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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF WILLIAM JAMES'
THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

by Mei Lai Choy

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies.
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

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Abstract

Therapists of differing theoretical orientations have been known to have various techniques in common. A comparison, however, of the specific conditions under which experienced therapists use similar techniques as well as the consequences of these techniques have never been carefully studied, especially in the context of actual therapy sessions. In the present research, five verbatim transcripts of the initial interviews of Joseph Wolpe and Carl Rogers were rated by ten judges, with the intent to identify those techniques common to both therapists and compare the antecedent and consequent conditions of their use of such techniques. Results indicated that in initial interviews, Wolpe and Rogers had one technique in common, that is, both interpreted but under different therapeutic conditions. Specifically, Wolpe interpreted following statements in which patients had their attention focused on the self either in the form of describing the self or informing about the problem. Rogers, on the other hand, interpreted following statements in which patients had their attention focused on the therapist, primarily in the form of accepting what the therapist had said. Consequent to both Wolpe's and Rogers' interpretations, results indicated a "soft" tendency for patients to respond in a similar manner, namely, by accepting what the therapist had said and describing the self. Results were discussed and implications of these findings for practitioners and researchers were explored.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1. A General Explication of the Central Theme of this Dissertation

The purpose of this dissertation is to present an interpretation of William James' theory of consciousness in the light of Husserlian phenomenology.

Almost all students of philosophy know that a philosopher's studious commentators are not always the best sources of a very profound or stimulating exposition of this particular philosopher's ideas. Often it is in other philosophers' rejections, revisions or solutions that the significance of the ideas of a philosopher or the impact of the problems raised by a philosopher are thoroughly disclosed. Thus, it is in Kant's explication of human beings' a priori structure of understanding that the meaning of Hume's denial of the causal relation between experiences is fully exposed; and it is in Aristotle's revision of Plato's theory of forms, namely, in Aristotle's transformation of Plato's doctrine of transcendental essences into his own doctrine of immanent essences, that the peculiar characteristics of Plato's theory

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of forms are brought into the open. Descartes' notion of the indubitable 'thinking I' enables us to have a deeper apprehension of St. Augustine's concept of one's certain knowledge of one's own existence. Bergson's examination of the 'duration of a stream of consciousness' reveals to us a new significance in Heraclitus' notion of the irrecurrences of all the things in the universe. Therefore, we believe that, by studying how a philosopher's ideas are refuted, modified or developed by later philosophers or how the similar concepts are cultivated by other philosophers, we can often come to some novel, even profounder understanding of this particular philosopher. In other words, we believe that, by analysing an earlier philosopher's less complicated, less rigorous thinking in the framework of a later philosopher's more elaborate, better developed philosophical system, we may be able to uncover some interesting aspects hidden in the former philosopher's thinking. It is this belief that leads us, in this dissertation, to make an attempt of interpreting William James' theory of consciousness in the light of Husserl's phenomenology.

What we intend to demonstrate in this dissertation is that: if we try to examine James' psychological investigations from the standpoint of a Husserlian scholar, we can easily come up with the following

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new discoveries. On the one hand, unlike what the orthodox Jamesian scholars, the scholars of pragmatism assume, James' psychological studies are not only his early endeavours in the field of natural sciences which are totally irrelevant to his later philosophical speculations. On the other hand, unlike what the historians of psychology claim, what James has given to us in The Principles of Psychology is not merely a summation of all the psychological ideas appearing in nineteenth century or a powerful refutation of Wundt's experimentalism, or Spencer's associationism. What we intend to argue for in this dissertation is this point: if we look at James' psychological studies with Husserl's phenomenology in our minds, then, we can easily discover that, in his psychological investigations, James has worked out a theory of the constitution of consciousness which is extremely similar to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness, presented in his constitutive phenomenology.

As a philosopher, James, at least in appearance, is totally different from Husserl. James, as a founding father of American pragmatism, in the eyes of his commentators, is a philosopher who has the New-worldly practicality, the pluralistic open-mindedness, the restless frontiermanship of his Yankee style, and who is hostile to the empty rationalisms and idealisms

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of Old Europe. Besides these, James expresses his ideas unsystematically in untechnical common language.

Husserl, as the creator of phenomenology, has a traditional German philosopher's thirst for transcendental, a mathematician's rigorousness and bears an ambition to elevate philosophy to the level of strict science. Husserl uses extremely technical languages. What, then, leads us to think that, by analysing James' psychological works in the light of Husserl's phenomenology, we are able to gain some new understandings of James. What inspires us to make an attempt of excavating some proto-Husserlian ideas in James' psychology? Before we can go on to present a more thorough explication of the purpose of this dissertation, we think that we are obliged to give a brief explanation.

Two new developments in the Husserlian and Jamesian scholarships arouse our interests to attempt for a phenomenological interpretation of James' psychology.

First, it is the revelation of Husserl's interest in and praise of James' psychology. In the recent years, phenomenological scholars like Herbert Spiegelberg,¹ Dorion Cairns,² Hans Linschoten³ have gradually published their knowledge of Husserl's interest in and admiration of James' psychology, which, they obtain through their conversations with Husserl and their studies of Husserl's collection of books

client-centered and behavioral orientations. In spite of theoretical differences between the client-centered and behavioral schools, and differences between what they seek to accomplish within an interview, it is at the level of actual therapist techniques that specific differences have yet to be studied. The question is: In what specific ways do client-centered and behavioral therapists compare and contrast with each other in the techniques used in initial therapeutic interviews? Joseph Wolpe and Carl Rogers are taken as leading exponents of these two therapeutic approaches.

Several questions are central to this investigation:

1. What techniques are used by Wolpe and Rogers in their initial interviews, and what are the relative frequencies with which these techniques are used?

For both Wolpe and Rogers, the clinical and research literature will be examined in order to compare what may be expected from the literature with what may be found by studying actual transcripts.

Data answering this first question will permit investigation of the second question which is the major question of the study.

2. For those initial interview techniques used by both Wolpe and Rogers, what are the similarities and differences in the ways in which these common techniques are used? The present study will examine the conditions under which Wolpe and Rogers employ common techniques, and also the consequences or effects of these common

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kept in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain. In these publications, we know that it was Carl Stumpf, in the 1890s, who called Husserl's attention to James' psychology. In Husserl's personal library kept in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, one can find not only James' The Principles of Psychology, but also most of James' independent works. The marginal notes, key words and translation of terms appearing in chapters 4-9, 11, 12, 14-16, 17-22 and 26 of The Principles of Psychology indicate that Husserl has studied this book carefully. At first, Husserl could read only very few pages. But even that limited understanding of James' psychology was enough to induce Husserl, in an article called "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik," published in 1894, to make two explicit references to James. Husserl refers to chapter 9, "The Stream of Thought" of The Principles of Psychology and James' notion of the 'fringe of consciousness'. But, after the article of 1894, Husserl read larger sections of The Principles of Psychology and took excerpts from them. In a diary written in 1906, Husserl says,

Then in 1891-92 came the lecture course on psychology which made me look into the literature on descriptive psychology, in fact look forward to it with longing. James' Psychology, of which I could read only little, yielded some flashes. I saw how a daring and original man did not let himself be held

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down by tradition and attempted to really put down what he saw and to describe it. Probably this influence was not without significance for me, although I could read and understand precious few pages. Indeed, to describe and be faithful, this was absolutely indispensable. To be sure, it was not until my article of 1894 that I read larger sections and took excerpts from them.⁴

It seems that Husserl was extremely impressed by James' psychological researches. Later, he told Alfred Schutz that he once had an intention to write a review of The Principles of Psychology and R. B. Perry that he had abandoned his plan of writing on psychology because he felt that James had said what he wanted to say. In the paragraph of Husserl's diary which we have just quoted here, we can find that Husserl has admitted that James' influence on him was not without significance and even absolutely indispensable. In Logical Investigations, Husserl claims that James' descriptions of the cognitive experiences have helped him to reject psychologism. He says,

It will be apparent from the present work that James' genius-like observations in the field of descriptive psychology of the cognitive experiences are far from making psychologism inevitable. For the help and progress which I owe to this excellent investigator in the field of descriptive analysis have only aided my emancipation from the psychologistic position.⁵

Chapter I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter reviews the literature with regard to (a) the initial interview techniques of Joseph Wolpe and Carl Rogers and those techniques common to both, and (b) the manner in which each therapist uses common techniques in their first sessions, i.e. the conditions under which common techniques are used and the consequences following these techniques. The following review of the literature addresses these topics.

The Initial Interview Techniques of Wolpe and Rogers

The first intent is to describe the initial interview techniques of Wolpe and those behavior therapists who follow his approach, namely therapists considered as "Wolpean", "desensitization therapists", "reciprocal inhibition therapists", or "conditioning therapists". Second, the intent is to describe the initial interview techniques of Rogers and client-centered therapists. The overall objective is to formulate a composite picture of those techniques which both therapists have in common.

Wolpe's Initial Interview Techniques

In the following section, the initial interview techniques of Wolpe will be described using several sources: (a) the clinical writings of Wolpe; (b) clinical observations of Wolpe's initial sessions; (c) descriptions of what "Wolpean" behavior therapists do in the initial session; and (d) empirical research on Wolpe's initial interviews.

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In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl points out that, under the title of the 'fringe of consciousness', James, before himself, has already discovered the phenomena of 'horizon'. He says,

William James was alone, as far as I know, in becoming aware of the phenomena of horizon--under the title of "fringe"--but how could he inquire into it without the phenomenologically acquired understanding of intentional objectivity and of implication?⁶

The second development which arouses our interest is the appearances of a significant number of phenomenological interpretations of James' psychology in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, in the 1940s, Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz, two New School phenomenologists, had published three articles to discuss the phenomenological elements embedded in James' analysis of the characteristics of a stream of consciousness. In the 1950s no other phenomenological studies of James had been published except several sections from Aron Gurwitsch's book, Theorie du champ de la conscience, published in 1957, in which Gurwitsch examines mostly James' notion of the 'fringe of consciousness'. In 1960, Herbert Spiegelberg published The Phenomenological Movement, in which he enclosed a short excursus called "William James' Significance for Husserl's Phenomenology."

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In this article, Spiegelberg has not just disclosed the historical relations between Husserl and James, but also has suggested some possible influences which James had on Husserl. We believe that this short article stimulated the so-called Jamesian Renaissance in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Four books and a significant number of articles had been published in this period of time. They all try to deal with the problem of James' relations with phenomenology. In 1961, Hans Linschoten published a book called On the Way Toward A Phenomenological Psychology. In this book, Linschoten points out how James had, in The Principles of Psychology, unceasingly traced the new ways of formulating more adequately the things that are proper to psychology. Linschoten contends that, by presenting a new and more adequate formulation of the various subject matters in psychology, James had come very near to accomplishing a phenomenological psychology. Linschoten has given us a brief examination of almost all the subjects which James had discussed in his psychological investigations. What he intends to point out to us is how James' approach to these subjects is very similar to the phenomenologists' approach to these subjects. We do find, here and there in Linschoten's book, some stimulating and novel observations of James' various ideas. But since none of these observations has been developed into a thorough

presented. These techniques will then be re-described, by the present author, into terms which may also be used for Rogers, that is, to enable a comparison between the initial sessions of these two therapists.

Gathering of Information: In the gathering of information, three basic procedures are followed: (1) conducting a stimulus-response analysis; (2) taking a personal history; (3) administering several questionnaires as homework assignments (Wolpe, 1973; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966).

To conduct a stimulus-response analysis, Wolpe asks specific questions about the circumstances surrounding the onset of each of the patient's reactions and about the later contingencies of these reactions. For example, Wolpe might ask: "What is the nature of the complaint?" "When did it arise?" "What were the circumstances responsible for it?" Such questions are directed towards securing "... the greatest possible definition in relating stimuli (situations) to the responses that constitute the complaints that have brought the patient to treatment" (Wolpe, 1973, p.29).

When a personal history is taken, Wolpe asks specific questions to derive relevant facts concerning the patient's past and present life, and to explore the content and intensity of the patient's feelings (Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966). In the questioning procedure, several topical areas are covered: early family life, education, sex life, and present social life. To secure the information Wolpe may ask: "How many children were in your family?", "What kind of person was your father?", "Did he show personal interest, did he punish, and if so did it seem just or not?", "Did you enjoy school?", "How well did you do academically?", "What age

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explication, we consider Linschoten's book as merely a pioneer phenomenological study of James. In 1968, Bruce Wilshire published a book called William James and Phenomenology, which is considered by James Edie as the best commentary on The Principles of Psychology.⁷ In this book, Wilshire traces, in an extremely thorough way, the whole process of how James, in The Principles of Psychology, has gradually given up a naive dualistic notion of the knowing subject and the known object and developed the phenomenological notions of intentionality and life-world. In the first half of this book, Wilshire presents us with a painstaking exposition of James' discovery on how the specification of thought depends on the specification of the object of thought. Wilshire points out that this discovery has induced James to give up the notion of the causal relation between the knowing subject and the known object and cultivate a notion of the intentional relation between them. In the second half of this book, Wilshire presents us with an explication of James' discovery of how the specification of the object of thought depends on the specification of the context in which this object exists. Wilshire points out that this discovery has led James to uncover the horizon structure of the object of thought. Eventually, according to Wilshire, James had uncovered the whole life-world in which an object of thought was

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embedded. In 1969, John Wild published a book called The Radical Empiricism of William James, in which he points out how James had always upheld a radical empirical position in every stage of his philosophical career, namely, in his analysis of the structures of consciousness, in his religious and ethical studies, and, of course, in his explications of radical empiricism. John Wild, then, demonstrates how James' radical empirical position is similar to a group of phenomenologists' existential phenomenological position. But, in our opinion, the most unique contribution of this book exists in John Wild's discussion of James' notion of 'noetic freedom'. Wild points out how James had emphasized the presence of the function of active selectivity in every cognitive act. Due to the existence of this active selecting function, according to Wild, James had contended that consciousness has the freedom of choosing to know whatever it wants to know. In other words, what consciousness knows is not determined by what it encounters. What it knows is what it consents to know. In 1974, Richard Stevens published a book called James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning. In this book Stevens has, first of all, pointed out how James' notion of 'the world of pure experience' is similar to Husserl's notion of the pre-predicated, immediately experienced life-world. Stevens then

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points out how James had traced back the foundations of the meanings of the structure of the self, the constitution of the physical world, the genesis of space and time to this pre-given world of perceptual experiences. Stevens contends that James' effort to ground all meaning in the original givenness of the sphere of pure experience bears remarkable resemblance to the later Husserl's return to the primordial evidence of the life-world. Besides these four major phenomenological studies of James, phenomenologists like James Edie, Stephen Skousgaard have also published some articles to examine James from the phenomenological perspective.⁸ We must admit that the various phenomenologists' accounts of the historical relations between James and Husserl have aroused our initial interest and curiosity about James' psychology. We begin to wonder what James had accomplished in his psychological investigations which liberated Husserl from the pitfall of psychologism, originated the notion of 'horizon' and in which Husserl found all that he wants to say about cognitive experiences? But it is, in fact, this series of phenomenological studies that convince us that the profoundest meanings of James' thinking and the genius and originality of James as a thinker can be fully exposed by thus examining him from a novel perspective, namely, from the perspective of phenomenology. In this

When giving information about the therapy process, Wolpe will teach, explain, provide examples or give short speeches about the practices of behavior therapy. He might tell the patient how behavior therapy will help, its strategy, its goal, its philosophy and theoretical underpinnings.

The behavior therapist schools the patient to realize that his unpleasant reactions are due to emotional habits that he cannot help...the overcoming of a human neurosis is within the control of the therapist through techniques

quite similar to those used in the laboratory

(Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966, pp.16-17).

In giving information to the patient about his specific problem, Wolpe (1973) may assure the patient that his symptoms are reversible; he explains how the patient's reactions were learned and even provides examples of that specific learning process.

One way to re-describe what Wolpe does when providing information about the therapy process is to say that he introduces and structures therapy. This is accomplished by telling the patient about the therapy process and what can be achieved. Giving information about the nature of the problem may be re-described as the therapist

telling the patient about the patient, what he is like and what his problem is like. Thus, the techniques that Wolpe uses in orienting the patient in the initial interview may be described as: (1) structuring and introducing therapy; and (2) telling the patient what the patient

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dissertation, we plan to contribute our own effort to this enterprise of re-interpretation of James.

Nevertheless, what we attempt to deal with in this dissertation is an area of James' psychology which has not been studied carefully by our former phenomenological scholars. As we can see in our former brief account of the phenomenological studies of James, up to 1974, most of the phenomenological scholars were generally captivated by the following ideas and characteristics emerging from James' psychological studies: scholars like Linschoten and Wild are fascinated by James' radical empirical attitude. They then concentrated their efforts to expose how James' principle of 'being faithful to what appears before one's eyes' is similar to Husserl's idea of 'back to the things themselves'. What they notice is James' phenomenological approach to all the subjects which he deals with either in his psychology or in his philosophy. Gurwitsch, Wilshire and Stevens all notice James' important discovery of the presence of the 'fringe of consciousness' and how James' notion of the 'fringe of consciousness' does bear striking similarity to Husserl's notion of the horizon. They, nevertheless, try to understand James' notion of the 'fringe of consciousness' in three different contexts. Gurwitsch points out that the discovery of the 'fringe of consciousness' had led

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James to claim that all objects of thought are assimilated by a flux of consciousness into a certain thematic field and declares the Gestallean tendency of James. Wilshire claims that James' discovery of the 'fringe of consciousness' had allowed James to find out that every object of thought is, in fact, existing in a world, namely, a sort of 'being in the world'. The discovery of the 'world' coming with every object of thought, then, in Wilshire's opinions, leads James to uncover the different orders of the life-world, the different orders of reality. Stevens, on the other hand, points out that James' notion of 'the fringe of consciousness' proves that James had discovered the vague relations and patterns appearing in the pre-predicative, pre-given world of pure perceptual experiences. He claims that James' notion of the world of pure experiences is similar to Husserl's notion of life-world, appearing in Experience and Judgment.

Therefore, we should say that James' two types of proto-Husserlian notions of life-world are well explicated.

In Wild and Stevens' works, we are able to find a thorough discussion of James' notion of 'noetic freedom'. Gurwitsch, Schutz, Wilshire, Stevens, etc. have all noticed the emergence of the notion of intentionality in James' analysis of the nature of consciousness.

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But, while most of these phenomenological scholars of James seem to be fascinated by James' radical empirical attitude, by his discovery of the 'fringe of consciousness' and by his eloquent description of the world of lived experiences, they tend to neglect the other interesting proto-phenomenological notions buried in James' psychological investigations. The area which is neglected by the phenomenological scholars is James' constitutive theory of consciousness. Though Spiegelberg, in his 1960s short excursus "William James' Influence on Husserl's Phenomenology," has speculated about James' influence on Husserl's notion of the constitutive intentionality, this speculation, however, has not inspired any phenomenologist to pursue a thorough examination of James' theory of the constituting functions of consciousness. Gurwitsch, in his 1940s article "On the Object of Thought," and in two sections of his 1950s book, The Field of Consciousness, has pointed out the similarities between Husserl's two notions of 'the object of consciousness', 'the noëma of consciousness' and James' two notions of 'the topic of thought', and 'the object of thought'. But Gurwitsch's discovery, too, has not been followed by a more detailed analysis of James' theory of the structure of the object of consciousness. The fact is, the notion of the constitution, namely, the constituting functions of

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consciousness and the structure of the object of consciousness, is not at all less important than the notions of the 'pure experience' or 'fringe of consciousness' in James' thinking. James, in fact, has used a large portion of his major work, The Principles of Psychology (chapters 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22) to give us, on the one hand, a painstaking analysis of the various constituting functions of consciousness, how these functions can, step by step, constitute the pure experiences into a certain sort of intended object; on the other hand, a depiction of the multiple-layers structure of an intended object. Furthermore, the similarities between James' constitutive theory of consciousness and Husserl's constitutive phenomenology are as interesting as the similarities between James' notion of the 'world of pure experiences' and Husserl's notion of the life-world. Therefore, in our opinion, a thorough phenomenological re-interpretation of James cannot be achieved without a careful examination of James' notion of the constitution of consciousness. Since no systematic study of this area of James' psychology has yet been produced by phenomenological scholars, in this dissertation, we attempt to work out a phenomenological analysis of James' constitutive theory of consciousness.

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Another point that we need to clarify here is this: from Logical Investigations to Experience and Judgment, Husserl's phenomenology develops. As the issue which we intend to deal with is neither the 'refutation of psychologism' nor the problem of life-world, but the problem of constitution of consciousness, our understandings of Husserl will be mainly based on the middle period of Husserl's phenomenology, a period in which Husserl tries to work out a detailed analysis of structure of the object of consciousness and the constituting functions of consciousness. To speak more concretely, if, in this dissertation, we intend to present a phenomenological interpretation of James' constitutive theory of consciousness in the light of Husserl's phenomenology, our understandings of Husserl's phenomenology will be mainly based on the phenomenology presented to us by Husserl in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.

The purpose of our dissertation is to demonstrate that, by uncovering the universal structure of the object of consciousness and the various active cognitive functions of consciousness in which the object of consciousness is constituted, James has, in his psychological studies cultivated a theory of the constitution of consciousness which is extremely similar to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness.

out that there is no reason for shame, because factors in the circumstances make it a natural thing to happen (Wolpe, 1958, p.106).

Furthermore, Wolpe may (4) ask more questions to indicate that he approves and that it is appropriate for the patient to continue to talk about that. For Wolpe, the existence of this supportive atmosphere is an important part of therapy (Patterson, 1968). However, the techniques used in establishing this atmosphere in the initial interview, are given little attention in his writings.

Observations of Wolpe's Initial Interviews

To identify potential initial interview techniques Wolpe might also use, the present research consulted several reports which describe his therapy sessions. These reports however, did not limit their observations to his initial interviews alone.

Brown (1967) observed Wolpe at work in both initial and later sessions. He pointed out that in the initial interview, a complete history is taken with Wolpe asking many specific and direct questions. To gain further information, Wolpe often repeats the last word of a patient's sentence in a somewhat puzzled manner. He responds with "uh-huh" and "good" when he feels these are appropriate. After the history is taken, Wolpe explains the process of therapy. During the first part of the session, advice may be given, sentences paraphrased, and general comments expressed.

Klein, Dittmann, Parloff and Gill (1969) observed Wolpe, along with other behavior therapists, in interviews which occurred at various points along the duration of treatment but they did not specify if the initial interview was observed. Assuming it was, these therapists were described

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On one hand, we would like to point out how James' notion of 'thought's object' is similar to Husserl's notion of 'noema', and James' notion of 'thought's topic' is similar to Husserl's notion of the 'object of consciousness'. Moreover, James' notion of the 'fringe of consciousness' is similar to Husserl's notion of 'horizon'. Finally, how James' account of an intended object as constituted of a flux of constantly changing 'thought's objects', all revolving around one central, self-same topic and escorted by the 'fringe of consciousness' is similar to Husserl's description of an intended object as built up of a stream of continuously shifting noemata, unified under one self-identical 'object of consciousness' and existing in a horizon.

On the other hand, we plan to disclose how, by tracing the foundation of the constitution of an intended object to a flux of consciousness which is not only able to direct itself towards a transcendent object, but is also able to perform the active functions of meaning-bestowing and constituting on its object, James has, in fact, discovered the most important key notion which Husserl has disclosed in his phenomenology, namely, the notion of the transcendental, constitutive intentionality of consciousness. What we, therefore, intend to argue for in this dissertation is this particular point: as James has developed some proto-Husserlian

as using assertive training, systematic desensitization, and education in learning principles. Suggestion was used in the orientation period of treatment: "...the therapist tells the patient at length about the power of the treatment method, pointing out that it had been successful with comparable patients and all but promising similar results for him too" (p.260). The therapists were further described as approaching the patient in an explicit, positive and authoritative manner. They provided a learning theory formulation of the problem and a rationale for the way in which the treatment would work. The therapists corrected misconceptions and clearly laid out the treatment plans and goals.

Locke (1971) examined unspecified writings and various transcript excerpts of Wolpe, and organized his methods as follows:

- (a) convincing the patient that he can be helped
by (behavior)therapy;
- (b) identifying the patient's irrational beliefs,
values, and fears;
- (c) providing the patient with new knowledge and/or
values;
- (d) helping and persuading the patient to act on this
new knowledge; and
- (e) teaching the patient how to relax in the presence
of formerly frightening situations (relaxation
training, imagining situations, etc.) (p.324)

Furthermore, Locke notes that Wolpe offers reassurance, encouragement and clarification.

The descriptions in these reports are in essential agreement with

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notions of the constitution of the intended object and the nature of consciousness in his theory of consciousness, so James has cultivated a constitutive theory of consciousness which is similar to Husserl's theory of consciousness. The principle part of our dissertation will be devoted to disclose the crucial similarities between James' theory of consciousness and Husserl's constitutive phenomenology, however, at the end of our dissertation, we will try to expose one fundamental difference between James and Husserl. We plan to disclose how James, as a pragmatist, has held a sort of humanistic notion of consciousness and the object of consciousness which are extremely different from Husserl's transcendental notions of consciousness and the object of consciousness. We will then point out how, due to the presences of these different interpretations of 'what is consciousness' and 'what is the object of consciousness', what James has accomplished in his psychology is not exactly a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. What James has cultivated in his psychology, in our opinion, is a constitutive theory of consciousness with a humanistic tendency, a sort of existential phenomenology.

Like all the unorthodox Jamesian scholars who have, before us, tried to look at James from the perspective of phenomenology, we believe that, by thus

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disclosing all the strands of phenomenology, buried in James' psychology and philosophy, we are able to obtain a better understanding of the profundity and significance of James' thinking and a more accurate evaluation of the genius and originality of James as a thinker.

2. 'Introspective Observation' As the Method--
An Examination of the Phenomenological Tendencies in William James' Methodology

As Ralph Barton Perry points out, "William James was at one and the same time one of the first of the scientific psychologists and one of the last of the philosophical psychologists."⁹ This peculiar historical position has induced James to include two completely different methods in his psychological research, namely, the emerging method of psychological experiments and the traditional method of 'introspective observation'. Influenced by Hermann Von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt, the two founding fathers of experimental psychology, James sets up the first psychological laboratory in America. Nevertheless, either because of the naivety of these early experimental devices or because of James' unconscious reluctance to study human beings' mental phenomena by the quantitative methods, in his psychological laboratory, James does not harvest any significant

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result.¹⁰ 'Introspective observation' thus becomes the sole method on which James relied to obtain his knowledge about the structures of the consciousness. In The Principles of Psychology, James, therefore, openly admitted this, "Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always."¹¹ In a chapter called "The Methods and Snares of Psychology" in The Principles of Psychology, James presents a thorough examination of this particular psychological method, in which both the unique superiorities and the difficulties of 'introspective observation' are discussed. As part of the preparatory explication of our interpretation of James' theory of perception, we intend to present an analysis of James' interpretation of 'introspective observation' in this section of our thesis. Our attention will be focused on two proposals advocated by James. They are the proposal of returning back to one's own immediately given experiences to secure the indubitable datum of psychological investigations and the proposal of presenting a faithful and unreduced description of human beings' mental phenomena. Our purpose is to expose the similarities between these two proposals and the two crucial projects portrayed in Husserl's program of phenomenology, namely, the project of delving into the Cartesian Cogito to grasp the radical,

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new beginning for all philosophical studies and the project of employing the phenomenological description as the instrument to carry out the explorations of the essential structures of all phenomena. We believe that, after this analysis, we will be able to demonstrate that, to a certain extent, James' interpretative exposition of 'introspective observation' is actually an incomplete precursor of Husserl's phenomenological methodology.

A. The Immediately Given Experiences
as the Indubitable Materials
for Psychological Investigations

What is 'introspective observation' or 'introspection'? In The Principles of Psychology, James gives this psychological method a simple definition in this way: "The word introspection need hardly be defined," he says, "it means, of course, the looking into our minds and reporting what we there discover."¹² After this clear and commonsensical definition, it is unnecessary for us, at this point, to add any further explication. Therefore, what we intend to do is to give 'introspective observation', the psychological method used by James as well as other philosophical psychologists, a new reading from the perspective of phenomenology. In this section, we will work out an interpretation of the method on which the introspectionists

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rely to obtain the datum of their psychological investigations.

What is the method which an introspectionist or James depends on to gather the datum of his psychological analysis? In The Principles of Psychology, James tells us in a metaphorical way that the only method which a retrospectionist can rely on to obtain his research materials is the method of 'looking into our own minds'. Therefore, the sole method which James suggests that an introspectionist can depend on to secure his datum is by searching backwards to the psychologist's own subjective, immediately given experiences. Now, the question we'd like to raise here is that, philosophically, or epistemologically, how should we interpret this procedure, this plunging into one's own subjective experiences to look for the datum of psychological investigations? In order to acquire a horizon for us to grasp acutely the deeply buried philosophical significance of this procedure, at this point, we have to switch our discussion to a seemingly unrelated topic, namely, James' notion of a psychologist's legitimate scope of investigation. It is only after we obtain a correct concept of James' idea of a psychologist's territory of studies, then, we are able to understand thoroughly the philosophical meanings embedded in James' very activity of looking into

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his own mind to find the datum for psychological analysis.

In chapter 7, The Principles of Psychology, James tells us clearly that he regards as the subject matter of psychological investigation three irreducible items: the thought studied, the thought's object and the psychologist's reality. Then, he emphasizes that, as a psychologist, his duty is to present a faithful description of: first, the essential structures of these three items, and, secondly, the mutual relations existing between them. He does not trouble himself, first, with the puzzle of how he is capable of making such a description, and second, with the question of whether these three items are or are not real existences.¹³ Now, let us have a closer look at these three irreducible items of psychological investigation. What does James mean by them? We know that, by 'the thought studied' James means all sorts of mental activities which include various emotions, imaginations and different cognitive faculties.¹⁴ But what are 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality'? Of course, later, in the chapters called "The Stream of Consciousness" and "The Perception of Reality" in The Principles of Psychology, James does give these concepts some explications with a striking phenomenological tendency. At this point, however, he tries to merely give a

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simple illustration of his notion of a psychologist's legitimate scope of investigation. James does not tell us specifically what he intends to mean by these two terms, 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality'. It is not too risky to assume that, at this stage, James only uses these two terms in a very vague and undecided way. By 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality', therefore, James means that which the thought intends or the psychologist encounters, which, however, can be interpreted as the psychological, the physical or the ideal existence. Even if we are incapable of grasping the precise meanings of 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality', nevertheless, this does not prevent us from obtaining a general understanding of James' notion of the psychologist's legitimate scope of investigation. Compared to our contemporary psychologists' legitimate territory of investigation, which, mostly is limited to the investigations of human beings' various behaviours and mental phenomena, James allows the psychologists to have a much more extensive scope of investigation. For James, a psychologist is responsible not just for the exploration of the essential structures of human beings' various mental phenomena, but it is also a psychologist's job to provide us a satisfactory explication of the natures of what the thought intends and what a psychologist

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encounters cognitively. In other words, a psychologist, according to James, will include in his scope of investigation not only all that can know and can feel, but also all that are known and are felt.

After this brief examination of James' notion of a psychologist's scope of investigation, we are ready, at this moment, to attempt an interpretation of the method which James, as an introspectionist, employs to secure the datum of psychological investigations. James claims that the method which he uses to obtain the datum of psychological studies is the method of 'looking into our own minds'. It is undoubtable that the only 'place' where one can catch one's own mental activities in their active states is the 'place' called one's own mind. Or, if we like to adopt John S. Mill¹⁵ or Brentano's¹⁶ theories, then, we have to admit that it is only through reflecting on our past experiences that we are capable of acquiring any knowledge of our own mental phenomena. Therefore, if we can, at this point, avoid the arguments with the radical behaviorists, whether there are or there are no such things called 'mental phenomena', and agree with Descartes, Brentano or James, etc. that thought or consciousness does exist, then we are obliged to say the advantages of the method of 'looking into our own minds' is that, by this method, a psychologist will be able to obtain

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the direct accessibilities to the mental phenomena in their active, original states. But how do we interpret the procedure of directing one's glance backwards into his own mind to find the datum of 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality'? It is at this point that we come across a crucial procedure in 'introspective observation' which does bear some undeniable similarities to an important technique proposed by Husserl in his explication of the phenomenology's methodology, namely, the technique of phenomenological reduction, or the technique of the suspension of all that is transcendentally posited.¹⁷ But on what basis can we make such an analogy? Let us, first of all, have an extremely simple explication of Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction. Then, we will be able to provide an apology for our analogy.

Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction is a complicated concept. First, the philosopher himself has stored in this crucial term different levels of radicalities. Then, under the skillful hands of some of Husserl's commentators, the complexity of this term has increased to an unbelievable degree; for example, in a book called Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect, Quentin Lauer tries to dissect the phenomenological reduction into six stages, and in an article called "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological

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Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," Iso Kern claims that the phenomenological reduction can be achieved three ways. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to give this important phenomenological concept any sufficient explication in the limited space we have here. But, fortunately, the phenomenological reduction employed here to shed light on James' special activity of returning backwards to his own mind to search for the datum of his psychological investigation is merely the phenomenological reduction in its preliminary stage, namely, the nullifying of the transcendent world. We can confine our explication of Husserl's theory of 'phenomenological reduction' exclusively to this layer of reduction.

Preoccupied with the ideal of rendering philosophy into a kind of rigorous science, Husserl claims that philosophy should, first of all, be grounded on an indubitable foundation. In other words, philosophy, in order to meet the standard of the strictest science, must, in the beginning, start with the materials which possess the character of 'apodicticity', the absolute indubitability. The suspension of all that is transcendently posited,¹⁸ also known as, the nullifying of the transcendent,¹⁹ is the technique used by Husserl to achieve a thorough purification of the datum which he is going to use in his philosophical system.

Empathy: The condition of empathy has been described as the therapist's sensing the patient's private world; recognizing and clarifying the patient's feelings; accepting and being permissive of these feelings; exploring the patient's feelings; and encouraging their free expression (Rogers, 1942, 1957).

An important procedure used to communicate the therapist's sense of the patient's world is commonly referred to as reflection of the patient's feelings and attitudes. When reflecting, Rogers expresses and communicates to the patient what the patient is trying to express; he articulates for the patient the patient's inner attitudes, unformulated feelings and bodily-felt meanings (Gendlin, 1972, p.337; Rogers, 1957, p.99). Reflections, then, include the therapist saying to the patient what he believes the patient is saying, feeling or meaning.

As Rogers (1942) assists the patient in the recognition and clarification of feelings, he may, at times, step slightly beyond a reflective-type statement and toward the realm of interpretative statements (Staines, 1969).

Under certain conditions, it is possible to interpret to the client some of the material which he has been revealing. When the interpretation is based entirely upon statements which the client has made, and when the interpretation is merely a clarification of what the client has already perceived for himself, this type of approach can be successful (Rogers, 1942, p.196).

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Following Descartes, Husserl holds the Cogito, the thinking I, is the only item which is capable of surviving the severe censorship of the Cartesian doubt. But, going a step further than Descartes, Husserl has transformed the Cogito from an empty thinking I to a stream of thinking carrying with it the objects of thoughts. To use Husserl's words, the barren Cogito has been expanded into a stream of 'Cogitationes' bearing within itself its Cogitatum (Cartesian Meditations, Second Meditation). In this way, Husserl extends the scope of indubitable material to include not only the thinking (the stream of thoughts), but also the thought's objects. Then, Husserl concludes that, if philosophy intends to accomplish the enterprise of the most rigorous science, all philosophical analysis should be based exclusively on these three sorts of indubitable data: cogito, cogitationes and cogitatum. But how can a philosopher who starts with the natural experiences arrive at, in Iso Kern's words,²⁰ 'this promised land of absolutely indubitabilities'? It is, therefore, at this point, that Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction emerges as a technique to perform the special function of the purification of our daily experience. For Husserl, the indubitability of the cogitationes or cogitatum lie in their special characteristic of immanence; and, likewise, the contingencies of the

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external objects or external world exist solely in the latter's transcendence. By immanence, Husserl means to be found with the cognitive act in the same stream of cogitations.²¹ For example, 'the perceived apple' is given indubitably in the cognitive act 'perceiving an apple'. By transcendence, in opposite, Husserl means to be found outside the cognitive acts' stream of cogitation, 'for example, the physical chair is supposed to exist outside to cognitive act, 'seeing a chair'. Using phenomenological reduction as a tool, Husserl, thus, strips from a philosopher's experiences all the transcendent elements. After this first level of the phenomenological reduction, what remains as the 'phenomenological residuum' will be solely the stream of cognitive activities bearing within themselves their cogitatum, namely, the sphere of absolute indubitabilities. Phenomenological reduction, thus, can be interpreted as a technique of banishing from a phenomenologist's scope of investigation all the contingent elements, all that are not given immediately in the stream of cogitations. This is the technique of refraining a philosopher from imposing any judgment on the objects which are short of the characteristics of indubitabilities. Husserl calls this technique the 'epochs' of all the doubttable datum, the 'putting into a bracket' the transcendent elements, the 'making

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no use' of all that one cannot obtain directly in his immediate experiences, or, simply, the phenomenological reduction.

After this brief explication of Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction, we are capable of giving James' or the introspectionists' method of 'looking into one's own mind' to secure the research datum, a new interpretation from the phenomenological standpoint. In what sense can we claim that, by directing his glance backwards into his own mind to secure the datum of the thought's object or the psychologist's reality, James has performed a phenomenological reduction on these two items. The first question we have to solve is, from the phenomenological point of view, how do we understand the meanings of the introspectionists' of James' activity of 'looking into his own mind' to collect the research datum of psychological investigations? From the phenomenological point of view, we can say, by returning his glance backwards into his own stream of consciousness to find the datum of his psychological investigation, an introspectionist or James has, in fact, imposed a significant restriction on the materials of his psychological analysis. He has confined his research exclusively to what he is able to encounter within his own mind or stream of consciousness. In other words, he has severed the

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cognitive relation with whatever cannot be found inside his stream of consciousness; that is tantamount to saying that all the transcendent elements have been banished from his sphere of investigation. Now the second question we'd like to raise here is this: in what sense can we argue that, by limiting his datum of psychological investigations to just what he can obtain immediately inside his stream of consciousness, James or an introspectionist will unavoidably perform a phenomenological reduction on two of his irreducible items of psychological investigation, these being the thought's object and the psychologist's reality? Our arguments are the following: James is limiting his scope of investigation to what he is capable of encountering within his own stream of consciousness. He is going to apply this limitation to, not only 'the thought studied' but also to 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality'; the two items which, from a realistic or naturalistic point of view, are supposed to exist outside a psychologist's stream of consciousness. Then 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' which James is going to include in his legitimate scope of investigation are no more 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' in the realistic or naturalistic sense, but 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' as they are .

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given immanently inside the stream of consciousness.

In other words, 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' which can be given immediately inside the stream of consciousness, is 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' as the content of the cognitive activity of seeing, feeling or knowing, etc.

That is to say, James, in restricting his analysis of 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' to what can be obtained inside the stream of consciousness, is banishing what cannot be given immediately inside the stream of consciousness about 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' out of his scope of investigation. As we have explicated in our expositions of Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction, phenomenological reduction is actually the technique of stripping from a philosopher's experiences all the transcendent elements, all that do not have the characteristics of indubitabilities by banishing these transcendent elements from a philosopher's scope of investigation. Therefore, we conclude that, by returning into his own mind to find the datum for the studies of the structures of 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality', James has, unintentionally, but, actually performed a phenomenological reduction on these two items of psychological investigation.

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'The thought's object', 'the thought studied' and 'the psychologist's reality' are, according to James, the three irreducible items of psychological investigation. The datum of 'the thought studied' (the stream of the various mental activities), in the Cartesian or phenomenological sense, do possess the characteristic of absolute indubitabilities. However, no one can doubt his own knowledge about his own mental activities no matter how radical a skeptic he is. But the datum of 'the thought's object' or 'the psychologist's reality' do not have the advantageous position of absolutely undoubtable. It is only by restricting his analysis of these subjects, 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality', to what these two subjects are given immediately inside the stream of consciousness, that James is able to guarantee that his investigations of 'the thought's object' and 'the psychologist's reality' are based on nothing but the most undoubtable datum. We can conclude that, James' returning backward to his own mind to obtain the datum of his psychological investigations, like Husserl's crucial project of plunging into the Cartesian Cogito to secure a new beginning for his philosophical analysis, can, to a certain extent, be interpreted as an important strategy in his psychological studies. Through this strategy, James is able to guarantee that his psychology

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is a rigorous science because all his psychological investigations are built on a sound foundation, namely, the absolutely indubitable datum.

