


Reading Islam in Hospitable Terms

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I'd like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Sophie Cloutier, who helped me refine my philosophical outpourings. I dedicate these words to my mother who handled my rambling with grace and to my beloved wife Assma who is my greatest critic and an intellectual inspiration. This work couldn't have been initiated without the long nights of conversing with Naba Choudhury and without the knowledge and wisdom shared with me by Sidi Hamdi. To my late father, you are missed. And finally to my dear brother Abdel Majid El Amine, may God have mercy on you, who inspired me to pursue these studies and who was a great inspiration.

Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to understand how Islam is becoming Canadian. The process of *becoming* is illustrated using the philosophical framework of the ethics of hospitality developed by Emmanuel Lévinas and Jacques Derrida as a means to emancipate from the Hegelian system of progress. This work illustrates the need to differentiate between *Islam*, *Islamism* and *Muslimness*. This is explained with an understanding of Hannah Arendt's writing on totalitarianism, ideology and religion. Islam is found to differ from Islamism by its connection to a scholarly tradition while the latter's emphasis on religious puritanism severs itself from tradition. Furthermore, examples are illustrated to show that Islam's scholarly tradition respected context. By introducing the ethics of hospitality, it becomes evident that this ethical system promotes both the tradition of Islam and the contextualization of that tradition. The thesis' final part exemplifies these ideas with a discussion on Islamic fashion as the embodiment of the ethics of hospitality.

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Introduction

1. Canadian Muslims

'Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
 Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.
 What's Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
 Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
 Belonging to a man. O, be some other name!
 What's in a name? that which we call a rose
 By any other name would smell as sweet;
 So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
 Retain that dear perfection which he owes
 Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
 And for that name which is no part of thee
 Take all myself.

Romeo & Juliet, Shakespeare

What's in a name? Identity, culture, heritage, religious affiliation, etc. can all be derived from a name. Names can encourage belonging or alienation. It could be argued that an Elizabeth or a Marc has a better chance of being employed in Canada than an Ahmad or a Priya. Consider the name James Love, not an uncommon name for a Canadian from Scottish decent. Someone with a name like this would most likely not be subject to much prejudice. It could be said, in fact, that James Love is a Canadian name. To the surprise of many, James Love, born in 1854, was the first Canadian-born Muslim. The Love family, who had migrated from Scotland and settled in Ontario, alongside John and Martha Simon, “constituted almost the entire Muslim Community in Canada.” (Hamdani, 1984, 8) There has not been much research done on James Love and

company but his existence reveals an important point that illustrates the overarching intention of this paper. The formation of Islam in Canada was not necessarily foreign to Canadian identity. We can deduce from the name, James Love that there was a Scottish heritage. Scots, who were settling pioneers helped build Canada as a nation. Love's identity was Canadian, his heritage Scottish and his religion Islam. This thesis attempts to illustrate how James Love is not a fringe exception. Islam can both be Canadian and Traditional. Traditional is understood as a connection to a dynamic, as opposed to a static, historical narrative that re-contextualizes itself in a particular time and space. Thus, the main question is whether Islam, as a Traditional religion, can properly express itself as Canadian, as it has been able to do in other parts of the world such as Arabia, Persia, China, West Africa, etc. The hypothesis is positive. Islam, as it begins to re-investigate its own cultural history in Canada, challenges particular assumptions it has made about itself regarding integration, acculturation, political presence, multiculturalism, traditionalism and orthodoxy. We believe that the vital dimension to integration is not found in the concept of progress but in referencing the past.

2. The Question of Integration

The subject of integration in Canada is an important yet sensitive issue. Since Canada formally declared itself as a multicultural nation, concepts such as the politics of recognition, assimilation, diversity and citizenship have dominated the Canadian philosophical scene. Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, to name a few, have questioned the role of multiculturalism in the public sphere, the importance of integration and the necessity of diversity. However, most, if not all, have assumed modern discourses that

relate integration to progress. This is best understood, by what the Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul, called the dictatorship of reason in his book *Voltaire's Bastards*. Progress, being the product of reason, tends to verge on a particular assimilation process, either linguistically or culturally. The common assumption is that there is a need to put particular policies in place to encourage this process.

One such example that arose while writing this thesis is the Quebec Charter of Values (Law Project 60) which attempts to redefine, or promote for that matter, a form of secularism that would uphold the process of integration into Quebecois society. One of the recommendations of this proposed Charter, which is of great relevance to the topic of this work, is the ban on religious symbols from the public service. If passed, Muslim women, for example, would be forbidden to wear their veil. Consequently, it has been shown that this debate has led to a rise of violence and islamophobic tendencies¹. During public statements, which are readily available on the Internet, many citizens expressed their discomfort from “foreign values.” This particular sentiment implies a cultural superiority and a feeling of being invaded. This work not only challenges this strict secularism as being non-progressive but suggests that it is antithetical to the integration process. Rather, the integration process, from the viewpoint of this work, would claim that the Muslim veil needs to *become* Canadian.

¹ A recent example was published in The Globe and Mail: Peritz, Ingrid. *Attacks on halal butcher, mosque shock Quebec community* (Feb. 21, 2014). : “To some members of the local Muslim community (in Sherbrooke) [...], the incidents underscore a growing sense of vulnerability since the start of the debate on the Quebec charter of secular values...”

² The work of Tariq Ramadan cannot be ignored. He has discussed quite thoroughly the question

3. The Argument

This thesis argues that *becoming* Canadian is best characterized by Emmanuel Lévinas' *ethics of hospitality*. Hospitality as ethics conceptualizes the relationship between the self and the other, not as a process of assimilation, but as a process of *infinitization*, which encourages the other to explore himself or herself *ad infinitum*. In other words, it is a direct refutation of Hegel's notion of *progress through assimilation*, which is discussed later. Discourses and research have been made attempting to illustrate the importance of modernizing/reforming Islam to accommodate a Western context. This is seen through the works of political and liberal thinkers such as Tariq Ramadan², Abdullah An-Naim, Bassam Tibi, of religious reformers such as Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Yusuf Qardawi, of feminists scholars such as Amina Wadud, etc. In general, the foundational question is searching for a particular reform of Islam that would be in line with a liberal Western discourse. Some post-colonial thinkers, such as Wael Hallaq, seek to shed light on the traditional Islamic sources, politically speaking, as being paradigmatically incompatible with the modern nation state. The common theme amongst many scholars is the incompatibility of a traditional discourse in modern/post-modern times. This work challenges these opinions.

A growing assumption is that there is a correlation between radicalization and piety amongst Muslim. Radicalization would be the product of an unintegrated population. However recent research has shown that piety is often linked to increased political participation. In a 2013 research conducted by Katherine Bullock and Paul

² The work of Tariq Ramadan cannot be ignored. He has discussed quite thoroughly the question of identity in European Muslims. See Ramadan, T. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005).

Nesbitt-Larking on the political participation of young Muslims in Canada, it was found that “[d]eep piety, such as wearing a face veil, is not necessarily connected to disengagement from Canadian society, in fact, sometimes quite the contrary. Some of the least vigilant in their daily prayers are also the least interested in politics.” (Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking, 2013, 201) In their research, Bullock and Nesbitt-Larking found that contrary to popular belief, there is a strong correlation between piety (that is a deep reverence for the religion) and political participation (from community volunteering to formal politics). One could argue that integration is characterized by a sense of political participation. Thus to be a Canadian citizen would mean to exercise the political power given to a citizen. This leads to the following questions. Is piety related to traditionalism and if so can a tradition of Islam be born out of a space that is at once pluralistic and non-Islamic? In other words, can there be a Canadian traditional Islam?

4. Hypothesis

The hypothesis attempts to show that the *ethics of hospitality* can only be applied to Islam as a religion and that ideological streams of Islamism nullify and discourage this process. By illustrating the staunch dichotomy between religion and ideology, it is hoped that religion can be indigenized to a particular time and place while remaining steadfast to its tradition. This will be done in four stages.

The first introduces the conceptual challenge of defining Islam by comparing Islam to Judaism using Judith Butler’s important article “Is Judaism Zionism?” This comparison provides a backbone that reveals the need to differentiate Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology. It provides the theoretical framework on how Islam is

defined. We have chosen to study normative Sunni Islam. By normative, we mean the Islam that is adhered to by the majority of Muslims. However, normative should not be synonymous with monolithic. It will be argued that the essential difference between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology is the pluralistic nature of the former. In the second, examples and cases within the Islamic tradition will illustrate that Sunni Islam is theologically, legally and ethically pluralistic. The discussion will present the importance of the context when deriving legal rulings from Islamic sources. The plurality of rulings illustrates how ideological Islamism fails to provide a contextual understanding. In the third, the *ethics of hospitality* is introduced and discussed as a means to encourage this inner plurality and to elucidate the necessity of providing a culturally-relevant conception of traditional Islam. The ethics of hospitality promotes the dynamic traditionalism found in the religion. If the inner plurality is discouraged, even by the so-called progressive policies, then the path towards Islamism ideology is paved. Finally, the dynamism of hospitality is exemplified through the expression of fashion and the bidirectional influence of culture and of the Islamic tradition.

Religion and ideology and its relation to Islam and Islamism

1. Defining Islam

It is necessary, for the purpose of our study, to recognize two major perspectives or spheres that witness and experience Islam: from *within* and from *without*. These perspectives are not necessarily oppositional because one influences the other, as will be seen throughout. However they are ontologically different. The Muslim believer sees himself as subscribing to a religion that represents truth. His or her religion brings meaning to the forms that he or she experiences in his or her daily life: prayer, family, society, morality, spirituality, law, etiquette, etc. are all *Islamic*. He or she may subscribe to a secular model that is not found within the tradition and thus practice Islam strictly privately. The possibility to choose how an individual will relate to a secular political model shows the relationship between the experience *within* and the experience *without*. Non-Muslims experience Islam from afar. They observe the Muslim experiencing his or her religion yet do not see the sacredness experienced from his or her perspective. This we could say is the secular extreme. Throughout the essay, these two perspectives will form an important scale, with the extremes being *holistically within* and *holistically without*. It will become evident how each one has the power to influence the perspective of the other.

More and more it seems within these two main perspectives that the terms *Islam* and *Islamism* have increasingly become synonymous especially amongst popular mainstream media. Muslims are portrayed as identifying to both; subscribing to Islam necessarily means subscribing to Islamism, meanwhile Muslims cannot distinguish

between the two. Thus, the lines between *Islam*, *Islamism* and *Muslimness* appear blurred and the consequences impact the lives of millions. Politically, the absence of differentiating between Islam and Islamism brings forward an ideological trend that attempts to embody the voice of one unified community. Furthermore, religious affiliation decrees political orientation. These issues are methodological. The major issue with the lack of differentiation between religion and ideology is the influence it has on the construction of identity. Once the divide is drawn and defined, the myriad of Muslim identities surfaces.

Bearing with in mind, it must be illustrated that *Islam*, *Islamism* and *Muslimness* all signify different moral, ideological and spiritual streams. In terms of religion, there are various schools of jurisprudence (madhahib), creeds (‘aqīdah) and denominations (firq³). Ideologically, there is an array of political orientations from progressive and liberal to neo-conservative and fundamentalist. This complexity is not recognized when Islam and Islamist are synonymous. Thus, it becomes essential to define *Islam*, *Islamism*, and what it means to *be* Muslim.

Islam makes up a fifth of the world’s population and is the second largest religious community in the world. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010) Followers of the religion believe that the Qur’ān is the Word of God (kālāmullāh) and is a continuation of the Abrahamic tradition of Judaism and Christianity. The Prophet Muḥammad (b. 570) is believed to be the seal of a prophetic lineage that includes Adam, Noah, Abraham,

³ The term sect (pl. fiqah) comes from the following saying of the Prophet (hadīth): “The Jews split into seventy-one sects or seventy-two sects, and the Christians similarly, and my Community will split into seventy-three sects.” (Tirmidhi, Chapter 40, Hadīth 18)

Moses, David, Solomon and Jesus. (Esposito, 2002, 4-8) All who are considered Muslims agrees to this generally. There is though many tenets that are subject to debate. The Amman Message was a recent attempt was made to define what it means to be a Muslim according to a traditional framework. This conference was collaboration of scholars from various schools of jurisprudence, creed and sects. They came up with three major points that united the Muslim community. This will be carefully analyzed to shed light on what it means to *be* Muslim according to the vast scholarship of Islam. According to these scholars, Islam is to be divided in the three important dimensions of the religion (al-dīn) that were narrated in the hadīth or prophetic narration of the Angel Gabriel: submission (islām⁴), faith (īmān) and virtue (iḥsān).

“While we were one day sitting with the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah upon him, there appeared before us a man dressed in extremely white clothes and with very black hair. No traces of travel were visible on him, and none of us knew him. He sat down close by the Prophet, peace and blessings upon him, rested his knees against his knees and placed his palms on his thighs, and said, O Muhammad! Inform me about islām.” (Sahih Muslim, Chapter 1, Hadīth 1)

He then answered that the dimension of submission (islām) comprises five pillars. “Muhammad said, ‘Islām is that you should testify that there is no deity save Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger (kalimat ash-shahādah), that you should perform the ritual prayer (ṣalāt), pay the alms (zakāt), fast during Ramadan (ṣiyām), and perform the pilgrimage (ḥajj).’” (Sahih Muslim, Chapter 1, Hadīth 1) These five pillars are legislated

⁴ There needs to be a clear distinction between Islam and islām. See *W. Chittick and S. Murata, Vision of Islam* (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1994): “In short, we have four basic meaning for the word *islam*, moving from the broadest to the narrowest: (1) the submission of the whole of creation to its Creator; (2) the submission of human beings to the guidance of God as revealed through the prophets; (3) the submission of human beings to the guidance of God as revealed through the prophet Muhammad; and (4) the submission of the followers of Muhammad to God’s practical instructions.” (Chittick & Murata, 1994, 6) These authors explain that the third meaning is what would be called Islam, while the other three are various uses of the word islām. Submission, in the hadīth of Gabriel, represents the fourth category.

by the realm of jurisprudence (fiqh) derived from the Sacred Law (sharī‘a). This is the dimension of the scholars (‘ulamā’), interpreters (mujtahid) and jurists (fuqahā’). The Amman Message defined anyone who adheres to a particular school of jurisprudence (madhhab), which includes the four Sunni schools (Hanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī and Hanbalī), the two Shī‘i schools of jurisprudence (Ja‘farī and Zaydī), and the Ibādī and the Zāhirī school, to be a Muslim. (International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 2006) The scholars of the Amman Message categorized these schools as the legitimate schools of jurisprudence and thus gave validity for these schools to govern the legal realm of Islam.

The second realm shown in the hadīth of Gabriel is that of faith (īmān). When asked to inform him about īmān, the Prophet replied: “It is that you believe in Allah and His Angels and His Books and His Messengers and in the Last Day, and in divine decree, both in its good and in its evil aspects.” (Sahih Muslim, Chapter 1, Hadīth 1) This dimension is the realm of creed and belief and is associated to theological schools (kālām) as well as to numerous philosophical schools⁵. Nevertheless, the concept of faith can be narrowed down to the six pillars (belief in God, Angels, Holy Books, Messengers, the Judgement Day, and divine decree). These six pillars have been formalized in various schools or methodologies, which include the Ash‘arī and the Mu‘tazilah that form Sunni theology or kālām⁶.

Finally, the dimension of virtue (iḥsān) is described by the Prophet as follows:

“It is that you should serve Allah as though you could see Him, for though you cannot

⁵ See H. Corbin, *Histoire de la philosophie islamique* (Paris: Folio essais, 1999) for an insight on the history of this second dimension. Islamic philosophy, having borrowed from both Greek/Western and Eastern metaphysics amalgamated a wide variety of philosophical thought.

