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**A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION
OF
KIERKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHISKE SMULER**

by

VIDAR LANDE

Thesis submitted to

the School of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Ph.D.

degree in Philosophy





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PREFACE

Before starting to read the thesis, the reader should make himself acquainted with the methodological guidelines which are employed throughout the exposition. As the title says, the thesis is "a critical interpretation of Kierkegaard's Philosophiske Smuler" (Philosophical Fragments). The thesis intends thus to read this work "critically". It goes through the text chapter by chapter, but does not limit its analyses to direct reading of the texts. The reading is "intentional" in the sense that it attempts also to take into account the states of mind which must have produced the text. In this way the method is "phenomenological". It attempts ultimately to approach the "phenomena" behind the texts, i.e. the experiences corresponding to the textual manifestations.

Given this phenomenological intention, it appears that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus, shares spiritual experiences with religious mystics. The thesis attempts to express these experiences in a language which can suit comparative purposes with Climacus. In order to show how mysticism enters Climacus' mind, one could refer to examples on almost every page throughout Philosophiske Smuler. This has been done in the thesis itself.

However, just to explain the central methodological principle of the thesis, an illustrative example from the text will be useful.

In Chapter 2 of Philosophiske Smuler (page 26-36)¹ Climacus deals with "love", an exposition which he continues in Chapter 4 (page 53-66), now within the term of "faith". In Chapter 2 (page 28) he tells a story about a King who loved a poor girl, and explains how these two very different persons, as far as worldly status were concerned (page 28-30), were united in love. However, Climacus also underlines the great inequality between the lover and the beloved, and shows how this inequality causes the King to suffer. (See t.ex. page 29, line 20 ff., and page 32.)

Climacus continues his exposition of love in Chapter 4 (page 53). In this chapter he starts to compare the earlier mentioned King with "the God" (line 2f.), and goes further on to talk about how the God became man (page 53). In this way Climacus explains the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation within the framework of the story about the King and the poor girl, and explains also the suffering which follows a unification of God and man in love, which he, due to the historical dimension of God, calls faith.

Climacus' exposition is in full accordance with the mystic Christian neo-Platonic tradition, where love is the very connecting tie between man and God, manifested in the Incarnation. Examples on such mysticism of love occur in abundance

¹ References to Philosophiske Smuler is given to the third Danish edition of Kierkegaard's Samlede Vaerker. See the thesis, page 438, below.

in the writings of St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, St. Bonaventure, St. Francis, Meister Eckhart, Henry Suso, John Tauler, Thomas À Kempis, etc. etc. Climacus' emphasis on "suffering" in relation to mystic love is also a common trait in this mystic tradition. Some of the Christian mystics tended to emphasize the element of "evil" more than others, as for instance St. Augustine and Henry Suso.

The phenomenon of love as a dynamic principle which leads the mystic from the temporal world to the eternal, is not only a Western Christian mystic phenomenon. Many schools\sects of theistic Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism describe their God in terms of love. Sufi mystics in the tradition of Islam, as well as Jewish mystics in the Kabbalah tradition, never tire of repeating that "God is love", and that the human souls endeavour to be united with God.

If we approach mysticism from a purely psychological perspective, we will also find a clear correspondence between Climacus' description and what psychologists of religion say about the highest mystic states of consciousness. The well-known psychologist in the Freudian tradition, James Henry Leuba, calls the ultimate experience of mystics a "sweet bliss", in which "sex organs participate, tormented by an insufficient stimulation".

Thus, Leuba states that there are both suffering and love in this experience.

Some of the readers might not be familiar with the phenomenon of religious mysticism, or with some of the key terms which often occur in mystic literature.

Chapter 1 of the thesis therefore contains a detailed explanation of mystic concepts. But in order to avoid any misunderstandings on this important issue, the reader should consult the glossary in the end of the thesis. This glossary explains the most important mystic concepts and gives references to the pages in the thesis where they occur. The glossary also points out the most important places in Kierkegaard's text of Philosophiske Smuler where the mystic concepts are most relevant.

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The thesis would probably never have been written in this form if I had not been introduced to the discipline of Comparative Philosophy during my MA studies at Brock University, Ontario, Canada, in 1977-78. In my MA-programme I acquired a renewed interest in Kierkegaard, as a result of a phenomenological, mystic-religious, comparative reading of his works. The present Ph.D. thesis follows these methodological guidelines in the interpretation of Kierkegaard's Philosophiske Smuler (Philosophical Fragments).

I am grateful to my thesis advisor, Professor Leslie Armour, Ph.D., at the Philosophy Department of the University of Ottawa, who encouraged me to follow up my ideas about Kierkegaard. He also gave me valuable criticism and advice about the disposition and organization of the thesis material.

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Finally I want to thank the institutions which have helped me financially. The Department of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa has supported me with departmental assistantships. I also received a Graduate Assistantship from the University of Ottawa for a period of time. The Norway-America Association gave me a scholarship in 1986, which made it possible for me to spend some time at the Kierkegaard Libraries at St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota, USA. The Norwegian State Loan Fund for Education gave me student loans. Without this financial help my Ph.D. studies would have been impossible.

CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Vidar Lande was born January 19th, 1949, in Arendal, Norway. He received the Candidatus Magisterii degree from the University of Oslo, Norway in 1975. He received the Master of Arts degree in Philosophy at Brock University, Ontario, Canada in 1978.

FOREWORD

The thesis attempts to expand traditional Kierkegaard research by interpreting one central work in Kierkegaard's religious philosophy on the basis of mystic, religious-phenomenological presuppositions. Not all Kierkegaard scholars will agree to these presuppositions concerning the interpretation of any of Kierkegaard's works. On the contrary, it has been a more common view that Kierkegaard rejected mysticism altogether, and stayed firmly within the framework of Lutheran, "anti-monastic" religion. However, subsequent research has shown that his religious views have much in common with those of mystics, and that Kierkegaard in many ways can possibly be best understood as a religious mystic.

The possibility of interpreting Kierkegaard as a mystic gave me a renewed interest in his works. I had long been interested in mystic religion and philosophy of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, as well as in Comparative Religion and Philosophy in general. The mystic reading of Kierkegaard's works opened up new possibilities of comparing and contrasting him with religious thinkers from Western as well as Eastern culture and tradition. In a mystic, comparative perspective, Kierkegaard appeared as a philosophical mystic who strongly emphasized analytic thinking and the seriousness of suffering and evil.

In the present thesis, which is an interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler (Philosophical Fragments), I found it useful to introduce elements from classic, mystic phenomenology, related to the same mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition as Kierkegaard can be said to have belonged to. Choosing the Dominican monk of the 14th century Germany, Meister Eckhart, as the main figure in this respect, the peculiarities of thinking and the understanding of evil of the author of Philosophiske Smuler, i.e. of Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus, could appear in clear contrast. Kierkegaard's Climacus rejected the classic, neo-Platonic, mystic claim, that "evil is ignorance". For Climacus evil had a stronger and more independent status, so that it only could be eradicated by a "transcendent" principle, beyond human understanding. On the basis of Kantian sceptical epistemology, Climacus argued that no transcendent knowledge could exist. "Pure Reason" could only lead to scepticism or "absurdity", not to transcendent reality. But in addition to this Kantian, epistemological view, Climacus also adhered to religious, mystic, Christian ideas, saying that a mystic-transcendent reality exists. By combining these two contradictory positions in his religious consciousness, Climacus seemed to subscribe to something he also must reject at the same time. He should therefore, in accordance with topical terminology concerning Kierkegaard's epistemology, be termed an "irrationalist". In this perspective Climacus seemed to believe that the mystic, transcendent reality should be tainted with scepticism. It could thus possibly contain evil, since Kantian epistemology shows that it is totally inscrutable. Evil is therefore not only ignorance which will fade with the increase of knowledge. It has a stronger ontological status. Further, on Kantian presuppositions, Climacus could strengthen this view by arguing

that since sceptical "rationalism" exterminates evil, then "anti-rationalism" must uphold evil. Thus, on Kantian sceptical presuppositions, he could apparently argue within a mystic-transcendent perspective that evil is a result of Kantian "anti-rationalism", thus to be upheld and never to be extirpated by the increase of knowledge.

By pointing out the strong emphasis given to evil in Climacus' work of Philosophiske Smuler, the thesis argues that Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" are essential in this work. The closely related question of whether or not the historical Kierkegaard should be termed an "irrationalist" has been a debated theme in Kierkegaard research in recent decades. By reading Kierkegaard's works on the basis of phenomenological, mystic, neo-Platonic presuppositions, it seemed to me that one could point out a new perspective and contribute new ideas in this debate. Viewed in a religious-mystic perspective, Climacus' strong emphasis on evil and Kantian sceptical epistemology unmistakably pointed towards the "irrational" position.

However, as my work proceeded, serious difficulties arose of which I had been insufficiently aware in the beginning. First: the problem of Kierkegaard's pseudonymity appeared to be extremely complex. It seemed to pose an impassable obstacle in any attempt to approach Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism" through one work written under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Secondly: I found that almost all mystics tended to emphasize the importance of ascetism and suffering, i.e. "evil elements", in their development towards mystic perfection. In addition, psychologists of religion unanimously consented to the fact that evil was always mixed with bliss in the

ultimate, mystic, transcendent experience. Mysticism seemed thus necessarily to imply the existence of an element of serious evil. Kierkegaard could therefore not necessarily be said to deviate from classic, mystic, neo-Platonic, rational phenomenology by virtue of his emphasis on evil. And this emphasis would consequently not necessarily point in the direction of "irrationalism".

Thus, as my studies went on, my personal views concerning Kierkegaard underwent a modification, and partly changed in the direction of more uncertainty. I found that the Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler, as well as the historical Kierkegaard, were extremely intricate thinkers, who seemed to have been most utterly conscious and diligent in disguising their personal views by means of indirect communication, humour, irony, and analytic scepticism. After having analyzed the text of Philosophiske Smuler as thoroughly as I could, I was not able to conclude without reservation, that its author, Johannes Climacus, was an "irrationalist". In full agreement with other Kierkegaard scholars who have studied the works of Johannes Climacus, I concluded that his thoughts were "dialectical", and did not lend themselves to a final, ultimate interpretation. Any conclusion could only be tentative and suggestive, building partly on one's own subjective predilections and choices. However, in that perspective, with the necessary reservations, I tended to conclude that Climacus gave so much importance to the seriousness of evil and Kantian sceptical epistemology, that when considered within mystic phenomenology, he should rather be counted as an irrationalist, as not.

Very soon I also realized that my thesis ought to be limited to the question of "irrationalism" of the author of Philosophiske Smuler alone. It should not be intended to account for the possible "irrationalism" of the historical person Søren Kierkegaard. I realized that the question of pseudonymity was too comprehensive and difficult adequately to be dealt with in a thesis of a few hundred pages. However, the close connection between Kierkegaard and Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler also appeared to be so conspicuous, that I tended to think that the views propounded in this work could also be used as an argument for Kierkegaard's own possible "irrationalism". But in order to pay due respect to the problem of pseudonymity, as modern, analytic Kierkegaard scholars had recommended, I ultimately left this question unanswered, and claimed only that my thesis intended to prepare the ground for further research into the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". Thus, I included a section (Section C) in Chapter 1 of the thesis, where I drew up basic methodological guidelines which in my opinion could be used to argue in favour of Kierkegaard's "irrationalism". And in this same section I also made clear how I thought that my own interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler pointed more strongly in favour of Kierkegaard's "irrationalism" than in favour of the opposite view.

To my knowledge, Philosophiske Smuler has never been interpreted within a clearly defined, mystic, phenomenological perspective before. My interpretation is therefore first-hand work in most respects. Other commentators on the work build on different presuppositions, and have different intentions. Most of their arguments and concerns are not primarily relevant to the thesis. I therefore mostly made references

directly to the original text of Philosophiske Smuler, (Danish 3rd edition) and placed numbers of page and line (counted from the top of the actual page) in square brackets behind the actual topic in the main text of the thesis¹. I only referred to available secondary literature when this apparently had more direct relevance for the argument of the thesis. I placed these references in the Notes, and added them to each chapter. However, one should bear in mind that the thesis intends to contribute constructively to the current debate about Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". In this respect my presuppositions and interpretations could of course be objects of criticism from any Kierkegaard scholar. But it is my opinion that, consenting to the premisses of the thesis, one should be led in the direction of "irrationalism" - at least as far as the author of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus is concerned.

The thesis sometimes refers to historical material. This is the case concerning Meister Eckhart, but the thesis takes also into consideration historical developments in the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. However, it should be emphasized, that the thesis does not intend to partake in a historical discussion about these matters. Meister Eckhart, as well as other neo-Platonic and Christian mystics, serves only as a systematic, comparative and contrasting model, to be used meaningfully in the interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler. The historical material concerning neo-Platonic mysticism is thus only introduced with the clearly limited intention of shedding light upon phenomenological material. Thus one should neither be led to

¹ See the Appendix in the end of the Thesis. There I also included a Pagination Table to help the reader who is not familiar with Danish to look up the actual passages in English translations.

believe that the thesis intends to propound a complete comparison between the historical Meister Eckhart and Johannes Climacus - or rather Søren Kierkegaard. Such a reading would imply too many methodological difficulties, and present too wide a scope for the present, comparative project.

However, in order to understand properly the text of Philosophiske Smuler, a fair amount of historical material, especially concerning Kierkegaard and Climacus, is needed. The historical material I have introduced in this respect builds mostly on my own reading of Kierkegaard's works, as well as on Niels Thulstrup's thorough commentaries. But I have also consulted other secondary literature written by Kierkegaard scholars in Europe and North America. The results of this research can hardly be said to be controversial. The originality of the thesis lies only in the use of this material, not in discussions of the historical material itself.

Kierkegaard wrote three works under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus. In addition to Philosophiske Smuler dating from 1842-43, he also wrote an unpublished sketch on the biography and philosophy of Johannes Climacus, Johannes Climacus eller (or) De omnibus dubitandum est, dating from the same period. In 1845 he published the most comprehensive of his philosophical works, also under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, namely the work Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Some commentators deal with these three works together as a coherent expression of "the philosophy of Johannes Climacus", and they tend to attribute most importance to Afsluttende uvidenskabelig

Efterskrift². However, it should be borne in mind that the present thesis is only an interpretation of one of Climacus' works, namely Philosophiske Smuler. It only refers to other parts of Kierkegaard's authorship when these can shed light upon Philosophiske Smuler. The thesis seeks in this way to pay due respect to the problematic fact that several years have passed between Kierkegaard's publication of Climacus' first and last work. This distance in time might have caused changes in the views which Kierkegaard attributed to Climacus. The thesis seeks thus to preserve the unity of Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler. Consequently, it does not attempt to interpret Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift in relation to Philosophiske Smuler unless it can obviously contribute to the clarification of the latter work. Thus, when the thesis refers to Johannes Climacus, it refers only to the Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler, unless otherwise stated. One must also view the comparative elements from the neo-Platonic and Christian mystic tradition of Meister Eckhart in this perspective. The purpose of introducing comparative material is always, within a mystic, phenomenological perspective, to clarify the work of Philosophiske Smuler, primarily with respect to evil and "irrationalism". Whether the intentions have been successfully carried out or not is another question, which could be a matter of dispute. However, it is my earnest opinion that the new perspectives the thesis introduces in a very limited part of Kierkegaard research ought not to be ignored or neglected. It seems to me that these perspectives can shed light upon aspects of Kierkegaard that hitherto have been little explored. These perspectives give an argument in the

² See for instance, C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript". The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus. Humanities Press International, Inc., 1983

direction of "irrationalism" for the Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler. This argument may be a first and important step in the direction of understanding the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism".

Before reading the thesis, the reader should make himself/herself acquainted with the APPENDIX which is placed at the end of the thesis. This APPENDIX contains important source-explanations and explanations of abbreviations used in the Notes. To help the reader who is not familiar with Danish, the APPENDIX also contains a pagination table for Philosophiske Smuler, 3rd Danish edition, which the thesis refers to throughout the exposition, and Philosophical Fragments (English editions, 1962 & 1985). The APPENDIX also contains a selected bibliography of relevance for the present research.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

A) Introduction

The main purpose of this first chapter will be to introduce the reader to the central problem of the thesis, namely whether the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus, who appears in Kierkegaard's Philosophiske Smuler, should be considered an "irrationalist" or not. By going through the text of Philosophiske Smuler chapter by chapter, the thesis argues consistently for the view that Climacus is an "irrationalist". It is of vital importance to show this, because it could be a decisive contribution to understanding the historical Kierkegaard's own attitude to "irrationalism". Indeed, the view has been posited in a current debate, that Kierkegaard is not "irrational". Alastair McKinnon, Professor of Philosophy at McGill University in Montréal, has been one of the main proponents of such a view (1).

His views will be more closely examined in Section B of this Introductory Chapter, but a preliminary definition of his position regarding Kierkegaard's and Climacus' possible "irrationalism", as well as the position of the thesis regarding these questions will also be very useful at the outset of the thesis.

McKinnon's concept of "irrationalism" falls into two distinct parts: "ontological irrationalism" and "epistemological irrationalism". He defines the former concept in relation to the "old, great rationalists", who believed that reality and reason were

essentially connected. In this perspective, the view that reality/existence is somehow chaotic, indeterminate, and non-systematic must appear as "irrationalism". McKinnon underlines that Kierkegaard/Climacus makes a sharp, distinction between logic and existence. Reason belongs thus to a different sphere than ontological reality, and the concept of "ontological irrationalism" therefore does not apply to Kierkegaard/Climacus.

The more relevant and important definition is what McKinnon terms "epistemological irrationalism". He defines this concept as "accepting or believing a claim which is and must remain logically incompatible with our underlying conceptions" (2). McKinnon argues that Kierkegaard/Climacus never understands the ultimate essence of Christianity in this "irrational" way. If there is any evidence of "epistemological irrationalism" in his works, it is because Kierkegaard/Climacus often writes from a perspective of "becoming a Christian", not from an already established Christian perspective. Before "true" faith is attained, it must appear as contradictory. This changes, however, when faith is attained. In this way McKinnon apparently thinks that the pseudonym Johannes Climacus could be guilty of "apparent epistemological irrationalism". As far as the historical Kierkegaard is concerned, i.e. the person who actually uses Climacus as a means to communicate a "true" view of Christianity, the "non-irrationalist" view is indisputable. But neither Kierkegaard nor Climacus show any decisive evidence of "epistemological irrationalism", according to McKinnon. McKinnon appears to believe that Kierkegaard/Climacus is committed to a certain, purely logical use of reason, a use which is clearly separated from ontological and

existential reality. In this perspective, logical concepts are static, so that logical rules have full validity. The borders of reason are delimited according to logical rules. Reason does not "go beyond" ontological reality, or vice versa. Rather, the two belong to totally different spheres (3).

In the perspective of mystic phenomenology, which will be explained further in Section D of this chapter, the thesis argues that Climacus' separation of logic and ontological reality is ambiguous. For Climacus uses the borders of logical reason, i.e. the principles of contradiction and exclusion, to attain so-called "paradoxical passions" in the thinking subject. These passions are the means through which "true" mystic contact between God and man can be established. The ontological connection between God and man will thus be strengthened by adherence to the logical rules. In this way logic and existence are connected in a way which does not exclude the possibility of holding a view which implies a clear separation of the two spheres at the same time (4)!

Historically Climacus is in the midst of a polemic against Hegelian theologians. Climacus considers that they hold a concept of reason which neglects the necessity of clear rational borders. This has intolerable consequences for Christianity. For if man were able infinitely to expand his knowledge, he would also be able to "understand" the revealed, dogmatic truths of Christianity. The Christian dogmas of sin, atonement, salvation, and judgement would then be diluted. In fact, reason would solve all these problems in the same way as Plato, who had taught that evil was ignorance and lack

of good. In this situation Climacus apparently refers to a philosopher in the same pietistic, religious tradition as he himself belongs to, namely Immanuel Kant. Against Hegelians he refers to the sceptical, epistemological ideas of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, positing a clear limit to reason's validity. Reason cannot answer questions about God, and divine reality. If it attempts to do so, it contradicts itself, thereby imposing a limit on its own validity. In this way Climacus can secure the dogmatic truths of Christianity, so much emphasized in Pietism, from Hegelian, rational dilution.

Since Climacus is a mystic who believes that reason somehow influences mystic reality, he also assumes a mystic concept of reason which seems to "go beyond" logical reason, or the sceptical, Kantian epistemological realm. Mystic reason can thus be understood as partly expanding Kantian, sceptical reason. On purely logical premises this expansion must be the opposite of reason, i.e. a Kantian "anti-rationalism". The common rational Hegelian view concerning evil is that "evil is ignorance", and Climacus certainly agrees that there can be no fundamental evil within the area of human natural reason. However, when logical reason turns into "anti-rationalism", and extends into mystic-transcendent reality, this must imply that the opposite must happen to evil. Thus, by adhering to purely logical or Kantian, sceptical views as well as mystic-rational views, Climacus can apparently argue on sceptical premises that there must be evil in transcendent, mystic reality. Climacus buttresses his view of "transcendent" evil by strongly adhering to Kantian sceptical views, and thereby acquires a contradictory epistemological position. He apparently becomes guilty of "epistemological irrationalism", according to McKinnon's definition of this term. And

the corresponding ontological reality manifested in mystic, transcendent evil should most adequately be termed "ontological irrationalism". This concept appears at least to correspond very closely to McKinnon's definition, that "existence somehow is chaotic, indeterminate, and non-systematic". For if ultimate reality contains such unpredictable aspects, then certainly all the rest of human reality must incorporate them too. In this way Climacus' mystic God cannot be said to be totally good without reservation. He must also contain an element of unpredictable evil never to be extirpated by the use of reason. Only God himself can forgive sins- if he in his inscrutable mercy decides to do so.

Thus, by pointing out the existence of this most serious evil in Climacus' consciousness, the thesis gives an argument for the view that Climacus should best be termed an "irrationalist", both in the ontological and the epistemological sense.

However, the existence of serious evil is not only a problem belonging to Climacus, but to the historical Kierkegaard too. The thesis therefore points out a methodology which could be used to argue in favour of the "irrationalist" position for the historical Kierkegaard as well, although it does not pretend to draw more than probable conclusions from this exposition (Section C, Chapter I, below).

It thus appears that the thesis attempts to contribute to a Kierkegaard research which is rather complicated, due to all the ambiguities and varieties of the concepts. One can also, of course, seriously question the mystic presuppositions, and thereby

establish impassable obstacles to further research. In order to take proper account of these constraints, this first chapter attempts to make as clear as possible some of the most important problems and presuppositions of the thesis connected to Kierkegaard's pseudonymity as well as his and Climacus' attitude to mysticism and evil.

Beginning with pseudonymity, one sees right away that Philosophiske Smuler apparently is written by Johannes Climacus, not by Kierkegaard. The thesis attempts to clarify this problem in Section C of this first chapter, concluding that Climacus' possible "irrationalism" also points in the direction of Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism"³. An exhaustive discussion about the historical Kierkegaard's "irrationalism", however, lies beyond the scope of the thesis. The problem of pseudonymity appears to be so intricate and complex, that a too thorough discussion could easily grow into a whole thesis by itself. The thesis does therefore not intend to solve this problem once and for all. It only points out a possible solution, which seems plausible - at least for the author of the thesis (5).

As already mentioned, the thesis reads Philosophiske Smuler from the viewpoint of mystic, religious phenomenology. Not every Kierkegaard scholar will consent to this presupposition. However, it is well documented, especially in recent Danish research, that Kierkegaard shared most of his religious views with Christian mystics. The well-known Danish Kierkegaard scholar, Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, gives

³ If the term "irrationalism" is used in the following, it means both epistemological and ontological irrationalism, unless otherwise is explicitly stated.

importance and emphasis to the fact that Kierkegaard grew up in a pietistic, Protestant tradition, a religious branch which gave special importance to personal experience in religious matters. One can trace the origins of Pietism to the German, mystic lay movements in the Rhineland Valley after the Reformation. These movements sprang out of the monastic, neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism of the Middle Ages. There are therefore historical as well as ideological lines of connection from neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism, to the pietists. As a result, the pietist Søren Kierkegaard shares mystic presuppositions with the monastic tradition (6).

However, it should also be noticed that there are peculiarities in pietistic mysticism which might appear alien to common mystic phenomenology. These peculiarities are partly caused by the anti-monastic and anti-mystic tendency which followed the Lutheran religion. In accordance with ideas from the Old Testament and St. Augustine, Luther had emphasized the great distance in perfection between man and God. Man could ultimately do nothing towards his own salvation, for instance through own merits. Only the incomprehensible God could save man, if God decided to do so, and man could never do anything but receive God's gift of grace in passivity (7).

The Lutheran pastor, Johan Arndt (1555-1621) is considered "the father of Pietism". His main work is Wahres Christentum (True Christianity). In this work he, acknowledges the importance of man's own merits in the process of salvation, in clear opposition to Lutheran religion. Arndt's ideas were further developed by Philipp Jacob

Spener (1635-1705) and August Hermann Francke (1663-1727). These two theologians are usually considered to be the real founders of Pietism. It is from a treatise Spener wrote, called Pia desideria (Pious desires), that the term "pietists" is derived. In this treatise Spener tends to give experiential aspects of Christianity priority over the scriptural and dogmatic aspects, which were all-important in Lutheran religion. Many orthodox Lutherans therefore considered Spener's theology as a return to the Catholic concept of justification based on merit (8).

A central trait of Pietism is therefore to underline the seriousness in ethical decisions and the corruptedness of human nature, together with emphasis given to pious deeds of charity in the struggle for religious conversion and perfection. And these elements enter their singular mystic religion.

Kierkegaard as well as Kant grew up in a pietistic family. They both emphasize suffering and the indispensable ethical responsibility pertaining to the "right" human life. Kierkegaard, however, attributes more importance to passions than Kant does. As Kant exclusively underlined, within rational presuppositions, the suffering which must accompany correct pietistic ethical behaviour, Kierkegaard apparently gives more priority to the mystic-religious aspects of love and passions in Pietism. Kierkegaard thus attributes suffering to mystic passions and underlines thereby the pietistic-Lutheran seriousness and emphasis on the great gulf in perfection between man and God.

This is not the place to go into the details of Pietism and pietistic mysticism. However, the typical pietistic opposition between two paths to salvation, as both within and outside of man's capacities, is a most typical trait of the mysticism of the Kierkegaardian Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler. So is the suffering and the seriousness in a "true" Christian existence. In order to emphasize these traits to an extraordinarily high degree, Climacus refers to the rational, sceptical epistemological views of his "fellow-pietist", Kant. The thesis therefore says that Climacus adheres to Kantian sceptical views. The term "Kantian" is only used to underline the pietistic-religious connection between Climacus and Kant. - The thesis will deal more extensively with Kierkegaard's singular pietistic mysticism in Section C of this Introductory Chapter.

By reading Philosophiske Smuler in the perspective of religious mysticism, one discerns an interesting and renewing perspective in the understanding of central parts of Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion. As already stated above, this perspective appears to shed new light upon the problem of "irrationalism". In this connection the thesis introduces a comparing and contrasting, phenomenological, mystic model. It describes this model on the basis of neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism from St. Augustine to Meister Eckhart, and focusses most thoroughly on the latter. For Eckhart is a typical representative of neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism, and well suited for comparative purposes (9).

The most conspicuous difference between Climacus and Eckhart appears to be in their solutions to the problem of evil. Neo-Platonic mystics, like Meister Eckhart, solve this problem in the same way as Plato, saying that all evil is ignorance and lack of good: evil must disappear with the increase of knowledge. The mystic way towards perfection implies thus an increase in mystic knowledge, which at the same time annihilates evil. In this way man can work towards his own perfection and "salvation" (10). The thesis will deal with this problem more extensively in Section C of Chapter IV.

Kierkegaard's Climacus is much more reluctant to solve the problem of evil in this Platonic way. He seems rather to follow more closely the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition of St. Augustine than Meister Eckhart had done, by attributing more seriousness to evil. Evil is not ignorance, Climacus asserts. Man is ultimately unable to work on his own salvation. Only the inscrutable, Christian God, who can possibly punish man and thus make use of "evil", can in his grace and mercy decide to forgive sin, and thus "solve" the problem of evil. God can never be understood through reason (11). Climacus needs to emphasize evil's independence of reason. For as already mentioned above, he is in the midst of a polemical debate against Hegelian, rationalistic philosophers and theologians who, in Climacus' opinion, wanted to solve the problem of evil through an infinite increase in knowledge. In this polemic Climacus reveals his Kantian sceptical epistemological views, which combined with his Hegelian-related, mystic ontological views become an argument for an extra strong

status of evil. In this perspective Climacus appears as an "irrationalist" - epistemological as well as ontological - in the sense given to these terms above.

Thus, the thesis attempts to interpret Philosophiske Smuler in the perspective of Climacus' combination of mystic and Kantian presuppositions. By these methodological guidelines, it intends to contribute to the crucial and intricate question of whether or not the historical Kierkegaard should be considered an "irrationalist". And the conclusion must be that since Climacus seems reluctant to subordinate without reservation and ambiguities, his Kantian sceptical views to his mystic views, he should most adequately be called an "irrationalist". This conclusion points in the direction of "irrationalism" for the historical Kierkegaard as well.

B) Central Lines of Kierkegaard Research of Relevance for the Thesis

Søren Kierkegaard belongs to a time in European history when secularization started to gain significance. Born in 1813 in Denmark's Copenhagen, as the son of pious, pietistic parents, he reacted against Hegelianism, the prominent modern ideology at the European universities of the time. Its influence was especially felt in literature, philosophy, and theology, and Kierkegaard reacted against the rationalistic, Hegelian method, which he felt would undermine the dogmatic, indisputable truths of his own Christian, pietistic religion (12).

As soon as Kierkegaard started his theological studies at the University of Copenhagen in the late 1830's, he began to protest against the Hegelian rationalistic system. As time went on, the attacks became increasingly more conspicuous and vigorous. In the period from 1842 to 1845, when he published most of his philosophical considerations, his so-called "aesthetic literature", attacks on Hegelian rationalism figure on almost every second page. In the late 1840's and up to his death in 1855, the Kierkegaardian protest against Hegelianism became mostly manifested in his attacks on the institution of the state church which, in his opinion, was ruled by secularized, rational, Hegel-inspired theologians (13).

One can thus understand that epistemological questions become important in Kierkegaard research, and that Kierkegaard, by virtue of his attacks on Hegelian rationalism could possibly become a protagonist of scepticism, "anti-rationalism", and possibly "irrationalism". Such is the view of many Kierkegaard scholars. However, this view is not unanimously agreed upon. First: Kierkegaard writes most of his philosophical ideas under pseudonyms, and apparently he deliberately omits to explain what the exact relationship is between his own and the different pseudonyms' views. If then a pseudonym expresses a view which unmistakably points in the direction of epistemological and/or ontological "irrationalism", this does not necessarily prove that Kierkegaard himself is an "irrationalist" in any of these senses. Secondly: Kierkegaard ultimately attempts to communicate a "transcendent" message, a message that cannot be adequately expressed directly in language. He refers therefore to "indirect communication". Consequently, what he writes is not necessarily meant to be taken

literally - either as his own or his pseudonyms' views. Apparently, Kierkegaard often intended his writings to be solely different means of leading readers towards "higher" or different kinds of "knowledge". Kierkegaard's attacks on Hegelians - often on the basis of Kantian sceptical epistemology - do therefore possibly not reveal Kierkegaard's own, ultimate position, but only a position which could be a means towards discerning his own ultimate position (14).

The problems of pseudonymity and indirect communication must therefore occupy a central position in Kierkegaard research. Any scholar who wants to study Kierkegaard's ideas has to confront these obstacles, and has somehow to come on terms with them before further progress can be made. However, such progress is soon afflicted with new problems. Owing to an often fragmentary and dense form, the Kierkegaardian texts lend themselves to many different interpretations. These interpretations have been used by scholars with different interests, and thus given rise to divergent "schools" of Kierkegaard research. This has especially been the case in the last four or five decades.

Traditionally, Kierkegaard has been considered "the father of existentialism", the true forerunner of modern existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre. However, his minute and detailed descriptions of the human mind have also become the object of thoroughgoing analyses by modern educational theorists as well as by psychologists and sociologists. Analytic philosophers have also noted the acuity of his arguments. One could in this connection refer to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who has praised

Kierkegaard as "the most profound thinker of the last century" (15). In addition, Kierkegaard's ideas have been thoroughly studied by Marxists as well as religious thinkers from the most diverse parts of the world (16).

In order to give a brief sketch of the Kierkegaard research which is most relevant for the thesis, one could tentatively distinguish between three methodological approaches:

1. The biographical-historical method
2. The analytic-philosophical method
3. The phenomenological-philosophical method

Methods 2 and 3 are more exclusively philosophical than method 1. But some biographical and historical material is also always needed in order to clarify Kierkegaardian philosophical concepts.

It is natural that biographical-historical interest in Kierkegaard should have been greatest in Scandinavia, the area where Kierkegaard actually lived and was influenced by the culture. The Scandinavians know Kierkegaard's cultural background as their own, and should therefore be the best placed to study and understand all the local influences which formed Kierkegaard's personality, as well as his philosophical and religious writings. As one of the foremost representatives of this research in our time, mention should be made of the Rev. Dr. Niels Thulstrup, Copenhagen,

Denmark. Together with other Scandinavian Kierkegaard scholars he has been highly interested in studying the relationship between Kierkegaard's theological and philosophical ideas in the perspective of the general European history of ideas. These scholars of history have mostly understood Kierkegaard in relation to Hegel and German Idealism. We could name this branch of Kierkegaard research "The Copenhagen School" (17).

However, there is also another considerable centre for Kierkegaard research in Denmark, centred around the philosopher and theologian, Dr. Johannes Sløk at the University of Aarhus. "The Aarhus School" has assigned most importance to the modern existentialist and humanistic issues, and interpreted Kierkegaard's writings in this perspective. Less work there has been devoted to purely biographical, historical research, although none of these elements can be totally excluded in any Kierkegaard research (18).

The Danish Kierkegaard research, especially The Aarhus School, has been closely connected with the philosophical milieu in West Germany (19). However, in recent decades, most Kierkegaard research has probably been done in North America. American Kierkegaard scholars have built on the European research, but in addition especially expanded the analytic, philosophical interest in Kierkegaard. This is natural, considering the dominating influence of the Anglo-American, empirical and analytic philosophical traditions at most American universities. Analytic philosophers who study Kierkegaard often justify their methodological choice by arguing that Kierkegaard is

so complex and his writings inherent of so many contradictions and inconsistencies, that it would be almost useless to search for Kierkegaard's ultimate, personal beliefs. One should rather be content with trying to explore smaller bits of the Kierkegaardian authorship, and leave the final overviews until one has acquired sufficient knowledge to reach such views. Analytic philosophers tend therefore to give extra emphasis to the problem of pseudonymity, thus splitting up the coherence of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship. They try to understand the ideas of each pseudonym by itself, rather than attempting to integrate them all in a common "Kierkegaardian unity". It is thus a natural consequence, that much of the American Kierkegaard research is concerned with smaller parts and sections of Kierkegaard's authorship (20).

One of the best known analytic Kierkegaard scholars in North America today is a Professor of Philosophy at McGill University in Montréal, Dr. Alastair McKinnon. Being decisively influenced by Wittgenstein and philosophy of language, McKinnon conceived the idea that the language of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings reveals a consistency of its own, differing from pseudonym to pseudonym. On the basis of this presupposition, McKinnon argued that the works Kierkegaard had written under pseudonymous names were radically different from each other. The pseudonymous writings should never be taken as expressions of Kierkegaard's own ultimate views without further ado. In this connection McKinnon referred to Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers as well as his other personal writings, where in several places Kierkegaard explicitly tells the readers that the views of the pseudonyms were intentionally made different from his own (21). In order to strengthen his argument further, McKinnon

went on carefully to examine the use of terms and concepts in each of the pseudonymous works. This research resulted in the publication of the Kierkegaard Indices, Vol. I-IV, in 1970-75. In this gigantic work McKinnon introduced use of computers for the first time in Kierkegaard research. By means of computers he counted frequencies and registered variations of different terms in different works.

McKinnon has also used computers in his subsequent research, examining how concepts are placed in relation to each other in different Kierkegaardian works. On the basis of information given by computers he was in a position to draw graphic diagrams which could reveal something about the importance and use of different concepts. Thus the computers apparently provided an "objective" tool which could be useful in examining each of the Kierkegaardian pseudonymous authors' views. In this way McKinnon appeared to be able to "prove" scientifically, through analysis and computerwork, that one must be most careful clearly to distinguish between Kierkegaard himself and the pseudonyms, and that each pseudonym deserves the respect of separate examinations by means of analyses of the literature pertaining to it (22).

Not all Kierkegaard scholars concurred with McKinnon's method. A common criticism was that a computer was unable adequately to render the Kierkegaardian use of humour and irony, central elements in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works. But even the negative critics pointed out that information given by a computer might be useful in some connections. In spite of its inability adequately to render ambiguities

and deliberate obscurities, it could point out rational structures in the different works (23).

McKinnon had primarily reacted against what he considered to be an uncritical use of the Kierkegaardian pseudonymous authorship among Kierkegaard scholars. In the 1960's it had become a more or less accepted approach among American philosophers to consider Kierkegaard together with Nietzsche as a protagonist of absurdity and "irrationalism". In one of his first works on the topic, an article from 1967 called Kierkegaard: Paradox and Irrationalism, McKinnon attempted to refute the widespread "irrationalist" position (24). From an analytic point of view he argued that the "irrationalist" view was mainly caused by a misreading of the Kierkegaardian concept of "paradox". He excluded first the "ontological irrationalism" from his concern, arguing that Kierkegaard never thought of reality or nature as "irrational", but rather as belonging to a different realm than thinking (25). Thereafter McKinnon turned to the "epistemological irrationalism", defining this as "accepting or believing a claim which is and must remain logically incompatible with our underlying conceptions" (26). Within this category he distinguished between the "existential" and "logical" interpretations, holding that the existential do not apply to his concern (27). Instead he turned to the logical senses, numbering five of them as possible: 1. the dialectical, 2. the systematically incomprehensive, 3. the self-contradictory, 4. the historically dependent, 5. the apparently contradictory (28). It should not be necessary for our purpose in the thesis to go through McKinnon's refutation of the first four senses. He refutes them all by defining them in such a way that they do not imply the

acceptance of logical inconsistencies (29). Concerning the fifth, however, McKinnon admits that there might be an element which suggests that the concept of paradox could imply belief in something absurd or self-contradictory. He attempts, however, to solve this problem by referring to Kierkegaard's use of indirect communication as well as use of pseudonyms. He expresses this as follows: "But Kierkegaard, or rather Climacus, does not use it (faith as "paradox") to claim that Christianity is in itself logically contradictory". -His point is rather that- "in the process of coming to believe, the unbeliever must necessarily experience it ("true" faith) as contradicting his former conceptions. But again, this is simply a function of the process of coming to believe" (30). When belief is attained this changes:-" it is possible to revise our conceptions in the light of our claims; because real belief is, by its very nature, internally consistent and logically coherent" (31). McKinnon thus concludes that none of Kierkegaard's, or rather Climacus' uses of the concept paradox is "irrational" (32).

Later, however, McKinnon apparently wished to modify and/or specify his views. In an article from 1969, entitled Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited, he admits that his views in the article from 1967 were inadequate to refute the widespread "irrationalist" position (33). Now he thinks that the main reason for the "irrationalist" reading of Kierkegaard should not primarily be sought in Kierkegaard's or Climacus' use of the term paradox and/or related concepts, but rather in the presupposition that Kierkegaard believed in some "theory of stages" in a human being's development towards true Christian existence. McKinnon admits that one can read such a view out of some of Kierkegaard's writings, but he thinks that nevertheless

it belongs only to some of the pseudonyms, not to Kierkegaard himself (34). McKinnon therefore emphasizes that one should deal more seriously with the fact that Kierkegaard wrote under pseudonyms, and he thinks that "irrationalism" should possibly be attributed merely to some of the pseudonyms, never to Kierkegaard himself (35). He argues further in support of this view by presenting a table of terms, showing that the words "absurd", "Absurde", "Absurditet", "Paradoks", and "paradox" are frequently used by the pseudonyms, but do not occur at all in the works which Kierkegaard acknowledged under his own name (36). McKinnon's final conclusion in his last article, however, seems to be very much in accordance with the conclusion of his first one. He states his conclusion as follows: "I suggest that taken together, these considerations mean that even (the pseudonymous authors of) Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus are not irrationalists in the sense with which we are here concerned. Certainly they show that Kierkegaard himself cannot possibly be interpreted in this way" (37).

It is thus clear that McKinnon understands the concept of "irrationalism" in terms of breaks on logical rules, and that he refers ontology to a different realm than logic. He does apparently not think that Kierkegaard - also in the shape of Climacus - is partly committed to a mystic Hegelian - related concept of reason, where logic and ontology are tied together in some way. In this way McKinnon omits possible ontological and existential "irrational" elements as irrelevant from his primary concern (38).

The thesis primarily reads Climacus as a religious mystic who thereby partly subscribes to a mystic, Hegelian-related concept of reason, beside his also clear separation of logic and existence. The thesis understands Climacus' purely logical concept of reason historically, in the light of Kantian, sceptical epistemology, which Climacus apparently adheres to in his polemics against Hegelians.

In this way Climacus must hold a contradictory view of "true" mystic Christianity, seen in a Kantian, sceptical, logical perspective. Climacus thereby assumes elements of epistemological "irrationalism" in his mystic, Christian view. However, since he in his mystic perspective also adheres to the view that reason and ontological reality are somehow connected, the epistemological "irrationalism" cannot be totally separated from the ontological realm. The Kantian epistemological borders of reason must thus, in the mystic Hegelian-related perspective, also correspond to some kind of ontological limitation. Climacus can use these Kantian borders of Pure Reason to argue against the Hegelian rationalistic view, that "evil is ignorance". Full knowledge must therefore mean that all evil is eradicated, and total goodness achieved. Protesting against this view, Climacus points to the Kantian limits of knowledge and argues, on mystic as well as Kantian premises, that beyond these limits Kantian sceptical rationalism becomes "anti-rationalism". The ontological counterpart of such "anti-rationalism" must be the opposite of good, i.e. "anti-good" or "evil". There is thus an unpredictable ontological element in mystic reality that cannot be extirpated by reason! In this way Climacus' mystic view also acquires an ontological-irrational dimension, which must pervade all his ontological-existential reality.

In a mystic, phenomenological perspective the thesis argues against McKinnon's "non-irrational" position of the first article referred to above. In this article McKinnon builds his views of Kierkegaard on analyses of concepts used by Climacus, namely "paradox" and related terms. However, in the second article referred to above, *Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited*, McKinnon focusses on the problems of indirect communication and pseudonymity. He urges Kierkegaard scholars to take these problems seriously, and warns them against using the label "irrationalist" before they have taken the special nature of the Kierkegaardian writings into due consideration. For if they do so, McKinnon believes, it will become clear that there is no convincing reason to say that Kierkegaard, or Climacus are "irrationalists".

McKinnon uses his warning concerning pseudonymity and indirect communication to strengthen his logical-sceptical position, and argues that Kierkegaard still less than Climacus should be termed an "irrationalist". The thesis agrees with McKinnon concerning this warning (39), but disagrees with his conclusion and intentions. The thesis attempts to point out that both Climacus and Kierkegaard appeared to struggle with an insoluble problem of evil, and that this fact is most conspicuously substantiated by Kantian scepticism in Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler. Thus, Climacus should best be termed an epistemological and ontological "irrationalist", in spite of reference to pseudonymity and indirect communication. And in a mystic-phenomenological perspective the same seems to hold true for Kierkegaard. McKinnon employs a purely logical and analytic method to define the term "irrationalism". He is concerned with examining words and logical structures in

Kierkegaard's works, in order thereby to strengthen his non-irrational (epistemological) position. He attempts in fact in this way to show that the logical, sceptical elements have indisputable validity, in order thereby to argue that Kierkegaard/Climacus is not an "irrationalist". The thesis emphasizes these same indispensable logical, sceptical elements in order to substantiate Kierkegaard/Climacus' adherence to an additional mystic Hegelian-related concept of reason, implying an epistemological, "irrationalist" position.

Thus, it seems clear that even though the thesis and McKinnon agree about the indisputable validity of logical, sceptical reason, their views differ radically in regard to underlying methodological conceptions. By reading Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler in a mystic, phenomenological perspective, the thesis concludes on McKinnon's own definitions that Kierkegaard/Climacus is an "irrationalist". In this way, the thesis intends to bring new perspectives into the debate about Kierkegaard's "irrationalism", and in this debate it argues for the "irrationalist" position.

Although analytic philosophers as well as historians tend to dominate Kierkegaard research of today, elements of a phenomenological methodology cannot be totally excluded from their views. Taking a personal interest in Kierkegaard, often within a polemical context, they go out of their primary methodology to defend and/or attack Kierkegaard as a person. Thus, a subjective ancillary element enters their views, implying that their research has to be placed within a wider methodological, phenomenological context. The more purely phenomenological reading of

Kierkegaard's works, however, is rather new. It has been met with criticisms from analysts as well as historians, since it somehow tends to subsume the sharp oppositions and contradictions in Kierkegaard's expositions under a phenomenological unity: Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings become different perspectives of the Kierkegaardian consciousness. Given this interpretation, the pseudonyms do not necessarily represent Kierkegaard's most ultimate views. Rather, they give utterance to different sides or "structures" of his consciousness. Together, the different pseudonyms delineate a consciousness which is to be named "Kierkegaard". They reveal possibilities in the Kierkegaardian consciousness, possibilities which not necessarily are actualized in the historical person of Søren Kierkegaard. Among these latent possibilities one can hardly exclude epistemological, "irrational" elements as well as ontological "irrational", i.e. "evil" elements. Such possibilities must be part of the unity of the enigmatic person and authorship of Kierkegaard. Whether a phenomenologist is a defender of the view that Kierkegaard is an "irrationalist" or not, is thus dependent on how much emphasis he wants to give to the "irrational" elements in the Kierkegaardian consciousness. "Irrationalism" in some sense cannot be totally excluded, but it does not need to be the ultimate structure in the Kierkegaardian consciousness.

One of the first attempts to read Kierkegaard phenomenologically appeared with the work of the Jewish Professor at the University of Tel Aviv, Adi Schmöeli. His work was titled Kierkegaard and Consciousness, published in Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1971. Analytic critics reacted positively to the thoroughness of Schmöeli's study,

but more negatively to his methodological presuppositions. Since Schmöeli apparently presupposed unity above logical inconsistencies and diversity in Kierkegaard's writings, Kierkegaard's emphasis on subjectivity and paradox was weakened. Kierkegaard became "objectivized", and lost his claim to be decisively different from Hegel, his arch enemy and ideological opponent. In fact, one could place Kierkegaard within Hegelian understanding, as a representative of the "unhappy consciousness", described in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. For analytic Kierkegaard scholars who wanted to defend Kierkegaard's claim to be decisively different from Hegel, such an interpretation was intolerable. For Kierkegaard's main concern was exactly to protest against Hegelianism, and polemicize most vigorously against everybody and everything that could possibly weaken the paradox of Christianity (40).

However, other Kierkegaard scholars were more positive to the use of phenomenological methodology. A phenomenological understanding opened up possibilities for comparing Kierkegaard as a religious type with other religious personalities. A well-known Kierkegaard scholar today, who has worked on this presupposition, is the American Professor of Philosophy, Dr. Mark C. Taylor. In his doctoral thesis at the University of Copenhagen, published under the title, Journeys to Selfhood, Berkeley, California, USA, 1980, Taylor undertakes the extremely difficult task of comparing and contrasting Kierkegaard and Hegel as religious types. He exposes them as "opposite dialecticians", emphasizing "opposite" parts in a dialectical phenomenology consisting of individuality-generality, subjectivity-objectivity. In this respect Kierkegaard is predominantly the subjective individualist, Hegel the objective

generalist. Taylor says that Hegel continually seeks his way out of individual limitations towards generalizations, i.e. towards the "super-individual". Kierkegaard stubbornly claims the rights of the individual, and understands Christianity in relation to this emphasis. Taylor does not choose one side as "right" in the dialectical discussion. In his view, the two sides supplement each other (41).

However, Taylor can, by virtue of his methodological choice, be criticized by traditional Kierkegaardians for being "Hegelian". On the other side, Taylor has apparently more or less arbitrarily, chosen an interpretation of Hegel which suits his comparative intentions. Hegel scholars can thus criticize him for having designed a "Kierkegaardian Hegel". In this way Taylor has laid himself open to criticisms from both the Hegelian and the Kierkegaardian factions, and ironically enough, these criticisms can be said to illustrate the very dialectics he has intended to expose (42).

It is not only Taylor who has made comparisons of different types of religiousness on a phenomenological basis. Such comparisons have long been made by religious thinkers. In this connection special mention could be made of the German philosopher and phenomenologist, Max Scheler (1874-1928), who in his attempts to describe Christian consciousness has introduced comparative and contrasting material from different cultures of the world. His comparative method is especially clear in his work, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, from 1948 (English translation: The Nature of Sympathy). In this work Scheler discusses the phenomena of "fellow-feeling", "compassion", "love", and "unity with the cosmos". In his discussions he employs

material from Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as from Greek and Christian religion. Material from different religious types are thus compared and contrasted on a phenomenological, comparative basis (43).

Scheler's ultimate frame of reference is his own, subjective experience of the phenomena he discusses. His religious phenomenology is therefore highly subjective. Many scholars of religion who work in Comparative Religion today within the academical discipline of Phenomenology of Religion, tend to attempt a more "objective" and scientific description of religious phenomena. They rather build their phenomenological descriptions on empirical material, collected from different cultures and religions. The Swedish scholars of religion, Helmer Ringgren, Åke V. Strøm, and Geo Widengren could be mentioned as representatives of this kind of phenomenological research (44).

Kierkegaard has only recently been submitted to comparisons and contrasts with religious types from other cultures. Considerable work has been done in relation to Buddhism, but otherwise only smaller references to parts of Kierkegaard's works have been made. Such references and comparisons often presuppose knowledge of the phenomenon of religious mysticism. On the basis of a mystic, religious outlook - which is often the central part of Eastern religiousness - Kierkegaardian ideas can be discussed along methodological lines similar to those employed by Max Scheler and scholars of Phenomenology of Religion. For instance, the Indian scholar of religion at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada, Dr. John G. Arapura, uses such a method

in his work from 1972, Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity. Arapura considers Kierkegaard a representative of religious anxiety, in contrast to typical Indian mystics, who in Arapura's opinion represent religious tranquillity (45).

Most of the research which has been done on Kierkegaard and mysticism stems from recent decades. Much has been achieved by Marie Mikulová Thulstrup. Personally, she is sympathetic to Catholic, monastic mysticism, and tends to see Kierkegaard negatively in relation to this religious view. She tends to think that Kierkegaard could have found solutions to his problems if he had known classic Thomistic religion and philosophy. For her, Kierkegaard primarily is a Protestant who has excluded himself from fulfilment of a mystic-religious development by virtue of adhering to Lutheran, anti-mystic and anti-monastic dogmas. However, in her later research she is more favourable to the notion of Kierkegaard as a true mystic, and she points out all the typical traits of mystic religiousness which Kierkegaard apparently shared with Christian mystics of the Middle Ages (46).

The thesis intends to partake in, and expand on the research described above. Taking up the problem of Climacus' "irrationalism", it attempts to contribute to the discussion about Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". In this respect it tries to give due consideration to the problem of pseudonymity by arguing for the "irrationalist" position in one of Johannes Climacus' works alone, namely Philosophiske Smuler. However, this first chapter of the thesis also contains a section on Kierkegaard's problem of pseudonymity, where good grounds are given for not distinguishing too

radically between Kierkegaard and the Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler. Therefore, by arguing that Climacus is an "irrationalist", the thesis also intends to point in the "irrationalist" direction for the historical Kierkegaard.

The thesis belongs furthermore to the phenomenological tradition in Kierkegaard research represented by Schmöeli, Taylor, and comparative philosophers. It attempts partly to expand on Taylor's comparisons between Hegel and Kierkegaard, by substituting the rational, dialectical Hegel for the practising, neo-Platonic, Christian mystic, Meister Eckhart. However, the thesis also narrows the scope of Taylor's comparative work on two important issues. First: the present thesis deals only with one of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works, and does not necessarily pretend to present the "entire" Kierkegaard. It only claims to clarify a part of his philosophy which has importance in future research on Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". In this respect the thesis is in accordance with traditional, American, analytic Kierkegaard research, referred to above. Secondly: the present thesis does not, as Taylor's does, pretend to give a nuanced discussion of the person that is related to Kierkegaardian ideas, i.e. of Meister Eckhart's views. It presents only a systematic view of a representative of neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism, manifested in Meister Eckhart. This view can be used as a clarifying tool to expose peculiarities of the mysticism of Johannes Climacus in Philosophiske Smuler. These peculiarities concern "evil" and apparently deliberate epistemological contradictions and ambiguities. One can thus say that as Taylor's work intends to cover a comparison between two equal ideological components, the thesis presents a comparison where most importance is given to only one of the two parts

that are compared. The other part is only used for contrasting and comparative reasons, so that the views of Kierkegaard's Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler can appear as clearly as possible.

As far as the mystic presuppositions of the thesis are concerned, they often build on research done by Marie Mikulová Thulstrup. However, her work has a more purely theological and confessional scope than is required in this philosophical thesis. Much of the work on Kierkegaard's mysticism must therefore be first-hand work. There is very little secondary literature to refer to. But, generally speaking, one can say that the mystic research concerning Kierkegaard already is so well established that one hardly can speak of more than a minor expansion of previous work in this respect too. Where the thesis specifically intends and claims to do something new lies only in the mystic, phenomenological interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler, and in the argument it presents about the Kierkegaardian Climacus' "irrationalism" in the mystic perspective. The thesis intends to introduce perspectives in the Kierkegaardian epistemological debate that hardly have been dealt with earlier. Thus, on a phenomenological, methodological basis it argues for the view that epistemological and ontological "irrational" elements hardly can be excluded from the Kierkegaardian Climacus' consciousness. This "person" should consequently most adequately be named an "irrationalist", a view which points in the direction of also calling the historical Kierkegaard an "irrationalist".

C) Introductory Background about Kierkegaard's Authorship, the Problem of Pseudonymity in Philosophiske Smuler, and Kierkegaard's Problem of Evil

Apart from his Journals, private papers, and polemical writings, Kierkegaard distinguished between two distinct components in his authorship and called these the "religious" and the "aesthetic" writings. Kierkegaard published these two kinds of writings in parallel from the very beginning of his authorship in 1842 (47). On the religious writings his own name appeared as author. These writings mostly contained sermons and smaller treatises on biblical themes, intended to be read by the "single individual" for religious edification. In their forewords Kierkegaard emphasized that he spoke "without authority" in religious matters. By this he most likely meant to say that he had never received any kind of "transcendent revelation" which could be thought to place him in a more favourable position than all other human beings concerning Christian matters (48). His religious writings were built on the truths of faith as manifested in the Bible and were accessible to everybody alike. Kierkegaard presented these truths in a "direct" and straightforward manner. But at the same time he thought that the transcendent subject matter they intended to communicate could only be "understood" when God, in the event, provided the capability for understanding them. In spite of the "direct" communication, Kierkegaard can therefore be said to have used an "indirect" method of communication in his religious writings. For "direct" communication must always come from God (49).

The so-called "aesthetic" writings deal with themes which are not necessarily related to religion or Christianity. A considerable part of them is related to descriptions and analyses of different "alternatives of life" human consciousness can exist within or choose between. Man can live within an "immediate" aesthetic or an ethical "life possibility", and these ways of life can, in turn, assume a religious dimension. We can place the works Enten/eller (Either/Or) and Stadier paa livets vej (Stages on the Way of Life) in this category of aesthetic writings.

Some of the aesthetic writings relate general, human "life possibilities" to "faith". Among such aesthetic writings we find Frygt og Bæven (Fear and Trembling) and Gjentagelsen (Repetition). Others of the "aesthetic works" are more philosophical and theological. They deal with Christianity or Christian themes in relation to psychological, philosophical, or general religious problems. Philosophiske Smuler (Philosophical Fragments), Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript), Sygdommen til døden (Sickness unto Death), and Indøvelse i Christendom (Training in Christianity) can be placed in this category.

Presupposing a phenomenological methodology, one could say that Kierkegaard's aesthetic works describe human consciousness from a variety of perspectives, including the Christian perspective. But when we come to the aesthetic works in which Christianity is the main theme, a border zone between the aesthetic and religious literature is reached. Such is the case in Philosophiske Smuler and Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. In these works, Christianity is discussed from a

philosophical and "non-Christian" perspective. In Sygdommen til døden and Indøvelse i Christendom, the "aesthetic border" seems to have been transgressed and taken into the religious sphere: Christianity is now discussed from a definitively Christian perspective. But these two works differ from Kierkegaard's religious works in that they explain dogmatic, Christian concepts and existential categories, and are not primarily written for "religious edification".

Kierkegaard published all his aesthetic literature under pseudonyms. The use of pseudonyms was apparently very common in Kierkegaard's Denmark. The literary critic, P. L. Møller, wrote in 1847 that Danish literature is "overwhelmed by fictive names, behind which the authors hide their real identity" (50). The close friend of Kierkegaard's family, Bishop Mynster, as well as Kierkegaard's university teacher, Professor Martensen, both used pseudonymous signatures. So did the two contemporary philosophers of Kierkegaard, Sibbern and Heiberg. Their main purpose for doing so was usually to present the contents of their writings as independent of their own persons (51).

Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms was thus in accordance with a common, contemporary, literary practice. But he apparently developed a special use of fictitious author names which differed from his predecessors' use. Contrary to common usage, Kierkegaard did not use only one pseudonym, but used different names from work to work. These names were not chosen arbitrarily, but deliberately to reflect the themes of the works they were made authors of. His ideas in this respect seem partly to have

been derived from his knowledge of the German "Bildungs-Roman", represented by Goethe, Richter, van Hardenberg, and Schlegel (52).

There is therefore no simple and definite explanation for Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms. Every fictitious name must be understood independently from the others and also in relation to the theme of the particular work of which the fictitious name appears as author. In some respects, however, the pseudonym of Philosophiske Smuler and Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, Johannes Climacus, can be said to be a special case: it is only partly a pseudonym, since, in Climacus' published writings the name of Kierkegaard also appears on the title-page as editor. In his work En første og siste Forklaring (A First and Last Declaration), from 1846, Kierkegaard explains that this "double authorship" was necessary because the subject matter of Climacus' works required a person to be responsible for the possible consequences these works might cause in real life (53). In Synspunktet for min Forfattervirksomhed (The Point of View for my Work as an Author) from 1848, Kierkegaard says that Climacus' Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript) belongs to a literary border zone between the pseudonymous and the religious works (54).

Johannes Climacus seems therefore to represent views that are closer to Kierkegaard's own, than Kierkegaard's other pseudonyms can do. Climacus deals with themes that are directly connected to Christianity. In Kierkegaard's opinion, Climacus "knows correctly" what Christianity is, and attempts to describe this knowledge for himself and others (55). He is somehow Kierkegaard's "philosopher of religion", a

conceptual thinker, whose whole intention and joy is to clarify the problems that arise when attempts are made to accommodate Christianity to a philosophical, conceptual framework (56).

If Climacus expresses Kierkegaard's own views on Christianity, why can it then be so important for Kierkegaard to use the pseudonym of Climacus at all? A possible answer to this question is given in the difference between Kierkegaard's first and last draft of the introductory questions on the first page of Philosophiske Smuler. In the first draft, Kierkegaard says: "How can I obtain an historical point of departure for my eternal consciousness, and how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest to me? How can I build my eternal consciousness upon an historical knowledge" (57)? Kierkegaard apparently planned to publish the first version of Philosophiske Smuler under his own name. When he decided to use Climacus' name instead, he changed the above questions from personal to general ones (58). Consequently, Climacus deals with religious and philosophical problems in a more impersonal and general way than Kierkegaard himself would have done.

A similar explanation of the relation between Kierkegaard and Climacus follows from Kierkegaard's general distinction between himself and the pseudonymous authors in En første og siste Forklaring (A First and Last Declaration). In this work Kierkegaard states that, by using pseudonyms to express his thoughts, he was able to carry all his psychological and logical arguments to their utmost conclusions, without taking into consideration whether a living person could permit himself to convert these

thoughts into actual life. Kierkegaard obtained more distance from the persons in his works and could reflect more "ideally" on them as "types" (59).

Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, Climacus does not need to take into full consideration whether his thoughts would be "integrative" or "disintegrative" of an actual living person's consciousness. The pseudonym of Climacus gave Kierkegaard a freedom in thinking which he claimed he could not have obtained if he had written under his own name. And since Kierkegaard elsewhere also defines Climacus as an "immanent humorist", i.e. a humorist who like Socrates avoids epistemological and ontological transcendence, Climacus would always, at least theoretically, be able to finish up his possible disintegrative conclusions within self-referential humour and irony. His own integrity would thus be preserved, as well as Kierkegaard's. For Kierkegaard could stand beside Climacus as a "souffleur" during his experiments in thinking, and was exempted from converting Climacus' thoughts into actual life (60).

From a phenomenological perspective we can thus say that, Climacus' consciousness reveals possibilities within the Kierkegaardian consciousness which not necessarily are actualized in real life (61). When Climacus presents the outlines of "right" Christian consciousness in its ideal form, carrying his arguments to the very last extreme conclusions, be they good or so bad that they imply dissolution of the very consciousness, he will always be able to turn round afterwards and say that the whole project of thinking was a joke. Climacus has thus protected himself from any possible

disintegration, and so has Kierkegaard, for he can claim to have been only a spectator of Climacus' game (62).

It is thus clear from Kierkegaard's own judgments, that there are obvious differences between himself and his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, in spite of the common view they share on Christianity. The differences can be well explained within the concepts of possibility and actuality. Climacus describes the theoretical possibilities of Kierkegaard's mind, Kierkegaard claims to be a living person with practical and existential limitations. One seems thus to be in a position to conclude, as McKinnon has done, that Climacus could possibly be an "irrationalist", even if Kierkegaard is not so. By arguing that Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler is an "irrationalist", as the thesis does, one does therefore not necessarily argue for Kierkegaard's own "irrationalism". In order to point out Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism", one would thus have to point out the actualization of possible "irrational" traits in the consciousness of Kierkegaard's Climacus. One cannot search for these in the life of the fictitious person of Climacus, but would rather have to look into Kierkegaard's own, personal life.

The findings of such an examination will necessarily be controversial. The "Kierkegaard sympathizers" tend to emphasize positive actualizations in Kierkegaard's life. The "Kierkegaard critics" tend to emphasize negative actualizations, i.e. actualizations which seem to originate in an "irrational" trait in his personality. Such a trait is connected to Kierkegaard's solution to the problem of evil, in theory and practice. It is a matter of uncertainty and dispute, whether he definitively solved the

problem of evil in his own actual life, i.e. whether he finally brought his "irrational" elements under control.

To attempt a thoroughgoing examination of Kierkegaard's personal life in respect to the actualization of the problem of evil, goes far beyond the scope of the thesis. The thesis intends primarily to stick with epistemological problems in Philosophiske Smuler, and in this respect to point out that Climacus subscribes to sceptical Kantian epistemological elements, without being willing without reservation to subordinate them to his mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological views. This fact is manifested in the insolubility of the problem of evil, in the Christian, mystic consciousness of Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler. However, such an examination is, at least, very closely connected to Kierkegaard scholars' actual concern about Kierkegaard's own possible "irrationalism".

Religious mysticism is so interwoven with psychology, that the personal, psychological side of Kierkegaard's problem of evil cannot be totally excluded from the thesis. There are obviously sections in Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers which suggest his inability to handle the problem of evil constructively in actual life. In the following I shall briefly present some of the sections that seem to point in the direction of "irrational evil" in Kierkegaard's life, as well as in the Kierkegaardian possible consciousness of the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus.

In his personal notes from 1842-43, Kierkegaard has written a longer section, or rather a book which he has called Johannes Climacus eller (or) De omnibus dubitandum est. In this work there appears a longer section on the person of Johannes Climacus (63). This section was written in close connection both in terms of time and content, with Philosophiske Smuler, and thus appears to render Kierkegaard's views on the Johannes Climacus of the latter work. It gives the biography of a person who in all traits has parallels in Kierkegaard's own life. In his biography of Climacus, Kierkegaard tells about Climacus' feeling of being different from others. Loneliness and suffering are strongly emphasized, as well as his passion for analytic thinking. Thinking could lead either to "melancholic resignation", or to "joyful passion", i.e. an ambivalent mixture of suffering and joy (64). Climacus' biography is only a shorter unfinished sketch. However, the historical Kierkegaard's own biography completes the image of his Climacus. It is especially important in the context of the present section of the thesis, to focus upon suffering, and in the next section on religious mysticism, also to focus upon the possible small glimpses of joy that might break through the gloomy, pessimistic, Kierkegaardian, personal horizon.

It is easy to point out that Kierkegaard's life was filled with suffering. In 1846 he was involved in the so-called "Corsair-affair": Kierkegaard had been praised by the editor of a political magazine, Corsaren. However, being himself reluctant to endorse the liberalistic, anti-conservative political views of this paper, Kierkegaard replied that he would rather have preferred to be abused than praised in its articles. The editor of Corsaren, Meir Aron Goldschmidt, responded in a way which Kierkegaard

apparently had never expected. In the ensuing publications he started to ridicule Kierkegaard in text and caricature drawings, thus fulfilling in humour and irony Kierkegaard's own wish to be abused! This unexpected attack hurt Kierkegaard most deeply. His attitude towards the "masses" of people was changed for the rest of his life! He reacted in a hurt and vindictive manner, pitying himself and his immense sufferings (65).

Further, one can point out Kierkegaard's sufferings by referring to his work from 1848, Synspunktet for min forfattervirksomhed (The Point of View for my Work as an Author). In this work Kierkegaard writes, under his own name, about his longing for death and his predilection for suffering: "-the lonely, inner suffering can be thought to find its demonic expression and satisfaction in hating people and cursing God - or quite the opposite". He mentions also "the cruelty of Christianity", and his own "incurable melancholy". He has conceived the idea that, in every generation, God chooses two or three martyrs to be sacrificed for the benefit of others. And he has apparently understood himself as having been determined to be sacrificed in this way. He repeats again and again his restlessness, together with his inability to make a single close friend, and his destiny to remain an observer of others (66). All these personal traits are vigorously repeated with increased strength and passion in his final polemics in 1854-55, against the priests in the state church. They are restated on almost every second page in Øieblikket (The Instant), now still harsher and more bitter than before. Repeatedly he there uses expressions such as "hatred", "crucifixion of the flesh", "suffering", "heathen church", etc. (67).

It is also an indisputable fact that Kierkegaard had great problems throughout in involving himself constructively in practical activity in society. A case in point is the crucial relationship with his beloved fiancée, Regine Olsen. She was the daughter of a respected Councillor in Copenhagen, who gave his approval for his daughter's engagement to Kierkegaard. But for Kierkegaard the thought of marriage raised insurmountable problems of social and practical nature. He could not possibly fulfil the rôle of Regine's husband and live according to the expectations of society and Regine's family. After only two months, he felt obliged to break off the engagement. This was a far more serious matter in the Copenhagen of 1840 than it is today. It was especially humiliating for a woman to be rejected in this way. Therefore, Kierkegaard attempted in all possible ways to force Regine to reject him. He behaved badly in public places, and tried thereby to convince both Regine and the citizens in Copenhagen, that he was a worthless and silly person. But his tactics failed. Regine understood what he was doing and thought that it was an expression of his melancholy, which she decided to cure! Therefore, he finally had to give up his games and break the engagement himself, thereby imposing upon himself immense sufferings (68).

Kierkegaard explains the necessity of breaking off the engagement by referring to a deficiency in his mind. He says that he has a "thorn in the flesh". In 1854 he defines this concept as "a sorrow, a mental anguish related to my late father, a deep grief related to the beloved girl (i.e. Regine Olsen) and everything that was involved" (69). Exactly what the expression "thorn in the flesh" means psychologically is an enigma in Kierkegaard research. Jacques Maritain thinks it means Kierkegaard's

"solitary despair", "bruising of sensuality", and finally the "social impotence" which surrounded these sufferings (70). Josiah Thompson gives most emphasis to the fact that Kierkegaard's sufferings and melancholy were a result of his "inwardness". By never relating adequately to others, he drove himself further and further into a "lonely labyrinth", and increased the sufferings from the "thorn in the flesh" (71).

In his book Søren Kierkegaard. En psykiatrisk-psykologisk studie, the Danish psychologist, Hjalmar Helweg, discusses different explanations which the German, Freudian psychologists of his time had provided to account for Kierkegaard's enigmatic "thorn in the flesh". Examples of these explanations are "homosexuality", "sexual impotence", "excessive masturbation", and "syphilis". Helweg rejects these attempts to understand Kierkegaard's psyche in the light of a sexual abnormality. Helweg thinks that it is more important to take into due consideration the inherited, psychological dispositions in Kierkegaard's family. It is a fact that several of Søren Kierkegaard's ancestors and close relatives suffered from manic depression. For instance, Søren's older brother, the Grundtvigian, Bishop Peter Christian Kierkegaard, developed clear symptoms of this mental illness in his old age. Helweg argues therefore that Søren Kierkegaard suffered from a periodically recurring "manic-depressive psychosis", which prevented him from having "normal" and harmonious social relationships with other people (72).

Helweg's views were set forth in 1933 and appear today, together with the other psychological explanations from that time, to be somewhat outdated. Modern

psychologists who have studied Kierkegaard's writings unanimously tend to agree that the attempts to understand Kierkegaard primarily as a "mentally ill" person must be abandoned. One should rather start one's approach to his enigmatic personality with the presupposition that he was mentally healthy. A representative for this more "modern" view is the Danish psychologist, Ib Ostenfeld. He rejects all pathological explanations of Kierkegaard's psyche which, he admits, had been common among earlier psychiatrists and psychologists (73). Instead he argues that "there is one psychologically normal and understandable line running through Kierkegaard's entire life", and that "it is impossible to find manic-depressive features in his writings, journals, or even biography". Kierkegaard's social disabilities and melancholic tendencies should therefore never be considered to have become dominating traits in his psyche. Kierkegaard should never be diagnosed to have been "mentally ill" (74).

Whatever explanation there might be for Kierkegaard's "thorn in the flesh", it is certainly true that he was far from being a practical man, and that this trait in his personality caused him severe suffering. This fact is verified for instance by his relative and close friend, Hans Brøchner. In Brøchner's short book, Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard (Memories about Søren Kierkegaard), the author tells of Kierkegaard's amusing attempts to learn to ride a horse, and of his financial improvidence. Brøchner also relates that Kierkegaard had a private servant who took care of all practical matters concerning his household, finances etc. These matters were apparently too difficult for Kierkegaard himself to handle. He is in this connection quoted as having said that his servant "is in reality my body" (75).

Kierkegaard's lack of practical sense is also manifested in the fact that he never held a job or any kind of paid position in society. All his life he lived on money he had received from his father. This money terminated when he died at only 42 years of age. There was exactly enough money left to pay for his final hospital bill and possibly also his funeral bill (76).

Since Kierkegaard was a Theological Graduate of the University of Copenhagen with an excellent record, one should think that it might have been possible for him to follow an academic career or become a pastor in the Danish state church. Kierkegaard thought of both these possibilities. He told his father's good friend, Bishop Mynster, that he had plans to apply for a job at the University. But Mynster seems to have avoided giving him any kind of encouragement or recommendation in this respect. Apparently Mynster considered Kierkegaard too unpractical and unsuited for a job as university teacher (77).

The possibility of becoming a pastor seems to have been more realistic. Kierkegaard nurtured this option as a dream he wanted to realize when he had finished his aesthetic writings. In 1846, when he had published Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript), he apparently thought that he had written all he wanted to write. He added En første og siste Forklaring (A First and Last Declaration) to his last work, explaining that all his intentions and meanings with his written work were now "concluded". From now on he only wanted

to become a pastor somewhere in the Danish countryside, and remain there for the rest of his life (78).

This plan remained a dream in Kierkegaard's mind, however, never to be realized. Instead, Kierkegaard became increasingly involved in clashes with society, the state church, and the priests. His authorship evolved into a new, polemical phase, and his dreams of becoming a pastor were accordingly put aside.

There is no doubt that Kierkegaard's inability to adapt to normal life in society was painful for him. He wrote about the suffering he went through as a result of feeling "different" from others. His pain must have been increased by the respected position of his family. His father was a well-off, respected merchant whose closest friends were among the most prominent citizens of Copenhagen. His oldest brother, Peter Christian, was a successful theologian, a Grundtvigian church leader, who finally became a bishop. Compared with these two of his close relatives, Søren's life must have appeared a failure. He did not become "anything". His books received little attention and bad notices from the literary critics. They seemed rapidly doomed to oblivion (79).

Kierkegaard was well aware of these facts. They aggravated his tendency towards melancholy and pessimism, and made his attacks on the church, the priests, the Grundtvigians, and the well established Hegelian theologians at the University of Copenhagen, still more harsh and bitter. These people, who apparently were happily

accommodated to society had, in addition, accommodated Christianity to themselves, and thought that they were representatives of the true church! Kierkegaard could not accept such a view. In his opinion, the established "Christians" were not true Christians at all. In addition to accommodating Christianity to suit themselves, they had neglected the severe difficulties and "sufferings" which must invariably accompany true Christian existence. They had overlooked the Christian concepts of sin and guilt, and replaced them with happiness, self-satisfaction, and Epicureanism (80).

Thus, there is clearly sound evidence in Kierkegaard's personal life of an "insoluble problem of evil". As briefly shown above, this problem is reflected in his notes about Johannes Climacus, as well as in his personal records about himself. The thesis attempts to point out the emphasis Climacus gives to evil in Philosophiske Smuler, thereby arguing that Climacus is an "irrationalist", and further that also Kierkegaard most likely belongs to this category.