B. Presenting a Faithful Description
of the Mental Phenomena as the
Goal of Psychology,

If 'looking into his own mind' is the method on which James relies to secure the indubitable datum of his psychological analysis, then, 'reporting what he there discovers' or presenting a faithful description of what he can find in the mind is the ultimate goal of James' psychological studies. In The Principles of Psychology, James refers to the task of a psychologist as to "report them [the three irreducible items of psychological studies, namely, the thought, the thought's object and the psychologist's reality] and their mutual relations as truly as he can without troubling himself with the puzzle of how he can report them all."²² 'Faithful description' or 'objective report', thus, for James, is the best instrument by which he is able to bring into the open the essential structures of the objects of psychological studies. Now, the questions we attempt to pose in this section are these two: a) What does James really mean by the faithful description of what one can encounter in the mind, or the psychological phenomena? b) From the

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phenomenological point of view, how do we understand James' proposal of presenting a faithful description of his subject matter?

- a) An Explication of James' Notion of the Faithful Description of the Mental Phenomena

What does James mean by a faithful description, or true report of the mental phenomena? Although James repeatedly insists that the crucial task of a psychologist is to present an objective, true, faithful, etc., report of what he can discover in his own mind, nevertheless, throughout all his works, James has never attempted to give us any direct explication of what can be regarded by him as the faithful, true or the objective. Therefore, it is impossible for us to answer this question by presenting an analysis of what James says about the characteristics of the truthful description of mental phenomena. But it does not mean that we cannot answer this question in an indirect way. Thus, the strategy which we attempt to use here is, instead of looking in vain for James' own statements about the nature of faithful descriptions, we will retreat to an opposite resource. We can find out what James says about the characteristics of the untruthful, unfaithful, unobjective descriptions of the mental phenomena. By fully exposing the errors which, in James' opinion,

as well as the kinds of reactions he may have. In essence, the therapist is the authority and explainer of reality to the patient, focusing primarily on the kind of person the patient is.

In addition to Wolpe and Rogers sharing this technique, it may be that both therapists also share the techniques of reflection and acknowledgement. While these two techniques are used by Rogers, there exists clinical descriptions of Wolpe's sessions as well as sessions of other behavior therapists which suggest that similar techniques might also be used by Wolpe (Brown, 1974; Fisher et.al., 1975; Lazarus, 1972; Sloane et.al., 1975a, 1975b; Rimm & Masters, 1974; Wolpe, 1976).

Consequently, one of the major purposes of the present research will be to compare the initial interview techniques of Wolpe and Rogers in order to identify those techniques used by both therapists and compare how each therapist uses such techniques. The literature cited above suggests that Wolpe and Rogers will have at least one technique in common, namely: telling the patient what the patient is like.

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can prevent a psychologist, especially an introspectionist, from giving a genuine picture of the psychological phenomena, then, it will not be difficult for us to deduce from these data what, in James' ideas, a truthful report of psychological phenomena should be. The faithful description of the psychological phenomena is, however, nothing other than the description which is purged of all the fatal errors existing in the unfaithful descriptions of the mental phenomena.

In a section by the title of "The Sources of Errors" in chapter 7, The Principles of Psychology, James presents a penetrating analysis of all errors appearing in the psychologist's introspective descriptions. Here, we must notice one important point. The subject of James' severe criticism is the associationists' atomism. For the associationists who trace their heritage directly back to Hume, and include almost all of the prominent psychologists of James' time, like Herbert Spencer, John S. Mill, Alexander Bain, J. F. Herbert, W. Wundt or James Mill, are a group of psychologists who always make the claim that their theory, atomism, is based on nothing but their faithful reports of mental occurrences. James is capable of exposing the mistakes which the associationists have made in their descriptions of the mental phenomena and demonstrating that, in fact, the associationists have totally failed to

Antecedent and Consequent Conditions of Initial Interview Techniques Common to Wolpe and Rogers

In psychotherapy research a major concern is to identify those therapy techniques that work and to study the conditions under which they work. In part, to address such an objective, an investigation might include study of the antecedent and consequent conditions of important therapy techniques, namely those shared by experienced and competent therapists (Bergin & Strupp, 1970, p.22; Goldfried, 1978; Kiesler, 1965; Lambert & Bergin, 1976; Mahrer, 1979). As such, the major purpose of this research is to compare and contrast how Wolpe and Rogers, experienced therapists of differing psychotherapeutic orientations, use similar initial interview techniques. In this pursuit two questions are central: (a) Under what conditions do Wolpe and Rogers use the same initial interview techniques, that is, what kinds of patient responses precede their use of common techniques? (b) What are the consequences or in-therapy outcomes of Wolpe's and Rogers' use of common techniques? That is, how do patients respond, or what kinds of statements do patients make subsequent to such techniques?

Since the actual common techniques in the initial interviews of Wolpe and Rogers are not yet known, the specific antecedent and consequent conditions cannot be predicted. The following sections, however, will review the literature with regard to the antecedent and consequent conditions of those techniques which the previous clinical and research literature anticipates may be common to both Wolpe's and Rogers' initial sessions, namely, telling the patient what the patient is like, reflection, and acknowledgment.

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present us any genuine picture of our mental lives. James then does not have any obstacle in refuting ~~this~~ most dominating school of psychology of his time and can easily pave the way to present, in his own opinion, an unmistakable theory on the structure of human beings' consciousness. Now, let us take a careful look at what does James say about the errors in the associationists' descriptions of the mental phenomena.

For James, all the errors in the associationists' introspective descriptions arise from one crucial weakness in all psychological investigations. That is the psychologist's fatal dependence on the common language. The psychologist has never really made up a set of technical language to describe the mental phenomena, so that, whenever he ~~wants~~ to give a report of a certain psychological episode, he has to turn to our common, daily language. But, unluckily, the common language appears to be an unsuitable tool for the psychologist to accomplish his aim. Here, allow us, first of all, to see how James describes the impotence of the common language with the associationists' use in their descriptions of the mental phenomena. James says,

The first of them arises from the misleading influence of speech. Language was originally made by men who were not psychologists, and most men today employ almost exclusively the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal passions of our life, anger, love, fear,

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hate, hope, and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, expect, think, know, dream, with the broadest genera of aesthetic feeling, joy sorrow, pleasure, pain, are the only facts of a subjective order which this vocabulary deigns to note by special words. The elementary qualities of sensation, bright, loud, red, blue, hot, cold, are, it is true, susceptible of being used in both an objective and a subjective sense. They stand for outer qualities and for the feelings which these arouse. But, the objective sense is the original sense, and still to-day we have to describe a large number of sensations by the name of the object from which they have most frequently been got. An orange color, an odor of violets, a cheesy taste, a thunderous sound, a fiery smart, etc. will recall what I mean. This absence of a special vocabulary for subjective facts hinders the study of all but the very coarsest of them.²³

Common language, according to James, is originally created to describe physical objects rather than psychological phenomena. When common language is used to describe mental phenomena, then, in Hans Linschoten's words, a kind of impotence will appear.²⁴ Common language, which is tailored to the special natures of the physical objects, is incapable of giving us any perfect illustrations of the psychological episodes. By using these objective oriented languages to describe the subjective occurrences, various kinds of deficiencies and impotences will, in James' opinion, appear in the associationists' expressions. The very lack of a suitable vocabulary, therefore, has led the associationists into making several fatal mistakes in their descriptions of mental

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phenomena. Because of the existence of these errors, James argues what the associationists give us, namely, the atomism or the so-called 'mind dust' theory, is anything but a genuine picture of mental phenomena. According to James, the errors which the associationists have made in their descriptions of the psychological phenomena can be classified into three major types. They are: a) the overlooking of some nameless mental states. b) The confusing of the structures of the objects of the mental states with the structures of the mental states themselves. c) The projection of one's knowledge of the objects of the mental states into one's descriptions of the mental states. In the following paragraphs, we attempt to present a thorough exposition of James' criticism of the various errors in the associationists' descriptions of our mental lives.

The first error that appears in the associationists' descriptions of the mental phenomena, according to James, is the associationists' overlooking of certain mental phenomena. James says,

Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing one great set of delusions which language inflicts on the mind.. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to denote a certain group of phenomena, we are then prone to suppose a substantive entity existing beyond the phenomena, of which the word

literature illuminating the underlying principles of his use of common techniques could be found. There seems to be no articulated source for basing a specific expectation. In spite of this glaring lack of data, the present author makes a general prediction that: both Wolpe and Rogers, proponents of different approaches to psychotherapy, will follow different guidelines for their use of common techniques; that is, they will use common initial interview techniques differently. Each therapist will use such techniques under different conditions, favoring different kinds of antecedent patient responses over others.

Consequent Conditions of Common Initial Interview Techniques

Given that the techniques common to both Wolpe's and Rogers' initial interviews have not yet been identified, the consequences specific to those techniques can not be stated. However, in the following section, the literature will be reviewed regarding how patients tend to respond to Wolpe's and Rogers' use of reflection, acknowledgement and telling the patient what the patient is like, those techniques expected to be common to their initial sessions.

Consequences of Rogers' Common Techniques: Rogers (1951, 1958, 1975; Rogers et.al., 1967) describes two specific consequences which usually occur following the expression of empathy, namely, patient self-exploration and the patient focusing on and relating to the therapist in an accepting manner.

With regard to the first consequence, the patient self-explores; that is, she talks about and relates to her "self". In this response, the patient describes the kind of person she is, the kinds of thoughts she has, the kinds of feelings and reactions she has, and the kinds of relationships she has. In essence, the patient's attention is focused on her self and the kind of person

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shall be the name. But the lack of a word quite as often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be there; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all, had we only grown up to hear it familiarly recognized in speech. It is hard to focus our attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts of most psychologists.²⁵

According to James, mental states can be classified into two types. James calls the first type of mental state the 'substantive parts of consciousness'. The characteristics of this kind of mental state are that they have in themselves a clear intentional object, for example, the thunderbolt of the 'hearing of the thunderbolt' or the red apple of the 'seeing of a red apple' or the 'imagining of a red apple'. James argues that the psychologist generally does not have any difficulty in describing this sort of mental state because they can call them by the names of their objects. But, in our consciousness, according to James, there still exists a second type of mental state which James calls the 'transitive parts of consciousness'. James claims that this type of mental state, unlike the 'substantive parts of consciousness', does not have a clear intentional object in itself. They are either the fading retentions of the past perceptions or the vague expectations of our coming perceptions. Whenever we have

D

she is, rather than on the therapist or something external.

In the therapeutic experience, to see one's attitudes, confusions, ambivalences, feelings, and perceptions accurately expressed by another, but stripped of their complications of emotions, is to see oneself objectively ...he (the patient) then is able to explore, for example, a vague feeling of guiltiness which he has experienced (Rogers, 1951, p. 40-41).

Although no study has looked at the specific consequences of Rogers' expression of empathy in the initial interview, a body of research exists which indicates that therapist's expressions of empathy do to some degree lead to patient self-exploration (Bergman, 1951; Bergin & Strupp, 1972; Kurtz & Grunmon, 1972; Michell, Bozarth, Krauft, 1977; Truax & Carkhuff, 1965; Truax & Mitchell, 1971).

With regard to the second consequence of therapist's expression of empathy, Rogers (1975) suggests that the patient will largely focus her attention on the therapist. That is, she will become more aware of and be in full interaction with the therapist, rather than focus upon external concerns or on the kind of person she is. In essence, the patient will largely accept and welcome what the therapist says.

Though it may not be articulated clearly, the experience goes something like this. "I have been talking about hidden things, partly veiled even from myself, feelings that are strange, possibly abnormal, feelings I have never communicated to another, nor even clearly to myself,

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a perception, an imagination or an illusion, the 'transitive parts of the consciousness' will hang around in the margins of the 'substantive parts of the consciousness'. In James' words, they surround the 'substantive parts of the consciousness' like the halos or the fringes. It is these 'transitive parts of consciousness' that connect the 'substantive parts of consciousness' to each other and constitute the background for the 'substantive parts of consciousness'. Like the Gestalt psychologists, James claims that the nature of the background of a certain mental state always has a decisive influence on the nature of this particular mental state. These 'transitive parts of consciousness' do not have in themselves any clear, distinguishable objects, so that the psychologist, who is used to calling the mental states by the names of the objects of the mental states, finds it extremely difficult to describe them. In their descriptions of the psychological phenomena, they just ignore the existences of the 'transitive parts of the consciousness'. This very overlooking of the 'transitive parts of consciousness', then, makes up the first error in the associationists' descriptions of their 'introspective observations'.

The second type of error that James accuses the associationists of making is the associationists' confusing of the structures of the objects of

and yet he (the therapist) has understood them even more clearly than I do. If he knows what I am talking about, what I mean, then to this degree I am not so strange, or alien, or set apart. I make sense to another human being. So I am in touch with, even in relationship with, others. I am no longer an isolate' (Rogers, 1975, p.6).

There is however no empirical literature which specifically addresses this second consequence with regard to Rogers' expression of empathy in the initial interview. Nor, to the present author's knowledge, is there any research addressing this issue in general.

The two consequences described are largely in relation to the therapist's expression of empathy. To some extent empathy can be expressed with several techniques, most commonly reflection and acknowledgement. However, the expression of empathy may also be transmitted by the therapist telling the patient about the patient or what the patient is like, since such a technique is both close to and difficult to distinguish from a reflection (Staines, 1969; Hill et.al., 1979; Rogers, 1942). To the extent that these three techniques may be operational components of the expression of empathy, it may be expected that the use of such techniques, by Rogers in the initial interview, might all lead to similar consequences.

Although the specific common techniques of Wolpe and Rogers are not known and the specific consequences cannot therefore be stated, the above literature provides some basis for a general prediction, namely, that certain kinds of patient responses will tend to follow Rogers' use of common techniques to a greater degree than other kinds of patient responses.

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consciousness with the structures of consciousness or the mental states themselves. James says,

But a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the dependence of psychology on common speech. Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several distinct things can only consist of several distinct bits of thought, or 'ideas'; that of an abstract or universal object can only be an abstract or universal idea. As each object may come and go, be forgotten and then thought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, self-identity and mobility. The thought of the object's recurrent identity is regarded as the identity of its recurrent thought and the perceptions of multiplicity, a co-existence, a succession, of perceptions.²⁶

Calling the mental states by the names of the objects of these particular mental states, James claims that the associationists have eventually failed to distinguish the structures of the objects of consciousness from the structures of consciousness. Thus, while the associationists attempt to give us the descriptions of the structures of the mental phenomena, they always give us, instead of the truthful illustrations of the mental phenomena, the descriptions of the natures of the objects of these mental phenomena, while still holding that these are the objective reports of our mental lives.

The third kind of error made by the associationists in their introspective descriptions are, in James'

Consequences of Wolpe's Common Techniques: The topic of immediate consequences, or how the patient responds to the certain initial interview techniques expected to be common for Wolpe, is given little attention in his clinical writings (Wolpe, 1958, 1973, 1976; Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966). Furthermore, neither empirical research on Wolpe or other behavior therapists, has yet addressed this important issue (i.e. identifying patients' responses to such techniques as reflection, acknowledgement or telling the patient what the patient is like). Due to this lack of clinical or research data, only a general prediction can be made for Wolpe, namely, that certain kinds of patient responses may tend to follow Wolpe's use of common techniques to a greater degree than other kinds of patient responses. This prediction rests on the notion that techniques, used by experienced therapists will elicit specific patient responses (Barnabei, Cormier & Nye, 1974; Gamsky & Farwell, 1966; Heller, 1963; Houts, MacIntosh & Moos, 1969; Krasner, 1962; Rotter, 1960; van der Veen, 1965).

Moreover, it is expected that since Wolpe and Rogers are from different therapeutic orientations, it may be expected that patients will respond to their use of common techniques differently.

Summary of Literature Review

In summary of Chapter One, the following are the questions this present research intends to answer, as well as the expectations provided by the literature regarding each of the research questions:

1. The first question is: Of the techniques used in initial interviews by Wolpe and Rogers, as proponents of different approaches to psychotherapy, are there any techniques which are used in common? The clinical and research literature confirms the difference between the,

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idea, the error of confusing a psychologist's knowledge of a certain object with the structure of the mental state of this particular object. James says,

The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par excellence. For some of the mischief, here too, language is to blame. The psychologist, as we remarked above (p. 183), stands outside of the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are for him. Now when it is a cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other way of naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from the case.²⁷

The psychologist, describing the psychological phenomena by the physically oriented language and being incapable of presenting any truthful illustration of how a certain object is perceived in his mind, many times, will fail to see the difference between his knowledge of a certain object and his perception of this same object. Therefore, while he is asked to give a faithful description of his perception of a certain object, he sometimes will give us, instead of a genuine report of how this object appears in his mind, his knowledge of this object. The switching of one's knowledge of a cognitive object with one's

techniques used by Wolpe and Rogers in the initial interview. However, there is some indication that both therapists will use the technique of telling the patient about the patient's problem and the patient's self. It is therefore expected that, although the two therapists will predominately use different techniques in the initial interview, at least this one technique will be used in common.

2. The second question is: What are the similarities and differences in the conditions under which Wolpe and Rogers, as proponents of different approaches to psychotherapy, use common techniques in the initial interview? That is, are these common techniques used following similar or different kinds of antecedent patient statements?

As proponents of different therapeutic approaches, it would seem that common initial interview techniques might be used under differing therapeutic conditions, i.e. following different kinds of patient statements. With regard to Wolpe, however, the literature offers essentially no basis for specific expectations. With regard to Rogers, the literature provides scant and competing expectations that Rogers may use initial interview techniques on either a selective or a non-selective basis. Given these considerations, it is hypothesized that Wolpe and Rogers will use common initial interview techniques (a) on a selective basis (i.e. following certain kinds of antecedent patient statements); and (b) they will use these common techniques in different ways (i.e. following different kinds of antecedent patient statements).

3. The third question may be stated as follows: What are the similarities and differences in the consequent conditions following Wolpe's and Rogers' use of common techniques in the initial interview? That is,

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perception of this same object, therefore, constitutes the third type of error in the associationists' description of the mental phenomena.

After this thorough exposition of the various errors which James accuses the associationists of making in their untruthful descriptions of the mental phenomena, we now believe that we are able to make a general summary of where, in James' opinion, the faults of the associationists lie. Because of the lack of the proper instrument, namely, a kind of language which is tailored to the special natures of the mental phenomena, the associationists, in their reports of the mental phenomena, are actually trapped into the pitfalls of either neglecting some nameless mental states or substituting what, in fact, are not the mental states for the psychological phenomena. In other words, the associationists have failed to offer us a description of the mental states as such. What, then, for James is the description of the mental phenomena which is qualified to be claimed as the truthful, objective or the faithful report of the mental states? From the errors which James accuses the associationists of making, we are capable of deducing three sorts of negative standards which, James has set for the psychologist who attempts to accomplish a truthful description of the psychological phenomena. Being fully aware of the dangers, the misleading

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powers, of the common language, the psychologist, in the process of making a faithful report of his psychological phenomena, must struggle very hard to avoid, first, neglecting even the vaguest, the most unnamable mental state, secondly, substituting what he knows for what he sees, and, thirdly, interpreting the nature of the psychological phenomena by the nature of the object of the psychological phenomena. In other words, for the sake of producing a faithful description of the mental phenomena, a psychologist must refrain from making any intellectual judgment, interpretation or selection of the psychological phenomena which he encounters in his introspection. Instead of actively manipulating the psychological datum which he can put his hand to, the psychologist should assume an extremely passive attitude towards the psychological phenomena. For James, to be faithful to what one sees in his immediate given experiences is the cardinal law which all the introspective psychologists have to obey. To present a truthful description of the psychological phenomena is nothing other than, using Heidegger's words in the "Introduction" of Being and Time, 'letting the psychological phenomena reveal themselves', through, in the case of the philosophical psychologists, the medium of the common, daily language.

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b) An Exposition of Husserl's
Notion of the Phenomenological
Description

After the above explication of James' notion of the faithful description of one's psychological phenomena, the question that faces us is, from the phenomenological point of view, how do we understand James' proposal of presenting a genuine report of one's psychological phenomena. We can pose our question in this way: in what sense can we claim that James' proposal of presenting a true picture of the mental phenomena is similar to Husserl's project of a phenomenological description? What are the basic similarities between these two methods? In order to acquire a base for this comparison, let us, here, first of all, present a simple exposition of Husserl's concept of the phenomenological description.

As we know, throughout all his publications, Husserl has declared repeatedly that the mission of a phenomenologist is to bring into the open the essences or the meanings of different phenomena. This declaration can be interpreted from two perspectives: from an objective perspective, it means that Husserl regards it as the ultimate assignment of a phenomenologist to expose the essences or the meanings of the objects of consciousness, the essential characteristics of how these objects will appear in pure experiences

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and the essential structure of the fundamental ground which makes these appearances a possibility, namely, the structure of the transcendental subjectivity. Seen from the subjective perspective, what Husserl attempts to accomplish is a thorough exploration of the essential constitution of the transcendental subjectivity through the procedure of uncovering the essences or the meanings of the different modes of the transcendental subjectivity's intentionality and the essences or the meanings of these intentionalities' intentional correlates, namely, the objects of consciousness. About this particular task of a phenomenologist, we can find Husserl explaining it in Logical Investigation, in this way,

This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experiments in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences.²⁸

And, in the Ideas, Husserl has also explicated to us the goal of a phenomenologist from an opposite perspective, i.e., the subjective perspective. He says,

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Eidetic phenomenology is restricted in this book to realm of essential structures of transcendental subjectivity immediately transparent to the mind.²⁹

From these two paragraphs in Husserl, we can formulate the complicated program of the Husserlian phenomenology into this simple formula: if the ultimate mission which Husserl attempts to fulfill in his phenomenology is the uncovering of the essences of the various regions of phenomena, then, phenomenological reduction is the method on which Husserl relies to perform a thorough purification of the datum in these various regions of phenomena, and, phenomenological description is the instrument which Husserl uses to bring out the essences (meanings) of these various regions of phenomena. Husserl believes that it is only through the phenomenologist's faithful, untwisted report that the essences (meanings) of the various regions of phenomena can be allowed to reveal themselves. And, sometimes, Husserl even claims bluntly that the entire enterprise of phenomenology is nothing other than the objective, genuine description of the essences of the various phenomena. He says,

Now phenomenology, in point of fact, is a pure descriptive discipline which studies the whole field of pure transcendental consciousness in the light of pure intuition.³⁰

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As concerns phenomenology, it aims at being a descriptive theory of the essences of pure transcendental experiences from the phenomenological standpoint.³¹

Now, the question which we have to answer here is this: what exactly is this technique of phenomenological description on which Husserl relies to fulfill his mission of bringing out the essences (meanings) of various phenomena?

First of all, allow us to take a look at Husserl's own explication of the peculiar characteristics of this method. He says,

[Phenomenological description], like every descriptive discipline, neither idealizing nor working at the substructure of things, it has its own justification. Whatever there may be in "reduced" experiences to grasp eidetically in pure intuition, whether as a real portion of such experience or as intentional correlate, that is its province, and is a vast source of absolute knowledge for it.³²

By a thorough analysis of this paragraph, we believe that we are able to grasp at least a partial comprehension of Husserl's concept of phenomenological description. First, Husserl cautions us that, phenomenological description, as a special type of discipline, attempts 'neither an idealizing nor a working at the substructure of things': In this sentence, Husserl has literally severed all the connections between phenomenological

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description and the two major techniques in modern philosophy: the empiricists or the naturalists' Occamian reduction and the rationalists or spiritualists' ontological explanation. Phenomenological description is not an Occam's razor. A phenomenologist does not intend to discard all surplus, chaotic or ambiguous elements in the phenomena and reduce the concrete, lumpy phenomena into a set of simple, essential and homogeneous basic building blocks, i.e., the physical or mental atoms. The unevenness, mistiness or indeterminacy of the phenomena is exactly the thing which a phenomenologist needs to tolerate. But if a phenomenologist does not get along with the empiricists' brutalization of the phenomena, that does not mean that they are sympathetic with the other camp of philosophers. A phenomenologist does not believe in constructing an ontological or metaphysical foundation for the existing phenomena. Phenomenological description, Husserl insists, however, is not an instrument for the excavation of the 'substructures'. What the phenomenological description aims at, Husserl claims in this paragraph, is to report as truly as possible all the essences that one is able to grasp intuitively in one's immediately given experience. In the phenomenological description, a phenomenologist not only will present a genuine picture of the essences of

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the objects of the consciousness, but he will also try to produce as accurately as possible a faithful presentation of how these objects are manifesting themselves in the stream of consciousness, or, in what manner these objects are known, and, then, the essential structure of the Cogito, the 'knower'.

In order to enable us to have an even clearer comprehension of phenomenological description, in the same section in Ideas, Husserl goes a step further to show us, by an example, how a phenomenological description should be done. As a compensation to the nearly sloganized explication of this key concept in Husserl's phenomenology, let us see what Husserl says in this example.

Husserl claims, first of all, that changing and fluctuating is part of the peculiarity of consciousness. In this flowing, unstable stream of consciousness, according to Husserl, an object will therefore manifest itself as being known in this particular way:

Let us take, for instance, an experience of the genus "imagery of a thing" as it is given us either in phenomenologically immanent perception or in some other (of course reduced) intuition. The phenomenologically particular object (the eidetic singularity) is then just this imagery of the thing in the whole wealth of its concreteness, precisely as it participates in the flow of experience, with the precise determinacy with which it lets its thing appear, now in this aspect, now in that, and with just that distinctness

asks for information about the patient and the problem and the therapist asks for information about an external situational context. Furthermore, there is no room to categorize those patient responses expected to occur in the initial sessions of Wolpe and Rogers, namely, statements relating to: the patient self-explores or describes the "self", the patient provides factual information about the problem, and the patient describes or provides information about an external situational context.

The system of Stiles (1979) also falls short of categorizing all the therapist and patient verbalizations which are expected to occur in Wolpe's and Rogers' initial sessions. For example, Wolpe's asking questions about the nature of the problem might be classified in the same category as his asking about the external situational context, and his telling the patient about external reality might be classed in the same category as his telling the patient what the patient is like. Likewise, patients describing the self or self-exploring would not necessarily be categorized differently from patients telling about external reality, or patients giving factual information about the problem.

Thus, of the few systems containing both therapist technique and patient response categories, each system does not have enough categories to classify all of Wolpe's and Rogers' techniques or the expected patient responses. Likewise, of those systems which classify only patient responses or therapist techniques, no one system has enough categories to classify all patient responses or therapist techniques which might occur in the initial interviews of Wolpe and Rogers.

For example, several systems designed to measure patient in-therapy

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or mistiness, that fluctuating clearness and intermittent obscurity, and so forth, which is peculiar to it.³³

Husserl claims that, confronted with such a piece of experience and attempting to make a phenomenological description of it, the one thing which a phenomenologist will never think of is translating this section of flowing flux into a set of exact and stable concepts. In Husserl's words, that is "We can see at once that a conceptual and terminological fixation of this and every similar flowing concretum is not to be thought of."³⁴ If a phenomenologist will try very hard to bring the perceived object into the clearest openness, or the so-called 'full givenness' as Husserl claims in section 67 of Ideas, this is tantamount to saying if a phenomenologist is anxious to grasp the essence of that which appears in this flux of consciousness, however, he has never spared himself the nuisance of reporting in an extremely faithful way in what distinctness or mistiness, what determinacy or indeterminacy this object presents itself. Unlike the empiricists, in his description of the perceived object, a phenomenologist never attempts any elimination of the various manifestations of this object. Husserl held that, if a phenomenologist wants to achieve a phenomenological description of certain perceived objects, he will not

responses, confine themselves to only a few kinds of categories which are conceptually linked to psychoanalytic theory. These systems, for example, measure a patient's level of anxiety, degree of hostility, drives in conflict, level of schizophrenic thinking, and ability to free associate (Borden, 1966; Gottschalk & Gleser, 1969; White, Fichtenbaum & Dollard, 1966a, 1966b). The systems of Klein, Mathieu, Gendlin and Kiesler (1970), and Truax and Carkhuff (1967), although derived from client-centered theory, measure a patient's level of experiencing and self-awareness. These systems do not contain categories which reflect those patient responses expected to occur in the initial interviews of Wolpe and Rogers.

Similarly, of those systems designed only to measure therapist techniques (Bandura, Lipsher, & Miller, 1960; Goodman & Dooley, 1967; Harway, Dittman, Raush, Bordin & Rigler, 1955; Hill, 1978; Howe & Pope, 1961; Siegman & Pope, 1962; Strupp, 1957), none have enough categories to classify all techniques expected to occur in the initial sessions of Wolpe and Rogers.

Thus, since no one system of content analysis fully meets the criteria set forth earlier, the present research will "borrow" the appropriate categories. That is, therapist techniques and patient responses categories will be drawn from established systems of content analysis to develop a measure which will be comprised of therapist and patient categories suitable to the needs of this project. The final product is essentially that used in the psychotherapy research project at the University of Ottawa.

Therapist Categories

The following therapist technique categories were borrowed or selected from other major systems of content analysis (The complete description of each therapist category is found in Appendix A).

1. The therapist structures the therapy session: The therapist clarifies the role of the patient as patient, tells the patient

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only report what stays in the core of this flux and possesses a peculiar characteristic of 'sameness', namely the object, but he will do his best to report this object in its various modes of manifestation.

After our analysis of Husserl's own explication of the concept of phenomenological description, and, after our scrutiny of the example given by Husserl to exemplify how a certain phenomenological description should be done, we believe that we are able to come to a very simple conclusion of what, in fact, Husserl means by the technique of phenomenological description. First, phenomenological description is an instrument by which Husserl attempts to bring into the open light all the essences in the phenomenologically reduced experiences, namely, the essence of the object of these experiences, the essential structure of this object's various manifestations, the essences of the cognitive activities and the essence of subjectivity which possesses these various activities. Secondly, the unique characteristic of phenomenological description lies in this discipline's absolute transparency. While any subject is presented in the phenomenological description, it will be presented absolutely as how it is, what it is. In the phenomenological description, we can neither find any addition, reduction, nor any distortion. All phenomena, therefore, will reveal

how therapy works, its benefits, its rationale, its advantages and disadvantages.

This category is similar to those of Structuring (Strupp, 1957), Structuring and Giving Information or Explanation (Snyder, 1945). It is also similar to the categories of Information (Hill, 1978) and Directions (Murray, 1956) although less broadly defined.

2. The therapist tells the patient what the patient is like:

In effect, the therapist names, labels, describes, tells about the kind of person the patient is. He tells the patient about the patient. This may include telling the patient about the kind of problem(s) he has, the kinds of thoughts he has, and the kinds of feelings he has. The therapist speaks from his own perspective, and, generally as an authority, tells the patient how the patient functions, what his interpersonal relationships are like, what kind of world the patient lives in and creates for himself, and what the patient's relationship to the self is like.

This category is taken from the category known as Interpretation in the systems of Dollard and Auld (1959), Goodman and Dooley (1976), Hill (1978), Siegman and Pope (1962), Snyder (1945), Stiles (1979) and Strupp (1957). It is also similar to what Bandura, Lipsher and Miller (1960), and Murray (1956) refer to as Labeling. The Confrontation category of Hill (1978) and the Confirmation category of Stiles (1979)

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themselves in their authentic forms.

c) The Basic Affinities between James' Notion of Faithful Description and Husserl's Notion of Phenomenological Description

The last question that faces us in this section is: what are the basic affinities between Husserl's project of the phenomenological description and James' proposal of giving a faithful report of the psychological phenomena. This question can be answered from two perspectives. First, from the purely technical point of view, we have to disclose the similar skills that both philosophers in their methodology advocate the use of. Secondly, from a philosophical standpoint, then, we have to dig into these two philosophers' discussions of their methodology to see if there exists a certain philosophical concept which both these two philosophers share and which can be regarded as the crucial affinity between them.

If we place Husserl's explication of the method of phenomenological description side by side with our reconstruction of James' method of faithful report of the mental phenomena, then, it is not difficult for us to detect the similar skills that are advocated in these two methodologies. The methods of both philosophers attempt an ideal of an absolute transparency. That means the subject matters can be described

also contain elements which approximate the above category.

3. The therapist asks the patient to provide data about what the patient or problem is like: The therapist is seeking to obtain more or less factual data about the problem or about the patient as related to the problem. The therapist's attention, to a large extent, is focused on the patient or the patient's problem. The therapist may gather information about the patient or problem by: (a) Inviting the patient to tell more about the problem in general, asking the patient for clarification, or indicating a desire to hear more about that aspect of the problem. (b) Asking direct fact-related questions about the problem, its history, and nature. (c) Asking about the patient as related to that specific problem, including the patient's history and the background of the problem in the patient's current and past life. (d) Asking about the patient's reactions, thoughts, feelings about the problem or his self. The therapist may also ask for the patient's causal explanations about the problem.

4. The therapist gathers data about and clarifies the external situational context: The therapist draws the patient's attention to, or clarifies and illuminates, some external situational context. This may be with respect to an object, figure, or situation. The therapist attends to, and asks for more information or impres-

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in an untwisted, undistorted way and then allowed to reveal themselves as they really are. Therefore, the skills that are advocated by these two philosophers in their methodologies are actually the skill to refrain from projecting any intellectual interpretation, judgment or selection into one's description of the subject matter. Or, we can interpret this as a technique to look at the object with a mind which is purged of all the philosophical dogmas, scientific assumptions or beliefs; then to present a genuine report of what one sees. What Husserl and James ask of the philosopher or the psychologist is to assume an extremely passive attitude towards their subject matter, to resign themselves unreservedly to the lumpy, concrete and uneven phenomena. Thus, from a purely technical point of view, we can say that the skills which both Husserl and James rely on to obtain the phenomenological description or faithful report of their subject matters are strikingly similar. Now, the problem is, can we regard this usage of the same sort of tool to pore into one's research data as a significant similarity between these two thinkers? We know, the descriptive method has been widely used by the scientists in different fields as well as by the philosophers in different schools. Therefore, if we intend to make a claim that James' proposal of presenting a faithful report of mental phenomena

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is similar to Husserl's project of giving a phenomenological description of the phenomenologically reduced experiences in the sense that both philosophers have planned to use the same sort of method to approach their subject matters, then, we are forced to admit that our claim is both superficial and insignificant. That means, if we attempt to argue that James' method of presenting a faithful report of the mental phenomena is similar to Husserl's method of giving a phenomenological description of the phenomenologically purified experiences, then, our argument has to be based on some more meaningful affinities between these two thinkers' methodologies. It is at this point that we have to retreat back to one important concept hidden behind these two thinkers' explications of their methodologies. Both Husserl and James claim that what they intend to accomplish in their descriptive method is to present a complete, unreduced report of what appears in the experience, from their discussion of how this goal can be achieved, we can discover one crucial affinity between these two philosophers: they share an unprecedented broad concept of experience. Here, let us present some explications on this statement.

First, we need to give an explanation of what we mean by the 'broad concept' of experience. The broad concept of experience is a term which we intend

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disclosure. Statements of this nature may include revelations about the therapist's own personal life, involvement with the patient's problem or symptoms, the way the therapist copes with this type of problem or symptom, his fantasies, images, associations, bodily-phenomena, his mistakes and errors, and what he seeks to do in the immediate therapy situation.

This category is similar to Self-Disclosure categories in other systems (Goodman & Dooley, 1976; Hill, 1978, Stiles, 1979). Moreover, this category is also similar to the major therapy technique of Self-Disclosure as described by Sidney Jourard (1971a, 1971b, 1978) and others (Bundza & Simonson, 1973; Epting et.al., 1977; Kempler, 1969; Simonson & Bahr, 1974; Weiner, 1972).

6. The therapist tells the patient what external reality is like:

The therapist interprets external reality by serving as the authority or the one who explains what the external situation, or state of events are really like. The therapist describes the relationship between the facts and the external event, he tells how events take place and what consequences will follow. The therapist provides an explanation of the situation, how and why it came about.

7 The above category, although confined to external reality, is commonly embodied within broadly defined categories such as Interpretation, Giving

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to use to contrast with the British empiricists' narrow concept of experience. Thus, in order to understand Husserl or James' 'broad concept of experience', we have to, first of all, take a look at the 'narrow concept of experience' in British empiricism or associationism. In an essay called "Husserl's Critique of Traditional Empiricism," John Heffner has given the British empiricists' theory of experience,

. . . the theory of experience accepted by the traditional empiricism is highly selective as well as profoundly atomistic. . . . Traditional empiricism has consistently refused to accept the entire phenomenal field at face value. Sense impressions are typically emphasized as fundamental and therefore uniquely qualified as the basis for knowledge claims, to the virtual exclusion of dreams, memories, and fantasies, which are disregarded as derivative.³⁵

We call the British empiricists' concept of experience a 'narrow concept of experience' because, as John Heffner points out, the empiricists have selected as the fundamental elements of experiences the sense impressions, or the mental atoms and failed to include in the concept of experience the entire phenomenal field. Heffner does not notice the error that subsists in the British empiricists' 'narrow concept of experience' is not merely their unequal treatment of sense impressions, or the sensations and other kinds of mental phenomena. The most crucial mistake made by the empiricists is .

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their misunderstanding of the nature of these impressions as well as their overlooking of other important parts of experiences.

According to both Husserl and James, this group of independent, separated, stable sense impressions or mental atoms are objects of the mental phenomena rather than the mental phenomena themselves. By narrowing down one's concept of experience to include in this concept only the objects of the mental phenomena means one has confined one's so-called experience to only one area of experience. Then, by mistaking the sense datum, the objects of the mental phenomena, for the mental phenomena themselves, the empiricists are induced to overlook two important elements in experience: first, the unique characteristic of the mental phenomenon, namely, its directedness towards its object or, in the Husserlian term, its intentionality. Secondly, the various relations between the mental phenomenon and its object, i.e., the various modes in which an object is intended or the various ways in which an object is meant.

Now, if we look back to both Husserl and James' explications of the phenomenological description or faithful report, it is not difficult for us to notice that both philosophers insist that, in order to present a faithful description of a certain object, one must

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not neglect the various modes in which this object is intended. In James' words, one must not overlook the fringe, the transitive parts of consciousness which surround this object, the substantive parts of consciousness. These various modes in which an object is intended or these different fringes or halos which surround the object are different ways in which we are related to this object. The meanings of the object are actually originated from these various relations between the object and the mental phenomenon. In both Husserl and James' proposal of giving a genuine report of experience, the concept of experience has been expanded to include not only the sense datum, but also the context of meanings in which these sense datum are being intended.

3. An Analysis of William James' Description of the Stream of Consciousness

In the former section, we presented an exposition of James' methodology. We examined James' accusation that the associationists' failed to provide us a genuine picture of the nature of the mental phenomena and gave our own interpretation of James' concept of the faithful report of mental lives. Using the method of 'looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover',

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James has made some crucial discoveries of the structure of the objects of consciousness, the functions of consciousness and the cognitive relations between consciousness and the objects of consciousness. We can say that these new discoveries have enabled James to conceive an original theory of perception which does bear a striking similarity to Husserl's phenomenology of perception. In this section, before we start to engage ourselves in the detailed analysis of James' unprecedented psychological discoveries, we will attempt to look into two general characteristics of mental lives which James explicates at the very beginning of his theory of perception. That is: a) the constant changes of our mental lives, and, b) the continuity of our mental lives.

James calls these mental phenomena or mental lives by the name of 'the stream of consciousness' or 'the stream of thought'. In James' words, he uses this term to "indicate all states of consciousness merely as such, and apart from their particular quality or cognitive function."³⁶ James uses this term to cover both sensations, and thoughts, as well as other mental functions indifferently. More important, we notice that, by this term, James intends to mean not only the continuous flux of the various mental activities or cognitive functions, but also the total stream

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of these activities bearing within themselves the various 'being thought as such' or the 'being felt as such'. If we use the Husserlian terminology, then, we can say that James' 'stream of thought' or 'stream of consciousness' is the flux of cogitations carrying within themselves their cogitatum or a stream of intentional experiences.

In The Principles of Psychology, James claims that the stream of consciousness is a flux of mental states which is both sensibly continuous and changing constantly. It is obvious that James presents the exposition of these two characteristics of our mental lives as a reaction to two basic assumptions in associationism. That is: the ever-recurrence of particular elementary mental atoms and the discreteness and self-sufficiency of these mental atoms. Nevertheless, if we try to look at these two concepts in the context of James' total theory of perception, then we are able to discover that these two Jamesian contentions of the nature of consciousness are more than just a sort of correction to the associationists' faulty portrayal of our mental lives. In fact, it is James' very discovery of the stream of consciousness' characteristic of constant changingness that leads James, later, in his discussion of the structures of the objects of consciousness, to the contention of the distinction

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between the objects and the mental states which are of these objects. According to James, the objects' capacity to reappear in an identical state has differentiated the objects from the mental states of these objects, namely, the flux of constant changingness. Furthermore, in his exposition on the continuity of the stream of consciousness, James talks about the thematic structure of the stream of consciousness. That means: within our stream of consciousness, objects are unified under several central themes and understood as a constituent of a coherent context of meaning. We can say that James' theory asserting the objects of consciousness are organized into various different contexts of meanings is totally based on his understanding of this particular nature of consciousness.