⁶ For methodological purposes, these will be the schools limited for the present study due to the large number of theological schools in various sects.

see Him yet He sees you." (Sahih Muslim, Chapter 1, Hadīth 1) Iḥsān is thus the moral and spiritual sphere as it is characterized by intending service to God. Formalized, one could argue that this is the realm of spirituality, as practiced by Sufism (taṣawwūf⁷). The hadīth of Gabriel lays the foundation of Islam as a religion. Chittick and Murata write:

“The hadith of Gabriel suggests that in the Islamic understanding, religion embraces right ways of doing things, right ways of thinking and understanding, and right ways of forming the intentions that lie behind the activity. In this hadith, the Prophet gives each of the three right ways a name. Thus one could say that ‘submission’ is religion as it pertains to acts, ‘faith’ is religion as it pertains to thoughts, and ‘doing the beautiful’ is religion as it pertains to intentions. These three dimensions of religion coalesce into a single reality known as Islam.” (Chittick & Murata, 1994, xxxiii - xxxiv)

Chittick and Murata, in their work *Vision of Islam*, use the hadīth of Gabriel to define Islam because it can be used as a foundation, from within the religious tradition that expands into various schools and doctrines. Following this framework, it can be understood that the tradition is pluralistic, even within a particular sect (in this case Sunni Islam). The array of opinions that make up Sunni orthodoxy promotes a legal, theological and ethical tradition that is itself pluralistic, which is antonymous to religious ideology.

Pluralism within the Muslim community, be it Sunni or Shī'i, has not come without its controversies. It is thus incumbent to be aware of the idea of sectarianism understood within the religious framework. Islamic scriptural sources refer to the Qur'ān and the hadīth literature, and each source offers a striking condemnation of sectarianism:

⁷ Sufism has been the subject of numerous academic studies and internal controversy within the Muslim community. The definition of Sufism used in this work conforms to its understanding by the British Muslim scholar Martin Lings, which will be made evident in the course of the essay. See *M. Lings, What is Sufism?* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1999)

“This community of yours is one single community of the same faith, and I am your Lord (Who creates, sustains, and protects you), so hold Me alone in fear and keep your duty to Me in piety. But people, having broken up into groups, differed among themselves as regards the Religion, each group proudly rejoicing in the portion they have.” (Qur‘ān, 23:52-53)

The Qur‘ān is clearly stating that (1) sectarianism is condemned and (2) sectarianism is foretold. Stressing this point, the Prophet foretold that the Muslim community would “split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.” And when asked which one will be in Paradise, he answered: “The main body.” (Sunan Ibn Majah, Vol. 1, Book 36, Hadīth 3992) At the advent of this new religious tradition, the warning against sectarianism was clearly stated both by the textual source of the message and by its messenger. Bearing this in mind, the notion of difference and of plurality became an important question as the sciences within the tradition developed.

Even within this “main body” theological, juridical, ethical and philosophical differences are to be found. However, there is consensus (ijmā‘a) amongst Islamic scholars that the hadīth of Gabriel divides Islām into three main dimensions: islām, imān and ihsān. Whatever falls into the fold of the religion must have these three components. Within them, there is usūl al-fiqh (jurisprudence), kalām (theology), adāb (ethics), taṣawwūf (sufism), etc. Generally, each manifestation of Islam, from traditional Sunni Islam to radical Wahhabism, from Shi‘ism to Ahmadiyya Islam, you will find these three dimensions embodied and discussed. For methodological purposes, the present study deals strictly with Sunni Islam, or what is known as Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l Jamā‘a (The People of the Tradition and of the Community), which is the manifestation of Islam practiced by the majority of Muslims around the world. Within the Sunni Islam tradition, there have been different opinions and conclusions regarding certain fields of study such

as jurisprudence, belief, etc. For the most part, there has been an acceptance of this plurality but there has arisen a growing number of ideological strands trying to totalize the doctrinal and legal tenets by ‘universalizing’ Sunni Islam. This is how we shall understand *Islamism*: the monolithic expression of a religion that has been traditionally pluralistic.

Finally, *Muslimness* is understood as the bridge between religion and ideology. It is an individual’s or community’s definition of their relationship with their belief. *Muslimness* deals with the socio-psychological definition conceived individuals and communities conceive of when they define themselves as Muslim.

2. Fear and Prejudice

The absence of a proper understanding of what Islam actually consists of, especially stemming from the perspective outside the religion, leads to important methodological issues. Martha Nussbaum, in her book *The New Religious Intolerance*, describes the negative consequences of a politics of fear. She explains that many religious communities have experienced outright discrimination due to their particular faith. Some of the examples cited in her work relating to Muslim communities are the ban of minarets in Switzerland, the regulations on headscarves worn by public employees in France, Germany, Holland and Spain. (Nussbaum, 2012, 4) She does express that Islamophobia is manifested differently and less intensely in the United States, however, she also discovers cases in which policies driven by irrational anxieties are introduced to the public space. She refers to Rex Duncan, the architect of an amendment against the application of “Sharia law” in Oklahoma, who fought rigorously

to have his amendment passed. (Nussbaum, 2012, 11) Ironically enough, there was no such attempt to legislate Islamic law. The only expression of Islamic law in the United States or in any country with a Muslim minority, is during individual obligations such as prayers, ritual slaughtering, fasting, and other such rituals. Nevertheless, these examples of Islamophobia are not exceptions. Anti-Muslim propaganda is continually on the rise. A study conducted in 2012 for the Association for Canadian Studies in Montreal and the Toronto-based Canadian Race Relations Foundation concluded that “52 percent of Canadians feel Muslims can be trusted ‘a little’ or ‘not trusted at all.’” While “42 percent of Canadians said discrimination against Muslims is “mainly their fault.” (Csillag, 2012)

Nussbaum, in her research on anti-Semitism, found that fear arises from three major sources. The first is associated to a real particular problem such as “economic security,” “class tensions and the possibility of revolution,” “the unpredictable forces of both political and economic change.” Then she explains, that “fear is easily displaced onto something that may have little to do with the underlying problem but that serves as a handy surrogate for it, often because the new target is already disliked”. And finally, “fear is nourished by the idea of a disguised enemy.” (Nussbaum, 2012, 23) These three points reveal that when living in an anxious age, the notion of the enemy is constructed and even encouraged. Muslims, without being known, become the so-called disguised enemy. The *Other* is caricatured because of the way he or she looks, speaks, eats, worships, etc. It is for this reason that Islam needs to be properly defined, not just in the realm of academia but also in the mainstream media.

Hatem Bazian, who tirelessly studies Islamophobia, analyzed the effects of prejudice on Muslim-American consciousness. He found a haunting similarity to W. E. B. Du Bois' idea put forth in *The Souls of Black Folk* of “‘double consciousness’: the self-measuring and regulating mechanism that causes African Americans to ‘look at one’s self through the eyes of others’, denying them the ability ‘to attain self-consciousness manhood’ and ‘merge his double self into a better and truer self.’” (Bazian, 2013) Bazian’s argument relies on the premise of an “apparent external identity marker” that was constructed during the colonial era and its remnants remain to our day. He writes,

“[m]uslims began to see themselves through the constructed colonial lens and thus Islam went from being a unified system of meaning, into an objectified external construct, seeking meaning in an imitative project of a perceived coloniser's success.” (Bazian, 2013)⁸

Perception of one’s self-consciousness will be constructed by one’s environment. As Nussbaum argued in her study, religious intolerance was the product of a general fear. These create various stereotypes that surround Muslim identity sourced from films, television, video games, literature and even factual news. These stereotypes become archetypal mirrors that govern what an ideal Muslim should be. Bazian calls this the loss of the “unified system of meaning.” That is, there is suddenly a double consciousness. On the one hand, Muslims have their own personal idea of what an ideal Muslim should be, and on the other hand, the ideal is imposed by an external source. Bazian continues, “the identities of the colonised Muslims are constructed similar to other colonised subjects as a series of negations, inadequacies and incapacities.” (Bazian, 2013) This

⁸ One may be interested in the works of Franz Fanon and Edward Said for more on the subject.

constructed identity must be recognized and to properly define the identity from a unified system of meaning, as Bazian remarked, is to resist the “negations, inadequacies and incapacities” imposed on the colonized subjects, in our case Muslims. To do so, one needs to properly understand Islam in a conceptual trifecta; *Islam*, *Islamism* and *Muslimness*. These need to be defined, scrutinized and differentiated because its ignorance is the root of this fear. Ever since Samuel Huntington⁹ formulated the so-called clash of civilization thesis it has been assumed that the West and Islam are inherently conflictual.

3.The Nuances between Islam and Islamism

There is a need to understand the nuances between Islam and Islamism because of their synonymous use. Fred Dallmayr, in his book *The Promise of Democracy*, dedicates an important chapter entitled “Religion, Politics, and Islam” on this specific subject. By distinguishing religion from politics, he sheds light on how Islam and Islamism differ. He introduces his chapter by illustrating the etymology of the term *religion*. *Religare*, as used in Latin, describes a state of reconnection. Thus, there is a sense of return to a transcendent divine nature. (Dallmayr, 2011, 155) This notion of return is important because it implies how one needs to actively work towards a particular end. Dallmayr’s definition actually makes reference to the third dimension of Islam of moral virtue. One needs to pray as though one “sees Him” and if one can’t then to know that “He sees you.” This maxim is essential to the spiritual path of Muslims and Dallmayr stresses that

⁹ See Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs* ; Summer 1993 ; 72, 3 ; *ABI/INFORM Global* p. 22. The author explains that “the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world” is a civilizational conflict. He notes that Islam and the West are necessarily conflicting civilizations.

this notion of virtue must be the foundation of spirituality. However, the religious framework can also be subject to political manipulation as Dallmayr explains, “either religion strives to colonize and subjugate worldly politics, thereby erecting itself into a public power (which may result in ‘theocracy’), or else politics colonizes religious faith by expanding itself into a totalizing, quasi-religious panacea or ideology.” (Dallmayr, 2011, 157)

Dallmayr proposes a bilateral formulation where the religious sphere intertwines with the political. He explains that there is a dialectical relationship between religion and politics and that the religion becomes a “public power” as a reaction to an extreme form of secularity or a “*laïcité fermée*¹⁰”, where there is no space for a religious presence in the public space. Dallmayr points out that the clash is not a civilizational one, but a clash of the secular and the sacred where the latter attempts to subjugate its by using the sacred’s terrain as a means to push its own agenda. In other words, the secular becomes a sort of sacred worldly politic. On the other side of the coin, the political sphere strives to secularize the religious. In either case, religion and politics synthesize into a worldly sphere, be it a political religion or a political secularity; faith gets thrown out of the equation.

The reaction to secular colonization, often antagonized by colonial narratives, gives rise to movements that are anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-capitalist, etc. Some may argue that these movements are necessary to promote a non-hegemonic version of

¹⁰ As opposed to a “*laïcité ouverte*” that one may find in the final report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. A “*laïcité fermée*” is characterized by an absence of pluralism and multiculturalism. An extreme example is Atatürk’s concept of secularism that nationalized Turkey (See Minareci, Semih. “Search for Identity: Turkey’s Identity Crisis, 2008). One can also conceptualize an open/close scale when thinking of secularism.

democracy, however, they can be dangerous and encourage monolithic ideology to prosper, which will be discussed later. Islamism, as understood by Dallmayr, finds its origin in this reaction. This should not be seen as a uniform ideology followed by all Muslims. There is an enormous degree of variance between different political theories, from the Muslim Brotherhood to fundamentalist Wahhabism. Dallmayr asks himself whether these specific forms of Islam are antithetical to democracy, which according to the thinker demands a level of pluralism. The thesis proposed by Dallmayr understands Islamism as opposed to spiritual Islam. Following Abdullah An-Naim's thought in *Islam and the Secular State*, Dallmayr explains: "separating Islam and the state while maintaining the connection between religion and social life is liable to generate respect for, and widespread observance of, Islamic teaching – an observance that today requires certain democratic safeguards." (Dallmayr, 2011, 163) Two crucial points are brought up; the separation of religion and state and the connection between religion and social life. The first point is self-explanatory but the second is worth more investigation. Dallmayr sees that within the Islamic tradition, there are ethical principles and juridical rulings relating to social institutions, which include family, neighborhood and state. Within the texts on Sharī'a there are two areas that are covered by jurisprudence: acts of worship (ʿibadat) and transactions (muʿāmalat). The former involves the relationship between a person and God while the latter, "the relationship between people, such as trade, marriage, penal law, inheritance, etc." (al-Husaini, 2012, 29) The controversy arises when dealing with the legal regulations of transaction because they implicate the establishment of particular institutions. Dallmayr's separation of state and religion calls for an abrogation of certain legal applications of Islamic law. The abrogation, however,

still encourages a certain colonial domination between the one who legislates what should be abrogated and the one who must abrogate their own beliefs. Dallmayr is calling for a reform, which is imposed by his own particular worldview. He wants to see a non-militant Islam that does not seek any political objective. Unfortunately, this ideal cannot encourage proper citizenship because political action is necessary in a pluralistic society. This reform must be a moral reform, which is rooted in the practice of *ihsan*.

Sufism animates moral reform by exploring the tradition of jurisprudence. T. J. Winter, professor of Islamic Studies at Cambridge, himself a convert to the religion, has done extensive studies on the role of Sufism in traditional Islam. He has come to the realization that Sufism actually encourages political engagement, yet differs from the militantism seen from Islamic political engagement nowadays. He writes,

“nothing is further from reality, in fact, than the claim that Sufism represents a quietist and non-militant form of Islam. However, it has always been utterly different from modern, wild extremism, in that it is rooted in mercy and justice, forbidding the targeting of civilians, and conforming to the ethical ideal of the just war.” (Winter, 2009, 310)

Winter’s point is to acknowledge that the Islamic tradition has tackled questions of war and peace, upon which Sufis have commented. By embodying an ethical self-critique an effective way of investigating the relationship between ideology and religion can be encouraged, especially when understanding not only what it means to be a Muslim, but also a *good Muslim*.

The complex relationship between Islam as ideology and Islam as religion raises many questions regarding the very definition of both ideology and religious conviction. What are they and do they differ? It could be argued, on the one hand, that religion is an ideology. Hegel’s position, for example, as will be seen later in the paper. On the other

hand, religion and ideology, if proven to be different, shed light upon the notion of integration. Dallmayr's methodological issues, regarding the spiritual/political division, are strengthened with a reading of Judith Butler's work on Judaism and Zionism. Instead of a spiritual/political divide, she introduces the religious/ideological divide. In her article "Is Judaism Zionism?" Butler illustrates the need to consider the intricacies present in the relationship between *Judaism*, *Jewishness*, and *Zionism*. Butler analyzes the question whether the criticism of the State of Israel is anti-Semitic and/or anti-Jewish. The author claims that there is an inherent difference between Zionism as Israel's claim of a unified Jewish sovereignty (ideological Judaism), Judaism as religion and Jewishness as identity. What bridges all three together, however, is an ethos of exile (galut) and diaspora inherent in the historical narrative of the Children of Israel. (Butler, 2011, 77) This ethos is coined by her idea of a shared "conceptual apparatus." The political/ideological interpretation of this ethos has been embodied with the idea of the "right of return" posited by Gerschom Scholem¹¹. Martin Buber¹², a spiritual and cultural Zionist, argued for a cultural autonomy that would be perverted if politicized. (Butler, 2011, 77) The very idea of exile (galut) is necessary to push the political Zionist agenda forward. Its success lies in the manipulation of its people's historical memory. The claim that the "right of return" is inherent in both Jewishness as identity and Judaism as religion, leads to a claim that any criticism of Israel's political agenda is an attack against the Jewish identity and religion. This point was clearly analyzed by Hannah Arendt in her study of totalitarianism and in her Jewish writings. Butler explains

¹¹ See Ohana, David. *Modernism and Zionism*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012)

¹² See Buber, Martin. *Paths in Utopia* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996)

that in writing *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt was led to “oppose any state formation that sought to reduce or refuse the heterogeneity of its population, including the founding of Israel on principles of Jewish sovereignty.” (Butler, 2011, 78) As populations become homogenized and their plurality removed, every member of that population shares the moral and/or legal culpability of the community at large. The freedom of expression to speak for a cause is one of the foundational principles of pluralism. Arendt explains that the notion of Jewish sovereignty manipulated what it means to subscribe to Judaism. It led one’s Jewishness to be validated by the acceptance of Jewish sovereignty. Thus, any judgment against the actions of the state of Israel is scrutinized as being anti-Semitic. Zionism usurps the moral plurality of Judaism, hence the importance of differentiating Zionism and Judaism because the former is a political ideology and the latter a religion.

