

**Liberal Internationalism's Cheshire Cat: Imperialism, Status, and the United Nations
Security Council**

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Philosophy degree in Political Science

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Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a place where states can seek international status by campaigning for its ten elected seats. Beginning from this premise, in this dissertation I ask: how do states seek status through their competitions for seats on the UNSC? Drawing on the concerns of IR theorists as well as historians, this is a process-driven question. I am interested in the process of status-seeking, not simply status itself, and I am concerned with the ways that status-seeking has evolved from 1945 to the present in the lifetime of the UN. I understand status as membership in a club embedded in larger hierarchies and examine both the nature of the hierarchies and the responsibilities associated with that membership. Similarly, I take a relational view of status that is predicated on recognition and social closure.

While the UN and the UNSC are embodiments of liberal internationalism, they are also embodiments of global and historical imperialism. This imperialism structures the hierarchy under which status-seeking occurs. Status, as membership, comes with shared expectations of behaviour, responsibility, practices, and resources. I argue that status-seeking thus requires relating to these expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices. Thus, states conduct their campaigns in terms of articulating how they plan to use their status and contribute to the UNSC's (liberal) mandate. By speaking to these liberal responsibilities and the use of status, states are also articulating their relationships to global imperialism at different points in time through the process of status-seeking. In supporting this argument, I examine Canada's nine campaigns to the UNSC in 1946, 1947, 1957, 1966, 1976, 1988, 1998, 2010, and 2020. Using a combination of historical methods (interviews, archival work, policy document analysis), I use a genealogical lens to trace the process of status-seeking in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Acknowledgments

When I made a spreadsheet of the expected wordcount of each chapter, I thought about planning for how long the acknowledgments would be. I knew from very long ago that I would have a lot to say if I made it to the end. It turns out that I underestimated the acknowledgments *and* every single chapter. Nothing about the path to completing this dissertation has been straightforward or typical. It really has taken a village, or at this point, the entire city of Ottawa. Consequently, to thank that village will take far more words than the average acknowledgments section.

The journey began in August 2016 in Washington, DC and I am forever indebted to my classmates at The George Washington University. It was a different time. I owe so much to my 2016 cohort and many students above and below me – to those who made it through and to those who didn't, I am grateful for your friendship, support in dark times, yelling at the Donald Trump motorcade, intellectual brilliance, and the lifelong bond we share, regardless of where we are. In particular, I'd like to thank Jessica James (and Zachary Keefe), Emily Schraudenbach (and Amy Hayes), Gabriella Jimenez Garcia, Siobhan Kirkland, Bit Meehan, Alex Verschoor-Kirss, Alex Beck, Rosalie Rubio, Jack Hasler, Samer Anabtawi, and Amoz Hor. Without you, I would not be here and I wish I could give you each a whole page as well as a hug right now. I treasure our memories and look forward to many more years of brotherhood. Jessica and Zachary were also fantastic roommates and their friendship in DC was such a highlight. Jack is a wonderful co-author. Emily is a kindred spirit in the classroom; and Siobhan, the fellow Canadian, is too. Amoz and I have shared many struggles on our similar path and he is one of the most thoughtful scholars I know. Beyond my classmates, a very important thank you goes to Michael Barnett for being an intellectual guiding light, whose work I am constantly dreaming of matching, and whose passion for IR knows no bounds. So many parts of this dissertation originated in working with Michael and I hope the future holds that as well. Michael also taught me to always read the acknowledgments of books, which certainly made me value the writing of this one more. Marty Finnemore also deserves great thanks – she served as a great mentor at GW and TA-ing her IO class was an absolute highlight. In DC more broadly, thank you to Lucas Dolan for being a great writing partner.

The highly unprecedented decision to transfer to the University of Ottawa was one of the most difficult, terrifying, and absolute best decisions I've made in my 31 years. While it is isolating being one of the few to take that risk, I would make that decision one thousand times more. Intellectually, emotionally, professionally, and personally, the decision to come "home" changed me for the better and allowed me to follow my heart and write the project I wanted to write. There were many involved in that process, but there are three heroes – my dad, for driving most of the Eastern Seaboard to make it happen; Dominique Arel, for taking a chance and admitting a student knocking on your door; and Rita Abrahamsen, for steering the ship and making it happen. Rita has been a wonderful mentor, confidante, cheerleader, investor in my professional development, and Director of CIPS and I cannot thank her enough. I am also indebted to other wonderful staff, volunteers, and colleagues at CIPS, most notably Marion Laurence and Gino Vlavourou, who are incredible co-authors and editors. I am so lucky to have worked with both of them as well as the many contributors to our peacekeeping project.

At the University of Ottawa, there are many more who have supported me and helped me make the transition as straightforward as possible. The generosity, flexibility, and overwhelming kindness of many of you has kept me afloat and motivated me over many years – thank you to Marie-Josée Massicotte, Emily Regan Wills, Cédric Jourde, Philippe Frowd, Michael Williams, Roland Paris, Costanza Musu, and Mark Salter. It sometimes feels surreal how many people looked out for me along the way, whether I was a current student, future student, former student, TA, or just really needed good feedback and help. I am grateful to you all. Due to transitioning 10 weeks before the COVID-19 pandemic, I barely got to know any other students in my program, but to all of those who sat in a few weeks of in-person classes and many weeks of online classes, as well as to Andrew Heffernan and Michael Murphy, thank you. I wish I could have gotten to know my other classmates more and spent time socializing and collaborating with them. I hope that I can connect with more of you in the future. At uOttawa, many administrative staff and CUPE organizers also make the PhD gears turn behind the scenes. I am grateful for their hard work.

My dissertation committee deserves endless gratitude for taking me and my project on and letting me hit the ground running. Alexandra Gheciu and Kevin McMillan have been steadily supportive and kind and regularly full of new ideas and guidance for strengthening my work. Your faith and trust in me and my research have kept me going and sharpened everything along the way. Thank you for pushing me while also being gentle. Thank you for your flexibility as everything was in flux so regularly. Finally, thank you for your endless reference letters and feedback on my writing and all of your time. You've been a model dissertation committee.

The single most important person professionally in this PhD has been my supervisor, Srdjan Vucetic. There is an entire dissertation to be written on the ways that Srdjan has stepped up for me, been in my corner, and also trusted me to be in the driver's seat. There is no dissertation or continued PhD without him. Srdjan kindly consulted on my work before I was even his student and came to the GAC consultations I organized. He then took me on as a student when I showed up to say "Surprise! I am going to come to this university now!" He even did all these things after following me on Twitter for years. Intellectually, Srdjan is unmatched and there is something new to find in both his writing and his feedback every time I revisit it. Our shared curiosity and his thoughts about IR theory, imperialism, Canada, genealogy, and more remind me every day how lucky I am. His faith in me and the project, as well as all of my other ideas, are what really made me feel that I could do this and that it mattered. He has put an unbelievable amount of time and energy into this project and my professional development, and I am forever indebted. His ability to also rein me in without discouraging me when I take on too much has also been crucial. One of the many joys of finishing a dissertation is thinking about what projects can come next and I hope that we have many future projects together. Thank you. Merci.

The village expands beyond my two universities. Many others have given me feedback along the way, let me sit in their classrooms, helped me work towards publishing, and provided support, opportunity, and assistance. Thank you to Veronica Kitchen, Brian Bow, David Black, Heather Smith, Philippe Lagasse, David MacDonald, Susan Colbourn, Timothy Andrews Sayle, Jess Gifkins, Halvard Leira, and many more I may be forgetting. Veronica has been a mentor and a guide for a whole decade and I am grateful for everything I've learned from her. A very special

thank you goes to Adam Chapnick for archival support, reference letters, advice, feedback, and for writing the original authoritative source on Canada at the UNSC. I am not sure what I would have done without the book or more importantly, Adam's support. I am also grateful not just for the content of the book but for the fact that his efforts with Access to Information and Privacy requests over the last decade made my ability to access archival material far easier. Brian and Susie also provided excellent feedback and editing as they shepherded a small part of this dissertation through publication at *International Journal* in 2020.

In addition, the students and professors involved in the 2018 CASID PhD School were such a pleasure to work with and a real high point of the PhD. It was an indispensable experience in writing a dissertation and I am glad to have met so many wonderful colleagues – a special thank you to Gloria Novovic for becoming a true friend along the way. The 2021 ISA Theory Network's workshop on relationalism and practice was a really great opportunity to work through difficult theoretical challenges in this dissertation and I am grateful to the organizers, my fellow students (who I hope to meet in person soon!), and Ayse Zarakol and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson for their feedback.

At Global Affairs Canada, many people were part of my absolutely transformative experiences both in 2017 in the office of the Chief Development Officer and in 2018-2019 as the Cadieux-Leger Fellow. The list is far too long for me to be comprehensive on this page, but Justine Bell deserves my greatest gratitude, as do members of the 2018-2019 Foreign Policy Research team. Pam Isfeld, Anna Bretzlaff, Denis Robert, Martin Roy, Madeline Johnson, John Kotsopoulos, Shehryar Sarwar, Manuel Mulas, Sven Schirmer, and Akeisha Grant (and Jax) were wonderful colleagues who have shaped the direction of my work and taught me so much. I truly would not have stuck out a PhD if it were not for the Fellowship and the support of that team and others spread across the Strategic Policy Branch. Many senior management also provided valuable advice and mentorship and the network of collaboration and friendship I built with others at GAC proved to be endlessly wonderful. The late Greg Donaghy also deserves a special thank you, not just as a colleague at GAC, but as someone whose work is cited throughout this dissertation and whose influence is present in the work of so many of young scholars. Canadian history and Canadian foreign policy are immeasurably richer with Greg's contributions and we have lost a wonderful person and scholar. I am incredibly indebted to Greg's work and wish we could have been in touch longer.

The librarians and staff at the Jules Léger Library at GAC were very helpful in finding sources, giving me a space to write, and teaching me new skills. Similarly, many staff at Library and Archives Canada made this project possible – without their work and access to their documents, I would have nothing to write about! Lastly, the ATIP office at GAC deserves great thanks for managing my high volume of requests and Laura Riggs was especially helpful and kind. All 21 interviewees for this project, particularly retirees from GAC, deserve many thanks – a number of them also went above and beyond, sharing not just their time and wisdom but also feedback, additional connections, documents, direction, check-in emails, and further reading. I would greatly love to name them and their contributions but in order to maintain their anonymity for the project, I cannot do so here at this point. I am grateful for their reflections and wisdom and indebted greatly to their knowledge about diplomacy. Senator Peter Boehm also kindly

connected with me over a shared interest in Canadian foreign policy history and I thank him for his thoughts and for letting me read his dissertation.

I've collected some academic friends along the way who have not yet been mentioned. I found many of you on Twitter dot com or at conferences and workshops. Academic Twitter has been an absolute godsend, which sounds like a ridiculous thing to say. When we've been away from the office, conferences, workshops, and social interaction so long, Twitter feels like the only hang out space we have left. We all log on to the cursed site every day and find each other. Elsewhere in academia, Jasmine Chorley-Foster has become one of my closest friends – she is a sister in all things academic but also a lifelong pal, dog aunt, appreciator of Rachel Bloom (Rachel should honestly get an acknowledgment too), and sharer of all the same anxieties and neuroses. Without Jasmine, I'm not sure how I would have appropriately complained my way through this whole thing. Other academic friends deserving of my thanks include Jordan Carlson and Tari Ajadi. They are both excellent pals who have seen me through so much. Rob Burroughs and I have been friends since my first time at uOttawa, but I must put him here since I would be nowhere without The Group DMs (feat. Jordan as well), his cheerleading, and his undying faith in my ability to do things I often think I can't. Multiple writing groups have also been a part of this journey, in Ottawa and on Zoom. Their feedback, comradery, and forcing me to sit still for a few hours every week has been immeasurably valuable.

In my “regular” life, many friends have stuck with me over the last 6 years, putting up with my stress, my chaotic schedule, and frequently being on the road. They too deserve an entire page of thanks, but their names are here and I owe you all the next 6 years of making it up to you – Mila Janjic-Zarab, Emily Millar, Hannah Pattinson, Cam Chislett, Eric Deys, Rob Gage, Lora Capobianco, Kelsey Comeau, Ericka Lavoie, Naomi Czawlytko, Niké Gichuru, Jenna Vikse, Eric Kennedy, and many more. Eric Deys was with me the morning I woke up in our AirBnB in Vancouver (visiting Rob) and found out I got into GW. He's supported the good, the bad, and the ugly ever since that pivotal moment. I have come full circle as I submit this dissertation on another trip to British Columbia. Lora Capobianco is my oldest friend, the sister I never had, and an incredible academic and researcher herself. I couldn't ask for a better person to cheer me on and to share a journey in this profession with. Hannah and Cam have been my extended family in Ottawa over the years, taking care of me and going on the best adventures together. Thank you for everything. Kelsey, Ericka, and Naomi have all been there for me throughout the multiple transitions in and out of Ottawa, and along with Emily and Hannah as well, all made the journey to the DMV to see me (and Andrew Carroll, thank you too!). Kelsey, Ericka, and Naomi have been incredible sources of strength at every step of the journey. I couldn't be more grateful to have had you with me and to be in one another's lives. Emily and Mila are also two of my oldest friends and have worked so hard to care for me and support me over many years of distance. It is truly a gift to live in the same city as them again and be able to spend much time together. Thank you to you all. Finally, the community I grew over a decade at what was The SPACE Youth Centre has taught me more than any degree has and they've helped me find myself, my values, and my commitments. I am sad that The SPACE is no longer formally with us, but I hope that its community remains connected.

Many healthcare professionals have been integral to allowing me to finish this PhD through a number of bumps in the road. They all deserve thanks, but Debra Vekstein and

Jennifer Tiviluk were especially important. My family has gone above and beyond to keep me going over a difficult 6 years. My parents, Beth and John Dunton, my brother, Nick Dunton, and his partner, Julia Gibson, have been with me at every stage and every plot twist. They have all worked so very hard to make sure that I made it to the end and that I always have somewhere to comfortably be at home. I can't imagine doing this without their support and dedication both throughout this PhD and in the many years of education beforehand. Much like them, Sue Dunton, Sara Winger, and Sam Winger have been my most important home away from home (and sometimes literally my home!) in Ottawa for almost a decade. They too have been central to helping me jump through all of the hoops and have enough to eat along the way. I am very lucky to have such close family in more than one place and all willing to be supportive of this process. I am additionally grateful to Deb Dunton, Jon Minden, Ben Minden, and Jake Minden for cheering me on and always welcoming me to Pittsburgh. Lastly, grandmother, Linda MacRae, has kindly been excited and supportive at each step.

Before thanking the final person, I must acknowledge four dogs. After 15 years, I am saddened that Cosmo was not able to see me cross the finish line, but he was a sweet and gentle soul who sat on my lap for many hours of reading. Bear and Rosie were great roommates at different points, who always kept my energy levels high. In the last year and a half, my dog Peri has been an absolute joy for me. Not only has she insisted I go outdoors occasionally, but she has brought so much love and fulfilling challenge into my life. I am glad that we have succeeded at reaching Canine Grade 2 together.

Liam Midzain-Gobin is the singular person to whom I owe the most. Liam somehow manages to be an incredible partner, dog dad, and scholar all at once. I don't know how he does it, though I now understand why he has so many coffee makers. Not only has Liam put endless hours into helping me with this dissertation and supporting me as a loving partner, but he has written his own and built an amazing scholarly career in the past few years. Liam inspires me intellectually and personally every day and has put so much effort into making sure that I get to do work that is fulfilling, challenging, and interesting. After over five years together, including two COVID years and two PhDs, nothing makes me happier than building a life with Liam, whether co-authoring articles, co-parenting a medium-sized mutt, travelling, or cooking lentils. I love you. I cannot thank Liam enough and I am so lucky to have had him with me. Liam's family has also been wonderfully supportive and kind to me and I am very grateful for additional family members in Teryn Midzain-Gobin, Rhys Midzain-Gobin, Katharin Midzain, Tom Midzain, and David Gobin.

This project has been a labour of love (and sometimes a few other emotions). Not only is it the result of my own intellectual curiosities and passions, but it is the result of this entire village looking out for me along the way.

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Dunton, Caroline. ‘Willing to Serve: Empire, Status, and Canadian Campaigns for the United Nations Security Council (1946–1947)’. *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 4 (December 2020): 529–47. <https://doi.org/10/ghs8s3>.

(1) Introduction: Unearthing Status and the Security Council

*“Empires, in their most basic sense, are sociopolitical formations that are constructed and maintained through the exercise of political power. This is not an arbitrary starting point. The word **empire** derives from the Latin term **imperium**, which roughly translates as ‘sovereignty’ or ‘rule’. During Roman times, **imperium** denoted the capacity to wage war and make laws, thereby describing a sphere of authority. Later, during the early modern period in Europe, the term **imperium** took on added layers of meaning. Some usages rendered empire more or less synonymous with status or state”.*¹

In preparing research for Canada’s candidature in the 1957 election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Dorothy Osborne, a rare woman in the foreign service at the time, wrote to John W. Holmes, “I am now covered in Security Council dust but I have unearthed the following...”.² She dug back into the archives from a decade prior to learn about Canada’s previous campaigns in 1946 and 1947. She was attempting to figure out whether there was a claim for the Commonwealth to have its own seat on the UNSC, a debate with which members of the Commonwealth itself and the broader membership of the United Nations (UN) were struggling at the time. From 1945-1963, contestation over representation on the UNSC dominated much of the politics of the Council and was tied into broader questions of membership in the UN. Jumping forward to the 21st century, many campaigns for the 10 elected seats on the United Nations Security Council look very different, but many of their core dynamics have similarities. In historical perspective, there are many questions that remain unanswered about the process. Campaign-watchers contemplate: How does one win? Why does one win? Why are they so important? Why bother? Historians ask: Has it always been this way? What trends have unfolded over time? Scholars of International Relations (IR) ask which concepts in our field of study are evoked. Reputation? Prestige? Identity? Cooperation? Competition? Recognition? For me, the concept of interest is status.

I begin this dissertation from the premise that campaigns and elections for non-permanent seats on the UNSC are unique status competitions and therefore opportunities for states to seek status.³ Others have noted the importance of the UNSC itself as both a status hierarchy and a status competition.⁴ As Vincent Pouliot writes, “indeed, nowhere else do state delegates debate

¹ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6. Emphasis my own.

² Dorothy Osborne, ‘Commonwealth Seat - Election Procedures’, 3 May 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

³ Ann-Marie Ekengren, Fredrik D. Hjorthen, and Ulrika Möller, ‘A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council: Why Bother?’, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 26, no. 1 (9 April 2020): 21–45, <https://doi.org/10/ggt7cp>.

⁴ Ann-Marie Ekengren and Ulrika Möller, ‘Campaigning for the Prize: The Quests by Sweden and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for Security Council Membership, 2017–2018’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 16, no. 1 (29 December 2020): 27–52, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-BJA10055>; Baldur Thorhallsson and Anna Margrét Eggertsdóttir, ‘Small States in the UN Security Council: Austria’s Quest to Maintain Status’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 16, no. 1 (29 December 2020): 53–81, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-BJA10017>; Baldur Thorhallsson, Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir, and Anna Margrét Eggertsdóttir, ‘A Small State’s Campaign to Get Elected

as explicitly on the international pecking order and the principles by which a privileged few should be granted special status and powers”.⁵ Yet, there is still much to be learned about how states pursue such status. Consequently, I ask, *how* do states seek status through their competitions for seats on the UNSC? This is a process-driven question; I therefore focus on the process of status-seeking, not simply status itself, and I am concerned with the ways that the status-seeking process has evolved from 1945 to the present in a variety of ways. In answering this question, I focus on Canada and argue that one avenue for status-seeking takes place wherein states articulate their ability to contribute to the responsibilities and mandate of the Security Council, as constructed through liberal internationalism.

The UNSC, Status, and Hierarchy

The politics of the Security Council have historically been dominated by the Permanent 5 members (P5): the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. These 5 members have the power of the veto on the Council as well as significant geopolitical power. Powerful in 1945 at the end of the Second World War, the permanent seat and veto conferred at the founding of the UN cemented these five members’ power. When paired with the legal authority that the Council has over international life, this means that these 5 states hold significant authority over every other country in the world in an institutionalized way. While some may believe that this makes an elected seat and its pursuit meaningless, this could not be further from the truth. The elected 10 (E10) members also hold significant power and authority over other states by virtue of their membership. The power of the P5 does indeed limit what a country holding an elected seat can do; but conversely, both the nature of and proximity to that power itself imbues elected seats with significance, giving them their own unique game of power politics. Moreover, as international organizations (IO) develop productive power, the ability to shape global politics, and a life of their own,⁶ new dynamics (re)-emerge under which status competition can unfold and elected membership matters. The ability to sit at the UN’s most important table comes with a variety of benefits and both “confers symbolic legitimacy”⁷ and shapes the nature of the Council’s power itself. The UNSC holds power and legitimacy not just because of the material power of its strongest members, but also through symbols, or the “informal development of [the UNSC’s] role in international society...that legitimacy is the source of the Council’s authority”.⁸ The ability to contribute to the Council’s agenda, vote in favour of resolutions, have a regular voice at the table, have close access to P5 diplomats, and take on specific roles and responsibilities of the Council make an elected seat an important way to engage in the Council’s key role in international society. This means that there are both concrete material and ideational reasons for states to pursue seats.

to the UNSC: Iceland’s Ambitious Failed Attempt’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 14 March 2022, 1–31, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-bja10099>.

⁵ Vincent Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 82.

⁶ Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004).

⁷ Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 8, no. 1 (28 July 2002): 43, <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-00801006>.

⁸ Hurd, 35–36.

Through power, authority, and legitimacy comes status. The Council's membership, which is given the rights and responsibilities of the Council's authority, is exclusive, creating a hierarchy between members (elected and permanent) and non-members, and consequently, the opportunity for states to seek to join the club, thus conferring status. States want to join the club, which in turn, continues to improve the value of such status. This is reflective of a key principle of status, which is that it is self-reinforcing: having status influences the acquisition of further status.⁹ Other organizations within the UN system also have competitions for seats, populating a universe in which there are multiple competitions for status (including, for example, the UN Human Rights Council)¹⁰, but it is the UNSC whose competitions come with the most important consequences, as well as the most responsibility and reward. The UNSC's competition for membership is therefore both the most competitive and acquires the most attention from states and from scholars. As such, scholarship for status competitions within IOs tend to focus primarily on the UNSC.¹¹ While this is a growing area of inquiry, it has mostly been case-driven and focused more on the content of campaigns rather than the theoretical implications of status and status-seeking more broadly. My goal is to bring theory back in.

To understand status-seeking, it is important to define status. In demystifying the *process*, it is essential to know what is being pursued. Some understand status as membership in a club of peers¹²; others see it as a ranking on specific attributes (often material).¹³ Some understand it as both¹⁴, where a club may have specific rankings within itself. Taking a social, relational view (rather than one based on characteristics), I work from the membership definition, seeing status as the successful acceptance of a state into a club such as an international organization (IO), an informal grouping, or anything else with exclusionary criteria.¹⁵ That the criteria is exclusionary is central, as that is part of what allows status to be valuable.

⁹ Marina G Duque, 'Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach', *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1 September 2018): 578, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001>.

¹⁰ Hanna Tuominen, 'Finland's Status-Updating through the UN Human Rights Council Campaign', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 17, no. 2 (5 April 2022): 306–30, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-bja10103>.

¹¹ John Langmore and Jeremy Farrall, 'Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council? Australia's Experience in 2013–2014', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 22, no. 1 (19 August 2016): 59–77, <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02201005>; Langmore and Farrall; Colin Keating, 'Power Dynamics Between Permanent and Elected Members', in *The UN Security Council in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder London: Rienner, 2016), 139–55; Hurd, 'Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council'; Axel Dreher et al., 'The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council', *Public Choice* 158, no. 1–2 (January 2014): 51–83, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4>; Jeremy Farrall et al., 'Elected Member Influence in the United Nations Security Council', *ANU College of Law Research Paper* 19.29 (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488824; Thorhallsson, Elínardóttir, and Eggertsdóttir, 'A Small State's Campaign to Get Elected to the UNSC'; Thorhallsson, Elínardóttir, and Eggertsdóttir; Ekengren and Möller, 'Campaigning for the Prize'; Ekengren, Hjorthen, and Möller, 'A Nonpermanent Seat in the United Nations Security Council'.

¹² Duque, 'Recognizing International Status'.

¹³ William C. Wohlforth, 'Unipolarity Status Competition, and Great Power War', *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 28–57.

¹⁴ Courtney Fung, *China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status*, First edition (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019).

¹⁵ Duque, 'Recognizing International Status', 580.

Equally central is the idea of hierarchy. The existence of status implies the existence of hierarchy, a recently reinvigorated literature in International Relations. To theorize about status is to both make assumptions and conclusions about the nature of hierarchy as well. Theorizing status-seeking allows one to make sense of one of the ways that states navigate hierarchy in relation to one another. There are two hierarchies at play when speaking about status and the UNSC. The first is the structure of the UNSC. The UNSC is an institution made up of 5 permanent members and 10 elected members that serves the 193-member General Assembly (UNGA), giving it a large group of non-members. This is a clear institutional hierarchy of membership both in terms of tenure of membership and powers – the P5 have a veto, the E10 have a vote, and non-members have no powers but often observe, speak to, and are affected by its decisions. The UNSC is an especially useful place for scholars to observe both hierarchy and status-seeking because the hierarchy is so explicit and the rules of participating in it and pursuing status are clear, with elections occurring every two years. This provides an empirical opportunity that much research on status often does not have; in other contexts, status can be both hard for states to achieve and for scholars to observe.¹⁶

Imperialism and Liberalism

Of course, international organizations do not exist independently of broader global politics. Their hierarchies do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, the UNSC's second hierarchy is an enshrining and solidification of the imperial global order that existed in 1945 at the founding of the UN. The UNSC's existence is co-constitutive with global imperialism; its hierarchy reflects the power dynamics of broader imperialism, but it also helps to maintain continued global hierarchy and stratification in geopolitics. The Permanent 5 became the Permanent 5 because they were victors in the Second World War, but also because they maintained political control of much of the world, in many cases through imperialism. Most notable for the UN are the empires and practices of imperialism of the United Kingdom and the United States, since their influence was central to the series of conferences up to and including the San Francisco conference that founded the United Nations. Of course, as Lora Viola writes, the "Big Three" were the victors of the war – the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union – giving Anglo-American worldview significant dominance, often marginalizing the Soviet Union in the process.¹⁷ The inclusion of France was because "the British argued that France was necessary to help keep peace in Europe against Germany".¹⁸ Further, "the United States argued that China could help keep order in the Pacific, especially against Japan".¹⁹ Since 1945, imperialisms have shifted and evolved, shaping the ongoing dynamics of the UN, and the UN's internal politics have shifted imperial policy. This is the environment in which the pursuit of status takes place. It is one of a formalized, narrow hierarchy in the UN system as well as a broader, looser hierarchy through imperialisms. Writing about Dumbarton Oaks in 1945, W.E.B. DuBois emphasized the problems with the new UNSC as handing power simply to countries of white Europe and

¹⁶ Paul Beaumont, 'The Grammar of Status Competition International Hierarchies as Domestic Practice' (As, Norway, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2020).

¹⁷ Lora Anne Viola, *The Closure of the International System: How Institutions Create Political Equalities and Hierarchies*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 190, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108612562>.

¹⁸ Viola, 190.

¹⁹ Viola, 190.

America, as well as China, leaving around 750 million people under the authority of Euro-American imperialism and lacking power within the powerful organization.²⁰ The enshrining of power in permanent membership for all of the “Big Three”, China, and France demonstrates that inclusion in the P5 was not just for the most militarily powerful, but for “common interest in and special responsibility for global order”.²¹ It is this special responsibility for global order that is embedded in the UNSC’s mandate. It creates a hierarchy where some have rights over others, and ultimately, makes status valuable.

Imperialism is not just a large hierarchical system, but it is also a large umbrella definitionally. I advance a view of imperialism that conceptualizes it as a structure of multiple relations of power involving “direct or indirect rule over dependent or colonial territories”²² and the subordination of people. This has both economic and socio-political roots and effects, producing differentiated forms of sovereignty, economic position, and subjectivity, and a variety of tactics, modalities, and ways of exercising power. It is a “big tent” definition, capturing both the material and ideational effects and considering them as “sets of relations and forms involving multiple tactics, policies, practices, and modalities of power; hierarchically ordered formations wherein a state or center exercises control or unequal influence over subordinated territories, peoples, and societies through a variety of means and methods”.²³ At its core, it involves domination, subordination, and stratification of different polities in formal and informal ways.

It is difficult to discuss imperialism and its evolution in the 20th century without discussing liberalism. While the UN was certainly born in the image of Anglo-American liberalism in 1945, Mark Mazower argues that it was also born out of imperialism.²⁴ These two concepts had been tied in political thought for some time,²⁵ but their coming together in institutional form was monumental. The UN is the central institutionalization of liberal internationalism – a form of internationalism and multilateralism predicated on the creation of liberal forms beyond the state and the domestic context within which many typically understand liberalism. As the UN also emerges from imperialism, it is a living demonstration of the ways that imperialism and liberalism intersect in global politics. While founded on liberal ideas, international cooperation through a new organization in 1945 was also about ensuring the domination of colonial powers, especially the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. This demonstrates both the contradictions and coherences of liberalism – while contradictory on

²⁰ W.E.B. DuBois, *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945), https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cbibliographic_details%7C4387109.

²¹ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 190.

²² Jeanne Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4.

²³ Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 12.

²⁴ Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

²⁵ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*; Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal Internationalism: From Ideology to Empirical Theory – and Back Again’, *International Theory* 1, no. 03 (November 2009): 409, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971909000141>; John C. Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870-1914* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice*, Palgrave Studies in International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal Internationalism: Historical Trajectory and Current Prospects’, *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 43–61, <https://doi.org/10/gcwwnw>.

the surface for its commitment to concepts like equality while producing hierarchy, it is very much by design. This phenomenon did not spontaneously appear for the founding of the UN, rather it had already existed since the late 19th century in the evolution and re-branding of the British Empire.²⁶

Liberalism's overlap with imperialism resembles different versions of a Venn diagram in many ways, with some scholars considering them fully inseparable, others seeing them fully separate, and many seeing their deep intertwining somewhere in the middle.²⁷ This applies to both political thought as well as the way that both are operationalized in global politics. For the purposes of this dissertation, I envision the Venn diagram as heavily overlapped but not entirely. In practice, in the British Empire, liberalism had been used both to deflect from imperial forms of violence but also to justify it throughout the late 19th and early 20th century.²⁸ This included both the rebranding of the British Empire as the Commonwealth as well as the use of liberalism and economic growth to justify expansion of the Empire through settler colonialism.²⁹ This overlap of liberalism and imperialism continued throughout the declining British empire and the continued growth of American empire globally. Liberalism, despite its focus on individuals and their rights, required domination, extraction, and dispossession of some people for the success of others. This is the political universe under which mid-20th century cooperation began to unfold: "the coexistence of equality and hierarchy is a constitutive feature of the international system and its institutions".³⁰ One only needs to look quickly at some of the major issues on the UNSC agenda in the 20st century to understand how deeply imperialism plays a part in the organization's operations: the creation of Israel and the question of Palestinian self-determination; the decolonization and independence of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia; or partition and conflict between India and Pakistan.

Ultimately, the UNSC's hierarchical structure is embedded in overlapping forms of imperialism that are intertwined with its foundation as a central organ of liberal internationalism. It is the institutional manifestation of liberalism as well as imperialism. Liberal internationalism and imperialism intersect as they constitute the UNSC hierarchy, continuing to reinforce one another in varied ways over time, reflecting both historical legacy and contemporary geopolitics. While this is present in UNSC dynamics more broadly, I posit that it is specifically important to look at election campaigns specifically as a form of constitution and reconstitution of hierarchy and power to understand status-seeking. Status is conferred via a process of recognition and social closure.³¹ Recognition here is the act of being seen by others and deemed worthy of entry into a club.³² States articulate particular visions of themselves or identities to be recognized by others. As Marina Duque writes about liberalism, "fundamental values—such as democracy, human rights, and economic liberalism—are important drivers of recognition in the

²⁶ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*.

²⁷ Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire*, 2019, 21.

²⁸ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*.

²⁹ Morefield; Jahn, 'Liberal Internationalism', 1 January 2018.

³⁰ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, Quote from book description page.

³¹ Duque, 'Recognizing International Status'.

³² Duque, 578.

contemporary status order".³³ This is especially true in the context of the UNSC. Social closure is the act of setting boundaries within a group; separating the inside of the club from the outside.³⁴ It distinguishes what it means to be part of the club or not part of the club. To do so in the context of the UNSC is to participate in the election process and being recognized, through voting, as welcome in the club.

UNSC Elections in Context

I take a historical approach to analyzing the process of status-seeking, tracing different trends over time. At the macro level, this allows me to make theoretical conclusions about status-seeking and its many different faces. At a more micro level, a UNSC campaign is a unique lens into a state's foreign policy choices and projection of identity at a particular moment. Tracing each of these over time paints a much larger picture of trends in status-seeking and a foreign policy history. In this project, I study Canada's 9 campaigns to the Council, from 1946-2020. My goal is to effectively move back and forth between this zoomed-in and zoomed-out view, drawing conclusions about the nature of status-seeking and revisiting the narrative arc of Canadian foreign policy in that time. Few countries have run for seats so frequently as Canada and even fewer have done it at such regular intervals (around once every 10 years): 1946, 1947, 1957, 1966, 1976, 1988, 1998, 2010, 2020. As a result, Canada's is an empirically rich history for tracing changes in the status dynamics of elections to the Council and it provides an interesting timeline for understanding how a state may approach status in the context of its broader foreign policy over time.

The status-seeking process within the UNSC can take two forms, differentiated by the type of contestation that takes place. Since 1965, there are five regional groups through which seats are allotted (Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean, Western European & Others, and Eastern Europe) and voting takes place via secret ballot in the General Assembly. Canada sits in the Western European & Others group (WEOG). Each group has different processes for internally selecting candidates to present to the General Assembly – either negotiating internally, building norms of rotation, or allowing for open competition. If the regional group presents a higher number of candidates than available seats to the General Assembly, then the election is considered competitive, and the result will be decided by General Assembly member votes. If the regional group presents an equal number of candidates as available seats, then the election is considered a *clean slate*. Prior to 1965, informal groupings of states did exist but there was significant disagreement on their make-up and role, though both clean slates and competitive elections still occurred, just in different, informal makeups. Of course, presenting a clean slate does not mean that there was no decision-making, consideration, contestation, or challenge around status-seeking. Status-seeking and contestation over status is not limited to a formal voting competition in the General Assembly. That is certainly the major one in contemporary context, but when a clean slate is presented, there is internal contestation within the regional group, contestation within individual states about whether to seek the seat, or contestation over the norms of how seats should be divided up or rotated. Similarly, these forms of contestation often also occur in a competitive election, prior to the General Assembly decision, indicating that it is not just the campaigning and voting that matters, but also the

³³ Duque, 578.

³⁴ Duque, 578; See also: Viola, *The Closure of the International System*.

decision to run, process of running, and dynamics within the regional group. These are all parts of status-seeking and status competition. This is precisely why this is a project that takes a long view of the messy art of status-seeking.

The Argument & its Methods

I make an argument in this project about both clean slate and competitive elections, as it is an argument about the process of contestation in the context of liberal internationalism more broadly. Each case-study chapter of this dissertation describes a particular form of that process, analyzing how the argument unfolds in both clean slate and competitive elections, of which Canada has had 4 of the former and 5 of the latter. In doing so, key themes appear in each, which are both parts of a longer historical trajectory, but also key sub-arguments with their own implications for how we may understand status. I outline the argument below.

Status, as membership, comes with shared expectations of behaviour,³⁵ responsibility, and practices. In other words, status must be actively used. The argument I present demonstrates one way (of likely many based on other cases) that “using” status is conceptualized. Like the UNSC itself, these expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices emerge from liberal internationalism which is embedded in historical imperialisms. They stem specifically from the UNSC’s mandate: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”.³⁶

In my account, based on my study of Canada, status-seeking can involve relating to these expected behaviours, responsibilities, practices, and resources. Therefore, a state may articulate how they plan to *use* their status in relation to the mandate of a special responsibility for peace and security. The mandate stems directly from liberal internationalism and so they are relating to liberalism in some way, whether in its favour or in opposition. I understand responsibilities as prospective (forward-looking) obligations stemming from shared, agreed upon terms (i.e. the UN Charter) toward both acute and long-term actions, such as responding to humanitarian crises in the immediate term or engaging in long-term maintenance of peace operations.³⁷ I use a definition of practices as “competent performances” in diplomacy, or “socially meaningful patterns of action”.³⁸ Behaviours are much more material than practices and limited in time; behaviours are actions. As I refer to them as “expected” behaviours, they are imbued with social meaning and purpose, but exist as unique choices or explicit actions rather than practices, which are patterned, routine, and implicit.³⁹ All three exist within normative and ideational frameworks. Regardless of whether governments intend to follow through genuinely or not, they must speak

³⁵ Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 580.

³⁶ ‘United Nations Charter’, Pub. L. No. Chapter V: The Security Council (n.d.), <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>.

³⁷ The distinction between prospective and retrospective responsibilities comes from: Toni Erskine, *Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 8.

³⁸ Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’, *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (February 2011): 4.

³⁹ On the detailed difference between the two, see: Adler and Pouliot, ‘International Practices’.

to these expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities because I argue that status must be used. Since these emerge from liberal internationalism, states speak directly to liberal internationalism and subsequently issues of imperialism in one of two ways:

- (1) States may articulate a *commitment to liberal internationalism* in terms of the UNSC's responsibility for global peace and security, as a way of asserting their desire to hold a seat – this requires states to inherently navigate the contradictions of liberalism and imperialism as they unfold within the hierarchy of the UNSC.
- (2) They may alternatively argue that the maintenance of peace and security requires an anti-liberal position and attempt to push back on the structure and operations of the Council through their campaigns. This is a rarer position but may echo anti-imperialism or anti-liberal activism at the United Nations.

I expand this argument in much more detail in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation. It is an inductive, interpretive argument that constructs a framework for making sense of the process of UNSC elections. It can be extended to different trajectories of different states, but it is not generalizable in the positivist sense. It contains a significant amount of flexibility to account for both variation between states and change over time, especially as it is that change over time in the practice of status-seeking that interests me. I build this argument and construct one path of the framework in detail, by focusing on the first (1) of the two possibilities in the argument; I trace Canada's 9 campaigns to the UNSC over the past 75 years. While ultimately always returning to a commitment to liberal internationalism and to the point that multilateral engagement is in Canada's interest, Canada's 9 campaigns have varied in the location of contestation and decision-making (i.e. competitive or clean slate elections), political positions on regional groupings and allotment of seats, the broader outlook and goals of Canadian foreign policy, the role of domestic politics, Canada's relationship to imperial powers, and the relationships between political and diplomatic decision-makers. Canada's large range of 9 elections provides an entry point at regular intervals throughout the UN's existence, allowing for both a long-term study of status-seeking but also Canadian foreign policy. Canada has won 6 of these elections, losing in 1946, 2010, and 2020.

I consider this project to be analytically eclectic, both methodologically and theoretically, drawing on several traditions for studying political and international history. I start from the ontological position of relationalism, as is common in recent status and diplomacy literature. It stands in opposition to substantialism, taking entities not as fixed, but rather as “unfolding dynamic relations”⁴⁰, where such relations constitute fluid, ever-changing actors. Relationalism is also procedural, focusing on the process under which actors and environments are co-constitute and developing webs of relations.⁴¹ My focus analytically is therefore on connections, processes, mechanisms, ties, and relations themselves – both actors and structures are themselves unfolding dynamic relations. I understand hierarchy as a type of structure constructed in a relational manner and actors as relational within that hierarchy. In terms of the kinds of relations that constitute actors over time, I have attempted in this dissertation to unravel the idea of a state

⁴⁰ Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 578.

⁴¹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (September 1999): 291–332, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005003002>.

as unitary, trying to pull apart the power dynamics and types of components and forces whose relations create “Canada”. For example, I draw on and highlight important relationships between Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign affairs, diplomats and broader civil servants, Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, and civil society culture/actors. These relationships constitute, produce, and reproduce Canadian policy and decision-making – to understand how they come together is to see a relational ontology in action.

Scholarship on bureaucracies and leaders indicate that both are important in foreign policy and have different practices, communications, decision-making, and interests. Moreover, scholarship on Permanent Representatives is important, indicating that they “are also implicated in the conduct of global governance itself”⁴² and are becoming “more and more significant for the study of world politics”.⁴³ They are part of global governance as a larger process and at the same time part of their home country’s foreign policy, where their relations help constitute both. Throughout the dissertation, it has been my aim to make clear the complex nature of these relations. Moving to this micro level helps unravel how foreign policy is constructed and negotiated at the macro level. Campaigns to the UNSC require the work of all the internal actors to produce something bigger on behalf of the state, thus offering an important insight into the relationship between the micro and macro levels. As such, this dissertation offers a narrative about the social nature of status-seeking but also about the constitution of Canadian foreign policy, both by offering an explanation through relationalism.

Within relationalism, I follow a pragmatist logic of action. Relationalism tells me how actors are constituted and exist in the world, and pragmatism is the account of action that tells me what they do and how. Building on sociological approaches, especially those of practice, pragmatism re-integrates the political nature of actors and relations that constitute them. Pragmatism allows for analysis of the discursive environments, form of power, creativity, reflexivity, and individual subjectivities that surround practice. Here, “a creative actor embedded in an organized or arranged social context”⁴⁴ builds relationships in response to social settings, power dynamics, material and economic relations, ideational surroundings, norms, and political engagement. Such an actor, through relations, also creatively problem solves.⁴⁵ Therefore, I treat “political contestation as a kind of collective deliberation instead of simply the continuation of power politics by other means”.⁴⁶

The ontological position of relationalism leads to Global Historical Sociology (GHS) as both a theoretical guide and a knowledge community to which this dissertation contributes. GHS is a relational approach that connects political and sociological theory to historical analysis, with a view that does not necessarily centre states as the object of focus. It is *global* in its view, rather

⁴² Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Practice of Permanent Representation to International Organizations’, in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 82, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316162903.004>.

⁴³ Pouliot, 82.

⁴⁴ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Reclaiming the Social: Relationalism in Anglophone International Studies’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32, no. 5 (3 September 2019): 590, <https://doi.org/10/gm98b2>.

⁴⁵ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

⁴⁶ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

than international, allowing for analysis that transcends micro and macro levels and thinks about large, global systems, orders, and forces (i.e., imperialism) beyond simply state-state interactions. GHS lens allows me to understand the sources of international ordering and hierarchy and the way that actors engage and relate within that. Its global aspects draw on big concepts like liberalism and imperialism and its sociological aspects build out from relationalism. Having discussed these, where does the historical component come in?

I take a genealogical approach to this project, taking a long view of the 1945-2020 period to understand status-seeking as not just a process in terms of individual elections, but one that evolves over time. Genealogy, as a methodology, is a tool for tracing history to understand the process of getting to the present. It is a method that reconstructs a trajectory of history in a way that makes sense of power relations, the subjective nature of truth, and importantly, discourse. Notably, it is an epistemologically historicist approach. A historicist approach employs fine empirical detail to explain through context and narrative how events can be plotted or ordered; it is an epistemological guide and commitment. In doing so, contingencies and causes are drawn, and events are linked together through systems, social formations, structures, and relations.⁴⁷ Genealogy is not the only historicist approach – there are many within the discipline of history. In the study of politics, genealogy is common, as are approaches that follow the Cambridge School, focused on historiography, or historical materialism, including a neo-Gramscian approach.⁴⁸ Genealogy allows me to best capture the more identity-based and ideational aspects of status-seeking, but I do draw on Gramscian and historical materialist analysis at many points. For example, economic relations are one of the many constitutive forces of imperialism at the macro level (i.e., exploitation of the periphery by the core) and at the micro level, they are also the part of the social context within which pragmatic action take place.

Ultimately, for IR, historicism matters. Too frequently, IR's engagement with history is only half-hearted in terms of treating history like a discipline with its own arguments, theories, and traditions. This means that there is often a lack of thought put into engaging with arguments but also into the detail required for emplotment and interpreting material, especially in understanding context, contingency, and cause. Often, selection of historical material is intimately linked to a Political Science positivist view of causality, at the expense of both historicism and other interpretations of cause, as well as key phenomena that go alongside it. When asked why particular historical case studies may have been chosen, scholars often argue that it is for specific causal inference purposes or "testability" of hypotheses, regardless of whether those cases even make sense historically and historiographically, let alone for the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical choices of the project. However, engaging history on equal footing with theory can improve the use of history and prevent its abuses. There have been significant efforts to remedy this from a variety of scholars interested in engaging history differently. This includes GHS scholars as well as other traditions in historical IR more broadly.

⁴⁷ George Lawson, 'The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 2 (June 2012): 207, <https://doi.org/10/bnkgbz>.

⁴⁸ Lorenzo Cello, 'Taking History Seriously in IR: Towards a Historicist Approach', *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 2 (April 2018): 241, <https://doi.org/10/gc7dv4>; Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (June 1983): 163, <https://doi.org/10/cdvw7w>.

Recent volumes on historical IR have begun to discuss the different ways that IR can find itself on better footing with history. This project is an intervention into those debates.

In this intervention, I do genealogy in a non-traditional way, if there even is a conventional way of doing genealogy. Discourse is central to genealogy, but given that I am also interested in practice, I am interested in a broader tent approach to discourse. I work with textual material in archives, from contemporary policy documents, and in secondary sources, but I also work with interviews, of which I completed 21. Analyzing what people do in diplomacy is important and it is also a form of discourse itself. I treat my interview material more as oral history, again stepping away from more causal-inference driven views of interviewing in Political Science. With attention to power and the movement from the past to the present, I link practice and discourse. Below, in table 1, I summarize the key components of this research, demonstrating how the path to these methods from epistemology, ontology, theory, and methodology.

Epistemology	Ontology	Theory	Methodology	Methods
Historicism	Relationalism Pragmatism	Global Historical Sociology	Genealogy	Interviews, Archival Research, Policy Analysis

Table 1: Research Design Components

Following this introduction, I provide a short background chapter that details the technical set up of elections to the UNSC and their history and reviews the key literature on the questions of “why run for a seat? What are the benefits?” I then move to a theoretical chapter to discuss the core concepts of imperialism, liberalism, status, and recognition and provides the detailed theory-building framework for status-seeking. Subsequently, I discuss the methodology and methods of the project. Four empirical chapters follow that demonstrate a pragmatist account of action through finely detailed historical analysis. Throughout, I contribute to the advancement of the theory as explained in the relevant chapter. These four chapters are: (1) 1946, 1947, 1957; (2) 1966, 1976; (3) 1988, 1998; (4) 2010, 2020. Each campaign is built upon a relationship to liberal internationalism, appealing to its basic principles in the broader hierarchical context of the UN. Further, each was shaped by the key geopolitical issues at the time that were relevant to both Canada and the UNSC, as well as changes in Canadian foreign policy that had domestic origins.

In the first three, 1946/1947/1957, Canada was focused on how seats should be distributed and the criteria for election. The Canadian position, known as the functional principle, argued that states should hold seats in organizations based on their ability to contribute.⁴⁹ When considered in opposition to other arguments about how representation should play out for seats, this became both an argument about how status should be accorded as well as the method by which Canada sought seats. In the first two elections, Canada used functionalism to make clear how it had earned the status it wanted and how it would be used. In the third, Canada saw functionalism as a tool for ensuring status could be maintained and that

⁴⁹ Adam Chapnick, ‘The Canadian Middle Power Myth’, *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 189.

opportunities to contribute to an effective UN remained. In 1966, Canada was managing uncertainty and change in global politics, in the UN, and at home. Amidst such change, Canadian officials sought a seat for the purpose of maintaining existing status to ensure future opportunity. In 1976, a new Canadian government was re-imagining Canada's approach to the UN and liberal internationalism. It is this chapter that draws out the importance of the self-reinforcing nature of status as well as the functional limits of what is possible within liberal international ordering. By 1988 and 1998, Canadian policy makers sought to make Canada an international leader, a model citizen of liberal internationalism. Canada sought recognition, and subsequently status, for more than just the ability to perform the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices of the Council – it wanted both recognition for and the opportunity for leadership. In the most recent two decades, Canada has seen a partisan debate over liberal internationalism and its role in Canadian foreign policy, reaching inflection points over the two UNSC campaigns in 2010 and 2020. In the most recent four campaigns, a pattern emerged suggesting that a state's bilateral relationships with others matter and those bilateral relationships, when it comes to a UNSC campaign, can be influenced by how each country understands the other's positions on major multilateral policy issues.

Ultimately, I provide multiple paths within my theoretical framework, as there are different ways that states may status-seek through liberal internationalism in IOs; each chapter tells a different story. Whether pursued for functionalist purposes, maintenance of status and international ordering, re-envisioning liberal internationalism, leadership within liberal internationalism, or contestation over liberal internationalism's role, each is predicated on the complex relationship between liberalism and imperialism in constructing international hierarchy in the Security Council context. In wrapping up the dissertation, I provide a conclusion that revisits the argument and I explore its extension to other cases and its importance to International Relations. Throughout the dissertation, I weave a narrative of Canadian foreign policy with a long historical lens, problematizing existing histories of particular events and issues, and stitching across holes in the narrative fabric of Canada's relationship to IOs, to international order, and to global politics more broadly.

Conclusion

Returning to Dorothy Osborne, her 1957 quest to learn about the 1946 and 1947 elections to the UNSC was intriguing. In her research on the Commonwealth, she found that neither the UN nor the Commonwealth could come to an agreement as to whether a seat should be reserved for Commonwealth members, due to differing positions both within and outside the organization. The debate around the seat would remain unresolved for several more years. Likely referring to the lack of consensus on whether the Commonwealth could claim a seat or not, she concluded, asking "here we are in 1957 and where did the grin become a flesh and blood Ches[h]ire cat?".⁵⁰ I draw out the imperfect and mysterious metaphor of Lewis Carroll's Cheshire cat in this dissertation to bigger questions of meaning. While the Cheshire cat metaphor is often debated in literary scholarship, it also has significance and use in mathematics and various sciences, including Physics, to describe different phenomena. While I have no way of knowing whether

⁵⁰ Osborne, 'Commonwealth Seat - Election Procedures'.

that was her connection to the metaphor, Osborne was originally trained in physics and mathematics before joining the foreign service.

The Cheshire cat refers to something that is there but not there, present and then disappearing, perplexing, contradictory, and paradoxical. Certainly, the presence, or lack thereof in regard to a Commonwealth seat on the Council, is a Cheshire cat-like situation. This debate over whether there was a functioning informal Commonwealth seat, whether there should be a formal Commonwealth seat, and whether Canada should take part in it puzzled Canadian diplomats for some time until the early 1960s. This was embedded in broader debates about Canadian relationships with the Commonwealth and the declining British empire, with Britain itself, as well as with processes of decolonization. Imperialism was central and yet it is often overlooked in analysis of global politics. Imperialism is the Cheshire cat of this dissertation. I aim to reconstruct its importance in the history of both Canada and the UNSC out of the clues it leaves behind, one of which is liberal internationalism.

Canada has always struggled with its position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and the British Empire, the United States, and the rest of the globe. It has struggled to figure out where to stand in relation to each, often finding itself somewhere in the middle. While it has been championed as a “middle power”, a “mediator”, and a champion of balance and restraint, I suggest not that this moniker is necessarily mistaken, but rather it should be framed from the perspective of imperialism. Kevin Spooner refers to Canada as “Britain’s imperial hinterland”.⁵¹ Canada-in-the-middle has historically been stuck between its loyalty to two empires, British and American, and its sympathies with the historical “others”.⁵² Seeking “balance” or compromise has been a liberal international cornerstone, but it has equated struggle against those empires with the empires themselves and this has played out in Canada’s campaigns to the UNSC. This is further complicated by Canada’s own colonial occupation of Indigenous lands at home. My contribution through this dissertation to the study of Canadian foreign policy is one both of analyzing a significant amount of historical material and embedding it in theoretical context, but also of questioning the idea of Canada as a middle power, mediation, and balance. Most importantly, these questions of balance, middle power-hood, compromise etc. evolve over each decade, with different views from different policymakers and governments on how to manage such issues in different geopolitical and temporal contexts. For example, how Pearson saw managing relationships between great powers and the Global South looked very different than how Trudeau saw it, which was very different than how Brian Mulroney did. Paired with an argument for eclectic historicist methodology and a theoretical intervention on status-seeking, this dissertation thus produces contributions to three separate traditions. Much like Dorothy Osborne’s trip down the archival rabbit hole, this project too has left me covered in Security Council dust over the last few years, though a much thicker metaphorical dust pile, reflecting many decades of campaigns. The following chapters are what I have unearthed.