However, one should also be aware that such a conclusion is not necessary. The sufferings which are so often manifested in Kierkegaard's writings are also countered with a "joyful passion". Kierkegaard's writings document a possibility that he ultimately managed to solve the problem of evil in his own life. This is especially clear in the writings after 1848, when he recounts a deep religious experience. In this experience he seems to claim that he has found an ultimate solution to his problem of evil, and to have reached a peace which would obviate altogether his need to refer to "irrationalism" (81). The thesis, however, attempts to respect the problem of

pseudonymity by confining the examination of "irrationalism" to only one work written by Johannes Climacus in 1842-43, namely Philosophiske Smuler. It argues that Climacus adheres to Kantian scepticism in this work by pointing out Climacus' need to emphasize evil most strongly within a mystic, religious phenomenology. By arguing for the view that the Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler is an "irrationalist", the thesis clarifies elements and problems within the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". But before the actual interpretation of the text can start, some further clarification of Kierkegaard's relation to religious mysticism is needed. This will be the concern in the following section of the thesis.

D) Kierkegaard and Mysticism

Definitions of the phenomenon of religious mysticism vary according to methods and purposes of the different scholars who have attempted a definition. In order to emphasize the great variety of definitions, the Swedish scholar of religion, Geo Widengren, gives an example in his phenomenological work, Religionens Värld (The World of Religion). He refers to W. R. Inge, who, already in the beginning of this century asserted the existence of 26 different definitions, and in addition assured us that these were only a sample (82)! Nevertheless, scholars of religion unanimously agree that mysticism is a common religious phenomenon which occurs in different cultures and in different ages. It is above time, independent of changes in human

history, and has therefore often been called philosophia perennis, i.e. "the perennial philosophy" (83).

The thesis presupposes mystic phenomenology as the basis of interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler. In order to understand the arguments one therefore needs some knowledge of religious mysticism in general, as well as more specific knowledge about Kierkegaard, together with the contrasting and comparative representative of mysticism, Meister Eckhart.

Following the Swedish scholar of religion, Geo Widengren in his work Religionens Värld, we can distinguish between two main components in the definition of mysticism. First: Mysticism is experienced religion. The religious mystic experiences within himself, in religious "ecstasy", some kind of unity with God or the divine. Since the overriding goal of a mystic is to reach this ultimate experience, he/she uses methods of psychological training in order to prepare the mind for the experience. One can thus approach a concept of mysticism through the science of psychology. Secondly: Mysticism must be described within the language of a historical context. Thus, only by having some knowledge of the historical context in which the actual mystic lives, can one attempt to understand the concepts and language he/she employs in order to communicate the perennial, ahistoric, mystic experience.

Widengren further explains that common to all mystics is the belief in a kinship between "God", or the ultimate ground of all being, and the human soul or "mind".

The idea that man somehow is a reflection of God, a bearer of his "image", is a dominating idea. Due to this kinship, man has an inherent urge within himself, a mystic "love", which drives him back towards his origin. Such a view leads easily to pantheism, the view that all distinctions are lost, God is in all, and man and God are identical. This pantheistic trait in mysticism, however, has always to be balanced with a theistic view, i.e. a view that gives more value to human individuality and a god understood within personal categories. Thus, Widenegren makes a distinction between pantheistic and theistic mysticism, and he claims that all mystics strive to reach a proper balance in their consciousness between these two components (84).

Before a mystic can attain the ultimate experience, he/she has to go through a psychological development which appears to be very much the same for mystics of diverse cultures. This development can be more or less systematized into a practical training programme. During this period, the mystic's mind goes through a transformation. Following the usual way of describing a Christian mystic's practical way, one can, like Evelyn Underhill's work Mysticism, distinguish between four main stages in a mystic's development. First: the mystic starts to perceive the futility of his/her earlier non-religious life. He/she is in "the stage of the awakening of the self". Secondly: he/she starts out to purify himself/herself ethically. He/she is in "the stage of the purification of the self". Thirdly: the mystic attains experiences of joy and divinity. He/she understands a new kind of knowledge which hitherto had been concealed to him/her. This stage can be called "the stage of the illumination of the self". This third stage can for some mystics lead to the ultimate mystic experience, i.e.

union with the divine or "God", the so-called unio mystica. This is the fourth stage, "the stage of the unitive life". This last experience is rare, even among persons that we usually think of as typical mystics (85).

An element of knowledge seems unvariably to follow mystic experiences. In his well-known work, The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James calls it a "noetic quality", and he points out how it becomes manifested in a number of ways (86). It is natural that mystics with special intellectual interests tend to emphasize the noetic quality, and that they are especially concerned to explain their experiences within the conceptual framework of the philosophers of the age in which they happen to live. One could term them "speculative mystics" (87). However, mystics agree that the ultimate mystic experience is ineffable. It goes beyond the scope of normal, daily life, and reveals glimpses of a "transcendent" reality. However, the concept of "transcendence" is an epistemological as well as ontological, philosophical concept. It means something different for the Thomistic theologians of the Middle Ages than, for instance, for the modern philosopher, Immanuel Kant. A carrier of the mystic "perennial philosophy" will thus be encountered by a different conceptual, philosophical framework, dependent on whether he lives in the 12th or the 18th century Europe. Indian mystics, like for instance Shamkara or Ramanuja, express themselves within a Hindu, philosophical tradition, having a concept of "transcendence" which is very different from all corresponding Western concepts (88).

Thus it is clear that mystic phenomenology has a historical dimension in addition to the ahistorical, perennial aspects. The thesis attempts to interpret a work of Kierkegaard's *Climacus* within the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. As a means to interpret this work, it contrasts his mystic religiousness with the typical neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism of Meister Eckhart. Since the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard belongs to the 19th century Europe, he lets *Climacus* refer to Kantian sceptical epistemological ideas, which are more purely logical than the Catholic, Thomistic epistemology of the Middle Ages, to which the philosopher Meister Eckhart could refer. The latter epistemology could apparently more easily be reconciled with mystic experience, since it presupposes an essential connection between logic and ontology, and believes that knowledge about central Christian dogmas is possible without transcending an exclusive limit between this knowledge and the knowledge of human, natural reason (89).

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had argued that no transcendent knowledge can be attained on the basis of Pure Reason. If one should attempt such an enterprise, reason would contradict itself, and rational scepticism would be the result (90). Although *Climacus* is a mystic adhering to a mystic, Hegelian-related concept of knowledge, he appears in part also to refer essentially to rational scepticism when he attempts to explain his distinctive mystic, transcendent knowledge to speculative rationalistic, Hegelian opponents. But it could also be possible that the Kantian sceptical elements in *Climacus*' exposition are only intended as a means of "indirect communication", i.e. as a pedagogical means to lead the reader in the direction of

"true" mystic reality. Consequently, his epistemological and ontological "irrationalism" could be only relative, not ultimate. If such an interpretation is chosen, the thesis could seem to point to a position in full accordance with McKinnon's logical and/or ontological "non-irrationalistic" conclusion (91). However, this is not so. Since the thesis in that case would explain Climacus as a classic "mystic" subscribing to a mystic, Hegelian-related concept of reason, essentially combining logic and existence, McKinnon appears to attribute Climacus' non-irrational views to logic alone, clearly separated from reason. In this way the thesis would be in opposition to McKinnon's views. For it would have to make McKinnon's "non-irrational" concept of reason relative in the mystic perspective. However, the thesis agrees with McKinnon that Climacus does not subscribe to any breach of logical rules, and that he separates logic and existence. But when the thesis views this "non-irrational" issue in a wider, mystic-phenomenological perspective, it becomes an indispensable means of attaining "true" mystic insight. And in this perspective Climacus must become an "irrationalist", according to McKinnon's own definition.

In order to approach a clarification of the problem of Kierkegaard's Climacus' possible "irrationalism", the thesis contrasts Climacus with a typical mystic in 14th century Germany, namely Meister Eckhart. Eckhart does not refer to any kind of "irrationalism" in his ultimate mystic experience. Instead he stays within rational neo-Platonic and Thomistic epistemological frames of reference. He solves the problem of evil in accordance with Plato and Aristotle, holding that "evil is ignorance and lack of good". Evil disappears with the increase of knowledge, and when one attains full

mystic knowledge, evil is also annihilated. True, pure knowledge is only good. Thus, the mystic can attain full goodness and true, ultimate knowledge in his practical, psychic development (92).

For Kierkegaard's Climacus this seems different. He criticizes the Platonic solution of evil, disguised as modern Hegelianism, as "un-Christian". In his opinion, Christianity requires a more serious evil, which cannot be removed by any kind of "knowledge". As a mystic, Climacus tends to emphasize evil to a higher degree than Eckhart, and this emphasis is in fact an argument for strong adherence to the Kantian, sceptical, epistemological views in Critique of Pure Reason, pointing towards "irrationalism". By comparing Climacus' attitude towards evil with Eckhart's views in this respect, the thesis argues for the view that Climacus adheres to Kantian scepticism in his mystic, Christian consciousness. Much of the value of the argument of the thesis rests thus upon the presupposition that Kierkegaard's Climacus can really be interpreted in terms of mysticism of the neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. Of course, such a position cannot be proved. Mysticism implies subjectivity and "transcendence" of normal, daily human capacities and its ultimate experiences are not accessible to direct communication. Nevertheless, there are obvious strong grounds for placing him within the religious typology of mysticism. The following exposition will present some of the most typical traits of the historical Kierkegaard's personal religious consciousness, which point in the direction of mysticism. By understanding Climacus' consciousness as Kierkegaard's possible consciousness, one can conclude that if the latter belongs to the mystic type, then the former must also contain these mystic traits.

In his Journals and Papers Kierkegaard recounts two especially "deep" and decisive religious experiences in his life (93). The first occurred on May 19th, 1838, at 10:30 a.m. It seems primarily to have been an indescribable feeling of joy, somehow connected with a memory of reconciliation with his recently deceased father. He writes in his Papirer (Papers):

"There is an **indescribable** joy that glows all through us just as inexplicably as the apostle's exclamation breaks forth for no apparent reason: "Rejoice, and again I say, Rejoice. --"Not a joy over this or that, but the soul's full outcry "with tongue and mouth and from the bottom of the heart": "I rejoice for my joy, by, in, with, about, over, for, and with my joy" -- "a heavenly refrain which, as it were, suddenly interrupts our other singing, a joy which cools and refreshes like a breath of air, a breeze from the trade winds which blow across the plains of Mamre to the everlasting mansions." (Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong) (94).

This experience can probably not be counted among the deepest religious experiences of a mystic. It is quite common for mystic, religious personalities occasionally to experience short moments of religious joy and bliss. Here is no total unity with the ultimate, but just a feeling of divine love and goodness. We could place such an experience in Underhill's second, or possibly beginning of the third stage of a mystic's development (95).

Kierkegaard's second decisive religious experience occurred in the "holy week" of 1848, i.e. in April 1848. This experience seems to have been intentionally prepared for over a long period of time (96). Kierkegaard seems, like other mystics, to have worked systematically with his own mind in order to attain this experience. It is

somehow connected to the memory of his fiancée six years earlier, Regine Olsen, and like the first experience ten years earlier, he recounts an "indescribable joy". But in addition Kierkegaard now tells us that his experience was explicit, that all his sins were "forgiven and forgotten" (97). In his Papirer (Papers) he writes further:

N.B. Wednesday, April 19, 1848 "My whole nature is changed. My concealment and inclosing reserve [Indesluttethed] are broken -- I am free to speak.

Great God, grant me grace!"

and:

"Alas, she could not break the silence of my melancholy. That I loved her -- nothing is more certain -- and in this way my melancholy got enough to feed upon. Oh, it got a frightful extra measure. That I became a writer was due essentially to her, my melancholy, and my money. Now, by the help of God, I shall become myself. I now believe that Christ will help me to triumph over my melancholy, and then I shall become a pastor." - etc. (Translated by Howard. H. Hong and Edna H. Hong) (98).

At this time Kierkegaard seems to believe that he finally was free. In his religious experience he had apparently solved his "problem of evil", - the constant melancholy and sorrow, which had followed him all through his life. He says now that he has experienced God's infinite goodness, and he is ready to partake in social activities. This kind of experience seems to belong to an "advanced" mystic. It belongs possibly to the last part of the third stage, according to Underhill's terminology (99).

Love is a necessary part of mystic phenomenology. It is therefore of mystic relevance that the latter experience is somehow connected to Kierkegaard's fiancée.

However, it is of no avail to go in detail about the great rôle love plays elsewhere in Kierkegaard's writings - the aesthetic as well as the religious. A few examples from these two main components of his authorship will suffice in this connection. In his religious work on Christian love, Kjærlighedens Gjærninger (The Works of Love), written under his own name, he primarily underlines the incomprehensible duty to love one's neighbour, i.e. the "agapic" trait in traditional mystic, Christian love. In his sermons and personal notes the same concept of love often appears (100). This concept will be further explained, especially in Chapter III in the thesis.

In Kierkegaard's aesthetic works, images of love are frequently used. The story of Agnes and the merman could be cited, as well as the story about the "swain and the princess" in Frygt og Bæven (Fear and Trembling) (101). In these two stories Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes de Silentio uses images taken from erotic love to explain the relation between man and God. In the work which the thesis attempts to interpret, namely Johannes Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler, Kierkegaard intentionally uses a "poetical method" when he attempts to describe the relation between God and man, by recounting a story of love between a king and a poor girl (102).

If we turn to Kierkegaard's final aesthetic work, Sygdommen til Døden (Sickness unto Death), written by a pseudonym as close to Kierkegaard as Climacus, namely "Anti-Climacus" (103), one becomes still more convinced of Kierkegaard's close affinity with mysticism. This work was written in 1848, at the same time as Kierkegaard had his second deep religious experience. Here he gives an

anthropological-philosophical description in full accordance with mystic, religious, theistic experience of the third or fourth stage of Underhill's systematic division. Anti-Climacus writes:

"This then is the formula which describes the condition of the self when despair is completely eradicated: by relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which posited it." (Translation by Walter Lowrie) (104).

Concerning Kierkegaard's own biography after 1848, one becomes aware of his growing consciousness of the value of mental training in his religious life. Like most mystics he seems deliberately to employ ascetism in order to reach closer to God, to tighten the ties of faith and love between himself and the divine. He openly praises the suffering he has had to go through by involving himself in society, because it helps him on his mystic way towards higher perfection (105).

There should be no need to go into a more comprehensive and detailed exposition of Kierkegaard's mysticism here. This research is already well established. The purpose of pointing out these mystic facts in this connection is just to show that the mystic interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler, as well as other of Kierkegaard's works, is possible. However, Kierkegaard himself does not seem to have been fully aware of the mystic traits in his religious mind. Being a Lutheran, he rejected mystic monasticism as part of the "wrong" Catholic creed, and he had a tendency to reject mysticism in his own time as "Hegelianism". He saw an intellectual problem in

religious mysticism, for adherents of this kind of religion apparently claimed to have access to knowledge about the incomprehensible, dogmatic truths of Christianity. If so were possible, this knowledge would apparently have been attained on the basis of man's own capacity. The Hegelian "mystics" of his own time, such as the theology professor at the University of Copenhagen, Professor Martensen, who had studied both Eckhart, Baader, and other German mystics, subscribed to the Hegelian concept of Speculative Reason (106). This implied that there was a drive within logic itself, which could take knowledge beyond its own limits, all the way into the "transcendent" realm! Such an idea should, in Kierkegaard's opinion, only be rejected as "heathenry". He must protest, and through Climacus he often does so by presenting the Kantian epistemological theory of Pure Reason, whose limits are reached in the antinomies. However, remaining himself within mystic, religious categories, implying Hegelian-related, mystic knowledge, which extends beyond the sceptical Kantian limits, Climacus must point towards ontological, mystic transcendence through Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism". Therefore, his religious consciousness must contain an element of "irrationalism", and he combines this "irrational trait" with his understanding of the seriousness of evil: the problem of evil cannot be solved by means of reason alone! Thus he attributes a possible evil to the ontological, transcendent reality, ending up as a possible ontological dualist, in opposition to the common religious mysticism of the Middle Ages.

It is thus concerning the problem of evil that Kierkegaard's Climacus apparently differs from the more classic, neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism. If we turn to modern

psychologists of religion, however, they can tell us that the deeper religious experiences of mystics are not a total bliss. For instance the Freudian psychologist of religion, James Henry Leuba, writes in his work The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, that different mystics recount an element of evil together with bliss in the ultimate mystic, religious experience. Therefore, Leuba calls this experience a "sweet bliss". On the basis of his Freudian tradition, he explains the evil element as "the participation of sex organs, tormented by an insufficient stimulation" (107).

Kierkegaard's emphasis on suffering, even up to the ultimate core of his religious experience, could thus be said to be in accordance with common mystic phenomenology. However, it seems as if Kierkegaard tends to emphasize evil to an extraordinarily high degree. As a classic mystic like Meister Eckhart tends to solve the problem of evil in both theory and practice, Kierkegaard seems to continue to struggle with it. Even after his assurance from 1848, when he had had his second deep religious-mystic experience, and assures us that all his sins are finally forgiven and forgotten, he continues with a long and bitter polemic against Hegel-inspired theologians. In this polemic Kierkegaard seems to express himself with even greater bitterness than before. He never tires of repeating and underlining the evil and sufferings he has had to go through, and still experiences as most serious. There seems to be no ultimate solution to his problem of evil, no clear way out of the miseries (108). Conversely, when a mystic such as Eckhart talks about suffering, he intends to use it "rationally", as a tool in his practical, mystic development. Suffering is the means which drives him further on his way towards total perfection (109). For Kierkegaard,

this perspective seems partly to have become obscured. He tends to underline the "irrational" trait of evil so strongly, by referring to Kantian epistemology, that suffering never becomes a clearly defined "rational" tool in his mystic development. In addition, he emphasizes, in accordance with Lutheran dogmatics, that it is God alone who can save us, and that no adequate "rational" way towards God exists. Thus, God is left in an "obscure mist", and evil cannot be excluded from his essence.

However, one could also think, at least theoretically, that Kierkegaard ultimately managed to solve the problem of evil in the same way as Eckhart, but kept this solution mainly to himself. He could do so in order to attempt to direct the Hegelian theologians of his own time towards "true" Christianity. His account of the religious experience from 1848, as well as sections from his later writings could be interpreted to point in this direction. Such an interpretation would expose Kierkegaard as a non-irrational mystic. My personal opinion is, however, that there are also important elements in his writings that point towards a fundamental Kantian scepticism. The "irrational" traits in his mystic consciousness can thus hardly be made relative and excluded.

The thesis attempts to point out that Johannes Climacus, the author of Philosophiske Smuler, is an "irrationalist". In this work Kantian scepticism is connected with a most serious evil. By pointing out Climacus' emphasis given to evil, the thesis argues for "irrationalism" in his views. This can serve as a starting point for a further discussion about Kierkegaard's own possible "irrationalism".

E) Organization of the Thesis Material

The present thesis is an interpretation of Kierkegaard's work Philosophiske Smuler. The main theme in this work is the relation between faith and reason, and Kierkegaard presents his own view of Christianity through the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus. The thesis raises the question, whether the Johannes Climacus of this work is an "irrationalist" or not. It attempts to answer this question affirmatively, thus contributing to the topical problem in Kierkegaard research concerning Kierkegaard's own possible "irrationalist" position.

There is unanimous consent among Kierkegaard scholars, that Philosophiske Smuler is one of the most difficult parts of Kierkegaard's authorship to read, in spite of its humble size of less than a hundred pages. For in this work Kierkegaard apparently undertakes to present his entire view of Christianity. The present thesis follows primarily a phenomenological methodology, and reads in Philosophiske Smuler a presentation of the Kierkegaardian Climacus' religious consciousness. Kierkegaard scholars have traditionally called this work a dialogue between Socrates and Jesus (110). Climacus attempts to clarify the difference between these two religious types. The thesis understands the key difference to lie in the importance and emphasis Climacus' Jesus gives to evil. For Socrates evil is ignorance. It disappears with the increase of knowledge. For a "true" Christian of Climacus' type, however, evil is not

ignorance. It cannot be removed by any human effort, only by God, who is beyond human capacities and in this sense "transcendent". Man is entirely in the hands of God, and he cannot reach perfection unless God decides to have mercy upon him. The image of God is frightening as well as good. God is unpredictable and incomprehensible. Climacus argues for his view by referring to Kantian sceptical epistemology, since he wants to attack the Hegelian view of his polemical opponents. These are identified with Plato. Their Christianity lacks "true" transcendence. Socrates, who appears as a representative of classic neo-Platonism, has an advantage over the Hegelians, though, since he gave importance to transcendent subjectivity. However, Socrates lacked the final insight of "right" subjectivity, which only belongs to "true" Christianity. This Socratic lack of insight consists in being ignorant of the "true" seriousness of evil (111).

So far it has been pointed out that Climacus shares the mystic phenomenology of Meister Eckhart, differing only in the solution to the problem of evil. As the thesis proceeds, it attempts to point out that Climacus' Christianity does not need to be the only "right" one, as Climacus claims. The thesis argues therefore that it would be possible to maintain the value of sin and evil in Christianity, even if the problem of evil were solved as it is solved by Socrates. Meister Eckhart represents such an alternative solution. He is a typical neo-Platonic, Christian mystic, who through his practical involvement in society works "rationally" to exterminate evil (112). In this way the thesis undertakes to collate elements from Eckhart's mystic philosophy with that of Climacus'. By so doing, it appears that Climacus' arguments for evil are

ungrounded, and that they rather reveal a trait of insoluble evil and "irrationalism" within his own consciousness. In this way the Kantian, sceptical, epistemological elements seem to be necessary for Climacus, although he shares the Socratic, neo-Platonic, mystic view on all other issues. Being an adherent of Kant as well as Plotinus, Climacus introduces elements of "irrationalism" into his ultimate, mystic reality.

In Chapter 2 of the thesis, i.e. the chapter succeeding this introductory chapter, the thesis undertakes to interpret Chapters 1 and 3 of Philosophiske Smuler. In these two chapters, Climacus gives a presentation of what is called a Socratic and an Alternative View. The presentation is formed as an experiment. It is never said directly that the Alternative View is the same as Christianity. However, it soon becomes clear that this is the case. The thesis focusses directly on this fact without discussing the experimental form of Climacus' exposition, and reads these chapters primarily as a presentation of basic structures in Climacus' mystic, Christian, religious consciousness. It appears that a "Kantian-sceptical" trait enters Climacus' mystic Christianity, causing "irrationalism". One can thus very well say that Chapters 1 and 3 of Philosophiske Smuler are primarily centred around epistemological and ontological problems, i.e. around the theme of "immanent reason" (meaning reason within man's capacities) in relation to "transcendent faith" (meaning an ontological/epistemological mystic reality outside of man's capacities) of Christianity.

In Chapter 3 of the thesis, Chapters 2 and 4 of Philosophiske Smuler are interpreted. In these chapters Climacus deals with faith and love, i.e. what has been named the love of agape and eros in traditional, neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism (113). It becomes evident that Climacus follows the neo-Platonic tradition of giving most emphasis to the love of eros. His concept of agape (faith) is identical with his concept of eros, with the addition of a serious element of evil. For Climacus apparently feels the need to emphasize "evil" in ultimate religious experience. Knowing that Socrates held evil to be ignorance, Climacus must also emphasize that evil is not ignorance for a "true" Christian. Evil is incomprehensible. The Christian concept of faith (agape) is thus influenced by Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. Climacus seems to stick decisively to these Kantian elements, making them necessary parts of "true" Christianity.

The thesis follows a plan often employed in works of Comparative Philosophy, when it attempts to introduce the comparative elements little by little in the first three chapters, and refrains from introducing a long section on Meister Eckhart in the very beginning of the exposition. In this way the thesis seeks to focus as clearly as possible on the main issue, namely the interpretation of Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler. In Chapter IV of the thesis, however, a longer section on Meister Eckhart appears. For at this point in the exposition both the rational and emotional structures of Climacus' religious consciousness have already been presented, and a more comprehensive and detailed explanation of Eckhart's mystic philosophy seems appropriate. The thesis presents Eckhart's main ideas systematically as representing typical mysticism in the

neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. This systematized mysticism is presented in a form which can suit comparative and contrasting purposes in relation to Climacus' mystic, philosophical views. It should especially be noted that the thesis also presents the "temporal structures" of Eckhart's mysticism in this chapter, although temporal problems play a secondary rôle all through the development of neo-Platonic mysticism. Eckhart, like his mystic predecessors, always focusses on the eternal within the temporal. However, this is different for Climacus. He does not seem to be able to liberate himself entirely from the secularized, modern age he lives in. He often apparently gives primary importance to temporality, and only secondary importance to eternity. (This fact becomes especially evident in Mellemspil (The Interlude), the section between Chapters 4 and 5 of Philosophiske Smuler.) Finally Chapter 4 of the thesis introduces the social structures of Meister Eckhart's religious mysticism, a theme which Climacus deals with in the final chapter of Philosophiske Smuler. In addition, the thesis also gives a systematized presentation of Eckhart's epistemological ideas, based on Thomism and neo-Platonism. This is especially important, for in this way Climacus' mysticism, partly based on Kantian epistemology, can appear in clear contrast to Eckhart's, and the difference concerning the problem of evil and "irrationalism" become evident. This is the main theme in Section C, Chapter 4 of the thesis.

In order to make this contrast clearer, the thesis in this section also introduces comparative elements from the mystic philosophy of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Pascal has traditionally been considered as an Augustinian Christian with many traits in

common with Kierkegaard (114). According to the view of Climacus, which the thesis has presented, he holds a different epistemological view from Pascal. As the latter belongs to a period of history before both Kant and Hegel, he must build his scepticism on philosophical presuppositions which are very different from Kierkegaard's Climacus. Pascal can not refer to the radical scepticism of Kant, as Climacus does. Pascal can therefore hardly be termed "irrationalist" in the same radical way as Climacus. The thesis argues that ultimately Pascal resorts to reason and believes, in accordance with Thomistic epistemology, that reason is never an essential hindrance to faith. On the contrary, it could be a great help. For if man only had sufficient rational capacities, he could understand faith. Consequently, Pascal's view must imply that evil can ultimately be eradicated by reason (115)!

In Chapter 5, the thesis undertakes to interpret Mellemspil (The Interlude) of Philosophiske Smuler. This section of Kierkegaard's authorship is especially difficult to read. For the text is presented in such a dense and concentrated form that it partly appears as incoherent fragments. The thesis reads Mellemspil in the light of the concepts of circular and linear views of time and history. It defines these concepts of time in accordance with the common terminologies of treatises in the academical discipline of Phenomenology of Religion. Thus, the concept of linear time denotes a time which always considers future as radically new in relation to the past. This concept of time usually belongs to nomadic peoples, whose future is unpredictable and new in all ways. Circular time is the "opposite" view. It belongs primarily to settled farmers who experience the recurring repetition of the cycles in nature in accordance

with the seasons. In this perspective, time must repeat itself, and remanifest the temporal reality of the past. In the temporal perspective, it appears that Climacus essentially understands time as linear, in accordance with Kant's as well as Jewish, nomadic understanding of time (116). Climacus' polemics against the rational speculative Hegelians is particularly conspicuous in this section. For the problems of time and history belong to a modern age, and the mystic Socrates who was a representative of a rationalistic view in the first four chapters, is no longer a suitable representative. However, in order to keep the main argument of the thesis clear through this very difficult section, the thesis chiefly presents and discusses the views of Climacus' polemical opponents in the Notes. In its main text, the thesis confines itself to clarify the text of Philosophiske Smuler's Mellemspil. It then becomes clear that Climacus now reveals his Kantian epistemological position still more clearly than before. In undisguised polemics against the Hegelians he tends to underline Kantian sceptical elements in a linear understanding of time and history. By his strong emphasis on "irrationalism" in this respect, Climacus apparently shows that he adheres to a modern, secularized view, against which he simultaneously attempts to protest with all available means! The thesis tries to show that his "unhappy mysticism" is a result of this curious dilemma. Climacus must thus impose evil in the mystic-transcendent reality, in opposition to the classic mysticism of Meister Eckhart.

Chapter 6 of the thesis is an interpretation of Chapter 5, i.e. the last chapter of Philosophiske Smuler. In this chapter, Climacus reveals how his mystic consciousness with additional "irrationalism" and evil, reacts when it encounters the

social reality of his environment. Climacus gives here a veiled criticism of theological rationalism and speculative Hegelian rationalism in his own contemporary Danish church. These two types of rationalism will therefore be explained. Climacus rejects them both as having omitted the transcendent parts of "true" Christianity, which are beyond man's capacities. He also points out that these factions of "rationalists" have weakened the seriousness of man's sin. In Chapter V of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus also presents a criticism of the Rev. N. F. S. Grundtvig. However, he cannot attack Grundtvig as a "rationalist" in any of the two senses above. Grundtvig had himself attacked theological rationalism within the Danish state church, and he had even for a long period of his life lost the right to serve as a pastor in the church (117). Climacus must therefore seek another suitable object of attack. He finds this in Grundtvig's view of the church. Climacus is not satisfied with Grundtvig's optimistic, social view of Christianity. In addition he ridicules Grundtvig's Scandinavian-romantic views, and the superficial way he seems to handle the problem of evil. Climacus' adherence to Kantian scepticism and mystic-transcendent evil are especially clearly revealed in relation to Grundtvig. For in spite of Grundtvig's clearly outspoken theological anti-rationalism, Climacus attacks him in the same way as he attacked the Hegelian rationalists and the theological rationalists. Climacus' attacks thus appear as groundless accusations, which could be seen as projections of his own insoluble problem of evil (118).

Chapter 7 of the thesis presents the conclusions from the interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler. It draws up the main lines of the Christian mystic consciousness

of the Johannes Climacus of this work in three main structures: 1. The epistemological, connected to the emotional structures, 2. The temporal structures, 3. The social structures. Finally it refers point 2 and 3 under point 1. Thus, the main theme of the work is the relation between faith and reason, and by combining a Kantian and a mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological perspective, the thesis has given an answer to Climacus' possible "irrationalism".

The thesis continues with concluding remarks on Climacus' relation to Meister Eckhart's classic mysticism, especially concerning the problem of evil. The conclusion must thus be that Climacus assigns so much importance to evil in his mystic view of Christianity that it is felt as a breach of the common, mystic phenomenology of Meister Eckhart. Climacus so strongly adheres to Kantian, sceptical epistemology, that his mysticism becomes tainted with evil and "irrationalism". Further, the thesis briefly repeats the close connection between Kierkegaard and Climacus. By arguing that the Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler is an "irrationalist", the thesis intends constructively to contribute to the actual problem of Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". In this topical question it advocates a view which on important issues opposes McKinnon's epistemological, non-irrationalist view.

Finally, Chapter 7 briefly repeats the theoretical possibility of understanding Climacus' relation to Kantian epistemology exclusively as an expression of indirect communication. Given this option, it is possible to interpret Climacus as a classic, neo-Platonic mystic with a concept of reason in which reality and reason are essentially

tied together. In this perspective Climacus becomes more like a classic "rationalist", and the term "irrationalist" seems misplaced. This epistemological view would thus also be in opposition to McKinnon's non-irrationalist view, which presupposes that Climacus is committed to a purely logical view of reason. In fact, the view of the thesis, that Climacus is an epistemological "irrationalist", presupposes that McKinnon's view is correct. For it is Climacus' reluctance to give up the purely logical or Kantian, sceptical epistemological presuppositions, which makes him an "irrationalist" in the mystic, phenomenological perspective. Thus, the thesis both agrees and disagrees with McKinnon's position. It attempts to present his problems in a mystic-phenomenological perspective, and thereby achieves, on mystic, phenomenological premises, an expansion of McKinnon's sceptical position. In order to expose its ultimate "mystic-irrational" view concerning Climacus, as clearly as possible, the thesis briefly repeats the comparative elements from Pascal's philosophy, which were introduced earlier, in Chapter 4. These elements serve as an illustration intended to strengthen the "irrationalist" view concerning Climacus - and probably also concerning Kierkegaard.

F) Conclusions of Introductory Chapter

The exposition above shows that the thesis occupies a position in the mainstream of contemporary Kierkegaard research. It takes up the topical question of "irrationalism" in Kierkegaard's thinking. In this respect it builds on results of the biographical-historical as well as the phenomenological-philosophical reading of

Kierkegaard. It also pays respect to analytic-philosophical methodology by limiting its scope to only one work of one of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, namely Johannes Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler. Given this composite methodological background, it is natural that many Kierkegaard scholars cannot share all the presuppositions and conclusions of the thesis. The phenomenological reading has strong opponents, and the mystic reading of Kierkegaard is still fairly new and unfamiliar to the great majority of Kierkegaard scholars.

However, whether one agrees or disagrees with the methodological presuppositions of the thesis, it can hardly be a matter of dispute that an interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler on the basis of mystic phenomenology opens up interesting perspectives in the understanding of this work and gives a possible argument for the view that Climacus should be considered an "irrationalist". His strong emphasis on evil and the insolubility of the problem of evil point unmistakably in the direction of adherence to Kantian scepticism, and further to "irrationalism" in Climacus' transcendent, mystic reality. One could possibly avoid drawing this conclusion as far as the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism" is concerned, by adhering strongly to a sharp distinction between Kierkegaard and Climacus. By emphasizing the problem of pseudonymity one might argue that Kierkegaard is not an "irrationalist", even if Climacus should deserve such a label. The thesis does not attempt categorically to refute this last argument. Primarily it limits its scope to a clarification of a central part of Kierkegaard's writings, and only secondarily points out

that there are good grounds for not drawing an absolute distinction between Kierkegaard and Climacus as far as evil and "irrationalism" are concerned.

Some Kierkegaard scholars might more strongly oppose the presuppositions of the thesis, and thus find all of its argumentation doubtful. Such a view must be paid due respect. However, no criterion in Kierkegaard research is objective and beyond discussion. Hence, the same kind of doubt could be raised against any presuppositions. The thesis certainly has its presuppositions, but this does not mean that it pretends to be dogmatic in its presentation. It merely wishes to contribute to clarification of a topical problem in Kierkegaard research, namely the problem of "irrationalism". It attempts to do so through analysis of the crucial Kierkegaardian figure, Johannes Climacus of Philosophiske Smuler. To partake in a discussion concerning Climacus' dialectical views should at least not be alien to the historical Kierkegaard's own intentions.

G) Short Summary of Chapter I

The chapter starts by delineating the main problem of the thesis, namely the possible "irrationalism" of Kierkegaard's pseudonym of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus. It also presents the main presupposition for the interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler, i.e. mystic phenomenology within the neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. In this connection it introduces Meister Eckhart, a most typical mystic from the 14th century, as a comparative and contrasting model.

The thesis further points out that Climacus resorts to epistemological as well as ontological "irrationalism" when he adheres to crucial elements of both Kantian-sceptical and mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological views concerning transcendent knowledge. This fact is illustrated in Climacus' opposition to his understanding of Socrates' rationalistic claim that "evil is ignorance".

The chapter attempts further to place the research of the thesis in relation to previous central Kierkegaard research. It draws therefore up some basic lines in Kierkegaard research in Europe and North America. It becomes clear that the thesis primarily belongs to the phenomenological-philosophical tradition; secondarily, it stands within the biographical-historical and the analytic-philosophical traditions of Kierkegaard research.

The chapter goes on to present problems concerning pseudonymity in Philosophiske Smuler, and it tentatively concludes that there appears to be no reason for drawing a clear distinction between Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus as far as "irrationalism" and evil are concerned. In this connection the thesis refers to Kierkegaard's biographical statements about Climacus as well as about himself, where suffering and evil seem to play dominant rôles. As a mystic, Kierkegaard seems to emphasize evil to an extraordinarily high degree.

The chapter ends by presenting the organization of the thesis material, and restates the problem it attempts to solve: whether Kantian scepticism can be excluded from the Kierkegaardian Climacus' ultimate mystic views in Philosophiske Smuler. It illustrates its mystic, "irrationalistic" point of view by introducing comparative and contrasting elements from Pascal's philosophical mysticism.

H) Notes to Chapter I

1. See the following articles by Alastair McKinnon: Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard: "Paradox" and Irrationalism, Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No 27 spring, 1967.

Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IX, No 2, June 1969.

Alastair McKinnon, Believing the Paradox: A Contradiction in Kierkegaard? Harvard Theological Review 61, (1968), page 633-36.

2. Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard: "Paradox" and Irrationalism, Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No 27, spring 1967, pp. 402 f.

3. *ibid.*

4. See Chapter II, Section D, the thesis, below.

5. In many of his articles and works, Professor Alastair McKinnon has shown the extreme complexity of the problem of pseudonymity. See the articles referred to in Note 1, above, as well as the articles listed below:
Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard's Interpretation of his "Authorship": Some statistical Evidence, Inquiry 27, 1984, pp. 225-33.

Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard and his Pseudonyms. A Preliminary Report, K, 7, 1968, pp. 64-73.

Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard's Remarks on Philosophy, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XI, no. 4, Oct., 1973, pp. 513-22.

6. See Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Pietism, B.K., 6, 1981. M.M. Thulstrup gives here a thorough exposition of Kierkegaard's relation to Pietism. See esp. pp. 178 ff.

See also: M.M. Thulstrup, Studies of Pietists, Mystics, and Church Fathers, B.K., Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 61-65.

M.M. Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's møde med mystik gennem den speculative idealisme, K, Vol. 10, 1977, pp. 7-69.

7. See Luther's Works, ed. by H.J. Grimm and H.T. Lehmann, Vol. 25, Lectures to the Romans, esp. his commentary to Rom.1.17 on page 151 f., Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1955.

8. See Johan Arndt, True Christianity, ed. by Peter Erb, Section 3, 4, 1-2, Paulist Press, Toronto, 1979, and Peter Erb, Pietists. Selected Writings, Paulist Press, Toronto, 1983, page 6 f.
9. Meister Eckhart has often been compared with Eastern mystics of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions. See for instance: Rudolph Otto, Mysticism. East and West, Macmillian Pub. Co. Inc., New York, 1976. D.T. Suzuki, Mysticism. Christian and Buddhist, Harper & Row, New York - London, 1957.

Rudolph Otto compares Eckhart with the Hindu mystic Shamkara. D.T. Suzuki compares Eckhart with mystics in the Japanese, Zen-Buddhist tradition.

10. This common neo-Platonic idea underlies for instance many of his sermons on knowledge and perfection. See The Works of Meister Eckhart, by Franz Pfeiffer, translated by John M. Watkins, London 1947: Sermon XLIII, Knowledge and Love, Sermon LVIII, Divine Understanding, Sermon LXXVIII, The Speculative Intellect.
11. See Philosophiske Smuler, page 46.
12. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, Princeton, N.J., 1980, pp. 82 ff.
13. *ibid.*, and also Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Princeton, N.J., 1965, pp 222-260.
14. Throughout his work Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed (The Point of View for my Work as an Author), Kierkegaard states that he has employed an indirect method of communication all through his aesthetic authorship. His ultimate intention has always been to lead people in the direction of becoming Christians.

See for instance S.V., Vol. 18, S.F.M.F., page 81 ff, 85 ff., 90 ff., etc.

15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Personal Recollections, ed. by Rush Rees, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1981. Wittgenstein says here: "Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint."
16. Concerning the variety of Kierkegaard research, see B.K., Vol. 15, C.A. Reizel's forlag, Copenhagen 1987. See also bibliographies in K., Vol. XII, Vol. XIV, etc.
17. A glance on the titles of Niels Thulstrup's publications show his interest in biographical and historical questions concerning Kierkegaard. See for instance B.K., Vol. I-XV.

18. See B.K., Vol. 15, page 180, 195-96, K. Vol. XII, pp. 103 ff, K. Vol. XIII, p. 176.
19. *ibid.*
20. See B.K., Vol. 15, esp. pp 27-30. A glance on publications in American philosophical journals and periodicals also gives an impression of the predominantly, analytic Kierkegaard research at most American universities.
21. See Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 2, June 1969, pp. 170, 175 etc.
22. *ibid.*, part 3, pp. 175 ff. See also examples on McKinnon's recent methodology in K., Vol. 10, 1977, pp. 117 ff., esp. page 125.
23. Kierkegaard Resources and Results, ed. Alastair McKinnon, Wilfred Laurier University Press, Ontario, 1982, page 160.
24. Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard: "Paradox" and Irrationalism, Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 27, spring, 1967, page 401.
25. *ibid.* page 402.
26. *ibid.* page 402-03.
27. *ibid.* page 405.
28. *ibid.* page 406.
29. *ibid.* page 407-08.
30. *ibid.* page 411.
31. *ibid.* page 412.
32. *ibid.* page 413.
33. Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited, pp. 165 f.
34. *ibid.*
35. *ibid.*, pp. 166 ff.
36. *ibid.*, page 175.

37. *ibid.*, page 176.
38. See Notes 2, 3 & 25, this chapter, above.
39. See Notes 30, 34, 35, & 36, this chapter, above.
40. See Foreword in Adi Schmöeli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, written by Paul Holmer. Holmer is negative to Schmöeli's method. See also K., IX, 1974, pp. 367-371. In this section J. Heywood Thomas gives an evaluation of Schmöeli's work. He is negative to Schmöeli's method, but very positive to the anti-irrationalism of the work. Thomas also praises Schmöeli's unorthodox, audacious philosophizing.
41. Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel & Kierkegaard, University of California Press, 1980, esp. the section, Concluding Preface, pp. 2- 22.
42. *ibid.* page 12.
43. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1979, pp. 77-95. See also Max Scheler's definition of "the phenomenological attitude", in his essay, Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition, Selected Philosophical Essays, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973, pp. 137-143.
44. See especially Geo Widengren's work, Religionens Värld, Uppsala, 1971. This work is written on the basis of an empirical and phenomenological method. The same method is used in the more historical work by Helmer Ringgren & Åke V. Ström, Religionerna i historia ock nutid., Stockholm, 1974.
45. Arapura, John Geeverghese, Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity, Mouton - Hague - Paris, 1972, pp. 94 ff.
46. M. M. Thulstrup, His Seifunderstanding as a Christian, B.K., 1, 1983, pp. 162-75. See also the articles referred to in Note 6, this chapter, above.
47. O.M.F.V., S.V., Vol. 18, page 65.
48. The term "without authority" is still controversial. In the methodology of the thesis the term must be ambiguous, corresponding to the ambiguous concept of reason. However, the thesis wants to underline the Kantian, sceptical elements in order to argue for Climacus' "irrationalism" in the mystic perspective. Therefore, "without authority" is here viewed in the Kantian, sceptical perspective. See in support of my view: O.M.F.V., S.V., Vol. 18, p. 126.

49. A.O.T., S.V., Vol. 4, Foreword, page 3.
50. Lars Bejerholm, Meddelelsens Dialektik, Håkon Ohlsens Boktrykkeri, Lund, 1962, page 219, Section B.
51. *ibid.*
52. *ibid.*, Chapter III, Sections C, D, and E.
53. A.U.E., S.V., Vol 10, page 286, ftn.
54. S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol 18, page 87, lines 17-21.
55. A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, pp. 18 f. Also Kierkegaard claims to know what Christianity is. See O.M.F.V., S.V., Vol. 18, page 73. See also Papirer VII 1 A, 158, X 6 B, 105, and X 1 A 556.
56. *Ibid.* See also Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, pp. 11 & 98.
57. Papirer V B 1, 1.
58. Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, page 7.
59. A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 10, page 285, lines 18-25.
60. *ibid.*, line 29 f.
61. A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, page 19, line 27.
62. Ph.S., S.V., Vol 6, pp. 98 f, and A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 10, page 288, line 32 f. See also S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, page 129.
63. Papirer, IV, B1, pp. 104-14.
64. *ibid.*, pp.111 f.
65. Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Princeton, N.J., 1965, pp. 176 - 87. S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, page 110, lines 25-29, pp. 113-19, 142 f., etc. For comparison, see also, Henrik Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, translated by Michael Meyer, Eyre Methuen, London, 1974, pp. 94 ff., and Den Enkelte (The Single Individual) S.V., Vol. 18, pp. 149 - 57. See also attacks on Mynster and Martensen in S.V., Vol. 19 pp. 9 - 31.
66. S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, pp. 128 ff.

67. See Ø., S.V., Vol. 19, pp. 27, 131, 205 ff., etc.
68. Papirer, X, 5 A, 149, and Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, pp. 135 - 143.
69. Papirer, XI, 1 A, 484.
70. Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy. An historical and critical survey of the great systems. Carl Schreiber's Sons, New York, 1965, page 362.
71. Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works, Southern Illinois University Press, London & Amsterdam, 1967, pp. 45 - 49.
72. Hjalmar Helweg, Søren Kierkegaard. En psykiatrisk- psykologisk studie. H. Hagerup's forlag, København, 1933. In the pages 308-14, Helweg refers to the theory set forth by Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum, in Genie-Irrsinn und Ruhm, München, 1928, that Kierkegaard was homosexual. On page 315 Helweg refers to Vetter's theory in Frömmigkeit und Leidenschaft, Leipzig, 1928, that Kierkegaard possibly suffered from syphilis. On page 318 f. Helweg discusses the theory set forth by G.v. Messen in Søren Kierkegaard und Karl Barth, Stuttgart, 1925, that Kierkegaard was sexually impotent. Finally Helweg mentions Geismar's suggestion, that Kierkegaard might have suffered from the effects of exaggerated masturbation. Helweg argues against all these theories of Kierkegaard's possible sexual deficiencies. In his own opinion, Kierkegaard suffered from periodical manic depressions. See Helweg's op. cit., Chapter I, pp. 7-30, esp. page 25. See also Note 74, this chapter, below.
73. Ib Ostenfeld, Søren Kierkegaard's Psychology, ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Wilfred Laurier University Press, Ontario, 1979. See the Preface, XIII.
74. ibid., esp. pp. 47 - 55. In this connection one could also refer to Professor Hans Lassen Martensen's biographical work, Af mit Levnet (About my Life) I, 2nd edition, page 79, Gyldendal, København, 1883:

"Jo mere han (S.K.) kom til Udvikling, desto mere udfoldede hans Liv og Virksomhed sig som en Eenhed af Sophistik og et dybt, om end sygeligt Gemyt. Men at Sygdommen i dette dybe Gemyt i Aarenes Løb mere og mere tog overhaand, derpaa har han selv givet det Uimodsigeligste Beviis i de af ham efterladte Dagbøger, hvilke man har havt den Taktløshed og Uskaansomhed mod den Afdøde at udstille for Offentligheden."

Translation:

"As he grew older, his Life and Work developed as a Unity of sophisticated Thought and a deep, although sick Character. In his Journals he (Kierkegaard) has given the best Proof of his increasingly dominating Sickness - these

Journals which one has inappropriately exhibited to the Public". (Transl. by the author of the thesis.)

75. Hans Brøchner, Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard, Gyldendal, København, 1953, Sections 3, 13, 14, and 26.
76. Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vols: 7. Edited by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1967, Vol. 6, page 622, note 2692. Josiah Thompson, Kierkegaard, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1972, page 230.
77. Hans Brøchner, Erindringer on Søren Kierkegaard, Section 21. See also Niels Thulstrup, Mynster, B.K., 10, 1982, page 52.
78. Gregor Malantschuk, Digter eller Præst, K., 6, 1966, pp. 75 - 85. See also for instance Papirer X, 5 A, 146, and Niels Thulstrup, Mynster, B.K. 10, 1982, pp. 49 - 52. See also p. 56, the thesis, above.
79. Hans Brøchner, Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard, Section 11. See also A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, pp. 9 ff., and Ib Ostenfeld, Søren Kierkegaard's Psychology, sections on J.L. Heiberg, P.L. Møller, and Aron Goldschmidt, pp. 32-36.
80. Ø., S.V., Vol. 19, pp. 9-24.
81. Papirer, VIII, 1 A, 637 - 648.
82. Geo Widengren, Religionens Värld, Stockholm/Uppsala 1971, pp. 307 ff.
83. In modern time the expression "philosophia perennis" has been used to denote mysticism by Aldous Huxley. His book on mysticism was entitled Perennial Philosophy., Harper & Row, 1972. The English scholar of mysticism, F.C. Happold, uses the same expression in his work Mysticism, Penguin books, 1988.
84. See Note 82, this chapter, above.
85. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism, Methuen, London, 1960, Part II, pp. 165 ff. The well-known German mystic, Johannes Tauler, has explicitly stated, that he himself never had experienced the unio mystica. See Johannes Tauler, Sermons, translated by Maria Shradý, introduction by Joseph Schmidt. Preface by Alois Haas. Paulist Press, New York/Toronto, 1986, esp. page 31. An other well-known German mystic in Eckhart's tradition, Henry Suso, was also very much concerned to emphasize his distance from God. Suso never focussed on the unio mystica, and like Tauler he might not have experienced this state either. See in this connection, Heinrich Suse, Deutsche mystische Schriften.

Erstes Buch: Das Leben des seligen Heinrich Seuse, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1966, pp. 17-207. See esp. Chapter 16, pp. 51-55. Heinrich Suse, Buchlein der Wahrheit (The Little Book of Truth), Chapter 2, page 335. See also, The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XIII, Late Medieval Mysticism. Ed. by R.C. Petry, Westminster Press, pp. 245-51, and Thomas Katsaros and Nathaniel Kaplan, The Western Mystical Tradition, Vol. I, New Haven, Connecticut, 1969, pp. 252-57.

86. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Collins Fount Paperbacks, Glasgow, 1985, page 367. F.C. Happold, Mysticism, Penguin, London, 1988, pp. 18-21, 24-30, 35-42, etc.
87. The expression "speculative mystics" is frequently used by scholars who write on religious mysticism. See for instance F. C. Happold, Mysticism, page 65, and W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism, Meridan books, N.Y. 1956, pp. 21 ff., esp. page 28.
88. See for instance M. Hirianna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Allen & Unwin, 1973, Chapter 7. In this chapter Hirianna explains some essentials in the cultural background for Shamkara and Ramanuja.
89. See Chapter IV, Section B, and corresponding Notes 6 & 12, the thesis, below.
90. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. Max. Müller, Anchor Books edition, New York, 1966. 2nd. Division, Chapters I & II.
91. See Notes 34 f., this chapter, above.
92. See Note 10, this chapter, above.
93. See Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, pp. 118-27. See also Papirer, 1 A, 637-648, dating from 1848.
94. Papirer, 2 A, 228.
95. See Note 85, this chapter, above.
96. Concerning Kierkegaard's mystic preparation, see Papirer, VIII, 1 A, 250, dated from August 16th, 1847.
97. After his second deep religious experience in 1848, Kierkegaard seems to have become more and more conscious of the concept of "forgiveness for sins". He comes to the conclusion that Christ's atonement means that man's sins are "forgiven and forgotten". See Papirer, VIII, 1 A, 177, and 663, from 1848.

98. See Note 93, this chapter, above.
99. See Notes 85 and 95, this chapter, above.
100. See K.G., S.V., Vol. 12, pp. 49 ff. See also: Papirer IV, 4, 148, VIII, 1 A, 219 & VIII, 1 A, 648-50. In Papirer X, 3 A, 739, Kierkegaard writes: "Love to God and love to neighbour are like two doors that open simultaneously, so that it is impossible to open one without opening the other, and impossible to shut one without also shutting the other." (Transl. by Hong & Hong). Concerning the importance of love for Kierkegaard's authorship, see Papirer IX, A 18; X, 1 A, 374; X, 3 A, 168; X, 5 A, 150. See also F.B., S.V., Vol. 5, pp. 39-50, esp. page 41. line 29-35, and S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, pp. 89 f.
101. F.B., S.V., Vol. 5, pp. 39-41 & 85-90.
102. F.B., S.V., Vol. 6, pp. 29 ff.
103. Kierkegaard apparently uses the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus as the dialectical opposite of Climacus. As Climacus correctly knows what Christianity is, but is not actually a Christian himself, Anti-Climacus is a Christian to an extraordinarily high degree. Anti-Climacus is the author of Sygdommen til Døden (Sickness unto Death), and Indøvelse i Christendom (Training in Christianity). On these two works, Kierkegaard's name appeared on the title pages as editor, as in the works of Climacus. Anti-Climacus renders also Kierkegaard's own views on Christianity. But Anti-Climacus is not an "aesthetic pseudonym", as is Climacus. Anti-Climacus is a "religious pseudonym", "above" Kierkegaard's personality. He represents an idealized form of the Kierkegaardian Christianity, and since Kierkegaard is an existing human being with mundane imperfections, he is unable to identify himself with his religious pseudonym. See Papirer, X, A 510.

Thus Kierkegaard has apparently intended to create Climacus and Anti-Climacus as dialectic opposites. Climacus is the "immanent non-Christian", Anti-Climacus the "transcendent-immanent Christian". The two idealized types must differ from an actual existence. Kierkegaard's own Christian existence is therefore situated somewhere in the dialectic tension between Climacus' and Anti-Climacus' positions. But this tension does not belong to an idealized, fictive person, only to an existing subject, i.e. Kierkegaard himself. He differs from them both by being an existing human being. Papirer, X, 2 A, 195.
104. S.D., S.V., Vol. 15, pp. 73 f. Kierkegaard published this section on July 30th, 1849.
105. See S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, pp. 127 ff., esp. pp. 142-44., Ø., S.V., Vol. 19., pp. 318-24. Papirer VIII, A 640-50, XI, 1 A, 85, 134, 198, 263, 443. These entries

can also be looked up in the English translation by Hong & Hong, Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, sections 2761-65.

106. Marie Mikulová Thulstrup has emphasized this fact in her research on Kierkegaard and mysticism. See Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's møde med mystik gennem den spekulative idealisme, K. 10, 1977, Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Suffering, B.K. 7, 1980, esp. pp. 159 f., Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Studies of Pietists, Mystics, and Church Fathers, B.K., Vol. 1, 1978, page 66: "It was without doubt the philosophers who were responsible for the fact that S.K. never really fastened upon genuine mysticism, upon the unio mystica, the souls union with God, or with descriptions of ecstasies and visions."

See Professor H.L. Martensen, Af mit Levnet (About my Life) II, Gyldendal, København, 1883:

"Baade Tauler og Eckhart tiltrak mig i høy Grad, jeg excerperede især Mester Eckhart, og jeg besluttede grundigt at gennemtrengte hele Middelalderens Mystik." (Page 126) og (and) "Hos Eckhart fandt jeg i Forening med det Opbyggelige de dybeste spekulative Blik, Religion og Speculation som Forbundne" (Page 127).

Translation:

"I was strongly attracted by both Tauler and Eckhart. I especially chose Meister Eckhart, and decided thoroughly to explore all the Mysticism of the Middle Ages. (Page 126) And "In Eckhart I found a Combination of religious Edification and the most profound speculative Understanding, Religion and Speculation essentially connected." (Page 127) (Transl. by the author of the thesis.)

107. James Henry Leuba, The Psychology of Religious Mysticism, Routledge & Kegan, London/Boston, 1972, pp. 137-55. For the Freudian understanding of mysticism, see also Capman Cohen, Religion and Sex, reprint by AMS Press, Inc. New York, 1975, pp. 120-45. 102. See for instance Ø., S.V., IXX, pp. 182, 202, etc.
108. See O.M.F.V., S.V. Vol. 18, pp. 126-131. See also M.M. Thulstrup, Suffering, B.K., Vol. 7, 1980, pp 159 f.
109. This view is clearly expressed, for instance in Meister Eckhart's treatise About Disinterest. See R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Harper & Row, London, 1986, pp. 90 ff. (Hereafter R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart.)
110. See S.V., Vol 6, page 343.
111. See Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, page 46.

112. See Chapter IV, Section C, the thesis, below. This section shows that Eckhart wants to use practical activity as an ascetic, purifying means to reach mystic passivity.
113. The Swedish scholar of religion, Anders Nygren, has given a thorough explanation of these two concepts in his classic work on Christian mysticism, Agape & Eros. English ed. by Philip S. Watson, London, 1982. See pp. 27-40.
114. Denzil G.M. Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard, Lutherworth Press, London and Redhill, 1947., pp. 318-22.
115. Pascal's rational view is clear in his so-called Wager. A discussion of the Wager follows in Chapter IV, Section C, the thesis, below. See also Chapter IV, Notes 31-33, below. See Pascal, Pensées, fragm. 343, according to Laufma's arrangement. See also fragments 352-79.
116. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 153 ff. 1st Division, 1st Book, 2nd Chapter. See Note 28, Chapter 5, below.
117. See Notes 10 & 11, Chapter VI, the thesis, below, and Niels Thulstrup's article on Grundtvig in B.K., Vol. 13, 1984.
118. Concerning Kierkegaard's criticism of Grundtvig, see S.F.M.F., S.V., Vol. 18, pp. 98 f; A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, page 42; A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 10, pp. 226 ff. See also Papirer XI, 1 A, 149: "Strictly speaking, the Grundtvigians are Jews" -- etc.

CHAPTER II

Johannes Climacus' Exposition of a Socratic and an Alternative View

Interpretation of Chapters 1 & 3 of Philosophiske Smuler

A) Introduction

This chapter is an interpretation of Chapters 1 and 3 of Philosophiske Smuler. Turning to the title-page of this work, one encounters right away a Kierkegaard who communicates through the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus [7, 4 & 6]. The latter is known to have been a neo-Platonic, Christian monk in a famed monastery on Sinai, who lived in the 6th and 7th centuries A.D. He obtained his name from the title of a book he wrote, called Klimax tou Paradeisou, which literally means "The ladder of Paradise". This work consisted of thirty chapters, each of which described a progressive step towards religious perfection. It could be seen as a ladder of thirty rungs, leading the readers, or rather "followers", towards ethical and mystic-religious perfection.

These facts seem to have caught Kierkegaard's interest and imagination, and he found it appropriate to use the name Johannes Climacus as the author of the central parts of his religious philosophy. "Climacus" symbolized a systematic "ascent" from man towards God, from the temporal to the eternal. Therefore, Kierkegaard could use him as a representative of a thinker who attempted to clarify the conceptual and emotional structures in his understanding of the essence of Christianity: i.e. the Incarnation of the eternal God in the temporal man Jesus Christ, and man's relation to this historical fact in his personal faith (1).

One can localize the historical roots of Christianity in the great, cosmopolitan, Roman Empire. During the first centuries A.D., a complexity of cultural impulses gave rise to Christianity's growth into a world religion. In our connection it might be useful to distinguish between three main ideological strata in this process, namely Judaism, Greek philosophy, and the oriental mystery-religions. The latter two can further be understood as the basic cultural elements of neo-Platonism. The four ideologies above, in a constant struggle among themselves, gave rise to different churches and Christian-religious factions within Western history: any attempt to understand the ideological origins of Christianity henceforth has had to confront this four-fold background in some shape.

Climacus' exposition in Philosophiske Smuler is, in this respect, no exception. He clarifies Christianity in relation to the philosophy represented by a Socrates figure who vacillates between subjectivity and objectivity and represents a mystic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Platonism. The view of Christianity which Climacus in turn arrives at, appears in principle to be this Socratic and mystic neo-Platonic view, enriched with additional ideological elements from Old Testament Judaism. These elements are sin, guilt, and suffering, which Climacus attaches to his experienced, mystic, neo-Platonic religion, by means of Christian dogmatics, Kantian scepticism and existential experience of time. The latter experience, in Climacus' opinion, necessarily gives rise to anxiety and guilt, an experience which is qualitatively changed into what he calls "sin-consciousness", when related to the "transcendent", Christian God. But upon closer examination, the explanation of anxiety and guilt does not primarily seem

to be experience of time, but rather pure logical reason's inability to comprehend the process of time. Climacus thus connects evil in man to epistemological questions, and he provides no way out of the miseries by means of pure logical reason [t. ex. 44-47 & 78, 3-16].

Climacus draws a sharp distinction between objective thinking and the thinking subject. The former is impersonal and follows the rules of logic; the latter is an existing individual, who relates to thinking through his emotions or "passions". The highest passion man can attain in his relation to thinking, develops when he wants to think what cannot be thought. When he encounters the logical principles of contradiction and exclusion, he has reached the borders of thinking. At this point there arise so-called "paradoxical passions" in the subject. These passions increase when the subjective thinker adheres to the indisputable validity of correct, logical principles [38, 10-19 & 47, 8-16].

Thus, Climacus does not primarily wish to violate correct, logical, conceptual thinking. He does not want to transcend thinking into rational "nonsense". Rather, he wishes to maintain the validity of thought, so that the paradoxical passions can attain their peak. For he believes that "true" mystic Christian transcendence, where God meets man in mystic faith in the Moment in Time, occurs in passions. These are able to go "beyond" understanding. God is love, and he can meet man in passions of love beyond logical thinking [28, 3-7 & 52, 15-22].

However, Climacus believes that reason necessarily raises questions about God's transcendence. It appears then as though the passions go beyond reason into the "unknown". Man must therefore experience Christian mystic transcendence partly through anxiety. In this way Climacus becomes confronted with the problem of evil in a most serious shape. Evil seems to have an independent ontological status, which cannot be extirpated or understood by logical reason [46, 20 ff.].

Consequently, it follows that, if any power should ever be able to remove man's anxiety and solve his problem of evil, this power must necessarily belong to the mystic reality which goes beyond the limits of reason. But if so, this power must theoretically carry the possibility of being evil itself. Climacus' "right" Christian God must therefore contain an element of potential evil as well as good. God must be ambiguous on this issue, being "irrational", inscrutable and unpredictable as well as trustworthy.

Being a mystic with "transcendent" experiences of "true" faith, Climacus apparently is in a position to state that the essential element of "true" mystic experience which Socrates lacks, is evil. Man must therefore to some extent be unhappy if his relationship to mystic reality beyond logical understanding is to be "correct". He must have transcendent "sin-consciousness" [46, 32]. Climacus' "evil" God, whom he apparently understands on the presuppositions of a combination of Kantian sceptical epistemology and mystic-Hegelian epistemology, is thus a projection of his own "mystic-transcendent", unhappy consciousness. And he gives his own evil extra

strong status by referring to a "transcendent", divine authority beyond logical understanding [36-37 & 45, 6-9].

Climacus' understanding of evil is thus clearly different from Plato's. Plato always subordinates passions, i.e. "eros", to reason. Furthermore he understands reason as being essentially connected with the utmost ontological reality, thus being totally good. Evil consequently becomes a lack, a "gap" of ignorance, which can be filled with reason and knowledge. By increasing one's knowledge, man can work his way towards goodness and perfection.

Plotinus agrees with Plato that "evil is ignorance". In Plotinus' mystic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Platonic philosophy, in which reason (nous) is transcended into the One (to hen), it appears therefore theoretically possible to attribute evil to the religious, mystic-transcendent reality as much as good. Plotinus could thus be understood as agreeing with Climacus concerning possible evil in God. However, Plotinus makes strong efforts to assure us that he is not an ontological dualist. He attacks the gnostics, represented by Celsus, who would make evil into an independent, existing, transcendent ontological principle. For Plotinus, as for Plato, evil is basically ignorance and lack of good. In the One (to hen), man reaches true fullness and goodness. There can be no evil. Consequently, Plotinus' mystic transcendence of reason by means of eros must occur in religiously and ethically purified passions, above human personality and plurality. Plotinus thus keeps transcendence of reason within rational, Platonic presuppositions. This view is clearly manifested in his division

of reason (nous) into two separate spheres, or "hypostases", a higher and a lower nous. He places the higher nous above the area to which the personal soul (psyche) usually has access, and it culminates somehow in the One, which is "beyond", but does not weaken the validity and coherence of the three attributes of the utmost Platonic reality, i.e. goodness, truth, and fullness of being (2).

But, as already pointed out, owing to some kind of "transcendence" of reason, there is a latent possibility of interpreting Plotinus' mysticism in the same manner as Climacus' i.e. implying a kind of "irrationalism". This latent possibility became manifested in the succeeding development of mystic, neo-Platonic ideas in Christianity. One of the first neo-Platonic, Christian mystics who severely struggled with the problem of evil, was St. Augustine. Influenced by personal experiences and Manichaeism, he introduced a solution to the problem of evil which implied that evil tended to obtain a stronger status than in earlier mystic neo-Platonism. His view could therefore more easily be reconciled with dogmas concerning sin, guilt, and salvation of Old Testament Judaism, a religion which strongly emphasized God's superiority in relation to man. St. Augustine stated his views clearly in his refutation of Pelagius, who had propounded a view which denied original sin. St. Augustine opposed this view whereby the Christian concept of sin, in his opinion, would be diluted, and he argued further that man's will fundamentally is corrupt and evil (3). Man must therefore be separated from God, and the unio mystica must not be an "easy convenience"; to be obtained without "evil", purifying practice, i.e. without ascetism.

The seriousness of sin was given different emphasis by different religious thinkers and mystics in the succeeding Augustinian, neo-Platonic tradition. Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, and Meister Eckhart all tended to weaken this seriousness, thereby approaching the Platonic-Plotinian understanding of evil as a lack of good, which could be remedied by means of man's own rational capacity. However, for the European churches, the Reformation meant a change in this view, in the direction of Judaism and St. Augustine's religion. Martin Luther, for instance, emphasized man's inability to handle his own sinful nature, and his need to receive God's grace. In the succeeding Lutheran, mystic-pietistic tradition, focussing primarily on personal religious experience, man's sin and the seriousness of evil in his corrupted nature, were most severely underlined (4).

Kierkegaard, in the shape of Johannes Climacus, belongs to the Lutheran, mystic-pietistic tradition. His views on Christianity were formed by the orthodox, Lutheran, Danish church in the beginning of the 19th century, as well as by the strict Pietism he had encountered in his home (5). His mystic-religious views were tainted with the seriousness of evil in a strong and decisive way. Thus, Climacus' mystic views can appear in clear contrast to the more classic mystic, neo-Platonic views of Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, and Meister Eckhart. For several reasons Meister Eckhart in particular seems to be suited for comparative purposes with Climacus. First, one of Climacus' most important Hegelian polemical opponents, Hans Lassen Martensen, was decisively influenced by Eckhart's mysticism. Climacus' views are thus set forth in an ideological framework which meaningfully can be related to Eckhart's

mystic views. Secondly, Meister Eckhart's mystic views are typical and representative as far as mysticism is concerned. He developed a philosophical, mystic theology which came very close to Plotinus' views. Eckhart emphasized thus "pantheism", or rather pure monism (the One) so much, that it finally became intolerable for the official Roman Catholic church. He was convicted of heresy, but died before his punishment was carried out. Climacus tends to emphasize the other component in classic mysticism, namely theism, so much that he comes into conflict with the Danish official church. Thus, the contrast between Eckhart and Climacus becomes particularly obvious (6).

Attempting to describe Eckhart's mystic religion in accordance with modern mystic phenomenology, one could say that his mysticism is primarily built on a wish to keep a right balance between pantheism and theism. However, Eckhart introduces apparently a third additional strand, which might be interpreted as going "beyond" common mysticism. Besides the two strands of theism and pantheism, Eckhart posited apparently a radical transcendence into "mystic nothingness". We could name this third strand "atheistic mysticism". As a result of the latter, Eckhart's mystic views have often been compared with Buddhism (7).

However, it might be more tenable to interpret Eckhart's third strand of mysticism as an "aggravation" of the two classic mystic components. If one chooses this interpretation, one could say that the radical transcendence into "nothingness" gives an additional aspect to the theistic component, implying individuality and subjectivity.

Further, by adding "atheistic mysticism" to pantheism, a clearer aspect of monism and objectivity can emerge. In this way, the three strands are somehow reconciled in complete identification and strict balance (8). Given this interpretation, Eckhart can appear as a typical representative of neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism. And it was apparently in this way he wanted himself to be understood. For when he was charged with heresy, being accused of subordinating theism to pantheism, and further to monistic atheism, it was of the greatest importance for him to show that the three strands were of equal value, and that he always had struggled to keep up the right balance between them (9).

In order to maintain this balance, Eckhart connects his mystic theory to mystic practice, intending to lead mystic followers towards ultimate reality, i.e. the "Christian God", "Being", or "Pure Nothingness". He does not give a detailed account of this practice, but states briefly, that it proceeds through "suffering". By this concept he seems to mean "practical involvement in society". The ascetic way towards mystic perfection thus entails partaking in daily social life. The way towards ultimate "passivity" in the mystic, transcendent reality, implies "activity" in the world. The dialectic relation between activity and passivity makes possible a religious and ethical purification, so that the passions can "transcend" reason in eros, without violating the validity of reason. Eckhart can thus further understand Christian concepts of sin and evil as constructive, ascetic means to reach higher mystic perfection (10).

Climacus cannot use evil in the same constructive, "rational" way (11). Being a contemporary of Hegelian theologians, who have omitted the "true" transcendent aspects of Christianity, and equated sin with ignorance, he takes on the sceptical, epistemological views of Kant's First Critique. Pointing towards Kantian scepticism, he states that evil is beyond Pure Reason, and that it can only be entirely removed by the "true", mystic-transcendent, inscrutable, Christian God. Man is incapable of mending his imperfections on his own. In fact, in the mystic, rational perspective Kantian scepticism must be manifested as "anti-rationalism". This "opposite" sceptical view proves that evil must belong to "true" mystic transcendence. For evil is the opposite of reason, i.e. "anti-reason", which belongs to "true" mystic transcendent reason!

In this way Climacus approaches St. Augustine's serious emphasis on sin and suffering. However, when Climacus adheres to Kantian, epistemological views, and takes the step into Kantian "anti-rationalism", mystic evil attains a still stronger status than it had for St. Augustine. Climacus possibly becomes an ontological dualist, creating an insoluble and inscrutable problem of evil. Thereby he excludes himself from Eckhart's views, and claims to "know" logically what "true" Christianity is: his own mystic, religious views, deviating from the mystic neo-Platonism of Socrates by virtue of ontological, inscrutable evil, guaranteed through sceptical, Kantian "anti-rationalism"!

B) The Socratic View

In Chapter 1 of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus starts with the presentation of a mystic, neo-Platonic, philosophical view, which he connects to Socrates. He wants to use this view as a comparative and contrasting model for an "Alternative View", which in turn appears to be his view of Christianity. It will in the succeeding sections be referred to these two views as the "Socratic View" and the "Alternative View".

Sometimes Climacus seems to talk about his Socrates figure as if he were representative of an "objective", formal interpretation of Platonic philosophy. But at other times he resorts to subjectivity, referring to what he thinks belongs to the historical Socrates. The Socratic View which emerges can therefore be said to have two distinct components, reflecting the ambiguity between subjectivity and objectivity, known from mystic neo-Platonism. Consequently, Climacus' Socratic View appears to be a mystic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato's central philosophy.

Following the objective, Platonic philosophy, Climacus presents first a Socratic View presupposing that ethics, being, and logical thinking are indissolubly tied together in an eternal, unchangeable realm, underlying the changeable realm of the senses. The relation between these two realms is one of coherence. They are tied together by means of veils of ignorance. When knowledge increases, as a result of right conceptual thinking, the veils are removed, and the eternal realm is revealed.

The highest spiritual development a person can reach is therefore to have all ignorance replaced by knowledge. In that case thinking, being, and ethics will appear in their pure form and the thinker reach the highest right, good, and true reality. Any attempt to transcend this reality must lead to non-being, logical absurdity, and ethical relativism. Transcendence must, therefore, be excluded from the Platonic-Socratic reality [38 ff.].

In this connection Climacus especially focusses on the transition from "ignorance" to "knowledge". How can this process be possible? According to Plato, thinking can only grasp static, eternal concepts, and must therefore be unsuited for expressing the process of transition from man's temporal, illusory existence to eternal, true reality. It implies "transcendence" to go from something "known" to something "unknown". But even though "transcendence" is excluded from reality, Climacus' Platonic Socrates thinks that this incomprehensible element can be given a real content. Temporal man can attain eternal reality. The recognition comes suddenly, in a moment, and man "recollects" the truth, which had been in his mind all the time. The transition is possible because ignorance fundamentally is illusory. In reality, man knew the truth before he started to seek it, and had only to be reminded about it. In this way, "transcendence" is made possible through an "immanent" explanation, i.e. an explanation which man's pure thinking can grasp. Socrates tries thus to account for the incomprehensible process of transition from ignorance to knowledge, by means of the phenomenon of recognition, and to make this transition identical with a logical truism. He claims that there is, in reality, no "transcendence" from the temporal realm of

change into the eternal, because the temporal ultimately must be non-existent. Since learning of eternal truths thereby appears to be possible, Climacus' Platonic Socrates also claims to have proved that man has an eternal, immortal soul, which must have existed prior to its existence in temporal reality [15, 15-18].

A "Socratic" person must therefore be directed away from the temporal towards the eternal, and his attainment of knowledge is somehow, in accordance with mystic phenomenology, a "coming back home" to his origin, his own immortality. His thinking makes him not a stranger to himself, but rather reveals his true, divine nature [17, 2]. One can therefore say that the eternal Socratic realm which Climacus has presented, is anthropological as well as theological, and that the phenomenon of recognition consists in realizing this fundamental truth.

The Socratic "moment" (to exaifnes) in Climacus' Socratic View (12), (i.e. the smallest moment in time when man suddenly realizes the eternal) must necessarily be placed in temporal reality; for it is there man lives in his ignorance. When truth suddenly reveals itself, the moment in time can not have crucial importance any more. This moment just happened to become an occasion for the truth to become revealed [16, 20]. Socratic time must be illusory, since it fades away as soon as truth is achieved. Therefore, Climacus' Socrates does not see time as something which leads man towards an ultimate, decisive goal in the future. Instead it is an illusory superstructure upon eternity, which becomes repeated in every new ignorant existence. The future can therefore not be expected to bring anything new, but only to repeat what has

already been before. Time must consequently be made "cyclic". It can only lead to a repetitive remanifestation of the same eternal truth, for individuals as well as for societies in history. If anyone should wish to seek eternal truth, he/she must do so in the past. The Socratic View is therefore directed "backwards". Its "pathos" focusses on "recollection" of what has already been and is [15, 15-18, & 24, 37-38].

Such a view has consequences for Socrates' relation to other individuals and for the relation between a "Socratic teacher" and his "follower". If all human beings partake in the eternal realm, and all changeable elements are fundamentally considered to be "non-existent", there can be no difference between the teacher and the follower. As a consequence, the teacher must respect the follower as much as the follower the teacher. [26, 25-28]. Socrates compares himself to a "midwife", who "releases" knowledge in his follower by means of his famous, pedagogical, "maieutic", method of questioning. But the very "birth" of knowledge, i.e. the process of recognition in the sudden moment, will always be incomprehensible. In the Socratic terminology: "Giving birth" belongs only to "the god" [16, 1-18].

