Canada's Emergence as a Pacific Power:
The Fall and Rise of Japanese-Canadian Relations, 1941–1957

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Abstract

Canada's Emergence as a Pacific Power:
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Historically, the focus of Canadian foreign relations has been the Atlantic world, looking towards Europe and the United States as its core trading partners, its main source of immigrants, and the geopolitical centre of an overarching military and diplomatic strategy linked with London and Washington. Only in the postcolonial era, the argument runs, did Ottawa pursue any serious relationship with the rest of the world. Such claims are equally applicable to Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific region, where scholars have emphatically argued that Ottawa had no formal policy for the area before at least the 1970s. This explains, among other things, its apparent disinterest in the Pacific War against Japan when compared to the European struggle against Nazi Germany.

Building on recent scholarship, I argue in this dissertation that Canada developed a greater interest in becoming a "Pacific power" around the era of the Second World War and early Cold War than is often conceded, and that its relationship with Japan was the foundation of this emerging policy. This study is framed by a focus on three crucial individuals within the Department of External Affairs—Hugh Keenleyside, Herbert Norman, and Arthur Menzies—who all had academic credentials and practical experience with Japanese and East Asian affairs and played an outsized role in articulating Canadian interests in the region. In addition, rather than focusing solely on the actions of Ottawa officials in the drafting of Canadian policymaking, I hinge my study on the role that public opinion, the press, notable NGOs, and other non-state actors all played in building a sense that Canada had pertinent interests in developing closer ties with Japan.

My thesis concludes that Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific, and with Japan in particular, were much greater than previous historians have given them credit. On a wide range of issues—trade, diplomacy, immigration, and national defence—Canada's budding relationship with Japan played a vital role in the broader development of Canadian foreign policy as the country gained increasing independence from the British Empire and a closer association with the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. Moreover, I argue that debates on Japan's place in the world provoked serious discussion among Canadians, first as an enemy to be defeated and than as a friend to be cultivated. In short, Canada's emergence as a Pacific power was forged largely in the crucible of Japanese-Canadian relations that arose out of the Pacific War and its immediate aftermath.

Acknowledgements

Like most academic projects, the research and knowledge that goes into a PhD thesis is always a collective effort. First and foremost, I'd like to thank Dr. Galen Roger Perras for agreeing to be my PhD supervisor. From our first meeting on a wintery day back in December 2018, through a global pandemic and back again, he was always a pleasure to work with and offered excellent suggestions on all aspects of my research. Also employed by the University of Ottawa, my thanks go out to Dr. Serge Durflinger and Dr. Richard Connors, who organized my other two PhD field courses on Canadian military history and the history of the British Empire, respectfully. Credit is also due Dr. Sylvie Perrier, who provided some much-needed insights early in my research.

Even in an era less wielded to a Rankian focus on paper sources, archival collections remain a vital source for historians and were indispensable in my own research. At Library and Archives Canada, I'd like to thank France Vachon for all her help in sorting through archival requests gone awry. At the Canadian War Museum's Military History Research Centre, credit is deservedly given to Paul Durand, Vincent Lafond, Alain Simard, and Shannyn Johnson, who all helped in the tracking down of both documents and photographs in their collection. At the Directorate of History and Heritage, it was a pleasure to receive help from Isabella Sun. In acquiring digital copies of sources at the City of Vancouver Archives, help came from Jeannie Hounslow and Chak Yung; at MacMaster University from Renu Barrett; at Queen's University from Lisa Gervais; and at UBC from Chelsea Shriver, Weiyan Yan, John Moran, and Leanne Koch. Thank you all.

Many researchers were also generous in freely passing along sources and details that contributed mightily to my work. They include Dr. Doug Delaney at RMC Kingston, Dr. Dayna Barnes at the College of International Security Affairs, Lindsay A. Stokalko at the University of Saskatchewan, and David Fedman at the University of California, Irving. All went above and beyond the call of duty in doing so and I respect them all immeasurably for it. Let credit also be given to Dr. Andrew Burtch at the Canadian War Museum, who read through an early draft of Chapter 6 for me and suggested many useful improvements (many of which even made it into the final version!) I also acknowledge the funding received through Ottawa's Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) program, which aided mightily in the research and writing of this thesis.

Finally, I'd like to thank my father, Eric Pass, who read through every single page of my thesis at one time or another, offering his services as my trusted "educated layman." If he couldn't understand it, then it didn't go in the thesis. Future readers: you're welcome!

Abbreviations

Archival Collections and Other Citation Abbreviations

Acc. – Accession Number
AMPEI – Acadian Museum of Prince Edward Island (Miscouche)
BCA – British Columbia Archives (Victoria)
CMOHC – Canadian Military Oral History Collection (University of Victoria)
CRCR – Correspondence Respecting Commonwealth Relations (UK)
CVA – City of Vancouver Archives
CWM – Canadian War Museum
DAFP – Documents on Australian Foreign Policy
DCER – Documents on Canadian External Relations
DDF – Documents Diplomatiques Français
DHH – Directorate of History and Heritage (Canada)
DEAF – Department of External Affairs Fonds (Canada)
DNDF – Department of National Defence Fonds (Canada)
DTCF – Department of Trade and Commerce Fonds (Canada)
FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States
LAC – Library and Archives Canada
Memoirs – Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside (McClelland & Stewart, 2 vols.)
MUA – McMaster University Archives
NARA – National Archives and Records Administration (United States)
PAROPEI – Public Archives and Records Office of Prince Edward Island
PCOF – Privy Council Office Fonds (Canada)
QUA – Queen's University Archives
RMC – Massey Library, Royal Military College of Canada (Kingston)
SSEA – Secretary of State for External Affairs (Canada)
UBCRB – University of British Columbia Rare Books and Special Collections
UBCA – University of British Columbia Archives
USaskA – University of Saskatchewan Archives and Special Collections
USSEA – Under-Secretary of State for External Affair (Canada)
WD – War Diary
UVicA – University of Victoria Archives

Organizations, Positions, and Other

1 CIR – First Canadian Infantry Regiment (WWII)
2 CAU – No. 2 Canadian Administrative Unit (Korean War)
25 CRG – 25th Canadian Reinforcement Group (Korean War)
ACC – Aluminum Company of Canada
APWC – Allied Political Warfare Committee
BCOF – British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan)
CITF – Canadian International Trade Fair
CCC – Canadian Chamber of Commerce
CIPO – Canadian institute of Public Opinion
CAPF – Canadian Army Pacific Force (WWII)
CASF – Canadian Army Special Force (Korean War)

CMMFE – Canadian Military Mission, Far East (Tokyo)
CP – Canadian Press
CWB – Canadian Wheat Board
DL – Department of Labour
DTC – Department of Trade and Commerce (Canada)
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations (US)
FEC – Far Eastern Commission (Washington, DC)
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GHQ – General Headquarters (SCAP, Japan)
HKVAC – Hong Kong Veterans Association of Canada
ICC – International Chamber of Commerce
IJA – Imperial Japanese Army
IJN – Imperial Japanese Navy
IPR – Institute of Pacific Relations
JCP – Japanese Communist Party
JETRO – Japan External Trade Recovery Organization
JITFC – Japan International Trade Fair Commission
MITI – Ministry of Trade and Industry (Japan)
MFN – Most Favoured Nation (GATT)
NFB – National Film Board of Canada
NPAM – Non-Permanent Active Militia (Canada)
NRMA – National Resources Mobilization Act (Canada)
OSS – Office of Strategic Services (US)
OWI – United States Office of War Information
PCMR – Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (Canada)
PPC – Office of War Information's Pacific Propaganda Committee (Washington, DC)
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SCAP – Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Japan)
SEAC – Southeast Asian Command (UK)
SIS – Special Intelligence Section, Department of External Affairs (Canada)
SISS – United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security
SSCR – Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (UK)
UBC – University of British Columbia
UNKRA – United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
WIB – Wartime Information Board (Canada)

Glossary of Japanese Terms

Anpo - An abbreviation of "Nichi-Bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku," the general Japanese name for the treaty cementing the US-Japanese Alliance. It was first signed in September 1951 in the aftermath of the Treaty of San Francisco. The attempt by the Japanese administration of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to try and renegotiate it in 1960 provoked the largest protest moment ever recorded in Japanese history. Successfully passed on 23 June 1960, the new treaty remains in force to this day.

Bushidō – Derived from "bushi" (a Japanese term for a warrior) and dō (from the Chinese "dao," meaning "the way"), hence the common English translation of "the way of the warrior." It was an ethical system of thought intended for the samurai class, mostly codified from earlier examples during Japan's Tokugawa era (1603–1868). During the Pacific War, the term became a major focus of Japanese propaganda and was widely disseminated in the Imperial Japanese Army, though the term has been overused by Western historians seeking to explain Japan's wartime atrocities.

Dai Tōa Kyōeiken – Usually translated somewhat clumsily as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," this was Japan's plan for reorganizing the former European colonial empires overrun by Japan in 1941 and 1942 into a new Japanese-led bloc. Ostensibly, this would be an improvement for the local inhabitants, liberating them from Western domination, but the result was often little more than an exercise in replacing one form of imperialism with another. The phrase itself was coined by Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke in August 1940.

Ee ja nai ka – A phrase associated with several waves of carnivalesque protest in Japan around the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1867 and 1868. Often heralded with the spontaneous appearance of Japanese paper charms (*ofuda*) falling from the sky, local villagers across large parts of Honshu would then engage in all manner of wild, frenzied, or debauched activity. In 1945, Herbert Norman referenced the event to refute the racist assumption that the Japanese were an overly stoic or rigid people. Literally translated as "good, isn't it?", the sentiment of the phrase might also be given as "Who cares?", "Why not?", or "What the hell?"

Gaimushō – The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often referenced by its English synonym as "MOFA". Many Canadian diplomats in the 1940s and 1950s, however, frequently used the original Japanese title in their official correspondence.

Gyokusai – Literally, a "shattered jewel," the term referred to the seventh century Chinese classic the *Book of Northern Qi*, which used the term as a metaphor for a noble sacrifice. During the Pacific War, the term was used in Japan for what the Allies referred to invariably as a "Banzai change," an almost always suicidal attack by Japanese soldiers towards the end of a battle. The first such charge occurred, unplanned, on the Aleutian island of Attu in 1943. Such attacks became a widely perceived symbol of Japanese fanaticism both during and after the war.

Oyabun-Kobun – The "Boss-Henchman" system, as Herbert Norman translated it. Defined by one anthropologist as a "ritual kinship institution," the term denotes an informal relationship where a dominant "oyabun" figure (literally, one with "parental status") dominates, while various "Kobun" (literally, "child status") pay fealty. By the 1940s, the system was relatively well known in Japan,

with Norman referencing the concept to explain systems of patronage within the postwar Japanese government. Today, the concept is best associated with the hierarchy of Yakuza mobsters.

Shintōism – A polytheistic religion native to Japan. Shinto venerates innumerable spirits called "kami" that inhabit people and places across the country and are worshipped at Shinto shrines, which are popularity associated with the distinctive gates (torii) that mark their entrances. During the Pacific War, the Japanese government prescribed a form of "State Shintoism" that encouraged fealty to the emperor and respect for Japan's war dead, a form of belief that was routinely attacked as inherently deranged, amoral, or cruel by Canadian and other Western propogandists.

Tsūshō-sangyō-shō – The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, more commonly known by its English acronym as "MITI." By the early 1950s, the head of MITI was fast becoming one of the most important and prestigious postings in the Japanese government. The ministry would gain increased standing in the years that followed given its perceived role in creating Japan's "economic miracle" of the 1970s and 1980s.

Zaibatsu – Pre-1945 Japanese industrial conglomerates. These were vertically integrated enterprises, most founded during the early Meiji era, that wielded significant economic power in prewar Japan and were widely by foreign observers seen as having conspired in Japan's militarism. They would be dissolved under SCAP directives during the American occupation. The "big four" zaibatsu were Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda.

Author's Note

In text, Japanese names are referenced in standard Asian order—the family name first—apart from those writers who explicitly reversed it when writing in English. Japanese terms, including personal and place names, appear with standard diacritical marks according to modified Hepburn romanization. Exceptions include well-known place names, such as Tōkyō or Kyōto, along with other commonly known words in English, like Bushidō or Shintō. Thus, the Japanese prison guard referred to at the time and in the text as Kanao Inouye—the "Kamloops Kid"—would, according to these standards, be written as Inoue Kanao. Transliterated words in direct quotations have been silently corrected to match these standards. Chinese words are rendered using Pinyin transliteration and Korean using the McCune-Reischauer system, with the same caveats.

Library and Archives Canada uses a range of numbering systems for its various collections. Those named after individual donors, for example, used to be cited using an "MG" number. Government documents, meanwhile, were divided by department into a series of Records Groups, cited as "RG." Hugh Keenleyside's fonds, for example, were initially cited as MG31-E102, while files from the Department of External Affairs were filed under RG25. However, there has recently been a move to a single unified system of "R" numbers, which now files Keenleyside's papers under R4217 and External's as R219. In this dissertation, I have converted all references to the new "R" numbers wherever possible. For the other major governmental departments cited here, those from the Department of National Defence fonds (RG24) are now R112, the Department of Trade and Commerce fonds (RG20) are R208, and the Privy Council Office fonds (RG2) now R165.

Additionally, some sections of this dissertation have appeared in altered forms in other venues. Chapter 6 is a version of the research included in my article "Belated Interests: The Canadian Military Presence in Japan during the Korean War, 1950–1955." *Canadian Military History* 32, no. 2 (2023). Parts of Chapter 6 on the Canadian military connection with Japan during the Korean War and Chapter 7 on the recovery of Japanese-Canadian economic relations were delivered as part of my conference paper at the *Recovery: Promises and Pitfalls, Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference* held at the University of Alberta in March 2022, where it received the award for Best Abstract Submission.

Introduction: The Far Eastern Mandarins

No one could claim that Klaus Pringsheim had lived a boring life. Born in Germany to a famous composer, Pringsheim moved in elevated circles. His aunt's husband was Thomas Mann, and Pringsheim had lived with the famous novelist during his Nazi-era exile in California. While living in Japan, Pringsheim had also been briefly arrested over his acquaintance with Richard Sorge, the German-born journalist executed as a Soviet spy. But that was all in the past as a middle-aged Pringsheim settled into McMaster University's Political Science department in the late 1960s. In time, he became known as "the man who knows about Japan," and calls regularly arrived from Canadians interested in their neighbour across the Pacific. One day, in September 1976, a letter arrived from A.H. Hart, head of the Department of External Affairs' historical section. With the fiftieth anniversary of Japanese-Canadians relations coming up in 1979, Hart needed someone to write that history and he suggested Pringsheim apply for the job. Pringsheim did and was accepted. On 27 January 1977, a contract was drafted. External would provide "a selection of documents from its files that will enable you to understand the Canadian Government's activities," along with a set of the department's *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series, letters of introduction for any potential interviewee, and free airfare to visit Japan. In total, $10,500 was on offer. "There were now five of us in the family," Pringsheim recalled. "Half my salary went for income taxes. The house was then still a long way from being paid for. I signed the contract."[1]

Work began well enough. Archival documentation was quickly provided, and drafts began to flow between Hamilton and Ottawa. In March 1977, an initial 50-page draft of the chapter on Japanese-Canadian interactions before 1929 was on its way to Hart. By October, a second chapter

[1] Hart to Pringsheim, 17 September 1976, RC0039, box 2, file 43; External to Pringsheim, 27 January 1977, RC0039, box 1, file 64, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA; Zena Cherry, "Diplomatic Record is Commissioned," *Globe and Mail*, 25 December 1976, 15; Klaus H. Pringsheim with Victor Boesen, *Man of the World: Memoirs of Europe, Asia and North America (1930s–1980s)* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic, 1995), 219. See also Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 1.

was in transit, containing the research Pringsheim had undertaken in Japan, including interviews with Canada's Embassy staff in Tokyo, conversations with all former Japanese ambassadors to Canada then living, as well as a side trip to Victoria in April for an interview with Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside who had worked at the Canadian Legation in Tokyo between 1929 and 1936.[2] While this last interview proved worthless due to poor sound quality, Pringsheim kept in contact with the retired diplomat as his project progressed.[3] As Keenleyside was writing his own memoirs, both men were keen to collaborate.[4] Another key diplomat Pringsheim wanted to meet was Arthur Redpath Menzies, the ex-head of Canada's postwar Liaison Mission to Tokyo from 1950 to 1952, and now its ambassador to Beijing. Indeed, Pringsheim was so eager to meet Menzies that he told External if the ambassador was ever in Ottawa, he was ready "to fly up at a moment's notice if he were willing and able to see me."[5] In the end, with time ticking, he settled for mailing his questions to Beijing in November 1977. Only in the new year did Menzies find time to answer Pringsheim's "catalogue of questions," sending Hart a copy of his responses badly duplicated on the Embassy's aging photocopier.[6] Privately, Menzies also told Hart that without his private papers on hand, nor wishing to "say anything unkind about colleagues," he had tempered his answers accordingly.[7]

There was one final Canadian diplomat whose presence repeatedly weaved its way through Pringsheim's research: the late Egerton Herbert Norman. A scholar-diplomat whose 1940 book *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* had made him a respected "Japanologist," Norman had

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[2] Pringsheim to Hart, 25 March 1977; 4 October 1977, RC0039, box 2, file 43, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA; Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 219. See also Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 2.
[3] The material salvaged from this interview can be found in RC0039, box 9, file 1A, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA. Cf. Pringsheim to Keenleyside, 11 November 1977, RC0039, box 3, file 13, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.
[4] Keenleyside to Pringsheim, 4 April 1977; 3 May 1977; 18 July 1977; 26 October 1977, RC0039, box 3, file 13, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA. Keenleyside's memoirs were later published in two volumes with McClelland & Stewart, the first appearing in 1981 as *Hammer the Golden Day*, the second in 1982 as *On the Bridge of Time*.
[5] Pringsheim to Hart, 25 March 1977; 4 October 1977, RC0039, box 2, file 43, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.
[6] Pringsheim to Menzies, 16 November 1977, RC0039, box 3, file 70, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA; Menzies to Pringsheim, 8 January 1978, R15615, vol. 31, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[7] Menzies to Hart, 9 January 1978, R15615, vol. 31, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 3.

served repeatedly in Japan, both before the war at the Canadian Legation, and later as head of the Canadian Liaison Mission (CLM) from 1946 until his replacement by Menzies in 1950. Recalled over charges of being a communist and a Soviet spy, Norman was caught up in the frenzy of McCarthyism. In 1957, fearful that he was again about to be put under investigation, Norman took his own life in Cairo while helping to broker the Suez Crisis in Egypt.[8] Given this shocking history, Pringsheim was curious for the views of Norman's colleagues. In his abortive April 1977 interview with Keenleyside, Pringsheim had asked after Norman's suicide and later tried to recall whether Keenleyside had stated that Norman had been given "a clean bill of health" in 1957.[9] Likewise, in his "catalogue" to Menzies, Pringsheim asked three questions about Norman, including when Menzies first met the man and what influence he had on the postwar Japanese occupation.[10] These three men, all specialists in East Asian affairs, had mingled together under the roof of External's Far Eastern Division. With his sources piling up, Pringsheim's project seemed to be going well.

Until it wasn't. Mostly, this seems self-inflicted on Pringsheim's behalf. Despite his later boast that given the "pressures of college days, I was not without experience in working fast," the sheer scale of his task—writing a complete history of Japanese-Canadian relations in only 200 pages while conducting research on two continents—clearly wore on Pringsheim.[11] By May 1978, Hart bluntly told Pringsheim that he was behind schedule, while what he had submitted still needed serious edits. "If we are to continue with the project," Hart warned, "it is imperative that we receive

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[8] See Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 4. For an overview of Norman's life, see Roger Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986). See also my comments on the historiography of Norman and his death below, as well as my account of Norman's death in the Conclusion.

[9] Pringsheim to Keenleyside, 11 November 1977, RC0039, box 3, file 13, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA. Keenleyside, for his part, did not believe that the comment was his: "This makes the episode sounds more formal than I believe it was," he recalled, though Lester Pearson and others had quietly given Norman their confidence. See Keenleyside to Pringsheim, 17 November 1977, RC0039, box 3, file 13, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.

[10] According to him, Menzies first got to know Norman when he was "sent to New York in August 1942 to clear through to Canada the Canadians being repatriated from the Far East on the SS *Gripsholm*." See Menzies to Pringsheim, 8 January 1978, R15615, vol. 31, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. See also Chapter 1.

[11] Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 220.

the remaining portions of the manuscript by June 15."[12] He does not seem to have received a reply. However, according to Pringsheim, this was because another issue had reared its head: "As I read deeper into the [External] files, I began to uncover a skeleton in the closet." For one, there was the wartime internment of Japanese-Canadians, which Pringsheim increasingly understood as simple political expedience.[13] Equally egregious, he found a deliberate omission in *The Mackenzie King Record*, an account of the prime minister's reign largely crafted by Liberal insider J.W. Pickersgill, which bowdlerized King's frankly racist opinion that, "It is fortunate that the use of the [atomic] bomb should have been on the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe."[14] "Up to this point," Pringsheim related in his memoirs, "my work had brought effusive approval. Now I heard no more. As the silence grew louder, I went silent at my end as well, sending them no more material. The deadline passed and the government cancelled my contract, on the technicality that I had failed to deliver the manuscript on schedule."[15] Yet, when Pringsheim explained events to Keenleyside in 1978, he related Hart's criticisms as simply "my failure to meet the standards of excellent that the Department expects," and that "I'm late in delivering the manuscript."[16]

Whether due to personal tardiness or External's dislike of Pringsheim's closet rummaging (or a bit of both), his final draft, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, was not published in Canada in 1979, but by Connecticut's Greenwood Press in 1983. As one of the advisors at Greenwood was George Schwab, a friend from Pringsheim's student days at Columbia University, the rogue author expected a positive hearing. Greenwood eventually offered to publish the text if it was halved from the submitted 500 pages to a more manageable 250. In public years later, Pringsheim laughed this

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[12] Hart to Pringsheim, 19 May 1978, RC0039, Box 2, file 43, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.
[13] Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 220-221.
[14] Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 221; Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations, 1870–1982* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic, 1983), 90-91. For the offending passage, see J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forester, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 451.
[15] Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 221. Some technically, one might argue!
[16] Pringsheim to Keenleyside, 7 June 1978, RC0039, Box 3, file 13, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.

off as "boiling out the Pringsheim verbosity." Privately to Keenleyside, he grimly joked of doing it "with the publisher's gun at my temple."[17] A Canadian edition of Pringsheim's book was finally released with Mosaic Press in April 1984, with the launching party held at the Japan Trade Centre in Toronto.[18] The reviews, however, would be mixed. Its "main problem," as historian Bahir Bilgin argued not unjustly, "is that the author has attempted to cover a remarkable amount of territory in too little space."[19] Other critiques were more fundamental. If Pringsheim's text was "a useful and important beginning," political scientist Michael Donnelly allowed, then it was "also marked by sweeping comments and a tendency to preach."[20] Ultimately, it seems Pringsheim was his own worst enemy, ruining his relationship with External by going overtime and over his word count and had retroactively used his allegedly divisive (if true) findings to justify himself for posterity.

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Looking back, the torturous completion of Pringsheim's book from Canada to the United States and back again can tell us much about the historiography of Japanese-Canadian relations. First, as flawed as its creation was, *Neighbours Across the Pacific* remains to this day one of the only major scholarly accounts of the subject. True, there has been the occasional journal article or edited compilation looking at relations from specific angles—postwar business ties elicited their own small cottage industry[21]—but few historians apart from John Meehan have tried to replicate Pringsheim's holistic, archival-based study of all the interlocking political, economic, social, and

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[17] Pringsheim and Boesen, *Man of the World*, 221-222; Pringsheim to Keenleyside, [December 1984?], R4217, vol. 25, file 16, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[18] Zena Cherry, "Experts Try Restaurants in Toronto," *Globe and Mail*, 4 April 1984, M4.
[19] Bahir Bilgin, review of *Neighbours Across the Pacific: The Development of Economic and Political Relations between Canada and Japan*, by Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Pacific Affairs* 57, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 97-98.
[20] Michael Donnelly, review of *Neighbours Across the Pacific: The Development of Economic and Political Relations between Canada and Japan*, by Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Canadian Historical Review* 65, no. 2 (June 1984): 276-277.
[21] For examples, see Frank Langdon, *The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations, 1952–1982* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984); Keith Hay, ed., *Canadian Perspectives on Economic Relations with Japan* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980); Robert M. Stern, ed., *Trade and Investment Relations Among the United States, Canada, and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

military dimensions that make up the relationship.[22] Second, it highlights three of the main players at External who had key roles in directing Canadian policy towards Japan in the 1940s and 1950s—Keenleyside, Menzies, and Norman—whose private papers, official writings, and later testimonies are all important historical sources.[23] All were members of "the Ottawa Men," to use historian J.L. Granatstein's term: "an extraordinary group of civil servants who collectively had great influence in Ottawa from the Depression through the late 1950s." It was an insular group, to be sure: all men, a majority WASPs, most from Central Canada.[24] But as our three "Far Eastern Mandarins" show, not all were snobbishly ethnocentric. Two were missionary sons born abroad—Norman in Japan, Menzies in China—the latter eulogized as "Mr. Pacific."[25] Norman, meanwhile, was a well-read and cosmopolitan scholar who drew comparisons rather than accentuated differences between the "East" and "West" and held "an affection for the lesser names," as his friend, historian Maruyama Masao, once wrote.[26] As for Keenleyside, he became well known in wartime Ottawa as a vehement opponent of Japanese-Canadian internment, "a man of deep compassion, devoid of any prejudice," as NDP politician David Lewis later contended.[27] All three had left-leaning political ideologies; all served outside the typical European and American postings for Canadian diplomats of this era, thus developing a greater interest in "the Orient" than their contemporaries; and all helped to direct Canadian policymaking away from its traditional focus on the Western world. Furthermore, given

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[22] See John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929–41* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), which is focused on relations between the opening of Canada's Tokyo Legation in 1929 and the dawn of the Pacific War in 1941. Otherwise, the two major edited collections are Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy, eds., *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); and John Schultz and Miwa Kimitada, eds., *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991). Donaghy and Roy's book is the better of the two, but like many such edited works, its lacks a certain degree of cohesion, comprehensiveness, or theoretical coordination among its various chapters.

[23] Keenleyside and Menzies papers are held at LAC, while many of Norman's are at UBC.

[24] J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), xxi, xiii.

[25] Charles Enman, "'Mr. Pacific' Triumphed in Interesting Times," *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 March 2010, B3.

[26] Maruyama Masao, "An Affection for the Lesser Names: An Appreciation of E. Herbert Norman," *Pacific Affairs* 30, no. 3 (September 1957): 251. See also Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 85-86.

[27] David Lewis, *The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909–1958* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), 344.

that the existing scholarship on Canadian-Japanese relations has so often been undertaken with the self-censored input of the historical actors themselves—as seen in Pringsheim's exchanges with Menzies and Keenleyside—I hope to recover from both men's newly archived and opened papers a more candid record of Canada's relationship with Japan without accepting official whitewashing induced by professional tact or a lessening of emotions due to the passage of time.

Yet, despite the long duration of Canadian relations with Japan and the presence of talented diplomats at External's Far Eastern Division, to many past scholars it was generally assumed that Canada lacked a coherent "Far Eastern Policy" during the Second World War or early Cold War. Sure, there were bromides about Canada being a "Pacific" as well as an "Atlantic" power, but this was ostensibly aspirational, not concrete reality.[28] "Popular indifference to the Pacific," historian W.L. Morton wrote in 1946, "illustrates the fact that Canada, though a Pacific country, can scarcely be said to have a Pacific policy."[29] "An examination of departmental files as a background for a study of Canadian Far Eastern policy in the years 1946–50," historian F.H. Soward concurred in an internal report for External during the 1950s, "reinforces one's instinctive feeling that there has never been any coherent Canadian pattern of diplomatic thinking and action in the Far East which could be dignified by the world 'policy.'"[30] More recent scholars accept these claims. "For Canada, the Cold War in Asia was rather like 'noises off'—a distracting attachment to Canadian-American relations, or the unwelcome aftermath of our imperial connections," historian Robert Bothwell

[28] For instance, at the 1947 Canberra conference to discuss a postwar Japanese peace treaty (see Chapter 5), Canadian representative Brooke Claxton argued explicitly that "Canada's strategic position as a Pacific Power—Canada has a long Pacific coastline—and our interest in foreign trade as the third largest trading nation of the world, make the establishment of political and economic stability in the Far East a matter of vital concern to us." For the complete speech, see Robert A. MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1954: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971), 279-281.

[29] W.L. Morton, "Canada and Future Policy in the Pacific," *International Journal* 1, no. 1 (January 1946): 55. Morton would return to this point a few months later, again arguing that "Canada cannot properly be said to have a positive Far Eastern policy," though he did believe that such a policy "must develop, and is, indeed, in the process of doing so." See Morton, "Canada's Far Eastern Policy," *Pacific Affairs* 19, no. 3 (September 1946): 241.

[30] F.H. Soward, *Canadian External Policy, 1946–1950*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1952), 136.

argued in 1998. "The Cold War in Asia belonged to somebody else, usually the Americans, and it was our job to make sure that they did not exaggerate its importance."[31] As historian Greg Donaghy concluded in one of his final articles before his untimely death in 2019, the start of a real Canadian policy for East Asia was Pierre Trudeau's in the 1970s: "An accurate appreciation of the extent to which Canada was *not* a Pacific nation in the two decades after 1945 casts Trudeau's Asian policies into relief."[32] In short, the standard narrative holds that Canada's foreign policy during the 1940s and 1950s was basically Eurocentric, more focused on events in Europe and the United States (and at NATO and NORAD) than on any comparable issue involving Japan or East Asia.

True, most Canadian policymakers were preoccupied by European affairs at this time, and the bulk of Canada's armed forces were committed to Europe, not the Pacific, in the Second World War. Yet as I argue, this dismissiveness by historians ignores the extent to which the emergent Cold War had expanded into the Pacific after 1945 and Canada along with it. By the summer of 1944, with Soviet success in Operation Bagration and the Western Allied landing and breakout from Normandy, the fact that Europe would be divided between the extra-European superpowers was easy to foresee.[33] By contrast, and unlike Europe where the Nazi empire was largely conquered on 8 May 1945, large swathes of the Pacific remained under Japanese control on 15 August—with both superpowers, the returning colonial powers, and various local independence movements all jockeying for position. Moreover, the Pacific territory taken by Japan was simply too extensive to be easily partitioned and its political intricacies neatly resolved. In the Pacific, as historian Ronald

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[31] Robert Bothwell, "Eyes West: Canada and the Cold War in Asia," in *Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943–1957*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1998), 59-60. This view that Canadian action in the Pacific was driven by American concerns was also pursued by political scientist Denis Stairs in his *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, The Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

[32] Greg Donaghy, "Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific Tilt, 1945–1984," *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (March 2019): 136 (emphasis original).

[33] That Germany recklessly fought on after this time only delayed the inevitable. See Ian Kershaw, *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945* (New York: Penguin, 2011), 15.

Spector notes, "peace was at best a brief interlude. In some parts of Asia, such as Java and southern Indochina, peace lasted less than two months. In China, a fragile and incomplete peace lasted less than a year. In northern Indochina, peace lasted about fifteen months, and in Korea about three years."[34] Only by the mid-1950s had these various conflicts played themselves out.[35] Defeating Japan and then winning the peace was thus far more complicated than establishing peace in Europe because no one power, not even the United States, had the ability to dictate terms across the entire arc of territory stretching from Burma to Japan. The practical result of this fact can be seen in the fate of the two Canadian Army units stationed overseas in the 1950s. That the soldiers of the 27th Infantry Brigade in Germany waited uneventfully for a Soviet invasion that never came while their compatriots in the 25th Infantry Brigade fought and bled on the hills of Korea makes perfect sense given this reality.[36] With this context, the fact that Canada fought in the Korean War or sat on the Indochinese International Control Commission is unsurprising, and it is a development that cannot wholly be explained by citing Canadian deference to the United States or a desire to act as a mere accessory to Western imperialism in Asia as some historians have suggested.[37]

Consequently, my dissertation argues that the key geopolitical issue at stake in Asia during the 1940s and 1950s was the defeat of Japan and the fate of its empire and that Canadian policy in

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[34] Ronald H. Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia* (New York: Random House, 2008), xi.

[35] Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949. That year, Mao Zedong and the communists also won the Chinese Civil War, and the 1955 Strait Crisis effectively codified a Taiwan independent from Beijing. The Korean War ended in stalemate in July 1953 and Malaya gained its independence from Britain after the end of the communist-led "Emergency" there in 1957. Indochina's fate should have been sealed with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference of 1954 but was prolonged by Americans-led Vietnam War until 1975.

[36] See Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 5. This argument that East Asia was the focal point for early Cold War tension is forcefully made in Paul Thomas Chamberlin's *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace* (New York: Harper, 2018), Part I. It contrasts with Greg Donaghy's view that in "the postwar decades of the 1940s and 1950s, Canada was undeniably a North Atlantic nation. Its cultural, economic, and political interests lay in Europe, where the main Cold War threat remained Joseph Stalin's communist Soviet Union." See Donaghy, "Canada's Pacific Tilt," 136. This "pivot to Asia" also highlights how Canada's military and diplomatic resources had to be stretched thinly between Asia and Europe during this period to meet geopolitical contingencies.

[37] See, for example, Bothwell's 1998 quote cited above. This claim is also made in an interesting, if somewhat overly didactic way, in John Price's *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

the region was driven by this reality. As one Canadian scholar argued back in 1996, the decision to open Canadian relations with Tokyo in 1929 "represented a clear if reluctant recognition on the part of the Department of External Affairs of the importance of [the] Asia-Pacific in general, and Japan in particular. It also reflected the need for Canada to have a 'Far Eastern' policy."[38] Tokyo was to be Canada's "window" on Asia. And while the small Legation never lived up to these early hopes by Prime Minister W.L.M. King, it was hardly a trivial expression of interest in the region.[39] During the long "road to war" in the 1930s, Ottawa often relied on the British Foreign or Dominion Offices for firsthand reporting on European political developments, whether this was Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 or Hitler's Anschluss with Austria in 1938. Ottawa, after all, had no formal diplomatic presence in either Berlin or Rome, much less in Vienna or Addis Ababa.

Japan's descent into militarism and war with China, on the other hand, was a different story. As John Meehan has elaborated in his groundbreaking 2004 book *The Dominion and the Rising Sun*, Canadian diplomats in Tokyo both focused Ottawa's attention on the region and played a critical role in developing the country's official presence on the world stage. "Canada's dealings with East Asia during the 1930s," Meehan argues, "were more than a prelude to war or a sideshow to more important events in Europe." Rather, Asia offered Canadians, "a new forum in which to project its evolving international persona."[40] Indeed, Canada's growing interest in Asia was widely noted by contemporary scholars with a firm knowledge of Asian affairs. The diplomat and political scientist Henry Angus, for example, published a book on the topic in 1953. While Angus was careful not to overstate his case, citing Canada's minor military role during the Pacific War and its still limited public opinion on the region, he nevertheless explicitly argued that "Canadian policies

[38] Tou Chu Lynhiavu, "Canada's Window on Asia: The Establishment of the Tokyo Legation in 1928–1931," *International Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue internationale d'études canadiennes* 31, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 97.
[39] For Ottawa's rationale in founding the Tokyo legation, see Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun*, chapter 1.
[40] Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun*, 198-199.

in the Far East and in Southeast Asia are the result of Canadian policies in general," and even titled one chapter of his book "Canadian Policy in the Far East," implying that he thought such a thing did exist in some form.[41] My discovery of a nine-point outline in Arthur Menzies private papers dating from about 1954, simply entitled "Canadian Policy in the Pacific," makes explicit what was considered Canada's main geopolitical objectives in East Asia during this period:

A. Repel Aggression: World War II, Korea
B. Contribute to peaceful settlements – Indochina
C. Applaud SEATO while remaining out of it recognizing difficulty in concluding Pacific Pact
D. Recognize the force of the new nationalism – encourage development of national movements along democratic lines for our sakes to keep them from falling under Communist control [and] menacing our security.
E. Friendly relations with Commonwealth Asian parties – recognize contribution India can make to peace.
F. Understand Chinese [situation?]
G. Colombo Plan [and] UN Aid
H. Trade Promotion – agreement with Japan
I. No substantial Asian immigration[42]

Of these points, only one specifically mentions Japan (point "H"), but its influence is pervasive in most of the rest. It was Japanese aggression that had to be "repelled" in the Second World War; Japanese-Canadians were one of the largest Asian immigrant communities in Canada at this time; Japan's subversion of European imperial rule in Southeast Asia was directly responsible for the rise of the "new nationalism"; and Japan was one of the major non-Commonwealth donors to the Colombo Plan, where Canada had positively received its application for membership in 1954.[43] If we are to look for a Canadian policy in Asia and the Pacific during the 1940s and 1950s, then all

[41] H.F. Angus, *Canada and the Far East, 1940–1953* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), vii, chapter 4. In his review of Angus's book, Hugh Keenleyside himself praised the work for making exactly these claims, arguing that it "provides all the facts that are essential for an understanding of the springs of Canadian opinion and the basis of Canadian policy in this field." See H.L. Keenleyside, review of *Canada and the Far East, 1940–1953*, by H.F. Angus, *Far Eastern Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (November 1954): 85-86.
[42] Point "I" was clearly inserted with pencil after the fact. See Appx. 1, Intro., Fig. 6.
[43] For both the military dimension and Japan's role in undermining Western imperialism, see my discussion in Chapter 1. The controversial role of Japanese immigration into Canada is discussed in Chapter 4, while the Colombo Plan is analyzed in Chapter 7.

the evidence points to relations with Japan as the most obvious candidate for study. Building on John Meehan's work, this thesis continues the story into the war and immediate postwar years.

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If it is necessary to clarify what this dissertation is about, then is it equally important to establish what it is not. In terms of the historiography, while certain aspects of Canada's wartime and postwar relationship with Japan have been well studied by historians, little attempt has been made to contextualize these events beyond their domestic relevance to Canadians. In general, these topics can be divided into three distinct categories: a political angle focused on the role of Herbert Norman in the American-run occupation of Japan; a social angle on Canada's wartime internment and postwar repatriation of Japanese-Canadians; and a military angle about Canada's controversial decision to garrison Hong Kong in 1941 and the fate of its POWs in Japanese captivity. Norman's career, for example, is mainly studied for his shocking suicide in 1957 and the question of whether he was a Soviet agent and communist sympathizer.[44] The fate of Japanese-Canadians, meanwhile, is discussed for its tale of Canadian racism, the 1980s redress campaign, and its modern relevance to Canada's multicultural national identity.[45] Finally, the fall of Hong Kong is important solely as

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[44] This acrimonious debate has lingered on through the years. In 1986, two books established the topic's battlelines: Roger W. Bowen's aforesaid *Innocence Is Not Enough*, which exonerated Norman, and James Barros's *No Sense of Evil: Espionage, the Case of Herbert Norman* (Toronto: Deneau, 1986), which convicted him. A good overview of both works' merits is Charles Taylor, "The Strange Suicide of a Diplomat," *Globe and Mail*, 8 November 1986, E19. The debate has evolved since this time, although the consensus now overwhelmingly favours Bowen. For the major contributions, see Peyton V. Lyon, "The Loyalties of E. Herbert Norman," *Labour/Le Travail* 28 (Fall 1991): 219-259; Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945–1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 18; Donald Barry, "Cleared or Covered Up? The Department of External Affairs Investigations of Herbert Norman, 1950–52," *International Journal* 66, no. 1 (Winter 2010/11): 147-169. I take to heart the 2008 observation by scholars Greg Donaghy and Patricia Roy that if "there are scholarly debates on the unhappy career of Herbert Norman [there is] almost no archivally based work on relations since 1945," and that this "narrow focus" reinforces "the tendency of foreign policy scholars to emphasize Canada's relations with the Atlantic world." See Donaghy and Roy, introduction to *Contradictory Impulses*, 1.

[45] Two pathbreaking works that tackled the internment were Ken Adachi's *The Enemy That Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), closely followed by Ann Gomer Sunahara's *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981), both of which criticized it as unnecessary and motivated by simple bigotry. More recent works supporting this line of argument include Stephanie D. Bangarth's *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in North America, 1942–49* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); and Patricia E. Roy's *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese*

a military defeat, for the "mild nationalist critique" it spawned in search of a scapegoat, and for the campaign by the surviving POWs for compensation.[46] These debates, as long and as bitter as they have been, have only a marginal relevance on Japanese-Canadian foreign relations. Moreover, it seems clear that they have mostly played themselves out and suffer from the law of diminishing returns. In the absence of any conclusive evidence that he passed secrets on to the Soviets, Herbert Norman was likely not a communist spy, and therefore his diplomatic reporting from Japan can be taken as sincere and in keeping with official policy.[47] The internment of the Japanese-Canadians, motivated by British Columbian racism and abetted by the expedient politics of Ottawa, is relevant here solely when it influenced foreign relations with Japan or affected Canadian military priorities during the Pacific War.[48] Finally, while the decision seems understandable given the circumstances

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and Chinese in Canada, 1941–1967 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007). A counterpoint was offered by historians J.L. Granatstein and Gregory Johnson in 1988, who argued that there were legitimate issues of national security at play in the decision to place restrictions on the Japanese-Canadians. See Granatstein and Johnson, "The Evacuation of the Japanese Canadian, 1942: A Realist Critique of the Received Version," in *On Guard for Thee: War Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939–1945*, edited by Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988), 101-130. This piece has since been reprinted in Granatstein's *Canada at War: Conscription, Diplomacy, and Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), chapter 14. Granatstein continued his line of argument in Patricia E. Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Iino Masako, and Takamura Hiroko's *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). However, few scholars have accepted Granatstein's claims. Two solid critiques of the flawed assertions in *Mutual Hostages* are provided by Reginald Whitaker in the *Canadian Historical Review* 72, no. 2 (June 1991): 224-227, and Audrey Kobayashi in *B.C. Studies* no. 96 (Winter 1992/93): 117-121.

[46] One of the most incisive attacks on the decision to garrison Hong Kong is Carl Vincent's *No Reason Why: The Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy, an Examination* (Stittsville, ON: Canada's Wings, 1981). For a sample of the literature that portions out the blame, see Paul Dickson, "Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong Kong," *Canadian Military History* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 97-110; Kent Fedorowich, "'Cocked Hats and Swords and Small, Little Garrisons': Britain, Canada and the Fall of Hong Kong, 1941," *Modern Asian Studies* 37, no. 1 (February 2003): 111-157; Terry Copp, "The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941," *Canadian Military History* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 3-13. The 1991 broadcast of *Savage Christmas: Hong Kong 1941*, one of three controversial documentaries by Brian and Terence McKenna for the National Film Board of Canada, also elicited responses from academics, some of which are collected in David J. Bercuson and S.F. Wise, eds. *The Valor and the Horror Revisited* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994). A good summary of this historiography is Galen Roger Perras's "Defeat Still Cries Aloud for Explanation: Explaining C Force's Dispatch to Hong Kong," *Canadian Military Journal* 11, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 37-47. The best extant account of Canadian POWs in Japanese captivity is Charles G. Roland's *Long Night's Journey into Day: Prisoners of War in Hong Kong and Japan, 1941–1945* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001). A more polemical account of the POW experience is in Dave McIntosh's *Hell on Earth: Aging Faster, Dying Sooner: Canadian Prisoners of the Japanese During World War II* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997).

[47] A point made by Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, chapter 4, 354-355.

[48] Given the fundamentally irrational nature of the decision-making process behind the Japanese-Canadian internment, I disagree in Chapter 1 with Granatstein's revisionist view that rational concerns played any significant role here.

that existed in late 1941, the debate about whether Canada *should* have garrisoned Hong Kong is less important to me than the fact there *were* Canadian soldiers in the colony on 8 December 1941 to be killed and captured by the invading Japanese.[49] In all three cases, their broader relevance to Japanese-Canadian relations takes priority over the minutia of their individual controversies.

Beyond these debates, my dissertation also argues that Canadian foreign relations cannot be studied as the sole brainchild of External "mandarins" without needlessly simplifying Canadian policymaking. As we saw with H.F. Soward's report cited earlier, his conclusion that there was no "coherent Canadian pattern of diplomatic thinking" on Asia was based solely on the "departmental files" he reviewed at External.[50] It was thus a narrow definition of what forms Canadian foreign policy; ignoring the views of other federal departments, such as those of National Defence or Trade and Commerce; the roles of Prime Ministers William Lyon Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent; the views of specific provinces, particularly the Pacific-fronting British Columbia; as well as the influence of nongovernmental actors in shaping its Asian policies. Taking a concept from political science, I argue that historians cannot understand Canadian foreign policy without examining both state and nonstate actors and the interaction between them. As political scientist Mehran Kamrava has recently argued, "politics" must be understood as "events occurring within the state, and within society, as well as between them," and that this interaction "has escaped the careful attention of most scholars, with much of the emphasis having been put on either the state or society and rarely on the nexus connecting them."[51] I embrace this "state-in-society paradigm" by exploring how contact between Ottawa and the broader Canadian public helped condition federal policymaking

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[49] "Dispatching C Force was a poor decision retrospectively," as Perras notes, "as it only added to the magnitude of the defeat. But bad strategic choices are inevitable in war's dense fog, as few leaders possess all the facts." See Perras, Defeat Still Cries," 46.

[50] This reliance on External documentation was also shown by Bothwell in 1998, who leaned heavily on the official *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series. See Bothwell, "Eyes West," 69-70.

[51] Mehran Kamrava, *Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 35.

towards Japan. If, as Soward concluded, External was insufficiently invested in East Asian affairs, then perhaps at times a de facto Canadian policy for Asia was driven by no singular authority but rather by a diverse constellation of actors, some originating from outside government.

Finally, I seek to avoid the pitfall inherent to writing about postwar Canadian foreign policy by not using any grand international relations theory to try and justify the motivations of Canadian policymakers in their actions on the world stage. "Traditionally," as political scientist Petra Dolata recently observed, Canadian scholars have typically "opted for one of two perspectives":

> Either Canada's foreign diplomacy is dominated, or at least influenced to a considerable extent, by its bilateral relationship to its powerful neighbour to the south, the United States, or it is characterized by a multilateral approach as a middle power in the international system. These two perspectives partly translated into (neo)realist and liberal internationalist readings of Canada's role in the world and intersected with the dichotomous categorization of foreign policy as either value-based or interest-driven.[52]

In contrast, my dissertation avoids categorizing Canadian foreign policy as being based either on liberalism with its "Pearsonianism"[53] and peacekeeping, or on realism with its anarchy and anti-Americanism, in favor of a more flexible, constructivist approach: "reject[ing] the deterministic features of the other theories" in favor of the idea that "concepts such as power and capabilities only matter to the extent that states have constructed or defined their meanings."[54] In doing so, I hope to avoid contorting my exploration of Canadian-Japanese relations toward any predetermined outcome. Post-1945 Canadian foreign relations, to paraphrase the constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt, were simply whatever Canadian policymakers chose to make of them.[55] By splitting this

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[52] Petra Dolata, "Canada and/in the World," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 1 (March 2017): 351. For their relevance to Canada's postwar foreign policy, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998); David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirkton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: Wiley, 1983).
[53] For the use of Pearson's foreign policy as a template for diplomats, see Erika Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 34, no. 1 (February 1999): 75-92.
[54] Elizabeth G. Matthews and Rhonda L. Callaway, *International Relations Theory: A Primer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 168.
[55] See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

difference, I argue that Canadian relations with Japan were based on a complicated dance between aiding the United States without appearing coerced while also pursuing its own foreign policy objectives, a dance that often took place within multilateral forums like the United Nations, the GATT, or the Colombo Plan. The result was a purported "North Pacific Triangle," as a few writers have term it, mirroring the North Atlantic one Ottawa had with Britain and the United States.[56] As Canada was in a transitional phase during this period, moving from a British Imperial to a Cold War American setting in the 1940s and 1950s, I believe that this is a wise precaution to follow.

Regarding Canadian interests in East Asia, it is also important to mention the latent hostility between Britain and the United States in the region, as their postwar policies were more divergent here than in Europe. Unlike in the war to defeat the Nazis, as historian Christopher Thorne argued in 1974, the Anglo-American allies in the Pacific War were more often just "allies of a kind."[57] In part, this was due to the prevailing American position that they had not joined the war to save the British Empire; an empire that was more directly threatened by the Japanese in Asia than by the Germans in Europe.[58] In the Pacific, then, Canada had to negotiate its interests in an arena of greater rivalry between its two main allies. Its eventual role in the Pacific War and occupation of Japan reflected this geopolitical reality.

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[56] See Gregory Allan Johnson, "'North Pacific Triangle?' The Impact of the Far East on Canada and Its Relations with the United States and Great Britain, 1937–1948" (PhD thesis, York University, 1989); Michael Fry, John Kirton, and Kurosawa Mitsuru, eds. *The North Pacific Triangle: The United States, Japan, and Canada at Century's End* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

[57] See Christopher G. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). For the continuation of this story into the postwar era, see Robert M. Hathaway's *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947* (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1981) and Peter Lowe's *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies Towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948–53* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1997).

[58] For the role of British imperialism in constraining the wartime Anglo-American alliance, see John J. Sbrega, *Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East Asia, 1941–1945* (New York: Garland, 1983); William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). I mention this issue myself in Chapter 2.

This dissertation is divided into two broad sections. In the first three chapters, I examine Canada's participation in the war to defeat Japan from December 1941 to August 1945. In the final four chapters, I study the restoration of Japanese-Canadian relations from the Japanese surrender in September 1945 until the end of the "Liberal Era" in Canadian politics with the election of John Diefenbaker's Conservatives in June 1957. In Chapter 1, I explore how Canadians approached the Pacific in the aftermath of Japan's stunning military successes in 1941 and 1942 that destroyed the prewar Western colonial order and tried to replace it with a new order centred on Tokyo. In the first half of the chapter, I study the potential for a Japanese attack on Canada, its relevance to the internment of Japanese-Canadians, and the role of racism, fearmongering, and political expedience in informing both. In the second half, I explore the content of Canadian propaganda created against Japan, showing how it was not only invariably ignorant, simplistic, and deeply condescending, but also that it was far nastier than anything claimed about the Germans and had a long postwar legacy for Canadian understanding of the country. In Chapter 2, I jump back to late 1941 to investigate how Canadians debated what the postwar Pacific would look like supposing the Allies won. This includes studying Canada's participation at the two Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) conferences that were held during the war—the first at Mont Tremblant, Quebec in December 1942 and the second at Hot Springs, Virginia in January 1945—as well as the role that the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) had in influencing Ottawa policymakers on Pacific affairs. I also evaluate Canada's contribution to producing propaganda against Japan and its influence on defining a broad set of war goals articulating what the Allies were fighting for in the Pacific as an alternative to the Pan-Asian rhetoric explicit in Japan's Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chapter 3, by contrast, is focused narrowly on the "pivot" in the higher direction of Canada's war effort that took place as success in the European theatre by mid-1944 presaged the freeing-up of

men and materiel that might be sent to the Pacific if needed. Notably, I explore the development of a line of argument that suggested that Canada had good reasons to contribute to the Pacific War after VE Day, which found resonance among many Ottawa officials, within the armed forces, and even with the wider Canadian public. In fact, there was a degree of popular enthusiasm in English Canada to join in the Pacific War. Additionally, I offer a detailed look at Canada's preparations to contribute a military unit, the Canadian Army Pacific Force (CAPF) under Major-General Bert Hoffmeister, to fight in the invasion of Japan slated to take place in early 1946.

Chapter 4 begins with the war's end and studies how Canadians processed their feelings of anger against the Japanese that had built up during the conflict. This includes Canada's pursuit of war reparations at the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington, and reactions to the decision to invite a mission from the Japanese Diet to visit Ottawa in 1950. It also studies the homecoming of liberated C Force veterans, who quickly established the Hong Kong Veteran's Association of Canada (HKVAC) to press their claims of unique mistreatment by Japan to the federal government. The liberation and repatriation of the Japanese-Canadians after 1945, which provoked a backlash that eventually led to their enfranchisement in 1949, is also examined for its broader impact on Japanese-Canadian relations. In Chapter 5, I turn to how Canada's attempt to conduct diplomacy between the divergent views of the British Commonwealth and the Americans influenced its views on the US-led occupation of Japan that existed from September 1945 to April 1952. This includes a look at the relationship between Herbert Norman and General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan; the so-called "Crerar Mission" of 1947, as the former commander of the First Canadian Army toured Japan and China to report on the region's postwar situation for Ottawa; and Canada's role at the 1947 Canberra Conference, hosted by Australia's mercurial Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt. This chapter ends with a discussion

of Canada's role at the San Francisco peace conference in September 1951 that paved the way for Japan's return to full sovereignty the following year. Chapter 6 studies how Canada's decision to use Japan as a base to fight the Korean War in 1950 began a wholly unexpected form of postwar engagement with the country, necessitating an increased diplomatic presence in Tokyo while also introducing thousands of ordinary Canucks in uniform to a people they had been at war with only five years before. In Chapter 7, I return to the realm of "high diplomacy" to study how Canada, by engaging with a newly independent Japan, sought to rebuild its economic and political ties with the country. As we will see, Canada advocated continuously, and quite vociferously, for Japan's reintroduction into the international community, whether at the United Nations, the GATT, or within the Commonwealth-led Colombo Plan for Asian economic development. It also saw the opening moves in a profitable trade relationship, assiduously cultivated by Canadian businessmen and business lobbying groups, that grew rapidly after the mid-1950s. Finally, in my conclusion, I end my thesis by exploring the impact that Herbert Norman's 1957 suicide had on Japanese politics in the late 1950s and the personal legacy he left for his Japanese friends.

In studying these events, my overarching aim is to demonstrate that Canada's engagement with Japan was both richer and more varied than earlier historians have acknowledged, and that it also constituted a significant plank in a wide-ranging Pacific policy for the newly self-confident nation, particularly through the influence of External's three "Far Eastern Mandarins" of Herbert Norman, Arthur Menzies, and Hugh Keenleyside. In short, I hope to offer a novel take on Canadian foreign relations during the 1940s and 1950s, proving that not only was there something we can call a Canadian "Far Eastern Policy" during this period, but that Japan constituted its cornerstone.

Part I: Sunset

Chapter 1: Days of Infamy: Canada Confronts the Co-Prosperity Sphere, 1941–1945

> *"We gathered to watch the victory parade. Thousands of triumphant troops marched past, flags flying, officers on white horses strutting proudly, imperiously down these British-built streets, tasting the sweetness of power unlimited, impervious to the curses lavished on them on all sides. Wasn't this how we had marched down these streets a few weeks ago? How easily one was brainwashed, hypnotized into a belief in the false god of permanence. We assuaged our wounds with vengeful thoughts. Well, have your turn, you bastards. Someday, somehow you'll pay the piper too."*
>
> — Signalman William Allister, Hong Kong Veteran, 1989[59]

> *"The Members of the Conference who had just arrived from British Columbia found it difficult to accept the assurances of the representatives of the Armed Services and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police […] Most of them stated they did not trust persons of Japanese racial origin and that they considered the continued presence of these persons in British Columbia a menace to public safety. They emphasized particularly their fear that virtually all of these residents would commit positive acts of disloyalty if Japan should land forces in British Columbia."*
>
> — Conference Summary Regarding Japanese-Canadians, 8-9 January 1942[60]

The exhausted gaggle of men and women who staggered off the train at Ottawa's Union Station on 26 August 1942 had come a long way. In a sense they were political refugees, the families of Canadian diplomats and other civilians displaced by Japan's attack in 1941. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, they and their American colleagues were interned in Japan until they could be exchanged for their Japanese counterparts in North America. In July, this exchange took place at Lourenço Marques, in the neutral Portuguese colony of Mozambique before the Canadians sailed on for New York.[61] There they were met by External's Arthur Menzies and Ralph Collins, then put on a special train with an RCMP escort to see them through to Canada. The deportees passed customs at Montreal before finally arriving in Ottawa a few hours later.

Leading the arriving diplomats was Edgar D'Arcy McGreer, ex-head of Canada's Tokyo Legation, along with his wife. As he told the *Ottawa Citizen*'s waiting reporters, their internment

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[59] William Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989), 45.
[60] "Conference on the Japanese Problem in British Columbia," 6, 10 January 1942, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[61] Bruce Elleman, *Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941–45* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 53.

had not been a bad one. Walks outside the Legation had been allowed, and he had witnessed the Doolittle Raid on the Japanese capital in April. Also arriving was Herbert Norman, third secretary in Tokyo, who had proven his worth both before and after the war's start. Norman had been an "ideal person to be imprisoned with," McGreer later recalled, as the well-read diplomat helped pass the time by animatedly discussing such things as "Persian poetry, the wines used in Italy at the time of Catullus, the gutty writing of John Aubrey … and colorful personal sidelights on such writers as Cervantes and Voltaire." Another arriving diplomat was H.F. "Temp" Feaver, second secretary in Tokyo and the unluckiest Canadian in East Asia. In November 1941, Feaver had left Japan on a special sailing of the NYK liner *Asana Maru*. Unfortunately for him, the ship was still in transit (*east* of the International Date Line) when news came over the radio of the Pearl Harbor attack, whereupon the Japanese ship had immediately returned to Yokohama. Feaver was promptly met on the dock by a policeman who put him under house arrest with the other Canadians. This may explain the diplomat's terse comment to the *Citizen* that his experiences "were not pleasant."[62] A more unusual arrival was William Poy, an Australian-born Chinese with fourteen years service as a Canadian trade official in Hong Kong, who arrived with his wife and son while holding his young daughter, Adrienne, in his arms. Given that Canada's Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 was still in effect, it had taken some effort behind the scenes by Hong Kong Trade Commissioner Paul Sykes to get the Poy family to Canada. In New York, the Poys had been the last to board the train, and Arthur Menzies later recalled carrying a tired Adrienne onboard, a fact the retired diplomat later reminded Governor General Adrienne Clarkson when he received the Order of Canada in 2000. Given the fate they might have suffered under Japanese rule, we can understand William's

[62] To add insult to injury, when Feaver (at McGreer's prompting) tried to donate ¥8,899.50 he had on hand to aid the Swiss authorities acting as the protecting power for Canadian assets in Japan, the Japanese stonewalled him. These funds were only unblocked in November 1943. See H.F.F., "Memorandum for Mr. Miles, Special Section," 24 August 1943; Alfred Rice to USSEA, 11 November 1943, R219, vol. 3246, file 5882-40, DEAF, LAC.

thanks to the *Citizen* that the Canadians "were magnificent and did all that could be expected of them," as he and his family walked wearily to their assigned room at the Chateau Laurier.[63]

For those Canadians, who by choice or necessity, had decided to remain in East Asia, the homecoming would not occur for another three years. But that remained a long way away during the disastrous early years of the Pacific War in 1941 and 1942. For the doomed soldiers of C Force at Hong Kong, and for the long-established Canadian missionaries in China, Japan and elsewhere, life was now set according to Japanese prerogatives as their forces fanned out across Asia and the Pacific. Suddenly, in the heady haze of Japanese victory, the Pacific's old geopolitical order set on Western imperialism had abruptly vanished for Canadians. That Hong Kong was one of Britain's oldest Asian colonies, dating to 1841, made its capture all the more symbolic. The "psychological damage" of its loss, one contemporary asserted, "was even greater than the military defeat."[64] The Japanese had shown that not only could the "white man" be beaten, but that it was apparently not hard to do so. "Drunk on hard-fought victories and rapid expansion," in historian Jeremy Yellen's words, Japan tried "to cast off what they saw as the inequities within global politics." The result was the vague but potent idea of a Dai Tōa Kyōeiken ("Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere") first articulated by Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke in August 1940. "By July 1941," Yellen observes, "the Co-Prosperity Sphere had become the central goal of national policy, a goal that dominated discourse until the war's end in 1945."[65] As protean as the idea was, it nevertheless gave a name to the apparent new reality in Asia, providing a convenient framework for Western

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[63] "Sight of Ottawa Stirs Canadian Repatriates," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 27 August 1942, 15; "69 Repatriates from Orient Back in Canada After Long Trip," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 27 August 1942, 13; Sidney Katz, "What Kind of Man Was Herbert Norman," *Maclean's Magazine*, 28 September 1957, 87; Interview with H.F. 'Temp' Feaver, 20-33, 22 June 1978, R5637, vol. 29, file 1, Peter Stursberg fonds, LAC; Arthur Menzies to Barbara Uteck, 2 July 2000; Narrative Account for Dr. Neville Poy, 21 June 2000, R15615, vol. 52, file 2, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

[64] Gerald Horne, *Race War! White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire* (New York: NYU Press, 2004), 1-3.

[65] Jeremy A. Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 2-4.

writers seeking to frame Japan's intentions.[66] At its most grandiose, the Co-Prosperity Sphere was little more than a wish list for Japanese conquest. In December 1941, for example, Japan's Ministry of War had created a "Land Disposition Plan in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This proposal ranged from a practical plan to reorder Japan's colonies in the central Pacific, to fantastic visions of creating a "Ceylon Government-General," an "Australian Government-General," and even an "Alaska Government-General," comprising the titular US territory, Canada's Yukon, the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, and Washington State![67]

One need not see such aspirations as attainable to argue that Canada faced an unappealing military situation in December 1941. Involved in a two-front conflict, its army deployed to Britain, Ottawa needed to manage Canadians' rising fear, especially among British Columbians, that the war was now at their doorstep. "As we get our breaths after the shock of yesterday's news," the Vancouver *Province* editorialized on 8 December, "we people of Vancouver realize that we are in the front lines at last. We have new enemies, eighty million strong, and they lie just across the way."[68] While Ottawa privately concluded on 11 December that "such fears were unwarranted on military grounds and that they should ignore the inevitable demands from the public for a strengthening of the home defence forces," public pressure would not prove easily allayed.[69] By early 1942, as first Hong Kong then Singapore fell to Japan, followed by the collapse of Dutch forces in the East Indies, the Americans in the Philippines, and the British in Burma, a poll by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) reported that 56% of respondents thought "a Japanese attack on Canada's west coast" would likely occur within a year. Only 35% dared disagree.[70] As

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[66] See A.J. Grajdanzev, "Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere," *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 3 (September 1943): 311-328.
[67] Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63-66.
[68] "We Had Better Mean A.R.P.," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 8 December 1941, 4.
[69] Bill Rawlings, "Only If Necessary: Canada's War Against Japan, 1941–45," in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Patricia Roy and Greg Donaghy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 106.
[70] CIPO, "Half Voting Public Think Japs May Attack Dominion," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 27 May 1942, 2.

fears continued to mount and the men of C Force became martyrs to the Allies' Pacific unravelling, life soon became very difficult for the Japanese-Canadians living on the west coast.

In this chapter, I tackle two topics concerning Japan's moment of regional hegemony as its aspirational Co-Prosperity Sphere briefly became a harsh reality. In the first section, I demonstrate that Ottawa's 1942 decision to intern Japanese-Canadians was part of a long history of alarmist views about the potential for a highly unlikely Japanese invasion of North America that had been disingenuously fostered before the Pacific War, a decision vocally opposed by Hugh Keenleyside and others at External Affairs. As will be seen, the link between Japanese-Canadian fearmongering and the ostensibly objective criteria of national defence are harder to separate than is sometimes claimed. In the second section, I explore how the Canadian public tried to come to grips with its new Japanese enemy as reports rolled in about its cruel mistreatment of Allied civilians and POWs. Here, local reactions to Japan's aggression ranged from a blithe ignorance of the factors motivating Japanese soldiers to commit crimes that allegedly dwarfed anything done by the comparatively "tame" Nazis, to a hateful bigotry that fantasized about exterminating the evil "Japs." "Repatriates from Japan and occupied areas of China," as one Canadian paper expressed the popular sentiment after the *Gripsholm*'s return, told of crimes that "did not vary, but was of a piece," where "Faces were frequently slapped for the most trivial breach of 'regulations.'" And after all, "what could be more exquisitely humiliating for a white man than to be slapped by an insolent Oriental?"[71]

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On 20 June 1942, the war came home to Canadians. Nearly a month before, the submarine *I-26*, under the command of Commander Yokota Minoru, had left the Japanese naval base at Yokosuka in tandem with its sistership, *I-25*, to scout US forces in the Aleutians before proceeding to watch Seattle as part of Japan's naval buildup prior to the Battle of Midway. On 27 May, *I-25*

[71] "Showing the Japs in True Light," *North Bay Nugget*, 2 September 1942, 4.

launched a floatplane to survey the Alaskan port of Dutch Harbor to gather intelligence before a diversionary air raid by the light carriers *Ryūjō* and *Jun'yō*. That mission complete, the two subs proceeded down the Alaskan coast and into Canadian waters. On 7 June, *I-26* sank the US transport *Coast Trader*, and on 19 June, *I-25* sank the *Fort Camosun*, both prompting rescue missions by ships of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), including corvette HMCS *Edmundston*.[72] On 20 June, Yokota gazed through his periscope at what he assumed was a "compass station" at Estevan Point on the west side of Vancouver Island. In fact, it was the local lighthouse. Between 10:00PM and midnight, Yokota surfaced and manned his deck gun to destroy this target of opportunity.

Unluckily for him, the attack failed. "Because of the dark," Yokota recalled after the war, "our gun-crew had difficulty in making the shots effective." Despite firing 17 rounds at the lighthouse, none came close to disabling it. In fact, lighthouse keeper Robert Lally watched much of the attack from the lighthouse's observation deck before heading to safety, noting that beyond three broken windows in his lantern and minor structural damage, it did little but rattle his nerves: "Made terrible racket like freight trains passing over bridge."[73] As news of the raid spread, the RCN sprang into action. Five patrol vessels, including the recently-commissioned and aptly-named HMCS *Merry Chase*, converged on Estevan along with a Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF) Stranraer flying boat to try and catch *I-26*.[74] However, Yokota was able to slip away in the night for the long voyage home, though several of his calling cards were later discovered. On 6 July, the day before *I-26* returned to Yokosuka, E.T. Redford was walking along a coastal trail south of the lighthouse when he found "a hole about four feet across with an unexploded six inch shell with its

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[72] Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp, "IJN Submarine I-26: Tabular Record of Movement," Imperial Japanese Navy Page, last modified 2017, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm; W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, et al., *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939–1945*, Volume II, Part 2 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2002), 353-354.
[73] Douglas et al., *No Higher Purpose*, 355-356; R.M. Lally, "Lighthouse Control Emergency, War Diary," 20 June 1942, R112, vol. 11845, file 5-11-5-2, DNDF, LAC.
[74] Douglas et al., *No Higher Purpose*, 356-357.

nose only buried in the dirt," having apparently ricocheted off the water or the rocks in front of the lighthouse. Later removed, the dud shell and fragments found at other nearby sites matched a 5.5-inch gun known to be mounted on at least two classes of Japanese submarine.[75] With that, Japan's only major attack on Canadian soil during the entirety of the Pacific War came to an end.[76]

Yet, despite the small scale of Yokota's raid, some Canadians were convinced there was more to the story. On 1 July, BC Liberal MP Thomas Reid rose in the House of Commons to argue that Canadians were "not being told the truth of the war situation." Despite assertions from officials that Japan's capture of the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska in June was "only a little invasion," that did not threaten Canada, Reid was convinced that more was afoot than the government cared to admit. "Only a few days ago a Japanese submarine fired shells into Estevan," he noted irritably, and while some had said "the Japanese must have been poor marksmen because they did not hit anything," perhaps hitting the lighthouse was not their "real object" in Canadian waters:

> They may have been looking for supplies that could have been cached there earlier. In British Columbia in January of this year, and even before, the Japanese [in Canada] were buying gasoline, not by the gallon but by the drum, and buying stumping and blasting powder in great quantities. We from British Columbia raised our voices many times and asked the government to move the Japanese out of the province, but this was delayed. The latest information I have is that there are as many Japanese seen around the city of Vancouver now as ever there were. Those who come from British Columbia know that the situation is serious, but we have had a terrible fight to make the authorities here believe it. It has been flung in our teeth: "Do not listen to those men from British Columbia because they have not the milk of human kindness in them." Well, Mr. Speaker, I hope we are wrong; our own people come first.

As someone who had lived with Japanese-Canadians and who knew "something of their methods," Reid concluded ominously, he felt it was possible that they were surreptitiously helping Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) ships along the coast, asking the armed forces to "watch the bays and coves

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[75] Redford to Department of Transport, 6 July 1942; "To Staff Officer Operations," [undated], R112, vol. 11845, file 5-11-5-2, DNDF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 1.

[76] While objectively a failure, the Japanese would get significant propaganda value out of the attack. See, for examples, "Our U-Boats Shell Canadian & U.S. Coasts," *Syonan Times* (Singapore), 24 June 1942, 1; "Attacks on Vancouver, Oregon Seen as Sequel to Aleutian Landings," *Syonan Times*, 26 June 1942, 1. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 2.

of the coast of British Columbia" in search of the caches.[77] Indeed, the idea that Japanese-Canadian fishermen might have left supplies for Japanese raiders had been suggested by the *Vancouver Sun* on 22 June, soon after Ottawa broke news of the attack to the public. While the Japanese-Canadian fishing fleet in British Columbia had already been interned by this time, the paper still noted that the Estevan raid, "has local tugboatmen, fishermen and others in marine circles wondering if the little yellow fishermen got on their 'work' before the boats were rounded up."[78]

Needless to say, Reid's accusations had no basis in fact. Yokota had not acquired supplies left by Japanese-Canadians fishermen; no such caches existed. Nor was his attack a harbinger of a larger Japanese offensive against the west coast of North America; his mission was part of Japan's secondary attack on Alaska in June 1942 intended to complement Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's failed operation to capture the island of Midway that same month. Yet, in more recent years, some historians have revived the debate on whether there was a genuine Japanese threat to Canada after Pearl Harbor. In 1988, historians J.L. Granatstein and Gregory Johnson published a "realist critique" of the Japanese-Canadian internment that Granatstein later reprinted unedited in a 2020 collection of his essays.[79] Both men suggested that the mere potential for such an attack was "worth some consideration if only because the received version denies any." As they argue, in the view of Canada's contemporary military staff, such a raid—albeit of a minor sort—remained possible even after Midway: "In other words, and contrary to the arguments of those who have argued that there was never any threat from Japan to the coast and hence no justification on grounds of national security for the evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, there was a credible—if limited—military

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[77] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 4 (1 July 1942): 3855-2857; "Reid Wants Coast Searched for 'Gas' Caches by Japs," *Vancouver Sun*, 2 July 1942, 3.
[78] "Raid Revives Fears of Jap Caches in B.C.," *Vancouver Sun*, 22 June 1942, 13.
[79] J.L. Granatstein, *Canada at War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), chapter 14. An earlier test piece, which had appeared in *Saturday Night* under only Granatstein's name in 1986, had received significant pushback. See J.L. Granatstein, "The Enemy Within?" *Saturday Night*, November 1986, 32-42; Tim Cook, *The Fight for History: 75 Years of Forgetting, Remembering, and Remaking Canada's Second World War* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2020), 267.

threat into 1943."[80] What follows here is my counter-argument that the Japanese could *never* have attacked Canada with enough strength to justify the internment of Japanese-Canadians and that an attack of such scale was utterly implausible with both the benefit of hindsight and even on evidence available during the war. In part, this case rests on the assertion that, contrary to Granatstein and Johnson, "objective" military considerations and racist and/or alarmist claims of the credibility of a Japanese attack on the North American west coast are not so easily divorced as they imply.[81] In fact, both mingled uncomfortably and had a long history well before the start of the Pacific War in 1941. Moreover, the declared plausibility of a Japanese attack rested not only on more sober views by the national military establishment, but also on those of Canadian politicians and civilian administrators whose own motives were founded less on reasoned, impartial fact than on irrational fearmongering, blunt racism, political opportunism, or a mixture of all three. Despite pushback by Ottawa officials with more "milk of human kindness," including External diplomats like Hugh Keenleyside, emotive rationalization—not cool logic—was *vastly* more influential in framing the danger posed by Japanese-Canadians and the likelihood of any Japanese inclusion into Canada.

In 1909, a startling book appeared in American bookstores. Entitled *The Valor of Ignorance* and written by 32-year-old American adventurer Homer Lea, later to be known for his involvement in the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the book offered a startling outcome: America's military defeat at the hands of Japan. Accompanied by a large selection of maps and tables, Lea charted a shocking reversal of US fortunes in the Pacific as first the Philippines then Hawaii fell to the invaders, the fall of the latter abetted by Japanese migrants. Soon, 100,000 men were landing in Washington

[80] See Granatstein, *Canada at War*, 263-266.

[81] To be clear, it is worth noting that Granatstein and Johnson do *not* deny that bigotry and fearmongering motivated the internment. As they conclude, Japanese-Canadians were "victims of the racism of the society in which they lived and an uncaring government that failed to defend the ideals for which its leaders claimed to have taken Canada and Canadians to war." Still, they suggest that there were valid reasons for Ottawa to be concerned about the loyalty of Japanese-Canadians: "The anger that persists at the evacuation might be misplaced; that at the confiscation of property and the attempt at deportation still seems wholly justifiable." See Granatstein, *Canada at War*, 267.

and Oregon, with the hammer set to fall on California. Yet even here it was hopeless: "We have shown how simple, and yet how decisive, is the conquest of Washington and Oregon, how quickly it can be accomplished by Japan without even the probability of a battle; yet the seizure of southern California presents less difficulties than are to be found in the Northern States." Within days, it too was under Japan's jackboot, and with their forces in control of the passes through the Rockies, the entire West coast was secured from any US forces marching westward. As San Francisco falls and the remnants of America's standing army are defeated, the reader is left with a grim warning:

> Not months, but years, must elapse before armies equal to the Japanese are able to pass in parade. These must then make their way over deserts such as no armies have ever heretofore crossed; scale the intrenched and stupendous heights that form the redoubts of the desert moats; attempting, in the valor of their ignorance, the militarily impossible; turning mountain-gorges into the ossuaries of their dead, and burdening the desert winds with the spirits of their slain. The repulsed and distracted forces to scatter, as heretofore, dissension throughout the Union, brood rebellions, class and sectional insurrections, until this heterogeneous Republic, in its principles, shall disintegrate, and again into the palm of re-established monarchy pay the toll of its vanity and its scorn.[82]

A valour born of ignorance and a lack of military preparation had led this counterfactual America to ignominious defeat. Could the real country manage to escape this same terrible fate?

Later serialized in *Harper's Weekly*, Lea's assertions produced a minor uproar in the years that followed. Reinforced by sympathetic forewords from Generals Adna Chaffee and J.P. Story, the book had substantial credibility attached to its otherwise lurid charges, with many in the press taking its claims seriously.[83] Lea himself added to the debate by giving numerous lectures to west coast Americans, advocating the building of coastal fortifications.[84] Nor was Lea ignored north of the 49th Parallel. In February 1910, the Vancouver *Province* began serializing the *Harper's* articles in its weekend magazine. "The series is of immense interest to all people whose interest lie on the

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[82] Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1909), 271, 306-308.
[83] For contemporary and generally supporting reviews of the book, see "Most Valorous in Our Ignorance," *New York Times*, 8 January 1910, BR4; "Sees Menace of War," *Washington Post*, 20 February 1910, A14. Other reviewers were more critical. See, for example, "The Foreboding Mind of General Lea," *Hartford Courant*, 19 October 1909, 8.
[84] "Predicts Japanese War," *Los Angles Times*, 14 August 1910, II5.

Pacific coast and has undoubtedly a particular interest for British Columbians," the paper argued, "especially in view of the attitude of the Dominion Government towards naval defense."[85] Lea's book also found an audience within Canada's small prewar and interwar military establishment. This included George Pearkes and Andrew McNaughton, both of whom were posted to Esquimalt in 1928. There, they saw Lea's scenario as farfetched but with applicability to British Columbia, and one they might conceivably be called to counter. When McNaughton left BC for Ottawa a few months later, his parting words to Pearkes was a facetious call to "keep your eyes on the Pacific. You can't trust those Japanese."[86] The joke was less funny in September 1942 when Pearkes was reassigned from Britain to head up Pacific Command to counter a very real Japanese enemy.

As the above quotes imply, *The Valor of Ignorance* was hardly an objective look at Japan's ability to menace continental America. Indeed, Lea's worldview was suffused by a militaristic and Social-Darwinian view of global affairs as dominated by individual races battling for supremacy. "Readiness for war is for him the essence of nationality, and ability in it the supreme measure of the health of nations," the noted philosopher William James correctly summarized Lea's message. For him, nations "must necessarily expand or shrink, according to their vitality or decrepitude."[87] Lea's biggest fear was that America no longer had the political will or the ethnic purity to defeat its enemies. Divisive forces—"the deteriorating influence of industrialism, feminism, and political quackery"—could sap America's strength. All this was music to Japanese ears according to Lea:

> There is no more complete surety to world-wide supremacy for Japan than for the nations of the Occident to allow the present progressive deterioration of active

[85] "The Valour of Ignorance on Armed Invasion," *Vancouver Province Magazine*, 12 February 1910, 16. Extracts from the *Valor of Ignorance* were even cited in Parliament by Conservative MP Hugh Morphy during the debates over Canada's contribution to imperial naval defence in 1913. It was also cited seriously by South African and Australian officials during the larger imperial defence debates in the 1910s. See *House of Commons Debates*, 12th Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 1 (17 January 1913): 1705-1706; Galen Roger Perras, "Canada's Paper Warrior: C.F. Hamilton's Prophecies of War in the North Pacific" (presentation, Society of Military History, Fort Worth, TX, 1 May 2022).
[86] Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 99-100.
[87] William James, *Memories and Studies* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), 277-278.

> militancy to continue without check or end. If Japan continues in the opposite course, and holds the bushido of her people aloof from the contamination of feminism and commercialism, the spirit of her samurai unsullied in the Temple of the Forty Ronins [*sic*], then shall the rest of mankind play Atlas to the Islands of the Eastern Sea.[88]

In book after book and newspaper after newspaper, the ability of Japan to attack the United States, and the role of Japanese-Americans in conceivably abetting it, had been steadily normalized before 1941.[89] In the papers of his vast media empire, William Randolph Hearst repeatedly beat the drum of Japanese hostility to the United States and the prospects of a coming race war. "Japan's Plans to Invade and Conquer the United States," the headline of Hearst's *New York American* magazine promised in 1915, claiming Japan was preparing to invade California and destroy the Panama Canal. The "plans" in question were a reference to Japanese novelist Shirokita Yasushi's sensationalist *Nichibei Kaisen Yume Monogatari* [A Dream of War with the United States, 1913] and were quickly rebutted by Japan's consul-general in New York and the investigative reporting of *Harper's Weekly*.[90] Other attempts by Hearst to alert Americans to the Japanese threat included financing the 1917 film *Patria,* depicting an invasion of America by pillaging Japanese soldiers and their Mexican allies.[91] Professional American military officers were not above abetting such fears, if only for their own reasons. In June 1915, General Montgomery Macomb, the ex-military commander of Hawaii from 1911 to 1913 and now the US Army's chief of staff, argued that with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in effect, Japan and Britain could combine forces to invade the United States from Canada! "The practical military effect of that alliance," Macomb asserted, "has been to place a powerful army on our northern frontier." As historian Richard Preston notes, Macomb's

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[88] Lea, *Valor of Ignorance*, 101, 190-191.
[89] Lea had argued that Japanese migration into Hawaii was "political rather than economic," and that within 24 hours of the war's start, they would have wrested control of the archipelago. See Lea, *Valor of Ignorance*, 248-250.
[90] Ben Procter, *William Randolph Hearst: The Later Years, 1911–1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48. See also Mark R. Peattie, "Forecasting a Pacific War, 1912–1933: The Idea of a Conditional Japanese Victory," in *The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan between East and West*, eds. James W. White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R.H. Havens (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 117-118.
[91] Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations Throughout History* (New York: Norton, 1997), 120.

"underlying purpose" was likely not to seriously suggest that Japan could invade America from Canada at the height of the First World War, but to "play upon American fears of Japan and dislike of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in order to build up the army's case for expansion."[92] A similar rationale almost certainly lay behind Chafee and Storey's support for Lea in 1909.

Yet, in the heady days of infamy after 7 December 1941, Lea's melodramatic views seemed prophetic as Japanese soldiers invaded the Philippines much as he had described it in his book and routed the British and Americans in the Western Pacific. It was for this reason that, in early 1942, *The Valor of Ignorance* was reprinted with a new foreword by Clare Boothe Luce, the wife of *Time* magazine founder Henry Luce. By her own admission, Luce had been introduced to the book in October 1941 while visiting Manila by Colonel Charles Willoughby, the head of General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff in the Philippines. To Willoughby, Lea was "neither a mystic nor a prophet," but "a scientist" whose views on Japan's victory had a certain terrible logic about them.[93] Luce's reprint was eagerly latched onto by dazed Americans still reeling from Pearl Harbor. Even in Canada, the reprint left its mark, widely reviewed in many papers and hailed for its "uncanny" and "amazing accuracy."[94] In March 1942, both the English and French language press carried an article that treated Lea's claims that Japan could invade America with absolute sincerity.[95] In June 1942, Canadian pundit Charles Huestis penned a letter to the *Edmonton Journal*, noting that Lea's thesis was "of particular interest today when Japan is on the rampage in the Pacific and producing

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[92] Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867–1939* (Montreal & London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 192-193.

[93] Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (New York: Curtis, 1942), 1-3. Willoughby, it should be noted, was also an ardent admirer of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco: "A super-patriot at best, a fascist at worse," in one historian's formulation. Indeed, during the occupation of Japan, it was Willoughby's claim that Herbert Norman was a communist that helped incite the investigation that eventually led to his suicide in 1957. See Roger Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986), chapter 6, esp. 180-181.

[94] "'Valor of Ignorance' Predicted Jap Stab," *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 July 1942, 10; Adam S. Marshall, "H. Lea's Prophecies, 33 Years Old, Come True in Jap War Today," *The Gazette*, 18 April 1942, 6.

[95] See, for examples, John Gower, "U.S. West Coast Invasion Pattern?" *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 7 March 1942, 22; "Comment la Côte Ouest Peut Être Envahie," *La Presse* (Montreal), 24 March 1942, 23.

jitters on the Pacific coast and even ARP [Air Raid Precaution] alerts in prairie towns." Only its defeats at Midway and the Coral Sea, he concluded, "have destroyed Japan's dreams of conquest of the Pacific coast."[96] John McAree, a long-serving and respected *Globe and Mail* columnist, reported reading the reprint "with absorbed fascination." *The Valor of Ignorance*, he concluded breathlessly, "is the most exciting book on military matters we have [ever] read."[97]

This is not to say all Canadians accepted Lea's claims uncritically. Adam Marshall at the *Montreal Gazette*, for one, noted that Lea's "unadulterated militarism was too much for Americans in 1909," and that his "scorn for democratic processes … rules him out as a hero for a people who wage war with democracy as their slogan."[98] "Homer Lea," the otherwise supportive Vancouver *Province* decided, "was a totalitarian before his time."[99] His tone, the *Ottawa Journal* editorialized, was "an odd compound of Carlyle and the Bible," and far from being visionary, "there is little in 'The Valor of Ignorance' to prove that Homer Lea was a 'military genius.'"[100] Still, by the outbreak of the Pacific War, there was a long history of playing up the remote threat of a Japanese invasion of North America, the role that disloyal Japanese migrants would play in it, and of otherwise sober military officials consciously endorsing these fears, if only for reasons of naked opportunism.

Yet, in the realm of reality, the possibility of Japan invading Canada was far less interesting or credible to interwar Canadian military planners than the idea that in any war between Japan and the United States, the Americans might infringe Canadian sovereignty to prosecute such a conflict, especially if the Japanese attacked Alaska.[101] In 1936, for example, Escott Reid—then secretary

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[96] Charles E. Huestis, "Valor of Ignorance," *Edmonton Journal*, 26 June 1942, 6.
[97] J.V. McAree, "United States Blind to Japanese Danger," *Globe and Mail*, 19 March 1942, 6.
[98] Marshall, "H. Lea's Prophecies," 6.
[99] P.M.I., "Foresaw Jap Landing on U.S. Coast," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 15 May 1942, 40.
[100] "It Took Two World Wars to Sell His Book," *Ottawa Journal*, 9 April 1942, 8.
[101] See, for examples, Galen Roger Perras, "Who Will Defend British Columbia? Unity of Command on the West Coast, 1934–1942," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 59-69; Gregory A. Johnston and Galen Roger Perras, "A Menace to the Country and the Empire: Perceptions of the Japanese Military Threat to Canada before 1931," in Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy, eds., *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth*

of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA)—penned an article on Canadian defence that mentioned exactly this point.[102] In mid-1937, he began writing another article on the same theme, averring that a Japanese-American war was likely within ten years and that there was a prospect of the Japanese "seizing an advanced base" on BC's Queen Charlotte Islands. When Reid solicited comments from Hugh Keenleyside, however, Keenleyside argued (wrongly, as it turned out) that the odds of war occurring within a decade were poor, but added that as to an invasion:

> This would seem to indicate that you expect the Japanese to actually take semi-permanent possession of such a base. I think the view of military and naval experts is that the Japanese are likely to hide "mother ships" in the fiords of the British Columbian coast, but I do not believe that there is any possibility of their trying to establish a regular base in such a position. It would be too vulnerable to attack from American territory.[103]

That Japan might take advantage of the length and seclusion of the BC coastline to avoid detection was at least plausible, and one the raid on remote Estevan perhaps validates. That it could seriously invade and hold Canadian territory, however, Keenleyside sensibly saw as farfetched.[104]

Yet, when the Pacific War began in December 1941 and Japan proved victorious in battle after battle, fears of an attack on Canada metastasized. In mid-1942, British Columbian reporter Francis Dickie penned a 3,500-word indictment of the "stupid Canadian government" for ignoring local defence and giving the Japanese-Canadians "utmost freedom" for two months without taking any action against them. Whether Dickie had read the *Valor or Ignorance* or not is unclear, but he was very much singing from Lea's hymnbook when he reminded readers that "the Japs for thirty years have been planning the conquest of British Columbia!"[105] In making his argument, Dickie

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Century (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 62-79; and Galen Roger Perras and Katrina E. Kellner, "'A Perfectly Logical and Sensible Thing': Billy Mitchell Advocates a Canadian-American Aerial Alliance Against Japan," *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 3 (July 2008): 785-823.

[102] Escott Reid, "Can Canada Remain Neutral," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 May 1936, 56.

[103] Keenleyside to Reid, 3 May 1937, R4366, vol. 34, file 25, Escott Meredith Reid fonds, LAC. A checkmark next to this passage seems to indicate that Reid accepted Keenleyside's conclusions on this point.

[104] Maurice Pope likewise feared US intervention more than Japanese aggression before 1941. See Pope, *Soldiers and Generals: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 91.

[105] Francis Dickie, "Only Truth Can Save Us!" Typed Manuscript, 3, [May 1942?], PR0963, Box 6, file 4, BCA.

cited an article in the *Vancouver Sun* on BC's "derelict defense." "The Japanese technique always involves a desperate attempt to isolate the invaded sectors by cutting their communications," the *Sun* warned. And like Lea, it cautioned that the province was dependant on lines of communication through the Rockies to soldiers arriving from the prairies. "How will they come to our aid if those lines are cut?" the paper asked.[106] The passes might not become "ossuaries of their dead," as Lea had warned, but BC's defences would surely be imperiled. The tone of the Ottawa press corps was no less gloomy. "When Will War Reach B.C. Coast?" was journalist Bruce Hutchison's question in February 1942. "The capital is about to debate in secret session the question whether Canada should defend itself," he scoffed testily. "This, while Japan is sweeping across the Pacific world and for mere self-protection must soon strike northward towards Alaska."[107]

The fears were not all Canadians'. As historian Galen Perras notes, between Pearl Harbor and Midway, US officials in Alaska—like their Canadian counterparts in British Columbia—sent off a stream of reports asking for more resources to bolter their defences.[108] Yet, in the war's early stages, Japan lacked the strength to attack Alaska, much less Canadian or American forces in North America. In fact, what is most surprising about the scale of Japan's victories between December 1941 and May 1942 is that they were won with an almost implausibly small number of men. While Japan could call on the full might of the IJN to aid its "southern thrust" against Anglo-American-Dutch forces in southeast Asia, the Army's order of battle for its campaigns to take the East Indies, Burma, Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, New Guinea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Wake amounted to little more than 11 divisions.[109] This was all Tokyo could spare given the war in China, its need

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[106] Alan Morley, "The Derelict Defense," *Vancouver Sun*, 16 March 1942, 13. "In tumultuous printed assault," Dickie ranted, "it told the truth, voiced B.C.'s imperative immediate need." See Dickie, "Only Truth Can Save Us!" 4.
[107] Bruce Hutchison, "Sit Down, Nero, and Be Comforted," *Vancouver Sun*, 23 February 1942, 1-2.
[108] See Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867–1945* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), chapter 3.
[109] This was only a fifth of the entire Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) at that time. See Johnathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway* (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005), 25.

to garrison its pre-existing empire, and its lack of available shipping to transport additional forces. Most of these formations were also used in multiple battles. The reinforced Japanese 38th Infantry Division, for example, was initially selected to defeat British forces at Hong Kong, including the Canadians of C Force. Later, it was shifted to the East Indies, and the majority then sent to defend a small island in the Solomons named Guadalcanal, where it was finally destroyed.[110] Given the war goals of Japan's military and civilian leaders, well known to Allied strategists, to acquire the resources of Southeast Asia—particularly oil—as quickly as possible to break the Allies' prewar embargo, Japan had neither the time nor the military assets between December 1941 and May 1942 to seriously threaten American and Canadian possessions in the Eastern Pacific.[111]

None of these Japanese logistical constraints or strategic priorities made any impact on the fears of British Columbians. On 29 January 1942, Conservative MP Howard Green, representing the riding of Vancouver South, rose in the House to fearfully claim that "Canada is in deadly peril." With the Allies' defeats, he claimed, Japan had opened a path to Canada. While Canadians "have a score to settle with the Japanese over Hong Kong," Green stated defiantly, this "must be settled not in North America but on the far side of the Pacific." With Alaska now a tempting target given its proximity to Japan, it was possible Tokyo had its eyes on "our own city of Prince Rupert, the Queen Charlotte islands, and even Port Alberni" to use as "nuisance bases, or even as invasion bases." If these were captured, Green warned, "it would be possible from them for the enemy to bomb our coastal cities at short range," along with their attendant war industries.[112] Unlike Thomas Reid, Green was not known for extreme bigotry or hyperbole. His claims, Hugh Keenleyside wrote

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[110] Its remnants retreated to Rabaul and the surrounding islands and played no further part in the war. See "History of the 38 Japanese Div. in Second World War," R112, vol. 20538, file 982.013 (D5), DNDF, LAC.

[111] Indeed, in May 1942, Maurice Pope made this ***exact*** conclusion in his diary. See Pope, *Soldiers and Generals*, 219-220. For Japan's economic motives in waging the Pacific War see, Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). See also Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 3.

[112] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 1 (29 January 1942): 152-153.

later, were part of "normally well-balanced and responsible politicians" giving in to irrational fear. As he noted charitably, Green became "a widely admired Minister of External Affairs" under John Diefenbaker, yet in 1942 even he was one of many BC politicians who got "caught up in the spirit of the times and repeated arguments and made allegations that I am sure they later regretted."[113]

The same can *not* be said for Reid.[114] A few days later, it was his turn to address the House. After applauding the government's work in detaining the Japanese-Canadian fishing fleet and musing darkly about their larger loyalties, Reid then turned to the defence of British Columbia raised by Green. Directly calling out Defence Minister James Ralston, Reid claimed that his views were not raised "from any alarmist point of view," but that simply on the rationale that "so many optimistic reports have been made by high military men and authorities which later events showed were certainly not justified." The result was that Ottawa was not taking the threat of the Japanese-Canadian community seriously given Japan's military triumphs. "It is my opinion that Japan's real object is that of world domination," Reid declared. "It is part of Japanese philosophy to believe in her own destiny of world domination and might I point out," he added, echoing Homer Lea, "in this regard that Japanese immigration to British Columbia and all other Pacific coast territories has all been a part of that plan looking toward Japanese world supremacy." This disingenuousness was too much for Ralston: "My hon. friend is speaking about Japanese nationals in Canada; I thought he was speaking about the preparation of defences against attack. … I do not appreciate being made the subject of attack in connection with the internal situation in relation to the Japanese."[115] To Reid, the ties between Japanese-Canadian sedition and the threat of a Japanese invasion were

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[113] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:171. For a nuanced exploration of Green's motivation during the wartime debates on the Japanese-Canadians that supports Keenleyside's conclusions, see Daniel Heidt, "Howard Charles Green and Japanese Canadians," *BC Studies* 164 (Winter 2009/10): 31-50.

[114] Indeed, Reid was one of Ottawa's most anti-Japanese MPs. For his long prewar interests here, see Patricia Roy, *The Oriental Question: Consolidating a White Man's Province, 1914–41* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), passim.

[115] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 1 (2 February 1942): 224-228; "Tom Reid Clashes with Ralston Over B.C. Defenses," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 February 1942, 2.

intimately linked. Nor was he the only BC parliamentarian to think so. In March 1943, MP Alan Neill heaved a sign of relief that he had supported prewar immigration restrictions for Japan. "What would the result be if it had not been for that?" he asked rhetorically: "Instead of having 24,000 Japs, we would have had 50,000. This is only a conjecture, but I think it is reasonable to say that had there been 50,000 trained Japanese soldiers or their dependents in British Columbia, that fact might have been the major deciding factor in the Japanese deciding to invade Canada."[116]

In June 1942, Japan was presented with its only real opportunity to expand the war into the Eastern Pacific. By this point, its campaigns in Southeast Asia had all been successfully concluded, the Doolittle Raid on Japan in April had convinced Tokyo that the defensive perimeter of its new empire had be pushed back even further, and despite its setback in May's Battle of the Coral Sea, Japan still had the requisite naval aviation assets. Yet, if the US and Canadian forces facing them were not as strong as local commanders wished, they were not the ill-prepared and surprised men of December 1941 either. Alerted by cryptoanalysis, both nations knew the Japanese were planning to attack Midway and Dutch Harbor after May, and their defences from the Aleutians to California were being enhanced.[117] In October 1941, there had been 30,000 American servicemen in Hawaii; by April 1942 there were 70,000, with plans to raise that to 115,000.[118] Forces in Alaska were comparatively weaker, though by April, two runways had had been constructed at Cold Bay and Otter Point. Further, after an intervention by Prime Minister W.L.M. King, RCAF units were also grudgingly dispatched to Alaska's panhandle.[119] In Canada, Pacific Command had expanded from

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[116] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 4th Session, vol. 1 (1 March 1943): 798. In the same speech, Neill also advocated for the expulsion of all Japanese-Canadians from the country at the end of the war. See "Neill Demands Post-War Deportation of Japanese," *Vancouver Sun*, 2 March 1943, 3.

[117] For Canada's wider role in the Midway Campaign, see Galen Roger Perras, "'The Defence of Alaska Must Remain a Primary Concern of the United States:' Canada and the North Pacific, May-June 1942," *Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord* 7, no. 4 (October 1997): 29-43. See also Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere*, chapter 3.

[118] Parshall and Tully, *Shattered Sword*, 40.

[119] Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere*, 70-75. New units were also rushed into position along the American west coast, where 172,000 men and 550 planes were arrayed to meet any Japanese attack. See Stetson Conn, Rose C.

almost nothing in 1941. By March 1942, local forces included two divisions of National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) conscripts—the 6th and the 8th. Additionally, in February 1942, a new auxiliary formation, subsequently named the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR), was created. Ultimately arranged into 137 companies, these were deployed from the Queen Charlotte Islands to the American border to exploit the local knowledge of farmers, fishermen, and trappers along the coast. By June 1943, Pacific Command peaked at 34,316 men; the PCMR peaked a few months later at 14,849. This was hardly a trivial commitment. As Canada's official military historian C.P. Stacey noted, "That the expenditure on the armed services for the fiscal year 1942–43 was nearly double that for 1941–42 was due in no small part to the excitement in British Columbia."[120]

In the end, these forces proved sufficient to confront the limited Japanese strikes directed against them. As Canada's official naval history observes, despite the lack of a serious Japanese probing of Canadian defences, local maritime forces "nevertheless passed muster." Sited to guard key sites along the coast, their patrols "left the area only open to pinprick attacks like I 26's. If that was all the enemy could accomplish, then the navy can be said to have done its job."[121] Backed by the soldiers of Pacific Command, local units of the RCAF, and the growing might of the American military, Japan could never have seriously raided, much less invaded, Canada. After its decisive defeat at Midway in early June, Japan's sole chance to menace the North American coast passed over the horizon for good.[122] Its units on Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians, progressively isolated by US and Canadian forces, could do little but cling to what they already held. Japan's "Aleutian enterprise," as Stacey concluded in 1955, "was not the beginning of an offensive move against the

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Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, *United States Army in World War II, The Western Hemisphere*, Volume II: *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 88-92.

[120] C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 171-175; Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery*, 176-178.

[121] Douglas et al., *No Higher Purpose*, 357. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 4.

[122] On 15 June 1942, in the aftermath of Midway, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff made essentially this conclusion. See "Chiefs of Staff Committee Monthly Appreciation," 3, 15 June 1942, R165, reel C-4874, PCOF, LAC.

American continent. He had no plan for an invasion of the mainland."[123] No source uncovered in the years since has ever hinted that Tokyo seriously intended otherwise, despite Granatstein and Johnson's hypothetical suggestion that Japanese planners "could (and should?)" have considered raiding the Canadian west coast with a force of 5,000 men akin to the 1942 Dieppe raid.[124] Beyond wishful thinking, Japan had no ability whatsoever to create an "Alaska Government-General."

Yet, that was not the conclusion Ottawa received if it listened to British Columbians. Even before the war, many west coast politicians had claimed that Japanese immigrants were potential spies or saboteurs. In March 1938, on repeated reports that there was an influx of illegal migrants from Asia into the province, particularly from Japan, Ottawa established an Inter-Departmental Committee on Orientals in Canada, led by Hugh Keenleyside, to investigate the allegations. In its final report, the committee concluded that while there had been "extensive violations" before 1931, by 1938 most of these early violators had left Canada, and "the total number of illegal entrants still here is very small (probably c. 150)." Privately, as Keenleyside wrote later, neither he nor the rest of his committee was terribly impressed by "the way in which the politicians (at various levels) and other people in the public eye persisted in making allegations about illegal entry, espionage, unfair competition, and other offensives with no substantiation for their accusations."[125]

Such charges returned with a vengeance in December 1941. On 8-9 January 1942, a now infamous conference occurred in Ottawa to discuss "the Japanese Problem in British Columbia." Chaired by Ian Mackenzie, the British Columbian (and openly Japanophobic) Minister of Pensions

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[123] Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 173. Cf. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 48. Indeed, as Parshall and Tully argue, Yamamoto's mission to capture the Aleutians alongside Midway was, at its heart, "frivolous" and the whole operation merely "a poor excuse" to send forces to the North Pacific in pursuit of "a strategic irrelevancy." See Parshall and Tully, *Shattered Sword*, 52.
[124] Granatstein, *Canada at War*, 275-276. Given the logistical difficulties in taking such a force undetected across a thousand kilometers of the stormy North Pacific instead of the narrow English Channel, this idea is not credible.
[125] "Japanese Immigration," 2, 10 December 1938, R4217, vol. 25, file 2, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC; Keenleyside, *Memoirs* 1:479-482. See also John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 103-104.

and National Health, it was attended by a variety of other BC officials; Vice-Chief of the General Staff Maurice Pope; and a large External delegation led by Norman Robertson and including Hugh Keenleyside, Escott Reid, and Henry Angus, the last a political scientist from the University of British Columbia who had been temporarily brought onto the government payroll for the duration of the war. After Keenleyside and Angus had laid out the background, the delegates read a set of reports on the ongoing Japanese-Canadian situation. This including accounts by the RCMP and Pope for the army that they felt there were no immediate risks and that since December 1941, "it had been necessary to intern only one Japanese because of disloyal remarks." But this did not sit well with the BC delegates. In the words of the conference's formal summary, they:

> found it difficult to accept the assurances of the representatives of the Armed Services and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that the measures which had already been taken in British Columbia or which were recommended by a majority of the members of the Conference could be sufficient to meet the requirements of national defence and security. Most of them stated they did not trust persons of Japanese racial origin and that they considered the continued presence of these persons in British Columbia a menace to public safety. They emphasized particularly their fear that virtually all of these residents would commit positive acts of disloyalty if Japan should land forces in British Columbia.[126]

Unofficially, if Pope's account is to be believed, "all hell broke loose," and the BC members' "rage was a site to behold."[127] "The whole performance was hysterical," Keenleyside himself said later, "and made worse by the bitterness of the members of both provincial and federal governments during this particular occasion."[128] Escott Reid was shocked. "When I listened to what these British Columbians said about the Japanese-Canadians I thought that this was surely just the way the Nazis talked about Jewish Germans." They were motivated, he believed, "not by considerations of the national interest but by a desire to rid white British Columbians of the economic competition of

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[126] "Conference on the Japanese Problem in British Columbia," 6, 10 January 1942; Keenleyside to Ian Mackenzie, 10 January 1942 and Enclosure, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[127] Pope, *Soldiers and Generals*, 177.
[128] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:173.

efficient Japanese-Canadian market gardeners and fishermen."[129] It was, Keenleyside concluded, "the vigorous attacks of those who from fear, prejudice, ignorance, or misinformation were demanding action. It was the old problem of trying to prove a negative."[130]

As a result, for the remainder of the war, Keenleyside and Angus became the biggest targets for those British Columbians who wanted the Japanese-Canadians first interned and then expelled from Canada once the conflict was over. A few weeks after the conference, Alan Neill sent a letter inquiring after information on the Japanese-Canadians to Keenleyside's office and received a reply from Angus. In reply, Neill stated categorically that he wanted to hear from Keenleyside directly and not "from a man whose violent and extreme pro-Japanese tendencies through long years had become a byword and reproach in the minds of 90% of the people of British Columbia." Neill also endorsed the view of a BC newspaper that Angus was "a man who was so false to his country," a charge so egregious that Norman Robertson brought it to the prime minister's attention. A quick response was warranted, Robertson warned King, "as I am afraid that otherwise he may make his reckless and unfounded statements about Professor Angus on the floor of the House."[131]

Such tact proved futile. In June 1942, Neill claimed in the House that Ottawa had taken too long in moving Japanese-Canadians away from the coast, blaming "two officials at Ottawa, deeply entrenched in the government offices, whose souls seem to be bound up in the prosperity and happiness of the Japanese in British Columbia," one of whom "was brought here from British Columbia and has been given a prominent position in an office here. His name is a byword and a reproach in British Columbia for his open and passionate advocacy of the Japanese." While Neill dared not name names, as that would expose him to claims of libel, it was clear the two men were

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[129] Escott Reid, *Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 163.
[130] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:173.
[131] Neill to Keenleyside, 21 January 1942; N.A.R., "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 29 January 1942; Robertson to Neill, 29 January 1942, R10383, reel H-1536, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.

Keenleyside and Angus, the latter being "a member of a faculty of the university there and he has been lent by them to give instruction and information—first-hand information—to the Department of External Affairs, where he is in the very best position to have early information of any steps likely to be taken against his friends, the Japanese."[132] These comments produced a minor kerfuffle in British Columbia and provided good copy for local newspapers, including the consistently anti-Japanese *Vancouver Sun*.[133] More damning still was Thomas Reid's accusation a year later in both the House and press that someone "close to the government" had been bribed by the Japanese, a claim Robertson, Keenleyside, and Angus all knew was another veiled attack upon Angus.[134]

To their credit, these allegations provoked sharp rejoinders from the Liberal leadership. This included King himself in 1942, who stated that "so far as the Department of External Affairs is concerned, I will take complete responsibility for everything that is being done there in relation to the Japanese."[135] Nevertheless, these allegations had a cumulative impact on both Angus and Keenleyside's influence in Ottawa. In September 1942, King met the Canadian-born US advisor Lauchlin Currie, the latter having returned from China after talks with Chiang Kai-Shek. During their meeting, Currie mentioned that he "thought Keenleyside would like to go to China," but King demurred: "I told him confidentiality that there was so strong a feeling against him in the H. of C. arising out of reports that he had made regarding the Japanese, that I was doubtful that it would be

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[132] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 4 (19 June 1942): 3485.
[133] "Are B.C. Japs Too Lightly Treated? M.P.s in Heated Commons Debate," *Vancouver Sun*, 20 June 1942, 2.
[134] The charge, as Robertson informed King, was likely a covert allusion to Angus's visit "to Japan and China under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1929," and he asked King's permission to approach Reid and his House supporters "to see if they will withdraw their charges when they are in position of the facts." King consented but added naively that he "doubt[ed] they are 'after Angus.'" For this incident, see *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 4th Session, vol. 4 (29 June 1943): 4170-4175; "Charges Japs Made Gifts to Officials," *Ottawa Journal*, 5 July 1943, 1, 10; N.A.R., "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 5 July 1943, R10383, reel H-1498, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:171; H.F. Angus, "Autobiography," 320, R2490, vol. 1, file 15, Henry Forbes Angus fonds, LAC. For Angus's prewar connections to the IPR, see Chapter 2.
[135] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 4 (19 June 1942): 3485; "King Defends Aides on Japanese Issue," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 20 June 1942, 20. In 1943, Labour Minister Humphrey Mitchell also demanded that Reid state who he had in mind, to which Reid coyly responded that he would "give it to the minister privately." See *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 4th Session, vol. 4 (29 June 1943): 4173-4174.

wise to have him go."[136] Keenleyside, however, had his own ways of striking back. In the 1940s, given the chance to write several uncredited editorials for the *Ottawa Citizen*, he used the privilege to criticize Parliament's conduct towards Japanese-Canadians. In one editorial entitled "Blind Hate in Politics," Keenleyside assailed Bill 135, an amendment tailored to disenfranchise Japanese-Canadians at the federal level even if they could vote at the provincial one.[137] In another editorial, Keenleyside explicitly named Neill and Reid for "doing their best to convince the people of Canada that they are all in great danger from the presence in Canada of people of Japanese race."[138]

In the end, the two BC MPs finally went too far. In May 1945, while campaigning for re-election in his New Westminster constituency, Thomas Reid again claimed that several Ottawa officials had been bribed by Tokyo and gotten "fine trips to Japan" as a reward. "These higher-up civil servants are putting in a plug for the Japanese on every occasion," Reid claimed, alleging that when he named the person privately to Norman Robertson and the prime minister in 1943, King had asked if the man mentioned denied the charge and "Mr. Robertson made no reply." His only regret, Reid told the press defiantly, was that he had not revealed "two others in the same category," again implying Keenleyside.[139] That was the last straw. In September 1945, a furious Keenleyside wrote M.J. Coldwell, leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the House of Commons, explaining Reid's "vendetta" against him, Angus, and others at External. Noting that Robertson had privately told him Reid's account of their meeting was "a grotesque perversion," and that Robertson had visited Reid in Vancouver to elicit an apology "without satisfactory result," Keenleyside asked if Coldwell could do anything "to rectify the present situation in which Reid

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[136] W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 26 September 1942, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.
[137] "Blind Hate in Politics," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 5 July 1944, a copy of which is clarified to have been written by Keenleyside and can be found among his private papers, R4217, vol. 16, file 3, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[138] "Japanese In Canada," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 5 October 1944, a copy of which can be found in R4217, vol. 16, file 3, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[139] "M.P. Claims Premier King's Advisors 'Bribed by Japs,'" *Vancouver Daily Province*, 31 May 1945, 24; "Tom Reid Charges King's Advisers Bribed by Japs," *Vancouver Sun*, 31 May 1945, 12.

and others can denounce us under cover of their parliamentary immunity while we are restricted by the rules of our service from making public reply."[140] Coldwell's response came in December 1945, when CCF MP Angus MacInnis read out Reid's comments from the Vancouver *Province* in the House. Now forced to offer a reply, a credulous King clarified that "at the time he [Reid] made the statements he had reason to believe that they were founded on fact, but that he was now quite prepared to say that he would not countenance the statements at all and withdrew what he had said at that time," an excuse that he had accepted.[141] Norman Robertson later sent a copy of the relevant *Hansard* issue to Angus as a sign of his own support. Still, as Angus noted years later, "a verdict of 'not-proven' is not quite the same thing as an admission of deliberate defamation." Nor did the typically equivocal King "rebuke his supporter until after the election was over."[142]

The internment and expulsion of the Japanese-Canadians would prove an awkward legacy to the Canadian officials and public figures who urged or executed it. "The temper of the Canadian people seems to be becoming more and more arbitrary," the historian and public intellectual Arthur Lower remarked grimly in October 1941 as the war dragged on, "and we are fast losing whatever tolerance and magnanimity we once possessed."[143] Five months later, with the Pacific War going badly, Lower told the *Financial Post* that, "As our national safety is the paramount consideration[,] local interest must everywhere give way." The relevance for Japanese-Canadians was clear:

> If the Japanese are a danger on the Pacific coast, they should be removed, and objections from any community or province unwilling to receive them must be ignored. There is no means of discovering whether they will or will not be a danger until an attack actually occurs. It would therefore seem that the sensible thing to do is to remove them all, as we know too little about them to be able to make safe distinctions between those born in Canada and those born elsewhere. Moreover, action

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[140] Keenleyside to Coldwell, 13 September 1945; Coldwell to Keenleyside, 26 September 1945, R4291, vol. 24, file "Keenleyside Mexico," James William Coldwell fonds, LAC.
[141] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 3 (17 December 1945): 3695-3696.
[142] Angus, "Autobiography," 320-321. "The whole thing was absurd, though irritating," Angus noted later, and "quite insincere." See Angus to Keenleyside, 6 October 1977, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[143] Doug Owram, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900–1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 263.

> should be rapid, for, within a few weeks the Japanese will be relatively free to act against North America through Alaska and Hawaii and it is probable that they will attempt to do so.[144]

The author of a prewar book on Canadian relations with East Asia and a prolific writer in any case, his opinions carried considerable weight (see Chapters 2-3). Yet, in his memoirs, Lower ignored these comments, merely stating it had been "wisest to take precautionary measures, though I never anticipated the extremism of the expulsion that later occurred."[145] But, given his "hostility to the unselective nature of Canada's immigration policies" and belief that "a reasonable degree of social stability and ethnic homogeneity was necessary for any kind of society," Lower's advocacy here is unsurprising.[146] "I had no part in or influence on the decisions made in 1941 and 1942 concerning the people of Japanese origin resident in Canada," J.W. Pickersgill assured readers of his 1994 memoirs, although his brother Thomas was later asked to head the 1945 resettling and repatriation effort. Given Thomas's hesitancy to accept the offer, Jack assured him "it was surely better to have someone in charge who would administer it humanely than some racist enthusiast or sadist who might overlook maltreatment or even promote it."[147] Still, his overall views remained mixed:

> I did not like the action, which those with responsibility felt was necessary as an act of war, but it was certainly less painful than most acts of war. I felt regret but not sense of guilt at the time and later. I did not approve of the monetary compensation recently decided upon. The treatment of the Japanese-Canadians was not unique as a war measure, and compensation for one group has already resulted in claims from others. There is plenty of injustice in society today that needs correction; we should not try to correct the injustices of history.[148]

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[144] "What Ought to Be Done with Our Japanese, Native-Born, Other?" *Financial Post*, 21 March 1942, 3. In another wartime comment on the Japanese-Canadians, Lower essentially blamed them for their own predicament, stating that, unlike Chinese migrants, they had "a knack of getting themselves disliked" as they were "aggressive" and "had large families." See A.R.M. Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," *Canadian Affairs* 1, no. 4 (1 March 1944): 6-7.