⁵¹ Kevin A. Spooner, “‘Awakening Africa’: Race and Canadian Views of Decolonizing Africa”, in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 207.

⁵² Spooner, 207.

(2) Joining the Council: The Nuts and Bolts

Introduction

States seek status through their pursuit of seats on the UNSC. Understanding the process of elections is significant because “nowhere else do states debate as explicitly on the international pecking order and the principles by which a privileged few should be granted special status and power”.⁵³ Much literature on the UNSC concludes that great powers, hegemony, and the infamous veto are the only real drivers of the Council, but as Chapnick writes, “there are elements of the history of the UN Security Council - the evolution and impact of UNSC elections in particular, but also the dynamics of permanent member-elected member relations, and the evolving role and influence of council presidents – that cannot be fully understood by focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)/Russia, and China: the so-called Permanent Five [P5]”.⁵⁴

The focus of this dissertation is to unpack the status-seeking process of elections at the UNSC, doing so by looking at Canada’s experience specifically. In order to understand the dynamics of non-permanent members and their engagement with the P5 and the bigger international structures that shape and govern the Council, it is important to understand precisely how these elections work and what happens when states win them. In sketching this bigger picture and the details of how elections work, I also aim to illustrate the importance of the politics of elections and how they contribute to key IR theories and concepts. The goal of this chapter is to provide appropriate background research on the process of elections to allow readers to understand the theoretical analysis in subsequent chapters. Key components of the election process include the process and timing, as well as regional groupings and their dynamics. The following section outlines these in order. The second section addresses Canada’s history of elections to the Council. The third section addresses why elected states on the UNSC matter and the contributions and benefits that come from seats.

Election Processes and the Rules of Procedure

All states are entitled to run for seats on the UNSC. That said, not all states have served and service amongst those that have has been uneven.⁵⁵ Evidently, a complex politics exists in terms of who serves and who does not. The first step to understanding this is in understanding the unique rules, procedures, and regional dynamics of competitions for seats. Elections to the Security Council take place via secret ballot in the General Assembly. The rules of elections taking place from 1965 until the present are stipulated in the General Assembly resolution 1991

⁵³ Vincent Pouliot, ‘Setting Status in Stone: The Negotiation of International Institutional Privileges’, in *Status in World Politics*, ed. T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 192, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107444409.012>.

⁵⁴ Adam Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage*, 2019, 4.

⁵⁵ See: ‘Countries Never Elected Members of the Security Council’, United Nations Security Council, n.d., <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/countries-never-elected-members-security-council>.

(XVII).⁵⁶ The Charter indicates that the role of the Security Council is to have “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ...[where states]... agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf”.⁵⁷ The Council will also “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”⁵⁸ which include Article 1 and 2 of the Charter:

“Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. *To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;*
2. *To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;*
3. *To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and*
4. *To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.*

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. *The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.*
2. *All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.*
3. *All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.*
4. *All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*
5. *All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.*

⁵⁶ ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, United Nations Security Council, n.d., <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/security-council-elections-2018.php>.

⁵⁷ United Nations Charter.

⁵⁸ United Nations Charter.

6. *The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.*
7. *Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII*.⁵⁹

These articles are important because the rules of elections stem from them and voting stems from individual understandings and interpretations of these rules. The Charter stipulates that in the General Assembly's voting on elected members, attention should be paid to "the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution".⁶⁰ The Charter does not provide detail or definition on what equitable geographic distribution should look like, and so prior to 1965, there were no formal regional groups, rather a series of informal agreements, individual efforts, and overlapping blocs that sought to compete against one another and also cooperate. Resolution 1991 (XVII) sought to solve the confusion about what "equitable geographical distribution" meant.⁶¹ The General Assembly passed this resolution in 1963 and it took effect in 1965. It increased the number of members of the UNSC from 11 to 15 (11 had been the original number in the UN Charter⁶²), where 5 of these members are permanent, and 10 are elected and rotating.⁶³ This resolution also made official the regional allotment of seats through caucuses. As such, regional dynamics have been complex, important, and differing from one another. Prior to 1965, much of the decision-making was around how to interpret "contributions to peace and security" and "equitable geographic distribution"⁶⁴ in deciding to take seats and vote for states. These two components were in competition with one another. Post-1965, each regional grouping has taken on its own unique character with particular norms and challenges. The increase in the number of UNSC members through Resolution 1991 (XVIII) also coincided with the large increase in number of members of the UN through the process of decolonization, particularly in Africa.

Prior to 1965, one of the major issues for the Council was the debate around informal groupings. The independent countries of the British Empire were navigating their relationships to the UK and each other, noting that they had many similar interests. These similar interests and qualities though came into conflict with the Charter's stipulations on contributions to peace and security and geographical representation. So, there was consistent back and forth between states about whether a Commonwealth grouping should exist. In the first election to the Council in

⁵⁹ United Nations Charter.

⁶⁰ 'Charter of the United Nations' (1945), <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>.

⁶¹ United Nations Charter.

⁶² 'Security Council Elections 2018', What's In Blue (New York: Security Council Report, 21 May 2018), 6, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/security-council-elections-2018.php>.

⁶³ 'Question of Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council', Pub. L. No. 1991 (XVIII) (1963), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WMP%20A%20RES%201991A%20XVIII.pdf>.

⁶⁴ United Nations Charter.

1946, Canada and Australia were both seeking seats. Canadian officials were less keen on the idea of regional groupings, as there was a fear that it would put Canada at a disadvantage. Canada was particularly confident in its major contributions to the war effort and its work at the San Francisco conference of 1945 but felt disadvantaged by questions of geographical representation.⁶⁵ Further, Canada was keen to assert independence from Britain following the war. Canada ultimately lost to Australia in this first election, seemingly because of the argument that Australia could provide regional representation, causing Canadian officials to believe that perhaps the functional principle had been abandoned in practice.⁶⁶ This debate then raged on in the Department of External Affairs in deciding to run again in 1947.

Following Resolution 1991 (XVIII), there are 5 regional groupings that caucus together: Eastern Europe has 1 seat; Western Europe and Others (WEOG) has 2 seats; Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) has 2 seats; Africa has 3 seats; and Asia-Pacific has 2 seats.⁶⁷ There is an “Arab swing seat” that unofficially rotates between Africa and Asia-Pacific.⁶⁸ Sometimes, Asia-Pacific and Africa are considered a single group of 5 seats.

The five permanent members caucus with their respective regions, with the exception of the United States.⁶⁹ The United Kingdom and France caucus with WEOG. Russia caucuses with Eastern Europe. China caucuses with Asia-Pacific. The United States does not caucus with any group but observes WEOG. While there are seats given to each region, they are not distributed equally.⁷⁰ Asia and Africa have 54 seats each, giving Asia 1 seat per 26.5 member states (China is subtracted) and Africa 1 seat per 18 member states. Eastern Europe has 1 seat per 22 states, as they have 23 members (Russia is subtracted). WEOG has 1 seat per 13 states, given their 26 rotating members plus the UK and France (28 total). GRULAC has 1 seat per 16.5 member states, as they have 33 members.

Groupings are not always logical. States must be members of regional groups to participate in elections, but some have moved around over the years. For example, Turkey has caucused with Asia and Eastern Europe in the past, but now caucuses and runs for seats in WEOG.⁷¹ Israel also now caucuses with WEOG, rather than Asia, as one of the “others”, along with members of the anglosphere (Canada, Australia, New Zealand). States are elected for two-year terms that begin in January. Elections formerly took place in autumn,⁷² but are now held in

⁶⁵ Lester B. Pearson, ‘DEA/211 - C Ambassador in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs’, 23 January 1946, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12, 1946.

⁶⁶ Pearson.

⁶⁷ Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

⁶⁸ ‘In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10’, Security Council Report, 28 October 2018, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-10/in_hindsight_emergence_of_the_e10.php.

⁶⁹ ‘Security Council Elections 2020’, Research Report (New York, NY: Security Council Report, 29 May 2020), 7, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/unsc_elections_2020.pdf.

⁷⁰ ‘A/Res/1991(XVII)’ (1964), [https://www.undocs.org/A/RES/1991\(XVIII\)](https://www.undocs.org/A/RES/1991(XVIII)).

⁷¹ ‘Security Council Elections 2018’, 8.

⁷² Dreher et al., ‘The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council’, 54.

June,⁷³ giving states more time to prepare for their term (i.e., staffing positions at their UN missions, providing training on UNSC practices, analyzing ongoing and previous proceedings) and to allow for events like election debates to take place. Countries can declare their candidacy to their regional group's chairperson as early as they wish, and the chair adds them to the roster. In recent years, especially in WEOG, some states declare candidacy with nearly a decade of notice.

To win an election, a country must gain the votes of two-thirds of present states in the General Assembly Session. Thus, if all 193 member states are present and voting, then 129 votes are required to win a seat.⁷⁴ Not all members of UNGA can and do vote. If states have unpaid arrears, they cannot vote. Similarly, some states can abstain from voting, or they can vote, but not fill in each line on the ballot. For example, states that are running for one of two available seats may vote for themselves but not for the other seat. They may also encourage their "friends" to do this. In general, there are two types of elections: (a) there are more competitors than seats available when the list of candidate countries is presented to the General Assembly (UNGA); therefore it is a competitive election. The "competitive" part of status-seeking takes place in a campaign to the entire UNGA audience. (b) UNGA is presented with a "clean slate", or list of competitors equal to the number of seats, therefore the "competitive" part of status-seeking takes place in the selection of this clean slate as well as internally.

Africa is the one caucus that does operate on a norm of turn-taking (but still competitive internally) based on sub-regional groups, meaning that competitive elections are rare, and they often present a clean slate. That said, there are exceptions where competition has gone to the General Assembly. In 2011, there was a contested election between Mauritania, Morocco, and Togo. In 2000, Sudan and Mauritius contested a single seat.⁷⁵ In 2020, Kenya defeated Djibouti in a very contested election with multiple rounds, following disagreement within the African Union. The African Union had initially endorsed Kenya for the seat, but Djibouti pushed back, seeking to contest the seat. While P5 states are often quiet about who they endorse, Chinese support for Djibouti was widely reported, following significant investment in Djibouti's infrastructure and strategic port, as well as a large Chinese military base.⁷⁶

The Asia-Pacific Group has no established norms of rotation, leading to primarily competitive elections that are decided by the General Assembly. Security Council Report notes that larger member states consistently declare candidacy close to the election, but smaller states have announced their candidacy years in advance.⁷⁷ They also note that South Asian countries rarely run against each other (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan), but that one of the four is

⁷³ Stephanie Fillion, 'Canada, Ireland and Norway, Now Vying for the 2020 UN Security Council Vote', *Pass Blue: Independent Coverage of the UN*, 27 March 2019, <https://www.passblue.com/2019/03/27/canada-ireland-and-norway-already-vying-for-2020-security-council-vote/>.

⁷⁴ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 6.

⁷⁵ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 7.

⁷⁶ Maurizio Guerrero, 'As Kenya and Djibouti Fight Over a UN Security Council Seat, China Pops Up', *Pass Blue: Independent Coverage of the UN*, 24 January 2020, <https://www.passblue.com/2020/01/24/as-kenya-and-djibouti-fight-over-a-un-security-council-seat-china-pops-up/>.

⁷⁷ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 7.

frequently present.⁷⁸ The exception here was in 1975 when India and Pakistan contested a seat and Pakistan prevailed after 8 rounds of run-off votes.⁷⁹ Beyond these four South Asian countries, the Asia-Pacific Group is very large because it includes most of the world's small Island states as well as continental Asia, from the Middle East to the Pacific. Finally, Japan has been present for 22 years, the most frequent presence of all non-permanent members.⁸⁰ Like Germany, Brazil, and India, Japan has also indicated its desire to gain a permanent seat (for this reason, these four countries make up the G4).

Eastern Europe is both the smallest group and the one with the smallest sample size in terms of number of elections. While other groups such as GRULAC or WEOG have had heavily populated groups since the establishment of the UN, the Eastern Europe group became heavily populated after the Cold War. 15 of the 23 members joined the group since 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.⁸¹ That said, most of these elections are contested and follow no norm of rotation. They all tend to go to the General Assembly.

GRULAC has no formal rules of rotation, but often now reaches an in-group consensus on a clean slate (through intense internal competition), but there is variation, and this is a new norm.⁸² In-group consensus only began in 2007 and there are still exceptions where the General Assembly decides. From 1965-2007, all elections were competitive and decided by the General Assembly. Security Council Report notes a few highlights, as GRULAC has had the records for most rounds of voting. In 1979, Colombia and Cuba went to 154 rounds of voting before the General Assembly elected Mexico as a compromise Candidate.⁸³ In 2006, 48 rounds of voting between Guatemala and Venezuela at the General Assembly led to Panama agreeing as a compromise candidate, following significant diplomatic efforts by the United States to ensure Guatemala's election over Hugo Chavez's Venezuela.⁸⁴

Lastly, WEOG consistently has highly contested elections that often go to many rounds of voting, with few exceptions since the 1980s.⁸⁵ In the 2016 election, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden ran for two seats. Sweden won the election in the General Assembly and Italy and the Netherlands decided to split the term between them, with each country taking one of the two consecutive years.⁸⁶ Seat splitting more broadly had occurred in the 1950s but ended upon the expansion in the 1960s from 11-15 members.⁸⁷ WEOG is particularly competitive because it contains so many different types of states. Germany seeks a permanent seat and until it gets one (if it does), its plan is to run as frequently as possible. WEOG also contains extremely

⁷⁸ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 7.

⁷⁹ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 7.

⁸⁰ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 7.

⁸¹ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

⁸² 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

⁸³ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

⁸⁴ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

⁸⁵ Fillion, 'Canada, Ireland and Norway, Now Vying for the 2020 UN Security Council Vote'.

⁸⁶ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

⁸⁷ 'Security Council Elections 2018', 8.

“enthusiastic” states like the Scandinavian countries that also run frequently, as well as tiny states like Europe’s principalities and the non-European states of the Anglosphere. As such, it has proved nearly impossible to agree on any sort of sharing or rotational arrangement.⁸⁸ As a non-EU and non-European country, Canada is still at somewhat of a disadvantage as being a bit of an outlier and is still often seen as a “second American vote”.⁸⁹ These are important themes that will be elaborated further in a later chapter’s discussion of the 2010 and 2020 election losses.

Canada’s Previous Elections in WEOG

As a member of WEOG, Canada has run in 9 elections that have been both competitive and non-competitive. The [public record on elections](#) to the UNSC is maintained by an NGO called Security Council Report in New York. Data in the following tables comes from their collection.⁹⁰ Canada has held a seat for 12 years over 6 terms on the UNSC. It is tied for 6th place globally for number of years served and stands out in particular because of its size. Most of its “peers” in terms of others who have held a high number of terms are larger countries, including three of the four seeking permanent membership: Brazil, Japan, and India. Canada’s UNSC terms are Table 2 below. UNSC rankings (by years served) are detailed in Table 3.

<u>Election Year</u>	<u>Term Served</u>
1946	Loss
1947	1948-1959
1957	1958-1959
1966	1967-1968
1976	1977-1978
1988	1989-1990
1998	1999-2000
2010	Loss
2020	Loss

Table 2: Canada's Elections to the UNSC

⁸⁸ Interview #3, 23 July 2020; Interview #10, 17 August 2020.

⁸⁹ Interview #10.

⁹⁰ “Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018” (Security Council Report, 2019), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Elections%20Table%201946-2018.pdf> .

Ranking	Country	# of Terms	Years on the Council	Total Years Served
1	Japan	11	1958 to 1959 1966 to 1967 1971 to 1972 1975 to 1976 1981 to 1982 1987 to 1988 1992 to 1993 1997 to 1998 2005 to 2006 2009 to 2010 2016 to 2017	22
1	Brazil	11	1946 to 1947 1951 to 1952 1954 to 1955 1963 to 1964 1967 to 1968 1988 to 1989 1993 to 1994 1998 to 1999 2004 to 2005 2010 to 2011 2022 to 2023	22
2	Argentina	9	1948 to 1949 1959 to 1960 1966 to 1967 1971 to 1972 1987 to 1988 1994 to 1995 1999 to 2000 2005 to 2006 2013 to 2014	18
3	India	8	1950 to 1951 1967 to 1968 1972 to 1973 1977 to 1978 1984 to 1985 1991 to 1992 2011 to 2012 2021 to 2022	16
4	Pakistan	7	1952 to 1953 1968 to 1969 1976 to 1977 1983 to 1984 1993 to 1994 2003 to 2004 2012 to 2013	14
4	Colombia	7	1947 to 1948 1953 to 1954 1957 to 1958 1969 to 1970 1989 to 1990 2001 to 2002 2011 to 2012	14
5	Italy	7	1959 to 1960 1971 to 1972 1975 to 1976 1987 to 1988 1995 to 1996 2007 to 2008 2017*	13
6	Canada	6	1948 to 1949 1958 to 1959 1967 to 1968 1977 to 1978 1989 to 1990 1999 to 2000	12
6	Belgium	6	1947 to 1948 1955 to 1956 1971 to 1972 1991 to 1992 2007 to 2008 2019 to 2020	12

Table 3: Number of Years Served on the UNSC⁹¹

⁹¹ * In 2017-2018, Italy and the Netherlands shared a two-year term, rather than competing for it, giving them each a single year term.

**The 1946 term was the first year that the UNSC was in operation and was held as only a single year of elected membership. Two-year terms began in 1947.

Since the formal establishment of the groups in 1965 until 2019, Canada's group, the Western Europe and Others Group, has never had more than 6 rounds of voting in an election.⁹²

- 67.86% of elections (19 total) have been decided in the first round.
- Four have been decided in three rounds, including Canada's loss in 2010 and Canada's win in 1988. Only 2 have been decided in two rounds.
- The election with 6 rounds was the 2016 election that led to Italy and the Netherlands historically sharing a seat. This is the only instance in the post-1965 era of seat sharing in WEOG.

E10 Contributions: Why do the E10 actually matter?

The ten elected members of the United Nations Security Council (E10) are often dismissed as having very little power or agency upon being elected, therefore rendering them both useless in practice and unworthy of scholarly investigation. When the E10 are dismissed as useless or pointless, this is predicated on three assumptions that I argue are misguided. It is upon the idea that the E10 *matter* that this dissertation's theorizing rests. First, dismissal of the E10 assumes that there are no benefits for states that come from membership; even if states are not making a difference for the UN, it assumes that there are no self-interested benefits that states want. Second, it assumes that elected states cannot make significant contributions to international life. Finally, it assumes that there is no payoff to drawing conclusions about concepts and theories from studying the E10, something I argue against in the remainder of this dissertation. In an effort to respond to these first two assumptions, I discuss contributions that the E10 can make for themselves and for the UNSC. I outline notable contributions, successes, and key roles of the E10 as documented in existing literature. This section is particularly focused on the contemporary context but should serve to give the reader a sense of the range of possibilities and limitations.

At the most basic level, the UNSC E10's votes on resolutions matter. For a resolution to pass, at least four of the E10 must vote in favour. Further, states vote with an open ballot on resolutions so that each member has an opportunity to express their concerns and make a statement.⁹³ In addition to voting, states can use their position on the Council to strengthen their relationships with the P5 and also bring specific issues of concern to the official agenda as well as the general attention of the international community.⁹⁴ The agenda has more recently become open to all UNGA members but states on the Council have an ease of access and an opportunity to work directly with the P5 on issues.⁹⁵ Adding to the agenda while on the Council is also much more likely to be taken seriously by members rather than non-members.

⁹³ Dreher et al., 'The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council', 53.

⁹⁴ Langmore and Farrall, 'Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council?', 73.

⁹⁵ Hurd, 'Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council', 42.

The dynamics of the E10 are only recently coming to the attention of UN scholars. Recently, a group of scholars found that IR's attention to the UNSC focuses so intensely on the P5 and so little on the E10, that it has generally missed many opportunities to look into these above-mentioned dynamics more deeply. They argued that in fact the E10 can make a difference in a variety of ways, while demanding more research into the E10's contributions.⁹⁶ Similarly, analysis of the UNSC's meeting records and draft resolutions revealed that norm dynamics at the Council reflect broader great power dynamics, where states align on normative issues in ways that reflect broader trends in power between states like the United States and China. In turn, states can signal allegiance and dissent through these normative issues and voting processes.⁹⁷

Further, E10 states can take on two key roles in the UNSC's rules of procedure. First, the Presidency of the Security Council rotates monthly through all fifteen members of the Council in English alphabetical order. The President calls meetings, approves the agenda of meetings, prepares the work plan for the month, provide briefings to the Council, and oversees crises.⁹⁸ They are also authorized to issue Presidential Statements on behalf of the Council and act as the representative to the press on behalf of the council.⁹⁹ The Presidency offers an opportunity for a state to amplify its voice, take initiative on particular issues, and more recently, make political gestures. In March and April 2019, the Presidency was scheduled to rotate between France and Germany for the two consecutive months. Instead, France and Germany decided to coordinate their efforts and share the Presidency for two months back-to-back.¹⁰⁰ The main objective of the shared presidency has been to make a statement in defense of multilateral cooperation and reflect the values of the European Union.¹⁰¹ As a permanent member, France has also been an advocate for enlargement of permanent membership to include Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil.

Second, penholding is a practice that has historically been almost exclusively restricted to the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, but elected members have been engaged in the penholding practice in a variety of ways, providing insight into the different ways in which elected members influence the Council. Similar to the presidency, penholders draft documentation, including resolutions and presidential statements, and coordinate meetings and visiting missions.¹⁰² As there has been much pressure from both Russia and China as well as

⁹⁶ Farrall et al., 'Elected Member Influence in the United Nations Security Council'.

⁹⁷ Sara Greco, 'Winning Friends and Influencing Others: Normative Balancing in the United Nations' (Doctoral Dissertation, Kingston, ON, Queen's University, 2019).

⁹⁸ 'Note by the President of the Security Council', Pub. L. No. S/2017/507 (2017), <https://undocs.org/en/S/2017/507>.

⁹⁹ Note by the President of the Security Council.

¹⁰⁰ Stephanie Fillion, 'UN Security Council Presidency: Two Old Friends Share an Office, Part 2', *PassBlue*, 9 April 2019, <https://www.passblue.com/2019/04/09/un-security-council-presidency-two-old-friends-share-an-office-part-2/>.

¹⁰¹ 'Security Council: A Dual Presidency between France and Germany to Defend Multilateralism', United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, 22 February 2019, <https://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/31308-security-council-a-dual-presidency-between-france-and-germany-to-defend-multilateralism>.

¹⁰² For a lively and theoretically rich debate on the nature of the penholder system, see: Jason Ralph and Jess Gifkins, 'The Purpose of United Nations Security Council Practice: Contesting Competence Claims in the Normative Context Created by the Responsibility to Protect', *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 3 (September 2017): 630–53, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066116669652>; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot,

elected members to open up the penholding practice, elected members now take it on from time to time, allowing them to act with significant authority. When not penholders, it has been noted that the E10 have begun in recent years to push for a significant say in negotiating compromise with the P5. They have done this by working with the penholder, allowing them to shape both how the Council votes but also the content of the text on which it voted.

In 2013, Australia and Luxembourg took on the penholder role to issue statements on humanitarian access in Syria, and were soon joined by Jordan in taking leadership on the humanitarian issue.¹⁰³ This was taken over at the end of their terms by New Zealand, Spain, and later Egypt, and then continued once again by Japan, Sweden, and Kuwait.¹⁰⁴ Unofficially, Venezuela took a drafting role on a note on the Council's sanction system, and was soon joined by New Zealand in bringing it to the full Council.¹⁰⁵ In 2016, Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Uruguay, and Venezuela also acted as penholders on another humanitarian resolution, this time on healthcare in armed conflict.¹⁰⁶ Lastly, in terms of official UNSC visits, which the penholder organizes, the Netherlands has cooperated with Bolivia and Kazakhstan to organize official visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, and Haiti.¹⁰⁷ Organizing visits and issuing statements brings the P5's attention to issues that they otherwise might not and can shift the topics of discussion of the Council.

Beyond votes, the presidency, and penholding, elected countries have made important contributions to the Security Council, despite P5-driven deadlock that is particularly dominated by the United States.¹⁰⁸ While many have identified this deadlock and the preponderance of US power in the Council, both Ian Hurd and John Langmore and Jeremy Farrell have noted that there are certain conditions under which the elected members are most successful. Hurd also notes that in the early 2000s, as the Council's discussions and agenda became more open to and collaborative with non-Council members of UNGA, the role of the elected member declined compared to the late Cold War years and the 1990s, especially in a P5 dominated space.¹⁰⁹ That said, there was no notable decline in desire to win seats. Over time though, elected members have since carved out more space for themselves and made efforts to build strategic alliances and cooperation with one another to increase influence.¹¹⁰

'Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya', *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (December 2014): 889–911, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113512702>.

¹⁰³ 'The Penholder System' (New York: Security Council Report, 21 December 2018), 4, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ 'The Penholder System', 4.

¹⁰⁵ 'The Penholder System', 4.

¹⁰⁶ 'The Penholder System', 4.

¹⁰⁷ 'The Penholder System', 4.

¹⁰⁸ Ian Hurd, 'The UN Security Council', in *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.45>; David M. Malone, 'Security Council', in *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford University Press, 2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560103.003.0006>.

¹⁰⁹ Hurd, 'Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council', 42.

¹¹⁰ 'In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10'.

Langmore and Farrell note that Australia has had a variety of successes in its various tenures on the Council. Most recently, in addition to the penholding work on Syria, Australia took the lead on Resolution 2166 (2014) despite the reluctance of the P5. Resolution 2166 called for an immediate ceasefire in eastern Ukraine following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, and called for the comprehensive international investigation of the process.¹¹¹ With its constructive relationships with other elected members and its P5 allies, it was able to convince the P5 to push forward the resolution and not use their vetoes.¹¹² Similarly, New Zealand has developed a reputation in its time on the UNSC for skillful negotiation between the P5 and non-Western blocs of UN states, acting as a conduit between them and taking a “committed, more inclusive” approach to cooperation.¹¹³

This skillful engagement from elected members can be an important force for preventing deadlock and P5 spoilers, but it is not easy. Langmore and Farrell do note that Australia was able to do its effective work on humanitarianism, sanctions, and Resolution 2166 because it had clear goals, adequate staffing and funding at their mission, active dialogue with permanent members, and good relationships with other elected members.¹¹⁴ Of course, while this is feasible for many states, states with less than adequate staffing and funding to their missions (i.e. smaller, poorer states) are at a disadvantage in terms of being able to make a difference on the Council. It is indeed states like Canada, Australia, and The Netherlands that can invest money and end up with a disproportionate number of these examples of success. This staffing and funding issue is especially notable when compared to the resources that the P5 have on the Council.¹¹⁵ The P5 are indeed permanent and so their missions are always well-staffed, well-funded, well-trained, and maintain much better institutional memory in terms of both practice and procedure, as well as the issues of the day, compared to states that rotate onto the Council.¹¹⁶

Beyond material contributions, the Security Council is bound up in processes of legitimacy in world politics. Ian Hurd argues that the Security Council carries a symbolic legitimacy, wherein the Council’s legitimacy as an actor in world politics comes from its use of symbolic practices.¹¹⁷ The competition for elected seats is one of these key symbolic practices that legitimizes the Council’s role.¹¹⁸ Thus, in addition to tangible and concrete contributions identified, states may seek seats because “membership confers status and recognition on a state and allows the state to appropriate some of the authority derived from the legitimacy of the Council”.¹¹⁹ Similarly, membership confers the benefits of access and opportunity. Diplomatic access to the P5 is very important, as many states may not have that elite access to senior P5

¹¹¹ Langmore and Farrall, ‘Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council?’, 64–65.

¹¹² Langmore and Farrall, 64–65.

¹¹³ Colin Keating, ‘New Zealand’s 2014 Election to the UN Security Council: How Was It Achieved and What Does It Mean?’, in *New Zealand and the World: Past Present and Future*, ed. Robert G. Patman, Iati Iati, and Balazs Kiglics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2018).

¹¹⁴ Langmore and Farrall, ‘Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council?’, 73.

¹¹⁵ Langmore and Farrall, 73.

¹¹⁶ ‘In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10’.

¹¹⁷ Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, 36.

¹¹⁸ Hurd, ‘The UN Security Council’, 36.

¹¹⁹ Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, 36.

personnel otherwise. Similarly, holding a seat with such diplomatic access is often used as leverage with other states who may want to access some of those benefits.

Lastly, timing is important. Since states and observers of international politics cannot predict future events or crises, seeking seats on the Council is important at nearly any time. If a major world event were to occur, many see it as an advantage to be at the table during crisis management times rather than not at the table. For Canada, this has proved to be true on a few occasions. In 1967, Canada was on the Council during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In 1989-1990, Canada held a seat during the end of the Cold War and the start of the first Gulf War. Notably, Canada chaired the UNSC's sanctions committee during this time and also held the presidency in October 1989. Members of the Canadian delegation at the time have indicated that the timing of running for a seat was its own political calculation, but that the ability to be at the table at any given point is always a benefit for Canada, highlighting actions such as Prime Minister Mulroney's activism on South African apartheid.¹²⁰ The platform of a seat at the UNSC table allowed for amplification of this political work and for Canada to develop a policy competency on the issue of sanctions, something that became a key selling feature of Canada's campaign a decade later.¹²¹ Relatedly, New Zealand's time on the Council in 1994 was marked by Ambassador Colin Keating's outspoken stance on taking action on the genocide in Rwanda, in stark opposition to the lack of action by the P5.¹²² Keating has stated that this stance and work on the Council has followed New Zealand into the 21st century, where that reputation for action and resistance helped get them elected in 2014.¹²³

In sum, the UNSC is not simply a space controlled by P5 vetoes and "great power politics". It is much more complex and there are both contributions that the E10 can make and benefits they can reap. These are the things that help give a seat on the UNSC value as a status symbol, something that will be articulated more in the theory chapter of this dissertation. Understanding that the E10 do matter, and the technicalities of their election dynamics is important as a foundation for understanding the UNSC's role in relation to status and its implications in international ordering.

¹²⁰ Interview #4, 23 July 2020; Interview #5, 23 July 2020; Interview #21, 26 May 2022.

¹²¹ Interview #1, 20 July 2020, 1.

¹²² Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda; with a New Afterword* (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2016).

¹²³ Keating, 'New Zealand's 2014 Election to the UN Security Council: How Was It Achieved and What Does It Mean?'

(3) Theorizing Status in a World of Hierarchy

Introduction

This project's main focus is the process of status-seeking. How do states seek status in multilateral settings? Specifically, I am interested in status-seeking at the United Nations Security Council through the process of elections. With elected members and permanent members, the UNSC is a unique space under which to study status-seeking. I take a historical perspective, focusing on one country's trajectory of campaigns and elections from the founding of the UN to the present: Canada. This is a story about Canada from which new ideas can be generated about status-seeking.

I understand status is membership in a club, where members of the club recognize one another as peers who follow particular rules.¹²⁴ It is predicated on recognition and emerges from a process of social closure, or the process of differentiating the inside of the club from the outside.¹²⁵ It requires an "effective claim" from states that must be recognized by others and it also comes with expected behaviours.¹²⁶ In focusing on status-seeking, I am interested in *how* states position themselves to acquire recognition, become part of the "inside" through social closure, and ultimately position themselves vis à vis the expected behaviours of "having" status, where status is the seat on the Council. I take a relational approach to understanding this process, wherein relations precede entities and the hierarchies and orders under which status and status-seeking take place are co-constitutive with states and other actors. In particular, the status club is neither stagnant nor fixed, and the process of status-seeking and the nature of the club itself (and its expected behaviours) are also co-constitutive. The relations between states and the club itself are essential for shaping each entity.

From this perspective, I conceptualize the UNSC as a hierarchical institution embedded within broader hierarchies of IOs and global politics. My argument takes two parts that I outline below. First, the UNSC's hierarchical structure is an imperial structure on its own and it is embedded in a broader, overlapping imperialisms. The UNSC is a formalization of historical, imperial governance that solidified hierarchies found in 1945 and have taken many forms since. The imperial nature of the UNSC's historical roots and contemporary position is intertwined with its liberal international principles. Second, my argument outlines the process by which status-seeking takes place within this imperial hierarchy. States seek status – elected membership – within the UNSC that is conferred through a process of recognition. Importantly, the club has key responsibilities, shared expectations of behaviours, as well as shared practices. In the case of the UNSC, the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices come from the UNSC's mandate to maintain peace and security, a central embodiment of liberal internationalism globally. The UNSC's mandate, per the UN Charter, indicates that it has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security...[where states]...agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf".¹²⁷ The Council

¹²⁴ Duque, 'Recognizing International Status', 580.

¹²⁵ Duque, 578.

¹²⁶ Duque, 580.

¹²⁷ United Nations Charter.

will also “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” which include Article 1 and 2 of the Charter (see previous chapter). This gives the UNSC specific power over other UN bodies, making participation in its decision-making valuable. The politics of this power is embedded in the UN’s historical context of imperialism through the 20th and 21st century.

As such, status-seeking is a process of articulating why a state wants to join the UNSC club and how they seek to take on the responsibilities of the (liberal, imperial) mandate. As the UNSC and its responsibilities embody both liberalism and imperialism, status-seeking is thus a process of articulating and negotiating relations within imperialisms that structure the UNSC via liberal internationalism, and the club’s associated responsibilities that stem from it. Two possibilities for doing this follow.

- (1) States may articulate their commitment to liberal international values and the move toward taking on the UNSC’s responsibility for maintaining global peace and security. Inherent in this commitment to liberal internationalism is an articulated relation to imperialism, allowing them to navigate the hierarchy of the Council. Often, even if indirectly and unsaid, the navigation of liberal internationalism’s responsibilities at the UNSC are in support of imperialisms, even if they are not fully in the state’s logical interest.
- (2) Alternatively, they may behave in resistance to liberalism/imperialism if they argue that the maintenance of peace and security and the responsibility to do so requires a push back against those things and if they believe it to be a roundabout path to still achieving status (and its benefits).

Each of these are possible under two types of competition for seats, of which Canada has participated in both – clean slate and competitive (see previous chapter). It is important to note that (a) status has self-interested benefits, as described in the previous chapter; (b) status and different forms of power itself can be co-constitutive. So, this theory does not assume that states are simply looking to serve for altruistic reasons, rather it suggests status-seeking has many roots and due to the nature of the hierarchies, expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities, that rhetorically and pragmatically, they may engage in the campaign process and discuss these regardless of whether they end up fulfilling that. This dissertation focuses on both types of competition and the first (1) of the two possible paths for status-seeking, outlining one possible path. I outline this argument in more detail in the section on status-seeking later in this chapter. Ultimately, the goal of this argument is to construct a framework under which I can make sense of different campaigns to the UNSC. Each case in this dissertation does in fact look different in many ways, but this framework allows me to interpretively understand the dynamics of each campaign in ways that can be extended or applied to others. This is not an argument about all status-seeking, but rather a framework of possibility that builds on existing theorizing about status.

In working towards the explanation of the argument, I begin by describing the ontological commitment of relationalism and why it is important. I then discuss relevant literature and conceptualizations of hierarchy and the specific form of hierarchy for this dissertation: imperialism. From there, I move directly into status and status-seeking, as it takes place in this

hierarchy, before reflecting on the theoretical approach that flows from these concepts, Global Historical Sociology. I conclude with a short discussion on “why Canada” that sets up the transition to discussing methodology and methodological choices in the next chapter.

Relationalism

A relational perspective on International Relations is situated in opposition to a substantialist perspective. Very simply, a relational perspective sees relations between actors as coming *before* actors themselves¹²⁸ and as “not self-subsistent or preformed entities, but rather unfolding dynamic relations whose changing meaning affects the very identity of actors”.¹²⁹ In this case, states emerge from relations, and concepts associated with state dynamics, such as status, emerge from the way that relations are configured over time.¹³⁰ On the other hand, a substantialist perspective takes the position that actors are fixed, delineated, and pre-existing.¹³¹ Before delving more deeply into the concepts of this dissertation, I outline further detail about the characteristics and advantages of a relational perspective for this project.

Relationalism is a large umbrella that cross cuts various theories of IR and methodological approaches. It is not a theory, rather it is an ontological commitment preceding theory. Many relational categories of scholarship are populated by constructivist and critical approaches to IR, though not always explicitly. Relationalism moves the debate beyond agents and structures and offers novel a way of situating oneself and a family of scholarship ontologically. It places emphasis on “the theoretical and analytical significance of connections, ties, transactions, and other kinds of relations among entities”.¹³² Importantly, “rather than seeking to enumerate a list of the attributes of agents or entities, or a holistic catalogue of structures and forces, relational approaches to world politics specify *processes* and *mechanisms* that, among other things, give rise to both actors and the environments in which they find themselves”.¹³³ This focus on process is what drives my concern with *status-seeking* rather than status itself, as status-seeking is procedural and in the context of the UNSC, is heavily driven by relations between states, and between states and multilateral organizations. The process of status-seeking is thus my main object of inquiry.

Jackson and Nexon highlight two types of relationalism, where the focus is either on (a) position; or (b) process, as it relates to actor interactions in the international.¹³⁴ These are not mutually exclusive, rather most relational scholars draw on both process and position, but with a focus more heavily on one or the other.¹³⁵ They plot a variety of traditions on a matrix of position vs. process and the main concepts of the research, and also note that much critical

¹²⁸ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 291–332, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005003002>.

¹²⁹ Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 578.

¹³⁰ Duque, 578.

¹³¹ Jackson and Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, 293.

¹³² Jackson and Nexon, ‘Reclaiming the Social’, 583.

¹³³ Jackson and Nexon, 584–85.

¹³⁴ Jackson and Nexon, 584.

¹³⁵ Jackson and Nexon, 595.

discourse analysis falls into relational categories, though it does not make it into their matrix. With obvious features of discourse analysis, this project draws most heavily on the pragmatist account of action for state relations, which falls in the process category. Status is obviously positional to a degree (due to hierarchy), but even with that in mind, status-seeking concerns itself with the process of chasing position, not position itself. In the pragmatist vein, actors are situated in “‘problem-situations’ with which they wrestle”.¹³⁶ “In their efforts to find and implement solutions, actors creatively rework the materials – including the cultural materials that they find themselves in the midst of”.¹³⁷ This includes knowledge, which is subjective and imbued with power, cultural norms, and a Gramscian set of material conditions that shape social interaction. In this sense, while focusing on a more ideational question in this project, pragmatism allows me to consider the material conditions, practices, and ideational surroundings that shape relations and subsequently, actors. From a pragmatist perspective, relations are dynamic. Agents’ “solutions are not the result of the essential properties of the individual actors, or of any essential properties of the social setting, but *emerge instead from the complex transactions among situated actors and their environments*”.¹³⁸ Here, practice is foregrounded – much like practice theories – but political contestation is re-integrated and power itself is conceptualized as “*productive* [often in the Foucauldian sense], rather than merely coercive”.¹³⁹ My view of pragmatism, in relation to practice theory, is one coming from the art of improv: “yes, and...”. Foregrounding practice is important, as it zooms in on the social terrain on which global politics happens. In both practice theories and pragmatism, “formal institutions are only the starting point of inquiry”¹⁴⁰ in relational thinking, making zooming in on the micro-level as important as the macro-level for understanding such politics. In this view, pragmatism is ontological rather than methodological, but has “a commitment to an embodied, processual view of knowing and being”¹⁴¹ for actors and aims to move beyond binaries of agents/structures and normative/instrumental logics of action.¹⁴² I return to pragmatism-as-ontology in more detail in the subsequent methodology chapter as a way of making sense of my conversations with diplomats.

Relationalism is the central ontological wager of this project that comes before theoretical selection and methodological choice. It shapes the way that I understand status-seeking but also allows me to make sense of change over time in the status-seeking process. If entities are not fixed, but rather co-constituted and preceded by relations, then change over time and the historical unfolding of status-seeking becomes possible to study. Similarly, a relational perspective allows me to make sense of the ways that actors may exist in different ways at different points in time – a country or organization in 1945 may not be the same in 1975 – providing me with the flexibility to maintain historicism methodologically and not analyze the past from the perspective of the present. Finally, a relational approach allows me to focus on

¹³⁶ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

¹³⁷ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

¹³⁸ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

¹³⁹ Jackson and Nexon, 590.

¹⁴⁰ Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*, 120.

¹⁴¹ Simon Frankel Pratt, ‘Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology: Exploring the Full Horizon of Pragmatism as an Approach to IR Theory’, *International Studies Review* 18, no. 3 (September 2016): 523, <https://doi.org/10/f9fk3k>.

¹⁴² Pratt, 523.

active processes and relations rather than fixed attributes of states and organizations. With this in mind, I move to the central concepts of this dissertation. I select relational approaches to these concepts but situate them more broadly in the literatures surrounding each of them.

Hierarchies in International Politics

To study status implies that there must be some form of hierarchy that exists in a particular context in international politics. Status-seeking requires navigating that hierarchy. I proceed with a short discussion of hierarchy, with an eye towards the processes by which hierarchies are made, remade, arranged, and navigated. IR's decades-long preoccupation with the assumption of anarchy has been the subject of significant challenge in recent years, with efforts to both demonstrate the presence of many hierarchies as well as theorize about hierarchies in a coherent manner. Some see hierarchies as replacing anarchy, where others see hierarchies as emerging within anarchic structure. Both perspectives see hierarchies as forms global inequality, be it sovereign inequality, economic inequality, or other related forms of stratification.¹⁴³

Hierarchies are structures of super- and subordination of global actors and may be material or ideational or both.¹⁴⁴ Hierarchy-centric theories of IR promise “to deliver what anarchy-centred approaches have not: a framework for theorizing and empirically analyzing world politics as a *global system* rather than an international one”.¹⁴⁵ In other words, they are expanding the possibilities of understanding international politics to one in which sovereign inequality exists, structures of power are transnational (and transcend states), and states are not the only actors that matter. As Zarakol writes, “the structures of differentiation at the core of hierarchical systems are deeply implicated with power. Hierarchical systems are thus intrinsically political”.¹⁴⁶ She adds, “hierarchies stratify, rank and organize the relations not only among states but also among other kinds of actors”.¹⁴⁷ Finally, “there are many different kinds of hierarchical relations in world politics. However, since different hierarchies can and often do intersect with each other, these logics can be nested”.¹⁴⁸ For example, I see overlap between forms of hierarchy that may be institutional, political, and economic (i.e., core-periphery or revolving around capital) and see different types of hierarchies embedded within other ones (i.e., within the UN system). In this case, hierarchies are key drivers and components of international ordering, or “relatively stable patterns of relations and practices in world politics”.¹⁴⁹ I use

¹⁴³ See: Jack Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society’, *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2006): 139–70, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106064505>; Meghan Mcconaughey, Paul Musgrave, and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Beyond Anarchy: Logics of Political Organization, Hierarchy, and International Structure’, *International Theory* 10, no. 2 (July 2018): 181–218, <https://doi.org/10/gdt4rb>.

¹⁴⁴ Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon, ‘Beyond Anarchy’.

¹⁴⁵ Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Hierarchies in World Politics’, *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016): 624, <https://doi.org/10/gj2vqf>.

¹⁴⁶ Ayşe Zarakol, ‘Theorising Hierarchies’, in *Hierarchies in World Politics*, ed. Ayşe Zarakol, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241588.002>.

¹⁴⁷ Zarakol, 3.

¹⁴⁸ Zarakol, 3.

¹⁴⁹ Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 31.

ordering as a verb, following Cooley and Nexon, with the idea that no ‘order’ is fixed enough to be a noun¹⁵⁰, but also from a relational perspective in which states, institutions, organizations, and subsequently hierarchies are often overlapping, fluid, and nested.

International organizations provide an environment for nested hierarchy that exists under broader systems of hierarchy. For example, within broader global hierarchies exists the United Nations. There are 193 member states, but also polities for whom membership is not granted. From that 193 member states, the Security Council contains 5 permanent members with a veto power and 10 elected members without. Members of the Security Council have select rights and powers over the other UNGA members that those others do not have. Elected members have more power on the surface than non-members, but less power than permanent members. Moreover, elected seats have not been equally distributed over time, despite each state having equal opportunity in theory to run for seats. Many states have never served, whereas others have served multiple times or only once. Even UNGA, of which all 193 UN member states are members, is not a bastion of equality. As Lora Viola indicates, the idea of equal access to membership for all sovereign states does not translate to equality among them in practice. In fact, Viola indicates that the idea of increased inclusion leading to increased equality is a myth based in the liberal (and subsequently liberal international) belief in linear progress.¹⁵¹ What happens instead is an increased inequality within organizations (as well as more globally) through stratification into nested and both formal and informal hierarchy.¹⁵² While increased membership in the UN may increase “formal” equality between members, organizations then create institutional designs “that are likely to decrease procedural equality”.¹⁵³ Through this logic, Viola demonstrates that more increased membership leads to stratification based on broader global dynamics of hierarchy.

For hierarchy, there are both narrow and broad understandings of the concept. Narrow understandings see hierarchies as institutions where they are assumed to function as they are designed and is more concerned with agency. Broad understandings are focused more on the nature of inequality and structure, with less focus on actors. Hierarchies themselves can be viewed from either lens, each of which may provide a different angle of analysis. For example, Andrew Phillips argues that imperialism can be seen as structures of “narrow hierarchy” focusing on institutions of domination, but also “broad hierarchy” due to its social stratification based primarily on race.¹⁵⁴ My analysis takes an eye to both the narrow and broad understandings for the reason that I am interested in imperialism as a stratifying force under which multiple overlapping and nested hierarchies are created in global politics and whose effects may outlast a particular empire itself or hold relevance across multiple contexts. Further, a relational commitment obligates a move beyond agentic and structural approaches and a focus on the ways that relations are co-constituted with both agents and structures. This approach also

¹⁵⁰ Cooley and Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony*.

¹⁵¹ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 165–67.

¹⁵² Viola, 165–67.

¹⁵³ Viola, 166.

¹⁵⁴ Andrew Phillips, ‘Making Empires’, in *Hierarchies in World Politics*, ed. Ayşe Zarakol, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 65, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241588.004>.

allows for hierarchy to be understood as fluid and constantly being negotiated, remade, and transformed, rather than a more stable anarchy.

In general, treating hierarchy as a central feature of global politics allows scholars of international relations to understand systemic inequality, be that procedural inequality, sovereign inequality, material inequality, or otherwise. Karim El Taki suggests that recent hierarchy literature has made one critical oversight – it commonly approaches analysis of hierarchy from above.¹⁵⁵ This leads to the overemphasis of dominant actors, much like literature on status, which, as I point to later, focuses too much on great powers and rising powers. El Taki’s point is well taken when it comes to thinking about the Security Council, as most literature on its workings focuses on the P5, ignoring the E10. In focusing on hierarchy-from-below, El Taki’s relational-sociological approach sees hierarchy as “a socially differentiated system predicated on recognition” and focuses on how states pursue that recognition.¹⁵⁶ Like others who do not see anarchy and hierarchy as mutually exclusive, he sees hierarchy as “the main structuring feature of the international” and sees recognition as fundamental to the operation of hierarchical structures.¹⁵⁷

Hierarchy is everywhere in global politics and the shift towards hierarchy allows scholarship to uncover more about super- and sub-ordination. It is also a base concept under which status and status-seeking unfold. The UNSC is a straightforward institutional hierarchy nested within the United Nations, a more complex hierarchy with multiple, overlapping dynamics. These organizations are structured by much bigger hierarchies, the most important of which is imperialism for these purposes. Central to the argument of this dissertation is the idea that imperialisms are ever-present in global politics, even in 2021, and campaigns to for elected seats on the UNSC are embedded in this. Much research on status takes for granted the historical processes through which status hierarchies are constructed. With attention to such process, I aim to change that. In turn, I focus specifically on imperialism so to capture the historical change in status-seeking within the UNSC hierarchy, as well as change in the construction of hierarchy itself.

Imperialism (and relatedly, liberalism)

As discussed, the politics of status requires a hierarchy or series of hierarchies. If the UNSC is a nested hierarchy within the United Nations, which is itself a nested hierarchy within global politics, what are the structuring forces that built and sustain this hierarchy? The answer exists as a double-edged sword - liberalism and imperialism – which have long been integrated in political thought. In this case, imperialism is the primary hierarchical force at work, but liberalism is both an interrelated ideology and process as well as a foundation of the United Nations. The foundations of the United Nations and the UNSC are in liberalism, but they are also in imperialism and that is no coincidence. The relationship between imperialism and liberalism is complex and debated, but nowhere is it more evident than in unravelling the history of the UN’s origins. In this section, I begin with a discussion of the history of the UN in terms of liberalism

¹⁵⁵ Karim El Taki, ‘Subordinates’ Quest for Recognition in Hierarchy’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1 November 2021, 2, <https://doi.org/10/gm98bw>.

¹⁵⁶ El Taki, 3.

¹⁵⁷ El Taki, 3.

and imperialism and then I work through key conceptualizations of imperialism, empires, liberalism, and liberal internationalism as they suit this dissertation.

The UN's founding values, goals, and texts are the touchstone of liberal internationalism. Built in 1945, the United Nations took on the challenge of building peace, supporting economic development, championing human rights, and promoting democracy. This liberal project was a very American one built in the image of increased American hegemony in the post-war world, but it was not only dominated by American power; rather, European imperialism was institutionalized in its creation too, especially British imperialism. In San Francisco, the countries that became the P5 – soon to be victorious in war – cemented their own power in their liberal creation. Outside of Europe, the Soviet Union had a number of semi-imperial relations, and while explicitly anti-liberal, was outnumbered by its European and American counterparts. Moreover, the inclusion of China at the time was the Republic of China, not the later People's Republic of China, until 1971. China was also the least active on the Council of the P5 countries, having less influence than its counterparts. The P5 represented the most powerful countries at the conclusion of the Second World War, notably also countries with one of many forms of empire. As Martin Bayly writes,

*“the discourse of ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states, or in more contemporary parlance, ‘failed states’, ‘ungoverned spaces’, and ‘rogue states’; and the presence of the P5 on the UN Security Council, all of these features of world politics can be traced back to empire and imperialism in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, patterns of empire that in turn were parasitic upon other imperial polities and their legacies elsewhere”.*¹⁵⁸

Most of the world was also dominated by primarily European empire, either formally or informally, with many including W.E.B. DuBois emphasizing how many millions of people were dominated by a small number of countries, many of whom were now in charge of the central organization of the new liberal internationalism, the UNSC.¹⁵⁹ In practice, this was an intersection of liberalism and imperialism becoming institutionalized as a form of ordering. In fact,

*“the UN’s later embrace of anti-colonialism...has tended to obscure the awkward fact that like the League [of Nations] it was a product of empire and indeed, at least at the outset, regarded by those with colonies to keep as a more than adequate mechanism for its defense. The UN, in short, was the product of evolution not revolution, and it grew out of existing ideas and institutions, their successes and failures as revealed by the challenge of the war itself”.*¹⁶⁰

Bell also writes that “empire was widely seen as a legitimate, even necessary, form of political order, capable of underwriting state power and prestige, maintaining geopolitical

¹⁵⁸ Martin J. Bayly, ‘Imperialism: Beyond the “re-Turn to Empire” in International Relations’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 356.

¹⁵⁹ DuBois, *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace*.

¹⁶⁰ Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 2009, 17.

stability and ‘civilizing’ purportedly backward peoples. The modern architecture of global governance – including international law and numerous international organisations – was forged in this imperial world system”.¹⁶¹ Mazower identifies this foundation of the UN as *imperial internationalism*, where the efforts of the P5 and their allies were directed at protecting their own imperial interests and institutionalizing them in the post-War era, as seen in both the existence of the P5 but also the creation of systems such as trusteeships, which followed from the League of Nations mandate system.¹⁶² Importantly, the legacies of the League of Nations followed into the later UN, most notably in the mandate systems’ transformation into the trusteeships which were operational until the 1990s.¹⁶³ In terms of these empires, the prominence of both British empire and American empire mattered significantly for Canada, as former was declining and the latter was rising. Not only were they the two most influential powers at the table in San Francisco, but Canada’s special relationship with the two structured its own positioning at the conference and for the remainder of the 20th century within the UN space. In the 1940s, imperial internationalism was central to Canada’s UNSC campaigns, as it was committed to making the UN work as a force for “good” while also strongly defending Britain’s interests and the nature of the Commonwealth. By the 1950s, the role of the Commonwealth had slipped somewhat, and Canada was, on the surface, a moderating force in favour of decolonization in Africa and Asia, but ultimately sought to protect Cold War goals for the West. These tensions were not only central to Canada’s desire to join the UNSC and seek status, but also exemplary of imperial internationalism in action.

