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Cosmopolitan Affinities: The Question of the Nation in Edgeworth, Byron, and Maturin

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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of cosmopolitanism in early nineteenth-century Britain, and it approaches cosmopolitanism as an alternative and often overlooked approach to the question of nation in the early nineteenth century. Building out of enlightenment political philosophies such as that of Kant, cosmopolitanism does not mean the absence of national attachment and national limitations but rather involves the co-existence of national demarcations and universal belonging, and in early nineteenth century Britain, it appears alongside romantic nationalism in the struggle to represent the nation. I am interested in how cosmopolitanism in this period offers a non-unified formulation of the nation that stands in contrast to more unified models such as Edmund Burke's which found nationality in, among other things, language, history, blood and geography. The dissertation traces this alternative formulation not only in representative fictions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (e.g. Edgeworth's Irish tales, Byron's *Childe Harold* and *Don Juan*, Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer*) but also in British political thought of the period (e.g. Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, Price's *Discourse on the love of our country*, and the discourse of the *Edinburgh Review*). Each chapter examines a different romantic inflection of cosmopolitan ideals and is intended to establish continuities between enlightenment philosophy and the idea of the nation as it unfolds within the British context.

The question of balance between trans-national disinterest and national interest is a fundamental one for each of the writers studied in the dissertation, and it has also become paramount in our contemporary struggle to create alternative, non-unified ways of thinking about nationness. The dissertation thus intersects with present debate over the relationship

between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, drawing on notions such as Bruce Robbin's "situatedness-in-displacement," Julia Kristeva's "nations without nationalism," Edward Said's "critical thinking," and James Clifford's "pilgrimage."

Contents

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Introduction

In his influential *Imagined Communities* (1983) Benedict Anderson claims that the modern nation is given existence in part through its representation as a definable community. Symbol and narrative, he argues, subsume diverse and often conflicting components under the rubric of a uniform national identity.[1] If the modern nation required such a representational (if not actual) unity in order to come into being, however, what conceptions of nationness had to be excluded or suppressed in order to achieve this unity? Early nineteenth-century British writing provides a useful focus for posing this question because it demonstrates a complex response to political and philosophical upheavals both on the continent and within imperial Britain itself. In popular Romantic forms such as the national tale and the lyrical ballad, British writers (both English and Colonial) struggled to found nationality in, among other things, language, history, blood, and geography. While such formulations have recently begun to come under critical scrutiny, most critical study continues to assume a unified model of the nation. My interest, by contrast, lies in non-unified formulations of nationness, notably in the rarely discussed notion--at least in the British context--of cosmopolitanism.[2] Cosmopolitanism subordinates the historical inescapability of place to a trans-historical, trans-national ethical constant, creating a form of nationness that Bruce Robbins, drawing on Immanuel Kant, describes as "situatedness-in-displacement."[3] Understood in a Kantian sense, cosmopolitanism does not mean the absence of all national

attachment or the elimination of national boundaries in the creation of a single world state. Rather, it involves the a co-existence of national demarcations and universal belonging, of form and freedom.

To think about the nation in terms of alternative understandings of nationness such as cosmopolitanism is to complicate assumptions about the genesis of the modern nation. The French Revolution has generally been understood as signalling a pivotal shift in European thought from eighteenth-century enlightenment cosmopolitanisms to nineteenth-century romantic nationalisms. In this formulation, nationalism is defined in counter-enlightenment terms as a fundamental departure from or reaction against eighteenth-century religious, intellectual, and political universalisms. More and more, however, cultural historians are re-interpreting this shift by emphasizing continuities between enlightenment philosophy and the concept of the nation.[4] By focusing on the idea of cosmopolitanism in early nineteenth-century British writing, I intend to participate in this re-interpretation, tracing the relationship between enlightenment philosophy and the idea of the nation as it unfolds within the British context, a context that has so far been only peripheral to such discussion.

The thesis consists of five chapters and is divided into two parts. The first part contextualizes the notion of cosmopolitanism within British political thought of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and the second part examines how this notion operates in representative fictions of the period. To frame the analysis, Chapter One directs attention to continental political philosophy in order to produce a more precise understanding of cosmopolitanism in the period. It focuses in particular on two of Kant's important essays on the topic: "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784) and "On

Perpetual Peace" (1795). Kant is a key figure in the establishment of continuity between philosophies of enlightenment and nation: not only does he summarize much of eighteenth-century debate about cosmopolitanism in his work, but he has been seen as both complicit in and hostile to nationalist projects of the nineteenth century. For my purposes, his notion of "unsocial sociability" and its political manifestation as interaction between national and international politics provides a model of nation that is at once bordered and borderless. Kant's thought builds out of a liberal tradition of political philosophy that postulates a social contract whereby individuals accept governance in order to preserve their freedom. For Kant, government reconciles individual freedom and the freedom of others under the universal law of right, a political extension of his categorical imperative. Nations should likewise enter a society of nations or international federation in order to guarantee their freedom: such a federation would reconcile the freedom of the nation with freedom for all nations, a reconciliation that would occur also according to the universal law of right. Although national boundaries are retained at the international level, the centrality of the universal law of right to the model underlines a continuing primacy of individual over nation as primary unit of political social organization. I argue that it is this non-unified model of nation that accounts for the confusion surrounding Kant's relationship to nationalism, a confusion that also appears in public reception of early nineteenth-century British writers working out of the same tradition.

The second part of Chapter One begins investigation of cosmopolitanism in the nineteenth-century British context by looking at the debate between Richard Price and Edmund Burke over the notion of patriotism. In late eighteenth-century Britain, patriotism

was much on the public mind. For radicals such as Price, it extended beyond national borders to embrace a larger cosmopolitan ethic, and his interpretation of "love of country" entails an understanding of nation as civil union. For others such as Burke, however, patriotism was first and foremost an attachment to hearth and home, and his *Reflections on the French Revolution* (1790) evokes a very different understanding of nationness. In *Reflections*, Burke attempts to increase the political distance between England and revolutionary France through his presentation of the English nation as historical continuity, and his well known argument anchors national identity in attachment to one's "little platoon." By casting his understanding of nationness in the insular terms of inheritance and local attachment, Burke evokes a correlative banishment of cosmopolitan ideals as nationally disruptive (hence he criticizes figures like Voltaire, Helvetius and Rousseau, as well as English Jacobins like Fox). This Burkean paradigm then informs conservative interpretations of the French Revolution and supports an ongoing equivalency in early nineteenth-century thought between enlightenment philosophy and Jacobinism.

Chapter Two moves to an analysis of how eighteenth-century notions of cosmopolitanism were refracted in official critical discourse in the early decades of the nineteenth-century. The chapter focuses on the *Edinburgh Review* under Francis Jeffrey, concentrating on the early years when the Whig quarterly was the most influential periodical in Great Britain (1802-1815). Arising out of the eighteenth-century tradition of moral philosophy, the *Edinburgh Review* viewed itself as an instrument of political enlightenment, making the point immediately by a review of Villers' *Philosophie de Kant* in its first volume. How, then, did it respond to the question of the cosmopolitan under the national pressures

generated by the Napoleonic war? In a climate where even qualified endorsement of cosmopolitan ideals met with charges of Jacobinism, the *Edinburgh Review* turned to the political economy of Adam Smith as a means of voicing its approval of certain cosmopolitan tenets of the Scottish enlightenment. In particular, Smith's *Wealth of Nations* offered the *Edinburgh* reviewers a cosmopolitan model of commerce based on the interdependence of nations. Arguing against the protectionist polices of the mercantilist system, Smith posits individual self-interest as the primary motor of the national economy, and for him, individual self-interest--and thus also national interest--is best served through free trade. In this model, what goes on inside national borders is dependent upon what goes on outside them. Following Smith, *Edinburgh* reviewers such as Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, and Francis Horner argue that Britain's national economy is not self-contained or self-sufficient but is intimately connected to and shaped by foreign economies, and their writings on topics such as the Orders of Council and Free Trade re-introduce cosmopolitanism into a nationalistic political climate by rewriting it as a commercially-based internationalism.

These opening chapters provide a framework for discussing the problem of nationness in three representative literary figures of the period in Part Two: Maria Edgeworth, George Gordon Byron, and Charles Robert Maturin. The critical juncture between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is a vexed one for all three of these writers, and is continually being renegotiated in their work. Maria Edgeworth, immersed in continental enlightenment thought and herself affected by the nationalist upsurge in the 1798 Irish Rebellion, domesticates cosmopolitanism in her construction of a rational patriotism. Chapter Three explores this process in relation to her Irish tales, *Castle Rackrent* (1800), *Ennui* (1802), *The Absentee*

(1812), and *Ormond* (1817). In her influential rewriting of Anglo-Irish identity in these tales, Edgeworth re-articulates Burkean local attachment with philosophical cosmopolitanism. Her rewriting implies an understanding of nationness that is neither tightly bordered (such as those based on historical premises like blood or inheritance) nor borderless (such as those based on rational premises of universal inclusion). In Edgeworth's hands, the nineteenth-century national tale intersects with eighteenth-century enlightenment narratives such as the philosophical tale.

Chapter Four turns to the nineteenth-century import of the figure of "philosophical traveller" or "cosmopolitan," a figure central to enlightenment narratives such as Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721), Voltaire's *Candide* (1759), and Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* (1762). Julia Kristeva has defined this figure as the "alter ego of national man, one who reveals the latter's personal inadequacies at the same time as he points to the defects in mores and institutions."[5] Seen positively, the cosmopolitan reveals "the tribe's hidden significance;" seen negatively, he is "an intruder who destroys the consensus" (*Strangers to Ourselves*, 147). Oscillating between these two poles, the figure appeared regularly in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century literature, but the most celebrated example remains that constructed by Lord Byron. His cosmopolitan Childe Harold challenged the political insularity of war-time Britain: a border figure, he was both inside and outside national attachment. But for Byron's enemies, both pilgrim and poet were deemed traitors to the nation and unceremoniously pushed outside Britain's borders. Early reviews characterized Byron as waging a "Jacobinical challenge" against established politics (*British Review* May 1812), and claimed that his writings "run directly counter to very many of our national

passions" (*Edinburgh Review* February 1812). And in Caroline Lamb's *Glenarvon* (1816), he appears as a politically suspect Irish-Italian exile who returns from the continent to lead the 1798 Irish rebellion. In response to such critiques, Byron created one of the most infamous cosmopolitans of the nineteenth century, Don Juan.

Chapter Five shifts from cosmopolitan figures to cosmopolitan forms, focusing on the writing of Charles Robert Maturin. Cosmopolitanism is a discourse that explodes organic conceptions of literature, such as that of Coleridge, and Maturin's strange and heterogeneous *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820) offers a striking literary embodiment. Its early reviewers characterized Maturin as a literary insurgent who--if left unchecked--threatened to overthrow the institution of British literature. In *Melmoth the Wanderer*, Maturin renders concrete the existential restlessness of Byron's Childe Harold, rewriting the cosmopolitan Byronic hero as a satanic pilgrim. Indifferent to all borders (abstract and concrete), Melmoth the Wanderer throws into question the very idea of borders. The narrative structure of *Melmoth the Wanderer*, I argue, invites a sort of scattered cosmopolitan reading which stands against the more concentrated "national" reading demanded by dominant novels of the period like those of Walter Scott.

"Cosmopolitanism has repeatedly emerged at times when the world has suddenly seemed to expand in unassimilable ways," Amanda Anderson writes. [6] In her genealogy of the new cosmopolitanism, Anderson observes a tension between universalist ethical assumptions and the desire "to cultivate ethical practices that do not impose false universals," and it is this tension, she argues, that is behind the "casual normativity" of the new cosmopolitanism ("Cosmopolitanism," 275). Mediating between the universal and the

particular, the new cosmopolitanism advocates an ethico-political stance that is at once detached and situated, and this stance has important implications for genre. "[T]he articulations of cosmopolitanism often occur not within a philosophic or high theoretical mode," Anderson notes, "but rather within genres more classically literary or eclectic: the essay, the autobiography, travel writing, and works of literature generally" ("Cosmopolitanism," 275). Uncomfortable with abstract universalism, the new cosmopolitans shy away from the traditional modes of philosophical justification favoured by neo-Kantian universalists such as Habermas, and adopt "a process of incremental, casual description" ("Cosmopolitanism," 275). In particular, they invite "descriptions from the perspective of the participant as he or she negotiates a dense array of affiliations and commitments" ("Cosmopolitanism," 275). The cosmopolitan fictions of Edgeworth, Byron and Maturin suggest that Anderson's observations about the casual normativity of the new cosmopolitanism have a much wider--and older--resonance. In the politically fraught climate of early nineteenth-century Britain, these three writers turned to genres such as enlightenment narrative, national tale, and gothic to take up the question of nation. Together their cosmopolitan fictions constitute not only a neglected counter-voice to dominant understandings of nationness in the Romantic period but also a neglected part of a larger genealogy of cosmopolitanism.

Notes to Introduction

1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

2. There has been a lot of recent critical attention in Romantic studies to imperialism and colonialism as international or transnational energies in the period. See, for example, Saree Makdisi, *Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and the essays collected in two important volumes: Tim Fulford and Peter J. Kitson, eds. *Romanticism and Colonialism: Writing and Empire, 1780-1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alan Richardson and Sonia Hofkosh, eds. *Romanticism, Race, and Imperial Culture, 1780-1834* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

3. Bruce Robbins, "Comparative Cosmopolitanism," *Social Text*, 31-32 (1992): 169-186.

4. See, for example, Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) and Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

5. Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, 133.

6. Amanda Anderson, "Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of Modernity," *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, ed. Bruce Robbins and Pheng Cheah (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 272.

Chapter One

A Cosmopolitan Nation? Kant, Burke and the Question of Borders

In his influential *Nationalism* (1960) Elie Kedourie casts Kant as the philosopher of nineteenth-century nationalism; in his equally influential *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), Ernest Gellner casts him, by contrast, as an eighteenth-century internationalist.[1] This divergence provides a useful frame for thinking about the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism at a crucial historical moment in modern European history. For both Kedourie and Gellner, Kant functions as a sort of shorthand for a number of ideas associated with eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, but the role he plays in each in relation to nationalism points to the instability of the idea of cosmopolitanism itself. Considered alternately as representative of enlightenment cosmopolitanism and as precursor to romantic nationalism, Kant's political philosophy has remained pivotal in recent attempts to theorize the nation: not only does he summarize much of eighteenth-century debate about cosmopolitanism in his work but his political thought combines the cosmopolitan and the national to create a non-unified model of nation confounding those critical formulations that map the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism in strictly oppositional terms.

Elie Kedourie defines nationalism as a doctrine invented in early nineteenth-century Europe whose main tenet is "that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government" (*Nationalism*, 9). A concept of self-determination is central to this doctrine of nation.[2]

Kedourie explains: "Nationalism, which is itself, as will be seen, largely a doctrine of national self-determination, found here [in self-determination] the great source of its vitality, and it has therefore been necessary to examine how self-determination came to have this central importance in ethical and political teachings" (*Nationalism*, 31). For Kedourie, the concept of self-determination was theorized most thoroughly not in the political writings of French philosophes or revolutionaries, as might be expected, but in those of the seemingly unrevolutionary German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kedourie argues that Kant's philosophy underwrote Enlightenment assertions about the inalienable natural rights of humankind, replacing the scepticism inherent in eighteenth-century epistemologies of sensation with a new certainty when he claimed that each individual holds within himself a universal law and that it is in obedience to this internal law that morality consists. Individuals do not possess liberty and equality because individuals are part of the natural order; rather, they determine liberty and equality for themselves. Kedourie attributes to this notion of self-determination radical changes in European political thought, and he sees Kant, as the philosopher of self-determination, to be instrumental in the formation of European nationalism. This does not mean that Kant was a nationalist. As Kedourie explains in an "Afterward" to *Nationalism* written twenty-five years after its original publication, he is not claiming Kant for the nationalist camp: "The argument, rather, is that the idea of self-determination, which is at the centre of Kant's ethical theory, became the governing notion in the moral and political discourse of his successors, notably Fichte" (*Nationalism*, 142). In thus insisting on the shared ground between Kant and romantic nationalism and on the break Kant makes with eighteenth-century political philosophy, Kedourie downplays the particularly

cosmopolitan aspects of Kant's political philosophy.

Ernest Gellner interprets nationalism differently than does Kedourie, but he too dismisses Kant's cosmopolitanism in order to solidify a model of nationalism. Gellner argues that nationalism is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1). For him, the roots of nationalism lie in a new form of social organization, one based on the equivalence of culture and state. This form arises with the advent of industrialization, and it is sparked by modern social conditions such as homogeneity, literacy, and anonymity. In Gellner's view, nationalism appears as the necessary product of a new configuration of society, culture, and polity, a view markedly different from Kedourie's, in which nationalism (as Gellner puts it) is a "contingent, avoidable aberration, accidentally spawned by European thinkers" (*Nations and Nationalism*, 142). Gellner sees Kant himself solely as an adherent of a cosmopolitanism that is narrowly understood as the antithesis of nationalism. For him, Kant's commitment to the universal leaves no room for the cultural and ethnic specificities of nationalism:

> Kant's identification of man with that which is rational and universal in him, his fastidious and persistent, highly characteristic distaste for basing anything of importance on that which is merely contingent, historical or specific, makes Kant a very model for that allegedly bloodless, cosmopolitan, emancipated ethic of the Enlightenment, which romantic nationalists spurned and detested so much, and which they so joyously repudiated in favour of a more earthly, shamelessly specific and partial commitment to kin or territory or culture.
>
> (*Nations and Nationalism*, 131)[3]

By positioning Kant as "a very model" of the enlightenment cosmopolitanism "spurned and detested" by romantic nationalists, Gellner draws a firm line between Kant and nationalism: "If a connection exists between Kant and nationalism at all," he concludes, "then nationalism is a reaction against him, and not his offspring" (*Nations and Nationalism*, 134).[4] In their formulations of nationalism, then, Kedourie and Gellner position Kant quite differently: where Kedourie tries to tuck Kant under the edge of early nineteenth-century nationalism, Gellner firmly forces him back into eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism. What their debate underlines is a dubious exclusionary logic that identifies Kant as either nationalist or cosmopolitan. But, as Andrew Hurrell points out in "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations," this split tradition of interpretation derives from a doubleness in Kant's thought itself.

Although Hurrell does not include the Kedourie-Gellner debate in his study, he points out that on one side scholars such as E.H. Hinsley, Ian Clark, and Patrick Riley downplay the universalist and cosmopolitan side of Kant's writings, focusing on the idea of a limited association of independent states put forth by the philosopher in later essays such as "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch;" on the other side, scholars like Hedley Bull and Martin Wight accentuate the cosmopolitan or universal paradigm in Kant's writings by turning to earlier writings such as "Idea of a Universal History."[5] Hurrell himself attributes this split to Kant's "attempt to come to terms with *both* the deep rootedness and benefits of statism on one hand *and* the increasing moral and practical demands of cosmopolitanism on the other."[6] In his opinion, there is no single Kantian solution to the international problem. Rather, there are two interlaced approaches deriving from Kant's recognition that what

happens within a state cannot be separated from what happens outside the state. Kant's political philosophy strives to reconcile the seemingly incompatible demands of political realism and moral idealism, the particular needs of the nation and the universal needs of all individuals.[7] In this reading, Kant is both statist and cosmopolitan; moreover, this doubleness is the core of his achievement. Hurrell's "double logic" offers a more satisfactory approach to Kant's political thought, and a rereading of Kant's key political essays with such a logic in mind points to a greater complexity both within late eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism and in its interaction with nationalism.

The Kantian Model

Kant's foray into the field of political philosophy in 1784 resulted in two essays, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" and "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'." It was through these two essays that Kant established the central concept of his cosmopolitanism, the "cosmopolitan purpose." He begins "Idea for a Universal History" by directing his inquiry away from metaphysics and towards the world of phenomena. Since humanity does not appear to follow any rational purpose of its own--neither "pursu[ing] [its] aims purely by instinct" like animals nor following some "prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans"--it would seem that the task of writing a universal history is not a feasible one.[8] Kant argues, however, that this is not the case. Just as pattern can evolve out of apparently random marriages, births, and deaths when they are collected together into national statistics, so too pattern can evolve out of the randomness of historical event if only historians extend the horizon of their inquiry. "[W]hat strikes us in

the actions of individuals as confused and fortuitous," he explains, "may be recognised, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man's original capacities" ("Universal History," 41). Thus the historian must not look to the singular and chaotic movements of individuals or even nations but to the gradual progress of humanity as a whole through time if he is to make sense of human history: "Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature" ("Universal History," 41). Through his notion of universal history, Kant unifies the disparate actions of individuals and nations, and points to a singular purpose governing human existence. Ultimately, all human actions, both individual and collective, are to be judged according to their contribution to this universal or cosmopolitan purpose.

For Kant, the cosmopolitan purpose coincides with the development of human reason. The capacity for reason is universal in that it belongs to every individual, but Kant stresses that it exceeds the finite limits of the individual: "*In man* (as the only rational creature on earth), *those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual*" ("Universal History," 42). The goal of reason in enlightenment is made clear in "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'," written in the same year as "Idea of a Universal History." Reason is not to be won at one blow through violent political upheaval; rather, it is a gradual reform in thinking, an "*emergence*" from one's "*self-incurred immaturity*," and it brings political change along with it ("What is Enlightenment," 54). True reform comes not

through revolution but through freedom, specifically the freedom to make public use of one's reason. Freedom to think leads to the freedom to act, and "[e]ventually, it even influences the principles of governments, which find that they can themselves profit by treating man, who is *more than a machine*, in a manner appropriate to his dignity" ("What is Enlightenment," 59-60). "If it is now asked whether we at present live in an *enlightened* age," Kant writes in a famous formulation, "the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of *enlightenment*" ("What is Enlightenment,"58). Enlightenment as the uncompleted emergence of reason overlaps with the cosmopolitan purpose of universal history. In particular, both extend beyond the individual: "There is more chance of an entire public enlightening itself," Kant claims, than of an individual throwing off the "ball and chain of his permanent immaturity" ("What is Enlightenment," 55).[9] Although each individual is capable of reason, reason itself is fulfilled through the development of society as a whole. Understood in this way, the realization of enlightenment is co-terminus with the realization of cosmopolitan purpose: "after many revolutions, with all their transforming effects, the highest purpose of nature, a universal *cosmopolitan existence*, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop" ("Universal History," 51). The "cosmopolitan purpose" behind Kant's idea of a universal history is thus the development of humanity's capacity for reason, its ongoing progress towards enlightenment.

This teleology of reason positions Kant ideologically within the eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism usefully analyzed by Thomas Schlereth in *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*. Schlereth identifies three different strains of thought gathered under the rubric of cosmopolitanism: the construction of an elite intellectual class of cosmopolitans,

the prevalence of theological and epistemological universalisms, and the establishment of political internationalisms. Kant does not figure largely in *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*, but his writings fall into all three of Schlereth's categories. In the "Contest of the Faculties," for example, Kant writes in the first strain, putting forward philosophers as a unique, transnational class of intellectuals with the freedom to judge without government (national) interference. The famous three critiques, where he posits reason as universal to all individuals, clearly fall into the second category, while notions like "cosmopolitan purpose" and "enlightenment" extend the traditional eighteenth-century conception of universal reason by encompassing the progress of reason through time, making it universal in a new sense: as human teleology. It is Kant's relation to the third strain of cosmopolitanism (internationalism), however, that is most important here.

Schlereth defines internationalism as primarily "the political doctrine or belief that world peace may be attained by the friendly association of all nations on a basis of equality and without sacrifice of national character for the securing of international justice and for cooperation in all matters of worldwide interest."[10] His definition supports a reading of cosmopolitanism as more than the elimination of nations and the creation of a world state. By understanding internationalism as the "friendly association" of nations "without sacrifice of national character," he points to a sense of nation within eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, a sense often overlooked so as to maintain a convenient and easily manipulated binary between eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism and nineteenth-century nationalism. Schlereth's argument helps draw attention to the way in which the cosmopolitan Kant works with rather than dissolves the notion of nation. Even in "Idea of a Universal

History," a work generally considered the most cosmopolitan of Kant's political writings, a positive conception of nation takes its place alongside formulations of "cosmopolitan purpose." In particular, Kant broaches in this essay a notion of "unsocial sociability" which points to a non-unified model of the nation at the core of his cosmopolitan political philosophy.

The notion of "unsocial sociability" is at the heart of Kant's notion of the civil state. Kant founds his political philosophy in the well-known eighteenth-century concept of the original contract. Unlike Rousseau, however, who argues that society distorts the true nature of individuals, Kant argues that the individual is truly himself only within society. In "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice'," he describes the original contract as the voluntary forfeiture of individual freedom in order to regain freedom within a larger society of individuals. Its goal, like that of all social contracts, is the union of individuals. Kant notes, however, that "a union as an end in itself which they all *ought to share* and which is thus an absolute and primary duty in all external relationships whatsoever among human beings (who cannot avoid mutually influencing one another), is only found in a society in so far as it constitutes a civil state, i.e. a commonwealth" ("Theory and Practice," 73). He defines this ideal civil state as one based on three *a priori* principles: freedom, equality, and independence; and these principles, he argues elsewhere, are best fulfilled through a republican constitution.

What sets in motion the development of this civil state is the paradox Kant terms "unsocial sociability" ("*ungesellige Geselligkeit*") in "Idea of a Universal History:" "Man has an inclination to *live in society*, since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he feels

able to develop his natural capacities. But he also has a great tendency to *live as an individual*, to isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas" ("Universal History," 44). Kant locates these conflicting impulses within human nature, and he argues that they rouse us out of our lethargy and instill in us the desire for honour, power, and property. These desires in turn drive us "to seek status among [our] fellows, whom [we] cannot *bear* yet cannot *bear to leave*" ("Universal History," 44). It is therefore our asocial tendencies (for example, our "social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power") that, paradoxically, serve to effect social union ("Universal History," 45). And it is social union that prepares us for the step out of barbarism and into culture: "a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles; and thus a *pathologically* enforced social union is transformed into a *moral* whole" ("Universal History," 44-45). What Kant means here by "a *moral* whole" (described in "Metaphysics of Morals" as a "state of right") is a national union in keeping with cosmopolitan purpose. This, the highest purpose of nature, "can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others" ("Universal History," 45). The co-existence of individual freedoms demands the enforcement of limits, and enforcement comes with the adoption of a constitution. From social union, then, we move to national union.

In "Metaphysics of Morals" Kant argues that the step out of barbarism is contingent on the "union of an aggregate of men under rightful laws" (*status civilis*) or, in other words, the formation of a state (*civitas*) ("Metaphysics of Morals," 138). Citizens of a state, he reasons, "will not intermix with any neighbouring people who live in a state of nature, but will consider them ignoble, even though such savages for their own part may regard themselves as superior on account of the lawless freedom they have chosen" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 164). Savages may "constitute" national groups, but "they do not constitute states" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 164). According to Kant's logic, national groups are natural entities while states are civil ones. And national groups become states through union. For Kant, this national union, like social union, is based in antagonism: "*The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order*" ("Universal History," 44). If the state begins as a "*pathologically* enforced social union," and if antagonism is indeed the cause of its creation, then faults exist in its very foundation. What these faults imply for Kant's model of nation is asymmetry: the nation is not a faultless homogeneity but a faulty heterogeneity.

The centrality of unsocial sociability to Kant's understanding of nationness appears in his use of a standard analogy of the period. Individual development, he argues in "Idea of a Universal History," is like that of a tree in the forest: "In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and straight--whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from others, grow stunted, bent and twisted" ("Universal

History," 46). While unrestricted freedom warps tree and individual, restricted freedom beneficially directs their development. Kant explains:

> Man, who is otherwise so enamoured with unrestrained freedom, is forced to enter [a] state of restriction by sheer necessity. And this is indeed the most stringent of all forms of necessity, for it is imposed by men upon themselves, in that their inclinations make it impossible for them to exist side by side for long in a state of wild freedom. But once enclosed within a precinct like that of civil union, the same inclinations have the most beneficial effect.
>
> ("Universal History," 46)

Kant is drawing on an established tradition of political thought in such arguments, but his emphasis falls less on the public benefit of private vices (as in Mandeville's well-known fable) than on the matter of interdependence: the individual (the tree) is a self-contained entity yet remains dependent upon its relations with the containing unit (the forest) to fulfil its natural capacities. The components of Kant's nation state are thus distinct yet dependent.

Kant returns to the same image in "Perpetual Peace," but this time to describe the state directly: "It is a society of men, which no-one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity" ("Perpetual Peace," 94). His description draws on an organic vocabulary--the state has "its own roots"--that recalls the discourse of the nation in romantic nationalism. Kant's tree, for example, bears a marked similarity to Edmund Burke's well-known image of the oak of England found in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). But unlike Burke's oak,

which rises organically out of itself, Kant's tree, though autonomous, cannot be grafted. This is not because it is in essence ungraftable but because grafting "contradicts the idea of the original contract, without which the rights of a people are unthinkable" ("Perpetual Peace," 94). National union is an artificial (civil) process in Kant's view, not an already-given natural state, as it is in Burke's. The similar vocabulary used to effect different understandings of nationness (Burke's solitary oak is not Kant's ungraftable tree) points to the proximity of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and it goes some way towards explaining the confusion surrounding the notion of cosmopolitanism. Unlike Burke's unified nation, however, Kant's state is non-unified: it is founded in antagonism (rather than inheritance), and heterogeneity lies at its core.

This does not mean that it lacks integrity; it is a unit, after all. But the integrity of Kant's non-unified nation depends on something outside itself. Its union is secured through international union. In the seventh proposition of "Idea of a Universal History," Kant claims that a universal cosmopolitan existence cannot be realized independently of a certain configuration of international relations. In fact, "*[t]he problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed* ***external relationship*** *with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved*" ("Universal History," 47). Evidently, the same antagonism which urges human beings to social and then national union also propels states into union as well: "Nature has thus again employed the unsociableness of men, and even of the large societies and states which human beings construct, as a means of arriving at a condition of calm and security though their inevitable *antagonism*" ("Universal History," 47). Just as individuals for Kant forfeit unrestricted freedom for restricted freedom

within society, so too must states forfeit unrestricted freedom for restricted freedom within a world government if there is to be political stability. In concrete terms, this means the creation of and participation in a "federation of peoples" ("Universal History," 47). While Kant acknowledges the sceptical reception accorded to previous manifestations of this idea in the works of philosophers such as Rousseau and Abbé St Pierre, he nonetheless posits it as the inevitable outcome of antagonism between states, even as he acknowledges that such a federation is a distant and as yet unreachable goal. As long as states hold political and geographical expansion as a priority and continue to curtail the process of enlightenment within their populations, such a federation is not possible: "The human race will no doubt remain in this condition [of antagonism] until it has worked itself out of the chaotic state of its political relations in the way I have described" ("Universal History," 49). But Kant feels that certain developments are slowly guiding the peoples of the world towards union. In war, he argues, the growing uncertainty of outcome for both parties, the increasing debt incurred, and the spreading internal opposition to it will lead states to re-evaluate the merits of war and inch them towards the adoption of some system of united power. As well, growth in international trade means that nations must consider how they appear to other nations. Internal injustices, he explains, are even now incurring external sanction: "civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state's power in its external relations will also decline" ("Universal History," 50). Kant's example points to a larger three-fold political structure in which the freedom of the individual is contingent on the state, and the freedom of the state on international peace. Realization of the cosmopolitan purpose according to this

structure entails both internal (domestic) and external (international) components.

Kant's cosmopolitan political philosophy, then, entails a non-unified notion of nation (the state as heterogeneity) and a theory of inter-state relations (federation of states). Indeed, realization of his cosmopolitan purpose is contingent upon both national and international union. Thus understood, the cosmopolitanism of "Idea of a Universal History" is not as distant as often thought from ideas in later writings such as "Perpetual Peace" and "Metaphysics of Morals." In fact, these later essays, written after the French Revolution, expand rather than depart from the political philosophy introduced in "Idea of a Universal History."

In "Perpetual Peace," Kant reworks the notion of unsocial sociability into a practical theory of international relations. He argues that "Peoples who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external laws; for they are a standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbours" ("Perpetual Peace," 102). The practical antidote for such inter-state antagonism is the second definitive article of peace which reads: "The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States" ("Perpetual Peace," 102). The article makes it clear that the internal integrity of the state, its ability to preserve the rights of its citizens, depends upon something external to the state: inter-state relations. Importantly, Kant here rejects the notion of a world state in which borders between composite states disappear because it contradicts the freedom of nations guaranteed by international right. Furthermore, antagonism between states is preferable to "an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy" ("Perpetual

Peace," 113). Instead he posits a "federation of free states" in which the borders between individual states are preserved: "This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the *freedom* of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature" ("Perpetual Peace," 104). Federation (of states) preserves national identity: it is not itself an identity.

In the first part of "The Metaphysics of Morals" called "The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right," Kant reminds us that mere federation does not ensure perpetual peace. He argues that when states are restrained in a union (for example, Europe's balance of power) they can achieve temporary stability ("Metaphysics of Morals," 165). Punitive wars or wars that threaten the existence of a state can be prohibited. However, it is "[o]nly within a universal *union of states* (analogous to the union through which a nation becomes a state) can such rights and property acquire *peremptory* validity and a true *state of peace* be attained" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 171). What Kant means here by "universal *union of states*" lies in his bracketed analogy between international union and national union. He explains: "Since the state of nature among nations (as among individual human beings) is a state which one ought to abandon in order to enter a state governed by law, all international rights, as well as all the external property of states such as can be acquired or preserved by war, are purely *provisional* until the state of nature has been abandoned" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 171). Until a "universal *union of states*" occurs, national union remains provisional.