Climacus apparently wishes to idealize his Socrates figure by referring to what he thinks explicitly belonged to the historical Socrates. Climacus therefore introduces subjectivity as a necessary part of his Socratic View. As a result, Climacus' Socrates appears not only to be a defender of Platonic, objective thinking, but also a person who defends the fundamental value of each individual. When Socrates "proves" the theory of recollection in the dialogue of Meno, he picks a slave-boy, i.e. a person from

the lowest class in society, and shows that this individual also is endowed with the eternal truths within his mind [17, 7-8]. The slave-boy appears in this way to have the same authority as Socrates, as far as knowing the truth is concerned [16, 25-26]. Therefore, no person ever has the right to proclaim himself an authority over another. They are always in the same position, and of eternal value [17, 12-13].

All this might appear to be very positive. But from Socrates' subjectivistic position, more dubious consequences also follow. Climacus does not raise these problems. He neglects, for instance, the fact that there is no evidence that the historical Socrates did anything substantial to terminate the serious discrimination which slavery represented in Greek society. Socrates' own self-indulgent philosophizing was in fact made possible by the Greek state's economical exploitation of lower groups in society. His questioning of a slave-boy could, from this point of view, appear as hypocritical, arrogant mockery (13).

Neither does Climacus seem to think it necessary or relevant to clarify further the apparent contradictions between objective and subjective elements in his Socrates figure. In the present work from 1842-43, Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus apparently presents an idealized Socrates figure who fully respects the limits of individuality, and argues also that the value of the individual is based upon an objective ground, going beyond all individual differences! Two or three years later, in 1845-46, the same Climacus states that he intentionally left the Socrates figure of Philosophiske Smuler ambiguous in this way. Within such a mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View, he was able

to defend Socrates' individuality, and also to reveal a polemical attitude against anything that could remind him of the objectivity of Hegel and Hegelian-influenced theology [t.ex. 10, 23-25 & 17, 8-16 etc.]. The ambiguity made possible both a criticism and a defense of subjectivistic individualism and objective, speculative Hegelianism. The Socratic View could therefore serve as a useful presupposition and first step in the direction of Climacus' own, Augustinian, mystic, neo-Platonic view of Christianity (14).

The Platonic dialogue Meno, which Climacus has chosen to place as an introduction to his presentation of the Socratic View, can historically be said to reflect a polemical situation between Socrates and the sophists. The sophists adhered to a radical subjectivism, and argued that it was impossible for one individual to communicate objective truths to others. Every attempt to do such a thing must necessarily presuppose that the others already knew the truth. As a consequence, all truths must be subjective. They concluded, therefore, that any person had the same right to proclaim himself an authority in aesthetic, religious, and ethical-political matters.

Socrates saw the possible dangerous consequences of such a relativistic view. If it were valid the basis upon which the Greek "democratic" society was built would be undermined. Therefore, he polemized against the sophistic relativism by introducing his theory of the eternal, objective realm of reality, which he believed to

underlie the apparent change and relativity. And he attempted to show that this reality could be reached by means of recollection.

Thus Socrates criticised sophistic subjectivity with its characteristic Protagorean doctrine of "homo mensura" (i.e. that man is the measure for all things), from an objective point of view (15). But thereby Socrates had apparently also argued against the absolute value of the individual. For individuality is connected with the world of change and must, therefore, according to Socrates' own statements ultimately be overcome.

As a consequence, Socrates had also in some way contradicted his own stated respect for the limits of another person's individuality. For this respect could not be based on objectivity, but only on illusory subjectivity. It seems as if Socrates' statements should assume credibility, his subjectivity would somehow have to become "absolutized" or "objectivized"; however, in so doing, one would necessarily arrive back at the sophistic, Protagorean position, that man is the measure for all things, which Socrates apparently set out to refute.

The historical Socrates' claim to respect all other individuals as much as himself must therefore contain some ambiguity. For he could apparently not respect the ignorant slave-boy in Meno as much as himself. Socrates must also presuppose that he knew more than the slave-boy, since only on the basis of such a presupposition could Socrates "teach" the slave-boy the eternal truth, so that Socrates could in turn

respect the slave-boy! Neither could Socrates respect the relativistic sophists as much as himself, but must claim that he knew better than they did. For his respect was built upon an impersonal, objective ground. Therefore, he could only respect another person's individuality as far as the latter was humble and willing to accommodate himself to Socrates' own views. This implies further that Socrates, as a subjective individual, in reality only respected himself and his own views. Given these implications, it could be more frightening than advantageous, that Socrates gave his views a divine sanction [16, 11-18].

Climacus does not raise the above problems with regard to his Socrates figure, but seems only to accept the Socratic subjectivity and individuality as positive parts of his mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View. For Climacus needs in turn these contradictory elements in order to "clarify" his subsequently introduced mystic, neo-Platonic, Alternative View. He seems either to believe that the positive elements in his Socrates figure can be separated entirely from the negative consequences pointed out above, or that his Alternative View in some way does not apply at all to his Socratic View. The latter possibility would have to be a consequence of his subsequently introduced theory of "right" Christian mystic transcendence within the passions. For Climacus believes that this transcendence is somehow capable of counter-influencing the negative elements in his Socratic presuppositions (16).

However, it is important for Climacus to make it perfectly clear that the Socratic View, emphasizing values of subjectivity and individuality, is preferable to

Hegel's objective philosophical views concerning the individual. Climacus' criticism in this respect is directed against the interpretation of Hegel which, for instance, Professor Hans L. Martensen subscribed to. In this connection, Climacus emphasizes what he understands to be Hegel's cardinal mistake, namely insufficient separation of logic and being, causing the necessary, clear distinction between these two spheres to become confused. In Climacus' opinion, logic always deals with absolute, static entities: the principle of contradiction must never be made relative. Only when this precondition is fulfilled can one establish a coherent and absolutely valid thinking and ethics [97, 29-39].

Hegel had distinguished between Understanding and Speculative Reason and claimed that the principle of contradiction was overcome in the latter through a process of "reconciliation". This meant that logic and existence were made to coincide in Reason. In Climacus' opinion, Martensen and his Hegelian adherents interpreted this to mean that existence and history were subsumed under reason, and therefore made "understandable". When they applied this presupposition to Christianity, all the dogmas concerning Christianity as an historical and existential religion with the need of a Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, and Judge, were subsumed under human capacities and human thinking (17).

Kierkegaard's Climacus must protest most violently against such a view. For him, true Christianity is radically transcendent and "beyond" understanding. The "right" Christian view implies that the principle of contradiction is maintained with

undisputable validity, and that "transcendence" of logical reason occurs in the existential, subjective passions. It is only the individual, existing subject who can experience "true" Christian mystic transcendent reality, implying presence of serious guilt and sin. If all of Christianity could be understood, as the speculative, Hegelian theology implied, Christianity would become an objective, "immanent" Platonism. In such a view, all evil is ignorance [49, fn. 2], and the seriousness in "true" Christian existence, implying fear and trembling, evil and sin, would be fundamentally undermined.

Conversely, the Socratic individualistic view implies that logical thinking is "transcended" by existence. This must necessarily be incomprehensible, since thinking in that case must be limited to an area below being. Only on such a basis can true, Christian mystic "transcendence" be defended successfully. Therefore, Climacus believes that Socrates has an advantage over the objective Hegel by virtue of the Socratic subjectivity. In Climacus' mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian View, this subjectivity must be maintained against reason, parallel with the Platonic, speculative objectivity. He must protest against the Hegelians' rational concept of "transcendence" in Speculative Reason, and does so by referring to Kantian, epistemological views in the First Critique. There, Kant had said that Pure Reason cannot reach transcendent knowledge on the basis of itself. If it attempts to do so, it will necessarily contradict itself, and thus design the borders of its own validity (18). The Hegelians had apparently not taken Kant's sceptical warnings seriously enough, but instead "reconciled" the Kantian antinomies in Speculative Reason! One must therefore

understand Climacus' rejection of their position as rejection of isolation of the objective, Platonic part in his mystic neo-Platonic view of Socrates. Climacus' statement from 1846 in Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript), that his lack of distinction between Socrates and Plato in Philosophiske Smuler was intentionally left so, because a clearer definition in that work was unnecessary, seems then to have an ironical connotation. For in this work Climacus has, in fact, made the distinction most clearly, maintaining the Socratic ambiguity to define his own, mystic, neo-Platonic position in opposition to the objective rational, Platonic/Hegelian view. Consequently, the ambiguous Socrates figure appears to have been kept for "terminological obscurity's sake", which, in the present case points precisely towards Climacus' own mystic position, and can be considered as "clarifying" of the description of the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, Alternative View he ultimately wants to communicate (19).

Attempting tentatively to place Climacus' "Socratic" ideas in the history of Western philosophy, one needs to maintain most clearly his distinction between the Platonic and the historical, subjectivistic Socrates. The tradition of the speculative Plato can be said to originate in the pre-Socratic Eleatics, proceeding further on to Plato, and an extreme realist position in the scholastic dispute about particulars and universals. From there the tradition can be said to lead to the German, idealistic positions, and Climacus' contemporary Danish Hegelians, represented by Professor Martensen. In this connection, Climacus' neo-Platonic Socrates, giving priority to subjectivity, belongs to a philosophical tradition which starts in the pre-Socratic

Heraclitus. It proceeds further on to Aristotle, Plotinus, and a nominalistic position in the scholastic period. It also manifests itself in Kantian scepticism and in modern variants of scepticism and empirical traditions in the Anglo-American tradition. In this perspective, Climacus' criticism of Hegel and Hegelians can be seen as a one-sided expression of the "eternal dialogue" between Aristotle and Plato, running all through the history of Western philosophy. Climacus' Socrates figure appears to attempt to unite both components of this dialectics in mystic knowledge, although the violent polemical attacks on the Hegelian Plato seem to suggest that Climacus favours the Aristotelian line.

C) The Alternative View

Climacus attempts to clarify the Alternative View, i.e. his mystic understanding of Christianity, in relation to the mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View. He locates the decisive difference between the two as lying in their understanding of "evil", i.e. anxiety and guilt. In the Socratic View, these elements are relative and illusory, to be subsumed under thinking, and they disappear altogether with the increase of knowledge. In Climacus' Alternative View, they have a more crucial ontological status, due to the importance he gives to temporality. For Socrates, time is illusory, a fact which is "proved" in the process of recognition. But in the Alternative View time cannot be made relative. An encounter between time and eternity "fills time with the eternal", without thereby lessening the true reality of the temporal realm! In opposition to the empty Socratic moment of recognition (to exaifnes), Climacus calls

his moment in time, when time touches eternity, the Moment in Time [18, 12-17 & 22, 22-27].

Climacus views time as linear and irreversible. An existing individual necessarily lives within this time stream, and incessantly encounters new "moments in time". If temporal man should ever be able to touch eternity, it would therefore have to be in an incessant, future-directed repetition of the Moment in Time [24, 37-38 & 25, 1-2] (20). But this encounter can never be completed and eternity finally attained. For if so, the transition from time to eternity would be, as for Socrates, a transition from the "unknown", illusory human existence to the "known" eternity, and all evil would then be ignorance. However, in the Alternative View, human temporal existence is the "known" reality, and the repetition of the Moment in Time into the future must be a leap of transcendence into the "unknown". Climacus thinks that a "true" Christian must direct his passions towards eternal reality in the future of the temporal world, and thereby transcend the eternal, Socratic realm of reason and recollection. This experience must be filled with "fear and trembling", which is the precondition for "right" Christian "sin-consciousness".

Apparently Climacus first attempts to construct his Alternative View in "logical contradictory opposition" to the Socratic View. However, the problems with such an analytic, logical method soon become conspicuous. For if the Alternative View should be the "logically contradictory opposite" of the Socratic, both views would have to share the presupposition of a common, logical system. At first sight, this might seem

to be the case, since Climacus praises Socrates for his logical views, contrary to Hegel's. But upon closer examination, there are decisive differences between Climacus and Socrates in respect to logic. Socrates does not separate logic, being, and ethics, but struggles to keep them together in unity within his transcendent, ultimate, eternal, mystic reality. Climacus seems to disagree with him in this respect. If not, he could not even have attempted to construct a view which is the "logical contradictory opposite" of the Socratic. For such an attempt presupposes a logic which is separate from being. If this were not so, the opposite view would be "non-being", which is absurd. Moreover, if one presupposes Socrates' transcendent understanding of being, thinking, and ethics as one coherent unity, one cannot construct a logical "opposite" view of "good". For "evil" is defined as ignorance and lack of good, having only relative value. Socratic "transcendence" does not transcend thinking. If so were the case, absurdity, non-being, and evil would be the result. This would be incompatible with mystic reality (21).

Consequently, the mystic Alternative View cannot be "entirely different from", or "the contradictory opposite of" the Socratic view. Climacus seems to make the Socratic View identical with the Kantian, sceptical, rational view. His "anti-Socratic" view thus also becomes an "anti-rational" Kantian view, which in turn can "prove" rationally that evil is not ignorance, but belongs ontologically to "true" mystic-transcendent reality. Owing to Climacus' combination of mystic, neo-Platonic and Kantian epistemological views, his mystic reality becomes "irrational". When Climacus apparently starts out to construct such an "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view, he runs into more and more serious problems. His exposition develops into descriptions

which seem to delineate, partly an ontological structure in reality, partly a Christian dogmatics. The elements are linked together in a way which sometimes seems logically coherent, sometimes logically contradictory. Climacus' argument runs as follows:

In the Socratic View, time is irrelevant in relation to ultimate reality. Time is hence illusory and identical with nothingness. In an "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view, time must conversely be most relevant, real, and filled with being [18, 12-15]. From this primary starting point, Climacus argues further: In the Socratic View the follower possesses the eternal truth before he/she starts to seek for it. The moment in time when the follower realizes this fact becomes irrelevant as soon as he/she reaches true insight. In the "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view the "contradictory opposite" must be the case. The follower must not be in possession of the truth, and the Moment in Time when he/she attains the eternal must be of crucial importance [18, 23-27]. Further: In the Socratic View the follower is in possession of truth from his/her very birth. He/she therefore directs his/her passions "inwards", towards his/her inner innate truth. In an "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view, the follower must be the "untruth", and his/her passions must be directed away from the truth, in the opposite direction [18, 29-31]. Since Climacus wishes to give the Moment in Time decisive importance in this view, man must be confronted with some all-important subject matter in this moment. But this subject matter cannot concern an eternal truth within man himself. For if that were the case, we would have a Socratic View. The subject matter must then concern the eternal truth "outside" of man, a fact that cannot be the exact "contradictory opposite" of his inherent "untruth". For if it were, he would

in fact know the truth by himself, as the opposite of his inherent "untruth". This would refer him back to the Socratic position, which says that truth can be found within man himself by means of recollection. In addition, it must also be incomprehensible and logically inconsistent that man should be confronted with the eternal truth in the Moment in Time, when Climacus earlier has presupposed that, by nature, man is directed away from this very truth.

At this point, Climacus' attempt to construct a "contradictory opposite" of the Socratic View seems to founder. He apparently experiences the same phenomenon as Kant has pointed out in his First Critique, that when reason attempts to go beyond its proper limits, it contradicts itself and cannot say anything about transcendent reality. When reason attempts to do so, it is led into "scepticism". But since Climacus is a mystic, he must hold that a transcendent religious reality exists. In addition he does not give up his Kantian, sceptical views, but gives them validity in mystic reality as "anti-rationalism". When he further attempts to describe this mystic reality, further advance must somehow appear as arbitrary and "irrational", seen from a logical point of view. Thus, Climacus appears as an "epistemological irrationalist", according to McKinnon's definition.

However, Climacus does not give up his attempt to describe his Alternative View in spite of logical impossibilities. He continues to develop his Alternative View, by cutting off his earlier line of thought and starting up a new, apparently logically coherent deduction from new premises. He always gives a logical explanation for the

new points he makes about the Alternative View. He contrasts his conclusions with the Socratic View, so that the differences can appear clearly, and he refers these differences back to the main point of departure, namely the understanding of time, and the mystic Moment in Time. By such means, his exposition preserves an illusory appearance of being an "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view. Thus, Climacus apparently adheres so strongly to his Kantian sceptical epistemological presuppositions, that he considers it to be of importance to give his Alternative View this "analytic-logical", and "anti-rational" image [18, 12 & 23, 29 etc.].

The attempt to explain the mystic Alternative View as an "anti-Socratic" and "anti-rational" view without logical inconsistencies, was bound to fail. Climacus must therefore give his logical, constructive method an existential, descriptive dimension. He subsumes the apparent use of logic under a description of an existential, ontological reality. Thinking presupposes being, and not vice-versa. The Alternative View must therefore be radically different from the Socratic in "being". With this presupposition, Climacus continues his exposition towards what he considers to be the key difference between the two views, namely their solutions to the problem of evil. His discussion on this point reveals that evil has a stronger status in the mystic Alternative View, than in the mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View. In the former, Climacus connects evil to temporality and man's freedom, so that it appears that man, by means of his freedom and existence in temporality, necessarily entangles himself in evil. Therefore, in order to become released from his bondage, man needs a "truly" transcendent God. To account for this understandable need, Climacus introduces a

solution through the Christian dogmatics concerning Christ's function as Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, and Judge [21, 8-9; 22, 4 & 22, 17].

Climacus starts this line of thought with the term "untruth", which he had first introduced as a logical contradictory opposite to "truth". In the Platonic, Socratic View, values were tied together with thinking; truth was necessarily good. Climacus apparently uses this same presupposition when he gives an existential, ontological meaning to the term "untruth". In the mystic Alternative View, also understood as a Kantian, sceptical, "anti-rational" view, "untruth" must therefore mean "anti-reason" and "evil". Consequently, he continues to state that man is untruth, i.e. "evil", and a teacher of the mystic Alternative View cannot, as Socrates can, remind the learner that he is truth, or good. Contrariwise he must state that man is "evil". Like in the Socratic View, man must therefore be repulsed from the subjective, individual teacher of truth. In this respect the two views are identical. No individual human being can ever teach the truth to another individual. Rather, truth has to be introduced by a super-individual power: a radically transcendent God in the mystic Alternative View, or the self-revealing, eternal reality in the Socratic process of recognition. In this way Climacus assumes "ontological irrationalism" as well as "epistemological irrationalism". He becomes a defender of what we could call "mystic irrationalism", containing both ontological as well as epistemological elements.

In the mystic Alternative View man must therefore realize for himself that he is evil and directed away from the good. By realizing this fact, he can, in accordance

with Lutheran religion, become aware of his own inability to become good through his own efforts. Climacus concludes further that man must lack the necessary condition to become good. For his evil state is so radical that it cannot be made relative. Man needs a "truly" transcendent, incomprehensible God to remove his burden of sin. And since Climacus apparently understands the "true", mystic Christian God, partly on presuppositions from Kantian, sceptical, epistemological views, this God must partly be "irrational". He can therefore also possibly be evil.

With respect to the exposition of evil, Climacus has thus chosen a solution which deviates from classic neo-Platonism, and is closer to St. Augustine's views. However, on some points he also wishes to give evil a stronger status than St. Augustine had done. This seems to be the case when Climacus, on the basis of Kantian epistemology and mystic phenomenology, argues that mystic "transcendence" must contain ontological evil. Climacus appears then as an ontological dualist, a view which St. Augustine clearly rejected in his polemics against contemporary gnostics (22).

However, Climacus is not a dualist without reservation; his views are ambiguous. In opposition to his strong emphasis on evil, he also adheres to a more classic, mystic Augustinian view. He can thus state that man must have had the necessary condition for understanding truth, i.e. the good, some time in the past, and then later lost it. He explains this statement further by making a distinction between man and animal, which reveals his Augustinian, neo-Platonic and Old Testament

presuppositions, as well as his polemical attitude against Hegel and romantic pantheism. The romantic philosophers, especially Schelling, whose lectures in philosophy Kierkegaard had attended in Berlin in 1841-42, had considered nature as a gradual awakening of consciousness (23). In this process, Schelling placed man as the final stage. His view presupposed therefore that there could be no radical difference between man and the rest of nature (24). This view meant further that no crucial value could be attributed to man's ontological transcendent subjectivity. Hegel's Platonic rational view undergirded Schelling's views. Therefore, Climacus must protest against such heathenry.

In accordance with the ideas of creation in the Old Testament, Climacus emphasizes that man is created superior to all animals. And following St. Augustine's mystic, neo-Platonic ontology, he believes that man originally must have been totally good. Climacus argues therefore that man must have had the necessary condition for understanding truth when he was created as a human being. For otherwise, he would previously have been mere animal, and God who gave him the condition for understanding truth would first have had to recreate the animal into a human being. Such an argument is untenable [19, 32-35]. The loss of the necessary condition must be due to a "fall", as already accounted in the Old Testament. Or this loss could be a result of the distance from completeness, following from the theory of emanation in neo-Platonism. In any event, the loss cannot be due to an act of the all-good God. For such an idea would imply contradiction. Man cannot have lost the condition by accident either. That would also imply contradiction, according to Climacus. It would

imply that arbitrariness was mightier than God, or that "something inferior would be able to vanquish something superior" [20, 1-4]. This last argument seems also to imply that Climacus considers the "truly" transcendent God to be a rational, organizing principle like in mystic neo-Platonism, and not an "irrational", unpredictable power.

Climacus continues his reflections concerning evil by stating that there are no more than three alternatives for what can have caused the loss of the condition for understanding ultimate truth. These three are God, arbitrariness, or man himself. Since the two first ones have already been excluded, Climacus concludes that the loss must have been caused by man himself [20, 4]. Like St. Augustine, Climacus thinks that it must be man's own will that chooses evil, and that God cannot be held responsible for evil in man. In fact, in his infinite goodness, God has created man with the perfection of total freedom.

In his concept of human will, Climacus also seems to have been influenced by his "fellow-pietist" Kant's understanding on this issue. In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant had argued that man has a free will, and that he is able to fulfil the ethical demands of the Categorical Imperative. Evil and wrong choices man makes do not come from his rational, good will, but arise because he gives priority to his sensuous inclinations and self-interests (25). But whereas Kant thought that it clearly was within man's capacity to follow the good will throughout, Climacus seems to emphasize more strongly the extreme difficulties man encounters when he tries to fulfil the demands of the good will. He can never be able to do so by his own rational capacities, but

radically needs to "transcend" reason in mystic passions, and receive God's "transcendent" grace. Kant's moral view must therefore partly be given up and replaced or supplemented with a more sceptical and Augustinian, neo-Platonic, moral view.

Climacus arrives at his moral position by means of the following arguments: Man is "untruth", caused by his own act. To cause something by his own act is freedom. Since man has caused his own situation by his own act, he must be free [20, 18-22]. After this deduction, which Climacus seems to hold as logically valid, he continues to state that the conclusion is ontologically "wrong". Adhering to both mystic phenomenological and Kantian sceptical epistemological presuppositions, he goes on to connect the "right" ontological view logically to what has previously been said about the "anti-rational" untruth, and man's situation in the world, in the following way: To be free from truth is to be excluded from truth. To be excluded by oneself is to be bound by oneself. Consequently, man is not free [20, 22-24]. But since he has bound himself, he must also be able to loosen himself. If so, Climacus continues, the moment in time when he possibly could liberate himself from his bondage, could acquire no decisive significance. For in that case there would have been an earlier state of freedom which he could recollect. But that would be as in the mystic Socratic View, from which the mystic Alternative View was supposed to distance itself, by making the Moment in Time crucial. Man must therefore be unable to free himself from his self-inflicted state of bondage [20, 24-35].

It seems to be of great importance for Climacus to show that man's sinful situation is so serious, that he is entirely unable to disentangle himself from it. Even St. Augustine's understanding of evil is ultimately inadequate. Only by a still stronger emphasis on evil, can the Christian dogmatics concerning Salvation, Redemption, Atonement, and Judgement, become meaningful. Climacus needs an existential-ontological explanation which can show that man's sinful situation is necessary and extremely serious. He states therefore, as he must, that his understanding of evil also is so "in truth", and goes on to suggest an explanation of man's nature which is such that, by means of his freedom, man increases his "unfreedom" and becomes a slave of sin [21, 2-5]. In order to clarify further what he has in mind, Climacus tells two stories:

The first is about a child who has the free choice between a book and a toy. He chooses the toy, but later on he repents and wants to repeat the choice-situation and choose the book. Then he learns that the first state of freedom cannot be recalled: there was once a time when he had a free choice. But after the choice has been made, the freedom which existed in the beginning cannot be reinstated.

The second story is about a soldier who can freely choose between two armies before a battle starts. He chooses the loser, but when he becomes aware of the situation and wants to change his choice, he realizes that this cannot be done. There was once a time when he had the freedom to choose, but after the first choice has been made, freedom has become more limited than it was before [21, fn.].

Both stories deal with two main elements which necessarily limit man's freedom, namely choice and time. When man makes a choice, he excludes all other possible choices. This happens in time, which Climacus understands to be linear and irreversible, so that the original situation of free choice never can be recalled. Time deprives man of his freedom by being irreversible. It thus becomes of great importance to make the right choices. All is left to man's will, which has the decisive power to make choices. If the will is evil, man makes wrong choices, and ties himself to a state of guilt from which it is impossible to become free, owing to time's irreversibility. Climacus follows thus St. Augustine in his view of the corrupted will and, like him, claims to be able to reconcile man's morally evil nature with God's ontological goodness: God cannot be responsible for man's evil. The latter originates in the free will, and man himself causes the bondage in guilt and sin.

However, as far as emphasis on time is concerned, Climacus underlines this element more strongly than St. Augustine. Climacus belongs to a secularized age, after Kant and Hegel. At this time human reason tended to preponderate over religious, "eternal" truths of dogmatic and experienced nature, and the modern empirical, philosophical tradition started to become established. Climacus must therefore underline the temporal borders which limit man's freedom, to an extraordinarily high degree. He shares apparently Kant's views on time in Critique of Pure Reason, saying that time is linear and irreversible (26). Since man lives in this time from his very birth, time becomes the decisive factor causing that only one of infinitely many possibilities of life becomes actualized at any given moment in time. In this way actual

life destroys an infinite number of possibilities of life that could have been chosen, including itself, owing to time's irreversibility. Due to the many possibilities of life which man is unable to actualize, he must make himself guilty in his own eyes, by his very existence. Thus, time necessarily seems to bring guilt and evil into man's existence, even if his will were not evil. Man's situation in the world is therefore totally hopeless. He needs a Saviour to free himself from his state of guilt. In this way, Climacus has shown that evil is still more serious than it had appeared for St. Augustine, and that the Christian dogmatics centred around Christ as Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, and Judge, are absolutely necessary preconditions for man's freedom.

It is therefore clear that man's nature is so evil that he needs to be "recreated" by God and become a "new person". Only then can he be capable of receiving God's goodness [22, 35]. In this connection, Climacus clarifies other concepts which also reveal his Augustinian and Kantian presuppositions, as well as his adherence to Pietism. The pietists had especially emphasized the importance of radical conversion and repentance (*Busskampf*) (27). Like his pietistic predecessors, Climacus says that man needs to "turn round" and start to go in the opposite direction. He consequently needs a "conversion" [23, 1]. When he understands that his sinful state is self-inflicted, and realizes what he has caused by his aberration, he becomes sorry and repents. This sorrow wants to restore in the future what was lost in the past [23, 11]. In this way Climacus connects his concept of repentance to active, social involvement in the future. However, this involvement cannot be totally constructive and "rational". It must

contain an element of "possible evil" and sorrow. Only thus can the seriousness of "right" Christian existence be sufficiently underlined. Climacus' "right" mystic Alternative View must thus contain an element of unhappiness and suffering, never to be diluted or weakened by human, rational capacities.

Climacus continues his line of thought by stating that the conversion is so radical that it implies a transition from our present state of being in "untruth" to the logically opposite state in "truth". For the converted person, his previous state in "untruth" appears as "non-being" compared with the new state. Climacus finds it proper to call the transition of conversion for "rebirth" [23, 18]. For, like a birth, it is a transition from "non-being" to the logical opposite, "being". In this way Climacus has given an existential explanation of a well-known Christian, dogmatic and pietistic concept, while also adhering to his Kantian sceptical and "anti-rational" presuppositions, which can warrant "evil" in ultimate, mystic reality.

It is clear from the above exposition that Climacus has presented an Alternative View which, in its main traits follows St. Augustine's mystic, neo-Platonic understanding of Christianity, but is more extreme as far as evil is concerned. He has contrasted this view with a so-called Socratic View, which apparently is a classic, neo-Platonic, mystic interpretation of Plato's philosophy. The main difference between these two views lies in the understanding of guilt, sin and evil. These elements are relative in the Socratic View. However, in the Alternative View, Climacus gives them a stronger status by referring to the inscrutable God of Christian dogmatics, as well

as to man's experience of irreversible time. Climacus has thus apparently given an existential, ontological explanation, which is intended to show the ontological necessity of anxiety and guilt. He seems thus to emphasize evil more strongly than St. Augustine had done in his mystic neo-Platonism, and approaches ontological dualism. Apparently, he wants thereby to show that evil can only be removed by the "truly" transcendent Christian God. Anxiety and guilt are given an inscrutable status, founded in Kantian scepticism, and on this basis Climacus can give his mystic understanding of the dogmas about Jesus Christ as Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, and Judge key importance, never to be diluted in relativism.

As already mentioned, Kierkegaard has stated that the fictitious character, Johannes Climacus, knows what Christianity is (28). This statement implies also that his polemical opponents, the Hegelians, do not know what Christianity is. Climacus constructs his "right" views of Christianity, i.e. his mystic Alternative View, in sharp contrast to the Hegelianism in Denmark. This approach forces him into Kantian, sceptical, epistemological views. Since, on these presuppositions he most vigorously underlines that his mystic Christianity is "transcendent", it must consequently also be "irrational". Through Kantian "anti-rationalism" he can give ambiguity between good and evil in mystic, transcendent reality, a rational, "understandable" foundation, which can further serve as a relevant and meaningful attack on Martensen's and Heiberg's Hegelianism. One should thus always bear in mind that behind Climacus' emphasis on evil lie the polemical attacks on the rational Hegelians, and that Climacus refers to "irrationalism" on the basis of Kantian epistemology in this polemics. The thesis argues

that this "irrationalism" is fundamental in Climacus' views - and not only a means to be employed in the polemics. On mystic as well as Kantian sceptical presuppositions, Climacus must appear as an "irrationalist".

By his emphasis on the right Christian view, Climacus does not seem to be open to the possibility that there could be other alternative Christian views, even within the same mystic, neo-Platonic tradition to which his Socratic and Alternative Views belong. In Meister Eckhart's view of Christianity, one can find an alternative understanding of Christian dogmas concerning guilt and sin. Eckhart gives suffering, including anxiety and guilt, a practical function, as an ascetic means of purification, leading towards the transcendent, Christian God. Therefore, he does not need to consider "evil" as an unpredictable, "transcendent" threat, such as Climacus does, by referring to the Old Testament's Yahweh, or man's "evil nature". Eckhart does not understand God's "transcendence" as a transcendence of reason, into Kantian scepticism, as Climacus' Alternative View seems to imply; Eckhart's concept of transcendence is rather a rational, purified mystic-existential transcendence within eros, as it was for Plotinus.

In this way, Eckhart has avoided Climacus' insoluble problem of evil. Repentance, for instance, does not need to impose a "transcendent sorrow" into the future-directed, social involvement. Instead, it can serve a practical and positive function as a means of purification of the passions, so that a Plotinian mystic-

existential transcendence within eros can occur. Evil can thus be made relative, and God's complete goodness preserved.

The seriousness of evil has always been a debated theme within Christian theology and philosophy. In order to approach a clear concept of this central theme, it might be useful to consider it as consisting of three main ideological components. The most important component is ethical religion of the Old Testament, but also speculative Gnosticism and neo-Platonism have played important rôles. These three ideologies were given different emphases in the history of the Christian church, and they gave rise to different meanings of the concepts of sin, suffering and the essence of evil.

Anthropologists who have studied concepts of evil in different cultures all over the world tend to make a basic distinction between a "stronger" and a "weaker" sense of evil. The English anthropologist, David Perkin, has pointed this out in an introductory essay to a collection of articles published under the title The Anthropology of Evil (29). In this same book, David Tylor clarifies the gradation of evil in the ethical concepts of the Old Testament. For the most part, these concepts reveal a "weaker" evil, whereby ethical "sins" can be removed by some kind of repentance or rites of purification. But there is also a "stronger" ethical evil in the Old Testament that never can be removed in this way. Examples on the latter include sins of murder, idolatry, and adultery. They were regarded as unforgivable for any living person and punishable by death (30).

The so-called gnostics understood "evil" as an independent, metaphysical principle in opposition to "good". This dualism has its roots in old Persian religion and found its way into Judaism and other religions of the Middle East in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., when this area was conquered by the great Persian Empire (31). The gnostic, metaphysical evil can thus be said to be still "stronger" than any of the Judaic-ethical kinds of evils. It cannot be removed by any human act, since it is part of ultimate reality. But although good and evil apparently are metaphysical principles of equal value, most gnostics tended to think that good would finally preponderate and extinguish evil. Therefore, gnostic dualism is ultimately relative, tending to be subsumed under an ultimate principle of good (32).

Plotinus polemicized against the radical evil in Gnosticism. For him all reality was a coherent unity, created by an emanation from an ultimate, monistic principle, the One (to hen). The One was completely good, and therefore all reality, including the sensory world, must be considered to be good. Where evil existed, it was not caused by a metaphysical, gnostic principle, but by "incompleteness". Plurality contained the imperfection of being divided, and was therefore in lack of unity. Since man's soul had to live in a world of plurality it must necessarily contain imperfections. But these could, according to Plotinus, have no independent, ontological basis. They could be removed by approaching perfection, fullness, and unity, in mystic, religious practice. This practice meant an increase in metaphysical, mystic knowledge about ultimate reality. In the "unio mystica" where the soul could merge in the One, full

"knowledge" and unity was reached. Then there would no longer be any lack nor any evil.

Meister Eckhart's view of evil was formed by the presuppositions of the Catholic church to which he belonged. For him as for the church, a central presupposition was that faith and reason were in harmony, not in opposition to each other. The epistemological views of Aristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophies, where the former tended to preponderate in the official church, could therefore meaningfully be used in order to approach ultimate metaphysical and religious truth. In addition, the church guaranteed that the dogmas of faith were absolutely certain and true. Eckhart could therefore leave Christian dogmas about original sin and ethical evils to the church. By means of the authority of the church, these evils could be removed. This was manifested in different kind of cult rites, for instance in baptism, which was believed to wash away the impurity of original sin (33).

Eckhart understood evil within a Greek philosophical and neo-Platonic context. Being a practicing mystic, he naturally focussed primarily on neo-Platonism, and explained evil as a lack of perfection. By approaching God's unity, fullness, and goodness through increasing mystic knowledge, evil must disappear. The way towards God was therefore not a way towards an ultimate, ambiguous reality of good and evil, as it seemed to be for Climacus, on his combination of mystic and Kantian presuppositions. On the presuppositions of neo-Platonic mysticism and Thomism, Eckhart understood the way towards God as an experience of God's infinite, "self-

transcendent" goodness. The world of plurality, imperfection, and suffering was Eckhart's ascetic means of purification. It made him aware of ultimate mystic perfection and unity, so that he could work constructively to exclude the world of the senses in disinterest (34).

Eckhart's God has therefore transcended Climacus' logical Kantian and mystic Hegelian-related known-unknown dichotomy. Instead, Eckhart has connected God's reality to a mystic and practical "knowledge", which only can be "understood" by people who follow the mystic, religious practice. Therefore, Eckhart cannot, like Climacus, claim to "know" purely intellectually what Christianity is. For Eckhart any such knowledge must be limited and inadequate. Instead, he attempts to describe and lead others towards the religious, mystic reality which he himself has experienced. In this respect he does not primarily focus on the logical rational "known-unknown" dichotomy, and thereby also the corresponding mystic "good-evil" dichotomy. Instead he prescribes a "being-nothingness" dichotomy in relation to his practical, ascetic, ethical-religious process of purification. By actively annihilating his own selfish passions and self-will, he approaches passivity and "nothingness". Within this passivity, the "transcendent" good God can miraculously give birth to a new, purified activity (35).

Climacus can hardly use activity in the same way. He is unable clearly to define an intentional ascetic-mystic process of purification, since he must conclude that there could be evil in the ultimate, transcendent, ontological reality. Being a Lutheran

protestant, he rejects right away the authority of the Catholic church. He thinks that man is related directly to God in faith, and therefore responsible for his own ethical mistakes. Only the "transcendent", inscrutable, possibly evil God can remove sin, if he wishes to do so.

Climacus must therefore most strongly emphasize evil ethical elements. He brings the distance in ethical perfection between man and God of the Old Testament, together with monistic, neo-Platonic, mystic religion, and ends up imposing serious "evil" into ultimate reality of the mystic, neo-Platonic framework. Thus evil possibly attains an ontological status, and Climacus seems to approach a possibly ontological-dualistic view. He aggravates his dualism in his polemics against Hegelians when he claims within Kantian epistemological presuppositions, that Christianity is beyond reason and "unknown". In this way Climacus gives evil a stronger status than it had for Eckhart and even for St. Augustine: Evil seems possibly to belong to the very essence of ultimate reality. He can therefore not use suffering and activity constructively, as ascetic means to attain purification, truth, completeness, and goodness. Evil must possibly be an unpredictable threat, never to be completely overcome or controlled.

Climacus' can therefore be criticized from Eckhart's practical-mystic position. From Eckhart's point of view, Climacus' claim to "know" what Christianity is seems dubious. Rather, Climacus' audacious claim seems possibly to reveal his own Kantian, limited knowledge and inadequate mystic view of Christianity. He does not seem to "know" fully by experience Eckhart's classic, mystic "unknown", transcendent, Christian

reality. Instead Climacus "knows" too well the world of temporality and anxiety, thereby partly excluding himself from mystic reality of eternity and peace.

D) The Socratic Paradox

Kierkegaard states several times in his writings that his pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, is not a Christian. He is a conceptual thinker who believes in the absolute validity of the principle of contradiction, and distinguishes most sharply between being and thinking. He is therefore able to define clear, absolute, logical, and ontological border zones in relation to which he can know what Christianity is and what it is not.

He calls these border zones "paradoxes", and claims that they are of two kinds. The first kind belongs to the mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View, the second to the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, Alternative View. The relation between these two kinds of paradoxes is crucial, since both the above-mentioned views imply "transcendence" of reason in some way. But Climacus thinks that the understanding of paradox in the Alternative View presupposes the Socratic paradoxes. Moreover, it goes through a qualitative transformation, as a result of the special Christian, mystic category of the Moment in Time. Before one attempts to define "paradox" in the mystic Alternative View, the Socratic paradoxes must therefore be clarified.

In Chapter 3 of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus starts out by defining the Socratic paradox in relation to the mystic ambiguous Socrates figure. Climacus most sharply distinguishes between the "immanent", i.e. the Platonic-Hegelian objective, and the transcendent-subjectivistic Socrates, and states it as a "paradox", that one person can contain both these aspects within himself. He illustrates this first by referring to the "immanent" objective, Platonic-Hegelian Socrates, who apparently had the ability to know everything about man's nature. He did so by virtue of his unsurpassed insight into the eternal realm of knowledge, being and ethics, through recollection. Thereafter, Climacus contrasts this "omniscient" figure with the Socrates in the Platonic dialogue, Phaedrus, who says that he is not certain any more whether he is a more curious monster than Typho, or a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing something divine [38, 5-9]. This Socrates has apparently attained an insight which causes him to doubt everything concerning his self-knowledge and goodness (36).

These two Socrates figures are contradictory. Together they make a Socrates who both knows and does not know himself. This is incomprehensible for thought. Reason has encountered a border, a "paradox", in the contradiction beyond which it is unable to think.

The two-fold Socrates figure is also reflected in Climacus' use of the Platonic theory of eros. Climacus believes that thinking always presupposes existence. It is an existing individual who thinks a contradiction. Any contradiction creates a passion

within the thinking subject [38, 10-11]. The subject somehow despairs over the impossibility of thinking the impossible, and it can only reach the ensuing passion's highest pitch if the passion becomes directed towards something. In accordance with the immanent, Platonic theory of eros, Climacus concludes that the subject cannot direct this passion towards anything that it is impossible to think. The passion must therefore be directed towards itself, and so annihilate itself. Therefore, both passion and thinking will encounter a limit in the contradiction [38, 16-17].

The border between "transcendence" and "immanence" thus understood, is a logical and ontological border. In addition, it must have an ethical counterpart. Where this border is transgressed, the good becomes absurd, and a possibility of introducing evil into the transcendent realm lies open, in Climacus' Socrates figure as well as in Plotinus' neo-Platonic, metaphysical system.

Climacus continues to state that nothing can be known about the transcendent realm. Beyond the border he has drawn up round "immanence", lies the totally "unknown" [40, 16]. The "unknown" cannot be known by logical thinking, since the latter always presupposes its content. Neither can it be known by being, for the latter has been shown to have annihilated itself on the border of the "unknown". And since there can be no ontological ground in the "unknown", the possibility for a valid ethics is also undermined [40, 18-30].

In this way Climacus seems to have drawn up the borders of the area where reason can meaningfully be employed, in accordance with Kant's understanding of this problem in the Transcendental Dialectic. Therein, Kant had shown that there are twelve formal and rational categories as necessary conditions for knowledge. But these categories are only valid for human reality given in the "forms of intuition", i.e. within space and time. If one applies the categories beyond this limitation, there arise the so-called "transcendental illusions". However, reason is of such a nature, that it raises metaphysical questions: i.e. questions about God, the soul, the world, and the unity of all there is. Such questions go beyond the limits of reason's capacity. In addressing these questions, reason arrives at contradictory answers, which both seem to be true. Kant calls these contradictions "antinomies" (37). Therefore, according to Kant, one cannot achieve metaphysical knowledge on the basis of the rational categories. However, one can attain such knowledge on the basis of moral experience. The latter offers the most adequate "proof" of metaphysical reality through the experience of the Categorical Imperative, which is given with self-evident clarity (38).

Climacus seems to have adopted the Kantian sceptical epistemological view concerning his Socrates figure. When his Socrates encounters the "antinomies", he does not try to transcend them or overcome them through a Hegelian "reconciliation". Instead, he turns back to the realm where thinking meaningfully can be employed. Climacus can use this Socrates as a precondition for "true" Christian transcendence. For this transcendence occurs in the passions and goes beyond Kantian sceptical thinking without "reconciling" the contradictions which mark the border between

"immanence" and "transcendence". The Platonic Socrates had turned the paradoxical passions of thinking back to "immanence", and subordinated them to thinking. Socrates had made this possible through humour and irony, an intellectual game he played in order to avoid a "tragic dissolution" of all his fundamental presuppositions. Thus Socrates has excluded rational logical "transcendence". He adheres to the logical principle of exclusion.

However, Climacus thinks that in "right" Christian transcendence, the passions can be directed beyond "immanence" into the "unknown", without leading to absurdity. This is a subjective experience occurring when man's and God's love coincide in "faith", in the mystic Moment in Time. But the encounter with the "unknown" has at least disturbed the Platonic Socrates' "immanent" self-knowledge [40, 15-16]. The mystic transcendent, neo-Platonic Socrates has obtained an insight which the former lacked. He has reached a stage of self-consciousness from where he can consider the entire, ultimate realm of thinking, being, and ethics. This insight sets him in a position to understand which conditions can threaten and which integrate his consciousness. Thus, the Socratic, logical paradoxes assume corresponding ethical and ontological additional dimensions.

From now on the possibility for Socrates to choose voluntary disintegration of his consciousness is present in his mind, and he cannot nullify it by pretending its non-existence. This threat must lead to unease and anxiety, since Socrates must shut his eyes to something he knows can undermine his existence and thinking at any time

(39). Like Plotinus, he is faced with a serious problem of evil, owing to "transcendence" of reason. Climacus' Socrates overcomes this problem in the same way as Plotinus, by excluding all kinds of rational transcendence altogether, and turning back to reason. Socrates does so through the intellectual game of humour and irony, which he connects with the passion of eros. This eros can counterinfluence "evil" passions connected with anxiety. Instead of directing his passions "outwards" from himself, "transcending" the limits of being, he directs them "inwards", towards the process of recognition. Socrates can therefore, in self-integrative, paradoxical humour and irony, turn round on the border of possible destruction, and direct his passions towards the eternal, immutable reality of ethics, thinking and being. He has thus reversed his passions from being directed from the "known" towards the "unknown", to being directed from the "unknown", non-existing, temporal existence towards the "known", which he knows from before and recognizes. His anxiety will disappear to the same extent as he realizes eternal truth within himself. In this way he places the "evil", dissolving possibilities of his consciousness in the "unknown", temporal realm, and makes these ultimately illusory. "Sin is ignorance", connected to temporality, which will have to fade away with the increase of knowledge.

We can summarize the "Socratic paradox" as Climacus understands it, in four paragraphs of logical and existential-ontological contents as below:

- 1.) The paradox understood solely within logical thinking as a logical contradiction.

- 2.) The paradox understood as a border zone for ethics, being, and thinking, excluding transcendence altogether. We could call this understanding of paradox, "the principle of exclusion".
- 3.) The paradox understood as something "absurd", transcendent, or absolutely "unknown", as the very connecting link between logic and existence. For this aspect might cause the most serious consequences for all eternal knowledge, being and ethics. As Kant had pointed out, it could only lead to scepticism. And Climacus' Socrates resorts therefore to the principle of exclusion, avoiding "the unknown" by means of humour and irony. He can thus in turn solve the problem of evil in accordance with Plotinus' solution.
- 4.) The paradox understood mystic-phenomenologically within the Socratic self-consciousness, as resulting from the encounter with the "unknown". This aspect contains all the other connotations and opens in addition up two possibilities: the consciousness can, through humour and irony, by means of its passions of eros, either be led into "sceptical dissolution" or into "rational integration". In accordance with classic, neo-Platonic mysticism, Socrates chooses the latter possibility, thus reverting the passions leading towards anxiety and evil into passions leading towards eternal peace, essentially connected to reason.

E) The Sophistic View

In Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus points towards "irrationalism" within two historical contexts. The first is within a Greek-Socratic context, the second within a Kantian-Hegelian context. We have already termed the latter "irrationalism", containing epistemological as well as ontological connotations. However, "irrationalism" in the Greek-Socratic context might require a different name, although Climacus apparently also tends to read Greek philosophy within a Kantian-Hegelian frame of reference. The thesis has chosen to call the "irrationalism" within the Greek-Socratic context "Sophism", or "The Sophistic View". For the Greek Sophists represented a classic kind of "irrationalism" in theory as well as practice. Their views implied a radical relativism, applied to ethical values as well as to thinking's correspondance with reality. It was therefore an important task for conservative Greek thinkers and statesmen to fight their views, which they felt could undermine the foundation of the democratic, Greek society. In order to approach the concept of the Sophistic View of the thesis, attention should be given to Climacus' exposition in Philosophiske Smuler, as well as to modern scholars of Greek philosophy:

In the beginning of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus states the Socratic-Menonic dilemma in the following way:

"A person cannot possibly seek what he knows, and just as impossibly he cannot seek what he does not know, for what he knows he cannot seek, he knows it,

and what he does not know he cannot seek, because, after all, he does not even know what he is supposed to seek" [15, 8-12] (40).

This dilemma is supposed to have been a sophistic dilemma, originating in the Greek, Megarian, sophistic school (41). It was also used later by other Greek Sophists and sceptics in order to show the futility in attempting to communicate and to attain objective knowledge. The dilemma can be clarified by substituting the different parts with symbols in order to expose its logical structure. One can attempt the following reduction:

The dilemma makes two claims:

- 1.) If A knows X, A cannot not know X (for A knows X)
- 2.) If A does not know X, A cannot know (or come to know) X (for A does not know X and cannot know what to seek)

This can be reduced further in the following way:

The dilemma makes two claims:

- 1.) If B, then not (-B), (because B)
- 2.) If (-B), then not B, (because (-B))

Further:

$$1.) \quad +B = -(-B) = +B$$

$$2.) \quad -B = -(+B) = -B$$

Further:

$$1.) \quad B = B$$

$$2.) \quad -B = -B$$

This shows that the claim made by the Socratic-Menonic dilemma is a truism. A breach of the claim is a logical contradiction. If one holds the Aristotelian principle of contradiction to be valid, the dilemma must be insoluble. A "solution" would be a logical contradiction.

The dilemma apparently shows that the sophists, like Socrates, held the principle of contradiction to be absolutely valid. However, as a result of the radical, subjectivistic conclusions the sophists drew from the dilemma, Socrates felt obliged to try to refute their views. Whereas Socrates presupposed an eternal, objective ground in reality, consisting of thinking, being, and ethics, to be attained through the increase of knowledge in recollection, the sophists apparently gave more importance to subjectivity, and were unable to consent to the Socratic presuppositions. When Plato's Socrates polemicized against them in the dialogue Meno, he consequently did not set

out to prove that the Menonic dilemma was false, but attempted to convince his opponents that his own doctrine about the eternal, common objective ground, was right. For this purpose he used an illiterate slave-boy and showed that the latter apparently knew a well-known geometrical theorem without having had any possibility to learn it. Socrates realized, though, that his intention to prove his own position would ultimately be unsuccessful. He concluded therefore, that the slave-boy had only acquired a "true opinion" (doxa) about a theorem. He had not attained "true" knowledge (episteme). But Socrates believed that the slave boy could have reached such knowledge through more practice (42).

In this way Socrates seemed to refer to a subjective, "indisputable" (thus "objective") reality, in order to provide a secure foundation for his presuppositions. He was unable to prove objectively that his subjective presuppositions were right and the sophists' subjective presuppositions were wrong. His criticisms of the Sophists was in fact rather a clear illustration of the Menonic dilemma, which claimed that all communication and learning of objective truth was impossible. The sophistic position might therefore appear to have an advantage over the Socratic. For the sophists' reluctance to accept absolute unity of thinking, being, and ethics implied, that they admitted to their incapability of having objective understanding of ultimate reality. Socrates, on the contrary, seemed to presuppose that man was capable of knowing objective truth.

The position of the sophists is apparently close to the position of Climacus' subjectivistic Socrates, who had encountered the "unknown". Both positions expose a "free" consciousness, capable of choosing its own development. The subjectivistic Socrates chooses to believe in his own eternal presuppositions. Thereby, he avoids the sophistic problem of evil and the Sophistic View, which might cause "tragedy" and dissolution of all political, religious, and ethical values in Greek society. This Socrates of Climacus seems to follow the Platonic Socrates figure, who apparently was a defender of a conservative political view, and whose attack on the Sophists also was an attack on a radical and critical attitude to the established order in Greece. In Socrates' opinion, created by the society where he lived, the Sophists attempted to go beyond the "right" epistemological-ontological-ethical limitations of human beings. This was hubris, and would necessarily lead to "evil".

Owing to Socrates' polemical concern to refute relativism, he seems to have neglected any possible constructive implications of the Sophistic View (43). For it is a fact that the Sophists were the first in Western history to claim human rights for slaves as well as for other citizens in Greek society. The Sophists also raised the claim of more rights for women, previously unheard of in Old Greece, and formulated the idea that punishment should serve the purpose of preventing future crimes. In sharp opposition to the old Greek heroic view of war, the Sophists held that war is abnormal, and peace the only sane and desirable relation between states. The Sophists' criticisms also influenced the writing of Greek tragedy and history, which from now on began

to question many aspects of Greek culture. Earlier, all art had been intended to preserve the old, established order.

But it is a fact that the Sophistic View could also lead to disintegrative subjectivity, as Socrates had pointed out. In Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus explains therefore that the transcendent view of his mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates is different from the Sophistic View. Climacus' Socrates never gave up objective reason, not even in his subjective, ultimate, mystic reality. And he clearly distanced himself from the Sophistic View. In this way he avoided "irrational", insoluble problems of evil, which the Sophistic View apparently could lead to (44).

Climacus' Alternative View, described above as a mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View with the addition of sin and guilt, might hence appear as almost identical with the Sophistic View. But Climacus would most certainly have claimed that Christian "sin-consciousness" and "true" Christian mystic "irrationalism" differ from the "irrationalism" of the Sophists, owing to the special nature of the mystic-transcendent, Christian God. How such a view is tenable can only be subjectively understood in the mystic, Christian experience of the Moment in Time. Climacus apparently seeks refuge in a quite special subjectivity, in order to avoid positions such as in the Socratic or the Sophistic Views.

Climacus claims that the ultimate mystic reality of the Alternative View to which man has access through passions, possibly "essentially" connected with reason,

is of such a nature that it can "solve" the problem of evil, without subsuming passions under reason. This position is contradictory, and Climacus seems therefore forced to introduce Christian dogmatics in order to maintain his view with "certainty". He justifies the dogmatic statements rationally, by placing them in the Socratic "unknown", and understands further this point as the mystic Socrates' advantage over Hegel. Climacus seems thereby to say that Socrates subscribed to epistemological ideas similar to his own sceptical, "anti-rational" Kantian epistemological ideas, implying that Socrates subscribed to a kind of epistemological "irrationalism". However, Socrates did not take this "irrationalism" seriously enough, since he excluded it from mystic reality, and had no place for ontological evil.

Since Meister Eckhart belonged to the 14th century, he was excluded from entangling himself in the 18th-century, Kantian sceptical presuppositions of Climacus. Eckhart can therefore apparently give a more satisfactory solution to the problem of evil within his Thomistic and neo-Platonic epistemologies. His solution is also in accordance with Christian dogmatics concerning God's complete goodness and man's serious sinfulness. Climacus, on the contrary, is driven into Kantian scepticism through his need to polemize against Hegelians. As a result, he must think that there could be "irrational" and "evil" elements in the ultimate, mystic, Christian reality. When Climacus attempts to express in words this ultimate, ineffable reality, his mystic ambiguities must also include the good-evil dichotomy. These facts manifest themselves in Climacus' need to repeat the Moment in Time incessantly, in order to counter influence the power of evil. Climacus thus reveals an "evil disturbance" in his

mind, which seems alien to the tranquillity of common mystic phenomenology, represented by Meister Eckhart.

F) Proving Existence

Climacus agrees with the Sophists that thinking and being must be clearly separated. Consequently, one can never prove existence by means of thinking. He understands further the Platonic Socrates' and Hegel's cardinal mistake to be a result of a confusion of these two spheres. Contrary to Hegel, Climacus takes on the Kantian sceptical view, that existence can never be added as part of a concept (45). However, it could be a matter of dispute whether Climacus really wants to subscribe to everything Kant says in this respect. Climacus seems to believe in a still more radical separation of being and thinking than Kant. One can hardly believe, at least on the presuppositions of the thesis, that Climacus' separation of being and thinking gives room for Kant's view that there could be "synthetic truths a priori". This fact seems indicated in Climacus' categorical separation between thinking and existence, for instance when he talks about proofs concerning existence. Climacus believes that if one attempts to prove that a stone exists, such a proof necessarily implies a transition from the realm of essences to the realm of existence. This is impossible. One cannot prove that a stone exists, but only that an actual item should be described in

accordance with the definition of a stone. One should thus consider the proof as an analytic statement or a truism of the following kind:

- 1.) A stone (X) is defined as $a + b + c$
 - 2.) This item (Y) is defined as $a + b + c$
-

Conclusion: This item (Y) is a stone (X), or $Y = X$

Since this is so, one can substitute X for Y, and Y for X. One then obtains $X = X$, or $Y = Y$, i.e. a truism. Climacus' view seems thus to imply that there is no connection whatsoever between the existing stone and the proof. Concerning proofs of this kind he also distances himself sharply from Leibnitz, whose view on proofs, i.e. the relation between being and thinking, was in agreement with Climacus' Plato and Hegel [41, 1 & 68, 7] (46).

Climacus also gives another example to explain what he has in mind. He states that Napoleon's deeds cannot prove Napoleon's existence. What one possibly could hope to show, if one attempted such a proof, would at most be an identity between two formal descriptions. One could thus first describe Napoleon by means of his deeds, and thereafter examine whether this description was identical with another description of Napoleon! The possible validity of the proof would have to be concluded from the relation between the two descriptions. If they were identical, the

proof would be valid. But the proof could in no case say anything about Napoleon's existence as such. For Napoleon's existence would have to be presupposed in the description of "the deeds of Napoleon". Proofs are thus always concerned with essences, not with existence [41, 13-25].

In this connection Climacus refers to Hegel's distinction in the Logic between quantity and quality. Climacus concludes that existence is a quality, while thinking exclusively deals with quantities, which are external to qualities (47). In opposition to Hegel, Climacus thinks that these two realms can never coincide but must be kept distinctly and most clearly apart. He claims in this respect to follow the tradition of classic Greek Scepticism. The Greek sceptics had examined the possibilities of reaching conclusions concerning "qualities" on the basis of "quantitative" premises, and had stated that such a transition was impossible. They showed this, for instance, by raising the question: How many grains do you need in order to have a "heap"? They illustrated their problem by placing a heap of grains before their opponent. Then, by removing one grain after the other, they kept asking after each removal: "Is it still a heap"? Thus it appeared impossible to say exactly at which point the qualitative word "heap" lost its meaning. By this illustration they claimed to have proved that a quantitative method never could lead to a qualitative statement and vice-versa. There would always have to be a leap from the one sphere to the other [43, 17-27] (48).

In applying this discussion about proofs to the problem of God's existence, Climacus' conclusion must be that all proofs of God's existence are false. Climacus is

especially concerned to show the non-validity of the so-called "ontological" and "physico-teleological" proofs. He thereby reveals his apparent agreement with Kant in the First Critique on these issues (49). But this does not mean that Climacus ultimately agrees with these Kantian ideas. Whereas Kant in Critique of Pure Reason can be said to have refuted proofs in order to establish a sceptical agnosticism in religious matters as far as reason alone is concerned, Climacus intends more with his refutation of the validity of the proofs. He wishes also to refute the validity of the proofs in order to show his Hegelian, polemical opponents, that the "true" transcendent, Christian God contains an element of "irrationalism" and evil. For Climacus "knows" the existence of the "true" Christian God. His mystic experience through passions in faith gives a "subjective-objective knowledge" of God's existence, to which Pure Reason only has access as scepticism and "anti-rationalism". Thus, on his Kantian sceptical premises, the proofs of God's existence are all false, not because of their actual conclusion that God exists, but because they claim that his existence can be "understood" by reason.

Climacus first discusses the ontological proof of God's existence and chooses to do so in relation to Spinoza's concept of God: Spinoza had apparently attempted to prove God's existence by making existence and essence identical. God's existence is his essence, or it is God's essence to exist. In this way the very concept of God necessarily implies God's existence, and the problem of bringing these two apparently incompatible spheres together is overcome. Climacus finds this interesting, and goes on to examine further the Spinozistic concept of God. In this connection he quotes

Spinoza's "Principiae philosophiae Cartesiensae (Principles of the Philosophy of René Decartes):

"In proportion as a thing is by its own nature more perfect, it entails a greater and more necessary existence; and conversely, in proportion as a thing entails by its own nature a more necessary existence, the more perfect it is" (50).

Climacus reduces this statement to the following two statements:

- 1.) The more perfect, the more necessary existence (being), and
- 2.) The more necessary existence (being), the more perfect.

He concludes that Spinoza's statement is a tautology: perfection is defined by necessary existence (being), and necessary existence (being) by perfection. Climacus says further that his own interpretation is verified by a note (nota II), where Spinoza explicitly says, "by perfection I mean only reality (realitas) or being (esse)" (51). Being and perfection are thus identical. They are defined by each other, and the Spinozistic explanation of being's relation to perfection is illusory. In fact, it only states a truism: the more being, the more being, or $X = X$.

Climacus thinks that Spinoza's mistake is that he failed to make a distinction between what Climacus calls "factual being", i.e. existence in the empirical world, and "ideal being", i.e. being as an essential truth. Regarding "factual being", one cannot meaningfully talk about a gradual increase of being, since in this world things are or

are not. A fly has as much being as God, if they both exist in this world. Talking about a gradual increase in "ideal being", however, is possible. But in that case one deals with existence conceptually, i.e. with "essences". Spinoza's failure to make the distinction between essential and factual existence confuses and obscures his real problem, namely to bring eternal, essential truths dialectically together with temporal existence. His concept of God thus conforms to essential truth, and the bringing together of existence with this truth is an illusion. There is nothing wrong with Spinoza's truism, but he avoids the real problem [41, fn.].

Climacus' criticism of Spinoza appears in this way to be identical with his criticism of the Danish Hegelians. Climacus thinks that Spinoza confuses thinking and existence and, as a result, believes that he can "prove" the latter by means of the former. In this respect, Climacus holds a Kantian sceptical epistemological view, built on Critique of Pure Reason, establishing an impassable and clear limit for thinking's capability. Therefore, the Spinozistic proof must be considered to be an analytic truth, having no connection with existence whatsoever.

Climacus does not discuss other possible interpretations of Spinoza's philosophy. He neglects the possibility of understanding it within the same mystic, neo-Platonic tradition as his Socratic and Alternative Views belong to. Given this option, one could say that "self-consciousness" arises in the Spinozistic concept of the "idea of an idea" (*idea ideae*). Further one could understand the coincidence of being and thinking in the Spinozistic substance as a neo-Platonic, mystic-religious experience of

the same kind as is known from the tradition of Plotinus (52). Thus understood, Spinoza can solve the problem of evil within a rational, Platonic framework, without cancelling the freedom provided by an individual's self-consciousness. One could then interpret the ambiguity concerning subjectivity and objectivity which enters Spinozistic philosophy, to be of the same kind as the corresponding ambiguity of Meister Eckhart's mystic philosophy, i.e. as an infinite transcendence within "good". Spinoza has thus excluded Climacus' strong emphasis on evil. In this perspective, Climacus' criticism of Spinoza seems irrelevant. For Spinoza can really be said to have succeeded in bringing thinking and being together dialectically, by virtue of his concept of transcendent consciousness. And he has also avoided the irrationalism and serious evil implied by Climacus' mystic Alternative View (53).

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had shown much respect for the physico-teleological proof of God's existence together with the ontological and cosmological proofs, although ultimately he rejected them all after subsuming them under the ontological proof. The physico-teleological proof takes its starting point in empirical reality, according to Kant, and it attempts to point out a plan in the universe which possibly could prove the existence of a transcendent, intelligent creator. Such a proof must be a "transcendental illusion". For it implies that the categories are employed outside of time and space. Any intentional arrangement one might discern to be present in nature can never prove a "transcendent" creator, but at most an "immanent architect" of the world (54).

Like Kant, Climacus also seems to show much reverence and respect for the physico-teleological proof. However, the reason for this seems to be slightly different from Kant's. For Climacus, the special reverence partly seems to be a result of the physico-teleological proof's connection with the mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates. Climacus states consequently that Socrates never set out to prove God's existence. Socrates constantly presupposed that God existed, and on this presupposition he sought to infuse nature with the idea of fitness and purposefulness [44, 5-7]. In this way Climacus seems ultimately to agree with Kant in giving priority to the ontological proof.

Climacus' image of Socrates seems thus to imply that Socrates subordinated thinking to his existential, religious experience in accordance with the mystic, neo-Platonic elements in his Socrates figure. The advantage of Socrates' physico-teleological proof, subordinated to the ontological, consequently lies in the ambiguity it introduces between subjectivity and objectivity. From this mystic-phenomenological position, Climacus' Socrates is able both to stay totally within the rational borders of thinking (where proofs can meaningfully be made and, in the event, rejected as invalid for the ultimate mystic reality) and to "transcend" reason into the mystic God's very essence. This mystic Socrates can therefore possibly be said to have "proved" God's existence. But since such a proof also requires transcendence of reason, Socrates must necessarily end up in subjectivity and be faced with the problem of communication of the Menonic dilemma.

On the basis of empirical facts alone, Climacus seems to reject the physico-teleological proof, like Kant. His argument in this respect is as follows: He states tentatively that one can see God's wisdom, goodness, and providence in nature, but that there would have to be a different relation between God's works and God, than for instance between Napoleon and Napoleon's works. For God's works would have to be so "absolute", i.e. would have to reveal the almighty so clearly, that they could belong to nobody else. By pointing out God's works in nature, his existence would be indisputable [41 & 42]. Climacus continues to answer this tentative statement negatively in a way very similar to Pascal: one is unable to draw such conclusions from God's works in nature, since they are not convincing enough (55). One would rather have to derive his works from the mundane works "regarded ideally" [42, 12]. But by so doing, one would already have removed oneself from the realm of existence into the eternal world of essences, and a proof of God's existence would have to presuppose his existence, so that it would be with trust in him that the proof started [43, 1-2].

By his argument against the physico-teleological proof, Climacus does not only clearly reveal his Kantian epistemological presuppositions from the First Critique, but also his current polemical attitude against Hegelians. His sharp distinction between thinking and being dismisses not only the proofs, but also Hegel's epistemological position as invalid. In Climacus' opinion, Hegel had violated the limits of "right" thinking by his concept of Speculative Reason and his claim to "understand" the historical development. Furthermore, by making history ultimately identical with

Absolute Spirit, Hegel had given a false "proof of God's existence". The implication for Christianity of such a view was that man could understand God's works in history: God's transcendence was subsumed under understanding, and Christianity became a human religious creation. Thereby "true" Christian seriousness of guilt and sin was diluted. The Hegelian "Christianity" was in reality a speculative Platonism where there was no place for sufficient serious evil. In Climacus' opinion the Hegelians had no ultimate need for a Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, or Judge, but thought they were able to save themselves by means of Speculative Reason.

However, Climacus thinks that his mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates figure has an advantage over Hegel and the Danish Hegelian theologians, as far as Christianity is concerned. Socrates' physico-teleological proof of God's existence is not a Hegelian rational deduction from logical reason to God, proving the necessity of God's existence. Socrates' proof is an ambiguous phenomenological, mystic description of the religious, subjective-objective mystic reality. His proof can therefore very well be valid. The only element Socrates lacks in his mystic religious view is "sin-consciousness". Climacus cannot accept Socrates' rational, Plotinian mystic transcendence of reason by means of eros, in which evil is made relative and excluded from the mystic transcendent essence of God [46, 28-32].

Climacus is certainly very much concerned with attacking the Hegelians in his contemporary Denmark. This important concern seems to prevent him from a more neutral discussion and consideration of Hegel's views. Climacus does not seem to

realize that Hegel's position also could be interpreted in a more mystic, neo-Platonic way, owing to the subjective element present in Hegel's concept of Speculative Reason, as was attempted for instance by Hans Lassen Martensen. Neither does he take into consideration that Hegel's philosophy has a social aspect, implying social connotations in the terminology, alien from Climacus' own individualistic way of thinking (56).

Climacus' polemical attitude has apparently also excluded him from a more nuanced consideration of different, mystic, neo-Platonic alternatives. Climacus sees only two, namely his Socratic and his Christian Alternative Views. He stays dogmatically within Kantian, sceptical presuppositions, and presents his opponents views in relation to these. When he later introduces the concept of Kantian epistemological transcendence, manifested in scepticism and "anti-rationalism" as the "totally unknown", and identifies this concept with the mystic, Christian God, he must necessarily confront the insoluble problem of evil in return, a problem for which he further accounts by referring to the dogmatics of Christianity. His Christian mystic reality seems thus partly to be founded on "irrationalism". Climacus can hardly get rid of this trait, owing to his fundamental subscription to Kantian scepticism together with mystic Hegelian-related epistemological presuppositions.

In this way, Climacus misses Eckhart's alternative mystic, Christian view. Eckhart identifies ultimate truth of Christianity, a truth which human reason is incapable of grasping adequately, with Plotinus' "atheistic", mystic transcendence within

eros. Thereby Eckhart is able to reach a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. Furthermore, he gives validity to the Christian dogmatics concerning guilt and sin, by understanding evil and suffering as ascetic means within the mystic-religious process of purification. In this way, evil becomes the Klimax tou Paradeisou, i.e. the "ladder towards religious and ethical perfection". This purification can, in turn, make mystic Christian reality accessible, not by "transcending" logical reason on the basis of Kantian scepticism, but instead by letting God reveal himself as self-transcending into pure "nothingness" (57).

In relation to Spinoza's concept of God, Climacus rejected the ontological proof of God's existence as false and inadequate, a creation of human reason alone. He therefore concludes that one must consider this "proof" as a projection of man's own existence into a fictitious, totally "unknown" God. Apparently in agreement with Ludwig Feuerbach, Climacus thinks that the "proved" God is a projection of the human mind. When thinking deals with God, it projects itself and mistakes the difference for the likeness [44, 34-39 & 45, 7-12]. Climacus thinks that it is only within Socratic, mystic, neo-Platonic ambiguities that one possibly can overcome Feuerbach's criticism of Christianity. However, mysticism is subjective, opposing objective communication. Feuerbach's criticism must therefore always be taken seriously [45, 6-10] (58).

Climacus believes that the Socratic mystic ambiguity fundamentally reflects the Socratic paradox which, in the Moment in Time goes through a transformation into

what he chooses to call the "Absolute Paradox". He apparently believes that this transformation is the Alternative View's advantage over the Socratic View. But, since the former is founded upon the latter, the Alternative View must be subject to the same criticisms concerning subjectivity as the Socratic View. It seems impossible to distinguish between the Alternative View and the Socratic View in any other way than by means of the Alternative View's emphasis upon guilt and anxiety, which Climacus calls "sin-consciousness". By means of the same kind of projection as Feuerbach had believed in, Climacus must draw the conclusion that there may be evil in God. And he can undergird this claim dogmatically by referring to the unpredictability of Yahweh in the Old Testament, and rationally with reference to Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" within mystic Hegelian-related epistemology.

G) The Absolute Paradox and the Offended Consciousness

The "expansion" of the Socratic Paradox that takes place in the Alternative View implies primarily incorporation of Judaic-Christian dogmatics concerning sin and salvation into Climacus' mystic, Socratic, neo-Platonic religion. In order to reconcile these two fundamentally different, cultural elements, Climacus avails himself of the sophistic and Kantian-sceptical Socrates: Climacus identifies the Christian God with the Socratic-Kantian absolute "unknown" and Kantian "anti-rationalism". This implies further that he places God "beyond" logical understanding, and any attempt to

comprehend him by means of reason is bound to end up in Kantian antinomies and scepticism. As a result of this presupposition, Climacus can introduce the entire Christian dogmatics, apparently without interfering with the validity of thinking, as far as this is kept within its proper limits. He can therefore state with dogmatic certainty, that man is totally different from God. As a result of his self-caused evil, man is also guilty in the eyes of God. Consequently, God can appear as a Saviour, Deliverer, Reconciler, and Judge, who has appeared in history to restore a harmonious relation between himself and man.

Thus, the Socratic View has somehow become expanded in the Alternative View. When God appeared as man in history, the "unknown" became "known". Consequently, the Incarnation implies that an additional, incomprehensible element, a contradiction, is added to the Socratic Paradox. Climacus makes this clearer by saying that, owing to man's self-caused sin, man is still more removed from the absolutely different God. But through the Incarnation, God has shown that "absolute difference" has become transformed into "absolute likeness". In this way, the paradox in the Alternative View becomes a so-called "double paradox", and Climacus finds it suitable to name it the "Absolute Paradox" [38, 1 & 46, 38 & 47].

It is of great importance for Climacus to emphasize the great difference between man and God. However, in mystic experience when this difference is transformed into "likeness", the former is not cancelled, but preserved. In the encounter between God and man, which is made possible through the Incarnation,

man becomes a "sinner". "Sin-consciousness" is part of the Absolute Paradox and "beyond" logical reason. In this way "evil" becomes part of the mystic-transcendent, "inscrutable", divine reality. Therefore, God can also be evil, a trait which is compatible with the idea of the unpredictable Yahweh of the Old Testament.

In order to show that the seriousness of evil is more than an absurd, dogmatic statement, Climacus ties evil to man's temporal existence in the world. "Sin-consciousness" is a qualitative change, occurring within anxiety and guilt, arising from man's temporal existence. Thus, Climacus' view implies that man's existence in temporality necessarily is inflicted with evil (59). Further, God must himself be subjected to this evil, since He has become man throughout, in the Incarnation. Climacus apparently needs dogmatics in order to assume some credibility for the Christian truth that God is totally good. In addition he attempts to weaken the impression of contradictions and "irrationalism" by explaining incomprehensible "evil" elements within presuppositions of sceptical Kantian epistemology and mystic phenomenology.

Due to all the ambiguities in Climacus' views, he is able to incorporate all the positive traits of his mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates figure within the Alternative View. In this view he thus also includes all the constructive elements of the Sophistic View. The mystic Moment in Time, when God encounters man, assumes a positive dimension. But at the same time a destructive element follows. Climacus needs to

bring an additional aspect into the Moment in Time, which can neutralize the destructive, disintegrative elements and prevent man from destroying himself.

As already stated, Plotinus had somehow tried to solve the problem of evil in his mysticism by approaching a rational, Platonic solution. Therefore, he made no rational breach between the One and the upper nous (reason), and attempted to keep "transcendence" of nous into the One (to hen) within a rational framework, so that "irrationalism" may be avoided.

Meister Eckhart has apparently followed closely to Plotinus' solution. He understands suffering and evil as practical means in the mystic way towards the "unknown". But Eckhart's "unknown" is not like Climacus' sophistic and Kantian "unknown". Eckhart makes the Christian God and dogmatics as well, "known" through adding an "atheistic-mystic" dimension to his otherwise classic, ambiguous, practical, theistic-panteistic mysticism. For him, the Christian "unknown" God is not unpredictable and possibly evil. On the contrary, he is good throughout, and sin and evil assume only relative validity. Eckhart is careful not to exaggerate rational, sceptical elements, and instead of ending up in Climacus' mystic vacillation implying Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" with the ontological counterparts of good and evil, Eckhart approaches God's goodness and nothingness through ambiguities within degrees of goodness. God's goodness and dynamic love are God's "self-transcendent" mystery, both within and possibly outside of man's capacities, but in either case exclusive of all evil.

