


JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF GROWTH IN EDUCATION

by Goldwin J. Emerson

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INTRODUCTION

John Dewey believes that education and growth are synonymous processes. An understanding of his concept of growth is therefore essential to an understanding of his educational philosophy. However, Dewey's references to growth in education do not indicate clearly the particular direction of the growth process. His concept of growth lacks a definite terminus. As a result of this lack, standards by which one may recognize and understand the process are also lacking, yet the importance of growth in Dewey's educational philosophy is underlined by the fact that he devotes much of his writing to the concept and also by the fact that he equates growth with education.

Scholars of Dewey's works have attempted to solve this malaise by seeking directing principles which may serve as criteria in recognizing and understanding Dewey's concept of growth in education. As the Review of the Literature will show, the answers are not complete nor are they always in agreement. Some scholars are content to simply point to the difficulty which exists; that is, that Dewey's concept of growth in education lacks a clearly defined terminus. Consequently, they conclude that his meaning cannot be understood, or further, that it has no meaning. Others, perhaps more sympathetic to Dewey's open-ended philosophy, are content in the idea that growth is a

positive, on-going concept which by common agreement, leads to such vague goals as harmony and the good life. Still others suggest that the key to understanding Dewey's concept of growth in education lies in one single facet of growth such as freedom, change, consequences, or in the continual reconstruction of one's habits. Unfortunately, this latter group overlooks the need to find guiding principles and directions within such concepts as freedom, change, and the assessment of consequences, so that the overall concept of growth in education may take on meaning and purpose.

An analysis of Dewey's own writings lends itself most appropriately to the study of this malaise. Dewey's abstruse literary style and his own unique terminology make it necessary to analyze his particular use of words. His special use of the terms metaphysics, reflective inquiry, and habit, are cases in point.

The nature of this malaise and of Dewey's writings suggest that his works must be analyzed primarily in terms of an interpretation of meaning rather than in terms of an analysis on the basis of hard facts or on the basis of an evaluation of the worth of his ideas.

Again, as the Review of the Literature will show, the work of scholars has sometimes been prejudiced by the

tendency to prematurely evaluate Dewey's philosophy. As a result, scholars tend to be polarized into two groups: severe critics on one hand and unquestioning disciples on the other. Another difficulty encountered by scholars is that many have sought to understand Dewey's concept of growth in education in terms of one single principle or criterion which might serve as a key to understanding the whole of the concept. The extent of Dewey's voluminous writings makes this approach rather unproductive. It seems more likely that the concept of growth in education means many things to Dewey and that the concept therefore takes on a number of directions. Closely connected with this research difficulty is the matter of Dewey's changing philosophy as it is expressed in his writings which extend over a period of seventy years. Scholars who limit themselves to too narrow a selection of Dewey's written works limit the possible interpretation that may follow from the concept of growth in education. Since the concept of growth pervades Dewey's educational philosophy, as wide a selection of his works as possible appears necessary for a full understanding of his meaning of growth.

The overriding difficulty, which pervades the work of other scholars dealing with the matter of growth is their failure to identify any clearly defined terminus for Dewey's

concept of growth in education. This difficulty may be expected for Dewey himself states on numerous occasions that no fixed directions or unchanging goals guide his philosophy.

In the light of the difficulties encountered by other scholars a somewhat different approach seems in order. First, since the concept of growth in education is so pervasive in Dewey's writings, it seems reasonable to expect that growth may proceed in a number of different but interrelated directions. Secondly, in view of Dewey's affinity for change and his antipathy for fixed principles, it also seems reasonable to expect that whatever guiding principles give a measure of direction to his concepts, they will be changing principles; that is, they will be tentative in nature rather than fixed directions. Thirdly, since Dewey regards growth and education as two similar on-going processes, whatever tentative directions are found, will be contained within the processes of growth and education themselves, for Dewey claims that growth and education are two autonomous processes which contain their own set of guiding principles. Fourthly, since growth and education are synonymous processes in Dewey's view, the goals which give direction to his educational ideas may be regarded as giving direction to the growth process as well.

It also follows that goals which are inconsistent with Dewey's educational process are also inconsistent with his growth process. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, certain types of growth which are inconsistent with Dewey's educational goals will be excluded. Physical and spiritual growth are cases in point. Fifthly, because of the changes in Dewey's philosophy over the course of his writings, as broad a sampling of his works as is currently possible is appropriate. This is particularly so if one is to understand the interrelationship of the various tentative directions of growth that may be expected to emerge from the study. Sixthly, the study will analyze Dewey's particular terminology with a view to interpretation of his meanings rather than with a view to evaluating the appropriateness or worth of his concept of growth in education. Since an interpretation of Dewey's terminology must precede any meaningful evaluation of his ideas, interpretation should be the main thrust of this study.

In the light of these particular considerations the overall framework which will be used in this study will be an analysis of Dewey's writings in which tentative directions will be sought within the process of growth in education on various dimensions. Here the term "tentative" will mean temporary, in recognition of the fact that Dewey

regards all aims or directions within his philosophy as subject to change. For Dewey, there are no permanent directions. The term "directions" will mean guiding principles which may serve as indicators of where Dewey's growth concept is heading. Since these directions are expected to be tentative they are more likely to indicate characteristic qualities of growth than to provide fixed principles of growth. The term "process" will indicate an on-going and moving procedure which is not static but which is subject to continual change. The term "growth" will mean progressive development along desirable lines. "Dimensions" will indicate various aspects which occur frequently and prominently in Dewey's concept of growth in education. Since growth and education are regarded by Dewey as similar processes these dimensions will necessarily be compatible with Dewey's stated educational aims. Foremost among these are social, moral, and intellectual aims. For this reason the particular dimensions to be investigated in this study will be social, moral, and intellectual dimensions as they are found within the process of growth in education. Each dimension considered by itself will have importance in the concept of growth, yet each will be only a part of the whole. It will be necessary to investigate the manner in which each dimension is interrelated with the remaining

two and how it is related to the overall concept of growth in education.

In the light of these considerations, the main problems which guide this research will be as follows: What are the tentative directions within the process of growth in education on the social, moral, intellectual dimensions and how are they interrelated? How are these dimensions integrated in the overall concept of growth in education? The investigation of Dewey's concept of growth in education will therefore be primarily limited to an analysis of his writings as they pertain to its social, moral, and intellectual dimensions.

The primary source material in this study will be John Dewey's own writings. It should be noted that no complete list of John Dewey's voluminous writings is presently in existence. The monumental task of collecting and verifying Dewey's complete works is presently part of on-going research conducted by The John Dewey Society and The Association of Co-operative Research on Dewey Publications at Southern Illinois University. As an outcome of this research Jo Ann Bodston, past president of The John Dewey Society, has been instrumental in editing Guide to the Works of John Dewey.¹ An additional

¹Jo Ann Boydston, editor, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University, 1970, xv-396 p.

outcome is the publication of the five-volume series, The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898.² In an effort to be as complete as is presently possible, the writer will be directed by Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey. In brief, these writings will include all the major works and all of the published works of Dewey both as author and as co-author. In addition, the early essays, journal articles, and other verified minor works as found in the five volume edition of The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898 will be used.

The method of research will involve an analysis of both the related literature and of Dewey's own works according to the following procedures: Chapter I will begin with a review of the literature. The entire literature written about Dewey is extremely voluminous and it becomes necessary to make selections which are relevant to the present study. Thus, works both opposing Dewey and in support of him will be selected as they pertain to Dewey's concept of growth in education. Of particular importance to this study will be works dealing with tentative directions in educational growth as well as literature dealing with the lack of apparent

²George E. Axtelle, et al., editors, The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University, Volumes I-V, 1967 to 1972.

direction in Dewey's concept of growth. Also of importance to this study will be those works dealing with social, moral, and intellectual growth, particularly as they are related to the concept of growth in education.

In Chapter II the study will deal with Dewey's view of the relationship of growth to education. The general qualities or characteristics of both education and growth will be noted with reference to the similarity and interdependence of these two concepts. In Chapters III, IV, and V the study will consider social, moral, and intellectual dimensions of growth within the educative process. These chapters will include Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of social, moral, and intellectual growth, in the school setting. Chapter VI will deal with the interrelationship of social, moral, and intellectual growth, and with the union of these three dimensions of growth in the on-going development of the self. In Chapter VII, there will be a critical overview of Dewey's concept of educational growth as a whole. Difficulties inherent in Dewey's style of writing and in his educational philosophy will be discussed in this chapter. Finally, an effort will be made to synthesize the various dimensions of educational growth as they are presented in the writings of John Dewey.

The main thrust of the analysis of Dewey's writings will be an effort to interpret his particular meaning of the

concept of growth in education in terms of its tentative directions. An important guideline in this analysis will be whether or not the interpretations given to Dewey's meanings are consistent with his overall philosophy. In addition they must be compatible with Dewey's ideas of an on-going process in which growth and education are similar and in which neither process has a fixed terminus. The tentative directions of growth in education must nevertheless be tied together in a meaningful whole. It is to this end that this research will address its efforts.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Of the scores of theses, books and articles written about John Dewey comparatively few discuss his concept of growth in depth. Among those commentaries which do deal with growth many express concern regarding the lack of clearly defined criteria by which to evaluate or even recognize the concept. Partly as a result of this lack Dewey's concept of growth is interpreted in a wide variety of ways. In an effort to provide a focus for Dewey's concept of growth a number of writers suggest that a particular aspect of his philosophy, such as the development of habits or the adjustment to one's environment, may provide the key. However, these particular propositions fail to provide the necessary clarity and consistency that is required in order to recognize and evaluate Dewey's concept of growth.

In the first section of the review that follows, Dewey's lack of clearly defined criteria for growth will be discussed. The second section will concern commentaries which relate to particular areas of development which have been used individually in an effort to solve the lack of clearly defined criteria. These include social, moral, and intellectual development. Literature concerning the development of the self as a

focus for growth will be discussed in section three. In the final section of the review there will be a statement of the problem which emerges out of the literature regarding Dewey's concept of growth.

1. A Lack of Clearly Defined Criteria for
the Concept of Growth

A recurring theme among writers who comment on Dewey's concept of growth is the lack of clearly defined and stable criteria by which growth may be recognized and understood. As a result of this lack, confusion exists regarding what Dewey means by the notion of growth leading simply to more growth. Malcolm Skilbeck expresses his concern in these words:

... by defining the aim of education as 'growth leading to further growth' he [Dewey] appeared [...] to be offering a formal definition which incorporated no criteria at all for distinguishing between educative and miseducative experiences.¹

Martin Dworkin presents a similar concern in his work, Dewey on Education:

... complaints have been made about the ambiguity of Dewey's meaning of 'growth' as an end in itself. The dictum that education ought to lead only to more education, growth to more growth, has been criticised as without precise meaning at best and as a justification of aimlessness at worst. In a way, Dewey may be said to deserve whatever confusions came to be associated with his name.²

1 Malcolm Skilbeck, editor, Dewey, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970, p. 19.

2 Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, New York, Columbia University, 1959, p. 13-14.

Although Dworkin does not attempt to clarify the concept of growth as such, the following advice to professional teachers might well be taken to heart by all who have an interest in understanding Dewey:

It may be no compliment to professional educators that they so easily understood Dewey while philosophers shock their heads.³

Dworkin goes on to explain that any true understanding of Dewey will be accompanied by the knowledge that "Dewey wrote badly. His style was often opaque, his terminology ambiguous."⁴ Thus Dworkin accounts for Dewey's lack of criteria for growth in two ways: a lack in his clarity of thought and a vagueness in his use of terminology.

Reginald Archambault⁵ presents one of the clearest statements of the difficulties accompanying Dewey's concept of growth. The following quotation serves to illustrate his view:

3 Ibid., p. 14.

4 Ibid., p. 13.

5 Reginald D. Archambault, Dewey on Education, New York, Random House, 1966, xvii-235 p.

The tendency to insist upon experience alone supplying its own ends, while denying the validity of the admission of external goals, clearly serves as the source of the difficulty in the experimentalists' view in general, and in the thought of Dewey in particular. The inadequacy of this approach can best be exemplified by pointing to the supposedly complete and self-justifying concept of growth as an educational end. In spite of attempted defenses of the view by Dewey and his followers emphasizing the inadequacy of distorted criticisms of the view, we seem left with little in the way of a tangible⁶ criterion which could direct the educative process.

Yet, since Dewey's ideas are widely accepted by educators, it seems irrational to believe that his philosophy is merely a collection of disjointed thoughts. When Dewey's critics suggest that growth can be destructive or malignant they are met with the response that, "the true meaning of growth implies a dynamic process of positive and healthy development."⁷ This response still falls short of presenting a means of distinguishing negative from positive growth. At this point, Archambault introduces the argument that the abandonment of criteria is a rather negative way to view the notion of growth:

In essence, however, insistence upon education to further growth is a negative concept in that it merely calls for the abandonment of imposed goals which might deter the process. We can all admit that nothing must be allowed to interfere with healthy development, but we are still left with the need for establishing a standard for ascertaining exactly what is healthy in a given instance.⁸

6 Ibid., p. 177.

7 Ibid., p. 177.

8 Ibid., p. 177.

The lack of a clear standard of growth leads some students of Dewey to rely heavily on the notion of growth as an ongoing cumulative process that develops on the strength of its own momentum. That is, growth is measured in terms of whether or not it leads to more growth, and it is measured on the basis of its cumulative and ongoing qualities. Although this notion of growth is, to say the least, confusing, a number of themes exist in defense of this view. One is the idea that ends and means must be fused before Dewey's view of growth can be properly understood. Another is that growth is characterized by one's degree of adjustment to his environment. A third view is that growth is necessarily characterized by continual flexibility, variety and change. All of these themes appear to be compatible with Dewey's concept of growth lacking in clearly defined criteria, yet none overcomes the difficulties inherent in the lack of these criteria.

In Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey,⁹ a number of writers comment on a wide variety of concepts of growth. Bertram Morris emphasizes the cumulative nature of growth as found in Dewey's Art as Experience. The following comments give a brief summary of Morris' ideas:

⁹ Jo Ann Boydston, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, xv-396 p.

The art-process easily becomes the paradigm of the educational process. And indeed Dewey defines them both in the same way. 'This cumulative movement of action toward a later result is what is meant by growth.' The only difference is that whereas art has an end, a finality, education has none, since 'there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.'¹⁰

Although the comparison is an interesting one, it seems that the stated difference between art and education with respect to ends is indeed significant.

In the same work, Axtelle and Burnett extend the cumulative theme of growth and education:

Dewey especially emphasizes these points [...] making the principle of continuity the criterion for judging a truly educative experience: Where does the experience lead? What are its potentialities for physical, intellectual, moral growth?¹¹

In Axtelle and Burnett's view of the ongoing nature of growth it appears that their emphasis on physical growth as part of the educative experience is an overstatement of Dewey's position.

¹⁰ Bertram Morris, "Dewey's Theory of Art", Chapter 6 in Guide to the Works of Dewey, p. 164.

A more detailed explanation of the cumulative nature of art can be found in Irwin Edman's "Dewey and Art", Chapter 2, of Sidney Hook's John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, Dial Press, 1950, p. v-383.

¹¹ George Axtelle and Joe Burnett, "Dewey on Education and Schooling", Chapter 10, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 260.

Anticipating criticism of the concept of growth without ends, Axtelle and Burnett say that "one can 'grow'--in a non-Deweyan sense--as a criminal".¹² That is, they recognize that growth can be negative as well as positive, but they assert that only constructive growth properly belongs in Dewey's philosophy. However, a new and serious criticism arises from such a statement of faith in Dewey. Without ends by which to judge the direction of growth, how is one to determine whether such a cumulative process is moving in a positive or a negative direction? Their simple answer is that "it is important to judge progress during interruptions and recoveries rather than judge progress by purported 'ultimate' ends".¹³ If growth has no ultimate ends, at least it must have temporary goals, or failing that, it must be judged by some standards along the course of its development. Yet to make judgments about positive or negative directions in growth, no matter at what point they are made, requires some notion of standards by which to judge. In this sense, Axtelle and Burnett appear to be begging the question in stating that the judgments should be made "during interruptions and recoveries".¹⁴

12 Ibid., p. 263.

13 Ibid., p. 263.

14 Ibid., p. 263.

As if in anticipation of such a criticism, Axtelle and Burnett later present a plethora of criteria for the recognition of Dewey's concept of growth:

What are the characteristics of growth? [..] They are 'flexibility, openness to new insights, new possibilities, hospitality to novelty, to the imaginative and to the creative.' Growth involves, at the same time, 'integrity, balance, proportion, dynamic equilibrium, a unified wholeness of character. It involves the integral expression of all the resources and powers of the self.'¹⁵

Axtelle and Burnett leave the reader hard pressed to understand exactly what is implied by the terms, "balance, proportion, and dynamic equilibrium" and their particular relevance to Dewey's concept of growth.

George Geiger, in his work, John Dewey in Perspective, emphasizes "the continuity of experience and therefore growth", and reiterates the concept of "fusion of ends and means".¹⁶ He states that "growth in education, as in life itself, cannot be a means to any ultimate end except more growth".¹⁷ Departing somewhat from other scholars of Dewey, Geiger rejects the idea that some kinds of growth may be more desirable than

¹⁵ George Axtelle, "John Dewey's Conception of the Religious", as quoted in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 236, from Religious Humanism, No. 1, 1967, p. 66-67.

¹⁶ George Geiger, John Dewey in Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 199.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 199.

other kinds. To admit that this is the case would be to open the door to the problem of what standards are suitable by which to determine those kinds of growth which are more desirable or less desirable. Geiger appears to set this complex problem aside by including as part of Dewey's philosophy only a positive notion of growth: "The growth being understood here is assumed to be full and balanced. It is partial and distorted growth alone that must be rejected."¹⁸ Although most would agree that distorted growth must be rejected, the problem of how to judge what is distorted and what is not comes back to haunt us.

Part of the difficulty in understanding Dewey appears to arise out of his desire to stress the dynamic interrelation between means and ends. The meaning of each becomes obscure in Dewey's writing as he emphasizes the cumulative, ongoing character of growth and education. But neither ends nor means can be fully understood in a logical sense until they have been separated, at least temporarily, so that each can stand for something in its own right. Archambault states the same idea in these words:

18 Ibid., p. 199.

... the emphasis on this practical relation in a live context tends to obscure the logical distinction between means and ends which can and must be differentiated. To say that the two cannot be divorced is only half true, for they must be divorced in imagination if we are to understand the true meaning of the concepts. Ends represent aims, focal points for action--desirable goals which are deserving of attainment and worthy of pursuit.¹⁹

A number of writers comment on Dewey's concept of growth in terms of an adjustment to one's environment. Since the concept of growth lacks clearly defined criteria it is hoped by these writers that the principle of adjustment might fill the void in distinguishing what is growth and what is not. William Brownson²⁰ offers an in-depth study of Dewey's concept of growth in relation to the function of active human habits which work towards the adjustment of the individual to his environment. His thesis presents the following line of argument:

... the analysis of Dewey's concept of habit as a basic unit and as a process of the modification of behavior and experience will provide content, form, and detail to Dewey's concepts of, experience, continuity, interaction, and growth.²¹

19 Archambault, op. cit., p. 178.

20 William Brownson, John Dewey's Concept of Habit and the Dynamics of Growth, Ph. D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1970, vii-292 p.

21 Ibid., p. 4.

And finally, it is in the process of the modification of habits that Dewey's concept of growth gains content.²²

Brownson has relegated the notion of growth to a secondary position as a resultant condition of habit. Thus, growth represents the fulfillment of habit working at its optimum level. In Brownson's terms, the proper function of habit appears to be "the modification of the integration of organism-environmental energies or connections."²³ Put more simply, the proper role of habit would appear to be that of adjustment to one's environment.

Although Brownson recognizes "that Dewey's philosophy is a philosophy of growth",²⁴ in the main, he views growth as an ongoing phenomenon which arises out of "the development of habits of thought and meaning which will be growth-producing rather than growth-restricting".²⁵ In a sense, his view of growth becomes somewhat autological. That is, good habits bring about good growth, and growth requires good habits; but both are contingent upon an integration of "organism-environmental connections",²⁶ or, in short, upon one's

22 Ibid., p. 5.

23 Ibid., p. 53.

24 Ibid., p. 229.

25 Ibid., p. 231.

26 Ibid., p. 53.

adjustment to the environment. In the end, readers of Brownson's work are left with the problem of pondering what criteria may constitute a good or bad adjustment to one's environment.

Irwin Edman also discusses growth in terms of habits.²⁷ Like Brownson he believes that habits which lead to accommodations of the status quo are bad for growth. These he calls habituations to distinguish them from active adjustments or good habits. A simple acceptance of what is, without any active determination for improvement, represents habituation, and the difference between civilized and uncivilized men resides in their attitude and ability towards adjusting their environment rather than being adjusted by their environment. In Edman's terms, "the savage is merely habituated; the civilized man has habits which transform the environment".²⁸

In Edman's view, plasticity is a key concept of Dewey's growth. He has not suggested an adaptability to fixed ends, like the "plasticity of putty or wax" to fit a static condition, but rather, an active "pliable elasticity" which

27 Irwin Edman, John Dewey: His Contribution to the American Tradition, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955, 322 p.

28 Ibid., p. 143.

enables ongoing adjustments to new and changing conditions.²⁹
The outgrowth of Edman's concept of plasticity "is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is useful in coping with the difficulties of a later situation".³⁰

Harold Johnson adds his support to the idea that one's adjustment to the changing conditions of his environment is an indication of growth:

In Dewey's opinion the best training for the future is in general methods and attitudes which will enable a person to adjust himself to changing conditions with confidence and efficiency.³¹

James Gouinlock also suggests that Dewey's growth concept may be characterized as an adjustment process between the individual and his environment: "Quite simply, the process of growth is one in which the organism enhances its ability to participate with its environment ..."³²

While the principle of adjustment may be compatible with Dewey's concept of growth, it appears inadequate as a

29 Ibid., p. 143.

30 Ibid., p. 139.

31 A.H. Johnson, editor, The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey, Boston, Beacon, 1967, p. xxxiii.

32 James Gouinlock, John Dewey's Philosophy of Values, New York, Humanities Press, 1972, p. 238.

standard by which growth can be recognized and understood.

In summary, the lack of clearly defined criteria for Dewey's concept of growth causes difficulty in recognizing and evaluating what Dewey means by the term. Writers who attempt to explain growth in terms of a fusion of means and ends, or as an ongoing and cumulative process, or in terms of an adjustment to one's environment, still fall short of providing an adequate standard by which to explain Dewey's concept of growth. As a result, a wide variety of opinions is held regarding the concept of growth in Dewey's philosophy.

2. Growth as Intellectual, Social, and Moral Development

Certain commentators have attempted to show that the essence of Dewey's concept of growth is contained in his propositions relative to social, moral, and intellectual development. There is however, a paucity of literature regarding the connection of these areas with Dewey's concept of growth in education.

Although Skilbeck associates an extremely wide variety of meanings with the concept of growth, his most frequent references concern growth as "reflective inquiry" or as an "intellectual" process.³³ One's intellectual development is

³³ Skilbeck, op. cit., p. 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 29, 57, and 84.

the means by which growth occurs, and at the same time it represents the product of the growth process.

Brownson associates Dewey's idea of growth with the development and refinement of habits, and indirectly suggests that thinking and intelligence are qualities of growth:

... without taking thought there is limited possibility of the integration of habits, of the guided reconciliation of conflict, or of educative growth.³⁴

The role of the intellect in the development of good habits is also stressed by Edman. One must "learn to learn", and there are "habits of judging and reasoning as truly as of handling a tool, painting a picture, or conducting an experiment".³⁵

Some commentators note that for Dewey, moral and social goals are frequently regarded as synonymous, and one finds that there is considerable overlap in the meaning of the terms social and moral in the literature. A blending of these two terms with the intellectual dimension can be seen in Richard Bernstein's comments:

34 Brownson, op. cit., p. 206, The underlining is the present writer's.

35 Edman, op. cit., p. 143.

Can virtue be taught? Dewey insists that it can, not by imposing a fixed code of values, or communicating a special kind of knowledge, but by nurturing those personal and social dispositions required for making intelligent moral judgments.³⁶

Reginal Archambault believes that Dewey himself came to recognize the lack of firm criteria for growth and education in his own writings. Archambault holds that in time Dewey turned to societal values in an effort to find guiding principles for the growth concept:

Dewey himself seems to recognize the inadequacy of his original experimental approach when he points to the need for the recognition of persistent societal values in order to establish a firmer foundation for judgment, and a basis for direction in the postulation of educational ends.³⁷

Dewey, in his later writings, seems aware of the need for such a standard to serve as a directing force for the educative process.³⁸

If social standards can provide a guide for Dewey's growth concept it is still necessary to determine which values are good for society and which are not.

John Childs explains Dewey's working principle for social good or social morality in terms of consequences:

³⁶ Richard Bernstein, Dewey: On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960, xxxvi p.

³⁷ Archambault, op. cit., p. 178.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 179.

An activity or a thing is to be judged a good--a value--if it makes for further all-round growth. By their fruits in everyday experience--personal and social--they are to³⁹ be known and evaluated and by no other means.

Thus life creates its own sanctions for conduct as it learns to judge consequences. That which makes for a continued growth of flesh and blood human being in their social relations is the end--the end for life and the end for education.⁴⁰

While Child's explanation regarding consequences may provide a working principle for social morality, it appears to beg the question regarding clearly defined criteria for lasting social or moral growth. Bhattacharya puts the question back in its proper perspective in these words:

We may know that certain experienced objects have such and such conditions and consequences. But how does this knowledge alone produce the conviction that we should regulate our desires and enjoyments in one particular way rather than another? Where does this should come from? Can we answer these questions unless we already know or believe certain phases or features of life to be good and desirable?⁴¹

Some writers attempt to bring clarity to Dewey's ideas by comparing them with those of other educators. Elizabeth

39 John Childs, "Educational Philosophy of Dewey", Chapter 14 in Paul Schilpp's The Philosophy of John Dewey, Chicago, Northwestern University, 1939, p. 434.

40 Ibid., p. 434.

41 N.C. Bhattacharya, "Inquiry, Values, and Growth: A Re-Assessment of Dewey's Theory of Valuation", Educational Theory, Winter, 1975, p. 99.

Young shows certain similarities between Dewey and Jerome Bruner, and she suggests that Bruner's interest in cognitive growth may help to give meaning and depth to the Deweyan concept of growth. The following quotation stresses the interrelationship of intellectual, social, and moral dimensions of Dewey's concept of growth.

If Bruner remains today primarily concerned with the cognitive growth of the individual (as opposed to Dewey's more comprehensive interest in total growth--social, moral, physical and intellectual), it is fascinating to watch the manner in which he is coming around to the idea that intellectual growth is inextricably tied to other kinds of development in the child and even to eventual (as well as immediate) interaction of the individual and his society. While Bruner's emphasis is not quite what Dewey's would have been in saying, (as Bruner has now said), "I believe that education is the fundamental method of social change", there are indications that Bruner's pioneering efforts in educational theory and practice may result not from repudiating the dreams of the progressive but from asking the questions they failed to ask, e.g., about the role of cognitive growth and the nature of interaction with society, and from gathering precise experimental data to strengthen the more valid hypotheses. It may be that Bruner and his colleagues will at last be able to rid the air of the concept of "child-centeredness" in its least meaningful, most sentimental sense and to unravel that most mysterious and potentially rich Deweyan idea of "education for growth" by telling us how growth occurs and how we, as educators, may foster it.⁴²

42 Elizabeth Young, "Dewey and Bruner: A Common Ground", in Educational Theory, Volume 22, Winter, 1972, Number 1, p. 68 and 77.

It is apparent in Young's comments that Dewey's view of growth is seen in terms of a multi-dimensional concept.

In summary, the literature concerning intellectual, social, and moral growth is both scarce and lacking in depth. It does suggest that there is no one simple and isolated key to the understanding of Dewey's idea of growth. It seems likely however that a combination of intellectual, social, and moral aspects working together may provide a more adequate basis for understanding Dewey's concept of growth.

3. Growth as Self Development

Some writers suggest that Dewey's principles of social, moral, and intellectual development combine in the ongoing development of self growth. Again, the literature regarding self growth is scant. Nevertheless the idea of self growth seems significant in Dewey's overall concept of growth.

Brownson views growth as a resultant condition of the appropriate reshaping of one's habits. That is, Dewey's concept of self emerges from an ongoing reconstruction of habits:

In this process of the reconstruction of experience growth occurs and the concepts individual, individual mind, self, subject,⁴³ subjective, and personal achieve distinctive meaning.

43 Brownson, op. cit., p. 242.

Brownson also believes that Dewey's notion of self implies that the self interacts with its own society in order that self development may occur.

Communication between individuals is a prerequisite for the development of the possibility of 'communication' within an individual.⁴⁴

In this connection Brownson quotes Dewey's own words with approval in order to illustrate the principle of interaction:

... personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social.⁴⁵

The principle of interaction is also emphasized by Mayeroff⁴⁶ when he refers to Dewey's idea of the adjustment of one's self to the environment in terms of a necessary process for self-unification. Two kinds of adjustment are required for wholesome self growth. "The adjustment is 'passive' when external conditions 'cannot be changed'", and it is necessary to "accommodate" ourselves to the acceptance of the weather or to the colour of our eyes.⁴⁷ The second

44 Ibid., p. 232.

45 Ibid., p. 250. Here Brownson is using Dewey's own words from Experience and Nature, p. 208.

46 Milton Mayeroff, John Dewey's Concept of the Unification of the Self: An Exposition and Critique, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1961, iv-117.

47 Ibid., p. 4.

and more active adjustment occurs when "we modify particular modes of conduct in accordance with the particular state of affairs."⁴⁸ This latter adjustment, Mayeroff describes as an "adaptation"⁴⁹ and both accommodation and adaptation are necessary for self-unification and growth.

Terms such as progress, growth, development and individuality have popular public appeal. Bernstein cautions those who are ready to accept such terms without at least as much critical judgment as Dewey would have exercised in the matter:

We must be careful here; terms like 'development' and 'individuality' are highly emotive and are too often used eulogistically, but Dewey is describing a trait which in itself is morally neutral. Individuality per se is neither good nor bad; the crucial issue is what we do with it.⁵⁰

The comments of Harold Johnson add yet another dimension to Dewey's idea of self growth. Johnson claims that the term growth ought to be regarded in the broadest sense since Dewey is very critical of those who attempt to explain all human behavior in terms of a few, clear-cut, unchanging motives-mastery, hunger or sex. In his opinion

48 Ibid., p. 5.

49 Ibid., p. 5.

50 Bernstein, op. cit., p. xlvi.

the basic urge of an organism is to grow.⁵¹ Johnson refines this "basic urge" somewhat, to that of a social and individual development which is thought to progress most favourably under a democratic political organization:

It follows that each individual should be encouraged to develop his own distinctive capacities in such a fashion as to contribute to the 'all-round growth' not only of himself but also of all other members of society. Democracy is a way of life based on the assumption that human beings are capable of intelligent action--if proper conditions are present.⁵²

One of the everyday truths of teaching which has come to be commonly accepted as a part of the educational process is the recognition of individual differences and individual needs among children. Geiger applies this simple but valuable notion to Dewey's concept of growth as follows:

This interpretation of education as growth, as enrichment of experience, would imply that all persons at all ages are educable, although perhaps not educable in exactly the same way, for each individual has different capacities [..] Each individual must be given full opportunity to exploit himself and his environment so that he actually does grow.⁵³

51 Johnson, op. cit., p. xviii.

52 Ibid., p. xxviii.

53 Geiger, op. cit., p. 200.

John L. Childs also emphasizes the importance of the individual in Dewey's growth process:

The growth of [.] individuals constitutes the supreme moral purpose of a democracy. And just as there is nothing to which this process of growth is relative save more growth, so there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.⁵⁴

Childs is aware however that Dewey himself had serious doubts about children's own ability to select wisely those experiences which would lead to positive growth. The persistent question is, "How is this process of growth to be achieved?"⁵⁵ Childs is aware of Dewey's doubts about placing too much emphasis on children's felt needs and of the gaps in experience that may result from waiting on children's initiative in selecting certain areas of growth and learning:

He [Dewey] has emphasized that what are often asserted to be the present needs and interests of the children are superficially derived from what may have been suggested to them by the radio, the movies, the billboards, the newspapers, or current developments in the life of the family and neighbourhood.⁵⁶

Joseph Ratner also distinguishes between Dewey's idea of individual development and undirected freedom.