[145] Arthur R.M. Lower, *My First Seventy-Five Years* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), 260. "I feared for a time," Lower admitted more candidly, "some attempt at a west-coast landing by the Japanese, simply to create a division and injure our war effort, but the farthest they got was to take some pot-shots at a lighthouse on the outside of Vancouver Island (which they did not hit)."

[146] For Lower's beliefs on Canadian immigration, see Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 128-131.

[147] See Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 5.

[148] J.W. Pickersgill, *Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir* (Markham, ON: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1994), 260-262.

Even Norman Robertson, no one's idea of an inveterate racist, later noted annoyance at ex post facto criticisms of the policy. In 1960, Escott Reid reminisced to Robertson that in the January 1942 meeting they had both attended, "I had felt the physical presence of evil." That, Reid noted, merely "exasperated" him: "He had not been revolted as Keenleyside, Henry Angus, Maurice Pope, and I had been by the demands of British Columbia politicians for the deportation of persons of Japanese racial origins."[149] A dutiful bureaucrat, Robertson had carried out the policy to the best of his ability with the least hardship that he could manage. As the unrelated senior civil servant Gordon Robertson argued in his own memoirs, "Norman Robertson has, in my judgment, been unfairly criticized for his role in our wartime Japanese policy":

> He abhorred the racism that underlay the near panic in British Columbia. However, he would have lost credibility as the prime minister's adviser in this critical area and would have increased the risk of even more drastic policies if he had pressed the prime minister to adopt positions that would not have been acceptable when emotions were as strong as they were after the Japanese aggression at Pearl Harbor and in Southeast Asia and particularly after the fall of Hong Kong.[150]

As J.L. Granatstein concurred, while Keenleyside and Angus criticized Robertson—and there was "force in these arguments"—Robertson "had a clearer realization than Keenleyside or Angus that the politicians were set on action, and given public opinion from 1941 to 1944, had to be." Their actions were "honourable and admirable, but possibly counterproductive," while Robertson's were more compromised but effective.[151] Gordon Robertson agreed: "an adviser on matters as politically explosive as was the problem of the Japanese in 1942 could not properly indulge the luxury of pressing a harassed prime minister to adopt a policy that he considered unwise and unacceptable. Norman Robertson understood that; Hugh Keenleyside apparently did not."[152]

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[149] Reid, *Radical Mandarin*, 164.
[150] Gordon Robertson, *Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant: Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 42.
[151] J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929–68* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981), 167.
[152] Robertson, *A Very Civil Servant*, 43.

There is certainly truth to this. As Maurice Pope noted, the event was proof that "under our form of representative government, the government of the day can do no more, and certainly no less, than give expression to the public opinion of the time."[153] In modern parlance, a systemically racist society will elect bigots, and men like Thomas Reid and Allan Neill simply gave their voters what they wanted. Yet, in some ways, Keenleyside saw more clearly the inflexible nature of those who backed the internment and deportation. The core of Granatstein and Johnson's 1988 "realist" critique is that a clear dividing line between rational matters of national security and alarmist or inflexible racism existed on the Japanese-Canadians, and that if the latter should be deplored, the former was reasonable.[154] Yet, as Keenleyside noted at the 1938 inquest into Asian migrants, for BC bigots, there was *no* dividing line, at least not one as clearcut as Granatstein and Johnson assert:

> It may be argued that if immigration is stopped, if the Japanese already in Canada are registered and those illegally resident are deported, the anti-oriental feeling in British Columbia will die down and eventually British Columbia will extend the ordinary rights of citizenship to oriental Canadians. In my opinion this argument is fallacious. The policy of [race] baiting the Orientals has been used to such good political effect by at least two of the parties in British Columbia [i.e., the Liberals and Conservatives, but not the CCF] that it will be many years before any political organization will have the courage to bring upon itself the dangers inherent in any programme involving fair treatment of the Orientals in that province. The line of least resistance for fifty years to come will be to leave the subject alone and during that time our oriental fellow citizens will continue to be subjected to discriminations worse that those existing in California. This is not a prospect that we should view with any satisfaction.[155]

Keenleyside saw clearly that the hostility of British Columbians towards Japanese immigrants was not based on rational thought but fearful racism, and that appeals to the contrary were made in bad faith. Given this fact, no compromise position was possible because their very intolerance ruled it

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[153] Pope, *Soldiers and Generals*, 178. "We must remember that in the popular mind … the whole population of Oriental race is popularly considered alien in the fullest sense of the word. This popular view assumes (i) that the Canadian law concerning nationality does not really express the will of the Canadian people, and that it is not morally binding on them…" See H.F. Angus, "The Effect of the War on Oriental Minorities in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 7, no. 4 (November 1941): 507.
[154] Granatstein, *Canada at War*, 267.
[155] H.L.K., "The Inter-Departmental Committee on Orientals in Canada," 2-3, 28 October 1938, R4217, vol. 25, file 2, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

out. Time and again during the war, politicians like Reid or Neill demanded that ever more onerous restrictions be put on Japanese-Canadians—first by removing them from the coast into the interior, then into the rest of Canada, then out of the country entirely—a demand they promoted by abetting the defeatist fears of more tolerant Canadians that, contrary to all military logic, Japan could really invade Canada and that the Japanese-Canadians' potential powers of mischief through sabotage, spying, or insurrection were a serious liability.[156] As a result, Robertson's attempts to "moderate the hostility to the Japanese" were always doomed to fail; men like Reid and Neill did not *want* to be moderated.[157] They would pocket his concessions, and then demand more. Given this defiant inflexibility, Keenleyside argued, what was needed was to forgo rationality and use public relations to achieve King's original pledge to promote "a calm and reasonable attitude" towards Japanese-Canadians. Yet, as Keenleyside alleged later, "little or nothing was done to try to persuade the people of British Columbia to behave reasonably and fairly in the situation."[158] One can debate this claim, but the easiest course for Ottawa—and the most expedient one—was simply to bend to BC demands to intern and later deport all Japanese-Canadians, something it would have done if public opinion in the rest of Canada had not become more engaged after 1945 (see Chapter 4).

None of this is to say that Keenleyside or Angus opposed taking lawful and reasonable precautions to defend Canada from Japan if it was needed, as Granatstein and Johnson note.[159] In 1977, while he was penning his memoirs, Keenleyside wrote Angus to ask him about his memories on the whole affair. As Angus noted, "war was war and that any deportation urged by Army, Navy,

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[156] Ken Adachi, one of the Japanese-Canadian internees whose book *The Enemy that Never Was* (1976) helped create the standard narrative about the internment, was understandably indignant with Granatstein's 1986 article in *Saturday Evening*, noting that by Granatstein's logic, "I was old enough then to be a terrorist-in-the-making—storing bombs in the cellar and guns in the attic, waiting to aid Japanese troops as they climbed the beaches of Vancouver. I never had the opportunity, for I spent the wartime years in an internment camp—thanks to the same kind of spirit that informs Granatstein." See "Letters: The Enemy Within," *Saturday Night*, February 1987, 5.
[157] Granatstein, *A Man of Influence*, 166.
[158] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:173-174.
[159] Granatstein, *Canada at War*, 251-252, 257, 262.

Air Force or the R.C.M.P. was justifiable but that demands based on hostile feeling in B.C. were not, and could only serve to give Japan the chance of turning the war into a racial struggle that could have disastrous repercussions."[160] What did shock him was "the insistence of such usually fair-minded people as Norman Robertson and Louis St. Laurent that there must be at least a token deportation of some Canadians of Japanese race."[161] "The only possible justification," Keenleyside concluded later, "was the depth of the fear and hysteria aroused by the leaders of the long campaign against Orientals in British Columbia and the danger of possible civil disturbances."[162]

And postwar Canadians have come to agree with him. In the years after 1945, Keenleyside played a critical role in helping build the contemporary consensus that the internment was patently unjust with little if any military or political justification to it. We have already seen the close ties Keenleyside built with Klaus Pringsheim while the latter was working on *Neighbours Across the Pacific* in the late 1970s (see Introduction). In the Christmas card he sent Keenleyside to announce the completion of his book, Pringsheim even reported that when he gave a draft to Herbert Moran, the retired Canadian diplomat handed it back with the comments: "Very interesting. I learned a lot—but I think you should change the title and call it 'The Keenleyside Story,' with all the credit you give the man."[163] Nor was Pringsheim the only historian who came calling. When Keenleyside wrote Henry Angus in 1977 to thank him for his wartime memories, he also noted he was receiving an influx "of requests for information or interviews by students working on this general subject," including "a letter this morning from a student in Edmonton named Sunahara."[164] The graduate

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[160] As we will see, the Axis ***did*** use the Japanese-Canadian internment to attack Allied claims to racial tolerance, and this contradiction was repeated raised by Angus and Keenleyside throughout the war. See Chapter 2.
[161] See Angus to Keenleyside, 6 October 1977; Angus to Keenleyside, 6 November 1977, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC; Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:175-176. This remained Angus's consistent position on the issue until his death. See Angus, "Autobiography," 319. For St. Laurent's vehemence in deporting all Japanese-Canadians regardless of status in 1946 and 1947, see Chapter 4.
[162] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:176.
[163] Pringsheim to Keenleyside, [December 1984?], R4217, vol. 25, file 16, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[164] Keenleyside to Angus, 17 November 1977, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

student Ann Gomer Sunahara, whose 1981 book *The Politics of Racism* played a pivotal role in codifying the Japanese-Canadian internment as one of the most flagrant lapses of civil liberties in Canadian history, did indeed send a precocious letter to Keenleyside looking for facts beyond the official record and asking for an interview.[165] This Keenleyside was more than happy to give, along with copies of various files in his possession.[166] Her resulting book was kind to him, noting he had tried "Both privately and publicly … to modify government policies affecting Asians and to promote equal rights for all Canadians."[167] Such generosity with his time and papers took place because, unlike other mandarins, Keenleyside had nothing controversial in his wartime record; his criticisms of official policy were all well documented and were now being vindicated by history. Like Winston Churchill, history was kind to Keenleyside, for he helped to write much of it.

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On 27 September 1945—three weeks after the end of the Pacific War—the *Ottawa Journal* ran a pointed editorial. Japan, the paper announced firmly, was not the war's main villain:

> The danger is, however, that in our attention to the iniquities of Japan we are forgetting that greater and more deadly criminal Germany. Even in the matter of atrocities the revelations of the Japanese prison camps have produced nothing to equal the horrors of Hitler's Reich. There was gross brutality among the Japs, prisoners were starved and beaten and murdered, but they could not match the incredible savagery of Germany, the mass slaughter of the concentration camps. […] Germany was the chief aggressor, and if we lose sight of that fact in the shocking reports of brutality coming out of Japan, if we let our attention be distracted from the immediate task—which is to render Germany harmless for all time—we are making a colossal blunder. Japan, too, must be made safe for peace, but by comparison that is comparatively easy.[168]

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[165] Sunahara to Keenleyside, 13 November 1977, R4217, vol. 29, file 29, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[166] Indeed, like with Pringsheim, the flow of evidence went both ways. In January 1978, Sunahara reported a reference to Keenleyside she had found in the prime minister's diaries that he had read "a statement of policy regarding Japanese in B.C. Something prepared by Keenleyside, but really poor judgement in its phraseology. I do not think much of his judgement and have been disappointed in his abilities." This gave Keenleyside some "mild amusement," and he later incorporated the quote into his memoirs. See Sunahara to Keenleyside, 18 January 1978; Keenleyside to Sunahara, 26 January 1978, R4217, vol. 29, file 29, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC; W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 7 February 1942, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:179.
[167] Ann Gomer Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981), 20-21.
[168] "Big Rats and Little Ones," *Ottawa Journal*, 27 September 1945, 8.

By any objective evaluation, the *Journal*'s editorial board was entirely correct. Nearly 50 million people died in the European War compared to the 10-20 million that had likely perished in Asia. And the Germans in Europe had committed a crime so vast that a new word had to be invented to describe it: genocide. "Make no mistake," historian Robert Cribb wrote in 2023, "Japanese soldiers committed a great number of war crimes in the period 1937–1945":

> The [1937] Nanjing and [1945] Manila Massacres were amongst the worst single atrocities of the entire war. The medical experiments of Unit 731 were sickening. Millions died as a consequence of Japan's inability to manage its conquests effectively. But that does not make them like the Nazis. Nazi Germany carried out the Holocaust, a deliberate and systematic program to murder 6 million Jews. The Nazis murdered two million Soviet prisoners of war. Nothing that Japan did approaches the awfulness of the Nazis.

Those that assume otherwise, Cribb concluded, "unwittingly [swallow] the neo-Nazi playbook that seeks to portray the Nazis as relative gentlemen in comparison with the allegedly barbaric Japanese."[169] Unlike the Japanese, as historian Sarah Kovner agreed in 2020, there *was* an explicit order for German soldiers to execute Soviet prisoners of war during Operation Barbarossa:

> It was high-level policy to kill all communist Commissars. Hitler refused to change this order even when he was told it was discouraging Soviet troops from surrendering. Those Soviet POWs who were not summarily shot as suspected communists were provided no shelter and no medical care during the Russian winter. As a result, by the end of the war as many as 57.5 percent of Soviet POWs in German hands died, about double the rate of mortality among Allied POWs in the Pacific [i.e., about 25 percent].[170]

Germany, in the *Ottawa Journal*'s words, was undoubtably the "more deadly criminal."

And yet this was clearly not the view most Canadians held while the war was still ongoing. In September 1944, the *Edmonton Journal* claimed there was "A curious reluctance on the part of some of our people to recognize the Germans for what they are." When Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt mentioned defeating "the barbarians of the Pacific," the paper noted, "we nod

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[169] Robert Cribb, "Why History Does Not Disqualify Japan as an Ally: A Reply to Richard Cullen," *Pearls and Irritations*, 21 February 2023, https://johnmenadue.com/why-history-does-not-disqualify-japan-as-an-ally-a-reply-to-richard-cullen/#.

[170] Sarah Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire: Inside Japanese POW Camps* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 210.

grim approval. But we should be no less determined to destroy the barbarians of Europe."[171] Like the *Ottawa Journal*, the *Edmonton Journal* felt it was necessary to say this as the view was clearly not widely accepted. "The Japanese barbarians had little to learn from their Axis associates in the way of inhuman treatment of defenceless prisoners," as the *Calgary Herald* put it more typically in September 1945. "In fact they outdid the bestiality of the Germans in some particulars."[172] When CIPO asked in June 1942 if Japan or Germany was Canada's "chief enemy," 58% said Germany, 22% Japan, and 13% named both, a comparable result to US polling. Asking respondents to explain themselves, the Americans found that those picking Japan claimed, among other things, that "they are more treacherous, barbaric and cruel than the Germans." No appeal to German barbarism was given, whose dangers were attributed to them being "more powerful" or Hitler being "greedier."[173] Why, then, did Canadians think Imperial Japan was a more brutal adversary than Nazi Germany? As I will show here, the factors were many: Canadians' sheer ignorance of Japan by 1941; the fact Japanese war crimes were directed at Canadians, not nameless foreigners; the ubiquitously vicious tenor of Allied propaganda used against Japan; the political utility of accentuating Japan's villainy by some ex-POWs beginning in 1945; and the undeniably racist dimensions of a conflict widely regarded as pitting the English-speaking "white" nations against the barbarous "yellow Japs."

As was the case for British, Australian, and American wartime views of Japan, a variety of overlapping lines of argument were offered in Canada to explain why the Japanese did what they did, and how their actions differed from those of the Germans. From the outset, the idea that the Japanese were a more mysterious and enigmatic people requiring considerable effort to understand was accepted as a basic truism. "From the time I was a little boy [during the 1930s], right up until

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[171] "The Barbarians of Europe," *Edmonton Journal*, 26 September 1944, 4.
[172] "Japanese Atrocities Being Brought to Light," *Calgary Herald*, 19 September 1945, 4.
[173] American Institute of Public Opinion, "Germany is Greatest Enemy, Canada and U.S. Agree: But Many Call Both Foes Equal Threat, Recent Gallup Poll Surveys Reveal," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 29 June 1942, 2.

the day we left Cleveland a couple of years ago for Japan," US businessmen Don Maloney later wrote in 1974, "I don't think I ever heard anybody use the noun 'Oriental' without modifying it with the adjective 'inscrutable.'"[174] During the war, historian John Dower notes, even among those with personal experiences of Japan, "it even became a sort of badge of expertise to say that you knew from long and vain endeavor that it was futile to try and penetrate the Japanese mind."[175] If this was true for experts, then what hope did ordinary Canadians have in understanding their new "inscrutable" enemy? "The Japs take pride in the fact that their written language is a mystery to foreigners," the *Globe and Mail*'s John McAree airily informed his readers in 1942. "They regard this as an advantage, for it would obviously be in keeping with the Japanese mentality to be able to show that what an American thought was 'black' was in reality 'white.'"[176] In trying to explain some obviously flimsy Japanese propaganda, an editorial in the Vancouver *Province* shrugged that "Probably the Japanese mind is inscrutable to our people about all this sort of thing and it is useless for us even to attempt an exploration of it."[177] Similar observations were repeated ad nauseum by Western commentators throughout the conflict.[178] Even after the end of the war, such ideas retained their currency for many. As Canadian Colonel Richard Molone informed *Maclean's* readers after visiting Japan immediately after the surrender in September 1945 (see Chapter 3), it was precisely this "sphinxlike attitude of every Japanese," combined with the language difficulties, that made it so hard to determine whether they were repentant for starting the war or not. They were, at the end of the day, "a race whose thinking processes and ours are several centuries apart."[179]

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[174] Don Maloney, *Japan: It's Not All Raw Fish* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1975), 198. This comment first appeared in Maloney's column for the English-language newspaper the *Japan Times*.
[175] John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 96.
[176] J.V. McAree, "Foreigners Baffled by Jap Language," *Globe and Mail*, 15 September 1942, 6. See also J.V. McAree, "Some Japanese Words Reveal Character," *Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1945, 6.
[177] "The Inscrutable Jap," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 18 November 1942, 4.
[178] For further non-Canadian examples, see Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 95-97.
[179] Richard S. Malone, "Japan in Defeat," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 October 1945, 7. Cf. Richard S. Malone, *A World in Flames, 1944–1945* (Don Mills, ON: Collins, 1984), 261-266.

If Canadians accepted that it was possible to understand the Japanese, then the issue quickly turned to what their brutal conduct said about their mental stability or capacity for rational thought. "It requires a psychologist to explain the mental process, if any, which causes this program of horror," the Regina *Leader-Post* opined on Japan's abuse of Allied POWs in 1944. "These are the actions of madmen, according to Occidental standards of conduct. But it is difficult to believe that the number of persons involved in the handling of war prisoners are all madmen or that those in authority are so completely insane. One is almost forced to the conclusion that the horror which has been told is not considered abnormal by the Japanese mind."[180] Japan's propaganda was "more misleading than Dr. Goebbels' best efforts," the *Calgary Herald* wrote in 1943. "According to an authority on Japan, this brazen mendacity is not only for propaganda purposes on the home front, but part of the Japanese way of life determined by tradition and unrealistic fixed formulas that permit of no variation."[181] Among the Canadians aboard the Gripsholm in 1942 was Phyllis Argall, a reporter and educator in prewar Japan who published her memoirs in 1944 as *My Life with the Enemy*. "Anyone who lives long in Japan goes though two phases," she solemnly informed her readers: First, "everything is queer," then "one accepts his strange ways as simply a part of his nature." And yet, she warned, more preceptive foreigners "who looked underneath to see what was really happening and why, were sometimes overwhelmed with a sense of the completely fantastic." Quoting a fellow expat, Argall maintained that "Like many things in Japan, when rendered into English, it seems too crazy to be credible. It is crazy, it is incredible, and it happened."[182]

To some commentators, Japan's wartime brutality had exposed the country as uncivilized, proving that its "Westernization" since opening to the world in 1853 was simply a sham, or at best

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[180] "The Sadistic Japanese Mind," *Leader-Post* (Regina), 31 January 1944, 9.
[181] "Japanese Code Is to Never Admit Defeat," *Calgary Herald*, 15 July 1943, 4.
[182] Phyllis Argall, *Prisoner in Japan* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945), 159. The expat in question was popular American *New York Times* reporter Hugh Byas. See Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York: Knopf, 1942), 213.

a thin coating over an otherwise primitive interior. "From the beginning of the war to its end," as John Dower writes, "primitivism and its cognates (savagery, barbarism, tribalism) were not only central to everyday Allied commentary on the Japanese enemy, but also usually offered [by many experts] as if they were genuinely historical or anthropological observations."[183] "There should really be little amazement over this defiance of every law of civilized warfare by the Japs," the *Ottawa Citizen* ranted in 1943 after Japan's execution of the American flyers captured during the Doolittle Raid in April 1942. The *New York Times* had called it the actions of a government "whose thin veneer of modernism covers a primitive savagery." "That is true," the *Citizen* agreed. "Not far below the surface, the Nipponese are still tribal warriors in whom cruelty and lust are readily aroused." The Americans had opened Japan in 1853, the paper added sarcastically, "And in less than fifty years, this nation of primitives blossomed forth as a civilized nation, 'Westernized' and 'modern.'"[184] Nor were these views solely a result of personal anger, only conjured into existence after the outbreak of war in December 1941. "If we regard the Japs as somewhat akin to Hottentots and Digger Indians in the matter of civilization, and even the nearest thing to the missing link that has survived," John McAree mused mockingly in 1937 while considering Japan's ethnonationalist propaganda, "we are certainly not taking the view of them that they take of themselves."[185]

Many Canadians even took Japan's conduct as a personal betrayal against the West. "The Japs, with insufferable conceit, of a quality similar to that of the murderous Nazis, boasted of the progress they had made since they adopted Western manners and science," the respected Montreal lawyer and King's Counsel Bernard Rose sneered in 1944. "They have utilized this progress to kill and treat in the most fiendish manner the men of the nation to which they owe so much."[186] Japan

[183] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 140.
[184] "Nippon's Mask Is Off," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 26 April 1943, 24.
[185] J.V. McAree, "Japan Sees Herself as Heavenly Power," *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1937, 6.
[186] Bernard Rose, "They Must Be Avenged!" *The Labour World/Le Monde Ouvrier* (Montreal), 26 February 1944, 7.

had deliberately "discarded her mask as a convert to Western ideals," an affronted *Globe and Mail* declared, and "under her present rulers has clearly forfeited any right to be treated as a civilized nation."[187] The Japanese were, the *Ottawa Citizen* asserted with equal contempt, "the commercial West's Misbegotten Offspring, raised up from the level of the hermit crab to become the world's bespectacled gangster since about 1867—the year of Canadian confederation."[188] Such brazen ingratitude, the feeling went, could not go unpunished by the more "civilized" Allies.

A final claim raised against the Japanese by Canadian and other Allied observers was their supposedly innate treachery and capacity for deceit. "In the wake of Pearl Harbor," John Dower notes, "the single word favored above all others by Americans as best characterizing the Japanese people was 'treacherous,' and for the duration of the war the surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet remained the preeminent symbol of the enemy's inherent treachery."[189] Yet, even before Pearl Harbor, belief in Japan's ingrained capacity for double-dealing was already well established. In February 1941, Canadian diplomat Charles Ritchie read British diplomat Sir Robert Vansittart's anti-German polemic *Black Record* (1941). "Its thesis is that the Germans are an accursed race differentiated from the rest of Europe by their savagery," as Ritchie correctly observed, though he believed this claim to be "dubious." After all, he wrote nonchalantly, "are they more cruel than the Russians or the Turks, or the Spanish, more treacherous than the Japanese?"[190] Once the Pacific War was underway, all rhetorical restraints fell away. "Japan's smiling front has been a cover for treachery which cannot be forgiven in this generation," the *Globe and Mail* fulminated in 1942 in an editorial nominally addressing the loyalties of Japanese-Canadians.[191] The *Globe*'s editorial

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[187] "The Real Japan Revealed," *Globe and Mail*, 29 July 1942, 6.
[188] "The West's Misbegotten Offspring," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 19 March 1942, 24.
[189] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 36. For the debate on whether Pearl Harbor constituted a "sneak attack" and American reactions in this respect, see Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), chapter 29.
[190] Charles Ritchie, *Undiplomatic Diaries, 1937–1971* (Toronto: Emblem, 2008), 104.
[191] "Jap Problem a Lesson," *Globe and Mail*, 23 June 1942, 6.

board was not the only one to cite Pearl Harbor in this context. "How, after Pearl Harbor, anybody can vote to give the Japanese the franchise is beyond my ken," Manitoba Senator John Haig stated incredulously in 1944. "The representatives of the Japanese Government were negotiating with the American representatives at Washington at the very moment Japanese bombers were over Pearl Harbor. Such treachery is unthinkable to us; it is not to the Japanese. That is our difficulty."[192]

Assertions of Japan's treachery even carried the imprimatur of the Canadian government. In the National Film Boards' (NFB's) notorious wartime documentary about Japan, *The Mask of Nippon* (1942), the Allied powers were reported to be seeking "a closer knowledge of their savage enemy: The Little Men, whose double faces and double minds may well render them the most dangerous foe of all."[193] By the time the war ended, few Canadians were willing to take anything Japan did at face value. "Defeated, the little yellow man is wiping the snarl from his face and resuming his fixed, hypocritical smirk," the respected *Windsor Star* columnist Hugh MacPherson lectured readers with poorly-concealed bigotry after the end of the war in August 1945:

> The smiling Jap has placed himself in the category of the trusted machine that breaks down, and is never fully trusted again. He has planted suspicion in the Occidental mind, and in much of the Oriental mind and well. It will not be easy to live it down. It will be difficult, for instance, to look at one of those seemingly harmless monkeys in [the] future without the feeling that if he were a sentry, and you failed to salute him, he'd promptly slap your face; or that if you were his prisoner he'd club you with a rifle butt or skewer you with a bayonet with equal indifference.[194]

As literary scholar Ian Littlewood notes, the wartime popularity of the "treacherous Japanese" line emerged for the practical reason that it shifted the blame for Allied missteps away from a "failure of perception on our part" and onto "the exercise of oriental cunning on theirs."[195] After all, far better to say *they* pulled off a clever deceit rather than admit *you* made a foolish misjudgement.

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[192] *Senate Debates*, 19th Parliament, 5th Session: Vol. 1 (30 June 1944): 277.
[193] Margaret Palmer, *The Mask of Nippon* (National Film Board of Canada, 1942).
[194] H.L. MacPherson, "Stories of Smiling Japs Recall Past," *Windsor Daily Star*, 29 August 1945, 4.
[195] Ian Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan: Western Images, Western Myths* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 165.

When Canadians moved from general summaries of the Japanese character to more specific motivations for their conduct, the profound ignorance continued along with an added tendency to credulously accept Japanese propaganda at face value. Two notable examples of this trend can be seen in Canadian attempts to explain "Bushido"—the samurai's "way of the warrior" embraced by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)—and "State Shintoism"—the government mandated religion of wartime Japan. In March 1942, for instance, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden rose in the UK House of Commons to explain alarming reports he had received on the conduct of Japanese soldiers at Hong Kong. "Their testimony establishes the fact that the Japanese army at Hong Kong perpetrated against their helpless military prisoners and the civil population, without distinction of race or colour, the same kind of barbarities which aroused the horror of the civilised world at the time of the Nanjing massacre of 1937," Eden told the shocked MPs. As he concluded, two things were now clear. First, Tokyo's claim "that their forces are animated by a lofty code of chivalry, Bushido, is a nauseating hypocrisy." The second, that "the enemy must be utterly defeated."[196] Taking their cue from Eden, Canadians latched onto Bushido as a catchall explanation for the IJA's penchant for war crimes. "It is not barbarism, it is just 'Bushido,'" the *Calgary Albertan* notified readers about "the little brown men's pleasant habit of bayoneting prisoners, a trait they displayed particularly at Hong Kong."[197] Bushido "dominates every facet of Japanese life," Canadian Edith Poole claimed while reviewing a book about Japan for the *Calgary Herald* in September 1942:

> It is ancestor worship and emperor worship; it is frenzied chauvinism and religious passion beyond anything an Anglo-Saxon can imagine; it's what makes the Japanese general commit hara-kiri and the Japanese school-child answer that his dearest wish is 'to die for my beloved emperor.' It's a fanatical belief in the Nipponese messianic mission, beside which Western ideas of happiness and comfort don't rate anything. Moreover, it's a distortion of every human value that we take for granted. […] And

[196] *House of Commons Debates*, Fifth Series, vol. 378, George VI, Year 6 (10 March 1942): 930-933. For the reception of Eden's speech by Canadians, see "Canada Demands Revenge for Hong Kong Atrocities," *Montreal Daily Star*, 11 March 1942, 17; "Ce Que L'On Peut Attendre des Japonais," *La Presse*, 11 March 1942, 6.
[197] "Past the Front Door," *Calgary Albertan*, 29 October 1942, 5.

> it's no mushroom growth, this fanatical Nipponism. It had whiskers long before Naziism or Communism were born—going back at least twenty centuries."[198]

"So this is Bushido," Francis Aldham of the Vancouver *Province* announced in April 1945 as he explained the IJA's conduct: "He can be servile or arrogant; tenderly considerate or ruthless as the tiger's fang; … Craven coward or foolhardy hero, mystic or just a guttersnipe, he is the Japanese soldier."[199] That Japan's exhortation of Bushido may have been cant was never entertained.[200]

Canadian views of Shintoism were no less simple or sanctimonious. "They actually believe that they are of Divine descent, in a manner different from any other people," the *Globe and Mail*'s John McAree wrote with stunned incredulity. "The German notion about Aryan supremacy is mild and childlike compared with the conviction which is held by every Jap, taught to him almost from the cradle and impressed upon him throughout his entire life."[201] Most appalling to Canadians was Shinto's apparent lack of morality, unlike Christianity. "Even in heaven, he is taught, the god-like ancestors practiced deceit and treachery, as well as good to achieve their divine ends," the narrator explains solemnly in *The Mask of Nippon*. "And he, their earthly child, must follow their example without question." "To the Japanese, there is nothing intrinsically wrong about theft or murder or rape or falsehood," the *Edmonton Journal*'s Harold Weir concurred in 1944. "In other words, in the Japanese state religion there is no moral code whatever. Murder, rape, and treachery actually become virtues when they employed against the enemies of the Mikado."[202] For a people that saw themselves as starkly Christian in the 1940s—whether as Anglophone Protestants or Francophone Catholics—such accusations carried considerable weight. "The Emperor is considered the father

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[198] Edith Poole, "Japan's Major Weapon: The Blind Loyalty of Suicide," *Calgary Herald*, 26 September 1942, 34.
[199] Francis Aldham, "So This is Bushido," *Vancouver Daily Province Sunday Magazine*, 28 April 1945, 3.
[200] For a sample of Japanese propaganda on this topic, see "Our Treatment of War Prisoners Dominated by Spirit of Bushido," *Syonan Times*, 17 July 1942, 4. For the difficulties in determining to what extent IJA mistreatment of POWs was a result of Bushido, and how this impacted Allied thinking about it, see Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 39-40.
[201] J.V. McAree, "Japan Has Plans to Rule the World," *Globe and Mail*, 23 February 1942, 6. See also J.V. McAree, "Shintoism a Kind of Devil Worship," *Globe and Mail*, 18 February 1944, 6.
[202] Harold L. Weir, "The Saturday Night Review," *Edmonton Bulletin*, 13 March 1944, 4.

of the human family," the Montreal Liberal Party's organ *Le Canada* wrote in 1942. "It is therefore his duty to hasten the return of our prodigal sons under the guidance of the yellow paterfamilias."

> For too long [the paper concluded] we've scorned the rodomontade of the Tokyo militarists. We now see how far such exaggerated rhetoric can go. If we don't want to sit at the bottom end of the family table presided over by the Emperor, a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, we'd be wise to do our utmost to strike decisive blows against an unscrupulous enemy, who remains vulnerable despite his exaggerated pretensions.[203]

Indeed, the common Christian values of both French and English Canadians were widely seen as a unifying influence during the war, particularly when contrasted with the "heathen" Japanese. As historian Arthur Lower noted wryly in December 1943, "We would very soon find out something about our common Christianity if we had to undergo, shall we say, a Japanese conquest."[204]

Despite such flat ignorance, Canada did have one individual with the expertise to comment accurately on Japan: Herbert Norman. In his work, allusions to Japanese "inscrutability" or their ingrained barbarity had no place at all. "Modern Japanese politics conform to categories different from those of the West," Norman did allow in June 1944. "This does not mean that Japanese politics are so incomparable or opaque that they can resist the analytical scrutiny of a political scientist," he hastened to add. "But social and economic forces which run parallel to those in Western countries have expressed themselves in Japan in different political forms."[205] Such nuance certainly did not mean that Norman was uncritical of Imperial Japan. In reviewing the memoir of an American expat who had lived in interwar Japan for *Pacific Affairs* in September 1943, Norman readily attacked "the tightly packed houses, the patriarchal regime, the stifling parochialism, and the dead hand of a feudal tradition which weigh so heavily on the spirits of the living":

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[203] "Le Mein Kampf du Japon," *Le Canada* (Montreal), 2 September 1942, 2.
[204] Arthur Lower, *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism*, ed. Welf H. Heick (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1975), 207. For a modern critique of the West's wartime views of "State Shintoism" and the nature of religious freedom in pre-1945 Japan, see Jolyon Baraka Thomas, *Faking Liberties: Religious Freedom in American-Occupied Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), esp. chapter 5.
[205] E. Herbert Norman, "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 3 (September 1944): 261.

> One readily perceives how the old social restraints, reinforced by modern instruments of spiritual control, the State school, the press and radio, which monotonously preach a morbid nationalism and a chauvinism both as potent and poisonous as Nazi racism, all combine to warp, cabin, and confine any but the stoutest spirits. In such an environment, the intellectual curiosity of a young Japanese is well-nigh smothered before he has discarded his toys; initiative is stultified; human life loses value and significance; fatalism and a brutish fanaticism flourish like rank and noxious weeds. Small wonder that the Japanese soldier, fresh from the dull routine of his rusticity, repressed by the unbearable social tension and petty restrictions, sullen and morose under the universal sense of frustration, runs amuck in China, encouraged by his officer to slaughter, rape, and terrorize to impress the unhappy neighbors of Japan with the "superiority" of the Yamato race.[206]

Yet, as this quotation makes clear, Norman was careful to frame his comments in terms of general governmental policies and a shared human nature. Any attempt to explain Japan's wartime conduct without properly contextualizing its history, Norman wrote sharply in late 1944, "leaves the field open to the mentally lazy, or worse, the instinctive racist, who attributes the black record of Japanese imperialism to some inherent racial quality of the Japanese people." If he could help expose the role of history in "molding the political behavior and ambitions of the Japanese people, thereby implying the possibility that if this environment is radically changed there is some hope of the Japanese developing in a peaceful and liberal fashion," Norman concluded with conspicuous and atypical idealism, "this would be cause for some gratification."[207] As a result, unlike many of his contemporaries, a skeptical Norman rarely took Japanese propaganda at face value.[208]

Regrettably, Norman's voice was rarely heard by the Canadian public during the war given his many official—and classified—government assignments (see Chapter 2). This left a significant hole in Canadians' understanding of Japan's wartime desires. As Queen's University historian Eric Harrison recognized in June 1943, "In both Canada and the United States knowledge of Asia and

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[206] E. Herbert Norman, "Militarists in the Japanese State," *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 4 (December 1943): 475.
[207] E.H. Norman, "Feudal Background of Japanese Politics," in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman*, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 321.
[208] As an example, while the repatriated *New York Times* columnist Otto Tolischus claimed in 1942 that a propaganda booklet distributed on the return voyage was "my bible for Japanese policy," Norman dismissed it as having "so many of the well-worn clichés of Japanese apologists [that] I did not attach to it the same value as Tolischus apparently did." See A.E. Armstrong to Keenleyside, 2 September 1942; Norman to Keenleyside, 4 September 1942, R219, vol. 235, file 4606-40c, part 1, DEAF, LAC. See also Norman's comments on Bushido to Arthur Menzies in Chapter 2.

of the whole Pacific is at a premium and the expert a rarity." In Japan's case, Harrison added, Neville Chamberlain's "infamous phrase" was more apt than it had been for the Czechoslovaks: the Japanese truly were "a people of whom we know nothing."[209] While many Canadian politicians and Japanese scholars among the Allies would avail themselves of Norman's expertise during the war (see Chapter 2), little of his work would trickle down into Canadian public discourse.[210] And even if it had, his would have been a lonely voice crying out in an otherwise hostile wilderness.

This brings us to a final, controversial, issue about Canadians' wartime views of Japan, the role of racism in underpinning it. As seen in the comments cited above, some of the violent rhetoric directed against Japan during the war was genuine fear and anger: Fear that Japanese-Canadians might prove to be traitors, anger at the unquestionable war crimes committed against Canadian and other Allied soldiers and civilians. Yet, even leaving such issues aside, it is simply undeniable that much of this language—whatever else it was and however valid it might be—was expressed in extremely bigoted, xenophobic, and racist ways. Most Canadians, even at the time, would not have judged themselves a violent or hateful people. Nevertheless, it remains abundantly clear that such hateful language was widely voiced throughout the conflict and repudiated by very few. This is especially true when such Allied propaganda is compared to that employed against Japan's Axis partners in Europe. These were generally cited by their nationality—Germans, Italians—or by their ideological affiliations—Nazis, Fascists—with cruder slurs such as Huns, Krauts or Wops used more sparingly. The Japanese, in contrast, were almost invariably "Japs," or a bit less commonly

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[209] Eric Harrison, "Review Articles: Canada and Foreign Affairs," *Canadian Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (June 1943): 179.

[210] One of the only times the public got to hear Norman's expertise on Japan was in November 1944, when he lectured on "The Background of Japanese Aggression" at the RCAF base in Dorval, Quebec catering to members of Ferry Command. This was part of a lecture series organized by the Canadian Legion's Education Services and was attended by local journalists. Arthur Menzies also delivered lectures in the same series about Japan and China. See "Forces Get Facts for Jap Invasion," *Montreal Daily Star*, 20 November 1944, 3; "Danger of Underestimating Japs Stressed by E.H. Norman," *Montreal Daily Star*, 21 November 1944, 7; "Hits at Optimism: E.H. Norman Speaks About Pacific War," *The Gazette*, 22 November 1944, 15.

"Nips"—from Nippon, the Japanese word for their own country.[211] For Francophones, "les jaunes" was the usual slur.[212] When Canadians thus listed their enemies as "the Nazis, the Fascists and the Japs," or as "Germans, Japs and Italians," they were signalling not only their ignorance of Japan's political affinities, but they were also disparaging every Japanese soldier and even civilian as akin to the most indoctrinated Nazi or fervent Fascist.[213] "With the Germans," Ian Littlewood notes, "we shared a common humanity—there was always room for the concept of 'the good German'—but the Japanese might almost have been a different form of life." One crude and widely reiterated wartime slogan contained the obvious corollary: "The only good Jap is a dead Jap."[214]

The most shocking example of such racist attitudes was the "exterminationist rhetoric" that was frequently employed against the Japanese but not their European allies.[215] The "Nazis and Fascists" were brutal, the *Windsor Star* editorialized in 1943, but they could not hold a candle to the barbaric Japanese: "In the case of that nation, there was never any hint of a regime being forced on the people. They all had shown, for generations, a dastardly streak of cruelty, a ruthless belief in their destiny as a master race, that justified any and all atrocities. The Japanese, as a race, must be destroyed, and to doubt it is to be blind to all reason."[216] For the Montreal lawyer Bernard Rose, reports of atrocities by "the subhuman Japs" were unconscionable. Such accounts "of the terrible treatment to which those who surrendered were subjected rouses every decent fair-minded man and woman within the United States and the English-speaking lands to a fury that will not be

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[211] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 81.
[212] The French dub of *The Mask of Nippon*, for instance, was titled *Les Nazis Jaunes*. Many French-speaking members of C Force captured at Hong Kong also used the term in their contemporary POW writings. See, for example, Bernard Castonguay, *Prisonnier de Guerre au Japon (1941–1945)* (Quebec City: Marquis, 2005), 94, 97, 98, 180.
[213] "No Gentleness," *Windsor Daily Star*, 30 April 1943, 4; *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 4th Session: Vol. 4 (8 June 1943): 3439. To take but one example of such ignorance, when Arthur Lower catalogued the racist ideologies of the Axis for the Canadian Historical Association in May 1943, he easily cited "nazism" and "fascism," but could only gesture vaguely at what he dubbed "Japanese-ism" for Japan. See Lower, *History and Myth*, 51.
[214] Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan*, 13; Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 78-79.
[215] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 37, 52-55.
[216] "No Gentleness," 4.

satisfied until these filthy associates of Hitler are completely liquidated."[217] In September 1945, Chester McLure, a newly elected Conservative MP from Prince Edward Island, rose in the House of Commons to thank God for the recent allied victory. Then he went on:

> While giving thanks to the Divine Ruler of the universe for our great allied victory, I am inclined to believe, as I read the papers from time to time of the atrocities of the Japs, that the Great Ruler may never fully pardon the American nation or the British nation for not absolutely destroying and driving into the sea those human rats of the Pacific. God forbid that our nation should ever allow one of them to set foot on Canada again. Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, you may think I am bitter, but let those atrocities that have been written up come home to you, and there is not a member of this house, I believe, but will say: Away with those human rats.[218]

As Peter Worthington, a young teenager who became a noted reporter for the *Toronto Telegram* and *Toronto Sun*, later recalled in his memoirs, as kids during the war "We all hated Hitler, mocked Mussolini, and were slightly frightened of Hirohito, who was the symbol for Japan, a country so alien and remote that we had no starting point for comprehension."[219] When Worthington joined the Royal Canadian Navy in 1945, his instructor told him to keep a class diary. When asked what should be done with the Japanese after the war, he gave a voice to his fear and incomprehension, recommending they "liquidate the little brown so and so's." He justified his appeal simply: "We have seen by the examples of Singapore, Hong Kong, Corigidor [*sic*], Pearl Harbour, and countless other places that the Jap has no scruples. He has pillaged homes, tortured, raped, showed extreme cruelty towards human and beast alike and draws no line, in fact nothing is too low for him. A race like that has no place in this world and should be sent to the next."[220] Other Canadians agreed but lamented no one had the fortitude to carry it out. "Shocked by the revelations of cruelties practiced

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[217] Rose, "They Must Be Avenged!" 7.
[218] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 1st Session: Vol. 1 (25 September 1945): 448; "Japs Are Seen as Rats by P.E. Island M.P.," *The Gazette*, 26 September 1945, 19. This was the speech that inspired the *Ottawa Journal*'s editorial on the Japanese "rats" cited at the beginning of this section. "We have not the least objection in the world to a Member of Parliament calling the Japanese 'human rats'," its editorial board noted, "although perhaps it is going a bit far to say that the Allies should have exterminated the entire Japanese race." See "Big Rats and Little Ones," 8.
[219] Peter Worthington, *Looking for Trouble: A Journalist's Life… and Then Some* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1984), 18.
[220] Peter Worthington, *Cornwallis* Diary, 30-31, 7 July 1945, R13880, vol. 46, file 1, Peter Worthington fonds, LAC.

on prisoners, there are a whole lot of us who think that the Japanese race had best be exterminated as we cannot live in the same world with them," one writer for the *Windsor Star* urged. "That is unlikely to happen, although we are going to wreck Japan's empire if we can."[221] "The normal Occidental instinct is to look upon them as some kind of cancerous growth on humanity and to deal with them accordingly," the *Leader-Post*'s editorial board declared. "But mankind, even after knowing of these horrors of the prisoner camps, is not prepared to take such measures."[222]

It is worth noting that this rhetoric was more than just idle commentary, but likely had real consequences on how Canadians wanted the war against Japan prosecuted. In January 1943, CIPO reported that Canadians believed Japan would take longer to defeat than the European Axis. This is, of course, what happened. But the stated rationale was hardly based on a detached analysis. "In the mental calendar of the Canadian public," CIPO deduced, "the yellow-skinned 'Sons of Heaven' will take longer to polish off than even the much-vaunted war machine of Germany."[223] Two weeks later, CIPO reported that when it came to strategically bombing enemy civilians, 62% of Canadians approved bombing the Japanese compared to 57% for the Germans and 51% for the Italians. "Of the three Axis countries," the pollsters noted, "Canadians appear to feel that the Japanese have put themselves further beyond the pale, and least deserve the protection of the ethics of war":

> In naming Japan as the country least deserving of consideration in this respect, the public is undoubtedly reflecting the deep impression which the Pearl Harbor attack, and tales of Japanese atrocities and general ruthlessness, have had on the opinion of this country. It is interesting to compare this division of opinion with that reported by a recent Gallup poll, in which, if the three Axis partners, the Canadian public named Japan as the country which will take longest to beat.[224]

The Japanese, in the estimation of the Canadian public, were a barbaric and fanatic people, clearly willing to fight to the death, and who killed and tortured with no sense of guilt. Given this belief,

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[221] H.P.A., "Why Japs Are Polite," *Windsor Daily Star*, 5 February 1944, 23.
[222] "The Sadistic Japanese Mind," 9.
[223] CIPO, "Canadians Think Japanese Will Take Longest to KO," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 2 January 1943, 1, 12.
[224] CIPO, "Canadian Public in Grim Mood on Bombing Civilians," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 16 January 1943, 1, 3.

it is not surprising many concluded that such a people could not be reasoned with and would have to be destroyed. In this respect, W.L.M. King's comment discovered by Klaus Pringsheim about Japan getting the atomic bomb merely reflected a shared Canadian belief: Killing in war is always a tragedy, but many Canadians lost less sleep if the dead were Japanese rather than Germans. After all, as the *Ottawa Citizen* joked ghoulishly in early 1942, "the Japs may shortly find out that people who live in paper houses shouldn't throw bombs."[225] Those bombs would finally come in 1944.

In reading these wartime Canadian accounts of Japan years after the fact, what also strikes the reader is not only the racism, but also how credulous and accepting contemporary readers were of their outlandish claims. With hindsight, the polemical anger and shameless propaganda of such works is so obvious that one is startled anyone took them seriously. Yet, popular endorsements are not hard to find. The NFB documentary *The Mask of Nippon*, for example, was lavishly praised, including by the film critic at the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*. It was admittedly a propaganda film, "but one forgets this as the spiritual backgrounds of Japan's rise to a modern power is pictured." The reviewer went on to admire how it "reveals the whole story of a nation preparing to grasp at world domination," noting the "Shocking scenes of atrocities perpetrated in China [that] give an idea of what might happen here if the Japanese managed to invade Canada."[226] Like other NFB films, *Mask* was widely distributed. At a screening for the Ottawa Lion's Club in August 1945 alongside the Anti-Nazi *Behind the Swastika* (1945), both films' "grim realism made a profound impression on the spectators."[227] In August 1943, it was shown to Vancouver's Junior Board of Trade. "The film," the Vancouver *Province* reported, "was a substitute for the address of Hon. Ian Mackenzie, federal minister of pensions, who was called back to Ottawa."[228] Given Mackenzie's

[225] "Comment," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 26 January 1942, 22.
[226] C.S., "Tivoli Offering George Formby," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 24 September 1942, 4.
[227] "Lions See Films on Atrocities," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 2 August 1945, 17.
[228] "Mask of Nippon Shown Meeting," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 13 August 1943, 6.

well-attested Japanophobia, one wonders if any attendees noticed the difference. On 24 September 1942, the *Ottawa Citizen*'s Ernest Harrold attended a private showing of *Mask* and another film at the NFB along with Hugh Keenleyside and his wife Katherine. Harrold praised the film, "which contains a few of the most horrifying shots of warfare ever I saw, but which handsomely serve their purpose of convincing the onlooker that we cannot dare think of losing this war."[229]

Foreign films on Japanese atrocities played just as well in Canada. One of the most popular was American Mark Moody's *Ravaged Earth* (1943), depicting Japanese war crimes in China. "It will make you fighting mad!" the accompanying handbill promised and Canadian reviewers tended to agree.[230] At a private screening in June 1943, the *Ottawa Citizen*'s critic reported that the film "brings before the startled eyes of spectators the brutal happenings in their actuality, the polite Japs being seen at their work of murder, outrage and pillage."[231] *Ravaged Earth* was "a graphic portrayal of scenes I saw myself," Liu Shishun, the newly appointed Chinese minister to Canada (see Chapter 3) vouched after the same showing. "The picture should be shown to all the United Nations." [232] Canadians agreed. "Propaganda wears thinner and thinner as the war goes on," the respected Canadian columnist Elmore Philpott recognized. Yet, he continued, *Ravaged Earth* was a film everyone needed to see. "The modern world can never really and finally win the war against war until all people really know what war is really like. This film is all fact—no fiction."[233]

The material in *Ravaged Earth* was indeed genuine, collected by Mark Moody in the late 1930s. But often this was simply untrue. As modern scholars note, most wartime propaganda films about Japan, including *The Mask of Nippon* or filmmaker Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* series for

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[229] [E.W. Harrold], "Diary of Our Own Pepys," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 26 September 1942, 30. This was one of many entries in Harrold's public diary written in the vein of famed diarist Samuel Pepys. See E.W. Harrold, *The Diary of Our Own Pepys: E.W. Harrold's Record of Canadian Life*, ed. I Norman Smith (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947).
[230] See Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 6.
[231] W.J.H., "'Ravaged Earth' Shows on Screen Japs' Brutality," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 28 June 1943, 9.
[232] "'Ravaged Earth' Shows Jap Brutality," *Ottawa Journal*, 28 June 1943, 6.
[233] Elmore Philpott, "As I See It: War Like This Movie Far from Nice," *Vancouver Sun*, 1 June 1943, 4.

the American military, contain a lot of staged material or clips taken from other sources, including stock footage and even works of Japanese fiction.[234] *Mask*, as scholar Gary Evans writes, contains "the most atrocity-filled war footage ever shown to Canadians." Yet many scenes—including a shot of Japanese soldiers tearing an infant from the arms of its Chinese mother to throw and catch it on their bayonets—"were in fact staged, taken from a Chinese-made propaganda film and inserted as actuality footage" along with shots of real Japanese war crimes. "Mixing black (staged) and white (authentic) propaganda was allowable [by NFB]," Evans notes, "if the result articulated the true larger picture," and neither NFB editor Tom Daly nor director and writer Stuart Legg had any misgivings about doing so.[235] In such a situation, it was hard to tell what was real and what fake; whether the soundtrack was merely accentuating a real horror inherent the images or actively seeking to precipitate it. Between the genuine war crimes committed by Japanese servicemen and such graphic obfuscations by filmmakers in Canada and the United States, it is not surprising many Canadians believed that the barbarous Japanese put even the Nazis to shame.

Nor was film the only medium to give Canadians an exaggerated sense of their Japanese enemy. In many wartime books available to Canadian readers, a deliberate shifting of material had taken place. In the hands of propagandists, unfounded assumptions became realities and random anecdotes compiled to denote insidious patterns. Phyllis Argall's *My Life with the Enemy* is a good example of the latter trend. Manitoba-born to missionary parents who first went to Japan in 1916, Argall's claims were highly respected by Canadians. She "first saw Japan through the unprejudiced eyes of a child," the *Ottawa Journal* stated. Her 25 years of experience in Japan "entitle the reader to believe her opinions free from the hurried conclusions of travelling correspondents."[236] "Her

[234] For a study of the content and rhetoric of Capra's documentaries, see Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 15-23.
[235] Gary Evans, "The Nanking Atrocity: Still and Moving Images 1937–1944," *Media and Communication* 2, no. 2 (July 2014): 66.
[236] G.H., "Canadian Girl Tells of 25 Years in Japan Ending in Prison," *Ottawa Journal*, 4 March 1944, 15.

experiences," Canadian Press correspondent Anita Freedman argued, "forced her to the conclusion that there is inherent in the Japanese race a strain of bestiality, cruelty, and a passion for inflicting torture on the defenceless." But Freedman added, this view was made by close observation of the Japanese character, "not by riding in on a blind wave of race hatred."[237]

These are certainly not the conclusions of modern researchers. Angell's book, as literary scholar Susan Fisher argues, "is undiluted vitriol, almost impossible to consume yet instructive for its revelation of a wartime mentality." It may be presented as autobiography, Fisher notes, "but is plainly an anti-Japanese polemic in which every detail about Argall's life serves her propagandistic purpose."[238] Even before seeing Japan as a child, Argall writes that she received a Japanese tea set and doll which she promptly smashed and despised, respectively. "It may be that the smashed tea set and the despised doll indicated an innate tendency to obstruct and where, possible, destroy what the Japanese had produced, and to dislike the people," Argall muses near the start of her narrative. "To Argall," as Fisher concludes, "the Japanese are irremediably Other, and nothing about their difference is attractive; they are simply an alien force that must be repulsed."[239] While Argall was more nuanced than some writers, her book is hardly fair-minded towards Japan. That any Canadian could interpret her text as "unprejudiced" or eschewing "race hatred" speaks volumes to the overall negative tenor of Canadian commentary about Japan during the Second World War.

The best example of a book raising mere assumption to tangible fact was the popularity of the so-called "Tanaka Memorial." Purported to have been presented to Emperor Hirohito in 1927 by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, this was a Chinese forgery that was nevertheless widely accepted as real during the 1940s. "Like the 'Pentagon Papers,'" in historian John Stephan's words,

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[237] Anita Fredman, "Says Cruelty is Inherent in Jap Race," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 4 April 1944, 12.
[238] Susan Fisher, "'Our Neighbour Across the Way,' Japan and Canadian Writers," *Canadian Literature* 174 (Autumn 2002): 36.
[239] Argall, *Prisoner in Japan*, 10-11; Fisher, "'Our Neighbour Across the Way'," 36-37.

it both "shocked and fascinated readers by unveiling the cynicism and opportunism that supposedly underlay the pious façade of government leadership."[240] In 1942, the Memorial was reissued with an introduction by American Sinologist Carl Crow, who began by relating the famous "Ear Hill" in Kyoto, a crypt holding the severed ears of people killed during the invasion of Korea by the Shogun Hideyoshi Toyotomi in the 1590s.[241] The failure of this invasion, Crow argued, had birthed Japan's overseas ambitions that continued to the present day, codifying the idea, "that the world belonged to Japan by virtue of the fact that their emperor was a god destined to rule the world." The Tanaka Memorial was merely a modern embodiment of this old idea.[242]

That the Memorial is a conspiracy theory is self-evident. Yet, once again, this did not stop many otherwise informed Canadians from repeating its salacious claims. "In the school of perfidy, where grandiose lies are concocted, barbaric tortures distilled and plans for world conquest drafted, who is the pupil and who is the teacher—Hitler or the Japs?" a widely reprinted *Winnipeg Free Press* column asked in December 1941. "Before giving Hitler all the credit, let's take a look at the Japanese record and let's look closely at the Tanaka Memorial, the Japanese Mein Kampf."[243] "Today, a volume like Mein Kampf, the Nazi gospel, has done more for the prestige and influence of the National Socialist doctrine than the Gestapo or any tank division," *Le Canada* expounded in a March 1942 article later republished by *L'Action Catholique*. "The same is true in Japan, where a fanatical population conforms to Baron Tanaka's famous Memorial, long disavowed in

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[240] See John J. Stephan, "The Tanaka Memorial (1927): Authentic or Spurious?" *Modern Asian Studies* 7, no. 4 (1973): 733-745.

[241] This was a popular talking point for Allied propagandists during the war. Frank Capra's documentary *Know Your Enemy: Japan* (1945) mentions the ear mound. A US news clipping about it was even saved by Prime Minister King, which cited it as "one of the things which has kept alive, to the present day, the streak of barbarism that is part of their nature." See Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 20-21; "How Japan 'Saved Face' With 60,000 Ears," *The American Weekly*, 28 June 1942, a copy of which can be found in R10383, reel H-3038, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.

[242] "Tanaka Giichi," *Japan's Dream of World Empire: The Tanaka Memorial*, ed. Carl Crow (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 1-8, 19-20.

[243] J.H.G., "Japanese Mein Kampf," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 December 1941, 17. For reprints, see *Toronto Daily Star*, 22 December 1941, 6; and *Victoria Daily Times*, 9 January 1942, 4.

official circles, while successive governments are scrupulously applying its provisions."[244] There are likely few things the conservative Francophone *L'Action Catholique* and J.W. Dafoe's liberal internationalist *Free Press* shared, but a willingness to entertain the Tanaka Memorial was one of them. Nor were they alone. In 1942, Manitoba feminist Nellie McClung endorsed its claims, again comparing it to *Mein Kampf*.[245] In 1943, Major J.P. Simon, a CIIA member, cited it as an early "signpost pointing to the road that influential Japanese thought was travelling."[246]

What is most striking about all this propaganda is its sheer ubiquity and uniformity. These ignorant and frequently bigoted views were ***not*** the lone preserve of a handful of British Columbian racists but appeared with monotonous regularity across Canada: In Ontario as well as the prairies, for Francophones as well as Anglophones, for the well-to-do as much as the academically inclined, and in domestic propaganda as well as in British and American imports. Everywhere the Japanese were equally sneaky, equality barbaric, equally fanatic. In political cartoons they were forever sallow-skinned, bucktoothed, nearsighted, and talking in broken English, more like goblins or orcs than fellow human beings.[247] They were, in short, nastier than the Germans, and had to be treated accordingly. When a Canadian Army planner drafted an overview of Japan for the newly raised Canadian Army Pacific Force in June 1945 (see Chapter 3), he had a large reservoir of images to draw upon. When asked to explain Japanese morals, the list was utterly conventional:

> a. Loyal – to his Emperor and nation without question: the supreme virtue.
> b. Brave – fanatically so, because of his faith and religion, not through reason.
> c. Reverent – to a feudal emperor concept void of any need for honesty.
> d. Cunning – almost an animalistic thinker to achieve any national desire.

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[244] "L'Action Profonde de Quelques Livres," *Le Canada*, 11 March 1942, 2; "L'Action Profonde de Quelques Livres," *L'Action Catholique* (Quebec City), 18 March 1942, 4.
[245] Nellie L. McClung, "Thanks for Everything," *Saskatoon Star-Pheonix*, 30 November 1942, 9.
[246] J.P. Simon, "Japan's Far East Policy," *Victoria Daily Times*, 7 May 1943, 4.
[247] See Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Fig. 7. Such humanoid appearances were not a coincidence. Like most fantasy archetypes, the modern concept for such creatures owes much to the works of J.R.R. Tolkien. As Tolkien himself wrote in 1958, he imagined his orcs as "squat, broad, flat-nosed, sallow-skinned, with wide mouths and slant eyes: in fact degraded and repulsive versions of the (to Europeans) least lovely Mongol-types." See J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien*, ed. Humphrey Carpenter with Christopher Tolkien (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 274.

e. Truthless – expediency in the national cause should sacrifice truth always.
f. Polite – in a cunning way: Uriah Heep-ism.[248]
g. Sinless – his religion has taught him only one sin: failure to win Asia for the Jap; and the atonement for that one sin, only suicide.[249]

Among the works cited by the writer to come to these conclusions were Carl Crow's edition of the Tanaka Memorial as well as Phyllis Argall's *My Life with the Enemy*.[250]

One of the great ironies regarding Canadian wartime views of Japan is that hostile opinions on the home front were sometimes bleaker that those held by civilian repatriates or freed POWs, who suggested there was more to Japanese behaviour than simple barbarism. This is *not* to imply that Canadian POWs and civilian internees did not suffer in Japanese captivity, but rather to note that the more often nuanced and carefully phrased caveats by repatriated Canadians rarely shifted the dominant narrative in Canada. For one, as historians have noted, Allied civilians were generally treated better in captivity than their military counterparts.[251] In 1941, Hugh Keenleyside was tasked by External to help repatriate Canadian civilians from Japan. "Naturally those of use who knew the most about Japan were particularly concerned with the possible dangers of the situation," he wrote years later. "Japanese treatment of prisoners was notoriously severe, and if our people were interned, we could expect that their incarceration would probably be as harsh as it was likely to be extended." Yet, as he concluded, the experiences of those who remained were varied: "some were left almost unrestricted; a very few were subjected to brutal treatment in Japanese prisons."[252] One of the most numerous groups in the former category were the Canadian missionaries in Japan and China, Anglophones as well as Francophones. "Although I know of the common Japanese soldiers committing atrocities that I couldn't or wouldn't describe," Rev. Harold Murphy told the *Kingston*

[248] Heep was the weaselly and sycophantic villain of Charles Dickens's *David Copperfield* (1850).
[249] "Background Notes on Japan and China," *The Grid: District Education Office, Kingston Military District 3*, 5-6, 20 June 1945, R15615, vol. 28, file 13, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[250] "Background Notes on Japan and China," 28.
[251] See, for example, Kovner, *Prisoners of the Empire*, 101-102, 208.
[252] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:162.

Whig-Standard in 1943, "I have never heard of or seen a Jap deliberately harming a child." He called such accusations "a lot of nonsense," though he cautioned he was not "praising the Japanese soldiers who have been turned into beasts," but was simply relating his own experiences. Murphy added that if IJA soldiers behaved the worst, he had visited Chinese towns occupied by IJN sailors and marines of the Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai ("Special Naval Landing Forces") "and had heard only praise of their conduct towards civilians," a fact he credited to the IJA's unique indoctrination while the navy was "trained almost in the same manner as the forces of the United Nations."[253]

Another case study is provided by the Acadian Jesuit Cornelius Pineau, who was posted to the predominately French-Canadian mission near Xuzhou. Between 1937 and 1943, Pineau related after the war, the missionaries remained free and most of the atrocities they saw were committed, not against them, but on Chinese civilians. The sole exception occurred in March 1943 when three Canadian priests were shot by the Japanese in nearby Fengxian, though this was not a systematic attempt to kill missionaries but "apparently the product of the personal hatred of the chief Japanese official in the town."[254] In November 1943, the Jesuits were finally interned at Shanghai. As Pineau later reported, little cruelty was exhibited in the roundup: "Very kind and considerate, the Japanese Consul prepared a special car for us and allowed us to take with us whatever we wished without any restriction or examination." At the camp the food was terrible and gradually dropped in quality, with most internees losing "between 30 and 40 pounds." Luckily, "it was always allowed to receive a monthly package from friends outside of camp," and "on two occasions, Uncle Sam played Santa Claus in camp giving each internee a very-well-thought-out comfort parcel." Vermin, especially rats and lice, were common companions. Yet the guards were not sadistic, and to pass the time the

[253] "Local Priest Back from Seven Years in China: Says Japs Cruel to Adults but Kind to Children," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 15 December 1943, 3.
[254] For this quote and an overview of these missionaries, see Diana Lary, "Faith and War Eyewitnesses to the Japanese Invasion of China: Quebec's Jesuit Priests," *Modern Asian Studies* 39, no. 4 (October 2005): 817-843.

internees held concerts, kept a garden, and otherwise tried to keep busy. "All during my stay," Pineau added, "I was struck [by] the good morale of the camp." Most internees had little doubt in an Allied victory, and in late 1945 all were released uneventfully.[255] Yet, despite the credibility of the missionaries as interpreters of Japan, few Canadians were inclined to believe them. "The 1941 award for great dramatic acting must go to the inscrutable Jap," the *Windsor Star* laughed in July 1941. "A Canadian missionary just back from there says he is 'not naturally warlike.'"[256]

Some C Force soldiers offered similar caveats. Unlike their families back in Canada, many POWs could readily cite examples of "good Japs" that had helped them during their long captivity. When historians write of POWs meeting a Japanese-Canadian, they usually have Kanao Inouye—the infamous "Kamloops Kid"—in mind. No one can doubt Inouye viciously abused the Canadians at almost every opportunity; the word "sadistic" was used by more than one survivor to describe his conduct.[257] Born in Kamloops in 1916 and educated in Vancouver, Inouye had been humiliated by local racists before moving to Japan. Now, in Hong Kong with the remnants of C Force, he had a chance to take revenge.[258] But Inouye was ***not*** the only Japanese-Canadian the prisoners met. As Lance Corporal Stewart Ganton related, after Hong Kong fell, "a group of Jap privates took charge of us. Among them was [a] former Vancouver man. He had worked in a city lumbermill. He served as interpreter. He liked Canada and apparently had been given what he thought was good treatment over here. So he tried to do the same for us, such as giving us cigarettes."[259] Another Japanese-

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[255] Pineau to "My Dear Friend," [1945?], file "Pineau – Année 1940," Cornelius Pineau papers, AMPEI.
[256] "Pertinent and Impertinent," *Windsor Daily Star*, 18 June 1941, 4.
[257] For accounts of Inouye's vicious treatment of Canadian POWs, see Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands*, 80-83; Daniel G. Dancocks, *In Enemy Hands: Canadian Prisoners of War, 1939–45* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983), 240-241; and Kenneth Cambon, *Guest of Hirohito* (Vancouver: PW Press, 1990), 49.
[258] Inouye was eventually tried for treason and executed in August 1947. See Patrick Brode, *Casual Slaughters and Accidental Judgments: Canadian War Crimes Prosecutions, 1944–1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 169-176. For the later confirmation of Inouye's birth in Canada, see G.B. Puddicombe, "Memorandum. Subject: War Crimes: Inouye Kanao," R10740, vol. 1, file 31, George B. Puddicombe fonds, LAC.
[259] Unfortunately, Ganton did not record the man's name. See "A Good Jap—From Vancouver," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 20 October 1945, 1.

Canadian was encountered by Leonard Birchall. Not a member of C Force, Birchall was an RCAF pilot who had alerted the British to an incoming Japanese carrier strike on Colombo in April 1942 before being shot down and captured, earning him the rather exaggerated moniker "the Savior of Ceylon."[260] After being shipped to Japan, Birchall met George Enomoto, another Vancouver-born Canadian who worked as a fisherman. Vacationing in Japan when the war began, Enomoto became a translator to help put food on the table for his sickly family. Sympathetic and helpful, Enomoto was eventually fired for being too "pro-prisoner," though he kept in touch and Birchall was later able to return the favour. In March 1945, Enomoto wrote thanking Birchall for some yarn and pork he had sent as a gift. "I handed your canned pork to my brother who has been ill since January. He accepted it with tears in his eyes."[261] Birchall lost contact with Enomoto after the war, but he never forgot him. A third "Good Jap" recorded by the POWs was Rev. Watanabe Kiyoshi, a priest who spoke English and helped at Hong Kong by smuggling in diphtheria medicine during the outbreak in late 1942. Watanabe too was fired for excessive sympathy but was later thanked by the surviving Royal Rifles, who pooled their money to offer him a reward.[262] None of these individual actions excuse the overall harsh treatment accorded POWs during the Pacific War, but they *do* nuance the image of unremitting horror that dominates Canadian views of the conflict in popular memory.

This brings us to a final point regarding Japan's wartime conduct: The postwar legacies of wartime propaganda. It is certainly exaggerated to claim that all contemporary Canadian attitudes towards the Japanese are dominated solely by the Pacific War. After all, the Japans of 1955, 1985, or 2015 were patently different places from the one of 1945.[263] Yet, what scholar Charles Grinnell

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[260] For a measured overview of Birchall's actions in 1942, see Rob Stuart, "Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 4 (Winter 2006/07): 65-74.
[261] See Birchall's attached commentary to the letters in his papers: Enomoto to Birchall, 34 [*sic*] March 1945; Enomoto to Birchall, 23 April 1945, R14039, vol. 2, file 17, R14039, Leonard Joseph Birchall fonds, LAC.
[262] E.G. Weeks to R.O.G. Morton, 21 September 1946; Oscar Orr to George Puddicombe, 9 January 1947, R10740, vol. 2, file 19, George B. Puddicombe fonds, LAC.
[263] Sheila K. Johnson, *The Japanese Through American Eyes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 171.

Cleaver observed about the United States in the mid-1970s likely held true for Canadians of the same era. The Pacific War, he argued, was a defining moment in their countries' relationship:

> The amount of space devoted to Japan in the American media, except for wartime propaganda, has simply been very slight […] Few Americans have surmounted the formidable language barrier. […] [In opinion polls,] Many Americans, if they had any response at all about Japan, thought first of its products. A sizable minority, however, retained the images produced by America's propaganda during World War II: militarism, "sneakiness," untrustworthiness.[264]

As the largest conflict in human history, the feelings and tropes popularized by the Second World War are naturally lodged firmly in the West's collective psyche. As literary scholar Ian Littlewood has explored, pre-existing stereotypes that the Japanese were an inherently "violent" or "sadistic" people only multiplied because of the conflict. "The war might not be mentioned," he notes, "but it provides the reservoir of images of which we draw; and when occasion offers, its memories are resurrected with zest." At the time of Hirohito's last illness in 1988, the floodgates opened:

> HIROHITO'S THUGS CAUGHT BABIES ON THEIR BAYONETS is not a propaganda line from 1942 but a *Sun* headline from September 1988 […] The excuse for rehearing these atrocities over fifty years later was to set the historical record straight about the emperor's part in the war; but in reality it was a question of touching base. In these days when the car in front is a Toyota, this sort of item keeps Japan in focus.[265]

Or, at least, so goes one line of Western thinking about Japan. In reality, of course, Japanese society is far more complex than such simplistic assertions presume. The Japanese, as many scholars now recognize, are no less paradoxical, strange, or inscrutable than any other nation and trying to decern an immutable "national character" is likely doomed to failure.[266] And Canadians, one might argue, are no more contradictory or eccentric. After all, why has their country endured and not split apart along its restless English and French fault lines? Aren't Canadians just Americans in name only? As Hugh Keenleyside—who held a PhD in history—later wrote in response to historian Arthur

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[264] Charles Grinnell Cleaver, *Japanese and Americans: Cultural Parallels and Paradoxes* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 4. See also Johnson, *The Japanese Through American Eyes*, chapter 2, esp. 35-38.
[265] Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan*, 177-178. See also chapters 16-17.
[266] See, for example, Cleaver, *Japanese and Americans*, 7-8; Johnson, *The Japanese Through American Eyes*, 2-3.

Lower's sweeping generalization that, overall, Canadians were "worthy, thriftly people, perfectly safe" and thus "uninteresting": "What queer myths some people will believe!"[267]

Yet, it is clear that at least some of the wartime tropes popularized in Canada continued to be accepted into the postwar years. Take, for example, the concept of Bushido. As seen, the idea that all Japanese soldiers were driven by an insidious and omnipresent warrior creed inculcated in every Japanese from birth was repeated endlessly throughout the war. Perhaps even more than at the German Nuremberg Trials, Canadian legal scholar Patrick Brode asserted in 1997, the Japanese war crimes trials "showed the cultural chasm between the triers and the accused." If explaining the appeal of Nazism to Germans was often difficult for Canadian judges in the 1940s, then at least in Japan "the commissions were faced with accused motivated since early youth by the Bushido code of absolute obedience and disdain for everything that was not Japanese." In many cases, Allied officials "got a glimpse of the harsh reality that motivated every Japanese soldier."[268] That Brode uncritically accepted the ignorant views of Allied officials to come to his conclusion is undeniable. Indeed, "Bushido" quickly became a catch-all explanation for Japanese war crimes, articulated by numerous popular writers and professional historians in the years that followed.[269] In 1958, British aristocrat Lord Russell of Liverpool—hot off the success of writing a study of German war crimes in *The Scourge of the Swastika* (1954)—titled his parallel look at Japanese atrocities *The Knights of Bushido*.[270] Decades later, Liverpool's sobriquet remains shorthand for both Japanese brutality

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[267] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:198-199. As he went on, what other nation "engulfed in the most appalling war in history, could boast of a minister of defence [Sam Hughes] who was palpably mad and yet achieved some remarkably good as well as some lamentable results." And which could also call its "most politically astute prime minister" a man who was "a firm believer in spiritualism and was convinced that through his favourite female mediums he was in constant communication with departed friends, including his dog Pat and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt!"

[268] Brode, *Casual Slaughters*, 186.

[269] For other comparable citations of bushido by Canadians, see Dancocks, *In Enemy Hands*, xii-xiii; Desmond Morton and J.L. Granatstein, *Victory 1945: Canadians from War to Peace* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1995), 146; and Brereton Greenhous, *"C" Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe, 1941–1945* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997), 75.

[270] See Lord Russell of Liverpool, *The Knights of Bushido: A Short History of Japanese War Crimes* (London: Cassell, 1958). For the context and a critical analysis of Liverpool's book, see Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan*, 172-175.

and its soldiers' military fortitude. The writer Nathan Greenfield, for example, cites it repeatedly in his 2010 study of Canadian POWs in Hong Kong. Asserting that Japan refused to formally ratify the Geneva Convention because "Japanese legal scholars argued that prisoners of war had forfeited their moral right to life," and that this belief was a result of "the way the sixteenth-century *Bushido* Code came to be interpreted" in the 1930s.[271] No modern historian of Japan uncritically accepts such views any longer, yet they clearly continue to hold wide popular purchase in Canada.[272]

Nor is this the only example of Canadian and Western recycling of wartime tropes that one could cite. When a four-person research team led by Canadian historian J.L. Granatstein found the writings of a Xuzhou missionary, like Father Pineau's, that said "we enjoyed relative freedom. We had our books and our leisure, the joys and comforts of the communal life in a religious setting." the thought that perhaps Japanese war crimes were not quite as ubiquitous as initially thought went unconsidered. Instead, they concluded that this priest, clearly, "had an unusually sunny outlook or a unique experience."[273] Historian Brereton Greenhous came to a similar conclusion regarding a positive statement made by a Canadian POW in Japan. After all, he argued, we know "as a matter of policy the Japanese were treating their prisoners as they always had, and as their own creed of 'no surrender' called for—as inferior creatures to be worked as hard as possible without too much concern for their ultimate end."[274] In April 1971, American physicist Herman Kahn carelessly told a reporter that "The Japanese no doubt will continue to be conscious of their defeat in the Pacific War and of the danger of fighting a war with misguided judgement. But I wonder if they have ever

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[271] Nathan M. Greenfield, *The Damned: The Canadians at the Battle of Hong Kong and the POW Experience, 1941–45* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2010), xxvii, 75, 185.
[272] For critical evaluations of Bushido's role in the Pacific War, see Karl F. Friday, "Bushidō or Bull? A Medieval Historian's Perspective on the Imperial Army and the Japanese Warrior Tradition," *History Teacher* 27, no. 3 (May 1994): 339-349; and Oleg Benesch, *Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter 6.
[273] Patricia E. Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Iino Masako, and Takamura Hiroko, *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 203-204.
[274] Greenhous, *"C" Force to Hong Kong*, 138.

been aware that the Pacific War was also wrong from the moral and ethical viewpoint." This was not only a claim of "pontifical ignorance," as Charles Grinnell Cleaver concluded, but was also a casual acceptance of the "amoral-Shintoism" line from the war years.[275] Many sins have been laid upon Brian and Terence McKenna's documentary series *The Valour and the Horror* by historians, but muddling the Japanese perspective is not one of them.[276] At the start of the episode *Savage Christmas* about the Battle of Hong Kong, the narrator claims that "the details of what happened to these soldiers were for a long time suppressed by the Canadian government. The terrible story is known to very few Canadians. Many Japanese would also prefer that it be forgotten." "While I have no doubt that the last sentence in this statement is absolutely correct," historian S.F. Wise confidently asserted without reference to any supporting evidence, "the rest of it is problematic."[277] As a more perceptive scholar noted, "The McKennas imply in 'Savage Christmas' that the kind of behaviour exhibited by the Japanese in Hong Kong was institutionalized in their culture. … The Japanese are treated very differently in *The Valour and the Horror* than the Germans. Germans are competent and civilized, the Japanese are cruel and indifferent to human suffering."[278]

Such uncritical acceptance of wartime propaganda was also voiced by many ex-POWs who felt that Western popular culture was not taking their postwar suffering or compensation claims against Japan seriously. As historian Frances Houghton has explored, many British POW accounts

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[275] Cleaver, *Japanese and Americans*, 5.

[276] For criticisms of the series and the book that accompanied it, see David J. Bercuson and S.F. Wise, eds. *The Valor and the Horror Revisited* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); Monica MacDonald, *Recasting History: How CBC Television has Shaped Canada's Past* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019), chapter 4; and J.L. Granatstein, review of *The Valour and the Horror*, by Merrily Weisbord and Merilyn Simonds Mohr, *Canadian Historical Review* 74, no. 2 (June 1993): 298-300.

[277] S.F. Wise, "The Valour and the Horror: A Report for the CBC Ombudsman," in *The Valor and the Horror Revisited*, ed. David J. Bercuson and S.F. Wise (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 14. Nor is he the only Canadian historian to make such claims. Cf. Cook, *The Fight for History*, 276-277. For a nuanced evaluation of Japan's penitence for the war that compares its conduct to that of its ex-Axis partners, see Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), chapter 4.

[278] Jeannette Sloniowski, "Popularizing History: *The Valour and the Horror*," in *Slippery Pastimes: Reading the Popular in Canadian Culture*, ed. Joan Nicks and Jeannette Marie Sloniowski (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2002), 170n10.

of the Siam-Burma Death Railway were shaped by what the veterans felt were distortions of their experiences in David Lean's famous 1957 film *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, including the sense that it "sanitized" their suffering. Consequently, emphasizing their mistreatment by the Japanese at the expense of other events was one way to try and rebalance popular memory to make it more "truthful."[279] Many later chroniclers of the Allied POW experience were outraged by the apparent indifference towards veterans' claims and voiced their contempt in no uncertain terms. When New Zealand writer James Mackay investigated Japan's war crimes in 1995, he argued vehemently that there was a "conspiracy" by both Tokyo and Western government to ignore these veterans. When it came time to describe their abuse, Mackay pulled no punches: Japanese soldiers harmed POWs with "an inherent imbecilic glee," separated children from their parents "for some peculiar reason of the Japanese mentality," and committed "an orgy of widespread and deliberate massacres, that has shamed the name 'soldiers of Nippon' up to the present day." The present-day Japanese, as he concluded, "are not stupid—indeed their forte is cunning," and they were now rich enough to avoid apologizing or making amends.[280] These words were written 50 years after the end of the war.

In the Canadian context, POW experiences are usually framed by the long controversy over whether C Force was needlessly sacrificed by bungling British commanders and craven Canadian politicians, plus the Hong Kong Veterans Association of Canada's claims that Ottawa inadequately supported survivors. After all, the more C Force suffered, the greater the guilt of the men who sent them there. As historian Galen Roger Perras writes of Nathan Greenfield's book *The Damned*, its strength—"a moving depiction of the pain C Force members endured in battle and in Japanese

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[279] Frances Houghton, "'To the Kwai and Back': Myth, Memory and Memoirs of the 'Death Railway' 1942–1943," *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 7, no. 3 (August 2014): 227-229, 234.

[280] James Mackay, *The Allied Japanese Conspiracy* (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1995), 56-58, 163. The copy of the book in the author's collection was the one owned by late War Amps CEO Cliff Chadderton. Given his vocal support for the HKVAC and his frequent public assertions that Japan "would undoubtedly be more inclined to acknowledge its past if other world governments stopped letting economic interests get in the way," this discovery is unsurprising. See, for example, H.C. Chadderton, "Hong Kong Veterans," *Globe and Mail*, 26 May 1994, A30.

POW camps"—is also deeply flawed: "By emphasizing this narrative of suffering, Greenfield has perpetuated the notion that C Force's sacrifices were the tragic product of colonial subservience."[281] As a result, many former Canadian POWs were quick to decry accounts of their captivity that appeared to minimize their suffering. One of the most vocal in this camp was Leonard Birchall. As noted, Birchall's captivity was different from the other Canadians, and he seems to have extrapolated his own personal privations onto others.[282] In 1984, he criticized Canadian writer Daniel Dancocks's oral history of Second World War POWs, *In Enemy Hands*, by saying he failed to adequately evoke "the filth, starvation, sickness, death, cold, misery and lack of privacy endured by POWs."[283] We will return to the postwar legacy of C Force's POW experiences in Chapter 4.

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In watching the victory parade to celebrate Japan's capture of Hong Kong, William Allister and the rest of C Force could only grit their teeth as the soldiers marched "imperiously down these British-built streets, tasting the sweetness of power unlimited." He could only hope it would all be short lived: "Well, have your turn, you bastards. Someday, somehow you'll pay the piper too."[284] That bill came due in August 1945. With its defeat in the Pacific War, Japan's bid to create an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere had ended in catastrophe. So too, as historian Gerald Horne notes, had "Tokyo's dream of a complete racial reversal" for the Asia-Pacific.[285] Yet, Hong Kong could not simply return to the easy prewar days of British hegemony; the war had changed too much for that.

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[281] Galen Roger Perras, "Defeat Still Cries Aloud for Explanation: Explaining C Force's Dispatch to Hong Kong," *Canadian Military Journal* 11, no. 4 (Autumn 2011): 37.

[282] Birchall kept a diary of his POW life, which formed a key part of Dave McIntosh's 1997 exposé about Canadian prisoners under Japanese rule. The book, one journalist reported breathlessly, "will sicken and astound the reader with its documented accounts of Japanese military brutality and of the death and survival of the Canadian and other POWs." See Dave McIntosh, *Hell on Earth* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), chapter 7 & 9; Murray Hogben, "Birchall Diary Tells of Hell in POW Camp," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 11 November 1996, 9.

[283] Leonard Birchall, "No Crime Committed," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 14 January 1984, 55.

[284] Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands*, 45.

[285] Horne, *Race War*, 279. Still, as historian Jeremy Yellen correctly concludes, there was always a large gap between Japanese rhetoric and reality: "Despite the promise of a new and inclusive Pan-Asian order, Japan delivered little more than war, oppression, control, cruelty, and hardship." See Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, 206.

As C Force headed home, Britain's oldest Asian colony remained trapped between Japan's dashed dreams and growing calls for decolonization, a fact that benefited Canada as Britain tried to rebuild its moral authority in Asia. In the October 1947 issue of the *Legionary*, the journal of the Canadian Legion, a striking contrast was shown in the Battle of Hong Kong's meaning for Canadian and Japanese soldiers. On page 14, two images of the newly completed cemeteries in Hong Kong and Yokohama where 139 Canadian soldiers were now buried were revealed. These "last resting places of many gallant Canadians," the magazine assured readers, were being "Carefully tended by the Imperial War Graves Commission." Flip the page, however, and the sight could not have been more different as a three-image timelapse showed Japan's Hong Kong war memorial toppling into ruins. This, the paper gloated, had been built by Allied POWs during Japan's fleeting rule of the colony. "The memorial was to be symbolic of the alleged superiority of the victorious Nipponese. Early this year the memorial was demolished by British Engineers and the above photos show the destruction of this last symbol of the once proud conquerors."[286] Readers were left in no doubt about whose deaths had been sanctified and who soldiers were declared to have died in vain.

Yet, as Canadians quickly discovered, the Japanese soldiers confronted in defeat often bore little resemblance to vicious stereotypes in their wartime propaganda. As John Dower observes, one of the main reasons for the remarkably peaceful transition of power in Japan was the simple fact that "the dominant wartime stereotypes on both sides were wrong." The Anglo-Allies were not the violent demons of Japanese propaganda, while the Japanese "were more diversified and far more war-weary then their enemies had been led to believe."[287] Quite simply, what Canadians took as statements of ubiquitous fanaticism to fight to the end were, by mid-1945, nothing more than a routine mouthing of official pieties; a game of charades that lost all pretense once the war ended.

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[286] See Appx. 1, Chap. 1, Figs. 8-9. For the postwar burial arrangements of Canadian war dead in Asia, see Chapter 4.
[287] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 301. See also Chapter 2.

A telling anecdote to this effect is related by Kamane Harada, a Japanese test pilot on Hokkaido in August 1945. When news arrived that the fighting had stopped, local servicemen immediately began debating if they should fight on. Fears of Western enslavement were mentioned, plans for a guerilla war were laid, and Kaname sent his family home. "We continued to make preparations for our guerilla struggle in the mountains, but then the Americans arrived and simply told us all to go home," Kamane later related. "And you know," he concluded, "that's just what we did."[288]

One of the first Canadians to see this loss of nerve firsthand was Joan Fletcher, a Regina nurse in the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry who was attached to Lord Louis Mountbatten's British-run Southeast Asian Command (SEAC) in April 1945. As SEAC moved into the Dutch East Indies in October, Mountbatten's staff were initially worried about their reception by local IJA units who, like other Japanese formations in Southeast Asia, had been bypassed by the Allies and were thus undefeated in battle. Such men, they worried, might be reluctant to surrender.[289] In fact, far from needing to disarm rogue fanatics, Mountbatten mostly found the Japanese a compliant force ready to maintain the peace while Dutch troops were hastily assembled in Europe.[290] This was something Joan Fletcher discovered personally when she arrived at the Sumatran internment camp near the village of Bangkianang. This camp held 1,700 civilians captured by the Japanese well inland from the planned evacuation city of Padang and was surrounded by increasingly hostile Indonesian guerrillas seeking their independence. With an initial rescue team of only four people—including herself, a doctor, and two NCOs—Fletcher realized that the local Japanese, an amalgam unit known as the Yamashita Butai, was their only chance to get the prisoners out safely.

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[288] Peter Williams, *Japan's Pacific War: Personal Accounts of the Emperor's Warriors* (Philadelphia: Pen & Sword Military, 2021), 168.
[289] Ronald H. Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia* (New York: Random House, 2008), 167-168.
[290] After establishing control, the British evacuated most Japanese from the main island of Sumatra in the summer of 1946. Dutch forces finally arrived to relieve SEAC in October. See Spector, *In the Ruins of Empire*, 207.

While later commentators made much of Fletcher brashly "marching into a Japanese army headquarters" and emerging with the trucks and men she needed, by her own testimony the soldiers did not need to be strongarmed: "I was most polite, and the Japanese were most courteous. Finally I got the trucks."[291] Two of these Japanese were Lieutenant Matsuo Daisaburō, a young college student, and Sergeant Nobuo "Arthur" Miyazawa, a US-born Nisei who was a journalist in civilian life and spoke fluent English. As Matsuo recalled, their men were recruited from Kyushu and his superior officer, Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake, initially worried they might do something reckless like "jump into the valley with Dutch women and children out of chagrin [for] the defeated war." But Matsuo disagreed: "I trusted my men and they behaved themselves in a gentlemanly manner."[292] Eventually leading 25 trucks with 70 Japanese to serve as drivers and escorts, Fletcher successfully evacuated the entire camp, regularly breaching Indonesian roadblocks along the way, and even rescuing two of the accompanying Dutch officers who had been taken captive by rebels. Most dramatically, at one point a truck driven by a British Indian soldier clipped Fletcher and threw her between it and a nearby jeep. Luckily, she received only a minor headwound that was patched up by a Japanese doctor, but the IJA soldiers were impressed. "Although she suffered [a] severe bruise on her face, she continued to accompany us," Matsuo marvelled.[293] "From there on," Fletcher reminisced, "the Japanese couldn't do enough for me. My interpreter [Miyazawa] told me they had discussed it that night and he said he would like me to know that I had won the respect of every man on the convoy."[294] As a result, Matsuo decided to give Fletcher a gift, noting she was "greatly fascinated" by a sword owned by Captain Tachibana Keikichi. After the evacuation was

[291] See "Japs Admire Canadian Women Leader; But Think Her 'Too Tough' For Marriage," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 29 October 1946, 8; "She Gave Orders—The Japs Obeyed!" *Leader-Post*, 30 October 1946, 6; Jim Smith, "Regina Girl Commanded Jap Soldiers," *The Standard* (Montreal), 16 November 1946, a copy of which can be found in Joan Bamford Fletcher's papers, acc.19800177, CWM.
[292] Matsuo Daisaburō, "Translation of Japanese Scroll," 1-3, [1980?], 19800823-2, CMW.
[293] Matsuo, "Translation of Japanese Scroll," 3.
[294] "Japs Admire Canadian Women Leader," 8

complete, Tachibana presented his weapon to Fletcher "in token of my respect and esteem." "In the great confusion of the past war," Matsuo concluded, "although I commanded [the men,] she completed her duty bravely among the former enemy soldiers."[295] Fletcher left the Indies with the soldiers' admiration, while the Japanese were rewarded for their efforts. As Miyazawa wrote later:

> Yamashita Butai was virtually the only Japanese army unit exempted from a full-year's forced labor in Malaya. Upon being moved there in 1946, Matsuo showed the local [British] colonel in command the unit commendation signed by none other than Lord Mountbatten himself in recognition of the unit's outstanding performance during the repatriation assignment. I am informed that the colonel immediately loaded the men on British lorries (normally when you lose a war—you walk!) and sent them directly to the Singapore Naval Base, from where they were sent home on the next available ship. […] In fact, I was amazed to learn that the whole unit—every single man—was safely back home more than a full year before even I was repatriated. This whole outcome was directly due to my suggestion to Joan, which she followed up through direct contact with Lady Mountbatten, while in Pakan Baroe[,] that she give the unit a written testimonial commending their good/faithful service.[296]

This specific group of incurably cruel and fanatic "knights of bushido" had proven to be nothing of the sort.[297] Perhaps it was possible to rebuild relations between Canada and Japan after all.

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[295] Matsuo, "Translation of Japanese Scroll," 4-5; "Japs Admire Canadian Women Leader," 8. The sword now rests in the collection of the Canadian War Museum.

[296] Miyazawa to Madge Tibbenham, 12 September 1979, acc.19800177-9, CWM.

[297] Indeed, as one historian concludes, on Sumatra the Japanese were generally "of great assistance in gathering in prisoners of war and internees from outlying areas and bringing them into the safety of the Allied occupied zones." This allowed the internees to be swiftly repatriated. Whereas on Java this work took until mid-1946, "on Sumatra all prisoners of war and internees had been gathered in by the Japanese, with some help from 26th Indian Division, by November 1945." See Richard McMillan, *The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945–1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution* (London: Routledge, 2005), 128-131.

Chapter 2: Designs for Peace: Canada Debates the Postwar Pacific, 1941–1945

> *"The Institute of Pacific Relations is having its biannual meeting next week at Hot Springs, Virginia. […] In view of the character of the United States, United Kingdom and Chinese groups, it should be a very useful opportunity for some of our people to find out what they are thinking about problems of post war Pacific relationships."*
>
> — USSEA Norman Robertson to W.L.M. King, 4 January 1945[298]

> *"The Japanese were unable to secure their own liberty at the fateful hour of the overthrow of feudalism [in 1868]. The time of their liberation will have to be postponed until the forces of the democratic nations can defeat the Japanese army and then, in addition to the primary task of freeing Asia from Japanese conquest, help the Japanese people themselves to secure that liberty and freedom which they have so far been too misguided and weak to accomplish unaided."*
>
> — Herbert Norman, January 1943[299]

Like many graduate students, Herbert Norman wanted to convert his PhD dissertation into a book. Unlike most graduate students, Norman's book proved highly influential, both inside and outside the academy. In January 1939, Norman submitted his doctoral dissertation, "Establishment of the Modern State in Japan," to his Harvard PhD committee, a group that included Columbia University Japanologist Hugh Borton plus the noted US Sinologist John Fairbank, successfully defending it in May 1940. But before the defence had even been conducted, and with the support of both Borton and Fairbank, Norman had presented his work in 1939 to the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) for publication, where it was quickly accepted. This highly unusually timetable resulted in the bizarre spectacle of Norman having to write IPR editor Philip Lillenthal in February 1940 to report that "Mr. J.K. Fairbank is very anxious to secure a page-proof copy of my book so he can pass on format etc. before it is finally [and] formally submitted for thesis"![300] At about the same time, Norman received a letter from Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

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[298] N.A.R., "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 4 January 1945, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. See also the copy in King's papers (reel H-1512, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC).
[299] E. Herbert Norman, "Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (Part II)," *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 2 (June 1943): 165.
[300] Roger Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986), 75-77; Norman to Lillenthal, 6 February 1940, UBCA-ARC-1157, box 15, file 17, IPR fonds, UBCA.

Oscar Skelton, accepting him as the department's new Japanese language specialist once he had completed his degree. Norman's book was finally published in 1940 as *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, exploring the impact of the 1868 Meiji Restoration on Japanese society, a strikingly relevant topic for Westerners watching Japan's descent to war in the early 1940s. "Some of this historical essay upon the Meiji era may seem remote to the reader who is pondering the Japan of 1940," Norman admitted in his book's introduction. "Yet much of Meiji Japan lingers on, even flourishes in contemporary Japan; the growth and ramifications of the bureaucracy and of the military caste; the pusillanimity of [political] parties and Diet; state intervention in enterprise; … these are but some of the more obvious phenomena which have molded Japanese life."[301]

While criticisms later arose about the novelty or precision of Norman's research,[302] *Japan's Emergence* still had a critical impact on contemporaries looking to understand the Japan that had made itself an enemy on 7 December 1941. In 1940, American Orientalist Owen Lattimore praised the book as "the first adequate 'functional' account in any language … of the rise of Japan to modern statehood." It was a work, he noted, that eschewed simplistic categories of "militarists" and "liberals," in favour of one "that has a comprehensible range of conditions. No group within the country is a unit with sharp edges."[303] Although Norman stopped at the Russo-Japanese War, reviewer John Maki noted in 1943 that none of "the spate of books attempting to explain the nature of the Japanese enemy has come as close to defining the drives that ineluctably pushed Japan into war. When one reads this book, he will understand that it was something more than what is

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[301] E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York: IPR, 1940), 3.
[302] These criticisms were first made in George Akita's "An Examination of E.H. Norman's Scholarship," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1977): 375-419 and were rebutted in Herbert P. Bix's "The Pitfalls of Scholastic Criticism: A Reply to Norman's Critics," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 4, no. 2 (Summer 1978): 391-411. For a survey of the merits of these arguments, see Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 86-88; and Gary D. Allinson, "E.H. Norman on Modern Japan: Towards a Constructive Assessment," in *E.H. Norman His Life and Scholarship*, ed. Roger W. Bowen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1984), 100-105.
[303] Owen Lattimore, review of *Japan Among the Great Powers*, by Hishida Seiji and *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, by E.H. Norman, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 211 (September 1940): 211.

conveniently labelled 'the military' that drove Japan into this war."[304] Nor did praise cease when the war ended in 1945. It may have been published "before the United States or the author's own country, Canada, were at war with Japan," scholar Geoffrey Hudson argued in 1947, but its value had only grown since. In 1940, "the Western democracies had only to deal with Japan externally in the field of international relations, whereas since the surrender they have taken upon themselves the terrific task of remaking Japan's entire political and social system."[305] Norman's book also shaped other works that tried to impact the American occupation. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict, for one, in her influential *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946)—aimed at both the American public and Washington policymakers—based much of her analysis of Japanese history on *Japan's Emergence*.[306] As one biographer observes, Benedict wanted to help Americans "see the Japanese as 'human,' rather than incomprehensibly barbarous and cruel," and to have the book be used as a toolkit for "understanding the wellsprings of Japanese behaviour which could be manipulated to promote American designs for post-war Japanese reconstruction," both aims that the humanistic and politically-engaged Norman supported.[307] In 1946, Norman even had his book translated into Japanese while serving as head of the Canadian Liaison Mission (CLM) in occupied Tokyo. Indeed, from its translation in 1947 until the mid-1950s, many Japanese historians began studying their own history by reading Norman, whose books also found a popular audience in the country.[308]

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[304] John McGilvrey Maki, review of *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, by E.H. Norman, *Far Eastern Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (August 1943): 396. This, it should be noted, is a mainstream argument now made by both modern Japanese and Western historians. For examples, see Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*, trans. Ethan Mark (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

[305] G.F. Hudson, review of *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, by E.H. Norman, *Pacific Affairs* 20, no. 3 (September 1947): 328.

[306] In particular, she described Norman's analysis of Japanese industrialization during the Meiji era as "illuminating." See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1954), 63, 77, 80, 93, 174-175.

[307] Margaret M. Caffrey, *Ruth Benedict: Stranger in this Land* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 322.

[308] Norman to Lillenthal, 18 November 1946; "Memorandum of Agreement," 20 November 1946, UBCA-ARC-1157, box 15, file 15, IPR fonds, UBCA; Tōyama Shigeki, "The Appreciation of Norman's Historiography," in *E.H. Norman His Life and Scholarship*, ed. Roger W. Bowen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 122.

If sometimes overestimated, Norman's influence on the postwar American occupation of Japan is not seriously doubted by scholars (see Chapter 5).[309] What is less studied are the broader efforts by Canadians to influence wartime preparation for the post Pacific world, of which Norman was merely one of many. In fact, a large cohort of Canadians contributed to both postwar planning and helped to create wartime Allied propaganda and intelligence for use against Japan. Among these were several Ottawa diplomats, as well as a range of civilians co-opted during the war. These included Norman's fellow Far Eastern Mandarins Hugh Keenleyside and Arthur Menzies, along with political scientist Henry Angus, borrowed from the University of British Columbia (UBC). Most were affiliated with Ottawa's Pacific Propaganda Committee, formed in 1944 to liaise with its Anglo-American allies to try and undermine the emancipatory image of Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere as having liberated Asia from colonial rule and return legitimacy to the Allied cause after their disastrous Pacific defeats of 1941 and 1942.

Secondly, both Menzies and Norman were deeply involved in the creation of propaganda intended to explain to Canadians, and the Allies at large, what they were fighting for in the Pacific and why Japan had to be defeated. Norman alone penned numerous scholarly articles and internal memos that attempted to explain the nature and allure of Japan's militarism and determine how it could be undermined. Knowledge was power, and understanding your enemy was something all three Mandarins, who all had extensive practical experience in East Asia, could contribute to. As Norman himself argued in September 1943, as he reviewed several books about Japan's militarism for the IPR's *Pacific Affairs*, the works contained "fresh material which serves the very practical purpose of making us better acquainted with the enemy—a basic prerequisite for victory."[310]

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[309] For two notable studies of Norman role in the American occupation, see Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, chapters 4-5; Michael G. Fry, "Canada and the Occupation of Japan: The MacArthur-Norman Years," in *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context* (Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial Foundation, 1984), 131-159.
[310] E. Herbert Norman, "Militarists in the Japanese State," *Pacific Affairs* 16, no. 4 (December 1943): 481.

Finally, there was Canada's sizable contribution to the IPR's two wartime conferences, the first at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942 focused on winning the war against Japan, and the second at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945 that looked forward to Japan's impending defeat and occupation. While nominally an unaffiliated NGO, both IPR meetings got significant support from Allied officials. At Mont Tremblant, Ottawa took a lead in preparations, with Hugh Keenleyside remaining in close contact with Edgar J. Tarr, head of IPR's Canadian branch. Having waived the IPR's normal rules forbidding government officials from attending events, both Mont Tremblant and especially the Hot Springs conferences would welcome foreign delegations heavily staffed by influential military and civilian leaders. For its part, Ottawa sent many key members of External, including all three Far Eastern Mandarins and Henry Angus. The American delegations, meanwhile, included noted State Department officials, and their report on Hot Springs eventually reached the desk of President Franklin Roosevelt himself.[311] As historian Dayna Barnes concludes, bodies like the IPR "indirectly influenced postwar planning by providing its influential members with thinking spaces for reflection and for hashing out ideas."[312] In short, both IPR summits did for Asian affairs what Bretton Woods or Dumbarton Oaks did for the International Monetary Fund or the United Nations, and there was a significant Canadian contribution to both gatherings.

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While it is an amorphous factor, no one can doubt that war is, in part, a "moral contest" where rallying the trust of your own people and breaking that of your enemies is a vital prerequisite for victory. "The conscription of moral energies," in historian Richard Overy's words, was as much

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[311] Sasaki Yutaka, "Foreign Policy Experts as Service Intellectuals: The American Institute of Pacific Relations, The Council on Foreign Relations, and Planning the Occupation of Japan during World War II," in *The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front*, eds. G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 293-299.

[312] Dayna L. Barnes, *Architects of Occupation: American Experts and the Planning for Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 82.

part of the Second World War as "the mobilisation of technical and economic resources."[313] "Ideas were also mobilized" by the Allies to combat Japan, historian John Dower concurred:

> In trade books and popular magazines, in universities and professional journals, in the intelligence arms of the services, and in government agencies such as the U.S. Office of War Information and the British Ministry of information, a variety of experts turned their attention, among other concerns, to analyzing enemy behaviour in a manner that would facilitate both accurate military planning and long-term policy-making for the postwar period. Where the enemy in Asia was concerned, these experts and specialists treated their subjects in human terms that were in sharp contrast to [popular idioms].[314]

This effort was necessary, not only because beleaguered civilians and soldiers needed knowledge about their enemy and assurances that their suffering was justified, but also for the simple fact that, as Overy adds, "None of the Allies, the democracies included, fought an unblemished war by any standard."[315] This was especially true in the Pacific where, in a reversal of the European situation, it was the Allies who stood for imperial tyranny while Japan claimed it was liberating locals from the yoke of European colonialism with its Co-Prosperity Sphere (see Chapter 1). This was a stance it largely justified with the rhetoric of "Pan-Asianism," that "Asia was for the Asiatics."

Given Japan's ruthless treatment of Asian civilians under its rule, such appeals may seem to be little more than a cheap Japanese justification to replace Western imperialism with their own homegrown equivalent. But Pan-Asianism, as historian Eri Hotta argues, "was not a vacuous ideology proclaimed to provide an ex post facto explanation for its expansionism, but rather [was] an integral part of the very active force behind its expansionism." Consequently, she adds, "Japan's expeditious acquisition of territories had resonance and consequences well beyond material or strategic considerations."[316] This was especially true where the issue of racism was concerned. As Allied academics with knowledge of Japan repeatedly warned, nothing weakened their credibility

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[313] Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2006), 351.
[314] John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 118.
[315] Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, 351.
[316] Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War, 1931–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 201.

more than the idea that all an Allied victory represented was the reimposition of colonialism, a view that was only encouraged if racism was perceived to pervade official policy. On 4 July 1943, Japanese diplomat Kurusu Saburō, just returned from captivity in the United States after failing to avert Pearl Harbor, delivered a biting radio broadcast for Independence Day, mocking the Atlantic Charter's claim that the Allies stood for self-determination: "Japan's war aims, on the other hand, are directed towards the establishment of an enduring world peace through the liberation of East Asia." Only a Japanese victory, he warned, could give these "teeming millions" their freedom.[317] On reading an internal memo by diplomat Gordon Robertson in 1944 on the treatment of Japanese-Canadians, Henry Angus warned that he had framed his position to conciliate "illiberal opinion," and that a "more generous approach would be … more creditable to Canada and would do a great deal towards removing circumstances which tend to embitter racial relations not only in this country but throughout the world."[318] As Angus explained his rationale postwar, in addition to believing that the loyalty of the Japanese-Canadians to their country of residence was more robust than their critics granted, "I also thought that as a matter of policy we should not make it easy for Japan to pose as fighting for racial equality."[319] "White Man's Arrogance," as one article by noted Canadian columnist Elmore Philpott concluded simply, was the "Jap's Best Weapon."[320]

Luckily for External Affairs, in 1940 it had recruited two diplomats with a great deal of academic and personal experience of Asian affairs despite their youth: Herbert Norman and Arthur Menzies, both of whom had already deeply impressed Hugh Keenleyside. After he had been posted to Canada's new Tokyo Legation in 1929, Keenleyside had met Herbert's father, the missionary

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[317] Kurusu Saburō, *Kurusu Speaks* (Tokyo: Nippon Times Ltd., 1944), 36. "Asiatic liberation," Kurusu concluded, could only be brought about "by the concerted efforts of Japan and her neighbors who are now engaged in constructing a New East Asia, freed entirely of the baneful influence of Anglo-Saxon machinations." See ibid., 38.
[318] Special Wartime Assistant [Angus] to USSEA, 22 March 1944, *DCER*, vol. 10, 1129-1130.
[319] H.F. Angus, "Autobiography," 319, R2490, vol. 1, file 15, Henry Forbes Angus fonds, LAC.
[320] Elmore Philpott, "As I See It: White Man's Arrogance is Jap's Best Weapon," *Vancouver Sun*, 5 April 1944, 4.

Daniel Norman. "I was greatly impressed by the quality of [Daniel's] mind and the obvious depth of his personality," Keenleyside later wrote, and this encouraged him "to take a direct and personal interest in Herbert in spite of the difference in age."[321] Shortly after Keenleyside returned to Ottawa in 1936, Norman visited the East Block to seek his advice on joining External. Having finished his History BA at Cambridge's Trinity College, Norman was mulling his career options, apparently after having already contacted Oscar Skelton about joining the "Ottawa men."[322] While Norman enjoyed academia, Keenleyside noted, he also desired "a more active career provided that it still gave him reasonable opportunities to continue his Japanese studies," citing as an example the noted British Japanologist and diplomat George Sansom. Keenleyside encouraged Norman to continue his studies, having been offered a lucrative scholarship to Harvard, but promised "if he joined the Canadian service, he could expect to spend much of his time in Tokyo, and that if I was still the head of the American and Far Eastern Division, I should use my influence to that end."[323]

Unlike Norman, Keenleyside had never met Arthur Menzies before he applied to External, although Menzies and Norman shared similar backgrounds. Born to missionaries in China's Henan province, Menzies had returned to North America to start his own history PhD at Harvard, where he made the choice to write the External entrance exam for Third Secretaries in January 1940.[324] In April, Menzies was summoned to Ottawa for an oral exam before a panel consisting of Oscar Skelton,[325] Laurent Beaudry, John Read, and Keenleyside himself in his capacity as head of the

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[321] Living in Nagano Prefecture, Norman's parents had attended the official opening of the Tokyo Legation on Canada Day, 1929. By that time, Norman had already left Japan and was in Canada attending Toronto's Victoria College. See Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:277-278; Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, chapters 1-2.

[322] This meeting with Keenleyside seems to confirm Roger Bowen's claim in 1987 that there had been contact between Norman and External in about 1935, well before his official recruitment in 1940. Bowen, however, puts the initiative for this proposition mostly on External for thinking Norman was "a potential recruit." In fact, if Keenleyside is to be believed, it seems to have been Norman who first approached External. See Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 65.

[323] Keenleyside, "Herbert Norman," 1-2, [1979?], R4217, vol. 22, file 18, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

[324] "Time-Table: Competitive examination in order to qualify for employment as Third Secretary in the Department of External Affairs," 9 January 1940, R15615, vol. 28, file 2, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

[325] Menzies, it should be noted, had a close relationship with Skelton, later marrying his daughter Sheila in 1943.

American and Far Eastern Division. Parrying some easy questions from the other members, Keenleyside then emerged "as the principal questioner":

> He said "I see from your CV that you have a black belt in judo and have been teaching judo at Toronto and Harvard. Yesterday one of our confidential messengers bringing the day's receipts from the Passport Office was knocked off his bicycle and his money bag was stolen. Do you think that you could teach our confidential messengers how to protect themselves?" I realized that he was testing my flexibility of response. So I said: "If you get knocked off a bicycle onto hard pavement you are stunned. The first thing is to learn to fall without hurting yourself." Then I stood up, pushed my chair back a little and did a shoulder roll over the back out onto the carpet. Well, that startled my examiners whose tea cups rattled in their saucers. There was amusement all around and I was a shoo-in.[326]

Given his youth, however, Menzies was placed fifth from the bottom on the list of candidates for Third Secretary positions. While Herbert Norman—who sat in the exact middle of the list—was soon whisked off to Tokyo where he remained until his repatriation in August 1942 (see Chapter 1), Menzies remained at home. Instead, given recent changes in US visa requirements, he was sent to External's passport office in Toronto. While Oscar Skelton remained supportive of Menzies's career, praising his work as "very good," this was not, as Menzies later recalled, "the sort of foreign affairs work that I had dreamed of." Instead, with Skelton's blessing, Menzies returned to Harvard to complete his degree, but found his hopes dashed again when, after graduation, he was returned to a passport office, this time in Windsor.[327] Here he stayed until after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Both men, as we shall see, would play important roles in both anti-Japanese intelligence work and in explaining Japan's intentions to both government officials and the public.

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In July 1942, a letter came to William Langer, deputy chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA's wartime predecessor. In his message, OSS's Far Eastern Section head

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[326] Arthur Menzies, "An Asianist in Old External Affairs," 2-3, 20 September 2000, R15615, vol. 52, file 1, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 1.
[327] "Eligible List of Third Secretaries," 7 September 1940; Skelton to Menzies, 15 August 1940, R15615, vol. 28, file 2, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; Menzies, "An Asianist in Old External Affairs," 3.

Carl Remer reported that an interesting gentleman was slated to return home from Japan on the *Gripsholm*: Herbert Norman. "We believe that if Mr. Norman could be assigned to Washington he might be extremely helpful in establishing liaison in regard to Japanese studies between Canada and British agencies," Remer wrote, recommending "the suggestion be bought to the attention of Canadian authorities here if any proper channel is available."[328] In October, after the *Gripsholm*'s return, Remer reported to Langer that after he had joined the ship on the last leg of its journey from Rio de Janeiro to New York, he had talked with both Norman and Edgar D'Arcy McGreer about "securing and handling of information on the Far East from the Canadian point of view." This introduction had gone well, Remer reported, and Norman seemed an excellent intermediary: "He is a young man of initiative and ideas. He had competence as a scholar and has experience in the Far East and in the United States." It would be worthwhile, Remer added, for OSS head William "Wild Bill" Donovan to approach Ottawa with the proposal, or to present it by some other means. After all, he concluded, "it seems to me so obviously important to have close relations with Canada in the field of Far Eastern research that I venture to put it before you."[329]

Given what would happen to Norman at the hands of American surveillance organizations during the 1950s, there is considerable irony in Remer's proposal. Yet, in many ways, it was not as strange as it appears. The Second World War made for strange bedfellows, both in terms of who the OSS wooed as foreign partners, including Vietnamese communists under Ho Chi Minh, as well as in its choice of domestic recruits.[330] No less than three members of the Marxist-leaning Frankfurt School—Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Leopold Neumann, and Herbert Marcuse—were employed by OSS as political analysts, doing everything from writing reports on the nature of German support

[328] Remer to Langer, 21 July 1942, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, FOIA 0001365869.
[329] Remer to Langer, 9 October 1942, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, FOIA 0001365868.
[330] For this foreign connection, see Dixee R. Bartholomew-Feis, *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War Against Japan* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

for Adolf Hitler to aiding in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals.[331] Even if OSS had known of Norman's student beliefs, would yet another quirky Marxist scholar on the government payroll really have mattered? However, Ottawa refused Donovan's request, and Norman remained with External for the rest of the war.[332] But this refusal did not mean that Norman was not engaged in Canada's own wartime intelligence effort, or that he never interacted with the OSS.