4. Islam, Muslimness and Islamism

Can *Judaism*, *Jewishness*, and *Zionism* as proposed by Butler be transposed to *Islam*, *Muslimness*, and *Islamism*? Butler explains in her article that any claims about “religions” in “public life” are suspicious because each religion has unique “conceptual apparatuses.” (Butler, 2011, 72) These unique “conceptual apparatuses” cannot be universalized as they prove that each religion is unique. Thus, imposing a particular form of secularism as universally answering the questions regarding religion in the public space would be futile. As mentioned above, one “conceptual apparatus” of Judaism is the idea of exile (*galut*). When instrumentalized, it becomes a colonial “right of return,” but when spiritualized, using Buber’s terminology, it encourages a

dispossession of space and brings about an ethic of neighborly love; promoting difference, democracy, pluralism and alterity. Fred Dallmayr sees that Islam embodies a “conceptual apparatus” of submission (*islām*). Etymologically, *islām* is rooted in the word *salām*, which means peace. To be *Muslim*, is to *submit* to this peace. What Dallmayr attempts to show, is that Islamists try to bring about the Kingdom of God in the hands of man. Thus submission is no longer to God but to man. “Islamist thinkers,” writes Dallmayr, “typically propose a return to ‘God’s sovereignty,’ that is, to a semi- or quasi-theocracy (which usually means some form of religious authority or elitism).” (Dallmayr, 2011, 159) There are many conceptual apparatuses that are shared within the same community. A theological analysis of Islam would be needed to understand fully the implications of being Muslim. However, it must be known that these conceptual apparatuses can be manipulated for political ends. The same way that Zionism uses Judaism as a tool to justify certain political actions, Islamism uses Islam as a tool to justify the destruction of graves and historical sites in Saudi Arabia, attacks on religious sects in Pakistan, ethnic cleansing in Sudan, attacks of non-Muslims, etc. The ideological instrumentalization is often the cause for deeper issues relating to certain moral influences. It must be stressed that Islamism as political ideology is often reduced to political jihadism. It is true, that the “holy war” claim is often associated to Islamists, however, what characterizes Islamism is the methodology of scholarship, which will be discussed further. Nevertheless, Islamists are often portrayed as guerrilla militants in the mainstream medias. From this vantage point, to compare Zionism and Islamism seems futile, as the latter is present in a specific nation state. However, political thinkers such as Bassam Tibi beg to differ and understand Islamism as a transnational political religion

(Tibi, 2007, 36) that can be understood as a totalitarian project. In his article “The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam”, Tibi develops the thesis, using Arendt’s philosophical analysis of totalitarian movements, that the Islamic community as a whole is often excommunicated by the homogenizing ideologies promoted by numerous Islamists. In this way, Islamists become totalitarian when they claim that they are the “True Believers.” (Tibi, 2007, 38) Tibi highlights some major figures that have influenced modern day Islamism. Seyyed Qutb promoted an establishment of God’s rule on Earth. This idea calls for a return of the sacred in the political sphere. Taking from Arendt, Tibi characterizes that the sharī‘azation, cleverly coined by Tibi, of a specific political ideology imposes “norms of belief and behavior on all aspects of life, thus also denying any separation between the private and the public sphere.” (Tibi, 2007, 37) Thus, Islamism becomes a form of Islam that strives to be institutionalized as a modern political system, aiming to homogenize society by striving for a particular Islamic state. Tibi explains,

“Muslims need to embrace pluralism both within Islam and in the world at large. [...] Jihadists insist on essentialising Islam by reducing it to the single monolithic entity, an idea epitomised by the rhetoric of a clash between civilisations. However, Islam cannot behave like a monolith; even Sunni jihadist political Islamist movements are diverse. However, within Islamist internationalism diverse Islamist groups adhere to similar concepts of political order based on a common politicisation of their religion, and on their common understanding of Shari’ah [divine law].” (Tibi, 2007, 46-47)

Tibi’s thesis compares Islamism to totalitarianism because it attempts to define the one true way to identify as Muslim and annihilates its internal pluralism. It instrumentalizes *Muslimness* to achieve its particular ends.

The philosophical understanding of totalitarianism and its consequences vis-à-vis morality and freedom is best described by Emmanuel Lévinas. He finds that there is an important correlation between violence (in its abstract understanding) and totalitarianism; violence is not simply to harm someone physically or emotionally, but it is to affect his or her freedom to make a moral decision. He calls this one's "continuity." In his magnum opus work *Totality and Infinity*, he explains that totalitarianism interrupts its subjects' "continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but also their own substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility for action." (Lévinas, 1994, 21) Lévinas provides a philosophical approach to totalitarianism as an idea that "disrupts" the *Other's* "continuity." Using Butler's terminology, it follows that religion as ideology, by politicizing a specific interpretation of its "conceptual apparatus," as in submission to God (islām) disrupts the continuity that is inherent in the Muslims moral life. Islamists interrupt the continuity of all members who subscribe and believe in Islam. By defining and imposing particular tenets of faith, Islamists can successfully manipulate what it means to be a "good Muslim." Thus, actions are founded upon ideological means. The consequences become evident from two vantage points. On the one hand, the public space (ie. medias, political parties, academics) envisions a monolithic and superficial label of a whole community. Members of the community are portrayed guilty by virtue of belonging to the faith. On the other, members of that community have a hard time identifying extremists who use the same scriptures and sources for particular political gains. Arendt, in her article *Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility*, explains that the success of the totalitarian regime in Germany

was that, in their defeat, there remained no difference between Nazis and Germans. (Arendt, 1994, 121) The totalitarian ideology of Germany successfully halted the moral continuity of its people because the German people could no longer speak out against the Nazi regime and manipulated the “conceptual apparatus” of the nation as a whole; Germanness and Nazism became synonymous. Thus, eliminating any remnants of democracy and plurality within the nation. Arendt illustrates that the German people became inadvertently responsible for the actions of the nation as a whole, yet their moral conscience remained free from guilt. It became increasingly difficult to judge who could be considered morally good as the totalitarian regime completely alienated the public sphere from the private. Arendt writes:

“The totalitarian policy, which has completely destroyed the neutral zone in which the daily life of human beings is ordinarily lived, has achieved the result of making the existence of each individual in Germany depend either upon committing crimes or on complicity in crimes.” (Arendt, 1994, 121)

Arendt characterizes this as the victory of Nazism because even in its defeat, the German identity had become synonymous to the Nazi identity, which meant that any plurality that was present within the nation had been obscured by the totalitarian ideology. Can the same phenomenon take place with religion?

It has been illustrated that there is a necessary distinction between *Islam*, *Islamism* and *Muslimness*. It was explained that each share a “conceptual apparatus” which can be manipulated by a specific ideology, characterized by Islamism. Yet, this “conceptual apparatus” remains an integral part of the religious sphere. Members of the community *identify* themselves as *Muslim* and this identification is subjected to an instrumentalized conceptual apparatus. The present essay strives to explain this identification. When

instrumentalized, it becomes ideology, while the religious understanding is an ontological commitment to a greater community. There is a sense of responsibility towards this “conceptual apparatus” inherent in an individual’s identity.

When it comes to identifying to a specific group, in this case Muslims identifying with Islam, there must be a staunch separation between the political ideologies and religious attitudes. In this sense, ideology must be clearly defined, especially if the lines between the two seem blurred. Arendt gives an important definition to ideology in her article on *Ideology and Terror* that can help us situate the philosophical framework that she, as well as the scholars who have studied her, would later use to discuss the subject. She writes: “Ideologies-isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise.” (Arendt, 1953, 315) Ideologies have an inherent ability to make sense of contingent events and they are logically justifiable, yet the logic has no contingent reality. Ideology, in other words, brings events under one particular idea; an idea that explains particular events. For example, Germany’s economic depression must be *caused* by the Jewish vision of world domination. In this example, the event is explained by an idea. Ideology stems from a premise, is then taken as an axiom. The premise is thus justified and the tyranny begins. In that case, the justifications can be used to reach political ends as they can easily manipulate their subscribers. It is, in fact, this logic that Arendt worries about:

“To an ideology, history does not appear in the light of an idea (which would imply that history is seen sub specie of some ideal eternity which itself is beyond historical motion) but as something which can be calculated by it. What fits the “idea” into this new role is its own “logic,” that is a movement which is the consequence of the “idea” itself and needs no outside factor to set it into motion.” (Arendt, 1953, 316-317)

Returning to Islamism, the definition of Islam is manipulated. The political orientations are ensued from the logicity of the premise. In this example, we could say that the premise is the clash of civilization; the war between Islam and the West. If this becomes an ideological premise, then any Qur'ānic verse, narration of the Prophet (hadīth), or juridical opinion relating to an enemy can be used to manipulate that specific cause.

Arendt further writes:

“The tyranny of logicity begins with the mind's submission to logic as a never-ending process, on which man relies in order to engender his thoughts. By this submission, he surrenders his inner freedom as he surrenders his freedom of movement when he bows down to an outward tyranny. Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men.” (Arendt, 1953, 320)

The tyranny spoken of by Arendt is the logic behind ideologies; it abolishes plurality. Human beings are rational beings and if a particular argument makes sense, then often, thought and criticism of the argument is halted. If the particular premise is faulty, then the rest of the argument, which depends on the initial premise, is weakened. However, if the premise is properly manipulated and portrayed as infallible, then the logical progression cannot be subject to criticism. Ideology turns the initial premise into a fundamental axiom. Islamists take particular premises and manipulate Muslims to follow that particular opinion, even if it contradicts traditional scholarship.

5. The ideological logicity fallacy

Ideological logicity is cancerous to any project towards dialogue and pluralism. By using a fallacious premise, ideologies begin to make sense within their own

epistemological framework. If the initial idea of Islam is pluralistic¹³, then Islamism becomes simply ideological; it is logical within its own framework. Yet one could easily argue that religion holds the same phenomenon. Religion has a certain premise such as belief in God, dogmas, and so on, and these are completely valid within the religious framework. When faced with an opposing epistemology, the religious framework can simply deny the other's framework based on the first's inherent logicity. Muslims can easily deny the legitimacy of another's religion using their own scriptural sources. Nevertheless, this thesis seeks to discover the limits of such logicity and the difference between ideology and religion. This difference lies in the plurality of religion and its relationship with the religious identity. One can seek the epistemological understanding of Islam by understanding how Muslims relate to it. Yet discussing Islam as religious identity brings forward many methodological questions, including cultural associations, orthodoxy/orthopraxy, sectarian identification, etc. For the scope of this work, we have used the definitions are those developed by traditional Islamic scholarship methods.

¹³ As would be illustrated by the saying of Imam al-Qasim ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr al-Siddiq: "The differences among the Companions of Muhammad are a mercy for Allah's servants" found in Al-Hafiz al-Bayhaqi's book "al-Madkhal" and al-Zarkashi's "Tadhkirah fi al-ahadith al-mushtaharah."

Traditionalism as a means to ideological transcendence

1. Islamic scholarship and its influence on contextual legal reasoning

Traditional Islamic scholarship has always sought to answer contemporary and contextual issues. Contemporary issues were held to utmost importance, hence the role that unwritten customary law played in deriving legal rulings¹⁴. Nevertheless, this is one of the major reasons for various opinions in different contexts. Each has an understanding that was rooted in a traditional religious framework, yet interpreted legal matters according to *specific* needs. Practicing Muslims living in non-Muslim lands often seek out justification for their social engagement in the public space. It may be a search for a particular *fatwā* that allows for a smoother integration¹⁵. If one decides to delve deeper in traditional sources, one may be surprised at some of the opinions of leading scholars regarding the state of Muslims in non-Muslim lands. One particular concept that is discussed amongst Islamic scholars is the notion of *hijra* (emigration), a concept particularly important for Muslims in non-Muslim lands. The ethical and legal

¹⁴ Contemporary issues could be understood as the notion of custom or what is known as ‘urf. John L. Esposito writes in *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) that ‘urf is “[c]ustom. In the central Islamic countries, it is the common name for unwritten customary law, in contrast to written Islamic law codes or other legal canons. *Adat* is a synonym used in other parts of the Islamic world, especially Indonesia. *Urf* often refers to three different types of legal categories: the way common people maintain order, engage in social interactions, or conduct business locally, for example, in the marketplace or in wedding ceremonies; the legal decisions made by a ruler and his representatives; and the practices of local courts. According to the Malikis and some Hanafis such as Ibn Abidin, urf is considered to be a source of law.”

¹⁵ One may be interested in the work *Responding from the Tradition: One Hundred Contemporary Fatwas by the Grand Mufti of Egypt* (Kentucky: Fons Vitae, 2011) by Shaykh ‘Ali Goma’a that deals with understand the contemporary context with respect to deriving legal rulings. Another work is Amjad M. Mohammed’s *Muslims in Non-Muslim Lands: A Legal Study with Applications* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2013), which discusses in detail the notion of legal rulings.

dimensions of the *hijra* are best conceptualized in the Qur'ānic formulation: "Anyone who migrates in the path of God will find in the Earth many an abundant refuge. Whoever leaves his home in migration towards God and his Messenger, and death overtakes him, his reward with God is guaranteed, for God is Forgiving and Merciful." (Qur'ān 4:99-100) From this formulation and other examples, scholars have discussed whether Muslims are legally (from a Shari' perspective) subject to non-Muslim laws. The very notion of citizenship can be discussed on the legal obligation to the state. Andrew F. March, a leading scholar on the subject, discussed this particular issue in his book *Islam and Liberal Citizenship*. He unveils from the tradition particular opinions regarding the legal obligation of Muslims living under non-Muslim rule. March presents arguments from the tradition that shows conclusions ranging from the impermissibility to the permissibility of living under non-Muslim rule. Many North African/Andalusian Mālikī scholars prohibited Muslims from living in non-Muslim lands. The jurist Ahmād b. Yahyā al-Wansharīsī ruled that:

"*Hijra* from the land of disbelief to the land of Islam is a duty until the Day of Resurrection, as is *hijra* from lands of sin and those tainted by injustice or sedition. [...] God Almighty does not accept their excuses [for not migrating], for he demonstrated that they were capable of migration in some way. Rather, the weak and oppressed that are forgiven by God are only those who are incapable in every way. [...] Only then is forgiveness due to them, for they become like the one who is coerced into pronouncing disbelief. But even then it is necessary that they have the abiding intention to perform *hijra* if only they were able. As for him who is capable of migrating in any way of means, he is not forgiven and has wronged his soul." (March 294)

This opinion was not uncommon at the time and for obvious reason. Al-Wansharīsī lived in the 16th century A.D. when Christians were conquering Spain. Muslims were feeling the consequence of being in an abode of war, which meant that there was no possibility

of inviting to “goodness,” proselytization, or guiding their co-religionists. The only options were either to fight back or retreat to North Africa. Thus, the dichotomy between *dār al-hārb* (the abode of war) and *dār as-salām* (the abode of peace) becomes clear. On the flip side, the great *Hanbalī* scholar Ibn Taymiyya¹⁶ when discussing the situation of Muslims living under Mongol rule in Mardin, issued a legal verdict (*fatwā*) that went beyond the dichotomous relationship of the two abodes.

“As for whether it is a land of war or peace, it is a composite situation. It is not an abode of peace where the legal rulings of Islam are applied and its armed forces are Muslim. Neither is it the same as an abode of war whose inhabitants are unbelievers. It is a third category. The Muslims living therein should be treated according to their rights as Muslims, while the non-Muslims living there outside of the authority of Islamic Law should be treated according to their rights.” (Quoted from al-Turayrī)

Essentially, Ibn Taymiyya claims that there is no religious obligation to leave a land in which there is no hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims. The rulings presented here recognize the importance of considering the context when establishing a legal ruling in Islam. It also reveals that both opinions presented were at once rooted in the Islamic tradition yet still remained free from any universal ideological commitment. Their commitment was exclusively to their religious tradition and their context.