A. Thought is in Constant Change

Within each consciousness, thought is always changing. Both James and the associationists agree on this statement. Using James' words, "such a statement can awaken no possible protest from anyone."³⁷ "We all recognize as different great classes of our conscious states," James says, "Now we are seeing, now hearing, now reasoning, now willing, now recollecting, now expecting, now loving, now hating, and in a hundred other ways we know our minds to be alternately engaged."³⁸

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Both James and the associationist see the changing quality of our mental lives, their point of conflict is whether this complex, changing stream of thought can or cannot be dissolved down into some basic mental element which will remain unchanged in this flow of changes.

Adopting the framework of the Newtonian physicists in their investigation of the mental phenomena, the associationists believe that all the higher, complex mental states can be reduced into some basic, fundamental mental elements called the 'sensations', the 'simple ideas' or the 'mental atoms'. They claim that all the changes in our mental life are actually the result of the various combinations of these basic mental atoms. They also claim that, in these numberless types of combinations, basic mental elements are able to retain the same intrinsic qualities. Now, what James tries to argue in The Principles of Psychology is that these unchanged mental elements, these basic building blocks are merely the theoretical entities which can never be found in our real mental lives. Our stream of thought, according to James, is like a Heraclutusean flux in which everything is changing constantly and nothing, not even the simplest mental state is able to appear twice in the same state. In this section of our dissertation, we will attempt to present an examination

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of how James refutes the associationists' atomism and argues for the constant change of the mental phenomena.

The associationists' assumption of the ever-recurrence of the same mental state has been never confronted with any serious objection because, James claims, "our common experience seems at first sight to corroborate it entirely."³⁹ The associationists will ask, do we not find the same sensations, the same mental states, appearing again and again in our daily experiences? Are not the sensations we get from the same object, for example, always the same? Does not the same piano key, struck with the same force, make us hear in the same way? Does not the same grass give us the same feeling of green? And do we not get the same olfactory sensation, no matter how many times we put our nose to the same flask of cologne? In other words, in our common experience, does not the same quality of an object cause the same mental state to occur in our consciousness? James' reaction to these questions is that: at first sight, it seems so obvious that whenever a certain quality of a certain object appears, then, corresponding to this quality, a certain mental state will occur. But, James points out that, if one pores more carefully into our stream of consciousness, then, one can find out that, what actually

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appears in the stream of thought is the same object, not the same mental state. James says,

What is got twice is the same object. We hear the same note over and over again; we see the same quality of green, or smell the same objective perfume, or experience the same species of pain. The realities, concrete and abstract, physical and ideal, whose permanent existence we believe in, seem to be constantly coming up again before our thought, and lead us, in our carelessness, to suppose that our 'ideas' of them are the same idea.⁴⁰

According to James, the objects of our mental states, no matter whether they are the physical, the psychological or the ideal objects, all have a unique characteristic of constantly appearing before our eyes. It is, therefore, this constant reappearance of the same object that leads us, in our common experiences, to believe that, as a response to the reappearance of the particular object, the same mental states will recur. But, in James' opinion, this contention is totally based on the error of identifying the nature of the object of a certain mental state with this particular mental state. This error, James claims, appears in both the layman and the associationists' understanding of our mental phenomena. They both think that,

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If the thing is composed of parts, then we suppose that the thought of the thing must be composed of the thoughts of the parts. If the thing is simple, its thought is simple. If it is multitudinous, it must require a multitude of thoughts to think it. If a succession, only a succession of thoughts can know it. If permanent, its thought is permanent.⁴¹

It is this error that leads the associationists, according to James, to the assumption of the ever-recurrence of the mental atoms. They think that, as a certain quality of a certain object reappears, the mental state of this particular quality recurs. If some fundamental qualities will appear again and again in different objects, then the mental states of these qualities, the simple sensations or the mental atoms, recur again and again in the various complex mental phenomena. James, in The Principles of Psychology, compares these unaltered mental atoms to the Jack of Spades, and holds that the mental atoms, like the Jack of Spades, are merely mythological entities which never exist in reality. In fact, James claims, our streams of thought can be likened to the Heraclitusean flux, in which, nothing once gone is able to come back in the same nature and no mental state once past is able to reappear unaltered. If we observe more carefully our mental phenomena, then we can find out that, from the same object, we always get different sensations.

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In James' explications or arguments on the constant change of the stream of consciousness, we can detect unmistakably some elements of Gestalt psychology. Let us here see how James argues for this contention.

We are unable to get the same sensation from the same object because, James claims, the nature of our sensation is not decided totally by the nature of the object of a particular sensation. In fact, the nature of any single sensation is determined partly by the object of this sensation and partly by the nature of the stream of consciousness in which this sensation exists. In other words, the external context in which a sensation exists can alter the intrinsic nature of a sensation. James says,

. . . an impression feels very differently according to what has preceded it; as one color succeeding another is modified by the contrast, silence sounds delicious after noise, and a note, when the scale is sung up, sounds unlike itself when the scale is sung down, as the presence of certain lines in a figure changes the apparent form of the other lines, and as in music the whole aesthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set of sounds alters our feeling of another.⁴²

From this quotation, we can see that James has rejected a basic assumption of the traditional introspectionists. That is: from a certain stimulation we can always get a certain sensation. Like the

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Gestalt psychologists, James has noticed the dynamic relation existing between the parts and the whole, namely, the mutual influential roles played by the single sensations and the whole field of consciousness. He says, "Experience is remoulding us every moment; and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our experience of the world up to that date."⁴³

Both James and the Gestalt psychologists reject completely the associationists' concept of a passive, receptive mind. Mind is neither a white board on which an object is able to print its own image, nor an empty theatre in which sequences of impressions pass constantly. For James and the Gestalt psychologists, mind is actually the total field of our past experiences, or, as what James claims in the above quotation, "our experience of the world up to that date." In all the cognitive activities, while the mind absorbs a certain new sensation into itself, it performs a function of appropriating. In the process of appropriation, the intrinsic character of the new sensation will undergo a certain modification. Furthermore, because of the addition of this new element, the total field of our experience will be remoulded. Thus, for James, every cognitive activity, every acquisition of a new experience, is actually a process of the mutual modification between

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the mind and the new sensation. This discovery of the dynamic relation between a single sensation and the mind, induces James as well as the Gestalt psychologists to reject the associationists' 'constancy-hypothesis', a hypothesis that the nature of a sensation is totally determined by the nature of the object which gave us this particular sensation and from a certain stimulation a certain reaction cannot fail to appear in our mind. James' theory of the irrecurrence of the mental states, on the other hand, is based on his theory of the dynamic relation between mind and the sensation.

In James' opinion, a certain object or a certain quality of an object can appear again and again, but every time it appears, it will be perceived by a modified mind. After the addition of a new sensation the mind itself will undergo a modification. The intrinsic nature of a sensation is partly determined by the nature of the external context, and partly by the nature of the mind in which it exists. If no one object can be perceived more than once by the same mind, then, from the same object, we are unable to get the same sensation. Of this phenomena, James says, "Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of kind with other thoughts of the same fact."⁴⁴ Every mental state, thus, is

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a unique existence that once past will never come back in our stream of consciousness. According to James, the associationists' mental atoms, the basic building blocks which can appear again and again in various higher mental states, are merely theoretical entities resulting from the faulty observation of mental phenomena. Like a Heraclitusean flux, passing continuously, changing constantly and never-recurring, this is the first characteristic of our stream of consciousness.

B. Thought is Sensibly Continuous

In an article called "William James' Theory of the Transitive Parts of the Stream of Consciousness," Aron Gurwitsch says,

Besides Bergson and Husserl, it is James to whom we are indebted for the insights into the continuity and temporality of conscious life and the streamlike character of the latter. To James this continuity and coherence of experience was a topic of utmost concern, and his interest may be said to have revolved around this topic throughout all periods of his development.⁴⁵

In this section of our dissertation, we will attempt to present a preliminary examination of the problem of the continuity of the stream of consciousness. As we know, buried in James' exposition on the continuity and coherence of the stream of consciousness, there is an undeniable Husserlian theory on the structure

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of the objects of consciousness. We are not going to look into this particular point until the following chapter in our dissertation. Here, we will just limit our discussion to James' argument for the continuity and coherence of the stream of consciousness.

According to James, if the associationists' first error is to assume the recurrence of basic mental atoms, then, the second error in their psychology is their contention of the discreteness and discontinuity of the mental phenomena. The associationists regard the mental states as independent and self-sufficient units and the stream of consciousness as a train of these separate mental states, one succeeding the others. In the chapter 9 of The Principles of Psychology, James rejects this mosaic theory of the stream of consciousness; and presents to us a theory of the stream of consciousness being as a continuous and coherent context of meanings. One point that is worth noticing is James' theory of the continuity of our mental phenomena is much more profound and complicated than the Bergsonian concept of the interpenetration of the mental states and the temporality of our mental lives. James does discover that beneath every present mental state there does exist the shadowy retention of the past mental state and the vague anticipation of the coming mental state. But the talent of James as a philosopher is

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manifested in his ability to detect two unique characteristics of our mental phenomena. First, James notices that, though the objects of our consciousness may exist in an independent and discrete state, while they are perceived, they are always perceived as relating to each other. Secondly, James is able to observe that, hanging in the margin of our consciousness, there are some vague topics or subjects. It is these topics or subjects that unify a group of mental states together by giving them the sense of affinity, the sense of belonging to the same theme. Thus, we can say that James' notion of the continuity of the stream of consciousness is more than the Bergsonian concept of the duration of our mental states. For James, our mental states are continuous in the sense of sharing the same theme, being the manifestations of the same subject or the constituents of the same thematic field. It is this novel discovery that leads James, later, to claim that knowing is bestowing meaning on the object known and being known is being taken into a certain coherent context of meanings. However, before we go too far into the philosophical significances hidden in James' theory of the continuity of the stream of consciousness, let us, first of all, see how James argues for the continuity of the stream of consciousness.

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James holds that our mental states can be classified into two types: the substantive parts of consciousness and the transitive parts of consciousness. James claims that the difference between these two sorts of mental states is that the former passes in our mind at a slow and stable rate, while the latter has a special fleeting nature. But the more crucial difference between these two types of consciousness is whether they have or have not a definite object in themselves. James says, "When the rate is slow, we are aware of the object of our thought in a comparatively restful and stable way."⁴⁶ "When rapid, we are aware of a passage, a relation, a transition from it, or between it and something else."⁴⁷ Thus, we can reach a preliminary conclusion, the substantive parts of consciousness are the mental states, call them sensations, imaginations or illusions which carry a distinctive object in themselves and are thus named after their objects. The transitive parts of consciousness are the nameless, imageless mental states which exist as the transition, the passage between the substantive parts of consciousness, the fringes or halos which surround or stay in the margins of the substantive parts of consciousness. It is very easy for us to be aware of the existence of the substantive parts of consciousness because whenever we look into our mind, we will have no difficulty to find seeing,

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thinking or imagining going on there. On the other hand, because of the fleeting and unstable nature of 'the transitive parts of consciousness', it is very difficult for us, even the introspective psychologists, to notice their existence. James says,

Now it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts for what they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them. While if we wait till the conclusion be reached, it so exceeds them in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses, and swallows them up in its glare.⁴⁸

According to James, it is this overlooking of 'the transitive parts of consciousness' as well as the undue emphasizing of the substantive parts of consciousness that leads the traditional psychologists, the associationists, to believe that our stream of consciousness is constituted of a train of unconnected, self-sufficient mental units. In James' words,

The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailful, spoonful, quartpotful, barrelful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow.⁴⁹

James believes, by the uncovering of these neglected parts of consciousness he is able, on the one hand, to overthrow the associationists' atomism,

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and, on the other hand, to demonstrate the continuity of the stream of consciousness.

It is not difficult for us to understand James' notion of 'the substantive parts of consciousness'. As we have already pointed out in our former explications they are the mental states possessing distinctive objects and thus can be named after their objects. Our seeing of a chair, imagining a unicorn or conceiving of an abstract theory, therefore, in James' opinion, are all 'the substantive parts of consciousness'. But it is not so easy to grasp James' concept of 'the transitive parts of consciousness'. In the following pages, we intend to present an explication of James' notion of 'the transitive parts of consciousness'.

In The Principles of Psychology, under the label 'the transitive parts of consciousness', we can find two sorts of mental phenomena. James calls the first sort 'the sense of relation' and the second sort 'the fringe of consciousness', 'the margin of consciousness' or 'the psychic overtone'. James claims the associationists, while they are all aware of the existence of 'the substantive parts of consciousness', neglect the presence of feelings of relations between these larger bits of consciousness. He says,

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If there be such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum natura, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known. There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought.⁵⁰

We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold.⁵¹

The objects of our consciousness may be independent of each other and exist in a discrete and unconnected state, yet, while they are perceived or conceived, they are always perceived or conceived as relating to each other. Thus, James claims that, if we are more careful in our observations of our mental phenomena, then, it is not difficult for us to discover, in the so-called gaps between 'the substantive parts of consciousness', there actually exists some sense of relation. James calls these senses of relation a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, or a feeling of by, etc. Although these mental states do not refer to any definite intentional objects, their presence, in James' opinion, is as obvious as 'the substantive parts of consciousness'. The sense of relation not only cements the bits of consciousness together, but,

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for James, it is this sense of relation that transforms the unconnected and thus meaningless sense-datum into knowledge about something. In other words, with these feelings of relation, the objects of our consciousness are changed from the dumb 'mere there' into something understood.

The second type of transitive parts of consciousness are called by James 'the fringe of consciousness', 'the psychic overtone', 'the psychic suffusion' or 'the feelings of tendency'. By using this term, James attempts to indicate a number of ambiguous, imageless and unstable 'feelings' lingering in the margin of our consciousness. It can mean a vague anticipation, a not-yet manifested central idea, a certain feeling of harmony, discord or a sense of affinity. James' ability at introspective observation is shown in his description of these long time neglected mental phenomena. Here, let us see how James talks about them:

First, James claims that, floating in our daily experience, there is always some nameless, vague sense of direction or expectation. He says,

... suppose three successive persons say to us: "Wait!" "Hark!" "Look!" Our consciousness is thrown into three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no definite object is before it in any one of the three cases.⁵²

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Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein, but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensively active.⁵³

And has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his intention of saying a thing before he has said it? It is an entirely definite intention, distinct from all other intentions, an absolute distinct state of consciousness, therefore; and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images, either of words or of things? Hardly anything!⁵⁴

From the above quotations, we can deduce that, for James, the fringe of consciousness can mean a sort of ambiguous foresight of the coming events. This is the shadowy determination which the present mental state casts or projects on the coming mental state. It can also mean a vague expectation. This expectation sometimes is the fading out of a certain forgotten name. It hangs at the border of our consciousness causing a gap in our consciousness, an intensively active gap expecting a certain filling, namely, this forgotten name. At other times, this expectation is a certain direction, as in the third example given by James it can appear as the intention of saying a thing before one has said it. But these vague anticipations are not the only psychic suffusion that James claims to present in our mental lives. He gives us another example: "What is that shadowy scheme of the 'form'

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of an opera, play or book, which remains in our mind and on which we pass judgment when the actual thing is done?"⁵⁵

In this example, the psychic overtone is a vague central idea or a central theme that overshadows a group of mental states. This central idea causes us to expect what the coming mental state should be like. If the coming mental state does meet our vague expectations or realize our underlying idea, then, in the margin of our consciousness, a feeling of harmony will emerge, if not, then, a feeling of discord will occur. These weak feelings of harmony or discord are, for James, another type of 'fringe of consciousness'. The last type of psychic overtone is called, by James, 'the sense of affinity'. James says "In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve."⁵⁶

In our stream of consciousness, the mental states are naturally grouped under certain subjects or topics and become the manifestations of this subject or topic. For example, the seeing of pink, the smelling of a fragrance and the touch of softness will all revolve around a subject, namely, the cherry flower, and become the various manifestations of this particular subject. In James' opinion, all the mental states related to the same subject or topic, thus, will share a feeling

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of affinity. It is a feeling of belonging to the same group or being part of the same thematic field; and exists as a halo that surrounds a certain group of mental states.

In James' opinion, atomism, a theory that claims our mental life is a succession of independent, discrete and self-sufficient mental units, is a theory based solely on the atomists' faulty observations of our stream of consciousness. They overlook the existence of 'the transitive parts of consciousness'. Through the uncovering of these fleeting and imageless mental phenomena, James has, in fact, presented us a totally different picture of our mental life. 'The transitive parts of consciousness' represent mental phenomena which are not and cannot be reduced into the sense-datum. From James' various illustrations of these unstable, nameless mental phenomena, we can grasp that the so-called 'transitive parts of consciousness' are actually the subjective interpretation, intention or feeling of relation between certain two sense-data, etc., which always accompanies the sense-datum as it appears in our mental life. The presence of these psychic suffusions transforms the unrelated and thus, for us, meaningless and dumb sense-datum into contexts of meanings, namely, the numberless thematic fields. They unify the sense-data by conferring

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on them the meaning of being qualities of a certain object or the constituents of a certain unitary theme, and by knitting them into the complicated nets of relations. For example, the intention of saying something can bind a series of words together by making them into a meaningful whole sentence and each word a constituent of this sentence. The sense of affinity, e.g. the sense of being part of the same cherry flower can unify a group of smell, touch and sight together, transforming them into the various qualities of a certain object. The objects of our consciousness may be discrete and unrelated to each other, but, in James' opinion, when they are perceived or conceived, they are always perceived or conceived as relating to each other in a pattern. An isolated, independent and self-sufficient mental state, like the ever-recurrent mental atom, is a theoretical entity which one can never find in real mental life. Our streams of consciousness are continuous and coherent in the sense that all the units in this stream, namely, all the mental states, instead of being just co-present with each other, are woven into a thematic field. Our mental lives, in fact, are made up of these various contexts of meaning. Later, in the second volume of The Principles of Psychology, these are labelled by James as 'the different orders of reality'.

Chapter I

Notes

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⁶ Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 264,

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¹² James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 185.

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- 16 Franz Brentano, Psychologie Du Point De Vue Empirique, trans. Maurice de Gandillac (Paris: Aubier, 1944), chapter 2, section 3.
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- 21 Husserl, Ideas, section 38.
- 22 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 184.
- 23 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 195.
- 24 Linschoten, chapter 2, section 8.
- 25 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 195.
- 26 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, pp. 195-96.

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- 34 Husserl, Ideas, section 75. p. 209
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Chapter I
Notes

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Chapter II

An Analysis of William James' Theory on the Structure of the Object of Consciousness

1. The Distinction Between Object of
Consciousness and Consciousness--
A Phenomenological Interpretation
of James' Refutation of
Mind-stuff Theory

In a footnote at the end of Volume I of Logical Investigations, Husserl acknowledges William James' influence on his philosophical development in these words,

It will be apparent from the present work that James' genius-like observations in the field of descriptive psychology of the cognitive experiences are far from making psychologism inevitable. For the help and progress which I owe to this excellent investigator in the field of descriptive analysis have only aided my emancipation from the psychologistic position.¹

From Husserl's work, a critical study of Cornelius' modern Humeanism, in which this particular footnote appears, we know that the so-called genius-like observations of James are, in fact, James' capability to distinguish the object of consciousness from consciousness. Using Husserl's terms, that is James' ability to

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distinguish the intentional object, namely, the object of consciousness, from 'the intentional experience', namely, the consciousness. James' novel findings in the field of cognitive psychology had helped Husserl to discover the crucial mistake made by all the philosophers in the camp of psychologism, that is, the identification of the object of consciousness with consciousness.

This enabled Husserl to liberate himself from this intellectual pitfall of his time. In this section of our dissertation, before we begin to look into the similarities between James and Husserl's theories on the structure of the object of consciousness, we attempt to present an examination of this interesting issue in James' theory of perception, namely, the distinction between the object of consciousness and consciousness.

James explicates his theory on the distinction between the object of consciousness and consciousness in two places in The Principles of Psychology, first, in chapter 6, "The Mind-stuff Theory," and secondly, in chapter 9, "The Stream of Consciousness." Like the other original discoveries in his studies of perception, the crucial significance of this novel finding does not dawn on James completely. The primary reason for him to claim the difference in structure between the object of consciousness and consciousness is to counteract one crucial assumption in associationism,

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that all complex mental states are the results of various modes of association of simple mental states. Therefore, we have to expose how this striking phenomenologically oriented notion is advocated in his refutation of this particular basic assumption, namely, the so-called mind-stuff theory. Then, we can go a step further to examine the significance of this concept from a phenomenological point of view.

As we have already mentioned in our analysis of James' criticism of the associationists' methodology as well as in our exposition of James' contention of the Heraclitusian nature of the stream of consciousness, one of the most important occurrences in the development of modern psychology is the adoption of the framework of Newtonian physics into the research of human beings' mental life. R. B. MacLeod, in an article called "Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology," has made such an observation of the characteristic of modern psychology in this way:

At any rate, whether we follow Locke, Berkeley, or any of their successors, associationism was born of Newtonian physics and nurtured throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the Newtonian philosophy. All mental life was explained away through the reduction of the complex to the simple; even when the term "idea" was replaced by elementary stimulus-response combination, the idea of a science of mind was still essentially Newtonian.²

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The mind-stuff theory, or the mind-dust theory put forward by the then renowned philosopher, Herbert Spencer, is the materialization of this sort of psychological speculation in a most radical form. Understanding human beings' mental phenomena by the model of the Newtonian theory on the structure of physical nature, this school of psychologists holds that mental states are all compounds, and, thus can be dissolved into basic mental units, homogeneous mental atoms or mind-dust. (In The Principles of Psychology, James makes these remarks on the common characteristics of this school of psychological thinking, "The theory of 'mind-stuff' is the theory that our mental states are compounds, expressed in its most radical form."³ "One of the obscurest of the assumptions of which I speak is the assumption that our mental states are composite in structure, made up of smaller states conjoined."⁴

From these brief quotations, we are able to grasp a clear picture of the central ideas sustained in the mind-stuff theory. Nevertheless, in order to obtain a more thorough understanding of this school of psychology, let us look into Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology, and see how he puts forth the crucial concept of this theory. He writes,

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Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of which consciousness is built up, appear to be severally simple, homogeneous, unanalyzable, or of inscrutable natures, yet they are not so. There is at least one kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced, seems elementary, that is demonstrably not elementary. And after resolving it into its proximate components, we can scarcely help suspecting that other apparently elementary feelings are also compound, and may have proximate components like those which we can in this one instance identify.

Musical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple feeling which is clearly resolvable into simpler feelings. Well known experiments prove that when equal blows or taps are made one after another at a rate not exceeding some sixteen per second, the effect of each is perceived as a separate noise; but when the rapidity with which the blows follow one another exceeds this, the noises are no longer identified in separate states of consciousness, called a tone.

If the different sensations known as sounds are built out of a common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred so likewise are the different sensations known as tastes, and the different sensations known as odors, and the different sensations known as colors?

There may be a single primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness may be produced by the compounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher degree: so producing increased multiplicity, variety and complexity.

It is possible, then--may we not even say probable?--that some thing of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness, and that all the unlikeness among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of this ultimate unit.⁵

From the above long quotation, it is easy for us to detect an obvious Newtonian reductionism in Herbert Spencer's reasonings. Spencer, like other associationists,

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holds that the more advanced, thus more complicated mental states, can be reduced into the various combinations of some simple, elementary mental states. But the radicality of Spencer's theory lies in his claim that these qualitatively different basic mental states can be reduced further into a homogeneous mind-stuff called a nervous shock. Even though a nervous shock only possesses a minimal degree of perceptibility, nevertheless, the numberless varieties of our mental phenomena, according to Spencer, are the results of the different modes and degrees of integrations of these ultimate units.

James' criticism of the mind-stuff theory is that the associationists' contention of the mental states' reducibility into simple mental units, like their proclamation of the ever-recurrence of certain basic mental units, is, in fact, the result of an inability to distinguish the structure of the object of mental state from the mental state itself. James claims that all the associationists have an inveterate habit; whenever they try introspectively to describe one of our mental states they drop the mental state as it is in itself and talk of something else. They always describe the structure of the object that appears to the mental state, or their own knowledge of the structure of the object of the mental state. Thus, if we try to

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describe the structure of the mental state of a table, they will drop the description of the mental state and try to describe the structure of the table that appears to this particular mental state and claim that the mental state is made up of the mental states of four legs and one top. While attempting to give an illustration of the nature of the mental state of a pack of cards, they will give us, instead of the constitution of the mental state itself, an illustration of their knowledge of the object of this mental state. They will claim that a mental state of a pack of cards is composed of a number of mental states of one card. James points out that it is this error in the associationists' introspection that lures them to assume that the structure of the mental state is parallel to the structure of the object of the mental state. The mind-stuff theory's proposition of the reducibility of the mental state or the mental state's compositional structure, therefore, is a logical deduction from this very erroneous assumption. The psychologists of the school of the mind-stuff theory think that, if a certain complicated object is composed of a group of simpler objects, and these simpler objects, in turn, can be further resolved into some basic material units called atoms, then, corresponding to the structure of this particular object, the mental state of this object

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should be reducible to a group of basic mental units, the mental atoms or the mind-dust. In James' words,

The ordinary associationist-psychology supposes that whenever an object of thought contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of just as many ideas, one for each element, and all fused together in appearance, but really separate.⁶

James argues that the associationists' compound theory simply does not reflect the real structures of our mental states. According to James, if one looks more carefully into the nature of one's consciousness, then, one can find out that, contrary to the associationists' assumptions, the structure of consciousness does not correspond to the structures of the objects of consciousness. In other words, though simpler objects can be combined into more complex objects, the lower, simpler mental states cannot be integrated into the higher, compound mental states. James says,

The associationists say the mind is constituted by a multiplicity of distinct "ideas" associated into an unity. There is, they say, an idea of a, and also an idea of b. Therefore, they say, there is an idea of a+b, or of a and b together. Which is like saying that the mathematical square of a plus that of b is equal to the square of a+b, a palpable untruth. Idea a + idea b is not identical with idea of (a+b). It is one, they are two, in it, what knows a also know b; in them, what knows a is expressly posited as not knowing b, etc. In short, the two separate ideas can never by any logic be made to figure as one and the same thing as the "associated idea".⁷

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As James argues in the above paragraph, it is obvious that idea $a + b$ is not equal to idea $(a+b)$. What is presented in the formula, idea $a + b$, is the relation between two mental states, idea a and b . What is presented in the latter formula, on the other hand, is an idea of the relation between two objects, namely, the idea of object a plus object b . Of course, we can have an idea a , an idea b , and then realize that we have idea $a + b$. But, our realization or reflection, the idea (idea $a + b$), is a new mental state rather than the mixture of idea a and idea b , namely, the idea $(a+b)$. Or, we can use another example given by James. We know that the color green is the combination of the color yellow and blue, but, we cannot mix the mental state of yellow and the mental state of blue and obtain a mental state of green. An idea of a mixture, contrary to the assumption of the associationists, is not a mixture of ideas, i.e., an idea of a hot potato is not a hot idea of potato, or, an idea of a big man is not a big idea of man, etc.

From this sort of reasoning, James reaches the conclusion that, no matter how complex an object is, the consciousness of this object is always a simple, unitary state of mind. According to James, irreducibility, like irrecurrence, is the essential characteristic

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of our mental states. He says,

There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the notion of such a thing is a chimera. . . Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from the outset in an unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a simple psychosis, feeling, or state of mind.⁸

In other words, multiple objects, for example, a group of men, can be thought of by one single mental state, rather than a group of mental states. Furthermore, while the same object appears again and again on various occasions, instead of being thought of by the same recurring mental state, it is, in fact, being thought of by multiple different mental states. In James' opinion, the associationists' theory of the parallel structures between the object of consciousness and consciousness does not succeed in giving us a real picture of the relation between these two sorts of entities. According to James, the structure of the mental state is totally different from the structure of the object of the mental state.

After this exposition of James' discovery of the difference in structures between the object of consciousness and consciousness, the question we wish to pose is: what is the significance of James' notion of the distinction between the object of consciousness and consciousness? Of course, putting ourselves

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in James' standpoint, the notion of the difference in structure between the object of consciousness and consciousness, is able to provide us a basis for the overthrowing of the mind-dust theory, and thus to rescue our studies of mental phenomena from the invasion of Newtonian philosophy. But, if we put ourselves in the position of a phenomenologist, then we will be able to look at James' advocacy of the heterogeneity in structure between consciousness and its object from a different perspective. Instead of finding a basis to prevent the psychologists in the atomistic tradition from reducing the mental phenomena into some homogeneous building blocks, what we see is James' ability to distinguish the objects of consciousness from the consciousness of these objects. As either Husserl,⁹ Aron Gurwitsch,¹⁰ or James Edie¹¹ point out, it is this discovery of the difference in constitution between consciousness and the object of consciousness that saves James' investigation of the nature of the objects of consciousness from slipping into a psychologistic position. It lays a foundation for the establishment of a crucial phenomenological concept in James' theory of perception, namely, the concept of the autonomy of the sphere of the objects of consciousness. Here, let us see in what sense James' separation of the object of consciousness from consciousness can pave the way

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for the establishment of the concept of the autonomy of the sphere of the objects of consciousness.

As we have already mentioned, in our examination of the methodology of James' psychological investigations, James considers both consciousness, the object of consciousness and the relation between consciousness and its object as the subject matter of his psychological analysis. In order to guarantee a strict scientific basis for his psychological investigations, James, like Husserl, has plunged into the stream of consciousness, namely, the self-evident, immediately given experiences to seek the indubitable datum for his psychological investigations. In other words, by 'looking into his own mind', what James attempts to find is not only the essential nature of the object of consciousness, the flux of thinking, seeing, feeling or imagining, etc., but also the essential structures of what is seen, what is imagined, or what is thought, etc. If James, like Wundt, Herbert, Spencer, Hume, James Mill, J. S. Mill, or other associationists believes that the structures of the objects of consciousness are paralleled to the structures of consciousness, or, vice versa, then, it would be almost inevitable for his investigations to slip into the pitfall of psychologism. He would then explain away the characteristics of the constitution of a single object or

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the relation between any two objects by reducing them into some psychological phenomena or psychological laws. For example, by observing the unique nature of the irrecurrence of the mental states, and by assuming that mental states are the exact copies, the inner images of the outer objects, it is very easy for James, like Hume, to deny the endurance of the object of consciousness, reducing the identity of the object of consciousness to a series of similar sensations. Or, in another case, by seeing the so-called causality, when being perceived is perceived as the temporal succession between two mental states, then, by supposing the similarity in structures between consciousness and its objects, James will, like Hume, be lured to explain causality away as a pattern of succession which is always believed to exist between two objects. In other words, without the realization of the heterogeneity in structures between consciousness and its objects, it is impossible for James, who intends to grasp the essential structures of the objects of consciousness through the analysis of the immediately given experiences, to be immune from the error of transferring the characteristics of consciousness to its objects. It is this discovery of the differences in constitutions between consciousness and the objects of consciousness that enables James to pierce through the layers of

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intentional experiences and secure the knowledge of the essential structure of the objects of consciousness. He also is, thus, able to realize the autonomy of the sphere of the objects of consciousness in the sense of realizing that the structures of the objects of consciousness are totally independent of the structures of the consciousness. If we look back into the history of philosophy, we can see that, as Husserl, in Logical Investigations has pointed out,¹² it is this very realization of the autonomy of the sphere of the objects of consciousness that enables Husserl to emancipate himself from the psychologistic position. What Husserl refers to as James' genius-like observations in the field of descriptive psychology of the cognitive experiences are nothing other than James' observations of the heterogeneity in structures between consciousness and its objects. As Husserl, in Logical Investigations points out,¹³ or as John Wild, in an article called "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism: Its Historic Roots and Contemporary Relevance" points out,¹⁴ the nineteenth century psychologism held by James Mill, J. S. Mill, Sigwart or Lipps, etc., is, in fact, nothing other than a school of philosophical speculations based on this erroneous confusion of the structure of the objects of consciousness with the structure of consciousness. This very confusion has led the philosophers in the

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camp of psychologism to reduce the mathematical rules or the logical laws to various empirical habits that govern the psychological acts as counting, proving, deducing or reasoning, etc., and to identify the objective validity with subjective feeling of validity, etc. In other words, in the nineteenth century psychologism, the objective sphere of absolute truth or absolute necessity has collapsed into the subjective domain of empirical, contingent psychological phenomena. James, by proposing the heterogeneity in structures between consciousness and its objects, has knocked down the basic assumption in psychologism, the assumption that the structures of the objects of consciousness are similar to the structures of consciousness. He thus created a foundation for the restoration of autonomy to the sphere of the objects of consciousness.

The crucial phenomenological concept of the absolute objectivity of the objects of consciousness is seen in James' rejection of the mind-dust theory, particularly in his assertion that a multiple unit of objects can be conceived by a single, unitary mental state. And that a single object can be conceived of by a number of succeeding mental states. We are able to detect another crucial phenomenological concept. This is the phenomenological concept of objects of consciousness as transcendent existences. As we

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see it, since Descartes dissected reality into two separated, unbridgable worlds, the world of cognition and the world of extension, philosophers in both the Cartesian tradition and the tradition of British empiricism tended to consider consciousness as a closed, self-sufficient sphere which has no inter-relation with the external world. The immediately given objects of consciousness, for this group of philosophers, thus, are the immanent mental images of the transcendent objects rather than the transcendent objects themselves. They held that, in every pulse of consciousness, in every pulse of sensation, perception or imagination, there exists an object of consciousness, namely, a what is sensed, a what is perceived, or a what is imagined, etc. The crucial point here is that, for them, these objects of consciousness are nothing other than the content of these various pulses of consciousness and constitute parts of the stream of consciousness. Consciousness, according to this group of philosophers, is absolutely unable to reach something outside itself. An object of consciousness, therefore, must be something existing inside the consciousness, namely, a sort of immanent existence rather than a transcendent being. Now, by proposing that a single, unitary pulse of consciousness can have two or more separate entities as its object, and that multiple units of consciousness

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can direct themselves towards one single, self-same object, James has set a foundation for the rejection of the post-Cartesian philosophers' theory of consciousness as a closed, self-sufficient sphere. As we see, if an object of a mental state is, like Brentano or the philosophers in either the Cartesian or the Humean traditions claim, the content of this mental state, then it is impossible for a single, unitary pulse of consciousness to have two or more separated entities as its objects. The reason is that it is impossible for a simple, undivided, uncomposite mental state to have two or more separate contents. On the other hand, as all the mental states do have the characteristic of irrecurrence, the characteristic of being unable to appear twice in the same way, therefore, a succession of multiple mental states must have a succession of different contents. If an object of a mental state is its content, then it is impossible for multiple states of consciousness to have the same object as their contents. By advocating that the mental state of a complex object or a group of separate objects is a single, simple pulse of consciousness and that a succession of mental states can be conscious of an identical, self-same object, James, in fact, has denied that an object of a certain mental state constitutes the content of this mental state. In other words,

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by holding that the structure of an object of a mental state is totally different from the structure of this mental state itself, James has already laid the ground for the proposal that an object of consciousness is something other than the consciousness itself, and that it is a sort of transcendent existence.

Thus, we can conclude that what James originally attempted to achieve in his refutation of the mind-dust theory is to prevent the atomists from reducing the structures of the mental phenomena into the structures of the physical phenomena. What we, from a phenomenological point of view, see in James' rejection of the mind-dust theory is his ability to rescue the objects of consciousness from a total collapse into the psychological sphere. From James' exposition of the heterogeneity in structures between consciousness and its object, we are able to derive two crucial phenomenological concepts about the characteristics of the objects of consciousness. First is the phenomenological concept that, though to be conceived of is the essential characteristic of an object of consciousness, nevertheless, an object of consciousness can have an independent structure which is totally different from the structure of the consciousness. Secondly is the crucial phenomenological concept that an object of consciousness is a transcendent existence outside the stream of

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consciousness. It is this realization of the independence both in structure and in existence of an object of consciousness that guides James, later, to deduce that the ultimate relation between consciousness and its object is, neither one being the other, one copying the other nor one creating the other, but is and only is one knowing, and the other being known. What exists between consciousness and its object is solely the cognitive relation. James says,

The psychologists' attitude towards cognition will be so important in the sequel that we must not leave it until it is made perfectly clear. It is a thorough going dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world and one simply knows, or is known unto its counterpart. This singular relation is not to be expressed in any lower term, or translated into any more intelligible name.¹⁵

It is undeniable that, in the above quotation, James still holds a naive dualistic position. His concept of subject-object relation is quite far away from the Husserlian concept of noesis-noema in the sense that his concept has not undergone any phenomenological purification. Nevertheless, as Husserl points out in Logical Investigations, James' genius-like observations have led him, in his descriptions of the

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cognitive experience, to distinguish the object of consciousness from consciousness, and thus realize that being known is the ultimate characteristic of the object of consciousness. Therefore, we can say that, to a certain extent, James has, in his rejection of the atomistic structure of mental states, laid a foundation for a crucial phenomenological enterprise, namely, the enterprise of restoring absolute objectivity to the objects of consciousness.

2. A Comparison Between William James' Theory on the Structure of the Object of Consciousness and Edmund Husserl's Analysis of the Constitution of Perceptual Noema

In the previous section of our dissertation, we have tried to explain how James, in his refutation of the mind-stuff theory, knocked down a basic assumption in psychologism, namely, the similarities in structures between consciousness and its object. He, thus, restores the absolute objectivity of the object of consciousness. In this section, we attempt to examine James' theory of the constitution of the objects of consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. Our purpose is to demonstrate that, between James' description of the structure of the object of

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consciousness and Husserl's analysis of the constitution of perceptual noema, there, in fact, exist a number of striking affinities. Due to the appearance of these similarities, it will not be inappropriate for us to claim that, from James' explication of the structure of the thought's objects, there actually emerges a Husserlian theory of perceptual noema, appearing in a ruder, un-self-conscious form.

The first part of this section will be used to put forth a brief explication of Husserl's theory of the constitution of the perceptual noema. It is not difficult for one to realize that, in order to produce even a quite sketchy illustration of Husserl's theory of noema at the most elementary level, the noema of perception, one needs to cover a number of issues included in this theory, i.e. the characteristic of noema, the characteristic of the object, the noetic-noematic relation, the nature of the noetic phase and hyletic phase, the relation between noema and the object, etc. However, the limit of space confines our explication of Husserl's theory of noema to three issues which are absolutely relevant to our interpretation of James' description of the structure of the object of consciousness. They are the exposition on the nature of the noema, the characteristic of the object of noema, Husserl's understanding of the relation between the

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noema and the object, and Husserl's concept of horizon.

The second point which requires some clarification here is the problem about the schools of interpretation of Husserl's theory of noema. Ever since the publication of Dagfin Føllesdal's important essay, "Husserl's Notion of Noema" (The Journal of Philosophy, 66, No. 20 [1969]), the interpretation of Husserl's notion of noema has been forked into two groups, that of the orthodox Husserlian commentators and that of a group of linguistic analysis-oriented scholars. Aron Gurwitsch and Dorion Cairns represent the orthodox Husserlian scholars, and Dagfin Føllesdal, Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith are the new corps of Husserlian commentators who received their training partly in the linguistic analytical tradition. The point that needs to be clarified beforehand is that our explication of Husserl's theory of noema will be based chiefly on the first type of interpretation, i.e., the orthodox interpretation.¹⁶

After we have pinned down what exactly is Husserl's theory of the structure of noema, in the second part of this section, we will go a step further to excavate the strands of phenomenological speculation in James' description on the nature of the object of consciousness. Our analysis will deal with three crucial notions in James' theory of the constitution of the

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objects of consciousness. They are: James' notion of 'the sense of sameness', James' analysis of 'the object and the topic of consciousness' and James' concept of the 'fringe of consciousness'. What we plan to demonstrate in this section is that, in his explications of these three crucial notions, James has already found three crucial concepts in the Husserlian phenomenology on the structure of the perceptual noema. That is:

- 1) Various perceptual noemata are able to be unified under the same object.
- 2) Every noema has a content and is referring to an object.
- 3) Consciousness has a marginal structure called the 'horizon'. Our ultimate aim, here, thus, is to prove that an unpolished form of Husserlian phenomenology on the structure of the perceptual object does exist in James' psychological studies.

