardently desire a sleek black limousine for the purpose (final causation) of seeking a well needed rest, of showing off, of committing a murder, or, as a matter of fact, for any other end.

Associations, therefore, are not exclusively of the realm of efficient causality. It is only a deterministic point of view that makes them so. It thus follows that only determinism can substantiate an exclusively genetic outlook on psychic phe-

nomena (a view which is essentially incomplete) and it is only determinism which can warrant the exclusion of final causation from the scope of scientific psychology.

This omission of teleology in psychoanalysis is but another example of the restrictions imposed by materialism and determinism upon their followers. There can be no undeterministic materialisms, nor can there be unmaterialistic determinisms. The very terms imply the crudest of logical contradictions.

Freud, however, never greatly bothered himself about the logical consistency of his thought. One of his most persistent and characteristic logical deficiencies is his continual failure to grasp the fallacy of the statement, post hoc, ergo propter hoc¹⁰.

A remarkable example of this peculiar logical deficiency rampant in psychoanalysis is found in the writings of Doctor Karen Horney, one of Freud's followers. In her popular work, The Neurotic Personality of our Times, Doctor Horney has used the following example to illustrate the neurotic patient's need for power, prestige and possession.

A girl was strongly attached to her brother who was four years older than she. They had indulged in tenderness of a more or less sexual character, but when the girl was eight years old her brother suddenly rejected her, pointing out that they were now too old for that sort of play. Soon after this experience, the girl developed a sudden fierce ambition at school. It was

¹⁰ Nota: The affirmation post hoc, ergo propter hoc can be true only in a world of material determinism, of course. In this sense, Freud is completely logical.

caused certainly by a disappointment in her quest for affection (which in psychoanalysis is libidinal and therefore sexual in nature) and this was all the more painful as this child had not many people to cling to¹¹.

Doctor Horney apparently takes it for granted that the little girl's "fierce ambition" in school was assuredly due to her frustrated desires of affection. How can she be sure of this? The little girl's sudden scholastic ambitions are certainly chronologically subsequent to her sexual frustrations, a post hoc, but how can she be certain that both are causally related, a propter hoc?

By stating that the little girl's sudden scholarly ambitions are due to an experience of sexual frustration, Doctor Horney oversteps the basic laws of logic and scientific methodology. The child's fierce ambition in school may have been caused by a multitude of reasons other than sexual frustration: for instance, personal ambition, jealousy, rivalry, or a remonstrance by the teacher which the child might have withheld from the analyst.

Doctor Horney is taking for granted many things which are not quite so apparent as psychoanalysis makes them out to be, such as infantile sexuality, love's (tenderness and affection) identification with sex and the libido, and the widespread

¹¹ Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of our Times, New York, W.W.Norton, 1937, p. 164.

influence which psychoanalysis attributes to these peculiar concepts in man's life. Her attitude, however, is compatible with one basic idea which alone can give it a semblance of logic. This idea is a rigidly deterministic materialism of which the above-mentioned case is a beautiful example¹².

Determinism is not the only regrettable characteristic of psychoanalysis. The preceding chapters have also made manifest another pernicious deficiency to be found in analysis, bestowed upon it by its unfortunate heredity as it crossed the threshold of life.

This trait is elementarism. Elementarism in itself is one of the direct results of a materialistic philosophy and it is strictly compatible only and exclusively with the principles of materialism.

The tenets of elementarism in science stand in direct opposition to the intellectual and spiritual. They imply immediately the hegemony of matter in science, the nonexistence of the mind as such, and the general tendency of physiology to proclaim that it possesses the ultimate explanations of the more psychological aspects of man. In psychology itself, the elementaristic trend is overtly manifest in behaviourism; however, it is currently most noticeable in those sciences which are close to matter yet very near the mind, the biological sciences

¹² Note: This case also serves well to illustrate the general intermingling of fact and theory in psychoanalysis and the importance achieved by preconceived ideas. Change the idea of the all-importance of sex in this case, and the entire psycho-analytical fact of sudden scholarly ambitions falls to the ground.

such as physiology, anatomy, biology, and the medical sciences (and of course, behaviourism in psychology).

Its principal scientific tenets are based upon the assumption that there is no distinction between mind and matter; that mind, as it is usually spoken of, does not exist at all; and that in fact it is really nothing more than a more perfectly developed organ, a material conglomeration of highly specialized cells.

This materialistic and purely laboratory approach to the topic of intellection has resulted in the spread of experimental physiology into the kingdom of the spirit and the proclamation of the identity of the two worlds. Of course, in reality, no identification takes place because the spirit is definitely beyond the scope of physiological experimentation.

What takes place is the denial of the spiritual nature of the mind and its exclusion as a topic of study in itself. However, more emphasis is placed on the physiological bases and manifestations of intellection (such as speech and the speech organs as constituting the faculty of intellection and its seat), localization of the higher mental processes in the brain (the research of Franz, Lashley, and the pioneer Broca are good examples of this feature), or the invasion of neurology in general into the realm of the purely psychological¹³.

¹³ Nota: Most of these, the reader will surely recognize as being phases of behaviourism in one way or another. In contemporary psychological circles, Watsonian behaviourism is a typical example of application of physiological methods to the realm of the spirit.

This ascension of the lower functions of man's organism into his higher rational plane of activity is singularly manifest in psychoanalysis. In psychoanalysis the instincts are not only instincts, singular and material in nature, but also the source and cause of culture, the fine arts, music, philosophy and the sciences.

This all-importance and all-embracing scope of the libidinal energies and instinctual urges characteristic of psychoanalysis cannot but be a by-product of elementarism which in turn is an essential phase of any materialistic and deterministic philosophy.

In view of this invasion of the instincts into man's higher mental processes, it is evident that one will not find in Freudian psychoanalysis such "antequated" topics as learning, intellection, perception, retention or volition, for psychoanalysis is a psychology without a soul, without a mind, without a will, without freedom and...without logic.

The emphasis which psychoanalysis places upon the instincts, the title role which it makes them play in man, the dynamic nature which it has bestowed upon them, all contribute to give to analysis a decidedly materialistic flavour and aroma in science and philosophy, and a most unfavourable notoriety in morals.

The very moment one proclaims a doctrine akin to the

Freudian irresistibility and hegemony of the instincts, one can expect considerable opposition on the part of moral philosophers, not only because the instincts are not irresistible, but also because one thereby ultimately implies categorical negation of the first moral principles.

Moreover, when one makes of morality the result of such arbitrary and subjective concepts as an Oedipus Complex and a Super-ego, one can surely expect to be, not only morally and philosophical wrong, but for all practical purposes in flat contradiction with common sense and objective reality, for there exist, whether man likes it or not, objective truths and moral values inherent in man and his universe, among which the principles of practical reason enjoy a point of singular vantage.

We have said that the logical conclusion of the Freudian doctrine of the hegemony of the instincts is the complete denial of the first principles of practical reason, of morality. This is true for more reasons than one.

First, it makes of morality the result of a purely subjective process of organic functions; second, it is the denial of objective moral values based upon intellectual insight and consciousness; and third, it paves the way for the crudest moral hedonism, which, if pushed to its logical consequences means not only destruction for the individual, but for the human race itself.

These assertions may seem daring, yet they are none the less true as has already been implied in the last pages of Chapter VII (the origin of the Super-ego) and as the following pages will show.

The reader will readily recall that each and every complex, entity or mechanism out of which arise the Super-ego and the first moral precepts of psychoanalysis is the result of subjective, physiological drives and instinctive biological impulses which remain totally unconscious and unperceived by the child. Neither the Oedipus Complex, the Super-ego, nor the pleasure principle directly imply outer reality. They are essentially the result of subjective, physiological and instinctual Id-drives.

From a subjective bodily basis such as this, there follows immediately the conclusion that morality itself must of necessity be subjective; that active intellectual insight into actions, ends or even desires themselves, is not required (as a matter of fact, in psychoanalysis, such insight becomes impossible because the activity of the Super-ego is unconscious and the material it censors also unconscious).

Psychoanalytical morality, if reduced to strict essentials, is really the negation of morality and objective reality, the exaltation of subjective opinions and desires, and the scientific sanction of hedonistic behaviour and crass instinctual indulgence.

These are serious affirmations for they imply that the analysts are thorough-going depravers parading under the respectable cloak of science and learning as benefactors of mankind when in reality their moral teachings, if applied to the letter, can result only in the physical and ethieal degradation of man.

