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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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FRENCH CANADIAN HISTORIANS'
INTERPRETATIONS OF CONFEDERATION,
1867 - 1967

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Thesis submitted to the School of
Graduate Studies of the University
of Ottawa in partial fulfilment of
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SUMMARY

This study is an analysis of French Canadian histories of Confederation spanning the period from 1867 to 1967. It explains the interpretations of the historians in relation to the background of the historians and to French Canadian society in general. To date, there have been no major in-depth studies of French Canadian historiography of Confederation. Ramsay Cook broached the subject, but he restricted his analysis to a few pages and based his conclusions upon a handful of histories. This study examines sixty histories of Confederation, written by thirty historians, in order to establish the general trends in the one hundred years since 1867.

In establishing the general trends, this study focuses on two aspects of the historians' interpretations of Confederation: the causes invoked by the authors to explain the union of 1867 and the significance accorded to that union. Analysis of these two aspects indicates that from 1867 to 1967 there were basically three different French Canadian interpretations of Confederation. From 1867 to 1915, historians used the United Canadian political crisis of the 1860s to explain the union of 1867 and they centred their discussions of the importance of Confederation around the theme of la survivance. From 1916 to 1953, historians continued

to focus on French Canadian survival, but they expanded their explanations of Confederation to include the fear of an American invasion. From 1954 to 1967, historians added the economic factor to their list of causes. As for the significance of Confederation, they shifted the focus away from la survivance and considered the history of the 1860s as it related to economic development.

Why did French Canadian historiography go through this three-stage process? The answer lies largely with French Canadian society. The changes that characterized the interpretations from 1867 to 1967 paralleled other changes: changes in the economic and social structures of society; changes in the issues that society deemed significant; changes in perspective because of events that occurred after 1867; and changes in the historians in terms of occupational and educational background and their concept of history.

INTRODUCTION

This study is an analysis of French Canadian histories of Confederation spanning the period from 1867 to 1967. It explains the interpretations of the historians in relation to the background of the historians and to French Canadian society in general. This approach stems from the premise that writers of history are products of their time. They cannot escape the world in which they live. They may strive to isolate themselves from the events and influences of the present, but in the end, historians remain creatures of their environment.

To date, there have been no major in-depth studies of French Canadian historiography of Confederation. Only Ramsay Cook's introduction to Confederation: essays by D. G. Creighton et al.¹ broaches the subject; but Cook restricts his analysis to a few pages and bases his conclusions upon a handful of histories of Confederation. This study examines sixty histories of Confederation, written by thirty historians, in order to establish the general trends in the


one hundred years since 1867.

The types of history that are examined in this study include direct studies of Confederation, general histories, biographies, articles, pamphlets, constitutional studies, memoirs and government publications. The method used in selecting the historians varied according to when the historians wrote about Confederation. Specifically, for those who wrote prior to World War II, the term 'historian' is used in the broadest sense and is applied to any writer who endeavoured to explain Confederation. Thus, among the historians studied in this period are pamphleteers, politicians, journalists, priests and civil servants. In the period after World War II, the list of historians is restricted to writers who produced scholarly works. This restriction corresponds to the professionalization of history which has taken place in French Canada since the 1940s.

In establishing the general trends, this study focuses on two aspects of the historians' interpretations of Confederation: the causes invoked by the authors to explain the union of 1867 and the significance accorded to that union. Analysis of these two aspects indicates that there are three different periods of French Canadian histories of Confederation: the bleu versus rouge mono-causal political period (1867-1915); the 'federal' versus 'provincial' multi-causal period (1916-1953); and the 'federal' versus 'provincial' economic

period (1954-1967). The years 1916 and 1954 were chosen to mark the beginning of the second and third periods because these dates correspond with the publication dates of pivotal interpretations. The cut-off dates are not absolute. Traits that characterize one period may appear in another, which is to say there are exceptions to the general trends in each of the periods.

This study is divided into three chapters: the first chapter covers the period from 1867 to 1915; the second chapter covers the period from 1916 to 1953; and the third chapter covers the period from 1954 to 1967. Each chapter consists of four parts: the first part distinguishes the general characteristics of the interpretations; the second part relates the causes of Confederation cited by the historians and explains why the writers called upon these causes; the third part notes the significance accorded to Confederation by the historians and explains why the writers assigned that significance; and the fourth part recounts the historians' view of 1867 as the starting point of the new Canadian nation.



NOTE TO THE INTRODUCTION

¹ Cook, Ramsay. "Introduction" in Confederation: essays by D.G. Creighton et al., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967, pp. vii-xiii.

CHAPTER ONE

1867-1915: The Bleu versus Rouge Mono-Causal Political Interpretation

Two elements characterized French Canadian histories of Confederation in the period from 1867 to 1915. First, all the writers who endeavoured to explain the Union of 1867 cited the political crisis in the United Canadian colony as the primary cause; in fact, to the majority, it was the sole cause. Second, all the writers appraised the significance of Confederation according to how it affected la survivance of French Canada.

Historians, throughout this period, agreed that the political crisis of the 1850s and the 1860s was the primary cause for the advent of Confederation. For example, four years after Confederation, Louis-Philippe Turcotte put forth the following explanation:

En trois ans, quatre ministères différents
avaient été condamnés, et deux élections
générales avaient eu lieu sans rétablir
l'harmonie. Les affaires avaient languie,
la législation avait souffert de la chute
des diverses administrations, et les
discussions étaient devenues de plus en
plus acerbes... Cet état de choses ne
pouvait se continuer sans soulever quelque
complication grave. Il fallait donc un

changement. Les chefs des deux partis se donnèrent la main afin de sauver la province du péril imminent qui la menaçait. Comme cela se fit lors de la coalition McNab-Taché, des hommes jusqu'alors ennemis acharnés se firent des concessions mutuelles, et s'unirent dans un but commun pour le bien public.¹

Forty-three years later, Thomas Chapais also called upon the political crisis to explain Confederation:

La population du Haut-Canada s'accroissait rapidement par l'afflux de l'immigration anglaise. On pouvait prévoir que, dans peu d'années, elle dépasserait d'un demi-million celle du Bas-Canada; au bout d'une ou deux décades, l'écart serait peut-être d'un million. Et pourrait-on indéfiniment, en face de cette disproportion ascendante, résister aux réclamations de plus en plus véhémentes du Haut-Canada? D'un autre côté, comment le Bas-Canada pouvait-il consentir à ce que ses institutions les plus chères fussent soumises à la juridiction d'une législature où la province anglaise et protestante aurait une représentation supérieure et, conséquemment, une prépondérance absolue?

En face de ce problème d'une si redoutable complexité, les hommes d'Etat bas-canadiens se demandèrent si une solution conciliant les deux intérêts n'était pas possible. Et, dès 1858, Cartier, [George-Etienne Cartier] successeur de Lafontaine, de Morin et de Taché, adopta l'idée de l'union fédérale des provinces comme devant être le meilleur moyen de mettre fin à la crise politique dont souffrait le Canada.²

That the historians of this period relied on the political crisis - a political explanation - is not surprising considering both the nature of historical writing at the time and the back-

ground of the historians in question. With regard to the nature of historical writing, history originating from Western Europe and North America prior to World War I was, in general, "the study of past politics³." In English Canada, as in Great Britain, Whig historians used history to trace the development and the achievement of British Parliamentary institutions⁴. As such, histories revolved around political parties and their leaders. In this respect, French Canadian histories of Confederation were no different. Writers were not interested in Confederation as a specialized historical subject; only a few dealt directly with Confederation per se⁵. Most examined the Union of 1867 as it related to the life of a French Canadian politician⁶. The rest broached the subject within the confines of a political history of either the Union period (1841-1867)⁷ or the post-Confederation era⁸.

As for the background of the historians, politics played an important role in their lives. All but three were directly involved in politics, as either politicians and/or journalists⁹. Thus, with both experience and an interest in politics¹⁰, they naturally found a political explanation for the Union of 1867. The political crisis suited the politically inspired French-speaking essayists from Quebec perfectly because it was both political and it involved French Canadians¹¹.

Historians disagreed, however, on the nature and origin of the political crisis itself. Some historians blamed George Brown's Grits and A-A Dorion's rouges for the crisis. For example, the Confederation pamphleteer of 1867 argued that:

Une des principales causes qui ont nécessité un changement est évidemment le fanatisme des grits et lâcheté des rouges et des annexionistes [sic]... 12

In 1873, Elzéar Gérin proposed that:

Tout allait assez bien dans le Bas-Canada, où Cartier avait la majorité, mais le Haut-Canada soulevé par les démagogues, qui leur promettaient la représentation basée sur la population, ne voulaient plus de régime politique créé par l'Union des Canadas... [les] luttes politiques [des clear-grits] étaient une guerre de classe ou plutôt de fanatisme. 13

Other historians emphasized the role played by the Liberal leadership in finding a solution to the crisis. Philippe Casgrain, for instance, described George Brown's part in bringing about the Great Coalition: "M. Brown devint alors l'homme de la circonstance, et avec son concours, les bases de la Confédération furent préparées, au moyen d'une coalition entre les deux partis¹⁴." Another historian, Laurent Olivier David, pointed to A-A Dorion's 'unselfish' response to George Brown's wish to include the rouge leader in the coalition: "Dorion... refusa en disant qu'il ne pourrait jamais faire approuver par le Bas-Canada un pareil changement constitutionnel, que Cartier seul en était capable¹⁵."

The source of the divergent explanations lay in the world of United Canadian politics. The acrimonious debates which pitted A-A Dorion and George Brown against John A. Macdonald and George-Etienne Cartier did not end with the advent of the union of 1867. The rouge-bleu battles continued to be fought in the Confederation histories which followed.

Prior to 1916 there were bleu historians and there were rouge historians. An examination of the occupational and familial backgrounds of the historians allows us to label all but one¹⁶ as either 'Liberal' or 'Conservative'¹⁷. The bleu-Conservative group consisted of Thomas Chapais, Elézar Gérin, B.A. Testard de Montigny, Joseph Royal and Louis-Philippe Turcotte¹⁸. Those with rouge-Liberal inclinations included Ludovic Brunet, Philippe-Baby Casgrain and Laurent Olivier David¹⁹. Another four authors, at one point in their lives, changed political allegiances; nevertheless, at the time they wrote their histories, Alfred Duclos De Celles, Aegidius Fauteux and Joseph Octave Pelland were Liberals. Thomas Jean-Jacques Loranger, if not a Liberal, was an anti-Conservative²⁰.

After 1900, a different explanation of the political crisis appeared. The simple rouge-Liberal versus bleu-Conservative political argument became for some historians, a racial and religious conflict of les français catholiques contre les anglais

protestants. For example, in 1914, Charles Lavergne explained the political stalemate in the following manner:

Le gouvernement du pays était devenu impossible sous le régime de l'Union. Après les conquêtes constitutionnelles de Lafontaine et de Baldwin, les rivalités de provinces et de races allèrent en augmentant. Ce fut toujours le tort de la population anglaise de ne connaître pas ou de méconnaître les sentiments de notre peuple.²¹

Aegidius Fauteux described the situation in a similar fashion in 1914:

Les passions dans l'Ontario [le Haut-Canada] se faisaient plus violentes tous les jours, les protestations contre la french domination se déchaînaient avec une fureur grandissante et le jour devait fatalement venir où il serait impossible de résister au torrent.²²

The introduction of "antagonisme de race et de religion"²³ as a means to account for the 'political impasse' of the 1860s was a product of the growing estrangement between the French and the English after 1900. Such controversies as Canada's contribution to the South African War (1899), the debate over Saskatchewan and Alberta education (1905), the naval question (1909), the school dispute in Keewatin (1911) and Regulation #17 of Ontario (1912) worked together to widen the gulf between the 'two founding races.' The link between such events and a historian's treatment of the political crisis is evident in the following remark from Charles Lavergne's biography of Cartier in 1914:

George Brown est peut-être celui qui réussit le mieux à communiquer sa francophobie aux électeurs de l'Ontario. Au cri de "No French

domination", il creusa un fossé profond, qui est loin d'être comblé aujourd'hui [1914] entre les populations anglaise et française.²⁴

Although this period is typified by writers who relied exclusively upon the political crisis to explain 1867, a few authors also cited the fear of an American invasion. For example, during the election campaign in the fall of 1867, the Confederation pamphleteer warned his readers: vote for Confederation or be invaded:

Nos hommes d'état, ceux dont s'honore le parti conservateur, tant du Bas que Haut-Canada, avaient senti que le premier coup de canon tiré en 1860 au Fort Sumter... était pour nous un avertissement solennel de penser à notre avenir... Les américains ont besoin du Canada: ils nous l'ont dit bien des fois et ont même essayé de nous le prouver: ouvrez et lisez les journaux des Etats et vous verrez cela comme nous... Mais comment nous protéger? Il n'y avait que deux moyens: l'annexion? Horreur!... Il ne restait donc que l'autre alternative, que tous les gens intelligents devinaient et désiraient: La Confédération...²⁵

In 1878, B.A. Testard de Montigny briefly discussed the American Civil War and the threat of annexation:

Dans le même moment [que la conférence de Québec en octobre 1864], la guerre faisait des ravages chez nos voisins. On parlait d'une rupture entre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis; nous étions menacés de l'abrogation du traité de réciprocité et du système de transit de nos marchandises en entrepôt sur le territoire américain, où l'on avait même inauguré un système de passe-ports; les tentatives d'annexion exprimées par la presse américaine, ses démagogues et ses hommes d'Etat...²⁶

After pointing to Great Britain's changing attitude toward the colonies, de Montigny concluded: "tout concourait, avec la crise intérieure [la crise politique du Canada], à faire unir les hommes de coeur dans un effort suprême pour faire face à la situation²⁷."

For the Confederation pamphleteer and B.A. Testard de Montigny, memories of the American Civil War, the Trent affair, the St. Albans raid and the Fenian excursions across the Canadian border remained alive. They believed that the possibility of an attack from the south actually existed in this period. Consequently, they included the fear of an American invasion as part of their explanations. The high-pressure election pitch of the Confederation pamphleteer suggests that bleu historians used the fear of an American invasion for another reason: it served to justify the pro-Confederation stance adopted in the early 1860s by the bleu party - the political party with which the bleu historians identified²⁸.

In the early twentieth century, the fear of an American invasion cause reappeared when, in 1902, Joseph Roy proposed that "les bruits de guerre avaient démontré la nécessité pour toutes les provinces de resserrer les liens qui les unissaient...²⁹." Twelve years later, Charles Lavergne put forth a similar argument. He suggested that:

...toutes les provinces britanniques, et particulièrement le Bas-Canada, sentaient le besoin de se rapprocher sur un terrain commun, dans la crainte d'une guerre entre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis. Et comme au Canada le sentiment de fidélité à l'Angleterre a toujours été plus fort que celui du mécontentement soulevé par son arbitraire, il y eut immédiatement unanimité sur l'idée d'unir toutes les provinces.³⁰

Joseph Royal was a bleu historian who had first-hand experience with the fear of an American invasion. In 1871, in response to the Fenian raiders, he secured a cavalry command and headed a scouting expedition into southwestern Manitoba³¹. Thus, like the Confederation pamphleteer and B.A. Testard de Montigny, he believed that there had been an actual threat of American invasion at the time of Confederation. In the case of Royal, however, there was another reason for his use of the fear of an American invasion. His history, and the history of Charles Lavergne, reflected a growing belief within French Canadian society that the invasion from the south, which had threatened during the 1860s, had finally materialized thirty years later in the form of factories and unions. Indeed, under the impetus of the hydro-electricity and the pulp and paper industries, Quebec was undergoing significant economic development. By 1911, over forty per cent of the total labour force was involved in manufacturing, commerce or construction. Coupled with industrialization was a period of rapid urbanization. By 1910, 48.4 per cent of the population was

urban³². Pointing to the concurrent massive emigration of French Canadians to the factories of New England, some observers feared that the industrialization and urbanization of Quebec would lead to the Americanization and the destruction of French Canada³³.

Joseph Roy, for one, considered American society to be corrupt³⁴ and he was alarmed at the growing influence of American unions in Canada³⁵. The history that he wrote mirrored his concerns. After 1880, he and Charles Lavergne were the only writers, in the first period, to cite the fear of an American invasion as a cause of Confederation. They turned to this cause in reaction to the increasing flow of American capital into Quebec's economy. As the first historians to react in this way, they were exceptions to their era and precursors of the historians who, after 1915, wrote multi-causal explanations.