A. An Exposition of Edmund Husserl's Theory of the Structure of the Perceptual Noema

a) An Analysis of Husserl's Notion of the Noema of Consciousness

Husserl, following the footsteps of Brentano, claims intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness. "To have a meaning, or to have something 'in mind'," Husserl says, "is the cardinal feature of all consciousness."¹⁷ In order to avoid the unwanted connotations of any common usage, in Ideas,

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Husserl starts to use a new term, 'the noetic phase of consciousness', or, more briefly, 'the noesis' to denote all the different modes of intentionality, all the different forms by which the consciousness is conscious of its objects. According to Husserl, the noetic phase of consciousness, as perceiving, remembering, imagining, hoping, loving, hating, judging, reasoning, etc., namely, as the different forms of Cogitation, is a real integral part of the stream of the intentional experience. On the other hand, correlated to these different sorts of noesis of consciousness, there are, in Husserl's opinions, the irreal intended objects of consciousness, namely, the ideal 'perceived as such', 'remembered as such', 'imagined as such', 'hoped as such', 'loved as such', 'hated as such', 'judged as such' or 'reasoned as such'. Husserl calls these various irreal correlates of the noesis of consciousness by the general term, 'the noematic content' of consciousness, or, briefly, the 'noema of consciousness'. He says,

Now truly as this illustrative series of phases (noted: the bringing out, relating, apprehending synoptically, and taking up the various attitudes of belief, presumption, valuation and so forth) points to real (reelle) components of the experiences, it also points, through the rubric 'meaning', to components that are not real.

Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real (reellen) noetic content,

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there is a variety of data displayable in really pure intuition, and in a correlative "noematic content", or briefly, "noema".¹⁸

Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such. Similarly, the recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its remembered as such precisely as it is "meant" and "consciously known" in it; so again judging has its own the judged as such, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth.¹⁹

In order to give us a clear concept of what exactly is the noema of perception, Husserl, in Ideas, uses an example, 'a blossoming apple tree'. Husserl says "Suppose we are looking with pleasure in a garden, at a blossoming apple tree on the green lawn, and so forth." Then, what he will consider as the noema of this particular noesis, namely, this 'perceiving the blossoming apple tree', is nothing other than 'the blossoming apple tree on the green lawn appearing to us from such a perspective and with such pleasant quality, etc.'. From this example, we can easily grasp that perceptual noema is, corresponding to all points of both the activity and the content of a 'perceiving experience', its correlated 'perceived as such'. Or, if we'd like to illustrate Husserl's notion of perceptual noema in a more understandable way, then, we can make use of Aron Gurwitsch's explication and claim that it is "the object such, exactly such

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and only such, as perceiving subject is aware of it, as he intends it in this concrete experienced mental state."²⁰ In a briefer form, we can describe noema as 'the object as it is intended', 'the object as it is meant', etc. Before we go any further to present a more detailed explication of the character of a Husserlian noema, we have to, first of all, clarify one important issue. That is the issue of the ontological structure of a perceptual noema.

One point that we have to be extremely careful with in our readings of Husserl's notion of noema is: although it is almost inevitable for Husserl to use either the physical or the psychological terms in his description of a noema, however, what Husserl attempts to mean by noema is neither a psychological nor a physical entity. On the one hand, a noema, an 'intended as such' is rather an object of a certain piece of intentional experience than this piece of experience itself. In other words, a noema does not constitute a part of the stream of intentional experiences. As Gurwitsch points out, "The noema is distinct from the act in the sense that it does not constitute a part, an element, a factor of an act, and does not really exist within consciousness, as the act does."²¹ Thus, we can mean that, by 'noema' Husserl does not mean a mental state, for instance, a blossoming tree is

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not a perception of a blossoming tree. On the other hand, though Husserl always defines the noema as 'the intended object', 'the meant object', or 'the object as it is intended', nevertheless, what he attempts to refer to as noema is not a real object in the transcendent world. In Ideas, Husserl has made an explicit remark on this particular point. He says,

The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--the meaning of this perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence--can not burn away, it has not chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.²²

For Husserl, a perceptual noema, as a logical correlate of the perceiving noesis which derives its indubitable being solely from its intentional relation to this particular piece of perceiving experience, is an unreal, atemporal, ideal entity which belongs to the same sphere as meanings or essences. What we try to explicate here is that, while referring to a perceptual noema as 'the object perceived from a certain perspective', what Husserl has in his mind is neither a perception of this object, namely, a real psychological episode, nor an actual perceived entity, but just, and nothing more than just the ideal essence of

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'being perceived as such'. For example, while Husserl claims that the perceptual noema of a perceiving noesis 'seeing a blossoming apple tree' is 'the blossoming apple tree appears to us from a certain perspective', what he attempts to indicate by 'the tree appears to us in such a determinate condition' is neither a mental image of a tree nor a real tree out there in the garden. According to Husserl, 'the blossoming apple tree appears to us from such a perspective', as a perspectual noema, stands solely for the essences of being intended as the 'blossoming apple tree appears to us in such a condition'.

Thus, a perceptual noema, if understood in the contexts of the constitution of the perceiving experience, should be interpreted as standing for the total special way in which a state of perceiving noesis is conscious of its object. For instance, in our example, 'perceiving a blossoming apple tree in the garden out there', the perceptual noema, 'a blossoming apple tree appears to us in such a condition', can be interpreted as indicating the particular manner by which this very state of intentional experience is aware of its object, namely, how this state of intentional experience intends its object as pink, fragrant, blossoming out there, in the garden, etc. Aron Gurwitsch claims that, it is solely by virtue of the perceptual noema that

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"a given perception is not only a perception of a certain thing but also a determinate perception of that thing-- that is to say, a perception through which the thing presents itself in this rather than another manner of adumbrational appearance."²³ In Ideas, Husserl calls a perceptual noema 'the perceptual meaning' and claims that it belongs inseparably to the perceiving experience. The reason for Husserl to make this remark is that, a perceptual noema, in Husserl's opinion, can be regarded as the description of the characteristics of a particular state of intentional experience, or the meaning of a certain pulse of consciousness.

On the other hand, if we try to read Husserl's notion of perceptual noema from an opposite angle, namely, from the perspective of a perceived object, then, we can claim that a perceptual noema is nothing other than 'the entire content of what is perceived by any single state of perceiving experience'. What we can find in a perceptual noema is not only just the perceived object, but also the perceived object, correlated to the special ways in which it is being intended, presenting itself with such determinate predicates, from such a determinate perspective and in such determinate modes, etc. For example, correlated to an intentional experience 'perceiving a blossoming apple tree out there on the green lawn in the garden',

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what Husserl considers as a perceptual noema is not just the tree, using Husserl's own expression, just the 'object simpliciter', namely, the pure object without any modification, but the tree as blossoming with flowers, as out there on the green lawn, as appearing to us from this perspective, from that perspective, etc.. In other words, as a perceptual noema, an object will present itself to us with all sorts of its particular characteristics. It is in this sense that Husserl calls a perceptual noema 'the object as modally determined' or 'the object presents itself in its modal setting'. While we claim that in a perceptual noema we can find all the special ways an object is being intended, namely, how it is being perceived, how it is being understood, or how it is being meant, etc. As in Husserl's opinion, an object's essences totally come from how it is being intended, namely, how it is being perceived, understood or meant, etc. Thus we hold that in a noema, there lie the meanings, the essences or the various manifestations of a perceived object.

Husserl claims that, correlated to the flux of the constantly changing mental states, we will find before us a stream of continuously varying noemata, i.e., the same or the different object or objects presents itself or present themselves to us in different modal settings, from different perspectives or in

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different manners. In Husserl's opinion, this flux of constantly varying intended as such's represents the only indubitable datum that we are able to grasp about the objects of consciousness. According to Husserl, it is solely through a faithful observation of both the characteristics of this stream of varying manifestations and how they are being constituted into various self-same objects that we are able to obtain some indubitable knowledge about the objects which we intend or the world which we confront intentionally. Here, after having presented a brief explication of Husserl's notion of the general characteristics of noema, we attempt to go a step further to see how, in Husserl's opinion, this flux of constantly shifting noemata are constituted into a system of multiple manifestations of the same object; and what, according to Husserl, is this self-identical object?

b) An Analysis of Husserl's Notion of the Object of Consciousness

As William James or Henri Bergson before Husserl point out, our stream of consciousness or intentional experiences are a flux of constantly changing mental states; and, in this flow of continuous shifting and variation, no mental state is able to recur in the same, unmodified state. Husserl points out that,

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correlated to these unceased alterations of the stream of intentional experiences, in our consciousness, there will emerge a chain of different 'intended as such's', namely, different noemata. Supposing that we are looking into a garden at a blossoming apple tree. Because of the shiftings of our positions, the changes of our moods, the elapsing of time, or, because of the changes of the sunshine, the stirring of the wind, our perceiving experiences of this apple tree will change constantly. That means, both the noetic and hyletic phases of the intentional experiences of this apple tree will undergo continuous modification.²⁴ Correlated to these constant variations of the perceiving experiences, we will find the blossoming apple tree presents itself to us from this perspective, from that perspective, with these determinate predicates, with that determinate predicate, in this manner, in that manner, etc. But, according to Husserl, in a group of these continuously changing 'intended as such's', namely, in a flux of these constantly varying noemata, there always exists one unchanged, self-same, common substratum, which Husserl calls the object of consciousness.

In order to avoid confusion in our following exposition of Husserl's notion of the object of consciousness, we have to, first of all, straighten out one special point. That is, Husserl's two different usages

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of the term 'noema' in Ideas. In the former section of our dissertation, we have pointed out that a single noema is, correlated to the peculiar way in which a pulse of intentional experience is aware of its object, 'the object presents itself to us in such determinate manners, from such determinate perspective, in such determinate mode, etc.'. We think that Husserlian commentators like Aron Gurwitsch or Dorion Cairns will not object to this sort of interpretation of Husserl's notion of noema. The knotty point that emerges here is that, in addition to this noema as a one-sided, single manifestation of the intended object, in Ideas, especially in the chapter called "The Noematic Meaning and Relation to the Object," Husserl has produced a different notion of noema. In order to distinguish this second type of noema from the first type of noema, Husserl calls it 'the full noema'. If we combine all of Husserl's tangled explications and complicated analysis of the constitution of the full noema, then we can claim simply that a full noema is, in fact, nothing other than a series of continuously shifting and changing single noemata. In a full noema, all the single noemata, which Husserl calls, in this context, the noematic phases, will refer to the same topic and appear as the varying manifestations of this same object. One point that we need to notice is that, in Husserl's

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explication of the notion of the object of consciousness, while he talks about the changing characters of a noema or the multiple noematic phases presenting themselves differently, what he refers to is a full noema rather than a single noema.

As we have already mentioned at the beginning of this section, due to the unceasing transformations of the intentional experiences, inside a full noema, we can always find a flux of constantly changing noematic phases, for example, 'the blossoming apple tree perceived in this manner, in that manner'. Husserl calls this series of continuously varying 'perceived as such's' by the name 'the content of a full noema'. Husserl claims that, if we look more carefully into the content of a full noema, then, it is not difficult for us to discover that, in the midst of this stream of constantly passing, altering predicates or manifestations, there exists one unchanged, self-same core which keeps on recurring in the identical state. Husserl says,

We say that in the continuous or synthetic process of consciousness we are persistently aware of the intentional object, but that in this experience the object is ever "presenting itself differently"; it may be "the same," only given with other predicates; with another determining content; "it" may display itself only in different aspects whereby the predicates left indeterminate have become more closely determined; or "the object" may have remained unchanged throughout

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this stretch of givenness, but now "it," the selfsame, changes, and through this change becomes more beautiful or forfeits some of its utility-value, and so forth.²⁵

Husserl calls this recurring, unchanged, self-same 'bearer' of the flux of continuously transforming character by the names of 'the object of noema', 'the object of consciousness', or simply, 'the intentional object'.

In a stream of continuously shifting and passing noematic phases, the self-identical, unchanged intentional object can function as, in Husserl's words, 'the nodal point of connexion' or as 'the central point of unification'. All the different single noemata or noematic phases in a full noema will refer to the intentional object as their common subject of which they are the various manifestations. In other words, it is solely by relating to the same objective reference, the self-identical intentional object that a flux of constantly changing noematic phases are able to be unified into a system in the sense of being unified into the different aspects of the same object. In order to present a clearer picture of Husserl's theory of the constitution of a perceptual noema, let us, at this point, again make use of Husserl's example, 'seeing a blossoming apple tree'. Supposing that we walk around a blossoming apple tree, then sit down and stare at

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this tree for a while. Correlated to the various ways in which we are aware of this particular tree, in our consciousness, we find the blossoming apple tree presents itself to us in different appearances, laced with our different sentiments for it. Husserl calls this flux of constantly changing presentations of apple tree the stream of the different noemata of an apple tree, or, simply, a full noema of an apple tree. What we have to notice here is that, in this flowing of the various one-sided manifestations of the apple tree, it is the apple tree, the identical, self-same topic that pulls them together by unifying them into a system of the different aspects of the same object, namely, the same apple tree. In Ideas, Husserl calls this same apple tree the 'intentional object', or the object of consciousness.

According to Husserl, while an intentional object is able to unify a group of shifting, changing noematic phases by being their common objective reference, nevertheless, as an unchanged, self-identical topic, it is able to separate itself from this whirlpool of altering predicates. Husserl says,

. . . the self-same intentional "object" separates itself off self-evidently from the shifting and changing "predicates." There detaches itself as the central noematic phase: the "object," the "objective unity," the

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"self-same," the "determinable subject of its possible predicates"--the pure X in abstraction from all predicates--and it disconnects itself from these predicates, or more accurately from the predicate-noemata.²⁶

In Husserl's opinion, there is a relationship of mutual dependence existing between an intentional object and a flux of altering noematic phases. To a full noema, an intentional object is a subject of which this stream of noematic phases assumes the role of the various meanings, characteristics or manifestations. An intentional object without these various predicates, according to Husserl, will be an incomprehensible, empty, pure subject; in Husserl's words, a synthetic X. On the other hand, a full noema as a flux of changing predicates without a common objective reference, without an intentional object, cannot be unified into one system. Notwithstanding this mutual reliance between noema and its object, an intentional object will detach itself from this stream of unstable changes. Of course, in every noematic phase, we can always find that the presence of an intentional object functions as 'the bearer' of the different predicates in this particular noema. For instance, in a perceptual noematic phase, 'a blossoming apple tree perceived from a certain perspective', we find the presence of a tree, as a point of reference to which all the

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particular characteristics of 'a blossoming apple tree perceived from a certain perspective' refer themselves. But, the point that we need to notice here is that while a noematic phase changes into another noematic phase, an intentional object, instead of vanishing with the passed noematic phase, will stay to function as a topic for the second noematic phase. Thus, we can say that an intentional object (call it the objective reference of the varying meanings, the common bearer of the changing predicates or the self-identical subject of the different adjectives, manifestations, etc.) does not constitute part of the flux of the noematic phases. An intentional object, as a self-same, objective unity, in fact, totally disconnects itself from the shifting and varying full noema.

Up to this point, we have tried to present an exposition of Husserl's notions of the intentional object and the relation between noema and intentional object in the context of the constitution of a full noema. There are still a few special characteristics about an intentional object and its relation to a noema that cannot be duly explicated in this context. In order to convey a more thorough picture of Husserl's theory of the structure of the object of consciousness, here, in a very brief way, we attempt to analyse these two notions in a wider context, namely, in the context

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✓ of Husserl's theory of the intentionality of consciousness.

Inherited from Brentano, Husserl claims that directing itself towards something other than itself is the essential characteristic of the consciousness. For Husserl, an identical, self-same intentional object which can be intended by multiple states of intentional experience is this something other than itself which consciousness directs itself to. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, calls it "the object which is intended."²⁷ One point that we have to notice here is that, by 'the object which is intended', Husserl does not necessarily mean a real object existing in the transcendent world. As phenomenologist, Husserl refrains himself from posing any ontological judgment on either a noema or an object of consciousness. Thus an intentional object can be a real entity in the external world, or an unreal, atemporal entity existing solely in the transcendental realm. Its only essential characteristic is that it is a unified point, a common objective reference towards which multiple states of consciousness can direct themselves. Husserl holds that, while a certain mental state is conscious of an object, it is not just conscious of it, but will be conscious of it in a certain determinate manner. If we speak from the opposite standpoint, we can claim that, while an object is

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intended, for example, while it is perceived, it will not only be perceived, but it will be perceived in a certain manner. In Husserl's opinion, it is solely how it is being intended, namely, it is solely from its noema, that an intentional object obtains its meanings, characteristics or essences. For instance, it is solely from its being perceived as 'an apple tree', 'blossoming', 'green', 'pink', 'on the lawn in the garden', 'waving in the wind', etc., that an intentional object, a synthetic X acquires its characteristic of 'being a blossoming apple tree waving in the wind on the lawn in the garden'. It is in this sense that in Logical Investigations, Husserl claims that, while a state of consciousness is conscious of its object, it not only directs itself towards the object, but it can also bestow meaning on its object. As a state of consciousness has to intend its object in some ways, in other words, it is impossible for a state of consciousness to be conscious of its object in no way, so that Husserl holds that consciousness is conscious of its object through or 'by means of' its noema. Or, Husserl will declare that "every consciousness has its what (an object which it intends), and means its objective (the noema or meaning which it carries with itself)." ²⁸ In this way, while an intentional object is intended by multiple states of

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consciousness, we can say that it is not just intended by multiple states of consciousness, but it is also intended by multiple states of consciousness in a number of ways. In other words, while a number of states of intentional experiences are conscious of the same object, correlated to the special characteristics of the noetic and hyletic phases of these intentional experiences, they will be conscious of the same object by means of a number of different noemata, namely, they will bestow a number of different noemata on this same object.²⁹ Thus, we can draw up a conclusion in this way: to a stream of consciousness, an intentional object is the common objective reference to which a multiple states of intentional experiences not only can direct themselves but also can attach the various intentional meanings or noemata which they carry with them. To a flux of the different, changing noemata, an intentional object can function as, in Husserl's own words, 'the central point of unification' which can unify these altering noemata into a system of the different meanings or aspects of the same object. On the other hand, it is solely from the different ways of how it is being intended that an intentional object acquires its various meanings or essences. Therefore, to an object of consciousness, a stream of shifting and varying noemata stands for the different aspects,

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manifestations or characteristics of this particular object. It is this special relation between an intentional object and the noemata that induces Aron Gurwitsch to claim that an intentional object is a system of noemata and the relation between an intentional object and a single noema is, in fact, nothing other than the relation between a system and one member of this system. He says,

It [an intentional object] is nothing besides, or in addition to, the multiplicity of those presentations through all of which it appears in its identity. Consequently, the thing perceived proves to be the group, more precisely put, the systematically organized totality of adumbrational presentations. Both the difference and the relationship between the thing perceived and a particular perceptual noema can now be defined in terms of a noematic system as a whole and one member of that system.³⁰

Here, we would like to use the above quotation from Gurwitsch to end our exposition of both Husserl's notion of object of consciousness and his theory of the relation between noema and intentional object.

c) An Analysis of Husserl's Notion of Horizon

According to Husserl, an object of consciousness is constituted of a system of different noemata unified by one self-same, central core, an 'object simpliciter'. But outside of every object of consciousness, in

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Husserl's opinion, it is not, metaphorically speaking, a pure emptiness or nothingness. Surrounding every perceived object of consciousness and outside of the focus of our attention, there always exists some dim, marginal phenomena which Husserl calls the 'horizon'. While Husserl does not consider this vague halo around an object of consciousness as constituting part of this particular object, nevertheless, he does claim that, like the dynamic relation between a Gestaltian whole and one of its constituents, the nature of this vague halo can influence the intrinsic nature of an object surrounded by it. Therefore, in order to give a complete picture of Husserl's theory of the structure of the object of consciousness, we have to, here, present a brief explication of Husserl's notion of horizon.

Using the same term 'horizon', Husserl attempts to indicate both the temporal field, the spatial field, as well as the context of relations in which an object of consciousness is intended. Thus, it is only through a careful exploration of Husserl's various analyses of the natures of these different marginal phenomena, that we are able to extract a more thorough understanding of this concept. Nevertheless, before we start to look into Husserl's explications of these different sorts of horizons, we would like to, first of all, present a brief analysis of the general character of

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this, in Husserl's words, 'co-present fringe' of the object of consciousness.

No matter whether it is the retention of the past perception, the anticipation of the coming perception, a vague sense of the world in which an object exists, or, it is the dim feeling of an object's relations to other objects, horizon is, as we have already pointed out, a vague, marginal phenomenon appearing with all the objects of perception. While an object of perception occupies the center of our attention, a horizon will exist solely at the fringe of our consciousness, namely, outside of the focus of our attention. Thus, subjectively speaking, a Husserlian horizon is a sort of phenomenon which one does not really perceive but nevertheless senses vaguely with all the perceptions. Objectively speaking, horizon, according to Husserl, is a kind of dim, indeterminate halo surrounding every object of consciousness. This halo can be interpreted as the extension of our actual perceived object, namely, the other unperceived aspects of a certain perceived object. Or, it is a background, a context in which an object exists, as Cornelius A. Van Peursen in an article, "The Horizon" points out; a sort of infinitely receding horizon encompassing every object of consciousness.³¹ In Ideas, Husserl explains it in these ways: "(A) co-present margin, which forms a

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continuous ring around the actual field of perception."³²
"(To a perceived, really presented object), an outlying zone of apprehension consisting of marginal 'co-data' or an accessory kind (uneigentlicher) and a more or less vague indeterminacy."³³ "The misty horizon that can never be completely outlined (but) remains necessarily there."³⁴ In our understanding of Husserl's notion of horizon, there are two points to which we have to pay special attention: the first thing that we have to notice here is that, as a sort of vague, co-present marginal phenomena, a horizon does not merely just surround a perceived object, but, like what a Gestaltein whole can do to a Gestaltein part, a horizon does play an active role in the formation of the intrinsic nature of the perceived object of which it encompasses. The second thing that we need to notice is that, while a horizon is some phenomena which occupies solely the fringe of our consciousness and conveys to us nothing more than a vague sense of their existence, the phenomena in the horizon do have the potentialities of moving into the focus of our attention, under the conditions that we direct our rays of attention towards them, and transform them into the actually perceived objects. Here, let us move on to have a brief look at Husserl's explications of the various types of horizons. Doing thus, we cannot only grasp a more thorough idea of

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the nature of a Husserlian horizon, but we can also have a better understanding of the relations between a horizon and the perceived object which it surrounds.

According to Husserl, while we perceive a certain object we will not just have a perception of this object, but, accompanying every perception of an object, there is always a dim sense that, outside of the actual field of our perception, there exists a ring of other objects; and outside of this ring of objects, there are still other objects. In other words, accompanying every actual perception of an object, at the fringe of our consciousness, there is always a vague understanding that this perceived object, instead of existing alone, in the midst of pure nothingness; in fact, exists among an infinite number of other objects, it exists in a world. Husserl calls this dim, outlying zone of other co-present objects around the actually perceived object this perceived object's external horizon, or an awareness of the existence of a world outside of the perceived object. In Husserl's opinion, it is this external horizon, this vague presence of a world out there, encircling the actually perceived object that brings to the perceived object the characteristic of an object existing in a field of other objects. In other words, it is the external horizon that transforms a perceived object from a self-sufficient, isolated entity to

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one of the constituents of the whole universe, related to other objects in this universe in various patterns. On the other hand, it is this vague sense of an infinite number of objects co-given in the zone beyond the actually perceived object that allows us to have a preliminary understanding of the perceived object as an entity existing in a spacial context. Or, we can say that it is the appearance of the other co-present objects around the actually perceived object that dawns on us an idea that this very object exists simultaneously with other objects and keeps spatial relations with an infinite number of other objects. Thus, while an object presents itself to us as wrapped in a halo of external horizon, it does not just present itself to us, but it presents itself to us within a spatial field, caught in a network of various spacial relations, and related to other objects in the world around it in various patterns. We can say that a perceived object does not just present itself to us, but brings to us with it, to a certain extent, a whole external world around it.

Husserl calls the second sort of horizon that appears with our perception of an object 'the internal horizon'. In order to grasp a clear idea of what, in Husserl's mind is an 'internal horizon', we have to, first of all, have an understanding of Husserl's

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theory of the nature of perception. According to Husserl, perception, or perceiving, is a process of very complicated activity. In Husserl's words, "To perceive it (a perceived object), even if it is perceived as remaining unchanged, is something very complex: it is to see it, to touch it, to smell it, to hear it, etc.; and in each case I have something different."³⁵ Even if perceiving is limited to one type of cognitive activity, for example, seeing, seeing an object, as we have already mentioned in the former two sections, is still a flux of a constantly varying stream of intentional experiences. Correlated to this flux of a ceaselessly altering stream of experience, a perceived object will manifest itself to us in a series of different noematic phases, namely, in a series of different 'aspects' seen from different perspectives. Using Husserl's own expression, "the pure thing seen, what is visible 'of' the thing, is first of all a surface, and in the changing course of seeing, I see it now from this 'side', now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever differing sides."³⁶ According to Husserl, the phenomenon of 'internal horizon', thus, will occur with every perception of a one-sided manifestation of the perceived object. Subjectively speaking, it is a vague retention of this perceived object's former manifestation, the dim anticipation of this perceived object's forthcoming

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manifestation that accompanies every perceiving experience. Objectively speaking, it is the hidden, unperceived aspects of the perceived object, the potentiality of disclosing the total object that always comes with every perceived aspect of the perceived object. First, Husserl claims that, while we perceive a single manifestation of a certain object, we always perceive more than what is immediately given to us. In Husserl's words, "while the surface is immediately given, I mean more than it offers."³⁷ While we perceive a certain aspect of a certain object, in Husserl's opinion, accompanying our perception of this one-sided manifestation of the perceived object and existing at the fringe of our consciousness, there is always a vague retention of this object's past manifestation and a dim anticipation of the forthcoming manifestation of the same object. In a paragraph in Experience and Judgment, Husserl describes this consciousness' dim anticipation of how a perceived object is going to disclose itself in this way,

Every experience has its own horizon, every experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as "itself-there", it has its own horizon. This implies that every experience refers to the possibility--and is a question here of the capacity of the ego--not only of explication, step by step,

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the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity with what is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing.³⁸

In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl describes the vague retention of our past perception of the perceived object in this way:

Indeed, I have ontic certainty of this thing (as that) to which all the sides at once belong, and in the mode in which I see it "best". Each side gives me something of the seen thing. In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen ceases being actually still seen, but it is "retained" and "taken" together with those retained from before; and thus I "get to know" the thing.³⁹

Subjectively speaking, whenever we perceive a certain one-sided manifestation of the perceived object, according to Husserl, our mind is always armed with ambiguous knowledge of the whole object, consisting of both the retention of the past perceptions of this object and a dim knowledge (Vorwissen) of how an object is going to disclose itself to us. Husserl calls it the internal horizon of the perception. But, if we try to look at Husserl's notion of internal horizon from an opposite angle, namely from the angle of the perceived object, then we are able to grasp another significance of this notion. Let us, here, first of

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all, see how does Husserl, in Experience and Judgment, describe the characteristics of the internal horizon in the contexts of the perceived object. He says,

This real thing itself is more than that which at any given time attains (and has already attained) actual cognizance. It is provided with a sense which continuously confers on it its "internal horizon"; the side that is seen is a side only in so far as it has sides which are not seen, which are anticipated and as such determine the sense. We can always turn toward them thematically; we can ask for them, we can envision them.⁴⁰

From this paragraph, we can grasp that, for Husserl, internal horizon is the perceived object's unseen potentiality of disclosing to us more of its characteristics or sides. It is, as Helmut Kuhn in an article called "The Phenomenological Concept of Horizon," points out, the perceived object's unseen, but vaguely felt possibility of continuously determining itself.⁴¹ Or, we can regard the internal horizon as the unseen total object hidden behind the momentarily perceived side of the object. It is solely because of the overshadowing of this hidden total object on the perceived side of the object that the perceived side of an object can be understood rather as a certain side of a perceived object than just as a certain shape with a certain color. In The Field of Consciousness, Aron Gurwitsch describes the internal horizon in this way,

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Every perceptual appearance contains a nucleus consisting of what is given in direct sense-experience. To this nucleus are attached references to what is not given in that privileged mode but nevertheless, essentially pertains to, co-constitutes, and co-determines the perceptual appearance.⁴²

Here, we can make a brief summation of our explication of Husserl's notion of internal horizon. Internal horizon, like other types of horizons, is a sort of vague, marginal phenomena surrounding every perception or perceived object. What exists in an internal horizon, according to Husserl, is the shadow of a total object of which the perceived object is just a one-sided manifestation. Subjectively speaking, an internal horizon will present itself to us as a kind of dim retention of the perceived object's past manifestations as well as a vague anticipation of the perceived object's forthcoming manifestations. Objectively speaking, an internal horizon will reveal itself to us as a perceived object's past manifestations that cast a shadow on the present manifestation of the perceived object, and as the perceived object's potentiality of disclosing to us more of its characteristics. It is the total object appearing in the background of the actually perceived aspect of an object. This unseen, but vaguely felt total object, is capable of transforming every actually perceived aspect of an object into one of

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its multiple manifestations.

The last sort of horizon that we have to mention here is, using C. Van Peursen's term, 'the horizon as meaningful coherence', or, using our own term, 'horizon as the context of meaning'. In The Field of Consciousness, Aron Gurwitsch holds that,

Things are perceived not only as material objects to which spatiality is essential, as having an inside, as being perceivable from different sides, etc., but also as belonging to certain types and falling into certain classes.⁴³

This ambiguous stamp of being a member of a certain group, of being part of a certain whole that a perceived object carries with it is what we here attempt to name as 'the horizon as meaningful coherence'. In other words, while an object presents itself to us, it will not just present itself to us, but, according to Husserl, it will present itself to us as a certain sort of being, namely, as belonging to a certain order of reality. For example, while we see a hammer in the daily environment, what we see is not only just a hammer, but also a hammer as an instrument existing in a practical world. On the other hand, when we see a hammer displayed on the wall of a museum of modern art, then what we see in the hammer is a piece of artistic creation existing in an aesthetic world. Being one of the constituents

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of a whole, a perceived object has to relate to other objects in this 'same whole' in a certain pattern.

In C. Van Peursen's terms, a perceived object has to relate to other objects in the 'same whole' with 'meaningful coherence'. C. Van Peursen says,

. . . each real object within the horizon is related to other things. Each object and each aspect refers back to other objects and aspects. They exist as such by a coherence with one another. Objects are not isolatable; nor are their properties. The thing is not a sum of properties. The world is not an agglomeration of things.⁴⁴

A Husserlian 'horizon as meaningful coherence' is this ambiguous network of relations in which a perceived object is caught; or, it is the vague characteristic of being part of a certain order of reality that permeates a perceived object.

Here, we would like to sum up our explication of Husserl's notion of horizon in this way: a horizon, according to Husserl, is the indeterminate, vaguely sensed background, in which an actually perceived object appears. What we can find in a horizon is that 'something' more than what we would find in any single manifestation of the perceived object. As we have already pointed out, what we find in an internal horizon is the retention of the past manifestations which a perceived object has already shown us before the present

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manifestation, and a vague expectation of what this same object is going to disclose to us in its forthcoming manifestations. What appears in an external horizon is the dim appearance of the actually perceived object's co-present, co-given objects. What we find in the last sort of horizon, namely, horizon as a meaningful coherence, is the unseen, but ambiguously felt order of reality as a coherent whole in which an object exists. While Husserl does not consider horizon, the vague halo surrounding a perceived object, as constituting any part of this actually perceived object, nevertheless, according to Husserl, the peculiar character of a horizon does play an important role in determining the meaning of a perceived object which it surrounds. In Husserl's opinion, it is solely because of the existence of this dim addition, this vague encompassing halo, that a perceived object, for us, can change from just a certain shape, a certain patch of color, etc., into a certain side of an object, a piece of instrument, an aesthetic entity, or a certain object in the company of other objects.

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B. An Exposition of William James' Theory of the Structure of the Object of Consciousness in the Light of Edmund Husserl's Theory of the Structure of Noema

a) An Analysis of William James' Notion of the Object of Thought

In a diary written in 1906, Husserl makes this remark on James' The Principles of Psychology:

Then in 1891-92 came the lecture course on psychology which made me look into the literature on descriptive psychology, in fact look forward to it with longing. James' Psychology, of which I could read only some and very little, yielded some flashes. I saw how a daring and original man did not let himself be held down by tradition and attempted to really put down what he saw and to describe it. Probably this influence was not without significance for me, although I could read and understand precious few pages. Indeed, to describe and to be faithful, this was absolutely indispensable. To be sure, it was not until my article of 1894 that I read larger sections and took excerpts from them.⁴⁵

In James' The Principles of Psychology, besides a nascent theory of intentionality, the other explorations of the structure of consciousness which deserve Husserl's praise as the works of a 'daring and original man', in our opinion, should be his analysis of the constitution of an object of consciousness. Having rejected the British atomists' reduction of an experienced object to a set of discrete sense-data called mental atoms, in The Principles of Psychology, James

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proposes that an object of consciousness is, in fact, built up of a stream of shifting 'objects of thought', all referring to a self-identical, unchanged 'topic of thought', and bathed in a sort of marginal phenomenon called 'the fringe of consciousness'. Whether or not James' description of the structure of an object of consciousness had any influence on Husserl in his elaboration of the noematic constitution; nevertheless, James' three sorts of crucial components of an object of consciousness do look like the precursors of Husserl's three basic constituents of an intentional object, the noema, the object and the horizon. In the next three sections of our dissertation, we shall look into James' explication on the natures of these three basic elements of an object of consciousness and see in what sense they are similar to Husserl's three crucial constituents of an intentional object.

According to the associationists, while all extra-mental objects are discrete, self-identical entities, the experienced objects, as the mental images or inner copies of these transcendent objects, should also be both unchanged and discrete. In James' opinion, by making such a claim, the associationists have, in fact, made a so-called 'psychologist's fallacy par excellence' in the sense of projecting their own knowledge of the nature of the object of consciousness

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into their observation of, using a very queer Jamesian expression, the nature of 'how the thought knows its objects', namely, into their observation of the genuine characteristics of 'the objects of thought'. It is this sort of erroneous hypothesis of parallels in structure between an object of thought and a transcendent object that induce the traditional psychologists, in their descriptions of the nature of the 'objects of thought', to make the following two types of mistakes.

James points out that, first, if an associationist is asked to describe an 'object of thought', instead of giving us a faithful complete account of the nature of the entire 'object of thought', he will single out 'a substantive kernel or nucleus' from the total 'object of thought' and mistakenly consider it as the 'object of thought'. For example, if a traditional psychologist is asked about what is the mind's object in a judgment, 'Columbus discovered America in 1492', he will answer that it is either Columbus, America or at most 'the discovery of America'. James describes this phenomenon, "They will name a substantive kernel or nucleus of the consciousness, and say the thought is 'about' that--as indeed it is--and they will call that your thought's object."⁴⁶ But, James notes that, if a psychologist's power has not been crippled by the false scientific assumptions, then, it will not be hard for him to

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find out that, what is called by him the 'object of thought', is, in fact, nothing more than just the topic of thought or the subject of thought. He says, "Really that is usually only the grammatical object, or more likely the grammatical subject, of your sentence. It is at most your 'fractional object', or you may call it the topic of your thought, or the subject of your discourse."⁴⁷ According to James, by thus substituting 'the topic of thought' for 'the object of ~~thought~~', the associationists have, in their illustration of the characteristics of the object of thought, made the mistake of, using R. B. Perry's expression, confusing "what the thought is 'about'" with "'what is thought about it'."⁴⁸

James claims that, secondly, if an associationist is requested to present us with a description of a flux of the objects of thought, which are all about the same subject, then, instead of giving us a genuine portrayal of a stream of ceaselessly transforming 'objects of thought', he will tell us that the same object of thought keeps on re-appearing in exactly the same state. But, James points out that, here too, if a psychologist is capable of being truthful to what he sees inside his own mind, then, it will be easy for him to find out that "what is got twice is the same object" (by object, James means the transcendent object or the

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topic of thought), rather than the object of thought.⁴⁹

What makes a psychologist to regard a recurrent object of thought as a self-identical entity, is solely the reason that, "he himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case."⁵⁰

If the associationists' description of the object of thought as a series of self-same, discrete mental copies of the transcendent objects are just a sort of faulty portrayal of the object of thought based on some erroneous scientific assumption, what then, according to James, can be considered as the genuine illustration of the object of thought?

First, James claims that, while the 'topic of thought' can be a 'substantive kernel' or 'nucleus' extracted from its determinate settings or fixed contexts, the 'object of thought', on the other hand, is nothing more or less than the total content of what a certain pulse of thought is thinking about as its topic or subject. In James' words, "But the object of your thought is really its entire content or deliverance, neither more or less."⁵¹ What we can find out in this entire 'object of thought' is, thus, according to James, not just an isolated, self-sufficient topic, but rather

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a topic or subject presenting itself in a certain fixed context of relations and with a certain number of determinate predicates. For instance, in his example 'Columbus discovered America in 1492', James points out that what he considers as the 'object of thought' is, therefore, neither just 'Columbus', 'America' nor just 'its discovery'. What is considered by James as the object of thought in this example is nothing more or less than the entire 'Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492', namely, nothing more or less than this entire unitary predicate about either Columbus or America. He says,

It is nothing short of the entire sentence, "Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492." And if we wish to speak of it substantively, we must make a substantive of it by writing it out thus with hyphens between its words. Nothing but this can possibly name its delicate idiosyncrasy. And if I wish to feel that idiosyncrasy we must reproduce the thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the whole sentence bathed in that original halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about its meaning.⁵²

What, according to James, appears in an object of thought is not only a Columbus or an America, but rather a Columbus being thought of as 'one who discovered America in 1492,' or an America being judged as 'that which was discovered by Columbus in 1492'. Therefore, James concludes that, if a psychologist attempts to

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give us a faithful description of the object of thought, then, instead of presenting to us just a certain topic X, he has to give us a total account of how this topic X is being thought by this particular state of thinking, namely, he has to depict to us a complete picture of 'X being thought as such'. For James, "the object of every thought, is neither more nor less than the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the matter of thinking may be."⁵³

Secondly, James points out that it is possible for many objects of thought to be about the same topic. He says, "In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve."⁵⁴ For instance, two different 'objects of thought' like 'Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492' and 'He-was-a-daring-genius' can all be about the same topic, Columbus. In James' words, these two objects of thought can all terminate in Columbus, lead from and to the direct idea of Columbus. But, here, what James requests us to notice is that, in these two thinkings of the same topic, namely, the same Columbus, what we get is, in fact, just the same topic and not the same object of thought about a certain topic. Now, while it is really easy for one to tell the difference between these two predicates of Columbus and be

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convinced that they are, in fact, two different objects of thought about the same topic, nevertheless, in the case of a series of simple perceivings of a certain identical object, it is not easy for one, even for an introspective psychologist like an associationist, to tell the distinctions between multiple perceptions of the same object. Thus, as we have already mentioned before, when an associationist tries to give us the description of a series of varying perceptions of a certain self-same object, instead of presenting us a faithful portrayal of a flux of constantly transforming perceptions, he will tell us that a certain unchanged perception keeps on re-appearing in our stream of consciousness. But, according to James, it is impossible for us to perceive any object twice in exactly the same way. For instance, we look at the green grass out of the window for a period of time. Now, because of, objectively speaking, the changes of the sunshine, the blowing of the wind and, subjectively speaking, the shifting of our standpoint, the alteration of our moods, the elapsing of time or the addition of the residues left behind by former perception, we are unable to look at the same green grass twice in exactly the same way. Corresponding to the different ways in which we perceive an object, our perception of this particular object, in James' opinion, is always undergoing some

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changes. In other words, it is impossible for us to obtain two identical perceptions of a certain self-same topic. Therefore, James claims, if a psychologist wants to give us a faithful illustration of a stream of 'objects of thought' which are all about the same topic, especially if he wants to give us a genuine description of a stream of perceptions all about the same subject, then he has to depict to us a flux of continuously varying 'objects of thought'. According to James, what we have about a certain self-identical topic is always a flux of ceaselessly shifting, changing 'objects of thought'.

Here, after having presented this brief explication of James' notion of the object of thought, now we attempt to move on to the second question in this section.

That is, in what sense are we able to proclaim that James' notion of the 'object of thought' does bear a striking similarity to Husserl's concept of noema?