Yet this is exactly what is taking place if one considers exclusively the doctrines of psychoanalysis. By strange coincidence, however, the analysts themselves have found it necessary to conduct as a sideline a campaign for morality and observance of the principles of the good life.

An excellent example of this occurred to the writer a few years ago during lectures given by a medical practitioner well versed in analytical traditions. The lecturer, after having reviewed the topic of the instincts with utmost care and stressed the main theories of psychoanalysis a propos and their disastrous consequences if thwarted (repression, neurosis etc.,) asked the students if they had any difficulties which he might solve with regards to the topic.

One student raised his hand and asked a question which in substance ran somewhat thus: "Suppose one always gives in to one's instincts in order to avoid a neurosis. What happens then?" The lecturer answered in all seriousness: "Quite likely he would ruin his health or land in jail." The student deemed the answer sufficient for his purposes. Nevertheless it contains

the flattest contradiction of analysis the author has ever heard. It moreover implies the crudest moral hedonism imaginable.

Hedonism in morality, although not necessarily linked with a materialistic philosophical outlook, is nevertheless generally indicative of and concomitant with such a system of thought in the modern world. This is due in great part to the peculiar trends that modern and contemporary thought have undergone at the hands of materialism during the last century or so.

Hedonism, as it is known in psychoanalysis, is not that refined love and quest for delicate pleasure characteristic of the teachings of Epicurus, who, in spite of his search for pleasure and satisfaction, still recognized the existence and necessity of moral and intellectual values. Freud's is a crude hedonism compared to that of Horace, that Epicuri de grege porcum.

The carpe diem of Horace is in fact the refined and even virtuous contradiction of the lust or vorlust of Freud. Freud knows no refinement in pleasure, nor does he admit of any pleasure other than the libidinal. For him pleasure is univocal; there can be but one pleasure and one source of pleasure in psychoanalysis which can be none other than instinctual in nature, whether it be spiritual or material in its manifestations. For the psychoanalyst, the joys of writing and the pleasure of the act of love are the same, only the methods of manifestation differ (both are aspects and results of libidinal Id-drives, the

former achieved by means of sublimation, the latter being libidinal indulgence in pure form).

Since there can be but one pleasure, and this being intimately connected with sex and the libido, Freudian hedonism can be said to be a direct offspring of his materialism and scientific elementarism.

Nevertheless, Freud seems to have recognized the basic quest for happiness in man. However, the instinctual, hedonistic and libidinal explanation that he has given it have made this urge for happiness totally unrecognizable. This is a beautiful example of what theories can do to facts when the realistic approach is abandoned in order to save at all costs one's theoretical conceptions.

Had Freud's conception of the instincts been less elementaristic, without a doubt his position with regards to morality would have greatly improved. However, psychoanalysis in se is not a school of ethics. It comes under the broad dictates of ethical principles only inasmuch as the laws of morality pervade every human thought and action.

It is because of the pernicious influence that the teachings of psychoanalysis may have that it falls under the wide scope of moral principles and condemnation. It is by its moral results that the hedonism of psychoanalysis must be judged.

As a therapy, psychoanalysis is not concerned with moral-

ity. In its endeavours to cure hysterical symptoms or psychoneurotic ailments psychoanalysis has nothing to do with morality in se or the ethical goodness or evil of the neurotic patient's behaviour.

Rather, psychoanalysis appears to be beneath morality in this respect for all moral conduct implies intellectual processes, recognition of the first ethical principles, and conscious intellectual insight into the ends to be achieved. Of these psychoanalysis knows nothing.

In the phases of its teachings which imply morality, psychoanalysis has never mentioned intellectual or rational processes, intellectual insight or objective reality. Nor do such concepts or entities as the instincts, emotions, sublimation, repression and the Super-ego, from which psychoanalytical morality is said to spring.

An objective philosopher would affirm these irrational or unconscious phases of man's psychic activity to be beneath morality and only actively moral inasmuch as the human being himself becomes intellectually aware of them.

It is absolutely essential to note that every activity linked with morality in psychoanalysis is totally subjective and unconscious. Never once is there an appeal to objective reality, conscious intellectual insight into objective principles of what is good or bad, or active reasoning and judgment about the truth, goodness or evil of a desired end.

The instincts, the censorship and resistances of the Super-ego, the onset of the Oedipus Complex, the Id-drives, the active incestual urges of the child which are the prime-motor and ultimate cause of psychoanalytical morality, are all absolutely subjective and totally unconscious.

Not one of these activities implies the necessity of conscious intellectual insight into a problem, nor do they directly take into account objective reality. Psychoanalysis therefore remains content with exalting as morality a mere part of the matter (in the Aristotelian sense of the word) of morality, while neglecting its form, its very essence (active intellectual insight into the good or evil of an aim, object or action).

In this sense, psychoanalysis is not objective, but most emphatically subjective. It is not moral; it is infra-moral. Its morality is one of matter only and its moral teachings are not moral at all. Its ethics are a crude hedonism which authorizes instinctual indulgence without even mentioning the existence or necessity of intellectual control and judgment. Its morality is essentially incomplete.

The only true and complete moral philosophy is that which respects man's animal nature, but gives precedence to his rationality; which recognizes both the matter and the form of morality; and which acknowledges the objectivity of potency and actuality in nature.

The Aristotelico-Thomistic distinction between form and matter, act and potency, is not very popular today, nor is it to be found in Freud's teachings even in the most rudimentary ways. This lack represents one of his last philosophical shortcomings, but definitely not the least.

Freud never recognized the existence of potency as such in his theories or therapeutics. The reason is simple. He could not do so and still uphold his doctrines concerning the Id. Nor did he acknowledge the objectivity of form, for had he his entire metapsychological structure based upon instinctive dynamism would have come tumbling to the ground¹⁴.

Of course, these two deficiencies are nothing more than ordinary phases of materialism, compatible with this philosophy alone. It is because of these deficiencies in thought that we are led to believe that Freud never insisted upon the subconscious factor of man's mind, preferring to make the subconscious a part of the Ego which is itself an offspring of the Id where no potency exists.

14 Nota: There can be no real potency in man's psychic life as it is portrayed by psychoanalysis for the simple reason that the Id originally contains all man's psychic life. It is out of the Id that are developed the Ego and the Super-ego. The Id, ever actual and dynamic, houses all the subsequent phases and psychic activities of man. These alone are potential in their sequence of appearance, not the Id. In the Id, they are actual. As concerns form, in psychoanalysis, it is quite evident that where there is no soul, there can be no form... A form without a soul is a complete logical absurdity.

It is undoubtedly because of these deficiencies also that he refused to recognize any functions in man other than those reserved by Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas for the sentient soul, thereby excluding from life all that makes of man, man.

In psychoanalysis, man is not man, he is brute. He has no soul other than his instincts. He has no mind other than matter, and no will other than blind impulse. He is not man; he is the illusion of man who has been made to conform to a theory much as water in a glass.

The author knows of no better example of applied philosophy than the philosophy of psychoanalysis; nor can he give a more suitable description of the power of philosophical thought than that embodied in the disastrous effects of the philosophical errors of which psychoanalysis has made use.

The philosophy of psychoanalysis is a thorough-going unmitigated materialism complete in all its phases, determinism, elementarism, and subjective moral hedonism. When a school of thought based upon principles such as these claims to possess the key to the nature of man; when it affirms its tenets to be the source and explanation of human activity, it becomes really astonishing that man himself should survive.

However, man will long outlive psychoanalysis, and will witness its last burial rites. When these take place, psychoanalysis will be nothing more than an unpleasant memory.

CHAPTER XII

THEORY AND THERAPY

Psychoanalysis at birth was a therapeutic method, intent upon curing the psychoneuroses. Upon this primitive method were subsequently imposed the many theoretical assumptions which Freud felt must exist if this therapy were to prove viable.

To both method and theories Freud gave the name psychoanalysis, deeming it inconvenient to give to the therapy one name and to its theoretical counterpart another. This peculiar coincidence, in itself, is most revealing. In our times, as a result of this double personality, psychoanalysis has come to mean both method and doctrine, theory and therapy.