54 John L. Childs, "Dewey and Education", Chapter 8 in Sidney Hook's John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, Dial Press, 1950, p. 155.

55 Ibid., p. 156.

56 Ibid., p. 157.

Maturing the powers of the individual "does not mean that the child is to be left to his own devices, so that he may unfold according to the dictates of his own nature".⁵⁷ Ratner believes that for proper individual growth as seen by Dewey education must be geared to the special needs of the learner at each particular stage of his development:

Each phase of growing life has its own distinctive needs, qualities, and powers. The organization of study and the methods of teaching must for each phase be such that the process of learning will satisfy the needs, enrich the qualities, and mature the powers of the individual.⁵⁸

Dewey's stress on the importance of individual stages of growth is compatible with the idea that children exist as beings in their own right. Their progress should not be measured in terms of how closely they approximate adult standards. Edman stresses a positive view of children's immaturity in the process of self growth. Immaturity expressed in this sense represents "the ability to develop".⁵⁹ In a more negative and non-Deweyan sense, immaturity represents merely receptivity, and a "dormant or quiescent" state of the learner, not unlike "the capacity of a quart measure" to be filled with liquid.⁶⁰ Such a negative view of the

57 Joseph Ratner, Education Today, New York, Greenwood Press, 1969. p. xi.

58 Ibid., p. x.

59 Edman, op. cit., p. 136.

60 Ibid., p. 136.

learning process arises out of an inappropriate notion of standards by which to judge what a child is:

Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and growth as something which fills up the gap between the immature and the mature is due to regarding childhood comparatively, instead of intrinsically.⁶¹

This fixes attention upon what the child⁶² has not, and will not have till he becomes a man.

Judgments are wrongly made on a comparison basis between what a child can do and what an adult can do. Even by this criterion, Edman suggests that in certain areas of endeavour the capacity of children may exceed that of adults:

"With respect to sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, and openness of mind, we may say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness."⁶³ Further, Edman elaborates on Dewey's position in his statement that "there is excellent adult authority for the conviction that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as little children."⁶⁴

But the main point at issue here is that judging child growth by adult standards leads to a disregard for the intrinsic worth of the child. It also sets up standards which relate to static ends. The implication is that having arrived at

61 Ibid., p. 136.

62 Ibid., p. 136.

63 Ibid., p. 146.

64 Ibid., p. 136.

adult standards growth has at this point become an accomplished fact.

It is this notion of static ends in self growth that Robert Roth wishes to contest in his work, John Dewey and Self-Realization.⁶⁵ Roth presents Dewey's concept of self growth in terms of an ongoing self--a self that is never quite complete because there is always more to experience, more to learn, and consequently more of the self yet to be developed. In the ongoing process of self-realization Roth stresses the need for "social awareness"⁶⁶ and the important role of "reflective inquiry".⁶⁷ He holds that Dewey's idea of self-realization must be "applied to every phase of human activity"⁶⁸ including education, morals, and social questions. Roth's work indirectly suggests that Dewey's idea of the development of the self may provide a focus for human growth. This idea will form the basis of discussion in Chapter VI of the present research.

In summary, the literature regarding Dewey's concept of self growth expresses the idea that the self is developed

65 Robert Roth, S.J., John Dewey and Self-Realization, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1962, vii-152 p.

66 Ibid., p. 57.

67 Ibid., p. 71.

68 Ibid., p. 72.

through the appropriate reconstruction of one's habits. Interaction with society is required as a catalyst in the growth process although each individual is unique and has his own stages and times of development. The immaturity of childhood should not be measured against adult standards, and immaturity in its most positive sense should be viewed as an opportunity for increased self growth. While individual freedom is needed for growth, adult guidance is required as well. Finally, there is the suggestion that self-realization may provide a focus for Dewey's concept of growth.

4. Statement of the Problem

The literature regarding John Dewey's concept of growth in education is both varied and vague. Both of these qualities appear to originate from a lack of clearly defined and stable criteria in Dewey's own writings. The notion of growth leading simply to more growth is confusing, and it results in a wide variety of ideas regarding what Dewey's concept of growth means.

There is some support in the literature for the proposition that the concept of growth is contained in Dewey's propositions relative to social, moral, and intellectual development. This idea is not developed in depth, however, nor is the particular interrelationship of each

of these traits of growth established in the literature.

The literature also gives a limited degree of support to the proposition that social, moral, and intellectual development combine and culminate in the ongoing development of self growth. Again this idea is not discussed in depth in the literature.

Dewey's belief that growth and education are very similar if not identical processes raises questions regarding the manner in which they are similar. What are the traits which are common to both? How can they be recognized? Dewey's pragmatic emphasis on practical results in growth and education is closely related to his willingness to judge concepts on the basis of what methods actually work best in a given situation. This suggests that an understanding of his concepts of growth in education must take into account Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of growth in the practical reality of the school situation.

In conclusion, the present state of the literature suggests that more research is needed in order that John Dewey's concept of growth in education may be better understood. The writer will attempt to show, through Dewey's works, that the concept of growth is contained in his propositions relative to social, moral, and intellectual development and further, that these three areas of

development combine in the ongoing development of self growth. An attempt will also be made to show Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of growth in the school situation.

CHAPTER II

GROWTH AS EDUCATION AND EDUCATION AS GROWTH

In this chapter the writer will discuss the close relationship that Dewey conceives between growth and education. Since he frequently regards these terms as synonymous, an understanding of his general criteria for education should be helpful in understanding his concepts of growth as well. These criteria will be divided into three main areas: Autonomy in Education, Means and Ends in Education, and Continuous and Cumulative Aspects of Education. These qualities of education pervade his thinking about growth, and they provide an overall perspective from which one can begin to understand the meaning of growth as presented in Dewey's writings.

1. General Concepts of Growth and Education

Many definitions and descriptions of growth and education appear in Dewey's own writings. Since these definitions vary, it would seem wiser to consider a number of them together than to rely too heavily on any one in particular. For example, the statement that "the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their

education"¹ tells the reader very little indeed about the nature of education, and this is especially so when this statement stands by itself. However, when it is understood in the context of education and growth combining as two cumulative and progressive human developmental processes, the statement carries some of the meaning of Dewey's notions about the nature of education. But Dewey does not discipline his writing and perhaps not even his thinking to any one succinct and definitive statement about growth or education. Nevertheless, by considering a number of his statements together one can see that the terms growth, life, and education are frequently used by Dewey to mean one and the same thing:

Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself.²

When it is said that education is development, everything depends upon how development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing is life.³

Realization that life is growth protects us from that so-called idealizing of childhood.⁴

1 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, The Free Press, c. 1916, p. 100.

2 Ibid., p. 53.

3 Ibid., p. 49.

4 Ibid., p. 51.

Education is a mode of life, of action.⁵

Education and growth go hand in hand. Education means growth. Without it there can be no growth except in a purely physical sense.⁶

Through these statements Dewey expresses the view that education, growth, development and even life itself are interchangeable ideas. Occasionally, however Dewey suggests that growth is the end product of education rather than its exact synonym:

Hence education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure⁷ growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age.

... growing, or the continuous reconstruction⁸ of experience is the only end of education .

Getting from the present the degree⁹ and kind of growth there is in it is education.

5 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, New York, Horace Liveright, 1929, p. 75.

6 John Dewey, Lectures in China 1919-1920, edited by Robert Clopton and retranslated from the Chinese by Tsuin-Chen Ou, (no original English versions are in existence, p. 2 of the introduction), Honolulu, University of Hawaii, C. 1973, p. 185.

7 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 51.

8 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Boston, Beacon Press, c. 1920, enlarged edition with new introduction by John Dewey, 1948, p. 184.

9 Ibid., p. 185.

In spite of some ambiguity, for the greater part of his writings Dewey views growth and education as two identical processes. In comparing growth and education to life, Dewey gives the broadest possible meaning to these terms. Unfortunately, such sweeping descriptions leave the reader with the impression that education and growth stand for something positive and all-embracing but these terms are vague and confusing as well.

Dewey presents another definition in Democracy and Education which may be more helpful:

We thus reach a technical definition of education:
It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.¹⁰

Although the definition is tautological, it introduces a new concept of education as a series of life experiences which requires continual refinement and reworking in order to become more meaningful. Or, in Dewey's words, "... the ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience."¹¹

10 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 76.

11 Ibid., p. 76.

An additional concept of experience is that "a genuinely educative experience, then, one in which instruction is conveyed and ability increased, is contradistinguished from a routine activity on one hand, and a capricious activity on the other."¹² This implies that the reorganizing and reconstruction process of growth and education requires a degree of reflective or cognitive development. That is, true growth does not happen accidentally nor without thought. This view will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V of the present research, but it may be sufficient to say at this time that the theme of cognitive growth, and its connections with experience, pervades Dewey's writings from his early works to his later major works. Consider the following quotation from Psychology, as early as 1887:

In the first place, perception or knowledge of particular things is not a passive operation or impression, but involves the active integration of various experiences. It is a process of reaching out after the fullest and richest experiences possible.¹³

12 Ibid., p. 76.

13 Jo Ann Boydston, textual editor, The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Psychology, 1887, Vol. 2, Carbondale, Southern Illinois, Feffer and Simons, 1967, p. 138.

In his later writings John Dewey deals with experience principally in Experience and Nature, 1929, and Experience and Education, 1938.

It is clear that Dewey does not claim that every experience can be considered educative even if the experience has the potential of being rich and full in itself. It must be refined and reconstructed within the life and growth of the individual. Furthermore, some experiences are so restrictive that they work against the educative process:

Experience and education cannot be directly related to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.¹⁴

Although growth and education may be synonymous and interchangeable terms, clearly, experience must be qualified if it is to become a part of the growth and educative process. Firstly, it must be experience of a certain type, and secondly, it must be reconstructed through a reflective process that involves the individual as an active participant in the growth process. These two qualifications of experience provide a key to a better understanding of Dewey's concept of growth, and it will be necessary to return to a more detailed consideration of them both later in this research.

¹⁴ John Dewey, Experience and Education, London, Collier Macmillan, c. 1938, p. 25.

Dewey believes that "education is all one with growing",¹⁵ and his main criteria for recognizing the educative process serve as guides to a better understanding of the qualifications which govern growth as well. According to Dewey, three of the more important qualities of education are as follows: Education is autonomous, and thus it has no end beyond itself. Secondly and consequently, there is a blending of means and ends so that the processes and the products of education are intermixed. Thirdly, the intermixing of means and ends suggests a continuous or cumulative nature to education. These three factors, autonomy, fusion of means and ends, and continuity, permeate Dewey's notions about growth as well as about education.

2. Autonomy in Education

In Dewey's view, the concept of autonomy in education means that education should be self-directing and self-governing: "Education is autonomous and should be free to determine its own ends, its own objectives."¹⁶ It is clear from this statement that ends in education are taken to mean

¹⁵ John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 53.

¹⁶ John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, New York, Liveright, c. 1929, p. 74.

objectives, goals, and aims, and that these objectives should be chosen from within the jurisdiction of education itself. The term autonomy means self-direction, and particularly self-direction in regard to the selection of objectives or aims. Aims, goals, and objectives are taken by Dewey to be synonymous with ends.

Dewey is reluctant to profess fixed and absolute truths. His inclination toward change and growth in education leads him to believe that education should seek out its own aims and that it should be self-directing:

I believe that to set up any end outside of education as furnishing its goal and standard, is to deprive the educational process of much of its meaning and tends to make us rely upon false, and external stimuli in dealing with the child.¹⁷

Dewey persists in proclaiming the autonomy of education and develops this notion further in his most popular work, Democracy and Education:

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.¹⁸

17 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, 1897, as quoted from M.S. Dworkin's Dewey on Education, New York, Columbia University, 1967, p. 27.

18 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 49-50.

Dewey's view of society and the larger environment which exists beyond the school is that it too should reject fixed and unchanging truths. Ideally, the values of the school and of society should be compatible. The common enemy of both, in his view, is rigid and external goals:

... static adjustment of a fixed environment, and rigidity of habit, are all connected with a false idea of growth or development,-- that it is a movement toward a fixed goal. Growth is regarded as having an end, instead of being an end.¹⁹

The notion of growth "being an end" is somewhat perplexing, and one's natural inclination is to look for some further directions or values on which to secure the concept so that it may take on meaning both in theory and in the practical world. Apparently Dewey does not see this as a problem when he writes as follows:

Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.²⁰

Accepting this view in its most serious and literal sense would imply that most of what has been studied concerning aims and values by students of history, philosophy and comparative education would have been an idle and

19 Ibid., p. 50.

20 Ibid., p. 51.

useless waste of time. The logical conclusion of Dewey's statement is that no criteria could be brought to bear on the process of education, no judgments could be made, and no lessons can be learned from past or present efforts. Yet Dewey persists in the view that "since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself."²¹ Not only is education regarded as autonomous, but growth too is autonomous, for Dewey clearly states, "We have laid it down that the educative process is a continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth."²² It should be noted that Dewey is advocating more than a search for goals within education. He is actively excluding goals which lie outside the educative process:

In our search for aims in education, we are not concerned, therefore, with finding an end outside of the educative process to which education is subordinate. Our whole conception forbids. [sic]²³

21 Ibid., p. 53.

22 Ibid., p. 53.

23 Ibid., p. 100. Dewey's purposeful avoidance of external aims will be discussed in Section 3. A detailed account of his criticism of external aims can be found in Chapter 8, "Aims in Education", p. 100-110 of Democracy and Education.

Dewey regards the setting up of aims and values both inside and outside of education as a hazardous pursuit. He has an abiding faith that nature and everyday experiences present individuals with certain limitations and opportunities that necessarily give direction to their lives. Through reflection on the consequences which nature brings upon him, man learns by his experiences.

Dewey is fearful that in an effort to establish goals, "the philisopher erects a 'realm of values' in which to place all the precious things which are extruded from natural existence because of isolations artificially introduced."²⁴ Whether inside or outside of education, the matter of establishing values is a task rife with difficulties and one which requires a recognition of the following guidelines:

It must recognize that limits, closures, ends are experimentally or dynamically determined, presenting, like the boundaries of political individuals or states, a moving adjustment of various energy-systems in their cooperative and competitive interactions, not something belonging to them in their own right.²⁵

In this sense autonomy in education is not so much a separation of education from other facets of life as it is a

²⁴ John Dewey, Experience and Nature, New York, Dover, c. 1929, p. 394.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 395.

recognition of its need to be in harmony with life, nature and experience. For example, a child's reward for school work well done should be found within the experience itself:

Rewards and high marks are at best artificial aims to strive for; they accustom children to expect to get something²⁶ besides the value of the product of work they do.

The intrinsic rewards of education are always to be in close harmony with the process of education and to fulfill this expectation one would need to regard the activity or process as of prime importance, since education is not looked upon as providing extrinsic rewards. For Dewey the notion of autonomy in education has little or no meaning unless it is understood in the context of an ongoing process in which means and ends are fused, and continual reassessment of both occurs:

To see what is going on and to observe the results of what goes on so as to see their further consequences in the process of growth, and so on indefinitely, is the only way in which the value of what takes place can be judged. To look to some outside source to provide aims is to fail²⁷ to know what education is as an ongoing process.

Two main conclusions emerge from Dewey's insistence on complete autonomy for education. The first is that the

26 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, New York, Dutton, c. 1915, p. 297.

27 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 74-75.

notions of growth and education are so intermixed that growth, too, requires autonomy. The second is that autonomy does not imply separation from society or the larger environment so much as it implies a harmony with it. While growth and education are self-directing, they must, at the same time, be at one with life and everyday experiences.

3. Means and Ends in Education

Because Dewey is reluctant to separate means and ends in education, it is difficult to make clear-cut distinctions in meaning between the two. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity the following distinctions can be made: "Means" refers to methods or processes in education, and the term "ends" is used synonymously with objectives in education. Thus, ends or objectives in education would include goals and aims in education as well. These distinctions seem lucid enough until one considers some of the statements of Dewey in which the meanings become fused:

Means and ends are two names for the same reality. The terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment [...]. 'End' is a name for a series of acts taken collectively--like the term army. 'Means' is a name for the same series taken distributively--like this soldier, that officer.²⁸

28 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York, Modern Library, c. 1922, p. 35.

It is apparent that, in Dewey's mind, distinctions between means and ends are not helpful ways of viewing life experiences. Yet, certain inferences about the means or methods he approves can be drawn from his writings. Frequently, he discusses means in terms of "activity", "process" and "change".²⁹

In spite of his reluctance to separate means and ends, Dewey apparently holds strong views as to which means and ends are acceptable and which are not. Consider the following comment regarding education:

As traditionally conducted, it [education] strikingly exhibits a subordination of the living present to a remote and precarious future. To prepare, to get ready, is its key-note [..] If education were conducted as a process of fullest utilization of present resources, liberating and guiding capacities that are now urgent, it goes without saying that the lives of the young³⁰ would be much richer in meaning than they are now.

His emphasis lies not on the past nor the future, but upon the here and now, and this strong emphasis on the present appears to rule out any far-reaching or long-term goals.

29 John Dewey, "Reconstruction as Affecting Social Philosophy", Chap. VIII, in Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 187-213; "Process and Product" in Chap. XIX, How We Think, p. 285; Experience and Nature, p. 47-50; "Criteria of Experience", Chap. 3 in Experience and Education, p. 33-50.

30 Ibid., p. 248.

As soon as a new end or goal is reached, it in turn immediately becomes a means which conditions still further new ends yet to be reached. To represent the tentative nature of ends, Dewey uses the term, "end in view".³¹

His reluctance to view any end as final can be illustrated from his own example of a man who sets about the task of constructing a new house:

We must not confuse the act of building with the house when built. The latter is a means, not a fulfillment. But it is such only because it enters into a new activity which is present not future. Life is continuous. The act of building in time³² gives way to the acts connected with a domicile.

Dewey's emphasis on the importance of present activity seems clear enough. However, there are times when his writing includes some different and apparently contradictory standards by which to evaluate means and ends. For example,

31 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 105; Experience and Education, p. 67; Experience and Nature, p. 101; How We Think, Boston, Heath, c. 1933, p. 17; Human Nature and Conduct, p. 209; Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, New York, Holt, 1938, p. 77; Philosophy in Education, p. 257; Theory of the Moral Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, c. 1908, p. 101; The Quest for Certainty, New York, Putman's, c. 1929, p. 244; The School and Society, Chicago, University Press, c. 1900, p. 16.

32 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 248.

the following passage seems more future oriented than concerned with the present:

Change becomes significant of new possibilities and ends to be attained; it becomes prophetic of a better future. Change is associated with progress /growth/ rather than with lapse and fall. Since changes are going on anyway, the great thing is to learn enough about them so that we be able to lay hold of them and turn them in the direction of our desires.³³

In this passage it is more likely that Dewey is emphasizing the need for flexibility in means and ends than the need to set out far-reaching goals for the future. In other words, "an aim must, then, be flexible; it must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances."³⁴

Thus far, certain qualities of means and ends emerge. These are flexibility, emphasis on activity and emphasis on the present. Dewey claims that as far as education is concerned, "the aim, in short, is experimental, and hence constantly growing as it is tested in action."³⁵ Furthermore, "strictly speaking, not the target but hitting the target is the end in view ..."³⁶ There are suggestions in his writings, however, that the destination of education

33 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 116, (the underlining is the present writer's).

34 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 104.

35 Ibid., p. 105.

36 Ibid., p. 105.

is not always reached through a vigorous pursuit of activity for activity's sake:

In learning, the present powers of the pupil are the initial stage; the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit. Between the two lie means--that is middle conditions--acts to be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be used. Only through them, in the literal time sense, will the initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation.³⁷

In this quotation one can see a break, at least temporarily, in the proclaimed unity of means and ends. The remote aims of the teacher represent a goal distinct from the pupil, and for a time, from the active means required to pursue the goal. A further indication that aims are significant to Dewey, apart from means, can be seen in his concentration on the importance of consequences. In this context, consequences are taken to mean results as an action. He deplores rational, moral, social or other systems which disregard consequences.³⁸ In the final analysis, consequences are the only justification of means. Merely "hitting the target"³⁹ or taking an active journey through the educational process is not in itself sufficiently good reason to judge the process as a worthwhile journey. The importance of consequences will be discussed further in

37 Ibid., p. 127.

38 Ibid., p. 347.

39 Ibid., p. 105.

subsequent chapters of this research, but the main point at issue here is that consequences are of utmost importance to Dewey. Without them he could not judge the means he proposes. Thus, in terms of human progress, "a relationship of cause-effect has been transformed into one of means-consequences."⁴⁰ It is unfortunate that he is reluctant to set out clearly his criteria for worthwhile ends, but it seems apparent that his philosophical system depends upon his private view of which consequences are good and which are bad. In his disinclination towards clearly defined aims, he is hesitant to state any at all. Yet he is equally disinclined to accept all means and all ends as unequivocally worthwhile. His opposition towards fixed ends is prevalent in his major works. The following excerpts illustrate the point:

It [a philosopher's realm of values] must recognize that limits, closures, ends are experimentally or dynamically determined, presenting, like the boundaries of political individuals or states, a moving adjustment of various energy-systems in their co-operative and competitive interactions, not something belonging to them in their own right.⁴¹

Liberation from a fixed scheme of ends made modern science possible.⁴²

40 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 371.

41 Ibid., p. 395.

42 Ibid., p. 150.

Fixed forms and ends, let us recall, mark fixed limits to change. Hence they make futile all human efforts to produce and regulate change except within narrow and unimportant limits. They paralyze constructive human inventions by a theory⁴³ which condemns them in advance to failure.

The ongoing quality of ends pervades Dewey's thinking. Each end or goal as it comes close to one's grasp appears to recede into an endless series of yet further ends:

'Endless ends' is a way of saying that there are no ends⁴⁴--that is, no fixed self-enclosed finalities.

We must know that the dependence of ends upon means is such that the only ultimate result is the result that is attained today, tomorrow, the next day, and day after⁴⁵ day, in the succession of years and generations.

So intent is Dewey upon emphasizing this quality of ends that his terminology regarding what is final and what is temporary becomes confusing. The following truism is a case in point: "There is no such thing as a fixed and final set of objectives, even for the time being or temporarily."⁴⁶ Further, the above statement appears to run counter to Dewey's frequently proclaimed position that it is necessary to operate on the basis

43 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 70.

44 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 395.

45 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, New York, Putman's, 1939, p. 176.

46 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 75.

of "ends in view".⁴⁷

In spite of this ambiguity, Dewey's overall view is that ends are ongoing, flexible, and subject to change. In terms of educational growth, "maturation and fixation are polar opposites."⁴⁸ Hence, Dewey concludes that "the philosophy of education neither originates nor settles ends. It occupies an intermediate and instrumental or regulative place."⁴⁹

Dewey is not always so hesitant about pursuing definite ends. In his early writings he sees the close inter-relationship of means and ends. Precisely because of this relationship he believes that only through clearly defined aims can the methods (means) take on importance and meaning:

If we are to reach an end we must take certain means; while so far as we want an undefined end, an end in general, conditions which accompany it are mere accidents [..] If when starving, I am to live I must steal a dinner, but, having stolen, the logical but unsympathetic judge may question the relevancy (that is, the necessity) of my end, and thus cut the ground out from under the necessity of my means. My end requires its justification, the establishing of its validity, before the necessity of the means is anything more than hypothetical.⁵⁰

47 Vide footnote 31.

48 John Dewey, Art as Experience, New York, Putman, c. 1934, p. 41.

49 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 56.

50 John Dewey, "The Superstition of Necessity", Monist, III, April, 1893, p. 373, as quoted by Jo Ann Boydston, general editor, The Early Works of John Dewey, 1893-1894, Early Essays and the Study of Ethics, Vol. IV, Carbondale, Southern Illinois, Feffer and Simons, 1971, p. 30.

Again: end, if it means anything, signifies the fulfilling of purpose, the realizing of an idea [...]
The end, in any intelligible sense, must be a unity which binds together every event, every existence [...]
It can be only an idea, a spiritual, [sic] an ideal unity of purpose and meaning.⁵¹

In his early writings, Dewey was somewhat equivocal about the importance of final ends. The following statements suggest that ends may be of less import to the scientist and the teacher than they were to the philosopher or the theologian.

The conception of end, therefore, has no place in the lexicon of the physicist. It is consistent only with a teleological interpretation of the world; one which sees it as the embodiment of reason and the manifestation of intelligent purpose.⁵²

I believe that the teacher's business is simply to determine on the basis of larger experience and riper wisdom, how the discipline of life shall come to the child.⁵³

At other times, Dewey regards the matter of clearly defined ends as having equal importance to both the scientist and the philosopher.

⁵¹ John Dewey, "Ethics and Physical Science", Andover Review, VII, June, 1887 as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1888, Vol. I, p. 223.

⁵² Ibid., p. 223-224. For a more complete discussion of the need for definite, clearly thought out ends see Vol. IV, p. 30-36 and Vol. V, p. 134-135.

⁵³ John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, 1897, as quoted from Martin S. Dworkin's Dewey on Education, p. 24.

All knowledge is one. It is all of God, the universe, say rather of God; and if any set of facts are regarded as something in themselves, out of all relation to God and God's creatures, it is no knowledge. The whole world of nature and history is worthless except as it is brought into relation with man's nature and activities; and that science or philosophy is worthless which does not ultimately bring every fact into guiding relation with the living activity of man, and the end of all his striving--approach to God.⁵⁴

This earlier point of view, which stressed the need for definitive ends, does not really run counter to Dewey's notion in the assessment of worthwhile methods. Indeed it supports it. Unfortunately, ends are frequently obscured in Dewey's writings. These ends which relate to Dewey's concept of growth in education will be discussed in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI. But for now, a further consideration of Dewey's more general goals for education seems in order. Again, Dewey does not discipline his thinking towards one absolute goal. The following quotations represent an overview of those rather diversified concepts which come close to representing final ends:

Growth itself is the only moral 'end'.⁵⁵

... growing, or the continuous reconstruction of experience is the only end.⁵⁶

54 John Dewey, "The Obligation to Knowledge of God", Student's Christian Association, University of Michigan, Nov. 1884, as quoted in Jo Ann Boydston's The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. I, p. 62.

55 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 177.

56 Ibid., p. 184.

Frequently Dewey's suggestions for educational growth center on intellectual ends.

Only when ends are closing termini of intelligent operations of thinking are they ends in the honorific sense.⁵⁷

As the means of the general institution of intelligent action, it⁵⁸ [education] holds the key to orderly reconstruction.

At other times Dewey suggests that the development of one's personality and individuality are central to the growth process.

Aims, ideals, do not exist simply in 'mind'; they exist in character, in personality and action.⁵⁹

The child is the starting-point, the center, and the end. His development, his growth, is the ideal. It alone furnishes the standard. To the growth of the child all studies are subservient; they are instruments⁶⁰ valued as they serve the needs of growth.

In spite of such a strong child-centered philosophy, Dewey is apprehensive about the methods employed in the progressive schools of his day. He sees a need for teachers to be leaders in the sense that they should set forth well thought out objectives:

57 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 243.

58 Ibid., p. 252.

59 John Dewey, A Common Faith, New Haven, Yale, c. 1934, p. 48.

60 John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, Chicago, University Press, c. 1902, p. 9.

... the teacher, as the member of the group having the riper and fuller experience and the greater insight into the possibilities of continuous development found in any suggested project, has not only the right but the duty to suggest lines of activity, and to show that there need not be any fear of adult imposition provided the teacher knows children as well as subjects [...].⁶¹

Further indications of Dewey's varied aims for education are represented in these statements:

Education must have a tendency, if it is education, to form attitudes.⁶²

For it is the main business of the family and the school to influence directly the formation of growth of attitudes and⁶³ dispositions, emotional, intellectual and moral.

Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future consequences to present conditions. And these traits are just⁶⁴ what is meant by having an aim or a purpose.

Since education is not a means to a living, [...], the only ultimate value which can be⁶⁵ set up is just the process of living itself.

The following comparison of traditional versus progressive educational aims is meant by Dewey to convey the superiority of progressive schools:

61 John Dewey, Progressive Education, Vol. V, 1928, p. 201, as quoted in M.S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, p. 124.

62 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education, p. 56.

63 Ibid., p. 62.

64 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 103.

65 Ibid., p. 240.

To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; to learning from texts and teachers, learning through experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill, is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.⁶⁶

I admit gladly that the new education is simpler in principle than the old. It is in harmony with principles of growth [...]⁶⁷

It is not the subject per se that is educative or that is conducive to growth. There is no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it.⁶⁸

These statements indicate part of Dewey's thinking about general educational aims. In his later works he shows an increasing awareness of mounting criticism which is levelled at the lack of definite, clear-cut objectives for education. The following rather lengthy quotation represents an attempt on his part to deal with the criticism; however, it appears to this writer that Dewey is more convinced than convincing:

66 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 19-20.

67 Ibid., p. 30.

68 Ibid., p. 46.

... The objection made is that growth might take many different directions: a man, for example, who starts out on a career of burglary may grow in that direction, and by practice may grow into a highly expert burglar. Hence it is argued that "growth" is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which growth takes place, the end towards which it tends. Before, however, we decide that the objection is conclusive we must analyze the case a little further.

That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, or as a corrupt politician, cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as education and education as growth the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasion, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines? I shall leave you to answer these questions, saying simply that when and only when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing. For the conception is one that must find universal and not specialized limited application.⁶⁹

The original problem of direction of growth remains unanswered in this explanation. In another work, Dewey acknowledges this self-made dilemma when he says, "We have just pointed out the futility of trying to establish the aim of education--some one final aim which subordinates all

69 Ibid., p. 36.

others to itself."⁷⁰ In any case, even if he were able to settle on one or more final aims, he would not be content to identify these ends in isolation from the means through which they could be achieved. For John Dewey, "the problem of philosophy concerns the interaction of our judgments about ends to be sought with knowledge of the means for achieving them."⁷¹ In terms of understanding means and ends, "the great evil lies in separating instrumental and final functions."⁷²

Since Dewey is reluctant to view means and ends separately, it is with even greater hesitation that this writer attempts to make a distinction between these two notions. In the preceding pages ends have been discussed in general terms and more specific ends will be dealt with in the following chapters. A brief overview of means seems now in order.

In their generic sense, Dewey's means or methods for education can be described as experimental. Since clearly defined objectives are obscure in his philosophy, the means

70 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 111.

71 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 37.

72 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 205.

also lack guiding principles. Consequently the means employed are adjusted on an ad hoc basis according to the consequences that arise from educational activities. This trial-and-error method requires an openness towards change and a flexibility of attitudes on the part of both the teacher and the learner.

The importance of both first-hand experience and the experimental approach can be found in most of Dewey's writings about education. The following statements are representative:

Our first teachers in natural philosophy are our feet, hands, and eyes. To substitute books for them does not teach us to reason; it teaches us to use the reason of others rather than our⁷³ own; it teaches us to believe much and know little.

... there is an intimate and necessary relation between the⁷⁴ processes of actual experience and education.

One discovery leads to another, and the interest of pursuit leads the child of his own accord into investigations that often amount to severe intellectual discipline. Following this path of natural growth, the child is led into reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, etc., by his own desire to know.⁷⁵

73 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of To-morrow, New York, Dutton, c. 1915, p. 11.

74 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 20.

75 Ibid., p. 21.

.... let me say that reference to experience seems at present to be the easiest way of realizing the continuities among subject-matters,⁷⁶ that are always getting split up into dualisms.