If we put Husserl's explication of his concept 'noema' side by side with James' description of his concept, 'the object of thought', then it is not hard for us to have this discovery: presented under two different labels, 'noema' and 'the object of thought', what these two philosophers attempt to convey to us are, in fact, the same sort of phenomenon. It is, nevertheless, a sort of phenomenon which has never

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been disclosed by other thinkers in the past. It is, using Aron Gurwitsch's expression, the so-called 'subjective object'. Gurwitsch says, "Laying down the concept of a 'subjective object', James, prior to both phenomenology and Gestalt theory, inaugurated an autonomous psychological point of view and advocated a strictly descriptive orientation in psychology."⁵⁵ "What is meant by this (the subjective object) is called noema in Husserl's terminology."⁵⁶ On the one hand, to a flux of various cognitive activities like perceiving, thinking, judging, imagining, etc., both the 'thought's object' and the 'noema' are the objects. In Husserl's words, for a chain of various intentional experiences like perception, recollection, judging, etc., the noēmata are the flux of the different 'perceived as such', 'remembered as such' or 'judged as such', etc.⁵⁷ In James' expression, 'the object of thought', then, is neither more nor less than all the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it.⁵⁸ On the other hand, both Husserl and James have made it very clear to us that 'noema' or 'the object of thought' is neither the transcendent object towards which the stream of intentional experiences direct themselves, nor even a sort of mental copy of this intended object. James, as we have already mentioned above, points out that a psychologist should be able to tell the difference between the 'thought's

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object' and the 'thought's topic'. James claims that, instead of the object which the thought is about, the thought's object should be 'what is thought about an object'. By demonstrating the differences in structures between a thought's object and an intended object, James has also rejected the associationists' theory that 'the thought's object' is the mental duplicate of the intended object. Husserl, first in Logical Investigations, has distinguished the 'object as it is intended', namely, the precursor of the Husserlian noema, from the 'object which is intended', namely, the transcendent object towards which consciousness directs itself intentionally. Later, in Ideas, Husserl claims that, while consciousness does direct itself towards its intended object through the noema, nevertheless, noema is not this intended object. The reason is that, while an 'intended object' is a topic on which consciousness confers a certain meaning, a noema is the meanings which are conferred on this particular topic. What, then, Husserl means by noema or James means by the 'object of thought' is, therefore, the entire content of how a certain object is being intended by a certain state of consciousness. In Gurwitsch's words, that is, "Provisionally and roughly defined, it is the concept of the object not as it really is, but as it appears to the experiencing subject's mind

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through a given act of consciousness."⁵⁹ Or, we can say that what is called by Husserl as noema and by James as 'the object of thought' is not just an object stripped of all determinate predicates, an empty point of reference, or, in Husserl's words, "the pure X in abstraction from all predicates."⁶⁰ They are, in fact, a certain object as it presents itself with all determinate predicates or contexts of relations derived from nowhere other than how this particular object is intended. They are both objects bearing on themselves all the meanings or connections conferred on them by the experiencing subject, so that Gurwitsch calls them the 'subjective objects'. Anyone who is familiar with Husserl's notion of noema can see that James' explication of how a 'thought's object' is 'really its entire content', or how it is 'neither more nor less than the thought thinks', look almost like a paraphrase of Husserl's statement that 'noema' is the 'object modally determined', 'the object as it is intended'. It is this obvious similarity existing between Husserl's notion of noema and James' notion of 'thought's object' that leads the Husserlian scholars like Alfred Schutz to claim, "the theory of noema and noesis is but the radicalized expression of James' statement that the object of thought is 'all that the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it'."⁶¹ Later, in an

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article called "On the Object of Thought" as well as in his book, The Field of Consciousness, A. Gurwitsch also holds that in James' distinction between the 'thought's object' and the 'thought's topic', he is able to see a Husserlian separation of noema from object.

The other sort of similarity between Husserl's notion of noema and James' notion of 'thought's object' lies in James' theory of the nature of a flux of thought's object and Husserl's theory of the nature of a stream of noemata. First, while Husserl claims that a stream of noemata can all refer to one self-same object,⁶² James proposes that, about one identical topic, there can be a plurality of 'thought's objects'.⁶³ Secondly, while Husserl says that a stream of noemata has the peculiar characteristic of constantly shifting and altering,⁶⁴ James also declares that a flux of 'thought's objects' changes continuously.⁶⁵ Thus, we can say that, appearing under two different names, what both Husserl and James attempt to mean by either 'a flux of thought's objects' or 'a flux of noemata' is, in fact, the same chain of ceaselessly varying 'subjective objects'.

b) An Analysis of William James' Notion of the Topic of Thought

In the former section, we have already talked about William James' accusation of the associationists'

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confusion of the 'object of thought' with the 'topic of thought' and pointed out the affinities existing between James' notion of the 'object of thought' and Husserl's notion of noema. In this section, we shall attempt to move on to James' notion of the 'topic of thought'.

Before we can begin to present an exposition of James' theory of the nature of the topic of thought, the first question that we have to answer is: for James, what is a 'topic of thought'? In The Principles of Psychology, we find James' direct answer to this question quite meagre and always appearing as a sort of contrast to his notion of the 'object of thought'. Nevertheless, from the bits and pieces of explication about the notion of the 'topic of thought' given either in The Principles of Psychology or Psychology: Briefer Course, we discover that it is possible to pin down, first of all, what James means by the term 'the topic of thought'. In The Principles of Psychology, James claims that, in contrast to an 'object of thought', which is the entire content of how a particular state of thought is thinking about an 'X', a 'topic of thought' is just that X which this particular state of thought is about. Thus, we can say that a 'topic of thought' is really the topic of a state of thought or the subject of its discussion. James contends that the

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'topic of thought' is a sort of substantive kernel or nucleus of the consciousness in which the 'object of thought' terminates, to which it directs and from which it leads.⁶⁶ In other words, 'the topic of thought' is that X to which a state of thought directs itself and which the 'object of thought' describes. Or, we can use Aron Gurwitsch's interpretation of James' notion of 'the topic of thought' in this way: from a few statements by James about his notion of the 'topic of thought', Aron Gurwitsch, in The Field of Consciousness, comes to this understanding of James' notion of the topic of thought: he says, "The term topic denotes the fact or state of affairs, whether real, ideal, or merely imaginary, to which the act of consciousness bears cognitive reference."⁶⁷ Aron Gurwitsch then argues that, as the 'topic of thought' is an object to which an act of consciousness refers cognitively, so it can be an intended object if it is, seen in the phenomenological sense.⁶⁸ Thus, we can say that, if by 'the object of thought' James attempts to mean the entire content of how a state of consciousness is aware of its object, then, by 'the topic of thought', what James attempts to mean is nothing other than the transcendent object toward which this particular state of consciousness directs itself intentionally.

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James introduces both his notions of 'the object of thought' and 'the topic of thought' as well as his notion of the distinction between these two sorts of 'entities' with reference to judgments formulated in propositions. But, one point that we have to stress here is that these three Jamesian notions do not exist exclusively in James' analysis of the structure of the objects of thought at the level of judgment. In fact, we can also find them in James' expositions of the structure of the perceptual objects. The only difference is that James will call them by different names. He will call 'the topic of thought' or 'the intended object' the 'object' and 'the object of thought' the 'perception'.

If, judged by its relation with the cognitive act, a Jamesian 'topic of thought' can be looked upon as a Husserlian 'intended object' appearing under a different label, then, the other questions that we have to answer in our comparisons of James' notion of 'the topic of thought' and Husserl's notion of the 'intended object' are the following. Has James attributed to the 'topic of thought' the same sorts of characteristics which Husserl attributes to the 'intended object' of consciousness? In other words, while Husserl considers the 'intended object' as a self-same, unchanged nucleus in a flux of constantly

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shifting noemata, does James consider 'the topic of thought' to have the same sort of endurance in a stream of continuously changing 'objects of thought'? What is the relation between 'the topic of thought' and 'the object of thought'? For Husserl, an intended object is able to unify a flux of varying noemata into a coherent noematic system. Does James consider the topic of thought to play the same role in a stream of objects of thought?

First, we know that, for James, the topic of thought is, in contrast to the objects of thought which are a flux of ceaseless changes, a self-same, unchanged 'entity' which is capable of reappearing before our eyes in exactly the same way. In The Principles of Psychology, James points out that, if we look into our minds, we will find out that, what appears before us is a flux of constantly altering objects of thought. It is not only that a number of different objects will present themselves to us in various forms, namely, as seen, imagined, thought, hated, loved, etc., and from different angles. But, because of the changes of the subjective or the objective conditions, even when an identical fact recurs, it will present itself in a fresh manner. Using James' own examples, because of the shifting of the sunshine, the green grass outside the window will now appear to us as bright yellow,

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then as dark brown. Or, the same Columbus, in different contexts, will at this time present himself to us as one who discovered America in 1492, and at another time as a daring genius. Nevertheless, James holds that, in this Heraclitusean flux of ever passing, in this stream of irrecurrent objects of thought, we still can find some unchanged, self-same 'entities' which keep on appearing before our eyes. They are, according to James, the 'intended objects' or the 'topics of thought' to which our states of consciousness refer themselves intentionally. He says, "What is got twice is the same object. We hear the same 'note' over and over again. We see the same 'quality' of green, or smell the same 'objective perfume', or experience the same 'species' of pain."⁶⁹ In other words, even though the green grass will now appear to us a yellowish green, then as brownish green, James claims that it is still the same 'green grass' that is given itself in these various presentations. Or, we may now think of Columbus as one who found America in 1492, then as a daring genius; nevertheless, in James' opinion, all our thoughts are still all about the same Columbus. Using James' own expression, all these judgments of 'Columbus' will terminate in, lead from and to the same topic, 'Columbus'. Thus, although an 'intended object' or a 'topic of thought' can never be

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conceived of twice in exactly the same way so that a stream of the objects of thought of any 'intended object' has to be a flux of ceaseless changes, nevertheless, according to James, in this irrecurrent Heraclitusean flux, the 'intended object' or the 'topic of thought' can remain unchanged, self-same and stays there to be the same topic of intended object of the multiple states of thought and their objects. "In all our voluntary thinking," James points out, "there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve."⁷⁰ James claims that it is solely this topic of thought's capability to reappear in an identical state that leads us to distinguish it from the flux of ceaselessly changing intentional experiences. In James' words, "The judgment that my own past thought and my own present thought are of the same object is what makes me take the object out of either and project it by a sort of translocation into an independent position, from which it may appear to both."⁷¹

In our exposition of Husserl's notion of the 'topic of thought', we have already pointed out that, according to Husserl, in a flux of constantly changing and shifting noematic phases of a full noema, the 'object of consciousness' will remain as an unchanged, self-identical central pole to which these various noemata

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all refer themselves. In other words, in a full noema, we find the 'object of consciousness' as a self-same object presenting itself differently, or displaying itself in various aspects.⁷² Now, by considering the topic of thought as an unchanged, self-same topic in a chain of continuously changing objects of thought, we can say that James has, in fact, attributed to the topic of thought the same sort of endurance or permanence which Husserl attributes to the object of consciousness. In other words, both James and Husserl have regarded the 'intended object' as a self-identical 'entity' giving itself to us in a series of constantly transforming 'subjective objects' called 'noemata' by Husserl and 'objects of thought' by James.

Here, if we look at James and Husserl's agreement on the endurance, the self-sameness of the intended object in a flux of constantly shifting objects of thought from the perspective of the history of philosophy, then we are able to discover one crucial affinity in their analysis of human beings' cognitive phenomena. That is, by maintaining the self-sameness of an intended object, they both regard an intended object as something other than a flux of intentional experiences which are of this object. So doing, both James and Husserl have refuted psychologism's erroneous confusion of the intentional experience with the objects of the

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intentional experience and have recognized the absolute objectivity in the object of consciousness. However, as the main theme of our discussion here is not the problem of the autonomy of the sphere of the objects of consciousness in William James' philosophy, so let us not pursue this issue any longer and move on to the other crucial question in our comparison of James' notion of the topic of thought and Husserl's notion of the object of consciousness. That is: while Husserl regards the intended object, namely, the unchanged nucleus in the whirlpool of continuously transforming noematic phases as a 'nodal point of connexion' which is capable of unifying this flux of varying noemata into a full noema, does James too consider a topic of thought to have the same sort of position in the constitution of an object of consciousness?

Now, one point that we have to notice here is that when we claim that a Husserlian 'intended object' is capable of unifying a flux of noematic phases into a full noema, we do not mean that it is an active synthesizer which can bind a series of noemata into a coherent full noema. In fact, as we have already pointed out in our former explications of Husserl's notion of the object of consciousness, we know that a Husserlian intended object's function as a 'nodal point of connexion' lies solely in its being the self-same,

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common point of references to which all the noemata refer themselves, namely, in its being the central subject about which the whole flux of the changing noemata are the various predicates. Thus, if we want to ask the question whether a Jamesian topic of thought has or has not the Husserlian object's capacity of unifying a flux of objects of thought or noemata into one coherent system, then it will be more proper for us to pose the question in this way: to a stream of constantly transforming, shifting objects of thought, can a Jamesian topic of thought serve the role of being a common reference to which a multiple number of thought's objects are able to refer themselves; namely of being the common subject of which the multiple objects of thought are the various descriptions?

Our answer to this question is: while James claims that, "In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve,"⁷³ he considers it as self-evident that the objects of these members of thought will all refer to this self-same topic as the common topic about which they are the various 'thought as such's'. First, James points out, in a flux of 'thought as such's', one can always find one self-identical topic of thought, presenting itself now in this way, then in that way, now from this angle, then from that angle.

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He says,

When the identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations from those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we cognize it is the thought of it in those relations, a thought suffused with the consciousness of all that dim context.⁷⁴

This persistent recurrence of the 'topic of thought' thus convinces James that a flux of constantly transforming objects of thought is a flux of the different presentations of this self-same topic. In other words, this constantly reappearing topic of thought is able to unify a flux of different objects of thought into a system of its various manifestations, namely, into a system of different ways in which it is being intended.

He says,

We feel things differently according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or tired; differently at night and in the morning, differently in summer and in winter, and above all things differently in childhood, manhood and old age . . . From one year to another we see things in new lights. What was unreal has grown real, and what was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to care the world for are shrunken to shadows; the women, once so divine, the stars, the woods, and the waters, how now so dull and common; the young girls that brought an aura of infinity, at present hardly distinguishable existences; the picture so empty; and as for the books, what was there to find so mysteriously significant in Goethe, or in John Mill so full of weight?⁷⁵

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Things can appear to us in totally different ways.

But James points out that,

Yet, we never doubt that our feelings reveal the same world, with the same sensible qualities and the same things occupying it.⁷⁶

Of course, we have to notice that, by the term 'our feelings', what James attempts to mean here is 'the ways the things are felt by us'.

Thus we can say that James, like Husserl, considers the self-identical topic of thought which keeps on reappearing in every object of thought as the central nucleus which is capable of holding a stream of objects of thought together into a system.

Secondly, James points out that, in some cases, the self-same, unchanged topic of thought does not present itself in the objects of thought. But, in James' opinion, that does not mean that this group of objects of thought do not have a common topic to refer to and thus are a flux of separated, unrelated phenomena. James claims that, if we look more carefully at this stream of objects of thought, then we are able to find out that a common subject, topic or theme always exists in the margin of this flux of phenomena. Every object of thought, in fact, is overshadowed or surrounded by a horizon of its relations to this

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topic. He says, "Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic."⁷⁷

Therefore, according to James, even though some topics are unable to unify a flux of objects of thought together in the form of presenting itself in every object of thought and being the common reference point for this flux of objects of thought, they still are able to organize the flux of objects of thought into unitary thematic fields by imposing vague tones of affinity on every one of them. Therefore, we can conclude that, no matter whether a topic of thought exists in the focus of our consciousness, namely, inside an object of thought, or at the fringe of our consciousness, namely, at the margin of the object of thought, for James it is always able to function as the central core to which the flux of objects of thought attach themselves.

Here, we can sum up briefly our explication of James' theory of the structure of the object of consciousness in this way: using 'introspection' as the method to gain a more accurate view of the structure of the object of consciousness, James claims that an object of thought always presents itself to us in the form of a flux of ceaselessly changing 'intended as



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such's'. But unlike the associationists or the thinkers in the camp of psychologism, James never tries to reduce an intended object into this flux of continuously varying presentations of the object. James points out that, although an object of consciousness can never present itself twice in exactly the same way, nevertheless, the object or the topic of thought which manifests itself in the flux of shifting 'objects of thought' is a self-identical, unchanged 'entity'. For James, it is to this self-same topic that our consciousness directs itself, through, of course, the different 'objects of thought', namely, the different ways in which it is aware of it. Thus, James points out that, if we intend to give an accurate description of the structure of the object of consciousness, we should not skip either one of these two essential parts of the object of consciousness. According to James, an object of consciousness is, in fact, made up of a self-same topic of thought presenting itself in a series of continuously changing presentations. Or, we can say that, for James, an object of consciousness is a flux of constantly varying 'objects of thought', all revolving around one unchanged topic of thought and all unified under this 'topic of thought' into an identical system of the object of consciousness. While it is from this stream of different ways in which it presents itself

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that an object of consciousness obtains its various meanings and characteristics, it is, however, by referring to this self-same nucleus, this unchanged 'topic of thought' that the flux of varying meanings or characters are able to unify into one object. Now, if we look back to our former exposition of Husserl's notion of the structure of the object of consciousness, we can remember that, except expressed in a much more elaborate way, Husserl's idea of the structure of an object of consciousness is basically the same as James'. For Husserl, like James, considers an object of consciousness as, using Aron Gurwitsch's term, an 'object-system' constituted of a flux of shifting noemata all referring to one self-identical point of connexion, the object. Thus, we can say that, before Husserl, a Husserlian concept of the structure of the object of consciousness has already emerged in James' psychological studies. But the similarities between Husserl and James' concepts of an object of consciousness go further than the likeness in their ideas of object as 'object-system'. Here, let us move on to James' concept of the 'fringe of consciousness'.

c) An Analysis of William James' Notion of the Fringe of Consciousness

In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl says,

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William James was alone, as far as I know, in becoming aware of the phenomena of horizon--under the title of "fringe"--but how could he inquire into it without the phenomenologically acquired understanding of intentional objectivity and of implication?⁷⁸

A Jamesian fringe, for Husserl, is the concept of 'horizon' presented under a different title. The question which we attempt to answer in this section is: what is James' concept of the fringe of consciousness? Why Husserl considers James' concept of the fringe of consciousness as his notion of the horizon?

A fringe of consciousness, for James, is one of the two types of so-called 'transitive parts of stream of thought'. In the first chapter of this dissertation, under the title of "Thought is Sensibly Continuous," we already presented an explication of James' concept of 'the transitive parts of thought'. There James' notion of the fringe of consciousness was given a brief analysis. Here, we do not intend to repeat what we have already said. Nevertheless, in our former examination of James' notion of the fringe of consciousness, while our attention was focused on the expositions of James' arguments for the continuity of the stream of thought, our examination, then, concentrated on the fringe of consciousness' function of unifying the so-called 'substantive parts of consciousness' into continuous flux. The peculiar characteristics of

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the fringe of consciousness, namely the peculiar characteristics which do bear a striking similarity to the characteristics of Husserl's notion of the 'horizon', thus, have not been given enough exposition. In this section, in order to disclose the essential affinities between Husserl's notion of horizon and James' notion of the fringe of consciousness, we have to present a more thorough analysis of these special natures which belong to James' notion of the fringe of consciousness.

First, according to James, the fringe of consciousness is a sort of vague halo that surrounds and escorts every object of thought, which is also called by him the psychic overtone, psychic suffusion; or penumbra. James points out that the relation between the object of thought and the fringe of consciousness is comparable to the relation between 'the pailsful, spoonsful, quarter-potsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water' in a river and the free water flowing between them. Using James' words, since every perceived object is 'dyed' and 'steeped' in this flux of ambiguous phenomena, the value or significance of a perceived object is greatly determined by the nature of the fringe of consciousness that surrounds it.⁷⁹ It is this influential role assumed by the fringe of consciousness in the forming of the meaning of a perceived object, or it is this intimate relation between them that leads

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James, in a footnote on page 258 of The Principles of Psychology to make this claim,



But the fringe, as I use the word, means nothing like this (some sort of psychic material by which sensations in themselves separate are made to cohere together); it is part of the object cognized--substantive qualities and things appearing to the mind in a fringe of relations.⁸⁰

Secondly, James points out that some psychologists call the 'fringe of consciousness' the 'psychical zero' and claim that, while its results on our objects of consciousness can be felt in our reflection, it itself, nevertheless, cannot be really perceived. For James, though the 'fringe of consciousness' as a sort of transitive part of thought, does not carry any object within itself, however, contrary to what these philosophers suppose, it is not a sort of transparent, unperceivable phenomenon. As a vague halo that surrounds an object of consciousness, it is, in a certain sense, always perceived with the object of thought. It even is part of the object of thought.

What, then, is this dimly felt halo that escorts and surrounds every perceived object? In chapter I of this dissertation, we have already pointed out that, for James, a fringe of consciousness can mean a vague anticipation, a not-yet manifested central idea, a certain feeling of harmony, discord and a sense of

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affinity. These are, undoubtedly, the various sorts of the Jamesian fringes of consciousness. But, if we like to give a more thorough exposition of James' notion of the fringe of consciousness, then our job cannot be done by simply presenting a description of these various types of fringes. Rather, it is solely by looking at the notion of the fringe of consciousness in the context of the structure of the object of consciousness that we are able to really grasp the true meaning of the fringe of consciousness. Here, let us see how James presents this notion to us.

First, as we have already pointed out in the former section in our dissertation, most of our 'objects of thought' have the characteristics of referring themselves towards this or that self-same, unchanged 'topic of thought'. Thus, James claims that, whenever one single object of thought presents itself to us, a sort of vague phenomenon that always appears with it will be its relation or its own attachment to this particular 'topic of thought'. James says,

Half the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described some time back, influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel their relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our thought's destiny. Some bring us nearer

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to that consummation. Some the gap negates as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid gap is the term.⁸¹

Using James' expression, most of the objects of thought are 'swimming in a felt fringe of relations' towards a 'topic of thought', thus, we can, like A. Schutz, even claim that, while an object of thought presents itself to us, what exists outside the focus of our attention and at the margin of this object of thought, then, is the topic of thought to which it refers. Therefore, we can consider this topic of thought as a sort of Jamesian fringe of consciousness.

James also points out that, corresponding to an object of thought's different relations towards a topic of thought or a central theme, subjectively, an ambiguous feeling of either harmony or discord always appears with our perception of this very object of thought. When an object of thought is a sort of furtherance of this topic, we will have a feeling of harmony at the fringe of our consciousness; and when the object of thought is a sort of hindrance of the topic of thought, then we will have a feeling of discord at the fringe of our consciousness. James regards these dim senses of discord or harmony as another kind of vague halo that always escort our perceptions of the objects of thought. He says,

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Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. When the sense of furtherance is there, we are 'all right', with the sense of hindrance we are dissatisfied and perplexed, and cast about us for other thoughts.⁸²

All the objects of thought that revolve around one self-same topic or are being knitted into one unitary system by one central theme, will then be bathed in a sort of dim halo which James calls by the name 'inarticulated affinity'. In other words, James claims that, every object of thought in this unitary system will not just present itself, but will present itself as the same type of object as other objects in this system. James regards this sense of sameness carried by all the objects in the same system as another important kind of fringe of consciousness.

Finally, James points out that, as most of the objects of thought have the tendency to unify under one central idea into one unitary thematic system or under one self-same topic into one object-system, therefore, whenever one single object of thought presents itself to us, a vague idea of this total thematic system or object-system will also emerge at the back of our mind. James claims that it is this ambiguous understanding of how a total thematic system or object-system should be that leads us to have a sort of vague

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anticipation of a coming object of thought in this system before we are actually conscious of it. James calls this dim precognition of an object of thought an awareness of 'the direction of thought' and claims that, to a certain extent, most of the objects of thought are given themselves to us in these fringes of our expectations of them. In The Principles of Psychology, he tries to explicate these phenomena to us by the following example. He says,

What is that shadowy scheme of the "form" of an opera, play, or book, which remains in our mind and on which we pass judgment when the actual thing is done? What is our notion of a scientific or philosophical system? Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes of relation between terms, which hardly even as verbal images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process. We all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling of what thoughts are next to arise before they have arisen.⁸³

Of course, according to James, if an object of thought can meet our expectation, then, it will not just present itself to us, but will present itself to us in a psychic suffusion of 'felt suitability'. On the contrary, if an object of thought is not able to fulfill our anticipation, then a sense of unfitness will accompany our perception or consciousness of this particular object. These halos of 'felt suitability' or 'unfitness' that always escort an object of thought

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are, then, another type of Jamesian fringe of consciousness.

From James' various expositions of his notion of 'the fringe of consciousness', we can understand that, by this particular term, he attempts to mean one of the following phenomena: it can be the momentarily given object of thought's relations to a certain topic of thought. In these relations, we can find out whether the presently given object of thought is or is not a sort of further manifestation of this topic. It can be a dim sense of the presently appearing object of thought's fitness or unfitness to a certain thematic system. It can be an ambiguous feeling of a certain object of thought's affinity with other members of the same thematic system. It can be a vague anticipation of a certain not-yet materialized object of thought. It can also be a faint feeling that this particular object of thought is exactly what a certain intended object is going to disclose to us, or what a thematic system is going to make up. But what exactly are these various vague phenomena that present themselves with the objects of thought? In order to answer this question, we have to look back into James' theory of the structure of an object of consciousness. In the former section of our dissertation, we have already pointed out that, for James, an object of consciousness or a thematic

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system is made up of a flux of constantly varying objects of thought all referring themselves towards one self-same topic or idea. Now, if we try to look at the fringe of consciousness, the vague halo surrounding every object of thought in the context of the essential structures of either the object of consciousness or the thematic system, then, we can say that the fringe of consciousness, in fact, is the sign of an object of thought's 'belongingness' or 'bondage' to this total system. It is, metaphorically speaking, the shadows cast by this total system upon a momentarily present single element of this system. These shadows tell us something more than what are actually given in this object of thought. It tells us that the momentarily given object of thought is not just a form, a patch of color, a certain sign or a single word, but is also an aspect of a certain continuously disclosing object of consciousness or a part of a developing theme. Or we can say that the fringe of consciousness is the link between a single object of thought and the total system to which it belongs.

After the above exposition of James' notion of the fringe of consciousness, the second question that we have to solve in this section of our dissertation is: why Husserl considers James' notion of the fringe of consciousness as similar to his notion of horizon?

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First, we can claim that a Jamesian fringe of consciousness does have the same sort of general character as a Husserlian horizon. Like a Husserlian horizon, a Jamesian fringe of consciousness is a sort of marginal phenomenon which always appears with an object of thought. While a Jamesian object of thought, like a Husserlian noema, occupies the focus of our attention and can be clearly perceived or thought of, a Jamesian fringe of consciousness, like a Husserlian horizon, exists solely at the fringe of our consciousness and can only be ambiguously sensed. A Husserlian horizon is "the dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality which girts or pervades that which is actually perceived,"⁸⁴ is the misty "outlying zone of apprehension consisting of marginal 'co-data' of an accessory kind,"⁸⁵ while the Jamesian fringe of consciousness is the vaguely felt halo or penumbra which always surrounds and escorts every object of thought. In other words, we can say that the Jamesian fringe of consciousness is similar to the Husserlian horizon in the sense that they both are the dimly sensed phenomena which the actually perceived or judged objects bring with themselves. They both are the 'something' more than the momentarily perceived or judged object. But, the similarities between a Jamesian fringe and a Husserlian horizon are not just limited to their being the same sort of

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'misty outlying zone of apprehension' surrounding an actually appearing object of thought. The second, and, in fact, the much more significant reason for Husserl to regard James' notion of the fringe of consciousness as his notion of horizon appearing under a different label, is that in James' explications of the notion of the fringe of consciousness, an almost complete portrayal of a Husserlian internal horizon has already appeared. Before we can try to argue for the above statement, let us, first of all, recollect what we have said about Husserl's notion of internal horizon. In this chapter, we have already presented an explication of Husserl's notion of the internal horizon in this way: we pointed out that, corresponding to one single pulse of perceiving experience, a perceived object will give itself to us in a one-sided manifestation which Husserl calls a perceptual noema. What Husserl means by the internal horizon will then be the whole perceived object hidden behind this single perceived side of the perceived object. It is this hidden whole object that induces us, using Husserl's expression, to see something more than what has actually been offered in this single manifestation of the perceived object. In fact, we will try to fit this momentarily appearing perceptual noema into the whole context of the object of consciousness and see it

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as an aspect, a part of this particular object. We see it as the natural continuity of what the perceived object has already revealed to us, as a fulfillment of our former anticipation. We have a vague precognition of what is going to follow the present noema. In other words, it is solely because of the existence of the internal horizon that we are able to see a perceptual noema as one ring in the chain of the continuous revelations of a perceived object than as an independent, isolated and complete entity. Now, keeping Husserl's explication of his notion of internal horizon in mind and looking back at James' descriptions of the fringe of consciousness, we are able to find out that, using different expressions, what, in fact, these two philosophers attempt to present to us are the same sort of phenomena. It is the meaning of the momentarily appearing object of thought or perceptual noema which is not given in this object of thought or noema. In it we can see the total object of consciousness or thematic system in which the present object of thought or perceptual noema is only one single constituent. In it we see either this object's fitness or its unfitness to this system. In it we also see the specific meaning of this object of thought in this particular context. Or we can say that a Jamesian fringe of consciousness is similar to a Husserlian internal

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horizon in the sense that they both are the hidden Gestalt whole in which the present object of thought is only a part; and they both assume a very influential role in determining the meaning of the present object of thought. Thus, we can conclude that a Jamesian theory of the constitution of the object of consciousness is similar to a Husserlian theory of the structure of an intentional object not only in the sense that both philosophers consider a flux of the objects of thought as having the essential characteristic of unifying into one unitary system and referring themselves all towards a self-same central core, but also in the sense that both philosophers contend that every single object of thought is given in the shadow of the system to which it belongs.

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- ¹ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 208.
- ² R. B. MacLeod, "Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology," in Behaviorism and Phenomenology, ed. T. W. Wann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 49.
- ³ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 145.
- ⁴ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 145.
- ⁵ Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), section 60.
- ⁶ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 277.
- ⁷ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 161.
- ⁸ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 278.
- ⁹ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 208.
- ¹⁰ Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Object of Thought," in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966); "Towards a Theory of Intentionality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 30 (1970); The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964).
- ¹¹ James M. Edie, "Necessary Truth and Perception: William James On the Structure of Experience," in New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. James Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1969).
- ¹² Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 208.
- ¹³ Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation 2, chapter 5.

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¹⁴ John Wild, "Husserl's Critique of Psychologism: Its Historical Roots and Contemporary Relevance," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).

¹⁵ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 218.

¹⁶ As Robert C. Solomon in an article called "Husserl's Concept of Noema" points out, the controversy between these two branches of Husserlian commentary lie mainly in their different understanding of the nature of noema. While the orthodox Husserlian scholars tend to regard noema as the 'perceived as such', the 'object viewed from a certain perspective', the linguistic orientated commentators, on the other hand, claim 'the unperceivability' of the noema and regard it as an abstract or intensional entity. Following R. C. Solomon's line of argument, we consider these two branches of Husserlian interpretation more as the complements of each other than as two unsolvable contestations. In fact, it is merely the different focus on different levels of noema in these two branches of interpretation that entail the appearance of two seemingly contradictory notions of noema. Dagfin Føllesdal and his followers focus their explications of Husserl's concept of noema mainly on the noema of judgment or other higher levels of noema; on the other hand, the orthodox Husserlian scholars tend to concentrate their exploration of the noema at the level of perception. In R. C. Solomon's words:

"The dispute between the 'orthodox' view of Gurwitsch, Cairns, et al. (What Hubert Dreyfus has called 'the New School school') and the 'heretical' view of Føllesdal and his students can be seen largely in terms of their acceptance of one of these competing paradigms (the paradigm of the study of perception and the paradigm of the studies of logic of mathematics) and their relative neglect of the other. Gurwitsch, who has also been a major contributor to the philosophical aspects of Gestalt psychology, takes perception and its problems to be the proper setting for Husserl's noema. Føllesdal, a first-rate logician and student of W. V. O. Quine, sees in Husserl's conception of the noema an answer to certain

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puzzles in the Fregean theory of 'indirect' or 'opaque' intensional contexts. . . Føllesdal, on the other hand, takes Husserl's noema to be very much like Frege's notion of the Sinn of a linguistic expression, generalized appropriately to nonlinguistic acts."

(Robert C. Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the 'Noema'," in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, eds. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, p. 161.)

Gurwitsch uses perceptual noema, namely, the correlate of the perceptual experience, as the paradigm for his study of Husserl's notion of noema. Noema is interpreted by Gurwitsch as a perspective of an object or an object perceived in a certain way, (appropriately "bracketed" by the phenomenological epoche). Noema, therefore, is perceivable. Føllesdal understands Husserl's distinction of intentional experience, noema and object in the framework of Frege's distinction of linguistic expression, meaning of the linguistic expression and reference of the linguistic expression. Judgmental noema, the correlate of the conceptual experience, namely, the asserting, believing, judging, doubting, is the paradigm which Føllesdal uses to understand Husserl's notion of noema. Noema, thus, is interpreted by him as the meaning of a state of judgmental experience. It is an abstract, intensional entity which is not perceived through the sense.

Now, if we return to Husserl's original analysis of the notion of noema as given in Ideas, we can see that noema, for Husserl, stands for an unreal correlate of all types of intentional experiences. The notion of noema, in fact, covers both the perceptual and judgmental noema. What the orthodox Husserlian commentators and the linguistic analysis oriented scholars give us, are not two incompatible, contradictory interpretations of the notion of noema. As the analyses of the different levels of noema, they are the complements of each other and can be combined into a more thorough interpretation of the Husserlian noema.

In our dissertation, Husserl's notion of noema will be used to shed a new light on James' notion of the 'object of thought'. What we attempt to discuss will be the basic affinity between these two notions.

We attempt to explicate that James' 'object of thought', like Husserl's noema, is a subjective object, an object intended as such or the correlate of the intentional experience through which the experience intends its object. The term 'object of thought' is, in fact, used by James to indicate both the correlates of perceptual and judgmental experiences. Therefore, no matter which branch of interpretation we adopt in this dissertation, Husserl's notion of noema can still be used as a framework to give James' notion of 'object of thought' a phenomenological interpretation. Since our analysis of James' theory of the structure of the object of consciousness will be limited mainly to the level of the perceptual object, so we just follow the school of commentary which focuses on the interpretation of Husserl's concept of noema at the level of perception.

17 Husserl, Ideas, section 90, p.262

18 Husserl, Ideas, section 88, p. 258

19 Husserl, Ideas, section 88, p. 258

20 Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," in Phenomenology, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 128.

21 Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," p. 129.

22 Husserl, Ideas, section 89, pp. 260-261

23 Aron Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective," in Phenomenology and Existentialism, eds. E. N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 47

24 The noetic phases and the hyletic phases of the intentional experiences are, according to Husserl, the two real components of the intentional experiences. By the hyletic phase of intentional experience, Husserl means the formless experience in a state of intentional experience. It is the pure experience of colour, touch, sound, etc. Husserl calls the hyletic phase of the intentional experience by the names of 'sensory

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content', 'sensile experiences' or 'primary content'. In Husserl's opinion, it is through the stratum of the hyletic phase of the intentional experience that the appearing phases of an intended object, i.e., its colour-quality, its roughness, etc., exhibit themselves. By the noetic phase of the intentional experience, Husserl means the immaterial form in a state of intentional experience. It is the empty intentional form, namely, the empty form of seeing, feeling, remembering, judging, etc., in a state of intentional experience. Husserl considers the noetic phase of the intentional experience as the 'animating', 'meaning-bestowing' stratum of a state of intentional experience. It is, according to Husserl, in this stratum of consciousness that the hyletic phase of intentional experience is animated, namely, that it undergoes the 'formal shaping', the 'gift of meaning'. In other words, it is in this stratum of consciousness that the pure experience in a state of intentional experience is formed into a certain type of intentional experience. For example, it is in the form of 'seeing' that the formless experience of redness is formed into a state of concrete experience, 'seeing a red thing'. Here, by the sentence 'both the noetic and hyletic phases of the intentional experiences of this apple tree will undergo continuous modifications', we attempt to mean the following things: looking into a garden at a blossoming apple tree, we will have a stream of different perceptual experiences of this particular apple tree. By the modifications of the hyletic phases of the intentional experiences of this apple tree, we attempt to mean the changing experiences of the different appearing phases of this apple tree, i.e., the experiences of this aspect or that aspect of the apple tree, this colour or that colour of the apple tree, etc. By the modifications of the noetic phases of the intentional experiences of this apple tree, we mean the changes of the ways in which we intend this apple tree, namely, the different ways of seeing it, hearing it, or smelling it, etc.

25 Husserl, Ideas, section 131. p.365

26 Husserl, Ideas, section 131. p.p. 365-366

27 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation 5, section 17.

28 Husserl, Ideas, section 130. p.364

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29 In footnote 24 of this chapter, we have already presented a brief explication of what Husserl means by the hyletic phase and the noetic phase of the intentional experience. Here, by 'the special characteristics of the noetic and hyletic phases of these intentional experiences', we mean the special characteristics of the 'sensory contents' of the intentional experiences and the special characteristics of the forms in which the intentional experiences intend their objects.

30 Gurwitsch, "Husserl's Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness in Historical Perspective," p. 53.

31 Cornelius Van Peursen, "The Horizon," in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, eds. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

32 Husserl, Ideas, section 27. p. 102

33 Husserl, Ideas, section 44. p. 137

34 Husserl, Ideas, section 27. p. 102

35 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, p. 157.

36 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, p. 157.

37 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, p. 158.

38 E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Kark Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 32

39 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences, p. 158.

40 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, p. 35.

41 Helmut Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept of 'Horizon'," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Faber (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).

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237. 42 Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p.
238. 43 Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p.
- 44 Van Peursen, p. 191.
- 293-302. 45 Husserl, "Personliche Aufzeichnungen," pp.
231. 46 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
275. 47 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
- 48 Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2, p. 75.
231. 49 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
196. 50 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
275. 51 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
276. 52 James, ⁴The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
- 53 William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt, 1892), p. 181.
- 54 James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 181.
185. 55 Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p.
141. 56 Gurwitsch, "On the Object of Thought," p.
- 57 Husserl, Ideas, section 88. p. 258
276. 58 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.

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- 59 Gurwitsch, "On the Object of Thought," p.
141.
- 60 Husserl, Ideas, section 131. P. 366
- 61 Alfred Schutz, "William James' Concept of
the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 (1941),
447.
- 62 Husserl, Ideas, section 131.
- 63 James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 181;
James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 276.
- 64 Husserl, Ideas, p. 181. P. 282
- 65 James, The Principles of Psychology, chapter
9, I, section 2.
- 66 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, pp.
275-276.
- 67 Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p.
313.
- 68 Gurwitsch, "On the Object of Thought," p.
185.
- 69 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
231.
- 70 James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 181.
- 71 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
278.
- 72 Husserl, Ideas, section 131. P. 365
- 73 James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 181.
- 74 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
233.
- 75 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
232.
- 76 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
232.

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259. 77 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
- 78 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences.
255. 79 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
258. 80 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
259. 81 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
259. 82 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
- 255-256. 83 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, pp.
- 84 Husserl, Ideas, section 27. p. 102
- 85 Husserl, Ideas, section 44. p. 137

Chapter III

The Foundation of the Structure of the Object of Consciousness--An Examination of William James' Theory of the Activities of Consciousness

In the previous chapter of our dissertation, we have presented an analysis of William James' theory on the structure of the object of consciousness and disclosed crucial similarities existing between James' notion of the structure of the object of consciousness and Husserl's notion of the constitution of the intended objects. In this chapter of our dissertation, we plan to go on to expose the affinity between James and Husserl's theories on the nature of consciousness. In the first and second parts of this chapter, we shall try to explicate how both James and Husserl consider 'projecting outside of itself towards its objects' as consciousness' essential characteristic. We intend to prove that a Husserlian notion of intentionality has already emerged from James' exposition of consciousness' essence of cognition. In the third and fourth part of this chapter, we attempt to point out that, for both Husserl and James, consciousness will not just merely direct itself towards its object,

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but it can perform a certain active constitution of its object. In the third part of this chapter, we will expose the similarities between James' notions of consciousness' various passive and active cognitive functions and Husserl's notions of the hyletic phases and the different noetic activities of consciousness. In the fourth part, we will point out how both Husserl and James hold that the different stratum of an intended object are the product of consciousness' different cognitive functions.

1. An Explication of Edmund Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

It is generally agreed among the Husserlian scholars that, besides the concept of phenomenological reduction, intentionality is a key concept in Husserl's phenomenology. From Logical Investigations, in which Husserl works out the first elaborate exposition of his concept of intentionality, to Cartesian Meditations and Formal and Transcendental Logic, in which Husserl accomplishes a theory of the so-called operative intentionality, Husserl continuously makes revisions of this notion. Like J. N. Mohanty, in an expository article called "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality," points out, by tracing the development of Husserl's concept of



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intentionality, one can almost grasp the total picture of the development of Husserl's phenomenology.¹ Since our purpose here is neither to give a thorough examination of the development of Husserl's concept of intentionality nor to present a detailed analysis of the various issues in Husserl's theory of intentionality, we shall confine ourselves, therefore, to a basic exposition of Husserl's notion of intentionality.