It has been ascertained that the theoretical aspects of analysis are decidedly false and insecure. However, in spite of the poor quality of its theories, psychoanalysis has achieved some success as a therapy. The determining factors of this success are as yet unknown and its decisive mechanisms may be due to causes entirely unrelated with the methods of psychoanalysis¹.

The hypothesis has been advanced that the real source

¹ Nota: Nor has the therapeutic success of analysis merited the unrestricted praise that the analysts themselves claim for it. Analytic therapeutic successes are inferior in number and in duration to those of psychiatry, and the scope of activity of psychoanalytical therapy is greatly restricted compared to that of psychiatry.

of psychoanalytical cure is due, not at all to analysis itself with its techniques of free association and interpretation cloaked in thick theoretical garb, but rather to the suggestions of the analyst during treatment, and to the autosuggestions of the patient himself, his will to be cured. This is a most plausible hypothesis, and Freud himself has stated that transference itself is but a phase of suggestion².

Be that as it may, psychoanalysis has achieved some therapeutic success, and this has warranted, on the part of some thinkers who are aware of its unsound philosophy, the idea that it would perhaps be wise to keep its therapeutic method as a valuable instrument of cure while rejecting psychoanalysis itself as a theory.

This idea of separation, however, has never been suggested by the analysts themselves. They are quite against such a weaning and vociferously combat it maintaining the absolute unity and inseparability of both.

As an example of this, Doctor Franz Alexander, the famous Chicago analyst, may be cited. In his introduction to Adler's What Man Has Made Of Man and in his own work, The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis, he directly implies the unity of Freud's theories and therapy³.

The idea of separability has found favour mostly among philosophers. Doctor Adler, of the University of Chicago, and Monsieur Maritain, the great French Neo-Scholastic, are the

² Nota: On suggestion in psychoanalysis, see Allers op. cit., pp. 149ff.

³ Nota: Bibliographical references and data follow.

better known and more frequently quoted authorities who have voiced their opinions in its favour⁴.

Doctor Roland Dalbiez, while not himself an analyst, although apparently very well acquainted with various psychoanalytical techniques, is one of the better known non-analytical representatives who upholds separability mostly from the therapeutic point of view.

The most fervent opponents of separability are the psychoanalysts themselves, and with them, curiously enough, the great enemy of psychoanalysis, Doctor Rudolf Allers. Both agree for once, but for widely diverging reasons.

Mr. Adler has presented his views in What Man Has Made Of Man where he seems favourably inclined to preserve the therapeutic method of psychoanalysis provided that a more secure and objective base be substituted for its false philosophical foundations. He mentions the principles of Thomism as the best possible successor⁵.

M. Maritain is somewhat of the same opinion. In his Cuatro ensayos sobre el espíritu en su condición carnal⁶, (Quatre essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle), he advocates much the same idea, lauding the therapeutic success of psychoanalysis, but objecting to its philosophy and metapsychology.

His thought has been definitely influenced by the

⁴ Nota: Bibliographical data follow immediately.

⁵ M.J. Adler, What Man Has Made Of Man, Toronto, Longmans, 31

⁶ Jacques Maritain, Cuatro ensayos sobre el espíritu en su condición carnal, traducido al español por Eugenio S. Melo, Buenos Aires, República Argentina, Desclée de Brouwer, 1943.

ideas of Dalbiez who upholds the possibility and desirability of separation. In his Prólogo del Autor, Maritain writes:

Nuestro primer ensayo se refiere al freudismo y al psicoanálisis; su idea nos ha venido con la lectura del gran libro de nuestro amigo Roland Dalbiez⁷.

M. Maritain in the subsequent pages of his first essay proceeds to separate analytical psychology and philosophy from its method, insinuating that even the method may prove morally dangerous (v.g. hazards of transference, breaking down of resistance). Finally he shows the philosophy of psychoanalysis in its true light,

la filosofía freudiana viciada por un empirismo radical, y por una metafísica aberrante...que descansa sobre un prejuicio: la negación violenta de la espiritualidad y de la libertad⁸.

Many of Maritain's ideas concerning the therapy of psychoanalysis can be traced to those of Roland Dalbiez who more than once mentions the desirability of separation in his monumental work, Psychoanalytic Method and the Doctrines of Freud⁹.

The very title of this work is indicative of the thought of the author and his tendency to distinguish between the two. Dalbiez does not accept in its entirety the therapeutic method of Freud. He freely discusses its reservations and shortcomings. Nor does he approve completely of the theoretical assumptions of analysis. His approach is decidedly critical.

7 J. Maritain, op. cit., Prólogo del Autor, p. 20. The author regrets having to quote in Spanish. He was not able to obtain a copy of the French original or an English translation.

8 J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 51. In Les Degrés du Savoir, p. 292, he mentions somewhat the same ideas.

9 R. Dalbiez, Psychoanalytic Method and the Doctrines of Freud, Toronto, Longmans, 1941, 2 Vols.

In the opposite camp, the great opponent of separability is Doctor Rudolf Allers, one of the most tenacious enemies of psychoanalysis in the contemporary world of philosophy and science, and also one of the most able. In The Successful Error he has not only made manifest the disastrous philosophy of psychoanalysis, but he has also described and condemned its therapeutic method¹⁰.

In The Successful Error (Chapter VII) he shows with finality the inseparability of the two. In his estimation, "the method implies and contains the whole of the theory." Moreover he adds that their unity is absolutely essential to the life of analysis and that separation means death for both.

The writer is in full agreement with the assertions of Doctor Allers. He has his own reasons for this, apart from those of the Washington psychiatrist. He is also aware that opposed to him are the mighty figures of Maritain and Adler, but as Allers himself says: "They (Maritain and Adler) are after all outsiders, in a sense, since they look at the method from the viewpoint of the philosopher who relies on the statements of the specialist¹¹."

The writer does not claim to be a specialist, but he does claim to have noticed certain flaws in Freud's way of thinking which make the idea of separability impossible and the idea of unity absolutely necessary to the very existence of

¹⁰ R. Allers, The Successful Error, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1941.

¹¹ R. Allers, op. cit., p. 167.

psychoanalysis as a school of thought.

Therefore the author agrees with Allers that the method of psychoanalysis really implies the entire theory and the theory the method. Without the other, neither can exist. An occurrence such as this can, of course, take place only in Freudian analysis or in any school whose founder is possessed of a frame of mind and an intellectual background which resemble Freud's. This identification of theory and therapy is the exclusive result of the incessant intermingling of subjective theories and beliefs with objective facts until these very facts themselves have become totally unrecognizable in mantles of personal hypotheses.

We have already seen various examples of this constant intermingling of fact and theory so characteristic of psychoanalysis¹². There are many others which can be added to our list. Let us, for instance, examine the fact of repression as seen by the analyst Franz Alexander in The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis. We read a description such as this. (The italicized words do not appear as such in Alexander's text, having been italicized by the writer to indicate theoretical assumptions and postulates).

Let us now describe the act of repression more fully. It starts with the super-ego's inner perception of a dynamic tension which tends to become conscious in order to induce motor innervations necessary to its release. If the tendency is in conflict with the code of the super-ego, the

12 See pages 45, 103, 110ff., and above all Chap. XI. Nota: The only possible outcome of this intermingling, as we shall see, is a projected theory in which a fact depends upon a theory for its very existence, as a fact.

conscious ego rejects it from fear, which is the motive power of repression. The ego, acting on the cue given by the super-ego rejects the condemned id-tendency and so produces what we call repression. The fear felt by the ego for the super-ego is the signal which warns the ego to repress, and this intimidation of the ego by the super-ego can be considered as the continuation of the pressure which the parents brought to bear upon the child during the period of education¹³.

The writer asks the reader to consider the words in italics. It soon becomes apparent that the "fact" of repression is not only clouded in a mass of theory, it is absolutely and essentially a theory.

It is most obvious that repression is not the plain and simple fact that analysis would have us believe it to be, but rather the result of a basic postulate of interior psychic mechanisms each in conflict with the other. The neurotic patient may have repressed some incident. Undoubtedly he did, but was it assuredly because of an Ego, a Super-ego, and parental pressure exercised during childhood? The only fact is the patient's forgetting, all the rest is pure theory.

Not one analyst would dare contend that the theory surrounding repression is separable from the therapeutic fact of repression, or vice-versa. It would be their death knell, and that of psychoanalysis. The reason is obvious.