Of course, at the systemic level and in the international organization context, imperialism and imperial internationalism is often forgotten and ignored in International Relations, particularly at the systemic or global order level, despite widespread efforts to discuss the rise and fall of “liberal international order”. Much has been left to historians and political theorists, though Priya Satia argues that historians have been central to the craft of historical narratives that justified imperial expansion, as part of a larger trend in intellectual history.¹⁶⁴ As Mark Mazower notes, much of imperialism is erased in mainstream IR, particularly because of the discipline’s rejection of pre-war ideas in the modern canon.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, Vitalis makes related arguments about the dominance of white, imperial institutions in the creation of IR and the rejection of international thought critiquing this.¹⁶⁶ This is also echoed by many in the post and decolonial traditions in IR, as well as Marxist and feminist traditions and historical and historiographical scholarship that intersects with intellectual history. In particular, Jeanne Morefield indicates that IR has purposely obscured this theoretical connection through historical analysis in order to defend liberalism as an organizing principle, as many actions of seemingly liberal “actors” throughout the late British empire and the history of American dominance behaved in imperial

¹⁶¹ Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction: Empire, Race and Global Justice’, in *Empire, Race and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 2.

¹⁶² Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 2009.

¹⁶³ Mazower; On the League’s mandates, see: Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, First edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Priya Satia, *Time’s Monster: How History Makes History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2020).

¹⁶⁵ Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*, 2009, 17.

¹⁶⁶ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).

ways under the guise of liberalism.¹⁶⁷ Each of these streams of thought are also echoed by those who see liberalism as so foundational to the political thought that underlies IR, not just in terms of liberal theories of IR as an analytical approach, but in terms of the values of liberalism that shape the assumptions of much scholarship across theoretical divides.¹⁶⁸ Both the practice *and* the study of global politics in the post-war era are indebted to liberalism – even realism, seen as a folly to liberal thought in IR, is ultimately more complementary with liberalism than it may claim.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, it is IR’s relationship with liberalism more broadly makes it difficult for many in the discipline to grapple with the ways in which imperialism has shaped 20th century global politics and the ways in which liberalism and imperialism are bound up in one another.¹⁷⁰ This has made it difficult to really grasp the nature of hierarchy, as much super and subordination has historically been in the shape of imperialisms. Without acknowledging and understanding imperialism, it is impossible to fully theorize about hierarchy and the processes that unfold within it – particularly identity, recognition, and most importantly for this project, status.

Returning to imperialism, an empire is “a state that emerges in the direct or indirect rule over dependent or colonial territories” and imperialism is the process of maintaining it.¹⁷¹ Of course, there is significant variation in reality between the level of formality of empire as well as the breadth of the definition. For Bell, a narrow view of empire consists of one state that controls the sovereignty of another. On the other hand, a broad view consists of a polity exerting “decisive or overwhelming power in a system of unequal power relations, thus encompassing very diverse forms of control and influence”.¹⁷² This broad definition is most useful for thinking about the complexities of empires over time and their spectrum of formalities. It is from this broad view that I analyze the effects of *imperialism*, which in this case refers to the different processes of maintaining unequal power relations, subordinations, and both formal and informal forms of control and influence. Using a “big tent” approach to understanding imperialism allows for inclusion within the term of imperial forms as different as British and American ones in the 20th century and aligns with much of the work of historians. While there is debate in the discipline about whether “America is an empire”, I begin from the position that it is and the best way to capture its differences from its European contemporaries is with a broad definition and with the perspective that while it has differences, it does also maintain many similarities to earlier moments of British Empire.¹⁷³ Some have also noted the blurry relationship between IR’s understanding of hegemony (as typically understood in IR, not the Gramscian sense) and empire, where hegemony is argued to represent control over subordinates in terms of their foreign policies but not their domestic policies, while many political theorists and historians argue that this distinction is unhelpful or inaccurate.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁷ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*.

¹⁶⁸ Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism*, 2013.

¹⁶⁹ Jahn, 21; Michael C. Williams, ‘In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of International Relations Theory’, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 649, <https://doi.org/10/f5f8hp>.

¹⁷⁰ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*, 4.

¹⁷¹ Morefield, 4.

¹⁷² Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire*, 2019, 91.

¹⁷³ Go, *Patterns of Empire*; Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*.

¹⁷⁴ Cooley and Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony*, 27.

An important note on imperialism comes from Julian Go, who points to the centrality of political power, which must be exercised in order for the wheels of imperialism to turn. This exercise of power can be multifaceted, including various techniques, modalities, and forms.¹⁷⁵ What separates imperialism from other forms of global power is the nature of its hierarchy and subordination. In the 20th century and into the present, that was and is most commonly a racialized hierarchy, whose structure of whiteness and white supremacy is maintained across the varieties of formal and informal exercises of power.¹⁷⁶ A useful way of thinking of this broad definition of imperialism, taking into account all of these attributes, most notably its internationalism, is Ann Laura Stoler's imperial formations. Stoler's account captures the historical diversity and contingency and plurality of different empires and imperialisms, especially due to the way that they overlap in their different levels of formality and points in time, as the concept of imperialism has indeed shifted over time and needs to be read in historical context.¹⁷⁷ She defines it as "macropolities whose technologies of rule thrive on the production of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation...harboring and building on territorial ambiguity, redefining legal categories of belonging and quasi membership, and shifting the geographic and demographic zones of partially suspended rights".¹⁷⁸ Similarly, Go draws on this, thinking of imperial formations as "sets of relations and forms involving multiple tactics, policies, practices and modalities of power; hierarchically ordered formations wherein a state or center exercises control or unequal influence over subordinated territories, peoples, and societies through a variety of means and methods".¹⁷⁹ Most importantly in these overlapping definitions, the focus is on how imperial formations are productive of social effects that have temporal, geographic, and economic aspects – they produce different categories of sovereignties, subjectivities, economic positions, and geographies through varying modalities and exercises of power.

Stoler and McGranahan argue for its use in order to better understand what empires *do* and affect in a larger way, so that the term is "a critical analytic to underscore not the inevitable rise and fall of empires but the active and contingent process of their making and unmaking".¹⁸⁰ This is consistent with the idea of understanding imperialism as structures of relations; or in other words, imperial formations provide a relational lens to understanding the global effects of imperialism.¹⁸¹ Ultimately, it is an analytic that I use going forward, borrowed from historians, that aligns with my focus on global and transnational relations with fluid geographical and temporal boundaries. A central theme of imperial formations is inconsistency in the application of rights, membership, economic power, and sovereignty, as well as differentiated subjectivities and geographies. This is central because it overlaps significantly with the intellectual and

¹⁷⁵ Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 6–9.

¹⁷⁶ Go, 9.

¹⁷⁷ Go, 5.

¹⁷⁸ A. L. Stoler, 'On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty', *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (1 January 2006): 128, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-00000009>; Also quoted in: Bayly, 'Imperialism: Beyond the "re-Turn to Empire" in International Relations', 360.

¹⁷⁹ Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 12.

¹⁸⁰ Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, 'Introduction: Refiguring Imperial Terrains', in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Peter C Perdue, Carole McGranahan, and Ann Laura Stoler (Santa Fe, N.M.; Oxford [U.K.: School for Advanced Research Press : James Currey, 2007), 8.

¹⁸¹ Bayly, 'Imperialism: Beyond the "re-Turn to Empire" in International Relations', 357.

practical history of liberalism, whose central tenets have always been inconsistently applied within imperial hierarchy. The Gramscian form of hegemony is central as well in this form of imperialism, as a form of power stemming from economic and material subordination and subjugation, with particular social norms and relations emerging out of it.¹⁸² Hegemony, in this sense, is a central form of the economic subordination found in empire that I have mentioned above. In Cox's application of hegemony to the international, he notes that international organizations are part of this process and this is central to understanding how the United Nations embodies both liberalism and imperialism. For Cox: "(1) they embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas".¹⁸³

This view of material subordination as part of imperialism in the international sphere is essential, not least because it is a critique of liberalism, illustrating one of the interconnections between the two. Central to liberalism and its export to the international sphere is the rights of the individual, democracy, and economic moves towards private property, free trade, and free markets. Liberalism originates in the domestic and private spheres but in the international, "the institutionalization of liberal forms" has been central as a "basis for cooperation and reform of the international system at large".¹⁸⁴ The UN is the central institutionalization of liberalism in its global form, liberal internationalism, which focuses on human rights, rule of law, maintenance of peace, economic development, and democracy. Of course, the inconsistencies and hypocrisies of liberal internationalism have been well documented across the 20th and 21st centuries, especially when it comes to American regard for these things. It is not that each of these things are inherently bad; rather the inconsistency of their application and their use to maintain structures of power are where the problem lies. That the institutionalization of liberalism in the UN produced both liberal internationalism and imperial internationalism would suggest that perhaps these two things are far more overlapping than often considered, though not the same. This overlap becomes obvious from the perspective that the UN's founding only allowed membership and sovereignty for some nations and not others – and when it did increase membership, an increase in equality did not necessarily follow.¹⁸⁵ For a thought tradition that emphasizes equality, it has historically only meant equality for certain groups at certain places in a hierarchy. Moreover, that notion and the overlap between liberalism and imperialism goes further back in both the activities of imperial formations and intellectual history. Bell describes what can essentially be visualized as a Venn diagram of three arguments where liberalism and imperialism may be treated as mutually exclusive, as fully overlapping, or as having a complex relationship where they overlap in many ways but not all.¹⁸⁶ This applies to both historical and theoretical themes of liberalism but also much of what is now known as "liberal order" and its "liberal institutions". This dissertation is positioned such that liberalism and imperialism are heavily overlapping (though perhaps not completely) through their practices and relational structures.

¹⁸² Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', 163–64.

¹⁸³ Cox, 172.

¹⁸⁴ Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism*, 2013, 3.

¹⁸⁵ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*.

¹⁸⁶ Bell, *Reordering the World*, 2019, 21.

Morefield has pointed to the ways in which liberal thought has been central to justifying imperialism, despite the idea of imperialism seeming to be a challenge to ideas of individual freedom and equality. In the first half of the 20th century, thinkers and policymakers of the British Empire saw liberalism as applying to white British populations and justified the expansion of the empire as expanding the possibilities of liberalism for whom it applied. This was evident in the different forms of colonization across the settler colonies (space for British life to expand) versus the non-settler colonies (territorial conquest and extraction alone). Liberal actors could justify the expansion of settler colonialism in places like Canada by providing opportunity for the expansion of private property for Europeans and “domestic” liberal rule, despite its existence requiring the domination and dispossession of Indigenous peoples.¹⁸⁷ British intellectuals and leaders later also saw its decline and began to deflect and reframe it within liberal values as opposed to clear domination. This was evident in the move towards the use of the word “Commonwealth” instead of “empire” as well as moves towards paternalistic narratives of “helping” uncivilized populations.¹⁸⁸

In the post-war UN era, liberal internationalism preached sovereign equality and self-determination, as a theoretical move away from domination and hierarchy. In practice, hierarchy remained, even as formal imperialism declined, with both fashioning and refashioning themselves in new and contradictory ways through the second half of the 20th century and into the present. In this sense, colonized peoples were not “ready” to be independent at the establishment of the UN and have access to self-determination and membership. They were again under the paternalistic narrative of being “helped” by imperialism. This stemmed from the 19th century, where the contradictions of only applying principles political freedom and sovereignty to some and not others emerged. Jahn writes,

*“empire-building was systematically supported by liberal international lawyers and political thinkers alike. Indeed the principle of layered sovereignty so characteristic of empire was confirmed by the Berlin Conference as late as 1884-5. And the idea of an international order based on nation states was not codified until the UN charter of 1948, and largely realized only in the 1970s after decolonization”.*¹⁸⁹

Ultimately, the expansion of liberalism and its rights and privileges for those at the top of an imperial hierarchy has routinely come at the cost of those rights and privileges for those at the bottom. Similarly, “the establishment of liberalism requires, and historically has systematically entailed, both appropriation and expropriation, political emancipation and political oppression”¹⁹⁰; the configuration of which of these applies to whom is determined by imperial formations. It has both contradictions that are in many ways also coherently by design; it preaches equality but structures authority and hierarchy such that its principles are only available to some, at the expense of others.

¹⁸⁷ Jahn, ‘Liberal Internationalism’, 1 January 2018, 53.

¹⁸⁸ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*; Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870-1914*.

¹⁸⁹ Jahn, ‘Liberal Internationalism’, 1 January 2018, 54.

¹⁹⁰ Jahn, 59.

In the creation of the UN, which originally guaranteed its principles for some, Jahn writes that the 1945-1989 liberal international world in the West, as led by the United States, had “five distinguishing features: co-binding security arrangements, penetrated reciprocal hegemony; the integration of semi-sovereign and partial Great Powers; economic openness; and civic identity”.¹⁹¹ The 1990s and the end of the Cold War then offered “the possibility of extending these features to the international order at large; the chance to realize a liberal world order”.¹⁹² Of course, this has not come to pass and the 30+ years between 1989 and the present have been marked by a variety of failures, a rise of illiberalism, and many unexpected challenges and subsequent debates about their meaning. Through each of these periods, global inequality in terms of these liberal principles – as well as the creation of the modern state – has been configured by the actions of imperial formations and their domination of global ordering.¹⁹³ Much like liberalism’s inequality domestically, liberal internationalism has been rife with inequalities internationally beyond those mentioned thus far.

Two concepts become relevant here that are at the core of the UN’s liberal international purpose. The first is sovereign equality and the second is self-determination. While founded on ideas of sovereign equality and self-determination, as opposed to domination and hierarchy, the UN has long struggled to implement these principles of liberal internationalism. While formal imperialism declined by the 1970s, the UN had been central to paternalistic forms of domination from the trustee system (which existed until 1994) to hindering self-determination movements across the post-colonial world. On the other hand, the UN also saw a variety of movements in support of anti-colonialism, self-determination, and sovereign equality that rose and fell over time.

While the principle of self-determination at the UN has certainly proven contradictory and complex, the idea of sovereign equality is also paradoxical historically. On the one hand, a liberal notion of linear progress would suggest that more states joining the United Nations, thus increasing membership, would make it more democratic and more equal – each state becomes an equal member of the General Assembly, but if one thinks through the trajectory of the 20th century, increasing UNGA membership did not mean that the world became less hierarchical or stratified. In this case, powerful liberal states have expanded the notion of “democracy” to the international and implemented liberal features through organizations like the United Nations. From this perspective, the idea was that as membership in IOs increased, sovereign equality also increased. Based on a liberal teleology of progress, Lora Viola writes that this is a myth and calls it the “false promise of universalism”.¹⁹⁴ Liberalism has long promised increased membership in international organizations and sought to imagine this as increasing sovereign equality and increasing democratic order. However, “far from promoting equality, international institutions lock actors into hierarchical relations”.¹⁹⁵ The creation of liberal organizations and their

¹⁹¹ Jahn, 45.

¹⁹² Jahn, 45.

¹⁹³ Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Narrating Inequality, Eliding Empire’, *The British Journal of Sociology* 72, no. 1 (January 2021): 69–78, <https://doi.org/10/gjkm4q>; Gurminder K. Bhambra, ‘Chapter 17: The State: Postcolonial Histories of the Concept’, in *Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics*, ed. Olivia Umurerwa Rutazibwa and Robbie Shilliam, Routledge Handbooks (London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 200–209.

¹⁹⁴ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 1.

¹⁹⁵ Viola, 3.

expansion both produces equality and inequality, as well as inclusion and exclusion, and ultimately has continued to stratify international ordering processes into the present.¹⁹⁶ Ultimately, hierarchy persists and paradoxically, further hierarchy and exclusion is commonly part of the same process as increased inclusion. Resolution 1991A (XVII) is a good example of this false promise of universalism. Following increased membership and advocacy from new members to expand the Security Council, the Resolution increased the number of non-permanent members from 6 to 10 on the UNSC and formalized regional groups. Far from increasing equality, it actually allowed for more states to climb a hierarchy and hold rights over others. Similarly, it created new forms of hierarchy and competition within regional groups. It changed the nature of status-seeking and hierarchy rather than increasing sovereign equality.

Increased membership as equality is also built on the same liberal idea of progress that sees “becoming” a state requiring a certain level of economic development, especially following independence from an empire. In this case, Viola notes that historical materialists provide a useful critique of liberalism, which resembles Jahn’s mentioned above. While liberals often saw “underdeveloped” states as one that could “mature” into European style states, historical materialists argue usefully that “the very position of developed states depends on others being economically weaker. In other words, the political equality of states makes unequal exchange possible and, even more, legitimizes it”.¹⁹⁷ This once again connects to both hegemony as domination by social consent, as well as the role that IOs play as “mechanisms of hegemony” – they expand particular social orders, legitimate them, and reform them.¹⁹⁸ In one of these key critiques, Gramsci allows Cox to “understand how ideas, material factors, and institutional rules combine to maintain a world order that allows for the expansion and domination of a hegemonic social class”.¹⁹⁹ Ultimately, Viola synthesizes this historical materialist critique of the economic relations of domination with one that focuses on the role of social processes, ideas, and institutions in producing relations of power and authority.²⁰⁰ Like other critiques of imperialism, this view is valuable, as it pairs well alongside analysis that focuses more on the social and ideational role of empire and hierarchy, as I take here. Like Viola, I focus on social processes and institutional politics but take seriously the materialist approach in the background.

While Viola does not formally work imperialisms into her analysis, such analysis a sharp critique of liberalism and connected to other arguments about sovereign inequality and self-determination related to the UN. On sovereign inequality, Adom Getachew writes, “imperial domination structured modern international society and was internal to the very development of the legal regimes that came to govern international relations. These processes of unequal integration engendered legal and political hierarchy within the boundaries of international society”.²⁰¹ She argues that this set of relations was built on the politics of Du Bois’s global color line, which produced racialized inequality about who had access to sovereignty and participation

¹⁹⁶ Viola, 3–8.

¹⁹⁷ Viola, 20.

¹⁹⁸ Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, 172.

¹⁹⁹ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 20; Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’.

²⁰⁰ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 20.

²⁰¹ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019), 20.

in international institutions and organizations.²⁰² By the 1960s, as anti-colonial nationalists came to critique the hierarchical nature of international organizations, as dominated by imperial formations, they sought further sovereign equality by using the United Nations and its principles to secure self-determination. They “envisioned a world where democratic, modernizing, and redistributive national states were situated in thick international institutions designed to realize the principle of nondomination”.²⁰³ In other words, they sought to actually implement the principles of liberal universalism, self-determination, human rights, and increased equality applied to all, instead of for some at the expense of others. They sought to undo the problems of liberalism that appeared contradictory on the surface but were actually by design. This represented a large opening in the United Nations in the 1960s and 1970s through the period of decolonization, especially as new members were admitted in large numbers in 1955 and 1960 and incrementally over the intervening and following years. The General Assembly and other bodies were sites of contestation of imperialism as well as anti-imperialist activism, and this also played out in the UNSC in elections for seats (and the creation of Resolution 1991 (XVIII)). Ultimately, despite both increased anti-imperialist activism and increased membership, sovereign equality did not necessarily increase throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. The “false promise of universalism” suggests that subordination persisted and new forms of hierarchy were constructed and re-constructed.

Of course, with a conceptual return to hierarchy, I return to the idea status and status-seeking, as the manners of navigating such hierarchies. I answer the questions “what is status-seeking?” and present a theory of how it operates within the embedded hierarchy of the United Nations Security Council.

Status and status-seeking

As Robert Gilpin states, “status is the everyday currency of international relations”.²⁰⁴ It is indeed a “core and continuous²⁰⁵” concern of international life for states but is commonly highlighted as such only for great powers and rising powers. Yet, it is also related to and constitutive of power and hierarchy. In general, many agree that status has three categories that roughly follow “theoretical” divides in IR – approaches under realism, social psychological approaches, and constructivist approaches. Of course, these are roughly overlaid with IR’s main divisions and the constructivist box in particular captures a large diversity of approaches that need their own breakdown. More usefully, it is important to look at the two-part definition of status and examine which conclusions about status-seeking flow from each aspect of the definition.

²⁰² Getachew, 6, 20, 79.

²⁰³ Getachew, 28.

²⁰⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267>.

²⁰⁵ Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, ‘The Status of Status in World Politics’, *World Politics* 73, no. 2 (April 2021): 362, <https://doi.org/10/gk9mjc>.

Status can be understood in much of the literature as “membership in a defined club of actors and as a relative standing within such a club”²⁰⁶, where the club can be a place with authority, legitimacy, policy capacity, and/or power.²⁰⁷ This means that some scholars focus on a ranking of states on a particular attribute or in a particular category and the hierarchy is simply in terms of rank.²⁰⁸ Others focus on relations between states, specifying status as membership and status-seeking as the pursuit of membership, wherein membership is a social phenomenon and the social nature of a club and belonging to such a club (and being recognized) matters most.²⁰⁹ Others focus on both.²¹⁰ In both cases, status-seeking is logically conceptualized as the pursuit, using many methods, of status, however it may be defined. That said, those reviewing recent studies of status seem to find much more agreement between authors on what status *is* but less agreement and less clarity on how it is *sought*, which often depends on whether status, actors, and the international is relational or substantial.²¹¹ In this project, I focus specifically on status as membership in a club, rather than ranking, and status-seeking as the pursuit of that membership.

In another piece, I have noted that I share this key theoretical distinction with Paul Beaumont, who writes, “the rules that constitute these two types of status-seeking [ranking versus membership] produce very different relationships between actors”.²¹² Beaumont also points out that for the second, membership, status research has also barely begun to understand how social hierarchies and the status-seeking actors within them change, emerge, and whither over time, as well as how these fluid structures shape interactions.²¹³ In all cases, as he points out, quests for status are difficult and achieving status can be “unfair”.²¹⁴ In some cases, international society may withhold status.²¹⁵ Nonetheless, states consistently pursue it and scholars continue to study it. Categorizing approaches into the two buckets described above – rather than simply ‘isms’ – allows me to highlight which side of the definition one falls upon and which aspects are emphasized. In my case, I draw primarily about membership but discuss the differences between both below.

²⁰⁶ T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William Curtis Wohlforth, eds., *Status in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.

²⁰⁷ Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’; Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*; Pouliot, ‘Setting Status in Stone’; Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’.

²⁰⁸ Jonathan Renshon, *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), i.e., <http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691174501.001.0001>.

²⁰⁹ i.e. Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’.

²¹⁰ i.e. Fung, *China and Intervention at the UN Security Council*.

²¹¹ Elias Götz, ‘Status Matters in World Politics’, *International Studies Review* 23, no. 1 (4 March 2021): 228–47, <https://doi.org/10/gh7k83>; MacDonald and Parent, ‘The Status of Status in World Politics’; Deborah Welch Larson, ‘New Perspectives on Rising Powers and Global Governance: Status and Clubs’, *International Studies Review* 20, no. 2 (1 June 2018): 247–54, <https://doi.org/10/gd537v>.

²¹² Beaumont, ‘The Grammar of Status Competition International Hierarchies as Domestic Practice’; Caroline Dunton, ‘Willing to Serve: Empire, Status, and Canadian Campaigns for the United Nations Security Council (1946–1947)’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 4 (December 2020): 529–47, <https://doi.org/10/ghs8s3>.

²¹³ Beaumont, ‘The Grammar of Status Competition International Hierarchies as Domestic Practice’.

²¹⁴ Beaumont, 3.

²¹⁵ Beaumont, 3; Jonathan Mercer, ‘The Illusion of International Prestige’, *International Security* 41, no. 4 (April 2017): 133–68, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00276.

The ranking approach to status tends to cover much of IR's realism as well as social psychological theories. The realist strand of status research has typically focused on the status competitions of great powers and the aspirations of rising powers, the role of polarity in relation to status, and the role of status as a cause of conflict or war.²¹⁶ For realists, states seek status as part of their broader quest for security and material dominance and markers of status are particular attributes that can be ranked. Status can thus be measured in material ways, including economic and military variables, and claims to status can be interpreted as threats. That said, even realists acknowledge that status is social, even if it is about "how much" they have or where they stand. Renshon writes, "[status] clarifies what rights, obligations, and patterns of deference from others the actor should expect, as well as how the actor is expected to behave with respect to others in dominant and subordinate positions".²¹⁷ Notably, the nature of the social and the behaviour of actors is up for debate, with realists, social psychological theories, and constructivists having different understandings of how social interaction works amongst actors. The important takeaway though is that even from a material and ranking-dominated position, many agree that status is, at the very least, about social expectations, though there is less interest from this camp in terms of status-seeking.

Social psychological theories draw from Social Identity Theory to examine how theories about status dynamics within groups of individuals can be applied to states, through norms, institutions, values, or practices.²¹⁸ In these cases, states can follow a variety of logics to improve their ranking within a particular hierarchy – it is a ranking approach but it is more focused on *seeking* than other schools of thought.²¹⁹ While status is clearly considered a social phenomenon here, the conception of the social is somewhat thin, where structures and hierarchies are pre-existing, substantial, not historically contingent, and simply by-products of great power politics. In the adaptation of social psychology to IR, scholars have scaled up theories about why individual people desire status and feel dissatisfied with their status, in order to theorize about state behaviour.²²⁰ Additionally, others have provided theories drawn from Social Identity Theory about how "intergroup status dynamics influence individual attitudes and behavior to derive a taxonomy of strategies by which states can seek status...".²²¹ Ultimately, its scholars make solid conclusions, but the nature of relations and action need filling out.

Larson and Shevchenko provide a theory that suggests states seek status by adopting things like norms, institutions, behaviours, practices, or values of members of the club they want to join, calling it social mobility. They also suggest that states will engage in tactics to seek favourable positions on new ranking systems, re-evaluate negative traits as positive, or identify

²¹⁶ For example: Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Wohlforth, 'Unipolarity Status Competition, and Great Power War'; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, 'Reputation and Status as Motives for War', *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 371–93, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421>.

²¹⁷ Renshon, *Fighting for Status*, 33; Also quoted in: MacDonald and Parent, 'The Status of Status in World Politics', 362.

²¹⁸ Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, 'Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy', *International Security* 34, no. 4 (April 2010): 63–95, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63>.

²¹⁹ Steven Ward, 'Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics', *International Theory* 11, no. 2 (July 2019): 211–38, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191800026X>.

²²⁰ Renshon, *Fighting for Status*.

²²¹ Ward, 'Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics', 214.

new criteria to rank more highly. Lastly, they may try and compete with higher ranked states on certain areas that make the higher-ranked state stand out.²²² In their 2019 book, they expand on this characterization, looking very much at perception, rank order, and prized attributes. They add that states may pursue status through social competition or social creativity – either finding material ways of competing with other states or coming up with new criteria under which status can be evaluated.²²³

Ward’s examination of status-seeking sees states as following four logics and built upon the idea of status-seeking as *stratified identity management*.²²⁴ He focuses specifically on the work that individuals can do on behalf of states. The first is a logic of identification change, where a individuals in leadership may “alter their portfolio of social identifications” by weakening or increasing performance of a particular identity characteristic.²²⁵ The second is a logic of emulation, wherein they make an “effort to improve the group’s status by acquiring symbolically significant resources that are consensually valued and thought necessary for the achievement of higher status”.²²⁶ By the logic of emulation, “a state will need to acquire symbolically significant resources and competently perform symbolically significant practices that indicate a certain level of advancement in economic and military fields”²²⁷ in order to achieve an improvement in hierarchy placement (or a seat on the UNSC). The significant resources and competent performance may vary depending on the context, as Ward draws on Nexon and Neumann’s adaptation of Bourdieu, which suggests that different social fields (i.e. different IOs, regions, etc.) may have different kinds of social capital.²²⁸ Alternatively, they may also “promote collective efforts to transform via reinterpretation or renegotiation some component of the interstate comparative situation”, which is a logic of transformation.²²⁹ Finally, in a logic of rejection they may “reject the norms, rules, and institutions that constitute and are productive of the interstate status hierarchy as a means of expressing resentment and signaling the illegitimacy of the status quo”.²³⁰ Key here is the focus on individuals in different relations of power as constituent of state decision-making as well as the possibility for multiple different approaches to status-seeking. Notably, the fourth, “signaling the illegitimacy of the status quo”²³¹ is useful to keep in mind. While I do not take a social psychological approach, the idea that states may push back against an existing normative order is important as a precedent for thinking about how it is possible that states may push back against liberalism while status-seeking within liberal order.

²²² Larson and Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers’, 71–75; See summary in: Ward, ‘Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics’.

²²³ Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, *Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019); Götz, ‘Status Matters in World Politics’.

²²⁴ Ward, ‘Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics’, 211.

²²⁵ Ward, 212.

²²⁶ Ward, 220.

²²⁷ Ward, 220.

²²⁸ Ward, 220; Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Hegemonic-Order Theory: A Field-Theoretic Account’, *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 3 (September 2018): 662–86, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117716524>.

²²⁹ Ward, ‘Logics of Stratified Identity Management in World Politics’, 213.

²³⁰ Ward, 212.

²³¹ Ward, 212.

A variety of theorists roughly captured by IR's sociological traditions dig much more deeply into the social construction of both hierarchies and status and focus specifically on membership. These are the theories from which I primarily draw in my membership approach, though with attention to the range of possibilities for status-seeking identified by social psychological scholars. Interestingly, it is an eclectic category, without too much interaction between the approaches other than their definitional agreement, though some can be categorized as relational and others as more substantial. In all cases though, the emphasis is on the idea that status is not simply something to be possessed, but rather it is membership-focused, where membership requires a performance and status must be used or has a purpose. Status-seeking is therefore about the social dynamics of membership and the use of that membership, rather than seeking to meet a standard or material attribute. For space constraints, I focus on relational theories below as they are the ones upon which I build my argument and whose claims and findings I translate into the UNSC context.

For Pouliot, multilateral diplomacy is a unique environment filled with very specific “pecking orders”.²³² He is primarily concerned with diplomatic practices and the relationships between representatives at international organizations and how social practices organize these organizations. As such, the practice theoretical approach is indeed a relational one. Status thus emerges from social structures which are mutually constitutive with practice-driven interaction and larger structures of meaning.²³³ This is also related to the nature of power itself. He argues that status hierarchies are socially organized around “norms, identities, practices, rules, standards, responsibilities, duties, privileges, entitlements”²³⁴ which he argues opens up the possibilities of a status hierarchy that is socially and politically constructed and precedes agents.²³⁵ As status emerges from social structure and is part of larger meaning structures, it is sought and determined by social interactions. IOs, then, are both symbols of and drivers of status in the status-seeking process. In a similar relational fashion, Schia and Sending argue that status-seeking and accordance in multilateral settings comes through diplomacy, giving it rules, practices, and varying contexts.²³⁶ They see behaviours and roles as according status when sought and De Carvalho and Neumann see this as a dimension of identity relations.²³⁷ The criteria by which status is accorded in multilateral settings (and therefore sought) comes from the institutionalized hierarchy set by great powers, and as such, status can be sought via adherence to norms (of liberal order in particular) or opposing them.

²³² Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*.

²³³ Pouliot.

²³⁴ Vincent Pouliot, ‘Multilateralism as an End in Itself’, *International Studies Perspective* 12 (2011): 122.

²³⁵ Vincent Pouliot, ‘Against Authority: The Heavy Weight of International Hierarchy’, in *Hierarchies in World Politics*, ed. Ayse Zarakol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 122, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108241588.007>.

²³⁶ Niels Nagelhus Schia and Ole Jacob Sending, ‘Status and Sovereign Equality’, in *Small States and Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho and Neumann, Iver B., 1st ed. (Routledge, 2014), 75, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315758817>.

²³⁷ Schia and Sending, 74; Iver B. Neumann and Benjamin de Carvalho, eds., *Small States and Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing*, New International Relations (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 4.

From these perspectives and also with a relational view, I also argue that status emerges from social interaction and to study status-seeking, I look at the web of relations that states take on in competing for seats on the UNSC. I take these above sociological arguments as a starting point and foundation. Where I build further on practice theorists is that I re-politicize the space and hierarchy under which status is sought, emphasizing different forms of power. Practice theory – especially with respect to status-seeking – falls short in its focus on background knowledge, the rules of the game, institutional knowledge, and the day-to-day practices that make up diplomacy. In many ways, this can strip diplomacy of both the agency and creativity of individual diplomats and leaders, but it also sees the hierarchy under which status-seeking occurs as politically neutral and ahistorical. Agency does not necessarily mean that diplomats act outside of the social terrain that constitutes them, but rather the political (including economic) and discursive space in which they relate to one another shapes their worldviews and choices that are built on more than just practices. In fact, these worldviews and choices and the political and discursive space in which they operate are often fields of contestation within their relations, especially in an unequal context like the UN.

The presence of imperialism, as it is baked into the very foundations of the United Nations, means that the hierarchy under which status-seeking occurs and status is accorded is deeply shaped by this power dynamic. To study only the practices of diplomats removes historical contexts, the productive power of imperialism, and the political choices that are made by diplomats and leaders within a status competition such as a campaign for a UNSC seat. I concur that status-seeking comes from the institutionalized hierarchy of a multilateral organization. In fact, central to my argument is the alignment or rejection of power in status-seeking, but that multilateral hierarchy is not only about “great powers” or “rising powers”. Much like other theories of status and status-seeking (realism, social psychology) focus too much on great and rising powers at the expense of other states, constructivist and practice-based accounts do the same by ignoring the social context of the historical and ongoing construction of multilateral organizations and liberal internationalism. From a pragmatist perspective and a from a place of concern for discourse, I see the need to bring both agency and politics back into a practice-account of diplomacy. It is not that practice theorists are wrong, it is that diplomats have positionality, agency, and historical contexts, and rendering them apolitical and focusing too much on a single logic of action rather than multiple can be problematic. These historical contexts can be conceptualized from a Foucauldian perspective of knowledge and power as well as a Gramscian perspective of hegemony and its ability to create norms and knowledge.

Studying bilateral diplomacy and representation, Duque also takes a relational approach to status, arguing that for status to be accorded as membership and “a claim to social esteem”, recognition is a required prerequisite.²³⁸ In other words, states must recognize others as members of the club in order to accord status; it emerges from processes of recognition.²³⁹ As such, recognition is then a key part of the status-seeking process. This is shared by Michelle Murray who argues that status is achieved via recognition of identity²⁴⁰ – “status seeking is an inherent

²³⁸ Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 578.

²³⁹ Duque, 578.

²⁴⁰ Michelle K. Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019).

part of a state's identity formation process which is never finished".²⁴¹ She argues that states want ontological security through status and status is a process of managing insecurity and uncertainty through relations.

Recognition is the process by which a state has its "self-conceptions received, accepted, and reflected back to them in their social interactions with others".²⁴² Recognition is the key link – "and only as recognized can we conclusively come to establish an identity...yet recognition is rarely automatic and before we gain it we are often required to prove that our interpretations of ourselves indeed do fit".²⁴³ Recognition has its roots in international law and is often understood in binary terms, wherein states are either recognized as such or they are not. They are either provided diplomatic representation or they are not. This, of course, is limited because state identities that require recognition are so much more complex and nuanced than simply *being* a state. Scholars thus can follow what Wendt calls this "thin" definition of recognition, or they can look at the "thick" definition of recognition.²⁴⁴ The thick definition captures more than just whether a state is a state, but it also captures what kind of state it is and the similarities and differences with other states that may emerge.²⁴⁵ As Freedman writes, "a state can be recognized for what makes it similar to all other actors worthy of that designation, but it can also be recognized for what makes it unique and different".²⁴⁶ In seeking recognition, Ringmar notes, "we need to come up with an account that describes us [a story of identity], but in addition, we need to have this account accepted by people around us. We need to be recognized".²⁴⁷ Duque focuses on a thinner definition of recognition in her network analysis of diplomatic representation, but the UNSC and campaigns for seats provides a window from which one can look at her relational understanding of status, where recognition is a precondition, while also capturing a thicker conception of recognition.

Via recognition, Duque argues that status emerges from two relational processes which are therefore central to the status-seeking process, and on which I directly draw: (1) the self-reinforcing nature of status, where recognition begets further recognition and status; (2) social closure, or the establishment of boundaries between members and non-members of a group.²⁴⁸ Social closure, which is also studied in depth by Viola, is the process of inclusion and exclusion in terms of who is granted membership. It is "the process and practices by which one set of actors exclude others from sharing in their commonly produced resources or opportunities".²⁴⁹ In the case of the UNSC, the common opportunity is having the rights and powers over other states

²⁴¹ Götz, 'Status Matters in World Politics', 236; Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations*.

²⁴² Joshua Freedman, 'The Recognition Dilemma in World Politics' (Doctoral Dissertation, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University, 2019), 12.

²⁴³ Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.

²⁴⁴ Alexander Wendt, 'Why a World State Is Inevitable', *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 512, <https://doi.org/10.1177/135406610394001>.

²⁴⁵ Freedman, 'The Recognition Dilemma in World Politics', 14.

²⁴⁶ Freedman, 14.

²⁴⁷ Erik Ringmar, 'The International Politics of Recognition', in *International Politics of Recognition*, ed. Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (Taylor and Francis, 2015), 3.

²⁴⁸ Duque, 'Recognizing International Status', 578.

²⁴⁹ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 65.

that are conferred through UNSC membership. It is closely linked to stratification, as the exclusion of states through social closure often creates or reproduces hierarchy.²⁵⁰ It is through social closure that status can be conferred, allowing some to join a particular level of a hierarchy and not others. Social closure requires dense relations within a group.²⁵¹ In high status contexts, members with dense relations also adopt distinctive values and resources, allowing status to operate around the recognition of states with “similar values and resources”.²⁵² According to Duque, “that is, the relevance of a given attribute for status recognition is socially defined: attributes matter because of their symbolic – rather than intrinsic – value”.²⁵³

Flowing from recognition and social closure, status also has shared expectations of behaviour, and thus, status-seeking occurs through the ‘identification with the distinctive lifestyle – a set of behaviours and practices – expected from a group’s members’, where the behaviours are built upon the values and resources. Schia and Sending share this view, arguing that rather than material attributes, certain behaviours or roles can accord it and flow from it; status must be used.²⁵⁴ This view of status is necessarily cooperative. Duque, Pouliot, and Schia and Sending differ from other accounts of status and status-seeking by showing a model that is based on cooperative behaviours and wanting to join a club and behave accordingly, rather than one based on conflict or competition. Similarly, Pål Røren argues that status can be sought through “friendly” competition and cooperation together. Using the Nordic countries as a case, he demonstrates that status competition is still present within their club, but the friendliness and cooperative nature of it matters significantly.²⁵⁵

Taking all of this together, I conceptualize status relationally and socially as membership in a club with expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities. It is conferred through recognition which comes through social closure, and it can be self-reinforcing through recognition. I add to the idea of expected behaviours that status must be used. It is an active process. That it has expected behaviours, as well as practices and responsibilities, is important. The UNSC comes with responsibilities that stem from its mandate, and it has practices, expected behaviours, as well as opportunities for power and self-interest. The undertaking of any or all of these is central. The conferral of status requires active participation and the use of status is central to the concept. Consequently, status-seeking as the main process *must* include the consideration of the use of status.

The Argument

Applied in context, the UNSC is a hierarchy wherein there are non-members, elected members, and permanent members. Status-seeking is the process of seeking and campaigning for a seat. Elections to the Council are therefore competitions for status via a process of social closure, or the division between the outside and the inside of membership. The act of voting is an

²⁵⁰ Viola, 26.

²⁵¹ Duque, ‘Recognizing International Status’, 584.

²⁵² Duque, 578.

²⁵³ Duque, 578.

²⁵⁴ Schia and Sending, ‘Status and Sovereign Equality’, 74.

²⁵⁵ Pål Røren, ‘Status Seeking in the Friendly Nordic Neighborhood’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 15 February 2019, 001083671982841, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719828410>.

act of recognition. As voting takes place in the General Assembly, I identify two different types of status competition through elections for seats: (a) there are more competitors than seats available when the list of candidate countries is presented to the General Assembly (UNGA), therefore the “competitive” part of status-seeking takes place in a campaign to the entire UNGA audience; (b) UNGA is presented with a “clean slate”, or list of competitors equal to the number of seats, therefore the “competitive” part of status-seeking takes place in the selection of this clean slate, either within the group and/or domestically. This project covers both of these, as Canada has competed in both types multiple times. My argument applies to both – in different ways - and they will be specified and central to the story in the empirical chapters covering each of Canada’s 9 campaigns. Stemming from this, my argument contains multiple logically connected claims based on the theoretical and conceptual choices described in this chapter.

First, I argue that the UNSC is an institutionalized status hierarchy embedded in a global and historical hierarchy of imperial formations, representing both imperial internationalism and liberal internationalism. This is because the roots of the United Nations and the UNSC specifically are imperial in nature, beginning in 1945 and unfolding into the 21st century. This imperial hierarchy does not exist in a vacuum, the imperial formations that constitute it intersect both globally and at the United Nations with liberal internationalism. The very existence of a hierarchy of non-members, elected members, and the P5 exhibits an unchanging structure dependent on outsized power to 5 countries for a body with a liberal mandate. On the surface, the existence of only 51 members in 1945 (see figure 1), including 46 non-P5 states, provides a rough picture of how much territory and how many people were under the domination of both the P5 and other European states. The P5 became the P5 in part because they controlled so much of the world’s power, wealth, and governance. In this way, the structure of hierarchy within the UNSC is not just one of imperial legacy but of contemporary dynamics of imperial formations as well.

Second, I argue a specific social process of status-seeking that makes sense of the way that imperialisms and liberal internationalism intersect through the UNSC. It is a framework that provides multiple paths via which status-seeking can take place. In this reading, status-seeking occurs within the UNSC through a process of social closure that requires an articulation of relations to such an imperial hierarchy. States seek membership for elected seats – status itself – which is conferred via recognition, occurring through voting. Status must be used and has expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities. In the case of the UNSC, status can be “used” through membership by taking on the work, practices, and responsibilities of the Council’s mandate. Effective use, or a claim to it, is also part of what makes status self-reinforcing. Consequently, status-seeking requires engagement with the potential to use status. It is therefore the process of articulating one’s desire to join to the club and one’s vision of how one seeks to engage the responsibilities (the use) of the UNSC’s mandate and practices, which stem from both liberal internationalism and imperialisms simultaneously, particularly through their institutionalization in the UN charter and subsequent norms and rules.

This means that there are two possibilities through which states seek status. First, following a relational-pragmatic approach, states may aim to demonstrate, through diplomacy, how they share liberal international values and plan to take on the responsibility stemming from UNSC’s mandate of the maintenance of peace and security. This may be only rhetorical – for

example, the outcomes upon achieving status may be debatable, especially if they simply want status without following through on using it – but the norms of liberal internationalism and their commitment to it and its expected behaviours root the campaign as they hope to be recognized for these values and claims to expected behaviours and responsibilities. In doing so, states navigate the imperial nature of the Council and its membership, articulating their relations to those imperialisms in the process. More often than not, this is in support of these imperialisms via their support of liberal internationalism, though it may be in resistance,²⁵⁶ and it may be a multi-faceted or contradictory position, demonstrating the complexity of liberalism’s points of interconnection *as well as* divergence from imperialisms. Ultimately, this possibility sees support for liberal internationalism, and most often (though not always) imperialism.

In this first possible path, states may appeal to the liberal international principles of the Council to differentiate themselves as “better” than others, consequently aspiring to the “inside” of the club as separate from the outside. To be clear, the reasons for joining the “inside” are mixed and not solely out of some altruistic desire – there are many self-interested reasons for and benefits by which states may seek to join the Council (see chapter 2). The demonstration and upholding of liberal international values, practices, behaviours, and the claim to take on those responsibilities are part of the process of social closure by which states seek seats, and therefore status. This is an answer to the question of *how* states seek status in multilateral settings, not a question of *why*. Of course, many (but not all) states also have an interest in maintaining liberal internationalism as the defining principle by which multilateralism and international ordering operate, which, as I will demonstrate, is quite often bound up in the interest of maintaining imperial power globally. It is therefore, for many states, beneficial to maintain the status quo or seek to reap the benefits of liberal international club membership,²⁵⁷ regardless of whether they agree with it or if they are using it for strategic, more instrumental purposes. This is often seen in the case of Canada, whose campaigns have illuminated the many contradictions of liberal internationalism in its foreign policy and will be unpacked in subsequent chapters.

As an alternative and second possibility, states may position themselves in opposition to liberal internationalism within the Council and see the maintenance of peace and security (and the responsibility to do so) as necessarily requiring a resistance to the dominant ideology. This often also means resisting imperialism and campaigns can draw on enthusiasm from UN member states to push back against any of the P5. This can be in the context of broader anti-imperial and anti-liberal movements at the United Nations and globally. While the second possibility has notably existed, it is the exception to the rule and states tend to at least desire the status rewards that come from entertaining and upholding liberal internationalism as the dominant model of the multilateral system.

This dissertation covers the first of the two possibilities, where states seek status through campaigns built on the commitment to liberal international values, practices, and a desire to take on the UNSC’s responsibilities, therefore engaging in expected behaviours, or “use” of status.

²⁵⁶ Similar to a logic of rejection from Ward (2019)’s framework.

²⁵⁷ Liberal Internationalism as a strategic tool has been used in the UNSC context and is well-documented by Hurd. It is a similar phenomenon to his analysis here that I am describing: Ian Hurd, ‘The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003’, *International Organization* 59, no. 3 (2005): 495–526, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050186>.

Consequently, they are articulating their relationships to the liberal internationalism of the UNSC's mandate and the imperialisms at the foundation of it. This is primarily because it is the most common form of status-seeking, both in terms of the number of states using it at a given time in the UN and in terms of the number of years that have seen these types of campaigns. This status-seeking may be oriented to a more global audience, when the seat is competitive at UNGA, or a more regional and domestic audience when the UNGA competition is a clean slate. As such, the strategy in each case is slightly different; the nuances of this difference and the findings surrounding it are the contributions of later chapters of this dissertation.

In exploring and supporting this argument throughout this dissertation, I take a historical approach, tracing Canada's campaigns to the UNSC from 1946-2020. This is simply an extended view of one possible way that status-seeking in this framework may play out. Each of the 9 Canadian cases has their own specific sub-argument that contributes to the central argument and demonstrates the different ways that states can articulate commitment to liberal internationalism. In 1946, 1947, and 1957, *functionalism* is central. Functionalism in the Canadian tradition is the idea that a state's membership and contributions on an IO should be determined by their capabilities to do so.²⁵⁸ This is a particular Canadian idea, found initially in the UN context in the San Francisco conference in 1945. It is the principle in the UN Charter that stipulates membership should be based partly on the ability to contribute to the Council's mandate. Canada strongly believed in this liberal international principle much past 1945 and its presence in the first three campaigns was unavoidable. It was both a strategy of status-seeking *and* an argument about social closure, or how one should join the UNSC and how the boundary between inside and outside should be drawn. Functionalism was used differently in each of the two decades, with Canada looking back to its past contributions (as related to service) in the 1946/1947 elections and to its future ones in the 1957 election.

In 1966 and 1976, uncertainty and change were the central themes. In the context of a changing UN environment amidst decolonization and anti-imperial activism, as well as the Cold War, Canada's UNSC campaigns were built on the navigation of such uncertainty and change. With status as self-reinforcing, the 1966 campaign was about maintaining existing status by performing key responsibilities of the Council and maintaining unity within relationships with imperial powers and Cold War allies. The goal was to maintain Canada's status across such a period of uncertainty so that it could reap benefits in the future, bearing some similarity to 1957. In 1976, change was also coming from within – Pierre Trudeau's government sought to re-shape Canada's relationship to liberal internationalism in a similar context, to pursue status with a new face, providing a different illumination of relating to liberal internationalism than previous generations.

In 1988 and 1998, Canada was seeking not to just be any elected member, but to be a leader on the behaviours, responsibilities, and practices of the Council. Canadian officials wanted to demonstrate not just that Canada could perform liberal internationalism, but that it could lead it. In doing so, Canadian officials aimed to balance the maintenance of relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom and engaging in an "activist" foreign policy that

²⁵⁸ Chapnick, 'The Canadian Middle Power Myth', 189.

appealed to a majority of UN members.²⁵⁹ Finally, in 2010 and 2020, domestic politics played a significant role in Canada's status-seeking as the government in each case sought to re-litigate liberal internationalism as an approach to Canadian foreign policy, making it a partisan issue within domestic party politics. This strongly shaped the status-seeking process and the way that it unfolded.

Ultimately, each of these historical stories from each decade contribute to my argument substantially but also in offering the argument as a framework for making sense of both the history of the UNSC and status-seeking as a concept. The goal is to use the framework not as a testable hypothesis, but to demonstrate the range of possible ways to try and make sense of how status-seeking through elections to the UNSC occur and why states navigate that particular social and political terrain the way they do. The multiplicity of difference across 9 campaigns shows such flexibility. Finally, this framework also stands to demonstrate the importance of hierarchy, liberalism, and imperialism in shaping global politics and call additional attention from IR theorists to their centrality. I now turn to the theoretical tool, Global Historical Sociology, and finish with further discussion on why I select Canada.

Global Historical Sociology

Framing this argument is the Global Historical Sociology (GHS) agenda, which is an umbrella of many different research areas and methodological approaches with similar theoretical and ontological commitments. These theoretical and ontological commitments are inclusive of the choices I have made around my own concepts in this dissertation – relationalism, hierarchies-as-global, hierarchies-as-embedded, imperialism, *status-seeking*, and the process of social closure. It follows earlier historical sociology approaches across political science, as well as efforts to historicize sociology and bring political theory to the empirically dominant history.²⁶⁰ IR's commitment to the "international" has its roots in the presumption of anarchy in the international system and that states are the logical actors to be studied. As such, recent efforts in IR have sought to move beyond the state-centric lens to one that is *global*, wherein social processes, identities, histories, conflicts, etc. are understood in ways that transcend borders and are interconnected. History and sociology too have had a similar call to move towards the global or the transnational. As such, a global historical sociology studies two dynamics, according to Go and Lawson: "first, the transnational and global dynamics that enable the emergence, reproduction, and breakdown of social orders whether these orders are situated at the subnational, national, or global scales; and second, the historical emergence, reproduction, and breakdown of transnational and global social forms".²⁶¹

They write that the first dynamic encompasses the "global" in the theoretical approach, as opposed to the international, and the second follows the longer tradition in the social sciences of historical sociology, though with some new insights. Following early intellectual work, historical

²⁵⁹ Interview #21.

²⁶⁰ Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, eds., *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²⁶¹ Julian Go and George Lawson, 'Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology', in *Global Historical Sociology*, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316711248>.

sociology had its “second generation” ranging from the 1970s to the 1990s in both Comparative Politics and to a lesser degree, IR. The issue with both of these was that while they were providing rich analysis, they were very focused on the fixed entities of nation-states either as the main object for “international” interactions, or for “looking inside” and subsequently bracketing off anything outside of the “domestic”.²⁶² That said, the historical sociology within IR that pre-existed GHS was responsible for generating insights on key concepts upon which I will draw (and GHS scholars do as well), including those of hierarchical international order and the complex system of norms in international organizations.²⁶³

The GHS project aims to move beyond this boundary of inside/outside, wherein the ‘global’ or the “transnational” are “spatial and analytical scales of social interaction that need to be taken seriously”.²⁶⁴ Similarly, in rejecting this state-centrism and inside/outside boundary, it “focuses on social processes and temporality”, attempting to overcome some of the shortcomings of three disciplines.²⁶⁵ Lawson and Go argue that processes of globalization and larger, historical global forces, in particular imperialisms drive the need for a historical social science that can capture the ways that these forces have shaped global politics. In short, GHS “represents an interest in social relations as they unfold in time and as they are articulated on multiple scales”.²⁶⁶

Importantly, GHS is generally methodologically flexible, in that there are many ways to *do* it. That said, where different forms of GHS may diverge, they do so from a shared, central starting point of ontological relationalism. In rejecting the “international” as a space of anarchy with fixed state units, GHS’s relationalism sees entities as fluid, changing, given meaning in relation to one another, and neither fixed nor stable in space and time. In other words, social structures become patterns of interactions that are both socially and historically constituted and actors and subjects within them are also similarly constructed. This is both ontologically and epistemologically important as well as analytically useful:

*“GHS eschews talk of a single world-system or a timeless anarchical structure, instead examining the diverse interactions that take place between historically situated peoples, networks, institutions and polities...the international is not an essentialized system or the unchanging aggregation of lower order essences (such as states), but a sphere of interactive multiplicity”.*²⁶⁷

Where earlier historical sociology assumed international anarchy in Comparative Politics or took for granted “liberal” international order (in response to neo-neo debates) in International

²⁶² Jonathan Wyrzten, ‘For a (Comparative?) Global Historical Sociology’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 6 (1 November 2020): 897, <https://doi.org/10/gh38jx>.

²⁶³ Go and Lawson, ‘Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology’, 17.

²⁶⁴ Go and Lawson, 4.