"The Second World War marked Canada's entry into the world of signals intelligence," as Canadian intelligence officer-cum-academic Alan Barnes has recently noted, and External Affairs rose to meet the challenge. While Canada had been modestly involved in the intelligence work against Japan even prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War,[333] it was only in June 1941 that a small body, dubbed the "Examination Unit," was formed under the National Research Council to decrypt and distribute intercepted Axis communications.[334] Still, this early system remained primitive. What External needed, as Barnes observes, was intel that was "analysed rather than raw." Thus, in September 1942, External created a new Special Intelligence Section (SIS) to help "process" the intel it received with a mandate, in Norman Robertson's words, to prepare reports, "in which will be brought together secret information which comes in from various sources concerning Japan and the Far East." The plan was for SIS to intercept both Japanese diplomatic traffic, initially from its missions in Latin America and later those in Europe, as well as Vichy French traffic to its Japanese occupied colony of Indochina. And External had no officials better qualified for this task than the freshly repatriated Herbert Norman, who was assigned to head the project in September 1942, plus

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[331] Stuart Jeffries, *Grand Hotel Abyss: The Lives of the Frankfurt School* (London: Verso, 2016), 253-257.
[332] Langer did present Remer's proposal to Donovan in October 1942, one that Donovan received positively. However, in the end, nothing came from the request. See Langer to Donovan, 12 October 1942, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, FOIA 0001365870.
[333] For Canada's prewar intelligence gathering in Asia, see Timothy Wilford, *Canada's Road to the Pacific War: Intelligence, Strategy, and the Far East Crisis* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), chapter 2.
[334] Alan Barnes, "First Steps: Intelligence Analysis in Canada during the Second World War," *Canadian Military History* 29, no. 1 (2020): 6. For a more detailed history of the Examination Unit's birth, see Kurt F. Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939–51* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 38-52.

Arthur Menzies, who was brought onboard in November and remained until February 1944.[335] In this division of labour, Norman took the Japanese traffic while Menzies had the French along with, as he joked later, any task "Norman did not want to do."[336] The work was tedious, but rewarding. As Norman himself wrote in an internal history of the project, it necessitated "filing each message, Japanese and French, building up a system of cross references, and making cards on each proper name and subject." The result was a set of reports with "paraphrases or summaries of [the] original messages, together with editorial or interpretive comments, and references to preceding messages," the majority focused on Japan's ongoing diplomatic initiatives.[337]

It was here that Norman's scholarly credentials really shone. "The true value of Norman's expertise," Barnes writes, "was reflected in a number of assessments that sought to go beyond the available facts to reach forward-looking conclusions."[338] This, as we shall see, was the same ability for critical thinking and analysis that would serve Norman in good stead when he was posted to head Canada's postwar mission to Japan in 1946 (see Chapter 5). As Barnes notes, Norman wrote a variety of detailed reports on Japanese politics for External. In January 1943, he explored whether Japan was planning to attack the Soviet Union, and in April studied the appointment of Shigemitsu Mamoru as Japanese Foreign Minister. One 1943 memo, "Japanese Prospects and Policy," was so well received it not only ended up on Prime Minister W.L.M. King's desk, but it was also passed along to London to be read by Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office, "an indication that Norman's reports were read and valued at senior levels."[339] Indeed, Norman's views were regularly circulated in British and American intelligence circles. To take but one example, in July 1944 Norman wrote

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[335] Barnes, "First Steps," 6-7; Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 52.
[336] Barnes, "First Steps," 8; Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 52.
[337] Norman, "Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," [hereafter SIS Report], 2-3, March 1945, R112, vol. 29166, file "WWII-31, part 1," DNDF, LAC.
[338] In contrast, while Menzies occasionally wrote reports on Japan, his "were largely descriptive as [he] did not have Norman's expertise on Japan that would enable him to reach broader conclusions." See Barnes, "First Steps," 10.
[339] Barnes, "First Steps," 10.

a detailed study of the collapse of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki's cabinet after the fall of Saipan to the Americans. On top of Japan's previous losses, Norman posited correctly, this defeat was clearly the straw that broke the camel's back and Tōjō "was compelled to accept full responsibility for the trend of the war and divest himself of all power." Offering cutting biographies of the major figures involved,[340] Norman also noted that the appointment of a set of Army officers from the Kantōgun (the Kwantung Army) made this faction ascendant in the new cabinet, and that unlike in Germany where Hitler dominated, Japan's government was "more flexible; it eschews the concentration of too much power in any one man's hands and also takes a far more balanced view of the long term interest of the ruling class as a whole, i.e. of Emperor, big business, bureaucracy, and army." The emperor, Norman concluded, was the regime's beating heart and as the war progressed, "it should become more evident even to the most ardent apologists of the Emperor institution in the U.S. and Britain that the real citadel of power resides in the Palace."[341] Approving his commentary, George Glazebrook passed Norman's analysis to the British Political Warfare Mission in Washington in August, urging that it be given "a limited circulation among your Far Eastern personnel."[342]

Norman also engaged with American and British intelligence spooks firsthand. As Norman wrote in his internal history, in addition to being passed to External and all three branches of the Canadian Military, SIS information was "also forwarded to British Security Co-ordination in New York." In March 1944, Norman also became External's representative on the intelligence sharing "Y" Committee, which met in London under British auspices.[343] This body's "Sub-Committee for assignments" helped integrate Canada's work with its British and American Allies: "Through the

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[340] The new War Minister Sugiyama Hajime, for example, was a "tough and thick set man with squinting eye," and was "strikingly ugly, dour and surly, even by the best Japanese army standards." As for the new Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki, his brutal rule as Governor General of Korea more than justified his moniker as the "Tiger of Chōsen."
[341] E.H.N., "Reflections on Recent Cabinet Changes in Japan," 29 July 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. Given the clout Hirohito had on ending the war in August 1945, this assumption proved accurate.
[342] Glazebrook to David Bowes-Lyon, 3 August 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[343] SIS Report, 8.

kind offices of Colonel H.M. O'Connor, British Liaison Officer at Washington with United States Army Intelligence, Mr. Norman was able to make personal contact with United States officers working in this field," letting him "exchange views on interpretations of Japanese intelligence; in general to review the particular interest of Canada in this work."[344] In October 1943, Norman even had an opportunity to visit OSS headquarters in Washington while he was in town to attend a meeting of the United States Office of War Information (OWI). "I spent the better part of three days interviewing members of the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S.," Norman reported, meeting again with Carl Remer on the final day. As he discovered firsthand, the men recruited to OSS were mostly academics cut from the same cloth as himself. His former PhD committee member John Fairbank, for one, was assisting OSS in Chongqing.[345] In meeting with William Langer, Norman enthused that he was "the famous modern historian from Harvard," who was now OSS Director of Research and Analysis. "We only discussed generalities," Norman admitted, "but Dr. Langer was very friendly and cordial, and emphasised the fact that if we would only tell them the subject in which we were interested they would be glad to send us any research material they had on it." Yet, as Norman himself noted, given that Ottawa was re-evaluating its relationship with OSS and the jumble of US intelligence agencies thrown up by the war, "it [was] wiser for me not to give any indication that we were considering dropping the liaison [with OSS]."[346] Alas for Remer's bid to acquire Norman, in covert operations, loyalties could be fickle even between allies.[347]

Norman's own career parallels the rising sense with External and the Canadian government more broadly that Ottawa needed to get more involved with the production and dissemination of

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[344] SIS Report, 9.
[345] For his own take on his work with OSS and intelligence gathering, see John K. Fairbank, *Chinabound: A Fifty-Year Memoir* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), part 4.
[346] Norman, "Report on Trip to Washington," 19 October 1943, R219, vol. 5762, file 108(S), DEAF, LAC.
[347] Ottawa severed the link with OSS in early 1945. As Alan Barnes notes, OSS's relationship with Ottawa was one born of sheer practicality: "The OSS, a newcomer to the Washington bureaucracy, did not have access to US signals intercepts and was pleased to receive the Section's summaries of Canadian intercepts." See Barnes, "First Steps," 12.

Asian-focused intelligence and propaganda if it wanted a stake in postwar Asian affairs. In March 1943, Canadian High Commissioner to Australia T.C. Davis wrote Norman Robertson to report a recent meeting with Canberra on producing such propaganda, advising that Ottawa participate in their plans by sending someone from Ottawa to join him. "I am convinced that Canada is definitely interested in the Pacific," Davis pressed forcefully, "and that we should get our finger in every pie possible to maintain our position as against the day when the war is over." Robertson's response can stand for the fate of many such proposals to get Canada involved in the Pacific War. While he agreed the proposal had merit, "we are so short-handed that the possibility of sparing anyone for this purpose must be ruled out."[348] Given that Norman and Menzies were the only ones suited for such a posting, and both were occupied with SIS and other duties, Robertson's decision is hardly surprising. Still, if Ottawa's role in Asian propaganda efforts remained limited, it did contribute to a variety of wartime initiatives launched by their British, American, and Australian allies.

As noted, OWI was keen to get the Canadians involved in their propaganda effects through its Pacific Propaganda Committee (PPC), and for a very good reason. Quite simply, it lacked ideas and needed knowledgeable members. As Lester Pearson, then at Canada's Washington Embassy reported, when Owen Lattimore chaired one PPC meeting in September 1943, attended by envoys from the various Allied powers in Asia, "none of them seemed to have any ideas on anything." Pearson thus advised that "if we are to make any contributions to [the debates], either some expert like Norman or Menzies should be present, or the Legation representative should be briefed."[349] A particularly trenchant problem for the PPC, in its own words, was how to counter "Japanese race propaganda." As the Canadian Embassy reported in November, Tokyo seemed to be "intensifying

[348] Davis to Robertson, 22 March 1943; Robertson to Davis, 29 May 1943, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[349] Pearson to Thomas Stone, 4 September 1943, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Norman would attend one OWI meeting when he visited Washington in October. See Norman, "Report on Trip to Washington," 5-7.

the 'Asia for the Asiatics' line in their propaganda," with PPC advocating "we should continue to stress the argument that co-prosperity really meant exploitation by Japan."[350]

The problem of thwarting Japan's race propaganda returned to PPC in July 1944, at which time External delegated the task of suggesting solutions to Norman.[351] In a brief but detailed report, Norman brought his considerable knowledge of East Asian affairs to bear on the problem, arguing that an "attack would be the best defence, and a fairly extensive survey of Japanese treatment of temporarily occupied countries should provide considerable evidence of their treatment of these peoples as members of a 'lower race.'" As examples, he cited "Japanese denationalization policy in Korea," which compelled Koreans to use Japanese names (Sōshi-kaimei) and limited the use of the Korean language, as well as the bloody anti-Korean pogrom that arose after the great Tokyo Earthquake of 1923.[352] "The callous neglect of the Ainu, the aborigines of their own islands, is of so scandalous a nature as to warrant mention," he added, as was "the official claim of their descent from the Sun Goddess [Amaterasu] and consequent right to rule other peoples,"[353] as well as the "Complete cynicism" of Japanese officialdom in barring "the unexpurgated edition of *Mein Kampf* because of derogatory remarks on the Japanese race therein."[354] This well-developed list of topics, one that no Canadian apart from Norman likely had the requisite expertise to suggest, was dutifully relayed to Washington.[355] Yet at the PPC, as Lester Pearson conveyed, one OWI official frankly admitted that their arguments were limited "in the absence of declarations by the colonial powers

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[350] Canadian Minister US to SSEA, 8 November 1943, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[351] Canadian Minister US to SSEA, 28 June 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[352] For the post-earthquake pogrom against Koreans, see J. Charles Schencking, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and the Chimera of National Reconstruction in Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 26-29; 52-55; 73-76.
[353] See Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 2.
[354] E.H.N. to Agnes Ireland, 29 June 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. In the unexpunged English edition published during the war, Hitler had argued that only Aryan people were the "bearers of culture," with other races mere borrowers. This included Japan, where the "foundation of actual life is no longer the special Japanese culture … but the gigantic scientific-technical achievements of Europe and America; that is, of Aryan peoples." See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 290-291.
[355] SSEA to Canadian Ambassador US, 30 June 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

either promising independence or at least a greater measure of independence, since liberation would merely entail a substitution of European Imperialism for Japanese Imperialism." The Dutch, Pearson noted, had asked Washington to minimize its pledge to liberate the Philippines to avoid causing unrest in the Indies! The Dutch PPC delegate even thought it "quite unnecessary to attempt to counter Japanese race propaganda because the people in the occupied territories were all hoping for early liberation from Japanese tyranny."[356] If Indonesians were learning to hate the Japanese, then that dislike was not mutually exclusive with their hatred of the Dutch, as the British ultimately discovered when they liberated the Indies in 1945 (see Chapter 1). To a large extent, it was Japan's misrule as much as the Allied capitalization on such misrule that won them the propaganda war.

Yet, one should not assume such racist or colonialist attitudes were limited to the European powers. Canada too had closet skeletons in the form of its treatment of Japanese-Canadians, a point External was forced to grapple with on multiple occasions. In March 1944, for example, a German-language radio broadcast from Tokyo gleefully quoted an article in *Time* magazine to deplore the "scandalous conditions" in Japanese-Canadian internment camps.[357] While the article proved less sensational, External speedily sent statements to Canada House for use by the British Ministry of Information to counter the accusations, the alacrity and content revealing Ottawa's sensitivity to criticism.[358] In his remarks to Marcel Cadieux at Canada House, for example, External's Thomas Stone earnestly insisted the camps were "a temporary means of meeting an emergency," with the goal being to employ the Japanese-Canadians outside BC, though that left "approximately 11,000 Japanese" still interned, most of whom were either too old or infirm to work.[359]

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[356] Pearson to Leighton McCarthy, 4 July 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[357] High Commissioner London to SSEA, 22 March 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[358] H.V. Redman to Marcel Cadieux, [undated]; Cadieux to T.A. Stone, 13 April 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. Among other things, *Time* noted that there were outstanding legal challenges on the forced sale of Japanese-Canadian property and that camp councils had requested better housing, allowances, and recreation facilities. See "British Columbia: Farewell to the Japs," *Time*, 21 February 1944, 23.
[359] Stone to Cadieux, 27 March 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.

The worry behind this refutation was not unfounded. As seen, Henry Angus and others had warned that any neglect of Japanese-Canadians, perceived or otherwise, could only help facilitate Japanese propaganda. As Hugh Keenleyside noted as early as January 1942, External had already received Japanese inquiries via Spain, its protecting power in Canada, "as to the meaning of recent Government decisions relating to the treatment of Japanese in Canada." Any attempt to deport "Canadian nationals, based on the colour of their skins," Keenleyside cautioned, "would be used for propaganda purposes throughout Asia," with possible negative consequences for Canadian and British POWs.[360] Indeed, one C Force prisoner later claimed that when "the Japanese treated us a little more harshly than usual it was their custom to inform us that their people were being ill-treated in Canada." When they tried to explain that "in Canada there were such things as universal suffrage, the right of free trial and all other rights of democracy, … they laughed in our faces."[361] Keenleyside and Angus's fears that Canadian racism harmed the Allied cause in Asia is confirmed by both the diplomatic protests and the propaganda attacks that Tokyo lodged against Ottawa.[362]

Conversely, at one point during the war, the Japanese-Canadian internment gave Ottawa a modest opening to contribute to the anti-Japanese propaganda effort. In July 1944, Paul Malone at Canada's High Commission in Canberra wrote George Glazebrook with an unusual request. A few months prior, Australia had stepped up its regular radio broadcasts targeting Japanese soldiers with negative coverage of the war. To make this bitter pill of propaganda go down easier and encourage new listeners, these were mixed with the sugar of entertainment. "A consequence of this increase," Malone explained, "has been an increased demand for recordings of Japanese music." This was something the Allied Political Warfare Committee (APWC) recognized that Canada might be able

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[360] H.L.K., "The Japanese Problem," 3, 26 January 1942, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[361] A.T. Robson, "A P.O.W. Answers a B.C. Jap Hater," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 March 1948, 72. Cf. Chapter 4.
[362] See, for example, "Protests to the United States and Canada…," *Contemporary Japan* 11, no. 11 (November 1942): 1675-1676; "Steps to Look After Welfare of Internees," *Syonan Times* (Singapore), 4 February 1943, 1.

to provide, Malone wrote, as the "Canadian authorities may have confiscated a number of these records at the time of the removal of the Japanese from the west coast."[363] Following APWC's hunch, Glazebrook quickly contacted the Custodian of Enemy Property to see if any records had been expropriated from the Japanese-Canadians.[364] After a quick search, the custodian was able to confirm that about 2,000 Japanese records had been confiscated from a Mr. Kanjiro Kitamura, who had owned a store that had sold them in Vancouver.[365] In response, F.S. Tomlinson from the British political warfare unit in San Francisco visited the Vancouver custodial branch, ultimately selecting 962 records for use in the Australian broadcasts.[366]

Ultimately, despite T.C. Davis's suggestion that Ottawa "get our finger in every pie," there were only one Herbert Norman and Arthur Menzies to go around, and many pressing problems for External to manage. In August 1944, Norman Robertson rejected Davis's request to have Norman "make a tour of Far Eastern political warfare stations," with Thomas Stone adding he was "rather skeptical" of the impact Allied propaganda was having on Japan.[367] When Tim Healey, head of the Far Eastern section of the British Political Warfare Mission in the United States, visited Canada in April 1944, he asserted the value in having "The Voice of Canada" heard in the Pacific with his broadcasting staff in San Francisco. Canada, Healey noted, "was being almost completely ignored as a Pacific power. He thought that this was the more regrettable since Canada could make such a unique and healthy contribution to world thought and action on Pacific problems," especially since

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[363] Malone to Glazebrook, 8 July 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-2-40C, DEAF, LAC.
[364] Glazebrook to F.C. Carroll, 2 August 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-2-40C, DEAF, LAC. On a hunch, Edgar D'Arcy McGreer followed up his own lead by mailing Robina Martin, a friend from his time at the Canadian Legation in Tokyo, now living in Vancouver. Regrettably, she had not brought back any Japanese records, but she did find used ones at a local department store, "probably from the Japanese houses vacated on the coast." These were collected and seemingly delivered to APWC. See McGreer to Martin, 23 August 1944; Martin to McGreer, 1 September 1944; Glazebrook to David Bowes Lyon, 2 October 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-2-40C, DEAF, LAC.
[365] A.H. Mathieu to USSEA, 30 August 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-2-40C, DEAF, LAC.
[366] Mathieu to USSEA, 1 November 1944; Mathieu to Glazebrook, 1 December 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-2-40C, DEAF, LAC.
[367] Stone to Davis, 26 August 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

no one could charge it "with having territorial or imperial ambitions, past, present or future." More cynically, Healey added that given that the US "was beginning to feel her strength in the Pacific," if Canada "was to assert herself more in Pacific affairs we could not but have a salutary influence on the development of official thought and public opinion [among Americans] by compelling them through our greater activity to take more into consideration the interests and susceptibilities of other nations." By transmitting from San Francisco, he concluded, "Canada could assert herself in Pacific affairs and gain more general recognition as a great Pacific power," including the ability to directly refute Japanese propaganda against Canada, "e.g. recent Japanese radio criticism of our treatment of Japanese internees."[368] Yet Healey's proposal remained stillborn as the CBC never transmitted against Japan. In this respect, at least, a unique opportunity for Ottawa to make Canada known as a Pacific power during the Second World War slipped unheeded though its fingers.

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In December 1942, a year into the Pacific War, the American Asian scholar Charles Nelson Spinks penned a short article for the IPR's journal *Pacific Affairs*. His topic was Japan's history with liberalism, or more exactly its lack thereof. "Of all the Axis powers, Japan will unquestionably present the most difficult problem when the time comes for the postwar reorganization of our defeated enemies," Spinks began bluntly. The reason for this, he contended, was that Japan lacked anyone remotely "liberal" for the Allies to support, at least none that had put up any real resistance to Japan's nascent authoritarianism: "Throughout the history of modern Japan the political groups we have been pleased to call the Japanese liberals have offered little or no opposition to the basic national policy of conquest and expansion which on December 7, 1941, finally brought Japan into war with the United States." Japan's liberals, Spinks charged, were not "beaten into submission,"

[368] "Canadian Broadcasting in the Pacific," 1-3, 24 April 1944, R219, vol. 3209, file 5353-G-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. A copy of this memorandum is also held in Arthur Menzies files at LAC (R15615, vol. 29, file 8).

its reactionaries had acted "and the liberals rushed to climb on the bandwagon."[369] This included ostensible liberals like diplomat Kikujirō Ishii or the activist Nitobe Inazō, who had both allegedly opposed Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, not out of principle, but because it gave them the cover "to convince the world of the righteousness of the militarists' cause." This craven conduct, Spinks added, had stark warnings for any postwar attempt to liberalize Japan:

> Before the Japanese can be expected to make a success with liberalism as we have defined it and attempted to practice it ourselves, or before they can ever succeed with any form of political organization beyond their own archaic system of tribal glorification, there will have to be fundamental changes in the political, economic, social and even religious concepts of Japanese life. The grave question which the United Nations will eventually have to face is whether we shall be able to trust a defeated Japan to make these essential changes or whether we shall feel that our own future safety and well-being demand that we make them ourselves.[370]

Sprinks was not the only Westerner to think this way. Even before Pearl Harbor, diplomat George Sansom, Britain's most accomplished living Japanologist, had written much the same thing in the prestigious American journal *Foreign Affairs*:

> We are inclined to postulate the existence of a numerous class of "liberals," and we are misled by our own use of the word "liberal" into supposing that there is in Japan a school of political thought which approves of democratic institutions and thus somehow corresponds, if only in miniature, to those great majorities in the United States or Great Britain which believe in representative government, in freedom of speech and thought, and in a great measure of individual enterprise. […] There is little in Japan's past history to justify such assumptions. It is true enough that since the Restoration of 1868 there have been short phases of liberalism in internal politics in Japan, but it was liberalism of a type long obsolete in Occidental countries, and events have shown that it had in it no power of growth because it was a borrowed thing, out of harmony with Japan's traditional ways of thinking.[371]

Samson's views had not changed when he sat down with Canadian diplomats George Patterson and Ralph Collins in March 1943. "He started on a list of the old 'liberals' who might be counted on to establish a government by moderates after the war," Patterson notified Hugh Keenleyside,

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[369] See Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 3.
[370] Charles Nelson Spinks, "The Liberal Myth in Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 15, no. 4 (December 1942): 450-456.
[371] George Sansom, "Liberalism in Japan," *Foreign Affairs* 19, no. 3 (April 1941): 551-552.

"but his paper is blank so far."[372] Keenleyside too had a cynical attitude towards liberal-minded Japanese like Nitobe. At the height of the Manchurian crisis in November 1931, while still working at Canada's Legation in Tokyo, Keenleyside had pilloried Nitobe in his diary as a "fake liberal." "It is becoming more and more difficult," he concluded, "to retain a belief in the existence of any widespread adherence to liberalism or internationalism in this country."[373] If this was all true, how could the Allies even attempt to democratize Japan when the war finally ended?

More than anything else, rejecting this view and asserting the redeemability of the Japanese was the crux of Herbert Norman's published and unpublished scholarship during and immediately after the Second World War, particularly the two articles for *Pacific Affairs* that became his short pamphlet *Soldier and Peasant in Japan*, as well as the various articles that were expanded or derived from "Feudal Background of Japanese Politics," the policy paper Norman wrote for the January 1945 Hot Springs IPR conference (discussed below). This background is a point that many historians seem to misunderstand about Norman's wartime writing. Journalist Charles Taylor for one, argued that *Soldier and Peasant* bespoke Norman's "rationalist innocence," a part of his naive conviction "that men of all nations could order their affairs in a sane, civilized and democratic matter if only they could be educated out of their fears and prejudices."[374] Roger Bowen, likewise, offers the truistic conclusion that *Soldier and Peasant* was "a snappy piece of wartime propaganda written purposefully as a morality play with good versus evil." Like "any good patriot of an Allied

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[372] Patterson to Keenleyside, 21 March 1943, R4217, vol. 9, file 12, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[373] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:406. Time did not dull Keenleyside's cynicism for Nitobe. After the first volume of his memoir was printed in 1983, his friend and translator for the Japanese edition, Iwasaki Tsutomu, "felt somewhat thrilled" at translating this passage and noted that he might get pushback from ardent "Nitobeists" in Japan, asking for clarifications. "In some cases Nitobe seemed to be in certain aspects 'liberal" and even 'internationalist,'" Keenleyside admitted. "In other instances, however, I did not agree with his interpretations. … I did read several various brief publications [of his] in English and some bits I found mildly interesting. But I found an increasing emphasis upon his own personal aspects of increasing national propaganda. Among his ideas were also certain increasingly popular attitudes regarding reactionary controls of public policies." See Iwasaki to Keenleyside, 21 November 1983; Keenleyside to Iwasaki, 16 December 1983, R4217, vol. 20, file 7, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[374] Charles Taylor, *Six Journeys: A Canadian Pattern* (Toronto: Anansi, 1977), 125.

nation," he adds, "Norman criticized the enemy for failing to be democratic … but in the process sacrificed his scholarly integrity by abandoning his principles."[375] Both authors support their views by quoting Norman's ending statement in *Soldier and Peasant*, cited as my chapter epigraph, that the Japanese had been "unable to secure their own liberty at the fateful hour of the overthrow of feudalism," and that now only an Allied victory would give them the chance "to secure that liberty and freedom which they have so far been too misguided and weak to accomplish unaided."[376]

Both men's assertions, I argue, miss the real point of Norman's wartime writings. Bowen's commits a simple category error, assuming that detached scholarship was the aim or the ultimate value of Norman's work.[377] That was not Norman's assumption. As Norman told Keenleyside in 1936, he had been drawn to External because it offered him "a more active career" than remaining within the academy. As Norman ***wanted*** his work to influence policy, he deliberately tailored it to the need of public policy at External. "This essay on the origins of conscription in Japan is not, as the casual reader of its title might suppose, a little excursus for the pleasure of historians, of no interest to students of the present," as George Sansom himself wrote correctly in his foreword to *Soldier and Peasant*, echoing Norman's own preface from *Japan's Emergence*.[378] That this work contained "elaborations at best or duplications at worst" of his research in *Japan's Emergence*, as Bowen notes, was also immaterial to its value for the new "Japan-watchers" thrown up by the war who had likely never read the original book.[379] This budding new crop of intelligence officers, war

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[375] Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 94.
[376] E. Herbert Norman, *Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription* (New York: IPR, 1943), 57.
[377] In part, Bowen was likely reacting against the debates of the 1970s and 1980s, raised by John Dower among others, to revaluate Norman's scholarship for modern audiences. See Allinson, "E.H. Norman on Modern Japan," 102-105.
[378] Norman, *Soldier and Peasant*, ix. As the records of the IPR make clear, Norman's two scholarly articles on Japanese conscription that formed the basis of *Soldier and Peasant* were published simultaneously to his preplanned pamphlet. Norman completed *Soldier and Peasant*'s various appendices and his first round of revisions in April 1943, while his articles were both dated January and released in March and June 1943. Due to delays, however, the pamphlet itself did not get printed and distributed until late 1943 or early 1944. See Norman to Mary Healy, 16 April 1943; Norman to Katrine Parsons, 8 December 1943, UBCA-ARC-1157, box 13, file 3, IPR fonds, UBCA.
[379] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 95.

correspondents, civil servants, and propaganda pedlars, in Sansom's words, were part of "the great army of writers on contemporary Far Eastern affairs, an army which seems to be expanding as fast as the combatant forces of the United Nations, but is, alas, not so well equipped with weapons and ammunition."[380] *Soldier and Peasant*, to continue his metaphor, was a much-needed supply drop to keep these greenhorns armed. Judged in this way, all of Norman's wartime works were nuanced but clear expansions of his PhD thesis deliberately tailored to inform a political audience.

Taylor misses that, rather than naively thinking he could educate the Japanese "out of their fears and prejudices," Norman was attacking the cynicism, condescension, and outright bigotry that coloured most wartime Western accounts of Japan (see Chapter 1). Allied propagandists at all levels of society, as John Dower described them, "portrayed the Japanese as inherently inferior men and women who had to be understood in terms of primitivism, childishness, collective mental and emotional deficiency."[381] A failure to appreciate Japanese history, as Norman explicitly argued in "Feudal Background," "leaves the field open to the mentally lazy, or worse, the instinctive racist, who attributes the black record of Japanese imperialism to some inherent racial quality of the Japanese people."[382] And as noted, part of this mindset rested in contrasting mature and responsible Western democracies like Canada's with the inferior Japanese model that was "a borrowed thing" at odds with its "archaic system of tribal glorification." After all, if authoritarianism was Japan's default state, with no real democratic antecedents—as Spinks, Sansom, and others alleged—then wasn't trying to rehabilitate Japan a fool's errand? Yet, as General Douglas MacArthur found in 1945, most Japanese, meeting the war's end with relief, were happy to help build a new democracy. While some fanatics did try to prolong the conflict, most Japanese did not oppose it, permitting a

[380] Norman, *Soldier and Peasant*, ix.
[381] Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 9.
[382] E.H. Norman, "Feudal Background of Japanese Politics," in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman*, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 321.

few thousand US soldiers to take over the entire country, "an astonishing achievement in the face of a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain," as historian Takemae Eiji notes.[383] "What defeat showed, to the astonishment of many," Dower himself concludes, "was how quickly all the years of ultranationalistic indoctrination could be sloughed off."[384] Reviving Japan's democracy postwar proved easier than writers in 1941 or 1942 had dared imagine.

Norman's own views on democratization are made abundantly clear in his 1949 work *Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism*. Issued while serving as Canadian Minister to Japan during the occupation (see Chapter 5), this was a survey of "an obscure eighteenth-century iconoclast," from whom Norman wanted to retrieve, in Taylor's words, "a philosophy vindicating resistance to unbridled authority and oppression."[385] Yet Taylor's conclusion, that the book reflects "Norman's pervasive bias," again misses the point.[386] Norman wrote about Andō in a bid to show contemporary Japanese that they *could* rebel against authority and build a democracy if they chose to do so, and that there were antecedents to this in their history. Norman backed an occupation-organized "Festival for Democracy" the same year *Ando Shoeki* was published for much the same reason (see Chapter 5). In brief, *Ando Shoeki* and Norman's other wartime works were not intended to be purely objective scholarship, but to be assertions of faith in the face of near universal Western cynicism about Japan, assertions the durability of Japan's post-1945 democracy have vindicated. Japanese Marxist historian Tōyama Shigeki had it right in 1984: "When, during World War II, the forces of antifascism and antimilitarism pushed European historiography towards contemporary 'relevance,' Norman stood in the vanguard."[387] And as we shall see in Chapter 5, Norman's main

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[383] Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 56-57.
[384] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), 122.
[385] Taylor, *Six Journeys*, 131.
[386] "We may suspect," Taylor claimed, "that both Norman and his readers failed to confront the deeper question which was clearly raised by the selection of the obscure Shōeki as a liberal exemplar." See Taylor, *Six Journeys*, 131.
[387] Tōyama "The Appreciation of Norman's Historiography," 134.

complaint during the occupation was not that he found no one with a democratic bent in postwar Japan, but rather that so few of them reached his own lofty expectations.

As scholars have noted, one of Norman's biggest strengths as a historian was his ability to draw connections across different cultures and time periods, a skill that assured the Japanese in his works never emerged as exotic or essentialized, but as just another cog of world history.[388] A good example of Norman's bid to do away with notions of the Japanese as "inscrutable Orientals" was his brief wartime article "Mass Hysteria in Japan," written for *Far Eastern Survey* in March 1945. One of the main clichés about Japanese people to circulate during the war was the idea they were emotionless and unexpressive. That an impassive "Japanese mask" covered their inherent brutality or duplicity was a common wartime trope. Canada's National Film Board was being utterly typical when it cut the propaganda film *The Mask of Nippon*, in which Japan's soldiers were described as "little men … their faces, even in the heat of battle, are tawny masks: blank, expressionless."[389] "Stolidity, emotional restraint and stoicism are often mentioned as characteristic of Japanese social behavior," Norman observed in 1945. But like most generalizations, it "may in fact be misleading because it fails to explain the social reasons for this restraint, nor does it suggest that such reserve might not be so much a temperamental habit as a deliberately cultivated behavior-pattern assumed like camouflage for self-protection."[390] In other words, such traits were not an ingrained product of "the Japanese race," but the result of its distinct history, culture, and society. As he elaborated in his article, while pressure for social conformity in Japan is high, there were numerous examples

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[388] "Dr. Norman," Japanese writer Watanabe Daito observed after reading *Ando Shoeki*, "has a thorough knowledge not only of world history but [also] of [the] history of Japan. … I would even thank Dr. Norman for his attempt at comparing Shōeki to those writers such as [Denis] Diderot, [Gerrard] Winstanley and others of whom it is difficult for a reader of superficial learning like myself to find names in a biographical dictionary." See Watanabe Daito, "My Impressions After Reading *A Forgotten Philosopher: Andō Shōeki*," 5, trans. Ōkubo Genji, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 2, file 22, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB. Cf. Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, chapter 3, esp. 84-86.

[389] Margaret Palmer, *The Mask of Nippon* (National Film Board of Canada, 1942). Robert Craigie, the prewar British ambassador to Japan, even titled his memoirs *Behind the Japanese Mask* (1945). See also Chapter 1.

[390] E. Herbert Norman, "Mass Hysteria in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 14, no. 6 (28 March 1945): 65.

throughout its history of Japanese engaging in spontaneous acts of emotional release. After all, "under the heaviest burden of duties and regulations, human nature, particularly when fired by the spontaneous outbreaks of more inflammable spirits, will very often express itself in the most violent and unexpected fashion."[391] The Japanese were no different in this regard.

The most obvious example of such an emotion release, Norman argued, were the so-called "Ee ja nai ka" protests of 1867 and 1868, when ordinary Japanese took to the streets with a reckless abandon, yelling the titular Japanese phrase, which Norman translated as "isn't it good?"[392] Such "hysterical acts," as Norman termed them, had been "social safety valves" throughout history. As he notes, one could compare it to everything from the revels of the slaves during the ancient Roman festival of Saturnalia to "the practice of voodoo in Haiti" by enslaved Africans. But, as Norman argued, "the most striking parallel" with Japan's case was the medieval European "dancing mania" that arose after the Black Death and later.[393] "Under any unbearably oppressive social system," he concluded, "whether feudalism or slave society, the emotions of the common people, curbed and repressed by the unrelenting restraints, their spirits dulled by the drab and bleak drudgery of daily life, blindly sought some outlet."[394] While such events had not occurred in more recent Japanese history, he admitted, they might reoccur if conditions were right. The anti-Korean riots after the 1923 earthquake, which Norman compared to the anti-Jewish pogroms of the Black Hundreds in the late days of imperial Russia, were "a somewhat similar phenomenon." "As the military and political machine of Japanese imperialism begins to crack under the hammer blows of its enemies," Norman concluded, "it is not improbable that violent outbursts of mass hysteria will flare up here

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[391] Norman, "Mass Hysteria in Japan," 65.
[392] Alternative translations might be "Who cares?", "Why not?", or "What the hell?" See Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 4.
[393] For a modern look at the phenomenon, focused on Strasbourg's 1518 outbreak, see John Waller, *A Time to Dance, a Time to Die: The Extraordinary Story of the Dancing Plague of 1518* (London: Icon, 2008). Norman himself cites J.F.C. Hecker, *The Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, trans. B.G. Babington, 3rd ed. (London: Trübner, 1859), 80-162.
[394] Norman, "Mass Hysteria in Japan," 66-69. For more on Ee ja nai ka protests, see George M. Wilson, *Patriots and Redeemers: Motives in the Meiji Restoration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), chapter 6.

and there. The political effect of such manifestations may be slight," he conceded. But it would make it clear that Japan desperately needed "a therapy of rational politics, the complete repudiation of militarist and chauvinist influences, together with the pursuit of a civilized and peaceful mode of life."[395] Given that, as more recent historians argue, the "specter of revolution" was a salient fear for many Japanese elites as the Pacific War hurtled towards its destructive endgame, playing a key role in the decision to end the conflict alongside the atomic bombs and the Soviet Union's declaration of war in August 1945, such fears were more plausible than Norman knew.[396]

In his own small way, Arthur Menzies was also trying to explain Japan's wartime ambitions to Canadians. Indeed, the Pacific War saved Menzies from disappearing under a mass of passport paperwork in Windsor. By mid-1941, the backlog there had reached truly staggering proportions given the need to renew short-term wartime visas and the fact that other passport offices in Toronto, Winnipeg, and Sault Ste. Marie had shuttered their doors, as a wearied Menzies warned the press.[397] "We have been driven to abominable hours in order to keep within sight of the present passport rush," Menzies groaned bitterly to a relative as he worked days and nights.[398] A diversion of some sort was clearly needed. On 29 November, a brief advert appeared at the back of the local *Windsor Star*. "'Japan and the Far Eastern Crisis' is the title of Arthur Menzies' address to the Men's Club Tuesday at 8 p.m.," the paper reported. "The public is cordially invited to attend."[399] As talks between the United States and Japan deadlocked in late 1941, Menzies found his expertise increasingly relevant and requested. On no less ironic a date as 6 December 1941, Menzies wrote Hugh Keenleyside in Ottawa to inform him of his newfound standing. "As you know I am very

[395] Norman, "Mass Hysteria in Japan," 69-70.
[396] See Jeremy A. Yellen, "The Specter of Revolution: Reconsidering Japan's Decision to Surrender," *International History Review* 35, no. 1 (March 2013): 205-226. One group in favour of ending the war assembled around diplomat Yoshida Shigeru at the Gaimushō, whom Norman met postwar when he became prime minister (see Chapter 5).
[397] "Long Delay Faces Passport Application in Windsor," *Windsor Daily Star*, 23 August 1941, 3.
[398] Menzies to Marion [Menzies], 18 August 1941, R15615, vol. 18, file 14, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[399] "Arthur Menzies Speaks on Japan," *Windsor Daily Star*, 29 November 1941, 15.

keenly interested in Far Eastern affairs and find it difficult to keep this interest from bubbling over [given] the lack of intellectual exercise in Passport Office work," Menzies hinted unsubtly, but as he was still employed by External, he wanted to "secure your approval" before continuing.[400] It was also a chance, as Menzies told his family candidly, "to call his attention once more to the fact that such a person as myself did still exist."[401] On 10 December, with the war now on, Keenleyside agreed that Menzies "should accept most of the lecture invitations that you receive but should do what you can to keep reports of your speeches out of the newspapers."[402] As the mound of *Windsor Star* clippings in Menzies papers indicate, this last request was a conspicuous failure.[403]

While Menzies was initially a little unsure of himself, his speaking gradually improved as his venues grew. In one of his earliest speeches in mid-December 1941, he crossed the border to lecture in Birmingham, "one of the wealthier suburbs of Detroit." Despite by his own admission doing "too much reading beforehand and not enough actual preparation," the talk he gave to his 72 listeners proved to be "one of the best speeches I have ever given."[404] Given that most of his lectures appeared from February to May 1942 as Japan was at the peak of its military success, Menzies usually found a rapt audience for his commentaries, which varied slightly from lecture to lecture. Since he adlibbed these from notes, their actual content is difficult to reconstruct, though their titles give a fair indication: "The Imponderables Behind the Japanese Drive in the Far East," "Auditing Japan's Ledger," "Reminiscences of the Far East: Japan Rides the Tiger."[405] As Menzies

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[400] Menzies to Keenleyside, 6 December 1941, R15615, vol. 28, file 2, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[401] Menzies to Parents, 18 December 1941, R15615, vol. 18, file 14, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[402] Keenleyside to Menzies, 10 December 1941, R15615, vol. 28, file 2, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[403] Clippings of most of Menzies lectures printed in the *Windsor Star* can be found among his papers at LAC, many of which were also passed along to his family in his letters home (see R15615, vol. 18, file 15).
[404] Arthur to Parents, 18 December 1941, R15615, vol. 18, file 14, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Others were less successful. One speech for a local women's group, the Mary Grant Society, was a flop. For an audience of "some 75 middle aged (and better) women," Menzies admitted that his talk "went right past some of them, especially the poor woman who was reporting," though he was received politely. See "Mary Grants Enjoy Talk," *Windsor Daily Star*, 3 March 1942, 20; Menzies to Family, 5 March 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[405] Two outlines, one on letterhead from a Detroit business, are identifiable in Menzies files (R15615, vol. 28, file 11).

himself noted, in a claim that academics throughout the ages can undoubtably relate to, the press reports of his talks were often "garbled, but all newspaper accounts contain this element of risk."[406] Still, between these flawed reports, Menzies's own notes, and his private correspondence to others, we can analyze his views on Japan's early Pacific War victories in some detail.

Overall, the keynote of Menzies's talks was that, in the long run, the Allies would win the war given their numbers and resources. "In short, the balance of power is heavily weighted in 1942 in favor of Japan," Menzies warned one audience in February. "And it will be some time before that balance can be righted in favor of the United Nations." Even so, he never doubted that the Allies would win in the end: "Victory may come sooner than expected. The resources of Japan are extremely limited." Japan was on a timer, Menzies argued. It had 18 months to seize the resources of Southeast Asia and, until that was done, it had no ability to invade India, Australia, or anywhere else.[407] "Our course remains clear," he concluded in March. "We must increase and increase production. We must build ships and more ships, because at the moment these are most important. We must transport fighting planes to the Far East, and mobilize air squadrons in that areas. But in the end, victory must be ours."[408] Yet, Menzies was careful to note that it was unlikely Japan would surrender before it was defeated militarily. "Japanese will not be beaten by collapse of morale," he wrote categorically in his notes, "only by naval, aerial, military defeat," for there was "No nucleus around which opposition could gather."[409] "There are no variant philosophies in Japan today," as Menzies put it publicly in March. "There is no one against expansion in Japan—no labor organization—no Christian organizations to preach against her policy."[410] Combined with the state

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[406] Menzies to Family, 12 February 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[407] "Seize World, Aim of Japs," *Windsor Daily Star*, 27 February 1942, 24. "Mr. Menzies said he does not believe Japan intends to invade Australia or India," one reporter noted in May. "Both campaigns would require a million men collectively, he said." See "Must Defeat Jap Forces," *Windsor Daily Star*, 12 May 1942, 6. See also Chapter 1.
[408] "Business and Professional Women Hold International Night," *Windsor Daily Star*, 30 March 1942, 13-14.
[409] [Notes for Pacific War Lecture #2], [1942], R15615, vol. 28, file 11, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[410] "Business and Professional Women," 13.

of government surveillance in Japan, as journalist Tom Brophey parsed Menzies's lecture to the Windsor Lions Club in February, the possibility of any domestic upheaval was nil: "the powerful Japanese police force holds the common people closely in check, so closely that it would not occur to the Japs to try to do anything against their war leaders. The strength of the ruling class in Japan is formidable."[411] Defeat in battle was the only path forward to an Allied victory.

Overall, this was a fair summation of Japanese ambitions at the start of the Pacific War and were seemingly well received by all who heard them. Tom Brophey, in his column for the *Windsor Star*, praised Menzies as a great public speaker who "held his audience's rapt attention throughout his speech—and he talked for over an hour."[412] Even the *Windsor Star* itself penned an editorial on Menzies's final speech in May, approving his contention that Japanese morale would not crack: "Bombing raids may appear to be the easy method, but they simply will not work."[413] To arrive at his considered conclusions, Menzies had consulted a wide variety of sources. At the time, he was a member of the local branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), and so could draw on the roundtables and lectures he heard there. One can almost sense Menzies's dismay when lecturer Sir Robert Holland, a Canadian-born civil servant working in India, disregarded his intended speech on "Japanese Psychology and Strategy" in February 1942 in favour of one on "India Today."[414] Menzies was also an avid reader of the *New York Times*, whose articles seem to form the backbone of most lectures. This was particularly true of the articles authored by Nathaniel Peffer, a prominent American reporter on East Asian affairs, whose columns Menzies clipped and diligently underlined. "Japan will not be defeated for any reasons having to do with the

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[411] [T.R. Brophey,] "Attack Seen on Siberia: A.R. Menzies Expects Japs Will Give Help to Germany," *Windsor Daily Star*, 12 February 1942, 21.
[412] T.R. Brophey, "The Roving Reporter," *Windsor Daily Star*, 12 February 1942, 32. This was rather high praise. As Menzies noted, Brophey was "a very hard-boiled old newspaper reporter," who had sat "right opposite me and took notes as I spoke." See Menzies to Family, 12 February 1943, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[413] "They Must Be Beaten," *Windsor Star*, 13 May 1942, 4.
[414] Menzies to Family, 8 February 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

psychological impact of war on the spirit of the Japanese people," Peffer had written in December 1941. "The Japanese, being what they are, will be brought to sue for peace when they are defeated on the land, on the sea, and in the air."[415] Combined with his personal experiences and the research for his PhD at Harvard, Menzies thus had a solid background of knowledge to draw upon.

Yet, this is not to say that Menzies's lectures completely avoided the Japanese stereotypes of the day. True, he was careful to set Japanese actions in context. As he noted of his December 1941 Detroit lecture, he discussed "some of the imponderables behind Japanese policy, that when we said the Japanese were treacherous, it was in the final analysis an admission that we did not understand their standards."[416] Yet, in the hands of reporters like Brophey, such claims were easily distilled to the simplistic assertion that the "Japanese mind can envision no loyalty to anyone or anything outside Japan, so that moral standards have no meaning to the Japs in their dealings with other nations."[417] Sometimes Menzies's knowledge of Japan failed him. In one speech, letting his imagination get away with him and leaning heavily into the idea of Japan's ingrained militarism, he depicted each of its soldiers as "a knight errant riding forth in the service of his god [the emperor]."[418] This time, a reporter's faulty hearing was not to blame. Later, in October 1944, for example, Menzies finalized *A Guide to Reading the Far East* for the Canadian Legion (see Chapter 3), in which he outlined the rise of bushido in Japan during the Genpei War (ca. 1180-1185), and how the samurai's creed was "one of utter faithfulness to the feudal overlord." This "supreme virtue," he added, was, "in theory at least, a bond of service owed by the retainer to his lord

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[415] Nathaniel Peffer, "Fatalism—Their Strength, Their Weakness," *New York Times Magazine*, 14 December 1941, a marked copy of which can be found in Menzies papers, R15615, vol. 28, file 11, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Menzies also saved another Peffer article, "Japanese Supermen? That, Too, is a Fallacy," *New York Times Magazine*, 22 March 1942. Indeed, by Menzies's own admission, he was planning to cancel his subscription to the paper, "as I find it takes too much time to read; the time might be better employed reading longer range surveys in some of the better periodicals." See Menzies to Family, 8 January 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[416] Menzies to Parents, 18 December 1941, R15615, vol. 18, file 14, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[417] [Brophey,] "Attack Seen on Siberia," 21.
[418] "Must Defeat Jap Forces," *Windsor Daily Star*, 12 May 1942, 5.

regardless of any benefits he might receive in return."[419] Yet, when Menzies shared the work with Herbert Norman, the more experienced Japanese scholar pushed back on his claims, very much going against the grain of received opinion during the war (see Chapter 1):

> In the brief discussion of feudal loyalties of the Samurai, I think there may be danger when we generalize in the way we do about feudal loyalties in Japan of unconsciously accepting at face value the idealized later legends of their feudal civil wars. Actually there was a degree of calculating interest, whether for personal ambition or family interest, which often cut through clan loyalties and gave rise to a surprising number of "treacheries". The more powerful families in the period of the great civil wars seemed to develop the knack of having different branches of the family on the different sides through a civil war so that no matter which side won one stem of the family tree at least would be preserved.[420]

In his notes for his Windsor lectures, Menzies often betrayed his background in Chinese history, generalizing that there was "no theory of revolt" in Japanese history, "nothing in tradition similar to [China's] Mandate of Heaven theory [so it] would not occur to them [the Japanese] to revolt."[421] As we have seen, Norman had argued that this was not exactly true or, at least, Western observers should not have taken such a concept for granted. Still, despite such limitations, given the state of Canadian ignorance about Japanese history and culture during the Pacific War, this was very much a case where in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man was king.

In the end, Menzies was saved from his passport purgatory. In April 1942, news finally arrived that a replacement in the form of a diplomat named Andrew Bell was coming to Windsor,

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[419] Arthur R. Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East* (Ottawa: Canadian Legion Education Services, 1944), 11. Menzies final typeset draft for the piece is also held in his papers (see R15615, vol. 29, file 3).

[420] Norman to Menzies, 17 October 1944, R15615, vol. 29, file 4, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Indeed, as Norman argued after reading captured documents, while the exultation not to surrender was pervasive in the IJA, "it seems safe to say that there is no uniform indoctrination of Japanese troops in regard to surrender. … It seems that even at this stage of the war Japanese army policy is to encourage the mystique against surrender by drawing on the 'bushido' tradition, *and exploiting the fear of ostracism and later punishment* which, perhaps deliberately, is never too accurately described or legally defined. The automatic response to long years of training, in traditional Japanese behaviour pattern is probably regarded as the stronger psychological armour than [any] indoctrination." (Emphasis mine.) See E.H.N., "Japanese Attitudes Towards Surrender," 3, 23 October 1944, R4217, vol. 22, file 18, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. As a young student in 1932 reflecting on the Manchurian crisis, Norman had even dismissed "that Bushido rot" as simply an "outworn feudal ideal that is being exploited by unscrupulous militarists, … desperate in the hope they may be able to precipitate a revolution, to create a fascist regime." See Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 45.

[421] [Notes for Pacific War Lecture #1], [1942], R15615, vol. 28, file 11, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

and that Menzies was going to Ottawa. "I have made many friends, gained valuable experience from my C.I.I.A. work and talks on the Far East," Menzies admitted to his family, "but the office work itself has been far from stimulating over the past months, and I am very glad indeed that I am to be given a chance to try my hand at something different."[422] Breaking him into the office routine, an eager Menzies found Bell to be "a very nice chap all-around, especially as he is coming to relieve me."[423] A few days later, Menzies ended his lectures on a high note, speaking to "all the big shots in town" at Windsor's Rotary Club in "the posh Convention Room of the Prince Edward Hotel where you have to speak through a microphone," a unheard of luxury in his prior speeches. "I guess that will be the last speech I have to make for some time," Menzies realized glumly to his family, finding the one dark spot of his move. "I won't have the opportunity in Ottawa."[424] But that was a small price to pay for working in the capital. Transferred to Laurent Beaudry's office, Menzies was thrilled when his boss introduced him one day to the French minister as "mon jeune collègue." "My chest swelled with pride," Menzies later recalled. "At last I was a diplomat."[425]

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To a large extent, the eventual formation of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, now known as the Canadian International Council, owed much to the Institute of Pacific Relations. "In Canada the creation of an institute of international affairs was due to the convergence of forces deriving from three institutions," one CIIA publication noted in 1935: "the Institute of Pacific Relations; [Britain's] Royal Institute of International Affairs; and the Canadian League."[426] In the summer of 1925, the IPR's inaugural conference was held in Honolulu, Hawaii.[427] Leading the

[422] Menzies to Family, 30 April 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[423] Menzies to Family, 5 May 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[424] Menzies to Family, 12 May 1942, R15615, vol. 18, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[425] Menzies, "An Asianist in Old External Affairs," 4. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 5.
[426] "Canadian Institute of International Affairs Handbook," 15, February 1935, R2849, vol. 7, file 2, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[427] For the formation of the IPR, see Akami Tomoko, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45* (London: Routledge, 2002), chapter 3.

Canadian delegation was John Nelson, a noted advocate for increasing awareness of Asian affairs. Initially in favour of restricting Asian immigration to Canada, Nelson's views had softened with time; by 1925, he was becoming an increasingly vocal advocate of international cooperation.[428] Returning from Hawaii, he made clear "the urgent necessity of the creation of a national Canadian organization which would make possible effective Canadian participation in future conferences and studies" under the IPR.[429] Accordingly, Nelson contacted lawyer Newton Rowell, and impetus was given to that idea that an increasingly independent Canada, now beginning to conduct its own foreign affairs, needed an organization to help study its place in the world. By 1927, Nelson and Rowell had roped several high-profile Canadians onto their project. That year, ex-Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden became Canada's representative on the IPR's governing body, the Pacific Council. In 1929, the Canadian delegation to the IPR's second conference was co-chaired by both Nelson and Sir Arthur Currie, the decorated former commander of the Canadian Corps during the First World War.[430] As the retired general informed the delegates in Honolulu, Canada was:

> an autonomous nation on the shores of the Pacific, working out its own destiny and considering primarily its own interests, consonant with those of the Great Empire of which it forms a part, and as an increasingly important member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada's place in Pacific affairs is undoubted, and will increase vastly in significance in the great era of Pacific development which is just beginning. […] The view of the Canadian people is that in the solution of these problems we have a safe guide, an unfailing light, if we remember that faith is better than doubt, and love is better than hate.[431]

It was "an impressive statement," reporter Charles Bowman noted later. Initially sent to Hawaii on behalf of the Southam newspaper chain with 17 other Canadians, Bowman was later co-opted by Borden to recruit members for the CIIA. "Ottawa responded well," Bowman wrote in his memoirs,

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[428] Lawrence Timothy Woods, "John Nelson and the Origins of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs," *International Journal* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 387-396.
[429] E.D. Greathed, "The Antecedents and Origins of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs," 20, April 1966, R4217, vol. 10, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[430] Greathed, "Canadian Institute of International Affairs," 20-23; Woods, "John Nelson," 396.
[431] Arthur Currie, "Canada and Pacific Relations," *News Bulletin* [IPR], August 1927, 12.

so well, in fact, "It became necessary to restrict the membership to a convenient number for round table discussion."[432] Finally founded in 1928 with Borden as its first president, the CIIA would serve as the Canadian branch of the IPR until the latter's eventual dissolution in 1960.

Canada's links with the IPR expanded in the 1930s as the institute's biannual conferences began to rotate amongst its members. In 1929, the Japanese hosted in Kyoto; in 1931, the Chinese at Hangzhou and Shanghai. In 1933, the delegates trekked up the Rocky Mountains to Banff as the CIIA rolled out the red carpet for its Pacific neighbours. By this point, the organization had picked up many Canadian "men of affairs" of a generally left-liberal bent, notably UBC academic Henry Angus, who attended Kyoto in 1929; Escott Reid, who became the CIIA's secretary; and Edgar J. Tarr, the president of the Monarch Life Insurance Company and head of the CIIA's influential Winnipeg branch. Tarr chaired the delegation in Banff and later became CIIA president in 1937.[433] Unsurprisingly, events in Banff were eclipsed by the ongoing crisis in Manchuria, though the Canadians tried to keep the summit focused on economic matters.[434] Also during the 1930s, both the CIIA and the IPR began devoting resources to studying Canadian interests in Asia. In 1937, the CIIA published its first book: William Strange's *Canada, the Pacific and War*. "In view of the gravity of the present international situation in the Far East," CIIA president J.W. Dafoe wrote in its foreword, they had decided "it would be in the interest of the people of Canada to have a short book written for Canadians on the situation in the Far East and how it affects Canada."[435] By 1938,

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[432] Charles A. Bowman, *Ottawa Editor: The Memoirs of Charles A. Bowman* (Sidney, BC: Gray's Publishing, 1966), 114-118. See also Greathed, "Canadian Institute of International Affairs," 32-33.
[433] Priscilla Roberts, "Tweaking the Lion's Tail: Edgar J. Tarr, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and the British Empire, 1931–1950," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 23, no. 4 (2012): 639-640.
[434] For the conference events, see Bruno Lasker and W.L. Holland, *Problems of the Pacific, 1933* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). It was here that the Gaimushō sent an increasingly ill Nitobe Inazō to plead Japan's case, a plea that Henry Angus and the other Canadians dismissed. It was in Victoria, on his return journey, that Nitobe died and the Japanese gardens at UBC were later named in his honour, a fact that the ever-waspish Hugh Keenleyside "greatly regretted." See John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 104-105; Angus, "Autobiography," 237A-238, R2490, vol. 1, file 14, H.F. Angus fonds, LAC; Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:422.
[435] William Strange, *Canada, the Pacific and War* (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937), v.

with Japan's invasion of China still ongoing, many IPR members—including Rowell and Tarr—began to ponder how "the International Secretariat should make some effort to relate its work directly to the present conflict." As Dafoe wrote to the Canadians, the dominant view was that everyone "with interests at stake should have at their disposal accurate, concise and objective information as to the conditions which have produced the present conflict."[436] One recipient of this letter was historian Arthur Lower, who was later asked to write "a monograph and a bibliography" on Canada's interests by IPR Secretary Edward Carter, which eventually became *Canada and the Far East – 1940*.[437] Despite the obstacles in writing the text,[438] Lower later boasted that when the Pacific War finally broke out, his book's forecasts were so accurate it "seemed almost like looking at a play, the script of which I had already read."[439] By the time Japanese planes descended on Pearl Harbor, a knowledgeable cohort of Canadians had thus been assembled within the CIIA.

As already seen, while the CIIA was nominally an NGO, its relationship with Ottawa was incredibly tight. This was especially true of Asian affairs given the background of its president, Edgar Tarr. "Unlike many Canadians," as historian Priscilla Roberts notes, "Tarr thought Asia of vital importance to Canada."[440] This Asian link was further strengthened by the fact that Tarr's main contact in Ottawa was Hugh Keenleyside, whom he even tried to recruit in January 1943 as a CIIA director after his work at Mont Tremblant, a tempting offer that Keenleyside ultimately declined.[441] Indeed, the first week of December 1941 found the CIIA's John Holmes telling

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[436] J.W. Dafoe to Members of the Pacific Council et al., 9 February 1938, F01676, box 44, file 21, Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower fonds, QUA.
[437] Carter to Lower, 27 May 1938; Lower to Carter, 28 May 1938, F01676, box 44, file 21, Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower fonds, QUA. See also Arthur R. M. Lower, *Canada and the Far East – 1940* (New York: IPR, 1940).
[438] Lower later complained that Carter was "muddy in his explanations of what he wanted," and worked with Hugh Keenleyside for suggestions and encouragement on revising his manuscript. See Lower to Keenleyside, 16 January 1940; Keenleyside to Lower, 20 January 1940; Lower to Keenleyside, 5 February 1940; Keenleyside to Lower, 9 February 1940, F01676, box 44, file 21, Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower fonds, QUA.
[439] Arthur R.M. Lower, *My First Seventy-Five Years* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967), 259.
[440] Roberts," Tweaking the Lion's Tail," 644.
[441] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:217-219.

Keenleyside that the US "Foreign Affairs Council of Cleveland is having an I.P.R. conference next week, December 6th and 7th," a meeting Keenleyside later directed the CIIA's new vice-president, Henry Angus, to attend.[442] As Angus wrote later, he was amazed that, even at this late date, "The consensus was that there would be no war because Japan would not dare to fight the United States." This illusion was only shattered when the IPR's Edward Carter arrived after lunch on Sunday with telegrams announcing Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, throwing the meeting into disarray. "When my turn came," Angus recalled, he simply noted that while Canadians were already at war, now they could feel relief, "for we were now assured of a powerful ally and knew that, in the long run, we were bound to win."[443] After that, winning the Pacific War became the IPR's main goal.

In this task, Canada could not have found a better advocate than Edgar Tarr, with the help of Hugh Keenleyside. In June 1942, the initial draft proposal for the conference that would become Mont Tremblant was forwarded to the Canadians. In it, Canada was not even mentioned by name, seemingly relegated to the category of "Great Britain and Dominions." Elsewhere, the draft noted the significance "of Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands," as well as the role "of the Western nations (United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, Netherlands, [and] Portugal" in postwar Pacific affairs. Tarr was insulted. "I notice you don't care a damn about the susceptibilities of your Canadian friends," he teased Edward Carter. "Apparently even Portugal is to play a mighty role in the Pacific area in the post-war world. Might it be suggested that there is a geographical area north of the U.S. which in itself had some significance,—even if its people haven't?"[444] "I entirely agree with the note that you sent to Carter," Keenleyside noted approvingly from Ottawa.

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[442] Holmes to Keenleyside, 1 December 1941; Keenleyside to Holmes, 4 December 1941, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Roberts," Tweaking the Lion's Tail," 645-646.
[443] Angus, "Autobiography," 317-318.
[444] Tarr to Carter, 10 June 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 4, CIIA fonds, LAC; Tarr to Keenleyside, 10 June 1942 and Enclosure, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Carter later apologized "for the bad slip we made on page 2 of the agenda," and arranged to have new copies mimeographed to replace them. See Carter to Tarr, 12 June 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 4, CIIA fonds, LAC.

"I am getting pretty fed up with the way in which Canada is blithely ignored in Washington (and London) except when we make a fuss."[445] This was an especially insolent blunder by Carter given that the Americans had already propositioned the CIIA to host the conference! In June, J.W. Dafoe had discussed the matter with the Pacific Council's Phillip Jessup, being "enthusiastically in favor of the notion." This was necessary, Jessup wrote Tarr, as they were "having great trouble" finding a suitable location to host and thought they might find space "either out in Jasper or Banff or up in Quebec where so many winter resorts have been developed," a position Carter endorsed.[446] Given that these were "busy times," Tarr advised that the conference be held in central Canada, with the ski lodge at Mont Tremblant north of Montreal eventually chosen as the designated site.[447]

Given wartime demands, the Canadian contingent to Mont Tremblant was less of a dream team than Tarr would have liked. With their responsibilities in Ottawa, it was impossible for both Angus and Keenleyside to attend, with Keenleyside eventually taking the honour.[448] Several other Ottawa mandarins courted by Tarr, including Lester Pearson, could not attend at all. Tarr's bid to get a delegate from every major political party also fell through when Conservative MP Howard Green proved unavailable, though Brooke Claxton would represent the Liberals and M.J. Coldwell the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).[449] One Canadian that Tarr and most of the Americans wanted to see at Mont Tremblant was Herbert Norman.[450] Contacted directly by the IPR headquarters in New York, Norman was eager to attend even if he had to "take some of the

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[445] Keenleyside to Tarr, 12 June 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Roberts," Tweaking the Lion's Tail," 647.
[446] Jessup to Tarr, 2 June 1942; Carter to Tarr, 5 June 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 4, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[447] Tarr to Carter, 8 June 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 4, CIIA fonds, LAC. One false lead followed up by Keenleyside was to hold the conference at the Hotel Frontenac. See G.L. Bartrem to Keenleyside, 7 July 1942; Keenleyside to Tarr, 9 July 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC. See Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 6.
[448] Keenleyside to Tarr, 5 October 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[449] Tarr to J.M. Macdonnell, 21 September 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC; Keenleyside to Tarr, 12 November 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[450] Edward Carter wanted Norman to contribute a report based on his internment experience in Japan, but Keenleyside quashed this request. See [Keenleyside] to Tarr, 14 September 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC.

leave which he has coming to him from the Department for this purpose."[451] While Tarr thought Norman far too "senior" for the only open position of secretary-stenographer, he was included on the Canadian delegation in that position.[452] Despite these impediments, the meticulous Tarr was nonetheless "delighted" with the facilities he found at Mont Tremblant, "better than we have ever had at any former conference."[453] Centred around a ski lodge in the Laurentians recently furnished by French-Canadian polymath Jean Palardy, it was more than capable of hosting all the delegates despite the wintery conditions.[454] It was here that the Allied IPR nations finally met for ten days between 4 and 14 December 1942.

One of the crucial differences between the IPR's two wartime conferences and its prewar forebears was, as its official report explained, the attempt to invite "persons holding government position to participate in the discussions, though only in their personal capacities." This was necessary not only because many Asian scholars, like Canada's Henry Angus, "had gone into government service," but also because "without the presence of some officials the discussions on such a topic as cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific would inevitably be unrealistic if not misleading."[455] The Chinese delegation, for one, was led by Alfred Sao-ke Sze, one of its most senior diplomats serving in Washington. Among the Americans was the Canadian-born Lauchlin Currie, a special assistant to President Franklin Roosevelt; Assistant Undersecretary of State Adolf Berle, the State Department's Asia expert Stanley Hornbeck; and the OSS's Carl Remer, along with IPR perennials like Owen Lattimore and Philip Jessup.[456] While the conference was explicitly focused on winning the war and not on postwar planning, there was still much to debate, notably

[451] Keenleyside to Tarr, 21 September 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[452] Tarr to Keenleyside, 24 September 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[453] Tarr to Keenleyside, 21 September 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[454] See Appx. 1, Chap. 2, Fig. 7-8.
[455] *War and Peace in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Eight Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and Far East* (New York: IPR, 1943), vi.
[456] Barnes, *Architects of Occupation*, 80. The full list of delegates is in *War and Peace in the Pacific*, 154-162.

the role that Western colonialism played in Japanese propaganda. The fault line here was in the anti-imperialism of the US, Chinese, and the newly invited Indian delegations on the one side, and the pro-imperial British and Dutch on the other, energetically defended by the British leader, Lord Hailey. A former Indian civil servant, Hailey's polished rhetoric proved capable of fending off his attackers. The British team, as Keenleyside later put it, "was the most experienced in public affairs, the best prepared and the most exhaustively briefed."[457] One British participant smugly recalled his boss "tucking up his mental trousers to step gingerly through a great deal of intellectual ditch-water."[458] In some ways, this success was a civilian precursor to the Anglo-American military talks held at Casablanca in January 1943, where the better prepared British once again outargued their US rivals despite the growing power disparity between them.[459] Chairing the round-table on India, Edgar Tarr did his best to manage this skirmish. Yet, with CIIA help, as Pricilla Roberts concludes, "the Mont Tremblant conference tipped the balance within the IPR against the continuation of European colonialism in Asia, whilst serving as a manifesto of Canada's determination to resist an Anglo-American monopoly over the shaping of the post-war world."[460]

Regarding Japan, one of the conference's regional roundtables was focused on the country, and throughout the rest of the proceedings, as an American report noted, "the conference seldom lost sight of our enemy in the Pacific."[461] Aligning Allied objectives with the Atlantic Charter, for one, was a frequent point of order. About Japan itself, the conference touched most of the issues

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[457] [Keenleyside], "Report on the Mont Tremblant Conference…," [hereafter Keenleyside Report], 2, 30 December 1942, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[458] William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 12-13. Cf. Christopher G. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 212-213.
[459] "We came, we saw and we were conquered," was American General Albert Wedemeyer's sardonic summary of Casablanca. See Niall Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II* (New York: Pegasus, 2015); 218-222; and Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 103-104.
[460] Roberts," Tweaking the Lion's Tail," 651.
[461] Frederick V. Field, "The Mont Tremblant Conference," *Far Eastern Survey* 12, no. 1 (11 January 1943): 9.

already discussed in this chapter. Political warfare was debated, its efficacy becoming "a matter of some debate." Some saw prospects for action, while others "voiced skepticism, pointing out that liberalism in Japan had never had firm roots."[462] The fate of Japanese migrants in Canada and the United States also came up for debate, with Andrew Lind at the University of Hawaii submitting a paper on the situation in Hawaii. In a measured assessment, while Lind concluded that "the overwhelming majority of the Japanese in Hawaii are loyal to the United States," he noted that if disloyalty was possible, subjecting them to constant suspicion after the mainland internments was stoking resentment.[463] "Internationally," the official report concluded, "this discriminatory action, whatever its military justification—and this round table did not attempt to decide—is the kind of thing which will be seized upon and exploited by the Japanese in their propaganda to their own people and other Asiatics. They will distort the record," the report acknowledged, "but the charge of racial prejudice and persecution will have a regrettable basis in fact."[464]

On Japan's postwar fate, all attendees agreed that it would be stripped of its empire. Lord Hailey, as M.J. Coldwell put it, "laid it down as an accepted principle that territory she has seized since 1930, must be restored." Hailey added that given the role "the paralysis of [Japan's] trade relations with Europe and America" played in the road to war in 1941, he supported granting Japan "full access to the markets of the world," a deal that accorded "with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and would involve some sacrifices on the part of Great Britain and the United States."[465] This, as we shall see, was a principle Ottawa accepted during the 1950s (see Chapter 7). Presciently, as one US summary concluded, most attendees "believed that the knock-out blow [against Japan] would come from the air and not from invasion of the Japanese islands. The occupation of Japan was

[462] *War and Peace in the Pacific*, 38. As George Sansom was on the British delegation, this view is unsurprising.
[463] Andrew W. Lind, *The Japanese in Hawaii Under War Conditions* (New York: IPR, 1942), 29-30.
[464] *War and Peace in the Pacific*, 40.
[465] M.J. Coldwell, "Report to Ottawa Branch," 10-11, 21 January 1943, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC.

therefore a question to be approached from the point of view of its value in teaching Japan a lesson and in preventing the recurrence of Japanese aggression."[466] While the atomic bomb and the B-29 firebombing tactics were yet glints in the eyes of scientist Robert Oppenheimer and General Curtis LeMay, this proved an accurate prediction of how the war against Japan would develop.

The Mont Tremblant conference would play a serious role in the development of Allied strategy towards Japan, particularly in Washington. "The conference reinforced policy networks," in historian Dayna Barnes words, "and brought specialist attention to key issues relating to postwar East Asia." Lauchlin Currie, for one, returned home "full of all kinds of ideas and enthusiasms for a technical mission to China for post-war reconstruction." Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles shared many of the ideas debated at the conference, including views on disarming and decolonizing Japan postwar, and even spoke at the IPR luncheon announcing the publication of the meeting's official report. As Barnes argues, the Mont Tremblant consensus on these issues, "of which Welles approved, was a likely source for key agreements made at Cairo [in November 1943]."[467] Canada too benefited from the proceedings. "Not only were we in the position of hosts to the Conference," CIIA participant Nik Cavell applauded, but their organization had also benefited from having "so many distinguished experts on Pacific Affairs in Canada. … As a result, I think we now have, not only a better grasp of the very real and serious problems which the Pacific area present, but also a better realization of the part Canada can and should play in resolving these problems."[468] Even the Japanese took notice. On 20 April 1943, a propaganda broadcast from Tokyo airily dismissed the event, claiming that they on the "most important" side of the Pacific "hardly knew that the institute as such even existed, let [alone] being aware that its meeting was being held." "Japan Discovers

[466] Field, "The Mont Tremblant Conference," 9-10.
[467] Barnes, *Architects of Occupation*, 80-81. British delegates, associated with Chatham House, were also subsidized by the Foreign Office and their reports too found official traction in London. See Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 212, 214.
[468] R.G. Cavell, "The Pacific Relations Conference," [1942], R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

the IPR," was the American branch's sarcastic retort to this blatant bit of historical revisionism.[469] The broadcast went on to slander the conference's members—laying into the British, Americans, and Chinese Nationalists—while also mocking the idea that "great and difficult problems of the Pacific area can be settled or solved by means of a mere expression of [the participants'] own highly righteous and subjective views."[470] As Hugh Keenleyside concluded, "I believe that Mont Tremblant did rather more than fulfil the hopes of those responsible for its organization."[471]

Coming off this success, Tarr's ambitions for the Canadian contribution to the IPR's final wartime conference at Hot Springs, Virginia in January 1945 were high. By the time arrangements for this meeting were being made in mid-1944, the war had finally turned against Japan, and Hot Springs was to be directly focused on "the effects of defeat on Japan," and what the postwar Pacific would look like economically, politically, and culturally.[472] Yet, as an anxious Tarr worried, "I am wholly convinced that the group as we have planned it is quite inadequate to enable Canada to play its part at the Conference." With the war's end in sight, the other Allied delegations would no doubt be "strong in official and expert personnel," and Tarr wanted his team equally well staffed: "It seems to me we should make a special effort to get Hugh Keenleyside, who is the head of the Far Eastern Section, and if at all possible, to get Henry Angus as well."[473] "We very much hope that you will feel it worth while to have Keenleyside and Angus attend," Tarr meekly entreated Norman Robertson in October. "At Mont Tremblant," the patriotic Canadian added, "our official personnel stacked up mighty well against all and sundry … We are naturally very keen to repeat

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[469] "Japan Discovers the IPR," *Far Eastern Survey*, 12, no. 12 (14 June 1943): 123-124.
[470] "Transcript of Japanese Broadcast Commenting on the Mont Tremblant Conference," 9 June 1943, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[471] Keenleyside Report, 4. Keenleyside also praised Tarr's leadership of the Canadians, claiming that "I went to the conference confident," but his faith had been exceeded: "I came away convinced that I had greatly underestimated your capacity." See Keenleyside to Tarr, 18 December 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 6, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[472] For the conference's full objectives, see *Security in the Pacific: Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations* (New York: Comet Press, 1945), v.
[473] Tarr to Cavell, 4 October 1944, R2849, vol. 3, file 8, CIIA fonds, LAC.

the performance at the same or a higher level, and hope that you will be just as anxious as we are to do that."[474] Nor was Tarr the only one looking to involve as many Ottawa mandarins as possible. In September, William Holland wrote to Keenleyside with a brazen request:

> As you probably know, Herbert Norman has been doing a little writing for us on the feudal background of Japanese politics and we have published part of his manuscript as an article on the Gen'yōsha in the current issue of *Pacific Affairs*.[475] I have written strongly urging him to continue his work so that this whole or a large part of the study could be submitted as a paper to the I.P.R. conference in January. […] I am writing this note to ask whether you could do anything to assure the completion of the study in time for the conference, perhaps by seeing that Norman is given the time to work on it, particularly during his office hours. […] If it were necessary, we should probably be glad to contribute something to Norman's salary in order to give him a little more time to work on his manuscript. I realize that because of Norman's position as a government servant he can't discuss Japanese politics as thoroughly as he might desire to. I hope, however, that he will be given reasonable freedom to show how the feudal survivals in Japan influence the present political setup and how they are likely to influence the post-war Japanese government and society. From our point of view the more Norman can point a moral of this sort the more useful his study will be. I do hope you will do what you can to see that he has a fair degree of liberty in this respect. I have not told Norman that I am writing you and I hope you will forgive me if I am committing a breach of departmental etiquette.[476]

Amazingly, Keenleyside was remarkably conciliatory to this bold appeal. Admitting that he would "very much like to do anything possible to assist the Institute," Keenleyside reported that as Norman was being groomed for a larger role in the Far Eastern Division at External, it was unlikely he would have more free time as a result.[477] More than anything, this act demonstrates the profound respect that both External and the IPR had for Norman's abilities as a scholar of Japan during the Pacific War. Still, this rebuff did not rule out Norman attending the conference itself. By December

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[474] Tarr to Robertson, 16 October 1944, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[475] See E. Herbert Norman, "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs*, 17, no. 3 (September 1944): 261-284. Literally, the "Dark Ocean Society," this was a Pan-Asianist, ultranationalist lobbying group founded in 1881 by Tōyama Mitsuru, who was also founder of a related ultranationalist group, the Kokuryūkai (the "Black Dragon Society"). Both organizations would be outlawed by the Americans during the postwar occupation. For a modern analysis of these organizations, see Sven Saaler, "The Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism in Japan, 1901–1925," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (July 2014): 125-160.
[476] Holland to Keenleyside, 13 September 1944, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[477] Keenleyside to Holland, 15 September 1944, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

1944, an exhilarated Tarr had successfully booked Keenleyside, Angus, Norman, and Arthur Menzies for at least part of the conference—all ranked as "full members of the Canadian group"—and had even "taken the liberty of asking Escott Reid" to sit on their bench as well.[478] Finally, Tarr had assembled the Asian affairs dream team that he had first envisaged for Mont Tremblant.

With such a distinguished cohort of Canadian officials travelling to Virginia, expectations were high in Ottawa. "The Institute of Pacific Relations is having its biannual meeting next week," Norman Robertson informed Prime Minister W.L.M. King in January. "In view of the character of the United States, United Kingdom and Chinese groups, it should be a very useful opportunity for some of our people to find out what they are thinking about problems of post war Pacific relationships."[479] This expenditure of External manpower would prove to be more than justified. Writing after the conference was over, University of Toronto historian Edgar McInnis—who had also attended with the Canadian group—wrote to thank Robertson "for your generosity in making so many members of the Department available as delegates to Hot Springs":

> I need hardly say how great an advantage it was to have people like Angus and Keenleyside as members of the Canadian delegation; and the fact they were immediately seized on as chairman of Round Tables was a testimony to their standing at the Conference. I think I should make particular reference to the excellent impression which both Norman and Menzies made in the discussions. I heard numerous references to the soundness and value of their contributions—in fact one of the lads from the State Department frankly expressed a wish that he could steal them for Washington. I'm satisfied that the calibre of the Canadian delegation as a whole would bear comparison with that of any other national group at the Conference, and that is largely due to the soundness and ability of our membership from External Affairs.[480]

The Canadians were in good company. "On the whole," Escott Reid concurred, "the calibre of the delegations was on a higher level than at the two previous conferences I attended in 1933 and

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[478] Tar to Robertson, 15 December 1944; Keenleyside to Tarr, 16 December 1944; Tarr to Keenleyside, 18 December 1944, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC; Tarr to Edgar McInnis, 19 December 1944, R2849, vol. 3, file 8, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[479] N.A.R., "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 4 January 1945, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[480] McInnis to Robertson, 23 January 1945, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

1936."[481] Ultimately, while Hot Springs may have been effectively a large "talk shop," it was an influential one held to a very high standard, and one the Canadians did much to elevate.

As for its contribution to Hot Springs, the CIIA authored four policy papers, including one by Arthur Lower on "Canada and the Pacific After the War." These were in addition to Herbert Norman's much awaited "Feudal Background of Japanese Politics," which was submitted under the IPR's International Secretariat.[482] At the meeting itself, the delegates were divided on the future of Japan. There were, Norman noted in his report for External, two main schools of thought, which he called the "status quo" and "no return to the past" views. While both accepted the 1943 Cairo Declaration stripping Japan of its ill-gotten conquests, the first school thought "Japanese politics were mysterious and irrational." As a result, its adherents shrank "from any attempt to experiment with a new Japan which departs from the traditional pattern of Emperor, courtiers, bureaucracy, and above all, the Zaibatsu." This view was favoured by the British delegation, as well as American official Eugene Dooman, a close confident of the ex-US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew. The contrary position, shared by the American delegates plus their Australian, Canadian, and Chinese colleagues, was for a systematic purge of the Japanese government "from the Emperor down to all war guilty officers and civilians." As Norman was writing an official report, his private views were not indicated, but his sympathy for the second school is clear given that it held "there was evidence that the Japanese people were far more mature politically than was generally believed."[483] As

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[481] Escott Reid, "Memorandum: Hot Springs Conference…," 1, 17 January 1945, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

[482] See A.R.M. Lower, *Canada and the Pacific After the War* (Toronto: CIIA, 1944); E.H. Norman, "Feudal Background of Japanese Politics," in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman*, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 317-464. For the full listing of papers submitted, including those by the Canadians, see *Security in the Pacific*, 146-148.

[483] E.H.N., "Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations…," 2, 23 January 1945, R219, vol. 2929, file 2837-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Sasaki, "Foreign Policy Experts," 300-302. Indeed, few Canadians supported Dooman's views on Japan. In November 1944, Hugh Keenleyside visited Washington for talks with him and other US officials and was soon "depressed by Dooman's recital. His attitude toward Japan was bellicose without being constructive; dogmatic but not clear; positive but unchecked by critical scepticism." See Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:185-187.

Menzies later told the CIIA's Kingston branch, while a few delegates were "willing to deal with a Japanese regime which would include present ruling groups for the sake of obtaining an assurance of early stability," most "regarded all the military and the important industrialists as partners in Japanese aggression[,] urged radical political and economic changes and expressed the hope that democratic Japanese groups might emerge to assume leadership in building a peace-minded Japan."[484] In the end, this is exactly what the Americans did in Japan, and Norman assisted in this task while serving with the US occupation forces (see Chapter 5). As Dayna Barnes notes, the American delegates at Hot Springs also accepted the notion Norman had encouraged in "Feudal Background" about limiting the power of the zaibatsu and pursuing agrarian reform, both of which were eventually conducted during the early phases of the occupation (see Chapter 7).[485]

Canada's contribution to both wartime IPR conferences proved significant and, in many ways, unduly influential. As one Canadian Hot Springs delegate—likely Nik Cavell—concluded, before the war "such a conference would have been inconceivable." Yet, the exercise proved that "private citizens coming together from many parts of the world could seriously discuss affairs of state."[486] The decision to hold the IPR meetings and other wartime brain trust gatherings, historians agree, was of major value to wartime policymakers in all Allied countries. "Attendees," in Barnes words, "could both provide representations of current thinking and bring new ideas from other conference attendees back into the policy circles in which they worked. Conference materials were retained for government use, and delegates had access to important official documents brought to the conferences."[487] The ability of meetings like those of the IPR, scholar Yutaka Sasaki concurs,

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[484] A.R.M., "The Hot Springs Conference," 6, 19 February 1945, R15615, vol. 29, file 8, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. For the general conclusion of the round table on Japan, see *Security in the Pacific*, chapter 2.
[485] Barnes, *Architects of Occupation*, 81. As historian Takemae Eiji has argued, the postwar land reform was "one of the most ambitious and successful initiatives of the Occupation … a peaceful agrarian revolution that swept aside pre-modern social relations and transformed the Japanese countryside." See Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 339-344.
[486] *Security in the Pacific*, 134-135.
[487] Barnes, *Architects of Occupation*, 81-82.

to seriously debate "divergent views on the peace settlements with Japan was a great asset in a democratic formulation of foreign policies in a time of war."[488] And along with the academic and diplomatic credentials of Henry Angus, Escott Reid, and the three Far Eastern Mandarins in supporting the conferences, Edgar Tarr's role in raising Canada's involvement in Asian affairs cannot be underestimated. In Priscilla Roberts's words, during his 20 years as president, "Tarr made the CIIA into an instrument that championed Canadian national autonomy and sought a greater role for Canada in international affairs." His influence, and that of the CIIA, also "revealed the porosity and imprecision of the boundaries in Canada between the state and non-state realms," with the institute also serving—as Escott Reid exemplifies—as "a fruitful recruiting ground" for External.[489] By 1945, Ottawa's thinking on and engagement with Asian affairs was thus far more robust that it had been in 1940 when Herbert Norman and Arthur Menzies were first recruited.

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"No doubt the war in the Pacific resulted in a diffusion of knowledge about countries in that area that made the efforts of the I.P.R. look small indeed," Henry Angus conceded modestly in his autobiography many years after the war. "But the Institute did not deserve the reproach of being a front for Communism."[490] Indeed, one of the many ironies of the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security's (SISS's) charge in 1952 that the IPR was "a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives," was that no Soviets had attended the conferences at Mont Tremblant and Hot Springs.[491] Despite repeated entreaties by Edward Carter to involve them—including by taking the issue up with the famously magnanimous and Western-oriented Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinov, in 1942—the

[488] Sasaki, "Foreign Policy Experts," 324.
[489] Roberts," Tweaking the Lion's Tail," 653.
[490] Angus, "Autobiography," 330.
[491] *Institute of Pacific Relations: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), 225.

Soviet IPR Council, as the IPR's official account of the Hot Spring's meeting observed, "has been prevented principally by the fact that the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan."[492] Not willing to threaten Moscow's non-aggression pact with Tokyo before the Nazi menace was finally beaten, the Soviets sat on the sidelines of both the IPR and the Pacific War until its final days.

Nevertheless, in the fevered years of the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the Korean War ongoing and China "lost" to Mao's Communists, the idea that a Pacific-facing group like the IPR might be riddled with communists and fellow travellers was an easy sell to frightened Americans, and ensuring that these people would be named, shamed, and compelled to repent and state their co-conspirators was SISS's raison d'être. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy assailed the IPR's Philip Jessup as a supporter of communism, an allegation quickly latched onto by McCarthy's confederates. Finally, from July 1951 to June 1952, the SISS took up the IPR's own culpability. Illegally seizing Edward Carter's private papers from a barn in Massachusetts, SISS began its dive into the alleged communist infiltration of the United States, especially by looking for those responsible for the "loss" of China.[493] John Fairbank was put on the stand.[494] So too was Owen Lattimore, whom SISS singled out for special interrogation.[495] And, on 7 August 1951, Orientalist Karl Wittfogel testified before SISS that when a left-wing study group had existed at Harvard in the late 1930s, there was "a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese Department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman."[496] At first, few accepted these claims. At

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[492] *Security in the Pacific*, vi. For the behind-the-scenes lobbying to get the Soviets involved at both conferences, see Carter to Litvinoff, 3 November 1942; Litvinoff to Carter, 5 November 1942, R2849, vol. 3, file 4, CIIA fonds, LAC; Carter to Tarr, 7 December 1944, R2849, vol. 3, file 8, CIIA fonds, LAC. For Litvinov's tenure as US ambassador and his attempt to build a "Grand Alliance" with the Western Allies during the Second World War, see Geoffrey Roberts, "Litvinov's Lost Peace, 1941–1946," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 27-31.
[493] David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 314-317.
[494] For his experiences of McCarthyism, see Fairbank, *Chinabound*, chapter 25.
[495] Caute, *The Great Fear*, 317-321.
[496] *Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the International Security Act…*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 318.

his SISS hearing, a defiant Edward Carter denounced Wittfogel's testimony as a "slanderous attack on Mr. Norman."[497] In Ottawa, Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson dismissed the charges as "unimpressive and unsubstantiated." Norman himself, already back from Tokyo to be probed over his communist ties (see Chapter 5), wrote a private memo for External explaining his side of the story, one eventually accepted even as his name continued to be raised in Washington.[498]

Yet, these charges would not go away. Norman had been named quite conspicuously as a communist, and instead of playing the game and publicly recanting his beliefs as he was expected to do, Norman denied the accusation. And, as the SISS ruefully noted in its final report on the IPR, while he had been "Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses," Norman was "Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena."[499] What had begun as a rewarding relationship to get his PhD dissertation published was rapidly becoming a fight for Norman's reputation and—as it transpired—his life. "Over a quarter of a century," John Fairbank noted in his memoirs, "the IPR had issued about 1,200 books and pamphlets in 116,000 pages plus 18,500 pages of periodical articles." Now, the SISS had condemned it as pro-communist by referencing "less than 2 percent of this output (5 books, 5 pamphlets, 21 articles, and 6 book reviews)," the scrutiny of which included Norman's *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*.[500] It was, as Fairbank concluded, "a great fishing expedition. It thoroughly muddied the waters, broke some careers, and perhaps inspired a suicide, but it didn't catch many Communist fish."[501]

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[497] *IPR: Hearings*, 1:450.
[498] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 243-246.
[499] *IPR: Report*, 156.
[500] The IPR's decision to publish *Japan's Emergence* was explained to the SISS by William Holland on 10 October 1951. See *Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the International Security Act…*, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 1153-1154.
[501] Fairbank, *Chinabound*, 336-337.

Chapter 3: In at the Kill: Canada's Pacific Pivot, 1944–1945

> *"Assuming that before the European phase of the war is concluded Canada will need to plan a further contribution to the war in the Pacific—a proportional contribution will certainly be expected of us—the question arises as to just where and how this contribution can be most effectively made in the light of our geo-strategical interests."*
>
> — Arthur Menzies, ca. 1944[502]

> *"The Japanese have taken second place to the Germans in our minds simply because, as yet we haven't had them on the sharp ends of our bayonets."*
>
> — Canadian Army Intelligence Bulletin, May 1945[503]

All Gordon Eligh wanted was a shave. Yet again, the red-headed Canadian Army captain from Vancouver had found his daily routine disturbed by the arrival of Japanese kamikazes, which circled over Okinawa looking for targets among the island's American forces, shaking plaster from the roof of his commandeered house as they crashed. "Damn the Japs!" he muttered casually as he and fellow Canadian Samuel Simon continued their grooming next to concealed artillery belonging to the US Marine unit that they and eight other observers had been attached to in April 1945. "They're worse than the Jerries. Always catch me shaving, with my helmet full of water." A veteran of the Italian Campaign, Eligh had been sent to the Pacific to help Canada plan for its own forthcoming contribution to the Pacific War: "a role still not fully disclosed or developed," as *Maclean's* journalist James Maclean reminded his readers on 1 July 1945.[504] By the time his article had gone to print, Eligh and ten other observers had already returned home to report on the difficult conditions in the Pacific. "The Japs just aren't going to quit," Eligh informed waiting journalists in Vancouver. "Jap prisoners we saw there always were amazed that they were alive at all."[505]

First proposed by General Maurice Pope in 1943, Eligh was only one of the Canadian Army observers now reporting to Ottawa.[506] Another Canadian on Okinawa was Captain Willard Estey,

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[502] "Question for Canadian Geopoliticians," [1944?], R15615, vol. 29, file 8, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[503] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 2 (May 1945): 6, R112, vol. 20538, file 982.023, DNDF, LAC.
[504] James A. Maclean, "We Learned on Okinawa," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 July 1945, 13, 47.
[505] "Vancouver Officer Tells of Fighting on Okinawa," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 12 May 1945, 5.
[506] "Report No. 16: The Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944–1945," paragraphs 35-39, 15 July 1947, DHH.

attached to the US Army. In August, he submitted a report about adapting Canadian military units to American standards with "a view to ultimate Canadian Army participation in this theater." This was an important consideration if the Canadians, hitherto trained to British Army doctrine, invaded Japan alongside the Americans, a plausible scenario before the completion of the atomic bomb.[507] Interviewed in 1977 after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Estey recalled his "peculiar" war fondly. Sitting on the staff of the US 10th Army under General "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell, the young Canadian listened as the voluble Stillwell "cussed the British in Burma and cussed the British for supporting Chiang Kai-Shek, and he called Chiang Kai-Shek a liar, and he cussed Roosevelt… he went on for hours." Otherwise, Estey too had a "box office seat" to the Kamikazes, even joining B-24 Liberator bombing runs, although these were always uneventful—"never saw a Jap fighter except on the ground." Only postwar did Estey realize what an "amazing experience" he had.[508]

To most historians who discuss the topic, the fact that the European struggle to defeat Adolf Hitler was the "real war" for Canadians is made so often that it approaches cliché. "The fighting in the Pacific theatre continued through the summer [of 1945]," J.L. Granatstein observed in 1975, "but this war was not one that greatly concerned Canadians, nor were many Canadian servicemen involved in the fighting. Europe had been the locale for Canada's War, and with its successful conclusion peace returned."[509] The war might not have strictly ended until September 1945, Robert Bothwell concurred thirty years later, "but as far as most Canadians were concerned the real war finished in Europe in May with the surrender of Germany."[510] Given that the majority of Canada's

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[507] Willard Z. Estey, "Canadian Observers Report," 1, August 1945, R112, vol. 10719, file 218U10.013 (D1), DNDF, LAC. For the history of how the Canadian Army had been steadily fashioned to integrate with British and Imperial army units in the first half of the twentieth century, see Douglas E. Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and India, 1902–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[508] Interview with Willard Estey, 20-27, 24 December 1979 and 5 March 1981, R927, vol. 6718, part 1, Supreme Court of Canada fonds, LAC.
[509] J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939–1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 419.
[510] Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945–1984* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 10.

war potential was devoted to Europe and not the Pacific, such an assertion seems hard to contradict. Yet, I argue there are limits to how far historians may take these claims. True, Canadian interests in defeating Japan were less than those for defeating Germany, but can historians go as far as writer Leslie Roberts in claiming that "No matter what the statements were made for the benefit of the public, Canadians did not take the Japanese war seriously after the defeat of Germany"?[511] Despite the apparent common sense of this claim, this chapter argues, in fact, that there was more Canadian interest in defeating Japan than is generally assumed. Indeed, I argue that many Canadians *did* take the Pacific War seriously, both before and after VE Day. Further, the statements by Ottawa to this effect were not mere window dressing for its Allies or vague platitudes for domestic consumption, but part of a serious effort to remind Canadians that the global war would continue even after the fall of Berlin. Indeed, given that both Granatstein and Bothwell have argued elsewhere that Prime Minister W.L.M. King's rationale to join the war in 1939 was based largely on Canada's "self-evident national duty" towards Britain, devoid of any real hatred of Nazism or interest in shaping European affairs, one might wonder if Ottawa thought it similarly "self-evident" that it was duty-bound to aid its US and British allies where the Pacific War was concerned?[512]

Part of the rationale for this argument likely lies in the seemingly farcical and half-hearted contribution that Canada did make to the Pacific War. The fact that Japanese forces had covertly retreated from Kiska before the joint Canadian-American Operation Cottage in August 1943 is one example.[513] The decision by HMCS *Uganda*'s crewmen to vote themselves out of the war in July 1945 was yet another.[514] But the crowning example of such apparent fecklessness is generally cited

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[511] Leslie Roberts, *C.D.: The Life and Times of Clarence Decatur Howe* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1957), 149.
[512] See J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, "A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935–1939," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 3, no. 2 (January 1975): 212-233. See also the version in J.L. Granatstein, *Canada at War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), chapter 7.
[513] See Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 1.
[514] For this incident, see Bill Rawling, "Paved with Good Intentions: HMCS *Uganda*, the Pacific War, and the Volunteer Issue," *Canadian Military History* 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 23-33.

as Colonel Lawrence Moore Cosgrave's error at the Japanese surrender ceremony onboard the USS *Missouri* in September 1945, where Canada's military attaché to Australia signed under (not above) the Canadian line on the surrender document, forcing all who followed to sign one line lower. "Cosgrove [*sic*] for Canada, like Merkel for N.Y., failed to touch 2nd base," the watching Joseph Stilwell moaned to his dairy. "It was terrible."[515] This was not helped, Stilwell added, by the fact that Cosgrave—in his mind, at least—looked more like "an elderly masher or gigolo type" than a career military officer.[516] Later writers have been no more kind. This "Monty Python-like episode" as journalist Ken Cuthbertson joked in a popular history, ensured Canada's involvement in the war came to "a decidedly anti-climatic—and mildly amusing—end."[517] "Cosgrave's blunder symbolized much about Canada's approach to Asian affairs," historian John Meehan concurred. After all, unlike the Americans, "its role in the Pacific War had been tentative and ad hoc."[518] While a relatively inconsequential mistake by a decorated First World War officer who was blind in one eye, the gaffe's legacy to both Cosgrave and Canada would prove a lasting one.[519]

Despite such errors, I argue here that Canadians spent more time and energy debating their nation's role in the Pacific War than is often claimed. Rather, it seems clear that most Canadians, both inside and outside the government, agreed that Canada needed to make a military contribution to the Pacific War's endgame. When a July 1945 opinion poll asked if Canadians felt Ottawa was "doing all she should" in the war—by which point Ottawa had already agreed to contribute naval, land, and air assets to the final drive against Japan—67% of respondents agreed, while another

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[515] Rookie baseball player Fred Merkle of the New York Giants infamously made a failed run to second base during a game against the Chicago Cubs in September 1908 that cost his team the match, for which he received the derisive nickname "bonehead."
[516] Joseph Stilwell dairy, entry 2 September 1945, 51001.56, Joseph Warren Stilwell papers, Hoover Institution.
[517] Ken Cuthbertson, *1945: The Year That Made Modern Canada* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2020), 308-310.
[518] John D. Meehan, *Chasing the Dragon in Shanghai: Canada's Early Relations with China, 1858–1952* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 154-155.
[519] For Cosgrave's tarnished legacy, see Murray Brewster, "The Man Who Skipped a Line," *Legion Magazine*, September/October 2021, 46-51. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 2.

17% thought Ottawa "should do more" and only 6% thought it was "doing too much."[520] The more pertinent issue, as Arthur Menzies noted, was the form this contribution would take given Canada's "geo-strategical interests." In the first half of this chapter, I investigate how Canadians debated escalating their nation's role in the Pacific War starting in 1944. Here, the rationales ranged from the need to support its allies, a sense of military duty, a desire to avenge the loss of Hong Kong, as well as the argument that Canada was a rising "Pacific power" that could benefit by being in at the kill, this last view pushed by both Menzies and Hugh Keenleyside. In the second section, we will see how debates for contributing to the war against Japan played out within the armed forces after the Quebec Conference of September 1944, as Canada's military establishment drafted plans for what became the Canadian Army Pacific Force (CAPF), along with supporting deployments by the Royal Canadian Airforce (RCAF) and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). In the end, it was the political concerns of Prime Minister King that restrained Canada's commitment to the Pacific War, not a lack of civilian resolve nor any disinterest by military and civilian officials.

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> Get off the train at Vancouver some fine summer morning, look across the harbour to the mountains; go out to Point Grey where you can see a stretch of sea leading across to the lighthouse on Point Atkinson and the mountains of Howe Sound in the background; note the loveliness of the flowers and the forest. Anyone who can do that and not be a bit overwhelmed by the beauty of it is a peculiar person. And most people will add to appreciation of the scenery a little thrill of pride when they recollect that it is part of their own country, that as Canadians they have their personal share in that part of the world.[521]

So proclaimed Arthur Lower in an article published for *Canadian Affairs*, a series of informational pamphlets published by the Wartime Information Board (WIB) in November 1943 and tellingly

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[520] CIPO, "Majority of Canadian People Think Our Pacific Contribution Adequate," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 21 July 1945, 3. The majority of those unsatisfied with Canada's role against Japan supported the Conservatives (28%) and, to a lesser extent, the CCF (18%) compared to the reigning Liberals (12%). Still, while only 6% of all Canadians thought that Ottawa was doing too much against Japan, that number jumped to 20% in anti-conscription Quebec.

[521] A.R.M. Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," *Canadian Affairs* 1, no. 13 (1 November 1943): 1. The original draft of Lower's piece can be found in his papers at Queen's University (F01676, box 13, file 52).

entitled "Canada as a Pacific Power." Surveying the history of Canada's presence in the Asia-Pacific going back to the nineteenth century—noting the arrival of first Chinese and then Japanese migrants to the Dominion in the years that followed—Lower's focus was "Canada's Stake in the Pacific Today and Tomorrow." "The riddle of the future is naturally Japan," he concluded:

> Whatever we did, here is the crux of the whole question of Canada as a Pacific power: in future do we allow ourselves to become an instrument in reviving Japanese imperialism or do we not? If not, can we work out some solution that is neither sentimental nor selfish but founded on justice? If so, we have contributed greatly to the world's decent future and have justified our fathers when they took the terrific decision to extend Canada from sea to sea—*a mare usque ad mare*, as our coat of arms proudly says—and made Canada into A PACIFIC POWER.[522]

Nor were Lower's arguments perceived as eccentric or soon forgotten. In March 1944, *Canadian Affairs* reprinted Lower's work with new illustrations. In one cartoon, Johnny Canuck peers wide-eyed over the Rocky Mountains, having apparently just discovered that his country overlooks the vast Pacific Ocean.[523] Canada, in Lower's view, had a great Pacific future ahead of it.

Lower was not the only scholar with a background in Asian affairs to write about Canada's stake in the Pacific War during its closing years. In October 1943, Gregory Vlastos at the WIB contacted Arthur Menzies for suggested additions to the second edition of Lower's pamphlet, who duly wrote a new "Questions for Discussion" section that was appended to the end to help stimulate debate. The work was, Menzies thought, "a very useful introduction to the subject," and one that "conforms fairly closely to that adopted in Professor Lower's *Canada and the Far East – 1940*."[524] This was well in tune with Menzies's ongoing effort to further disseminate Canada's interests with Japan and in Asia after his return to Ottawa from the Windsor passport office (see Chapter 2). On 12 January 1944, as part of his intelligence work for External, both he and Herbert Norman visited

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[522] Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," (1943), 6, 9-10.
[523] A.R.M. Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," *Canadian Affairs* 1, no. 4 (1 March 1944): 4.
[524] Menzies to Vlastos, 12 October 1943 and Enclosure, R15615, vol. 29, file 3, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; Menzies to Vlastos, 20 January 1944, R15615, vol. 29, file 8, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Cf. Chapter 2.

the RCN's Operational Intelligence Centre for a series of talks about the Pacific War. In this first seminar, Menzies—considering "Canada and Security in the Pacific"—reviewed the four national "security systems" facing Japan: British, American, Russian, and Chinese. "I concluded by trying to show how the war was linking all four of these systems together more closely," Menzies wrote his family, "and suggested that Canada's best interests would be served by the still closer binding together of these security systems for the preservation of peace in the Pacific in the future."[525] On 3 May, he and Norman concluded their lectures with a roundtable on "Peace Conference Problems in the Pacific," having "some lively arguments." The following night, Menzies discussed the same subject with students at Carleton College for a class run by political scientist Robert Mackay.[526]

A few months later, Menzies was contacted by the Canadian Legion's John Robbins. As part of their education work for soldiers overseas, Robbins was commissioning a set of "Guides to Reading" that would offer a brief outline of a topic along with a selection of authoritative books for further study. As some studies dealt with "various countries or groups of countries," and given Menzies background, Robbin's thought he was the right person to write one on "the Far East."[527] Yet, even in such an ostensibly neutral forum, Menzies wanted to force Canadians to grapple with Asian affairs. "I have taken a somewhat argumentative approach to the subject," Menzies admitted in October, as he presented his draft to Robbins, "in the hope that it might arouse some interest on the part of the readers."[528] While Menzies's *A Guide to Reading the Far East* would be "the longest

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[525] Menzies to Family, 16 January 1944, R15615, vol. 19, file 5, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[526] Menzies to Family, 7 May 1944, R15615, vol. 19, file 5, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Menzies and Norman would also be tapped by External to give numerous lectures and briefings across Canada and the United States during the war. In late 1943, for example, both were invited to New York's Columbia University where they each gave four lectures to the new School of Civil Administration of Occupied Territories for US navy officers. Menzies, for his part, gave a long talk on the state of the Japanese economy. See N.A.R., "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 4 August 1943, R10383, reel H-1534, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; A.R. Menzies, "An Estimate of Japan's Present Economic Position with Reference to Certain Important Raw Materials and the Related Industries," September 1943, R15615, vol. 28, file 11, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[527] Robbins to Menzies, 27 July 1944, R15615, vol. 29, file 3, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[528] Menzies to Robbins, 10 October 1944, R15615, vol. 29, file 3, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

in the Series to date," Robbins had no issue with this given "the timeliness of the subject."[529] From his opening paragraph, Menzies made Canada's future role in the Pacific War transparently clear:

> After Germany has been defeated Canada will turn an important part of her fighting power against Japan. Not until the Japanese enemy has been defeated will we have peace. […] Canadians realize that we must stick at the grim business of war until Japan is beaten. However, because we have concentrated all our effort upon defeating Nazi Germany first, most of us have not had much time to think about the war in the Pacific. And many of us are just a little hazy about why Canada must fight Japan. In the following paragraphs some of the reasons why Canada is fighting Japan will be enumerated.[530]

As part of his selected works for further reading, Menzies not only included the updated edition of Arthur Lower's tract, but also a yet unwritten pamphlet tentatively entitled "Why We Must Defeat Japan" to be written by Hugh Keenleyside and slated "To be published in 1945."[531]

When Keenleyside's pamphlet appeared in February 1945 under the title *What's Japan to Us?*, the end of the European war was in sight. "At the time of writing, allied land and air power is ironing out the last of the Belgian bulge, sending Jerry back in complete rout," the WIB's preface noted, while the Soviet Union's Red Army "is flowing forward like all-consuming lava on a front of hundreds of miles." Yet, while the tide had also turned in the Pacific theatre, there was "still a long, amphibious trail to Tokyo; and all indications are that we'll have to travel it before the war is won everywhere in the world." "Canada is a Pacific power," the WIB reminded readers, and irrespective of "the nature or the extent of our share in the war in the Pacific, we are committed to participate in it. And this is in our own interest, as the article shows."[532] "By their brutal acts we have learned to know the Nazis," Keenleyside claimed in his own introduction. Yet, "most of us know a good deal less about Japan than we do about Germany." Still, Canada had committed itself

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[529] Robbins to Menzies, 13 October 1944, R15615, vol. 29, file 3, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[530] Arthur R. Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East* (Ottawa: Canadian Legion Education Services, 1944), 1. Indeed, in addition to his readers within the Canadian armed forces and the Legion, Menzies later sent copies of his pamphlet to many members of External Affairs, including Norman Robertson, Herbert Norman, Ralph Collins, James McCardle and T.C. Davis. See "Copies Given To," [undated], R15615, vol. 29, file 4, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[531] Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 45.
[532] H.L. Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?" *Canadian Affairs* 2, no. 3 (15 February 1945): 2.

to combating Japan. "We must convince ourselves that the defeat of this Oriental menace is worth the sacrifices that will have to be made," Keenleyside argued. What *was* Japan to Canada? "Japan is a dangerous enemy, and as such must be soundly defeated before Canada can again feel secure in a world at peace."[533] As we shall see, the arguments offered by Menzies and Keenleyside on why Canada should contribute to the defeat of Japan were widely accepted in English Canada and meshed well with opinions already circulating in the press and government propaganda.

Most obviously, there was Hong Kong. Among the 1,500 Canadians that fell into Japanese captivity in December 1941 was Sergeant Frank Ebdon of the Royal Rifles. Badly wounded in the jaw, Ebdon recovered and was eventually sent to the Omine POW camp near Fukuoka in January 1943. Yet, for his wife Nina back in Canada, the initial lack of news made for months of agonized waiting. In January 1942, the Department of National Defence admitted that while it had received no word from Hong Kong, it was reluctant to list anyone missing "until further efforts have been exhausted." "You may rest assured," the Department added, "that on receipt of any particulars respecting the welfare of your husband you will be advised immediately by telegram."[534] In the years that followed, Ebdon was able to exchange only a handful of censored letters with his wife, admitting little more than that "I am alive" and to offer "My love to you my dear and the children."[535] In February 1945, Nina was lucky enough to receive a letter detailing a radio message from her husband that had been intercepted by the United States Navy.[536] When VE Day was finally declared a few months later, there was no celebration at the Ebdon household in the village of Delhi, Ontario, as the town council quickly realized. "Knowing that the end of the war in Europe does not mean the end of the anxiety that has been, and will continue to be yours for the safety of

[533] Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 3-4.
[534] W.E.L. Coleman to Nina Ebdon, 14 January 1942, R2568, vol. 1, file 12, Frank William Ebdon fonds, LAC.
[535] Ebdon to Nina, 2 June 1942, R2568, vol. 2, file 27, Frank William Ebdon fonds, LAC.
[536] T.S. Hare to Ms. F.W. Eddon [*sic*], 13 February 1945, R2568, vol. 1, file 13, Frank William Ebdon fonds, LAC.

your husband," the town's Reeve H.J. Collins wrote comfortingly to Nina, the council had sent her a bouquet of flowers "as a token of our regret and understanding." "We hope," Collins concluded, "that you will be able to draw a great deal of comfort from the knowledge that the entire effort of the United Nations will now be directed against Japan, and that this will hasten your husbands [*sic*] return to you."[537] For C Force and their families, the "real war" was very much still ongoing.

The worries of Nina Ebdon—shared by all C Force families—offer a graphic example of the emotional investment many Canadians had in successfully concluding the Pacific War. If, as historian David Bercuson once argued, "Canada was not a Pacific power and had nothing to do with the long train of events leading to the Japanese assault," leaving many Canadians to wonder why their soldiers "lay in the path of the Japanese juggernaut," then after the battle this point was moot.[538] All that mattered, as MP Howard Green put it in January 1942, was that Canada now had "a score to settle with the Japanese over Hong Kong."[539] The Hong Kong atrocities committed by the Japanese, "have answered the question as to what action we should take," Toronto Rev. James Fleming roused *Globe and Mail* readers in March 1942 (see Chapter 1). "Rise up, Canadians, and remember that when Germany chose a nation like Japan for her ally she chose one like herself, of well-trained brutes." And like Germany, Japan had to be defeated "or your children and mine will live in slavery for generations to come. We must, and we can, smash the enemy."[540] Japan, no less than Germany, was a Canadian enemy and had to be treated accordingly. "Canadians are already fighting Japan," Keenleyside reminded readers of his *What's Japan to Us?* "Nearly two thousand of our men were killed or taken prisoner at Hong Kong."[541] "Canadians remember Hong Kong,"

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[537] Collins to Nina, [May 1945], R2568, vol. 2, file 27, Frank William Ebdon fonds, LAC. Ebdon later donated his papers to LAC, one of the first C Force veterans to do so. Cf. Mark MacMillan, "Former Japanese Prisoner Remembers Years in Camp," *Delhi News Record*, 6 August 1980, a copy of which is in Ebdon's papers, R2568, vol. 2, file 26.
[538] David J. Bercuson, *Our Finest Hour: Canada Fights the Second World War* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2015), 71.
[539] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 1 (29 January 1942): 152.
[540] James Fleming, "Horrors at Hong Kong Should Arose Canada," *Globe and Mail*, 18 March 1942, 6.
[541] Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 3.

Menzies agreed in his own guide. "We have a score to settle there. We are determined to free the Canadian soldiers … and to avenge those who were killed there or who have died since because of inadequate food and medicines and ill treatment from their guards."[542] Indeed, "Remember Hong Kong," quickly became a Canadian battle cry, one cited to encourage recruits to flock to the colours and providing a stark illustration of why Canada had to contribute to Japan's defeat.[543]

In June 1945, an editorial appeared in the *Legionary*, the magazine of the Canadian Legion aimed at both serving military personnel as well as older veterans—no small demographic in Canada by the end of the Second World War. The title was blunt enough: "We Are Still at War":

> V-E Day has come and gone. […] Meanwhile, Victory in Europe does not mean Victory Everywhere. We are still at war, though many Canadians talk and act as if the fight against Japan is just a sideshow with which this country can hardly be expected to concern itself seriously. It may be that the oriental Axis partner can be defeated without military assistance from us, but surely our sense of honour, loyalty and self-respect must demand a different course, not to mention Canada's future standing and prestige among the peoples of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and China.[544]

This highlights a second rationale offered for Canada's participation in the Pacific War: supporting its Pacific allies in a common struggle. Aiding Australia, a fellow member of the Commonwealth, was particularly attractive to Canadians. In February 1942, for instance, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) asked if Canadians would "like to see a force of Canadian soldiers sent to Australia to help defend that country from Japanese attack?" The response was very positive: 55% endorsed the idea, just 31% disagreed, 14% remained undecided.[545] As CIPO interpreted the result, the majority had concluded that "Aussies have been sent to other parts of the world, and now that they are facing attack, we should be ready to help them." Unsurprisingly, CIPO added that while

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[542] Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 3.
[543] See Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 3. As the Canadian Army's Chiefs of Staff phrased it in August 1944, having Canadian soldiers fighting in the North Pacific was important as they would be "represented at the final assault on the Japanese homeland" and would thus be "a means of avenging Hong Kong and restoring Canadian military prestige in the Far East." See Chief of the General Staff to Cabinet War Committee, 23 August 1944, *DCER*, vol. 10, 396-397.
[544] "We Are Still at War," *The Legionary*, June 1945, 27.
[545] And this polling, CIPO noted, was ***before*** the disastrous Japanese carrier raid on Darwin on 19 February.

approval in BC and Alberta was nearly 70%, the rate in Quebec was only 35%. "The whole issue of Canadian help to Australia," it noted, "has been highlighted not only by military developments in the Far East, but by speakers and editorial writers who have discussed the pros and cons of sending aid in the form of either materials or troops."[546] Public support for Australia remained consistent throughout the war, despite sometimes bitter conflict at the official level.[547]

By 1944, Canadian aid to Australia was rising. Having begun supplying the country with materiel aid on an ad hoc basis in 1943, in March 1944, Ottawa signed a Mutual Aid agreement with Canberra. The following year, with the war in Europe over, planned shipments for 1945 and 1946 were being "greatly increased." "Through its mutual aid supplies Canada has helped make possible the hard-fought Australian campaigns in the Solomons and New Britain, New Guinea and North Borneo," a WIB report trumpeted in July 1945, truthfully if with hyperbole. In the summer of 1944, it added, Canadian soldiers had been sent to Australia to assist "in the use and maintenance of Canadian-made technical equipment."[548] In September 1944, this deployment was even raised on a CBS radio show Keenleyside attended with spokesmen from Australia and China on postwar planning to prevent a recurrence of Japanese aggression. "I notice that for the first time since this war began," moderator Lyman Bryson remarked, "a group of Canadian soldiers have just landed in Australia, marking, I suppose, the beginning of another phase of the war." "I'm not in the secrets of the High Command," Australian attendee H.J. Temperly confessed, "but one would hope that they would be the vanguard of the Canadian force,[549] because after all, Canada is as much a Pacific

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[546] CIPO, "Canadians Favor Sending Troops to Aid Australia If Such a Step Feasible," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 25 February 1942, 1-2.