On July 1, 1867, the British North America Act went into effect. Why was this event important for French Canada? Both bleu and rouge historians were concerned with la survivance. The bleu-Conservative historians argued that Confederation provided "la plus ample protection à nos lois, à notre religion, à notre langue et [à] nos intérêts matériels... Toutes ces choses précieuses et sacrées sont placées sous notre contrôle..."³⁶ They under-

lined the fact that 1867 had dissolved the Union of 1840, thereby leaving Quebec to deal with her own local affairs:

chaque province a un gouvernement complet pour la gestion de toutes ses affaires intérieures...En un mot, la province de Québec (Bas-Canada) est complètement séparé [sic] du Haut-Canada et a une organisation gouvernementale entière pour administrer seule toutes ses affaires locales.³⁷

Bleu-Conservative historians also emphasized the part played by George-Etienne Cartier in bringing about Confederation and, as a result, ensuring French Canadian survival. For example, in 1871, Louis-Philippe Turcotte, in applauding the role of the bleu leader, stated:

Il faut reconnaître surtout la part de mérite qui revient à M. Cartier, comme chef du parti conservateur du Bas-Canada, le courage et l'énergie incessante qu'il a déployés pour constituer le nouvel ordre des choses...³⁸

B.A. Testard de Montigny paid homage to Cartier in a similar way. In 1878, de Montigny wrote:

Honneur et reconnaissance à Sir George-Etienne Cartier, aux efforts et à l'énergie duquel nous devons la Confédération, qui a été faite en grande partie pour le Bas-Canada, dont les institutions civiles et religieuses auraient été menacées par une union législative, qui convenait aux autres provinces.³⁹

From the rouge-Liberal point of view, however, the importance of Confederation did not lie in what it had provided, but

in what it had omitted. The rouge-Liberal historians maintained that the union of 1867 was not advantageous for French Canadians. Ludovic Brunet, for one, concluded that "la confédération n'a pas été faite à l'avantage de la nationalité canadienne-française"⁴⁰ since it did not protect French Canadians from the English-speaking minority in Ottawa:

nous savons maintenant à quoi nous en tenir sur la valeur de la nouvelle constitution au point de vue canadien-français... Supposons maintenant qu'une question nationale, intéressant exclusivement les Canadiens-français, s'élève au sien du parlement fédéral, que feront nos cinquante députés contre les 163 représentants anglais? Nous savons bien que nous mettons les choses au pire, mais le fait brutal reste que nous sommes à Ottawa une minorité désolante.⁴¹

While bleu historians regarded George-Etienne Cartier as the hero of Confederation, rouge historians praised the opponents of the Confederation scheme. Philippe Casgrain described the opposition of his cousin, Luc Letellier de Saint-Just, as follows:

Il [Luc Letellier de Saint-Just] combattait le projet [de Confédération] préparé par le gouvernement, avec un sens et une logique dont la force et la vérité ne furent que trop démontrées par les événements qui suivirent.⁴²

Laurent-Oliver David focused upon those men who were involved with the anti-Confederation journal Union Nationale. This is not surprising since David had been one of its editors. He suggested that they fought "vaillamment"⁴³ and he asserted that:

Le programme de ces jeunes gens, unis par un sentiment patriotique, était de combattre par la plume et la parole, le changement de constitution proposé, de démontrer que ce régime politique, suggéré par lord Durham, pour angliciser le Bas-Canada, finirait par nous mettre à la merci d'une majorité hostile à nos droits religieux et nationaux.⁴⁴

David also praised the performance of A-A Dorion during the Confederation Debates in the Canadian Legislative Assembly in 1865.

David concluded:

M. Dorion prit plusieurs fois la parole dans le cours de ce débat mémorable... et déploya, chaque fois, une force d'argumentation remarquable. Il discutait toujours avec un rare talent d'avocat les questions légales et constitutionnelles, mais cette fois, il fut chaud, pathétique parfois, et signala les dangers et les résultats de la Confédération avec une clairvoyance que le temps fera briller de plus en plus.⁴⁵

Opposing political views, however, only partially explain the contrasting bleu-rouge versions. With the exception of Joseph Roy, bleu historians wrote in the 1860s and 1870s when the novelty of Confederation still inspired hopes. They celebrated la survivance of the French culture in North America. For example, in 1871, Louis-Philippe Turcotte pointed to the benefits of the new union:

La population française pouvait mieux conserver ses lois, sa langue et son caractère français, avec sa législation locale... Elle pouvait développer ses

ressources, ses institutions... Le Bas-Canada devait avoir une influence assez considérable dans le gouvernement fédéral...⁴⁶

Rouge historians, on the other hand, wrote, for the most part, in the early twentieth century. From there, a historian's perception of the importance of Confederation was affected by events which had transpired since 1867. Occurrences such as Riel's hanging, the imperial question and the bitterly-fought school debates made it difficult to view Confederation with the same optimism displayed by Turcotte in the 1870s.

Although la survivance was the main concern of the historians of this period, there were other important matters: the compact theory and minority rights. The compact theory⁴⁷ originated with T.J.J. Loranger. Writing in 1883, Loranger focused his attention upon the federal-provincial relationship established by the Fathers of Confederation. He argued that:

... les résolutions de la conférence de Québec étaient fondées sur le principe d'une stricte égalité ou d'une autorité égale entre la Puissance et les provinces, sans subordination des secondes envers la première, dans les limites de leur ressort respectif. Dans la sphère de leurs attributions locales, l'autorité des provinces devait rester absolue, comme le pouvoir fédéral le deviendrait dans les bornes de ses attributions générales. Ce fut à ces conditions qu'elles [les provinces] consentirent et en particulier celle de Québec, à l'union fédérale.⁴⁸

Loranger, who had broken with John A. Macdonald and George-Etienne Cartier in the 1860s⁴⁹, was part of the anti-federal government wave that swept the province of Quebec during the 1880s. The decade began with the still-fresh memories of Ottawa's intervention into the Letellier de Saint-Just and Boucher de Boucherville controversy⁵⁰. The anti-federal government sentiment grew as John A. Macdonald consolidated his power and French influence in Ottawa appeared to be on the wane. There was a general dissatisfaction with "la centralisation excessive du pouvoir fédéral"⁵¹; out of this atmosphere of uncertainty and fear the compact theory emerged.

Toward the end of the 1890s the topic of minority rights first appeared. In his discussion of the London Conference of December 1866, Laurent-Olivier David argued that:

La modification la plus importante est celle qui étendait aux minorités possédant, dans toute province faisant partie de la Confédération, des droits et privilèges en vertu de la loi quant à des écoles séparées, tous les droits et privilèges dont jouissaient, lors de l'Union, en vertu de la loi les minorités protestantes et catholiques du Canada, et qui créait le droit d'appel au gouverneur-général en conseil de tout acte ou décision d'un gouvernement provincial, contraire aux droits et privilèges de la minorité protestante ou catholique.⁵²

David turned his attention to minority rights as this time as a result of the continuous debate over French Catholic educational

rights outside of Quebec. The Manitoba school question (1890s), and later the Saskatchewan and Alberta (1905), the Keewatin (1909) and Ontario (1912) school questions, not only drew historians toward the subject of minority rights, they influenced the interpretations put forth by the historians. How the events affected the historical account of an author depended, to a large degree, on his political bias. From the rouge point of view, the intensification of the "lutte de race et de nationalité"⁵³ served to justify the arguments put forth by A-A Dorion and his followers. For example, Laurent-Olivier David argued that:

Les adversaires de la Confédération prétendaient que ce droit d'appel, comme le droit de désaveu des lois provinciales, serait une protection pour les minorités protestantes et une arme dangereuse pour les minorités catholiques entre les mains du gouvernement central.

Il faut bien admettre que le temps leur a donné raison.⁵⁴

Thomas Chapais, a bleu historian, endeavoured to deflect this rouge argument by focusing attention on George-Etienne Cartier and the rights he won for the French Canadians of "Bas-Canada".

In 1914 Chapais stated that:

Dans toutes les réunions, dans toutes les discussions, dans tous les pourparlers qui eurent lieu alors, M. Cartier tint un rôle prépondérant et décisif. Sa position était unique. Il était le représentant principal, le porte-parole, le chef reconnu du Bas-Canada et de la nationalité canadienne-française. Il avait des intérêts spéciaux à sauvegarder, des principes à faire respecter, des garanties à obtenir, et par

conséquent un système à faire prévaloir. L'historien impartial doit reconnaître qu'il réussit dans la lourde tâche qui lui incombait et pour laquelle il eut l'appui énergique de ses collègues bas-canadiens et de l'opinion publique de sa province.⁵⁵

After 1900 most writers, however, saw Cartier from a different vantage point from that of historians writing during Canada's first decade. Even Alfred De Celles and Aegidius Fauteux, Laurier Liberals⁵⁶ who once had supported the Conservative party⁵⁷, could not ignore the times. While they respected Cartier and praised his role in bringing about Confederation⁵⁸, they criticised him as well. Fauteux, for instance, applauded Cartier for his diligence in protecting French Catholic minorities in Upper Canada and Manitoba⁵⁹ but he was less generous on the subject of the minority in New Brunswick:

Malheureusement, par rapport à la province du Nouveau-Brunswick, sa prudence a été prise en défaut... La loi écrite de 1867 ne garantissait le droit aux écoles séparées que dans les provinces où ces écoles étaient déjà sanctionnées par une loi et non pas seulement tolérées par la coutume. La demande d'un désaveu persistant, Cartier soutint à ses compatriotes que le remède serait cent fois pire que le mal. En créant ce précédent, disait-il, l'on ne faisait rien de moins que remettre les droits des catholiques du Canada entre les mains d'une majorité protestante, celle du parlement fédéral.⁶⁰

Like the rouge writers, De Celles and Fauteux had to take into account the 'antagonisme de race et de religion'. Thus, their admiration for Cartier was tempered by events which had occurred

since 1867. "Hélas! Comment les faits sont venus donner tort à ses prévisions⁶¹!"

When bleu and rouge historians examined the history of Confederation their prime concern was French Canadian survivance. The fact that 1867 also created a new nation was of secondary importance. The birth of Canada was noted in the first decade by bleu historians. In 1871, Turcotte proclaimed that "le Canada a pris sa place parmi les nations⁶²." Seven years later, de Montigny praised Confederation for "elle nous faisait devenir une grande nation⁶³." The idea of a Canadian nation, however, lost its appeal when 'le temps et les événements' suggested that the 'new nation' was endangering the existence of the French Canadian nation.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

¹ L-P Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, Québec, Des Presses Mécaniques du Canadien, 1871, p. 518.

² T. Chapais, "Cartier et la Confédération", la Revue canadienne, vol. 14, 1914, pp. 238 - 239.

³ K.W. Windsor, "Historical Writing in Canada to 1920", in C.F. Klinck (gen. ed.), Literary History of Canada: Canadian Literature in English (2 ed.), vol. I, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 299.

⁴ See Windsor, "Historical Writing in Canada to 1920", p. 234; and J.K. McConica, "Kingsford and Whiggery in Canadian History", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 40, June 1959, p. 117.

⁵ Author unknown, La Confédération, c'est le salut du Bas-Canada; il faut se défier des ennemis de la Confédération, Montréal, E. Sénécal, 1867. Robert Rumilly suggests that the pamphlet was "rédigé par le gros, souriant et sympathique Joseph-Alfred Mousseau." The author, however, does not indicate his source. R. Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, vol. I: Georges-Etienne Cartier, Montréal, Fides, 1971, p. 96; T-J-J Loranger, Lettres sur l'interprétation de la constitution fédérale dite l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord, 1867, Québec, Imprimerie A. Côté, 1883.

⁶ George-Etienne Cartier's death in 1873 and the hundredth anniversary of his birth in 1914 inspired a number of biographical studies: E. Gérin, "Sir George-Etienne Cartier" in A. Dansereau, B. Sulte, E. Gérin, A. Racine, George-Etienne Cartier, Montréal, Beauchemin, 1914, pp. 66-84. (Gérin wrote his biography either in 1873 or 1874 just after Cartier's death); L-P Turcotte, Biographies politiques: l'Honorable Sir G.E. Cartier, ministre de la milice, Québec, L. Brousseau, 1873; A.D. De Celles, Cartier et son temps, Montréal, Beauchemin, 1907; "La carrière de Cartier", la Revue canadienne, vol. 14, 1914, pp. 212-224; C-E Lavergne, Georges-Etienne Cartier, homme d'état canadien: 1814-1873, Montréal, Langevin et l'Archevêque, 1914; A. Fauteux, "Cartier et les minorités", la Revue canadienne, vol. 14, 1914, pp. 245-255; T. Chapais, "Cartier et la Confédération", la Revue canadienne, vol. 14, 1914, pp. 236-244. Liberal politicians also were subject of historical study: P-B Casgrain, Letellier de Saint-Just et son

temps, Québec, C. Darveau, 1885; J.O. Pelland, Biographie, discours conférences, etc. de l'hon. Honoré Mercier, Montréal, (no publisher), 1890. Two autobiographical works have been included in this study: B.A.T. de Montigny, Catéchisme politique, Beauchemin et Valois, 1878; L-O David, Souvenirs et biographies, 1870-1910, Montréal, Beauchemin, 1911.

⁷ L-P Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, Québec, Des Presses Mécaniques du Canadien, 1871; L-O David, L'union des deux Canadas, Montréal, E. Sénécal, 1898; L. Brunet, La province du Canada: histoire politique 1840 à 1867, Québec, Laflamme et Proulx, 1908; J. Royal, Histoire du Canada: 1841 à 1867, Montréal, 1909. (Royal's book was published posthumously in 1909. Royal had almost completed his book at the time of his death in August, 1902.)

⁸ L-O David, Histoire du Canada depuis la Confédération: 1867 à 1887, Montréal, Beauchemin, 1909; A.D. De Celles, The Province of Quebec, vol. 15 of Canada and its Provinces, A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty (ed.), Toronto, Glasgow, Brook & Co., 1914.

⁹ Prior to the First World War, the vast majority of newspapers in Quebec were political in nature. Each political party had a number of newspapers under its control. For example, until its demise in 1899 La Minerve was a Conservative newspaper while La Presse, which began as a Conservative newspaper, became Liberal after 1897. Journalism was looked upon as valuable preparation for a career in politics and many writers used "le journalisme comme un tremplin pour se hisser dans l'arène politique..." J. Hamelin et A. Beaulieu, Aperçu du journalisme québécois d'expression française, Recherches sociographiques, vol. 7, no 3, sept.-déc. 1966, p. 319.

¹⁰ The ultimate example of a writer with political interests was the Confederation pamphleteer. His purpose was to win votes for Cartier's bleu party: "Peut-on hésiter entre M. Dorion et M. Cartier; entre le parti rouge et le parti conservateur? Tous les honnêtes gens, à quelque parti qu'ils appartiennent, répondront avec enthousiasme: donnons notre mépris à MM. Dorion et Lanctôt, et nos votes à M. Cartier et à son parti." La Confédération, c'est le salut du Bas-Canada; il faut se défier des ennemis de la Confédération, 1867, p. 72.

¹¹ Joseph Royal, a Manitobian for twenty-five years, was the only historian to make reference to Maritime aspirations. Histoire du Canada: 1841 à 1867, 1902, p. 486.

- ¹² La Confédération ..., 1867, p. 7.
- ¹³ E. Gérin, "Sir George-Etienne Cartier", 1873, p. 80.
- ¹⁴ P-B Casgrain, Letellier de Saint-Just et son temps, 1885, p. 127.
- ¹⁵ L-O David, L'union des deux Canadas, 1898, p. 208.
See also David, Souvenirs et biographies, 1911, p. 9.
- ¹⁶ Lack of background material does not allow us to label Charles-Edouard Lavergne as either 'Conservative' or 'Liberal'.
- ¹⁷ This author is using the terms "Liberal" and "Conservative" merely as political party labels. "Liberal" refers to the rouge-Liberal tradition of A-A Dorion and Wilfrid Laurier. "Conservative" is assigned to the bleu-Conservative party of George-Etienne Cartier and John A. Macdonald with its origins in the Canadian Union period.
- ¹⁸ Consider, for example, Thomas Chapais. He was the son of Jean-Charles Chapais and the son-in-law of Hector Langevin, both of whom were prominent Conservative Fathers of Confederation. As a journalist Chapais was associated with the Conservatively-inclined Le Courrier du Canada. In 1884 he was named editor-in-chief and in 1890 he became its owner. Chapais was also actively involved with the Conservative party. In the federal election of 1891, he was an unsuccessful Conservative candidate in the riding of Kamouraska. The following year he became a member of the Legislative Council of Quebec. In 1893, he joined Premier Louis-Ollivier Taillon's Conservative cabinet as a minister without portfolio. Two years later he was appointed President of the Legislative Council. In 1897, he was named Minister of Colonization under Premier Edmund J. Flynn.
- ¹⁹ Consider, for example, Laurent-Olivier David. He made a number of unsuccessful attempts to win a seat as a Liberal. He met with defeat provincially in 1867 and in 1875 (Hochelega) and federally in 1878 (Hochelega) and in 1896 (Montreal-East). He did manage one electoral victory. From 1886 to 1890 he held the Montreal-East seat in Ottawa. In 1903 Laurier named him a Senator. David also had a long career in Liberal journalism. He was involved directly with such Liberal papers as Le Courrier de Montréal, Le Bien Public and La Tribune.