... every complete act of reflective inquiry⁷⁷ makes provision for experimentation.

Although experience and experimentation are not identical terms, both are closely connected with activity. It is Dewey's belief that education is necessarily accompanied by activity in some form:

It is left to the teacher to insure his [the pupil's] mental attendance by a sound appeal to his active interests.⁷⁸

Our first conclusion is that interest [in learning]⁷⁹ means a unified activity.

It is not the business of the school to transport youth from an environment of activity into one of cramped study of the records of other men's learning; but to transport them from an environment of relatively chance activities [...] into one of activities⁸⁰ selected with reference to guidance of learning.

76 John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, New York, Dover, 1953, p. 71.

77 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 188.

78 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, Cambridge, Riverside Press, c. 1913, p. viii.

79 Ibid., p. 15.

80 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 274.

John Dewey's propensity towards activity and change in education necessitates a flexibility of attitudes on the part of the learner. A continual reassessment of the role of habits in learning is required so that one might be freed from those habits which work against the educative process. In everyday conversation, habits are frequently associated with repetitive behavior, fixed attitudes, and excesses in drinking, smoking, gambling and swearing. It is Dewey's view that by taking thought and by exercising one's freedom of choice, it is possible to develop constructive habits. In other words, "the view that habits are formed by sheer repetition puts the cart before the horse."⁸¹ Habits should be formed instead by an act of conscious choice; then in time, good choices can lead to good habits:

Our reflective judgment of the good, needs an ally outside of reflection. Habit is such an ally. And habits are not maintained, save by exercise; they are not self-generated.⁸²

⁸¹ John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1938, p. 32.

⁸² John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1908, p. 53.

For a more detailed consideration of Dewey's concept of "habit" see William Brownson's John Dewey's Concept of Habit and the Dynamics of Growth, unpublished doctoral thesis, Stanford University, 1970, p. vii-292.

The methods involved in Dewey's concept of education include first-hand experience, experimentalism, flexibility and continual reassessment of habitual behavior patterns. These are very general methods and it is only when he becomes more specific in his aims that one can detect more specific methods as well. It is important to keep in mind that Dewey finds that separating means from ends tends to detract from the meaning of both. In the philosophy of Dewey the union of both represents a cumulative or continuous dimension in growth and education: "The growth and development of any living organism from seed to maturity illustrates the meaning of continuity."⁸³

4. Continuous and Cumulative Aspects of Education

By combining the notion of means and ends Dewey hopes to overcome two important problems which exist in traditional education. The first is the difficult task of setting out clearly defined goals for education; the second is the avoidance of overly authoritative and dogmatic methods which tend towards indoctrination in support of fixed educational goals. One of the results of this combination of means and

⁸³ John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1938, p. 23.

ends is the concept of a flexible continuity between the two. Dewey has an optimistic faith that the continual flexibility and interchange between means and ends will enhance the process of educational growth. As new "ends-in-view"⁸⁴ are reached, these in turn are used to provide guidelines for still newer methods which lead to yet more advanced ends in view. It is Dewey's belief that this ascending spiral of interchanging means and ends leads upwards in a cumulative process to greater and greater educational achievement. "Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral".⁸⁵ In a generic sense, Dewey relates these continuous and cumulative aspects of education to a self-generating, life-long process:

When we say that a person is educated, we do not mean to imply that he has ceased to grow, but rather that he has been educated to the stage at which he can and will take the initiative in the future development of his capacities and interests.⁸⁶

Dewey believes that the "main purpose of elementary education [..] is the cultivation of basic abilities, techniques, and habits which will affect the course of subsequent

84 Vide footnote 32, p. 44.

85 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 77.

86 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 197-198.

development."⁸⁷ When conclusions or ends are achieved in education these achievements do not stand on their own merits. They are connected to the means by which they are accomplished:

If a conclusion is reached it is that of a movement of anticipation and cumulation, one that finally comes to a completion. A 'conclusion' is no separate and independent thing; it is the consummation of a movement.⁸⁸

Two principles, experience and consequences, are thought to give direction to the ongoing process of education. Dewey writes voluminously about experience.⁸⁹ Perhaps his simplest view of experience and educational growth can be found in his early writings:

The baby's knowledge is not a thing which occurs all at once, but is a matter of gradual growth. The first years of childhood are spent, not so much in knowing things, as in getting experiences which may be brought to bear in the future, and thus enable him to know. [..] Knowledge is an acquired product, due to the possibility of connecting present experiences with past.⁹⁰

87 Ibid., p. 261.

88 John Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 38. A more detailed explanation of the relationship of the continuous and cumulative nature of growth through experience can be found in Chapter 3, "Having an Experience", p. 35-57.

89 John Dewey, Experience and Education; Art as Experience; "Experience and Abstraction" in The Sources of a Science of Education, Chapter I, p. 16-21; "Experience and Thinking" in Democracy and Education, Chapter II, p. 139-151; "Changed Conceptions of Experience and Reason", in Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 77-102; How We Think, p. 201-202; The Quest for Certainty, p. 194-195; Experience and Nature; "Nature in Experience" in Philosophy of Education, p. 193-210.

90 John Dewey, Psychology, 1887 as found in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. II, p. 81.

Thus, if experience is to have a useful function, it must provide opportunity for continuity and cumulative development. Dewey recognizes that not every experience satisfies these criteria, and that some experiences are "mis-educative".⁹¹ It is necessary for Dewey in his later works to explain how some experiences can be regarded as "mis-educative" when at the same time he claims that there are no fixed ends towards which education is to develop. Without some ends or standards by which to judge education how can the term "mis-educative" have meaning? Dewey's answer lies in setting out guiding principles for experience itself.⁹² He believes that proper experiences necessarily lead to worthwhile activities within the educational process. In order to explain which experiences are educative he uses new phrases such as "the experimental continuum",⁹³ "a coherent theory of experience",⁹⁴ "the category of continuity",⁹⁵

91 Vide footnote, 14, p. 35.

92 John Dewey, "The Need of a Theory of Experience", Chapter 2, and "Criteria of Experience", Chapter 3, in Experience and Education, p. 25-50.

93 Ibid., p. 28.

94 Ibid., p. 30.

95 Ibid., p. 33.

"reconstruction of experience",⁹⁶ and "the two principles of continuity and interaction".⁹⁷ But in the end Dewey comes to the admission that "the principles of the continuity of experience" lead to varying degrees of growth and educational achievement:

There is no paradox in the fact that the principle of the continuity of experience may operate so as to leave a person arrested on a low plane of development, in a way which limits later capacity for growth.⁹⁸

Apparently having the right kind of experiences does not in itself guarantee educational growth.

In order to further qualify the proper experiences for growth, Dewey introduces an additional criterion of consequences. The results or consequences of one's actions might provide guiding principles for further actions. Since Dewey rejects fixed and enduring aims, consequences are not associated with long-term results. In keeping with the continuity of means and ends Dewey uses yet another term: "means-consequences".⁹⁹ Using this term, "a relationship of cause-effect is transformed into one of means-

96 Ibid., p. 47.

97 Ibid., p. 44.

98 Ibid., p. 37-38.

99 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 371. See also "The Means-Consequence Relation and its Educational Significance", p. 146-148 in How We Think.

consequences".¹⁰⁰ That is, there are no real aims as such but a series of consequences of one's actions which are meant to give guidance for further actions. The worth of each action is tested by the results it brings about rather than by an enduring principle or long-term goal. In this sense, present actions are always experimental, and they are judged by their immediate consequences:

To see what is going on and to observe the results of what goes on so as to see their further consequences in the process of growth, and so on indefinitely, is the only way in which the value of what takes place can be judged. To look to some outside source to provide aims is to fail to know what education is as an ongoing process.¹⁰¹

Not all consequences of all actions are good or desirable. It is apparent that Dewey recognizes this fact, but that he fails to see that it makes his principle of means-consequences vulnerable to the question of what standards can be used to judge good or bad results:

We may sum up by stating that things gain meaning when they are used as means to bring about consequences (or as means to prevent the occurrence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we have to discover means. The relation of means-consequences is the center and heart of all understanding.¹⁰²

100 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 371.

101 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 75.

102 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 146.

If this principle is "the center and heart of all understanding" there ought to be some standards by which to view the results and give cohesion and direction to Dewey's philosophy.

5. Summary

The following points represent an overview of Dewey's concepts of growth as education and education as growth. Firstly, growth and education are interchangeable ideas. Frequently other terms such as life, experiencing, and development are used as synonyms of growth and education, but the two latter terms are used, with very few exceptions, in a manner that makes their meaning identical. In Dewey's mind, growth is education and education is growth. Secondly, both growth and education are autonomous. They have no raison d'être beyond their inherent value. As such, their prime purpose is expressed in the actions of further growing and further educating. Thirdly, the ends (aims) of both growth and education are flexible and intermixed with the means (methods). Both means and ends are characterized by change and activity. They are thought to be unified because of their close interaction and interdependence. Because of its transient nature, an aim is called an end-in-view. Fourthly, growth and education are on-going processes, where the intermixing of means and

ends leads to new means and ends. This process is regarded as both continuous and cumulative in nature. The ongoing process is considered to be enhanced and guided through proper experience by close attention to consequences. The criteria for experience are interaction and continuity. Consequences are immediate results of actions, and they provide feedback by which to judge the value of the means taken. In Dewey's view, this immediate interaction between means and results is represented by the term, means-consequences.

In conclusion, Dewey's concept of growth appears to lack clearly defined and stable criteria. Certain traits of growth do exist in Dewey's writings however and it is the purpose in this present research to seek out Dewey's traits for growth in education and to present them in the following chapters. These include Dewey's propositions relative to social, moral and intellectual development and they include the combination of these traits in the ongoing development of self growth.

CHAPTER III

GROWTH AS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter Dewey's view of social growth as an important educational aim will be discussed. The term "social" refers to the obligations and privileges which the individual has in his associations with other people. In Dewey's words, "... a society is a number of people held together because they are working along common lines in a common spirit, and with reference to common aims".¹ The first section of the chapter will be concerned with Dewey's view of social aims in their generic sense. The second section will deal with the necessity of social awareness in educational development as seen by Dewey, and in the third section, Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of social development in schools will be considered.

1. Social Aims in Education

While Dewey states that "there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth",² in order to

¹ John Dewey, The School and Society, Chicago, University Press, c. 1900, p. 14.

² John Dewey, Democracy and Education, New York, The Free Press, c. 1916, p. 100.

understand his concept of growth it is necessary to analyse it in more detail. One of the main areas of growth in education is that of social development. The following statements serve to illustrate the importance that Dewey places on social aims in education:

The growth of the child in the direction of social capacity and service, his larger and more vital union with life, become the unifying aim; and discipline, culture, and information fall into place as phases of this growth.³

... the primary business of school is to train children in co-operative and mutually helpful living; to foster in them⁴ the consciousness of mutual interdependence [...]

I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race.⁵

... fruitful and creative participation in society is the end at which we aim education; the child as he is when he comes to us is the point from which to start; and the school is the bridge linking the child and his society. The business of education is to help the child walk across the bridge and become a useful, contributing member of his society.⁶

3 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 92.

4 Ibid., p. 117. In this quotation Dewey recognizes his indebtedness to Froebel's educational principles.

5 John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed", in The School Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, January, 1897, p. 77-80, as quoted by Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, p. 19.

6 John Dewey, Lectures in China, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, c. 1973, p. 198.

In these statements Dewey claims that social development is the primary and unifying aim for education. It is the proper focus towards which all education ought to proceed.

Dewey's admonition to teachers expresses a similar view:

So obvious, indeed, is the necessity of teaching and learning for the continued existence of a society that,⁷ we may seem to be dwelling unduly on a truism.

I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of individuals, but⁸ in the formation of the proper social life.

Put in terms of the child, Dewey's view of educational development is expressed in these words:

We want that type of education which will discover and form the kind of individual who is the intelligent carrier of a social democracy--social indeed, but still a democracy.

A study is to be considered as a means of bringing the child to realize the social scene of action.¹⁰

Although Dewey clearly states the importance of social development as a very significant aim, he maintains

7 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 4.

8 John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed", in The School Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, January, 1897, p. 77-80, as quoted by Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, p. 32.

9 John Dewey, Education Today, New York, Greenwood c. 1940, p. 143.

10 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, New York, Greenwood, c. 1959, p. 31.

that aims, and the means for achieving aims are inseparable. The intermixing of means and ends results in the view that education is an activity, a practice, and a process. This intermixture is evident in Dewey's writings.

We may fairly enough call educational practice a kind of social engineering.¹¹

I believe that education is a regulation of the process of coming₂ to share in the social consciousness [...] ¹²

The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and₃ of social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand.¹³

John Dewey holds the view that in a democracy it is necessary for the school to be constantly alert to the changing needs of society so that education may revise its goals according to these needs. Such a view requires not only flexibility of purpose but also careful attention to the intricate combinations of varying needs within society: "Sensitiveness to the complexities and needs of social life enables us to formulate goals for education."¹⁴ At the same

11 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, New York, Horace Liveright, 1929, p. 39.

12 John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed", as quoted in Dworkin, op. cit., p. 30.

13 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 331.

14 John Dewey, Lectures in China, p. 191.

time, he believes that education ought to remain autonomous to the degree that it will be more than a servant of society. It should assume a role of active leadership in the direction of social change.¹⁵ In this sense, "social progress is dependent upon educational progress."¹⁶ In fact, for Dewey, education "is the indispensable basis of all social progress."¹⁷

The role of social leadership for which education is responsible frequently assumes qualities of moral obligations in Dewey's writings:

Education should create an interest in all persons in furthering the general good, so that they will find their own happiness realized in what they can do to improve the conditions of others.¹⁸

It should act as a catalyst to elevate society and the moral quality of life. The close relationship between moral and social aims will be discussed in Chapter IV of this research, but it seems evident at this point that, for Dewey, the terms social and moral frequently hold similar meanings: "Apart

15 John Dewey, "Education and Social Change", from The Social Frontier, May, 1937, as found in John Dewey's Education Today, p. 348-358.

16 John Dewey, Lectures in China, p. 185.

17 Ibid., p. 189.

18 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1908, p. 98.

from participation in social life, the school has no moral end nor aim."¹⁹

Social obligations, taken in the broadest sense, also imply growth in knowledge and continuing development along intellectual lines:

Knowledge that is worthy of being called knowledge, training of the intellect that is sure to amount to anything, is obtained only by participating intimately and actively in activities of social life.²⁰

This view will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. The point at hand is, that taken in its generic sense, social growth in Dewey's writings implies cognitive growth as well: "Information is genuinely educative only insofar as it presents images and conceptions of materials placed in a context of social life."²¹ Dewey's plea that "the demand is for social intelligence",²² suggests an interdependence of the intellect and social awareness.

Another aspect of social growth involves the development of the individual. Only through the route of continuing

19 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, New York, Greenwood, c. 1959, p. 11.

20 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, New York, Dutton, c. 1915, p. 47.

21 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 32.

22 Ibid., p. 43.

social development is there room for self growth: "Only in social relations can individuals develop their capacities."²³ Dewey is not caught up in the traditional philosophic arguments wherein the individual is pitted against the overwhelming power of society in his struggle for freedom. The notion of individual freedom is entirely compatible with man's development through his growing awareness of his social environment: "The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment."²⁴ Dewey opposes the philosophy that man and society are at odds with each other:

The whole temper of this [Rousseau] philosophy is individualistic in the sense in which individualism is opposed to organized social action. It held to primacy of the individual over the state not only in time, but in moral authority. It defined the individual in terms of liberties of thought and action already possessed by him in some mysterious ready-made fashion, and which it was the sole business of the state to safeguard. Reason was also made an inherent endowment of the individual, expressed in men's moral relations to one another, but not sustained and developed because of these relations. It followed that the great enemy of individual liberty was thought to be government because of its tendency to encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals.²⁵

23 John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, New York, Holt, c. 1915, p. 60.

24 John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, New York, Holt, 1938, p. 33.

25 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, New York, Putman's, 1935, p. 5.

Dewey is much more optimistic than Rousseau that organized society works in the best interests of individual freedom. The following statement is illustrative of his optimism, tempered with a hint of disappointment:

... the conception of a social harmony of interests in which the achievement by each individual of his own freedom should contribute to a like perfecting of the powers of all, through fraternally organized society, is the permanent contribution of the industrial movements to morals--even though so far it be but the contribution of a problem.²⁶

For Dewey, the notion of the individual and society growing compatibly together is very acceptable. In fact, the development of each is regarded as interdependent on the other:

The moral end must also include the ends of the various agents who make up society. It must be capable of constituting a social system out of the acts of various agents as well as an individual system out of the various acts of one agent; or, more simply, the moral end must be not only the good for all the particular acts of an individual, but must be a common good--a good, which in satisfying one, satisfies others.²⁷

26 John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Bloomington, Indiana University, c. 1910, p. 60.

27 John Dewey, "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics", as found in The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 3, p. 261.

In the above statement Dewey has indicated that social standards form the basis of moral growth as well as individual growth.

Summarily, social growth, in its generic sense, implies moral, cognitive and self development. The school as an integral part of society has obligations to develop social growth and awareness, and to assume leadership in social development.

2. The Necessity of Social Awareness

Social development is regarded as a very positive form of growth in education. In keeping with Dewey's notions that growth and education should be autonomous in their aims, and with the idea that there are no fixed absolutes to which growth should aspire, one is brought to the question of why Dewey regards social development with such esteem. How does he decide that social development is, in fact, valuable? It would be inconsistent for him to say that it is in keeping with God's will, or by order of the State, or by some other external criteria. His answer lies in the belief that man is, by nature, a social being. Consequently, he can not develop other than through society. Social development is a necessity if there is to be any development at all. It is his view that "society and individuals are correlative,

organic, to one another, society requiring the service and subordination of individuals, and at the same time existing to serve them".²⁸ Dewey frequently speaks of man's inherent social nature:

Most children are naturally 'sociable'. Isolation is even more irksome to them than to adults. A genuine community life²⁹ has its ground in this natural sociability.

The native mechanism of the child and his³⁰ impulses all tend to facile social responsiveness.

The vital importance of social aspects in human growth are emphasized in these words:

If we eliminate the social factor³¹ from the child we are left only with an abstraction.

The first stage [of growth] (found in the child, say, of from four to eight years of age) is characterized by directness of social and personal interests [...]³²

The social interest, identical in its deepest meaning with³³ moral interest, is necessarily supreme with man.

Dewey combines his belief in the social nature of man with his characteristic emphasis on experience, activity and

28 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Boston Beacon Press, c. 1920, 1948 ed., p. 187.

29 John Dewey, Experience and Education, London, Collier Macmillan, c. 1938, p. 56.

30 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 43.

31 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, as quoted in Martin S. Dworkin's Dewey on Education, p. 22.

32 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 105.

33 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 288.

interaction with one's environment.

The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment.³⁴

... all human experience is ultimately social:
[...] it involves contact and communication.³⁵

We can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social.³⁶

... a society is stably organized when each individual is doing that for which he has aptitude by nature₃ in such a way as to be useful to others
[...]³⁷

Although Dewey regards man as a social being by nature he does not feel that the newborn child enters into the world completely programmed with social graces and social awareness. These have to be developed. The child is a social being in an immature sense only. However, Dewey regards immaturity in a very positive manner: "The primary condition of growth is immaturity [...] a being can develop only in some point in which he is undeveloped."³⁸

34 John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, p. 33.

35 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 38.

36 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, New York, Modern Library, c. 1922, p. II.

37 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 88.

38, Ibid., p. 41. See also pages 50, 51, 52, 54 and 73 for a more complete discussion of the positive nature of immaturity and its relationship to growth.

Thus, when Dewey speaks of the natural social capacity or potentiality of the child he is also speaking of the child's social needs. Social growth is a necessity. To grow at all means to grow socially, and social growth is not regarded as an external end of education because social development is a route to self development. Neither is it regarded as a fixed end since both society and the individual are changing and developing at the same time:

The existing state of society, which the schools reflect, is not something fixed and uniform. [..] Social conditions are not only in process of change, but the changes going on are in different directions, so different as to produce social confusion and conflict.³⁹

Since the individual and society are inevitably bound together, and since society itself is in a state of change, Dewey believes that this interdependence provides a further compelling reason for the individual to become socially aware. In order to guide the inevitable changes in society it is necessary to understand the forces that shape it:

39 John Dewey, Education Today, p. 349.

... the schools thereby do take part in the determination of a future social order; and that, accordingly, the problem is not whether the schools should participate in the production of future society (since they do so anyway) but whether they should do it blindly and irresponsibly or with the maximum possible of courageous intelligence and responsibility.⁴⁰

Every society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and with what is positively perverse. The school has the duty of omitting such things from the environment which it supplies, and thereby doing what it can to counteract their influence in the ordinary social environment.⁴¹

In order that both individuals and institutions can have an informed perspective concerning the direction of societal changes it is necessary that they have a concept of the ideal in society: "The conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind."⁴² It must be free from external authority; it must be flexible in its means and ends; and it must involve the individual in the ongoing experience of a democratic social development: "Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary

40 Ibid., p. 349.

41 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 20.

42 Ibid., p. 97.

disposition and interest; these can be created only by education."⁴³ Within a democratic society, "social efficiency as an educational purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities."⁴⁴ Having taken the position that society and the individual are dependent upon each other, progress seems most likely to occur wherever democratic ideals flourish:

A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational measures.⁴⁵

In a democracy, individual freedom should exist for the purpose of self-growth, but equally as important to Dewey is the notion that individual freedom serves to shape and develop society as well:

43 Ibid., p. 87. See also, p. 99, and "Reconstruction as Affecting Social Philosophy", Chap. VIII, in Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 187-213.

44 Ibid., p. 123.

45 Ibid., p. 305.

... the idea of democracy as opposed to any conception of aristocracy is that every individual must be consulted in such a way, actively not passively, that he himself becomes a part of the process of authority, of the process of social control; that his needs and wants have a chance to be registered in a way where they count in determining social policy.⁴⁶

The necessity of social development is twofold. Society itself needs the directing influences of the individual. But even more important to education and the young is the influence of society on the child so that he might grow in accordance with his inherent social capacities:

... we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are in truth forces in man as well as without him.⁴⁷

In the life of a child the social forces "without" have a profound effect on what he will become within. The necessity of social growth is increased by the inevitable fact that he is shaped by his environment, either blindly or consciously: "It is not an ethical 'ought' that conduct should be social. It is social whether good or bad."⁴⁸

46 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), Totowa, New Jersey, Littlefield, Adams, 1971, p. 35-36.

47 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 11.

48 Ibid., p. 17.

... whatever are the native constituents of human nature, the culture of a period and group is the determining influence in their arrangement; it is that which determines the patterns of behavior that mark out the activities of any group, family, clan, people, sect, faction, class.⁴⁹

... how profoundly the mental habits of others affect the attitude of the one being trained.⁵⁰

The younger the person, the more he is open to the influence of those around him:

Small children's concern with persons is remarkably intense. Their dependence upon others for support and guidance, if nothing else, provides a natural basis for attention to people and for a wish to enter into intimate connections with them.⁵¹

When a child acts, those about him re-act. They shower encouragement upon him, visit him with approval, or they bestow frowns and rebuke. What others do to us when we act is as natural a consequence of our action as what fire does to us when we plunge our hands in it.⁵²

49 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, New York, Putman, 1939, p. 18.

50 John Dewey, How We Think, Boston, Heath, c. 1933, p. 206-207.

51 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Riverside, c. 1913, p. 84.

52 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 314.

Social adjustments are very important. In connection with parents, nurse, brother, and sister, the child learns the signs of satisfaction of hunger, of removal of discomfort, of the approach of agreeable light, color, sound, and so on. His contact with physical things is regulated by persons, and he soon distinguishes persons as the most important and interesting of all objects with which he has to do.⁵³

That the human infant is modified in the mind and character by his connection with others in family life and that the modification continues throughout life as his connections with others broaden, is as true as that hydrogen is modified when it combines with oxygen.⁵⁴

It is clear to Dewey that social forces inevitably shape the individual to even a greater degree than the individual shapes society. Since this is the case, it is important that the institutions of society should be aware of their power, and should use it widely. In this regard the school is society's main vehicle for constructively guiding the young into acceptable social behaviour. The school as an agent of society needs guiding principles itself in order to cope with this task. In the following statement Dewey sets forth broad social ideals which he hopes will provide a criterion of operation:

⁵³ John Dewey, How We Think, Boston, Heath, c. 1933, p. 206-207.

⁵⁴ John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 41.

Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal. The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.⁵⁵

These guidelines are very general and it is rather easy to agree with them without knowing exactly what suggestions Dewey recommends. In the following section of this chapter, Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of social development in the schools will be considered.

3. Dewey's Suggestions for Promoting the Process of Social Development in Schools

As outlined in Chapter II, education and growth are regarded as two autonomous and similar on-going processes. The aims of each are contained within the process itself rather than externally imposed. These aims are thought to

55 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 99.

be flexible and changeable so that they might be continually re-adjusted according to immediate consequences. Thus, aims are tentative, and they are regarded as ends-in-view. The growth process requires a fusion of means and ends as each new experience leads to modifications in future means and ends. It is within this context of educational thought that Dewey proclaims social growth as a worthy goal.

One of Dewey's suggestions for promotion of social goals is that children should be given opportunities for relatively unstructured play and work within the school context. This serves a dual function: Dewey believes that, particularly in the first stage of growth, up to eight years old, when "the demand for a motor outlet for expression is urgent and immediate",⁵⁶ physical activity satisfies this need. But more importantly, it fulfills social needs in the young child which can be "characterized by directness of social and personal interests, and by directness and promptness of relationship between impressions, ideas, and action."⁵⁷ As a result of Dewey's view he comes to the following conclusion:

56 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 105.

57 Ibid., p. 105.

Hence the subject-matter for these years is selected from phases of life entering into the child's own social surroundings, and, as far as may be, capable of reproduction by him in something approaching social form--in play, games, occupations, or miniature industrial arts, stories, pictorial imagination and conversation.⁵⁸

John Dewey is reluctant to make distinctions between the value of work and play as educational experiences for children.⁵⁹

The value of both lies in the active opportunities they provide for social intercourse and experience: "For even in a competitive game there is a certain kind of participation, of sharing in a common experience."⁶⁰ Both work and play can be limited by the imposition of external rules, or both can be relatively free situations where children are given the liberty to interact with others according to the dictates of their inherent social natures. Generally speaking, play affords more liberty to the child to experiment actively and learn from social situations, and it is this liberty, wherever it can be found, that Dewey regards as valuable in social growth:

58 Ibid., p. 105-106.

59 John Dewey, "Play and Work in the Curriculum", Chapter 15 in Democracy and Education, p. 194-206.

60 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 53.

... liberty for the child is the chance to test all impulses and tendencies on the world of things and people in which he finds himself, sufficiently to discover their character so that he may get rid of those which are harmful, and develop those which are useful to himself and others.⁶¹

Outside of the school, a large portion of the children's plays are simply more or less miniature and haphazard attempts at reproducing social occupations.⁶²

The antithesis of liberty is rigid and dogmatic methods which serve to work against social growth in education:

"Dogmatic methods which prescribe and make for docility and passivity not only become ineffective in modern society but they actually hinder the development of the largest possibilities of society."⁶³

Some school activities such as drama are a mixture of work and play. While the child may work hard to succeed in drama, drama itself is representative of play-acting or playing out reality as the child sees it.

61 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 102.

62 John Dewey, The Schools and Society, p. 136.

63 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 127.

A moment's consideration of children's plays shows how largely they are sympathetic and dramatic reproductions of social activities; and thereby affords a clew [sic] to the extent in which interest in things is borrowed from their ideas of what people do to and with things. Much of the so-called animistic tendency of children, their tendency to personify natural objects and events, is at bottom nothing but an overflow of their social interests.⁶⁴

A second and closely related suggestion for promoting the process of social aims in education involves the preparation of the child for flexibility and change. It is as though Dewey wants to generate a love for novelty, or, at least, an open-minded and positive attitude towards new ideas.⁶⁵ Since Dewey regards social change as inevitable, he considers that it is the responsibility of the school and the individual to give intelligent direction to the process:

Full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs.⁶⁶

John Dewey regards change with more than a passing acceptance. He actively seeks change as a process of opening up minds to challenges and activity:

64 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 87.

65 Vide "Education and Social Change", Chapter 44 in John Dewey's Education Today, p. 348-358.

66 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 209.

Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought. The more activity is restricted to a few definite lines--as it is when there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences--the more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a disadvantage, and capricious, aimless, and explosive on the part of the ⁶⁷class having the materially fortunate position.

The individual, the self, centered in a settled world which owns and sponsors it, and which in turn it owns and enjoys, is finished, closed. Surrender of what is possessed, disowning of what supports one in secure ease, is involved in all inquiry and discovery. ⁶⁸ For to arrive at new truth and vision is to alter.

Knowledge is no longer an immobile solid; it has been liquified. It ⁶⁹is actively moving in all currents of society itself.

Another suggestion arising out of Dewey's views is that the child should be taught social awareness informally by his peers. That is, opportunities should be provided whereby children will learn from each other through interaction, group projects and collective enterprises. The social sanctions of the group have a powerful influence in shaping the individual, and Dewey believes that it is wise for teachers to recognize, and use this fact within the school context. The approval or disapproval of one's actions by social peers is just as much a consequence of one's social

⁶⁷ John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 85.

⁶⁸ John Dewey, Experience and Nature, New York, Dover, c. 1929, p. 245.

⁶⁹ John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 25.

behaviour as are the physical consequences which result from one's physical actions. Thus the individual is continually shaped by his social milieu:

Habit is the mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the most⁷⁰ part under the influence of the customs of a group.

It is at least as true that the state of culture determines the order and arrangement of native tendencies as that human nature produces any particular set or system of social phenomena so as to obtain satisfaction for itself.⁷¹

Bare reference to the imitateness of human nature is enough to suggest how profoundly the mental habits of others⁷² affect the attitude of the one being trained.

Dewey believes further that there is a moral rightness about the standards that are found in society:

... the law which society or reason prescribes should be consciously thought of as right,⁷³ used as a standard, and respected as binding.

Because he regards social standards as morally correct, Dewey is not apologetic in stating that these standards should be used as a means of control in the classroom just as they are used in the adult world:

⁷⁰ John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, An Essay in Political Inquiry, Chicago, Gateway, c. 1927, p. 159.

⁷¹ John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 18.

⁷² John Dewey, How We Think, p. 58.

⁷³ John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. xii.

The conclusion is that in what are called the new schools [progressive schools] the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility.⁷⁴

Absence of social blame is the usual mark of goodness for it shows that blame has been avoided.⁷⁵

Liberty does not mean the removal of the checks which nature and man impose on the life of every individual in the community, so that one individual may indulge impulses which go against his own welfare as a member of society.⁷⁶

The child cannot learn the true meaning of socially based phenomena without social experience to give them depth:

"The child has to learn through social intercourse that certain qualities of action mean greediness or anger or fear or rudeness [...] "⁷⁷ To attempt to teach social truths without social experience and social sanctions is to teach in a vacuum. Dewey's own words serve to illustrate the point:

74 John Dewey, Experience and Education, New York, Macmillan, 1938, p. 61.

75 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 4.

76 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 138.

77 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 260.

When the social factor is absent, learning becomes a carrying over of some presented material into a purely individual consciousness, and there is no inherent reason why it should give a more socialized direction to mental and emotional disposition.⁷⁸

... the absence of a social environment in connection with which learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isolation of the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and so infertile in character.⁷⁹

Another suggestion which Dewey presents for promoting the process of social growth is that the social situations provided within the school environment should approximate those outside the school to the closest degree possible. This requires traditional schools "to readapt traditional materials and technique to meet present social conditions [...] "⁸⁰ Too often the child "is unable to apply in daily life what he is learning at school."⁸¹ Further, Dewey believes that careful attention to subject matter presented in schools can help bridge the gap. School subjects must appeal to the natural social interests of the learner. He uses the following example to illustrate the point:

78 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 301.