[547] For the less than cordial state of relations between Canberra and Ottawa during the Pacific War, see Galen Roger Perras, "'She Should Have Thought of Herself First': Canada and Military Aid to Australia, 1939–1945," in *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 124-150.

[548] "Canada and the Pacific War," *Reference Papers*, no. 39 (6 July 1945): 17, 11. Cf. "Report No. 16," para. 39-41.

[549] This was not the case. In February 1944, Mackenzie King told London that Canada would fight alongside US forces in the Pacific, not the Australians or British. See Perras, "She Should Have Thought of Herself First," 139-140.

power as Australia is, although that's not always realized." While Keenleyside likely knew the truth of the deployment, he did not dispel the rumour, observing merely that "determination" was needed by the United Nations "to carry this war through to complete and crushing victory."[550]

Nor was Australia the only Pacific power that Canadians voiced support for during the war. China too received its fair share of Canadian sympathy. When Canada and the other Western Allies were thrust into the Pacific War in 1941, appreciation for China's ongoing war of resistance against Japan and praise of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist regime were accepted by most Canadians, while Ottawa quickly extended the country humanitarian aid and military assistance. The National Film Board's 1942 film *Inside Fighting China*, to offer but one example, fulsomely praised both Chiang and the Chinese people for unifying before the Japanese threat in a bid to create a "new" China. Thus, "the old coolie China died," as the narrator explained, "and out of the torment of war, a great young nation arose."[551] This was a conclusion also accepted by Canada's policymaking elite. "Out of the ancient and mature Chinese civilization has been brought forth the Chinese nation," reporter Grant Dexter wrote for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1944. The results of these changes for Canada were clear: "It may be assumed that China will not tolerate anything remotely resembling the position of inferiority which was forced upon her in the past. Extraterritorial rights are gone for good."[552] The results of this goodwill were immediate. In 1942, Canada opened formal diplomatic relations with China, sending Victor Odlum as its first ambassador to the Nationalist wartime capital at Chongqing while Chinese diplomat Liu Shishun arrived in Ottawa.[553] With his fluent Chinese language skills, Menzies was quite at home in this new milieu.[554] On 14 April 1944,

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[550] "Prevention of Aggression: 'Can Japan Be Stopped from Fighting Another War', Program No. 7 – CBS People's Platform," 18, 30 September 1944, a copy of which is in R4217, vol. 20, file 10, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[551] Stuart Legg, *Inside Fighting China* (National Film Board of Canada, 1942).
[552] Dexter Grant, *Canada and the Building of Peace* (Toronto: CIIA, 1944), 36.
[553] Meehan, *Chasing the Dragon*, 142.
[554] In 1943, when China's military attaché to Washington, Xiong Shifei, visited Ottawa (to general Canadian acclaim), Menzies "gained considerable face as I was the only non-Chinese who could speak to the General without an

Canada signed its first treaty with China, renouncing extraterritoriality. To celebrate, a dinner was held at the Chinese Embassy with Menzies, Keenleyside and even Prime Minister King making an unexpected appearance. Toasted by Liu, "Mr. King gave a very good informal speech," Menzies later noted, praising External for its work in the negotiations.[555] Equally dramatic was the war's impact on Chinese-Canadians. As Keenleyside later put it, if Japanese-Canadians on the west coast had become universally reviled, then the Chinese-Canadians "were temporarily popular in British Columbia."[556] Indeed, across Canada, Chinese communities saw their stock rise in the eyes of European-Canadians given Japan's aggression on their ancestral homeland. "By V-J Day," as historian Patricia Roy concludes, "Chinese Canadians had demonstrated their loyalty to Canada by buying Victory Bonds, working in war industries, and volunteering for the armed forces despite initial discouragement," and consequently, had "rekindled their campaign for full citizenship."[557] After all, as the *Ottawa Citizen* opined in 1943, "It is probable that Chinese resistance for ten years prevented Japan from repeating incidents like Mukden [in 1931] much nearer to Canada."[558]

By 1945, this empathy for Australia, China, and Canada's other Pacific allies had helped produce broad support for military participation in the region. "Canada has given her pledge to support her Allies," Menzies wrote in his 1944 Legion guide. "Canadians were moved when in 1942 the position of our sister countries, Australia and New Zealand, was threatened by Japanese aggression." Canadian feelings for China, he argued, were likewise strong:

> We have also had great admiration for China's war of resistance against Japanese aggression which began with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The will to resist of the common people of China together with leadership given the nation by

interpreter." See Menzies to Sheila, 18 February 1943, R15615, vol. 19, file 3, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. See also "China's War Veterans," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 17 February 1943, 20.

[555] Menzies to Family, 16 April 1944, R15615, vol. 19, file 5, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; "Canada, China Sign Treaty of Friendship," *Globe and Mail*, 15 April 1944, 1. Cf. Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 25-26.

[556] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:171.

[557] See Patricia E. Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941–1967* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 185.

[558] "Canada's Debt to China," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 14 June 1943, 24.

> Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has tied down for a long period up to a million Japanese troops; it has kept the Japanese from establishing and developing a strong self-sufficient base in East Asia; it has preserved a land base from which the Allies may attack Japan; and it has bolstered the morale of the peoples of occupied Asia by giving the lie to Japan's claim that she is fighting for "Asia for the Asiatics". We owe it to the Chinese to give them our support until the Japanese have been driven from China.[559]

"It is unthinkable that the democratic powers could desert China and leave Japan in possession of Manchuria and those parts of China proper which she has overrun," Keenleyside agreed in his own pamphlet. "A glance at the record of Japanese rule in conquered areas can only strengthen our vow to break Japan's hold on the people she has enslaved." After all, if left unchecked, "Japan would soon extend her power over all the useful parts of China," and much of Asia as well, leaving Tokyo with all the region's resources as well as a vast population of captive labour. "Neither self-respect nor self-interest will allow us to tolerate such a prospect," Keenleyside concluded.[560]

A final rationale offered for Canadian participation in the final drive against Japan was the one mentioned by Arthur Lower in his pamphlet that was dear to the hearts of all three Far Eastern Mandarins, Canada's growing stature as a Pacific power. "Canada, as a Pacific power, has a special interest in seeing peace speedily restored in the Pacific," Menzies declared in his guide. Moreover, "If Canada, as a growing Pacific power, is going to play a part in bringing about the defeat of Japan she must also be prepared to join in fixing the conditions of peace in the Pacific." Fighting the war, in short, had to precede any Canadian involvement in the postwar peace process.[561] "Canada is a Pacific power," Keenleyside concurred. "As such, we are directly interested in future policies affecting that part of the world. Only by sharing actively in freeing the Pacific can we claim an effective voice in its future." He ended his pamphlet with a passionate and patriotic cri de coeur:

> As a Pacific power, the fourth of the United Nations in military and industrial strength, our responsibility will be large. To meet it as we must, we should have no doubts about

[559] Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 3-5.
[560] Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 11-13.
[561] Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 2, 33.

> why we are fighting—or about what Japan means to us. There can be no doubt about the quality or measure of our action. When Canadians have found it necessary to fight in the past, they have not failed. They will not fail against Japan.[562]

Far from being the platitudes of a handful of External eggheads, by 1944, even this claim had significant public support. Indeed, more than anything, it was the rise of a Japanese threat to Canada in 1941 that had helped convinced Canadians that they now had important interests in Asia. "Canada as a Pacific power should be taking part in the war against Japan now," Vancouver Conservative MP Howard Green argued when appropriations for the RCN were tabled in March 1944. "As a Pacific power we cannot afford to stay out of the fight and allow those other nations to fight Japan for us." A forceful advocate for expanding Canadian defences against Japan in 1942 (see Chapter 1), Green was now convinced that "special preparation should be made now against the day when Canada really goes into the war with Japan." While he received pushback from Navy Minister Angus Macdonald, this had more to do with Ottawa's desire to concentrate forces to win the war against Germany rather than any sense that Canada had no stake in the Pacific War.[563]

That the Pacific War affected Canada was also stated by many allies. In January 1944, Field Marshall Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, visited Canada.[564] An outspokenly Anglo-Irish general, Dill's first public address was at Toronto's Irish Protestant Benevolent Society, attended by local notables including city Mayor F.J. Conboy and Ontario Lieutenant-Governor Albert Matthews. Opening with a warning to not count Germany out of the war just yet, Dill immediately pivoted to note that its defeat did not mean the end of the war. After Germany "crashes to her fall," he cautioned, "we shall still have those treacherous spalpeens, the

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[562] Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 13, 15.
[563] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 2 (16 March 1944): 1518-1525; "Green Asks Action in Pacific Fight," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 17 March 1944, 10.
[564] Dispatched to Washington in December 1941, Dill developed a close relationship with George Marshall and grew to become a trusted intermediary between the British and Americans. For his career, see Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field-Marshall Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941–44* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986).

Japanese to destroy. You are, like Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain a Pacific power, and you in Canada can know no real peace till those treacherous Japanese, whom we once befriended, are laid by the heels."[565] That declaration, the *Kingston Whig-Standard* editorialized after Dill visited the city's Royal Military College, should "receive widespread publicity" as it would "do something to counteract complacency over the course of the war in Europe":

> To some people [the paper added], the description of Canada as a "Pacific power" may seem a trifle exaggerated. To others—and we hope they are in the majority—it will come as deserved recognition of the tremendously increased status of the Dominion. […] Even if we so desired, we cannot escape the responsibility which is the natural accompaniment of this eminence. The war in the Pacific is—or should be—a matter of equal moment to the Dominion with the war in Europe. For in the Pacific this country has a coastline more open to attack than any other it possesses. The accident of geography has given Canada equal concern with the Pacific angle of the war as with any other. It is something to keep in mind when discussions arise about an early end to [the] war.[566]

As the European war careened towards its bloody finale in 1944, Canadians were thus receiving clear signals from Ottawa officialdom, politicians, the press, and even some foreign observers that their country had a role to play in the final drive against Japan. "We are a Pacific power; the Pacific is part of our show," *Maclean's* influential editor Blair Fraser summarized events for his readers after the Quebec Conference in October 1944, and its obligations were clear: "We've started a job that won't be finished until the Jap is beaten, and Canadians don't quit unfinished jobs."[567]

By 1945, all these claims had reached such a level of common sense that some Canadians were growing dissatisfied with the Liberal government's seemingly diffident prosecution of the war. On 2 March, King delivered a radio broadcast on the state of the war and his thoughts for an upcoming federal election.[568] Yet, as reporter R.T. Bowman opined from Washington, the speech's

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[565] "Irish Protestants Honor Sir John Dill at Lunch," *Toronto Daily Star*, 25 January 1944, 16; "Germany Has 'Lot in Her Yet,' Declares Dill," *Globe and Mail*, 27 January 1944, 4.
[566] "Canada is a Pacific Power," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 28 January 1944, 4. Other papers would pick up and support the *Whig-Standard's* commentary. See "Canada: Pacific Power," *Brantford Expositor*, 8 February 1944, 4.
[567] Blair Fraser, "Our War with Japan," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 October 1944, 6.
[568] W.L.M. King, "Nation-Wide Broadcast by the Prime Minister of Canada…," 2 March 1945, R10383, reel H-3038, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.

"constant suggestion that the war will be over and [Canadian] troops be able to return home when Germany is beaten will not be welcomed here." After all, "American troops in Europe are to be transferred to the Pacific." As Bowen added, to Canadians in the US capital, it seemed "incredible" that King "should have made no mention of the war in the Pacific, or indicated that Canada planned to play her part in it." Several clippings of Bowen's critical article, widely reprinted in the Southam newspapers, were provided to the prime minister.[569] Other Canadians agreed. On 5 April 1945, the *Ottawa Citizen*'s popular public diarist Ernest Harrold (see Chapter 1) spent his morning:

> Reading what I could of the Prime Minister's declaration upon our policy with respect to the Japanese war, which seems to be a policy lacking in integrity, for we, of our own free will, declared war on Japan, but will not treat that war as being on a like footing to the war against Germany, and only volunteers are to be sent, from among the men who have fought overseas mainly, while 40 thousand draftees will stay at home.[570]

"It is as important to this country as a Pacific power to have Japan completely defeated as it is to the United States," the *Globe and Mail* lectured readers in May. "Yet so far," it scolded, "we have been told virtually nothing about the part to be taken in the war. … We do not yet know the extent of the Japanese war, how long it will take to defeat the enemy which has already proved its deadly skill." But surely, even if Canada's Army was to contribute a single division to the war, "the only fair way to get it is by use of the draft."[571] If they were not needed in Europe, the popular attitude in English Canada essentially ran, then the NRMA conscripts should be sent to fight in Asia.

This was a step too far for the prime minister. Having just weathered the 1944 Conscription Crisis, King was not going to send the "Zombies" to fight in Asia.[572] Indeed, even before the crisis,

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[569] R.T. Bowman, "King Ignores Jap War; U.S. May Resent that," *Winnipeg Tribune*, 3 March 1945; "R.T. Bowman, "King Speech Causes Stir in U.S.," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 3 March 1945, copies of which can be found in R10383, reel H-3038, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.

[570] E.W. Harrold, *The Diary of Our Own Pepys: E.W. Harrold's Record of Canadian Life*, ed. I Norman Smith (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947), 286.

[571] "What of the Pacific War?" *Globe and Mail*, 14 May 1945, 6.

[572] For the outcome of the Conscription Crisis, see J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), chapter 6; and Daniel Byers, *Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), chapter 8.

King was privately unenthusiastic of any Canadian role in the Pacific War. On 5 January 1944, he lamented to Air Minister C.G. Power that "there was really no place for sending any army over the Pacific," and groused that Canadians were unlikely to obtain any credit from its allies by doing so. Still, as he grudgingly admitted, Canada had "an obligation to share" in Japan's downfall.[573] Yet, despite these usual vacillations, King remained an incisive reader of Canadian public opinion and was quickly pulled along over the following months by the pace of events. On 11 August 1944, a young first-term Conservative MP from Saskatchewan named John Diefenbaker quizzed King in the House over "the determination of Canada to continue in this war until the destruction not only of Germany but also of Japan is achieved." Would the Canadian soldiers now serving in France and Italy be used against Japan, Diefenbaker asked? Discussing specifics was not possible at that time, King predictably hedged to the expectant MPs:

> But this I will say, as is well understood, that the government has always assumed and said that the armed forces of Canada would be used to the end of the war, whether against the enemy in Europe or against the enemy in Asia, and that it is well known to be the policy of the government that our armed forces will continue to take their part in the war against Japan. […] I would make it perfectly clear that the policy of the government is to see that our appropriate part is taken in the war against Japan to the very close of the war.[574]

This quote was latched onto by both Menzies and Keenleyside in their respective pamphlets. "That is our official position, as stated by our leaders," Keenleyside glossed the report. "If we Canadians are to do our job properly, it is essential that we take a clear look at Japan and the Japanese."[575] A *real* Pacific power, after all, was up to date on its regional interests and responsibilities.

But this broader enthusiasm for the Pacific War did not mean that all Canadians favoured their country's involvement. In April 1945, Maxime Raymond, an ex-Liberal MP who had left the

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[573] Galen Roger Perras, "No Need to Send an Army Across the Pacific: Mackenzie King and the Pacific Conflict, 1939–45," in *Mackenzie King: Citizenship and Community*, eds. John English, Kenneth McLaughlin, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002), 124.
[574] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 6 (11 August 1944): 6265, 6270.
[575] Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 4. See also Menzies, *A Guide to Reading the Far East*, 1.

party over the Conscription Crisis to lead the new Bloc Populaire Canadien, argued in the House that he failed "to understand that ambition of the Prime Minister who would like Canada to fight everywhere, on land, on the seas, in the air, in every country where there is a war going on, when he knows the price will be the ruin of his own country." "I want our Pacific coast to be protected," he averred, "but I am against sending our forces thousands of miles away to fight in the Pacific, where we have no interests to protect."[576] For the Quebec anti-conscriptionists, Raymond's views likely held wide appeal,[577] and they were gleefully quoted by Japanese propagandists as evidence that Canadians were "obviously too war-wearied to battle against the Imperial Nippon forces" and were loath to incur the heavy casualties the Americans had already suffered against them.[578]

Yet, even among French-Canadians, there were shades of opinion. What galled influential Quebecois journalist Omer Héroux was not that Canada would fight in the Pacific War, but rather that King had seemingly outsourced its role in it to the Americans and the British. "There may be singular minds," Héroux wrote sardonically in *Le Devoir* after the 1944 Quebec Conference, "who regret that the political leader of Canada, a sovereign nation and master of its own actions, did not want himself, in such a serious question, to expose the attitude of his country, leaving this honor and stain to the head of government from another country." Still, he conceded, Canada "will be in the fight until the end, until the capitulation of Japan. We do not intend to give others our share of the cake."[579] Somewhat ironically, this was a belief that King now shared, having rebuffed Winston Churchill at Quebec for offering Canada only a minor Pacific War role in future Aleutian operations. Canadians, King retorted, "did not wish our men assigned to any second Kiska role."[580]

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[576] *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 6th Session, vol. 1 (9 April 1945): 680; "'Voluntary' War in Pacific Only 'Election Propaganda'," *Ottawa Journal*, 10 April 1945, 18.
[577] As noted, a fifth of Quebecois told CIPO in July 1945 that Canada was doing "too much" in the Pacific War.
[578] "Canada Opposed to Helping Britain," *Syonan Times* (Singapore), 12 April 1945, 1; "Canadian Leaders Oppose Continued Participation in 'Britain's War'," *Syonan Times*, 12 April 1945, 1.
[579] Omer Héroux, "Le Canada et la Guerre du Pacifique," *Le Devoir* (Montreal), 18 September 1944, 1.
[580] Perras, "No Need to Send an Army Across the Pacific," 150.

If Canada was going to fight in the Pacific, he responded vehemently, it would at least invade some place worthwhile like Taiwan, the Philippines, or Japan itself. And as we will see, members of the Canadian armed forces were enthusiastic to go wherever their political masters directed them.

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In September 1944, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, W.L.M. King, and the Allies' Combined Chiefs of Staff met in Quebec City for the conference codenamed "Octagon." On the agenda were plans for both the impending defeat and occupation of Germany, as well as the consequent shift of Allied forces to the Asia-Pacific to confront Japan that this conquest would facilitate. As King and his advisors argued, not only should "Canadian military forces … participate in the war against Japan," but they would also do so "in operational theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation, for example, in the North or Central Pacific, rather than in more remote areas, such as Southeast Asia." This move would also be contingent, the Canadians added, on Britain's own contribution to the Pacific War.[581] This last point, as Maurice Pope reported, "was perhaps the most contentious item on the agenda," with the British "insistent that they had a score to settle with Japan and that they were determined to do so."[582] That both Ottawa and the Commonwealth were pushing for a place in the Pacific was applauded by most Canadians. "Canada is a Pacific nation with a great potential interest in Pacific relations after the war," the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized before the conference. Britain was striking back in Southeast Asia at the same time the US was crossing the central Pacific. "It may be taken as probable," the paper concluded, that King, Churchill, and Roosevelt "are already fully advised of the magnitude of the task ahead before Japan is totally defeated. It will probably call for the whole power of the

[581] Extract from Minutes of Cabinet War Committee, 14 September 1944, *DCER*, vol. 10, 413-414.
[582] Maurice Pope, "The Quebec Conference, 1944," 2, 18 September 1944, R112, vol. 20320, file 951.023 (D20), DNDF, LAC. Cf. Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Generals: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C.* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 243-244.

United Nations, especially of the Pacific nations, including Canada."[583] "Canadians are to have a full share in the war against Japan," the *Citizen*'s H. Reginald Hardy wrote with satisfaction at the meeting's close. "They have demanded such a share as their right and they will fight alongside British and United States armed forces until the Nipponese have been defeated on land, on sea and in the air."[584] Canada was now on track to join the invasion of Japan, slated for early 1946.

W.L.M. King had come a long way by September 1944 from his half-hearted acceptance of Canada's role in the Pacific War voiced at the start of the year. As noted in the previous section, this had much to do with the shift of public opinion on the topic, but it was also had due to internal dynamics within Ottawa. As historian Galen Roger Perras argues, this about-face can be credited to successful lobbying by the Canadian Army's senior commanders—who were keen to participate in the war—and had learned since 1939 how to tailor their requests to what King wanted to hear. As such, they had "emphasized national rather than service needs, acknowledged civilian supremacy, and sought to avoid becoming a tool for British imperial interests." Now convinced the Army "was eager to atone for its mistakes and impressed by its modest requirements [in contrast to the overly-bold RCAF and RCN] Mackenzie King agreed to allow a division to fight alongside American forces against Japan."[585] As a decision to avoid exacerbating the question of military manpower that would explode a few months later during the Conscription Crisis, King's rationale to constrain CAFP's size was reasonable, and one that would also be applied to the more extensive requests by the RCAF and RCN.[586] Yet, what this choice clarifies is that the decision to

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[583] "Canada Concerned with Pacific War," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 6 September 1944, 18.
[584] H. Reginald Hardy, "Canada to Share Fully When United Nations Go All-Out Against Japs," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 18 September 1944, 13.
[585] Galen Roger Perras, "Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The Origins of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944–1945," in *Uncertain Horizon: Canadians and Their World in 1945*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1997), 77. See also C.P. Stacey in *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 55-56.
[586] For these demands by the other Canadian services, see Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling, *The Crucible of War, 1939–1945: The Official History of The Royal Canadian Air Force*

constrain Canada's engagement in the Pacific War was fundamentally a political calculation, not one of military need, geopolitics, or flagging civilian morale. Despite the prime minister's caution, officials within all three branches of the military moved forcefully to pivot to what became known internally as "Phase II" of the conflict, hyping the creation of the CAPF and the selection of its commanding officer, promoting education about Japan and the training of servicemen for Pacific combat, and preparing for the new logistical and medical hurdles that this new war required.[587]

By the time of the Quebec Conference, Canada's most important military role in the Pacific War to date had been its participation in the Aleutian campaign of 1943. After the RCAF's initial deployments to Alaska in early 1942, along with Japan's capture of the islands of Attu and Kiska and defeat at Midway in June (see Chapter 1), fears of an attack on British Columbia had dimmed for the Canadian public. Yet, as Japanese forces entrenched themselves in the Aleutians over the summer of 1942, pressure by the BC public and its elected MPs would again increase on Ottawa.[588] Ultimately, as American plans to recapture the Aleutians matured in early 1943, Ottawa acquiesced to the inclusion of Canadian forces at Kiska, and an enthusiastic General George Pearkes at Pacific Command assigned the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade to the task.[589] Famously, the 34,000 men of the joint American-Canadian invasion force that arrived at Kiska on 15 August discovered that the Japanese had already withdrawn undetected and the operation was an anti-climax.[590]

Yet, this was ***not*** the end of Canadian interest in the North Pacific for the war against Japan. Barely had the Allies discovered that the Aleutians were theirs then planning began on a follow-

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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), chapter 4; W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, et al., *A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939–1945*, Volume II, Part 2 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2007), chapter 22.

[587] For a summary of Phase II planning, see W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, *Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Dundurn, 1995), 242-246; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 54-62.

[588] Galen Roger Perras, "Canada as a Military Partner: Alliance Politics and the Campaign to Recapture the Aleutian Island of Kiska," *Journal of Military History* 56, no. 3 (July 1992): 423-427.

[589] Perras, "Canada as a Military Partner," 429-445.

[590] Perras, "Canada as a Military Partner," 445-447.

up operation to assault the Japanese-held Kurile Islands north of Hokkaido. As Galen Roger Perras has explored, this proposal eventually floundered "on the rocks of [Prime Minister] King's hostility to the scheme and the vagaries of American strategic planning." Yet, this is not to say that the proposal was unpopular within the Canadian military, the civilian government, or even with the Canadian public. As Perras notes, three individuals aside from King played critical roles in the debate over the Kurile operation: "Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, Chief of the Canadian General Staff (CGS); the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Canadian Pacific Command, Major-General George R. Pearkes; and Hugh Keenleyside, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs."[591] For Keenleyside, the Kurile operation offered Canada many advantages. For one, as he wrote the prime minister in a memo dated 29 July 1943, given the large US presence in the Canadian North due to the Alaska Highway, there was a clear "disparity between the American and Canadian contributions to defence operations in the Northwest." The result was the public impression that Canada was less involved in the region than was really the case. He thus advocated for a more assertive policy in the area, something more substantial than the Kiska invasion at least. While King almost certainly read this memo, he did not accept its conclusions.[592] Keenleyside's motives during this whole affair, Perras argues, are easily understood:

> A strong and vocal nationalist, [Keenleyside] saw Canadian military action in the north Pacific as an opportunity for his government to reassert its presence in the northwest and balance the massive American effort in the area. An added incentive for the veteran of the Department of External Affairs was his hope that Canada would gain a meaningful voice in the post-war deliberations [regarding Japan and the Pacific] that would follow an Allied victory. For Keenleyside, Kiska and the Kuriles were seen more as an expression of national and political sovereignty than as a military necessity.[593]

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[591] Galen Roger Perras, "Eyes on the Northern Route to Japan: Plans for Canadian Participation in an Invasion of the Kurile Islands—A Study in Coalition Warfare and Civil-Military Relationships," *War & Society* 8, no. 1 (May 1990): 100-101. For the American perspective on the Kurile operation, see Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867–1945* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), chapter 7.
[592] Perras, "Eyes on the Northern Route to Japan," 111-112. See also Perras, "Once Bitten, Twice Shy," 79-80.
[593] Perras, "Eyes on the Northern Route to Japan," 114.

Yet, at the end of the day, King got the final say on the matter, not his passionate Assistant Under-Secretary of State or the more zealous officers among Canada's military brass. Given the logistical hurdles in waging a war in the stormy North Pacific, the American military would advance towards Japan via Central and South Pacific routes. Plans for a Kurile operation remained a dead letter.

Yet, Keenleyside was within the realm of public opinion on this issue. From 1942 onwards, there was mounting Canadian interest for a northern drive against Japan. "United States military leaders are giving increasing indication that the eventual offensive against Japan will come from more than one direction," the Associated Press announced in late March 1942, "lending weight to speculation that one assault may fallow the pathway of Japan's northern islands, the Kuriles."[594] "North to the Realm of Japan?" a widely circulated Canadian newspaper article asked a few days later, accompanied by a map showing how this could be achieved. "Evidence mounts that the long Aleutian Island chain sweeping towards Japan from Alaska will not be overlooked when America carries the war to its arch enemy," it noted by way of explanation. While its judgments were based "entirely on speculation and purport[ed] no inside knowledge," the authors had clearly done some homework.[595] That same year, academic Donald Cowie claimed that an Aleutian advance "could convey a stream of retribution straight from the North American continent, main arsenal of the Allies, to the very backdoor of Japan."[596] By 1944, the National Film Board's *Fortress Japan* was even asserting that a move "over the northern land arch of the Pacific" was one of three "highways of attack" being pressed against Japan, along with US and Australian forces in the Central and South Pacific, and British and Chinese armies in India and Burma. "For in the Aleutian Islands," Lorne Greene's sonorous voice declared, "are bomber bases only 700 miles from Nippon shores,"

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[594] "Speculation on Plans for Invasion of Japan," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 21 March 1942, 14.
[595] For examples, see "North to the Realm of Japan?" *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 28 March 1942, 27; "North to the Realm of Japan?" *The Gazette*, 28 March 1942, 7. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 4.
[596] Donald Cowie, "To Japan Via the Aleutians," *Queen's Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (Summer 1942): 142.

accessible by road up the Alaska Highway and the airbases of the Northwest Staging Route "in subarctic Canada."[597] This "highway" was not to be, but many Canadians ranging from newspaper columnists to government officials had suggested again and again that there *were* opportunities for Canada to contribute to the Pacific War if it so desired. By mid-1945, with the European War in its final death throes, Ottawa's plans for joining the Pacific War acquired a new urgency.

Without question, no Canadian soldier had a more meteoric rise during the Second World War than Bertram Merrill Hoffmeister. A prewar member of the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) who had gone overseas in December 1939 as a company commander with the Seaforth Highlanders, Hoffmeister had ended the European war as a Major-General commanding the 5th Canadian Armour Division—dubbed "Hoffy's Mighty Maroon Machine" in reference to the unit's distinctive brown shoulder patches and Hoffmeister's own popularity—having served in both the Italian Campaign and Northwest Europe.[598] By May 1945, after so many years abroad, Hoffmeister was keen to return home to reunite with his wife and daughter and to resume his prewar job at H.R. MacMillan, a lumber export company based in British Columbia whose president was pressing the prime minister for Hoffmeister's return to civilian life.[599] Yet, given his proven command ability, the reluctant general was widely regarded by his contemporaries (as well as later historians) as one of Canada's best combat commanders during the war.[600] In May 1945, Defence Minister Andrew McNaughton stated that he would accept Lieutenant-Generals Charles Foulkes, Guy Simonds or Major-General Hoffmeister as the CAPF's commander, a list supported by First Canadian Army

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[597] Stuart Legg, *Fortress Japan* (National Film Board of Canada, 1944).
[598] For Hoffmeister's wartime career, see J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 189-202; Douglas E. Delaney, *The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), passim, chapters 3-10.
[599] Ken Drushka, *HR: A Biography of H.R. MacMillan* (Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing, 1995), 254-255.
[600] Historians have since dubbed him "the best Canadian fighting general of the war," "the most successful Canadian battlefield commander of the Second World War," as well as "the only Canadian who could have reached his rank in the German army." See Granatstein, *The Generals*, 180; Delaney, *The Soldiers' General*, 3; Douglas and Greenhous, *Out of the Shadows*, 232-233.

commander General H.D.G. Crerar. As both Foulkes and Simonds would have to take a reduction in rank to assume the post, Hoffmeister quickly emerged as the favoured candidate.[601] Reluctantly, the former "once-a-week" NPAM volunteer departed Europe for Ottawa on 12 June 1945.[602]

Beyond matters of rank or even his proven military abilities, Hoffmeister was an excellent candidate to lead the CAPF. For one, both his natural charisma and personal modesty inspired the loyalty of his subordinates as well as the trust of the Canadian public. As historian J.L. Granatstein notes, with its moniker "the Mighty Maroon Machine," the 5th Division was "the only Canadian formation with a clear sense of its own identity," largely due to Hoffmeister's leadership.[603] As Ottawa understood, this fact presented significant benefits for CAPF recruitment, especially given W.L.M. King's refusal to commit NRMA conscripts to the Pacific War. "Recruiting by Major-General Hoffmeister of his staff and [command] structure Overseas," as the Canadian Army's Adjutant-General Ernest Walford wrote McNaughton in May 1945, "would secure some additional volunteers and many NCO's and men would follow their tried leaders, but will not 'elect' cold."[604] Beginning on 25 May, Hoffmeister began canvasing for his command-level officers, probing both reliable subordinates like Brigadiers H.P. Bell-Irving and H.A. Sparling, as well as other officers he knew by reputation to be battle-proven leaders—including a gruff brigadier from the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, Australian-born John Rockingham, who would later lead Canadian forces in Asia during the Korean War (see Chapter 6).[605] Hoffmeister's resolve to get the men he wanted,

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[601] Delaney, *The Soldiers' General*, 221; Granatstein, *The Generals*, 202.
[602] As one of his subordinates, Brigadier H.P. Bell-Irving, observed in an interview years later, many permanent force officers seemed resentful at the time that a NPAM soldier had gotten the CAPF command instead of them. See J.L. Granatstein, *The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada's Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 55.
[603] Delaney, *The Soldiers' General*, xi. See also Bell-Irving's testimony in Granatstein, *The Weight of Command*, 55.
[604] Walford to McNaughton, 31 May 1945, R10383, reel H-1540, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.
[605] Delaney, *The Soldiers' General*, 221-222. Many of the officers approached by Hoffmeister for the CAPF went on to play prominent roles the Korean War. This included Jim Stone, who later commanded the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; Jacques Dextraze, who led the Royal 22e Régiment; and Paul Bernatchez, who headed up the Canadian Military Mission, Far East in Tokyo from August 1951 to November 1952.

as well as the tremendous loyalty he engendered in them, is best exemplified in his recruitment of Sparling, as the Brigadier himself later recalled. At a post-VE Day party, Hoffmeister approached him to see if he was already a CAPF volunteer. "Will you go?" Hoffmeister asked. "Of course, if they'll let me," Sparling responded, having already been told he might lead part of the Germany occupation force. Bowing out, Hoffmeister returned after barely five minutes. "I've been on to Army HQ," he stated matter-of-factly, "you're my CRA." Almost the whole 5th Division, an awed Sparling concluded, would have joined Hoffmeister in Asia if he had asked them to.[606] By the end of May, 23,400 of the projected 30,000 men for the CAPF had already volunteered from among the Canadian Army in Europe, although there was a oversubscription for certain positions and a sizable dearth in others—notably frontline infantrymen—that would take time to fill.[607]

Hoffmeister's reception in Canada would prove no less positive. On 13 June, the general and his hand-picked staff arrived at Ottawa's Rockcliffe airport.[608] The next day, a reception was held at the Chateau Laurier with W.L.M. King to welcome the general home with a CBC speech introducing him and the CAPF to Canadians. "General Walford is very keen to have as much said as possible about the Pacific Force, its origin, composition, etc., in order to stimulate interest and volunteering," one of King's aides noted, prompting the prime minister to embark on a marathon editing session of Walford's draft.[609] Beginning his remarks with Hoffmeister's record in Europe, King acknowledged the Pacific War would be a new challenge, but that "the experience you have gained in helping to defeat Nazi Germany will prove of the utmost value in the new theatre." After all, the recently re-elected prime minister noted wryly, "you will excuse me for reminding you that

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[606] Granatstein, *The Weight of Command*, 169-170.
[607] Walford to McNaughton, 31 May 1945, R10383, reel H-1540, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; William Boss, "23,400 Overseas Troops Volunteer for Service in War Against Japan," *Globe and Mail*, 5 June 1945, 13.
[608] For the itinerary of Hoffmeister's actions after his arrival in Canada, see "Program for Reception of Major General B.M. Hoffmeister…," [June 1945]; "Time Table: Luncheon for Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister…," 14 June 1945, R10383, reel H-1495, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.
[609] J.W.P. to Mackenzie King, 13 June 1945, R10383, reel H-1495, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.

the people of Canada do not under-estimate the value of experience." King then reminded listeners of the strategy adopted at Quebec, and how he "believed the Canadian people wanted our country to bear its just share of the burden of defeating Japan."[610] In his response, speaking "earnestly and with decision," Hoffmeister modestly attributed his successes "to the gallant men it was my honor to command in Sicily, Italy, and later in Europe." "I am going in with a winning team," he added. "I have no worries at all."[611] As Hoffmeister noted later, King was adamant during their meeting that "I reported directly to him and to no one else in Canada," a likely sign of the prime minister's lingering uneasiness about not letting Canadian involvement in the Pacific War expand out of his control.[612] The reception from the waiting journalists was elated: "'A real guy—no brass hat,' was the popular verdict." Hoffmeister, the *Vancouver Province*'s Torchy Anderson concluded, had handily won his first battle: "He won over the press."[613]

More than anywhere, this ecstatic reception was strongest in Hoffmeister's home province of British Columbia. Born in Vancouver in 1907, the city's papers hailed the general's return with unabashed enthusiasm. Barely 20 minutes after arriving in Ottawa, the *Vancouver Sun* was on the phone to ask him what he thought of tales of Japanese soldiers' fanaticism.[614] His return to the city at the end of June quickly turned into one long victory lap as the general attracted boisterous crowds wherever he went. "A mass ovation which lasted several minutes" greeted him at the city's Canadian Club and its 700 rapt attendees.[615] At the armory of the Seaforth Highlanders, 2,500 gave him "a thunderous ovation … amid all the pageantry and music that only a Scottish line regiment

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[610] W.L.M. King, "Welcome to General Hoffmeister," 1-2, 14 June 1945, R10383, reel H-3052, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC. The edited draft of the speech received from Walford can be found in the same file.
[611] "Hoffmeister Selects 'Winning Team' of Battle-Tried Veterans for Pacific," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 14 June 1945, 24; "Pacific War Plan Explained by King," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 June 1945, 20.
[612] Interview with B.M. Hoffmeister, 133, 136-137, McAndrew Collection, RMC.
[613] Torchy Anderson, "Canada's Press Feels Hoffmeister 'Tops'," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 14 June 1945, 2. See also "The Canadian Soldier," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 15 June 1945, 22.
[614] "Hoffmeister Ready to Battle Japs," *Vancouver Sun*, 13 June 1945, 1.
[615] "Hoffmeister Given Ovation in First Public Speech Here," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 27 June 1945, 2.

can provide."[616] "Welcome Home to Vancouver's Own Maj.-Gen. Bert M. Hoffmeister," BC's Spencer's department store saluted in a full-page ad in the *Vancouver Province*.[617] A more personal welcome awaited him at an informal dinner held by his colleagues at H.R. MacMillan, who were delighted to hear his report that there had been "several occasions" in Europe where "the world-wide connections of the lumber company" had helped "in obtaining otherwise unavailable service and accommodation." "I wouldn't want you to over-estimate our influence in Japan," MacMillan himself quipped at the news. "You may have to make your own arrangements there."[618]

Darker trends were at work in this adulation. "There is something symbolic in the Allies' choice of Bert Hoffmeister," Don Carlson of the *Vancouver Sun* wrote after visiting the general's beachfront home. "For the same waters which lapped against the beach at the rear of his white-painted, comfortable Belmont Avenue home … extend to the shores of Japan."[619] Indeed, for British Columbians, the "real" war was still ongoing as the general returned home, explaining the popular enthusiasm. The fact the virulently anti-Japanese *Vancouver Sun* had shown the most fervour for Hoffmeister's appointment to the CAPF was not a coincidence. Having lived through much-exaggerated fears of a Japanese invasion in 1942 (see Chapter 1), the cool confidence that Hoffmeister as a "local boy" brought to his new command was precisely what British Columbians wanted to see. For locals, Hoffmeister seems to have become almost an avatar of their vengeance against Japan. "They can't be any more fanatical than some of the Germans' elite troops," was the general's nonplused reply to the *Sun*'s question on the zeal of Japanese soldiers. "The Canadians had no trouble dealing with them—and we'll have no more trouble dealing with the Japs."[620]

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[616] "2500 Pay Tribute to Hoffmeister," *Vancouver Sun*, 28 June 1945, 6.
[617] See Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 5.
[618] "Gen. Hoffmeister Guest of Old Business Friends," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 5 July 1945, 23.
[619] Don Carlson, "Hoffmeister Proud of His 'Star Team'," *Vancouver Sun*, 23 June 1945, 15.
[620] "Hoffmeister Ready to Battle Japs," 1. "In the last war," one BC writer noted, "a citizen of Victoria left his desk to finally win promotion to the command of the Canadian army overseas." And just as real estate broker Arthur Currie had won his spurs in the First World War, so too had Hoffmeister won his in the Second. "He is perfectly certain that

Back in military circles, Hoffmeister began the slow task of impressing a sense of purpose among his new soldiers, as well as building relations with his American allies. Soon after his return to Canada, Hoffmeister attended a meeting in Ottawa to brief him on CAPF preparations before departing to confer with American officialdom in Washington and members of the US 2nd Army in Memphis, Tennessee.[621] As with the 5th Division, Hoffmeister was keen to develop the CAPF as a distinct unit. One of his first requests after his return to Canada were "urgent representations" to Ottawa that the battalions of his three divisional brigades—the latter were retitled "regiments" per US usage to avoid confusion—be given the names of those in the 1st Division.[622] He also proposed, "in the interests of espirt de corps, [cap] badges be made as distinctive as possible."[623] Signifying the CAPF's composite nature, the monochromatic shoulder patches of the Army's other divisions were also superseded by a new multicoloured hexagonal patch—resembling a completed Trivial Pursuit token—incorporating the colours from all five divisions (Red, Blue, French Grey, Green, and Maroon) along with Black for the Army's two independent armoured brigades.[624]

Such CAPF distinctiveness was essential given the relationship it had to build with the US Army. Given the preponderance of American forces in the Pacific War, the Canadian Joint Chiefs had suggested in April 1945 that the CAPF be organized like an American division to facilitate its integration into the theatre. While Ottawa had initially desired to use its own equipment in the unit, this request too was quickly conceded and the CAPF would retain only its distinctive Canadian

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his seasoned men will give a good account of themselves against the Japs when the time comes." See Roy W. Brown, "Hoffmeister," *Vancouver Sun*, 24 July 1945, 4.

[621] For Hoffmeister's itinerary, see "Memorandum Ref CAPF Force Comd Visit to USA," 16 June 1945, R112, vol. 37308, file 112.1 (D64), DNDF, LAC.

[622] R.S.G. to Minister of National Defence, 16 June 1945, R112, vol. 37308, file 112.1 (D64), DNDF, LAC. While historian J.L. Granatstein attributes this suggestion to Hoffmeister playing on McNaughton's "sentimental streak," as the defence minister was the one who had taken the 1st Division overseas in 1939, it likely had as much to do with Hoffmeister's desire to build a sense of unit continuity and prestige. See Granatstein, *The Generals*, 202.

[623] "Minutes of Meeting Held … to Acquaint Major-General Hoffmeister and Members of his Staff with US Ts O & E…," 3, 14 June 1945, R112, vol. 37308, file 112.1 (D64), DNDF, LAC.

[624] "Battle Patch for Army Pacific Force," *Ottawa Journal*, 20 June 1945, 11. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 6.

uniforms.[625] As Hoffmeister had told the press in Ottawa, the plan was for "a happy medium, with the least possible change in Canadian procedure." The CAPF, he assured patriotic readers, would be "a Canadian division all the way through."[626] The reality proved more jarring. Meeting with US officials, including Chief of Staff George Marshall at the Pentagon, Hoffmeister apparently left the United States feeling that his unit was seen as simply another quirky—and unduly exacting—unit in the American order of battle.[627] After his return to Canada, Hoffmeister met up with Colonel Richard Malone, a noted prewar news editor turned public relations officer responsible for creating the Canadian Army's wartime paper the *Maple Leaf*. As Malone wrote later, the general seemed "pretty disturbed" by his overall treatment in the United States and privately felt that he had "rather been given the brush-off."[628] Hoffmeister's concerns would persist through the summer as the Pacific War seemed to be drawing towards a rapid conclusion.

By late July 1945, the CAPF volunteers had started to trickle back into Canada, establishing themselves at Army bases from Shilo, Manitoba to Debert, Nova Scotia. The unit's main centre of gravity, however, was in eastern Ontario from Brockville, where Hoffmeister had his headquarters, to Barriefield near Kingston, where the core of the CAPF's trainers were activated on 23 July as part of the new First Canadian Infantry Regiment (1 CIR). Here they would undertake "smartening training" before eventually being transferred to Breckinridge, Kentucky, where they would receive instruction to help them teach the rest of the division to operate American-style weapons.[629] Yet, as the great re-mustering continued, both Hoffmeister and Ottawa remained vigilant in keeping the

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[625] Stanley W. Dziuban, *United States Army in World War II*, Special Studies: *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), 269.
[626] "Hoffmeister Proud of Pacific Forces," *Vancouver Sun*, 14 June 1945, 1.
[627] Delaney, *The Soldiers' General*, 223. However, this feeling was <u>not</u> a result of Hoffmeister's meeting with Marshall at the Pentagon, whom Hoffmeister left "feeling very happy and encouraged," but apparently in his meetings with other officials in Tennessee and elsewhere. See Interview with B.M. Hoffmeister, 135, McAndrew Collection, RMC.
[628] Richard S. Malone, *A World in Flames, 1944–1945* (Don Mills, ON: Collins, 1984), 211.
[629] WD, HQ 1 CIR, Introduction, July 1945, R112, vol. 14100, file 1938, DNDF, LAC; "Canadian Army Pacific Force Will Train in Brockville," *Ottawa Journal*, 14 June 1945, 13.

volunteers focused on Japan. In July, General Crerar cautioned that the CAPF recruitment process was being abused. Since the volunteers from Europe were being immediately returned to Canada for retraining, "a proportion of these have always signed up with the thought that either they would not be compelled or would not need to fulfil their operational obligations on return to Canada and have done so only to get earliest transportation home." This notion, McNaughton noted, had to be disabused and the system altered to prevent further abuse.[630] Such apparent shirking was also being tackled at 1 CIR. In August, its staff laid plans to build "a CAPF spirit of enthusiasm, cheerfulness and discipline." "Rumors," it noted, "such as 'The US NOT wanting 6 Div with them' and 'Oh the war with Japan will be over before the Cdns get there' must be squashed at once."[631] "Canada is still very much at war," Hoffmeister himself sternly lectured the Barriefield trainers as they readied for their move to the US on 4 August. "You have a very serious job on your hands."[632]

One man who took American indifference to the CAPF to heart was Richard Malone. In March 1945, the Canadian Army's public relations director Joseph Clark wrote the Chief of the General Staff John Murchie with a proposition. Given the difficulties experienced by Australian war correspondents "in providing reports of Australian successes in Pacific Actions," Canada had ample warning that "unless adequate plans are laid, our war effort in the Pacific is not going to be fully told to the people of Canada, the United States, Great Britain and other countries." As such, Clark had asked Malone and another officer "to survey the Pacific theatre in order that they might make complete recommendations to ensure recognition of Canada's war effort in the Pacific."[633] "Ostensibly," as Malone wrote in his postwar memoirs:

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[630] Crerar to J.C. Murchie, 9 July 1945; "Extract from Morning Conference," 10 July 1945, R112, vol. 2924, file HSQ-9131, vol. 7, DNDF, LAC.
[631] WD, HQ 1 CIR, entry 4 August 1945, R112, vol. 14100, file 1938, DNDF, LAC.
[632] "Hoffmeister Pays Visit to Camp," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 7 August 1945, 2. For the organization of the training regime at Barriefield, see WD, HQ 1 CIR, entry 6 August 1945, R112, vol. 14100, file 1938, DNDF, LAC.
[633] Clark to Chief of the General Staff, 27 March 1945, Kardex 1000-146-21, vol. 1, box 70, file 6, DHH. Cf. Malone, *A World in Flames*, 193-194.

> my advanced trip would be to clear up such matters as Canadian censorship, press communications and policy matters at command levels. Unofficially, my job would be to smooth the way a bit for the arrival of our unwanted Canadians, diplomatically see if it was possible to increase the scope of our Pacific contribution, and ensure that Canada's participation received adequate publicity before any Japanese surrender.[634]

With Hoffmeister's own experiences in mind, Malone took "a very tough stand in all my meetings at the Pentagon," getting agreement on most of his points. With one last visit to the US Army base at Fort Benning before the arrival of some CAPF trainers, Malone was off to the Pacific to make a show of Canadian resolve at General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in Manila.[635]

Back in Canada, the effort to impart the nature of Pacific combat and explain the Japanese way of war to CAPF recruits was also proceeding. As Hoffmeister told the press in June, the Pacific War differed in many aspects from the European struggle. "We [have] got to learn cave-fighting, which we didn't have in Europe," he explained to the *Vancouver Sun*'s Don Carlson. "The Jap is a fanatical fighter. We've got to learn about that too."[636] As "Phase II" planning jumped into high gear, all three Canadian services began a frantic dash to acquire and disseminate general information and the latest intelligence about Japan. "The Nucleus Planning Staff, 'Tiger' Force, advises that the Force Commander desires that all squadrons in the Command be in possession of books of reference on Japan and the Far East," RCAF Squadron Leader T.A. Fishbourne informed the Department of National Defence on 9 June. His book list included everything from *Ten Years in Japan*, the new memoir of former US Ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew, to the classic *Things Japanese* by British Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain, first issued in 1890.[637] To this catalogue

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[634] Malone, *A World in Flames*, 194.
[635] Malone, *A World in Flames*, 211-212. Malone vigorously asserted Canadian interests while in the Philippines. For example, he tried to interest MacArthur's staff in having the general record a radio broadcast for Canadians back home: "It would give him a chance to publicly welcome the coming Canadian contingent, be excellent for international good will and also assist in making Canada more conscious of the Japanese war." The offer, however, was reportedly brushed off by MacArthur's staff. See Malone, *A World in Flames*, 223.
[636] Carlson, "Hoffmeister Proud of His 'Star Team'," 15.
[637] Fishbourne to Secretary Department of National Defence for Air, 9 June 1945, R112, vol. 5427, file HQS-85-10-1, DNDF, LAC. See also Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944); and Basil Hall

was eventually added numerous supplementary reports and intelligence briefs received from the Americans, along with various other Japanese maps, gazetteers, and textbooks, including copies of the Tokyo publisher Kenkyūsha's definitive English-Japanese dictionaries.[638] Planning was no less determined within the RCN. "Japanese suicide attacks present difficult and novel problems in target identification, recognition and A.A. gunnery control," one US Navy report on Japanese Kamikaze attacks at Okinawa that was later distributed to Ottawa noted. Incorporated into a dossier that encompassed lessons from both the USN and British Pacific Fleet, copies were sent to both Halifax and Esquimalt for circulation "to ships of the Pacific Fleet which work up on the East and West Coasts respectively."[639] This was an especially noteworthy challenge given the RCN's prior focus on countering German U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. In the Pacific, by contrast, "The major problem will be the defence of the convoy ships and of the escorts themselves, against air attack, particularly the 'Kamikazi' [*sic*] or suicide pilot. The gravity of this most recent Japanese threat to surface ships," one report on 28 June warned, "cannot be too greatly stressed."[640] Learning to counter this new menace would be vital for all Canadian warships deploying to the theatre.

The Army did not lag too far behind its two sister services. "Lack of information is a most fertile source of exaggeration, distortion, and legend which, if unrefuted, eventually assumes the stature of accepted fact." So began the first Japanese "intelligence bulletin" curated by the Army's intelligence staff at Camp Borden in May 1945, its inaugural issue focused on "the background of a people whom we mean to defeat, whom we hope to change, and with whom we will have to live

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Chamberlain, *Things Japanese: Being Notes of Various Subjects Concerned with Japan* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1890).

[638] C.P. Clark to Secretary Department of National Defence for Air, 18 June 1945, R112, vol. 5427, file HQS-85-10-1, DNDF, LAC.

[639] "Operation 'Iceberg,' Appendix No. 2…," 6 June 1945; Secretary Naval Board to Commander in Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic et al., 11 August 1945, R112, vol. 11845, file NSS1100-146/21, DNDF, LAC. See also Douglas et al., *A Blue Water Navy*, 526.

[640] D.L. Miller to Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, 28 June 1945, R112, vol. 11121, file 71-1-1, DNDF, LAC (emphasis original).

in a world whose different parts are becoming more closely interrelated from year to year."[641] In its first three issues—"Japan, the Land," "Japan, the People," and "Japan Starts a War"—the basics of its society and history were outlined, much of it offering a nuanced, if not apologetic, view of the country. "From this brief outline," the first issue concluded, "one can easily gather that we are not dealing with a primitive or backward country. Modern methods and modern equipment, skillfully employed by highly trained physically fit men, will be the answer to the problem."[642] In part, this nuanced perspective was unsurprising given that many of the bulletin's arguments were culled, unacknowledged, from informed sources such as Arthur Lower's and Hugh Keenleyside's previously cited *Canadian Affairs* pamphlets, including both their assertions that Canada was a Pacific power "directly interested in future policies affecting that part of the world."[643]

In the final issue in June, "Japan, The War Machine," CAPF readers were given a practical overview of the structure of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), its system of ranks, its equipment, as well as an outline of the training and instruction received by new recruits, exposing much of the folklore attributed to it. "Myths have sprung up concerning the ability of the Japanese soldier to subsist on extremely small quantities of food, and it has been popularly believed that he eats little save rice while in the field."[644] In fact, "when the Japanese soldier gets nothing to eat he becomes just as hungry and dejected as any other soldier," quoting one captured soldier's diary to that effect. "Naturally, the Japanese soldier would no more be satisfied with a ration consisting exclusively of

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[641] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 1 (May 1945): cover page, 1, R112, vol. 20538, file 982.023, DNDF, LAC.
[642] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 1 (May 1945): 4. Only with Japan's defeat, the third issue added, "can the allies strengthen their backs and with the clear eyes of honourable men who have done their duty turn to the greater task of rebuilding the world on the ashes of totalitarian tyranny." See *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 3 (May 1945): 7.
[643] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 2 (May 1945): 4; Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 13; Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," (1944), 3. Much of the information in the bulletin's second issue on Japanese and Chinese immigration to Canada, to take but one example, is cited verbatim from Lower. Cf. *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 2 (May 1945): 4-6; Lower, "Canada as a Pacific Power," (1944), 5-7.
[644] The average IJA soldier "lives on rice," one American propaganda film claimed in 1945. With meat or fish if they could get it, "but often on rice alone, and he's proud of it." See Frank Capra, *Know Your Enemy: Japan* (Army Pictorial Service, Signal Corps, 1945).

rice than an Allied soldier would with bread alone."[645] Ultimately, as all four bulletins collectively concluded, the Pacific War was Canada's war, and in a passage lifted directly from Keenleyside's pamphlet, boldly declared that "The Japanese have taken second place to the Germans in our minds simply because, as yet we haven't had them on the sharp ends of our bayonets."[646]

Nor was it only the Japanese people that were receiving increased scrutiny in Ottawa. On 10 July 1944, a new committee was founded bringing together members of all three branches of the armed forces: "The Interdepartmental Committee on Medical Problems in the War Against Japan."[647] As the Canadian military had quickly realized, the tropical, temperate, as well as arctic settings of the geographically dispersed and "triphibian" Pacific War, created many new challenges for Canada, necessitating intensified research in the fields of "epidemiology, hygiene, sanitation, and all other medical aspects of the maintenance of the physical and mental efficiency of all Canadian Forces engaged in the war against Japan."[648] Other adaptations ran from awnings to keep direct sunlight off ship decks, to vermin control measures, and even the use of lighter camouflage patterns when compared to their darker Atlantic counterparts.[649] The "tropicalization" of military kit for Canadian servicemen was also given consideration given that, in a humid tropical setting, just about everything had the potential to rust, rot, or mold. Provisioning new uniforms, for instance, was given top priority. As H.S. Hopkins, a Royal Navy observer attached to the USN, later informed Canadian officials, "Even in the temperate Central Pacific Area … the heat in cabins

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[645] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 4 (June 1945): 6-7.
[646] *Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 2 (May 1945): 6; Keenleyside, "What's Japan to Us?," 16.
[647] "Interdepartmental Committee on Medical and Dental Problems, War Against Japan," 10 July 1944, R112, vol. 8134, file NSS1288-4, DNDF, LAC.
[648] "Interdepartmental Committee on Medical Problems, War Against Japan," 2, 13 July 1944, R112, vol. 8134, file NSS1288-4, DNDF, LAC. There is a certain irony in this. As many historians have argued, during the Korean War, it was partially "a lack of operational experience in a Far Eastern context" that resulted in high rates of venereal disease and other local maladies among Canadian soldiers. Had CAPF fought in the Pacific War, the army might have gained sufficient experience to avoid this issue in the 1950s. See Brent Byron Watson, *Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 138-139.
[649] Douglas et al., *A Blue Water Navy*, 526-528.

and living spaces [was] excessive."[650] By July 1945, the RCN had unveiled plans for a new set of lightweight, mosquito-proof uniforms for all its sailors involved in "Stage II warfare."[651]

In May 1945, a memorandum for Defence Minister McNaughton about the expense of the CAPF passed over the desk of the prime minister. According to calculations received by the Joint Chiefs, the total cost of planned Canadian Army operations against Japan from 1 September 1945 to 31 March 1946—encompassing CAPF's training in the United States, the cost of equipping the unit, and its dispatch overseas—was now estimated at $70,205,620, well over $1,175,000,000 today adjusting for inflation. This, the memo added, was also based solely on the costs of getting it into the Pacific and assumed that CAPF, "will not get into action before 31 Mar 46."[652] Once the Sixth Division had arrived and was included in the Allies' order of battle, its objectives remained open. That same May, Ottawa received word that American plans for invading Japan now called for a two-pronged operation. In an initial assault on the southernmost Japanese island of Kyushu codenamed "Olympic," US forces would land in the autumn of 1945. In spring 1946, this attack would be supplemented by Operation "Coronet," the invasion of the island of Honshu. While its late arrival—and its need to be further drilled in amphibious warfare—would likely have delayed the CAPF's inclusion in the initial Coronet landings, the unit might have been incorporated into a "Commonwealth Corps," along with British and Australian divisions, to serve as an "assault reserve afloat," eventually coming ashore as reinforcements early in the battle.[653]

In the end, of course, no such invasion was necessary as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with the Soviet Union's entry into the fray in August, made a forced conquest

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[650] "Appendix 'A' to Staff Minute 256-16: Report of Cdr. H.S. Hopkins, R.N., B.N.L.O. to U.S. Pacific Fleet," 1, [1944], R112, vol. 8134, file NSS1288-4, DNDF, LAC.
[651] Secretary Naval Board, Memorandum, 16 July 1945; "Draft Naval Order," [undated], R211, vol. 11121, file 71-2-1, DNDF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 7.
[652] Murchie to McNaughton, 17 May 1945, R10383, reel H-1540, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.
[653] D.M. Giangreco, *Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947*, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 35; Perras, "Once Bitten, Twice Shy," 93.

of Japan superfluous. "Although Canada had been among the first of the Western nations to declare war on Japan, Canadian forces had been but lightly committed in the Pacific war," one Canadian report concluded in retrospect. Still, this fact, "was not due to any lack of awareness on Canada's part of her vital interest in the defeat of Japan, but rather to heavy participation in the fighting in Western Europe and the North Atlantic. Following V-E Day in Europe, extensive plans were made for sending larger forces to the Pacific, but, as events turned out, the Pacific War was ended before this major changeover in the direction of effort could be made."[654] Or, in historian C.P. Stacey's more succinct summation, "The Canadian forces to be used in the final phase, the organization of which had consumed so much time, thought and paper, never went into action."[655]

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By August 1945, Canadians were impatient for victory. After the two atomic bombs and the Soviet Union's declaration of war, reports indicated that the conflict might soon be over. On 12 August, crowds spilled into the streets as the CBC mistakenly broadcast W.L.M. King's pre-recorded victory speech on the rumour that President Harry Truman had accepted Japan's surrender. In Vancouver, this resulted in all eight of the city's air-raid sirens wailing as people rejoiced only to learn they had acted prematurely, leaving the prime minister "chagrined."[656] When the news finally broke on 14 August (15 August back in Japan) the scenes of May were repeated across Canada. "Vancouver went almost as crazy as London on VE Day," an on-leave CAPF soldier named Pierre Berton later recalled. While his own Pacific War training lasted through the month, it was difficult, he admitted, "to show a man how to stick a bayonet into a Japanese when the Japanese were signing an armistice with General MacArthur on that battleship. Our hearts were

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[654] "Canadian-Japanese Relations and Canadian Participation in Japanese Affairs Since 1945," 1, [1950?], R15615, vol. 29, file 9, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[655] Stacey, *Arms, Men, and Governments*, 62.
[656] Cuthbertson, *1945*, 305-306; J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forester, *The Mackenzie King Record*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 457-459.

no longer in it."[657] Victory took different forms for different Canadians. It was "a laughing jade whose hair was entwined with tickertape and office toilet paper," journalist Kenneth Cragg observed as he strolled Ottawa on the 14th. It was also "a silent woman standing on the curb, her eyes filling with tears for the son now dead," as well as "thoughtless youths who clambered over the heroic bronze figures in Canada's National War Memorial."[658] One group of Canadians were happier than most. In Montreal, many Chinese-Canadians "joined in a dragon dance to the beat of Chinese drums while skyrockets and firecrackers fused."[659] Chinese communities nationwide were equally exuberant. In Vancouver, a parade rolled through the nation's largest Chinatown, while in Summerside, Prince Edward Island (population 5,000) local Chinese-Canadian businesses took out a full-page ad in the local paper to praise China's unsung eight-year role in the global war.[660] When the formal surrender was held on the USS *Missouri* in September, King heard the broadcast from the Ottawa Country Club in company with Ambassador Liu and Chinese Premier T.V. Soong, who was then visiting Canada. "As the dinner got under way … I made the announcement of the signature to the assembled gathering," King noted to his diary. "All stood when Canada's signature was announced." The Governor General Earl Athlone proposed a toast to Chiang Kai-Shek and Soong politely responded with one for George VI. "I then spoke of Dr. Soong and his services to his country," ending with an appeal "that all the United Nations were now committed to further the law of peace, work and health, and wishing success at the dawn of the new era."[661]

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[657] Pierre Berton, *Starting Out, 1920–1947* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 259-262. "V.J. Day was celebrated with great spirit in the Mess and elsewhere," the war diarist of one group of CAPF soldiers at Barriefield agreed, "and seemed to leave all ranks minus some of the interest in their remaining in the Army." See WD, 3rd Battalion, 1 CIR, entry 14 August 1945, R112, vol. 15297, file 1944, DNDF, LAC.
[658] Kenneth C. Cragg, "Thoughtless Lads at Cenotaph Blot on Victory Celebration," *Globe and Mail*, 15 August 1945, 13.
[659] "Rejoicing Across Canada Greets Official News of Final Victory," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 15 August 1945, 2.
[660] Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship*, 149; "China Rejoices in Victory with All the Allies," *Summerside Journal*, 14 August 1945, 2. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 8.
[661] W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 1 September 1945, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC. King later referenced the event in the House of Commons during an overview of Pacific affairs in December. See W.L.M. King,

Another group of Canadians particularly excited by the end of the war were the soldiers of the CAPF. "In the early evening celebration of V.J. Day commenced on the official announcement by Mr. King," the war diary of 1 CIR HQ reported on 12 August, "but ardour was soon dampened by the denial which followed shortly afterwards." But by the evening of 14 August, "the official announcement was received by radio" and the celebrations "commenced immediately."[662] "Thank God," Bert Hoffmeister exclaimed when he heard the news. Still, he added, had the CAPF "met the Japanese on the battlefield," he remained convinced it would have upheld "the great reputation of the Canadian Army."[663] On 15 August, Hoffmeister arrived in Ottawa with 250 CAPF soldiers to join the victory parade presided over by Prime Minister King and several thousand onlookers coxed away from the raucous street parties. "The better time was had at the street dance," Cragg admitted, but even the "red-tabbed and gold-braided atmosphere" seemed to reflect a new feeling "of ease and downright good-will that was in sharp contrast to similar ceremonies of the war years."[664] For CAPF soldiers arriving from Europe, it was all an anticlimax. "It means we're out of a job," Private Fred Balcombe shrugged to a Canadian Press (CP) reporter as he disembarked in Halifax.[665] On 29 August, the Prime Minister's Office released a statement saying that when the formal Japanese surrender was signed, both the CAPF "and the Royal Canadian Air Force units which were being organized for participation in the Japanese war will be disbanded," with their men returning to the ongoing queue of servicemen scheduled for demobilization.[666]

"China," [undated], R10383, reel H-3068, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 3 (17 December 1945): 3694.

[662] WD, HQ 1 CIR, entries 12, 14 August 1945, R112, vol. 14100, file 1938, DNDF, LAC.

[663] "'Thank God,' Reaction of Gen. Hoffmeister," *Globe and Mail*, 15 August 1945, 5.

[664] "Hoffmeister Helps Review VJ-Day Parade," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 15 August 1945, 1, 12; Kenneth C. Cragg, "Parades, Dance Feature Ottawa Celebrations," *Globe and Mail*, 16 August 1945, 7.

[665] "'It Means We're Out of a Job,' Volunteer States," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 15 August 1945, 12. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 3, Fig. 9.

[666] "Press Release," 29 August 1945; Army Message A.G. 6758, 31 August 1945, R112, vol. 2924, file HQS-9131, vol. 7, DNDF, LAC. See also "Pacific Army Disbandment Under Way," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 4 September 1945, 1.

In a more serious moment, Cragg met with other journalists at Laurier House, where it was left to the prime minister to sum up events. First thanking the armed forces for their contribution to victory, King then offered special recognition to the men of C Force. "Every effort will be made to have them brought home at the earliest possible moment," he promised solemnly. "They are free now."[667] Back in Asia, as Canada's senior military official in the region, Richard Malone was tasked by Ottawa with tracking them down. Coordinating with the small group of Canadians in the Philippines, CP correspondent Bill Stewart immediately set off for Hong Kong, while Malone and Captain Colin MacDougal hitched a ride to Atsugi Airbase near Tokyo. Within a few days, they had helped locate 286 Canadian POWs. After their evacuation, both Malone and MacDougal went on to attend the *Missouri* surrender ceremony, the only other Canadians present, and witnessed as Lawrence Cosgrave made his fabled mistake. "It was an unfortunate slip," Malone wrote later, "and following the ceremony there was a fair amount of kidding about it, particularly as Moore for a brief moment tried to argue that he had been right and everyone else had been wrong." This, however, "was quickly forgotten when Moore stood the drinks at a subsequent celebration."[668]

The Pacific War's end also ushered in a new era for the Far Eastern Mandarins. By mid-1944, Hugh Keenleyside and his wife Katherine had started to mull "the whole question of how we wanted to spend the remainder of our active life together," as the war's end would be a logical moment to choose. While accepting a post in academia was debated, in the end Keenleyside chose to remain with External. In October 1944, Norman Robertson entered his East Block office, addressing him formally as "Your Excellency." Keenleyside, he soon learned, was Canada's next ambassador to Mexico.[669] "I view his departure with mixed feelings," Arthur Menzies admitted to

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[667] Kenneth C. Cragg, "Today V-Day, Premier King Announces," *Globe and Mail*, 15 August 1945, 1. See also Pickersgill and Forester, *The Mackenzie King Record*, 2:460-462.
[668] Malone, *A World in Flames*, 238-241, 248-249. 255.
[669] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:219-221.

his parents that November, "as he has been a good chief to work with, leaving me plenty of latitude to work out my own ideas."[670] This would be the end of the road for Keenleyside's real engagement with Japanese affairs. "Although I occasionally wrote on Japanese subjects from Mexico City," he wrote in his memoirs (see Chapters 4-5), "I was not in a position to maintain any regular review of affairs in the Far East or of the reaction of the Canadian government to them."[671] After his return to Ottawa in 1947, Keenleyside sporadically attended Japan-focused events. In February 1950, he attended the luncheon given by Lester Pearson for a visiting group of Japanese parliamentarians while serving as the Department of Mines and Resources' deputy minister (see Chapter 5), but by this point he had largely moved on to other projects.[672] Still, as Keenleyside wrote later, his two most ambitious subordinates had proven themselves capable replacements: "We are fully entitled to believe, also, that in Canadian representation in Japan during the early post-war years, Herbert Norman and Arthur Menzies were in every case on the side of enlightenment, reform, and common sense."[673] The torch at External had been passed to a new generation of Asian diplomats, tempered by war and about to be tested by a hard and bitter Cold War peace.

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[670] Menzies to Family, 19 November 1944, R15615, vol. 19, file 5, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. An editorial in the *Ottawa Citizen* had recently praised the appointment of "One of the ablest men in the Department of External Affairs" to Mexico City. See "Canada to Mexico," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 16 November 1944, 22.
[671] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:187.
[672] "Report on the Visit of a Japanese Parliamentary Delegation to Ottawa, February 23-24, 1950," 4, 11 March 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC. At several points, Keenleyside's name was floated to represent Canada in Japan, initially just before the war in the early 1940s and later as its first postwar ambassador in 1952. Ultimately, given the breakdown of Japanese-Canadian relations in 1941, no minister was sent to replace the nominally temporary Edgar D'Arcy McGreer. After the war, Robert Mayhew was ultimately made Canadian ambassador to Tokyo, at which point Keenleyside had left External to work at the United Nations. See Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:158-160; "Keenleyside May Be First Japan Envoy," *Victoria Daily Times*, 23 June 1952, 2.
[673] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:188.

Part II: Sunrise

Chapter 4: A War Without Mercy? Japan and the Limits of Canadian Hatred, 1945–1950

> *"The revelations of freed prisoners of war and the United States' report on atrocities committed by the Japanese go to show that, far from being the kindly-hearted, laughter-loving people of popular tradition, they are pitiless creatures whose capacity for savagery was concealed beneath a thin veneer of politeness which they exhibited to visiting foreigners."*
>
> — Editorial, *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 September 1945[674]

> *"Whether or not we can forget our dislike for the Japanese is of little or no consequence; that is for each one of us to decide for ourselves. To deny the rights of a Canadian citizen to* any *person having a legitimate claim to Canadian citizenship, however, is to mock the ideal for which we fought and paid so dearly."*
>
> — Cpl. Arthur Robson, Hong Kong Veteran, 15 March 1948[675]

In August 1945, 6.5 million Japanese were not where they needed or wanted to be. Only 3.5 million were the defeated remnants of Japan's armed forces. The remaining three million were civilians—"a huge and generally forgotten cadre," historian John Dower observes, "who had been sent out to help develop the imperium." Exempting a smaller number of POWs, most were scattered across the scraps of Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere: 1.4 million in long colonized Taiwan and Korea; 1.1 million in Manchukuo; 1.5 million in the rest of China; 270,000 dispersed across the Pacific islands, withering on the vines of bypassed Truk and Rabaul; 760,000 still guarding the resources of Indochina, Malaya, and the East Indies. Fewer than 20,000 were based in the ex-British colony of Hong Kong.[676] There were also many foreigners who did not want to be in Japan, notably at least 1,170,000 "aliens" who had laboured in coal mines and factories.[677] Over a million were Koreans, dragooned into serving the empire since 1940. About 1,050 were Canadians, most the ill-fated remnants of C Force.[678] From 1945 until 1947, the US Supreme Commander for the

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[674] "Japan Unmasked," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 10 September 1945, 20.
[675] A.T. Robson, "A P.O.W. Answers a B.C. Jap Hater," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 March 1948, 72.
[676] John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), 48-49; *Reports of General MacArthur*, vol. 1 supplement (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 1966), 148.
[677] *Reports of General MacArthur*, vol. 1 sup., 149.
[678] Charles G. Roland, *Long Night's Journey into Day* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001), 322-323. Dower sets the Korean figure at closer to 1.35 million. In addition, many of Japan's ex-colonial Taiwanese and Chinese subjects chose to be repatriated to Japan. See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 54.

Allied Powers (SCAP) tried to regulate this great traffic of humanity, initially conducted with what remained of Japan's merchant shipping, before American transports were finally provided.[679]

In April 1946, another group of civilian repatriates docked in Yokohama. These, however, came not from Japan's lost empire, but rather Vancouver. These were the first of 3,957 Japanese-Canadian who arrived in five waves between April and August under the sweeping powers of the Canadian War Measures Act, exiling all Japanese nationals no matter their legal status, plus any Canadian-born citizen who had tendered a voluntary request, many feeling they had no choice but to accept. All repatriates, whatever their status, were stripped of their Canadian citizenship.[680] They returned "home" to a ruined country, its cities bombed, with unemployment rife, and food scarce. Like one relative of Naomi Nakane in Joy Kogawa's influential novel *Obasan* (1981), they had "co-operated with the will of the country by taking all [their] family and grandchildren to hunger, poverty, and ostracism in Japan." "What do you think happened to mother and Grandma in Japan," Naomi asks her aunt. "Did they starve, do you think?" If fictional, Naomi's precocious question undeniably ate at many real Japanese-Canadians who remained in Canada, much as it did her Aunt Emily, who had a "sudden beam of pain that had to be extinguished immediately."[681]

On the other side of the Pacific, C Force's survivors docked in Esquimalt. In Hong Kong, only on 16 September had the Japanese garrison finally surrendered to British Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, allowing the 369 Canadians still in the colony to be liberated. Joining the POWs liberated in Japan, many returned home on HMCS *Prince Robert* in October.[682] Their experiences stunned the country. The state of the first ten repatriates on 15 September, was shocking enough.

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[679] See *Reports of General MacArthur*, vol. 1 sup., 149.
[680] Ann Gomer Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981), 143-145; Audrey Kobayashi, Reuben Rose-Redwood, and Sonja Aagesen, "Exile: Mapping the Migration Patterns of Japanese Canadians Exiled to Japan in 1946," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 37, no. 4 (Summer 2018): 82-83. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 1.
[681] Joy Kogawa, *Obasan* (Toronto: Penguin, 2017), 164-165. For the influence of Obasan in Canada, see Susan Fisher, "'Our Neighbour Across the Way,' Japan and Canadian Writers," *Canadian Literature* 174 (Autumn 2002): 29n2.
[682] Roland, *Long Night's Journey*, 322-323. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 2.

"They smiled though the memories of four years of hardship under the Japanese heel," the *Vancouver Sun* noted, "but the only real display of emotion was evident in the trembling of their hands as they held their cups of coffee, and the sweat that appeared on trembling lips as they told their stories." One story involved Kanao Inouye, the guard who, having faced discrimination while growing up in Kamloops, BC had later moved to Japan and joined the Japanese army, where he had the chance to "beat them with anything he could lay his hands on" (see Chapter 1).[683] Bringing "the Kamloops Kid" to justice became a Canadian cause célèbre. As early as 14 September, Davie Fulton, the MP for Kamloops, had risen in the House to ask Prime Minister W.L.M. King whether reports that "the most brutal of their captors was a Canadian-born Japanese" from his own riding were true and to ask how Ottawa planned to deal with him.[684] The anger of many ex-POWs was palpable. "The Japanese are just animals," the newly-liberated William Moles told the *Globe and Mail* in October. "They're not human. … Let there be no talk of a soft peace with Japan."[685]

By the end of the Pacific War, then, Canadian public opinion toward Japan was universally hostile, marked by an almost total lack of sympathy or respect for the country or its people. That May, the CIPO asked Canadians if they thought "it would be possible for Japan to become a good nation within twenty years or so after the war." The results were both conclusive and damning: 31% thought it would take more than two decades, 51% thought the Japanese could <u>*never*</u> redeem themselves, a far greater proportion that the third of respondents who deemed the Germans as similarly incurable.[686] With the full scope of Japanese war crimes now emerging, few Canadians were in a lenient mood. Events had shown the Japanese to be "pitiless creatures whose capacity

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[683] "First Repats Tell of Jap Camp Life," *Vancouver Sun*, 15 September 1945, 30. See also, "First Hong Kong Men in Dominion from Jap Prison," *Globe and Mail*, 15 September 1945, 2.
[684] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 1 (14 September 1945): 177.
[685] "Recipes Favorite Topic of Hong Kong Prisoners," *Globe and Mail*, 14 October 1945, 4.
[686] CIPO, "Canadians Think Japanese Even Worse Students of Peace Than Are the Germans," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, May 19, 1945, 13. Cf. Hadley Cantril with Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 502.

for savagery was concealed beneath a thin veneer of politeness," the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized that September. "That some studied politeness is being manifested again" was because "the game of conquest is up and hope of victory vanished." But this, the paper concluded, "should deceive nobody."[687] Even the prime minister, as Klaus Pringsheim later discovered, had little sympathy for Japan, shrugging that if the atomic bomb had to be used on anyone, "It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe."[688] To most Canadians in 1945, Japan was an irredeemably violent and deceitful country, one populated by racial inferiors who had suffered a richly deserved defeat at the hands of the Allies. With such a dismal starting point, one may wonder how Japanese-Canadian relations ever recovered.

In this chapter I explore how, in hindsight at least, things were not as bad as they appeared. Indeed, what is perhaps surprising about postwar Japanese-Canadian relations are how quickly the racism and fearmongering of the war years were buried. As historian John Dower notes, Western racism and cynicism toward Japan did not magically evaporate in 1945, it was merely "sublimated, and emerged in less blatant guises." Yet, it was still striking how fast "seemingly irreconcilable hatred gave way to cordial relations once the fighting had ceased."[689] This chapter explores how this phenomenon played out in Canada as the repatriation of Japanese-Canadians and the desire of ex-Canadian POWs for compensation impacted perceptions of the defeated ex-Axis country and Ottawa's foreign policy towards it. In the first section, we will see how Ottawa debated how harsh to make its postwar conduct towards Japan and how it aided in both punishing and rehabilitating the defeated country. This included both the stick of tendering of reparations claims against Japan and the carrot of inviting a group of Japanese legislators to visit Ottawa in 1950 to study Parliament

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[687] "Japan Unmasked," 20.
[688] W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 6 August 1945, R10383, W.L. Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic, 1983), 90-91.
[689] John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 310-311.

and aid procedural reforms to the Diet under SCAP direction. In the second section, I explore how Ottawa's decision to repatriate Japanese-Canadians in 1946 influenced Canadian policymaking on the country, focusing on the role played by Herbert Norman and the new Canadian Liaison Mission (CLM) in facilitating it. Ultimately, while domestic pressure would help enfranchise the rest of the Japanese diaspora in Canada by 1949, it would *not* affect Ottawa's exclusionary policies barring new Japanese immigration, ignoring concerns from the Japanese government. In the final section, I offer a case study on how C Force veterans banded together to press Ottawa for compensation given Japan's mistreatment of them during the war. As I argue, while the new Hong Kong Veterans Association of Canada (HKVAC) garnered immense support from the Canadian public in asserting its claims and had some success in winning "Pacific pay" from a reluctant Ottawa in 1949, the group's maximalist desires and controversial lobbying strategies eventually doomed its efforts to failure as its anti-Japanese views diverged from mainstream opinion in the decades that followed.

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On 15 August 1946, John Kenderdine and his stenographer Alice Browne disembarked the S.S. *General Meigs* in Yokohama as Canada's new representatives from the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC). They had arrived with Herbert Norman and his own secretarial staff to reoccupy Canada's Tokyo Legation and establish the new Canadian Liaison Mission to represent the country in postwar Japan.[690] Among the papers in Kenderdine's possession as he stepped off the boat were two cheques from the Nippon Typewriter Company and Yawata & Company dated 1937 and 1938. Initially misplaced, these had been found at the Legation by Commercial Secretary M.T. Stewart "at the time of the Pearl Harbor debacle" and returned to Canada with Edgar D'Arcy McGreer in 1942, where they collected dust until rediscovered in 1946. Both originated as part of

[690] See Acting USSEA to Norman, 24 July 1946; Browne Biography; Kenderdine's Biography, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC. For more on Norman's arrival in postwar Japan, see Chapter 5.

Canada and the other Western powers' embargo of Japan in the lead-up to the Pacific War. At the time, Nippon Typewriter was importing Canadian carbon paper, while Yawata had ordered ice skates from a firm in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. When foreign exchange restrictions came into effect in the late 1930s, however, both were unable to acquire Canadian dollars, and so were allowed to ship their products against the deposit of the cheques. "Obviously if we had been sure the war was inevitable we would have recommended very strongly against this procedure," DTC official C.M. Croft admitted in 1947, "but when these cheques were received there was still a reasonable hope that war might be averted." As it was, the point was moot, for neither firm had seemingly survived the war. Nippon Typewriter, as Croft noted, had its headquarters "in an area near the Ginza, which, I understand, was badly bombed and burnt." In the end, it seems that Kenderdine was never able to track either company down. The old cheques went unclaimed.[691]

The fate of these two small claims can perhaps stand in for the many difficulties Canadians experienced in trying to pursue reparations against Japan during the occupation. Under the terms of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, "just reparations in kind" were to be ceded by Japan to the victorious Allies, including Canada, and acquiring its fair share had received serious attention in Ottawa. As External informed Norman as part of his official instructions on being posted to CLM:

> the Inter-Departmental Committee on Reparations agreed that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to have Canadian titles to properties in the Far East recognized and given protection. In some cases this will involve restitution of property that has been damaged or destroyed. You will, no doubt, receive enquires regarding the status of such property. It would be helpful if, before leaving Ottawa, you could acquaint yourself with property lists filled with the Custodian of Enemy Property and, perhaps, provide yourself with copies to take to Japan.[692]

Indeed, as early as March 1946, External held an informal meeting with DTC officials to discuss

[691] Stewart to H.W. Cheney, 2 July 1946; Kenderdine to Cheney, 10 September 1946; Cheney to C.M. Croft, 29 November 1946; Croft to Cheney, 3 January 1947; Cheney to Kenderdine, 23 January 1947, R208, vol. 956, file T-7-1943, DTCF, LAC.
[692] USSEA to Norman, 3 July 1946, R219, vol. 3659, file 4900-B-10-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.

Canada's position on reparations for the upcoming opening of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington. While all in attendance agreed that "as the shares of reparation from Japan would probably be allocated on the basis of contribution to the Pacific war, the Canadian portion would no doubt be relatively modest," they concluded that Ottawa held $3 million dollars worth of seized Japanese assets in Canada, with claims worth as much as $11 million abroad, though this figure was thought inflated.[693] Still, given the state of Japan's postwar economy, reacquiring these assets or getting compensation was fraught with difficulties. Despite scholar Keith Webster's glib remark that Canada was "un-mindful of the economic devastation that had visited Japan" and saw "no contradiction between their desire for Japanese recovery and their preparations to claim a share of the reparations," this fact had indeed been noted by Ottawa.[694] "In considering the amount of capital equipment to be removed from Japan on reparations account," Ottawa explicitly informed Canada's Washington Embassy in April, "you should bear in mind Canadian long term interest in the peaceful economic recovery of Japan."[695] Still, the desire to both get financial restitution and ensure Japan's postwar economic viability was a careful balancing act for the Allies. When Edwin Pauley, President Harry Truman's reparations advisor, concluded in November 1946 that once his plan was executed Japanese industry would be returned to its level circa 1900—much to Japan's horror—it was clear that claiming full reparations would not be without consequence.[696]

Despite their limited claims to Japanese reparations, many Canadians were clearly eager to receive their due. In June 1946, the Aluminum Company of Canada (ACC, the future Alcan) let it be known that they were "interested in the possibility of securing under reparations or by purchase,

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[693] "Japanese Reparation," 18 March 1946, R208, vol. 295, file T-10182, part 1. Cf. *DCER*, vol. 12, 303-304.
[694] Keith Stuart Webster, "Canada and the Far Eastern Commission" (MA thesis, University of Victoria, 2007), 47.
[695] SSEA to Canadian Ambassador Washington, 12 April 1946, R208, vol. 295, file T-10182, part 1, DTCF, LAC. This remained a consistent Canadian position throughout the reparations debate. Cf. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 99. See also my comments in Chapter 7.
[696] Saori N. Katada, "Japan's Foreign Aid After the San Francisco Peace Treaty," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9 no. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2000): 199.

a sheet rolling mill, and a foil mill from Japan," later adding an "electric caustic soda plant of approximately 12,000 ton capacity" for installation at Arvida to its list, a request taken seriously by Ottawa.[697] When a proposal circulated in late 1946 that a multinational reparations commission might be assembled to go to Japan to survey what was available, Ottawa immediately readied a list of the "principal trade associations in Canada" for incorporation into their delegation, including someone from ACC.[698] As Lester Pearson personally assured the company in November, Ottawa wanted to survey Japanese industry, "so that when Canada has been allocated a percentage share in reparations from Japan, the Government will be in a position to make bids for specific industrial equipment," including their coveted aluminum and lye plants. Yet, as Pearson admitted, this all came down to what happened at the FEC, where an understanding "has not yet been reached on the allocation of reparations shares to the interested governments."[699]

In Washington, the reparations issue was taken up by one of the FEC's seven committees in 1946, where the national allocation of reparations had become a major issue. In November 1946, a private American plan created a formula wherein most reparations went to themselves and China (30% and 43% of all assets, respectively), and the remainder was divided among the other Allies, with 4% for Australia and 1% for Canada.[700] This proposal marked the start of months of debate as each nation predictably defended their maximalist claims. In May 1947, reparations were seen in Washington as one of the "knottiest problem" facing FEC. By this time, total claims amounted to 176.5% of all reparations, with Canada now formally claiming 1.5%. Yet, as American diplomat John Emmerson noted, this was actually "more modest than most members had expected"![701] This

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[697] G.D. Mallory to Norman Robertson, 21 June 1946, R208, vol. 295, file T-10182, part 1, DTCF, LAC; M.W. Mackenzie to USSEA, 9 August 1946, R208, vol. 293, file T-10110, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[698] T.M. Kerruish to Mallory, 19 October 1946, R208, vol. 293, file T-10110, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[699] Pearson to Aluminium Secretariate Limited, 15 November 1946, R208, vol. 293, file T-10110, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[700] John H. Hilldring to Dean Acheson, 25 November 1946; "United States Views Regarding Division of Shares Among Claimant Countries of Japanese Reparations Assets," 23 November 1946, RG43, 43.11.23, reel 160, NARA.
[701] Emmerson to Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 15 May 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 395-397.

game of ratios continued for several more months, as GHQ implemented "interim" measures to ensure the movement of 30% of the slated reparations.[702] Both the Soviets and the Chinese were especially dogged in their claims, an understandable fact in the latter case given the damage Japan had wrought to China during its eight-year invasion. Few nations proved as unhelpful as Australia, however, which desired 28%, despite other members more modest suggestions that they deserved 8%.[703] By September, it was clear to the Canadians that these ratios were "almost a dead issue," though one optimist noted that at least "there has been no objection … to the Canadian claim of 1½%, and no country has allotted to Canada a figure below this."[704] Unfortunately, even this silver lining was lost when the next American plan proposed reducing Canada's share to 1%.[705]

As the fight dragged on fruitlessly in Washington, SCAP established a new Restitution and Reparations Team to act on "routine matters pertaining to reparations removals, restitution, or any other relevant matter which would otherwise require the visit of individual missions." In December 1946, Ottawa decided that Kenderdine would chair the Canadian delegation, joined in Japan by F.F. Ruthven from ACC and insurance expert R.M. Dobson from Sun Life Canada, the two groups holding most of Canada's prewar assets in the country. Made official in January, the two men left Canada in February to join an expectant Kenderdine in Tokyo.[706] Yet, from the start, it was clear that the Americans were not keen on surveying anything before a formal reparations policy was settled at FEC. As Kenderdine informed Norman, it was clear the committee's head, US Brigadier

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[702] Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 109.
[703] See Canadian Ambassador to the US to SSEA, 21 July, 30 July, 20 August, 28 August; Memorandum to Louis St. Laurent, 30 August 1947, R208, vol. 310, file T-10815, part 4, DTCF, LAC. Indeed, Australia was one of the more intransient FEC members on reparations. In May, its delegation had given the opinion that "FEC has no jurisdiction over division and allocation of reparations," a position that "threw [the] Commission into confusion," before it was eventually rejected. See George Marshall to Dean Acheson, 16 May 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 399.
[704] Canadian Ambassador to the US to SSEA, 18 September 1947, R208, vol. 310, file T-10815, part 4, DTCF, LAC; "Japanese Reparations – Division of Shares," 30 August 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 253-255.
[705] Memorandum by James Penfield, 25 September 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 428-431.
[706] Pearson to Deputy Minister DTC and Enclosure, 18 December 1946, R208, vol. 293, file T-10110, part 2, DTCF, LAC; "Order in Council," 14 January 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 245-247.

William Harrison, was "endeavouring to discourage any early inspection action by the delegates now in Japan." Moreover, as Ruthven found, Harrison made it clear in "off-the-record discussions" that ACC's desire for plants "might be further reduced or eliminated altogether."[707] This was part of General Douglas MacArthur's hardening stance towards "war booty" and Edwin Pauley's initial plan to denude Japan of its industrial assets, which would impede any Japanese economic recovery. While the already agreed 30% of reparations were sent to the most devastated regions of southeast Asia, their further extraction was discontinued in the spring of 1949, to much anger from the other FEC nations.[708] There would be no Japanese "contribution" to Arvida after all.[709]

Yet, this fact was not a terrible surprise for Ottawa, which had already accepted that taking maximum reparations from Japan served no one's interests. In November 1947, the Americans had offered a final "a take it or leave it" proposal to break the deadlock at FEC, with Canada getting 1.25%. This resolution was badly needed, External noted at the time, as the dispute was "seriously holding up the economic recovery and rehabilitation of many Far Eastern areas." Moreover, given information received from DTC that aside from ACC there was "a complete lack of interest on the part of Canadian industry in securing any industrial plants from Japan," abandoning .25% of their claim was "a small sacrifice to make considering the advantages which could be gained by an early settlement of the reparations question."[710] In the end, with SCAP waiving the bill on reparations in favour of restoring Japan's economy, the issue was left in abeyance for the remainder of the occupation. Included in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 14 held that "Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war,"

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[707] Kenderdine to Noman, 7 March 1947 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 293, file T-10110, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[708] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 109; Katada, "Japan's Foreign Aid," 200-201.
[709] Though this decision did not stop ACC from trying to benefit from Japanese reparations. In 1948, Arthur Menzies handled their request to buy additional shares in an aluminum company that had formerly belonged to the Sumitomo zaibatsu. See Menzies to Deputy Minister DTC, 5 February 1949, R208, vol. 953, file T-7-283, part 6, DTCF, LAC.
[710] Division of Reparations Shares of Japanese Industrial Facilities, 14 November 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 255-257. Both DTC and External had privately accepted a 1.25% share in May 1947.

while also recognizing that "the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering."[711] Given Canada's modest claims and dwindling postwar malice towards Japan, this was not seen as a great hardship. While Ottawa would keep already seized Japanese assets, it would demand no more.

A second major issue for Ottawa in helping to rehabilitate Japan was reviving the country's democratic norms, a fact exemplified by the visit of a delegation from the Diet to the United States and Canada in 1950. For obvious reasons, democratization was a key goal for SCAP that received significant coverage by both Norman at CLM as well as in the Canadian press. While Japan did emerge from the occupation with the beginnings of a new democratic tradition, this fact was by no means obvious to observers at the time (see Chapter 5). As Norman's reporting shows, he and his staff were deeply critical of the reconstituted Diet, as well as the new prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. In December 1947, Norman noted the persistence of Japan's prewar "Oyabun-Kobun" [Boss-Henchman] system despite SCAP reforms. This produced, in Norman words, "cliques and factions organized in feudal fashion with a leader at the top and blindly loyal henchman beneath them," which extended "far into cabinets and into the upper reaches of the bureaucracy." These networks, he added, persisted in Yoshida's cabinet.[712] As for the prime minister himself, Canadian views were mixed. Writing from Mexico in October 1945, Hugh Keenleyside argued Yoshida was "definitely inclined in the right direction" and would "do nothing to hamper the introduction of a reform policy in Japan." However, he had worryingly "close contacts with the Mitsubishi interests" and was thus unlikely to confront the zaibatsu.[713] In Japan, Norman was even more critical, arguing

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[711] *Treaty of Peace with Japan, Treaty Series 1952, No. 4* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 14.
[712] Norman to SSEA, 5 December 1947, R219, vol. 235, file 4606-40c, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 149-151. Today mostly associated with the hierarchy of Yakuza gangsters, the system was then pervasive in Japan, with one opinion poll by the *Asahi* in 1947 reporting that most Japanese were familiar with how it worked. For a more detailed analysis of the system published a few years after Norman's own, see Ishino Iwao, "The Oyabun-Kobun: A Japanese Ritual Kinship Institution," *American Anthropologist* 55, no. 5 (December 1953): 695-707.
[713] Keenleyside to H.H. Wrong, 10 October 1945, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

that if Yoshida had been against the war and was personally "affable and genial," he also agreed with MacArthur's critique that he was "ignorant of politics and economics," while also being "in every sense of the word a conservative with little understanding of the position of labour in modern politics," with no real desire to learn.[714] In his final political report to External before the delegates arrived, Norman described a vapid report that Yoshida had delivered to the Diet. "This speech is no clarion call sounded by a dynamic and forthright leader," he concluded bluntly, but rather that "of a political manipulator," one that had received bad press in all the major Japanese papers.[715]

This stance was broadly shared by the Canadian press. The *Toronto Star*, for one, penned a series of editorials in 1949 lamenting what it saw as "the volume of evidence concerning the failure of democratization in Japan," where Tokyo seemed intent on evading as many of SCAP's reforms as possible, especially those respecting labour rights.[716] The liberal *Star* was, perhaps, more critical than most, but even the establishment papers had their doubts. To British journalist Honor Tracy, writing in 1948 for both the London *Observer* and *Globe and Mail*, local politics were "hopelessly confused," political ideals were "jettisoned freely as the expediency of the moment may require," the corruption of politicians was endemic, and all took place "despite the fact that American control of their actions has never been more rigid."[717] "The visit of a group of Japanese parliamentarians to Ottawa later this month," the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized in late February 1950, "is the kind of association that can promote international good will." "But," the paper added, "amiable sentiments cannot of themselves ensure the peace and prosperity of Japan or another country."

> Realities must be faced. Japan needs democracy, since its old ruling groups chose the way of imperialism and war. Its middle class being small, workers and peasants form

[714] Norman to SSEA, 1 November 1948, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 155. A checkmark next to this passage seems to indicate that External agreed with Norman's assessment.
[715] Norman to SSEA, 14 November 1949, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC. The papers Norman cited were the *Yomiuri*, the *Mainichi*, the *Asahi*, the *Nihon Keizai*, and the *Nippon Times*.
[716] For this quote, see "Doubts About Japan," *Toronto Daily Star*, 19 November 1949, 6. For another comparable editorial in the same paper, see "The State of Democracy in Japan," *Toronto Daily Star*, 30 July 1949, 6.
[717] Honor Tracy, "Politics Corrupt," *Globe and Mail*, 25 August 1948, 6.

> the only popular base for democracy. The fact is, however, that these classes have little political consciousness or power. The present conservative government represents the elements that dominated before the war. In the last election, much of the vote was delivered by political machines aided by terrorist gangs. Not long ago, widespread corruption was exposed even among parliamentarians. The government is veering back to "thought control" and intimidation by secret police. Thousands of teachers are threatened by a purge in schools and colleges. Only the allied occupation prevents a drive to destroy labor's gains.[718]

Such cynicism did not seem to bode well for the positive reception of any Japanese politicians to Canada, nor in Canada's belief in a democratized Japan writ large.

Yet, despite these issues—or, indeed, because of them—Ottawa remained opened to seeing the Diet mission if it wanted to come. Initially, MacArthur's staff had raised the idea to Norman in April 1949, as Canada's Westminster-style Parliament was in many ways closer in design to the Japanese Diet than the US Congress.[719] While this visit was later postponed until 1950, Norman still recommended that Ottawa agree to the proposal for two reasons. First, their visit would help SCAP's democratization efforts by showing the Japanese "an example of democratic procedure other than their own." Given the corruption or fecklessness of many Japanese politicians, this alone made it worthwhile. Second, for Canadians, it would "also serve to emphasize that our interest in the Far Eastern Commission and Japanese political development is of [a] practical nature."[720] In other words, it would assert Ottawa's interest in Japanese and East Asia affairs at little personal cost. A third potential benefit was later raised by Arnold Heeney in a memo to Lester Pearson. As Heeney noted, the visit might also give Norman's staff "access to Japanese parliamentarians that might not otherwise be readily available."[721] Such contacts could only raise Norman's standing in the eyes of Japanese officialdom. In the end, this Canadian diversion was only a minor part of the

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[718] "Democracy's Weakness in Japan," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 20 February 1950, 30.
[719] Norman to SSEA, 18 April 1949, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.
[720] Norman to SSEA, 13 December 1949, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-2, PCOF, LAC.
[721] A.D.P.H., "Proposal for Visit to Canada if Japanese Parliamentary Delegation," 20 December 1949, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.

Japanese delegates visit to North America, two days out of the total forty planned in the United States. Still, the visit did signal Canada's interest in helping to rebuild postwar Japan.

Luckily for Japan, the 14 Diet members slated to join the delegation were some of the better parliamentarians it had to offer. As Norman reported, the group was representative of the current Diet, including "all major parties, with the exception of the Communists, and [had] members from both the [lower] House of Representatives and the [upper] House of Councillors." This included the charismatic socialist Asanuma Inejirō, then secretary of the left-wing Social Democratic Party who, despite his past support for Japan's wartime government, was now a staunch advocate of its postwar democracy. It also included Kanamori Tokujirō, a skilled bureaucrat and legal scholar then serving as the Diet's Chief Librarian who, in the words of two later scholars, was "profoundly liberal in his constitutional values" and "believed deeply in the rule of law and in human rights." Indeed, as Norman noted, at the time Kanamori was best known for his "chief part in preparing [Japan's postwar] Constitution for presentation to the Diet," which gave his liberalism significant credibility at GHQ.[722] Joining the Diet men would be several translators, plus two officials from SCAP.[723] On 31 January 1950, Ottawa told the Americans through their Washington Embassy that they were happy to receive the Japanese in the capital on 23 and 24 February.[724]

Yet, as the delegates toured the United States prior to their Canadian visit, their presence remained somewhat controversial. While the formal receptions by US federal officials were always

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[722] Norman to SSEA, 4 January 1950 and Enclosures, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC; Andrew G. Gordon, "Asanuma Inejirō (1898–1960)," in *Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism*, ed. James L. Huffman (New York: Garland, 1998), 15-16; Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State Under MacArthur* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8-9.
[723] These were Justin Williams, head of SCAP's Parliamentary Division, and Makoto Matsukata, an American Nisei.
[724] Canadian Ambassador to the US to SSEA, 31 January; 1 February 1950; "Press Release," 9 February 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC; "Canada Invites Japanese," *New York Times*, 10 February 1950, 31. Originally, the Privy Council had proposed inviting the delegates sometime in early to mid-February. However, as St. Laurent argued, since parliament was in recess and would not return before 16 February, it made more sense to invite them later in the month when they could actually see Canadian democracy in action. See "External Affairs; Visit of Japanese Parliamentary Delegation," 18 January 1950, R165, reel T-2366, PCOF, LAC.

cordial, some Americans were not so happy. In Boston, the city council voted 11-to-8 on a motion by Councillor James Coffey to ban the delegates from their chamber. With a call to "keep those Japs the hell out of here," Coffey urged councilmen to "remember the sneak attack" at Pearl Harbor and "the March of Bataan." Many other Bostonians, however, disassociated themselves from the vote, the *Boston Globe* calling it "unfortunate and regrettable."[725] North of the border, in External's prepared "background notes" for the visit, the success of Japan's postwar democracy was tempered by its apparent deficiencies. Echoing Norman, the brief criticized Yoshida's "somewhat feudal domination of party activities." Debates in the House of Representatives, meanwhile, "have not always been dignified," and it was evident that many "individual Diet members lack the experience which they would have had as a result of the growth of a tradition of parliamentary government." Still, in their trip through the US, the Japanese had "posed searching and intelligent questions and it is very likely they will do the same while in Canada."[726] The Japanese were coming here to learn, External essentially concluded, and Ottawa would do what it could to instruct them.

Despite its brevity, the delegation's visit to Ottawa was a clear success. Due to the fog that blanketed Washington, DC on 22 February, the plan to fly the delegates up for two full days proved unworkable, and the Japanese only disembarked at chilly Rockcliffe Airport on the morning of the 23rd to greet Arthur Menzies, the acting head of External's Far Eastern Division.[727] Over the next two days, the Japanese were progressively wined and dined by their Canadian hosts. On their first day, both Pearson and Robert Mayhew—recently returned from Japan after attending the Colombo Conference in January (see Chapter 5)—attended receptions in their honour at the Chateau Laurier,

[725] "Japanese Ban Stirs Furore," *Daily Boston Globe*, 31 January 1950, 1; "Abashed Boston Warmer Host to Japanese," *Daily Boston Globe*, 1 February 1950, 1; "Visitors from Japan," *Daily Boston Globe*, 1 February 1950, 16.
[726] "The Japanese Government: Background Notes… February 22, 1950," R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC. The Americans too had noticed that the delegates appeared genuinely interested and "took copious notes on their experiences." See "14 Japanese Visit City's Landmarks," *New York Times*, 14 February 1950, 20.
[727] Canadian Ambassador to the US to SSEA, 22 February 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 3.

with Mayhew hosting dinner for them at the House of Commons that evening.[728] Unlike in Boston, both receptions proceeded without controversy. More relevant to the delegation's mission was their visit to the Hill. Here they toured Parliament, attended sessions of both the House and Senate, and held seminars with many of the officials who kept the debates running smoothly, including the Clerks of both chambers and the Sergeant-At-Arms.[729] At the Senate, the Japanese were even serenaded in the Gallery by Liberal Senate Leader Wishart Robertson, who broke off his prepared remarks to extend "our heartiest welcome" and to "wish them well in the great experiment upon which they are embarking," an opinion seconded by opposition Senator John Haig. As Haig added, little time had elapsed since the Pacific War, "and we did our best to prevail." But as that war was over now, "I join with other members of this house and with all our people in the hope that a peace treaty with Japan will soon be adopted and that in its new parliament Japan, as an independent nation, will pattern its affairs on a democratic system similar to those at work in Canada."[730]

At the end of the day, however, the most popular meeting the Japanese attended was with Arthur Beauchesne, the long-serving and recently retired House Clerk, who had literally written the book on Canadian parliamentary procedure.[731] In External's words, only a single two-hour session had been scheduled, "but at the request of the delegation a second and unplanned seminar was arranged for them in their free time."[732] Other delegates used their time to probe those areas of government most pertinent to their own interests. For Kanamori, this meant "several hours with the Parliamentary Librarian," where an exchange program between their nations' two libraries was

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[728] "Report on the Visit of a Japanese Parliamentary Delegation to Ottawa, February 23-24, 1950," [hereafter Japan Report], 4-5, 11 March 1950; "Luncheon Given by Honourable L.B. Pearson…"; "Dinner by the Honourable R.W. Mayhew…," R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.
[729] See Japan Report, 2-4.
[730] *Senate Debates*, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 1 (23 September 1950): 26-27.
[731] See Arthur Beauchesne, *Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada with Annotations and An Extensive Index* (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1922). Originally written in 1922, Beauchesne's work would be periodically updated and reissued, remaining the main guide on parliamentary conduct for decades to come.
[732] Japan Report, 2-3. Cf. Pearson to Beauchesne, 28 February 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.

discussed.[733] The final courtesy came just before the Japanese left Ottawa, as Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent himself appeared. In his brief remarks, he thanked the delegates for coming and hoped that they had gained a "more intimate knowledge of Canadians." Presciently, he also mentioned that "other Canadians, including himself, would be able to visit Japan in the not too distant future." Many delegates were later overheard contrasting "the friendly nature of Mr. St. Laurent's interview with interviews conducted by their own Prime Minister."[734] In fact, the gap between the aloof Yoshida and the jovial, well-honed persona of "Uncle Louis" could not have been wider.[735]

Beyond External's mandarins, the visit was also well-received in both Canada and Japan. In Ottawa, a press conference was held in the House's Press Gallery with 20 journalists from across the country. While the reporters probed the Japanese forcefully on points ranging from their views of the occupation to Japan's prewar reputation for unfair trade, the journalists emerged satisfied with their answers, which were "all reassuring and, in the main, convincing" in the *Globe and Mail's* view.[736] "Former enemies of Canada were applauded Thursday in the Senate," the *Ottawa Journal* reported, while the *Ottawa Citizen* testified they were "interested only in restoring Japan's good name."[737] "On the whole, the group conducted itself very well in its relations with the press," External concluded, while "Canadian newspapers gave prominent though not undue attention to the visit … and so far as is known no unfavourable reaction to their visit appeared."[738] In Japan, Norman reported that the visit had received due coverage. To focus attention, External had sent CLM copies of four different photos taken of the delegates to distribute locally. "Through

[733] Japan Report, 4.
[734] Japan Report, 6-7.
[735] For the deliberate cultivation of St. Laurent's affable public persona, see Paul Litt, "Uncle Lou, Both Old and New: The Marketing of St-Laurent," in *The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada*, ed. Patrice A. Dutil (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020), 89-114.
[736] Japan Report, 5-6; Frank Flaherty, "Willing to Play Ball, Jap MP's Attest," *Globe and Mail*, 27 February 1950, 8.
[737] "Ovation Given to Japanese by Senate," *Ottawa Journal*, 24 February 1950, a copy of which can be found in R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC; "Japs Talk to Press," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 25 February 1950, 14.
[738] Japan Report, 6.

acquaintances of goodwill employed by the newspapers *Nippon Times*, *Mainichi* and *Asahi*," as well as the Kyodo wire service, "we were able to have certain of the pictures published and widely circulated," Norman informed External, with further copies sent to Yoshida and MacArthur.[739] In addition, several Diet members penned their own travelogues for the local papers. For Asanuma, Parliament suggested many useful reforms for the Diet, including fines for members who failed to attend, the fact that both houses sat facing each other rather than in a semicircle around the speaker as in the Diet, as well as quorum limits for both houses. He also praised the Canadian Senate's impromptu address to the delegates, the eager reception they received from local reporters, and the meeting with St. Laurent, quoting his desire to visit Japan.[740] As a constitutional scholar, Kanamori was naturally most interested in parliamentary minutia. He noted that Canada's Senate was more like Japan's prewar House of Peers than the new House of Councillors, as its members had lifetime tenure, and described its duty to deliver "solemn and grave reconsideration"—his translation of Sir John A. Macdonald's famous call for a place of "sober second thought." Indeed, compared to the US model, where Congress was a "place for struggle," Kanamori viewed Parliament as more cooperative and "humane" by comparison. Like Asanuma, he also reflected on how both the party in power and the opposition sat facing each other and was likewise impressed by the bearing and courtesy of St. Laurent.[741] On 27 March, Norman was also able to pass along the resolutions passed by both Houses of the Diet thanking the Canadians for their hospitality.[742]

In April 1950, the Japanese delegation presented its final recommendations to both Houses in the Diet. Recommending such things as "Diet members should be more punctual," the speakers

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[739] Norman to SSEA, 20 March 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.
[740] Asanuma Inejirō, "Jinrui no Risō Tassei ni Otagaini-Ryoku o Awaseyou: Kanada Sushō Giin Dan ni Kataru," *Jōmō Shinbun*, 5 March 1950, a copy and translation of which is in R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.
[741] Kanamori Tokujirō, "Kanada Tsūshin," *Asahi Shinbun*, 13 March 1950, a copy and translation of which is in R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC. The adversarial nature of the Canadian press did surprise him, however.
[742] Norman to SSEA, 27 March 1950 and Enclosures, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.

of both houses should have "gavels to maintain order," and that "The Diet building and grounds should be kept clean." "Most of this is rather frothy stuff," Norman admitted, though he thought it "unfair to judge the success or failure of the Delegation's tour abroad on this effort alone." As he continued, most recommendations likely owed more to American than Canadian models, although he thought this was due less to their longer stay in America than the fact they had remained under constant SCAP influence given their chaperones. Still, he added, "I am inclined to think that the Delegation called for gavels, clean dining rooms and ground as the result of its own uninfluenced observations." "I hope that whatever spiritual insight the Delegation members may have obtained into the workings of democracy during the course of their tour," he concluded, "will be of some practical value to them in the present political climate of Japan."[743] At the very least, the delegates sent St. Laurent a polite calligraphy message, praising the "minute knowledge on your Parliament" they had received and that they would "use that precious knowledge for the further democratization of Japan, and eventually to contribute to the peace of the world."[744]

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For Elizabeth Gray Vining, a great adventure was just beginning. On 1 October 1946, she boarded the ex-American troopship *Marine Falcon* in Vancouver bound for Japan, where she would have the task of tutoring Hirohito's eldest son, twelve-year-old Crown Prince Akihito. As Vining later admitted in her memoirs, she faced a daunting task, "sailing into the unknown to take up a fabulous assignment." Luckily, there was at least good company to be had on the voyage over. Coincidentally, Vining shared a cabin with Diana Kenderdine, the wife of Canada's Commercial Councillor, who was also travelling to Japan to join her husband along with Irene Norman, Herbert's wife. "A keen observer, with a gift for vivid and witty expression and a poetic love of

[743] Norman to SSEA, 6 May 1950, R219, vol. 3985, file 9908-AH-40, DEAF, LAC.
[744] Delegation to [St. Laurent], 31 May 1950, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-2, PCOF, LAC; Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 4.

beauty," Vining wrote of the more experienced expat, "she painted for me day after day a picture of Japan as seen by one who had lived in it and loved it." All three women were part of a varied group of Americans and Canadians heading to Japan that August, including "about three hundred army 'dependents,' … about sixty missionaries, returning to the fields from which they had been driven by the war; [and] some twelve hundred [*sic*] Japanese repatriates from Canada":

> The Japanese were a small part of that great tide of repatriates picked up from their homes in America, Korea, China, Manchuria, Formosa, and the South Sea Islands, and washed back upon the shores of the homeland that many of them had never seen, to begin a new life without assets and without hope. Most of them stayed in their dormitories in the hold, though the children came up to play on deck and to buy Coca-Cola and chocolate and blue plastic combs in the little shop.[745]

This was the penultimate group of 532 Japanese-Canadians slated for repatriation who had left their internment camps in the Canadian interior straight for Vancouver's harbourfront immigration office, the ship, and then on into their Japanese exile, having dutifully surrendered 37 Certificates of Naturalization and three passports to the Canadian authorities as they departed.[746]

For Diana and Irene, their arrival in Japan was a happy one. Proving the value of having contacts, Herbert Norman was able to convince General Robert Eichelberger—the commander of the American Eighth Army occupying Japan, who was also on his way to Yokohama to meet his wife arriving on the *Marine Falcon*—to let Kenderdine and himself join the General for lunch and a lift onboard his personal naval launch to greet the ship as it came into port. "We circled her a couple of times," Norman later enthused in a letter to his mother, "and on the second round I was able to pick out Irene … We then cut ahead and were back in the post in time to see her dock."[747] As Vining noted, despite the rain, "excitement reached fever height amid the delays and confusions

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[745] Elizabeth Gray Vining, *Windows for the Crown Prince* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1952), 11-14.
[746] D.J. Timmons, "'Evangelines of 1946': The Exile of Nikkei from Canada to Occupied Japan" (MA diss, University of Victoria, 2011), 59-60; A. MacNamara to USSEA, 17 October 1946, R219, vol. 3634, file 3363-D-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[747] Norman to Mother, 18 October 1946, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 3, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.

of disembarking." For a lucky few, waiting husbands were let aboard "and here and there little clusters of families radiated happiness."[748] But there were no happy welcoming parties waiting for the *Marine Falcon*'s Japanese-Canadians. Instead of lunches with three-star generals and sailing junkets, there was only disillusionment and heartbreak. "We were terribly disappointed in Japan," one returnee recalled of his own repatriation in August 1946. "They put us in this army barracks. They weren't using it [anymore] so it became a reception centre. The first night a lot of us cried." The food in occupied Japan, as his family quickly discovered, was simply awful: "At least we were able to eat in the camp in Canada." But the worst feeling was the basic sense of resentment exuded constantly by locals as they tried to rebuild their lives. "They were starving," he recalled. "You'd see them having a bowl of rice, [a] bowl of gruel. And we came to take some of that."[749]

This "tale of two voyages" starkly underlines how the dark legacy of the repatriation and Ottawa's increasingly lenient postwar relationship with occupied Japan juxtaposed uncomfortably with each other in the late 1940s. While much has been written about the lived experiences of those Japanese-Canadians who experienced repatriation, little study has been given to the impact this decision had on Canada's diplomatic presence at SCAP, or how this controversial act impacted Canada's relationship with the Japanese people.[750] As I show here, the exile's legacy dovetailed with many of the issues External, CLM, and Ottawa were trying to arrange with Japan during this era, including issues of immigration, trade, and even Canada's military presence in Japan during the Korean War (see Chapter 6), which cannot be dissociated from Ottawa's antipathy towards to the Japanese-Canadian diaspora and the Canadian public's growing sympathy towards them.