²⁰ Loranger's break with the Conservative party occurred in the 1860s. De Celles began his journalistic career working for the Conservative newspapers Le Journal du Québec and La Minerve. He later became a Laurier Liberal. The other two men experienced similar Conservative-to-Liberal transformations: Pelland in 1885; and Fauteux in the 1900s.

²¹ C-E Lavergne, Georges-Etienne Cartier, homme d'état canadien, 1814-1873, 1914, p. 53.

²² A. Fauteux, "Cartier et les minorités", 1914, pp. 252-253. Author's emphasis.

²³ A-D De Celles, Cartier et son temps, 1907, p. 79.

²⁴ Lavergne, Georges-Etienne Cartier, 1914, pp. 53-54. Aegidius Fauteux also referred to the French Catholic minorities, "comme en 1890 au Manitoba, comme aujourd'hui [1914] en Ontario." "Cartier et les minorités", 1914, p. 255.

²⁵ La Confédération . . ., 1867, pp. 7-8.

²⁶ de Montigny, Catéchisme politique, 1878, pp. 48-49.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁸ Rouge historians, naturally, did not wish to give support to their political enemies; therefore, the fear of an American invasion was not part of their explanations.

²⁹ J. Royal, Histoire du Canada: 1841 à 1867, 1902, p. 453.

³⁰ Lavergne, Georges-Etienne Cartier, 1914, p. 58. Louis Turcotte and Ludovic Brunet mentioned the American Civil War, but they treated the war as an event and not as a cause per se. See Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, 1871, pp. 437-438 and Brunet, La province du Canada; histoire politique de 1840 à 1867, 1908, pp. 272, 282, 286.

³¹ The Canadian Parliamentary Companion: 1887, Ottawa, J. Durie & Son, 1887, p. 160.

³² See W.F. Ryan, The Clergy and Economic Growth in Quebec (1896-1914), Quebec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1966, pp. 29-49; J. Hamelin et J-P Montminy, "Québec 1896-1929: une deuxième phase d'industrialization" in F. Dumont, J. Hamelin, F. Harvey, J-P Montminy, Idéologies au Canada Français, 1900-1929, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974, pp. 15-28.

³³ Joseph Royal believed that the French Canadian people had a mission: "Notre mission dans cette partie du Nouveau-Monde paraît être avant tout religieuse et intellectuelle. Quoique l'on fasse, nous n'avons pas comme nation le génie des affaires, et si nous nous y essayons, ce n'est pas tant par le succès que nous devrions nous distinguer que par la scrupuleuse honnêteté des employés canadiens-français et la proverbiale honorabilité de nos négociants et de nos industriels. Les hommes qui sont intègres sont prudents, et la prudence empêche de risquer l'argent du prochain. Nous ne saurions trop le répéter, notre peuple a un rôle distinct à jouer dans l'économie providentielle des sociétés de l'Amérique anglaise du Nord; il ne doit pas l'oublier sous peine de forligner et de marcher à la queue des autres nationalités qui l'entourent. C'est à ce point de vue qu'il doit toujours se placer pour juger sainement des questions qui l'affectent et des chefs politiques qui entreprennent de le conduire." Histoire du Canada: 1841 à 1867, 1902, p. 501.

³⁴ S. Gagnon, "Historiographie canadienne ou les fondements de la conscience nationale", in A. Beaulieu, J. Hamelin, B. Bernier, Guide d'histoire du Canada, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1969, p. 31.

³⁵ R. Hamel, J. Hare, P. Wycynski, Dictionnaire pratique des auteurs québécois, Montréal, Fides, 1976, p. 611.

³⁶ La Confédération ..., 1867, p. 20.
Also see Chapais, "Cartier et la Confédération", 1914, p. 241; de Montigny, 1878, pp. 50, 51; Royal, 1902, p. 498.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 13. Author's emphasis.
Also see de Montigny, 1878, pp. 49, 50.

³⁸ Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, 1871, p. 595.

³⁹ de Montigny, Cathéisme politique, 1878, p. 53.
Also see La Confédération ..., 1867, p. 9.

40 Brunet, La province du Canada; histoire politique, de 1840 à 1867, 1908, p. 301.

41 Ibid., pp. 298-299.

42 Casgrain, Letellier de Saint-Just et son temps, 1885, p. 130.

43 David, L'union des deux Canadas, 1898, p. 213.

44 David, Souvenirs et biographies, 1911, p. 10.

45 David, L'union des deux Canadas, 1898, pp. 258-259.
Ludovic Brunet also underlined the position taken by the "libéraux" in the debate of 1865. La province du Canada, 1908, pp. 294-297.

46 Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, 1871, p. 539.

47 Proponents of this theory argued that Confederation was an agreement between the provinces and/or between the French and the English, the two 'founding races'.

48 T.J.J. Loranger, Lettres sur l'interprétation de la constitution fédérale dite l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord, 1867, 1883, p. v.

49 From 1854 until his resignation in 1863, Loranger represented Laprairie in the Legislative Assembly. For eight months in 1857 and 1858, he held the position of Provincial Secretary in the Macdonald-Cartier government. He was "l'un des chefs les plus populaires du parti conservateur..." Loranger's dissatisfaction began when he was not named to the new Macdonald-Cartier government after the famous "double shuffle" in the summer of 1858. "A partir de cette époque, la mésintelligence qui régnait entre Cartier et Loranger s'aggrava de jour en jour." Finally, Loranger left the Conservative party for a judge's robe in 1863. David, Souvenirs et biographies, 1911, pp. 61, 63.

50 Luc Letellier de Saint-Just was a long time rouge who had opposed the Confederation project. Alexander Mackenzie appointed him Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec. In March 1878, he 'fired' the Conservative premier, Boucher de Boucherville, and allowed the Liberals under Henri Joly de Lotbinière to take over the reins of power in Quebec City. Eventually this led to Letellier de Saint-Just's own dismissal by the newly elected federal Conservative party in July 1879.

- 51 Loranger, Lettres sur l'interprétation..., 1883, p. vi.
- 52 David, L'union des deux Canadas, 1898, p. 290. Author's emphasis.
- 53 In the introduction to his political history of United Canada, Brunet concluded that "Durham, d'ailleurs, l'avait bien deviné; c'est, disait-il, une lutte de race et de nationalité qui s'est toujours livrée au Canada." La province du Canada, 1908, p. 20.
- 54 David, L'union des deux Canadas, 1898, p. 290. Brunet suggested that: "Le temps et les événements ont malheureusement donné raison aux sentiments peu optimistes de M. Dorion et du parti libéral. On ne saurait se cacher qu'en se plaçant exclusivement au point de vue national, les Canadiens-français n'ont pas joué un rôle prédominant." La province du Canada, 1908, p. 298.
- 55 Chapais, "Cartier et la Confédération", 1914, p. 242.
- 56 Both men had connections with Laurier's Liberal party. De Celles was a "contemporain et disciple du chef Libéral." Gagnon, "Historiographie canadienne ou les fondements de la conscience nationale", p. 32. Fauteux was editor-in-chief of the Liberal La Presse from 1908 until 1918.
- 57 For De Celles' connections with Conservative journalism see footnote 20. Fauteux was one of the founders of Le Rappel, the "organe de la jeunesse du parti conservateur." He served as its editor from 1902 until 1904. O. Maurault, "Aegidius Fauteux", Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, ser. 3, vol. 35, 1941, p. 104.
- 58 See, for example, De Celles, "La Carrière de Cartier", la Revue canadienne, vol. 14, 1914, pp. 219-220; Fauteux, 1914, pp. 250, 253.
- 59 Fauteux, "Cartier et les minorités", 1914, p. 253.
- 60 Ibid., p. 255.
Also see De Celles, Cartier et son temps, 1907, pp. 88-89.
Also see De Celles' comments concerning the establishment of an Upper House for the province of Quebec. The Province of Quebec, 1914, p. 171.

61 De Celles, Cartier et son temps, 1907, pp. 88-89.

62 Turcotte, Le Canada sous l'union, 1871, p. 606.

63 de Montigny, Letellier de Saint-Just et son temps, 1878, p. 50.
Also see La Confédération ..., 1867, p. 72.

CHAPTER TWO

1916-1953: The 'Federal' versus 'Provincial' Multi-Causal Interpretation

During the First World War, the bleu versus rouge mono-causal histories of the previous fifty years gave way to the 'federal' versus 'provincial' multi-causal histories of the next forty years. This change was marked by the publication of Charles Langelier's La Confédération, sa genèse, son établissement (1916)¹ and Lionel Groulx's La Confédération canadienne: ses origines (1918)². With the appearance of these studies, the Confederation question passed from the realm of contemporary politics to that of history³.

A number of other writers followed the lead of Langelier and Groulx, and produced works dealing exclusively with the history of Confederation⁴. This was in contrast to the previous period and suggests that historians' interest in the union of 1867 as a subject of study had increased. This newly-developed historical concern for Confederation grew out of the circumstances of the time. Events such as the Ontario school question, the conscription crisis of 1917, the industrialization and urbanization of Quebec, the Depression, the second conscription crisis and the federal-provincial jurisdictional battles created an atmosphere

of continual debate and introspection. The French Canadian elite endeavoured to redefine Quebec in reference to English Canada, to the federal government and to industrialized North America. Quite naturally some commentators turned to the past to help explain the events and ideas of the present in order to defend their own reactions⁵. Eventually this led some writers, whose interest in history stemmed from their contemporary concerns, to the British North America Act⁶ and the history of the 1860s. O

While the writers of the first period had been drawn to Confederation to rationalize their bleu or rouge political beliefs, the new generation tended to use Confederation to justify their 'provincial' or 'federal' points of view⁷. Specifically, within the period from 1916 to 1953, one set of writers endeavoured to explain Confederation within a Canadian or 'federal' context⁸. This group consisted of Jean Bruchési⁹, Thomas Chapais, Alfred-Duclos De Celles, Roger Duhamel, Gustave Lanctôt¹⁰, Maurice Ollivier, Joseph-Edouard Perrault and Georges Robitaille. Another group of writers looked at Confederation from a québécois or 'provincial' perspective¹¹. 'Provincial' historians included Richard Arès, Jean-Charles Bonenfant, Lionel Groulx¹², Charles Langelier, Wilfrid Morin¹³ and Robert Rumilly.

Historians writing in the period from 1916 to 1953 called upon two causes to explain the union of 1867: the political crisis in United Canada; and the fear of an American invasion.

In the previous period, in which most of the historians had put forth a mono-causal political explanation, only a few historians included the fear of an American invasion as a cause. After 1915, the use of this second cause generalized¹⁵.

Historians continued to look to the political crisis to explain the coming together of the British North American colonies in 1867¹⁶. For example, in 1936, Robert Rumilly stated that:

Depuis quelques années, les ministères s'étaient écroulés et succédés comme châteaux de cartes. Mercier [Honoré Mercier] constatait que les deux années écoulées depuis 1862 avaient été, sous quatre ministères, "sacrifiées à l'esprit de parti". La concorde ne revenait pas. C'est alors que fut lancé [sic] l'idée d'un changement de régime... On lança le projet de Confédération.¹⁷

While historians of the earlier period had, for the most part, explained the political crisis itself as a bleu-rouge conflict, after 1915, historians gave the political crisis an ethnic explanation. 'Provincial' historians held English-speaking Ontarians responsible for the political difficulties of the 1860s. In 1916, Charles Langelier described George Brown as follows:

Il [George Brown] fut un curieux mélange de zèle honnête et de bigoterie dans le mouvement organiste qui se développait alors dans le Haut-Canada et il s'y jeta avec enthousiasme. Il considérait l'Eglise Catholique comme la pire ennemie du Canada, et, il lui fit partout une guerre sans

trêve, sous quelque forme qu'elle se manifestât, soit dans la politique, soit en matière religieuse.¹⁸

Lionel Groulx painted Brown with the same brush in 1918:

Un jour était venu où le Haut Canada fortifié par l'immigration s'était senti le plus fort et avait demandé le rappel de la clause de la constitution accordant à chacune des provinces l'égalité de représentation... Un homme viendra qui de cette réforme, fera son cri de guerre, et le fossé se creusera très vite comme un abîme entre les deux races. Cet homme funeste, l'une des plus parfaites incarnations du fanatisme ontarien, devait être le fougueux agitateur, George Brown. La carrière de George Brown tient en quelques mots: pendant vingt ans, contre le papisme, contre la "french domination," il aboya à grosse voix et apparemment sans fatigue. Tout l'Ontario se souleva au cri du Rep by pop dès l'accession de l'agitateur à la direction du parti clear-grit.¹⁹

'Federal' historians, on the other hand, attributed the political crisis of the 1860s to the conflicting aspirations of both sides. In 1934, Thomas Chapais, for example, presented the political situation in the following manner:

La situation [politique] était absolument déconcertante et décourageante. Depuis six ans, c'était le sixième ministère qui succombait... Tous les expédients politiques s'étaient trouvés inefficaces. L'antagonisme des deux provinces s'accusait chaque jour, plus aigu. Les divergences paraissaient désespérément irréductibles.²⁰

In 1945, Maurice Ollivier reiterated Chapais' explanation:

Long before 1867 the Union Act had ceased to work properly ... The claims for representation proportional to the population...

came more especially from Upper Canada. On the other hand, the two political parties were at times so evenly divided, especially between 1862 and 1864, that five changes of ministry then took place and it was extremely difficult to govern under the circumstances as the fate of the government was dependent upon the transfer of a couple of votes, sometimes of a single one.²¹

Recurring French-English disputes such as the Ontario school question and the two conscription crises (1917, 1942 - 1944) kept the spotlight on the political crisis. For 'provincial' historians, the political crisis was another example of the English Canadian majority imposing its will on the French minority. English-speaking Ontarians who were threatening Franco-Ontarian survival with Regulation 17 in 1912, were also deemed responsible for the political crisis of the 1860s.

'Federal' historians viewed the French-English controversies of the twentieth century in a different light from their 'provincial' colleagues. They believed that the problems of 'today' would only be solved through compromise²². This notion of the post-World War I situation in Canada affected the way in which they presented the political crisis. They attempted to understand both the French Catholic and English Protestant points of view. In the end, 'federal' historians argued that the political crisis was resolved when both the English and the French put aside their differences and formed a coalition. This ultimately led to Confederation.

The fear of an American invasion, which had had limited appeal as a causal factor in the first five decades, came to be accepted as a legitimate cause after 1915. Both 'federal' and 'provincial' historians regarded the possibility of an American assault as a stimulus for union. For example, Lionel Groulx, a 'provincial' historian, declared in 1918 that:

les provinces britanniques n'avaient qu'à écouter l'instinct même de la vie. Cet instinct les avertissait depuis longtemps de se prémunir contre l'appétit toujours en éveil de leur voisin d'outre-quarante-cinquième. Je note en passant que l'idée d'une union fédérale a surgi en notre pays chaque fois que les mouvements du colosse américain nous ont éveillés à certaines inquiétudes... Ce sera vers 1861 à une date où le premier coup de canon tiré au fort Sumter avertissait les Canadiens de prendre garde à la fragilité de leurs frontières. 23

A 'federal' historian, Thomas Chapais, advanced the same kind of argument as Groulx. Chapais suggested that the need for common defence against the Americans brought the colonies together:

Enfin les symptômes alarmants qui, à un moment donné, avaient pu faire redouter des hostilités entre les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, comportaient un avertissement significatif et démontraient combien l'union serait essentielle à la défense. 24

The general use of the fear of an American invasion was linked to two ongoing processes which characterized the 1920s: the political independence of Canada from Great Britain; and the industrialization of Quebec. The First World War marked an

intensification of Canada's attempt to be recognized as an autonomous nation. With the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the British Parliament formally acknowledged Canadian independence. The continual reassessment of Canada's position within the British Empire during the 1920s led some essayists to consider the role played by Great Britain in bringing about Confederation. It was argued that the threat of an Anglo-American conflict induced the British to support the Confederation scheme. Hence, the Trent affair²⁵ became an important ingredient of the Confederation story. Charles Langelier wrote in 1916:

Mais l'événement [l'incident du "Trent"] eut un autre effet en Angleterre: celui de faire cesser toute vacillation chez le gouvernement de Londres. Tout le monde en Angleterre... n'avaient [sic] plus qu'une même politique: c'était la consolidation de l'Amérique Britannique du Nord, tout en la mettant dans une position à avoir besoin le moins possible du gouvernement impérial, se contentant d'une allégeance purement volontaire et d'une liaison purement nominale avec l'empire.²⁶

In 1935, Joseph-Edouard Perrault argued that the American Civil War did much to convince the British that a federation in British North America was necessary:

Après 1860, les troubles de la guerre de la sécession américaine et ses conséquences possibles pour le territoire canadien rallièrent au projet les quelques hommes qui, à Londres, manifestaient de l'hostilité à ce sujet et les portèrent à vouloir que le Canada imitât la Nouvelle-Zélande, fédéralisée dès 1852.²⁷

More than any other event, the industrialization of Quebec

after World War I promoted the use of the fear of an American invasion. In economic terms, it appeared that Quebec was being attacked from the south. American investment in the province increased dramatically²⁸. American companies, like the Aluminum Company of America, the International Paper Company, the Consolidated Paper Company and the Tribune Company of Chicago 'invaded' the north in their quest for hydro-electricity and pulp and paper²⁹. American products, with names like Campbell, Heinz, Coca Cola, Kellogg, Wrigley, Libby and Shredded Wheat 'invaded' the québécois consumer market³⁰. To observers, such as Lionel Groulx and Thomas Chapais, this 'invasion' threatened to destroy the French, Catholic, rural world to which they related. It was, for them, more than a question of importing American dollars and technical knowledge: "Le Canada importe beaucoup des Etats-Unis. Et comme il arrive toujours, bien d'autres importations accompagnent et suivent les marchandises... ils exportent leur style de vie, l'American way of life³¹. In other words, these men believed that an American invasion was taking place and that it was drastically changing the face of québécois society. In 1920, Lionel Groulx argued that Quebec was under siege:

...la guerre économique existe: elle se fait sur tous les points du monde. C'est la guerre qui ne connaît ni les trêves, ni les armistices. Elle se fait au milieu de nous; elle se fait contre nous.³²

Groulx equated urbanization with americanization. In 1939, he described Montreal in the following manner:

Ville monstrueuse, Montréal ne l'est pas seulement par son excès de population, mais, avant tout, parce que poste-récepteur de tout de qu'il y a de pire dans l'américanisme. Montréal, ville sans caractère et sans âme, ou dont le caractère est de n'en pas avoir, tant y dominant [sic] tout ce qui n'est pas de nous, ni de notre province, ni même de notre pays. Essayez de me définir l'âme de Montréal, même du Montréal canadien-français, caravansérail qui a peu ou point de commerce à soi, peu ou point de langue à soi, pas de théâtre à soi, pas de radio à soi, ... pas de presse à soi, pas de famille à soi...³³

As such, for Groulx and other historians who shared his concerns³⁴, the fear of an American invasion became part of their explanations.