79 Ibid., p. 359.

80 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 139.

81 Ibid., p. 75.

Children generally begin the study of geography, for example, with a social interest so strong that it is fairly romantic. Their imaginations are fired by the thought of learning how strange and far-away peoples live and fare. Then they are fed on abstract definitions and classifications; or, what is almost deadening, upon bare physical facts about the forms of land⁸² and water, the structure of continents, etc.

Similar examples are drawn from other subjects. In Dewey's mind, "history is considered as an account of the forces and forms of social life".⁸³ The aim of historical instruction "is to enable the child to appreciate the values of social life".⁸⁴ The essential teaching technique is to make the presentation "moving" and "dynamic" rather than "to amass information".⁸⁵ Above all, the subject matter itself is the vehicle for social growth, and not the end of learning:

It is not the subject per se that is educative or that is conducive to growth. There is no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it.⁸⁶

82 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 87.

83 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 150-151.

84 Ibid., p. 151.

85 Ibid., p. 151. Other examples regarding the relationship of the "three R's" to social development can be found on page 112. See also "Subject Matter as Social" in Democracy and Education, p. 191-193.

86 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 46.

It will be remembered that I am not making these points [about school subjects] for their own sake, but with reference to the general principle that when a study is taught as a mode of understanding social life it has positive ethical import. What the normal child continuously needs is not so much isolated moral lessons upon the importance of truthfulness and honesty, or the beneficent results that follow from a particular act of patriotism, as the formation of habits of social imagination and conception.

But the particular point I would make is that in any case we have carried the isolation of subjects from their social effects and possibilities too far down the education scale.

4. Summary

John Dewey proclaims social growth as a worthy and important aim for education. In a democracy the school must serve the needs of the individual and society in the ongoing development of each. In this respect education has an obligation to both, just as the individual and society have mutual obligations towards each other. These obligations frequently assume a moral tone in Dewey's writings, but society and the individual are also supportive of each other. Generally, Dewey regards both as mutually compatible. Society needs the socially aware individual just as the individual himself needs awareness of society. The

87 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 40.

88 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education, p. 182.

development of both is interdependent.

Man is thought to be social by nature in as much as he has the capacity or potentiality for social growth. Self-development necessarily involves continued growth in social awareness. The young child is thus socially immature, but immaturity viewed positively suggests room to grow and to be fulfilled. While Dewey believes in individual freedom as part of the growth process, he rejects the extreme individualistic philosophy of Rousseau wherein society and the self are at odds with each other.

Since society is flexible and changing it requires socially aware individuals to give it direction. This necessitates the school's acting as a microcosm of society so that social awareness can be actively engaged in by the learners. The closer the school can come to representing society at large, the more efficient the learning process will be.

Dewey makes certain suggestions for promoting the process of social development in the schools. The school should provide opportunities for children to learn from each other in social situations where relative freedom is given to the learner to experience problems and actively work out solutions. School subjects should be geared to the natural interests and social needs of the child.

It appears that Dewey rests his case for social growth in education rather heavily on a number of assumptions about the nature of man and society. One of these is that man is naturally and basically a social being. Although most students of human nature would agree that man has social qualities and social needs to be fulfilled, it would be difficult to weigh accurately the importance of these against other human aspects, be they cognitive, spiritual or physical. Dewey also believes that in an ideal democratic society no dichotomies exist between the true interests of the individual and society.

It is difficult to conclude from Dewey's writings what principles ought to govern society or give direction to it. Apparently he believes that the ideal society is the one which works harmoniously within itself, protecting the interests of the group, and which also works harmoniously with other societies with which it comes in contact.⁸⁹ In subsequent chapters the relationship of the individual to society will be investigated, with particular reference to the type of moral and cognitive growth that Dewey regards as necessary to social development.

89 Vide footnote 53, p. 84.

In conclusion, the educational concepts of flexibility, continuity, autonomy, and fusion of means and ends which were discussed in Chapter II are consistent with Dewey's view of social growth. Finally, social development holds a very fundamental and prominent place in Dewey's concept of growth in education.

CHAPTER IV

GROWTH AS MORAL DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter, John Dewey's concept of moral growth will be discussed under four main headings. The first will deal with Dewey's concept of development taken in its general sense and with its particular function as an important dimension of educational growth. The next will concern Dewey's early view of morals which is rooted in Christian theological principles. Dewey's later secular concepts of moral development stand in contrast to this early view and these secular based moral principles will be discussed in section three. In the final section, Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of moral development in schools will be discussed.

1. General Concepts of Moral Development in Education

It will be shown in the pages that follow that Dewey uses the term "moral" in a wide variety of ways. Consequently it is difficult to find a generic definition of the term that is appropriate to both his earlier and later writings. It appears that the term "good" and the search for a common good come closest to Dewey's general meaning of "moral" and "moral development". Dewey's notion of moral goodness includes the good life for both

the individual and society. In short, it includes the principle of a common good:

The moral end must also include the ends of the various agents who make up society. It must be capable of constituting a social system out of the various acts of one agent, or more simply, the moral end must be not only the good for all the particular acts of an individual, but must be a common good¹—a good which in satisfying one, satisfies others.

What is really good for me must turn out good for all,² or else there is no good in the world at all.

Dewey's notion of moral good includes the idea of a continuous adjustment. In his words, "the bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better."³ There is no resting place where one

1 John Dewey, "Fundamental Ethical Notions: The Good", as found in The Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898, Vol. 3, p. 261; Vide, p. 314-326 for a similar notion of moral as the common good; Here, as elsewhere Dewey uses the terms, "morals" and "ethics", interchangeably. See also, "The Moral Consciousness" in The Study of Ethics, Vol. 4; "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", Vol. 5; "The Ethical Postulate", Vol. 1; and "The Logical Character of Ethical Judgment" in Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), p. 229-232.

2 John Dewey, "The Ethical Postulate", in The Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898, Vol. 3, p. 320.

3 John Dewey, "Moral Reconstruction", in Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 176.

can reach moral goodness and then remain content in his moral goodness. "To be good is to be better than; and there can be no better except where there is shock and discord combined with enough assured order to make attainment of harmony possible."⁴

Dewey's emphasis on continuous adjustment in the direction of harmony and the common good, leads him to believe that moral development is a part of the growth process. In his view, "morals means growth of conduct of meaning [..] It is all one with growing--morals is education".⁵ Dewey concludes that "growth itself is the only moral end".⁶ When moral development is viewed as a growth process, it becomes an important educational aim for Dewey.

It [moral development] is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is education.⁷

4 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 62.

5 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 259.

6 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 117.

7 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 259.

[Moral education] is universally recognized as the ultimate and final end of the educative process.⁸

... all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral.⁹

... the educative process is all one with the moral process, since the latter is a continuous passage of experience from worse to better.¹⁰

When Dewey regards moral development as a proper goal for education, he has in mind a type of moral development that works for the common good. His social emphasis is evident as follows:

We have frequently insisted [...] that the aim of education is social; now we are saying that it is moral. But there isn't any contradiction; the moral aim of education is identical with the social aim.¹¹

Education should create an interest in all persons in furthering the general good so that they will find their own happiness realized in what they can do to improve the conditions of others.¹²

In a nutshell, the aim of education, especially in democratic countries is to create good citizens.¹³

8 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 286.

9 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 359.

10 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 183.

11 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 295.

12 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1932, p. 98.

13 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 210.

The above passages indicate that Dewey regards moral growth as an ongoing process which works in the direction of the common good. There is also the indication that moral growth is an important educational obligation. Many questions remain, however, regarding Dewey's stand or basis for determining what constitutes a moral good. His writings indicate that his earliest criteria for moral goodness stand in contrast to those presented in his later written works. This is particularly true of his view of the role of institutionalized religion in moral development.

2. Dewey's Early Concepts of Moral Development

In his earlier writings, Dewey presents moral concepts which are based on principles in keeping with those of institutionalized religion. These principles include a belief in God and in the tenets of faith and worship as practised in the various organized Christian churches. The following statements illustrate Dewey's faith in God and in religion as effective forces in guiding moral development:

We believe that the cause of theology and morals is one, and that whatever banishes God from the heart of things, with the same edict excludes the ideal, the ethical, from the life of man. What-¹⁴ ever exiles theology makes ethics an expatriate.

The scriptures are uniform in their treatment of scepticism. There is an obligation to know God, and to fail to meet this obligation is not to err intellectually, but to sin morally. Belief is not a privilege, but a duty,--'whatsoever is not of faith is sin'.¹⁵

For Dewey, the terms moral and social are frequently synonymous, and what is morally good is necessarily socially good. The search for goodness must not be separated from the search for religious values.

The idea of democracy, the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity represent a society in which the distinction between the spiritual and the secular has ceased, and as in Greek theory as in the Christian theory of the Kingdom of God, the church and the state, the divine and the human organization of society are one.¹⁶

14 John Dewey, "Ethics and Physical Science", from The Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898, Vol. 1, Jo Ann Boydston, editor, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University, Feffer and Simons, c. 1967, p. 209.

15 John Dewey, "The Obligation to Knowledge of God", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 1, p. 61.

16 John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 1, p. 248.

Further, in Dewey's philosophy the development of society and of the individual self is interdependent and there is a moral obligation to develop the self. Self development, however, can not progress properly without religious growth:

The emotion which accompanies the religious life is that which accompanies the completed activity of ourselves; the self is realized, and finds its true life in God. In sensuous feeling we find our self [sic] expressed in organic processes; in intellectual feeling we find our self expressed in the objective relations of the world; in aesthetic feeling we feel our self expressed in ideal values; in social feeling we find our self expressed in persons; in religious feeling we find our self expressed in God.¹⁷

Our loves and hatreds, our affections, become more definite as our feelings correspond to wider growths of the soul. [...] One loves a beautiful work of art more distinctly than he does a proposition in geometry; and he loves a person more than either; while the only perfectly definite object of love can be alone the absolutely ideal self; the absolutely universalized personality, or God.¹⁸

The man whose interest in the things of God is not great enough to lead him to direct his eyes to the things₁₉ of God, will never see the light of the world.

According to Dewey's early writings, to "see the light of the world", is more of a moral question than an intellectual one.

¹⁷ John Dewey, Psychology, as found in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 2, p. 245.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 249.

¹⁹ John Dewey, "The Obligation to Know God", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. I, p. 63.

Many sceptics declare that their greatest sorrow is that they live as orphans in an orphaned world, without the Divine Father, and that their greatest joy would be knowledge of Him. But the statements of Christ and his immediate followers are explicit. To fail to get knowledge in these matters is not an intellectual, but a moral defect.²⁰

All knowledge is one. It is all of God, the universe, say rather, of God; and if any set of acts are regarded as something in themselves, out of all relation to God and God's creatures, it is no knowledge. The whole world of nature and history is worthless except as it is brought into relation with man's nature and activities; and that science or philosophy is worthless which does not ultimately bring every fact into guiding relation with the living activity of man, and, the end of all his strivings--approach to God.²¹

Moral development is both a social and an individual obligation. Dewey leaves little doubt that education serves an important function in moral growth.

I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth. I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and usher in of the true kingdom of God.²²

In summary, Dewey bases his early concepts of moral development on God and on religious principles. Secondly, there is the suggestion that moral and social obligations

20 Ibid., p. 61.

21 Ibid., p. 62.

22 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, as found in Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, New York, Columbia University, c. 1959, p. 32.

are compatible ideas and that social and individual moral growth must go hand in hand. In the section that follows it will be shown that these secondary ideas are further developed in Dewey's later writings and that he departs from his early religious ideas as the basis for his moral principles.

3. Dewey's Later Concept of Moral Development

As Dewey continues to develop the idea that moral standards can be equated with social goals and with one's individual harmony with his society, he departs further and further from his earlier view that moral principles should be rooted in divine imperatives and religious institutions. For the greater part of his writings, from the turn of the century to his death in 1952, Dewey's moral principles are secular in nature. This later secular view stands in juxtaposition to Dewey's earlier religious ideas on moral development. The following statements are representative:

But in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects. It is that which is closest to human nature; it is ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical.²³

23 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 271.

... ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence.²⁴

There is danger in reiteration of eternal verities and ultimate spiritualities. Our sense of the actual is dulled, and we are led to think that in dwelling upon ideal goals we have somehow transcended existing evils.²⁵

The forces that have worked to humanize relations, that have resulted in intellectual and aesthetic development, have come from influences that are independent of the churches. A case could be made out for the position that the churches have lagged behind in most important social movements and that they have turned their chief attention in social affairs to moral symptoms, to vices and abuses like drunkenness, sale of intoxicants, divorce, rather than to the causes of war and the long list of economic and political injustices and oppressions. Protest against the latter has been mainly left to secular movements.²⁶

Dewey's early statement that "All knowledge is one. It is all of God [...] "²⁷, stands in sharp contrast to the following words:

There is but one road of access to truth--the road of patient co-operative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled reflection.²⁸

24 John Dewey, Ethical Principles Underlying Education, as quoted by J.J. Findlay in Educational Essays--John Dewey, London, Blackie, 1910, p. 58.

25 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, New York, Capricorn, c. 1929, p. 147-148.

26 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 32.

27 Vide, footnote 21, p. 106.

28 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 31.

... men still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed in authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their activity by thought.²⁹

Dewey believes that religious institutions actually hamper the individual's ability to think clearly on moral questions. He suggests that the path of clear thinking follows the methods of science.

The reactionary movement is dangerous (or would be if it made serious headway) because it ignores and in effect denies the principle of experimental inquiry and firsthand observation that is the life-blood of the entire advance made in the sciences [..] It is natural enough that the chief advocates of the scholastic reaction should be literary men with defective scientific educations, or else theologians who are convinced in advance of the existence of a supernaturally founded and directed Institution whose official utterances rank as fixed and final truths because they are beyond the scope of human inquiry and criticism.³⁰

With a very few notable exceptions ecclesiastics were antagonists to the development of science, since they feared science would challenge the 'truths' of religion.³¹

Because he believes that church leaders lack his optimistic faith in the methods of science, Dewey concludes that they are unable to deal adequately with the everyday moral problems of this present world.

29 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 339.

30 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), p. 150.

31 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 67.

For Christendom as a whole, morality has been connected with supernatural commands, rewards and penalties. Those who have escaped this superstition have contented themselves with converting the difference between this world and the next into a distinction between the actual and the ideal, what is and what should be [...] ³²

It seems evident that Dewey's later view of moral development contains many elements of a secular approach. It would be a mistake however, to conclude that his concepts of moral development consist entirely of a reaction against religious principles. In understanding Dewey, it is important to consider what his moral principles stood for as well as what they stood against.

First and foremost, John Dewey's later concepts of moral growth are connected with social development. Only through the crucible of social interchange and experience can the individual come to find right moral principles: "Morals is as much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment as walking is an interaction of legs with the physical environment."³³ Furthermore, social

32 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 271.

33 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 291. For a more complete discussion of the relationship of moral to social see "Morality is Social", chapter 4 of Part 4, p. 287-302.

interaction, whether successful or not, can not be avoided: "Our conduct is socially conditioned whether we perceive the fact or not."³⁴ Since moral standards are rooted in social standards, Dewey dismisses the idea that moral questions can arise at a purely individual level apart from one's social milieu:

If a man lived alone in the world there might be some sense in the question, 'Why be moral?' were it not for one thing: No such question would then arise. As it is, we live in a world where other persons live too.³⁵

Apparently Dewey does not conceive of any situations in which moral behaviour is a completely private matter. The following statements are indicative of his belief that correct moral and social behaviour are one and the same thing:

There is a peculiar inconsistency in the current idea that morals ought to be social. The introduction of the moral 'ought' into the idea contains an implicit assertion that morals depend upon something apart from social relations. Morals are social.³⁶

These two facts, that moral judgment and moral responsibility are the work wrought in us by the social environment, signify that all morality is social.³⁷

34 Ibid., p. 289.

35 Ibid., p. 297.

36 Ibid., p. 291.

37 Ibid., p. 289.

The social interest, identical in its deepest meaning with a moral interest is necessarily supreme with man.³⁸

The moral and the social quality of conduct are,³⁹ in the last analysis, identical with each other.

For Dewey, an understanding of one's society leads to moral development: " ... when a study is taught as a mode of understanding social life it has positive ethical import."⁴⁰

Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence--the power of observing and comprehending social situations [..]. There is no fact which throws light upon the constitution of society, there is no power whose training adds to social resourcefulness that is not moral.⁴¹

Thus social education is an important part of moral development. "Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end or aim."⁴² Yet, education and growth are ongoing processes which are not limited to children alone. Adult moral growth depends upon a continued understanding of society.

38 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 288.

39 Ibid., p. 358.

40 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 40.

41 Ibid., p. 43.

42 Ibid., p. 11.

If the moral business of the adult as well as the young is a growing and developing experience, then the instruction that comes from social dependencies and interdependencies are [sic] as important for the adult as for the child. Moral independence for the adult means arrest of growth, isolation means induration.⁴³

At first sight, such a strongly stated view of the importance of social aspects in moral development appears to leave little room for the role of the individual except as a follower of social standards. This is not the case, however, for Dewey regards the individual as an active participant in shaping society, in modifying his own habits, and in applying reason and an awareness of consequences to the ongoing processes of moral growth:

We can't help being individual selves, each of us. If selfhood as such is a bad thing, the blame lies not with the self but with the universe, with providence. But in fact the distinction between a selfishness with which we find fault and an unselfishness which we esteem is found in the quality of the activities which proceed from and enter into the self, according as they are contractive, exclusive, or expansive, outreaching. Meaning exists for some self, but this truistic fact doesn't fix the quality of any particular meaning. It may be such as to make the self small, or such as to exalt and dignify the self.⁴⁴

43 John Dewey, "Reconstruction in Moral Conceptions", chapter vii in Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 185. In this chapter Dewey discusses moral growth as a worthy end for education.

44 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 269. See also, "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal", in Philosophical Review II, Nov., 1893, as found in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 4, p. 42-43.

In the end, the individual has both the freedom and the responsibility to make moral choices. Society may set standards, but only individuals can make choices and modifications of these standards. On one hand, Dewey rejects the notion of "confining moral freedom to an inner region" which is completely personal and apart from society.⁴⁵ On the other hand, he rejects the view which "denied the existence of any such inner power, and in so doing conceives that it has denied all moral freedom".⁴⁶ His view of moral freedom lies between these two positions:

There is an alternative to being penned in between these two theories. We can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social. Then we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are, in truth, forces within man as well as without him.⁴⁷

Thus, while Dewey emphasizes the importance of social standards on the one hand, and the significance of individual choice on the other, most important of all is the recognition that moral development occurs through the interaction of these two components.

45 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 10.

46 Ibid., p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 11.

For Dewey, the notion of choice carries with it, the implication of alternatives, of freedom to choose, and of the need to discriminate wisely from among informed selections. This "reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better".⁴⁸ The idea of choice is central to John Dewey's moral concepts: "The foremost conclusion is that morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter."⁴⁹

A further implication regarding flexibility and change arises from Dewey's belief that choice and alternatives are central to moral growth. Moral standards themselves are flexible and changing rather than fixed and enduring. The circumstances of the times and the experiences of the present situation, along with their attendant consequences, have more to do with appropriate moral standards than have divine imperatives and enduring moral traditions. The enemy of moral growth is thought to be rigid moral codes which become embedded in fixed habits. The following statement is indicative of Dewey's ready acceptance of "change" as a facilitator of progress in moral growth:

48 Ibid., p. 257.

49 Ibid., p. 257.

No one can claim that the existing morality embodies the highest possible conception of personal relations. A morality which does not recognize both the possibility and the necessity of advance is immorality.⁵⁰

In fact situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create new principles. Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ceases to apply.⁵¹

In a more general sense, Dewey equates change with progress. With reference to the particular directions that change may take, he is optimistic that change will result in positive accomplishments.

Change becomes significant of new possibilities and ends to be attained; it becomes prophetic of a better future. Change is associated with progress rather than with lapse and fall.⁵²

The theory that human nature is unchangeable is thus the most depressing and pessimistic of all possible doctrines. If it were carried out logically, it would mean a doctrine of predestination from birth that would outdo the most rigid of theological doctrines.⁵³

50 John Dewey, "Moral Life: Growth of Ideals", in Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 3, p. 358.

51 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 221.

52 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 116.

53 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), p. 191.

Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought.⁵⁴

In spite of Dewey's affinity for change, he recognizes that change for the sake of change is no guarantee of advancement in a positive manner. The role of morals is to provide a constructive direction to the process of change. "In a genuine sense, social change is accidental unless it has also a psychological and moral foundation."⁵⁵

The proper development of habits is also important in Dewey's concept of moral growth. In his view, one of the factors which works against moral growth is an inflexible adherence to fixed moral codes. Thus when moral habits become rigid, the ongoing development of one's values ceases. Habits of using judgment, learning from experience and evaluating the consequences of one's actions, are regarded positively, but habits can also work against continuing moral growth:

54 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 85.

55 John Dewey, "Education and Social Change", from The Social Frontier, May, 1937, as quoted in Education Today. p. 355.

Each act has consequences and also impresses tendencies (habits) for future acts. In turn habit reaches into the self to build up and solidify future desires, intents, choices.⁵⁶

In giving way to a certain course of action, "the person in so far commits himself not just to that isolated act but to a course of action, to a line of behavior".⁵⁷ Thus habits may set the scene for future action but they are unable in themselves to provide intelligent guidance or to take account of the learning that can come from past experiences: "Habit, impulse, appetite, do not lead to foresight of what will happen as a consequence of their operation."⁵⁸

Dewey holds the view that proper moral habits can be developed along intellectual and affective lines. One need not be a prisoner of one's own habits:

... if habits are to be cultivated substantially rather than superficially, they must develop with relation to [..] reflection and desires, for only those habits which are formed on the basis of reflection and desire are indications of truly moral behavior.⁵⁹

56 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1908, p. 13.

57 Ibid., p. 14.

58 Ibid., p. 31.

59 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 288.

I do not see how anyone can deny that the training of habits of imagination and lines of emotional indulgence is at least equally important with the development of certain outward habits of action. For myself, when it comes to the moral question, not merely to that of practical convenience, I think it is infinitely more important.⁶⁰

What is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than is now current. Then they will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements.⁶¹

In Dewey's words, "the view that habits are formed by sheer repetition puts the cart before the horse".⁶² That is, the individual has a choice in his patterns of thinking and feeling, and in time, these choices become a part of one's everyday behaviour. It is important to remember that the original choices belong to the individual so that habits may remain the servant of good moral conduct rather than the master.

One way to ensure that habits remain flexible and thus useful in moral growth is that the individual be constantly vigilant to the consequences of his actions. Alertness to consequences serves as a continuous and cumulative

60 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 10.

61 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 120.

62 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 20.

guide for moral standards. In Dewey's words, "all principles by themselves are abstract. They become concrete only in the consequences which result from their application."⁶³ Further, Dewey states that "consequences include effects upon character, upon confirming or weakening habits, as well as tangibly obvious results."⁶⁴ Mention has already been made of Dewey's stress on the development of intellectual habits in moral growth.⁶⁵ He holds that consequences are of great import in the development of one's intellectual powers as well:

Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it, and accept responsibility for consequences.⁶⁶

We dwell upon favoring circumstances till they become weighted with reinforcing considerations. We don't give opposing consequences half a chance to develop in thought.⁶⁷

63 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 20.

64 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 45.

65 Vide, footnotes 59, 60, 61, p. 118-119.

66 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 287.

67 Ibid., p. 228.

We may sum up by stating that things gain meaning when they are used as means to bring about consequences (or as means to prevent the occurrence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we have to discover means. The relation of means-consequence is the center and heart of all understanding.⁶⁸

In terms of intelligent moral growth, consequences "are redirecting pivots in action".⁶⁹

In previous chapters of this research the fact that John Dewey sees fixed aims or ends as contrary to educational development was presented.⁷⁰ Dewey regards inflexible ends as particularly antithetical to moral growth:

The notion that a moral judgment merely apprehends and enunciates some predetermined end-in-itself is, in fact, but a way of denying the need for and existence of genuine moral judgments.⁷¹

Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and what is wrong.⁷²

68 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 156.

69 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 209.

70 Vide, p. 38-51.

71 John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago, c. 1903, as found in the microfilm-xerography copy of the original of Decennial Publications, University of Chicago, 1969, p. 168.

72 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 6.

Who can reckon up the loss of moral power that arises from the constant impression that nothing is worth doing in itself, but only as a preparation for something else, which in turn is only a getting⁷³ ready for some genuinely serious end beyond.

Clearly, Dewey opposes the idea that moral goals exist beyond immediate moral actions and decisions, and their attendant consequences.

Another dimension of the moral concept in Dewey's writings involves reason and judgement in arriving at satisfactory moral values. Dewey uses the phrase "reflective thinking"⁷⁴ as an appropriate expression of intellectual activity and its concomitant role in relation to moral judgments. The concept of reflective thinking and its connections with educational growth will serve as the main topic of discussion in the following chapter. For the present purposes it may be described briefly as follows:

Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends constitutes reflective thought.⁷⁵

Here Dewey refers to "reflective thought" as an active process of thinking.

73 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 25.

74 John Dewey, How We Think, vi-301 p.

75 Ibid., p. 9.

In terms of moral values, reflective thought implies moral judgements made on the basis of full consideration of consequences:

By putting the consequences of different ways and lines of action before the mind, it enables us to know what we are about when we act. It converts action that is merely appetitive, blind, and impulsive into intelligent action.⁷⁶

Reflective thinking implies that traditional moral habits, fixed rules, divine imperatives, and selfish desires and impulses not in the best interests of society should all give way to its direction. In this sense, a heavy responsibility for correct moral choices rests on the shoulders of the individual. For Dewey, to think and act in a moral way requires the use of one's intellect. In his words, "moral theory begins, in germ, when one asks; 'why should I act thus and not otherwise?'"⁷⁷ In a similar vein Dewey states that,

Reason, always an honorific term in ethics, becomes actualized in the methods by which the needs and conditions, the obstacles and resources of situations are scrutinized in detail, and intelligent plans of improvement are worked out.⁷⁸

While Dewey emphasizes the importance of reasoning in morals, he also recognizes that reason will be affected

76 Ibid., p. 17.

77 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 5.

78 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 174.

by the realities of human impulses, feelings, habits, and other mitigating factors. Reasoning alone does not constitute the whole of moral excellence:

Mere knowledge of what the right is, in the abstract, mere intentions of following the right in general, however praiseworthy in themselves, are never a substitute for the power of trained judgment [..] But the consciousness of ends must be more than merely intellectual. We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet does not act upon his judgment.

The notion that thought, apart from action, can warrant complete certitude as to the status of supreme good, makes no contribution to the central problem of development of intelligent methods of regulation. It rather depresses and deadens effort in that direction.

Dewey believes that even under the best of conditions human reasoning is subject to error on a number of counts.

There are however vices in reflection as well as of impulse. We may not look far enough ahead because we are hurried into action by stress of impulse; but we may also become overinterested in the delights of reflection: we become afraid of assuming the responsibility of decisive choice and action, and in general be sicklied over [sic] by a pale cast of thought. We may be so curious about remote and abstract matters that we give only a bedrugged impatient attention to the things about us.

As a result of imperfections that are evident in human reasoning, Dewey concludes that other factors must be taken

79 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 51.

80 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 36.

81 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 197.

into account in moral decision-making. He points out the necessity of recognizing that sensations and desires do not stand in opposition to one's ability to reason correctly:

Reason pure of all influences from prior habits is a fiction. But pure sensations out of which ideas can be framed apart from habit are equally fictitious. The sensations and ideas which are the 'stuff' of thought and purpose are alike affected by habits manifested in the acts which give rise to sensations and meanings.⁸²

... reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire.⁸³

Thus reason or reflective thinking must take into account a number of factors which combine to bring about moral growth.

In Dewey's search for principles of moral behaviour, he is concerned about arriving at a proper balance between satisfying the needs of the self and those of society. These are the two most important aspects in finding principles of right behaviour: "'Morals' in its broad sense is a function of the interaction of these two forces."⁸⁴ The main moral task is that of obtaining "an equilibrium with reference to intrinsic human nature on one side and social customs and institutions on the other".⁸⁵ While Dewey claims that there

82 Ibid., p. 31.

83 Ibid., p. 194.

84 Ibid., p. viii.

85 Ibid., p. viii.

are no dichotomies between the true interests of the self and society,⁸⁶ he recognizes a continued need for guiding the raw impulses of human nature. Moral sanctions, however, should not work against human nature: "Moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in effect committing suicide."⁸⁷ Ideally, moral principles should guide natural impulses towards the continued growth of the self in harmony with society.⁸⁸

It is Dewey's belief that the school has a definite responsibility in offering the moral guidance that is required. He presents a number of suggestions for promoting the process of moral development in the environment of the school.

4. Dewey's Suggestions for Promoting the Process of Moral Development in the Schools

John Dewey combines his emphasis on activity and experience with the view that social standards are proper

86 Vide Chapter 3.

87 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 4.

88 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 18-19. See also "A Study in Ethics" in The Early Works of John Dewey 1882-1898, Vol. 5, p. 254-255.

criteria for the establishment of moral standards. As a result, he concludes that children should learn moral sanctions from the social experiences that are properly a part of school life rather than from lessons about morality itself. Dewey's emphasis on first hand activity leads him to make a distinction between "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality"⁸⁹. Moral ideas pervade, or ought to pervade, the curriculum of the schools, the actions of the teachers, and in fact the total program and activities of the school. Presenting ideas about morality in special classes at specific times set aside for this purpose is considered to be of little value in the ongoing process of a child's moral growth:

Now 'ideas about morality' may be morally indifferent or immoral or moral. There is nothing in the nature of ideas about morality, of information about honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct.⁹⁰

Dewey emphasizes the importance of moral actions and experiences as opposed to instruction about moral ideas.

Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. [...] Morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of rules to be applied, like drugstone prescriptions or cook-book recipes.⁹¹

89 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 197.

90 Ibid., p. 1.

91 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 169.

The idea that dispositions and attitudes can be altered by merely 'moral' means conceived of as something that goes on wholly inside of persons is itself one of the old patterns that has to be changed. Thought, desire and purpose exist in a constant give and take of interaction with environing conditions.⁹²

In Dewey's mind, teaching about morality is associated with religious education classes in schools and he concludes that special religious education classes are of no real value in moral development.

... when the arguments for special religious education at special times and places by special means proceed from philosophic sources--from those whose primary premise is denial of any breach between man and the world⁹³ and God, then a sense of unreality comes over me.

A second and closely related educational principle arising out of Dewey's concept of moral development in schools is that it should be closely related to social experiences. Society provides the moral laboratory for the type of interaction and standards that are needed for development: "There cannot be two sets of ethical principles, one for life in the school, and the other for life outside of the school."⁹⁴ It is Dewey's belief that in most cases the school does not go far enough in this direction:

92 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 61-62.

93 John Dewey, "Religion in Our Schools", in The Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, as found in Education Today, p. 75.

94 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 7.