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[748] Vining, *Windows for the Crown Prince*, 19.
[749] Barry Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame: The Story of the Japanese Canadians in World War II* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1977), 322-323. For other similarly grim accounts of Japanese-Canadian arrivals in Japan, see Timmons, "Evangelines of 1946," 71-79; Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 143-145.
[750] In addition to D.J. Timmons's aforesaid MA dissertation, the best overview of the deportation's legacies is Patricia Roy's "Reopening the Door: Japanese Remigration and Immigrants, 1945–68," in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Patricia Roy and Greg Donaghy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 158-175.

For W.L.M. King and his Liberal cabinet, the repatriation and continued repression of Japanese-Canadians had a direct bearing on Canada's postwar relationship with Tokyo. By December 1946, as the last repatriates left for Japan, public pressure was increasing for Ottawa to take a more lenient stance on the Japanese-Canadians now that the war was over. Outside British Columbia, most Canadians were less dogmatic about the issue, and their views had softened with time.[751] As historian Stephanie Bangarth notes, "Although there was almost no opposition to the relocation, their disfranchisement and expatriation mobilized dissent."[752] From papers like the Japanese-Canadian *New Canadian*, to mainstream organs like *Saturday Night*, the *Winnipeg Free Press*, and the *Ottawa Citizen*;[753] as well as from the 28 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) MPs in the House of Commons; the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy; the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians; and other lobby groups, pressure began to mount on Ottawa. While, in the first six months of 1945, the Prime Minister's Office received a mere four requests to take a moderate policy on Japanese-Canadians, by July and August it had received 36, with comparative increases also registered at the Departments of External Affairs, Labour, and Justice.[754] This pressure only grew as the repatriation proceeded over 1946.

Yet on 22 January 1947, when King's Cabinet met to debate continuing the deportation, it was not an ardent Japanophobe like Ian Mackenzie who took the hardest line, but the new External Affair's Minister, Louis St. Laurent. According to King, St. Laurent hoped to deport "practically all who could be deported, including some Canadian citizens," on the rationale they would never

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[751] Even in January 1945, with the war still ongoing, a 41% plurality of respondents polled by CIPO believed that Japanese-Canadians who had "never done anything disloyal" should be allowed to remain in Canada while a further 18% thought this should apply only to the Canadian-born. Likewise, when asked if Japanese-Canadians deserved the vote, 42% of respondents agreed. See Cantril and Strunk, *Public Opinion, 1935–1946*, 379-380.

[752] Stephanie D. Bangarth, *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in North America, 1942–49* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2.

[753] Many clippings from these papers can be found in Hugh Keenleyside's papers at LAC (R4217, vol. 20, file 18).

[754] See Patricia E. Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941–1967* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 188-190.

have a better chance to do it. Given time, the Japanese diaspora would only grow "and demands would be made later when Japan was a settled country to have the Japanese in Canada given the same rights as the white population," which might cause Canada trouble at the UN. Yet, given the logistical hurdles, a new repatriation would take time and "the Civil Liberties League would begin stimulating opinion." Eventually, "after considerable discussion," the cabinet voted to repeal the deportation order and other wartime restrictions. "Let the Civil Liberties League stay at home," St. Laurent shrugged.[755] Later that year, as King was preparing a statement for the House on Canada's postwar immigration policy, he likewise worried that if he failed to clarify the Japanese restrictions were not "indefinite," he would face pressure from both Japan and at the UN. In his typically self-important way, King drew a fantastic sketch of what might have happened without the change:

> I mentioned to [the Privy] Council that nothing could be worse than that we should allow the Japanese to say that they were permanently excluded, and find them possibly united with Russia at some future time in their resentment with Canada. As a matter of fact, I do not know any greater danger that our country faces than this possibility and indeed almost probable possibility. The nations of the Orient with their crowded populations will resent a small population here with the almost unlimited resources of this country and its relatively small population seeking to hold to part of the globe exclusively to itself. I am sure my experience in these matters will have saved a very difficult situation as regards the future.[756]

This was a potent brew of Red Scare paranoia mixed with Yellow Peril fearmongering. As King eventually concluded in his remarks to Parliament, he was certain that Canadians did not wish "as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population" that immigration from Asia would inevitably bring, giving rise "to social and economic problems of a character that might lead to serious difficulties in the field of international relations."[757]

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[755] W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 22 January 1947, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC; "Persons of Japanese Race; Report of Cabinet Committee," 22 January 1947, R165, reel T-2365, PCOF, LAC. For one cynical assessment of the order's repeal, see "Retreat Under Pressure," *Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1947, 6.
[756] W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 1 May 1947, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC.
[757] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 3 (1 May 1947): 2646. Arthur Menzies had studied this topic for King, recording the contradiction between the UN's new anti-racist values and bigoted domestic opinion. See "Asiatic Immigration into Canada," 1 March 1947, R15615, vol. 29, file 12, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

Given these feelings by both the Secretary of State for External Affairs as well as the Prime Minister himself, it is not surprising that, as with the reparations issue, dealing with inquiries from deported Japanese-Canadians in Japan was seen as a prospective issue for Norman's staff at CLM by both External and the Department of Labour (DL), the latter having managed the internment. "While you will have no general responsibility for Japanese formerly resident in Canada who have chosen to return to Japan," External's official instructions to Norman directed, "there may be special problems connected with arrangements that the Canadian Government has made to forward to them assets left in Canada." Moreover, "There may also be persons of Japanese race with claims to Canadian citizenship who will apply [at CLM] for entry to Canada. Such enquiries as seem justified should be referred to Ottawa for disposal."[758] These orders had been included at the behest of External's Gordon Robertson, although as he clarified to DL, Norman would "probably wish to refer the enquiry back here before attempting to give any answer."[759]

This task was major headache for Norman. By November 1946, given his time-consuming workload that included answering "the increasingly steady flow of routine letters from Canadian Nisei and others enquiring about Canadian nationality, possibility of return to Canada, etc.," Norman was elated to hear that External's James McCardle was joining him in Tokyo.[760] Norman was hopeful that McCardle's Japanese language skills could "relieve me considerably of some of the interviews with Canadian Nisei and foreign nationals," and he advised External to fully brief McCardle on the issue and also send CLM all their "relevant material" on the repatriates' status.[761] Given that under the laws governing the repatriation both "Canadian citizens of Japanese origin"

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[758] USSEA to Norman, 3 July 1946, R219, vol. 3659, file 4900-B-10-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[759] Robertson to A.H. Brown, 31 July 1946, R219, vol. 3634, file 3363-D-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC; "Memorandum re Canadian Liaison Mission to Japan," 19 June 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC.
[760] Indeed, even prior to the creation of CLM in mid-1946, requests for return by Canadian Nisei were being received by External though the British Liaison Mission in Tokyo. See Hume Wrong, "Memorandum for Acting SSEA," 10 August 1946, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-1 (1946), PCOF, LAC.
[761] Norman to S.D. Hemsley, 14 November 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC.

and "Japanese nationals who have domicile in Canada" could return to Canada, as Robertson noted in December 1946, Ottawa had three options. Either it could refuse to allow any of them to enter ("which would be contrary to the existing law and would require legislation of a rather unsavoury type"), they could "instruct the Mission that they should be prepared to grant visas for travel to Canada," but give no assistance in booking passage, or they could instruct CLM to issue visas and help secure accommodations to Canadians citizens, but not to Japanese nationals.[762] Given the mounting pressure in Canada against repatriation, and the basic illegality of barring entry, External was not able to halt the return of the repatriates through CLM even if they had wanted to.

Norman's staff continued to face the deportation issue well into 1947. In June, the Deputy Minister of Labour contacted Lester Pearson directly for help. Initially, DL had been requisitioning the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Orr, who was part of the Canadian War Crimes Liaison Detachment in Tokyo, to help manage claims from repatriates, "such as loss of baggage, inquiries about transfer of assets, etc." However, with the trials winding down, Orr was returning home and, surprisingly, DL was even then still planning to "arrange a sixth sailing of repatriates this summer, and it is important that we have someone at the Tokyo end to whom inquiries can be addressed and who can straighten out the occasional difficulties which accompany such a movement." Would Norman have someone on staff able to help with this undertaking? External was more than happy to volunteer CLM's services, passing along its postal address for good measure.[763] By this point, however, Norman had other actors breathing down his neck.

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[762] R.G.R. to Heeney, 6 December 1946, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-1 (1946), PCOF, LAC.

[763] Deputy Minister of Labour to Pearson, 5 June 1947; David M. Johnson to Deputy Minister, 11 June 1947, R219, vol. 3634, file 3363-D-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. It is also worth noting that in January 1946, when Norman was still on loan to SCAP, External had reported that given the lack of information about conditions in Japan for the arrival of repatriates, "it might be desirable to have a message sent to Mr. Herbert Norman asking him for such advice as he could give as to the desirability and possibility of having someone from Canada sent out in advance of the movement from this country to make preparation for the arrivals." It is not clear if such a message was ever sent, but Lieutenant-Colonel Orr was later directed to aid the repatriates. See A. MacNamara to N.A. Robertson, 7 January 1946; SSEA to Canadian Ambassador to US, 9 January 1946, R219, vol. 3634, file 3363-D-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.

Back in Canada, the deportee issue fell to a new Cabinet Committee on Japanese Problems with representatives from all the relevant federal departments, including External represented by Arthur Menzies.[764] As a Committee memo noted in April 1947, "the Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan has been asked by the Japanese Government through [SCAP] to state how the Canadian Government regards persons of Japanese ancestry born in Canada who went to Japan, before, during or after the war." As Norman added, 5,000 to 6,000 people with a claim to Canadian citizenship now resided in Japan. One can read his exasperation even through the terse bureaucratic language: "Mr. Norman points out the magnitude of the task of interviewing and processing these 5,000–6,000 applicants, but urges the desirability of facing this problem now and reaching decisions that will enable him to state Canadian Government policy." Among the Committee's recommendations were that CLM be authorized "to accept, from persons claiming to be Canadian citizens, applications for certificates of Canadian citizenship to be forwarded after careful examination to the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada along with such documents or affirmations as the Department may, in the circumstances, consider necessary…"[765] It was yet more red tape, but it did promise to satisfy the Japanese government, and offered a solution to the growing backlog at CLM. In September 1947, Arthur Menzies and Lester Pearson presented the memo to the Committee and proposed that CLM be allowed to start processing the repatriates' claims, which the Committee quickly approved.[766] Combined with the public pressure making any further repatriation impossible, CLM now had the power to deal with the claims that came to it. Under Norman's leadership, CLM continued to process requests for both Japanese and Canadians

[764] Hugh Keenleyside also attended these meetings as Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, his department being responsible for immigration at this time. He would write frequently about immigration politics during this era. See H.L. Keenleyside, "Canadian Immigration Policy," *International Journal* 3, no. 3 (Summer 1948): 222-238.
[765] Ref. Document JAP 3, "Memorandum to the Cabinet Committee on Japanese Problems," [16 April 1947], R165, vol. 84, file J-25-1 (1947-49, part 2), PCOF, LAC.
[766] "Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Cabinet Committee," 4-5, 3 September 1947, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-1 (1947-49, part 2), PCOF, LAC.

travelling both ways across the Pacific. The ample paperwork would continue, but at least there were increasingly coherent and lenient policies by External to deal with it.[767]

A final question provoked by this tangent is what Norman himself personally felt about the plight of the repatriates. Did he, simply, endorse the repatriation policy? On the face of it, this seems unlikely. Like many other Canadians officials during the deportation and interment, such as Norman Robertson (see Chapter 1), Norman likely had private doubts, but never let them interfere with his public duties. An example of this separation between personal desire and public action is contained in a report Norman sent to External after an interview he had in May 1947 with Russell Brines, an American reporter for the Associated Press in Tokyo. Brines was writing an article on "the present position of Nisei, both Canadian and American, in Japan," mainly related to how well they had reintegrated back into Japanese society. Norman gave Brines some background on the Canadian repatriation, emphasizing that it was "entirely voluntary … and that the actual carrying out of repatriation was done in an orderly and equitable fashion." Yet, Norman was worried that even these tepid remarks might embarrass External and expose the callousness of the policy:

> I do not think that I said anything which would be in any way interpreted as prejudicial to our policy, and I also requested him that in case he referred in any way to our Government's policy he would as a matter of courtesy show me the script first, particularly since he came to me enquiring for background information. As I know him quite well, I do not think he would maliciously distort any of the remarks which I gave him. As the article is to be concerned primarily with Nisei in Japan, I do not expect that he will dwell at any length on our Government's repatriation policy. However, I felt that you should be informed of what I had done in this matter. If there is any sequel to this interview such as objectionable matter in the script, I shall do my best to change it and shall keep you informed of the matter.[768]

While Norman's letter bounced around Ottawa from Gordon Robertson to Arthur Menzies and others, nothing seems to have come of it. "I doubt if any useful purpose would be served in passing

[767] For examples, see McCardle for Norman to SSEA, 29 November 1947; 11 December 1947; McCardle for Norman to Kamachi Yashiro, 26 May 1948, R219, vol. 2974, file, 3363-40C, part 5, DEAF, LAC.
[768] Norman to D.M. Johnson, 20 May 1947, R219, vol. 3634, file 3363-D-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.

this letter to other Depts at this time," one note scrawled in the corner of Norman's original report noted.[769] Thankfully for him, Norman was saved from publicly defending the repatriation.

Yet, there is another question about Norman's views of the repatriation that was raised by the aforesaid contrast on the *Marine Falcon*. Despite his fundamental liberal and humanistic values in late 1940s, as historian Roger Bowen argues, Norman also had a streak of what some writers have termed "epicureanism": "an egocentric, potentially self-indulgent philosophy that emphasises the cultivation of one's own character and the gratification of one's own desires." As Bowen notes, Norman enjoyed the good life in Japan, including his meals with SCAP bigwigs and personal rides in their limousines and boats. He also had "an ivory tower existence, protected from the distasteful, the mundane, the pitifully human aspects of life, those aspects of existence which characterizes the lot of ordinary human being, with which he clearly did not identify."[770] To put it bluntly, the unpleasant experiences of the repatriates might simply have been too far removed from Norman's elitist life in Japan for him to have been fully aware of them as he mixed with SCAP officials, Japanese politicians, and foreign diplomats. For Norman, their claims may have just been another bureaucratic nuisance to solve, rather than the dismal lives of real people. This is only speculation, however, though Norman's broader complicity in the repatriation effort remains irrefutable.

Ultimately, the Japanese-Canadian repatriation and the attempt to bar the door to any new immigrants was a key plank of Canadian foreign policy toward Japan, part of item "I" on Arthur Menzies's 1954 list of foreign policy objectives for Asia (see Introduction). This would remain a consistent bipartisan policy by Ottawa in the years that followed, even despite the lessening hatred of the Canadian public for the postwar Japanese-Canadian diaspora that remained. As one External

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[769] I have been unable to locate any column by Brines that touched on Canada's policy towards the deportation.
[770] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 140-141, 263-264. For the two writers who cited Norman's epicurean tendencies, albeit in more positive ways, see Sidney Katz, "What Kind of Man Was Herbert Norman," *Maclean's Magazine*, 28 September 1957, 84; Charles Taylor, *Six Journeys: A Canadian Pattern* (Toronto: Anansi, 1977), 113-114.

report from 1947—possibly drafted by Arthur Menzies—later noted, since the war's end, "the matter has receded into the background, and this results in part from the exemplary behaviour of the Japanese racial groups [in Canada] in spite of the ordeal suffered during the war."[771]

Yet, after the Treaty of San Francisco went into effect in April 1952, Ottawa still hoped to bar any ex-Japanese-Canadians who had served in Japan's armed forces from entering the country, despite the fact that—by its own admission—it had instituted no similar checks for former German or Italian combatants.[772] Likewise, while Ottawa did mull accepting a "token quota" of Japanese immigrants in 1952, it still noted in its brief to Robert Mayhew, Canada's new ambassador to Japan, that a standing order-in-council prohibited "the entry of all Asiatics into Canada with the exception of the wife, the husband and children under 21 years of age of Canadian citizens residing in Canada."[773] While Ottawa knew this issue was, in historian Patricia Roy's words, "an important prestige problem" for Tokyo, Mayhew was effectively told to avoid discussing it.[774] Likewise, when St. Laurent visited Japan in 1954 (see Chapter 6), he made it abundantly clear that Japanese were not welcome in Canada, essentially telling Tokyo to "dismiss any hopes they had of sending large numbers of immigrants to Canada," as one American journalist parsed his remarks.[775]

Still, the decision to limit Japanese immigration to Canada does not seem to have provoked wide public discontent in Japan. When Trade and Commerce Minister C.D. Howe visited Japan in 1956 (see Chapter 7), for example, local journalists planned to ask Howe about the life of Japanese

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[771] "Asian Immigration into Canada," 6, [1947], R15615, vol. 29, file 12, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[772] "Immigration; Entry of Canadian Citizens from Japan," 15 May 1952, R165, reel T-2368, PCOF, LAC. Brooke Claxton even mused about a new law "by which natural born citizens who acted against the interest of Canada in the course of a war or of war-like activities in which Canada was engaged could be deprived of their citizenship."
[773] "Japanese Immigration," [17 October 1952], R219, vol. 3659, file 4900-B-10-40, part 1, DEAF, LAC.
[774] Roy, "Reopening the Door," 162.
[775] Mac R. Johnson, "Mr. St Laurent Makes Friends," *Vancouver Province*, 16 March 1954, 7. As Patricia Roy notes, St. Laurent's evident awareness of how unpopular this policy could be in Japan if it was given attention, led him to conceal both his own concerns with Japanese immigration and the Canadian public's general dislike of it. He thus disingenuously "evaded a journalist's question about Canada's restrictive immigration policies by referring to Canada's housing shortage!" See Roy, "Reopening the Door," 163.

immigrants in Canada and Ottawa's wider immigration policy. Yet, as then Canadian Ambassador T.C. Davis later wrote, they rapidly "became so engrossed in trade matters they forgot this and left muttering about their stupidity."[776] Had they wanted, of course, these reporters could have pressed the issue more energetically to Howe. But, at least according to Davis's account, they did not seem to rank immigration as more important than trade to Japanese-Canadian relations. Only in the mid-1960s did Canada reopen the door to Japanese immigrants thanks to a mix of lobbying by Japanese-Canadians, the rise of a broader culture of "human rights," Japan's increasing postwar economic clout, and the realization that Japanese immigrants could more be easily assimilated into Canadian society than had previously been thought, making the idea politically viable.[777] In the end, while a waning hatred for Japan and increased advocacy had quickly improved the lot of prewar Japanese-Canadians during the postwar Liberal era, it did not lead to the end of immigration restrictions.

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For the survivors of Japanese POW camps, returning to Canada was bittersweet. But for those Canadians killed in the line of duty, there would be no homecoming; their journeys ended at either the British Commonwealth War Cemetery at Yokohama or the Sai Wan Military Cemetery in Hong Kong. This was due, in no small part, to the fastidious efforts of Lieutenant-Colonel John Bailie, himself a C Force veteran, who returned to East Asia to fight for Canada's interests in the reburial of Allied war dead. Bailie, as historian Mark Sweeney argues, "heralded successful results, despite a lack of resources and support from the Canadian government." This was generally true, although help from Ottawa was perhaps more forthcoming than either man realized. In Yokohama,

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[776] Davis to Lu, 1 December 1956, 10, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA. At the very least, this fits the pattern of prewar Japanese engagement with Canada. The issue of trade was also a motivating factor in Japan's quiet resolution of the Vancouver Race Riot of 1907. In addition, both Tokyo and the Japanese press often drew a distinction between Japanophobia in Canada when compared to the United States, with the Americans generally pictured as both less tolerant and less willing to apologize than their Canadian counterparts. See, for example, Iino Masako, "Japan's Reaction to the Vancouver Riot of 1907," *B.C. Studies* no. 60 (Winter 1983/84): 28-47.
[777] Roy, "Reopening the Door," 170.

Bailie had aid from CLM, which helped publicize the cemetery's completion and alerted many of the Canadian expats in Japan. Ultimately, this group comprised about 40 people, "almost the entire Canadian community in Japan," as the Canadian Legion's official journal, *The Legionary*, later declared. At the ceremony on 6 November 1946, both Irene Norman and Brigadier Henry Nolan, Canada's prosecutor at the Tokyo war crimes trials, placed wreaths on the temporary monument Bailie had erected.[778] The work in Hong Kong, however, proved trickier. As Sweeney notes, Bailie "does not appear to have been well aligned to influence military and civilian decision makers" in the colony. Yet, he did receive unexpected aid from Canada's most famous Second World War veteran, General H.D.G. Crerar.[779] In August 1947, Crerar visited Hong Kong with Brigadier Sherwood Lett for Ottawa as part of his tour of East Asia in preparation for Commonwealth talks on ending the Japanese occupation (see Chapter 5).[780] "The situation with regard to the interment of the Canadian soldiers who fell at Hong Kong is not good," Lett personally informed W.L.M. King. Despite Bailie's tenacity, there were still "a very high percentage of unidentified soldiers' graves." The solution was obvious: "My own thought is, and I believe this is shared by General Crerar, that a proper Graves Registration and Burial Unit might well be despatched to Hong Kong to assist in the work." As King quickly replied, "I am taking this up this matter, at once, with the competent authorities here, and I am grateful to you for bringing it to my attention."[781]

Crerar's visit to Sai Wan, Lett's dialog with King, and the role of CLM in Tokyo all speak against the usual assertion by Hong Kong veterans and historians that events like Bailie's project, as Sweeney put it, were just "another stage in a process of the federal government neglecting or at

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[778] Mark Sweeney, "'Representing Canadian Interests in all Matters Relative to Canadian War Dead:' Lt. Col. J.A. Bailie and the Recovery, Concentration and Burial of the 'C' Force Casualties in Japan and Hong Kong," *Canadian Military History* 27, no. 1 (2018): 2, 10-11; "Canadian Graves in Japan," *The Legionary*, February 1947, 10-11.
[779] For Bailie's efforts in Hong Kong, see Sweeney, "Representing Canadian Interests," 14-21.
[780] See Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 5-6.
[781] Lett to King, 2 September 1947; King to Lett, 5 September 1947, AM361, series 2, file 4, Sherwood and Evelyn Lett family fonds, CVA. Cf. Crerar, "Observations on Burial Arrangements…" R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC.

best only paying pittance to the Pacific theatre, mainly with a focus on helping to protect, maintain, or rebuild British colonial prestige in the region."[782] This is part of what *Legion Magazine* editor Marc Johnston later alleged was Ottawa's "defensive politics" to the veterans, "a belief that what you accomplish is not merely so important as what you prevent, or think you prevent."[783] In short, the argument runs, due to Ottawa's miserliness and the ambivalence of Canadians, the concerns of Hong Kong veterans have been repeatedly ignored, with any gains hard won. Often quoted are the comments by C Force veteran William Allister, that for them, there was "no counseling, no advice, no awareness that we might act or feel any differently. It was sink or swim, you're on your own boys. Like good Canadians we expected nothing, got nothing."[784] As I argue in the ensuing pages, while there is some truth to this claim, it underrates both the support Canadians gave the veterans and the fact that while the HKVAC ***did*** have to pressure Ottawa to get increased compensation, it still achieved many of the goals it lobbied for, including its first bid for "Pacific pay" in 1949.

First, given the stark tone of wartime propaganda (see Chapter 1), most Canadians were in no mood to view Japan positively in 1945 and were thus primed to accept whatever negative claims were made against them. But in addition, and perhaps surprisingly, many also held nuanced views of the POWs' experiences. For William Allister, the voyage home was a contrast between attempts at "joyous reunions" and the fact that the veterans "were in a bad way," with wounds both mental and physical. Meeting his family, meanwhile, was an underwhelming experience: "I was dry-eyed myself as, I'm sure, were all other POWs, our hearts well secured against all painful emotional onslaughts."[785] Yet, by their own testimonies, this was not always true. As C Force veteran Thomas

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[782] Sweeney, "Representing Canadian Interests," 25.
[783] Dave McIntosh, *Hell on Earth* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), v. Cf. Kenneth Taylor, "The Challenge of the Eighties: World War II from a New Perspective: The Hong Kong Case," in *Men at War: Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Timothy Travers and Christon Archer (Chicago: Precedent, 1982), 209.
[784] William Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989), 236. For one recent citation to support this line of reasoning, see Tim Cook, *The Fight for History* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2020), 273.
[785] Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands*, 236-237.

Forsyth wrote in a staccato diary entry, in Vancouver he saw an "enormous crowd, band, cheering, … train waiting, crowd surging up and down alongside, hunting relatives, pulled out later, very tired, wired home." His return to Winnipeg was, by his own admission, a wonderful day:

> It was all in the papers next morning. The biggest crowd that ever jammed the station. The wildest most excited mass of surging humanity I ever saw. The thrill, the joy, the heartfelt gratitude of being spared to meet my loved ones once again. My own family, my own friends, my neighbours. "Kiss all the girls you can, while you can," was the sage advice of my brother Jim. "In a couple of weeks time they will be slapping you again!"[786]

For Kenneth Cambon, in Winnipeg, veterans were "met by hordes of relatives … it was great to stand on the platform and watch it all." There were darker moments too, of course: "Already some had heard of deaths of wives and children, while others had received 'Dear John' letters." But for him personally, returning home was very emotional. When a Veterans Affairs official boarded his train enroute home to Montreal to brief the men about their postwar benefits, Cambon was stunned. "I was astounded to hear that the Government would pay my tuition and also give me 60 dollars a month to go back to school." It beat returning to his prewar job as a soda-jerk. "For the first time I began to think that perhaps I could go to University and possibly become a doctor." Having left home at age 17, Cambon's return to his family at 22 was initially awkward, but he adjusted and went on to get his medical degree from McGill. "My gastro-intestinal problems did not disappear," he admitted, "but [they] became quite tolerable and I was very happy."[787] Certainly not all reunions by C Force veterans were this successful, but neither were they all as bitter as Allister's.

As these anecdotes also show, Canadians did turn out in large numbers to welcome home the C Force veterans, with many cities and local charity organizations sending them gift packages and cheerful welcome letters as they journeyed home on their train, the "Hong Kong Special," in

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[786] Tom Forsyth, Hong Kong Diary, entries 7 and 8 October 1945, R2463, box 1, Thomas Smith Forsyth fonds, LAC.
[787] Kenneth Cambon, *Guest of Hirohito* (Vancouver: PW Press, 1990), 109-110, 116. "I decided I didn't want to spend my time talking about yesterday," C Force Signalman Jack Rose later remarked of his own mindset in 1945, "which is all some of the other vets seemed to want to do. I wanted to get on with my life and deal with tomorrow." See N. Suzuki, "A Soldier's Story," *NAJC*, December 1991, 20-22, a copy of which is in acc.20120078-005, CWM.

"one big welcoming party after another."[788] "You have come up out of the Valley of the Shadow of Death, to be with friends whose warm good wishes will follow you wherever you go," one letter from the BC government read as they first arrived in Victoria. "May Good Fortune attend you, and may you find contentment in which to rebuild your lives."[789] Numerous accounts were written about their sacrifices and their homecomings, including within military circles such as the Legion's *Legionary*, which published a glowing review of C Forces' heroism in November 1945. This was followed by other articles, freshly printed for the journal's expanding readership of Second World War veterans. In January 1946, for example, it ran an article about the three McKnight brothers—Melville, Gerald, and Elmer—who had all joined the Winnipeg Grenadiers and survived Japanese captivity. Soon after, there was a poignant account of the actions of Company Sergeant Major John Osborn, whose Victoria Cross had just been posthumously awarded by the King.[790]

Much of the mainstream press was equally sympathetic. "Let's give the Hong Kong boys a real welcome," *Ottawa Citizen* journalist Austin Cross wrote in an op-ed for his paper in August 1945, with money no object. After all, he reasoned, if Canada could "spend 15 million dollars a day on the war, surely we can spare a few bucks for these lads." Nor were most Canadians deluded about the veterans' terrible experiences. For Cross, C Force veterans had clearly been treated worse than their counterparts in Germany. What the prisoners experienced exactly, he added, "we don't know; it may be so terrible that we will never want to hear."[791] Even so, as the *Globe and Mail* opined that September, their "harrowing experiences" remained beyond doubt. "They have been living on pitiably small rations of poor nutritional value, with the result that the health of many has

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[788] Daniel G. Dancocks, *In Enemy Hands: Canadian Prisoners of War, 1939–45* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983), 279.
[789] A good collection of cards can be found in the papers of C Force veteran Douglas Rees. In addition to the one from British Columbia, these included greetings from the mayor of Victoria; the cities of Calgary and Brandon, Manitoba; and both the Legion and Red Cross branches in Calgary. See R5323, box 1, Douglas B. Rees fonds, LAC.
[790] Joseph Crampton, "Hong Kong Memorial," *The Legionary*, November 1945, 18; Paul Malloy, "Three Grenadiers: A Hong Kong Saga," *The Legionary*, January 1946, 5-7; "Canada's 15th V.C.," *The Legionary*, May 1946, 8-9.
[791] Austin F. Cross, "Hong Kong Home Coming," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 29 August 1945, 22.

been impaired by beriberi and other diseases. In some cases they have been the victims of barbarous treatment by their jailers." The paper ended on an empathetic, if overly optimistic note:

> So the Canadian survivors of Hong Kong will be as men emerging into the sunlight from long confinement in some subterranean cavern. For many their whole nature and outlook upon life may well have been affected by the heart-gnawing weariness of their years of captivity. However, youth can have enormous powers of recuperation. Health and physique which have been impaired can be rebuilt, and where the psychological balance of individuals has been upset it can be restored by skilful treatment. For these brave men who have been through such arduous trials in the Far East the process of readjustment to a normal life in their native land will not be easy. They will be entitled to a helping hand not merely from the Government and relatives but from all who have the privilege of knowing or dealing with them.[792]

While many veterans' wounds would not prove as easily salved as the *Globe* imagined, both it and the *Citizen* agreed that the federal government and the Canadian public had a duty to help veterans readjust and recover as best they could from their obvious mistreatment. This insight helps explain the enthusiastic public support the HKVAC later received from the press in their early petitions to Ottawa. Far from being forgotten, these old soldiers most definitely did ***not*** just fade way.

In October 1945, the Department of National Defence retroactively introduced a new battle patch for soldiers, "a red circle, approximately two inches in diameter, with neat, white 'Chinese-styled' monogrammed letter 'H.K.' embroidered in the centre." This was the insignia that signalled the wearer as a veteran of C Force, "which is distributed to the men as soon as they arrive at British Columbian reception depots," as the *Montreal Gazette* reported, in due time becoming the official logo of the HKVAC and later featured on the group's letterhead.[793] The organization itself first came into being in December 1946, when 43 veterans from Toronto formed a local "Hong Kong Veterans Association," later to be amalgamated with other, similar groups established by veterans in Manitoba and Quebec.[794] At first, these were intended to be little more than C Force-specific

[792] "Return from the Dead," *Globe and Mail*, 4 September 1945, 6. For another similarly sympathetic editorial for C Force veterans, see "The Royal Rifles Come Home," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 12 October 1945, 8.
[793] "Battle Patch Is Issued Hong Kong Veterans," *The Gazette*, 24 October 1945, 16. See Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 7.
[794] "Hong Kong Veterans Meet," *Globe and Mail*, 6 December 1946, 8.

veterans clubs. "When we first started," ex-C Force POW Howard Donnelly recalled, "the idea was to get together for a few drinks." But as the number of premature heart attacks and other chronic health conditions among members increased, the group became more organized. "So this is what really sparked us to fight for our pensions and benefits for Hong Kong veterans."[795]

The first campaign fought by the HCVAC was over the issue of "Pacific pay." During the creation of the Canadian Army Pacific Force (CAPF) in May 1945 (see Chapter 3), Ottawa had issued Order-In-Council P.C. 3593 to raise the salary of all personnel serving with the unit. In part, this measure was introduced, as National Defence Minister Brooke Claxton later stated, because CAPF "would be acting in close association with the forces of the United States, which had a different pay structure from ours [with] express provision for foreign service pay."[796] However, it also vaguely referenced the "Extra hazards peculiar to that theatre of war," a fact later latched on to by the HKVAC. The controversy itself began just after VJ Day, when Canada's military attaché to China, Brigadier Orville Kaye, flew to Hong Kong on 20 August to meet the liberated POWs. In their later testimony, the veterans recalled Kaye explaining that they would get backpay plus "a further rate of pay to be known as Pacific Pay … to be at the rate of thirty-five cents per diem and above according to rank."[797] Upon returning home, however, the veterans were told that this pay was not for them, sparking anger towards Ottawa. Yet, in this incipient conflict, the HKVAC had important allies. The Legion, for one, lent its support. So too did the press which was outspokenly sympathetic towards the ex-POWs. As their backers grew, Ottawa found itself in a bind.

Battle was joined in May 1947 when the Legion, on behalf of the HKVAC, wrote Claxton with a brief drafted by the Hong Kong veterans. "No doubt there are technical details to be ironed

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[795] Dancocks, *In Enemy Hands*, 282.
[796] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 2 (17 March 1949): 1552.
[797] *Special Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1947–1948: Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 26, Thursday, June 17, 1948* [hereafter *Special Committee*] (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), 840, 844-845.

out," the Legion's General Secretary J.C.G. Herwig conceded, "but it does seem to the Legion that the special circumstances surrounding this ill-fated expedition should entitle the survivors to the very small consideration they now seek."[798] Claxton responded that he too hoped that "a solution acceptable to all may be found in the near future." Yet by November, when the Legion inquired if they had succeeded, the HKVAC had to report their failure. "It seems to this organization," HKVAC Secretary J. Leslie Varley wrote bitterly to the Legion's Thomas Kines, "that there is a definite block somewhere along the line which is preventing us from reaching the proper channels to put Pacific Pay into the limelight."[799] More direct action was clearly needed.

In February 1948, the HKVAC launched its next gambit. If quiet formal channels went nowhere, then maybe getting loud was the answer. In February 1948, before a gaggle of Toronto reporters, HKVAC President Charles Clark aimed a "double-barrelled charge at the Mackenzie King government," as the *Globe and Mail* wrote in a front-page report. "Not only did Ottawa send a poorly trained and poorly equipped force to fight the Japs," he alleged, "but now that the war is over the department is welching on its promises of special campaign pay."[800] A decorated veteran who had won the DCM for sabotaging a Japanese shipyard and had served in the First World War, Clark's accusations carried weight as he explained their letter to Claxton and its dismissal. Many Canadians were angered by Clark's claims, which received wide coverage in many newspapers. It was a "shameful and, to the Canadian people, a humiliating admission," the *Globe and Mail* ranted.[801] "The Canadians at Hong Kong, who suffered extreme hardships," the *Montreal Gazette* added, "would seem to have suffered, too, a curious degree of official misrepresentation and

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[798] Herwig to Claxton, 27 May 1947, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.
[799] Kines to Varley, 24 November 1947; Varley to Kines, 8 December 1947, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.
[800] For examples, see "War Bonus Never Paid, Say Hong Kong Vets," *Globe and Mail*, 11 February 1948, 1-2; "'Welching' Change Made by Veteran," *The Gazette*, 11 February 1948, 3; "Claim Hong Kong Veterans Having Their Pensions Cut," *Toronto Daily Star*, 11 February 1948, 22.
[801] "Remembering Hong Kong," *Globe and Mail*, 20 February 1948, 6.

confused dealing."[802] It was an embarrassment for the reigning Liberals. A few months later, Conservative MP Howard Green verbally flayed Claxton in the House by noting an editorial in the Vancouver *Province* headlined "Must They Fight Twice for their Pay?" While Green was hardly a disinterested actor, there was little hyperbole in his claim that, "I think that editorial sums up the sentiment of Canadians from coast to coast with regard to these Hong Kong veterans."[803]

The wheels of government turn slowly, but they do turn. On 17 June 1948, Charles Clark and fellow HKVAC members Raymond Pellor and Robert Stager went before the House's Special Committee on Veteran Affairs to present their case. Laying out Kaye's promise, their 1947 letter to Claxton, and the lack of progress, Clark argued that given the aid C Force POWs had provided to the allied war effort through sabotage and escape attempts, plus "the inhuman treatment accorded these troops by the Japanese after surrender," that Pacific pay was rightfully due to them, a view positively received by the Committee. "I can only say to you, sir, and through you to your organization, that the purpose of your being here has been accomplished," Chairman L.M. Mutch remarked cheerily at the meeting's end.[804] Again, the Legion had facilitated the HKVAC in their visit to Ottawa, sending them a copy of the committee's minutes and noting the positive impression they made, although "we know from experience that it does not pay to be too optimistic about any dealings with Parliamentary representatives."[805] The concern proved prescient; only in December did the cabinet privately agree that granting Pacific pay "would satisfy present grievances and would not create a difficult precedent for extension of similar treatment over a longer period or to additional groups."[806] Finally, in January 1949, the HKVAC wrote the Legion to report that it had

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[802] "Time To Set the Record Straight," *The Gazette*, 16 February 1948, 8.
[803] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 4th Session, vol. 6 (25 June 1948): 5898.
[804] *Special Committee*, 839-841, 845.
[805] Legion to Pellor, 2 July 1948 and Enclosures; Pellor to Kines, 22 June 1948, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.
[806] "Hong Kong Expedition; Rates of Pay," 15 December 1948, R165, reel T-2366, PCOF, LAC. See also Kines to A. Cairnes, 16 December 1948, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.

heard from National Defence Headquarters that Ottawa was ready to grant their pay.[807] On 17 March, Claxton confirmed the rumour in the House. While Ottawa did not want to open the door to all manner of backdated pay for Pacific servicemen, such as the 1943 Aleutian veterans, Claxton argued that C Force's experiences "were so different that it was felt that others could not properly regard this as opening the way for other retroactive adjustments." Thus, "the terms of the original order will be extended so as to make members of the Hong Kong forces eligible for Pacific pay [from 1 June 1945] until two months after return of such members to Canada."[808] This was not the full payment from 1941 to 1945 that the HKVAC desired, but as the *Legionary* mused, "half a loaf is better than no bread."[809] Yet, out of sight, frustration remained. "Personally," the Legion's T.A. Anderson admitted, "I think this is a pretty narrow-minded and hard-boiled attitude on the part of the Government." The HKVAC accepted the government's offer, but it did not waive their full claims.[810] Its battle with Ottawa went on and would rage for the next 50 years.

The resolution of the Pacific pay question says much about the elevated position C Force veterans occupied in Canadian society. For one, as historian Clare Makepeace argued in relation to British ex-POWs in Asia, C Force veterans received "public recognition for their hardships, contradicting the idea that they were a 'forgotten army'."[811] Far from being ignored by Canadians and marginalized by Ottawa, their claims garnered public support, were addressed in parliamentary debates, and were ultimately effective. Secondly, it demonstrates that Canadians *did* appreciate the POWs' degrading experience in Japanese captivity, far more than is often claimed. At the Veterans Committee in 1948, for example, one of the committeemen had tactlessly asked if Clark could give

[807] Clark to Kines, 31 January 1949, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.
[808] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 2 (17 March 1949): 1552-1553.
[809] "Pacific Pay for Hong Kong Survivors," *The Legionary*, April 1949, 24.
[810] Anderson to Patrick Biggs, 3 February 1949; Legion to Anderson, 12 February 1949, R2966, reel M-8517, file 19-1-18, Royal Canadian Legion fonds, LAC.
[811] Clare Makepeace, "For 'ALL Who were Captured'? The Evolution of National Ex-Prisoner of War Associations in Britain after the Second World War," *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 7, no. 3 (August 2014): 261.

"any information of the conditions under which you lived in the Japanese camps." Yet, this line of inquiry was immediately quashed by Chairman Mutch, himself a veteran. "There is nobody here who has not got written indelibly in his mind the story of what these men endured," he declared firmly. While only those who were there knew what had happened, he added, there was no reason to make the veterans relive their trauma. "The members of this committee will understand as far as chaps who have served can understand what you went through."[812] The HKVAC members never really had to prove their pain to skeptical Canadians; this was continuously taken for granted.

Thirdly, it denotes the hardball and sometimes dubious tactics the otherwise small HKVAC used to punch above its weight.[813] While Clark claimed before the Veterans Committee that the anecdotes in their brief on their activities in captivity were not to suggest "any form of heroism on our part," this was disingenuous given how much they had staked their case on winning over the press. "Man Who Set $1,000,000 Fire In Jap Shipyard Asks Raise," was how the *Toronto Star* reported Clark's meeting with the committee on their front page.[814] Indeed, the HKVAC repeatedly used accusations and hearsay to make their case. At their February 1948 press conference, for instance, Clark cited the recently released 1942 "Drew letter" by Ontario's Conservative Premier George Drew, to allege that C Force had been sent overseas unready.[815] "Mr. Drew told the truth," Clark proclaimed. Secretary J. Leslie Varley added that he had heard many C Force pensions were being cut and that "a chap who served with the postal corps in Kiska" had got Pacific pay.[816] For

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[812] *Special Committee*, 843-844.
[813] It is also worth noting that if, by their own admission, the HKVAC had "a membership of 400 across Canada" in the late 1940s and it was predicted that about "1539 persons, including 71 officers and 1468 other ranks," were eligible for the 1949 Pacific pay settlement, then only about a quarter of C Force veterans were members of the organization. In short, despite its implications to the contrary, the HKVAC did not speak for all C Force veterans. See "'Welching' Change Made by Veteran," 3; "Hong Kong Veterans to Get Pacific Pay," *Vancouver Sun*, 18 March 1949, 10.
[814] *Special Committee*, 839; "Man Who Set $1,000,000 Fire…," *Toronto Daily Star*, 17 June 1948, 1.
[815] For the letter's release and the resulting controversy, see *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 4th Session, vol. 2 (24 February 1948): 1549-1554. For the context of its creation back in 1942, see Bradley St. Croix, "Fighting It Out: Canadian Troops at Hong Kong and in Memory" (PhD thesis, University of Ottawa, 2021), chapter 6.
[816] "War Bonus Never Paid, Say Hong Kong Vets," 1-2.

Ottawa, these claims were simply bemusing; they had never planned to give Pacific pay to C Force. Clark was "misguided," two spokesmen for Defence Headquarters and the Pension Commission responded tactfully. Pacific pay was for the CAPF, while C Force veterans "were receiving special pension consideration," with no intent to cut them.[817] As for Drew's letter, this was a clear partisan comment to incite further debate in Parliament. When Conservative MP Gordon Graydon crowed after Claxton's March 1949 report granting Pacific pay that the whole affair was "Another victory for George Drew," he was being profoundly cynical, but he was not incorrect either.[818]

The best example of HKVAC willingness to engage in cynical lobbying was the rising role the treatment of Japanese-Canadians played in the group's rhetoric. In February 1957, Charles Clark pulled a new press-friendly arrow from his rhetorical quiver to allege that "the Canadian taxpayer has not paid one cent to the former Japanese prisoners of war, but, ironically enough, the Canadian Government has paid out millions of dollars since 1945 for the repatriation, relocation and general welfare of many alien nationals who were our former enemies."[819] The statement was inaccurate; the issuing of Pacific pay in 1949 had come from the federal government and thus <u>*was*</u> "taxpayer money." Nor were most Japanese-Canadians "alien nationals," but rather Canadian-born or naturalized citizens, nearly three-quarters of the total.[820] The choice by Canada's Pacific War veterans to attack Ottawa's support for Japanese-Canadians to contrast their own treatment was a major blunder, a fact best shown in the later activism of Leonard Birchall.

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[817] "Ottawa Explains Case," *The Gazette*, 11 February 1948, 3. Indeed, far from the parsimonious Ottawa conjured by the HKVAC, the decision to have Pacific pay apply to veterans for two months after their return to Canada was made on the generous assumption that since the "more seriously wounded" would have been "normally discharged soon after arrival in Canada," simply making the final pay date that of the veteran's discharge "would, in effect, amount to discrimination against the more deserving cases." Hence, why the Cabinet made the decision that it did. See "Hong Kong Veterans; Japanese Campaign Pay," 17 March 1949, R165, reel T-2366, PCOF, LAC.
[818] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 5th Session, vol. 2 (17 March 1949): 1553.
[819] L.C. Speller, "Payment to Japanese POWs," *Victoria Daily Times*, 27 February 1957, 4.
[820] According to the 1941 census, there were 23,450 inhabitants of Japanese ancestry in Canada. Of these, 13,600 were Canadian-born, 3,650 were naturalized citizens, and 6,200 retained Japanese citizenship, overwhelmingly comprising the generation between the ages of 35 and 59. See Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 171.

As noted in Chapter 1, Birchall was vociferous in his efforts to establish the unvaryingly horrific treatment of Canadians POWs by Japan, becoming one of the most vocal veterans against the Japanese-Canadian redress movement by the 1980s.[821] Yet this time neither his own activism nor that of the HKVAC hit home. In February 1986, a journalist named Brenda Large wrote a short op-ed for the *Kingston Whig-Standard*. In a polite but nuanced way, Large noted Birchall's claim to be the "Savour of Ceylon" and stated the "horrors of the Japanese prisoner-of-war camps have been well documented." But she firmly rebuffed his position on redress, for his was "no role for a hero."[822] Despite her relative mildness, however, Birchall lashed out. Calling the piece "a rotten, dirty, unwarranted, cheap shot," and attacking Large's alleged belief she had "a God-given right and a smug arrogance to say what she pleases without any substantiation," Birchall launched into a full-page tirade, filling the *Whig-Standard's* entire op-ed page.[823] His rant convinced few. "Mr. Birchall does his case no good by such an essay," one reader replied bluntly, "which only makes him appear a crackpot."[824] Yet Birchall would not relent. A few years later, his wartime diaries were heavily cited in Dave McIntosh's POW exposé *Hell on Earth* (1997). The book was backed by the HKVAC's John Stroud and Edmund Hurd and was dedicated to Birchall, who was also cited meeting a Japanese historian who had been a wartime POW guard. "You just want to take him around the corner and beat the hell out of him," Birchall fumed furiously. "You'll never lose that feeling. At least I won't."[825] As is clear from Birchall's voluminous private papers, held at LAC, the veteran collected reports of Japanese atrocities for all his postwar life.[826] Birchall, clearly, never forgot nor forgave, and he believed that the rest of Canada should do likewise.

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[821] Lyndon Jones, "War Hero Fights Compensation for Internees," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 3 February 1986, 1-2.
[822] Brenda Large," No Role for a Hero," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 8 February 1986, 6.
[823] Leonard Birchall, "Editorial About Japanese Compensation Was a Cheap Shot, Birchall Says," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 15 February 1986, 7.
[824] "Brian E. Otto, "Birchall's Blast Backfires," *Kingston Whig-Standard*, 4 March 1986, 7.
[825] McIntosh, *Hell on Earth*, 274.
[826] See R14039, Leonard Joseph Birchall fonds, LAC.

Birchall's stance was as unrealistic as it was understandable. Yet, the flaw with his desire had been identified back in the 1940s. In February 1948, journalists Pierre Berton and Jack Scott, in a pair of articles for *Maclean's*, detailed the legacy of the interment on those Japanese-Canadians who remained in Canada, provoking a spirited debate.[827] In a subsequent issue, one letter appeared from ex-C Force POW Arthur Robson. "Whenever the Japanese treated us a little more harshly than usual," the veteran wrote, "it was their custom to inform us that their people were being ill-treated in Canada … whereupon we called them liars." As he now knew, events had made a lie of he and his compatriots' idealism. "Whether or not we can forget our dislike for the Japanese is of little or no consequence; that is for each one of us to decide for ourselves," he concluded with notable subtlety. "To deny the rights of a Canadian citizen to *any* person having a legitimate claim to Canadian citizenship, however, is to mock the ideal for which we fought and paid so dearly."[828] In short, it was up to each individual veteran to forgive the Japanese or not. But they could not demand that any other veteran—or by extension Ottawa and the Canadian public—be obliged to display anger on their behalf.[829] This quixotic demand, and the choice by Birchall and the HKVAC to essentially argue it, doomed their advocacy as the war and its related hatreds receded into the past. In the end, the HKVAC's public-facing activism proved a double-edged sword.

As for those C Force members who did not grow old, their final resting places continued to be respected at Hong Kong and Yokohama. On 11 November 1951, CLM staffers in Tokyo were joined by Robert Mayhew, then on a visit to Japan and Korea, for that year's Remembrance

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[827] See Pierre Berton, "They're Only Japs," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 February 1948, 16-17, 40-41; Jack Scott, "Why B.C. Draws the Color Line," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 February 1948, 17, 40.
[828] Robson, "A P.O.W. Answers a B.C. Jap Hater," 72 (emphasis original).
[829] One example of this attitude is cited by McIntosh. On a postwar pilgrimage to Japan, Deputy Minister of Veterans' Affairs David Broadbent "snapped back the curtains of his first-class plane compartment and strode among the economy-class veterans in Japanese kimono and slippers." Beyond the class element at work, the implication seems to be that in wearing the outfit, Broadbent had disrespectfully "gone native" and should have, like the veterans themselves, shown disdain for all things Japanese in solidarity. That he saw no problem with his dress, the argument runs, implied that he and Ottawa were yet again dismissing their trauma. See McIntosh, *Hell on Earth*, 273.

Day ceremony, as he later wrote in an account for the *Legionary*. "About one hundred and fifty members of the Commonwealth community, including the heads of the British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and Canadian diplomatic mission attended," Mayhew reported, as the Last Post echoed over the graves of the fallen. "In the Canadian Section," he recounted, "I had the privilege of laying a wreath on behalf of the Government of Canada at the base of the big granite cross carrying an inverted bronze sword of sacrifice." This was followed by other wreathes, including one laid by RCAF attaché R.W. McNair for the HKVAC and one from CLM head Arthur Menzies for the mission itself. "I was impressed," Mayhew concluded, "by the peaceful seclusion and beauty of this last resting place for our war dead."[830] The Canadian section of the Yokohama Cemetery is maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission to this day, with C Force's fallen men now joined by many of the Canadians who died during the Korean War.[831] The men of C Force have not been forgotten, just as John Bailie would have wanted it.

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There is nothing like the visit of royalty to add a puff of glamour to the lives of ordinary Canadians. Such was the case when Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh visited Canada in October 1951.[832] It was equally true in April 1953 when Crown Prince Akihito, the now 20-year-old son of Emperor Hirohito, visited Canada and the US enroute to Elizabeth's coronation that June in place of his controversial father. Indeed, by all accounts, the visit was a signal honour for Canada. Initially, as Canadian Ambassador Robert Mayhew personally wrote St. Laurent, the

[830] "R.W. Mayhew, "Remembrance Day in Japan," *The Legionary*, February 1952, 25.
[831] Later, when Louis St. Laurent visited Japan as part of his 1954 world tour (see Chapter 6), Charles Clark wrote the prime minister to ask that he place a wreath on the Yokohama memorial in their honour. St. Laurent had already left Canada when the message was received, and it could not be fit into the final itinerary. However, this had nothing to do with Ottawa's lack of interest in the POWs, as Mayhew's case shows. See Clark to Secretary of State, 9 February 1954; J.S. Cross to Clark, 12 February 1954, R11214, vol. 184, file I-15-W, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[832] One can find no better example than the official account of the visit created by the National Film Board. See David Bairstow, Gudrun Parker, and Roger Blais, *Royal Journey* (National Film Board of Canada, 1951). Cf. "Visit of Their Royal Highnesses Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh," 25 October 1951, in *CRCR*, vol. 2, 37-39.

plan by the Japanese Household Ministry and Prime Minister Yoshida was "to have the Crown Prince land in Canada, travel across Canada and on to the United Kingdom," *without* stopping in America.[833] However, because of scheduling issues in crossing the Pacific, the prince was forced to land in San Francisco and depart from New York, though he would immediately fly to Victoria and cross the continent by train on the CPR, spending most of his time north of the border. This was the first time a member of Japan's royal family had visited Canada since Hirohito's brother, Prince Chichibu, had travelled to George VI's coronation in 1937.[834] It was all an exciting prospect for Akihito, marking his first official journey overseas. As St. Laurent was told, he wished "to see Niagara Falls and to meet in Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal members of the local Japanese Community," the later made possible by the Japanese-Canadians' dispersal after the internment.[835] The visit was scheduled to be a busy one. As reporter Reg Hardy noted, "in keeping with the jet-like speed of modern living," this was not a month-long royal tour: "He has consented to meet the gastronomic challenge of a dozen or more 10-course dinners and luncheons, face numerous artillery salutes, visits colleges and military establishments and exhibit himself to the populace at such inconvenient hours at 4:30 in the morning."[836] That, at least, was the plan as the prince and his minders were ushered aboard an RCAF transport in San Francisco for their flight to Victoria.[837]

Akihito's visit proved to be as raucous and tiring as Hardy had predicted. At stops across the country—Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Niagara, Toronto, Montreal—the "boyish," "personable," and "well-poised" prince was feted by local notables, stuffed at meals, and mobbed by both Japanese as well as Canadian reporters. Near Vancouver, he visited a Fraser River sawmill

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[833] Mayhew to St. Laurent, 2 January 1953, R11214, vol. 118, file J-11-4, vol. 1, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[834] John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 142.
[835] Loman for C. Stein to St. Laurent, 13 March 1953, R11214, vol. 88, file D-12-I, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[836] Reg Hardy, "Japanese Prince Akihito Will Face Heavy Schedule in Canadian Tour," *Vancouver Province*, 10 April 1953, 3.
[837] For the full itinerary of Akihito's journey, see "Tentative Programme: Visit to Canada of the Crown Prince of Japan," 19 March 1953, R11214, vol. 88, file D-12-I, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.

owned by MacMillan Bloedel, where he received a tour from the company's president, Ex-General Bert Hoffmeister, enjoying his Cincinnatus-like retirement.[838] In Calgary, he was "whisked into a melee of well-wishers, crowned by the mayor with a white cowboy hat," paraded before dignitaries and local aboriginal leaders, "and placed on a cowboy horse—all within ten minutes."[839] As Arthur Menzies recalled years later, he and his colleagues at External had a good laugh at the expense of Eustace McGaughey, the official attached to accompany the prince, as reports of the wild welcome flooded in and McGaughey chronicled the prince's rebellious streak. "The people of the Imperial Household Agency were anxious to keep him under control," Menzies recalled. "So he would duck into the train toilet and then nip out and go."[840] By the time the prince finally arrived at Ottawa's Union Station, some 2,000 people had crowded the platform to greet him alongside Prime Minister St. Laurent, federal cabinet ministers, and officials from the Japanese Embassy.[841] Small wonder that as he toured Canada's hydroelectric facilities at Niagara after a lunch of roast beef, Yorkshire pudding, pea soup, broccoli, fried eggplant and strawberry shortcake, instead of admiring the view, the prince dozed peacefully as his car motored from one section of the project to another.[842]

Yet, far from the madding crowds, Akihito's visit was more than just a cheery series of banquets and receptions, but also an occasion that showed both the progress of Japanese-Canadian relations since the end of the war, as well as their lingering tensions. On the positive side, the visit was an opportunity for both nations to learn something about the other. "If the people of Japan are not acquainted with what goes on in Canada after Crown Prince Akihito's visit," Ken Liddell of

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[838] "Sawmill Sees Royalty," *Vancouver Province*, 13 April 1953, 1.
[839] Dick Snell, "Prince Wildly Greeted: Huge, Milling Mob Jams CPR Station," *Calgary Albertan*, 16 April 1953, 3.
[840] Jeff Davis, "Ottawa's Imperial Visitor," *Embassy*, 8 July 2009, 7, 10. For his own account, see C.E. McGaughey, "The Crown Prince of Japan and the Press [hereafter McGaughey Memo]," 5 May 1953, R15615, vol. 31, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. As McGaughey later admitted to Klaus Pringsheim, the assignment "had its amusing aspects." See McGaughey to Pringsheim, 18 June 1978, RC0039, box 3, file 51, Klaus H. Pringsheim fonds, MUA.
[841] Ainslie Kerr, "Poised and Serious, Akihito Looks at Canada's Capital," *Ottawa Journal*, 20 April 1953, 17. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 4, Fig. 7.
[842] "Prince Akihito Falls Asleep on Tour of Hydro Projects," *Globe and Mail*, 20 April 1953, 8.

the *Calgary Herald* joked, "it won't be the fault of the 23 newspapermen who are putting the story on thousands of feet of tape recording, hundreds of photos and strange words made up of alternate consonants and vowels that even cable operators can't understand."[843] Indeed, relations between both nations' journalists during the visit were incredibly cordial. Vancouver *Province* writer Dan Ekman, for one, wrote an entire article on their views of Akihito. "Our imperial family has taken Britain's royal family as its model," one told him positively, "and Akihito is shaping up well." As for the reporters themselves, Ekman smirked, the rivalry between their papers "is strictly western-style," as his paper's offices were "overrun with Japanese photographers using Associated Press Wirephoto facilities to send pictures of Vancouver's reception for Prince Akihito to Tokyo."[844] Departing from wartime propaganda, these were no longer the dangerous and inscrutable Japanese of 1945, but ones motivated by the same journalistic motives as Ekman himself.

Nor were all contacts strictly professional. Liddell, for one, joined the Japanese along with several other Canadian reporters in pursuing the prince across the country. Among their number was Paul Y. Ishihara of Radio Tokyo, "a most likable fellow" conspicuous for his "tie of McTavish tartan, purchased in San Francisco." There was also Ezaki Toshio of the *Sangyō Keizai Shinbun*, who spent the journey practicing his rudimentary English skills and "slowly mastering the words of Alouette." He did not, Ekman observed, "have the faintest idea of what he was singing." And speaking of music: "Ishihara whipped out his recording machine again. He made quite a speech to himself. Somebody asked what he had said into the microphone, in Japanese, and he replied 'I say… and here is everybody on Canadian train having good time.' So everybody on Canadian train having good time sang Roll Out the Barrel for 19 Japanese radio stations."[845]

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[843] Ken Liddell, "Visiting Writers Record Trip Fully," *Calgary Herald*, 15 April 1953, 25.
[844] Dan Ekman, "Japanese Newsmen Find Heir 'Personable Young Character,'" *Vancouver Province*, 13 April 1953, 1-2.
[845] Liddell, "Visiting Writers Record Trip Fully," 25, 34.

But the war's legacy was not far away either. As per Akihito's request, Japanese-Canadians from across Canada did come out to greet him.[846] These ranged from the 30 Japanese-Canadian families in Moose Jaw to the nearly 1,000 individuals that turned out in Vancouver. In Winnipeg at 6:30AM, the *New Canadian* reported, "Over 500 JC's as well as civic officials gathered in the CPR waiting room" to present Akihito with "a bronze buffalo, emblem of Manitoba." Yet, many were on edge. "Extra caution was used by the police in Winnipeg," the paper noted, "as it had been rumored that trouble was expected from Hong Kong Veterans' Ass'n members."[847] Happily, no trouble arose, but other difficulties surfaced in Montreal. On 21 April, the prince gave a polite speech at the city's Windsor Hotel to a group that included 800 Japanese-Canadians. Afterwards, 86-year-old Kintarō Kobayashi, "the oldest Issei resident in the community," led the assembled in three cheers of "Banzai."[848] This did not sit well with the *Montreal Star*, which if not overtly hostile, still adopted a sullen tone. "Just eight years ago, the cry of 'Banzai' was one to be dreaded," the paper noted matter-of-factly. "Yet last night, in the Windsor Hotel, some 800 Canadians joined in this cry—and everyone was happy about the whole thing." It was a cry, it reminded readers, that "is best known by the Western nations as the symbol of Japanese fanatic fighting tactics."[849] Almost in response to the *Star*'s implied accusation of disloyalty, that same day the *New Canadian* framed the visit as an opportunity to "bolster friendly relations between Canada and Japan":

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[846] "The only place on our itinerary where no Japanese Canadians were on hand to see the Prince was Sudbury," as McGaughey later reported, and only because there were none living there! See McGaughey Memo, 9. Indeed, one of the Canadians travelling with Akihito was RCAF officer Tomika "Grace" Honkawa, a Nisei from Port Essington, BC whose family had relocated to Ontario after the internment and who spoke fluent Japanese. The Canadian journalists, McGaughey noted, "realized the news value of a Canadian girl in uniform as a Canadian meeting on the West Coast the second most elevated representative of her race." See McGaughey Memo, 6. Cf. "Japanese Girl in RCAF To Greet Crown Prince," *Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1953, 17; "Only Women with Group," *New Canadian*, 18 April 1953, 1.

[847] "JC Communities Go All Out in Meeting Prince at Stops," *New Canadian*, 18 April 1953, 1. "There was good reason, of course, for the Winnipeg ceremony to be well-policed," McGaughey noted without further elaboration. See McGaughey Memo, 13.

[848] "Prince Ends Tour of Canada in Montreal, Greeted by 800," *New Canadian*, 25 April 1953, 1.

[849] "800 Japanese-Canadians Give 'Banzai' Salute to Akihito," *Montreal Star*, 22 April 1953, 9. The paper also noted, incorrectly, that Akihito appeared "stiff and unsmiling," with his smile on wearing a drab outfit to visit a grain elevator "perhaps the only one of the visit." As noted, Akihito's shy, but generally cheerful appearance was widely noticed.

> The Nisei and Issei, as Canadian citizens, bearers at the same time of the racial origin and cultural heritage of the land which Prince Akihito is representing, made a great contribution to Canada in welcoming the distinguished visitor in the manner that they did. Prince Akihito could have been regarded merely as another visitor from a foreign land, but our role as Canadian citizens does not mean that we should be completely invisible citizens detached from a land which has given us the cultural heritage of its customs, aesthetics, philosophy, art and moral code that we can help impart to Canadian life.[850]

This passionate plea for Canadian multiculturalism, however, was not a view yet embraced by a majority of Canadians, where the dominant British tradition still held sway, especially if those appeals to ethnic plurality were expressed in favour of immigrants from a recently defeated enemy combatant. As CCF MP Angus MacInnis later noted in the House, there was a deep irony that Canada had welcomed Akihito with open arms after thousands of ordinary Japanese-Canadians had been recently repatriated. "If we want to be friendly with the Japanese nation," he concluded pointedly, "I would say that by doing justice to these people we would be doing more towards cementing that friendship than we accomplish by making a great ado about Prince Akihito."[851]

For Louis St. Laurent, this was a path to tread carefully as he rose in the House to welcome Akihito to Ottawa on 20 April. In his prepared speech, the prime minister planned, rather boldly, to directly mention and address the war's legacies to Japanese-Canadian relations. After surveying the long history of ties going back to both nations' modern founding in 1867 and 1868, St. Laurent then planned to jump forward to the Pacific War, which had cast "deep shadows across the path of the history of our relations." And yet, the prime minister also argued, there could be no going back: "What is passed belongs to the past but must serve as an example for the future so that costly mistakes be not repeated. What is present belongs to us and we must use it to fashion our own peaceful and ever increasingly intimate destinies in a world where distance between nations has

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[850] "The Visit of Prince Akihito," *New Canadian*, 22 April 1953, 2.
[851] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 7th Session, vol. 4 (24 April 1954): 4354; "Aid Urged for Orientals," *Globe and Mail*, 25 April 1953, 8.

been abolished." The past had to be confronted before it could be overcome. Having accepted the hand of friendship at the San Francisco peace conference in 1951, Japan's relationship with Canada now remained to be rebuilt "on mutual trust and goodwill."[852]

But that was not the address St. Laurent gave. Instead, in the shorter speech he did deliver, the prime minister spoke more tepidly about how relations had been "darkened by heavy shadows during the tragic years of war," but Akihito's arrival was "a happy omen of better relations between our peoples." Rather than confronting the past, these dark passions were muffled in favour of a vague glance forward to a peaceful, postwar Pacific that would be "a highway for the maintenance of political, economic and trade relationships that will be mutually beneficial to our two peoples." But the bigotry and violence thrown up by the war—its "legacy of residual racism," as the historian John Dower once put it—went unmentioned.[853] Then again, perhaps this was an unfair expectation for the man who had once voiced his desired to expel all Japanese-Canadians back across his broad Pacific "highway" in defiance of both Canadian public opinion and his own cabinet's wishes. St. Laurent, much like Akihito's controversial father, had his own shabby wartime secrets to conceal. Perhaps it was better, after all, if Canadians did not study the past too closely.

As the 1950s rolled on, the Pacific War's long shadow lingered for Canadians. Japanese-Canadians continued their fight for a place in Canadian society. Japan's new democracy continued to be monitored by External for evidence of both communist infiltration and autocratic backsliding. The signing of the Treaty of San Francisco, which waved all further Canadian reparations claims against Japan, would be cursed bitterly by the HKVAC. And which of the two choices offered by Arthur Robson would the veterans of C Force make regarding the Japanese; would they choose to

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[852] "Address by Prime Minister on the Occasion of the Visit to Ottawa of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of Japan," 20 April 1953, R11214, vol. 278, file "Visit of Crown Prince of Japan," Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[853] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 7th Session, vol. 4 (20 April 1954): 4073. For Dower's comments see *War Without Mercy*, 312.

forgive, or not? Many, even the bitter ex-signalman William Allister, were able to do so: "Forget—no. But forgive—yes, if forgiving could encompass disapproval."[854] Others, like Leonard Birchall, could not.[855] To forgive, but not forget, to remember but not repeat, these issues had rankled beneath the surface throughout Akihito's visit. And far from being resolved by 1957, Canadians' complicated attitudes towards Japan would remain a nettlesome issue well into the future.[856]

[854] Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands*, 243.
[855] Nor could many other veterans of C Force. See Cook, *The Fight for History*, 284.
[856] Even in the twenty-first century, the war's generational trauma remained strong for some C Force families. See Carolyn Thompson, "Remembering Canada's Hong Kong Vets," *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 December 2011, B1, B4.

Chapter 5: Occupation Politics: Canada Between America and the Commonwealth, 1945–1952

> *"The issue of Canada's position as a Pacific power is posed more pointedly than ever by the close of the war against Japan. For there now arises the question of the part this country is to play in the diplomatic and military problems that belong to the reorganization and security of the Pacific area."*
>
> — Editorial, *Montreal Gazette*, 22 August 1945[857]

> *"The Canadian Ambassador in Washington has on two occasions informed high officials of the State Department that so far as Canada is concerned the Canberra conference will result in no commitments on policy and that the Canadian Government will certainly not formulate its position without giving full consideration to the views of the United States Government."*
>
> — SSEA Louis St. Laurent to Defence Minister Brooke Claxton, 13 August 1947[858]

To some extent, it was miraculous that the Canadian Legation in Tokyo had survived the Pacific War. Beginning in mid-1944, the Japanese capital had been subjected to a mounting crescendo of American firebombing. The most destructive raid had come on 10 March 1945, destroying 261,000 houses, leaving 1.15 million residents homeless, and killing nearly 100,000 people.[859] Located outside the city centre in Minato Ward, the Legation was spared this carnage, but its luck did not hold indefinitely. Since the departure of Canada's diplomatic staff in mid-1942, the Legation had been taken over by the Swiss, the "protecting power" for Canadian interests in Japan. Along with the site's prewar Japanese employees, they would face the coming onslaught. On the 24 May, starting at about 9:00PM, waves of American B-29s filled the skies over western Tokyo. "Plane after plane came over us to rain burning shells around us," as housekeeper Bessho Ichigoro later wrote in a letter to External, "and the noises of the shells and planes intermingled almost made us deaf." Together, the Swiss and Japanese worked relentlessly to save the Legation. "We found ourselves in the sea of fire and smoke, and fire flakes [floating embers] rained and

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[857] "The Wallflower of the Pacific," Montreal *Gazette*, 22 August 1945, 8.
[858] St. Laurent to Claxton, 13 August 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 1," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.
[859] See Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Penguin, 1999), chapter 1. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 1.

hailed over the whole premises." Using water from the on-site well, everyone "pour[ed] water over themselves whenever their clothes got dry, [and] bravely fought against [the] fire."[860] Despite minor damage to the roof and gates, the compound ultimately survived the night. When, on 5 September 1945, Colonel Lawrence Cosgrave and Canadian journalist Richard Malone travelled into Tokyo after attending the Japanese surrender on the USS *Missouri*, they found the Legation "a veritable 'oasis' amidst block after block of ruined desolation."[861] When Herbert Norman took up his post as Canada's new Head of Mission to SCAP in 1946, repairing the site was a top priority. By May 1947, nearly ¥2.9 million had been spent on its restoration.[862] In 1951 the building, once said to be among the finest diplomatic residences in Tokyo, still stood out among the ruins. When Hugh Keenleyside revisited Japan that October, he traversed "the jerry-built areas of Tokyo to the Legation" to find it "in quite good shape" compared to his prewar memories.[863]

If Japan was humbly "reaping the whirlwind" during the late 1940s, Canada's national ego was at an all time high. Not only had its economy successfully navigated the worst dislocations of the postwar years, but its new global stature was a mounting source of pride for Canadians. Before there was "Joe" and his famous "I am Canadian" rant from 2000, the beer company Molson's was proud to proclaim there were "Foreign Flags over Ottawa" from the city's new postwar embassies. "20 years ago there was none… ten years ago only four… TODAY there are 24 Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Ministers representing their governments at Canada's capital," one 1947

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[860] Bessho to External, 10 April 1946, R219, vol. 2628, file 80-M-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC. However, as Jacques Frey, one of the Swiss caretakers, contradictorily told External, the Japanese were allegedly more disorganized that in Bessho's heroic narrative, even if "an outbreak of fire in the residence which might have gutted the building had it not been discovered in the nick of time, was [found] due to the Japanese staff's disregard of instructions [about] how to behave during raids." See J.F. Fray to H.G. Nolan, 24 April 1946, R219, vol. 2628, file 80-M-40, part 2, DEAF, LAC.
[861] R.S. Malone, "Canadian Legation in Jap Capital Not Damaged by Allied Bombings," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 6 September 1945, 8; Cosgrave to USSEA, 8 September 1945, R165, vol. 119, file W-22-5-J (1945-46), PCOF, LAC. Cf. Richard S. Malone, *A World in Flames, 1944–1945* (Don Mills, ON: Collins, 1984), 256.
[862] E.H. Norman to SSEA, 6 May 1947 and Enclosures, R219, vol. 2667, file 8620-Y-1-40, DEAF, LAC.
[863] Hugh L. Keenleyside, Travel Diary (Trip Around the World), entry 8 October 1951, R4217, vol. 30, file 14, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. Cf. Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:458-459. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 2.

advert crowed. "Striking evidence, that, of Canada's new place among modern nations!"[864] One might argue that this was the populist edge of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's more sober Gray Lecture delivered that same year, wherein Canada was said to have a growing "willingness to accept international responsibilities."[865] "Whether Canadians like it or not," Hugh Keenleyside wrote in the third issue of *International Journal*, the new foreign affairs periodical of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), "their country has to play a new and gravely broadened role in international affairs."[866] This was a buoyant age of Keynesianism and of technocrats: "The Age of Wiz" as one historian later dubbed it, where "Whiz Kids" like Pearson and the three Far Eastern Mandarins could shine.[867] For them and for Canada, it was also a new "Golden Age" of international diplomacy, an era of internationalism.[868] Indeed, despite the later mythmaking about "Pearsonianism," the man-in-the-bowtie's impact on early Cold War Canadian diplomacy cannot be underrated. As historians John Hilliker and Donald Barry aver, Pearson managed External so skillfully, "that his years as under-secretary laid the basis for his dominance of Canadian foreign policy as minister from 1948 until 1957 and for a lasting influence afterwards." The postwar era, they note, was one of growth at External as the department upheld Canada's new, enlarged global stature: "Personnel had to be found to help deal with the increasing workload at home, to prepare for and attend international conferences, and to staff newly created posts abroad."[869] And, one of its more unusual posts was the Canadian Liaison Mission (CLM) in Tokyo. No longer a Legation

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[864] See Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 3.
[865] Robert A. MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1954: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1971), 392. Cf. Hector Mackenzie, "Shades of Gray? 'The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs' in Context," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 37, no. 4 (December 2007): 459-473.
[866] H.L. Keenleyside, "Canada's Department of External Affairs," *International Journal* 1, vol. 3 (July 1946): 190.
[867] See David Priestland, *Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A History of the World in Three Castes* (New York: Penguin, 2013), chapter 4.
[868] For a study of Canadian foreign policy during this era, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), chapter 3.
[869] John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, Volume II: *Coming of Age, 1946–1968* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 4.

accredited to the Japanese government, the building now hosted Canada's delegation to the US occupation forces under General Douglas MacArthur that ran Japan until April 1952.

As Norman oversaw CLM's repairs, the question became what sort of repairs did Canada and the Allies want to make to Japan itself? Caught between a declining British Commonwealth and an ascendent United States, Canada found itself pulled in multiple directions as decolonization moved across Europe's Pacific empires dislocated by Japan in 1941 and 1942. Initially for SCAP and CLM, the question was how Japan, the most economically advanced nation in East Asia, could be democratized and received back into the international community in line with prewar planning. Later, as the Cold War loomed in 1947, a "reverse course" began to consider how Japan could be made a stable member of the anti-communist Western alliance without sacrificing early occupation gains.[870] In both tasks, Canada was well served by being able to call on Norman as he held three key Japanese-related positions between August 1945 and October 1950. In late 1945, he served at SCAP under MacArthur; in early 1946, he was one of Canada's representatives on the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington tasked with overseeing the occupation; and finally, he was head at CLM until his replacement by Arthur Menzies (see Chapter 6). In each position, Norman had the chance to be that most elusive of figures: A "scholar-diplomat." With credentials comparable to the British Sir George Sansom or American Edwin Reischauer, Norman's clout as a Japanologist gave Canada an outsized role on the occupation's conduct.[871] Yet, as reviewers noted of Robert Bowen's *Innocence is Not Enough*, which gave Norman this title, Bowen was more interested in debunking Norman's alleged communist ties than in studying either his Japanese contacts or his

[870] For the concept of a "reverse course," see Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), chapter 6. However, it should be noted that more recent scholars avoid making so sharp a division between these two periods as they would have in the past. As Dayna Barnes observes, "A comprehensive framework and set of goals were created during the war, and these remained in place throughout the occupation." See Dayna L. Barnes, *Architects of Occupation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 167. Cf. Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 473.
[871] Roger Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986), 117, 112.

influence at SCAP. Reviewers particularly scoffed at his glib assertion that it was Norman who secured clemency for accused war criminals Shigemitsu Mamoru and Tōgō Shigenori in 1950.[872] While Bowen admitted this was only "speculation," it is worth stating that while Norman did have significant clout at SCAP, his overall impact is more difficult to assess than Bowen implies.

Meanwhile, Canada's postwar diplomacy towards Japan would be tested by two key events in 1947: the dispatch of retired General H.D.G. Crerar, former Commander of the First Canadian Army, to tour Japan and East Asia in July; and Defence Minister Brooke Claxton's mission to represent Canada at the conference called by Australian Minister of External Affairs H.V. Evatt to harmonize Commonwealth policy towards the occupation in August. Currently, neither event has been given significant space in the Canadian literature, despite their importance to the development of Canadian policy towards postwar Japan. In the two most comprehensive biographies of Crerar and Claxton, for instance, neither episode receives much attention.[873] In remedying this deficiency, I argue that Canada was more deeply involved in the diplomacy surrounding the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan than is often appreciated. Moreover, I argue that Canada's engagement here, as in the rest of its diplomatic initiatives during the 1940s and 1950s, attempted to tread a thin path between Britain and the United States in an arena that saw a far more fractious relationship between the two major Western allies than in the rather more unified European arena.

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Despite rhetoric about the "special relationship," historians have long recognized that if relations between the United States and Britain were broadly aligned on anti-communism during the early Cold War, they still diverged considerably on their respective national interests. This was

[872] See Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 137-138.
[873] David J. Bercuson's *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898–1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), ignores the Canberra visit, while Paul Douglas Dickson's *A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), only mentions it in passing, 452-453.

true globally but was particularly acute in the Pacific.[874] "Will Britain and America Split in Asia?" academic Geoffrey Hudson asked in the noted journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1953. "The history of the last five years," he argued, "shows that increases of Communist pressure in Europe tend to bring Britain and America closer together, while increases in the Far East tend to drive them apart."[875] Left unstated by Hudson, much of this was the result of Britain's postwar weakness and the United States' rising self-confidence. By late 1945, many in Washington were privately conspiring to keep Britain and "the rest of the world militarily out of the Pacific."[876] Britain, meanwhile, was irritated by MacArthur's autonomy in Tokyo despite the FEC's ostensible oversight. London was willing to let Washington "take the lead in controlling Japan," one British official allowed, but, "H.M.G. surely cannot accept the assumption which the Americans appear to be making that we have given them unlimited power of attorney in all matters relating to Japan."[877] This simultaneous rivalry and partnership within the Anglo-American alliance had key implications for Ottawa as Canada established itself as both an independent member of the Commonwealth and an American ally.

A related issue was Canberra's bid to stake out a major claim in guiding the Western Allies in the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan. Given that Australia had lived through a feared Japanese invasion in 1942, there were few policymakers in Canberra who dared take a "soft" line on dealing with the country in its defeat. In February 1946, the mercurial Australian Minister of External Affairs H.V. Evatt wrote a long essay for the *New York Times Magazine* to rally American opinion to Australia's side entitled "Japan is Still a Menace." "Australia believes the terms of the peace settlement with Japan must be carried out with firmness," Evatt stated in no uncertain terms.

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[874] See, for example, David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 318-319.
[875] G.F. Hudson, "Will Britain and America Split in Asia?" *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 4 (July 1953): 547.
[876] Robert M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947* (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1981), 202-208.
[877] Christopher G. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 678-679.

"Defeat in the war," he warned, "has not necessarily changed the Japanese character one iota." Only a firm, if not vengeful hand, could uproot Japanese militarism root and branch. But, he added, the Allies had to avoid being "misled by the present apparent submission of the Japanese. There are indications that their docile behaviour is only a mask behind which many of them still nurse the hope and intention of reviving Japanese power and trying once again at some future time to dominate the Pacific and the world."[878] A man known "for speaking his mind," the *Ottawa Journal* opined a few weeks later, Evatt's piece clearly implied that "people living more distant from Japan should be more willing to leave the Japanese problem to those who know it when they see it."[879] As we shall see, Australia's interest in guiding the Japanese peace settlement brought Canberra into direct conflict with both Washington as well as London and Ottawa.

This incipient conflict had ramifications for Ottawa given the emerging sense by Canadians that they had a growing interest in Pacific affairs. As noted above, rhetoric about Canada being a "Pacific power" rose sharply during the Second World War (see Chapter 3).[880] "The issue of Canada's position as a Pacific power," the *Montreal Gazette* editorialized in August 1945, "is posed more pointedly than ever by the close of the war against Japan." Later reprinted in the *Globe and Mail*, the editorial noted Canberra's effort to burnish Australia's status as "a principal Pacific power and not as a subsidiary." What's more, Canadians could not assume the Americans would protect their Pacific coast for them, leading some "to consider that we are relieved of any need to take thought for ourselves." Their conclusions were clear: "The time has come when Canada must

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[878] Herbert Vere Evatt, "Japan Is Still a Menace," *New York Times Magazine*, 3 February 1946, 10-11, 46-47. For Evatt's broader postwar policy towards Japan, see Alan Renouf, *Let Justice Be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr. H.V. Evatt* (St. Lucia, QLD: University of Queensland Press, 1983), chapter 9. Evatt's view in the *Times* that Japan was exhibiting little remorse for its wartime conduct and might be silently planning a comeback in the immediate postwar years was also one asserted by many contemporary Canadian writers. For examples, see Richard S. Malone, "Japan in Defeat," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 October 1945, 7, 59-61; and William D. Bayles, "Mr. Moto In Defeat," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 March 1946, 5-6, 26, 28, 30.

[879] "Too Easy on the Japs?" *Ottawa Journal*, 13 February 1946, 8.

[880] See also page 7, footnote 28.

define its own interests in the Pacific and assume its own obligations as a Pacific power."[881] That the war had left Canada as a Pacific power was widely echoed in 1945, in both popular and in elite venues. That December, the *Canadian Historical Review*—the respected journal of the nation's academic historians at the University of Toronto—ran a long review article by C. Cecil Lingard that tried to reveal "the nature and magnitude of some of the major problems awaiting solution in East Asia and in which Canada's future as a Pacific power is inseparably involved":

> The time has at last arrived when Canadians can no longer afford to neglect the fact that Canada fronts three oceans, that she occupies a vital geographical position with respect to each of the Big Four Powers [Britain, America, China and the USSR] and the great land masses of the world, that she possesses northern Pacific and Arctic doors to vast new industrial and trading opportunities with awakening Asiatic peoples that her newly recognized status as a "Middle" World Power, combined with her central position among the land masses of the globe, in an age of aerial navigation, necessitate her political, industrial, and cultural leaders given ever-increasing attention to the needs, aspirations, and cultures of hundreds of millions of Asiatics across the northern Pacific, in the interests of the future of Canada and a co-operative world order.[882]

That same year, ordinary Canadians heard a popular version of this argument compliments of the National Film Board. In *Gateway to Asia*, produced as part of the *Canada Carries On* series of informational films, the documentary opens with a long pan up from behind the Rocky Mountains to expose the vast reaches of the Pacific expanding westward towards Japan and China. "To many Eastern Canadians," the narrator intones gravely, "the Pacific was long a little-known world. Some even imagined Vancouver as a sort of back door to a country that faced the Atlantic. But once and for all, the shock of Pacific war has driven home the fact that Canada is not only an Atlantic power, but a Pacific power as well!" After a whirlwind tour of the province's history, its natural resources, its contribution to the national war effort, the internment of Japanese-Canadians, and the lives of local Chinese and Indian immigrants, viewers were left with no uncertainty that a new era had

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[881] "The Wallflower of the Pacific," Montreal *Gazette*, 22 August 1945, 8. For the reprint, see "The Wallflower of the Pacific: From the Montreal Gazette," *Globe and Mail*, 23 August 1945, 6.
[882] C.C. Lingard, "Far Eastern Affairs," *Canadian Historical Review* 26, no. 4 (December 1945): 432. Cf. C. Cecil Lingard, "Canada's Stake in the War and the Peace," *Pacific Affairs* 17, no. 2 (June 1944): 156-167.

dawned: “In the peace that follows, Canadians have great duties to discharge, consummate with the Pacific power they have come to be. Increasingly, their eyes are turning westwards. For in British Columbia, we have a gateway to Asia: A passport to the new Pacific world!”[883]

This discovery was also gaining traction in Ottawa and notice abroad. “Canada, a country which borders on the Pacific Ocean, would be foolish to try to isolate itself from the political and economic problems of Asia,” External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson told the House of Commons in 1949. “That continent is now close to us. The vast expanses of the Pacific have shrunk as the result of air transport.” From Vancouver, “the Far East is neither far nor east. Therefore Canadians must learn to look, as they are of course learning to look, northwest to Asia.” And, he added, one of Canada’s main concerns was the signing of a Japanese peace treaty, the absence of which “is one of the causes of uncertainty in the Far East.”[884] Nor were Ottawa’s mandarins ignorant of Canada’s new Pacific interests. In 1948, the CIIA’s fifteenth annual study conference, having already helped develop postwar Canadian strategy towards Japan during the conflict (see Chapter 2), devoted one of its three round tables to “Canada and the Far East.” This included discussions on “The Far Eastern Economy”; the “Political and Social Movements in the Far East,” including postcolonialism and the ongoing Chinese Civil War; as well as the “Peace Settlement in the Far East,” including whether the occupation of Japan was satisfying Canadian interests.[885] Admittedly, Asian affairs remained a niche topic, with the session having “the smallest attendance of the three,” as Lingard himself noted.[886] Still, the session attracted many of Canada’s most prominent Asian experts. This including Sherwood Lett, who had accompanied the Crerar mission in 1947, as well

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[883] Tom Daly, *Gateway to Asia* (National Film Board of Canada, 1945). Its tone was likely part of the broader effort by NFB Commissioner John Grierson to put “Canada at the center rather than the periphery of the world.” See Jack C. Ellis and Betsy A. McLane, *A New History of Documentary Film* (London: Continuum, 2005), 125.
[884] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 2 (16 November 1949): 1837. Pearson’s new vision of Asia was viewed with interest in London. See G.B. Shannon to SSCR, 24 November 1951, in *CRCR*, vol. 1, 12-17.
[885] See “C.I.I.A. Notes,” May 1948, R2849, vol. 8, file 3, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[886] Lingard to R.J. Boroughs, 28 July 1948, R2849, vol. 8, file 3, CIIA fonds, LAC.

as Arthur Menzies from External.[887] Again, while we should not overstate the size or magnitude of Canada's focus on Asia during the late 1940s, there was certainly a growing debate about what role it wanted to play in the region given the geopolitical rivalry between the Americans and the Commonwealth. And as we shall see, concluding a Japanese peace treaty proved to be one of Canada and the other Western Allies' thorniest Asian concerns during this era.

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Nowhere were Canada's rising hopes for a new Pacific age more obvious than with Herbert Norman. A talented historian and a perceptive diplomat, Norman proved an incredibly useful asset for External in conducting its policy towards Japan during the occupation. Yet, Norman's influence in Japan and with the American occupation authorities has often been overestimated, mainly for two reasons. First, there is ambiguity in the surviving records about his clout with MacArthur. As noted above, controversy was raised by Roger Bowen's claim, also asserted by Klaus Pringsheim, that it was Norman who eventually secured Shigemitsu Mamoru's release. In 1948, Norman wrote MacArthur directly to recommend that both his and Tōgō Shigenori's prison terms be reduced. "Neither in the MacArthur Archives nor in External Affairs records is there a letter from MacArthur answering Herbert's appeal," Bowen admits, "but curiously, almost exactly two years later MacArthur released Shigemitsu from prison. Norman's humanitarian appeal had apparently worked."[888] This speculation, understandably, drew criticism. Historian Roger Dingman, for one, cited it as an example of Bowen's tendency to "make assumptions as logically unsound and distant from the truth about Norman's influence on people and events as the allegations of his detractors against him."[889] Historian Akira Iriye likewise noted that while Bowen made much of Norman's

[887] Menzies's notes on the event are in his papers (R15615, vol. 29, file 3).
[888] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 138; Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 98. For the original letter, see Norman to MacArthur, 23 November 1948, R219, vol. 3642, file 4060-C-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[889] Roger Dingman, review of *Innocence is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman*, by Roger Bowen, *Monumenta Nipponica* 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 367.

alleged "humanitarianism," he did not explain why Norman apparently had no sympathy for a third accused Japanese foreign minister, Hirota Kōki, who was eventually hanged as a war criminal.[890] A similar tendency was also exhibited by Pringsheim when he claimed that "Norman's views of Japanese society became Canadian policy, as manifested in the positions taken by the Canadian representative in the consultations of the FEC."[891] "Certainly Norman's positions were sought and highly regarded," the scholar Keith Webster accepts, "but Canadian positions presented at the FEC were the result of diplomatic compromise with heavy doses of realism and deference to American interests."[892] In short, while Norman was an articulate and knowledgeable Canadian advocate for restructuring Japan, it is sometimes hard to find sources directly linking him to the "big decisions" made at SCAP and in Ottawa, particularly given policymaking's collaborative nature.

Second, there is Norman's rhetorical utility for the occupation's later critics. For some left-leaning scholars, Norman's views, which at times ran against the grain of US's actions in Japan, constitute a useful counterpoint to SCAP's ostensibly highhanded or "imperialist" inclinations, especially after the "reverse course." Two historians in this camp are American John Dower and Canadian John Price. For Dower, the fact that Norman's research on Japan was later occluded by the new "modernization theory" of US historians in the 1960s had helped to sideline his liberal argument that once SCAP had created the initial conditions for democratization the Japanese could be trusted to rebuild their own country. There was, in short, less need for a patronizing America to fix Japan for them.[893] For Price, meanwhile, Norman's views offer a contrast to MacArthur's own

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[890] Akira Iriye review of *Innocence is Not Enough: The Life and Death of Herbert Norman*, by Roger Bowen, *Journal of Japanese Studies* 14, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 471.
[891] Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 96.
[892] Keith Stuart Webster, "Canada and the Far Eastern Commission," (MA thesis, University of Victoria, 2007), 10.
[893] See John W. Dower, "E.H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," in *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman*, ed. John W. Dower (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 3-102. An edited extract of this essay was later reprinted by Dower with a new explanatory foreword in his edited collection *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World* (New York: New Press, 2012), 1-27.

actions at SCAP. Rather than mostly supporting him, as Bowen had argued, "Norman and Canada often challenged MacArthur and US policy during the earliest phases of the occupation and in the Far Eastern Commission." Yet, in the end, the Canadians were compelled "to line up firmly behind US imperial policy in Asia." As Price asserted in 2007, "Norman's life can teach us much about what it means to be human in the face of adversity," with his death "a reminder of the costs of catering to Empires, and the risks of criticizing the powerful."[894] There is truth to these claims, but such a polemical reading of Norman's actions risks turning his life into a simple morality play.

This leads to a point about Norman views raised by Iriye in his review of Bowen. As noted in Chapter 4, Norman had a harsh opinion of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, a point that Bowen raised in his own work. Norman also criticized the Japanese Communist Party as "reckless and demagogic" while socialist Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu was "indecisive."[895] Yet, "If neither Yoshida nor Katayama could do the task of democratizing Japan," Iriye noted perceptively, "whom would Norman have supported? The book does not say."[896] This observation gets at the heart of the argument. While it was easy to criticize Yoshida or SCAP for their deficiencies, Norman rarely had viable alternatives. If it is easy to fault SCAP for taking a particularly expedient decision, the fact remains that Norman's critiques—and the later academics who cite them—rarely offer better alternatives that were politically viable at the time. In contrast, Hugh Keenleyside—who had struck up a close friendship with Yoshida while in Tokyo during the 1930s—concluded that if "Properly supported," he and other local politicians like the liberal-minded Shidehara Kijūrō, "will go a good way towards constructing the new framework that is an essential prerequisite to the establishment

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[894] See John Price, "E.H. Norman, Canada and Japan's Postwar Constitution," *Pacific Affairs* 74, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 383-405; John Price, "Herbert Norman, the Occupation of Japan, and Canada-U.S. Relations. A Canadian Critique of MacArthur and the Occupation," *Japan Focus* 5, no. 5 (May 2007): 1-10; John Price, "Rethinking the Occupation: E.H. Norman, Canada, and the American Empire in Asia, 1945–51," in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Patricia Roy and Greg Donaghy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 120-139.
[895] Bowen, *Innocence is Not Enough*, 159, 155-156.
[896] Iriye, review of Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 471.

of democratic government in Japan," a conclusion born out by events.[897] In other words, even if Norman had concerns about Yoshida or SCAP, his criticisms did not necessarily offer a feasible or widely accepted "liberal" alternative to MacArthur's ostensibly "imperialist" decisions.

Finally, it is worth noting that for most of Norman's connection to postwar Japanese affairs between 1945 and 1950, he was neither at SCAP nor the FEC, but head of CLM from August 1946 to October 1950. This position gave him access to MacArthur, but little leverage at SCAP, mainly the ability to support pre-existing plans and report on new developments. In 1985, Judy Hotard, a research assistant for historian D. Clayton James who was working on a multi-volume biography of MacArthur, went through the general's SCAP office diary to try and quantify who he saw most frequently. According to her calculations, Norman formally met with MacArthur 29 times between 3 September 1945 and 9 April 1951.[898] This was significant enough to be noticed, but it paled in comparison to the 128 times that MacArthur met with Sir Alvary Gascoigne, the head of the British mission in Japan. As such, I would argue that Norman's most important legacy for the occupation likely came from the aforesaid role *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* and his other academic publications had on SCAP thinking (see Chapter 2). As US Colonel Charles Kades—who played a key role in drafting Japan's postwar constitution—later noted, his own knowledge of Japan was largely derived from reading Norman.[899] Less valuable, though not insignificant for Canada's own policy towards Japan, was Norman's role as head of CLM, a study of which I now turn to.

At the time, the decision to appoint Norman was obvious. "Dr. Norman's qualifications for heading the Mission are well known," External reported in May 1946. "While serving as adviser

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[897] "The point of this letter," Keenleyside concluded, "is to say that I have been very agreeably impressed by the recent appointments," with Japan's future "much more hopeful that it was a few weeks ago." See Keenleyside to H.H. Wrong, 10 October 1945, R4217, vol. 20, file 19, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. Cf. Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:298-300.
[898] D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Volume III: *Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 693-694. As James McCardle later told Roger Bowen, he witnessed only "six to eight" encounters between the two men during his entire two-year stint in Tokyo. See Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 135n41.
[899] Dower, "E.H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 40. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 4-5.

on SCAP staff and later as Canadian representative on the Far Eastern Commission, he gained the confidence of General MacArthur and other leaders in U.S. headquarters to a remarkable degree. This should make it possible for him to do effective work in the present situation and enable him to render valuable reports on broad political developments."[900] The prime minister readily agreed, signing off on the proposal in July.[901] A far greater difficulty came from SCAP, as consent from MacArthur came "rather grudgingly." Mostly, this was due to Tokyo's postwar housing crunch (see Chapter 6). Since Canada's Legation was one of the few sites in Tokyo to survive the war, Norman had offered it with Ottawa's permission to the occupation authorities while serving at GHQ, "on the understanding that any Canadian officials who might be arriving in Tokyo after his departure should have priority in billeting." Yet, when the time came to reoccupy the site in 1946, SCAP claimed it was now "completely utilized" by the Commonwealth mission to the Tokyo war crimes trials, which refused to depart given the lack of alternative billets.[902] Given that the site was owned by Canada, Norman visited the State Department—already being in Washington to attend FEC meetings—to "protest in no uncertain terms" that it be returned, promising that "any space which we do not require in the Legation for our own mission will remain available for other use."[903] This was eventually accepted, and Norman and his staff proceeded to Tokyo as planned.[904]

"You drive off a wide street near the parliament buildings," the Canadian journalist Dave McIntosh later wrote when he visited Tokyo in 1950. You then drive down "a narrow lane, through a wooden gate and under stately old trees." Finally, on your right, you see the main building of the Canadian Legation, reminding one of "a New England colonial mansion." It was here in this "two-

[900] G.S.P., "Canadian Representation in Japan," 10 May 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC. A copy of this memo can also be found in *DCER*, vol. 12, 280-282.
[901] W.L.M. King to Governor General, 8 July 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC.
[902] Canadian Ambassador to the US to SSEA, 24 May 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC.
[903] "Note for File," 22 May 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC.
[904] For Norman's own account of re-acquiring the Legation, written after his arrival in Japan, see Norman to External, 28 August 1946, R219, vol. 3651, file 4606-C-10-40, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 131-132.

storey building [that] the 10 legation members look after Canada's interests in Japan."[905] For Norman, the next five years here proved to be both an exhilarating as well as an incredibly taxing job. Late in his tenure at CLM, Norman received a letter from an uncle asking what it was like to work in Tokyo, giving him the chance to explain the nature of his work:

> On the purely diplomatic side I have to undertake to prepare, in the form of despatches, reports to Ottawa which I think would be of interest on current developments in Japanese politics as well as economic developments. In addition, I try to explain the significance of various actions taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In the last year the despatches numbered close to 1,000. These included some rather brief and routine matters, but others again represented a good deal of research and careful preparation. The number of telegrams we sent averaged about one to the day ranging from consular matters to matters of greater importance.

In addition, his staff were "expected to meet as many Allied or Japanese individuals as will help in our understanding of various aspects of Japanese life and culture," along with the "almost 400 Canadians living in Japan."[906] As Norman concluded, "I find the work very interesting, although with our small staff I often feel disappointed not to get around to doing some of the larger projects which I have wished."[907] No doubt he had his as yet unfinished book on the Japanese philosopher Andō Shōeki in mind with this last comment.[908] Yet, as Norman himself noted, reporting about contemporary Japanese events was his prime duty in Japan, and the one for which he received the most acclaim from External. In response to one report on Japanese politics in 1947, Pearson wrote Norman personally to say that his dispatch had been given "pretty wide distribution" within the department. Given that Japan was still occupied, Pearson admitted, "there is probably a natural

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[905] Dave McIntosh, "Ottawa Girls Serving First Postings Abroad," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 22 November 1950, 21.
[906] Most of these, Norman added, were "French-Canadian Catholic missionaries … located in remote parts of the country so that I hardly see them from one year to the next," though there were now "an increasing number of Canadian traders coming to Japan to investigate trade possibilities [see Chapter 7]."
[907] Norman to Uncle Rude, 24 May 1949, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 6, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB. "There's no five-day week at the legation," McIntosh confirmed. "The staff works Monday through Saturday and often on Sunday. … meeting and talking with scores of people who keep the legation in close touch with the Japanese situation or who just want help." See McIntosh, "First Postings Abroad," 21.
[908] *Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism* was finally published in 1949 with both English and Japanese editions. See Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 99-104.

tendency to attach less importance to events there … Yet I am sure that whether or not Japan learns the lessons intended from her defeat [she] will have an important bearing on future peace in the North Pacific area and consequently on our own country." Pearson concluded his note by praising how Norman's "exposition of Japanese politics makes sense even to the general reader and your resourceful style of writing sustains interest throughout the dispatch."[909] Many reports were good enough to pass along to the Privy Council for use in federal cabinet meetings.[910] If these routine messages lacked the glamour of rewriting constitutions or scrutinizing war criminals, they remained the bread and butter of Norman's work in postwar Japan. And, most relevantly here, they marked Norman's most important contribution to Ottawa's foreign policy designs in Asia.

Beyond his official duties at CLM, Norman also had the opportunity to support pre-existing SCAP initiatives to develop Japanese democracy. One notable example was his contribution to the "Festival for Democracy" held in Shizuoka Prefecture on 27 and 28 July 1949. On 20 July, Moses Burg of SCAP's Shizuoka Civil Affairs Team, who knew Norman from his time at GHQ, wrote to explain his proposed programme. In effect, the festival expanded upon a pre-existing celebration honouring a local peasant uprising, led by the farmer Goroemon Masuda, which had successfully extracted concessions from a local daimyo in 1816.[911] "The purpose," Burg clarified, "is to show the Japanese that the principles of liberty and democracy are not totally alien doctrines transplanted to Japan for the first time at the end of the Pacific War and foisted upon the Japanese," but were partially organic, indigenous traditions that SCAP had only vindicated. Given Norman's aforesaid desire to make Japanese the architects of their own democratic destiny, he was swiftly sold on the

[909] Norman to SSEA, 31 January 1947; Pearson to Norman, 12 March 1947, R219, vol. 235, file 4606-40C, part 1, DEAF, LAC. Cf. Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 134.
[910] Most of these were reports written by Norman, along with those he signed off on by other CLM officials like James McCardle or James Britton, on various aspects of Japanese domestic politics, particularly the fortunes of the Japanese Communist Party. See, for examples, McCardle for Norman to SSEA, 27 June 1949; Britton for Norman to SSEA, 19 June 1950; Norman to SSEA, 13 September 1950, R165, vol. 84, file J-25 (vol. 1), PCOF, LAC.
[911] "Shizuoka Prefecture Revives Festival in Honor of Democrat," *Nippon Times*, 27 July 1949, 3.

project. Burg invited Norman to attend the festival, fawning that he would be "deeply honoured to receive encouragement from one of the world's outstanding authorities on Japanese history."[912]

Given the short notice and his other duties at CLM, Norman was unable to visit Shizuoka personally, but he did compose a message that was read out at the festival and proved unexpectedly popular. Nominally, Norman was supposed to clear such activities with External in advance. But given the tight deadline and his statement's "academic" tone, he had not expected it to leave much of an impact. "I was a little taken aback at the publicity," he wrote External sheepishly, "for it was featured in both the English language papers and most of the Japanese papers" as well as on the radio.[913] In his remarks, Norman observed that every country had its "conflicting and opposed traditions," and in Japan this was one of liberty and tyranny. "Now that it is possible to study the Japanese past freely, it is vitally important that the Japanese rediscover for themselves the warm and generous traditions in their history." But this did not mean whitewashing the missteps of the past. Rather, "the grim and often discouraging struggle which precursors of democracy waged in Japan" had to be laid bare and the "formidable opposition to such efforts of reform" exposed. As the story of Goroemon and other rebels showed, "it is always a source of inspiration to read how individuals and also groups of humble folk whose names we hardly know persistently tried to win a more decent and human existence, not only for themselves but for future generations." Norman ended by remarking that if other festivals were "little more than a brief moment of relief and merry-making," he hoped that this one would be "a serious and concerted effort on the part of the villagers consciously to set themselves the task of looking back upon their past history and deriving benefit from its lessons and thus attempting to make brighter and richer their own future."[914]

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[912] Burg to Norman, 20 July 1949, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[913] Burg to Norman, 1 August 1949; Norman to SSEA, 15 August, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[914] E.H. Norman, "Message to the 'Festival for Democracy'," 26 July 1949, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.

Despite his lack of prior approval, External applauded Norman's initiative to work with the festival and was impressed at the apparent impact his message had made in Japan. Copies of Norman's correspondence on the matter were rerouted to the Canadian Embassy in Washington, and his message was well received by External's Far Eastern section head, Arthur Menzies.[915] "I was greatly interested in this report," Menzies wrote External's Information Division, and had wondered if they "would think it worthwhile including the message and some of the accompanying correspondence (or extracts thereof) in a future issue of *External Affairs*," the monthly journal published by the department.[916] This was agreed, and a long extract of Norman's message ran in its November 1949 issue under the headline "Democratic Traditions in Japan" along with Moses Burg's enthusiastic response.[917] Given the wide publicity it received in Japan, including in papers like the American military's *Stars and Stripes*, it seems likely that SCAP press agents were at least partly responsible for this wide coverage.[918] MacArthur seems to have been keen to have Norman write and speak about the changes he and SCAP were making in Japan, even after Norman had departed GHQ. In February 1949, for example, MacArthur urged Norman to write "an article in some reputable and widely-read journal on the general subject of the comparison of Japan past and present." While Norman demurred, he did pass along the transcript of a speech he had given to the US Foreign Policy Association in 1946, noting that "I think it contains something of the spirit of the suggestion which you made to me which at some time I earnestly hope to be able to amplify."[919] While, as John Price argues, it is apparent that Norman and MacArthur were ideologically opposed on many issues—in 1951 Norman produced "a rather scathing indictment" of the general's conduct

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[915] A.D.P. Heeney to Ambassador Washington, 9 September 1949, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[916] Menzies to G.C. McInnis, 7 September 1949 and Enclosure, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[917] "Democratic Traditions in Japan," *External Affairs*, 1, no. 11 (November 1949): 12-13. For Burg's original letter included in the article, see Burg to Norman, 1 August 1949, R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[918] See "Letter Highlights Democracy Meet," *Stars and Stripes*, 28 July 1949, a copy of which can be found in R219, vol. 3649, file 4606-40, part 3, DEAF, LAC.
[919] Norman to MacArthur, 28 February 1949, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 6, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.

during the Korean War—he still does not seem to have detested MacArthur to the extent that he engaged with him merely "out of duty," at least not during the late 1940s.[920] In this period, Roger Bowen's conclusion that their relationship was "something more than simply cordial" seems more accurate, unless we assume that Norman's occasionally barbed reports to Ottawa on MacArthur's transparent egotism masked a more deeply personal dispute.[921] At the very least, unlike Price, I hesitate to hinge an argument on their relationship's "real" character based upon the contents of a single report published well after their collaboration days at GHQ was over.

For Canadians back home, Norman's career in Tokyo was viewed with pride as a notable part of their more vigorous postwar standing in the world. Canadian prestige in Japan was high, *Globe and Mail* journalist Ken Ford argued in 1947, "mainly through the reputation and efforts of Herbert Norman." After all, he was "rated as one of the outstanding authorities on modern Japan," and Americans in particular "have recognized Norman's abilities and this has increased Canada's stock in Tokyo."[922] Yet, despite both the public and official approval, Norman's entire career was about to be upset. While slated to return to Ottawa in November 1950 to head External's American and Far Eastern Division, on 14 October 1950 a cable arrived from Arnold Heeney telling Norman to return immediately. The RCMP had just received allegations from the FBI that Norman was a communist. External wanted to interview him.[923] While he initially downplayed the radicalism of his student days, Norman finally confessed his earlier affinity for communism and admitted he had mixed with like-minded students at Cambridge and Harvard. While no evidence that he had done

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[920] See Price, "Herbert Norman, the Occupation of Japan, and Canada-U.S. Relations," 6-8. It is worth noting that Bowen too mentions Norman's criticism with SCAP policy during the Korean War, particularly in its censorship of Japanese journalists who advocated for neutrality in the Cold War and against Japanese communists who protested American actions there. But he nevertheless notes that Norman did support ***some*** censorship in Japan during the war, though it was with "mixed but democratic emotions." See Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 166, 169.

[921] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 136.

[922] Ken Ford, "Canadian States Japs Strong for MacArthur," *Globe and Mail*, 26 May 1947, 5.

[923] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 171; Donald Barry, "Cleared or Covered Up? The Department of External Affairs Investigations of Herbert Norman, 1950–52," *International Journal* 66, no. 1 (Winter 2010/11): 153.

anything disloyal or illegal while working at External emerged, the experience proved devastating to Norman. In an anecdote later shared with Herbert's brother Howard, Arthur Menzies recalled seeing Norman struggling to regain his composure in an East Block hallway after one particularly grueling session.[924] And while Norman was now the nominal head of the Far Eastern Division, External purposefully kept him away from the position on temporary assignments to wait out the inquiry and resulting furor in the American press.[925] There is thus something terribly ironic about the interview Norman gave *Ottawa Citizen* reporter Austin Cross in January 1951 while he remained under a cloud of suspicion. As he entered his office "on the third floor of the East Block," Cross found Norman "[poring] over Japanese charts, [reading] Oriental reviews, and, generally speaking, [getting] himself ready for the new approach to Japan." With a Japanese peace treaty now on the horizon, the return of "this mildly-spoken, broad-shouldered man with the brilliant mind" to Ottawa was a clear sign that External was ready to "pick up where Canada left off at Pearl Harbor."[926] Yet Norman played no serious part in the revival of Japanese-Canadian relations after 1952. In a bid to have him keep a low profile, External made Norman High Commissioner to New Zealand in 1953, and then, fatefully, Ambassador to Egypt in 1956. The talents of Canada's most prominent Japanologist would never again be seriously exploited.

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In the summer of 1947, a Japanese peace treaty looked like it might be around the corner. By this time, many of SCAP's initial objectives for the occupation had been achieved, the "reverse course" was coming into effect as the Cold War deepened, and concerns about Japan's economic reconstruction were growing.[927] In response, a flurry of activity developed in the United States and

[924] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 239-240n34.
[925] Barry, "Cleared or Covered Up?" 156.
[926] Austin F. Cross, "Japanese 'Desk' Ready for Foe-Turned-Friend," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 4 January 1951, 6.
[927] See Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, chapter 10; John Price's *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 169-170.

among its Pacific allies as each debated the terms by which Japanese sovereignty might be restored. Among the plans advanced, one of the most ambitious came from the Australians under H.V. Evatt. His proposal was to hold a conference in Canberra among Commonwealth members to debate a common policy towards any forthcoming peace settlement and assert Australia's interests in Japan. As Evatt lectured his cabinet colleagues in mid-August, "Australia's war effort entitled her to be recognized as a party principal in the peace." Canberra had "earned this position," he stated forcefully and unequivocally.[928] Naturally, Canada was one of the invitees, sending a mission led by Defence Minister Brooke Claxton. However, unwilling to have their delegates rely on foreign intelligence to make their plans, and keen to exhibit Canada's own resolve in Asia, Ottawa decided to send a mission to Japan to observe the occupation's progress for themselves and gather evidence for Claxton's team. And Ottawa had the perfect man for the job: General H.D.G. Crerar.

In the postwar years, few Canadian military officials had both the simultaneous respect yet obscurity of General Henry Duncan Graham Crerar. The former commander of the First Canadian Army in northwest Europe—the largest formation ever commanded by a Canadian soldier—Crerar had retired in late 1945 while, in writer Paul Dickson's words, "his public profile and standing was at an all-time high." Yet, despite his accomplishments, during the late 1940s "Crerar remained an active if marginal figure in Ottawa international affairs circles."[929] He gave speeches and collected foreign medals, but he played only a minor role in the renovations being undertaken to prepare the Canadian military for the Cold War's long twilight struggle. Yet, much like George Marshall south of the border, Ottawa saw in the decorated general a respected emissary for the nation abroad. In early July 1947, the new Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson asked Crerar if he would lead their mission to Japan. Initially, Crerar was hesitant. Much like Marshall, he hoped

[928] Cabinet Submission by Evatt, 13 August 1947, *DAFP*, vol. 12, 574-576.
[929] Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 451-452.

to enjoy his retirement in peace, and Pearson's proposal had "quite upset summer arrangements for the entire family."[930] But a man of duty, Crerar eventually took up the offer, much to Claxton's delight.[931] On 24 July, after much speculation,[932] W.L.M. King publicly announced that Crerar was going to Japan, having received formal invitations from both MacArthur as well as Australian General Horace Robertson, head of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in the country.[933] The press quickly warmed to the decision, the *Globe and Mail* editorializing that there were few Canadians "equally well equipped to assess a problem of this nature as the former Army Commander."[934] Joining the general would be Brigadier Sherwood Lett, another decorated Second World War officer who had fought at Dieppe and in northwest Europe; Roland Bock, president of the Canadian Lumberman's Association, who would handle the mission's economic questions; External's Ralph Collins, then serving as Canada's representative at the FEC in Washington; and Air Commodore H.B. Godwin. The latter two would also accompany Claxton to Canberra along with Herbert Norman, who was being temporary detached from CLM for the assignment.