²⁶⁵ Victoria Reyes, ‘Reviews of Global Historical Sociology: Toward a Globalized and Historicized Social Science’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 6 (1 November 2020): 891–95, <https://doi.org/10/gh38tm>.

²⁶⁶ Go and Lawson, ‘Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology’, 5.

²⁶⁷ Go and Lawson, 23.

Relations, GHS looks at more complex roots of international order(ing).²⁶⁸ GHS sees international ordering as a process. Much historical sociology has importantly “sought not just to unpack the different forms of international orders have taken in the past, but also the ways in which the contemporary international order cannot be treated as a predetermined given”.²⁶⁹ The global perspective on this is no different and often sees those international orders as shaped by historical and contemporary overlapping imperial formations. Frequently, imperialism is importantly centred within the GHS agenda, as well as the broader Historical International Relations field. This is both in response to scholarship on ideas such as “imperial globality”, where “historical trajectories have been intertwined through power relations”,²⁷⁰ as well as the acknowledgment of the imperial, Anglo-American roots of the discipline of IR that shape the way it has discussed history.²⁷¹ Certainly, both imperialism and anti-imperialism throughout the 20th century took on transnational and global characters and IR’s roots as a study of the “international” historically overlooked it during the same time periods.²⁷² Both of these have driven a larger reflection and body of work on the need for historical IR as well as critical IR, as encounters with imperialism are nearly impossible to avoid when looking at the history of the global and the discipline.²⁷³ Importantly, a goal of good historical IR is to “address the stories of origin, [and question] the taken-for-grantedness of key concepts in IR”.²⁷⁴ I aim to take this on by illuminating the imperial overtones of the UNSC and the role of multiple imperial assemblages in shaping the politics of status-seeking within it.

This brings me to a key point of tension in the project – both eurocentrism and state-centrism. Much work within both Historical IR and GHS has emphasized the “multilinear or

²⁶⁸ Julian Go, George Lawson, and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Historical Sociology in International Relations: The Challenge of the Global’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 49–53.

²⁶⁹ Go, Lawson, and de Carvalho, 52.

²⁷⁰ Julian Go, George Lawson, and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Historical Sociology in International Relations: The Challenge of the Global’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 48.

²⁷¹ Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira, ‘Introduction: Historical International Relations’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 6.

²⁷² See: Christopher Patrick Murray, ‘Anti-Imperial World Politics: Race, Class, and Internationalism in the Making of Post-Colonial Order’ (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020), <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/4140/>; Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire*; Tarak Barkawi and George Lawson, ‘The International Origins of Social and Political Theory’, in *Political Power and Social Theory*, ed. Tarak Barkawi and George Lawson, vol. 32 (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017), 1–7, <https://doi.org/10.1108/S0198-871920170000032001>; Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies’, *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2006): 329–52.

²⁷³ Martin J. Bayly, ‘Imperialism: Beyond the “re-Turn to Empire” in International Relations’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 356; de Carvalho, Costa Lopez, and Leira, ‘Introduction: Historical International Relations’, 6.

²⁷⁴ Halvard Leira and Benjamin de Carvalho, ‘Stubbornly Stumbling into Making History: Constructivism and Historical International Relations’, in *Tactical Constructivism, Method, and International Relations*, ed. Brent J. Steele, Harry D. Gould, and Oliver Kessler, *The New International Relations* (London ; New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 225.

polyvalent character”²⁷⁵ of global histories and the role of historical processes requiring attention and study from a perspective that neither assumes a Eurocentric perspective or the rigidity and robustness of the state as the key object of inquiry. It is not that states are not important, but rather that relations, power structures, and global phenomena are not contained to it. Networks, processes, organizations, and imperialisms transcend them.²⁷⁶ While taking a theoretical and ontological framework that seeks to look beyond the state and Eurocentrism, it may seem peculiar that I study status-seeking within an IO and focus on Canada, an Anglo-settler-colonial state.

Why Canada?

These choices are explicit though and part of my research is to make sense of the theoretical contradictions and those inherent in Canada-as-a-political-actor. I do this in a handful of ways. First, I view status-seeking and status itself as fluid, dynamic, and relational, consistent with the ontologies of GHS. Indeed, status is focused on a competition between states but I am building an argument predicated on the idea that the forces driving that competition are necessarily transnational, historic, global, and existing within many layers and assemblages of governance and power. Similarly, while the UNSC is a place where states meet, I look beyond simply state relations and look to these structures, assemblages, and layers for sources of the UNSC’s politics, unlike much work on IOs.

Selecting a single state over time with attention to the changing dynamics of an IO and the spatial and temporal dynamics that shape it is also an explicit choice. I do not see Canada as a fixed entity with traditional IR-boxed boundaries. Rather, Canada has evolved over time notably through its relations to the British Empire, the French empire, and the United States and thus it is not fixed temporally or politically. Driven by an understanding of status as relational and relations-before-states, I see Canada as an object of study that is bound by, active in, and implicated in complex imperial, transnational, and historical politics. To trace it over time allows me to see these changes and be explicit about its global transformations in a way that specific snapshots or “traditional case studies” would not. Similarly, a historical approach allows me to use a multitude of archival material, immersion, and interviews to capture the micropolitics that constitute “Canada” and its place in the world. This allows me to make an explicit link between the importance of studying “micropolitics”²⁷⁷ and diplomatic interactions and the larger ideas of global order that come from thinking about both IOs and imperialisms. Ultimately, I take the position that rejecting the rigidity of state-centrism in IR, from a GHS perspective, does not mean doing away with the state as something to study, but rather applying the ontological commitments surrounding time and space to the way that the state is understood, problematized, and at times, subverted.

²⁷⁵ Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, ‘Theories and Philosophies of History in International Relations’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 20.

²⁷⁶ Go, Lawson, and de Carvalho, ‘Historical Sociology in International Relations: The Challenge of the Global’, 49.

²⁷⁷ On micropolitics, see: Ty Solomon and Brent J. Steele, ‘Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory’, *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (June 2017): 267–91, <https://doi.org/10/f98c7r>.

On Eurocentrism, I share normative concerns with those who seek to broaden the discipline of IR beyond its Western roots. Certainly, my objects of study sit firmly within the dimensions of Anglo-American power but I endeavour to change the way that those objects are viewed, highlighting the central role of imperialisms in the process and demonstrating the historical trajectories of international organizations as they are rarely considered in IR. Further, Canada is rarely considered in global view in terms of its broader positions within global, historical, imperial structures of power. Reconsidering Canada-US relations or Canada-UK relations in terms of imperialism and reconsidering Canada's place in the global will hopefully broaden and subvert the perspectives that can be taken within the field of Canadian foreign policy.

To develop and support this argument, I have been working with the case of Canada from 1945-2020. Rather than selecting a number of different cases or taking a positivist standpoint, I focus on a single story over 75 years to provide a critical history of how status-seeking behaviour has emerged and developed throughout the UN's history. Canada has run in at least an election every decade since 1945: 1946, 1947, 1957, 1966, 1976, 1988, 1998, 2010, 2020. They have lost 3 and won 6, making it a consistent but also varied historical presence. Similarly, they are a founding member of the United Nations and have run in elections throughout the UNSC's changes, including the creation of regional groups, expanded UNSC membership, and expanded UN membership more generally. Thus, very simply and pragmatically, there is a great deal of material to study to get a long, historical understanding of the evolution of status seeking. Importantly, as much status literature and hierarchy literature focuses only on great powers, rising powers, or the perspective "from above"²⁷⁸ more broadly, Canada is an interesting case because in the context of the UN, it is both "above" and "below". It is both a non-P5 member of the UN, making it "below" in the UNSC context, but its relationship to imperialism through settler colonialism also makes it "above".

Canada is interestingly positioned globally, having a unique relationship to global imperial formations as both a former colony and a historical and contemporary colonizer. It sits at a special place in relation to the British Empire and its legacy and that of the United States. It has also straddled major policy discussions of the role of both small and middle-sized (or - power) countries. It thus provides an interesting opportunity to understand both the effects of imperial formations and "great powers" without necessarily centring them and while also trying to theorize and conceptualize from the perspective of "smaller" countries. This is important for understanding status as well as hierarchy and international order – to better understand the effects of primarily Anglo-American liberal order, there is much to contend with in the way of unpacking empire and imperialisms and a small country so closely attached to "special relationships" of the United States and the United Kingdom provides a unique opportunity to understand how states move within that hierarchical order.

Further, while the study of Canadian foreign policy can be somewhat parochial and embedded in few IR discussions, Canada is importantly and frequently discussed by historians of the British and American empires, the Commonwealth, and the early United Nations. Similarly, Canada is implicated in many political theory discussions on both liberalism and imperialism

²⁷⁸ See: El Taki, 'Subordinates' Quest for Recognition in Hierarchy'.

much more frequently than in IR. This is through Canada's role as a settler colony within the British Empire and its place in actively colonizing Indigenous lands into the present. For example, on liberalism and empire and the uneven and inconsistent overlaps between the two, Duncan Bell indicates that where the two intersect most prominently is in the use of settler colonialism in the evolution of imperial ideology.²⁷⁹ This tension and intersection come up regularly as themes in each empirical chapter. While not writing *on Canada*, many of the important debates that surround this set the stage for why an empirical study of Canadian history is actually important for furthering IR's understanding of both liberalism and imperialism. The key implications of Canada within historical and political theory discussions on empire and international order provide an opportunity to link these areas of study with IR, which Bell also writes has insufficiently contended with the effects of imperialisms on its key concepts.²⁸⁰ Certainly, these implications also justify the utility of answering my research question through a historical study of Canada.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken a relational approach to my main concepts, beginning with discussing hierarchy and then the specific features of global politics driving stratification and hierarchy construction: imperial formations. I have then discussed how status-seeking occurs within the specific embedded hierarchy of the UNSC, providing a process-driven argument for how it unfolds through the competition for elected seats. Each of these theoretical choices fits into a Global Historical Sociology lens, which frames the methodological choices outlined in the next chapter.

²⁷⁹ See: Duncan Bell, *Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016).

²⁸⁰ See: Bell, *Reordering the World*, 2019.

(4) Doing Historical IR: A Plural and Eclectic Method

Introduction

Inherent in the question of how states pursue status within the UNSC is an interest in policy, discourse, and practice. My goal in this project is to answer this question in a way that considers all three, unraveling answers to this research question through patterns in each and the way that they overlap. I do so by tracing Canada's 9 campaigns to the UNSC from 1946-2020. Through this, I produce an account of status-seeking in the multilateral context as it evolved in the post-war era. This account is interpretive, critical, and inductive; it is explicitly not a positivist approach seeking explanation and generalizability. Rather, I understand actors, structures, and change as "historically emergent"²⁸¹ and I follow a "process-based mode of explanation"²⁸² aiming to "emphasize the active ways by which something occurs".²⁸³ Stemming from the previous chapter, I have taken a relational view to each of my central concepts, uniting them with a view to Global Historical Sociology. This involves a focus on *process* and *fluidity*, in terms of both actors and temporality. While methodologically flexible, GHS requires an attention to power, as it manifests in ways that are not simply state-centric and linear, and to historicism, as a way of understanding the links between the past and the present. My goal is to take up the GHS challenge by connecting key strands of IR theory with the rigour and attention to process, detail, and relations that comes from historians. Like others under both the GHS umbrella and Historical IR more broadly, I use Foucault's genealogy as a methodological guide – or an overarching theory guiding the choice of methods and the analysis of empirics.

This chapter sets out to achieve multiple objectives. First, I briefly discuss what genealogy is before turning to a discussion of why I use it. I then outline the role of historicism in this project and in IR, relating specifically to the work that historians do and the possibility for engagement between historians and IR scholars. Most importantly, I discuss the specific methods I have used for this project, with attention to the ways that they speak to one another and allow me to think critically about policy, discourse, *and* practice together. Each of these methods – archival work and oral history interviews – begins from a place of asking what diplomats and leaders working on a UNSC campaign *do*, *think*, and *say*. These are central to thinking about *how* status-seeking unfolds. As such, following the discussion of these two methods, I provide a succinct reflection on diplomacy as a concept for IR and a profession and site of status-seeking. Finally, I conclude by providing insights into how each of these methods appear in the proceeding empirical chapters.

Genealogy

My concern with genealogy is primarily in a methodological rather than theoretical approach to Foucault's historical perspective. Following Vucetic, genealogy is a methodological tool for IR, flowing from ontological and epistemological choices and then directing the choice

²⁸¹ Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*, 29.

²⁸² Pouliot, 13.

²⁸³ Pouliot, 13.

of specific methods.²⁸⁴ Rather than an ideological commitment to a particular Foucauldian understanding of history and the structure of society or politics, I use genealogy as a tool for guiding historical research. The goal is to “[uncover] how discourses pervasive across institutions, genres, and social groups are legitimized and legitimize social norms and political orders”.²⁸⁵ In doing so, the goal is to “[analyse] how social items become possible and then – or simultaneously – [move] to examine their consequences in the social and political world”.²⁸⁶ Ultimately, it is an approach to understanding history by understanding the conditions of possibility for events, decisions, and trends and I am applying it specifically to understanding the changing nature of status-seeking. I am interested loosely in “cause”, where cause is not equal to a positivist causal inference, but rather one where I am making sense of and both deconstructing and reconstructing the representations, discourses, and practices involved in the choices states make over time in the pursuit of status. Equally important though is contingency – showing that the way events happen and were not the only way for them to happen; the path from past through present could unfold in different ways and a consideration of contingency allows for a better understanding of historical trajectory.²⁸⁷ Genealogy tends to be heavily focused on discourse and the way that discourses are interconnected – they cannot be “analysed in isolation”²⁸⁸ – but I capitalize on the tool’s flexibility to also examine practices. I do so by first and foremost speaking *to* practitioners, but also by looking for evidence of practice within texts and uncovering the ways that narrative and practice interact. The act of talking to people and looking for practical things within genealogy is relatively novel, for all of its integration into International Relations, combining it with interview practice, especially from an oral history perspective is uncommon. As oral histories are a “method of recording and preserving oral testimony”²⁸⁹, they are in many ways different forms of discourse that can enhance existing analysis.

Genealogy “traces the historical emergence and transformation of an idea [and]...exposes how particular claims become dominant or acquire the status of truth”.²⁹⁰ It is a form of historical research that ‘maps the play of competing forces and reversals of power that produce a concept or practice...genealogy is thus both historical and inventive, analyzing how the past molds the conditions of possibility for the appearance of a concept in the present’.²⁹¹ It is an approach that constitutes an “art of problematizations”²⁹² built on different understandings of historical

²⁸⁴ Srdjan Vucetic, ‘Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations’, *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1295–1312, <https://doi.org/10/cxxd4s>.

²⁸⁵ Audrey Alejandro and Eleanor Knott, ‘How to Pay Attention to the Words We Use: The Reflexive Review as a Method for Linguistic Reflexivity’, *International Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (13 May 2022): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac025>.

²⁸⁶ Vucetic, ‘Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations’, 1296.

²⁸⁷ Gary Gutting, *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521840821>.

²⁸⁸ Sara Mills, *Discourse*, New Critical Idiom (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004), 15.

²⁸⁹ ‘Principles and Best Practices for Oral History’, Oral History Association, 2009, <https://www.oralhistory.org/about/principles-and-practices-revised-2009/>.

²⁹⁰ Benjamin Meiches, *The Politics of Annihilation: A Genealogy of Genocide* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 22.

²⁹¹ Meiches, 21.

²⁹² Claudia Aradau et al., ‘Discourse/Materiality’, in *Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 157.

discourses, ruptures, relations of power, and episodes. It is geared towards making sense of the present using the past²⁹³ and can be used to challenge not only particular narratives of history, but the intellectual origins of those narratives.²⁹⁴ By looking at Canadian foreign policy and the UN in a way that considers imperialism and unweaves the fabric of liberal internationalism, I am able to see the intertwining not just of how those two forces shaped international politics but also knowledge about international politics from both an ideational and material perspective. Liberal internationalism itself has changed over time (i.e., in the way it intersects with imperialism), and it has become dominant and aligned with power in ways that genealogy allows me to uncover.

Genealogy is useful because it allows for an alternative view of history than the liberal teleological one, wherein linear progression towards the future persists. Genealogy's alternative uncovers power relations and contingencies (as well as causes) and that can be used to see the way that imperialism has structured global politics in the 20th and 21st centuries and the way that it is often ignored both materially and ideationally. It is primarily a tool of re-constructing history but it also exists as a historiographical tool that allows one to understand how knowledge about history also emerges through particular norms, forms of power, and narratives, some of which may also emerge from forms of thought such as liberalism.²⁹⁵

Not all genealogies are created equally or for the same purpose. While many are genealogies *of* a concept, this project is a genealogy of the evolution of status-seeking as an activity of states. Methodology and methods must “fit” and flow from a research question.²⁹⁶ Having selected a research question that is structured around “how”, I am inherently looking for answers about process, change, and action. Therefore, a methodology concerned with constructions of reality over time and the role of power within that is a good fit.²⁹⁷ In addition to seeking connection between research question and methodology, I have chosen genealogy for a few reasons. First, it is flexible in terms of the types of methods and sources I use, as well as in its adaptability to different social contexts.²⁹⁸ Second, it suits my epistemological and ontological goals. Third, it is a *historicist* approach to International Relations, allowing me both attention to the concerns and constraints of historians and historical methods, as well as clear goals and targets in the analysis of my empirics. This is also important to the choice of Canada – a genealogy of Canadian foreign policy is important because much historical work on Canadian foreign policy is lacking in theory and requires politicization. Meanwhile, much work in IR on Canada pays little attention to the epistemological and ontological concerns of how to *do* history or approach it in long perspective. Genealogy allows me to reconcile these problems by doing a political history. I outline the first two choice justifications below and then discuss *historicism* in the next section, in tandem with a discussion of the overlap between History and IR.

²⁹³ Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham, *Using Foucault's Methods*, 1. publ, Introducing Qualitative Methods Series (London: Sage, 1999), 4.

²⁹⁴ Kendall and Wickham, 34.

²⁹⁵ Mills, *Discourse*, 48; Wendy Brown, *Politics out of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3.

²⁹⁶ Anna Leander, ‘Historical Representations’, in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 12.

²⁹⁷ See: Kevin C. Dunn, ‘Historical Representations’, in *Qualitative Methods in International Relations a Pluralist Guide*, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 78–92.

²⁹⁸ Mills, *Discourse*, 15.

Methodology is the theoretical choices and “intellectual process guiding reflections” about how a research question is to be answered, maintaining key connections to epistemology, ontology, ethical responsibility, and importantly, the choice of method.²⁹⁹ As such, methods are specific tools fitting into broader methodology that help answer the question. As a methodological approach, genealogy is flexible in terms of the methods that may flow from it, but it guides the way that I undertake those methods and interpret what I gather with them. In this project I use (a) interviews; (b) analysis of contemporary policy documents (primary sources); (c) analysis of archival sources (primary sources); (d) analysis of secondary sources, such as news and media reporting. Each of these are sources relating to Canada’s campaigns to the UNSC from 1946-2020. The choice of genealogy over a single “history” may seem very specific to Canada, and in many ways, that is a benefit, but it also is a limit. That said, the selection of Canada is beneficial because while a single historical narrative, it has many different types of campaigns at many different points in time, allowing for the tracing of a longer evolution of status-seeking. This bears resemblance to the “extended case methodology”, which shares many similarities with genealogy, in terms an attention to longer, historical detail.³⁰⁰ Lai and Roccu argue that their use of the extended case methodology is incredibly similar to that of genealogy for interpretivist or critical IR, but with a zoomed-in approach to a phenomenon.³⁰¹ The extended case methodology focuses on “construction”, much like genealogy, whereby a case is “constructed through a dynamic interaction with theory”³⁰² and “knowledge is produced through extensions rather than generalization”.³⁰³

My goal in making sense of both discourse and practice as they appear in these sources is to understand contradictions, tensions, and relations within historical events and historical change over time. I have an attention to power in each of these, both ideational and material, but most centrally the structures of power flowing from imperialisms as they govern global politics, and also additional forms of power as they may appear in the practice of diplomacy. I also pay attention to the way that each of the empirical forms analyzed (i.e., documents vs. interviews/oral history) may speak to one another, allowing new questions to arise, claims to be verified, and particular points of interest to be contextualized. Using each of these methods can fit under the umbrella of genealogy, but when combined and analyzed together, provide a much fuller picture of conditions of possibility, and both the contingent and non-contingent causes and details of events.

While genealogy allows for flexibility and multiple methods to complement one another, my use of it flows from a much more constrained and specific set of ontological and epistemological choices, as detailed in the previous chapter. Explaining the use of genealogy

²⁹⁹ Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, ‘Feminist Methodologies for International Relations’, in *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, ed. Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), See also:

³⁰⁰ Daniela Lai and Roberto Roccu, ‘Case Study Research and Critical IR: The Case for the Extended Case Methodology’, *International Relations* 33, no. 1 (March 2019): 71, <https://doi.org/10/ggh6mb>.

³⁰¹ Lai and Roccu, 71.

³⁰² Lai and Roccu, 67.

³⁰³ Lai and Roccu, 67.

requires re-engaging these choices here. The primary concepts of relevance here are *the global* and *relationality*. Seeing relations as constitutive of actors and putting process at the centre are of central concern. Genealogy makes sense here because I use it to trace (a) how the past events and choices shape subsequent ones; and (b) how actors transform and evolve through relations. These are general methodological choices, but for the specifics of this project, I use genealogy to make sense of how status-seeking emerges *within* a geopolitical structure of imperial formations that transcend traditional IR assumptions about boundaries and anarchy *as well as* a sociological structure of international organizations.

Within a relational approach that sets up genealogy, I focus on a pragmatist approach. I am concerned with discourse, truth, and ideas, as well as practices. I use methods that allow me to unpack both, but also make an ontological wager about how to make sense of those that fits well with the philosophical assumptions of genealogy. Pragmatism, as mentioned before, foregrounds practice, but make different assumptions about actors and practices than those who fall more under the label of “practice theory”. In a pragmatic view, social arrangements emerge “within social action rather than standing parametrically outside of it”³⁰⁴ and actors who are embedded in knowledge, culture, norms, material conditions (i.e. under Gramscian historic blocs or hegemony)³⁰⁵, and rules creatively implement solutions to problems and operate within productive power structures.³⁰⁶ In the context of the UNSC, these actors are diplomats acting on behalf of states and pragmatism sees agency, subjectivity, and power as emerging from human relations and actions.³⁰⁷ Notably, since I have a concern for how past *choices* shape the future, I am interested in how choices are made by diplomats and leaders together – drawing on ideas of subjectivity, agency, disagreement, and action.

Where practice theorists see tacit knowledge, routines, and repetitive action as central, pragmatists are additionally interested in the potential of innovation, creativity, and problem solving in response to the political context in which they work. In both, “configurations form a key unit of analysis, primarily because social dynamics tend to be locally emergent, that is, the by-product of interaction”.³⁰⁸ Zooming in on the practical level is essential, but especially as I analyze this level historically, it is central to my pragmatic approach to re-integrate the politics, both material and ideational, that surround that practical level. This matters specifically because diplomats, as practitioners, are certainly engaged in typical routine, background knowledge-driven practices, but they are also crafting policy, writing speeches, engaged in contention and conflict, and engaging in creative strategies in status-seeking. This is indeed a re-integration of more agency for diplomatic actors, but not in the sense that they act in a vacuum, rather the emergent social environments in which they are embedded are developed historically over time in specific social and political orders. As such, I see practice alone as a starting point and pragmatism as an opportunity to extend the analysis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I extend from practice in the spirit of improv, saying “yes, and”. The attention to power, political structures, and social environments is beneficial, as is the focus on actor-environment

³⁰⁴ Jackson and Nexon, ‘Reclaiming the Social’, 591.

³⁰⁵ See: Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, 168.

³⁰⁶ Jackson and Nexon, ‘Reclaiming the Social’, 590.

³⁰⁷ Pratt, ‘Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology’, 514.

³⁰⁸ Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*, 120.

interactions, where actors and their environment are co-constitutive, relational, and inseparable. To do this, my analysis therefore covers both discourse and practice as they appear in documents and interviews and can be analyzed in the context of ideational, material, *and* practical constraints and logics.

According to Pratt, “in a pragmatist view of action, then, the focus is on how these transactions and innovations generate change and stability alike, and how the creative process grants subjects the capacity to alter their worlds”.³⁰⁹ In this instance, practice theory in IR can be complementary, as pragmatism provides the following addition: “Without needing to completely renounce the concept of field [stemming from Bourdieu],³¹⁰ which provides a compelling view of the action environment, pragmatists are able to better account for the process of reflexivity and variable awareness that subjects may have of their own subjectivity, of the relationship between their ends and means, and of the possibilities open to them for revising their body–world transactions”.³¹¹

Genealogy’s fit under pragmatism is valuable, as a relational ontology that considers reflexivity, subjectivity, power, and change requires a methodology that can account for the role of those things. Genealogy does this in many ways. Notably, it allows one to analyze discourse to uncover these things and their interactions in producing historical trajectories and series of events. Using genealogy as a methodology rather than also a theoretical orientation allows me to use it in a way that satisfies ontological and epistemological commitments that precede such a methodology. Turning now towards history, the final justification behind a genealogical methodological approach is one of *historicism*.

History, Historicism, and Historians

Genealogy takes a critical ethos to produce fine detail on empirical histories. In producing such an empirical history, I use a relational lens and apply a pragmatist account of action. This brings together a historical approach with a sociological understanding of action and change. Thus, the use of genealogy sits alongside longer historical sociological traditions in IR, which have indeed taken a Foucauldian approach before³¹² as well as GHS, as I described in the previous chapter. For me, genealogy serves the double historical sociological purpose: (1) “an understanding of the centrality of discontinuity, contingency, and particularity in international processes alongside an interest in examining how social forms shape international events”;³¹³ and (2) “a focus on the rich detail of historical international relations alongside an emphasis on how configurations of social relations combine in particular contexts in order to generate discrete outcomes”.³¹⁴ Certainly, this interest in process, social form, and histories of how the past progressed to the present are central to the project, as I study the change in status-seeking and

³⁰⁹ Pratt, ‘Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology’, 514.

³¹⁰ GHS, too, has multiple roots, one of which is a Bourdieusian tradition.

³¹¹ Pratt, ‘Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology’, 517.

³¹² See Steve Smith’s chapter in: Hobden and Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*.

³¹³ Go and Lawson, ‘Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology’, 19.

³¹⁴ Go and Lawson, 19.

campaigns at the UNSC *as well as* the trajectories, forms, continuities, and discontinuities between Canada in 1946 and Canada in 2020.

Most importantly, in the broader debate on using history in IR, I use genealogy for the purpose of creating work embedded in historicism. Historicism is defined as “an understanding of the contingent, disruptive, constitutive impact of local events, particularities, and discontinuities”.³¹⁵ Epistemologically, history is not simply “out there” to mine for “cases” but rather an entire universe of empirics within which theory is inseparable. Similarly, the contributions of historians are not simply lists of events, rather historians make unique arguments about events and causes as they fit together. They also have unique theories from a philosophy of science perspective about what history is and what it does.³¹⁶ These arguments and theories should push scholars of IR to review and reconsider their concepts and theories, not just slot cases into them or select history for empirics. Often scholars of IR simply pick and choose pieces of “history”, either as a collection of primary source material or the contributions of historians, without much consideration for how events are reconstructed and framed or for how theory and history intersect, especially in the empirical process. Ultimately, the goal here is to use historicism to provide a better account of history in IR, both theoretically and methodologically, and to challenge historical accounts in theoretical ways.

George Lawson emphasizes the importance of historicism to argue that historical explanation and causality based on context and narrative with a social scientific approach to eventfulness can allow for an ideal combination of history and IR.³¹⁷ Given genealogy’s emphasis on events and episodes, the need for historical focus on events and narratives matters. In other words, genealogy fulfills the needs of an ‘eventful’ approach, one that “allows researchers to see how historical events enable social formations to emerge, reproduce, transform, and potentially break down”.³¹⁸ Where I – and arguably other historical IR scholars - converge most heavily with history is on both context and emplotment, or the understanding of ordering and making sense of events in ways that establish causality and “make them intelligible” in ways that are not necessarily positivist notions of causality.³¹⁹ Ultimately, the goal is to place events in order, in context, and in narrative in a way that takes into account power, subjectivity, reflexivity, and action, satisfying GHS concerns and applying a pragmatist account to them.

Lorenzo Cello argues that genealogy represents one of two major sources for a historicist approach. Much like Lawson, he sees a historicist view as one in which “social phenomena are different at different points in time in human history, the logical corollary of which is that we should approach the past without assuming continuity with the present. The attempt is to reverse the way history is commonly practiced in IR: rather than dragging the past into the present, we

³¹⁵ Lawson, ‘The Eternal Divide?’, 207.

³¹⁶ Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, ‘The Conduct of History in International Relations: Rethinking Philosophy of History in IR Theory’, *International Theory* 9, no. 2 (July 2017): 203–36, <https://doi.org/10/gbjjdf>.

³¹⁷ Lawson, ‘The Eternal Divide?’

³¹⁸ Lawson, 217.

³¹⁹ Lawson, 218.

must agree to be dragged into the past”.³²⁰ Importantly, a historicist approach is useful for thinking about imperial formations and their multiplicity of forms³²¹ – the role that Britain played at the UN and in its relations with Canada in 1946 is different than in 1957 which is different than 1966, despite constituting a significant portion of Canada’s global concerns and responsibilities at all three points. For Cello, historicism can be achieved either through a genealogical approach or following the historical contextualism of the Cambridge School, which he argues converge more than they diverge.³²²

Further, a historicist approach requires both historical and theoretical contexts for interpreting historical empirical claims. Cello points out that historical sociology is consistent with historicism, where the traditions of both earlier historical sociology in IR (i.e. Hobson)³²³ and more current (i.e. GHS) recognize the importance of temporal and special contexts, specificity of context, and rejects transhistorical categories that see patterns or causal relationships without good historical tracing.³²⁴ Historical approaches alone are not necessarily historicist, but a flow from GHS’s ontological commitments through a practical take on Foucault’s genealogy, and a historicist perspective should provide a unique way to observe status seeking over time. Moreover, the inclusion of Gramscian concepts at points in this dissertation (i.e. the way that material conditions or hegemony affects diplomatic environments) is also a historicist approach, as Cox argues that “Gramsci’s historical materialism (which he was careful to distinguish from what he called ‘historical economism’ or a narrowly economic interpretation of history), ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circumstances”.³²⁵ While this project focuses more on ideational questions and concerns, I do engage with material structures by examining the way that they shape power, diplomatic environments, and imperialism throughout, especially in my critique of liberalism. Historical materialism, as a historicist approach, offers important interpretations and critiques of history that are integrated from time to time in this project and are ontologically and epistemologically consistent with the tenets of *how* I approach history.

In general, I do not see Canada as a consistent polity or entity over 75 years, rather that it takes many forms and images over time and those who inhabit it also change. I expect these differences, contradictions, continuities, and discontinuities to become clear as I plot changes in each decade of Canadian foreign policy through the elections to the UNSC. I also see it as sociologically complex, made up of politicians, diplomats, and other civil servants, and public figures whose roots, interests, priorities, material conditions, and socializations change and combine in different ways over time. Canada is not stable, and neither is the UNSC as an organization, rather through a historical, sociological, genealogical approach, those things can be traced over time, both as a series of insights into Canada’s changing foreign policy as well as the evolution of status-seeking in multilateral settings. As such, a history-of-the-present of status-

³²⁰ Cello, ‘Taking History Seriously in IR’, 237.

³²¹ Cello, 248.

³²² Cello, ‘Taking History Seriously in IR’, 241.

³²³ Hobden and Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*.

³²⁴ Cello, ‘Taking History Seriously in IR’, 238.

³²⁵ Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, 168.

seeking may tell us how we got to where we are today. Moreover, on genealogy, following Bartelson, Nohr notes that histories of the past are to be written in terms of the past and focused on movement to the present.³²⁶ For Nohr, the present is “chaotic, contingent, singular, and still at points interconnected and somewhat continuous”.³²⁷ The past is not written in terms of the present but rather the evolution from one to the other is linked through emplotment of events and their central contexts, narratives, causes, and consequences.

Methods

With the value of a genealogical approach established, I now turn to the specific tools I use to undertake it. In this project, I used (a) interviews with sitting, former, and retired diplomats; and (b) discourse analysis (in the genealogical tradition) of a variety of historical and contemporary policy documents, acquired through archival research, Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests, publicly available documentation; and (c) discourse analysis of media reporting, media archives (i.e. the Canadian Broadcasting Company) and other secondary sources. Each of these covered the 9 Canadian campaigns to the UNSC’s elected seats (see Table 4) from 1946-2020. Archival research covers the campaigns of 1946, 1947, 1957, 1966, 1976, 1988, and 1998. ATIP document procurement as well as publicly available documents and media reporting covers the campaigns of 2010-2020. I have completed 21 interviews spanning the campaigns from 1976-2020. In the analysis of all of this, I have taken a historical approach to analysis, using these sources to understand series of events, priorities, and processes of decision-making with attention primarily to emplotment, but also a discourse analysis approach to think about meaning, contestation, power, patterns, and preconditions.³²⁸ I am concerned both with temporality but the conditions of possibility for events, trends, ideas, identities, and representations within that. Similarly, I am interested in (a) what diplomats *do* (practices) as part of campaigns; (b) the discourse within and around the campaigns; and (c) the nature of diplomatic agency and creativity, as well as material conditions, in terms of making and implementing policy choices. My preliminary interview questions reflected this, as did my approach to reading documents.

³²⁶ Andreas Aagaard Nohr, ‘Poststructuralism and the Challenge of History’, in *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, ed. Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2021), 92; Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), See also:

³²⁷ Nohr, ‘Poststructuralism and the Challenge of History’, 93.

³²⁸ Kevin Dunn and Iver Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.7106945>.

ELECTION YEAR	TERM SERVED
1946	Loss
1947	1948-1949
1957	1958-1959
1966	1967-1978
1976	1989-1990
1988	1989-1990
1998	1999-2000
2010	Loss
2020	Loss

Table 4: Canadian Service to the UNSC

I first detail my interviews below and then discuss my archival research and document analysis. I have structured my interviews following Lee Ann Fujii’s relational interviewing method.³²⁹ For Fujii, knowledge is not simply something handed over as data through interview answers, but rather the process of learning through interacting with participants, reflecting broader interpretive and critical traditions in IR and other social sciences.³³⁰ It is reflexive and attentive to positionality, both in terms of the interviewee in their social environment and researcher-interviewee relations, where the dynamic of the exchange and meaning made and shared within it is central. Practically, it requires a working relationship, active listening, familiarity with the language and norms of the interviewee, and flexibility in structure.³³¹ In many ways, it is similar to a historian’s view of interviews as oral history, rather than a Political Science-driven, positivist use of them as “qualitative data” to generate testable claims.³³²

In simple terms, I would describe my interviews as “semi-structured”, but more interpretive and guided by the dynamics of the unfolding interaction with participants. Helpfully, Fujii contrasts relational interviewing with other interview methods, which I find valuable for my own work. She describes it as sharing ethical and methodological commitments with many forms of ethnography, focused on learning about the world from the inside, but interviews are not themselves done within a broader ethnographic project involving participant observation and other methods.³³³ Rather, they still exist as separate, limited interactions with the field (which may involve some immersion). Unlike more positivist interviewing, the discussion of beliefs, biases, norms, power, etc. are welcome and attention is paid to their effects, rather than seeking to “control” or “limit” them.³³⁴ Ultimately, relational interviewing provided a best fit for me as someone interested in the social dynamics, narratives, and structures of power found in the UN

³²⁹ It is very important to note here that the use of the descriptor “relational” is confusing, as I use relational to describe an ontological commitment throughout the dissertation – the use of the term “relational interviewing”, when citing Fujii is used in this section and effort is made to clarify which “relational” I am using following the introduction of this term. While they do have similar philosophical roots, they are not the same term when applied to ontology and method.

³³⁰ Lee Ann Fujii, *Interviewing in Social Science Research: A Relational Approach*, 1 Edition, Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 2–3.

³³¹ Fujii, 3–4.

³³² Layna Mosley, ‘Introduction’, in *Interview Research in Political Science*, ed. Layna Mosley (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 10.

³³³ Fujii, *Interviewing in Social Science Research*, 7.

³³⁴ Fujii, 8.

Security Council and Canada's campaigns but with more interest in a larger, historical story rather than a present-day ethnographic account of its workings. While relational interviewing is often applied in settings not considered "elite" interviews, there is both a precedent for applying it to the "elite" category but also reflecting on the complexity and plurality of that term, especially in relation to the researcher's position.³³⁵ "Elites" are not monolithic and different challenges appeared at different points, both in terms of positionality and in terms of each individual's relationship to the campaign for which I was interviewing them.³³⁶

All interviews remain anonymous – while some interviewees were comfortable identifying themselves, others were not. As the group of people who worked on each campaign was not that large, it would be easy for those "in the know" to identify anonymous individuals through a process of elimination if others were identified. As such, I have removed all identifying information from each interview.

While it may be uncouth to suggest this to many Political Scientists, this form of interviewing bears similarity to the concept of oral history, with which I also engaged in conducting interviews. While I was not able to complete interviews with the length and depth of traditional oral history, I integrated its principles to fulfill both epistemological and ontological commitments and to provide a richness to the genealogical approach. In oral history, there is a focus on "personal experience and reflections", "historically significant questions", and "context and identity".³³⁷ Moreover, interviewers "must respect the narrators' equal authority in the interviews and honor their right to respond to questions in their own style and language".³³⁸ In engaging significantly with the discipline of history, I sought to think about the principles and purposes of oral history and its use for understanding narrative, contingency, and cause in genealogy.

My interview process began with identifying names of people I knew had worked on Canada's UNSC campaigns or during a term immediately after a campaign. Between 2020 and 2022, I completed 21 interviews with sitting, former, and retired Canadian officials. All took place over the phone or via videoconference software due to the constraints of the COVID-19 pandemic. The use of phone and videoconferencing software was a very easy transition – as interviewees were diplomats, they were used to operating in this manner already through working abroad, and so connecting with a researcher in this way was a natural transition and they had the skills and experience to effectively communicate through this medium. I used the software Sonix to securely organize, manage, and transcribe interview data for use in this project.

I was able to use a snowballing method to gain more names as well as use information found in my document research. ATIPs and archival documents, as well as UN documents such as the General Assembly's Index to Proceedings, have provided me with names of people to

³³⁵ Aarie Glas, 'Positionality, Power, and Positions of Power: Reflexivity in Elite Interviewing', *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 23 February 2021, 1–5, <https://doi.org/10/gjhffc>.

³³⁶ Glas; See also: Matthew N. Beckman and Richard L. Hall, 'Elite Interviewing in Washington, DC', in *Interview Research in Political Science*, ed. Layna Mosley (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 1–29.

³³⁷ 'Principles and Best Practices for Oral History'.

³³⁸ 'Principles and Best Practices for Oral History'.

interview based on who had authored them, signed them, or delivered remarks. I was able to cross-reference these with contact information on government directories, public websites, LinkedIn, and sometimes through simple contact forms online. As such, the relationship between interview and document analysis was ongoing throughout the process. As I uncovered more documents, more names appeared, both for identifying new people to contact, but also, in some cases (1976 to 2020), for returning to people with whom I had spoken to ask questions, fact check, and clarify points within documents. For example, if there are a lot of pages on a particular meeting or briefing, it is difficult to know whether that necessarily means it was important or whether it simply produced a lot of paper. Interviews allow me to discuss these items where possible to get a better sense of where they sit in broader memory. Similarly, looking at documents can help clarify and verify claims made by interviewees as well as illustrate the nature of patterns found in interviewing. Ultimately, the interplay between document and interview has been incredibly important to this research.

In terms of archival work, I have accessed archival material through the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the United Nations (digital), Library and Archives Canada, the Library of Parliament, the Jules Leger Library, published diplomatic memoirs, the Documents on Canadian External Relations series from Global Affairs Canada, Carleton University, and the University of Ottawa. Additional material was provided through a few personal collections of retired diplomats as well as Adam Chapnick, who had maintained personal collections for his own research and passed them on to me when finished with them. The bulk of my material did come from Library and Archives Canada and the Jules Leger Library, through multiple in-person visits, digital collections, and additional requests for digitization through librarians. Finally, I read a large number of diplomatic memoirs from the 1940s through 1960s available through libraries or various archives. While I did not ultimately use them as a direct source, they were valuable for understanding more about the social, personal, material, and positional contexts in which the diplomats and politicians acted. It served the purpose of helping me understand the conditions necessary for a pragmatic analysis where I did not have the opportunity to talk to people in generations past. They brought to life the correspondences available in archival material and allowed me to understand particular situations and views of Canadian foreign policy from the perspective of their time. They were an opportunity to think about the past in terms of its evolution towards the present and the narratives surrounding it.

Contemporary policy documents were mostly acquired through ATIP requests in 2020 and 2021. I used both the regular ATIP request system to Global Affairs as well as the Government of Canada's proactive disclosure system. The ATIP request system allowed me to make general inquiries based on areas of interest for me in the 2010 and 2020 campaigns and then after using the proactive disclosure system, I filed many additional requests. The proactive disclosure system allowed me to see previously released documents of interest and request a copy of them, as well as see titles and numbers of Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial briefing packages and request them as well. Similarly, it allowed me to see things like travel expenses and use the data associated with those to request briefing packages for those trips. For example, if the Minister of Foreign Affairs was travelling to the General Assembly for a certain period, I had key dates, locations, and additional information to make a specific request for material. Similarly, if the Ambassador to the United Nations was making a particular trip on something I

knew was substantially related to the campaign (i.e., a financing for development initiative for the UN), I could request material associated with that trip.

I also used documents from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the United Nations. I was able to gather key documents that provided substantial information, such as the Index to Proceedings, speeches, Explanations of Votes, resolutions, transcripts of meetings, deliberations, and committee sessions. I used these types of documents to provide context for Canadian documents and also to identify issues that were important to the Canadian campaigns based on how they were discussed in UN settings. In addition, this information was valuable for informing the specifics of ATIP requests as well as archival searches at LAC.

Finally, newspaper and media reporting on each of the campaigns has provided substantial information that complements the use of primary sources as discussed above. I have been able to find either these sources directly or as quoted by others for nearly every campaign. This has been useful for understanding the broader picture on how people outside of the campaigns perceived them and understood them.

While I have not done a formal ethnography at any point, I have spent time “immersed” in the world I am studying. I spent a year (2018-2019) as the Cadieux-Léger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada where I worked in the foreign policy research unit, holding some “desk officer” files, providing my research for the 2020 campaign, producing independent research, and taking on a variety of other responsibilities. In addition to another year and a half of time in the Department, I became very fluent in the languages, norms, practices, social behaviours, and processes of Canadian diplomacy. This has given me a huge advantage for my research skills both with my textual research and my interviews. I was not active in the Department while undertaking either interviews or archival work (in 2020-2022) and was upfront with interviewees about my past experiences and present position as external to the Department. Positionality matters not just for actors in a social setting but for researcher-participant interactions as well. My previous time may have affected our conversations in a handful of ways – I do think it gave me credibility in terms of gaining trust of interviewees and it allowed them to be honest since I “knew what I was talking about”. That said, it may have changed the way that they told me stories in a more negative way, which is why I spent a significant amount of time verifying claims where I could in documents, with others, and in other published texts. My own positionality of course also affected my analysis, as from an interpretive perspective, research is neither separate from the policy or “real world” environment, nor the relations with interviewees. My hope is that in detailing it here, readers are aware of such positionality as it frames my text.

For archival material and ATIPs, I was able to understand both the language and nuance captured in many types of written documents as well as the differentiation between the types of documents, their purpose, and their importance. Similarly, accessing them became easier since I knew the type of work that I was looking for, was familiar with their coding, numbering, and language, and I also had a strong understanding of the ATIP and proactive disclosure systems.

In terms of interviewing, my ability to understand these norms and language, as well as the Fellowship itself, gave me both credibility and access to individuals that I would not have had otherwise. This came from people willing to say yes because of who I was, but also because

it meant that people inside and formerly inside the Department passed my name along and recommended me as someone with whom to speak. I interviewed officials from the analyst to the Minister and Deputy Minister level, including one Minister of Foreign Affairs and multiple Permanent Representatives and Deputy Permanent Representatives. It also gave me the analytical skills to “read between the lines”, know what to cross-reference, know what to ask, and reflect on interviewees’ answers in terms of their positionality, experience, and relation to the foreign service and its hierarchies.

This immersion and learning experience on the inner workings of diplomatic life have helped me overcome many of the shortcomings identified in interview-only research³³⁹ and the challenges in ethnographic participant observation, as identified by Nair.³⁴⁰ Interview-only research or archival-only research can be limited in terms of what knowledge a researcher brings to analysis. Immersion, prior to my research, provided me with the opportunity to understand the social setting in which actors in my research are and were engaged. What this offers has been an attention to “micropolitics”, in which interactions between people within social structures are important for understanding the behaviour of IOs.³⁴¹ Ethnographic research or other forms of immersion can be hard to access in “elite” bureaucracies, but I was lucky enough to have this immersion doing other research in the GAC setting while writing the proposal for this project.³⁴² I chose not to do an ethnographic project, but my research question, epistemological and ontological choices, and theory as detailed in this project stem from this immersion experience.

My attention to “micropolitics”³⁴³ aims to link the worlds of diplomacy and practice with the larger questions of international order and international structures (i.e. imperialisms) as well as to transcend some of the boundaries between discursive and practical approaches to IR, which can often treat the work of social agents as separate from texts and vice-versa.³⁴⁴ I have been able to gather the benefits of immersion in my initial research design stages in 2019 (without doing ethnographic work) that then heavily informed the interpretive research practice and analysis of my interviews and both historical and contemporary texts. The consistent interaction in my research between both the micro and the macro (the diplomatic and the systemic) as well as the textual and the practical is at the very least an attempt to fulfill the goals of my theoretical, ontological, and historicist orientation. Each of the empirical chapters are structured to move between this micro and macro level - from the interpersonal interactions of policy makers to large, geopolitical trends - in order to provide the fullest context possible for the narratives and arguments that emerge.

Moving Forward: Diplomacy and the UNSC

³³⁹ Mosley, ‘Introduction’, 11.

³⁴⁰ Deepak Nair, “‘Hanging Out’ While Studying ‘Up’: Doing Ethnographic Fieldwork in International Relations”, *International Studies Review*, 2 March 2021, 3, <https://doi.org/10/gjhf58>.

³⁴¹ Nair, 5.

³⁴² Nair, 6.

³⁴³ See also: Solomon and Steele, ‘Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory’.

³⁴⁴ For a very good piece transcending this boundary theoretically, see: Stéphanie Martel, ‘The Polysemy of Security Community-Building: Toward a “People-Centered” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?’, *International Studies Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (1 September 2020): 588–99, <https://doi.org/10/gjm63s>.

Status-seeking is the business of states, as they exist in that moment in time. Doing the business of states are diplomats. Diplomats do the work of establishing and maintaining relations and are the central individuals responsible for campaigns to the UNSC, under the direction and eye of political leaders. Ultimately, in developing a genealogy of status-seeking with a pragmatic view of action, I am examining what diplomats do and the social and discursive environment around them. While I have detailed *how* I have done that, I conclude with some reflections on how I understand diplomacy for the purpose of framing the next chapters. Following Rebecca Adler-Nissen, diplomacy “has never been just about representation and the mediation of difference”.³⁴⁵ Diplomats are engaged in cooperation and mediation, but also negotiation, conflict, coercion, and in my case, competition. Many scholars of diplomacy focus on the first three - cooperation, mediation, and negotiation – at the expense of the others, especially competition. Adler-Nissen rejects the idea that “diplomats are simply ‘greasing the wheels’”.³⁴⁶

The case of campaigning for a seat on the UNSC is a particularly interesting one because it is a situation where even those who may be “friends” are competing against one another for status rewards and responsibilities. Sometimes, enemies also compete with one another. Each of these happens within a specific hierarchical context, embedded in larger global hierarchies. In status-seeking and pursuing a seat on the UNSC, states are engaging with those who they think will vote for them, those who they think will not vote for them, those for whom they have no idea, their competitors, and their closest supporters. Diplomats are thus managing each of these relationships concurrently, allowing them to be engaged in conflict, cooperation, competition, and negotiation all at once. Similarly, they are both taking direction from above (political leaders) but also guiding leadership and taking initiative. They are managing relations internally, between themselves, their leaders, and their domestic audiences, ultimately managing the division of the inside/outside and the friendly/unfriendly.³⁴⁷ In essence, they are the operators of global governance³⁴⁸ in the sense that they undertake the very relations that constitute states, organizations, and hierarchies. A relational-pragmatist ontology allows me to build a theory that unpacks these operations and genealogy provides a methodological framing for understanding the ways that the operation of those relations, as they constitute actors and structures, is imbued with power, subjectivity, truth claims, continuities, and ruptures.

Looking ahead to the following chapters of this dissertation, I present four empirical chapters, constructed using the methodology and methods detailed in this chapter: (a) 1946, 1947, and 1957; (b) 1966 and 1976; (c) 1988 and 1998; and (d) 2010 and 2020. Each chapter examines the campaigns taking place in those years, as they span two major types: (1) those where the major competition – and subsequently status-seeking as a process - takes place through voting at the General Assembly; and (2) those where the competition takes place prior to being

³⁴⁵ Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Just Greasing the Wheels? Mediating Difference or the Evasion of Power and Responsibility in Diplomacy’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 10, no. 1 (27 January 2015): 23, <https://doi.org/10/gmcpth>.

³⁴⁶ Adler-Nissen, 23.

³⁴⁷ Adler-Nissen, 26.

³⁴⁸ See: Jennifer Mitzen, ‘From Representation to Governing: Diplomacy and the Constitution of International Public Power’, in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 111–39, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316162903.005>.

presented to the General Assembly, making the status-seeking process narrower and within a small group, as well as internally. 1946, 1988, 1998, 2010, and 2020 fall into category (1) and 1947, 1957, 1966, and 1976 fall into category (2). As such, I make an argument about status-seeking in each one, as it relates to the type of competition at hand, that come together to illustrate my broader argument as outlined in the previous chapter. Throughout, I also draw conclusions about Canadian foreign policy and Canada's place amongst imperialism and liberal internationalism.

(5) Willing to Serve: The 1946, 1947, and 1957 Elections

Introduction

Canada's business with the United Nations Security Council begins not in its first election in 1946, but much earlier, in its engagement with the founding of the organization during the Second World War. Canada was an active member in the founding of the UN, perhaps the most active of countries of its size, even if its success and influence was limited. In this founding process, Canada's participation very much set the stage for future conversations within the organization on membership, responsibility, and recognition of small states. Most importantly, Canada articulated an early vision of how status should be distributed in international organizations through the functional principal and used this in its own status-seeking through the pursuit of a UNSC seat. The functional principle essentially holds that representation on a body should be determined by capabilities and ability to contribute to the mandate on such a body.³⁴⁹ It has a much longer and more complex history of meaning in Canada and outside, but in the UNSC context and for the space constraints of this project, this is the most simplified distillation post-1945.³⁵⁰ Functionalism was central to Canada's position at the San Francisco conference and continued to be so during Canada's first three campaigns to the Security Council. Ultimately, the UN Charter captured functionalism in part, as it says that in selecting non-permanent members, there should be "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographic distribution".³⁵¹ In practice, the idea that membership should be distributed "equitably" around geography strongly competed with functionalism as states argued how and why some should join the Council and others should not. This tension and Canada's commitment to advancing functionalism was the core theme of Canada's first three attempts to gain a seat on the UNSC, unsuccessfully in 1946, successfully in 1947, and again successfully in 1957.

These elections took place within the newly created United Nations, led by imperial powers and created in the image of Anglo-American liberal internationalism. The existence of only 51 members in 1945, including 46 non-P5 states, provides a rough picture of how much territory and how many people were under the domination of both the P5 and other European states at the end of the war (see figure 1). Imperialism strongly structured the environment under which early UN dynamics played out. Particularly in the late 1940s, it is too narrow a view to look only at growing Cold War dynamics within institutions when so much imperial power was alive and well and central to the foundation of the UN. This is because "IR naturalizes liberalism and detaches it from its legacies of imperialism and domination",³⁵² treating IOs as advancers of

³⁴⁹ Adam Chapnick, 'Canada's Functional Principle: 75 Years On', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 72, no. 2 (June 2017): 271, <https://doi.org/10/f99r7b>.

³⁵⁰ For history and historiography of the functional principle, see: Peter M. Boehm, 'Towards Principled Influence: An Overview of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1943-1948' (University of Edinburgh, 1983), <https://era.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/7142>; Adam Chapnick, 'Canada's Functional Principle: 75 Years On', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 72, no. 2 (June 2017): 269-78, <https://doi.org/10/f99r7b>.