If the industrialization of Quebec invoked the writers of the 1920s and 1930s to integrate the fear of an American invasion into their historical studies, the use of this cause in the later 1940s was reinforced by English-Canadian historiography. Younger historians, like Roger Duhamel and Jean-Charles Bonenfant, influenced by historians from English Canada³⁵, gave prominence to the American Civil War. In 1949, Duhamel, for example, argued that "la guerre civile américaine... obligera les colonies britanniques à préciser leurs positions, à faire un choix, à opter pour une formule qui ne les laisse plus aussi démunies en face des dangers extérieurs³⁶."

While most historians explained the union of 1867 with the political crisis and the fear of an American invasion, six historians also referred to economic considerations. For example,

Jean Bruchési stated in 1935 that:

Entre temps, par suite de l'instabilité ministérielle, jointe aux nécessités économiques qu'imposait le voisinage des Etats-Unis, une idée s'était répandue au point de dominer la vie politique des deux Canadas: unir les colonies anglaises de l'Amérique du Nord en un seul gouvernement.³⁷

In 1918, Lionel Groulx's explanation of the fear of an American invasion included reference to economic matters:

C'est alors et devant le menace de ce péril de l'extérieur [le péril des Etats-Unis] que le Canada-uni se vit poussé à son tour vers les provinces du golfe. En 1864, M. Galt parlait à Halifax du péril américain et la nécessité de l'Inter-colonial en cas d'une guerre. Une réalité peu rassurante, c'était celle d'un Canada manquant de débouchés vers la mer, pendant toute la saison d'hiver et se trouvant à la merci des Etats-Unis pour ses communications postales avec Londres.³⁸

The circumstances of the two decades following 1913 made it impossible for writers to refer to the causes of Confederation without alluding to the economic factor. The transition of québécois society from agricultural to industrial, from rural to urban³⁹, the flood of American investment into the province and the long lines of the unemployed during the Depression focused attention upon economic changes and their effects upon French Canada. The constant reference to the economic question by the French Canadian elite⁴⁰ led some writers to examine the history of 1867 in relation to economic considerations.

Historians of this period did not, however, consider economic considerations to be on the same level as the political crisis or the American threat. Three factors contributed to the subordination of the economic cause: a lack of exposure to the field of economic history; the equating of economics with Protestant materialism and secularism; and a belief in the distinctiveness of French Canada.

In the early twentieth century American and English Canadian historians began to reexamine the past from an economic perspective⁴¹. There was no parallel movement in French Canada. As for Confederation historians, they had neither the training, the experience⁴², nor the inclination to consider their subject from an economic point of view. At best, some looked upon economic matters as background material or as products of a 'true' cause⁴³. Others viewed economic matters with suspicion, if not disdain. Economics constituted part of the materialistic, Protestant world of the English - a world of industrial expansion and urbanization which threatened to destroy the fabric of French Canadian society:

Elle [l'expansion industrielle] se développe, à la façon d'une force anarchique, presque sauvage, sans le moindre souci du milieu, ne tenant compte apparemment que de la loi de ses voraces appétits. D'aucuns ont parlé de "seconde conquête" du Canada français. Conquête plus désastreuse peut-être que la première. Elle brise le rythme ancien de la vie, déchaîne le cycle infernal:

concentrations urbaines, prolétarisation
des masses, désintégration du capital
humain, misère, révoltes, chaos de 1929.⁴⁴

Writers like Groulx believed that language, religion and culture distinguished French Canadians from other North Americans. Furthermore, it was the duty of French Canadians to resist the 'material invasion'. They had a special mission in North America. Their mission was to remain French, Canadian and Catholic⁴⁵.

The common belief in the differences between the English and the French affected the way in which the historians presented the economic factor⁴⁶. Writers accepted that economic circumstances were important in motivating some of those involved in the union of 1867 - but only the English. For example, Gustave Lanctôt argued that the Maritime colonies reacted to an economic crisis:

A cette date [1860], les cinq provinces qui se partageaient la moitié du pays de l'océan aux grands lacs s'agitent sous l'étreinte d'une double crise, surtout économique dans la Nouvelle-Ecosse, le Nouveau-Brunswick et l'Ile du Prince-Edouard, et surtout politique dans le Bas et le Haut-Canada.⁴⁷

Great Britain, Lionel Groulx maintained, also acted for economic reasons in the 1860s:

C'est le moment où la toute-puissance industrielle des Anglo-Saxons est battue en brèche; pour parer à la concurrence ils rêvent de fonder un vaste empire fédéral libre-échangiste qui draine tout le commerce au profit de la métropole et prépare en même temps de vastes débouchés à ses industries.⁴⁸

Groulx acknowledged that some United Canadians had been economically

motivated. But these were members of the business community:

Dégoutés du marché américain autant que du marché britannique, privés sur celui-ci, de la préférence impériale, menacés sur celui-là, d'une répudiation prochaine du traité de 1854, certains de ces hommes de commerce et de finances se tournent vers l'ouest encore vide, comme vers le pays des généreuses compensations... De plus, certaine urgence paraît s'imposer de barrer la route au plus tôt aux Américains...⁴⁹

Not until the late 1940s did the attitude to economic considerations change. Under the influence of English-Canadian historians, writers like Roger Duhamel and Jean-Charles Bonenfant gave causal status to the economic factor. In 1949 Bonenfant explained the advent of Confederation as follows:

Mais ce n'est qu'en 1864 qu'un projet [d'une fédération des colonies britanniques en Amérique du Nord] vraiment sérieux fut mis à l'étude, sa réalisation étant devenue nécessaire par suite de l'instabilité politique dans le Canada uni, des exigences économiques, du besoin d'un chemin de fer intercolonial et de la crainte qu'on avait des Etats-Unis.⁵⁰

Duhamel argued in 1949 that Washington's decision not to renew the Canadian-American reciprocity treaty (1854-1866) forced the colonies to think about accelerating intercolonial trade⁵¹. He concluded that the colonies had a choice to make:

Le choix se pose nettement aux colonies: ou demeurer ce qu'elles sont actuellement et souffrir durement d'une stagnation économique à peu près chronique; ou s'unir entre elles et former un grand pays plus en mesure de faire face aux difficultés; ou rechercher l'annexion aux Etats-Unis.⁵²

This is not to say that Duhamel and Bonenfant were advocating an economic interpretation of Confederation. On the contrary, they shared the contemporary view that the French Canadian decision to accept the project had nothing to do with economic matters.

"C'est leur [les Canadiens français] souci de la fidélité à leur être national qui finalement emportera la décision⁵³." Bonenfant concluded in a similar fashion:

Il reste que les Canadiens français du Bas-Canada étaient le seul groupe qui pour les raisons profondes de race, de langue et de religion pouvait redouter les conséquences de la Confédération, les gens des Maritimes n'ayant à craindre que pour leur économie ou leur vanité.⁵⁴

Duhamel and Bonenfant were the exceptions. In general, economic history was not accepted because to do so would be to admit that French Canadians were motivated by the same things as English Protestants. This ran contrary to the conviction that the most important influence in the life of a French Canadian was his religion. This factor, Groulx argued, must be acknowledged:

Selon que l'on admettra ou n'admettra point le facteur spirituel dans l'histoire des hommes, le jeu des forces morales, l'historien discernera, reconnaîtra le rôle de l'Eglise ou des églises, l'action considérable des croyances religieuses, dans les diverses activités de collectives humaines, ou, ce rôle il l'amoin-drira fatalement, si même il ne l'ignore. S'il cède plus ou moins au matérialisme historique, n'inclinera-t-il point à faire plus large ou moins large, la part des faits économiques, l'explication de l'histoire par la seule géographie ou par la seule économie?⁵⁵

The religious factor played an important role in the explanations of a number of historians. The simplest manifestation of this was the suggestion by priest-historians that the ultimate force behind Confederation was God:

L'oeuvre qu'ils [les Pères de la Confédération] vont accomplir n'exigeait, au surplus, que pour certaines parties, les facultés des bâtisseurs de nations. Et que font autre chose ces bâtisseurs eux-mêmes que coucher en écriture les plans et constitutions élaborés par Dieu?⁵⁶

Writers also directed their reader's attention to the role of the clergy in bringing about Confederation⁵⁷. Groulx, an active commentator of the interwar years, had difficulty with this issue. He could not ignore the part played by the bishops in gaining acceptance for Confederation. His 'provincial' outlook and his less-than-enthusiastic support for Confederation⁵⁸, dictated that he emphasize the bishops' passive support, and reluctance on the part of some, to give approval:

On ne saurait nier que l'attitude du clergé catholique n'ait fortement contribué à la déroute de l'opposition. Néanmoins une partie des évêques et du clergé parurent hésiter tout d'abord.⁵⁹

He concluded with a question which rationalized both the bishops' actions in 1867 and his own in 1927:

S'ils eussent prévu tant de persécutions scolaires et de manquements de paroles, croit-on que les évêques du Bas-Canada, par exemple, auraient écrit leurs Lettres pastorales en faveur de la Confédération?⁶⁰

Thomas Chapais gave his interpretation of Confederation a unique religious flavour. In his discussion of the Confederation Debates in the Canadian legislature in 1865, he focused attention on the question of marriage and divorce:

Enfin, le chef libéral bas-canadien [A-A Dorion] abordait une question d'un autre ordre, et plus grave encore. Nous voulons parler de la résolution vingt-neuvième (paragraphe trente et unième), qui plaçait le mariage et le divorce sous la juridiction du parlement fédéral.⁶¹

Chapais' analysis of the Confederation Debates reflected his position on marriage and divorce. He believed that "le Christ a enseigné l'indissolubilité du mariage⁶²." He was adamant about the evils of divorce:

...le divorce est un mal et un danger social et au lieu de le répandre il faudrait le restreindre... La famille est la pierre angulaire de la société ... Le divorce est l'ennemi le plus terrible de cette grande institution sociale. Il l'ébranle à sa base même; il met en danger sa stabilité; il ouvre la porte aux querelles odieuses et aux honteuses manoeuvres destinées à annuler le plus sacré des contrats humains.⁶²

Chapais' strong convictions regarding marriage and divorce⁶⁴ put him in the unusual position of supporting the rouge point of view rather than that taken by his father, Jean-Charles Chapais, and other bleu members of the government. On the subject of marriage, Chapais admitted that:

L'intervention et l'insistance de MM. Dorion [A-A Dorion] et Geoffrion [le député de Verchères] eurent tout de même, vraisemblablement, un résultat heureux. En effet, quand on eut à faire la rédaction définitive de l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique septentrionale basée sur les résolutions de Québec, on ajouta, dans l'article relatif à la juridiction exclusive des législatures provinciales, le paragraphe suivant: "La célébration du mariage dans la province." Cette addition était d'une grande importance, on devait le constater ultérieurement. ⁶⁵

Nevertheless, he tempered his criticism of the bleus by concluding that:

Leur situation [les représentants du Bas-Canada dans la conférence de Québec] était extrêmement [sic] difficile. On ne doit pas oublier que, dans cette assemblée constituante, il n'y avait plus que cinq catholiques sur trente-trois membres. Ils ne pouvaient prétendre arranger les choses absolument à leur gré. ⁶⁶

Historians of the second period, like their predecessors, centred much of their analysis of the importance of Confederation around the theme of la survivance. This interest in French Canadian survival was shared by many members of the French Canadian elite. In the years from 1916 to 1953 Quebec was in a transitional period and many observers, historians included, wondered how French Canada would survive.

⁶⁵
'Provincial' historians believed that only a strong

autonomous government in Quebec City would guarantee the continued preservation of the French Canadian 'nation'. As such, they evaluated the union of 1867 as it related to provincial autonomy. In 1917, Lionel Groulx argued that "l'autonomie des unités reste à la base de cette union fédérative⁶⁷." Robert Rumilly described the situation in 1867 in the following manner:

Les Provinces n'avaient nullement l'intention de disparaître. Chacune d'elles possédait son histoire, ses traditions, ses traits particuliers. Les Provinces se sont constituées en Etats, pour sauvegarder et pour développer ces richesses. Elles ont aussi créé un Etat fédéral pour s'occuper des grands intérêts communs.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the Fathers of Confederation had no intentions of suppressing "la souveraineté des provinces⁶⁹." This was why they rejected a legislative union:

Georges [sic] -Etienne Cartier, soutenu par ses collègues canadiens français, tenait à un système parlementaire complet pour sa province. Les constituants de 1867 ont résolument écarté l'union législative, pour adopter le régime fédératif.⁷⁰

Groulx concluded:

Donc, en 1867, le Bas-Canada, devenu le Québec, recouvre, comme en 1791, son individualité politique. Pour lui, la bataille de l'autonomie paraît définitivement gagnée.⁷¹

'Federal' historians underlined the establishment of a federal system in 1867. They suggested that the French Fathers of Confederation had not accepted a legislative union because this would have resulted in "la disparition de la race française en

Amérique⁷²." Gustave Lanctôt contended that the province of Quebec "imposa l'adoption du principe fédératif qui, sauvegardant son entité française et catholique lui permettait de se développer selon ses traditions nationales⁷³." For Thomas Chapais, the constitution of 1867 signified an important victory for French Canada:

Ce que nous avons voulu mettre en lumière, c'est que le mérite capital de l'oeuvre accomplie en 1867 a été la création d'un Etat fédéral au lieu d'un Etat unitaire, et la reconnaissance de l'autonomie provinciale, grâce à laquelle la province de Québec s'est trouvée investie d'une vaste juridiction sur des matières d'importance vitale pour le développement de notre vie économique, sociale et nationale. Et c'est en nous plaçant à ce point de vue que nous croyons avoir le droit de proclamer la constitution de 1867 comme le couronnement d'un siècle de luttes pour la conquête du self-government par le Canada français.⁷⁴

The historians' focus on provincial autonomy and federalism mirrored a debate which was taking place in Quebec and in Canada during the second half of the 1930s. The Depression, with its long lines of unemployed⁷⁵, brought into question the role of government in the economy. The response of the Canadian government, like those of other western nations, was shaped by the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes⁷⁶. Keynesian analysis called for government involvement in the economy in order to ensure "equilibrium levels of full-employment without inflation⁷⁷."

In Canada the question of which level of government would make the necessary economic decisions remained open to debate. The outbreak of war in 1939 and the implementation of the War Measures Act enabled the federal government to assume control of many areas which, under normal circumstances, were provincial concerns. To meet the financial exigencies of new social and economic responsibilities as well as the cost of waging war, the federal government 'borrowed' the major sources of tax revenue from the provinces. After the war, the trend of greater federal involvement continued.