Pearson's orders for Crerar, laid down in a letter on 23 July, were clear. In addition to the minor tasks of paying "a courtesy call" to the Canadian Embassy in Nanjing, attached to Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists, and to "lay wreaths on behalf of the Canadian government and people in the cemeteries where Canadian soldiers are buried" (see Chapter 4), he would "acquire information to assist the Government in the formulation of its views on the Japanese Peace Settlement," and "emphasize Canada's interest in the revival of trade with Japan consistent with the requirements of military security," on which he would write a report for External. In keeping with Canada's

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[930] Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 452. For George Marshall's comparative views to commanding his own mission to East Asia—his to try and negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Chinese Civil War—see Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, *The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945–1947* (New York: Norton, 2018).
[931] Claxton to Crerar, 10 July 1947, R5357, vol. 17, file "Trip to Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC.
[932] See "Crerar May Go to Japan," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 22 July 1947, 14.
[933] Frank Swanson, "Crerar Heads Canadian Mission to Japan," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 24 July 1947, 1.
[934] "A Fine Appointment," *Globe and Mail*, 26 July 1947, 6.

growing postwar interests in East Asia, Pearson also offered Crerar a detailed history of why his mission was so valuable for Ottawa:

> Canada as a Pacific power has a special interest in seeing peace and stability speedily restored in the Pacific. […] Canada's proximity to Japan has been brought home even more forcefully to Canadians by the building of the north-west staging route and by the completion of the Alaska Highway. In the next decade, we should be able to exploit to our advantage, Canada's strategic trading position as a Pacific power but this can only be done when peaceful conditions return to the Far East. While Japan has suffered military defeat, the job will not be complete until Japanese militarism has been stamped out. Canadians will remember the fact that nearly five hundred Canadian soldiers died fighting the Japanese at Hong Kong or from mistreatment or malnutrition in Japanese prison camps. […] We hope to see Japan stripped of her power to make war but we also hope to see conditions created in Japan for the ultimate emergence of a peace-loving and democratic Government there, which will in time enable the Japanese people to make their distinctive contribution to International life.[935]

Pearson, clearly, intended the mission to be more than political theatre. Dressed in a new regulation summer uniform, his face "bronzed from a New Brunswick fishing trip," Crerar and his team left Rockcliffe airport on 26 July in a specially fitted RCAF B-24 Liberator bound for Tokyo.[936]

In retrospect, External's decision to choose Crerar for the mission was a solid choice. The general, back in a uniform "that bears seven rows of ribbons," as the *Ottawa Citizen* noticed, cut a dignified figure throughout his 18-day stay in Japan and subsequent visits to China and Hong Kong.[937] "As in this part of the world the military hierarchy is quite an important factor," Herbert Norman told his family from SCAP-ruled Japan, "we of our small mission here who have no troops in the country were quite impressed to see the effect of four stars (the American way of rating a full General) had upon the various guests and hosts." While Crerar was "rather reserved in his manner" and had no prior experience of Asia, Norman still found him "easy to get along with" and "very open to suggestion." He also noticed that the general had a laconic sense of humour. At one

[935] Pearson to Crerar, 23 July 1947, R5357, vol. 17, file "Trip to Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC. Cf. Prime Minister W.L.M. King's official statement of intent in Swanson, "Crerar Heads Canadian Mission to Japan," 1.
[936] "Gen. Crerar Away on Japan Mission," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 26 July 1947, 1.
[937] "Gen. Crerar Away on Japan Mission," 1. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 6.

party, Norman recalled that the wife of a prominent diplomat asked him innocently "Where were you during the war General?" "In Europe," the former army commander replied simply.[938] Despite the stifling weather of Japan's hottest weeks that summer, Crerar's assignment proceeded as planned, including two meetings with General MacArthur, one with Japanese Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu and his cabinet, a visit to the BCOF forces encamped at Kure on the Inland Sea, and informal visits to the famous onsen (hot spring resort) at Miyanoshita, plus the famous tourist sites of Kyoto, Nara, and Lake Biwa.[939] "Although it was quite strenuous in spots, and very warm," Lett latter wrote Pearson after his return to Canada, "I think we all enjoyed our trip."[940] More formally and usefully, Crerar's team returned with a set of detailed reports on Japanese affairs as Norman, Collins, and Godwin continued with their mission to meet Claxton in Canberra.

After a meandering journey across the Pacific—stopping at Cheyenne, San Francisco, Honolulu, Johnson Island, Kwajalein, and Guam—Crerar's party arrived at Haneda on 2 August. "Here we were met by a guard of honour composed of United States and Australian forces," Godwin noted in his final report. "After the ceremony we were taken to our hotels in American automobiles."[941] While space had been found for Crerar at CLM by "squeezing some of us up," as Norman reported, Lett and the remaining Canadians were billeted at Tokyo's prestigious Imperial Hotel.[942] The following day, Crerar had his first meeting with MacArthur, with a second visit held on 19 August. An astute observer, Crerar immediately grasped his character: "As a man, he would not be content unless he was in the centre of the stage and the focus of attention. A dominant personality, possessing great dignity. A gracious host." Not surprisingly, MacArthur did most of

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[938] Norman to Family, 15 August 1947, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 4, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.
[939] For Crerar's itinerary while in Japan, see Patterson to SSEA, 29 August 1947 and Enclosure, R5357, vol. 17, file "Trip to Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC.
[940] Lett to Pearson, 4 September 1947, AM361, series 2, file 4, Sherwood and Evelyn Lett family fonds, CVA.
[941] H.B. Godwin, "Narrative Report on Trip to Japan and Australia – 1947," 2, [hereafter Godwin Report], R112, vol. 5196, file HQS15-13-18, DNDF, LAC.
[942] Norman to Family, 15 August 1947, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 4, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.

the talking. ("99% of his making," as Crerar put it). In their first meeting, the conversation ranged widely from Japan's prewar history to its contemporary politics, its need for an economic revival, and MacArthur's general views on politics, the Cold War, and events in Korea.[943] Yet, while the American was clearly knowledgeable, Crerar wrote in his report, "neither I nor the other members of the Mission found ourselves in complete agreement with the views of General MacArthur," though this did not detract from the perceived value of the meeting.[944] Fundamentally, Crerar noted correctly, SCAP's aim was to "to tie Japan politically and economically to the United States," and to use the country to block Soviet ambitions in the Pacific. Yet, conveniently for Canada, "I do not consider that there is any underlying antagonism to the British Commonwealth in the adoption of such intentions." Indeed, both the British and Americans had "a common interest in preventing any attempt by Russia to extend her power in the Western and SW Pacific."[945]

One of the issues where Crerar showed most skepticism of MacArthur was in the success of Japan's democratization, a view reinforced by his meeting with Katayama on 8 August. Invited to the Prime Minister's official residence along with Lett, Bock, Collins, Norman, and the CLM's George Patterson, the Canadians met the Prime Minister's cabinet for talks revolving around Japan's economic recovery—debating whether trade with Canada was now worthwhile—as well as Japan's democratic revival. Given the state of Japan's industrial capacity, estimated by Crerar's team at only 30% of its prewar level, along with the economic restraints in place from SCAP (see Chapter 7), trade with Canada was thought unlikely to be profitable for several more years, though Tokyo was interested in buying Canadian raw materials on credit.[946] As for its democracy, Foreign

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[943] "Memorandum on the Proceedings at the Two Private Meetings between General Douglas MacArthur and General H.D.G. Crerar…," 1, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC.
[944] "Report on Visit of the Canadian Mission to Japan, 2 – 20 August 1947," 2, [hereafter Crerar Report], 20 September 1947, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC. This passage was highlighted by the PCO in the original text.
[945] Crerar Report, 2-3. This paragraph was highlighted by the PCO in the original text.
[946] Crerar Report, 3, 5; "Minutes of the Conference … 8th August 1947," 3, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC; "Report on Japan," 11-15 [hereafter Lett Report], AM361, series 2, file 6, Sherwood and Evelyn Lett fonds, CVA.

Minister Ashida Hitoshi was clear that despite the "severe handicaps, our people are trying their utmost to pursue 'the middle of the way' course [in politics] without leaning either to the right or the left," and that they were "embracing the cause of democracy full-heartedly even to the extent of congratulating themselves on the adverse outcome of the war." While Ashida admitted that a nation's democratic resolve "cannot be measured in the terms of day or year but in the terms of generation," he felt that Japan's return to ultranationalism was unlikely.[947]

Still, Crerar was unsure. "There is no doubt that General MacArthur, backed by those under him, has done a very remarkable job in initiating the political and cultural re-orientation and re-organization of Japan," he granted. "And yet, in the opinion of the Mission, it would be most unwise to assume that a practicing and enduring democracy can be established in any country, in a brief space of time, and by means of instructions issued from above." This "suspicion," he added, was unpopular at SCAP, which had alleged that "it is the Japanese people, as represented by their popularly elected Government, who are themselves creating their own democracy," and that their role was "but advisory." But Crerar remained unmoved. Their interview with Katayama, he noted, typified this concern: "The 'voice' may be that of the Japanese government, … but it would be correct to assume that the 'thoughts', almost invariably, are those held by S.C.A.P."[948] This was seconded by Lett who thought Katayama's men simply gave responses they thought SCAP wanted to hear, but there was "little evidence of independence of thought." Overall, Lett was "not greatly impressed with the strength of the leadership and ability of the present government."[949] Given that it was the democratic United States that had triumphed over Japan, Crerar argued, the system had

[947] "Minutes of the Conference … 8th August 1947," 4-5, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC. A copy of this report can also be found in Sherwood Lett's papers along with additional reports on Japan's economic situation and the impact of its new civil liberties. See "The Japanese Government: Emergency Economic Measures," 11 June 1947; "Implementation of the Constitutional Provisions on Human Rights and Liberties," [undated], AM361, series 2, file 6, Sherwood and Evelyn Lett family fonds, CVA.
[948] Crerar Report, 4. This last passage was highlighted by the PCO in the original text. Cf. Chapters 2 & 4.
[949] Lett Report, 6.

some contemporary appeal in Japan as a success to emulate. Yet, it was possible that many wartime militarists and zaibatsu leaders simply accepted it pragmatically to hasten an end to the occupation and would try to re-assert control after the Americans had left.[950]

Outside of his official functions, Crerar also proved an excellent mouthpiece for Ottawa in asserting its Asian interests. On 8 August, the general addressed both Japanese and foreign press correspondents. "The visit of a Canadian official party to Japan and China at this time will serve to underline Canada's interest in the revival of her pre-war trade in the Far East," he began, echoing Pearson. "In the wider field of international relationships Canada's interest as a leading middle power in the political problems of the Far East is great." While its role in the Pacific War had been minor, he admitted, "Canadians, to a man, were solidly committed to destroying in Japan as in Germany, the groups which were attempting to lead their respective nations to conquest and expansion at the expense of the liberty and rights of democratic nations and individuals the world over," and his visit to the Canadian war cemetery in Yokohama had "impressed me greatly." Crerar ended by praising MacArthur's work in Japan, though he tactfully alluded to his wariness at the depth of the country's democratization.[951] His remarks were "widely featured in all the Japanese papers," Norman noted in his official report to External, including polite comments in the *Yomiuri* and the *Jiji Shimpō*.[952] Moreover, Crerar's reference to Canada's involvement in the Pacific War was useful, Norman added, as it was "a factor too often overlooked in this theatre."[953]

Beyond these events, most of the mission's remaining time in Tokyo "was taken up by inspections of American units and in meetings and conferences with the various American officials

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[950] Crerar Report 4-5. Cf. Lett Report, 7. This passage was highlighted by the PCO in Crerar's Report.
[951] "Notes for Press Interview August 8th," R5357, vol. 17, file "Trip to Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC. Crerar later noted publicly that while he was impressed by Japan's democratization, he remained unsure if "it had sunk to the roots." See "Crerar Sees Canada Reviving Interest in Far Eastern Trade," *Ottawa Journal*, 19 August 1947, 2.
[952] Translations of both these articles from their respective papers' issues of 9 August 1947 can be found in R5357, vol. 17, file "Trip to Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC.
[953] Norman to SSEA, 14 August 1947, R112, vol. 5196, file HQS15-13-18, DNDF, LAC.

at SCAP," as Godwin related. More enjoyably, given the "large number of entertainments" they were expected to attend, the Canadians "were glad to spend a night in the leave hotel at Miamoshita [*sic*], and obtain relaxation and a rest."[954] Meetings were also held with Japan's surviving prewar ministers to Canada—including Yoshizawa Seijiro, who awkwardly conveyed "regret" for the war—and a visit made to the ongoing Tokyo war crimes trials.[955] Later, upon visiting Kure, the Australian-led BCOF forces took them on a tour of the city's ex-Imperial Japanese Navy drydocks ("which will take the [liners] Queen Mary or the Queen Elizabeth with considerable spare room"), and had them review "a large number of units, guards of honour, etc."[956] Yet, most relevant for Canada's participation at the Canberra conference are the remarks Crerar gave publicly upon his return and the informal report Lett wrote to Crerar which informed his official narrative.

In his account of the 1947–1948 peace treaty debates, historian John Price argues that the Americans, by reason of their own designs for "imperial anti-communism" in Asia, sabotaged the negotiations, and Pearson and Ottawa did nothing about it: "Despite having a position of privileged access to US policy makers … and having the option of working with the British government to offset some aspects of the new US approach, Pearson chose not to." To Ottawa, Japan was "mainly the responsibility of the United States," and it acted accordingly. "It was Big Power politics, and Pearson knew which side he was on, even if the British offered an alternative course of action."[957] There is truth to this assertion: Ottawa had no desire to break with Washington over Japan. Yet, as Lett noted in the context of MacArthur's 1947 plan to end the occupation, the Commonwealth had little leverage to affect a different outcome. The British Empire, routed handily in 1941–1942, had "'lost face' in the entire Orient and Japan," and there was no hope its imperial prestige could be

[954] Godwin Report, 3. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 7.
[955] See "Crerar Praises MacArthur for Job in Japan," *Ottawa Journal*, 2 September 1947, 1, 14.
[956] Godwin Report, 3.
[957] Price, *Orienting Canada*, chapter 8, esp. 187-188.

regained (see Chapter 1). The Dominions, meanwhile, "are in no position financially or by reason of their parts in the Pacific war or the occupation to insist upon any alternative to McArthur's [*sic*] plan."[958] While MacArthur's proposal was not utilized, the fact remains that, contrary to Price's argument, many Canadians did not think they had an ability to markedly shift American thinking about Japan. As noted with Norman's views of the occupation cited above, while Ottawa may have had concerns about US policy in Asia, that did not necessarily mean that it had an alternative that was politically viable. Nor could Canada pursue such a policy independently of the United States or the rest of the Commonwealth. And as we will see, Canadians were hardly enamoured by the Australia proposal put forward by H.V. Evatt for the Commonwealth in Canberra.

Moreover, in his final report and the speeches he delivered after his return, Crerar expressed mixed feelings about Japan. For one, there was his views of communist influence in Japan and the threat the Soviet Union posed to it. For Price, this was a moot point: "As is now known, the Soviet threat was exaggerated. Even at the time, many opposed the way containment theorists were characterizing Soviet actions. MacArthur stated unequivocally that the Soviets had no designs on Japan, nor was domestic communism in Japan a significant threat."[959] This was true: MacArthur had told Crerar that the Japanese "had no use for Communist ideas," and had long hated Russia.[960] Lett, who visited Japanese Communist Party headquarters with a member of the occupation forces, found "an unfinished and unimpressive building," with its meetings "poorly attended."[961] Yet, as already noted, Crerar's report had been critical of MacArthur, and he was by no means opposed to slotting Japan into a Cold War framework.[962] For Lett, the Japanese were too busy rebuilding to

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[958] Lett Report, 4.
[959] Price, *Orienting Canada*, 188. Cf. Price, "Rethinking the Occupation," 127-130.
[960] "Memorandum on the Proceedings at the Two Private Meetings between General Douglas MacArthur and General H.D.G. Crerar…," 1, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC.
[961] Lett Report, 6.
[962] Crerar dubbed Japan, "a country which circumstances have brought to a key position in the struggle for domination of the Western Pacific now in full swing between the United States and Soviet Russia." See Crerar Report, 2.

give ideology much thought, keeping democracy out of convenience. However, he did feel that if "democratic methods as developed in Japan fail to give them a living and room for their expanding population, they might quite conceivably turn to Communism as a way out."[963]

In his post-mission speeches, Crerar reiterated and expanded upon this point. In the text he wrote in October 1947 and later delivered in multiple Canadian cities, the general argued that both the Commonwealth and the United States needed to rebuild Japan's trade and industry. "Should such steps not be taken," he warned, "I have no doubt that, in the not distant future, positive inducements to the Japanese people to try another solution to their economic problems will be held out to them by Soviet Russia." Arguing that the Cold War might turn hot, and that Japan's position in Asia was analogous to that of Britain in Europe, Crerar wanted the country protected. "Should either of these two groups of islands—one controlling the outlets from Europe and the other those from Eastern Asia—succumb to Communist influence from within, or to Soviet aggression from without, then the security and power of the Western Hemisphere will have been effectively undermined." Turning the optimism of the National Film Board's *Gateway to Asia* on its head, Crerar argued that Canadians had to watch "the Western Pacific in general, and Japan in particular":

> What happens in them is going to affect the citizens of Quebec just as much as it does those who live in Vancouver. Today, by an American Commercial Airline, it is but [a] 33 hours trip, via the Northern route, from Tokyo to Chicago. And so, whether the majority of Canadians now welcome it, or dislike it, the situation must be faced that in this international struggle of today, Canada is in the political 'front line.' It is bound to be also, very definitely, a part of a military 'front line' in any great war of tomorrow.[964]

This was an argument the press reported with alacrity, and one many high-profile Canadians heard firsthand. "Crerar Wants Japan Restored Before Reds Help," the *Ottawa Journal* wrote when the

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[963] Lett Report, 7.

[964] H.D.G. Crerar, "Address on Canada and Japan," 3-4, October 1947, R5357, vol. 26, file "Canada and Japan," H.D.G. Crerar fonds, LAC. This file contains two copies of Crerar's speech, with minor differences. The first is written on a series of small notepad-sized paper with amendments, apparently the copy Crerar would deliver from the podium. The other is a more formal copy on A1 paper, perhaps a reference copy of a version intended for distribution.

speech was given in mid-October to the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Club.[965] "East or West Domination Inevitable," the *Montreal Star* exclaimed in November when its Club branch heard its warning.[966] "Crerar Warns Japan Key to World Peace," the *Ottawa Citizen* reported when it was delivered at the Conference of Defence Association's annual dinner in December, citing the above quotation nearly verbatim.[967] For Canadians, war in East Asia was presented as a real possibility.

"The nationalist reading of the late 1940s is that Canada was bullied by the Americans into lining up in Washington's anti-Communist crusade," historians Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker once observed. But there is "little in the historical record to buttress this interpretation." Instead, they found an Ottawa vigorously trying to embed the Americans in Cold War affairs to stave off their retreat into prewar isolationism.[968] Perhaps, as Price suggests, alternative views were floating around Ottawa about Japan's place in the world at this time, but these were certainly not seen as viable options. Nor were they the majority opinion voiced by the respected H.D.G. Crerar to both Ottawa and the public when he returned home in September 1947. For him, Soviet mischief in Japan remained plausible despite assurances from the self-important MacArthur.[969] External, for its part, received nothing but praise from CLM on Crerar's conduct in Japan; Pearson dubbed his report "thoughtful," agreeing that he had "obtained an excellent grasp of the situation there"; and Arnold Heeney quickly forwarded a copy to Claxton in Canberra.[970] Crerar's overseas visits during the late 1940s, Paul Dickson notes, "cemented a belief that a Third World War was possible, and even probable, if Germany and Japan were not revived economically and if the United States

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[965] "Crerar Wants Japan Restored Before Reds Help," *Ottawa Journal*, 15 October 1947, 1, 16.
[966] "East or West Domination Inevitable," *Montreal Daily Star*, 24 November 1947, 3-4.
[967] "Crerar Warns Japan Key to World Peace," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 6 December 1947, 8.
[968] Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945–1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 114-115.
[969] One need only consider Norman and Ottawa's aforesaid criticism of MacArthur for taking the Korean War north of the 38th Parallel to conclude that the general's hubris meant that his judgements were hardly infallible.
[970] L.B.P. to A.D.P. Heeney, 10 October 1947; Heeney to Claxton, 24 October 1947, R165, vol. 84, file J-25 (1945-48), PCOF, LAC.

and Canada continued their withdrawal from Europe."[971] That viewpoint, not the one articulated by Price, was closer to Ottawa's prevailing attitude. In the years that followed, Pearson and many other Canadians spoke repeatedly about reviving the Japanese economy to stave off communism in East Asia (see Chapter 7). This evidence, in my opinion, does not support the conclusion that any alternative policy for Japan would have been readily accepted by Ottawa.

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One day during the summer of 1947, the phone rang at the Far Eastern section of External Affairs in Ottawa's East Block. On the line was Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton. On 10 July, Prime Minister King had risen in the House to report that Claxton would be going to Canberra as Canada's representative to the Commonwealth conference hosted by the Australians on the upcoming Japanese peace treaty. Now, Claxton was calling with an important question: "On this Canberra trip—can you let me have some background material on our Pacific policy? Or do we have one?" At least, that was the version later reported by the Canadian edition of *Time* magazine in August 1947. As this thesis has now argued for five chapters, Canada indeed had the beginnings of a Pacific policy by 1947, and the task of preparing an outline of it fell to Arthur Menzies, the section's head, plus the four mandarins who worked under him, who expended "substantial effort" to synthesize a two volume "briefing book" for Claxton to take with him. On the weekend of 16–17 August, if *Time* is again to be believed, Claxton spent his time "at his lakeside country place in the Laurentians, boning up on a text of several hundred pages prepared for him by Menzies' men," a fact apparently confirmed by Menzies decades later.[972] Now located among Claxton's private papers at LAC, the two books offer a useful window into Ottawa's views

[971] Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 454.
[972] "Made to Measure," *Time* (Canadian Edition), 18 August 1947, 15; A.R. Menzies, "Canadian Views of United States Policy Towards Japan, 1945–1952," in *War and Diplomacy Across the Pacific, 1919–1952*, eds. A. Hamish Ion and Barry D. Hunt (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1988), 168-169.

of H.V. Evatt's conference, Canada's position vis-a-vis the United States in Asia, and its own interests in planning for the restoration of Japan's sovereignty.

One of the most striking conclusions of Canada's role at the conference is Ottawa's explicit desire to keep open room for maneuver on Japanese affairs and to avoid the appearance that it was subsuming its foreign policy into the Commonwealth. In his message to the House of Commons, King explicitly stated that "No decisions will be taken at this Canberra meeting which will affect the freedom of action of the Canadian government at the [formal] Japanese peace conference which is to be held," a view accepted by his cabinet and conveyed by the press.[973] "Canada felt there was no great need for the conference," the *Ottawa Journal* noted airily of King's announcement, which Canberra had called simply "to win support of its views on what form the Japanese peace treaty should take."[974] In part, Ottawa had taken this position in respect for American views. As Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent wrote in his orders for Claxton, their Ambassador to Washington, Hume Wrong, had already "on two occasions informed high officials of the State Department that so far as Canada is concerned the Canberra conference will result in no commitments on policy and that the Canadian government will certainly not formulate its position without giving full consideration to the views of the United States Government."[975] Yet, to frame Canada's actions in Canberra as simple deference to Washington is to ignore the negative opinion Ottawa had of Australian aims, particularly when they were conceived by H.V. Evatt.

To say that Ottawa disliked Herbert Vere Evatt would be an understatement. During the Second World War, the volatile Evatt had developed a visceral dislike of Canada for its failure to

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[973] *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 6 (10 July 1947): 5348; "Japanese Peace Settlement; Commonwealth Conference; Canberra," 18 July 1947, reel T-2365, PCOF, LAC.
[974] "Claxton Will Head Delegation to Canberra Meeting," *Ottawa Journal*, 10 July 1947, 25. See also the particularly detailed assessment of the conference, including Canada's desire to keep its options open, in G.H. Sallans's, "Canberra Parley Will Formulate Commonwealth's Defence Lines," *Montreal Daily Star*, 21 July 1947, 13.
[975] St. Laurent to Claxton, 13 August 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 1," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC. Cf. SSEA to Ambassador in US [Wrong], 4 July 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 207-208.

help Australia in the dark days of Japanese victory given its commitments elsewhere. The reasons were various: Canada's period High Commissioner to Canberra Victor Odlum—vastly unqualified for his post—had promised Australians more than Ottawa was willing to provide; W.L.M. King's typical political evasiveness and his focus on domestic stability had played badly in Canberra; and Canada's geopolitical position in North America, which removed it from the threat of anything but nuisance raids by Axis forces, led Ottawa to underappreciate Australia's vulnerability to Japanese attack.[976] But regardless of the causes, few Canadians had anything other than contempt for Evatt by the war's end. When Ottawa refused to back Canberra's attempt to prevent the creation of "Veto powers" at the new UN in 1945, Evatt had labeled Canada "an American stooge," while Canadian diplomat Charles Ritchie had dubbed him "insufferably megalomaniacal and irresponsible."[977]

Little had changed by 1947. "If Dr. Evatt seriously intends to push this idea in the hope that he would be the Commonwealth spokesman," Hume Wrong scoffed in May, "the sooner it is killed the better." [978] These concerns were transmitted directly to Claxton, whose brief contained a five-page memo on Evatt's career and personality from Canada's High Commissioner in Canberra:

> Dr. Evatt is intensely ambitious, restless, eager for power for its own sake, ruthless in his judgment of men and in making decisions. If he fails at times as a politician it is because he is temperamentally out of the reach of his fellow men, but he sustains his high position by brilliance unchallenged in his own field. He is brusque, curt, rude, no respecter of persons or positions and jealous of contemporaries. He permits no rising star in his galaxy to challenge his own unshaded position as the central sun.[979]

A man who drove "his policy onwards by sheer weight of mind, plus ruthless indifference to [the] feelings of others," Evatt was hardly a man Ottawa sought to support at the best of times. Canada

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[976] See Galen Roger Perras, "'She Should Have Thought of Herself First': Canada and Military Aid to Australia, 1939–1945," in *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 142-143.
[977] Perras, "She Should Have Thought of Herself First," 143-144.
[978] Wrong boiled down the Australian proposal as amounting to little more than "Dr. Evatt's personal ambitions." See Ambassador in US [Wrong] to SSEA, 6 May 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 202-203.
[979] Appendix E: "Memorandum on the Right Honourable Herbert Vere Evatt…," 2, 2 July 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 2," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.

would go to Canberra to make itself heard, but it would promise nothing nor abet Evatt's bid for Commonwealth leadership, a stance supported by the conference's other participants. London was intent that "there should be no misunderstanding on this score in Washington," as St. Laurent told Wrong.[980] Indeed, in October 1947, the British directly shared their reporting on the event with the Americans, averring that as they "did not wish to give the impression of forming a Commonwealth bloc among the countries to participate in the peace conference, they felt it advisable to inform us [the US] of their views at the Conference."[981] Australia's bid to direct "the Pacific policy of the British Commonwealth" had run into a snag, one contemporary scholar observed: "Neither Great Britain nor any other Commonwealth nation is willing to recognize such leadership."[982]

Matters were not helped when the Americans suggested in July that all FEC members meet in Washington to discuss a Japanese peace treaty for 19 August, a date that conflicted with the Canberra meeting. "This will, of course, cause a great gnashing of teeth in Canberra," Pearson reported to King, "and Dr. Evatt will naturally interpret it as a direct offensive move on the part of the United States to prevent or at least neutralize his Canberra meeting." As Ottawa was not enthusiastic with Evatt's plan to begin with, Pearson admitted that he felt the US meeting was the "much more sensible one," yet even he saw that the scheme was perfectly tailored to be "almost gratuitously offensive to the Australians."[983] Ultimately, both Ottawa and London wrote similar messages to Washington, reporting that while they were certainly willing to participate in such a meeting, it would have to take place when the Canberra conference was over.[984] The way was clear for Evatt's moment in the sun.

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[980] SSEA to Ambassador in US [Wrong], 4 July 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 207-208.
[981] "Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton," 6 October 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 525-526.
[982] Werner Levi, "Australia and the Peace with Japan," *Far Eastern Survey* 16, no. 20 (26 November 1947): 235.
[983] "State Department officials may try to say that there is no connection between the two invitations," Pearson noted cynically, "but the connection is quite clear." See USSEA to Prime Minister, 15 July 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 208-209.
[984] British Embassy to Department of State, 15 July 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 471-472; SSEA to Ambassador in US, 21 July 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 210.

In preparing its brief for Claxton, External solicited widely for views on Canada's interests in Japan. As the sheer size of Menzies's two books imply, this included a range of reporting from across Ottawa's policymaking establishment. In addition to Crerar's report—which arrived for Claxton separately—the brief included a series of reports from Herbert Norman, based on his experiences at CLM, as well as a military memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Given Norman's long experience in Japan by 1947, calling on him to contribute a report was an obvious choice. On 12 June, David Johnson at External had contracted CLM to ask Norman for a series of position papers ranging from his views on the Gaimushō's response to ending the occupation, the disbanding of ultranationalist groups, the protection of Japanese "who showed sympathy or took action" to support the Allies, and Japan's view on the Ryukyus and its other territories outside the Home Islands. Producing five papers, Norman had completed his task by July, at which point they were transmitted to Ottawa and copied by Menzies, to be positively received by Claxton.[985]

Yet, for obvious reasons, the military dimensions of any Japanese peace treaty also loomed large for Ottawa. On 12 July, Pearson wrote the Department of National Defence's Chiefs of Staff, sending along a copy of a memo containing External's summary of events leading up to the conference. "Problems of military security in the Pacific area will be included in the agenda of the Canberra conference," Pearson noted, and he wanted Claxton to have, "a tentative statement of Canadian requirements under this heading," particularly regarding the demilitarization of Japan.[986] In considering the request, the Chiefs were leery about any potential rearmament of Japan, noting with alarm that several ex-Gaimushō officials in Japan had proposed "(a) a request to maintain an armed force of one hundred thousand, and (b) a request for a small air force to patrol the Japanese

[985] Appendix D: Johnson to Acting High Commissioner London, 9 July 1947; Norman to SSEA, 4 July 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 2," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC; Price, *Orienting Canada*, 171-172.
[986] Pearson to Secretary of Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 1947, 2002/17, box 88, file 17, Joint Staff fonds, DHH, a copy of which is also held in R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 1," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.

coast and outlying islands."[987] As Norman himself observed pointedly, that number held a grim irony "in view of German experience following [the] first world war."[988]

On 29 July, the Chief's Joint Planning Committee offered its initial thoughts to External, which mirrored Crerar's views in his report. The "continuance or extension of U.S. Military power in the Pacific and in particular, within the sphere of former Japanese influence," the Committee argued, along with the creation of a "friendly (non communist) Government in Japan," were both in Canada's interest. Moreover, while Canada desired "a return of industrial prosperity to Japan to restore the economic balance in the Far East," it did not want this "without adequate means of defence, i.e., an undefended 'workshop of Asia' on the Eastern doorstep of the U.S.S.R. would be a rich prize." As Canadian self-interests were more closely aligned with Washington than with the Commonwealth, they argued, Ottawa should thus welcome the US military in Asia "as a stabilizing influence."[989] This debate was continued on 6 August when the Chiefs of Staff Committee debated the issue personally. In the discussion that followed, Canada's interest to keep Japan demilitarized was expressed, and that if some sort of inspection agency was set up to oversee this, "the Canadians government should be prepared to participate." Also reiterated was the Planning Committee's view that "Canadian interests in the Pacific are more closely allied to those of the United States than the Commonwealth. She should therefore support the continuation of United States military power in the Pacific as a stabilizing influence."[990] These conclusions, dutifully relayed to Pearson by Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.K. Rutherford, were included by Menzies in Claxton's brief.[991]

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[987] The passage in External's report noting this fact was underlined with exclamation points by the Joint Chiefs. See "Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee," 6, 12 July 1947, 2002/17, box 88, file 17, Joint Staff fonds, DHH.
[988] Under the Treaty of Versailles, the interwar German Reichswehr had been limited to 100,000 men. See Appendix C: Norman to SSEA, 2 May 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 2," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.
[989] Report of Joint Planning Committee of Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 July 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 210-212.
[990] "Peace Settlement with Japan - Military Aspects," 6 August 1947, 2002/17, box 88, file 17, Joint Staff fonds, DHH.
[991] Acting Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to USSEA, 7 August 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 212-213; Tab V: Rutherford to Pearson, 7 August 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 1," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.

With the stakes so low and much of the Commonwealth already on the same page, the Canadians found the atmosphere in Canberra less confrontational than they had expected. Landing in Australia on 21 August, Claxton proved a charming emissary, telling the local press he was keen to meet local airmen who had trained in Canada under the wartime Commonwealth Air Training Plan. "They proved themselves the best of ambassadors," Claxton blatantly flattered his hosts.[992] And the Australians were happy to return the favour. When he arrived at the Conference's opening session on 26 August with Canadian High Commissioner Kenneth Green, *The Age* proclaimed that both men gave "the impression of being shrewd, good-natured men of affairs."[993] Unanimously elected conference chairman, with Claxton seconding his nomination, Evatt proved to be a model of decorum, "in every way entirely friendly," as Claxton noted with surprise.[994] "As chairman, Dr. Evatt was urbane and conciliatory," he concluded in his final report. Having made his own visit to MacArthur's GHQ in July 1947, Evatt was informed about the occupation and had made "a total about-face in his general attitude to the Japanese settlement. Where before he had repeatedly declared himself in favour of a hard peace, he now appears to be willing to go far in the opposite direction."[995] Evatt might have been undermined by the American FEC offer, but he had made the best of the situation. As for Claxton and his team, the conference was another opportunity to stress Canada's interests in Asian affairs. "Holding the Conference in Canberra fittingly recognises the part played by Australia in the Pacific war," Claxton toasted his hosts in his opening speech:

> The attendance of the Canadian Delegation is an indication of Canada's interest in Pacific affairs. Canada's strategic position as a Pacific Power—Canada has a long Pacific coastline—and our interest in foreign trade as the third largest trading nation of the world, make the establishment of political and economic stability in the Far East a matter of vital concern to us. Before the war, Canadian shipping, insurance, Christian

[992] "Canadian Envoy Arrives for Canberra Talks," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 August 1947, 3.
[993] "Empire Personalities in Conference," *The Age* (Melbourne), 27 August 1947, 2.
[994] High Commissioner in Australia to SSEA, 26 August 1947, *DCER*, vol. 13, 225-226.
[995] Claxton to SSEA, 2 September 1947, 6, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Final Report," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.

> missions and trade played major role in Japan's contacts with the outside world. The province of British Columbia, bordering on the Pacific, is one of the richest provinces in Canada, and Victoria and Vancouver are far closer to Yokohama and Tokyo than are the West Coast cities of the United States of America. The great circle route from North America to the Far East follows the Canadian coastal islands around the Aleutians. Canada is thus about the same distance from Japan as is Brisbane.

Arguing that "Uncertainty and disorder will disturb the world as long as the state of war existing between the Allies and their defeated enemies is not brought to an end," Claxton told the assembled that he hoped a peace treaty could be finalized by 1948, an opinion he reiterated when he returned to Canada in September.[996] It all seemed to bode well for an early Japanese peace conference.

And yet, no conference arose until 1951. Unsurprisingly, this was a result of the mounting Cold War rivalry. The years 1948 and 1949 saw Soviet coups among its Eastern European puppets, the Berlin airlift, Mao's victory in China, and 1950 the start of the Korean War, all of which pushed Japanese recovery into the binary logic of containment. As scholars have long noted, much of this was the brainchild of the increasingly hawkish diplomat George Kennan and his supporters in the US "Japan Lobby," who held that MacArthur's reforms at SCAP were impeding Japan's economic recovery and producing "a serious degree of instability," in Kennan's words. In what later became known sarcastically as the "Kennan Restoration," improving Japan's finances and developing the country as an anti-Soviet bulwark became the key American objective, a point Keenan made clear to Canadians when he personally visited Canada in May and June 1948.[997] In his talks with External diplomats, including Menzies and Ralph Collins, and in the speech he gave at the Royal Military College, Kennan made his cynicism of the Soviets clear. In Kingston, he surveyed Russian diplomacy going back to the Elizabethan era, claiming that one looked vainly "for a single example

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[996] For Claxton's speech, see MacKay, *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*, 279-281; "Speeches at Opening of Canberra Talks," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 August 1947, 4. For Claxton's views on his return, see "Early Parley on Jap Treaty Seen by Defence Minister," *Ottawa Journal*, 23 September 1947, 15; Austin F. Cross, "Claxton Finds Ottawa Hottest and Coldest," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 23 September 1947, 9.
[997] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 458-462; Price, *Orienting Canada*, 174-183.

of an enduring, decent and pleasant relationship between Russia and a foreign state."[998] In Ottawa, he claimed more relevantly that, "while we were worrying about Japanese reforms, we were giving the Russians an opportunity to extend their influence in Japan," as Menzies recorded.[999]

Naturally, such a change jolted Ottawa. As the historian John Lewis Gaddis phrased it, for Canadians, Kennan became a sort of "Delphic oracle," offering cryptic views of relations between the Americans and the Soviets, first expressing optimism, then profound cynicism.[1000] But contrary to John Price's view that Ottawa simply chose to compromise its ethics with Washington in the name of dubious anti-Soviet imperialism, the fact remains that voices of worry were growing in Ottawa about Soviet ambitions in Asia and support for a US military presence there, particularly within the military as the reports by Crerar and Canada's Chiefs of Staff reveal. There were also concerns that if Japan's economy did not promptly recover, it could impede any beneficial trade relationship with Canada, while also making communism palatable to the Japanese. As Marcuse and Whitaker note, Canada's initial Cold War worry was a ***lack*** of US interest in confronting the Soviets, not that they would care too much. "Only with the Korean War did doubts about American commitment to global leadership finally vanish—to be replaced by doubts of a different kind."[1001] As Menzies himself later argued, Canadian views of the Soviets collapsed in the late 1940s given both their actions in Eastern Europe and domestic events like the Igor Gouzenko spy affair and the resulting Royal Commission's revelations about it. "These developments across the Atlantic in Europe inevitably influenced Canadian thinking about the Pacific and the importance of preventing the trained manpower and industries of Japan from slipping into the Soviet or Chinese Communist

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[998] John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin, 2011), 314.
[999] Price, *Orienting Canada*, 183-189. See also "Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Canadian Department for External Affairs," 3 June 1948, *FRUS*, 1948, *Far East and Australasia*, 801-807.
[1000] Gaddis, *George F. Kennan*, 314.
[1001] Marcuse and Whitaker, *Cold War Canada*, 114. Like the Americans, there was a debate within Canadian foreign policy circles over how to approach the Soviets, with Canadian Ambassador to Moscow Dana Wilgress preaching tact on one side, and the more hardline diplomat Arnold Smith in Ottawa on the other. See ibid., 115-127.

orbits."[1002] Nor was the "reverse course" a complete shock to Ottawa. As Crerar had written in his report, so long as Washington maintained its Pacific presence, "[it] can reasonably be assumed that no steps to provoke war in the Pacific area will be attempted by the USSR." Yet, given that the Soviets were likely to build pro-Soviet regimes in Korea and China, he anticipated that at some point Washington would "no longer be a strong supporter of the UN policy of a de-militarized Japan."[1003] In conclusion, there were valid reasons for Canada's interest in Japan outside abetting American imperialism, and these were not wholly dependant on pressure from Washington, though its pressure grew with time. Still, if worries about communist infiltration or Soviet aggression were routinely voiced (and, indeed, encouraged) by Ottawa during the early Cold War, most Canadians rarely indulged in the "national ideological binge" of red-baiting or McCarthyism to quite the same extent that the Americans eventually did south of the border (see Conclusion).[1004]

As for Canadian relations with the Australians, the difficulties between both countries were a result of two factors, one geographical and the other personal. Personally, as Galen Perras notes, the departure of the slippery King and the moody Evatt from power in 1948 and 1949 allowed for a reset in relations.[1005] By the early 1950s, as historian Christopher Waters discerns, the new Australian administration of Prime Minister Robert Menzies and External Affairs Minister Richard Casey "very much enjoyed visiting Ottawa as a pleasant interlude during their many journeys to Washington and London" to meet with their Canadian counterparts, Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson.[1006] The Evatt interlude, clearly, had not soured relations too deeply. More important was the fundamental geographical contrast between both nations. As noted, located an ocean away in

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[1002] Menzies, "Canadian Views of United States Policy Towards Japan," 169-170.
[1003] Crerar Report, 3. This passage was highlighted by the PCO in Crerar's Report.
[1004] See Marcuse and Whitaker, *Cold War Canada*, 131-134.
[1005] Perras, "She Should Have Thought of Herself First," 144.
[1006] Christopher Waters, "Diplomacy in Easy Chairs: Casey, Pearson, and Australian-Canadian Relations, 1951–7," in *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 207.

the shadow of the United States, few Canadians had the visceral sense of fear from Japan that the Australians felt, at least outside of British Columbia. This was hardly the first break in Canadian-Australian views over Japan. The fact that both nations had split at the British Imperial Conference of 1921 on renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had arisen for much the same reason, with Canada in favour of abrogation to improve relations with the Japanophobic Americans and the Australians opposed to keep Japan a friend rather than a potential foe.[1007] In addition, there were both Dominions' respective views of the Americans. As Arthur Menzies later argued, their debates at the FEC fit the "typical Canadian practice" in dealing with Washington: "first, discuss a proposal confidentially[,] bilaterally with the responsible American officials; then second, put on the record of an international organization a carefully crafted Canadian statement that recognizes the realities of American power, but nevertheless expresses a distinct Canadian view."[1008] Meanwhile, a world removed from Britain and the United States, with only New Zealand for company in the antipodes, Australia was often more willing to speak sternly to its great power allies to try and catch their ear. What Ottawa had dismissed as Evatt's penchant to act "as a small boy throwing pebbles at bigger boys with the intention of annoying them and attracting their attention," is perhaps more charitably thought of as a strategy to draw attention to Australian perspectives given the country's geographic remoteness and relative geopolitical weakness.[1009] Regardless, differing views towards postwar Japanese affairs would not prevent an otherwise cordial postwar relationship between Ottawa and Canberra from developing during the 1950s.

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[1007] See M.G. Fry, "The North Atlantic Triangle and the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *Journal of Modern History*, 39, no. 1 (March 1967): 46-64. Although there did remain significant debate within Canberra over how threatening Japan was to Australia after the First World War. See P.G. Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901–1949* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), 54-56.
[1008] Menzies, "Canadian Views of United States Policy Towards Japan," 166.
[1009] Appendix E: "Memorandum on the Right Honourable Herbert Vere Evatt…," 3, 2 July 1947, R3306, vol. 99, file "Canberra Conference, Book 2," Brooke Claxton fonds, LAC.

In terms of his impact on Canadian foreign policy, one of Herbert Norman's most direct opportunities to influence the highest reaches of Canadian officialdom occurred late in his tenure at CLM when the officials came to him. In February 1950, Lester Pearson disembarked in Japan on his return journey to Canada after attending the Commonwealth's Colombo Conference with Fisheries Minister Robert Mayhew in January (see Chapter 7). With them was Escott Reid, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Arthur Menzies, included for his expertise in Chinese affairs. (Such an expert was needed given the Commonwealth's split views on recognizing Mao Zedong's new People's Republic of China.) "This was the first visit of Mr. Pearson and Escott Reid to Asia," Menzies later noted, "and [it] made quite an impression on them."[1010]

For his first time since leaving Ottawa, Pearson's official report noted, he was back "on Canadian soil, as we were the guests of the Normans at the Legation—a solid, attractive building in the midst of Tokyo's bombed waste lands." In many respects, the visit was a replay of H.D.G. Crerar's 1947 visit. Pearson met for lunch and an interview with MacArthur and Robertson, visited the living prewar Japanese ministers to Canada, attended a wreath laying ceremony at the Canadian military cemetery near Yokohama, and relaxed for dinner at the Miyanoshita onsen, "a most interesting occasion, with the meal served in Japanese style," as Pearson enthused.[1011] The view of Mount Fuji was lovely that day, Norman later wrote to his brother, and the chefs prepared, at his request, sukiyaki for the Canadians. Menzies, meantime, "astounded his colleagues by the number of bowls of rice he consumed and, as Escott Reid noted, no doubt added to the Japanese food problem." All in all, Norman concluded wistfully, "the most informal aspect is sometimes the most appreciated."[1012] Making good use of his natural charm and local knowledge, Norman's

[1010] Arthur Menzies, "An Asianist in Old External Affairs," 14, 20 September 2000, R15615, vol. 52, file 1, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1011] [Pearson Report], 6-8, 10 February 1950, R15615, vol. 30, file 16, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1012] Norman to Howard, 14 February 1950, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 7, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.

support for Pearson during his visit was a fitting swansong to his time as Canada's representative in Japan before his recall to Ottawa under a cloud of suspicion just months later.

Like Crerar, Pearson also witnessed MacArthur's egotism in action, "the most imperial, proconsular figure I have ever seen," he later recalled, their meeting being little more than a one-sided "sermon." Yet, as Norman joked to him later, "MacArthur listened to me longer than he had to anyone else whom he had seen with the General, and that I was to be congratulated!"[1013] MacArthur also reiterated that he felt "the Japanese have seen the error of their ways," though, like Crerar, Pearson felt it was "hard to be as confident in this matter as he is, but he speaks with great conviction on the subject." More remarkably, Pearson noted his desire to "not seek to embroil the Japanese in the cold war against communism but that we should strive to convert Japan into a Pacific 'Switzerland' whose neutrality would be guaranteed by everyone." Yet, as Pearson added, "he gave his case away, I thought, by adding that, of course, Japan would be quite willing to give the United States certain defence rights on her islands. If she ever did, she would not, of course, be a Switzerland and the Russians could not be expected to respect her neutrality."[1014] As Sir Alvary Gascoigne reported to London, Pearson "had not succumbed" to MacArthur's charm, and had later lamented to him that the general seemed out of touch and "did not get about more."[1015] MacArthur also argued a peace treaty was needed soon, "even if the Russians and Chinese were not included," a position that caught even Norman off guard "at the frank and emphatic way in which he talked to me on this subject."[1016] Over the following days, Pearson rounded off his visit by meeting the new Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, "who was very pleasant and agreeable," if

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[1013] Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 145-146.
[1014] Pearson Report, 8; Pearson, *Mike*, 2:146.
[1015] John English, *The Life of Lester Pearson,* Volume II: *The Worldly Years: 1949–1972* (Toronto: Vintage, 1990), 41.
[1016] Pearson Report, 9; Pearson, *Mike*, 2:147. It was a view Pearson tentatively agreed with, as he later told a Tokyo press conference. See "A Treaty with Japan: Canadian Desire for Early Action," *The Times*, 3 February 1950, 4.

"rather feudal in his attitude toward parliament and gave me the impression, which Herbert Norman confirmed, that he would be much happier governing without parliamentary interference." As he concluded, his meetings had been "supplemented by very valuable talks that Mr. Mayhew and the other [Canadian] officials had with American and Japanese government officials and experts. All in all, our visit to Tokyo turned out to be not only pleasant but, I think, most useful."[1017]

Returning to Ottawa, Pearson delivered his report to the House on 22 February. In keeping with his previous comments on Canada's role in postwar Asia, Pearson described the Colombo meeting as "a recognition of the importance of Asian problems today, and of the necessity of looking at world problems from an Asian point of view as well as from that of Europe and the north Atlantic." As for any Japanese peace conference, both the Colombo meeting and his Tokyo visit had made it clear that as Japan had made all the postwar adjustments that had been mandated of it, a peace treaty was overdue. "I do not mean to conclude from this that the Japanese by now, in the course of four years, have completely changed their habits of thought," Pearson added, again echoing Crerar, "although there appear to be some in Tokyo who think this has happened."[1018] This indirect rebuff of MacArthur aside, the viewpoints of Ottawa, Washington, and the rest of the Commonwealth finally appeared to be aligning. A few months after Pearson's speech, President Harry Truman tasked John Foster Dulles with opening talks with Tokyo, meeting repeatedly with Yoshida to hash out a deal.[1019] Dulles kept Ottawa abreast of these discussions,[1020] and as Pearson alerted the cabinet in August 1951, they had "some opportunity to influence the text, in secret exchanges through diplomatic channels in the past six months."[1021] Canada's minor influence

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[1017] Pearson Report, 7, 9.
[1018] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 1 (22 February 1950): 129, 133-134.
[1019] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 499-502.
[1020] See, for example, Ambassador in US to SSEA, 27 March 1951, *DCER*, vol. 17, 1800-1802.
[1021] "Draft: Memorandum to the Cabinet: Japanese Peace Treaty," 1, 20 August 1951, R165, vol. 208, file W-22-5-J (1950-51), PCOF, LAC; "Japanese Peace Treaty; Signature," 22 August 1951, reel T-2367, PCOF, LAC. For the conduct of these consultations, see "Note: Memorandum," and Enclosure, 18 May 1951, *DCER*, vol. 17, 1807-1816.

aside, more relevant were Canberra and Wellington, who still had lingering fears about Japanese rearmament. As a result, Dulles pushed for a defence agreement with Washington that became the ANZUS Pact, a deal "excluding Britain and confirming American ascendancy in the Pacific."[1022] With the ground prepared, a peace conference was eventually set for the autumn of 1951.

In September, 50 nations converged on San Francisco. Flying in for Canada was Pearson, flanked by Robert Mayhew, with Norman as Ottawa's "chief adviser" and James McCardle acting as secretary.[1023] As for the "conference" itself, held at the San Francisco Opera House, it was really nothing of the kind, as Norman observed. Instead, it was "a gathering of representatives of 51 countries at which the views of each country of an already agreed draft treaty were expressed. There was no opportunity for amending the Treaty." Needless to say, this fact did not sit well with the Soviet delegation, led by Andrei Gromyko, nor his attending Polish and Czechoslovak allies. However, the Soviets "put up only a half-hearted struggle," as Norman related, and simply refused to sign.[1024] Outmaneuvered by the Americans under Dulles and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the ceremony continued as planned, with each delegate giving their speeches on schedule.

When Pearson's turn came, his eclectic speech proved half an endorsement of a soft peace for Japan, half a Cold War rebuke of the Soviets, and all wrapped in his now famous cliché that Canada was "a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power."[1025] "As so many speakers before me have said, it is not a perfect treaty," Pearson granted. "No human document ever is. But it is a good treaty and in our opinion it would not be a better one if we spent two or three months discussing it…" Ottawa had long desired concluding a treaty, he continued, obliquely citing Crerar and his

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[1022] Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 502-503.
[1023] Pearson to US Secretary of State, 29 August 1951, R165, vol. 140, file C-100-27, PCOF, LAC.
[1024] E.H. Norman, "Japanese Peace Treaty," 17 September 1951, *DCER*, vol. 17, 1835-1836. "The Russian opposition," Pearson told Canadian reporter Ross Munro, "was not nearly as violent as expected." See Munro, "West Puzzled Over Gromyko: Collapse of Soviet Fight Against Pact Mystifying," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 September 1951, 1, 20.
[1025] The following section contradicts the argument offered by John Price in 2008 that Pearson's speech offered little more than naked support for the Americans. See Price, "Rethinking the Occupation," 135.

own visits to Japan by adding that with "the evidence at our disposal we were satisfied many months ago that the main task of the occupation, so admirably directed by General MacArthur, had been accomplished." Pearson went on to call both Dulles's and Britain's contributions to the treaty "imaginative, farsighted, and ungrudging," before moving into a dialogue on American-Canadian relations and Canada's own small role in drafting the treaty:

> I would also like to state that my own government was given an adequate opportunity to comment fully on the various drafts as they appeared. Our suggestions for change were given careful consideration by other governments and although naturally—and of course unfortunately!—not all were accepted, some of our most important points have been met fully in the draft before us. We have therefore a sense of direct participation in the framing of the treaty.[1026]

Turning directly to the Cold War, while Pearson lamented that the People's Republic of China had not been included in the negotiations, he blamed Beijing itself for this fact: "Had that regime not participated in the aggression already committed by the Communist forces in North Korea … it might have spoken for China at this Conference."[1027] In a swipe against Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe, Pearson added that Washington had not embarked "on the imperialistic course of making Japan a mere appendage to the United States." Finally returning to Japan, Pearson cautioned the nations of "the West" that they "would be well advised not to apply too strictly our own national experience as a yardstick to Japanese progress. Men reach the truth by different paths and they can strive toward a tolerant and peaceful society on widely variant roads." In a conclusion that one can only assume originated with Norman, Pearson ended with an anecdote from Japanese history:

[1026] L.B. Pearson, "The Japanese Peace Treaty," *External Affairs* 3, no. 10 (October 1951): 330-331. For the intent and reception of Pearson's speech, see Ross Munro, "Pearson Praises Treaty: Canada's Voice at 'Frisco Parley," *Ottawa Evening Citizen*, 7 September 1951, 1, 20; "Mr. Pearson on the Japanese Peace Treaty," *Canadian Weekly Bulletin* 6, no. 45 (14 September 1951): 2.

[1027] Pearson, "The Japanese Peace Treaty," 332. Indeed, Canada had considered recognizing Mao's China despite US pressure, as had been debated at the Colombo Conference and privately discussed in cabinet. In February 1950, Pearson had argued that if Canada were "to derive any advantage from recognition, we should take action before being faced with the necessity of doing so." However, the Korean War would stymie this initiative. See SSEA to Cabinet, 17 February 1950, *DCER*, vol. 16, 1780-1782. For an insider view of these events, see Chester Ronning, *A Memoir of China in Revolution: From the Boxer Rebellion to the People's Republic* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), chapter 12.

> In the dark days of Japan toward the end of feudal isolation a century or so ago, a Japanese writer and patriot, Sakuma Shōzan, said that at twenty he knew that men were joined together in one province; at thirty he knew that they were joined together in one nation; and at forty that they were joined together in one world. The Canadian delegation, speaking for the people and Government of Canada, hope that this treaty, unlike so many treaties between victor and vanquished, will become a strong foundation for the co-operation of 'one nation', Japan, with other friendly nations in the search for 'one world' of welfare and peace.[1028]

With his speech complete, Canada's minor contribution to the proceedings was complete. Pearson would sign the treaty with the other delegations—exempting the Soviets and their two satellites—on 8 September 1951. The agreement would come into force seven months later.[1029]

Pearson's San Francisco speech was a microcosm of the varying political elements at play in Canada's foreign relations with Japan during the late 1940s and early 1950s. First, there was the realization that Ottawa's desire to get the United States involved in Pacific affairs had succeeded but had steadily limited its own freedom of action and that the Commonwealth was, at best, a weak counterweight that few supported. Despite Ottawa's concerns about Dulles's negotiations, Pearson remained unwilling to publicly break with Washington over Japan. "Although Japanese specialists in the Department of External Affairs are less convinced of the conversion of [Japan] to democracy than one seems to be on the banks of the Potomac," as the French ambassador to Ottawa wrote the Quai d'Orsay prior to the San Francisco conference, "they did not consider it appropriate to present objections on this subject to Washington."[1030] Second, having witnessed the apparent rise of Soviet ambitions after the end of the Second World War, and having already dispatched Canadian troops to Japan and Korea to halt North Korean aggression in 1950 (see Chapter 6), Pearson held a dim view of Moscow and wanted to see that the peace treaty was signed and Soviet intriguing stymied.

[1028] Pearson, "The Japanese Peace Treaty," 332.
[1029] See Appx. 1, Chap. 5, Fig. 8.
[1030] Hubert Guerin to Robert Schuman, 15 August 1951, *DDF*, vol. 1951, 810. Public opinion, "as it is reflected in the press," Guerin added, approved of Ottawa's caution: "if the United States wants to risk liberating Japan, as it was the United States that bore the brunt of the last war in the Pacific … why be any more demanding than them?"

While arguably less intense than Acheson or Dulles, Pearson too was a "Cold Warrior" of a certain sort. As historians Robert Cuff and J.L. Granatstein argue, both Pearson and Acheson's rhetoric on the need to thwart international communism were often indistinguishable, and Pearson "never [publicly] questioned the moral basis of American [Cold War] leadership."[1031] Third, there was Ottawa's desire to construct a liberal internationalist and "Pearsonian" foreign policy, one that avoided the smug sense of superiority often alleged to cloud contemporary US policymaking.[1032] Japan was a different country with different traditions; if it was to develop a liberal and democratic tradition, this had to be based on their own national idioms and not on those imposed by others, a view Norman passionately supported and had tried to impress on Ottawa. The result was a speech that tried to cover all of Canada's bases yet contained deep ambiguities and intense contradictions, much like its occupation-era policy towards Japan as a whole. This was the state of Canadian views of Japan as Treaty of San Francisco formally came into effect on 28 April 1952.

[1031] See R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1975), 118. Cf. Marcuse and Whitaker, *Cold War Canada*, 372-373.
[1032] Unlike Acheson, Cuff and Granatstein note, Pearson was both less nationalistic and more idealistic than Acheson, and this reflected itself in the Canadian's interest "in supranational institutions." See Cuff and Granatstein, *Canadian-American Relations in Wartime*, 119.

Chapter 6: The "Other" Occupation: The Canadian Military Arrives in Japan, 1950–1955

> *"Canada and Japan have also been drawn closer in recent years through the conflict between the United Nations and Communist forces in Korea. The Canadian servicemen in the three branches of our Armed Forces who have seen service under the United Nations Command have enjoyed and praised the hospitality of your country."*
>
> — Draft Speech by Louis St. Laurent to Yoshida Shigeru, 27 September 1954[1033]

> *"When the day came to head back to Korea, we travelled on a Japanese ship, the* Wo Sang*. As we embarked everybody was quiet, we all stayed on deck to look at the port fading out. The return journey took place in silence. Some of us were in tears. For most of us, the way the Japanese treated us was a revelation. It was hard to believe that they were once our enemies. It made me realize that politicians can make you believe that wonderful people are barbarians. Once you are convinced of it, it is easy to abuse and kill people, because you believe you are the good ones and the others are just evil."*
>
> — Pte. Eddy Weetaltuk, Korean War Veteran, ca. 1974[1034]

March 1954 was a busy time for Tokyo's Maple Leaf Club.[1035] On 7 March, three Canadian destroyers—HMCS *Haida*, *Cayuga*, and *Crusader*—docked at Yokohama's Shibaura Pier, allowing their crews to make the brief journey into the Japanese capital. "Club invaded by Cdn navy," the Club's war diary noted laconically. "Sales show quite a climb." The next two days remained hectic as sailors continued to flow in on leave. On day three, however, the centre received a more prestigious guest: "Mrs H. O'Donnell, P.M. St. Laurent['s] daughter visits Club and remains over one hour, accompanied by Lt. Col. McDougal and Lt. A. Gale of the Cdn Mil Mis."—the Canadian Military Mission, Far East (CMMFE) in Tokyo. Far from a mere social call, the navy had arrived in Japan to greet Canada's Prime Minister. On 12 March, while his daughter met with the men of the ranks, Louis St. Laurent delivered a speech to the local Japan-Canada Society, had audiences with both Emperor Hirohito and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, and then visited Yokohama to take the salute of the squadron's commander, Captain John Charles. In his

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[1033] Louis St. Laurent, "Notes … in Honour of Prime Minister Yoshida," 12-13, 27 September 1954, R11214, vol. 285, file "Yoshida," Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[1034] Eddy Weetaltuk with Thibault Martin, *From the Tundra to the Trenches* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2016), 109.
[1035] This chapter is a variation of my 2023 article, "An Enemy No Longer: The Canadian Military Presence in Japan during the Korean War, 1950–1955," *Canadian Military History* 32, no. 2 (Autumn 2023): 1-40.

brief remarks, St. Laurent praised the sailors for having done their part in the Korean War. "The men gave three cheers for the prime minister," the *Ottawa Citizen* later reported, "and he responded by leading them in three cheers for 'Canada, this great nation of ours.'" By the end of March, 1,787 Canadian servicemen had visited the Maple Leaf Club, a sizable number of which were sailors from the RCN. After all, this was, as CMMFE's own war diary observed, "the first time that all three Canadian Destroyers have been together in one place in the Korean Theatre."[1036]

With the benefit of hindsight, St. Laurent's visit can be seen as an important milestone in Ottawa's postwar relationship with Tokyo. Before his visit, no foreign leader from *any* country had visited Japan since the end of the Pacific War. As part of a world tour that also took the prime minister to Korea to greet the soldiers overseeing the ceasefire brokered in July 1953, his visit is also a notable coda to Canadian operations in the Korean War, one highlighting the conflict's wider impact on Canada's shifting attitudes toward Japan and its people.[1037] From the end of the Second World War in September 1945 until April 1952, Japan was under the American-led occupation in which Ottawa had chosen not to participate. Yet, Canada eventually found itself sending troops to East Asia, not to occupy Japan, but as part of the United Nations (UN) response to the Korean War in June 1950. Despite this fact, Canada's military presence in Japan during the 1950s has provoked little interest from scholars. Having declined to join the occupation, the argument runs, Canadians had little interest in the country. As historian A. Hamish Ion argued in 1983, Canada had not been heavily involved in the Pacific War and was thus content to leave the occupation to the United States. In short, "the occupation was not a turning point in Canadian-Japanese relations: Canadians

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[1036] WD, Canadian Recreation Centre, Maple Leaf Club, entries 8-11; 31 March 1954, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; Mayhew to Ritchie, 25 February 1954 and Enclosures, R11214, vol. 184, file I-15-W, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC; "Mr. St. Laurent Speaks in Tokyo: Hopes for Trade Expansion," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 1954, 1; WD, CMMFE, entry 8 March 1954, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC.

[1037] For the broader context of St. Laurent's tour, see Greg Donaghy, "A Voyage of Discovery: St-Laurent's World Tour of 1954," in *The Unexpected Louis St-Laurent: Politics and Policies for a Modern Canada*, ed. Patrice A. Dutil (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2020), 466-82.

were plainly not interested in rediscovering Japan."[1038] As I will show here, this view rests on an artificial separation of Canada's diplomacy with Japan from its military involvement during the Korean War. What Ion and other scholars ignore is that between June 1950 and April 1952, the two overlapped. True, no Canadian servicemen were sent to Japan explicitly to occupy the country. Nevertheless, given that there were still plenty of Canadian soldiers *in* Japan during the occupation and its aftermath, both events are not so easily divorced. While becoming involved with Japan in this fashion was not Ottawa's intent in sending its armed forces to fight in Korea, the need to supply and command its men in the field quickly made it a necessity.

From September 1950 until late 1954, when the army began its withdrawal from East Asia, several thousand Canadians were based in Japan.[1039] The RCN's destroyers stayed even longer, staying until September 1955. While the continued presence of both services after July 1953 lacked the excitement of the war years, it would be wrong to downplay their activities, as the navy's official history does, by dismissing them as "mainly of a routine nature."[1040] Despite the end of hostilities and the subsequent Canadian drawdown, those servicemembers left in theatre still had to be clothed, fed, and entertained. By July 1954, a year after the ceasefire, 5,726 soldiers were still serving in East Asia: 5,053 in Korea and 673 in Japan.[1041] If they lacked the drama of frontline combat, it was the "boring" command decisions of CMMFE in Tokyo as well as the logistical and organizational arrangements of No. 2 Canadian Administrative Unit (2 CAU) and 25th Canadian Reinforcement Group (25 CRG) at Kure that allowed soldiers to be supplied, rotated out of the

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[1038] A. Hamish Ion, "Canada and the Occupation of Japan," in *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952*, ed. Ian Nish (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 96.

[1039] In total, about 22,000 Canadians served in Korea and Japan during the war, with a peak strength of 8,123 in January 1952. By May 1955, most of these units had been withdrawn. For these statistics and the phased withdrawal of Canadian forces from East Asia, see Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy in Canada* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 283-287.

[1040] Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), 130.

[1041] WD, 2 CAU, entry 7 July 1954, R112, vol. 35994, DNDF, LAC.

line, and sent for Rest and Relaxation (R&R) or medical treatment in Japan throughout their deployment. As Brigadier Jean Allard—the Canadian Army's Vice Quartermaster-General before taking command of the 25th Infantry Brigade in Korea—later noted in his memoirs, in Kure "I was able to see one of the last links in the logistical chain of which I had been one of the first, at the other end, as Vice Quarter-Master."[1042] While some Korean War veterans have derided their fellow servicemen working in Japan—one claiming that the staff in Kure "had found a comfortable niche and were not prone to letting anything as small and distant as the war in Korea interfere with their cushy lives"—this view likely reflected the typical protest of frontline soldiers in every war about the supposedly coddled men to their rear.[1043] Despite such complaints, a military presence in Japan had an important part to play in Canada's Korean War.

The practical result of this was not only that the Canadian military was dragged unwillingly into Japanese affairs, but also that thousands of ordinary Canadians in uniform had the opportunity to meet a people they had been at war with only a few years before. For most, this was their first visit to an Asian country, and the experience left a lasting impact. Yet, if Japan is discussed as part of Canada's war, the dominant narrative by both academic and popular historians focuses on the five days of R&R that all troops in Korea were supposed to have every three months in either Kure or Tokyo and the troubles that often resulted. Known crassly as "Rape and Rampage" or "Rack and Ruin," R&R leave was "the highlight of the Canadian soldier's Far Eastern tour," in historian Brent Watson's words, filled with nonstop drinking, partying, and prostitution (plus an epidemic of venereal disease [VD]).[1044] This is by no means a false view, but it does not do justice to the

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[1042] Jean V. Allard with Serge Bernier, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), 172.
[1043] Andrew C. Moffat, *Korea Memories: A Canadian Gunner's Experience in the "Forgotten War"* (Ottawa: Keshet, 2006), 23.
[1044] See Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 1. See also Brent Byron Watson, *Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 135-136. See also David J. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 174; Robert Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon: The Canadian Army in Korea, 1950–1953* (Edmonton: Four Winds, 1995), 291-294.

complexity of Canadian interactions with the Japanese, ignoring both the non-combat servicemen permanently based in the country as well as the often-varied nature of the R&R experience itself.

In this chapter, I attempt to nuance Canada's relationship with Japan during the 1950s by bridging its military history of the Korean War with that of its contemporary East Asian diplomacy. In doing so, I show Japan's importance to Canada's Korean War effort as both a logistical hub and a leave centre that brought large numbers of Canadians into contact (and sometimes conflict) with Japanese civilians. In the first section, I explore the "high policy" of the Canadian presence in Japan to see how this engagement operated at the official level. As will be seen, Ottawa's decision to not get involved in the occupation required it to play catch-up compared to its better-established US and Commonwealth counterparts. In the second section, I turn to the "real life" experience of the ordinary men and women of the Canadian armed forces to see what these interactions looked like at the individual level.[1045] As will be seen, visiting Japan during the Korean War proved a memorable experience for servicemen, helping to break down the negative stereotypes many held about the country owing to its violent conduct during the Second World War.

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On 24 September 1950, an RCAF transport plane touched down at Tokyo's Haneda airport. On board were the nine men of CMMFE commanded by Brigadier Frank Fleury. Sent in advance of the newly-recruited Canadian Army Special Force (CASF), Fleury's orders were to coordinate with Canada's diplomatic mission in Tokyo and the US Supreme Command for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP) to prepare for CASF's arrival, particularly by finding a place where it could train before seeing combat. This would not be easy. The initial plan for the Canadians to train at an American base on Okinawa was quickly deemed impractical as the facilities were primitive and

[1045] I borrow both terms from historian David Reynolds's study of Second World War Anglo-American encounters. See Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (New York: Random House, 1995), Part III & Part IV.

the terrain too dissimilar from that in Korea.[1046] Even worse, there was simply no room for CMMFE in war-ruined Tokyo. "Attempts were made to find proper office accommodation," their war diary recorded, but this was "a very difficult job as office space is at a premium." Eventually, CMMFE officers were billeted at the luxury Marunouchi Hotel, controlled by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). It took another fortnight and several false leads before Fleury secured two offices at "Empire House," BCOF's Tokyo headquarters, which also provided a Lieutenant Morley—"their office furnishing expert"—to help provision them. While, as Fleury later testified, his relations with his Allies in Tokyo were cordial and their help greatly appreciated, this was still not a particularly auspicious start for his mission.[1047]

As its involvement in Korea increased, this lack of a pre-existing presence in Japan would hamper both the Canadian Army's combat efficiency and its military prestige. One telling anecdote is given by CASF commander Brigadier John Rockingham as he traversed Japan with BCOF head William Bridgeford in 1952. The C-in-C, as Rockingham later noted, "lived in Japan in the grand manner, as did his American counterpart." His presence assured that both men were escorted from their train to a waiting car by the stationmaster "actually over a red carpet." "See what we missed," Rockingham joked, "by not being part of the occupation forces!"[1048] The comment was facetious, but it noted a basic truth: Canada's refusal to involve itself in occupation politics had repercussions. If there were "a series of blunders and oversights that ultimately shaped the Canadian infantry's Korean experience," then it is inadequate to frame this, as some historians do, as a mere defect of prewar planning.[1049] That "the Canadian army was not ready to take care of its men's morale or

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[1046] In the end, training was undertaken at the American military base at Fort Lewis in Washington state before departing for Korea by sea via Seattle. See Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 50-53.
[1047] WD, CMMFE, entries 20 September to 16 October 1950, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, The Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 191-192, 211-212. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 2.
[1048] John Rockingham, "Recollections of Korea," 77, August 1975, R4240, John Meredith Rockingham fonds, LAC.
[1049] Watson, *Far Eastern Tour*, 14.

their overall physical or spiritual well-being behind in front," was as much due to fact that it lacked the Japanese support facilities already enjoyed by its American and Commonwealth allies.[1050] Still, by the war's end, the military was able to remedy most of its early shortcomings, relying less on the largess of its allies while tailoring new services to the needs of Canadian servicemembers.

Canada did at least have one outpost in Japan before Fleury's arrival, the Canadian Liaison Mission (CLM) in Tokyo. While the Department of National Defence had intended CMMFE to be separate from CLM, they eventually decided that Fleury would have "the dual capacity of military adviser to our head of mission and … liaison officer to GHQ United Nations Command."[1051] In essence, Fleury and his successors were Canada's formal representative to the American-led forces in Korea, as well as its military attaché in Tokyo. In 1950, Arthur Menzies was the head of CLM, having just taken over from Herbert Norman. Menzies was a ubiquitous presence in Japan during the war, meeting with seemingly every Canadian who visited enroute for Korea. On 13 December, one of his first acts as CLM head was to visit the troopship *Private Joe P. Martinez* in Yokohama, which was carrying CASF soldiers bound for Pusan.[1052] Even ordinary soldiers were impressed by Menzies's charm. In his semi-fictionalised memoir of the Korean War, writer Vince Courtenay has his protagonist Joe Dowey introduced to Menzies on his return from R&R in Tokyo. "Menzies gives Dowey a pat on the back. 'Keep up the good work, Dowey!' He has remembered Dowey's name, at least for that moment. It thrills the young soldier."[1053] Menzies's alleged hospitality to CASF soldiers even created misunderstandings. In July 1951, Corporal Fred Woroch wrote Menzies having "read in a paper somewhere in Korea" that he had offered to let CASF soldiers

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[1050] Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills*, 174. That the Canadian Army had initially decided that the CASF did not require its own welfare unit only compounded this initial situation.
[1051] Escott Reid to Arnold Heeney, 17 September 1950, *DCER*, vol. 16, 117-118.
[1052] WD, CMMFE, entry 13 December 1950, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; Arthur Menzies to Family, 17 December 1950, R15615, vol. 20, file 7, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1053] Vince Courtenay, *Love and Duty: A Canadian Remembers the Korean War* (Seoul: Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, 2011), 243-244. Courtenay refers to his book as a "nonfiction documentary novel."

stay at CLM. Menzies politely responded that while he and his wife Sheila were "happy to entertain you at lunch," it was not "practical to have servicemen come and stay with us in the Legation residence."[1054] More officially, CLM reports were a key source of wartime information for Ottawa. Menzies himself visited Korea five times during the conflict, of which the most publicised trip was in October 1951. And while such visits were always a headache for Brigadier Rockingham and the 25th Infantry Brigade, they were useful fact-finding missions for Ottawa.[1055]

While CMMFE would remain close to the centres of power in Tokyo, subsequent Canadian units would be based in Japanese cities further west to facilitate communications with its forces in Korea. On 6 May 1951, 2 CAU and 25 CRG disembarked in the port of Kure, a naval base on the Inland Sea south of Hiroshima. Unlike American-dominated Tokyo, Kure was the centre of the Australian-dominated Commonwealth occupation forces in Japan.[1056] There, BCOF transport was on hand to transport the Canadians to their new facilities, "midway between Kure and [the suburb of] Hiro in the Australian Zone."[1057] Along with the smaller units of the Canadian Communications Zone Detachments, this formed the bulk of Canadian forces deployed to Japan during the war. By August 1951, when Fleury and Menzies toured Kure, the latter could report that there were "nearly 1,500 Canadians" using the "excellent barracks, training facilities, hospital accommodation, storage warehouses, etc., built up by BCOF in the early years of the occupation."[1058]

[1054] Woroch to Menzies, 4 July 1951; Menzies to Woroch, 23 July 1951, R15615, vol. 30, file 18, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. Many other letters of thanks from Canadian visitors to Tokyo during Menzies's tenure are included in his papers at LAC, both in this file and in R15615, vol. 31, file 5.

[1055] See Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 3. For Menzies' five visits to Japan, see "Mr. A.R. Menzies," 27 April 2004, R15615, vol. 52, file 11, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. For the October 1951 visit, his second, see Menzies to Pearson, 31 October 1951, R112, vol. 20810, file 7-10-5, part 2, DNDF, LAC; Menzies to Parents, 28 October 1951, R15615, vol. 20, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; and Rockingham, "Recollections of Korea," 61-62.

[1056] During the occupation, Britain let Australia represent the Commonwealth in Japan, both on the Allied Council for Japan and as C-and-C of BCOF. In late 1945, nearly a third of BCOF's 35,456 servicemen were Australians, a ratio that later increased. See Geoffrey Bolton, "Australia and the Occupation of Japan," in *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952*, ed. Ian Nish (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 57.

[1057] WD, 2 CAU, entry 6 May 1951, R112, vol. 35994, DNDF, LAC; WD, 25 CRG, entry 6 May 1951, R112, vol. 18432, DNDF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 4.

[1058] Menzies to Pearson, 10 August 1951, R112, vol. 20811, file 7-10-5, part 2, DNDF, LAC.

One of the most useful sites provided by BCOF was the Commonwealth Division Battle School at Haramura. Located at a former Japanese cavalry base north-east of Kure, the site allowed Canadians to practice fighting over hilly terrain like that found in Korea.[1059] Training under British Lieutenant-Colonel M.R. Lonsdale, an eccentric but professional instructor who went around "in shirts sleeves or bare-chested, as the mood fits," recruits were taught platoon-level tactics in a series of live-fire exercises. When Menzies and Fleury visited in 1951, a mock hill assault was conducted, proceeded by mortar and machinegun fire. "With this live ammunition whistling in over their heads, platoons of infantry assaulted the hill, carrying full combat equipment and fifty rounds of ammunition."[1060] Life in camp was hard as the Japanese barracks were sparsely furnished and rations drawn from British and Australian stores meant lots of tea and mutton.[1061] The heat was also notorious; simply standing in the sun to watch was enough to force Menzies into the shade of a jeep "with a piece of cardboard to fan myself."[1062] Accidents also occurred. In October 1952, an explosion during small arms training killed two Canadians and wounded 19 others.[1063] Still, the training did enhance the Canadians' combat efficiency and most recalled their time there positively. Lieutenant Ramsey Withers, Canada's future Chief of the Defence Staff, later called his wartime tour at Haramura, "the most interesting four months I've ever had in my life."[1064]

For most Canadian soldiers, their first extended encounter with Japanese civilians likely came in the form of hired help on base. Known locally as "indigenous labour," these workers were used by all the units in Kure, usually as stevedores, cooks, or truck drivers. Initially, these workers

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[1059] See Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 5.
[1060] Menzies to Pearson, 10 August 1951, R112, vol. 20811, file 7-10-5, part 2, DNDF, LAC.
[1061] For accounts of life at Haramura, see Bill Boss, "Day of Soft Layover for Canadians in Japan Over," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 July 1952, 4; Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 59-62.
[1062] Menzies to Pearson, 10 August 1951, R112, vol. 20811, file 7-10-5, part 2, DNDF, LAC.
[1063] WD, CMMFE, entry 17 October 1952, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; "Army Releases Names of Canadian Casualties," *Globe and Mail*, 20 October 1952, 2.
[1064] John Gardam, *Korea Volunteer: An Oral History from Those Who Were There* (Burnstown, ON: General Store, 1994), 138.

were paid by the Canadian Army, but in July 1954 there was a move to a subcontracted "indirect hire" system. On a personal level, these workplace relationships were professional, but often cool. When Lieutenant Bob Ringma took over Canada's section of Kure's Commonwealth-operated ordnance depot, he commanded a warrant officer, "about a dozen Canadian soldiers … and a crew of Japanese labourers." These Japanese were "respectful but neither friendly nor unfriendly," he recalled, and would politely bow and doff their caps—"many of which were old Japanese Army hats"—when approached.[1065] The reason for this lukewarm attitude is obvious. As many of the workers were former Imperial Japanese Army soldiers, as Ringma's note about their hats implies, such men likely had mixed feelings about the foreign soldiers now living in their country. It also tells something about Japanese perceptions of UN soldiers. During the Korean War, the local press began complaining of a "reign of terror" in Kure by foreign soldiers, including Canadians. As war correspondent Bill Boss testified, these incidents were not caused by the 600 Canadians working in Kure, who were "well-behaved." Rather, it was "the final fling of [our] troops on the way home that has given Canadians service men a bad name." Moreover, he clarified, most cases amounted to petty crime: "No Canadian has been charged with murder in Kure."[1066] Still, the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized after reading Boss's report, while such claims might be overstated, "there is no room for complacency regarding the situation in which Canadians in Kure find themselves." As the paper added, the Canadian Army needed to improve "all official recreation services for transients" and to formalize ties with the Japanese to ensure their soldiers were properly supervised.[1067]

Still, even leaving aside murder, prostitution, or drunkenness, this left plenty of openings for run-ins with the law, both Canadian and UN military as well as Japanese civilian. One entry in

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[1065] Bob Ringma, *M*L*B*U: Full Monty in Korea* (Burnstown, ON: General Store, 2004), 118.
[1066] Bill Boss, "Reign of Terror Not Canadian-Created," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 December 1952, 17; and Bill Boss, "Reputation of Canadians in Japan Areas Improving," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 December 1952, 39.
[1067] "Soldiers' Behavior in Japan," *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 December 1952, 34.

CMMFE's war diary gave a fair range of possible crimes, running from the banal to the bizarre: "A/B Blair (RCN), who was tried by court martial, was found not guilty of robbery with violence but guilty of robbery only. … Sgt Conway, of Hiro, who committed a civil offence, settled his case out of court by paying ¥5000 for damages. … Maj Brown called concerning the case of Pte Butts who was involved in a fracas with the head of the local Communist Party."[1068] Even staying within the law, there remained plenty of room for trouble. One wild incident was later related by Eddy Weetaltuk, the Inuit soldier from northern Quebec. Convinced by a friend to take a rickshaw back to their R&R hotel, he was given a whip by his driver and told "to use it on him if he didn't go fast enough." Severely drunk, Weetaltuk flogged the man mercilessly through the streets of Tokyo, imagining he was riding his childhood dogsled back home. "Now that I recall the events," Weetaltuk wrote years afterwards, "I am sure he must have been quite scared. … I gave five dollars to my driver to ease my conscience for having treated him the way I did."[1069] However, it is equally true that many soldiers could play against type. In December 1951, Sheila Menzies, Arthur's wife, received a call at CLM from a soldier who "asked if he and his friends could come up for a party." "I had thought they would be rather odd because of their rude approach," Sheila admitted in a letter home, "but [they] turned out to be three very nice non-commissioned officers here on R. and R. leave—all of the quiet type who did not want to paint the town like all their buddies at the camp, but just wanted a friendly visit with some Canadians—so we enjoyed having them."[1070] Ultimately, as Canadian Court Reporter Dick Pucci later claimed, most crimes committed by soldiers in Japan and Korea, "except for the strictly military offences, were the same as you would find in any comparable group in Canada," with most involving "stupidity and alcohol."[1071]

[1068] WD, CMMFE, entry 16 June 1952, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC.
[1069] Weetaltuk and Martin, *From the Tundra to the Trenches*, 106-07.
[1070] Sheila to Mr. and Mrs. Menzies, 2 December 1951, R15615, vol. 20, file 10, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1071] Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 262-263.

New troubles arose with the end of the occupation on 28 April 1952. One of the most serious was the need to renegotiate the terms under which Canadian soldiers served in Japan, for once the occupation ended they could be exposed to the full extent of Japanese law.[1072] On 8 April, Lester Pearson formally suggested to Prime Minister St. Laurent that they "ask Japan to agree to the same treatment which was to be accorded US forces, plus certain additional benefits such as immunity from Japanese criminal jurisdiction," a stipulation he thought Tokyo might accept since, unlike the Americans, "Canadian troops were to remain in Japan only for the duration of the Korean conflict."[1073] The assumption proved as wrong as it was historically ignorant. During the nineteenth century, Japan had laboured under a set of "unequal treaties" granting the European imperial powers extraterritoriality over their nationals in the country. This had been a national embarrassment, and their revision a major aim of Japanese diplomacy.[1074] Now, after six further years of Allied occupation, few Japanese wanted new limits on their sovereignty, a view that was only reinforced by accounts of rowdy Canadian soldiers in Kure.[1075] As talks dragged on, rumours began to spread. In September 1952, British reporter R.M. MacColl claimed Canada was "so dissatisfied" with the pace of negotiations that it was "considering giving up Japan as a base altogether."[1076] While Defence Minister Claxton publicly denied the charges, he admitted that if talks were "disappointingly slow," he still expected a deal would eventually be signed.[1077]

MacColl's rumour, however, was true; Ottawa ***had*** debated moving its operations to Korea. But as the newly appointed Ambassador Robert Mayhew wryly advised in October 1953, Tokyo

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[1072] Menzies to USSEA, 28 January 1952; Claxton to Pearson, 15 January 1952; SSEA to Embassy Washington, 28 January 1952, R112, vol. 5196, file HQS15-13-20, DNDF, LAC.
[1073] "Japan; Status of Canadian Forces After Ratification of Peace Treaty," 8 April 1952, R165, reel T-2368, PCOF, LAC.
[1074] For the revision of extraterritoriality in Japan, see Pär Kristoffer Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 6.
[1075] Bill Boss, "Contends Jurisdiction Must be With Man's Army," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 December 1952, 14.
[1076] R.M. MacColl, "Canada May Give Up Japan as a Base," *China Mail* (Hong Kong), 10 September 1952, 1.
[1077] "Deny Canadians Planning to Withdraw from Japan," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 September 1952, 1, 20.

"might very well feel the concern of a landlord on seeing his defaulting tenant departing with all his distrainable goods and chattels" if Canada tried to do so. More seriously, he noted that even if most Canadians moved to Korea, there would still be some in Japan on leave that would need diplomatic arrangements in place if they got into trouble, and well as rest facilities for their use.[1078] Ultimately, it was only with the aid of American mediation that a temporary deal on criminal jurisdiction was brokered in October 1953 and a formal agreement ratified between Japan, Canada, and the other UN forces on 19 February 1954. In it, Tokyo agreed to allow UN soldiers and their dependants to reside in Japan for the duration of UN operations in Korea on the understanding that while Japanese laws would not apply to them in all instances, they would still have to defer to local regulations in certain cases.[1079] In the summer of 1954, the Japanese Diet endorsed a series of laws to enforce the new agreement, as CMMFE dutifully relayed to Ottawa.[1080]

Yet, even with such an agreement in place, it was impossible to entirely prevent Japanese domestic politics from intruding on Canadian military matters. During the occupation, US officials had empowered Japanese labour unions to try and limit the power of Japan's prewar industrial conglomerates, the zaibatsu. While, after 1947, both SCAP and independent Japanese governments repressed the unions due to their left-wing affiliations in a hardening Cold War environment, their influence in Japan remained substantial.[1081] In 1952, Japan was hit by a wave of strikes, part of a "labour offensive" against the increasingly unpopular rule of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, which affected Commonwealth forces that summer. The climax came in December when 13,000

[1078] Mayhew to USSEA, 20 October 1953, R112, vol. 5196, file HQS15-13-20, DNDF, LAC.
[1079] For the text of both agreements, see *Protocol on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Forces in Japan, Treaty Series 1953, No. 27* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 195[?]); and *Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, Treaty Series 1954, No. 13* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1959).
[1080] R.E.A. Morton to Chief of the General Staff, 13 August 1954; 20 August 1954; 7 September 1954 and Enclosures, Kardex 81/520/1700-1, box 146, file 1, DHH.
[1081] For SCAP's impact on the Japanese labour movement, for better or worse, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), chapter 8; Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853–1955* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), chapters 9-10.

workers walked off the job in Kure, at Hiroshima's Iwakuni Airbase, and at Tokyo's Ebisu leave camp. As American journalist William Jorden reported, "The British, Australians and Canadian soldiers, some on rest leave from the Korean fighting, drove trucks, cooked meals and performed other chores abandoned by the Japanese employes [*sic*] during a seventy-two-hour walkout," many toiling to prevent "the spoiling of tons of turkey, beef and other perishables recently arrived for holiday meals."[1082] The strike was settled on 23 December when the picketers accepted a Japanese Diet proposal for wage raises and bonuses.[1083] One can only imagine what the average Canadian or other UN soldier thought about having to spend hard-earned leave time working as scab labour. Ultimately, these messy and unpredicted encounters complicated what was initially expected to be a limited set of official relations to facilitate Canada's contribution to the Korean War.

In the end, Canada's reliance on Commonwealth facilities in Japan would be criticized by contemporary soldiers and historians alike. Canadians visiting Tokyo for R&R, Bill Boss observed in 1951, found nothing for them. "During the Second World War and after, the Canadian Army showed the world how to operate leave centres that fitted the bill. The knack must be there somewhere still; and the will to do it again."[1084] The result was that if Canadians wanted to stay at a leave centre, they had to use other nations' facilities, like the Australian centre at Ebisu. Not only did this often cause tensions—few Canadians, as one veteran recalled, wanted to spend leaves "eating mutton and listening to how great the British and Australians thought they were"—but it also created, as journalist Peter Inglis noted, an inferiority complex: "in every case the Canadians involved have a feeling of being beggars."[1085] Not only did this foster poor morale, but the absence

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[1082] William J. Jordan, "Troops Run Bases in Japanese Strike," *New York Times*, 21 December 1952, 3.
[1083] Sir Esler Dening, Outward Saving Telegram, 6 January 1953, R219, vol. 8084, file 4606-40, part 5.1, DEAF, LAC.
[1084] Bill Boss, "Men Have Poor Time on Tokyo Leave," *Globe and Mail*, 29 June 1951, 9. See also Peter Inglis, "Acute Shortage of Welfare Facilities Among Valid Complaints by Soldiers," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 January 1952, 15.
[1085] Watson, *Far Eastern Tour*, 135; Peter Inglis, "Submersion of National Identity Cause of Most Complaints by Troops," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 January 1952, 13.

of other entertainment may have enabled the high rates of VD and the R&R escapades noted earlier. While Canada did decide to build its Maple Leaf Club in May 1952—and had opened it by September—many historians argue this was too little too late.[1086] That may be true, but as this chapter shows, the decision to rely on its allies made practical sense given Canada's refusal to join in the occupation. With no pre-existing facilities in Japan by 1950, no prior agreements with the Japanese, and no time to swiftly build any, this was the path of least resistance. As a result, it was only later that Canadian amenities were viewed as necessary as the war persisted; for soldiers after 1952, leave in Japan was much better. Moreover, not only did this lapse create military difficulties in Korea, but it also meant that, despite the view of later historians, Canada could not just "continue her very limited pre-war relationship with Japan," as its soldiers' misconduct in Kure or stoppages by local strikers necessitated involvement from the Canadian government.[1087] Ultimately, Ottawa's diplomatic ambivalence towards Japan proved a military liability.

A few months after the 1954 UN Agreement went into effect, St. Laurent visited Japan. By this point, as the new CMMFE head Brigadier Ronald Morton reported, Japanese views of Canada had reached an all time high. "Government officials, newspapers, the Japanese radio and ordinary people constantly express a friendly interest—and often an enthusiasm—for Canada and her people." The reasons for this positivity were many: "They like our national characteristics, our stability, our comparative good manners and friendliness…" But most important from a military viewpoint was the fact that they "generally appreciate that we are not Americans or Australians." Moreover, as only a minor player in the war against Japan, "It is undoubtedly an advantage to us

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[1086] See W.R. Wright, "Re: Cabinet Conclusions of May 8, 1952: Military Recreation Centre, Tokyo; Lease of Building," 21 May 1952, R112, vol. 5196, file HQS15-13-20, DNDF, LAC; WD, CMMFE, entry 17 September 1952, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; K. Meghan Fitzpatrick, "Prostitutes, Penicillin and Prophylaxis: Fighting Venereal Disease in the Commonwealth Division During the Korean War, 1950–1953," *Social History of Medicine* 28, no. 3 (August 2015): 571-574.

[1087] Ion, "Canada and the Occupation of Japan," 77.

that we never participated in the Pacific War after Hong Kong, which they have forgotten and so presume that all Canadians do likewise." As Morton concluded, "Personnel of the Canadian Army stationed in Japan have, of course, worked hard to promote and maintain good relations with the Japanese, especially in relation to our soldiers on leave."[1088] While we might temper such views given the Canadian misdemeanours already noted, the broad stroke of Morton's conclusion rings true. Less numerous than the Australians, not intending to stay permanently like the Americans, Canada's military presence was large enough to reintroduce Japan to Canadians via soldiers' tales and war correspondents' reports, but not large enough to alienate the Japanese by its ubiquity.

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I'll never forget Tokyo that August night
When I stepped off the plane from a hurried flight
The city so different and smelly and hot
And I disliked it all, right there on the spot
But travelling round Tokyo, I got to know the place
And I soon got intrigued by this Japanese race
I liked all the people and my job too
"Oxies" [Occidentals] and Asians – my days were too few.[1089]

This bit of self-described soldier's "doggerel" was penned by Brigadier Ronald Morton after he was appointed head of CMMFE in August 1952, replacing Brigadier A.B. Connolly over his role in sending Canadian soldiers to police the notorious Korean POW camp at Kŏjedo.[1090] Remaining at CMMFE until October 1954, Morton made a life for himself in Tokyo with his wife, daughter, and fifteen-year-old son, Desmond. Years later, historian Desmond Morton recalled his time in Japan fondly. "The Canadian Embassy helped find us a house in the Sugamo district of Tokyo … adjusting to Japanese lifestyle under the tutelage of our 'head boy,' Takeda-san, a stout 'Cook-san,' and two charming housemaids." Initially, Desmond studied at the Canadian Academy,

[1088] WD, CMMFE, Routine Report No. 40, April 1954, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC.
[1089] R.E.A. Morton, "Doggerel of a Canadian Soldier," R3776, file 8, Ronald Edward Alfred Morton fonds, LAC.
[1090] For this incident, see David J. Bercuson's *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898–1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 235-238; Stairs, *Diplomacy of Constraint*, 249-258.

a missionary school in Kobe headed by Rev. Howard Norman, Herbert's brother, and former Alma Mater of Arthur Menzies. (As Morton senior told Menzies, this was because "they don't want to change him from the Ontario curriculum he has been used to.") In the summer, however:

> My father arranged for me […] to spend July and August working at the Canadian Army's administrative unit (2 CAU) in Hiro, near Kure. Under the supervision and guidance of Sergeant Vince Alkins, a charming, wise, and utterly regimental Trinidadian, I was 'broken in' to Army administration and management in every part of the unit from the quartermaster's stores to the Central Registry and the kitchens. Vince even took me to visit Hiroshima, an emotional experience for both of us.

In the end, these experiences convinced Desmond to join the army. While his flatfeet prevented an active posting, he was still "judged adequate to command cooks, clerks, and truck drivers in the Army Service Corps, the very branch Vince Alkins had prepared me for at Hiro."[1091]

As the Morton family reveals, Japan was a new and varied experience for Canadians during the Korean War.[1092] As Morton senior confessed in his poetry, he had never lived abroad until he was posted to Britain during the Second World War: "So, when I reached Japan in Fifty Two/My travels abroad had been very few." Like him, the Canadians arrived with "a confusing mixture of emotions," as gunner Andrew Moffat recalled. Along with typical soldierly worries about combat and missing loved ones, there was now a novel "excitement of entering a new cultural world … the utterly new feeling of being a 'minority' surrounded by a very visible 'majority'."[1093] For most, these encounters would be happy ones; in researching this thesis, I was unable to find a single veteran who later spoke ill of Japan. "We really had … a very nice holiday," one remembered in a typical assessment. "It was really a pleasure to be over there."[1094] For some, Japan was associated

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[1091] Desmond Morton, "Is History Another Word for Experience? Morton's Confessions," *Canadian Historical Review* 92, no. 4 (December 2011): 678-681; Menzies to Isabel Skelton, 31 August 1952, R15615, vol. 20, file 12, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. See also Morton's preface to Gardam, *Korea Volunteer*, viii-x.
[1092] Indeed, the Canadian experience in Japan was comparable to the life of other Canadian servicemembers garrisoned abroad during the early Cold War. For the other obvious comparison, see Isabel Campbell, *Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
[1093] Moffat, *Korea Memories*, 12.
[1094] Interview with Leslie Pike, 12 January 2004, acc.20020121-189, CWM.

with wild excess on R&R. For others, it was their workplace, a place with ample food and cheap shopping, or just somewhere to avoid the war in Korea. But for all, Japan proved memorable.

For most soldiers, experiences of Japan began the moment the country became visible from the deck of their ship or the window of their airplane. For some Canadians arriving aboard the *Joe P. Martinez*, this came as they docked at Yokohama in October 1951. "Faces were glued to the window until darkness," their war diary reported. "This was our first closeup view of the Orient and the troops were not going to miss a thing."[1095] For those arriving at Haneda Airport, as Morton noted, it was the smell that hit you. "As soon as you opened the door of the aircraft," Colonel Arthur Byford later recalled, "there was a very distinctive smell," which he attributed to farmers use of nightsoil.[1096] Entering Tokyo, it was the war scars and the rebuilding effort which struck Canadians; Japanese cars rigged to run on coal or wood instead of petrol were a common sight.[1097] For many soldiers, some from smalltown Canada, one of the world's largest cities was interest enough. Postwar Tokyo teemed with people, some dressed in western clothing, others in kimono, and some in hybrid outfits. Andrew Moffat saw local businessmen in "western style suits" with "Japanese zōri [sandals] and in bare feet."[1098] For Quebecois officer Charly Forbes, Ginza was "a huge moving flower bed. The Japanese in their kimono were just so many flowers roaming this street adorned with lanterns, pennants, dragons, and brightly coloured banners."[1099] For some, memories were tinged by nostalgia. In the semi-fictional remembrances of Joe Dowey, modern life was "a very long way from the Tokyo that had been still getting to her feet after the devastating bombings of World War Two. That Tokyo was gone long ago. That wonder he had known there

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[1095] Watson, *Far Eastern Tour*, 55.
[1096] Interview with Arthur Byford, 17 November 2003, acc.20020121-158, CWM. That is, human excrement. Nightsoil was also commonly used as a fertilizer in Korea.
[1097] Byford Interview; Pierre Berton, *My Times: Living with History, 1947–1995* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1995), 66.
[1098] Moffat, *Korea Memories*, 120.
[1099] J. Charles Forbes, *Fantassin: Pour Mon Pays, la Gloire et… des Prunes* (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 1994), 326.

was gone, too. It was something only the privileged fellow who had fought in Korea had experienced. … The old was gone and only sensed in memory."[1100]

As noted above, the Canadian experience in Japan has typically been dominated by stories of R&R misconduct, and there is truth to this. Although fictional, Herbert Wood's 1966 novel, *The Private War of Jacket Coates* is often cited as a typical example, as our titular protagonist spends two chapters in Japan carousing and looking for "female companionship." "After all," Coates rationalizes, "the whole idea was to give the soldiery a break from the horrors of war; the horrors of an army-run leave centre were just not the answer."[1101] For some, R&R conformed to Coates's template. Corporal Les Butts, outlining his eight-day excursion, recalled a hotel "with lots of girls; you can have a different one each night if you want" as well as plenty of drinking.[1102] But other Canadians had different stories, particularly those who worked in Japan long-term. For Clarence Fisher, a quartermaster sergeant stationed in Tokyo, R&R was something he prepared for others:

> Because I was there for several months, I met a lot of our men and I also saw a lot of Japan. And I loved it. Getting the posting there was one of the best things that ever happened to me. Because I was working in Japan, as opposed to just passing through, I was able to meet more of the Japanese and see more of their country than the fellows who were just there for a few days. I love the Japanese and I grew to love their country. […] I was invited to Japanese homes once or twice a month.[1103]

As Fisher's testimony demonstrates, historians should be cautious in classifying certain Korean War experiences as normal and other aberrant. Canada's "occupation" of Japan was a more varied event for its participants than simplistic account of wine and women typically suggest.

One of the most evocative expressions of such varied conduct occurred in September 1952, when Private Earl MacMillan of Medicine Hat arrived home with what would be the first of many

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[1100] Courtenay, *Love and Duty*, 221.
[1101] Herbert Fairlie Wood, *The Private War of Jacket Coates* (Don Mills, ON: Longmans, 1966), 129. For historians' use of Coates by to illuminating the cynical aspects of Canada's Korean War experience, see Bercuson, *True Patriot*, 216; Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, 184n3, 189; Watson, *Far Eastern Tour*, 134, 136, 160.
[1102] See Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 292-293.
[1103] John Melady, *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011), 260.

by Canadians back from Korea: A Japanese wife. Like the Second World War, the Korean War created a small cohort of Canadian war brides. For twenty-three-year-old Matsuno Toasaka, her first glimpse of her future fiancé came in April 1951 when MacMillan visited her brother's giftshop in Kure. "I wasn't a very good customer," MacMillan later joked to the press. "But I saw her every day for five months and we were married a year ago." The couple's return home to Alberta went well, with both MacMillan's family and members of the local Japanese community turning out to greet them.[1104] Despite rumours that "officers were told to discourage these marriages," a fact seemingly reinforced by a mandatory ninety-day wait period, CMMFE's reticence came as much from the bureaucratic headache than any anti-Japanese racism, necessitating complex procedures to process immigration visas and other paperwork.[1105] "This task is becoming increasingly onerous and exacting," one official report complained. "Will headaches never cease?" the war diary of 2 CAU asked in August 1954, as yet another marriage was officiated in Hiro.[1106] While some brides-to-be, as Red Cross worker Dorothea Wiens later noted, "had a rosy, unrealistic picture of Canada," most would adapt to their new Canadian lives, much as their British and Dutch counterparts had in 1945. Ultimately, sixty-eight Japanese war brides would proceed to Canada.[1107] Despite clichés about ingrained Japanese reticence, the response of the new Mrs. MacMillan when asked whether she would enjoy Canada was quite candid: "I'll try," she replied, "I'll try."[1108]

Shopping was another experience that Japan offered servicemembers. As they discovered, prices were cheap in Japan and the local merchants were friendly and efficient. For Colonel Robert

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[1104] "Dimpled Japanese Bride: Canadian Went to Shop Returned to Store Daily," *Globe and Mail*, 6 September 1952, 7; "First Jap War Bride Reaches Canada Home," *Globe and Mail*, 11 September 1952, 8.
[1105] Though racism certainly existed within the system. Corporal Bert Clinton later claimed a bigoted New Zealand padre at Ebisu flat out refused to officiate his marriage in July 1954. But most soldiers were undeterred; Clinton had a Canadian Embassy official marry them instead. See Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 349.
[1106] WD, CMMFE, "Annual Report," March 1954, R112, vol. 18441, DNDF, LAC; WD, 2 CAU, entry 3 August 1954, R112, vol. 35994, DNDF, LAC. For the rumours, see Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 349.
[1107] Day et al., *Women Overseas*, 346-347; Wood, *Strange Battleground*, 153.
[1108] "Dimpled Japanese Bride," 7.

Peacock, a stop in Hiroshima was also a chance to buy "pearls, silk and other items for my fiancée and my parents at somewhat better terms than normal."[1109] As Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Meredith on HMCS *Nootka* noted, all Japanese ports had shops catering to sailors. In Sasebo, he visited "Black Market Alley." "There's very little black marketish about it," Meredith admitted in his diary. "The stores are all open fronted, prices comparatively cheap. Toys, silk, Chinaware and souvenirs, pearls all also to be had—cultivated ones at that."[1110] "The Japanese were wonderful," Major Walter Conrad recalled of a visit to buy gifts for his unit in 1954. "We'd sit and we'd have dinner, and we'd navigate, and we'd chat about everything," only then placing his order. Leaving his money with the vendors, Conrad returned to Korea and "everything arrived right on time, right to the accurate count and everything else."[1111] Some purchases even had military applications. As Andrew Moffat related, he and a friend visited a blacksmith before heading to Korea, ordering two trench knives of amazingly high quality.[1112] In May 1953, newly-appointed Brigadier Jean Allard accurately plotted all major Chinese positions along his section of the front using a high-powered telescope he had purchased in Japan, allowing Canadian tanks "to conduct a destructive shoot each day as soon as the morning mists had lifted sufficiently to allow direct observation."[1113]

Good food and hospitality were other benefits. For soldiers fed-up with military rations, Japan offered numerous opportunities for fine dining at cheap prices, and for the more daring there were always local Japanese dishes to try. Given the ubiquitous availability of Asian cuisine in Canada today, there is a certain amusement in hearing Canadians' first experience with "exotic" Japanese food like sushi or daikon. "The meal started off with raw fish dipped in a hot sauce," the

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[1109] Robert S. Peacock, *Kim-chi, Asahi and Rum: A Platoon Commander Remembers Korea, 1952–1953* (Toronto: Lugus, 1994), 125.
[1110] Douglas George Meredith, Diary, entry 12 February, acc.20010081-001, CWM. Cf. App. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 6. When he later got to Kure, Meredith found "the usual merchandise" available here as well. See ibid., entry 6 March 1952.
[1111] Interview with Walter Conrad, 17 November 2003, Acc.20020121-161, CWM.
[1112] Moffat, *Korea Memories*, 25-27.
[1113] William Johnston, *A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 362.

rather bemused war correspondent Dave McIntosh wrote in December 1950, as he maneuvered his chopsticks "about as deftly as a couple of ax handles."[1114] For Clarence Fisher, "Japanese food was strange at first, but I tried it all—raw fish, octopus, the biggest prawns I ever saw, soups, rice dishes, even fish eyes."[1115] For men living in muddy Korean dugouts, Japan's famous bath culture was also a pleasure. Not only were they pampered by female bath attendants, but the then common Japanese practice of mixed-gender bathing also proved a memorable culture shock.[1116] There were also tourism opportunities. "The highlight of my visit to Japan," Robert Peacock later claimed, "was a day trip to Hiroshima and the island shrine of Miya Jima." At this famous Shinto shrine on the Inland Sea, famous for its floating torii, Peacock was "the only westerner in sight for the whole day and had a wonderful time wandering and enjoying being a tourist with my camera."[1117] For units based in Japan such excursions were routine, as the site was popular with BCOF. "Boat trip to Miya Jima where sight seeing and swimming was enjoyed," the war diary of the Canadians at Kure's ordnance depot noted in August 1954. "Thirty-two all ranks attended."[1118]

But there were also more uncomfortable shades to the Canadian presence in Japan. As seen, the signs of Japan's defeat were everywhere in 1950, and this irony was widely noted. Landing at Haneda, *Maclean's* reporter Pierre Berton noted that this was "in the lee of a blasted Zero factory." The absurdity was palpable: "It is less than six years since the last war ended. … The hated Japanese have become our pals; the Chinese, once our comrades-in-arms, have become our bitter foes."[1119] "I couldn't help but look about me at the Japanese who were passing by on the street or

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[1114] Dave McIntosh, "Took Off Shoes to Enter Home for Japanese Dinner," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 December 1950, 41.
[1115] Melady, *Canada's Forgotten War*, 260. Other Canadian encounters with Japanese cooking were less successful. See Moffat, *Korean Memories*, 17-19; and Courtney, *Love and Duty*, 233-234.
[1116] Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 292; Moffat, *Korea Memories*, 16-17; Forbes, *Fantassin*, 326; and Ringma, *Full Monty*, 113-114. Mixed bathing also makes an appearance in James Michener's Korean War novel, *The Bridges at Toko-Ri* (New York: Random House, 1953), 67-68, as well as its 1954 Hollywood adaptation.
[1117] Peacock, *Kim-chi, Asahi and Rum*, 125. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 7.
[1118] WD, Canadian Section Britcom Base Ordnance Depot, entry 1 August 1954, R112, vol. 18441, LAC.
[1119] Berton, *My Times*, 66. Cf. Pierre Berton, "Milk Run to Korea," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 May 1951, 39.

who were waiting on me in shops, and wondering what they were doing during the Second War," Andrew Moffat later admitted. After all, "we had been made well aware of the atrocities committed by the Japanese, especially against Allied prisoners—including a lot of Canadians taken at Hong Kong."[1120] Studying Kure from HMCS *Nootka*, Douglas Meredith observed that their berth was "next door to the drydock in which the [battleships] 'Yamato' and 'Ise' were built."[1121] Yet, for some, personal experience exposed the gap between wartime spin and Japanese reality. "For most of us, the way the Japanese treated us was a revelation," Eddy Weetaltuk asserted. "It was hard to believe that they were once our enemies. It made me realise that politicians can make you believe that wonderful people are barbarians. Once you are convinced of it, it is easy to abuse and kill people, because you believe you are the good ones and the others are just evil."[1122] At Kure, Bob Ringma recalled hearing his Japanese workers relaxing in a nearby building. "Shouts of 'banzai, banzai' would erupt and get my imagination going. I had heard the word in wartime movies and was sure it meant something sinister." Yet, as he quickly realized, "The meetings were probably just workers getting together[,] but with the end of World War II just six years earlier, I imagined a plot to get back at the imperialist Canadians … However it was used, in the context in which I heard it ringing from the nearby meeting place, I learned that it was not threat to us."[1123]

Another wartime legacy for Canadians servicemen in Japan was the unexpected discovery that there were some Canadians already there who were keen to put on a uniform and join them. For many of the Japanese-Canadian repatriates who had arrived in Japan over the course of 1946 (see Chapter 4), especially the Canadian-born who had only been children at the time, Canada was their "home" and joining the army offered a way to eventually return after their tours of duty were

[1120] Moffat, *Korean Memories*, 121.
[1121] Meredith, Korean War Diary, entry 7 March 1952.
[1122] Weetaltuk and Martin, *From the Tundra to the Trenches*, 109.
[1123] Ringma, *Full Monty*, 118.

complete.[1124] "It was difficult for me there," Private Fujino Atero later recalled. "I had been born and raised in Canada and did not know the Japanese culture."[1125] Others simply had few options in postwar Japan. "I didn't have any money, don't have a job, don't have a place to stay," Sergeant Arthur Sato laughed years later. "We suggest you join the Canadian Army," the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo recommended after he had explained his predicament.[1126]

In July 1952, the first eight Japanese-Canadians were inducted into the Canadian Army at Kure. "There is a constant flow of applications for enlistment from other youths similarly situated," as Bill Boss reported. While the screening was rigorous—physical maladies, usually tuberculosis, caused many rejections—plenty of applicants made the cut. These Japanese-Canadians left a good impression on the other soldiers they served with. "They're above average for the normal recruit and they work hard," drill Sergeant C.W. Kelly told Boss approvingly. "I'd like to see us recruit infantrymen and gunners like these fellows," Lieutenant-Colonel Ed McNaughton, the commander of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery's 1st Regiment, added. "They're good chaps."[1127] Their deployments would run smoothly. Fujino was initially employed as a runner in Korea before being sent to 2 CAU for clerical work. He returned to Canada in 1955. As for Sato, he never got further than Kure where he joined 2 CAU in 1953. He returned to Canada in August 1954.[1128] The positive reception of these Japanese-Canadian soldiers—fighting for their country after having been barred from enlisting, forcibly interned, and then exiled only six years before—reveals the weakening of Canadian Japanophobia that had taken place between 1945 and 1952.[1129]

[1124] D.J. Timmons, "'Evangelines of 1946': The Exile of Nikkei from Canada to Occupied Japan" (MA diss, University of Victoria, 2011), 84-86.
[1125] Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 15.
[1126] Interview with Arthur Hitoshi Sato, 21 May 2008, SC141_SAH_595, CMOHC, UVicA.
[1127] Bill Boss, "Eight Japanese Canadians Complete Training," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 July 1952, 6.
[1128] Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 15; WD, 2 CAU, 30 July 1954, 20 August 1954, R112, vol. 35994, LAC; Interview with Arthur Hitoshi Sato; and WD, 2 CAU, 4 August 1953, R112, vol. 35994, LAC.
[1129] For the rejection of Japanese-Canadians during the Pacific War, see Patricia E. Roy, "The Soldiers Canada Didn't Want: Her Chinese and Japanese Citizens," *Canadian Historical Review* 59, no. 3 (September 1978): 341-358.

Other soldiers with a fondness for photography documented the lives of ordinary Japanese, especially children who had nothing to do with the war and often showed innate curiosity towards them. "It was always a pleasure to see the children on their way to or from school," Bob Ringma wrote later. "They were well scrubbed and, to my view, happy, well fed and well loved."[1130] For Canadians who had been told how violent and barbaric the Japanese were during the Pacific War (see Chapter 1), the innocence of childhood was a reminder of their common humanity. Nor did children have any reservations about interacting with foreign soldiers. While taking a train just as school was getting out, Seargent John Richardson was amazed at the students' fearless curiosity. "They would wave and come right up to the windows, friendly and afraid of bugger all."[1131] Many Canadians had no trouble getting children to pose for their cameras as they toured Japan.[1132]

But the most emotional event for Canadians was a trip to Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Given that Hiroshima was near Kure, many Canadians visited the city and saw for themselves the power of the atomic bomb. "I will always remember seeing the pictures of devastation caused by the bomb," Sergeant Gordon Peacock remarked years later. "It was a very sobering place to visit."[1133] Other soldiers recalled the shadows of people imprinted on the city's concrete by the heat of the blast or the appearance of survivors, their burned and scarred skin resembling "a tanned alligator."[1134] "My feelings were much the same as those aroused by looking at Dachau or Auschwitz," Red Cross worker Dorothea Wiens later concluded: "Absolute horror."[1135] Such emotional appeals for the Japanese victims of the last war also clashed with the derision shown by some servicemembers towards Koreans suffering in the present conflict.

[1130] Ringma, *Full Monty*, 119.
[1131] Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 328.
[1132] See Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 8.
[1133] Gardam, *Korea Volunteer*, 169.
[1134] Gardam, *Korea Volunteer*, 219; George Douglas Imlay, Written Memoir, 19, acc.20130627-002, CWM.
[1135] Frances Martin Day, Phyllis Spence, and Barbara Ladouceur, *Women Overseas: Memoirs of the Canadian Red Cross (Overseas Detachment)* (Vancouver: Ronsdale, 1998), 347. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 6, Fig. 9.

For many Canadians, positive relations with the Japanese were often contrasted by equally poor interactions with Koreans. As Red Cross worker Jacqueline Robitaille recalled, "The Koreans wanted us to leave them alone. … They seemed to hate the United Nations troops and that always puzzled me. In Japan, by contrast, we were treated with great courtesy."[1136] The cause is not hard to fathom. Having lost loved ones and seen their homes destroyed, most Koreans likely saw the Canadians as just another marauding army, and many foreigners documented numerous cases of Canadian contempt or abuse towards South Korean soldiers and civilians.[1137] Accordingly, it was easy for some to think that Koreans were simply churlish. The state of Korea after years of war and, most ironically, decades of Japanese colonialism, coupled with racism, also played its part. "The Japanese seemed to be far more prosperous and their standard of living far higher than that of the Koreans," Canadian Army chaplain Roy Durnford jotted in his wartime diary. "Needless to say, they are not at war and their industrial resources have not been wrecked so completely as in Korea. Their cultural life, also, seemed to me much higher than in Korea where that agrarian people live close to the ground."[1138] Even Hugh Keenleyside, hardly an ardent bigot, voiced disgust at the poor Korean refugees he saw while visiting Pusan from Tokyo as part of a UNKRA mission in 1951: How UN soldiers in a city known for its VD could "touch these grimy and repulsive creatures is beyond me."[1139] While the Japanese were their former enemy, the courtesy and respect Canadians received from them and their ostensibly higher level of "culture," contrasted poorly with the poverty, primitiveness, and apparent ingratitude of many Koreans.