The social work of the school is often limited to training for citizenship, and citizenship is then interpreted in a narrow sense as meaning capacity to vote intelligently, disposition to obey laws, etc. But it is futile to contract and cramp the ethical responsibility of the school in this way.⁹⁵

Apparently he believes that these efforts are too frequently limited to opportunities to practise moral principles which are already established and imposed by the school rather than those which are developed freely out of the social situations in which the students are presently involved. The extent to which Dewey is willing to pursue this course of action is expressed in these words:

... the ethical responsibility of the school on the social side must be interpreted in the broadest and freest spirit; it is equivalent to that training of the child which will give him such possession of himself that he may take charge of himself; may not only adapt himself to the changes that are going on, but have power to shape and direct them.⁹⁶

Further indications that the school ought to serve as the laboratory of moral development in the same manner in which it is found in society at large are expressed in these terms:

The child ought to have the same motives for right doing and to be judged by the same standards in the school, as the adult in the wider social life to which he belongs.⁹⁷

95 Ibid., p. 8.

96 Ibid., p. 11.

97 Ibid., p. 17.

Now it is a wholesome thing for any one to be made aware that thoughtless, self-centered action on his part exposes him to the indignation and dislike of others.⁹⁸

If the standard of morals is low it is because the education given by the interaction of the individual with his social environment is defective.⁹⁹

The school ought to reflect the same moral standards that are expected of adults outside the school setting. One's first impression may be that such a standard will require too much of young children. But Dewey tempers this view with the belief that teachers should refrain from the damaging practice of using fear, punishment, and derisive comments in order to force the child into new modes of moral conduct:

In the first place, morals cut off from positive roots in man's nature is [sic] bound to be mainly negative.¹⁰⁰

Moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in effect committing suicide.¹⁰¹

'Give a dog a bad name and hang him.' Human nature has been the dog of professional moralists, and consequences accord with the proverb. Man's nature has been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks [..] It has appeared to be so evilly disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it.¹⁰²

98 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 293.

99 Ibid., p. 291.

100 Ibid., p. 6.

101 Ibid., p. 6.

102 Ibid., p. 3.

Attention to wrong-doing distorts the child's ability to see his social-moral responsibilities. In short, it emphasizes the wrong things while neglecting the right things.

Any conditions that compel the teacher to make note of human failures rather than of healthy growth give false standards and result in distortion and perversion. Attending to wrong-doing ought to be an incident rather than a principle.¹⁰³

Thus Dewey believes that moral development should be free from punishment:

... conduct is not moral except as its motive is pure--except, that is, as free from reference to personal fear of punishment and hope of reward.¹⁰⁴

An astonishingly large number [of Dewey's undergraduate students] record that they got their first distinct moral impressions through punishment, and of these a considerable fraction got the idea that the chief reason for doing right was to avoid punishment in the future. This division runs into that dealing with the religious motive, as sometimes the fear was of punishment from parent, sometimes from God, [..] all the reports re-enforce [sic] the lesson which moralists of pretty much all schools have agreed in teaching--that appeal to fear as such is morally harmful.¹⁰⁵

103 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 16.

104 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 114.

105 John Dewey, "The Chaos in Moral Training", Popular Science Monthly, XLV, August, 1894, as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 4, p. 110-111.

Concomitant with the idea of some moralists that human nature is perverse, is the belief that it needs to be, at the least, controlled if not subdued. However, Dewey believes that social and self controls emerge through careful attention to consequences and reflective thinking. He also believes that there is nothing inherently perverse in human nature and that moral development occurs only when natural interests and impulses are given a large measure of free expression. Only in this way can the impulses and actions of the individual be modified by their interaction with society. Action, experience and testing are the forerunners of moral growth. In the school setting, the appropriate educational method is that the teacher should allow the child freedom to act, to explore, to make mistakes, and to revise his own judgements in the process. In a word, he should allow freedom. Here the teacher must be careful not to impose his own will upon the students' thoughts to the extent that individual freedom is destroyed:

The operation of the teacher's own mental habit tends, unless carefully watched and guided, to make the child a student of the teacher's peculiarities rather than¹⁰⁶ of the subjects that he is supposed to study.

106 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 61.

'If you find that what I am telling you, or what another teacher here tells you, gets in the way of your common sense, of your use of your own judgment in an actual school situation, forget what you have learned and rely upon what your own judgment tells you is the best thing to do under the circumstances.'¹⁰⁷

Dewey regards dogmatic methods as harmful. He prefers to replace these practices with more stress on individual thought and action so that moral growth may occur.

Dogmatic methods which prescribe and make for docility and passivity not only become ineffective in modern society but they actually hinder the development of the largest possibilities of society.¹⁰⁸

Here, then, is the moral standard, by which to test the work of the school upon the side of what it does directly for individuals [..] Does the school system, at present, attach sufficient importance to the spontaneous instincts and impulses? Does it afford sufficient opportunity for these to assert themselves and work out their own results?¹⁰⁹

But when we recognize there are certain powers within the child urgent for development, needing to be acted out in order to secure their own efficiency and discipline, we have a firm basis upon which to build. Effort arises normally in the attempt to give full operation, and thus growth and completion, to these powers.¹¹⁰

107 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 30-31.

108 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 127.

109 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 53.

110 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 14-15.

Freedom carries with it the notion of responsibility, and the main point in providing freedom is precisely so that the individual might change and grow to be more responsible in his choices:

A man might have 'acted otherwise than he did act' if he had been a different kind of person, and the point in holding him liable for what he did do (and for being the kind of person he was in doing it) is that he may become a different kind of self, and henceforth choose different sorts of ends.¹¹¹

It is Dewey's view that the teacher should provide opportunities for students to form judgments on moral situations which are truly open-ended. The presentation of real-life problems and dilemmas generates reflective thought and is useful in calling close attention to consequences:

Let the teacher, at the outset, ask the pupils how they would decide, if a case of seeming misery were presented to them, whether to relieve it, and if so how to relieve. This should be done without any preliminary dwelling upon the question as a 'moral' one; rather, it should be pointed out that the question is simply a practical one, and that ready-made moral considerations are to be put to one side. Above all, however, it should be made clear that the question is not what to do, but how to decide what to do.¹¹²

A need for reflective morality grows out of conflict between ends, and Dewey believes that the role of moral theory is

¹¹¹ John Dewey, Theory of The Moral Life, p. 171.

¹¹² John Dewey, "Teaching Ethics in the High School", Educational Review, Nov., 1893, as found in Education Theory, Vol. 17, No. 2, April, 1967, p. 223.

threefold.¹¹³ First, moral theory should generalize the types of moral conflict. Secondly, it should state the ways in which others have dealt with and thought of the problems. Thirdly, it should aid in systematic reflection and suggest alternatives. On the other hand, "ready-made solutions contradict the very nature of reflective morality."¹¹⁴ The important task for the teacher is that of getting the child to reflect on his own actions:

First, it is true that the child can not see in the act all that an adult sees in it. There is not the slightest reason why he should. If he did, it would be an entirely different act, an act having different conditions, a different aim, and a different value. The question is whether the child can be made to see the reason why he should perform the act, not why some other older person should perform it. [...] the ideal is to appeal to the child's own intelligence and interest as much as possible.¹¹⁵

In this task the teacher has an ally in "the natural strong interest of children in moral questions--not, indeed, as consciously moral, but as questions of what to do and what not to do".¹¹⁶ Although the child must seek his own conclusions

113 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 6.

114 Ibid., p. 8.

115 John Dewey, "The Chaos in Moral Training", Popular Science Monthly, XLV, August, 1894, as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Volume 4, p. 115.

116 Ibid., p. 115.

and decide on the basis of his own experiences, it is the teacher's task to guide his thinking so that he might benefit from the broader experiences of his teacher:

To give reason to a child, to suggest to him a motive--I care not what--for doing the right thing, is to have and use a moral theory. To point out its consequences to himself in the way of pains and pleasures; to point out its reaction into his own habits and character; to show how it affects the welfare of others; to point out what strained and abnormal relations it sets up between him and others, and the reaction of these relations upon his own happiness and future actions--to point to any of these things with a view to instilling moral judgment and disposition is to appeal to a theory of the moral life.¹¹⁷

It is apparent from the educational practices related to Dewey's concepts of moral growth, that he is opposed to the teacher's setting aside of certain regular periods of the day for moral instruction as such. He is also opposed to any attempt in the classroom to indoctrinate children with fixed moral values. He emphasizes, instead, the importance to children of discussion and reflection upon moral dilemmas which lie within the scope of their own everyday experiences. It is the teacher's role to give guidance, suggest courses of action, and to encourage children to reflect upon the personal and social consequences which might attend their actions.

117 Ibid., p. 117.

5. Summary

Moral growth is concerned with principles of behaviour as they affect the common good of the individual and society. The key to a truly moral life is to find a proper balance of actions and choices that work in the best interests of both. In this respect the raw impulses of the individual need guidance, first by society and the school as an institution of society, and later, as moral growth progresses, by the individual himself.

Because society is constantly changing, its moral values must be modified and developed in harmony with these changes. Thus a morality based on fixed and enduring principles does not serve the society nor the individual well. Dewey's quarrel with institutionalized religion is that it frequently holds fixed moral principles which are rooted in divine imperatives. As a result, in his later writings he develops a secular approach to moral concepts, a position which runs counter to his earlier writings.

Dewey's later concepts of moral growth are rooted in social standards. Society sets the guidelines concerning acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and it offers both rewards and punishments to its members according to its own needs.

In spite of this strong social orientation of moral standards, the individual holds the key to his own moral

development. He possesses the freedom of experience, to act, and above all to make moral choices. However, in order to attain moral growth it is necessary for him to use his freedom wisely. To do so he must understand society and the consequences that follow from his actions. He must be aware of alternative courses of action and reflect carefully on the outcomes of these alternatives. As moral growth develops, and individual impulses and habits come to serve the best interests of the individual, he eventually gives direction to the ongoing changes of society itself.

The young child needs help in this process of moral growth, and the school as an institution of society should serve in this function. Teachers should assist children in understanding the consequences of their actions and in considering possible alternatives. They should encourage social interaction and provide opportunities for the development of moral values through open-ended discussions which give practice in making moral judgements. Dewey is confident that children will come to use their freedom wisely. His optimism is founded in the belief that social sanctions and social approval serve as adequate moral guides and that the attendant consequences of one's actions lead to adequate moral standards.

In conclusion, Dewey is very concerned with moral development and he believes that the school has a significant role to play in this task. In this connection Dewey's moral principles are compatible with his general views of education as outlined in Chapter II. These include the continuous and cumulative nature of growth, fusion of means and ends, lack of fixed principles, and ready acceptance of flexibility and change. Finally, when Dewey speaks of growth in education, one of the main traits of growth is moral development.

CHAPTER V

GROWTH AS INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

John Dewey regards intellectual development as a proper aim in education. The topic of intellectual development and its importance as an educational aim will be discussed in section one. The second section will be concerned with Dewey's own particular view of the best route to intellectual growth under the heading of reflective thought. Reflective thought, in Dewey's terms, is a process of thinking which is patterned after the scientific method. Section three will discuss the role of the scientific method in the process of reflective thought. Section four will deal with Dewey's view of affective factors of intellectual growth such as impulse, interest and curiosity. In the final section Dewey's suggestions for promoting the process of intellectual development in schools will be discussed.

1. Intellectual Development as an Aim in Education

Dewey believes that "interest in intellectual matters" is the outcome to which education should proceed".¹ He

¹ John Dewey, How We Think, p. 226.

holds that "without conceptualizing or intellectualizing, nothing is gained" that "counts, educationally speaking".² Further he notes that "no educational question is of greater import than how to get intellectual good out of what persons and books have to communicate."³

Dewey believes that it is possible to train people to think clearly and that it is the responsibility of education to do so.

For anything approaching their adequate realization, /i.e., the realization of values which derive from training thought /thought needs careful and attentive educational direction.⁴

With "careful and attentive educational direction" good intellectual habits can be developed. In fact Dewey believes that "forming intellectual habits" is the "most pressing problem of education".⁵ In his words, "we state emphatically that, upon its intellectual side education consists in the formation of wide-awake, careful, thorough habits of thinking."⁶ This statement indicates that intellectual habits, like other habits, may be developed in such a manner as to result in either good or bad consequences. It is this possibility

2 Ibid., p. 153.

3 Ibid., p. 257.

4 Ibid., p. 22.

5 Ibid., p. 216.

6 Ibid., p. 78.

of developing either constructive or destructive habits that gives an urgency to Dewey's belief that intellectual development should be an important educational aim. The above statement of Dewey also suggests that some patterns of thinking are preferable to others.

In summary, Dewey holds that intellectual growth is an important educational aim. He believes that constructive intellectual habits can be developed and that some patterns of thinking are preferable to others.

2. Reflective Thought

In general, the term reflective thought is used by Dewey interchangeably with reflective inquiry⁷ and both terms convey the notion of an active mental process.

Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions⁸ to which it tends constitutes reflective thought.

It is apparent from the above statement that reflective thought stresses the need for active participation on the part of the learner and Dewey makes no distinctions in his use of the terms reflective thought and reflective thinking.

7 Ibid., p. 6 and 12-14.

8 Ibid., p. 9.

It is important to note that in Dewey's view, some patterns of intellectual development are preferable to others. "The better way of thinking [..] is called reflective thinking."⁹ Thus when Dewey refers to intellectual development he is concerned about cultivating the process of reflective thinking:

... it is evident that education, upon its intellectual side, is vitally concerned with cultivating the attitude of reflective thinking, preserving it where it already exists, and changing looser methods of thought into stricter ones whenever possible.¹⁰

In general, this growth [intellectual advance] is a natural process. But the proper recognition and use of it is perhaps the most serious problem in instruction upon the intellectual side. A person who has gained the power of reflective attention, the power to hold problems, questions, before the mind, is in so far, intellectually speaking, educated.¹¹

In Dewey's mind reflective thinking is "discriminated from other kinds of thinking"¹² so that in intellectual matters, "educative effort is a sign of the transformation of a comparatively blind activity [..] into a more consciously reflective one."¹³

9 Ibid., p. 3.

10 Ibid., p. 78.

11 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 147.

12 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 76.

13 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 58.

One description of reflective thought has already been cited. Other definitions and descriptions reveal the multi-dimensional aspects of this concept. The ability to relate ideas properly to each other is an important part of Dewey's concept of reflective thought:

Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a con-sequence--a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each outcome in turn leans back on or refers to, its predecessors.¹⁴

[Reflective] thinking for the purposes of this inquiry, is accordingly defined as that operation in which present facts suggest other facts (or truths) in such a way as to induce belief in what is suggested on the ground of real relation, in the things themselves, a relation between what suggests and what is suggested.¹⁵

All authorities agree that the discernment of relationships is the genuinely intellectual matter; hence, the educative matter.¹⁶

Here Dewey refers to the importance of linking ideas together in proper relationships. One idea or action has its consequences upon another, and in each event the results are "reflected" upon subsequent actions. In this sense, "reflective thought is a chain"¹⁷ which joins isolated pieces

14 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 12.

16 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 144.

17 Ibid., p. 4.

of information together to reveal their meaning or purpose. In Dewey's words, "the train must lead somewhere; it must be substantiated outside the course of the images".¹⁸

This function whereby one thing signifies or indicates another, thus leading us to consider how far the one may be regarded as warrant for belief in the other, is then, the central factor in all reflective or distinctively intellectual thinking.¹⁹

In previous chapters the importance of cumulative and continuous aspects of growth was presented in relation to social and moral development. To relate ideas suggests the consecutive nature of thought, but reflective thought implies more to Dewey than a simple bringing together of ideas. They must be related with precision and purpose.

There is no thinking without what is called 'association of ideas', or a train of suggestions. But such a train, of itself, does not constitute reflection. Only when the succession is so controlled that it is an orderly sequence leading up to a conclusion that contains the intellectual force of the preceding ideas, do we have reflective thought.²⁰

It means variety and change of ideas combined into a single, steady trend moving toward a unified conclusion.²¹

18 Ibid., p. 5.

19 Ibid., p. 11.

20 Ibid., p. 47.

21 Ibid., p. 28.

The word 'reason' is connected etymologically with the word 'ratio'. The underlying idea here is exactness of relationship. All reflective thinking is a process of detecting relations; the terms just used indicate that good thinking is not contented with finding 'any old kind' of relation but searches until a relation is found that is as accurately defined as conditions permit.²²

Relating ideas to one another in a meaningful way implies an active involvement on the part of the learner. Dewey rejects the concept of passive acceptance in the learning process. There must be first hand involvement and activity, at least mentally, if not physically:

Thinking is inquiry, investigation, turning over, probing or delving into, so as to find something new or to see what is already known in a different light.²³

For experimental inquiry or thinking signifies direct activity, doing something which varies the conditions under which objects are observed and directly had and by instituting new arrangements among them.²⁴

But intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses. These are impossible without an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien; and active desire to entertain considerations which modify existing purposes.²⁵

22 Ibid., p. 77.

23 Ibid., p. 265.

24 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 123.

25 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 175.

It will be apparent that mind is one with intelligent or purposeful activity--with an activity that means something and in which the meaning counts ²⁶ as a factor in the development of the activity.

Stimulation to active thinking originates out of problems to be solved and difficulties to be surmounted. Frequently "deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action which straightens it out".²⁷ Dewey believes that the confrontation of meaningful problems serves as one of the best motivators of mental activity:

Positively, it is the whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive continuity, and its inner active distraction, its elements at odds with each other, in tension against each other, each contending for its proper placing and ²⁸relationship, which generates the thought situation.

If the action indicated be carried out and the disordered or disturbed situation persists, then we have not merely confuted the tentative positions of intelligence, but we have in the very process of acting introduced new data and eliminated some of the old ones, and thus afforded an opportunity for the resurvey of the facts and the revision of the plan of action. By acting faithfully upon an adequate reflective presentation,²⁹ we have at least secured the elements for its improvement.

26 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 92.

27 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 187.

28 John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 122.

29 Ibid., p. 241.

It is John Dewey's conviction that intellectual growth advances in proportion to the inner mental activity that the learner is able to bring to bear upon specific situations which in their beginnings are frequently typified by dilemmas, confusion and conflicts, or by problems to be solved. In his view, some systems of thought, such as the scientific method, lend themselves better to this approach than do others.

Dewey is critical of the epistemological method of empiricism and he feels that it does not serve as an appropriate method for reflective thinking.³⁰ His description of empiricism is as follows:

Since the impressions made upon the mind by objects were generally termed sensations, empiricism thus became a doctrine of sensationalism--that is to say, a doctrine which identified knowledge with the reception and association of sensory impressions.³¹

It is clear from the above statement that Dewey associates empiricism with sensory impressions and that empiricism and sensationalism are regarded synonymously. His main criticism of the epistemological method of empiricism, particularly

30 John Dewey, "Intellectual and Practical Studies" and "Theories of Knowledge" in Democracy and Education, Chapters 20 and 25. See also "The Play of Ideas" in Quest for Certainty, p. 166.

31 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 268.

as it was espoused several centuries earlier by John Locke, is with its passive acceptance of isolated sense data.

Dewey comments that "a thoroughly false psychology of mental development underlay sensationalistic empiricism".³²

Empiricism stresses sense impressions in isolation rather than in their active connections with events and their attendant meanings and consequences.

Since the impressions made upon the mind by objects were generally termed sensations, empiricism thus became a doctrine of sensationalism--that is to say, a doctrine which identified knowledge with the reception and association of sensory impressions [...]. So far, there is nothing to complain of. But the emphasis upon sensationalism also operated to influence the way in which natural objects were employed, and to prevent full good being got from them. 'Object lessons' tended to isolate the mere sense-activity and make it an end in itself. The more isolated the object, the more isolated the sensory quality, the more distinct the sense-impression as a unit of knowledge. The theory worked not only in the direction of this mechanical isolation, [...] but also to the neglect of thinking.³³

The failure of empiricism to account for mathematical ideas is due to its failure to connect them with acts performed. In accord with its sensationalistic character, traditional empiricism sought their origin [the origin of mathematical ideas] in sensory impression, or at most in supposed abstraction from properties antecedently characterizing physical things.³⁴

32 Ibid., p. 270.

33 Ibid., p. 268-269.

34 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 156.

According to Dewey, the simple grouping or organizing of things and experiences into categories does not in itself constitute intellectual meaning. Education should be on guard against the tendency in empiricism to view events in isolation.

Education takes the individual while he is relatively plastic, before he has become so indurated by isolated experiences as to be rendered hopelessly empirical in his habit of mind.³⁵

Dewey equates the methods of empiricism with the practice of viewing sense impressions in isolation rather than with the practice of reflecting upon their meanings so that understanding and general concepts may be achieved. He is distrustful that concepts and general ideas can be attained through the methods of empiricism.

... empiricism has also misread the significance of conceptions or general ideas. [...] Concepts are thus simply memoranda of identical features in objects already perceived; they are conveniences, bunching together a variety of things scattered about in concrete experience.³⁶

Even when objects and events are carefully observed, it is important to keep in mind that things are not always what they appear to be. Without reflection, mere sensory data can be quite misleading:

35 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 202. The underlining in the present writer's.

36 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 166.

There are comparatively few cases in which we can accept without questioning the so-called 'evidence of the senses'; the sun does not really travel around the earth; the moon does³⁷ not actually change its own form, and so on.

Clearly, observation in isolation, as found in the methods of empiricism, is not compatible with Dewey's notion of reflective thought. Only when sense data are actively reflected upon "in the context of meanings wrought out in the larger experience "³⁸ do they take on their true importance in intellectual development.

Dewey is also critical of the epistemological method of rationalism or intellectualism--a system which he believes tends to rely too heavily upon inner reason and logic to the exclusion of sense impressions and experience. His description of the epistemological approach of rationalism is as follows:

Rational knowledge is supposed to be something which touches reality in ultimate, intellectual fashion; to be pursued for its own sake and properly to terminate in purely theoretical³⁹ insight, not debased by application in behavior.

37 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 77.

38 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 343.

39 Ibid., p. 334.

Because of its heavy reliance on purely intellectual means, Dewey equates the term rationalism with intellectualism.⁴⁰ He regards the methods of rationalism as inferior to those of reflective thinking as exemplified in the following statement:

Inquiry proceeds by reflection, by thinking; but not, most decidedly, by thinking as conceived, in the old tradition, as something cooped up within 'mind!'. For experimental inquiry or thinking signifies directed activity, doing something which varies the conditions under which objects are observed and directly had and ⁴¹by instituting new arrangements among them.

Dewey believes that "theory apart from experience cannot be definitely grasped even as a theory."⁴² Consequently he decries practices where "thinking is often regarded both in philosophic theory and in educational practice as something cut off from experience, and capable of being cultivated in isolation."⁴³

40 Ibid., p. 298. See also "The Naturalization of of Intelligence" in The Quest for Certainty, p. 195-222.

41 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 123.

42 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 144.

43 Ibid., p. 153.

The most direct blow at the traditional separation of doing and knowing and at the traditional prestige of purely 'intellectual' studies, however, has been given by the progress of experimental science. If this progress has demonstrated anything, it is that there is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the offspring of doing. The analysis and rearrangement of facts which is indispensable to the growth of knowledge and power of explanation and right classification cannot be attained purely mentally--just inside the head.⁴⁴

It is Dewey's belief that, with the findings of Darwin and the promotion of the scientific method, there was a growing change in what was conceived to be truly intellectual activity.

What is of moment is that intelligence has descended. from its lonely isolation at the remote edge of things, whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to take its seat in the moving affairs of men.⁴⁵

A second important criticism of the epistemological methods of extreme intellectualism or rationalism concerns the matter of fixed truths. Dewey regards any system of thought which professes such fixed truths as inimical to educational growth:

44 Ibid., p. 275.

45 John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 55.

In contrast with this experimental and re-adjusting intelligence, it must be said that Reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness, conceit, irresponsibility, and rigidity--in short absolutism [...] --irresponsibility because rationalism assumes that the concepts of reason are so self-sufficient and so far above experience that they need and can secure no confirmation in experience.⁴⁶

Dewey is critical of the principle of ready-made truth both within education and outside of it as proposed by the school of rationalism.

Bare logic, however important in arranging and criticizing existing subject matter, cannot spin new subject matter out of itself. In education, the correlative is trust in general ready-made rules and principles to secure agreement, irrespective of seeing to it that the pupil's ideas really agree with one another.⁴⁷

The doctrine that nature is inherently rational was a costly one. It entailed the idea that reason in man is an outside spectator of a rationality already complete in itself. It deprived reason in man of an active and creative office; its business was simply to copy, to represent symbolically, to view a given rational structure.⁴⁸

Concomitant with the idea that intellectual growth should not proceed towards fixed ends, is the notion that reflective thinking has an instrumental function. That is, the value of reflective thinking does not lie in the thoughts

46 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 97. See also p. 98. The term "historic rationalism" is used in reference to extreme rationalism as practised by Kant. In Dewey's view, Kantian rationalism exemplified "dogmatic rigidity".

47 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 299.

48 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 211.

themselves so much as in what the process of thinking can lead to. Because of its instrumental function, reflective thinking serves as a key to other worthwhile goals in education such as moral growth, social growth, and in the end, self growth. In this respect, "we find reflection, or thought, occupying an intermediate and reconstructive position"⁴⁹ in the ongoing development of social, moral, and self growth. Dewey criticizes educational systems of his day because frequently "they ignored the temporally intermediate and instrumental place of reflection".⁵⁰ Although reason and the intellect may be regarded as valuable in themselves, their value is enhanced by their instrumental function:

... instrumentalism holds that an object as a knowledge-object is never a whole; that it is surrounded with and inclosed by things which are quite other than objects of knowledge, so that knowledge cannot be understood in isolation or when taken⁵¹ as mere beholding or grasping of objects.

When Dewey states that "an object as a knowledge-object is never a whole" this statement reflects his view of knowledge as a multi-faceted concept. Knowledge is not merely a

49 John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, New York, Dover, c. 1916, p. 18.

50 Ibid., p. 22.

51 Ibid., p. 32.

collection of facts. It involves an active process of knowing which includes observation, experience, consequences, relationships, and above all, reflection and understanding. The process of reflection is valuable for what it can lead to in terms of meaning, depth of understanding, and in seeing the relationships of various facts. In this sense reflective thought is an "instrument" of growth.

The instrumental theory acknowledges the objectivity of meanings as well as of data. They are referred to and employed in reflective inquiry with the confidence attached to the hard facts of sense.⁵²

Here, as in so many other things, the great evil lies in separating instrumental and final functions. Intelligence is partial and specialized, because communication and participation are limited, sectarian, provincial, confined to class, party, professional group.⁵³

In summary, the following points represent Dewey's propositions relative to the concept of intellectual growth conceived as the process of reflective thinking. Intellectual growth is decidedly an important aim in education. Nevertheless, the primary value of intellectual growth lies in the instrumental role rather than as a complete end in itself. Dewey uses the term "reflective thought" in order to distinguish it as a mental process which is different from the

52 Ibid., p. 46.

53 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 205.

process presented by both empiricism and rationalism. Reflective thought is meant to convey the notion of an active process which unites experiences and meaning. The reflective process brings understanding to the individual by linking ideas in their proper relationships rather than in isolation so that cause and effect relationships and their attendant consequences might be noted. Dewey's opposition to the epistemological method of empiricism is that it views sensory data in isolation and that the learner is not actively involved in mental reflection. His opposition to the epistemological method of rationalism is two-fold as well. It fails to take into account man's first-hand experiences and observations and it relies heavily upon fixed truths.

The general propositions regarding reflective thought that have already been discussed tell more about its aims than about the actual method of operation. When it comes to the application of reflective thought, that is to the process of thinking itself, Dewey turns his attention to the methods of science. He believes that the scientific method serves well the process of reflective inquiry.

3. The Scientific Method in Reflective Inquiry

In the discussion which follows it should be noted that the scientific method is regarded by Dewey as an integral part of his concept of reflective inquiry rather than as something that stands apart from it. It is important to note as well, that Dewey is concerned with the scientific method as a process rather than with science as an accumulated body of knowledge.

Science is not constituted by any particular body of subject matter. It is constituted by a method, a method of changing beliefs by means of tested inquiry as well as of arriving at them.⁵⁴

It is Dewey's belief that this process can function well as an appropriate method of reflective thinking within education as well as within the wider context of everyday living:

... scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live. It means that scientific method provides a working pattern of the way in which and the conditions under which experiences are used to lead ever onward and outward. Adaption of the method to individuals of various degrees of maturity is a problem for the educator.⁵⁵

54 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 39.

55 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 88.

Education is a mode of life, of action. As an act it is wider than science. The latter, however, renders those who engage in the act more intelligent, more thoughtful, more aware of what they are about, and thus rectify and enrich in the future what they have been doing in the past.⁵⁶

Again, it is apparent from the above statement that Dewey refers to the scientific method as an active process rather than science as a body of knowledge. Yet he does not wish to discount the importance of accumulated knowledge in the learning process.

That which we call a science or study puts the net product of past experiences in the form which makes it most available for the future. [...] It economizes the workings of the mind in every way.⁵⁷

It [information] should be an integral part of the operations of learning that construct the scientific attitude; that are, indeed, a part of that attitude since the scientific inquirer is above all else a continuing and persistent learner.⁵⁸

These statements indicate the importance of the scientific method to education and to learning in general. But Dewey is more explicit concerning his belief that the method of science ought to be the method of reflection. The following statements are indicative:

56 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education, p.

57 John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, University of Chicago, c. 1902, p. 21.

58 John Dewey, "The Supreme Intellectual Obligation", from Science Education, February, 1934, as quoted in Education Today, p. 285-286.

Without initiation into the scientific spirit one is not in possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised for effectively directed reflection.⁵⁹

The full victory will not be won until every subject and lesson is taught in connection with its bearing upon creation and growth of the kind of power of observation, inquiry, reflection and testing⁶⁰ that are the heart of scientific intelligence.

It is only a variation upon this same theme to say that every complete act of reflective inquiry makes provision for experimentation--for testing suggested and accepted principles by employing them for the active construction of new cases, in which new qualities emerge. Only slowly do our school accommodate themselves to the general advance of scientific method.⁶¹

In its simplest form the scientific method begins with the recognition of a problem to be solved--a difficulty arising out of some perplexing situation, the confrontation of confusing information, or an unexpected outcome when the effectiveness of established habits breaks down. Out of this situation of vague confusion and uneasiness the active mind attempts to formulate the problem in more precise forms. As the problem becomes more clearly defined, upon reflection, a number of possible solutions emerge. These in turn

59 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 189.

60 John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), p. 168.

61 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 188.

represent hypotheses to be tested in experience. Without the careful formulation of hypotheses, all efforts towards a solution of the problem tend to be reduced to trial and error or to mechanical following of rules instead.⁶²

"The method of science engrained through education means emancipation from rule of thumb and from the routine generated by rule of thumb procedure."⁶³ Efforts at a solution of the problem are economized by careful reflection upon hypotheses which lead in a step-by-step progression to a specific end. The scientific method culminates in carefully testing ideas through observation, the application of new knowledge, or through the consequences of new ideas or actions. In brief, the following description of reflective thought is compatible with the scientific method:

- (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity.⁶⁴

62 Vide "Observation Valuable When Guided by Hypotheses in How We Think, p. 167-168. Also "Hypothesis" in The Sources of a Science of Education, p. 54-55.

63 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 225.

64 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 12.

The importance of recognizing the problem can scarcely be over-emphasized. In intellectual growth, it marks the beginning of one's awareness of the need to think reflectively. It serves as a motivator of thought:

Deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action that straightens it out.⁶⁵

Every reflective knowledge, in other words, has a specific task which is set by a concrete and empirical situation, so that it can perform that task only by detecting and remaining faithful to the conditions in the situation in which the difficulty arises [...]⁶⁶

Thinking begins in what may fairly enough be called a forked-road situation, a situation that is ambiguous, that presents a dilemma, that proposes alternatives.⁶⁷

It [thinking] arises from the need of meeting some difficulty, in reflecting upon the best way of overcoming it, and thus leads to planning, to projecting mentally the result to be reached, and deciding upon the steps necessary in their serial order.⁶⁸

It [thinking] is occasioned by an unsettlement and it aims at overcoming a disturbance.⁶⁹

Unfortunately a desire to overcome a disturbance may lead to a blocking out of the problem. In a desire to arrive at

65 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 187.

66 John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 12.

67 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 14.

68 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 135.