The combination of centrifugal and centripetal drives in Kant's political philosophy has recently attracted Julia Kristeva, who argues in *Strangers to Ourselves* (1991) that "the acknowledgement of *difference* is inscribed at the very heart of [Kant's] universal republic."[11] That is, states do not disappear into an amalgamation or universal monarchy but rather coexist, their distinctness preserved through language and religion: "Thus *separation* and *union* would guarantee universal peace at the core of this cosmopolitanism, understood as coexistence of the differences that are imposed by the technique of international relations on the one hand and political morality on the other. In short, since politics can only be moral, the fulfilment of man and of the designs of Providence demand that it be 'cosmopolitical'" (*Strangers to Ourselves*, 173). Building on this reading of Kant in her more explicitly political *Nations without Nationalism* (1993), she reclaims cosmopolitanism as a viable alternative to nationalism in our own time. Positing the possibility of "nations without nationalism," Kristeva seeks to reinstate into contemporary nationalisms a universal principle of humanity. She claims for herself the denomination "cosmopolitan," defining the term as a "transnational or international position situated at the crossing of boundaries."[12]

Kristeva's formulation draws attention to the importance of boundary crossing in Kant's practical cosmopolitanism. In "Metaphysics of Morals," Kant argues that the globe is of limited dimensions ("a determinate whole"), and it rightfully belongs to all: "all nations are *originally* members of a community of the land" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 172). This communal possession of a finite globe gives individuals the right to "*attempt* to enter into a community with everyone else and to *visit* all regions of the earth with this intention" ("Metaphysics of Morals," 172). Although he posits this cosmopolitan right "to visit" as

universal, he does not include within it the universal right to settle where one wills. Cosmopolitan right is similarly restricted in "Perpetual Peace," where Kant insists that although universal hospitality entails "the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory," it is not equivalent to the "right of guest" which entitles the foreigner to become a member of the native household for a time ("Perpetual Peace," 105, 106). Rather, universal hospitality is a "right of resort" which enables foreigners to enter into relations with native inhabitants ("Perpetual Peace," 106). For Kant, individuals may traverse all borders within the world, but borders remain nonetheless. In national terms, this means that nations may settle alongside other nations only after drawing up treaties and only if no attempt is made to appropriate the other nation for oneself. So Kant complains that in European encounters with foreign states, such as the Spice Islands and East India, visitation is the same as conquest ("Perpetual Peace," 106). Balancing cosmopolitanism and statism, Kant makes the world's borders permeable to individual visitation but impermeable to national appropriation or colonization. In keeping with the co-existence of freedom and restriction in his notion of unsocial sociability, his cosmopolitanism allows for the free movement between borders but not the elimination of them.

Debating the Nation in Britain

Kant's model was not the model that prevailed in post-Revolution Britain as it engaged in war with France, not even when it was a question of uniting with other nations to defeat the French. Thus in "Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs" (1792),

Edmund Burke dismisses the proposition that a Congress of all European powers be formed so as to create a defensive alliance against France: "It is so perfectly absurd, that if that, or any thing like it, meets with a serious entertainment in any Cabinet, I should think it the effect of what is called a judicial blindness, the certain forerunner of the destruction of all Crowns and Kingdoms."[13] Indeed, such an alliance "is so evidently impossible, is such a chimera, is so contrary to human nature, and the course of human affairs, that I am persuaded no person in his senses, except those whose Country, Religion, and Sovereign, are deposited in the French funds, could dream of it ("Heads for Consideration," 401). Burke's outright rejection of a cosmopolitan solution to Europe's problems runs directly counter to Kant's conviction that national security is found only within international union, and his influential *Reflections on the Revolution in France* adumbrates a unified model of the nation that ultimately excludes the cosmopolitan. But in this text Burke was responding to a cosmopolitan line of thought within Britain akin to that of Kant, and this cosmopolitan line kept in play alternative notions of the nation even within the post-Revolutionary British state.

Burke introduces his *Reflections* by distancing his work from the London Revolutionary Society's "Congratulary Address to the National Assembly of France," which praised the French Revolution and voiced the hope that together England and France could effect a general reformation in the governments of Europe. Burke casts himself as a politically astute Englishman:

> I certainly take my full share, along with the rest of the world, in my individual and private capacity, in speculating on what has been done, or is doing, on the public stage; in any place antient or modern; in the republic of

> Rome, or the republic of Paris: but having no general apostolical mission, being a citizen of a particular state, and being bound up in a considerable degree, by its public will, I should think it, at least improper and irregular, for me to open a formal public correspondence with the actual government of a foreign nation, without the express authority of the government under which I live. (*Reflections*, 56-57)

Couched as a private letter to a French acquaintance, Burke's *Reflections* fall within the boundaries delimiting national concern: they are the speculations of "a citizen of a particular state." By contrast, the Revolutionary Society's "Congratulary Address" is a pointed public document of apparently corporate or official origin (misleadingly so, Burke argues) which initiates a political collaboration with the French government. Thus the "Address" falls outside the boundaries delimiting national concern: its proponents are not English citizens so much as citizens of the world, participants in a "general apostolical mission." Burke's desire to close such improper avenues of political relations with France and to re-found English politics in England (as opposed to the world at large) prompts the conservative model of nation developed in *Reflections*.

Burke's *Reflections* are, in part, a reaction to a sermon given by the outspoken English Dissenting minister Richard Price on November 4, 1789, a sermon Burke believed was the impetus for the Revolutionary Society's "Congratulary Address."[14] Price's sermon, published that year as *A discourse on the love of our country*, and read by Burke in January 1790, addresses the notion of patriotism, a notion widely discussed during the eighteenth century and one which fell under increasing scrutiny with the advent of the French Revolution.

Price's interpretation of this crucial notion entails an understanding of nationness that complements rather than contradicts a cosmopolitan agenda but is at odds with the understanding of nationness Burke sketches in his *Reflections*.

Price begins his interpretation of patriotism or what he terms "love of country" by defining "country" so as to bring it in line with eighteenth-century understandings of nation as civil contract: "by our country is meant, in this case, not the soil or the spot of earth on which we happen to have been born, not the forests and fields, but that community of which we are members, or that body of companions and friends and kindred who are associated with us under the same constitution of government, protected by the same laws, and bound together by the same civil polity."[15] According to this definition, "country" is not a geographical location, not a place of birth or residence. Rather, it is a space delimited by common laws and a common constitution. Price goes on to insist that despite this dry and legalistic definition, national belonging still demands a certain attachment or "love." This love, however, "does not imply any conviction of the superior value of it to other countries, or any particular preference of its laws and constitution of government" (*Discourse*, 178). Individuals may have a natural partiality to what is close by, but they should combine this partiality with "right opinions," so making love of country a moral obligation or duty (*Discourse*, 178). Price establishes the significance of his definition of love of country by laying out the practical consequences that result from other definitions of the two key terms: "What has the love of their country hitherto been among mankind? What has it been but a love of domination, a desire of conquest, and a thirst for grandeur and glory, by extending territory and enslaving surrounding countries? What has it been but a blind and narrow

principle, producing in every country a contempt of other countries, and forming men into combinations and factions against their common rights and liberties?" (*Discourse*, 179). When "country" is understood as geographical location, "love of country" justifies the territorial conquest of other nations. And when "love" is understood as preference resting on perceived superiority, "love of country" justifies the enslavement of other peoples. However, when "country" is understood as shared laws and shared constitution and "love" as moral duty, the result is quite different. It becomes possible to fulfil Price's ideal and love one's country "ardently, but not exclusively" (*Discourse*, 181).

Price's definition of "love of country" thus allows him to open patriotism to a cosmopolitan ethic: "Though our immediate attention must be employed in promoting our own interest and that of our nearest connextions, yet we must remember that a narrower interest ought always to give way to a more extensive interest. In pursuing particularly the interest of our country we ought to carry our views beyond it" (*Discourse*, 180-181). Indeed, individuals should consider themselves "more as citizens of the world, than as members of any particular community" (*Discourse*, 193-194). If patriotism is consistent with an attitude of universal concern, the English patriot can extend his reach beyond England's borders to embrace the world at large. For Price, this means, among other things, actively supporting the French Revolution. His sermon presents the national revolutions of England, America, and France as a continuum: the three fundamental principles that constituted the "spirit" of the English Revolution of 1688 (that all civil and political authority is derived from the people, that the people have the right to resist this authority in the case of misconduct, and that the people have the right to liberty of conscience in religious matters)

also guided the American and the French Revolutions. All three revolutions are "glorious," and each participates in what Price describes as a world-wide struggle for liberty: "And now, methinks, I see the ardor for liberty catching and spreading, a general amendment beginning in human affairs, the dominion of kings changed for the dominion of laws, and the dominion of priests giving way to the dominion of reason and conscience" (*Discourse*, 195). Price's coming "dominion" of law, reason, and conscience is not circumscribed by national borders but by the world itself, and one's patriotic duty is to work towards its realization.

In the *Reflections*, Burke methodically separates what Price has joined, removing England from the events occurring in France and from the "general amendment beginning in human affairs" so enthusiastically heralded by Price. Through these important separations, he sets up the oppositional relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism that was to inform mainstream British reception of cosmopolitanism throughout the nineteenth century.[16] Burke begins this process of separation by challenging the convergence of French and English Revolutions claimed by Price. He declares that the Glorious Revolution did not set a precedent guaranteeing the popular election of sovereigns, as Price suggests. Rather, it was a "small and temporary deviation from the strict order of a regular hereditary succession" that was necessary "for the peace, quiet, and security of the realm" (*Reflections*, 68). Indeed, the principles of the Revolution of 1688 lie not in Price's "hitherto unheard-of bill of rights" (which includes the people's right to choose its own governors, to cashier them for misconduct, and to form a government for themselves), but in the Declaration of Right, which "indissolubly" binds together the rights and liberties of individuals with rules for hereditary succession (*Reflections*, 66, 67). Instead of eliminating hereditary succession

altogether, which would have been a feasible proposition in 1688, the English chose only to refine the means of determining succession. If England has no precedent in place guaranteeing the people's right to choose their sovereign, its constitution is not a forerunner to France's new constitution as Price intimates. Such misconceptions, argues Burke, are but "counterfeit wares which some persons, by a double fraud, export to you in illicit bottoms, as raw commodities of British growth though wholly alien to our soil, in order afterwards to smuggle them back again into this country, manufactured after the newest Paris fashion of an improved liberty" (*Reflections*, 76).[17] Burke draws on the language of international trade to make his point: "raw commodities" are exported to France, and manufactured "wares" imported to England. His chosen image of international smuggling makes such cross-cultural exchange into something fraudulent or illicit. England is set up as organic: French manufactures are alien to British soil and should be stopped at the border.

Burke's ability to draw an uninterrupted line from the Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right is essential to his model of the English nation. It allows him to present England as a historical continuity. He writes in an often-quoted passage:

> We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we possess as *an inheritance from our forefathers*. Upon that body and stock of inheritance we have taken care not to inoculate any cyon alien to the nature of the original plant. All the reformations we have hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of reference to antiquity; and I hope, nay I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may be made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example. (*Reflections*, 81)

Burke's emphasis on the natural development of one "original" plant through time and his insistence that this development has been removed from all external or "alien" influence supports his understanding of the English nation as an organic whole: "a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (*Reflections*, 147). His notion of the "little platoon" or, as he terms it elsewhere, the "locality of patriotism" testifies to the insularity of this understanding of nation ("Thoughts on French Affairs," 342). Unlike Price, who adds a cosmopolitan ethic to patriotism, Burke anchors national belonging in local affection: "To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind" (*Reflections*, 97-98). First affections must be in place before the circle of attachment can expand; in this way, Burke grounds the nation in the particular rather than the universal. Unlike Price, who reformulates "love of country" to enable England to reach beyond itself and secure rights for all individuals and all nations, Burke turns England in upon itself, creating an England which is unified and self-enclosed.

In order to cast the nation as an organic unified whole, Burke rejects several notions of civil union circulating in eighteenth-century political thought. In particular, his model of nation demands a correlative banishment of cosmopolitanism as nationally disruptive. Thus in Burke's *Reflections*, the cosmopolitan Price becomes a participant in a world-wide political conspiracy, "a man much connected with literary caballers, and intriguing philosophers; with political theologians, and theological politicians, both at home and abroad" (*Reflections*, 61); and the Revolutionary Society becomes a secret society, the unsigned "Congratulary Address"

proof of their Jacobinical intentions. Similarly demonized are those "literary caballers" and "intriguing philosophers" such as Rousseau, Voltaire, and Helvetius, whom Burke believes in part responsible for the French Revolution. Burke's hostile treatment of the universalism perpetrated by the French philosophes signals a darkening in the British reception of continental cosmopolitanism, and establishes a connection between cosmopolitanism and Jacobinism that continued to be perpetuated even after the war with France was over.[18]

In Burke's opinion, the French philosophes facilitated the French Revolution through their philosophical one.[19] It is one continuous path, he insists, from their enlightenment cosmopolitanism to the French Revolution: "In the groves of *their* academy, at the end of every visto [sic], you see nothing but the gallows" (*Reflections*, 128). The enlightenment philosophy of the philosophes, he explains, is a "barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings" (*Reflections*, 128).[20] Sacrificing the concrete particulars of everyday life to abstract universals, it breaks down the foundations upon which civilization rests. In particular, it undermines the traditional values Burke places at the heart of the nation: love of hearth and home. "On the principles of this mechanic philosophy," he declares, "our institutions can never be embodied" (*Reflections*, 129). These abstract principles fail to "create in us [the] love, veneration, admiration or attachment" that are the true constituents of national belonging (*Reflections*, 129). What the philosophes advocated in their writings, the revolutionaries put into practice. Even now, Burke suggests, the National Assembly is guided by the "polluted nonsense" of these philosophes, schooled in its cosmopolitan tenets by sundry intellectuals and "clubs composed of a monstrous medley of all conditions, tongues, and nations" (*Reflections*, 118).

Burke's most methodical criticism of the French philosophes is found outside the *Reflections* and is directed towards Rousseau. Burke's treatment of him re-engages the criticism of the universalism he began in *Reflections*, and it helps to sharpen the connection he introduced there between enlightenment cosmopolitanism and the French Revolution. In "Letter to a Member of the National Assembly" (1791), Burke claims that Rousseau's "*ethics of vanity*" form the core of the new French constitution ("Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," 313).[21] At their centre (and thus at the centre of the French constitution) is a "benevolence to the whole species" ("Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," 315). The consequence of this universal benevolence is an absence of affection for what is local. In Rousseau's case, this takes the form of parental neglect of his five children, whom he placed in a foundling hospital. Rousseau, Burke concludes famously, is "a lover of his kind, but a hater of his kindred" ("Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," 315). Having adopted Rousseau's "ethics," France commits the same error. It too fails to recognize the importance of local affection. In particular, it has ceased to value that first circle of attachment in the series that constitutes national belonging, the family: "Your masters reject the duties of this vulgar relation, as contrary to liberty; as not founded in the social compact; and not binding according to the rights of man; because the relation is not, of course, the result of *free election*; never so on the side of the children, not always on the part of the parents" ("Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," 315-316). For Burke, national belonging begins with love of hearth and home and not with the universal rights of man.

Since Burke sees the French Revolution as a product of the French enlightenment, he argues that England's safety lies in an absence of enlightenment. As he exclaims in his

Reflections: "We are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire, Helvetius has made no progress amongst us. Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers" (*Reflections*, 137). The English nation is defiantly unenlightened: "You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them" (*Reflections*, 138). In contrast to the enlightened French, the English are a people of "untaught feelings" and lasting "prejudices," the very qualities in fact that secure the Burkean nation. Noting that from Bacon onwards, Englishness was closely associated with an anti-theoretical common sense, David Simpson has recently argued that Burke added an important twist to this anti-theoretical tradition by implicating theory in a "cosmopolitan, internationalist initiative that could only survive by breaking down the local and national structures (imaginary structures) upon which his own preferred political order depended."[22] With Burke, he suggests, theory becomes not only anti-English, but also anti-national. It is not only foreign to English thought; its internationalism is hostile to the existence of all nations.

Set against Burke's model of nation, the new France is ungrounded in two senses: it is founded on an abstraction (the rights of man) rather than on historical continuity (inheritance), and its abstract foundation disrupts the natural correspondence between local ground and national belonging that secures the nation. This second sense of ungroundedness becomes significant in Burke's examination of the National Assembly's restructuring of

France's territory, population, and finances. Here Burke points to the disjunction between the forms of national organization and the organic nation the forms are to organize: "In this whole contrivance of the three bases, consider it in any light you please, I do not see a variety of objects, reconciled in one consistent whole, but several contradictory principles reluctantly and irreconcilably brought and held together by your philosophers, like wild beasts shut up in a cage, to claw and bite each other to their mutual destruction" (*Reflections*, 229). In the old France, historical nation and political nation corresponded, but in the new France they do not.[23] This non-correspondence is most apparent in France's geographical re-territorialization, where the borders and boundaries constituting the old France have been erased and redrawn with mathematical precision: the "ebb and flow of various properties and jurisdictions" have been cut into Cantons, Communes, and Departments (*Reflections*, 221). For Burke, such re-territorialization does not create a new nation but prevents the formation of any nation at all by eliminating the core of national belonging, attachment to place: "No man ever was attached by a sense of pride, partiality, or real affection, to a description of square measurement. He never will glory in belonging to the Checquer, No 71, or to any other badge ticket.... Such divisions of our country as have been formed by habit, and not by a sudden jerk of authority, were so many little images of the great country in which the heart found something which it could fill" (*Reflections*, 244). If national belonging lies in an attachment to one's "little platoon," elimination of this attachment will ultimately eliminate national belonging. Intellectual commitment to an abstraction fails to elicit the emotive attachment that results from instinctive love of place. Indeed, Burke goes so far as to predict that "instead of being all Frenchmen, the greater likelihood is, that the inhabitants of that

region will shortly have no country" (*Reflections*, 244). Burke's understanding of nation thus not only leads him to judge the new France as ungrounded compared to England but also leads him to put its status as nation, its very "nationness," into question.

But if France is no longer exactly a nation for Burke, what is it? In his "Second Letter on a Regicide Peace" (1796), Burke calls France a "faction." This denomination makes France a collection of disparate individuals joined together for political dissension, and gestures towards the sort of non-unified nation put forth by Kant and Price. Neither "local nor territorial," post-revolutionary France is "not a new power of an old kind" but rather "a new power of a new species" ("Second Letter on a Regicide Peace," 265, 277). It is a "general evil" that takes France for its center and Europe for its circumference ("Second Letter on a Regicide Peace," 265).[24] What Europe is facing, then, is more a "civil" war of doctrine than a "foreign" war of territory: "It is a war between the partizans of the antient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe against a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists which mean to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a sect aiming at universal empire, and beginning with the conquest of France" ("Second Letter on a Regicide Peace," 267). As Burke explains elsewhere, France initiates the destabilization of other nations by introducing "*other interests into all countries, than those which arose from their locality and natural circumstances*," most notably, cosmopolitan ideas such as the rights of man ("Thoughts on French Affairs," 341).

As a cosmopolitan system of political organization, Jacobinism threatens the very existence of the Burkean nation. According to Burke, "with this Republick nothing independent can co-exist" ("Second Letter on a Regicide Peace," 290). Jacobinism and

nations are mutually exclusive alternatives, and Burke's later political writings argue more and more vehemently that England's security, like the security of all nations, depends on the complete extinction of Jacobinism. Writing on French affairs one year after the *Reflections*, for example, Burke worries that disruptions in France will influence stability elsewhere: "Never shall I think any country in Europe to be secure, whilst there is established, in the very centre of it, a state (if so it may be called) founded on principles of anarchy, and which is, in reality, a college of armed fanatics, for the propagation of the principles of assassination, robbery, rebellion, fraud, faction, oppression, and impiety" ("Letter to a Member of the National Assembly," 305-306). By the next year, fear of influence has sharpened into a fear of infiltration. Burke sees Jacobinism reaching outside the boundaries of France and establishing itself within other nations: "This evil in the heart of Europe must be extirpated from that center, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it, and which will spread circle beyond circle, in spite of all the little defensive precautions which can be employed against it" ("Heads for Considerations on the Present State of Affairs," 402). The benign circles of attachment that start with the "little platoon" and lead to national belonging are transformed into malignant circles of Jacobin contagion that start in France and then expand to erode national belonging everywhere. Where Burke's benign circles are expansive, each circle building on the previous one, the malignant circles of Jacobinism eradicate all previous circles, leaving nothing in their wake.

But the real threat is posed by English Jacobins, as "Observations on the Conduct of the Minority" (1793) makes clear. Burke declares the nation's primary problem to be the "zeal of the Partisans of Jacobinism," a zeal he identifies with French sympathizers such as

Charles Fox, whose Jacobinical tendencies he methodically documents in a full fifty-five points ("Observations on the Conduct of the Minority," 404).[25] His "Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace" (1795) develops this earlier sketch of the English Jacobin. In it he warns that English Jacobins are "worse than lost to their country" because "their hearts are abroad" ("Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace," 105).[26] Burke laments that although England's Alien Act of 1793 facilitates the expulsion of foreigners, English Jacobins are still allowed to visit France "to cabal, and to be corrupted, by every means of cabal and of corruption; and then return to England, charged with their worst dispositions and designs" ("Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace," 105). Such travellers carry the alien seeds of rebellion back to England and plant them there. Burke's characterization of the English Jacobin foregrounds the border between England and France: the Jacobin deposits his heart over the border in France, and he carries French ideas back over the border to England. His crime, it appears, is that of crossing over. Indeed, Jacobinism itself for Burke straddles the borders between England and France: it "is a Colossus which bestrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil" ("First Letter on a Regicide Peace," 199).[27] For Burke, the internal threat of Jacobinism is in fact far more dangerous than the external threat of France, and he concludes in the "First Letter on a Regicide Peace" (1796) that "a change in the national spirit is the most terrible of all revolutions" ("First Letter on a Regicide Peace," 188). He bases his conclusion in part on the calculation that there are eighty thousand "pure Jacobins" residing within England and Scotland ("First Letter on a Regicide Peace," 224).

He does not include Ireland in this calculation, but Burke's writings on Ireland at this time also evoke Jacobinism as a pressing threat to national security. However, in this case

emphasis falls more on achieving national unity than on maintaining national borders. Burke argues that the only protection against Jacobinism in Ireland is a unified Ireland, and unification demands Catholic emancipation. In a "Letter to Richard Burke" (circa 1792), for example, he claims that patriotism cannot exist in a "country of monopoly" such as Ireland, where a minority (Protestant Ascendancy) oppresses a majority (Irish Catholics) and effectively excludes them from citizenship. In such a nation, he says, "There may be a party spirit--but a public spirit there can be none" ("Letter to Richard Burke," 641). As always for Burke, where patriotism is absent, Jacobinism is present. Thus patriotism must be restored in Ireland if it is to be saved from Jacobinism, and to achieve restoration Ireland must emancipate its Catholic population. Only emancipation will transform Ireland's "Protestant Parliament" into a "Patriot Parliament" ("Letter to Richard Burke," 650). In letters such as "Letter to William Smith" (29 January 1795), "Second Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe" (26 May 1795), and "Letter on Affairs of Ireland" (1797), Burke builds on this argument, suggesting that the Protestant Ascendancy's continued discrimination against Irish Catholics not only subverts patriotism but also turns discontented Catholics towards Jacobinism. In a "Letter to William Smith" (29 January 1795), for instance, he defines Jacobinism as "an attempt (hitherto but too successful) to eradicate prejudice out of the minds of men, for the purpose of putting all power and authority into the hands of the persons capable of occasionally enlightening the minds of the people" ("Letter to William Smith," 661). His definition not only emphasizes Jacobinism's connection to the cosmopolitan program of universal enlightenment but also ascribes to it the eradication of "prejudice," a central component in the Burkean nation.[28] The specific prejudice Burke has in mind here is

religion. In "Letter on Affairs of Ireland" he warns that punitive measures against Catholics weaken religious prejudice and create Jacobins rather than the hoped-for Anglicans. The disappearance of Catholicism in Ireland thus signals the triumph less of Protestantism than of Jacobinism. In Ireland, Catholicism in fact forms "the most effectual Barrier, if not the sole Barrier, against Jacobinism" ("Letter on Affairs of Ireland," 663). Although advocating a different solution to the threat of Jacobinism (Catholic emancipation rather than eradication of enlightenment thought), Burke's Irish writings nonetheless echo his English ones in their wish for a united and patriotic people.

What Burke sets up in his *Reflections* and develops in his later writings is not so much an opposition between two nations, England and France, as an opposition between two political ideologies, one national and one anti-national. "Jacobinism" appears as a political manifestation of cosmopolitan ideals that must be eliminated before England and all other nations can consider themselves safe. This reading of Jacobinism was not of course restricted to Britain. It governed the notorious Barruel, who indicts Kant, along with Weishaupt, in an international conspiracy of philosophes, Freemasons, and Illuminati who "[i]n the name of their equality and disorganizing liberty...trampled under foot the altar and the throne...stimulated all nations to rebellion, and aimed at plunging them ultimately into the horrors of anarchy."[29] For Barruel, Kant is the father of a "new species of Jacobins" and his cosmopolitanism incites his followers to revolution:

> [Kant's] colleagues in the universities do not teach his principles with his coolness; the disciples become violent; the Jacobins smile; and as the system spreads, the offspring of both these teachers [Kant and Weishaupt] unite and

> form alliances in their tenebrous abodes. Under pretence of this perpetual peace that is to be enjoyed by future generations, they have begun by declaring a war of cannibals against the whole universe; nor is there to be found scarcely one of their offspring, that is not ready to betray his country, his laws, and his fellow citizens, to erect that Cosmopolitan Empire announced by the Proffessor Kant, or to enthrone the *Man-King* of the modern *Spartacus*.
>
> (*Memoirs*, 4: 527-28)

Here Kant, philosopher of union, becomes a philosopher in union with Weishaupt and his Illuminati, a prominent participant in Jacobin conspiracy. In Barruel's reception of him, Kant's desire for perpetual peace is reinterpreted as a "war of cannibals against the whole universe," and his complex notion of the citizen of the world transformed into simply a traitor to nation.

The influence of Burke's own conspiracy theory was not restricted to conservative thinkers. His model of the causes of the revolution entered into anti-Burkean discourse as well, even though differently interpreted. In one of the most celebrated responses to Burke, for example, James Mackintosh's *Vindiciae Gallicae. A defence of the French Revolution and its English Admirers, against the Accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke* (1791), the author accepts Burke's argument that two primary groups were responsible for the French Revolution: the monied class and the French philosophes. But instead of denigrating the monied class, as Burke does, Mackintosh suggests that these citizens of the world are "less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent than the landed gentry" because their views are "enlarged by a wider intercourse with mankind."[30] Indeed, Mackintosh makes commerce

instrumental in overturning the feudal and chivalrous system nostalgically evoked by Burke:

> The manners of the middle age were, in the most singular sense, compulsory: enterprising benevolence was produced by general fierceness,--gallant courtesy by ferocious rudeness; and artificial gentleness resisted the torrent of natural barbarism. But a less incongruous system has succeeded, in which commerce, which unites men's interests, and knowledge, which excludes those prejudices that tend to embroil them, present a broader basis for the stability of civilized and beneficent manners. (*Vindiciae*, 435)

Mackintosh's "less incongruous system" of international relations is the product of a Europe more intellectually but also more economically interconnected, and implies a Kantian rather than a Burkean understanding of nation. National borders are opened to accommodate the foreign traffic of goods, and animosity between nations is reconciled in international union. Mackintosh's recuperation of cosmopolitanism as international commerce (rather than international conspiracy) draws on an already-established tradition of economic cosmopolitanism in Britain, and it was this economically inflected cosmopolitan line that the *Edinburgh Review* was to take up in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Notes to Chapter One

1. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Hannah Arendt was instrumental in initiating the current interest in Kant's political philosophy. Her influential *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982) argued persuasively that Kant's political philosophy formed a neglected fourth critique. Among the numerous recent studies of Kant's political philosophy, see for example Kimberly Hutchings' *Kant, Critique and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996), Hans Reiss' Introduction to *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Patrick Riley's *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983).

2. In the introduction to the fourth edition of *Nationalism* (1993) Kedourie describes nationalism as a form of "ideological politics" in that it sees itself as cure-all to social ills and is "necessarily and inevitably caught up in a perpetual disastrous and self-destructive tension between ends and means." Thus the "enshrinement of national self-determination as the organizing principle of international order" has been both the greatest triumph and greatest failure of nationalism. *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), xi, xvi.

3. In an earlier work, *Legitimation of Belief* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), Gellner stresses Kant's mistake in supposing a universal human predicament rather than an historically specific one: "Kant did not suppose that we could take with us, when entering the cold cognisable world, all our luggage, whole lorry-loads of conceptual furniture. He took the absolute minimum to save our humanity, to make us more than mere things; the rest he spurned. He was like a refugee from a catastrophe who arrives nobly carrying but two or three beings

dearest to him" (188). The characterization of Kant here as refugee is an interesting one, considering Kant will later bear the related burden of cosmopolitanism for Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism*.

4. In the controversial *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Friedrich Meinecke argues for a less abrupt transition from cosmopolitanism to nationalism in German political thought: "Cosmopolitanism did not merely sink to the ground, pale and exhausted; and the new national idea did not then spring up in its place, unimpeded and victorious. Cosmopolitanism and nationalism stood side by side in a close, living relationship for a long time. And even if the idea of the genuine national state could not come to full bloom within such a relationship, the meeting of these two intellectual forces was by no means unfruitful for the national idea" (94). Felix Gilbert's useful 1970 introduction to *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* puts Meinecke's glorification of nationalism and the nation state into the context of pre-World War one politics.

5. Hurrell refers primarily to the following works in his argument: E.H. Hinsley 's *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (1961); Ian Clark's *Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (1980); Patrick Riley's *Kant's Political Philosophy* (1983); Howard Williams' *Kant's Political Philosophy* (1985); Hedley Bull's "Society and Anarchy in International Relations" in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (1966); Martin Wight's "An Anatomy of International Thought" in *Review of International Studies* 3 (July 1987).

6. Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 16 (July 1990), 204.

7. In his study *Political Theory and International Relations*, Charles R. Beitz divides international morality in modern political thought into three distinct conceptions: international

moral scepticism, morality of states, and cosmopolitanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). He recognizes, however, that Kant's political writings can be included under both morality of states and cosmopolitanism.

8. Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *Kant's Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 41. All references to Kant are to this edition.

9. Reason also extends the limits of the individual in a more basic way. As Kant explains in "Idea of a Universal History:" "Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its projects is unbounded" ("Universal History," 42).

10. Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan in Enlightenment Thought* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), xii.

11. Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 172.

12. Julia Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 16.

13. Edmund Burke, "Heads for Consideration on the Present State of Affairs," *The Writing and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, ed. Paul Langford, 12 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 401. All references to Burke's essays are to this edition.

14. Price's sermon was bound together with "The Congratulary Address to the National Assembly of France" in *A discourse on the love of country*. Burke writes of this combined effort that "The whole of that publication, with the manifest design of connecting the affairs of France with those of England, by drawing us into an imitation of the conduct of the National Assembly,

gave me a considerable degree of uneasiness" (*Reflections*, 59).

15. Richard Price, *A discourse on the love of our country* (Oxford: Woodstock Books, 1992), 178.

16. As the Kedourie-Gellner debate suggests, the oppositional relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism continues to linger in twentieth-century thought. For an even more recent example, see the debate provoked by Martha C. Nussbaum's "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" in the *Boston Review* (Oct/Nov 1994). The core of this debate is published in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994).

17. Price, for example, claims that the English constitution is a model for the new French constitution, but also claims that England should imitate the French constitution and correct the inequality of representation it preserves in its own constitution.

18. Séamus Deane observes that long after Burke's conspiracy theory was discredited, the English government "was willing to nurture this notion because it kept anti-French feeling alive and because it was a useful weapon in its own battle against Jacobins in England, Scotland, and Ireland." *The French Revolution and Enlightenment in England, 1789-1832* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 170.

19. Deane shows that Burke was pivotal in the reception and the interpretation of the Enlightenment in England, creating a climate of hostility towards Enlightenment thinkers "by picturing them as a band of atheistic conspirators plotting revolution against throne and altar" (*The French Revolution and Enlightenment*, 5).

20. The philosophes may have answered back. Hans Reiss suggests that Edmund Burke may be the "worthy man" whom Kant addresses in his defense of theories and systems in "Theory and

Practise." Burke's *Reflections* were translated into German in 1793. See Kant's "Theory and Practise," 63, and Reiss's note, 274.

21. Burke clearly points out that the first statue the National Assembly erected was of Rousseau.

22. David Simpson, *Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt against Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 178.

23. Burke notes a similar non-correspondence between moral and geographical France in his "Remarks on the Policy of the Allies" (1793) where he declares that "France is out of itself" (465).