Let the reader return to Alexander's quotation. Let him erase every word in italics and attempt to substitute for

13 F. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

it another, even if it should mean much the same thing. Then let him re-read the citation. Repression, as described by psychoanalysis, cannot survive the erasing.

Alexander offers us another splendid opportunity to show the constant intermingling of fact and theory in psychoanalysis. Let us consider for a moment what he affirms to be the essence of psychoanalytic therapy. (*Italicized words again indicate theoretical elaborations and supporting assumptions*).

The essence of psychoanalytic treatment consists of three fundamental processes: (1) abreaction of repressed emotions (2) insight into the nature of formerly repressed material and (3) remembering the repressed infantile memories¹⁴.

In these statements, also, the infusion of theory into therapy is obvious. Abreaction is an analytical theory, the repression of emotions is another theoretical concept, as is of course its immediate subject matter, repressed infantile sexuality (of which the repressed infantile memories mentioned by Alexander are the direct offspring, and which also constitutes the psychoanalytical theory of the cause and origin of the psychoneuroses).

It is most interesting to note that not once is the essence of psychoanalytic treatment spoken of as a technique, as a method of treatment. Alexander describes it exclusively as a theory. This is a most interesting coincidence indeed, for never once is mention made of the techniques of psychoanalytic treatment, the technique of free association, and the art of interpretation.

14 F. Alexander, op. cit., p. 100.

It is upon this practical inseparability of theory from therapy in psychoanalysis and the consequent death for both if divided that the author has based his conclusion: The theory of psychoanalysis directly implies its therapy, and the therapy of psychoanalysis is fully contained in its theory.

Of the logical deductions and implications following this inseparability of both doctrine and method in psychoanalysis, by far the most interesting and far-reaching is its inference that the very source of psychoanalytical data is vitiated.

The basis of psychoanalytical therapy is held to be the technique of free association and the art of interpretation. Free association as a source of raw data cannot be held to account and is surely not the vitiating factor. Free association is a fact, a factual and objective technique. It is a technical procedure used not only by the analysts, but by other psychologists as well for purposes other than clinical.

The very foundation of analytic therapeutics, that which serves to distinguish psychoanalytical therapy from that of every other school of psychology or psychiatry (and of course from the analytical therapies of Jung and Adler) is not free association. It is the Freudian art of interpretation.

It is the particular way in which Freudian psychoanalysis interprets the raw material arising out of the free association which serves to distinguish Freudian analysis from all other therapies. This peculiar use and interpretation of

associated data (with which are intimately linked the topics of sex and the libido) are the determining factors of psychoanalytic therapy, (its formal object so to speak), that which distinguishes it from all other methods of therapeutic treatment.

We have already seen, however, that psychoanalytical interpretation of therapeutic data is greatly tinged with theory and underlying theoretical hypotheses¹⁵. That theories are present in the analytical art of interpretation, that they are necessary to give to this art its peculiar nature, is obvious. The Freudian art of interpretation involves directly the significance and import of symbols which in psychoanalysis are of an almost exclusively sexual nature (a theory), the meaning of dreams which in analysis are wish-fulfilments of sexual nature in great majority (a theory), and the purport of wit, of the various lapses of everyday life, of forgetting, of symptoms, (all of which are based upon preconceived theoretical assumptions of a highly deterministic nature).

The interpretation of associated ideas and psychic raw data as rendered by psychoanalysis therefore involves directly and implies immediately the existence of a goodly number of theoretical assumptions without whose support the associated raw data as viewed by analysis become absolutely meaningless or

15 See Chap. VII.

assume a totally different purport.

It is obvious that use of any other theoretical basis will invariably give rise to an entirely different interpretation of therapeutic raw data. A good example of this is offered us by the diverging interpretations given to the same symptoms and dreams by three schools of analysis which make use of the same technique of free association, the Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian. The difference of interpretation can be due only to a difference of theoretical background which directly influences the interpretation itself and causes the facts to appear under a different light. This should be proof enough of the inseparability of psychoanalytic therapy from its supporting theoretical assumptions.

It is of course possible to make use of free association without adopting the philosophy and theories of psychoanalysis. This is done everyday in non-analytical circles when investigators study the phenomena of retroactive inhibition, reaction time, the frequency of given associations in the general population, or when they wish to examine more fully an individual personality, or even study the thought and behaviour patterns of neurotic and psychotic patients as viewed by the Rorschach tests.

In these instances, it is unnecessary to interpret the associations themselves in order to find hidden meanings. The associations are not considered as symbols; they are con-

sidered as facts and studied as such. The associated facts obtained remain facts. However, the very moment one tends to consider these associations as symbols (to give a meaning to these associations other than that in which they actually appear), one must of necessity make use of theoretical generalizations. It is absolutely impossible to interpret anything without a supporting background, or a basis for comparison.

In psychoanalysis, this background is sex and the libido. Any analyst who interprets free associations does so in the light of (objectum quo) of his sexual theories and the outcome invariably represents the associations in sexual garb and purport.

In psychoanalysis, therefore, due to the vitiated nature of these underlying assumptions and the faulty logical procedures therein employed, the art of interpretation becomes in reality an instrument of distortion and destruction, a blind fixed catalogue of sexual symbols far more rigid than the categories of Kant.

It is upon this constant intermingling of theories with facts, in psychoanalysis, the practical impossibility of separating both without resultant death for each, and above all the key position held by theory (sex, the libido, and instinctive dynamism) in psychoanalytic interpretation, that the writer has based his conclusion that the theory and therapy of psychoanalysis are essentially one and indivisible.

In assuming such a position, the author is fully aware of the principle of Thomistic logicians who distinguish between the objectum quo and the objectum quod of each science, of each branch of science, and of the great divisions of human knowledge such as theology, mathematics, philosophy and the sciences.

He wishes to state that in no way has his conclusion of inseparability impugned the teachings of Thomistic logic¹⁶. There are two decisive reasons for this. First, Freud's theories are not his philosophy. Second, psychoanalysis has identified both objects.

Freud's theories (v.g. sex, the libido, wit, the dream work, symbols and sublimation etc.) are not his philosophy. They are the unfortunate result of his most pernicious philosophy. Freud's theories are essentially scientific generalizations, and

16 Nota: Concerning the teachings of Thomistic logic with regards to the topic of inseparability of both doctrine and method in psychoanalysis, Father Brennan, director of the Thomistic Institute of Providence College, in his review of Dr. Allers' The Successful Error (cf. The Thomist, Vol. II, Number 4, issue of October, 1940, p. 581, published by Sheed and Ward, New York) has said: "At the very outset he (Dr. Allers) states his thesis: that the method and the philosophy of the psychoanalytical school are inseparable, that rejection of the latter implicitly includes a rejection of the former. Dr. Allers, of course does not mean to impugn the ancient distinction between the objectum quod and the objectum quo of any branch of science; but he does hold that, in the case of psychoanalysis, the particular knowledge studied and the particular technique by which this knowledge is acquired and used, stand or fall together. Thus, it is the firm contention of the Freudian school that the methodological principle by which we investigate man's psychological processes is essentially the same as the methodological principle by which we investigate his physiological processes. The reason that they are the same, of course, is that there is no essential difference between the physiological and the psychological, or, more ultimately, between matter and spirit and the operations of each."

mighty poor ones indeed¹⁷.

Many of Freud's theoretical conclusions often approach the realm of philosophy. At times they appear to be essentially philosophical in nature, but upon closer examination, they can always be retraced to a scientific conception (rather preconception) and not to empirical facts. These theoretical conclusions and assumptions are therefore on an equal footing with their corresponding therapy. Just as the subject matter of theoretical physics or theoretical psychology often seems to approach philosophy (but none the less remains on the same level as practical physics or psychology), so the theories of psychoanalysis remain on the same plane of abstraction as their therapeutic counterpart.

These statements eliminate the possibility of a distinction between formal objects of two specific branches of human knowledge such as exists between philosophy and the sciences. However they do not eliminate the possibility of a distinction between the objectum quo and the objectum quod of psychoanalytical theory and therapy as found on the same level of abstraction (the scientific level, or first degree of abstraction).

Fortunately, Freud himself has most aptly identified both objects. This may sound absurd to the Thomistic logician but it is none the less true. This identification is most evi-

¹⁷ Nota: However many of Freud's deductions from his conclusions are philosophical in nature. For instance, when he claims that the essence of man is rooted in his Super-ego, he is obviously philosophizing. And of course, many of his basic theoretical assumptions are philosophical in nature, v.g. determinism and efficient causality, elementarism etc.

dent in the way in which Freud has given sexual import and meaning to dreams, wit, symbols and neurotic symptoms.