2 The Husserlian notion of intentionality is a revision of Brentano's notion of intentionality. Thus, before we go on to what sort of amendments Husserl has made to Brentano's notion of intentionality and how the Husserlian notion of intentionality develops from Brentano's notion of intentionality, we would like to, first of all, take a brief look at Brentano's notion of intentionality.

3 As Brentano, in an article called "The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena," points out, 'intentionality' is a concept presented by him to give 'the line of demarcation' between the areas of mental and physical phenomena. According to Brentano, intentionality is the mental phenomena's unique and essential characteristic which is able to distinguish the mental phenomena from the physical phenomena. He says, "This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomena manifest

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anything similar."²

What Brentano means by the mental phenomenon's unique characteristic of 'intentional inexistence' or 'intentionality' is, in fact, the mental phenomenon's peculiar characteristic of 'directing itself towards its object', 'relatedness to a content' or 'immanent objectivity'. He explains this notion in this way,

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of Middle ages called the intentional inexistence of an object, and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object, or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, etc.³

Intentionality, according to Brentano, is consciousness' unique characteristic of having something as its intended object, of referring itself towards something of which it is the consciousness, of carrying something within itself as its object, of being specified by its object, etc. Since no physical phenomenon displays this characteristic, Brentano considers intentionality as the distinguishing feature which is able to set the mental phenomenon apart from the physical phenomenon.

Although Husserl is not interested in the enterprise of distinguishing the area of the mental phenomenon

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from the physical one, nevertheless, he considers Brentano's notion of intentionality as an indispensable starting-point for his analysis of the nature of consciousness. He admits that directedness towards its object is the essential characteristic of most of the consciousness. Husserl says,

We take intentional relation, understood in purely descriptive fashion as an inward peculiarity of certain experiences, to be the essential feature of 'psychical phenomena' or 'acts', seeing in Brentano's definition of them as phenomena intentionally containing objects in themselves a circumscription of essence, whose 'reality' (in the traditional sense) is of course ensured by examples.⁴

It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the term. We understood under Intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences "to be the consciousness of something." It was in the explicit cogito that we first came across this wonderful property to which all metaphysical enigmas and riddles of the theoretical reason lead us eventually back: perceiving is the perceiving of something, maybe a thing; judging, the judging of a certain matter; valuation, the valuing of a value; wish, the wish for the content wished, and so on. Acting concerns action, doing concerns the deed, loving the beloved, joy the object of joy. In every wakeful cogito a "glancing" ray from the pure Ego is directed upon the "object" of the correlate of consciousness for the time being, the thing, the fact, and so forth, and enjoys the typically varied consciousness of it.⁵

In Husserl's opinion, Brentano's discoveries that consciousness is the 'consciousness of something'

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and that consciousness can be characterized by its 'reference to its object', in fact, are able to give him the preliminary answer to his inquiry concerning what is consciousness. In other words, if the main purpose of Husserl's phenomenology is to give us a transcendental description of the structure of consciousness (of course, the structure of the object of consciousness, as the structure of the correlate of consciousness, will also be described in Husserl's phenomenology), then, Brentano's notion of intentionality, as Brentano's discovery of the essence of consciousness, obviously can be used by Husserl as the valuable starting point for his whole philosophical enterprise. But, as J. N. Mohanty or Herbert Spiegelberg have already pointed out, Husserl does not just transplant Brentano's notion of intentionality into his analysis of the nature of consciousness without any modification.⁶ According to these two Husserlian scholars, it is solely by revising Brentano's theory of intentionality into his own theory of intentionality that Husserl is able to present, in his phenomenology, a more accurate description of consciousness' essential characteristic of 'projecting outside of itself towards its objects', 'transcending beyond itself towards the world'.

In his appropriation of Brentano's concept of intentionality, we find that Husserl has, in fact,

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made two crucial revisions: first, he has dropped Brentano's notion of the immanency of the intended object in the intentional experience. Secondly, he has transformed Brentano's concept of intentionality from consciousness' passive, static directedness towards its object to consciousness' active constituting of its object.

In the third part of this chapter, where we present an exposition of Husserl's notion of consciousness' various hyletic phases and noetic acts, we will explicate how, in Husserl's opinion, consciousness will not just direct itself towards its object, but can, in fact, perform an active constituting of its object. Here, in this section of our dissertation, we will merely confine ourselves to the exposition of Husserl's rejection of Brentano's notion of the immanency of the intended object.

As we have already mentioned, while Brentano considers intentionality as mental phenomenon's distinguishing characteristic which is able to separate it away from the physical phenomenon, he has defined intentionality by the mediaeval terms as 'the intentional inexistence of an intended object in consciousness' or 'the immanent objectivity of the intended object'. That means all mental phenomena, according to Brentano, have the peculiar nature of directing themselves towards their objects.

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However, for Brentano, the intended objects towards which the mental phenomena direct themselves are, in fact, nothing other than immanent beings existing inside the mental phenomena as the contents of the mental phenomena. Of course, as H. Spiegelberg or J. N. Mohanty have already pointed out, Brentano, in his later writings, especially in his letters, does give up this notion.

But, we can say that, before such a radical step is taken, Brentano's failure to realize an intended object's absolute objectivity and his reduction of an intended object into a sort of psychological existence does lead his thinking to slip into the pitfall of psychologism. This psychologistic position, in fact, had hindered Brentano in working out an adequate formulation of the notion of intentionality.

To Brentano's concept of 'the immanency of the intended object', in Logical Investigations, Husserl raised such objections.

It is always quite questionable, and frequently misleading, to say that perceived, imagined, asserted or desired objects, etc., 'enter consciousness' (or do so in perceptual, presentative fashion, etc.), or to say conversely that 'consciousness', 'the ego' enters into this or that sort of relation to them, or to say that such objects 'are taken up into consciousness' in this or that way, or to say, similarly, that intentional experiences 'contain something as their object in themselves' etc. etc.

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Contrary to what Brentano has proposed, Husserl claims that an intended object is not an immanent object which exists inside a state of intentional experience as part of this state of experience. In Logical Investigations, we find that Husserl has given these two reasons to support his objection of Brentano's concept of the 'immanency of the intended object':

Containing, having or being contained, being had, a part to a whole or a whole to a part, are, in Husserl's opinion, a sort of real relation existing between two real beings, namely the container and the contained, the possessor and the possessed, the part and the whole. Intentionality, according to Husserl, is not a sort of real relation between the intentional experience and the intended object. Husserl points out that, while we say that a state of intentional experience has an intentional relation with its object, what we mean is solely that an actual state of experience has intended or meant its object in a certain way. Whether the intended object is or is not a real being does not hinder the intentional experience to intend or mean it in a certain way. In other words, a state of intentional experience may intend an irreal object. The fact that this particular intended object is not an actual object does not make any difference to the intentional experience's essence of intending this

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object in a certain way. Therefore, in Husserl's opinion, if we claim that a state of intentional experience intentionally directs itself towards a certain object, we do not mean that this state of intentional experience is having any real relation with this object in the sense of containing this object, having this object as part of itself. Opposite to what Brentano holds, an intended object, thus, for Husserl, is not an immanent object existing in the intentional experience, like an entity in an empty box. Besides, the 'immanent content of a state of intentional experience', according to Husserl, is, in fact, part of this intentional act rather than the object intended by this particular intentional act. Husserl says,

These so-called immanent contents are merely intended or intentional while the truly immanent contents which belong to the real make-up of the intentional experiences are not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary points d'appui which render possible an intention, but are not themselves intended, not the intended object in the act.⁸

The second reason given by Husserl to support his notion of the 'transcendence of the intended object' is the difference in structure between the intentional experience and the intended object. Husserl points out that while the intentional experiences are a flux of constantly changing, non-recurrent states of

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consciousness, an intended object is a self-same, enduring entity. The endurance of the intended object, according to Husserl, can be proven by the obvious fact that, in our stream of consciousness, we always find that a multiple number of our different mental states can all direct themselves towards one self-identical object and become a number of different experiences of this object. As an unchanged, enduring entity, an intended object, in Husserl's opinion, of course is not part of the non-recurrent stream of intentional experiences.

Thus, although Husserl has adopted Brentano's notion of intentionality into his analysis of the nature of consciousness, unlike Brentano, he does not consider an intended object as an immanent object which constitutes part of the consciousness. An intended object, for Husserl, is a transcendent object existing outside of the sphere of the intentional experience. According to Husserl, when we claim that we intend some objects, what our intentional experiences direct themselves to are the objects themselves rather than the mental images or sensations of these objects, as Brentano or other philosophers in the camp of psychologism have always claimed. Husserl says, "I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song, etc. etc."⁹

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It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them.¹⁰

Now, no matter whether the reasons given by Husserl in Logical Investigations to support his rejection of Brentano's notion of the 'immanency of the intended object' are or are not sound enough, the crucial point that we need to notice here is that Husserl has revised Brentano's notion of intentionality by substituting the notion of the 'transcendancy of the intended object' for the notion of the 'immanency of the intended object'. The crucial point that we need to notice here is that, by changing the intended object to which consciousness directs itself from an immanent object existing inside consciousness to a transcendent object existing outside of the sphere of consciousness, Husserl has, in fact, changed the whole meaning of the concept 'intentionality'. If an intended object is transcendent rather than immanent, intentionality, as consciousness' essence of referring itself towards its object, should, then, be interpreted as consciousness' characteristic of projecting outside of itself towards its object, rather than consciousness' essence of being specified by what it carries inside itself. Thus, we can say that, following Brentano's footsteps, Husserl has considered

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that the essence of most of the consciousness lies in its intentionality. However, by intentionality, what Husserl attempts to mean is not consciousness' peculiar nature of 'including something as an object within itself', but consciousness' unique function of transcending itself, thrusting outside itself, directing itself towards an object other than itself. Intentionality, instead of consciousness' essence of containing its objects within itself and severing itself from all the non-mental entities, as it has been interpreted by Brentano, is, for Husserl, consciousness' unique characteristic of opening, projecting itself towards all the mental and non-mental entities, the physical, mental as well as the transcendental world.

Thus, if we were asked to give the simplest interpretation of Husserl's notion of intentionality, then, we can say that intentionality is Husserl's notion that the essence of most consciousness lies in its being the consciousness of something other than itself. Of course, this 'something being conscioused' is not necessarily a real entity, as Prof. D. Carr has said in an article called "Intentionality:"

The intended object is not necessarily some real thing, whether internal (mental) or external that they both have. To speak of an intended object is to refer obliquely, one might say, to a possible real object, but not to commit oneself to its reality

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(or unreality).

Now we could say of the two experiences of a dancing bear, one veridical and one illusory, that what they have in common is an intended object. The intended object is not necessarily some real thing, whether internal (mental) or external, that they both have. To speak of an intended object is to refer obliquely, one might say, to a possibly real object, but not to commit oneself to its reality (or unreality). Possible equivalents for 'intended' would be 'putative' or 'alleged'.¹¹

In this paragraph we can find out that both a veridical and an illusory experience have an intended object. In this example the intended object is a dancing bear. The reality of the intended object, in the case of the veridical experience of a dancing bear, and the unreality of the intended object, in the case of the illusory experience of a dancing bear, however, does not make any difference to the fact that both these two experiences are intentional experiences and have an 'intended object'. The reality or unreality of the intended object of an experience is not in any way a condition for this particular experience to be intentional.

2. The Worldliness of Thought--An Analysis of James' Concept of Intentionality

In an article called "William James' Significance for Husserl's Phenomenology" in The Phenomenological

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Movement, Herbert Spiegelberg has made these remarks about James' influence on Husserl,

Little would be needed to show traces of James' inspiration in the case of such conceptions as that of the "stream of consciousness" (Husserl's rendering of James' usual phrase "stream of thought") after the publication of the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen, which had been in the making in the years after 1894; the same applies to a concept like that of the "fringe." But there is one case, possibly even more important, where James' influence is less obvious and has not yet been noticed: Husserl's concept of intentionality.¹²

Spiegelberg then claims that he suspects it is James' studies on the nature of consciousness that stimulate Husserl to develop the notion of intentionality beyond Brentano's mere relatedness to an object to the Husserlian active constitution of the intended object. Now, in this section of our dissertation, we are not interested in exposing James' significance for Husserl's phenomenology. In fact, the question that we attempt to raise here is: if what Spiegelberg speculates is true, that James' notion of the nature of consciousness does play a crucial role in Husserl's elaboration of his theory of intentionality, then, can we, in James' analysis of consciousness, discover the emergence of a Husserlian notion of intentionality?

Intentionality, or the specification of a mental state by this mental state's relatedness to a certain

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object, is an age-old notion formulated by the schoolmen in mediaeval times. Nevertheless, in modern times, it is Brentano who recovers the significance of this notion and uses it to provide a distinguishing definition to the subject of psychology, namely, the psychological phenomena. Thus, before we start to disclose the notion of intentionality in James' thinking, we would like to know whether there is any relation existing between James and Brentano?

In The Principles of Psychology, James has quoted Brentano's Psychologie Vom Empirischen Standpunkt four times, in volume 1, page 187; volume 1, page 240; volume 1, page 547 and volume 2, page 286. He admits openly that in the issues of the infallibility of the introspective observation, the continuity of the flux of consciousness, and the classification of the mental phenomena, he agrees totally with Brentano. Thus, we can say that James not only is a serious reader of Brentano, but, in fact, has adopted some of Brentano's concepts into his psychology. If the concept of intentionality is Brentano's crucial contribution to psychology, then it is almost unthinkable that James has not come across it in his studies of Brentano. Nevertheless, in both his The Principles of Psychology and Psychology: Briefer Course, he has never even once mentioned Brentano's concept of intentionality.

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Does this fact indicate that James either is not interested in the issue of consciousness' intentionality or does not consider that consciousness has intentionality as its essence? Now, if we ignore the historical fact of whether James has or has not quoted Brentano on a particular point and try to concentrate our attentions on the intrinsic affinities existing between these two philosophers' concepts, then we can discover that, although James has never even once mentioned Brentano's notion of intentionality in his works, in his psychological studies, he not only has analyzed the intentionality of consciousness, but, like Brentano, has also considered intentionality as consciousness' essential characteristic. Therefore, we suspect that James is deeply influenced by Brentano in the issue of the directionality of consciousness, even though he has never mentioned it in his works.

The first obvious evidence of James' awareness of the existence of intentionality in consciousness can be found in James' explanation of his usage of the term 'thought' to indicate the stream of consciousness. He says,

We ought to have some general term by which to designate all states of consciousness merely as such, and apart from their particular quality or cognitive function 'Thought' would be by far the best word to use if it could be made to cover sensations.

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It has no opprobrious connotation such as "feeling" has, and it immediately suggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to an object other than the mental state itself), which we shall soon see to be of the mental life's essence.¹³

In this paragraph, James tells us that the reason for him to choose the general term 'thought' instead of other general terms like 'psychosis', 'conscious modification' or 'idea' to designate all states of consciousness is that the term 'thought' can immediately suggest the consciousness' essence of directionality towards its object. What we, then, can grasp from this explanation is the evidence that while James is selecting the term to indicate the flux of consciousness, he is already aware of consciousness' essence of intentionality. He, then, hopes that the term he chooses is able to convey to his readers this crucial characteristic of consciousness. The only thing that we need to notice here is that while Brentano uses the term 'intentionality' to indicate consciousness' essence 'being conscious of something as its object', James calls it the presence of cognition or knowledge.

The other evidence that shows that the notion of intentionality has already existed in James' psychological studies can be found in James' explications of the scope and datum of his psychological investigations. In these explications, we find James not

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only admits that consciousness has the capacity of intending (knowing, feeling) its object, but even considers the existence of the intentional relation between consciousness and its object as the indisputable pre-supposition for his psychological analysis.

In the Introduction to Psychology: Briefer Course, James claims that the existence of "knowledge, by these states of consciousness, of other things"¹⁴ like the existence of the states of consciousness, is what he likes to assume at the beginning of his psychological studies. Or, in The Principles of Psychology, he claims that while the relation between consciousness and its object is one of the indubitable data of his psychological investigations, what he means by this relation is nothing other than the intentional relation. He says, "The mind's relations to other objects than the brain are cognitive and emotional relations exclusively, so far as we know. It knows them, and it inwardly welcomes or rejects them, but it has not other dealings with them."¹⁵ In the same chapter of The Principles of Psychology, James then claims that, "knowledge becomes for him an ultimate relation that must be admitted, whether it be explained or not, just like difference or resemblance which no one seeks to explain."¹⁶ James, here, holds that though, as a psychologist, he is not going to ask the philosophical questions

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how consciousness is able to know its object or what is cognition, nevertheless, 'consciousness knows its object' is taken by him as an obvious, undisputable fact which he likes to assume at the outset of his psychological analysis. Therefore, we can say that James might not, like Brentano, consider intentionality as consciousness' unique and distinguishing feature. However, it is unquestionable that he is aware of consciousness' functions of feeling and knowing its object and considers these emotional or cognitive relations as the only relations that consciousness can have with its objects. Whether or not James gets the inspiration from Brentano, in his affirmation of the omnipresence of cognition in consciousness, we are, in fact, able to see an unformulated version of Brentano's idea of intentionality.

In a former section of our dissertation, we have already pointed out that Husserl, in his studies of the nature of consciousness, has inherited Brentano's notion of intentionality and considered reference to its object as consciousness' essential characteristic. But we also emphasized that Husserl does not just uncritically transplant Brentano's notion into his philosophy. We pointed out that, in his adopting of Brentano's notion of intentionality, he has, in fact, transformed it from consciousness' unique character

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of having an immanent object in itself to consciousness' function of projecting itself to an object other than itself. A Husserlian notion of intentionality, thus, is a revised version of Brentano's notion of intentionality. In this section of our dissertation, if we want to claim that a Husserlian notion of intentionality rather than Brentano's notion of intentionality has already been cultivated in James' theory of the nature of consciousness, then we cannot, as we have up to this moment, just point out that a Brentanian idea of consciousness' relatedness to its object has already existed in James' thinking. We must, rather, prove that James, like Husserl, while admitting Brentanian directedness towards its object as consciousness' essence, nevertheless, regards this directedness as consciousness' capacity to transcend itself. Can we, then, find any contention of consciousness' transcendental in James' analysis of the nature of consciousness?

If we are careful enough, even in James' advocacy of the presence of cognition in consciousness, which we have just quoted in the former paragraph, we can already find traces of James' idea of cognition as consciousness' essential characteristic of thrusting itself towards its object. Therefore, we find that James, while asserting the omnipresence of cognition in consciousness, interprets cognition as 'reference

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to an object other than the mental state itself. He, while claiming consciousness' knowledge as a pre-supposition which he would like to assume at the outset of his psychological studies, points out that by knowledge, he means 'knowledge, by these states of consciousness, of other things'. It is obvious that James, unlike Brentano, does not consider an intended object as part of the experiencing consciousness. But, if we are not satisfied with these casual remarks, then, a more elaborated theory of consciousness' transcendentalty can be found in James' exposition of what Bruce Wilshire calls 'the worldliness of consciousness' in his study of the phenomenological tendency in William James' psychology, namely, in his book called William James and Phenomenology. It is in James' notion of the worldliness of consciousness that phenomenological scholars like Aron Gruwitsch, B. Wilshire or James Edie, etc., discover an obvious proto-Husserlian theory of intentionality. We must say that Spiegelberg also suspects that James' contention of consciousness' openness to the world, namely, consciousness' worldliness, has inspired Husserl to drop the idea of the immanence of the intended object. Let us see what James says in his theory of the worldliness of consciousness.

In order to give an explicit account of James' notion of the worldliness of consciousness, we must,

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here, first of all, shift our attention to one dominant Cartesian notion of mind which has been accepted by most of the post-Cartesian philosophers, both the idealists and the empiricists. For it is only through a contrast with Descartes' notion of mind that James' notion of the worldliness of consciousness, like Husserl's notion of intentionality, can be thoroughly explicated. What we mean by this dominant Cartesian notion of mind is Descartes' confinement of consciousness to a subjective domain of interiority. As we have already pointed out several times in this dissertation, Descartes, after having severed reality into two unbridgable domains, the domain of res cogitans and the domain of res extensa, claims that mind has to be closed within itself. Thus, while Descartes, like Brentano, admitting that mind, as a flux of cogitations, has the essential capacities of intending its objects, all the intended objects, for him, are nothing other than the immanent objects existing inside consciousness. When the mind knows a transcendent object in the external world, what the mind knows, according to Descartes, is the mental image of this transcendent object rather than the transcendent object itself. We can say that, Brentano's concept of intentionality as the mind's having mental entities inside itself is, in fact, a theory based on this Cartesian notion of the self-enclosedness of consciousness.

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A Jamesian theory of the worldliness of consciousness, speaking simply, is a rejection of Descartes' notion of mind. What James attempts to present in this particular theory is that, contradicting Descartes and the post-Cartesian thinkers' view that the mind can only be aware of its own content, consciousness is able, through its cognition, to refer itself to something other than itself. By worldliness, we mean merely consciousness' characteristic of having non-mental entities as its objects. In The Principles of Psychology, he explicates his notion of the worldliness as,

"Human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself, that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the function of knowing."¹⁷ Also, he claims that, while 'writers of every school' content "that knowledge in any strict sense of the word, as a self-transcendent function, is impossible," his "own blunt statements about the ultimateness of the cognitive relation, and the difference between the 'object' of the thought and its mere 'topic' or 'subject of discourse', are all at variance with any such theory."¹⁸ Now, if we recollect how Husserl, in his explication of consciousness' intentionality, emphasizes that while intentionality is consciousness' characteristic of directing itself towards its object, this directedness is consciousness' capacity of projecting out of itself,

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thrusting out of itself, then, we can claim that the affinity between James' notion of consciousness' worldliness and Husserl's notion of intentionality is undeniable. But, in his theory of the worldliness of consciousness, James not only presents us the same sort of concluding remarks about consciousness' ability to intend something other than consciousness as Husserl does in his theory of intentionality. Since it is quite possible for a naive realist to have the same dualistic concept of consciousness and the object of consciousness, so, if the similarity between Husserl's notion of intentionality and James' notion of the worldliness of consciousness is merely limited to the similar blunt statements about consciousness and the object of consciousness' irreducibilities to each other, then, the similarity can be quite superficial and insignificant. What, then, leads us to assert the affinities between Husserl's notion of intentionality and James' notion of the worldliness of consciousness are not only that both philosophers have held the similar concluding remarks about the nature of consciousness, but also that both their remarks have been based on the same observations of the structures of consciousness and the object of consciousness.

The first observation that James shares with Husserl is the observation of the transcendence of the object

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of consciousness. In our former explication of Husserl's theory of intentionality, we have already pointed out how Husserl has refuted the Brentanian concept of the immanence of the object of consciousness by distinguishing the intentional experiences from the intended object. Husserl's revision of Brentano's notion of intentionality from consciousness' having an object in itself to consciousness' projecting out of itself to an outside object were, in fact, founded on Husserl's rejection of Brentano's notion of the immanence of the intended object. In James' psychological studies, we can find the same sort of advocacy of the distinction between consciousness and the object of consciousness.

In chapter II of this dissertation, we have already presented an examination of James' notion of the transcendence of the object of consciousness. We have pointed out that, by disclosing the differences in structure between consciousness and the object of consciousness, namely by disclosing the irreurrences of the mental states and the self-sameness of the object of consciousness, James has succeeded in demonstrating that an object of consciousness is something other than consciousness. Here, we do not want to repeat what we have already said in this dissertation. The only thing that we would like to add to our former exposition

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of James' notion of the transcendence of the object of consciousness is that, by distinguishing the object of consciousness from consciousness, James not only rescues the sphere of the object of consciousness from totally collapsing into the subjective, psychological sphere and refutes the Cartesian or Humean notion of the immanence of the intended object. But, if we look at James' notion of the transcendence of the object of consciousness in the context of James' discussion of consciousness' cognition, then it is this particular notion that induces James to consider cognition as consciousness' transcending function.

Besides the transcendence of the object of consciousness, the other observation that induces both James and Husserl to claim the transcendental of consciousness, is consciousness' characteristic of intending the same thing by multiple states of consciousness.

First, from Logical Investigations to Experience and Judgment, throughout the whole of his philosophical career, Husserl has claimed that one self-same object can manifest itself in a number of various "objects intended as such's."¹⁹ Correlated to the same intended object's persistent reappearance in the shifting 'intended as such's', consciousness can, in Husserl's opinion, constantly direct its different states to

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this unchanged unity. For Husserl, it is the intended object's constant endurance that convinces us of the intended object's transcendence from the flux of constantly changing consciousness. It is, on the other hand, the varying mental states' referring to one common, self-same point of reference, namely the unchanged intended object, that illuminates the fact that mental states, instead of referring themselves to their own contents, to something that can go with them, can project outside themselves to something other than themselves.

In chapter 12, The Principles of Psychology, we find James, too, claims that our flux of consciousness is able to intend the same object by a number of its different portions. He says,

The same matter can be thought of in successive portions of mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matter which the other portions mean.

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The mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the same.²⁰

From consciousness' unique characteristic of constantly meaning or intending the same object by its flux of continuously shifting states, James, like Husserl, comes to the conclusion that this flux of consciousness, instead of directing itself backwards to its own contents, namely, instead of directing itself to something that can go with it, intends something other than

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itself. He says,

The judgment that my own past thought and my present thought are of the same object is what makes me take the object out of either and project it by a sort of triangulation into an independent position, from which it may appear to both.²¹

Therefore, we can conclude that, if in James' realization of the presence of cognition in consciousness we are able to find the emergence of a Brentanian concept of intentionality, then in James' explication of how the consciousness' cognition is, in fact, consciousness' unique characteristic of knowing or meaning something other than the consciousness, we can see the formation of a proto-Husserlian transcendental notion of intentionality.

3. Three Modes of Intentionality in William James' Theory of Consciousness

In the two former sections of this dissertation, we have already mentioned that Husserl, in his adoption of Brentano's notion of intentionality into his phenomenology, not only had changed intentionality from consciousness' essence of having an object within itself to consciousness' essence of projecting itself to an object, but also had transformed intentionality

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from consciousness' static relatedness to its object to consciousness' active, creative constituting of its object. We have also pointed out that some Husserlian scholars like Spiegelberg or Gurwitsch have suspected that Husserl's revision of Brentano's notion of intentionality is accomplished under the influence of James' theory of the nature of consciousness. In the two former sections of this chapter, we have already presented an explication of what, in Husserl's opinion, is consciousness' essence of self-transcendence, namely, consciousness' intentionality; and in what sense James, in his analysis of consciousness' cognition, has attributed the same sort of characteristic to consciousness. In this section of our dissertation, we shall attempt to present an examination of James' idea of three sorts of crucial functions of consciousness. Then we shall attempt to explain in what sense these three sorts of cognitive functions are similar to Husserl's three modes of intentionality. Therefore, in this section of our dissertation, we shall try to compare James' notions of sensation, perception and conception to Husserl's notions of the hyletic phases of consciousness, consciousness' functions of noetic formation and identification. Our purpose is to demonstrate that, before these three sorts of consciousness' active, creative and

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constitutive acts are exposed elaborately by Husserl in his phenomenology, they have already been, in fact, disclosed by James in his studies of the nature of consciousness.

A. An Analysis of William
James' Notion of Sensation

Sensation, for James, is the most basic function of cognition. In both The Principles of Psychology and Psychology: Briefer Course, James has tried to explicate this almost passive function of consciousness, this mere presentation, by contrasting it with consciousness' preliminary function or organization, the perception. Here, let us see how James describes this function.

First, James claims that, like perception, sensation is a sort of mental function. He says, "Both of them (sensation and perception) name processes in which we cognize an objective world. . . . They are therefore names for different cognitive functions, not for different sorts of mental facts."²²

The crucial significance of this statement is that, by it, James has totally broken the linkage of his notion of sensation with the sensationalists'. While the sensationalists, for example Hume, consider sensations as the elementary sensory materials, the basic building blocks of which the perceptual or

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conceptual objects are made, James considers it as a type of consciousness' cognitive relation towards its objects, namely, consciousness' dumb presenting of its objects. While James considers sensation as consciousness' preliminary encounter with the objects in the world, the basic building stuff of our perceptual or conceptual objects, then, contrary to what the sensationalists propose, are the dumb presences of the objects of the world, brought to us by our sensations, rather than our sensations or impressions, namely our mental images of the objects in the world. Therefore, in William James and Phenomenology, Bruce Wilshire points out that, according to James, consciousness' characteristic of worldliness, namely, consciousness' characteristic of projecting outside itself towards the objects in the world, does not just manifest itself in consciousness' active cognitive functions like perception or conception, but also presents itself in consciousness' most passive function, namely, its sensation.²³

James then claims that sensation can be differentiated from perception by, contrasted to perception's activeness, its extreme passiveness, and contrasted to perception's constituting function, its function of mere presenting. At the beginning of a chapter called "Sensation" in The Principles of Psychology,

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we find James distinguishes sensation from perception in this way,

The nearer the object cognized comes to being a simple quality like "hot", "cold", "red", "noise", "pain", apprehended irrelatively to other things, the more the state of mind approaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations the object is, on the contrary; the more it is something classed, located, measured, compared, assigned to a function, etc., etc.; the more unreservedly do we call the state of mind a perception, and the relatively smaller is the part in which sensation plays.²⁴

At first sight, it seems James, like P. Natorp, claims that sensation and perception not only are both the functions of consciousness, but, as the mental functions, they also cannot be differentiated from one another. The only difference, then, lies in the difference between the objects of these functions. While the objects of sensations are some simple qualities like 'red', 'hot', 'noise', the objects of perception are these qualities classed and organized into certain perceptual objects. But, if we go a step further to see how these two cognitive functions are explicated later by James in the same chapter, then, we can find out that, although James goes so far as to say that "sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of view, differs from perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object of content,"²⁵ what

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James means by 'the simplicity of its object' is, in fact, the simplicity of the ways in which an object is being intended rather than the simplicity of the intended object itself. In addition to the former explications, we find James continuously describes sensation in the following ways,

Its function is that of mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication.²⁶

A pure sensation is an abstraction and when we adults talk of our "sensations" we mean one of two things: either certain objects, namely simply quality or attributes like hard, hot, pain; or else those of our thoughts in which acquaintance with these objects is least combined with knowledge about the relations of them to other things. As we can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to postulate a function in our thought whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several objects are distinguished. The function is sensation.²⁷

Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether other ways.²⁸

... dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection 'lo!').²⁹

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It is easier for us to grasp a clear, undistorted understanding of James' notion of sensation in the above passages. We can say that, the difference between the object of sensation and the object of perception is the result of the difference between two sorts of cognitive functions in which these two particular sorts of objects are intended rather than vice versa. In contrast to perception's function of classing, constituting, interpreting of its objects, namely, in contrast to perception's function of putting its objects in the context of relations, sensation, for James, is the non-analytical, uninterpretative, dumb experiencing of its objects. Or, we can say that, in contrast to perception's active operating on its objects, sensation is the passive having, accepting of its objects or encountering with its objects. It is, according to James, correlated to sensation's pure passiveness that the objects of sensation are intended as 'the something there', the 'mere this as yet', or as a set of "whats or thats, or its, of subjects of discourse in other words, with their relations not yet brought out."³⁰ Or, we can say that, due to sensation's non-analytical, uninterpretative and pure presenting function, the objects of consciousness will appear to us, in Sartre's terms, as a lump of pure existence. James claims that, in this pure

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sensation, not only the sensed objects cannot be classed, distinguished from one another or related to one another, but the sensing consciousness also cannot separate itself from its objects. James says, "The first time we see light, in Condillac's phrase, we are it rather than see it."³¹ Since in our adult life, all our cognitive activities are, in a more or less degree, a sort of active organization or constitution of our intended objects, so James claims that sensation, the pure passive presentation of our objects, can either only occur at the first day of our life or exist as an abstraction. In other words, in our adult life, we can only find sensation mixed with other cognitive function rather than the pure sensation in our consciousness.

At last, James claims that sensation, as consciousness' basic and simplest cognitive function, does not have it in any other sorts of cognitive function. But perception or other higher levels of cognition, on the other hand, always include in themselves sensation. He says.

Perception always involves Sensation as a portion of itself; and Sensation in turn never takes place in adult life without perception also being there.³²

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As we can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to postulate a function in our thought whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several objects are distinguished. This function is sensation.³³

Perception, conception, judgment, namely all the cognitive activities other than sensation, according to James, can operate an active formation of their objects. But, in order to accomplish these activities, they must have a datum to operate on. In James' words, "We can only think or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance already."³⁴ Sensation, as the "mere inarticulate feeling of the presence"³⁵ of objects, in James' opinion, is the agency by which the datum, the lump of dumb, not yet known objects are presented to our various active cognitions. Using James' words, it is "a function in our thought whereby we first become aware of the bare immediate natures." Therefore, James claims that perception or other cognitions at the higher level must base itself on sensation. Analytically speaking, in perception or other higher cognitions, we can always discover the element of underlying sensation.

If we look at James' notion of sensation from the perspective of phenomenology, then we can easily

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discover that this passive, non-interpretative cognitive function called by James as sensation is, in fact, pretty similar to a sort of dumb experiencing ability which Husserl claims to exist in the hyletic phases of consciousness.

In section 85 of Ideas, Husserl claims that, analytically speaking, every state of consciousness is combined or interwoven of two strata or crucial elements: the 'primary content' and the experience or phase of experience which is the bearer of the specific quality of intentionality.³⁶ In Ideas, Husserl names the former layer of consciousness, the hyletic phases of consciousness and the latter layer of consciousness, the noetic phases of consciousness. The noetic phases of consciousness, as the bearers of the specific quality of intentionality, according to Husserl, are the various form-shaping, meaning-bestowing or constituting intentional functions. (In the following two sections of this chapter, we will explicate, in a more thorough way, what, for Husserl, are exactly the noetic phases of consciousness. At this point, we will stop with a brief understanding that the noetic phases of consciousness, in Husserl's opinion, stand for the active function in a state of intentional experience.) The hyletic phases of consciousness, according to Husserl, are lumps of

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the pre-forming, pre-meaning-bestowing and pre-constituting, thus, pre-predicated pure experiences or feelings. In Ideas, Husserl calls this hyletic phase of consciousness the 'unitary sensile experiences', 'the sensory contents'. In other words, if we take the noetic phases of consciousness, the forms of consciousness, for example, the form of either hearing, imagining or remembering, etc. away from an actual state of consciousness, for example, an actual mental state of either hearing of a certain voice, imagining of a red rose or remembering of a table, etc.; what, then, is left in this state of consciousness, namely the pure experiencing of a sound, the dumb sensing of the redness of a rose, the meaningless feeling of the various qualities of a table is called by Husserl the hyletic phases of consciousness. Thus, Husserl describes the hyletic phases of consciousness as "the 'unitary sensile experiences', 'sensory contents' such as the data of colour, touch, sound, and the like, which we shall no longer confuse with the appearing phases of things, their colour quality, their roughness, and so forth, which rather 'exhibit' experientially through their means."³⁷ Or, as Alphonso Lingis, in an article called "Hyletic Data", points out, under the title hyletic data, Husserl, in fact,

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. . . classes together indiscriminately the exteroceptive sensations corresponding to the various sense organs, the interoceptive kinesthetic sensations, the affective sensations of pleasure, pain, tickling and other sensile feelings, and the sensile phase of tension and release, impulses, drives, volitions, and inclinations, like the empiricist sensations, they are passivity and matter (hyle), and are of the nature of impressions.³⁸

In Husserl's opinion, what this lump of sensile experiences, this flux of formless senses do in a state of consciousness is to present by themselves or exhibit through themselves the various appearing qualities of an intended object, namely, the colour quality or the roughness of an intended object. Or, using Alphonso Lingis' words, what the hyletic phases of consciousness do in a state of consciousness is mirror by themselves within consciousness the various characteristics of the transcendent object. Now, if we recollect how James describes sensation as consciousness' passive cognitive function of purely presenting an intended object, then it is not difficult for us to see that what James attempts to expose in his notion of sensation is, in fact, the same sort of consciousness' basic feeling mirroring function which Husserl claims to exist in the hyletic phases of consciousness.

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As the 'primary content' of a state of consciousness, or as the underlying strata in a state of consciousness, the hyletic phases of consciousness, according to Husserl, are not yet a state of consciousness.

A state of consciousness, in Husserl's opinion, is the combination of the hyletic and noetic phases of consciousness. It is only after the hyletic phases of consciousness, as a flux of pure feelings or experiences of colour, touch, sound, etc., are animated through noetic phases of consciousness, namely, have undergone the formal shapings or gifts of meaning that a complete state of consciousness can be formed. Husserl says,

Intentional experiences are there as unities through the bestowal of meaning (used here in a very wide sense). Sensory data offer themselves as material for intentional informings or bestowals of meaning at different levels.³⁹

In a state of consciousness, the hyletic phases of consciousness, as a flux of pure senses of colour, touch, sound, etc., are, in Husserl's terms, the 'sensile or sensory materials', 'simply and plainly materials' or the 'material data' given themselves to the intentional phases of consciousness to be molded into various sorts of consciousness. Husserl says,

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. . . and from the functional view-point, it wins significance from the fact that it furnishes a woof that can enter into the intentional tissue, material that can enter into intentional formations.⁴⁰

In Husserl's opinion, it is solely due to the presence of the hyletic phases of consciousness, that a state of consciousness can have a content. It is, in other words, only after the empty cognitive forms, the noetic phases of consciousness are furnished with the hyletic phases of consciousness that a state of consciousness can emerge. For example, it is only after the empty cognitive forms of seeing, remembering, imagining or asserting, etc., are furnished with 'the pure senses of a red rose' that a state of 'seeing a red rose', 'imagining a red rose', 'remembering a red rose' or 'asserting a red rose' can be formed. Husserl, thus, claims that while how a state of consciousness intends is totally determined by the noetic phases of consciousness, what a state of consciousness intends is totally determined by the hyletic phases of consciousness.

If we recollect how James claims that sensation, as our consciousness' pure passive cognitive function, as our consciousness' function of dumbly experiencing an object, never appears independently in our normal adult life but always exists as a sort of underlying



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cognitive function in a state of perception, imagination, memory, etc.; and if we recollect how James claims that it is solely through sensation, namely, through our consciousness' function of purely being aware of an object, that perception, imagination, reason, etc., namely, that our consciousness' other active cognitive functions are able to encounter their intended object, then it is not hard for us to detect the other crucial similarity between the Husserlian hyletic phases of consciousness and the Jamesian sensation. Both the hyletic phases of consciousness and sensation, according to Husserl and James, are the underlying, passive strata in a state of consciousness. Both Husserl and James consider this underlying strata in a state of consciousness as the medium by which this particular state of consciousness is able to have an intended object.

Therefore, we can conclude that, in James' exposition of his notion of sensation, we can already find the emergence of the Husserlian notion of the hyletic phases of consciousness.

B. An Analysis of James' Notion of Perception

In the former section of our dissertation, we have presented an examination of James' notion of sensation, namely, James' notion of consciousness'

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passive, receptive function of cognition. We have already pointed out that, by this pure passive function of cognition, according to James, our consciousness is able to have a series of intended objects as "a set of whats, or thats, or its; of subjects of discourse in other words, with their relations not yet brought out."⁴¹ But our consciousness will not stop with just dumbly having lumps of the 'mere presences of the intended objects' in it. James points out that, after we have some 'objects' in our mind, our consciousness will "think over their relations and subject them to a sort of treatment and operate upon them."⁴² In other words, James claims that, after we have a flux of objects presented to us as a flux of formless and meaningless 'there's', the various active cognitive functions of consciousness are able to shape them into different sorts of intended objects by absorbing them into the different contexts of relations. In The Principles of Psychology, James calls these different types of consciousness' active forming acts by the common psychological terms of 'perception', 'memory', 'imagination' or 'reason'. In The Principles of Psychology, in the various chapters under the titles of the "Perception," "Memory" "Imagination" or "Reason," James has presented to us a thorough explication of how these various active cognitive acts knit a piece

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of 'mere presence of the intended object' into different contexts and shape them into either 'an aspect of a perceived object', 'an aspect of a remembered object', 'an aspect of an imagined object' or 'a subject of discourse'. The limit of space prevents us from giving each of James' notions of the active forming activities of consciousness a thorough exposition. In this section of our dissertation, we would, then, like to simply present an exposition of James' notion of perception, James' notion of consciousness' most basic active forming function. We hope that we are able to use perception as an example to show what, in James' opinion, is an active forming function of consciousness and how these various active forming functions of consciousness shape the 'mere presences of the objects' into different types of intended objects.