The Union Nationale, under Maurice Duplessis, continuously opposed Ottawa's centralist policies. In the fall of 1939, Duplessis called an election on the grounds that the federal government was using the war to intensify her "campagne d'assimilation et de centralisation"⁷⁸. During the war and in the post-war period the Union Nationale continued to reject the federal government's programs and policies. In the provincial elections of 1944, 1948 and 1952, the victorious Duplessis managed to make provincial autonomy the main issue⁷⁹.

'Provincial' historians made it clear where they stood on this issue. They regarded provincial autonomy as the only means by which French Canada could survive. Writing in 1948, Rumilly warned:

L'histoire du Canada, dans la période contemporaine, c'est l'histoire d'une lutte incessante menée par la race canadienne-française pour

survivre. Dans cette lutte, la race française aurait succombé depuis longtemps si elle n'avait pu s'arc-bouter sur une province solidement constituée en Etat. Pour nous, c'est question de vie ou de mort. Avec le triomphe absolu de centralisation fédérale, les Canadiens français deviendront, à plus ou moins longue échéance...des Anglais de langue quelque peu française.⁸⁰

In 1950, Lionel Groulx issued a similar warning:

Favorisé ... par la guerre de 1939, le gouvernement d'Ottawa n'en mène qu'à plus vive allure sa politique d'empiètement. Il retient sans scrupule les privilèges fiscaux que, pour fins de guerre, lui ont temporairement abandonnés les provinces. Ses tactiques sont bien connues. Il procède par sondages, par étapes; il agite devant les masses la fascination de l'argent, de l'assistance ou de la sécurité sociale: allocations familiales, pensions de vieillesse. De sa seule autorité, sans consulter les provinces, il tente de faire amender, par le parlement britannique, la constitution du pays. Pour ne pas leur restituer les grandes sources d'impôts, il pratique savamment, entre les Etats provinciaux et selon les recommandations de l'enquête Rowell-Sirois, la tactique de la division... Le péril de cette offensive ne saurait être surfait, spécialement pour le Québec. Une nationalité ne saurait vivre, admet-on généralement, sans une certaine somme d'autonomie de l'ordre politique, économique, social, culturel. Le centralisme laisserait-il subsister ce minimum d'autonomie?⁸¹

An integral part of the 'provincial' argument was the suggestion that "les vieilles provinces du Canada ont conclu, en 1867, le pacte de Confédération⁸²." To accept the notion of a

compact between the colonies was logical for 'provincial' historians. It provided historical evidence for those supporting provincial autonomy and served as valuable ammunition in the fight against the federal government's centralist policies of the 1930s and 1940s.

'Federal' historians did not accept the compact theory as readily as their 'provincial' counterparts. Both Alfred De Celles and Maurice Ollivier rejected the hypothesis of the provincial pact completely. De Celles argued that the national government was 'superior' to the provincial governments:

A sa base se trouve un principe en vertu duquel les provinces ou Etats confédérés consentent à se départir d'une partie de leur souveraineté et de leurs attributs, pour créer au-dessus d'elle un autre Etat, leur supérieur.⁸³

Ollivier did not believe the British North America Act was an agreement between the provinces: "notre constitution n'est pas un contrat, ... rien n'exige... le consentement de toutes les provinces à une modification de la constitution⁸⁴." Both De Celles and Ollivier were federal civil servants⁸⁵. Consequently, the concept of a provincial pact did not appeal to them because they did not perceive the federal government as a threat to French Canada.

Minority rights was another topic which generated considerable discussion after 1915. Historians centered their analysis of minority rights around articles 133 and 93 of the

British North America Act. The nature of their presentation depended upon a writer's 'provincial' or 'federal' ties. Both groups viewed article 133⁸⁶ as a symbol of linguistic equality for the French and the English: "les Pères de l'Acte confédératif placent sur le même piédestal, entourées des mêmes honneurs et nanties des mêmes avantages, la langue française et la langue anglaise⁸⁷." 'Federal' writers went on to describe article 133 as "une grande victoire nationale" in the fight for survival⁸⁸.

'Provincial' historians, who were disenchanted with the treatment that the minorities had received since 1867, argued that the French Canadian Fathers of Confederation had not done enough for the French minority groups:

Leur illusion et leur tort [Cartier et ses lieutenants] - et l'un et l'autre sont grands - furent de trop accorder à la bonne foi de leurs associés politiques, prenant ainsi sur l'avenir des gages téméraires.⁸⁹

In the case of education, 'provincial' writers zeroed in on article 93 and directed the reader to the 'injustices' done to the French Catholics not living in Quebec. They concluded that the so-called built-in safeguards of article 93, the appeal to the Governor-General in Council and the remedial federal legislation⁹⁰, were incorporated into the constitution in order to protect one group - the English Protestant minority of Quebec⁹¹.

'Federal' historians acknowledged the attacks against francophones outside of Quebec since 1867 but insisted that Cartier

and his followers were not responsible:

L'offensive contre la langue est un produit d'un autre temps que nos représentants ne prévoyaient pas, confiants qu'ils étaient d'avoir mis le français en sûreté sous la clause qui lui confère l'égalité officielle.⁹²

'Federal' historians were equally vehement in defending Confederation against charges that Confederation itself was responsible for the assault on French Catholic minorities. Chapais, commenting on the lack of rights for the minorities, upheld the federal system:

Mais il faut bien se rendre compte qu'il n'est pas dû à l'existence de la confédération. Que nous voulions et que nous puissions demain dénouer le lien fédéral, et redevenir purement et simplement le Bas-Canada, sans union et avec aucune autre province; le sort de nos minorités dans l'Ontario, dans les Maritimes, dans l'Ouest, en deviendrait-il meilleur?... Non, leur situation ne serait pas meilleure. Elles resteraient sans aucune sauvegarde, à la merci des majorités; cette situation serait pire. Supprimez la confédération... et nos minorités extra-québécoises [sic] seront plus isolées et plus désarmées qu'aujourd'hui.⁹³

From 1916 to 1953 the main issue of the day for the French Canadian elite was la survivance. Would the French Canadian nation endure in the face of the dramatic social and economic changes? Historians were not isolated from these concerns and, as a consequence, they projected the question of la survivance back to

1867 and evaluated Confederation from that perspective. To recognize 1867 as "la naissance d'une nation nouvelle: la nation canadienne⁹⁴" was impossible unless a writer was able to accept the concept of a federation from coast to coast. Thus, only those with 'federal' connections acknowledged that some supporters of the Confederation project may have been motivated by "l'idée d'une patrie plus grande, plus riche et plus forte⁹⁵." For 'provincial' historians, however, Confederation could never be more than a "faute de mieux⁹⁶."

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

¹ C. Langelier, La Confédération, sa genèse, son établissement, Québec, Le Soleil, 1916.

² L. Groulx, La Confédération canadienne: ses origines, Montréal, Le Devoir, 1918.

³ Charles Tupper, the last of the Fathers of Confederation, died in 1915.

⁴ R. Arès, La Confédération: pacte ou loi?, Montréal, Action Nationale, 1949; J-C Bonenfant, "Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1952, pp. 39-45; "La genèse de la loi de 1867 concernant l'Amérique du Nord britannique", Culture, vol. 9, mars 1948, pp. 3-17; T. Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, vol. VIII, (1861 - 1867), Montréal, Boréal Expresse, 1972. [Reprint, 1934]; R. Duhamel, "Vers la fédération", Action universitaire, vol. 15, juillet 1949, pp. 16-30; L. Groulx, "Battle for Acceptance", L'indépendance du Canada, Montréal, Action Nationale, 1949, pp. 151-163; "Ce Cinquante-naire", l'Action française, vol. 1, juillet 1917, pp. 193-203; "Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", l'Action française, vol. 17, mai-juin 1927, pp. 282-301; G. Lanctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1927, pp. 97-101; J-E Perrault, "La Confédération canadienne est-elle née viable?", Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, vol. 5, 1935, pp. 8-25; G. Robitaille, "La Confédération canadienne", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1927, pp. 62-66.

⁵ See Ramsay Cook's discussion of French Canadians as a "most historically-minded people". "Some French-Canadian Interpretations of the British Conquest: une Quatrième Dominante de la Pensée Canadienne-Française", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1966, pp. 70-83.

⁶ A.D. De Celles, Les constitutions du Canada, Montréal, Beauchemin, 1918; M. Ollivier, L'avenir constitutionnel du Canada, Montréal, Albert Lévesque, 1935; Problems of Canadian Sovereignty from the British North America Act, 1867, to the Statute of Westminster, 1931. Toronto, Canadian Law Book, 1945.

⁷ 'Provincial' is used by this author to describe a writer who tended to place loyalty to Quebec (Or French Canada) above other conflicting loyalties. Similarly, 'federal' describes a writer who tended to place loyalty to Canada above other conflicting loyalties. See International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1972 ed., s.v. "Nation" by Dankwart A. Rustow.

⁸ Gustave Lanctôt is a good example of a 'federal' historian. He had a number of 'federal' connections. He began to work for the Canadian Archives in 1912. Ten years later he was appointed director of the French section. From 1937 until his retirement in 1948, he was the Dominion archivist. Lanctôt interrupted his archival career in 1914 when he joined the Canadian forces as a volunteer. He spent four years overseas.

⁹ J. Bruchési, Histoire du Canada pour tous, vol. II, Montréal, Abert Lévesque, 1935; Canada, réalités d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, Montréal, Variétés, 1948.

¹⁰ G. Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, Montréal, Albert Lévesque, 1934.

¹¹ Lionel Groulx is representative of a 'provincial' historian. He had several 'provincial' connections. As the editor for eight years (1920-1928), Groulx was the driving force behind l'Action française. In the thirties, he was also a contributor to l'Action nationale. In 1947 Groulx founded the Institut d'histoire de l'Amérique française.

¹² L. Groulx, L'enseignement français au Canada, vol. I: Dans le Québec, Montréal, Action Canadienne-Française, 1931; vol. II: Les écoles des minorités, Montréal, Granger, 1933; Le français au Canada, Paris, Delagrave, 1932; Histoire du Canada français, depuis la découverte, vol. II, 4e éd., Montréal, Fides, 1960. [First published 1950] .

¹³ W. Morin, Nos droits minoritaires, les minorités françaises au Canada, Montréal, Fides, 1943.

¹⁴ R. Rumilly, L'autonomie provinciale, Montréal, l'Arbre, 1948; Histoire de la province de Québec, vol. I: Georges-Etienne Cartier, Montréal, Fides, 1971. [Reprint, 1940] ; Histoire du Canada, Paris, La Clé d'or, 1951; Mercier, Montréal, Zodiaque, 1936.

- 15 Of the fourteen writers considered in the second period, all but five used the fear of an American invasion. Two of the non-users were only concerned with the importance of Confederation and did not attempt to give an explanation of Confederation.
- 16 Only two historians did not refer to the political crisis: Richard Arès and Alfred De Celles. They dealt exclusively with the importance of Confederation.
- 17 Rumilly, Mercier, 1936, p. 42.
- 18 Langelier, La Confédération, 1916, pp. 17-18.
- 19 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, pp. 38-39. Also see Groulx, Histoire du Canada française, II, 1950, p. 281; Morin, Nos droits minoritaires, 1943, p. 36; Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, I, 1940, p. 9.
- 20 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 113.
- 21 Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty, 1945, p. 34. Also see Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 113; Duhamel, "Vers la fédération", 1949, p. 28; Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1934, p. 112; Perrault, "La Confédération canadienne est-elle née viable?", 1935, p. 11.
- 22 In 1934 Thomas Chapais maintained that: "La politique n'est pas le domaine de l'absolu; elle est essentiellement le domaine du relatif. Les hommes politiques ne sont pas toujours maîtres de faire ce qu'ils veulent, mais ils doivent se contenter souvent de faire ce qu'ils peuvent." Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 192.
- 23 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, pp. 14-15, 16. Also see Groulx, "Battle for Acceptance", 1949, pp. 157-158; Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 29.
- 24 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 143. Also see Bruchési, Histoire du Canada pour tous, II, 1935, p. 229; Canada, réalités d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1948, pp. 169-170; Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1934, pp. 115-117.
- 25 The United States and Great Britain were brought to the brink of war in November 1861 when an American warship stopped the Trent, a British mail ship, and two Confederate diplomats were seized.

- 26 Langelier, 1916, p. 27.
Also see Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, pp. 14, 33; Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 279; Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, I, 1940, p. 36; Histoire du Canada, 1951, p. 382.
- 27 Perrault, "La Confédération est-elle née viable?", 1935, p. 11.
- 28 World War I stopped the flow of investment from Europe and opened the flood from the United States. J. Hamelin et J-P Montminy, "Québec, 1896-1929: une deuxième phase d'industrialization" in F. Dumont et al., Idéologies au Canada Français, 1900-1929, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974, p. 22.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Y. Roby, Les Québécois et les investissements américains (1918-1929), Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1976, pp. 26-28.
- 31 Groulx, Histoire du Canada français, vol. II, 1950, pp. 387-388. Author's emphasis.
- 32 Groulx, "Le problème économique", l'Action française, vol. 4, déc. 1920, p. 559.
- 33 Groulx, "La bourgeoisie et le national" in E. Minville, V. Barbeau et L. Groulx, l'Avenir de notre bourgeoisie, Montréal, Bernard Valiquette, 1939, pp. 102-103.
- 34 Robert Rumilly, like Groulx, believed that French Canadians living in urban centres were "plus vulnérables aux influences américaines, par exemple au "cinéma judéo-américain", à la radio et aux journaux des Etats-Unis." J. Levitt, "Robert Rumilly, historien des relations francophones et anglophones depuis 1867 jusqu'à l'industrialisation du Québec", Recherches sociographiques, vol. 15, no 1, 1974, p. 71.
- 35 Duhamel's "Vers la fédération" (1949) was basically a summary of the arguments put forth by George Parkin de T. Glazebrook in Canadian External Relations, an historical study to 1914 (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1942, pp. 64-81). In his article, "La gènese de la loi de 1867 concernant l'Amérique du Nord britannique" (1948), Bonenfant made reference to a number of English Canadian historians. This included John Boyd, Joseph Pope, Reginald G. Trotter and W. Menzies Whitelaw.

- 36 Duhamel, "Vers la fédération", 1949, p. 16.
Also see Bonenfant, "La genèse de la loi de 1867 concernant l'Amérique du Nord britannique", 1948, p. 5.
- 37 Bruchési, Histoire du Canada pour tous, II, 1935, p. 225.
- 38 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 37.
- 39 The percentage of the rural population of Quebec dropped below 50 for the first time in 1921. Within a decade it was less than 40. Quebec, Department of Trade and Commerce, Statistical Yearbook, 1953, p. 65, table 10.
- 40 According to Yves Roby "c'est la question économique qui, indéniablement, tenait la vedette durant les années 1920." Les Québécois et les investissements américains (1918-1929), p. 3.
- 41 For example, Charles A. Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913) and Harold A. Innis' The Fur Trade in Canada: an introduction to Canadian economic history (1930).
- 42 Bruchési was the only one with an 'economic' background. From 1931 to 1937, he taught politics at the Université de Montréal. He was also a professor of Canadian economic history at l'Ecole Supérieure de Commerce at Laval University. In 1945, he received a doctorate in political, social and economic sciences from the Université de Montréal.
- 43 See, for example, Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty, 1945, p. 35; Bruchési, Canada, réalités d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1948, p. 170.
- 44 Groulx, Histoire du Canada Français, II, 1950, p. 375.
- 45 See, for example, Groulx, Notre mission française, Montréal, Le Devoir, 1941.
- 46 Groulx, for one, recognized that a historian's philosophy of life influenced his historical arguments: "Dans le choix des faits à retenir, ou à laisser tomber, dans l'importance à leur conférer, forcément l'historien en est amené à établir un ordre de grandeur, une échelle de valeur. Où prendra-t-il le principe de son choix, de l'ordre de grandeur, si ce n'est, encore cette fois, dans l'idée

qu'il se fait de l'homme, c'est-à-dire dans une philosophie?", "Le manuel unique est-il conciliable avec l'histoire scientifique?", l'Action nationale, vol. 35, no 5, mai 1950, p. 345.

47 Lanctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", 1927, p. 97.
Also see Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1934, p. 113; Bonenfant, "Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération", 1952, p. 45; Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 34; Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 280; Perrault, 1935, p. 11.

48 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 34.
Also see Groulx, Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 287.

49 Groulx, Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 280.

50 Bonenfant, "La genèse de la loi de 1867 concernant l'Amérique du Nord britannique", 1948, p. 5.

51 Duhamel, "Vers la fédération", 1949, p. 24.

52 Ibid., p. 25.

53 Ibid., p. 26.

54 Bonenfant, "Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération", 1952, p. 45.

55 Groulx, "Le manuel unique est-il conciliable avec l'histoire scientifique?", 1950, p. 345.

56 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 60.
Also see Perrault, 1935, pp. 9-10; Robitaille, "La Confédération canadienne", 1927, p. 65.