Turning to Climacus again, we see that he has given so much emphasis to Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" together with "sin-consciousness", that he is in need of an additional, mystic-transcendent power, capable of cancelling evil. But on Kantian sceptical and mystic premises, this power must also contain the possibility of being evil itself. Climacus apparently solves this dilemma by referring to the "Absolute Paradox". He thinks that the Christian God is incomprehensible throughout. Therefore, the "irrational" consequences within his mysticism, caused by his reluctance to subordinate his Kantian, sceptical views to his mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological view, cannot threaten the absolute truth of God's goodness, even though reason might lead to such a conclusion! Man can experience for himself the ultimate solution to the problem of evil in the Moment in Time. This is a subjective mystic-transcendent, individual experience, which Climacus ultimately must be unable adequately to express. But when he attempts to approach an expression, he avails himself of Kantian scepticism again, thus begging the question he is asking. He never seems to be willing to give up his Kantian presuppositions altogether, but leaves this question in uncertainty.

However, besides the Kantian scepticism, Climacus certainly also expresses himself clearly in accordance with common mystic phenomenology. He can thus state that the image of love is most suited to give an impression of the incomprehensible, mystic connection between God and man in faith [40 & 47]. Climacus believes that self-love is the basis of all love. But at love's "peak", the passion of love wills self-love's downfall. Only under such contradictory circumstances can two lovers be "in mutual

understanding" with each other, and their relationship of love happy. If self-love tends to preponderate, it will result in a crisis of love, i.e. in love's "spiritual trial" [47, 15-25].

Climacus employs this image of love to say that the relation between the Absolute Paradox and thinking is similar to the above-stated relation between lovers. The passion of thinking wills thinking's downfall, and so wills the Absolute Paradox. The latter wills the unity between the unknown God and man, and in order to "communicate" this truth, thinking must be set aside. Thus, thinking and the Absolute Paradox have a common intention and can be "in mutual understanding" with each other. The passion of thinking and the Absolute Paradox can then unite in "blissful", mystic perfection.

In this way Climacus claims subjectively to have overcome the dilemma about the God who can be both good and evil. He does not nullify the validity of logical reason, but defines it within a different sphere than mystic, transcendent reality. The latter can only be made accessible through a qualitative, emotional relationship of passion which is of such a nature that the destructive possibilities in man's self-consciousness are overcome. Climacus adds thus the "blissful", mystic-transcendent passion of the Moment in Time to man's "sin-consciousness", created by man's existence in time, and the great difference between God and man. Thereby "evil", in some mystic sense, might be overcome (60).

However, Climacus quickly adds that, in the emotional relationship between God and man through passions, there is also a possibility for self-love to be revived, as there is between lovers. Thinking can become "offended with" the Absolute Paradox. In that case, their common intention will not be discerned, and the result is the Offended Consciousness [47 & 48].

Climacus explains that the Offended Consciousness is a concept belonging to the Alternative View. It is a reaction of human consciousness when it encounters the Absolute Paradox. Since the latter comes into existence in the mystic Moment in Time, Climacus can state that the two concepts cover the same content, i.e. everything that is involved and/or contained in the entire Christian dogmatics. Offence is therefore a reaction to the whole "Alternative Existence" in the mystic Moment in Time [50, 7-17]. Offence can appear either as "active" or primarily "passive". Its expressions can find the most diverse appearances. But common to them all is that they are caused by the Absolute Paradox or the Moment in Time. Ultimately, offence is therefore always "passive" or "suffering". The Offended Consciousness is a hurt consciousness, and its wound creates all kinds of reactions within what is possible [48 & 49, esp. ftn.].

Consequently, it may be difficult to discern the difference between what a non-offended and an offended consciousness might utter. Since the Absolute Paradox belongs to the sphere of the totally "unknown", the Offended Consciousness cannot be conscious about what causes the offence. And the offence cannot be expressed in a

language which the consciousness could "borrow" from the "unknown". The Offended Consciousness necessarily borrows its language from an area which is known for man, from the sphere of logical conceptual thinking. When the Offended Consciousness articulates its offence, it must necessarily sound as if the origin of offence were in logical conceptual thinking. Climacus calls therefore offence an "acoustical illusion" [48, 2]. It sounds as if it comes from logical conceptual thinking, but in reality it has its origin in the Absolute Paradox and is a reaction and "backwards copy" of the latter (61). Its expression is therefore somehow an indirect expression of the Absolute Paradox, so that one can "read" the Absolute Paradox through the expressions of the offence: the deeper the passion is manifested in its expression, the greater is the extent to which the offence is indebted to the Absolute Paradox [49, 24-28].

The Offended Consciousness is thus always a reaction to the incomprehensible contents of Christianity. As an example, Climacus mentions two contradictory expressions the Offended Consciousness can choose in order to describe the Absolute Paradox: the Absolute Paradox is either "foolishness" or "something which is of great importance, worth working for" [50, 25-29]. The former expression should be understood as the Absolute Paradox's claim that understanding is the absurd [50, 27]. The latter expression is also a reaction to the claim of the Absolute Paradox, that understanding is the absurd [50, 30].

Applying these considerations to the current polemical situation, it seems as if Climacus intends to say that the Danish Hegelian theologians represent examples on

the Offended Consciousness. Offended by "true" Christian transcendence, implying sin-consciousness and "irrationalism", they have made Christianity into a convenient, rational religion. As a result, they wish to explain and understand Christian dogmatics. However, in reality their rational explanations are attempts to escape the Absolute Paradox. For the person who has received the Absolute Paradox has set reason aside and received the incomprehensible contents of Christianity directly from the Christian God in the mystic passion of faith. Only such a non-offended consciousness can "know" what Christianity is.

One must therefore conclude that Climacus' explanations of the Offended Consciousness are extremely intricate, contradictory, and pointing in different directions. The Offended Consciousness can only be a meaningful concept when considered in the Moment in Time. It is a subjective, mystic-transcendent statement of a phenomenon which is impossible to communicate to an individual who is not familiar with the content of the Moment in Time. In the text of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus illustrates this by giving seven examples. He quotes seven utterances which, in his opinion, come from non-offended, but could as well have come from offended consciousnesses [51 & 52]. In principle there is no way to see this from the text itself. But Climacus thinks that the Offended Consciousness points out the difference between man and the "unknown" more clearly than any non-offended consciousness can do. For in the latter, "the difference is in fact on good terms with the understanding", overbridged by a mystic "blissful passion". But Climacus also

emphasizes that this passion does not weaken the great difference [52, 9-22]. One should thus not take for granted that evil ultimately can be eradicated!

Thus, Climacus' exposition of the Offended Consciousness presupposes that he "knows" what Christianity is (62). He adheres to sophistic-Kantian epistemological scepticism and mystic phenomenology, and thinks that there is a "correct" Christian view whose most decisive features are serious guilt and sin together with an unpredictable, possibly evil God. This presupposition is best illustrated in his polemical writings against his contemporary Danish theologians, especially in his attacks on the Rev. N.F.S. Grundtvig⁴. No Danish theologian had fought harder against theological rationalism than Grundtvig. He had even emphasized the "living word" of subjective faith so strongly in opposition to his contemporary theological rationalists, that he had been expelled from the church (63)! Nevertheless, Climacus attacks him for holding a view which is incompatible with "true" Christianity, since it apparently neglects the "true" seriousness of sin. The central point in Climacus' criticism seems therefore only to be the very difference between the mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View and the mystic, neo-Platonic, Alternative View. Climacus apparently neglects other alternative Christian views, even within his own mystic, neo-Platonic tradition. He reacts to these views in "offence", understood in accordance with his subjective definition of this concept. Instead of understanding Christian dogmatics and the mystery of Incarnation within a mystic, neo-Platonic view like Eckhart's, in which evil in God is excluded and

⁴ Grundtvig's views will be more closely examined in Chapter VI of the thesis.

"offence" necessarily an ascetic means of relative validity, Climacus establishes a serious evil element in God and claims that disagreement with him concerning this issue implies "offence". Climacus' concept of offence is subjective, mystic-transcendent, and "evil", therefore he could be attacked on the basis of his own criticism. As well, he himself can be said to illustrate the suffering, Offended Consciousness which, because of its serious evil has made him unable to approach the central mystery of the Christian religion (64).

Climacus has apparently given an exposition of the Offended Consciousness in order to illustrate the same phenomenon as the general proofs and the proofs of God's existence illustrated: they remain outside the Absolute Paradox and can only give rise to expressions which do not apply to the "true", mystic-transcendent contents of the Moment in Time, but are self-projections [50, 32]. However, it is not only the Offended Consciousness which projects itself when it attempts to express mystic-transcendent reality. Any consciousness attempting to give a description of this reality must do so. No consciousness can even be aware of the impossibility of expressing this reality, since the unknown is literally "unknown", and can only become "known" subjectively in the Moment in Time [49, 17].

By pointing out which consciousness is offended and which is not, Climacus reveals that he really thinks that he "knows" what Christianity is, and that the essential element lacking in pagan-Socratic, mystic, neo-Platonism is "evil". The Alternative View thus assumes the same characteristics as the Offended Consciousness. Offence

becomes the very element that should be maintained with absolute validity. Climacus can justify this contradictory position by referring to the Absolute Paradox, which must be totally incomprehensible and absurd, when understood within an irrational context, built on sophistic and Kantian epistemological elements as well as on mystic phenomenology.

H) Concluding Summarizing Remarks

The exposition in this chapter has shown that, Climacus' description of the Alternative View occurs on three main discernible levels: the logical, the mystic existential-ontological, and the dogmatic level. By means of logically coherent statements, it appears as if Climacus derives the Absolute Paradox from the Socratic Paradox by introducing new, true premises of dogmatic and/or existential-ontological nature. The truth of the new statements seems thus to be partly dependent on the logical correctness of deductions. In addition, Climacus seems to "place" and accommodate the entire Christian dogmatics inherent in the Moment in Time, into the Socratic Paradox by identifying Christian dogmatics and the "unknown". One is left in doubt as to how much of this description of Christianity is meant to be something which belongs to man's mystic, existential experience, and how much one should understand as mere dogmatic statements. This problem is most conspicuous when Climacus talks about "sin-consciousness" [46, 32]. His emphasis on guilt, sin, and evil

obviously presupposes the dogmatic understanding of sin and salvation. But it also seems to be caused by an existential, ontological reality in his consciousness, originating in the experience of time and the nature of his ultimate religious experience, together with his sophistic-Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" as well as the corresponding ontological-epistemological concept of mystic "transcendence" into the "unknown". The solution Climacus presents to the problems of sin and guilt is therefore the dogmatic "salvation". It is connected to a mystic, existential-ontological passion of faith in the Moment in Time, undergirded by sceptical, epistemological views built on Kant's First Critique.

In addition the concept of the Offended Consciousness certainly has its dogmatic basis in the Bible. This is the case for instance in St. Paul's statement that, Christianity is "foolishness" for the "wise" Greeks, as well as in the many repeated statements in the gospels, that people became "offended" with Jesus (65). But as certainly, this concept also has its basis in an existing consciousness which reacts to the Christian message.

Throughout Climacus' exposition we are left partly in doubt as to whether the dogmatic connotation really is superfluous in accounting for the validity Climacus attributes to his statements, or whether some parts of Climacus' exposition might rely upon this dogmatic authority for their credibility. Certainly, dogmatic truths are beyond discussion and human understanding. Since Climacus understands the dogmatic realm on mystic, Hegelian-related presuppositions, and gives his understanding

emphasis through sceptical, Kantian epistemological views, an "irrational" trait enters his exposition.

Since the Offended Consciousness is a reaction to the Alternative View, its existential-ontological validity is dependent on the Moment in Time. If this crucial concept were merely meant to express a dogmatic truth, it follows that the Offended Consciousness has only dogmatic validity, and that its existential-ontological validity is illusory. But if one also should account for the Moment in Time, as a description of a mystic, existential-ontological reality, the Offended Consciousness might somehow assume more reality. One could then believe that this consciousness had reached a "higher" mystic stage than a consciousness totally unaware of the Absolute Paradox. The Offended Consciousness would have failed to reach its full possible development only because of its "misunderstanding" of the Absolute Paradox (66). According to Climacus, it is only the mystic consciousness which has attained perfect union with the "unknown" God in the Moment in Time, which can fully understand Climacus' ambiguity between dogmatics - connected with sophistic-Kantian scepticism-, and existential-ontological truths.

Climacus' crucial mystic ambiguities must also contain good and evil. Owing to his dogmatic sanction of extra strong suffering and evil, Climacus excludes other mystic, neo-Platonic Christian alternative views. He sticks to his own mystic, neo-Platonic, Alternative View, where evil is most strongly underlined, and in addition he takes on Kantian epistemological presuppositions in his polemics against Hegel and

Hegelians. Thereby he unavoidably assumes an "irrational" position. As a result, he seeks to overcome evil by means of a mystic, subjective, personalized passion, which he further gives rational justification within a Socratic-sophistic, Kantian, sceptical and "anti-rational", epistemological framework. Thus he repeats and strengthens his "irrational" position.

Meister Eckhart's alternative, mystic view, however, is apparently capable of maintaining all the fundamental, mystic ambiguities within Climacus' Alternative View, and in addition also capable of excluding Climacus' ambiguity between good and evil. As Climacus only can state with dogmatic authority, the absurdity of giving evil "absolute" status, Eckhart clearly makes evil relative. In addition, Eckhart adds another element, an element which is both comprehensible and incomprehensible at the same time, to the Absolute Paradox. This is that the mystic, self-transcendent God cannot be evil. In this way Eckhart excludes anxiety and guilt from the ultimate mystic, "transcendent" reality, and understands man's way back to his mystic, neo-Platonic origin as a way towards the Absolute Good. Unlike Climacus, who from man's point of view, emphasizes the great distance between man and God, Eckhart apparently leaves the question of this necessary distance to the "transcendent" God himself, and from man's point of view, Eckhart believes entirely in God's goodness. As a result, one could consider ambiguities within Eckhart's concept of the mystic God to be more "incomprehensible" and more "ambiguous" than Climacus' corresponding ambiguities! In this perspective, Eckhart can also give full validity and meaning to the crucial dogmatic elements within Climacus' Alternative View. Thus, in addition to this

"superiority" concerning ambiguities, Eckhart seems also capable of giving a less extreme and more satisfactory solution to the problem of evil.

From the interpretation of Chapters 1 and 3 of Philosophiske Smuler one can thus conclude, that Climacus possibly is an "irrationalist". He adheres apparently so strongly to Kantian sceptical epistemological views, that these ideas also influence his ultimate mystic-religious views. In fact, Climacus needs the sceptical views to underline the seriousness of evil in a "right" Christian consciousness. He emphasizes therefore that evil is not ignorance. In this perspective he needs Kantian epistemology in the shape of "anti-rationalism", to undergird the seriousness of evil, and to account for his own "unhappy", mystic consciousness.

The thesis argues therefore against the view set forth by McKinnon, that Kierkegaard, also in the shape of Climacus, should not be considered an "irrationalist". However, the intentions and methodology of the thesis are very different from McKinnon's. As McKinnon rejects "irrationalism" by means of analyses of the term "paradox" and related concepts, as well as by attributing special importance to the problem of indirect communication and pseudonymity, the thesis approaches the problem of "irrationalism" in a mystic, phenomenological perspective. It points out the strong emphasis Climacus gives to evil within a mystic, neo-Platonic phenomenology, and further his strong adherence to Kantian sceptical and "anti-rational" views, in order to save the concepts of evil from dilution. It then becomes clear that Kierkegaard's Climacus needs the Kantian views to defend evil and miseries in the

"true" Christian consciousness. His Kantian epistemological views can not be completely subordinated to his mystic, epistemological views, and Climacus must therefore subscribe to a claim that is and must remain logically incompatible with his underlying conceptions. He should thus be termed an epistemological irrationalist, according to McKinnon's definition. On his mystic, Hegelian-related presuppositions this "irrationalism" must assume some ontological validity, a fact which becomes manifested in Climacus' need and concern to give extra strong emphasis to evil. Thus, the thesis also opposes McKinnon's view that the charge of ontological irrationalism in the sense that reality is unpredictable, absurd, etc., most likely is an irrelevant question which Kierkegaard would hardly even have understood. The thesis argues that this question acquires relevance in the mystic, phenomenological perspective, and must influence Climacus' entire existence.

In this way the thesis argues that Climacus, and probably also Kierkegaard, holds two epistemological views at the same time, i.e. the Kantian, logical-sceptical, and the mystic, Hegelian-related view. McKinnon's view seems in principle to be the same as the Kantian, logical-sceptical view. The thesis thus agrees with McKinnon that Climacus/Kierkegaard adheres to this view and never consents to make it relative. However, when the thesis adds a mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological concept of reason to McKinnon's sceptical view, additional epistemological and ontological perspectives arise, perspectives that seem partly to refute McKinnon's "non-irrationalist" epistemological and ontological positions.

I) Short Summary of Chapter II

Chapter II is an interpretative and critical reading of chapters 1 & 3 of Philosophiske Smuler. In this section, the thesis first clarifies the concepts of the Socratic View, and the Alternative View. The Socratic View is a mystic, neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato's philosophy, represented by Socrates. The Alternative View is Johannes Climacus' view of "true" religiousness, which appears to be a mystic, Augustinian, neo-Platonic interpretation of Christianity, supplemented with Kantian sceptical epistemological views and an extra strong status of evil.

By means of reason, Climacus defines borderlines within his views. These limits define logical, as well as ontological and ethical subject matter, and structure the consciousness of the mystic Socratic and the mystic Alternative Views. Climacus names the borderlines, as well as the consciousnesses to which they belong, "paradoxes". Since both the Socratic and the Alternative Views imply "transcendence" of reason in some way, Climacus seeks refuge in subjectivity to distinguish between them. The decisive point of difference between the two appears to be in the solution to the problem of evil. In the Socratic View, this problem is solved in a Platonic-Plotinian way, by means of subordinating evil to reason; evil should hence be considered as ignorance and ultimately illusory. However, Climacus thinks that "true" Christianity needs to give evil a stronger status, so that one can maintain the "true" dogmatics concerning sin and salvation. Climacus argues therefore, that evil is part of the "true" mystic-transcendent, Christian reality, and that it never can be nullified by reason. His view is partly a

product of a polemical situation, wherein he reveals his adherence to Kantian sceptical epistemological presuppositions against rational, speculative Hegelian opponents. Since Climacus claims that Christianity implies transcendence of reason, understood on Kantian premises from Kant's First Critique, he seems also forced to bring scepticism and "anti-rationalism" into ultimate, mystic Christian reality. He tries to escape this dilemma by seeking refuge in a personal, subjective, mystic experience through passions, but also the latter contains sceptical epistemological elements. Thus Climacus ends up as an epistemological irrationalist. In the mystic perspective this fact is manifested in "evil", which points towards ontological irrationalism.

Thus, Climacus' mystic, Alternative View contains a complexity of ambiguities, including fundamental vacillations between good and evil. Owing to Climacus' strong adherence to Kantian presuppositions, as well as his claim to present the right Alternative View, he excludes other possible, mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian views. The thesis has therefore introduced an alternative, mystic contrasting view to Climacus' mystic Alternative View. This alternative view is based on Meister Eckhart's mystic, neo-Platonic Christianity. Eckhart's alternative view seems to contain all the fundamental ambiguities of Climacus' views, including preservation of Christian dogmatics concerning sin and salvation. It seems also to present a more satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. Instead of Climacus' ambiguity between good and evil, Eckhart presents ambiguities between degrees of goodness. Instead of Climacus' Kantian sceptical epistemological presuppositions, Eckhart presupposes an epistemological view based on Thomism and neo-Platonism, i.e. views which not are

in opposition to mysticism. Eckhart's alternative view might therefore be better suited than Climacus' Alternative View, to express adequately the mystery of Incarnation in Christianity.

The chapter concludes by restating that the Kierkegaardian Climacus viewed in mystic and Kantian, sceptical perspectives can hardly avoid the label of "irrationalist" as this term has been defined by McKinnon. For the epistemological views of Kant's First Critique and the mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological view must appear contradictory. If Climacus is reluctant to subordinate the Kantian sceptical perspective to the mystic perspective, he should be termed an epistemological irrationalist. However, in the mystic perspective, epistemological irrationalism acquires a corresponding ontological counterpart. The thesis argues that ontological irrationalism is manifested in the fact that Climacus gives extra emphasis to evil. Thus, the thesis disagrees with McKinnon's view that ontological irrationalism does not appear to apply to Climacus/Kierkegaard.

J) Notes to Chapter II

1. See Anders Nygren, Agape & Eros, translated by Philip S. Watson, S.P.C.K., London, 1982, esp. pp. 594 ff.
2. Plotinus, The Enneads, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1962. See especially the 5th Ennead, e.g. V, 1, 10 & Ennead I, 2, 6.
3. St. Augustine, The Confessiones, translated, with an introduction and notes, by John K. Ryan, Image Books, Garden City, New York, 1960, Book VII, 16; and St. Augustine, The City of God, translated by Demetrius B. Zema, S.J., and Gerald G. Walsch, Fathers of the Church, S.J. - New York, 1950, e.g. Book XII, 7.
4. See Chapter I, Notes 6, 7 & 8, the thesis, above.
5. See B.K., Vol. 6., 1981, pp. 178 ff., and Chapter I, Note 6, above.
6. Raymond B. Blakney gives a comprehensive account of Eckhart's life. See his book Meister Eckhart, Introduction, page XXIV. Concerning Martensen, see Chapter III, Note 31, and Chapter V, Notes 16 & 17, the thesis, below.
7. The thesis intends to follow the common phenomenological method of Comparative Philosophy. See: D.T. Suzuki, Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist, Harper & Row, New York & London, 1957.

Suzuki argues that Eastern and Western mysticism basically are identical. See esp. pp. 3-39.

8. Etienne Gilson emphasizes that Meister Eckhart is a Plotinian, intellectual monist, in opposition to Thomism. See Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, New York, 1955, pp. 438-42.

Frederik Copleston tends to give most emphasis to the Thomistic elements in Eckhart's thought, and argues that Eckhart's Plotinian and pantheistic statements must be understood as results of the situations in which they were uttered. See Frederik Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1972, pp. 279-85.

Henry Suso identifies pantheism, theism (including Christian dogmatics), and Plotinian monism in his Christian mysticism. See Chapter I, Note 85, the thesis, above.

9. Eckhart's defense against the charges of heresy can be looked up in the so-called Rechtfertigungsschrift (The Vindication Document). Translation into English in Raymond B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Harper & Row, London, 1941, pp. 258-305.
10. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, p. 90.
11. Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Lidelsens problematik hos Kierkegaard og mystikerne, K, Vol. 3, Munksgaard, København, 1959, p. 69. See also M.M. Thulstrup, Suffering, B. K., Vol. 7, C.A. Reizel, København, 1980, pp. 159f.

M.M. Thulstrup states in these articles, that for the mystics, suffering is always transitory. For Kierkegaard, however, suffering remains and increases. Thulstrup traces the difference between Kierkegaard's and the mystics' views, back to their religious confessions. Christian mystics seldom belong to protestant churches. Kierkegaard was a Lutheran protestant, and did not know the mystic alternative view of the Catholic church. Thus, M.M. Thulstrup's method is different from the method employed in the thesis. For the thesis does not want to criticize Kierkegaard on the basis of his Lutheran confession, but attempts to point out phenomenologically that there exists a very strong element of evil in the Kierkegaardian Climacus' mystic-religious consciousness.

12. Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, deals extensively with these problems in B.A., S.V., Vol. 6, Chapter 3. See especially pp. 171f, ftn. 2, and p. 176.
13. See Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2nd ed., Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, pp. 91ff.

The accusations set forth against Socrates, which finally led to his execution, show that he was considered to be a sophist: "Socrates is guilty of corrupting the minds of the young and of believing in deities of his own invention, instead of the gods recognized by the State". Plato, Apology, 24B. Quoted after the translation by Hugh Tredennich, The Last Days of Socrates, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1978. See also Apology 18B & 19B, C, D.

14. A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, p. 172, ftn. 1.
15. The "homo-mensura" doctrine is known from the only preserved sentence in the sophist Protagoras' philosophical work, On Truth. This sentence, supposed to have been the opening sentence of the work, says:

"Of all things the measure is man: of existing things that they exist, of non-existent things that they do not exist."

Quoted after J.M. Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1968, p. 24.

16. See Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 47.
17. See Chapter 5, Note 50, the thesis, below, and corresponding text, the thesis, below.
18. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. Max Müller, Anchor Books edition, New York, 1966, 2nd Division, Chapters I & II.
19. See Note 14, this chapter, above.
20. In Philosophiske Smuler Climacus does not explicitly use the term "repetition", but the meaning of this concept is presupposed. This is most obvious in the Interlude, where Climacus clarifies his concept of time and history. (Ph.S., pp. 79f.) Kierkegaard first uses the term "repetition" in Gjentagelsen (Repetition), from 1843. The pseudonym of this work, Constantin Constantius, clearly defines this concept. See G., S.V., Vol. 5, esp. pp. 130-32.

The term "repetition" is also used by an other pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, in Begrebet Angest (The Concept of Dread). Kierkegaard published this work in the same year as Philosophiske Smuler (1844). Vigilius Haufniensis closely follows Climacus' views on Christianity. See e.g. B.A., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 178, fn. 1.

Johannes Climacus of Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift is also familiar with the term "repetition". See e.g. A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, pp. 220 & 243, and S.V., Vol. 10, p. 9, line 13 & p. 144, line 39.
21. Plato, Meno, 77.
22. St. Augustine, Confessiones, Book III, Chapter VII ff.
23. See Chapter V, Note 36 f, the thesis, below, and Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Princeton, N.J., pp. 144 ff.
24. See Note 36, Chapter V, the thesis, below.
25. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by T.K. Abbott, Longmans, London, 1967, Book 2, Chapter 4.

26. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1. Division, Book I, Chapter II, 2nd Analogy, Max Müller's translation, New York 1966, page 153 ff. See also Note 27, Chapter V, the thesis, below, and corresponding text.
27. Peter Erb, Pietists. Selected Writings, Paulist Press, Toronto, 1983, p. 9.
28. See Chapter I, Note 55, the thesis, above.
29. David Perkin, ed., The Anthropology of Evil, Basil, Blackwell, Oxford-New York, 1985, pp. 1-23.
30. *ibid.*, Donald Tylor, "Theological Thought about Evil", pp. 26-41. Concerning unforgivable sins. see *op. cit.*, p. 32.
31. Helmer Ringgren & Åke Strøm, Religionerna i Historia ock Nutid, Verbum, Stockholm, 1974. See esp. p. 175. For general information about the development of Persian religion, see pp. 286-88.
32. Geo Widengren, Religionens Värld, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, pp. 286-88.
33. See the Bible, 1. Cor. 6, 11, and Ezek. 36, 25-27. For further information about the cleansing effect of baptism, see Rudolf Schnackenburg, A Study in Pauline Theology, translated by G.R. Beasley-Murray, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1964, pp. 3-17.
34. See Note 10, this chapter, above.
35. *ibid.*
36. Climacus refers here to the Platonic dialogue Phaedrus, 230A, where Socrates says: "-and I try to discover whether I am a more complicated and puffed-up sort of animal than Typho, or whether I am a gentler and simpler creature, endowed by heaven with a nature altogether less typhonic." Translated by Walter Hamilton, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1977, p. 25.

It appears that the name Typho is etymologically related to a Greek participle which is translated as "puffed-up" in the text. The expression "less typhonic" is a translation of the Greek word "atyfos", which can be translated as "non-conceited", "non-vain", "non-arrogant" or "humble". There appears, therefore, to be a play with words in the Socratic statement, reflecting the idea of Greek tragedies, that man's pride and self-conceit (hubris) necessarily must lead to the gods' revenge (moira). Therefore, Socrates can in the context of Philosophiske Smuler be understood to say that Climacus' epistemological sceptical Kantian views never must be "transcended" in "hubris". For in that case, the mystic-

transcendent gods will take their revenge, causing ontological evil, or "tragedy". See also Walter Hamilton's commentary to Phaedrus in note 2, p. 25.

37. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by F. Max Müller, Anchor Books edition, New York, 1966, 2nd. Division, Chapters I & II.

See commentary in Justus Hartnack, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, Brace & World, New York, 1967.

38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by T.K. Abbott, Longmans, London, 1967, Book 2, Chapter 2, Section 5.

39. See Note 36, this chapter, above.

40. Plato, Meno, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1977, 80E.

41. Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vols: 12, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1927, Vol. I, The Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 71 B. See also R.S. Bluck, Plato's Meno, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1961, p. 272.

42. In Meno Socrates states:

"At present these opinions (doxa), being newly aroused, have a dreamlike quality. But if the same questions are put to him, (i.e. the slave-boy), on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody's. -- This knowledge (episteme) will not come from teaching, but from questioning. He will recover it for himself."

Translation by W.C.K. Guthrie, Meno, 85, C & D, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1977. See also Meno, 81, A-B.

43. This is clear from Plato's exposition of Socrates' defense in the Apology, translated by Hugh Tredennich, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1977.

44. This is pointed out by many writers of the history of Western philosophy. See for instance Eilev Skard, Filosofien i Oldtiden, Aschehoug, Oslo, 1966, pp. 51-66. See also G.F.W. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, pp. 352-84. (German text in H.G.W., Vol 18, pp. 406-41.) See also Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, pp. 91-100.

45. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd. Division, Sections 3-5.

46. G.W. Leibnitz, The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, translated by R. Latta, Oxford University Press, Oxford-London, 1965. See §§ 31-38. See

- Also G.W. Leibnitz, Theodicy, translated by E.M. Huggard, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1952, § 351. See also Die Philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibnitz, herausgegeben von C.G. Gerhard, George Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-New York, 1978, the section called "Nouveau Essais", 4, 2, 1.
47. G.F.W. Hegel, The Science of Logic, the First Part of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, translated by William Wallace, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 8.
 48. Climacus has this information from W.G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1798, VI, p. 344. See Niels Thulstrup's Commentary to the Philosophical Fragments, in Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, Princeton, New Jersey, 1962. (Hereafter op. cit. by Niels Thulstrup will be referred to as Thulstrup's Commentary.)
 49. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd. Division, Chapter 3, Sections 4 & 6.
 50. Benedictus de Spinoza, Earlier Philosophical Writings, The Cartesian Principles and Thoughts of Metaphysics, translated by Frank A. Hayes, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis/New York, 1963. See I, 7, 1, p. 37.
 51. Op. cit., I, 7, 1, Note 2, i.e. p. 38.
 52. The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, Vols: 2, translated by R.H.M. Elves, Dover Publications, New York, 1955. See The Ethics, Def. 1, P. / & 11. See also op. cit., E. 2, P. 21, note.
 53. *ibid.*
 54. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd. Division, Chapter 3, Section 6.
 55. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, translated by John Warrington, J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1973. See fragment 13, according to M. Laufma's arrangement (i.e. frgm. 100 in Michant's, and 229 according to Brunschvieg's arrangements): "But being too much to deny and too little to assure me, I am in a pitiful state", etc.
 56. Concerning Martensen's Hegelianism, see Chapter III, Note 31, and Chapter V, Notes 16 f., the thesis, below. Concerning Hegel, see Note 15, Chapter 3, the thesis, below.
 57. See Notes 17 and 19, Chapter 4, the thesis, below.
 58. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, in Gesammelte Werke, Vols: 11, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1973. See Vol. 5, pp. 75-130.

59. In Philosophiske Smuler Climacus does not explicitly say that the temporal is sin, but he presupposes the idea. See e.g. Ph.S., p. 49, fn. The idea is explicitly expressed by Vigilius Haufniensis in B.A., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 180, line 1: "The moment sin is posited, the temporal is sin".
60. Climacus does not explicitly mention "forgiveness for sins", as a solution to the problem of evil. He apparently considers this problem to be "more insoluble". For Climacus, evil can only be somehow "neutralized" in a mystic "blissful passion" which is identical with the "Absolute Paradox". Sin must never be made relative (Ph.S., 52, 15-22 & 61, 29-33). But after 1848, when Kierkegaard had had his second deep religious experience, he started to believe that sins can be "forgiven and forgotten". Kierkegaard might thus ultimately have solved the problem of evil. If so, he could be considered as a mystic of the same type as Eckhart. This possibility is pointed out as part of the conclusion of the thesis.
61. The two English translations from Princeton University Press translate the Danish expression "bagvendt copierer" into "copies in the wrong way" (1985) and "copies perversely" (1963). These translations do not take into consideration the rational connection between the expressions of the Offended Consciousness and the Absolute Paradox. (Climacus says that one can read the Absolute Paradox from the expressions of the Offended Consciousness). It might, therefore, be more correct to translate "bagvendt" literally, as "backwards". The rational element understood as a kind of Kantian "anti-rationalism" in offence seems then to be more adequately accounted for.
62. See Thulstrup's Commentary, p. 61, concerning a note by David Swenson.

Swenson says that "the writings of Nietzsche exemplify on a grand scale most of the characteristics here ascribed to the passion of offence; they constitute a reaction phenomenon, tend toward the end to be pervaded by what amounts to an unfree obsession, and borrow from Christianity the chief category in which the attack is launched" (p. 222).

Swenson's view might very well be in accordance with Climacus'. For apparently Climacus is also able to tell which consciousness is "offended" and which is not [Ph.S., 53, 6-7]. But this is contradictory to Climacus' statement that there is no absolute difference in the expressions between an offended and a non-offended consciousness. Climacus' view on this point reflects the same dilemma as he reveals in his attacks on Grundtvig's Christianity in Ph.S., Chapter 5. Nietzsche's relation to Christianity seems to be as complicated as Kierkegaard's, and Nietzsche's concept of "resentment" seems in many ways to correspond to Climacus' concept of "offence". Swenson presupposes that he himself has "understood" Climacus' subjective view of Christianity, and that is impossible.

63. Concerning Grundtvig, see Chapter VI, Section C of the thesis, below. See also the corresponding Notes, where references to Grundtvig's Værker i Udvalg (Selected Works) are given.
64. See Chapter I, Note 106, the thesis, above.
65. See e.g. The Gospel according to Matthew, Chapter 11, verse 6, Chapter 13 verse 57, Chapter 15, verse 12, etc. The Gospel according to John, Chapter 6, verse 60, Chapter 10, verse 33 etc., and the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, Chapter 1, verse 23.
66. It seems likely that Climacus considers the Hegelians as representatives of the Offended Consciousness. Their "consciousness" has not reached its "right" development. See in this connection the Revelation of John:

"I know your doings, that you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you were either cold or hot. So because you are lukewarm and neither hot nor cold, I am going to spew you out of my mouth".

Rev., 15-16. (Quoted from the Revised Berkeley Version of the New Testament.)

CHAPTER III

Johannes Climacus' Exposition of Love and Faith

Interpretation of Chapters 2 & 4 of Philosophiske Smuler

A) Introduction

In accordance with mystic and neo-Platonic thinking, Climacus has described a Socratic and an Alternative View, in which reason is transcended by love. Climacus claims, though, that the transcendent content of love differs in the two views. In the mystic Socratic View, we apparently encounter a theory of eros close to Plotinus' concept, where eros "transcends" reason (nous), but is still to be kept within rational limits, so that irrational evil can be excluded. Plotinus defines the One (to hen) as good throughout, and does not understand eros in opposition to reason, although it supposedly transcends it. In the mystic Alternative View, however, "transcendence" is more emphatically underlined. There, Climacus avails himself of epistemological views from Kant's First Critique, as well as of the Old Testament image of God, in order to account for possible evil in his transcendent, mystic reality. Climacus brings thus Plotinus' neo-Platonic theory of eros together with Old Testament "transcendent" law-religion, so that a more decisive difference between the "transcendent" and "immanent" loves in his Kantian sceptical and "anti-rational" mystic framework, can occur. In order to maintain indisputable validity of "transcendent" love in the Alternative View, Climacus needs a dogmatic, authoritative foundation. And he finds this in the Judaic-Christian concept of "agape", which implies that love is an unselfish duty, a divine, transcendent demand, in sharpest contrast to the neo-Platonic, egocentric concept of

eros (1). Since the Alternative View builds on the Socratic View and expands on the latter, by adding concepts of more serious sin and guilt, taken from Judaism, Climacus' concept of love must contain both Plotinus' eros and the Judaic-Christian agape. Since Climacus also subscribes to Kantian epistemology in his understanding of transcendent knowledge, his concept of mystic love must partly appear as contradictory and "anti-rational", seen from a logical rational, epistemological, Kantian point of view. Therefore, when Climacus attempts to communicate the content of his concept of love, he abandons his earlier "rational" method, which he used when he drew up the paradoxical borderlines within the Socratic and the Alternative Views. For Climacus thinks that such a rational method is unable to grasp the transcendent elements of sin and guilt in the Alternative View. A rational method would, instead, annihilate sin and guilt in accordance with the Platonic-Plotinian solution to the problem of evil. Concerning the characteristics of the Alternative View, Climacus needs a method which can grasp the mystic-transcendent "evil" subject matter in the concept of love, and he proposes to attempt a "poetical method" for this purpose [30, 34]. For he thinks that nobody can be more able to render the content of love than the poets. Climacus therefore calls his exposition of love a "poetical venture", and he presents a "poem" which he apparently thinks can clarify the complex relation between the loves of eros and agape in his Alternative View.

Looking for historical roots of the concept of eros, we find that eros has its origins in the earliest Greek mythology, where a dynamic power, being able to shape and keep cosmos going, was needed. The early Greeks thought that without

"movement" no existence could be possible. However, in the mythological accounts, it remains an insoluble problem how the dynamic principle itself could come into existence. According to an orphic myth, the god Eros spontaneously sprang out of the "great world-egg". He was bisexual, and contained the seed from which the universe later could develop (2).

Hesiod expresses the same paradox in the Theogony, when he recounts that Eros was a cosmic god without parents, created by the universe in the very beginning of time (3). The pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles considers Eros a cosmic principle, part of the cosmic reality, and the question about his origin, as far as the sources allow us to judge, is apparently not raised (4). The Greek mystery religions knew a different aspect of Eros, however, later to be taken over by Plato. According to this theory, all human beings have their origin in a super-sensible, perfect world. Mundane existence is the result of a "fall", after which the originally perfect, eternal souls have become "polluted" and imprisoned in matter. But the souls still have preserved a memory of their source, thus longing for their earlier perfection (5). Eros can thus be understood as a "lack", creating a "movement" or "drive" in the human soul. According to Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium, this drive can be channelled in one of two possible directions. It can be "fallaciously" directed towards the sensible world where no satisfaction can be found: this is the "vulgar eros". But it can also be "rightly" directed towards the eternal world, where full satisfaction and fulfilment can be found: this is the "heavenly eros" (6). However, Plato thinks that ultimate reality is identical with the eternal realm of thinking. Eros cannot "transcend" reason in any

way (7). Later, the mystic-religious neo-Platonists developed a theory which changed the definition of eros so that it was thought to go "beyond" thinking. Thus, Plotinus held that man could reach full mystic fulfilment beyond the realm of reason (nous) in the One (to hen). But Plotinus attempted, nevertheless, to keep eros within rational presuppositions, in order to avoid too strong emphasis on mystic evil.

Plotinus' problem concerning eros and reason entered Christianity in the Christian, mystic and neo-Platonic tradition, which we can follow from St. Augustine, through Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, and further into the Christian mysticism of the Middle Ages. When the Greek theory of eros was incorporated into Christianity, it encountered the Judaic-Christian concept of agape. St. Augustine tried to reconcile the two concepts of love in his own subjective, personalized concept of caritas. This concept contains both man's love of God (eros-love), and God's unselfish love of man together with man's unselfish love of neighbour (agape-love). But St. Augustine tended to give priority to the love of eros. Agape somehow became an additional "alien" element, appearing somewhat contradictory in relation to his concept of eros. Therefore caritas primarily became a "contradictory" love of eros, used by St. Augustine to account for the decisive distance between God and man in his mystic, neo-Platonic scheme of eros (8).

The Christian mystics of the Middle Ages, among them also the so-called "heretics", increasingly tended to subordinate agape to eros. The tension in St. Augustine's concept of caritas was weakened, so that the concept of love approached

a more classic, Greek eros. The main reason for this can be said to have been that the church organization somehow took over and gave priority to the agapic functions of Christianity. The church required people to love their neighbours, since God loved them, and it also required deeds of charity, guaranteeing salvation in return. Agape thus became somewhat superfluous in the personal, subjective, religious-mystic experience of love.

The religious experience of Christian mystics in the Middle Ages is therefore not primarily centred around a personal experience of agapic love, but around eros. St. Bonaventure's famous work, Itinerarium mentis ad Deum (The Mind's/Soul's Journey to God), as well as Dante's Divinia Comedia (The Divine Comedy), are manifestations of eros-preponderance: life in this world is the soul's pilgrimage back to its divine, Christian origin. And this journey is at the same time a practical process of purification, preparing the soul for entering the holy and good kingdom of the Christian God (9).

Meister Eckhart absorbed all main traits of St. Bonaventure's and Dante's concepts of love. Consequently, he understood love primarily in terms of eros, and wanted to use agape as a means of purification. Active involvement in society, i.e. "suffering", was Eckhart's mystic method. This idea apparently could be in full accordance with the official views of the church. But clearly Eckhart also went decisively beyond these views in some respects. The church, represented by St. Thomas Aquinas, taught that the soul's final return to God only could occur after death.

Eckhart, however, taught that it could happen in this life. Although he wanted to be loyal to the authority of the church, he thus apparently rejected its authority in questions of salvation, and claimed that man himself/herself was related directly to God. There was a "divine spark" in the soul of each individual. When a religious person worked with himself, to isolate this inner spark of his soul, God would be drawn to him/her. God could thus reveal his true agapic nature in self-transcending vacillation between activity and passivity. This agapic love would be cleansed of evil, being identical with purified love of eros (10).

However, when Eckhart attempted to describe his mystic experience, he tended to emphasize that the ultimate ground to which we return, or God returns - is totally beyond love and being. He called this ground the Godhead, and claimed that it was beyond God, defined in personal and pluralistic categories. In fact, he described the Godhead in terms closely akin to those Plotinus had used to describe the One. Man could reach the One through a "Plotinian, purified transcendence", within eros. Eckhart thus apparently believed that this transcendence even went beyond the Christian God's self-transcendence, and reached into "pure nothingness" and total unity (11).

In this way Meister Eckhart can be said either to have "aggravated", or possibly still more radically "gone beyond" the traditional theistic and pantheistic strands of mysticism, and to have defended a more radical "atheistic mysticism". In the latter perspective his mysticism ultimately approaches total passivity and ontological

nothingness. Thus, man's activity in the world seems ultimately to be directed towards its own self-annihilation. As a result, eros must finally be given up and extinguished, and the function of agape must be to purify eros, so that this annihilation can occur.

The age of the Reformation in Europe brought forth a reaction against the dominance of eros in the Christian concept of love of the Middle Ages, together with restoration of agape. Luther reacted to the Catholic understanding of agape as more or less a technical tool which man could use to secure his own salvation. Luther claimed that the church had no right to talk with divine authority and make people believe that they could save themselves by their own efforts (12). Reverting to the Old Testament and St. Augustine, Luther underlined the great distance in ethical and religious perfection between man and God, and he emphasized also the absolute need for God's grace in the process of salvation. Man's own works could never help him to get rid of his sinful nature. Only God himself could do this, through his love and grace. Only through faith in God's infinite love could man believe in overcoming his natural, evil inclinations. Luther considered therefore man as both sinner and "justified" at the same time. Man could never expect to get rid of his sinful nature through his own efforts alone (13).

Therefore, Luther's concept of love did not focus on the soul's return to God, but on God's love for man through grace. Love of one's neighbour was not a means to attain an "erotic" return to a perfect state of bliss or nothingness, but a dogmatic demand and Christian duty, more similar to the concept of love known from Jewish

law-religion (14). In this way Luther underlined God's inscrutable essence, and he gave love of agape dogmatic priority over eros.

Climacus belongs to a Lutheran, Christian culture, and adopts apparently the Old Testament, inscrutable, dogmatic elements in Luther's religion without questioning their credibility. But being also a pietist, a Christian mystic in the neo-Platonic tradition, Climacus wishes at the same time to reconcile the love of agape with the love of eros. Climacus' concept of mystic love consequently appears to be "contradictory", and filled with paradoxical passions, like St. Augustine's *caritas*. Climacus certainly emphasizes that "God is love", but underlines also that this love is tainted with evil. It is a "suffering love" [28, 28 & 29, 20 & 32, 10, etc.]. He does not think that one can ultimately transcend love, as Eckhart's view ultimately seemed to imply. For Climacus, love is the very essence of God. Climacus must also think that the agapic elements in the concept of love cannot totally purify the elements of eros, so that mystic transcendence within eros can occur. He must rather maintain agapic elements by the authority of dogmatics. These elements are namely a necessary part of ultimate mystic reality, and must be maintained together with the more "understandable" elements of eros.

Climacus strengthens the agapic traits in his polemical situation. Adhering to Kantian epistemology against Hegelians, he must most vigorously emphasize that Christian love is more incomprehensible than neo-Platonic love of eros. Only in a

clearly defined agapic perspective can "right" Christian dogmatics concerning sin and salvation be validated, and not diluted in relativity and ignorance.

B. Johannes Climacus' Concept of Love

Climacus defines love as an emotional connection between persons [28f.]. Therefore, when he takes up the theme of love in Chapter 2 of Philosophiske Smuler, he presents Socrates as a person, not only as a "rational principle". This subjective Socrates has in some ways "transcended" reason, but in addition Climacus also wants to present a purely rational, "objective" Platonic Socrates, who believes in reason's validity, and stays within the ontological and ethical borders designated by reason. Together, these two interpretations of Socrates make a mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates figure. Owing to Climacus' polemical attitude against Hegelians, he has been driven into sceptical, Kantian epistemological presuppositions, and he therefore delineates the borders of "reason" more sharply than the religious, mystic Plotinus had done. As a result, Climacus' mystic Socrates figure tends to be dominated by "objective", logical speculative traits from the philosophies of Plato and Kant. When Climacus adds the personal, mystic, subjective, "transcendent" neo-Platonic Socrates to the Platonic one, his Socrates must appear as contradictory and "irrational".

Given this twofold image of Socrates, the apparently contradictory traits in his personality assume meaning. Climacus can thus state that Socrates was a teacher who had a personal interest in his follower, and "loved" him, but that this love also fundamentally was subordinated to reason. The unity in love between Socrates and his follower was therefore illusory. The genuine unity between them must be sought in the objective, rational and impersonal reality they both shared. For Socrates was unable to give the follower any knowledge. All knowledge a follower might attain in Socrates' company would have to be excavated from the follower himself, through "recollection". Socrates' love was always his divine, personal zeal for the objective, rational and impersonal, eternal truth to become conscious in Socrates himself, as well as in the follower [26f.].

Climacus is apparently also aware of the Greek original, mythological, cosmic and superpersonal connotations in the concept of eros. His Socrates exhibits the characteristics of a person who understands himself as an individual created by Greek society, living in a reciprocal relation to his social and cultural environments. Therefore, the Socratic concept of eros also acquires an additional ambiguity between "subjectivity" and "objectivity", understood in terms of the subjective individual in relation to "objective" society. But ultimately Climacus seems to subsume this ambiguity too under objectivity (15).

In this way Climacus seems to believe that Socrates could not really attribute ultimate value to individual existence. Owing to each person's alleged wisdom, if an

individual would allow another to "adore" or "love" him, this would be an offence against divine reality, and an attempt to "seduce" him into illusion [27, 4-11].

Climacus concludes therefore that Socrates' unity with the follower must have been free from pity and compassion for the individual as such. Socrates' love of another individual must have appeared as a "repulsion" [27, 1-15]. By pushing the follower away from his own person as a teacher, he showed the highest solidarity with him. In this way the individual decreased his value in proportion with the increase of knowledge (16).

Climacus has exposed his mystic Alternative View as identical with the mystic Socratic View with additional elements of most serious guilt and sin. He imposes "evil" into the mystic Socratic View by referring to Judaic-Christian dogmatics, existential experience of time, and Kantian epistemology. Since Climacus is a mystic in the neo-Platonic tradition, he must reconcile the Judaic-Christian dogmatics which enters his views with the mystic, neo-Platonic theory of eros. In Judaism God's possible love must be "inscrutable". In Climacus' Kantian epistemological views, it must belong to the "unknown" transcendent realm of God, and Climacus admits therefore that he is unable to grasp and express this reality by means of reason. However, he believes that it can be grasped subjectively in the mystic Moment in Time. He therefore attempts to indicate a possible communication of this experience by employing a poetical method, and so describe poetically the content of love considered from God's Kantian and mystic-transcendent point of view. But Climacus is also well aware that his

method in this respect is inadequate, only capable of rendering a projection of human experience of love. In an "objective", rational, Socratic-Platonic view, evil is ignorance. Apparently, a projection of this view into "true" mystic transcendence will therefore be unable adequately to render "true" transcendent suffering and evil. However, Climacus' intention is nevertheless to try to describe "true" transcendent "suffering love", and point towards a mystic solution, where God and man can unite in a perfect and blissful relationship of love. For Climacus also believes that God's transcendent suffering can be qualitatively changed into a "good" unity with man [30, 34-39 & 31, 1-3]. Apparently this is a dogmatic fact. But Climacus also believes that man mystically can experience this love of God. In the same way as God miraculously became man in Jesus Christ, God can also miraculously encounter man in his mundane existence. It is on this presupposition that Climacus constructs his poem. He starts out by stating the great difference between God and man: man has an evil corrupted will, and he is directed away from God towards perdition [30, 28]. Man is therefore unable to do anything towards his own salvation and his possible unity with God in love. For if he had been able to, God's "transcendence" would be illusory, and the possible unity in love would be a Socratic, illusory love of eros [27, 33-34]. The Christian dogmatics tells us that the initiative in love has to be taken by God himself. God must decide, contrary to all human reason, to seek contact with man. Thereby, man can receive a subjective-transcendent, mystic experience. He will then "understand" that, in spite of "objective", rational impossibility, it is possible to be in contact with God through love. This love, however, must necessarily be filled with suffering: "the unhappiness (of love) is the result, not of the lovers being unable to have each other, but of their being

unable to understand each other" [28, 22 & 30, 30]. Thus, Climacus underlines that his sceptical Kantian concept of reason never must be made relative. Since reason is opposed to the contact of the divine and man through love, there arises a possibility for man to become offended. God knows this when he approaches man to give him love, and thereby suffering in God's love is increased.

Climacus thinks hence, that God approaches man in suffering love. God enters the temporal world from his eternal heaven and makes a paradoxical contact with man through love in the Moment in Time. Man can subjectively experience this contact, an experience containing the contradiction that God and man are both like and different from each other at the same time. However, the great difference must never be weakened. If so, God's incomprehensible "transcendence" would also be weakened. Christianity would be subsumed under the objective, Socratic realm of reason, and man would ignorantly continue on his way towards perdition. However, God entirely "understands" the "transcendent" truth which man cannot understand through his rational faculties: namely that God loves man and wants to save him [30, 25-30]. Since God cannot communicate his infinite love for man without running the risk of repulsing him into eternal perdition, the suffering in God's love must be immensely increased.

In order to explain further "God's suffering love", Climacus tells a story about a king who loved a poor maiden. The king married her, and their love united them so that they reached "equality". But the king worried that the girl might ever recollect

the original inequality between them. If so, she might be so conscious of the difference that it might have been better for her to have remained in her earlier state of poverty. The king became more and more obsessed with this thought and was unable to get it out of his mind. Because he really loved the girl and wanted her to be equal with himself, his love for her became filled with sorrow and suffering. But the girl could never understand this sorrow. It only belonged to the king in his loneliness [29].

Apparently Climacus has intended this story as an illustration of God's love of man, as well as God's suffering, owing to his own superiority and man's inferiority in an imagined relationship of mystic love between the two. In spite of the great difference, God wants the unity to continue. For he truly loves man and wants to save him. Salvation has been manifested in the historical Incarnation, where God entered temporal reality to achieve unity with man. God's suffering increases, due to man's inability to understand that God really loves him, and that God has become a human being for this reason.

In order to clarify further the necessity of suffering in God's love, Climacus suggests two ways of establishing a relationship of love between God and man. The first is a variant of the Greek theory of eros, belonging to Climacus' mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View. The second is a variant of the Judaic-Christian theory of agape, belonging to Climacus' mystic, neo-Platonic, Alternative View.

The theory of eros implies unity in love by means of an ascent from man to God. Climacus describes two ways in which this ascent can occur. In the first way he thinks that God could divert man with happiness and tumultuous joy, so that he would forget his original, miserable state in the temporal world. Man would be overwhelmed by the joy of God's wish to unite with him [31, 1-17]. In the second way, Climacus thinks that God could reveal himself in all his glory and splendour, and thus create an adoring admiration in man. Man would entirely forget himself in his veneration and worship and hence become "nothing" in relation to God [31, 19-30].

These two ways of describing unity between God and man through eros reveal the already-mentioned two main categories in religious mysticism, namely theistic and pantheistic mysticism (17). In both cases, man is ultimately made to forget and abandon his human nature as temporal being. In the first case, Climacus appears to have described a predominantly theistic mysticism, where man somehow preserves his identity in the ultimate mystic experience. Man experiences himself to be like God in his being and love. But such a view is not acceptable in "true" Christianity, according to Climacus. For if man were so much like God, it would imply "love's death"; there would be no difference between man and God, and therefore, God could not love man but only himself [32, 4-7].

In the second case, Climacus propounds a predominantly pantheistic mysticism. In this view, God is all there is, and man's experience of unity with him is also an

experience of partaking in all that exists. Man disappears in the realm of "pure being" without having the transcendence necessary for subjective, individual existence.

However, according to Climacus, Christian dogmatics says that God genuinely loves man as an individual human being. Both the mystic theism and pantheism are therefore inadequate, only capable of bringing more suffering into God's love. Related to "true" Christianity, both theistic and pantheistic mysticisms are insufficient. They can only express God's love of himself, not of man. The traditional "mystic love" can thus only be self-love within man's own capacities, an obstacle to "true" Christian, transcendent love. Too much adherence to love of eros might make man offended, and repel him towards eternal perdition. Therefore, eros must lead to increased suffering in God's love. It cannot save man from his miserable state of being.

Besides this theory of eros, Climacus must therefore also describe an additional idea of love God uses to attain "true" mystic contact with man. This is the Judaic-Christian idea of agape, implying a descent of love from God to man. Agape takes its starting point in the "unknown", totally transcendent God and can therefore never be understood by human reason. In opposition to the "anthropocentric" love of eros, agape is "theocentric". It finds its full expression in Christian dogmatics, especially concerning the event of the Incarnation. For this event shows that the eternal God loves man so much, that he has become temporal man in Jesus Christ.

In this connection it is of vital importance for Climacus to exhibit Jesus as the "poorest" and most miserable of all human beings (18). For only within such categories can God reveal his unselfish love of, and solidarity with man. Socrates had also made himself like the poorest person in his divine task to lead people to the eternal, objective realm of knowledge. But his "servant-clothes" were illusive [33, 28-29]. His factual presence on the same level as a "servant", for instance together with a slave-boy, was ultimately illusory. It could only serve a relative function within his pedagogical intentions. There could never be a "true" unity between Socrates and his followers. For him true unity could only belong to the impersonal, objective eternal realm of pure thinking, being and ethics. Socrates' unity with poor people ultimately was an illusory garment he put on in order to "cheat" people out of their individual, subjective, "poor" situation in the temporal world. His ultimate intention was beyond subjectivity and individuality.

Climacus must protest against such an "objective" view. He wants to underline subjectivity, Kantian scepticism and possible evil as necessary components of his mystic Alternative View. Only then can the temporal world assume full value, as required by Christian dogmatics. Thus, Climacus must emphasize that the God who appeared as man in the historical Incarnation, really was man throughout. God was "equal of the lowliest of human beings, even forsaken in death" [34, 12-15]. It is also necessary that God, after having appeared as man, must leave the temporal world again. For he is also totally different from man, and must maintain this difference [35, 7-8]. His human suffering must not be relieved in any way. Any relief would imply a step towards "love

of eros", and the Socratic, Platonic realm of reason. It would make God more "acceptable", "understandable", and take away the possibility of "offence". However, if it really is true that God loves man, the possibility of offence must be maintained. The suffering in God's love must therefore be immensely increased. In Climacus' poem suffering appears as a maximum of passion, arising from the collision of reason and love, a collision which one never must attempt to bridge by love of eros alone!

However, Climacus claims that his exposition on love is only an imaginative poem, and the impossibility of attaining contact with God through love is only apparent. Reason can be "set aside" so that a true unity of love can be established. In this unity, mystic-transcendent suffering can also find its "correct place", and somehow be converted into something "good". Climacus can thus say that his poem is "wonderful" (Danish: vidunderlig), and that the unity in love between God and man is the "Wonder" (Danish: Vidunderet) [37, 11-20].

Climacus' concept of love might thus appear "contradictory". On the one hand he gives great emphasis to the necessity of evil and suffering in mystic transcendent love. But, on the other hand, he seems to think that a successful relationship of love between the "transcendent" God and "immanent" man can be established, whereby evil somehow is overcome [30, 37-39 & 31, 1-3]. His concept of love is therefore in principle similar to St. Augustine's "caritas". Like St. Augustine, Climacus basically stays within mystic, neo-Platonic presuppositions of eros, and superimposes agapic love upon eros as a "contradictory" and "alien" element. He connects most closely his mystic

theory of love to rational, speculative, Platonic-Hegelian thinking and, owing to his own Kantian polemical position, he is forced to connect love of agape to Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism". Thus, Climacus becomes involved in an insoluble problem of evil, which becomes manifested in "God's suffering love". In this way the Kantian scepticism in the shape of "anti-rationalism" is combined with a religious, mystic, neo-Platonic epistemological view, and Climacus gives this combination authoritative sanction by referring to Judaic-Christian dogmatics. Climacus' concept of love must therefore assume a trait of evil, implying ambiguities between good and evil in the essence of God.

Even though Climacus emphasizes that essential elements of Christianity are beyond human epistemological and ontological capacities, his view of Christianity, has much in common with Ludwig Feuerbach, who explicitly rejected all kinds of transcendence in Christian religion. His presupposition is that religion is a projection of man's own mind. Therefore, religion is always necessarily within the borders of man's capacities. It is a fact that man's life is filled with suffering. The most true religion must therefore contain suffering as a necessary element in the essence of God. Christianity is the most true and perfect religion, since it reveals a God who suffers (19).

Climacus reaches a similar conclusion by means of his "poetical method", implying projection of the human mind into "transcendence". For he claims that he has set himself in God's place and writes a poem about love as this must be considered

from God's point of view [37, 3-4]. But according to Climacus, his own poem is imperfect and insufficient. It cannot adequately express transcendent reality, and his "poetical adventure" can therefore not give an adequate and satisfactory expression of the subject matter he wants to communicate. Only subjectively can one experience "true" Christianity in the mystic Moment in Time, where "suffering love" will also find its "solution" [30, 37-39 & 31, 1-3].

In this way Climacus tries to go beyond Feuerbach's position by referring to subjectivity. But he is aware of the fact that as soon as he attempts to communicate his message, his view will appear identical with Feuerbach's. The only conspicuous difference seems to be the pathos with which Climacus emphasizes the necessity of evil. Whereas Feuerbach expounds his view in a clear and rational exposition, Climacus' exposition appears to be more emotional. Paradoxically enough, strong emotions are, according to Climacus, the only way to distinguish between an offended and a non-offended consciousness (20). Climacus himself might thus possibly represent an "unhappy" and offended consciousness, which he undergirds with the Kantian, sceptical epistemological views he needs in his polemical situation. As a consequence he seems to ignore all other alternative theories of love in the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition.

How Climacus fails to consider other theories of love is well illustrated in his own exposition of the theistic and pantheistic "mysticisms of eros". Theistic mysticism presupposes some kind of transcendence to account for subjectivity and individuality.

But Climacus ignores this fact, or thinks that this "transcendence" is too weak. He subsumes theism together with pantheism to an objective logical, Platonic, rational point of view. He apparently connects all kinds of mystic love with Hegel, and rejects them altogether as obstacles to "true" agape. Taking Climacus' "exaggeration" concerning theism into consideration, one understands how he excludes himself from trying to establish a more balanced view between pantheism and theism. Thereby Climacus also excludes himself from Eckhart's mystic view of Christianity. Eckhart undergirds the validity of theism with his own transcendent, neo-Platonic, practical mysticism. This implies that a purified passion of eros leads up to "mystic nothingness". When a mystic reaches this stage, he has made possible a mystic transcendence which takes its starting point in God's world. This transcendence can establish a sufficiently decisive difference between God's and man's world, and give full validity to theistic mysticism. Thus, the love of agape can be encountered as an experienced, mystic-transcendent fact in the religious process of purification. Agape is not a sceptical, "anti-rational" love, as it is in Climacus' Kantian-influenced mysticism. For Eckhart, agape is always kept within mystic-rational presuppositions. God's love is not an "evil" suffering love, reflecting ambiguities between good and evil, but reflects rather infinite transcendence into degrees of goodness. Suffering is Eckhart's means to purify eros, so that God's goodness can reveal itself in the mystic Moment in Time.

Thus, Eckhart has apparently reconciled the loves of eros and agape without ending up with Climacus' insoluble problem of evil. And Eckhart seems also to have accounted for the transcendence required by Christian dogmatics. But it must be

admitted that Eckhart could be criticized for giving more emphasis to neo-Platonic, mystic, "atheism" than to Christian theism. Christian dogmatics could thus appear as an inferior element in Eckhart's religious view. Ultimately he could be understood to defend an impersonal, intellectual-monistic mysticism like Plotinus, and hardly compatible with the Christian image of a personal God. Thus, Eckhart's mystic practice is possibly not primarily directed towards fulfilment of Christianity in this world, but towards pure, monistic, intellectual nothingness. In this perspective Eckhart's mystic religion could be criticized as being "quietistic" and out of touch with the everyday world. This could be the reason why Eckhart frequently seems to feel the need clearly to underline that his views really are in full accordance with the official views of the church (21).

Climacus has apparently succeeded in avoiding Eckhart's "mystic atheism", but in his polemics against Hegelians he is driven into an exaggerated subjectivism, together with Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism". Apparently his religious views are so strongly rooted in the temporal world, designed by Kant's purely rational insights which exclude the existence of God, that the "other world" becomes fictitious. Climacus' emphasis on mundane existence is certainly in accordance with Christian doctrines concerning the value and importance of activity in this world. But his emphasis on the incomprehensibility of mystic transcendence and the seriousness of evil, forces him also to subscribe to ontological dualism, hardly reconcilable with Judaic-Christian ideas of the mundane world as the good God's good creation. Climacus' unbalanced mystic views seem to prevent him from striving towards the

deeper religious, mystic experience of self-transcending unity, peace and tranquillity, for which Eckhart is a spokesman. Eckhart's mystic Christianity may thus possibly be said to be a better starting point for constructive, Christian involvement in society, than Climacus' experience of, and emphasis on "incomprehensible evil".

C) Johannes Climacus' Concept of Faith

In Chapter 4 of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus continues his "poetical adventure" from Chapter 2. Consequently he still claims to be dealing with a transcendent subject matter, which cannot directly be communicated within the objective realm of reason and conceptual thinking. The concept he now attempts to clarify is the Christian concept of faith which, in addition to the concept of love from the Alternative View, is dogmatically connected to the historical event of the Incarnation. The "true" Christian believes that God really became man in the historical person of Jesus Christ, and he applies this belief further to the passion of love in the Alternative View, so that a "happy understanding" can occur between God and man. The expansion from love to faith seems thus to imply a decisive incorporation of Christian dogmatics into the mystic, experienced concept of love. The relevance of this expansion can only be subjectively "understood" in the mystic Moment in Time, when God gives the condition for understanding it. In the Moment in Time it becomes clear that man is separated from God as a result of his sin, but also that a unity between

man and God can be established if reason is set aside. This unity is identical with the Absolute Paradox of the Incarnation, and Climacus states therefore that faith is the Absolute Paradox [61, 29-33].

It thus becomes clear that the concept of faith covers the same content as Climacus' contradictory concept of love, composed by elements of eros and agape. In faith, however, the emotional tension within this concept of love, if possible, is increased, owing to introduction of additional, incomprehensible, dogmatic elements. These necessarily increase the paradoxical passions, which in turn can cause strengthening of the mystic, unifying ties between man and God. When Climacus attempts to clarify his concept of faith, it must therefore be a priority for him to emphasize that reason is unable to grasp what he wants to communicate. It is most important that Christianity be exposed as clearly as possible as the Absolute Paradox. The Jesus who appeared in history was entirely God and entirely man at the same time. One must not weaken this paradox by saying that God's appearance as human being was only illusory, for if so, God's transcendent incomprehensible elements would be subsumed under human capacities. In that case the Alternative View would be made identical with the Socratic View, and for Socrates sin is ignorance, fading away with the increase of knowledge. In "true" Christianity it is of crucial importance that the seriousness of sin be maintained. Only under such circumstances can God give man his salvation through faith. God must therefore reveal himself in the miserable shape of a servant, the poorest of human beings. There must be no possibility of "understanding" his way of acting [53, 5-25] (22).

But besides this trait of agape in Climacus' concept of faith, emphasized through Kantian sceptical, epistemological views, there also runs the "opposite", apparently quite as important, common mystic trait of eros. After having said that the God of the Incarnation must necessarily be man throughout, Climacus continues to argue that the God-man still could not be quite like other human beings. For if God was man and nothing more, no difference between him and other men could be discerned. His presence in the world would have remained totally unknown, and his salvation would have been a "mockery with man" [53, 29-31]. Jesus must therefore be different from other men in some respects. His special divine task in the world would necessarily have to make all his concerns different from those of other human beings. He did not concern himself with food, house, family life, or death, but only with the love of his follower [54, 15-24].

Climacus tries first to reconcile these contradictory elements of eros and agape by taking his starting point in man, arguing that man could be like God. Climacus refers in this connection to the human will. Like the pietist Kant, Climacus argues that if man really wanted to, then he could reach the perfection of the God-man. And like St. Augustine, Climacus states further that human corruption does not originate in man's nature as such, but comes from his subjective, free will. Man's ontological nature is originally good. After this argument, Climacus continues with an attempt to reconcile the contradictory elements of eros and agape in his mystic consciousness. He now takes his starting point in God, arguing that the God-man's nature could be thought to be identical with human nature. For the difference one might have

discerned between Jesus and other human beings could very well be only in the outer appearance. The God-man might be thought to have preserved his divine nature hidden for other human beings [54, 32-39].

Climacus has therefore argued that man could be like God and thereby like the God-man, and that God could be like man and thereby like the God-man. He apparently plays on the ambiguity of the God-man, and can justify his contradictory statements by referring to subjectivity in the mystic Moment in Time. By such means, his views could not easily be refuted by Danish Hegelian theologians who, in Climacus' opinion subsumed faith under reason.

To continue his attacks on Hegelian theologians, Climacus states that one cannot expect to find a genuine follower of Christ in the well-established church community, ruled by Hegelian theologians. One should rather seek for a "true" Christian among "poor" and despised people. For pure reason is always an obstacle to faith and must be set aside before the subjective relation between man and God in mystic faith, can be established. All knowledge and wisdom one might learn from the God-man's teaching, will have to be referred to Hegelian rationalism. The theological discussions among the "wise and learned" Hegelians are all useless, whether they appear to be "nonsensical" or "serious". They can only illustrate the phenomenon of offence. Their "objectivity" in matters of faith can always be led back to the Hegelian presupposition that faith is subsumed under reason. "True" Christian "sin-

consciousness" becomes then an illusion, and the "happy life" of the Danish church community, the most obvious manifestation of a speculative, Platonic-Hegelian view.

However, in the "true" Christian, Alternative View, "true " faith is always entirely a free gift of grace, given by God to the "single individual". For it is only for the "single individual" that the God-man can appear as the truth, and the Moment in Time as "truly" decisive [55, 1-30].

It is always a primary concern for Climacus to state that faith cannot be "understood" by pure reason. In order to underline this fact again, he emphasizes that the historical Incarnation is an absolutely necessary element of faith. He wants to maintain with dogmatic authority, that the God-man has existed in history, since this fact prevents the God-man from becoming "rationalized" and "understandable". In this connection Climacus praises Lessing, who had described the gap between rational and historical truths as "the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across" (23). And on this basis he goes on to blame Hegel for having committed a cardinal sin when he claimed to have understood world history as a "necessary, rational development". The Hegelian view of the Danish theologians implies, according to Climacus, that the event of the Incarnation can be understood, and that Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" has been crossed. As a result, the "Christianity" of the Danish church has lost "true" transcendence, and thereby also the seriousness of sin, which constitutes the crucial difference between the mystic Socratic and the mystic Alternative View.

In Climacus' time in Denmark the results of modern historical criticism of the Bible started to become increasingly influential. This criticism originated in Germany. It was first directed towards the Old Testament, where a number of contradictions and inconsistencies were found. It appeared that many of the Old Testament accounts were not historical facts but stories and myths (24).

The critical method was soon also applied to the New Testament. The most known and influential work in this respect was David Strauss' Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus). In this work, Strauss attempted to show that the New Testament accounts about Jesus contained contradictions and inconsistencies, and could not be believed as reliable historical sources of the life of Jesus. Rather, they were stories or "myths", created by early Christian congregations. On this basis, Strauss rejected the historicity of the supernatural accounts in the New Testament, which often were the ground of Christian dogmatics. For instance, he rejected the historicity of Christ's resurrection and ascent to heaven (25).

Strauss' ideas were advanced in Denmark mainly by two radical, Hegelian theologians, Andreas Frederik Beck and Hans Brøchner. They considered Strauss' dissolution of the traditional Christian dogmatics as a necessary consequence of scientific honesty. They wanted to carry the arguments of historical criticism of the Bible to their uttermost, logical conclusions. By so doing, both Beck and Brøchner were strongly condemned by other theologians of the University of Copenhagen, as well as by all theological factions of the contemporary Danish state church. Beck was

even refused permission to finish his Theological Examinations at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Copenhagen (26).

Also Climacus protests against the application of a critical, historical method to the Bible. In his opinion, such criticisms can never be relevant for Christian faith. For faith must always be a gift from God and incomprehensible. Historical criticisms of the Bible can, at most, hope to advance an increasing approximation to a perfect description of the life of Jesus [50, 30-39 & 59, 1-20]. However true and detailed this description might be, it will always belong to a different sphere than faith. Criticisms of the Bible can therefore never become a threat to Christianity. The critical results belong to an area which man can understand, and these results are excluded from the subjective faith in the mystic Moment in Time (27). Faith necessarily is part of God's inscrutable and incomprehensible world. An individual human being can therefore never, by himself, choose to will belief in the event of the Incarnation and thereby reach faith. Like Kant, Climacus can state that "will" is within man's natural capacities. But Climacus abandons these Kantian views of the Second Critique, when he claims that there are divine demands that one cannot will. One cannot "will" what is impossible to will. And this is exactly what "true" Christian transcendence implies! In this way Climacus gives Kantian sceptical epistemological views validity in relation to ethics and the will. On the basis of this scepticism, as well as mystic, Hegelian-related epistemological views, Climacus apparently gives ethics and man's will a crucial limitation caused by Kantian antinomies, a limitation which is alien from Kant's moral

views. Thus, Climacus' ethical views in the mystic perspective must assume an aspect of "irrationalism", connected to evil and unpredictability.

In faith, Climacus believes, man encounters the transcendent, historical and absolutely paradoxical God. Man becomes united with him through love in the mystic Moment in Time. In faith, man must passionately cling to the Christian, paradoxical truth, as it moves forwards in time towards the unknown future. One must therefore repeat faith in every new moment in time. In this way, the eternal truths of Christianity are "rolled up forwards" in repetition, in opposition to the Socratic eternal truths, which were "rolled up backwards" in recollection (28). Human understanding is unable to comprehend the temporal process of movement. It will encounter Zeno's paradoxes (29). As a result, there is created a paradoxical passion in the Moment in Time. Likewise, reason is unable to grasp the content of the Absolute Paradox, being revealed in this process. Thereby another paradoxical passion arises. Together these two passions strengthen the passion of faith, the unifying mystic tie between man and God.

Since Climacus so strongly has emphasized that it is entirely impossible to understand the historical fact of the Incarnation, it follows that everything of value concerning the Incarnation belongs to an existing mystic consciousness. Within the latter, God gives man a "solution" to the insoluble problem of reconciling reason and historical facts. This problem, however, increases the paradoxical passions, which in turn strengthen the mystic ties between man and God. Paradoxically Climacus has thus

apparently ended up in a mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic position where the historical Incarnation is superfluous. The only difference between Climacus' view and classic neo-Platonic mysticism seems to lie in Climacus' suffering claim, that the historical Incarnation nevertheless is relevant, contrary to all reason! And he strengthens his "irrational" claim by resorting to dogmatic authority.

Climacus' concept of faith has thus appeared to be identical with his concept of love. He most passionately emphasizes the agapic elements in both concepts, and it remains merely a dogmatic claim and an apparently groundless statement, that the historical Incarnation is indispensable in "true" Christianity (30).

Since Climacus is a mystic in the neo-Platonic tradition, it is natural that his concept of faith is, in many ways, closely related to Eckhart's. Eckhart also maintains the historical Incarnation with certainty, together with attributing decisive importance exclusively to the existential, mystic experience of love in the present now. But he does not primarily consider the historical Incarnation as totally beyond human reason and capacities. Eckhart belonged to a time when the otherworldly, eternal realm was given priority over the temporal world, and the different accounts in the Bible were taken to be simple truth. The Incarnation was therefore considered as a fact beyond rational doubt, excluded from creating fear and anxiety. It belonged to God's self-revealing, mystic-transcendent essence, implying exclusion of evil and infinite expansion in goodness. Eckhart's view could thus be in full accordance with the "perennial philosophy" of mysticism. In opposition to Climacus, he could consider evil relative,

and use suffering constructively in mystic purification of passions. This purification led towards mystic transcendence, where God revealed his agapic love in terms of absolute and complete goodness. Climacus' concept of mystic faith, containing Kantian scepticism as well as common mystic epistemological views, implying ontological as well as ethical evil in ultimate religious reality, is therefore not the only concept of faith within the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. Climacus' "faith" can possibly rather be seen as a creation of historical circumstances, from which he apparently never wanted or managed to disentangle himself.