If sensation, in James' opinion, is consciousness' most passive function of experiencing an object, then perception, in James' opinion, is consciousness' active function of adding to the given object of sensation a number of associations. In other words, if by sensation, what James intends to mean is our consciousness' most basic function of having an object, then perception is our consciousness' active function of understanding this given object in a certain context of relations. Let us, here, see how James explicates this notion.

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First, James claims that, "Perception thus differs from sensation by the consciousness of farther facts associated with the object of sensation."⁴³

Then, James uses an example, the perception of a side of a library table, to explicate to us what he attempts to mean in this statement. He points out that, when we look at a rectangular walnut library table from a certain perspective, what we immediately obtain in our mind, then, is a "brown eye-picture with lines not parallel and with angles unlike."⁴⁴ This 'brown eye-picture', in James opinion, is the object of the sensation of one side of the rectangular library table. It is, in other words, an object sensed by us in the dumb, passive way. As we have already pointed out in the former section of our dissertation, correlated to the inactive way by which we are aware of it, the object of sensation, i.e. this 'brown eye-picture', will appear to us as a piece of unknown, uninterpreted mere 'there', i.e., a certain patch of brownness, even undistinguished from the mental state which experiences it. According to James, although in our perception of the library table, we always have to have in our mind, first of all, a dumb awareness of this table; in our ordinary adult life, this dumb awareness never actually exists. Thus, when we look at the brown library table from a certain

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angle, what we usually are conscious of is, in fact, a brown library table appearing to us from a certain perspective, namely, an aspect of a library table. Now, what transforms an object of consciousness from the 'mere presence of a patch of brownness' into 'an aspect of a library table' is not, according to James, a certain change taking place in the intended object itself, but the change of the ways by which it is intended. In other words, it is solely because an intended object, i.e. a 'brown eye-picture', is intended by us as an object perceived by us from a certain angle, i.e., a brown library table perceived by us from a certain angle, that it can become an aspect of this perceived object, i.e., a side of this library table. James points out that, while we look at the brown rectangular, walnut library table and have the 'mere presence of this brown library table' by our passive cognitive function, namely, our sensation, the active cognitive functions of our consciousness can, simultaneously and without our awareness, subject the object of sensation, i.e., this patch of 'brownness' into a certain treatment or operation. The active cognitive function at the level of perception can relate the momentarily given single aspect of the intended object to the other features of this intended object not given at this moment. In the

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case of the perception of the 'brown library table', the active cognitive function at the level of perception can connect this side of the brown library table presenting itself as a 'patch of dumb brownness' to the other sides and corners of the brown library table and transform it into a side of the brown walnut library table. Or we can say that the active cognitive function at the level of perception can, according to James, fix this momentarily given, single presentation of the library table to the total system of various presentations of the library table and transform it into an aspect of the perceived object. It is in this sense that James claims that, in the case of the perception of the brown library table, "the back of the table, its square corners, its size, its heaviness, are features of which I am conscious when I look (at this particular library table), almost as I am conscious of its name."⁴⁵ Therefore, James claims that if sensation is the passive consciousness of an intended object, then "perception thus differs from sensation by the consciousness of farther facts associated with the object of sensation."⁴⁶

In order to relate a presently given perceived aspect of the intended object to other aspects of the intended object not given at the present moment, what we actually are doing in our psychological sphere,

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according to James, is "supplementing a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of revived sensations."⁴⁷

In the psychological area, we connect the experience of the presently perceived object to the retentions of the past experiences of other objects. Or, we can say that, in James' opinion, in order to understand a presently given single aspect of the perceived object in the context of the constitution of the total perceived object, what we, in fact, do psychologically is knit the experience of this single aspect of the perceived object into the system of the experiences of the total perceived object. It is in this sense that James claims that, unlike an object of sensation, which is a lump of presently felt attributes, an object of perception is this lump of felt attributes tied together with the reproduced attributes in the unity of a thing with a name.⁴⁸ In Psychology: Briefer Course, James thus claims that a state of perceptual experience is made up partly with the sensational experience and partly with the active function that can relate this particular piece of sensational experience to the other sensational experiences.⁴⁹

Consciousness' active functions of relating either the presently given single aspect of the perceived object to the total perceived object or the presently given sensational experience to the whole system of

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the perceptual experiences of a perceived object, understood in a more profound way, should be, in fact, interpreted as consciousness' active function of conferring the meaning of 'part of a certain system' to either a presently appearing object of sensation or a state of sensational experience. Or, we can say that perception, in James' opinion, is consciousness' active function of bestowing the meaning of 'an aspect of a perceived object' on 'an aspect of a perceived object' sensed by us as a lump of meaningless 'there'. Imagination, memory or reason, according to James, are also consciousness' other sorts of active functions of bestowing the meanings of 'the imagined object', 'the remembered object' or 'the subject of a certain judgment' on a piece of passively aware, meaningless 'sensed object' by relating this piece of 'sensed object' in a certain pattern to a certain system of 'imagined objects', 'remembered objects' or 'judged objects'. In James' opinion, it is because consciousness can thus actively absorb a piece of dumbly sensed object into a certain order of objects that this particular piece of 'dumbly sensed object' can become a 'remembered object', an 'imagined object' or a 'judged object'. Here, by presenting an examination of James' notion of perception, we wish to, in this example, give a general explication of what James means by

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consciousness' active forming functions and how these various forming functions of consciousness, in James' opinion, mold the flux of sensational experiences into different types of experienced objects.

If one is familiar with Husserl's analysis of the constitution of the intentional experiences, then it is not difficult for one to discover that what James attempts to mean as consciousness' various active forming functions do bear a striking likeness to what Husserl intends to mean as the intentional experiences' various noetic phases. In other words, if one is familiar with Husserl's theory of how a flux of concrete intentional experiences is constituted of a lump of meaningless hyletic phases undergone noetic phases' various 'formal shapings', 'gifts of meaning', then it is not hard for one to see that, while the Jamesian sensational experiences can be likened to the Husserlian hyletic phases, James' various active forming functions of consciousness, then, can be likened to Husserl's different noetic phases which can perform the various form shapings or meaning bestowings.

In Ideas, Husserl claims that every state of consciousness is a composite of two real components. They are the hyletic and noetic phases of consciousness. Husserl says,

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Intentional experiences are there as unities through the bestowal of meaning (used here in a very wide sense). Sensory data offer themselves as material for intentional informings or bestowals of meaning at different levels.⁵⁰

While, by hyletic phases of consciousness Husserl means the lump of meaningless and formless sensory materials in a state of concrete experiences, by the noetic phases of consciousness, Husserl, then, means the active denoting, form-shaping or constituting functions in this state of consciousness. In Husserl's opinion, in order to become a certain type of intentional experience, for example, a perception, the lump of hyletic phases of consciousness has to undergo a certain sort of operation performed by the noetic phases of consciousness. In Husserl's words, "the material elements are animated through noetic phases, they undergo 'formal shapings', 'gifts of meaning', which we grasp, in reflection, upon and with the material elements."⁵¹

The noetic phases of consciousness, for Husserl, are consciousness' different animating apprehensions, namely, consciousness' different active molding, sense-conferring or constituting functions. As we have already pointed out in this section of our dissertation, what James attempts to mean as consciousness' various active cognitive functions, namely, imagination,

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memory, reason, are the various forming activities in a state of experience which are capable of forming a lump of sensational experience into various types of experiences. We can say that, in James' exposition of the various active cognitive functions, namely, in James' exposition of consciousness' functions of perception, imagination, memory and reason, he has already anticipated Husserl's notion of the noetic phases of consciousness.

But the more crucial reason that induces us to consider James' notion of consciousness' various active cognitive functions as the Husserlian notion of the various noetic phases as presented under different names and in a less systematic way is the way by which James considers the various active functions of consciousness form the sensational experiences into different types of experience is similar to the way by which, Husserl considers the noetic phases of consciousness mold the hyletic phases of consciousness into different sorts of intentional experiences. In Ideas as well as in Experience and Judgment, Husserl has presented us a thorough analysis of how the hyletic phases of consciousness or the pre-predicated experiences are constituted by the different noetic phases of consciousness into different sorts of intentional experiences. The limit of space forbids us to go into

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detail to see how different noetic phases of consciousness shape the hyletic phases of consciousness into different levels of intentional experience. Since in this section of our dissertation we have already used James' notion of perceptual constitution as an example to show how, in James' opinion, the active cognitive functions of consciousness are able to shape the sensational experiences into different types of concrete experiences, so we would like to confine our exposition of Husserl's notion of noetic formations to the level of the formation of perceptual experiences. By exposing the similarities between Husserl and James' idea of how, at the level of perception, the active function of consciousness forms the sensational experiences into perceptual experiences, we hope that we are able to demonstrate that James' idea of how the active functions of consciousness shape the sensational experiences into different sorts of concrete experiences is similar to Husserl's idea of how the various noetic phases of consciousness animate the hyletic phases of consciousness into different sorts of intentional experiences.

We have already pointed out how, in James' opinion, the perceptual function of consciousness changes a single piece of inarticulated feeling into a one-sided perception of something by relating this piece

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of momentarily given feeling to other feelings of this particular thing not given at the present moment. In Ideas, especially in sections 97 and 98, we find out that, using almost the same method of fixing or catching a piece of formless and meaningless hyletic phase of experience into a system of perceptual experiences, the noetic phases of consciousness can stamp the sense of 'being a partial perception of a certain object' on this particular piece of hyletic phase of experience. Husserl points out that when we look at a certain object for a period of time, for example, when we look at a tree trunk for a while, we will have in our mind not just a flux of meaningless hyletic phases, for example, a flux of varying brown senses, but, with this flux of hyletic phases of consciousness we will also have, in our mind, the active cognitive functions which unify them into a series of continuous feelings of a self-same object; for example, a flux of perceptions of the same tree trunk from various angles. In Husserl's opinion, it is solely by thus being unified under the same object, for example, the same tree trunk, that a series of feelings, for example, a series of brown senses, can become a flux of different perceptions of an object, for example, a flux of different perceptions of a tree trunk. The way used by the noetic phases of consciousness to

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bestow the sense of 'being a partial perception' on each momentarily given hyletic phase of consciousness, according to Husserl, is to relate this piece of hyletic phase of consciousness to the system of perceptions not given at the present moment. After this particular treatment of the noetic phase of consciousness, what appears in a state of perceptual experience, according to Husserl, is not only the sense of a single aspect of a certain object, but also the feeling of this single aspects of a certain object's relations to the other aspect of this particular object.⁵² In other words, at the stage of perception, what the noetic phases of consciousness do is to associate the dumb presentation of a single aspect of a certain object to the retentions of our past experiences of this particular object and the anticipations of the forthcoming experiences of this particular object. Thus, we can say that what the Husserlian noetic phases of consciousness at the level of perception do is to mold a pulse of meaningless presentation of an intended object, namely, a hyletic phase of consciousness, into a one-sided perception of an intended object is pretty similar to what the Jamesian perceptual functions of consciousness do to cast a piece of dumb sensation of an object into a state of perception of this particular object. What these two sorts

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of active functions of consciousness do is to connect a piece of 'mere experience' of a certain object to the total system of experiences of this particular object.

As the same sorts of active elements in a state of consciousness which are able to mold, in the same way, the formless and meaningless experiences in this particular state of consciousness into different types of consciousness, the Jamesian active cognitive functions of consciousness, therefore, can be interpreted as the Husserlian noetic phases of consciousness given under a different name.

C. An Analysis of James' Notion of Conception

After sensation, James' notion of consciousness' passive function of purely presenting an object, and perception, James' notion of consciousness' active function of bestowing the sense of one-sided manifestations of a certain object on the immanently presented object, now, in this section of our dissertation, we come to James' notion of the most crucial active function of consciousness, namely, James' notion of conception.

One point that we would like to clarify before we begin our exposition of James' notion of conception is James' usage of the term 'conception'. In The Principles of Psychology, James claims that, by

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the term 'conception', what he attempts to mean is neither an intended object nor a mental state. He says,

The word "conception" is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither the mental state nor what the mental state signifies, but the relation between the two, namely, the function of the mental state in signifying just that particular thing.⁵³

Conception is a word used by James to indicate a certain function of consciousness, or a certain way by which consciousness is conscious of its object. Since the word 'conception' comes from the word 'concept', it is, therefore, quite easy for us to think that James uses this term to denote a certain sort of consciousness' function associated with concept. As P. L. Heath points out in an article called "Concept" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Concept is one of the oldest terms in the philosophical vocabulary, and one of the most equivocal."⁵⁴ In different schools of philosophy, the word concept may be used to mean different things, namely meaning, word, Platonic form or abstract idea, etc. However, if we understand 'concept' as an abstract idea or a general name, then, we have to notice that, by the term 'conception', James does not attempt to mean a special function of consciousness by which consciousness is able to

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think about concepts. By 'conception', James does not want to mean consciousness' function of mathematical or philosophical reasoning, namely, consciousness' function of thinking about the abstract ideas and the relations between these abstract ideas. Furthermore, James does not use the term 'conception' to indicate consciousness' function of conceptualizing. In other words, 'conception', for James, is not consciousness' function of abstracting the universal and essential characteristics from a group of concrete entities and using these characteristics to form a common representative of these entities, namely, to form a concept. 'Conception', in fact, is used by James to indicate a sort of function of consciousness which is present in all sorts of consciousness' intentional activities, i.e., perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc. In order to have an undistorted understanding of James' notion of 'conception', we have to neglect all the other meanings of the term 'conception', and look upon it just as a sign used by James to indicate a sort of mental function which he discovers in his psychological investigations.

What, then, is conception? In The Principles of Psychology, James defines conception as 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings' and explicates this definition in the following ways:



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The mind can always intend, and know when it intends, to think of the same

.
The same matter can be thought of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other portions meant.⁵⁵

For James, the mind's function to mean the same or consciousness' 'sense of sameness' is "the very keel and backbone of our thinking"⁵⁶ or "the most important of all features of our mental structures."⁵⁷

At first sight, it seems that what James attempts to mean as the most crucial function of consciousness, namely, conception, is, in fact, nothing other than the basic function which all the realists or men of common-sense assume consciousness to have. It is, in fact, 'consciousness' function of intending the same permanent external object by a multiple number of mental states, no matter whether these mental states are a flux of repeated recurrences of the same state or a series of constantly varying states. But, if one goes a step further to look at James' more elaborated expositions of his notion of conception, then one can find that what James attempts to mean as 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings' is very different from what the realists claim as the basic capacity of consciousness. In fact, while

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the realists emphasize the self-sameness, the permanence of the intended external object and claim that it is the self-sameness of the intended object which causes the flux of mental states to intend it as the same, James stresses that consciousness' capacity to mean the same, however, does not rely on the sameness of the meant object. In The Principles of Psychology, James claims that he is "speaking of the sense of sameness from the point of view of the mind's structure alone, and not from the point of view of the universe."⁵⁸ In other words, while the realists or men of common-sense claim that multiple states of consciousness are able to intend the same object, James actually holds that an intended object may or may not continue to be the same, but, a state of consciousness can, nevertheless, intend it as the same object which the other states of consciousness intend. It is in this sense that James, in The Principles of Psychology, claims that, if one wants to have an accurate understanding of his notion of conception, then one has to pay special attention to the subjective character of this notion. He points out that, in his talking about consciousness' function to intend the same, he is "psychologizing, not philosophizing."⁵⁹ He is, in other words, describing the 'sameness' of the mind's meanings, not speculating about the sameness

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of the real external intended object. In The Principles of Psychology, he explicates his notion of consciousness' phenomenon of knowing the same object by multiple mental states in the sense of the multiple states of consciousness' capacity to mean the same in this way,

That is, we do not care whether there be any real sameness in things or not, or whether the mind be true or false in its assumptions of it. Our principle only lays it down that the mind makes continual use of the notion of sameness, and if deprived of it, would have a different structure from what it has. . . . The mind must conceive as possible that the same should be before it, for our experience to be the sort of thing it is. Without the psychological sense of identity, sameness might rain upon us from the outer world for ever and we be none the wiser. With the psychological sense, on the other hand, the outer world might be an "unbroken flux", and yet we should perceive a repeated experience. Even now, the world may be a place in which the same thing never did and never will come twice. The thing we mean to point at may change from top to bottom and we be ignorant of the fact. But in our meaning itself we are not deceived; our intention is to think of the same.⁶⁰

Conception, then, in James' opinion, is a flux of states of consciousness' subjective function to mean, and know that they are meaning the same object, no matter whether this intended object is or is not a real self-same object. Without this peculiar function to intend the same, according to James, a flux

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of states of consciousness might encounter a self-same object without knowing that it is the same.

While the object which is meant to be the same by a flux of mental states might or might not be a real same object, this flux of mental states which means their objects as the same, can never be a flux of recurrences of the same state. Since, as we have already pointed out several times in this dissertation, in James' opinion, it is impossible for a mental state to reappear twice in exactly the same way, so, the flux of mental states which intend the same object is a flux of different states. Thus, if we like to explicate James' notion of conception in a more accurate way, then, we should say that, conception is James' notion of consciousness' peculiar function of constantly meaning the same object by a flux of different states. What stays the same in this whole process, according to James, is neither the meant object nor the meaning consciousness, but the way by which this flux of consciousness means its object.

We have already pointed out that, for James, 'the mind's function to mean the same' is 'the very keel and backbone of our thinking' or 'the most important of all features of our mental structures'. The reason for James to make such a statement is that, in James' opinion, 'the principle of constancy in

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the mind's meanings' is, in fact, the consciousness' most crucial active function by which consciousness is able to unify a flux of varying manifestations of an object into an object presenting itself in different perspectives.

In James' opinion, while we are looking at an object, for example, an armchair, we will have not only a flux of different perceptions of this object, but in this flux of different mental states, the object, the armchair, will be perceived in a number of different contexts and from a number of different angles. According to James, it is solely due to the mental states' peculiar function of bestowing the 'sense of being the same object' on this flux of 'objects perceived from different perspectives and in different contexts' that these particular 'objects perceived from different perspectives and in different contexts' are able to unify themselves into a system of the different manifestations of the 'same object'. In other words, it is because of the presence of 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meaning' in our consciousness, that while we encounter a flux of objects given to us in different ways, we are able to "feel ourselves to be working over identical materials and thinking them in different ways."⁶¹ Therefore, we can conclude that, if by sensation we can passively have the

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objects as lumps of formless and meaningless 'there's and that's' and by perception we can bestow the meanings or forms on this flux of dumb 'there's' by actively fixing them into different contexts and thus transforming them into flux of varying 'thought's objects', then, by conception, we are able to unify this flux of constantly shifting 'thought's objects' into various manifestations of self-same objects. According to James, the Heraclitusean flux of formless and irrecurrent experiences are thus gradually constituted into our different conceived worlds.

If we look at James' notion of conception from the standpoint of a phenomenologist, then, we can easily agree with the Husserlian scholars like A. Gurwitsch, A. Schutz, James Edie or Bruce Wilshire, Johannes Linschoten, etc. by holding that, in his disclosing of consciousness' peculiar function of meaning the same object or topic by a flux of different states, James has, in fact, anticipated a most crucial discovery in Husserl's theory of intentionality, namely, Husserl's discovery of multiple states of consciousness' capacity to refer themselves to one unified topic of reference.⁶² Before we go on to expose the crucial similarity between James' notion of 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings' and Husserl's notion of the manifold-unity correlation between the

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noetic and the noematic sides of consciousness, we would like to present a brief exposition of this crucial notion in Husserl's theory of intentionality.

As we have pointed out in the beginning of chapter III of this dissertation, by adopting Brentano's notion of intentionality, Husserl has made a crucial revision of the Brentanian notion of intentionality by transforming an intended object from an immanent entity to a transcendent entity. Consciousness' peculiar characteristic of referring multiple different mental states to one self-same object, then, as we have pointed out, is one of the evidences used by Husserl to support his theory of the transcendence of an intended object. Nevertheless, in that section of our dissertation, we did not present a more thorough exposition of how Husserl presents his notion of the multiple versus unity relation between consciousness and the object of consciousness. Here, we would like to finish what we didn't finish before.

In Logical Investigations, "Investigation 5," chapter 2, sections 14, 17; Ideas, sections 41, 86, 135, 145, 150 and Cartesian Meditations, sections 17-18, Husserl explicates his notion of a multiple state of consciousness' function of referring itself to one self-same object, roughly speaking in the following ways: suppose we look at an object, for

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example, a tree, for a period of time. Because of the shifting of our positions, the elapsing of time, the changing of the objective conditions, etc., in our mind, we will have a various number of different perceptions of this tree in which the tree will be perceived in a number of different ways. According to Husserl, this flux of constantly varying perceptual experiences is the real psychological occurrence of our consciousness. Husserl calls it the noetic sphere of consciousness. In Husserl's opinion, although our consciousness is a flux of ever changing, irrecurrent intentional experiences, nevertheless, this flux of states of different experiences does have the peculiar function of referring itself to one self-identical object. For example, in our seeing of a tree, the flux of the varying perceptual experiences of the tree will refer itself to the tree as the same object which it is all about. We find, in Logical Investigations, Husserl describes consciousness' peculiar function of referring multiple states of consciousness to one self-same object in this way, .

In the flux of experienced content, we imagine ourselves to be in perceptual touch with one and the same object; this itself belongs to the sphere of what we experience. For we experience a "consciousness of identity," i.e. a claim to apprehend identity. On what does this consciousness depend? Must

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we not reply that different sensational contents are given, but that we apperceive or "take" them "in the same sense," and that to take them in this sense is an experienced character through which the "being of the object for me" is first constituted. Must we not say, further, that the consciousness of identity is framed on a basis of these two sorts of experienced characters, as the immediate consciousness that we mean the same?⁶³

(While we look at an object for a period of time), many new presentations may arise, all claiming in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge, to be presenting the same object. In all of them the object which we intend is the same, but in each our intention differs, each means the object in a different way.⁶⁴

According to Husserl, while an object is experienced by us as a flux of different experienced contents, our consciousness, nevertheless, has the crucial function to 'take' or 'apperceive' this flux of changing experienced contents to be the experience of the same object.

Also, later in Ideas, while Husserl formulates the intentional relation between the consciousness and the object of consciousness as the noetic-noematic correlation (the structures of the noematic object are correlated to the constitutions of the noetic experiences), he claims that, correlated to a flux of the varying noetic experiences, the noematic object, namely, the 'object intended as such by the noetic

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experiences', is a self-same unity. In Husserl's opinion, it is the varying noetic experiences' peculiar characteristic of constantly meaning the same object that induces the intended object to appear as a self-identical entity. In Ideas, we, then, find these paragraphs about the noetic experiences' character of referring themselves to one self-same intended object. Husserl says,

A parallelism between noesis and noema does indeed exist, but is such that the formations must be described on both sides, and in their essential correspondence to one another. The noematic field is that of the unitary, the noetic that of the "constituting" variety factors. The consciousness that "functionally" unites the varied elements, and at the same time constitutes unity, never, as a matter of fact, shows identity where in the noematic correlate we have an identity of the "object" presented. Where, for instance, different sections of an enduring act of perceiving through which the unity of a thing is being constituted show something identical, this one tree that remains unchanged within the meaning of this perceiving process, there we become aware of the object subsisting in the noema as self-identical in the strict sense of the word, but in the different sections of its immanent duration our consciousness of it is something non-identical, its parts being merely conjoined, and one only in virtue of its continuity.⁶⁵

To the one object we attach a variety of modes of consciousness, acts or act-noemata. Manifestly there is nothing accidental; no one of these is thinkable unless various intentional experiences are also thinkable, bound together in continuous or in properly

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synthetic (polythetic) unity, in which "it", the object, is consciously grasped as self-same and yet in a noematically different way.⁶⁶

In the above two paragraphs, we can also see how Husserl, in Ideas, claims that, although our consciousness is made up of states of constantly changing intentional experiences, however, this flux of varying consciousness does have the unique characteristic of meaning the 'same object'. Some Husserlian scholars consider Husserl's notion of the manifold-unity relation between consciousness and the object of consciousness as the key-notion in his transcendental theory of intentionality, in his theory of consciousness' essential characteristic of projecting outside itself towards something other than itself.⁶⁷ The reason for the Husserlian scholars to make this contention is very simple. It is the discovery of a stream of continuously passing away, irrecurrent intentional experiences' essential characteristic of referring themselves to the unchanged object, the object which does not pass away with them, that leads Husserl to realize that, in the process of knowing, what consciousness does is, in fact, constantly point to something other than itself.

By referring themselves to one self-same object, a flux of intentional experiences, in Husserl's

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opinion, are able to synthesize a flux of changing noemata into a system of varying presentations of one self-same object. In chapter II, we have already pointed out that, the essences and structures of a noema or a system of noemata is totally correlated to the characteristics and constitutions of a state of intentional experience or a flux of intentional experiences. Thus, while a flux of intentional experiences constantly refers itself to one self-same object, the noemata of this flux of intentional experiences will all attach themselves to this self-same object and unify into a system of various presentations of one self-same object. It is, then, in this sense that Husserl considers consciousness' peculiar function of constantly meaning the 'same object' as "an experienced character through which the 'being of the object for me' is first constituted."⁶⁸ It is also in this sense that Husserl holds that consciousness can "'functionally' unite the varied elements, and at the same time constitute unity."⁶⁹ Thus, consciousness' function of referring multiple states of consciousness to one self-same object is considered by Husserl as consciousness' active constituting function.

Here, after we have an understanding of Husserl's notion of the manifold-unity correlation of the consciousness and the object of consciousness, it is

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not difficult for us to see in how striking a way James' notion of conception has anticipated this key-notion in Husserl's theory of intentionality. First, in James' explication of 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings', we can easily see the emergence of Husserl's notion that a flux of varying intentional experiences can constantly mean the same object. Then, by claiming that consciousness' ability to constantly mean the 'same object' as consciousness' active function by which consciousness is able to unify a flux of varying manifestations of an object into one self-same object, we can say that James, like Husserl and before Husserl, has considered consciousness' ability to mean the 'same' as the subjective foundation for the formation of the self-identical intended object. It is in this sense that Johannes Linschoten, in his book called On the Ways Towards Phenomenology, interprets James' notion of conception as a proto-theory of intentionality.⁷⁰

4. Activities of Consciousness as the
Foundation of the Structure of
the Object of Consciousness

After having exposed various similarities between Husserl and James' notions of the structures of the

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object of consciousness, and the cognitive activities of consciousness, in this section of our dissertation, we attempt to examine another crucial affinity between Husserl and James' theories of consciousness. We attempt to look into Husserl and James' affinity in considering consciousness' various active cognitive activities as the foundation of the constitutions of the objects of consciousness. First, let us see what exactly is Husserl's idea of the relation between consciousness' various cognitive activities and the objects of consciousness.

We have already pointed out that, in his adoption of Brentano's theory of intentionality, Husserl not only changed intentionality from consciousness' peculiar characteristic of carrying an intended object within itself to consciousness' essential capability of projecting outside itself towards its object; but also has transformed intentionality from consciousness' mere directedness towards its object to consciousness' active constitution of its object. We, then, have presented a brief explication of what, in Husserl's opinion, are consciousness' various passive and active cognitive activities. Here, what we attempt to explicate is Husserl's notion that it is solely because consciousness can actively organize the intentional experiences into a certain system that the object

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of consciousness can acquire certain structure.

According to Husserl, in the noetic sphere, the noetic phases and the hyletic phases can, metaphorically speaking, interweave into a flux of different intentional experiences, e.g., perceptions, imagination, illustrations, etc. Since a flux of intentional experiences has the essential characteristic of constantly intending a certain self-same object, the varying states of intentional experiences in this flux, therefore, are, in a certain sense, unified into a system of varying experiences of this self-same intended object. It is correlated to these constitutions of the intentional experiences in the noetic sphere that, according to Husserl, in the noematic sphere, we can have a self-same intended object constituted of a flux of shifting noemata. What, then, we attempt to present in this section of our dissertation is a brief explication of this Husserlian idea of the correlation between the structure of the intended object and the constitution of the intentional experiences. Or, we can say that, what we would like to expose in the following pages is Husserl's idea that the foundation of the structure of the intended object exists in the constitution of a flux of consciousness.

In our dissertation,⁷¹ we have already pointed out that, in Husserl's opinion, although the perceiving

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experiences are a constantly changing flux, the perceived objects of this flux of experiences, nevertheless, do appear to have a certain sort of stable structure. Contrary to what the Humean philosophers claim, that a perceived object (or other sorts of objects) are just a series of continuously varying, unidentical impressions, Husserl points out that a perceived object is, in fact, made up of a flux of constantly shifting 'objects perceived as such', namely, a flux of changing noemata, unified under one self-same intended object and giving themselves to us as a system of various manifestations of this particular object. In Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, Experience and Judgment or The Idea of Phenomenology, etc., we find Husserl claim that it is solely because a particular intended object is intended by a flux of intentional experiences which are able to perform a certain active constitution of this object that this intended object is able to have such a sort of structure. In other words, Husserl contends that it is merely because an intended object is constituted rather than just being made passively conscious of by a flux of consciousness that it is able to acquire a certain type of structure. Husserl says,

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And the object is not a thing which is put into cognition as into a sack, as if cognition were a completely empty form, one and the same empty sack in which now this, now that is placed. But in givenness we see that the object is constituted in cognition, that a number of different basic forms of objectivity are to be distinguished, as well as an equal number of different forms of the given cognitive acts and clusters and interconnections of cognitive acts.⁷²

We have pointed out in chapter II of our dissertation, an intended object, in Husserl's opinion, is, instead of an actual transcendent object, a system of irreal correlates, namely, a unified system of noemata of the intentional experiences which derives its 'esse' solely from its 'percipi'.⁷³ Thus Husserl claims that consciousness is able to operate a sort of constitution of its intended object merely by connecting, organizing or articulating itself, namely, the flux of intentional experiences into certain structures. Husserl, in The Idea of Phenomenology, claims,

(While) cognitive acts, more generally any mental acts, are not isolated particulars, coming and going in the stream of consciousness without any interconnections. As they are essentially related to one another, they display a teleological coherence and corresponding connections of realization, corroboration, verification, and their opposites. . . . And it is in these interconnections that the objectivity involved in the objective sciences is first constituted, not in one stroke but in a gradually ascending process--and especially the objectivity of real spatio-temporal actuality.⁷⁴

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For Husserl, an intended object is, then "the 'transcendentally constituted' product, shaped 'on the basis' of the material experiences, and 'through' the noetic functions" ⁷⁵ If an intended object always appears to us to have a certain structure, this constituted object, then, to Husserl, is nothing other than the result of the interlacings of the noetic forms and the hyletic materials. Or, in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl points out that an intended object is "an intentional effect produced by the synthesis of consciousness." ⁷⁶ In Husserl's opinion, from the particular structure of an intended object, a phenomenologist is, in fact, able to trace back to the particular constitutions or performances of the intentional experiences of this object.

In Ideas, especially in fourth section, "Reason and Reality," Husserl gives us a clear description of the structure of an intended object. An intended object, according to Husserl, is composed of a flux of shifting noemata unified around one central core, the self-same object of consciousness, and surrounded by horizon. In various sections of Ideas, Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgment, Husserl constantly claims that, it is correlated to the various stages and types of constitutions of the intentional experiences in the noetic sphere, that, in the noematic

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sphere, we can have the different strata of an intended object, i.e., the different noemata and horizons. Even the self-same intended object is the 'product' of a flux of 'intentional experiences' unified by constantly intending the self-same object.

As we have pointed out earlier in our dissertation,⁷⁷ in Husserl's opinion, the basic stratum of consciousness is a layer called the 'primary contents'. What consciousness does through this layer is the pure presenting or exhibiting in itself the various appearing phases of an intended object, namely, the various 'colour-qualities, resistance or sound-qualities of an intended object. In other words, what consciousness performs by the 'primary contents', according to Husserl, is the pure sensing, experiencing or feeling of the intended object. In Husserl's opinion, presenting various appearing phases of an intended object themselves as lumps of formless sense-datum of colour, touch, sound, etc., are the results of these pure passive operations of consciousness. To the various active noetic functions, these lumps of sense-datum are able to serve as the material foundation on which these various active cognitive acts are able to bestow different forms and meanings. Correlated to these lumps of formless, meaningless 'primary contents' of consciousness, there is, according to Husserl,

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the formless material strata of the intended object like the redness, the toughness, etc., of the intended object. Although various perspectives or manifestations, in a certain sense, are made up of these material datum, these formless materials, are not yet the various manifestations of the intended object. Therefore, by passively experiencing an intended object, what consciousness produces in its correlated, objective area are the various material foundations of an intended object which are not yet formed into the various manifestations of an intended object and thus are not part of the structure of the intended object. If, in Husserl's opinion, the basic, fundamental constituents of an intended object are a flux of constantly shifting noemata, for example, a flux of 'objects perceived as such' given themselves as a flux of constantly changing manifestations of one self-same perceived object, then, each single noema is the result or correlate of consciousness' noetic or active formation of its material contents.

In our dissertation,⁷⁸ we have already pointed out that, in Husserl's opinion, an actual state of consciousness is, in fact, a lump of hyletic matter, namely, a lump of formless sense-datum which has undergone a certain sort of noetic 'form shaping' or 'meaning bestowing' and molded into a certain type

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of intentional experience, for example, the seeing of a red object from a certain perspective, the remembering of a hard thing or the judging of a certain sound. For Husserl, these various noetic forming acts which can form the hyletic matter of consciousness into different sorts of intentional experiences are the fundamental active functions of consciousness. Since noema, according to Husserl, is the correlate of the intentional experience (in Husserl's words, that is, "Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure intuition, and in a correlative 'noematic content', or briefly 'noema'.")⁷⁹ so that, while the hyletic and noetic phases of consciousness are interweaving into a certain state of consciousness, in the objective sphere, a certain noema will emerge. For example, it is only while the hyletic datum of redness is formed into a state of perceptual experience, 'the seeing of a red object from a certain perspective', that, correlated to this particular state of intentional experience, a perceptual noema, 'a red object perceived from such a perspective', will arise in the objective sphere. In the same sense, it is only when lumps of hyletic data are shaped into a flux of constantly varying intentional experiences that, in Husserl's opinion, a flux of continuously

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shifting noemata are able to materialize in the objective sphere. Different noetic activities, therefore, for Husserl, are the various active cognitive activities in which the different noemata are constituted. We have, then, in the same section, already pointed out that, according to Husserl, the ways by which a noetic function molds a piece of hyletic data into a piece of partial perceptual experience of an intended object is by bestowing the meaning of being part of the system of the perceptual experience on this hyletic sense-matter. Husserl claims that the noetic acts of consciousness will confer the meaning of being the natural continuity of the former state of perceptual experience on a piece of hyletic datum by connecting this piece of sense datum with the retention of this former state of perceptual experience and intend this piece of hyletic datum as being able to evolve into a certain perceptual experience by adding to this piece of hyletic matter the pre-cognition of the future state of consciousness. In other words, it is by fitting the immediately given sensation of a certain quality of the intended object into the midst of the marginal experiences of the other qualities of the intended object that the noetic acts of consciousness turn this particular piece of sense-datum into the partial perception of an intended object. According to

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Husserl, it is correlated to these marginal experiences of a total intended object that always occur with every experience of a single aspect of an intended object that, in the objective sphere, a total intended object will always appear behind every single manifestation of the intended object. In chapter II, "An Analysis of Husserl's Notion of Horizon," of our dissertation, we have already pointed out that this whole intended object, metaphorically speaking, hidden behind every single perceptual noema is called by Husserl as the internal horizon of the intended object. Thus, in Husserl's opinion, the internal horizon that always appears with every perceptual noema is also the result of the particular activities in which the noetic acts form the hyletic sense-datum into the perceptual experiences.

In our dissertation,⁸⁰ we have pointed out that, after the noetic functions of consciousness have shaped the hyletic matter into a certain type of intentional experience, for example, the perceptual experience, they are able to unify this flux of perceptual experiences into a unitary system of perceptions of one self-same object by referring each state in this flux of changing intentional experiences to this unchanged, self-identical object. In the same section of our dissertation, we have also mentioned that, by exposing

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the intentional experiences' ability to intend one self-same object by a flux of varying states, Husserl has, in fact, solved one crucial problem that haunts all the post-Humean philosophers. That is the problem of how can we find a self-same intended object in the flux of changing experiences of an object. According to Husserl, correlated to a flux of shifting states of intentional experiences constantly meaning the 'same object', in the objective sphere, the flux of varying noemata, namely, the flux of 'objects' intended in a number of different ways', thus, are able to unify themselves into a system of adumbrational presentations of one self-same object. Husserl says,

In the flux of experienced content, we imagine ourselves to be in perceptual touch with one and the same object; this itself belongs to the sphere of what we experience. For we experience a 'consciousness of identity', i.e. a claim to apprehend identity. On what does this consciousness depend? Must we not reply that different sensational contents are given, but that we apperceive or 'take' them 'in the same sense', and that to take them in this sense is an experienced character through which the 'being of the object for me' is first constituted. Must we not say, further, that the consciousness of identity is framed on a basis of these two sorts of experienced characters, as the immediate consciousness that they mean the same? 81

In Husserl's opinion, since this flux of changing experiences has the essential characteristic of

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constantly meaning the same object by its different states, so, a self-same intended object is not only able to appear in a flux of changing intentional experiences, but it is, in fact, in this flux of shifting intentional experiences that this self-same object is constituted. Husserl says,

The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself--and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.⁸²

In Husserl's opinion, a self-same intended object, therefore, is constituted by the consciousness' active functions of synthesizing a flux of consciousness into a stream of unitary consciousness of this self-same object.

Here, we can come to this conclusion: if an intended object, for Husserl, always has a certain sort of structure, then the foundation of this structure lies in nowhere else than the various activities of consciousness.

We have already mentioned that the structure of the object of consciousness presented by William James in his 'faithful description of what he discovers in his mind' does bear a striking similarity to the

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constitution of the intended object which Husserl exposes clearly in Ideas and other works.⁸³ We pointed out that while Husserl considers an intended object as made up of a flux of noemata surrounding a self-same object and bathed in the halos of different horizons, James contends that an object of consciousness is constituted of a series of 'objects of thought' revolving around one unchanged topic and escorted by different fringes. Now, after having exposed Husserl's concept of how a constituted intended object is the product of consciousness' various cognitive functions, we would like to point out that the same sort of constituted object, in James' opinion, is also the result of consciousness' active organizations. In fact, instead of operating indirectly on its object through the noetic-noematic correlation, consciousness' active cognitive activities, according to James, are able to perform different sorts of organization, classification, formation, etc.; directly on the object of consciousness.

In our dissertation,⁸⁴ we have pointed out that, while for Husserl, consciousness' most basic activity is its pure exhibiting, mirroring of the appearing phases of the intended object, for James, consciousness' most fundamental or primary function, then, is its passive cognitive encounter with an intended object.

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James calls this basic cognitive function sensation. Now, the crucial point that we need to notice is that James, unlike the naive realists, does not consider that, through such inactive, merely receptive cognitive acts, one is able to obtain before himself various intended objects, constituted in different forms and unified into a well ordered reality. According to James, what one, in fact, can acquire through such a sort of purely receptive cognitive acts is nothing more than lumps of the dumb presences of the various appearing phases of the objects encountered. In James' words, what one gets in such a primordial stage of cognition is, owing to the temporal character of the cognitive acts, a flux of simple qualities like 'hot', 'cold', 'red', 'noise', 'pain', given unrelated to other things, namely, a flux of mute 'theres' or mere 'thats' which are not yet any definite 'whats'. In James' opinion, although this flux of dumb datum can be constituted into various objects of consciousness, nevertheless, as just the materials from which the objects are constructed, they are not yet the objects. He says,

A sensation is thus an abstraction seldom realized by itself; and the object which a sensation knows is an abstract object which cannot exist alone. "Sensible qualities" are the objects of sensation. The sensations

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of the eye are aware of the colors of things, those of the ear are acquainted with their sounds; those of the skin feel their tangible heaviness, sharpness, warmth or coldness, etc., etc. From all the organs of the body currents may come which reveal to us the quality of pain, and to a certain extent that of pleasure.⁸⁵

In other words, for both Husserl and James, what we can obtain through the passive acts of consciousness are rather the building stuff of the objects of consciousness than the objects of consciousness themselves.

We have already pointed out that,⁸⁶ instead of a flux of isolated and constantly changing mute presences of intended objects presenting themselves as patches of redness, lumps of coldness, etc., an object of consciousness is, according to James, made up of a flux of 'objects of thought', namely, a flux of objects presenting themselves in different contexts of relations, revolving around one self-same topic. In James' opinion, every single 'object of thought' then is the product of consciousness' various active operations. In other words, it is only after we have, using James' own words, "thought over their relations, subjected them to a sort of treatment and operated upon them by our thought,"⁸⁷ that we can change a flux of 'mute presences' into a flux of 'objects of thought'.