These examples bring out the importance of context in the Islamic tradition to spark serious contemplation when attempting to define war, resistance, violence, etc. These aren’t black and white concepts. In no tradition, from liberalism found in the West to ancient scriptures do these terms shed their ambiguous definitions. In what context can one legitimize war against a ‘legitimate’ threat? When does an oppressive regime

¹⁶ See Michot, Yahya. *Ibn Taymiyya, Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 2006)

become tyrannical and necessitate the use of resistance, be it violent or peaceful? These questions are essential in understanding how Muslims relate to their leaders, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, oppressive or lenient, good or evil, etc. *Contextualizing* the needs of a community allows for a deeper understanding of how Muslim jurists can define their relationship with the *Other*.

Sherman A. Jackson wrote an article in 2009 discussing the ideological transformation of Egypt's *Gamā'a Islāmiyya*. His interest came when this jihadist movement decided to "renounce political violence" and change its "religious ideology and orientation." (Jackson, 2009, 53) Jackson called this an ideological evolution yet following the philosophical framework adopted throughout this paper; the reasoning for the *Gamā'a*'s change of opinion resembles the shift from an Islamist ideology to a traditional understanding of Islam. In the late 1980's and 1990's, the *Gamā'a* led a

"campaign of political violence to the tune of about a thousand deaths, raining down murderous mayhem upon Coptic Christians, Western tourists, Egyptian security forces, police, intellectuals, and government officials – including the murder of the speaker of the Egyptian parliament, Rif'at Maḥjūb in 1990, and an attempt on the life of President Ḥusnī Mubārak himself in 1995 during a visit to Addis Ababa. All of this would be reciprocated, of course, by government reprisals, mass-imprisonments, summary executions and the torture of *Gamā'a* members." (Jackson, 2009, 55)

Following the ideological framework set by prominent Islamists, the *Gamā'a* subscribed to a clash of civilization between Islam and the West. Anything "Western" became a target. They had been following the fundamentalist leaders: Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Faraj and Karam Muḥammad Zuḥdī, who had planned to take over Egypt and establish an Islamic State (Jackson, 2009, 53) Yet, the young radical followers sought *jīhad* as an end and not as a means, which is its traditional understanding. After the *Gamā'a* had

followed in these footsteps, there “was a formal inauguration of what became known as the ‘Initiative to Stop the Violence’ (*Mubādarat waqf al-‘unf*).” (Jackson, 2009, 55) This was seen as a new step in the *Gamā‘a Islāmiyya* foundational philosophy. They saw that political violence simply reinforced the clash of civilization, which was detrimental to the cause of Islam. They continued to publish articles criticizing other Islamist groups for promoting political violence, which they saw was disadvantageous to the cause of Islam.

The question arises as to whether this newfound characterization of the organization was simply an ideological shift, as expressed by Jackson, or was truly a moral change towards their vision of Islam. This question lies in the methodology used to achieve a conclusive redefinition of the notion of *jihad*. It is evident that the *Gamā‘a* believed in a war between the West and Islam and they sought to use political violence as a means to re-establish a religious leadership in the government. Yet, their use of political violence became an end in and of itself that caused many of its members to be jailed or killed by the state. Their change of heart came as an answer to the issues presented in the conflict with their “enemies.” Do the *Gamā‘a* understand Islam as holding a pluralistic tradition of scholarship and as transcending the Islam-West dialectic?

Jackson’s research reveals that the *Gamā‘a* sent a letter to al-Azhār University that was finally approved with a few minor revisions. Jackson writes, “[the mainstay of their argument would be the quite classical principle of *maṣlaḥa*, or ‘broader aims and objectives of the law,’ coupled with an emphasis on what has come to be known as *fiqh al-wāqi‘*, i.e., ‘understanding reality’ or ‘pragmatic jurisprudence.’” Their argument was

“that whenever the application of a rule threatens to subvert the benefit it was intended to promote, or to accentuate a harm it was intended to avert, it becomes unlawful to apply that rule.” (Jackson, 2009, 59) The principle of *maṣṣlaha*, represents an important principle in Shari‘a that has traditionally been used by scholars. *Maṣṣlaha* entertains the contextual needs of a particular society which helps put the spiritual, religious and ethical demands into perspective. The *Gamā‘a* noticed that political violence subscribed to an ideological warfare between the West and Islam. They sought to overthrow any remnants of Western government and interest. Their initial view was “that Muslim governments that refused to apply Islamic law were infidel regimes that deserved no recognition from believing Muslims and were to be over-thrown as a religious duty.” (Jackson, 2009, 63) However, based on their commitment to “*fiqh al-waqi‘*”, or reality-based jurisprudence, “the *Gamā‘a* concede[d] that the government may be justified in setting this or that particular rule aside.” (Jackson, 2009, 63) However, this perspective began to change once they noticed that the war was not so black and white. When the *Gamā‘a* took a new position regarding political violence, they had begun to reassess the importance of contextualizing jurisprudence. In doing so, they successfully used their understanding of traditionalism to critique contemporary forms of ideological Islam. One of these signs has been their effort to critique contemporary Islamism that uses political violence. “[T]heir basic critique is that al-Qa‘ida misunderstands the rules and purposes of jihad and ignores or misapprehends contemporary reality.” (Jackson, 2009, 64) The use of jihad has always been a means to resist an oppressive adversary

The shift of perspective in the *Gamā‘a*’s understanding of political violence revealed the importance of the scholarly methodology found within the Islamic tradition.

Whether the shift was strictly ideological for political ends or was a sincere return to tradition, it provided a framework that allowed traditional scholarship from al-Azhar to promote an opinion that was found within the four traditional Sunni schools. Afterwards, the *Gamā'a* used their perspective to criticize the ideological framework to which they once subscribed. Using the traditional sources, they were able to criticize the ideological methodology used by other organizations such as al-Qa'ida. In this sense, it becomes clear that a contextual critique was a major factor in their shift. By properly defining the notion of “war” in the Islamic tradition, the *Gamā'a*'s position becomes one of tradition instead of ideology. There are three main critiques that the *Gamā'a* had of al-Qa'ida. The first critique was that it saw jihad as an end in itself and not a means to the end of promoting the faith. (Jackson, 2009, 64) The *Gamā'a* considered the image of Islam to be of utmost importance to the establishment of an Islamic polity and thus political violence was not useful to the cause. Secondly, the *Gamā'a* came to recognize the skewed notions of Islamic jurisprudence in other jihadist organizations:

“Al-Qa'ida has an over-inclusive understanding of its scope, by virtue of which they condone the killing of non-combatants, including innocent ‘civilians.’ Here the *Gamā'a* begins with the claim that, with the exception of al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī, all of the schools of Islamic law hold non-Muslims' *fighting* against the Muslims, rather than their *unbelief*, to be the reason why they can be fought.” (Jackson, 2009, 64)

The majority opinion of Sunni scholars was that one could only fight another if they initiate violence. Furthermore, civilians, who aren't actively fighting, are not supposed to be harmed according to the majority of the legal schools. Finally the third point brought up by the *Gamā'a* is that Al-Qa'ida adheres to a:

“faulty assessment of contemporary reality, most particularly regarding the role, agenda and influence of the United States. Specifically, the *Gamā'a* see al-Qa'ida

as being driven by ideological commitments that blind it to historical facts, and prevent it from seeing the connection, or the lack thereof, between these facts, its actions and its purported goals.” (Jackson, 2009, 65)

Returning to the point of ideology, it becomes evident that many jihadist organizations had political motives and held a binary view of the West and Islam. They simply subscribed to the same civilizational clash that American neo-conservatives subscribed to. This rhetoric was used to instill a vision of the West as an enemy and to breed hatred towards the *Other*, which according to the new position of the *Gamā’a* and to the majority of Sunni scholars, is faulty.

There may be two reason for this new insight. The first could be reduced to a practicality. The *Gamā’a*, having realized that political violence is no longer an option, decided to prorogate their ideological tendencies through peaceful means. This is an option if one considers that the intention behind the ideological shift was to find a useful way to instill Islam as a state religion/ideology. The second could be a return to a scholarly tradition that accepts the complexity of (1) the fabrications of a state, (2) jihad as a means and (3) contextual discourse. If this is the case, the new position of the *Gamā’a* diverts from the ideological commitment they once had to an Islamist ideology. Methodologically this is an issue, as the *intention* behind the organization is mere speculation. However, the analysis of the reason can show the outcome of accessing traditional scholarship in one’s understanding of the religion. The possibility to transcend ideological leanings is given. The shift was characterized by an important trend: the subscription to a binary civilizational discourse. The *Gamā’a* became critical of Al-Qai’da because they saw Western hegemony as the sole source of evil. They had

attempted to reform themselves in order to pursue a particular political end that didn't necessarily conform to the ideals of major Egyptian Sunni scholars.

2. Is Scholarship Progressive?

What are the ideals of Sunni scholars and are these ideals progressive? Ever since the succession of the Prophet, traditional Sunni scholars have posed the questions on how to relate to the political status quo. Discussion around the term ideology is a fairly new phenomenon and relates to the notion of *progress*. Coined by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy in late 18th century. Bearing this in mind, when applying the term to a concept as ancient as religion, it becomes evident that each framework is born out of its own paradigm. In other words, the sacred world coloured by the religious universe enforces a particular paradigm that may or may not be compatible with a particular ethical, political and/or metaphysical system. We have seen that Islam goes beyond mere political strife as it encompasses a deeper moral and spiritual framework. Also, in order for a proper understanding of Islam to come into fruition, there needs to be some sort of progression. In other words, Islam must constantly contextualize itself with regard to its specific space and its specific time. For example, one can look at the expressions of Islam in West Africa, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India and China, which all embody an orthodox Sunni practice, yet each are intertwined with a particular culture, language and ethos. In that sense, Islam progressed in a way to mould with the cultural circumstance of its environment. Yet after many forms of colonization, both physical and ideological, Islam's dynamic relationship with culture has halted and now theorists are trying to understand how the religion can "progress" to meet the needs of the times.

There is a constant discourse of the modernization of Islam. Ebrahim Moosa tackles this issue on progressive Muslims. He argues that the viewpoints held by many progressive Muslims, as well as conservative Muslims, can be ideological:

“[T]he major differences between Muslim progressives and their critics would be that the latter are either wedded to dated methodologies or committed to doctrines and interpretations that have lost their rationales and relevance over time. On the other hand, progressives are also painfully aware that to uncritically succumb to every fact and fad also makes little sense, since it results in a Panglossian option of being unwaveringly and unrealistically optimistic about everything in the modern style.” (Moosa, 2007, 117)

Moosa presents two important points. He speaks of dated methodologies and irrelevant doctrines with regard to critics of progressive Islam. The view of some conservative Muslims can fall under these categories, especially with ideological Islam. When discussing methodologies, however, it must be clear to which methodology is referred. As was discussed in Arendt’s idea of the tyranny of logic, this is a form of outdated methodology, where the plurality of conclusions is not allowed. Quite often these ideological mythologies lead to an irrelevant doctrine. Moosa adds that the notion of progress, however, cannot result in a pure acceptance about everything ‘modern’; there must be a critical approach to the present context to properly be progressive. Moosa continues by subscribing to, what he calls, critical traditionalism. He argues that too many thinkers associate ‘progress’ to a Hegelian worldview that imagines “that history is moving toward some clearly defined and concrete end.” (Moosa, 2007, 118) This idea of cultural evolutionism presupposes that all cultures must follow the Western cultural paradigm as the zenith of cultural advancement. In turn, any culture that does not follow this particular progression is deemed lesser. If that is so, there is a notion that the

progressive Muslims are in the midst of establishing a version of Islam that has, as its ‘concrete’ end, a supreme manifestation characterized by the ideal of modernity. Moosa is critical of this notion because progress “becomes hubristic when it only emphasizes the mastery of nature but does not recognize the retrogression of society.” (Moosa, 2007, 119) Moosa is referring to the idea that there is an end to be reached that is found in all things, essentially the mastery of nature. He is critical of this idea because once again, the progressivists also fall into an ideological trap. The very idea of the clash of civilization is a view that follows a Hegelian framework. There is a conflict between two opposing ideologies (civilizations), which can have only one supreme victor. In Samuel Huntington’s thesis, the conflict was between the West and Islam. For many progressive Muslims, it is between modernity and conservatism. Nevertheless, this dialectical relationship brings about the idea that there is a need to make modernism the mastery of all things:

“...the modernist à la Fukuyama believes in the *inevitability* of progress while the opposing view would, sometimes grudgingly, concede to the *possibility* of change or progress. Progress as fortuitous, rather than as inevitable, holds the promise that change might occur in diverse and multiple forms, not the totalitarian narrative of progress driven by scientism, and liberal capitalism.” (Moosa, 2007, 119)

The Hegelian notion of progress is problematic as it undermines the conservative/traditional values. This binary relationship becomes ideological as the tension increases because each party finds itself trapped in the logic of its own respective stance. This strict opposition overshadows the value of the Islamic tradition as well. Moosa is trying to redefine the meaning of progress, not as a Hegelian *telos* towards mastery, but as a phenomenon that was and always will be present within the tradition itself. Progress goes beyond ideology. As Moosa explains, “tradition is the self-

intelligibility of the past in the present; a continuously evolving and mutating intelligibility or state of being.” (Moosa, 2007, 124) By attempting to understand traditional scholarship as a dynamic engagement between context and tradition, Moosa is illustrating that one does not subscribe to a tradition but becomes part of a living tradition. Moosa is referring to a philosophical paradigm dominated by a vision of progress that sees itself as the pinnacle of civilization and this is an important subject to discuss, as ideological frameworks attempt to either move progress forward or resist and fight it.

Joseph E. B. Lombard in his article discusses the ideological hijacking of traditional Islamic sciences by reformist groups like the ones discussed previously. He postulates further that the problem with Muslim reformists is that they couldn't holistically understand the repercussions of a modernist discourse within a traditional framework. The Islamic intellectual tradition was abandoned in lieu of Western modernist discourse, which led, according to Lombard to a rise of both modernist and puritanical reformists; the former struggling to secularize Islam and the latter trying to 'purify' by shedding any intellectual innovation. The notion of *bid'a* (innovation) is a very sensitive issue amongst Muslims, both scholarly and non-scholarly. The oft-cited hadīth, “Avoid novelties, for every novelty is an innovation, and every innovation is an error,” (Abu Dawud, Chapter 42, Hadīth 1682) warns Muslims of the detrimental consequences of *bid'a*. Lombard explains that these puritan movements, in an attempt to rid Islam of cultural and intellectual innovations, actually move away from tradition. In an attempt to look to the past, puritans purposely forget the past and begin to fit the

Hegelian framework of the progressivists as proposed earlier by Ebrahim Moosa. In other words, both puritans and modernists attempt to reform the religion in opposition to an inherited tradition. The difference between both groups is simply the inspiration for such opposition. Both modernists and puritans become alienated from the ancestral tradition. They have divorced themselves from the traditional framework of scholarship. The connection to Islamic Sciences allowed the *Gamā'a* to re-define its political role. It noticed that it had a skewed understanding of Islamic war ethics. Lumbard stresses that the separation between tradition and ideology leads to important moral ideals being altered. However, he adds that it is not a question of reform, in terms of modernizing Islam, but a reform reconnecting Islam to its tradition.