Owing to the same historical circumstances, Climacus wants to maintain the sharp difference between faith and reason. He therefore attempts to strengthen his view of reason's inability to understand the Incarnation by arguing that a historical contemporary of Jesus could have no advantage over a later follower, as far as the "understanding" of the Absolute Paradox is concerned. Even a contemporary, whom one might imagine knew Jesus' life into the most minute details, would be quite as far away from faith as any human being born later [56f. & 59f.]. In fact, contemporaneity might rather count as a disadvantage. For to experience through the senses a person born in an inn, laid in a manger, and executed as a criminal, might more easily lead to offence than a later account of these facts.

However, Climacus does not mean that a person born long after Christ is in a more favourable position concerning faith, than a contemporary. In clear polemics against the Danish Hegelians, perhaps especially H.L. Martensen, Climacus claims that

it might have been easier for a contemporary with Christ to assume faith, than for a person born later (31). For at Jesus' time faith was not yet mixed with reason, but appeared in its original purity. The Danish Hegelians had made faith more "acceptable", by making it "understandable". However, this was an "untrue and confused faith-rumour", an obstacle to genuine faith. It might therefore be more difficult to reach faith in his own time than in Jesus' time. For in Climacus' present there was a misleading and convenient "faith alternative" in the church, believing itself to be "Christian" and presenting itself as "Christianity" [66].

Climacus must protest against such heresies (32). "True" faith can never be easy to attain for any person, whenever he happens to live in history. Faith requires a most serious suffering which, together with paradoxical passions can be changed into "sin-consciousness". Only in such a "suffering love" can man find "true" salvation.

D) Concluding Summarizing Remarks

In Plotinus' mystic, metaphysical system, eros transcends reason (nous) into the One (to hen). The One is a monistic, impersonal principle beyond diversity, which man can approach and encounter in ultimate, mystic, religious experience. The concept of the One seems to be very remote from the Judaic-Christian image of a personal God, who takes a special interest in man. Plotinus' mystic religion had

therefore to be radically changed when it accommodated to Christianity. The One was substituted for the Christian God and identified with the Creator of Being. The Judaic-Christian account of creation was identified with the neo-Platonic theory of emanation, and the neo-Platonic, Christian, mystic experience of ultimate reality therefore became an experience of man's being as derived from God's. Such a view could easily lead to pantheism, and neo-Platonic, Christian mystics, like Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena, had somehow to find a way to secure the key difference between God's and man's being. In this respect they tended to approach Plotinus' theory of transcendence into the One. They moved consequently God's essence beyond Being into a "Supra-Being". The latter was a state beyond adequate description. By removing God from the "known" reality, they could better account for a predominantly theistic, mystic religion, in accordance with Christian dogmatics (33). The need for "transcendence" of rational categories also actualized the problem of evil. Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena solved this problem like Plotinus. Meister Eckhart followed their view concerning evil, but tended to approach a still more classic Plotinian view of transcendence into the One. In this way Eckhart managed to remove himself more clearly from the pantheism to which his two predecessors, among them especially John Scotus Eriugena, came close.

There is a more radical, theistic interpretation of neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism in St. Augustine's writings, especially in his earlier ones. His emphasis on the great difference in ethical perfection between man and God tended sometimes to

become combined with Manichaeian Gnosticism, in which good and evil were principles with almost equal, ontological status.

Climacus belongs to the Augustinian mystic tradition. However, he seems to represent a theistic, neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism which is still more radical with respect to "transcendence", than St. Augustine's. One can see this, for instance, from the way Climacus deals with pantheistic and theistic mysticisms. He apparently neglects to notice that theism necessarily implies "transcendence". Instead he refers it together with pantheism, to the realm of "objectivity" and pure thinking. Thus Climacus seems to think that "true" Christian transcendence is still more radical than theistic, mystic transcendence, and he explains this position within Kantian sceptical epistemology. Thus he underlines the element of incomprehensibility in "transcendence" by distinguishing radically between Christian agapic and mystic erotic love.

The tensions in Climacus' concept of faith-love thus seem to be stronger than in any of his mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian predecessors' concepts of faith-love. Climacus apparently gives evil a most decisive and inscrutable status. He incorporates "evil" into his theistic, neo-Platonic, Christian mysticism, so that even the ultimate Christian, religious experience possibly contains an element of sin, guilt, and suffering.

Therefore, Climacus' exposition of theistic mysticism seems contradictory. He states apparently his view both as mystic, epistemologically transcendent (i.e. as

sceptical Kantian "anti-rationalism") and as pure Kantian scepticism. His theistic mysticism must thus imply epistemological "irrationalism". This contradictory ambiguity should not be referred to the Socratic, mystic vacillation between subjectivity and objectivity, but must be understood as a vacillation between subjectivity and objectivity within the subjectivity of Socrates! This means that the mystic Socratic View lacks an essential subjective-objective element. We already know that this is "evil". Thus, it seems clear that this evil follows from Climacus' categorical distinction between faith and reason (34). Faith is so utterly transcendent that the "transcendent", neo-Platonic, mystic, Socratic View appears as totally within human capacities in relation to the "true" Christian, Alternative View!

Climacus seems thus to give Kantian, sceptical epistemological views highest authority. Since faith is so highly transcendent that it is entirely out of touch with man, "irrational" ambiguities between good and evil enter his mystic Alternative View. Evil cannot be made relative and excluded, as it could for Eckhart. For Climacus has referred evil to an ambiguous theistic mysticism which by "exaggeration" first was referred to "objectivity", and thereupon given mystic-transcendent "true" validity through the dogmatic authority of an inscrutable, Kantian sceptical and "anti-rational" God.

Thus, Climacus' concept of faith-love ultimately becomes an "unhappy" love of eros, containing more contradictory tensions than St. Augustine's concept of caritas. Nevertheless, Climacus apparently agrees with St. Augustine and the mystic, neo-

Platonic, Christian tradition, that contact with God through love is possible. In Climacus' opinion, this can occur in the coincidence of God's suffering love and man's paradoxical passion of love-faith, implying "sin-consciousness", in the mystic Moment in Time.

The interpretation of Chapters 2 & 4 of Philosophiske Smuler has thus shown that Climacus underlines evil as a necessary part of ultimate, religious reality. He employs Kantian sceptical "anti-rationalism" in order to "explain" transcendent evil. Kantian scepticism is therefore a necessary element of Climacus' "right", Christian mystic view, and it cannot be made relative by referring it to "indirect communication". In this perspective Climacus must appear as an "irrationalist" - both ontological and epistemological. Ultimately, in the mystic perspective, the thesis therefore brings elements, which are rejected by McKinnon, into Climacus' concept of reason. Given the mystic-Kantian interpretation, Climacus must appear as an "irrationalist" in McKinnon's definition. However, the thesis does not disagree with McKinnon when he appears to say that Kierkegaard/Climacus absolutely adheres to logical principles of reason. In fact, the thesis argues that adherence to logical principles is a necessary condition of Climacus' mysticism. And it is only within this latter perspective that the thesis terms Climacus an "irrationalist".

E) Short Summary of Chapter III

This chapter is an interpretative and critical reading of Chapters 2 & 4 in Philosophiske Smuler, clarifying Climacus' concepts of love and faith. The exposition is centred around the Greek concept of eros and the Judaic-Christian concept of agape. The conclusion is that Climacus' concepts of love and faith ultimately are identical, derived from the neo-Platonic concept of eros. However, Climacus' love of eros differs from the corresponding neo-Platonic concept on two important issues. First: Climacus places greater emphasis on subjective, individualistic aspects of eros. Secondly: Climacus emphasizes evil more strongly. Ultimately Climacus therefore presents a "suffering love" of eros, and he gives his view authoritative sanction by referring to Judaic-Christian dogmatics concerning guilt, sin, and salvation. Thus, Climacus' concept of faith-love becomes similar to St. Augustine's concept of mystic love, "caritas". In caritas there are also strong tensions, owing to man's ethical imperfection in relation to the perfect God.

Climacus connects his views on love and faith with sceptical, Kantian, epistemological views, in his polemics against Hegelians. He emphasizes pure reason so much in his exposition of mystic love, that it becomes impossible to exclude epistemological irrationalism and ontological evil in mystic-transcendent love. Thus he misses Eckhart's mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian alternative view. Eckhart accommodates agape to eros within God's self-transcendence, excluding evil

altogether. Eckhart's mystic transcendence does thus not imply ambiguities between good and evil, but only ambiguities between degrees of goodness. "Evil" is relative and a means to purify passions, leading into God's mystic-transcendent realm, and possibly further into mystic "nothingness".

Chapter III of the thesis thus shows that Climacus hardly can avoid the label of being an "irrationalist". His strong emphasis on agape is a manifestation of his adherence to Kantian, epistemological scepticism and "anti-rationalism", besides his mystic Hegelian-related epistemological views. He shows thereby that he adheres to epistemological "irrationalism", and the corresponding mystic, ontological realm must contain ontological "irrationalism" as well.

F) Notes to Chapter III

1. Anders Nygren, Agape & Eros, translated by Philip S. Watson, S.P.C.K., London, 1982. In this work, Anders Nygren attempts to expose the history of Christianity as a struggle between the concept of agape in N.T., and the Platonic concept of eros. After Nygren published his work, his main distinction between agape and eros has become classic in treatises on Christian love. By pointing out that Climacus (Kierkegaard) strongly adheres to the concept of agape in favour of the traditional Greek concept of love, eros, the thesis argues for the view that he is an "irrationalist".
2. Apparently there has been a collection of myths ascribed to Orpheus, called the Rhapsodic Theogony. This work is only known through fragments quoted by later Greek and neo-Platonic writers. The Orphic myth of creation has been construed on the basis of these quotes. An English translation of Orphic fragments, together with source references, can be found in W.K.C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1952. See op. cit., pp. 137-142. Concerning the "Orphic egg", see also pp. 92-96.
3. Hesiod, The Poems of Hesiod (Theogony & Works and Days), translated with Introduction and Comments by R.M. Frazer, University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1983. See also Theogony, 120f.
4. John Mansley Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1968. This work contains translations from Empedocles' fragments. See fragm. 8, 32-37, pp. 158-60.
5. Plato, Phaedo, translated by Hugh Tredennich, 1978, Sections 66-81, 1977. Plato, Meno, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, 1977, Section 81. Plato, Phaedrus, translated by Walter Hamilton, 1977, Sections 253-57. Plato, Symposium, translated by Walter Hamilton, 1965, Sections 201-12.

(All these books are published by Penguin Classics, Middlesex, England.)
6. ibid., esp. Phaedrus, 246-57, and Symposium, 210-12.
7. ibid.
8. Anders Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp. 449-63. Augustine of Hippo, Selected Writings, translated by Mary T. Clark, Paulist Press, New York/Ramsey/Toronto, 1984. See also the Homilies of Psalms, esp. psalm 121,

"the Ecstasy of Love". See also St. Augustine, The City of God, translated by Demetrius B. Zema, Ronald G. Walsh, S.J., and Fathers of the Church, S.J. - New York, 1950, Book 11.

9. Dante, The Divine Comedy, translated by C.H. Sisson, Regnery Gateway, Chicago, 1981. "Paradiso", XXXII, pp. 127-45. Andres Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp. 613-21 & 626-33.
10. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart:
 "Disinterest brings God to me and I can demonstrate it in this way, Everything likes its own habitat best; God's habitat is purity and unity, which are due to disinterest. Therefore God necessarily gives himself to the disinterested heart." Quoted from "About Disinterest", p. 82. See also Chapter IV, Notes 19-25, the thesis, below.
11. "I put disinterest higher than love", op. cit., p. 82. See also Eckhart's sermon: "Beati Pauperes" (Blessed are the Poor):

"Thus we say that a man should be so poor that he is not and has not a place for God to get in. To reserve a place would be to maintain distinctions. Therefore I pray God that he may quit me of God, for (his) unconditioned being is above God and all distinctions". R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, p. 231.
12. T.G. Tappert, ed., Selected Writings by Martin Luther, Vols: 4, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1957. See Vol. 1, Martin Luther, "Ninety-five theses, or Disputation on the Power and Efficiency of Indulgences".
13. A number of references to Martin Luther's lectures on the Epistle to the Romans and the Epistle to the Galatians are given in P. Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, translated by R.C. Schultz, Fortune Press, Philadelphia, 1966. "Simul justus et peccator" (at one and the same time righteous and a sinner) is a main concept in the Lutheran lectures referred to above. See op. cit., pp. 242-45.
14. Andes Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp. 681-91.
15. Climacus' "exaggerated" analytic, sceptical thinking explains why he misses the social aspect in Hegel's philosophy. See Chapter II, Note 56, the thesis, above.
16. Plato, Symposium:

"And thus, by scanning beauty's wide horizon, he will be saved from a slavish and illiberal devotion to the individual loveliness of a single boy, a single man,

or a single institution. And turning his eyes toward the open sea of beauty, he will find in such contemplation the seed of the most fruitful discourse and the loftiest thought and reap the golden harvest of philosophy, until, confirmed and strengthened, he will come upon one single form of knowledge, the knowledge of the beauty I am about to speak of."

Plato, Symposium, 210C-D, translated by Walter Hamilton, Penguin Classics, Middlesex, 1965.

See also Symposium 210A-212B.

In his doctoral dissertation, Om Begrebet Ironi (On the Concept of Irony), Kierkegaard defined Socrates' ironical attitude as an "absolute, infinite negativity". When he wrote Philosophiske Smuler, his image of Socrates seems possibly to have changed. Now, i.e. in 1844, he writes in his Journals: "Maybe Socrates was not so cold. Maybe it hurt him that Alcibiades was unable to understand him." Papirer V, B4, 3.

Ambiguity between personal and impersonal aspects are reflected in the Socrates figure throughout Philosophiske Smuler.

17. See Chapter 1, Section D of the thesis, above.
18. Climacus shows here his aversion against "Docetism", the view that Jesus' body was not human throughout. Historically, the roots of this view lead to the very origins of Christianity, reflecting the attempts of gnostic and mystic religious factions to incorporate Christianity into their speculative, and often predominantly dualistic, systems.

Bishop Irenaeus (130-202 A.D.) was very active in the early church's struggle against Gnosticism in general, and Docetism in particular. He defended an anti-intellectual view in religious matters, and held that the true way to God was "love".

Irenaeus published a comprehensive work in five volumes, called Against Heresies, where he attacked the gnostic teachings of Marcosians, Ebionites, Nicolaitans, Marcionites, Encratites, Cainites, and of Valentius. A main point for him was to state that the Incarnation was not "docetic". Christ was fully and truly human being, representing human life in all possible aspects. See Clyde L. Manschreck, A History of Christianity in the World, 2nd. edition, Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1985, pp. 42-44.

Climacus apparently thinks that the Hegelian-Platonic position implies Docetism. It is therefore of great importance for him to make it perfectly clear, that Jesus was man throughout, also like the poorest and most miserable of all human beings.

19. Ludwig Feuerbach agrees with Kierkegaard's view, that there must be "suffering" in a fully developed consciousness. Since God is a projection of man's consciousness, Feuerbach concludes like Climacus, that there must be "evil" in God.

See Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Vol. 5 of Gesammelte Werke, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1973. See esp. the section "Das Geheimnis des leidenden Gottes" (The Mystery of the suffering God), pp. 117-30.

Feuerbach's exposition in the section referred to above seems to account for everything in Climacus' "poem" about the "suffering God". But Climacus claims that his poem is inadequate and unable to render a "true" image of the "true" transcendent God. Climacus must therefore ultimately reject both his own and Feuerbach's positions!

20. See Chapter II, Section G of the thesis, above.
21. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, "The Defense" (Rechtfertigungsschrift-Vindication Document), p. 258.
22. The "irrationalist" position comes recurrently forth in Climacus' (Kierkegaard's) need to underline Christ's miseries. See Note 18, this chapter, above.
23. Henry Chadwick, Lessing's Theological Writings, A. & C. Black, London, 1956, pp. 51-56.
24. William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, pp. 100 & 105, and Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated by W. Montgomery, SCM Press, Ltd., G.B., 1954, Chapter 3, p. 78. For a more thorough exposition of critical exegesis of the Old Testament, see Hans Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments, Neukirchener Verlag, Neukirchen, 1982, esp. pp. 166-208.
25. David Friedrich Strauss, The Life of Jesus critically examined, translated by Marion Evans, 1860, Vols: 2, republished by Scholarly Press, Michigan, 1970. See Vol. 2, §§ 137-143.
26. Hans Brøchner, Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard, Gyldendal, København, 1953, Sections 40 & 41.
27. Hans Brøchner mentions Kierkegaard's aversion to Bible criticism. Op. cit., Section 40.
28. Chapter II, Note 20, the thesis, above.

29. See Chapter V, Notes 24 & 25, the thesis, below.
30. Chapter V, Section E, and Chapter V, Note 34, the thesis, below.
31. In his biographical work, Af mit Levnet (About my Life), Martensen writes about his dependence on Meister Eckhart's mystic religious views. In the mystic perspective there can be no difference between early and later generations of Christians, as far as attaining faith is concerned.

"Hos Eckhart fandt jeg i Forening med det Oppbyggelige de dybeste speculative Blik, Religion og Speculation som Forbundne"(Page 127).

Translation:

"In Eckhart I found the most profound, speculative View reconciled with religious Edification, Religion and Speculation united" (Page 127) (Transl. by the author of the thesis.)

However, Martensen thinks that as time went on, the church became settled and natural in peoples' life. Thus, it could be said that some of the insecurity pertaining to faith in the first generation of Christians had become removed. In Den christelige Daab (The Christian Baptism) Martensen writes:

"Thi det er i og for sig klart, at i det Tidsrum, da det væsentligt var Opgave at indplante Kirken i Verden, Meget maa gestalte sig anderledes, end i de efterfølgende Tider, hvor Kirken har slaaet faste Rødder i Verden, hvor Gud's Rige ligesom er blevet Natur".

(Den christelige Daab, Barnedaaben, Section II, page 23.)

Translation:

"It is clear in and for itself, that in the period when the essential task was to establish the church in the world, much had to take forms different from those in later times, when the church had put out its firm roots in the world, where God's Kingdom had become just like nature --, where it had become an indwelling in the folkspirits." (Transl. by N.Thulstrup.)

32. Climacus' use of the term "false rumours" reveals his polemical attitude against the Danish Hegelian theologians as well as against the official Danish church. The expression that "faith has been transformed into gossip" (Danish: "sladder") and similar utterances are often used in Kierkegaard's Øieblikket (The Instant/Moment). Quotes from Ø., S.V., Vol. 19: "-that all of the public religion is to make fun of God, is blasphemy". --- "-the priest gossip (prestesladdereren), Ø., p. 206, --- "- to worship God by making fun of him", Ø., p. 96, etc.

33. In the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius emphasizes the "transcendent" aspects of the Christian God. In the Divine Names, he primarily does so by attributing to God all human, positive traits, to an extraordinarily high degree. God is thus above man, a "super-God" (via affirmativa). In the Mystical Theology, Dionysius removes God from everything known, by stating that all descriptions of him are inadequate (via negativa).

John Scotus Eriugena took over Pseudo-Dionysius' methods of "via affirmativa" and "via negativa". In his main work, De Divisione Naturae (On the division of Nature), John Scotus Eriugena explains that God is both "the nature that creates and is not created", and "the nature that does not create, and is not created". See also F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Medieval Philosophy, The Newland Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1950, chapters IX & XII.

34. Climacus' "exaggeration" is also exemplified in his attacks on Grundtvig's views of transcendence. See Chapter VI, Section C of the thesis, below.

CHAPTER IV

Meister Eckhart

Central Mystic Ideas

A) Introduction

The author of Philosophiske Smuler, Johannes Climacus, is a fictitious character created by Kierkegaard of the 19th century Denmark. Meister Eckhart is a historical human being, a practising mystic who lived in Lower Germany in the first part of the 14th century. The possible actualization of Climacus' views, however, must belong to Kierkegaard himself, who has said that both he and Climacus know what Christianity is (1). Thus, one faces serious methodological problems when one attempts to compare Climacus and Eckhart. The thesis attempts to respect these problems through giving comparative aspects a clearly defined, limited scope. It presents primarily an interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler on the basis of mystic phenomenology. In this interpretation, the thesis avails itself of elements from Eckhart's mystic philosophy as a "correcting" comparative and contrasting model. It thus appears that Climacus' mystic views are peculiar in one respect. For Climacus seems reluctant to state without reservation that God is pure goodness. Such a statement could possibly weaken the seriousness of sin and evil, elements that are indispensable in "true" Christianity. Climacus strengthens his emphasis on "evil" when he subscribes to sceptical Kantian epistemological views in his polemics against Hegelians. Eckhart's views can therefore appear in clear contrast to Climacus' with respect to evil, and peculiarities in Climacus' views can be more clearly revealed. By

such an exposition, the thesis gives an argument for the Kierkegaardian Climacus' possible "irrationalism", intending to contribute to the current debate about the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism".

In the following section, the thesis presents a sketch of basic structures in Eckhart's mystic philosophy, together with a presentation of ideological lines of connection between Eckhart's views and classic neo-Platonic mysticism as well as Thomistic philosophy. It becomes clear, that Eckhart's epistemological views do not conflict with the phenomenology of classic mysticism, as Climacus' Kantian epistemological views seem to do. Eckhart appears as a representative of classic mysticism, representing a timeless, "perennial philosophy", who solves the problem of evil in accord with Plato and Plotinus.

Climacus does not seem to be independent of the historical epoch in which he lives to the same extent as Eckhart. Belonging to a post-Kantian and post-Hegelian, secularized age, he strongly adheres to Kantian scepticism in epistemological matters. He does not seem to be willing to give up these views in relativity, as one might expect his mystic, "transcendent" consciousness to demand. Instead, he sticks to Kant's epistemological rejection of transcendent religion, and ends up introducing scepticism, "anti-rationalism" and evil into the ultimate, transcendent, mystic reality. His mysticism thus becomes tainted with evil in a more serious way than Eckhart's mysticism. An "unbalance" enters Climacus' views. He is an "unhappy mystic".

B) Structures in Meister Eckhart's Mystic Philosophy

Meister Eckhart was born in Hochheim near Erfurt about 1260 A.D., and he died probably some time between 1327 and 1329. Historical documents show that he was condemned as heretic in 1329, and that by then he already was dead. In 1327, however, he was alive. At that time he wrote his so-called Rechtfertigungsschrift (Vindication Document), in which he revoked everything he might have said or written against the official church (2).

Eckhart was a catholic who belonged to the Dominican order, and his work as a preacher led him into contact with the expanding communities of lay-people in Lower Germany, who often subscribed to mystic religion. Eckhart was also well acquainted with Franciscan mysticism, as well as with practising mystics of the well-known monastery of St. Victor, in Paris. In addition he was also well trained in scholastic philosophy of his time, originating in Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Eckhart thus became one of the first to make the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena, known for a broader class of people than theological specialists. He exposed and published their mystic ideas in vernacular sermons, the so-called Predigten. Together with treatises on special topics, Traktaten (Treatises), these sermons are the most important of his German

writings. However, like other scholastics of his time, Eckhart wrote also many works in Latin. His most important Latin writings are Opus Sermonum (Work of Sermons), five university discussions: Questiones Parisienses (Parisian Questions), and some commentaries on St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica, the so-called Opus Tripartitum. This last work has only survived as fragments. The following exposition of Eckhart's views is based on the above mentioned works, and the conclusions are fairly uncontroversial. The description is primarily intended to show that Eckhart is a representative of classic mysticism, against which Climacus' mysticism can appear in clear contrast (3).

In his philosophical theology, Eckhart followed the common scholastic trend of his time, attempting to establish a synthesis between faith, i.e. Christian dogmatic truths, and reason. The concept of reason was understood as a composition of Aristotelian and neo-Platonic ideas. Since he was a practising mystic, his concept of reason was primarily neo-Platonic. As a result, he kept neo-Platonism distinctly apart from Aristotle's philosophy. In this respect Eckhart seems to have been more in agreement with his early teacher Albertus Magnus than with St. Thomas Aquinas. But Eckhart differed also clearly from Albertus by attempting to reconcile philosophical discrepancies in mystic, religious practice. In this respect he seems to have been more in accordance with the monks at the mystic school of St. Victor in Paris. However, Eckhart differed from this school too through his close association with mystic lay movements, the so-called "Friends of God", i.e. "Beguines" and "Beghards" (4).




Figure 1 Main structures in the ideological background for Meister Eckhart's mystic view of Christianity.

Eckhart's mystic Christianity contains therefore elements of Judaic-Christian dogmatics, Aristotelian philosophy, neo-Platonism and practical mysticism. Eckhart attempted to maintain all these "strands" with equal validity, and they appear as parallel structures in his mystic, religious consciousness (see figure 1, above).

As a loyal member of the church, Eckhart must claim that dogmatic truths of Christianity are beyond discussion. The Incarnation is a historical fact whose truth is indisputable. Eckhart feels therefore no impetus or need to raise the historical problems Climacus, in his secularized age, had to struggle with. Eckhart also assumes the scholastic presupposition, that if reason and Christian dogmatics should arrive at opposite conclusions, dogmatics is right. In that case, the discrepancy must have been caused by reason's limitations and inadequate insight. It does not prove that reason and faith are in conflict with each other. It is thus obvious that when scholastics attempted to approach faith through the use of reason, they had no need to point towards any kind of Kantian scepticism and/or "anti-rationalism". Evil was excluded from God's essence, to be explained as a lack of good and rational insight. The scholastics had found a solution to the problem of evil which functioned satisfactorily in their time. They felt it more urgent to distance their views from pantheism and to explain the necessary distance between God and man in accordance with Christian, dogmatic presuppositions. If they failed in refuting pantheism clearly enough, they could fall into heresy. For if man and God were identical, the absolute authority of revelation, the foundation of the church, would be diluted (5).

In Aristotle's epistemological philosophy there was apparently only one concept of reason. By taking his starting point in sensuous experience, reaching universals through abstraction and thinking, Aristotle argued that man could never "transcend" mundane experience. Thus, Aristotle's philosophy was apparently well suited to account for the Judaic-Christian idea of creation, emphasizing the value of the world of the senses. But it could not give a satisfactory explanation of a "different", "transcendent" reality, independent existence of spiritual monads/souls, or other apparently indispensable elements in Christian dogmatics. It might appear as incompatible with belief in individual immortality, and in God as an eternal, personal, spiritual reality. In these respects neo-Platonism provided a supplementary epistemological, philosophical explanation, bringing reason to a better understanding of the revealed truths of Christianity. But neo-Platonism was inadequate in other respects. It proclaimed "transcendence" of natural reason into intuitive insight, i.e. it apparently believed in two kinds of knowledge. Thus, even though one might subscribe to the view that evil is ignorance, one could not be sure that the concept of ignorance belonged to both kinds of knowledge. In this way, evil could possibly be introduced in the ultimate mystic reality. However, such a view was irreconcilable with the Christian doctrines of the God-man, as well as God's almightiness and infinite goodness, and the neo-Platonists attempted to overcome these inconsistencies in mystic experience and practice. They claimed that evil is ignorance, also in the ultimate mystic perspective, and that evil therefore does not belong to God.

St. Thomas Aquinas brought forth a synthesis of Aristotelian and neo-Platonic ideas, tending to give priority to the former. He moved ultimate, transcendent knowledge from this life to after death, holding that in relation to man, God's nature is pure "being". Aquinas explained his idea with reference to the biblical text in Exodus, where God says about himself: "I am Who Am". This meant, according to Aquinas, that God can only reveal himself to man as "pure being", i.e. "pure activity". Thus, for us human beings, knowledge must be subordinated to pure activity. For knowledge is an attribute of God's essence, which is "pure activity" (6).

St. Thomas Aquinas believed therefore, that the knowledge one assumes in this life, built on sense experience, is certain and reliable. However, it cannot transcend man's being. In order to reach knowledge about the essential being of God, who is beyond man's being, transcendent grace is needed. After death this grace can bring about the divine illumination of transcendent knowledge. As long as we live, our knowledge can only establish a relative and inadequate relation between man and God.

However, beside this predominantly Aristotelian view, Aquinas also subscribed to neo-Platonic, mystic ideas. Thus, he stated also that when man lives, he can obtain the most adequate relation to God through a "love", which is limited in accordance with the limited being God imposes on man. If man is not aware of this limitation, he might fall into heresy, proclaiming himself to be God. Thus, dogmatics and God's grace are needed as long as we live, since they can warrant the authority of the

church, as well as a sufficient difference and distance between God and man (see figure 1, part E, above) (7).

In his Commentary on the Book of Exodus, and in the Prologue to the Opus Tripartitum, Eckhart propounds a view stating in full agreement with Aquinas, that the Christian mystic experienced God's ultimate essence is "being" (8). But in his Questiones Parisienses, dating from 1302-03, he argues apparently to the opposite conclusion, namely that being is an attribute of reason. The latter view had been advocated by his early teacher, Albertus Magnus, and was also common among the mystics of St. Victor in Paris as well as among Franciscan mystics. Eckhart emphasizes in this connection, that it is more perfect both to know and to be, than only to be. The Christian mystic experienced God must therefore be more than being. His ultimate essence must be "pure knowledge" (9).

Some commentators see here an irreconcilable contradiction and inconsistency in Eckhart's views, and they propose that he must have changed his views as he grew older: since he in his old age obviously attempted to show that his views were in full accordance with the official church, in order to avoid heresy, he must have held a purely neo-Platonic view in his early Questiones Parisienses, developing later towards a more Thomistic view (10).

This view is hard to verify, since Eckhart scholars agree that it is almost impossible with certainty to arrange Eckhart's writings chronologically. It might be

more tenable to argue that Eckhart held both views concurrently, reconciled in his mystic consciousness, and that they reflect the essence of the mystic experienced God considered from two different perspectives. When God is considered in himself alone, he is pure intelligence. When he is considered in relation to human beings, he is pure being. In the latter respect, God is the Christian-Judaic Creator who draws man out of his nothingness by conferring upon him his being. However, one should be aware that both these perspectives are inadequate expressions of the ultimately ineffable mystic experience.

In a sermon called Quasi Stella (Like a Morning Star), Eckhart apparently supports the above stated view and explains the relation between these two perspectives. They do not exclude each other: "When I say that God is not being and that he is above being, I have not denied him being, but, rather, I have dignified and exalted being in him". When God is considered as being, he is considered "in the keep of the castle where he dwells". But "intellect is the temple of God, and nowhere does he shine more holy than there" (11).

St. Thomas Aquinas had also said that man most adequately can approach God in a divine vision beyond the limits of man's being. But the decisive difference between his and Eckhart's view consists in where they place the limit between the rational knowledge we derive from sense experience and thinking, and divine knowledge. St. Thomas Aquinas is utterly concerned to underline a decisive distance between man and God, and places the limit between the two different kinds of

knowledge beyond death. He holds thus that there is only one kind of knowledge for man as long as he lives, and this knowledge is ultimately not in opposition to the revealed truths of Christianity (see figure 1, part E, above). Eckhart, on the contrary, places the limit before death. He thinks that man can approach God in divine illumination, when he lives in mundane existence (12).

It thus seems as if Eckhart makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge that we have access to when we live. The first is like the Thomistic natural knowledge, or Spinoza's "scientific knowledge". The second is like Plotinus' intellectual intuition of the One, or like Spinoza's "intuitive knowledge". On logical presuppositions, these two kinds of knowledge exclude each other. But Eckhart claims, like Spinoza, that they are somehow reconciled in mystic experience (13). In order to explain what he has in mind, Eckhart uses language borrowed from the Christian, neo-Platonic mystics, Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. But their ideas can very well be traced further back to Plotinus and St. Augustine.

It is common to all these Christian, neo-Platonic mystics, that they somehow identify the Christian God with Plotinus' "the One", but understand him as "being" in accordance with God's saying in Exodus, "I am Who Am" (14). The Son of God is the biblical "logos" of the New Testament, identified with reason (nous). The neo-Platonic concept of eros is identical with the "Holy Spirit". Further, Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena understand these theological concepts both anthropologically and cosmologically. Thus, God is the highest reality of being, and other things in the world

exist to the extent they partake in this being (see figure 1, parts B, C, D, and F, above).

Such a view leads easily to pantheism, since all things that exist are "God". But both Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena want to distance their views from pantheistic dominance. In accord with mystic phenomenology they attempt to balance the pantheistic view with a transcendent, theistic view. Therefore, they claim that there is an ultimate element in God which is different from everything we know. Pseudo-Dionysius accounts for the transcendent element in God by removing him from the rest of reality in an "affirmative" (*via affirmativa*) and a "negative" way (*via negativa*). According to the former, God is above everything we know or can express by virtue of his complete perfection. According to the latter, God is different from everything we can know. Therefore, we approach the most adequate description of him by stating what he is not. As a result of these two ways of approaching the transcendent God, Pseudo-Dionysius names him "super-being", "super-truth", "super-good", etc. (15).

John Scotus Eriugena shares the views of Pseudo-Dionysius, but tends to give less emphasis to the difference between man and nature than Pseudo-Dionysius had done. In his work De divisione naturae (On the Division of Nature), Eriugena explains that God is both "the nature that creates and is not created", and "the nature that neither creates nor is created". This implies that God is both active and passive, both removed from and present in the dynamic, natural process. There is therefore a

transcendent element in God, beyond our known reality. Eriugena names this element "the Godhead" (see figure 1 part D, above) (16).

Eckhart follows his neo-Platonic, mystic predecessors' theory of a hierarchy of being, but he identifies the transcendent intellectual principle from the Questiones Parisienses with the concept of the Godhead. Thereby he attains a more decisive transcendent connotation in his ultimate concept of the mystic God than both Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena had done. When Eckhart talks about the Godhead, he seems to place it even "beyond" the Christian God. He describes the Godhead as a "divine wasteland", a "pure nothingness", a "total emptiness", etc. It is a pure unity beyond all diversity, like Plotinus' "the One" (see figure 1, part F, above and figure 2, below) (17).

As a result of such negative expressions about the ultimate, mystic reality, Eckhart has been interpreted as an "atheistic mystic", similar to some mystics in the Buddhist tradition (18). Presupposing that what mystics experience and attempt to express is the same in all cultures, it follows that Eckhart's "Godhead" should be identical with Buddhist concepts of Nirvana, Sunyata, etc. However, such an identification could also be dubious. Eckhart definitely understands his mystic concepts within a Judaic-Christian context, presupposing a more clearly defined social aspect than Buddhist thinkers ever would do. In addition, Eckhart wants to maintain Christian dogmatics beside his "mystic atheism". It seems thus as if he possibly gives more value to individuality and subjectivity than many Buddhists, and that his

"atheistic" aspects rather should be understood as aggravations of the transcendent aspects in the classic mystic components of theism and pantheism. Buddhists understand the ultimate on the presupposition of a very different "dogmatics", namely the ideas of karma, dharmā, and the transmigration of souls. The "negative" aspects of the ultimate seem, therefore, not to be balanced so clearly by "positive", theistic content. Buddhism is possibly still more "objective" and "atheistic" than Eckhart's "atheistic" mysticism (19).

Like Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena, Eckhart understands theological concepts both anthropologically and cosmologically. Eckhart's theological concepts of theism, pantheism and intellectual monism have therefore a cosmological as well as an anthropological connotation. But as a practising mystic Eckhart is almost exclusively concerned with the latter. Thus, he explains that the human soul is endowed with a "divine spark", a "citadel", of the same nature as the Godhead. This spark is the point of connection between man and ultimate reality. One should consciously work to exclude the world of the senses from the soul. What finally will remain then is the "citadel" in all its purity, which is so much identical with the Godhead, that it will "force God into man" (20). When this occurs, God's grace causes the Father to give birth to the Son in man's soul, thereby creating the Holy Spirit of Love. In this process of creation, man must understand himself together with everything else that exists, as part of God's being. Thus, pantheism assumes as much validity in Christian consciousness, as theism and intellectual monism. This implies that Eckhart acknowledges both activity and passivity as indispensable, and he builds

his ethics and mystic practice on these two components. Therefore, activity and passivity are main themes throughout Eckhart's Predigten (Sermons) and Traktate (Treatises).

In the sermon Beati pauperes (Blessed are the Poor), Eckhart takes up the theme of passivity. A person on the way towards perfection must rid himself of everything in his mind. He must proceed towards "wanting nothing, knowing nothing, and having nothing". He must free himself even of the image he might have of the Christian God. Only in that way can he approach total "emptiness", the necessary precondition for God's entry into the soul (21).

In the treatise Von Abgeschiedenheit (About Disinterest), Eckhart also deals extensively with the theme of passivity. Eckhart says there that the best way to attain "disinterest" or "passivity", is through "suffering" (22). Since "suffering" in this connection implies active life, he seems to say that activity and passivity are complementary concepts. Involvement in active life is the ascetic "method" a mystic should employ, in order to approach the passivity in "unio mystica". Eckhart does not prescribe in detail a practical way of purification, as is common in many Christian as well as other mystic traditions. He wants to use life itself in this respect.

At the end of the sermons Beati pauperes, as well as in Mary and Martha, Eckhart deals with the theme of activity. In the latter sermon he makes it perfectly clear that one should strive to attain perfection in "activity", originating in "passivity"

(23). Eckhart thus apparently wishes to found his ethics on the dialectics between passivity and activity. Activity is directed outwards, towards society, and it is composed by two phases. The first phase requires active involvement in life to work against one's self-interests and self-love. This active work annihilates all one's egotistic drives, and leads towards mystic nothingness, i.e. complete passivity in the Godhead. At this point, God can reveal his essence of agapic love, his Holy Spirit, which flows from God to the Son. This activity gives absolute and divine value to the outer world, and purifies one's active way towards ethical and religious perfection. Thus, Eckhart unites Christian transcendence with ethical and religious perfection. This transcendence does not imply "evil". For "evil" is the tool man can use "rationally" in the process of self-perfection (24). Evil is excluded from God's ultimate essence, like Plotinus' the One is excluded from the plurality of nous. Full perfection means transcendence, and ethics is in this way connected to the three components of theism, pantheism, and intellectual monism in the Christian, mystic consciousness (see figure 2, below).

Eckhart's understanding of evil is in accord with both Thomistic and neo-Platonic ideas. He has apparently excluded Climacus' reluctance to solve the problem of evil as well as the implication that evil possibly belongs to the very essence of God. By making activity and passivity dialectic aspects of reality, Eckhart can claim that the sensory world is good throughout. It is God understood as being, the nothingness upon which God inferred his reality in creation. Time is therefore not evil, but belongs to the same eternal realm of goodness as God himself. God's love is the dynamic principle which makes involvement in the world a means to reach the ultimate mystic




Figure 2 Five main structures in Meister Eckhart's mystic, Christian Consciousness.

goal, i.e. return to God in the "Godhead".

Thus, the identification of activity and passivity could apparently lead Eckhart towards possible pantheism of the same kind as Pseudo-Dionysius' and especially John Scotus Eriugena's views implied. On this basis, understanding of time must be "circular", since its function is to bring creation back to its original starting point. To obtain transcendence strong enough to account for a forward-directed, "linear" view of time in accord with Judaic-Christian dogmatics, Eckhart refers to the distinction between God and the Godhead, as well as mystic "nothingness". He can therefore claim, that God is of such a nature, that he transcends himself into the Godhead, and that man can partake in this divine self-transcendence through mystic-religious, practical experience. Divine transcendence is not Kantian sceptical, "anti-rational" and "repetitive", as for Climacus. In Eckhart's mystic view, it is not man who transcends himself into an "unknown" future, but God who transcends himself in man, into God's infinite and good, eternal essence. In this way evil can be excluded from a future-directed, "linear" understanding of time. Eckhart's "Moment in Time" means "eternity in time", and it is the good God alone who causes outward-directed, agapic love. By such means Eckhart can account for a meaningful, temporal future: he makes time part of the mysterious coincidence of God in the Godhead and man's "citadel", deepest in his soul.

Eckhart shared his non-monastic, practical religious views with many of the mystics among lay people, the so-called "Friends of God", i.e. Beguines and Beghards.

They were usually simple people who built their religious views on mystic religious experience. It was of importance for them actively to involve in daily life. Thus, it was the Friends of God who had built the so-called "Beguin-houses", serving as social institutions for orphans (girls), as well as the "Beghard-houses", serving as homes for people who were mentally ill. Eckhart apparently saw a practical illustration of his passivity-activity dialectics in the Friends of God. In his religious life he wanted to become as one of them, in their simplicity and sincerity (25).

Not everybody who has been sympathetic to mystic religion in general, is sympathetic to the mysticism of Meister Eckhart. Jacques Maritain, for instance, criticizes Meister Eckhart for having confused the practical and speculative aspects of mysticism. Maritain seems further to suggest that Eckhart consequently was a less "profound" mystic thinker than St. John of the Cross (1542-1591). For the latter clearly distinguished between these two aspects, and did not confound the mystic and theological languages, as Eckhart did (26).

There is no doubt that Eckhart has brought speculative and practical aspects of his religious mysticism together. But it is more questionable whether this should be negatively interpreted as a "confusion". From Maritain's Thomistic point of view it is certainly an advantage to distinguish between mystic and theological languages, since they must appear to be partly in opposition to each other. If not, Eckhart could proclaim himself to be "God" or "like God". But from a speculative mystic's point of view this might be different. Eckhart's primary intention is to describe mystic,

Christian reality. Given this aim, it seems most likely that he has deliberately superimposed mystic practice upon his theoretical, theological presuppositions. For only thus can he be able to describe how one can bridge the oppositions between these apparently partly contradictory presuppositions, and express the unity he experiences in his mystic, religious consciousness. In this way Eckhart can give the different theological concepts additional aspects of connotation, playing a rôle in his attempt to say that there is a decisive "transcendence" aggravating the pantheistic and theistic components of his mystic religion. Eckhart's "confusion" makes him apparently also capable of giving a more adequate and satisfactory solution to the problem of evil, one which is in accordance with Christian dogmatics. Eckhart's "confusion" has therefore a clearly defined function within his speculative mysticism, and a separation of philosophy/theology and religious practice, would bring his mystic consciousness into a different sphere.

Apparently Hegel follows a philosophical method with clear affinities to Eckhart's, when he describes "The Absolute Idea" in the Logic:

"The Absolute idea is, in the first place, the unity of the theoretical and the practical idea, and thus at the same time the unity of the idea of life with the idea of cognition (§ 236, note).

Hegel explains further that, by themselves, theoretical and practical ideas, can only render "one-sided", inadequate ideas of reality in its totality. Only the Absolute Idea can adequately do so (27).

The main difference between Meister Eckhart and Hegel, however, seems to be in the application of their method. Eckhart primarily describes his subjective, mystic experience, secondarily pointing towards the "objective", absolute reality of God's 'self-revelation'. Hegel seems primarily to describe an "objective", absolute reality, and only secondarily to focus upon individual subjectivity within this reality. One can therefore naturally apply Hegel's descriptions to mankind and its historical development. Hegel does not primarily seem to be concerned with individual, subjective mysticism. Individuals are not the dominant factors within human history, but rather larger social groups and peoples.

Given the interpretation of Hegel above, Eckhart's position is somewhere between Hegel's and Climacus'. Whereas Climacus is a representative of emphatic subjectivity, in contrast to 'exaggerated', Hegelian objectivity, Eckhart seems to belong not so much 'moderate' subjectivity. Thus, the difference between Hegel and Eckhart is more in the subject matter of their views, than in their principles of method. They seem to agree that reconciliation of being and thinking is necessary in a description of reality which includes subjective as well as objective elements. In this respect they seem to disagree with Climacus. For, on his sceptical presuppositions, he wants to keep being and thinking separated. And he continues to keep up this separation manifested as Kantian 'anti-rationalism', beside a classic mystic Hegelian-related epistemology and view, all the way into ultimate mystic reality. As a result, his mystic reality becomes burdened with epistemological 'irrationalism' and an element of evil, eliminating possible ontological questions on the ultimate, mystic reality. He acquires what

Hegel collectively understands as a dialectical tension in the historical development, and calls "unhappy consciousness" (28). Seen from Eckhart's subjective, mystic point of view, the mystic Climacus has not been sufficiently able to annihilate his self-interests and passions, so that mystic-transcendent, Christian reality can reveal itself, and make subjectivity "rational" and meaningful. Climacus cannot without some reservation, use activity, suffering, and evil as practical, "rational" tools to reach more passivity and "good". And it is in the mystic silence that God creates himself as "transcendent", pure goodness, without introducing an insoluble problem of evil in return.

However, it is also possible to interpret the Kierkegaardian Climacus more favourably in relation to "irrationalism". The presuppositions for such an interpretation on the basis of mystic phenomenology would be, that Climacus' has only intended his emphasis on evil and Kantian scepticism as practical means to reach the same kind of mystic experience as Eckhart is a representative of. Given this interpretation, Climacus like Eckhart, differ from Hegel only by virtue of the application of the Hegelian method. In this perspective Climacus, like Eckhart, appears to give somewhat more emphasis to individuality and subjectivity than Hegel, who seems to deal with the same problems in a more collective perspective.

Such an interpretation of Climacus might be hard to defend successfully. For it obscures the clear contrast between Climacus' mystic Socratic and mystic Alternative Views. The view that the Kierkegaardian Climacus is a "non-irrationalist", advocated

by McKinnon and others, seems thus hardly tenable on the basis of the mystic-phenomenological methodology of the thesis. McKinnon, as well as most other American Kierkegaard scholars, tend to emphasize Kierkegaard's great distance from Hegel. It seems difficult for them to keep up such a distance without attributing sceptical, epistemological views to Kierkegaard and/or Climacus. However, in a mystic phenomenological perspective, the implication of such a position must be that Kierkegaard/Climacus is an "irrationalist". Considered in Hegel's epistemological perspective this means that Kierkegaard/Climacus is a representative of the "unhappy consciousness". Considered within the Hegelian-related mystic, phenomenological perspective of the thesis, Climacus must rather appear as an "unhappy mystic". Climacus' harsh and violent attacks on Hegelians can hardly be meant only as jokes and ironical utterances, intended to frighten the Hegelians a little - Hegelians that Climacus in principle agrees with! The thesis argues therefore that the Kierkegaardian Climacus best can be understood as an "irrationalist", although it acknowledges that in other perspectives, as for instance in McKinnon's more purely sceptical-analytical view, the opposite conclusion might be possible.

C) Problems of Evil, Faith, and Reason in Neo-Platonic, Christian
Mysticism

Suffering and evil in some shape follow mysticism, even into the unio mystica. According to Freudian psychologists, like for instance James Leuba, evil in ultimate mystic experience originates in sexual dissatisfaction. Such an explanation, however, does not take into account that the mystics claim to deal with "transcendent knowledge" of some kind. This knowledge cannot adequately be communicated or scientifically explained, through any kind of psychological theory. However, all mystics admit that suffering and evil play important rôles in the mystic way towards perfection. They recommend often voluntary evil, i.e. "ascetism" in some form or another, in order to approach God's goodness.

Ascetism has always been a prominent trait in the Christian, neo-Platonic, mystic tradition, but the ascetic elements were not given equal importance by different mystics. St. Augustine was an adherent of strong ascetism. He underlined the great difference in perfection between God and man, and that man could only approach God's holiness and "remote" goodness through an ascetic life. However, St. Augustine did not subscribe to ontological dualism. He thought that evil ultimately could be extirpated, although with great difficulty. Ethical purification combined with God's grace could lead man out of his miserable situation towards the all-good, mystic, Christian God.

The successors of St. Augustine in the Christian, mystic, neo-Platonic tradition followed his ideas with respect to evil. In accordance with neo-Platonic understanding of the One, as well as with the Judaic-Christian image of God as a monistic, all-good

Creator, they understood the ultimate in their mystic strive to be good, and evil to be relative and inferior to God. They identified evil with ascetism, a means which one meaningfully could use in the way towards mystic perfection. Resorting to Plotinus, they explained evil theoretically as a lack of good, a lack which could become filled by means of increase in knowledge.

Meister Eckhart did not prescribe a practical, systematic use of ascetism, as some of his fellow-mystics had done. But he underlined the usefulness of "evil" in mystic growth. "The steed swiftest to carry you to perfection is suffering, for none shall attain eternal life except he pass through great bitterness with Christ" (29). Eckhart seemed to impose this suffering upon himself by partaking in life in his own social environment. By involving himself in a meaningful manner in society to relieve suffering among people, he attained higher mystic perfection. Activity was the means to purify the mind, so that he could reach ultimate mystic passivity. For in mystic passivity, God, through his grace, could give birth to his Son, implying renewed purified activity.

However, Eckhart did not emphasize ascetism and suffering as much as some of his close successors in the Rhineland mystic tradition. Henri Suso (1295-1366) and John Tauler (1300-1361) were far more concerned to emphasize ascetism in terms of suffering and evil. Especially Suso is known for having imposed upon himself the most torturous methods, in order to purify himself in mystic preparation for ultimate reality (30). By emphasizing the difference in perfection between God and man, Suso and

Tauler approached St. Augustine. They avoided the danger of heretical pantheism and/or pure monism, proclaiming themselves to be God or like God. Eckhart was charged exactly on this point, and found guilty.

The Augustinian line in Christian, mystic religion is also well documented in French monastic Catholicism, centred around Jansenism, whose foremost spokesman was Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Pascal never tired of underlining the ascetic elements which always must follow a true Christian on his way towards perfection, together with the great distance between man and God, and the seriousness of sin. Man must "shiver" before God in fear and trembling, and can hardly hope to eliminate these evil elements as long as he lives. Like the Kierkegaardian Climacus he apparently gave extra importance to evil and suffering, even in the ultimate religious experience (31). However, he did not seem to be willing to draw up the borders between faith and reason on such a mutually exclusive basis as Climacus does. Pascal seemed to presuppose the epistemological views of his mystic, Catholic predecessors. In accordance with Thomistic and neo-Platonic epistemologies, he did not totally break off the rational connection between the human and the divine, "transcendent" realm. He distinguished between "l'esprit de geometrie" (the geometrical spirit) and "l'esprit de finesse" (the fine spirit). The former dealt with a limited number of self-evident presuppositions which man's reason could comprehend, and from which man could reach conclusions whose truths were guaranteed by right "geometrical", or logical thinking. The fine spirit was much more complex. Pascal believed that human nature is so intricate that reason is incapable of dealing with it adequately. The "heart" of

man has its reasons that understanding cannot know. The presuppositions to be taken into consideration are in this case so many, the influencing factors as well, that reason must give up. In this way faith must be "beyond" reason. An encounter between man and God cannot occur in man's heart without the intrusion of God's grace (32). However, such an encounter is possible, and faith is thus not totally "beyond" reason, as this concept is understood by Kant in his First Critique. For if human reason just had been more perfect, Pascal thought, it would have understood that faith is in full accord with reason. Pascal was therefore not an "irrationalist" in the same strong way as Climacus. Pascal stayed within the concepts of reason designed by Thomism and neo-Platonism, and did not come in conflict with the epistemological views subscribed to by the official church.

Pascal also revealed this "non-irrational" view in his polemics against religious sceptics - agnostics and atheists - of his own time. He presented for them the so-called Wager, where he argued according to calculation of probability, that it would be untenable to reject the Christian message, even from a "rational" point of view. In this way Pascal attempted to make Christianity somewhat attractive and seriously worth considering, even for intellectual sceptics of his own time. Pascal concluded that it would be more against sceptical reason to reject Christian faith than choosing to try it out for oneself. The risk of losing eternal life would be at stake, and it would be against sceptical reason to risk the loss of eternal life just because one did not want to put up with the suffering and inconvenience Christianity might cause in the short span of human life. In addition, Pascal thought that when one had chosen to become

a Christian, Christianity would "prove" its truth by itself. Consequently, the original "risk" of choosing Christianity would be nullified and replaced with certainty. Pascal therefore concluded that it would be very "silly", even from a sceptical, rational point of view, not to dare to become a Christian, for by choosing to believe in Christianity, one would have nothing to lose, but everything to gain (33).

Kierkegaard's as well as the Kierkegaardian Climacus' communication to the "intellectuals", seems in some respects to be very different from Pascal's. Kierkegaard/Climacus does not attempt to make Christianity "attractive" by some kind of calculation of probability, but strives instead to make it as unattractive as possible. In Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus exposes Christ in a most miserable shape [33 ff.]. When he later lets Climacus refer to calculations of probability [85f, ftn.], an idea which Kierkegaard might have encountered in his German translations of Pascal's Pensées and other of Pascal's writings, Climacus does this in a derogatory sense (34). He apparently identifies the Danish Hegelians' concept of reason with "probability", and rejects it without further ado in humour and irony [85 ff.]. For Kierkegaard's Climacus, Christianity is the Absolute Paradox, necessarily causing wise intellectuals to become "offended". The way to "true" Christianity is not through reason, but through the passion of faith, implying that reason must be set radically aside, and suspended.

Climacus, following Kant in the First Critique, must hold that Pure Reason ends up in antinomies beyond which it cannot reach. As a mystic he must also hold

that the passions of love-faith, which are connected to Pure Reason, can reach "beyond" Pure Reason, into ultimate religious, transcendent reality. However, since Climacus apparently wants to keep up both these views at the same time, his mystic consciousness must contain epistemological "irrationalism". He tends rather to emphasize Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" in order to "prove" theoretically for the Hegelians that evil is not ignorance. Evil is so serious that no rational insight of any kind ever can have the power to remove it. Only the inscrutable God can remove sin, if he decides to do so in his mercy and grace.

However, one should not forget in this connection, that Climacus also could be considered a "non-irrationalist". For the question of whether the Kantian sceptical elements in Climacus' epistemological views might be intended only as an indirect means of communication of the ultimate, mystic truth, can never be adequately answered. If they are intended in such a way, Climacus should most appropriately be considered an Augustinian mystic of the same type as Pascal. The label "irrationalist" would then be misplaced. But since we are asking here about subjective, mystic-transcendent views, no certain answer can be given in either direction. Whether one answers the question of "irrationalism" positively or negatively will always be a question of which elements in Climacus' exposition one tends to give most importance to. The thesis gives most emphasis to the fact that Climacus seems to underline evil more strongly than both St. Augustine and Pascal. This fact shows Climacus' adherence to Kantian scepticism beside his mystic views, and points more clearly towards "irrationalism" than for any of the other two mystics. The emphatic rejections

of Plato's rationalism as well as the "Socratic", neo-Platonic mysticism seem to suggest, that Climacus possibly adheres to a mystic-transcendent, dualistic view. Climacus states namely, that Socrates' mistake is his "lack of evil" in mystic-transcendent reality. However, it is certainly also true that Climacus does not polemize too strongly against this Socrates (35). On the contrary, he tends to idealize him in relation to rational Platonism, which he attacks in the shape of Hegelianism. But nevertheless he feels the need to underline that the mystic Socrates lacks the "right" seriousness of evil, since he apparently eradicates evil too well in his ultimate, mystic experience.

Climacus must thus appear in clear contrast to Meister Eckhart. As the latter tended to weaken the seriousness of sin by making the distance between God and man too small, so that he became a heretic in the eyes of the official Catholic church, Climacus apparently tends to overemphasize evil, so that he can hardly account for the Christian image of an all-good Creator. One could explain this difference between the two mystics by referring to the different epistemological traditions to which they belong. Eckhart belongs to the neo-Platonic and Thomistic traditions, which have been shown to hold epistemological views compatible with mystic phenomenology. Climacus, however, belongs to the neo-Platonic and Kantian traditions. Climacus therefore believes that Kantian scepticism is part of the "true" mystic consciousness. The Kantian epistemological views must be in opposition to mystic phenomenology. Climacus must therefore appear as an epistemological "irrationalist", whose mystic consciousness must become "unhappy". On this basis he emphasizes the insolubility of the problem of evil.

D) Concluding Summarizing Remarks

As shown above, Meister Eckhart represents a mystic view in the Christian, neo-Platonic tradition which is close to the classic mysticism of Plotinus, as well as to the mysticisms of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. But Eckhart does not emphasize the great distance between man and God to the same extent as the more Augustinian influenced mystics of the Christian, neo-Platonic tradition. He believes, nevertheless, that he stays within the framework of dogmatic Christianity, as it was recognized by the official Catholic church. He subscribes to Thomistic as well as neo-Platonic epistemological views which are compatible with his mystic experiences and mystic practice. He accounts for the necessary distance between God and man, by referring to Thomism and the authority of the church. Eckhart has thus no need to introduce any kind of Kantian scepticism and "anti-rationalism" in ultimate reality, as Climacus does. Such an idea does not even occur to Eckhart. God is not in opposition to reason. In God, all lacks and evil are eradicated. Eckhart's image of the mystic Christian, personal God culminates in complete unity and passivity, "the Godhead", which gives rise to the miraculous purified manifold of the highest mystic practice.

The situation is apparently very different for Climacus. He cannot in the same manner as Eckhart ignore the historical epoch in which he lives. In Climacus' time there is a conflict between faith and reason. He lives in a secularized age when reason threatens to make the Christian dogmatic truths and mysteries of transcendence superfluous. His age is also highly influenced by Hegel's view of history, which claimed

that the historical process, as well as the transcendent truths of Christianity can be approached by reason! In this connection Climacus resorts to Kantian, sceptical epistemology, and believes that "transcendent" truths cannot be understood by Pure Reason. Evil is not ignorance, a transcendent Saviour is needed to remove man's sins. Climacus follows Pascal who had emphasized that there is a great distance between God and man, and that it is "impossible" to understand faith. But Pascal's views are apparently too weak in this respect. Climacus ultimately rejects all kinds of "probability proofs" concerning faith, and adhering to Kantian scepticism, as well as mystic faith and mystic Hegelian-related epistemology, he most emphatically claims that it is totally impossible to approach Christian faith through reason. Thus, he apparently acquires an epistemological "irrational" position.

Since Climacus does not seem to be willing to give up the philosophical presuppositions of his contemporaries, he must give priority to temporal existence in favour of eternal, mystic truths. His mystic mind becomes tainted with evil in a way which earlier mystics had excluded on the basis of their mystic practice, an exclusion which also could be strengthened by their contemporary, epistemological views.

Historical questions about Jesus Christ had not been a relevant theme of research and dispute in Eckhart's 14th century. However, such questions were most relevant in Climacus' time. Like other neo-Platonic mystics, Climacus explains time and history in relation to eternity, but unlike his predecessors he gives priority to temporality. Climacus apparently adheres too much to Kant's views concerning linear

time and reason's ability to answer metaphysical questions. Therefore, his mystic views must presuppose some rational doubt about the existence of eternity, and his experience of mystic reality must contain elements of ontological evil and Kantian "anti-rationalism". Thus he becomes an "irrationalist".

In this way it seems hard to defend without reservation McKinnon's view that Kierkegaard, and most likely Climacus as well, should not be considered "irrationalists". For Climacus seems definitely to represent a "modern" mind, influenced decisively by modern atheism and scepticism, manifested in anxiety due to the loss of God. In the mystic perspective this becomes clear in his attitude to evil, and it must manifest itself in "irrationalism".

In the Interlude of Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus presents his views of time and history. Since these are topical questions in Climacus' own time, he now more explicitly substitutes the figure of the Socratic Plato for Hegel. Thus, his exposition now grows into a clearer polemical attack on Hegelians in his own time, than his earlier expositon. The following chapter of the thesis, i.e. Chapter V, will therefore more clearly explain the different factions of Hegelians in Climacus' time, before it goes on to interpret the Interlude.

E) Short Summary of Chapter 4

Chapter 4 gathers and explains the main lines of Meister Eckhart's mystic, Christian, neo-Platonic philosophy, which earlier has been presented little by little when needed. It becomes clear how Eckhart can appear as a suitable comparative and contrasting model to Climacus' mystic philosophy. The chapter draws up historical lines of connection between Eckhart and the neo-Platonic tradition, as well as between Eckhart and the Thomistic tradition. The epistemological views of these traditions are not in opposition to mysticism, and Eckhart does not need to clarify the relation between his own mystic views and the current epistemologies.

For Climacus this is different. He belongs to a secularized age of the 19th century, and takes over some of the epistemological presuppositions of modern time, primarily built on Kantian scepticism. This makes Climacus a more radical Augustinian mystic than any of his neo-Platonic, mystic predecessors. In a comparative and contrasting perspective, the thesis introduces in this connection the Augustinian, mystic views of Blaise Pascal, who did not reject natural human reason as radically as Climacus had done. Pascal did not distinguish between reason and faith by "impossibility", but only by "intricacy". For him, faith was not absolutely contrary to reason, but only very difficult to understand.

Climacus, however, rejects Pascal's views, proclaiming a mystic view tending towards ontological dualism. Thus, epistemological as well as ontological

"irrationalism" must follow. McKinnon's conclusions, implying that the Kierkegaardian Climacus most likely is not an "irrationalist", seem thus hardly tenable in light of the mystic methodology of the thesis.

F) Notes to Chapter IV

1. For exact references concerning Climacus, see Note 55, Chapter I, the thesis, above. See also O.M.F.V., S.V., Vol. 18, page 73. Kierkegaard writes there, under his own name, in 1848: "I know what Christianity is. I admit that I am an imperfect Christian myself, but I know what Christianity is."
2. Concerning Eckhart's trial documents, see James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart, pp. 251-58.
3. Most important secondary sources for Eckhart's mystic, philosophical views: Robert B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, Introduction. Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., Meister Eckhart: His Times and Writings, The Thomist, 42, April 1978, pp. 240-58.

Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Medieval Philosophy, The Newland Press, Maryland, 1950. (Sections on Meister Eckhart.)

Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, New York, 1955. (Sections on Meister Eckhart.)

Hermann Ludin Jahnsen, Mester Ekehart, Gyldendal, Oslo, 1970.

Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, ed. by Etienne Gilson, Random House, New York, 1967. (Sections on Meister Eckhart.)

Thomas F. O'Mehara, O.P., The Presence of Meister Eckhart, The Thomist, 42, April 1978, pp. 171-81.

Richard K. Weber, O.P., The Search for Identity and Community in the Fourteenth Century, The Thomist, 42, April 1978, pp. 182-96.

Most important primary sources for Eckhart's mystic philosophical views:

Robert B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart. Contains a selection of Eckhart's treatises and sermons as well as fragments, legends and the Vindication Document.

James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart, Nelson, New York, 1957. Contains translations of Eckhart's trial documents, pp. 251-58.

Master Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues, translated with Introduction and Notes by Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., Toronto, 1974.

Meister Eckhart, Predigten, Traktate. Herausgegeben von Franz Pfeiffer. Neudruck der Ausgabe Leipzig 1857, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1962.
Translation into English of this work, with some omissions and additions, by C. de B. Evans, The Works of Meister Eckhart, Vols: 2, John M. Watkins, London, 1947-52. Evans' translation contains also most of the Latin sermons.

Mester Eckehart, Taler og Traktater, v. Aa. Brynildsen, Dreyer, Oslo, 1970. Contains a selection of the German and Latin sermons, as well as extracts from the treatises.

For other secondary sources about Eckhart (books, articles, etc.), see the Bibliography in the end of the thesis.

4. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Introduction, p. XV.

See also:

Wilhelm Preger, Geschichte der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalters. Nach den Quellen untersucht und dargestellt, Otto Zeller Verlagsbuchhandlung, Aalen, 1962. See especially the section, Häretische Mystik im XIII. Jahrhundert (Heretical mysticism in 13th Century), pp. 166-216.

Among the heretical, pantheistic mystics were Amalrich von Bena and his followers, Ortlieb von Strasbourg and his followers, Joachim von Floris and his followers, and several others. From these religious movements, the so-called "Sechte des freien Geistes", a synonym for the "Friends of God", developed. The adherents were mostly Beghards and Beguines.

5. See Note 2, this Chapter, above.

6. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Brothers, Inc., New York, 1947, Pt. 1, Q. 12, Art. 11-13.

St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, (Summa Contra Gentiles). Translated by Charles F. O'Neill, Image Books, New York, 1955, Book I, Ch. 22, Book II, Chapters 6, 11, 16, 52 & 53.

Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Random House, New York, 1956, pp. 29-35, 93-95.

7. St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Book I, 91, 6, Book III, Chapters 16-22, 47f. & 52f. "Love is the best way of Clinging to God": Book III, Chapters 115ff. See also Book IV, Chapter 22.

See also Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 274-77.

8. Meister Eckhart, Parisian Questions and Prologues, the appendix: Eckhart's Commentary to the Book of Exodus, p. 113. See also the Prologue to the Opus Tripartitum, op. cit., pp. 91-93.
9. *ibid.*, Parisian Questions 1 & 2, pp. 43-54.
10. See for instance, John D. Caputo, The Nothingness of The Intellect in Meister Eckhart's "Parisian Questiones", The Thomist 39, Jan. 1975, p. 89 ff.
11. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Sermon 26, pp. 218-23. The quote in the text is from page 220.
12. *ibid.*, pp. 220-22.

Sometimes Eckhart suddenly seems to reserve himself from the ultimate heretical, "Plotinian" implications of his mystic presuppositions. In those cases Eckhart primarily wants to follow a traditional Thomistic view. So seems to be the case even in his elsewhere so typical neo-Platonic treatise, "About Disinterest":

"Someone may ask : "Who could long endure this unwavering contemplation of the divine object?" I reply: "No one living in such times as these-."

R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, p. 91. The German original text shows, that the expression "times as these", in Blakney's translation, also can mean "in this life". If one chooses the latter interpretation, Eckhart expresses in fact the same view as St. Thomas Aquinas. German text: Pfeiffer, Meister Eckhart, Predigten. Traktate, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1962, p. 493.

13. Plotinus, Eckhart, and Spinoza all seem to claim, that there is a continuity between the knowledge one can reach through sense-experience, and the transcendent, intuitive, or "mystic" knowledge.
Plotinus, The Enneads, V. 9, 14 & VI, 9, 3ff., R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Sermon nr. 26., Spinoza, The Ethics, Part 2, Prop. 41, 42f, proof and note.
14. The Christian identification of God (the One) and being, starts apparently with St. Augustine. He, however, does not think there is a complete identity. He holds that "essence" is a more adequate name for God's nature than "existence". In this way, he "intellectualizes" God's "being", and approaches Plotinus' concept of the One. St. Augustine thus clearly distances himself from pantheism.

See St. Augustine, De Trinitate, (On the Trinity), 7, 5, 10. See also Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 70-72.

15. Chapter 3, Note 33, the thesis, above.
16. John Scotus Eriugena, De Divisione Naturae, t.ex 1, 11 ff., 4 ,8 ff., etc.
17. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, in "About Disinterest", pp. 83-91 & in "Blessed are the Poor", pp. 227-232.
18. See Chapter 1, Note 9, the thesis, above & T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 271 ff., 280 ff.
19. See Note 17, this Chapter above, as well as Rudolf Otto, Mysticism, East and West, MacMillan Pub. Co., Inc., New York, 1976, pp. 187 ff. Otto makes it here clear, that Eckhart's Godhead "has a different meaning from the resting "Sat" (Being) in India. It is both the principle and the conclusion of a mighty inward movement, of an eternal process of ever-flowing life. A wheel rolling out of itself", "a stream flowing into itself", etc. For Shamkara, a Hindu mystic closely related to Buddhism, this positive aspect lacks. For him, "the coming forth of God and the world from the primeval oneness of Brahman is the great "mistake" of Avidya (i.e. ignorance)."
20. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, "About Disinterest", p. 84, Sermon no. 8, "The Castle of the Soul", pp. 136-39. See also: The Works of Meister Eckhart, by Franz Pfeiffer, Vols: 2, translated by C. de D. Evans, Vol. 2, Sermon no. 9, "The Spark".
21. R.B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, Sermon 28, "Blessed are the Poor", 227-32.
22. *ibid.*, "About Disinterest", p. 90.
23. *ibid.*, "Blessed are the Poor", p. 232. The Works of Meister Eckhart, Sermon 2, Vol. 2, pp. 90-98.
24. *ibid.*, text no. 9, "How Sinful Inclinations are Always Salutary", p. 12.
25. See Note 3, this Chapter, above. Eckhart, however, did not subscribe to all the views of the Friends of God. He wanted firmly to stay within the official church, and rejected their most revolutionary and pantheistic ideas. See in this connection James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart, Nelson, New York, 1957, pp. 251-58.
26. J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, G. Bles, London, 1959, p. 326 f.

27. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, Part 1 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, § 236, note.
28. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, Sections 197-230.
29. See Note 107, Chapter 1, the thesis, above and Notes 22 & 24 this Chapter, above.
30. See Heinrich Seuse, Deutsche mystische Schriften. "Erstes Buch: Das Leben des seligen Heinrich Seuse, pp. 17-207. See esp. Chapter 16, pp. 51-55.
31. In a religious-mystic experience on Monday 23rd, 1654, from 10:30 p.m. to 0:30 a.m., Pascal writes: "I am separated from Him; I have shunned, renounced, crucified Him. May I not be separated from Him." etc., Blaise Pascal, Pensées, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1973, pp. 203f. (i.e. frgm. 737, Laufma).
32. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, p. 59 f., frgm. 224 f. See also Blaise Pascal, Oevres, Vols: 6, Paris, 1926. See Vol. 6, De l'esprit geometrique, pp. 25-52, and Vol. 4, Pensées Diverses, pp. 265-69. See also Morris Bishop, Pascal. The Life of Genius, Greenwood, New York, 1968, pp. 77 f., 94 f.
33. Pascal, Pensées, p. 92 ff., frgm. 343 (Laufma).
34. Ktl., 711-14.
35. See Chapter 3, Note 16, end, the thesis, above.

CHAPTER V

Johannes Climacus' Philosophy of Time and History

Interpretation of the Interlude of Philosophiske Smuler

A) Introduction

As far back as about 1500 B.C., the Middle East area was mainly inhabited by agricultural tribes who cultivated the powers of "fertility" in nature. For farmers it is an obvious fact that life recreates itself in accordance with successive seasons, and the creation myths of their fertility religion must therefore explain creation as a reorganization of an already present material, from "chaos" into "cosmos". The public cult of their religion was also founded on these ideas. It followed the public calendar, celebrating its most important festivals and cult events at times of the year when life was thought to be in a most "chaotic" or "cosmic" state. Recitation of creation myths played an important rôle in the rituals, together with processions and plays, all symbolizing "creation" in one way or another. Thus, the public cult helped to sustain the "right order", i.e. the eternal, repetitive creation of life in nature. The experience of time which followed such a view was repetitive and circular, since the "content of history" already had to be present and only could be remanifested in time (1).

Mosaic Judaism meant a radical break with the circular views of time in the fertility religions of the Middle East. This religion had its origin in nomadic tribes which roamed the Sinai peninsula. In the centuries after 1500 B.C., some of these tribes began to settle and become farmers. The process of settlement was filled with

strife and wars against the peoples who already lived in the farming areas. Mosaic Judaism was thus, to a large extent, a war religion. The most important god, Yahweh, was a fierce war god who helped his people in the process of settlement. His sphere of action was not connected to the cycles of fertility in nature, but rather to the "unknown" future. He helped his worshippers against their enemies in the transition from a nomadic to an agricultural culture (2).

Although the characteristics of nomadic cultures have been thoroughly studied by modern anthropologists, it still appears impossible to find a common pattern for their behaviour and development. Their lives do not follow any fixed scheme in accordance with seasons or other systematic changes. Neither can their culture be understood as a stage of development towards a succeeding, "higher", cultural stage. There are nomadic tribes that do not change or develop at all. Their lives seem "unpredictable" in all ways. For instance the English anthropologist, Ernest Gellner, has pointed out how this fact has caused severe difficulties for Soviet Marxist anthropologists. They cannot easily understand and explain the behaviour of nomadic tribes in Siberia and Mongolia in terms of the Marxist, materialistic theory of incessant, dialectical change and development (3).

Nomadic peoples do not experience time as circular and repetitive. Since the future always is "unknown", and nobody knows what the next period of time will bring, time must contain an element of possible "unpredictability". Time must be forward-

directed and "linear", in clear opposition to the view of time in agricultural societies (4).

The Old Testament tells us about a strife between the nomadic tribes of Israel and the settled, agricultural peoples in their environment. When the tribes of Israel settled, a radical change in their life-style was inevitable, a change which apparently would require a new view of time. However, the Jews were opposed to giving up their linear view in favour of circular understanding of time. They believed that Yahweh had chosen them for a special task in the world history. Israel was different from other peoples, and had to be faithful to Yahweh's will and commands. There were always fervent religious people ready to defend the traditional, religious views and customs of the nomadic period. The Old Testament prophets therefore repeatedly reminded Israel that it was "God's chosen people", and pointed out that any attempt to "reconcile" Mosaism with fertility religion must be considered "aberrations" and "sin" in the eyes of Yahweh. Cycles of fertility could have nothing in common with Yahweh's plan for his chosen people. Yahweh acted freely in accord with his own divine will, and in future he would continue to lead his people through the "unknown" history. Israel's historical development must therefore follow a linear pattern. It started out in Mosaic time with Israel's "creation" as a people out of their enslavement in Egypt, and it would lead towards an ultimate fulfilment of Yahweh's promises in the future (5).

It is therefore natural that Israel's principal myth of creation differs from the "circular" creation myths of other nations in the Middle East. The Old Testament presents a story about a God who creates the world and Israel "ex nihilo", and prescribes a religious cult intended repeatedly to remind Israel of this fact. This cult must continue into the future until Yahweh's plan is fulfilled, and an end can mark the beginning of a new, "inscrutable", divine order.

The oldest Greek religious myths of creation belong to fertility religion, presupposing a repetitive, circular view of time and history. This is also the view in Greek mystery religions. Through Plato's close connection with Orphic and Pythagorean mystery religions, the circular view of time became an important factor of inspiration and influence in his philosophy. He explains eternal repetition of time within mystic religious ideas: the soul's "fall" and captivity in temporality, as well as the soul's return to the eternal origin by means of eros. Plato must thus understand time as a state from which the soul endeavours to be released. One should strive to reach eternity, which, for Plato, meant a rational view of "eternal forms" (6).

St. Augustine was the first to attempt to give a comprehensive and complete explanation of Western history. He published his work The City of God, primarily with the intention of defending Christianity from the accusation that it was responsible for the Goths' invasion of Rome in 410 A.D. Thus, St. Augustine's philosophy of history became an apologetic work, where ideas from the Old Testament as well as Greek

Hellenistic, Platonic philosophy were the main components in the justification of Christianity (7).

St. Augustine made a fundamental distinction between a "sacred" and a "secular" history. The former was represented by the "City of God", the latter by the "City of Man". The sacred history was the more important. Borrowing ideas from the Old Testament, St. Augustine understood this history as a linear process, founded in an inscrutable, transcendent principle. God's plan took its starting point in the dogmatic truths of the creation and man's fall which, in turn led to the Incarnation and Redemption. Redemption had been inaugurated through the Universal Church of the Roman Empire, and it would ultimately lead to eradication of all evil in history.