We have already pointed out that,⁸⁸ after we have, through the passive, receptive ability of our

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consciousness, obtained a series of dumb presences of the objects as the 'theres', 'thats', the various active functions of consciousness, in James' opinion, are able to fix these 'thats' or 'theres' into different contexts of relations. According to the different ways or different orders in which an active function of consciousness fixes a lump of 'there', James will call this activity of consciousness perception, imagination or reason, etc. In James' opinion, it is only by thus having a certain context added to it, that a dumb 'that' "will then receive a name and be no longer speechless."⁸⁹ In other words, it is only after having been fixed into a certain network that a 'mere presence of object' can really become a known object. For example, it is solely by being related to other partial manifestations of a red rose that a patch of redness can obtain the meaning of a partial presentation of a red rose; it is solely by being linked to other words of a spoken sentence that a 'sound' can become the subject of a verbal statement, etc. James calls this object, or more precisely, this appearing phase of the object presenting itself in a certain context, the 'thought's object'. Therefore, if a noema, for Husserl, is the result of the noetic function's active formation of the hyletic datum, then a 'thought's object' or a flux of

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'thought's objects', for James, is the product or products of consciousness' various active organizations.

We have also presented a description⁹⁰ of how, in James' opinion, the active functions at the level of perception turn a piece of dumb 'there' into a one-sided manifestation of a perceived object by connecting this piece of momentarily given 'there' to the other one-sided manifestations of the same object. The perceptual activities are able to transform a lump of dumb 'there' into a partial presentation of a perceived object by fitting this piece of 'there' into the system of adumbrate presentations of a perceived object. The shadow of the total perceived object cast upon every partial manifestation of this object, is, then, the product of consciousness' perceptual acts. James says, "If a certain sensation be strongly associated with the attributes of a certain thing, that thing is almost sure to be perceived when we get the sensation."⁹¹

In our dissertation,⁹² we have pointed out that the halo of a total perceived object or whole statement surrounding every 'object of thought', namely, every 'object of thought' as a partial presentation of this perceived object or a single word in this unitary statement, is called by James as the fringe of consciousness. Therefore, we can say that, for Husserl, the

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basis of the internal horizon of a perceptual noema can be traced to consciousness' noetic acts at the perceptual level; for James, too, the foundation of the 'fringe of consciousness' lies in consciousness' perceptual functions.

Finally, we pointed out that⁹³ a flux of constantly varying 'thought objects', namely, a flux of continuously changing 'mere presences of the intended object' appearing in different contexts, can revolve around one self-same object or topic and constitute themselves into a system of different presentations of this self-same object or topic. In James' opinion, it is solely due to consciousness' active function of referring a flux of constantly shifting 'thought objects' to one self-same 'topic or intended object that this particular flux of 'thought's objects' is able to unify under one self-same topic of intended object. In our dissertation,⁹⁴ we have pointed out that, according to James, our consciousness does have a peculiar sort of active function of conferring the 'sense of sameness' on a flux of constantly changing 'objects of thought'. James claims, "The thing we mean to point at may change from top to bottom and we be ignorant of the fact. But in our meaning itself we are not deceived; our intention is to think of the same."⁹⁵

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Our consciousness, in James' opinion, can actively denote a flux of continuously varying 'thought's objects' as a flux of changing presentations of one self-same object or topic. By thus bestowing the 'sense of sameness' on a flux of shifting 'thought's objects', consciousness does, in fact, constitute them into a system of different aspects of one self-same object. Therefore, we can say that, if Husserl bases the foundation of the identity of an intended object on consciousness' active function of intending a self-same object by multiple states, then James traces the ground of the emergence of a self-same object to consciousness' capability of bestowing the sense of sameness on a flux of different 'objects' of thought'. He says,

The mind must conceive as possible that the Same should be before it, for our experience to be the sort of thing it is. Without the psychological sense of identity, sameness might rain upon us from the outer world for ever and we be none the wiser. With the psychological sense, on the other hand, the outer world might be an unbroken flux, and yet we should perceive a repeated experience.⁹⁶

Here, we can conclude that, if a Jamesian object of consciousness, like a Husserlian intended object, is a self-same object presenting itself to us in a number of different one-sided manifestations rather than a flux of changing, meaningless mere presences

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of the appearing phases of the intended object, then every strata of a Jamesian object, like every level of a Husserlian object, is the product of consciousness' various active operations. In fact, throughout The Principles of Psychology, Psychology: Briefer Course or various articles in his Radical Empiricism, James, like Husserl, keeps on emphasizing that consciousness is not just, metaphorically speaking, an empty container or sack into which an object just enters. Consciousness, for James, like for Husserl, is a series of various active cognitive acts by which we, the conceivers, are able to perform a number of classing, measuring, locating, relating, meaning-bestowing, constituting, namely, a number of treatments on the datum given to us through our receptive faculty, our sensation. According to James, it is through these various creative, active operations of consciousness that we organize a flux of meaningless 'mere presences of the intended objects' into a number of objects of consciousness presenting themselves to us from various perspectives and transform what we experience into our different conceived worlds. Thus, in The Principles of Psychology, James says,

The result of the thought's operating on the data given to sense is to transform the order in which experience comes into an entirely different order, that of the conceived world.⁹⁷

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¹ J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality," Analecta Husserliana, 1, p. 100.

² Franz Brentano, "The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena," in Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. R. Chisolm (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 50.

³ Brentano, "The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena," p. 50.

⁴ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 555.

⁵ Husserl, Ideas, section 84. p.p. 242-243

⁶ In Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement; and Mohanty, "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality."

⁷ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 557.

⁸ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 559.

⁹ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 559.

¹⁰ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 595.

¹¹ David Carr, "Intentionality," in Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding, ed. Edo Pivceciv (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1975), p. 34.

¹² Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 114-115.

¹³ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 186.

¹⁴ James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 16

¹⁵ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 261.

¹⁶ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 261.

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- 37 Husserl, Ideas, section 85. p. 246
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- 40 Husserl, Ideas, section 86. p. 254
- 41 James, Psychology: Briefer Course, pp. 26-
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- 42 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
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- 43 James, The Principles of Psychology, II,
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- 44 James, The Principles of Psychology, II,
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- 46 James, The Principles of Psychology, II,
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- 55 James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p.
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450.
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Chapter IV

Conclusion--William James' Humanistic Theory of Consciousness

In chapter I of this dissertation, we have already pointed out Husserl's several acknowledgments of James' influence on the development of his phenomenology, appearing both in his publications and his conversations with various American scholars and the significant numbers of comparative studies of James' psychology and Husserl's phenomenology that inspired us to write this dissertation. The central question that we attempt to answer in this dissertation is this: can we, or can we not, in James' collections of his unsystematic, untechnical observations of various mental phenomena, namely, in James The Principles of Psychology and Psychology: Briefer Course, detect a theory of the constitution of consciousness which is similar to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness, presented in his constitutive phenomenology? In order to answer this question, we have, in the former three chapters of this dissertation, worked out a comparison of Husserl and James' theories of the appropriate method that can be used in their analysis of consciousness, their ideas of the structure of the objects

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of consciousness and the natures of the activities of consciousness and their notions of the relations between the object and the activities of consciousness. The obvious similarities between Husserl and James' theories of methodology, idea of the structure of the objects and the natures of the activities of consciousness and their notions of the activities of consciousness as the foundation of the structures of the objects of consciousness have almost compelled us to admit that James has discovered, in his descriptions of mental phenomena, all the unique characteristics of consciousness and the object of consciousness which Husserl exposes in his phenomenology. Thus James has, to a certain extent, established in his psychology a theory of consciousness which is very similar to the Husserlian phenomenology. But, if we look back and have a general reflection of Husserl's phenomenology and James' psychology, then, we find that, despite all the dazzling affinities existing in Husserl and James' theory of consciousness, there has, in fact, been one radical difference between Husserl's phenomenology and James' psychology. It is this basic diversion between Husserl and James that prevents James to really formulate a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology in his psychology, and forbids us to conclude our dissertation by declaring simply that James is a

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Husserlian phenomenologist.

Simply speaking, the crucial difference between Husserl and James is that, although in their phenomenology and psychology they hold almost identical ideas about the constitution of the object of consciousness and the nature of consciousness, nevertheless, ontologically speaking, they do not look upon consciousness and the object of consciousness in exactly the same way. In other words, Husserl and James do not place consciousness and the object of consciousness in the same ontological class. As far as the problem of 'what are consciousness and the object of consciousness?' is concerned, James has not, in fact, made, in Husserl's words, a "change of standpoint,"¹ which is so decisively important in Husserl's phenomenology. Since this 'change of standpoint' is the most crucial, distinguishing characteristic of Husserl's phenomenology which, in fact, distinguishes Husserl's phenomenology from the empirical sciences, here, at the end of our dissertation, in order to present a more accurate reading of James' psychology, we have to discuss briefly the lack of this significant 'change of standpoint' in James' theory of consciousness.

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1. William James', Psychology as a Descriptive Psychology

Phenomenology is a rigorous study of the essences of all Beings. This, of course, is the fundamental definition of phenomenology which one has to grasp firmly if one would like to have a correct apprehension of Husserl's phenomenology. At the beginning of Ideas, Husserl has explicated this particular characteristic of phenomenology in this way,

As over against this psychological "phenomenology", pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being (as "eidetic" Science); a science which aims exclusively at establishing "knowledge of essences" and absolutely not "facts".²

In order to accomplish the ambitious aim of building philosophy into a sort of rigorous science, Husserl confines his philosophical investigations to the analysis of the indubitable datum. Following the footsteps of Descartes, Husserl has searched backwards to our stream of consciousness to find these indubitable materials of his philosophical investigations. But, unlike Descartes, what Husserl considers as the absolutely evident datum is not just a "barren thinking subject."³ Thinking subject, as a flux of cogitations, a flux of intentional experiences, and the cogitatum carried

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by this stream of cogitations, the intended objects of this flowing thinking subject, are all included by Husserl in the scope of indubitability. In other words, in order to establish philosophy into a sort of rigorous science, Husserl limits his philosophical investigations to the studies of consciousness, objects of consciousness and their relations. As we know, consciousness, objects of consciousness and their relations are the subject matter of psychology. Can we, then, say that what Husserl intends to accomplish in his philosophical investigations, namely, in his phenomenology, is a certain sort of psychology? Here emerges one crucial point that we need to notice. Even though at the first sight, the territory of phenomenology and the territory of psychology seems to have overlapped, nevertheless, phenomenology is not psychology. From Ideas to Experience and Judgment, we can find out that Husserl constantly differentiates phenomenology from psychology. In Ideas, Husserl says,

. . . the pure phenomenology . . . is not psychology, and that it is not accidental delimitations and considerations of terminology, but grounds of principle, which forbid its being counted as psychology. Great as is the importance which phenomenology must claim to possess for psychology in the matter of method, whatever the essential "bases" it provides for it, it is itself

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(if only as Science of ideas) as little identifiable with psychology as is geometry with natural science.⁴

First, phenomenology and psychology are two types of totally different sciences. Psychology is a sort of positive science which intends to expose the empirical characteristics of a flux of consciousness. Phenomenology, on the other hand, is a priori or eidetic science which attempts to disclose the essential structures of a flux of consciousness. Phenomenology is, in Husserl's words, "a science which aims exclusively at establishing 'knowledge of essences' and absolutely no 'facts'."⁵

Secondly, what Husserl attempts to accomplish in his phenomenology is absolutely not what a psychologist attempts to accomplish in his psychology. For a psychologist, a flux of consciousness is just a flux of real psychical life, a region of the reality. What a psychologist attempts to present to us are, then, just some analyses or descriptions of the peculiar characteristics of a region of reality. Husserl, on the other hand, looks upon a flux of consciousness as a flux of absolutely indubitable datum for his philosophical analyses. What, then, Husserl attempts to extricate from these datum are not just some special characteristics of a region of nature. Grasping a

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flux of Cartesian subjects as an indubitable starting-point, what Husserl attempts to disclose in his phenomenology are, in fact, the essences of all that which we can know indubitably. In other words, by exposing the essential characteristics of both consciousness and the objects of consciousness, what Husserl attempts to disclose are the meanings of both consciousness and the entire universe which is intended by consciousness. It is in this sense that Husserl, in his "Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica," claims that, what his transcendental phenomenology aims to establish is a Leibnizian universal ontology. He says,

Remarkable consequences arise when one weighs the significance of transcendental phenomenology. In its systematic development, it brings to realization the Leibnizian idea of an universal ontology as the systematic unity of all conceivable a priori sciences, but on a new foundation which overcomes "dogmatism" through the use of the transcendental phenomenological method.⁶

Phenomenology, therefore, is a rigorous investigation of the essences of the total indubitable Being, presenting itself as a system of 'knowings' and, as correlates of these 'knowings', the 'knowns'. Now, after we have, here, grasped firmly this essential characteristic of phenomenology, we shall not have difficulty in understanding what, in Husserl's opinion, are the consciousness and the objects of consciousness

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which have such and such a sort of structure.

Speaking simply, an object of consciousness, according to Husserl, is nothing other than a certain intended object, be it a chair, a mental image or a mathematical axiom, which has its reality put into a 'bracket' and all of its essential characteristics and its objectivity remained untouched. As we have already mentioned in this dissertation,⁷ in Husserl's opinion, an object of consciousness is made up of a system of noemata unified under a certain self-same object and appearing in a horizon. Husserl claims that what a flux of noemata stand for are the various different ways in which an object of consciousness is intended and what a horizon stands for is the particular context in which an object is intended. Then, it is solely due to a flux of consciousness' essential characteristic of constantly referring to one self-same object that a flux of noemata can be unified into one self-identical object. In other words, Husserl claims that, as an irreal correlate of consciousness' various intentional activities, an intended object derives both its characteristics and its constitution from the particular ways in which consciousness intends its object. But, the crucial thing that we need to notice is that, as a phenomenologist who looks upon all the indubitable phenomena from a phenomenological

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perspective, Husserl does not regard the noemata or the horizon as a thinking subject's various subjective perceptions, interpretations or assertions of his intended objects. For Husserl, the noemata, the horizon are nothing other than the essences or meanings of an intended object and the essential background or context in which an intended object exists.

If all the objects of consciousness, in Husserl's opinion, are the unreal entities which derive both their essences and their structures from nowhere but a flux of consciousness, this flux of consciousness which is able to bestow the meanings on its object or constitutes a flux of changing meanings into a self-same object is not just a flux of flowing empirical thinking ego existing in the natural world, but the transcendental foundation of the total essential Being. Husserl says,

I am no longer a human Ego in the universal, existentially posited world, but exclusively a subject for which this world has being, and purely, indeed, as that which appears to me, is presented to me, and of which I am conscious in some way or another.⁸

In other words, for Husserl, a transcendental phenomenologist who attempts to build up a science of all the indubitable essences, a flux of consciousness, is rather the fundamental, absolute base from

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which all the essences derive their irreal existences than an active thinking subject which is able to think about its objects in various different ways. It is in this sense that Husserl claims that a flux of consciousness is a 'transcendental subjectivity' "in which this world and all that is presented--for us--constitutes itself through certain apperceptions."⁹

If what Husserl ambitiously attempts to establish in his phenomenology is a universal science of Being, namely, an investigation of the essence of the total indubitable Being, then, what James humbly aims to accomplish in his psychology is nothing more than a faithful report of the characteristics of various mental phenomena.

In Psychology: Briefer Course, James points out that psychology is just "the description and explanation of states of consciousness as such."¹⁰ Also, in The Principles of Psychology, James points out that what he, as a psychologist, attempts to accomplish is "looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover."¹¹ By claiming that the task of a psychologist is to present a faithful description of both the essential characteristics of consciousness, the peculiar ways in which consciousness intends its object and the essential nature of the object intended by consciousness, what James attempts to do in his

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psychology is almost similar to what Husserl proposes to accomplish in his phenomenology, nevertheless, there is still one significant difference between Husserl and James. As a natural scientist, James has never imagined that, by giving a faithful report of the characteristics of a flux of consciousness, he is able to expose the essences of all that we can know indubitably. He never considers his psychology as a rigorous transcendental ontology.

After we have firmly grasped this crucial point, namely, what James expects from his psychological studies is totally different from what Husserl expects from his phenomenological researches, we will have no difficulty in apprehending in what sense James does not interpret consciousness and the object of consciousness in the same way as Husserl does. Now, let us, first of all, see how James looks upon an object of consciousness.

As Aron Gurwitsch has pointed out in The Field of Consciousness, a 'topic of thought', in James' opinion, is nothing other than "the fact or state of affairs, whether real, ideal, or merely imaginary, to which the act of consciousness bears cognitive reference."¹² Therefore, we can say that, undoubtedly, a Jamesian 'topic of thought' is a Husserlian self-same intended object presented under a different

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name. But when it comes to James' notions of 'an object of thought' and 'the fringe of consciousness', then we find that we cannot easily contend for their unconditional affinities with Husserl's notions of noema and horizon. In this dissertation,¹³ we have already mentioned how a 'thought's object' is described by James as the 'entire content of how an object is intended in a state of consciousness'. A 'thought's object' is understood by James as the entire peculiar ways of how an object is sensed, is perceived from a certain angle, is interpreted or is absorbed into a certain context by a state of consciousness. We have, then, pointed out how James' description of the essential characteristics of a 'thought's object' is similar to Husserl's description of the essential characteristics of a noema. We have already mentioned how a fringe of consciousness is interpreted by James as a sort of vague awareness of a momentarily given 'object of consciousness' status of being a single aspect of a total intended object or a part of a unitary intended system.¹⁴ In other words, we have pointed out how James, by looking upon a 'fringe of consciousness' as the shadow cast by the total object or system upon an intended object, has understood a 'fringe of consciousness' in exactly the same ways in which Husserl understands a horizon. But there

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is one crucial point that we have not mentioned in those two peculiar sections of our dissertation. That is, these two philosophers do not consider the noema, the 'object of thought', the 'fringe of consciousness' and the horizon as the same sorts of beings. In fact, while Husserl, as a phenomenologist, considers a flux of noemata as an intended object's essences or meanings and horizon as the essential background in which an intended object exists, James, as a psychologist, understands a flux of 'thought's objects' and 'fringes of consciousness' solely as human beings' different interpretations, understandings of an intended object. While Husserl considers the noema and the horizon as a sort of irreal transcendent existence, James contends that the 'object of thought' and the 'fringe of consciousness' are a sort of immanent being existing in a flux of consciousness. They are the 'contents' of a flux of consciousness.^{14 a.}

If James, as a psychologist, does not regard what he discovers inside our minds, namely, the various peculiar ways in which an object is intended as the various essences of an intended object, then, naturally, he does not regard a flux of consciousness which is able to think about its intended objects in these various ways as a Husserlian transcendental subjectivity from which the total intended world derives its

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being. For James, a flux of consciousness is still just a flux of flowing thinking subject which can actively interpret or organize its intended objects in different ways. It is not the ground of the total indubitable Being.

Using Husserl's terms, we can say that, as far as the problem of the nature of consciousness and the object of consciousness is concerned, James does not shift his standpoint from that of a natural scientist's to a transcendental phenomenologist's.

2. William James' Reflex-Arc Theory of Consciousness

If one is familiar with some of the articles published by James before The Principles of Psychology, for example, "Reflex Action and Theism," published in 1881, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence," published in 1878, some of the articles published by James after The Principles of Psychology, for example, articles in Pragmatism, published in 1907, and remarks in The Principles of Psychology, then it is not hard for one to find that what sets James' psychology apart from Husserl's phenomenology is not just the fact that, as a psychologist, James has not ventured a step further to

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consider the ~~objects~~ of consciousness as the essence of all that we can know indubitably and consciousness as the fundamental, absolute ground from which the total indubitable world of essences derives its legitimate existence. In fact, what separates James' psychology widely away from Husserl's phenomenology is the fact that James has always held a reflex-arc theory of consciousness and an instrumental notion of the nature of objects of consciousness which is extremely different from the Husserlian notions of consciousness and the objects of consciousness. In order to grasp a clearer idea of this fundamental division between Husserl's phenomenology and James psychology, we would like to present a brief explication of what, for James, are exactly a flux of consciousness and the objects of consciousness.

Contrary to Husserl's idea that consciousness is the transcendental ground for all the indubitable essences, James holds that a flux of consciousness is just human beings' reactive faculty, namely, mental functions by which human beings can convert the stimuli into reactions.¹⁵ In an article called "Reflex Action and Theism," James has described the structure of this reactive faculty and the process by which it converts the stimuli into reactions in the following ways:



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The structural unit of the nervous system is in fact a triad, neither of whose elements has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists only for the sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the central process of reflection exists only for the sake of calling forth the final act. All action is thus re-action upon the outer world; and the middle stage of consideration or contemplation or thinking is only a place of transit, the bottom of a loop, both whose ends have their point of application in the outer world.¹⁶

Any mind, constructed on the triadic-reflex pattern, must first get its impression from the object which it confronts; then define what that object is, and decide what active measures its presence demands; and finally react. The stage of reaction depends on the stage of definition, and these, of course, on the nature of the impressing object.¹⁷

In James' opinion, mind will first passively receive the impressions which it gets from the objects confronted cognitively by it in the surrounding world, then it can actively constitute these impressions into different sorts of objects of thought or various contexts of meaning, and, at last, as a reaction to the different objects of thought, it produces different emotions or desires to act. According to James, how a mind reacts towards the objects which it confronts is totally decided by how it interprets and understands these objects. Therefore, in James' opinion, among the three stages of our reactions towards the external world, the middle stage is

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the most important one. According to James, all three stages of mind's reactions towards the external world are performed in the so-called three departments of mind. They are the department of sensory impressions, the central department of reflection and the department of action. Since it is in the central department of mind that all the passively received impressions are constituted into different sorts of objects, so, in James' opinion, all the cognitive activities which we have previously described are the various mental functions existing in this section of our mind.¹⁸ While they can organize the objects which they encounter passively in the outer world into various sorts of objects of thought, what they actually are doing, in James' opinion, is nothing other than arranging a flux of impressions into certain contexts of meanings to which we can react properly. Therefore, in "Reflex Action and Theism," James claims that the active cognitive activities "can have but one essential function . . . , the function of defining the direction which our activity, immediate or remote, shall take."¹⁹

Here, we are able to detect the first crucial diversion between James and Husserl's interpretations of the nature of consciousness. While Husserl holds that consciousness can perform the active functions

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of constituting and meaning-bestowing on its objects, James goes a step further to claim that by thus doing, consciousness has transformed or organized a flux of impressions into some texts of guidelines to direct human beings' actions.

In James' opinion, the thinking subject's practical and existential interests can play a dominating role in determining how the central department of his mind is going to mold a flux of impressions into different contexts of signals. James says,

I am not quite sure that its full scope (the full scope of the reflex theory of mind) is grasped even by those who have most zealously promulgated it. I am not sure, for example, that all physiologists see that it commits them to regarding the mind as an essentially teleological mechanism. I mean by this that the conceiving or theorizing faculty--the mind's middle department--functions exclusively for the sake of ends that do not exist at all in the world of impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether. It is a transformer of the world of our impressions into a totally different world--the world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in the interests of our volitional nature, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Destroy the volitional nature, the definite subjective purposes, preferences, fondnesses for certain effects, forms, orders, and not the slightest motive would remain for the brute order of our experience to be remodelled at all. But, as we have the elaborate volitional constitution we do have, the remodelling must be effected; there is no escape. The world's contents are given to each of us in an order so foreign to our subjective interests

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that we can hardly by an effort of the imagination picture to ourselves what it is like. We have to break that order altogether--and by picking out from it the items which concern us, and connecting them with others far away, which we say 'belong' with them, we are able to make out definite threads of sequence and tendency; to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for them; and to enjoy simplicity and harmony in place of what was chaos.²⁰

In other words, for James, it is the thinking subject's various needs, interests or desires that drive the central department of his mind to organize the impressions into certain patterns of objects of thought or even to perform the function of organization at all. Since in his explications of the consciousness' various active activities, Husserl has never tried to relate the activities of consciousness to a thinking subject's personal interests, so, in James' exposition of the necessary connection between a thinking subject's various needs and his different active cognitive activities, we can discover the other crucial difference between James and Husserl's notions of consciousness. Here, we can sum up these two philosophers' different notions of consciousness in this way: Husserl considers a flux of consciousness as a transcendental subjectivity which is able to constitute an indubitable world in its various active activities, while the same flux of consciousness

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is looked upon by James as human beings' mental reactive faculty which, guided by this particular human being's various practical and existential needs, can remodel or translate the world which it encounters into a context of guidelines to lead his various actions.

While a flux of consciousness, in James' opinion, is a teleological mechanism which can convert the stimuli into reactions, the objects of consciousness, for James, are the contexts of different signals or guidelines for our actions. In "Reflex Action and Theism," James describes how the objects of thought perform the functions of directing our actions in this way,

When the objects are concrete, particular and familiar, our reactions are firm and certain enough--often instinctive. I see the desk, and lean on it; I see your quiet faces, and I continue to talk. But the objects will not stay concrete and particular: they fuse themselves into general essences, and they sum themselves into a whole--the universe. And then the object that confronts us, that knocks on our mental door and asks to be let in, and fixed and decided upon and actively met, is just this whole universe itself and its essence.

What are they, and how shall I met them?

The whole flood of faiths and systems here rush in. Philosophies and denials of philosophy, religions and atheisms, scepticisms and mysticisms, confirmed emotional moods and habitual practical biases, jostle one another; for all are alike trials, hasty, prolix, or of seemly length, to answer this momentous question. And the

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function of them all, long or short, that which the moods and the systems alike subserve and pass into, is the third stage--the stage of action. For no one of them itself is final. They form but the middle segment of the mental curve, and not its termination. As the last theoretic pulse dies away, it does not leave the mental process complete: it is but the forerunner of the practical moment, in which alone the cycle of mentality finds its rhythmic pause.²¹

In James' opinion, while a flux of impressions are constituted by the middle department of our consciousness into different 'what's', what we can find in these 'what's' are the answers to our question: how shall I meet them? Thus, as an example, James claims that, if the impressions of the weather of a number of days is organized or summed up by the central department of our consciousness into a concept, 'winter', then this concept 'winter' becomes an instruction to guide our behaviour. James says,

Nevertheless the word is a useful one to plunge forward with into the stream of our experience. It cuts off certain probabilities and sets up others. You can put away your straw hats' you can unpack your arctics. It is a summary of things to look for. It names a part of nature's habits, and gets you ready for their continuation.²²

For James, "theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas . . ."²³ James says, "We don't lie back upon them (theories), we move forward,

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and, on occasions, make nature over again by their aid."²⁴

Unlike Husserl, James does not interpret a flux of objects of consciousness as a flux of indubitable essences. A flux of objects of consciousness, or a conceived reality, as the totality of the objects of consciousness, is, in James' opinion, a set or a context of symbols which we carve out from the world given to us to suit our human purposes.²⁵ According to James, what is actually shown in an object of thought is either the use which an object has to us, or the peculiar characteristic of an object to which we have to react in a certain way. It is, therefore, in this sense that James says, "They (the various objects of thought in a conceived reality) characterized us more than they characterize the thing."²⁶ It is also in this sense that James claims that, what an object of thought gives to us is not the answer to the question 'what is that?', but the answer to the question "what is to be done?"²⁷

Therefore, we can say that, even though James and Husserl have held almost identical ideas about the nature of consciousness, the structures of the objects of consciousness and the relations between the object of consciousness and consciousness, nevertheless, ontologically speaking, they do not look

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upon consciousness and its objects in exactly the same way. It is not only that James, as a psychologist, refuses to change his standpoint and regards consciousness as a transcendental subjectivity which can originate all the essences and the objects of consciousness as these essences originated by the consciousness.

What takes James' theory of consciousness even farther away from Husserl's phenomenology is the fact that James has interpreted consciousness as a teleological mechanism which, in order to facilitate an individual's adaptation to his environment, has translated all the objects it encounters into different signals for actions. Objects of thought are this flux of signals.

Of course, it will be unjust to claim that, among so many striking similarities existing between James' theory of consciousness and Husserl's phenomenology, the emergence of these divergent interpretations of the natures of consciousness and the object of consciousness can, in fact, prove that James has not developed a certain sort of phenomenology in his psychology. Nevertheless, due to the presence of these crucial diversions, we are compelled to admit that a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, understood in the narrow sense, has not been developed in James' theory of consciousness.

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On the one hand, James, unlike Husserl, has never changed his 'natural attitude' into a 'phenomenological attitude'. What James aims to give us in his psychological studies are the descriptions of 'the ways in which objects are intended' and the essential natures of the intentional experiences. Unlike Husserl, he does not go a step further to look upon 'the ways in which objects are intended' as the essential meanings of the intended objects and the intentional experiences as the ground from which these meanings come. Therefore, James' constitutive theory of consciousness may bear a striking similarity to Husserl's constitutive phenomenology, but, in our opinion, it is not yet a fully developed constitutive phenomenology.

On the other hand, in James' advocations of the reflex-arc notion of consciousness and instrumental theory of the object of consciousness, we can say that James has gone a step further than Husserl to disclose the humanistic, existential aspects of consciousness and the object of consciousness which have always been neglected by Husserl in his analyses of the characteristics of consciousness and the object of consciousness. First, James has discovered that a flux of consciousness is not just a flux of disinterested, pure intellectual activities. James points

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out that, a flux of consciousness is, in fact, a flux of certain concrete human beings' teleological mental activities. Whatever this flux of mental activities are doing, they are doing for the purpose of facilitating this particular human being's survival in the world. James, like Husserl, has discovered how consciousness, through its intentional activities, is able to bestow meanings and constitutions on its objects; nevertheless, James has ventured a step further than Husserl to point out how these meaning-bestowing and form-shaping activities are consciousness' functions of making up signs to direct a human being's actions. For James, consciousness is not just an originator of meanings, but is also a strategist of actions. Or, we should say that, in James' opinion, consciousness' meaning-producing activities are also consciousness' strategy-making activities. In these various strategy-making activities, no matter that they sometimes can be very abstract intellectual operations, human beings' various existential interests, aims and practical needs, according to James, can play a dominant role. Secondly, while both Husserl and James hold that a flux of noemata or 'thought's objects' is a flux of varying meanings or essences surrounding an intended object, James, nevertheless, unlike Husserl, does not understand this flux of

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meanings or essences solely as a thinking subject's disinterested, purely intellectual denotations of an intended object. For James, what are present to us as the meanings of an intended object are always a thinking subject's pragmatic interpretations of an intended object. In other words, what the meanings of an intended object stand for are the indications of a particular intended object's usages or threats to a thinking subject. In James' opinion, what the meanings of an intended object reveal to us are, in fact, nothing other than a thinking subject's idea of what sorts of actions they should render to this particular intended object. James, like Husserl, contends that a chaotic, constantly changing world can be analyzed, re-organized by a thinking subject into different contexts of meanings. He points out that these contexts of meanings, for a human being, are different 'blue-prints' or 'guide-lines' which can function as a sort of direction for his various activities. In his theory of consciousness, by thus disclosing not just the constitutions of the objects of consciousness and the constituting abilities of consciousness, but also uncovering the humanistic, existential aspects of the objects of consciousness and consciousness, we should say that James has, in fact, gone a step further than Husserl to initiate

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a sort of existential phenomenology, namely, a phenomenology with a humanistic tendency.

Here we would like to conclude our entire phenomenological interpretation of James' theory of consciousness in this way: due to the emergence of the unique Husserlian notions of the constitutions of the object of consciousness, the transcendental, constitutive intentionality of consciousness and the constituting-constituted relations between consciousness and the object of consciousness in his theory of consciousness, we have to admit that, before Husserl, James has cultivated, in his psychological studies, a theory of the constitution of consciousness which is extremely similar to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness. Nevertheless, James, in his theory of consciousness, has never, like Husserl, substituted 'a phenomenological attitude' for his 'psychological attitude'. By not looking upon his analyses of the constitution of the objects of consciousness as studies of the essential structure of all that we can know indubitably, and his analyses of the natures of consciousness as investigations of the natures of the foundations of all these indubitable beings, we should say that James has not let his constitutive phenomenology develop into a sort of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. In fact, by fully exposing the

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existential, humanistic characteristics of consciousness and the object of consciousness, what James has really established in his theory of consciousness, in our opinion, is a humanistic theory of consciousness, or a certain type of existential phenomenology.

As we have already pointed out in the Introduction of this dissertation, a significant number of phenomenological studies of James have been published in the period between 1941 and 1974. In order to prove that our thesis is not just a tedious summary of these previous works, it seems necessary for us to present a brief assessment of the points of originality of this thesis. This assessment can indicate how our investigation complements other phenomenological studies of James.

First of all, we have to acknowledge H. Spiegelberg as the first scholar who has sensed the crucial similarity between James' theory of the constitution of consciousness and Husserl's constitutive phenomenology. From Spiegelberg's brief contention of how James has inspired Husserl to transform a static Brentanian notion of intentionality to a notion of constitutive intentionality, we have developed this thesis. As we have pointed out in a review of the previous works in the introduction of our dissertation, our investigation

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has focused on an area which has not yet been covered thoroughly by any phenomenological scholar. In our dissertation, we have presented the following new interpretations of James' theory of consciousness which we have never discovered in any phenomenological examination of James:

1) We have presented a phenomenological analysis of James' psychological methodology. We point out how the two crucial phenomenological techniques, the techniques of phenomenological reduction and phenomenological description, have already existed in James' method of introspection. No previous work has ever presented such an analysis of James' psychological methodology.

2) In our discussion of James' refutation of mind-stuff theory, we have noticed how James, by advocating the difference in structure between consciousness and the object of consciousness, has succeeded in lying down the ground for an anti-psychologistic position and restoring the absolute objectivity to the object of consciousness. No scholar has ever discovered the root of James' anti-psychologism in his criticism of mind-stuff theory.

3) All the phenomenological scholars have related James' notion of the fringe of consciousness to Husserl's notion of horizon. Nevertheless, it is in our dissertation that James' notion of the fringe of

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consciousness is compared specifically to Husserl's notion of internal horizon.

4) We claim that James has cultivated a notion of the transcendental intentionality of consciousness in his discussion of consciousness' essential characteristic of referring itself towards something other than itself. While phenomenological scholars like Bruce Wilshire or James Edie have all noticed the emergence of the notion of intentionality in James' theory of consciousness, it is in our dissertation the the transcending character of the Jamesian notion of intentionality is thoroughly exposed.

5) We discover the crucial similarity between James' notion of sensation and Husserl's notion of the hyletic phase of consciousness.

6) We expose the affinity between James' notion of the active cognitive activities of consciousness and Husserl's notion of the noetic phase of consciousness. No phenomenological scholar has ever noticed this particular point of affinity between James' theory of consciousness and Husserl's phenomenology.

7) In the conclusion, we uncover the basic differences between James and Husserl's theory of consciousness. We point out that they hold different concepts of 'what is consciousness' and 'what is an object of consciousness'. We have discussed how these

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differences separat their theories of consciousness into a transcendental phenomenology and a theory of the constitution of consciousness with a humanistic, existential tendency. We claim originality in our discovery of these diversions between James and Husserl's theories of consciousness.

With the above points of originality, we believe that our dissertation does make a significant contribution to the Jamesian scholarship.

Chapter IV

Notes

¹ Husserl, Ideas, "Author's Preface to the English Edition." p. 16

² Husserl, Ideas, "Introduction." p. 44

³ Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 31.

⁴ Husserl, Ideas, "Introduction." p. 42

⁵ Husserl, Ideas, "Introduction." p. 44

⁶ Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927)," trans. Richard E. Palmer, The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2 (1971), 87.

⁷ See chapter II, section 2A of this dissertation.

⁸ Husserl, Ideas, "Author's Preface to the English Edition." p. 14

⁹ Husserl, "Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl's Article," p. 85.

¹⁰ James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 15.

¹¹ James, The Principles of Psychology, I, p. 185.

¹² Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, p. 313.

¹³ See chapter II, section 2B of this dissertation.

¹⁴ See chapter II, section 2B of this dissertation.

^{14 a.}

It is obvious that James considers the 'topic of thought' as a transcendent reference of consciousness. James' anti-psychologistic position and concept of transcendental intentionality, in fact, are based on his notion of the transcendency of the object of consciousness. While it comes to the problem about

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the ontological status of the 'object of thought', ambiguity arises. It is very hard to pin down whether James regards an 'object of thought' as a transcendent or an immanent entity. Scholars like Bruce Wilshire or James Edie tend to interpret the Jamesian 'object of thought' as a transcendent entity. They contend that James has cultivated a thoroughly developed Husserlian notion of noema in his notion of 'the object of thought'. This 'object intended as such' or 'entire ways of how an object is intended', for James, is the meanings existing outside the sphere of consciousness. Their interpretations, in our opinions, can be justified on one base. In Section 4 of a chapter called The Stream of Thought in The Principles of Psychology, while James talks about how human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself, he seems to realize that the subjective interpretation or subjective quality of feeling of an intended object can be objectified into a transcendent meaning or quality of an intended object. In other words, James seems to think that an object of thought can become either a public entity in a world of intersubjectivity or a common object for a multiple states of consciousness. But, if one takes a more global reading of James' notion of object of thought, one can see that this spark of inspiration does not enlighten James to elevate his notion to the level of a Husserlian noema. In fact, as far as the notion of an object of thought is concerned, James does not seem to succeed in liberating himself from the bondage of introspective psychology. By calling a flux of objects of thought the contents of a flux of consciousness, James seems incapable of shedding the idea that an object of thought is an immanent entity. Therefore, in our opinions, although James considers that consciousness can refer a flux of objects of thought to a transcendent point of reference, a transcendent topic of thought, he is still unable to regard these objects of thought as beings outside the sphere of psychology. We can not deny the presence of this remnant of psychologism in James' notion of the object of thought.

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James, Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 372

16

William James, "Reflex Action and Theism," in The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, 1897), pp. 113-114.

Chapter IV
Notes

- 17 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," p. 124.
- 18 See chapter III, section 3 of this dissertation.
- 19 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," p. 124.
- 20 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," pp. 117-
118.
- 21 James, "Reflex Action and Theism," p. 123.
- 22 James, "Pragmatism and Humanism," in Pragmatism
and Four Essays From the Meaning of Truth, pp. 171-
172.
- 23 James, "What is Pragmatism," in Pragmatism
and Four Essays From the Meaning of Truth, p. 46.
- 24 James, "What is Pragmatism," p. 46.
- 25 James, "Pragmatism and Humanism," p. 165.
- 26 James, The Principles of Psychology, II,
p. 334.
- 27 James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in
The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy, p. 84.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of our dissertation is to present an examination of William James' psychology in the light of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. We attempt to argue one point: if we look at James' psychological studies with Husserl's phenomenology in mind, we can discover that James has cultivated a theory of the constitution of consciousness which is extremely similar to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness, presented in his constitutive phenomenology.

In chapter I, we first present an analysis of the method used by James in his psychological studies. What we intend to point out is that the two crucial phenomenological techniques, phenomenological reduction and phenomenological description, have already appeared in James' method of 'introspection'. We then give an explication of James' theory of the irrecurrence and continuity of a stream of consciousness.

Chapter II is devoted to the excavation of the similarities between James and Husserl's theories of the structure of the object of consciousness. We begin with a phenomenological interpretation of James' refutation of the mind-stuff theory. The point that we would like to expose is: by advocating the difference

in structure between consciousness and its object, James has anticipated Husserl's anti-psychologistic position and created a foundation for the restoration of the absolute objectivity to the object of consciousness. We then continue with a discussion of the similarities between James' notion of 'the object of thought', 'the topic of thought', 'the fringe of consciousness' and Husserl's notions of 'the noema of consciousness', 'the object of consciousness' and 'horizon'. We attempt to demonstrate that, by considering an object of consciousness as constituted of a flux of multiple 'objects of thought' referring to one self-same topic and escorted by the fringe of consciousness, James has almost developed a proto-Husserlian theory of the structure of the object of consciousness.

Chapter III deals with James' theory of the various activities of consciousness as the foundation of the structure of the object of consciousness. First, we expose the affinity between James' concept of the worldliness of consciousness and Husserl's notion of intentionality. We then go a step further to produce a comparison of James' theory of the different cognitive activities of consciousness and Husserl's theory of the different modes of intentionality. We claim that James, like Husserl, has uncovered not only the intentionality of consciousness, but the constitutive intentionality of consciousness, and grounded the

structure of the object of consciousness in the activities of consciousness.

If the first three chapters of our dissertation concern the similarities between James and Husserl's theories of consciousness, chapter IV turns to the difference. We discuss James and Husserl's diverse notions of 'what is consciousness' and 'what is the noema of consciousness or thought's object'. We point out how the emergence of this difference prevents us from viewing James' theory of consciousness as an exact Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. We conclude that, nevertheless, James, in his psychological studies, has worked out a theory of the constitution of consciousness which bears striking similarities to Husserl's theory of the structure of consciousness.