Islamic sciences have always played a major role in establishing and refining doctrine and law. Lumbard comments upon the stagnation of these sciences due to the rise of reformist ideologies, be they puritan or modernist. Puritanical reformists abandon the principles of Islamic thought "because they favor an opaque literalism which denies the efficacy of our speculative, intuitive, and imaginal faculties. Modernists do so because they have capitulated to the mental habits of their conquerors, conditioned as they are by relativism, scientism, and secular humanism." (Lumbard, 2009, 41) The author proposes that this decline in intellectual tradition has, following Hannah Arendt's thesis on ideology and religion, turned Islam from a spiritual and moral experience to a mere political ideology, be it secular, modernist, fundamentalist, *ad infinitum*. This decline is the case in most, if not all, Islamic sciences. Lumbard's focus is on the intellectual heritage of Sufism, which has been present throughout Islamic history. He shows how this tradition is on the decline in the modern world. Sufism, according to

Lumbard, "comprises a science of Ultimate Reality in which metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and ethics are elaborated in terms of the attachment of all things to their one true origin, which is also their ultimate end." (Lumbard, 2009, 42) We find in the tradition of Sufism a holistic view of Islam, where jurisprudence, theology, ethics and philosophy comprise an elaborate system of thought. The decline of Sufism is a sign of the shedding of the spiritual and moral sphere in the realm of Islamic legal thought. It is the embodiment of the third dimension of the prophetic narration of the Angel Gabriel: the manifestation of excellence and of moral virtue. This final sphere presented earlier in the tripartite categories of the Islamic tradition is the one of *iḥsān*. This excellence is the path towards enlightenment, and without it, the legal and theological dimensions lack depth. If the sciences, notably Islamic jurisprudence, can return to that tradition of virtue and excellence, then understanding contextual needs will become clearer. The only question that remains is the relationship between the so-called 'us' and 'them'.

After discussing the intricate relationship between religion and ideology, it becomes important to understand how they find themselves in a new space. It was mentioned earlier that there were contextual rulings regarding Spain and Mardin with respect to the understanding of the abode of war. Contemporary scholars have argued that the present situation of Muslims in the West is similar to the situation of Muslims in Mardin where the telos (*maqasid*) of Shari'a can be fulfilled. Scholars, both ideologically and religiously, disagree on the relationship Muslims must have with their non-Muslim abode. Essentially there are three main legal opinions. The first calls for Muslims to migrate to a Muslim land. This would follow the classical opinion

mentioned above relating to the obligation of making *hijra* in order to preserve one's religion. The second involves Muslims engaging in proselytization and spreading their faith to their hosts. Finally, the third although similar to the second opinion yet more passive, relates to the goal-oriented understandings of the law. Under the non-Muslim government, if Muslims can fulfill the principal conditions of their faith, they can continue to live under that rule, as their abode is not in conflict with being Muslim. This was the argument used by scholars in Mardin. Modern scholars who strive to overcome the Islam-West tension usually fall under this category. They can at once remain attached to their religion whilst being under a rule that does not necessarily conform to their faith. There is, however, another issue that arises. The following question is whether Muslims who live in non-Muslim lands are forced to conform to a certain status quo. The relationship between host and guest comes into play and understanding how the guest, in this case Muslims, can be integrated without being assimilated, into their new home.

Two main points were brought up when trying to understand how traditional Islamic scholarship tackles contemporary and contextual issues. Ebrahim Moosa, in his article on progress, attempts to redefine the very notion of progress from within a traditional framework, in other words, he claims that progress, in Islamic terms, is not founded upon a social evolution. Rather progress is a contextualized shift. Traditional scholarship provides a framework based on the teleology (*maqāṣid*) of *sharī'a*. The other major point discussed is the importance of developing and understanding the sphere of virtue (*iḥsān*). Virtue ethics, especially embodied by spiritual leaders, can clarify the complex relationship between ethics and law. Questions such as how one should act,

relate, or even 'be', cannot merely be answered by a literalistic reading of the law, which is the demise of Islamism. The Prophet Muhammad said: "God shall raise for this community at the head of every century a man who shall revive for it its religion." (Abu Dawud Chapter 37, Hadīth 4278) This revival, is not simply a return to the fundamentals as preached by the fundamentalists, but is characterized by a reading of tradition in the particular context.

Hospitality as the transition from ideology to religion

1. Being and Becoming Muslim

To be Muslim entails to be and to become. Discussion surrounding identity is a sensitive endeavour, as was seen earlier, because it is at once constructed by a larger sphere, be it cultural, political, religious, etc. while at the same time subjected to the viewpoint of the other's perception. In this sense, being Muslim is to "be" the inherited construction of what it means to be Muslim and to "become" what a Muslim perceives to be "Muslim." The complexity of this interplay of identity is enhanced when the identity is hyphenated by another adjective. To be Muslim-Canadian is to both "be" and "become." Yet the process of "becoming" is teleological because it implies a particular change from one state to another. When the religious identity is hyphenated, the newly added adjective is the *telos*: The Muslim becomes the Canadian but *to what extent does he or she become Canadian?* In other words, the matter of assimilation, integration, naturalization and indigenization comes to mind. Is the process of becoming Canadian achieved by shedding the Muslim self? Or does the Muslim identity impose itself upon the Canadian identity, as would an unwelcomed *guest* on his or her hospitable *host*. Integration, through an ethics of hospitality, is actually a question of a *host-guest* dynamic. Thinkers from Kant to Derrida attempted to understand how the stateless person finds his or her home in a new land. In other words, how can the stranger become the known, the familiar? Consider these two identities, Canadian and Muslim and try to understand how the latter implied as *guest* relates to the former as *host*. Furthermore,

how can these identities learn from one another and develop a dynamic relationship without annihilating or assimilating the *Other*?

2. The problem of the *Self* and the *Other*¹⁷¹⁸

Hegel as seen through the lenses of Alexander Kojève¹⁹ states that the *I* or *Self*-consciousness is a product of itself, "...it will be (in the future) what it has become by negation (in the present) of what it was (in the past), this negation being accomplished with a view to what it will become." (Kojève, 1969, 5) This is a foundational premise of Hegel's philosophical system. Kojève illustrates to the reader that the *I*, when confronting the *not-I* (as in *Other*), *desires* to destroy, transform and assimilate the *not-I*. (Kojève, 1969, 4) He gives the example of the desire for food. Food is an *Other*. And the *Self* *desires* to consume this *Other*, which can only be consumed if it is firstly destroyed (chewed or bitten through), transformed (digested) and assimilated (by absorbing necessary nutrients). This stark, or even haunting, comparison could be used to describe the recent history of colonization. The idea of *desire* is crucial in Kojève's reading of Hegel and is an important factor for Lévinas as well. It is the desire to not only negate but also transform and assimilate (food in the last example) that differentiates the human being from the animal. This means, that the human being has a desire for progress, which is the meaning of becoming "by negation of what it was." Hegel posits that this

¹⁷ We have chosen to capitalize and italicize the terms *Self* and *Other* to emphasize their ontological status and importance.

¹⁸ The author acknowledges that the discussion of Hegel is worthy of a larger study yet reminds the reader that this is not the principal purpose of the study. The choice of Kojève's reading is particularly interesting as it mirrors the tendency of fear and of clash ever-present in our era.

¹⁹ Kojève, an important French Hegellian thinker, is an essential figure in the notably French continental reading of Hegel, used especially by Lévinas.

dialectical process of destroying, transforming and assimilating is a process of becoming that is dependent upon time. Moreover Kojève writes, “human history is the history of desired Desires.” (Kojève, 1969, 6) Society, which holds a multitude of human desires, can make an *Other’s desire* desirable. For example, if a poor man meets a wealthy man and notices that he desires wealth, the poor man will begin to desire the wealthy man’s desire. The poor man’s goal will be to destroy, transform and assimilate the wealthy man, so that he can fulfill his desire of having wealth. The formulation of *Self* and *Other* within Hegel’s context is essential to understand, as it is foundational to the modern paradigm. Lévinas looks at this framework with reverence in its logicity but with disdain in its morality, which will be made clear later. According to Hegel, the relationship between the *Self* and the *Other*, whether characterized by a personal encounter (one to one), a societal encounter (group to group), or a paradigmatic encounter, is fundamentally the bond of the Master and the Slave:

“The Slave is subordinated to the Master. Hence the Slave esteems, recognizes, the value and the reality of “autonomy,” of human freedom. However, he does not find it realized in himself; he finds it only in the Other. And this is his advantage. The Master, unable to recognize the Other who recognizes him, finds himself in an impasse. The Slave, on the other hand, recognizes the Other (the Master) from the beginning. In order that mutual and reciprocal recognition, which alone can fully and definitively realize and satisfy man, be established, it suffices for the Slave to impose himself on the Master and be recognized by him. To be sure, for this to take place, the Slave must cease to be Slave: he must transcend himself, ‘overcome’ himself, as Slave. But if the Master has no desire to “overcome”—hence no possibility of ‘overcoming’—himself as a Master (since this would mean, for him, to become a Slave), the Slave has every reason to cease to be a Slave.” (Kojève, 1969, 21)

Hegel understands this dialectical process, the *Aufhebung*, in all phenomena. The human being is different because he or she is *conscious* of this process as was shown above. It can be observed that historical progress is a paradigmatic encounter. The tripartite

process of destruction-transformation-assimilation is present as paradigms confront each other. With this in mind, the paradigm of the Slave desires to engage in this process to overthrow the Master paradigm. We can vividly conceptualize this by imagining the French Revolution, which couldn't be far from Hegel's mind. Hegel posits that the essential nature of the Slave is to overthrow the Master. By overthrowing the Master, the Slave becomes its opposite, which is a *truly independent consciousness*. He writes:

“The *truth* of the independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman. This, it is true, appears at first *outside* of itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness. [...] servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite [that is lordship] of what immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness.” (Hegel, 1977, 117)

In other words, Hegel believes that the *Other* and the *Self* will be first destroyed, then transformed and then inevitably assimilated.

3. Lévinas' critique of Hegel

Assimilation is dangerous, yet it is currently the *arche* of the modern paradigm. Lévinas fundamentally disagreed with Hegel as he saw that the Master-Slave relationship is inherently violent. The rationality behind the system developed by Hegel is not in question here. Rather, Lévinas questions the foundation of his system as a progeny of a deeper philosophical problem; that of the *totalizer*:

“Inasmuch as the invisible is ordered into a totality it offends the subjectivity, since, by essence, the judgment of history consist in translating every apology into visible arguments, and in drying up the inexhaustible source of the singularity from which they proceed and against which no argument can prevail. For there can be no place for singularity in a totality.” (Lévinas, 1994, 243-244)

The problem is ethical. The *totalizer* is an ontological system, which in its totality embodies both the subject-I and the object not-I. In other words, everything that is

experienced outside of the *Self*, is simply defined as what is not-I. This perspective of *totality* is the source of all violence as it aims to eliminate the perspective of the *Other* by imposing one's own metaphysical conception. The totalistic project makes dialogue unattainable and thus nullifies ethical relations. By "interrupting their continuity," as expressed by Lévinas, the *Other* is trapped in an ontological prison imposed by the *Self*. The objectification of the *Other* to a prescribed ontological framework takes away his or her dignity and whatever is meaningful to them. Another point essential to Lévinas' thought is that of *continuity* and a critique of history. He explains, "[h]istory itself, an identification of the same, cannot claim to totalize the same and the other." (Lévinas, 1994, 40) The failings of history are the phenomenon of *continuity*, that is, the eschatological *desire* for transcendence. This transcendence is what makes the ethical relationship possible because it "designates a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own reality." (Lévinas, 1994, 41) This infinite distance, characterized as infinity in Lévinas' work, brings about the metaphysical foundation for a philosophy of dialogue. Only through this infinite distance between the *Self* and the *Other* can there be continuity. If the distance is finite, as would claim a totalized philosophical framework, the *Self* and the *Other* can be assimilated. However, Lévinas believes that this is how violence is defined, something which he wishes to avoid by all means. The question of ethics lies within the relation with the *Other*, and if the *Other* is assimilated to the *Self*, the relation is abolished. Any ethical thinking is an attempt to understand how to treat the *Other* (whether human, animal, plant, resource), and how one must comport his or her *Self* with respect to this *Other*. Lévinas believes that any imposition of a metaphysical conception is a violent act. Yet, any relationship with the *Other*

necessitates a clash of metaphysics. The firm atheist who decides to engage the devout Christian will inevitably lead to a form of disagreement. The *otherness* inherent in the *Other* will be revealed and shaken. The realm of the ethical is brought forward when these two worlds collide. Violence, which can be physical, emotional, intellectual, plays an integral role in the analysis of the ethical as the purpose of dialogue is, instead of a Hegelian master-slave relationship, to minimize this violence.

The idea of the encounter is prominent in Lévinas' work. He attempts to liberate himself from the Hegelian notion of subjectivity by introducing the concept of the *Face*. He explains that this is "the way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me." (Lévinas, 1994, 50) Lévinas illustrates that the *Other* as the *Face* is a representation of himself or herself *independent* of any prejudice imposed upon. By imposing any prejudice or conditions on how I will understand the *Other*, I am committing a violent act and thus halting his or her continuity. Lévinas claims that a true ethic promotes the notion of *infinity* in the *Other* and finds its application in the encounter. Yet the encounter is set in a specific place where the *Self* is the owner of an abode and the *Other* is a guest. As Lévinas explains: "The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement." (Lévinas, 1994, 152) Encounter begins in a specific place between a guest and an owner as the firsts host. Lévinas discusses that there is a sense of privilege in being in one's own home because the owner can place conditions upon the guest. For example, the guest must take off his or her shoes, sits in a specific place, asks to use the restroom, etc. These conditions placed upon a guest are the beginning of human activity, as Lévinas illustrates, because we must expect the guest to eventually

become sovereign of the home. This is the process of Lévinas' ethical project. However, by limiting ethics to totality, the owner remains owner and the guest remains guest.

4. Unconditional Hospitality

Jacques Derrida called Lévinas' *Totality and Infinity* a work on hospitality. By trying to remove the totalizer, which is an expression of *hostility*, infinity embodies an unconditional hospitality. The idea of infinity allows the *stranger* (or the *Other* in Lévinas' lexicon) to become the transcendental experience of the *Self*. In Derrida's *De l'hospitalité*, there is a fascinating discussion on the place of the *stranger* in Plato's dialogues. The Socratic person presents himself or herself as alien. "L'étranger," Derrida illustrates, "secoue le dogmatisme menaçant du *logos* paternel : l'être qui est, et le non-être qui n'est pas." (Derrida, 1997, 13) The paternal *logos*, expressed by Derrida, resembles the metaphysical totality explained by Lévinas. Derrida, however, pushes the conception of *totality* further by explaining that the encounter does not simply reveal one's sovereignty of a specific place, but also disturbs the sovereign's inherent metaphysical and ethical assumptions. The encounter between the owner and the stranger brings about a rediscovery of the one's *Self* as it manifests the building blocks of a society's truths that were taken for granted. Derrida, unlike Lévinas, uses the notion of the encounter to build the ethics of hospitality. Socrates, in the Dialogues, comes to dismantle and bring about a questioning of Greek norms and values. The stranger holds an important place in any dialogical relationship, as they are the ones who question the role of sovereignty, colonialism, power, racism, etc. However, there is always a fear when encountering the *stranger*, which has been illustrated in Plato's *Apology*. Socrates

was condemned to death because he was accused of “corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other *daimonia* that are novel.” (Plato, 24b) This is a prime example of the conditions that are placed upon the stranger by the sovereign. One needs only to look at the policies placed upon immigrants and refugees when entering foreign lands. Hospitality, which is a receiving of guest, can still promote hostility in this sense. Derrida calls this colonial hospitality.