57 See Bonenfant, "Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération", 1952, p. 42; Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 116; Rumilly, Histoire du Canada, 1951, p. 381.

58 In 1927 Groulx described Confederation in the following manner: "L'on convient qu'après plus d'un demi-siècle d'existence, la Confédération canadienne reste encore un géant anémique, porteur de maints germes de dissolution." "Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", 1927, p. 300.

- 59 Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 116.
Also see Groulx, "Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", 1927, p. 294; Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, I, 1940, p. 22.
- 60 Groulx, "Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", 1927, p. 300.
- 61 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 184.
- 62 Chapais, "La question du divorce, discours au Sénat, 15 mai 1930", Discours et conférences, Québec, Garneau, 1943, p. 414.
- 63 Chapais, "La question du divorce, discours au Sénat, 20 avril 1920", Discours et conférences, 1943, pp. 309-310.
- 64 Appointed to the Canadian Senate in 1919, Chapais continuously opposed any attempts to facilitate the process of obtaining a divorce.
- 65 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 187.
- 66 Ibid., p. 190.
- 67 Groulx, "Ce cinquantenaire", 1917, p. 196.
- 68 Rumilly, L'autonomie provinciale, 1948, p. 7.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Groulx, Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 11.
- 72 Robitaille, "La Confédération canadienne", 1927, p. 63.
Also see Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, pp. 175-176; De Celles, Les constitutions du Canada, 1918, p. 71; Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty, 1945, p. 36.
- 73 L'Anctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", 1927, p. 98-99.
Also see Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 160; De Celles, Les constitutions du Canada, 1918, p. 71.

74 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, pp. 214 - 215.

75 J-P Montminy and J. Hamelin estimate that from 1931 to 1933 the unemployment rate in the province of Quebec was 30 per cent with it going as high as 50 per cent in some areas. J. Hamelin et J-P Montminy, "La Crise", in F. Dumont et al., Idéologies au Canada Français, Québec; Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1978, p. 25.

76 Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was first published in 1936.

77 D.V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality, Toronto, Methuen, 1967, p. 36.

78 Cited in H.F. Quinn, The Union nationale: Quebec nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 105.

79 Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality, p. 53.

80 Rumilly, L'autonomie provinciale, 1948, pp. 295-296.

81 Groulx, Histoire du Canada français, II, 1950, p. 382.

82 Rumilly, L'autonomie provinciale, 1948, p. 7.
Also see Arès, La Confédération: pacte ou loi?, Montréal, Action Nationale, 1949, p. 72; Bonenfant, "Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération", 1952, p. 45; Groulx, L'enseignement français au Canada, I, 1931, p. 277.

83 De Celles, Les constitutions du Canada, 1918, p. 61.
Also see Bruchési, Histoire du Canada pour tous, II, 1935, pp. 235, 245; Lanctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", 1927, p. 98.

84 Ollivier, L'avenir constitutionnel du Canada, 1935, p. 67.
Also see Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty, 1945, p. 352.

85 De Celles held the position of chief librarian of the parliamentary library in Ottawa from 1885 to 1920. Ollivier served in England and in France during the First World War. In 1925 he was named legal advisor to the House of Commons. Ollivier was also part of the Canadian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946.

86 Article 133 of the British North America Act, 1867:

Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both of these Languages.

British North America Acts, 1867-1915, Ottawa, Taché, 1917, p.25.

87 Morin, Nos droits minoritaires, 1943, p. 71.

Also see Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, pp. 154-155; L'enseignement français au Canada, II, 1933, p. 243; Le Français au Canada, 1932, p. 208; Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1934, p. 118; Langelier, 1916, p. 40.

88 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 161.

89 Groulx, Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", 1927, p. 292.

90 Article 93, (3)(4) of the British North America Act, 1867:

3 Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissident Schools exists by Law at the Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority of the Queen's Subjects in relation to Education:

4 In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time seems to the Governor General in Council requisite for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section is not made, or in case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any Appeal under this Section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that Behalf, than and in every

such Case, and as far only as the Circumstances of each Case require, the Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section and of any Decision of the Governor General in Council under this Section. British North America Acts, 1867-1915, p. 19.

91 See, for example, Groulx, La Confédération canadienne, 1918, p. 177; Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, I, 1940, pp. 52-53.

92 Lanctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", 1927, p. 100.

93 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 214.
Also see Lanctôt, "Deux appréciations sommaires de la Confédération", 1927, p. 100.

94 Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, VIII, 1934, p. 211.

95 Lanctôt, Le Canada d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1934, p. 115.
Also see Bruchési, Canada, réalités d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, 1948, p. 173; Robitaille, 1927, p. 64.

96 Groulx, "Les Canadiens français et l'établissement de la Confédération", 1927, p. 284.
Also see Groulx, Histoire du Canada Français, II, 1950, p. 294.

CHAPTER THREE

1954-1967: The 'Federal' versus 'Provincial' Economic Interpretation

The publication of Maurice Lamontagne's Le fédéralisme canadien: évolution et problèmes¹, in 1954, marked a new stage in the historiography of Confederation. For the first time since 1867, French Canadian survival was not the focus of analysis. Lamontagne, and the young historians that followed him, endeavoured to put the history of the 1860s within the context of economic development. The new generation of writers summoned the economic factor from its shadowy background role to centre stage, as a full-fledged cause.

The leading actors in this historiographical drama were Maurice Lamontagne and Alfred Dubuc. Both relied almost entirely on economic considerations to explain Confederation. For example, Lamontagne argued that "les facteurs économiques ont joué un rôle prédominant sur le plan de l'unification politique"². A decade after Lamontagne, Dubuc explained the union of 1867 in the following manner:

L'on peut proposer, de la Constitution de 1867, une définition en termes économiques: la Confédération fut essentiellement une opération de finances publiques ayant pour

but de mettre à la disposition des agents reconnus responsables de l'investissement les ressources nécessaires au développement économique du pays. Elle reposait sur un projet fondamental de développement économique: l'ouverture de régions nouvelles à l'agriculture et à l'exploitation forestière; le développement de l'industrie nationale; la venue d'une main-d'oeuvre abondante; l'intensification des relations commerciales avec l'Empire. Dans la mesure, et c'était là la croyance générale, où tous ces secteurs économiques étaient solidaires les uns des autres et où toutes les régions géographiques du territoire canadien étaient, par leurs ressources et leurs avantages particuliers, complémentaires les unes des autres, dans la même mesure il suffisait de privilégier un secteur pour que, par voie d'entraînement, tous les autres secteurs et toutes les régions du Canada, se développassent parallèlement et de façon harmonieuse; bref, c'était un projet de croissance équilibrée, pourrions-nous dire aujourd'hui.³

The economic factor also formed an integral part of the thesis of Jean Hamelin, another member of the new generation of historians. His interpretation of Confederation, unlike those of Dubuc and Lamontagne, was not exclusively economic in nature. Hamelin described Confederation as a political solution which had "en même temps d'importants objectifs économiques qui forment la toile de fonds[sic] de l'histoire politique du Dominion⁴." Hamelin, however, insisted upon the tie between economic matters and other causes. In reference to the American Civil War, for example, Hamelin argued that the Canadian leaders feared, not only assimilation by their republican neighbour⁵, but an end to reciprocity⁶. Hamelin

continued:

Cette nouvelle union politique était réalisée essentiellement pour favoriser les ambitions des deux provinces centrales axées sur Montréal et Toronto.

En effet, la fermeture des marchés américains et britanniques rendaient [sic] nécessaire un rajustement du commerce. La seule solution consistait dans le libre-change [sic] entre les colonies de l'Amérique du Nord britannique, l'intercolonial unissant ces colonies.⁷

In concluding, Hamelin suggested that the principal concern of the Fathers of Confederation was to establish an economic framework which would induce a commercial interdependence between the different regions of British North America.

Le schéma économique élaboré par les Pères de la Confédération consistait donc à transformer le commerce international des colonies en un commerce interprovincial: les fermiers de l'ouest utiliseraient les revenus tirés de la vente de leur blé à l'étranger à l'achat de produits manufacturés dans le Québec et l'Ontario. Le charbon de la Nouvelle-Ecosse alimenterait en énergie les industries et les chemins de fer.⁸

The emergence of the economic cause after 1953 was linked to three factors: first, the educational background of the historians; secondly, the professionalization of French Canadian history; and thirdly, the secularization of French Canadian society in general. In regard to the education of the historians, the new generation of writers on Confederation were products of the social science revolution which began in Quebec universities just prior to World War II.⁹ Their formal training in the social sciences -

in either history¹⁰ or economics¹¹ - contrasted with the traditional educations¹² that their predecessors had received. In addition, the education of the new generation of writers took place when the writing of history in French Canada was entering its 'professional' stage, in the late 1940s¹³. The teaching and writing of history, which had been the domain of priests and part-time historians, became dominated by career historians¹⁴. Both the training in the social sciences and the professionalization of history worked together to diminish the powerful influence that Lionel Groulx had on French Canadian historiography in the inter-war period¹⁵. This was a significant development in the historiography of Confederation since Groulx had been one of the strongest opponents to an economic interpretation of Confederation.

While the influence of Lionel Groulx waned¹⁶, the influence of English Canadian historiography increased; this too furthered the use of economic considerations to explain Confederation. One of the English Canadian historians who affected French Canadian historical views of Confederation was Donald Creighton. In the case of Maurice Lamontagne, for example, Creighton's influence was considerable. Echoing Creighton's economic history of Confederation, Lamontagne emphasized the fiscal difficulties of the colonies in the 1860s and concluded that only the establishment of a powerful central government made the federation financially feasible:

Par ailleurs, les colonies ne pouvaient plus financer un tel projet. Seul un gouvernement central était capable de se procurer les crédits nécessaires pour le mener à bonne fin et d'unifier le territoire de l'Atlantique au Pacifique.¹⁸

The influence of Creighton is also evident in the interpretation of Jean Hamelin. Hamelin's insistence on the interrelationship between causes, and in particular, between economic considerations and other causes, originated from Creighton¹⁹. In his analysis of the political crisis, for example, Hamelin linked the deadlock to the Montreal-Toronto commercial and financial rivalry:

La section-ouest du Canada, dominée par les clear-grits... réclame l'annexion de l'Ouest, la représentation suivant la population, un système d'écoles non-confessionnelles et favorise une politique économique qui va dans le sens des intérêts torontois. Par contre, la section-est [qui] appuie la coalition libérale-conservatrice[,]... ne veut pas d'une représentation suivant la population ni d'une annexion de l'Ouest qui augmenterait la puissance de sa rivale. En majorité catholique, elle repousse l'idéologie grite qui en certains de ces aspects s'identifie au prosélytisme protestant. Montréal surtout voit d'un mauvais oeil Toronto accroître sa puissance financière et [se] poser en rival [sic].²⁰

The legitimization of the economic factor after 1953 was also connected to the process of secularization which French Canadian society was experiencing at this time. With la révolution tranquille, modern secular Quebec emerged. A corresponding process of secular-

ization occurred in the writing of French Canadian history of Confederation. The new generation of historians shared their contemporaries' interest in questions of finance and economic development. As such, they turned to these factors to explain the union of 1867.

Not all of the historians writing after 1953, however, centred their explanations around economic considerations. Jean-Charles Bonenfant, whose interest in Confederation as a historical subject dated back to the late 1940s, produced a number of essays dealing exclusively with Confederation²¹. For Bonenfant, the economic factor was just one of the many causes of Confederation. In 1966, he explained the union of the British North American colonies as follows:

Dans la naissance de la Confédération, plusieurs causes s'entremêlent, mais, on peut commodément les classer ainsi: les exigences économiques de l'époque; la nécessité de construire l'Inter-colonial et de renflouer financièrement le système déjà existant de chemin de fer; la crainte des Etats-Unis et en même temps, jusqu'à un certain point, le désir de les imiter; les exigences de la défense; la naissance dans les diverses colonies d'un sentiment national commun; le consentement de la métropole et finalement le désir dans le Canada-Uni de sortir des difficultés qui, depuis quelques années, paralysaient le fonctionnement des institutions politiques.²²

Bonenfant was a product of two different eras. He was educated in the 1930s before the social science revolution in Quebec yet he began to write history in the late 1940s when the history of

Groulx was being challenged by English Canadian historiography. Caught in between two generations, Bonenfant opted for an explanation which was both 'traditional' and 'secular'. Like the part-time historical writers of the pre-World War II era, the lawyer-historian presented a multi-causal explanation which centred upon religious and political leaders²³ but, influenced by English Canadian historians²⁴; Bonenfant also included economic considerations among his causes²⁵.

Interest in Confederation as an historical subject in the period after 1953 corresponded to an intensification of the provincial-federal power struggle which had begun before the Second World War. The Quebec government, first under the Union Nationale, and then under the revitalized Liberal party of Jean Lesage, maintained that additional sources of revenue were required to meet new provincial responsibilities. As such, Quebec demanded new fiscal arrangements with Ottawa²⁶ and eventually Quebec entered the private sector and participated directly in the development and management of the province's natural resources²⁷. With the focus in the 1950s and 1960s on the growing involvement of government in society and, more particularly, on the jurisdictional conflicts between Ottawa and Quebec City, it is not surprising to find the debate over the significance of Confederation revolving around the question of what had been created in 1867 - a centralized government in Ottawa or

a powerful autonomous government in Quebec City?

In 1953 Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec established the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Tremblay Commission²⁸) in order to provide his fight against the federal government with a weapon which would refute the centralist arguments of the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (1937)²⁹. Specifically, the government wanted the members of the commission to find evidence supporting the thesis that the Fathers of Confederation had intended the provinces to have sole right to all forms of direct taxation³⁰. With the purpose of supporting this argument, the authors of the Tremblay Report turned to the history of Confederation.

The Tremblay Report was completed in 1956³¹ and its authors rejected the notion that the Fathers of Confederation had installed an omnipotent central authority in 1867. The members of the commission were able to come to such a conclusion because they measured the union of 1867 with the same yardstick of "survival" that had been used frequently prior to 1954. They asked: What did Confederation do to ensure la survivance of French Canada? Like the writers of the 1920s and 1930s, they equated the survival of French Canada with language, education and religion. In other words, their outlook, which had been shaped by their 'traditional' education and by events occurring before the Second World War, differed from the

"modern" secular values of the younger generation. The authors of the Tremblay Report made this clear in their discussion of provincial-federal powers:

L'on aurait tort... de sous-estimer les pouvoirs réservés à ces dernières [les provinces], sous prétexte qu'ils ne portent que sur des matières d'intérêt local ou privé, comme si l'importance d'un pouvoir législatif se mesurait à l'étendue géographique sur laquelle il peut s'exercer, et non pas plutôt à la valeur humaine de son objet. Sans doute, il est nécessaire que le Parlement fédéral et que les législatures provinciales remplissent tous les deux leurs fonctions, mais si nous avons à choisir, ne préférerions-nous pas une famille saine à une monnaie saine, des écoles bien organisées à des communications faciles, un bon régime de la propriété à un bon régime de crédit, des institutions municipales florissantes à une législation bien faite sur les lettres de change et la faillite? Tout cela est en relation beaucoup plus immédiate et plus directe avec l'homme et avec les véritables fins de la société politique.³²

This belief in "human" values enabled the authors of the Tremblay Report to make a case for provincial autonomy. The members of the Tremblay Commission, for example, focused attention upon education, language and minority rights:

les auteurs de la nouvelle constitution avaient l'obligation de réserver aux anciennes provinces, puisque l'union se fondait sur le principe fédératif, les pouvoirs indispensables à leur subsistance comme unités politiques autonomes chargées de veiller aux intérêts culturels, sociaux et particuliers de leurs propres citoyens... L'ensemble de ces pouvoirs compris surtout dans les articles 92 et 93, forme précisément ce qu'on a coutume d'appeler l'autonomie provinciale.³³

An integral part of the provincial autonomy argument was the compact theory. To give substance to this theory, the authors of the Tremblay Report referred to the "so-called" language and educational guarantees obtained by French Canadians in 1867. They argued that the existence of these rights in the British North America Act confirmed the validity of the 'compact theory':

Dans cette nouvelle union... les Canadiens français ne voulurent pas entrer en vaincus ou en citoyens de seconde zone, mais bien en partenaires et en associés avec des droits spéciaux et distincts pour tout ce qui concernait leur survivance comme nationalité, notamment pour leur langue, leur religion et leur droit civil.

La constitution de 1867 porte, à divers endroits, l'empreinte de cette volonté des Canadiens français de se faire reconnaître comme groupe national distinct ayant place officielle dans la Confédération. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que l'article 133 parle de l'usage des langues anglaise et française au Parlement...