24. As in *Reflections*, Burke clearly differentiates between the old France and the new: the old is a unified nation with clear borders, while the new is a sprawling entity of "questionable shape" with pockets dispersed throughout Europe ("Second Letter on a Regicide Peace," 277). As he noted elsewhere, "We are at war with a principle, and an example, which there is no shutting out by Fortresses or excluding by Territorial Limits. No line of demarcation can bound the Jacobin Empire." "To the Compte de Mercy-Argenteau" (circa 6 August 1793) in vol. 9 of *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, 10 vols. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), 387.

25. Frank O'Gorman discusses the debate between Burke and Fox in the context of English politics in *The Whig Party and the French Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1967).

26. Burke began to draft the "Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace" in 1795 but left it to write the First and Second "Letters on a Regicide Peace."

27. In an earlier attempt to convey the relation between English and French Jacobinism, Burke writes to Lord Grenville (18 Aug 1792) that "Every encouragement direct or indirect, given to their Brethren in France, stirs and animates the [English] Embers." "Letter to Lord Grenville," vol. 7 of *Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, 177.

28. In *The French Revolution and Enlightenment*, Séamus Deane notes the close connection Burke established between the French Jacobins and the Protestant Ascendancy: "Thus much of what had happened in Ireland was a standing rebuke to all that was being attempted in France. National love and political affections were being broken or vulgarized by a despotic, enterprising sect which had a persecuting edge to its deeply embedded fanaticism. The French were universalizing sectarianism into a theory of global benevolence and revolution. Neither the sect nor the party, the Ascendancy nor the Jacobinism, was a true aristocracy." (17) For Burke, he suggests, "France was a threat, Ireland a dire warning, England the middle term between the two" (19).

29. Abbé Barruel, *Memoirs, Illustrating the History of Jacobinism*, trans. Hon. Robert Clifford, 4 vols. (London: T. Burton and Co., 1797), 1:ix. Barruel's translator, Robert Clifford, works with the same basic premises in his *Application of Barruel's Memoirs of Jacobinism, to the Secret Societies of Ireland and Great Britain* (London: E. Booker, 1798).

30. James Mackintosh, *Vindiciae Gallicae. A defence of the French Revolution and its English Admirers, against the Accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke* in *The Miscellaneous Works of the Right Honourable Sir James Mackintosh* (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1858), 426. Mackintosh compares Burke's treatment of the French monied class in *Reflections* to Tory treatment of the Whigs during the Glorious revolution.

Chapter Two

"A Great Federacy" of Nations: Internationalism and the *Edinburgh Review*

Despite the spread of a Burkean type of hostility towards cosmopolitanism in Britain during this period, it did not disappear from official public discourse. In fact, it enters into the pages of the most influential periodical of the time, the *Edinburgh Review*. Arising out of the eighteenth-century tradition of moral philosophy, the early *Edinburgh Review* viewed itself as an instrument of political enlightenment, making the point immediately in its first volume not only by a review of Villers' *Philosophie de Kant* but by actively setting itself against the Burkean paradigm.[1] In that first volume, reviewers characterized the "Burke and Windham school" of politics as "alarmist" and countered Burke's conspiracy theory with a socio-economic interpretation of the French Revolution, along with a vindication of the French philosophes.[2] They also defended the French economists against charges of Jacobinism, and advocated an "innocent cosmopolitanism" of intellect to atone for national animosity.[3] Such a stance represented a certain risk in the charged context of the Napoleonic wars, and the *Edinburgh Review* was repeatedly attacked as unpatriotic: "the watchword of Government was let loose upon us; and we were accused of wishing to lower the flag of England to her former rebellious colonies; and, in conjunction with our Transatlantic brethren, to aid Bonaparte in his views of universal empire:--and this because we were wanting in that *truly British feeling*, which is ready to sacrifice every opinion to that of the Minister of the day."[4] Indeed, it was an article on the war in 1808 that led to the founding

of the *Quarterly Review* as a conservative countervoice by Walter Scott and other Tories.[5]

But the cosmopolitanism of the *Edinburgh Review* was formulated as often in economic as political terms, as it pursued its crusade on behalf of the new, home-grown discipline of political economy. From 1802-1815, writers such as Henry Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, Francis Horner, David Buchanan, and James Mill drew on the political economy of Adam Smith to advocate a commercially-based internationalism. In particular, Smith offered the *Edinburgh* reviewers a formulation of international free trade that figured prominently in their liberal model of Europe. Smith's political economy may have underwritten empire, as often charged, but it is important to distinguish its cosmopolitan inflection early in the century from the better known imperialist inflection of the later nineteenth century.[6] By mid-century, the term "cosmopolitan" itself was placed rather differently. When "cosmopolitan" surfaces in J.S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), for example, it refers to capital and to the free migration of commodities and labour across the globe: "A tendency may, even now, be observed towards such a state of things; capital is becoming more and more cosmopolitan; there is so much greater similarity of manners and institutions than formerly, and so much less alienation of feeling, among the more civilized countries, that both population and capital now move from one of those countries to another on much less temptation than heretofore."[7] Mill's "cosmopolitan" economy supports an imperialist agenda in a way that Smith's does not. Mill advocates the expansion of Britain's commercial market (Britain's border is pushed out) whereas Smith advocates Britain's unlimited participation in international trade (Britain's border is made permeable).

Smith's Cosmopolitan Political Economy

In a discussion of the cultivation of benevolence in *Principles of Penal Law* (1843), Jeremy Bentham argues that legislators should "direct the affections of the citizens to this object; to repress the wanderings of benevolence; to make them feel their own interest in the general interest; to make them ashamed of that spirit of family--of that *esprit de corps* which militates against the love of country--of that unjust love of country which turns to hatred against other nations."[8] Unlike Burke's circles of attachment which build one upon the next, Bentham's expanding circle consumes those in its wake: "I prefer my family to myself," Bentham quotes Fenelon, "my country to my family, and the human race to my country" (*Principles*, 563). Somewhat surprisingly, Bentham traces the notion of universal benevolence not to the eighteenth-century moral philosophy of Shaftesbury or Hutcheson but to the political economy of Adam Smith: "The work of Adam Smith is a treatise upon universal benevolence, because it has shown that commerce is equally advantageous for all nations--each one profiting in a different manner, according to its natural means; that nations are associates and not rivals in the grand social enterprise" (*Principles*, 563).[9] Bentham draws attention to the combination of asymmetry and mutuality in Smith's political economy: nations profit differently from international trade, yet they profit equally. But the main point is that commerce opens the borders of national concern to the world at large, thereby engaging in practical terms the cosmopolitan ideals introduced earlier in the eighteenth century. Bentham's reading of Smith points to the late eighteenth-century intersection of moral philosophy and political economy that was to be crucial to the public persistence of cosmopolitanism during the early nineteenth century in Britain.[10] It is an intersection whose

eighteenth-century roots deserve some attention.

Eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, as Thomas Schlereth has shown, rests on a critique of seventeenth-century mercantilism, producing out of this critique "a constructive theory for domestic and foreign free trade."[11] David Hume's "Of the Jealousy of Trade" (1758) is exemplary.[12] Hume departs from (still dominant) mercantilist assumptions to argue for a correspondence between the good of a particular nation state and the general good of all nation states:

> Were our narrow and malignant politics to meet with success, we should reduce all our neighbouring nations to the same state of sloth and ignorance that prevails in MOROCCO and the coast of BARBARY. But what would be the consequence? They could send us no commodities: They could take none from us: Our domestic commerce itself would languish for want of emulation, example and instruction: And we ourselves should soon fall into the same abject condition, to which we had reduced them. I shall therefore venture to acknowledge, that, not only as a man, but as a BRITISH subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of GERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, and even FRANCE itself. I am at least certain, that GREAT BRITAIN, and all these nations, would flourish more, did their sovereigns and ministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other.[13]

Where mercantilists advocated an oppositional approach to foreign commerce in which Britain's economic triumph rested on the economic defeat of other nation states, Hume outlines a model based on a more reciprocal view of international trade relations. He argues

that domestic commerce depends on foreign commerce both to stimulate its industry and to provide Britain with a ready market. To make his point more strongly, Hume adopts the vocabulary of moral philosophy, decrying the "narrow and malignant politics" of mercantilism in contrast to the "enlarged and benevolent sentiments" of free trade. Hume's early reading of Britain's political economy emphasizes the important role played by foreign nations in Britain's domestic economy. What Hume presents here in kernel form is later expanded by his friend Adam Smith in the landmark *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776).[14]

Adam Smith is most often considered a philosopher of self-interest, whose privileging of the individual pursuit of wealth as a means to achieve the common good founds the ethos of modern capitalism. Less noticed, however, is the extent to which his political economy participates in an older cosmopolitan discourse. In *Wealth of Nations*, Smith transfers familiar cosmopolitan ideals from eighteenth-century moral philosophy to the new field of political economy to posit a system of international trade that rests on the interdependence of nations. In an important move, Smith sets up his discussion of international free trade with an economic reading of modern European history in which national development is seen as a product of foreign commerce. In Book Three of *Wealth of Nations*, Smith declares that the most profitable commerce of any civilized state takes place between the town and country: the country provides the town with rude produce, and the town, in turn, provides the country with products of manufacture. Both town and country profit from this division of labour, so that, as with all divisions of labour for Smith, the "gains are both mutual and reciprocal."[15] Commerce, however, is not limited to activity within the nation state: foreign commerce is

added to the basic system of exchange between town and country. Smith then casts this tripartite system of intra- and inter-national trade as a narrative of societal progress: "According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce" (*Wealth of Nations*, 160). Agriculture is cultivated before towns are developed, and domestic industry and manufacture are established before foreign commerce is introduced. In modern Europe, however, politics have inverted the "natural course of things" laid out in this narrative of societal progress: "through the greater part of Europe the commerce and manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country" (*Wealth of Nations*, 192).[16] Moreover, although certain domestic manufactures have arisen "naturally" through the refinement of needed household furnitures, others must be attributed to an outside impetus. In such cases, foreign commerce has influenced domestic taste and created a market for new products. Growing demand for new products has then prompted domestic industry to manufacture those products for itself. By motivating domestic industry in this way, foreign commerce has in the end improved domestic agriculture, which is pushed to meet increasing demands.[17]

The economic history of modern Europe thus reverses what Smith himself deems the "natural course of things," in that national development does not unfold organically from domestic agriculture to domestic industry and then outwards to foreign commerce. Rather, it tends to be initiated by foreign commerce. This formulation of national improvement as a movement from outside-in puts stress on the borders of the nation state in a way that the

"natural" order of things does not. Indeed, national borders become permeable in both directions, casting doubt on the possibility of a self-contained nation. Thus in Book Four of *Wealth of Nations*, Smith criticizes protectionist policies based on the balance of trade and posits in their stead a largely unregulated system of international trade composed of interconnected national economies, each hinging on an amalgamation of individual interests rather than on a singular national interest.

Smith begins his criticism of the mercantilist system by denying the equation between specie and wealth that underlay protectionist policies prohibiting the exportation of domestic coin and bullion. He explains that a wealthy state is not like a wealthy man: its wealth does not lie in the amount of gold and silver it possesses but in "rendering a greater part of that capital active and productive" (*Wealth of Nations*,125). National wealth is a question of trade potential not specie held. If wealth does not rest in specie but in trade, a mercantilism which devotes itself to the augmentation of gold and silver within the nation state is a misguided system of political economy. Smith's minimization of the role of specie in national wealth opens the way to a more pointed criticism of the two "great engines" supporting the mercantilist system, both of which work to increase the amount of silver and gold held within the nation state: restraints upon importation (which include restrictions on importing what can be produced domestically) and encouragements to exportation (which include drawbacks, bounties, advantageous trade treaties with other nation states, and colonial trade) (*Wealth of Nations*, 220). Designed "to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade," these policies give domestic merchants the advantage in international trade. "The laudable motive of all these regulations," Smith sarcastically writes, "is to extend our own manufactures, not

by their own improvement, but by the depression of those of all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable tasks" (*Wealth of Nations*, 337).

One of his favourite targets is the *Act of Navigation*. Under this *Act*, foreign ships that did not have owner, master, and three-quarters of the mariners British subjects were prohibited from trading with British settlements; furthermore, even ships that did meet these requirements were penalized by double duties if they imported goods categorized as "foreign." For Smith, the *Act* is not only hostile to foreign nation states (its inception, as he points out, was motivated by national animosity to Holland) but also contradicts the basic tenet of his economics: to buy cheap and sell dear. By limiting foreign trade primarily to British exportation, the *Act* forces foreign ships to come without cargo, a journey too expensive for most. This constricts the market of buyers and sellers, forcing British merchants to buy dear and sell cheap, a practise far from economically desirable for the nation. Smith sees protectionist policies such as the *Act of Navigation* creating trade monopolies, and such monopolies do not advance the national economy: "The monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from rising so high as it otherwise would do" (*Wealth of Nations*, 287).

Instead of the protectionist policies of the mercantilist system, Smith posits individual self-interest as the primary motor of the national economy: "It is [the individual's] own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society" (*Wealth of Nations*, 223).[18] National interest for Smith

becomes an amalgamation of diverse and conflicting individual interests best served through free trade. Just as division of labour between individuals proves to be the most efficient means of domestic production, so division of labour between nations is the most efficient for all nations: "If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage" (*Wealth of Nations*, 226). Although it may be possible to produce claret and burgundy in Scotland, for instance, other nations can produce them more cheaply. It therefore makes economic sense to import foreign wine rather than artificially to stimulate Scottish wine-making through bounties or drawbacks. The important theoretical point is that Smith's extension of the notion of division of labour into the international sphere produces a co-operative rather than competitive model of international commerce. In his scheme, foreign trade does not penalize one nation to reward another, as the mercantilist system assumes, but benefits all the nations concerned: "They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants and carrying out the superfluidities of his own, than of any other particular country" (*Wealth of Nations*, 216). Hence Smith advocates the gradual implementation of free trade between nation states as the best means to improve the national economy not just of Britain but of all nations. His political economy, then, not only reformulates national interest into a non-unified concept (an amalgamation of conflicting individual interests) but also makes national interest (like national improvement) dependent upon foreign economies.

One of the implications of Smith's political economy, as his late eighteenth-century

compatriot Dugald Stewart recognized, is a congruence of national and international good.[19] Stewart relies on this congruence in his discussion "Of Patriotism" (1828) in which he suggests that patriotism benefits from a cosmopolitan perspective. The discussion begins with an examination of the founding assumption of patriotism: the disunion of the human species. Stewart argues that (paradoxically) this disunion has its origin in the social nature of humankind: affection for tribe or country divides humankind into various groups or nations. But such disunion is not fundamental, merely contingent, for it derives from circumstance and from "the *ignorance* of men, which is apt to mistake a diversity of arbitrary signs and arbitrary ceremonies, for a diversity of opinions and of moral sentiments."[20] Indeed, "as government advances to maturity, and as the moral causes of hostility among nations (arising from the diversity of language and of manners) cease to operate upon men of enlightened and liberal minds...the tendency of civilized society is to diminish the dissensions among different communities, and to unite the human race in the bonds of amity" ("Of Patriotism," 181). To strengthen his point, Stewart turns to Adam Smith, whose observations on political economy confirm this vision of international amity: national interest is best served through international cooperation, not competition. Stewart's reformulation of the founding assumption of patriotism supports his presentation of patriotism as an imaginative (as opposed to substantive) attachment to countrymen and country. Moreover, it allows him to claim patriotism and cosmopolitanism as compatible moral positions. If disunion is not *a priori*, if nations are the result not of some "original malignity" but of social union, then love of country need not entail enmity to other countries ("Of Patriotism," 180). Stewart thus calls for a "rational" rather than "instinctive" patriotism, one based in reflection and a sense of

duty instead of "*blind impulse*" and sensibility ("Of Patriotism," 185). As he sees it, knowledge of the other (both geographical and temporal) removes prejudice by expanding one's sphere beyond the immediate, thereby preparing the ground for a rational rather than instinctive patriotism: "By transporting us in imagination over the surface of this planet, and by assembling before our view the myriads who have occupied it before us, [the study of history] serves to define to our thoughts more distinctly the particular community to which we belong, and strengthens the bond of relationship that unites us to all its members" ("Of Patriotism," 186-187). Oddly enough, then, it is by adopting a cosmopolitan perspective that proper national attachment is to be achieved.

The notions advocated by Stewart, drawing on Smith, were to become orthodox before the Victorian period, but in the 1790s Stewart (like many other writers associated with the Scottish enlightenment) was seen as a radical, sometimes even associated with Jacobinism.[21] And Lord Cockburn recalls the "sensation" of Stewart's *Lectures on Political Economy* in Edinburgh:

> The opening of these classes, made a great sensation. The economical writings of Hume and Smith, though familiar with the liberal youth, had so little impregnated the public mind, that no ordinary audience could be collected to whom the elements and phraseology of the science were not matters of surprise. The mere term 'Political economy' made people start. They thought that it included questions touching the constitution of governments; and not a few hoped to catch Stewart in dangerous propositions.
>
> (Quoted in *Memoir of Dugald Stewart*, li)[22]

As an essentially liberal discipline, political economy was (as Cockburn's comment suggests) a perilous site of inquiry during the Napoleonic wars. But amongst students at the University of Edinburgh it was also a popular one. Listening to Stewart during this time were Francis Horner, Francis Jeffrey, and Henry Brougham, all of whom took up his teachings in their own writings (*Memoir of Dugald Stewart*, liv-lv).[23] They not only brought the central concepts of Smithian political economy to the middle-class reading public in their writings for the *Edinburgh Review* but also (like Stewart) turned to political economy to support certain cosmopolitan tenets of the enlightenment within a politically fraught post-enlightenment atmosphere.

Free Trade, the Napoleonic Wars, and the *Edinburgh Review*

From 1802 to 1815 *Edinburgh* reviewers such as Francis Jeffrey, Henry Brougham, Francis Horner, David Buchanan, and James Mill appropriated the language of Smithian political economy to counter the Burkean understanding of nationness. Their writings on international trade criticized Britain's protectionist trade policies, re-introducing cosmopolitanism into a nationalistic political climate by re-writing it as a commercially-based internationalism. Following Smith, the reviewers saw Britain's national interest as part of an international community of interests, and the internationalism they broached in the pages of the early *Edinburgh Review* underlined Britain's dependence on foreign nations for its own domestic well-being.

Written shortly after the peace of Amiens, Henry Brougham's review "Politique de tous les Cabinets de L'Europe" in the first volume of the *Edinburgh Review* (January 1803)

provides a useful reference point for the question of cosmopolitanism in the *Edinburgh* during the Napoleonic wars. One of the *Edinburgh*'s founding reviewers and a long-time contributor, Brougham was influential in directing the periodical's early political orientation (often to accord directly with his own political ambitions at the time). In "Politique de tous les Cabinets de L'Europe," Brougham attempts to revive the eighteenth-century notion of "balance of power" as a viable structure for international relations, defending the notion against various "disclaimers" and "reasoners" whose criticisms, he suggests, are at odds with one another:

> Now--the balance of power is an unintelligible jargon, invented to cover every scheme; to furnish pretexts for every act of national injustice; to lull the jealousy of the people in any emergency; or to excite their alarms upon any occasion. Now--it is useless and superfluous; an interference with the natural order of things; or an attempt to effect that which would happen at any rate. Now--it is pernicious in the extreme; the parent of wars and offensive alliances; the exciting cause of national violence; the watchword of ambitious princes and destroying commonwealths; a refinement only of injustice; and a system of nothing but treachery or caprice.[24]

Appearing alternatively as counter-productive (encouraging rather than discouraging international conflict) and as irrelevant (merely echoing the natural state of things), the balance of power emerges as an over-determined concept, one capable of supporting diverse and often opposed political agendas. Brougham's own defence of the concept at this time was itself contentious. He argued for the interdependence of nation states, and thus

challenged the dominant paradigm that emphasized England's self-sufficiency and singularity.

In his review, Brougham casts the eighteenth century as a period whose most distinguished achievement was the improvement of international relations: "that perfect knowledge of the arts of administration, which has established certain general rules of conduct among nations; has prevented the overthrow of empires, and the absorption of weak states into the bodies of devouring neighbours; has set bounds to the march of conquest, and rendered the unsheathing of the sword a measure of the last adoption" ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 348). Governing these "rules" and "bounds" was the notion of the balance of power:

> The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing theory, is the systematic form to which it reduces those plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs, which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness over every motion in all parts of the system, which it prescribes; the subjection in which it tends to place all national passions and antipathies to the views of remote expediency; the unceasing care which it dictates of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves; the general union, which it has effected, of all the European powers in one connected system--obeying certain laws, and actuated in general by a common principle; in fine, as a consequence of the whole, the right of mutual inspection, now universally recognized among civilized states, in the rights of public envoys and residents. ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 353-354)

Deploying a rhetoric of visual survey reminiscent of Bentham's panoptic gaze, Brougham

describes the balance of power as an international system of "watchfulness" in which national interest is subordinated to the general (international) good. This disciplinary model moves into the foreground the importance of foreign affairs to the nation: the eye of the nation must be directed outwards as well as inwards, and it must include in its field of vision all nations, even those "apparently unconnected" to itself.

The balancing system Brougham defends in this review is not the series of treaties and alliances that characterized eighteenth-century international relations but the underlying "principles" of the system, principles more consistent with eighteenth-century cosmopolitan ideals than with actual eighteenth-century political history. In theory Europe is a "united whole," a "great federacy...united by certain common principle, and obeying one system of international law" ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 354). Included within this federacy is Great Britain, which for Brougham is no longer removed from the Continent either economically or politically: "it is an abuse of language to talk of her being separated from the continent of Europe by the straights of Dover" ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 355). At the heart of Brougham's defense of the balance of power, then, is a commitment to international order, an order that will eventually lead to "the establishment of equal rights, and rational systems of regular government over the whole of Europe" ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 364). He foresees an enlightened Europe where all nations are joined under one system of "certain general and invariable laws" that will "reduce every eccentricity of course, and...correct all accidental inequalities or alterations in the system" ("Cabinets de L'Europe," 364). It is important that coincident with this system is the reduction of national complexities, eccentricities, and inequalities: in so far as the nation adopts equal rights and a rational system of regular

government, it becomes like all other nations in the system. But it is even more important that international union for Brougham involves something more than pragmatic connections between self-sufficient Burkean nations: in his formulation of international union, nations are very much shaped by what is going on outside their borders.

Following the renewal of war between France and Britain in 1803, the vision of a "great federacy" tended to be stripped of its overt political context (i.e. the advocation of equal rights and rational governments) and began to appear more often as a commercially-based internationalism. Thus Francis Horner, another member of the *Edinburgh Review*'s inner circle, posed the question of nation in economic rather than political terms in his "Observations on the Bounty upon Exported Corn" (October 1804). Horner, himself an economist, drew on Adam Smith's ideas about an international economy to criticize the protectionist Corn Laws introduced in parliament on July 30, 1804. Advocates of the new legislation claimed that since the 1773 repeal of the bounty, corn prices had risen and the balance of the corn-trade turned against England.[25] They believed a return of the bounty would at once encourage production, secure adequate profit for farmers, and lower the price of corn. But for Horner, their logic involved a fundamental contradiction: the price of corn cannot at the same time be raised so as to encourage production and lowered so as to benefit the consumer. It is true, he admits, that this contradiction could be resolved by a distinction between the "real price" (paid to farmer) and the "money price" (paid by consumer), but he still remains doubtful that bounties actually increase real price and decrease money price. For support, he turns to Adam Smith, who reversed the logic put forth by bounty advocates. As Horner explains, Smith argued that corn bounties "can have no effect in equalizing prices,

because there is no surplus to be reserved in years of scarcity: that there can be no such surplus, because the bounty gives no additional encouragement to agriculture: that it can give no such encouragement, because it occasions no advance of the real price of corn: and, lastly, that its effect is to raise, not to lower, the average money-price of that commodity."[26] But Horner goes beyond Smith in emphasizing the connection between the foreign market and the enhancement of price. For Horner, the real price of corn increases in part because of extended demand in the foreign market, and this foreign demand will ultimately increase the money price as well. If both the money price and the real price of British corn are influenced by foreign demand, Britain's domestic economy can no longer be so easily protected. Conservative trade policies such as the 1804 *Act to Regulate the Importation and Exportation of Corn* still assumed a self-contained domestic economy, and for Horner they represented a crucial blindness to the inter-national framework within which Britain was necessarily situated.

In a suggestive moment, Horner speculates in his *Edinburgh Review* article that the 1804 *Act to Regulate the Importation and Exportation of Corn* reflects a growing anxiety about Britain's dependence on foreign states. He suggests in particular that the British worry they are importing too much corn and quickly losing their status as an independent agricultural nation. Such fears regarding Britain's agriculture he finds unwarranted, but Horner does concede that British dependence upon foreign corn is troubling. If self-sufficiency is the foundation of national defence, then the importation of foreign corn indicates a weakness in Britain's defence. Accordingly, Horner recognizes the immediate need to increase the domestic production of corn, recalling his mentor Smith, who also

warned that national wealth must at times be sacrificed to national defence. But this does not mean that Horner accepts the 1804 *Act*. Rather, he suggests an alternative solution to Britain's problem. Instead of recommending that bounties be attached to corn exportation and corn importation prohibited, he proposes that Britain legislate complete freedom of importation but combine this freedom with temporary bounties on production when necessary. His solution maintains the openness of free trade but allows for war-time adjustments. And he casts his argument in moral terms: "the minister who tampers, for a present purpose, with his own maxims, and indulges individuals in their frivolous fondness for making laws, instead of opposing, to temporary interests, the spirit of a general policy, cannot be true, either to his own fame, or to the lasting prosperity of Britain" ("Observations on the Bounty," 208). Since the bounties and trade restrictions that constitute the *Act* are in opposition to national economic prosperity (as defined by Smith), any minister who proposes such acts, Horner intimates, is negligent, even immoral. Smith's political economy, in other words, implies a moral economy as well.

The editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, Francis Jeffrey, activates the same relationship between political economy and moral philosophy two years later in "The Frauds of the Neutral Flags" (April 1806), when he criticizes Britain's 1756 rule of war prohibiting trade between neutral nations and French colonies. Jeffrey begins his criticism of the 1756 rule of war by discriminating between national interest and national right. He argues that although it may be in Britain's interest to restrict neutral trade with the French colonies, it has no right to do so: "We cannot annihilate the foreign trade of the rest of the world, in order to diminish the comforts, or cut off the resources, of the nation with which we happen to be at

war."[27] Each nation has a "natural right" to trade with any other wishing to trade with it, and this right "relates to all who can be affected by the acts it permits or prohibits; and it is formed upon an impartial view of the interests of the whole" ("Frauds of the Flags," 18). Although the right to trade may not seem fair (the French colonies, for instance, are prospering more during war than peace because of their guaranteed trade with neutrals), it is universal, and national interest must be subordinated to it. Jeffrey thus concludes: "Upon the whole, then, we conceive that the rule of the war 1756 is not agreeable to the analogy of any rule universally received as part of the law of nations, or to those views of general expediency and justice in which this law has its foundation; and that its unqualified revival at this moment would be a measure of which the neutral nations would be fairly entitled to complain" ("Frauds of the Flags," 31). More than bringing Jeffrey's argument to a close, however, the conclusion opens up an alternative possibility. If the law of nations is both "expedient" and "just," as Jeffrey suggests, then perhaps national interest is not incompatible with morality after all. The 1756 rule of war is not just, but it may not be in Britain's best interest either.

While Horner and Jeffrey considered the moral implications of Britain's protectionist trade policies in the pages of the *Edinburgh Review*, Britain's government confidently led the nation into a trade war with France. On November 21, 1806, international trade took centre stage when Napoleon passed the Berlin Decree closing Continental ports to British vessels. In retaliation, the British Parliament passed Orders in Council on January 9, 1807 blockading France and all tributary states. Less than a year later (November 11, 1807), it added another Order stating that all vessels having on board the certificate of origin demanded by

Napoleon's blockade could be seized, and that all neutrals wishing to trade with France must stop in Great Britain to pay a duty before proceeding on to trade with the enemy. Napoleon responded later that month with the Milan Decree, which authorized the seizure of ships caught complying with the British Orders.

The *Edinburgh Review* viewed the Orders in Council as nationally punitive and openly criticized them until they were fully revoked by Parliament on June 23, 1812. In "Examination of the late Orders in Council" (January 1808), for example, Brougham declared that by implementing the Orders in Council England had lost the moral high ground in its contest with France. His argument focuses on the mercantilist assumptions from which the Orders arose, and he claims that in effect the Orders force neutrals to trade with France in a way that seems (according to mercantilist assumptions at least) profitable to Britain. By making neutral ships pass through British ports and by demanding that the ships pay duties to Britain before trading with France, the Orders bring foreign (neutral) money into the country. But at the same time, Brougham points out, the Orders fail to fulfil their political goal of punishing France. Indeed, the Orders do not prevent trade with France so much as they make Britain a paid pander between France and the neutral nations. Brougham suspects, however, that as long as the Orders are believed to be financially advantageous, their political failure will be overlooked. Public opinion, then, is to be swayed through economic argument:

> When they find that we have been violating the rights of foreign states, and breaking through our own constitution, for *nothing*--nay, to our great and manifest injury in point of profit;--that we have been breaking all laws public

> and municipal, and gained nothing--nay, lost a great deal by it;--they may be disposed to review their former contemptuous judgement upon the value of those sacred principles which bind nations and individuals together; and to reprobate as unjust and unlawful, that conduct which they find to be ungainful.[28]

Brougham predicts that the Orders will prove unadvantageous or perhaps even disadvantageous to Britain. In an international economy, violation of the universal right to trade brings no profit. In fact, Britain's violation will ultimately exact a toll on its own domestic economy.

Brougham's intimations concerning the negative consequences of the Orders are followed up in a subsequent review summarizing contemporary opinion on the legislation. In "Baring and others on the Orders in Council" (April 1808), an anonymous reviewer comments favourably on Brougham's April 1 speech before the House of Commons in which Brougham rehearsed an argument similar to that put forth in his January 1808 article. The reviewer concurs with Brougham's political points, but his interest lies in the economic claim. He substantiates, for instance, the claim of loss of trade (British trade with America dropped from twelve million to four million dollars a year), and insists upon the negative global impact of Britain's trade restrictions. They have had a deleterious effect both at home and abroad, "interdicting the commerce of the greater part of the world; and not only cutting off, without necessity, the comforts and profits of their own peaceful population, but paralyzing the hand of industry and arresting the progress of society in nations separated from the scene of tumult, by the intervention of half the globe."[29] Over and over again, the *Edinburgh*

Review made the point of national and international harm, continuing to hammer the principle behind the Orders even after they were repealed in June 1812.[30]

The conservative *Quarterly Review*, however, saw the Orders quite differently, defending them against criticism directed from both inside and outside the nation, and its interpretation of the trade wars between Britain and France highlights by contrast the cosmopolitan political economy that dominated the *Edinburgh*'s criticism during this period. In "America--Orders in Council" (March 1812), John Barrow and William Gifford defend the Orders in Council against American complaints that they are politically ineffective and that they punished neutral nations. The best proof of the Orders' general effectiveness, they argue, is that while French commerce has come to a virtual stop, British and American commerce have increased. Since the Orders have benefited rather than harmed America, there must be another motive for American hostility to Britain, and Barrow and Gifford attribute American complaints about the Orders to American sympathy with France. In particular, they deem Thomas Jefferson a "modern *philosophe*," " pupil of Rousseau," and "patron of cosmopolites."[31]

Central to the *Quarterly Review*'s interpretation of the Orders in Council was the idea that Britain's domestic economy could exist without foreign commerce. In "Capt. Pasley on the Military Policy of Great Britain" (May 1811), for example, Robert Southey and John Wilson Croker argue that Pasley's concern over Napoleon's anti-commercial decrees is misplaced because foreign commerce constitutes only one eleventh of Britain's total commercial property.[32] Even if all external trade were to cease, they suggest, internal trade would quickly expand to make up the difference. Southey and Croker see the popular

assumption that profit is best gained through foreign trade as fallacious as well. If a British hatter and a British cabinet-maker were to exchange their products, they explain, both families would benefit: the hatter's home would be better furnished, the cabinet-maker's family would wear better hats. Moreover, national wealth would be augmented by the profits of two persons. If, on the other hand, the hatter were to trade with a foreigner, national wealth would be augmented only by the profit of one person. Thus, they conclude, the nation profits more from internal commerce than it does from external commerce. It is important that Southey and Croker figure Britain's national economy as a national tale about a hatter and a cabinet-maker. It is equally important, however, that they figure it as a closed system. For the *Quarterly Review*, Britain's national economy (like the nation itself) was self-perpetuating, self-sufficient and self-contained.

When peace came in the spring of 1814, the *Edinburgh Review* joined in the general jubilation, but peace with France for Francis Jeffrey and his fellow reviewers was but the first step on both the national and international level. On the international front, there remained the problem of Poland. In "*State and Prospects of Europe*" (April 1814), Jeffrey deplores the "extinction of [Polish] national dignity--this sore and unmerited wound to their national pride."[33] By depriving the Poles of their "political being," he argues, the partition of Poland not only destroyed an "antient kingdom" but "struck also at the root of [the] individual happiness and prosperity" of the Polish people ("State and Prospects of Europe," 39). But it is the international point that is central. "No one nation can be secure in its separate existence," Jeffrey insists, "if all the rest do not concur in disavowing the maxims which were acted upon in the partition of Poland" ("State and Prospects of Europe," 40).