Hospitality relates to both *hostis* and *hospes*. This was one of the important entries of Émile Benveniste’s *Indo-European Language and Society* discussed by Derrida. Benveniste’s analysis of the words *hostis* and *hospes* reveals the etymological understanding of *hospitality* and lays the foundation to the ethics of hospitality formulated by Derrida. Benveniste firstly illustrates that the “primitive notion conveyed by *hostis* is that of equality by compensation: a *hostis* is one who repays my gift by a counter-gift.” (Benveniste, 1973, 71) He explains that *hostis* once denoted guest as opposed to the notion of *hospes* where the latter part of the word *pet* or its other form *pot* denoted the Latin *potis* meaning power and *personal identity*. (Benveniste, 1973, 71) The latter word includes word such as *despot* meaning master, master of the house. The relationship between *hospes* and *hostis* begins to resemble the Master-Slave dialectic. Benveniste continues by discussing *hospitality*, which is a compound of both terms: “*hospes* goes back to *hosti-pet-s*.” (Benveniste, 1973, 72) This reveals two important elements: the *potis* (the Master) and the *hostis* (the Guest). The *hostis*, in Latin, came to be understood as *enemy*, i.e. as the stranger who cannot be included in Roman Law, and this is where the term *hostility* finds root. Yet Benveniste illustrates that “*hostis* in Latin corresponds to *gasts* of Gothic and to *gosti* of Old Slavonic, which also presents gos-

podī ‘master’, formed like *hospes*.” (Benveniste, 1973, 75) He reveals that there is a connection between *gast* and *gosti* which means *guest* and *enemy* which lies in the notion of *stranger*. Thus he writes, “[t]he notion ‘favourable stranger’ developed to ‘guest’; that of ‘hostile stranger’ to ‘enemy’.” (Benveniste, 1973, 75) Furthermore, the very idea of *hospitality* is “founded on the idea that a man is bound to another,” relating to the Gothic term *potlach*, “by the obligation to compensate a gift of service from which he has benefited.” (Benveniste, 1973, 77) Benveniste is interested in the conception of the institution of hospitality. Hospitality, as understood from the position of the *hostis* is the exchange with the favourable stranger or hostile stranger, but with the stranger nevertheless. The term *hostis* encourages a particular exchange of equality and thus places both the *Self* and the *Other* in an ethical relationship founded upon a principle of gift. This can be understood, using Derrida’s terminology as a post-colonial or unconditional hospitality where the greatest gift is a role reversal. The guest becomes host because the host has offered his own *Self* as a gift. But hospitality is not limited to this, hence, the importance of remembering the *hostility* of the *hostis*. Benveniste writes, “the notion of hospitality was expressed by a different term which the ancient *hostis* nevertheless persists, but in a composition with **pot(i)s*: this is *hospes*.” (Benveniste, 1973, 78) *Pot* originally had the meaning of *husband* not of *master* but became associated to that of Master. When contemplating the meaning of *husband*, Benveniste relates it to a *newly married husband* and thus could be understood as a lover, someone wanting to do anything for his bride. (Benveniste, 1973, 78) But *hospes* becomes the incarnation of hospitality, as Benveniste remarks, when it is confronted by an *Other*; when it is placed in a group. And in that sense, the *hospes* has the potential to be a Lover

or a Master. He is a Lover when he offers himself completely to either the hostile enemy or the favourable guest and he is a Master when he places conditions upon the stranger.

Derrida discusses both colonial and post-colonial hospitality. The former being the placing of conditions upon the stranger that halts his or her continuity and the latter, an exploration of post-colonial hospitality where the idea of sovereignty is deconstructed. In this sense, the Stranger is welcomed to question the dogmas inherent in the land and considered a potential Host. In that sense, the guest is not imprisoned in his role of Stranger, he is included in the chain of hospitality because he will have to compensate by being a host in return. The discussion of hospitality finds relevance when discussing migration and its exchange with the welcoming culture. Culture involves both a sense of solidarity or “belonging” and exchange. The goal of the hospitable act is to actualize both this solidarity and exchange. Solidarity however, can be understood either in a sense of assimilation or integration, which are expressions of colonialism and post-colonialism respectively. The notion of ‘belonging’ to a particular geographic space brings up the question of the stranger and the sovereign, which was presented above. Derrida underlines the idea of colonial and post-colonial hospitality in his discussion of Kant’s *Project towards Perpetual Peace*. Kant discussed the implications of a cosmopolitan world order that necessitates laws promoting hospitality instead of hostility. He claimed that “the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law - constitutional as well as international law - necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace.” (Kant, 1917, 142) Kant addressed the issue of immigration through the development of a proper system of laws and a constitution of

rights. As people emigrate from one land to another, there must be a set of ethically good conditions. Derrida criticizes Kant's approach, as it does not promote a positive cultural exchange; there remains a sovereign who is able to impose conditions upon the *Other*, his guest. Furthermore, the guest is not seen as a potential host. Derrida finds this problematic because Kant's host grants the guest a mere visitor's right and so the hospitality offered is conditional. Derrida takes Kant's initial concept further by elucidating the need for the dialectic between the host and the guest where the roles are exchanged. The guest becomes host and vice versa. Post-colonial hospitality is an exploration of inter-cultural exchange. The immigrant is no longer an immigrant. Post-colonial hospitality attempts to deconstruct the conditions of hospitality that are placed upon the *Other*. These conditions must be rigorously analyzed and criticized in order to promote a proper post-colonial cosmopolitan culture.

Dimitrios Karmis, in an article on the limits of "l'hospitalité québécoise" analyzes the question of reasonable accommodation in Quebec. He explains that the opposition against accommodation brings forward a monist and self-centered conception of hospitality, or in other words, a conception of colonial hospitality, which labels immigrants according to their place of origin and turns them into guest-citizens. (Karmis, 2008, 251) His article tackles the question of the Kirpan in public schools. In 2006, a young Sikh was criticized for bringing a Kirpan, considered sacred in his religious tradition, to school. This criticism led to a heated debate on reasonable accommodations and the limits of tolerance. According to Karmis, the opposition to the Kirpan in public schools represented the public common culture as animated by a very limited conception of hospitality. (Karmis, 2008, 250-251) With this in mind, Karmis

uses Derrida's idea of unconditional hospitality as a critical tool to oppose restrictive immigration policies and discourses, which according to the author is the case in Quebec. The famous Bouchard-Taylor Commission was created in the midst of this debate. The question boiled down to whether the Kirpan was fundamentally defined as a knife or a religious symbol. The knife would conform to a dangerous weapon and thus would be banned in the schools. The religious symbol, however, could be accommodated. Finally, the solution to the issue, after going to the Supreme Court, was the allowance of the Kirpan with certain conditions that would still conform to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court had come up with five conditions: 1) the Kirpan must be worn under clothing; 2) the sheath that holds the knife must be made of wood and not metal; 3) the Kirpan must be in its sheath, wrapped and sewed in a secure manner; 4) the school personnel must have the power to verify that the previous conditions are respected; and 5) the young Multani (who was accused of bringing the Kirpan) could not take out the Kirpan and must alert school authorities of its loss. (Karmis, 2008, 257) This final ruling seemed like the ideal compromise that would allow for a particular freedom of expression while putting in guidelines that would ensure the safety and security of others in the schools.

Then Karmis discusses the opposition to this ruling. He illustrates that the groups who opposed this decision professed themselves as open to receiving immigrants yet with limits and restrictions. (Karmis, 2008, 258) "*Du kirpan... à la charia ?*" was the title of a collection of articles tackling the issue of hospitality in Québec. (Karmis, 2008, 249-250) This title, *From the kirpan to Shari'a*, is revealing of a culture that opposed the

accommodation discourse. Karmis writes that the hospitality given to immigrant culture is revealing of a colonial type:

“Three distinct but interrelated character traits of colonial hospitality are presently omnipresent: 1) a weak openness to intercultural exchange with immigrant cultures, especially of recent immigration; 2) the rigidity of the roles of host and guest; 3) a feeling of cultural superiority.” (Our translation) (Karmis, 2008, 258)

This important analysis illustrates the receiving culture’s stubbornness in relation to the *Other*. In fact, it projects what Benveniste elucidated in the *hostis*, the hostile stranger. The assumption that accommodating immigrants threatens cultural sovereignty is founded upon a colonial outlook that is reminiscent, not of the loving husband as *hospes* but of the despot; the Master-Slave relationship is enabled and given life. The very notion of culture becomes dichotomized where the host remains host and the guest remains guest. There is no cultural exchange.

The idea of intercultural exchange is as essential for our analysis and as it is for Karmis. He explains that the weak openness to intercultural exchange is manifested by a unilateral and ethnocentric interpretation of the Kirpan’s significance. (Karmis, 2008, 259) On the one hand, the host takes it upon himself or herself to define the Kirpan as a knife in the formulation by expressing that a knife stays a knife. The Kirpan-as-knife can be used as a dangerous weapon and must be confiscated. On the other, the guest Sikh considers the Kirpan as a religious symbol. The Kirpan-as-symbol becomes an object of anamnesis. By *totalizing* the Sikh community, the host, imposes the definition of knife upon the Kirpan. Only by *infinetizing* the dialogue, can the guest community make a plea and share *their* understanding of the Kirpan-as-symbol. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives way to religious freedoms. However, the defining of the Kirpan itself

comes into play. Karmis explains that the lack of intercultural exchange led to the belief that the Kirpan is only a knife and cannot be otherwise. This leads to, according to Karmis, a fixation of the roles of host and guest. Post-colonial hospitality, by infinitizing the *Other*, allows the *Other* to become host and the *Self* to become guest. Thus, the Stranger becomes a transcendental experience of the *Self*; being in the *Other*'s shoes quite literally. Colonial hospitality, on the other hand, reinforces the host's sovereignty. The definition of the Kirpan-as-knife is imposed on the Sikh community. They are being told: "You can stay here, on condition that your *knife* is in a safe place." Finally, this leads to a cultural superiority. The host's definition takes precedence over the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and thus he or she can fully impose the Kirpan-as-knife upon the community. Post-colonial hospitality implies an intercultural exchange and a removal of the sovereignty of land. A genuine intercultural exchange is one of the building blocks of a pluralistic society.

The second trait demonstrated by Karmis is as a consequence the result of the refusal of intercultural exchange; the rigidity of the roles of host and guest. This is seen by the understanding of a fundamental value that is imposed on everyone in Quebec, in the case of the Kirpan, it is the zero tolerance on violence in schools as cited by the supporters of the ban. (Karmis, 2008, 260) This reinforces the host as host and the guest as guest because it assumes that the Kirpan is associated to violence in schools. The host imposes himself or herself by not permitting the guest, in this case the Sikhs, to have his or her *understanding* of the Kirpan as religious experience. Instead, the Kirpan is seen as knife and there is no such tolerance applicable because the overarching value of security does not tolerate violence in schools. Thus the Kirpan is violent and remains violent

according to the host. As Karmis explains, this host-guest relationship points towards pluralism in the sense that it infuses a bidirectional dynamic of reciprocity. (Karmis, 2008, 256) This reciprocity is an infinite exchange of how the world is to be defined. Sovereignty of land, however, implies a colonial hospitality. Guest will always need to be welcomed within the borders of a specific state. These are the remnants of the Westphalian nation-state. The absence of sovereignty allows for a deeper understanding of sharing and exchange. Thus, the intercultural exchange can be actualized. Finally, the feeling of cultural superiority is the underlying sentiment characteristic with colonial hospitality. It confirms the rhetoric of a civilized host and of the invited barbarian. (Karmis, 2008, 261) Karmis explains that the oppositional discourse to the Kirpan justified the importance of assimilation, which is by definition a feeling of cultural superiority.

The case of the Kirpan was very important in helping define the relationship between host and guest in Canada. It also brought out the importance of developing a post-colonial conception of this relationship; in other words, of bringing out the necessity for integration instead of assimilation. When the host attempts to halt the *Other's* own experience, it is merely denying his or her right to autonomy and to individuality. True hospitality encourages this autonomy, where, ideally, the guest becomes host and the host becomes guest. But what does it mean for the guest to become host when we think of Islam in the West? Does it mean that Islam imposes itself as the official state religion, or does it mean that Islam becomes indigenized as a Western experience, while remaining true to its origins? This essay argues for the latter. As an ideology, Islam cannot properly integrate because it desires to remain a guest. It

sees its place as an abode of war/conflict where citizenship and institutions must come from overseas to be authentic. This causes an exponential problem when trying to create policies around tolerance and respect because those striving to be tolerated and respected are at once claiming that they do not belong where they are. This, however, has not been a traditional position held by the majority of Sunni scholars. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, founder of the Nawawi Foundation, argues that there are cultural imperatives inherent in the Islamic tradition, which must be revived in order to properly understand how the tradition remains traditional in a new context. He calls for developing an American Islam:

“By setting the boundaries of the self and imparting a strong, unified sense of identity, a sound Muslim American culture would allow for dynamic engagement with ourselves and the world around us. It would also cultivate the ability to cope with complex social realities and negotiate productively the various roles which life in modern society require us to play, while maintaining a unified, dignified, and self-assured sense of who we are and a consistent commitment to the values for which we stand. People can repent from broken rules but not from broken psyches. The creation of a healthy Muslim American psyche is contingent on the creation of a successful, well-integrated indigenous culture. A well-integrated psyche and unified sense of identity make authentic Islamic religiosity, true spirituality, and moral perfection a normative possibility within the American context.” (Abd-Allah, 2004, 4)

Abd-Allah is calling on Muslims living in America to engage with themselves and the world around them. He is calling for a sort of introspective dialogue to understand one’s place, one’s role and one’s culture. He explains that this dynamic engagement will allow for recognition of complex social issues that may seem simply binary without such contemplation. In this sense, he calls for Muslims to contemplate their relationship with their non-Muslim co-habitants. It is in this sense, that a standard of integration is begotten.

5. Integration as understood through hospitality

True integration, through the ethics of hospitality, requires an unconditional relationship between host and guest. In this present case, this reverse of roles may become quite complicated because this relation is often seen as the host being Non-Canadian Muslims, so to speak, and the guest being non-Muslim Canadians. A reversal of roles in this case or an unconditional hospitality would see a transformation Canadians hosting Muslim non-Canadians, Muslims hosting Canadian non-Muslims. It would be as if the guest entered inside while already being inside and the host became the guest of his guest in their own abode²⁰. This is perhaps the goal of an unconditional hospitality, but it may seem to be quite unrealistic. However when variables are added to the host-guest relationship, the understanding of unconditionality becomes clear. If the host is defining his or her guest in terms of mere religiosity, hospitality has to be conditional, if not, the host would need to convert to the guest's religion and vice versa. The notion of exchange must be cultural. If that is the case, then the ethics of hospitality begins to seem plausible. Contextualization is an outward affair. It is the reformation of an outer shell holding the inexplicable majesty of the spirit. This outer shell characterized by the cultural sphere. Moreover, as was shown previously, culture plays an important rule in the contextualizing of legal rulings and law, in and of itself, remains an outward expression of culture. The veil, for example, is legislated by the shari'a but it is also an important element of the Islamic culture and identity. In the Islamic tradition, this is known as the relationship between *shari'a* (law) and *haqiqa* (truth). They require

²⁰ Further reading on this unconditionality can be done on the work of Daniel Innerarity, especially in *Ética de la hospitalidad* (Spain: Peninsular Publishing Company, 2001). The author understands this as the passage of the non-familiarity: the experience of strangeness.

each other, but the *haqiqa* holds the greater importance. However many scholars, from Western academia to Islamic scholarship believe that the lack of integration comes from the literalist understanding of the *shari'a*. There is a misconception that the legal permissibility of an act equates to its ontological goodness. Thus, whatever is lawful is good and whatever is forbidden is evil. This very phenomenon would turn religion into an evanescent expression of ostentation when in fact; religion plays deep into the human spirit (or psyche, if one takes a more secular approach). Because, at its core, religion is much more than a simple set of cultural and dogmatic norms, the core cannot, nor is it required to be removed in order to integrate in a particular space and time.