Secular history followed a development through the rise and fall of four great empires of the ancient world: Assyria, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome. The fall of Rome would make possible the establishment of the apocalyptic, Universal Church. Thus, St. Augustine considered the secular history as a human "aberration", which in turn would be led back to the "transcendent" origin of all things, namely God. In this way, history was explained cosmologically within a Platonic, circular idea of time. But St. Augustine accommodated this idea to the Old Testament's "transcendent" and linear view of a sacred history. His view of history was thus a combination of linear as well as circular ideas, i.e of "transcendence" and "immanence", corresponding to the mystic vacillation between subjectivity and objectivity in neo-Platonic mysticism.

St. Augustine's The City of God dominated political thinking in the Western world all through the Middle Ages. It described a pattern for the "right" relation between the church and the state. Intellectuals of the Middle Ages identified the church with the City of God, thus being the carrier of God's transcendent, redeeming principle, as well as being authoritative in matters of state. A separation of historical thinking and theology did not start until the Italian Renaissance, with the works of Niccolo Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini. Their ideas were continued during the Enlightenment in the 18th century, for instance by François-Marie de Voltaire and Edward Gibbon. In opposition to St. Augustine's partly "transcendent" understanding, they attempted to account for history in terms of human reason alone.

One can understand the succeeding Romanticism as a reaction against the Enlightenment's exaggerated belief in reason. Partly in contrast to this belief, the romantics emphasized subjectivity and the individual "genius". One can further read Hegel's philosophy as an attempt to synthesize the spirit of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. This synthesis is manifested in Hegel's Philosophy of History, where he understands the historical process as a coincidence of subjectivity and objectivity. Following St. Augustine, Hegel thinks that the secular world history originates in an "absolute principle", and leads back to the very same principle, which he calls Absolute Spirit. But Hegel does not distinguish between a secular and a sacred history, as St. Augustine had done. For Hegel there is only one historical development. This is not an "aberration" caused by man's sin, but the only and entire reality, governed by a "rational" principle, creating history as a dialectical movement into the future. Thus,

time is linear, but also circular, since the ultimate goal of history is to reach back to the original, pre-historic state.

Hegel thinks that his Philosophy of History reveals a universally valid structure in the development of human consciousness. He makes this enormous claim, although his exposition partly or totally excludes geographical areas which social anthropologists of today consider to be of vital importance for the understanding of human consciousness. Hegel deals only briefly with Africa, America, and great parts of Asia, and he builds his "universal views" on his knowledge of China, India, Persia, Israel, the Near East, and Central Europe. But in spite of this limited geographical scope he apparently believes that his exposition is sufficient to show the evolution of the "human consciousness of freedom" (8). Hegel says that history has developed from the earliest Oriental stage, through the Antique (i.e. the Greek) and the Roman, until finally it reaches what he calls the German stage: "Its aim is the realization of Absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of Freedom" (9). Thus, Hegel thinks that he himself belongs to the last historical stage. Like St. Augustine, he believes that the secular world has gone through four historical stages, and that it has presently reached the ultimate "culmination" or "dissolution". Absolute Spirit will then return to itself in pure reason and nothingness. Hegel has thereby, like St. Augustine, reconciled the linear, historical view of the Old Testament with the Platonic, circular return of temporality to its eternal origin. But Hegel overcomes, or "reconciles" St. Augustine's strong tension between linear and cyclic aspects of time, by making them

coincide in "dialectical reason". He assumes thereby a more clearly outspoken rational "objectivity" in his views than St. Augustine.

However, Hegel's philosophy is dialectical and ambiguous. It belongs to a time which marked the beginning of our secular, modern age, where "God is dead". Hegel's views of history were therefore interpreted and applied in very different ways by his adherents and critics. In the early 1830's, the Hegelians in Germany split into a right- and a left-wing party. The right-wing Hegelians sought most of all to show that Hegel's historical views were in accordance with traditional, orthodox Lutheran religion. Their further intention was to reconcile Lutheran religion with speculative, idealistic philosophy. The foremost representatives of this Hegelian faction were the theological professors, Karl Daub and Philipp Marheineke.

The left-wing Hegelians wished to eliminate what they considered to be Hegel's religious-metaphysical prejudices in his Philosophy of History. They saw an irreconcilable gap between Hegel's views of history and orthodox, "transcendent" Christianity, and wanted to draw what they considered to be the right conclusions from the Hegelian claim that human history reveals the entire and total reality. This intention led the left-wing Hegelians to criticize the historicity of biblical accounts. Foremost in this respect was David Strauss, with his work Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus), in which he tried to show that Christianity as well as all other human, cultural products, was a creation of human consciousness.

In the time to come, Strauss' principles were defended by Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach. Their views became of decisive importance for sociology, a science which claimed to clarify laws that were effective in human societies and interactions. The well-known sociologist, Max Stirner, formulated his sociological theories, combined with scientific materialism, on principles provided by the left-wing Hegelians.

The left-wing Hegelians all subscribed to Hegel's presupposition of a dialectical development and rational coherence between historical occurrences. This presupposition is most clearly visible in the left-wing Hegelian, Karl Marx's sociological and historical theories. In order to eliminate Hegel's metaphysical prejudices, Marx substituted Hegel's "dialectical reason" for "dialectical materialism". But he assumed also uncritically the Augustinian-Hegelian, Platonic and Old Testament pattern for his theory of historical development (10).

Other critics reacted to Hegel's Philosophy of History on different grounds than those of the left-wing Hegelians. Many felt that the most conspicuous weakness in Hegel's historical view was that he had enclosed reality within a system - be it metaphysical or speculative. In their opinion, Hegel, as well as the right- and left-wing Hegelians, had taken over this prejudice without further ado, and were therefore unable to give sufficient importance and value to individuality, particularity, transience of time, and concreteness of historical facts. As a result, these critics tried to establish an alternative philosophy of history in contrast to Hegel's. Their criticism aimed at

making the historical development more "independent" and "self-sufficient" than it had appeared in different forms of Hegelianism. They claimed that history followed its own course, determined by actual historical situations themselves. One should never confuse this "course" with laws of nature. History should never be enclosed by, or accommodated to any kind of systematic, "rational" understanding.

Such a criticism was later labelled "historicism" by its opponents, and therefore this term often has a negative connotation among philosophers. In modern times, above all Karl Popper's work The Poverty of Historicism, written in 1957, has contributed to this derogatory reading (11). The use of the term "historicism" in the following is solely intended as a statement of the historical understanding defined above, and in no way carries negative connotations or polemical understatements.

Historicism can be said to have developed into two main branches during the 19th century. The first is an empirical-scientific understanding represented by, for instance, Leopold von Ranke and the Prussian Historical School. Ranke's ideal in historical science was "objectivity": history should recount "what really happened". Ranke himself was a strict empiricist, but some of his followers tended to give more importance to historical theories. Their views became more "positivistic", since the positivists had described a universally valid law, according to which human history developed through succeeding stages. From Positivism the distance to some left-wing Hegelian views was short. Thus, Ranke's historicism came in many ways close to Positivism and some of the views of left-wing Hegelians.

The other branch of historicism constituted a more radical reaction against all kinds of systematization, science, and Rationalism. This branch was often connected with ideas that gave more importance to "will" and "passions". Historical knowledge should take more account of "irrational" and/or unpredictable powers as real factors in human individuals and societies. The main representative of this branch of historicism in the last part of the 19th century, was Wilhelm Dilthey. He and his followers wished to refute speculative philosophy as well as scientific empiricism, and to establish a new, independent, historical "science". This "science" should have its own method, wherein, for instance, psychology as well as descriptive phenomenology were important components (12).

Turning to Philosophiske Smuler again, we see that Climacus' reaction to Hegel's Philosophy of History apparently occurs on two main levels - a mystic "transcendent" and a "logical-immanent" level. On the "transcendent" level he seems to agree with the left-wing Hegelians' criticism of Hegel and the right-wing Hegelians, that "transcendent" Christianity is incompatible with Hegel's rational presuppositions. But Climacus disagrees with the left-wing Hegelians when, as a result of this they draw the conclusion that Christianity must be an entirely human, "immanent" religion, i.e. a religion that can be adequately explained within human capacities. Adhering to mystic, transcendent religion, Climacus rejects the views of the left-wing Hegelians, and establishes a "true" transcendent Christianity as a necessary presupposition for "true" understanding of history. On the same presupposition, he must reject all other Hegelian theories as well: they are all incompatible with "true", transcendent, historical

Christianity. For all Hegelians, whether right- or left-wing, enclose temporal reality in an "immanent", rational system. Climacus wishes to give greater emphasis to subjectivity and individuality in opposition to objectivity and society. He formulates therefore an alternative philosophy of history with many traits in common with the views of the historicists. But in opposition to these, Climacus' intention is not primarily to construct a philosophy of history, either as an empirical or as a more "special" science. His primary wish is rather to present an apology for his "right" mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, Alternative View, as St. Augustine had done in The City of God.

Climacus' intention does not imply, however, that he might possibly reject all kinds of historicism or the use of empirical methods in historical sciences, as serving no useful purpose [84, 25]. Neither does it mean that he would necessarily reject Hegel's and the Hegelians' belief in a historical development through different stages as far as the great cultures of the world are concerned. In fact, Hegel's stages are reflected in Climacus' own understanding of consciousness in Philosophiske Smuler. Thus, in this work, Climacus distinguishes between 1. "immediacy", 2. the Greek-Platonic, Socratic View, 3. ethics within man's capacity, and 4. the Christian Alternative View. This division corresponds to the three first stages of Hegel's fourfold division of the historical process, i.e. the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the German world, where ethical religion of Judaism plays a rôle in the rise of Christianity in the Roman world (13).

But parallel with the criticism of Hegel and Hegelianism from a radically transcendent point of view, Climacus also reacts to Hegel's Philosophy of History on an Aristotelian, "logical-immanent", rational level. For Climacus avails himself of Aristotle's logic in his polemics against right-wing Hegelians, attempting to focus his opponents' attention on the rational paradoxes which arise when reason attempts to understand the temporal process. He can thereby show that Aristotle's rational, conceptual understanding of time, composed by "extended" bits of time is based on an element logical reason cannot grasp, a "rational paradox". For Aristotle's view implies that by adding enough, infinitely small, extended bits of time, one arrives at a concept of extended time. Infinitely small bits of time, however, approach zero, implying that infinitely many also make zero. Aristotle's understanding of time originates therefore in a logical or "numerical nothingness" (14). By pointing towards this incomprehensible element in time, Climacus wants to undermine his polemical opponents' belief in history as a rational process. In this way he can prepare them for his own ultimate, transcendent Alternative View. Thus, he first wishes to direct their attention towards the incomprehensibility of time, by focussing on Aristotle's immanent, circular understanding of time; for even this understanding contains an element which logical reason is unable to grasp, a "numerical nothingness". This nothingness can in turn lead his opponents' attention towards time's origin in absolute, "ontological nothingness", which "true" transcendence of the mystic Alternative View implies. For the "true" Christian God creates time "ex nihilo" - beyond human understanding.

As a result of his pedagogical intention, Climacus seems consciously to confound numerical and ontological nothingness, so that the direction towards "true" mystic transcendence can appear "clearer" on the "logical-immanent", polemical level. By means of this confusion he also indirectly exposes the mystery of the Incarnation, which implies that the "truly" transcendent God "truly" has become man throughout. Climacus' polemical method consists thus of ambiguous vacillations between what is within and what is outside of man's capacity, i.e. vacillations between "immanence" and "transcendence", which turn out to be the most central part of his philosophy of history and religion. For as a result of these ambiguities, Climacus can account "rationally" (as far as this is possible) for the Incarnation and faith of the mystic Moment in Time.

On the "logical-immanent", polemical level, Climacus' view may thus seem to accord with the right-wing Hegelian view. But according to Climacus, Hegel's rational coincidence of "immanence" and "transcendence", objectivity and subjectivity, can not render the dialectical distinctions of "right" logical thinking clearly enough. Hegel emphasizes the concepts of "necessity" and "reconciliation" (i.e. objectivity) so much that he misses the quite as important dialectical opposites of "freedom" and "disjunction" (i.e. subjectivity). Climacus finds Aristotle's logic better suited than Hegel's for pointing towards the "true" transcendent view of Christianity. For Aristotle did not accept breaks on the logical principles of contradiction and exclusion. His logic can thus be better apt to render a sharp contrast between logical, dialectical opposites, which can heighten the paradoxical passions. And it is only within passions that "true" coincidence of "immanence" and "transcendence", i.e. objectivity and subjectivity, can

occur. This is a mystic-subjective experience in the Moment in Time, and absolutely different from Hegel's rational "reconciliation".

Thus, Climacus wishes to employ his "clarification" of Hegel's terminology as a pedagogical weapon in his polemical attack on Hegelian-influenced philosophy and theology in Denmark round 1840, represented mainly by the literature professor, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, and the theology professor, Hans Lassen Martensen. In Climacus' opinion, both these professors adhered to right-wing Hegelian views, and subscribed to Hegel's belief in Speculative Reason. Heiberg had openly written that, "the finite is reconciled with the infinite. It is a divine necessity that God, like man, had to dwell among men. One can therefore certainly say that, the Christian God was a work, not of Christ, but of Humanity". Like Hegel, Heiberg therefore said that the Christian religion was a product of historical necessity. Thus, Heiberg assumed a Platonic, rational position, irreconcilable with the historical elements in "true" transcendent Christianity, according to Climacus (15). As far as Martensen is concerned, he had explicitly expended great efforts in trying to reconcile speculative philosophy with historical, transcendent Christianity. He openly admitted that this was rather difficult, and he claimed that he had to go "beyond Hegel", in order to incorporate "true" Christian transcendence into speculative philosophy (16).

Martensen had named his lectures in dogmatics from 1838 "Dogmatica Speculativa" (i.e. Speculative Dogmatics). However, Climacus does not accept Martensen's attempts to use a Hegelian speculative method, as far as Christian

dogmatic truths are concerned. Martensen thus subscribed, like Heiberg, to a "Platonic Hegelianism", where historical Christianity became an element fundamentally alien to the speculative presuppositions. In Climacus' opinion, Martensen's views implied that the historical process was a "necessary" development. This indicated a Platonic, logical necessity, implying that the Incarnation was logically necessary. The "true", transcendent, Christian-dogmatic content of the Incarnation would thereby be diluted. Identification of speculative Platonism with Christianity led further to the view that "sin is ignorance", and the "true", transcendent meaning of sin and salvation pertaining to a "right" Christian view would become fictitious (17).

Martensen was a very popular teacher of theology at the University of Copenhagen in the 1830's and 40's. His lectures were attended not only by theology students, but also by many others who were interested in the application of the new Hegelian philosophy to contemporary theology. Martensen was also a popular and active preacher in the churches in Copenhagen, and he used to publish and distribute his sermons so that they could be reached and read by as many as possible. In 1854 he finally became the primate of the Danish church by being appointed a bishop in Copenhagen. Beyond doubt, Martensen was one of the most influential figures in Danish church and theology in the last part of the 19th century (18).

Another important person in these respects was the close friend of the Kierkegaard family in Copenhagen, Bishop Jacob Peter Mynster. Mynster was an outspoken opponent of Martensen's speculative theology. He strongly supported the

institution of a Danish state church, opposing all ideas which in any way could be thought to threaten its position. He was therefore not only opposed to Martensen, but also to the theologically orthodox faction of the Grundtvigians. The latter sharply distinguished between the church as a community of believers and the state church organization. They tended to give all importance to the former, and worked therefore in the 1820's and 30's for a clearer separation of the church and the state. The Grundtvigians wanted to give the community of believers more power in decision-making within the church organization, proclaiming that it was the people themselves who had received "The Lord's Oral Word", and therefore were the true Christian community (19). The church should be a "free" church independent of the state, not a dead organization ruled by rationalistic theologians. The leader of the Grundtvigians, the Rev. Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, favoured a practical, optimistic, and socially active Christianity, and the number of his followers was considerable (20).

The three influencing factors mentioned above have one thing in common, according to Climacus: they all neglect the difficulties involved in becoming a "true" Christian. They have no place in their views for sufficiently serious sin and suffering, although these are indispensable elements in "right" Christianity. Climacus feels that it is his divine duty to attack both Martensen's Hegelian-influenced theology and the other ruling groups within the Danish state church. Climacus' violent polemics against these opponents are reflected throughout the Interlude (Mellemspil), which is the name he has given to the section between the two last chapters in Philosophiske Smuler. The title of the "Interlude" is not only intended to describe a section between

two chapters. It also refers to the interlude in time between the event of the Incarnation and Climacus' own present [67, 15-17]. Climacus thinks that this interlude is a long period of time, and he makes fun of the philosophers who have too little time and the historians who are brought into serious difficulties, not by the historical subject matter, but by time [67, 17-24]. Both jokes probably refer to Heiberg and Martensen who, in Climacus' opinion, never had grasped the incomprehensible paradoxes in the historical development.

Climacus' philosophy of time and history in the Interlude is thus set forth within a definite polemical context. Climacus primarily wishes to argue that the long interlude between the Incarnation and his own present never can reveal any Hegelian "necessity" or Hegelian "necessary stages" in history. The Incarnation can never be made "necessary" and "understandable", but will always ultimately be a "creation ex nihilo". Only thus can "right" Christianity, implying sin, suffering, and salvation, be saved from being diluted in a view of convenience.

The polemical situation has apparently forced Climacus to give added emphasis to Kantian scepticism, "anti-rationalism", and evil, within his Christian understanding of time and history. For he constructs his mystic Christian view partly in contrast to speculative Hegelianism, from a Kantian sceptical point of view. Other alternative Christian views on time and history within Climacus' own mystic, Christian, neo-Platonic tradition, are excluded. He has therefore missed the opportunity to consider Meister Eckhart's view concerning this issue.

Eckhart ultimately relates his understanding of time to eternity, as Climacus does. But instead of placing most emphasis on temporality, Eckhart tends to give priority to eternity in time. Time assumes a meaning from the eternal point of view. Eckhart thus avoids Climacus' need to refer to any kind of "scepticism" in order to give validity to time. He understands time as a means to attain eternity, as a mystic tool of purification which can make possible mystic transcendence into "pure nothingness".

This does not mean, however, that Eckhart holds a "logical-immanent" view of time and temporality, like Climacus' speculative, Platonic Socrates does. Eckhart thinks there is a transcendent experience in mystic nothingness, which gives validity to time and temporality. In this experience, God reveals himself as the biblical, transcendent God beyond all comprehension, giving validity to time as well as eternity. Like Plotinus and other mystics, Eckhart strives to maintain a balance between "transcendent" elements of subjectivity and "immanent" elements of objectivity in his consciousness. Unlike Climacus he does not see these two components partly as a rational, anti-rational distinction defined within Kantian, sceptical epistemological views, where anti-rationalism and evil must be especially underlined. By excluding such sceptical views, Eckhart can maintain all religious elements and ambiguities of Climacus' Alternative View, without subscribing to mystic ontological evil. On his classic mystic, neo-Platonic presuppositions, Eckhart is thus apparently better able to explain how the temporal world is the transcendent God's good creation than Climacus is in his Alternative View. By excluding evil from time in his way towards

mystic perfection, Eckhart seems to be more in accordance with the Judaic-Christian idea of creation.

B) The Process of "Coming into Existence"

Climacus calls the temporal process the "process of coming into existence". In order to clarify this concept, he makes a distinction between "essential change" and the change of "coming into existence". One can understand essential change entirely within conceptual thinking. It deals with static elements in successive states of an essence, and explains the process of change as the static, conceptual difference between two of the states. Climacus defines this difference by adding and removing essential elements from one static, underlying essence.

As an illustration of Climacus' definition of essential change, we could imagine a maple leaf which changes colour from green to red. Throughout the process, the underlying, static essence of maple leaf remains. The very change consists in removing the static element of green colour from the first state and replacing it with the static element of red colour in the second state. The question of existence is excluded throughout the process of change. For change is defined as a static, conceptual difference in the essence of maple-leaf, which thinking can grasp and express [68, 4-6].

Against "essential change" Climacus contrasts the change of "coming into existence", or as we could say, "existential change". It is a transition from non-being to being. When one tries to define this change, one cannot refer to a common, underlying, essential element, in which the change takes place. For one is unable to conceptualize a first and a later state of existence. If one could, the process of existence would be divided and therefore "different from itself". Any approach to an existential change by means of conceptual thinking would either have to make it into an essential change, or it would be unable to utter anything at all about it [68, 10-13].

Climacus cannot, however, accept silence as response to the process of "coming into existence"; for he is in the midst of a historical situation in which Martensen's Hegelian-influenced, speculative theology has made Christianity into a "logical-immanent", understandable religion, where "sin-consciousness" and God's "true", inscrutable essence are subsumed under reason. Sin has become ignorance, and God's Incarnation and gift of faith in the Moment in Time are understood as necessary elements of reason (21). According to Climacus, one can trace back the origins of this "heathen" development among Hegelian theologians, to a misreading of Hegel's Philosophy of History. Hegel had there said that the reconciliation of objectivity and subjectivity in history, i.e. the "process of coming into existence", was a "necessary" development. He had apparently not strongly enough emphasized that this process also was "free". As a result of the terminological unclarity, the Danish Hegelian theologians were deceived into accepting a "logical-immanent", rational philosophical presupposition, irreconcilable with "true", mystic transcendent Christianity.

Climacus seeks therefore a way to express the process of "coming into existence" which can justify the claim that this change is a "free" development. In order to approach such an expression, he introduces the Aristotelian definition of "existence", or rather "nature", as a transition from possibility to actuality (22). However, Aristotle had defined this transition as an essential process. Consequently, Climacus sets out to explain an existential change by means of an essential explanation! He apparently deliberately confounds the two kinds of change he has described. His "confusion" is clear from the following example, which he seems to intend as an illustration of existential change, but which in reality is an essential change:

Climacus imagines a plan which is to be realized. Throughout the realization, the plan itself must remain unchanged. The plan is a static structure belonging to essences. The reality which conforms to the plan is a change in existence. The starting-point must be the non-existence of the final fulfilment of the plan, and the final result the full actualization of this content. The first non-existence is not identical with the "ontological nothingness", as this concept can be understood on the basis of the first myth of creation in the Old Testament. Rather, the first non-existence must have had some existence, for it must have contained the existent elements which made the fulfilment of the plan possible. Thus, one can understand the realization of the plan as a process of actualization of possibilities which already were present [68, 13-20]. Any such actualization annihilates the number of possibilities which existed. The process of reality must be viewed in light of this "numerical nothingness". It is an

"immanent", circular process of creation as recounted in the creation myths of fertility religions (23).

In this way, Climacus appears to have assumed the Aristotelian concept of time as an "extended motion which can be measured" (24). By this "quantitative" concept of time, Climacus must be unable to explain the problem of temporal motion as a process. He must necessarily encounter Zeno's paradoxes, which say that motion is an illusion (25). Time, understood as movement, must in this way originate in a logical incomprehensibility, or in a spatial, "numerical nothingness".

Climacus has apparently chosen to express the temporal process within Aristotelian understanding of time, in order to direct his opponents' attention to its origin in a numerical nothingness. But in describing this process, he uses a word which points towards ontological nothingness ("Ikke-væren" = "Non-Being") [68, 21-31]. Climacus can thus polemicize on the "logical-immanent", Platonic and right-wing Hegelian level against his contemporary, Danish, theological opponents, and at the same time repeatedly "obscure" his terminology so that it might point as "clearly" as possible towards "true" mystic transcendence.

Climacus' polemical exposition might thus appear to describe a coincidence of "immanence" and "transcendence", or objectivity and subjectivity, like Hegel's philosophy of history, in which the historical development can be said to be both free and necessary. But Climacus claims to disagree with Hegel concerning Hegel's rational

reconciliation of these opposites. Climacus wants to keep opposites distinctly apart so that subjective, paradoxical passions can be increased as much as possible. For it is only within passions that a "true" coincidence of "immanence" and "transcendence", i.e. objectivity and subjectivity, can occur. Only when this coincidence is a fact can also "immanent" freedom, i.e. freedom within man's capacity and suffering become meaningful concepts.

Therefore, Climacus polemizes against the Hegelian theologians through clarification of the Hegelian terminology. He claims that reality's "coming into existence" is "free" [69, 31], although he knows that his claim is set forth within a circular and "necessary", Aristotelian concept of time. But by clarifying the "immanent" concepts of freedom and nothingness, he wants to point towards "true transcendent" freedom and nothingness. In this connection he makes fun of the Hegelian use of the term "necessity". For Climacus thinks that the "necessary" cannot move, as Hegel apparently claimed through his concept of dialectical reconciliation. In this respect Climacus adheres to an epistemological view, based on Kant's First Critique, and argues that dialectical opposites are static and immovable. They are logical, rational necessities, founded on the validity of the principle of contradiction [68 & 69].

As a first step towards this ultimate view, Climacus thinks that Aristotelian logic might be well suited to clear up Hegel's diffuse terminology. In order to approach a clarification, he directs his opponents' attention towards the Aristotelian and Hegelian use of the term "possibility". Hegel had included this term in his concept

Alternative contradictions:

- A.1.) It is not possible to be
- A.2.) It is possible not to be

The three sentences must be understood in the following way:

Alternative 1.) It is not (possible to be)
Alternative 2.) It is (possible not to be)

Statement: + (possible to be)

Alternative 1.) - (possible to be)
Alternative 2.) + (possible not to be)

Further:

Statement: + X

Alternative 1.) - X

Alternative 2.) + Y

Thus, it appears that the direct contradictory opposite of the statement is Alternative 1.) For in that case, the element of "possibility" is totally eliminated from the logical structure, and the opposition is a logical contradiction. In Alternative 2.) the element "possible not to be", does not exclude the claim in the statement: "possible to be". Consequently, the statement can very well be identical to Alternative 2, i.e. these two statements can be held about the same thing. It thus follows that the element of "possibility" must be eliminated from the logical structure, if one wants to make absolutely true and certain statements and deductions. Climacus therefore concludes that "possibility" belongs to another sphere than "necessity" [69, 8-10].

Climacus tries to clarify his view further by referring to Epicurus. Epicurus had said that truth is that which is verified by experience. Falsehood is that which is not verified, or contradicted by experience (27). Climacus neglects the most plausible interpretation of Epicurus' definition, namely that Epicurus, like Plato and Aristotle, did not distinguish between logic and existence, but tied these realms together. Instead, Climacus focusses on the fact that the term "possibility" is excluded from Epicurus' definition of truth and falsehood. These two terms are therefore, in Climacus' opinion, defined within a framework of logical entities alone, i.e. solely within the realm of essences [69, 10-13]. According to Climacus' interpretation,

Epicurus thus appears to support Climacus' own crucial distinction between logic and existence!

However, Climacus seems also to be aware of his own special use of Epicurus' philosophical ideas. At least, he is well aware that Aristotle's philosophy fundamentally is rational, "immanent" and incapable of leading anybody to "true" mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian "transcendence" of reason within passions. Aristotelian logic has only a relative advantage over Hegel's logical views, in that it might clarify the paradoxes in thinking more sharply. Finally, Aristotle also fails in his logic. Climacus tries to show this by giving another example:

Aristotle had asked whether a syllogism could be valid when the element of "possible" occurs in the premisses. His argument is as follows, according to Climacus:

- 1.) The necessary is possible
 - 2.) All that is possible must also not be possible
-

Conclusion: The necessary is not possible

The logical structure is as follows:

- 1.) N is P
 - 2.) All P is -P
-

Conclusion: N is -P

This deduction shows that N is both P and -P, which is a contradiction. Aristotle solves this problem by saying that there must be two kinds of Ps, so that N is P1 but not P2. This "solution", however, implies that one of the concepts of possibility is identical with necessity, i.e. with N. In that case, the Aristotelian logical deduction, which Aristotle thinks is valid, is a truism: Necessity = Possibility, or N = N. The other P, i.e. P2, has the original meaning of "possibility", and does therefore not apply to the logical realm.

Climacus concludes that Aristotle's "solution" is illusory. Aristotle makes the same mistake as Hegel. He includes the concept of possibility in logic. But since possibility implies "uncertainty", it cannot belong to the sphere of necessity and logical thinking [69, 13-27].

In this way both the Hegelian and Aristotelian views proved to be rational, "immanent" and ultimately insufficient to give a satisfactory and adequate account of the process of "coming into existence". If one directs one's attention towards the "world process" in nature and history with such a rational, immanent presupposition, one will be confronted with an apparently infinite line of cause and effect concatenations. Everything that happens can be accounted for by means of previous causes. The entire "world process" would then have to be explained as a circular repetition of an eternal ground. But such a view is identical with the view of time in the creation myths of fertility religions. They can never explain a "creation ex nihilo", as the "true", Christian Alternative View requires.

Climacus apparently believes that one must abandon Hegel's position in favour of Kant's understanding of time in the First Critique. In accordance with Kant, Climacus concludes that everything has a cause, and that cause and effect follow each other in a forward-directed and irreversible time-stream (28). However, ultimately Climacus must also consider Kant's views of time as insufficient. For Climacus claims that the line of cause and effect must not only be referred to structures in man's "immanent" constitution. In order to express his ultimate view, Climacus refers to Leibnitz who completes the concatenation of causes and effects in a "freely acting cause", a "transcendent" God beyond man's world. Only then can the "world process" assume a linear, future-directed meaning [69, 28-39] (29).

However, on epistemological presuppositions taken from Kant's First Critique, Leibnitz' explanation must be a transcendental illusion, implying Kantian scepticism. Climacus needs this additional, Kantian-sceptical and anti-rational element in his mystic phenomenology in order to argue that "there is not only joy in heaven, but also sorrow [32, 10]". Sin is not ignorance, but part of the "true" mystic reality, beyond human capacities. Climacus has thus ultimately argued for a radical incomprehensibility and "transcendence" in his understanding of time. The Aristotelian concept of time could only serve as a means to heighten the paradoxical passions. It is repeatedly intersected by "truly" transcendent ambiguities, set forth through the terms of "nothingness" and "freedom". Therefore, Climacus' polemical concept of time apparently assumes the same meaning as the Hegelian in its ambiguity between "immanence" and "transcendence", objectivity and subjectivity. But, in Climacus'

opinion, there is one decisive difference between Hegel's and his own ambiguities. Hegel had reconciled the ambiguities rationally and thereby made time "understandable" and "immanent". Climacus wants to maintain a sharp distinction between opposite components in the ambiguities, and only to hold them together paradoxically in the mystic Moment in Time. The "true" Christian God of the Incarnation is both God and man throughout, i.e. he is both within and outside of man's capacities, both "immanent" and "transcendent". And Climacus undergirds this paradox by referring to Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. Only in that way can mystic experience assume the "true" suffering and evil.

Climacus' adherence to Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism is apparently not only a weapon in his polemics. Climacus completely rejects the possibility that an eternal reality might exist, for thereby to increase the paradoxical passions he needs in order to approach the eternal God in mystic faith! Climacus must therefore also consider the Aristotelian understanding of time as adequate! "True" faith means that mystic eternity can only enter time in the smallest of bits of time, in an Aristotelian Moment in Time! However, since every moment is "extended", every bit of time is concurrently replaced by another. Faith must therefore be repeated in every new Aristotelian Moment in Time. If not, faith would be an illusion. "True" faith thus becomes a desperate repetition of the mystic Moment in Time, a desperation that can undergird Climacus' understanding of evil in mystic transcendence, as well as his need to maintain the Judaic-Christian dogmatic elements concerning sin, salvation, atonement, reconciliation, and judgement. In this way, Climacus' understanding of time

reflects his own strong adherence to a radical scepticism built on elements from Kant's epistemology, implying that "God is dead". On this Kantian presupposition he rejects even Kant's view of time, and ties also the law of cause and effect to Kantian scepticism! In fact his view seems rather to be in accordance with a scepticism like David Hume's, saying that our belief in a necessary connection between cause and effect, is built on habit (30). It is apparently impossible for Climacus to discern other alternative Christian views of time, than his own. He must therefore believe that God is possibly evil, and also time, since it is founded in an inscrutable God's possibly evil will! Man is condemned to live in time until the possibly evil God in his "mercy" might decide to "save" him! Such a view seems hardly reconcilable with the Christian idea of creation, and the all-good God.

Meister Eckhart's mystic philosophy belongs to a time long before Kant, Hume, and Hegel had inaugurated modern, sceptical "atheism". Eckhart follows a classic, neo-Platonic, mystic view, and gives eternity priority over time. Nevertheless, he also gives linear understanding of time full value, by referring to God's self-transcendence in the "citadel" of the soul. He attempts to keep up the right mystic balance between theism and pantheism, giving these two components a more clearly defined "transcendent" dimension through his additional concept of a purely monistic, "atheistic" ground.

On these classic neo-Platonic, mystic presuppositions, Eckhart can explain the Incarnation as a "transcendent", incomprehensible fact in man's being. The Incarnation becomes for him, as for Climacus, identical with man's contact with God in the mystic

Moment in Time. Eckhart explains this moment in his sermon "God beyond Time", as the "Present Now-moment" (31). It is beyond time and identical with eternity. Like Climacus, Eckhart also states that one cannot find God as long as one operates within an Aristotelian concept of time. God is beyond numerical nothingness. But, unlike Climacus, Eckhart does not give the same emphasis to the value of establishing a linear view of time in rational opposition to the "immanent", circular view of time. Eckhart only recommends that one should avoid "clinging" to the circular, Aristotelian view. For linear and circular time must be parallel structures of equal value in his mystic consciousness. Clinging too much to one of the structures would imply an emotional exaggeration (32). And contrary to Climacus, Eckhart does not think that it is within unspecified, sceptical and "anti-rational" emotions that man can encounter God.

Eckhart's view is also clearly expressed in his treatise Von Abgeschiedenheit (About Disinterest). In this treatise, Eckhart establishes an almost ontological nothingness in the ground of the Godhead, implying transcendence of the Aristotelian concept of time, and giving sufficient transcendent perspectives in his mysticism to account for the Old Testament, linear view of time and history. Therefore, in his sermon on Mary and Martha, he can set the active Martha even above the quiet Mary. Thus, the temporal world apparently assumes more value than the eternal (33). By means of his balanced mystic view, undergirded by mystic practice in order to approach the "transcendent", good God, Eckhart seems to be in a better position than Climacus to account for the Judaic-Christian idea that this world is God's good

creation, and to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. He refers the latter to ignorance, fading away with increase in mystic knowledge.

Thus, the active future-directedness in Eckhart's Christianity is not a frightening repetition of the eternal, mystic Moment in Time, as it was for Climacus. Eckhart excludes evil, as Plotinus had done, and his Moment in Time becomes an eternal now, where the all-good, mystic God reveals himself in self-transcendent goodness. In mystic practice, which means constructive involvement in society, man can approach this mystery of "transcendent" perfection.

However, Eckhart could be criticized for having been unable to place enough decisive importance on the fact that Christianity is a historical religion, built on the historical fact of the Incarnation in Jesus Christ. This historical fact seems to be somewhat "superfluous" in his classic, neo-Platonic mystic religion. The Incarnation has apparently only an empty dogmatic function, serving as a theoretical model for the Christian, theistic, mystic experience.

The same can be said about Climacus. Sharing Eckhart's mystic, religious views, the Incarnation assumes the same function as for Eckhart, namely as a theoretical model for faith (34). The fact that Climacus refers more frequently to historical issues in Christianity than Meister Eckhart does, is only a consequence of his intention to heighten the paradoxical passions which arise when reason tries to understand historical facts. It is on this issue that he attacks the Danish Hegelian

theologians, who would make history, and thereby the Incarnation, "understandable". For Climacus believes that their trust in reason removes the seriousness of sin and evil, which must always follow a "true" Christian existence. Following Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism, he argues that God is totally "unknown", and that sin is rooted in this "unknown". Only God can remove sin. It is not accessible through Hegelians' concept of reason. For rational concepts are static, and cannot go beyond the Kantian antinomies on the border of the "unknown". Climacus, however, points towards the "unknown" through Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism, thereby arguing that mystic, "transcendent" sin is not ignorance. Evil and irrationalism thus become necessary parts of Climacus' mystic, transcendent reality. He is an "unhappy mystic", who apparently does not ever want to give up the Kantian epistemological views. He is an "irrationalist".

C) The Historical Consciousness

In full accordance with common mystic phenomenology, Climacus makes a central distinction between temporal and eternal reality. History belongs to temporality, and all things that exist in time have some connection with history. The eternal is excluded from time. In fact, the eternal is the only existing thing that has no history. It is "the perfection of the eternal" to exclude the historical process [70, 19-21]. Thus, Climacus seems to believe that a "historical consciousness" is excluded from eternal reality. He wants thereby to present an image of a "true", Christian view,

implying full value to temporality, in sharp contrast to the eternal, Platonic view of the Danish, right-wing Hegelians, in particular Professor Heiberg and Professor Martensen (35).

However, "true" Christianity implies a double meaning of the term "historical". Climacus defines this term as "that which has come into existence" [70, 3]. "Historical" must therefore be understood both within a "logical, immanent" / Kantian "sceptical-transcendant", Hegelian-Aristotelian, polemical epistemological context, as well as within a more "truly" transcendent, Old Testament, mystic-neo-Platonic, and Kantian "anti-rational" epistemological context.

Approaching a definition of "historical consciousness", Climacus makes a more decisive distinction between "nature" and "human beings" than had been common among romantics, for instance by Schelling (36). Climacus states that all things in nature, including plants and animals, have a beginning and therefore "have come into existence" at a certain time in history. Nature is thus "historical". But after it "has come into existence", it develops after a fixed pattern. It does not go through a "second creation". Nature has no power within itself which can decide its own development. It is not "self-conscious", and has no "self-consciousness". It is not what Climacus calls "dialectical with respect to time" [70, 15-16]. Nature's "natural" development can be described as a circular creation, a transition from possibility to actuality. Its origin in a "numerical nothingness" points further towards "true", "transcendent", ontological nothingness: that nature once was created ex nihilo, in the beginning of time.

Climacus thinks, however, that only human beings are historical in the most genuine sense. Nature, defined as animals and plants, has only an "intimation of history", as a result of their transcendent creation [70, 16-21] (37). Only man has freedom to decide his own future. He can "come into existence within his own coming into existence" [70, 22f.]. His "redoubling" in coming into existence must first be understood as a circular creation, as in the case of the rest of nature. This implies a creation out of a "numerical nothingness", i.e. a breach in logical rules, a rational paradox. This creation can further point towards Kantian, transcendent scepticism, anti-rationalism and the Absolute Paradox.

Man's second "coming into existence" implies that an additional rational paradox is added to the first rational paradox. Climacus describes thus man's self-consciousness from a "logical-immanent" point of view, as identical with the Socratic, rational self-consciousness: man knows that he does not know. By virtue of this insight he has assumed a freedom to decide his own development. He can choose between a "rational-immanent" or an "irrational-sophistic" possibility of life. Climacus does not think, however, that the Socratic consciousness has complete freedom. He apparently understands it within the framework of presuppositions taken from Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, subordinating the rational consciousness to the limitation of the good will (38). Man cannot by himself transcend the capacity of his own good will, without ending up in evil and absurdity [59, 22-24]. The "unknown" God has to bring him a transcendent element from "outside". Only then can he attain total freedom and a future-directed, genuine, historical consciousness [70, 22-30].

Climacus holds thus that "true" freedom of a genuinely historical consciousness is a subjective truth. The "rational consciousness" can be changed from being "Socratic-historical" to becoming "truly" "transcendent-historical". The "redoubling of coming into existence" can change from being a possibly transcendent actualization of possibilities, to becoming a totally new creation ex nihilo. The "true" transcendent consciousness can find a meaning in the future of the temporal world, which the Socratic consciousness was unable clearly to discern.

In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant had argued that man has sufficient rational capacity to will what is good. Evil is caused by man's natural inclinations, which the good will is able to conquer. Man is therefore always responsible for his own acts (39). Climacus does not seem to subscribe to all parts of this view. He certainly agrees with Kant that man has caused evil in himself through his will. But he also adheres to Kant's sceptical epistemological views in Critique of Pure Reason, pointing towards "irrationalism" in his mystic transcendent reality. For Climacus, evil thus assumes an incomprehensible dimension, in opposition to Kant's practical understanding of evil, and this sceptical dimension must contradict the view that man is totally responsible for his own deeds. For if he were, there would not be sufficient need for a Saviour who could save man from his corrupted, hopeless state of being. Thus, Climacus' "true" transcendent, Christian, historical consciousness becomes tainted with evil. The "coming into existence within its own coming into existence" implies that the future possibly is unpredictable and evil. And the solution to this problem

of evil is left to a God who himself is tainted with evil, Kantian scepticism, anti-rationalism and irrationalism!

As far as this incomprehensible solution to the problem of evil is concerned, Climacus seems to agree with Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonym Kierkegaard uses in Frygt og Bæven (Fear and Trembling). Silentio had there asked whether such a thing as a "teleological suspension of the ethical" was possible. He had answered this question affirmatively by referring to the biblical story of Abraham who had received the absurd commandment from Yahweh to sacrifice Isaac, his only son. Although this was a breach of Yahweh's earlier promise, that Isaac should become the forefather of Israel, Abraham did not protest or question Yahweh's commandment. He obeyed, contrary to reason and understanding, and as a result of his faith, he got Isaac back, together with a reassurance of God's goodness and faithfulness (40). Thus, Silentio had said that there was an incomprehensible element in God which could appear to be evil. But in the subjective experience of faith, evil could be turned into something good in the future.

In the same way as Silentio, Climacus refers to subjectivity in order to explain how what is apparently the most serious evil in Christianity can ultimately be something good. The historical consciousness he has described is highly subjective, containing the ambiguity of good and evil as possible actualizations in an incomprehensible future. Through his strong emphasis on subjectivity, Climacus could also be thought to subscribe to the same kind of "historicism" as Dilthey. However,

Climacus' historical intentions are of a different kind. As Dilthey wanted to draw up guidelines for a new historical science, built on "irrational" as well as rational forces in human consciousness, Climacus' intention is primarily to defend his mystic, neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Christian Alternative View. His historical consciousness is a "sacred-historical" consciousness, where "irrationalism" is used to underline the strong evil that must always pertain to a "true" Christian view. He is in the midst of a polemical situation in which rational Hegelians try to undermine the dogmatic foundation of "true" Christianity. They have understood the process of "coming into existence" as an objective and necessary occurrence, and omitted the subjective elements from the Hegelian dialectics in history. Climacus, however, understands the process of "coming into existence" as also highly "transcendent" and subjective, a "true" coincidence of subject and object, implying experience of serious evil. The "true", Christian philosopher of history is a "prophet in reverse". He relates first to the past in the paradoxical passion created by the encounter with the rational, Socratic paradoxes inherent in the process of "coming into existence". Thereafter he relates to the past in the passion of faith, created by the paradox of the "ontological nothingness" [73, 23-31] (41).

Climacus' intention is therefore not to construct a historical science, like the historicists'. He wishes rather to show that history is created by God as a free and totally incomprehensible phenomenon. This intention is also manifested in his definition of the concept "repentance". Climacus thinks that a subjective, historical consciousness is able to dissolve historical facts. This implies that sinful historical facts

also can be dissolved, and that the transcendent God can intervene and remove all sins from the repenting person's consciousness. Such a "forgiveness for sins" through repentance must take its starting point on the Aristotelian level, as dissolution of the sinful fact into the possibilities which made the actual sin possible. By reflecting on the incomprehensibility of the "numerical nothingness" which made the sinful actualization possible, paradoxical passions arise, which further can be changed into faith. The origin of the sinful fact in "numerical nothingness" becomes thereby changed into "ontological nothingness". In this "transcendence", God's grace can cause the sin to be eradicated from the repenting consciousness [70, 33 & 71, 5-18]. But, at the same time, Climacus' concept of "transcendence", implying Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism, has introduced an element of possible evil in repentance. Total forgiveness for sins seems thereby again to have been made impossible (42).

One understands that Climacus' exposition of repentance carries strong polemic understatements. He wants to underline the seriousness of sin as well as the great difficulties involved in becoming a "true" Christian. He follows an Augustinian, pietistic view when he requires repentance as a way to salvation (43). The Lutheran doctrines of salvation through God's gift of "faith alone", is apparently not enough. Such a Lutheran view was, according to Climacus, manifested in the Grundtvigian faction of the church. They had made Christianity into a convenient "faith society", whose most conspicuous characteristic was "happiness" (44).

Climacus also believes that Professor Martensen subscribed to a "convenient" Christianity. Martensen's view of Christianity was certainly more reflective and advanced than Grundtvig's (45). But Martensen's view was built on secular, "immanent", Hegelian-rational presuppositions, which were incompatible with "right", transcendent, Christian dogmatics. Martensen adhered to a confused, right-wing Hegelian view, implying that the Absolute Paradox of the Incarnation was subordinated to "necessity" and reason. He uncritically believed that Hegel's "absolute method" revealed an absolute, rational structure in the historical development. Further he thought that Hegel's theory could be proved through pointing out rational structures of cause and effect throughout Western history [73, 11-14] (46). As a result, he understood Christianity as a "natural" part of human life and history. The church could be safe and well-established, capable of guaranteeing security for its members, both in this life and in the next ! Martensen was thus in full agreement with the conservative primate of the church in Copenhagen, Bishop Mynster, about the value of having a state church (47).

Climacus also attacks Martensen's claim to have gone "beyond Hegel", implying that he had been able to maintain the indisputable value of historicity and future-directedness of Christian dogmatics, together with right-wing Hegelian speculation (48). Like left-wing Hegelians, Climacus thinks that such a combination is impossible. However, he ultimately rejects all Hegelian systematizations, whether left- or right-wing views. If, as Martensen thought, a rational principle rules the dialectical process of history, this implies that the entire future must be predetermined down to the

smallest detail [71, 22-30]. Martensen's interpretation of Hegel's method is, in Climacus' opinion, a "brilliant tautology" [72 fn.], only capable of giving a circular understanding of history. It is irreconcilable with "true" Christian, incomprehensible mystic transcendence. Martensen's claim to have gone "beyond Hegel" by making a transition from Hegel's views to "true" Christian transcendence by means of Hegelian Speculative Reason, is untenable. Such a claim reflects only Martensen's own, inadequate knowledge of Hegel's philosophy and his arrogance in presupposing that he knows more than Hegel. In fact, Martensen confuses dialectics at least as much as Hegel, through his attempt to reconcile linear, Christian experience of time with a "logical-immanent", rational "self-movement". As a result of believing in Hegel's reconciliation of rational opposites in his Philosophy of History, and not in Kantian scepticism, Martensen does not even discern the Aristotelian "numerical nothingness" in the historical process. The "right" meaning of dogmatic, Christian terms like sin, guilt, and salvation are thereby diluted and falsified.

In this way Climacus has drawn up a definition of historical consciousness reflecting the difference between his earlier introduced mystic Socratic View, and the mystic Alternative View. However, since he now deals with historical problems, Socrates has been substituted for Hegel, and the Alternative View therefore assumes a clearer Kantian sceptical influence. Both views thus appear more rational than earlier in the exposition, and the term "historical" which Climacus uses to explain a "true" Christian consciousness, seems primarily used to increase the paradoxical passions man needs for "true" transcendence of reason in the mystic Moment in Time.

A Hegelian consciousness is not genuinely historical, because it lacks "true" mystic transcendence. Thus, it lacks also sufficiently serious guilt and sin, the hallmarks of "true" Christianity. Climacus explains these components by referring to Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism, and overcomes the problems of evil and irrationalism by resorting to subjectivity and Judaic-Christian dogmatics!

Since Climacus excludes himself from other mystic, Christian views, he misses the mystic view of Meister Eckhart. Eckhart includes Christian dogmatics, the linear view of time as well, as a theistic perspective in mystic reality, besides the pantheistic-monistic perspective. When these two perspectives assume equal importance, there is no need to place a strong emphasis on emotions and "irrationalism", as Climacus does; rather, the insoluble problem of evil in Climacus' Christian consciousness has been solved. Eckhart's Christian consciousness might, by virtue of its purified emotions and "rationality", be more suited for discerning a constructive meaning in the future, since it would not have to justify scepticism and anti-rationalism in terms of additional sceptical and irrational subjectivity.

D) Knowledge of Historical Facts

In Climacus' view, genuine historical knowledge is subjective. Any attempt to grasp historicity within an objective, rational system must be inadequate and ultimately

fail. A philosophy of history like Hegel's must therefore not be read, as Martensen did, as an account of a necessary, rational structure in the historical development. History is a process which ultimately is inaccessible to logical, conceptual thinking. An empirical, historical science cannot adequately reveal history either, since it can give only approximate descriptions of historical facts. Since Climacus apparently wishes to describe a "historical science" different from both speculative philosophy and empirical sciences, he might seem to subscribe to the historicism of Dilthey and his school. Dilthey's historical science is subjective, approaching historical facts through "irrational", psychological powers, such as emotions (49).

But it soon becomes clear that Climacus' intention is very different from the historicists'. Climacus does not wish to establish a "new" historical science in opposition to other sciences, but to present an apology for his Alternative View. He has thus apparently intentionally placed his exposition of subjective, historical knowledge as an introductory clarification to his understanding of the historical Incarnation. And he has done so in sharp contrast to the right-wing Hegelian view of Danish theologians, primarily represented by Martensen.

In order to begin to grasp what he means by "historical facts", Climacus starts out to define the concept of "immediacy". He thereby reveals an affinity with Romanticism, which he apparently shares with many historicists. Climacus believes that we are never deceived by the immediate sense impressions we receive [74, 19-20 & 75, 6]. But this does not mean that we can use this immediate knowledge as a secure,

rational starting point for attaining historical knowledge. Climacus distinguishes sharply between immediate and historical knowledge, stating thereby his opposition to Martensen's concept of immediacy. Hegel had said that immediate knowledge is mediated through the dialectical process. This is manifested in time and history. Martensen apparently interpreted Hegel to say that historical knowledge could be derived from immediacy by logical necessity (50). But if so, the subjective element in Hegel's historical knowledge would be nullified. Climacus can therefore certainly assure that Martensen has gone "beyond Hegel". But by doing so, he has also reached an understanding of history which is incompatible with faith of "true", transcendent Christianity.

No historical knowledge is ultimately certain. Climacus emphasizes that historical knowledge always is "reflective" and "dialectical with respect to time". It is therefore always uncertain. For the term "historical" always implies that historical facts "have come into existence".

In order to illustrate the point he is making, Climacus gives an example: If a person sees a star, it is an indisputable fact that he really sees a star. But when he starts to reflect, he realizes that the star has had a beginning in time: it has once "come into existence". When the perceiver realizes this fact, immediate certainty disappears. Reflection somehow removes the star from the senses and makes it into a historical fact [74, 24-26].

It is thus of no avail to be contemporaneous with a historical fact, as far as historical knowledge of this fact is concerned, for immediate sense experience does not give historical knowledge. Furthermore, a person who happens to live after a historical fact has come into existence, will be in the same position as one who lives contemporaneously with it. Instead of relating to the immediacy of sensation, the non-contemporary must relate to reports of people who were contemporaneous with the fact. The non-contemporaries relate to these reports in the same manner as contemporaries relate to sense-immediacy [77, 18-22], and the former must make immediate knowledge historical by reflecting on the fact's "having come into existence".

There is consequently no difference between a contemporary and a non-contemporary in regard to a historical fact, as far as historical knowledge of the fact is concerned. To relate to historical facts will always mean to relate to something that is not immediate, but uncertain, and dialectical with respect to time.

However, this account of historical knowledge is set forth in a polemical debate, and is therefore ambiguous. Apparently, Climacus primarily argues logically and rationally, presupposing an Aristotelian concept of time. But at the same time he wants to transcend this concept, and point towards a "true", transcendent concept of time. Thus, when Climacus states that one can never assume certain and true knowledge about a fact, this statement can only be true when time is considered as "truly" mystic transcendent. For considered logically and rationally, as the Hegelians

did, historical knowledge must be certain and true, according to Climacus' own Aristotelian and Hegelian definitions. Therefore, both a contemporary and a person born later than a historical fact have true knowledge about this fact as far as "immanent", rational truths are concerned.

The same ambiguity holds true when Climacus states that one can only relate genuinely to historical facts through passions. The Christian God is a historical fact in the Incarnation. For Climacus, the Incarnation ultimately is a "true" mystic transcendent fact, and must be related to by a means that can transcend logical reason. The Hegelian, rational method is therefore useless. Only "Tro " (transl. faith) can transcend the realm of rational "immanence", and bring us in contact with the "true" mystic God. Historical facts must therefore be related to in "Tro " (transl. belief). Climacus plays on the ambiguity between "transcendence" and "immanence", subjectivity and objectivity, in the Danish term "Tro ", and can thereby point towards "true" transcendence all through his "logical-immanent" polemics. This deliberate ambiguity of Climacus does not appear in English translations, as a result of the distinction they make between immanent "belief" and transcendent "faith", in accordance with common analytic, sceptical methodology.

In the methodology of the thesis, however, the Danish term "Tro ", covers Climacus' special mystic-religious faith, in which Kantian sceptical elements delineate the borders of the rational-immanent concept of "belief". However, there should be no absolute mutually exclusive distinction between the two concepts faith and belief,

without adding that they also have full validity in mystic reality. This contradictory view seems better accounted for in an ambiguous term than merely in a distinction between the two mutually exclusive concepts which appear in English translations.

If one wants genuinely to relate to a historical fact, one must "troe" (believe/have faith in) that it "has come into existence". "Tro " (belief/faith) must thereby annul the uncertainty caused by the numerical/ontological nothingness of the origin of a historical fact. For Climacus has first understood this origin immanently and rationally as an actualization of one possibility and thereby the annihilation of all other possibilities. This numerical nothingness can further be connected with an ontological, "transcendent" nothingness, for thereby to assume the dimension of Tro (faith) [74, 27-33 & 85, 1-2].

Within such an ambiguous communication, Climacus can state that "Tro " (belief/faith) "troer" (believes/has faith in) what is not immediate. Applied to the example of the star, "Tro " (belief/faith) does not "troer" (believe/have faith in) that the star is there. For that can be sensed in immediacy as an indisputable fact. But "Tro " (belief/faith) "troer" (believes/has faith in) that the star, which certainly is there, "has come into existence". Similarly with facts belonging to a more remote past. "Tro " (belief/faith) does not "troer" (believe/have faith in) the knowledge which is given in immediacy about these facts (in reports of contemporaries). But "Tro " (belief/faith) "troer" (believes/has faith in) that these facts "have come into existence" [74, 33-39 & 77, 18-39].

"Tro " (belief/faith) is therefore not like Martensen's concept of immediate knowledge. It is a passion [77, 6]. "Tro " (belief) is something consciousness "immanently", i.e. within its own capacities, decides to do as an act of the "immanent, Kantian" will. This passion can be changed into incomprehensible mystic transcendent faith and is then connected to a genuinely free will, also partly understood on the basis of Kant's scepticism in the First Critique! "Tro " (belief/faith) annuls the uncertainty inherent in a numerical/ontological nothingness, without denying that things could have been otherwise in reality [76, 3-9 & 75, 3-5].

Climacus further points out that it is easy to discern a cause and effect relation between a historical fact and its "having come into existence". One seems thus to be in a position to conclude that since something is with certainty in immediacy, it must necessarily "have come into existence" at one point in time. For if not, it could not be at the present moment.

In Climacus' opinion, such an argument also has its origin in a right-wing interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of History. It confuses the realm of static, objective logic, with subjective existence. One cannot draw a logical conclusion on the basis of immediate facts, which can be valid in the perspective of "coming into existence". If one does so, one has made both the former and the latter into static, logical concepts. Climacus believes that "true" contact between the two realms of logic and "coming into existence" never can occur in the Hegelian rational concept of "reconciliation". Such a contact can only occur in subjective passions. In this

connection Climacus presents a humoristic play with words, saying that historical facts cannot be attained by "Slutning", i.e. "conclusion", from subjectivity to objectivity, but only by "Be-slutning", i.e. a subjective "resolution" of the will [76, 20-32].

Climacus not only polemicalizes against the Danish Hegelians' subordination of faith to reason, but also attacks their concept of doubt. His attack in this respect seems primarily to be directed against Professor Martensen and Professor Heiberg, who, in their writings, had identified doubt with Hegel's "dialectical reason". The result of this identification was, according to Climacus, that "nothing is doubtful" [75, 12-15] (51). Doubt would be as "necessary" as "logical-immanent", conceptual thinking, as well as the Danish right-wing Hegelians' understanding of the historical process! In that way, it would be impossible to doubt the miracle of the Incarnation event. Christianity would thereby have been turned into an "immanent" religion, within man's own capacity to comprehend. It would be without the necessary existential seriousness of "fear and trembling", which always pertains to "true" mystic faith. Thereby, the concepts of sin and salvation would be diluted, a consequence one could already see in the Danish church!

Climacus therefore starts out by showing that doubt is not rational, but an existential, subjective passion. It is an emotional protest against every conclusion that goes beyond immediate sensation and immediate knowledge [77, 3-8]. One must therefore reject the Hegelian concept of doubt as this was understood by Martensen and Heiberg. Climacus believes that the Greek sceptics used the term "doubt" in a way

which could be better suited to serve as an introduction to the mystic, Christian, Alternative View. Climacus apparently interprets the Greek sceptics' concept of doubt in accordance with Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus: the Greek sceptics decided to doubt by virtue of their will. They never directed their doubt against immediate certainty of sensation and immediate cognition, but only against the rational conclusions made on the basis of this immediate knowledge. All our mistakes, they thought, could be referred to this rational activity. If we only refrained from drawing any conclusion, no deception could occur [75, 24-28]. Thus, the Greek sceptics never doubted their own existence, for that was given in immediacy. They simply refused to draw any conclusions on the basis of immediacy. Their doubt was complete, without exceptions. They always used dialectical thinking to show that the opposite of a statement could be as true as the statement itself. But their scepticism was not, as it was for Martensen and Heiberg, a result of contradictory conclusions. It was entirely a result of their will to doubt. In this way they could neutralize all rational temptations and protect a peaceful, calm mind (ataraxia). This was always their ultimate intention [75, 28-39 & 77, 8-16] (52).

Thus, the Greek sceptics never intended to transcend the ontological borders of consciousness by their passion of doubt. In fact, they used their passion for the opposite purpose, namely to annihilate all aberrations from the human, ontological and rational reality. Their ultimate intention was the annihilation of all subjective passions, including doubts, together with the annihilation of objective, conceptual deviations. Only thus could they attain "ataraxia".

Concerning passions, Climacus' intention differs from that of the sceptics. Climacus does not ultimately aim at annihilation of passions, but rather at the opposite. For it is only through "suffering love", he believes, that God can recreate man's passions of belief into faith. In a sophisticated, apologetic attempt to defend his view of Christianity against Martensen's, Climacus states that the Hegelian concept of "Tro " (belief/faith) is the most disputable of all concepts, for it is defined within a rational-conceptual presupposition, and can therefore be met with the universal doubt of Greek Scepticism. But when "Tro " (belief/faith) is understood as a passion, it is the least disputable of all undertakings. For the passion of belief is opposite to doubt and so capable of neutralizing doubt. In that respect "Tro " (belief) is like (i.e. of the same nature, the opposite passion of) the Greek sceptics' passion of doubt. But in addition, Climacus wants to point towards faith with his ambiguous concept of "Tro " (belief/faith). In the subjective, mystic-transcendent passion of faith, all doubt is finally nullified and replaced with a positive, subjective content. Faith is thus the "least disputable" of all undertakings [76, 32 & 77, 1-3].

Thus, Climacus has apparently tried to prove the passions' advantage over reason as far as faith is concerned. But he must ultimately have failed in this attempt, because he has explained the passions within the framework of rational, logical-immanent presuppositions. He has therefore arrived at the absurd claim that the passions "transcend" reason, and the only way he possibly can "prove" it would be to point towards the nature, or quality of passions, as well as Judaic-Christian dogmatics: in his Alternative View, all passions are filled with non-illusory, serious evil, contrary

to the Greek sceptics' view, where all passions are illusive. But nevertheless, Climacus apparently admits that the Greek sceptics have a relative advantage over the Danish Hegelians. For the latter confuse passions and reason in their rational concept of "dialectical reason". The Greek sceptics held these two spheres distinctly apart. When they were confronted with immediacy, they did not draw any logical conclusions on the basis of this information, but related to it through passions.

"Tro " (belief/faith) belongs ultimately to subjectivity and must be kept clearly apart from logical thinking and "necessity". "Belief" (Tro) is a relatively free act of resolution, made by the will, and directed towards the "immanent" (i.e. within human capacities), creation of historical facts. When man relates to an "immanent" historical fact, i.e. "believes it": he repeats the possibilities which made the actualization of that fact possible. The subjective passion which follows the understanding of an "immanent" fact's origin in a rational paradox, i.e. in a "numerical nothingness", is of the same nature as the Greek sceptics' concept of doubt. According to Climacus, God can use such an "immanent passion" as basis for the passionate expansion which takes place in "true" mystic faith. Through faith, God can give man his incomprehensible gift of grace in the mystic Moment in Time [78, 3-16].

In this way, Climacus' exposition of knowledge of historical facts appears to be a despairing attempt to go beyond his mystic Hegelian-related presuppositions. He partly presupposes from the very beginning the same views as he is attacking, since his definition of "historical" partly is built on the Aristotelian, circular, rational

understanding of time. The only way Climacus can show his deviation from the Aristotelian concept of time, is in the despair and passion with which he sets forth his account. Such a "suffering passion" is exactly what Climacus claims to be the key difference between his mystic Christian Alternative View, and the "immanent", rational Hegelian view, held by Martensen and Heiberg. His emphasis on evil shows his adherence to Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. And in this perspective evil can never be only ignorance.

E) Historical Facts and the Incarnation

Hegel had explained all historical facts as manifestations of the dialectical process of the Idea in time. This process was "free", containing elements of "transcendence" and subjectivity (53). However, the subjective elements were often overlooked or neglected by interpreters of Hegel, many of whom still felt that Hegel had subsumed the historical process under a rational, objective principle. Climacus knows this interpretation from his contemporary Danish Hegelians. Like the historicists, he reacts to the rationalization of the historical process. But unlike them, Climacus has a "sacred-historical" reason for his reaction, i. e. he wishes to defend "true", mystic-transcendent Christianity. Following this intention, he believes that Hegel did not underline the absolute difference between the Incarnation and other historical facts clearly enough. His "diffuse" dialectics has caused the Danish Hegelians to

believe that the historical process is "necessary", and not "free", a view which has intolerable implications for the understanding of Christianity.

For Climacus, the Incarnation is an absolutely unique event, even more unique than Hegel had been able to express (54). Climacus calls the Incarnation "a historical fact of second degree", in opposition to all other historical facts, which are "historical facts of first degree". He states that the latter must be related to in "belief" or "doubt" : historical facts of first degree are incomprehensible by virtue of their origin in a "numerical nothingness". But the Incarnation cannot be adequately related to in this way. Fundamentally, it originates in an "ontological nothingness" and is a creation of God's "truly" transcendent, free will [79, 1-23]. It can only be adequately attained through faith.

Climacus does not, however, make the above distinction clear in his polemical situation. The terms he uses on the rational, logical-immanent level, concerning facts of first degree, repeatedly point towards sceptical and mystic transcendence. Unavoidably he seems to arrive at a subjective view of history, as in Dilthey's historicism. Initially Climacus understands all historical facts within a circular, Aristotelian understanding of time, a view which is fundamentally incompatible with linear, Judaic-Christian understanding of time. He must therefore suggest rational transcendence of the Aristotelian presuppositions by means of a sceptical and anti-rational, ambiguous terminology.

The Incarnation thus appears to be more like other historical facts than one should expect on the basis of Climacus' sharp distinction between the two. On the level of reason and man's immanent capacities, there can be no discernible difference at all: the Incarnation must originate in a "numerical nothingness". But, in addition Climacus wishes most strongly to emphasize that the Incarnation ultimately originates in "ontological nothingness". Therefore, he underlines the "transcendent" dimension in this fact most passionately and decisively. He explains this as a result of the double paradox implied by the fact of the Incarnation. In addition to the paradox of all historical facts of first degree, the Incarnation contains the paradox of being both temporal and eternal at the same time.

When consciousness relates to historical facts of first degree, the passion of belief should be directed towards faith, i.e. towards ontological nothingness. When it relates to the Incarnation, the passion of belief should also be directed towards faith! Thus, consciousness apparently discerns no difference in relation to the distinction Climacus has introduced. If there is a difference, it can only be subjective and inexpressible.

The crucial difference between the Incarnation and other historical facts is that for a true Christian the former repeatedly must be actualized in the present, and thereby lead to "true" mystic faith. Earlier Climacus has explained this faith with reference to a coincidence of Aristotelian, circular and Judaic-Christian, linear understanding of time. Understanding can only grasp faith within an Aristotelian

Moment in Time, which is eternal, and has to be repeated in a linear, forward-directed passion. Only thus can one "rationally" account for indispensable elements of evil in Christian dogmatics.

Climacus contrasts the temporal, "true", Christian mystic consciousness with the eternal Socratic, mystic consciousness. He says that Socrates did not "troe" (believe/have faith in) that God existed, for "Tro " (belief/faith) is a term which belongs to the historical consciousness. The Socratic consciousness was not genuinely historical, but primarily rational. His God was not historical, but eternal. What Socrates knew about God was attained through thinking and recollection [80, 1-8].

Thus, the temporal consciousness which Climacus has delineated in his Alternative View, apparently moves into the future. But he understands this movement conceptually within an Aristotelian concept of time. His repetition of the eternal Moment in Time in a linear, forward-directed movement must, according to his sceptical, Kantian, epistemological position, point towards sceptical transcendence of reason and anti-rationalism. Coincidence of the eternal and temporal realms in the passion of faith is always subjective and never accessible to reason and thinking. The difference between a Socratic-Hegelian, rational, and Climacus' Kantian-sceptical consciousness is therefore situated in the passions. Being driven by his passions, Climacus must repeat the eternal Moment in Time, and his repetition is connected to a serious element of evil, which is part of God's "true", unpredictable nature.

Since Climacus is a mystic, and has explained that the most important function of the Incarnation is to serve as a model for faith, it becomes evident that he must think that a contemporary of Jesus and a later follower ultimately are in the same position, as far as faith is concerned. Climacus argues therefore against Professor Martensen, who in his work, Den christelige Daab (The Christian Baptism), had said that it must have been more difficult for early than for later Christians to attain faith, since it must have been easier to attain faith after the church had become more safely established in the world, and "naturalized" (55).

Climacus' opinion about such a view is that it is abominable. It originates in a "false" interpretation of Hegel according to which everything is "rational", and the historical process "natural" and "necessary". The result is a "convenient" and "easy" Christianity, like the one of the Danish church, where "sin is ignorance", and one can become a "Christian" merely by joining the church [80, 8-23]! Climacus' prescription for escaping from the Hegelian delusion is most clearly to distinguish between subjective passions and objective reason: reason does not have an inherent drive within itself which can bring about a coincidence of rational opposites, as Hegel thought. There is no Hegelian, mystic, "nisus" or "Appetite" within the logical process, causing logic to move of its own accord (56)! Movement belongs to passions in man's subjective consciousness, and they intensify when a person adheres to the insolubility of the principle of contradiction. A sound dialectics must maintain this insolubility. The "wonder" and "miracle" inherent in the historical process [79 fn.] will then create paradoxical passions, which can point towards "right" mystic transcendence and, in

turn, be transformed into "true" mystic faith. It is therefore of the greatest importance for Climacus to protest against everything which might attempt to make the Incarnation more "understandable" [80, 17-36].

F) Concluding Summarizing Remarks

Climacus' philosophy of time and history appears to be a "modern" way of understanding how to reconcile the circular, Aristotelian, and the linear, Judaic-Christian views of time within the framework of mystic, Christian phenomenology. Climacus sets out to do so on the basis of sceptical, Kantian epistemological presuppositions, and he arrives at a mystic view of Christianity which implies an extraordinarily strong emphasis on evil. Climacus sets forth his views in the context of a violent polemical attack on a right-wing interpretation of Hegel. These views reveal a contrast between a rational, "immanent" and a mystic transcendent view, which is sharper than the contrast between the mystic Socratic and the mystic Alternative Views. For the two latter are both mystic transcendent, neo-Platonic views, the main difference between them only pertaining to the quality of mystic transcendent passions. It is, however, the same qualitative difference which appears to be the decisive difference between Climacus' rational immanent-Hegelian and the mystic transcendent-Christian views. But in this comparison, Climacus underlines

"irrationalism" in "true" Christian mystic transcendence more sharply, as a result of the more clearly expressed, Kantian position in his polemics against Hegelians.

As a result of this sharp contrast, one is also able more clearly to expose the contrast between Eckhart's mystic, Christian view and Climacus' mystic Alternative View. Eckhart has also attempted to explain Christian understanding of time through reconciling circular, Aristotelian understanding of time with the Old Testament linear time, and to incorporate this reconciliation within mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian phenomenology. Climacus makes this "reconciliation" through bringing the eternal and temporal realms together by means of incessant repetition of an eternal Moment in Time. Only in this way can he explain his solution to his rational, Hegelian polemical opponents. He uses apparently "rational" repetition sceptically, and anti-rationally, in order to maintain a forward-directed, linear view of time. The repetition also reflects Climacus' passionate disturbance, which he claims is a means to transcend reason. Evil is not ignorance, it has a more serious status, founded in the inscrutable, mystic transcendent, Christian God. Transcendence into the "unknown" future is also transcendence into "evil", and time is therefore evil (57).

The view that time is evil is hardly reconcilable with the Judaic-Christian view, that the temporal world is God's good creation. Climacus solves this problem by referring to subjectivity and the incomprehensible nature of mystic faith: evil is overcome in faith. However, this solution is itself built on Kantian sceptical

transcendence, implying irrational evil in mystic reality. Thus, one can never be totally certain that complete goodness and eradication of evil can be attained.

Eckhart understood the problem of Christian time within the framework of presuppositions taken from neo-Platonic, philosophical and practical mysticism. This implies that the entire distinction between time and eternity is somehow "transcended". Eckhart brings the circular and linear views of time together as parallel structures of equal importance in his religious, mystic consciousness. His mystic Moment in Time is therefore not a repetitive, anxiety-ridden activity in "fear and trembling", but a constructive, peaceful entrance to eternity. Eternity is always present together with time, and time assumes meaning in the light of mystic transcendence within rational categories, where evil is excluded. Thus, Meister Eckhart does not resort to scepticism, anti-rationalism, and irrationalism when he understands Christian transcendence. He can therefore define evil as weaker than Climacus' does, and his mystic view is consequently more easily compatible with the Judaic-Christian idea, that all creation is good.

In this way Climacus and Eckhart seem to have understood time in different ways. Climacus primarily presents the mystic, Christian consciousness as a temporal consciousness, a "sin-consciousness", filled with anxiety and dread, and claims in addition that these evil elements necessarily must be present in "right" Christianity. Eckhart, however, seems to have been able to avoid Climacus' emphatic emphasis on

evil, and still to have accounted for all the essential elements in Christian dogmatics concerning temporality.

It is possible that this difference between Eckhart's and Climacus' views only might be apparent, and could be accounted for by referring to the very different historical periods in which these two neo-Platonic, Christian mystics happened to live. Eckhart belonged to the late Middle Ages, long before a "philosophy of history" in the modern sense existed. In his time the reality of the eternal world was given priority over the temporal world. Climacus belonged to the early part of the 19th century, when secularization seemed to threaten the entire religious, eternal reality. The temporal world had become the only true reality, and the intellectuals considered religious beliefs to be superstitions. Therefore, Climacus must more strongly experience the reality of the temporal world than Eckhart, and he must also understand the tension between temporality and eternity almost as an "opposition". Some elements of his mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian religious consciousness would therefore have to be emphasized more vigorously than others. Climacus has emphasized passions to an extraordinarily high degree. His emphasis is also partly caused and strengthened by his polemical attitude towards the foremost representatives of secularization, namely the Hegelian theologians in Denmark at Climacus' time. As a result of his polemics, Climacus must argue from a sceptical, Kantian epistemological position, and therefore refer passions to scepticism, anti-rationalism, and irrationalism which he in turn can use as a justification and explanation of the Judaic-Christian dogmatics concerning sin and salvation.

Thus, Climacus' understanding of mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian time is a more "modern" mystic view than Meister Eckhart's. Climacus' view is certainly more passionate and future-directed. But the advantage Climacus might have attained with respect to temporality in this way, is perhaps reduced or nullified by the unavoidable dichotomy of good and evil which necessarily must follow his emphasis on "irrational" passions. One might therefore argue, that Climacus' view of Christianity is more dualistic than monistic, and therefore incompatible with Judaic-Christian monism and the idea of creation.

The only way to avoid such an "irrational" interpretation of Climacus, and thus argue in favour of a view apparently more in accordance with McKinnon's, would be to consider Climacus' adherence to Kantian epistemology as relative. In principle, this possibility lies open, since nobody can say with "objective certainty" that he knows the Kierkegaardian Climacus' ultimate subjective, mystic views. However, the interpretation of the Interlude in Chapter V of the thesis seems rather to reveal Climacus' Kantian sceptical position within the mystic perspective, still more clearly than before. For in this chapter, Climacus' attacks on Hegel are not disguised in attacks on the figure of Socrates. Instead, Climacus now directly attacks Hegel's secular views of time and history, presupposing his own, modern, secular, Kantian epistemological views, according to which no transcendent reality can exist on the basis of Pure Reason. By adhering to logical reason within mystic phenomenology so strongly as Climacus apparently does, anti-rationalism and irrationalism must be the result. And instead of rejecting these implications, Climacus seems to use them to

account for the immense sufferings and evil within a "true", Christian mystic transcendent consciousness.

But the thesis certainly agrees with McKinnon's view that Climacus is committed to a logical, sceptical concept of reason. It thinks in addition, however, that Climacus also is committed to a mystic Hegelian-related concept of reason. On holding both these views concurrently, Climacus must appear as an irrationalist, according to McKinnon's definitions.