69 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 326.

settlement and assurance, the learner may fail to recognize that a problem exists at all:

The commonest fallacy is to suppose that since the state of doubt is accompanied by a feeling of uncertainty, knowledge arises when the feeling gives way to one of assurance.⁷⁰

The more precisely the problem is defined the less haphazard are the solutions which emerge. In its most formal sense, defining the problem through the reflective process is "a rather complex intellectual operation".⁷¹

It [defining the problem] involves (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had a wider experience; and (3) judgment which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify.⁷²

The formation of the problem is crucial in giving direction to the processes of thought that follow it. In Dewey's words, "the nature of the problem fixes the end of thought, and the end controls the process of thinking."⁷³

70 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 227.

71 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 80.

72 Ibid., p. 80.

73 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 15.

In truth, every genuine experiment involves a problem in which something must be found out and where overt action must be guided by an idea used as a working hypothesis so as to give action purpose and point.⁷⁴

In turn, hypotheses function as "educated guesses", or more properly put, as informed but tentative solutions, to be tested in experience. Hypotheses serve as guiding ideas to delimit the multiplicity of possible directions which controlled observation or experimentation might lead to in seeking a final solution.⁷⁵ One of Dewey's more succinct descriptions of hypotheses and their relation to the scientific method is as follows:

Ability to frame hypotheses is the means by which man is liberated from submergence in the existences that surround him and that play upon him physically and sensibly. It is the positive phase of abstraction. But hypotheses are conditional; they have to be tested by the consequences of the operations they define and direct [...]. Scientific conceptions are not a revelation of prior and independent reality. They are a system of hypotheses, worked out under conditions of definite test, by means of which our intellectual and practical traffic with nature is rendered freer, more secure and more significant.⁷⁶

74 Ibid., p. 80.

75 For further discussion of the role of hypotheses see "Observation Valuable When Guided by Hypotheses", in How We Think, p. 167.

76 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 165.

To many people, the idea of testing a hypothesis under laboratory conditions may conjure up visions of precisely-made scientific equipment, careful measurement of microscopic particles, and fastidious recording of details. However, when applied to reflective thought, testing implies careful observation and judgement, taking account of past and present experiences, and attention to the consequences of one's actions. It implies that the observer will link events and ideas together in their proper sequence so that cause and effect relationships may be noted and understood.⁷⁷ Taken together, these processes involve the individual as a mentally active agent--as an active participant in the thinking process rather than as a passive receiver of facts and ideas.

The role of experience and consequences has been discussed previously⁷⁸ and it should be noted that both experience and consequences are instrumental in testing hypotheses and in providing and processing data which lead to informed conclusions. At the core of reflective thought, however, is judgement, and a consideration of its function should be helpful at this point. In Dewey's view, judgement involves the

77 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 4.

78 Vide Chapter II.

ability to estimate, appraise, evaluate, and to relate ideas correctly.⁷⁹ In his words, "the heart of a good habit of thought lies in the power to pass judgments pertinently and discriminately."⁸⁰ The need for judgement arises out of a "controversy within the mind" where "different sides compete for a conclusion in their favour".⁸¹ The judgement itself involves "the weighing of alternative claims",⁸² selection of pertinent facts, and exclusion of irrelevant ones. The data must then be interpreted in the light of criteria which culminate in a judgement and a decision.

There is a danger that the step-by-step procedure of reflective thought, particularly under the name of the scientific method, may be regarded by many as rigid and mechanistic. This is not Dewey's intention however:

No one can tell another person in any definite way how he should think, any more than how he ought to breathe or have his blood circulate.⁸³

79 Vide "The Place of Judgment in Reflective Activity", Chapter 8 in How We Think, p. 119-120.

80 Ibid., p. 121.

81 Ibid., p. 121.

82 Ibid., p. 121.

83 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 3.

In practice, two of them, [steps in the scientific method] may telescope, some of them may be passed over hurriedly, and the burden of reaching a conclusion may fall mainly on a single phase, which will then require a seemingly disproportionate development. ⁸⁴ No set rules can be laid down on such matters.

Individual approaches to reflective thought vary and the scientific method is meant to serve as a guide. In the end, one's attitudes prove to be equally as important in reflective thinking as the application of the scientific method.

Summarily, the scientific method is regarded by Dewey as the appropriate method of reflective thinking. In its simplest form, the scientific method begins with the recognition of a problem to be solved. As the problem becomes more clearly defined a number of possible solutions emerge. Upon further reflection, the more obviously unsatisfactory solutions are discarded and remaining solutions are refined into hypotheses to be tested by further reflection or by active experimentation. The scientific method culminates in carefully testing hypotheses in a step-by-step progression with the specific aim of resolving the original problem. Each step of the scientific method requires a degree of reasoning and careful judgement. Dewey recognizes that individual approaches to reflective thinking may vary and too rigid an application of the step-by-step procedures

84 Ibid., p. 116.

of the scientific method may inhibit the thinking of some individuals. He also recognizes that individual attitudes and affective factors may enhance or inhibit reflective thinking.

4. Affective Aspects of Intellectual Growth

In this section the term "affective aspects" refers to the effect that an individual's feelings, attitudes and emotions have upon his intellectual growth. One of the more important of these is an attitude of open-mindedness.

Openness of mind means accessibility of mind to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to be cleared up, and that will help determine the consequences of acting this way or that.⁸⁵

Dewey describes it as the "retention of the childlike attitude", while "closed mindedness means premature intellectual old age".⁸⁶ Openmindedness implies a desire to learn more, a willingness to accept new truths and new evidence, and a healthy curiosity since "intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and consequent formation of new purposes and new responses".⁸⁷ In an effort to further describe

85 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 175.

86 Ibid., p. 175.

87 Ibid., p. 175.

the openminded attitude, Dewey states that "openmindedness is not the same as empty-mindedness"⁸⁸ and in another work he describes the characteristics of empty-mindedness as mental sluggishness and prejudice.⁸⁹

Man's preoccupation with "the quest for certainty" militates against an open-minded attitude:

Tendency to premature judgment, jumping at conclusions, excessive love of simplicity, making over of evidence to suit desire, taking the familiar for the clear, etc., all spring from confusing the feeling of certitude with a certified situation.⁹⁰

Although Dewey uses the word "certainty", he believes that absolute certainty is unattainable⁹¹ and man's quest for certainty may block reflective thought by easy acceptance of rule of thumb principles. It may narrow the field of hypotheses prematurely and in the end it can lead to solutions which tend to become rigid and dogmatic principles.

A second attitude which affects intellectual growth is that of feeling responsible or accountable for one's own

88 Ibid., p. 175.

89 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 30-31.

90 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 227.

91 Ibid., p. 204, also p. 33 and 60. See also Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 21, 22; Human Nature and Conduct, p. 219.

free choices. Dewey holds that man undoubtedly possesses freedom to choose ⁹² but he must also feel emotionally ready to assume responsibility for his choices and his everyday actions. The concept of free choice has particular relevance to intellectual growth because it requires individuals to assume an active role in making informed selections, to reflect upon possible alternatives, and to use judgement and reason in evaluating the consequences of one's actions. Yet, Dewey believes that for the vast majority of people, the practice of free choice is a matter of correct attitudes.

If an agent could conceive of but one end in some case, it would always seem to him afterwards that he had been necessitated to act in the direction of that end; but the power to put various ends before the self constitutes 'freedom of choice', or potential freedom. After action, the agent calls to mind that there was another end open to him, and that if he did not choose the other end, it was because of something in his character, which made him prefer the one he actually chose. ⁹³

In Dewey's view, the concept of freedom has its greatest meaning in the intellectual domain, and he holds that it is a truism to say that thoughtless or flippant choices are meaningless expressions of freedom.

92 John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom", chap. 16 in Philosophy and Civilization, p. 276-282; also "Affective Thought", in the same work, p. 117-125. See also Human Nature and Conduct, p. 311.

93 John Dewey, "The Idea of Freedom", The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 3, p. 340-341.

We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about.⁹⁴

The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while.⁹⁵

A physician or engineer is free in his thought and his action in the degree in which he knows what he deals with.⁹⁶

Genuine freedom, in short, is intellectual.⁹⁷

The notion of freedom should not be confused with the idea of thoughtless activity.

Overemphasis upon activity as an end, instead of upon intelligent activity, leads to identification of freedom with immediate execution of impulses and desires.⁹⁸

In the statement just quoted Dewey wishes to emphasize the importance of taking reflective thought rather than to discount the role of impulses or desires in the intellectual process. In his view, emotion, when guided by reflection, serves to enhance intellectual growth:

94 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 250.

95 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 61.

96 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 278.

97 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 90.

98 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 81.

Of course, intelligence does not generate action except as it is enkindled by feeling. But the notion that there is some inherent opposition between emotion and intelligence is a relic of the notion of mind that grew up before the experimental method of science had emerged.⁹⁹

The whole story of man shows that there are no objects that may not deeply stir engrossing emotion. One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion, so intense as to be religious, to intelligence as a force in social action [...]. To say that emotions which are not fused with intelligence are blind is tautology. Intense emotion may utter itself in action that destroys institutions. But the only assurance of birth of better ones is the marriage of emotion with intelligence.¹⁰⁰

Dewey comes to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the forces which initiate the thinking process are themselves arational although not irrational.

When 'vital impulse' is given the only interpretation which is empirically verifiable (that of an organic biological tendency) the fact that an 'irrational' factor is the causal condition of valuations proves that valuations have their roots in an existence which, like any existence taken in itself, is arational.¹⁰¹

Dewey's concept of "impulse" will be discussed here in its connections with intellectual growth. The term

99 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 51.

100 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 79-80.

101 John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, Chicago, University Press, c. 1966. Originally published in Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1939, p. 18.

"impulse" denotes motivation or motive force, and it is easy to recognize the etymological relationship of motion with the term "emotion". It is John Dewey's view that impulse is a necessary motivational force in terms of interest, curiosity, and in the desire to explore the unknown. Raw impulse is in itself undirected however. It needs to be guided by reflective thought but not suppressed by it, so that it may enhance intellectual growth. In time, impulse should be channeled constructively into useful habits of thought.

The man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulses while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation.¹⁰²

A genuine purpose always starts with an impulse.¹⁰³

But when we recognize there are certain powers within the child urgent for development, [...] we have a firm basis upon which to build. Effort arises normally in the attempt to give full operation, and thus growth and completion to these powers. Adequately to act upon these impulses involves seriousness, absorption, definiteness of purpose; it results in formation of steadiness and persistent habit in the service of worthy ends.¹⁰⁴

Although Dewey upholds the notion of reflective thought and the importance of the scientific method, he also recognizes

102 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 184.

103 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 67.

104 John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 14-15.

that intellectual growth must originate in curiosity, interest and impulse, and that it must develop in harmony with attitudes, feelings and emotions.

But in every case where reflective activity ensues, there is a process of intellectualizing what at first is merely an emotional quality of the whole situation.¹⁰⁵

The task of promoting reflective thought and the scientific method, and of giving direction to emotional strengths falls to the classroom teacher. Dewey's suggestions regarding the role of the school should prove helpful in a further understanding of his concept of intellectual growth.

5. Dewey's Suggestions for Promoting the Process of Intellectual Development in Schools

The importance of affective aspects in intellectual growth was stressed in the previous section. Thinking has its beginnings in some state of uneasiness or curiosity, or in a desire to cope with new problems. In any case it begins with an emotional thrust. The following statement is illustrative:

Unless the activity lays hold on the emotions and desires, unless it offers an outlet for energy that means something to the individual himself, his mind will turn in aversion from it, even though he keeps at it.¹⁰⁶

105 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 109.

106 Ibid., p. 218.

Dewey believes that one of the best ways of arousing the required emotional thrust is to appeal to the present interests of the child. He uses the following words in applying this principle to the school situation:

The pupil labeled 'hopeless' may react in quick and lively fashion when the thing-in-hand seems to him worth while, as some out-of-school sport or social affair. Indeed, even the school subject might move him, were it set in a different context and treated in a different method. A boy dull in geometry may prove quick enough when he takes up the subject in connection with manual training; the girl who seems inaccessible to historical facts may respond promptly when it is a question of judging the character and deeds of people of her acquaintance or of fiction.¹⁰⁷

Therefore, Dewey suggests that experience must be directly related to the interests of the child.

Children's drawings afford a further exemplification of the same principle [an appeal to the child's interests]. Perspective does not exist, for the child's interest is not in pictorial representation, but in the values of things represented [...]. The house is drawn with transparent walls, because the rooms, chairs, beds, people inside, are the important things in the house-meaning [...]. At Christmas time, the stockings may be drawn almost as large as the house or even so large they have to be put outside of it--in any case, it is the scale of values in use that furnishes the scale for their qualities.¹⁰⁸

107 Ibid., p. 43.

108 Ibid., p. 143-144.

One of the difficulties, from the teacher's point of view, is that of being vigilant in making use of the child's natural interests:

The peculiar problem of the early grades is, of course, to get hold of the child's natural impulses and instincts, and to utilize them so that the child is carried on to a higher plane of perception and judgment, and equipped with more efficient habits.¹⁰⁹

Dewey abhors the restrictions placed on learning by teachers:

Children are hushed up when they ask questions; their exploring and investigating activities are inconvenient and hence they are treated like nuisances.¹¹⁰

It is Dewey's optimistic belief that an appeal to a child's interests will result in both direct and incidental learning:

To take an instance to which reference has already been made, the direct interest in carpentering or shop work should gradually pass into an interest in geometric and mechanical problems. The interest in cooking should grow into an interest in chemical experimentation and the physiology and hygiene of bodily growth.¹¹¹

Under the stimulus of interest in arriving at the knowledge of some particular subject they [children] overcome the mechanical difficulty of reading with ease and rapidity. Reading is not to them isolated experience; it is a means of acquiring a much desired object. Like climbing the pantry shelves, its difficulties and dangers are lost sight of in the absorbing desire to satisfy the mental appetite.¹¹²

109 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 127-128.

110 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 56.

111 Ibid., p. 226.

112 John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 22.

Closely related to the notion of appealing to students' interests is the idea that experiences and problems used in teaching should be as intimately connected with life experiences as possible. Learning should have its beginnings in first-hand experiences which are within the realm of the child's world:

Speaking generally, the fundamental fallacy in methods of instruction lies in supposing that experience on the part of pupils may be assumed [...]. The fallacy consists in supposing that we can begin with ready-made subject matter of arithmetic, or geography, or whatever, irrespective of some direct personal experience of a situation.¹¹³

Even when a child (or a grown-up) has a problem, it is wholly futile to urge him to think when he has no prior experiences that involve some of the same conditions.¹¹⁴

In Dewey's view, the closer these first-hand experiences come to being authentic or representative of everyday life, the better. It is important that they do not appear to the learner to be artificially contrived.

The giving of problems, the putting of questions, the assigning of tasks, the magnifying of difficulties, is a large part of school work. But it is indispensable to discriminate between genuine and simulated or mock problems.¹¹⁵

113 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 153.

114 Ibid., p. 162.

115 Ibid., p. 155.

Where schools are equipped with laboratories, shops, and gardens, where dramatizations, plays, and games are freely used, opportunities exist for reproducing situations of life, and for acquiring and applying information and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive experiences.¹¹⁶

As a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations which generate real problems, the pupil's problems are not his; or rather, they are his only as a pupil, not as a human being.¹¹⁷

Without experiences and pupil-interest in the material to be learned, there is the danger that both learning and teaching may degenerate into mechanical rules and thoughtless attention to details. This danger is most apparent in the skill subjects where "the tendency is to take the shortest cuts possible to gain the required end. This makes the subjects mechanical, and thus restrictive of intellectual power."¹¹⁸

Sheer imitation, dictation of steps to be taken, mechanical drill, may give results most quickly and yet strengthen traits likely to be fatal to reflective power.¹¹⁹

Frequently a mechanical approach to learning is generated by the teacher's overuse of abstract rules and symbols:

116 Ibid., p. 162.

117 Ibid., p. 156.

118 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 62.

119 Ibid., p. 63.

'Knowing' the definitions, rules, formulae, etc., is like knowing the names of parts of a machine without knowing what they do. In one case, as in the other, the meaning, or intellectual content, is what the element accomplishes in the system of which it is a member.¹²⁰

Symbols are a necessity in mental development, but they have their place as tools for economizing effort; presented by themselves they are a mass of meaningless and arbitrary ideas imposed from without.¹²¹

Clearly the emphasis ought to be placed on an understanding of the principles upon which the rules are developed, rather than upon the use of rules and symbols in and of themselves.

Dewey's critics frequently attack his educational ideas on the matter of too permissive an approach to learning and teaching. His emphasis upon activity, first-hand experience, no fixed ends in education, freedom to pursue individual interests, and freedom to express personal opinions heightens the tendency to think of his educational methods as completely non-directive.

When it is realized that Dewey himself believes that reflective thinking needs direction and teacher guidance, one is inclined to be much less apprehensive about criticisms levelled at the freedom Dewey would permit in the attainment of intellectual development. Dewey is critical of activity for activity's sake and of education without direction:

120 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 223.

121 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, as quoted in Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, p. 28.

The conceptions of play, of self expression, of natural growth, are appealed to almost as if they meant that almost any kind of spontaneous activity inevitably secures the desired or desirable training of mental power; or a mythological brain physiology is appealed to as proof that any exercise of the muscles trains power of thought.¹²²

Merely to accept without notice slipshod habits of speech, slovenly inferences, unimaginative and literal response, is to endorse these tendencies and to ratify them into habits--and so it goes throughout the whole range of contact between teacher and student.¹²³

The reflective process requires careful attention to the development of mental habits which give direction and purpose to learning:

In any case positive habits are being formed: if not habits of careful looking into things, then habits of hasty, heedless, impatient glancing over the surface; if not habits of consecutively following up the suggestions that occur, then habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like guessing [..]¹²⁴

Dewey is critical of those schools where "the main thing is just to give free play to impulses and desires without regard to any definitely intellectual growth".¹²⁵ Perhaps Dewey's view of the need for direction in education can be expressed best in these words:

122 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 51-52.

123 Ibid., p. 59-60.

124 Ibid., p. 89.

To interpret the fact is to see it in its vital movement, to see it in its relation to growth. But to view it as a part of normal growth is to secure the basis for guiding it. Guidance is not external imposition. It is freeing the life process for its own most adequate fulfilment. [sic] ¹²⁶

An important distinction should be made between the teacher's guiding the child's work on one hand and children doing work for the teacher on the other. A child's desire for "satisfying the teacher instead of the problem"¹²⁷ may override the intellectual process.

A pupil has a problem, but it is the problem of meeting peculiar requirements set by the teacher. His problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher wants, what will satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and outward deportment.¹²⁸

Closely related to this difficulty is the problem of other undesirable motivations for learning such as high marks, examinations and fear of failure.

He [the child] feels obliged to study because he has to recite, to pass an examination, to make a grade, or because, he wishes to please his teacher or his parents.¹²⁹

In instruction, the external standard manifests itself in the importance attached to the 'correct answer'.¹³⁰

125 Ibid., p. 83.

126 John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, p. 16-17.

127 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 31.

128 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 156.

129 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 31.

130 Ibid., p. 65.

A much better place to put the emphasis on learning is upon the process of careful and thorough reflection on the learning material itself. Too often teachers lack thoroughness in dealing with the work to be learned because they are rushed by the need to "cover the course" at all costs.¹³¹ Under these circumstances, children are not encouraged nor perhaps even permitted to reflect deeply enough upon a subject interest to reach an intellectual understanding of its underlying principles. The following statements are representative of Dewey's opinion in this matter:

Fewer subjects and fewer facts and more responsibility for thinking the material of those subjects and facts through to realize what they involve would give better results.¹³²

There is always a temptation for the teacher to keep attention fixed upon a limited field of the pupil's activity. Is the student progressing in the particular topic in arithmetic, history, geography, etc., that is under consideration? When the teacher fixes his attention exclusively on such matters as these the process of forming underlying and permanent habits, attitudes and interests is overlooked.¹³³

According to Dewey, a better approach would be to concentrate on the process of developing concepts, generalizations and overall principles that underlie the subject material:

131 Ibid., p. 120.

132 Ibid., p. 33.

133 Ibid., p. 57-58.

It follows that it would be impossible to overestimate the educational importance of arriving at conceptions: that is, of meanings that are general because applicable in a great variety of different instances [...]. At every stage of development, each lesson, in order to be educative, should lead up to a certain amount of conceptualizing of impressions and ideas.¹³⁴

The pupil may be encouraged to form on the basis of the particular facts, a general notion, a conception of how they stand related, but no pains be taken to make the student follow up the notion, to elaborate it and see just what its bearings are upon the case in hand and upon similar cases. The inductive inference, the guess, is formed by the student; if it happens to be correct, it is at once accepted by the teacher; or if it is false, it is rejected.¹³⁵

The notion of seeing things in their proper relationships, and of using reflective thought to develop overall concepts or generalizations is a main thrust in Dewey's methodological approach. It is this thrust that brings meaning and understanding to the process of intellectual growth and represents the fruits of reflective thinking.

6. Summary

John Dewey regards intellectual growth as an important aim in education. He calls his particular approach to intellectual growth, reflective thinking. This term represents

134 Ibid., p. 153.

135 Ibid., p. 185-186.

a method which stresses the importance of thinking as an inner active process. Dewey distinguishes the method of reflective thought from the epistemological methods of empiricism and rationalism.

Although reflective thinking is important in and of itself, its greatest importance lies in its instrumental function. Reflective thought should lead to increased understanding, to seeing cause and effect relationships, and to guiding principles rather than to knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Through linking ideas and seeing them in their proper relationships one becomes aware of the consequences of one's actions. The interconnectedness of ideas suggests a cumulative and continuous dimension in reflective thought. Frequently, routine habits, rules of thumb and passive acceptance of ideas, prove inadequate when situations arise where difficulties or problems present themselves. Recognition of a problem or a difficult situation is the starting point for reflective thought since it summons forth the need to reflect.

The process of reflective thinking is patterned after the scientific method. It begins with the recognition of a difficulty, and by reflecting upon the difficult situation one comes to a more precise understanding of what the problem is. Upon further reflection, various solutions or hypotheses emerge, and each of these is then tested

through experience, activity, consequences, or in some cases, through mentally projected consequences. The results of these tests are then weighed or judged so that unsuitable hypotheses can be eliminated, and a suitable conclusion can be reached. The scientific method serves as a guide to reflective thought, but Dewey recognizes that individuals differ in the ways in which they may apply the method. He also recognizes that the step-by-step procedures of science are not adequate in themselves to deal with life's problems without the inclusion of affective dimensions.

The affective aspects in intellectual growth include attitudes of openmindedness, interest, curiosity, willingness to make use of one's freedom to choose, to suspend judgments and to live with uncertainty when appropriate. Only through recognizing the impulses and feelings that motivate individuals to action and to decision-making can the individual modify his habits of thought in the direction of intellectual growth.

Dewey believes that it is the function of the school to enhance reflective thinking and he makes a number of suggestions for promoting the process of intellectual development in the classroom. The teacher should appeal to the student's own interests. By beginning in this manner the student can be motivated to pursue the topic in more depth, and incidental learning will result. Children need

first-hand experience and activity as a springboard to deeper intellectual development. These experiences should be as closely related to life experiences as possible so that the problems arising out of them will have meaning and purpose for the learner. The emphasis in learning should be upon broad relationships and reflection rather than upon facts, rules, symbols, and other mechanical-like processes of thinking. The teacher has a responsibility to guide the experiences of the student so that activity can be purposeful. In the end, broad principles, understanding, and the ability to form accurate generalizations are the fruits of intellectual growth.

CHAPTER VI

THE SELF AS THE FOCUS OF GROWTH

In previous chapters, growth has been discussed in terms of social, moral, and intellectual development. Frequently the close interrelationship of these three dimensions of growth has been referred to, and each takes on more meaning as it is understood in its interdependent connections with the remaining two. Nevertheless, the concept of growth remains rather fragmented until it is understood in terms of the "self" as unifying focus for ongoing development. The concept of individual self is so much a part of both the understanding and the existence of social, moral, and intellectual growth that its important function is in danger of being taken for granted.

Dewey's generic concept of self will be discussed in section one of this chapter and section two will deal with Dewey's view of self-realization. Dewey holds that human nature and culture interact as two important factors in the development of self and the interaction of these two factors will be discussed in section three. Finally, Dewey's view of the interrelationship of individual, social, moral and intellectual growth will be discussed in section four.

1. Dewey's Generic Concept of Self

At the outset a word of explanation regarding Dewey's use of terms related to the self seems in order. In his Psychology, and to a lesser degree in other works as well, he sets down some guides to his terminology in relation to the "phenomena of self".¹ Under the heading of "The Self as Individual" he states that "the self is individual, and all the facts of self refer to the individual. They are unique in this."² Elsewhere in his works he uses the words "self" and "individual" interchangeably and one may conclude that these terms hold identical meanings in his writings.³ In some works the words individual and self are combined, and the term "individual self" is used synonymously with either word.⁴

1 John Dewey, Psychology, as found in The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 2, p. 7.

2 Ibid., p. 8.

3 Ibid., p. 9. See also the following works: Experience and Nature, p. 245; Individualism Old and New, p. 166; Ethics, p. 336; "Illusory Psychology" in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 1, p. 160.

4 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 193; "Illusory Psychology", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 1, p. 70; "Self Realization as the Moral Ideal" in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 4, p. 44; "The Metaphysical Method in Ethics", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 5, p. 28, 30.

On a number of occasions Dewey uses the term "individuality" in reference to the quality of selfhood and to describe the state of being an individual.⁵⁵ Other variations of terms exist in reference to the self or the individual. These are much less frequently used and include the following: The term "selfhood"⁶ denotes the quality of individuality. "Existence"⁷ also is used to mean self or individual, but the word existence is used elsewhere with a fairly wide range of meanings including reality and universe and therefore lacks precision in the context of this chapter.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in understanding Dewey's use of the term "self" arises out of the fact that the self is an open-ended concept. The self is in a continual state of changing and becoming,⁸ and Dewey's idea of

5 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 99, 146, 148, 168, 169; Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 194; "Fundamental Ethical Notions: Obligation", in The Early Works, Vol. 3, p. 335.

6 John Dewey, "The Metaphysical Method in Ethics", in The Early Works, Vol. 5, p. 28; John Dewey and H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 335; Experience and Nature, p. 243.

7 John Dewey, "Fundamental Characteristic of Self", in Psychology, as found in The Early Works, Vol. 2, p. 7-9; Experience and Nature, p. 244.

8 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 172.

the self implies a continual interchange of social and environmental forces on the one hand, with the components of one's innermost self on the other. The writer uses the terms inner and outer self to categorize the great variety of words employed by Dewey in his discussion of this two-fold nature of the self.

Because the concept of self is never complete in Dewey's ontological view, it tends to defy adequate definition. As an ongoing phenomenon the proper function of the self is that of working toward self growth or self realization,⁹ and Dewey is reluctant to solidify the concept in a concise definition. As a result, in the pages that follow an attempt will be made to bring together the essential points of his concept of self and to arrive at a description based on these points.¹⁰

A consideration of a number of his statements taken together may serve to shed light on what Dewey has in mind when referring to individual self:

⁹ John Dewey, "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal", Philosophical Review, No. II, Nov., 1893, as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 4, p. 43.

¹⁰ Vide p. 197.

... a human individual is distinctive opacity of bias and preference conjoined with plasticity and permeability of needs and likings. One trait tends to isolation, discreteness; the other to connection, continuity. This ambivalent character is rooted in nature [...]. For every existence [or self] in addition to its qualitative and intrinsic boundaries has affinities and active outreachings for connection and intimate union. It is an energy of attraction, expansion, and supplementation. The ties and bonds of associated life are spontaneous uncalculated manifestations of this phase of human selfhood, as the union of hydrogen and oxygen is natural and unpremeditated.¹¹

To define one's self within closed limits, and then to try out the self in expansive acts that inevitably result in an eventual breaking down of the walled-in self, are equally natural and inevitable acts.¹²

It is possible to see in these statements the dual nature of the self with its inner and outer qualities which are in constant interaction with each other.

One no sooner establishes his private and subjective self than he demands to be recognized and acknowledged by others [...]. It is a formulated acceptance of oscillation between surrender to the external and assertion of the inner.¹³

While one continually strives to find oneself and to seek out one's identity, the meaning of self can only be found in testing this identity in its relationship to others.

11 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 242-243.

12 Ibid., p. 244.

13 Ibid., p. 244.

Since individuality is a distinctive way of feeling the impacts of the world and of showing a preferential bias in response to these impacts, it develops into shape and form only through interaction with actual conditions; it is no more complete in itself than is a painter's tube of paint without relation to a canvas.¹⁴

In this sense, Dewey's view of the individual self is consistent with his view of the total human organism. Both assume meaning only in relationship to the environment: "The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment."¹⁵

The "ambiguous nature of the self"¹⁶ is further compounded by Dewey's view of diversification within the individual self:

... 'Individual' is not one thing, but is a blanket term for the immense variety of specific reactions, habits, dispositions and powers of human nature that are evoked, and confirmed under the influences of associated life [...].¹⁷

While Dewey recognizes that the self develops through social relations, he regards the self as an autonomous agent. The individual is something more than a product of his environment. Dewey holds that the self as an active agent in which organization is centred assumes responsibility for its actions and decisions.

14 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 168.

15 John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, p. 33.

16 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 224.

17 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 199.

To say in a significant way, 'I think, believe, desire, instead of barely it is thought, believed, desired,' is to accept and affirm responsibility and put forth a claim. It does not mean that the self is the source or author of the thought and affection, nor its exclusive seat. It signifies that the self as a centred organization of energies identifies itself (in the sense of accepting their consequences) with a belief or sentiment of independent and external origination [sic].¹⁸

The modern discovery of inner experience, of a realm of purely personal events that are always at the individual's command, and that are his exclusively as well as inexpensively for refuge, consolation and thrill is also a great and liberating discovery. It implies a new worth and sense of dignity in human individuality, a sense that an individual is not a mere property of nature, set in place according to a scheme independent of him, as an article is put in its place in a cabinet, but that he¹⁹ adds something, that he marks [sic] a contribution.

The importance of both inner personal quality of the self and an outer environmental quality is emphasized by John Dewey. Although he sometimes dissociates his own views from those of other pragmatists, he finds himself fully in accord with the pragmatists' view that the self exists only in interaction and cooperation with its environment.

18 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 22.

19 Ibid., p. 172.

20 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 166.

But what the pragmatist does is to insist that the human factor must work itself out in co-operation with the environmental factor, and that their co-adaptation is both 'correspondence' and 'satisfaction'. As long as the human factor is ignored and denied, or is regarded as merely psychological (whatever, once more, that means), this human factor will assert itself in irresponsible ways [...]. Once recognize the human factor, and pragmatism is at hand to insist that the believer must accept the full consequences of his beliefs, and that his beliefs must be tried out, through acting upon them, to discover what is their meaning or consequence.²¹

In summary, Dewey believes that the concept of self acquires meaning only when it is understood in terms of an inner self and an outer self. This apparent bifurcation is modified by Dewey's stress on the co-operative interaction between these two elements of selfhood. A continuous interaction of the two elements also suggests that the self is in a process of being formed and reconstructed from moment to moment and from experience to experience. In short, the self is in a state of becoming or in the process of self-realization.

2. Self-Realization as a Process

In keeping with Dewey's view of growth as an ongoing and cumulative process, the individual is regarded as flexible

²¹ John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 166-167.

and changing. Ideally, the self is in a continual state of "becoming". Self growth implies a constant remaking in order that the self might be realized:

All voluntary action is a remaking of self, since it creates new desires, instigates to new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous development which binds together these changes. In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse.²²

... the idea of 'self-realization' insists upon its claims. The idea seems to be an important one, bringing out two necessary phases of the ethical idea: namely, that it cannot lie in subordination of self to any law outside itself; and that starting with the self, the end is to be sought in the active, or volitional, side rather than in the passive, or feeling side [...]. The notion which I wish to criticize is that of the self as a presupposed fixed schema or outline, while realization consists in the filling up of this schema. The notion which I would suggest as a substitute is that of the self as always a concrete specific activity; and therefore, (to anticipate) of the identity of self and realization.²³

Thus Dewey presents a view of the self as a constantly emerging entity which develops, not towards a fixed and predetermined end,

22 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 172.