The question of ethics within Islam is not novel. Almost mirroring the ethical questions in late Medieval and early Renaissance Europe, the Muslim world (if we dare name it that) had similar questions. The Renaissance began to question the notion of “intelligible essences” that was best formulated by the likes of Thomas Aquinas and the Neo-Scholastic school. Sherman A. Jackson writes an interesting article on the issue of “intelligible essences” in both the Western and Islamic tradition. Inspired by Roberto Unger’s essay *Knowledge and Politics*, Jackson highlights that Enlightenment epistemology is founded upon “liberal philosophy” and the critique of ontological morality:

“The key element in the triumph of liberal philosophy, which according to Unger began with Hobbes in the 17th century, was the rejection of the classical doctrine of “intelligible essences,” according to which the world constituted an objective reality that could be apprehended as such, regardless of the judgments or predilections of the individual observer. A stone, on this understanding, was distinguishable from a plant because it was the repository of an objectively intelligible “stoneness.” Against this view, liberal philosophy insisted that there was no objectively validatable perception of the world. Rather, the most the mind

could achieve would be the organization of experience in such a way that rendered it significant or serviceable to the observer.” (Jackson, 1999, 185)

Two major schools of theology in Islam are the Mu‘tazilites and the Ash‘arites. The latter represented the most conservative opinions and condemned the first to heresy. Interestingly enough, it is the Ash‘arite school that conformed to what was deemed progressive in Europe during the rise of liberal ethics. Jackson’s article provides a renewal of a classical doctrine to help distinguish ethics from law and assist a proper understanding of a balanced integration. Jackson argues that the correlation, in terms of moral ontology, between the liberal and the Ash‘ari vantage points reveals the necessity for a certain moral relativism. He argues that the increase in justifying morality through rational means is creating dominance over the plural notions of the good. Pluralism is the product of the inherent ambiguity of contextual morality. It allows each individual and community to construct a particular notion of self-determination, without infringing on another community’s or individual’s moral life. Thus, pluralism is the necessary condition for a healthy society of dialogue, multiculturalism and global citizenship. Pluralism and the variety of “good” can in fact assist integration without assimilating the other into a dominant ontology of “goodness.” In addition, Jackson explains that the very critique of moral ontology needed to be replaced by some other source of morality. He writes “‘good’ and ‘evil,’ when not based directly on scripture, are invariably conceived of as objects not of reason but of desire or the appetitive self (al-ṭab’).” (Jackson, 1999, 186-187) Desire or the appetitive self cannot be the criteria to decide good and evil according to the Ash‘ari School. The criteria must come from scripture, as these are expressions of the higher self. Yet scripture is subject to interpretation and to a

certain level of subjectivity. Qiyās or analogical reasoning is a foundational principle in deriving legal rulings and reasoning stems from the self; the question then becomes whether the analogical reasoning can be sourced from a “higher self.”

“The threat of domination initially represented by the Mu'tazilites' "objectively knowable" morality, coupled with the insinuation that those who failed to recognize this morality were guilty of feigning moral agnosia, gives way to a new threat in the form of the obligation to express personal likes and ambitions in terms of scripture, even while it is recognized that there is no such thing as objective good and evil, and that some members of the community possess greater ability at effecting scriptural justifications than do others.” (Jackson, 1999, 187)

Jackson tackles these issues in his work by bringing up two major points. The first is a criticism of the “objectively knowable” morality, which mirrors the modernists’ criticism of medieval morality. The second is that reason is incapable of attaining an objective understanding of good and evil. The Ash‘ari School can then be used to critique modern ideological claims of good and evil, which Islamists and secularists so often use politically. Jackson explains:

“[The Asharites] had argued that values lie essentially beyond the pale of reason. If this is true, however, it must also be true that reason cannot render one's values any more fitting than those of one's neighbors. Yet the fact that some of us possess greater mastery over the use of reason enables us to make more compelling arguments in support of our wants and values. It is essentially the revolt against the tendency to devalue certain sentiments in the name of reason, along with the growing resignation to the idea that some values cannot be transferred across cultural, ideological, or civilizational boundaries, that explains the proliferation in modern times of ideologies as diverse as Molefi Asante's Afro-centrism to Samuel P. Huntington's ‘Clash of Civilizations.’” (Jackson, 1999, 195)

This proliferation of ideologies exists because there is a moral dominance inherent within ideological claims. This brings us back to the idea brought forth by Hannah Arendt of the logicity of totalitarian ideology. Within its own framework, an ideology successfully defines good and evil and thus manipulates the actions of its adherents. On

the other hand, the Ash‘ari claim that morality can only be derived through revelation means that morality is at once pluralistic (due to the various scriptural interpretations) and that there is an intrinsic difference between legal limits and allowances and moral ontologies. This can be seen in mundane rulings such as the prohibition of pork consumption. Pork is not essentially evil because the one who is starving and cannot find any source of food to satiate their hunger is permitted to consume pork. If the consumption of pork were inherently evil, the consumption of it would be prohibited in all cases. One cannot derive moral judgments based on legal rulings. This is the point that the Ash‘ari School attempts to make.

The Ash‘ari position is very interesting in its relationship with non-Muslims because of its support for moral relativism. Ideology holds an ethics of domination because it supports an overarching “good” that its adherents need to conform to. Of course, the Ash‘ari position still holds that Islam is a universal religion, however, its relationship to others, is not confined to a moral subscription because the source of moral understanding is revelation. The concept of a universal religion brings about a certain inclusive aspect where any person regardless of race, class, culture, gender, etc. can be considered Muslim. However, universal religion also implies a necessity to convert the *Other*. The Ash‘ari position does not go against the grain, however, the absence of moral ontology within its particular theological leanings leads to an alterity of accountability. If the source of morality was reason itself, then one could argue that everyone in this world is held accountable to Islamic ethics. On the other hand, if revelation is the criteria, the accountability is reserved to the adherents of the faith. As

was explained earlier, revelation brings about a plurality of derived rulings that allows for a strict separation between law and morality.

The Creativity of Hospitality

1. Examples from within the tradition

Let us return to the notion of unconditional hospitality with the new insight on relative morality. If relative morality is taken to be part of the basis of religion, suddenly the very definition of integration begins to change. The main issue with assimilation is that it offers only a binary conception of morality and making the *Other's* conception of the good incompatible with one's own morality. Through unconditional hospitality, morality becomes shared. And the very act of sharing morality leads to an exchange of practices, ideals, arts, languages, etc. The possibilities become limitless. If one takes a look at the spread of Islam, the theological claim for universality was not always associated with a cultural superiority of the Arabs. Of course, one could argue that there was a form of colonialism in the spread of Islam; however, cultural identities often remained rooted in one's own heritage. We find in the Qur'ān the following verse: "We have enjoined on man in respect of his parents: his mother bore him in strain upon strain, and his weaning was in two years. (So, O human,) be thankful to Me and to your parents. To Me is the final homecoming." (Qur'ān 31:14) At first glance, this verse is simply asking Muslims to be thankful to God and to their parents. One could easily think that this implies thankfulness for being educated as a Muslim. However, this verse was revealed during the Meccan period, which means that Muslims were still a minority living under non-Muslim rule. Each Muslim at that time had converted to the religion and most, except for a select few, had forsaken their parents' religious background. But this verse is asking its reader to be thankful to their parents. No one in his or her right

mind would say that one must be thankful to his or her parents for instilling a desire to rebel. On the contrary, parents are one's access to a past and to a cultural tradition. And it is this heritage that breeds moral value. The Prophet Muhammad said about his companion 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb: "The best of you in Jahiliyyah (the time before Islam) are the best of you in Islam, as long as they have understanding." (Sahih Bukhari, Chapter 65, Hadīth 3304) At its core, we find that Islam takes on the cultural form of its host. At the beginning of its message, this was in the form of the Arabs. In a sense, one could argue that it islamicized Arab virtues and limited vice through its legal prohibitions. Yet some issues, which were not necessarily prohibitions, still remained vices of the heart, which became evident through the person of the Prophet. The adherence to the Prophetic tradition, known as the Sunnah, became the moral standard, whether or not it was attached to a particular rule or not. History has proven that this moral standard instead of becoming a totalizing ideological conformity, acted more as an epistemological filter which embraced different cultural practices.

Two works clearly show this phenomenon in two distinct ways. The first example is a study by Toshihiko Izutsu in his *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān* where he discusses the islamicization of old Arab virtues. This is an extremely useful resource as Izutsu's research suggests that the advent of Islam was not a revolt of a cultural paradigm but a moral and spiritual progression as expressed by Ebrahim Moosa earlier; new values did not necessarily topple old ones. One of the points made by the author and critical to this work is defining islamicization. In other words, one must ask: What are the ontological principles held by Islam that provide an epistemological overview of morality? As already mentioned, the obvious answer comes to mind: the testimony of

faith (there is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God). This statement is the condition of becoming Muslim. Izutsu, however, brings the ontological principle to a deeper level as he related it to Islam's eschatology. "Now this eschatological framework," the author writes, "makes the ultimate destiny of man depend on what he does in the present world, with particular reference to whether his or her conduct furthers or hinders the cause of Islam." (Izutsu, 2007, 203) Eschatology is crucial in understanding the actions of a good person and an evil person. Essentially, there are two categories of people, the people of Paradise and the people of Hell. These are used as the exemplars of virtue and vice respectively. These examples used throughout the Qur'ān were a shock to Arab customs. In this sense, eschatology trampled the materialist vision of the world. Martin Lings, in his biography of the Prophet makes reference to this islamicization:

"The disbelievers' attitude, past and present, was summed up in the words: There is naught but the life of this world ... and we shall not be raised." (Qur'ān 6:29) To this came the Divine answers: Not in play did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between them (Qur'ān 21:16) and Deem ye that We did but create you in vain and that ye shall not be brought back unto Us? (Qur'ān 23:115) For those in whom disbelief had not crystallized, these words rang with truth; and so it was with the Revelation as a whole, which described itself as being a light and having in itself the power to guide. A parallel imperative cause for accepting the message was the Messenger himself, a man who was, they were certain, too full of truth to deceive and too full of wisdom to be self-deceived. The Message contained a warning and a promise: the warning impelled them to take action, and the promise filled them with joy." (Lings, 2006, 69)

In the case of the Arabs, the introduction of a new eschatology was the grounds to further define morality. In that way, the people of Paradise and the people of Hell had virtues and vices that were already known to the Arabs. The Messenger was known to be honest and wise and this led people to follow his message. He was considered to be a

man who lived according to pre-Islamic Arab virtues. Murūwah, which was the highest ethical ideal of the Arabs, became Islamic. It included “generosity, bravery and courage, patience, trustworthiness, and truthfulness,” explains Isutzu. “Islam purified and freshened them, making their energy flow into certain channels which it had prepared.” (Izutsu, 2007, 75) Not long after, these virtues would become the virtues of the pious and the devoted. The phenomenon of islamicization revealed how an epistemological worldview grounded in a particular ontology will affect morality. It shows as well that these three concepts do not form a unified packaging. The cultural exchange and the dynamism of morality play an integral role in the development of religious thought. One could easily switch the formulation and claim that Islam’s universality had become arabicized. This switch of formulation becomes even more evident when one studies how Islam integrated in other parts of the world.

2. Non-Arabian Islam

Sachiko Murata writes, in her pertinent work *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light*, about this very phenomenon of unconditional hospitality in China. She doesn’t use the philosophical terminology associated to hospitality, but the idea remains ever-present. She recognized in the course of her research on Islam in East Asia that there were Chinese Islamic institutions. These institutions understood Islam from a vantage point that differed from the Arab, Persian or Turkish idea.

“What the Chinese ulama did, then, was write about Islam in a completely non-Islamic idiom. [...] Anyone who reads these texts with a knowledge of the Chinese ambience of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can see that they are part of the ongoing discussion and debate among Chinese intellectuals concerning the nature of the quest for human perfection.” (Murata, 2000, 6)

Murata recognized that the conceptual apparatus of the Chinese differed from the mainstream in other regions of the Islamic world. She noticed as well that Islam participated in an intellectual agora concerning the good life. There was a mosaic of intellectual thought stemming from various traditions from Confucian ethics, Neo-Confucian metaphysics, Buddhism and Taoism. The outcome was an Islam that was grounded in orthodox tradition but described with a historical terminology inherited from the Chinese language and thought. One of the texts presented by Murata is entitled “Great Learning of the Pure and Real” by Wang Tai-Yü. This work was meant to be a sort of lexicon to bring Islamic concepts to the Chinese worldview. This is how Muslims are defined:

“Muslims (hui-hui, literally, “returning of returning”). The Hui-Hui are the mirror of the Pure and the Real, while heaven and earth are their model. Hui has two kinds: the returning of the body and the returning of the heart. The returning of the body is of two kinds: “coming back” and “going away.” The returning of the heart is also of two kinds: that of the true heart and that of no-heart. The returning of the true heart is to awaken to the original beginning of oneself. The returning of the no-heart is to manifest the fountainhead of the mandate and to gain the Non-Ultimate. Embodying the Non-Ultimate and recognizing the Real Lord is the ultimate station of returning.” (Murata, 2000, 54)

The conceptual language present mirrors Chinese tradition. The author needed to explain intellectually to her non-Muslim counterparts what it means both metaphysically and ethically to be hui-hui. The conceptual apparatus, which is necessarily shared, becomes the vehicle in which the religion is understood and explained. “The term no-heart (wu-hsin),” writes Murata, “comes from a Taoist background and was also used by the Buddhists.” She uses Wing-tsit Chan’s translation of wu-hsin as “no deliberate mind of one’s own” or “no mind of one’s own,” and “in a Buddhist context as “the non-being of the mind.” (Murata, 2000, 54) The tradition in China’s spiritual ethos was one of

transcendence of the lower self. What was disagreed upon amongst spiritual heritages was the method. What is seen here is that this very notion of selflessness in terms of ethics is characterized by the concept of no-heart, which is in turn, understood Islamically. Instead of dismissing the spiritual tradition of the Chinese, the conceptual apparatus is embraced and threaded into the existing Islamic ethical, theological and spiritual paradigm.

The two examples mentioned above reveal a certain trend. Essentially there is a reciprocal exchange between the host and the guest. There is at once the “guestization” of the host and the “hostization” of the guest. This is the case for Islam in Turkey, Persia, West Africa, Spain, East Africa, and Indonesia, and is becoming the case in Europe, North America and South America. The difference is that in the case of the latter, the variables are much greater due to an increasingly pluralistic community. Nevertheless, each space has its own culture, language, art, etc. And it is this culture that becomes the standard for integration. Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah, born in Mauritania but now a scholar in Saudi Arabia, writes in an article on Muslims in the West:

“We can learn a lesson from the western people who have individuality as one of the foundations of their culture. They respect the rights of people to explore their individuality. There is some good in this understanding, and the Muslims should learn from this even though it is originally from our own tradition. We should see that part of their strength lies in this ability.” (Bayyah, 2011)

The next point of leads to understanding what integration means in the West. Bayyah makes reference to individualism as a foundation of the culture. This speaks to a certain respect for pluralism, which is a respect of another community’s or individual’s concept of self-determination, and to the declaration of human rights. He means that Muslims should look within their own tradition to find commonalities with the values of the host.

In that sense, they can become hosts by being at the forefront of the human rights discourse. This is the call made by many Western Muslim public intellectuals. Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, who has founded the Zaytuna College in Berkley, California, gives numerous presentations on the importance of developing organic practices in the Muslim Community. YouTube videos are filled with his lectures on the subject. This becomes interesting, especially after the Eid ul-adha scandal that happened in Quebec. An article that had appeared on TVA Nouvelle's website portrayed the annual lamb slaughter as scandalous. (TVA Nouvelles, 2011) This portrayal of Muslims as barbaric slaughterers is of course overtly exaggerated; it is no different than the annual turkey slaughter for Thanksgiving. However, it does bring into question the nature of the ethical practice of slaughtering which is at the heart of the Islamic tradition. The focus on animal rights as a Western value could also give way to a redefinition of ritual slaughtering whilst remaining true to the Islamic tradition. The only condition becomes a re-reading of the textual sources by the scholars of the tradition, which Bayyah attempts to do. Traditional Muslim scholars of old, from West Africa to China, re-read their tradition to understand their local culture and situation, it is now time for the scholars of North America to do the same.