³⁵¹ Charter of the United Nations.

³⁵² Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 165.

equality, rather than complex hierarchies of membership that can also produce inequalities. For the UNSC in particular,

*“the P5 club was forged on the basis of common interest in and special responsibility for global order, rather than the basis of material power alone. Indeed the normative belief in special responsibility for global order lent the group social coherence. In this sense, the closure mechanism helped to form the group of insiders just as much as it helped to exclude outsiders. The effect of the Security Council [at its formation] was to create a set of equal relations among the states within the Council, but a hierarchy of rights over those states outside the Council”.*³⁵³

As the Security Council has significant powers over global politics, especially violence, joining the group of insiders with rights over other states matters.




Figure 1: UN Membership from 1945-2013.³⁵⁴

Functionalism is of course a position on *who* can participate and *why*, producing an argument about how social closure should take place for elected seats. In turn, there is a tension between the incentives for maintaining hierarchy and demands for increased inclusion,

³⁵³ Viola, 190.

³⁵⁴ Data from ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present’, United Nations, n.d., <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html>.

something that later grew significantly during the 1950s and 1960s, as the General Assembly admitted new UN members. In the UNSC, the P5, led by the UK and the US, set the rules by which membership was determined at San Francisco and they are the states that pursue “different institutional strategies to preserve their privileges”.³⁵⁵ Functionalism was Canada’s claim to membership among the privileged, without disrupting the imperial order. In essence, it was a claim to status, asking to be recognized for its capabilities that directly stemmed from the UN’s mandate, and be granted status and responsibilities accordingly.

In this chapter, I examine the 1946, 1947, and 1957 campaigns to the UNSC. I argue that functionalism’s centrality to the first three elections in which Canada participated is important because it was a principle founded in liberalism that became both Canada’s status seeking strategy *and* a position on how social closure (and subsequently recognition and status) should occur. Linking to the broader argument of the dissertation, functionalism was the key framing of Canada’s status-seeking through liberal internationalism, as it drew on liberalism’s key tenets of cooperation, equality, and fairness. Canada’s first three campaigns were processes of status-seeking in which Canadian officials articulated Canada’s commitment to liberal internationalism through functionalism, advocating for small states and increased participation for non-P5 states, while also avoiding challenging the imperial nature of the Council.

In 1946 and 1947, Canadian officials used functionalism as a status-seeking narrative, contending that Canada’s ability to fulfill responsibilities justified its status aspirations, directly in competition with those who felt that other factors (i.e., geography) justified their own status aspirations. This was a period in which functionalism was distilled and presented in opposition to geography, to secure status in the uncertain aftermath of the Second World War, especially in rearranging the distribution of roles within the sphere of Anglo-American dominance. In 1957, functionalism was part of a broader re-evaluation of Canada’s relationship to its imperial allies and the dynamics of the Commonwealth. Canadian officials’ desire to take on the responsibilities of the Council were rooted in the belief that an active United Nations and a united Commonwealth served Canada’s interests. As such, Canadian officials concluded that they *should serve* because Canada *could contribute*, which would help maintain key relationships with allies. Status-seeking through functionalism was not just about why Canada deserved a seat, but rather was also about longer term interests for Canada by the 1950s. Seeking status in the short term maintained the possibility of a united Commonwealth and a well-oiled United Nations. The associated responsibilities that came with status were worth it for the greater cause of Commonwealth presence on the Council; functionalism, through liberalism, was the path to getting there. This idea that Canada’s wanted functional participation that did not challenge P5 power was part of a broader trend in Canadian foreign policy: moves towards decolonization were seen as acceptable if they did not threaten Canada’s Cold War interests and allyship with the British empire.

While each decade had a different view of functionalism’s purpose for Canada, functionalism was the reigning principle around which contestation occurred. In both cases, functionalism, as a liberal principle, and imperialism were linked. In the 1940s, Canadian officials saw functionalism as something that should not disrupt imperial, liberal order. In the

³⁵⁵ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 165.

1950s, they saw its value in relation to the maintenance of good Commonwealth relations; part of this was seeing decolonization and equality of UN membership as something to support if it supported American and British Cold War goals.

This chapter begins with the San Francisco conference and Canada's contributions to the founding of the United Nations. While there is indeed larger historical context, discussion of San Francisco captures Canada's general place and relations at the close of the Second World War, without needing to discuss the War in more general terms. Similarly, questions of UN membership are discussed in this section. After setting this stage, I then discuss the 1946 and 1947 elections in detail, with 1946 as a competitive election and 1947 as a clean slate election. Turning to 1957, I sketch the historical context and questions of UN membership in the mid-1950s. This is followed by the analysis of the 1957 election, which was also a clean slate election.

Canada in San Francisco

Between 1942 and 1945, Canada and its Department of External Affairs traversed a long path of UN conferences, with many stumbles along the way related to Canada's place as small or middle power, and as a member of the Commonwealth, within the sphere of American influence. Following the Balfour Declaration (1926) and the Statute of Westminster (1931), Canada's most relevant relationship to more formal empire was to Britain, though Canada-US relations were increasingly important. As a member of the Commonwealth, Canada had more agency and independence than countries still under more formal British control, but increased agency and a desire to put more power into the hands of small or middle powers did not mean that Canada sought to dismantle or oppose the British empire. Rather, Canada's advocacy for increased participation of smaller powers was to increase its status within a structure built on imperial formations that served the P5. In fact, the Commonwealth itself was a refashioning of the ideologies of the British Empire, which had rhetorically (though not in policy) followed the work of the Round Table in the early 20th century, seeking to naturalize the nature of the empire and politically frame it in liberal values of freedom and equality, rather than domination.³⁵⁶ In this context, Canada sought to increase its own influence and that of other small powers within international settings as a way of maintaining the strength of the Commonwealth and advocating for its members' interests, especially those of the settler colonies.

Canada's governance at home was in a period of change at the same time. In 1945, Mackenzie King was Prime Minister and held the responsibilities of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Norman Robertson was the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, having been in the role since O.D. Skelton died in 1941. The Department of External Affairs was small and not particularly well-resourced for the magnitude of global changes at the time, nor major, permanent representation to a new organization. Under Skelton, the Department had more of an isolationist approach to international affairs, though Robertson had brought a more

³⁵⁶ Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism*, 101; Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870-1914*, 33-34.

internationalist force to the Department, to an often-reluctant King.³⁵⁷ King was regularly distracted by domestic politics and generally had little interest in foreign policy.³⁵⁸

In 1942, while Canada was at the margins of transatlantic allied politics, Hume Wrong, while in Washington, articulated his vision of what came to be known as the “functional principle”. This principle became central to both Canada’s positions in San Francisco and its campaigns to the UNSC in the following two years, as it spoke directly to how Canada saw the role of the elected members and its own position. Importantly, the functional principle is in many ways an articulation about how status should be granted in multilateral settings (i.e., based on one’s capabilities for contribution) and how status should be sought and accorded. The functional principle was one of multiple competing philosophies for how the UNSC’s power and responsibility should be distributed. These alternative philosophies to functionalism included the idea that it should be shared by great powers only or that it should pay key attention to geographic distribution and regional dynamics, allowing for smaller states to participate but *not* based on capability.

Canada had attempted to push the functional principle on its American and British allies with mixed results throughout the many talks leading up to San Francisco.³⁵⁹ Often, it was intended to assert Canadian independence from Britain, given Canada’s wartime efforts. Similarly, it was used to demonstrate Canada’s position as an independent dominion of the British Empire and to make clear that Canada was apprehensive about a world organization becoming concentrated in the hands of victorious powers. The functional principle was both an effort to navigate Canada’s position post-war but was also a way to advocate for a distribution of power that included smaller states and as a status-seeking act of its own for the future UN. As Canada began to advance its own early approach to internationalism, it also struggled to sort out where it stood in relation to the US and the UK, especially in how it would approach relationships with both in terms of collective security. In that sense, the functional principle advocated more power and responsibility in the hands of smaller states, while not upsetting the empires themselves, as Canada leaned strongly on its ties to Britain and was its own colonial power at home. Canada did not seek to oppose the imperial hierarchy, but rather change the distribution of roles and pursue future status within it.

King took the functional principle with him to San Francisco in 1945 and was met with limited success. The most powerful countries in the room rejected the principle and wanted to concentrate power and responsibility for themselves.³⁶⁰ They sought to protect their interests, putting them at odds with many of the smaller countries, within which Canada led the push for functionalism. That said, the success of inclusion was King’s, and it reflected his broader thoughts on the matter. In one of his statements at the Second Plenary session, he said,

³⁵⁷ Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 9.

³⁵⁸ Chapnick, 7–8.

³⁵⁹ Department of External Affairs, ‘Canada and the United Nations, 1945-1975’ (Ottawa, ON: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1976).

³⁶⁰ Department of External Affairs, 10.

“We shall not be guided by considerations of national pride or prestige and shall not seek to have changes made for reasons such as these. We recognize the principle that power and responsibility must go hand in hand and that international security depends primarily upon the maintenance of an overwhelming preponderance of power on the side of peace. Power, however, is not exclusively concentrated in the hands of any four or five states, and the Conference should not act on the assumption that it is”.³⁶¹

In the end, Canada’s contributions to the conference were more significant for the Economic and Social Council, but the functional principle was integrated in San Francisco.³⁶² The UN Charter included the line indicating that attention should be paid in voting for UNSC seats to the ability to contribute to the mandate of maintaining peace and security.³⁶³ Of course, other smaller countries felt differently, taking the position that geographic consideration should drive their inclusion instead of functionalism. The Charter includes lines for both functionalism and geographic distribution, which Australia championed, in stipulating how elections for seats should be considered. While the Charter did not specify what geographical representation meant, the tension between the two components on UNSC membership haunted Canada in its first elections. The Department’s post-San Francisco Conference report spoke to Canada’s concerns about the UNSC’s composition, emphasizing the functional principle:

“The circumstances of the election of these non-permanent members were of particular interest to Canada, and indeed to a number of other states which like Canada were in the middle position between the great and the small states... the Canadian delegation felt that the position stated in the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was unsatisfactory in that there was no qualification for eligibility for election to the Council. The principle that power was to be combined with responsibility was recognized in the permanent membership of the Great Powers on the Council. It was suggested that the application of this principle should be carried a step further, and that among the six elected to the Council there should be several states which could make a really substantial contribution to the purposes of the Organization”.³⁶⁴

As was later expressed in a Department report in 1976, the UN offered Canada the opportunity to “affirm its status in the world as it demonstrated a willingness to fulfil its obligations to the organization. These factors were clearly in the PM’s mind at San Francisco as he pleaded for a greater measure of responsibility to be accorded the lesser powers”.³⁶⁵

This integration of the functional principle should not lead to overstating Canada’s contributions to the UN, nor is it to say that it has fully and completely guided elections to the United Nations Security Council in the intervening 75 years. What it can illuminate is how informal hierarchies and status-seeking began to emerge and become established at San

³⁶¹ ‘Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945’ (New York, NY: United Nations Information Organizations, 1945), 193.

³⁶² Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project*, 126.

³⁶³ Charter of the United Nations.

³⁶⁴ ‘Report on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Held at San Francisco, 25th April - 26th June, 1945, Conference Series, 1945, No. 2’ (Department of External Affairs, 1945), 29.

³⁶⁵ Department of External Affairs, ‘Canada and the United Nations, 1945-1975’, 5.

Francisco and in the first elections, via these competing philosophies of status-for-responsibilities. Regardless of whether members of the General Assembly casting votes considered the functional principle directly– or if they focused primarily on geographic distribution – the idea that status should be tied to the mandate and powers of the organization mattered as a precedent. In other words, the idea that the P5 should not hold all the power and responsibility stuck out to the other 46 states, even if there was disagreement as to how that should be distributed. Moreover, this idea brings to life the concept of status as an active, not static, concept – status must be used, and expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices must be undertaken once it is accorded.

The 1946/1947 Elections

The first election to the UNSC took place on January 12th, 1946, barely 6 months after the San Francisco conference.³⁶⁶ By this time, it had already become apparent that due to the interests of the P5, the UNSC was a body plagued by disagreement. It was also apparent that the geographic distribution of seats mattered to others more than it did to Canada. In 1946 and 1947, because Canada could contribute to the new UNSC, it sought to convince others that it therefore should have a seat to match. Through functionalism, Canadian officials essentially articulated that membership on the Council needed to be used appropriately and should be accorded based on the ability to contribute to the mandate. Functionalism is at its core a liberal principle, providing a particular vision of UNSC membership within the newly emergent liberal internationalism was central to seeking status within it. Canada saw itself as the most qualified and *also* felt that this type of qualification was the best way to select members.

On January 9th, a telegram from the High Commissioner in Great Britain to King said that “electioneering is going strong” for the Security Council.³⁶⁷ An idea was developing that states on the UNSC should not also be on the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for which Canada was already running. Canada was under pressure in the Commonwealth meeting that day to only pursue the Security Council seat and make way for Australia, India, and New Zealand on the other ECOSOC.³⁶⁸ Australia was running for the Security Council and there was a sense that the dominions should be split up, with only one Commonwealth representative on the Security Council.³⁶⁹ While Canada was the advocate of the functional principle, Australia felt strongly about geographic representation. Both felt strongly about the distribution of responsibilities and power for smaller states, especially those within the Commonwealth, but the difference was about qualification vs. geographical balance. This put competition within the Commonwealth.

Canadian officials felt limited by the idea of only one Commonwealth country on the Security Council at a time. While some, including Escott Reid, felt strongly about joining both the UNSC and the Economic and Social Council, others, including Hume Wrong, were more ambivalent. Wrong saw a seat purely as a service obligation and Norman Robertson was

³⁶⁶ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

³⁶⁷ Hume Wrong, ‘High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/211-C’, 9 January 1946, Page 629-630, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12, 1946.

³⁶⁸ Wrong.

³⁶⁹ Wrong.

hesitant.³⁷⁰ Canada spent the days leading up to January 12th, pursuing the seat against a more enthusiastic Australia.

On January 10th, Australia directly sought Canada's support for their UNSC candidacy, also suggesting that Canada could take one of the initial two-year terms and Australia a one-year term, as they were staggered in the first year. Prime Minister H.V. Evatt spoke to the High Commission of Canada, with the High Commissioner reporting that according to Evatt, "outside of the Big Five, Canada and Australia, in order named, made the greatest contribution to the war and that both were entitled to election on this score. Then he says that from geographical considerations Australia was entitled to a seat".³⁷¹ Ultimately, Canada felt confident of its election, and had the support of the P5, but was shocked to lose. Initially, Canada nearly reached the designated number of votes to win a seat, but the candidate from Nicaragua spoiled his ballot. The election went to a second round and Canada lost to Australia, 28-23.³⁷² In the symbolic square off between geography and functionalism, functionalism lost.

The situation differed in 1947. Canada had been elected to the Economic and Social Council and the UNSC was not off to a collaborative start, with the P5 consistently disagreeing. Some Canadian officials were beginning to feel discouraged.³⁷³ In September 1946, Louis St. Laurent became Secretary of State for External Affairs and Lester B. Pearson had become Undersecretary, replacing Robertson. Notably, Pearson held a more idealist view of internationalism, one not shared by the more pragmatic King, Robertson, or Wrong. St. Laurent also was more enthused by foreign affairs than King.³⁷⁴

Chapnick writes that Hume Wrong and Charles Ritchie conducted an analysis of the 1946 loss ahead of the 1947 election. They concluded that Australia's position as the "guardian of smaller states", as emphasized by the New Zealand Prime Minister in two speeches, and the election of Brazil and Mexico as Western Hemisphere states both contributed to the loss.³⁷⁵ Yet again, Canada faced challenges towards the functional principle, but not because its peers opposed the idea of power for smaller states, rather because they disagreed on how status should be accorded – and responsibilities granted. Ultimately, neither triumphed and many regional groupings still face this debate today in competitions for seats, especially in the Western European and Others Grouping. Both debates were different articulations of liberal international views of equality – each sought balance but how that balance was considered differed. Canada was neither European, nor American, but it was most importantly part of the Commonwealth. Unlike other Commonwealth countries though, it did not have a "region", which proved

³⁷⁰ Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project*, 16.

³⁷¹ Thomas Clayton Davis, 'High Commissioner in Australia to Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/211-C', 10 January 1946, Page 630-631, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12, 1946.

³⁷² Hume Wrong, 'High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/211-C', 12 January 1946, Page 631-632, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 12, 1946.

³⁷³ Adam Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2019), 19.

³⁷⁴ John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, Canadian Public Administration Series = Collection Administration Publique Canadienne ([Toronto]: Montreal; Buffalo: Institute of Public Administration of Canada; McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 32.

³⁷⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 17.

complicated.³⁷⁶ Canada was implicated in multiple global, collective identities and at the same time formally part of few. The functional principle was all the more important for a country with no region but many imperial pressures.

King and St. Laurent, in collaboration with the Department, decided to run in 1947, upon acknowledging this challenge and Canada's makeshift grouping with the Commonwealth. They had failed to convince the United States to change the informal emphasis on geography and they had also chosen not to run in the second round of staggered 1946 elections.³⁷⁷ Nearly all officials were feeling pessimistic about the prospect of running initially, but by April 1947, they were weighing the advantages. George Ignatieff indicated to Pearson that "the considerations of prestige are obvious. It is also an advantage that Canada should be in a position to participate in some of the most important decisions affecting the maintenance of world peace. It might also be argued that Canada would have a useful contribution to make in remedying the shortcoming of the Council and improving its practices and procedures while the Council is still in a comparatively formative stage of its development".³⁷⁸ He continued,

"On the other hand, membership would carry with it heavy obligations, responsibilities, and certain disadvantage...the role of the non-permanent member of the Security Council, especially at the present time, is not an easy one. Although the Charter imposes the obligation on all members to exercise their responsibilities as members of the Council not in the defense of their own national interests, but in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, this is a position which in practice generally falls to the lot of the non-permanent members especially to uphold".³⁷⁹

Importantly, in terms of Canada's relations to the P5, the memo went on to say,

"because of Canada's geographical situation, Canada may be placed in a difficult position in relation to decisions affecting the special interests of the United States or the Soviet Union. It should also be remembered that questions will inevitably arise in the Council which do not involve any direct Canadian interest but on which Canada will have to take a position for the purposes of voting, which may imply or involve a commitment to support a policy the consequences of which may present difficulties to the Canadian government".³⁸⁰

In response, Wrong was also pessimistic but was concerned that Canada not running might impair the UN or cause Soviet influence to increase, to the detriment of Anglo-American influence, which Canada supported.³⁸¹ Further, he felt that Canada did have much to contribute to the mandate of peace and security. Strengthening the Commonwealth was important. He also

³⁷⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 18.

³⁷⁷ Chapnick, 18.

³⁷⁸ George Ignatieff, 'Memo to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/5475-AS-1-40', 3 April 1947, Page 638-639, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947.

³⁷⁹ Ignatieff.

³⁸⁰ Ignatieff.

³⁸¹ Hume Wrong, 'Ambassador in United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/5475-AS-1-40', 25 April 1947, Page 639-640, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947.

felt that Canada's future chances of election would be decreased if they did not run and expressed concern that both the UK and the US wanted to see Canada elected. Lastly, he did not like the idea of the UK being the only Commonwealth representative on the Council without Canada as well.³⁸² Ultimately, with his mind toward the imperial allies, he believed Canada should run. Pearson agreed, on account of fear of damage to future elections.³⁸³ Pearson prepared a memo to Cabinet at the end of May summarizing the arguments for and against election, highlighting the value of the functional principle.³⁸⁴ The decision was made that summer and reflected Canada's broader desire to make the General Assembly and the UNSC work more effectively and constructively.³⁸⁵

In August, Pearson sent a telegram to Canada's missions abroad asking them to "inform the government to which you are accredited that Canada will be a candidate for election".³⁸⁶ He indicated that they should not ask for pledges of support, but rather a welcome for "sympathetic consideration".³⁸⁷ It had seemed at that point that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were in support. Cabinet conclusions by September indicated that the candidacy would be "popular",³⁸⁸ having approved it in August. St. Laurent later announced Canada's candidacy formally to the United Nations Association in Canada, following "some comment" already circulating.³⁸⁹

A 1947 Department of External Affairs Weekly Bulletin published the announcement, summarizing St. Laurent's position. He spoke of the election providing Canada "new and onerous responsibilities", wherein the challenges of the UN become those of the members.³⁹⁰ He also spoke to the burden that Canada would take on, both in terms of labour and challenges ahead, stating "we must not delude either ourselves or anyone else about the fact that membership on the Security Council will embody greater risks and responsibilities and fewer rewards and honours than it seemed to offer two years ago [the previous election]".³⁹¹ Lastly, he emphasized Canada's advocacy towards rules of procedure and bureaucracy in the Council and again drew on Canada's resistance to P5 dominance in San Francisco. He argued, "we shall never be reconciled, however, to a permanent situation in which a distinction is made between

³⁸² Wrong.

³⁸³ Lester B. Pearson, 'Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Head, Second Political Division, DEA/5475-AS-1-40', 26 April 1947, Page 640-641, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947.

³⁸⁴ Lester B. Pearson, 'Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA/5475-AS-1-40', 31 May 1947, Page 642-646, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947.

³⁸⁵ Frederic H. Soward, 'A Survey of Canadian External Policy 1946-1952' (Department of External Affairs, 1952).

³⁸⁶ Lester B. Pearson, 'Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner in United Kingdom, DEA/5475-AS-1-40', 15 August 1947, Page 652-653, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 13, 1947.

³⁸⁷ Pearson.

³⁸⁸ 'Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 2640 Access Code: 20' (Library and Archives Canada, 11 September 1947).

³⁸⁹ 'Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45' (Information Division, Department of External Affairs, 19 September 1947), Jules Leger Library.

³⁹⁰ 'Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45'

³⁹¹ 'Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45'.

five nations of the world which are defined as Great Powers and all other nations, which, despite the great differences among them, are placed together in a less privileged position”.³⁹²

Concluding that Canada was “willing to serve”, St. Laurent noted disputes that Canada could help mediate, saying:

“We shall be endeavoring to find solutions to problems which are complicated by the unresolved differences among the Great Powers”.³⁹³ More importantly, “if we wish to enjoy the benefits of such a development [international cooperation], we must also accept its responsibilities. We must even be prepared to accept these responsibilities at a time when the going is hard and when the future is by no means certain. I do not think that the people of this country would tolerate any other attitude on the part of its representatives to the United Nations”.³⁹⁴

He echoed this in the house and was met with approval, saying that Canada was willing to serve because “the Canadian government feels that the growth and strengthening of the United Nations must be a real cornerstone of Canada’s policy in foreign affairs”.³⁹⁵ This willingness to serve came with what he called “reserved optimism”, as “we, in Canada, regard our membership in the United Nations not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent partnership. At the same time, we are conscious of the effort which must be made to offset the danger in which this partnership lies”.³⁹⁶ Canada was elected on September 30th, 1947 for its first of 6 terms.³⁹⁷ St. Laurent’s discussion of responsibilities and willingness to serve highlight the importance of the functional principle for Canada and for the Charter, but more importantly for IR theory, the idea that seeking status is not simply an end; it is a dynamic process over time and a claim (of varying credibility) to participate in expected behaviours of the club.

Canada’s experiences campaigning for a seat on the Security Council pointed to some of the early challenges facing the organization. Its institutional scaffolding was built during the war, through a series of conferences, and its practical scaffolding was built in these first few years. The UN system has changed, but to understand the evolution in status and hierarchy, it is important to understand these foundations. The UNSC reflected imperial formations – which the P5 sought to protect – and many smaller states in their orbit sought to gain status within the hierarchy that resulted.

For Canada, the responsibilities of the UNSC mandate drove its willingness to serve, and in the late 1940s, Ottawa felt strongly about preventing the Council from being hijacked by imperial power squabbles. The functional principle shaped Canadian views of how status should be accorded; this was early status-seeking in itself and would be a theme in many of Canada’s future campaigns. The functional principle conflicted with other visions of how status and

³⁹² ‘Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45’.

³⁹³ ‘Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45’.

³⁹⁴ ‘Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45’.

³⁹⁵ ‘Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45’; ‘House of Commons Debates, 20th Parliament, 3rd Session: Vol. 6’ (1947), https://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC2003_06/72?r=0&s=1.

³⁹⁶ ‘Canadian Weekly Bulletin, Vol 2. No. 45’.

³⁹⁷ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

associated responsibilities should be allocated within the United Nations, as the non-P5 states had varying perspectives in their approaches to status-seeking and navigating the UNSC. They sought to have a voice at the table, redistribute power towards themselves and others like them, and have influence on how the Council's mandate could be interpreted, and its responsibilities put into practice. Canada's campaigns in 1946 and 1947 were part of these debates, often coming up against proponents of dividing seats geographically – a form of apportionment that cut against Canadian interests. Ultimately, functionalism was an appeal to liberal internationalism and the responsibilities of the UNSC mandate. It was both Canada's status-seeking strategy and relatedly, it was a position on how status should be accorded.

The opportunity to have status on the UNSC in these first few years was not simply a shallow competition, as many suspect; it was instead an opportunity for states to articulate their relations to the liberal foundations of the UN and imperial powers, their positions on the distribution of status as responsibility, and to work on momentous issues whose often violent consequences continue in the 21st century. A 1999 history of Canada on the UNSC would call this first term, "Baptism by Fire".³⁹⁸ Following the 1947 election, Canada served its term in 1948-1949, confronting consequential UNSC issues at the intersection of both continuities and discontinuities of empire: Palestine, Kashmir, and Indonesia.³⁹⁹ Palestinian self-determination would notably become an issue that would appear in every single one of Canada's elections until 2020. It would also be an issue with which Canada would engage on each of its terms, being part of the policy changes that later shaped future campaigns. This is what is central to participation on the Security Council as a form of international cooperation: acquiring status through election to the Council does not end with its conferral. Moreover, the active use of status is not simply going through motions of diplomacy; rather, it means political engagement and diplomatic practice with the most pressing issues of global politics. Status in the UNSC membership context has high stakes specifically because of the power that a few members have over the rest of UN members. The use of status is indeed a privileged form of international cooperation that is not available to all.

A Decade Later: Canada in the mid-1950s

During Canada's 1948-1949 term on the UNSC, Louis St. Laurent became Prime Minister. Lester Pearson left his position as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs. St. Laurent and Pearson remained in these positions for nearly a decade until their government's defeat by Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives in June 1957, a short few months before Canada's election to the UNSC. As such, Canadian foreign policy in the 1950s was significantly characterized by the tandem efforts and visions of St. Laurent and Pearson, and this strongly bled into Canada's election and the end of the campaign, even under Diefenbaker.

Parliament was dissolved in April 1957 and an election took place on June 10. The new and inexperienced minority government was sworn in on June 21st, with Diefenbaker taking on

³⁹⁸ 'Canada World View Issue 2: Canada on the UN Security Council: Opportunities and Challenges' (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), Jules Leger Library.

³⁹⁹ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, 78.

the External Affairs portfolio initially.⁴⁰⁰ Sidney Smith was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs on September 13th and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) began its 12th session on September 17th.⁴⁰¹ Canada's 23rd Parliament began sitting on October 14th, just after Canada was elected to a seat in the UNSC election at UNGA on October 1st.⁴⁰² Later that year, on December 10th, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.⁴⁰³ Within the first half of 1958, Diefenbaker would be elected once more.

The spectre of Pearson and St. Laurent loomed over the October UNSC election, especially in the shadow of the Nobel Prize. The decision to run, the views of other countries, and the politics of the election were largely shaped by Canada's relationships to the major events and subsequent bilateral relationships of the preceding years. For the Department, moving towards this election, even in a time between governments and amidst a new one was business as usual. Diplomacy proceeded in a regular fashion internationally and the 1957 election to the UNSC is generally considered to be forgotten and under-recorded.⁴⁰⁴ Yet, given the timing, in the shadow of a turbulent international 1950s and a deadlocked UN, this election reveals much about Canadian foreign policy at the time and the politics of status. In particular, the UNSC election was a point of transition for Canada to evaluate its relationship with key allies and its membership in the organizations within which its interests were bound up: the Commonwealth, NATO, and the UN more broadly. Through the challenges of these relationships at the time and the fractures and stratification within them, Canada's campaign for a UNSC seat framed functionalism not just from the perspective that because Canada *could* contribute, it *should* serve, but rather that it *could* serve, so it *should* contribute because service to the UN satisfied larger challenges of maintaining existing status positions and good relations with the US and UK. This time, functionalism was still about serving Canadian interests and securing Canadian representation, but it looked different than a decade before. Rather than stemming from the idea that it earned its UNSC seat in war and could consequently make use of its responsibilities, 1957's election saw Canada strongly considering the importance of contributing to an effective United Nations and continued opportunity to do so – and have status – in the future. Investment in status could serve future interests and future status needs. Moreover, maintaining the representation of the Commonwealth on the UNSC was important to Canada for both its own ability to sit on the Council, but also to maintain broader imperial power dynamics.⁴⁰⁵ Finally, sticking to its position on functionalism as a reason to seek the seat allowed Canada to consider its longer-term interests of an effective United Nations, a united Commonwealth, and good relations with the United States, despite differences, as a central tenet of continental and transatlantic security relations.

⁴⁰⁰ Raymond Daniell, 'Conservatives Take The Reins in Canada; NEW REGIME GETS REINS IN CANADA To Implement Pledges Full List of Ministers', *The New York Times*, 22 June 1957.

⁴⁰¹ 'The Hon. Sidney Earle Smith, P.C., M.P.', Parliament of Canada, Parlinfo, n.d., https://lop.parl.ca/sites/ParlInfo/default/en_CA/People/Profile?personId=5236; 'Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 12th Session', Dag Hammarskjöld Library, General Assembly Quick Links, n.d., <https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/12>.

⁴⁰² 'Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018', 2019.

⁴⁰³ 'The Nobel Peace Prize 1957', The Nobel Prize, n.d., <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1957/summary/>.

⁴⁰⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 45.

⁴⁰⁵ 'Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 1893' (Library and Archives Canada, 11 July 1957).

For the October 1st election, Canada officially announced its candidature on July 11th, having debated the issue internally and with other members of the Commonwealth over the preceding months.⁴⁰⁶ This was an election where a clean slate was presented to the UNSC and so the official competition and associated struggle for status took place within the Commonwealth, rather than in front of the General Assembly. As Cabinet Conclusions from July 1957 read, “the older countries of the Commonwealth and the United States would prefer Canada to serve in the next two years and India herself would support Canada’s candidature”.⁴⁰⁷

In this second half of the chapter, I sketch the geopolitical background in which Canada found itself with relation to the Cold War, decolonization, and the UN. I begin with discussion of UN membership, followed by the key issues of Indochina and Indonesia (and tangentially India), and lastly the Suez Crisis. I then articulate the details of Canada’s 1957 campaign in this context, illustrating how these global issues shaped the campaign, and more broadly, the politics of status. Much like the 1940s, the 1957 campaign demonstrates that the politics of status are not simply an endpoint; rather, status is an ongoing process of maintenance and management wherein states are also thinking about the responsibilities and actions that come with it. For Canada, taking on the responsibilities of a UNSC seat sat in the broader context of a desire to maintain the functionality of the UN itself, but more importantly the Commonwealth and NATO; a united Commonwealth was important and a UNSC seat for the Commonwealth would serve that. This connects to a broader liberal view of international cooperation, as each of these bodies were managing the major issues of the time and their dynamics intersected as they engaged with an acted within different issues. Canadian officials saw Canada as too small to act alone and so its interests were best served by effective and productive multilateralism.

In working towards these interests, Canadian officials determined that Canada *should serve* because it *could contribute*, which would help maintain key relationships within the Commonwealth and for Canada’s interests. Status-seeking through functionalism was not just about why Canada deserved a seat, but rather was also about longer term interests for Canada by the 1950s. Seeking status in the short term maintained the possibility of a united Commonwealth and a well-oiled United Nations. The associated responsibilities that came with status were worth it for the greater cause of Canada’s long-term interest and the united Commonwealth presence on the Council. Once again, the liberal functional principle was driving Canadian thinking - serving because they *could* was the path to this greater cause. Importantly, this idea that Canada’s wanted functional participation that in many ways strengthened British (and to some degree American) power was part of a broader trend in Canadian foreign policy: moves towards decolonization were seen as acceptable if they did not threaten Canada’s Cold War interests or allyship with either the US or the UK.

UN Membership

In 1957, prior to formal groupings, the 6 elected seats in addition to the P5 had been roughly organized around loose political groupings within the UN. Selecting candidates often

⁴⁰⁶ ‘Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 1893’.

⁴⁰⁷ ‘Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 1893’.

happened through complex and competitive politics within these loose groupings, but overlap often happened, such as the blending of East and Southeast Asian countries with Eastern European countries (see Figure 2). This stemmed from a disagreement over a Gentleman's Agreement in 1946 between the Soviets, United Kingdom and the United States on how representation could be informally divided between the groups of countries.⁴⁰⁸ Canada was not officially party to the agreement, though it allowed for a Commonwealth seat. The Americans believed it was valid only for 1946.⁴⁰⁹ The Soviets believed it would be best to keep it.⁴¹⁰ The allocation of seats would thus become an ongoing debate in each election until the signing of Resolution 1991 (XVIII), which created regional groups in 1963. Canadian officials believed in the maintenance of the Commonwealth group, as it felt that this was the best way to be able to win seats as well as maintain solidarity within the group.⁴¹¹ Moreover, because Canada did not have a clear "region", officials felt that it would be disadvantaged with a different set up. Due to debate around the Gentleman's Agreement⁴¹² and whether the Commonwealth seat wholly existed in the past, present, or future, the internal dynamics of the Commonwealth bled into the dynamics of social closure at the UNSC. This is both an example of debate around how status should be accorded, but also the processes by which status categories and the power of status markers are constructed – for status to be meaningful and constituted and reproduced by actors, it must be grounded in the social interactions of those actors. This debate around how membership should be accorded and why status was important, as well as Canada's ability to contribute, illustrates the way that status is both in flux and founded on recognition and social closure. States' positions on how groupings should be created or maintained were directly related to how they wanted to position themselves and assert themselves to others as well as how they envisioned the division between members and non-members. Status-seeking as a process is intimately linked with the process of status conferral. In 1957, a Canadian foreign service officer called the debated existence of the Commonwealth group a Cheshire cat. Canada's understanding of the often-in-flux and overlapping political groups was sketched for a report on UNGA 1956-1957 and included below in Figure 2. Figure 2 demonstrates both the complexity of the UN's unregulated, informal election system at the time, but also the complexity of global politics in this moment more broadly.⁴¹³

⁴⁰⁸ Lester B. Pearson, 'Letter from Lester B. Pearson to Claude S. Richardson', 13 January 1956, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-I-40; Vol. 6, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁰⁹ Pearson.

⁴¹⁰ Pearson, 40; See also: Bardo Fassbender, ed., *Key Documents on the Reform of the UN Security Council 1991-2019* (Leiden ; Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2020).

⁴¹¹ 'Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 1893'.

⁴¹² See: Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Fourth edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press, 2014), 185.

⁴¹³ Department of External Affairs, 'Final Reports Eleventh Session United Nations General Assembly New York November 12, 1956-March 8, 1957', 1957, RG 25 Vol. 2362, S/165/1, Library and Archives Canada.




Figure 2: A Department of External Affairs UNGA report featuring an interpretation of informal UNSC regional groupings

Canada was again vaguely region-less and highly concerned with its position and relations within the Commonwealth. Canada's primary important relations were of course with the UK, the USA, and France. Other similar states to Canada had overlapping political concerns with other elected members due to decolonization, regional politics, East-West alliances, or cultural-linguistic similarities. Like in the 1940s, this isolation of Canada, combined with its special Anglo-American relationships strongly defined the direction of the campaign for the seat, the debate around whether to run, and the nature of multilateral politics surrounding its election. When combined with major issues of concern in the preceding years, including the Suez Crisis, status politics for Canada was delicate and sensitive to the forces of imperialism.

The year 1955 was a year of major change for the United Nations. After the original 51 members in 1945, 9 were added over the following 5 years, many of which were newly independent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Burma, Indonesia). In 1955, another 16 were added all at once, including recently independent states in the Global South (Laos, Cambodia, Ceylon), and multiple European states in both the Eastern Bloc and the West. In 1956, another 4 members were added and another 2 followed in 1957, bringing the total to 82.⁴¹⁴ 1955 was the single biggest expansion to date of the UN system and it was also the year of the Bandung Conference, in which many of these new members were involved, creating a 10-point declaration of principles and taking the first steps towards the later Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The dynamics of the UN were changing, both in terms of Cold War relations and decolonization, and those two things were connected.

⁴¹⁴ 'Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present'.

As Viola writes “even as new states are admitted into the system as formal equals, this expansion itself drives new modes of exclusion within the system. The standard intuition that inclusion of a greater number of states, especially democratic ones, will go hand in hand with more equal and democratic international organizations downplays the contestation and turbulence surrounding newly included states’ demands for institutional recognition”.⁴¹⁵ In this context, the UNSC is what Viola calls “hierarchical multilateralism”, where different tiers of membership emerge (i.e., permanent, elected, and non-membership):

*“the creation of an equality among select actors, the P5, necessarily imposed an inequality with those excluded from this group. This is true at the boundary between UN members versus nonmembers just as much as it is true at the boundary between UNSC members versus non-members. In other words, equality is relative to how the boundaries of belonging are drawn. And when those boundaries are drawn, an inequality is also created”.*⁴¹⁶

The inclusion of new members was changing the drawing of boundaries (social closure) and reshaping the UNSC hierarchy. Where the hierarchy had reflected the imperial world of 1945 at the UN’s foundation, it was now shifting in 1957 due to the active efforts of decolonization. The politics of the broader hierarchy (imperialisms) and the changing narrow hierarchy (UNSC membership) were intersecting; the nature of status seeking within the narrow hierarchy was subsequently shaped by changes in the broader hierarchy.

Canada was acutely aware of and active in this change. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld oversaw this admission of new members that had previously been a deadlock for the P5. In previous years, according to Chapnick, the Soviet Union vetoed 28 resolutions for the admission of new applicants that they deemed to have Western sympathies. The P3 (UK, USA, France) had done the same for Soviet satellites. It was Paul Martin Sr., later Secretary of State for External Affairs in the 1960s, who helped broker the compromise for admission in 1955 while filling in for Pearson at the UN.⁴¹⁷ Prior to 1955, Western-sympathetic states were the majority in the General Assembly, but post-1955, decolonizing states working towards non-alignment would take on that majority. Canada encouraged this inclusion of non-aligned states because it would “reflect the real world” and end the deadlock, without ceding ground to the Soviets.⁴¹⁸ Canada was accepting of change to both the politics of decolonization and to some degree, boundary-drawing through new membership, but read these changes through the lens of continued maintenance of Anglo-American dominance.

Canada and Decolonization

This broader logic of self-titled compromise was reflected across much of Canada’s international engagement. In 1955, Canada was in fact serving on the International Commission

⁴¹⁵ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 166.

⁴¹⁶ Viola, 179, 194.

⁴¹⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 47.

⁴¹⁸ Here Chapnick quotes Paul Martin in making this point: Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 47.

for Supervision and Control in Indochina (ICC), part of the broader network of management of formerly colonized territories, which included the Trusteeship system. Following French withdrawal in late 1954, the Geneva Conference created the commission to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. Canada, along with Poland and India, made up the ICC, representing the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc, and a non-aligned country. Robert Bothwell writes that Pearson saw Canada's role here as "judicial impartiality".⁴¹⁹ While a Western bloc country dealing with this issue of decolonization, Pearson expected that Canadian representatives should deal as objectively as possible (in his view of objectivity) with the issues presented to the commission. He saw no purpose in trying to renew life into French colonial structures nor to create a set of Western allies.⁴²⁰ According to Bothwell, the United States did not like the implicit suggestion of neutrality, which was representative of the Indian influence on St. Laurent, Pearson, and the High Commissioner to India, Escott Reid.⁴²¹ Historians have consistently debated the influence Reid had on Canadian policy over his career, tending to take a more left-leaning approach to Canada's relations.⁴²² As High Commissioner, he maintained a good relationship with Nehru and Menon in India, and was highly evidenced by their thinking, as evidenced through the ICC.

India was committed to non-alignment and Canada was committed to its principle Cold War allies and anti-communism, but Canada saw an avenue for one to serve the other, especially through key Commonwealth ties with many non-aligned states (including India). This was both the attitude of impartiality in the ICC, but also one of seeing increased non-alignment as useful, as it signalled decreased allyship with the Soviet Union. David Webster identifies this overarching attitude of the 1950s with regards to the Global South more broadly, as well as Canada's policy towards Indonesia, who joined the UN post-Independence in 1950. Canada had sat on the UNSC in 1948-1949 when Indonesian independence was an agenda item. Canada had followed a philosophy of non-judgment and impartiality at this time as well, unlike its predecessor, Australia.⁴²³ With sympathies to both the Dutch as an ally and the cause of Indonesian independence, Canada, in cooperation with its Commonwealth partners, proposed compromise in March 1949, to bridge the broader opinion of the Council and the Dutch opinion. Ultimately, Indonesian independence flowed from this resolution, but Webster argues that Canada did not do this out of any altruism or staunch anti-colonialism. Rather, Canada's position was guided by its desire to maintain compromise amongst NATO allies at the time in which NATO was being constructed and it was willing to push for independence if such independence followed a "non-revolutionary model" and could serve as a compromise that helped its allies.⁴²⁴ As would be seen repeatedly through future decades, Canada was seeking "balance" between the colonizing and the colonized; its reputation for compromise and mediation was as much about its

⁴¹⁹ Robert Bothwell, 'Pearson and Pearsonianism', in *Mike's World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 39.

⁴²⁰ Bothwell, 39.

⁴²¹ Bothwell, 39.

⁴²² Ryan Touhey, 'Romanticism and Race: Escott Reid, the Department of External Affairs, and the Sundering of Canada-India Relations, 1952-1957', in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*, ed. Laura Madokoro, David Meren, and Francine McKenzie, 2018, 184.

⁴²³ David Webster, *Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 22.

⁴²⁴ Webster, *Fire and the Full Moon*.

own interests in satisfying colonial powers as it was anything else. The two “sides” of the challenge in Indonesia, as constructed rhetorically by Canadian officials, were not necessarily coming from an “objective” place but rather the broader politics of the Cold War and the groups in which Canada held membership.

Indonesia was simply one example of this Canadian position, though an important one that characterized Canada’s time on the UNSC in the late 1940s and its broader UN work in the 1950s. This sort of work shaped the campaign to come in 1957; like with the ICC, Webster writes that this was a broader philosophy of Canadian foreign policy from the late 1940s (its service on the UNSC) through the 1950s.⁴²⁵ Canada found itself throughout the decade supporting “‘constructive’ non-communist developments” wherein it was on the side of decolonization, non-alignment, and involvement in the Colombo Plan, but deeply committed to its Cold War position.⁴²⁶ Further, it played a delicate balancing act in opposing the United States’ policy of militarized excess in Asia and the rest of the Global South, while aiming not to alienate its principle ally.⁴²⁷ Canada saw itself as willing to constrain American aggression and willing to support decolonization when it represented non-alignment and capitalist economic development (i.e., the Colombo Plan), but it still desired to be bound to its close Cold War and commitments, which were themselves a complex imperial politics. The Cold War and the politics of decolonization were in fact two sides of the same coin – not separate dynamics – and Canada’s relation to each required consideration of the other. Even playing “nicely” with decolonizing states in trying to constrain the United States was not necessarily about standing up for those decolonizing states, but rather in trying to negotiate its own interests within the competing ones of the great powers and seeking cooperation between those great powers. This was an overarching theme both inside and outside the UN, most prominently during the Suez Crisis, which was transformational for Canada in late 1956. It was also directly linked to liberal internationalism as a guiding philosophy for how international cooperation, negotiation, and compromise should play out.

The Suez Crisis

Lester Pearson is most notable globally for his suggested solution to the Suez Crisis and the subsequent birth of UN peacekeeping. Unlike contemporary, post-Cold War peacekeeping, which finds itself managing crises in the Global South, Suez required a keeping-of-peace between imperial powers and a prevention of Great Power aggression. It was yet another instance of Pearson’s aspiration towards supposed impartiality and walking the tight rope between its principal allies and an occasional desire to side with global change. Like the issues discussed earlier in this section, the Suez Crisis animated Canada’s policies within the United Nations and created the context for both Canada’s calculations about whether to run in 1957 and the perceptions of Canada that shaped its election.

⁴²⁵David Webster, ‘A Natural Development’: Canada and Non-Alignment in the Age of Eisenhower’ (Canada in the Age of Eisenhower, Bill Graham Centre, University of Toronto, 2021).

⁴²⁶ Webster, 2–4.

⁴²⁷ Webster, 2.

Greg Donaghy describes the Suez Crisis as a “transformative experience for postwar Canada”.⁴²⁸ Most notably, this is not because of “peacekeeping”, as popular (especially Liberal) narrative has led many Canadians to believe. Rather, it signalled a shift from complete irrelevance and non-engagement to small stakeholder allied with the United States in the Middle East.⁴²⁹ With a sharp historical eye, Donaghy notes that in the 1950s, St. Laurent and Pearson saw the Middle East as the purview of the Great Powers (including as the P5) and better left distant and untouched by Canada.⁴³⁰ He argues that that view changed when the Suez Crisis threatened Canada’s strategic interests and sharply divided Anglo-American relations. Suddenly, the central axis of Canadian internationalism – its special relationships with Anglo-American power – were thrown into question.⁴³¹ Peacekeeping, as it played out, certainly gave Canada a role internationally within the UN structure, but in the larger picture, relations with Washington and those with the Commonwealth were what mattered most; problem solving would involve finding a way to optimize both when those parties disagreed.

More broadly, prior to Suez, Canada had generally good, if very minor and distant relations with the Middle East. Similarly, in addition to its good relationships with the P3, Pearson was the first NATO foreign minister to have visited the Soviet Union in 1955⁴³² and saw the potential for change in East-West relations, even if slim, after Stalin’s death. That same year, Pearson met Egypt’s President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Donaghy quotes Pearson’s memo, saying that Nasser was an “impressive and attractive personality” with “an impression of sincerity and strength, without any trace of arrogance or self-assertion”.⁴³³ At the time, Pearson did not believe that Nasser’s anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism would threaten Western interests, but rather, much like non-alignment in Asia and Webster’s assessment of that region, it would maintain Cold War neutrality for the region, which was his preference, especially in light of his visit to Moscow. Both visits would become part of Canada’s self-image as a mediator and negotiator between multiple sides of decolonization and the Cold War, which would later become themes of Canada’s status-seeking for the UNSC.

Of course, given this background, St. Laurent and Pearson became highly concerned in July 1956. Initially, they hoped that the larger powers and Egypt could sort out the trouble. In London, Prime Minister Anthony Eden strongly assumed that Canadian support would be assured, given Canada’s place in the Commonwealth.⁴³⁴ Norman Robertson, as High Commissioner in London, had told London to take the issue to the UNSC, to allow each of the P5 a chance to weigh in and demonstrating Canada’s commitment to the institution.⁴³⁵ Contrary to Eden’s belief, Pearson was alarmed by Britain’s strong position against Nasser and St. Laurent

⁴²⁸ Greg Donaghy, ‘The Politics of Accommodation: Canada, the Middle East, and the Suez Crisis, 1950–1956’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 71, no. 2 (June 2016): 313, <https://doi.org/10/gg94hf>.

⁴²⁹ Donaghy, 313.

⁴³⁰ Donaghy, 314–15.

⁴³¹ Donaghy, 313.

⁴³² Susan Colbourn, ‘Cheers to the Canadian Wheat Surplus! Lester Pearson’s Visit to the Soviet Union and the West’s Détente Dilemma’ (Canada in the Age of Eisenhower, Bill Graham Centre, University of Toronto, 2021).

⁴³³ Donaghy, ‘The Politics of Accommodation’, 317.

⁴³⁴ Donaghy, 319.

⁴³⁵ Donaghy, 319.

was “irked” that Eden thought a French-Canadian PM would obviously support him.⁴³⁶ Furthermore, Pearson felt concerned by Eden’s insinuations of the use of force and did not expect the United States to automatically support the British, despite Eden’s expectation.⁴³⁷ Donaghy indicates that St. Laurent was restrained in his correspondence to Eden, anxious not to upset the PM, despite his misgivings.⁴³⁸ Consequently, the British felt Canada’s response was disappointing but did not believe that Canada would not take its side.

Pearson strongly feared British use of force as time went on and saw the situation not just as one for the Great Powers, but one of interest to the entire international community and requiring UN action. When Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd finally asked in August whether Canada would support a use of force against Nasser, Robertson simply said no, much to Eden’s anger.⁴³⁹ From that point on, Canada’s opinions were no longer solicited. Australia took on initial mediation, but it had limited success. Pearson felt that British diplomacy was poorly undertaken and clear difference was beginning to emerge between the United States and British/French positions.⁴⁴⁰ Canada was careful to again make clear that their support should not be assumed. Following Israeli attack and British and French seizure of the Canal, the Canadian government was surprised. Robertson reported that he had not expected the move and St. Laurent learned about it from the media. Canada was similarly shocked that it occurred while the UNSC was still contemplating the matter.⁴⁴¹

Importantly, as Donaghy makes clear, Canada was incredibly anxious about both the state of the Commonwealth and the state of NATO.⁴⁴² Not only was the rejection of the UN as a forum a massive concern for Canada, but Pearson felt strong concern that the Commonwealth would be split, with some states, such as India, strongly supporting Nasser. This was important because Canada relied on the Commonwealth to “navigate the complex shoals of the post-colonial world”.⁴⁴³ Moreover, Canada worried that a break between its two closest allies – the UK and the US – and subsequently NATO, would damage the alliance and Canada’s own security in the long run. Following harsher words between St. Laurent and Eden, Pearson had the opportunity to bring forth his proposal to the UN to create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).⁴⁴⁴ Of course, this meant balancing US interests in comparison to Afro-Asian and Soviet opinions, to which Canada was attuned. It also meant taking criticism at home from Progressive Conservatives who would soon form government in the coming months.

Ultimately, Pearson’s accomplishment with the creation of UNEF came from finding agreement between the opposing American and British positions on the crisis. Peacekeeping, in

⁴³⁶ Donaghy, 319.

⁴³⁷ Donaghy, 319.

⁴³⁸ Donaghy, 319.

⁴³⁹ Donaghy, 320.

⁴⁴⁰ Donaghy, 321.

⁴⁴¹ Donaghy, 322.

⁴⁴² Donaghy, 322.

⁴⁴³ Donaghy, 322.

⁴⁴⁴ Donaghy, 323; Michael Carroll, ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping: The Pearson Years’, in *Mike’s World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 51–52.

this earliest iteration, was about finding imperial compromise and managing the series of overlapping interests and disagreements that each side had. Further, it was done in service of preserving both NATO and the Commonwealth as well as re-emphasizing the importance of the United Nations. Peacekeeping was neither altruistic nor a sort of post-colonial operation, as Canadian mythmaking often makes it seem. Rather, it was about preserving the relationships between imperial allies and the international organizations within which Canada operated. This was consistent with its positions on decolonization and non-alignment and the Cold War more broadly – Canada was pro-multilateralism, pro-decolonization, and pro-cooperation, as long as it served both Anglo-American goals and Canada’s interests. This applied even when seeking to disagree with the British or restrain American militarism. It was indeed a very thin tight rope.

UNEF was created on November 7, 1956. By early in the new year, Canada was discussing whether to run for the UNSC seat in 1957. It would also have a new government by June and the official UNSC campaign in the Summer and early Fall of 1957 would happen quickly. Given the high-profile issues taking place from 1955-1957, it is no wonder that the campaign itself received very little public attention at the time and historical coverage later on. There were bigger headlines internationally and domestically. It was indeed the forgotten UNSC election, as Adam Chapnick calls it, despite Canada’s position in the limelight following Suez. Many were focused on events themselves and not the minutiae of IO dynamics in their shadow. Nevertheless, while it was forgotten, it was a crucial piece of the puzzle of Canada’s negotiation of global status and part of a larger web of Canada’s involvement with high-profile global issues at the time. Translating these higher profile issues and concerns into meaningful status conferral was central to the contestation of the 1957 election.

The 1957 Election

The Security Council was at a low point in 1957, as new members were taking action at the UN outside of the Council and the P5 were quite split. The Department of External Affairs expressed worry internally that the “prestige and influence” of the UNSC was in decline, making it harder to make a valuable contribution.⁴⁴⁵ Following Suez, it was not just an East-West split that was problematic, but the British and the French attitudes towards the UN were quite “poisoned”.⁴⁴⁶ Division was also present at home, especially approaching an election. Yet, St. Laurent’s government still saw the UN as foundational to global politics and an opportunity for independence and impartiality to operate. Pearson’s view was that Canada had the capacity to contribute, and therefore should, because the UN was important for Canada’s interests.⁴⁴⁷ Chapnick writes that the question of when to run next for a seat went back to 1953.⁴⁴⁸ The complex question of where Canada “fit” regionally and strategically was central. Pearson was uninterested in taking the informal Commonwealth seat from 1953-1956, arguing that Australia

⁴⁴⁵ Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum for the Minister: Candidature of Canada for the Security Council in 1958’, 12 April 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁴⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 48.