For example, Freud states that a dream in which a person pictures himself or herself climbing stairs means that this person actively desires sexual copulation. In psychoanalysis therefore, climbing stairs is the symbol of (symbolizes) a desire for coitus. The dream fact of climbing stairs is an objectum quod; it is a fact, a dream object, a psychic phenomenon. The light in which this dream fact of climbing stairs is seen (sexual symbol in Freudian analysis) is its objectum quo.

However, it is of interest to note, that in psychoanalysis, the dreamer's image (the dream fact of climbing stairs) is really not a dream fact, it is essentially the symbol of sexual copulation. Therefore the Freudian conclusion that climbing stairs is the symbol of a desire for active coitus irremediably links both objects to the point of implying directly that the objectum quod is the symbol of the objectum quo! (And if this argument is pushed to its logical conclusions, it makes of the objectum quod the cause of the objectum quo, whereas in reality the symbol is only the sign of the object symbolized).

No Thomistic logician would ever dare make such assertions. Such an identification is logically absurd and serves only to show that Freud did not always respect the first laws

of reasoning when he elaborated his system¹⁸.

This identification of objects is to be found in every one of Freud's symbols. This is due to the fact that in psychoanalysis the dream image (the dream fact, the psychic phenomenon) is really no longer a fact. It is exclusively a sexual symbol. It is the symbol of a preconceived theoretical assumption, sex, with which it has become completely identified.

In this respect, the dream symbols of Freud are no longer facts; they are no longer objects, dream objects, psychic phenomena. They embody exclusively a theoretical conception concerning the sex life of man upon which they are totally dependent and with which they are totally identified. This dependence is so complete that any withdrawal of or changes in the underlying theoretical assumptions concerning the role of sex in these dream images immediately change their entire meaning and import.

This object dependence of fact upon theory in psychoanalysis should be sufficient proof of the inseparability of the two. When a fact becomes a fact only inasmuch as an underlying theory makes it so, it is really no longer a fact but a projected theory which has been made to look like a fact¹⁹.

18 Nota: Freud's lack of respect for the first laws of reasoning, in this instance, is, of course, embodied in a vicious circle caused by a petitio principii (the assumed premise being the truth of his sexual theories which in fact are not proved in the least nor true at all).

19 Nota: This is so obvious that a psychoanalyst will often overlook facts which are not deemed important by his theories and will consider others which would be of little interest to another school of psychopathology making use of different theories, for instance, the schools of Jung, or Adler, or psychiatry itself.

The immediate conclusion of this identification of theory and therapy in psychoanalysis carries with it the inference that, since the theories of psychoanalysis are themselves insecure (having been vitiated by a faulty philosophy), the therapy itself will also be infected and deficient.

This becomes evident when we consider the important role bestowed by psychoanalysis upon sex and instinctive dynamism in its therapeutic art of interpretation by which objective facts become in reality sexual facts and by which psychic phenomena come to symbolize sexual processes.

It is the author's firm conviction that the theories of psychoanalysis directly imply its therapy and that the therapy of analysis is fully contained in its theories. They are essentially one and indivisible. Neither will outlive the other; both must invariably fall together.

CHAPTER XIII

A TRUNCATED ANALOGY

A comparative study of Freud and Saint Thomas is somewhat akin to the analogy which exists between antipodes. Both are alike inasmuch as they differ. It is the consistency of their divergencies alone which is striking.

Both men have studied certain topics in common. This is not strange, as both have delved deeply into the realm of the psychological. Their opinions at times are said to be semblant although in reality this occurrence is rare. In the vast majority of instances their respective ideas are mutually exclusive and self-contradictory. The analogy is somewhat similar to that which exists between two men who are searching for truth, one with an arc-light, the other with a candle.

Most of the resemblances found in the respective teachings of both men concern issues of minor importance, or facts that are evident to any person who bothers to look at them objectively. Freud himself has recognized a few of these facts of life and reality. However, the explanations he gave them are so obscured by his theories as to become virtually meaningless and unrecognizable.

Psychoanalysis nevertheless is not without its merits. It has many good points which should be duly stressed and it should not be thought that the author is oblivious to them. On the contrary, he is most willing to praise the qualities

of analysis, but is not blinded by them to the point of being unwilling to condemn peremptorily its faults which in the scale of truth far outweigh its qualities.

One of the most notable qualities of psychoanalysis is the influence which Freud's teachings have had in making the contemporary world more conscious of the irrational phases of man's existence and their importance in life. His successful reminder of the great moment of the instincts and emotions in man should not go unnoticed, as often they did among his predecessors who were somewhat more wont to neglect these two features for the more appealing subtleties of man's higher mental processes.

Freud has most aptly, if indirectly, emphasized the crucial necessity of proper education, real love and good care during childhood, also. He has stressed the general importance of a sound and sane childhood and adolescence as the foundation of subsequent well-being (both psychological and physiological) in the adult.

Freud's intellectual forebears had definitely relegated these vital periods of life to a secondary rank in the field of science. It is only with the work of Wilhelm Preyer (1842-1897), the German physiologist, who published his child psychology (the first that had ever been written) in 1882, that science became genuinely interested in childhood and adolescence.

Freud truly recognized man's quest for happiness (although he invariably uses the German words lust and vorlust, pleasure and pre-pleasure, instead of happiness, - a most pregnant coincidence -), and has duly stressed the importance of understanding the scope and nature of this drive in man.

He most fittingly attempted to consider the individual as a unit instead of following the usual procedures of his immediate predecessors, who were wont to analyse man into minute parts and lose contact with him as an entire being. However he must be said to consider man chiefly as a physiological or libidinal unit while neglecting his more psychological and spiritual aspects.

But above all, he caused a revolution to occur in psychopathology, awakening the slumbering psychiatrists from their lethargies by insinuating, at first, then later insisting very justly that many psychic ailments are due to psychic causes and should be treated by psychic methods. His psychogenetic teachings in the realm of the neuroses should not be passed over lightly.

Freud should be given full praise for having stressed or unveiled these features even in spite of considerable opposition on the part of his contemporaries. Only his rugged determination could have kept him alive intellectually in the early days of psychoanalysis when the men of science looked coldly

askance at his findings and methods.

However, every one of these qualities of psychoanalysis (even implicitly the psychogenesis of the neuroses) has been anticipated by the Angelic Doctor in his writings of 700 years ago. Every single item has been mentioned, albeit in less explicit terms, by the Medieval master. One has but to peruse the index of the Summa Theologica to ascertain this fact¹.

Yet the influence of Saint Thomas is hardly recognized in modern circles of psychopathology. This is a most unfortunate ostracism which is due only to the triumph of scientific elementarism and contemporary lack of respect for the "antequated" doctrines of the Dark Ages...

It is not in the least due to inadequacy of doctrine on the part of the great Schoolman whose teachings, in spite of the scorn with which they are received in contemporary scientific or philosophical circles, retain a remarkable vitality. On the contrary, Thomas Aquinas has laid down many fundamental psychological and psychophysiological principles which could be of much use to contemporary psychopathologists.

1 Nota: This is evident if we glance through the Summa of Saint Thomas (the author is quoting the Leonina). Of the irrational phases of man, the emotions (passiones animae), Saint Thomas has spoken of lengthily in: 1, 75, 1, c; 1, 78, 2, o; 1, 82, 4, c; 1-2, 17, 7, c; 1-2, 23, 1, o; 1-2, 40, 3, c; 1-2, 41, 1, c; (etc., etc.). Of children and their education, he has treated in: 2-2, 10, 12 ad 2; 2-2, 102, 1. Of man as a psychophysiological entity, in: De Anima, 2, 50, 1; Summa Theo. 1, 29, 1 ad 2; 1, 75, 1, c; 2-2, 156, 1 ad 1; 3, 19, 1, 4. Of the appetitus boni, in: Summa Theo. 1, 5, 1, c; 1, 19, 1, c; 1-2, 13, 6, 3; 2-2, 156, 1, c; etc., etc. And of psychogenesis, in: De Anima, 1, 110; Summa Theo. 1, 111, 4, c; De Malo, 3, 3, ad 9. These references, of course, are only samples which have been taken from those of the following pages which are much more complete.