Until Poland is set free, the "wholesome neighbourhood" of Europe will be poisoned by its "noxious vapours:" "every independence within their range, sickens, and is endangered by the contagion" ("State and Prospects of Europe," 40). Brougham makes the same point in "*Appeal of the Poles*" (January 1814) where he notes that even though Poland remains "rather a delicate topic" among the Allies, the restoration of Polish independence is a necessary step if peace is to be permanently restored on the continent: "The restoration of European independence, is the object of every Statesman's anxious hopes;--the revival of sound and consistent principle alone, can effect it;--and this cannot be thought possible, by any reflecting mind, without the complete re-establishment of Poland as an independent State."[34]

On the national front, however, post-war depression led the *Edinburgh* to retreat from liberal political economy. In 1815 it joined Tory periodicals such as the *Quarterly Review* in supporting the reinstatement of the Corn Law. Some reviewers (Francis Horner and David Buchanan) continued to maintain the *Edinburgh*'s earlier position against trade restrictions and stood firmly against the *Corn Law*, but both Jeffrey and Brougham supported it, following the lead of Thomas Malthus, who became a contributor to the review in 1815. David Buchanan defines the split in "*Corn Laws*" (February 1815), and helps to outline these two positions.

In the review, Buchanan summarizes Malthus' *Observations on the Effects of the Corn Laws, and a Rise or Fall in the Price of Corn on the Agriculture and general Wealth of the Country* and *The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importations of Foreign Corn*. For Malthus, "a free exchange of produce" is problematic because national jealousies and hostilities can interrupt trade, thereby depriving a country of markets for its

surplus products as well as "those luxuries and conveniences for which she depended on foreign states."[35] Even worse, however, is the situation where a nation has come to depend on other nations "for the subsistence of a great proportion of its population" ("Corn Laws," 492). Malthus interprets free trade in corn as a loss of national independence: the unrestrained importation of corn depresses the price of domestic produce, discourages domestic production, and thereby puts England at the mercy of foreign states for its subsistence. In particular, it places it at the mercy of France, which can produce corn more cheaply. Malthus thus reasons that Britain should restrict importation to encourage British agriculture and to secure its independence from "both foreign supplies and foreign relations" ("Corn Laws," 494). Buchanan counters the Malthusian position by arguing that any decline in British agriculture due to free importation will not be permanent and by suggesting that fears about Britain's total dependence on foreign nations for its subsistence are "quite chimerical" ("Corn Laws," 498-99). For him, international trade entails not total dependence but "mutual dependence" or interdependence ("Corn Laws," 494). This split over the Corn Laws marks the end of the *Edinburgh Review*'s war-time vision of a cosmopolitan political economy.[36]

In *Nationalism and After* (1945), E.H Carr usefully divides the modern history of international relations into three overlapping periods: the first period ends with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the second with World War One, and the third with World War Two. During the first period, he explains, the nation is equated with the sovereign, and international relations are understood as relations between sovereigns. This period is characterized by the economic system of mercantilism, whose goal is to increase the power of

the state (i.e. the sovereign). Domestically, mercantilism seeks to break down local markets and make the state the sole economic unit; internationally, it seeks to build national wealth at the expense of other nations, procuring their markets and their bullion. In this first period, the political unit coincides with the economic unit, and both are national. In the second period, however, the nation becomes equivalent to the people constituting it, and international relations become governed (at least theoretically) "by the collective interests, ambitions and emotions of the nation."[37] The period is characterized by the economic system of *laissez-faire*. And with *laissez-faire*, the prevailing economic unit is international rather than national: the world economy. Thus there is no longer a coincidence between political and economic units: "while in the previous period political and economic power had marched hand in hand to build up the national political unit and to substitute a single national economy for a conglomeration of local economies, in the 19th century a compromise was struck between political and economic power so that each could develop on its own lines" (*Nationalism and After*, 6). Carr argues that the "compromise" between political nationalism and economic internationalism during the nineteenth century was secured by two illusions: first, that the world economic system was truly international; and second, that economics and politics were separate and independent.

In his discussion of the transition from the first period to the second, Carr makes an important point: "It is a mistake to contrast mercantilism with *laissez-faire* as if one were directed to national, the other to individual, ends. Both were directed to national ends; the difference between them related to a difference in the conception of the nation" (*Nationalism and After*, 5-6). Carr himself evokes the familiar romantic understanding of nation in

relation to the turn of the nineteenth century, but the debate over the national economy in the Napoleonic era suggests that other models were also active in the period. For liberal writers of the *Edinburgh Review* such as Henry Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, James Mill, and Francis Horner, the matter of *laissez-faire* economics provided a way of confronting rather than confirming the Burkean nation. What arises through their writings during the Napoleonic wars is not the "compromise" between national political and international economic units suggested by Carr but rather a correlation between a cosmopolitan understanding of nation and a commercially-based internationalism. In this model, politics and economics converge rather than pull apart, as the very term "political economy" helps to underline, and the political boundaries of the nation are drawn rather differently.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. John Clive has documented the connection between the *Edinburgh* and the enlightenment in detail in his foundational study *Scotch Reviewers: The Edinburgh Review, 1802-1815* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). More recently, Biancamaria Fontana has noted the *Edinburgh's* strong eighteenth-century roots, paying special attention to the source of its socio-economic methodology in the political economy of the Scottish Enlightenment. See her *Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: the Edinburgh Review, 1802-1832* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

2. [Sydney Smith], "Bowles *on the Peace*," *Edinburgh Review* 1 (October 1802), 96.

3. [Thomas Brown], "Villers, *Philosophie de Kant*," *Edinburgh Review* 1 (January 1803), 253. See also [Francis Jeffrey], "Mounier, *De L'influence des Philosophes*," *Edinburgh Review* 1 (October 1802): 1-18, and [Francis Horner], "M.Canard, *Principes d'economie politique*," *Edinburgh Review* 1 (January 1803): 431-450.

4. [Francis Jeffrey and James Loch], "Orders in Council,"*Edinburgh Review* 20 (July 1812), 234.

5. The same 1808 article also drew R. Wharton's rancour in his *Remarks on the Jacobinical Tendency of the Edinburgh Review*, where he uses the article as a stepping stone to a more general criticism of the *Edinburgh*'s jacobinical politics (London: J. Hatchard, 1809).

6. In their landmark essay "The Imperialism of Free Trade," John A. Gallagher and Ronald E. Robinson argue that there is no qualitative difference between mid- and late-victorian imperialism and that free trade is merely one of many techniques for British expansion used throughout the century. "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* 6 (1953): 1-15. The

essay is reprinted, along with various responses, in W.M. Roger Louis, ed., *Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976). Earlier in the century (1902), J.A. Hobson had posited imperialism as a "perversion" of international free trade that coincided with the advent of nationalism. See his *Imperialism: A Study* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1965).

7. John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, ed. J.M. Robson, vols. 2 and 3 of *Collected Works* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1965), 3: 588.

8. Jeremy Bentham, *Principles of Penal Law*, vol. 1 of *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. John Bowring (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 563.

9. Bentham's own connection to cosmopolitanism is strong. In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), for example, he lays out the parameters for an international system of law and coins the word "international": "[International law] is calculated to express, in a more significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the *law of nations*: an appellation so uncharacteristic, that, were it not for the force of custom, it would seem rather to refer to internal jurisprudence." *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, vol. 1 of *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, 149. His *Principles of International Law* (1786-1789) demonstrate an ongoing intellectual investment in cosmopolitan ideals, with the concluding essay, "A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace," arguing for European disarmament, the universal emancipation of colonies, and the establishment of a Common Court of Judicature to mediate conflict between nations.

10. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, for instance, political economy was considered a subsection of moral philosophy in British universities. On the intersection of

political economy and moral philosophy see chapters five and six of Mary Poovey's *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

11. Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan in Enlightenment Thought* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1977), 97.

12. Karen O'Brien traces Hume's cosmopolitanism in *Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan history from Voltaire to Gibbon*, arguing that Hume's historical works present the history of the English nation in conjunction with European history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

13. David Hume, "Of the Jealousy of Trade," *Writings on Economics*, ed. Eugene Rotwein (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 81-82.

14. In a letter to Smith written shortly after the publication of *Wealth of Nations* (1 April 1776), Hume gives the work a favourable review: "I am much pleas'd with your Performance; and the Perusal of it has taken me from a State of great Anxiety. It was a work of so much Expectation, by yourself, by your Friends, and by the Public, that I trembled for its Appearance; but am now much relieved" (*Writings on Economics*, 216). He does, however, say that if Smith were at his fireside, he would dispute some of his principles.

15. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 5th ed., ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1985), 156.

16. Smith explains that the invasion of German and Scythian nations interrupted the commerce between town and country and led to an amalgamation of smaller land holdings into vast dominions. Land ceased to be passed from generation to generation according to the natural law of succession (which divided land holdings between different family members), and began to be

passed on according to the law of primogeniture (which consolidated land holdings in the hands of the first born male). Coincident with these changes came a re-valuing of land as a means of power rather than as a means of subsistence, one of the results of which was that surplus capital went towards further land acquisition and not to the improvement of already-held lands. Such political changes, then, blocked the "natural progress of opulence" in Europe by disrupting domestic commerce and by discouraging agricultural improvement. Accordingly, international commerce is the impetus for national improvement in Europe: "But what all the violence of the feudal institution could never have effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about" (*Wealth of Nations*, 188).

17. Smith notes that, among other things, commerce has created domestic and foreign markets for agricultural produce, infused the countryside with wealthy merchants bent on agricultural improvement, and introduced into the countryside order and good government by helping to break up the vast dominions perpetrated by the feudal system. Its benefit has therefore been both economic (in that it encouraged agriculture) and political (in that it ensured the "liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country" (*Wealth of Nations*, 185). Smith stresses that the benefit "was not even confined to the countries in which [the towns] were situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they had any dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either of their rude or manufactured produce, and consequently gave some encouragement to the industry and improvement of all" (*Wealth of Nations*, 184).

18. Hume posits a similar connection between public good and individual commercial interest in his essay "Of Commerce" when he states that "The greatness of a state, and the happiness of

its subjects, how independent soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men" (*Writings on Economics*, 5).

19. For Stewart on Smith see his *Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith* (read to the Royal Society of Edinburgh on January 21 and March 18, 1793), vol. 10 of *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*, ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1971).

20. Dugald Stewart, "Of Patriotism" in *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, vol. 6 of *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*, ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1971), 180.

21. Stewart's early *Elements of the Philosophy of Human Mind* (1792), for instance, was declared Jacobinical, in particular because it expressed a sympathy for Condorcet that Stewart himself soon regretted. He tells Lord Craig on Feb 20, 1794, for example, that he "dishonoured some of [his] pages by mentioning with respect the name of Condorcet" and reminds Craig that although he defended the Economists, he opposed the French philosophers in general. Quoted in John Veitch's *Memoir of Dugald Stewart*, vol. 10 of *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*, lxxiv.

22. These lectures were delivered in various forms during Stewart's time as Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh from 1785 until his retirement in 1810. His first course on political economy alone, however, was conducted in the winter of 1800. Veitch outlines Stewart's professional career in his *Memoir of Dugald Stewart*.

23. Also listed among Stewart's students are Sydney Smith and Macvey Napier both of whom also wrote for the *Edinburgh Review*. James Mill also noted the important role of political economy in the early *Edinburgh Review* in his detailed review of early nineteenth-century periodical literature in the first number of *The Westminster Review*. See his "Periodical Literature: *Edinburgh Review*," *Westminster Review* 1 (January 1824): 206-49. The standard modern account of the *Edinburgh Review* draws a direct line of influence from Thomas Reid and Adam Smith through Dugald Stewart to the *Edinburgh Review*. See John Clive, *Scotch Reviewers*.

24. [Henry Brougham], "Politique de tous les Cabinets de L'Europe," *Edinburgh Review* 1 (January 1803), 346.

25. One such advocate was James Anderson, who insists in *A Calm Investigation of the Circumstances that have led to the Present Scarcity of Grain in Great Britain* (1801) that history has proven the success of corn bounties. Anderson argues that when the bounties were fully operative between 1689 and 1773, British agriculture flourished, prices fell, and Britain was a net exporter of grain. However, when the bounties were lifted in 1773 (partly because of Adam Smith) agriculture suffered, prices rose, and Britain became a net importer of grain.

26. [Francis Horner], "Observations on the Bounty upon Exported Corn," *Edinburgh Review* 5 (October 1804), 194.

27. [Francis Jeffrey], "The Frauds of the Neutral Flags," *Edinburgh Review* 8 (April 1806), 13.

28. [Henry Brougham], "Examination of the late Orders in Council," *Edinburgh Review* 11 (January 1808), 490-491.

29. "Baring and others on the Orders in Council," *Edinburgh Review* 12 (April 1808), 226.

30. See, for example, Francis Jeffrey and James Loch's "Orders in Council."

31. [John Barrow and William Gifford], "America--Orders in Council," *Quarterly Review* 7 (March 1812), 32.

32. [Robert Southey and John Wilson Croker], "Capt. Pasley on the Military Policy of Great Britain," *Quarterly Review* 5 (May 1811), 410.

33. [Francis Jeffrey], "*State and Prospects of Europe*," *Edinburgh Review* 23 (April 1814), 39.

34. [Henry Brougham], "*Appeal of the Poles*," *Edinburgh Review* 22 (January 1814), 331.

35. [David Buchanan], "*Corn Laws*," *Edinburgh Review* 24 (February 1815), 492.

36. The vision, however, was periodically taken up elsewhere before mid-century, most notably, by the Manchester School in the 1830s and 40s. William Cobden's *England, Ireland, and America* (1835), for example, evoked international commerce as the "grand panacea, which, like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world." *Political Writings of Richard Cobden*, (London: William Ridgeway, 1878), 20. Ronald Hyam implicates Cobden's internationalism in the imperial project in *Britain's Imperial Century 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1976).

37. E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), 8.

Chapter Three

Porous Borders: Maria Edgeworth and the Question of National Identity

Among the issues drawing the attention of the *Edinburgh Review* in the early years of the century was the question of Ireland, now a member of the British polity as a consequence of the 1801 Act of Union. Pro-union and pro-emancipation, the *Edinburgh Review* generally drew on Smith's political economy to figure Irish-English political relations in terms of international trade, and this model underlies Maria and Robert Lovell Edgeworth's commentary on Ireland in the journal. Their co-written review "Carr's *Stranger in Ireland*" (April 1807) formulates union as the free circulation of citizens and goods between Ireland and England: "it is a farce to talk of an incorporating union having taken place between two countries," they insist,"whilst the inhabitants cannot pass or repass from either country, without undergoing a search as rigorous as if they were in an enemy's territory: whilst the duties and drawbacks of excise operate as checks upon the transfer of property, and even upon locomotion."[1] Such a formulation of union recalls Kant's "union of states" in that it allows for the free movement across borders but not the elimination of them, and entails a particular understanding of nationness.

In a recent volume of essays on *Nations and Nationalisms*, Séamus Deane points out that at the turn of the nineteenth century enlightenment forms of narrative like the philosophical tale were threatened by a "newly assertive nationalism, predicated on notions of national character."[2] The kind of national narrative he has in mind is represented by a figure

like Edmund Burke, but the same Anglo-Irish milieu that produced Burke also produced Maria Edgeworth, who offered a rather different reading of national identity in the same period. Her writings on Ireland, especially her early Irish tales, offer an important rearticulation of Burkean local attachment and philosophical cosmopolitanism to produce an understanding of the nation as neither tightly bordered (like nations based on historical premises such as blood or inheritance) nor borderless (like those based on rational notions of universal inclusion). Edgeworth's own Anglo-Irish allegiance is central to this project, but her effort to rethink nationness makes her more than the colonial writer who tends to figure in much current criticism.[3] Herself both immersed in continental enlightenment thought and personally affected by the nationalist upsurge of the 1798 Rebellion, she used her writing to reconsider the meaning of the denomination "Anglo-Irish."[4] And through her interrogation she reinterpreted both cosmopolitan and national definitions of belonging so as to reconstitute "Anglo-Irish" less as a category than as an ongoing mediation between borders.[5]

In the *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke attempted to increase the political distance between England and revolutionary France by presenting the English nation as a historical continuity. The nation becomes the organic culmination of history: hereditary rank and inherited property preserve the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by the English people, a "patrimony derived from their forefathers."[6] Burke couples this notion of historical continuity with affinity to place, the rudimentary "germ" of public affection (*Reflections*, 97). As we saw in Chapter One, national identity begins with local attachment and extends outward, encompassing neighbourhood, province, and ultimately nation. In order to reinforce the point, Burke draws on the vocabulary of familial relations: "In this choice of

inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars" (*Reflections*, 84). Kinship--"relation in blood"--ensures the historical continuity that defines the English nation. It is also the departure point for the series of social relations that compose national affection: "We begin our public affections in our families" (*Reflections*, 244). By troping national identity as an inheritance, specifically "*an inheritance from our forefathers*," Burke activates the standard conflation of political and domestic in the period to create a self-enclosed England (*Reflections*, 81). If nationness is historical continuity perpetrated though local attachment, then French nationality has been upset first by the cosmopolitan philosophy of the French philosophes and later by the French Revolution itself. In his narration of this upset, Burke repeatedly casts the political in domestic terms: he describes the infiltration of the French domestic circle by the religious and moral heresies of the French philosophes; the ensuing violence inflicted by revolutionaries against the French Royal Family, most notably in his celebrated account of the removal of the Queen; and the disrespect the "illegitimate" national assembly shows for established hereditary rule.[7] If England is to maintain its integrity against France, it must prevent French influence from penetrating its national boundaries. By thus casting his understanding of nationness in the insular terms of inheritance and local attachment, Burke evokes a correlative banishment of cosmopolitan ideals as nationally disruptive; hence in the *Reflections* he criticizes figures like Voltaire, Helvetius, and Rousseau.

Burke's banishment of cosmopolitan ideals serves to mark the late eighteenth-century generic shift from enlightenment narrative to romantic national tale noted by Séamus Deane. Writing just a few years after Burke, however, Maria Edgeworth rethinks Burke's nation and its familial trope.[8] Her first novel, *Castle Rackrent* (1800), is a biting commentary on the founding British metaphor of patrilineal descent. Subtitled "An Hibernian Tale taken from facts and from the manners of the Irish squires before the year 1782," the novel chronicles the moral and financial downfall of the Rackrent family. The first Rackrent heir is Sir Patrick, famous for his lavish entertainments and his propensity for drink. Immensely popular because of his generosity, Sir Patrick "lived and died a monument of old Irish hospitality."[9] In contrast, his son, Sir Murtagh, exploits those around him. He manipulates the Irish law as a tool by which to secure his own wealth, among other things refusing to pay for his father's extensive debts and filing legal suits against his tenants for even the most trivial of misdemeanours. The third heir, Sir Kit, takes a hands-off approach instead. He assigns the running of the estate to an agent and then moves to England, where he gambles away his fortune. In an effort to escape bankruptcy, he marries a wealthy Jewess and returns to Ireland. He imprisons his new wife when she refuses to hand over her jewels and subsequently makes the most of his freedom by courting other women. The Rackrent legacy does not come full circle, however, until the advent of the last heir of Castle Rackrent, Sir Condy. Of the same "blood" as Sir Patrick (figuratively as well as literally), Sir Condy follows in his ancestor's footsteps, squandering his fortune on high living. Consequently, he loses the family estate once and for all, which is bought by the estate manager, Jason Quirk. Importantly, this new master of Castle Rackrent is not an heir but rather the business-minded

son of the family retainer. Edgeworth's narrative treatment of patrilineal inheritance has distinct political implications. For the liberal Edgeworth, a nation based on inheritance is susceptible to systemic corruption and to oppressive authoritarianism. Her "Hibernian tale" is not a Burkean one.

Edgeworth destabilizes Burke's model of the nation not only through her sardonic view of patrilineal inheritance but also by highlighting Ireland's dual status as an English colony and as a foreign, non-English nation. The preface to *Castle Rackrent*, for instance, introduces the novel as a foreign tale directed towards an English audience. "[T]o those who are totally unacquainted with Ireland," the editor warns, "the following Memoirs will perhaps be scarcely intelligible, or they may appear perfectly incredible" (*Castle Rackrent*, 63). Consequently, the editor has included a series of notes "[f]or the information of the *ignorant* English reader" (*Castle Rackrent*, 63). These informational notes attempt to explain Irish dialect and culture to English readers and present Ireland as exotic, foreign. But the preface suggests at the same time that Ireland is destined to be something other than foreign to England. "Nations as well as individuals gradually lose attachment to their identity," the editor warns, "and the present generation is amused rather than offended by the ridicule that is thrown upon its ancestors" (*Castle Rackrent*, 63). Thus it is that "[w]hen Ireland loses her identity by a union with Great Britain, she will look back with a smile of good-humoured complacency on the Sir Kits and Sir Condys of her former existence" (*Castle Rackrent*, 63). When Ireland loses its identity (independent parliament), the Irish will cease to identify themselves with "ancestors" like the Sir Kits and Sir Condys of their past, thereby reinforcing the anti-inheritance model of nation but incorporating Ireland into the synthetic model of

Great Britain.

The key point, however, is the play with borders (temporal, geographical, political) enacted by *Castle Rackrent* in the editorial epilogue to the novel. Departing from the chronicles of the Rackrent family, the text moves in its final lines to contemporary Irish politics, specifically to the impending union between Ireland and England. Consistent with the editor's emphasis on the foreignness of Ireland in the preface, glossary, and footnotes to the tale, the editorial comment begins with the boundary separating Ireland and England: "Indeed, the domestic habits of no nation in Europe were less known to the English than those of their sister country, till within these few years" (*Castle Rackrent*, 121). But it ends with a question that suggests something more porous: "Did the Warwickshire militia, who were chiefly artisans, teach the Irish to drink beer? or did they learn from the Irish to drink whiskey?" (*Castle Rackrent*, 122). This question, drawing together nation-specific customs of Ireland and England, opens the possibility of an overlap between the two nations. In Edgeworth's formulation, a cultural "learning" occurs on both sides of the border, facilitating an inter-national cross-over of customs.[10] This figure of inter-national cross-over will prove the cornerstone to Edgeworth's rewriting of Burkean nationness, and the notion of learning supporting such a cross-over links her rewriting to eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism.[11]

In Edgeworth's Irish novels, education is the key to both individual and national improvement: it is the foundation of the well-governed estate and the foundation of the well-governed nation. More specifically, a slow process of education instills trans-national understanding in the Irish people while retaining the bonds of local attachment by which the nation is secured. The centrality of education to national improvement in Edgeworth

distinguishes her writing from constructions of national identity as national character and links her thought to earlier cosmopolitan constructions of universal human subjects. It is no accident that she chooses to conclude her discussion of education in the *Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth* with the following words of her father, in which national identity is presented as the product of a specific education on a universal subject: "Did God give different minds to different countries? No! the difference of mind arose from education. It therefore became the duty of Parliament to improve as much as possible the public understanding--for the misfortunes of Ireland were owing not to the heart, but the head; and the defect was not from nature, but from want of culture."[12] By claiming that national difference was anchored in education ("culture" rather than "nature"), Edgeworth gave to national identity a socio-cultural foundation, and thereby opened a space in which change could take place.

"Neither Beef nor *Vael*:" The Anglo-Irish in Maria Edgeworth's Early Irish Tales

Maria Edgeworth's reconsideration of Burke's metaphor of inheritance moves into explicit focus in her second Irish novel, *Ennui* (1809), which effects that reconsideration through two central notions: fosterage and the ennui of the title. The plot of the novel rests on an Irish nurse's substitution of her own healthy peasant baby, Christy Donoghoe, for a sickly English aristocratic baby, Glenthorn, a substitution that does not come to light until well into the novel. The important point is that the education of the presumed lord Glenthorn forges a bored *English* aristocrat out of an Irish peasant, while the education of the presumed Christy Donoghoe leads him to become an *Irish* blacksmith. Edgeworth's plot here resituates

the traditional Irish practice of fostering within an enlightenment framework. In the practice of fostering, kinship becomes a matter of culture rather than blood (heredity).[13] And this has significant implications for the determination of identity. When identity is determined according to inheritance, the border line between belonging and not belonging is relatively clear: I was born into this family rather than that one. If identity is determined according to education, however, this process is complicated. The border line between belonging and not belonging is not so clear: one can feasibly belong to more than one family, as is the case in fostering. In political terms, this non-blood kinship works towards an inclusive rather than exclusive definition of national identity. Despite an English inheritance, that is, the Anglo-Irish can belong to Ireland, and at the same time they can continue to belong to England.

In *Ennui*, however, Glenthorn's attempt to straddle English and Irish identities in such a way makes him politically suspect even before his Irish origin has been uncovered.[14] He is in Ireland during the tense time of the 1798 uprising. The radical United Irishmen, as Ellinor reports to him, "said you was milk and water, and did not go far enough, and never would, and that it was not *in* you, and that you was a sleepy man, and not the true thing at all, and neither beef nor *vael*" (*Ennui*, 263). Here the possibility of a dual affiliation--Glenthorn as "milk and water"--is shut down, robbing him of all affiliation: he becomes "neither beef nor *vael*." Dual affiliation is no more accepted by his own peers than it is by the United Irishmen. When Glenthorn stands up in court for his "Irish" foster-brother, Christy, who has been wrongfully accused of being a rebel, his Anglo-Irish peers wield the same exclusionary logic as the United Irishmen, denoting Glenthorn a "trimmer or a traitor" to his national origin (*Ennui*, 247). Although Edgeworth herself was far from propounding such

exclusionary logic, it seems that in her novel Anglo-Irishness must settle out as either Englishness or Irishness.

In *Ennui*, the possibility of belonging to two nations ceases to be a narrative question as soon as Glenthorn's Irishness is revealed.[15] Removed from the problematic category of "Anglo-Irish," Glenthorn "belongs" only to Ireland. But the same turn in the plot that preempts Glenthorn's reinterpretation of Anglo-Irishness as a dual affiliation also paradoxically confirms such a reinterpretation. That Glenthorn and Christy lived as Englishman and Irishman respectively until the revelation of their "true" origins points to a disjunction between national identity and national origin: Irishness is not intrinsic to Irishmen, nor is Englishness to Englishmen.[16] The disjunction here between national identity and national origin is by no means an isolated case in Edgeworth's works. A similar disturbance occurs, for example, in *The Absentee* when Grace Nugent, presumed to be the last heir of an Irish family with Catholic connections, is revealed to be of English inheritance. Grace's national identity is further confused when one considers the historical and political significance of her surnames. Both her "Irish" surname (Nugent) and her "English" surname (Reynolds) have specific meanings within an Irish context. Thus Edgeworth confuses national identity not only directly through plot (the revelation of Grace's birth) but also indirectly in that supposedly "English" names such as Reynolds have specifically Irish resonances in the period.[17]

If national belonging is a socio-cultural relationship, so too is its antithesis: foreignness. Through the central trope of the novel, *ennui*, Edgeworth suggests that foreignness is not so much a political classification as a psychological relationship between

individual and surroundings. In the conventional discourse out of which she is working, *ennui* is attributed to the "monotony of situations," that is, to overly familiar environments (*Ennui*, 249).[18] Hence its logical cure is travel. But in the novel overcoming this condition entails something other than simply exchanging a familiar situation for a foreign one. Indeed, mere exposure to foreign countries fails to give relief: Glenthorn "rattled over half the globe without getting one inch farther from his ennui" (*Ennui*, 144). Foreignness here is not a matter of being outside native ground but of having no local attachment to any ground, a constant condition of displacement. The *ennui* suffered by Glenthorn is defined as "an aversion to the place [one is] in" (*Ennui*, 144). His general lack of interest in the world around him makes him as much a foreigner on his own English estate as he is in Europe or Ireland. When he is thrown from his horse and is close to death early in the novel, for instance, his peers and servants indifferently leave him for dead. Since foreignness, according to these terms, is made and not given (Glenthorn's upbringing in "luxurious indolence" is cited as cause for his *ennui*), Edgeworth can encourage its elimination (*Ennui*, 143). The last section of the novel simultaneously narrates Glenthorn's re-acclimatization to Ireland and the disappearance of his *ennui*: "Fired with ambition,--I hope generous ambition,--to distinguish myself among men, and to win the favour of the most amiable and the most lovely of women, all the faculties of my souls were awakened: I became active, permanently active. The enchantment of indolence was dissolved, and the demon of ennui was cast out for ever" (*Ennui*, 305).[19] Glenthorn's engagement with his environment--both social and geographical--allows him to overcome his *ennui*. His impending return to Castle Glenthorn, announced at the novel's close, will be that of a native this time, not of a

stranger. To give a socio-cultural foundation to national identity is thus not only to redefine nationness so as to encompass the possibility of hybrids like Anglo-Irishness but also to redefine foreignness as a mobile and temporary condition rather than a permanent classification.

Where the central focus of *Ennui* is the education of the hero--Glenthorn's progression from ennui to engagement in the world--Edgeworth's next Irish tale, *The Absentee* (1812), begins with a hero who is already properly educated. Lord Colambre's education, we are told, has ensured that "English and Irish had not been invidiously contrasted in his mind" (*Absentee*, 6). It has permitted Ireland and England to co-exist within Colambre's psyche. Co-existence does not mean a complete absence of borders between English and Irish, as would occur in the political universalism posited by some eighteenth-century cosmopolitanisms. Neither does it mean the "invidious" contrast perpetrated by nationalistic formulations that prevent any sharing of alliance. Rather, it is the same combination of separation and union that underpins Kant's political philosophy. English and Irish both retain a certain autonomy but an autonomy that is contained in a larger unity. In this case both national allegiances operate in one person, for in Colambre, the "sobriety of English good sense mixed most advantageously with Irish vivacity: English prudence governed, but did not extinguish, his Irish enthusiasm" (*Absentee*, 6). The co-existence of Irishness and Englishness then provides the basis for an Irish patriotism based in intellectual judgement and demonstrated through ongoing concern, one at odds with both the unbridled sentiment of the partisan and the cosmopolitan indifference of the absentee.

Set in post-Union Britain, *The Absentee* documents the circumstances behind the

eventual return of the Clonbrony family (Anglo-Irish absentees) from the bottom crust of English fashionable society to their proper place in Irish society. When the novel opens, the Clonbronys have joined the post-Union exodus of Anglo-Irish to England. For Lords Clonbrony and Colambre, the move to England is a return only in a historical sense: they are of English inheritance but not of English birth. For Lady Clonbrony, by contrast, the return (as she insists) is to her place of birth. In both cases, however, the consequences of return cast doubt upon the relationship between the Anglo-Irish and England. Once a "great power in Dublin," Lord Clonbrony becomes "a mere cipher in London"; and Lady Clonbrony, despite her English birth and cosmopolitan intentions, remains "a stranger, and from Ireland" (*Absentee*, 35, 22). In London the Clonbronys enter into the limbo of absentee culture: they are not accepted as English, yet, having forfeited their Irish identity to English fashion, they are no longer quite Irish either.[20]

What is at issue in Edgeworth's extended critique of absenteeism is the non-correspondence between Irish landlord and Irish estate: absenteeism rests in an absence of local attachment that is detrimental both to the absentee and to his forsaken property. The absentee Lord Clonbrony, for instance, is no better than other profit-hungry colonizers: "he's a great proprietor, but knows nothing of his property, nor of us," as one of his tenants explains: "He might as well be a West India planter, and we negroes, for anything he knows to the contrary--has no more care, nor thought about us, than if he were in Jamaica, or the other world" (*Absentee*, 130). Clonbrony's ignorance about his Irish assets is compounded by his absence from Ireland, which allows him to be easily misled in decisions regarding his Irish holdings: "He is at a distance, and cannot find out the truth" (*Absentee*, 136). Truth

in this case is a function of proximity (intellectual and geographical) and not distance. To see clearly does not mean distancing oneself from the estate but rather dwelling on it. Removed from his estate, for instance, Clonbrony pressures the good agent Burke to squeeze more money out of the tenantry, blind to the long-term consequences of such a strategy. When Burke refuses to do so, Clonbrony dismisses him and places the entire estate in the hands of a corrupt agent who has no more attachment to the land than his absentee master. Unlike Burke, who lives on the estate that he manages, the corrupt agent Garraghty lives in Dublin, appointing his brother as an under-agent to look after the day-to-day affairs of the Clonbrony estate. He himself sets foot on the estate only to collect money. In Garraghty's hands, the tenantry is driven into poverty, the estate into ruin. Absentee culture is not limited to Irish absentees, however, as Edgeworth carefully points out. The English Sir John Berryl, for instance, is "an absentee from his home, his affairs, his duties, and his estate" (*Absentee*, 48). The narrator makes the point explicit: "The sea, the Irish Channel, did not indeed, flow between him and his estate; but it was of little importance whether the separation was effected by land or water--the consequences, the negligence, the extravagance, were the same" (*Absentee*, 54).