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[1136] Day et al., *Women Overseas*, 365.
[1137] For examples, see Watson, *Far Eastern Tour*, 58-61, chapter 4; Hepenstall, *Find the Dragon*, 266-268; Pierre Berton, "The Real War in Korea," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 August 1951, 2.
[1138] Roy Durnford, Korean Diary, 11-12, acc.20110192-001, CWM. Durnford also praised one Japanese shopkeeper he met for his "excellent English."
[1139] Hugh Keenleyside, Travel Diary (Trip Around the World), entry 11 October 1951, R4217, vol. 30, file 14, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. Cf. Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:459-460.

In the end, having a military presence in Japan *was* important to the Canadian war effort in Korea. In 1950 and 1951, its lack of an occupation military presence in the county had hampered operations, forcing a reliance on Commonwealth or American facilities. After 1952, however, once the war had stalemated, these gaps were gradually filled by unique Canadian services, such as Tokyo's Maple Leaf Club, while an agreement between the UN forces and Tokyo was eventually negotiated.[1140] For ordinary soldiers, meanwhile, Japan proved a memorable experience. And, if many were simply content to passively enjoy the rich hospitality the country had to offer, more reflective servicemen discovered that their wartime enemies had their positive sides too. Moreover, despite later generalizations, there was more to Canadian life in Japan than simply being "overpaid, oversexed, and over here." While R&R could involve prostitution and drinking, relations with the Japanese were far richer that this cynical truism implies. For many ordinary servicemembers, their legacy of visiting Japan was positive. For some, Japan was remembered in the pages of their photo albums, in the memories invoked by souvenirs that sat on their fireplaces, or in the Japanese slang they had picked up on leave in Tokyo.[1141] Those who had taken war brides returned with something more. Ultimately, Canada's military presence in Japan played a greater role than anyone expected in helping to rebuild Japanese-Canadian relations after the trauma of the Pacific War.

Nor was this a fact lost on contemporary observers. The Canadian government too realised that the Canadian presence in Japan might be incorporated into its ongoing diplomatic efforts to rebuild postwar relations with the country. Three months before Louis St. Laurent's visit to Japan in March 1954, Ambassador Robert Mayhew called on Yoshida Shigeru to invite him to Canada

[1140] By the time the Centre closed in April 1955, 80,000 UN soldiers had reportedly been entertained by its facilities. At its peak, it had also employed 23 Japanese workers under Canadian supervision. See "Tokyo Army Club Closes," *Canadian Weekly Bulletin*, 10, 26 (29 April 1955): 5.

[1141] Most Canadians found Japanese an easier language to learn than Korean. As Korea was a former Japanese colony, their pidgin Japanese often sufficed in both countries. See "Hubba—Hubba!" *The Legionary*, March 1953, 13.

when he next visited North America for high-level talks with the Americans. Mayhew told Yoshida that while St. Laurent would deliver the offer personally, they were aware of how busy he was and so wished to tenure the offer well in advance.[1142] Six months after St. Laurent's departure, Yoshida touched down in Canada at the start of his own world tour that would take him to France, West Germany, Italy, the Vatican, Great Britain, and the United States. Battered at home by labour strikes, political infighting, and incidents like the fate of the irradiated Japanese fishermen aboard the *Lucky Dragon Five* after March's Bikini Atoll nuclear tests, Yoshida hoped his voyage would boost his declining political fortunes and allow for fresh talks with President Dwight Eisenhower and US policy-makers, something that Canadians frankly recognized.[1143] Still, as Yoshida landed in Vancouver, it did mark the first time that a Japanese Prime Minister had ever visited Canada.

Met on the tarmac by Arthur Menzies—back from Tokyo to head External's Far Eastern Division—along with other dignitaries, Yoshida stopped first at Stanley Park to place a wreath on the memorial honouring the Japanese-Canadians killed in the First World War. He then flew to Ottawa, where in a reversal of the scene in March, Yoshida and his daughter Asō Kazuko greeted St. Laurent. "The [Canadian] prime minister had visited Japan earlier that year," Yoshida recalled in his memoirs, "and had apparently formed a favorable impression of my country." Explaining St. Laurent's offer to the Press, Yoshida pressed for closer Japanese-Canadian ties, declaring that "Japan is happy to be a peaceful neighbor of Canada on the Pacific." Perhaps his good rapport

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[1142] "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 4 December 1953; R.L. Rogers to Shirahata Tomotake, 11 January 1954; S. Moreley Scott to USSEA, 11 January 1954; R.L. Rogers to USSEA, 14 January 1954, R11214, vol. 184, file I-15-W, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.

[1143] John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 471-473. For the state of this ongoing "political crisis" in Japan as Yoshida's left for Canada, see Dening, Outward Saving Telegram, 29 September 1953, R219, vol. 8084, file 4606-40, part 7.1, DEAF, LAC. "Mr. Yoshida said when he arrived here that the main purpose of his trip to Canada was to return the visit to Japan by Prime Minister St. Laurent earlier this year," the *Ottawa Citizen* noted. "But against the background of Japan's faltering and distorted economy, and the country's unquestioned need of help in one form or another, it may be taken for granted that Mr. Yoshida's visit constituted more than a courtesy call from the leader of a great country." See "Prime Minister Yoshida's Visit to Ottawa," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 September 1954, 44.

with St. Laurent from their meeting in March, Yoshida mused later, explained why "the reception accorded me and my party wherever we went in the dominion was most encouraging."[1144]

While most Canadians have ascribed little importance to the Yoshida-St. Laurent meetings, they nevertheless did aid in the reconstruction of postwar Japanese-Canadian relations.[1145] Indeed, as noted, St. Laurent's visit marked a notable milestone. Before him, no foreign leader had visited postwar Japan; the only major dignitary proceeding him was US Vice President Richard Nixon in 1953. "We got an excellent press, both in the English and the Japanese language papers," Mayhew enthused. "Canada had not had as big a boost in my time—and I doubt of ever—as the one which the Prime Minister gave us. We are really on the map in Japan now and I hope we continue to stay there."[1146] Even the restrained British Ambassador Sir Esler Dening, while admitting that Nixon likely got a bigger response, still concurred St Laurent received "a friendly welcome in the English and vernacular press."[1147] His visit was a "novel departure from the beaten tract of Ottawa to London and Washington," an excited *Asahi* editorialized. Its rival, the *Mainichi*, likewise scolded its readers that they had not spent more time thinking about Canada, "which is one of our nearby neighbours."[1148] Such apparently rapturous views did not come from nowhere. As the Canadian Embassy noted in a measured review of the year's events, Japan was still outside most international organizations in 1954, including the UN (see Chapter 7). "The feeling of isolation and insufficient

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[1144] Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*, trans. Hiroshi Nara (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 84-85; "Gale News Kept from Yoshida: Japanese Premier Tours Vancouver," *Vancouver Province*, 27 September 1954, 3; Austin Cross, "Yoshida Arrives in City," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 September 1954, 1; J.A. Hume, "Yoshida Hopes Canada Believes in Japan as a 'Good Neighbor'," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 September 1954, 3.

[1145] For diplomat Charles Ritchie, who accompanied St. Laurent, Tokyo was just one of many stops between "bad oysters at dinner with horrible old Syngman Rhee" and a "pointless" visit to Manila. "It was at Tokyo," he added, "that the Prime Minister began to show signs of fatigue," likely dysentery picked up earlier in his trip. Greg Donaghy, in his account of the world tour published in 2020, basically ignored the visit except to note that Mayhew "squabbled for local control before bemused Anglo-American officials." See Charles Ritchie, *Undiplomatic Diaries, 1937–1971* (Toronto: Emblem, 2008), 314-315; Donaghy, "A Voyage of Discovery," 472.

[1146] Arthur Menzies, "Memorandum for Mr. Ross Martin," 29 March 1954, R11214, vol. 184, file I-15-W, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.

[1147] Dening, Outward Saving Telegram, 17 March 1954, R219, vol. 8084, file 4606-40, part 6.1, DEAF, LAC.

[1148] Mac R. Johnson, "Report from Japan: Mr. St Laurent Makes Friends," *Vancouver Province*, 16 March 1954, 7.

appreciation of Japan's merits was widespread and, for a time, even outspoken." St. Laurent's visit had thus been perfectly timed to be "favourably received by the Japanese as an indication of international appreciation at a time when they were feeling neglected by most countries."[1149]

And the Canadian military presence in Japan played a key role in this diplomatic dialogue. As St. Laurent asserted in his prepared remarks for Yoshida, both nations had "been drawn closer in recent years" due to the Korean War. "The Canadian servicemen in the three branches of our Armed Force who have seen service under the United Nations Command have enjoyed and praised the hospitality of your country," he toasted.[1150] This was seconded by Robert Mayhew. In a speech to the Tokyo-based Canada-Japan Society soon after he was made ambassador in 1953, Mayhew affirmed that Canada was "grateful for the facilities given by Japan for the United Nations forces in transit through or on rest and relaxation in this country."[1151] While in Canada a few months later, Mayhew likewise asserted to the *Ottawa Citizen* that "Canadian troops in training or in transit in Japan have made a good many friends among the Japanese. The Japanese have treated our forces throughout with the strictest courtesy and helpfulness."[1152] While we should not idealize Canada's military presence in Japan given the difficulties explored above, we should not be quick to dismiss them as overly optimistic either. Ultimately, despite the difficulties in negotiating an agreement for Commonwealth forces to stay in Japan, Canada's Korean War contacts with Japan were not only a personal success, but a diplomatic one as well.

[1149] T.C. Davis to SSEA, 3 January 1955, R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-1, DEAF, LAC.
[1150] Louis St. Laurent, "Notes … in Honour of Prime Minister Yoshida," 27 September 1954, R11214, vol. 285, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC. It does not seem, however, that the prime minister ever delivered this speech.
[1151] Robert Mayhew, "Remarks … At a Meeting of the Canada-Japan Society," 29 January 1953, R15615, vol. 30, file 9, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1152] Austin F. Cross, "Canada's Tokyo Envoy Here on Flying Visit," *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 August 1953, 8.

Chapter 7: An Invitation in From the Cold: Canada and Japan in a Cold War World, 1952–1957

> *"Prime Minister Yoshida came to Canada in the fall of 1954, and when he visited the Japanese embassy, he once again lectured me that I should make the embassy a showcase for the sale of Japanese commodities and that it was my task as ambassador to make an all-out-effort in trade promotion by traipsing around the country in straw sandals and making a sales pitch."*
>
> — Matsudaira Kōtō, Ex-Japanese Ambassador to Canada, 24 May 1977[1153]

> *"Canadians at this time—the government—felt that Japan had gone through the occupation, and coming into the middle fifties, they were just beginning to feel their oats a little bit and flex their muscles. They were very anxious [for] international acceptance as a country. I felt that it was very definitely one of my responsibilities to do what I could to help them."*
>
> — William F. Bull, Ex-Canadian Ambassador to Japan, 20 October 1977[1154]

In some ways, the scene was typical. On Prince Edward Island in August 1955, at the height of the tourist season, two gentlemen leave the Charlottetown Hotel, get into their car, and drive out into the countryside to see the sights, including the fertile red soil and the roving herds of cattle. None of this was unusual. Tourism to the Island was a growing industry in the 1950s, and a long time had passed since the province's abortive attempt to ban automotive traffic between 1908 and 1913. Motorists and motels, the government increasingly realized, were the new norms for postwar tourists. The fact that the two men were Japanese, one the ambassador to Canada and the other his chauffeur, was admittedly a novelty. For Matsudaira Kōtō, however, it was all part of the job. As the ambassador declared candidly to the local press, he had never even heard of the Island before his posting to Ottawa. But being first at anything had its perks. "I am the first Japanese Ambassador to visit your province," Matsudaira boasted to one journalist, "and am therefore the first to establish diplomatic relations between my country and Prince Edward Island." Having toured the Island, meet with Premier Alex Matheson as well as the lieutenant governor, and successfully "traipsed" about loudly proclaiming that Japan was "anxious to establish a greater trade with Canada" to all

[1153] Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic, 1983), 119.
[1154] Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 127.

who would listen, Matsudaira could leave the province content that he had done as his political masters had ordered. Despite his polite platitudes about revisiting, Matsudaira would not return. A Japanese ambassador would only revisit Prince Edward Island in 1958.[1155]

Coming from a nation where reticence is prized, the brash Matsudaira hardly seems to fit the usual stereotype of a reserved Japanese diplomat. "He is quite unlike any other Japanese I have met," diplomat Charles Ritchie later observed while both men were at the United Nations. "He is worldly and witty, and is extremely indiscreet."[1156] Yet as Matsudaira told Klaus Pringsheim from the safety of a post-retirement interview, a least part of this brash aura came from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who had pressed him during his 1954 visit to Canada to make an "all-out-effort in trade promotion," much to his personal discomfort.[1157] Most venues, at least, proved more prestigious than rural Prince Edward Island. "It is our utmost desire to continue and to expand, as far as possible, our growing trade with Canada," the then-ambassador told Toronto's Empire Club of Canada in 1955, "for we are convinced that, in this way, not only can we complement the needs of another, but, also, through fair and honest trade, build up and deepen the good understanding between our two peoples."[1158] Still, one might argue Yoshida was correct that earnestness was now needed in Japan. As the occupation wound down in the early 1950s, he faced the daunting prospect of rebuilding a new, democratic Japan under America's aegis. New sources of foreign trade were

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[1155] "Japanese Ambassador Now Visiting Province," *Evening Patriot* (Charlottetown), 3 August 1955, 4; "Visit Proved Delightful to Japanese Ambassador," *Guardian of the Gulf* (Charlottetown), 4 August 1955, 13. For the prohibition and later rise of twentieth century motor tourism to PEI, see Edward MacDonald and Alan MacEachern, *The Summer Trade: A History of Tourism on Prince Edward Island* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022), 55-56, 61-64, 115-116. Matsudaira's replacement, Hagiwara Toru, visited the province in July 1958.
[1156] Charles Ritchie, *Undiplomatic Diaries, 1937–1971* (Toronto: Emblem, 2008), 395.
[1157] "The task of an ambassador is not direct involvement in the advertising and sale of products," Matsudaira later told Pringsheim. Indeed, by his own account, he had a "really noisy row on this subject" while Yoshida was in Ottawa and had threatened to resign. See Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific,* 119-120. Despite such issues, however, Matsudaira recalled his time in Canada fondly. "Every day," he later wrote in his memoirs, "I thought I would like to stay in Canada, if possible, for a long time. … I really thought Canada was like a paradise." See Matsudaira Kōtō, *A Diplomat's Life,* trans. Akira Irie (St. Thomas Place, UK: Melrose Books, 2016), 30.
[1158] Matsudaira Kōtō, "Japan's Position in the Far East," in *The Empire Club of Canada Addresses* (Toronto: Empire Club, 1956): 269-282, https://speeches.empireclub.org/60788/data?n=1.

needed for Japan's postwar economic revival and the country's political independence had to be assured in a new Cold War world. In what became known as the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan engaged in "low-posture diplomacy" to rebuild foreign trade, while leaving its geopolitics to the needs of the American-Japanese Alliance.[1159] In this strategy, Yoshida and his successors received both American, and a hitherto underappreciated level of Canadian support.[1160] William Bull may have served most of his ambassadorship under the Conservative Diefenbaker, but his desire to usher Japan back into the international fold derived from a bipartisan consensus in postwar Ottawa.

Yet, this was by no means an easy relationship to bridge. While Canadian trade with Japan grew rapidly in the 1950s, and Japan became "Canada's third best customer" after Britain and the United States, it remained mostly one way from Canada to Japan.[1161] As Matsudaira had lectured the Empire Club, "it is difficult to see how such a one-sided balance can continue indefinitely." To balance this trade deficit, Canada needed to buy more from Japan: "The woodsman in British Columbia, the farmer in Alberta or in Saskatchewan, the wheat grower in Manitoba," Matsudaira contended, "depend on a balanced and long-enduring system of trade between us to maintain and improve their individual, personal well-being. By buying more from Japan, you are ensuring the welfare and happiness of their children and of themselves."[1162] But this was not always an easy sell for Canadians. Before 1941, Japan had acquired a reputation for abusing trade subsidies and "dumping" inferior products in foreign markets. There had even been a minor trade war between Canada and Japan over dumping and tariffs in 1934 and 1935.[1163] "Admittedly Canada as well as Japan stands to gain from the restoration and expansion of mutual trade," the *Financial Post* opined

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[1159] W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 236-237.
[1160] For America's economic support, see Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival, 1950–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
[1161] V.J. Mackie, "Canada's Third Best Customer," *News-Herald* (Vancouver), 3 October 1952, 4.
[1162] See Matsudaira, "Japan's Position in the Far East," 269-282; "Warns 8 to 1 Japanese Trade in Canada's Favor 'Can't Continue,'" *Toronto Daily Star*, 15 April 1955, 23.
[1163] John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 122-129.

after the San Francisco peace treaty. "But before we open the gates completely it would be well to have some definite assurance that there will be no revival of previous troubles."[1164] Yet if Canada wanted to trade with Japan, the paper admitted a few months later, it needed to be open to receiving Japanese goods in return. "Humanitarian reasons aside, most Canadians would be glad to have a healthy democratic Japan in the Far East. Most of them too … realize that Japan must depend very largely on exporting and importing to reach that goal. They will hope that Japan's representative here is not too optimistic when he suggests that this can be achieved without serious dislocation of our own economy."[1165] Whether this could be done remained to be seen in April 1952.

In this chapter, we will see how these debates on reviving trade played out as Canada tried to expand its markets in Japan, and as Japan tried to convince Canadians that its "new" postwar nation was a partner they could trust. This included the start of Japan's new international trade fairs in 1954 and 1955, Canada's participation at the 1955 International Chamber of Commerce Congress in Tokyo, its expanded press coverage of Japan, and the 1956 opening of the Japan Trade Centre in Toronto. Additionally, we will see how Ottawa proved a consistent ally of Japan in the international arena, supporting its bid to be a contributor to the Commonwealth-led Colombo Plan in 1954, in its failed application to join the United Nations in 1955, and in its more successful bid to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that same year. As seen during Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's visit to Japan in 1954 (see Chapter 6), Tokyo appreciated Canada's willingness to engage with them at a time when few other nations dared do so. As I will attempt to show, Canada was one of Japan's most consistent diplomatic and financial allies during the 1950s, perhaps second only to the United States itself.

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[1164] "How Far with Japan?" *Financial Post*, 29 September 1951, 6.
[1165] "What About Japanese Trade?" *Financial Post*, 24 November 1951, 6.

How was Japan to be reconstructed at the economic level? For postwar planners at GHQ, this was a vital issue.[1166] While no one wanted to restore Japan's war-making potential, it became increasingly clear during the late 1940s that its economic revival was important not just for its own prosperity, but for all East Asia's too. As Canadian historian Edgar McInnis noted for *International Journal* in 1947, any chance that China could be the region's economic engine had vanished with the failure of the Marshall Mission and renewed civil war between Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists and Mao Zedong's Communists. The only other choice was clear: "With China in its present state of political and economic disruption, some alternative base must be sought, and the only practical alternative in sight is Japan."[1167] In the years immediately following the war, trade with Japan was conducted by government monopoly. Private trade was forbidden as SCAP and Tokyo tried to de-militarize the Japanese economy, notably breaking up the zaibatsu; both the famous Mitsui and the Mitsubishi concerns were collapsed in July 1947.[1168] For Canadian businessmen ready to rebuild ties with Japan, this proved a major disappointment. As Canada's Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) told one overzealous company lawyer in December 1945, trade with Japan was currently limited "to bare subsistence requirements" under US control. "I presume that Allied Governments will be invited to participate," DTC added, "but this has not yet been fully worked out."[1169] Only in June 1946 was trade re-established on a limited "government to government" basis via the Japanese Board of Trade (Bōeki Chō) and the Canadian Commercial Corporation.[1170] "For the present SCAP does not encourage any direct contact between foreign missions and Japanese producers and consumers," as Commercial Representative John Kenderdine reported in

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[1166] See John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), chap. 17.
[1167] Edgar McInnis, "Problems of Far Eastern Settlement," *International Journal* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1947/48): 52.
[1168] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 528-533; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 307-310.
[1169] R. Gerard Sampson to DTC Commercial Intelligence Service, 14 December 1945; Arthur Wilding to Sampson, 19 December 1945, R208, vol. 317, file T-11246, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1170] This was a new Crown Corporation founded in 1946 to replace the pre-existing Canadian Export Board.

September 1946. Still, despite the limited range of imports on offer, 51 Canadian companies had contacted the Corporation looking to trade with Japan by November 1946.[1171]

Eventually, SCAP gradually lifted restrictions as the occupation progressed. By 15 August 1947, when trade was liberalized to allow restricted trade with individual firms, many businessmen promptly visited Japan and reported being "swamped with inquiries." Yet despite such rosy claims, official Japanese-Canadian trade remained limited. "In many instances the business representatives returned disappointed," DTC warned one company, "for the conditions imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the absence of an exchange rate from the Yen, together with high cost of goods, limited stocks and uncertain future supply, all militated against trading."[1172] Impatience soon led to the spread of rumours. On 20 February 1948, the Vancouver *Province* ran on its front page that General Douglas MacArthur himself had said he would do "everything in his power" to reopen full private trade between Canada and Japan, a "fact" quickly repeated in several Japanese newspapers. A selective reading of MacArthur's comments, his full statement proved longer and less exciting. "It is unfortunate that to obtain a 'scoop,' newspapers are often prepared to deliberately misconstrue official statements," one DTC official sniffed irritably.[1173]

Nevertheless, by 1948, Ottawa was willing to offer most favoured nation (MFN) status in any future trade negotiations with Japan. "It is in the interest of Canada that the Japanese economy operate on a viable basis," Lester Pearson wrote in August after much internal debate. Not only

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[1171] Frank Hacking to DTC, 15 July 1946; G.S. Hall to Hacking, 16 July 1946; Kenderdine to G.R. Heasman, 4 September 1946; "Inquiries Received… Up to Nov. 1, 1946," R208, vol. 317, file T-11246, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1172] "Prospects for Japan Trade Reported Good," *Vancouver Sun*, 20 October 1947, 13; Hall to J.L Tyrer, 25 March 1948, R208, vol. 335, file T-11880, part 5, DTCF, LAC. As DTC warned another importer: "SCAP intends to hold down imports into Japan to an absolute minimum to prevent expenditures in foreign exchange holdings," letting trade "dispose of Japanese stocks and future production." See Hall to C.T. Sharpe, 3 September 1947, R208, vol. 329, file T-11675, part 4, DTCF, LAC. That only eight of the first 400 traders accepted by SCAP were allotted to Canada was also an issue. See "Opening of Limited Private Trade in Japan," 22 July 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, *Far East*, 257.
[1173] Erwin M. Swangard, "MacArthur Pledges Speedup of Canadian-Japanese Trade," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 20 February 1948, 1; Kenderdine to Heasman, 25 February; 26 February 1948 and Enclosures; Hall to Kenderdine, 13 April 1948, R208, vol. 335, file T-11880, part 5, DTCF, LAC.

would promoting trade "develop healthy commercial and trade arrangements in the Pacific area," but such a Pacific market "could become of considerable importance to Canada." Still, Pearson noted, "in the light of past Japanese practices, such treatment for Japan should only be granted on the basis of adequate guarantees from the responsible authorities in Japan."[1174] Even so, such a policy still had its discontents. Barely had "made in Japan" goods returned to stores in 1949 than fears of dumping returned. While the *Ottawa Citizen* noted that "Occupation authorities in Japan are keeping a close check on Japanese export prices," to prevent this outcome, anxious letters sent to Prime Minister St. Laurent claimed otherwise.[1175] One from the Association Professionnelle des Industriels in Montreal claimed there was "a flooding of the domestic market by children's clothes manufactured in Japan and sold here at a price so low that it deeply affects Canadian manufacturers in the same industry." Some products made in occupied Japan, the Dominion Association of Fire Chiefs added, were such a fire hazard "it is possible to ignite them by a lighted cigarette," urging Ottawa to "take immediate steps to prevent further importations."[1176]

Most allegations were easily dealt with. St. Laurent, for example, sent a polite response to the Fire Chiefs saying he would pass their letter on to the relevant agencies. Many more were the product of vested interests among local manufacturers directly affected by Japanese competition, primarily Canadian textile concerns.[1177] Yet, when Canada inked its MFN treaty with Japan in March 1954 with C.D. Howe, Pearson, and Matsudaira as signatories, criticism was muted.[1178] "In spite of cries of alarm from textile and other producers in Canada," *Maclean's* editor Blair Fraser

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[1174] Pearson to SSEA [St. Laurent], 23 August 1948, *DCER*, vol. 14, 88-89.
[1175] "Made In Japan Articles Re-Appearing," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1949, 11.
[1176] Jacques Massicotte to St. Laurent, 8 February 1950, R11214, vol. 118, file J-11-1, vol. 2; R.C. McRonald to St. Laurent, 3 December 1949, R11214, vol. 118, J-11-1, vol. 3, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[1177] St. Laurent to McRonald, 7 December 1949, R11214, vol. 118, J-11-1, vol. 3, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC. For further examples, see the letters received by the Privy Council over giving Japan MFN status, the majority from textile firms (R165, vol. 118, T-50-4-J). Textile lobbyists also mounted a vocal campaign against the deal, as even foreign observers noticed. See "Canadian Trade Plans with Japan: Textile Body's Protest," *The Times*, 4 November 1953, 6.
[1178] See *Agreement Between Canada and Japan, Treaty Series 1954, No. 3* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954).

wrote casually in May 1954, "Trade and Commerce officials don't expect any great rush of cheap Japanese goods as a result of the Canada-Japan trade agreement of last month."[1179] At a private Privy Council meeting in March, new complaints about cheap Japanese gloves prompted St. Laurent to shrewdly suggest that "the time was propitious" to tell Canadian textile firms that there were "special valuation procedures" under the new agreement to deal with dumping that might be invoked.[1180] These caveats in the treaty helped soften the blow for Canadian textile firms, while also letting the Japanese know they were still on economic probation. In Blair Fraser's words, Japan "is well aware of her reputation as an unfair competitor and knows that the other trading nations will be watching the new trade agreement with Canada to see what happens."[1181]

By the end of the occupation, then, Ottawa had fully committed Canada to rebuilding trade with Japan, and most private companies anticipated new markets for Canada's natural resources. After all, rebuilding Japan's cities and feeding its people, the Vancouver *Province* noted hopefully in 1947, was a boon to the BC timber trade and Prairie farmers. Moreover, it warned, "If the West fails to aid in placing the Japanese back in a position where they can buy and sell, then it is possible that Russia might shoulder this responsibility."[1182] On this point, at least, both state and society agreed. In February 1953, with negotiations for reopening trade still ongoing, Pearson delivered a lengthy commentary on Japanese-Canadian relations to the House of Commons. "The question of our trading relations with her is a difficult one," he admitted, "and some of us may find it hard to approach the problem entirely dispassionately." But trade was necessary, he continued, if Japan:

> is to be retained as a healthy and reliable friend and ally in that critical part of the world, we and the other free countries must be prepared to join with her in working out satisfactory arrangements for maintaining and expanding the trade on which we are both so dependent, and on which she is especially dependent, as she sees her markets

[1179] Blair Fraser, "No Cheap Japanese Goods This Time," *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 May 1954, 6.
[1180] "Knit Goods and Imports from Japan," 22 March 1954, R165, reel T-2368, PCOF, LAC.
[1181] Fraser, "No Cheap Japanese Goods," 6.
[1182] "Rebuilding of Jap Cities Will Take Western Lumber," *Vancouver Daily Province*, 20 May 1947, 23.

> on the mainland of Asia being curtailed or possibly being lost because of political difficulties. As an associate in the free world community, we look to Japan to adhere to her new-found democratic way of life, and we expect her to make a constructive contribution to collective security in the Pacific. On the other hand, I suppose Japan has the right to look to us to do our part […] to show that her choice of friendly association with us is wise from the point of view of enlightened self-interest.[1183]

This appeal to "enlightened self-interest," as Klaus Pringsheim observed, "was to become a theme song not only for Canadian but also for U.S. policy in the decades to follow." Letting Japan access North American markets in place of the Asian ones lost after the fall of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and communist victories in Asia would also benefit Canada and the US economically.[1184] That was the hope, at least, as full unobstructed trade between Canada and Japan resumed in 1954.

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In the mid-1950s, with the occupation behind it, Tokyo was eager to re-introduce Japanese products to a global audience, both at home and abroad. By this time, one of Japan's most important government departments was the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), founded in 1949. At the height of the "economic miracle" in the 1970s and 1980s, MITI was listed as one of the key instruments that had built Japan's prosperity. But, as political scientist Chalmers Johnson argues, it was only in "the period 1949 to 1954 [that] the Japanese forged the institutions of their high-growth system," and only after 1954, with the departure of the now unpopular Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, that MITI could put their policies into action.[1185] Under MITI, an alphabet soup of organizations, planning committees, and public-private ventures were created to revitalize Japan's economy and promote foreign trade. In the main, managing Japan's increasingly profitable (and fractious) trade with the United States was MITI's primary lobbying effort, as the creation of

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[1183] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 7th Session, vol. 2 (11 February 1953): 1854-1855; George Bain, "As Pearson Sees It: West, Asian Non-Reds Need Unity," *Globe and Mail*, 12 February 1953, 8.
[1184] Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 117-118.
[1185] See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), chapter 6, esp. 198-199. Cf. James E. Vestal, *Planning for Change: Industrial Policy and Japanese Economic Development, 1945–1990* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), chapter 2.

a new United States-Japan Trade Council in 1957 indicates. But a more general organization was JETRO, the Japan External Trade Organization, created explicitly to develop its foreign trade. Originally founded privately in Osaka in 1951, JETRO was co-opted by Tokyo in 1954 and would increasingly be staffed by MITI bureaucrats.[1186] As we shall see, MITI's initiatives would have a profound impact on the development of Japanese-Canadian trade relations during the 1950s.

In Japan, one notable attempt at this economic re-introduction was a series of trade fairs to entice foreign businessmen to Japan. Planned before the Pacific War, the first of these was held in the financial hub of Osaka in April 1954, the first international trade fair ever held in Asia. In July 1953, a delegation of officials from the Japan International Trade Fair Commission (JITFC) and the Osaka Foreign Trade Institute arrived at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo. "The Japanese government would very much like to receive our support," Commercial Counsellor James Britton reported to DTC, assured by Ushiba Nobuhiko—the head of MITI's International Trade Bureau—"that the Fair Commission is receiving every co-operation from their government."[1187] "We believe that our department should give serious consideration to participate in this Fair," Britton added, as Japan was "an important market to us mainly for raw materials, which do not lend themselves to being exhibited by an individual Canadian firm but could be very well incorporated in a prestige exhibit," citing "wheat, barley, flaxseed, base metals, wood pulp, lumber, and possibly synthetic resins and chemicals" for possible inclusion.[1188] As Canada was already well-subscribed to trade fairs in 1954 (and on a tight budget) Ottawa's initial response was tepid, if interested in principle.[1189] When DTC's Advisory Committee on Fairs and Exhibitions was held in October,

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[1186] Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 230-231; Charles Robert Angel, "Post-War Reconstruction of the Japan Lobby in Washington: The First Fifteen Years," *Japan Forum* 13, no. 1 (April 2001): 83-86. As in Canada, competition in the textile industry—particularly cotton—was a major sticking point between both the Americans and Japanese. See Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle*, chapter 8.
[1187] Tellingly, Ushiba was later appointed Japan's Ambassador to Canada from 1961 to 1964.
[1188] Britton to H.L. Brown, 24 July 1953, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1189] See, for example, Brown to Britton, 11 August 1954, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC.

however, they advised that Canada proceed. "Our participation in this fair would be opportune," the committee noted, as they planned to open a new Osaka trade office in 1954, giving Britton the go-head.[1190] By October, both the Gaimushō in Tokyo and Japan's Embassy in Ottawa had eagerly provided a set of application forms and JITFC promotional material for distribution to Canadian businesses. "Japan has rapidly reconstructed her industry in [the] ten years following the 2nd World War," one pamphlet proclaimed in its stilted English. "This Fair will, no doubt, become a wonderful opportunity for the world traders for furtherance of thier [*sic*] business."[1191]

Despite the initial hesitation, Canadian visitors to the fair eventually agreed. As Paul Sykes, the Canadian Trade Commissioner in nearby Kobe, later reported, Canada's booth was optimally sited off the main entrance to the No. 3 Pavilion. "Early agreement and booking of space gave us the best possible location," he later noted. "It was a timely and practical gesture."[1192] The fair opened on 10 April 1954 with 17 foreign countries participating. Canadian Ambassador Robert Mayhew, one of the only two foreign ambassadors who attended, delivered an opening speech on behalf of the foreign participants. Coming off the recent visit of Prime Minister St. Laurent and the signing of the 1954 Japanese-Canadian trade treaty, as James Britton advised DTC, Mayhew's speech "was very well received indeed and Mr. Mayhew was congratulated by Japanese and foreigners alike." "Delivered before a distinguished gathering on a special occasion," he added, "the speech was reported widely by press, radio, and television throughout Japan."[1193] Indeed, the Japanese press lavished attention on the fact that Mayhew was one of the only major foreign representatives to attend, and Canadian participants figured prominently in Japanese accounts of

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[1190] "Minutes of a Meeting of the Department Advisory Committee on Fairs and Exhibitions Abroad…," 2 October 1953; A.D. Simmons to Britton, 8 October 1953, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1191] A.D. Simmons to D. Harvey, 19 October; Britton to Brown, 23 October 1953, Note Verbale from Gaimushō, 8 October 1953 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 1.
[1192] Sykes to John H. English, 28 April 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC; Sykes to Canadian Government Exhibition Commission, 27 March 1954, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1193] Britton to English, 14 April 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.

the fair despite their small number.[1194] That a nongovernmental trade mission of 60 businessmen from the Vancouver Board of Trade and Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC), led by Canadian Pacific Airlines President Grant McConachie, also attended further raised Canada's profile.[1195] As for the display itself, it drove home Canada's "readiness to supply Japanese and other world requirements of basic foodstuffs," and was also well received.[1196] Overall, Canada's contribution to the fair received disproportionate Japanese interest. As with St. Laurent's visit in March, Canada had gone out of its way to meaningfully engage with Japan at a time where few nations would yet to do. As one DTC official commented, "Prestige means much in Japan and the recent Fair added to Canadian prestige."[1197] As Mayhew himself later informed External, "I hope that Canada will continue to exhibit at any future Fairs. It is one very definite way in which we can get our name before the people of Japan and in fact before the eyes of the people of Asia."[1198]

It did not take long for another such fair to emerge. In June 1954, James Britton reported to Ottawa that MITI "has approved an annual International Sample Fair to be held in Tokyo in 1955," and that a fair committee was already in existence. [1199] This time there was no hesitation from DTC, and its Trade Fairs and Exhibitions committee immediately started brainstorming what they could send to Tokyo. "Many Canadian businessmen have commented that our stand was too small," they conceded in September 1954, bumping their requested floorspace to 300 square feet for Tokyo. In addition, rather than trying to cover all manner of Canadian commodities as in Osaka,

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[1194] See, for examples, "Curtain Rises on Trade Fair," *The Mainichi*, 11 April 1954, 4; *The Japan International Trade Fair in Retrospect* (Osaka: JITFC, 1954), copies of which are in R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1195] W.J. Borrie, "The Working Circle," 2, in *Annual Meeting Addresses, October 1954*, R3090, vol. 2, Canadian Chamber of Commerce fonds, LAC; Simmons to Bursey, 22 January 1954, R208, vol. 1275, file T-8-160, part 1, DTCF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 2.
[1196] Paul Sykes, "Japan International Trade Fair…," 28 April 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1197] H.L.E. Priestman to English, 12 May 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC. This line was underlined for emphasis by someone at DTC in Priestman's final report.
[1198] Mayhew to USSEA, 14 April 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1199] Britton to Director Trade Commissioner Service, 29 June 1954; Britton to Director Information Branch, 29 July 1954 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.

"it seems that it might be useful at this stage to base the Canadian participation at Tokyo on a wheat and grain exhibition" with the help of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB).[1200] Given the rising sales of Canadian grain to the Japanese market (see below), this was a logical choice. The lengths DTC went to hone its exhibit to Japanese tastes was also nothing if not meticulous. In November, James Britton had an unusual message for Ottawa: "The typical Japanese bread as used by the majority of Japanese consumers in Japan was handed over a few moments ago to C.P.A.L. [Canadian Pacific Airlines]. They intend to send it forward by air express … I hope it arrives in good shape and that it will convey to the Canadian Exhibition Commission designers something of the shape and size of a Japanese loaf."[1201] DTC, clearly, was leaving nothing to chance.

The Tokyo trade fair finally opened on 5 May with 22 foreign exhibitions. Present for the opening ceremonies was T.C. Davis, Canada's new ambassador, where a *Mainichi* photographer caught him watching the opening ceremonies.[1202] Under the theme "Canadian Grain for Japanese Homes," DTC's display included several aerial photographs of a typical prairie town surrounded by wheat fields and wheat processing machinery; with a loaf of Japanese bread, a bowl of barley, and numerous sacks of grain sitting on display; and all overseen by a working model of a grain harvester.[1203] "The exhibit was a large bin of fine Canadian wheat," as Davis described the scene in a letter to his family, "with a conveyor affair which lifted the wheat up and then let it fall like a stream of water back into the bin." Simple enough, but effective: "It attracted the crowd and they stood there in droves intrigued with it. The cost was trivial but the results excellent."[1204] Official reports were just as positive. Most Japanese importers "were already well aware of the constant

[1200] "Minutes of a Meeting of the Department Committee on Trade Fairs Abroad…," 10 September 1954; "Japanese International Trade Fair – Tokyo…," [undated], R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1201] Britton to G.N. Vogel, 1 November 1954, R208, vol. 1284, file T-8-228, part 2, DTCF, LAC.
[1202] "Int'l Trade Fair in Gala Opening," *The Mainichi*, 6 May 1955, 1.
[1203] R.F. Renwick to L.H. Ausman, 6 May 1955 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC.
[1204] Davis to Lu, 1 July 1955, 2-3, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA. Cf. Davis to USSEA, 12 May 1955, R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 3.

high quality of our grain," M.J. Conacher of the Canadian Board of Grain Commissioners noted, "and were interested in learning about our grain inspection system." Many importers left the fair with a complimentary bag of Canadian grain, dished out as samples, and most were interested in the grain processing equipment depicted. By the fair's end, the Canadians had given away all 70,000 of their promotional pamphlets, and the Japanese president of the JITFC arrived to praise the Canadians for their "elegant display of [your] national products and attracting the attention of thousands of visitors." Even importers from other southeast Asian nations, who had earlier shown "a tendency to be out-spokenly critical" of Canada, as Tokyo Commercial Secretary R.F. Renwick later reported, now had "favourable comments" for him in Tokyo.[1205] Given the small stature of their presence at the fair,[1206] the Canadians seem to have again punched above their weight in selling themselves as trustworthy partners to the Japanese. When news came that the JITFC would return to Osaka in 1956, Canada was again ready to participate. On Davis's recommendation, DTC even decided to reuse the grain conveyor model, as it had proved such a success in Osaka.[1207] Canada would continue to patronize Japanese trade shows well into the future.

One particularly interested set of visitors to the Canadian display in Tokyo were some of the fifty Canadian delegates to the Fifteenth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Held concurrently to the fair, this included the head of Canada's ICC delegation, Goodyear Tire & Rubber's Canadian President Richard Berkinshaw, who visited with fellow delegate Forbes Rhude, the business editor at Canadian Press. As Conacher hyped the triumph of Canadian wheat

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[1205] M.J. Conacher, "Trip to Japan, May, 1955," [June 1955], 1; R.F. Renwick, "Formal Report Japan International Trade Fair – Tokyo 1955, Part B," 14 July 1955, R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC.

[1206] Canada had only three private and three government booths at the fair. By comparison, the US had 92 private and 38 governmental exhibits, with 651 registered buyers. Though, as Renwick noted, "It is thought that these official Administration statistics are an overestimation as apparently numerous foreigners actually exhibiting or permanent residence of Japan, were included among registered buyers." See Renwick, "Formal Report Japan International Trade Fair – Tokyo 1955, Part C," 14 July 1955, R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC.

[1207] USSEA to Deputy Minister, DTC, 1 June 1955; Frederick Bull to J. Leger, 3 June 1955, R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC.

in Japan to both men, back at the ICC congress, delegate Howard Walters of BC Electric attended a meeting focused on Asia's economic position in the world economy, a new and rising issue for the ICC and part of the theme of that year's conference, "Asian Problems – World Progress."[1208] This was not an incidental focus; the decision for the ICC to meet in Tokyo was part of its growing postwar pivot to Asia. Originally founded in 1919 by the business interests of five Western nations, in 1948 a new ICC Commission on Asian and Far Eastern Affairs was founded in New Delhi. By 1955, most non-communist Asian countries would send delegates to Tokyo, the first ICC congress ever held on the continent.[1209] This expanded venue suited Berkinshaw and his fellow businessmen just fine, as they joined the largest Canadian ICC delegation ever assembled.[1210] Before departing Vancouver, Berkinshaw had affirmed that Canada, "as a trading nation, is vitally concerned in Asia's development and must take cognizance of Asia's problems."[1211] Opened by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō at Tokyo's grand Imperial Theatre on 10 May—with Princess Chichibu, Ambassador Davis, and four other Japanese Royal Family members in attendance—the congress's 800 delegates from 46 different countries gathered to bring Asia into the global trading system; to raise local standards of living; and, as Berkinshaw so bluntly put it, to support "a major offensive to combat the morally and intellectually bankrupt world of the Communists."[1212]

While it never reached the towering heights attained south of the border, Canadian anti-communism was still influential in Ottawa during the early Cold War.[1213] As Arthur Menzies wrote in his 1954 policy brief for East Asia, inspiring local "national movements along democratic lines

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[1208] Forbes Rhude, "Japan Anxious to Buy More Canadian Wheat," *Victoria Daily Times*, 18 May 1955, 15.
[1209] George L. Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace: The History of the International Chamber of Commerce* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), 205-206. The five founders were Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States.
[1210] For the full list, see "Canadians to Take Part in World Meeting in Tokyo," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 9.
[1211] Forbes Rhude, "International C. of C. Attracts 50 Canadians," *Nanaimo Free Press*, 10 May 1955, 12.
[1212] Forbes Rhude, "World Progress Tied to Problems of Asia," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 May 1955, 35; Ronald A. McEachern, "They Look at World's Economic Destiny," *Financial Post*, 21 May 1955, 19; "Chamber Congress in Tokyo Called Attack on Communism," *Vancouver Province*, 11 May 1955, 24.
[1213] See Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker, *Cold War Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

for our sakes to keep them from falling under Communist control [and] menacing our security," was a key plank of Ottawa's policy in the region. "No better time could have been chosen" for the ICC gathering, as Ambassador Davis later informed his family. "Those in attendance were largely from the Western world and it was fine that just as the Soviets are trying to wean this country away from the West, that this Western interest in Japan should have been displayed."[1214] Canadian capitalists, no less attuned to these currents, did not need to read publications by the US National Association of Manufacturers to believe that communism threatened the economic system of "free enterprise" that both nations enjoyed.[1215] As Berkinshaw later wrote in a frontpage letter to the *Financial Post* after the congress's conclusion, "I believe we have made an important step forward in helping to keep Japan as well as the nations of Southeast Asia within the Western orbit."[1216] Few of his fellow delegates, Canadian or otherwise, would likely have disagreed. As the *New York Times* announced before the congress had even opened, all delegates "will be especially concerned with the development of Asian countries, both as a deterrent to the spread of communism, and in hope of extending faith in the liberal principles of a business man's international to every part of the free world."[1217] If this version of Cold War liberalism and its pean to economic interconnectivity was beset by contradictions, it was at least a creed that many Canadians shared in good faith with the Americans, not due to any obsequious deference to them.

But outside the ICC's purview, the Canadian delegates also had the opportunity to take in the sights and mingle with local elites. Ensconced at Tokyo's famous Imperial Hotel, originally

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[1214] Davis to Lu, 1 July 1955, 5, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA.
[1215] "It's inconceivable that the Western economy could be allowed to go into any severe decline," as Forbes Rhude remarked after his return from Tokyo. "To allow a severe decline would be virtual surrender to communism. The free enterprise system would never have another chance." See Bill Ryan, "Editor Sees Future for Wheat to Japan," *Vancouver Province*, 31 May 1955, 18. For the nature of "free enterprise" rhetoric in the US as primarily an attack on domestic critics of unfettered capitalism as much as on international communism, see Lawrence B. Glickman, *Free Enterprise: An American History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), esp. chapter 3.
[1216] R.C. Berkinshaw, "Tokyo Meeting Helps the West in Free Asia," *Financial Post*, 28 May 1955, 1.
[1217] "Topics of The Times," *New York Times*, 31 January 1955, E8. Cf. Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace*, 205.

designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, the Japanese provided each delegation with a staff of locals to help them prepare themselves and to navigate the city. Official support was also forthcoming from Ottawa. In April, Arthur Menzies personally briefed the delegates before their departure, giving them an outline of Japan's current foreign policy.[1218] Meanwhile, the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo was more than happy to cater to their needs while in Tokyo. As Davis noted, Berkinshaw was an "old friend" and the Canadians were more than welcome at his personal residence, where he gave them "a large cocktail party." "We looked after all of them well and it was appreciated," as he later wrote his family. Nor was it only the Canadians who entertained the delegates: "Prime Minister Hatoyama gave a garden party just at dusk in the spacious grounds of his official residence," Davis reported. The next day Shigemitsu Mamoru—the man who had signed Japan's surrender in 1945 and was again its Minister for Foreign Affairs—gave the delegates a lavish reception. "The whole great lawn thereof was covered with a tent that would do justice to a circus," while along the edges "he had chefs cooking hot things." There, Davis and the other Canadians sampled a wide range of "exotic" local cuisine: "They served tempura, a delicious Japanese dish."[1219]

There were also more informal encounters. Another Canadian journalist among the ICC delegates was Ronald McEachern, editor of the *Financial Post*, who published several long and enthusiastic columns on the conference and his experiences in Japan. "This wonderful, colorful land and its charming hospitable people," he later gushed in his paper, "had the Canadian group attending the International Chamber of Commerce goggle-eyed and pretty worn out with sight-seeing, parties, night life and feverish preparation of speeches, resolutions etc. for the meetings last week." Initially, he noted, "most of the Canadians seemed to stick pretty close to hotel dining

[1218] See "Japanese Foreign Policy," 19 April 1955, R15615, vol. 30, file 9, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1219] Davis to Lu, 1 July 1955, 5-6, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA. The ICC delegates also singled out Commercial Secretary Renwick for his help, Berkinshaw writing DTC to praise "the quality of the personnel you have in the field." See "Annual Report… 1955," 27, 29, 31 January 1956, R208, vol. 1491, file 18-1-39, DTCF, LAC.

rooms," but gradually they were coaxed out to visit local Japanese bars and restaurants.[1220] Once the congress was over and the Canadians were free to travel outside Tokyo, the rest of the country proved just as enjoyable. In late May, the Canadian delegates set off for Kyoto and Osaka under the auspices of the Japan Travel Bureau, where they were met at the train station by (purportedly) "the most beautiful geisha in all Kyoto," as McEachern claimed, along with the mayor. Intending to study local silk producers and meet with representatives from the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, the Canadians still had time to play tourist, visiting Nikkō, Hakone Lake, and the famous Buddha statue at Kamakura before departing Japan fifteen days after their arrival.[1221]

According to official reports, the Fifteenth ICC congress was a marked success. In the end, a series of 54 resolutions were accepted by the delegates, including a plank in support of the new GATT arrangements. For Asian delegates, the resolutions recognizing "that the violent short-term fluctuations in the prices of a number [of] primary commodities have had economic consequences which have, at times, been very serious," was a notable victory for emerging economies still based largely on exporting natural resources.[1222] Many of the Canadians also returned home to promote its benefits. For delegates Paul Bienvenu, Maurice Corbeil, Dave Hart, and René Perrault, all CCC members, the event was "highly successful from a business and social point of view." As Perrault told the CCC's Executive Council, they had negotiated a new trade arbitration agreement in Tokyo with Suzuki Fujio of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.[1223] Berkinshaw best summed up the Canadian delegation's reactions to the whole experience:

> I believe it is fair to say that the whole Canadian group was very pleased both with the proceedings of the congress and with the opportunity to get a first-hand impression of

[1220] R.A. MacEachern, "Goggled-Eyed Canadians Abroad," *Financial Post*, 28 May 1955, 12.
[1221] Ronald A. McEachern, "Of Trains, Castles, Roads: Canadians Visit Ancient City, National Park," *Financial Post*, 4 June 1955, 9; Forbes Rhude, "Canadians Leave Japan After Meet," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 May 1955, 38.
[1222] *XVth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce: Resolutions* (Tokyo: Kasai Publishing & Printing, 1955), 14-18; Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace*, 206. See also Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 4.
[1223] "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council…," 4-5, 15 June 1955, in *Executive Council Minutes, Oct. 1954-Sept. 1955, Vol. XIII*, R3090, vol. 14, Canadian Chamber of Commerce fonds, LAC.

> the East and its peoples. We were all favorably impressed by Japan and we admired the way the Congress was organized by the Japanese national committee of the ICC. We learned many facts about Japanese industry which will definitely help Canadians to understand Japan's problem.[1224]

As George Ridgeway, a scholar and avid promoter of international trade, later wrote in his history of the ICC, "The fact that the Tokyo congress was the first major business conference ever held in Asia was considered by many observers to be an unmistakable symbol of a new relationship, a relationship based on equality and mutual respect between East and West." More than mere formality, the courtesy of the Japanese hosts, he argued, "seemed to mark a new pride and easy acceptance of the partnership of the businessmen of all nations in the quest for a better life in a free and peaceful world."[1225] Whether or not Western nations seriously accepted the views of their new Asian counterparts in an era where imperial violence and the legacies of colonialism remained in recent memory is an open question. But indisputably, the enthusiasm of the Canadian delegates, the vocal promotion of their experiences in Tokyo, and the sheer size of their delegation did much to express Canada's rising interest in Japan and East Asia after the Second World War.

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Even before the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1952, the Japanese had returned to Canada. In June 1951, Narita Katsushiro arrived in Ottawa "semi-officially" with two assistants as part of Tokyo's new Overseas Agency to promote international trade.[1226] The following month, *Ottawa Citizen* reporter Austin Cross caught up with the Japanese delegation, now expanded to five, at their temporary lodgings in rooms 194 and 196 of the Chateau Laurier hotel. "We are glad to be here, and we are looking forward to the signing of peace," Narita told Cross. "We feel that

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[1224] Rhude, "Canadians Leave Japan After Meet," 38.
[1225] Ridgeway, *Merchants of Peace*, 207-208. For Ridgeway's career and views, see "George L. Ridgeway Dies at 66; Advocate of Trade Expansion," *New York Times*, 13 May 1968, 43.
[1226] External had authorized the agency's creation in April 1951. In addition to its economic objectives, it also offered "semi-consular functions" for Japanese nationals in Canada. See "Japanese Agency for Canada," *Canadian Weekly Bulletin* 6, no. 24 (20 April 1951): 2-3.

Canada and Japan need each other. I and my mission are here for the double purpose of helping Canadians find markets in Japan, and helping our Japanese goods find markets in Canada."[1227] In particular, Narita noted the aforesaid point about Canadian trade with Japan, that of the $15.3 million worth of Canadian products sold in Japan by 1950, more than $12 million of it arrived in the form of wheat. In his first public address to the Ottawa Rotary Club in October 1951, Narita made clear how important Canadian exports of wheat and other natural resources were to postwar Japan.[1228] Such foodstuffs were indispensable as Tokyo planned Japan's economic recovery.

As Japan's empire collapsed in 1945, its overseas resources lost, and millions of its citizens returned to the devastated Home Islands, the nation was left in a precarious state. As early as the late 1800s, it was clear Japan lacked the natural resources to sustain its new Meiji Era population growth. "Japan labors with a perplexing problem," Columbia University Professor John Orchard noted in 1928: "Her population is increasing at a rate so rapid that it threatens soon to pass beyond the productive capacity of the nation's soil and resources. … Search for relief is the keystone of Japan's domestic and foreign politics."[1229] In its own small way, this was an issue that Canada had exacerbated. Given that emigration was one way to reduce overpopulation, one might suppose that a settler nation like Canada would be a good place for Japanese migrants to go. Yet, as Orchard put it, "The lands bordering upon the Pacific Ocean that are seemingly the most suitable for Japanese settlement are for the most part the control of English-speaking people, and they now have restrictions, if not exclusion acts, with respect to the immigration of all Orientals."[1230] In 1908, after mounting tensions in British Columbia, Ottawa had signed a "Gentleman's Agreement"

[1227] "After 10 Years the Japs are Returning to Ottawa," *Ottawa Journal*, 5 June 1951, 16; Austin F. Cross, "Trade Mission Busy in City: 11 Years After Pearl Harbour, Relations Have Changed," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 July 1951, 1.
[1228] "First Japanese Since War Speaks for Tokyo … To Ottawa Rotarians," *Ottawa Journal*, 29 October 1951, 16.
[1229] John E. Orchard, "The Pressure of Population in Japan," *Geographical Review* 18, no. 3 (July 1928): 374.
[1230] Orchard, "Population in Japan," 399. For a transnational history of immigration restriction in the Anglo-American world, see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. chapters 7 & 11.

with Tokyo to limit Japanese immigration to Canada not long after a similar agreement had been reached with the Americans.[1231] If Japan's emigrants went anywhere, it would not be to North America. By the early twentieth century, many Japanese regarded the northeastern Chinese region of Manchuria as the solution to their population problems. After its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Manchurian cities like Dalian or Changchun were seen as gateways to a new Japanese empire on the Asian mainland.[1232] Manchuria would also provide many of the natural resources needed by Japan's growing population. This included commodities for heavy industry like coal and shale oil, but also vital foodstuffs like soy. By the mid-1930s, as control over Manchukuo was solidified, the new puppet state had a quarter of its cultivated land devoted to soybeans, producing more than half its exports, and making up 75% of the world's supply of the product.[1233] With the loss of these and other colonies in 1945, Japan would have to acquire such foodstuffs through peaceful trade, a fact recognized by Ottawa.[1234] Canadian wheat growers were only too happy to oblige.

In June 1954, CWB tendered an invitation to the Japanese government via James Britton for a three-man mission to visit Canada and meet the prairie farmers who grew the wheat so smartly presented at the following year's Tokyo trade fair. "The expenses for the Mission will be borne by the Canadian Wheat Board," Britton generously told Asakai Kōichirō at the Gaimushō's Economic Affair Bureau, and the visit itself held in September, when that year's harvest was being reaped.[1235] The three members would be Egami Shinsaku of Japan's Ministry of Agriculture; Yamagami Seiei, head chemist at the Nippon Flour Mill Company; and Yamanouchi Kōhei of the Nisshin

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[1231] For the tensions over Japanese immigration to Canada and the 1908 agreement, see Howard H. Sugimoto, "The Vancouver Riot and Its International Significance," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (October 1973): 163-174.
[1232] See, for examples, Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Bill Sewell, *Constructing Empire: the Japanese in Changchun, 1905–45* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019).
[1233] Sewell, *Constructing Empire*, 108.
[1234] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 91. That External later had a small file from its Tokyo Embassy entitled "population problems" (R219, vol. 29559, file 6-1-4-3-4) shows that such issues were not lost on Canadian policymakers.
[1235] J.C. Britton to Asakai Kōichirō, 30 June 1954, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.

Flour Milling Company.[1236] Accompanying them would be Toru Udo, a commercial secretary with Tokyo's new Ottawa Embassy at 88 Metcalfe Street, plus Douglas Treleaven of CWB. In line with other CWB missions during this era, the Japanese were given a three-week tour to the main wheat growing and processing regions of Canada, visiting Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Fort William, Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Regina, and Calgary before returning home via Vancouver.[1237]

On 14 September, the three Japanese delegates flew into Vancouver and were received by Toru, Treleaven, CWB's Winnipeg commissioner W.E. Robertson, and the new Japanese consular officials in Vancouver, Hirota Shigeru and Nomura Yutaka. Interviewed by the local press the next day, the Japanese observed that whereas before the war Japan had imported a mere 100,000 bushels of Canadian wheat a year, now they were importing 26 million bushels. "We would prefer to buy [even] more," Yamanouchi claimed, "and when we have a supply of dollars, the food ministry allows us to make greater purchases. We make white bread of high quality, and your wheat is ideally suited for our needs." Wheat, he added, was replacing rice as the staple Japanese starch in two out of every three meals, making its importation even more essential. Their not-so-subtle hint that if Canada wanted more orders from Japan, it needed to buy more in return was not lost on anyone.[1238] This theme was reiterated as the Japanese crossed the country, phrased more tactfully in some places than in others.[1239] Still, the mission was, by all accounts, a major success. Running concurrent to an Irish and a Swiss delegation who were also touring Canada under CWB auspices,

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[1236] Riddel to Vogel, 9 August 1954; Inagaki K. to Riddel, 23 August 1954, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1237] See Treleaven to McIvor, 8 November 1954 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1238] "Rice Going Out, Wheat In: Japanese Food Mission Here," *Vancouver Province*, 15 September 1954, 21; Bill Fletcher, "Japan Wants More Canadian Wheat: But Increased Trade is Dependent on Canadians Boosting Buying," *Vancouver Sun*, 15 September 1954, 19.
[1239] Few Canadians likely appreciated the patronizing tone in Winnipeg, when Yamanouchi stated "It is rather difficult for you to buy Japanese goods because your population is so small. Your requirement is in heavy industry … but you do your best to buy more Japanese goods." See "Japan Must Earn Dollars to Buy Wheat, Barley, Or Purchases May Stop," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 20 September 1954, 14. For a more positive layover, see "Japs Praise Canada's Grain Set-Up," *Calgary Herald*, 2 October 1954, 19, 29, a copy of which is in R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1.

the more lucrative Japanese mission received its fair share of attention. When the Japanese arrived in Ottawa on 23 September, they received a warm welcome from Gerry Vogel, the head of CWB's Grain Division; DTC Minister C.D. Howe; and Howe's up-and-coming young Liberal assistant, Mitchell Sharp.[1240] As Howe himself noted in a speech in Saskatoon the same day the Japanese had reached Canada, the 1950s were boom years for the country's grain growers. "We have reason to believe," Howe added, "that Japan, which last year was our second most important market for wheat and barley, will continue to import substantial quantities of both these grains."[1241]

Overall, the mission was a success. As Vogel later reported to CWB head George McIvor, the Japanese "created a most excellent impression every place they have gone by their friendliness, sincerity and, above all, their diligence."[1242] In Treleaven's more detailed report, all three delegates had prepared for their visit and there was "close liaison between the Mission and existing Japanese agencies in this country." In general, the Japanese were impressed by both the scale of Canada's grain operations and the quality of their grain.[1243] Indeed, they "expressed continuous amazement and, at times, disbelief," that Canada did not have the same problem with weevils and other grain pests as in Japan. Where issues did arise was in the lack of a consistent protein content in the grain that Japan received, a major concern as wheat was the new dietary staple for Japanese families. Treleaven concluded by praising the "interest shown by the members of the Grain Trade in all parts of Canada" that they stayed. "I believe they are whole-heartedly behind this programme and feel it is an excellent one in sponsoring good international trade relations. Their interest has grown tremendously since the first mission was brought to this country."[1244] Britton could also report

[1240] Vogel to Sharp, 24 September 1954, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC. Cf. Mitchell Sharp, *Which Reminds Me…: A Memoir* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 50-51.
[1241] C.D. Howe, "Long-Term Outlook for Wheat: Sense of Perspective," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 16 September 1954, 15.
[1242] Vogel to McIvor, 28 September 1954, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1243] See, for example, "Everything on Huge Scale in Canada," *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 23 September 1954, 17.
[1244] Treleaven to McIvor, 8 November 1954, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.

from Tokyo that favourable Japanese press coverage had again been obtained.[1245] The mission also set the tone for other CWB-sponsored missions to Canada. In October 1955, a similar mission for barley production was invited from Japan.[1246] In addition, when M.J. Conacher returned to Canada after the Tokyo trade fair, he proposed that a similar offer be given to the Japanese Grain Inspection Service, one that its participants later praised.[1247] But the highest-ranking Japanese guest in 1955 was Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kōno Ichirō in September, who held high level talks with Howe and Pearson. "Canadian wheat and barley is the best quality in the world and we would like more," Kōno brazenly flattered his hosts. "I sincerely hope," he added, "that my visit will further strengthen the good understanding and friendly relationship already existing between our two countries."[1248] Canadian grain had put Japanese-Canadian trade relations on a solid footing.

The rising postwar Japanese presence in Canada can also be measured in ways less formal than tedious trade statistics. Newspaper coverage is one. As historian Patrick Brennan argues, close links were developed between the major Canadian dailies and the federal government during the long Liberal era from 1935 to 1957. "A professional got his facts correct," Brennan notes, "and that meant winning the confidence of those with access to such information." During this era, that generally meant building contacts with "the senior levels of the civil service," where the journalists had "enormous respect for the mandarins and their work." To these mainstream reporters:

> Canada's commitment to internationalism was an article of faith. These journalists were convinced they shared a community of interest with the senior officials of the Department of External Affairs and the leading internationalists in the King and St. Laurent governments. This conviction, which was much strengthened by the close personal relationship they developed with these men, and above all with Lester Pearson, the personification of Canadian internationalism during this period, ensured

[1245] Britton to Vogel, 15 September 1954 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1246] Vogel to J.E. Lancaster, 3 October 1955, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1247] McIvor to Renwick, 10 June 1955; D.G. McKenzie to Finlay Sim, 4 October 1955 and Enclosures, R208, vol. 662, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC.
[1248] Udo to Vogel, 10 August 1955; Dick Turner to J. Fergus Grant, 30 September 1955 and Enclosures, file 17-58-2, part 1, DTCF, LAC; Frank Swanson, "Canadian Wheat and Barley World's Best Says Japanese," *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 September 1955, 8.

> that Canadian foreign policy-makers were able to count almost unfailingly on the timely and eloquent support of this influential group of journalists.[1249]

These principles were no less true for Canada's growing relationship with the Asia-Pacific region, particularly within the pages in Canada's premier business daily: The *Financial Post*.[1250]

Notable here is the *Financial Post*'s role in encouraging Japanese-Canadian trade. As seen at the Tokyo ICC conference, under the leadership of men like the volatile Ronald McEachern, the paper was vocal in supporting intensified trade with Japan.[1251] One of the most visible expressions of this aid came in 1955 with a new regular feature in the paper that lasted decades: a supplemental "Feature Report on Japan." "On this and succeeding pages," the introductory text explained, "The *Financial Post* presents a special report on Japan as seen through Canadian eyes," as the paper's news editor C.C. Milne visited Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto to meet the Japanese "at work and play." His headline article said it all: "Japan's Problems Crucial for Western World."[1252] Every year, the content of these inserts remained a stable mix of reporting on Japanese trade conditions, ads from Japanese firms looking to do business in Canada, and puff pieces by both Canadian and Japanese diplomats and politicians. In the inaugural report, Milne touched on most of the major Japanese issues discussed so far: its lack of space for its growing population, its dependence on imported grain, its lack of raw materials for industry, its need for new export markets, and whether it needed to do business with China, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries. "We are not asking for charity," one Japanese official told Milne on this last point. "We made a mistake 15 years ago in following our leaders blindly. We have paid and are paying for that mistake." But he added

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[1249] Patrick H. Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935–1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 170-171, 120. For a further study of Ottawa's management of public opinion during this era, see Marcuse and Whitaker, *Cold War Canada*, chapter 12.
[1250] For the *Financial Post*'s impact on postwar Ottawa, see Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business*, chapter 4.
[1251] If McEachern "oozed charm" in business circles, at the office he was "a tyrant who treated everyone, and not the least management, with thinly veiled contempt." See Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business*, 74.
[1252] C.C. Milne, "Japan's Problems Crucial for Western World," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 1. Cf. the next year's edition, Vincent J. Egan, "Which Way Will Japan Turn to Trade?" *Financial Post*, 9 June 1956, insert 1, 3.

dramatically, "Japan must trade to live. If the free world will not trade with us, then…"[1253] Aspiring Canadian businessmen were left to fill in the blanks.

Elsewhere, the 1955 insert had kind words from the prolific Ambassador Matsudaira, from Foreign Affairs Minister Shigemitsu—who thanked Canada for St. Laurent's 1954 visit as well as its interest in the Tokyo ICC congress, both of which "are unquestionably playing a vital role in furthering the good will and understanding between Japan and Canada"—as well as from Fujiyama Aiichirō, head of both the Japan and Tokyo Chambers of Commerce.[1254] But the most notable column included was attributed to Ishibashi Tanzan, MITI's new head under the Hatoyama administration. As Chalmers Johnson argues, Ishibashi was the minister who honed Japan's "high-growth system." With his appointment, MITI's "days of political oblivion were over; from now on the minster of MITI would be one of the most powerful men in the government."[1255] In his article, Ishibashi urged Canadians to visit the large exhibition that Japan was presenting in Toronto for the 1955 Canadian International Trade Fair (CITF), Ottawa's counterpart to the two Japanese fairs already explored.[1256] Elsewhere in the insert, Ishibashi's MITI included a full-page ad for its CITF mission, along with a list of Japan's 70 participating firms. These included companies selling well-known Japanese staples like textiles, ceramics, and pearls; but it also included products from newer firms, including seven selling precision optical equipment.[1257] Japan might have already joined CITF four times in the postwar era, MITI's full-page ad declared, but this was its first time "on a large scale" with "first-class" products. "Although in prewar years, Japanese merchandise was criticized as 'cheap but of poor quality', (and it seems that some Canadians still have that

[1253] Milne, "Japan's Problems Crucial," insert 1.
[1254] See Matsudaira Kōtō, "How New Japan Plans Her Future"; Shigemitsu Mamoru, "Better Understanding by Exchange of Visits"; Fujiyama Aiichirō, "A Japanese Viewpoint on Trade with Canada," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 6, 13, 16.
[1255] Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 229-230.
[1256] Ishibashi Tanzan, "A Message to Canada," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 3.
[1257] "Japan's Display at CITF: More than 70 Firms with Wide Variety," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 5, 10.

impression), today 'best quality at a fair price' is the motto of all Japanese manufacturers."[1258] In the years that followed, marketing by MITI's Trade Promotion Section would become a staple of the *Financial Post*'s Japan inserts. "Canada and Japan are Natural Trading Partners," their 1957 ad proclaimed alongside images of shipbuilding, fish canning, plastic manufacturing, and other industrial activities. No longer was Japan a nation of dumping; its exports were now "up to or above international standards." You could clearly trust goods "Made in Japan"![1259]

In the 1956 insert, one advertisement stuck out for its bold claims in this regard. "There's an industrial miracle taking place in the *New* Japan," it proclaimed:

> Since the end of the war, the *new* Japan has become one of the world's most modern and productive nations. Today, Japan turns out a large variety of high-quality goods—from the finest precision instruments to heavy industrial equipment. Her engineers and scientists are forever striving to improve designs—to perfect quality. Whatever your business—it will pay you to get a quotation from the *new* Japan. Find out what the *new* Japan has to offer; drop in or write to [the] JAPAN TRADE CENTRE.[1260]

What exactly was this brash new "Japan Trade Centre"? In truth, it was another initiative by MITI though JETRO. In March 1954, Japan had opened its first trade "center" in New York.[1261] These were intended to act as product information offices, putting on periodic displays of goods for local audiences, as well as to supply contacts to foreign firms interested in engaging with their Japanese counterparts. Moreover, given that Japan's postwar foreign trade thus far had been done "blindly" by simply assuming what foreigners wanted to buy, these and other JETRO programs would offer Japanese firms up-to-date business intelligence.[1262] After New York, the next three centres were built in San Francisco, in Cairo, and on Toronto's Yonge Street in March 1956, where C.D. Howe gave a speech at the opening beside Ambassador Matsudaira and Centre Executive Director Ijima

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[1258] "Japan's Industry Is Ready to Serve Canada," *Financial Post*, 7 May 1955, insert 2.
[1259] See Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 5. For the ad in the previous year's insert, see *Financial Post*, 9 June 1956, insert 2.
[1260] See Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 6.
[1261] Angel, "The Japan Lobby," 84.
[1262] Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 230-231.

Tsurunosuke.[1263] This was a telling gauge of Canada's value to postwar Japan; it got one centre, and North America three, before any were built in Europe or Australia.[1264] "The emphasis on North American markets is deliberate," the *Financial Post*'s insert stated frankly. "The US and Canada are considered important if Japan is to be able to buy the large amounts of goods it must get in the dollar area." According to Ijima, they were receiving "about 100 enquiries a week" by 1957.[1265]

Nor was the Toronto trade centre content to let Canadians come to them. Like Matsudaira at the Japanese Embassy, Ijima travelled tirelessly across the country. One of his first stops was at Montreal in June 1956. At the local Windsor Hotel, commodities from tinned mandarin oranges to precision surveying gear were displayed by Ijima and Associate Director Oue Shigeru with the help of two local Japanese-Canadian girls, Lucy Tagagaki and Shirley Shikatani. Ending Japan's trade deficit, Oue told the press, was one of the centre's main goals. "We certainly don't hope to overcome the deficit for many years," he noted casually, "but if we are to continue to buy as much as we need from Canada, we've got to build our exports to Canada." Nor could he ignore Japan's past reputation for dumping. "We are not fooling ourselves," Oue confessed. "We realize we must overcome the reputation for cheap mass-produced goods our industries gained—which was largely deserved."[1266] These missions continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s.[1267] Beyond the trade benefit of such visits, the centre also aided Japanese-Canadian relations at the grassroots level. Indeed, one of the centre's most unwittingly important legacies took place in 1963. On 12 June, a delegation led by Oue visited Charlottetown as part a routine tour across Atlantic Canada. To build local goodwill, Oue presented Island Premier Walter Shaw with a copy of *Akage no An*,

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[1263] "Japan to Open Trade Centre on Yonge St.," *Globe and Mail*, 1 March 1956, 5; *100 Years of Trade and Commerce Between Canada and Japan* (Toronto: Japan Trade Centre, 1977), 12.
[1264] The fact that Japan was dependent on Middle Eastern oil also explains the high priority of the Cairo centre.
[1265] "Japan's Trade Centres Aim at North American Markets," *Financial Post*, 24 August 1957, 28.
[1266] "Japan Seeks Sales Here to End Trade Deficit," *Montreal Star*, 27 June 1956, 27.
[1267] For one example the following year, see Edith McConnell Murray, "Japanese Trade Centre Breakfast Gets Preview Merchandise Show," *Vancouver Herald*, 13 March 1957, 10.

the famous Japanese translation of L.M. Montgomery's *Anne of Green Gables*—first published in May 1952—that had swiftly gained an energetic fanbase in the country. For the first time, Islanders were alerted to the Japanese popularity of their province's most famous cultural creation, a fact they later successfully cultivated to attract Japanese tourists.[1268] Perhaps Matsudaira had started something after all when he established "diplomatic relations" with the Island back in 1955?

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In the world of high diplomacy, the mid-1950s were an equally active region of Japanese-Canadian cooperation. In large part, this was because both Canadian and Japanese foreign policy objectives overlapped significantly. Generally, External's objectives in the immediate postwar era are defined as either "internationalist" or "multilateralist" in outlook, framed by a desire to engage with a broad coalition of countries in a wide number of international forums to create room for Canadian action and dilute the influence of larger powers like Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Or, to use one scholar's phrasing, they explain the Canadian "penchant for joining clubs."[1269] This was a policy many contemporary Japanese supported, albeit for different reasons. As scholars Caroline Rose and Tomaru Junko note, not only did Japan need to revive its economy during the 1950s and wiggle out from under the American colossus in foreign policy, but it also had to revive relations with its Asian neighbours and the international community. "By the end of the 1950s," they conclude, "Japan was actively pursuing three major objectives: economic and military security; a return to Asia; and re-entry to the global community."[1270] In this third objective,

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[1268] Michael B. Pass, "To the Tortured World and Back Again: *Anne of Green Gables* and Japanese-Canadian Relations, 1931–1970," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* 55, no. 113 (May 2022): 135-136.
[1269] Philip Resnick, *The European Roots of Canadian Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 26. For a more detailed exploration of internationalism and multilateralism on the conduct of Canadian foreign policy during the postwar era, see Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), introduction; David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirkton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: Wiley, 1983), 48-57.
[1270] See Caroline Rose and Tomaru Junko, introduction to *Japanese Diplomacy In the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, eds. Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste (London: Routledge, 2008), 1-6.

Canada proved a reliable and by no means reluctant supporter of Japan's multilateral ambitions to join the Colombo Plan in 1954, as well as the UN and the GATT in 1955.

On 9 January 1950, delegates from seven Commonwealth countries met in the Ceylonese capital of Colombo. In addition to the previously mentioned discussions on a forthcoming Japanese peace treaty (see Chapter 5) one of the results of their deliberation was a bold recommendation to improve Asian economic conditions: "Steps should be taken urgently to raise living standards and promote social welfare amongst the people of South and South-East Asia, thus enabling this area with its vast potential resources to play an increasing part in fostering well-being and furthering world prosperity." After further meetings in Australia in May and Britain in September, a plan was drafted, formally titled "the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia."[1271] Joining the delegates in Colombo were Lester Pearson and Robert Mayhew. As Pearson later told the House of Commons, communism threatened Asia's newly independent nations. "The social and economic danger arises out of the fact that the people out there are learning that independence is not enough," Person noted. "The agitation for freedom has stirred up in them other desires; for improvements in their conditions of life; for a change from distress, privation and even starvation." The implications were clear: "If southeast Asia and south Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world, including the Asian states themselves which are free, must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress."[1272] The Colombo Plan would be their answer.

In hindsight, given that Canadian membership lapsed in 1992, it can be hard to appreciate the level of Canadian interest in the Colombo Plan during the 1950s. In Canada, the Plan received

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[1271] *Canada and the Colombo Plan, 1951–1961* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 2-3. Cf. Daniel Oakman, *Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010), chapter 3; Jacqueline T. Shaw, "Grudging Gifts': Canada, the Colombo Plan and the Formation of an Aid Policy" (MA diss, Carleton University, 1992).
[1272] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 1 (22 February 1950): 131.

wide coverage, and its perceived stakes were taken seriously by journalists and policymakers alike. Academic Henry Angus, for example, now back at UBC, wrote a detailed article about its goals in 1955.[1273] Aiding the Plan was also item "G" on Arthur Menzies's list from 1954. And, as Douglas Dacre wrote for *Maclean's* that same year: "The task before R.G. Nik Cavell, director of Canada's contribution to the Colombo Plan, is to prove that Rudyard Kipling was wrong when he wrote that celebrated phrase: 'Oh East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.'" Not only would the Plan rebuild ties between the formerly colonized and the ex-colonizers on more equal terms, but in Dacre's words, it was "the fulcrum of Western cold-war policy in the East."[1274]

Equally notable is how early Japan had lobbied to join the Plan. In January 1953, Iguchi Sadao—Japan's first postwar ambassador to Canada who took over from Narita Katsushiro in June 1952[1275]—made clear Japan's desire to join the Colombo Plan at an Ottawa Lions Club meeting. Japan's economic interests in Southeast Asia, Iguchi noted, were important to Tokyo: "It is in this area that we believe we do have a constructive part to play in the advancement of economic wellbeing."[1276] While Ottawa decided to support Japan, not all Canadians were initially enthused by the idea. Soon after Iguchi's speech, the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized that as a Commonwealth initiative, Japan's involvement was impractical. "The Japanese will have plenty to do if they are to develop a peace-loving social democracy in their own country and to give Southeast Asia the services they have promised by way of reparation of war damage," the paper argued, but this was best done outside the Plan.[1277] Other members had even stronger reservations. Australian views on Japan's admission were mixed at best. "The immediate problem we have to consider is the security

[1273] H.F. Angus, "The Colombo Plan," *B.C. Professional Engineer*, March 1955, 18-21. The typeset draft of Angus's article can be found in his private papers at LAC (R2490, vol. 1, file 11).
[1274] Douglas Dacre, "He's Making a Liar Out of Kipling," *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 May 1954, 24-25.
[1275] See "New Japanese Ambassador Arrives," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1952, 14.
[1276] "Ambassador Says Japan Won't Forget Lesson Learned in Second World War," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 January 1953, 26. For the Gaimushō's broader enthusiasm for the Plan, see Katada, "Japan's Foreign Aid," 203-204.
[1277] "Japan a Colombo Plan Partner?" *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 January 1953, 34.

of Japan, even more than security against Japan," Australia's External Affairs Minister Richard Casey argued in 1952. Yet, as historian Daniel Oakman notes, this was not an easy sell: "Boosting Japan's economic power in the name of regional stability and progress was difficult for many to understand. To the generation with close and sharp memories of Kokoda, Changi and Sandakan, it seemed an absurd irony."[1278] Yet, as Oakman adds, the view that Japan might use economics to dominate the region could not be aired publicly: "For to suggest that Japan could use their member status to dominate smaller South–East Asian economies might imply that current donor countries [i.e., Australia] could do the same." Still, Canberra would not rule out Japan's admission entirely, seeing it as more "'premature' rather than inconceivable."[1279] Other nations were equally divided. Britain too resented Japan's rising economic clout in Southeast Asia. But as British Ambassador to Tokyo Sir Esler Dening contended, worse than blocking Japan's ambitions was to do so and provoke "the irritation of Asiatic opinion." Britain eventually supported the idea early on.[1280] Only the Americans offered any real, continuous enthusiasm for Japan's admission.[1281] These were the major fault lines as Canada prepared to host the 1954 Colombo Plan conference in October.

Overall, Ottawa was positive towards the idea of Japanese participation, if keen not to run too far ahead of other members. In surveying opinions in May 1954, External found "three forms" of reaction. For Asian delegates—"Indonesia in particular"—Japan's admission raised the concern that "a precedent would be created that might make the admission of other countries," including former colonizers like the Netherlands or France, "likely." Meanwhile, the "Australian (and to some extent the New Zealand) delegation appeared to be very much opposed to the idea of Japan's

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[1278] Oakman, *Facing Asia*, 99-101.
[1279] Oakman, *Facing Asia*, 101.
[1280] Tomaru Junko, "Japan in British Regional Policy towards South-East Asia, 1945–1960," in *Japanese Diplomacy In the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, eds. Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste (London: Routledge, 2008), 57-58.
[1281] See, for example, "Editorial Note"; Corbett to Waugh, 24 August 1954; Bowie to Secretary of State, 24 August 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954 Part I, *East Asia and the Pacific*, 780-784.

membership," while Britain and Canada were more sympathetic. As R.M. MacDonald reported to Mayhew in Tokyo, Japan's rationale to join the Plan was obvious: It wanted additional trade with Southeast Asia. Overall, he noted, "We have no desire to close the door on the question of Japanese participation in the Colombo Plan and we agree that we should not be unduly influenced by the prejudices of other countries."[1282] As planning for the 1954 meeting continued into the summer, Washington let Ottawa know that it had been in contact with Tokyo and fully supported Japan's entry.[1283] This was a position privately supported by Canada—"we are of course at one with the United States in desiring the growth of an economically viable and politically stable Japan closely associated with the nations of the free world," Pearson noted in September—but Ottawa would not move without the full support of the other Plan members. "We resisted the suggestion that Canada as host government should now take the initiative [to invite Japan]," Canadian Ambassador to Washington Arnold Heeney noted in September, a view External consistently gave to the press.[1284] Instead, sponsoring Japan was left to Canberra, which through the dawning realization that it might score some easy points with Japan and ease their own trade deficit with Tokyo, had changed its tune. "Sponsoring Japan," Oakman notes, "as opposed to merely allowing her admission, was a relatively painless way to maximise the seemingly magnanimous nature of Australia's decision." American pressure, the Japanese cynically believed, also played its part in the volte face.[1285]

In Canada, public opinion was also shifting. While the *Ottawa Citizen* remained outspoken in its criticisms, the Vancouver *Province* had come out in open support.[1286] On 17 September,

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[1282] R.M. MacDonald to Ambassador in Japan [Mayhew], 31 May 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 834-836.
[1283] Ambassador in US [Heeney] to SSEA, 21 July 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 837-838.
[1284] SSEA to Ambassador in US [Heeney], 9 September 1954; Chargé D'Affaires, Embassy in United States, 3 September 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 840-843. For press impressions of the Canadian position, see "Jap Membership in Colombo Plan May Be Weighed," *Globe and Mail*, 15 September 1954, 10; Georges Langlois, "L'Admission du Japon Sera Discutée à Ottawa," *La Presse* (Montreal), 18 September 1954, 1.
[1285] For this decision, see Oakman, *Facing Asia*, 105-109.
[1286] See "Japan as a Colombo Plan Candidate," *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 September 1954, 40; "Admit Japan to Colombo Plan," *Vancouver Province*, 22 September 1954, 6.

Ambassador Matsudaira notified Ottawa that "Japan desires to participate as a full member of the Colombo Plan." On 30 September, the Liberal Cabinet endorsed the recommendation "that Japan be admitted as a full member of the Colombo Plan if it is the general view among other countries that this course be followed."[1287] By the time the Ottawa meeting opened on 4 October, Japan's admission had been unanimously accepted and Matsudaira took his seat among the other delegates. While this "involved the conference for the first time in a certain amount of political shuffling," External later noted, the final decision was never in doubt.[1288] Ultimately, only Indonesia publicly voiced its "unstated doubts" but did not challenge Japan's entry.[1289] Canberra, having made no public statement of its plans, released its "bombshell" and reaped its rewards from a thankful Japan, an apparent unanimity that belied Australia's "complex interplay between anti-communist containment and the Anglo-American approach to economic regionalism.[1290] As one Western diplomat summarized events to Canadian Press, for a long time Japan had felt "left out in the cold." Now, its admittance signified "the desire of Western democracies to bring her closer into the family of countries linked in their general desire to remain free."[1291] And excepting the United States, no Colombo Plan donor had wholeheartedly supported Japan's bid more than Canada.

The other major international body where Japan received significant Canadian support was in its failed attempt to join the United Nations in 1955. If modern complaints are voiced about the partisanship that often characterizes UN deliberations, this was hardly a new development. In the 1950s, as the UN sought to expand beyond its initial membership of Second World War victors,

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[1287] Memorandum from Acting SSEA [Paul Martin Sr.], 27 September 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 845-846.
[1288] Jules Léger to SSEA and Enclosures, 9 December 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 850.
[1289] George Bain, "Japan Likely Colombo Link Though Indonesia Hesitant," *Globe and Mail*, 5 October 1954, 1-2; Bain, "Colombo Plan Powers Admit Japan, Thailand to Full Membership," *Globe and Mail,* 6 October 1954, 1.
[1290] Oakman, *Facing Asia*, 109-111.
[1291] "Support for Japan Grows as Colombo Plan Partner," *Globe and Mail*, 4 October 1954, 1. For External's overview of the meeting, see "The Colombo Plan Conference," *External Affairs* 7, no. 1 (January 1955): 2-9. Upon entering the Plan in October 1954, Japan promptly provided ¥13 million worth of aid as well as two agricultural experts. See *The Colombo Plan: The Fourth Annual Report…* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), 144-145.

Cold War tensions created a deadlock. Except for Indonesia, no nation was admitted between 1950 and 1955 as the Americans blocked membership of the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites, while the Soviets vetoed Japan and other US candidates in return. In early 1955, however, a series of initiatives, including one organized by the Canadians under Paul Martin Sr., tried to break the impasse with a grand bargain to admit a large cohort of Soviet and American allies simultaneously. In the end, Martin's plan to admit 17 countries (later expanded to 18 with Spain's addition) was introduced to the General Assembly in August 1955, becoming the template for all further negotiations.[1292] In its original form, as diplomat Jules Léger put it, "the Soviet bloc would gain 5 votes; the neutralists [Non-Aligned Movement] would gain 3 or 4; the Arabs 2; and the West 6 or 7 including the two most important members, Italy and Japan."[1293]

Prime Minister Anthony Eden and the British eventually came around to the plan, as did, to the surprise of many, the Soviets, who told the Canadians they could accept Japan's admission despite the lack of a formal peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo.[1294] The US delegation led by Henry Cabot Lodge, however, was cold towards both the plan and Martin, more concerned with containing the Soviets, blocking the admission of Mao's People's Republic, and keeping Taiwan on the Security Council, though President Dwight Eisenhower had a "relatively favourable view" towards it.[1295] The result, as scholar Kurusu Kaoru notes, was that the US took "a defensive rather than offensive line in controlling the situation, and it had to make every effort to limit the damage

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[1292] Kurusu Kaoru, "Japan's Struggle for UN Membership in 1955," in *Japanese Diplomacy In the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, eds. Iokibe Makoto, Caroline Rose, Tomaru Junko, and John Weste (London: Routledge, 2008), 115-117. The other 16 nations were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Mongolia, Portugal, and Romania.
[1293] Jules Léger to USSEA, 5 August 1955, *DCER*, vol. 21, 18.
[1294] See Chairman, Delegation to UN General Assembly to SSEA, 22 September 1955, *DCER*, vol. 21, 22-23; Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life,* Volume II: *So Many Worlds* (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 184. The Soviets had not signed the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco (see Chapter 5) and were thus technically still in a state of war with Japan.
[1295] Indeed, Martin had heated words with Lodge at the UN in November, as did John Foster Dulles with the staff at the Canadian Embassy in Washington. See Martin, *A Very Public Life*, 2:195-198; Greg Donaghy, *Grit: The Life and Politics of Paul Martin Sr.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 144.

in the face of pressure from Canada and other smaller states."[1296] Ultimately, the key sticking point became the link between accepting Mongolia ("Outer Mongolia" as it was then known) for the Soviets and Japan for the Americans, with Chiang Kai-Shek's rump regime on Taiwan threatening to veto the Mongolian application.[1297] Given domestic US support from the vocal China Lobby on Taiwan's behalf, Washington was forced to denounce Mongolia, and the Soviets would not support Japan's entry without them, again creating an impasse.[1298] This was a bitter blow to Martin. As Pearson notified the Canadian Embassy in Washington, "We had told the Japanese that we could not consider a proposal from which they were omitted and had emphasized our support of Japan in Mr. Martin's opening speech at the Assembly. It was our deliberate intention that Japan should be included and we were not prepared to sacrifice that country to exclude Outer Mongolia."[1299] Yet, suspicious of US claims on Taiwan, and despite both the British and Americans thinking the idea unwise, Martin submitted his plan to the General Assembly on 1 December 1955.[1300]

Inevitably, an exhausted and bitter Martin could only watch "misty-eyed" as his unaltered plan went to the vote on 13 December, Taiwan vetoed Mongolia, and the Soviets vetoed all thirteen Western candidates in turn. Surprisingly, the plan was salvaged the following day when the Soviets unexpectedly withdrew their vetoes and offered a revised plan to admit the other 16 countries while leaving Japan and Mongolia for another time, a deal Martin supported. "Barring the Chinese veto, we could have got in," Japan's UN observer Kase Toshikazu concluded wistfully. It was all "a severe disappointment."[1301] "Canada and many other countries regret the temporary exclusion of Japan from the United Nations," Louis St. Laurent lamented from Ottawa, "and for our part we

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[1296] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 117-119.
[1297] A former part of China, Mongolia raised the specter of Taiwan's UN representation as well as its national prestige.
[1298] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 120-127.
[1299] SSEA to Ambassador in US, 28 November 1955, *DCER*, vol. 21, 56.
[1300] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 122, 125; Donaghy, *Paul Martin Sr.,* 143.
[1301] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 128; Martin, *A Very Public Life*, 2:210-214; "Misty-Eyed Martin Sees Scheme Lose," *Globe and Mail*, 14 December 1955, 1.

shall continue our efforts to secure the admission of a state whose qualifications for membership command the support of the vast majority of nations."[1302] A fine sentiment, but it failed to help the beleaguered Hatoyama administration, which faced a vocal thrashing in the Diet as the opposition sponsored a no-confidence motion in Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. Kase, meanwhile, was tarred in the local press alongside the Gaimushō "for having been unduly optimistic about the prospects for Japan's entry," as Ambassador Davis reported from Tokyo.[1303] As the *Globe and Mail* glossed events, Mongolia should have been bartered for one of the other candidates like Libya—"a country in a similarly embryonic state of development"—instead of Japan. Still, if "Japan's exclusion is a regrettable feature of the deal … the Western Powers were wise to accept a package of sixteen members rather than no package at all."[1304] Politics, after all, is the art of the possible.

But victory for Japan was around the corner. In 1956, Tokyo and Moscow wrangled out a deal as Hatoyama personally wrote Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin to ask that Japan be allowed to enter the UN if Japan normalized relations with the Soviet Union. This was agreed, and Japan was formally admitted to the UN on 18 December 1956. "Japan's failure to be admitted during the tenth General Assembly session [in 1955] mirrored its weak status in the international community during this period," as Kurusu concludes. While Moscow's last minute "organized conspiracy" helped save the Canadian initiative from total ruin, that the General Assembly passed it "with an enormous majority can be attributed in part to Japan's inadequate measures to convince the smaller nations of its case, particularly the nations of South-East Asia."[1305] Not everyone in 1955, clearly, supported Japan's return to international respectability as much as Canada.

[1302] "Exclusion of Japanese Regretted by Ottawa," *Globe and Mail*, 16 December 1955, 40.
[1303] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 129; Foster Hailey, "Third Soviet Veto Stirs Ire in Japan," *New York Times*, 17 December 1955, 10; Davis to SSEA, 20 December 1955, R219, vol. 6867, file 4606-40, part 8.2, DEAF, LAC. In the end, the opposition Socialists and Communist Party members lacked the votes to successfully impeach Shigemitsu, losing by 259 to 135, a fact they had apparently realized in advance given their "lukewarm" performance in the debate.
[1304] "Nearly Universal Now," *Globe and Mail*, 16 December 1955, 6.
[1305] Kurusu, "Japan's Struggle," 129-131.

While a failure, Canada's support for Japan throughout the negotiations was solid. Under Martin's vigorous leadership, the Canadians outflanked the British and Americans, pulling them along with Martin's proposal to break the admissions logjam. Japan, unfortunately, was caught in the resulting crossfire, though this fact was unintentional. Indeed, along with Canada's permanent UN Representative Robert Mackay and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Martin later cited Kase as one of the few individuals with "an important influence on our position," as he had "an entrée to Dwight Eisenhower and funnelled a lot of information to me about the thinking in the American capital."[1306] While Canada did regret sidelining Japan, its membership just did not have enough support in the General Assembly to force a decision in 1955. When Japan's admission returned to the General Assembly with four other states in 1956, Canada was more than happy to vote in its favour, and one of Japan's first actions at the UN was to co-sponsor a draft resolution with Canada and Norway to monitor nuclear testing and global radiation levels.[1307]

Canada's support for Japan's admission to the GATT that same year was more successful. Much as in China's bid to join the World Trade Organization in the 1990s, few nations in the mid-1950s were enthusiastic about expanding trade and reducing tariffs with Japan. Canadian political cartoonist Bert Grassick captured the prevailing sentiment well in *Maclean*'s, depicting a halo-clad "New Japan" seeking entrance to fortress GATT while the devil of "pre-war trade tricks" jeers from the sidelines.[1308] As Henry Angus noted from UBC, this was a major concern for the world's manufacturing powers. Japanese exports, he wrote in *International Journal*, would compete "with protected industries in other industrial countries" that had already negotiated safeguards with each other under GATT rules. Yet, given Japan's notoriously low labour costs, any duty "designed to

[1306] Martin, *A Very Public Life*, 2:184.
[1307] *Canada and the United Nations, 1956–57* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), 27, 8-9. Both Tokyo and Moscow inked a deal on returning Japanese wartime POWs that same year. See ibid., 34-35.
[1308] See Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 7.

give adequate protection against a western competitor may be quite inadequate to give protection against Japan." And while there were GATT "escape clauses" to selectively refuse provisions to certain countries, "if these are too freely used the fabric of GATT will be destroyed."[1309] Despite these risks, Japan tendered its application to join GATT in July 1952, a proposal taken up at its eighth session in September 1953. Here, Japan requested "temporary associate membership" while its formal bid was judged, a bid that few nations then supported.[1310] "If [the] Japanese proposal for admission to GATT should come to a vote," Canada's GATT delegation informed External in October, "there would be a serious split among the Contracting Parties." Thus, the stopgap measure seemed the best path forward.[1311] Yet, they remained pessimistic about even this revised formula: "It seems highly conjectural at the present time whether Japan will or will not obtain the required 22 [of 34] votes. The possibility therefore cannot, repeat not, be ruled out that our vote could be of crucial importance to Japan and that our abstention at this session could mean Japan's failure to obtain provisional participation."[1312] With this fact in mind, External authorized voting for Japan's request. Ultimately, the final tally was more decisive than initially thought, with 26 for admission and seven abstentions, although apart from Canada this included much of the Commonwealth, including Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.[1313] What explains Canada's support was the ongoing negotiating on its 1954 trade treaty to extend MFN status to Japan, which already incorporated many of the provisions that Canada would have to extend Japan if it were a GATT member, a fact cited internally by External and recognized by the Canadian press.[1314]

[1309] H.F. Angus, "Japan's Economic Challenge," *International Journal* 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1952): 256-257. Cf. H.F. Angus, *Canada and the Far East, 1940–1953* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), 67-71.
[1310] "Japan and the GATT," *International Journal* 9, no. 3 (Summer 1954): 217.
[1311] Permanent Delegate to European Office of the UN to SSEA, 1 October 1953, *DCER*, vol. 19, 607.
[1312] Permanent Delegate to European Office of the UN to SSEA, 19 October 1953, *DCER*, vol. 19, 609.
[1313] SSEA to Permanent Delegate to European Office of the UN, 21 October 1953; Permanent Delegate to European Office of the UN to SSEA, 25 October 1953, *DCER*, vol. 19, 610-611.
[1314] SSEA to Permanent Delegate to European Office of the UN, 21 October 1953, *DCER*, vol. 19, 610; Victor J. Mackie, "Trade Concessions and Japan," *Leader-Post* (Regina), 14 November 1953, 13.

With the signing of the Japanese-Canadian trade treaty in March 1954, the way was clear for Ottawa's unequivocal support of Japan's GATT bid. When St. Laurent visited Japan for his world tour (see Chapter 6) he played up both the treaty and Canada's efforts in Geneva. "From the outset, the Canadian Government has supported efforts to bring your country back once more into the international trading community," he declared to Tokyo's Japan-Canada Society. "And, with the completion of the commercial agreement between our two countries, we intend to declare our readiness to have the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade apply to our trading relations with you for the immediate future."[1315] By 1955, vocal support for Japan was regularly trumpeted in both official statements and the press. On his return from the Tokyo ICC congress in May, Richard Berkinshaw declared that getting Japan into the GATT, "with certain protective reservations to insure [*sic*] fair competition," was a sensible move, praising the body as one of the "most hopeful type of international arrangement that has appeared on the horizon in many years."[1316] Elsewhere, few nations besides the United States can be said to have expressed anything more than grudging support for Japan. Commonwealth nations like Britain and Australia—along with the Netherlands, Belgium, and France—remained convinced that the "new" Japan might return to dumping and that it would anyway be a competitor for their own goods, as Ottawa recognized.[1317] Eventually, Japan did ascend to the GATT in September 1955 with unanimous support. However, fourteen nations, including Britain and Australia, then invoked the GATT's non-application provision of Article 35 to withhold MFN status from Japan. "This was an unprecedented form of accession," as scholar

[1315] Louis St. Laurent, "Notes for Speech…," 14, 20 January 1954, R11214, vol. 285, file "Tokyo," Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC. Cf. L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum from SSEA to Cabinet," 1 April 1954, *DCER*, vol. 20, 1847-1848.
[1316] "Berkinshaw Urges Japan Join GATT," *Vancouver Sun*, 18 May 1955, 17. For Berkinshaw's support of the GATT at the ICC, see Forbes Rhude, "Parley Backs Canada in Revision of GATT," *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 May 1955, 10.
[1317] See T.F. Harris to Director International Trade Relations Branch, 12 August 1955; J.C. Britton to Director, Trade Commissioner Service, 15 August 1955 and Enclosures; J.G. Harris to USSEA, 19 August 1955 and Enclosures; T.F. Harris to Director, Trade Commissioner Service, 12 September 1955, R208, vol. 2526, file T-4-1092, part 2.1, DTCF, LAC. For American support of Japan's GATT bid, see Shimizu Sayuri, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), chapter 2.

Francine McKenzie observes, "and it came as a great disappointment to the Japanese."[1318] As the London *Times* later glossed the event, it was "another important step towards Japan's post-war rehabilitation," but one "tempered by the realization that there is still a strong suspicion of Japanese trading practices in the world and that G.A.T.T. membership involves concessions as well as privileges."[1319] Canada, meanwhile, could rest on its laurels and its 1954 trade agreement.

My conclusion here is not that Canadians had no scruples about trade with Japan. As seen, many Canadians, especially textile concerns, remained deeply skeptical of Japan's intentions. Nor was Ottawa indifferent to their fears. In Geneva, the Canadians were "surprised and quite skeptical when we first learnt of the [tough] Japanese position on wheat and barley. … Had our instructions been different in this respect, we would have made an issue of this and might have had the Japanese reconsider their stand, but such was not the case." Only private assurances from the Japanese that they would continue to buy these valuable Canadian commodities helped persuade them not to raise the issue.[1320] Meanwhile, back in Ottawa, West York Conservative MP John Hamilton rose in the House of Commons that May to protest that vacuum flasks manufactured by a company in his constituency were being pirated by a Japanese firm.[1321] Yet, in the main, these voices were not widely amplified by either the federal government or the press. St. Laurent's Liberals could safely ignore Hamilton's complaints as largely partisan in origin, while Japan's bargaining at Geneva remained marginal enough, and the provisions of the 1954 Japanese-Canadian trade agreement enough of a fallback, that Ottawa felt no reason to deviate from its basic support. With the economy flourishing, foreign competition still manageable, and the Liberals firmly ensconced in power,

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[1318] Francine McKenzie, "GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 93-96.
[1319] "Japan a Member of G.A.T.T.," *The Times*, 12 September 1955, 11. For the broader outcome and reaction to the vote, see "14 GATT Nations to Exclude Japan," *New York Times*, 13 September 1955, 39.
[1320] Maurice Schwarzmann to Claude Ibister, 5 May 1955, *DCER*, vol. 21, 236.
[1321] *House of Commons Debates*, 22nd Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 4 (5 May 1955): 3470-3472; Grey Hamilton, "Jap Group Undercuts Canadian Sales Prices, Toronto MP Charges," *Globe and Mail*, 6 May 1955, 1-2.

Canadian fears of Japan were limited. In the end, expanding Japan's access to Canadian markets was seen as beneficial—or, at least, not too damaging—for the economy, worthwhile both to facilitate Japan's postwar recovery and to undercut communist influence there and elsewhere in Asia. It also fulfilled point "H" on Arthur Menzies list of Canadian objectives in Asia: Promoting trade with Japan. For all these reasons, Canada proved more willing than many other nations to further Japan's economic growth, much to the delight of Japanese diplomats and industrialists.

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By 1956, with its trade on the ascent, the time seemed right for Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce to visit the country whose business was increasingly vital to the well-being of the national economy. On 23 October 1956, C.D. Howe landed at Tokyo's Haneda airport escorted by his Deputy Minister, Mitchell Sharp. Here he was met by a large delegation of Japanese officials led by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu—Hatoyama was in Moscow at the time—as well as reporters from the press and the state broadcaster NHK. "His coming had been well publicised, and his name was already well known in Japan," Ambassador Davis later wrote his family, as Howe "bears here the reputation, well deserved, of having contributed as much if not more to the fabulous growth of Canada than any other individual." "One must live abroad," he added proudly, "to appreciate the favorable advertising Canada has received in recent years."[1322] Over his two week stay, Howe and Sharp traversed Japan, meeting dignitaries and seeing the sights of Japan's postwar recovery.[1323] This included an audience with the emperor, where they presented Hirohito with two movies from the National Film Board, including one on the life of Canada's Inuit, along with Inuit carvings for other officials that Sharp had purchased from the Hudson Bay Company in Winnipeg.[1324] On 26

[1322] Davis to Lu, 1 December 1956, 9, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA.
[1323] For the itinerary of Howe's visit, see "Visit to Japan of Rt. Hon. C.D. Howe…," [undated]; "Tentative Itinerary for the Rt. Hon. C.D. Howe," 11 October 1956, R5725, vol. 191, file 13, C.D. Howe fonds, LAC.
[1324] Davis to Lu, 1 December 1956, 11, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA; Sharp, *Which Reminds Me*, 58-59.

October, the Canadians visited Yokohama to tour the Nisshin Flour Mills, Japan's largest importer of Prairie grain, where they were met by Director Yamanouchi Kōhei, one of the three Japanese who had visited Canada with the CWB mission back in 1954. Also present was Nisshin's president, who reiterated the value of imported grain to maintaining Japan's postwar standard of living.[1325] Howe and Sharp even had time to sightsee, visiting the town of Nikkō that boasted the tomb of Tokugawa Ieyasu, first Shogun of the Tokugawa shogunate, who had died in 1613. There they had a reunion of sorts, meeting with both ex-Japanese Ambassador to Canada Iguchi Sadao as well as Tokugawa Iemasa, the diplomat who had been Japan's first representative to Canada in 1929 and was also the Shogun's living heir, posing for a photo together at nearby Lake Chūzenji.[1326]

Again, Canada had made itself conspicuous in Japanese eyes. When Hatoyama returned from Moscow in the middle of his visit, Howe was immediately called for and had a long chat with him and Kōno Ichirō, the latter having met Howe in Ottawa in 1955. "This invitation was a signal honor," Davis recognized, "and it surely was widely publicised all over Japan.[1327] Last year Mr. Howe went out of his way in Ottawa to be kind and helpful to Mr. Kōno when he visited Canada and these kindly acts certainly paid off."[1328] Canada, Davis realized, had banked substantial political as well as economic capital in Japan. As Howe noted rather bemusedly after his return, to many Japanese, "Mr. Pearson is the leading statesman of the world."[1329] Flattery no doubt played its part here, but Japanese respect for Canada should not be doubted. In his official report to External, which he later sent to St. Laurent, Davis recorded how impressed Howe was "with the friendliness exhibited to towards himself and Mr. Sharp and towards Canada and Canadians

[1325] "Welcome speech by Mr. H. Shoda…," 26 October 1956; "Welcome Speech by K. Yamanouchi…," 26 October 1956, R5725, vol. 191, file 13, C.D. Howe fonds, LAC.
[1326] Davis to Lu, 1 December 1956, 13, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA; Appx. 1, Chap. 7, Fig. 8. See also Howe to Tokugawa, 15 December 1956, R5725, vol. 191, file 13, C.D. Howe fonds, LAC.
[1327] As indeed it was. See Ikeda Hajime, "Premier to see Kono, Ohno," *Japan Times*, 5 November 1956, 1.
[1328] Davis to Lu, 1 December 1956, 16, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA.
[1329] "Pearson Top Statesman to Japanese," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November 1956, 2.

generally." None of this was surprising: "Canada's attitude in connection with the negotiation of the [1954] trade treaty, the entry of Japan into GATT, our attempts to get Japan into the United Nations, and other gestures of Canadian friendship had made a deep and lasting impression in this country, and one could sense this at every turn." Moreover, the Japanese appeared to appreciate "Canada's particular position in relation to both the United Kingdom and the United States, and that Canada can well be a mediator or link between Japan and these two nations." In short: "Japan feels that Canada is a good nation to keep close to, as her influence with the nations of the world is capable of being of great help to this country in its association with all others."[1330]

After his return to Canada, Howe summarized his own views to the Women's Canadian Club in Montreal. "Before the Second World War," he lectured, "trade between Canada and Japan was small and relatively unimportant," and what did exist had been hampered by "a prejudice amongst Canadians against Japanese produce, which was not always of the best quality and against Japanese trading practices, which were sometimes rather doubtful." In 1945, a choice had been offered:

> Japan suddenly emerged as a major market for Canadian produce. The question then arose—was this a temporary situation, or did it hold promise of permanence and growth? The Canadian Government considered the position carefully and came to the conclusion that if Japan could find sufficient export markets, she would probably continue to be a most important market for Canadian produce. The next question, of course, was whether Japan should be offered an opportunity of selling her goods in Canada on equal terms with other countries. […] Finally the Government decided to offer a most-favoured-nation agreement to Japan, subject to certain safeguards.

The result was the 1954 Japanese-Canadian trade agreement. A nation like Japan, Howe added, "with its dense population and its limited area, is, in many respects, the natural trading partner of Canada with our small population and large area."[1331] Few Canadians at the time appeared ready

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[1330] Davis to St. Laurent, 9 November 1956 and Enclosure, R11214, vol. 186, file J-10-1, vol. 1, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC. A copy of this letter is also printed in *DCER*, vol. 22, part 2, 1387-1389.

[1331] For the text of the speech, see Arthur E. Blanchette, *Canadian Foreign Policy 1955–1965: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977), 327-330. For the speech's reception, see "Japan Third in Canada's Customers," *Montreal Star*, 3 December 1956, 3, 5; "Howe Marks Milestone with Address to Women," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 4 December 1956, 12.

to publicly dissent from this appraisal. "There was a certain amount of headshaking in this country a couple of years ago," the *Ottawa Citizen* editorialized after Howe's return, when the 1954 treaty was under negotiation. "So far," it noted, "these trading arrangements between the two countries appear to have worked smoothly enough." Howe's mission, the paper added, showed "the Japanese are pleased with their side of the bargain … His own visit may have contributed to a better understanding by both sides and if this is so it will have been worth while."[1332] The *Financial Post* was even more effusive about the visit. Howe's speech in Japan, the paper argued was "tactful and timely … If we had had more public discussion like this in the prewar days, economic relations between Canada and Japan would certainly have been better." Japanese-Canadian trade, the paper concluded, was now "much too important to be left to grow unguided and ignored."[1333]

The reception accorded to Howe eloquently encapsulates the state of Japanese-Canadian relations during the 1950s. Time and again, Canadian diplomats, trade officials, and politicians (as well as journalists, businessmen, and financiers) had gone out of their way to engage their Japanese counterparts in a far more comprehensive and involved way than most scholars have yet credited them. Greg Donaghy, for example, has argued emphatically that Canadian interest in Japan during the postwar era was minimal at best. Not until Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's tenure in the 1970s, did Ottawa develop any notable interest in Japan or Asia, and even then, "except for the recognition of Communist China in October 1970, Trudeau was slow to show any substantial interest in the Pacific region." Relations with Japan, meanwhile, "seemed to have little to offer Canada." In the end, it was all a rather irrelevant exercise in "smiling diplomacy."[1334] Even Klaus Pringsheim's

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[1332] "Expanding Trade with Japan," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 November 1956, 6.
[1333] "Trade with Japan," *Financial Post*, 10 November 1956, 6. For other positive editorials, see "Mr. Howe Visits a Good Customer," *The Province*, 26 November 1956, 6; "Mr. Howe's Journey," *Ottawa Journal*, 22 October 1956, 6.
[1334] See, for example, Greg Donaghy, "Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific Tilt, 1945–1984," *International Journal* 74, no. 1 (March 2019): 135-137; Greg Donaghy, "'Smiling Diplomacy' Redux: Trudeau's Engagement with Japan, 1968–76," in *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Patricia Roy and Greg Donaghy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 190.

Neighbours Across the Pacific—limited as always for space—only acknowledges Canada's role at the UN, GATT, and Colombo Plan in passing, summarizing them in a single paragraph.[1335]

While, once again, we should not overemphasize Canadian engagement with Asia when compared to Europe, it seems clear that these conclusions are partial at best. In part, I would argue there are two reasons for this. First, as few Canadian scholars have a solid background in Japanese history compared to European or American history, they do not know what to look for in Japanese-Canadian relations. Put simply, to dismiss relations with Japan as "mere" smiling diplomacy is to miss the fact that few nations apart from Canada were ***willing*** to "smile" at Japan during the 1950s, much less constructively engage with it. Certainly, no other member of the Commonwealth was so frequently inclined. Canada, with the United States, were the two main exceptions. Second, Canadian scholars remain fixed to a concept of foreign policy rooted in the actions of the Department of External Affairs. That the publicly-regulated CWB's grain missions or JETRO's Japan Trade Centre exhibitions represented substantive "engagement" between both countries has never been voiced. If these events are ignored, how can we expect scholars to study fully private initiatives, like the 1955 Canadian mission to the ICC congress or the start of the *Financial Post*'s long running Japan business inserts that same year? By these alternative metrics, Canadians both inside and outside government were engaging Japan in an increasing number of new ways during the 1950s, to an extent that belies the idea that Canada lacked a coherent "Pacific policy." As seen, from Pearson on down to the press and the Canadian business community, rebuilding a democratic and capitalist Japan to help expand Canadian markets and undercut the popularity of communism in the Asia-Pacific region was a consistent and widely-held objective. It was, as one contemporary

[1335] Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 121-122. For a similar glossing of relations during this era, see Bamba Nobuya and Ōkuma Tadayuki, "The Postwar Years," in *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. John Schultz and Miwa Kimitada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), 130-131; Carin Holroyd and Ken Coates, *Pacific Partners: The Japanese Presence in Canadian Business, Society, and Culture* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1996), 57-60.

writer observed solemnly, "Canada's Part in Keeping Japan as [a] Free World Ally."[1336] "Although we have historically looked at Asia through European eyes," Arthur Menzies briefed Canadian delegates to a UNESCO conference running concurrent to Howe's Japan trip in October 1956, "we are increasingly adopting an independent North American outlook towards Asia." True, this policy remained "strongly influenced at almost every point by U.S. attitudes and policies," but as a North American nation, Canada's posture was already "broadly similar to that of the United States."[1337] In short, when Trudeau chose to expand trade with Japan as part of his "third option" in the 1970s, did this mark a new and radical departure in Canadian policymaking, or was it more a belated choice to expand the groundwork originally laid in the mid-1950s?[1338] I would argue this is a more reasonable idea than Donaghy and others maintain.

[1336] Gerald Samson, "Canada's Part in Keeping Japan as Free World Ally," *Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1955, 6.
[1337] Arthur Menzies, "Canada's Asian Policy," October 1956, R15615, vol. 30, file 19, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.
[1338] For the context of Trudeau's "third option" in diversifying Canadian trade away from the United States, see John English, *The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, Volume II: *Just Watch Me, 1968–2000* (New York: Knopf Canada, 2009), 259-265. For the policy's impact on relations with Japan, see Donaghy, "'Smiling Diplomacy' Redux," 192-203.