⁴⁴⁷ Adam Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, in *Mike’s World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 72.

⁴⁴⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 49.

and New Zealand should take on the responsibilities first.⁴⁴⁹ In 1954, the Department of External Affairs completed a study indicating that Canada was “underrepresented on a number of UN organs”⁴⁵⁰ and should run again. In fact, they noted that Brazil was a “less important” country that had served twice. While the mission in New York was sensitive to the sharing of responsibilities among allies and Australia’s desire to serve again, Chapnick writes that Jules Leger, as under-secretary, formally recommended Canada seek the seat for 1958-1959 in March 1955.⁴⁵¹

By February 1956, the British recommended that Canada run and declare its interest publicly so to pre-empt India’s interest in the seat. The involvement of other states in the decision process for Canada is central here. Rather than leaving it up to the General Assembly, the Commonwealth was seeking to present a clean slate, letting the politics of status play out internally and selecting a candidate to present to UNGA. Of course, with attention on Suez, the decision was stalled, but in March 1957, discussion began again.

Pearson’s broad understanding of the UN was indeed built on the functional principle, and this remained constant throughout his career. While his perspective on the organization evolved over time, he consistently saw the UN as necessary for promoting peace and solving global problems of “underdevelopment”, as well as for seeking democratic process in global politics.⁴⁵² While flawed, he saw the UN as useful for Canada, both in terms of a necessary responsibility for Canada to promote but also as a particular tool in the “Western arsenal in the Cold War and of particular interest to non-great power states”.⁴⁵³ While often mythologized (or critiqued) as an idealist, Pearson’s functionalism was much more central and he was well aware of the UN’s limits and disfunctions – it was the best that the world could do and it was a starting place to try and make the world better, but it was contained by the Great Powers and it should not be asked to do more than it could. Small states like Canada were necessary for ensuring its limited effectiveness, but the UN was also necessary for ensuring that small states like Canada maintained their place and their voice.

On March 28, 1957, John Holmes and Jules Léger wrote to Norman Robertson in London indicating that Australia approached Canada wondering if they were seeking election.⁴⁵⁴ They indicated that their concern was whether Ceylon, as a member of the Commonwealth, was also interested.⁴⁵⁵ Given sensitive Commonwealth dynamics, it would perhaps be an opportunity to have Ceylon run and push Canada’s run further into the future, despite the strong desire to take on the leadership role. Holmes and Léger hoped that Robertson would approach Ceylon’s High Commissioner in London and were hoping that the Ambassador in Washington could do the

⁴⁴⁹ Chapnick, 49.

⁴⁵⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 49.

⁴⁵¹ Chapnick, 49.

⁴⁵² Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, 2017, 72.

⁴⁵³ Chapnick, 73.

⁴⁵⁴ Jules Leger, ‘Elections to Security Council in 1958’, 28 March 1957, RG 25-6946, File No. 5474-CX-I-40, Vol. 6, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁵⁵ John W. Holmes, ‘Memorandum for United Nations Division: Candidature of Canada for the Security Council’, 21 March 1957, RG 25-6946, File No. 5474-CX-I-40, Vol. 6, Library and Archives Canada.

same thing.⁴⁵⁶ Holmes shared Pearson's position, but opposition within the Department was strong. From New York, Ambassador to the UN, Robert MacKay, "reminded Ottawa that membership on the Council provided Canada with otherwise unobtainable diplomatic leverage. Serious questions about the stability of the Middle East and South Asia were forthcoming on the UNSC's agenda and Canada's involvement was needed".⁴⁵⁷ From the Holmes-Pearson side, there was hope that Ceylon may be interested and seek Canada's advice. There was also hope that it would prevent division at the UN, as they were concerned that Asian states would not have a seat that year with the ever-shifting and unclear regional politics. Similarly, if division in the Commonwealth were to increase, the unofficial Commonwealth "seat" could be jeopardized.⁴⁵⁸ On the other hand, Robertson was very concerned that fractured relationships with the UK would get worse if Canada did not seek the seat.⁴⁵⁹

In the background, Latin American states were pushing for an expansion of the number of seats on the Council and formal groupings, which Canada wanted to push off so to avoid the inevitable challenges from the P5 and the loss of majority for the West.⁴⁶⁰ Further, Canada was a current member of ECOSOC and sought to propose a Canadian candidate for the presidency of ECOSOC.⁴⁶¹ As in the late 1940s, holding a role on both the UNSC and ECOSOC was frowned upon. While understanding that a seat would be to Canada's benefit in keeping their own position secure, the Department was cautious due to broader Commonwealth sensitivities and changing post-colonial politics. Selecting a Commonwealth member of the informal club was dependent on much beyond the UN itself. Discussion continued throughout the Spring on the issues of the Commonwealth, with the Department sensitive to its internal politics but feeling the need to take on the responsibilities of membership.

By late June, no decision had been made on whether to run, but after much consternation, the Department was now hoping to seek the seat and was awaiting newly elected Diefenbaker's choice. The British and the Americans wanted Canada to hold the seat and regardless of what Canada did, Léger was unsure about the future of the Commonwealth seat either way. Holmes had conceded that Canada should run on June 5th⁴⁶² and Pearson was out of government a week later. The new government had only been sworn in on June 21st when the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting was beginning on June 26th. The Department had been quietly reaching out to other diplomats to see if Canada would be a popular choice, knowing a decision was imminent.⁴⁶³

⁴⁵⁶ Leger, 'Elections to Security Council in 1958'.

⁴⁵⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 50.

⁴⁵⁸ Dorothy Osborne, 'Memorandum: Mr. Holmes' Memorandum on Canada's Election to a Seat on the Security Council in 1958', 22 March 1957, RG 25-6946, File No. 5474-CX-I-40, Vol. 6, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁵⁹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 50.

⁴⁶⁰ Osborne, 'Memorandum: Mr. Holmes' Memorandum on Canada's Election to a Seat on the Security Council in 1958'.

⁴⁶¹ Osborne.

⁴⁶² Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 51.

⁴⁶³ Dorothy Osborne, 'Commonwealth Candidature for Security Council', 20 June 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

In early July, the Government decided that they would seek the seat but were still not positive about the Ceylonese intentions. Sidney Smith was not yet Secretary of State for External Affairs and Diefenbaker was holding the portfolio briefly himself. A memorandum for Diefenbaker from Under-secretary Jules Léger was dated July 4th and it recommended seeking the seat, the position consistent for Léger.⁴⁶⁴ The Memorandum to Cabinet on July 8th echoed the memorandum from Léger very closely, as had a Memorandum to Cabinet dated June 5th to the soon-to-be-defeated PM St. Laurent.⁴⁶⁵ It indicated that the Department did not think Ceylon was interested in the Commonwealth seat, nor did they think newly admitted member, Ghana, was either. It made clear the Department's position on the Commonwealth seat, which certainly reflected the previous government, especially Pearson's, pragmatic attitude. It read,

*“Because of the considerable expansion of membership of the United Nations during the last two years there is a likelihood that conventions governing the allocation of seats will break down or be disregarded. It is important, however, to attempt to maintain the institution of a Commonwealth seat, not only because it contributes to Commonwealth solidarity but also because it affords by far the best opportunity for countries like Canada to have a regular opportunity to serve on the Council”.*⁴⁶⁶

Ultimately, Canada wanted the seat and membership in the exclusive club, but long-term thinking meant that continuing access to the club and the ability to seek and maintain status was also an important consideration, lending credibility to the idea that status is self-reinforcing. It is not a one-time opportunity that ends, but rather an active process that requires sustained engagement. Offering opportunity to the new members in the Global South was not because Canada wanted to hand over access to UNSC membership, but rather because it would prevent the disintegration of the informal Commonwealth grouping amidst increased UN members, without which Canada would not have access to seats. Canada would again be open to the idea of opportunity for newly decolonized states if it served the larger interests of Canada's place within the shrinking British Empire and the ability of the Commonwealth to act as a bloc. This was a manageable position at the time because Canada did not expect further growth of the UN or the size of the UNSC until at least 1960, which was indeed the case.⁴⁶⁷ Further, the Memorandum to Cabinet expressed concern that it would be hard to take on responsibilities of UNSC seat at a time when diplomatic resources were so heavily involved Canada's new presence in the Middle East and Indo-China.⁴⁶⁸ Canada would end up running for its own club membership and the maintenance of the Commonwealth, but even if they were not, long term preservation of existing status, future opportunity, and the Commonwealth club were drivers of a decision.

⁴⁶⁴ Jules Leger, 'Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs: Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council', 4 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁶⁵ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council', 8 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to the Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council', 5 June 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁶⁶ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council'.

⁴⁶⁷ John W. Holmes and Dorothy Osborne, 'Draft Telegram to Washington & Permisis, New York', 23 April 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁶⁸ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council'.

In terms of reasons to run, the memorandum indicated that Canada expected to have the support of its anglophone allies: New Zealand, the UK, Australia, and the United States.⁴⁶⁹ Canada also believed it had the support of both India and Pakistan. The UK had indicated its preference for Canada over Ceylon since April.⁴⁷⁰ The Mission in New York, whose diplomats were on the ground at the UN, had been in favour of Canada standing.⁴⁷¹ Simultaneous to the Department's continued recommendation to seek the seat, Diefenbaker had discussed the issue and sought support from Commonwealth Prime Ministers during the Prime Minister's Conference between June 26th and July 5th.⁴⁷² The United States had made clear through diplomatic channels that it preferred Canada's presence and would be concerned if Canada did not run, reflecting broader concern that the Council needed members who would vote for Western positions on resolutions.⁴⁷³ Notably, Diefenbaker took a strong position throughout his later governance towards improving ties with the UK following Suez and strengthening the damaged Commonwealth.⁴⁷⁴ This support from allies and within the Commonwealth came from the idea that the next two years would be tough for the future of the United Nations and Canada was particularly suited to seeking compromise and finding "acceptable solutions to difficult problems".⁴⁷⁵ Further, there was concern articulated earlier in the Spring about whether the divided Commonwealth as a bloc for the UNSC could survive with the ongoing competition between functionalism and geographic representation.⁴⁷⁶ For Canada, a declining Commonwealth would be a problem both because it was a status quo of power relations that worked for Canada, but also because it was an institution in which Canada already held status, which could be used in additional status seeking elsewhere. As Duque writes, having status accords further status – it is self-reinforcing.⁴⁷⁷

While the additional responsibilities of a UNSC seat with increased diplomatic presence abroad would be significant, the Department and Diefenbaker himself believed that Canada could not turn down these responsibilities and Canada should seek the opportunity to be the Commonwealth candidate and ultimately the elected member, with special attention to maintaining Canada's Council opportunities to the future.⁴⁷⁸ The balancing act and playing of status politics within the Commonwealth was the main place where seats were sorted out and

⁴⁶⁹ {Citation}

⁴⁷⁰ High Commission of Canada to the United Kingdom, 'Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council', 5 April 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁷¹ Department of External Affairs, 'Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council', 29 April 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁷² Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 51.

⁴⁷³ Saul F. Rae, 'Letter from Saul F. Rae to John W. Holmes', 24 June 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁷⁴ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council'.

⁴⁷⁵ Department of External Affairs.

⁴⁷⁶ Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva, 'Commonwealth Candidature for Security Council in 1958', 25 April 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁷⁷ Marina G Duque, 'Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach', *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1 September 2018): 578, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001>.

⁴⁷⁸ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council'.

1957 was the time to preserve opportunity for Canada amidst contestation. Cabinet officially decided to go forward with candidature on July 11th.⁴⁷⁹

On July 17th, the CBC reported that Canada was seeking the seat and because it had the support of all the Commonwealth delegations and the United Nations, it was “virtually assure[d]” of election as the sole candidate.⁴⁸⁰ Status and recognition could easily be accorded by the General Assembly following the struggle for it within the Commonwealth. The Department began notifying friendly countries on July 19th that they would be seeking the seat and were hoping to solicit support for their candidacy, though without a formal advance commitment.⁴⁸¹ A series of telegrams went back and forth between Canada and Western European states and expanded around the rest of the world throughout the remainder of July to secure support in the General Assembly. The letter to the United Kingdom’s Permanent Mission in New York and other permanent missions indicated, as in the 1940s, that Canada was “particularly conscious of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.⁴⁸² In general, many (but not all) countries expressed positive feelings towards Canada being presented to the General Assembly as the candidate, with response notes arriving consistently in late July.

On July 21st, the Ceylonese Ambassador in Washington and in New York, Sir Senerat Gunewardene, held a meeting with Canadian staff in New York. Ceylon was lukewarm on the seat, with disagreement internally on whether they should seek it.⁴⁸³ For a brief moment, it looked like it may be a contested seat taken to a competitive election in the General Assembly, but ultimately Ceylon chose not to run, allowing the Commonwealth to maintain its unity surrounding Canada as the candidate. Days later, on July 26th, Ceylon indicated it supported Canada as the candidate as well.⁴⁸⁴ In wanting to increase Asian representation without sacrificing the Commonwealth, Canada was supporting Japan over its complicated contest with Czechoslovakia.⁴⁸⁵ With that arrangement, Canada could be the Commonwealth representative and Asian states could be represented, satisfying Ceylon’s concerns about Afro-Asian presence.⁴⁸⁶ The United States had seen the choice to present Canada and Japan as a good

⁴⁷⁹ ‘Cabinet Conclusions: RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 1893’.

⁴⁸⁰ James Joseph Hurley, High Commissioner for Canada in Ceylon, Colombo, ‘Security Council Election - Commonwealth Seat’, 25 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸¹ The Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Vienna, Austria - J. S. Macdonald, ‘Commonwealth Seat on Security Council’, 19 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum to Cabinet: The Commonwealth Seat on the Security Council’.

⁴⁸² G.S. Murray (Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in New York), ‘Letter to Missions of Countries with whom Canada Maintains Diplomatic Relations’, 19 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸³ G.S. Murray (Acting Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in New York), ‘Election to the Security Council’, 22 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸⁴ Dorothy Osborne, ‘Elections to the Security Council’, 26 July 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-CX-1-40, Vol. 8, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸⁵ G.B. Summers, Canadian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, ‘Elections to the Security Council’, 27 August 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-AB-1-40, Vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸⁶ G.B. Summers, Canadian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

agreement in June, and was strongly considering Canada's decision for how it allocated its support in the broader questions of Afro-Asia and the Commonwealth.⁴⁸⁷

On September 5, the Department indicated that it had solicited support from all over the world that followed the intra-Commonwealth negotiation. While a clean slate, Canada expected 44 votes in its favour according to a note from the United Nations Division on September 5, just prior to the 12th Session of UNGA.⁴⁸⁸ This was up from the 31 expected as of August 30th.⁴⁸⁹ Beginning on September 17th, the Canadian delegation at UNGA had until the October 1 election to continue cementing support to affirm its decision. While Canada was presented as the uncontested candidate for the seat, it still needed a General Assembly vote of a 2/3 majority of 82 members voting in favour. Not only was this technically necessary by the Charter, but as an act of recognition, it would affirm global trust in Canada's representation on the UNSC. The same note indicated that this included informal support from the members of the Arab League, other Commonwealth members, Western Europe, much of Latin America, all members of the P5 except the Soviet Union, and many Asian countries. Non-committal replies were received from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Spain.⁴⁹⁰

Official briefing binders taken to UNGA indicated that Canada expected no difficulty in reaching the required number of votes.⁴⁹¹ Nearly all the work to ensure election had been done in ensuring the clean slate but assuring voters of Canada's competence was still necessary. Instructions for the Canadian delegation, as approved by Cabinet, highlighted the new responsibilities Canada would take on by holding the seat. In directing officials on how Canada should present itself to UNGA, it indicated that the delegation should:

*"...seek to express Canada's strong support for the United Nations and to point out that, despite its imperfections, the organization has played an essential part in maintaining peace, ending conflicts and advancing the social and economic welfare of its members. The delegation in particular should play the active role which Canada is peculiarly fitted to play in promoting understanding between Western countries and the countries of Asia and Africa in order to prevent the widening of a breach which threatens to weaken the strength of the United Nations".*⁴⁹²

Diefenbaker addressed the General Assembly prior to the election to clarify that a change in Canadian government from the St. Laurent/Pearson leadership was not a change in Canada's

⁴⁸⁷ R. A. Mackay, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, 'My Telephone Conversation with Mr. Leger on June 19: Elections to the Security Council', 19 June 1957.

⁴⁸⁸ United Nations Division, 'Weekly Divisional Note: Reactions to the Canadian Decision to Stand for Election to the Security Council', 5 September 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-AB-1-40, Vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁸⁹ A. C. Lapointe, 'Reactions to the Canadian Decision to Stand for Election to the Security Council', 30 August 1957, RG 25-6946, File no. 5475-AB-1-40, Vol. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁹⁰ Lapointe.

⁴⁹¹ Department of External Affairs, 'Commentary for the Guidance of the Canadian Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly', 17 September 1957, RG 25 Vol. 2319, Library and Archives Canada.

⁴⁹² Department of External Affairs, 'Commentary for the Use of the Canadian Delegation to the 12th Regular Session of the United Nations Assembly - 1957', 1957, RG 25, Vol. 2362 S/79/1, Library and Archives Canada.

international “principles or attitudes” and that the UN was still central to Canadian foreign policy.⁴⁹³ He drew on a memo from Escott Reid meant to assuage the worries of new members who feared that the new government would not pay as much attention as Pearson had to recently decolonized states.⁴⁹⁴ What remained was the idea that Canada’s interests were served by multilateralism and a United Nations that worked effectively. Chapnick notes that Diefenbaker did not take on all of Reid’s suggestions, but took note of Reid’s point that Canada’s influence at the UN generally focused on long-term strategy of national interest rather than judgment on short term issues.⁴⁹⁵ Canada expected many short and long term issues to arise, according to delegation instructions, including those of disarmament; new UN membership; expansion of UN organs; challenges in dependent territories; Chinese representation at the UN; a potential UN Fund for Economic Development; and the political situations in Hungary, Algeria, Cyprus, South Africa, Korea, and West New Guinea.⁴⁹⁶ Canada received 72 votes of 78 present and voting members at UNGA and held the seat in 1958-1959.⁴⁹⁷

While the 1957 election looked quite different from the 1946 and 1947 elections, each were focused on the active work that Canada could do on a Council already struggling in its early years. Where the 1946 and 1947 elections featured functionalism more straightforwardly, 1957’s officials wrestled with it as part of a larger web of concerns, notably maintaining status for the future and ensuring a functional United Nations. The Government of Canada saw longer term interests to be satisfied in taking on the responsibilities of a UNSC seat; and just as importantly, because it could contribute, it therefore should. Most notably, one of those interests was continuing to maintain a united Commonwealth and continuing to find compromise between new, decolonizing members and their formal colonial masters. The latter was indeed a construction of liberal internationalism, as if these two sides were equal both in name and in practice and not stratified in the complex hierarchy of 1950s imperialism and the hierarchical multilateralism that unfolded within it.

⁴⁹³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 53.

⁴⁹⁴ Chapnick, 53.

⁴⁹⁵ Chapnick, 53.

⁴⁹⁶ Department of External Affairs, ‘Commentary for the Use of the Canadian Delegation to the 12th Regular Session of the United Nations Assembly - 1957’.

⁴⁹⁷ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

(6) Compromise and Consensus: Elections in 1966 and 1976

Introduction

A reader could be forgiven for thinking this is a dissertation about Lester B. Pearson, as the first three empirical stories and now a fourth, feature him as a main character. In the fourth story, the 1966 UNSC election, Pearson was Prime Minister and more of a central figure than ever. It would be his last UNSC election. By the mid-1970s, Pierre Trudeau was Prime Minister and Pearson had been retired since 1968. Yet, the differences that Trudeau sought to make in Canadian foreign policy were directly reacting to the long legacy of his predecessor. Even in his absence, Pearson still haunted foreign policy in the 1970s.

Pearson became the leader of the Liberal Party in 1958. John Diefenbaker remained Prime Minister until 1963, when the Liberals narrowly defeated the Tories and formed the first of two minority governments. They formed the second minority government following the 1965 election. A year later, in November 1966, Canada was elected to the UNSC for the third time. From 1963 onward, Paul Martin Sr. served as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, maintaining a deeply contentious, if productive, relationship with his Prime Minister.⁴⁹⁸ From 1964, Marcel Cadieux served as the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), leading the civil service on foreign policy. During Canada's third term on the Security Council in 1968, Pearson retired, with Pierre Elliot Trudeau becoming leader of the Liberal Party, and subsequently Prime Minister. For the first time in its history, Canada's work at the UN would not be guided by Pearson, and for the first time in many decades, neither would its foreign policy. While of the same Liberal party, the Trudeau era was markedly different than its predecessors and sought to make this clear, paradoxically invoking Pearson along the way through its commitment to change.

Canadian foreign policy in both decades was constructed responsively to increasing uncertainty in geopolitics and rapid change domestically, ranging from the differing "coldness" of the Cold War, to a rapid growth in the number of international organizations, to war in the Middle East and in Vietnam, and to the economic uncertainty in the 1970s. I argue in this chapter that in 1966 and 1976, Canada's elections to the UNSC were oriented around managing change and uncertainty in global politics as part of the status-seeking process. In 1966, Canada was once again concerned with the *use* of status and the need to perform its expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices. In projecting how status could be used, especially in the context of its self-reinforcing nature, Canada's status-seeking in 1966 focused on maintaining existing status to ensure it could continue seeking it both on the UNSC and elsewhere in the universe of liberal international organizations. This was not unlike the 1957 election, though the reasoning for that was focused less on the idea of contributions/service to the UN, and more on managing a contentious and unpredictable period for the organization. In the 1970s, as the competition for seats became more exclusive, coupled with a re-organization of Canadian foreign policy under the new Trudeau government, liberal internationalism was re-formulated in the Canadian context

⁴⁹⁸ See: Greg Donaghy, 'C'est La Guerre: The Diplomacy of Mike Pearson and Paul Martin', in *Mike's World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017).

to fit the new environment. This re-formulation was indeed central to the status-seeking process for Canada in its campaign and the way that it re-articulated its commitment to the Council's mandate. These are two variations of the main argument of this dissertation, about appealing to liberal internationalism in status-seeking by speaking to the expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities of the Council.

Canada's 1966 campaign to the UNSC strongly illustrated that the process of status-seeking is not simply a means to an end, but rather a longer-term, active process. States, as their complex and often incoherent sociological forms, may sometimes seek status reluctantly for future status purposes. This is a central example of how status can be self-reinforcing: recognition can attract more recognition and states may have a long lens on their interests that frames how they think about status into the future. As such, maintenance of status is sometimes a priority; it is a move toward continued investment in the expected behaviours, norms, and activities of having status to both encourage its future gain in the organization in question as well as in the broader hierarchies of global politics. In the 1960s, Canadian officials were unsure of whether to take a UNSC seat, engaging in significant internal contestation as well as contestation within WEOG (rather than UNGA). Ultimately, they decided to take the opportunity to have status because they felt compelled to perform the responsibilities of a UNSC seat in a troubled UN period and not damage Canada's existing status position within the fragile Cold War environment of the 1960s. This was especially so as many in the West feared increased Soviet influence in the Global South. In the UN context specifically, an important part of this was due to the continued (since the 1940s) contestation over membership in the Council in the wake of Resolution 1991A (XVIII) that created regional groups for elections upon the addition of decolonized states to UNGA membership. For Canada to take the seat and maintain its status, it would be continuing to advance the idea that membership, and therefore social closure, should be predicated at least in some part on functionalism, reaching back to previous decades. More crudely, the 1966 UNSC election was an opportunity "stay relevant" at a moment of change, but also on key issues in the contradictory environment of the liberal international organization in the Cold War. It was both a process of pursuing status as well as a continuation of the contestation of how status should be accorded. Where status as self-reinforcing is often understood as attracting further status in other places⁴⁹⁹, it could also be understood here as helping attract further status in the future on the same body. This is a temporal expansion of the self-reinforcing nature of status, not just an organizational or geographical one. Pursuing status for the sake of maintaining it also allows its use, performing behaviours, responsibilities, and practices, to be part of the future status-seeking process. Throughout the 1966 election, Canadian officials appealed to and relied on their commitment to liberal internationalism as a reason to pursue the maintenance of status, navigating the complex imperial hierarchy that surrounded it in the process.

A decade later in 1976, in step with Canada's well-established pattern by that point, Canada sought a seat once again. A few trends emerged in that period. The 1970s were a turning point for the UNSC as well as Canada. At the UNSC, status began to look more precarious and more valuable than in previous decades. More negotiation and work of the Council was taking place behind closed doors and without the input of non-members (i.e., UNGA members), making

⁴⁹⁹ See: Duque, 'Recognizing International Status'.

it more exclusive and membership therefore of more value.⁵⁰⁰ Relatedly, regional groups were beginning the contestation for seats multiple years in advance, either through competitive elections at UNGA or through internal contestation to present a clean slate. The 1976 election saw considerable negotiation within WEOG for status, though the final election was a clean slate. Even still, membership was imbued with both more power and responsibility than in previous years, and the process of social closure (and recognition) to achieve that status was more complex and competitive. Liberal internationalism still dominated the work of the Council and the UN more broadly; to participate in the workings of the organization, states were still broadly engaging with its values. That said, it was being re-imagined by many, including the Canadian government. Pierre Trudeau came into office with a desire to break from the Pearsonian liberalism of the past and its dominance in Canadian foreign policy. Despite this, the changes in policy were only reworkings of liberal internationalism, reinterpreting traditional liberal internationalism. Change was only possible within the boundaries of liberal internationalism as it cohered at the United Nations in terms of status-seeking, as being recognized and *using* status still required performing expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices within acceptable ways. This was especially important as UNSC seats were becoming more valuable and difficult to achieve.

Status-seeking through liberal internationalism in IOs can take on many different forms, as seen thus far in this project. Whether pursued through functionalism, for maintenance of the status quo, or through re-imagining of the status quo, each could be approaches to seeking the rewards of status and claiming the responsibilities that come with it. These many faces are simply different approaches to engagement with the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices of status in a liberal international environment. They are also different ways of using status. Canada in the 1970s is a central example of how “change” and “contestation” of liberal international status quo can still be bound up in the pursuit of status within a liberal international environment.

I begin this chapter with the 1960s election. Before discussing the election specifically, I discuss key components of Canadian foreign policy that build toward the argument, in order to make sense of Canada’s place in the world, key bilateral relations, and most importantly, its position within the United Nations. Each of these are interrelated with the politics of the Cold War and the politics of decolonization in the early to mid-1960s. Most importantly, they describe and analyze Canada’s relationships to both liberal internationalism *and* imperialism, as the touchstone concepts that structure campaigns to the UNSC. The selection of these choice issues follows those that were highlighted by Canadian policymakers and leaders at the time, in archival material such as addresses to Parliament, to the General Assembly, to Canadians, or in overview documents from the Department of External Affairs.⁵⁰¹ They are not simply background information but rather the foundations of the politics that were part of Canada’s UNSC campaign. I first review Canada’s position in the imperial world through the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. I then discuss Canada’s relationship with its United

⁵⁰⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 98.

⁵⁰¹ For example, the CBC address by Paul Martin highlights many of these issues: Hon. Paul Martin, ‘YEAR-END MESSAGE FROM THE HON. PAUL MARTIN, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, BROADCAST BY THE INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF THE CBC’ (Ottawa: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 29 December 1965), Jules Leger Library.

States, with a focus on the Vietnam War. Much like the 1950s, Canada's complicated relationships to imperial powers and the Global South shaped the way that policymakers considered their relationships with others in campaigning for a UNSC seat. After constructing an overview of Canada's international constraints with these sections, I discuss the state of UN membership, regional groupings, and Canada's contributions. It is within these contexts and events predicated on liberal internationalism and imperialism that Canada's UNSC campaign unfolded and key choices relating to status were made. As such, the final section on 1966 advances the larger arguments about status and imperialism by narrating and drawing conclusions about the UNSC campaign in 1966.

Moving to the 1970s, I first provide an overview of Trudeau's policy changes and shifts within the Department of External Affairs, as they stood in relation to the Pearsonian past. I then turn to two major issues in Canadian foreign policy that framed the 1976 campaign, much like in earlier chapters: (a) Canada-US relations and the Third Option; (b) Relations with the Soviet Bloc and the Global South. Finally, I discuss the campaign in detail. In terms of imperialism in the 1970s, the relationships of major imperial formations to the UNSC – and competitors for seats – looked far different at the end of the decolonization era. Imperialism did not disappear, rather it remained in ways both subtle and explicit, especially in terms of the growth of American imperialism (often disguised through liberalism) in this period. In addition, changing Chinese membership and Soviet relations with other communist states remained relevant in UNSC dynamics. For Canada, this meant a break from the past strong concerns of relations to Britain and more concern with Canada-US relations than ever before. That said, the major geopolitical problems with which Canada found itself dealing in approaching the UNSC election (and while on the UNSC) were problems created by the former British Empire, including Palestine and Southern Africa.

The empirical material for the 1960s comes primarily from the Jules Leger Library and Library and Archives Canada. That for the 1970s comes both from the Jules Leger Library and Library and Archives Canada, as in the past, but also relies on a document from an out-of-print book from a personal collection, as well as two interviews with diplomats who served at the UN in 1976. This is the first of the subsequent campaigns in which I have interview material.

Imperialism at large: The Commonwealth and the Francophonie in the 1960s

Canada entered the 1960s under the leadership of John Diefenbaker, “the last leading Canadian political figure to identify publicly with Britain and the Empire”.⁵⁰² Upon taking office, Pearson, who had historically strongly identified with Britain, moved away from that identification as Prime Minister, understanding that the world he entered as a diplomat was no longer the same. However, this did not mean that the British Empire did not have significant influence on Canada throughout the 1960s. Even the increased independent control of foreign policy in Canada took place within the racial ordering of the British Empire. It especially did so as the British Empire rebranded itself as the liberal, multilateral, and post-racial Commonwealth,

⁵⁰² Dan Gorman, ‘Race, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations: From Imperialism to Internationalism in Canada’, in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 144.

as many British colonies fought for independence. Canadian elites were leading participants in this narrative and aesthetic shift, but ultimately, imperialism remained dominant in new ways.⁵⁰³ What Mazower identified in 1945 as imperial internationalism took on different evolutions in response to anti-colonial struggles and subsequent decolonization. Similarly, where PM King had seen Canada as “a linchpin in Anglo-American relations”⁵⁰⁴ in the 1940s, the special relationships with the two were looked different by the 1960s, due to the changes in the relationship between global empires (primarily British) and liberal internationalism. The central event in the early 1960s that both influenced Commonwealth relations through the decade and exemplified the liberal-imperial relationship at the time was South Africa’s withdrawal from the organization in 1961. For Canada, declaring South African apartheid unacceptable was both in-step with popular opinion in the United Nations and the increasing pressure from post-colonial Commonwealth members. However, it was also a form of liberal deflection by Britain and the anglosphere, leaning on liberal principles of equality while distracting from the exact same practices as the apartheid government by the British empire and others, particularly Canada.

In the early 1960s, Diefenbaker saw the Commonwealth as “a vehicle for liberal internationalism”⁵⁰⁵, seeing its imperial roots as a paradoxical source of progressive multilateralism. As the Commonwealth was rebranding as a “multi-racial organization” in the face of decolonization, Diefenbaker was in favour of pressuring South Africa to withdraw its membership application to the Commonwealth over opposition to apartheid.⁵⁰⁶ While opposed to South African membership, Diefenbaker did not want to bring the issue to a vote or sanctions, rather diplomatic pressure for withdrawal was his preferred choice.⁵⁰⁷ This was because he envisioned the Commonwealth as a united body that should not be divided; rather, they should stand together for liberal ideas of equality, even if that appears contradictory in hindsight. It is indeed this incident that demonstrates the ways that liberalism is both contradictory with imperialism and yet intertwined and inseparable by design.

Liberalism and its simultaneous coherences and contradictions were becoming increasingly evident through the 1960s, especially as much of Canada’s own domestic policy was not all that different – despite being branded as exceptional – from South Africa’s. This similarity helps make sense of the fact that Diefenbaker was strongly pro-Britain but also held anti-apartheid positions. Despite an international move towards liberalism and universalism – as well as a move towards a more liberal domestic politics – Canada occupied “a particular place within British imperial frameworks as a white settler society, racially identifying more closely with the colonial power and metropole, even as it shares a legacy of colonization and trajectory of political independence more akin to Britain’s imperial hinterland”.⁵⁰⁸ Much like the

⁵⁰³ Laura Makodoro and Francine McKenzie, ‘Introduction: Writing Race into Canada’s International History’, in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 12–13.

⁵⁰⁴ Lara Silver, ‘A Long Goodbye: Pearson and Britain’, in *Mike’s World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 211.

⁵⁰⁵ Gorman, ‘Race, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations: From Imperialism to Internationalism in Canada’, 144.

⁵⁰⁶ Gorman, 144.

⁵⁰⁷ Gorman, 144.

⁵⁰⁸ Spooner, “‘Awakening Africa’: Race and Canadian Views of Decolonizing Africa’, 207.

Commonwealth and liberalism more broadly, Canada straddled the language of liberal international rights and equality while operating in the in-between space of engaging in imperial domination at home. This was, of course, not unrelated to the continued discourse of the “middle power”, which was certainly influenced by Pearson’s functional principle, but also represented “the nation’s in-between status within the British Empire”.⁵⁰⁹ Canada would remain staunchly liberal throughout the 1960s, but selectively so; Canadian leadership saw some forms of colonialism (i.e., apartheid) as unacceptable or illiberal, but others as necessary. These tensions remained relevant through subsequent decades of UNSC politics in negotiating Southern Africa.

Upon returning to government in 1963, Pearson supported the Commonwealth as a liberal body, but expressed a readiness to move away from the closeness of the Canada-UK relationship, especially given the relative recency of Commonwealth splintering around the Suez Crisis. Despite Pearson’s move towards increased independence at this late point in his career, Canada remained embedded in the British orbit in the 1960s, both through the adoption of Britain-friendly policies in former colonies (especially in Africa and the Caribbean), as well as the broader positionality of Canada in the world. In conceptualizing these dynamics, Canadian historians have looked to a less state-driven conceptualization of Canada in the international that becomes particularly relevant for the history of the mid-20th century. Consistent with the key assumptions and boundaries of this GHS project, David Meren writes that the historical relationship in Canada between the domestic and the international is *symbiotic* via settler colonialism, where a move to understand a “more complex and comprehensive Canadian international history” must recognize “the multiplicity of links between the peoples inhabiting the northern half of North America and the world beyond the Canadian shores”.⁵¹⁰

For Meren and many historians, historical analysis of foreign policy requires a fluid understanding of the actor in time, space, and constituent parts.⁵¹¹ This is both particularly relevant to the relationship between Canada, Britain, and the Commonwealth, as many of the beliefs, assumptions, and cultural norms of British imperialism permeated Canada’s foreign policy bureaucracy and leadership through the 1960s. So, while its influence on Canada’s specific positions and Canadian culture more broadly may have been more limited than in the past, the ideas and professional culture that circulated within the bureaucracy were greatly shaped by Britain and the empire. This position on history is also usefully coherent analytically with a Global Historical Sociology perspective and a pragmatic-relational logic. It therefore represents an important point of crossover between the two disciplines of History and IR in terms of how they can be read together and how they treat historical events and actors. In doing historical IR with a GHS and a pragmatic-relational logic, this is the type of historical work that can be effectively linked, rather than just cherry-picked.

In step with this epistemological and theoretical linkage, David Webster writes that policy decisions must be understood historically within larger maps of context, history, culture, and norms, which, while liberal, were never independent of imperialism and were also not

⁵⁰⁹ Spooner, 207.

⁵¹⁰ David Meren, ‘Conclusion: Race and the Future of Canadian International History’, in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 285, 284-300.

⁵¹¹ Meren, ‘Conclusion: Race and the Future of Canadian International History’.

colour-blind to race.⁵¹² This affected not just the day-to-day interactions of officials, but also the pressures that officials faced in policy decisions. Consequently, Canada's relationships with Commonwealth Africa and the Caribbean greatly followed British positions. First, as Britain withdrew its presence in Africa into the 1960s, they did not want it falling under communist influence, subsequently pressuring Canada to "assist and recognize newly independent African states as part of a strategy to secure allegiance to the West".⁵¹³ Spooner notes that Canadian officials saw this as disingenuous on Britain's part, not expecting that this strategy would be successful, but shared the anti-Communist concerns. It was indeed part of the broader pattern where Canada – and Pearson especially – was enthusiastic towards decolonization and non-alignment if it meant fewer communist countries.⁵¹⁴ Similarly, Canadian policymaker attitudes towards decolonization were shaped by racist and paternalistic perceptions – stemming from British imperialism – of which groups were "ready" for independence and "modernity" at different points in the 1960s, both socially and economically. On top of this, these racist and paternalistic perceptions of modernity and civilization were also present at home, in a variety of colonial policies that sought to remove Indigenous culture, language, and peoples. Ultimately, the north Atlantic triangle that connected Canada to the United States and to the United Kingdom was pivotal for navigating both policy positions but also the norms and values, especially those stemming from imperialism, that went into those policy decisions.⁵¹⁵ For historians making sense of this, the relationship between structural constraints in foreign policy, key relationships, and cultures, cognitive maps, identities, norms and representations very much resemble a pragmatist position, one where individuals within structures make the choices they can based on the societal and professional webs surrounding them. Canada's relationship with Britain was not just central for its own importance, but also for driving bilateral and multilateral relationships in much of the rest of the world. Britain and imperialism were a source of significant tension for Canada on many issues, but also the source of much of Canada's "way of being" in the world.

Of secondary importance to the Commonwealth was the Francophonie, a product of the French historical imperial formation. Unlike Britain and the Commonwealth, France held little influence on Canada's positions internationally; rather brewing cultural tensions in the 1960s between French and English Canada shaped much of the domestic constraints on foreign policy and France's influence from abroad shaped those cultural tensions as well. Similarly, the role of Francophones within the foreign service, in particular Marcel Cadieux and Jules Léger in the 1960s should not be ignored. Léger, who went on to become Governor-General, had been the first francophone Under-Secretary of State (USS) for External Affairs in the 1950s and was Ambassador to France in the 1960s. Cadieux was USS in the 1960s, central to every major decision in his tenure. Pearson had served as Minister of External Affairs under francophone PM St. Laurent, who had seen national unity as central to Canadian foreign policy, but this was much

⁵¹² David Webster, "Red Indians" in Geneva, "Papuan Headhunters" in New York: Race, Mental Maps, and Two Global Appeals in the 1920s and 1960s', in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 255.

⁵¹³ Spooner, "'Awakening Africa': Race and Canadian Views of Decolonizing Africa", 215.

⁵¹⁴ Spooner, 215.

⁵¹⁵ Spooner, 215.

more difficult by the 1960s when Pearson became PM himself.⁵¹⁶ National unity was in question in the 1960s and relations with France were also tense, as it was much more independent than a multilateral cooperator under De Gaulle, and was willing to stir up Quebec nationalism, as later evidenced by De Gaulle's "Vive le Quebec libre" in 1967.⁵¹⁷

Through the Quiet Revolution, Quebec developed international ambitions and sought to develop strong ties with France. In response to these changes and increasing tensions at home, Canada also sought to increase cultural diplomacy and relations with the Francophonie, including across newly independent Francophone African countries. Following the Colombo Plan's implementation, Canada established development aid for the Caribbean (primarily Anglophone) in 1958, Commonwealth Africa in 1960, and then Francophone Africa in 1961, following British and French policy in the region.⁵¹⁸ All development aid, but specifically for the Francophonie, expanded rapidly through Pearson's tenure until 1968. Regardless, relations with France proved difficult, especially in the context of Quebec nationalism, leaving Léger with a difficult job. Quebec was also a source of anti-Americanism, making the management of the US-Canada relations and the broader anglo-world difficult from a domestic perspective. Indeed, as David Meren points out, Quebec's anti-Americanism in its nationalism paradoxically resonated with France, even when its independence movements would have sounded in sync with ongoing struggles against France's colonialism abroad.⁵¹⁹ Relatedly, French Canada's relationship with the anglo-world was also complicated in the 1960s by a sense within Quebec nationalism that it was a colony of anglophone Canada, rather than the child of French settler colonialism and racial ordering itself.⁵²⁰ Ultimately, as Canada was following the Commonwealth in moving towards a self-declared liberal international tradition abroad and a liberal, civic nationalism of unity at home, Quebec nationalism complicated both. As it engaged bilateral and multilateral relations abroad, the constraints and cultural influence of both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie shaped Canada's choices in constructing its foreign policy. Adding another wrench to this was the United States.

The Elephant at War: Canada-US Relations and Vietnam

Pierre Elliot Trudeau's 1969 quip that Canada's relationship with the United States was like sleeping next to an elephant has held true in the intervening years, but it is very much a reflection of the 1960s.⁵²¹ While Britain certainly occupied a foundational, and in many ways sociological, place in the conduct of Canadian external affairs, the United States was a constant

⁵¹⁶ Brendan Kelly, 'Pearson, France, and Quebec's International Personality', in *Mike's World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 314.

⁵¹⁷ Kelly, 314.

⁵¹⁸ Stephen Azzi, 'Lester Pearson and the Substance of the Sixties', in *Mike's World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 122.

⁵¹⁹ David Meren, 'Crisis of the Nation: Race and Culture in the Canada-Quebec-France Triangle of the 1960s', in *Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada's International History*, ed. Laura Makodoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 233–36.

⁵²⁰ Meren, 233–36.

⁵²¹ *Pierre Trudeau's Washington Press Club Speech* (CBC News, 1969), <https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/trudeaus-washington-press-club-speech>.

presence, pushing and pulling Canada in many directions. The most central issue to Canada-US relations in the 1964-1966 period (leading up to the 1966 election) was the Vietnam War, though it was indeed one of many issues of the day. This tension extended far beyond bilateral engagement – it influenced multilateral engagement at the United Nations, as well as the global perception of Canada amidst liberal internationalism. Going back as far as the late 1940s, Canada has been critiqued by foreign diplomats, Canadian civil society, and foreign and domestic media for being “too close” to the United States and too quick to follow its lead on international issues. As I will demonstrate in later chapters, this became a bigger problem for Canadian policymakers building UNSC campaigns into the late 20th century and the 21st century. In the mid-1960s, the “closeness” of the US-Canada relationship was at times rocky but also clearly on the minds of Canadian diplomats. Many had also accused Canada of being an American outlet on the ICC, complicating the relationship with other UN members.⁵²²

Canada’s role in the Vietnam War is historiographically patchy. Not only was contradiction in Canadian policy evident at the time, but the archival record surrounding the war is difficult to access, thus limiting the ability to make sense of it in a complete way. That said, some of the inconsistency in Canada’s rhetoric and policy towards Vietnam is somewhat telling about the nature of Canada-US relations more broadly at the time and the quagmires in which Canada found itself. Notably, the idea that it was indeed a quagmire for Canada does appear in the archival record of the pursuit of the 1966 UNSC seat. It may be that finding out what we do not know historically may not necessarily make the contradictions make more sense – these contradictions could be part of the broader historical trend of Canada-US relations requiring balancing multiple interests at once, much like that of Canada-UK relations. As this broader project demonstrates, Canadian policymakers have long struggled with the debate between satisfying imperial interests of key allies with its desire to be seen as liberal, cooperative, and a friend to the Global South.

The Canadian relationship to the Vietnam War begins in its work on the ICC in the 1950s, following French colonial withdrawal in the region, as highlighted in the previous chapter. The ICC and Canada’s work on it (and its relation to imperial internationalism and Cold War politics) continued into the 1960s, with Canada taking seriously the possibility of a UN-mediated, multilateral solution, especially championed by Paul Martin. This included the diplomatic efforts at mediation such as the Seaborn missions of 1964 and 1965, wherein J. Blair Seaborn, a Canadian diplomat working on the ICC, carried messages between Washington and Hanoi and met directly with Pham Van Dong. Obviously, much like the ICC itself, Seaborn was unable to reach negotiated settlement, but his attempted mediation was important, especially given that he was valued by both sides for his ability to mediate in French, itself a direct result of Canada’s complicated location amongst French colonial history. Given the ICC’s importance in attempting to prevent war, it is also important to note how the ICC affected 1960s Canadian policy in turn. Marcel Cadieux had worked on the commission in the 1950s prior to becoming Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1964, which Brendan Kelly argues greatly influenced his views on the conflict in the SSEA role.⁵²³ Beyond the ICC and UN diplomacy,

⁵²² Donaghy, ‘C’est La Guerre: The Diplomacy of Mike Pearson and Paul Martin’, 98.

⁵²³ Brendan Kelly, “‘Six Mois à Hanoi’: Marcel Cadieux, Canada, and the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 1954–5”, *Canadian Historical Review* 99, no. 3 (October 2018): 394, <https://doi.org/10/gg8nvt>.

Pearson's 1965 open opposition to American bombing and consequently, his famous interpersonal conflict with President Johnson is central to this story. Pearson's opposition to the war is complicated by the clear evidence of collaboration between Canadian officials and American intelligence.⁵²⁴ While there is not enough evidence to necessarily make a judgment on the significance of this within the broader context of the war and Canadian policy, it is important to highlight and identify places where the archival record is indeed patchy but complicates existing historical narratives and historiographical trends. I discuss these trends and then follow the war chronologically below.

Debates on Canada's complicity or lack thereof in the Vietnam War reach back to the 1980s, wherein both historians, but primarily IR scholars, argued about how much Canada helped or hindered American policy in Indochina. Of course, in the 1954-1966 period, Canadian policy evolved, and the intention of policy does not necessarily equate with the results. Helping at some points and hindering at others is likely, both intentionally and unintentionally. Reviewing these pieces of scholarship in 2001, Andrew Preston concluded that Canada's goal at the time was to "constrain American policy and prod it toward a negotiated settlement"; however, it ultimately failed at this goal.⁵²⁵ Canada used multiple tactics, amongst internal disagreement, but Canada may have been both complicit and non-complicit due to the many failures in attempting to avoid full-blown war. These tactics ranged from investment in the ICC, the Seaborn missions, and by 1965, Pearson's open disagreement with American leadership.

Canada also passed intelligence on to other allies, including the Americans, but due to the shrouding of the records in secrecy, we cannot accurately judge either the intention or the outcome of this intelligence sharing, though on the surface, it would suggest that it is part of a pattern of partial complicity. This is especially so given that Paul Martin and Mitchell Sharp, his successor, gave incomplete and misleading answers to critical questions about intelligence sharing and complicity at the time.⁵²⁶ Sayle argues that the new presence of evidence confirming this intelligence sharing suggests both the need for further research as well as the importance of studying intelligence policy as distinct, if interconnected, with foreign policy.⁵²⁷ Much is still unknown, but it perhaps suggests that Canadian policymakers' intentions and actions were mixed, a conclusion to which one can also arrive through a pragmatist perspective that takes into account differing and changing positions amongst actors making sense of their social and political environment. Much like Preston's suggestion that Canada failed at its intended prevention of war, Sayle's conclusions suggest that Canada could be considered both complicit *and* aiming to act in the interest of peace, similar to the more contemporary and nuanced understanding of the war across the board.⁵²⁸ Canada was operating under the broader umbrella of liberal internationalism, which may have influenced its officials to value the United Nations, mediation, negotiated solution, and its self-considered middle power-hood. That said, given Canadian embeddedness in anti-communism and in the broader imperial structures under which

⁵²⁴ {Citation}

⁵²⁵ Andrew Preston, 'Balancing War and Peace: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Vietnam War, 1961–1965', *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 1 (2003): 111, <https://doi.org/10/d2vmhq>.

⁵²⁶ Timothy Andrews Sayle, "'But the Story Was True': A Research Note on Canadian Intelligence Activities in Vietnam", *Canadian Historical Review*, 19 October 2021, 2, <https://doi.org/10/gn4mqc>.

⁵²⁷ Sayle, 2.

⁵²⁸ Kelly, "'Six Mois à Hanoi'", 396.

liberal internationalism evolved, it follows that Canadian diplomats and leaders were engaged in problem-solving and policy change within a contradictory and great-power-constrained environment. The results of this later came to a head in the UNSC campaign.

Two rifts developed by 1965, one between Pearson and Martin and the other between Pearson and President Johnson. The first was not caused by Vietnam but was exasperated by it. Martin strongly believed that even in light of the failing Seaborn Mission, a diplomatic solution could be found. Pearson was far more skeptical and frustrated with the Americans and their unilateral action outside of the United Nations, especially given how much work the organization had put into the region since the 1950s. For his part, Cadieux held a more pro-American position.⁵²⁹ In 1965, Martin did not want to make “Ottawa’s differences with Washington public”⁵³⁰, but Pearson felt differently and was encouraged internationally, including by Secretary General U Thant, to do what he could to stop the American bombing.⁵³¹ In February 1965, Pearson condemned both sides in proclaiming his desire to see a solution with a “independent, unified, and neutral” Vietnam.⁵³² This was consistent with the broader move towards pushing for an anti-communist, yet allowably neutral, Global South. He also warned that continued American retaliation against the North Vietnamese would escalate the war.⁵³³ By March, Operation Rolling Thunder began, massively escalating aerial bombing.

On April 2, 1965, Pearson gave his famous speech at Temple University. In this speech, he stressed the need for a settlement and demanded that President Johnson halt the bombing. Brendan Kelly’s later analysis of the speech, through Marcel Cadieux’s unpublished diary of the incident, demonstrates that Cadieux, Charles Ritchie, Martin, and Pearson disagreed on the purpose and content of the speech. Cadieux had the idea to insert the suggestion of a bombing pause,⁵³⁴ despite his history of being more antagonistic to North Vietnam due to his experience in the ICC.⁵³⁵ While it was not an original idea (Pearson obviously felt strongly about it), it was different than Martin’s suggestion that Pearson put it forward to President Johnson privately first.⁵³⁶ Cadieux made multiple edits to the final version of the speech that Pearson delivered, and Martin was concerned about whether Pearson should go to Washington upon leaving Philadelphia, which Ritchie advised against.⁵³⁷ Ultimately, Pearson’s delivery of the speech indicated irreconcilable differences between himself (and Canada) and the United States on the issue of aerial bombing and demonstrated his growing frustration with American moves away from seeking a diplomatic settlement. Theoretically, it also demonstrates the complexity of actors that make up states and the way they pragmatically negotiate the systems in which they

⁵²⁹ Kelly, 394.

⁵³⁰ Donaghy, ‘C’est La Guerre: The Diplomacy of Mike Pearson and Paul Martin’, 96.

⁵³¹ Donaghy, 98.

⁵³² *Prime Minister Pearson Speaks about the Crisis in Vietnam* (CBC News, 1965), <https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/pearson-let-us-not-oversimplify-the-situation>.

⁵³³ *Prime Minister Pearson Speaks about the Crisis in Vietnam*.

⁵³⁴ Brendan Kelly, ‘Lester B. Pearson’s Temple University Speech Revisited: The Origins and Evolution of the Proposal for a Bombing Pause’, *American Review of Canadian Studies* 47, no. 4 (2 October 2017): 374–76, <https://doi.org/10/gn4mqb>.

⁵³⁵ Kelly, 374.

⁵³⁶ Kelly, 374–76.

⁵³⁷ Kelly, 376.

find themselves. Pearson and Martin evidently had different positions and Pearson's positions were also changing in response to continued American aggression. Different institutions within government also had positions and interests. This is partly responsible for the way that the Vietnam War looks muddy historically, as individual actors negotiated with one another, shifted positions over time, and responded in real time to the changing behaviour of other complex actors.

President Johnson quickly summoned Pearson to Camp David, where he "berated Pearson for over an hour and eventually grabbed the Prime Minister by the lapels of his coat".⁵³⁸ The rift between the United States and Canada as well as the rift between Martin and Pearson was very clear. Frustration surrounded both Martin and Pearson. Martin wanted to double down on diplomatic missions in Vietnam and continue to seek multilateral negotiation. He also wanted to solve the related UN deadlock over Chinese representation, which was of course made stickier by the Vietnam War.⁵³⁹ Alternatively, Pearson wanted to back off pressuring Johnson, feeling defeated. By 1966, Pearson wanted to shuffle Martin out of his ministerial role. While he kept Martin in his position in the end, the tension over Vietnam ultimately prevented the two from cooperating more.⁵⁴⁰ The peak of these rifts in 1966 – and their multilateral ramifications – were a central dynamic within which Canada decided to seek the seat on the UNSC that year. I now turn to the multilateral setting more specifically, explaining the dynamics of the United Nations surrounding Canada's 1966 campaign.