A similar absence of local attachment appears in the borderless economy of international trade. Throughout the novel, national artifacts appear as décor: a brief survey of Lady Clonbrony's home, for example, reveals Turkish tent drapery, Alhambra hangings, a Trebisond trellice, and Egyptian hieroglyphic paper, among other things (*Absentee*, 12-13). The opening chapters include spirited satire on such London fashion, with the narration focusing at one point on a "Chinese" pagoda that Lady Clonbrony proudly displays to some

guests. One of the guests, the disdainful Lady Langdale, pretends to herald the curiosity as a "real Chinese pagoda," underlining her sense of its artifice by complimenting Lady Clonbrony for including "a comfortable English fireplace and plenty of Newcastle coal in China" (*Absentee*, 36). The remark points to the incongruity between the "Chineseness" of the pagoda and its supposed origin, China, a gap widened when Lady Clonbrony draws attention to a neighbouring vase and calls for lady Langdale's judgement on (fine) "china." This time, although the word "china" still refers to the country, the reference is no longer an active one. The cosmopolitanism of the international market-place has levelled national identity into sliding signifiers. The missing affiliations here between national product and nation parallel the missing affiliations of the absentee landlord: although the Irish absentee is still Irish, his national affinity to Ireland has become inactive.

Against the rootlessness of absentee culture, Edgeworth reintroduces local attachment. This attachment, however, is not the spontaneous and emotive national sympathy suggested by the Burkean rhetoric of national affection: rather, it is a critical concern that positions its bearer as (in Grace Nugent's words) "not a partisan, but a friend" to Ireland (*Absentee*, 73). The weakness of partisan dynamics is illustrated by Edgeworth's description of Colambre's initial arrival at the Bay of Dublin: "He admired, he exulted in the beauty of the prospect; and all his early associations of his childhood, and the patriotic hopes of his riper years, swelled his heart as he approached the shores of his native land" (*Absentee*, 80). This initial burst of unmitigated sentiment, however, quickly changes to disgust on closer view:

> But scarcely had he touched his mother earth, when the whole course of his ideas was changed; and if his heart swelled, it swelled no more with

> pleasurable sensations, for instantly he found himself surrounded and attacked by a swarm of beggars and harpies, with strange figures and stranger tones; some craving his charity, some snatching away his luggage, and at the same time bidding him 'never trouble himself,' and 'never fear. ' (*Absentee*, 80)

Against Colambre's early emotive and contradictory response to Ireland, Edgeworth juxtaposes the discriminating judgement of an English officer: "Sir James Brooke, had at different periods been quartered in various parts of the country--had resided long enough in each to become familiar with the people, and had varied his residence sufficiently to form comparisons between different counties, their habits, and characteristics" (*Absentee*, 81).[21] A self-described "friend to Ireland," but without "personal interest" in that nation, Brooke presents Colambre with a "just idea of the state of manners in Ireland" (*Absentee*, 248, 81). However, Brooke's ultimate marriage into the Irish nobility (Lady Harriet Oranmore) suggests that for Edgeworth a more successful orientation to Ireland includes not only critical friendship but personal interest as well. She concludes *The Absentee* with an evocation of the ideal Anglo-Irish position. A matured Colambre returns to Ireland, Lord and Lady Clonbrony in tow, "with the reasonable expectation that he will support through life the promise of his early character; that his patriotic views will extend with his power to carry wishes into action; that his attachment to his warm-hearted countrymen will still increase upon farther acquaintance; and that he will long diffuse happiness through the wide circle, which is peculiarly subject to the influence and example of a great resident Irish proprietor" (*Absentee*, 260-261). The novel stresses that Colambre's patriotic views and local attachment are tempered by disinterested reason to the ongoing benefit of Ireland. In Maria Edgeworth's

idealized model, neither partisan nor absentee landlord can qualify as properly Anglo-Irish: the partisan's loyalty is uncritical and limited to one nation, while the absentee landlord's removal from and lack of interest in Ireland prevents his full participation in the term. The ideal Anglo-Irish character, on the other hand, is marked by a combination of local attachment and critical judgement.

A Positive Cosmopolitanism

Marilyn Butler has noted that Maria Edgeworth's education bore the "intellectual stamp of a generation, or half a generation, earlier than that of her own adulthood" (*Maria Edgeworth*, 66). That intellectual stamp came from Richard Lovell Edgeworth, who took pains to establish a domestic atmosphere that upheld basic enlightenment tenets such as self-determination, reason, progress, and religious tolerance.[22] The unmarried Maria remained within this environment throughout her life, her thought guided in large part by the influential eighteenth-century principles absorbed from her father.[23] It is therefore not surprising that she turned back to certain tenets of enlightenment cosmopolitanism in order to supplement the insular Burkean understanding of nationness, an understanding that proved inadequate when faced with the problem of Anglo-Irish identity. What Edgeworth proposes in her early writing on Ireland is not a singular national alliance that occludes all other national relations. Nor is it a complete absence of national affinity. Rather, she proposes that national affinity exist within a larger, more universal understanding of belonging, one based in local attachment but guided by critical understanding.

Initially it may seem that Edgeworth's rewriting of the Burkean understanding of

nationness contradicts or at least problematizes her status as writer of national tales. But her cosmopolitanism and the patriotic genre of the national tale are not necessarily opposed, either generically or theoretically. In a recent discussion of the French *Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen*, for example, Julia Kristeva draws attention to the proximity of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the late eighteenth century. She observes that although the *Declaration* is based on an enlightenment understanding of universal human nature, slippage occurs between the universal notion "men" and the political associations that preserve men's rights: "the *nation*."[24] Testifying to the close relationship between cosmopolitan and national ideas, Edgeworth's treatment of Ireland in her early Irish tales shares much with the specific formulation known as "patriotism" in the eighteenth-century. As Joep Leerssen has argued in a discussion of Anglo-Irish patriotism, the word "patriotism" in its eighteenth-century usage is a forerunner to liberal rather than nationalistic modes of thinking.[25] He draws a distinction between a constitutionally-based conception of patriotism, arising out of eighteenth-century economic and political discourses, and a nineteenth-century nationalist conception of patriotism, arising out of historical, cultural, and racial-genealogical discourses. Such analyses of patriotism provide a way of getting beyond the polarity implicit in nationalist understandings of patriotism that classify Anglo-Irish authors according to Irish or English loyalty. In the case of someone like Edgeworth, entitled to her English inheritance yet devoted to Ireland, what this opens up is the possibility of non-nationalistic patriotism or what Bruce Robbins terms "positive" cosmopolitanism. Convinced of the practical impossibility of a purely negative cosmopolitanism yet anxious for an alternative to nationalisms, Robbins introduces the possibility of a positive cosmopolitanism, "a density of

overlapping allegiances rather than the abstract emptiness of non-allegiance."[26]

The Swiftian "Essay on Irish Bulls" (1802), co-written by Maria and her father, exemplifies this positive cosmopolitanism, as well as giving a clear presentation of the "Anglo-Irish" vantage point that underpins Edgeworth's rewriting of Burkean nationness in her novels. Although the Edgeworths play with the agricultural meaning of "bull" (i.e. uncastrated male ox) throughout the essay, the "bull" that is of primary concern here is a linguistic one: a blunder (conventionally associated with the Irish) that hinges on an incongruity between the usual, accepted meaning of the words said and the intended meaning. A quick example from the essay will illustrate: "A gentleman was complimenting Madame Denis on the manner in which she had just acted Zaire. 'To act that part,' said she, 'a person should be young and handsome.' 'Ah, madam!' replied the complimenter *naïvement*, 'you are a complete proof of the contrary'."[27] The Edgeworths announce their project as an attempt to determine the particular essence of the Irish bull, and in order to fulfil their goal, they engage in a method of exclusion: "Perhaps by ascertaining what it is not, we may at last discover what it is: we must distinguish the genuine from the spurious, the original from all imitations, the indigenous from the exotic; in short, it must be determined in what an Irish bull essentially differs from a blunder, or in what Irish blunders specifically differ from English blunders, and from those of all other nations" ("Irish Bulls," 86). Through a sort of genealogy of bulls, the writers look to the roots of several Irish bulls, both linguistic and practical. However, each attempt to discriminate between the "indigenous" and the "exotic" soon gives way to the conclusion that "[m]any bulls, reputed to be bred and born in Ireland, are of foreign extraction" ("Irish Bulls," 87). The Edgeworths recount, for instance, a bull

Joe Miller cites in his *Natural History* as an example of original Irish genius:

> An English gentleman was writing a letter in a coffee-house, and perceiving that an Irishman stationed behind him was taking that liberty which Hephæstion used with his friend Alexander, instead of putting his seal upon the lips of the *curious impertinent*, the English gentleman thought proper to reprove the Hibernian, if not with delicacy, at least with poetical justice: he concluded writing his letter in these words: "I would say more, but a damned tall Irishman is reading over my shoulder every word I write."
>
> "You lie, you scoundrel!" said the self-convicted Hibernian.
>
> ("Irish Bulls," 88)

Although the Edgeworths agree on this bull's excellence, they discover its appearance in M. Galland's "The Remarkable Sayings of the Eastern Nations" and must conclude that the supposed Irish bull is in fact a traditional oriental anecdote ("Irish Bulls," 88). Another supposed Irish bull, which rests on the ambiguity of personal identity--"I hate that woman, for she changed me at nurse" ("Irish Bulls," 90)-- is traced to the literatures of France, Spain and ancient Greece, again calling into question the category "Irish bull." If the Irish bull is not a "species of blunder *peculiar* to Ireland," if Ireland is not its origin, it has no claim to such a national distinction ("Irish Bulls," 89).

The diverse and sliding origins of the bulls examined by the Edgeworths point to the bull's existence as universal trope: not only do bulls occur elsewhere than in Ireland, but they also have the ability to transcend national boundaries, occurring in the lore of more than one nation. The Edgeworths even include a series of French bulls as an appendix to the "Essay

on Bulls." Despite the fact that their examination of bulls leads to such conclusions, the writers insist that stigma attaches to the Irish bull alone. The inconsistency of this situation appears more strongly when the focus is narrowed to Britain: "A free pardon is, and ought to be, granted by every Englishman to the vernacular and literary errors of those who have the happiness to be born subjects of Great Britain. What enviable privileges are annexed to the birth of an Englishman! and what a misfortune it is to be a native of Ireland!" ("Irish Bulls," 104). If an Englishman makes a conversational mistake, it remains a mistake; but if the same mistake is made by an Irishman, it becomes a bull. The specious reasoning here, though tongue in cheek, emphasizes a division between the "born subjects of Great Britain" (i.e. Englishmen) and the "natives" of Ireland. This division between English and Irish gains significance at the end of the essay when contemporary politics enter into the equation. Here the Edgeworths voice their hope that under the new Union, English-Irish relations will improve. Since the Union includes both England and Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, the English ridicule of the Irish bull is recast as a practical bull committed by the English. By stigmatizing the Irish bull, the English stigmatize themselves; they place the fool's bells on their own "imperial head" ("Irish Bulls," 187).[28]

Although this concluding bull is not--and is not intended to be--a solution for English-Irish relations, the figure of the bull is a resonant one in this context. The Edgeworths dismiss the prevalent definition of the bull as an incongruity of ideas in favour of one based on its similarity to the oxymoron: "In the oxymoron contradictions meet: to reconcile these, Irish ingenuity delights" ("Irish Bulls," 157). This second, revised definition of the bull as oxymoronic trope shares a marked affinity to the Edgeworths' understanding of the Anglo-

Irish position: the Anglo-Irish position is not a static deadlock or incongruity; rather, it is an active and ongoing reconciliation of contradiction. The figure of the bull also shares an affinity to the Edgeworths' understanding of their authorial responsibility: "We enter into no invidious comparisons: it is our sincere wish to conciliate both countries; and if in this slight essay we should succeed in diffusing a more just and enlarged idea of the Irish than has been generally entertained, we hope the English will deem it not an unacceptable service" ("Irish Bulls," 186). In order to fulfil their authorial aim, they claim a certain position vis à vis their subject: "As we were neither *born nor bred* in Ireland, we cannot be supposed to have this amor patriæ in its full force: we profess to be attached to the country only for its merits" ("Irish Bulls," 186).[29] In asserting their attachment to Ireland but insisting that this is an attachment based only on the "merits" of the country, the Edgeworths combine the proximity of concern with the distance necessary for cosmopolitan judgement.

Edward Said suggests a similar configuration in "Secular Criticism."[30] His project in this essay, as throughout his writing, is to direct Kant's formulation of disinterested judgment back to the world. To do this, he posits critical consciousness as the cooperation between "filiation" and "affiliation." For Said, filiation works out of an instinctual or natural matrix and defines belonging in terms of biological continuity. Affiliation, on the other hand, works out of a cultural or social matrix and defines belonging in terms of institutions, associations, and communities. The cooperation of filiation and affiliation recognizes the situatedness of human experience, and it allows for a rooted yet still critical judgement. Said himself argues that there was a shift from filiation to affiliation in late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought, a shift that reverses the often-noticed earlier move *to* filiation at the turn of

the nineteenth century. In the context of Said's argument, Edgeworth's attempt to articulate Anglo-Irish identity at the moment of the filiative turn is highly suggestive. Working away on her father's remote Irish estate, this genteel Anglo-Irishwoman could be said to approach Said's late twentieth-century formulation of critical consciousness, albeit from a very different position. Her early writings on Ireland argue for a socio-cultural foundation to national identity that allows for multiple national allegiances. They imply a positive cosmopolitanism that cuts across the ideological shift from eighteenth-century cosmopolitanisms to nineteenth-century nationalisms, refusing binary oppositions and positing what might be called a rooted cosmopolitan judgment.[31]

Edgeworth's positive cosmopolitanism is not to be confused with more liberal cosmopolitanisms, as her last Irish tale *Ormond* (1817) makes clear. Where *Ennui* and *The Absentee* hinged on a hero's unfamiliarity with Ireland, *Ormond* presents an insider's perspective. "In making Ormond belong to both worlds [Anglo-Irish and Irish]," Marilyn Butler writes, "Maria has had to sacrifice the fresh response to Ireland that only an outsider like Glenthorn can experience" (*Maria Edgeworth*, 386). Brought up in Ireland by his father's friend, Ulick, Ormond is as at home in metropolitan Dublin as he is in the remote Black Islands. Indeed, the hero of Edgeworth's fourth Irish novel is (in Butler's words) "almost unnaturally at home everywhere" (*Maria Edgeworth*, 386). But if Edgeworth loses an outside vantage point, what she gains from her "homeless, fatherless, Irish-English" hero, according to Butler, is a "view of Ireland that is both broad and intimate" (*Maria Edgeworth*, 386). Edgeworth's *Ormond* is a Bildungsroman in which the hero learns to combine the broadness of cosmopolitanism and the intimacy of local attachment.[32]

Ormond's travels through Ireland constitute the first part of his education. In particular, they allow him to witness first hand how Sir Ulick, King Corny, and Sir Herbert Annaly manage their estates:

> He liked to compare the different modes in which King Corny, his guardian and Sir Herbert Annaly managed these things.--Sir Herbert governed neither by threats, punishments, abuse, nor tyranny; nor yet did he govern by promises nor bribery, *favour* and *protection*, like Sir Ulick.--He neither cajoled nor bullied--neither held it as a principle, as Marcus did, that the people must be kept down, nor that the people must be deceived.--He treated them neither as slaves, subject to his will; nor as dupes, or objects on which to exercise his wit or cunning.--He treated them as reasonable beings, and as his fellow creatures, who he wished to improve, that he might make them and himself happy.[33]

A conformer, political trimmer, and government jobber, Sir Ulick is motivated by his own self-interest. He invests neither time nor money in his estates, turning a blind eye to what is happening there as long as it brings him a profit. When his tenants are forced to plunder shipwrecks in order to make their rents, for example, they do so unchastised by Ulick : "Oh! he was the man to live under--he was the man that knew when to wink and when to blink; and if he shut his eyes *properly*, sure his tenants filled his fist" (*Ormond*, 168). In contrast, King Corny's approach to estate management is more benevolent: "Born afore the present reformation in manners" in Ireland, Corny is a feudal king who rules over his adoring subjects with paternal generosity (*Ormond*, 31). Full of good intentions, he is constantly initiating various and sundry improvements about the Black Islands. However, his

improvements rarely come to fruition: the roof of Corny Castle still sits on stilts above its foundation, waiting for the walls to be built up to it, and the drawing-room is used as a make-shift granary, barn, barrack-room, and hospital, depending on whatever is most needed at the time.

Sir Herbert Annaly represents Edgeworth's ideal landlord in *Ormond*. Unlike King Corny, Herbert values justice more than generosity, governing his tenantry not with affection alone but with a just and even hand. And unlike Ulick, Herbert sacrifices his own immediate interests to change the morals and habits of the people for the long term, discouraging his tenants from plundering shipwrecks and encouraging them to be industrious by employing them in honest work such as building a light-house and manufacturing sail cloth. A conversation between Ormond and Ulick nicely sets up the distinction between Edgeworth's ideal landlord and the not-so-ideal: "I never saw Sir Herbert till now--," Ormond tells Ulick, "I like him--I like his principles--his love of his country--his attachment to his family" (*Ormond*, 161). Ulick sensibly concurs with Ormond's initial evaluation of Herbert: "He's a very fine fellow--no better fellow than Herbert Annaly--But as for his attachment to his family, who thanks him for that? Who could help it, with such a family?--And his love for his country--every body loves his country" (*Ormond*, 161). Ormond's response to Ulick--"More or less, I suppose"--suggests that what is at issue is not whether or not one loves his country so much as how one loves it. In Edgeworth's ideal landlord, "head and heart" come together (*Ormond*, 170).

Ormond's travels through Ireland may teach him how to love his country, but his education is not finished until he has travelled outside his country as well. Although Ormond

believes himself ready to marry Florence Annaly after his domestic tour, his friends advise him that he "should see more of the world before he settled for life" (*Ormond*, 192). Hence he travels to that most "cosmopolitan" of cities, Paris. There he is introduced into the society of enlightenment Paris by his childhood friend, Dora, and her husband, Black Connal, both Irish ex-patriates. During his stay, Ormond learns to appreciate cultural difference. His first glimpse of high society, for instance, is a lesson in cultural de-coding. When Ormond enters the Théâtre François, he finds the French ladies to be surprisingly unattractive. In particular, he is repulsed by the artificial dot of rouge that decorates their cheeks. He is informed, however, that it is this very dot that marks them as ladies of rank and fashion. What seems unnatural or artificial to him is not so for everyone, and in time Ormond too finds the French ladies "charming" and "full of vivacity" (*Ormond*, 206).

But for Edgeworth cultural tolerance does not mean cultural relativism, and she distances herself from the French milieu, home of enlightenment cosmopolitanism, characterizing Parisian society as superficial: "[Ormond] could not afterwards remember anything very striking or very solid that had been said, but all was agreeable at the moment, and there was great variety" (*Ormond*, 204). Of particular censure is the loose morality of the Parisian ladies. Attending his first "*petit souper*," Ormond is drawn away from the gambling tables by Dora's aunt, Miss O'Faley, who enthusiastically relates to him the extramarital affairs of the ladies present. Only three of the ladies (besides Dora) have unblemished reputations: the "frightfully dressed" Madame de la Rousse, the "[n]ouvelle mariée" Comtesse de la Brie, and the "cold" Madame de St. Ange who--though married a full year--has yet to choose a lover (*Ormond*, 205). For Miss O'Faley, wives taking lovers is

part of the cosmopolitan "esprit de société" of Paris, and she encourages Dora to do so (*Ormond*, 205). "How far [Parisian]society and correct female conduct be compatible," Edgeworth muses, "is a question which it might take too long a time to decide" (*Ormond*, 205). Her own position, however, is clear: "The moralist, who considers the essential interests of morality more than the immediate pleasures of society, will think [the end of such society] rather a matter of rejoicing than regret" (*Ormond*, 205). Edgeworth's condemnation of the loose morality of Parisian society recalls Burke's charge that enlightenment cosmopolitanism lacks an affection for what is local, a lack symbolized for Burke by Rousseau's parental neglect. But if Edgeworth echoes Burke's general criticisms of enlightenment society, she does not dismiss it *in toto*, and she draws a fine line between enlightenment philosophes: Ormond *hears* anecdotes about Rousseau and Voltaire, but he *meets* Marmontel, d'Alembert, and Marivaux.

The key point, however, is that cosmopolitanism for Edgeworth (as for Said) does not replace but rather supplements local attachment. While Ormond's outlook becomes more cosmopolitan as a result of his sojourn in Paris, his sensibility remains Irish: "Ormond, in his secret soul, preferred the bay of Dublin to all he then saw on the banks of the Seine" (*Ormond*, 200). Thus his grand tour prepares him to marry Florence Annaly and settle down in Ireland: "The last few months, though they might seem but a splendid or feverish dream in his existence, had in reality been, he believed, of essential service in confirming his principles, settling his character, and deciding for ever his taste and judgement, after full opportunity of comparison, in favour of his own country--and especially of his own countrywomen" (*Ormond*, 243). Importantly, Ormond's time in France does not make him

into a "thing...half Irish, half French" like the cosmopolitan Miss O'Faley, whose ongoing struggle to be French in all things is ridiculed throughout the novel (*Ormond*, 123). He is "content to seem and be" what he is (*Ormond*, 215).

Nor does it make him into a Frenchified coxcomb like the worldly Black Connal, as Edgeworth makes clear in an early conversation between Ormond and Connal. While discussing Connal's impending marriage to Dora, Ormond accuses Connal of lying about his intention to stay in the Black Islands. Ormond's accusation draws from the worldly Connal a lecture on the levity such promises hold in fashionable society: "Why, even women, now-a-days, don't lay such an emphasis on a *promise*" (*Ormond*, 105). Thus when Ormond declines to condone Connal's lie with a "smile of approbation," Connal interprets his refusal as a sign of provinciality, beseeching him to let go of his "romantic" notions and "See things as they are, as a man of the world." Connal's entreaty is met with outright rejection: "'I am not a man of the world, and I thank god for it,' cried Ormond" (*Ormond*, 105). Ormond's firm insistence that he is "not a man of the world" separates Edgeworth's ideal of a cosmopolitanism rooted in local attachment from the relativism of Black Connal. It also points to the increasing need in 1817 for a writer like Edgeworth to distance her positive cosmopolitanism from more controversial cosmopolitanisms of the day, most notably, that of Lord Byron, whose celebrated Childe Harold was ethically, culturally, and politically unrooted.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. Maria and Robert Lovell Edgeworth, "*Carr's Stranger in Ireland*," *Edinburgh Review* 10 (April 1807), 59.

2. Séamus Deane, "Virtue, travel and the Enlightenment," in *Nations and nationalisms: France, Britain, Ireland and the eighteenth-century context*, ed. Michael O'Dea and Kevin Whelan (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1995), 291.

3. Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace, for instance, argues that Maria Edgeworth appropriates peasant life, while Mary Jean Corbett focuses on how she ensures colonial stability. See Kowaleski-Wallace's *Their Fathers' Daughters: Hannah More, Maria Edgeworth, and Patriarchal Complicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Corbett's "Another Tale to Tell: Postcolonial Theory and the Case of Castle Rackrent," *Criticism* 36 (1994): 383-400, and "Public Affections and Familial Politics: Burke, Edgeworth, and the 'Common Naturalization' of Great Britain," *ELH* 61 (1994): 877-97.

4. On Maria Edgeworth's life, see the standard biography by Marilyn Butler, *Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972).

5. Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the category of Anglo-Irish. See, for example, Terry Eagleton's *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture* (London: Verso, 1995) and Julian Moynahan's *Anglo-Irish: The Literary Imagination in a Hyphenated Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

6. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, vol. 8 of *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke*, ed. Paul Longford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 82.

7. The intersection of the political and the domestic in Burke has received ongoing critical attention. See, for example, Deirdre Lynch, "Nationalizing Women and Domesticating Fiction: Edmund Burke and the Genres of Englishness," *Wordsworth Circle* 25 (winter 1994): 45-49; W.J. McCormack, *Ascendency and Tradition in Anglo-Irish Literary History from 1789 to 1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); and Ronald Paulson, *Representations of Revolution, 1789-1820* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

8. Marilyn Butler notes Edgeworth's rejection of Burke's historical model of nation in her Introduction to *Castle Rackrent* and *Ennui* (London: Penguin, 1992). On the other hand, Mary Jean Corbett has recently argued for an unproblematic adaption of Burke's "familial plot" in *The Absentee* that supports English hegemony over Ireland. See her "Public Affections and Familial Politics" noted above.

9. Maria Edgeworth, *Castle Rackrent* in *Castle Rackrent and Ennui*, ed. Marilyn Butler (London: Penguin, 1992), 84.

10. In *The Absentee* a similar point is made when O'Halloran points to the advantages of an exchange between Irish and English militia: "The two countries have the same interest; and, from the inhabitants discovering more of each other's good qualities and interchanging little good offices in common life, their esteem and affection for each other would increase, and rest upon the firm basis of mutual utility." Maria Edgeworth, *The Absentee*, ed. W.J. McCormack and Kim Walker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 117. In both *Castle Rackrent* and *The Absentee* the direction of national influence is not from England to Ireland, center to periphery, as one would be led to expect from descriptions of Edgeworth as colonial writer.

11. Edgeworth's connection to eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism was pointed out by

contemporaries such as Francis Jeffrey in "Maria Edgeworth's *Tales of Fashionable Life*," *Edinburgh Review* 14 (July 1809): 375-88, and it has been noted as well by modern critics like Marilyn Butler (Introduction to *Castle Rackrent and Ennui*; *Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography*) and W.J. McCormack (Introduction to *The Absentee*).

12. Maria Edgeworth and Richard Lovell Edgeworth, *Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth*, (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), 1: 247-48. Maria lifts the quotation from her father's speech on education delivered February 25, 1799.

13. On this point, Edgeworth quotes Sir John Davies who goes so far as to suggest that "fostering hath always been a stronger alliance than blood; and the foster-children do love and are beloved of their foster-fathers and their sept (or *clan*) more than of their natural parents and kindred" (*Ennui*, 159). For a complex reading of the nurse in the imperial context, see chapter five of Katie Trumpener's *Bardic Nationalism: The Romantic Novel and the British Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

14. Richard Lovell Edgeworth was in the same tenuous situation during the Irish rebellion of 1798. Trying to mediate between Irish and Anglo-Irish factions, he found himself suspected by both. See chapter 10 of *Memoirs of Richard Lovell Edgeworth*.

15. It is not until her last Irish tale, *Ormond* (1817) that Edgeworth grants unqualified narrative recognition to the potential inherent in the socio-cultural attribution of kinship. In *Ormond*, belonging as inheritance and belonging as socio-cultural relationship are conflated: the orphaned Anglo-Irish Ormond "inherits" the Black Islands from one of his foster-fathers, the Irish King Corny.

16. In "Privileged Assimilation: Maria Edgeworth's Hope for the Ascendancy," Meredith Cary suggests that this is "a postulation which would have aroused protests from both contemporary

cultures if its implications had not been obscured by Edgeworth's naturalistic detail." *Eire-Ireland* 26 (winter 1991), 31.

17. My thanks to Marilyn Butler who noted informally that the Nugents had cousins in County Leitrim named Nugent Reynolds, some of whom had been in the public eye as recently as 1799. On names in *The Absentee*, see also McCormack's Introduction and Appendix II. For the ambiguities of Irish or English in relation to Grace Nugent, see Robert Tracy's influential essay, "Maria Edgeworth and Lady Morgan: Legality versus Legitimacy," *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 40 (June 1985): 1-22.

18. The Edgeworths warn against that "yawning demon of Ennui" in their earlier treatise on practical education: "Young men who are most ready to yield their companions, are not therefore to be considered as of really compliant dispositions; the idle or indolent, who have no resources in their own minds, and no independent occupations, are victims to the yawning demon of Ennui the moment they are left in solitude." *Practical Education*, 2d ed. (London: J. Johnson, 1801), 1: 291.

19. In contrast, Glenthorn's first energetic foray into Irish affairs on the eve of Irish rebellion lacks the grounding necessary to ensure an ongoing and critical commitment to Irish improvement: "I had been driven to exertion by a mixture of pride and generosity; my understanding being uncultivated, I had acted from the virtuous impulse of the moment, but never from rational motive, which alone can be permanent in its operation" (*Ennui*, 249). When the direct threat of rebellion disappears, Glenthorn sinks back into his *ennui*. Mitzi Myers examines the public and private significance of Glenthorn's *ennui* in "'Completing the Union:' Critical *Ennui*, the Politics of Narrative, and the Reformation of Irish Cultural Identity," *Prose*

Studies 18 (December 1995): 41-77.

20. Unlike the Clonbronys, the Irish Sir Terence O'Fay exploits English stereotypes of the Irish, exaggerating his "native brogue, and his natural propensity to blunder" to meet English expectations (*Ennui*, 22).

21. As with Nugent Reynolds, Brooke is an English-sounding Irish name of some importance. See McCormack's note on the Brooke family of Rantavan in County Cavan (*Absentee*, 297).

22. For an account of R.L. Edgeworth's connection to enlightenment thought, see Desmond Clarke's *The Ingenious Mr. Edgeworth* (London: Oldbourne, 1965).

23. For two foundational readings of Richard Lovell's influence on Maria see Marilyn Butler's *Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography* and Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace's *Their Fathers' Daughters: Hannah More, Maria Edgeworth, and Patriarchal Complicity*.

24. Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (Columbia: Colombia University Press, 1991), 148.

25. Joep Leerssen, "Anglo-Irish Patriotism and its European Context: Notes Towards a Reassessment," *Eighteenth-Century Ireland* 3 (1988), 15.

26. Bruce Robbins, "Comparative Cosmopolitanism," *Social Text* 31-32 (1992), 173.

27. Maria Edgeworth and Richard Lovell Edgeworth, "Essay on Irish Bulls," in vol. 4 of *Tales and Novels* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969), 90.

28. In "Goring John Bull: Maria Edgeworth's Hibernian High Jinks versus the Imperialist Imaginary," Mitzi Myers reads the "Essay on Irish Bulls" as a parody that destabilizes gender, genre, and national identity. In *Cutting Edges: Postmodern Critical Essays on Eighteenth-Century Satire*, ed. James E. Gill (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1995).

29. On the centrality of the notion of merit to the Edgeworths, see Gary Kelly, "Class, Gender, Nation, and Empire: Money and Merit in the Writing of the Edgeworths," *The Wordsworth Circle* 25 (spring 1994): 89-93.

30. Edward Said, "Secular Criticism," *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983): 1-30.

31. The idea of a "rooted cosmopolitanism" has begun to receive quite a bit of critical attention. See, for example, Mitchell Cohen, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism," *Dissent* 39 (fall 1992): 478-84, and Bruce Ackerman, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism," *Ethics* 104 (1994): 516-535.

32. William Howard argues that in *Ormond* Edgeworth attempts to "convey a relatively consistent regional outlook, which would supersede not only the level of individual characters but also her own cosmopolitan bias." "Regional Perspective in Early Nineteenth-Century Fiction: The Case of *Ormond*," *The Wordsworth Circle* 10 (autumn 1979), 332.

33. Maria Edgeworth, *Ormond: A Tale* (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1992), 169.

Chapter Four

Pilgrim, Exile, Vagabond: Byron and the Citizen of the World

The early nineteenth-century figure of the cosmopolitan derives in large part from philosophical tales of the Enlightenment such as Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes* (1721), Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), Voltaire's *Candide* (1759), and Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* (1762). Most notably, Lord Byron turned to the figure found in such tales to counter the domestic patriot in native poets like Southey and Wordsworth. In *Strangers to Ourselves*, Julia Kristeva defines the eighteenth-century figure of the cosmopolitan as the "alter ego of national man," and to understand the cosmopolitan as the "alter ego" of national man is to see him as both other (foreign) and part of the same (a second self).[1] Kristeva's conception of the cosmopolitan forms part of a poststructuralist reconceptualizing of identity as a differential process: a shifting between self and other, between the semiotic and the symbolic. In her reading, the cosmopolitan adopts various subject positions only to displace them, so that his stance is "temporary, moveable, changing...it knows neither root nor soil, it is traveling, foreign" (*Strangers to Ourselves*, 39). Such a mobile stance undermines notions of identity both private and public, while its politics are disconcerting, for this kind of travelling figure cannot belong to any one nation. Kristeva's delineation of the eighteenth-century cosmopolitan offers a useful starting point for thinking about the way in which the figure functioned in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain. Considered either an ideal patriot or a traitor to the nation (depending on one's political outlook), the figure

appeared regularly in British writing of the period, but the most celebrated example remains that of Lord Byron.

"I am so convinced...of the bitter effects of staying at home with all the narrow prejudices of an Islander," Byron wrote on his Continental travels in 1811, "that I think there should be a law amongst us to set our young men abroad for a term among the few allies our wars have left us."[2] Travel produces a wider, more worldly perspective: "Here I see and have conversed with French, Italians, Germans, Danes, Greeks, Turks, Armenians...and without losing sight of my own, I can judge of the countries and manners of others.--Where I see the superiority of England (which by the bye we are a good deal mistaken about in many things) I am pleased, and where I find her inferior I am at least enlightened" (*Letters*, 2: 34-35). If for Byron being a cosmopolitan meant escape from the "narrow prejudices of an Islander" and from the tightening Burkean nationalism of war-time Britain, however, for his conservative critics it meant something more sinister. For them, the figure came to stand as the epitome of all that was wrong with liberal aristocratic thought: it was anti-national, anti-Christian, and immoral. And Byron himself, reacting to the critique, defiantly pushed the implications of his citizen of the world beyond the liberal to the libertine.