Of this Thomistic foundation and its possibilities for modern psychiatry, Doctor Eduardo Krapf, the Buenos Aires physician, has spoken eloquently in his Tomás de Aquino y la psicopatología², and mention must be made of Doctors Adler³, and Brennan⁴.

The Argentine doctor shows to what extent modern psychiatry is indebted to Saint Thomas, how much similarity exists between the tenets of the contemporary scientists and those found in the writings of the monk of 700 years ago, and even the very anticipation of some of the most modern theories by the Medieval thinker, as is apparent in his psychophysiological doctrines concerning the emotions⁵.

Unfortunately we cannot continue our study of Saint Thomas' position with respect to modern psychopathology in general, notwithstanding the interest and moment of the subject. We must limit our scope to Freud and Thomas Aquinas. However, the writer wishes to call to the attention of the reader the fact that Thomas Aquinas is most assuredly not an illiterate in psychopathology nor in psychology, as is often implied in the historical works of modern psychologists or psychiatrists whose

2 E. Eduardo Krapf, Tomás de Aquino y la psicopatología, Buenos Aires, República Argentina, R. Orlando, 1943.

3 M. J. Adler, What Man Has Made Of Man.

4 R. E. Brennan, A Theory of Abnormal Cognitive Processes, Washington, 1925.

5 Summa Theologica: (all references are to the 1-2): 27, 1, 1; 37, 4, c; 41, 1, c; 44, 1, c; 45, 3, c. And in general this entire section of the 1-2 which is dedicated to the study of the passiones animae.

general practise it is to ignore the Medieval master and commence their studies with Descartes⁶.

A comparative study of Saint Thomas and Freud must invariably commence with their respective teachings concerning man's quest for happiness. Both men have recognized the importance of this drive, although both have treated it in somewhat different terms because of their diverging philosophies of life.

The appetitus boni of Saint Thomas is somewhat akin to the lusttrieb of Freud. Beyond this general statement of similarity, however, it is imprudent to venture, for it is here that their divergent philosophies appear⁷.

In this respect, the appetitus boni of Thomas Aquinas is absolutely unrelated with the lusttrieb of Freud. This becomes evident when we stop to consider the fact that the quest for happiness in man, as it is found in the works of Saint Thomas, is based upon the rational cognitive powers of man who has adequate knowledge of the ends which he wishes to achieve and the good which he desires to attain, whereas the lusttrieb of Freud is

6 Nota: The references found in this thesis prove most adequately that Saint Thomas was very much interested in man's more irrational behaviour, and some of his insights into human psychopathological behaviour itself are astounding. For instance, Saint Thomas seems to have recognized the difference between mentally and somatically caused psychic ailments (De Anima, 1, 10; De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 8; Summa Theo. 1-2, 40, 6, c.). He mentioned epilepsy (De Somno et Vigilia, 5), mental deficiency, feeble-mindedness, (Summa Theo. 2-2, 46, 2, c.) and involutional melancholia (Summa Theo. 1-2, 32, 7). Of course, Thomas Aquinas' knowledge of therapy and therapeutic cure was most limited, but this is not in the least strange when we remember that psychiatry in the modern sense is barely one hundred years old.

7 Nota: For his assertions concerning Freud, the author kindly asks the reader to refer to Part Two of this thesis, notably to Chapters V, VI, and VII.

based exclusively upon the instincts of man, sex, the libido and unconscious Id-drives, and blind impulses⁸.

Man's quest for happiness, in the teachings of the Medieval master, is determined by his intellectual nature, the freedom of his will, the principle of teleology. It is based upon the dictum, nil volitum nisi praecognitum, which postulates active intellectual insight into the good to be attained⁹. Furthermore, the Thomistic teachings include not only man's quest for the natural good and pleasure of this world, but also the supernatural happiness and love, the summum bonum¹⁰.

This is not the case with the doctrines of the Viennese master. Love and pleasure, as proclaimed by psychoanalysis, are physiological, sexual and material in nature. They are based exclusively upon instinctual Id-drives. Freud's love is essentially selfish; that of Saint Thomas is often selfless. The lust-trieb of Freud is tyrannical and univocal; the appetitus boni of Saint Thomas is controllable and strictly analogous¹¹. The wild urge for happiness in Freud is irrational, rather infra-rational, whereas that of Saint Thomas is eminently rational.

⁸ De Veri. 25, 1; Summa Theo. 1, 80, 2, c., et ad 1; 1-2, 13, 6, 3; 1-2, 17, 7, c; 1-2, 26, 1, c; 1-2, 35, 1, c; 1-2, 40, 3, c; 2-2, 156, 1, c.

⁹ Summa Theo. 1-2, 8, 1, c; 1-2, 13, 6, 3; 1-2, 17, 7, c.

¹⁰ De Veri. 25, 1; Summa Theo. 1, 6, 1, 2.

¹¹ Summa Theo. 1, 6, 1, 1; 1-2, 26, 1, c; 1-2, 26, 2, c; 1-2, 40, 3, c; 2-2, 156, 1, c. Again the author requests the reader to refer to the section of the 1-2 which treats of the passiones animae (the above-given references being chiefly samples taken from this section).

for Saint Thomas, sensuality is the product of man's animality. In Freudian, where no soul exists (a fortiori no sentient soul) sensuality appears chiefly as sexuality, the unrestricted, the irresistible, the all-embracing.

Saint Thomas considers sensuality to be the source of evil and man's degradation¹⁵. Freud has made of sensuality (as embodied in the libido) the source of culture, intellection, man's resurrection and progress¹⁶.

The Angelic Doctor treats of the sensual as pertaining to one sphere only, that of the infra-rational souls of man¹⁷; the Viennese doctor's sensuality is universal. Its universality is overtly manifest in the pansexual traits of psychoanalysis and its tendencies to cause the influence of sex and the libido to be felt in every human activity, conscious or unconscious, instinctive or intellectual, moral or religious.

In psychoanalysis the concept of sensuality is better known as psychosexuality, and as such has invaded even the childhood years. Because of his pansexual tendencies and libidinal teachings, Freud considers the child a polymorphous pervert, whose nature is vitiated by the instincts of the Id, with which it is born, and the pleasure principle, whose influence is predominant throughout childhood (because of a weak Ego)¹⁸.

15 Summa Theo. 1, 81, 31; 1-2, 74, 3, 2.

16 Nota: Because of sublimation, and the fact that both Ego and Super-ego are developed out of the Id.

17 Summa Theo. 1, 81, 1, 1; 1-2, 46, 5, c.

18 Nota: cf. Freud, CTS p. 592.

In the teachings of Saint Thomas, the child is, not a polymorphous pervert, but a polymorphous pervertible¹⁹. Thomistic psychology does not irremediably fetter the child to the chains of evil and corruption, as does the pessimist Freud. Rather, it proclaims the child to be capable of moral and Christian conduct, love of God and neighbor, self-respect and sacrifice. The child is capable of these, not because of unconscious or masochistic impulses²⁰, but because he is consciously able to learn the humanity and truth of these actions²¹. In this respect Thomistic psychology is far more optimistic than the bleakness that is Freud's.

This mutually exclusive attitude towards the child is the direct result of the diverging vantage point from which each man has considered the individual. Freud's is an emphatically impersonal view. Freud is wont to consider people as objects, as sexual objects. He quite readily calls a person an object-libido, that is, an object to which is attached a certain amount of instinctual (sexual) attraction which causes a lesser or greater expenditure of libidinal energy in other ob-

19 Nota: Because of the Thomistic teachings concerning potency and act in nature, and the tabula rasa-like nature of the human intellect at birth.

20 Nota: The psychoanalytical doctrines of the unconscious influence of sadistic and masochistic impulses in man have left behind them an interesting trail of consequences, v.g. gamblers always lose, not because of the laws of normal probability, but because of unconscious masochistic Id-drives; criminals are always caught because of an unconscious desire to be punished! etc., etc.

21 Summa Theo. 1-2, 26, 1, c; 1-2, 40, 3, c; 2-2, 156, 1, c.

jects-libido (of the same or opposite sex, thus giving birth to homo or heterosexuality).