Conclusion: A Death in Cairo

On 5 November 1956, just as C.D. Howe was completing his successful trade mission to Japan, several hundred paratroopers descended on Egyptian airfields near the Suez Canal as the vanguard of a combined Anglo-French invasion force.[1339] The crisis now unfolding had begun three months earlier when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had unilaterally nationalized the Suez Canal from its British and French owners. London and Paris had protested, and in tandem with Israeli forces now sought to reclaim the canal and put Nasser in his place. Given the role that Ottawa would play in the unfolding drama, significant responsibility had suddenly been placed on the shoulders of the new Canadian Ambassador to Cairo: Herbert Norman.[1340]

Ever since the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference (see Chapter 5), Norman had played almost no role in developing Canadian foreign policy towards Japan. In a June 1952 swansong, he had attended the House of Common's Standing Committee on External Affairs with Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson to discuss ratifying the Japanese Peace Treaty. Here, after months of grilling on his communist ties, Norman was back in his element. When the committee asked Pearson about the reforms undertaken during the occupation, including "the breaking up of family cartels, the question of women suffrage, and the question also of land reform," he quickly handed the baton over to Norman, who offered a nuanced and articulate explanation of the changes that he had helped implement at GHQ.[1341] Yet, given the lingering doubts that remained because of his prevarication on his student radicalism and the entrenched suspicion of many in both Canada and abroad, Norman languished as head of External's Information Division for the rest of the year.

[1339] Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, *C.D. Howe, a Biography* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979), 320-321.

[1340] For the situation on Norman's arrival in Egypt in mid-August 1956, see Roger Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1986), 274-276.

[1341] *Standing Committee on External Affairs: Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 12* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 340-352; James McCook, "Hope and Anxiety Mingled in Canadian View of Japan," *Ottawa Journal*, 4 June 1952, 3.

Only in January 1953 was he finally given a new foreign posting, this time as High Commissioner to New Zealand. All pretenses aside, the move was simply a way to extract Norman from the glare of hostile public opinion, although it did demonstrate the private confidence Pearson and External both still had in him. As fellow diplomat Ralph Collins noted later, "For someone of Herb's calibre, being sent to New Zealand was a defacto 'rest cure': it got him out of the limelight."[1342]

Over the next four years, as Canadian relations with Japan gradually recovered from their wartime nadir, Norman visited the land of his birth only once. In May and June 1955, he arrived to prepare a Japanese book of his essays, *Kurio no Kao* [The Face of Clio], with publisher Iwanami Shoten, apprising External that the book was "unrelated to current issues."[1343] "He stayed part of the time with us and part with Bill Challis, who heads the New Zealand Mission here," Ambassador T.C. Davis wrote his family. "He was entertained everywhere and through him I met a host of people who were a joy and an inspiration to meet."[1344] As Canadian Minister-Counsellor Theodore Newton recalled, Norman seemed "in fine fettle," spending his time "consorting with a wide range of old Japanese friends, with his brother [Howard], playing robust tennis with a former Tokyo friend, the New Zealand Commissioner, and seemingly enjoying himself to the full."[1345]

Nor was Norman forgotten by his fellow East Asian colleagues in Ottawa. In July 1954, Maeda Toshio contacted Hugh Keenleyside with an unusual request. Prince Chichibu, the brother of Emperor Hirohito, had died in 1953 and Maeda was now working "to compile a biography of His Highness, and are asking the friends of the late Prince to write." Having directed the prince's visit to Canada back in 1937, Keenleyside was more than happy to sign on.[1346] Clearing the request

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[1342] Bowen*, Innocence Is Not Enough*, 268-269.
[1343] Bowen*, Innocence Is Not Enough*, 271-272.
[1344] Davis to Lu, 1 July 1955, 11, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA.
[1345] Second Draft, T.F.M. Newton, "The Death of Herbert Norman and Japanese Reaction," [hereafter Newton Report], 1-2, [1970s?], R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1346] Maeda to Keenleyside, 3 July 1954, Keenleyside to Maeda, 20 July 1954, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. For his role in the 1937 visit, see Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1:475-479.

with Pearson, Keenleyside began searching for other Canadians who had known the prince.[1347] In September 1954, Keenleyside met Arthur Menzies in his capacity as head of External Affair's Far Eastern Division, who was more than happy to jot down his own recollections of Prince Chichibu's last public appearance, which had coincidentally taken place at Canada's Tokyo Embassy while Menzies was still the interim ambassador in November 1952.[1348] A few days later, Keenleyside contacted Norman in Wellington, who was also happy to share his own story of meeting the prince at his estate near Mount Fuji postwar. After all, Norman added, the "tempo of life" in the antipodes was slow and both he and his wife were "a bit lonely and remote out here and we often miss our friends in Canada and elsewhere."[1349] Despite the basically trivial nature of Maeda's request, an evidently bored and nostalgic Norman spent several months carefully drafting his response, a delay "which arose from two or three attempts to start it and not feeling that I had struck the right note."[1350] Keenleyside finally mailed the reflections of the three Far Eastern Mandarins to Maeda in February 1955.[1351] It would be their last collaboration together.

On 14 March 1957, the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security (SISS) under Robert Morris publicly announced that they were reopening its inquiry into Norman, a fact that Norman learned the following day by reading the Egyptian press.[1352] Depleted after months of negotiations, fearful that he might be grilled again on his loyalties, Norman was at the end of his tether. Once more, the walls were closing in. On 4 April 1957, Norman took the elevator to the top of the Wadi

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[1347] Keenleyside to Pearson, 20 July 1954, Pearson to Keenleyside, 9 August 1954, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[1348] Keenleyside to Menzies, 13 September 1954, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC. For Menzies contribution, see "Prince Chichibu's Last Public Appearance…," 31 January 1955, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC, a copy of which is also held in Menzies papers (R15615, vol. 31, file 10).
[1349] Keenleyside to Norman, 16 September 1954; Norman to Keenleyside, 29 September 1954, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[1350] Norman to Keenleyside, 14 January 1955, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[1351] Keenleyside to Maeda, 28 February 1955, Maeda to Keenleyside, 3 May 1955, R4217, vol. 20, file 11, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.
[1352] Bowen*, Innocence Is Not Enough*, 292-294.

el Nil building, which overlooked the eponymous river in the heart of Cairo. At the top, Norman carefully removed his coat, glasses, watch, and cufflinks, setting them aside with two notes. He stepped out onto the ledge. He waited nervously for the coast to clear. Then he jumped.[1353]

The origins of the case against Norman begin and end with the same man: Tsuru Shigeto. Later a noted economist, Norman first met Tsuru at Harvard in 1936. A Marxist with a firm grasp of Japanese history, Norman excitedly wrote his brother that Tsuru was "a great help to me because we can discuss Japanese politics with complete freedom and understanding."[1354] Indeed, Tsuru contributed mightily to Norman's PhD, with *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* thanking "Mr. S. Tsuru of Harvard University whose penetrating criticism has been of the greatest aid especially in matters relating to Japanese economic history."[1355] After his departure in 1940 to join External, Norman lost contact with Tsuru. It was thus a happy coincidence when both men spotted one another across a pier in Portuguese East Africa in 1942. The origin of this odd encounter was the wartime repatriation of Japanese and North American nationals in the neutral port of Lourenço Marques (see Chapter 1). While the two groups were not intended to fraternize, many passengers were able to share terse greetings with their now enemy colleagues.[1356] This included Tsuru, who in "a brief conversation" mentioned that he had left much of his private library at Harvard and his Boston apartment, and that Norman might wish to collect it. Months later, Norman tried to access the flat, but was stymied by a wary janitor. When Norman returned the next day, he was confronted by two members of the FBI. As he told External years later, his only interest in Tsuru's effects was

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[1353] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 318-320.
[1354] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 15-16, 71.
[1355] E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York: IPR, 1940), xiii.
[1356] Norman and Tsuru were not the only ones to do so. US Ambassador Joseph Grew turned down a meeting with his Japanese counterpart Nomura Kichisaburō, feeling that it would serve "no purpose except to go into post mortems." Both men and Japanese Special Envoy Kurusu Saburō did, however, briefly spot each other on the pier, doffing their hats in curt acknowledgement. See Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945*, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1379-1380; Kurusu Saburō, *The Desperate Diplomat: Saburo Kurusu's Memoir of the Weeks before Pearl Harbor* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2014), 141.

"for both his work and his further study of Japanese history," nothing more.[1357] Yet, in the halls of the FBI and SISS, the "Tsuru apartment episode" morphed into the inciting incident of Norman's alleged communist connections that would be reiterated and built upon in the years to come.

Norman would see Tsuru again after the war. In September 1945, Norman sought him out in the ruins of Tokyo when he arrived in the country with SCAP, finding the economist living not far from the Canadian Legation with the father of Tsuru's wife.[1358] In 1947, Tsuru was brought into the administration of socialist Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu as chairman of Japan's new Economic Stabilization Board. In July, Norman sent Pearson a memo on a white paper authored by Tsuru, noting it had been praised by SCAP as "the most serious attempt to date of the Japanese to solve their own economic problems." "Thanks to Mr. Tsuru," he added, "I have been able to get considerable insight into Japanese Governmental matters."[1359] The following month, Norman met Tsuru across the conference table during General H.D.G. Crerar's visit to Tokyo (see Chapter 5).[1360] By March 1957, Tsuru was back in Boston, a visiting lecturer at Harvard on loan from Tokyo's Hitotsubashi University. It was here that he was called before SISS on 26 March.

Tsuru had no desire to make SISS his enemy. In historian Roger Bowen's words, "Tsuru pretty much told the subcommittee what it wanted to hear, and made it easy for SISS interrogators to lend credibility to his testimony by picturing himself as a reformed Marxist."[1361] In the probe that followed, Tsuru admitting knowing many people aside from Norman, including IPR figures such as William Holland. "Have you given the committee the names of all the persons whom you knew or had reason to believe were Communists?" Associate Counsel J.G. Sourwine asked Tsuru

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[1357] For the Tsuru apartment incident, see Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 228-233. Cf. Norman's account to Tsuru in *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Securities Act*… Part 57 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1957), 3744.
[1358] *Scope of Soviet Activity,* Part 57, 3743.
[1359] Norman to Pearson, 15 July 1947, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1360] See "Minutes of the Conference … 8th August 1947," 3, R165, vol. 249, file J-25, PCOF, LAC.
[1361] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 301.

at the end of his session. "As far as I can recall; yes," he replied.[1362] With that response to a vague question, Tsuru left "any reader of his testimony to decide who in the list were simply people he knew, and who were communists."[1363] Tsuru, as US historian Edwin Reischauer sighed, went to Washington "full of confidence that he would set straight various false charges … he fell instead into a typical McCarthy trap."[1364] Reopening Norman's file took on a whole new colour.

The response to Norman's death was swift and dramatic. "The news about Herb Norman came like a personal blow to me," William Holland wrote Canadian historian Edgar McInnis, "and I have been even more sickened by the cowardly attitude of the White House and the State Dept."[1365] Holland also drew McInnis's attention to a poem published by American poet Carolyn Kizer in the *New Republic* entitled "The Death of a Public Servant." "This is a day when good men die from windows," the poem began, ending with a defiant change against Norman's accusers:

I mark the fourth of April on this page,
When the sun came up and glittered on the windows
As you fell away from daylight into heaven:
The muck of Cairo, and a world silenced forever.
A poet, to whom no one cruel or imposing listens,
Disdained by senates, whispers to your dust:
Though you escape from words, whom words pursued,
Take these to your shade: of rage, of grief, of love.[1366]

Many ordinary Canadians were equally outraged by SISS and the US government, notwithstanding their feelings about the Soviet Union or communism. On 6 April 1957, the Manitoba branch of the Canadian Anti-Communist League—not an organization one would think would be terribly lenient towards allegations of communism—tabled a motion registering that they were "shocked by the events leading up to the tragic death of Dr. Norman," and petitioned Ottawa to "investigate security

[1362] *Scope of Soviet Activity*, Part 57, 3756.
[1363] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 302.
[1364] Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 127.
[1365] Holland to McInnis, 22 April 1957, R2849, vol. 11, file 22, CIIA fonds, LAC.
[1366] Carolyn Kizer, *Midnight Was My Cry* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 64-65. Roger Bowen includes a copy of the poem as an epigraph to his biography of Norman. See Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 9.

risks thoroughly, instead of smearing and attacking loyal citizen[s] of Canada."[1367] Indeed, beyond the personal tragedy, Norman's death erupted into a major diplomatic incident. While the visceral Canadian wave of anti-Americanism that arose from Norman's death is well documented,[1368] less focus has been given in Canada to the equally profound wave of anti-Americanism that erupted in Japan over the affair, an eruption that Norman's Japanese friends did much to propagate.

"As might be expected," Theodore Newton informed External from Tokyo on 9 April, "[the] Norman tragedy has had special impact here through press commentaries, editorials, calls and letters to [the] Embassy and widespread discussion."[1369] Indeed, Newton observed later, "The immediate sympathy and sense of outrage in the Japanese press was widespread and long continued." Criticism came in two flavours: "On the one hand, a spate of editorials condemned the McCarthy tactics of the United States Senate Committee and on the other somewhat shamefacedly recognized the part innocently played in the tragedy by Tsuru."[1370] The second charge was unfair. With SISS presenting Tsusu's testimony as "proof" that it had uncovered numerous communists, the Japanese press—in Edwin Reischauer's phrasing—"virtually crucified Tsuru as a turncoat who had welched on his former leftist associates."[1371] Attacks came from across the political spectrum. On 10 April, a column in the *Asahi* regretted that Tsuru had named names, claiming this fact alone had damaged Japanese prestige more than if he had been deported for being uncooperative.[1372] The next day the *Tokyo Shinbun* contended that his testimony made it seem like Tsuru had snitched to

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[1367] P.B. Hayward, Manitoba Branch, Canadian Anti-Communist League, 11 April 1957, R165, vol. 1990-91/154-105, file D-16-1-N, LAC. Cf. Gary Marcuse and Reginald Whitaker, *Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945–1957* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 405n5. See also Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 1.
[1368] See, for example, J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1997), chapter 4; John Hilliker, "'Sleeping with An Elephant': Canada, the United States and Herbert Norman, 1939–1957," in *Changing Japanese Identities in Multicultural Canada*, eds. Joseph F. Kess, Hiroko Noro, Midge M. Ayukawa, and Helen Lansdowne (Victoria, BC: University of Victoria, 2003), 547-556.
[1369] Newton to SSEA, 9 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1370] Newton Report, 2.
[1371] Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, 127.
[1372] Press Highlights, Morning Editions, 10 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.

SISS as a quid pro quo for his university exchange.[1373] One ruthlessly trenchant critic was *Akahata*, the organ of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). In the days following Norman's death, it carried a series of letters from ordinary Japanese on the event. Bitterly citing reports of Tsuru ingratiating himself before SISS, a Buddhist priest from Fukui Prefecture named Wakabayashi Choko claimed readers "may have felt a bad taste in their mouth after reading the testimony." "If Mr. Norman's suicide is even partly attributable to the Tsuru testimony," he continued, "it must be considered an intolerable tragedy."[1374] One letter, simply credited to "a labourer" from Saga Prefecture, mocked Tsusu's apparent shame over his left-wing past. "I do not ask you to oppose their policy," he wrote indignantly, "but I wish you would refuse to answer their questions. Do it as an offering to the memory of Mr. Norman. Maintain your pride as a democrat."[1375] As Newton told External, Tokyo had contacted the US State Department as early as 4 April to protest "the issuance of a subpoena to Tsuru without notification to the Japanese Embassy," an egregious gaffe given that Hitotsubashi was a government-run university and thus Tsuru was technically a government employee.[1376]

As for Norman himself, his death provoked profound sympathy from the local press, and touching memorials from his friends and fellow intellectuals. One of the first Japanese to hear the news was Ōkubo Genji, Norman's close friend who had helped translate *Japan's Emergence* and was now working as a translator for the Canadian Embassy. The evening after Norman's suicide, Theodore Newton received a call from the Japanese authorities and immediately asked Ōkubo to notify Herbert's brother Howard, then working at a university near Kobe.[1377] As Ōkubo later told one reporter, Norman was an "extraordinary scholar-diplomat and as humane as an 18-century

[1373] Press Highlights, Afternoon Editions, 11 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1374] Wakabayashi Choko, "Tsuru Case," *Akahata* (Tokyo), 18 April 1957, a translation of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1375] A Laborer in Saga, "Letter to Prof Tsuru," *Akahata*, 18 April 1957, a translation of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1376] Draft, Newton to SSEA, 15 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1377] Newton Report, 2.

enlightener." The world had lost "a great personality."[1378] For Hani Gorō, a former member of the House of Councillors and a noted Marxist historian, the event signified the extent to which the US government was now meddling in "the thoughts and private affairs of individuals," even those like Tsuru and Norman who were not American citizens. He went on to praise Norman's actions during the occupation, including his role in scrapping Japan's hated prewar Peace Preservation Law,[1379] which made him "a friend of the Japanese people." As for his scholarly achievements, "Norman was also an excellent historian," and in an apparent reference to his 1943 pamphlet *Soldier and Peasant in Japan*, Hani recalled how Norman had "analyzed the relationships between Japanese militarism and the poverty-ridden farmers, such as the farm youths, as the major source of supply of manpower for the Japanese army, from his own political and economic viewpoints."[1380]

Yet, in terms of its sheer scale, the largest Japanese tribute later appeared in the left-wing magazine *Sekai*, which dedicated most of its June 1957 issue to Norman's death. This included a complete transcript of Tsuru's questioning by SISS, an analysis of his conduct while on the stand, and three obituaries by literary scholar Watanabe Kazuo, popular writer Nakano Yoshio, and intellectual historian Maruyama Masao. In his account, Watanabe recalled visiting Canada's Legation during the occupation for Norman's birthday. Having stayed up all night due to a fire in his neighbourhood the previous day—and perhaps having drank too much—Watanabe fell asleep, only to wake in the early morning after the party was long over. Norman offered to drive a greatly embarrassed Watanabe home, and later paid him a visit with a bottle of whiskey, politely turning down his own offer to let him rest for a bit in his study. "I will never forget that visit," Watanabe

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[1378] "Norman's Death Great Shock Here," *Japan Times* (Tokyo), 6 April 1957, a copy of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 24, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.

[1379] Introduced in 1925, the Peace Preservation Law formed the cornerstone of the Japanese police state that developed during the 1930s and 1940s, criminalizing any attempt to subvert the Japanese "national polity" (Kokutai). See Richard H. Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), chapter 2.

[1380] Hani Gorō and Nosaka Sanzō, "Nosaka, Hani Comment on Norman's Suicide," *Akahata*, 6 April 1957, a translation of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.

wrote movingly, "when I told an acquaintance of mine about it, he was most impressed with the fact that Mr. Norman did not mind losing 'face' in order to allow me to save 'face.'"[1381]

It was Maruyama, however, who offered the most poignant tribute. At the time, he was a rising star on the Japanese academic scene. Classed by one historian as "the preeminent imaginer of democracy in postwar Japan," Maruyama had set to work during the occupation's early years to both debate Japan's new democracy with ordinary people through meetings and lectures, as well as to articulate an intellectual framework to help explain the nature of Japanese militarism.[1382] In his first postwar lecture in December 1945, Maruyama observed that while the Japanese had their freedom, it had been "issued to us—forced upon us, in fact, by a foreign country." Only by learning to exercise "their spirit to determine matters for themselves," he reasoned, could Japan become truly democratic.[1383] As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, the idea that the Japanese needed to build their own democracy had driven Norman during both his wartime planning and his postwar diplomacy, and the two men shared much in common. In his obituary, Maruyama recalled Norman's final visit to Japan in 1955—where he, Norman, Ōkubo, and Nakano Yoshio had spent several hours together chatting and catching up. When Norman joked that he felt his spoken Japanese was withering from lack of use, Maruyama thought he still "detected a trace of saddened resignation in his smile."[1384] Summing up Norman's writing, Maruyama memorably concluded that he was a historian with "an

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[1381] "In the Magazines," *Asahi Evening News* (Osaka), 13 May 1957, a copy of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 24, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC. Watanabe later related a variant of this episode to Canadian journalist Sidney Katz a few months later. In this version, he admitted that he was frankly drunk at the party and claims that Norman *did* sleep at his house as a "face-saving" gesture, not simply that he had offered to do so. See Sidney Katz, "What Kind of Man Was Herbert Norman," *Maclean's Magazine*, 28 September 1957, 87-88.

[1382] Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 198. In the May 1946 edition of *Sekai*, for instance, Maruyama had offered his take on "the main ideological factor that kept the Japanese people in slavery for so long and that finally drove them to embark on a war against the rest of the world." See Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1969), chapter 1.

[1383] Karube Tadashi, *Maruyama Masao and the Fate of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Japan*, trans. David Noble (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2008), 103.

[1384] Maruyama Masao, "An Affection for the Lesser Names: An Appreciation of E. Herbert Norman," *Pacific Affairs* 30, no. 3 (September 1957): 249.

affection for the lesser names."[1385] And if—as Maruyama believed—Norman was innocent of any wrongdoing, if a man "who so loved the good in men, and who had such faith in the power of reason to persuade men, has ended his short life in the midst of fanaticism and prejudices and intolerance, what should we do—we who remain behind?"[1386]

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As the dust settled on Tsuru's testimony, Theodore Newton wrote in his report for External, increased focus was being paid to what some in the press dubbed SISS's "Kenpeitai methods," a reference to Japan's feared wartime military police.[1387] As early as 6 April, JCP First Secretary Nosaka Sanzō had personally railed against the Americans' "fascistic" conduct regarding Tsuru. Noting that he "respected Ambassador Norman as an authority on Japan," Nosaka charged that his suicide "clarified that the US Government today is suppressing even the freedom of thought of individuals."[1388] On 9 April, the *Yomiuri* sneered at the sadistic pleasure SISS apparently took in its "Red hunt," reminding it of the severity of prewar thought control.[1389] "A struggle against Reds may be necessary for the US," the *Yomiuri*'s English-language *Japan News* conceded. "But such eccentric methods of conducting it will do America no good in the eyes of the world."[1390]

Such accusations were well in keeping with the tenor of the times. When news of Norman's suicide broke in April 1957, US motives in Japan were already under intense scrutiny, with charges

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[1385] This recalls the famous exhortation of British Marxist historian E.P. Thompson that his classic study of the English working class was intended to "rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'utopian' artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity." See E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London: Penguin, 1993), 12.
[1386] Maruyama, "An Affection for the Lesser Names," 253.
[1387] Draft, Newton to SSEA, 15 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1388] Hani and Nosaka, "Nosaka, Hani Comment on Norman's Suicide."
[1389] Press Highlights, Afternoon Editions, 9 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC. "This reminds us of the method of the prewar thought police of our country," *Akahata* agreed in an editorial a few days later. See "Lesson of the Tsuru Case," *Akahata*, 11 April 1957, a translation of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC. The "thought police" (Shisō Keisatsu) were a reference to the prewar Japanese Special Higher Police ("Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu" or "Tokkō"), the Kenpeitai's civilian counterpart.
[1390] "Leader: Tragic Death," *Yomiuri Japan News* (Tokyo), 8 April 1957, a copy of which is in R4086, vol. 2, file 24, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC. Newton cited this quote verbatim in his 15 April 1957 report to External.

of US "imperialism," "fascism," or "warmongering" increasingly voiced. The most visible symbol of this mounting anti-Americanism was resentment towards the US military bases in Japan. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the retention of Commonwealth and especially US military forces in Japan had been a major source of friction dating back to the end of the occupation in 1952. In March 1953, Arthur Menzies at the Canadian Embassy had Ōkubo Genji draft a map for External showing all the major US military installations in Japan. Even leaving out "dependent housing, warehouses, and oil-storage tanks" for brevity, Ōkubo's map showed a chain of bases across the country, from Kyushu in the south to Hokkaido in the north.[1391] In May 1955, protests erupted at one base near the village of Sunagawa over plans to extend the runway of US-run Tachikawa airbase; the arriving surveyors confronting an angry mob. The resulting "Sunagawa struggle" lasted two years, only ending in July 1957 when the Tachikawa extension was finally shelved.[1392] The event, as historian Nick Kapur notes, "became a nationwide media spectacle, receiving near-daily news coverage and becoming the subject of documentaries, artworks, and *reportage*-style photography."[1393]

In early 1957, another confrontation arose. On 20 January, a woman named Sakai Naka was scavenging shell casings for scrap metal at Camp Weir, a US Army base in Gunma Prefecture. On guard was soldier William Girard. Aiming an empty grenade canister at Sakai, apparently for no other reason than "his own amusement," Girard fatally shot her in the back. The result was a "public uproar," in historian Jennifer Miller's words, one "highlighting the direct physical threat stemming from the presence of U.S. forces." Eventually, President Dwight Eisenhower and the American military backed down, Girard was tried in a Japanese court, and Washington promised

[1391] Menzies to USSEA, 18 March 1953 and Enclosure, R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-2-2, DEAF, LAC. See also Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 2.
[1392] For events at Sunagawa, see Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), chapter 4.
[1393] Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 15.

to drawdown its forces in Japan by 40%.[1394] By June 1957, the American magazine *Newsweek*, in a survey of global opinion towards the United States, noted that while relations with most western European states were "friendly" or "basically good," in Japan, "Irritations [were] growing" due to "Disputes over civilian vs. military jurisdiction," as well as US "H-Bomb tests."[1395] It was against this backdrop that Norman's death broke in April, stunning the press and shocking his friends.

On 4 May 1957, a memorial service for Norman was held at Gakushi Kaikan, a campus club at the University of Tokyo. Obtaining permission from External to attend "providing you have an assurance from the sponsors that this meeting will not involve political speeches," Theodore Newton attended the ceremony along with Norman's brother Howard—the only two foreigners at an otherwise all-Japanese affair. The attendees, Newton later recalled, were "a distinguished group of Japanese university heads and professors, of government officials, of writers and artists, of cultural representatives and even of [Norman's] boyhood friends."[1396] The initial list of 65 invitees was a catalogue of some of the best and brightest Japan had to offer.[1397] In addition to all Norman's confederates mentioned thus far—Hani, Maruyama, Nakano, Ōkubo, and Watanabe—the list included many intellectuals who had already played, or would play, key roles in the political ferment sweeping Japan in the 1950s and 1960s.[1398] Among these was recently retired University of Tokyo President Nanbara Shigeru, who gave one of the service's keynote speeches. In January

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[1394] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 16-17; Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 180-181.
[1395] This last point was a reference to the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel *Lucky Dragon Five* after the Bikini Atoll tests in March 1954 (see Chapter 6). See Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 19-21.
[1396] Newton Report, 2; Newton to External, 17 April 1957; External to Newton, et al., 29 April 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1397] Three notable invitees were Kanamori Tokujiko, the Diet Librarian who had visited Canada with the parliamentary delegation back in 1950 (see Chapter 4); Ienaga Saburō, a Marxist historian and author of a 1953 textbook that had forthrightly exposed Japanese war crimes, provoking trouble with the Ministry of Education; and Watanabe Daito, a writer who had published his own book on philosopher Andō Shōeki and who praised Norman after reading *Ando Shoeki and the Anatomy of Japanese Feudalism* as "a possessor of erudite knowledge" who wrote "with a touch of poetical beauty." For this last point, see Watanabe Daito, "My Impressions After Reading *A Forgotten Philosopher: Andō Shōeki*," 4, trans. Ōkubo Genji, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 2, file 22, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB.
[1398] "List of Attendants… Memory of E.H. Norman," R4086, vol. 2, file 26, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.

1951, prior to the Treaty of San Francisco, Nanbara and fellow Norman invitee Takagi Yasaka had delivered a memo to John Foster Dulles on the "present position of Japan." While both men agreed that Japan's new democracy had put down roots, they strenuously protested the ongoing American effort to remilitarize the country. "Japan's act of rearming, at the risk of endangering the cause of democracy and peace in this initial stage of her generations," they asserted, "will entail deplorable effects on moral and intellectual development of her people, especially of the younger generation." Both men, Jennifer Miller argues, "directly challenged the American desire to equate democracy with active support for the U.S.-Japanese alliance, at least its military components."[1399] This was a growing fear among many left-leaning groups in Japan throughout this era. Japanese society was heading towards a reckoning in the late 1950s, and Norman's friends were active participants.

In 1959, the floodgates finally opened. In March, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke announced he was entering into negotiations with Washington to revise the US-Japanese Security Treaty, known locally by its Japanese acronym "Anpo."[1400] Nominally, this act had popular appeal. As part of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, Japan had been compelled to accept a patently unequal security treaty as the price for ending the occupation, a deal later Japanese governments had tried vainly to renegotiate and that Kishi had made a key plank of his foreign policy agenda.[1401] As Mori Haruki, the Gaimushō's Director of American Affairs, told the Canadian Embassy in August 1959, Kishi saw Anpo as "one link in the chain of the free world's defences against communism." Unless ordinary Japanese understood this point, Mori warned, "they might misunderstand the purposes of the proposed revision and see it as a kind of subservience to the U.S.A."[1402] And yet, by mid-1960, Kishi's decision to ram the new treaty through the Diet in defiance of widespread popular anger—

[1399] Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 132-133.
[1400] An abbreviation of "Nichibei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku."
[1401] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 11-12; Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 192.
[1402] R. Duder to USSEA, 19 August 1959, R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-1, DEAF, LAC.

and before President Eisenhower himself was scheduled to visit Japan—proved disastrous. By this time, the Japanese public had become increasingly cynical of Kishi's motives. A former member of the wartime Japanese cabinet of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki and purged as a war criminal in 1945, Kishi had been rehabilitated after the end of the occupation and was made prime minister himself in February 1957. If that sordid history was not dubious enough, it was compounded by Kishi's highhanded actions in 1958, when he had similarly attempted (but failed) to push a bill through the Diet that would have expanded the police's powers to conduct warrantless searches and seizures, once again invoking images of the prewar police state for many Japanese.[1403]

When the revised treaty was finally introduced to the Diet, the result was chaos. In graphic scenes that stunned Japanese and foreigners alike, Tokyo was the site of massive, daily, and often violent demonstrations. Most were led by students, but they were often joined by union members, intellectuals, women's groups, and even ordinary citizens shouting slogans like "Anpo Hantai!" [Down with Anpo!] and "Kishi Taose" [Topple Kishi!]. About 30 million Japanese, nearly a third of the population, participated in some form of protest between 1959 and 1960. Deepening this sense of crisis were several high-profile assassinations, including that of socialist politician Asanuma Inejirō. Since his return from touring Canada and the United States in 1950 (see Chapter 4), Asanuma had been elected chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party when, during a debate on 12 October 1960, a right-wing fanatic stabbed him to death on live television. But most spectacular of all, on the evening of 15 June, a stunned television audience watched as protestors stormed the Diet, their running battle with baton-wielding policemen lasting well into the night. When it was over, thousands lay injured and one female protester was dead. The Anpo Protests, as they became popularly known, were the largest sustained protest movement in Japanese history.[1404]

[1403] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 2, 17-18.
[1404] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 1, 252-255; Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 191-192.

And Norman's friends were in the vanguard. Among the attendees to his memorial service in 1957 was literary critic Katō Shūichi. "I learned to enjoy English literature," Katō wrote later, "not through my Tokyo middle school but from Herbert Norman." In his memoirs, Katō recalled seeing Norman in Paris in 1951. "It would be a good idea if you'd read *Abinger Harvest*," Norman recommended. "I'm sure you'd like it."[1405] Taking up the essays, Katō found them a delight, going on "to read as many of E.M. Forster's works as I could get hold of." Norman, he concluded, was a good friend: "In addition to his subtle intellectual refinement, he was extraordinarily sensitive to the feelings of others with whom he was conversing." During the heady days of 1960, "I personally hoped to see the abolition rather than the revision of the security treaty," Katō admitted. "Therefore I followed the lead of like-minded senior colleagues and friends … in a symposium to voice our criticism of the government's policy," publishing their results in the magazine *Sekai*.[1406]

Nor was Katō the only critic of Anpo among Norman's friends. In 1959, Maruyama Masao and Tsuru Shigeto—the latter now returned from teaching at Harvard—issued a declaration as part of the lobby group Heidankai decrying Kishi's actions.[1407] Another Norman well-wisher in 1957 was the popular literature professor Takeuchi Yoshimi. After listening to Kishi ram Anpo through the Diet on the radio in May 1960, he consulted with his colleagues and promptly resigned from Tokyo Metropolitan University. The act made headlines and Takeuchi went on to pen a blunt polemic entitled "Democracy or Dictatorship?" Following in his footsteps was Tsurumi Shunsuke, another friend of Norman's who also quit his university in protest.[1408] Years later, while visiting

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[1405] Norman also suggested the book to Maruyama Masao, gifting him a copy during his 1955 visit to Japan. Maruyama wrote later that "much of its excellence is lost on me." Still, he felt it "a fitting symbol of Norman's last days that he should have been fond of Forster, a man who continued the best traditions of European liberalism and had, moreover, a humane affection and understanding for the East." See Maruyama, "An Affection for the Lesser Names," 250.

[1406] Katō Shūichi, *A Sheep's Song: A Writer's Reminiscences of Japan and the World*, trans. Chia-Ning Chang (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 330-333, 399-400.

[1407] Rikki Kersten, *Democracy and Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy* (London: Routledge, 1996), 205-206.

[1408] Kersten, *Democracy and Postwar Japan*, 209; Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 154-155.

Montreal in 1979, Tsurumi discovered a 1958 textbook used in Quebec schools stated categorically that "Japan has no great literature. No one has dared to write anything that might offend the upper classes." That, he observed, was "factually wrong even in 1958," citing as an example not only the classic *Tale of Genji*, but also, more eclectically, "the egalitarian social thought of Andō Shōeki in the middle of the Edo period, who work was highly esteemed by E.H. Norman, a Canadian historian."[1409] The shadow of Herbert Norman clearly loomed large over the "Anpo generation." Certainly, one should not exaggerate his importance; none of the students who stormed the Diet in June 1960 likely had Herbert Norman on their mind while they did so. Nor was Norman's suicide the straw that broke the camel's back. Yet, his death <u>*was*</u> one more straw on the already tottering pile of mid-1950s Japanese antipathy towards the United States, one that had an outsized effect on the Japanese intellectuals who would play so prominent a role in the Anpo Protests.

Yet, few foreign onlookers appreciated this larger history. While Eisenhower was certainly a supporter of Japan, as Nick Kapur notes, "his administration, taken as a whole, tended to make major decisions affecting the course of the US-Japan alliance in a unilateral fashion, with little or no consideration for Japanese feelings." His ambassador to Tokyo in 1960, Douglas MacArthur II, "routinely laced his cables with derogatory language toward his Japanese counterparts," submitting them, much as his famous uncle often had, "to lengthy, monological harangues."[1410] Canadian reporting on the protests was not much better. In September 1960, External Affairs sent a long cable to the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo presenting its own explanation of events. While Kishi received his fair share of the blame, the report also lambasted in rather condescending terms, "the undignified role played by Japanese intellectuals and by the Japanese press":

> Although Japan's geographic insularity has been broken by the facilities of modern communications the same is not true of the mental insularity of the Japanese

[1409] Tsurumi Shunsuke, *A Cultural History of Postwar Japan, 1945–1980* (London: Kegan Paul, 1987), 125-126.
[1410] Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 38-40.

> intellectuals [*sic*] class whose members heatedly debate theories thirty to fifty years behind the trend of thought of their contemporaries in the West. Intellectuals with a socialist turn of wind were harshly suppressed in the two decades before the Surrender so that the post-war freedoms of expression acted as a heady narcotic which numbed their senses to the factual realities of the mid 20th-Century world. […] The universities and periodical press in Japan are rife with the debates and doctrines of these impractical theoreticians…[1411]

There was, Edwin Reischauer later concluded in *Foreign Affairs*, "a weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition elements in Japan." Yet even he argued that a lot of blame rested on "Japanese intellectuals for being so unrealistic."[1412] In 1961, the incoming Kennedy administration sent Reischauer to Tokyo as its ambassador, partly on the strength of his *Foreign Affairs* article. Yet in Japan, as historian Roger Brown notes, Reischauer exhibited a "paternalistic self-confidence" towards the Japanese and seemed to regard his role as being "more *sensei* (teacher) than diplomat."[1413] It is deeply ironic that had Norman lived, his left-leaning sensibilities and wide contacts among Japan's "mentally insular" intelligentsia might have offered Western policymakers a more nuanced evaluation of events. As time would show, far from being out of touch with "the factual realities of the mid 20th-Century world," the Japan of 1960 was ahead of the curve with its mix of student radicalism, public killings, and lurid TV coverage. Americans would have to wait until 1968 for their own annus horribilis.[1414] In the end, as scholar Cyril Powles notes, the affinity of Japanese intellectuals for Norman rested on "a feeling of mutual interdependence between the two sides—Japanese and foreigner—in which each exchanged ideas

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[1411] "The Japan-United States Security Treaty and the Accompanying Political Disorder in Japan," 13 September 1960, R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-2, part 1, DEAF, LAC.

[1412] Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," *Foreign Affairs* 39, no. 1 (October 1960): 25. A copy of Reischauer's "excellent article" was delivered to the Canadian Embassy by External that same month. See USSEA to Canadian Embassy Tokyo, 31 October 1960, R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-2, part 1, DEAF, LAC.

[1413] Roger H. Brown, "Cold War Ambassador: Edwin O. Reischauer and the 'Broken Dialogue' with Japan," *Saitama University Review* 41, no. 1 (April 2005): 116-117, 121-123.

[1414] The Anpo Protests would be a source of inspiration to Western protestors in the years that followed. The so-called Japanese "snake dance," where protestors would link arms and run back and forth across the street like a weaving snake to take up space and keep the watching police at a distance, would later be tried by many US and European protestors, with often mixed results. American students, for one, tried and failed to do it while protesting at Chicago's Democratic National Convention in 1968. See Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 3-4.

as equals, neither side having a sense of getting less than it gave."[1415] For all his skill as a historian, this was not a connection that the more didactic Reischauer could possibly make; he preached from the pulpit while Norman mingled more modestly amongst his intended parishioners.

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By 1957, Japanese-Canadian relations were at a crossroads. For both nations, the year saw elections that brought in new governments and a changing of the guard. In Japan, as already noted, the controversial Kishi Nobusuke was appointed prime minister in February 1957, replacing the recently elected—and seriously ill—Ishibashi Tanzan. Kishi, as the Canadian Embassy observed, had been "rather closely questioned" by the opposition parties "regarding his wartime record." But the new prime minister had waved off the criticism, claiming that since the war he had "completely reconsidered the situation" and thought that Japan "should be guided by democratic policies." "We have no way of assessing Kishi's sincerity," the Embassy admitted; his "true measure" would have to wait until he eventually formed his cabinet.[1416] Back in Ottawa, the federal election in June saw the Liberals out of power for the first time since 1935, replaced by John Diefenbaker's Conservatives. Here too the shadow of Herbert Norman loomed large, for Diefenbaker had gotten good political mileage out of flaying Pearson and the Liberals over their handling of his case.[1417]

In Tokyo, Ambassador T.C. Davis was also gone, soon to be replaced by William Bull.[1418] But before his exit, and to Davis's surprise, he was invited by Kishi to a farewell dinner. Joined at the prestigious Mitsui Club by Theodore Newton and Canadian Trade Commissioner J.L. Mutter, "Kishi arose and proposed our health." His remarks, as Davis noted with some surprise, "were very[,] very laudatory stressing as they did the need for friendship between this country and

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[1415] Cyril Powles, "E.H. Norman and Japan," in *E.H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship*, ed. Roger W. Bowen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 16.
[1416] T.C. Davis to SSEA, 1 March 1957, R219, vol. 6867, file 4606-40, part 10.1, DEAF, LAC.
[1417] Bowen, *Innocence Is Not Enough*, 351-353.
[1418] See Norman Cribbens, "Former Ambassador Arrives to Retire," *Victoria Daily Times*, 1 May 1957, 21.

Canada" and ending with praise for C.D. Howe's recent visit "in kindly terms." As Davis noted in his final letter from Tokyo to his wife, both history and Japan were moving on:

> In the old days I would think that Japan held little interest to the tourist. In those days, in any event, we didn't have tourists in the modern sense. There were always a few people travelling about the world. They were the inquisitive few. Now, led by the nomadic Americans there is a river of them flowing about the world. They are as yet largely Americans, with an ever-increasing flow of Canadians. Canadians, I suppose, have contracted the disease from the U.S.A. and now, in proportion to population, we seem to be producing more tourists than any of them. […] Japan is rapidly moving back into a position of importance in the world. Resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia has resulted in her admission to the United Nations. She is aggressively trying to resume her importance and place in the Asiatic world. She is the greatest industrial power in all Asia. […] The Westerner knows that this is at long last a democracy where every democratic freedom is preserved. […] Insofar as a Canadian Mission is concerned, we have more visitors than any other post I have been in.[1419]

Canada's Tokyo Embassy—as Newton himself griped in a self-described "personal screed charged with observations, complaints, and felicitations" to Arthur Menzies—was busier than ever:

> With the creation of many new missions in Tokyo adding to the plethora of national fetes and their personnel spawning an ever-growing number of parties, the social and ceremonial demands of diplomatic life here have increased madly even since our arrival. Peg [Newton's wife] and I already had a full plate of our own responsibilities, and now with the Ambassador's disappearance, we rarely have a free evening at home following the daily diet of cocktail parties. (Bull should be adequately warned.) Recently, what with the endless farewell parties for the Davises, […] the entertainment of our Navy personnel, the visits of two Prime Ministers […], the swelling number of Canadian visitors demanding attention atop normal duties, we have felt wan and worn as never before. Nor have the fast footwork of Kishi and the repercussions of the Norman tragedy helped in any degree.[1420]

This was a complaint that made Herbert Norman's 1949 admission that "the number of Canadians in this area has increased to such an extent we feel it would be impractical to try and have them all for dinner near Christmas Day as was our custom before" look tame by comparison.[1421] Japan's

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[1419] Davis to Lu, 1 March 1957, 12, 4, MG 373, box 1, Davis Family fonds, USaskA.
[1420] Newton to Menzies, 1 May 1957, R4086, vol. 2, file 21, Theodore F.M. Newton fonds, LAC.
[1421] Norman to Mrs. C. Norman, 6 December 1949, RBSC-ARC-1406, box 1, file 6, E. Herbert Norman fonds, UBCRB. "Excluding Canadian officers attached to the Occupation Force and Canadian repatriates of Japanese origin," 79 Canadians were in Japan by November 1946. By 1959, there were 1,200, its sixth largest group of foreign residents. See "Extract from Report… for the Year Ended December 31, 1946," [undated], R15615, vol. 29, file 9, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC; Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific* (Oakville, ON: Mosaic, 1983), 130.

geopolitical importance was clearly on the rise by 1957, as was Canada's presence in the country and the corresponding responsibilities of the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo.

The winds of change were also at work within External Affairs. In November 1957, Arthur Menzies was tasked with briefing the latest cohort of Canadian Foreign Service officers about the work being done in External's new Far Eastern Division. East Asian societies were undergoing "tremendous changes," Menzies lectured his new hires, "as teeming populations achieve political independence and seek to quickly catch up with the advanced industrialized nations of the West." The result was a battle of ideas between Chinese "Communists," American "Anti-Communists," and Indian-led "Neutralists." Nor was this just a problem for other nations, Menzies added sternly: "Canada as a member of [the] world community [is] compelled to take [an] interest in Asia." By 1957, Canada had already entered the "Pacific phase of World War II," fought in the Korean War, and contributed to the Colombo Plan. What's more, there was also Canada's relationship with the Americans to consider. After all, "Canada could hardly avoid involvement in a major war in which the U.S. became engaged in the Pacific because of our geographical location and the identity of our essential security interests." This included US efforts at "Keeping Japan on the Western side and denying its industrial plant and trained manpower to the Communists." Canada was a rising "Pacific Power," and its trade was growing with the region. In 1956, it sent $200 million worth of exports to Asia, of which "Japan took $128 million." Imports, in turn, equalled $150 million, with $60 million from Japan. A thornier problem was immigration. "Charges of racial discrimination, labour problems and security problems," Menzies noted tactfully, "have plagued us."[1422]

It was the goal of the Far Eastern Division, Menzies continued, to foster these growing ties. This included responsibilities "for reporting by [the] Canadian Embassy in Japan and giving advice

[1422] A.R. Menzies, "Notes for a Talk on the Work of the Far Eastern Division for New Foreign Service Officers," 1-9, 26 November 1957, R15615, vol. 30, file 19, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.

on [a] wide range of Japanese problems." But fear not, he assured his likely anxious listeners: Most work "requires no special background." Still, a knowledge of East Asia "may be acquired in [the] same way as one would acquire information about any other area of study, through [the] reading of books in English and French." Along with some general surveys, Menzies recommended Arthur Lower's *Canada and the Far East – 1940*, Henry Angus's *Canada and the Far East, 1940–1953*, as well as the articles in the IPR journals *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*.[1423] And for those inclined to make a career in the Far Eastern Division, there was also language training in Japanese and Chinese available, "in order that the Department may have available one officer at a time to serve in Japan and China with a sufficient knowledge of the spoken and written language to be able to supervise translations, serve as interpreter in an emergency, and have more informal access to the people and their way of thinking." Such linguistic abilities were also more important in Asia when compared to Europe, as "The foreign language press is often inadequate and it is necessary to set-up a system for scanning and translating the vernacular press and periodicals."[1424]

After collecting and collating all this information, the Division's ultimate task was to draft "memoranda suggesting a line of Canadian policy on important political questions." In his own career, Menzies explained, he had studied everything from "occupation policies for Japan, as discussed in the Far East Commission in Washington, the Japanese Peace Treaty, the unification of Korea," and even "United Nations participation in the Korean hostilities." Likewise, the division had to liaise and brief other federal departments, and when cabinet ministers chose to visit Asia or attend a conference, "it is necessary to prepare background briefs to assist them to understand the

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[1423] See Arthur Reginald Marsden Lower, *Canada and the Far East – 1940* (New York: IPR, 1940); H.F. Angus, *Canada and the Far East, 1940–1953* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953). A few years later, in January 1961, *Pacific Affairs* would move from the now defunct IPR headquarters in New York to the University of British Columbia, following ex-IPR Secretary William Holland when he was appointed head of UBC's new Department of Asian Studies. The journal remains in print as of this writing. See "Transfer of International IPR Headquarters and Pacific Affairs to Canada," *Far Eastern Survey* 29, no. 12 (December 1960): 192.

[1424] Menzies, "Notes for a Talk… for New Foreign Service Officers," 10-13.

problems of the countries they are visiting, the Canadian interests there, and to suggest lines for public statements, and private conversations." Public relations were also key: "journalists desiring to write about the Far East or intending to visit the area can be helped by [a] background briefing." Menzies might very well have had in mind his own briefing for the Canadians attending the 1955 International Chamber of Commerce meeting in Tokyo with this last comment (see Chapter 7). In short, if you joined the Far Eastern Division of External Affairs, you never had a dull life.[1425]

With all the proceeding history under our belts, what can we ultimately conclude about the Canadian pursuit of a "Far Eastern Policy" in the years between 1941 and 1957? At its most basic level, we can unequivocally detect the initial stirrings of a larger pan-Canadian interest towards the region. Before the Pacific War, as the Toronto branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs wrote in a brief for the Canadians attending the IPR's 1945 Hot Springs conference (see Chapter 2), "Canadian interest in the Far East could be quantitatively measured in terms of the relative distance of a given part of Canada from the Orient." In short, any "Far Eastern Problem" that could "cause a riot in British Columbia, might perhaps inspire a sub-headline in Winnipeg but could scarcely raise a ripple in Nova Scotia."[1426] However, if true, over the course of the war and its immediate aftermath attitudes had clearly changed, as numerous contemporary events show.

First, there was the treatment of Japanese-Canadians. In 1941, most Japanese immigrants to Canada lived in coastal British Columbia and the issue of their presence was solely a local one. Yet, when the decision was made to finally deport them in 1945, as historian Ann Gomer Sunahara put it, "King and his cabinet failed to realize that the fate of Japanese Canadians was no longer just a British Columbia concern." Dispersed across the country in 1942, their plight was increasingly witnessed by Canadian onlookers in all nine provinces, and many did not like what they saw. In

[1425] Menzies, "Notes for a Talk… for New Foreign Service Officers," 13-17. See also Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 3.
[1426] *A Canadian View of the Pacific* (Toronto: CIIA, 1945), 1.

1942, the Japanese-Canadians had been "virtually friendless, pariahs libelled as traitors. By 1945, however, they had made some very determined friends."[1427] By this point, as historian Stephanie Bangarth observes, "Japanese Canadians could claim organized support from Canadians in all provinces, with the exception of those in Atlantic Canada."[1428] And even in the Maritimes, feelings of sympathy were by no means unknown.[1429] What's more, as historian Patricia Roy contends, the future of the Japanese-Canadians was also "a major stimulus to the development of a human rights movement in Canada."[1430] By the late 1950s, then, an issue that clearly did "cause a riot in British Columbia" was now being debated across Canada and had repercussions at the national level.

Second, there is the fate of C Force veterans. While recruited mainly from Quebec and Manitoba, both the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadier incorporated soldiers from all nine provinces.[1431] As seen in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong Veterans Association of Canada was able to mobilize considerable public support from across the Dominion to support their claims for Pacific pay. And while some veterans kept their experiences and feelings bottled up, many felt an urge to tell their friends and relatives what had happened overseas. Returning to his home of Charlottetown in October 1945, C Force officer Francis O'Neill gave many "stirring addresses" to rapt Islanders. "For ninety minutes Huck held a large audience" from the local Charlottetown Gyro Club "in close attention while he related his experiences during the epic but ill-fated Battle of

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[1427] Ann Gomer Sunahara's *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981), 131.
[1428] Stephanie D. Bangarth, *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in North America, 1942–49* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2.
[1429] In Prince Edward Island, for instance, the Japanese-Canadian Mizunos found temporary accommodations with the local Callbeck family. Louise Callbeck, a former missionary in Japan, would vocally defend the Japanese-Canadians, attacking forcefully the "old familiar appeals to self-interest and racial prejudice." See Wayne MacKinnon, "I Was a Stranger and You Welcomed Me: The Story of the Callbeck Sisters and the Mizunos," *The Island Magazine*, 84 (Fall/Winter 2019): 15-23. See also Louise Callbeck, "Japanese Residents," *Charlottetown Guardian*, 17 May 1945, 4; British Subject, "Japanese Residents," *Charlottetown Guardian*, 19 May 1945, 4; W.I. Green, "Japs and Miss Callbeck," *Charlottetown Guardian*, 25 May 1945, 4.
[1430] Patricia E. Roy, *The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941–1967* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 188.
[1431] Somewhat ironically, BC was one of the provinces underrepresented in the unit. See Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 4.

Hong Kong and later in the hands of his Nipponese captors." It was, the *Charlottetown Guardian* declared, "a unique experience, giving as it did, a moving picture of what transpired during the course of the long confinement."[1432] Many Canadians were a little *too* interested in the veterans' stories. More than one ex-POW voiced ire at Canadians for their desire to have them continually relate "atrocity porn."[1433] "Their reluctance to speak should be respected," the *Montreal Gazette* wrote in rebuke to this morbid obsession.[1434] Such prying reflected poorly on ordinary Canadians, but it does not suggest a lack of emotional investment in Asian affairs.

Third, there is Canada's growing economic links with Japan outside the customary cross-Pacific market with British Columbia. As studied in Chapter 7, Canada's Department of Trade and Commerce was swamped in the late 1940s by companies eager to renew their ties with the Japanese market. Ensconced in Toronto, the new Japan Trade Centre was also dispatching a steady flow of trade missions across the country by 1956. As Tokyo Trade Commissioner J.L. Mutter reported, 1957 was a great year for shipments of Prairie grain to Japan. "The Australian crop failure of 1957 combined with U.S. action withholding wheat sales under Public Law 480 have given Canada, for the present at least, a solid advantage in wheat and barley sales to this country," his annual report noted cheerily. "Japan must import raw material to survive and while she will go a long way to find cheaper sources in such areas as Mainland China and South East Asia, the quality of Canadian products combined with our stability and the proximity of Canada gives us a distinct advantage."

[1432] "At Gyro," *Guardian of the Gulf*, 5 March 1946, 5. Cf. "Kinsmen Meeting," *Guardian of the Gulf*, 1 March 1946, 5. The content of O'Neill's lectures can be gleaned from the surviving speech he delivered on local radio for the 1946 Red Cross Campaign, in which he discussed what he had witnessed quite candidly. See Francis O'Neill, Red Cross – POW Talk, [1946], acc.5020, file 23, Frank G. O'Neill fonds, PAROPEI.

[1433] "All people cared about was the atrocities," Rifleman Donald Geraghty later recollected. "If you tried to tell them anything else, they lost interest and turned away." On arriving in Canada, the reporters were "bloodthirsty," William Allister later wrote savagely, "Pressing me to describe a beating." "'Is that all?' 'Well—I thought that was enough.' Too mild. 'No, no, don't you have something with more kick to it? Something really gruesome.' Vultures." See Daniel G. Dancocks, *In Enemy Hands: Canadian Prisoners of War, 1939–45* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983), 280; William Allister, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989), 235.

[1434] "The Royal Rifles Come Home," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 12 October 1945, 8.

The results of this development were also seen in the trade enquiries received by Mutter's staff, a "cursory study" of which indicated that "Japan and Korea are increasingly looking to Canada as a source of supply of essential raw materials."[1435] Indeed, the decision to appoint William Bull as Canada's new ambassador to Japan was a telling sign of this deepening trade. The Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, a former member of the Canadian Wheat Board, and a man regarded as "C.D. Howe's work-horse," Bull's appointment was well received by Prairie grain-growers.[1436] Regina's *Leader-Post*, for one, praised the selection of "a man well-versed in such problems as wheat exports," one who also held "an astute eye for developing trade possibilities." In any case, "with the possibility of increasing trade to Red China and other Asian countries in the near future, Japan is regarded as a key observation post to detect trends and trading openings."[1437] "Vancouver businessmen seeking an outlet for expansion would be well advised to look hard at Japan," the *Vancouver Sun* agreed in August 1957, noting that Japan's trade with the United States and Canada had risen "about 100 per cent in the past two or three years." After all, "Japan seems to hold more promise than the Red China market would even if the political embargoes were ended."[1438]

And yet, time and again numerous Canadians have discounted these ties, including many historians, a fact easily seen in their treatment of those Canadians who did in fact have professional or personal interests in Asia. Take Brooke Claxton. In his 1993 biography of the defence minister, historian David Bercuson claimed "Claxton did not want Canada to become involved in the Korean War in any significant way," and had rebuffed the appeal of Edgar Tarr—the Asian-focused former head of the CIIA (see Chapter 2)—that Canada involve itself. This is all uncontroversial. What is more dubious is Bercuson's assertion that Claxton was "a North Atlantic man":

[1435] "Annual Report… 1957," 2, 8, 4 February 1958, R208, vol. 1491, file 18-1-39, DTCF, LAC.
[1436] Pringsheim, *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, 126.
[1437] "Significant Appointment," *Leader-Post* (Regina), 7 March 1957, 17.
[1438] "Japan Looks Good," *Vancouver Sun*, 9 August 1957, 4.

> Since the beginning in the 1920s of Canada's control over its own foreign affairs, the nation's attention had, not unnaturally, been directed towards the United States and Europe. That was where the ancestors of the bulk of Canada's population came from, the source and direction of most of its trade, and the birthplace of its social, cultural, and political institutions. Canada's involvement with Asia had been both limited and painful. Hong Kong had been the scene of one of Canada's most disastrous military escapades. Canadians knew little of Asia and, for the most part, cared less. It was, therefore, wholly consistent with Claxton's own upbringing, experience, and background that he would think of war in Korea as an unwise adventure that would detract from what, for Canada, needed to be the main show—Europe.[1439]

The argument has some truth to it. But, as I have shown, it is false that Claxton's "upbringing" had left him ignorant and uninformed about Asia. As noted, Claxton was an early member of the CIIA and had attended the IPR's Mont Tremblant conference in 1942 (see Chapter 2). He had also been Canada's envoy to the Canberra Conference in 1947 (see Chapter 5), both facts that Bercuson fails to mention. And even on Korea, whatever his private doubts, Claxton was still compelled to bring the Canadian military into a state of readiness for an Asian war. In the House of Commons on 26 June 1950, he admitted that Canadian naval deployments to Europe would be affected by the war at the same time Lester Pearson stated ardently—and in keeping with prior claims that Canada was a "Pacific power"—that "if there is trouble in the Pacific, Canada will be affected just as quickly as if there is trouble in the Atlantic," a quote immediately picked up and magnified by the press.[1440] Claxton, simply, was not as much of a Pacific neophyte as Bercuson makes him out to be.

Or take Henry Angus. As we have seen, Angus played a not insignificant role in the conduct of Canadian relations with Japan, particularly by opposing the internment of Japanese-Canadians

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[1439] David J. Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898–1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 210-211.

[1440] *House of Commons Debates*, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session, vol. 4 (26 July 1950): 4128; Arthur Blakely, "Korean War Affects Us Claxton Warns House," *The Gazette*, 27 June 1950, 1-2. Moreover, in contrast to Bercuson's claims, many sources indicate significant Canadian support for the war. As CIPO noted in August 1950, 59% of Canadians thought Ottawa should send material aid, while a plurality of 34% thought it should also send troops. Elsewhere, Andrea Quaiattini has argued that there was more debate on Canadian involvement during the war's opening stages, as reflected in newspaper coverage, than the conventional narrative allows. See Mildred Strunk, "The Quarter's Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1950/51): 804; Andrea Quaiattini, "Hot Off the Presses in the Cold War: Canadian Newspaper Editorial Coverage of the Korean War, 1950–1951" (MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 2010).

(see Chapter 1), as a key Canadian attendee at the IPR's wartime conferences (see Chapter 2), and as a noted postwar commentator on Japanese and other Asian affairs, including the creation of the Colombo Plan in 1950 and Japan's bid to join the GATT in 1955 (see Chapter 7).[1441] Yet, this fact was not reflected in the 1961 festschrift edited for him by friends and students. In his preface to the volume, editor Robert Clark noted correctly that Angus was interested in many fields, including "Canada's relations with the Far East, civil liberties and the position of Oriental minorities in Canada." Yet, despite his argument that contributors "each chose a topic in which Dean Angus is interested," not one essay discussed Canadian ties with Asia.[1442] This even though, according to the book's bibliography of Angus's 78 published works, three of his six books and 31 of his articles and pamphlets were explicitly focused on Asia or Asian immigration to Canada.[1443]

Finally, there is the career of Victoria MP Robert Mayhew, Canada's first ambassador to Japan in 1952. In many accounts, Mayhew's appointment is portrayed as a cynical bit of political maneuvering. As the Liberal Party insider J.W. Pickersgill wrote in his memoirs, by 1952 Mayhew "was well liked but, because of his age and the relative isolation of his constituency, Victoria, from the rest of the province, was failing to keep in touch with the party organization, and the members were becoming discouraged." Yet, given his faithful services to the Party since 1937, there were concerns about taking "the conventional course" of kicking him upstairs to the Senate. As a result, he was instead accredited to Tokyo.[1444] "Are ambassadorships, like appointments to the Bench and

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[1441] In yet another example, Angus contributed to a symposium with Nik Cavell and J.H. Warren on the merits of the Colombo Plan in 1954. See H.F. Angus, "Political Aims and Effects," *Queen's Quarterly* 61 (1954): 337-344.
[1442] Robert M. Clark, *Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), vii. There was, however, a scintillating essay on "Telephone Rates in Canada."
[1443] Clark, *Canadian Issues*, 367-371. Nor did any reviewer of the book mention this lacuna. See, for examples, Colin Sabiston, "Canadian Issues Clearly Examined," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1961, 17; Frank H. Underhill, review of *Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus*, by Robert M. Clark, *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 28, no. 3 (August 1962): 445-446.
[1444] J.W. Pickersgill, *Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir* (Markham, ON: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1994), 383-384. Cf. the version related in J.W. Pickersgill, *My Years with Louis St. Laurent: A Political Memoir* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 175-176.

the Senate, now to become a means of retiring political veterans?" the *Globe and Mail* sniffed in an editorial soon after. "If the job in Tokyo is important enough to warrant a full Ambassador, it is too important to use for political juggling."[1445]

Yet, this is not the whole story. For one, compared to many of his fellow BC MPs, Mayhew was not a fanatic Japanophobe. While he had been no less anxious to see the Japanese-Canadians interned in 1942—abetting the conspiracy theory that they could have "already cached munitions and arms of various kinds in different places"—Mayhew would only weigh into the issue a handful of times and remained adamant that it must be done "in units of families, because this was the most humane way of treating them."[1446] It was a fact that paid Mayhew dividends when the cabinet seat of fisheries minister opened in 1948. As the post was earmarked for a British Columbian, it was a tossup between Mayhew and Thomas Reid, the ardent bigot who had done more than any other MP to help incite the internment in 1942 (see Chapter 1). Reid had his friends in Ottawa; Louis St. Laurent, for one, supplied his name to Prime Minister W.L.M. King. Yet, Reid was, as Pickersgill himself noted distastefully, "the most virulent anti-Japanese member in the House."[1447] It was no contest; both Pickersgill and King felt Mayhew was the best candidate, the only British Columbian MP, in the prime minister's words, who "commands the respect of all."[1448] It was in this post that Mayhew joined many of Ottawa's missions to Asia, attending both the Colombo Conference with Lester Pearson in 1950 and the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 (see Chapter 5). Mayhew was thus well versed in Asian affairs. "I know that this is a great honour and many would gladly have taken my place," a contrite Mayhew wrote Prime Minister St. Laurent upon his posting

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[1445] "The Cabinet Shuffle," *Globe and Mail*, 17 October 1952, 6.
[1446] See *House of Commons Debates*, 19th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 1 (9 February 1942 & 29 July 1942): 433-435; 4943-4944; *House of Commons Debates*, 20th Parliament, 3rd Session, vol. 3 (23 April 1947): 2353-2354.
[1447] Pickersgill, *Seeing Canada Whole*, 302.
[1448] "W.L.M. King Diaries, entry 9 June 1948, R10383, William Lyon Mackenzie King fonds, LAC. "Mayhew was not brilliant," Pickersgill admitted in his memoirs, "but he had great common sense and a genuinely liberal outlook." See Pickersgill, *Seeing Canada Whole*, 302.

to Tokyo. "I know too that there are many problems and that some of them are going to be difficult … I will do my very best to carry out the wishes of the Department and try to send back all the information possible on which the Department can safely base its opinion."[1449] Mayhew was as good as his word. As seen, he did not take his ambassadorship lightly, briskly travelling the country to burnish Canada's good image (see Chapters 6-7). What Herbert Norman or Arthur Menzies had in experience Mayhew at least made up for with sheer enthusiasm.

The careers of all three men—Claxton, Angus, and Mayhew—suggest that not only did Canada indeed have a well-established relationship with Japan and an emerging Pacific policy by the late 1950s, but also that Ottawa had a cohort of experienced officials to help manage it too. On the eve of the Pacific War, as journalist Pat Brethour observed in 1995, "To many Canadians, Asia and the Pacific seemed a world away." Yet, by the war's end, not only had the country "emerged as a middle power with an interest in world affairs, especially in Asia," but also Canadians "had created individual slices of history in the Pacific." The "Fight Against Japan," as his subtitle ran a touch melodramatically, had decisively "Ended Canadian Ignorance about Asia."[1450]

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And what of the Far Eastern Mandarins? In 1947, Hugh Keenleyside left the diplomatic service entirely, becoming Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources as well as the Commissioner for the Northwest Territories until 1950. After that his career varied widely. Until 1958, he worked for the United Nations, then as chairman of the British Columbia Power Commission. He finally retired from public service in 1969. "It has sometimes been suggested," Keenleyside wrote in his memoirs, "that my attitude in connection with the problems of the anti-Japanese furore in British Columbia was the explanation for a change in attitude towards me of the Prime Minister," and as

[1449] Mayhew to St. Laurent, 19 November 1952, R11214, vol. 118, file J-11-4, vol 1, Louis St. Laurent fonds, LAC.
[1450] Pat Brethour, "Coming of Age in the Pacific War," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 August 1995, B3.

a result his posting to Mexico City in 1945 was thus a promotion "out of the way" that derailed his career.[1451] If it was, Keenleyside did not share a grudge, at least not publicly. When a colleague wrote to commiserate this apparent relegation, Keenleyside quickly found the silver lining: "I must be thankful that I fell into such disfavour. If I had been appointed to the Under Secretaryship, for example, I would probably not have left the diplomatic service when I did. This in turn would probably have meant that my later activities would not have been as varied, as interesting and, I venture to hope, as useful as they turned out to be."[1452] In 1981 and 1982, Keenleyside published his memoirs in two volumes. If somewhat self-indulgent—one might ask why a bureaucrat who never reached a position higher than departmental head really needed over 1,000 pages to tell his story—Keenleyside's recollections still offer a readable and a well-corroborated look at Ottawa's upper echelons, and of Canada's early ties with Japan. As literary scholar Susan Fisher argues, the "rhetorical strategy" of the memoirs' first volume, *Hammer the Golden Day*, was less to passively describe Japan than to "demolish myths." Clichés about Asian mysticism or sensualism are quickly discarded with anecdotes drawn from Keenleyside's own career. Yet, as Fisher concludes, despite posing as a "demythologizer, Keenleyside does not engage in Japan-bashing," a noteworthy fact given the prevalence of such "bashing" in North American society during the 1980s.[1453]

In 1979, Keenleyside visited Japan one last time, this time to celebrate 50 years of formal Japanese-Canadian relations. There, Keenleyside visited the now vintage Canadian Embassy; paid a visit to Princess Chichibu, the prince's widow; and took a tour to Nikkō and Lake Chūzenji with its cluster of diplomatic residencies. "The original British summer embassy was little changed,"

[1451] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:179.
[1452] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:180-181.
[1453] Susan Fisher, "'Our Next Neighbour Across the Way': Japan and Canadian Writers," *Canadian Literature* 174 (2002): 35-36. For his own views on life in Japan, see Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 1: chapters 8-11, passim. With its 1980s "economic miracle," fears that Japan was fleecing Western nations—and the US in particular—were a common accusation by many commentators. See Andrew C. McKevitt, *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), passim, esp. chapter 1.

he wrote with surprise, "although our old house on the shore of the lake had long been superseded by a housing development." It was not the only intrusion: "Between Nikkō and Tokyo the Japanese countryside had been heavily invaded by industry," he noted sadly, "but in the mountains much of the old beauty still remained." Overall, "The whole visit had been a delightful experience."[1454] "When my turn comes at last," Keenleyside wrote in the last chapter of his memoirs, "I shall hope to meet the end without fear … that there will be something more to follow. If consciousness does survive, at least my curiosity will have been satisfied. I may even meet again all I have loved, and shall love, on earth."[1455] Keenleyside died on 27 September 1992, still remembered as the man who had once "represented Canada when it reached out across the Pacific to Japan."[1456]

As for Arthur Menzies, his career at External was just beginning. In 1958, he was appointed Canada's first high commissioner to the newly independent Commonwealth countries of Malaya and Burma. "I have always had the warmest regard for you as a person as well as for your work as a member of our Canadian service," Keenleyside congratulated him when he heard the news. "Your new post should be quite fascinating," he added excitedly. After all, not only would Menzies skills as an Asianist find a perfect outlet, but he was also the man "to do something to tamp-down the flames of bitterness between the coloured, historically exploited, and economically under-developed peoples of Asia on the one hand and our materially successful but generally insensitive Westerners on the other."[1457] Returning home in 1961, Menzies then headed up External's Defence Liaison (1) Division, responsible for dealing with the Department of National Defence on matters of Canadian security. After that, there was a stint in Canberra as high commissioner and a posting to Brussels as Ottawa's Permanent Representative to NATO. As Menzies wrote later, despite his

[1454] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:618-621.
[1455] Keenleyside, *Memoirs*, 2:625. See also Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 5.
[1456] Donn Downey, "Left-of-Centre Diplomat Opened Legation in Japan," *Globe and Mail*, 30 September 1992, C5.
[1457] Keenleyside to Menzies, 20 January 1958, R4217, vol. 25, file 9, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

many years of service in Asia, "I spent as much time, if not more, in Canada, the United States and Europe."[1458] Only in 1976 would Menzies return to China, and this time for the big prize: Canadian Ambassador to Beijing.[1459] It was a dramatic time to return to the land of his youth; Mao Zedong had just died, the Cultural Revolution was coming to an end, and Deng Xiaoping was about to start a new era of "reform and opening-up." In 2009, journalist Paul Gessell still found Menzies able to put on "a marvelously [*sic*] noisy, most undiplomatic imitation" of Deng "hawking into his ever present spittoon while entertaining Pierre Trudeau in the Great Hall of the People." The wise old diplomat, Gessell argued, deserved "plaudits as a quintessentially diplomatic, backroom Cold War negotiator in Europe and as a very visible flag-waving cheerleader for Canada in Asia."[1460]

Yet, despite the other prestigious positions held, Menzies was still asked periodically about both his time in Japan and his friendship with Herbert Norman. It was in Beijing, around the fiftieth anniversary of Japanese-Canadian relations, that Klaus Pringsheim had interrupted the ambassador in 1977 (see Introduction). The following year, Menzies was disturbed by Roger Bowen, who was researching his Norman biography that would become *Innocence Is Not Enough* (1986). "I do not have the time in this active assignment as Ambassador to China to sit down and write long essays as possible offering which may have little relevance to your biography," Menzies responded rather testily. Nevertheless, he still took time to praise Norman's reflections about Japan as "remarkably penetrating." He also suggested Bowen contact Hugh Keenleyside for more information, providing his address.[1461] In 1982, having finished his term in China, Menzies visited Norfolk, Virginia for

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[1458] Arthur Menzies, *Cold Warrior: My Career in International Peace and Western Security, 1962–1982* (Newcastle, ON: Penumbra, 2013), 10.
[1459] See Appx. 1, Con., Fig. 6.
[1460] Paul Gessell, "Diplomatic Core," *Carleton University Magazine*, Fall 2009, 28.
[1461] Bowen to Menzies, 11 January 1978; Menzies to Bowen, 20 February 1978, R15615, vol. 50, file 1, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC. On Menzies's suggestion, Bowen wrote Keenleyside a few weeks later, who offered answers to some specific questions about Norman's career. See Bowen to Keenleyside, 3 March 1978; Keenleyside to Bowen, 6 March 1978, Bowen to Keenleyside 6 April 1978; Keenleyside to Bowen, 11 April 1978, R4217, vol. 22, file 18, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds, LAC.

a symposium at the MacArthur Foundation, built in honour of the famous general. Here, he met Michael Fry, a Canadian historian at the University of Southern California, who was presenting a paper on "The View from Ottawa: Canada and Japan 1947–49." "It was revealing," Menzies later chuckled, "to see my name quoted so often by Professor Fry … and to review my work of more than thirty years ago in the context of the histories that have been written since."[1462] For his part, Menzies contributed a short five-page paper showing the influence that External stalwarts Lester Pearson and Hume Wrong had on his views of Japan. "I have found," he explained in his memoirs, "that historians with access to the [External] files tend to ascribe too much influence to the officers whose initials appear on them," ignorant of the "oral guidance by senior officers that has a strong influence but is not explicitly acknowledged." "I also suggested," he added pointedly, "that the views put forward by Canadians during the Occupation were not just the ideas of officials; they also represented what we thought to be the views of a broad cross-section of Canadians."[1463] It is an assertion I take to heart in this thesis. After a long and successful career, Arthur Menzies died on 4 March 2010, eulogized as a man "instrumental in developing Canada's Pacific identity."[1464]

[1462] Menzies, *Cold Warrior*, 187.
[1463] Menzies, *Cold Warrior*, 188.
[1464] Michael Posner, "For 40 Years an Extraordinary Diplomat for Canada," *Globe and Mail*, 20 March 2010, S11.

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Appendix 1: Images

Introduction



Figure 1: The Pringsheim family in Tokyo, Christmas 1959. Klaus Pringsheim Sr., the noted German composer, is seated at far right while Pringsheim Jr., later the author of *Neighbours Across the Pacific*, is second from left. Also present is Hans-Erik Pringsheim, Pringsheim Sr.'s eldest son, along with Hans-Erik's wife Yuki Inagaki and their two daughters Monika and Yurika.
Source: Elisabeth Mann Borgese fonds, Dalhousie University Archives, MS-2-744, Box 237, Folder 51, Item 8.




Figure 2: Hugh Keenleyside (second from left) stands in formal attire as the second secretary to Canada's new Tokyo Legation, 1929. Also present, from left to right, are Kenneth Kirkwood, third secretary; Herbert Marler, minister; and James Langley, trade commissioner.
Source: Makita Kogabo, LAC, PA-120407.



Figure 3: Arthur Menzies, January 1958.
Source: National Film Board, LAC, PA-134313.



Figure 4: E. Herbert Norman, ca. late 1940s – 1950s
Source: National Film Board, LAC, PA-134317.


Canadian Policy in the Pacific

A. Repel aggression: World War II, Korea
B. Contribute to ~~Peace~~ peaceful settlements – Indochina
C. Applaud SEATO while remaining outside it
+ recognizing difficulty in excluding Pacific Powers
D) Recognize the force of new nationalisms
– encourage development of national
movements along democratic lines
for our sakes + to keep them from
falling under Communist control +
menacing our security.
E. Friendly relations with Commonwealth Asian partners
F. – recognize contribution India can
make to peace.
F. Understand Chinese revolution
G. Colombo Plan + UN Aid
H Trade promotion – agreement with Japan.
I No substantial Asian immigration

Figure 5: The original handwritten copy of Menzies outline of Canada's policy objectives for the Asia-Pacific region, ca. 1954.
Source: Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC, R15615, vol. 29, file 8.




Figure 6: "The Double Magnetic Field." Contrary to the Eurocentric approach of later historians, many contemporaries explicitly linked Canadian policymaking in Asia with that of Europe, as this political cartoon by "Ting" shows. Here, a worried soldier from the Canadian Army Special Force, raised to fight in the Korean War, feels the twin pull of Canada's global military commitments. **Source:** Merle R. Tingely, *The Legionary*, December 1950, 11.

Chapter 1



Figure 1: Vice-Admiral Percy Nelles, Canada's Chief of Naval Staff, watches a subordinate point to Japanese writing on the base of an intact 5.5-inch shell fired by Japanese submarine *I-26* at the Estevan Point Lighthouse, 9 July 1942.
Source: Department of National Defence, LAC, PA-134083.



Figure 2: "A Magnificent Achievement: The Greater East Asian War." Much magnified by its propaganda, the scale of Japan's military victories is still apparent in this map produced one year into the Pacific War. Red figures denote mass surrenders while those in grey list Allied casualties. In an apparent reference to the raid on Estevan Point, one arrow points to "Vancouver Island."
Source: *Daitōasensō Kiroku Gahō* (Osaka: Osaka Shubbansha, 1943), fold out map.




Figure 3: "Enough in the tank to get to that filling station?" Even civilians, like the British political cartoonist David Low, could see what Japan's geostrategic priorities were before the Pacific War: Defeating the Allied armies in the Western Pacific and capturing the natural resources of Southeast Asia, especially its oil. Attacking the west coast of North America was ***not*** its main concern.
Source: David Low, *Evening Standard*, 8 August 1941.





Figure 4: Canadian defences along the British Columbian coast during the Second World War. In preparation for a Japanese attack, all the province's major ports were garrisoned by the Canadian Army and a chain of RCAF bases ran the length of the coast.

Source: Adapted from *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Patricia Roy and Greg Donaghy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 107.



DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR

CANADA

NOTICE

To All Persons of Japanese Racial Origin Now Resident in British Columbia

1. Japanese Nationals and others of Japanese racial origin who will be returning to Japan, have been informed by notice issued on the authority of the Honourable Minister of Labour, that provision has been made for their return and for the filing of an application for such return. Conditions in regard to property and transportation have been made public.

2. Japanese Canadians who want to remain in Canada should now re-establish themselves East of the Rockies as the best evidence of their intentions to co-operate with the Government policy of dispersal.

3. Failure to accept employment east of the Rockies may be regarded at a later date as lack of co-operation with the Canadian Government in carrying out its policy of dispersal.

4. Several thousand Japanese have already re-established themselves satisfactorily east of the Rockies.

5. Those who do not take advantage of present opportunities for employment and settlement outside British Columbia at this time, while employment opportunities are favourable, will find conditions of employment and settlement considerably more difficult at a later date and may seriously prejudice their own future by delay.

6. To assist those who want to re-establish themselves in Canada, the Japanese Division Placement Offices and the Employment and Selective Service Offices, with the assistance of local Advisory Committees, are making special efforts this Spring to open up suitable employment opportunities across Canada in various lines of endeavour, and in areas where prospects of suitable employment are best.

7. The Department will also provide free transportation to Eastern Canada for members of a family and their effects, a sustenance allowance to be used while in transit, and a placement allowance based in amount on the size of the family.

T. B. PICKERSGILL,
COMMISSIONER OF JAPANESE PLACEMENT

Vancouver, B. C.
March 12th, 1945.

Figure 5: A poster announcing the repatriation of Japanese-Canadians in 1945, credited to Thomas Pickersgill, the brother of noted Liberal Party politico J.W. Pickersgill, 12 March 1945.
Source: R219, vol. 5761, file 104(s), part 1, file pocket 1, DNDF, LAC.



Figure 6: "It will make you fighting mad!" A handbill for the American documentary *Ravaged Earth*, which received a wide Canadian release and much discussion in 1943.
Source: USC East Asian Library, University of Southern California.





Figure 7: "The least lovely Mongol-types." Like most wartime Allied illustrators, Canadian artists habitually depicted Japanese with the racist caricatures of buckteeth, slant eyes, sallow skin, and round horned-rimmed glasses. Nor was a distinction made between Japanese soldiers, civilians, or even immigrants born abroad. Likewise, while there was generally room in Allied propaganda for the "good German," a "good Jap" was widely seen as a contradiction in terms. As the crude slogan had it, "the only good Jap is a dead Jap."
Source: *Vancouver Sun*, 1 June 1943, 4.



CANADIAN GRAVES IN THE FAR EAST

In far-off Hong Kong and Yokohama are situated the last resting places of many gallant Canadians who died in the defence of the British crown colony or in prisoner-of-war camps in Japan. Carefully tended by the Imperial War Graves Commission, the cemeteries shown in the above photographs are, right, the Sai Wan Military Cemetery at Hong Kong, and, left, the British Commonwealth Cemetery near Yokohama, Japan, in which 139 Canadian soldiers are buried. (Canadian Army Photos)

JAP WAR MEMORIAL DEMOLISHED AT HONG KONG

During the period that the Japanese occupied Hong Kong they forced allied prisoners-of-war to build a memorial on Mount Cameron, a dominating feature on the island. This memorial was supposed to be symbolic of the alleged superiority of the victorious Nipponese. Early this year the memorial was demolished by British Engineers and the above photos show the destruction of this last symbol of the once proud conquerors. (Canadian Army Photos)

Figures 8-9: The victors and the vanquished. The Commonwealth's Hong Kong and Yokohama military cemeteries are completed, while Japan's Hong Kong war memorial is destroyed.
Source: *The Legionary*, October 1947, 14-15.

Chapter 2



Figure 1: A black belt in the East Block. Young Arthur Menzies (bottom right) sits with his Judo instructor and fellow students Eric Katō and Paul Kikuchi while attending school in Kobe, 1935.
Source: Arthur Menzies fonds, LAC, R15615, vol. 2, file 16.



Figure 2: Terauchi Masatake, Japan's first governor-general of Korea, opens the mythical cave said to have once held the Sun Goddess Amaterasu so her "righteousness and justice" will shines on a Korean couple, who bow reverently in response. This was the sort of propaganda Herbert Norman wanted to counter in his suggestions for the Pacific Propaganda Committee in 1944.
Source: *Tokyo Puck*, September 1910, cover image.




Figure 3: The architects of their own misfortune? The extent to which the Japanese people had rejected liberalism and were to blame for the rise of their country's militarism was heavily debated by the Allies, as this post-Pearl Harbor political cartoon by Canadian Les Callan exemplifies.
Source: Les Callan, *Leader-Post*, 8 December 1941, 11.



Figure 4: A stoic people? A contemporary print of an "Ee ja nai ka" scene, ca. 1867–1868.
Source: Kawanabe Kyōsai, National Diet Library via Wikimedia Commons.



Figure 5: Free at last. Arthur Menzies hands the Windsor passport office over to Andrew Bell.
Source: *Windsor Daily Star*, 16 May 1942, 5.



51.C.

EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF THE

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mont Tremblant Lodge, Mont Tremblant


Quebec, Canada

Friday, December 4 through Monday, December 14, 1942

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3 Willcocks Street Toronto, Canada

Figure 6: An invitation to the Mont Tremblant IPR conference, published by the CIIA.
Source: League of Nations External Fonds, United Nations Library and Archives, C1746/130/7.



Figures 7 & 8: The Mont Tremblant Lodge, designed and furnished by Jean Palardy in 1939, was the main accommodation for the IPR members during their ten-day conference in December 1942. **Source:** Jean Palardy fonds, LAC, 3943995 and 3944000.

Chapter 3



Figure 1: See the conquering heroes come? Men of the Canadian Fusiliers pose with a Japanese battle standard found while taking part in the unopposed invasion of Kiska, 9 October 1943.
Source: Toronto Star Photograph Archive, TSPA_0002132F.



Figure 2: The man who skipped a line. Supervised by Douglas MacArthur, Lawrence Cosgrave signs the Japanese Instrument of Surrender for Canada, 2 September 1945.
Source: Keystone/Hulton Archive via Getty Images, 940109456.



Figure 3: "To you from failing hands we throw…" A recruitment poster for the Royal Rifles of Canada printed after the unit's destruction at Hong Kong, ca. 1942. Outrage for the loss of C Force, especially over the abuse of POWs, would galvanize significant Canadian outrage against Japan. **Source:** Maurice Gagnon, CWM, acc.1970036-024.




Figure 4: "North to the realm of Japan?" Throughout the war, there was a degree of both public and official interest in Canada's involvement in opening a northern road to Japan. Ultimately, such an operation was deemed militarily unfeasible and would not be pursued.
Source: *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 March 1942, 27.



WELCOME HOME

To Vancouver's Own

Maj.-Gen. Bert M. Hoffmeister

D.S.O. and 2 Bars, C.B.E., V.D.

Newly Appointed Commander of the 6th Canadian Division of 30,000 men assigned for service in the Far East.

Highlights of

GEN. HOFFMEISTER'S BRILLIANT MILITARY RECORD

At the age of 12 "Bert" Hoffmeister joined the Seaforth Cadets, and later rose to the rank of Lieutenant. He then signed up with the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. On the outbreak of war he held the rank of Captain in the Seaforths, and went overseas with his Battalion in December, 1939, with the rank of Major, being promoted to the command of the Seaforths in England, as Lt.-Col. in September, 1942. He led the regiment in the Sicily campaign winning the D.S.O. and was given command of the 2nd Brigade, with the rank of Brigadier, in the 5th Canadian Division. In this command he won a Bar to his D.S.O. Next promotion was to the command of the 5th Canadian Division in Italy as Major-General, in January, 1944. Later he led the 5th Division in the fighting in Belgium and Holland, and received a second bar to his D.S.O.

Thus, from a "once-a-week soldier," holding the rank of Captain, Bert Hoffmeister was promoted through five ranks to Major-General in four-and-a-half years, and has been singled out as "the outstanding Canadian Commander of this war."

CONGRATULATIONS, SIR!

DAVID SPENCER LIMITED

Figure 5: A local boy makes good. General Hoffmeister's career is outlined in a newspaper advert placed by British Columbia's local Spenser's Department Store.
Source: *Vancouver Daily Province*, 21 June 1945, 24.



Figure 6: Three soldiers of the newly-raised CAPF, sitting with their distinctive multicoloured shoulder patches representing their unit's composite nature, pose with a guidebook on Japanese fighting tactics for the benefit of the camera, 1945.
Source: Department of National Defence, LAC, ZK-1041.




Figure 7: Designs for new tropical uniforms to be worn by sailors of the RCN in the Pacific.
Source: Department of National Defence, LAC, R112, vol. 11121, file 71-2-1.



Figure 8: VJ Day celebrations in Vancouver's Chinatown, 14 August 1945.
Source: James Crookall, City of Vancouver Archives, AM640-S1, CVA 260-1460.



Figure 9: "It's All Over!" Privates R.H. Haycock and A.T. Whittle read about Japan's surrender in the *Maple Leaf* while on duty in Germany. There would be no other war to fight, after all.
Source: Lieutenant G. Barry Gilroy, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA-115558.

Chapter 4




Figure 1: Returning "home"? A stone-faced group of Japanese-Canadians stand with their luggage in wait for the train that will transport them to the coast for eventual transport to Japan, ca. 1946.
Source: Tak Toyota, Department of Labour, LAC, C-047398.



Figure 2: Major-General Okada Umekichi formally surrenders his Hong Kong garrison to British officers of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt at Government House, 16 September 1945.
Source: Jack Hawes, Department of National Defence, LAC, PA-114815.



Figure 3: Arthur Menzies shakes hands with Yamazaki Takeshi, chairman of the Japanese Diet delegation, after disembarking from their RCAF transport plane at Ottawa's Rockcliffe Airport, 23 February 1950. Asanuma Inejirō is third from left, while Kanamori Tokujirō is fifth.
Source: Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC, R15615, vol. 28, file 14.



拝啓
今般吾々國會議員團が議會制度を通じて民主政治の理念と運營を調査するため渡来した際貴政府よりの鄭重な御招待により各地訪問の際は心からなる歓迎を受け、あらゆる便宜を供與されたことは、一同の感謝に堪えない所であります。吾々は貴國議會の運營を見うに知ることができて、幸に所期の目的を十分果したので、今後日本の民主化に役立てゝ、もつて世界の平和に貢献したいと思います。ここにその際煩わしました諸手数と御親切な取扱いに對し一同より改めて深く敬意と謝意とを表します。
敬具
一九五〇年三月
國會議員團
山崎 猛

カナダ總理大臣
エル・エス・セントローラン閣下

岩本信行
櫻内辰郎
椎熊三郎
大野木秀次郎
河野一郎
小林稲次郎
高田寛
松本滝藏
大池眞
辻嘉六
島静一
金森德次郎

Figure 4: "Deepfelt respect": The thank-you note for Prime Minister St. Laurent, signed by all fourteen members of the Diet delegation who visited Canada in 1950. Kanamori Tokujirō's signature is first from left while Asanuma Inejirō's is eighth.
Source: Privy Council Office Fonds, LAC, R165, vol. 84, file J-25-2.



Figure 5: C Force dead are carefully exhumed from Hong Kong's wartime Stanley Military Cemetery in preparation for reburial at Sai Wan Bay Military Cemetery, June 1947.
Source: C Force Cemetery Scrapbooks, Directorate of History and Heritage, 593.009 (D6).




Figure 6: H.D.G. Crerar and Sherwood Lett (both at far right) stand at Sai Wan Bay War Cemetery after laying a wreath to commemorate the fallen Canadians of C Force, August 1947.
Source: Sherwood and Evelyn Lett fonds, City of Vancouver Archives, AM361, CVA 78-182.



Figure 7: The HCVAC's distinctive logo: The letters "H.K." in a "Chinese style" on a red circle, as here seen on the uniform of a sergeant from the Royal Rifles of Canada, ca. July 1945.
Source: S & G Clothing Co. Ltd., CWM, acc.20000100-001.



Figure 8: Crown Prince Akihito and his attendants walk with External Affair's Chief of Protocol W. Howard Measures on Parliament Hill, 20 April 1953.
Source: Canadian Pacific Railway, W. Howard Measures fonds, LAC, PA-148547.

Chapter 5




Figure 1: The American firebombing of Tokyo during the Pacific War. The areas shaded in black were burned-out during the devastating raid in March 1945. The stippled area in the western part of the city was destroyed in the raid that threatened the Canadian Legation in May. The red dot marks the Legation's approximate location in Minato Ward.
Source: *Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama* (Washington, DC: United States Strategic Bombing Survey Urban Areas Division, June 1947), Map between pages 56 and 57.



Figure 2: The entrance of the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, originally built by Herbert Marler, Canada's first minister to Japan, as photographed sometime during the postwar era.
Source: LAC, acc.1990-105 NPC, Box, TCS 01085.



Figure 3: Even private corporations were keen to play up Canada's new-found diplomatic standing in the late 1940s. Note the prominent placement of the Republic of China's flag.
Source: *The Legionary*, September 1947, inside back cover.



Figure 4: Herbert Norman (third from left) outside the Canadian legation in Tokyo during his first postwar tour of duty in the country while attached to GHQ, October 1945. Standing with him (left to right) are Canadian journalists Gordon Root of the Southam newspapers and John Clare of the *Toronto Star,* along with Canadian Army Captain Don. G. Neeland.
Source: Department of National Defence, LAC, A-206848.



Figure 5: Influence or animosity? Norman talks with Douglas MacArthur while head of the CLM after the general's arrival at the Canadian mission to celebrate Dominion Day, 1 July 1947.
Source: Department of External Affairs, LAC, PA-187690.



Figure 6: General H.D.G. Crerar receives a warm welcome in Japan during his tour of East Asia while Sherwood Lett lurks in the background, August 1947.
Source: Sherwood and Evelyn Lett fonds, City of Vancouver Archives, AM361, CVA 78-168.



Figure 7: The Fujiya Hotel at the Miyanoshita onsen, where both H.D.G. Crerar and Lester Pearson stayed during their visits to Japan in 1947 and 1950.
Source: Sherwood and Evelyn Lett fonds, City of Vancouver Archives, AM361, CVA 78-166.



Figure 8: Lester Pearson signs the Treaty of San Francisco on behalf of Canada, 8 September 1951. Standing behind him in the light-coloured suit is Fisheries Minister Robert Mayhew, later to be appointed Canada's first postwar minister to Japan in 1952. Dean Acheson, chairman of the conference, sits in the speaker's chair at top left.
Source: Acme News Pictures, LAC, C-20131.

Chapter 6




Figure 1: "Rack and Ruin." An amused Canadian Lieutenant strikes a pose in front of a sign promoting a VD clinic in Kure, April 1953. The sign's language denotes the expected clientele. **Source:** John Thomas Redmond, CWM, acc.20110039-004, Plate 126.



Figure 2: A tramcar passes along the streets of a rapidly rebuilding Tokyo, as photographed by a Canadian soldier in the early 1950s.
Source: F.L. Lawson, CWM, acc.19840076-001, Plate 29.



Figure 3: Arthur Menzies sits with Brigadier Rockingham during his visit to Korea, October 1951. Seated with them is British General James Cassels (at left), commander of the 1st Commonwealth Division, as well as Brigadier Paul Bernatchez (right), then head of CMMFE.
Source: Victor Wilfred Jewkes, CWM, acc.19880242-004, Image 2.



Figure 4: The Canadian transit camp at Hiro, in the southern suburbs of Kure, April 1953.
Source: Robert S. Peacock, CWM, acc.20070056-012, Plate 94.



Figure 5: The hills of Haramura, near the Commonwealth Division Battle School, April 1953.
Source: Robert S. Peacock, CWM, acc.20070056-012, Plate 98.



Figure 6: Shops catering to UN soldiers near the Australian zone of Kure, April 1953.
Source: John Thomas Redmond, CWM, acc.20110039-004, Plate 125.



Figure 7: "Boat trip to Miya Jima…" The famous floating *torii* of the Shinto shrine at Itsukushima, as photographed by a visiting Canadian soldier, 1953.
Source: F.L. Lawson, CWM, acc.19840076-001, Plate 197.



Figure 8: Japanese children pose for a Canadian soldier on Itsukushima, 1953.
Source: F.L. Lawson, CWM, acc.19840076-001, Plate 205.



Figure 9: "Absolute horror." The broken dome of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial stands over a city still scarred by signs of the atomic bombing, April 1953.
Source: Robert S. Peacock, CWM, acc.20070056-012, Plate 100.

Chapter 7



Figure 1: "A wonderful opportunity for the world traders…" A sample of the publicity material the JITFC produced for the 1954 Osaka Trade Fair, attended by Canada despite initial hesitation. **Source:** *The Japan International Trade Fair in Retrospect* (Osaka: JITFC, 1954), [39].



Figure 2: Members of the Vancouver Board of Trade and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) visit the Osaka International Trade Fair, April 1954.
Source: *The Japan International Trade Fair in Retrospect* (Osaka: JITFC, 1954), [9].



Figure 3: "The cost was trivial but the results excellent." Ambassador T.C. Davis inspects the Canadian government's wheat exhibition at the Tokyo Trade Fair, May 1955.
Source: R208, vol. 1298, file T-8-245, part 3, DTCF, LAC.




Figure 4: The cover page of the formal resolutions of the Fifteen Congress of the ICC, the first such congress ever held in Asia. The largest Canadian delegation ever assembled for an ICC meeting joined the proceedings in May 1955.
Source: *XVth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce: Resolutions* (Tokyo: Kasai Publishing & Printing, 1955), cover page.



Figure 5: "World famous products made in Japan." MITI's pitch to Canadians for the "new," reformed Japan of trade and commerce.
Source: *Financial Post*, 23 August 1957, 40.



Figure 6: An advert for the new Japan Trade Centre in the *Financial Post*'s 1956 Feature Report.
Source: *Financial Post*, June 9, 1956, 7.




Figure 7: Only the penitent nation may enter? Most countries, including Britain and much of the Commonwealth, were deeply sceptical when Japan claimed it was a reformed nation that deserved entrance into the GATT. Canada would prove to be one of its few consistent allies in Geneva.
Source: Bert Grassick, *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 May 1954, 6.



Figure 8: C.D. Howe (centre) visits Lake Chūzenji. With him (left to right) are Deputy Minister Mitchell Sharp; Iguchi Sadao, former Japanese Ambassador to Canada; Tokugawa Iemasa, Japan's prewar minister to Canada and president of the Japan-Canada Society; J.L. Mutter, Canada's Trade Commissioner in Tokyo; Canadian Ambassador T.C. Davis; and an unnamed Japanese official.
Source: R5725, vol. 191, file 13, C.D. Howe fonds, LAC.

Conclusion



THE CALGARY HERALD

The Weather
Cloudy; High 35, Low 20
(Complete Report on Page 2)

74th YEAR — Price 5 Cents — CALGARY, ALBERTA, FRIDAY, APRIL 5, 1957 — CALGARY — Final Edition — 48 PAGES

Auto Safety Stickers Out

New Alberta Bill Places Onus On Owner To Keep Vehicle In Shape

By DICK SNELL
(Herald Political Reporter)

EDMONTON—Major revisions of existing legislation and several entirely new acts were introduced in the Legislature Thursday evening in seven government money bills.

Highlights were:

Scrapping of the safety sticker provision for vehicles under the Highway Act and placing onus on the owner to have his vehicle in good working condition.

Broad new powers for the Calgary and Edmonton District Planning Commissions introducing compulsory membership in the metropolitan area.

Establishment of a revolutionary new farm purchase board which would distribute government-sponsored capital loans to young farmers.

PUBLICIZE GRANTS

Wide amendments to the Municipal District Act forcing districts like other Alberta municipal bodies, to publicize government grants.

Provisions to license house trailers.

The amendments to the Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act introduced by Highway Minister Gordon Taylor put the onus on the owner of a car or truck to keep it in "good working order" and scrap the present safety-sticker system.

The owner must keep his vehicle's steering mechanism, windshield wipers, defroster, lights, horn, brakes and mirrors in good condition under the proposed changes.

MAY MAKE CHECK

A policeman may stop the vehicle at any time and make a check. He is authorized to tell the owner to make the necessary repairs as soon as it is reasonably possible and report back to that policeman.

Failure to do this makes the owner liable to maximum fines on first offence of $50; on second of $100 and on third and subsequent convictions of $200.

Another amendment allows a motorist making a trade-in with an already-licensed vehicle to drive the car or truck he has purchased for 14 days without having it registered. Within that period he may apply either to have his old licence plates reissued for the purchased car or have the plates on that car transferred to his name.

At the present time the motorist is requested to register the car within two weeks but cannot legally drive it until the registration is completed.

SIGNAL LIGHTS

New vehicles, if the amendments are passed, must be equipped with directional signal lights and these must be kept in good order. Failure to do so subjects the owner to penalties.

The amendments allow for right-hand passing on rural four-lane highways. At the present time a person can pass on either side on four-lane highways inside a city but may only pass on the left on rural four-lane roads.

LIGHT LIMIT USE

The act also limits the using of red flashing lights which can be seen from the front of a vehicle to police, fire and ambulance use. This does not apply to directional lights on the rear of vehicles or the alternative flashing red lights used for school buses.

Under the present act, red flashers are also permitted on snowplows and vehicles carrying explosives. The minister explained flashing blue lights are now used for snowplows and his department will draft plans for other colors to be used for other vehicles.

The bill gives the power to fix speed limits on district highways and local roads, without ministerial approval, to the municipal-

See Page 7 — LEGISLATURE

AUTO CHANGE IS WELCOME

Amendment of the Vehicles and Highway Traffic Act to put the onus on the owner of a car or truck to keep it in safe working condition, was welcomed here today by two leaders in the motoring field.

"I think it is something which should have been done long ago," commented Alberta Motor Association president Gordon McGachie.

"This little charge ($1) made for the stickers is just a nuisance and few vehicles were actually checked as far as I can find out.

"Of course, if the police would make spot checks on the highways it would be a better idea."

PROPOSALS APPROVED

AMA secretary J. G. McQueen also approved the minister's proposals.

"The sticker deal hasn't worked out very well at all," he said. "The onus rightly should be put on the owner of the car, in view of his responsibility to other people driving on the highway, and particularly to pedestrians."

4 Witnesses Heard In Case Against Ex-Cop

Counsel Injures Finger With Stapler

Preliminary hearing of a shop-breaking charge against Howard Elgin Robinson, 2015 Alexander Ave., Bowness, a former city police constable, is expected to conclude before Magistrate M. H. Staples, QC, in city police court this afternoon.

Four witnesses were heard this morning and the hearing was scheduled to resume at 1:30 p.m.

Constable W. R. Towhey, of the city police force, tendered his resignation to Chief Constable Larry Partridge this morning, and is scheduled to give evidence at the Robinson preliminary this afternoon.

MORNING HEARING

During the morning sitting M. B. Livergant, counsel for Robinson, shot a staple into his finger while handling a stapler which it is charged was stolen in a shop-breaking at Wood's Cement Works, 1926 20th Ave. S.W., last June 29.

W. S. Woods of Woods Cement Works told the court a stapler and staples were missing from the company shop on June 29. He told the court: "I would say it is the one that was missing" when shown a stapler entered as an exhibit.

Woods later corrected his testimony to say the stapler and staples were missing on June 30.

Mr. Livergant in cross-examination elicited in asking what value Woods placed on the stapler and whether it was "worthless junk."

Magistrate Staples told counsel: "I don't want to interfere but are you getting anywhere with this line of questioning?" The magistrate said he held the stapler did have some value.

NOT PROVEN

Leo Clarey, 2106 21st Ave. S.W., shipper at the cement works, said he could not swear the stapler entered as an exhibit was the one missing from the plant.

Det. Sgt. G. W. Kemp told of executing a search warrant at Robinson's Bowness home on March 8 at 11:15 p.m. He said the stapler, staples, three boxes of tools and a skilsaw were seized.

Mayor Denies City Heading For Bankruptcy

Mackay Defends Civic Centre Project

Mayor D. H. Mackay strongly denied today that he was "plunging the city into bankruptcy" over the $9,000,000 civic centre proposal.

He said that although he did not originate the plan "I have no hesitation in approving the idea."

Replying to criticisms levelled against him by Ald. P. N. R. Morrison and Ernie Starr over the civic centre, Mayor Mackay said it was not "my plan", but it resulted from town planning authorities.

MANY INCLUSIONS

The Mayor informed The Herald Tuesday that the recommendation of the planning department called for a civic centre on 4th St. W. south of Prince's Island. The centre would include a new city hall, library, police court building, public health building and museum.

"I have no hesitation in concurring with the proposal because it is the best plan for the city and is the most economical. The board of commissioners have received the plan but it is not my proposal," he stressed.

"Plunging the city into bankruptcy is a regrettable statement as it comes from one who knows better.

"The city's financial position is sound and despite phenomenal growth we know the position and how to cope with an expansion program of this nature.

"Apparently it has not been appreciated that it is a long term proposal and not an overnight development."

Regarding the criticism made of the Mayor's administrative abilities, he said: "I would be quite happy to have my qualifications matched with theirs at any time. I would like it further appreciated that in my plan involving the finances of the city no steps are taken without careful study.

"We also make it a habit to consult many of the leading financial minds in this city and the province."

He said he was still convinced, despite opposition in Calgary, that a $1,500,000 library "will be accepted by the majority of citizens".

URGENT NEED

Regarding police requirements, the mayor said this could only be met "if we turn over the present city hall facilities. But this cannot be done until a new city hall is built.

"That a police court building is in the civic centre plans is only further evidence that this proposal came from the town planning authority and the building outlay from Clayton, Bond and Mogridge without any direction or information from the board of commissioners.

"The main desire behind the criticism is to belittle myself," he said.

Mayor Mackay described this as "a chronic habit to be expected."

Because he had envisioned Calgary's future. "I have seen myself constantly labelled as Calgary's dream boy by my reactionary-minded opponents who have had that depression complex since the conclusion of the Second Great War."

Legal Action Threatened

By DICK SNELL
(Herald Political Reporter)

EDMONTON — Two Alberta towns were threatened with legal action by the Alberta Government Telephones recently for publishing directories which listed telephone numbers in alphabetical order.

In January, the Lloydminster Chamber of Commerce was nearly taken in court on grounds it had infringed the AGT copyright in publishing its directory last year and planning to re-publish this year.

Latest case occurred March 21 when the Rotary Club of Vegreville was ordered to cease publication of its directory of telephone numbers, even though they were obtained by personal canvass, were included.

Woman Gets Term

DORCHESTER, England (AP) A former hostess in a haven for the aged was sentenced Thursday to 12 months in jail for theft and fraud. The sentencing of Elmer Joy Kimpton, 46, came during an investigation by Scotland Yard into the deaths of seven elderly men and women at Castlemas House near Blandford, England.

Wave Of Protests Follow Canadian Envoy's Suicide

SCENE OF DEATH LEAP. An Egyptian soldier guards the section of Cairo pavement and dented car where Canadian Ambassador Herbert Norman met his death Thursday after hurtling from the seventh floor of the Swedish legation. Allegations of Communist sympathies against Norman by a U.S. Senate Sub committee are believed to have influenced his action. These allegations were refuted by the Canadian and U.S. government. (Herald Wirephoto From AP).

Norman's Wife Has Breakdown

[Compiled from CP, AP and Reuters]

Contempt, horror and revulsion Thursday prompted Canadian appeals to President Eisenhower, the United States Congress and Protestant religious leaders in that country to halt character-assassination—words that had just acquired new meaning in the death of a Canadian diplomat.

Egerton Herbert Norman, 47, scholarly Orientalist and Canadian ambassador to Egypt, took his own life in Cairo earlier in the day in a nervous collapse after the U.S. Senate sub-committee on internal security heard renewed allegations that he was linked with Communism.

Memorial services for Norman will be held at St. Andrew's Church of Scotland in Cairo Saturday. Plans have been made to fly his body back to Canada for burial but details are delayed until his wife recovers from a breakdown.

Mr. Norman jumped from the seventh-floor apartment of the Swedish ambassador. Notes he left indicated his collapse had left him without hope that his name would be cleared of U.S. sub-committee allegations — spurned by the Canadian government—that he had been a Communist.

"BENEATH CONTEMPT"

The Canadian government, which investigated the allegations in 1951 when Mr. Norman was acting chief of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, rejected them as unfounded. The question was disposed of: Mr. Norman became Canadian high commissioner to New Zealand and then, last summer, ambassador to Cairo, indication of the government's confidence in him.

The U.S. Senate's internal-security sub-committee during the last month twice revived the allegations and each time External Affairs Minister Pearson repudiated them as "beneath contempt."

SYMPATHY NOTES

Expressions of sympathy continued to pour into the Canadian Embassy at Cairo from all parts of the world.

From Tokyo came word that major Japanese newspapers were expressing editorial opinions of sorrow and bitterly criticizing the "Red witch hunt."

Norman, son of a United Church missionary, left a note when he jumped from the seventh floor of the Cairo building. "I have no option," said the message. "I must

See Page 2 — CANADIAN

Committee Has Power To 'Wound And Kill'

Britons Are Outraged At 'Death By Slander'

By JACK STEPLER
[From The Herald's London Bureau, Copyright Southam Company Ltd.]

LONDON — The "death by slander" of Herbert Norman, has outraged Britons' sense of justice.

It has generated in this country deep resentment of the methods, the recklessness and the irresponsibility of the United States Senate internal security sub-committee which now reveal the group's power not only to wound without fear of redress, but to kill.

In a scathing attack on the sub-committee over Mr. Norman's death, The Times today says:

"The suicide of Herbert Norman is a tragedy and a warning. There seems little doubt that he would be alive today, still efficiently performing the responsible office entrusted to him, if it had not been for what Lester Pearson called his 'feeling of renewed persecution'.

DEEPLY REGRETTED

"The persecution came from the senate internal security subcommittee in Washington — a body whose methods are as strongly resented by decent U.S. persons as by anyone else. There will be much sorrow in the U.S. as in Canada at this terrible consequence of the committee's recklessness.

Norman's death emphasizes again the nastiest aspect of the committee's investigating technique. It is bounded neither by the forms of law nor the abstract principles of justice.

Mr. Norman was a Canadian citizen, and so in no way in reach of the committee's authority. But his name, having once been mentioned in connection with Communism, was excuse enough for unsubstantiated slanders against him. They were first brought up in 1954 and repeated a few weeks ago.

BEEN CLEARED

The fact that he had, at his own request, been investigated and

See Page 14 — OUTRAGE

Packing Walkout Continues

The walkout of 270 men at the Union Packing Company plant in northeast Calgary is in its fourth day today and no indication of a settlement is in sight.

The 270 company employees walked off the job Monday in a dispute over the distribution of work on the dressing of meats for the Easter trade.

C. A. Loest of Union Packing said today plant operations remain at a standstill and prospects of a settlement are dim at the moment.

Jack Hampson, Alberta representative of the United Packinghouse Workers of America, said the union is prepared to discuss any settlement with the company. As yet, he said, no overtures on the part of the company have been made.

He said until such time as a suitable agreement is reached between the union and Union Packing, employees of the plant will remain idle. "As soon as the company comes to terms, it's over," he said.

Mr. Hampson said there is no indication "at present" that the walkout would touch off other strikes. "But we have our plans," he said.

MacArthur Honored

SEOUL (AP)—The South Korean government will erect a bronze statue of Gen. Douglas MacArthur to commemorate his role in the Korean War.

AMBASSADOR WAS PATIENT IN CALGARY

Herbert Norman, Canada's ambassador to Egypt, spent five months as a patient in Calgary's Baker Sanatorium 30 years ago when he was 17.

He came to Alberta on the recommendation of doctors in Japan. The son of Dr. and Mrs. Norman, United Church missionaries to Japan, the Canadian diplomat was born in Karuizawa, Japan, and was sent from there to Canada for treatment at the sanatorium.

MOTHER STAYED HERE

During the five months he spent at the sanatorium in 1927, his mother stayed in the home of the late Dr. A. M. Scott, former superintendent of schools in the city, and Mrs. Scott.

Mrs. Norman senior was well known in Wesley United Church, where she presented lectures on her work in the mission field in Japan.

Economic Survey

VICTORIA (CP) — An economic study of British Columbia agriculture will be started this summer, acting Agriculture Minister Kenneth Kiernan said Thursday.

'Who Is Next Victim?'

Morris Blasted After Suicide

By J. R. WALKER
[From The Herald's Washington Bureau, Copyright Southam Company Ltd.]

WASHINGTON — A perfunctory, 25-word note of condolence from "Foster Dulles" to "Dear Mike."

A two-paragraph statement by Senators Eastland and Jenner saying their committee is duty-bound to continue its witch-hunt.

A posed picture of committee counsel Robert Morris holding up a newspaper, headlined "Envoy accused as Red kills self."

This is the measure of the interest and sympathy expressed in official Washington over the suicide of Canada's able young ambassador to Egypt, Dr. E. Herbert Norman.

PRIVATELY DEPLORE

Many other U.S. citizens privately are deploring this tragic event and the circumstances which appear to have brought it about. But those here who could stop this terrible farce are doing nothing. To some of them, this spectacular death is a new lease on political life.

The big question here, as The Washington Post asks today, is why this dredging up of the "discredited accusations against Mr. Norman?" Despite Mr. Morris' contentions, says The Post, "it has no bearing whatever on our internal security." And as one reporter Thursday put it to Mr. Morris: "Who's your next victim?"

ULTIMATE 'VICTIM'

The pudgy-faced Morris merely smiled. But those who remember the furor created in November 1953 by Senator William Jenner and his side-kick Morris over the proposed Gouzenko appearance here are not discounting the possibility that Canada's External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson may be the ultimate "victim."

In 1953, when the committee first dragged Dr. Norman's name up as an alleged member of a communist study group at Columbia University, and in 1953, when Pearson foiled the committee in its attempts to have Igor Gouzenko here, the name of Canada's external affairs foreign secretary was openly bandied about.

The threat, as certain extreme right-wing U.S. newspapers have hinted in the past, is that the committee could reveal testimony by ex-communist Elizabeth Bentley labeling Pearson as a source of information to Communist espionage rings during the last war, **IRRESPONSIBILITY DECRIED**

The Washington Post in an editorial today entitled "suicide and slander," takes Morris to task for trying "to justify the callousness of his conduct" by drafting the Eastland-Jenner statement. And it concludes:

"The cruel and tragic event to which these tactics seem to have led ought at last to lead the senate of the United States to put an effective check upon the irresponsibility of its internal security subcommittee."

But so far there is no indication that either Canada's previous diplomatic protest about committee activities or the suicide in Cairo have bestirred the senate

See Page 3 — U.S. REACTION

Nuclear And Guided-Missile Age

Battleships Discarded

Figure 1: "When good men die from windows…" Initial reports of Herbert Norman's suicide in Cairo sparked a massive wave of popular support in Canada. Here the front page of the *Calgary Herald* is half devoted to Norman's death, including reports of protests in Canada, disgust towards the United States, and "outrage" from Britain.
Source: *Calgary Herald*, 5 April 1957, 1.




Figure 2: A map of American military installations in Japan as prepared by Ōkubo Genji and sent to External by Arthur Menzies in March 1953. The American military presence in Japan would play a vital role in the 1960 Anpo Protests.
Source: R219, vol. 29559, file 6-2-2-2, DEAF, LAC.




Figure 3: The organization of the Department of External Affairs, ca. 1957. By this point, the "Far Eastern" section had been finally separated from the American Division into its own distinct entity. **Source:** R15615, vol. 31, file 15, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC.




Figure 4: The hometown of all members of C Force, including the Winnipeg Grenadiers (red) and Royal Rifles of Canada (blue). The defeat at Hong Kong was clearly a pan-Canadian disaster. **Source:** Nathan Kehler, Project '44. https://www.project44.ca/hong-kong.




Figure 5: Hugh Keenleyside enjoying his retirement, 1984.
Source: Harry Palmer, http://www.aportraitofcanada.ca/hugh-keenleyside-cc-1984/.



Figure 6: Arthur Menzies presents his credentials as Canadian Ambassador to Beijing, 1976.
Source: R15615, Arthur R. Menzies fonds, LAC, e011198336-v8.