Citizen of the World

Writing to Robert Charles Dallas in 1810, Byron declared that "all climates and nations are equally interesting to me; that mankind are every where despicable in different absurdities; that the farther I proceed from your country the less I regret leaving it... I would soon be a citizen of the world, but I fear some indispensable affairs will soon call me back;

and as I left the land without regret, I shall return without pleasure" (*Letters*, 1: 248-49). Byron's use of "citizen of the world" in such passages recalls Allan D. McKillop's notion of "altruistic cosmopolitanism." McKillop traces a shift from a strict philosophical cosmopolitanism in the first half of the eighteenth century, one that rejected all local attachment, to a more inclusive cosmopolitanism in the second half, one that was sympathetic to local attachment.[3] But he also identifies an intermediate phase he associates with Oliver Goldsmith, one McKillop terms "altruistic cosmopolitanism." The altruistic cosmopolitan takes for his concern the happiness of others, extending love of self to love of country and mankind, but he tempers this universal benevolence with reason. Goldsmith's citizen of the world may be a sympathetic observer, but he is also a detached philosopher. He is both inside and outside local attachments, recognizing his attachment to place, but at the same time acknowledging that other places could serve just as well. This border position articulated by Goldsmith is important to Byron's early nineteenth-century appropriation of the figure, and it merits a brief discussion.

Goldsmith defines the citizen of the world as a philosophical traveller:

> He should be a man of a philosophical turn, one apt to deduce consequences of general utility from particular occurrences, neither swolen with pride, nor hardened by prejudice, neither wedded to one particular system, nor instructed only in one particular science; neither wholly a botanist, nor quite an antiquarian; his mind should be tinctured with miscellaneous knowledge, and his manners humanized by an intercourse with men. He should be in some measure, an enthusiast to the design; fond of travelling from a rapid

> imagination, and an innate love of change, furnished with a body capable of sustaining every fatigue, and a heart not easily terrified at danger. [4]

Goldsmith's citizen of the world is not a specialist but a general scholar, able to move with fluidity between different disciplines and spot the weaknesses in each. He is adaptable: his rapid imagination and innate love of change mean that he embraces new places and cultures with interest rather than anxiety or prejudice. Extensive travel fosters in him the critical ability to connect the particular and the general and to know "when to value and when to despise those national peculiarities which are regarded by some with so much observance" (*Citizen*, 166).

This latter point is central to Goldsmith's model. Writing for the *Royal Magazine* in 1760, he asserts "I should esteem it my greatest happiness...could I enlarge one mind, and make the man who now boasts his patriotism, a citizen of the world; could I level those distinctions which separate mankind; could I teach the English to allow strangers to have their excellencies; could I mend that country in which I reside, by improvements from those which I have left behind."[5] Unlike the patriot, who values his own kind above all others, the citizen of the world, as Goldsmith notes in the text of the same title, "makes no private distinctions of party; all that are stamped with the divine image of the creator are friends to him; he is a *native of the world*" (*Citizen*, 99). Where the patriot attempts to disunite society and kingdoms and favours his own nation to the detriment of others, the philosophical traveller attempts to "unite society more closely, and to persuade men to become citizens of the world" (*Citizen*, 86). Hence he is a man of the world in terms of geography (he travels the world) and in terms of identity as well (he considers himself first and foremost a "*native of*

the world"). This does not mean that Goldsmith's philosophical traveller is apolitical. Rather, it implies a politics of mobility. Altangi, for example, retains an allegiance to his homeland, but he also embraces England. In fact, he absorbs a certain Englishness during his residence: "I have interested myself so long in all the concerns of this people," he explains, "that I am almost become an Englishman; I now begin to read with pleasure of their taking towns or gaining battles, and secretly wish disappointment to all the enemies of Britain" (*Citizen*, 345). Furthermore, Goldsmith's traveller is not limited to two nations, as are Edgeworth's Anglo-Irish heroes, for example. For him, national attachment is infinitely expandable: "As I consider myself in the light of a Cosmopolite," Altangi explains, "I find as much satisfaction in scheming for the countries in which I happen to reside, as for that in which I was born" (*Citizen*, 426). Thus one of the implications of being a citizen of the world for Goldsmith is a certain flexibility of allegiance. Since the cosmopolite can reside happily in any nation, he can also transfer his political allegiance to any nation, i.e. he can scheme for any country.

Such scheming can imply an amoral pragmatism, and Goldsmith is careful to keep his traveller within moral space by distinguishing him from what he calls the "vagabond": "a man who leaves home to mend himself and others is a philosopher; but he who goes from country to country, guided by the blind impulse of curiosity, is only a vagabond" (*Citizen*, 41). The philosophical traveller, as McKillop puts it, is an "altruistic" cosmopolitan. He travels to improve himself and, more importantly, to improve others. Such a traveller, Goldsmith suggests, "instructs the heart." In contrast, the vagabond travels for travel's sake, for his own pleasure: he "indulges the imagination" (*Citizen*, 41). But it is difficult to draw

a firm line between philosophical traveller and vagabond. As Séamus Deane has noted, in the end Goldsmith's citizen of the world seems more vagabond than philosophical traveller.[6] Altangi himself does not return to China and use his new knowledge to improve things there; nor does he settle in his adopted country like his son Hingpo or, for that matter, like Edgeworth's Anglo-Irish heroes. Instead, he keeps right on travelling: "As for myself the world being but one city to me, I dont [sic] much care in which of the streets, I happen to reside, I shall therefore spend the remainder of life in examining the manners of different countries" (*Citizen*, 476).

For the epigraph to *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, Byron turns not to Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* but to Fougeret de Monbron's *Le Cosmopolite* (1753), which offers a negative reflection of Goldsmith's citizen of the world:

> L'univers est une espèce de livre, dont on n'a lu que la première page quand on n'a vu que son pays. J'en ai feuilleté un assez grand nombre, que j'ai trouvé également mauvaises. Cet examen ne m'a point été infructueux. Je haïssais ma patrie. Toutes les impertinence des peuples divers, parmi lesquels j'ai vécu, m'ont réconcilié avec elle. Quand je n'aurais tiré d'autre bénéfice de mes voyages que celui-là , je n'en regretterais ni les frais, ni les fatigues.[7]

The cosmopolite, de Monbron suggests, views his own nation as one page in a larger book. Extensive reading confirms that all pages are equally bad, but reconciles him to his own page. In contrast to Goldsmith's benevolent citizen of the world, de Monbron's malevolent cosmopolite travels for his own purposes. Denis Porter identifies this type of traveller as the "romantic rebel." For Porter, the romantic rebel is a traveller who pursues "intense or novel

forms of experience at or beyond the pleasure principle and culturally prescribed limits, often at great risk to the self-conserving ego."[8] In the politically-charged climate of war-time Britain, Byron rewrites Goldsmith's figure of the citizen of the world as just such a romantic traveller.

Byron's Pilgrim: The Romantic Traveller

In his attempt to define a postmodern ethnography, James Clifford has recently turned to the old trope of pilgrimage, seeing the ethnographer as a traveller or pilgrim who traverses various sites of culture. For Clifford, viewing ethnography as a pilgrimage is one way of getting beyond the subject/object binary implicit in most texts of cultural comparison, and the metaphor allows him to recast the ethnographer's role as participant in intercultural encounter rather than observer of a delimited field of study. But the notion of pilgrimage is also part of a more general gesture of displacement. Clifford posits culture as something that travels, as opposed to something organic and rooted, as in standard anthropological and ethnographical accounts. By looking at culture as travel, Clifford opens up the field of comparative cultural studies to various cultures of displacement and transplantation and to what he calls "discrepant cosmopolitanisms."[9] For him, these discrepant cosmopolitanisms complicate or "cross-cut" the boundary between "us" and "them," and recognition of such cosmopolitanisms prompts a reconsideration of our notions about what constitutes a culture. As early as 1812, however, aspects of Clifford's postmodern stance were anticipated by that most famous of Romantic pilgrims, Childe Harold. Like Clifford's pilgriming ethnographer, Harold occupies a liminal position between the native and the stranger.

Although often considered merely a travelogue in verse, the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (1812) refigure the conventional grand tour into a critique of the Burkean model of nation. The poem opens with Childe Harold's departure from England. His leaving means breaking though each of the concentric circles that Burke identified with national attachment: Childe Harold leaves "[h]is house, his home, his heritage, his lands" (1:11). War-time England is presented as insular and self-enclosed, "more lone than Eremite's sad cell" (1:4). Harold's departure from England means escape from that tightly-bordered cell.

Nor does Childe Harold look back with much regret. Crossing the channel from England to Lisbon, he deflates the notion of domestic attachment fundamental to Burke's model of nation through a sardonic ballad that makes nostalgia its target. In the ballad, the singer's page weeps because he misses his mother and father, while his yeoman mourns his separation from his wife and children in England. The singer himself, however, debunks their sentiment by invoking his dog, noting that although the dog may whine for him for a while, it will forget its master as soon as it is fed by someone else. Furthermore, when its master returns home, the dog will attack him as it would any other stranger. Domestic attachment is stripped of sentiment and becomes a product of physical need: the dog will be true to whoever feeds him. Any master will do just as well. Similarly, both page and yeoman can be replaced. Moreover, so can the nation. Thus while the singer's servants cling (naively) to home, he himself turns to the Continent:

> With thee, my bark, I'll swiftly go
> Athwart the foaming brine;

Nor care what land thou bear'st me to,

So not again to mine.

Welcome, welcome, ye dark-blue waves!

And when you fail my sight,

Welcome, ye deserts, and ye caves!

My native Land--Good Night. (1: 15-16)

As England disappears from view and the song ends, Harold shifts his outlook from stern to bow, from his native land to new lands. Thus his "Good Night" inflects with irony the very thing it is designed to celebrate: love of hearth and home.

Childe Harold's Pilgrimage foregrounds travel as border crossing. The hero begins his pilgrimage by breaking through the thickened border of a war-time England and crossing the channel separating the island from the Continent: "Without a sigh he left, to cross the brine,/ And traverse Paynim shores, and pass Earth's central line"(1:11). But Byron's point about borders is made more emphatically by the second border Harold crosses: that between Portugal and Spain, which is remarkable only because it is so unremarkable. Portugal and Spain are not separated by "barrier," "river deep," or "mountains dark and tall," the poem notes, but only by a diminutive and scarce-named "silver streamlet" (1:33). The streamlet does not so much determine the border between Portugal and Spain as the Portuguese and the Spanish determine it *as* border (1:33). In contrast to Harold, whose view is bound only by the horizon and extends from one nation to the other without interruption, the peasants standing on either bank see the streamlet as divisive. For them, it definitively separates one nation from the other, but the central impulse of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* itself is to throw

into question the very notion of borders.

When Harold moves from the Christian west into the Muslim east in Canto Two, for example, the crossing is figured as a descent into the underworld. But as soon as one tries to pin down the line between east and west, it becomes elusive. Thus Albania is a border-land where west blurs into east, and Albanians a confusing "mixture" of Christian and Muslim, detested by both. Moreover, Albania is not even particularly foreign. "The Arnaouts, or Albanese," Byron relates in a note, "struck me forcibly by their resemblance to the Highlanders of Scotland, in dress, figure, and manner of living. Their very mountains seemed Caledonian with a kinder climate. The kilt, though white; the spare, active form; their dialect, Celtic in its sound; and their hardy habits, all carried me back to Morven" (192-193). Byron arrives at the gateway to the Muslim east only to find there something like home. His comparatist, domesticating impulse may position him as an enlightenment ethnographer, but the point is that his note does not so much efface national difference as confound it. Travel in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* challenges the Burkean understanding of the nation as something clearly-bordered and unified, and the narrative structure of the pilgrimage itself allows Byron to criss-cross the political geography of Europe, dissolving lines even as he metaphorically unites European space within a text.

Moreover, this unity (like the ever-expanding poem) is a shifting one that does not really allow for "home" space. As Canto One makes clear, Byron's traveller is diametrically opposed to the homebody, who stays inside the nation and regards the traveller with scorn: "sluggards deem it but a foolish chase,/ And marvel men should quit their easy chair, / The toilsome way, and long, long league to trace" (1:30). The poet's sentiments are clear: "Oh!

there is sweetness in the mountain air,/ And life, that bloated Ease can never hope to share" (1:30). Immobile in his state of "bloated Ease," the homebody does not trek any further than his "easy chair." He denies himself not only the sensual pleasures of travel but also a widened and more complete understanding of the world. Quietude may have its attractions even for a Byronic hero, but Harold's quest for enlightenment depends on his movement through the landscape. He must remain in motion both geographically and intellectually; similarly, Byron's narrative has to keep moving as well. There is about both a kind of existential restlessness. Like the "fabled Hebrew wanderer" Cain, Harold is doomed to wander the earth until he dies: "What Exile from himself can flee?/ To Zone, though more and more remote,/ Still, still pursues, where-e'er I be,/ The blight of life--the demon, Thought" (40). Harold's journey, like Cain's, has no definitive end. It is entirely appropriate, then, that Byron's first two cantos have no definitive end either.

Canto Two of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* ends with Harold's arrival in Greece, an event he experiences as a sort of home-coming:

> He that is lonely hither let him roam,
> And gaze complacent on congenial earth
> Greece is no lightsome land of social mirth;
> But he whom Sadness sootheth may abide,
> And scarce regret the region of his birth
> When wandering slow by Delphi's sacred side,
> Or gazing o'er the plains where Greek and Persian died. (2: 92)

While some pilgrims long to return to their native land, Byron's pilgrim returns "home" to

the root of western civilization, Greece. Home in this sense implies a feeling of ease rather than the domestic attachment that underpins Burke's notion of national identity. It is in Greece (not England) that Harold is "at home." But Byron himself returns to England. Significantly, however, the poet's own home-coming is rendered tentative by the news of his friend John Edelston's death: "Thou too art gone, thou lov'd and lovely one!/....Nor staid to welcome here thy wanderer home,/ Who mourns o'er hours which we no more shall see--/ Would they had never been, or were to come!/ Would he had ne'er return'd to find fresh cause to roam!"(2: 95). With Edelston's death, Byron has little incentive to settle down in England. For Byron, as for Harold, pilgrimage entails more than a singular journey to a particular destination and back to a home space. The repetition of the rhyme "home"/ "roam" in the stanzas dealing with each of their returns underscores this point. It re-emphasizes Byron's distinction between the traveller and the homebody and, at the same time, reconfigures the notion of home, presenting the pilgrim as one who is "at home" travelling. "Where roll'd the ocean, thereon was his home" Byron writes at the beginning of Canto Three: "He had the passion and the power to roam" (3:13).

When the poet picks up Childe Harold again in 1816 after his own self-exile from Britain, Harold is still travelling. Although the pilgrim who makes his appearance in Canto Three is older and more disenchanted than the pilgrim of Cantos One and Two, he is still a "wandering outlaw of his own dark mind" (3:3). Moreover, he is an outlaw from humanity: "But soon he knew himself the most unfit/ Of men to herd with Man; with whom he held/ Little in common" (3: 12). He chooses to distance himself from humankind, but insists that this does not make him a misanthrope: "To fly from, need not be to hate, mankind" (3:69).

But it does make him an outsider: "I have not loved the world, nor the world me;...I stood/ Among them, but not of them" (3: 113). This sense of being "[a]mong...but not of" is crucial to Byron's survey of Italian culture and politics in Canto Four. In the preface to Canto Four, Byron declares that "It is...a delicate, and no very grateful task, to dissert upon the literature and manners of a nation so dissimilar; and requires an attention and impartiality which would induce us,--though perhaps no inattentive observers, nor ignorant of the language or customs of the people amongst whom we have recently abode,--to distrust, or at least defer our judgment, and more narrowly examine our information" (122-123).[10] Byron feels he not only possesses the impartiality required to assess the state of Italy but adds to it the benefit of his extended residence in that country: "I've taught me other tongues--and in strange eyes/ Have made me not a stranger; to the mind/ Which is itself, no changes bring surprise;/ Nor is it harsh to make, nor hard to find/ A Country with--ay, or without mankind" (4: 8). If Byron is "not a stranger" to Italy, he is not a native either. Rather, he is consciously a British expatriate living in Italy: "Yet was I born where men are proud to be,/ Not without cause" (4:8). Like Goldsmith's Altangi, Byron remains attached to his homeland even as he dismisses the nationalism of homebodies.[11] He sees himself, for example, as entitled to a place in English literature, and speculates that if he dies in Italy, his spirit will return to Britain. The Byronic stance highlights the liminal position of the expatriate. To be an expatriate is to be (voluntarily or involuntarily) outside the nation; at the same time, it is to define oneself according to the nation. It is thus to be both inside and outside national attachment.

Unfettered by the interest of insiders, for example, Byron can view historical events

and processes more critically. In particular, he can demystify the already mystified battle of Waterloo, viewing it as the exchange of one form of tyranny for another.[12] "Gaul may champ the bit/ And foam in fetters;--but is Earth more free?" Byron asks (3: 19): "Shall we, who struck the Lion down, shall we/ Pay the Wolf homage?" (3:19). England may have succeeded in ridding the world of Napoleon, but it has put another despot in his place. The only real change effected by the battle of Waterloo, the poet suggests, has been to fertilize the field itself with the blood of fallen soldiers (French and English). Although Byron narrates the events leading up to the battle from the British point of view, his commentary implicates both sides in the slaughter, and the canto invokes Gibbon and Voltaire. In this way, as Karen O'Brien points out, Byron's history of Waterloo is a cosmopolitan rather than a national history. It draws on the historical methodologies of writers like Gibbon and Voltaire to create what O'Brien calls an "exilic cosmopolitanism."[13] While Gibbon and Voltaire recognize the existence of national histories, she explains, they believe that national histories are not intelligible in and of themselves, and so they detach themselves from national frames to view events in terms of a European historical framework. For Byron, O'Brien suggests, Gibbon and Voltaire were "Europe's internal exiles...repatriating themselves in the bosom of European history" (*Narratives of Enlightenment*, 234). Their "imaginative homelessness" offered him an alternative form of European identity, one that was at odds with more dominant forms. In particular, it was at odds with the "culturally grounded position of address" adopted by Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (*Narratives of Enlightenment*, 234). Where Burke grounded his history of the French Revolution in his identity as Englishman, Byron knew himself as an

exile when narrating his history of Waterloo.[14] Not nationless so much as outside of the nation, he could view national events from an international perspective. Through such exilic cosmopolitanism, Byron reconciled his nationality and his internationalism.

If, as Kristeva suggests, the cosmopolitan is the "alter ego" of national man, Jerome McGann gets it right (although perhaps reversed) when he suggests that Robert Southey was Byron's "dark double."[15] Southey's "Pilgrimage to Waterloo" (1816) offers an important counter to Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* and highlights by contrast the radical nature of Byron's romantic traveller. In contrast to Childe Harold's peregrinations, the pilgrimage in Southey's poem is a singular journey. The poet travels from his home in the Land of Lakes through England to Flanders, Brussels, and, finally, Waterloo. The tour is a prescribed one, with a set agenda, and Southey is never way-laid. Indeed, the tour is so prescribed that Southey's "Pilgrimage to Waterloo" begins not with a departure but a return. In the opening proem, Southey, his wife, and their eldest daughter climb out of their carriage and are joyously received by the rest of the family (as a family man, Southey has brought his wife and eldest daughter along with him to the Continent). The other Southey children eagerly step forward to greet the returning travellers, and the travellers greet each in turn. Once the initial welcome is over, Southey hands out souvenirs of the voyage to the outstretched hands of his children and extended family. By positioning the return before the pilgrimage, Southey assures his readers that his pilgrimage (unlike Childe Harold's) will finish where it began: in the heart of England.

Travel here is not an unfolding of identity, as it is in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*; rather, it confirms an already-established identity. In contrast to Byron's romantic traveller,

Southey's pilgrim is unmistakably a national man. In fact, Southey undertakes the pilgrimage in his role as poet Laureate, a point he makes immediately clear: "Me most of all men it behoved to raise/ The strain of triumph for this foe subdued,/ To give a voice to joy, and in my lays/ Exalt a nation's hymn of gratitude,/ And blazon forth in song that day's renown,--/ For I was graced with England's laurel crown."[16] While Harold regards the triumph of Waterloo from a cosmopolitan perspective, Southey narrates the battle as "a struggle between good and evil principles" in which Napoleon is Satan, and England Europe's saviour ("Pilgrimage to Waterloo," 749).[17] Southey may go outside the borders of the nation, but he remains a homebody nonetheless.

The jingoistic "Pilgrimage to Waterloo" thus stands in stark contrast to Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, which, by 1816, had grown to three cantos. Southey's pilgrim was everything that Byron's romantic traveller was not: loyal, moral, religious, and thankful. Indeed, for Southey, the self-exiled Byron proved a very useful figure against which to position himself as national poet. His well-known Preface to *The Vision of Judgement* (1821) attributes to Byron the ruin of English literature and immortalizes him as father of the Satanic school of poetry. Southey's Preface begins with a nostalgic vision of Britain in the days when its literature was distinguished by "moral purity" and fathers could pass on books to their children without worrying about the contents (*Vision of Judgement*, 793). This, Southey laments, is no longer the case. Morally lax authors, publishers and booksellers have failed to forestall "pernicious works," and they are thus guilty of "one of the worst offenses that can be committed against the well-being of society" (*Vision of Judgement*, 793). Indeed,"every person...who purchases such books, or admits them into his house...becomes an aider and

abettor of the crime" (*Vision of Judgement*, 793). Most at fault, of course, are the writers themselves, whom Southey describes as men "of diseased hearts and deprived imaginations" whose object is to "make others as miserable as themselves, by infecting them with a moral virus that eats into the soul" (*Vision of Judgement*, 793-794). Led by Byron, these writers struggle to "subvert the foundations of human virtue and of human happiness" (*Vision of Judgement*, 794). Together, they constitute the "Satanic school," for, as Southey explains, "though their productions breathe the spirit of Belial in their lascivious parts, and the spirit of Moloch in those loathsome images of atrocities and horrors which they delight to represent, they are more especially characterized by a Satanic spirit of pride and audacious impiety, which still betrays the wretched feeling of hopelessness wherewith it is allied" (*Vision of Judgement*, 794). Because morality and politics are "inseparably connected" for Southey, the Satanic school invites political as well as moral subversion, so that poets like Byron threaten the integrity of the English nation by introducing a "moral virus" into the heart of English identity (*Vision of Judgement*, 794).

Byron's Vagabond

Looking back on his political career in late 1821- early 1822, Byron confided to Thomas Medwin that he took "little interest...in the politics at home."[18] The petty intrigues of English party politics were beneath him, he explained, and the dry House of Lords not the proper realm in which to unleash his "Don Juan kind of speech" (*Medwin's Conversations*, 229). Instead of a national statesman, Byron saw himself as a citizen of the world. Medwin quotes Byron:

> Perhaps, if I had never travelled,--never left my own country young,--my views would have been more limited. They extend to the good of mankind in general--of the world at large. Perhaps the prostrate situation in Portugal and Spain--the tyranny of the Turks in Greece--the oppressions of the Austrian Government at Venice--the mental debasement of the Papal States, (not to mention Ireland,)--tended to inspire me with a love of liberty. I felt for Romagna as if she had been my own country, and would have risked my life and fortune for her, as I may yet for the Greeks. I am become a citizen of the world. (*Medwin's Conversations*, 229)

Not only do Byron's views extend from the good of the nation to the "good of mankind in general--of the world at large," but he is willing to fight for liberty in any nation (be it Portugal, Spain, Greece, Venice, Ireland, or Italy).

This militant commitment to liberty underpins the poetical and political project of *Don Juan* (1818-1824): "And I will war, at least in words (and--should/ My chance so happen--deeds) with all who war/ With thought....To this my plain, sworn, downright detestation/ Of despotism in every nation" (*Don Juan*, 9:24). Byron's war against despotism "in every nation" includes England; hence the dedication to *Don Juan* takes Castlereagh to task for helping to repress the 1798 rebellion in Ireland and facilitate the 1801 union and for withdrawing English support from the move to return independence to the free cities of Italy in 1814. In the poem itself, Byron argues that Wellington may have helped restore "legitimacy" but failed to establish liberty, so that in this particular case (as in others) Britain proves to be a "false friend" to Europe (10:67). Having promised freedom, it has delivered

tyranny. In Byron's opinion, to have freedom and not to extend it to other nations is to be a "slavemaker." But it is also to be the "first of slaves." He thus writes of England:

> Would she be proud, or boast herself the free,
> Who is but first of slaves? The nations are
> In prison,--but the jailor, what is he?
> No less a victim to the bolt and bar.
> Is the poor privilege to turn the key
> Upon the captive, freedom? He's as far
> From the enjoyment of the earth and air
> Who watches o'er the chain, as they who wear. (10:68)

Both captive and captor are bound to the bolt and bar which separates them, and the implications of Byron's image recall the arguments earlier in the century by writers such as Brougham and Jeffrey: for true liberty to exist in one nation, it must exist in all.

"Cosmopolitanism will be either libertarian or totalitarian--" Julia Kristeva writes, and Byron's well known defence of liberty places him firmly within the libertarian camp. But libertarian cosmopolitanism, she adds, has two faces: "absolute cynicism based on individual pleasure, or the elitism of lucid, self-controlled beings" (*Strangers to Ourselves* 61). By the time of *Don Juan*, Byron fulfils Southey's fearful expectations by aligning the hero of liberty with the libertine. In this poem, Byron definitively cuts the romantic traveller loose from his nation, making him (irredeemably) a citizen of the world. In his mock-heroic account of the battle between Russia and Turkey in Canto Seven, for example, Byron presents the freedom fighter as a type of what Clifford has called "travelling culture." He draws attention to the

significant impact of non-Russian volunteers, "distinguished strangers in that fray," such as Prince de Ligne, Langeron, and Damas who fought "[a]s gallantly as ever heroes fought" (7:32, 34). Suggestively, Byron describes these soldiers as "dilettanti in war's art," and he is well aware that the motives of such soldiers are not always altruistic (7:39). They fight not "for their country or its crown" but for themselves: for money, for military rank, or, in some cases, for fun (7:18). While Juan's English travelling companion, Johnson, is a mercenary of the first sort, Juan is one of the latter:

> But Juan was quite 'a broth of a boy,'
> A thing of impulse and a child of song;
> Now swimming in the sentiment of joy,
> Or the *sensation* (if that phrase seem wrong)
> And afterwards, if he must needs destroy,
> In such good company as always throng
> To battles, sieges, and that kind of pleasure,
> No less delighted to employ his leisure. (8:24)

That Juan fights for pleasure rather than principle means, among other things, that he is able to turn against his Cossacque comrades-in-arms to save a Turkish girl from their swords. His protection of the "homeless, houseless, helpless" Leila, despite her Turkish nationality, is a humanistic rather than nationalistic gesture and points to an international code of ethics (8: 141). The key point, however, is that Juan aligns himself with nations other than his own. Like Goldsmith's Altangi, he can "scheme" for any country.

In this way, Don Juan is not all that different from Haidée's poet laureate who "varied

with some skill his adulations;/ To 'do at Rome as Romans do'" (3: 84). A world-traveller, the poet laureate "knew the self-loves of the different nations" and adjusted his verses accordingly (3:84). In Greece, for example, he would sing a patriotic hymn; in France, a chanson; in England, a six canto quarto tale; and in Spain or Portugal, a ballad or romance of the last war. So long as he was paid, this poetic mercenary could heap praise on any nation, whether deserving or not: "He gave the different nations something national;/ 'Twas all the same to him" (3: 85). For Byron, such poets are "liars" who "take all colours--like the hands of dyers" (3: 87). Nor is Byron himself exempt. Near the end of the First Canto, the poet highlights his own dependence on the purchasing public: "whether/ I shall proceed with [Juan's] adventures," he observes, "is/ Dependent on the public altogether" (1:199). He urges his readers to be patient with him: he will fulfil their need for a moral, but not until the twelfth canto. Moreover, in case they choose not to believe him, he has bribed the editor of his "grandmother's review--the British" to give the poem a favourable review (1: 209). Casting himself as a "humble servant" to the public, Byron thus ends the canto by bidding adieu to his "gentle reader! and/ Still gentler purchaser!" (1:221). When it comes right down to it, Byron suggests (albeit satirically) that modern poetry like modern warfare is about individual gain.

Don Juan's mother may have sent him on a grand tour to "mend his former manners, or get new" in accordance with the enlightenment understanding of travel as "pleasurable instruction," but in *Don Juan*, travel is more pleasure than instruction, a point underscored by the fate of Juan's tutor, Pedrillo (1:191).[19] As soon as Juan's ship leaves port at Cadiz, Pedrillo becomes sea-sick and is forced to take to his bed: travel has made him incapable of

teaching. Things get even worse for Pedrillo when the ship sinks. On board the life-boat, he is bled to death, then eaten by his fellow passengers (Juan excepted). Tellingly, then, Juan's grand tour begins with the incapacitation and then death of his tutor: like Goldsmith's vagabond, Juan will be travelling for pleasure and not instruction.

But Juan is a vagabond in a more unsavory sense as well. Just as he wanders from nation to nation, so too he wanders from woman to woman. Juan's romantic attachment to the married Donna Julia dominates the first canto of Byron's poem. This first illicit affair serves as the impetus for Juan's travels, but it also initiates a pattern of sexual conquests. As Juan tearfully leaves Cadiz for his grand tour, he pledges eternal devotion to Donna Julia. Although Juan's declarations of eternal love are sincere, the fact that they are interrupted by bouts of vomiting does not bode well for Donna Julia. It is thus no surprise that when the ship-wrecked Juan opens his eyes to the lovely Haidée on an obscure Greek island, Donna Julia is all but forgotten. Indeed, Byron suggests that Juan's inconstancy is inevitable: "no doubt, the moon/ Does these things for us, and whenever newly a/ Strong palpitation rises, 'tis her boon,/ Else how the devil is it that fresh features/ Have such a charm for us poor creatures" (2:208). Thus in Canto Five, Juan moves from Haidée to the Turkish Gulbeyaz and from Gulbeyaz to the seraglio. When he arrives in Queen Catherine's Russian court in Canto Nine, he promptly fills a "high official situation" in her government, becoming a sort of royal gigolo (9:48). Although, as Juan tells Gulbeyaz, "Love is for the free," it can apparently also be simulated for a fee (5:127). Not only Juan's military services can be bought.

Compared to his activities in the English cantos, however, Juan's role in Catherine's

court seems tame. In England, he is befriended by the "high-born," "beauteous" and married Adeline Amundeville, enamoured of the "prim, silent, cold" and virginal Aurora Raby, and seduced by the "[d]esirable, distinguish'd, celebrated" and married Duchess of Fitz-Fulke (13:2, 15: 49, 14:42). He plays the political field just as successfully. A political trimmer, he stands "well both with Ins and Outs" (13: 24). Indeed, he is the perfect diplomat:

> Serene, accomplish'd, cheerful but not loud;
> Insinuating without insinuation;
> Observant of the foibles of the crowd,
> Yet n'er betraying this in conversation;
> Proud with the proud, yet courteously proud
> So as to make them feel he knew his station
> And theirs:--without a struggle for priority,
> He neither brook'd nor claim'd superiority. (15:15)

In politics as in love, Juan is a free agent or, to use Byron's phrase, "A bachelor--of arts,/ and parts, and hearts" (11:47). Thus Byron's Don Juan is a vagabond in that he wanders from nation to nation led not by benevolence but by his own curiosity. In short, his political and sexual ambulations recall the *OED*'s definition of vagabond as a "disreputable, idle, or worthless person; a rascal, a rogue." It is this darker denotation that generally surfaced in contemporary critical reception of both Byron's romantic travellers and Byron himself.

Addressing the early periodical criticism of the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* in an "Addition to the Preface," Byron responded in particular to complaints concerning the most "*unknightly*" character of his hero (*Childe Harold*, 5).[20] That the

"vagrant Childe" did not conform to the chivalric ideals of love and honour is to be expected, Byron explained, for neither did the knights templar who, though "sans peur," were in no way "sans reproche" (5). For Byron, the cosmopolitan Childe Harold was a wandering philosophe who revealed the limitations of an uncritical and closed patriotism, but for his critics both pilgrim and poet were traitors to the nation, and both were unceremoniously pushed outside its borders. From the start the *Antijacobin Review* found Childe Harold "fractious, wayward, capricious, cheerless, morose, sullen, discontented, and unprincipled," and it poured contempt on "this querulous vagabond:"

> He arraigns wars, generally and indiscriminately, confounding the just with the unjust, the defensive with the offensive, the preservative with the destructive, not with the judgement of a sage, but the settled moroseness of a misanthrope; victories, though gained by courage exerted in the best of causes, excite only the sarcastic sneers of this querulous vagabond; and the profession of a soldier, deemed honourable by wise and good men, is the subject of his ridicule and contempt.[21]

Its charge that Byron's poem was the "rant of democracy in its wildest form" was only reinforced when Byron published "To a Lady Weeping." Written in March 1812, the poem referred to an incident at Carleton House when the Regent turned on his old Whig friends with such vehemence that he caused the princess Charlotte to shed tears. Byron's poem criticized the Regent for his growing conservatism, linking it to England's decline, and the *Antijacobin* scorned the lines as a "scandalous reflection on an exalted personage; and a calumny on the nation."[22] Elaborating, the review claimed that "he seems to have some

worm cankering in his own bosom, and to envy the tranquillity which reigns in others; he sees his native country, the pride of Britons, and the envy of the world; and he labours to degrade it in the eyes of all." Its parting shot was the advice that Byron effect a slight transposition of his family motto: "instead of CREDE BYRON, we say, BYRON!--CREDE!" ("Byron's Bride," 234, 237).