The psychology of Thomas Aquinas is eminently personal. It exalts the person, his mind and his place in the universe²². It considers the person as a psychophysiological entity, a complete rational being of material and spiritual nature²³; whereas psychoanalytical psychology is wont to consider the person as a physiological or libidinal unit.

The person is the essence of Christian and Thomistic psychology. It was with Christianity that the dignity of man as a person was finally recognized. In this respect, Freud's teachings are torpid and retrogressive, looking with preference towards the past faded glories of paganism rather than towards the future²⁴.

Kant, in one of his aphorisms, has admirably expressed what Christianity has meant for mankind: "All things have value, man alone has dignity." In psychoanalysis, man and woman do not even have dignity. They have only quantitative libidinal value, each being nothing more than a sexual object for the great-

22 De Anima, 2, 50, 1; De Ente et Essentia, Cap. I, III, VII; Summa Theo. 1, 75, 1, c.

23 Summa Theo. 1, 29, 3, c; 3, 19, 1, 4.

24 Nota: With regards to the notion of person and the arrival of Christianity, the philosophy and psychology of Saint Thomas represent a marked advance over the teachings of Aristotle. Aristotle's is chiefly a synolistic psychology; that of Saint Thomas is eminently personalistic (even anthropomorphic, in the sense of matter and form, animality and rationality). Of course, these two views are not mutually exclusive, rather they tend to complete themselves as a basis to a super-structure.

er or lesser gratification of the other.

This tendency is also manifest not only in the more impersonalistic and materialistic phases of psychoanalysis, but also in its metapsychology, the core of the psychoanalytical person (which of course in the light of objective psychology is but the direct offspring of scientific elementarism). The tripartite Freudian metapsychology of Id, Ego and Super-ego is sometimes compared with the threefold Thomistic division of man's soul into vegetative, sentient and rational²⁵.

The analogy is interesting but hardly objective. At best it can serve only to indicate the possibility of Freud's having identified the psychic apparatus of man with his soul. Such an identification on Freud's part is always a possibility for it would be in direct sequence with his elementaristic bent. Philosophically, however, such an identification would be disastrous for it implies directly the complete identification of the soul with its functions. This is not only impossible, it is logically untenable²⁶.

It thus becomes apparent that the two men have treated at times the same topics, yet both have given to them utterly exclusive answers. This is due to their antipodal philosophical bases, which have made one see the problems in the light of objective truth and reason, whereas the other has veered sharply into the darkened lanes of subjectivity and materialism.

25 Summa Theo. 1, 78, 1, o.

26 Summa Theo. 1, 75, 2, o; 1, 77, 1, o.

This doctrinal divergency is most evident in the way both treat the role of the emotions in man, and their importance in science and life. Saint Thomas makes of the emotions a psychophysiological phenomenon, the onset and outward manifestation of which is intimately linked with some psychic concomitant, or motor²⁷.

In the Thomistic conception, it is difficult to conceive of a person consciously crying without some reason for doing so; and it is equally difficult to think of this reason in terms other than a psychic insight into some difficulty of spiritual or material nature which causes or moves the physiological organism to action²⁸.

Freud, however, seems to adopt the contrary view and make of the emotions an exclusively physiological function. This tendency is manifest in the way he passes from certain outward emotional manifestations to their somewhat analogous inward concomitants and in the all-embracing and dynamic scope bestowed upon the Id which houses the emotions and instincts in man.

Thus Freud will say that a child is enjoying sexual gratification if it manifests outward emotional expressions somewhat similar to those noticeably apparent in the adult during

²⁷ Summa Theo. All references are to be found in 1-2. 22, 2, 3; 23, 1; 24, 2, 2; 37, 4, c; 44, 1, c.

²⁸ De Veri. 25, 2; Summa Theo. 1, 75, 3, 3; 1-2, 23, 1, ad 3; 1-2, 45, 3, c; 1-2, 48, 2, c.

sexual intercourse or indulgence. Saint Thomas was decidedly more wary of analogical arguments and reasoning!

The reader, by now, must be aware of the restricted scope of this chapter. In a sense, this restriction has and has not been intentional on the part of the author. It has been intentional inasmuch as he has preferred to study only those topics which both men have treated in common, rather than to enter into the kingdom of philosophical generalizations and background where it is self-evident that little or no similarity at all exists between the teachings of the two.

The restriction has been unintentional, however, inasmuch as the teachings of Freud themselves are incomplete; they consider only the physiological and instinctual phases of man, neglecting utterly his really psychic processes. Freud's view is a totally restricted and incomplete panorama of man, seen only in the light of a biased weltanschauung.

It is assuredly because of the antipodal nature of their respective philosophies that every topic which both Freud and Saint Thomas have treated in common has been divergent in final outcome. It is of interest to note that all the themes of this study are concerned solely with man's vegetative and sentient souls, the infra-rational world, the realm of matter and the psycho and biophysiological. Never do they directly concern the psychological and intellectual as such. It is as

if Freud never quite succeeded in freeing himself from matter to which he was irrevocably fettered by his past.

In this way, all analogical studies of Freud and Saint Thomas are necessarily truncated, with only limbs and a trunk as analogati and no head for comparison, because it is found only in the teachings of the Angelic Doctor.

CONCLUSION

The author herewith presents to the reader the more outstanding results and conclusions of his research:

A: In its philosophical aspects -

1. Psychoanalysis is based upon a weltanschauung which is a sheer unmitigated evolutionary materialism.
2. It categorically denies the freedom of the will and is completely deterministic in its outlook on psychic phenomena.
3. It is morally hedonistic and entirely subjectivistic.
4. Its philosophical background is one of anti-intellectualism, instinctive dynamism, and blind voluntarism, dominated by Schopenhauer, Herbart, Nietzsche and British Associationism.
5. It sins against some of the first principles of human reason, especially that of proper proportion with regards to sublimation, and its entire theoretical structure is based upon a petitio principii, the assumed premise being the truth of sex and the libido which in fact is at best a hypothesis of doubtful plausibility.

B: As a science -

1. Psychoanalysis is completely elementaristic and denies the gap which exists between mind and matter, making of mind, matter.
2. It is essentially positivistic in se, and in background, in which the teachings of Comte, Hughlings-Jackson and the British clinical traditions hold a point of vantage.
3. It is based upon a faulty scientific methodology (cf. Conclusion #5, above) and is essentially incomplete, not being able to submit its findings to general verification and control.
4. It is a projected theory, where fact becomes fact only inasmuch as it is so deemed by an underlying theory. This is obvious in dream symbols, neurotic symptoms and in the analytical art of interpretation.
5. It is a totally truncated psychology, restricted to consideration of the functions of the sentient and vegetative souls of man.

C: As a doctrine and a method - (over)

C: As a doctrine and a method -

1. Psychoanalytical doctrine directly implies its method, and the therapy is fully contained in the theory.
2. Psychoanalytical doctrine is vitiated by a faulty philosophical basis.
3. Psychoanalytical therapy is itself insecure, because of the insecurity of its theoretical assumptions, and because of its art of interpretation (Refer to psychoanalysis as a science, conclusion #4).

These are results which were proclaimed true and undeniable by a man who compared himself to Copernicus and Darwin -- Freud was never better served than by himself -- and who has been exalted by some of his pupils as the greatest genius ever born. The 19th Century, we are told, will someday be known as the century of Freud. Assuredly only a nodding Super-ego could have permitted such encomiastical dithyrambs to cross the threshold of consciousness of their respective authors¹.

Freud's was undoubtedly a queer mind which had an outlandish tendency to accept the most tenuous analogies as consummate facts and subjective theories as objective reality. The results of this penchant are embodied in the deductions which head this conclusion. Yet, in psychoanalysis, not one of these shortcomings is considered a fault; rather they are praised as the worthy accomplishment of the true scientific weltanschauung.

However, because of its background of anti-intellectualism,

1 IL p. 241.

blind voluntarism, and instinctive dynamism over which tower the mighty figures of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hume and Herbart, and because of itself, its subjectivism and crude moral hedonism, its evolutionary associationism and thoroughgoing materialism, psychoanalysis cannot be anything but emphatically false. With these alone psychoanalysis is compatible; without them it falls. With a background and a nature such as this, what can one expect of psychoanalysis philosophically?