Le même esprit et la même volonté d'égalité se retrouvent dans l'article 93 destiné à protéger les deux minorités religieuses: protestante et catholique, contre les possibilités d'injustice de la part des pouvoirs provinciaux.³⁴

Richard Arès, a prominent member of the Tremblay Commission, reiterated the same argument in the revised edition of his Dossier sur le pacte fédératif de 1867³⁵ (1967):

Ce qui nous intéresse ici, cependant, n'est pas la nature ou la valeur de ces garanties, mais uniquement leur existence ou, si l'on veut, le fait que les Canadiens français ont posé leurs conditions à leur entrée dans la Confédération et que ces conditions ont été acceptées dans le Pacte fédératif.³⁶

Arès concluded:

Les conditions ont été déterminées au Canada, les représentants des autres provinces les ont acceptées et le gouvernement impérial les a insérées dans la Loi de 1867. En d'autres termes, entre les deux groupes ethniques, entre les deux communautés culturelles, un pacte a été conclu qui ensuite est passé dans la loi.³⁷

The government of Quebec had established the Tremblay Commission primarily to justify Duplessis' position in his battles with the federal government. As such, the Tremblay Report's analysis of the importance of Confederation included reference to controversial topics of the 1950s such as federal subsidies, direct taxation and natural resources. In regard to federal subsidies, the authors of the Tremblay Report concluded that their existence was "un accroc au principe fédératif, lequel demande que chaque ordre de gouvernement soit autonome et responsable dans le domaine financier comme dans les autres domaines législatifs"³⁸.

The Tremblay Report suggested that the provinces had retained for themselves two of the most promising economic powers: natural resources and direct taxation³⁹. The Report described the latter as "la source de revenu la plus importante pour les gouvernements"⁴⁰.

In regard to direct taxation, it concluded:

Il serait sans doute vain de prétendre qu'ils [les Pères] ont tout prévu, mais au lieu de critiquer leur oeuvre sur ce point, peut-être vaudrait-il mieux reconnaître franchement que l'avenir a confirmé la justesse de leurs dispositions.⁴¹

The Report, however, chastised the 'Fathers' on the subject of direct taxation. The 'Fathers', the Report maintained, were not specific enough in delineating the federal government's powers of taxation, "laissant ainsi une porte ouverte par laquelle ce dernier [le gouvernement fédéral] finira par s'introduire dans le champ de taxation réservé aux provinces⁴²."

The authors of the Tremblay Report viewed the union of 1867 from a traditional perspective. They assessed the importance of Confederation with much the same value structure that their contemporaries of the 1920s and 1930s used. This enabled the Tremblay commissioners to make a strong case for provincial autonomy. In contrast, the new generation of historians were part of modern Quebec. The young writers had no difficulty in accepting Quebec's industrial revolution. They shared a belief that the future depended upon continued industrial development. Thus, in examining Confederation, they were particularly interested in the division of economic power. They all agreed that Ottawa had been assigned the predominant role in the economic domain and they concluded that a strong central government had been established in 1867.

Michel Brunet was a member of the new generation of historians⁴³. He underlined Ottawa's authority, arguing that the Fathers of Confederation wished to avoid the kind of system

which had allowed the disintegration of the American union. As a result, they had opted for "un gouvernement central dont l'autorité souveraine ne pourrait pas être mise en doute⁴⁴." To support his contention, Brunet pointed to the federal government's designated powers in economic matters⁴⁵, its right of veto and disallowance⁴⁶ and its residual powers⁴⁷. The distribution of fiscal powers, Brunet argued, also reflected the kind of union that the 'Fathers' wished to have. The federal government received customs duties, the most important source of revenue of the time, and had "le droit d'avoir recours à tous modes ou systèmes de taxation"⁴⁸. The provinces were left with direct taxation, an unpopular and unused source of revenue at the time of Confederation⁴⁹. As such, they depended upon federal subsidies for their existence⁵⁰. Brunet concluded:

Il n'est pas exagéré de soutenir que, conformément à la volonté de ses auteurs, la constitution de 1867 réduisait les provinces à de simples unités administratives dénuées de prestige, de "grandes municipalités" aimait à dire Macdonald, complètement sous la tutelle du gouvernement central ou "national".⁵¹

Brunet, however, was unlike other "secular" writers in that he also referred to "traditional" subjects like language, education and minority rights⁵². These things, he believed, were important for French Canada. But Brunet was a product of different circumstances from those that formed his mentor, Lionel Groulx.

He was a part of the social science revolution: For him, French Canadian survival did not depend upon the Church; it depended upon the State⁵³. This was why Brunet, who was a strong supporter of provincial autonomy, accepted the compact theory⁵⁴. This also explains his "Pessimistic" view of Quebec's future. His dream of a strong provincial government, which would control Quebec's economy as well as its social services, was shattered by the historical realities of the British North America Act. Thus, for Brunet, the constitution of 1867 remained "une oeuvre d'unification et de centralisation⁵⁵", and Macdonald and his colleagues "rêvaient de donner naissance à une nation British American ou Canadian⁵⁶." He concluded that the union of 1867 had not altered the status of French Canadians: "le fait demeure que les Canadiens français furent réduits comme collectivité à vivre dans un état permanent d'infériorité dans le pays qu'ont bâti les vainqueurs de 1760 et leurs héritiers⁵⁷."

Alfred Dubuc, like Michel Brunet, believed that the Fathers of Confederation had established a strong central government in 1867. Focusing on the distribution of economic powers, Dubuc argued:

... la Confédération de 1867 accordait au gouvernement fédéral tous les pouvoirs essentiels pour inspirer le développement économique. Le capital fixe de toutes les colonies était remis au pouvoir central, en même temps avec toutes les dettes; le pouvoir de législation dans tous les secteurs

responsables du développement lui était conféré... Toutes les sources importantes de recettes fiscales étaient abandonnées à Ottawa... A n'en pas douter, la constitution du Canada avait une préoccupation économique fondamentale: éponger l'épargne de tous le pays pour investir dans le développement économique, c'est-à-dire principalement dans le secteur des chemins de fer qui devait entraîner tous les autres. 58

Dubuc, more than any other writer, emphasized the economic sphere. This preoccupation reflected his economic determinism. For Dubuc, Confederation was important because it was an event which substantiated the need for a new constitution in the 1960s. Dubuc concluded:

Plus qu'un simple texte juridique, une constitution est l'image d'une société à un moment précis de son développement. Elle plonge ses racines dans l'infrastructure économique et sociale d'un peuple. C'est toute la vision du monde que se fait ce peuple, à une étape de son évolution historique, qui inspire une constitution. Une telle conception n'entraîne aucunement la nécessité de révisions fréquentes de la constitution. Car les étapes du développement social qui marquent une modification de la vision du monde et un tournant de l'histoire sont peu fréquentes: le milieu du 19e siècle en constitua une, qui entraîna une nouvelle constitution pour les colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord; le milieu du 20e apparaît comme une nouvelle étape de cette importance. 59

Similar to other 'secular' historians, Maurice Lamontagne and Jean Hamelin suggested that Confederation had created a strong central authority. In support of their argument, they stressed the federal government's role in economic development: "En somme,

on confiait au gouvernement fédéral les grandes tâches de l'Etat. Son rôle devait être essentiellement dynamique et ses responsabilités consistaient à réaliser les grands objectifs de la Confédération⁶⁰." They also pointed to the provinces' limited sources of revenue, the residual clause and the federal government's right of reserve and disallowance of provincial laws:

La constitution canadienne accordait au parlement fédéral une position prédominante par rapport aux législatures provinciales. Pour s'en convaincre, on n'a qu'à considérer les responsabilités et les sources de revenus limitées qu'elle laissait aux provinces et les pouvoirs généraux qu'elle attribuait au parlement central par la clause résiduelle de l'article 91, sans compter le droit de réserve et de désaveu des lois provinciales.⁶¹

For those who felt more at ease with Ottawa than with Duplessis in the 1950s, it was natural to present a history which supported the 'federal' point of view. Hamelin and Lamontagne did not regard the national government's "superiority" over the provinces as detrimental to French Canada. Hamelin, for example, suggested that the subsequent expansion of provincial power was not something that the Fathers of Confederation had envisaged or wished for⁶². As a federal civil servant⁶³ and later as a federal politician⁶⁴, Maurice Lamontagne looked upon the establishment of a strong central government as essential. In the nineteenth century the establishment of strong central government had enabled British North Americans to cope successfully with the unfavourable

repercussions of the first industrial revolution⁶⁵; in the last half of the twentieth century only a strong central government could ensure economic and social prosperity for Quebec and the rest of Canada.

The significance that Jean-Charles Bonenfant attributed to Confederation, like his explanation of Confederation, reflected elements of both his traditional education and his social science approach to the writing of history. In imitation of the traditional historians, he made reference to language, education and la survi-
vance. The latter, he suggested, was the principal source of motivation for the French-speaking Fathers of Confederation:

Même si les Pères de la Confédération n'ont pas très bien compris ce qu'aurait dû être le véritable fédéralisme, même s'ils furent plutôt favorables à un régime fortement centralisé, ils ont eu vraiment l'intention d'assurer la survivance des Canadiens français et ils ont adopté les moyens qui, à l'époque, leur semblèrent les meilleurs pour la réaliser.⁶⁶

He also accepted, however, the 'secular' notion that the Fathers of Confederation had wanted to set up a strong central government in 1867. Pointing to the right of disallowance, the financial structure and the federal appointment of lieutenant-governors, he concluded: "les Pères de la Confédération tentèrent d'établir le régime le plus centralisé possible...⁶⁷".

Bonenfant's analysis of the importance of Confederation was,

for the most part, a reaction against his contemporaries who were turning to the Fathers of Confederation and the constitution of 1867 in order to settle issues of the 1960s. For those opponents and proponents of bilingualism who attempted to use the history of the 1860s to support their arguments, he countered: "Il ne faut jamais juger les événements à la lumière des faits postérieurs avec une vision que ne pouvaient posséder les contemporains⁶⁸."

As for Bonenfant, his wish was to present an "objective" view of Confederation. In other words, his aim was to put forth an interpretation unaffected by present-day discussions of 'bilingualism and biculturalism'⁶⁹, 'special status'⁷⁰ and 'separatism'⁷¹; an interpretation that related the true spirit of 1867. He argued that the union of 1867 did not guarantee francophones the right to deal with the federal government in their mother-tongue: "L'article 133 de l'Acte de l'Amérique du Nord ne prévoit que le bilinguisme législatif et judiciaire et ... oublie celui de l'administration⁷²...".

Similarly, he contended that bilingualism in Canada's relations with the rest of the world was not an issue in 1867: "Aujourd'hui, nous pouvons nous scandaliser que l'activité internationale du Canada ne traduise pas toujours sa dualité, mais en 1867 ..., le problème ne pouvait même pas se poser⁷³." Bonenfant also argued that the British North America Act guaranteed minority educational rights; but not for French Catholics outside of the province of Quebec. Only the anglo-Protestant minority of Quebec received these privileges⁷⁴. He concluded that the resolution of issues of 1967 did

not lie in the spirit of 1867. Modern problems required modern solutions⁷⁵.

The centennial of Confederation did not have the same symbolic importance for French Canadian historians as it did for their English Canadian compatriots. The latter produced a plethora of Confederation histories⁷⁶ which celebrated the "triumph of Canadian nationality over the attractions of continentalism⁷⁷." French Canadian writers, like other Québécois, were more concerned with the process of secularization which Quebec was undergoing in the 1950s and 1960s. As such, only the 'federal' authors, Maurice Lamontagne and Jean Hamelin, who had been influenced by English Canadian historiography, saw 1867 as a starting point of a new nation. For members of the Tremblay Commission, 1867 meant provincial autonomy and an agreement between the provinces. For Michel Brunet, 1867 symbolized the birth of "l'Etat contemporain du Québec⁷⁸" and another victory for the English-speaking majority. For Jean-Charles Bonenfant, Confederation was "la seule solution réaliste⁷⁹" which French Canadians accepted because the alternative was annexation to the United States. He concluded that the French and the English came together in 1867, not because they "désiraient intensément vivre ensemble", but because they "ne pouvaient [pas] vivre séparément⁸⁰."

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

¹ M. Lamontagne, Le fédéralisme canadien: évolution et problèmes, Québec, Presses Universitaires Laval, 1954.

² Ibid., p. 7.

³ A. Dubuc, "Une interprétation économique de la constitution", Socialisme, no 7, jan. 1966, pp. 4-5.

⁴ J. Hamelin, J. Huot, M. Hamelin, Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, Québec, Culture, 1965, p. 14.
Also see J. Hamelin, "Le Canada français: son évolution historique", Annuaire de Québec, 1966-1967, Québec, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, 1967, p. 32.

⁵ Hamelin et al., Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, pp. 13-14

⁶ Hamelin, "Le Canada français", 1967, p. 32.

⁷ Hamelin et al., Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, p. 14.

⁸ Hamelin et al., Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, p. 15.
Also see Hamelin, "Le Canada français", 1967, p. 32.

⁹ This 'revolution' began in the late 1930s. Under the leadership of Georges-Henri Lévesque the Ecole des sciences sociales, économiques et politiques was established at Laval. In 1943, it became a Faculty. In 1942, at the Université de Montréal Esdras Minville's Ecole des sciences sociales et politiques which had been founded in 1920 went through the same process as Laval's. It was, however, not until 1950 that the Faculty at Montréal admitted day students. J-C Falardeau, L'essor des sciences sociales au Canada français, Québec, Ministères des Affaires culturelles, 1964, pp. 42, 45n.

¹⁰ Consider, for example, Jean Hamelin and Alfred Dubuc. Both received doctoral degrees in history: Dubuc from Ecole pratique des hautes études de Paris; and Hamelin from Université Laval.

11 Consider, for example, Maurice Lamontagne and Alfred Dubuc. Lamontagne was trained as an economist at Laval and Harvard. He served as a professor and chairman with the Department of Economics (Faculté des sciences sociales) at Laval. In 1959, Dubuc completed the course work for a doctorate in economic and social history at l'Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes à Paris. He went on to teach at the Université de Montréal with the Department of Economics.

12 Until the social science revolution in Quebec universities, many of those with professional aspirations became lawyers, priests or doctors. The learning received at Laval and the Université de Montréal "achemine exclusivement vers les trois carrières dans lesquelles s'incarnait l'idéal professionnel: le sacerdoce, la médecine et le droit". J-C Falardeau, L'essor des sciences sociales au Canada français, Québec, Ministère des Affaires culturelles, 1964, p. 26.

13 The 1940s witnessed the professionalization of history. In 1946 the Institut d'histoire et de géographie was established at Laval. One year later the Université de Montréal established the Institut d'histoire. In the same year, the Institut d'histoire de l'Amérique française came into existence. Up until the end of the Second World War, history in French Canada was written by amateurs. In 1943, E.C. Hughes reported: "The lawyer, the notary, the physician, the civil servant, and the priest have written much of Canada's history..." E.C. Hughes, French Canada in Transition, Toronto, W.J. Gage, 1944, p. 210.

14 P. Savard, "Un quart de siècle d'historiographie québécoise, 1947-1972", Recherches sociographiques, vol. 15, no 1, 1974, p. 95.

15 Pierre Savard described the prominence of Lionel Groulx in French Canadian historiography during the interwar period as follows: "L'abbé Lionel Groulx domine le concert historiographique de ce temps... [Groulx] exerce une sorte de présidence morale sur notre petit monde historiographique..." P. Savard, "Un quart de siècle d'historiographie québécoise, 1947-1972", pp. 79-80.

16 In the 1950s the history of Lionel Groulx was "de moins en moins celle des historiens de la génération montante." P. Savard, "Un quart de siècle d'historiographie québécoise, 1947-1972", p. 85.

17 D.G. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Appendix 2, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939.

¹⁸ Lamontagne, Le fédéralisme canadien, 1954, p. 9. "Central to Donald Creighton's interpretation of Confederation was the notion that "the Fathers of Confederation had intended the national government to possess the full panoply of power and had envisaged provincial administrations as mere municipal councils." C. Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, aspects of English-Canadian historical writing; 1900-1970, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 216.

¹⁹ In his writing of history, Creighton emphasized "the interplay between politics and commerce, ... the clash of interest groups and the political alignments of such groups." C. Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, p. 212.

²⁰ Hamelin, "Le Canada français", 1967, pp. 32-34. In their introduction the authors of Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle indicated their dependence upon English Canadian historiography: "On verra par les indications bibliographiques que la première partie de ce travail doit beaucoup à nos collègues de la langue anglaise. En histoire politique contemporaine, l'historiographie canadienne-française marque le pas." They singled out three works: J.M.S. Careless' Brown of the Globe (Toronto, Macmillan, 1959-1963); D.G. Creighton's John A. Macdonald (Toronto, Macmillan, 1952-1955); and D.C. Thomson's Alexander Mackenzie, Clear Grit (Toronto, Macmillan, 1960) Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, pp. 4, 4n-5n.