Where the *Antijacobin* then opted to forget Byron, refusing to review his later works, the *British Critic* sought to banish him. With the public airing of Byron's dirty domestic laundry in "Fare thee Well" and "Sketch from Private Life" in 1816, the *British Critic* took the side of "injured innocence," supporting Lady Byron against the "oppressive brutality" of her husband.[23] Like many other conservative periodicals at the time, it used Byron's adultery as a lead-in to a sweeping indictment of liberal ideology: "Our plain notions will doubtless appear bigotted and narrow to the refined and liberal feelings of his Lordship's school; but they are, and we trust that they long will be, the notions of British nation" ("Byron's Siege," 436). If the British public disapproves of Byron's adultery, the reviewer reasons, it must disapprove of liberalism as well. The journal evokes the same "tender feeling of the British nation" a few years later with the prediction that the "good sense, and the good feeling of the English nation must, and will banish [*Don Juan*] from their houses."[24] The mere possession of Byron's poem draws suspicion, and the *British Critic* threatens that it "should have the worst opinion indeed of any man, upon whose family table this volume were to lie exposed" ("Don Juan," 204). Indeed, for the *British Critic* Byron's own self-banishment should be enforced, for "after the just and natural hatred which he has more than once expressed against his mother country...it would be a most distressing revulsion if he were again to be exposed

to the necessity of coming among a people unfitted to his modes of thinking and acting; or of reviving any attachment which it is just possible he may once have felt for a soil which is too ungrateful to return it."[25] For both the *British Critic* and the *Antijacobin Review* there was no such thing as being both inside and outside national attachment. One either was a patriot or one was not. If the cosmopolitan was the alter ego of national man, it was an alter ego to be repressed at all costs.

Mad, Bad, and Dangerous to Know: Byron-the-Cosmopolitan

In "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Mikhail Bakhtin defines the romantic character as a "homeless wanderer, a sojourner, a seeker."[26] This early essay posits character as a form of interrelationship between author and hero, and makes a provocative distinction between the romantic and classical character. For Bakhtin, the author uses his position outside the hero to produce the hero as an artistic unity or whole. How this is done differs according to the "axiological soil" (or authorial world view) which shapes the hero. The unity of the classical character, for example, derives from the fulfilment of a specific destiny or "fate." All that he does is pre-determined: "I can be no more than what I am already in essentials; I cannot reject my essential *already-being*, for it is not *mine*, but belongs to my mother, father, kin, people, mankind" ("Author and Hero," 178). Hence the axiological soil of the classical character is one that values kin and tradition. In contrast, the romantic character is an embodiment or unfolding of an idea: "all of the moments that constitute his quest for meaning and value (he wants, he loves, he considers something to be true, etc.) find their transgredient determination as the symbolic stages of a single artistic course, the course

of actualizing a certain idea" ("Author and Hero," 180). That is, the romantic character "*responsibly initiates* the sequence of his life as determined by meaning and values" ("Author and Hero," 179). The axiological soil of the romantic character, then, is fundamentally different from that of the classical character. It is not kin and tradition that give value here but the idea. Since the romantic character's individuality comes from within himself and is not given to him, his value "cease[s] to be authoritative and is only re-experienced, lyrically re-experienced" ("Author and Hero," 180). One of the implications of this change is the dissolution of authorial distance. In the case of the romantic character, Bakhtin explains, the author's position outside the hero is compromised: "The weakening of this position leads to the disintegration of the character; the boundaries begin to be effaced, the center of value is transposed from the boundaries into the very life of the hero" ("Author and Hero," 180). We can see such a dissolution of authorial distance with Byron, which, in his case, meant the often-noted collapse of the difference between author and hero.

Despite Byron's half-hearted protests to the contrary, the public insisted on reading Childe Harold as Byron, and, equally provocatively, Byron as Childe Harold.[27] In a review of the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, for example, Francis Jeffrey declared that "the mind of the noble author has been so far tinged by his strong conception of this Satanic personage, that the sentiments and reflections which he delivers in his own name, have all received a shade of the same gloomy and misanthropic colouring which invests those of his imaginary hero."[28] Noticeably tenuous as it was in the first two cantos, in the third canto the boundary between Byron and Childe Harold completely gave way. The *British Critic* declared with confidence that Byron "has now so unequivocally identified himself with

his fictitious hero, that even in his most querulous moods, he cannot complain of an impertinence in tracing the resemblance."[29] And even the well-disposed Sir Walter Scott found it "impossible...to divide Lord Byron from his poetry, or to offer...criticism upon the continuation of Childe Harold, without reverting to the circumstances in which the commencement of that singular and original work first appeared."[30] Byron himself eventually surrendered. "The fact is," he wrote in the Preface to Canto Four, "that I had become weary of drawing a line which every one seemed determined not to perceive...it was in vain that I asserted, and imagined, that I had drawn, a distinction between the author and the pilgrim; and the very anxiety to preserve this difference, and disappointment at finding it unavailing, so far crushed my efforts in the composition, that I determined to abandon it altogether--and have done so" (*Childe Harold*, 122).

One of the consequences of this conflation of Byron and Childe Harold was the creation of the cultural figure "Byron-the-cosmopolitan," who figured in the battle over national identity outlined by Gerald Newman in *The Rise of English Nationalism*. Newman argues that the shift from eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism to nineteenth-century nationalism in England was intimately connected with the rise of the middling class or bourgeoisie, whose own self-promotion involved "the repudiation of 'Fashion,' the destruction of cosmopolitanism, and the elaboration of nationalist ideology."[31] Supporting this socio-cultural shift was the development of a "symbolic logic" consisting of four interconnected premises:

> (1) the [fashionable] World [is] pervaded, even neutered or hermaphroditized, by foreign cultural influence; (2) this foreign cultural influence translates itself

> into ruinous moral influence; (3)...ordinary, innocent Englishmen unthinkingly admire and follow the World's lead--they are seduced by the Quality; (4) hence alien cultural influence brings collective domestic moral ruin.
>
> (*Rise of English Nationalism*, 67)

Combining anti-French feeling with myths about the moral degeneracy of the aristocracy, the emerging middle-class ideology was at once "anti-cosmopolitan, anti-aristocratic, and nativist" (*Rise of English Nationalism*, 67). That the aristocratic Byron's fall from English grace nicely fed into this struggle between aristocratic and bourgeois notions of the nation is illustrated in particular by the response of the *British Review*.

Aiming at a middle-class audience, the *British Review* was both patriotic and moralistic, and from 1812 to 1819 its editor, William Roberts, used its reviews of Byron's poetry as a convenient space in which to criticize aristocratic Regency excess.[32] Roberts first connected Byron to the degenerate state of the British aristocracy in his generally positive review of the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, which accuses the peerage of self-neglect and deplores "the inverted ambition of noblemen who aspire to be less than gentlemen."[33] A member of the "peerage," Byron is cautioned indirectly. But his review of the third canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* explicitly makes Byron the exemplar of a segment of aristocratic society exhibiting certain negative characteristics:

> A contempt for English manners and institutions; respect for the memory of Jacobin France and her revolutionary ex-generals; indignation at the conduct of our allies, and all measures of caution towards the innocent French people; a dread of the ferocious despotism of Louis, and a tender feeling for the fate of

> afflicted Buonaparte and the interesting Bey of Algiers; are the present characteristics of most young men of superior thinking who have travelled for the instruction of their countrymen, with a zeal that has made them abridge and abandon their own.[34]

Travelled, young, and aristocratic, such men are steeped in the "cant of cosmopolitanism," and they return from their grand tours with "contempt for English manners and institutions" ("Canto the Third," 8).

Lord Byron--hostile to the monarchy, critical of the Holy Alliance, and pointedly unthankful for Britain's military victory at Waterloo--is a prominent member of this cosmopolitan class, and in his review of "Beppo" Roberts accuses the poet of subverting not only British politics but also British virtue. In particular, he takes exception to the content of Byron's satire, declaring that the self-exiled poet has sent back to Britain "a tale of pollution, dipped in the deepest die of Italian debauchery."[35] In his opinion, the "cosmopolitan liberality" that supports Byron's satire does not involve "a Christian enlargement of sentiments" but "a growing indifference to the distinction of moral worth" ("Beppo," 330). Resting in universal indifference rather than universal benevolence, this cosmopolitan liberality "disarms the vigilance of virtue" so crucial to Britain's national identity ("Beppo," 329). To make his point, Roberts calls upon Mme de Staël's claim in *On Germany* that nationality and morality are interdependent. For Staël, Germany's republican government encourages vice by undermining the "great pillars of human repose," such as love and religion. Similarly, when a society's "stays and fastenings are loosened," she explains, society itself "reels and totters" ("Beppo," 330). By introducing Italian morality into Britain,

Roberts reasons, Byron is helping to make Britain Continental. His cosmopolitan liberality is part of a "denationalizing spirit" that corrodes Britain's honour, prosperity, and masculine decency, among other things ("Beppo," 330).

Of particular concern in Robert's review of the fourth canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* is Byron's "enlightened friendship" with Hobhouse, which Roberts sees as based "on a covenanted contempt for mere decent men and women, mere English maxims, mere homely institutions in church and state, and ordinary life, combined with a strong infusion of French principles, and the dogma of the school of revolution and political regeneration."[36] Unlike "plain men" such as Roberts and his readers, Byron and Hobhouse have an air of "complacent superiority" ("Canto 4," 5). Possessing all the advantages of being English, they fail to appreciate those advantages; instilled with Continental values and philosophies, they judge England through the eyes of a foreigner and find it wanting. For Roberts, Byron and Hobhouse are men "bred out of the French revolution," a type that subverts the foundations of nations.

Robert's reviews of Byron in the *British Review* are part of an increasing hostility in the press towards an older cosmopolitan aristocracy.[37] The same kind of hostility entered into fiction as well. Published the same year as Byron's self-exile, Lady Caroline Lamb's *Glenarvon* (1816) makes Byron into a morally and politically suspect Irish exile named Glenarvon, who returns to Ireland from Italy to incite the 1798 rebellion. Admittedly, Lamb had a personal animus and was herself tied to the aristocracy, but the novel's anti-Byronic charge has a wider resonance. Lamb's *roman à clef* follows the marriage between a spirited Catholic Irishwoman, Calantha, and an honourable but overly lenient Protestant Englishman,

Lord Avondale.[38] Despite several impediments, Avondale and Calantha marry. Avondale educates her in the liberal tenets popular at the time, and then takes her to England, where he leaves her to her own devices in the morally dangerous world of London high society. Her inappropriate conduct there, coupled with her husband's frequent absences, strains the marriage, and eventually the couple decides to return to Ireland. Back in Ireland, Calantha breaks her marriage vows by taking Glenarvon as her lover, and then oversteps society mores by making this affair public. Glenarvon, however, soon leaves her for another woman. Despite a last-minute reconciliation with her husband, Calantha pays for her transgression with her life.

It is important to Lamb's *roman à clef* that Byron play anti-hero to Lamb's husband, William.[39] But it is equally important to her national tale that he play the cosmopolitan to her national man. Lamb uses the English-Irish marriage of her domestic narrative to support her treatment of a larger political marriage between England and Ireland. Calantha is yet another early nineteenth-century embodiment of Ireland as woman, one in a series which includes Edgeworth's maternal Ellinor in *Ennui* and Morgan's alluring Glorvina in *The Wild Irish Girl*.[40] Avondale's absences and careless neglect of his young wife offer an easy parallel to England's neglect of Ireland, and Irish complaints about Ireland's status within Britain are echoed in Calantha's protest that Avondale treats her as a child rather than a friend or a companion. The fateful arrival of the Irish exile Glenarvon around 1798 acts as a catalyst, unleashing both Calantha's and Ireland's rebellions. Encouraged by Glenarvon, Calantha expresses herself in direct opposition to her English husband and to the English mores which tolerate adultery so long as it is kept private, while on the public front, Glenarvon publishes

an incendiary pamphlet that proves crucial to the 1798 rebellion.

Lamb's dual narrative structure mirrors Glenarvon's sexual and political infidelity. Aside from Calantha, Glenarvon ruins and abandons two other Irish women in the course of the novel. He seduces the first, Alice, on his first visit to Ireland, deserting her two years later in England and leaving her without warning or money. He takes with him their son. The second, Elinor, he lures out of the convent. She joins Glenarvon and becomes both his mistress and a leader of the United Irishmen. Glenarvon's powers of seduction, however, are not limited to women. He has infatuated the whole nation with his "keen" eye, "sweet and tunable" voice, and "persuasive language, which never fails to gain upon its hearers."[41] Indeed, we are told, "[c]attle walk out of the paddocks of themselves: women, children, pigs, wander after Glenarvon" (*Glenarvon*, 113). But Glenarvon's fascination with Ireland and "with the romantic splendour of ideal liberty" proves to be as superficial as his love for women (*Glenarvon*, 140). Bribed by the English with a ship (significantly, named "the Emerald") and the reinstatement of his hereditary titles and estate, he forsakes the United Irish and joins the British troops, fighting against the revolutionaries he once led.[42] Glenarvon is a traitor not only to women but also to a nation.

Lamb's novel exemplifies the nationalist logic of foreign invasion and corruption delineated by Gerald Newman almost too neatly. Her Irish exile Glenarvon returns from Italy; he invades British fashionable society, and proves to be a ruinous moral influence. He not only ruins several women but seduces the Irish people as well, turning them into a group of "licentious democrats" and "rebellious libertines" and he causes widespread upheaval throughout Ireland (*Glenarvon*, 111). Glenarvon's horrific death at the end of the novel--

mad, haunted by his past, and convinced he will be dragged down to hell for his crimes--symbolically expunges the Whig party of its cosmopolitan element, bringing it closer in line with romantic nationalism.[43] For the liberal Lamb, Byron becomes a metaphor for an aristocratic liberalism less and less politically germane to a post-Napoleonic Britain, and as both liberals and conservatives turned their attention to Britain's own domestic situation, the demonization of the cosmopolitan escalated.

By the time John William Polidori published *The Vampyre* in 1819, Byron had become the ultimate outsider. Reworking one of Byron's own fragments, Polidori rewrote the cosmopolitan Byronic hero as a supernatural villain.[44] In Polidori's tale, an unknown nobleman, Lord Strongmore, begins to frequent London society, inspiring much speculation as to the exact cause of his singularity:

> Those who felt this sensation of awe, could not explain whence it arose: some attributed it to the glance of that dead grey eye, which, fixing upon the object's face, seemed not to penetrate, and at one look to pierce through to the inward workings of the heart; but to throw upon the cheek a leaden ray that weighted upon the skin it could not pass. Some, however thought that it was caused by their fearing the observation of one, who by his colourless cheek, which never gained a warmer tint from the blush of conscious shame or from any powerful emotion, appeared to be above human feelings and sympathies, the fashionable names for frailties and sins.[45]

With his "dead grey eye" and "colourless cheek," Lord Strongmore seems other-worldly, "above human feelings and sympathies." Very quickly this mysterious stranger becomes the

talk of the town. Intrigued by Strongmore, the hero (a romantic young orphan) leaves his sister and travels to the Continent with him. As the two proceed on their grand tour, the hero becomes more and more unsettled by Strongmore's indiscriminate liberality, gambling, and womanizing. Prompted by a letter from his guardian, he leaves Strongmore in Italy and travels to Greece alone. In Greece, he falls in love with a young Greek girl, who tells him tales of vampyres who feed on beautiful young women in order to prolong their own lives. He himself then witnesses a vampyre sucking the life out of the Greek girl, and sinks into a long illness from which he is nursed back to heath by Strongmore. The two travel together again until Strongmore is shot by bandits. Dying, he makes the hero promise not to reveal his crimes to anyone, and by the next day his body has mysteriously disappeared. When the hero returns to England, he is horrified to find Strongmore alive and well and courting his sister. Bound by his promise, however, he can say nothing and soon falls into a stupor. He wakes when he hears of his sister's marriage to Strongmore and, breaking his promise, relates the whole story to his guardian. But by the time his guardian reaches his sister, she is dead and the vampyre has disappeared. It is important that Strongmore attacks the figure linked most closely to home. Infiltrating the domestic realm, he literally sucks the life-blood out of the heart of the nation. But it is equally important that in rejecting all socially-constructed borders, the cosmopolitan Byronic hero moves beyond the confines of society itself. [46] In Polidori's novel, the citizen of the world becomes other-worldly. The grand tour becomes a ghost story and the world-traveller, a vampyre.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1991), 133.

2. Lord George Gordon Byron, *Byron's Letters and Journals*, ed. Leslie A. Marchand (London: John Murray, 1973), 2: 34.

3. Andrew D. McKillop, "Local Attachment and Cosmopolitanism--The Eighteenth-Century Pattern," in *From Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Frederick A. Pottle*, ed. Frederick H. Hilles and Harold Bloom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 202. Maria Edgeworth's cosmopolitanism, as the previous chapter suggested, is also characteristic of the second phase of cosmopolitanism.

4. Oliver Goldsmith, *Citizen of the World*, vol. 2 of *Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith* ed. Arthur Friedman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 21. Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World; or Letters from a Chinese Philosopher, Residing in London, to his Friends in the East* was originally published as a series of "Chinese Letters" in *The Public Ledger* during 1760 and 1761. Donna Isaacs Dalnekoff takes up Goldsmith's point, arguing that "the figure of the traveller, the outsider or stranger in a foreign land, is the natural paradigm of the philosophical critic." "A Familiar Stranger: The Outsider of Eighteenth Century Satire," *Neophilologus* 57 (April 1973), 125.

5. Oliver Goldsmith, "A Comparative View of Races and Nations," *Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith*, 3: 68.

6. Séamus Deane, "Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World*," in *The Art of Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. Andrew Swarbrick (London: Vision Press, 1984).

7. Lord George Gordon Byron, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, vol. 2 of *Lord Byron: The Complete Poetical Works*, ed. Jerome J. McGann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 3. All references to Byron's poetry are to this edition. Significantly, the epigraph positions Byron's poem in reference to a European rather than English literature, and he continues the dialogue in the following cantos (the third epigraph is also French, the fourth, Italian). Moreover, that it is unapologetically French (remaining in its original language) emphasizes Byron's own membership in an international aristocratic class: French not only peppered the conversation of the Regency "bon ton" at home but was the common linguistic denominator for travellers on the Continent as well.

8. Denis Porter, *Haunted Journeys: Desire and Transgression in European Travel Writing* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 126-127.

9. James Clifford, "Traveling Cultures," *Cultural Studies*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 108.

10. Byron distinguishes his methodology from Mr. Eustace's in his *Classical Tour of Italy* which Byron describes as "a mere compilation of former notices, strung together upon a very slender thread of personal observation, and swelled out by those decorations which are so easily supplied by a systematic adoption of all the common places of praise, applied to every thing, and therefore signifying nothing" (*Childe Harold*, 262).

11. Interestingly, Goldsmith's citizen of the world seems to have been on Byron's mind while writing the fourth canto, which Byron prefaces by declaring himself "weary of drawing a line which every one seemed determined not to perceive: like the Chinese in Goldsmith's 'Citizen of the World', whom nobody would believe to be a Chinese" (*Childe Harold*, 122).

12. Simon Bainbridge argues that writers such as Southey and Wordsworth used their poems on Waterloo to consummate their conservative plotting of the war, whereas Byron refused to recognize the battle's importance. See his *Napoleon and English Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

13. Karen O'Brien, *Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 234.

14. According to Thomas Moore's *Life of Lord Byron*, Byron attributed his own exile to general opinion: "The man who is exiled by a faction has the consolation of thinking that he is a martyr; he is upheld by hope and the dignity of his cause, real or imaginary: he who withdraws from the pressure of debt may indulge in the thought that time and prudence will retrieve his circumstances: he who is condemned by the law, has a term to his banishment, or a dream of its abbreviation,; or, it may be, the knowledge or the belief of some injustice of the law, or of its administration in his own particular; but he who is outlawed by general opinion without the intervention of hostile politics, illegal judgement, or embarrassed circumstances, whether he be innocent or guilty, must undergo all the bitterness of exile, without hope, without pride, without alleviation. This case was mine." *The Life of Lord Byron; with his Letters and Journals* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1846), 2: 666-667.

15. Jerome McGann, *The Beauty of Inflections: Literary Investigations in Historical Method and Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 277.

16. Robert Southey, "Pilgrimage to Waterloo," in *The Poetical Works of Robert Southey* (New York: D. Appleton and Co, 1851), 749. Subsequent references to "Pilgrimage to Waterloo" and *The Vision of Judgement* are to this edition.

17. Part two of the poem picks up on this allegorical subtext and pits the poet Laureate against the "evil prophet." Their conversation serves to reassert Tory values in the face of French materialism. The poem ends with Southey's confirmation that the "hopes of man" rest on the continued prosperity of the British empire, a point brought home by a "magic picture" that provides glimpses of all of England's colonies.

18. Thomas Medwin, *Medwin's Conversations of Lord Byron*, ed. Ernest J. Lovell Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 228. Medwin met Byron in late 1821 and saw him for the last time in August 1822.

19. I draw the term "pleasurable instruction" from Charles L. Batten Jr., *Pleasurable Instruction: Form and Convention in Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

20. According to McGann, the 'Addition to the Preface' was added to the fourth edition of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, published in September 1812.

21. "Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage," *Antijacobin Review* 42 (August 1812), 345.

22. "Lord Byron's Bride of Abydos and the Corsair," *Antijacobin Review* 46 (March 1814), 234.

23. "Lord Byron's Siege of Corinth and Parisina," *British Critic* 5 (April 1816), 430.

24. "Don Juan," *British Critic* 12 (August 1819), 204.

25. "Lord Byron," *British Critic* 15 (May 1821), 466.

26. M.M. Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 180. Bakhtin points to the heroes of Byron, Chateaubriand, and Goethe as examples of the romantic character.

27. The habit carried on into this century. Peter Quennell, for example, refers to Byron as "Childe Harold" throughout his study *Byron: the Years of Fame* (London: St. James, 1950).

28. [Francis Jeffrey], "Lord Byron's Childe Harold," *Edinburgh Review* 19 (February 1812), 467.

29. "Lord Byron's Childe Harold, and Prisoner of Chillon," *British Critic* 6 (December 1816), 609.

30. [Walter Scott], "Childe Harold 3 and the Prisoner of Chillon," *Quarterly Review* 16 (October 1816), 174.

31. Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 47.

32. The implications of Byron's aristocratic status have been variously understood. Andrew Rutherford finds in his satire style the synthesis of poet and aristocrat, casting him as a Regency figure (*Byron: A Critical Study*), whereas Michael Robertson foregrounds the more democratic impulses of Byron as Whig aristocrat ("The Byron of *Don Juan* as Whig Aristocrat"). See also Robertson's more recent "Aristocratic Individualism in Byron's *Don Juan*." Jerome Christensen's important study, by contrast, argues that "Byronism" helped consolidate Britain's commercial society by exploiting the affective charge of aristocracy in order to reproduce it in commodities that could be vended to a reading public avid for glamour" (*Lord Byron's Strength*, xvi). See Andrew Rutherford, *Byron: A Critical Study* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967); Michael Robertson, "The Byron of *Don Juan* as Whig Aristocrat," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 17 (winter 1976): 709-724; Michael Robertson, "Aristocratic Individualism in Byron's *Don Juan*," *Studies in English Literature* 17 (autumn 1994): 639-655; Jerome Christensen, *Lord Byron's Strength: Romantic Writing and Commercial Society* (Baltimore:

John Hopkins University Press, 1993).

33. [William Roberts], "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage," *British Review* 3 (June 1812), 276.

34. [William Roberts], "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage. Canto the Third," *British Review* 9 (February 1817), 8.

35. [William Roberts], "Beppo," *British Review* 11 (May 1818), 329.

36. [William Roberts], "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage. Canto 4," *British Review* 12 (August 1818), 5.

37. Even Hazlitt makes the most of Byron's connection to the cosmopolitan class in his comparison of Byron and Sir Walter Scott: "Lord Byron, who is in his politics a *liberal*, in his genius is haughty and aristocratic: Walter Scott, who is an aristocrat in principle, is popular in his writings." *The Spirit of the Age* in *Lectures on English Poets and The Spirit of the Age* (London: J.M. Dent, 1922), 236-237.

38. Calantha's Catholicism is only suggested in the first edition, but it is openly declared in the second edition. See John Clubbe, "*Glenarvon*--Revised and Revisited," *The Wordsworth Circle* 10 (1979): 205-17.

39. On *Glenarvon* as a novel of passion, see Gary Kelly's *English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 1789-1830* (London: Longmans, 1989). See also his "Amelia Opie, Lady Caroline Lamb, and Maria Edgeworth: Official and Unofficial Ideology," *Ariel* 12 (October 1981): 3-24.

40. Robert Tracy discusses Edgeworth's and Morgan's national tales in light of the old trope of Ireland as woman in "Maria Edgeworth and Lady Morgan: Legality versus Legitimacy," *Nineteenth-Century Fiction* 40 (June 1985): 1-22.

41. Lady Caroline Lamb, *Glenarvon* (London: Everyman, 1995), 109.

42. Peter Graham notes that Lamb settles the contradiction between Byron-the-aristocrat and Byron-the-revolutionary in favour of the aristocrat. "Fictive Biography in 1816: The Case of *Glenarvon*," *Byron Journal* 19 (1991): 53-68.

43. Malcolm Kesall reads Lamb's novel as a critical examination of Whig politics, arguing that Byron serves as a scapegoat for the Whig failure to find a solution for the Irish problem. See "The Byronic Hero and Revolution in Ireland: The Politics of *Glenarvon*," *Byron Journal* 9 (1981): 4-19.

44. "The Vampyre: A Tale by Lord Byron" was published in the *New Monthly Magazine* on April 1, 1819. Before revisions, Polidori's villain shared his name with Lamb's and was called "Ruthven."

45. John William Polidori, *The Vampyre* in *The Vampyre and Ernestus Berchtold; or, The Modern Oedipus: Collected Fiction of John William Polidori*, ed. D.L. Macdonald and Kathleen Scherf (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1994), 33.

46. When the first two cantos of *Don Juan* were reviewed a few months later in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Polidori's *The Vampyre* was still fresh in the minds of the reviewers, and they exploited Polidori's vampyric rhetoric in their characterization of Byron: "It appears, in short, as if this miserable man, having exhausted every species of sensual gratification--having drained the cup of sin even to its bitterest dregs, were resolved to shew us that he is no longer a human being, even in his frailties;--but a cool unconcerned fiend, laughing with a detestable glee over the whole of the better and worse elements of which human life is composed--treating well nigh with equal derision the most pure of virtues, and the most odious of vices--dead alike to the beauty of the one, and the deformity of the other--a mere heartless despiser of that frail but noble humanity, whose type was never exhibited in a shape of more deplorable degradation

than in his own contemptuously distinct delineation of himself." No longer even a "human being," the poet is indifferent to virtue and vice alike, and his *Don Juan* just adds new sins to an already damnable canon of crimes. "Remarks on Don Juan," *Blackwoods* 5 (August 1819), 513. This review is attributed to John Gibson Lockhart and John Wilson.

Chapter Five

Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer*: A Cosmopolitan Discourse

Not only the figure of the cosmopolitan but cosmopolitan literary forms threatened Burkean notions of nation and their related assumptions. Working well outside domestic genres, Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820) illustrates the way in which cosmopolitan narrative undermined certain romantic conceptions of genre sustaining Burkean formulations. "There is clearly a paradox in the fact that one of the most notable post-war Gothicists, C.R. Maturin, was felt by conservatives to be subversive," Marilyn Butler writes in *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries*.[1] The kind of reception that Butler has in mind is represented by a figure like Samuel Coleridge whose well-known review of Maturin's successful Gothic drama, *Bertram* (1816), deemed the play a "Jacobinical drama."[2] In his review, Coleridge objected to the play's superfluous supernatural effects and narrative inconsistencies, but most objectionable in his mind was the adulterous affair between Bertram and the married Imogine introduced at the beginning of the fourth act:

> I want words to describe the mingled horror and disgust, with which I witnessed the opening of the fourth act, considering it as a melancholy proof of the depravation of the public mind. The shocking spirit of jacobinism seemed no longer confined to politics. The familiarity with atrocious events and characters appeared to have poisoned the taste, even where it had not directly disorganized the moral principles, and left the feelings callous to all the mild

appeals, and craving alone for the grossest and most outrageous stimulants.[3]

What is at issue here is the intimate connection between just taste and pure morality that underpins Coleridge's literary criticism. For him, dramas such as *Bertram* not only "disorganize" moral principles but "poison" the taste of the nation as well, fostering in the public mind a "craving...for the grossest and most outrageous stimulants." That the British audience (with the exception of one "plain elderly man" sitting beside him) could remain passive "under such an insult to common decency" and, worse yet, that it could greet *Bertram*'s adulterous hero with "a thunder of applause" indicates the extent to which the "spirit of jacobinism" has pervaded British society (*Biographia*, 229). Coleridge's negative response to *Bertram* was hardly disinterested (Drury-Lane chose to produce *Bertram* over one of Coleridge's own plays), but his formulation of the "jacobinical drama" is important in that it establishes a firm connection between national literature and national politics, making "jacobinical" a generic as well as a political designation.

Coleridge prefaces his criticism of *Bertram* with a discussion of British drama, in particular, of the internal politics of Drury-Lane Theatre. The main object of the theatre under the management of the late Mr. Whitbread, he explains, was to make money, and dramatic productions were selected according to their ability to fulfil that object. Under the new joint management of Thomas Dibden, Alexander Rae and the "Supreme Committee," however, the theatre adopted a new mandate:

> Drury-Lane was to be restored to its former classical renown; Shakespeare, Jonson, and Otway, with the expurgated muses of Vanbrugh, Congreve, and Wycherley, were to be re-inaugurated in their rightful dominion over British

> audiences; and the Herculean process was to commence, by exterminating the speaking monsters imported from the banks of the Danube, compared with which their mute relations, the emigrants from Exeter 'Change, and Polito (late Pidcock's) show-carts, were tame and inoffensive. (*Biographia*, 208)

Writing in 1816, Coleridge evokes the timely rhetoric of restoration to present Drury-Lane's ambition to re-establish a national drama in Britain: British dramatists must be "re-inaugurated," their "rightful dominion" over the nation restored. In his view, the first step towards such a restoration is the elimination of all foreign drama, in particular those "speaking monsters" that England has imported from the Continent. Coleridge's desire to purify the English stage from all foreign imports recalls Burke's desire to stop all alien (French) "manufactures" at the English border, and for Coleridge (as for Burke) such a "restoration" is not simple.[4]

First among the "speaking monsters" to be eliminated for Coleridge is the German drama. A literary "*Olla Podrida*" or Spanish stew, the genre mixes together the "bloated style and peculiar rhythm" of Harvey's *Meditations*, the "strained thoughts," "figurative metaphysics" and "solemn epigrams" of Young's *Night Thoughts*, the "loaded sensibility," and "morbid consciousness" of Richardson's *Clarissa*, and the "horrific incidents," "mysterious villains," and "ruined castles" of Walpole's *Castle of Otranto* (*Biographia*, 211). Such a stew, Coleridge suggests, does not sit well with many, and the best critics in Germany have denounced the genre as "mere cramps of weakness" and "orgasms of a sickly imagination" (*Biographia*, 211). Moreover, with its roots in England, "The so-called *German* Drama is *English* in its *origin*, *English* in its *materials*, and *English* by re-adoption"

and is not really foreign at all (*Biographia*, 212). So Coleridge renames the genre the "modern jacobinical drama," and argues that England should take responsibility for its own progeny. "We should submit to carry our own brat on our own shoulders;" he insists, "or rather consider it as a lack-grace returned from transportation with such improvements only in growth and manners as young transported convicts usually come home with" (*Biographia*, 212). Like other English travellers such as Byron and Hobhouse, Coleridge's generic "brat" has travelled from England to the Continent, only to return to England tainted with continental "manners."

For Coleridge, the jacobinical drama is complicit with political jacobinism in that it confuses and subverts "the natural order of things in their causes and effects." In particular, it represents "the qualities of liberality, refined feeling, and a nice sense of honour (those things rather which pass amongst us for such) in persons and classes where experience teaches us least to expect them." By disseminating such republican ideals, he suggests, jacobinical drama aspires to "*reconcile* us to vice and want of principle" (*Biographia*, 221). Politically as well as morally subversive--and for Coleridge (as for Burke and Southey) the two are linked--the genre represents a threat to the nation and so should be removed from the national stage. Moreover, the jacobinical drama contradicts Coleridge's own sense of what constitutes good art. For Coleridge, a work of art should grow organically from within itself. Its form should not be mechanical--imposed from the outside--but internal, innate. Such an organic form "shapes as it develops itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form."[5] An artificial amalgamation of other genres, the jacobinical drama has no internal principle or order of its

own. In short, it lacks what Coleridge posits as the primary criterion for all good art: organic unity. This is not to say that the jacobinical drama lacks form: it is a genre after all. But unlike other genres, it is non-unified (an amalgamation of genres).