As a science, psychoanalysis fares but slightly better. It is a science which has been the victim of a most pernicious philosophy in which determinism and elementarism are but commonplace features. A school which accepts implicitly as a basic philosophical tenet the denial of free will in man, the identification of mind with matter, the ever-actuality and dynamism of the unconscious, and which maintains an ecological and exclusively genetic outlook on psychic phenomena, must of necessity be rigidly deterministic and elementaristic in methodology.

Psychoanalysis is a science which is essentially incomplete, which does not respect the first laws of human reason, and which is based upon false premises. It is a psychology which is completely restricted by an incomplete philosophy and biased by an essentially positivistic background. In the background of psychoanalysis as a science, the figures of Comte, Hughlings-Jackson, Lloyd Morgan, Breuer, v. Brücke, enjoy a point of

singular vantage. Sired by men such as these, what can one expect of psychoanalysis scientifically?

But Freud never bothered himself greatly with his past. He was far more absorbed in paying deep homage before the altars of the goddess of inspiration who appeared to him often and with brilliant éclat. His constant, deep conviction in the value of his personal ideas and his preconceived, theoretical assumptions of what nature should be rather than what it is, caused him to distort the most obvious facts and make them subservient to his completely subjective theories.

It is because of this incessant intermingling of facts with personal hypotheses that psychoanalysis alone among the modern sciences must be a projected theory. It is this characteristic of psychoanalysis which has led the author to believe that both the theory and therapy of psychoanalysis are in fact indivisible, that the method directly implies the theory, and that not only is the theory of analysis itself vitiated by a false philosophy, but that the method itself is insecure.

Yet psychoanalysis is not without merit, and it does contain some truths; but these are as naught compared to its faults.

Psychoanalysis has rightly emphasized the importance of childhood, the irrational phases of man's psychic life, the psychogenesis of the neuroses, the scope and influence of the human psyche, the necessity of considering man as a complete

entity, and the human quest for happiness.

However, psychoanalysis has made of man a complete physiological unit; of the child a polymorphous pervert; of happiness a quest for libidinal and sexual pleasures; of the psyche an instinctive force; and of the neuroses a wish to fall ill. Every one of its qualities has been warped by a weltanschauung which reflects exclusively the principles of an aberrant, unmitigated materialism. Psychoanalysis has but one god, Matter, and Freud is his prophet.

Adler, Mortimer J., What Man Has Made Of Man, New York, Longmans, 1937, 244 pages.

The schematic lectures of Doctor Adler have been of use mostly in determining his opinions concerning the separability of psychoanalytical theory and therapy (cf. Chap. XII of thesis).

Alexander, Franz, The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis, New York, Norton, 1936, 278 pages.

The author has found Alexander's standard psychoanalytical work most useful as a source of therapeutic data. It served above all to describe the intermingling of theory and therapy in psychoanalysis.

Allers, Rudolf, The Successful Error, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1940, 266 pages.

The author has undoubtedly been influenced by Allers' thought, mostly with regards to the philosophy of psychoanalysis and the question of doctrine and method. Allers' work may someday be called a classic of epistemological and scientific critique.

Allport, Gordon, W., Personality, a Psychological Interpretation, New York, Henry Holt, 1937, 588 pages.

Allport's Personality is perhaps the best in the field today. His study of sublimation and condemnation of the analytical mechanism has been accepted by the writer and commented upon in Chap. V of this thesis.

Blondel, Ch., La psychanalyse, Paris, Alcan, 1924, 251 pages.

Blondel's study of psychoanalysis is one of the best the author knows of in French. His classification of the neuroses in psychoanalysis has been mentioned in Chap. VII of this thesis.

Boring, Edwin, G., A History of Experimental Psychology, New York, D. Appleton Century, 1929, 700 pages.

Despite the fact that Boring's work (the most complete history of purely experimental psychology to date) has not been quoted directly, the author is indebted to Boring for many of his factual historical notions concerning the background of psychoanalysis

Brill, A.A., Introduction to the Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, New York, Random House, 1938, 32 pages.

Brill's short Introduction, valorizing the analytical view point, was of most use in the biographical and therapeutic phases of this thesis.

Dalbiez, Roland, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, trans. by T.F. Lindsay, Toronto, Longmans, 1941, Vol. I. Exposition, 415 pages; Vol. II. Discussion, 331 pages.

Dalbiez has been cited with regards to the Freudian Metapsychology, the question of doctrine and method, and the classification of the neuroses. The work of Dalbiez is an exhaustive treatise, perhaps the most complete to date. Dalbiez is partisan of the separability of doctrine and method.

De la Vaissiere, J., s.j., La théorie psychanalytique de Freud, Arch. de Philosophie, Vol. VII, 1932, Paris, Beauchesne.

This excellent, but brief, critique of analysis has served chiefly as a source of biographical data.

Eddington, Sir Arthur Stanley, The Nature of the Physical World, London, Dent, 1935, 345 pages.

Eddington's popular work describes from the astrophysicist's viewpoint (among other features) the scientific attitude and trends existing during the early days of psychoanalysis.

Greenwood, Thomas, Prolégomenes a la théorie des quanta, Ottawa, Les Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1942, 61 pages.

This opusculum has much the same value for this thesis as has Eddington's work. Professor Greenwood has aptly described from the mathematician's viewpoint the history of modern and contemporary physics thereby reflecting the scientific attitude of the latter 19th and early 20th Century.

Höfdding, Harald, History of Modern Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1924, 2 Vols. (the author has used the second only) Vol. II. 600 pages.

The Danish historian's very objective study of modern philosophy has been the basis of some of the author's descriptions of the philosophical background of analysis, notably in the case of v. Hartmann and Schopenhauer.

Horney, Karen, The Neurotic Personality of Our Times, New York, Norton, 1937, 299 pages.

Doctor Horney has been cited only en passant. (Chap. XI)

Humphrey, George, The Story of Man's Mind, The New Home Library, New York, 1942, 308 pages.

Humphrey also has been cited en passant and indicated as a source of material for the controversy surrounding the James-Lange theory of emotional behaviour.

Krapf, E. Eduardo, Santo Tomas y la psicopatología, Buenos Aires, República Argentina, R. Orlando, 1943, 45 pages.

An excellent, though brief, comparative study of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and modern psychopathology. This work has been of considerable use in Chap. XIII.

Maritain, Jacques, Cuatro ensayos sobre el espíritu en su condición carnal, Buenos Aires, República Argentina, Desclee de Brouwer, 1943, 200 pages, traducido al español por E.S. Melo.

This series of essays contains Maritain's ideas concerning the separability of doctrine and method in analysis, and also a study and condemnation of its philosophy and metapsychology.

Maslow, A.H. and Bela Mittemann, Principles of Abnormal Psychology, New York, Harper, 1941, 638 pages.

This work is a standard university textbook in which the author himself has studied. It was used primarily as a source of therapeutic data and in elaborating the analytical classification of the neuroses. It contains, moreover, a valuable Glossary and a list of 819 bibliographical entries.

Murphey, Gardner, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, New York, Harcourt & Brace, 1938, 471 pages.

This work has served to trace the scientific background of psychoanalysis mostly in its psychological phases. Its reputation is well equal to that of Boring's History in psychological circles. It contains a valuable supplement on Contemporary German Psychology by Heinrich Klüver.

Rand, B., Classical Psychologists, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1912, 734 pages.

Classical Psychologists is an anthology. It contains extracts from the writings of famous psychologists since the days of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas to those of Wundt. Rand has included lengthy excerpts from Herbart and Drobisch which the author found most propitious.

Warren, Howard C., Dictionary of Psychology, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934, 372 pages.

Many of the author's definitions, found chiefly in the footnotes of the thesis, are based upon those of Warren.

Wohlgemuth, A., A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1923, 250 pages.

Wohlgemuth has been cited only en passant.

Woodworth, Robert S., Contemporary Schools of Psychology, New York, the Ronald Press, 1931, 232 pages.

Psychoanalysis is one of the contemporary schools described most objectively by Woodworth, for his students. The work has served chiefly because of its comparative study of Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian methods of analysis.

Nota: The author has used the editio Leonina (Romae, ex typographia Forzani et S., M CM XXII) in his quotations and references with regards to the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas.

Nota: There have been so many editions and translations of the works of Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, and Jenseits von Gut und Bösen, and of Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, that the author wishes to state only that he has preferred to refer directly to these works in studying the influence of their respective authors upon psychoanalysis. This aim also determined his use of Rand's excerpts from Herbart and Drobisch, the original works being unobtainable.