3. Re-reading tradition through fashion

Re-reading tradition implies change and change can be violent as Lévinas attempted to illustrate. After World War I, Turkey struggled to preserve its Islamic identity. The Sultan's power declined while secularist groups were gaining influence in the political sphere. The Turkish revolutionary Mustafa Kemal, also known as Atatürk,

became a figure for the Westernization and/or modernization of Turkey. This shift is best symbolized by Turkey's hat revolution. On November 25th 1925, "the parliament passed a law that made it mandatory for all men to wear Western-style hats in public places; all civil servants had to wear them, and no other type of hat would be allowed." (Genç, 2013) The Turkish fez was to be replaced by European fedoras. For Kemal, the hat represented not only culture but was a sign of the times. Turkey, now looking westward, wanted to shift its cultural, linguistic, religious and intellectual identity from the Orient to the Occident. It was now illegal to wear the hat of the past; it was now illegal to look Muslim. Fashion is a metaphor. In France, for example, the veil worn by women has been banned in public schools since 2004 and the face veil banned in public space since 2011. There now is a discussion on the wearing of veils in university spaces. (Penketh, 2013) This debate has surfaced in Canada since the Parti Québécois was elected as a minority government in 2012. The Quebec Charter of Values was proposed by the party to instil a common culture amongst the Québécois. The result was to be a partial ban of religious and partisan symbols for public employees. Alexander Panetta, from the Canadian Press writes, "low-level public employees would have to tuck their Christian symbolism away, as would Muslims, Sikhs and Jews with their religious headwear." (Panetta, 2013) The hat remains a symbol of belonging, partisanship, ideology, etc. Quebec and France, as was the case with the secular Turks, notice that by shedding religious fashion from the public space, one will shed religious influence. On the other side of the equation, women wearing the *hijab* find themselves in a rhetorical dilemma. If they argue that they have rationally chosen to wear the *hijab* from a feminist standpoint, the secularist argument holds strength because the non-partisanship of the

public space is important. One chooses to wear a *hijab* just like one chooses one's ideological leanings. As a public servant, ideologies must be hidden. And thus, the *hijab* is the symbol of a rational choice and that symbol must be covered. If, on the other hand, they explain that the *hijab* is compulsory according to Islamic law, another dilemma unfolds. Secular feminists will argue that Islam is a patriarchal religion that doesn't allow *rational choice* and thus the savior complex is born.

Why is fashion so important for the secularists of Turkey, France and Quebec? It can be argued that fashion is the most apparent form of *otherness*. The host will *see* the guest from afar and through this superficial observation, the host will impose a constructed identity upon the guest. Once they meet, the host can either impose his or her clothing and fashion upon the guest so that they look alike or they share each other's fashion: will the hospitality be conditional or unconditional? The best example for an unconditional hospitality is embodied in the convert. Géraldine Mossière conducted an ethnological study on the fashion of French and Quebecois women who converted to Islam. She found that the women interviewed didn't *reject* their Quebecois identity but synthesized it by establishing Islamic norms. Women were beginning to represent and promote a sort of global Islam. These converts were developing "innovative and creative Islamic styles of dress aimed at dispelling the exclusive link that is often mistakenly made between Muslims and 'oriental' or Arab identities." (Mossière, 2012, 123) Convert women don't want to embrace a culture that isn't their own yet still want to live up to Islamic norms such as wearing modest clothing, covering the hair, etc. Yet these styles are not necessarily foreign to Western culture. Indonesia, for example, has become the hub for the Islamic fashion industry. According to Reuters, "Indonesia's government

is championing young designers and the garment trade, which employs more than 3 million people and contributes about \$15 billion to the economy.” (Paramaditha, 2013) Indonesia is setting an example for global Islam. From fashion shows to designers, the shift from ethnic standards to global standards is increasing. This example of hospitality is evident as fashion styles are shared amongst cultures and ethnicities. It becomes increasingly difficult to recognize a particular oriental style amongst fashion styles for women. Muslim women are able to find scarves in local shops designed by some of the top designer brands such as Calvin Klein. Even if the scarf was not *intended* to be a headscarf, through its appropriating it *becomes* a headscarf. And thus, the symbolism behind the fabric is simply one of *intention*. Controversies arose when the pop star Rihanna posed in a mosque in Abu Dhabi. She had a scarf on her head and fulfilled the Islamic norms to be present in the mosque, yet she was asked to leave for taking provocative pictures. (Reilly, 2013) Non-Muslims are beginning to use the headscarves to stir controversy while redefining standards of beauty and fashion.

There is no doubt that the question of fashion is a hot topic. Fashion not only ties in to culture but also towards ideologies. Mossière recognized in her study that converted women felt pressured “to embody [the Islamic] stereotype because they need to *perform* their Islamic identity in order to *legitimize* their belonging to the Muslim community.” (emphasis added) (Mossière, 2012, 124) The notion of performance and legitimacy influenced the creative ingenuity in adapting to new norms of fashion. To some extent, the notion of *legitimacy* is related to ideological leanings. These women entered a larger community that represents a different ethnic proportion than society at large. Most white women went from a community where they were the majority and

now are a minority amongst immigrants. The pressure to adopt “ethnic” norms is closely tied to the pressure to adapt to ideological norms. An example to this normative subscription embodied in a “Muslim doll” is illustrated in Mossière’s study. She shows that the “Razanne doll” for young Muslim girls encourages a normative Islamic dress code that is deeply ethnic and essentialist. The Razanne doll wears a long coat and headscarf, similar to the style of dress worn in the Middle East. Often this style is used as a standard of Islamic modesty. The author writes that these dolls, through the normalization of the Islamic dress contribute “to the homogenization and spread of a transnational Islamic identity. It therefore works as a universal benchmark for many converts who want to measure their adherence to Muslim ethical prescriptions.” (Mossière, 2012, 122) Thus, as was the case with transnational conception of Islamism, there is an ideological hegemony of Islamic standards. On the other hand, a recent fashion movement launched in December 2013 attempted to portray women in America. “Somewhere in America” is the title of a short video that went viral on social media depicting several Muslim-American women showcasing their fashion trends set to the Jay-Z song by the same title. This video stirred controversy amongst Muslims questioning whether these women were in accordance to the Sacred Law. Others criticized the video because it lacked diversity. Nevertheless, the video sparked a cultural investigation and attempted to coin the term *Mipsterz*. The creators of the video define *Mipsterz* on their Facebook page as such:

“A Mipster is someone who seeks inspiration from the Islamic tradition of divine scriptures, volumes of knowledge, mystical poets, bold prophets, inspirational politicians, esoteric Imams, and our fellow human beings searching for transcendental states of consciousness. A Mipster is an ironic identity, one that serves more as a perpetual critique of oneself and of society.” (Hafiz, 2013)

Once again there is a reoccurring theme that has been present across this paper: the dynamic relationship between context and law. From conceptions of *jihad* to depictions of Muslim hipsters, Islamic culture within any particular context, gives existence to its creative juice when in its dialogue with the standards as defined by law. Furthermore, because the legal sphere in Islam is manifested pluralistically, the discussions, debates and questions that arise in this dialogue are exponential. Mipsterz embody this dialogue, they seek reconciliation with the past instead of divorce. Mipsterz, just like unconditional hospitality, are ironic. And it is this ironic identity that resides in the identity that is both host and guest. In an essay entitled “The Hipster in the Mirror” published in the New York Times, Mark Greif writes,

“All hipsters play at being the inventors or first adopters of novelties: pride comes from knowing, and deciding, what’s cool in advance of the rest of the world. Yet the habits of hatred and accusation are endemic to hipsters because they feel the weakness of everyone’s position — including their own.” (Greif, 2010)

It can easily be argued that this applies to Mipsterz. Young Muslims in the West are inventors of novelty and are creating a new conception of cool not only amongst themselves but in the society at large. Hip Hop artists are claiming their Islamic identity; fashion trends are being set and culture is being created. The ethics of hospitality is an encouragement of this creative process. Yet as Greif expresses, that creativity is also subjected to accusation. Perhaps this is the criticism faced by new generations of Muslims. By re-contextualizing tradition, the criticisms come from two sides. On the one hand, ideological tendencies struggle to be heard and may attack this new plurality of culture. And on the other, the new culture is subject to scrutiny and estrangement from the host society, leading to the “guestization” of Muslims.

Fashion is a superficial representation. Those women who are attempting to redefine Islamic fashion are working within the ideals imposed by Islamic law to come up with creative expressions of the self. The law acts almost as an aesthetic guideline. Yet the literature and the controversies surrounding this creative process seem to be reserved for Muslim women. Are Muslim men subjected to the same pressures? Do they creatively design Islamic clothing? There is no doubt that these exist: the turban, the fez, the long dress, etc. Mustafa Kemal's Hat Revolution pertained mainly to the way men dressed. But it seems that most Western Muslims men have adopted typical Western dress. Those who want to display their Islamic identity continue to wear ethnic clothing such as the traditional clothing of Arabia. Once again, this is a subject for further study on host/guest dynamic for Western Muslim identity.

Conclusion

Fashion can be an important metaphor to the ethics of hospitality. Earlier on, the notion of fear was illustrated to highlight its effect upon policy-making and public opinion. Martha Nussbaum, in her work, discusses what she calls the “disgust tendency,” which beautifully compliments the fashion metaphor. She writes, “people who are different often give rise to this type of pathological fantasy,” that is the fantasy of danger. “If they cover their bodies, the fantasy may acquire even more power from the idea of concealment and threatened revelation.” (Nussbaum, 2011, 37) Nussbaum elucidates that this outer perception of the *Other* is fueled by a fantasy of a concealed inner. And thus, it can be argued that this fear stems from imagining the nakedness of the *Other*, which, when revealed will be different. Nussbaum quotes the cultural historian Sander Gilman²¹ who studied what people thought about the Jews: “...beneath their clothing was something disgusting and foul.” (Nussbaum, 2012, 37) She adds that “the idea was prevalent that the Jew’s body really was different from other bodies – with cloven feet like pigs, for example, and with male menstrual periods like women.” (Nussbaum, 2012, 37) And finally, comes the idea of male circumcision which was a reality that was not practiced by the greater society at the time. (Nussbaum, 2012, 37) Following this logic, fashion has the ability to affect perception in three major ways. Fashion that reveals one’s nakedness can either confirm or refute an imposed prejudice. Perhaps anti-hijab partisans are in dire need of unveiling Muslim women to *know* the

²¹ See Sander Gilman, *The Jew’s Body* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Sander Gilman, *Creating Beauty to Cure the Soul: Race and Psychology in the Shaping of Aesthetic Surgery* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1998).

unknown. The politics of fashion, from that point of view, is characterized by a cultural assimilation that equates to a synonymity between inner and outer perception. If everyone looks like each other from the outside, then the same must be in the inside. However, as seen above, Islamic fashion influences public perception similar to that of Gilman's findings. The veil, the long dress, the beard and many more are expressions of Islamic modesty. And yet, while these are quintessential to traditional Islamic understandings, balancing culture and jurisprudence will have an affect on how Muslims are perceived. Public perception can search for the beauty of Muslim aesthetics or for what the veil covers. Thus, fashion will need to juggle cultural and religious identity, and the perception that will follow will either be the product of a culturally relevant discourse or a product of a ghettoized and alienated community.

This study is a humble attempt to understand two major points regarding Muslims in the West, or even broader, Muslims in non-Muslim lands. It was argued that there is an ontological difference between Islam as a religion and Islamism as an ideology. It is becoming increasingly necessary to elucidate this difference to provide both Muslims and non-Muslims with a religious, intellectual and cultural framework that is grounded within the Islamic religious tradition. Doing so can encourage a strengthened Islamic identity while rooting a culturally-relevant discourse. The second point is highlighted by the ethics of hospitality. Too often, integration is characterized by a simplistic cultural assimilation. Yet the subject of *become of the land* is extremely complex and cannot be contained within an event. One doesn't suddenly become integrated. *Integration is a process*. Furthermore, unlike Hegel's idea that progress is an assimilation of the *Self* and the *Other*, to which proponents of integration as assimilation

would subscribe, Lévinas and Derrida provided an ethics that encouraged the *Other* to *remain Other*. This is not to be confused with remaining a *hostile stranger* as would be understood by characterizing the *Other* as a guest. But rather, through the ethics of hospitality, the *Other* receives the greatest gift of all: a exchange from guest to host. The *Other* becomes the host of the abode that belongs to the self while the latter transforms himself into the guest. In other words, the ethics of hospitality is characterized by a *gift*. This unconditional exchange, with regards to culture, breathes life into a creativeness and a dialectical quest of redefining oneself. Furthermore, this process can be shaped and encouraged by policy-makers, but is much more influenced in the culture from the ground up. Bigotry, racism and prejudice are best countered through education, cultural exchanges (as was seen in the ceremony of the potlach), discussions and building pluralistic spaces. Policy-makers need to encourage the creation of these spaces and develop an educational curriculum that provides the necessary framework, but the effort must be made by the citizens.

Two premises can be drawn from this research. On the one hand, the dichotomous relationship between Islam and Islamist needs to be clearly illuminated internally and externally. Internally, Muslim scholars ('*ulama*') must engage themselves with their tradition to investigate opinions and positions that hold a particular conservatism yet are contextual. This would actually promote religiosity while countering its instrumentalization. Muslimness, then, can be defined as following Islam, but can also be indiginized to a particular space and time. If these scholars, as in normative Sunni scholars, can revive their tradition to meet contextual needs, then the practice of Islam will be contextual. Externally, media representation must play an

integral role in the construction of identity. It can encourage or discourage radicalization and extremism. Without clearly defining the two, these representations construct a particular brand of Islam that can, at once encourage Islamophobic tendencies and persuade Muslims that the brand propagated is in fact the true Islam.

The other premise drawn confirms our initial hypothesis. Religion, through its dynamic traditionalism, can be contextualized via the ethics of hospitality. Hospitality redefines both dogma and context, dogma because the set beliefs and principles are put into question and context because the dogma is the source of question. If a relationship between shari'a (the Islamic embodiment of dogma) and culture (or context) can participate in a reciprocal negotiation and re-negotiation, which has been a core principle in traditional Islamic scholarship, then the ethics of hospitality is potentially applied. It is apparent that the Hegelian conception of progress and history discourages this process. This is how Islamists understand history and their path of progress in this form as well. It dampens the contextual negotiations and the re-contextualization of religious principles. Thus, religion and ideology are antithetical.

Muslims need to engage within their own religious tradition the relationship between culture and jurisprudence while the greater community engage its relationship with Muslims. With time, this engagement has the potential to produce culturally-relevant Islamic institutions and Muslims that re-defining Western identity. As was pointed out in the Introduction, James Love was quintessentially Canadian. He was a child of Scottish settlers and a progeny of a country that established itself on principles of tolerance. From what is known about him, he was also Muslim. He was the epitome the ethics of hospitality. He embodied at once a guest and a host. James Love is no

different from any of the children of settlers who come in search of a new abode. If the ethics of hospitality can truly be understood, then there may be a time when the Muslim identity is no longer estranged in a new land.

Appendix

IJMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

CONSONANTS

A = Arabic, P = Persian, OT = Ottoman Turkish, MT = Modern Turkish

	A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT
ء	ʾ	ʾ	ʾ	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k or g	k or ñ	k or n
ب	b	b	b	b or p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				or y	or y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				or ğ	or ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	s	s	s	ص	ş	ş	ş	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ض	ḍ	z	z	z	م	m	m	m	m
چ	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z	ه	h	h	h ¹	h ¹
خ	kh	kh	h	h	ع	ʿ	ʿ	ʿ	—	و	w	v or u	v	v
د	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g or ğ	g or ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ذ	dh	z	z	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ة	a ²			
ر	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	q	k	ال	3			

¹ When h is not final. ² In construct state: at. ³ For the article, al- and -l-.

VOWELS

ARABIC AND PERSIAN			OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH	
<i>Long</i>	ا or آ	ā	ā	words of Arabic and Persian origin only
	و	ū	ū	
	ي	ī	ī	
<i>Doubled</i>	ـَيّ	iy (final form ī)	iy (final form ī)	
	ـَوّ	uww (final form ū)	uvv	
<i>Diphthongs</i>	اَوّ	au or aw	ev	
	اَيّ	ai or ay	ey	
<i>Short</i>	ا	a	a or e	
	و	u	u or ü / o or ö	
	ي	i	ı or i	

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

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