²¹ J-C Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, vol. 17, no 1, juin 1963, pp. 19-38; "L'idée que les Canadiens français de 1864 pouvaient avoir du fédéralisme", Culture, vol. 25, no 4, déc. 1964, pp. 307-322; Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération, Ottawa, Société historique du Canada, 1966; "Le Canada et les hommes politiques de 1867", Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, vol. 21, no 3a, 1967, pp. 573-596.

²² Bonenfant, Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération, 1966, pp. 11-12.

²³ See Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", 1963, pp. 23-25.

²⁴ Bonenfant made reference to O.D. Skelton (The Railway Builders, Toronto, Brook, 1916), G.P. de T. Glazebrook (History of Transportation in Canada, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1938) and R.G. Trotter (Canadian Federation, Toronto, J.M. Dent, 1924).

- 25 See Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", 1963, pp. 21-24.
- 26 For example, in 1955 Premier Duplessis demanded that a taxation policy be implemented which followed the spirit and letter of the constitution. In 1962, Premier Lesage refused to make a submission to Diefenbaker's Royal Commission of Taxation. The following year Lesage established his own commission (Bélanger). "Aperçu chronologique de l'histoire politique du Québec, 1867-1967", Annuaire du Québec, 1966-1967, Québec, Ministère de l'Industrie et Commerce, 1967, pp. 863-864.
- 27 For example, in 1963 the Lesage government nationalized the private electrical companies and they became part of Hydro-Québec. In 1965 by establishing the Société québécoise d'exploration minière (SOQUEM), the province of Québec became involved in the exploration and development of natural resources.
- 28 Judge Thomas Tremblay headed this commission. Other members of the commission were Richard Arès, Paul Henri Guimont, Esdra Minville, Honoré Parent and John P. Rowat.
- 29 R. Rumilly, Quinze années de réalisations les faits parlent, Montréal, (no publisher), 1956, p. 208.
- 30 D. Kwavnick, "Editor's Introduction" in D. Kwavnick (ed.), The Tremblay Report, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1973, p. vii.
- 31 Rapport de la Commission Royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels, vol. I, II, Province de Québec, 1956.
- 32 Rapport de la Commission Royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels (Rapport Tremblay), I, 1956, p. 40.
- 33 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
Also see pp. 18, 20.
- 34 Rapport Tremblay, II, pp. 138-139.
Also see Rapport Tremblay, I, p. 43.
- 35 R. Arès, Dossier sur le pacte fédératif de 1867; la Confédération pacte ou loi?, (nouv. éd. entièrement refondue et mise à jour), Montréal, Editions Bellarmin, 1967.

36 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
Also see pp. 233, 234, 236.

37 Ibid., p. 234.

38 Rapport Tremblay, I, 1956, p. 29.

39 Ibid., p. 40.

40 Ibid., p. 41.

41 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

42 Ibid., p. 42.

43 Brunet received his doctoral degree in history from Clark University in 1947. Our study includes three of his works: Canadiens et Canadiens; études sur l'histoire et la pensée des deux Canadas, Montréal, Fides, 1954; La présence anglaise et les Canadiens; études sur l'histoire et la pensée des deux Canadas, (2e éd.), Montréal, Beauchemin, 1964; Québec, Canada anglais, deux itinéraires, une affrontement, Montréal, Editions HMH, 1968. (The chapters relevant to our study appeared before 1968: pp. 221-230, (1967); pp. 233-286 (1964).

44 Brunet, Québec, Canada anglais, 1968, p. 240.

45 Ibid., p. 245.

46 Ibid., p. 244.

47 Ibid., p. 241.

48 Ibid., p. 245.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., p. 246.

51 Ibid., p. 244.

52 Ibid., pp. 266, 280.
Also see La présence anglaise et les Canadiens, 1964, p. 238.

- 53 R. Cook, "L'historien et le nationalisme, le cas Michel Brunet", Cité Libre, 15e année, no 73, jan. 1965, p. 9.
- 54 Brunet, Québec, Canada anglais, 1968, p. 266.
- 55 Ibid., p. 243.
- 56 Brunet, Canadiens et Canadiens, 1954, p. 24.
- 57 Brunet, Québec, Canada anglais, 1968, p. 281.
- 58 Dubuc, "Une interprétation économique...", 1966, pp. 11-12.
- 59 Ibid., p. 21.
- 60 Lamontagne, Le fédéralisme canadien, 1954, p. 15.
- 61 Ibid., p. 16.
Also see p. 13; Hamelin et al., Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, p. 16.
- 62 Hamelin et al., Aperçu de la politique canadienne au XIXe siècle, 1965, p. 14n.
- 63 As an economist, Lamontagne held numerous positions with the federal civil service. The flow of the social science graduates of Laval to the federal government in the 1950s developed, according to Lamontagne, because of Duplessis: "Les diplômés en économie et en sociologie se trouvent de l'emploi dans le secteur privé mais ceux qui désirent oeuvrer au sein de la fonction publique doivent se rendre à Ottawa qu'ils veuillent ou non car l'accès au gouvernement du Québec est interdit." Lamontagne, "La Faculté des sciences sociales de Laval: prélude de la révolution tranquille.", Histoire Sociale, vol. 10, no 19, mai 1977, p. 149.
- 64 In 1963, Lamontagne was elected as a Liberal to the House of Commons. Within two years he was in the federal cabinet as Secretary of State and shortly afterward he was named to the Senate.
- 65 Lamontagne, 1954, p. 73.
- 66 Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", 1963, p. 32.
Also see "L'idée que les Canadiens français...", 1964, pp. 320-321.

67 Ibid., p. 28.

Also see p. 29.

68 Bonenfant, Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération, 1966, p. 19.

69 In 1963 the Pearson government created the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Dunton-Laurendeau). Its purpose was "to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races..." Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, General Introduction, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967, p. xxi.

70 Those who advocated special status for Quebec accepted "the continuance of the federal system for Canada", but they demanded "major amendments to the BNA Act, if not a complete revision of the constitution," which would officially recognize Quebec, "as, 'a province not like the others', one which is the fatherland of the French Canadian 'nation', and as such, a province which should be given special powers." Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Preliminary Report, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965, p. 92.

71 In the 1950s and 1960s a number of organizations and political groups advocated the separation of Quebec from Canada and the establishment of an independent French Canadian nation. Among these were: l'Alliance Laurentienne, Le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale, Le Ralliement Nationale, le Parti Républicain du Québec and le Mouvement Souveraineté Association.

72 Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", 1963, p. 36.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., p. 32.

Also see "L'idée que les Canadiens français de 1864 pouvaient avoir du fédéralisme", 1964, p. 321.

75 Bonenfant, "L'idée que les Canadiens français ...", 1964, p. 321.

76 For example, Confederation: essays by D.G. Creighton et al., introd. by R. Cook, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967; D.G. Creighton, The Road to Confederation; the emergence of Canada: 1863-1867, Toronto, Macmillan, 1964; W.L. Morton, The Critical Years:

the union of British North America, 1857-1873, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1964; P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867; politics, newspapers and the union of British North America, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962. For an extensive bibliography of Confederation history written to 1967, see P. Allen, "Confédération canadienne: bibliographie sommaire", Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, vol. 21, no 3a, 1967, pp. 697-719.

77 R. Cook, "Introduction" in Confederation: essays by D.G. Creighton et al., p.x.

78 Brunet, Québec, Canada anglais, 1968, p. 229.

79 Bonenfant, Les Canadiens français et la naissance de la Confédération, 1966, p. 19.

80 Bonenfant, "L'esprit de 1867", 1963, p. 38.

CONCLUSION

Confederation, as an event in French Canadian historiography in the period from 1867 to 1967, was overshadowed by the Conquest of 1760; it was not, however, ignored. Some of French Canada's most influential historians endeavoured to explain the union of the four British North American colonies. For example, in the early part of his historical career, Lionel Groulx delivered a series of lectures on Confederation; these lectures formed the basis of a book-length documented study on Confederation. Thomas Chapais devoted a substantial portion of his final volume of Cours d'histoire du Canada to the history of Confederation. Richard Arès dedicated much of his historical career responding to one question - 'Was Confederation a pact between the provinces?' Jean-Charles Bonenfant specialized in the history of Confederation and produced a number of essays dealing exclusively with the Union of 1867. Thus, while it did not attract the center-stage spotlight, Confederation was the centre of some important historical study.

French Canadians who examined Confederation in the period from 1867 to 1967 put forth three basic interpretations. From 1867 to 1915, historians used the United Canadian political crisis of the 1860s to explain the union of 1867, and they centred their discussions of the significance of Confederation around the theme of la survivance. From 1916 to 1953, historians continued to focus on French Canadian survival, but they expanded their explanations of the advent of Confederation to include the fear of an American invasion. From 1954 to 1967, historians added the economic factor to their list of causes. As for the significance of Confederation, they shifted the focus away from la survivance and related the history of the 1860s to economic development.

Coincidental to the changes in the interpretations of Confederation were changes in: the economic and social structure of French Canadian society; the issues that society deemed significant; the historians' perspective; and the type of historians who wrote about Confederation. Specifically, French Canadian society, of which French Canadian historians of Confederation were a part, went through tremendous social and economic change over the course of the hundred year period. Historians writing in the first period faced a relatively stable society which was characteristically rural, agricultural and Catholic. The social and economic changes which began to be evident after 1900, intensified with the First World

War and the invasion of American capital. Thus, historians writing in the period from 1916 to 1953 were confronted with an ever-changing society which was becoming increasingly more urbanized, industrialized and secularized. For those historians writing in the period from 1953 to 1967, the rural, agricultural Catholic Quebec had become a thing of the past. With la révolution tranquille modern secular Quebec emerged.

These changes in society coincided with changes in the interpretations. For example, in the first period (1867-1915), the interpretations were basically political. In the second period, the political historians gave way to a group of writers who witnessed tremendous social and economic changes. The traditional, rural, agricultural, Catholic Quebec with which they identified was changing and many associated change with the destruction of French Canada. These anxieties coincided with interpretations which revolved around the theme of la survivance. The historians of the period after 1953 differed greatly from their predecessors. These writers had come to accept the urbanization and industrialization of Quebec and acknowledged the role that economics played in modern society. This acknowledgement distinguished the historians writing in the third period from those writing in the first and second periods and coincided with an important change in the writing of the history of Confederation: causal status for economic considerations.

As society changed, the issues that dominated society changed too. In the ten decades following 1867, issues such as provincial rights (1880s), minority rights (1890s), Canadian participation in the British Empire (1890s and 1900s), the economic question (1920s and 1930s), provincial autonomy (1940s and 1950s) and separatism (1960s) gave rise to debate among members of the French Canadian intelligentsia. The issues themselves were triggered by events. For example, both the proposal by the government of Manitoba to abolish that province's system of separate schools (1890s) and Regulation 17 of Ontario (1912) fuelled the issue of French Catholic rights outside of Quebec, whereas the South African War (1899-1902) and the Naval Services Bill (1910) led to debate over Canada's role in the British Empire.

The different issues inspired different questions, some of whose answers lay in the past and, in particular, in the British North America Act and the history of the 1860s. For example, while the Depression inspired the question - 'What level of government is held responsible by the BNA Act for providing funds for the unemployed?' - Regulation 17 of Ontario gave rise to the question - 'Was the issue of bilingual schools in Ontario settled by law prior to 1867 and as a result are the French Catholic educational rights of Ontario guaranteed by Article 93 of the BNA Act?'

As members of French Canadian society, Confederation historians addressed themselves to the issues which were important at the time they wrote their histories. Thus, as new events took place and different issues arose, the interpretations of the historians changed in terms of general framework, focus and emphasis. For example, after 1900, with events such as the South African War, Regulation 17 of Ontario and the conscription crisis of 1917, the antagonism between the French and the English increased. This atmosphere of ethnic tension was reflected in the interpretations of Confederation. Before 1900, historians explained the United Canadian political crisis by referring to the political parties and their inability to sustain control of the Legislative Assembly. After 1900, the political explanation gave way to an ethnic one, as the historians laid the blame of the political crisis on the Anglo-Protestants of Ontario. In the same way, the flow of American capital into Quebec during World War I and in the 1920s gave rise to the economic question. The social and economic changes caused by the influx of American products, technology and money left commentators wondering what type of society would emerge. The apprehension over the American economic 'invasion' coincided with the general acceptance, by the historians, of the fear of an American invasion as an important cause of Confederation.

Concurrent with the changes in the interpretations were

changes in those who wrote about Confederation. In terms of their occupational and educational background, historians differed from one period to the next. The typical historian of the first period was either a lawyer or a journalist. In the second period, the historian was either a priest, a lawyer or a civil servant. In the third period, the part-time historian gave way to the university professional. These changes in the historians were reflected in the interpretations. As the historian evolved from the simple, untrained commentator of the 1860s into the career social scientist of the 1960s, the historiography of Confederation developed from the simple bleu versus rouge mono-causal interpretations of the first period into the 'federal' versus 'provincial' multi-causal interpretations of the second period, which in turn developed into the more sophisticated 'federal' versus 'provincial' economic interpretations of the third period.

Our analysis of the French Canadian histories indicates that the historians differed in another way: their concept of history. In the first two periods, historians saw history as an important device to guide French Canadians. Specifically, during the first period, the emphasis was on political guidance. The historians endeavoured to justify their respective parties' past political policies and to applaud the actions of their former leaders. In the second period, historians viewed history as an

important aid in the struggle for la survivance; they used history to identify the society they wished to preserve, to indicate those who threatened traditional French Canada, to point out the distinctions between French Canadians and English Canadians and to reveal how the French Canadian nation could best be protected.

With variations in conceptions of history came corresponding changes in the interpretations. For example, in the first period, the interpretations remained essentially political because the historians saw history as a legitimate means to rationalize political beliefs and behaviour. In the second period, the bleu versus rouge political interpretations gave way to the 'federal' versus 'provincial' interpretations. This reflected the belief that history was important in demonstrating how the French Canadian nation could best be protected. Specifically, 'provincial' historians believed that the only way to preserve French Canada was a strong autonomous government in Quebec City. Without the strong provincial government, English Canadians would overrun French Canadian defences just as they had in the 1860s when they brought the political life of the United Canadas to a standstill. 'Federal' historians, on the other hand, defended federalism. They argued that French Canadians in the 1860s, like those in the 1930s and 1940s, benefited from the existence of a federal system of government.

The social science revolution and the professionalization of history altered the historians' concept of history dramatically. After 1953, historians regarded historical knowledge as important for its own sake. Most writers gave priority to producing scholarly works for fellow historians. The aim of the modern historian was to convince other specialists of the validity of his or her historical argument.

One of the results of the social science revolution was increased contact between francophone and anglophone academics. This brought about an important change in the interpretations of Confederation. Influenced by English Canadian historians like J.M.S. Careless, Donald Creighton and G.P. de T. Glazebrook, French Canadian historians like Jean-Charles Bonenfant, Jean Hamelin and Maurice Lamontagne elevated the economic factor to the same level as, if not higher than, that of the political crisis and the fear of an American invasion in explaining Confederation.

The social science revolution also brought with it new theories of history. These corresponded with changes in the interpretation of Confederation. For example, Alfred Dubuc, an economic determinist, believed everything in the past was determined by economic factors. Not surprisingly, his explanation of Confederation was exclusively economic. Jean Hamelin assumed that

historians had to look to political, social and economic factors to explain their subjects adequately. Concomitant to that theory of history, was Hamelin's explanation of 1867, in which he underlined the connection between economic matters and the other causes.

Our analysis of French Canadian histories of Confederation indicates that over the course of a given period, the history of a given event changes. Sometimes the alterations to the history of that given event are simple shifts in emphasis, at other times a totally new interpretation appears. This study indicates that changes in interpretations, whatever their magnitude, are related to changes in the factors that affect the writing of history. What are the factors that influence the historian? Our study suggests the following: the economic and social structure of society, the predominant issues in society, the historian's perspective in light of events that transpired after the given event, the occupational and educational background of the historian, and the historian's concept of history. These factors do not work independently from one another; they are inter-related. Changes in the economic structure may cause the issues that dominate society to vary. They may also affect the background of those writing the history. The work of an historian may, in itself, become an event

affecting the work of historians who follow. Issues may affect the historians, but then historians may help to determine the issues. Ultimately, different generations of historians ask different questions and therefore produce different interpretations; but more than that, historians from the same generation, can ask the same or similar questions and produce different interpretations depending upon the historian's background and concept of history.

The relationship between an historian's interpretation and his or her environment is not a simple question of cause-and-effect. Specifically, society does not dictate the exact nature of an interpretation. Societal factors, however, influence the history in terms of subject selection, framework and focus. Thus, even though he or she may recognize the need to minimize contemporary influences, an historian cannot totally escape the restraints of the present.

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