The United Nations, Membership, and Security Council Seats

In December 1963, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1991 (XVII) on the "question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council". Put in motion in 1965, the resolution increased the membership of the UNSC to 10 elected members and formalized regional groupings into those that still exist today. These formal groupings and the rules and norms that stem from them are those that still govern contemporary UNSC elections. This resolution was the culmination of many years of change at the UN. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 1950s saw large increases in membership at the UN from recently independent states. This continued into the 1960s and was not simply an increase in numbers, but rather a political change as well. The Non-Aligned Movement was in full force in the early 1960s and its politics blossomed within the United Nations. In this period, Canada was managing new relationships within its regional group, WEOG, as well as broader relations to decolonization globally.

Calls for Security Council reform dated back to the Council's initial years of the 1940s. In the intervening years, deadlock among the P5 and increasing non-P5 numbers in the General Assembly pushed and pulled towards change. In December 1957, not long after Canada joined the UNSC that year, the General Assembly completed its own reform of its general committee, through Resolution 1192. This resolution changed the make-up of representation of the general committee to represent a more regional balance. Adam Chapnick argues that this change pushed

⁵³⁸ Preston, 'Balancing War and Peace: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Vietnam War, 1961–1965', 73.

⁵³⁹ Donaghy, 'C'est La Guerre: The Diplomacy of Mike Pearson and Paul Martin', 99–101.

⁵⁴⁰ Donaghy, 99–101.

Canada to reconsider Security Council expansion.⁵⁴¹ Canada had discussed this internally earlier in the 1950s but was consistently plagued by the problem of the Commonwealth.⁵⁴² Much like the 1940s, the problem of balancing geographic representation and the functional principle remained. Canada did not have a physical “region” with others to run against, and so it felt the need to protect the unofficial Commonwealth seat. However, this ran counter to the functional principle for which Pearson so fiercely fought. Geographic and political proximity to the United States meant that it could not be argued that Canada’s “region” was underrepresented, but the expansion of the Commonwealth via decolonization changed Canada’s relationship to that body too. This challenge plagued Canada in its subsequent move to join the Western European and Others Group, where it was somewhat ostracized by European states. The tension between geography and functionalism remained, aggravated by the tension between Canada’s political and geographical “place”.

Prior to the 1957 election, Pearson had supported UNSC expansion.⁵⁴³ By the 1960s, Diefenbaker did too.⁵⁴⁴ During Diefenbaker’s time, prior to Resolution 1991 (XVIII), countries of the Afro-Asian bloc, which had greatly strengthened in previous years, began running for seats informally allocated for Eastern European states.⁵⁴⁵ This was part of the push to get the General Assembly to formalize Council expansion and regional groupings, altering the original Charter. Membership in the UN was increasing steadily into the mid-1960s (Figure 3), but political equality and power had not yet followed. The passing of Resolution 1991 (XVIII) was a process of social closure, as it stipulated the rules for inclusion and exclusion on the UNSC, the UN’s most powerful body. While it gave power to *more* states by creating more seats and assigning regional representation, it still maintained two unequal tiers of membership, permanent and elected. Similarly, regional groups were not divided up equally; the new balance of 10 elected seats saw WEOG overrepresented and Africa-Asia underrepresented in terms of # of states per seat, a problem that persists into the present. Ultimately, within this new unequal structure of social closure, each group would subsequently develop its own norms, gentleman’s agreements, routines, and strategies for its elections.

⁵⁴¹ Adam Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage*, 2019, 67.

⁵⁴² Chapnick, 69–70.

⁵⁴³ Chapnick, 69.

⁵⁴⁴ Chapnick, 69.

⁵⁴⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 67.




Figure 3: UN Membership from 1945-2013⁵⁴⁶

Canadian officials struggled with deciding which group to join. While Canada ended up joining WEOG, the decision was difficult.⁵⁴⁷ Many Canadian officials still saw the Commonwealth as a natural home group for Canada and feared being disadvantaged in status-seeking if they were grouped with either the Americas or European countries. This was a strategic debate about status-seeking and being able to be represented (and have their interests represented) on the Council, but also about Canada’s broader relationship to multilateralism and how Canada wanted project its identity and be recognized. Joining a regional group would mean constructing campaigns and making decisions about joining the Council with regional constraints and contestation in mind. It would change how Canadian officials would represent Canada and its relationship to the Council’s mandate and liberal international principles, as the audience of WEOG was different than previous audiences (i.e., the Commonwealth). Pressure came internationally to join the group and Canada had very few options, especially given the value that

⁵⁴⁶ ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present’.

⁵⁴⁷ Marcel Cadieux, ‘Memorandum for the Minister: Canada and Regional Groupings’, 16 March 1965, RG 25-12145, File no. 12-13-4-2, Vol. 15, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum for the Minister: Canada and Regional Groupings at the United Nations’, 8 April 1964, RG 25-12145, File no. 12-13-4-2, Vol. 15, Library and Archives Canada.

Canada saw in a Commonwealth affiliation that would no longer exist.⁵⁴⁸ Once Australia, New Zealand, and Canada decided to join WEOG, members could not agree on how to rotate seats on the UNSC or other bodies, leaving them in a situation where competitive elections would soon become the norm.⁵⁴⁹ Where Western European states alone may have been able to agree to norms of rotation, the inclusion of the anglophone “others” meant that debates about geographic representation and functionalism were once again relevant. Moreover, the question of creating WEOG subgroups to allow for rotation was also left unresolved.⁵⁵⁰ This disagreement has remained, with many interviewees in later elections (1988 through 2020) indicating that iterations of this disagreement plagued Canada in each subsequent election and were responsible for some of the competitiveness of WEOG.⁵⁵¹

More broadly, the UN’s issues of more members, more conflicts, and fewer funds were plaguing the UN in the first half of the 1960s. For a decade that began with high cooperation and high hopes, many lost faith in the organization as the years went on. While support in the Global South was high, it was complex. Secretary-General U Thant supported many Afro-Asian and decolonization initiatives and supported the one-time reformation of the UNSC. While this seemed to indicate a shift in power at the UN, especially in tandem with the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, money was short and peacekeeping needs were high. Both the lack of funds and the call for peacekeeping plagued Pearson, who still saw Canada’s role and the structure of the UN from the perspective of functionalism.

Pearson did not see peacekeeping’s utility in an idealist way. Rather, he believed that a peaceful and interdependent world of cooperation was the ideal one within which Canada could thrive. In other words, investment in liberal, multilateral tools was in Canada’s interest.⁵⁵² While it became a subject of mythology and endless scholarly debate in subsequent decades, peacekeeping in the 1960s was in fact central to the way that Pearson conducted foreign policy. Michael Carroll writes that in the 1964 white paper on defence, “peacekeeping was explicitly identified as a priority in determining foreign and defence policy”.⁵⁵³ Importantly, the original version of the white paper that the Department prepared focused much more on NATO and the Soviet threat, much to Pearson’s dislike.⁵⁵⁴ The final version included much broader objectives focused more on the United Nations and the role of peacekeeping, as well as the consideration of peacekeeping in Canada’s NATO contributions.⁵⁵⁵

Peacekeeping had been unpopular post-Suez amongst Canadians, some of whom saw it as an “implied abandonment of Britain and the support of the United States that went along with it”.⁵⁵⁶ Yet, in returning to government, Pearson still pushed its importance explicitly. “In the mid

⁵⁴⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 69–70.

⁵⁴⁹ Chapnick, 70–71.

⁵⁵⁰ W.H. Barton, ‘Regional Groupings - WEO Subgroups’, 20 August 1965, RG 25-12145, File no. 12-13-4-2, Vol. 15, Library and Archives Canada.

⁵⁵¹ Interviews with multiple individuals.

⁵⁵² Carroll, ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping: The Pearson Years’, 49.

⁵⁵³ Carroll, 56.

⁵⁵⁴ Carroll, 56.

⁵⁵⁵ Carroll, 56.

⁵⁵⁶ Carroll, 48.

to late-1960s, Canada was the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts” and Canada was also heavily funding them.⁵⁵⁷ Pearson saw this contribution in both personnel and financial support as part of the functional principle;⁵⁵⁸ Canada had the means therefore it should spend on the UN.⁵⁵⁹ He saw the UN as a community in which all members owed one another the best that they could contribute.⁵⁶⁰ He was well aware of its limits, but he felt that diplomacy and peacekeeping were the best tools within those limits. Moreover, those tools were best uses to fight “underdevelopment”⁵⁶¹ and communism, which he saw as threats to Canada’s interests. Peacekeeping was not intended to be a permanent solution in Pearson’s mind; it was a means to an end and part of a larger toolbox.

He reluctantly saw the tool as useful in Cyprus in 1964, especially as it intersected with Canada’s Cold War interests.⁵⁶² Canada was already involved in some capacity across the Middle East (Yemen, Suez, Palestine, formerly Lebanon), West New Guinea, Kashmir, and the Congo.⁵⁶³ He saw a peacekeeping mission to Cyprus as fraught and noted the difficulties that lay ahead; similarly, he knew that the expectations from the Secretary General and other states would be high. He could not turn them down. Ultimately following Britain’s lead and taking encouragement from President Johnson, Canada participated in the mission to Cyprus both out of belief in peacekeeping as a tool, but more importantly concern about the mission failing.⁵⁶⁴ If it were to fail, it could drive a wedge within the UN and more dangerously, NATO. Two NATO members requiring peacekeeping was high stakes and this was further pressure on the functional need to contribute.⁵⁶⁵

Pressure to contribute also stemmed from financial trouble at the UN. Many UN members were not paying their dues in the mid-1960s.⁵⁶⁶ Non-aligned states were calling for more from the UN in terms of peacekeeping and development assistance, but they could not pay for it.⁵⁶⁷ In many cases, including Cyprus, Canada was paying more than its fair share for the cause. Like peacekeeping, economic development was of great interest to Pearson as well, as he was indeed preoccupied by the problems of economic development and its risk factors for conflict and/or communism. He saw very little leadership from great powers on this issue and was consistently increasing funding for both. Over the course of his time as PM, he tripled Canada’s aid budget from 69.5 million to 253.2 million, also founding the Canadian International Development Agency and expanding aid to Latin America.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁵⁷ Carroll, 64.

⁵⁵⁸ Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, 2017, 72.

⁵⁵⁹ Chapnick, 72.

⁵⁶⁰ Chapnick, 72; Carroll, ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping: The Pearson Years’, 62.

⁵⁶¹ Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, 2017, 73.

⁵⁶² Carroll, ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping: The Pearson Years’, 59–63.

⁵⁶³ Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order* (Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002), 93.

⁵⁶⁴ Carroll, ‘Pragmatic Peacekeeping: The Pearson Years’, 58–59.

⁵⁶⁵ Carroll, 59–63.

⁵⁶⁶ Carroll, 62.

⁵⁶⁷ Adam Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, in *Mike’s World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 71.

⁵⁶⁸ Azzi, ‘Lester Pearson and the Substance of the Sixties’, 122–23.

By the end of the 1960s, Canadians were more negative about the UN and international affairs more broadly.⁵⁶⁹ The window of anti-colonial power-building by the NAM was closing. This wave had begun around the time that Canada ran for its seat in 1966. As I demonstrate in the next section, Pearson was not personally convinced of the utility of a seat on the UNSC. Martin was much more enthused and interested, but for Pearson, “a Security Council seat was a necessary contribution to the stability and credibility of the organization as a whole. It was not, however, a position that would allow Canada, or its representatives, to shine”.⁵⁷⁰ Pearson saw participating to be an obligation and a responsibility⁵⁷¹, strongly reaffirming his ongoing position that Canada was the type of country that contributed to a liberal vision of progress and greater good. This reflected some of the same justification for paying more than Canada’s expected UN dues and continuing to invest in the organization, despite its problems; Canada had given so much and should double down. Canada also wanted to be recognized for its exceptional use of status. In this case, participation as an obligation and a responsibility was strongly about maintaining status in the club for the future and maintaining the legitimacy of liberal international organizations, especially the UN.

Is the juice worth the squeeze? Canada’s 1966 UNSC Election

Given the high number of issues on the external affairs agenda in 1966, discussion about seeking election did not begin until the Spring of that year. The years 1964 and 1965 had been busy at the United Nations for Canada, especially through heavy involvement in peacekeeping and development aid policy. Canada also had a federal election in 1965, which left the Liberals disappointed in a second minority government, rather than the majority for which they had hoped. These issues and years are not separate from the decision to seek the seat, rather they are the conditions that Canadian leaders had to consider in the broader questions of status and service to the UN. They are part of the status-seeking process in that they precede decisions around the pursuit of status, but are the major factors considered in the decision.

At the UN, two seats were available in 1966 for the 1967-1968 term and it was a clean slate election. As the vote in the General Assembly was not competitive, contestation on how the seat should be filled took place within the newly created and contentious WEOG, as well as between Canadian decision-makers. Canada’s relative lack of interest in the seat was due to both being spread thin but also an awareness of the rough political waters at the UN and a desire not to risk international reputation or credibility at such a time. The question of Chinese representation, the divide with the Americans over Vietnam, and many other thorny issues were controversial at the UNSC, and Canadian policymakers were unsure as to whether having to weigh in on them publicly would hurt or harm Canada’s interests and status. Each of the issues described in the earlier sections informed the debate on whether Canada should run, both within WEOG and at home. These issues, especially as they culminated in the 1964-1966 period, were considered strongly by policymakers, and were weighed against the need to maintain existing status as influential within the UN (and be recognized as such).

⁵⁶⁹ Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 109.

⁵⁷⁰ Chapnick, ‘Pearson and the United Nations: Tracking the Stoicism of a Frustrated Idealist’, 2017, 80.

⁵⁷¹ Chapnick, 76.

Canadian policymakers were in a position where they could not satisfy all parties and were often seeking to tread a middle ground between those such as the powerful P5 and the NAM, who were asking for more at the UN. They were aiming to find a policy space that prioritized a commitment to multilateralism and the fact that Canada was beholden to its larger, imperially dominant allies. Managing this middle ground between powerful states and the rest was a strategy for managing change and uncertainty in status-seeking. However, it was at the crux of the problem with liberal internationalism – Canada could not (despite Pearson’s efforts) simultaneously achieve the liberal goals of political equality and cooperation in an unequal international organization within an imperial world of exclusion. This problem is central to the broader story of this dissertation.

Two key points flow from this. First, this exact problem is what Viola calls the “false promise of universalism” – the process of social closure in a complex organization automatically creates hierarchy, and subsequently status-seeking.⁵⁷² The contradictory existence of both liberal equality *and* hierarchy is part of the foundation and ongoing (re)construction of international organizations.⁵⁷³ Second, this artificial idea of balance in navigating this inequality – between the powerful P5 members and the “rest” – would continue to plague Canada in future elections and would become part of the Canadian liberal attitude across the UN, often equivocating positions between imperial powers and the rest and trying to find compromise within that. This view that balance and a middle-ground can be achieved tends to flatten the power relations within imperial hierarchy. The liberal conception of a middle gave equal weight to the colonizer and the colonized (i.e., the Americans and the Vietnamese, the British and those seeking independent from it), which is a false dichotomy in hierarchical contexts. Trying to navigate this problem underlay Canada’s 1966 campaign.

For Canada, status-seeking in 1966 was much more in the form of maintaining status or avoiding losing it amongst such a difficult period in which it was contributing so much. Canadian officials had to decide whether to serve and hold the seat, which was an exercise in whether to pursue and claim status. Status is to be used, and for Canada, rather than seeking to necessarily advance a larger cause, agenda, or set of interests through the expected behaviours of status (like at other points), the decision to take the seat served to maintain its position and recognition, by taking the responsibilities of a UNSC seat. Canadian leaders’ belief in the United Nations as essential to peace and security, despite evidence to the contrast, required an investment in its work. This belief also carried over to functionalism, wherein the Canadian position remained that functionalism should drive election to the UNSC. For Canada to take the seat and hold its status was both to act in its interest in supporting the UN but also to maintain the relevancy of its position that functionalism should override geography. Canada perceived the responsibilities of liberal international cooperation as requiring investment to maintain and continue its role within the organization and global politics more broadly, even if it was not the most appealing role at the time. The debate and subsequent justification about seeking the seat centred on finding a middle ground on contentious issues and on the framing of maintaining the

⁵⁷² Viola, *The Closure of the International System*, 1.

⁵⁷³ Viola, 5.

responsibilities of liberal internationalism, at a particular moment in which it intersected with imperialism through the process of decolonization.

The election took place on November 11th, at the end of the 20th session of the General Assembly. Prior to the specific decision to pursue the seat, there are key documents that articulate how Canada perceived its place within the UN and the importance of the UN for Canada's status, as well as *why* this status was important. These articulations provide a unique sense of Canada's UN policy framing the decision of whether or not to run. In March 1966, William H. Barton, head of the UN Division at External Affairs (who would become Ambassador to the UN a decade later during the 1976 campaign) presented a review called "*Canada and the United Nations in the Mid-Sixties*". In this review, Barton noted the changes in the UN since 1945, noting most significantly (and with much space dedicated) to the shift in power from P5 and Western-centric to more diffuse, as membership increased. Upon attempting to explain the decolonizing world, he asks "But what of Canada in this changing United Nations?"⁵⁷⁴

*"First – let us look at Canada's view of itself as a leader in the Organization. If we think back to 1945 it comes as a bit of a shock to recall the status we enjoyed then as the most important of the so-called middle powers... We were very conscious of this status and were successful in having an expression of the special role we foresaw for ourselves spelled out in Article 23 of the Charter, which in setting out the composition of the Security Council provides that in the election of non-permanent members due regard shall be especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization".*⁵⁷⁵

Here, Barton is emphasizing, once again, Canada's commitment to the functional principle. He goes on to say that contrary to the Charter, geographical distribution has been the primary consideration. In this case, the distaste that Canada had for the geographical distribution argument in previous decades continued. Canada's position in favour of the functional principle was in fact contesting the process by which social closure occurred in the UNSC. The process of status conferral itself was not concrete, even following Resolution 1991 (XVIII), and the process by which status was sought and conferred in 1966 was still a live-wire issue for Canadian policymakers. Seeking the seat in 1966 was very much about the maintenance of status through taking on responsibilities but underneath that, the idea remained that status should be considered seriously from the perspective of the functional principle. To serve would not only maintain Canada's status, but it would maintain the position that functionalism mattered, and that Canada was following through on the use of the seat.

Barton continued in his speech, noting Canada's hopes of...

"achieving frequent election to the Security Council thus have not been realized, but indisputably during the first ten years of the UN's existence, when the membership was

⁵⁷⁴ W.H. Barton, 'Canada and the United Nations in the Mid-Sixties' (Department of External Affairs, 18 March 1966), 7, Jules Leger Library.

⁵⁷⁵ Barton, 8.

half that of today and mainly western-oriented, and when many governments were pre-occupied with the problems of post-war reconstruction, Canada was able to exercise a measure of leadership that it was not possible to maintain as other middle powers became able to play a more active role and as the number of members in the Organization increased. In other words, the process of diffusion of influence which I mentioned a few moments ago has had specific application to Canada's position and role".⁵⁷⁶

The discursive return to decolonization and increased UNGA membership here is important, because as membership increased and influence diffused, UNSC membership became more valuable and more difficult in deciding who should take newly allotted seats. The “false promise of universalism” once again appears here; as membership increases, hierarchy does too through increased competition for seats. Moreover, while power is centralized in the UNSC in the P5 and the rights they have over UNGA members, they are not the ones who determine membership on the UNSC. That is up to the General Assembly formally, though in this case and many other early ones, a regional grouping presenting a clean slate. Power is concentrated but recognition, in the process of social closure, is diffuse. Status-seeking is a diffuse process within an environment of concentrated power that dominates key policy issues. This is an example of how multilateral diplomacy, according to Pouliot, “reflects power inequalities but also that it produces them”.⁵⁷⁷ In this case, the UNSC’s diplomatic environment reflects the hierarchy of membership that is continually reproduced in a diffuse way through status-seeking that continued to become more diffuse with increased membership.

As a result, Canadian officials had to take into consideration the views of more countries than ever before and balance the views of newly independent states with those of its Western allies. This would prove to be a challenge. The process of social closure was not only contested (functionalism vs. geography) but was, for the first time, formalized through regional groups via Resolution 1991A (XVIII) making it even more difficult to achieve for Canada. Since WEOG had two specific seats with no Commonwealth division, Canada still did not “fit” anywhere well. It was important to both maintain the importance of functionalism but also the existing status and position within the power hierarchy that Canada had acquired through its two decades of UN membership and two terms of UNSC service. Barton concluded the section of the speech on the UNSC arguing for mobilization of cooperation among UN members, noting that “Canada can and does have an important and influential place in the circle of nations which actively support and sustain the United Nations”.⁵⁷⁸

It was the UK that first approached Canada about pursuing the 1966 seat, having originally preferred the Australians or the Italians. Both Australia and Italy indicated their discomfort with US conduct in Vietnam, fearing that a seat would force them to comment on the issue, alienating the Americans. In May 1966, Cadieux learned that London planned to ask the Canadian government to serve. At this time, the Australians also indicated that they hoped to

⁵⁷⁶ Barton, 9–10.

⁵⁷⁷ Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*, 37.

⁵⁷⁸ Barton, ‘Canada and the United Nations in the Mid-Sixties’, 10.

serve elsewhere in the UN and would support a Canadian term.⁵⁷⁹ Cadieux crafted a memo listing four pros and three cons to seeking the seat at that time.

In favour of the seat, given Canada's significant recent contributions to peacekeeping and potential to continue doing so, Cadieux noted that a seat would be a useful advantage for driving the policy direction of peacekeeping. On the same note, "if as seems possible the UN is asked to supervise a Vietnam settlement and if this takes place over the next two to three years, it might be in our interest to be able to participate in the decision".⁵⁸⁰ Second, with the expansion to 15 members, the UNSC could be expected to continue to deal with major disputes, but it was unlikely that any would become major crises during the time that Canada would serve in 1967-1968.⁵⁸¹ The questions of Chinese representation and Rhodesia were still outstanding but were unlikely to reach a crisis point in the time that Canada would have responsibilities to manage such a crisis. Thus, it might be better to serve sooner rather than later.⁵⁸² Third, on the importance of functionalism, due to both financial and personnel contributions, Canada had a strong claim to the seat over any rivals within WEOG.⁵⁸³ Fourth, "the group of non-permanent members over the next two years will be of high quality, including Nigeria, India or Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, and Denmark", as Denmark had already indicated its desire for one of the two WEOG seats.⁵⁸⁴

In the argument against pursuing the seat, he noted that Canada had served twice already, and others had not, especially since many of those who had not were "Western European" and not "others".⁵⁸⁵ Second, Cadieux was concerned that it would be hard for Canada to achieve the position of liberal balance that it so desired:

*"we would be involved in problems on which it has been extremely difficult for us to take a stand without appearing to hurt the interests of one or other group of allies or friends, in NATO or the Commonwealth for example. The kinds of problems I have in mind are the future of Rhodesia, South West Africa, apartheid in South Africa, the Portuguese territories in Africa, Kashmir, Israel's relationship with her Arab neighbours, the relations of the USA with Central America or Caribbean countries".*⁵⁸⁶

In other words, Canadian policymakers were not eager to challenge imperial powers and structures. They were struggling to find a balance between being recognized by the majority of members as champions of liberal values, while also acknowledging the degree to which Canada was still committed to its principal allies. This challenge would remain in future decades on these same issues, especially Southern Africa and Palestinian self-determination, but also Central

⁵⁷⁹ High Commissioner of Canada to Australia, Menzies, 'Elections to Security Council', 18 May 1966, RG 25-12145, File no. 12-13-4-2, Vol. 15, Library and Archives Canada.

⁵⁸⁰ Marcel Cadieux, 'Pros and Cons of Canadian Candidacy for a Seat on the Security Council', 13 May 1966, RG 25-12145, File no. 12-13-4-2, Vol. 15, Library and Archives Canada.

⁵⁸¹ Cadieux.

⁵⁸² Cadieux.

⁵⁸³ Cadieux.

⁵⁸⁴ Cadieux.

⁵⁸⁵ Cadieux.

⁵⁸⁶ Cadieux.

America in the 1980s. Finally, Cadieux expressed concern that UNSC membership would be a burden on the Department's personnel capacity.

As noted earlier, Pearson was hesitant. Unsurprisingly, Martin was more enthusiastic and was likely in favour of the pro-side of the argument. Chapnick adds that culturally, the Department of External Affairs held generally more conservative inclinations that were also predicated on a British, racist view of the world, which may have left them behind on the decision to run.⁵⁸⁷ Cadieux's description of the issues boiled down to the problems of imperialism; membership, representation, and functionalism; and the relationship with Anglo-American power. Much like the 1950s and 1960s position of "pro-decolonization when it is anti-communism", Canada's liberal internationalism in this period and its pursuit of balance also consisted of being in favour of decolonization with exceptions when the imperial formations at the root of the problem were American or British. Navigating that tension in a UNSC position would depend on how the issues played out in the UNSC and there was no way to predict the future. Either the issues would not reach crisis and Canada would not have to address the imperial contradictions of its liberal international positions, or they would, and Canada would be faced with a challenge. Combined with the debate about functionalism and geography, the question was whether the rewards coming from the status of a seat would be worth the investment and whether it was necessary to think about the long-term and the way that status needed to be maintained and could be self-reinforcing.

By May 19th, Gordon Robertson, who was the clerk of the Privy Council, expressed his opposition to pursuing the seat. His view of the same issues was more pessimistic than Cadieux's. He wrote to Pearson, noting, "I have the impression that [Mr. Martin], personally, is quite interested in seeing Canada elected to membership. There are undoubtedly many considerations of which I am not aware but from where I sit it seems to me that it would be quite undesirable for Canada to put itself in a position where it will, in the next year or so, have to incur serious problems and difficulties that are not necessary".⁵⁸⁸ He continued, "undoubtedly we have a responsibility to play a positive and constructive role when we can, and certainly we have done so in the past, especially under your guidance. However, as I see it, the problems likely to arise in the next little while are of a kind that could be particularly difficult for us".⁵⁸⁹

Specifically, these issues were both the demands of domestic politics and lack of civil service capacity, but more importantly, the differences with the United Kingdom and the United States:

"The problems of Africa, and especially Rhodesia, as they will come to the Security Council could put us in an extremely awkward position in relation to the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the African countries on the other, at precisely the time that we are likely to be having delicate problems with the United Kingdom in relation to our trade position, their entry into Europe, etc. Problems in the Council on Viet-Nam are likely to

⁵⁸⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 75.

⁵⁸⁸ R. Gordon Robertson, 'Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Membership in the Security Council', 19 May 1966, MG 26 N4 Vol 280, File no. 823 Secret.

⁵⁸⁹ Robertson.

*make more difficult our relations with the United States at a time when they too can be delicate in relation to “nationalist” pressures here, oil policy, etc.”.*⁵⁹⁰

Robertson concluded by strongly recommending that it was not the right time for the seat. In response, Pearson’s handwriting on the memo reads,

*“I agree we should not seek election to the SC but if we are approached by our friends to take the ‘Western’ seat we couldn’t, of course, refuse. The important thing is to show no particular desire to take on this responsibility”.*⁵⁹¹

It would have been harmful to Canada’s existing status to refuse the seat, but there were concerns in terms of relations with the P5. Finding a way to navigate both and whether one might help or hurt status was the challenge. It was the same debate that also framed Canada’s ambivalence on decolonization and tension between siding with the powerful and the liberal principles of equality, sovereignty, and multilateralism. The government was willing to take a risk and support initiatives like independence for states in the Global South as long as it could be squared with Cold War goals and maintaining relations with imperial cores. If the seat were to be taken, status maintenance and the *status quo* of responsibilities would be the reasoning but weighing the pros and cons of a seat came down to the ability of Canadian officials to navigate policy issues within the constraints of siding with the P5 and supporting multilateral initiatives. This was about what would happen when *using* status through behaviours, responsibilities, and practices. Was the risk inherent in *using* status worth it, especially in thinking towards the future? Regardless, action was not yet to be taken either way.

Martin met with the British foreign minister and ambassador to the UN a week later, on May 26th. They were still interested in seeing the Italians serve but thought “favourably upon a Canadian candidature”.⁵⁹² Martin “responded positively and encouraged his British colleagues to broach the subject with Pearson the following day”.⁵⁹³ In Rome, Canadian representatives were to inquire about whether Italy would run. If it were not, Martin told U Thant on the 30th, Canada would run.⁵⁹⁴ By August, Italy decided not to run due to its unwillingness to challenge the Americans, and Canadian officials chose to “take on the burden”.⁵⁹⁵ Canadian media noted and was critical of the reluctance. On August 23rd, WEOG agreed that Denmark and Canada would be the candidates. It was a notably smooth election, and a rare one with multiple clean slates, with the exception of a competitive Afro-Asian race.⁵⁹⁶

Canada went into UNGA that Fall expecting to be elected for the responsibilities associated with the status of a seat. In August, for the 20th anniversary of the United Nations, the

⁵⁹⁰ Robertson.

⁵⁹¹ Robertson. A thank you here goes to my mother for helping me decode and transcribe Pearson’s handwriting (as well as other handwriting in other documents). Especially so since she did this before I realized Adam Chapnick had already done this work (page 76 of Canada on the United Nations Security Council).

⁵⁹² Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 76-77.

⁵⁹³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 76.

⁵⁹⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 77.

⁵⁹⁵ Chapnick, 77.

⁵⁹⁶ Chapnick, 77.

Department of External Affairs released a publication titled “We the Peoples” that captured the mood of the responsibilities. Without explicitly covering Canada’s decision to run that year, it framed Canada’s contributions over the previous two decades as leadership in the pursuit of the UN’s goals. Quoting a similar document from 1957, it describes Canada’s role at the UN and on the UNSC: “If Canadians wished the United Nations to act wisely, we should conduct “an active policy within its framework” and be prepared to accept responsibilities”.⁵⁹⁷ It highlighted Canada’s successes in the 1958-1959 term on the UNSC and also highlighted the role of those responsibilities as the UN entered its third decade:

*“Canada, indeed, may be said to have taken an optimistic view of the potentialities of the United Nations, a view which is nevertheless, not unmindful of the realities of a world of sovereign states. For, in these days of bewildering technical progress, a sense of realism is also a sense of optimism in the future ability of mankind to bring order out of chaos ”.*⁵⁹⁸

In his address to UNGA on September 23rd, Martin echoed the same sentiments as “We the Peoples” and the internal debate on the seat. He reviewed the Canadian position on U Thant’s performance (commending it), the UN and the UNSC’s peacekeeping operations, the challenges of Vietnam, the importance of universal membership in the UN, human rights, problems in Southern Africa, and economic development.⁵⁹⁹ For those inevitably casting a vote for Canada, he made clear where Canada stood and tried to draw attention to the things that Canada saw as important, as well as Canada’s commitment to making the organization work on liberal principles. In a four-part conclusion, he stated that “we must not allow Great Power differences over certain admittedly very difficult issues to induce a fruitless passivity in the membership. We must continue to search for opportunities for initiatives which are both constructive and realistic”.⁶⁰⁰ Unlike previous decades, Canada’s candidacy was shrouded in the sobriety of frustration that came with the responsibilities of UN membership. Canada received 114 of 119 available votes on November 11th, thus serving for two years in 1967 and 1968.⁶⁰¹

The 1967/1968 term foreshadowed what would continue to come in UNSC politics, particularly in campaigns. Early into the term, war would break out in the Middle East and Canada was immediately required to engage in the Council’s work, including Resolution 242 on Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory, which would come to define much of Canada’s

⁵⁹⁷ Department of External Affairs, *We the Peoples...Canada and the United Nations 1945-1965* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 102.

⁵⁹⁸ Department of External Affairs, 108.

⁵⁹⁹ ‘Text of Statement to Be Made in the General Debate of the General Debate of the 21st Session of the General Assembly by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, the Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., Q.C., M.P.’ (Canadian Mission to the United Nations, 23 September 1966), Jules Leger Library.

⁶⁰⁰ ‘Text of Statement to Be Made in the General Debate of the General Debate of the 21st Session of the General Assembly by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, the Honourable Paul Martin, P.C., Q.C., M.P.’, 12.

⁶⁰¹ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’ (New York: Security Council Report, 2019), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Elections%20Table%201946-2018.pdf>.

later positioning on Israeli occupation and Palestinian self-determination into the 1980s.⁶⁰² In addition, the UNSC would debate colonialism in Rhodesia, once again invoking intra-Commonwealth imperial politics.⁶⁰³ While many other issues of concern and hesitation for Canada did not appear on the Council's agenda, such as Vietnam, those that did would continue to be relevant on the international stage for decades to come.

Having status and being able to use it ended up being valuable for Canada, as it would have the opportunity to participate in discussion and demonstrate credibility on issues that would come up later. This was especially so given that they framed later status-seeking competitions for Canada. Canada could *use* status in a way that would allow it to be recognized for such use later. Status could be self-reinforcing in the future. While status-seeking can sometimes be reluctant, what we learn from Canada is that it is not because status is unwanted, but rather because the politics of status-seeking within liberal internationalism are sticky. For Canada, officials' reluctance came from the place of wanting to achieve balance on issues between imperial powers and either decolonizing states or the majority of UNSC members. This liberal idea of balance is nearly impossible to achieve due to the hierarchical nature of the UNSC and the idea that not all membership is equal. Since the UNSC hierarchy is embedded in the larger global hierarchy, consideration must be given to the ways that a particular status competition exists within the bigger picture, geographically, politically, and temporally. Navigating this uncertainty and change was central. For Canada in 1966, maintaining existing status in the bigger picture, by seeking it on the UNSC, became worth it. Canada's use of status certainly invoked many of the larger problems of balancing equality and P5 power through imperialism and liberalism's nexus.

The Shift Forward: Trudeau and Foreign Policy

The 1970s began with a moment of profound rupture for Canadian foreign policy. The transition from Lester B. Pearson to Pierre Elliott Trudeau was one of great change, despite both men leading the same Liberal Party of Canada. While also only 22 years apart in age, Trudeau was a younger, fresher face in Canadian politics, as opposed to Pearson who had been involved at least as a diplomat since 1927. Where Pearson had attempted to manage change and uncertainty through maintaining Canada's liberal international commitment over a long period, Trudeau sought to create change himself. Ultimately, his form of change was to turn Canada towards new parts of the world, reject some of its image, and plan to shift economic and defence relations, though the latter was noticeably unsuccessful. This played into Canada's status-seeking – Trudeau sought to change Canada's identity and policy, but ultimately simply took on different areas of the same liberal international vision due to the competing desire to pursue status. Since status was constructed within a liberal international hierarchy of the UN, the importance of having status for Canada in the UN context limited how effectively Canadian policy could be changed. In the context of an increasingly competitive UNSC, Canadian campaigning through liberal internationalism was only subtly different in the way that it sought to use status; it had to remain within the bounds of what was already internationally acceptable and associated with Canadian foreign policy. In the context of the UN in the 1970s and the history of Canadian

⁶⁰² Robert Stanfield, 'Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa' (Special Representative of the Government of Canada and Ambassador-at-Large., 20 February 1980), <https://gac.canadiana.ca/view/ooe.b1845354/1>.

⁶⁰³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 90.

foreign policy to that point, Canadian policymakers could not depart too far from the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices necessary for using status and thus could only simply re-imagine liberalism in subtle ways. In this turn to the 1970s, I sketch the context of Trudeau's foreign policy at home, before looking internationally and developing the argument more deeply in discussing the election.

Under Trudeau, Mitchell Sharp became Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1968, a position he held until 1974. In 1974, Allan MacEachen was appointed and held the position until the fall of 1976. Both were central to the push to change Canada's trajectory globally, moving away from the legacy of Pearson, their predecessor. In the SSEA role was A.E. Ritchie, and subsequently Basil Robinson, who were both open to change, but still traditional in some ways, of which the government of the day was not immediately fond.⁶⁰⁴ Crucial to behaving in an un-Pearsonian manner, Trudeau questioned Canada's "'helpful fixer' role attendant on Canada's status as a middle power".⁶⁰⁵ Upon his election, he "demanded a 'fresh look at the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy' to determine how it might 'serve more effectively Canada's current interests, objectives and priorities'".⁶⁰⁶ For Trudeau, (a) re-assessing commitments to NATO; (b) recognizing the People's Republic of China; (c) expanding relations across the Pacific to Asia and south to Latin America; and (d) rethinking multilateralism were high on the agenda. Similarly, Trudeau was interested in deeper engagement with the Global South. Trudeau sought what he thought was a more realistic approach to foreign policy than that of Pearson, claiming to focus more on Canada's economic interests, and focusing less on international development and peacekeeping, which Pearson had seen as Canada's interests and fought so hard for at the UN in the 1960s. Moreover, the Trudeau government saw foreign policy as something in which domestic civil society should participate, bringing Canadians into the process of consulting and decision-making.⁶⁰⁷

The Trudeau era was marked by change politically and bureaucratically (including austerity programs in the public service) but unlike most periods of time before and after, it was marked by a significant amount of reflection on previous foreign policy choices. Many Canadians, including Trudeau, had pushed for a re-evaluation of Canada's activities abroad, owing to "East-West détente, the recovery of Western Europe, and a nascent Canadian nationalism".⁶⁰⁸ Under Sharp, the Department completed a defence review in 1969, and in 1970, a white paper titled *Foreign Policy for Canadians* re-evaluated Canada's external policy. Just over a year later in 1971, the Department of External Affairs submitted a review to Cabinet on the future of Canada-US relations. In 1972, the Liberal government was re-elected with a minority government and then re-elected again in 1974, with a return to a majority government.

⁶⁰⁴ John Hilliker, Mary Halloran, and Greg Donaghy, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), xi.

⁶⁰⁵ Mary Halloran, John Hilliker, and Greg Donaghy, 'The White Paper Impulse: Reviewing Foreign Policy under Trudeau and Clark', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 70, no. 2 (June 2015): 310, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbv>.

⁶⁰⁶ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 311; Halloran et al. quote Trudeau's speech: Pierre Trudeau, 'Canada and the World' (Department of External Affairs, 29 May 1968), Statements and Speeches 68/17.

⁶⁰⁷ Laura Macdonald, 'Canada Goes Global: Building Transnational Relations between Canada and the World, 1968–2017', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 24, no. 3 (2 September 2018): 358–71, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbr>.

⁶⁰⁸ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 'The White Paper Impulse', 310.

Following the 1974 election, PMO, PCO, and the Department reviewed Canada's attitude towards the United Nations, North-South relations, and the Middle East. The results "were fed into a final ICEDRC [Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Relations with the Developing World] review session chaired by MacEachen, which concentrated on Canada's possible membership on the Security Council".⁶⁰⁹ Each of these reviews allows those looking back to chronicle and understand changes in foreign policy throughout Trudeau's time in office. The 1976 UNSC election also offers a window into the status of foreign policy in 1976, as the Department gathered its positions on issues and strategies for engaging abroad. I discuss the defence review and Foreign Policy for Canadians below, and then discuss the Canada-US relations review in the section on US relations and the 1974 review when introducing the 1976 UNSC campaign.

The initial defence review in 1969 was fraught with disagreement between the Prime Minister, the Department of External Affairs, the Privy Council Office, and all levels of policymakers within them. Ultimately, the review altered the terms under which Canada participated in NATO. NATO commitments were to be reduced, peacekeeping was to be considered less important, and Canada's nuclear role was to be slowly eliminated.⁶¹⁰ Ultimately, North American defence would become the priority. This would later change in the second half of the decade with an increased surge of defence spending and re-engagement with NATO.⁶¹¹

Foreign Policy for Canadians saw more collaboration between the Department and the Prime Minister, and its results reflected much of what the Liberals had campaigned on in 1968, but with some twists. The final version of the paper indicated that the United Nations took too much Canadian effort and streamlined Canada's UN resources to 11 main areas, though they covered everything from peacekeeping to disarmament to social and economic development.⁶¹² It identified six priorities around Canada's so-called interests, which included, in order of importance, "fostering economic growth", "safeguarding sovereignty and independence", and "working for peace and security".⁶¹³ Similarly, it declared that foreign policy activities should be directly linked to domestic policy.⁶¹⁴ This was a major turn at this point from the Pearson-era, where the United Nations was seen as central to Canada's interests and there was nearly no maximum amount of effort that Canada would give the organization.

Appropriately titled for the new focus on civil society and the domestic side of foreign policy, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* drove the early Trudeau-years, including an increased engagement with the francophone world to combat Quebec's increasing global autonomy, an exchange of official visits with the Soviet Union in 1971, an increase in trade and diplomatic relations with Asia, and the official recognition of Beijing in 1973. The key theme of human rights emerged, among others, and came to guide engagement both bilaterally and multilaterally in the early 1970s. As Asa McKercher notes, human rights and self-determination were a point

⁶⁰⁹ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 316.

⁶¹⁰ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 312.

⁶¹¹ Jeffrey F. Collins, 'A Defence Budget Increase Will Need a Policy Rethink', *Policy Options*, 25 March 2022, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/defence-budget-increase-change-procurement/>.

⁶¹² Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 'The White Paper Impulse', 313.

⁶¹³ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 313.

⁶¹⁴ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 313.

of tension for the PM and for the Department of External Affairs.⁶¹⁵ Despite increased multilateral work on human rights internationally by the Department, Trudeau himself had little enthusiasm for the human rights “revolution” of the 1970s, particularly when it came to self-determination movements.⁶¹⁶ McKercher describes Canada’s international policies on rights as an “unsteady lurch”, where Trudeau and Canadian diplomats began to champion some UN initiatives, but Canada’s economic interests and Trudeau’s dislike of nationalisms – especially where support for self-determination abroad would incite Quebec nationalism – took precedence in guiding bilateral engagements.⁶¹⁷ Trudeau strongly believed in a united Canada and invoked Quebec nationalism in justifying non-engagement in Biafra and did not condemn Indonesian crackdown in East Timor. Similarly, he likened Ukrainian dissidents in the Soviet Union to the FLQ in Quebec.⁶¹⁸

Much like the domestic origins of this foreign policy stance, the desire for increased trade relations outside the United States drove the further desire to keep quiet on the affairs within the borders of others. This avoidance of discussing human rights was often contradictory when compared to the rhetoric of foreign policy at home. For example, in his mandate letter, Trudeau asked MacEachan to speak out on issues of inequality and human rights as Minister, creating a “strong moral fibre” for Canada, which also included advocated for increased nuclear safeguards globally and a decreased role for Canada in the arms trade.⁶¹⁹ Similarly, in a campaign speech in 1974, Trudeau stated, “if I were to identify any single criterion by which I hope Canada’s presence in the world would be judged, I hope it would be its humanism, its pursuit of social justice”.⁶²⁰ Driven by domestic interests, liberal economic interests, and different perspectives between actors, human rights, inequality, and self-determination hung over Canadian foreign policy in the 1970-1976 period in ways that were often contradictory but yet the product of a complex machine of how foreign policy is made and how power operates internationally. Of course, liberal contradiction was nothing new for Canada or many of its WEOG peers where an evolving liberal internationalism also reigned.

Branching Out? Canada-US Relations and the Third Option

The United States was firmly the most important relationship for Canada by the 1970s. Gone were the days of the centrality of loyalty to Britain; Canadian foreign policy was shaped strongly by its position and options in relation to the elephant to the south. This is not to say that the Commonwealth and British imperialism were not still stitched into the fabric of Canadian

⁶¹⁵ Asa McKercher, ‘Reason over Passion: Pierre Trudeau, Human Rights, and Canadian Foreign Policy’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 73, no. 1 (March 2018): 129–45, <https://doi.org/10/gdk36n>.

⁶¹⁶ McKercher.

⁶¹⁷ McKercher, 131.

⁶¹⁸ McKercher, 131–35.

⁶¹⁹ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 181.

⁶²⁰ Quoted in both: David Webster, ‘End of the Innocents: Engagement and Decolonization in the Global South since 1968’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 24, no. 3 (2 September 2018): 331, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbt>; Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 180.

governance and the Department of External Affairs, but rather they were no longer the main ally considered at the core of Canadian foreign policy debates. Similarly, many of the issues that Canada would deal with in the 1970s, specifically in the UNSC campaign, were geopolitical issues with their origins in British imperialism (i.e., Namibian independence, Palestinian self-determination), though time had removed them from the realm of being seen as “British”. Britain was consistently in the background, rendered more invisible as years passed, but cemented in the foundations of both 1970s global politics and Canada’s relation to it. In many ways, this was a sort of Gramscian shift; where Britain’s influence on global politics was so normalized in the background, rather than driving immediate policy issues for Canada.

The United States appeared to be a headache for Canadians of at the start of the 1970s. In 1971, the Nixon administration levied a 10% surcharge on import duties, prompting Canada to review its economic relationship. Written in late 1971 and released in 1972, the Department of External Affairs, with the Minister and the PM, drafted a document exploring new directions at the end of the “special relationship”.⁶²¹ Cabinet decided that the best course of option was the Third Option, which was also favoured by the Department.⁶²² The goal of the Third Option was (a) to make Canada less dependent on the American trade relationship, turning instead towards a growing Asia and a rebuilt Western Europe, as well as the Global South and the Soviet bloc; and (b) to increase Canadian autonomy in other social, economic, and cultural areas. The Third Option’s success was very limited, but it reflected a growing desire within government and within Canada more broadly to separate itself from the United States, out of a deeper fear of Canada-US interdependence and integration. Many Canadians and politicians saw the default to cooperation between the two countries as no longer in Canada’s interest. As John Hancock argues, the Third Option was as much about economic independence as it was concerns about “eroding Canadian sovereignty”.⁶²³ Little change in terms of actual trade diversification followed, but the Third Option clearly indicated that the power driving Canadian choices and identity was solidly the United States and not the imperial motherland, Britain. While many of Canada’s foreign policy constraints had previously come from the Commonwealth – and seeking to maintain its coherence – its main constraint was the United States in the 1970s. Moreover, what made this different was that the Third Option saw the United States as a foil, so it was a move to branch Canada out on its own rather than work within a group. This was an effort to change the way that Canada thought of itself and projected itself in multilateral settings. Unfortunately for Trudeau’s ambitions, its success was limited.

Through the early 1970s, following the reduction in NATO contributions, the Trudeau government kept defence and Cold War spending low. Like Pearson before him, Trudeau was skeptical of NATO⁶²⁴, but as the Cold War approached a period of détente, he had far more opportunity to decrease commitments to the alliance. By 1975 though, Trudeau and the government changed course. While some have argued that the search for trade links led to

⁶²¹ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, ‘The White Paper Impulse’, 315.

⁶²² Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 315.

⁶²³ John Hancock, ‘The Third Option: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Come?’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 70, no. 2 (June 2015): 322, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbs>.

⁶²⁴ Francis Maas, “‘We Must Take Our Allies’ Views into Account’: Pierre Trudeau and the Turn Back to NATO in the Mid-1970s’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 71, no. 2 (June 2016): 268, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbn>.

requests for increased Canadian defence presence from allies (notably West Germany), this was not the only reason for the turn. Francis Maas points out that Trudeau came around to NATO support because he accepted its role in maintaining the balance of power between East and West and because he became convinced (by Helmut Schmidt) that it could serve Canadian interests.⁶²⁵ From 1975 forward, NATO contributions increased, which, when combined with further investment in continental defence, kept Canada firmly in the United States of America's orbit, in more ways than just economic.⁶²⁶

Nearly a decade after Pearson's infamous argument with Johnson, Canadian differences with the United States over Vietnam remained. Canada's ICC responsibilities wrapped up in mid-1973, but the issue remained sensitive. Canada was still not seen as a neutral party from the United States, both abroad and at home from activists, but the Trudeau government took a "quiet diplomacy" approach to stating its differences with its neighbour.⁶²⁷ Disagreements were not made public, a trend that fit into the broader theme of the Trudeau government wherein the PM did not want to meddle in the human rights, sovereignty, or conflicts of other states. A quiet approach was the strategy with the United States and with others; in fact, Trudeau saw Canada as able to avoid condemnation and critique of human rights issues around the world simply because Canada was *not* the United States and therefore had the flexibility to prioritize its interests differently. Ultimately, Canada-US relations were not at their best in the early 1970s, owing to policy differences, trade and economic differences, and Nixon and Trudeau's low enthusiasm for one another. By 1975 and 1976, Ford-Trudeau relations looked stronger, trade had barely been re-oriented, and re-engagement with NATO was underway. While claiming commitment to cultural, economic, and political independence in many ways, Canada was firmly within the American sphere. The Third Option had become irrelevant.

North, South, East, and West: Canada's Diplomatic Expansion

In the efforts to try and diversify Canadian external relations, Pierre Trudeau reached across the East-West divide, concerning himself with increasing economic and political relationships with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet bloc. While strongly anti-communist, the emerging détente of the 1970s facilitated Trudeau's desire to increase economic and political relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. In turn, he was a promoter of détente. In 1971, Trudeau went to Moscow and was later welcomed in Havana in 1976, though the good relations with Cuba were cut short due to Cuban intervention in Angola. Simultaneously, the Canadian government was extremely concerned with the North-South divide, hoping to expand Canada's relationship with the Global South as well as across the Pacific to the rest of Asia. This included the previously mentioned relations with the PRC, but also deepening them economically with Japan, South Korea, and even Indonesia.⁶²⁸ Central to this "pacific tilt"⁶²⁹ was the role of multilateralism, including ASEAN and the United Nations, which facilitated many of

⁶²⁵ Maas, 268.

⁶²⁶ Maas, 268.

⁶²⁷ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 198-99; McKercher, 'Reason over Passion', 136.

⁶²⁸ Greg Donaghy, 'Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific Tilt, 1945-1984', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 74, no. 1 (March 2019): 135-50, <https://doi.org/10/gpftbw>.

⁶²⁹ Donaghy.

the issues and bilateral relationships at hand. These expansions to nearly every other corner of the globe were partly driven by the Third Option, but also stemmed from new views on the Cold War, a push for economic growth, as well as increasing globalization. These relationships would become essential to Canada's eventual election to the UNSC in 1976. In many ways, this expansion of Canadian external relations expanded Canada's image as an independent state no longer reliant on the Commonwealth or the United States, engaging with the problems of IOs and international order in a way that considered its own interests first. However, while it was no longer reliant on these other actors, it was deeply entrenched in the liberal ordering and institutions that they created.

Beyond Commonwealth relations with India and its role in Vietnam, Canada's relations with countries of Asia were limited prior to 1968, owing to earlier beliefs in government that Asia simply was not an important link for Canada.⁶³⁰ Trudeau brought skepticism of Canada's dedication to the North Atlantic, arguing that Canada was also a Pacific nation, and one that had been constrained too much by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. By the 1970s, not only were Trudeau and his Cabinet of a different generation than those who had governed in the immediate post-War years, but his diplomatic corps in the Department of External Affairs were also of a younger generation and more eager to look beyond the North Atlantic.⁶³¹ Canada exchanged diplomatic representatives with Beijing in 1970, and official recognition and an official visit took place in 1973. While making clear its enthusiasm for China, the Trudeau government was "keen to reassure other Asian governments that the overture to China was 'only on aspect of a general intensification of our interest and relations with the countries of Asia and the Pacific'".⁶³² Increased diplomatic and economic relations with Japan slowly began in 1971, with some false starts along the way.⁶³³ Similar engagement attempts with South Korea followed.⁶³⁴ In the development aid realm, Canada heavily invested in Indonesia. Multilaterally, Canada began to connect with ASEAN.⁶³⁵

Looking to the Global South, questions of decolonization remained ever-present in global politics. As David Webster points out, "before Pierre Trudeau became prime minister, Canadian relations with the Global South were subordinated to the relationships that mattered, with the United States and Western Europe".⁶³⁶ Similarly, as seen in earlier chapters, relationships *with* the Global South were framed and operationalized through Canada's relationships to colonial powers, driven heavily by French, British, or even American policy in particular regions. According to Webster, "after 1968, Canadian governments proclaimed that the Global South would be one area of Canadian interest, even if not at center stage, and that relations with the South would be made on the merits of the case, not as an afterthought or consequence of Canada's North Atlantic alliances".⁶³⁷ As such, from 1968 onward, global geographies were

⁶³⁰ Donaghy, 136.

⁶³¹ Donaghy, 143.

⁶³² Webster, 'End of the Innocents', 333.

⁶³³ Donaghy, 'Pierre Trudeau and Canada's Pacific Tilt, 1945-1984', 174-75.

⁶³⁴ Donaghy, 146.

⁶³⁵ Donaghy, 148.

⁶³⁶ Webster, 'End of the Innocents', 330.