23 John Dewey, "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal" from Philosophical Review, II, Nov., 1893, as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. IV, p. 43.

but rather a self that is modified and reconstructed by each new experience of living. In the process of experience the self grows and is realized. Moreover, there is no set mold or role to which the self must accommodate its growth. The final goal of selfhood is not known.

But individuality is something developing and to be continuously attained, not something given all at once and ready-made. It is found only in life-history, in its continuing growth; it is, so to say, a career and not just a fact discoverable at a particular cross section of life.²⁴

Again, Dewey emphasizes that in this process of self-realization and self-becoming the individual takes on the dimensions of an inner and outer self.

Only by participating in the common intelligence and sharing in the common purpose as it works for the common good can individual human beings realize their true individualities and become truly free.²⁵

Here Dewey refers to the practice of sharing ideas and experience for the common good of society as "participating in the common intelligence".²⁶ One comes to realize one's

24 John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education", from Progressive Education, Vol. V, 1928, as quoted in Martin S. Dworkin's Dewey on Education, p. 123.

25 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 25.

26 Ibid., p. 25.

individuality through the process of sharing and testing his ideas in society.

Through mutual respect, mutual toleration, give and take, the pooling of experiences, it [the cause of democracy] is ultimately the only method by which human beings can succeed in carrying on this experiment in which we are all engaged, whether we want to be or not, the greatest experiment of humanity--that of living together in ways in which the life of each of us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others.²⁷

Although Dewey does not succinctly define the concept of self as such, a review of the main points which have just been enumerated will lead to a description of the self. Firstly, individual self has an inner, private, and personal quality wherein it seeks to establish its own identity and to form its own boundary-lines. This inner subjective self strives to be autonomous and to assume a locus of responsibility for its actions. The inner self must establish and create its private identity and meaning since this is not a given quality. Secondly, the self has an outreaching quality which seeks to assert its influence on the environment and to test its identity in relation to its surroundings. Thirdly, as this ongoing dialectic between inner and outer self progresses, the self is changed by each

²⁷ John Dewey, Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men), p. 44-45.

new experience. Although no one experience can change the self completely, there is no experience that leaves the self completely unchanged. In this sense the self is continually becoming.

Dewey holds that the proper focus for growth and education is the self.²⁸ "Ultimately, there is but one end, the self; all other ends are means".²⁹ In terms of education, the aim is self-realization:

The child is the starting point, the center, and the end. His development, his growth, is the ideal. It alone furnishes the standard. To the growth of the child all studies are subservient; they are instruments valued as they serve the needs of growth. Personality, character, is more than subject-matter. Not knowledge or information, but self-realization, is the goal. To possess all the world of knowledge and lose one's own self is as awful a fate in education as in religion.³⁰

While educational growth may have a number of traits of development, the above statement indicates that the overriding and unifying trait is self-realization. Dewey

28 John Dewey, "Self Realization as the Moral Ideal" as quoted in The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 4, p. 43; John Dewey and H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 335; Individualism Old and New, New York, Capricorn, 1929, 171 p.

29 John Dewey, "Stages of Realization", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 2, p. 320.

30 John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, p. 9. It should be noted that although Dewey regards self-realization as a focus of growth he does not discount the importance of organized subject matter or of knowledge. Growth is regarded as a "continuous reconstruction, moving from the child's present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies", p. 11.

emphasizes the same point in these words:

... the supreme end of the child is fulness of growth--fulness of realization of his budding powers, a realization which continually carries him on from one plane to another.³¹

There is the danger that critics of Dewey may construe his concept of self-realization as the equivalent of undirected personal freedom. In fact, growth of the self means growth in powers of self-direction and self-control.

The ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control [...]. It may be a loss rather than a gain to escape from the control of another person only to find one's³² conduct dictated by immediate whim and caprice.

To prepare him for the future life means to give him command of himself; it means so to train him that he will have³³ the full and ready use of all his capacities.

In summary, Dewey's notion of the self is that it has an inner private quality and also an outreaching quality. He also believes that the self is a changing dynamic agent which under the proper conditions of educational growth continues to develop towards self-realization. In order to understand Dewey's idea of a self in the process of changing

31 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 119.

32 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 75.

33 John Dewey, Education Today, p. 6.

and becoming, his concept of the interaction of human nature and culture must be examined.

3. The Interaction of Human Nature and Culture

In the pages which follow it will be shown that Dewey attempts to explain the process of self development and individual behaviour in terms of an ongoing process of interaction between human nature and culture. So intent is Dewey on stressing the interaction between human nature and culture however, that he makes the claim that both human nature and culture lack meaning in isolation³⁴ and it is difficult to determine precisely what Dewey means by the terms human nature and culture.

On the side of human nature Dewey recognizes that "certain basic needs and emotions are permanent",³⁵ yet he does not specify clearly the nature of these needs and emotions. On the side of culture Dewey includes an accumulation of social, economic, political, and environmental factors which interact with human nature to form the

34 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, in Martin S. Dworking, Dewey on Education, p. 22; Freedom and Culture, p. 77; Individualism Old and New, p. 59.

35 John Dewey, Philosophy in Education (Problems of Men), p. 189.

individual self.³⁶ On one occasion Dewey stresses the outreaching quality of culture as follows:

And there is perhaps no better definition of culture than that it is the capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings.³⁷

In another work Dewey describes culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society."³⁸

In general, Dewey appears to include on one hand all of man's instinctive tendencies under the heading of human nature. On the other hand, all of the forces which lie outside of man's instinctive tendencies but which interact with the individual and eventually become a part of his way of thinking, responding and acting, are regarded as cultural influences.

It is Dewey's approach to look for explanations of individual behaviour in terms of the interaction of both

36 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture: Individualism Old and New: Human Nature and Conduct.

37 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 123.

38 John Dewey, "Existence", chapter 2 in Experience and Nature, p. 40.

human nature and culture. "Native human nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes the machinery and the designs."³⁹ Dewey is reluctant to engage himself in the long-standing argument over the forces of nature versus nurture or heredity versus environment:

There is an alternative to being penned in between these two theories. We can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social. Then we shall see that progress [growth] proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are in truth forces in man as well as without him.⁴⁰

... a social regime can come into enduring existence only as it satisfies some elements of human nature not previously afforded expression [...]. The general principle holds even if the elements that are provided a new outlet are the baser things in human nature: fear, suspicion, jealousy, inferiority complexes; factors that are excited by earlier conditions but that are now given channels of fuller expression.⁴¹

To view either human nature or culture in isolation is to miss the mark in understanding individual motives and

39 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 104.

40 Ibid., p. 11.

41 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 38.

individual behaviour. John Dewey is critical of such an approach: "Isolations have abounded, both on the side of taking some one thing in human nature to be a supreme 'motive' and in taking some one form of social activity to be supreme."⁴² He prefers to look for explanations of human behaviour in the "reciprocal connections raw human nature and culture bear to one another".⁴³ In including both human nature and culture Dewey does not intend to discount the importance of either factor in the development of selfhood.

Certain basic needs and emotions are permanent. But they are capable of finding expression in ways that are radically different₄₄ from the ways in which they now currently operate.

When taken together, human nature and culture account for individual development. But when separated, each factor in itself provides an unsatisfactory basis for understanding the individual.

42 Ibid., p. 23.

43 Ibid., p. 23.

44 John Dewey, Philosophy in Education (Problems of Men), p. 189.

If we eliminate the social factor from the child we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are⁴⁵ left only with an inert and lifeless mass.

It is evident from the above statement that Dewey regards the interaction of the individual factor and the social factor as crucial to the ongoing growth of the self.

Dewey recognizes that individuality is in danger of being lost whenever cultural and social forces are regarded as the exclusive basis for judging progress and growth. He is critical of the doctrine of Marxism and its efforts to explain human goals in terms of social development:

The Marxist isolation of one factor (one which actually operates only in interaction with another one) takes the form of holding that the state of the forces of economic productivity at a given time ultimately determines all forms of social activities and relations, political,⁴⁶ legal, scientific, artistic, religious, moral.

The philosophy of Marx is one of the pillars of Communism and many observers in the Western World find themselves in agreement with Dewey's criticism. However, Dewey is fearful that individuality might just as readily be submerged by economic and political forces in his own country:

45 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, as quoted in Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, p. 22.

46 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 77.

The development of a civilization that is outwardly corporate-- or rapidly becoming so--has been accompanied by a submergence of the individual.⁴⁷

The loss of individuality is conspicuous in the economic region because our civilization is so predominantly a business civilization. But the fact is even more⁴⁸ obvious when we turn to the political scene.

Dewey is also critical of the practice of using social and cultural forces to determine traits of human nature itself. The following passage indicates his disagreement with the philosophy of Plato in this regard:

The proper method, he [Plato] said, was to look at the version of human nature written in large and legible letters in the organization of classes of society, before trying to make it out in the dim petty edition found in individuals [...]. It would be hard to find a better illustration of the fact that any movement purporting to discover the psychological causes and sources of social phenomena is in fact a reverse movement, in which current social tendencies are read back into the structure of human nature; and are then used to explain⁴⁹ the very things from which they are deduced.

Dewey is equally critical of the other side of the argument wherein the behaviour of the individual self is

47 John Dewey, "The Lost Individual", Chapter IV, Individualism Old and New, p. 59.

48 Ibid., p. 59.

49 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 107-108.

explained in terms of primary motives rooted in unchanging human nature. Among the list of motives which he discounts as providing a satisfactory explanation for human nature are instincts of fear, love of pleasure, pugnacity, competitiveness, sympathy, love of power, and love of freedom.⁵⁰

The following statements are representative of his opposition to seeking out primary motives in an effort to understand the workings of the self:

The notion that anger still remains a single force is a lazy methology. Even in the cases of hunger and sex, antecedent conditions (or 'nature'), the actual content and feel of hunger and sex, are indefinitely varied according to their social contexts. Only when a man is starving, is hunger an unqualified natural impulse; as it approaches this limit, it tends to lose, moreover, its psychological distinctiveness and to become a raven of the entire organism.⁵¹

50 For a more complete discussion of Dewey's arguments against prime motivational factors see the following works: "Human Nature and Scholarship", Chap. 3 in Philosophy of Education; "Reconstruction as Affecting Social Philosophy", Chap. 8 in Reconstruction in Philosophy; "No Separate Instincts", Chapter 6 in Experience and Nature; "Democracy and Human Nature", Chapter 5 in Freedom and Culture.

51 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 143.

They [proponents of theories regarding primary motives] treat phenomena which are peculiarly symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time as if they were the necessary effects of fixed native impulses of human nature. Romantic love as it exists today, with all the varying perturbations it occasions, is as definitely a sign of specific historic conditions as are big battle ships with turbines, internal-combustion engines, and electrically driven machines. It would be as sensible to treat the latter as effects of a single psychic cause as to attribute the phenomena of disturbance and conflict which accompany present sexual relations as manifestations of an original single psychic force or Libido.⁵²

John Dewey holds that the very same motives which are thought to reside in human nature are themselves the products of minds that had been conditioned by the culture they attempt to explain. Thus objectivity is particularly difficult when one seeks to understand the self: "The idea that human nature is inherently and exclusively individual is itself a product of a cultural individualistic movement."⁵³

In order to understand Dewey's notion of individual self it is necessary to return to the idea of the interrelationship of human nature and culture. On the side of culture there is constant movement and change. On the side of human nature there is diversity with many native impulses emerging and receding under the influences and interworkings of cultural situations. No one specific human instinct can be said

52 John Dewey, "No Separate Instincts" in Human Nature and Conduct, p. 144.

53 John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 21.

to have exclusive sway over the affairs of the individual. Under these conditions Dewey's view of a changing, developing self emerges: "Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social."⁵⁴

For Dewey, the notion of change is compatible with growth,⁵⁵ and the concept of a changing developing self is very much a part of his idea of individual selfhood:

The old self is put off and the new self is only forming, and the form it finally takes will depend upon the unforeseeable result of an adventure [...]. Those who do not fare forth and take the risks attendant upon the formation of new objects and the growth of a new self, are subjected perforce to inevitable change of the settled and close world they have made their own.⁵⁶

Only the hold of a traditional conception of the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blinds us to perceiving what they mean: the relative fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood. There is no one ready-made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another, and assume a certain consistency of configuration [...].⁵⁷

54 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 208.

55 Vide Chap. 2 of this research, p. 57, Chap. 4, p. 115.

56 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 245-246.

57 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 130.

It is within this complexity of habits and impulses that Dewey's concept of the self resides and because of this complexity it cannot be defined. Within the realm of individual habits and impulse, change, and eventually self growth, must find their expression.

Impulses are described as "the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality".⁵⁸ In a sense, the notion of impulse is Dewey's concession to "native tendencies" and to "primitive human nature".⁵⁹ Yet taken by itself impulse is no more than "a physical spasm, a blind dispersive burst of wasteful energy".⁶⁰

Even if by some miracle original activity [impulse] could continue without assistance from organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything. It would be mere sound and fury.⁶¹

However, human impulses are very much a part of the self. As such they represent the raw material from which the self must grow.

58 John Dewey, "Impulses and Change of Habits" in Human Nature and Conduct, p. 88.

59 Ibid., p. 88.

60 Ibid., p. 86.

61 Ibid., p. 86.

His [the individual's] impulses are merely starting points for assimilation of the knowledge and skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends. They are tentacles sent out to gather that nutrition from customs which will in time render the infant capable of independent action. They are agencies for transfer of existing social power into personal ability; they are means of reconstructive growth.⁶²

The reconstructive growth which emerges out of the raw impulses of human nature develops into patterns of activity, into ways of behaving and thinking, in short into habits of the self. The expression of selfhood and self growth is to be found in one's habits. "All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self."⁶³ In Dewey's view of the changing emerging self, no part of the self remains static, yet habits do represent an expression of selfhood that approaches stability and predictability of thought and actions to a greater degree than do other aspects of the self such as impulse. Individual habits represent the culmination of native tendencies and cultural forces coming together within the self. Dewey holds that habits "are outgrowths of unlearned activities which are part of man's endowment at birth".⁶⁴ Although habits are

62 Ibid., p. 89-90.

63 Ibid., p. 26.

64 Ibid., p. 85.

"secondary and acquired, not native and original",⁶⁵ they are nevertheless very much a part of the individual self. When Dewey speaks of self growth he implies a continual modification and development of one's habits. "Our individual habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity."⁶⁶ Habits represent one's characteristics, one's mode of thinking, responding and behaving in everyday life. Dewey recognizes that he is using the term "habit" in a way that is different from the usual notion of a repetitive pattern of behaviour which comes to possess the self rather than to represent individual self.

While it is admitted that the word habit has been used in a somewhat broader sense than is usual, we must protest against the tendency in psychological literature to limit meaning to repetition.⁶⁷

The word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use when employed as we have been using it. But we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. Habit even in its ordinary usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word.⁶⁸

65 Ibid., p. 85.

66 Ibid., p. 23.

67 John Dewey, "Habits and Will", in Human Nature and Conduct, p. 40.

68 Ibid., p. 39.

Used in this sense, one's habits are not only an outward expression of the individual self, but they are indicators of personal progress and growth. The continual modification of habits represent growth, while fixed habits represent no growth. Nevertheless, thoughtless, undirected modifications of habits do not constitute self growth in any meaningful sense. In order for the self to develop constructively, the modifications of one's habits need some guiding principles. To simply change one's habits without direction and purpose or to change for the sake of change is to miss the mark. It is at this point that Dewey's traits of social, moral and intellectual growth emerge to provide direction and shape to the formation and reconstruction of habits of selfhood.

4. The Interrelationship of Growth and the Self

To state that social, moral and intellectual growth, or for that matter, any other type of human growth, is meaningless except as it relates to the development of self, is to border on the truistic. None of these traits of growth can be completely separated from the other two, but even more importantly, none can be separated from the development of individual self and still retain its fullest meaning. It is this interrelationship of growth with the self which gives

cohesiveness and purpose to Dewey's concepts of educational growth. When Dewey speaks of social, moral and intellectual growth he has in mind self growth. In an effort to bring clarity to the various traits of self growth it is necessary for him to separate temporarily the elements which more properly should be taken as a whole. In reference to the aims of educational growth, he states, "Even though all these are aspects of a single process, and are therefore inseparable, we had to deal with them individually and separately for the sake of clarity."⁶⁹ Reference has already been made to an inner and an outer self,⁷⁰ but in the everyday activities of the individual, distinctions between what is done for self growth and what is done for social, moral, and intellectual growth become emerged in a common purpose.

Neither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as he engages in his reflective activity, of any transition from one sphere of existence to the other. He knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one side and mere subjective ideas on the other; he is aware of no gulf to cross. He assumes uninterrupted fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking, from thought₇₁ to fact, from things to theories and back again.

69 John Dewey, Lectures in China, p. 261.

70 Vide p.193.

71 John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 10.

The same kind of fluidity exists in Dewey's treatment of the various aspects of human growth. As the active self reaches out it finds its identity and meaning. The self is not complete, and consequently Dewey believes it can not help but change. It can not stand still.

Individuality is at first spontaneous and unshaped; it is a potentiality, a capacity of development [...] It is not something complete in itself [...] it develops into shape and form only through interaction with actual conditions [...]

In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is³ becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse.

When the notion of inevitable change is combined with the literal meaning of "for the better or the worse", one can grasp the urgency of Dewey's concept of growth. In his view, nothing within the raw impulses of human nature ensures that change will be for the better. The guidelines for positive change and hence for the hope of mankind lie within the individual's interactions with his environment and his culture.

Dewey believes that the vehicle for growth is education. The notions of growth and education are so intimately bound together that they are regarded synonymously.⁷⁴

72 John Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 168.

73 John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 172.

74 Vide Chapter 2, "Growth as Education and Education as Growth" in this research.

He is optimistic that education can direct self growth into social, moral, and intellectual dimensions, but it is not his intention to segregate these areas of growth from each other and certainly not from the development of the self. The interrelationship of these three areas with each other and with the self is apparent in these words:

In one sense the change to social morality makes morals more acutely personal than they were when custom ruled. It forces the need of more personal knowledge and insight, more deliberate and steadfast personal convictions, more resolute personal attitudes in action--more personal in the sense of being more conscious in choice and more voluntary in execution. It would be absurd to suppose that 'social morals' meant swallowing up of individuality in an anonymous mass, or an abdication⁷⁵ of personal responsibility in decision and action.

I believe that all education [growth] proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at birth, and is continually shaping the individual's powers, saturating his consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings and emotions. Through this unconscious education the individual gradually comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in getting together.⁷⁶

75 John Dewey and Howard Tufts, "Individual and Social Morality", as quoted in Joseph Ratner's Intelligence in the Modern World--John Dewey's Philosophy, New York, Random House, 1939, p. 766.

76 John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed", Chapter I in Education Today, p. 3.

Dewey does not describe his concept of society with complete clarity, but it is evident that the principle of harmony among its individual members is of considerable importance as a criterion of social growth.⁷⁷ He recognizes that each society is composed of individual people and that a society can not have true growth at the expense of its members.

Society is a society of individuals and the individual is always a social individual.⁷⁸

... society has no existence excepting in and through the individuals who constitute it.⁷⁹

... the individual and society are neither opposed to each other nor separated from each other.⁸⁰

Just as society can not develop apart from its individual members, each individual self requires an association with others so that the self might grow.

The kind of self which is formed through action which is faithful to relations with others will be a fuller and broader self than one which is cultivated in isolation from or in opposition to the purposes and needs of others. In contrast, the kind of self which results from generous breadth of interest may be said alone to constitute a development and fulfillment of self, while the other way of life stunts and staves selfhood by cutting it off from connections necessary to growth.⁸¹

77 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 99.

78 John Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. V, p. 55.

79 Ibid., p. 55.

80 Ibid., p. 55.

81 John Dewey and J.H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 335.

Since society has no existence apart from its individual members,⁸² and social and self growth are interdependent, Dewey's concept of social growth can be said to culminate in self growth. Dewey considers the true interests of society and the self to be one and the same, and he can foresee no circumstances where this is not the case. Nevertheless he recognizes that children are not born into society with a complete understanding and appreciation of social harmony. He does however hold the view that society has a responsibility to assist the individual to become socially aware. The individual too has a responsibility to grow in social awareness so that in the end self development may accrue. This dual responsibility towards social awareness is a moral "ought" in Dewey's philosophy. That is to say, social standards form the basis of moral values. So closely are moral and social standards related to each other that they are regarded as identical.

The social interest, identical in its deepest meaning with a moral interest is necessarily supreme with man.⁸³

82 John Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. V, p. 55.

83 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 288.

The moral and the social quality of conduct⁸⁴ are, in the last analysis, identical to each other.

Dewey dismisses the idea that moral questions can arise at a purely individual level,⁸⁵ thus moral growth means, in effect, a process of self development in the direction of social awareness. Hence the purpose of moral development culminates in self growth.

We may accept as a practical fact that we do at a given time, have unrealized powers, or capacities, and that the realization of these powers⁸⁶ constitutes, at the time, our moral goal.

Individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out. It means initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief⁸⁷ and conduct. These are not gifts, but achievements.

In the statements above the notions of individual achievement and realization of potentialities suggest moral and social development. It is this realization of potential that Dewey regards as self growth. He believes that "the supreme end

84 Ibid., p. 358

85 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 291.

86 John Dewey, "Self Realization as the Moral Ideal", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. IV, p. 44.

87 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 194.

of the child is fulness of growth--fulness of realization of his budding powers, a realization which continually carries him on from one plane to another."⁸⁸

In the area of intellectual growth Dewey believes that the development of one's intellect serves an instrumental function.⁸⁹ The accumulation of bare facts and knowledge are of less importance than the development of one's ability to make careful judgements in moral and social matters. Since intellectual development is an instrument in moral and social growth it can be said that indirectly, intellectual development culminates in self growth. However a much more direct relationship exists between intellectual and self growth. Dewey calls the particular method of intellectual development that he prefers "reflective thinking".⁹⁰ Reflective thinking requires the active involvement and participation of the individual at each stage of the process.⁹¹ It involves the individual as a conscious participant in thinking rather than a passive receiver of facts and ideas. In the most immediate sense it develops the self. In Dewey's words, "literally,

88 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 119.

89 John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 18, 22, 32, 46; See also Experience and Nature, p. 205.

90 Reflective thinking as discussed in Chapter 5.

91 Vide p. 142, 143, 161, 162 of this research.

the phrase 'Think for yourself' is tautological; any thinking is thinking for one's self".⁹²

In one of Dewey's infrequent references to the physical domain, the interrelatedness of the components of the self is expressed in these terms: "The child is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, and morally, as well as physically";⁹³ however, Dewey usually excludes physical development from the process of educational growth. In his words, "Education and growth go hand in hand. Education means growth. Without it there can be no growth, except in the purely physical sense."⁹⁴

In regard to the whole self, Dewey's lack of reference to the physical and spiritual dimensions is noticeably absent. Perhaps this phenomenon may be accounted for, at least in part, by his antipathy towards fixed ends in growth.⁹⁵ Stage by stage physical development progresses towards a norm--that is, towards a standard of normal blood pressure,

92 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 258.

93 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 8.

94 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 185. See also Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 194-195. Here Dewey expresses the idea that physical qualities are "ready-made" or "original datum", and thus they are not created through a process of growth in the same sense that growth applies to moral, social and intellectual traits.

95 Vide Chapter 2, p. 44-51.

normal weight, average strength, in short, towards standards of good health which can be set out in advance, and which can serve as a standard of measurement. Thus physical growth does not require the same active reconstruction of the self that is vital to Dewey's concept of intellectual, social and moral growth. As part of the "original datum" of "individuality" physical growth is not a "means of creating individuals"⁹⁶. Strictly speaking physical development is a type of growth, but not growth in education. Again Dewey makes the following distinction between physical and educational growth: "Education means growth. Without it there can be no growth, except in the purely physical sense".⁹⁷ In spite of Dewey's belief that physical development is not growth in education he does recognize that physical activity should not be separated from thinking processes:

The advance of physiology and the psychology associated with it have shown the connection of mental activity with that of the nervous system. [...] But in fact the nervous system is only a specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily activities working together. Instead of being isolated from them, as an organ of knowing from organs of motor response, it is the organ by which they interact responsively with one another.⁹⁸

96 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 194.

97 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 185.

98 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 336.

To learn to think, we must exercise our limbs.⁹⁹

Hence the subject-matter for these years [from four to eight years of age] is selected from phases of life entering into the child's own social surroundings [...] - in play, games, occupations, or miniature industrial arts [...].¹⁰⁰

While Dewey emphasizes the importance of physical and mental interaction, he does not include physical development as a part of growth in education. Physical development in itself lacks the dimension of "creating" individuality as it proceeds towards "ready-made"¹⁰¹ standards.

In the matter of spiritual growth, Dewey frequently equates the term "religious" with the term "spiritual":

... those who isolate the meanings of these things [things in our everyday environment] and put them in a religious or so-called spiritual world aloof from things are, in effect idealists. Those concerned with progress, who are striving to change received beliefs, emphasize the individual factor of knowing; those whose chief business it is to withstand change and conserve received truth emphasize the universal and fixed--and so on.¹⁰²

99 John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, p. 15.

100 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 106.

101 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 195.

102 John Dewey, "Theories of Knowledge", in Democracy and Education, p. 344.

Here Dewey equates "progress" with "change" and with the "individual factor of knowing" while those who belong to the "religious or so-called spiritual" group of thinkers are associated with conservation of universal and fixed truths. While Dewey does make an attempt in his later writings¹⁰³ at separating spiritual and religious development from fixed truths and from the supernatural, for the greater part of his writings religion is associated with the preservation of fixed truths. As such it is seen as the antithesis of both inquiry and true growth in education. Dewey comments as follows:

... as long as religion is conceived as it now is conceived by the great majority of professed religionists, there is something self-contradictory in speaking of education in religion in the same sense in which we speak of education in topics where the method of free inquiry has made its way.¹⁰⁴

With few exceptions, Dewey tends to omit both physical and spiritual development from his concept of growth in education and he concentrates his view of the growth of self upon the interrelationships of social, moral and intellectual growth.

103 John Dewey, "Religion Versus the Religious", Chapter 1 in A Common Faith, p. 1-28.

104 John Dewey, "Religion and Our Schools", in Education Today, p. 82.

If Dewey's concept of the whole self seems partial and unclear, then in his mind, this is as it must be, for the whole self "cannot be apprehended in knowledge or realized in reflection".¹⁰⁵

The connection between imagination and the harmonizing of the self is closer than is usually thought. The idea of a whole, whether of the whole personal being or of the world, is an imaginative, not a literal idea [..] The whole self is an ideal, an imaginative projection. Hence the idea of a thoroughgoing and deep-seated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected) operates only through imagination --which is one reason why this composing of the self is not voluntary in the sense of an act of special volition or resolution. An 'adjustment' possesses the will rather than is its express product.¹⁰⁶

While this statement leaves the reader with an incomplete view of the whole self, nevertheless there remains Dewey's idea of three main traits of growth (social, moral, and intellectual) which come together and find their expression and their focus in self growth.

105 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 19.

106 Ibid., p. 18-19.

5. Summary

In summary, there are three main traits of growth, social, moral, and intellectual, which are interrelated, and these three find their focal point and their unity in the growth of the individual self. The self has an inner and an outer quality. The inner self seeks a personal identity and assumes a locus of responsibility for the actions that it initiates, while the outer self tests its experiences and its identity within its environment. These two qualities of the self generate a dialectic wherein the self becomes a continually changing entity. The two qualities of the self are guided by basic human nature on the part of the inner, private self, and culture on the part of the outreaching self.

Human nature has diversified tendencies, and it is unfruitful to seek out main motivating drives by which to explain the actions of individual self. Taken together, these natural tendencies are variegated and undirected, and may be considered under the rubric of human impulse. While impulse is the pivot of human action, and the initiator of experience, it is continually modified by one's culture and by the results of one's experiences tested in the environment. As the actions of the self are tested in day-by-day experiences certain patterns of behaviour and ways of thinking

are formed into habits of the self. Self-growth consists in the modification of one's habits along the lines of social, moral and intellectual development.

In conclusion, although it is impossible to fully comprehend the self as a whole, these three areas of development are interrelated and represent a unity in self growth. It is in the continual development of self that social, moral and intellectual growth find their raison d'être.

CHAPTER VII

A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF GROWTH IN EDUCATION

In order to understand Dewey's concept of growth it seems necessary that the reader have an awareness of a number of problems which inhere in Dewey's written works. Although these problems are interrelated, for the sake of convenience and clarity they may be divided into two broad groups. The first includes problems related to Dewey's writing style, such as a lack of clearly defined terminology, prolixity, and a somewhat specialized use of words and phrases which Dewey co-opts into his philosophy. The second set of problems is related to Dewey's philosophy itself. Included in this latter group is a number of metaphysical and epistemological difficulties inherent in a concept of growth which lacks a distinct terminus. In addition, certain axiological problems are related to the notion of continually changing values. In spite of these problems, Dewey's concept of growth, when taken as a whole, provides an important key to the understanding of his philosophy of education.

The first section of the chapter will deal with problems related to Dewey's style of writing. The second section will concern problems related to Dewey's philosophy

of growth, and in the third section a synthesis of his concept of growth will be made.

1. Problems Related to Dewey's Writing Style

John Dewey is a voluminous writer whose books, lectures, and papers, taken as a whole, number approximately one thousand items.¹ Chronologically his writings cover a seventy year period from 1882 to his death in 1952.² The scope of his writings is very broad, including topics on philosophy, psychology, science, religion, and education. In the light of these facts it is hardly surprising to find that a number of problems exist in the understanding and interpretation of his works.

There is wide agreement among scholars of Dewey's philosophy that his thinking changed over the seventy year period of his writings, although the changes are not always

1 Jo Ann Boydston, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University, 1970, the frontispiece.

2 John Dewey, "Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism", in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1882. Also John Dewey's "Introduction" to Elsie R. Clapp's The Use of Resources in Education, New York, Harper, 1952, p. vii-xi.

clearly demarcated nor well understood.³ It is generally believed however, that the periods of change can best be described as follows:

1. Intuitionism or the Religious Period,
2. Hegelian Idealism,
3. Instrumentalism and Reflective Inquiry,
4. Experience and Naturalism.⁴

Concomitant with these periods of change is a tendency on the part of Dewey to use words in somewhat different and novel ways. New phrases such as "means-consequences", "warranted assertability", and "ends-in-view" emerge to fulfill new roles in Dewey's philosophy. Old words such as "habits", "reflection", and "truth" lose their traditional meanings as they are co-opted into a changing philosophy. A lack of precise definitions of terminology results in confusion on the part of both admirers and critics:

3 A.G. Wirth, "John Dewey in Transition from Religious Idealism to the Social Ethics of Democracy", History of Education Quarterly, December, 1965, p. 264-268. See also Martin S. Dworkin, Dewey on Education, New York, Columbia University, 1959, p. 10; (No author listed). "John Dewey", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, The Free Press, 1967, p. 380-385; Joseph Ratner, "Introduction", in Intelligence in the Modern World, New York, Modern, c. 1939, p. 58.

4 Lewis E. Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and the Philosophic Method", in Jo Ann Boydston, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 15-51.

Dewey wrote badly. His style was often opaque, his terminology ambiguous.⁵

Dewey may be said to deserve whatever confusions came to be associated with his name.⁶

There appears to be general agreement that Dewey's use of language is a stumbling block to the understanding of his thought.⁷

The problem of a lack of clarity and of a changing philosophy are compounded by the sheer volume of Dewey's writings. To some degree critics must share responsibility for the confusion which results from their own lack of patience in pursuing Dewey's ponderous style and prolix writings in sufficient depth to grasp his overall meaning. As a result, criticisms of Dewey tend to be of a sporadic nature, and deal more with isolated ambiguities than with his educational ideas as a whole:

5 Martin Dworkin, op. cit., p. 13.

6 Ibid., p. 13-14.

7 George Eastman, "John Dewey's Literary Style: Theory and Practice", Educational Theory, January, 1966, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 110.