G) Short Summary of Chapter V

The chapter is an interpretative and critical reading of Mellemspil (The Interlude) in Philosophiske Smuler. It clarifies Johannes Climacus' philosophy of time and history, primarily in relation to the concepts of circular and linear views of time. Climacus tries to reconcile these two views in his mystic, Christian Alternative View. Primarily he understands time in the same way as Aristotle, and accommodates this circular view to the Old Testament's linear view through a repetition of the Aristotelian smallest bit of extended time, i.e. the Moment in Time, in a linear movement towards the future. Climacus argues for future-directedness by introducing Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism together with Judaic-Christian dogmatics. He

connects sin and suffering to the future, and seems to end up in an almost dualistic view of "true" mystic Christianity.

Climacus sets forth his views in contrast to Hegel and a right-wing Hegelian interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history. Climacus understands this philosophy as a "logical-immanent", rational view, incompatible with "true" historical, mystic transcendent Christianity. In this respect he appears to agree with the left-wing Hegelians. But he disagrees with them in wishing to replace the right-wing Hegelian view with his own mystic-transcendent, "irrational" Christianity.

As a result of the attacks on Hegel's philosophy of history, Climacus expounds his views in terminological ambiguities, intended to point towards "true" mystic transcendence. In this way he appears to defend irrational subjectivity, in the same way as the historicist, Dilthey. But Climacus differs from Dilthey in intention. Climacus is presenting an apology for his transcendent, Christian view, and does not try to establish some "special" kind of historical science.

As a reaction to Hegel's concept of "necessity" in history, Climacus argues that the Incarnation is a radically transcendent fact. Its importance lies in the bringing together of the eternal and the temporal, a phenomenon which must be totally incomprehensible. Paradoxical passions must arise when one relates to the Incarnation as a historical fact. These passions must not be weakened or diluted by the Hegelian concept of rational "reconciliation". The passions must be separated from reason, for

"true" mystic transcendence of reason can only occur in the passion of mystic faith. Thus, the Incarnation only assumes meaning in relation to faith. One can reconcile the "immanent", circular view of time with the "transcendent" linear view, in the mystic Moment in Time, in a passionate, forward-directed movement into the future.

Climacus must therefore place great importance on the future. But as a result of adhering to Kantian sceptical and anti-rational epistemological presuppositions in his polemics, he is also left with an insoluble problem of evil. Apparently he does not consider it relevant to look to the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition, for alternative ways of reconciling circular and linear views of time. Thus he misses Meister Eckhart's view.

Eckhart also places much importance on the future, but at the same time he accounts for Christian dogmatics concerning sin and suffering without resorting to Climacus' scepticism, anti-rationalism, and irrationalism. Eckhart's view of time might therefore be more in accordance with the Judaic-Christian idea of creation, than Climacus' view. But Eckhart can hardly be said to exhibit so passionate an interest in the future as Climacus does, and one might argue that Climacus' emphasis on "irrationalism" and evil is only a pedagogical tool, intended to lead his polemical opponents towards mystic, Christian reality. If so, a view in disfavour of "irrationalism" could be tenable, also in the mystic phenomenological perspective. The thesis, however, opposes such an interpretation, arguing that Climacus' philosophy of time and history reveals his "irrational" position even more clearly than before. However,

the thesis does not oppose McKinnon's view that Climacus/Kierkegaard is committed to a "sceptical rationalism". It is only in the mystic perspective that McKinnon's conclusions become insufficient and inadequate. And in this perspective the thesis must conclude that Climacus is an "irrationalist", in opposition to McKinnon's view.

H) Notes to Chapter V

1. Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, Harper and Row, New York, 1959, esp. Chapter 2, "The Regeneration of Time", pp. 51-92.
2. *ibid.*, "History regarded as Theophany", pp. 102-112. See also Hans Walter Wolff, The Anthropology of the Old Testament, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1974, pp. 93-98 & 149-155. See also Old Testament, Judges, Chapters 2 & 6.
3. A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, with Foreword by Ernest Gellner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. IX-XXV, esp. XIII-XIV.
4. *ibid.* See also Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, esp. pp. 102-112.
5. *ibid.*, esp. p. 104. See also Old Testament, Judges, Chapters 2 & 19.
6. Plato, Republic VI, 508 f.
7. St. Augustine, The City of God, Book I.
8. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, esp. the Introduction, pp. 1-102, and the section, "The German World", pp. 341-46. (German text in H.G.W., Vol. 12.)
9. *ibid.*, pp. 63 & 341.
10. The information on Hegelians is built on William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, and John Edward Toews, Hegelianism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
11. Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1957, pp. 159-61.
12. Hans Meyerhof, The Philosophy of History in our Time, Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1959, esp. pp. 1-25.
13. See for instance Leo Koskinen, Tid ock Evighet hos Søren Kierkegaard, Doxa, Lund, 1980, pp. 124-34.
14. The "numerical nothingness" corresponds to "Zeno's paradoxes". See Notes 24 & 25, this Chapter, below.

15. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, Vol. I, Reitzel, København, 1861. Heiberg writes:

"Allermindst kunde vi som Christne antage , at Stifteren af vor Religion var dens Frembringer, thi han selv har jo udtrykkelig forkyndt sig som Sønnen, der var udsendt af Faderen. Men Faderen sendte ikke Sønnen, førend Tidens Fylde var kommen, d.e. da det Nærværende var endt og afsluttet, og følgelig hørte til det Forbigangne, til de Døde, da der altsaa var et Stof, det vil sige en formløs Substans, som i Dannelsen af en ny Form kunde finde en Gjenoplivelse af de Døde". (Page 388 f.)

Translation:

"We Christians could least of all suppose that the Founder of our Religion was its Creator. For He, himself, has clearly presented himself as the Son, who had been sent by the Father. But the Father did not send the Son before in the Fullness of Time, i.e. when the Present was ended and finished, and consequently belonged to the Past, to the Dead, when a "material", i.e. a formless Substance, existed. This could find a Resurrection from the Dead in the Creation of a new Form". (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

In this passage Heiberg's subscription to Hegel's Philosophy of History is clearly visible. Like Hegel, Heiberg thinks that, historical Christianity is a product of a "necessary" development.

16. Hans Lassen Martensen writes in his memoirs, Af mit Levnet (About my Life), Gyldendal, København, 1883, about lectures in dogmatics which Kierkegaard attended to in 1838:

"Idet jeg nu foredrog Dogmatiken som den der kunde forudsætte Kjendskabet til den nyere Philosophie og dens Indvirkninger paa Theologien (i.e. in 1838), kom jeg i et eget Forhold til Hegel der var Tidsalderens store og berømte Philosoph, av J.L. Heiberg indført hos os og i mange Henseender Gjenstand for min Beundring og Kjærlighed. Jeg måtte føre mine Tilhørere gennem Hegel, vi kunde ikke blive staaende hos ham, men maatte , som det kaldtes, ud over ham. Jeg maatte om muligt begeistre dem for Hegel, og dog maatte jeg bekæmpe ham og bringe dem til at opponere mod ham." Af mit Levnet, Section 2, page 4.

Translation:

"As I taught Dogmatics presupposing Knowledge of the new Philosophy and its Influence on Theology (i.e. in 1838), I acquired a special Relationship to Hegel, the great and famous Philosopher of the Age, introduced to us by J.L. Heiberg. In many ways Hegel became an Object of my Admiration and Love. I had to lead my Students through Hegel. We could not remain with him, but had, as

it was expressed, to "go beyond him". I had to refute him as far as possible, make the Students enthusiastic about him. I had to refute him and lead them to oppose him." (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

17. Climacus' protest might seem dubious in light of Martensen's own statements. In Af mit Levnet, Gyldendal, København, 1883, Martensen writes:

"Men med Vished kan jeg paastaae, at jeg heelt igjennem har fastholdt mit theonomiske Standpunkt i Modsetning til Hegel's autonomiske, at Troes- og Aabenbaringsanskuelsen for mig var det Bærende i Modsetning til det Autonomiske hos Hegel. Jeg kunne ikke samstemme med en Tænkning, der selv vilde frembringe sit Indhold. Jeg søgte kun en Eftertænkning af det i Aabenbaringen Givne. Naar det ofte er sagt, at jeg i denne min første Universitetstid var Hegelianismens Representant, da er dette en meget ukritisk Paastand-". Af mit Levnet, Section 2, page 5.

Translation:

"But I can assert that I always have adhered to my theonomical Point of View in Opposition to Hegel's autonomical Point of View. For me, Faith and Revelation were essential, in Opposition to Hegel's "Autonomy". I could not agree with a Thinking which intended to produce its Content by itself. I sought only a Rethinking of the Content of Revelation. It has often been said that, I was a Representative of Hegelianism in my earliest Time at the University. But this is a very uncritical Statement-". (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

But Martensen also clearly shows his dependence on Hegel. He writes further: "- en ny Reproduction af de christelige Lærdomme arbejdede sig frem i min Dogmatik, at her var en religiøs Speculation, en Erkjendelse der udgik fra Troen, og i hvilken Troen kom til Selvforstaaelse, en Erkjendelse, der ikke førte bort fra de historiske Kjendsgjerninger, men Tvertimod bekræftede disse-" (Page 36 f.)

Translation:

"- a new Understanding of Christian Dogmas grew forth in my Dogmatics, that there was a religious Speculation, a Knowledge originating in Faith, in which Faith reached Self-knowledge. This Knowledge did not lead away from the historical Facts, but on the Contrary, verified these very Facts,-" (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

In his work from 1837, De autonomia conscientia sui humanae, in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta, translated into Danish in 1841 with the title, Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie i vor Tids dogmatiske Theologie, Reitzel, København, 1841, Martensen propounds a view of sin which

seems to give Climacus some justification for his attacks. Martensen writes there:

"Dette ligger ogsaa i den gamle Lære, at Gud har skabt Verden af Intet, altsaa af det i Gud der ikke er Gud. Den maa med samme Nødvendighed i Incarnationen see Fuldendelsen af Creationen; thi skal Incarnationen være motiveret ved Synden alene, faaer den kun en relativ, ingen absolut Gyldighed." (Page 36 f.)

"Det er iøvrigt vor Overbeviisning, at den evige Sandhed og dens væsentlige Typus ikke er undergaaet nogen Forandring paa Grund af Synden, saa at det substantielle Forhold imellem Skaberen og Skabningen forbliver det samme; og ihvorvel Incarnationen vilde være indtraadt under andre Forhold." (Page 39)

Translation:

"This belongs also to the old Dogmas, that God has created the World of Nothing, i.e. out of God's own Nothingness, of that in God which is not God. The old Dogmas must see the Fulfilment of Creation in the Incarnation; for if the Incarnation were motivated only by Sin, it would acquire only relative, not absolute Validity". (Page 36 f.)

"Otherwise it is our Conviction that the eternal Truth and its Essence have not become changed as a Result of Sin; the substantial Relation between the Creator and the Creation remains the same. Certainly, the Incarnation would also have occurred under other Circumstances"-. (Page 39.) (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

Climacus' emphatic attacks on Martensen's Hegelianism strengthen Climacus' Kantian sceptical position and point in the direction of "ontological dualism" and "irrationalism". See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980, pp. 14-33, 91-96 & 133-49. See also Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 15, fn. 1.

18. See J. H. Schørring, Martensen, B.K. 10, C. A. Reitzel, København, 1982, pp. 177-207. Esp. pp. 201 & 204.
19. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940. Vol. 3, page 313-58. In an article from 1834, called "Den danske Statskirke upartisk betragtet" (The Danish State Church neutrally considered), Grundtvig states his view of a "free" church:

"A free state-church with a free congregation, that is what I passionately wish for my fatherland. I am sure it will help to protect Christianity from the enormous stirrings which threaten it. I also know it will promote a deep,

influential, quiet, "enlightenment and science". Europe will be forced to admit that there is something "genuinely Danish", worth envying everywhere where it cannot be obtained". (Page 335, translated by the author of the thesis.)

"Later Grundtvig clarifies his view of the church more extensively. In Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. 6, page 215, he writes:

"because even when Heaven and Earth disappear together with all books, The Lord's Oral Word shall not disappear. Neither shall He himself, nor His believing congregation."

And further Grundtvig writes:

"-then, after having been urged by King Fredrik VI, I applied for the position of pastor at Vartou, where I was relatively free to serve the Lord and our common friends. So far I have done this for more than twenty years. I consented to do so on the condition that I should be allowed to teach as freely within the state church as earlier outside this church." (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

20. *ibid.* See also N. N. Thulstrup, Grundtvig, B.K., 13, C.A. Reizel, København, 1984, pp. 198-226, & Jørgen Bukdahl, Grundtvig og Kierkegaard, K. 9, Rosenkilde og Bagge, København 1974, pp. 196-219.
21. See Notes 16 & 17, this Chapter, above.
22. Aristotle, Physica, Book III, I: "Nature has been defined as a principle of motion and change". (200 b. 10 ff.) And: "The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists, is motion". (201 a. 10 ff.)
23. See Note 1, this Chapter, above.
24. Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Sections 218-24, in Richard M. Gale(ed.), The Philosophy of Time, A Collection of Essays, Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1967.
25. Aristotle discusses Zeno's arguments against motion in his Physics, Z 2 & 9. These texts are printed in G. S. Kirk & Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1964, pp. 291-97.
26. The Collected Works of Aristotle, Vols: 12, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1927. See Vol. 1, De Interpretatione, 21 B ff. Climacus supplements Aristotle's formal reasoning with the Platonic, metaphysical view by distinguishing between essence (i.e. the eternal idea), and existence (i.e. the temporal, changeable world). This is also pointed out in Thulstrup's Commentary, p. 237.

27. Kierkegaard has this information from W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 3, p. 407. See Thulstrup's Commentary, p. 237.
28. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1. Division, Book I, Chapter 2, 2nd Analogy. Max Müller's translation, New York, 1966, pp. 153 ff.
29. Climacus expresses here the Aristotelian idea of the "unmoved mover":

"But since there is something which moves itself while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. --- The first mover then exists of necessity".

Quoted after Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1-72 B, Vol. 8, in The Works of Aristotle, Oxford, 1927.

Leibnitz expresses the same idea:

"The sufficient or ultimate reason must therefore exist outside the succession or series of contingent particulars, infinite though this series may be. Consequently, the ultimate reason of all things must subsist in a necessary substance, in which all particular changes may exist only virtually as in its source: this substance is what we call God."

Leibnitz, The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, translated by R. Latta, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965. See also Leibnitz, Theodicy, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1952, Part I: "Essays on the Justice of God and the Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil".

30. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 7. Section, Part 2, end.
31. R. B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, pp. 212-17.
32. *ibid.*, p. 213.
33. Meister Eckhart, The Works of Meister Eckhart, by Frantz Pfeiffer, Vols: 2, John M. Watkins, 1947-52, Vol. 2, pp. 90-98.
34. See Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 93, line 36-38. Michael P. Levine argues that the Incarnation is without historical value for Kierkegaard. See his article, Why the Incarnation is a Superfluous Detail for Kierkegaard, Rel. Stud. 18, pp. 171-75. Levine understands thus Kierkegaard within religious-experiential phenomenology.
35. Concerning Heiberg, see Note 15, Chapter V, the thesis, above.

Concerning Martensen, see Notes 16 f., this Chapter, above.

36. F. W. J. Schelling, Werke, Vols: 6, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1965, Vol. 2, pp. 284-87, & 68f.
37. *ibid.*
38. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Metaphysics and Morals, Section I, 20-22. Translated by T. K. Abbott, Reprinted in London, 1967, pp. 17ff.
39. *ibid.*
40. F.B., S.V., Vol. 5, pp. 13-24, and Old Testament, Genesis, Chapter 22.
41. Climacus has the expression "prophet in reverse", from Carl Daub, Zeitschrift für Speculative Theologie, I, 1836. See Thulstrup's Commentary, p. 244.
42. See Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, p. 23, line 11.
 Max Scheler has a more positive view on repentance in Vom Ewigen im Menschen (On the Eternal in Man). In a long section he argues against all previous negative ideas of repentance, and finally states his own view. He thinks that repentance is a "faculty" in the human mind, capable of dissolving a "wrong" deed in the past, thereby making possible the complete forgiveness for sins through God's grace. Repentance has, therefore, a "transcendent" dimension:

 "In this view of God, the soul learns to understand the liberation of repentance and its own recreation through repentance, as the mysterious phenomenon of "forgiveness for sins", and as a new, powerful injection from the core of things".
 (Translated from German by the author of the thesis.)

 Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke, Vols: 6, Francke Verlag, Bern und München, 1968, Vom Ewigen in Menschen, Vol. 1, esp. p. 54. See also op. cit., 29-59.
43. See Peter Erb, Pietists. Selected Writings, Paulist Press, Toronto, 1983, pp. 29-96, esp. the texts by the pietist August Hermann Francke.
44. In Ph.S., Climacus seems to criticize Grundtvig, together with Martensen, for adhering to "immanent religion". See t.ex. Ph.S., S.V., Vol. 6, pp. 96 f. But in A.U.E., Grundtvig seems to be criticized by the same Climacus, for adhering to a transcendent religious view without having realized what immanent religiousness (Religiousness A) implies. See A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, p. 42. In Ph.S., Climacus criticizes Grundtvig from a Kantian, sceptical point of view.

45. H.L. Martensen also distanced himself clearly from Grundtvig, although he had been sympathetic to Grundtvigianism in his youth. In his memoirs, Af mit Levnet (About my Life), Gyldendal, København, 1883, he discusses at length why he disagrees with Grundtvig. See Section I, page 32-49. Among other things he writes there:

"Hvorfor jeg ikke blev hos ham?- Da svarer jeg i al Simpelhed; fordi han alligevel ikke kunde give mig , hva jeg væsentlig søgte" (Page 34.) "Jeg søgte Theologie, jeg søgte en harmonisk Eenhed af Tro og Erkjendelse, men Theologie, en Fordybelse i Troens Lærdomme, findes jo ikke hos Grundtvig."(Page 34)

Translation:

"Why did I not remain with him? (Grundtvig) My Answer is quite simple: because he could not give me what I was seeking." (Page 34) "I sought Theology, I sought a harmonious Unity between Faith and Reason. But Grundtvig has no Theology, no Reflections on the Truths of Faith." (Page 34). (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

46. See Notes 16-17, this Chapter, above.
47. See Niels Thulstrup, Mynster, B.K., 10, 1982, pp. 25 f.
48. See J. H. Schørring, Martensen, B.K., 10, pp. 185 ff., esp. 199 ff. & 204. See also Notes 16 f. this Chapter, above.
49. See Note 12, this Chapter, above.
50. In his work, Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie i vor Tids dogmatiske Theologie, Reitzel, København, 1841, Martensen writes:

"Og alle gammeltestamentlige Undere ere kun Fortegn, forberedende Gjennembrud af den nyskabende Virksomhed, der i Tidens Fylde centraliserer sig i Menneskeblivelsens og Kirkens Stiftelses Under." (§ 1, page 25)

Translation:

"And all Miracles of the Old Testament are only Preparations for the new creating Power, which in the Fullness of Time becomes centred in the Incarnation and the Miracle of the Foundation of the Church." (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

In this connection, see also §§ 15f. in the work mentioned above. See also Note 16, this Chapter, above, end.

It seems clear that Martensen subscribes to Hegel's rational, speculative view of the historical development, and that Climacus' criticisms on this point could be correct.

See also G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic. Part I of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 8. See also G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, p. 63. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 12.

51. Climacus' reference to doubt as the beginning of all philosophy, as well as his references to Socrates and Descartes in this connection, are aimed at Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy and Professor Martensen's views. See Papirer, IV B1-17,: Johannes Climacus eller(or) De omnibus dubitandum est.

H.L.Martensen expresses his views on Decartes' method in Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomi i vor Tids Dogmatik, Reitzel, København, 1883, § 5ff. (Page 17 ff.)

See also J.L. Heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, Reitzel, København, 1861, Vol. I, page 116 f., §§ 5-7:

§5: "Nærmest kan Philosophien da betragtes som Videnskaben uden Forudsetninger. Den maa altsaa begynde med Intet (Synthetisk Begyndelse).

§6: "Paa den anden Side er alle Philosophiens Gjenstande givne i Forestillingen, d.e. de ere Forudsætninger. Den maa altsaa begynde med Noget (Analytisk Begyndelse).

§7: "Philosophien maa da begynde med en Gjenstand, som baade er given og ikke given , baade Noget og Intet."

Translations:

§5 "Philosophy can be considered the Science without Presuppositions. It must start with Nothing" (Synthetic beginning).

§6: "On the other Hand, all Objects of Philosophy are given in Imagination, i.e. they are Presuppositions. It must consequently start with something" (Analytic beginning).

§7: " Philosophy must consequently start with an Object which both is and is not, both something and nothing. (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

52. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, translated by R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, Harward University Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 68 & 102-104.

See also Sextus Empiricus:

"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or "quietude" (ataraxia)."

Quoted from Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrronism, Loeb Classical Library, Heinemann, London, 1968, Book 1, 8. See also op. cit., 1, 12 & 1, 19.

53. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Dover Publications, New York, 1956, pp. 64 f. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 12.
54. *ibid.*, pp. 318-36. See also G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, translated by the Rev. E.B. Spiers, B.D., and J. Burdon Sanderson, Humanities Press, New York, 1968, pp. 99 f. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 17.
55. See Note 31, Chapter III, the thesis, above, and Kierkegaard's Papirer VI, A 10. Climacus extensively attacks Martensen's view of baptism and church in A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 10, pp. 65 ff. See also Ø, S.V. Vol. 19, pp. 83-88.
56. G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic:

"We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent contradiction itself. And similarly internal - or self-movement, or impulse in general (the appetitive force or *nisus* of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is itself and is also deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect. - Something therefore has life only in so far as it contains contradiction".

Quoted after G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Vols: 2, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, Vol. 2, pp. 67 f. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 6.

57. See Chapter 2, Note 59, the thesis, above.

CHAPTER VI

Johannes Climacus' Criticisms of the Danish Church

Interpretation of Chapter 5 in Philosophiske Smuler

A) Introduction

The 17th century in Europe was the age of the Enlightenment. During this century there was a steady progress in natural sciences. Nature could apparently be seen to follow fixed, rational laws and, by following these, mankind was thought to possess a tool with which it could determine its own future. As a result, confidence grew in the ability of reason to give satisfactory and adequate answers in religious matters. Theologians studied the Bible with a scientific, critical attitude, and it was soon pointed out that many of the biblical texts had to be a product of human superstitions. Christianity's possibility of survival was apparently dependent on its ability to accommodate to modern demands. It had first of all to meet the requirement of being a "universal" religion, resting upon three basic pillars: God, virtue, and immortality. The rationalistic theologians undertook therefore to interpret biblical texts in a way which could make them meet the requirements of the new age.

From the earliest time of Christianity, theologians had argued that there were three important, convincing proofs for the truth of Christianity. These were the miracles reported in the New Testament, the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies in Jesus, and the proof from Christianity's successful growth and victory in Western history. The rationalistic theologians especially attacked these three proofs. They argued that miracles could be accounted for through rational, scientific

explanations alone, and that the prophecies in the Old Testament could be interpreted historically in a number of ways; to attribute them to Jesus was therefore arbitrary. Finally, they argued that Christianity's success in history was a result of a number of factors, all following from secular reasons alone.

The first rationalistic theologian to attempt to provide a systematic criticism of the New Testament, was Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768). He lived in North Germany, but had received most of his rationalistic religious ideas from the English deists, John Tolland (1670-1722), and Anthony Collins (1676-1729). A main concern of Reimarus was to distinguish clearly between the Jesus of the four gospels and the Jesus of the epistles. The "gospel-Jesus" considered himself a political, Jewish Messiah, and proclaimed the Kingdom of God as a visible, political empire. In accordance with his self-understanding, this Jesus called people to repentance and belief.

The "epistle-Jesus", however, was a creation of Jesus' disciples. They fabricated the story of his resurrection and universalized his original national, Jewish message, so that it could be proclaimed for Gentiles as well as Jews. Jesus' disciples also changed the traditional Jewish customs into Christian sacraments (1).

Reimarus never published his biblical criticisms, knowing that they would cause a storm amongst orthodox theologians. His scientific criticisms were recorded in a handwritten, four-thousand-page manuscript, bearing the title, Apology for Rational Worshippers of God. Reimarus showed this work only to a few intimate friends. After

his death, the manuscript passed on to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), who anonymously published parts of it in a Journal for which he was responsible. This Journal was exempted from censorship, so nobody could stop him from publishing whatever he wanted. The only restriction was that he abstain from religious controversy.

Lessing published seven fragments from Reimarus' work, which he apparently refuted ~~as~~ to please the orthodox theologians. His "refutations" were a shrewd way of making Reimarus' ideas known. By setting the orthodox theologians up against the "unknown" author of the fragments, they would forget Lessing, the editor. He could therefore continue his publications, "educating" the ignorant theologians.

Lessing shared the optimism of the Enlightenment and thought that in time, orthodox beliefs would fall on their own untenability. Thus, he believed he would be able to supersede the orthodox superstition little by little. Apparently his own ultimate philosophical position was Spinozistic, pantheistic rationalism, rejecting all elements of historical, theistic Christianity. But he was careful not to tell anybody about his ultimate views until he lay on his death-bed. Spinozism had such a bad reputation among theologians at the time that a mere mention of Spinoza's name would exclude one from all further communication in religious matters. Lessing therefore chose this shrewd, indirect method of communication, with a view to eliminating the orthodox views. He apparently wished to prepare the ground for communication of his own, "a-historical", rational Spinozism (2).

Lessing's method of communication is well illustrated in his treatise, On the Proofs of Spirit and Power. There, he argues against the three traditional proofs of the truth of Christianity. He first rejects the proof of miracles as being "out of date": miracles simply do not happen any more. In order to please his theological opponents, he pretends to accept the New Testament accounts of miracles as having really taken place. In addition he raises the important problem of the relation between historical and rational knowledge. He concludes, in accordance with Leibnitz's distinction between "truths of fact" and "truths of reason", that "accidental truths of history" can never become the proof of "necessary truths of reason". There is an "ugly, broad ditch" between them which one "cannot get across". Lessing thus presented an insoluble dilemma to the orthodox theologians, a dilemma which in their view could be a defence of historical, dogmatic religion - including miracles - but, in Lessing's own ultimate, rationalistic view must be totally destructive of their views.

In the same, shrewd, indirect, rationalistic way Lessing continues to refute the two other proofs, namely the proof of fulfilled prophecies and the proof from history. But to please the orthodox theologians, Lessing continues to certify that he "does not deny" the tenability of these proofs. He omits saying that he ultimately must consider them as irrelevant, but says instead that his own views are based on "other grounds". What these "other grounds" are is not said; however, we must assume that they mainly are the ethical teaching of Jesus, defined in accordance with theological rationalism and Spinozistic philosophy (3).

As a Spinozist, Lessing must distinguish between two basic ways of understanding reality, namely sub specie temporis (from the temporal point of view), and sub specie aeternitatis (from the eternal point of view). Historical truths belong to time and must therefore be understood sub specie temporis. They can never give absolute, intuitive, essential insight. According to Spinoza's Ethics, such truths can render either inadequate knowledge, which can be true or false, or scientific, adequate, and necessarily true knowledge, attained by reason and deduction. Lessing consequently specifies that the historical truths he is talking about are "accidental, historical truths", thereby pointing towards "inadequate knowledge". This knowledge is separated from scientific and intuitive knowledge by an impassable border, the "ugly, broad ditch".

Lessing uses the "ditch" ironically against orthodox opponents. He believes that their religion belongs to a sphere of "inadequate knowledge" and must ultimately be rejected. But by pointing out the absolute border between adequate and inadequate knowledge, he wishes to direct their attention towards true, scientific, historical knowledge, which also can be considered sub specie temporis. This truth is, according to the Ethics, both identical with and absolutely different from intuitive, absolute, true knowledge. When man has reached this ambiguous stage of understanding, ultimate insight is within reach. At that point, the modes in reality can be understood sub specie aeternitatis, where all accidental, historical truths are superseded by mystic, pure and intuitive knowledge in amor intellectualis (4).

For Climacus, the "ditch" belongs to another context. He lives in a post-Kantian and post-Hegelian period of history, when the intellectuals take for granted that history reveals the complete and only reality. When Climacus reformulates Lessing's absolute distinction, it is not meant ironically, but as a most serious protest against Hegel's concept of dialectical reason, identified with the historical process. Climacus' formulation on the title page of Philosophiske Smuler runs as follows:

"Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?" [7, 7-10].

When Climacus first answers "no" to these questions, he is apparently in agreement with Lessing, and thereby reveals his "anti-Hegelian" position. But Climacus also adds a "yes" to this "no", thus acknowledging the Christian dogmatics Lessing wanted to repudiate. Climacus thinks that the historical and eternal realms have miraculously been brought together, in the historical Incarnation, and that this miracle can be repeated in the mystic, subjective passion of faith, where reason is transcended. In this respect he wants to distance himself from the right-wing Hegelians, Marheineke, Daub, and Martensen who, in Climacus' opinion, did not take Lessing's "ditch" seriously enough. As a result, Christianity was subsumed under reason and made "immanent" - ironically enough, as in Lessing's ultimate view! But in Philosophiske Smuler from 1843-44, the Kierkegaardian Climacus is apparently not concerned with, or even aware of Lessing's ultimate position. It took another five years before Kierkegaard rejected Lessing's views altogether in his writings (5).

However, the left-wing Hegelians apparently took Lessing's "ditch" seriously enough, like Climacus. David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74) criticized the right-wing Hegelians for not drawing the necessary implications of the historical criticism of the New Testament. Strauss' own findings in this respect meant a radical breakthrough for New Testament historical research. His work on the life of Jesus, Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus), written in 1835, is still one of the classics in the study of the historical Jesus. Strauss rejected the historicity of all four gospels. All his predecessors in critical Bible-research had taken for granted that, of the four gospels, the gospel according to St. John was the most reliable in historical matters, since it contained fewer miracles than the other gospels. But Strauss showed that it was the youngest, most philosophical, and the least reliable as a historical document. This strengthened Strauss' main idea that the accounts in the New Testament were legendary narratives, created in the early church after Jesus was dead. The creation of these accounts had occurred according to the same laws as had created myths and legends in any other religion and/or culture. The New Testament was not a historical document of the life of Jesus. It was rather a product of human consciousness at a certain time in history, caused by the mighty impact of the historical person of Jesus. Strauss argued therefore that Reimarus' distinction between the "gospel-Jesus" and the "epistle-Jesus" was fictitious. Nobody can know what Jesus taught. From the available documents we can only know the teaching of Jesus' followers (6).

Still more radical views were propounded by Strauss' follower and critic, the Tübingen professor, Bruno Bauer (1809-82). Bauer started out as a right-wing

Hegelian and a critic of Strauss' Das Leben Jesu, but by the end of the 1830's his views were drastically radicalized. He ended up criticizing Strauss for not going far enough in his criticisms of the Bible. Bauer meant that it was theological prejudice to believe that the Jesus of the New Testament had ever lived as a historical person. He believed that the story about Jesus was an invention of an author who wrote in Aramaic. The four authors of the gospels built upon this first story. Therefore, everything concerning Jesus could be explained as fantasies of human consciousness. From this starting point, Christianity had developed into a world religion in accordance with the laws that apply in all human individuals and societies. Bauer's view of Christianity was thus closely related to Ludwig Feuerbach's (1840-72), who held that Christianity was the result of a projection of human consciousness (7).

One can understand the theological milieu in Denmark around 1830-50 in the light of influences from theological rationalism, theological orthodoxy, and Hegelianism. The 18th century had been dominated by pietistic lay movements in concurrent opposition to a strong, ecclesiastic theological rationalism. In the beginning of the 19th century, Professor Henrik Nikolai Clausen (1793-1877) was the foremost representative of rationalistic theology at the University of Copenhagen. However, as a result of influence from Schleiermacher's theology, Clausen's theological position was a moderate rationalism. Schleiermacher had emphasized religious feeling and orthodox dogmatics beside his rationalistic, exegetic method. But Clausen made exegesis the principal discipline in theology, and thus introduced some rationalistic ideas to the Danish theological milieu (8).

Another representative of moderate theological rationalism was Jacob Peter Mynster (1775-1854), later to become bishop. He strongly adhered to Kant's philosophy of religion, expressing his Kantian, rational theology in his sermons. However, Mynster was more influenced by pietistic supra-naturalism and conservatism than Clausen, and during his life he became increasingly critical of Clausen's rationalistic exegesis (9).

The orthodox reaction to rationalistic theology in 19th century Denmark was a legacy of the theologically conservative Pietism of the foregoing century. Orthodox, pietistic influence is noticeable in both Clausen and Mynster, but becomes still more obvious in the Rev. N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). He titled his inaugural sermon upon his admission to the priesthood in 1810, "Hvi er Herrens Ord forsvundet af Hans Huus?" ("Why has the Word of the Lord vanished from his House?") (10). In this sermon he fiercely attacked theological rationalism, and published his criticisms without asking permission from the rationalistic theologians at the University of Copenhagen. This was illegal, and the theologians complained to the Danish Chancellery. The case was settled with Grundtvig receiving a reprimand for his illegal action.

This incident, however, did not stop Grundtvig's attacks on theological rationalism. His harshest attack occurred in 1825. Clausen had published a work called, Catholisismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning. Lære og Ritus (The Ecclesiastical Constitution of Catholicism and Protestantism. Their Doctrines and

Rituals). In this work he followed Schleiermacher's method of combining rational exegesis of the Bible with Christian faith. He claimed also that only theologians, not lay people, should be permitted to interpret the Bible.

Grundtvig reacted most vehemently to the rationalistic tendency in the work. He promptly published Kirkens Gjenmæle (The Church's Reply), written in such a sharp tone that Clausen pressed a case of libel against him (11). Grundtvig lost the case, and as a result he resigned from his work as a priest in the state church. Subsequently, all his written work was subject to censorship, until 1837. Even so, he continued to serve as an unpaid minister from 1832 to 1839.

In opposition to Clausen's emphasis on exegesis, Grundtvig gave priority to a theology centred around the church. He drew a sharp distinction between faith and reason, and claimed that the church was built on faith alone. He was not opposed to critical research of the Bible, but said that such criticism was only concerned with "dead words". The church, however, should be concerned with the "living word" of faith. Grundtvig especially found this "living word" in the words Jesus spoke when he instituted the sacraments of communion and baptism. These biblical texts were the concrete manifestations of the "living word", through which the true church had received the grace of God from generation to generation since Jesus' time.

Climacus ridicules Grundtvig's idea that the words of institution of baptism and communion were a more secure foundation for the church than the Bible itself (12).

Apparently he does not even try to understand what Grundtvig really wanted to say with his theory of the church. For Grundtvig's idea was certainly not to partake in a "scientific" or theoretical debate, thus attempting to find an "objective" and secure foundation for "right", Christian doctrines. It was an expression of his sharp distinction between subjective faith and objective reason, as well as of his belief that a Christian, religious society must be built on faith alone (13).

The central idea, which Grundtvig developed more and more clearly as he grew older, is the so-called "theory of growth". Grundtvig accepted "growth" in his concept of Christian faith. This applied to the individual believer as well as to the Christian church. He believed that immediate perfection in matters of faith was an impossibility. Rather, faith educated people so that they could grow towards perfection in social as well as individual matters (14).

Søren Kierkegaard's polemical "opposite" view of Grundtvig's "theory of growth" could be named the "theory of leap". Kierkegaard rejected all kinds of "gradation" regarding Christian faith, and claimed an absolute either/or in Christian matters. He thought that faith never could be a product of a gradual growth into "happiness". It must always be the Absolute Paradox, implying fear and trembling, sin and suffering (15).

In accordance with his "theory of growth", Grundtvig believed in the importance of educating "common man". Taking his ideas from English colleges, he founded his

so-called "Folkehøiskoler" (Folk High-schools) in contrast to the public "Latin Schools". In practice the Latin Schools recruited students from the economic and intellectual upper classes, and placed most importance on classic languages and culture. This was a legacy of the rationalists' programme of education from the century of the Enlightenment. Grundtvig's "Folkehøiskoler" placed most importance on Scandinavian culture. In the Old Norse mythology, Grundtvig saw a reflection of a fully developed consciousness which could serve as a foundation for Christian belief (16).

Grundtvig's views were thus highly influenced by romantic ideas. This influence is also obvious in his tendency to idealize the Christianity of lay people, in contrast to upper-class, ecclesiastic Christianity. He primarily desired a church governed by its members, a so-called "free popular-church", different from the state church which was favoured by Martensen, as well as Mynster and Clausen. However, Grundtvig became less ardent to change the church organization as he grew older. In 1839 he himself became a priest in the Danish state church, on the precondition that he now could teach as independently within the church as he earlier had taught outside the church (17). His views were thereby partly reconciled with the Hegelian as well as with the conservative, rationalistic views of the theological milieu in Copenhagen. The ensuing development within the Danish church partly changed Grundtvig's original ideas. In the latter half of the 19th century, Grundtvigianism became increasingly connected with "liberal theology". The orthodox reaction was taken over by a Kierkegaard-influenced, conservative Pietism. In this way a strife between a Grundtvigian and a

Kierkegaardian faction became one of the most decisive factors in the development of church history in Scandinavia. This strife lasted far into the 20th century.

Johan Ludvig Heiberg was the first to introduce Hegel's philosophy in Denmark, in the mid-1820's. However, as far as influence in theological circles was concerned, Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-84) was more important. He had studied in Germany from 1834 to 1836, and had met with the foremost Hegelians, Marheineke, Daub, Strauss, and Bauer. Martensen clearly rejected the views of the left-wing Hegelians, criticizing them for heresy and subjectivism (18). His position was closer to the views of the right-wing Hegelians, Marheineke and Daub. Martensen apparently believed that it was only to a certain extent possible to reconcile dogmatic, historical Christianity with speculative, Hegelian philosophy. He never really subscribed to the views of the German right-wing Hegelians. Martensen tended more towards the mysticism of Eckhart, Böhme and Baader, whom he had studied thoroughly, and it was on their mystic presuppositions that he claimed to "go beyond Hegel". He wanted thus to give Christian dogmatics and subjectivity a more independent rôle within speculative Hegelianism than his German, right-wing Hegelian predecessors had allowed (19).

In his young days, Martensen had been a Grundtvigian, and he remained sympathetic to Grundtvig's "theory of growth" throughout his life (20). However, he desired a strong state church, and on this issue he was partly in opposition to Grundtvig and in agreement with Mynster and Clausen. Søren Kierkegaard also shared

the positive view of a state church until his final struggle against it in the 1850's. A main reason for this initial positive attitude, was his emphatic rejection of the left-wing Hegelian views, propounded in Denmark by the theologians Andreas Frederik Beck (1816-61) and Hans Brøchner (1820-75). Against them, Kierkegaard took Mynster's party, thinking that a strong state church would be the best means to keep their "un-Christian" views away.

Martensen's views are clearly expressed in his treatise on baptism, Den christelige Daab (The Christian Baptism), which he published just before Søren Kierkegaard published Philosophiske Smuler. In his work, Martensen said that, since the church in the beginning was new and "unsettled", it must have been more difficult to become a Christian in the early church than later. For as time passed, the church became increasingly incorporated into European, cultural life, thus becoming "naturalized". Martensen further stated that full membership in the church followed from baptism (21).

Thus, it is clear that Martensen and Grundtvig shared many important views concerning the status and function of the church, which were in sharp opposition to Climacus' "right" Christian view. To say that the Christian church is "nature" is for Climacus blasphemous. Such an idea undermines the "true" dogmatic meaning of sin and redemption. Climacus can thus attack Grundtvig and Martensen together on this point, and he refers their common "convenient" view of the church back to a superficial, right-wing reading of Hegel, implying that "sin is ignorance". In order to

refute their views, Climacus argues in the same way as the left-wing Hegelians, Beck and Bröchner. However, Climacus shows only very limited agreement with the left-wing Hegelians. He is apparently well acquainted with the writings of the German left-wing Hegelians, Strauss, Bauer, and Feuerbach, and he agrees with Martensen in rejecting their ultimate views altogether. But Climacus can also use the left-wing Hegelians' criticisms to undermine Martensen's untenable, Hegelian-Platonic presuppositions, thus directing the right-wing Hegelians attention towards "true" Christianity.

It is thus clear that Climacus had to be entangled in a rather complex variety of ideas and views when he attacked his contemporary Danish theologians' views. In addition, these attacks were partly also a result of political and personal motives, making it still more difficult to clarify all nuances and details in his polemics. This being said, one could attempt to "place" Climacus in relation to his contemporary Danish theologian opponents, in the following way:

Climacus agrees with the moderate rationalists, Mynster and Clausen, as well as with the romantic-orthodox Grundtvig, in their opposition to Martensen's Hegelian, speculative theology. But Climacus disagrees with Grundtvig's and Martensen's view of the church and the function of baptism. (The historical Kierkegaard, however, supported the state church institution together with Martensen, Grundtvig, Mynster and Clausen until his breach with the church in the 1850's.) The relation between different factions in the debate is further complicated by the fact that Mynster had

been a close friend of Kierkegaard's father all through his life. Søren Kierkegaard therefore abstained from attacking Mynster as long as he lived, even indirectly in the pseudonymous writings. Kierkegaard therefore does not attack Mynster by means of Climacus! It is also a factor of influence in Kierkegaard's as well as Climacus' relation to Grundtvig, that Søren Kierkegaard's brother and father were sympathetic to the Grundtvigians.

It is therefore natural that Climacus' attacks on the Danish church in Philosophiske Smuler should be incomplete, compared with Søren Kierkegaard's attitudes and attacks on the Danish church through the 1840's and 50's. In Philosophiske Smuler dating from 1842-43, Climacus does not touch on Mynster at all, and he confines himself to attacking the theologically rationalistic and left-wing Hegelian criticism of the Bible. In addition, he attacks Martensen and Grundtvig together as far as their views of the church are concerned. Climacus believes that they have a too optimistic and social view of Christianity and, emphasizing that sin and evil are much more serious in "true" mystic Christianity, he focusses on the paradoxes as well as on, Kantian epistemological scepticism and anti-rationalism. "True" mystic Christianity thus acquires an "irrational" dimension, and through anti-rationalism Climacus can "prove" that "sin is not ignorance".

B) Criticism of Theological Rationalism and Hegelian Speculation

Climacus wants to make Lessing's "ugly broad ditch" completely impassable. In this respect he agrees with the view of the left-wing Hegelians, that there is an unbridgeable gap between the results of historical criticism of the New Testament, and orthodox, dogmatic Christianity. He must therefore reject the Danish rationalistic, Schleiermachian theologians' belief in reconciliation between faith and reason, as well as the Danish right-wing Hegelians' reconciliation of orthodox theology with Hegelian philosophy. But this is not enough. Climacus rejects further the left-wing Hegelians' views that Christian dogmas should be understood as "immanent" creations of the human mind, and thus without any historical foundation. He believes that Christian dogmas are literally true. Lessing's "ditch" is ultimately bridgeable through the subjective passion of mystic faith. In this experience, when reason is radically "transcended", the incomprehensible dogmas of Christianity become verified. Climacus must thus believe that ultimately there is a "historical starting point for an eternal consciousness" [7, 7-8], in spite of the impossibility reason raises for understanding such a connection.

Since mystic faith is attainable, Climacus raises the question of whether it would be easier for some people to reach faith than for others, depending on when they happened to live [81, 25-31 & 82, 1-8]. Before attempting an answer, Climacus excludes believers who were contemporary with Jesus. They could relate directly to their sensory experience of the Incarnation, and were therefore in a different position

than all succeeding believers [82, 20-30]. Climacus is concerned with believers who have attained faith through relating to reports by Jesus' contemporaries, i.e. believers within the "later" Christian church. Is there, then, a difference between early and late disciples of Jesus Christ with regard to faith? In order to approach an answer, Climacus finds it useful to contrast the first and latest generations of the church. They are the furthest away from each other in time, and can be expected to show the greatest differences [83, 1-11].

According to theological rationalistic interpreters of the Bible, such as H.C. Clausen, the first generation of Christians might be thought to be in the most favourable position. Since it was the closer to the Incarnation in time, this generation would be able to acquire exact and reliable information about what happened from men whose reliability could be "verified in other ways" [83, 13-16]. One could imagine a person of this generation, employing all his energy and conceivable means to acquire the most detailed and absolutely reliable description of the Incarnation or the "God-man event". This description might be even more reliable and certain than the immediate experience of Jesus' contemporaries, since the latter might possibly doubt their sense-experience. A more distant description might also be less "offensive", since a verbal exposition of a God in a servant's clothing would probably appear more neutral in respect to emotions than the God's actual, sensory appearance [84, 13-35].

Climacus does not reject the value of a detailed historical description [84, 25]. But he states that it can only be a "quantitative" approximation to an objective, outer

description of the God-man event, understood as a historical fact of first degree. Such a description can never be complete and final, since one might always have the possibility of acquiring new information that could lead to minor or major changes in the description [84, 2-3] (22). More accurately, Climacus seems to believe that, in the theologically rationalistic criticism of the Bible, Clausen had confounded faith and the impossible task of giving a complete description of a historical fact [84, 5-7]. In the same way, all critics of the Bible direct all their zeal and passions towards completing a description of a historical fact, thus deceiving themselves into believing that their research is relevant for faith! They obscure the absolute distinction between reason and passions, although clearly this distinction is a necessary precondition for attaining "true" mystic faith. Their criticisms are often manifestations of intellectual ability, but they are totally irrelevant for faith [83, 36]. In this way, Climacus, like the left-wing Hegelians, makes himself a spokesman for a Christianity which has been cut off from its historical connection. But he distances himself from the same left-wing Hegelians when he refers to another advantage the first generation might have over the last by virtue of being so close to the Incarnation event:

Strauss had pointed out that the Jesus-event must have caused a mighty impact, a "stir" in contemporary people and social environments, since it could give rise to the human "mythology" which founded the world-religion of Christianity. Even Bauer, who had gone further than Strauss in rejecting the historicity of Jesus, admitted that there must have been a first, decisive historical influence, a "stir", which could give rise to the creation process of Christianity (23). Climacus rejects Bauer's and Strauss' attempt

to found Christianity on some primary "astonishment". Faith cannot be a convenient result of "surprise"! It invariably implies "transcendence" of reason and connection with the historical fact of second degree of the Incarnation. The primary "stir" of Christianity is not a rational starting point for a "natural" creation of the human mind. It is the Absolute Paradox, leading to "offence" as well as "faith". In fact, the left-wing Hegelians are themselves an illustration of this. Being offended with the Absolute Paradox, they have made Christianity into an "immanent", human religion, excluding "sin-consciousness" of "true" mystic Christianity.

However, Climacus admits that there might have been a relative advantage of having been close to the mighty impact of the Incarnation event. The "astonishment" might direct people's attention towards Jesus. Thereby the contrast between faith and offence might have appeared more distinct for early disciples than for later, and the requirements of a fearful decision of "right" Christianity might have appeared more conspicuous. This could prevent the misunderstanding so prevalent in Climacus' contemporary church, that one might readily "understand" the Incarnation and acquire faith as an easy comfort [84, 34-39 & 85, 1-11].

Climacus believes that since the Danish church of his own time is so remote from the Incarnation, it cannot possibly have the advantage of a "first impact". However, it might be better off with respect to the traditional proof from history. For the more distant the Incarnation, the more one should expect to see its consequences in history, and thus be able to "prove" the validity of Christianity. Therefore, Climacus

points out that his contemporary church might be in the most favourable position to give a "probability proof" for Christian, dogmatic truths [85, 21-24].

However, Climacus straightway rejects this rationalistic idea. Such a proof can never be more than a "quantitative" approximation to a historical fact, being irrelevant for "true" faith [84, 24-27]. His rejection primarily seems to be directed against Martensen, who believed that history was a "necessary" development. Martensen had made faith "quantitative", and placed it within the area where rationalistic "probability proofs" could meaningfully be made! Climacus, however, believes that faith is a mystic subjective passion, a "quality". It implies "transcendence" of all quantitative thinking, an Absolute Paradox.

Climacus' rejection of the terms "probable" and "probability proof" also echoes a rejection of Pascal's thinking. Pascal had argued that the truth of Christianity was more probable than the opposite, if one were bold enough to try it out. In fact, Kierkegaard owned Pascal's works, and his use of "probable" is apparently more dependent on Pascal than on Hegel (24). Nevertheless, the polemical situation unmistakably points in the direction of rejecting the rational views of his contemporary Danish Hegelians. In this connection Climacus seems to identify the term "probable" with "reason" derogatorily, and "improbable" with "faith" ironically. Thus, he makes reason and faith into logical opposites, in accordance with his adherence to both Kantian sceptical epistemological views and mystic Hegelian-related epistemological views. In a rather sophisticated exposition, he goes on to state that one cannot give a

"probability proof" (quantitative) for the "improbable" (i.e. the quality of faith or the Absolute Paradox) to prove that the "improbable" (quality) is "probable" (quantity). For in that case the concept of "probable" (quantity) would have been changed into "improbable" (i.e. the quality of faith or the Absolute Paradox). And one cannot use a "probability proof" (quantitative) to prove the "improbable" (i.e. the quality of faith of the Absolute Paradox). For it is a "contradiction" (understood as a principle of exclusion) to use (quantitative) "probability" to prove (qualitative) "improbability" [85, fn. 1-5].

Thus, Climacus' word-games and exercises all circle around his fundamental distinction between quantity and quality as much as around the terms of probability and improbability. Climacus' considers that Martensen confounds quantity and quality, in his attempt to reconcile Christian faith with Hegelian philosophy of history. As a result of Martensen's confusion, Christianity must appear as an "immanent" religion, i.e. a religion within man's capacities, where faith is turned into reason. According to Climacus, one can never "understand" the Incarnation from possible "consequences" in history. For since they are caused by a paradox they might point in opposite directions. If Martensen were right, and one could actually see these consequences in history, they could no longer be absolutely paradoxical, but must have changed in quality during the interval between the Incarnation and the present. Climacus mentions two ways this transformation might have occurred. First he refers to the Hegelian theory that speculative concepts have a drive within themselves, causing the dialectical process of movement (25). If the "quality" of movement were part of

"quantitative" thinking, one might think that the qualitative, Absolute Paradox also might have changed, so that it would no longer be paradoxical. However, Climacus rejects this theoretical possibility, holding that Hegel's reconciliation of the quality of movement and the quantity of thinking is untenable [86, 1-14].

The other way Climacus thinks that the Absolute Paradox could be transformed from a quality to a quantity, is represented in Martensen's theory of "naturalization" in his work, Den christelige Daab (The Christian Baptism) [87, 7]. On the basis of Martensen's views in this work, Climacus draws the conclusion that the Absolute Paradox must gradually have become accommodated to the "immanent" human world, being "naturalized" after it entered history, so that its consequences became decreasingly paradoxical [86, 15-16]. In this way, the later church appears to have had an advantage over the earlier with regard to faith. For the later church would be increasingly protected against the possibility of "offence" which was so conspicuous in the early church [87, 1-4]. Climacus' contemporary Danish church might thus be in the most favourable position of all generations as far as faith is concerned. One can hardly become offended with its convenient message that one can become a Christian just by being baptized (26).

Such a convenient view is, in Climacus' opinion, totally incompatible with "true" Christianity, since it presupposes that faith is subordinated to quantitative thinking. In order further to illustrate the point he is making, Climacus tries to show some logical

implications which follow from Martensen's view, when this is applied to the Christian dogmatics Martensen himself subscribed to:

"Right" Christian dogmatics requires transcendence, implying a change from a first, human nature, into a second one, brought about by faith. Faith occurs in time, and thus there must be an interval in time between man's first and second nature. Martensen adheres to immanent, Platonic-Hegelian presuppositions, implying that time is an illusion. Thus, if one should attempt to reconcile Christian dogmatics concerning the "second nature of faith" with Martensen's view, it would imply that man was born with the "second nature". But this is absurd, since, if there is a second nature, there must also have been a first one earlier in time. For "true" Christianity can only be grasped within a context which gives full value to linear time. Otherwise, man must be an "absurd" creature, born with two natures at the same time- but still apart in time, so that one of them presupposes the intermediate, historical time span necessary for talking about a "second nature of faith" [87, 9-39]!

To illustrate further how ridiculous and untenable Martensen's theory is, Climacus also draws the following conclusions: If faith has become "naturalized", the dogmatic term "rebirth" must be identical with "natural birth". A "born" person is thereby also "reborn". If man is born with faith, mankind is "reborn", and its character must have become totally changed after the Incarnation. This must be so, in spite of Martensen's Hegelian presuppositions, requiring rational continuity between cause and effect through different stages in the development of mankind. However, these

presuppositions exclude any fundamental change. But if, nevertheless, mankind has changed radically after the Incarnation, it should not be called "mankind" any more, but ought to take another name [88, 4-15].

By drawing such absurd conclusions from Martensen's premises, Climacus wants to show, once and for all, that Martensen's theory of "naturalization" and view of baptism are ridiculous and untenable. "True" Christianity cannot be reconciled with immanent, speculative, Platonic-Hegelian philosophy [88, 18]. It must always be subjective and transcendent, refusing to be communicated directly. Every new generation within the church must face the same Absolute Paradox in faith. The "historical proof" of the truth of Christianity must therefore be rejected (88, 20-39 & 89, 1-4). Ultimately, there is no difference between the early and later church. All human beings are in the same position. They can either receive faith as a gift of grace in the highest "fear and trembling", or reject this gift of God in "offence" [89, 5-31].

C) Criticism of Grundtvig's View of the Church

Concerning theological rationalism and Hegelianism, Climacus could attack a clearly defined, "rational-immanent" position, which he could contrast with the "true" transcendence of his mystic, Christian, Alternative View. He thereby revealed a sharp discrepancy between the two positions. However, when it comes to Grundtvig's view

of the church, this contrast does not really apply. Grundtvig's orthodox, theological views were based on subjective faith, and nobody had fought more violently against theological rationalism than he had done. Apparently, Grundtvig held a "transcendent" Christian view, like Climacus, so he could hardly be criticized for adhering to a "rational-immanent" Christian position. A criticism of Grundtvig's Christian views must therefore be directed towards elements in his "transcendent" faith, appearing to be incompatible with the Absolute Paradox and the necessary evil characterizing Climacus' own "right", mystic Christian view.

Climacus finds his main point of attack in Grundtvig's "theory of growth" and the implications following from this theory: for if there really were an individual and collective growth in faith, then there must also be a difference between the early and later church as far as faith is concerned (27). Climacus has therefore raised the question of how one can define a later disciple of Christ in relation to an early one. Is there any difference at all [81, 8-25]? Climacus' answer is that there is not. For every disciple of Christ, whenever he happens to live in history, is a contemporary disciple, related to the Absolute Paradox. Grundtvig's "theory of growth" is therefore untenable.

Grundtvig thought that Jesus had given the "living word" of faith to the first disciples, when he instituted the sacraments of baptism and communion. Later, the church was the carrier of the "living word", and could pass it on to future generations in a process of successive growth for all mankind (28). From this theory, Climacus

draws the conclusion that Grundtvig presupposed that faith must be within human capacity after the church was founded. But if faith nevertheless is "transcendent" and outside of man's capacities, man must be transcendent too. He must be "God" for the next person who assumes faith! This is "nonsense", according to Climacus [91, 1-18]. In order to explain how Grundtvig's absurdity differs from the absurd consequences of the Absolute Paradox in his own view, Climacus refers to Socrates: the Socratic followers were totally independent of each other, because they had the divine nature within themselves. As a consequence, they could not owe each other anything. Also in the Alternative View there is a "Socratic" relation between followers, i.e. disciples of Jesus. They do not owe each other anything, but owe everything to the transcendent God [92, 2-4]. But in Grundtvig's "Christian" view, the Socratic relation is distorted. For him, a disciple would have to owe everything to another disciple. Grundtvig thus confuses "immanence" and "transcendence", like the Hegelians. As a result of his confusion, he thinks that there can be a quantitative "growth" in faith. "True" faith, however, must always be logically-rationally transcendent and totally incomprehensible, excluding all possibilities of "growth".

Climacus points further out that Grundtvig's "theory of growth" implies a "gradation" within the Absolute Paradox. He expresses this in an ironical comparison between the Absolute Paradox of the Alternative View and the "absolute paradox" of Grundtvig's view. In the former, the Absolute Paradox is a "urimeligheid" (i.e. a Danish term whose meaning lies between "absurdity" and "improbability"), in which faith can be obtained, and is not "nonsense". In Grundtvig's "absolute paradox", however, there

is apparently an additional contradiction, so that a "nonsensical" paradox is the result [91, 31-33]!

Thus, Climacus ridicules Grundtvig's "misunderstanding" of the Absolute Paradox. It is "nonsense" to weaken the seriousness of transcendence in order to make Christianity more convenient and suited for human beings!

Grundtvig had also idealized the Old Norse culture, believing that the Scandinavians could best find their true cultural identity in their own inherent, traditional mythology. For the Scandinavians, this mythology was a true predecessor of Christian faith, in the same way as Old Testament and Greek mythologies served as presages for Christian faith of the Jews and the Greeks. Grundtvig wanted to realize his religious ideas in his "Folkehøiskoler" (Folk highschoools) under the slogan, "first human, then Christian" (29). He often expressed his religious ideas poetically. A characteristic trait of "Folkehøiskoler" was therefore singing of optimistic, nationalistic songs. Grundtvig also wrote many religious hymns, and from 1837 he was in charge of editing a hymnbook for the Danish church (30).

Climacus does not see the relevance of Grundtvig's romantic ideas, and he has nothing else than irony with which to meet them. But on one point he directly attacks Grundtvig's views as "un-Christian": he cannot accept Grundtvig's social optimism, "happiness" and "festivity" [96, 16-23]. Climacus cannot consider his contemporary Danes to live in a more "happy generation" than other generations, as far as faith is

concerned [96, 29]. Moreover, Grundtvig's "singing and ringing" [96, 32/38 & 97, 27] in a "triumphant generation" [96, 37 f.] and his concept of "faith" that "advances en masse in triumph" [97, 3-14], describe a ridiculous caricature of "right" Christian faith, according to Climacus.

Thus, Climacus reacts to the lack of "seriousness" in Grundtvig's view of Christianity: the Absolute Paradox is forgotten in the noise of an "ale-norse, popular genius", and the difficulty involved in becoming a "true" Christian is neglected. Climacus does not accept a gradual transition to faith, either for societies or individuals. All generations are in the same position. They must become contemporary with the God-man in subjective, transcendent faith [94, 20 f. & 95, 4/15/16]. No person can give faith to another, as Grundtvig's view implies. A person can only tell another person that he himself has believed the Absolute Paradox, and received faith as a gift from God. Not even the New Testament, nor the words of baptism and communion, can lead anybody to faith. Only God himself can do this. If the contemporary disciples of Jesus had left nothing behind but the words, "We have believed that in such and such a year God appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died", this would have been "more than enough" [96, 34-38].

Climacus' criticisms of Grundtvig seem contradictory and out of place. His emphatic underlining of the crucial difference between faith and reason had been expressed at least as emphatically by Grundtvig himself for more than twenty years.

Climacus' rejection of the holy scriptures as of no avail for faith, so that just a short testimony from the first disciples would have been "more than enough", sounds similar to Grundtvig's claim, that the "living word" is "more than enough". The only conspicuous difference between Climacus' and Grundtvig's views, is the serious evil pertaining to Climacus' "right" view. Climacus appears to believe that Grundtvig has acquired a Socratic, Hegelian "Christian" position without taking into account the sophistic, Kantian sceptical and "irrational" implications of a "true" Christian view.

Climacus therefore seeks refuge in Kantian, sceptical epistemological views, and attributes Grundtvig's mistake to the same source as Martensen's, criticizing them both for confusing the borders of objectivity and subjectivity, "immanence" and "transcendence". This mistake can further be led back to the Hegelian claim, that the principle of contradiction is overcome in "dialectical reason" (31). As a result a clear dialectics has been made impossible. For in order to be a good dialectician, absolute distinctions in thinking are necessary. When Hegel neglects this and "reconciles" the principle of contradiction, this procedure is itself built on reliance upon the principle of contradiction! For otherwise, the opposite claim, that the principle of contradiction has indisputable validity, would be equally true [97, 31-37]. Absolute opposites in logic are necessary to acquire paradoxical passions, and it is only within these passions that a "true" mystic coincidence of "transcendence" and "immanence" can occur. One must therefore adhere to Kantian, sceptical, epistemological presuppositions in order to prevent Grundtvig's ridiculous misunderstanding, that "sin is ignorance", and that "faith" advances in triumph followed by "singing and ringing".

D) Concluding Summarizing Remarks

Climacus' dilemma in attacking another "transcendent", Christian view only led him again to emphasize the key characteristics of the mystic Alternative View: evil in transcendent reality and "sin-consciousness". In order to justify this view, he resorts to dogmatics and the peculiar mystic experience of faith. By subjecting Grundtvig's view to the same criticism as he directed against Martensen's, Climacus reveals how strongly he adheres to his Kantian sceptical epistemological frame of reference. The Kantian presuppositions in his polemics against Hegelians should not only be taken as ironical, pedagogical, indirect means of communication, but also as his ultimate view.

However, Grundtvig's solution to the problem of evil was primarily a practical solution, originating in his subjective faith. He held that God is good, and evil ultimately relative. Human life is also good, and through faith in the good, "transcendent" God, evil is excluded. Therefore, Grundtvig did not tie evil to rational, Hegelian presuppositions, as Climacus sometimes seems to presuppose. Grundtvig was not a Hegelian, speculative theologian, like Martensen (32). His practical solution to the problem of evil was connected with his "theory of growth", implying that human consciousness developed within God's good creation. This did not mean that the Christian dogmatic elements of guilt and sin were diluted. Grundtvig simply believed

that one should work against evil, in individuals as well as societies, in order thereby to grow in Christian perfection. It seems doubtful, however, that this perfection was a "mystic" perfection. Grundtvig's involvement in politics as well as in polemics against theological rationalism and the state church should rather be seen as a result of his personal zeal to realize his romantic and Christian ideas in practical life. He wanted to liberate common man from the manipulations of a hypocritical, snobbish, and intellectual upper class (33). Thus, Grundtvig became an important predecessor of radical, nationalistic, liberal political movements in Scandinavia in the latter part of the 19th century. One can trace some of the roots of the radical-liberal, as well as the socialistic, political parties in Scandinavia today, to Grundtvigianism.

Through his polemics, Climacus does not primarily intend to institute practical reforms in church or society, but rather to defend his "right" Christian views against "wrong" Hegelian views. Climacus claims to "know" what Christianity is, and this knowledge is composed of Kantian, epistemological views combined with mystic Hegelian-related religious knowledge, implying "irrationalism" and evil in the mystic transcendent reality. The "right" knowledge does not include practical, social reforms. In this way Climacus' views are closer to the mystic Christianity of Meister Eckhart than to Grundtvig's practical, social views. Also Meister Eckhart apparently gave greater priority to defending his own views, than bringing about practical reforms in the church or society. Towards the end of his life when he was charged with heresy, he did not rebel or try to promote some kind of revolution within the Catholic church. This would probably have been possible for him, since there existed strong lay

movements which undoubtedly would have supported him. Eckhart, however, did not start the Reformation. Instead he defended himself against the charges of heresy, trying to show that all his views were in full accordance with orthodox, Roman Catholic doctrines. He offered in addition to revoke everything that might have challenged the indisputable authority of the church. Thus, both Meister Eckhart and Climacus attempted to defend their mystic, subjective religious views against intruding disturbances. Their polemics had no radical, social intentions.

One may thus say that Climacus' polemics against theological rationalists, Hegelians, and Grundtvigians, is a subjective self-defence. When he attacks Grundtvig, he finds himself in a hopeless situation. He cannot know Grundtvig's ultimate views which were based on subjective faith, and neither can he communicate his own subjective views to others. He encounters the Menonic dilemma. Climacus' way out of this dilemma is to maintain it so that paradoxical passions can be increased to a maximum, and the "right" mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian transcendence of reason within passions occur. Thus, Climacus can use his polemical involvement as a means to reach faith. Like Eckhart and other mystics he apparently uses suffering and activity as tools of purgation on his way towards mystic perfection and tranquillity. Not totally so, though. For Climacus must emphasize that "true" faith is always a free gift from the inscrutable, transcendent God, "beyond" human, rational capacities. Both Martensen and Grundtvig confuse the absolute limitations set by the Menonic dilemma, Climacus believes. Their views of Christianity, together with the views of the

Danish theological rationalists are all "immanent", i.e. within human capacities, and must be rejected as false.

However, it is clear, especially from Climacus' attacks on Grundtvig's views, that he adheres to a stronger evil than other "transcendent", Christian views. It also seems clear that he refers Grundtvig's views together with Martensen's to the category of "rational-immanent" Hegelianism, and attacks them from a Kantian sceptical epistemological position. Climacus has thus revealed that he is an "unhappy mystic", subscribing to Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism in his struggle to underline the seriousness of evil in "true" Christianity. He is an "irrationalist".

E) Short Summary of Chapter VI

This chapter is an interpretative and critical reading of Chapter V of Philosophiske Smuler. It first clarifies historical presuppositions for Climacus' polemics against Danish theological rationalism, Hegelianism, and Grundtvigianism. The two former ideologies are met with Climacus' insistence on Kantian sceptical epistemological views from the First Critique, and rejected as "rational", "immanent" views, irrelevant for "true" mystic-transcendent faith. But since Grundtvig represents a "transcendent" view, Climacus attacks him in irony. Grundtvig does not attribute enough seriousness to evil, and therefore Climacus attacks him together with the rightwing

Hegelian Martensen, as an immanent "rationalist". By so doing he reveals his own strong adherence to Kantian epistemology, Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism.

This chapter also shows that Climacus' polemical involvement is an apology for his own "true" mystic view, in the same way as Meister Eckhart defended his mystic views against the charge of heresy. Grundtvig's polemics, however, is more practical, intended to bring about reforms and changes in the social environment. Climacus' mystic view thus acquires an "unhappy" dimension, which points in the direction of "irrationalism".

F) Notes to Chapter VI

1. Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, pp. 13-26.
2. Claus v. Borman, Lessing, B.K., 10, 1982. See also Henry Chadwick, Lessing's Theological Writings, Introduction.
3. Henry Chadwick, Lessing's Theological Writings, "On the Proofs of Spirit and Power", pp. 51-56.
4. Spinoza, The Ethics, Prps. XV-XXXVIII, esp. prp. XXXIII.
5. Claus v. Borman, Lessing, B.K., 10, 1982, p. 135. Concerning Kierkegaard's rejection of Lessing, see Papirer XI, A 465-66, from 1849.
6. Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, pp. 68-96.
7. ibid., pp. 137-60.
8. Niels Thulstrup, H. N. Clausen, B.K., 10, 1982.
9. Niels Thulstrup, Mynster, B.K., 10, 1982.
10. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. I, page 254-60.

In June 1816 Grundtvig published one of his most famous sermons from 1810, and he writes in that connection:

"This same sermon was published in 1810 under the following title: "Why has the Word of the Lord vanished from his House?" It said on the titlepage: I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, for it is a Power of God leading to Salvation for everybody who believes." (Page 112) In this sermon Grundtvig further says:

"But the holy Men believed the Truths they were called to preach. Does this apply to the Servants of the Word to-day? Oh no! And it was precisely therefore that the Word of the Lord vanished from his House. This is why Faith in Jesus daily disappears even among "the unlearned". Soon Christianity will have lost its Home. It cannot even dwell in the simple Huts where it settled when it was driven out of the great Palaces." (Page 257) (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

11. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol.2, page 317-49.

This section contains Grundtvig's "Kirkens Gienmæle mod (i.e. The Church's Reply against) Professor Theologiae Dr. H.N. Clausen", Grundtvig writes:

"- for in this Book he (i.e. Clausen) has become a Leader of all Enemies of the Church, as well as of the People in our Country who feel contempt for the Church" (page 317). (Clausen is a) "- false Teacher who misuses the Name of Christianity as much as possible to confuse and seduce the Congregation. He strives to undermine the Church, which he pretends to serve and strengthen"- (Page 318). (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

12. This is still more clear in Climacus' work A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, pp. 41 ff.
13. See Niels Thulstrup, Grundtvig, B.K., Vol. 13, 1984, p. 208, & Jørgen K. Bukdahl, Grundtvig og Kierkegaard, K. 9, 1974.

Both Kierkegaard and Grundtvig emphasized subjectivity and "transcendence" in Christian faith. They did not consider Christianity as a "religion", but rather as a "paradox", founded in revelation. Jørgen K. Bukdahl says this clearly in his article, "Grundtvig contra Kierkegaard". See J.K. Bukdahl, Om Søren Kierkegaard, Artikler i udvalg, ved Jan Lindhart, C.A. Reitzel's Boghandel A/S, København, 1981, pp. 96-98.

14. This idea is clearly expressed in Grundtvig's later works. See Note 27, this Chapter, below, for translation of relevant text. However, the "idea of growth" had long been central in Grundtvig's views, especially in polemical opposition to Pietism. (See Hal Koch, Grundtvig, Gyldendal, København, 1944, page 78.) The pietists emphasized man's corruptedness and need for radical conversion. Grundtvig believed, in accordance with Danish theological rationalism as well as with Plato and Greek thinking, that man basically is "good", and that he/she should develop towards actualization of his/her innate goodness. In a hymn from 1837, "Menneske først og Christen saa" (Human Being first, thereafter Christian), Grundtvig writes:

"Stræbe da hver paa denne Jord, Sandt Menneske at være. Aabne sit Øre for Sandhed's Ord, og unde Gud sin Ære! Er Christendom da Sandhed's Sag, om Christen ei han er idag, han bliver det imorgen."

Translation (without any poetical stylistic pretensions):

"Everybody on this Earth must strive to become a "true" Human Being. He/she must open his/her Ear for the Word of Truth, and pay due Respect to God,

if Christianity really is Truth! Man can grow to become a Christian to-morrow,- if he is not already a Christian today".

N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. 8, page 115. (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

15. See for instance Climacus' work, A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, page 15. Climacus writes there:

"-han selv begyndende gjorde Springets kvalitative Overgang fra ikke-Troende til Troende-."

Translation:

"in the beginning he made the qualitative transition of the leap, - from a non-believer to a believer"- (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

16. This idea is clearly expressed throughout Grundtvig's poem, Nordens Aand (The Nordic Spirit), printed in Nordisk Kirketidende, 1834, and in Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. 8, page 73-85. After having told about the eminence of the Nordic gods, Grundtvig writes about Christianity (on page 76):

"Ham, der kom i Tidens Fylde, kvindefødt, dog Søn af Gud. Ham må alle Aander hylde,"--etc.

Translation:

"He who came in the Fullness of Time, born of a Woman, although Son of God. All Spirits must praise Him,"-- etc. (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

17. See Note 19 end, Chapter V, the thesis, above. My sources for the following exposition are:

Niels Thulstrup, Grundtvig, B.K. 13, 1984, Jørgen K. Bukdahl, Grundtvig og Kierkegaard, K. 9, 1974, Jørgen K. Bukdahl, Om Søren Kierkegaard, C.A. Reitzel, København, 1981, J.L. Balling og P. G. Lindhart, Den Nordiske Kirkes Historie, 4. udgave, Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, København, 1979, esp. pp. 203-284, Hal Koch, Danmarks Kirke gennem tidene, Gyldendal, København, 1960.

18. H.L. Martensen writes:

"-medens Strauss's Lære om en mytisk Kristus forklares som havende sin dybere Grund i en Akosmisme der er uforenlig med Kristendommen".

Translation:

"-as Strauss' idea of a mythical Christ has been explained to have a deeper Ground in an Acosmism, which is irreconcilable with Christianity" (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

Den menneskelige Selvbevidsthed's Autonomie i vor Tid's dogmatiske Theologie, C.A. Reitzel, København, 1841, page 22.

In Af mit Levnet (About my Life), Reitzel, København, 1883, Martensen writes: "Strauss forudsætter uden videre at Undere ere umulige, og at Pantheismen er det eneste sande System" (2. ed., page 122 f.) Further: "Strauss optager et Politiforhør over de bibelske Forfattere, en Fremgangsmaade der kun lidet passer sig for religiøse Forfattere og deres Værker. Hans Leben Jesu er ganske blottet for religiøs Mythologie, der er aldeles fremmed for Forfatteren, som selv staaer udenfor det Religiøse." (Page 124)

Translation:

"Strauss presupposes right away that Miracles do not occur, and that Pantheism is the only true System". Further: "Like a Police Officer, Strauss examines the biblical Authors. Such a Procedure is not appropriate for religious Authors and their Writings. His Leben Jesu (Life of Jesus) is completely in lack of religious Mythology - which is completely alien to the Author, who stands outside the Religious Sphere. (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

See also J.H. Schørring, Martensen, B.K. 10, 1982, pp. 187, 191-94.

19. ibid., see also Note 17, Chapter V, the thesis, above.
20. See Chapter V, Note 45, the thesis, above.
21. H.L. Martensen, Den christelige Daab (The Christian Baptism), C.A.Reitzel, København, 1843, Section 2, page 23. See also Chapter III, Note 31, the thesis, above.
22. See Climacus' work, A.U.E., S.V., Vol. 9, pp. 24-34 ff.
23. Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, SCM Press LTD, London, 1954, the section on Bruno Bauer, pp. 137-160. See esp. p. 144.
24. See Chapter 4, Notes 33-35, the thesis, above.

25. See Chapter 5, Note 56, the thesis, above.
26. See Chapter 5, Note 54, the thesis, above.
27. See Note 14, this Chapter, above, and Jørgen K. Bukdahl, Grundtvig og Kierkegaard, K. 9, Munksgaard, København, 1974, esp. pp. 199 & 204.

Bukdahl quotes there a speech from the 1850's, where Grundtvig gives his central answer to Kierkegaard's "theory of leap"(see Note 15, this Chapter, above), Grundtvig's so-called "theory of growth":

"but we must most strongly oppose the unreasonable and un-Christian Proposition, that we should not be true Christians as a Result of not having reached the Christian Perfection of the Apostles. For such a View is like denying that our Children are genuine, Human beings, since they are still remote from us in Ability to know or to express human Life so strongly and clearly as us in Words and Deeds. For if one does not believe that Christian Life is like the natural, human Life, having its Childhood and Youth before it reaches mature Age, then one can only have a "dead" Understanding of Christian Life ---. It is Foolishness to believe that we can reach the Growth of Christ, without as him, to grow and be promoted in Age, Wisdom and Grace by God, as Christ did, or that one of us can start where the Lord finished". (Transl. by the author of the thesis.)

28. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. 2. In a sermon from July 31, 1825, Grundtvig writes:

"Da jeg nu i denne Retning uafslættelig grublede, læste og skrev under Bøn og Paakaldelse, se, da slog det mig i et velsignet Øieblik; at det mageløse Vidnesbyrd, jeg saa møysommelig ledte om i hele Aandens Verden, det gjennemlød som en Himmelryd hele Tiden og Kristenheden i den apostoliske Trosbekjendelse ved Daaben". (Page XXII, see also page 347).

Translation:

"As I was continually thinking in this Direction, read and wrote as I prayed and sought God, Behold, it struck me in a blessed Moment, that the unique Proof I was seeking already sounded all over the spiritual World, like a Voice from Heaven, in the Apostles' Confession of Baptism". (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

In Værker i Udvalg, Vol. 6, page 75, Grundtvig writes:

"Vores Præste-Vielse til at prædike Evangelium frit, som det findes, og til at forrette Daaben og Nadveren efter Herrens egen Indstiftelse, er da al den

christelige Indvielse til "Hyrder og Lærere", som efter Apostlenes Dage har været i Menigheden--" etc.

Translation:

"Our Priesthood, enabling us to preach the Gospel freely, as it appears, and to perform Baptism and Communion in accord with the Lord's own Institution, is consequently the Christian Initiation of "Shepherds and Teachers", which all the Time since the Days of the Apostles have existed in the Congregation--" etc. (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

See also f. inst. Værker i Udvalg, Vol. 3, page 437. This section is called "Kirkelige Oplysninger" (Church Information), and was first printed in *Nyt Nordisk Tidsskrift for Christelig Theologi*, 1840-42. Grundtvig writes there:

"-saa er det lige vist, at det Gud's Ord, som fører Herren og Aanden med sig, til de Troendes Gjenfødelse" etc. er "- ene og alene det Ord af Herren's Mund, som lyder til os! Hans Navn ved Daaben og Nadveren".

Translation:

"-then it is quite as certain, that the Word of God which contains the Lord and the Spirit, so that the Believers can be reborn -- " etc. is "- only and exclusively the Word from the Lord's Mouth, which sounds to us in his Name, in Baptism and Communion"- (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

29. See Note 14, this Chapter, above. The hymn, "Menneske først og Christen saa", is printed f. inst. in N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Vol. 8, page 113-15.
30. Niels Thulstrup, Grundtvig, B.K. 13, 1984, p. 213. Grundtvig published in 1837 Sang-Værk til den danske Kirke (Song-work for the Danish church).
31. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Vols: 2, Allen & Unwin, London, 1966, Vol. 2, pp. 58-70. German text in H.G.W., Vol. 6, pp. 64-80.
32. See Chapter V, Note 45, the thesis, above.
33. N.F.S. Grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, Gyldendal, København, 1940, Vol. 8, page 149-50:

"Er Lyset for de Lærde blot, til ret og galt at stave? Nei Himlen under flere godt, og Lys er Himlen's Gave. Og Solen staaer med Bonden op, slet ikke med de Lærde, oplyser bedst fraa Taa til Top, hvem der er meest paaferde."

Translation (without poetical aesthetic pretensions):

"Is the Light only for the Learned, so that they can say what is right and wrong? No Heaven wishes good for more People, and the Light is the Gift of

God. And the Sun rises with the Farmer, not with the Learned, (the Sun) enlightens best from Toe to Top, those who are most diligent." (Translated by the author of the thesis.)

CHAPTER VII

Conclusions from the Interpretation of Philosophiske Smuler

A) Introduction

The analysis of Philosophiske Smuler in the thesis has followed a fixed plan, intended to give a phenomenological description of the author Johannes Climacus' Christian consciousness, understood within a religious-mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian frame of reference. In this respect the thesis especially focussed on the function and place of "irrationalism" and evil. The thesis argued that Climacus underlines evil more strongly and emphatically than other mystics within the neo-Platonic, mystic tradition. In order to make this clear, the thesis used Meister Eckhart, a typical neo-Platonic, Christian mystic, as a comparing and contrasting model, against which the peculiarities of evil and "irrationalism" in Climacus' mystic consciousness could appear.

In polemical opposition to Hegelianism, Climacus emphasizes that "evil is not ignorance". It has a stronger, inscrutable, "transcendent" status. He undergirds his claim by referring to sceptical, Kantian epistemological presuppositions, saying that one cannot reach transcendent knowledge on the basis of Pure Reason. If one should attempt to do so, reason is led into absurdities. Climacus partly sticks to these presuppositions, and thus uses Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism in his attempt to describe the mystic, neo-Platonic, transcendent realm. He can use this to account for his strong experience of evil. Evil is not ignorance, it cannot be extirpated by

means of reason, but belongs to "true" mystic, transcendent reality, where Kantian scepticism only has access as "anti-rationalism".

The thesis does not take up in full the problematic relation between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms, nor Kierkegaard's and/or Climacus' use of indirect communication. These problems are too complex and comprehensive for the present, limited project. However, the thesis points out that there is a very close connection between Kierkegaard and Climacus, and that there seems to be little reason for distinguishing decisively between them as far as Philosophiske Smuler is concerned. By pointing out Climacus' Kantian scepticism in this work, together with understanding Climacus in light of mystic Hegelian-related epistemological views, the thesis argues that Climacus is an "irrationalist". And it intends to prepare the ground for further research about the nature of the historical Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism", thus presenting a possible argument in favour of this view.

The thesis has shown that in Philosophiske Smuler, Climacus reveals his mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian consciousness through three thematic "stages", each exposing a new central "structure" within this consciousness. He primarily deals with the first theme, "reason and faith", in relation to a mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates figure. Thereafter follows a theme about Climacus' understanding of time and history, mainly in contrast to a right-wing Hegelian interpretation of Hegel. The third theme is Climacus' view of the Danish church. This is set forth in polemical contrast to Martensen and Grundtvig, and reveals the problems Climacus encounters when he

attempts to communicate his views of Christianity to others (see figure 3 part A, below). The insoluble problem of evil follows each structure, tied together with Kantian scepticism, anti-rationalism, and irrationalism throughout the exposition.

The three themes referred to above are not clearly separated in Climacus' exposition. They overlap, so that the phenomenological unity of the work, i.e. Climacus' mystic, Christian consciousness, can appear as clearly and coherent as possible for the reader. Chapters 1 and 3 of Philosophiske Smuler primarily deal with "reason", while Chapters 2 and 4 primarily deal with "faith". The transition to temporal and social issues starts in the middle of Chapter 4, so that the social-ethical implications of faith can become clear. Further, the social-ethical aspect runs parallel with the questions of time and history in the Interlude, and culminates in a topical polemical debate in Chapter 5. Finally, both the social-ethical aspect and the questions of time and history are subsumed under the epistemological problems of "reason and faith". This is so, due to the additional rational paradoxes and the ensuing paradoxical passions they introduce. Thus, Climacus' whole work primarily makes up a unity centred around the epistemological problems of reason and faith. The thesis undertakes to interpret this fact in relation to mystic phenomenology, manifested in the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian tradition's description of Christian consciousness through reason/thinking and passions (eros/agape).

The full title of Climacus' work is Philosophiske Smuler eller en Smule Philosophi [7]. (Literally translated: "Philosophical Crumbs or a little Philosophy.") The

Danish word "Smule" means "crumb", and the expression "en Smule", primarily means "a bit" or "a little". Thus, the full title reflects associations which point towards the Bible as well as Hegelian philosophy. The word crumb (Smule) calls attention to the account in the New Testament, where Jesus refuses to help a Syro-Phoenician woman, because she does not belong to the people of Israel. Jesus says: "It is not fair to take the children's bread and throw it to the house dogs". But the woman argues against Jesus, saying "yet the house dogs under the table eat from the children's scraps" (1) (scraps = Smuler). This biblical allusion points towards Hegel and Hegelian theologians. They are the well-established "chosen people" who eat the bread on the table, and Climacus' philosophical crumbs or "scraps" (Smuler) are the superfluous small bits which the Hegelians have no use for. Climacus can therefore state that he makes no claim whatsoever to introduce new elements to improve the great philosophical system of Hegelians [9, 1-8]!

The Danish expression, "en Smule" (a bit, a little) in the second half of the full title of Climacus' work, directs our attention towards the common English translation of Philosophiske Smuler, namely "Philosophical Fragments". This connotation suggests something anti-systematic, in polemical opposition to the Hegelians, like the connotation, "a little philosophy". Climacus' book contains less than a hundred pages, in sharp contrast to Hegel's voluminous works. But in this "little" philosophy lies hidden a deadly criticism of Hegel's philosophy. In a most dense and fragmentary form, Climacus attempts to find room for his entire, central philosophy of religion.

Thus, the title is also ironical, for the "little bits" of thought might be able to ruin the whole "great", systematic philosophy of Hegel and the Hegelians!

Climacus seems also to intend an additional association, directly related to the most essential contents of his work, reflected in the formal division of the material into sections. The "bits" of the work point towards the nature of quantitative, logical, conceptual thinking. They can therefore never render the "true", mystic-transcendent content of evil, which is the crucial difference between the mystic Alternative View and the view of Climacus' speculative, Hegelian opponents. Climacus knows that he cannot transcend a conceptual, "rational-immanent" framework, by means of rational-conceptual thinking. He must therefore acquire a position like Martensen's, although he had earlier made fun of Martensen's claim to go "beyond" Hegel. Climacus now directs the irony against himself, the person who in Philosophiske Smuler, has attempted to go beyond the mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates! But although there is no way to show that this has been done successfully, Climacus still thinks that it is possible. The philosophical bits can be brought together in unity through the qualitative mystic passion of faith, containing most serious components of guilt and sin, in opposition to the mystic Socratic View [99, 1-12]. However, this mystic-transcendent quality must be beyond, not within, reason, as Martensen's view presupposes. Nevertheless, since a verbal exposition of Christianity must always be "quantitative", it must appear in bits and pieces (2).

The title Philosophiske Smuler is also reflected in another "quantitative division" of the work: it is divided into two parts near the middle, by the two historical figures Climacus has chosen as contrasting models to his Alternative View. Socrates plays the contrasting rôle in the first part; in the second part Hegel and a right-wing Hegelian view takes over the Socratic rôle, and Climacus argues against this Hegel from a Kantian sceptical, epistemological position. On these sceptical epistemological presuppositions he must reject the possibility of a "transcendent" religious reality. But also subscribing to a mystic, Hegelian-related concept of reason, Climacus' mystic-transcendent reality of the Alternative View becomes possibly "irrational" and tainted with ontological evil.

The philosophical bits from different historical contexts of neo-Platonism and the philosophies of Hegel and Kant, also overlap. The Socrates of the first part is present in the Hegel of the last part and vice versa, and the Kantian, sceptical epistemology seems to follow the exposition throughout. By such means, Climacus can maintain the ambiguity he needs to accommodate contradictory elements in the Judaic-Christian dogmatics to a philosophical framework (see figure 3, part B, below).

Thus, the title Philosophiske Smuler contains a rich and manifold symbolism, ultimately pointing towards the unity of Climacus' mystic, Christian consciousness, successively revealed through different themes and cultural frames of reference. Together, the philosophical bits make up a symbolic ladder, leading from plurality towards unity, a "klimax tou paradeisou" (3).

One can trace the origins of the idea of the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian ladder back to Genesis 28, 12, where a biblical author tells about Jacob who dreams that there is a ladder from earth to Heaven. The neo-Platonic, Christian mystics interpreted this story in light of neo-Platonic, metaphysical ideas as a contact between the eternal and temporal realms. Through the symbolism of the ladder, they described the soul's return to God as an ascent from rung to rung to the very top, meaning God's mystic-transcendent, monistic world.

Different Christian thinkers understood the "ladder" in different ways. There are three main interpretations, depending on which elements in Christianity were given most importance. St. Augustine distinguished between the ladder of virtue, the ladder of speculation, and the ladder of practical mysticism. The first ladder (of virtue) gives most importance to ethical elements in the ascent towards God. The second ladder (of speculation) is primarily concerned to point out a hierarchial organization of being in the universe. By using one's intelligence to understand this order, one is led from insight to insight, following the rational connections from effects to causes. Thus, one discovers a hierarchy of being, terminating in God, the primary cause of everything that exists. The third ladder (i.e. of practical mysticism) is connected to the ascetic monasticism of practising mystics. This ladder describes an ascent to God through three main, experienced stages, manifesting the mystic phenomenology referred to in Chapter 1 of the thesis. The three stages are purification, illumination, and union with God (4). The stage of purification contains ethical and speculative

elements. In the illumination and union, speculative elements belong as well. Thus, the practical mystic ladder somehow unites the three aspects of ascension to God (5).

The practical sides of mysticism were usually given highest priority in the development of neo-Platonic mysticism after St. Augustine. However, some "philosophical" mystics tended to give more emphasis to the "noetic quality" of mysticism. Pseudo-Dionysius is one of the foremost "speculative mystics". He had constructed a theory of a hierarchy of being in the universe. By means of increasing insight into this hierarchy, man was led upwards, towards the borders of being. Pseudo-Dionysius described God as "above" all things known; he could best be approached through negative descriptions, i.e. by defining his difference from everything in the "known", hierarchial world. He called God "super-being", "super-good", etc. (6).

The most classic manifestation of the speculative ladder of ascension in the Middle Ages, appeared with St. Bonaventure's well known work, Itinerarium mentis ad deum (The Soul's/Mind's Journey to God). In this work, St. Bonaventure sees the whole universe as a huge ladder, given to us so that we may ascend to God by working on understanding the universe. By traversing the universe step by step, we encounter more and more adequate "analogies" of the heavenly reality. St. Bonaventure outlines six main steps, or "analogies", through which we can proceed towards God. The sixfold division reveals the influence of St. Francis' mysticism of love. St. Francis is said to have had a vision of a six-winged seraph in the shape of the crucified Christ. St.

Bonaventure adapted this vision to his theory of ladder, thinking that our way towards God must be through love for the crucified Christ, in six successive steps. Thus, St. Bonaventure's speculations are connected to a mysticism centred around Christ. It culminates in a "seventh step" beyond all speculation, in a "mystic love" which reminds us of Spinoza's amor intellectualis. However, St. Bonaventure's mystic love is more emotional than Spinoza's. For in mystic love St. Bonaventure tells us, the soul is absorbed in God, in exstasis (7).

By dividing Philosophiske Smuler into six parts (five chapters and the Interlude), Climacus follows the symbolism of the six-divided ladder of speculative mystics and St. Bonaventure. Climacus' work is written by a rational, conceptual thinker, approaching the reality of mystic faith through reason. He "knows" what faith is theoretically (i.e. mostly on the basis of Kantian, sceptical, epistemological views), and he knows therefore also that sceptical reason cannot adequately give expression to this reality. Thus, the six sections of his work, like St. Bonaventure's speculative ladder, can only lead to the border of man's "immanent world". Climacus reveals therefore at the very end of his "speculative work", that he is a Socratic humorist who turns round on the borders of reason in self-referential humour and irony [98]. His thoughts are only philosophical bits and fragments, incapable of reaching the seventh mystery of mystic faith and Incarnation (8). He can therefore not compete with the Hegelians, who in Climacus' opinion believed that one could attain the ultimate mystery of Christianity by means of reason. Whereas the Hegelians can eat the whole bread on the table, Climacus must be happy to seek among the "crumbs" and "scraps"




Figure 3 Some connections between form and content in Philosophiske Smuler.

(Smuler) they waste and leave for the "housedogs". (See figure 3 above.)

B) Johannes Climacus' Mystic, Christian Consciousness

Climacus makes a fundamental distinction between man's world and God's world. He understands the difference between these two worlds both ethically and ontologically. Man is separated from God by his ethical imperfection, but also through the limitation of his being, imposed upon him in his mundane existence. Since God's being is absolutely different from man's, there is no way that one can approach an understanding of God's world by means of human natural reason. This reason is "immanent", only capable of dealing with the reality pertaining to human existence.

Climacus believes, however, that it is possible for man to come in contact with God. This can occur in the passion of mystic faith, an experience beyond reason, connecting man's ontological reality to God's. This experience is not only "bliss", but contains also serious suffering, as psychologists of mysticism have pointed out in common, mystic phenomenology. Climacus associates mystic suffering with the Christian, dogmatic elements of sin and guilt, claiming that "true" Christian existence implies transcendent "sin-consciousness". It is in fact this serious evil which distinguishes "right" Christianity from the mystic, neo-Platonic, Socratic View. In the latter, sin is ignorance, fading away as knowledge increases. But in "right" mystic Christianity, ultimate reality is "transcendent" and beyond reason, understood on

Kantian sceptical epistemological presuppositions. On Kantian "anti-rational" presuppositions Climacus can conclude that evil is not ignorance, and on his mystic, phenomenological presuppositions, he can consider this as a "rational" argument for the existence of an extra strong element of evil in mystic transcendence. By holding both Kantian and mystic Hegelian-related epistemological views, Climacus acquires a position of "epistemological irrationalism". And he can point to corresponding ethical and ontological counterparts in mystic-transcendent evil.

Climacus belongs to a time when right-wing Hegelian theologians claimed to have subsumed faith under reason. He protests most emphatically against this view, which in his opinion made Christianity into a "rational-immanent", Platonic religion, where sin is ignorance. As a result, Climacus must underline the rational incomprehensibility of "true" Christianity. In faith, reason must be radically transcended. Only thus can Christian dogmatics concerning guilt, sin, and salvation, acquire the "right" meaning.

One can therefore say that the concepts of "transcendence" and "immanence", containing logical, ontological, and ethical connotations, are key terms in Climacus' definition of the relation between reason and faith. He appears to interpret these terms within several frames of reference. The different connotations are borrowed from 1.) The Old Testament, 2.) Plato's rational philosophy, 3.) neo-Platonism, 4.) the pietist Kant's epistemology and ethics. Therefore, one must clarify these four ideological frames of reference in order to understand Climacus' basic distinction. The

thesis has interpreted Philosophiske Smuler on the presupposition of these ideologies (see figure 4, below).

The Old Testament does not present a "philosophy", like that of Plato or Kant. It seeks rather to promote a "wisdom" which implies true insight into man's "nothingness" in relation to God: man is mortal, and his whole life is dependent on God, the exalted and all-good Creator. Thus, the Old Testament emphasizes that there is a great distance between man and God. God has given man his wisdom in the Law, speaking with absolute, inscrutable, dogmatic authority, which man must obey through submission.

The authors of the Old Testament were not especially interested in rendering some kind of psychological experience of God, as in the contemporary Greek mysticism. Man can only experience his own inferiority and insufficiency in relation to God's holiness. This creates awe and fear, but, at the same time, God is like a good father who loves man. God is therefore also "lovable". The vacillation between unpredictability and goodness creates an insecurity in the relationship between man and God. God can be experienced as an ambiguous, unpredictable majesty, giving both rewards and punishments to individuals, families and his chosen people in the development of history.

Since God has revealed himself in the Law, his essence is primarily connected to ethics. Sin and salvation became all-important ideas in the religion of the Old

Testament, and as time passed on, the hope of a coming Messiah who could bring about ultimate redemption and atonement, became more and more evident. The Messiah was expected to bring salvation into the temporal world, for God's holy world was highly elevated from man's sphere of existence. The Old Testament finally propounded the idea of resurrection of the flesh, and an infinitely long state of paradise on earth (9).

Climacus' distinction between "transcendence" and "immanence" attains a different meaning within the context of Plato's philosophy. Plato tied all outer appearances to the eternal, intellectual forms through ignorance. When ignorance faded, the true reality of reason, ethics and being could appear. Man could not transcend the intellectual forms or "ideas", for there was no ontological reality beyond them. If one should try to "imagine" such a "transcendence", this would imply non-being, ethical evil, and unreal subjectivity, of the kind manifested in Sophism. Thus, in accordance with old Greek, traditional thinking, Plato believed that transcendence must lead to hubris (pride), which finally would bring about disintegration of consciousness; the gods would take their revenge (moira) on man.

Plotinus developed Plato's ideas in a mystic-religious direction. While Plato had consciously kept the drive of eros subordinated to reason in order to avoid sophistic "irrationalism", Plotinus taught that the mystically purified eros transcended the intellectual realm of nous (reason). In this way, man's soul could transcend intellectual plurality, and become united with the ultimate, monistic principle of the One.

However, Plotinus claimed that this mystic transcendence did not lead to subjectivism, non-being, and ethical evil. Rather, Plotinus' concept of "transcendence" was connected to an experience which did not violate the intellectual framework. For instance, in Ennead 5, 1, 8, he explained this by referring to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, who is said to have identified Being, Intelligence (i.e. thinking), and the One (to hen), so that Being followed the rules of thinking in the same way as for Plato. Plotinus explained, however, that the historical Parmenides was criticized for identifying unity and plurality, and that one could find a more accurate expression of his philosophy in Plato's dialogue, Parmenides. In this work, the philosopher Parmenides distinguished between three meanings of "unity": "the-one-in-the-proper-sense", "the-one-which-is-multiple", and "the-one-and-the-manifold". According to Plotinus, this division allowed a transcendence from intellectual and ontological plurality into unity to be possible without resulting in absurdity. He therefore claimed to follow Plato's "rational scheme" in the relation between unity and plurality when he explained the transition from nous to the One. The ultimate experience of the One was a kind of intellectual intuition of unity, implying exclusion of sophistic "irrationalism" and evil (10).

Climacus' fourth frame of reference is Kant's epistemological views in Critique of Pure Reason, and partly also the moral views in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. In his polemics against Hegelians, Climacus follows Kant's views in the First Critique, holding that when reason attempts to answer metaphysical questions, it contradicts itself. The contradictions designate a limit for the capacity of human

reason. Hegel's concept of "reconciliation" between opposites in his concept of Speculative Reason, must be rejected on the basis of Kantian presuppositions. However, Kant also thought that our Practical Reason might point towards transcendent reality through the Categorical Imperative, which intuitively is manifesting itself in our minds. Kant also believed that man was able to do what the Categorical Imperative demanded of him. If it was against one's natural inclinations to act according to the absolute demands, man must experience suffering. And this "evil" served as an indication of the "true" transcendent origin of the ethical formula.

Thus understood, Kant's ethical theory is ambiguous. Kant apparently claims that it is built on both a transcendent reality and on an "immanent", rational principle. This inconsistency can historically be explained as following from Kant's subscription to Pietism, implying emphasis on ethical demands and suffering, rooted in dogmatics (11). Climacus also has his religious roots in Pietism, and he therefore assumes some of Kant's ethical presuppositions. Thus, Climacus thinks that man should believe that he is able to do whatever is within the capacity of his will, and that absolute ethical demands are intrinsic to his consciousness. Like Kant, he refers them to an absolute and transcendent source, and connects them to suffering (12). However, Climacus seems to be still more concerned than Kant to emphasize transcendent, ontological evil, and to emphasize that this evil is connected with mystic, transcendent passions.

When Climacus attempts to express the relation between "transcendence" and "immanence" in his mystic, Alternative View, he plays on all the four frames of


	I Old Testament	II Plato	III Plotinus (mysticism) (<i>zoë</i>)	IV Kant
"Transcendence" Outside of man's capacities	God: Exalted "Inscrutable" Good/evil Father and Punisher Great distance Man: Inferior Weak Mortal Ethical evil Linear, dogmatic time	Non-being Empty, void Non-being (Sophistic ethical consequences)	The One Intellectual unity Indescribable Total perfection 	God ALTERNATIVE Categorical Imperative (1) "Practical Reason" (For Climacus: Anti-rationalism) Pure Reason: Scepticism ANTINOMIES "Pure reason" (SUFFERING) ALTERNATIVE (2) ABSOLUTE ETHICAL DEMANDS Something in the sensory world is absolute: intuition forms of intuition space and time Linear time
	"Immanence" Within man's capacities	Intellectual ideas/forms (Eternal, good, being) (<i>phōs</i>) Sensory world: illusory Evil is ignorance, lack of good, nothing Circular time	Intellectual (<i>vouç</i>) Plurality (Eternal good, being) EROS (<i>phōs</i>) Sensory world: real Mysticism: Circular/Linear time is transcended	

Figure 4 Four ideological frames of reference for Climacus' views.

reference above. Thus, the crucial "relation" mentioned above contains elements of an emotional as well as an ethical nature, which he must include in his concept of "reason and faith". Figure 4, above, is an attempt to visualize the main structures of the ideological background for Climacus' most central concepts.


The relation between reason and faith in Climacus' Alternative View hinges on the "paradoxes". When Climacus defines "paradox", he takes his starting point in the Platonic distinction between the "immanent" realm of reason and "transcendence", as presented in Plato's dialogues Meno and Phaedrus. In Meno, Plato had argued that reason always presupposes its own content, and therefore cannot possibly transcend its own sphere of validity. Thinking must therefore always be concerned with ontological reality, within man's comprehension. In Phaedrus, Plato rejects the possibility of transcending reason, as leading to nonsense and nothingness. Climacus therefore states that Plato makes a distinction between two "paradoxes", namely the principles of contradiction and exclusion. If thinking respects these absolute borders, it reveals a true, ontological and ethical reality (13).

Upon this Platonic starting point, Climacus imposes a mystic, neo-Platonic distinction between "immanence" and "transcendence". In the discussion of Meno in Philosophiske Smuler [15-18], Climacus reveals a Socrates who apparently believes that his own subjective opinions have objective validity. This "contradiction" seems to have been caused by some "divine" experience [16, 11-18]. As a result, Socrates considers himself as having the right to teach others and lead them towards what he

believes to be ultimate truth. He has therefore apparently "transcended" Plato's rationality without violating the Platonic paradoxes. Socrates subsumes evil under reason, and claims also to have transcended the Platonic, ontological reality. But this is contrary to his Platonic, rational presuppositions. The mystic, neo-Platonic Socrates has therefore imposed another, incomprehensible element, an additional "paradox", upon the Platonic paradoxes.

Climacus' next step is to introduce the mainly ethical distinction between God and man from the Old Testament. Whereas the author of Genesis 3 in the Old Testament, defines man as "dust" in relation to the Creator, and the author of Isaiah 6, underlines God's "holiness" in relation to man's "sinfulness", Climacus explains the great difference between God and man within his philosophical distinction between "immanence" and "transcendence". He identifies "the inferior man" of the Old Testament with Plato's rational, ontological realm. Further, he identifies "the Holy God" with sophistic, "irrational" transcendence, as well as with mystic, neo-Platonic, "rational", purified transcendence. As a consequence, Climacus has inferred a serious ambiguity between good and evil into "transcendent" reality, so that man necessarily must face guilt and fear in his ultimate, religious-mystic experience.

Considering the mutual superimposition of these three structures from Platonism, mystic neo-Platonism, and the Old Testament, there appears to be a conspicuous similarity between the Old Testament and the Platonic view of "transcendence". If, in addition, the concept of "transcendence" incorporates



connotations taken from neo-Platonism, an element of serious evil must necessarily be imposed upon the neo-Platonic, mystic reality. Climacus' ultimate, mystic view is therefore apparently different from the classic neo-Platonic view, where transcendence is possible without implying evil. Climacus believes the dogmatic, Old Testament truths of God's holiness to be indisputable. He thereby strengthens the sophistic implications of Platonism, and his Alternative View becomes endowed with an element of incomprehensible evil.

Since the ethics of the Old Testament is authoritative, founded in revealed demands of the inscrutable God, Climacus must also conclude, in accord with his Platonic presuppositions from Meno, that the ethics of the Alternative View is founded in transcendence of reason. It is identical with the sophistic, relativistic ethics Plato argued against in Meno. To avoid complete relativism, Climacus must define the nature of "transcendence" belonging to his mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, Alternative View in such a way, that it cancels sophistic "irrationalism". Like Plotinus, Climacus attempts therefore somehow to connect his view of transcendence to reason, so that this "irrationalism" may be weakened or excluded. He does so in the following way:

In the Alternative View Climacus has identified the neo-Platonic concept of eros with individual, subjective passions (14). Climacus concludes, therefore, that man can transcend reason within the passions of mystic "faith". This "transcendence" implies coincidence of man's passions and God's transcendent love in the mystic Moment in Time. The passions are attached to reason in the paradoxes. When one employs right

thinking, respecting the Platonic paradoxes of contradiction and exclusion, there arise paradoxical, subjective passions. Correct thinking is thus directly related to faith. Faith does not cancel reason, but becomes strengthened through adhering to the absolute validity of reason.

Climacus thus gives a different explanation of the relation between reason and faith than Plato's and Plotinus' understanding of the corresponding relation between reason and eros. Like Plato and Plotinus, Climacus apparently wishes to stay within rational presuppositions, giving passions of faith decisive guidance by reason through the paradoxes. But he wants also to give passions of faith an independent status. In this way he apparently makes it possible to argue that passions of faith are both different from and subordinated to reason at the same time. Consequently, he acquires ambiguity concerning the status of evil. If faith is subordinated to reason, evil is ignorance. But if faith goes decisively beyond reason, it acquires an evil, "irrational" status. Climacus can thus argue that evil is strong and most severe, acquiring more strength if one adheres to correct thinking!

Finally, Climacus understands his Alternative View within a Kantian frame of reference. He uses Kant's epistemological views in the First Critique to attack the Hegelian concept of Speculative Reason, arguing that it is impossible for Pure Reason to reach transcendent insight. When the right-wing Hegelians believe that reason can understand the transcendent, dogmatic truths of Christianity, they are in fact excluding themselves from "true", transcendent Christianity. By understanding everything, they

acquire a Platonic, rational position, implying a relativity in evil which is incompatible with "true" Christianity. The Kantian antinomies must not be weakened! They are, in Climacus' opinion, identical with the Platonic paradoxes, creating paradoxical passions which are necessary preconditions for "right", mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian transcendence.

In addition, Climacus also wants to accommodate much of Kant's ethical views to the ethics of the Alternative View. Climacus identifies Kant's Categorical Imperative with the dogmatic demands of the law-religion of the Old Testament. However, Kant believed that transcendent reality only could rightly be approached on the basis of Practical Reason, not in a "transcendence" by means of passions! Thus, Climacus somehow ultimately abandons Kant in favour of neo-Platonic mysticism, but still adhering to Kantian sceptical, epistemological presuppositions, he takes the step into scepticism and "anti-rationalism" combined with mystic Hegelian-related epistemological views, when he claims to "know" the existence of a "transcendent" reality. In this way he can account for God's inscrutable nature, which possibly might be evil! Climacus therefore underlines suffering in transcendent reality more strongly than Kant had done, making it a part of transcendent reality itself. He also attaches passions to human reality in a way very different from Kant, for whom they were subordinated to rational and practical ends. For Climacus believes that passions drive human consciousness either towards evil and dissolution, or towards new self-integration through self-referential humour and irony. Staying within Kantian, sceptical, epistemological presuppositions, he leads the passions towards disintegration!

For only then can he account for evil that is serious enough. However, he also claims to exclude disintegration through his "rational", mystic Hegelian-related transcendence in the connection of mystic faith and reason in the paradoxes!

Apparently in polemical contrast to right-wing Hegelians, Climacus adheres to a linear understanding of time (15). Since right-wing Hegelianism in reality is a "modern" Platonism, according to Climacus, these people assume a circular view of time, irreconcilable with "true" Christianity. Again Climacus apparently seeks refuge in Kantian ideas, but also Kant's linear view of time must ultimately be insufficient and inadequate. Time is not, as it were for Kant, a "form of intuition", rooted in man's mental constitution. Rather, time is rooted in the transcendent, "unknown" God, thus partly founded on Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism (16).

In order to approach the "right" concept of time, Climacus first sets out to give an explanation within an Aristotelian context. He sees human existence as actualizations of possibilities, implying a concept of spatial, "extended" time. In this way, Climacus explains that time comes out of a "numerical nothingness", implying additional paradoxes. Therefore, paradoxical passions increase, and in this process they mingle with guilt arising from the fact that only one of many actualizations is possible in every extended, spatial moment in time. In this way ethics becomes rooted in passions.

Secondly, Climacus understands the linear process of time within an Old Testament context, combined with Platonic and Kantian epistemological concepts of "transcendence", implying scepticism and incomprehensibility. The existential experience of constantly proceeding into an "unknown" future is anxiety, a "quality" which mingles with guilt in the paradoxical passions. "Evil" passions acquire authority through Judaic-Christian dogmatics, as well as Platonic-sophistic and Kantian epistemological anti-rationalism.

Thus, Climacus' view of time means a strengthening of paradoxical passions and the evil elements in them, implying a strengthening of integrative as well as disintegrative elements in consciousness. In principle, time means only a strengthening of passions, be they integrative or disintegrative.

Being a mystic in the neo-Platonic tradition, Climacus relates temporality to eternity. These two spheres are mutually exclusive. However, there is apparently one exception: the Incarnation. In this historical fact, the eternal God became temporal man in Jesus Christ. This is a miracle, a paradox of exclusion, implying more strengthening of passions! This historical fact was certainly like all other historical facts. God was man throughout. When one approaches this fact in subjective consciousness, seeking historical knowledge about it, one is first confronted with the rational paradox, that it has come out of a "numerical nothingness" (17). Thereupon one encounters the mystic Absolute Paradox, that this fact is a "creation ex nihilo".

One must maintain the latter through dogmatics and Kantian epistemology, implying "irrationalism" and increase in subjective, paradoxical passions.

Thus, Climacus has tied ethics to passions through guilt, and given anxiety crucial authority through dogmatics, Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. He further ties ethics to his social views, i.e. to the Moment in Time when he must act in accordance with his ambiguous passions! By partaking in polemics to defend his Alternative View, Climacus' ethical theory is tried out in practice (18). He does not direct his ethical passions "outwards", towards changes in society, but rather "inwards", towards vindication of his subjective, transcendent mystic experience. Thereby, he encounters an additional paradox, namely the Menonic dilemma. For there is no way for him to communicate the transcendent, subjective truth, without running the risk of being misunderstood. The only way to suggest a way out of man's "immanent" reality, is to refer to sophistic-Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. As a result, Climacus can point out "evil" as the decisive difference between his mystic, Alternative View and the mystic Socratic View, and he can further give his claim indisputable authority by referring to Judaic-Christian dogmatics, i.e. by referring to an Absolute Paradox, combined with Kantian sceptical epistemology. Therefore, Climacus believes, there is "irrational evil" in transcendent reality. This view must be maintained alongside the traditional mystic, neo-Platonic view, that "evil is ignorance". Climacus has made this peculiar ambiguous view possible through the ambiguous connection between reason and faith in the paradoxes. He thus adheres to a mystic Hegelian-related epistemological view besides his Kantian scepticism and mystic anti-rationalism.

From what has been argued in the thesis, it is clear that a characteristic trait in Climacus' thinking is his apparent mingling of ideas from very different cultural spheres and epochs. He thus mingles elements from Plato's philosophy with Plotinus' and Kant's without first discussing what their philosophical concepts mean in the right, historical contexts. The same holds true for his use of the Old Testament. Climacus apparently neglects the fact that this work is a whole library, created by a people over a period of more than a thousand years. This library contains in reality a variety of literary achievements, reflecting the most diverse attitudes towards religious problems. It is not a systematic philosophical treatise, which says that there is evil in the ultimate reality, but rather an expression of a practical-religious attitude of a whole people, in which "God" has been given anthropomorphic traits. The Old Testament can therefore also say that God is the "all-good Creator" of this world, who like a father has given man the world to take care of. The connecting tie between man and God in "faith" is not an intellectual, philosophical relation of "immanence" and "transcendence". It is rather a trust in God's goodness, of a whole people, or an individual, like a son trusts a good father.

Climacus' approach to religious reality is more purely "intellectual" than the Old Testament's. Climacus claims to "know" what transcendent Christianity is, and by virtue of this knowledge he is apparently also able to "know" that others in the society, like for instance Grundtvig, hold "wrong" transcendent views. His own "right" mystic Christian view requires that man should struggle with an insoluble problem of evil. For evil is founded in transcendent, subjective passions, beyond the possibility of being

"understood" by logical reason. The connection between passions and reason, however, is of such a nature that there is also a possibility for passions to be subsumed under reason. But one must never actualize this possibility unless serious evil is also maintained with authoritative dogmatics.

One thus sees, that the mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian consciousness Climacus has delimited contains fundamental ambiguities between good and evil. These ambiguities must never be weakened, since that would make the mystic Alternative View either into an entirely, Kantian sceptical and/or anti-rational view, or into a rational, Platonic, Hegelian, or neo-Platonic view. Evil must therefore be maintained, and the way to do this is to refer to Judaic-Christian dogmatics and/or sophistic-Kantian scepticism and anti-rationalism. The fundamental ambiguity in consciousness is in itself an incomprehensible paradox (19), which must be maintained so that the paradoxical passions can be strengthened! And these passions must always contain new ambiguities, serving as new Moments in Time, as new starting points for additional paradoxical passions. Thus, Climacus' consciousness seems to be forced into an infinite increase of passions, and therefore into an increase of both integrative as well as disintegrative possibilities. The consciousness is apparently split between "scepticism" and "rationalism", between faith and reason. For faith can never be totally subsumed under reason, but must point towards evil, "anti-rationalism" and "irrationalism"!

Thus, Climacus finishes up in a possibly dualistic view, beside his basic mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian, monistic framework. He apparently defends a Christianity

similar to the young St. Augustine's, whose most crucial characteristics were the great distance in perfection between God and man as well as the severe difficulties in approaching "true" Christianity. St. Augustine, as well as Climacus, maintains these "negative" traits within a basic monistic, mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian religious experience. For the young St. Augustine this evil was a result of a combination of Manichaeism and Old Testament dogmatics, where the latter tended to preponderate. Climacus maintains his views by referring to a sceptical framework provided by Kantian and Platonic philosophy, thus ending even more clearly up in ontological dualism than the young St. Augustine. Climacus combines this dualism with man's ethical imperfection, and he is forced to reassure the above mentioned presuppositions through his polemics against Hegelians.

In this way Climacus apparently represents what he himself has called the Offended Consciousness. He does not seem to have been aware of the "evil-excluding" reality of a more classic, neo-Platonic, Christian view, like Meister Eckhart's, but has instead become offended with this "paradox". It also seems as if the Kierkegaardian Climacus has been unable harmoniously to accommodate to his social environments, and that he therefore takes his "revenge" through emphasizing the value of his own subjectivity and individuality. He thereby introduces evil into his mystic consciousness, and justifies it rationally by resorting to Old Testament religion as well as sceptical, intellectual Platonic and Kantian epistemological presuppositions (20). One can thus hardly avoid labelling Climacus an "irrationalist".

C) Final Conclusions

The thesis has presented Climacus as a representative of mystic phenomenology within the neo-Platonic, Christian tradition. Climacus thus explains Christian transcendence within "faith" in terms of neo-Platonic transcendence by means of eros. He identifies the neo-Platonic "nous" with the Platonic realm of forms/ideas and the Kantian sphere of Pure Reason. In the dialogue Meno, Plato argues that transcendence of reason is absurd and impossible. Man should not seek the eternal truths in "outward-directed" transcendence, but in "inward-directed" recollection. Transcendence of reason can only lead to absurd and evil, sophistic consequences. In the First Critique, Kant argues that Pure Reason is unsuited to deal with metaphysical questions. If it attempts to do so, antinomies and scepticism follow. Since Climacus explains mystic, Christian transcendence within these Platonic and Kantian frames of reference, he must conclude that Christian mystic transcendence implies "evil", "anti-rationalism" and "irrationalism". Instead of rejecting this implication, which seems incompatible with the Christian idea of God as the Perfect and all-good Creator, Climacus uses it to emphasize most strongly Christian dogmatics of sin and the necessity of a transcendent intrusion to bring about "salvation". But thereby he apparently has arrived at the contradictory conclusion, that the God who saves man from evil possibly is evil in himself. This conclusion should not be rejected, though, according to Climacus. On the contrary, it should be maintained, so that the paradoxical passions can be increased, and thereafter possibly be directed towards

"true" transcendence by means of God's grace. The transcendent passions, which Climacus identifies with the neo-Platonic concept of eros, must therefore contain evil when considered from a Kantian, epistemological, sceptical and anti-rational point of view, together with the mystic perspective. God's love must be "suffering", and man's "salvation" in the passion of faith must be both good and evil. Climacus so strongly underlines evil in mystic transcendence that it seems as if he never wishes to make the Kantian views relative. Since he thus apparently adheres to both Kantian sceptical views concerning reason, as well as mystic Hegelian-related views, he must be an "epistemological irrationalist". In addition, since he stays within the mystic epistemological position, he must assume a corresponding ethical and ontological irrationalism.

Meister Eckhart lived in an age when faith and reason were in harmony. Grounded primarily in mystic, neo-Platonic, epistemological presuppositions, he understands transcendence as an intellectual transition from plurality to unity. This transition occurs through purified love, thus having no connection whatsoever with the qualities we experience in our mundane world. Tying transcendence to an ethical and religious process of purification, Eckhart held that transcendence through love is totally bereft of all human activity. Purification has changed love into a complete "disinterest" or "passivity", in which God gives birth to his own active, agapic love. This mystery is the source that gives value to passionate, outward-directed love, implying activity and suffering. Evil thus can have no access to the ultimate mystic transcendent reality, although it is most real in man's active, purifying existence. All life brings

"suffering". As long as man lives, transcendent salvation is needed to free man from his sinful situation, and reveal life as good and meaningful.

In this way, Eckhart has connected activity and passivity, good and evil, to human existence. And he has claimed that activity and evil meaningfully can be used as an ascetic means towards passivity and good. This truth is revealed through the subjective, mystic experience of the Son's birth in the citadel of the soul, an experience which itself is a result of the dialectics between good and evil in life.

Climacus can hardly use evil constructively in the same way as Eckhart. Like Feuerbach, Climacus apparently believes that the "ultimate" Christian reality must contain evil as well as good. However, Climacus believes in a mystic, transcendent reality which is lacking in Feuerbach's views of Christianity as a projection of human consciousness alone. Thus, Climacus' understanding of "ultimate" evil acquires a more serious status than evil did for Feuerbach.

Since both Eckhart and Climacus are mystics in the neo-Platonic, Christian tradition, there are clear affinities between their transcendent, ultimate views. But they also differ with respect to their understanding of evil. Eckhart is a typical representative of the classic mystic, perennial philosophy, giving priority to the eternal, transcendent, mystic realm. He excludes evil from this realm in accordance with the available epistemologies of Thomism and neo-Platonism. Climacus, however, gives priority to mundane, temporal reality, undergirding his views with the available

Kantian, sceptical and anti-rational epistemological views. His mystic concept of eternity becomes thus tainted with "irrationalism" and "evil" in a way that might seem alien to his mystic presuppositions.

However, both Eckhart and Climacus agree to the fact that human, mundane existence necessarily contains suffering, and that man's relation to God seen from man's point of view, contains evil. They also seem to agree that active involvement and passive disinterest, i.e. "lack of evil", are dialectical structures within a true Christian consciousness. The main difference between their views lies in the emphasis they attribute to the impossibility of man attaining transcendent salvation through his own efforts. Eckhart does not give more emphasis to this fact than to other elements in his mystic, Christian consciousness. He describes God's birth in the soul as a miracle, where God's grace is made accessible to man; and as a result of this "birth", suffering and social involvement in temporal reality become meaningful.

Sharing some basic religious views with St. Augustine, Climacus underlines the negative aspects of faith more strongly than Eckhart had done, and the possibility of understanding suffering as a means towards good is for Climacus overshadowed by the fact that suffering is necessary in this world as well as in the transcendent world. He does not clearly state the process of purification through suffering, for his secular environments require that he cannot refer to transcendent reality as directly as Eckhart could. Climacus must be satisfied to say that man has to choose suffering in order thereby to attain salvation some time in the temporal future. It thus appears as

if Climacus wants to approach the miracle of the Christian God's transcendence through the absolute doubts raised regarding Christian religion by post-Hegelian, secularized philosophy. Climacus must therefore state that there is no place for God and transcendence in man's world, and he attempts to defend his own mystic views on these facts! As shown above in Chapter IV of the thesis, Climacus surpasses even Blaise Pascal in regard to scepticism. Pascal, like St. Augustine, confined himself to emphasize the severe difficulties involved in becoming a Christian (21). He never emphasized rational, logical impossibility and exclusion in this respect! Pascal belonged to an age before modern secularization, manifested in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, had appeared. Pascal's concept of religious, mystic faith did therefore not contain the same kind of rational contradiction as Climacus' corresponding concept, and Pascal's faith could not become quite as "passionate" and clearly directed exclusively towards the "known" temporal world. So although Pascal might appear as more "irrational" than Meister Eckhart, he could hardly be considered a "true" irrationalist in relation to Climacus, and in relation to the definition used by McKinnon. Whether this is advantageous or disadvantageous for Climacus, might be disputable. It could be advantageous as far as actualization of active, social-ethical involvement is concerned. But it might also count as disadvantageous in this same respect. For the incessantly inferred associations of "irrationalism" and evil in "true" Christianity must create a "passionate disturbance" tending to overshadow everything else Climacus might want to say regarding his mystic religion. Pascal's, and even more so Eckhart's view might appear more "sane" and suited for constructive involvement in society.

However, in spite of Climacus' emphasis on serious evil, it might be possible to interpret Eckhart and Pascal, as well as Climacus as three Christian, neo-Platonic mystics, fundamentally in agreement with each other: the differences are only relative, concerned with degrees of emphasis they give to different elements in their common, mystic, neo-Platonic consciousness. There could be no doubt, though, that Climacus' post-Hegelian version of mystic, neo-Platonic Christianity is the most "audacious" and "unbalanced" religious view. One can hardly account for this fact only by referring to Climacus' possibly indirect use of Kantian sceptical, epistemological presuppositions in his polemical situation. One is rather left in uncertainty about Climacus' intentions and his ability to handle his problem of evil, as a result of his complete adherence to Kantian scepticism, anti-rationalism, and mystic Hegelian-related epistemology. Sometimes it seems as if he is the victim of an "evil" suffering which he is not willing, or able, to work constructively against. He might thereby appear to have obscured and mystified the suffering which could have been used in a constructive and "rational" process of purification.

Therefore, the thesis has argued throughout for the view that Climacus is an "irrationalist". It does not, however, identify Climacus and Kierkegaard in this respect without further ado. Rather, it limits primarily its scope to Climacus, aiming to clarify an important presupposition for further partaking in a debate about Kierkegaard's epistemological views. For the very close connection between Kierkegaard and his pseudonym of Climacus is beyond doubt. Professor McKinnon, arguing against the notion that Kierkegaard is an "irrationalist", has concluded that also Climacus most

likely is not an "irrationalist". The thesis has attempted to show, on the basis of a mystic, neo-Platonic reading of Philosophiske Smuler, that Climacus' "irrationalism" is clearly manifested in the emphasis he gives to evil in his mystic, Christian consciousness. By taking such a phenomenological approach, the way lies open to point out evil and "irrationalism" in Kierkegaard himself. The thesis, however, limits its scope to Climacus, and only intends to prepare the ground for further discussion about Kierkegaard's possible "irrationalism". In this respect it has pointed out, in Chapter I, obvious similarities and identities between Kierkegaard's own life and Climacus' fictitious personality. It was, especially in Kierkegaard's last years, when he most strongly underlined ascetism, and involved himself in polemics against the state church, that the "evil" elements in the Kierkegaardian Climacus' consciousness appear to have become actualized. Therefore, by approaching Kierkegaard within a phenomenological methodology, in the same way as the thesis has done with Climacus, it seems reasonable to consider Kierkegaard an "irrationalist" too.

However, the thesis has in addition pointed out that it is also possible to argue in favour of a non-irrationalistic conclusion on the basis of a mystic, phenomenological method. Such an argumentation presupposes that one underlines the problem of pseudonymity as well as the problem of indirect communication. In fact, these are precisely the two main problems McKinnon is most concerned with in his later Kierkegaard research. Therefore, one should not believe that the thesis intends to refute and eradicate McKinnon's well-founded views once and for all. It agrees with McKinnon that Climacus, and probably Kierkegaard as well, wishes to stay within the

validity of logical reasoning, and that Climacus/Kierkegaard can never accept breaches of logical rules. The thesis also agrees with McKinnon that Climacus/Kierkegaard in this perspective wants to separate logic and existence, so that they belong to mutually exclusive spheres. Thus understood, Climacus/Kierkegaard cannot be placed in the category of ontological irrationalism. However, in addition the thesis has argued that Climacus is a mystic, adhering to a mystic Hegelian-related concept of reason alongside the logical, sceptical concept. In this mystic perspective, Climacus' Kantian sceptical concepts of reason and "anti-reason" must appear as contradictory to the mystic concept. Thus, Climacus appears as an epistemological irrationalist, according to McKinnon's definition of this term, i.e. he "holds a view which is incompatible with his underlying conceptions". In the mystic perspective, epistemological irrationalism is not an isolated phenomenon. It must have an ethical and ontological counterpart. The thesis argues therefore that epistemological irrationalism becomes manifested as ontological irrationalism in the importance Climacus gives to evil.

Since Climacus polemizes against the rational, logical right-wing Hegelian view that "evil is ignorance", he must conclude that in the mystic perspective "evil is not ignorance". The mystic reality goes beyond, or "transcends" the realm of logical reason. Logical reason can therefore only have access to mystic reality through "anti-rationalism". In this perspective evil is not ignorance, but rather the opposite. And, in order to verify his views, Climacus can point to Christian dogmatics as well as his own "evil" experiences.

In this way the thesis points out that Climacus also is an ontological irrationalist, as manifested in the importance he attributes to evil. Since the same problem of evil can be pointed out in the historical Kierkegaard, the thesis sees a possibility to point out that he too most probably is an "irrationalist". - Thus, the thesis concludes that both Climacus and Kierkegaard most likely should be considered irrationalists, and this conclusion is apparently in opposition to McKinnon's view.

However, the thesis does not intend to see this irrationalism only derogatorily, but also positively, as a consequence of philosophical honesty. The thesis aims at exposing a dilemma of modern, secularized minds when they attempt to express the experience of the mystic, eternal, perennial philosophy. For modern, secularized man, mystic religious reality must appear as a contradiction. By adhering to modern epistemological views that ultimately exclude the existence of God, "true" mystic belief in his existence must be "irrational". Religious belief must therefore appear as contradictory. Whether the Kierkegaardian Climacus ultimately subsumed his sceptical views to classic mystic views and thus managed to exclude the dilemma of "irrationalism" could be a matter of dispute. But it can hardly be doubted that the dilemma is there, in the modern age as well as in Climacus' Philosophiske Smuler. The present thesis has taken this dilemma seriously, arguing that Climacus is decisively influenced by modern, secularized ideas. He is therefore an "irrationalist".

D) Short Summary of Chapter VII

Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis. First it focusses on form and themes in Philosophiske Smuler. This work appears to be composed of ideas that can be subsumed under one main theme, namely the epistemological problem of reason and faith. This theme seems also to be the most fundamental constituent of Climacus' mystic, Christian consciousness. Climacus propounds the main parts of the work in relation to a Socrates figure, who appears to be a combination of mystic, Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas, and to a Hegel figure, who is contrasted with a combination of Kantian and mystic, neo-Platonic ideas of transcendence. Thus, Climacus defines the concept of transcendence in relation to Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, Hegel, and Kant, thereby implying ambiguities between reason and "anti-reason", good and evil, "rationalism" and "irrationalism".

The concluding section of Chapter 7 sums up the main traits of Climacus' mystic, Christian consciousness, in relation to Eckhart's. The thesis points out that Climacus' ambiguities between good and evil could be interpreted as belonging to man's temporal existence alone, as in Meister Eckhart's view. Given this interpretation, the difference between the two views is only in emphasis, and thus subjective and relative. But nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Climacus represents the more "unbalanced" mystic, neo-Platonic, Christian view. This unbalance

might be a result of the fact that Climacus is a fictitious person constructed by Kierkegaard as a weapon in his polemics. But the polemical situation alone does not adequately account for Climacus' unbalance and passionate exaggerations. His exposition appears also to point in the direction of an element of evil so serious that he can hardly consider it as relative and under his control. This fact points towards "irrationalism". The thesis strengthens this view by referring to Pascal's "irrationalism". Further, the thesis introduces the problems of pseudonymity and indirect communication, dealt with in the Introductory Chapter, and states that it is theoretically possible to defend the view that Climacus and Kierkegaard are ultimately not Kantian sceptics and anti-rationalists. In the thesis, however, the scope is limited to the Kierkegaardian Climacus, placing him rather in the category of "irrationalism" than in the opposite category. By means of this conclusion the thesis intends to make a positive contribution to the epistemological debate about Kierkegaard's possible irrationalism, and thus suggests an argument apparently in opposition to McKinnon's conclusions, in the direction of irrationalism. However, the thesis does not attack McKinnon's position on his own premises. In fact, it agrees with his views in the isolated perspective of his own methodology. But in the mystic phenomenological perspective McKinnon's position acquires only limited validity. In this perspective McKinnon's non-irrational position serves as a necessary basis for the more fundamental irrational position. This holds true for Climacus - and most likely also for Kierkegaard.

E) Notes to Chapter VII

1. The New Testament, Mark. 7, 25-28.
2. Chapter II, Note 47, the thesis, above.
3. Chapter II, Note 1, the thesis, above.
4. Chapter I, Note 85, the thesis, above.
5. See Anders Nygren, Agape & Eros, SPCK, London, 1982, pp. 512-18, 572 f., 578 f., 594-98, 621-37, etc. See also Note 2, the thesis, above.
6. Chapter III, Note 33, the thesis, above.
7. Anders Nygren, Agape & Eros, pp. 627-33. See also St. Bonaventure, The Mind's Journey to God (Itinerarium mentis ad deum), Chicago Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago, 1979, Chapters 1 & 2.
8. Kierkegaard owned the works of St. Bonaventure. See Ktl., nr. 435-36.
9. For the main lines in O.T. theology, see e.g., Claus Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, translated by D.W. Scott, J. Knox Press, Atlanta, 1982.
10. See Chapter II, Note 2, the thesis, above. See also Plotinus, Enneads I, 2, 6 & Plato, Republic VI, 508 f. Francis MacDonald Cornford opposes the neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato. In his commentary to Plato's Parmenides, Cornford states that "there is no evidence that either Socrates or Plato ever had that experience which was really the core round which Plotinus constructed his theology." Cornford thinks that "there is as little here (i.e. in Plato's Parmenides) to suggest that the One has any religious significance as there is ... to suggest that x, y, and z are a trinity of unknown Gods." Quoted from, Francis MacDonald Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, n.d., page 131.
11. Logically considered, the views in Kant's First Critique could be seen to be in opposition to the views in his Second Critique. This might be caused by the fact that Kant grew up in a pietistic tradition, and this influenced his ethical thinking and feeling of "duty".
12. See for instance Chapter II, Note 25, & Chapter III, Section B, the thesis, above.

13. See Chapter II, Sections D & G, the thesis, above.
14. Chapter III, the thesis, above.
15. Chapter V, Note 28, the thesis, above.
16. *ibid.*, & Note 23 f.
17. See Chapter V, Notes 23 & 24, and corresponding text, the thesis, above.
18. See Chapter VI, the thesis, above.
19. Chapter II, Section D, end, the thesis, above.
20. Chapter II, Section G, the thesis, above.
21. Chapter IV, Section C, the thesis, above. See also Chapter, IV, Notes 32-35, and corresponding text, the thesis, above.

APPENDIX

A) Explanation of the most important Primary Source Citations

All quotations from Kierkegaard's published writings are taken from the 3rd edition of Søren Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker, in 20 volumes, edited by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg, and H.O. Lange, (Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1962). References and quotations from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers are taken from the 2nd edition of Søren Kierkegaard's Papirer, Vols. I-XI, edited by P.A. Heiberg, V. Huhr, and E. Torsting, and Vols. XII-XVI, edited by Niels Thulstrup, Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1968-78. Cross-references to English translations can be looked up in Hong & Hong, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Indiana Press, Bloomington & London, 1967, Vol. 7, pp. 107-32.

In the first chapters of the thesis, almost all references to Philosophiske Smuler are given in square parentheses within the text. The first number refers to the page, the second and possible third refer(s) to line number, counted from the top of the page. A typical reference will then appear thus: [42, 15-20]. This means: page 42, from line 15 to line 20. If only one number appears in the square parenthesis, this refers to page number in the text. For instance: [7], means page 7. In cases of doubt the references are further explained. These references must be kept strictly apart from the Notes,

which are marked out in the text by regular parentheses. A Note looks like this: (7), and can be looked up in the end of the actual chapter.

Towards the end of the thesis (In the Appendix, Section C, below) a pagination table is enclosed for cross-references between the 3rd Danish and two English editions of Philosophical Fragments (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, from 1962 and 1985). A complete table of cross-references between 1st, 2nd, and 3rd editions of Søren Kierkegaard's Samlede Værker in Danish can be found in Vol. 20 of the 3rd Danish edition, pp. 263-339.

B) Abbreviations used in the Notes

<u>H.G.W.:</u>	<u>Hegel's Gesammelte Werke</u> . Refers to the 1969-71 edition of Hegel's Collected Works (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Vols: 20.
<u>S.V.:</u>	<u>Samlede Værker</u> . Refers to the 3rd edition of Kierkegaard's Collected Works, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1962.
<u>O.B.I.:</u>	<u>Om Begrebet Ironi</u> (On the Concept of Irony), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. I.
<u>A.O.T.:</u>	<u>Atten opbyggelige Taler</u> (Eighteen edifying Sermons), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. 4.
<u>F.B.:</u>	<u>Frygt og Bæven</u> (Fear and Trembling), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. 5.
<u>G.:</u>	<u>Gjentagelsen</u> (Repetition), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. 5.
<u>Ph.S.:</u>	<u>Philosophiske Smuler</u> (Philosophical Fragments), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. 6.
<u>B.A.:</u>	<u>Begrebet Angest</u> (The Concept of Dread), <u>S.V.</u> , Vol. 6.

- A.U.E.: Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Concluding Unscientific Postscript), S.V., Vols. 9 & 10.
- K.G.: Kjærlighedens Gjerninger (Works of Love), S.V., Vol. 12.
- S.D.: Sygdommen til Døden (Sickness unto Death), S.V., Vol. 15.
- I.C.: Indøvelse i Christendom (Training in Christianity), S.V., Vol. 16.
- O.M.F.V.: Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed (Concerning my Work as an Author), S.V., Vol. 18.
- S.F.M.F.: Synspunktet for min Forfattervirksomhed (The Point of View for my Work as an Author), S.V., Vol. 18.
- Ø.: Øieblikket (The Instant/Moment), S.V., Vol. 19.
- Pap.: Søren Kierkegaard's Papirer, (Papers) 2nd, edition, Vols: XVI, Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1968-78.
- H.H.: Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong: Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vols: VII, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1967.
- Ktl.: Auktionsprotokol over Søren Kierkegaard's Bogsamling (The Auctioneer's Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard), v. H.P. Rohde, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, København, 1967.
- O.T.: The Old Testament.
- N.T.: The New Testament.
- B.K.: Biblioteca Kierkegaardiana, Vols: XIV, C.A. Reizel's forlag, København, 1978-85.
- K.: Kierkegaardiana, Vols: XIV, Munksgaard/Rosenkilde & Bagge/C.A. Reizel, København, 1955-88.

As far as Hegel is concerned, the references are made to standard English translations, and the quotes are from them. However, German corresponding

references are also given. They are made to the newest edition of Hegel's collected works in 20 volumes:

Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1969-71.

References to Greek sources are given with numbers indicating where they can be looked up in standardized Greek editions. These numbers are also indicated in English translations.

The translations from Scandinavian languages (i.e. Norwegian, Swedish, Danish) are mostly made by the author of the thesis. But when acknowledged English translations were available, they have sometimes been used. In this respect the quotations from Philosophiske Smuler are checked in relation to the newest English translation by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, New Jersey, 1985. The quotations from German sources other than Hegel follow also standard English translations, when they were available. If not, translations are made by the author of the thesis. Acknowledged translations from Greek and Latin are also followed, when they occur.

As a principle key concepts from primary sources are underlined the first time they occur in the text of the thesis, and later when special emphasis on these concepts is required.

C) Pagination Table for Philosophiske Smuler and Philosophical Fragments

Cross-references between the Danish 3rd edition of S.V., Copenhagen 1962, and the English editions from Princeton, 1962 & 1985. The numbers refer to page and line in the text (e.g., 12.3 - 14.5 means: from page 12, line 3, to page 14, line 5).

Danish 3rd ed.	English ed. 1962	English ed. 1985	Danish 3rd ed.	English ed. 1962	English ed. 1985
7	1	1	44	54.15-55.32	44-45.8
8	2	3	45	55.32-57.14	45.8-46.14
9	3.1-4.7	5-6.5	46	57.14-59.5	46.14-47.24
10	4.7-5.22	6.6-7.11	47	59.5-60.5	47.24-48.16
11	5.23-7.7	7.11-8	48	61.1-62.12	49-50.6
12	----	----	49	62.12-63.21	50.6-51.15
13	9.1-9.4	9.1-9.4	50	63.21-65.19	51.15-52.27
14	----	----	51	65.19-67.3	52.27-53.33
15	11.1-12.2	9.5-10.2	52	67.4-67.33	53.33-54.22
16	12.3-14.5	10.3-11.25	53	68.1-69.9	55-56.8
17	14.5-15.15	11.25-12.28	54	69.9-70.28	56.8-57.17
18	15.15-17.3	12.28-14.3	55	70.29-72.10	57.18-58.23
19	17.4-18.21	14.4-15.11	56	72.11-73.30	58.24-59.33
20	18.21-21.1	15.11-17.2	57	73.30-75.14	59.33-61.2
21	21.1-21.14	17.2-17.15	58	75.14-76.29	61.2-62.11
22	21.14-23.7	17.15-18.32	59	76.29-78.14	62.11-63.17
23	23.8-24.22	18.32-20.2	60	78.14-80.1	63.17-64.25
24	24.23-26.8	20.3-21.11	61	80.1-81.18	64.25-65.34
25	26.8-27.23	21.11-22	62	81.18-83.9	65.34-67.6
26	28.1-29.13	23-24.6	63	83.10-84.28	67.6-68.16
27	29.14-30.30	24.6-25.13	64	84.29-86.13	68.16-69.27
28	30.30-32.14	25.13-26.19	65	86.14-87.31	69.27-70.34
29	32.15-34.1	26.19-27.30	66	87.31-88.19	70.35-71
30	34.1-35.19	27.30-28.36	67	89.1-90.10	72-73.11
31	35.19-37.5	28.37-30.6	68	90.11-92.1	73.12-74.22
32	37.5-38.25	30.6-31.12	69	92.1-93.22	74.22-75.31
33	38.25-40.9	31.12-32.20	70	93.23-95.8	75.32-77.1
34	40.9-41.28	32.20-33.31	71	95.9-96.23	77.2-78.8
35	41.28-43.6	33.31-35.1	72	97.1-98.11	79-79.15
36	43.7-44.22	35-36.6	73	98.12-99.30	79.15-80.28
37	44.22-45.13	36.6-36.28	74	99.30-101.19	80.28-82.2
38	46.1-47.6	37-38.2	75	101.19-103.6	82.2-83.12
39	47.6-48.23	38.3-39.8	76	103.6-104.30	83.12-84.23
40	48.23-50.6	39.8-40.16	77	104.30-106.18	84.23-85.32
41	50.7-52.1	40.16-42.1	78	106.18-107.11	85.32-86.16
42	52.1-53.2	42-42.18	79	107.12-108.19	86.17-87.17
43	53.3-54.15	42.18-44.1	80	108.19-110.6	87.17-88

81	111.1-112.11	89-90.7	92	127.26-129.12	101.37-103.6
82	112.11-113.29	90.7-91.14	93	129.12-130.33	103.6-104.14
83	113.30-115.17	91.15-92.22	94	130.33-132.22	104.14-105.21
84	115.17-117.1	92.22-93.28	95	132.22-134.6	105.21-106.29
85	117.2-118.7	93.28-95.1	96	134.6-135.22	106.30-107.35
86	118.7-120.2	95.1-95.23	97	135.22-137.9	107.35-109.5
87	120.2-121.25	96.1-97.7	98	137.9-138.22	109.5-110
88	121.25-123.9	97.7-98.14	99	139	111
89	123.9-124.24	98.14-99.19			
90	124.25-126.10	99.19-100.29			
91	126.10-127.25	100.29-101.37			

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Glossary of Terms related to

Mysticism, Rationality, and

Scepticism (together with a

Note on the Nature of Evil).

A.) Mysticism.

In the academical discipline of Comparative Religion attempts are made to define the essentials of religious phenomena. In all the great world religions the religious phenomenon of mysticism occurs, and the adherents of this type of religion are called mystics (See the thesis, page 48ff.)

Mystic phenomenology is the attempt to describe the mystic states of mind (See the thesis, Foreword, page 9). The mystics fundamentally build their religious views on religious experiences and explain them in terms of the religious language of the culture they belong to.

Purification is a central term in mystic phenomenology (See the thesis, page 50). This term means the mystic's strive for ethical purification and perfection, which can make possible the deeper experiences of the ultimate ground. Thus, the mystic goes through a more or less systematic ethical training-programme, which purifies thoughts, feelings, and behaviour.

Illumination is the final state of mind occurring after the state of purification. (See the thesis, page 50) In this stage the mystic attains a clear knowledge of the final aim for his development, the "unio mystica".

Unio mystica is the highest state of mind of a mystic. In this stage the mystic reaches union with the Divine (See the thesis, page 51, and Philosophiske Smuler, page 31).

Pantheistic mysticism is a type of mysticism in which the unio mystica means a coincidence of man's being with the Divine Being. Thus, the individuality is extinguished (See the thesis, pp.50 & 201, and Philosophiske Smuler, page 31f.).

Theistic mysticism is a type of mysticism in which the mystic experiences himself/herself in the unio mystica as an individual related to a personal Divine Being (See the thesis Chapter 1, Section D, page 49.). It is natural that within the Judaic, Christian, and Islamic religions, with their emphasis given to man's inferiority in relation to God, only this type of religious mysticism can be officially acknowledged. Climacus is in the Christian tradition. The theistic traits in his mysticism are strongly underlined (See the thesis, pp.50 & 201, and Philosophiske Smuler, Chapter 2 & Chapter 4, esp. pp.28 & 31).

Perennial philosophy is a term which sometimes is used as a synonym of Thomism. In the mystic phenomenological perspective, however, it is a synonym of mysticism. The mystics often describe their progress in mystic development as a progress in "knowledge". The mystic grows in perfection and insight into the transcendent ground of reality. (See the thesis, pp. 49-52). Since this experience is common to all mystics, scholars of religion refer to it as the "noetic quality" of mysticism (See the thesis, page 51). Climacus shows great interest in philosophical problems (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 15ff., 24, 38 ff., 75 ff. & 97 f.).

Speculative mystics is the name given to mystics who tend to attribute extra emphasis to the noetic quality. It is natural that mystics with special philosophical faculties and/or interests tend to express their mystic knowledge in terms of the available philosophical frameworks. Thus, St. Augustine explains his mysticism in terms of neo-Platonic metaphysics, Meister Eckhart in terms of Thomism and neo-Platonism, Kierkegaard's Climacus mainly in terms of neo-Platonic metaphysics and Kantian epistemology (See the thesis, the table page 237, and Philosophiske Smuler, page 46). The thesis emphasizes epistemological structures in the consciousness of Climacus, because there arises a conflict in his subscription to both Kantian and mystic neo-Platonic epistemologies. This conflict is especially clear in Climacus' exposition of Christianity as the "absolute paradox". (See the thesis, Chapter 1, Section G, pp.158-169, and Philosophiske Smuler, pp.38-47).

Mystic atheism is a term which occurs in the thesis when topics concerning negative descriptions of the mystic, ultimate ground come into question. Some mystics emphasize the ultimate in terms as "void", "nothingness", "pure nothing", etc. Most negative expressions in this respect occur in Theravada Buddhism, where this negative nature of the ultimate is embodied in the concept of Nirvana. Since Nirvana points towards a radical "extinction" of human life, Buddhism has been named an "atheistic" religion. (See the thesis pp.95ff., 245f.) Climacus also subscribes to elements of "atheism" (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 40 & 44).

The Godhead is the term employed by Eckhart to denote the ultimate reality beyond God. Eckhart describes the Godhead in terms some Buddhists use to describe Nirvana, and Eckhart has therefore been considered to be the mystic in the Christian tradition who is closest to Buddhism (See the thesis page 245f.) Also Climacus could, by virtue of his adherence to Kantian epistemology, be considered "atheistic" (See the thesis pp.411 & 431, and Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 40 & 44).

B.) Concepts of evil.

The definition of evil in the thesis falls mainly in two categories: a "stronger" and a "weaker" evil.

Ontological evil is the very strongest evil. It occurs when man himself does not have the necessary capacities to extirpate it. The thesis argues that due to Climacus' Kantian epistemological views, Climacus assumes an insoluble problem of evil in the mystic phenomenological perspective. He is an ontological dualist, i.e. he holds a notion of God which implies that evil cannot be ruled out of his essence. Mystic man assumes thus what he calls sin-consciousness (See the thesis, pp.91f., 127 ff., 376 ff., and Philosophiske Smuler, page 46.).

Sin is a dogmatic concept, used in the Christian tradition to denote man's inferiority in relation to God. The concept of sin has its origin in the Judaic religion, where atonement and salvation were needed to mend man's ethical impurity. In the mystic Christian tradition this concept of sin was preserved. The Christian mystics excluded the possibility of giving evil a transcendent ontological status, and attributed the origin of all sin(evil) to man's will. Thus they tended to explain all kinds of evil as "weaker" evil, i.e. within man's capacities to mend. However, some of these mystics, as St. Augustine, tended in some circumstances to make the will evil in itself. Thus, he approached ontological dualism (See the thesis, pp. 93ff., 97, 122). Climacus as well as the Jansenists, Pascal and Luther belong to this Augustinian tradition (See the thesis, pp. 258ff. & 261f., and Philosophiske Smuler, page 20.). Eckhart, as well as John Scotus Eriugena, tended to weaken the seriousness of evil in the will. They were both condemned as heretics (See the thesis, pp. 238-240).

Ascetism is a concept which often occurs in mystic literature. This concept is a tool the mystic uses in order to cleanse the will, and thus prepare the soul for the ascent towards unio mystica. Ascetism is "voluntary evil", i.e. sufferings the mystic imposes upon himself in order to become sufficiently aware of the gulf of imperfection which

separates man from God. A mystic as Meister Eckhart uses the suffering of social involvement as the purifying, ascetic tool (See the thesis, page 257). The well-known German mystic, Henry Suso, imposed torture upon himself for ascetic purposes (See the thesis, page 82f., note 85).

Climacus cannot use suffering as constructively as Eckhart and Suso, since Climacus, as a result of his adherence to Kantian epistemological elements, subscribes to a stronger, ontological evil (See the thesis pp. 261, 316 & 428. See also Philosophiske Smuler, pp.20, 30, 32, 46, 48, & 49.).

Offence, sorrow, and guilt are concepts of "weaker evil" which Climacus often employs. However, these concepts are also sometimes connected to transcendence, and assume thereby a transcendent, ontological status. Thus, for Climacus they become "stronger evil" (See the thesis, pp.120-123, and 310ff.)

C.) Rationality and Scepticism.

The thesis employs a number of terms with different epistemological frames of reference.

Irrationalism is used in mainly two senses:

a) Logical irrationalism. This concept means a view of reason which implies breaks of logical rules. This concept is used by McKinnon in his attempts to argue that Climacus is not an "irrationalist". The thesis argues against this "irrationalistic" view (See the thesis, pp. 2, 17ff.,70, 223, 430f.).

b) Mystic irrationalism. In the thesis this concept is used about Climacus' epistemological views, when they are considered within mystic phenomenology. Mystic rationalism is a concept in which thinking and ontology are essentially connected, leading towards the annihilation of evil in ultimate reality. Mystic irrationalism is thus a view in which evil has a transcendent ontological status. The thesis holds the view that Climacus fundamentally is a mystic irrationalist (See the thesis, pp. 4, 7 note 3, 70, 265 & 431.).

Anti-rationalism explains transcendent reality in terms of something which transcends logical rationality. Since logical reason never can be transcendent, anti-reason establishes transcendence as the logically superior to logical reason. On Kantian epistemological presuppositions Climacus subscribes to anti-rationalism in Philosophiske Smuler when he establishes his view of Christianity in logical

opposition to Socrates' rationalistic mystic outlook (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 18f., & the thesis, pp. 111 ff.).

Hegelian rationalism refers to Hegel's concept of Speculative Reason. In this view reason and being are essentially connected; in Climacus' opinion, subsumed under logical, "objective" reason. (See Philosophiske Smuler, note 1, p. 71f., and the thesis, p. 107.).

Hegelian-related mystic reason refers to the rational view of Meister Eckhart and the speculative mystics. In their concept of reason, subjectivity is more underlined than in Hegel's concept of Speculative Reason. The thesis argues that Climacus also adheres to a Hegelian-related concept of reason, in which subjectivity is still more underlined than it was for Meister Eckhart (See the thesis, pp. 251-254, & 411.).

Theological rationalism refers to the rationalistic view of theologians in the age of the Enlightenment, who wanted to interpret the Bible in such a way that it could be completely understood by human reason. Thus, they disregarded the three classical proofs of the truth of Christianity, i.e. the proof of miracles, prophecies, and Christianity's successful growth into a world religion (See the thesis, pp. 352ff.). Kierkegaard strongly rejects this kind of rationalism which he knew from his studies at the Theological Faculty at the University of Copenhagen (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 83 ff., and the thesis, pp. 83 ff.).

Kantian scepticism. This term refers to Kant's epistemology in Critique of Pure Reason. Climacus apparently adheres to these Kantian views. (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 40 & 44). The thesis gives extra importance to the fact that Climacus is a Kantian sceptic (See the thesis, pp. 5, 114, 117, 134 f., 149, etc.).

Sophism, or The Sophistic View are terms which do not occur in Philosophiske Smuler. The thesis introduces these terms to indicate that Climacus introduces his Kantian sceptical elements in his Socrates figure. This leads to epistemological, ontological, and ethical relativism and nihilism (See Philosophiske Smuler, pp. 38 ff., and the thesis, pp. 139 ff.).