Its first reviewers saw *Melmoth the Wanderer* in just such a light, complaining that it transgressed established literary genres and lacked unity. It operated outside norms of literary authority. The generally positive review of the novel in *Blackwoods*, for instance, deems Maturin "a sort of applauded rebel against all the constituted authorities of the literary judgement-seat."[6] In particular, the reviewer argues, Maturin's works defy classical understandings of genre: "There is not one of them that a rigid disciple of the Aristotelian school of criticism would condescend to call by the name of any one given species of regular composition" ("*Melmoth*," 161). Indeed, his works scorn the basic structure Aristotle claims fundamental to all genres, "for there is not one of them that has either beginning, or middle, or end" ("*Melmoth*," 161). *Melmoth the Wanderer* is especially deviant in this regard:

> The truth is that it is mere curtesy to call MELMOTH 'a romance'; the four volumes contain as many or more stories which, with the exception of the agency of one character common to them all, have no sort of connextion with each other, their personages being otherwise quite different, and their scenes laid at different periods, and in quite different parts of the world.
>
> ("*Melmoth*," 162)

With its multiple plots, subplots and digressions, *Melmoth the Wanderer* has no singular story line to give the novel overall coherence. In short, it has no unity of action. Nor does it fulfil either of the other two classical unities, those of time and place. Spanning two

centuries, the novel has no temporal centre, and containing tales set in Ireland, Spain, England, Germany, and India, it has no geographical centre. The key point, however, is that *Melmoth the Wanderer* breaches established literary categories: it does not belong to any "one given species of regular composition."

Blackwoods was not alone in considering *Melmoth the Wanderer* a sort of generic hybrid. Writing on the novel for the *Quarterly Review* in 1821, John Wilson Croker observed that along with nonsense, want of veracity, ignorance, blasphemy, brutality, and obscenity, Maturin's "new ravings" united the "worst particularities of the worst modern novels."[7] "Compared with it," Croker writes, "Lady Morgan is almost intelligible--The Monk, decent--The Vampire, amiable--and Frankenstein, natural" ("Maturin," 303). Unintellible, indecent, unamiable, and unnatural, *Melmoth the Wanderer* is an assault "not merely on common sense and the English tongue...but on decency, and even religion" ("Maturin," 304). Most offputting for Croker, however, is the novel's organizational structure:

> We shall not waste our time in endeavouring to unravel the tissue of stories which occupy these four volumes, they are contained one within another like a nest of Chinese boxes; but instead of being the effect of nice workmanship, Mr. Maturin's tales are involved and entangled in a clumsy confusion which disgraces the artist, and puzzles the observer. ("Maturin," 304)

What is at issue is the heterogeneity: that *Melmoth the Wanderer* is a "tissue of stories," "a nest of Chinese boxes." But what really bothers Croker is less this heterogeneity (embedded narratives were not uncommon during this period) than the way in which Maturin's narratives

blur into one another. The novel is a "clumsy confusion" in which distinction between tales is lost. Croker ascribes this formal confusion to "a mind either very loose in its principles, or very wild in its operations" ("Maturin," 304). For him, the radical instability of Maturin's novel reflects the radical instability of Maturin's mind.

It was, however, in the pages of the liberal *Edinburgh Review* that the most rigorous criticism of the novel appeared. Like Croker, the reviewer for the *Edinburgh Review* found *Melmoth the Wanderer* appallingly over-determined, a "phantasmogorie exhibition" that crammed in every fashionable trope imaginable regardless of its fit: the novel included "sybils and misers; parricides; maniacs in abundance; monks with scourges pursuing a naked youth streaming with blood; subterranean Jews surrounded by the skeletons of their wives and children; lovers blasted by lightning; Irish hags, Spanish grandees, shipwrecks, caverns, Donna Claras and Donna Isidoras."[8] Maturin himself represented a "certain class of writer" who worked through formal and rhetorical excess ("Melmoth," 363). Like "offensive vagrants who used to thrust their mangled limbs and putrid sores into our faces to extort from our disgust what they could not wring from our compassion," writers like Maturin "attempt, by a still more revolting exhibition, to terrify or nauseate us out of those sympathies which they might have the power to awaken by any legitimate appeal" ("Melmoth," 362). In short, such writers manipulate sentiment rather than judgement to make their point, and the reviewer finds this jacobinical style particularly prevalent among Irish writers, for "[t]heir genius runs riot in the wantonness of its own uncontrolled exuberance;--their imagination, disdaining the restraint of judgement, imparts to their literature the characteristics of a nation in one of the earlier stages of civilization and refinement" ("Melmoth," 355). Against this

Irish "exuberance," he advocates the plain language of preferred Irish writers such as Swift, whose "unstudied and familiar" style of writing is better suited to public discourse ("Melmoth," 356).

In order to impress upon the reader the sort of threat that Maturin's novel poses, the reviewer broaches a cultural theory of genre. Underpinning this theory of genres in the *Edinburgh Review* is the idea of progress that defines genres not as static artifacts but dynamic entities. Nor are they independently evolving entities but forms enmeshed in national life. The reviewer proposes that national literatures--along with nations--reach a certain point of perfection and then begin to degenerate. Political change is one cause of such a degeneration; another is an "insatiable thirst for novelty" ("Melmoth," 354). What happens in this second case is that a writer who is unable to secure "legitimate applause" within the normative bounds of literature pushes outside those bounds, and he "arrests the attention of many who would fall asleep over monotonous excellence" with "fantastic or monstrous innovation." This writer is imitated by others, and "thus, by degrees, the whole literature of country becomes changed and deteriorated" ("Melmoth," 355). One errant text can thus infect an entire national literature.[9] The reviewer's sentiments are clear: *Melmoth the Wanderer* and novels like it are "tumor[s] of words" and it is "high time to step forward and abate a nuisance which threatens to become a besetting evil" ("Melmoth," 354).

Taken together, these early reviews of *Melmoth the Wanderer* delineate a certain class of text that stands in opposition to mainstream genres of the period. Heterogeneous and non-unified, novels such as Maturin's cut across the borders of traditional generic categories, disrupting the literary status quo and threatening England's national literature. *Melmoth the*

Wanderer itself makes the point about generic migration and hybridity from the start. "The hint of this Romance (or Tale)," Maturin asserts in the preface "was taken from a passage in one of my Sermons."[10] It is important that Maturin frames his novel with his own sermon, for it points to a fluidity not only between different kinds of discourse but also between his role as romance writer and his role as Anglican curate. Aside from his own theological writings, Maturin further informs the reader, his novel will draw on history: "The story of John Sandal and Elinor Mortimer is founded in fact," and the "original from which the Wife of Walberg is imperfectly sketched is a living woman" (*Melmoth*, 5). But Maturin positions his novel in terms of fictional genres in the preface as well, distinguishing his treatment of the Inquisition from that of the "Radcliffe-Romance."[11] Like his reviewers, the author too sees *Melmoth the Wanderer* as an amalgamation of genres, and the self-conscious literariness of the novel displays a cultural competence that includes not only British literary history but much of Western literary history as well. As Veronica Kennedy points out, Melmoth himself is an extraordinary compound of allusions: the character includes "touches of Zeus the Thunderer, Prometheus, the Satan of *Paradise Lost* and the Devil of folktale, of the German Faust of tradition as well as of the Faustus of Marlowe and the Faust of Goethe, of the Wandering Jew, of the Biblical and the Byronic Cain, of the other Byronic heroes--Lara, Manfred, and the Giaour--of Mephistopheles, of Vathek, of Ruthven, of the *Bonhomme Misèr* of French folklore, of Celtic wizards, druids and demons, of the amorous and evil Genii of the *Arabian Nights*, of Don Juan and the Demon Lovers of ballad tradition as well as the hero-villains of such 'Gothick' writers as Anne Radcliffe and M.G. Lewis."[12]

Melmoth the Wanderer: A Satanic Pilgrim

Melmoth the Wanderer follows a satanic pilgrim as he traverses the earth in search of some wretched or desperate soul willing to forfeit his salvation for earthly goods or glory. Proud, bored, and detached, Melmoth the Wanderer is the epitome of the Byronic traveller, and his stance recalls that of Childe Harold: "The world could show him no greater marvel than his own existence; and the facility with which he himself passed from region to region, mingling with, yet distinct from his species, like a wearied and uninterested spectator rambling through various seats of some vast theatre, where he knows none of the audience, would have prevented him from feeling astonished" (*Melmoth*, 358). Maturin's image of the world as theatre foregrounds spectatorial distance: the Wanderer watches history unfold with an "uninterested" eye. Moreover, he is distanced from his fellow spectators. Like Childe Harold, he is an outsider, "mingling with, yet distinct from his species." But where Byron keeps his traveller within the bounds of human sociability, distinguishing him from the misanthrope, Maturin pushes his outside all human attachment. Indeed, Maturin puts the Wanderer's very humanity into question: a "disinherited child of nature," he is "separated from life and humanity by a gulph [sic] impassable" (*Melmoth*, 319). He has neither empathy with nor sympathy for the human race, and he pursues those individuals least able to resist his temptation. "*I never desert my friends in misfortune*," he warns Stanton sardonically: "When they are plunged in the lowest abyss of human calamity, *they are sure to be visited by me*" (*Melmoth*, 45). Even the acquisition of wife and child fails to re-incorporate the Wanderer into the social body, and he leaves them both to die in the prisons of the Inquisition. The key point, however, is that Maturin's traveller is free not only from

national attachments but also from that most fundamental of attachments and the heart of the Burkean nation: love of hearth and home.

Central to Maturin's negative figure of the cosmopolitan is the irrelevance of borders. The frame narrative takes place in Ireland, but the Wanderer's diabolical mission leads him from nation to nation, and Maturin underlines the geographical sweep of his pilgrim's travels by setting embedded narratives in Spain, England, Germany, and India. The Wanderer not only crosses national borders but does so with supernatural facility and rapidity: he has the "power to pass over space without disturbance or delay, and visit remote regions with the swiftness of thought" (*Melmoth*, 537-8). One of the implications of this power is that he appears to be in two places at once, "active in his purposes of mischief in the remotest parts of Europe at the moment he was supposed to be expiating them in others" (*Melmoth*, 325). What is at issue here is not the kind of dual affiliation proposed by Edgeworth, for the Wanderer does not belong to any one nation, let alone two. Rather, he inhabits borderless space.

The Wanderer defies not only abstract national borders but more concrete borders as well. He traverses the rock barrier that protects Immalee's paradisal island, for example, with the same ease with which he crosses the walls of her father's Spanish villa: "Be it known to you," he informs her, "that I regard bolts, and bars, and walls, as much as I did the breakers and rocks of your Indian isle--that I can go where, and retire when I please" (*Melmoth*, 342-3). He also mysteriously penetrates Stanton's cell in a London insane asylum, offering him instant liberty in exchange for his soul. Perhaps most impressive, however, is his infiltration of the deepest dungeons of the Spanish Inquisition. He enters and exits the

prison of the Inquisition "without help or hindrance...like one who had a master-key to its deepest recesses" (*Melmoth*, 227). Moreover, he moves within the Inquisition walls with astounding fluidity, negotiating its halls unseen by vigilant guards and slipping unheard into cells "impervious to human power" (*Melmoth*, 239). If no boundary can keep the Wanderer out, none can keep him in either, and he successfully escapes every prison in which he is enclosed. Buildings themselves refuse to harbour him: "Even this mansion of horror trembles to contain you;" Stanton informs the Wanderer, "its walls sweat, and its floors quiver, while you tread them" (*Melmoth*, 58).

If the Wanderer disdains spatial borders, he equally disdains temporal ones. As he points out to Stanton, he is "independent of time and place" (*Melmoth*, 44). When the novel opens in 1816, the Wanderer is over one hundred and fifty years old. His personal memory extends from the Restoration to the Napoleonic wars, and includes an intimate familiarity with such historical characters as the queen-mother Henriette of France, Louis Quatorze, and the Duchesse d'Orleans.[13] This makes him a wonderful conversationalist: he is a master of language and his conversation is "rich, various, and intelligent" (*Melmoth*, 228). It also makes him an excellent historian, able to contextualize public events with a "minuteness and circumstantiality" of detail beyond the reach of most historians. Moreover, the Wanderer's memory is not limited to the past. He sees into the future, for instance, when he informs Stanton that their next meeting will be years hence in a madhouse. Unlike Byron's traveller, then, Maturin's Wanderer not only roams freely but is free from every given point in space and time.

The novel introduces this figure through a portrait. Fetching a bottle of Madeira for

his dying uncle, young Melmoth enters a locked closet and sees a portrait of one of his ancestors hanging on the wall. By candlelight he reads the words inscribed on the border of the painting: "Jno. Melmoth, anno 1646." But where the portrait captures Melmoth the Wanderer as an image and its bordering inscription locates him firmly in time (the portrait was painted a hundred and fifty years ago), the subject himself defies such representational and temporal fixity. The portrait's "original," the uncle points out, "is still alive," and young Melmoth catches his first glimpse of this mysterious ancestor hours later at his uncle's death bed (*Melmoth*, 18). But Maturin's point about representation is made more forcefully when young Melmoth tries to destroy the portrait of his notorious ancestor:

> He seized it;--his hand shook at first, but the mouldering canvas appeared to assist him in the effort. He tore it from the frame with a cry half terrific, half triumphant;--it fell at his feet, and he shuddered as it fell. He expected to hear some fearful sounds, some unimaginable breathings of prophetic horror, follow this act of sacrilege, for such he felt it, to tear the portrait of his ancestor from his native walls. (*Melmoth*, 60)

It is important that young Melmoth's symbolic act of destruction involves tearing the portrait from its frame and from the "native walls" which support it. In effect, he rips the work of art from its proper site. But it is also important that the portrait itself seems to aid young Melmoth in its own de-siting: "the mouldering canvas," Maturin writes, "*appeared to assist* him in the effort." Indeed, the portrait begins to deconstruct itself by confounding the line between art and life: "As the wrinkled and torn canvas fell to the floor, its undulations gave the portrait the appearance of smiling" (*Melmoth*, 60). After young Melmoth destroys the

portrait, he falls into a deep sleep. He dreams that the Wanderer is in his bedroom, but when he awakes, he finds himself alone. His right arm, however, "was black and blue, as from the recent gripe [sic] of a strong hand" (*Melmoth*, 60). Paradoxically, the destruction of the Wanderer's representation (the portrait) is the impetus for his actual manifestation in the bedroom. In other words, the sign of his absence (the portrait) brings about his presence (his arrival in the bedroom). Yet young Melmoth does not witness the Wanderer's presence: he sees only another sign of his absence (the mark on his arm). In this way, the Wanderer confounds the line between presence and absence and, in so doing, he points to the instability of the sign itself.

This instability has significant repercussions for Maturin's own narrative. "If I could but trace that being," Stanton asks himself after his first encounter with the Wanderer, "and what if I could?" (*Melmoth*, 39). The point of Maturin's novel, however, is that the Wanderer cannot be traced. Stanton, for instance, trails him back and forth across Britain and the Continent and even encounters him twice, but he fails to enact the definitive meeting he so desires:

> I have sought him every where.--The desire of meeting him once more, is become as a burning fire within me,--it is the necessary condition of my existence. I have vainly sought him at last in Ireland, of which I find he is a native.--Perhaps our final meeting will be in (*Melmoth*, 59)

Stanton's search for the Wanderer remains incomplete, and it is thus fitting that his manuscript breaks off not only *in medias res* but mid-sentence as well. What this does in terms of the novel as a whole is to defer closure. Indeed, narrative in *Melmoth the Wanderer*

merely produces more narrative. When Monçada concludes the "Tale of the Indian," for instance, he does so with the promise of more narrative. The "Tale of the Indian," he reminds young Melmoth, pertains to only one of the skeletons preserved in Adonijah's Madrid vault. He himself translated many more tales during his stay, and "[t]he circumstances relating to them were of a character still darker and more awful than those he had recited" (*Melmoth*, 534). Moreover, he has yet to complete his own story, and "the circumstances of his residence in the house of the Jew, his escape from it, and the reasons of his subsequent arrival in Ireland, were scarcely less extraordinary than anything hitherto related" (*Melmoth*, 534).

Monçada is about to recount to young Melmoth the sequel to the "Tale of the Indian" when the Wanderer himself enters the room, and announces: "Your ancestor has come home...his wanderings are over!" (*Melmoth*, 537). Significantly, Monçada's narratives are left incomplete. The Wanderer's diabolical mission has been unsuccessful--none of his victims has consented--and he now must prepare to bear the penalty for his ill-begotten gains himself. That night he locks himself in a room, instructing young Melmoth and Monçada not to open the door no matter what they hear. The two do as they are instructed, but the next morning they are amazed to find the room empty. They see traces of footsteps leading down a back staircase, and so follow them outside and across the estate to a summit overlooking the ocean. A few feet before the summit, the footsteps turn into a "down-trodden track," and they surmise that the Wanderer must have been dragged to the edge of the cliff by supernatural forces and thrown to his death. All that remains of him, it appears, is his handkerchief, and young Melmoth climbs down the precipice to retrieve this "last trace of the

Wanderer" (*Melmoth*, 542). The novel concludes with young Melmoth and Monçada exchanging "looks of silent and unutterable horror" and then returning home.

Appropriately enough, Maturin's novel ends with two home comings, that of the Wanderer, and that of young Melmoth and Monçada. The end of the Wanderer's narrative, however, is less certain. As Maturin's repetition of the word "trace" suggests (the word appears in various manifestations six times in the last two pages of the novel), young Melmoth and Monçada have drawn their conclusions about the Wanderer's fate around a missing body. Suggestively, the Wanderer himself remains absent. Equally suggestive is the reader's knowledge that the Wanderer has come back from the dead before. Earlier, in "The Lover's Tale," a clergyman is astonished to see the Wanderer alive because he had witnessed his death years before. Admittedly, Maturin may have had no intention of resurrecting the Wanderer, but he did write *Melmoth the Wanderer* with a sequel in mind. And, as Dale Kramer has observed, the premise of the novel allows for an infinite number of victims, its structure for an infinite number of narratives.[14] What is important is that the possibility exists for Maturin to defer closure indefinitely. Just as the Wanderer cannot be contained within the limits of time or space, so his story cannot be contained within the limits of one narrative or even, perhaps, the limits of one novel.

"Beads Strung on the Same String": A Narrative of Alliance

Melmoth the Wanderer as a whole foregrounds the construction of narrative. When Stanton is living in London, for example, his cousin asks him to accompany him to the countryside, purportedly to view a new estate that the cousin has purchased. Instead of a

new estate, however, the cousin takes Stanton to an insane asylum where he leaves him in a room while he makes final arrangements for his incarceration. The unsuspecting Stanton picks up the book nearest to him and begins to read. Its author proposes that London be rebuilt with the stone fragments of Stonehenge in order to protect the city from fire. He supplements this first proposal with "grotesque drawings of engines" designed to remove the stones from Stonehenge, noting that these illustrations would have been more accurate if he had been allowed a knife to sharpen his pen (*Melmoth*, 46). Next the author proposes that the best way to spread Christianity to the east is to give Turkish ambassadors an ultimatum to choose between Christianity and immediate strangulation. He supplements this proposal with intricate paper cut-outs of the Turkish ambassadors, noting that the cut-outs would have been more complete if his scissors had not been taken from him. That very evening, however, he intends to catch a moon-beam, whet it on the iron knob of his door, and use it in place of the confiscated scissors. This "*album of a mad-house*" nicely foreshadows Stanton's own imminent incarceration. Mesmerized by the author's descent into madness, Stanton is oblivious to his surroundings, and when he finally looks up from the book, he finds that he himself has been locked in a mad-house. But the "*album of a mad-house*" is interesting in another sense as well. What is so unsettling about the album is not so much the irrational nature of the proposals it contains as the tacit violence involved in its creation. The "*album of a mad-house*" is a book comprised of bits and pieces, and hewn out with sharpened pen and scissors.

"There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made," write Deleuze and Guattari.[15] For Deleuze and Guattari, the book is an *assemblage* of content and

expression where what is done is inseparable from what is said. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they develop this idea in terms of two different types of book: the root-book and the rhizome-book. Taking its governing image from the tree, the "root-book" is organized around a deep structure and possesses a "noble, signifying, and subjective organic interiority" (*Thousand Plateaus*, 5). Deleuze and Guattari use the term to refer to the classical or traditional book, one that is hierarchical, linear, and totalizing. In contrast, the "rhizome-book" is non-hierarchical, non-linear, and heterogeneous. It takes its governing image from the rhizome or fascicular root, a root system consisting of an "indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots" (*Thousand Plateaus*, 5). Unlike the tree, the rhizome "has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermesso*" (*Thousand Plateaus*, 25). Grass, for instance, is a rhizome. These two images--the tree and the rhizome--are at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between the root-book and the rhizome-book and each implies a very different model of relation: "The tree is filiation," they explain, "but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance" (*Thousand Plateaus*, 25).

Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* may usefully be thought of as a kind of rhizome-book. The novel is not organized around one narrative but consists of a multiplicity of narratives, with no one narrative acting as a pivot. Although three of the six embedded narratives open off the frame narrative, three open off embedded narratives, creating four distinct planes of narration in the novel: the frame narrative, tales ("Tale of the Spaniard," and "The Wanderer's Dream"), tales within tales ("Tale of the Indians"), and tales within tales within tales ("The Tale of Guzman's Family," and "The Lover's Tale"). Layering the narratives in this way adds a certain asymmetry to the novel's form. The "Tale of the

Spaniard," for instance, opens out into the "Tale of the Indians," and the "Tale of the Indians" into "Tale of Guzman's Family" and "The Lover's Tale." It also breaks up the supremacy of the frame: movement occurs not only between frame and tale but between tale and tale as well. This decentring impulse is central to *Melmoth the Wanderer*.

In a suggestive moment, Monçada is recounting to young Melmoth the "Tale of the Indians" when he mentions a hiatus that occurred during the Wanderer's seduction of Immalee. He explains that the Wanderer neglected to visit Immalee on her paradisal island for some time, and when he returned, he had lost his desire to corrupt her. Monçada digresses from this main point, however, to note that the Wanderer spent his time away from Immalee in London tempting "the Englishman Stanton" (*Melmoth*, 298). Digression is nothing new in Maturin's novel: it is an integral characteristic of his prose and is important both to his narrative structure and to the literary apparatus which frames the novel, most notably, the epigraphs and informational footnotes.[16] It does not forestall narrative movement so much as re-direct it, moving the reader sideways instead of forward. Although digression transforms a straight highway into a series of scenic detours, in other words, the reader is travelling all the same. Monçada's digression, however, referring as it does to Stanton's manuscript, usefully highlights the non-linear structure of Maturin's narrative in another way as well. Stanton's narrative and the "Tale of the Indians" are concurrent in time, yet they appear at different points in the novel. The formalist distinction between "story" (the chronological order of events) and "plot" (the order in which those events are presented to the reader) is useful here. Maturin requires his reader to refer back (in the plot) to something occurring simultaneously (in the story). On the whole, Maturin's narratives do not appear in

chronological order, and thus the reader is constantly moving back and forth through time.

Indeed, *Melmoth the Wanderer* does not work teleologically by unfolding one line of meaning through time but cumulatively, adding narrative to narrative. Struck by the mention of Stanton's name in Monçada's digression, young Melmoth--who (like Maturin's reader) has already read Stanton's manuscript--impatiently interrupts Monçada and asks him to repeat himself. Monçada's response is key: "Have patience with me, Senhor...have patience, and you will find we are all beads strung on the same string. Why should we jar against each other? our union is indissoluble" (298). In an important sense, Maturin's narratives are like "beads strung on the same string." Although each bead retains a certain autonomy (they can be different sizes, shapes, colours), together they form one necklace. Moreover, the beads can be rearranged, new beads added or old beads taken away, all without destroying the integrity of the necklace. The Wanderer himself threads his way through each narrative bead, but he does not pull the narratives together into a clear whole. The novel works less as filiation than as alliance, operates not as an organic unity but as a non-homogeneous union of narratives.

Given young Melmoth's struggle to create one coherent story out of detached bits and pieces, his impatience with Monçada is understandable. Such an incremental narrative structure can be disorienting, and Maturin takes time at this point in the novel to re-orient his own reader: "[Monçada] proceeded with the story of the unhappy Indian, as recorded in the parchments of Adonijah, which he had been compelled to copy, and of which he was anxious to impress every line and letter on his listener, to substantiate his own extraordinary story" (*Melmoth*, 299). Maturin's expository review re-enforces the earlier point about the

interdependence of narratives: the credibility of Monçada's "extraordinary story" rests on the other stories he tells. More important, it re-situates the reader within the novel's labyrinthine structure. By rehearsing each level of narrative through which the reader has moved--from the frame to the "Tale of the Spaniard" to the "Tale of the Indian"--Maturin creates a sort of narrative map by which his reader can get his bearings.

Nonetheless, *Melmoth the Wanderer*, fracturing as it does narrative unity, encourages a sort of scattered reading. Like the Wanderer himself, the reader wanders from place to place, from time to time, and from narrative to narrative. Maturin compounds this fracturing of narrative unity by introducing broken texts into his novel. Stanton's manuscript, for instance, is "discoloured, obliterated, and mutilated beyond any that had ever before exercised the patience of a reader" (*Melmoth*, 28). Through time, the elements have eaten away at the paper of the manuscript, leaving large sections of the narrative either missing or unintelligible. This has important consequences for the manuscript's reader: young Melmoth, we are told, "could make out only a sentence here and there" (*Melmoth*, 28). Maturin replicates young Melmoth's reading experience for his own reader, breaking up his presentation of the manuscript with blank spaces and setting those spaces off with series of asterisks. If the physical form of the book supports the idea of the text as an organic unity, the effacement of the physical text puts into question traditional assumptions about the unity of the work of art. Stanton's manuscript is no longer a clearly bordered and self-contained object: the line between text and world has dissolved. Certainly, missing or unintelligible sections of narrative are a standard gothic procedure. At the same time, Maturin takes the procedure to an extreme, and, in the context of *Melmoth the Wanderer*, his fracturing of

narrative encourages a distinct counter-reading to the centripetal "national" reading offered by other novelists of the period like Scott.

"Scott's manner of composition...shows a very interesting parallel to Hegel's philosophy of history," Georg Lukàcs observes in his well-known chapter on Scott in *The Historical Novel*.[17] For Lukàcs, Scott's historical novels anticipate Hegel's philosophy of history in that they broach a dialectic of historical development in which progress develops out of conflict. In particular, his novels "concentrate" and "intensify" historical events into a tight teleology (*Historical Novel*, 41). Conflict reconciles itself in the emergence of something new:

> Thus out of the struggles of the Saxons and Normans there arose the English nation, neither Saxon nor Norman; in the same way the bloody Wars of the Roses gave rise to the illustrious reign of the House of Tudor, especially that of Queen Elizabeth; and those class struggles which manifested themselves in the Cromwellian Revolution were finally evened out in the England of today, after a long period of uncertainty and civil war, by the "Glorious Revolution" and its aftermath. (*Historical Novel*, 32)

Lukàcs identifies this manner of composition as national: Scott is a "patriot" who "sees and portrays the complex and intricate path which led to England's national greatness and to the formation of the national character" (*Historical Novel*, 53, 54). Maturin's manner of composition, in contrast, is non-teleological and non-dialectical. Narrative in *Melmoth* produces no "logic" whereby one part answers another, and both resolve into a third part. Subverting organic theories of art and genre, Maturin appears unpatriotic and unhistorical. In

Lukàcs's sense, he is un-national. Instead, what he encourages is a scattered cosmopolitan reading, so that it is not surprising reviewers like Coleridge should expel him as "jacobin."

Coda

In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Slavoj Zizek posits a fundamental antagonism at the core of social union: "All 'culture'," he writes, "is in a way a reaction-formation, an attempt to limit, canalize--to *cultivate* this imbalance, this traumatic kernel, this radical antagonism through which man cuts his umbilical cord with nature, with animal homeostasis."[18] Zizek's "radical antagonism" recalls Immanuel Kant's notion of "unsocial sociability," and his discussion of social fantasies gives new resonance to Kant's description of the state as a "*pathologically* enforced social union" ("Universal History," 45). For the poststructuralist Zizek, social union does not itself exist but is a social fantasy constructed to mask an originary antagonism. There is always a gap between our fantasies of social union and the underlying antagonism that prompts their formation. What this means for the nation is that it (like all other fantasies of social union) is inherently unstable: "every process of identification conferring on us a fixed socio-symbolic identity," Zizek insists, "is ultimately doomed to fail" (*Sublime Object*, 127).

Central to Zizek's argument is the notion of the "social symptom." For Zizek, society anticipates the gap between its fantasy of social union and its own antagonistic nature by giving the gap a positive form. In fascism, for instance, society's failure to achieve its "full identity" as a unified and homogeneous whole is attributed not to that society's own antagonistic nature but to a particular figure, the "Jew." "If we look at it through the frame

of (corporatist) fantasy," Zizek explains, "the 'Jew' appears as an intruder who introduces from outside disorder, decomposition and corruption of the social edifice--it appears as an outward positive cause whose elimination would enable us to restore order, stability and identity" (*Sublime Object*, 128). Seen simultaneously as a threat to social union and the cause of its failure, the social symptom both denies and embodies the "structural impossibility" of our fantasies of social union, erupting on to the social surface [at] the point at which it becomes obvious that society 'doesn't work,' that the social mechanism 'creaks'" (*Sublime Object*, 126, 127-128).

Zizek's notion of the social symptom is suggestive in terms of the question of the cosmopolitan in early nineteenth-century Britain. At a time when the boundaries of national belonging were being redrawn (both inside Britain and on the Continent), unified models of the nation such as Burke's came under increasing scrutiny. Positing the nation as a homogeneous and organic whole, these images of social union failed to address the sorts of political unrest increasingly evident in fragmented nations such as Greece, Italy, and Ireland. In early nineteenth-century fiction, then, the cosmopolitan appears as a social symptom that gestures towards the impossibility of social fantasies of union even as it preserves them. Where Edgeworth tamed the transgressive potential of cosmopolitanism by incorporating it into a rational patriotism and Byron exploited it in his figure of the cosmopolitan, Charles Robert Maturin confronted the prospect of a cosmopolitanism that refused any containment or direction. Threatening to dissolve all boundaries--national, existential, and aesthetic--his *Melmoth the Wanderer* exemplifies an extreme cosmopolitan discourse. Unholy and unearthed, Maturin's cosmopolitan defies all recognized categories of belonging and he, like

cosmopolitanism itself, must be excluded if any unified understanding of nationness is to be sustained.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. Marilyn Butler, *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background, 1760-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 160.

2. Chapter 23 of *Biographia Literaria* is a reprint of five letters on *Bertram* that Coleridge published in the *Courier* from August 29 to September 11, 1816.

3. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, vol. 7 of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 229.

4. As I suggested in Chapter Three, the Edgeworths experienced the same problem in their etymology of Irish Bulls.

5. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Shakespeare's Judgement Equal to His Genius," *Shakespearean Criticism*, ed. T.M. Raysor (London: Dent, 1930), 2: 198.

6. "*Melmoth the Wanderer*," *Blackwoods* 8 (November 1820), 161.

7. [John Wilson Croker], "Maturin--*Melmoth, the Wanderer*," *Quarterly Review* 24 (January 1821), 303.

8. [William Hazlitt ?], "Melmoth the Wanderer," *Edinburgh Review* 35 (July 1821), 354. P.L. Carver has argued convincingly that William Hazlitt was the author of this review, "Hazlitt's Contributions to the *Edinburgh Review*," *Review of English Studies* 4 (October 1928): 385-393.

9. The same logic plays itself out on a grander level as well: literature from a nation in "one of the earlier stages of civilization and refinement" (i.e. Ireland) can infect the literature of a more advanced nation (i.e. England).

10. Charles Maturin, *Melmoth the Wanderer*, ed. Douglas Grant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 5.

11. Other sources, however, go unacknowledged. A large section of the "Tale of the Spaniard," for instance, was drawn from Diderot's *La Religieuse* (1796). This plagiarism gives a different stress to the question of organic unity than Maturin's own self-plagiarism does. What happens to a work of art's unity, for example, when it is not the product of a single author? For a discussion on *Melmoth the Wanderer* and *La Religieuse*, see Amy Elizabeth Smith's "Experimentation and 'Horrid Curiosity' in Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer*," *English Studies* 6 (1993): 524-535.

12. Veronica M.S. Kennedy, "Myth and the Gothic Dream: C.R. Maturin's Melmoth the Wanderer," *Pacific Coast Philology* 4 (April 1969), 41.

13. As Gary Kelly points out, the Wanderer's mission is co-terminus with the establishment of Protestant hegemony in Ireland, *English Fiction of the Romantic Period, 1789-1830* (London: Longmans, 1989). For the significance of *Melmoth the Wanderer* within an Irish context, see also Terry Eagleton's *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture* (London: Verso, 1995), and Julian Moynahan's *Anglo-Irish: The Literary Imagination in a Hyphenated Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

14. Dale Kramer, *Charles Robert Maturin* (Twayne: New York, 1973), 101. In his discussion of *Melmoth the Wanderer*, Kramer notes that either Constable or Henry Colburn of London offered Maturin five hundred pounds for a second set of tales.

15. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 4.

16. Leigh A. Ehlers points out that Maturin's informational footnotes sometimes contradict the text and so subvert narrative authority. "The 'Incommunicable Condition' of Melmoth," *Research Studies* 49 (September 1981): 171-182.

17. Georg Lukàcs, *The Historical Novel*, trans. Hannah Mitchell and Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), 39.

18. Slavoj Zizek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 5.

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