Responsible pieces of criticism are difficult to come by, because they are scattered throughout journals and books and because there are really so few of them. This paucity of sophisticated criticism of Dewey is interesting in itself. One must speculate on the reasons, but the primary one is probably that there are very few philosophical critics who have turned serious attention to Dewey's educational theory.⁸

Even among Dewey's admirers there is a tendency to choose those areas of his writings with which they find easy agreement while overlooking the whole:

What his myriads of disciples and opponents did not seem to take seriously at the time, however, was his mounting criticism of the educational movement of which he was 'leader'. [The Progressive Education Association founded in 1919] He sharply warned against the aimlessness and dangerous permissiveness of the notion of the 'child centered school', with its mixture of post war bohemianism, undisciplined expression in the name of individual creativity, and Freudian solicitude for avoiding inhibitions.⁹

While those who comment on Dewey have a responsibility to look at his philosophy as a whole, their task has been made difficult by the voluminous nature of his writings.

Closely connected with Dewey's tendency to use an abundance of words is his overuse of dogmatic and exclusive statements. The following statements indicate the inherent confusion that accompanies this practice:

⁸ Reginald D. Archambault, editor, Dewey on Education: Appraisals, New York, Random House, 1966, p. ix.

⁹ Martin S. Dworkin, op. cit., p. 10.

... the primary business of school is to train children in co-operative and mutually helpful living [...] ¹⁰

Moral education is universally recognized as the ultimate and final end of the educative process. ¹¹

All knowledge is one. It is all of God [...] ¹²

No educational question is of greater import than how to get intellectual good out of what persons and books have to communicate. ¹³

In fairness to John Dewey it must be recognized that these statements are taken from various sources and represent a time span of approximately forty years. If these statements are taken in the context of Dewey's particular interests during the periods they represent, some of the confusion can be eliminated. Nevertheless, on the whole, his writing style accentuates problems within his philosophy. That is to say, the writings themselves are a reflection of philosophical problems inherent in Dewey's thinking. "The problem of his language is inextricable from the

10 John Dewey, The School and Society, p. 92.

11 John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919-1920, p. 286.

12 John Dewey, "The Obligation to Knowledge of God", from The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. I, p. 61.

13 John Dewey, How We Think, p. 256-257.

problem of his philosophy, quite apart from the infelicities of his style".¹⁴ It is only for the sake of convenience and clarity that they are separated in this chapter.

In summary, a degree of confusion is apparent in Dewey's style of writing. His changing philosophy is reflected in his tendency to create new meanings for old words and to coin new expressions which are unique to his own philosophy. It is also found that Dewey makes use of mutually exclusive statements in an effort to emphasize important points in his writings. Perhaps most difficult of all is Dewey's prolix style which taxes the endurance of the reader.

2. Problems Related to Dewey's Philosophy

(a) Metaphysics.- Much of the confusion surrounding Dewey's philosophy can be traced to his metaphysical viewpoint. It is on questions of fixed truths, absolute values, and concepts of ultimate reality that he takes his departure from traditional philosophy. In his changing philosophy he came in time to regard metaphysical concerns in a pejorative manner:

¹⁴ Emmanuel Mesthene, "The Role of Language in the Philosophy of John Dewey", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, University of Buffalo, Vol. XIX, No. 4, June 1959, p. 511-517, as quoted in Martin Dworkin, op. cit.

After having ardently espoused for some years a highly organized system of philosophy with emphasis on completeness and finality, during this third period [Instrumentalism and Reflective Inquiry] he tended to deplore systems and system-makers and spoke of metaphysics mainly pejoratively as a way of setting up dualisms, fixed distinctions, or impassible chasms in what for the plain man or the working scientist is fluid, continuous experience.¹⁵

The net effect of this new attitude towards metaphysics is that he no longer pursues philosophical questions in terms of ultimate truths, fixed realities, or in terms of unchanging principles. He consciously chooses to adapt the meaning of metaphysics to the field of scientific inquiry.

In 'The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry' (1915) Dewey sketched a way of conceiving a naturalistic metaphysics of a descriptive, hypothetical sort, holding that its province is ultimate matters in the sense of basic and 'irreducible traits in any and every subject of scientific inquiry' and suggesting that three such traits are diversity, interaction, and change.¹⁶

Thus when Dewey concerns himself at all with metaphysical questions he does so in terms of his own specialized

¹⁵ Lewis Hahn, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method", in Jo Ann Boydston, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 26. See also John Dewey, "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 5, p. 23-24. Here Dewey writes of "metaphysical absurdities and unverifiable speculations".

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 14. See also, John Dewey, "The Present Position of Logical Theory," The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. 3, p. 125-141.

view of metaphysics. It is not surprising that confusion results from this practice, and that this confusion finds its way into his concepts of growth in education.

The lack of a clearly defined terminus for growth is of much less concern to Dewey than the matter of seeking out irreducible traits of growth. Viewed as an ongoing process these traits of growth are discussed in terms of "diversity, interaction, and change".¹⁷ The most important metaphysical questions remain unanswered however in this new view of growth. How can one know that the diversity, interaction and change that are thought to exemplify growth actually lead in the direction of growth if there is no end or goal towards which growth proceeds? By what standards can growth be measured or even recognized? Critical observers of Dewey's philosophy are aware of an inherent problem in the concept of growth lacking a clear terminus:

The dictum that education ought to lead only to more education, growth to more growth, has been criticised as without precise meaning at best and as a justification of aimlessness at worst.¹⁸

17 Ibid., p. 14.

18 Martin S. Dworkin, op. cit., p. 13.

The inadequacy of this approach [denying the validity of the admission of external goals] can best be exemplified by pointing to the supposedly complete and self-justifying concept of growth as an educational end.¹⁹

Dewey's metaphysical view lacks clearly defined goals. In his reluctance to accept any aims as fixed and enduring principles, his view of growth, the concept of the self, and his view of ends themselves remain incomplete.

(b) Epistemology. - The Fact that Dewey's metaphysical view is incomplete tends to place a heavy burden on his epistemological concepts. The means by which one comes to know, to learn, to grow, and to find truth become more important than the ends. Lacking definite goals, Dewey finds it necessary to incorporate built-in guiding principles or "ends-in-view" in the methods themselves. Ends and means become fused and confused so that they lose their individual and logical meanings.²⁰ Dewey seeks epistemological criteria that can be incorporated within the methods of knowing, learning, and growing, and yet remain independent of external

19 Reginald Archambault, "Philosophical Bases of the Experience Curriculum", in Dewey on Education, New York, Random House, p. 176-177.

20 Reginald Archambault, op. cit., p. 178 for a discussion of the logical meanings of ends and means and the confusion which results from Dewey's treatment of them.

goals. His method of reflective inquiry forms the basis of his epistemological approach. This method appears to work well enough in the solution of individual problems, yet it does not possess any built-in principles that assure adequate solutions to problems of a more universal nature. In an effort to find such principles without looking to external goals Dewey co-opts terms such as "change", "experience", "consequences", and "interest".

Change is thought to be an important aspect of growing and of coming to know. It indicates an openness of mind and a recognition that previous experience and knowledge changes the knower and hence the situation itself.²¹ Change is thought to be conducive to growth. This view appears to be weak on a number of philosophical grounds. First it can be said that regression and growth are equally related to change. Secondly change may be the result of growth rather than its cause. Thirdly, granting that change may be a necessary condition of growth, it does not follow that it is a sufficient cause.

Experience and consequences are also regarded as guiding components in Dewey's epistemological theory.

²¹ Gail Kennedy, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of Knowledge", in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, op. cit., p. 67, 78, and 69.

Experience is meant to provide first-hand involvement through sensory data. After reflective inquiry on the problem at hand, one's perception and solutions can be checked by the consequences which result from the decision taken. These two criteria are open to a number of criticisms. First-hand experience, although generally preferable to the experiences of others, is uneconomical in terms of time. Man does not live long enough to experience all that he needs to know. He must learn from traditions and the experiences of others as well. In addition Dewey himself recognizes that not all experiences lead to growth.²² Secondly the consequences of our actions and decisions can never be fully known. In the ongoing chain of causes and effects the entire consequences of even one act spread out beyond our ability to know.

The principle of interest is also thought to serve as an epistemological guide. Dewey has an optimistic faith that an appeal to the natural curiosity and interests of children will motivate them to grow in appropriate directions of knowledge and understanding. Although the principle of interest may serve as "an initiating factor"²³ in

22 John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 25.

23 William H. Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, New York, Nelson, 1936, p. 25. Here Kilpatrick discusses Dewey's principle of interest.

learning it is unlikely that it will suffice either as a guide or a "unifying force in the learning situation".²⁴ Archambault regards the principle of interest as an "essential catalyst"²⁵ in the learning process, but he expresses his belief that it falls short as a criterion which offers consistency and sustained guidance:

Most adherents of the doctrine of interest recognize the severe limitations of the unqualified concept of interest alone as a criterion for creating a setting for learning. [...] The doctrine of interest is by reference to 'persistent' and 'sustained' interests, but the criterion for differentiation between mere 'passing fancies' and more significant and worthy interests is often lacking.²⁶

Having failed to establish a sufficient metaphysical basis for his philosophy so that it might be guided by enduring principles, Dewey attempts to incorporate self-regulatory principles within his epistemological method. This heavily taxes his epistemology. The concept of growth is meant by Dewey to provide the necessary unity and direction in his educational philosophy. Students of Dewey differ greatly on whether or not the concept of growth

24 Ibid., p. 25.

25 Reginald Archambault, Dewey on Education, p. 168.

26 Ibid., p. 25.

serves this purpose adequately. One of the more noble defenses of his concept of growth is as follows:

Growth must serve as its own end leading toward further, evolving growth, and education is the chief instrument for accelerating the growth process. Inherent in the concept of education as growth is the principle of continuity. Growth is not directionless, for it offers a fundamental directing criterion, insuring a healthy evolving life-adjustment process leading to further development and growth. Growth is a positive criterion then, for it insures future wholesome activity, and a perpetuation of the self-correcting life adjustment process.²⁷

This writer finds himself in agreement with this point of view only to the extent that the directions of growth can be found within Dewey's own writings.

Dewey's epistemological method relies heavily upon observation and the scientific method and the observation of consequences of various patterns of behaviour is an important part of his learning process. Inherent in this epistemological method is the necessity of observing models which function well and of learning from these models so that adjustments and reconstructions can be made in one's own personal life or in one's society. An epistemological difficulty arises however in cases where appropriate models

27 Reginald Archambault, op. cit., p. 165.

do not exist. An important case in point is Dewey's view of the harmonious society.²⁸ Dewey apparently recognizes the limitations of his epistemology when he states "we must base our conception upon societies which actually exist, in order to have any assurance that our ideal is a practical one".²⁹

In summary, it appears that Dewey's epistemology promises too much. Lacking a clear metaphysical basis to give enduring principles to his method of inquiry, his epistemology is open to a degree of confusion. Means and ends are fused and no fixed principles guide his method of reflective inquiry. Principles of change, first hand experience, interest, and close attention to consequences, prove inadequate as enduring criteria for his epistemological method. Although the scientific method is useful in the solution of specific short-term problems it too lacks the kind of built-in criteria that can provide the sustained guiding principles which are lacking in Dewey's epistemology.

28 Vide Democracy and Education, p. 9..

29 Ibid., p. 83.

(c) Axiology. - A number of problems are evident in Dewey's axiological view also. Again, lacking clearly defined metaphysical principles, his view of values, morals and ethics is reduced to a quest for harmony and adjustment to problematic situations in the everyday experiences of living:

Moral insight, and therefore moral theory, consist simply in the every-day workings of the same ordinary intelligence that measures dry-goods, drives nails, sells wheat, and invents the telephone.³⁰

Students of Dewey appear to be in general agreement that he attempts to develop a system of axiology based on empirical methods rather than upon metaphysical foundations:

Ideals are made, not given. They are principles of change, not of fixity. [...] The Ethical Postulate is retained, but it is no longer "metaphysical faith". It is an hypothesis which is empirically verified.³¹

... for Dewey there are no fixed ends, either psychological, sociological, or theological; no authoritatively decreed moral laws, and no eternally specified virtues or vices. He insists that goals, laws, and judgments be balanced and related to each other in any account of ethics and that the account be given in terms of actual moral experience and not in terms of a divine plan, an isolated feeling, or casuistic categories of behavior.³²

30 John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice", in The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Vol. II, p. 94-95.

31 Herbert W. Schneider, "Dewey's Ethics" in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 108.

32 Darnell Rucker, "Dewey's Ethics", in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, p. 108.

From this premise Rucker concludes that "Dewey's ethics is nothing more or less than the application of his method of reflective thought to problems of human behavior, problems of good and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice".³³

Because Dewey's metaphysical foundations fail to provide stable criteria, his axiological system is overburdened in the same manner as his epistemology. There is a need to incorporate built-in criteria to give direction to his value system. The principles of "experience" and "consequences" have the same limitations in axiology as in epistemology and it becomes necessary for Dewey to co-opt additional support for his value system so that the moral domain might be included as a valid area in the overall concept of growth.

By looking at an harmonious society in its broadest sense Dewey hopes to find a model that will provide some working principles on which to base his morality in everyday action. A model for such a society is outlined in the following statement:

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 125. See also Reginald Archambault. "Growth, Values and Objectives", in Dewey on Education, p. 177-178. Here Archambault expresses a similar view to that of Schneider and Rucker.

The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the interests of the group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure³⁴ social changes without introducing disorder.

Among other things, Dewey emphasizes in the above passage, interaction, communication and harmony between society and the individual. Ideally the interests and welfare of both are in perfect unison. The ideal society in turn will work in perfect harmony and in "fullness and freedom" with other societies "with which it interacts". The model for moral principles can thus be found in whatever actions lead towards harmony in society at large.³⁵ Dewey is referring

34 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 99.

35 Vide "The Study of Ethics", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 5, p. 244-245. Here Dewey extends the notion of "harmony" as a criterion of moral good that may be applied to the actions of the individual as well as of society. See also The School and Society, p. 29. Dewey discusses the "larger society" in terms of its harmonious qualities.

to a social model from which to observe and abstract moral principles, but it is unlikely that such an ideal model exists in reality. While the lack of an existing model does not present a problem to the metaphysician, it does constitute a missing link in Dewey's axiological principles which are based upon observation of systems that approach his ideal society.

Secondly, he assumes a complete identification of the interests of the individual and those of society.³⁶ The two are held to be entirely compatible, yet this complete identification of interests tends to be more of an assumption than a fact of everyday life.

Under ordinary circumstances the life of the individual is not wholly absorbed in group experiences. In societies that lay some claim to a civilized life, such experiences are balanced by the individual's desire to live in₃₇ a world of his own, both real and imaginative.

Even granting a complete identification of individual and social interests, the task of determining what the best

36 Vide "Ethical Principles Underlyin Education", The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 5, p. 55.

37 Frederic Lilge, "The Vain Quest for Unity", in Reginald Archambault, Dewey on Education, p. 67-68.

interests of society are in order that the society may be able to operate with internal harmony as well as in harmony with other societies is, to say the least, a monumental task. According to moral theorists such as Lawrence Kohlberg this task is hardly the place where one can be expected to begin moral growth.³⁸

Supposing it were possible to overcome this problem, still others remain to be solved. Dewey's axiological system requires the learner to develop his powers of judgement through experience and through the consequences of his actions. While the development of moral judgement is commendable, this method of forming it is time consuming. One cannot wait to experience and judge, all moral situations before acting. It is necessary to operate on a working set of moral principles while one is in the process of learning. In practical terms the learner needs immediate guides whether from divine authority, traditions, metaphysical systems, or elsewhere. It is at this point that Dewey's axiological system is again strained due to a lack of stable metaphysical principles.

38 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order", Vita Humana, VI, 1963, p. 11-13; "A Cognitive-Development Approach to Moral Education", The Humanist, Nov./Dec., 1972, p. 13-16; "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education", in Moral Education, edited by Clive Beck et al., New York, Newman, 1971, p. 23-92.

(d) Summary. - Dewey is distrustful of any fixed principles which might be used to form a metaphysical basis for his philosophy. Hence he proclaims no clear-cut goals or ends, and all ends are viewed as temporary and changing, as expressed in the terms "end-in-view" and "fusion of means and ends". Concepts such as growth, education, and self development thus remain open-ended. This open-ended position creates the problem of determining how growth, education, and self-development can be recognized and measured. Dewey attempts to overcome this problem by creating epistemological and axiological systems that contain built-in, self-correcting principles. These principles are reflected in his rather specialized use of terms, such as experience, consequences, interest, change, reflective inquiry, and social harmony. In general these principles tend to complicate his epistemology and axiology and, along with his abstruse writing style, they lead to a degree of confusion and misunderstanding.

In conclusion, much of the confusion in Dewey's works can be attributed to his specialized metaphysical view which excludes fixed truths, absolute values, and concepts of ultimate reality. In place of these he seeks traits which may be discovered within everyday life experiences.

3. John Dewey's Concept of Growth A Synthesis

In spite of many difficulties in Dewey's writing style and confusion arising out of a lack of clearly defined goals, his concept of growth provides a valuable connecting link in bringing unity and meaning to his educational philosophy. The reader who hopes to find a clear terminus for educational growth in Dewey's works will be disappointed. If, however, he is content to think of education in terms of an open-ended, ongoing process as Dewey does, then the concept of growth offers a set of working principles which enables the reader to grasp Dewey's ideas about the function of education.

Since the ends of growth are never solidified in Dewey's thinking, the concept of growth can take on meaning only to the degree that one finds in it tentative ends, temporary directions, and tendencies that suggest still further directions. While this position does not go as far as one might wish, it is nevertheless an advancement over the rather vacuous and tautological notion that growth leads simply to more growth. To the extent that one finds even tendencies and tentative directions in growth, the concept of growth provides a key to Dewey's educational ideas.

It has been the intent in this research to seek out these tendencies or traits of growth, and the writer has found that Dewey's concept of growth can be viewed in terms of social, moral and intellectual aims in education. These three directions of growth are themselves united by an overall purpose, namely the ongoing development of the self.

The idea of social growth is not clearly defined in Dewey's works, but it is apparent that he regards society in an extremely broad sense. Since society is flexible and always changing, the growth of society itself requires some directing principle. By looking at a model for society in an overall sense, Dewey concludes that the degree of harmony evident in a society may serve as an appropriate principle. By considering the degree of harmony a society has in its relationships with other groups and also by considering the degree of harmony that exists among the members of the particular society, Dewey suggests a principle by which to measure its growth. He clearly recognizes that societies are composed of individual people, and a society cannot be said to have true growth at the expense of its members. Only in conjunction with individual growth and in fact because of individual growth can social growth occur. It is possible, nevertheless, to think of a society in a state of inner harmony with its members, but which at the same time may exploit other societies. Thus it is necessary

for Dewey to include in his concept of social growth a broad view that encompasses more than the welfare of one particular society on one hand, and on the other the growth of its individual members.

The values that enhance the growth of a society are thought by Dewey to be identical with the values that enhance personal growth. He can foresee no instances where this is not the case, and any apparent dichotomies are regarded as simply a lack of understanding of the proper relationship and interdependence of the self and society. Nevertheless it is apparent to Dewey that children are not born into the world as fully developed social beings who are immediately aware of the interworkings of a harmonious society, nor do they have an immediate identity of interests with their society. Yet Dewey claims that they have a potential for growth in this direction.

Society has an obligation to see that the individual grows in the direction of social awareness. The individual too has a responsibility to become socially aware so that he may learn to interact harmoniously with his social peers. This social obligation is equivalent in Dewey's philosophy to a moral "ought". So closely are moral and social growth bound together that Dewey sometimes uses the two terms interchangeably. Their close connection leads him to

conclude that the social and moral aims of the school are one and the same thing.

Inasmuch as the individual requires social growth in order to develop himself, moral development is also a way of developing the self. The standards or directions for proper moral growth are to be found in society, but some methods of moral development are preferable to others. Dewey holds that methods which rely on handing down fixed values, or on indoctrination are unacceptable. Instead he prefers a method that involves personal judgement, thoughtful consideration of circumstances, and an understanding of cause and effect relationships. This cognitive approach to morals requires some guidance from teachers or other adults, but it places a heavy emphasis on the individual's own intellectual development in moral decision making. While the standards for moral values are social, one's growth in moral decision making requires inner mental activity and results in self growth as well as in social growth.

The same cognitive procedures which are applicable to moral growth have broader application in the area of intellectual growth in general. Again Dewey wishes to avoid indoctrination and the dispensing of fixed truths, replacing these methods with principles of understanding, and an ability to form broad concepts and accurate generalizations. Some methods of intellectual growth are

preferable to others, and the particular method of intellectual growth which he believes best of all he calls reflective inquiry or reflective thinking. Reflective inquiry is a rather formalized procedure patterned after the steps of the scientific method. The intellectual growth that accrues through reflective inquiry has application to self growth since it enables the individual to make choices, to use his freedom wisely, and to become self directing. Equally important to Dewey is the idea that intellectual growth has applications to moral and social development. One's ability to make appropriate moral decisions and to become more fully aware of society are enhanced by one's intellectual growth.

The three traits of growth, social, moral, and intellectual, are interdependent, and together they contribute to the ongoing development of the self. No one area of growth can be completely developed or even understood when isolated from the others.

The concept of self is a unifying focus for growth, yet the notion of self is open-ended. There is no fixed pattern to which the self ought to be molded in the ongoing process of growth. The self is being continually developed through its experience. It is shaped, modified and reshaped partly by the environment and partly by an inner process of decisions and choices which have a role in

selecting its own particular environment. The self is at the same time an object and an agent in the growth process. While this falls short of a clear terminus for educational growth, Dewey believes that the final, ideal outcome of the self can not be known.

In conclusion, when Dewey speaks of growth leading to more growth he has in mind certain guides for educational activity. In spite of ambiguities in his writings and philosophy, by analyzing his works one can find indications of what the function of education should be. The concept of growth in education, though never absolute nor finalized, points in the direction of social, moral, and intellectual growth, having as its end-in-view the ongoing development of the self.

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Dewey, John and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Boston, Beacon, 1949, xii-329 p.

Problems in logic and epistemology are frequently related to semantics. Good philosophy requires a stabilization of word meanings.

Dewey, John and Evelyn Dewey, Schools of Tomorrow, New York, Dutton, 1915, 316 p.

A discussion of Dewey's experimental classrooms where education is regarded as natural development. Children work naturally and willingly, without external rewards or punishments, when taught what interests them. This work emphasizes the importance of first-hand experiences and social interaction in the learning process.

Dewey, John and J.H. Tufts, Ethics, New York, Holt, 1910, xii-618 p.

Later rewritten in part under Theory of the Moral Life. A review of major value systems and their sources. Discussion of their weaknesses and strengths. Much effort is devoted to a consideration of the negative and positive role of habits. A good overview of ethical systems but of limited use in this study.

2. Secondary Sources

Archambault, Reginald, Dewey on Education, New York, Random House, 1966, xvii-235 p.

A critical assessment of Dewey's philosophy. Archambault notes problems which are inherent in Dewey's fusion of means and ends, and also in his concept of growth leading to more growth rather than growth leading to specific and clearly defined ends.

Axtelle, George and Joe Burnett, "Dewey on Education and Schooling", Chapter 10 in Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, xv-396 p.

This work emphasizes the cumulative and continuous aspects of Dewey's concept of growth in education. Education and growth are seen as ongoing processes, and very little attention is paid to the matter of specific aims for these processes.

Bernstein, Richard, Dewey: On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960, xLix-293 p.

A discussion of the interrelationship of social and moral growth and their mutual dependence upon intellectual growth.

Bhattacharya, N.C., "Inquiry, Values, and Growth: A Reassessment of Dewey's Theory of Valuation", in Educational Theory, Winter, 1975, p. 92-101.

Dewey's lack of clearly defined criteria for desirable and undesirable consequences are examined in this article. His concepts of values and of growth without a definite terminus are also questioned.

Boydston, Jo Ann, editor, Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, xv-396 p.

The most complete listing of the works of John Dewey. An excellent and necessary guide. The best starting point for students of Dewey.

Brownson, William, John Dewey's Concept of Habit and the Dynamics of Growth, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1970, vii-292 p.

A study of Dewey's concept of the interaction of experience with human impulse and habits. The resulting change of growth of self is described as the product of organism-environmental interaction, or as an adjustment of the individual to his environment. A helpful study in understanding Dewey's concept of the inner and outer aspects of the self.

Childs, John, "Dewey and Education", Chapter 8 in Sidney Hook's John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, New York, Dial Press, 1950, viii-383 p.

Childs recognizes the importance of individual development in the growth process. Distinctions are made between stressing Dewey's central role of the self on one hand and allowing unlimited and unguided freedom on the other.

-----, "Educational Philosophy of Dewey", Chapter 14 in Paul Schilpp's The Philosophy of John Dewey, Chicago, Northwestern University, 1939, x-708 p.

This work stresses the role of consequences as a criterion of Dewey's morality. Actions and decisions which result in social good are judged to be morally correct.

Dworkin, Martin, Dewey on Education, New York, Columbia University, 1959, 134 p.

Selected works of John Dewey under various educational topics. The introduction by Dworkin is helpful in clearing up some popular misconceptions regarding Dewey and progressive education.

Eastman, George, "John Dewey's Literary style: Theory and Practice" in Educational Theory, January, 1966, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 110-127.

A criticism of Dewey's literary style and of his use of language. Eastman points out confusions which result from Dewey's lack of clearly defined terms.

Edman, Irwin, John Dewey: His Contribution to the American Tradition, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1955, 322 p.

Emphasis is placed upon the importance of reconstructing one's habits in the growth process. Good habits of thinking as well as of acting are required in order that individual development may occur.

Geiger, George, John Dewey in Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press, 1958, vi-248 p.

In this work Geiger stresses the need to recognize individual differences in the growth process. Dewey's concept of growth, although lacking in clearly defined criteria, is presented as necessarily moving in positive and desirable directions.

Gouinlock, James, John Dewey's Philosophy of Values, New York, Humanities Press, 1972, vii-377 p.

A helpful guide to Dewey's writings under conveniently listed topics. Gouinlock's search for principles which underlie Dewey's concept of growth leads him to believe that harmony and adjustment with one's environment are implied in Dewey's philosophy. A useful work for its discussion of Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics.

Hahn, Lewis, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method" in Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey, 1970, p. 15-60.

A discussion of Dewey's changing metaphysical view. Hahn describes Dewey's writings under four separate transitional periods: intuitionism, idealism, instrumentalism, and naturalism.

Johnson, A.H., editor, The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey, Boston, Beacon Press, 1969, Lx-lll p.

Selections from Dewey's own works with an extensive introduction. Johnson suggests that Dewey's principle of growth within the human organism implies a basic urge towards adjustment that is compatible with the all-round growth of society.

Kennedy, Gail, "Dewey's Logic and Theory of Knowledge" in Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey, 1970, p. 61-98.

Kennedy discusses Dewey's view that each new experience and each new decision changes the knower as well as what is known. Concomitantly, the importance of change itself is stressed as a necessary component in the learning process.

Kohlberg, Lawrence, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education", in Moral Education, edited by Clive Beck et al., New York, Newman, 1971, p. 23-92.

Kohlberg acknowledges his dependence upon the moral principles expounded by Dewey. The importance of a cognitive decision-making approach in moral development is discussed. In spite of his stated indebtedness to Dewey, Kohlberg's upper stages of moral development appear to depart somewhat from Dewey's strongly stated social standards for moral principles.

Lilge, Frederic, "The Vain Quest for Unity" in Reginald Archambault's Dewey on Education, p. 52-71.

A critical analysis of Dewey's quest for cultural, social, and political unity. Lilge questions a number of assumptions which underlie Dewey's view that individual and social interests are at all times compatible and supportive of each other.

Mayeroff, Milton, John Dewey's Concept of the Unification of the Self: An Exposition and Critique, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1961, iv-117.

Dewey's notion of adjustment and change within the process of self-growth is described as twofold. Healthy adjustments of the self to those environmental conditions which cannot be changed are called accommodations. Healthy adjustments of one's environmental conditions are called adaptations. Both types of adjustment are required for self-growth.

Morris, Bertram, "Dewey's Theory of Art", Chapter 6 in Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, p.156-182.

Morris regards Dewey's view of Art as Experience as a model of the cumulative process of growth. In order to create both the self and art one must combine the experiences of the environment with those of the innermost self. In the creative process each new experience builds upon previous experiences in a cumulative manner.

Ratner, Joseph, Intelligence in the Modern World, New York, Random House, 1939, xv-1077 p.

A selection of Dewey's works under a variety of topics. The extensive introduction by Ratner is helpful in clearing up popular misconceptions regarding Dewey's ideas about freedom and progressive education. The introduction also discusses Dewey's concept of a self in the process of change.

Rucker, Darnell, "Dewey's Ethics" in Jo Ann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, p. 112-130.

A discussion of Dewey's ethics which lack clearly defined fixed principles. Rucker concludes that Dewey's ethics are in fact the application of the method of reflective inquiry to problems of right and wrong behaviour.

Skilbeck, Malcolm, editor, Dewey, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970, vi-170 p.

A collection of comments on Dewey's educational principles. Skilbeck is critical of Dewey's lack of clearly defined criteria for the concept of growth, and he concludes that growth as seen by Dewey implies a cognitive approach as exemplified in the methods of reflective inquiry.

Wirth, A.G., "John Dewey in Transition from Religious Idealism to the Social Ethics of Democracy" in History of Education Quarterly, December, 1965, p. 264-268.

This short article is helpful in pointing out Dewey's transition from a religious basis to a social basis in his ethical and moral principles.

Young, Elizabeth, "Dewey and Bruner: A Common Ground" in Educational Theory, Volume 22, Winter, 1972, p. 68-77.

Young stresses the interrelationship and interdependence of Dewey's concepts of intellectual, social, and moral growth. She suggests that an understanding of Bruner's concept of cognitive growth might be enhanced by seeking similar principles of interdependence in his concepts of growth and education.

ABSTRACT OF

John Dewey's Concept of Growth in Education¹

The purpose of this study was to investigate John Dewey's concept of growth in education. Since Dewey's writings admit of no clearly defined terminus for the process of growth and education, confusion exists in the recognition and understanding of these two processes. Previous studies have failed to investigate comprehensively the concept of growth in its particular relationship to education. The question which guided this study was: What are the traits of John Dewey's concept of growth in education?

Dewey's own writings were used as primary source material. The study began with an investigation of the general traits which are common to both growth and education. Following this investigation Dewey's propositions relative to social, moral, and intellectual development were analyzed in terms of their relationship to growth in education and also in relationship to each other in the ongoing process of self growth. The study ended with a critical analysis and a synthesis of Dewey's concept of growth in education.

¹ Goldwin J. Emerson, doctoral thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, June 1975, x-266 p.

The results of the investigation demonstrate the following: Dewey regards growth and education as similar processes which have a number of general traits in common. Both are autonomous processes which have no external aims and also no fixed aims; consequently, there is a mixture of means and ends in growth and education, and both processes are continuous and cumulative in nature. Specific traits of Dewey's concept of growth in education are contained in his propositions relative to social, moral, and intellectual growth. Dewey's moral standards are derived from social criteria, and both social awareness and moral decision-making require that the individual be intellectually involved. Thus, as interrelated traits of growth in education, social, moral, and intellectual development contribute to the ongoing development of self. The self, according to Dewey, is never complete since it is in a continuous process of becoming as the elements of human nature and culture interact to contribute to self realization and self growth. Although the self is incomplete, it does, nevertheless, provide a focus for the tentative directions and traits of Dewey's concept of growth in education.