⁶³⁷ Webster, 331.

reimagined within the Canadian policy apparatus, taking place at the political level and the bureaucratic level, especially as External Affairs warmed up to a new PM, having been led in some capacity by the well-liked Pearson for so long. This too was part of Canadian officials, led by Trudeau, projecting a new image globally that trickled down into its status-seeking efforts.

That said, this did not magically mean the decolonization of the Canadian vision of the Global South, nor did it mean that Canada's relations were somehow devoid of the influences of imperialism, historically or contemporaneously. Certainly, while a newer, younger, and more modern bureaucracy was emerging and reimagining the Canada of the future, this version of the Department of External Affairs in particular was still in a state of evolution from its earlier, British, imperial predecessors. Removing the lenses, political framings, and worldviews from a bureaucracy did not necessarily take place simply because of a policy pivot, and political leaders were not free from this colonial view of the world either. Certainly, the view was still paternalistic and development-driven, and Canada was not, as Webster indicates, "an advocate for the Global South"⁶³⁸. The Canada of the 1970s often had gaps between rhetoric and action, especially when it came to newfound claims of solidarity with the Global South. Canada was still bound to the liberal trajectory of Anglo-American dominated order.

Imperialism and relations to imperial formations still mattered, even in a "mostly" decolonized world where independence was formally granted to many states, but they were still calling for an end to economic neo-colonialism and political forms of imperialism. Much like the 1960s, the UN was a site of challenging the white, Western liberal order and making demands for equality and anti-colonialism. In Canada, "policymakers still saw the process of decolonization through the lens of Canada's journey 'from colony to nation'".⁶³⁹ This firmly ignored Canada's role within British empire and as ongoing colonizer of Indigenous nations at home. In fact, it saw Canada as the decolonized territory in terms of its independence from the UK, rather than Canada as a settler colony. According to Webster,

*"The Canadian model of decolonization proposed in effect that other countries follow Canada's orderly, evolutionary path toward independence, one that did not cast off the colonizer's legacy, but built upon it. Decolonization should be orderly, gradual, non-confrontational and constructive. Official Ottawa was concerned to ensure that a new gulf did not emerge between Western states and the newly independent states of the South".*⁶⁴⁰

Moreover, the new détente phase of the Cold War meant that there was less of a strategic concern in keeping the Global South away from communism, but the fear of communism attitude prevailed, even amidst the alleged prioritization of the Global South.

The Trudeau government expanded relations with Latin America, in addition to Canada's extensive ties to the Francophone world and the Commonwealth. In the Francophonie, where Canada joined the official organization in 1970, there was a competition with Quebec for the

⁶³⁸ Webster, 340.

⁶³⁹ Webster, 340.

⁶⁴⁰ Webster, 335.

support of Francophone African nations, as part of the struggle for national unity at home.⁶⁴¹ In the English-speaking world, Trudeau himself still valued the Commonwealth. Though Webster notes that he called it “anachronistic” at first, he grew to appreciate it and strove to see it continue in its whole form, without any loss of members.⁶⁴² This unity was his priority when discussing the divide over British arms sales to apartheid South Africa in 1971.⁶⁴³ In fact, the preserved unity of the Commonwealth was also aligned with the desire to see decolonization happen in its preferred model; the Canadian government in the 1970s much preferred the approach of Commonwealth countries to decolonization, as opposed to those that took more revolutionary approaches, such as Algeria from France. The Commonwealth model was very much the “Canadian way” and Ottawa preferred it that way, especially given Trudeau’s dislike of the politics of self-determination and nationalism. This was of course an attitude that prioritized liberal values and even in an “unsteady lurch”⁶⁴⁴ forward on decolonization, Canadian policymakers were still attached to the imperial dynamics of the past.

While it should be made clear that not all nationalisms are the same, and anti-colonial nationalism did not have the same purpose as other types, Trudeau’s position against independence, self-determination, and nationalism was consistent on the surface, in that he was opposed to it in all forms. This meant that Canada was often seeking either a middle ground or silent on many issues multilaterally. While it came from a somewhat different place, it still resembled similar positions under Pearson in the two previous decades, where Canada sought to find compromise between the colonizer and the colonized. In Southern Africa, Canada voted to advocate for Portuguese decolonization in Mozambique and Angola, but policymakers “still indicated a preference for negotiated solutions and a reluctance to back national liberation movements...Canada had no intention of isolating Portugal and no intention to follow the Scandinavian lead and aid the liberation movements”.⁶⁴⁵ Even following the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, Canada’s position remained the same – evolution, negotiation, and a wariness of leftist movements – unlike many European allies.⁶⁴⁶

Webster writes that a similar pattern formed in the 1970s in Namibia, which was fighting for independence from South Africa and was also embroiled to some degree in the fight for Angolan independence from Portugal. Much like on South Africa itself in the early 1970s, Canada sought a “middle ground, not a policy of advocacy”.⁶⁴⁷ On East Timor, which Indonesia invaded following Timorese independence from Portugal, the Trudeau government still supported the Indonesian government heavily. Ultimately, Canada was yet again positioning itself in the middle, not as a “middle power” in the traditional sense but rather as a middle ground between imperial powers and former colonies. For all of his focus on change and despite it stemming from differing personal beliefs, Trudeau’s approaches to self-determination, rights,

⁶⁴¹ Webster, 337–38.

⁶⁴² Webster, 335.

⁶⁴³ Webster, 335.

⁶⁴⁴ McKercher, ‘Reason over Passion’.

⁶⁴⁵ Webster, ‘End of the Innocents’, 336.

⁶⁴⁶ Webster, 336.

⁶⁴⁷ Webster, 336.

and decolonization ended up similar to those of his predecessors. Both approaches were thoroughly grounded in liberalism.

At the UN, this approach remained consistent. Trudeau was concerned with the economic disparity between Western states and the Global South, but much like the new Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, greatly disliked the leftist politics of the NAM (and preferring the capitalist “Canadian” development model).⁶⁴⁸ The non-aligned states held little sway within the UNSC, but at the General Assembly, they were still well-organized, including successfully adopting the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974.⁶⁴⁹ The NIEO’s success was linked with broader political demands for national liberation and anti-imperialism. As Canadian policymakers grappled with this and struggled to figure out relations with liberation movements, they were also compelled to update their approach to Palestinian self-determination.⁶⁵⁰

Canada’s position under Pearson had traditionally seen the Palestinian people as “refugees without collective political rights”.⁶⁵¹ Arab states had perceived Pearson as “3/4 impartial on the Israeli side” over the years.⁶⁵² He was celebrated for his actions during Suez but had been central to the partition of the British mandate of Palestine, in line with acting in spirit of the Empire, during Canada’s first term on the UNSC. In many ways, this tarnished his reputation as “even-handed” or “balanced”.⁶⁵³ That said, given Canada’s relative disconnection from the region between 1948 and Suez, this had been generally ignored more broadly and Arab states later thought more positively of Pearson, Canada’s impartiality, and work at Suez. By the 1960s, Arab states developed formal diplomatic relations with Canada and saw Pearson’s return to government as a welcome change from Diefenbaker, though they did not find the “impartiality” on Palestinian self-determination for which they had hoped.⁶⁵⁴ Pearson reasserted Canada’s “peacekeeping role”, claiming impartiality, but did not grant “equitable treatment to the Palestinian and Arab right to self-determination” within the UN, “nor did [Canada] buttress the territorial integrity of Arab states against perceived Israeli expansionism; rather, Ottawa ardently defended Israeli security to the detriment of Palestine and decolonization more broadly”.⁶⁵⁵ Impartiality, it seemed, was in the eye of the beholder; it was a position constructed by Western states within a discursive and material context that normalized imperialism, thus equating Palestinian and Israeli causes, regardless of the fact that one held significantly more power than the other.

⁶⁴⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 97.

⁶⁴⁹ Chapnick, 97.

⁶⁵⁰ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 230.

⁶⁵¹ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 230.

⁶⁵² Maurice Jr. M. Labelle, ‘Not So Nobel: Arab Perceptions of Lester Pearson and Canada’, in *Mike’s World: Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs*, ed. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 173.

⁶⁵³ Labelle, 171.

⁶⁵⁴ Labelle, ‘Not So Nobel: Arab Perceptions of Lester Pearson and Canada’.

⁶⁵⁵ Labelle, 172–73.

The 1967 war was an “opportunity to demonstrate impartiality”⁶⁵⁶ for Pearson during Canada’s Security Council term, but instead, Canada recognized Israel’s “right of conquest”,⁶⁵⁷ despite calls from Arab states for Canada to ensure that “international law prevailed over settler colonialism”.⁶⁵⁸ This use of the status that others conferred upon Canada would shape Canada’s relationship to the same issues as they appeared in the Council in later years. The UNSC collectively refused to demand withdrawal of Israeli occupying troops, instead resolving to ask Israel to facilitate the right to return of refugees.⁶⁵⁹ Canada’s next move was to make offers to resettle Palestinian refugees and to provide humanitarian aid to the region. Ultimately, Canada did not itself demand a right of return for Palestinian refugees, backing the “desire to have the land without the people”⁶⁶⁰, which, even if not explicitly for Canadian diplomats, aligned with settler colonial historical notions of *terra nullius* in Canada, or the idea that Canada was a blank canvas for the historical expansion of liberal British settler society and economic activity. Offering resettlement elsewhere for refugees rather than condemning conquest and supporting a right of return stood as tacit approval of Israeli settlements and annexations following the 1967 war and the growing occupation. It also meant that officials did not need to become aware of or make an explicit connection between settler colonial societies. Arab-Canadians and Arab governments were disappointed in these positions, prompting Canadian diplomats to engage in a variety of conversations about how to improve relations between Canada and the region.⁶⁶¹ This bore little fruit, as relations between Arab states and Canada were permanently changed by the time Pierre Trudeau entered office in 1968. Moreover, Arab states saw Canada’s actions as a glorification of Canada’s self-image and impartiality at the expense of the spirit of humanitarianism.⁶⁶²

By 1974, the General Assembly, with the push of the non-aligned states, “adopted a resolution inviting Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to address the General Assembly during a debate on Palestine”.⁶⁶³ Importantly, Canada abstained on this resolution because it maintained the longer-held position of “refusing to ‘prejudge’ the question of who should represent the Palestinian people” at the UN.⁶⁶⁴ That said, this was taken as an opportunity for the Department of External Affairs to review the official policies on Palestinian self-determination. MacEachen sought what the Department considered a balanced approach, where they recommended that the Canadian delegation in New York provide a statement that referenced a Palestinian voice in politics, a small shift which would “bring Canadian policy into line with that of most of its European allies and encourage moderate Palestinians to pursue their cause peacefully”.⁶⁶⁵ Following critique of the abstention from domestic pro-Israel groups, which compared abstaining to supporting terrorism, MacEachan

⁶⁵⁶ Labelle, 177.

⁶⁵⁷ Labelle, 178.

⁶⁵⁸ Labelle, 178.

⁶⁵⁹ Labelle, 178–79.

⁶⁶⁰ Labelle, 179.

⁶⁶¹ Labelle, 179–81.

⁶⁶² Labelle, 184.

⁶⁶³ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 230.

⁶⁶⁴ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 230.

⁶⁶⁵ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 230.

instead chose to directly address UNGA to indicate that “Canada understood Israeli security needs, while simultaneously acknowledging ‘the concept of a distinct Palestinian entity and personality’”.⁶⁶⁶ Further critique from across civil society and within Cabinet pushed the Department to continue reviewing policy extensively.

In terms of UN votes, the Department recommended stressing “balance and objectivity” and a commitment to peacekeeping that “reflected Canada’s overriding interest in ensuring that regional conflict did not trigger a superpower confrontation”.⁶⁶⁷ In a similar vein, the Department recommended that Canada maintain existing policy as best as possible while improving relations across the region while figuring out how to vote at the UN on the topic of PLO representation.⁶⁶⁸ A later memo, led by Geoffrey Pearson, the former PM’s son, revised the earlier review to argue that the “balance had tilted too much towards Israel” in Canadian policy, and “to correct this imbalance, the government should consider active peacemaking initiatives”.⁶⁶⁹ Interdepartmental and intra-Cabinet conflict ensued, specifically on the issue of recognizing the PLO. MacEachan sought a more active, “pro-Arab” policy, with little success. Further policy review indicated that economic relations with the region were important, providing reasons to maintain good relations with Arab states, but MacEachan was unsatisfied with the lack of decision on Palestinian representation specifically.⁶⁷⁰ Ultimately, Cabinet endorsed a memorandum on a policy that accepted the PLO as the spokespeople of Palestinians, “provided the group accepted Israel’s right to exist within safe and secure borders”, but MacEachan avoided discussing the new policy internationally as much as possible.⁶⁷¹

Simultaneously – and relatedly – Trudeau acknowledged the need for updated foreign policy statements in 1974 beyond just specific issues. *Foreign Policy for Canadians* no longer applied in the changing international context, especially in response to the “growing political coherence”⁶⁷² of the Global South around the NIEO and the importance in his mind of North-South relations. As such, MacEachan initiated the review of Canada’s “attitude toward the United Nations”, as that was where North-South and Middle East issues were central. This was “at the core of the government’s effort to redefine its diplomacy in the 1970s”.⁶⁷³ The Palestinian self-determination issue as well as North-South issues were part of this review and it ultimately concluded with interdepartmental discussions on whether to run for the UNSC in 1976.⁶⁷⁴ The Department of External Affairs prepared a memorandum on UN policy, essentially justifying very little change to existing practices. It saw the UN as universally important and requested to maintain a “positive attitude toward the UN and its work by continuing to support universality of

⁶⁶⁶ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 230.

⁶⁶⁷ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 231.

⁶⁶⁸ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 231.

⁶⁶⁹ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 231.

⁶⁷⁰ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 230–31.

⁶⁷¹ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, 234.

⁶⁷² Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, ‘The White Paper Impulse’, 316.

⁶⁷³ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 316.

⁶⁷⁴ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 316.

membership, improving the UN's institutional structure and increasing multilateral consultations on UN matters".⁶⁷⁵

Two events followed: First, MacEachan was "delighted" with the result and its move towards "'progressive' policies" and he asked Basil Robinson, Deputy Minister, to release it as another white paper and table it in the House of Commons.⁶⁷⁶ Owing to bureaucratic delays, it was not ready until April 1976 and there were fears that it discussed issues that might arise during the UNSC campaign, which delayed it further. It was ultimately not released as a white paper.⁶⁷⁷ Second, it did indicate that "Ottawa should also help address the world's most basic problems, including peacekeeping in the Middle East and Cyprus, racism, and post-colonialism, by adopting a comprehensive policy toward the third world, lessening confrontation, and improving cooperation between developing and industrialized countries".⁶⁷⁸ Canada entered the 1976 UNSC campaign with Cyprus, The Middle East, and Southern Africa as the central issues with which to grapple.⁶⁷⁹ Canada's position on these issues would become crucial to its negotiation of status through its election to the Council that year. Notably, these difficult issues were the product of British imperial policy in earlier decades – particularly British settler colonialism in South Africa and Namibia – and Canada was struggling to figure out its positions in relation to them; only this time, Britain was no longer the power it once was and Canada was under the increasing burden of managing itself in relation to American empire, especially economically. Canada firmly sat between two imperial formations, managing the constraints of the United States and the legacy of the United Kingdom.

The 1976 Election

With 127 members in 1970 and 147 by 1976, the UN was still growing, though more slowly and steadily than in the 1950s and 1960s. Many new member states were indeed newly independent states in the Global South and while their influence had waned in some ways since the mid-60s, they were still quite powerful in the General Assembly. When non-members of the UNSC, NAM members were often seeking permission to speak at the Council and coordinated making statements on behalf of NAM members.⁶⁸⁰ Further, NAM UNSC representatives worked together, even producing a "negative veto": "when they were able to assemble seven votes on a given issue, they could exercise what one analyst has called a 'negative veto'".⁶⁸¹ In other words, they could coordinate to vote against something and ensure it did not pass because it did not reach the threshold of nine votes. Similarly, "with nine votes, barring a P5 intervention, they could pass resolutions on their own".⁶⁸² In response to the increasing of presence non-members,

⁶⁷⁵ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 316.

⁶⁷⁶ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 317.

⁶⁷⁷ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 317.

⁶⁷⁸ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, 316.

⁶⁷⁹ Robert Bothwell and J. L. Granatstein, *Trudeau's World: Insiders Reflect on Foreign Policy, Trade, and Defence, 1968-84* (Vancouver ; Toronto: UBC Press, 2017), 103 This book contains the interview material of multiple Trudeau-era officials, including this specific point in the interview material from the interview with Bill Barton in 1988. Interview #1; Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 101.

⁶⁸⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 98.

⁶⁸¹ Chapnick, 98.

⁶⁸² Chapnick, 98.

“serious UNSC negotiations moved out of the public domain”.⁶⁸³ This meant that serious discussions and negotiations were moved behind closed doors and public UNSC meetings lost credibility. With increased secrecy and increased numerical competition, membership at the UNSC was becoming more valuable as its privileges were more exclusive. This made the process of social closure even more high stakes: the boundary between inside and outside mattered more than ever before. Non-members could not make their voices heard or observe nearly as easily. Moreover, social closure was increasing the distance between members and non-members of the UNSC. As such, membership, and therefore status, became more valuable. Joining the club now had more benefits and higher stakes. This was the beginning of the process of status-seeking through UNSC elections becoming more and more competitive and consequently, expensive.

Further, the regional groups had begun trying to select candidates a few years in advance, requiring states to think ahead more seriously about future membership. This took place both through internal contestation and negotiation to present a clean slate to UNGA, as well as through an increasing number of competitive elections at UNGA. By the late-1970s, multiple rounds of voting were beginning to occur, including a record 155 round voting standoff between Colombia and Cuba in the GRULAC group.⁶⁸⁴ This longer-term selection process was also making status more valuable to states, as the process of social closure was not only increasing the distance between “in” and “out”, but also making the process more complex and costly. Within WEOG, candidacy was being declared earlier, but the expectation was that group itself would not meddle in specifically naming candidates, rather countries would be making decisions independently about whether to run based on the internal politics and pros and cons of doing so.⁶⁸⁵ The contestation was not for WEOG’s institutional approval, but rather a series of political decisions by members on whether they wanted to compete in a contested election or not.

Liberal internationalism was still dominant, especially as Western states sought to moderate and make palatable any resistance from the NAM and the Eastern bloc. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) now held the permanent Chinese seat but was very quiet in this period, exercising restraint, observing dynamics, and rarely intervening in the domination of the UK, the US, and France, and the disputes between these three members and the Soviet Union.⁶⁸⁶ This trend of Chinese restraint within the Council would continue through the 20th century. The nature of the Council’s work and responsibilities (and mandate), while they had evolved, was still firmly in the realm of liberal internationalism, made possible by imperial power of the past. This was the political universe in which contestation for UNSC membership existed, meaning that even a turn away from the form of liberalism of the 1950s or 1960s was still an articulation of a relationship to its current form. For Canada, this meant that even the attempted break from the Pearsonian past, both at home and within the UN, was certainly a policy move, but one within the confines of liberal internationalism. Reinterpreting and revisiting many of Canada’s policy positions and stances was still within the boundaries of what was acceptable internationally. Within this changing environment where membership was more exclusive and valuable, Trudeau

⁶⁸³ Chapnick, 98.

⁶⁸⁴ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

⁶⁸⁵ Interview #1.

⁶⁸⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 96–97.

took a different path than his predecessor, but remained concerned with attaining and using status, through the responsibilities that came with having a UNSC seat. These included various conflict resolution initiatives, increased engagement with the Global South, and managing East-West tensions in the name of peace and security. Even in change, liberal internationalism still drove the status-seeking process, and while Canadian foreign policy was different under Trudeau compared to Pearson, its interests and priorities could still be well-squared with the activities and goals of the Council.

The initial question was not about *if* Canada would seek a seat, but rather *when*. The discussion of when to seek the seat took place in 1974.⁶⁸⁷ In April, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, A. E. Ritchie, suggested candidacy for 1977-1978, requiring election in 1976.⁶⁸⁸ Ritchie saw the UNSC as remaining relevant to global stability and saw a non-permanent seat as an opportunity for Canada to “make a difference through their service”.⁶⁸⁹ On April 9, 1974, Mitchell Sharp agreed to tentatively seek candidacy.⁶⁹⁰ It was important to do so because Canada had “performed well during its previous terms, and its investment in UN peacekeeping (Canadian forces were involved in every ongoing UN mission at the time) made it all the more important that Ottawa be at the table when decisions on UN interventions were made”.⁶⁹¹ This is a perfect example of how officials saw the use of status; it was not simply to be attained but it was an active back and forth between contributions and interests. Being at the table was important both for the rewards it conferred but also the opportunity to lead and interpret the expected behaviours, practices, and responsibilities in a way that suited Canada and its view of the Security Council’s mandate.

Initially, Canada, West Germany, and Ireland all presented an informal desire to WEOG to hold the seat and Canada began informally mentioning it to other countries to test the waters.⁶⁹² Canada would have to both weigh the pros and cons of seeking election, knowing the environment was “trickier” than ever.⁶⁹³ Marcel Cadieux, now Ambassador to the United States, argued that membership would provide “prestige; the possibility of effecting real change; an opportunity to promote Canadian independence in foreign policy; increased access to the thinking of the great powers; and perhaps even a way to improve Canada-US relations”.⁶⁹⁴ In contrast, “there were domestic political risks to prominence on the world stage: Canada would have to take public positions on issues that were of little direct interest; some of those positions could affect relationships with other allies; and there was always the chance of having to publicly disagree with Washington”.⁶⁹⁵ While much had changed in the previous decade, much had

⁶⁸⁷ Halloran, Hilliker, and Donaghy, ‘The White Paper Impulse’, 316.

⁶⁸⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 98.

⁶⁸⁹ Chapnick, 98.

⁶⁹⁰ Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum to Cabinet: Possible Canadian Candidacy for Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations’, 02/76, 179, RG 25-10797, 24-13-4-2 pt. 2, Library and Archives Canada.

⁶⁹¹ Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum to Cabinet: Possible Canadian Candidacy for Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations’.

⁶⁹² Department of External Affairs.

⁶⁹³ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 235.

⁶⁹⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 99.

⁶⁹⁵ Chapnick, 99.

stayed the same. Canada could only have so much difference on policy issues from the United States and Canadian officials were not quite risk averse when it came to challenging the imperial elephant. If it were not already clear at this point that the Third Option was dead, the United States' implicit hold over Canada's multilateral decisions certainly made it so.

The Permanent Mission in New York saw Canada's chances as positive against Ireland and West Germany, seeing the opportunity for to make a large contribution especially around peacekeeping and other UN service.⁶⁹⁶ Similarly, they argued that Canada "[met] all the criteria for membership".⁶⁹⁷ In 1975, Cabinet decided that it would contest the seat.⁶⁹⁸ The Department of External Affairs, in its 1975 Memorandum to Cabinet (MC), had provided multiple options: to follow through on seeking membership for 1977-1978 (election in 1976), to wait until 1979-1980, or to wait indefinitely.⁶⁹⁹ While Trudeau was more concerned with social and economic areas of the UN, MacEachen was strongly in favour of running in 1976, which was the position that ultimately won out.⁷⁰⁰ The MC noted Ireland and West Germany's interest in the seat and its pros and cons strongly reflected the input of senior ambassadors in the Department. Prior to discussing the pros and cons though, it specifically discussed the "changing role and composition"⁷⁰¹ of the Security Council, or, in other words, the conditions under which status would be granted.

On this changing composition of the Council, the MC noted that continuing détente was making the Council a place with more potential for cooperation on issues under its mandate, though it did note that it was still more limited than was initially envisioned.⁷⁰² Similarly, while East-West tension over Europe had decreased, it was popping up in different areas such as the Middle East, and Great Powers were seeking to maintain their privileged position and veto.⁷⁰³ On decolonization, the MC emphasized the developing disagreement between "developed" and "developing" countries and the increasing role of the Third World both at the UN more broadly and when acting collaboratively at the UNSC.⁷⁰⁴ In a similar vein, the MC indicated that the NAM still had no permanent voice on the Council and that the UK and France's "status" had diminished since the 1940s, both of which prompted countries in all regions to seek reform and permanent membership.⁷⁰⁵ These countries sought "a role in conformity with the status that they wish to be theirs in the world community on the basis of their assumed, if not acknowledged, political and economic strength".⁷⁰⁶ Here, membership contestation was *ongoing* and the debate

⁶⁹⁶ Chapnick, 99.

⁶⁹⁷ Chapnick, 99.

⁶⁹⁸ Henry Kissinger, 'Telegram from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Ottawa: Canadian SC Candidacy', 17 January 1976, RG 25-10797, 24-13-4-2 pt. 2, Library and Archives Canada.

⁶⁹⁹ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: Possible Canadian Candidacy for Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations'.

⁷⁰⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 99.

⁷⁰¹ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: Possible Canadian Candidacy for Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations'.

⁷⁰² Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰³ Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰⁴ Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰⁵ Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰⁶ Department of External Affairs.

about how membership and its related roles, responsibilities, and benefits should be allotted were no longer simply about functionalism vs. geography but *also* about changing power dynamics outside the UN. While these countries were seeking a seat at the table, they were also the same countries trying to use the UN – successfully and unsuccessfully at different times – to organize in resistance to Western dominance of the organization. So, there was both a desire to acquire status as it currently existed but also alter the nature of the hierarchy in which it was embedded.

Status-seeking through elected seats was becoming more competitive on its own and some states were also seeking semi-permanent or permanent seats to distinguish themselves from elected others and hold increased status. Negotiations around membership would continue through further decades, but the idea that the UNSC could become *more* hierarchical, with benefits for some and not others, illuminates the way that status was becoming both more elusive and increasingly sought. This was the environment in which Canada pursued election.

When it came to Canada, the Department included an interesting reflection in the MC on Canada's own position. Certainly, many had noticed that it was more "important" as a small fish in a smaller pond in 1945 compared to the present, but in calling Canada "one of the ten most powerful countries in the world, by almost any measure except that of military power"⁷⁰⁷, it was clear that Canadian officials felt that a seat was necessary for status satisfaction. It continued with the statement that it was unlikely that Canada would ever receive a semi-permanent seat and so it was not worth pursuing that option. If successful, Canada would be the only WEOG member to have been elected for four terms, and so it was clear from many directions that continued elected membership was something to pursue, especially in light of what officials saw as Canada's significant contributions to UN peace and security work. Functionalism was making itself known once again, albeit more subtly than in previous decades. Canadian officials strongly believed that their contributions justified their status aspirations, even if functionalism itself was no longer the primary justification for such aspirations. The "changing composition" section concluded that "if Canada were to become a member, our relationship with the members of the Council and the role we would play could be substantially different from what they were in the past. The new situation would offer Canada, as a Western middle power, both advantages and drawbacks which require careful consideration".⁷⁰⁸

What were these substantial differences? Rapid change of the United Nations was heavily, but not exclusively, economic, from the NIEO to the increased importance of economic and social organs. These were related to security, even tangentially, as this too was changing for the UN – "it is increasingly possible that in addition to the traditional territorial, racial and ethnic causes of international conflicts, the threats to the peace may arise from the growing impatience of the Third World with the existing economic order which, in their view, is fundamentally unfair to them and condemns them to perpetual economic subjugation and poverty".⁷⁰⁹ For Canada, this could not be ignored. The Third World was a point of contention for Canada-US relations, but also Canada-Commonwealth relations and it was to be taken into consideration the massive space that Southern Africa was taking up on the UNSC agenda:

⁷⁰⁷ Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰⁸ Department of External Affairs.

⁷⁰⁹ Department of External Affairs.

*“as has been recognized in Canadian policy statements and in the Commonwealth context, it is important for Canada to be responsive to demands of the Third World in this respect. There are, of course alternative ways for Canada to shape such a policy other than participation in debate in the Security Council on issues on which we may be obliged to take sides against third world positions, e.g. expulsion of South Africa”.*⁷¹⁰

While Canada supported some policy measures *against* apartheid South Africa’s, the long remaining question of Commonwealth membership loomed, and Canada was not yet ready to demonstrate its differing position on the issue. Reflecting trends of the past, Canadian officials sought respect and good reputation in the Global South but were not willing to take substantial risks against its relationships with greater powers to do so.

In terms of advantages to joining the Council, the MC referenced *Foreign Policy for Canadians* and its recommendation to make “more effective use of the Security Council”.⁷¹¹ Following through on this would demonstrate support for the UN “at a time when the Organization is subject to criticism, especially in many Western countries” and, seeing a role for a “Western middle power”, would allow for Canada to “project an independent international image”.⁷¹² Canadian policy was also “directed toward reducing the gap between the developed and developing countries” and saw at UNSC seat as an opportunity to “play a moderating and generally constructive role”, with the “moderating” influence becoming more important if the economic debates took on “more serious political and security overtones”.⁷¹³ This moderating influence was a specific understanding of Canada’s relations to the Global North and South, to imperialism, and to the Great Powers. It was a claim to liberal internationalism and a claim to the supposed middle ground between former colonial power and former colony. To speak of the moderating influence was to champion liberal internationalism and its search for “balance” – even if at the expense of the Global South – and Canada’s ability to contribute to liberalism’s continued life as the dominant force of multilateralism. This balance once again equated two “sides” and reified compromise between them, even if such compromise was not a just or sustainable solution. Through this reification, Canadian officials also continued to cement the idea that this was the Canadian role, continuing to cement growing mythology of Canadian peacekeeping and mediation that would appear and be constructed even more strongly in Canada’s UNSC campaigns in 1988 and 1998. For all of its efforts to not look Pearsonian, the Trudeau government was perhaps even inadvertently cementing a Pearsonian legacy in the multilateral context due to this sort of commitment to the liberal middle. Even after all its efforts to subvert the liberalism of the past, in its pursuit of status, the 1976 effort was positively Pearsonian.

Identifying Cyprus, the Middle East, and Southern Africa as the main issues Canada would have to tackle, the middle position was once again central, noting that Canada’s position

⁷¹⁰ Department of External Affairs.

⁷¹¹ Department of External Affairs.

⁷¹² Department of External Affairs.

⁷¹³ Department of External Affairs.

on each of them was “well-balanced and currently respected”.⁷¹⁴ To critique the notion of balance and moderation is not to undersell Canada’s ability to pursue compromise and mediation at the time; rather it is to say that these come from the specific political place of liberalism, an oft taken-for-granted force underlying the evolving multilateral system. In this case, the ability to moderate, balance, and mediate were the central tenets of *how* Canada would use and put into practice the responsibilities of the Council, or the responsibilities associated with status. The status hierarchy of the UNSC was formally predicated on liberal internationalism and the responsibilities that flowed from it were constituted in the liberal tradition. Claiming to be well-balanced and respected in terms of being able to undertake these responsibilities indicate the desire to be recognized as such, to be granted status as such, and to undertake those responsibilities in line with the political benefits of maintaining the liberal international system. Even in referencing the changes and policy upheaval found in statements like “Foreign Policy for Canadians”, status aspirations remained associated with variation on the theme of liberal internationalism.

Notably, clear connection existed between contributing to a liberal international solution to the imperial-created “problems” of Cyprus, the Middle East, and Southern Africa. While liberal internationalism was favoured by most within WEOG (who were initially contesting candidacy for the seat), navigating specific policy issues within the liberal international framework proved complicated, on account of relationships with imperial allies. Cadieux’s concerns about Canada-US relations, especially in the context of the post-Third Option era, appeared in the MC alongside similar, broader ones. It read,

*“Membership on the Council would require Canada to define its position on world affairs at an earlier stage, and probably in greater depth, than at present. We should be obliged to take public positions on difficult issues, with the attendant risk of being misunderstood by one side or the other (or both) and thus to face criticism that we would have preferred to avoid. The Middle East is, of course, the most likely area in which this could occur. Moreover, Canada’s reputation and credibility could be put in jeopardy by a lack of firmness or evidence of indecision on issues which in fact might be of relatively minor importance to Canada. In any event, some criticism would be inevitable. In certain instances our independence of action might be questioned, e.g., in situations where our position was close to that of the USA”.*⁷¹⁵

A fear of having to disagree with the Americans on key issues was at hand once again. Moreover, it was clear that officials were concerned that other states might perceive Canada as too close to the United States. This was a problem that would continue throughout subsequent decades and will appear in every subsequent chapter of this dissertation. Canada was between a rock and a hard place next to the imperial power to the south, especially on issues stemming from imperial formations of the past. Officials did not feel it wise to dissent against the United States in many cases, while also knowing that *not* dissenting came at a cost. Balancing these within the toolbox of liberal internationalism was the challenge and it would come up repeatedly

⁷¹⁴ Department of External Affairs.

⁷¹⁵ Department of External Affairs.

during the 1977-1978 term on issues of Israel and Lebanon, and Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa.

The MC expanded on threats to bilateral relations, especially with each of the P5. It identified the risks apparent, while also stating that these risks could be managed, as they even had when a non-member of the Council.⁷¹⁶ Interestingly, it noted that it would be particularly difficult to avoid “public differences” with France and the UK on “some issues before the Council (e.g., the arms embargo against South Africa).”⁷¹⁷ It stated that,

*“Canada’s credibility is relatively good with the third world countries and, on a number of issues, we presumably could have a good relationship with the third world members of the Council. However, on certain issues such as moves to expel or apply sanctions against South Africa and/or Israel, we could differ fundamentally with the third world strategy. On these questions, the expression of our position under the spotlights of the Council could conceivably harm our reputation in the Third World”.*⁷¹⁸

Acknowledging that this could still be a problem outside of the UNSC or that they may be resolved in time, the MC indicated that this should not stop Canada’s pursuit of membership.⁷¹⁹ Ultimately, even in an era of change and a shakeup in foreign policy, similar problems remained and the liberal international and imperial constraints of the UNSC hierarchy – and the position in which Canada found itself – could not be avoided. Canada would pursue status through its navigation of these forces.

The government approved candidacy on October 9, 1975, weighing the above challenges as worthwhile because “Canada should not shirk its responsibilities”.⁷²⁰ Status and responsibility went hand in hand; to have status meaningfully requires using it. Upon seeing the seriousness of Canada and West Germany’s bids for candidacy, Ireland withdrew theirs. In late October, Malta declared that it was interested in running, upending the finally achieved consensus within WEOG.⁷²¹ This was, as Chapnick puts it, a “ploy”, and Malta would ultimately withdraw so that they could “leverage the withdrawal...in exchange for diplomatic support in other elections”.⁷²² Canada also had the support of many WEOG states and it is unlikely that this would have been budged by Malta’s candidacy – a telegram from Kissinger indicates that Canada had American support at this time and other internal memos make clear that Malta was likely not overly threatening.⁷²³ At this point in time, other UN bodies were also becoming more competitive in

⁷¹⁶ LAC, 184; Verona Edelstein, ‘The United Nations: An Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy’, in *Mackenzie King to Philosopher King: Canadian Foreign Policy in the Modern Age* (University of Manitoba, 1983), 157–72. This book is out of print but a copy of the chapter was provided from Verona Edelstein’s personal collection, written after her time serving at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations.

⁷¹⁷ Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum to Cabinet: Possible Canadian Candidacy for Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations’.

⁷¹⁸ Department of External Affairs.

⁷¹⁹ Department of External Affairs.

⁷²⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 99.

⁷²¹ Chapnick, 99.

⁷²² Chapnick, 100.

⁷²³ Kissinger, ‘Telegram from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Ottawa: Canadian SC Candidacy’.

their elections for seats, and while the UNSC was the most important and of the highest status, states were beginning to link their strategies and diplomatic moves in order to seek appropriate status within different bodies. Malta's ploy was not out of nowhere; it was in direct response to the increasing competitiveness within the UN status hierarchy. This would become relevant a decade later in the 1980s during big-budget, competitive elections. Altogether, the trend emerging was that status was becoming *more* important and competitive, which further cemented the value and importance of the liberal international status hierarchy that was the UNSC. Moreover, at this point in the 1970s, even those who explicitly rejected liberalism – the Soviet Union and the PRC – were relatively silent in contesting it. Détente was continuing and the PRC, as they were new to the Council, was relatively quiet and rarely used tools like the veto to challenge the status quo.

By early 1976, the Department of External Affairs was planning for the resource implications of holding the seat⁷²⁴ and challenge ensued on how to add staff and expertise in New York, as the decade-long gap between seats on the Council meant that that was not maintained (despite Canada's monitoring and engagement with the Council as a non-member).⁷²⁵ Canada was in fact quite well-prepared comparatively, as it had held multiple meetings hosted by the Department's UN Bureau on the issues of Cyprus, the Middle East, and Southern Africa.⁷²⁶ Similarly, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs discussed these issues with the Department, as did the Japanese delegation to the UN in New York.⁷²⁷ In May, William H. Barton took over the post as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, following experience in the same role in Geneva and time heading the UN division in Ottawa.

Canada and West Germany were presented as a clean slate to the General Assembly and did not have to campaign competitively to all General Assembly members. That said, formal diplomatic notes were sent out to a wide variety of missions internationally to ensure that Canada would be supported. Officials formally tracked the different yes, no, and uncommitted vote promises to ensure that a 2/3 majority would still be achieved. Just before the start of UNGA that year, Trudeau appointed Don Jamieson as Secretary of State for External Affairs in sudden cabinet shuffle.⁷²⁸ Barely more than 2 weeks into the role, he delivered an address to UNGA. He expressed Canada's support for universal membership, also noting that such a right, from his delegation's point of view, would be contravened by suspending Israel's UNGA participation (that the question of PLO representation still existed and Palestinians were unrepresented should not be overlooked).⁷²⁹ Jamieson continued with his support for all UN organs and multiple reforms and growth in them, though noting again concern that the UN's campaign against racial

⁷²⁴ Kissinger.

⁷²⁵ Interview #20, 23 April 2021, 20; Edelstein, 'The United Nations: An Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy'.

⁷²⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 101.

⁷²⁷ Chapnick, 101.

⁷²⁸ Hilliker, Halloran, and Donaghy, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 3: Innovation and Adaptation, 1968-1984*, 236–37.

⁷²⁹ 'Canada Pledges Continued Support for the World Organization: A Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 29, 1976' (Canadian Mission to the United Nations, 29 September 1976), Jules Leger Library.

discrimination singled out Israel.⁷³⁰ On human rights and peace and security, he further expressed Canada's support and contributions, calling for independence based on "majority rule and racial harmony" for Rhodesia and Namibia.⁷³¹ Jamieson also made clear Canada's support for continued peacekeeping operations with Canadian participation in the Middle East and Cyprus, as well as disarmament initiatives. After outlining positions on additional topics, he concluded the UNGA address by saying,

*"Mr. President, I have spoken about our hopes and disappointments as members of the United Nations. I conclude with the pledge that Canada will continue to be a loyal and, I trust, constructive member. The United Nations suits Canada. We are a country of many peoples and cultures. We understand the meaning of compromise and consensus. We prize the opportunity to cultivate relations with near and distant friends. We remain committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter".*⁷³²

Since it ultimately ran unopposed, Canada won its election on October 21, 1976, with 126 votes. West Germany received 119. Multiple other WEOG countries not running received 1-2 votes each. Canada was one of five NATO members on the Council in the 1978-1979 term, dubbed the "Gang of 5". Canada was "well aware of [the Council's] capabilities and its shortcomings"⁷³³ as it went into its term but saw it as important for the major issues at stake. Southern Africa went on to become the larger issue for Canada's membership.⁷³⁴ 1976 was one of the last of its type – "by March 1978, six states had indicated interest in succeeding Canada and West Germany for 1979-1980. The era of uncontested WEOG slates was over".⁷³⁵

As the UNSC, WEOG, and Canada entered a new era, change seemed on the horizon. Simultaneously, the more that changed, the more stayed the same. Liberal internationalism's bind on the dynamics of status remained, especially in terms of how status could be *used*, and its responsibilities operationalized. For Canada, the nature of its relationships with the United States would become a constant sticking point. Similarly, Southern Africa and apartheid would be central to the UNSC campaign a decade later in 1988, as would Palestinian self-determination. Even in a time of change and contestation, status-seeking was – and very much still can be – a process of relating to liberal internationalism, even if it involves reinterpretation and reconstruction of such a relationship.

⁷³⁰ 'Canada Pledges Continued Support for the World Organization: A Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 29, 1976'.

⁷³¹ 'Canada Pledges Continued Support for the World Organization: A Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 29, 1976'.

⁷³² 'Canada Pledges Continued Support for the World Organization: A Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, at the Thirty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 29, 1976'.

⁷³³ Edelstein, 'The United Nations: An Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy', 161.

⁷³⁴ Interview #20, 1; Interview with Barton: Bothwell and Granatstein, *Trudeau's World*, 102.

⁷³⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 100.

For all that changed in the Trudeau-père years, much stayed the same. While some of the efforts directed towards change were government choices, much of what foiled them were the same problems that Canada had faced within the UN system in previous years. Balancing relationships between principal, imperial allies, the UK and the US, and the values of liberal internationalism continued to be more difficult. Imperialism and liberalism's intersection makes liberalism's goals impossible to achieve when powerful interests are at stake. The boundaries of liberal internationalism in the United Nations and international ordering more broadly strongly constrained the types of changes that the Trudeau government could make for Canadian foreign policy, thus rendering them minimal. Canada would soon try a different approach to these challenges in the 1980s.

(7) Leading Liberal Internationalists: The 1988 and 1998 Elections

Introduction

After leaving the Security Council at the end of 1978, Canada sought election in 1988 and then again in 1998. By 1988, in the over 40 years since the Security Council was founded, many things had evolved. Many others had also stayed the same, particularly the conflicts with which the Council was tasked. Phases of the Cold War had come and gone and the late 1980s was proving to be a time of openness and cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union, relatively speaking. While these were all changes, the ongoing imperial knots of global politics remained tightly tied, especially at the UNSC. In 1988, Canada was once again running for a seat on the Council. The Department of External Affairs noted a distribution of work between divisions for the UNSC campaign based on the policy issues and areas that they thought were most important for the election and the subsequent work of the UNSC. Broadly, they identified peacekeeping, multilateralism, and disarmament as areas of note.⁷³⁶ More importantly, they identified Southern Africa and apartheid, Palestinian self-determination, and the Central American peace process as the key areas over which their relations with others would depend in the coming WEOG election.⁷³⁷ Different parts of the Department were to be responsible for managing each. None of these were new issues for Canada, let alone for Canada's positioning on the Security Council. Each had been part of a previous election debate, and each had been on the Council's agenda going back to its founding years. Long past the shadow of the British Empire, South African apartheid and Israeli occupation remained active issues as a consequence of such imperialism, but also contemporary settler colonial forms of domination in and of themselves. Additionally, the outcome of the Central American Peace Accords continued to demonstrate the ongoing effects of the American form of empire on the eve of the post-Cold War era. For all that the multilateral system and international order had changed, the spectre of imperialism continued to actively structure the challenges at hand and was responsible for the continued existence of these issues on the Council's agenda.

A decade later, in 1998, at the peak of the 1990s consensus of liberalism and liberal internationalism, Canada ran again. The conflicts of the 1990s tested the traditional Canadian foreign policy consensus, as it did the post-Cold War United Nations, but Canada entered the race believing in this consensus more strongly than ever and branding Canadian multilateralism as such. Both elections are sometimes considered evidence of the "golden age" of Canadian foreign policy, or of Canada at its peak performance globally. Moreover, they are also considered the gold standard or the platonic ideal of what a competitive UNSC campaign could look like. There is no doubt that both campaigns were high points for Canadian governments and diplomats alike. Certainly, their hard work paid off and they could capture their respective historical moments. However, what does this say about status-seeking both at these points in time and in the bigger picture?

In this chapter, I provide another view of status-seeking within my framework, demonstrating the diversity of forms that status-seeking can take within the realm of relating to

⁷³⁶ C.W. Westdal, 'Security Council Campaign Working Committee - Communications Strategy', 4 March 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁷³⁷ Westdal.

liberal internationalism and imperialism. In both cases, though not in identical ways, Canada's status-seeking through pursuit of a UNSC seat was not simply just that it could take on the responsibilities of the peace and security mandate, rather that it could be a leader of liberal internationalism, or an exemplary ambassador of it. Recognition for being capable of the responsibilities was not enough; status-seeking was framed through being an exemplary leader and recognition for such a position was sought as part of the pursuit of status and a seat. In the 1980s, Canada constructed this vision of leadership through its position in finding compromise between the Great Powers and the rest of the UN. For the 1990s, this vision of leadership was about Canada carving its own path at the UN. In both cases, this was a shift forward for Canadian identity on the international stage. Having served more terms than most other countries, many Canadian policymakers and decision-makers saw Canada as uniquely positioned to advance UN initiatives. From this perspective, Canada could *use* status in a more effective way than others, both in terms of actual contributions to the peace and security mandate, but also because of its effective relationships to major powers. Canada's quest for status projected an image of itself based on its vision of liberal internationalism, seeking recognition of that vision, and looking to perform its expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices in an exemplary way. Moreover, in comparison to previous decades, the attempt at balancing the interests of "great powers" with "others" in both campaigns was more confident and less risk averse. Canadian officials were much more willing to push back on American and British actions globally as part of this vision of liberal internationalism, though its limits were still very clear at certain intersections of liberal internationalism with imperialism.

This chapter uses 13 interviews and archival and additional policy material from multiple sources. For the 1980s, material comes from Library and Archives Canada, the Jules Leger Library, and the Dag Hammarskjold Library. LAC material is vast for this campaign, totalling thousands of pages and it is not possible to include it all. For the 1990s, it is extremely limited. Much is currently in an in-between space between Global Affairs Canada and LAC and access to it is very limited and it is also not readily available through the regular Access to Information and Privacy process. Until it becomes fully available through LAC, it is difficult to view firsthand; to my knowledge, only Adam Chapnick has received special permission to view it under supervised conditions at Global Affairs Canada and it was not possible for me to do so over the last 2 years. A future iteration of this chapter will hopefully contain more of that material. Unlike previous chapters where I have had first-hand contact with the same material as him, my citations of his work on the 1990s rests on his interpretation as I have not also handled it myself. Significant material is available through the Jules Leger Library, which comprises the majority of primary sourcing in that section. Adam Chapnick has also provided me with a personal collection chronicling Lloyd Axworthy's statements, speeches, and media coverage which I have used to inform this chapter as well.

I begin with an overview in this chapter of competitive elections to the UNSC (1988-2020) and key takeaways, trends, and themes that I have synthesized from my primary research on what matters the most in these elections and why that matters theoretically for my argument. The main difference between these elections and the previous ones were the competitive nature, as opposed to the "clean slate" (1947-1976). While this does not shape status directly – a UNSC seat is valuable regardless – it shapes the *process* of status-seeking significantly. The nature of status-seeking in competitive elections sees trends begin in the 1980s and continue well into the

present. Following this, I move to an overview of Canadian foreign policy and the key issue areas that shaped the 1988 election. I then discuss the campaign in detail, as per the pattern of this dissertation. I then do the same for the 1990s – a discussion of policy and issue areas and then the campaign in detail.

Competitive Elections – 1988-2020

Across formal interviews with current and retired diplomats, informal discussions, and reviews of policy documents, I have identified a few trends in Canada’s status-seeking process at the UNSC. A few patterns emerged in terms of the things that “matter” or are prioritized in a campaign, stemming from the voting procedures and rules. Given the constraints of rules, procedures, and norms, states such as Canada can strategize both technically and politically and prioritize their campaign processes as such. This will vary from country to country and there is opportunity to broaden this to a review of more countries in future research. Understanding these trends is important for framing the historical research that follows; the identified patterns themselves do not directly answer the research question but are necessary to understand what governments prioritized in campaigns logistically and technically to better unpack the processes and relationships that shape the campaigns. They are a small part of the answer to “how” campaigns as status-seeking emerge.

These patterns became clear across all four competitive elections and remained relatively consistent: 1988, 1998, 2010, 2020. Paradoxically, despite the UNSC being heavily dominated by the P5, election to the UNSC takes place at UNGA, so while the P5 are extremely powerful, they hold little to no sway in the process of *getting elected*. They can encourage others to vote for a country, but they often do not, preferring not to reveal their preferences and or exert much influence.⁷³⁸ There are exceptions to this and elections where they have intervened,⁷³⁹ but since the 1980s, have tended to stay out of competitive elections. Ultimately, the process of social closure in joining the UNSC stems from the universal membership of UNGA, as each member has an equal vote. This process of universal voting confers status and admits states to membership, but of course, it only exists *because* of the exclusivity of UNSC membership: there are only 10 seats.⁷⁴⁰ Indeed, it is because of P5 power in the 1940s that there are these 10 elected seats. Therefore, while the UNSC is historically dominated by the politics of the P5, joining it is dominated by a much larger universe of states. These two dynamics of social closure exist in tandem. Each country has an equal vote by secret ballot and so in a competitive election, candidate states are attempting to balance bigger picture relationships and foreign policy issues with meeting the concerns of smaller states, as well as trying to appeal to big voting blocs that sometimes vote together (i.e., Arab states, AU, EU).

Emerging from this is a central trend for Canada: bilateral relationships with each member state matter most. To seek each country’s vote requires focusing on the bilateral relationship with each country in the context of multilateralism. This was the largest takeaway

⁷³⁸ Interview #18, 12 February 2021; Interview #19, 3 March 2021; Interview #20.

⁷³⁹ There have been notable exceptions particularly in Latin America (i.e., Venezuela vs. Guatemala) where the United States got heavily involved, as well as most recently (2020) in Africa, but in general the playing of geopolitics is more “bigger picture” and less because of the P5 countries intervening.

⁷⁴⁰ See: Viola, *The Closure of the International System*.

from the interview process. These bilateral relationships are influenced by four different factors: (1) perception of the competing state's commitment to multilateralism (in the context of the voting state's vision of multilateralism); (2) the competing state's positions on issues of interest to the voting state; (3) the competing state's positions on issues of relevance to the UNSC, relative to those of the voting state (i.e., do we share a position on Israel-Palestine? Do we share a position on apartheid?); (4) to a smaller degree, personal relationships and general friendliness between countries (i.e., is there an affinity between ambassadors? Ministers? Heads of government or heads of state?). As it is a secret ballot cast by every country's UN ambassador (or sometimes Foreign Minister), it is impossible to know how a country really votes, but in some countries, the input and opinions of the ambassador and the mission in New York matter greatly. In others, decisions come more from the capital (which could also vary depending on the country). In general, it matters in a campaign that a state's leaders – ambassador, foreign minister, and head of government or state – “show their face” throughout the campaign, in New York and abroad, giving meaningful time to member states whose votes they court. Each must engage with foreign officials and leaders on behalf of their country.

For (2) and (3), voting at UNGA and in other UN organs is influential. For example, if a voting state is invested in issue X and is not sure where a competitor state stands on that issue, they may look at the voting record on it and bring it up during bilateral meetings or on the sides of a multilateral meeting. If the competitor state has a very public position on the issue, whether the voting state agrees with that or not will certainly influence how they vote, as the voting state would want to elect others to the UNSC that will work in their interest if elected. These all influence the broader question of “how would this competing country behave on the Council?” which is one of larger perception. For example, is Canada too close to the United States to be a useful member of the UNSC in the eyes of some countries? Is Canada independent within WEOG as a non-EU/EC member in ways that may be in the interest of some states (or not in the interest of some EU/EC members)? States are not voting for who they objectively think is “best”, and even the biggest advocates of the functional principle likely understood that – rather, one's opinion of who can best contribute exists within a context a state's own interests, liberal international structure, imperial history, and current geopolitical constraints. The UNSC is a politicized liberal institution and even campaigning as the most qualified via the functional principle is about navigating such politics. The most able to contribute to a mandate of peace and security is decided in relation to the construction of what that mandate means and what peace and security may be for some vs. others; as discussed in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation. One's campaign in relation to the mandate is actually a relationship to liberal internationalism and the liberal view of what peace and security means.

In general, based on items 1-4, as an interviewee indicated, other states will debate, “Is Canada a reliable country? Has it been reliable in the past and will it remain? And will...Canada send the right instructions to that guy [i.e., a P5 country]? And finally, the leader of Canada and the foreign minister; is he/she the kind of person we can trust?”⁷⁴¹ This interviewee later distilled such logic into the idea that a country may wonder what happens if they were to be invaded by a neighbour or a larger power – would Canada be on their side as a UNSC member? If that country were the subject of an agenda item at the UNSC, do Canada's positions and reputation suggest

⁷⁴¹ Interview #1.

that they would act in the interest of that country?⁷⁴² The focus is therefore not on what you promise to do during a term, but rather how you would be both proactive and reactive in managing the responsibilities of the Council.⁷⁴³ Some of this, as pointed out by the quoted interviewee and others, does have to do with personal relationships and trust, much like politics at all levels. Leaders, Ministers, and Permanent Representatives shape other countries' perceptions of a state and many countries have different relationships between the three positions; multiple interviewees pointed out that understanding this set of relationships is important. In some countries, Permanent Representatives are considered as important as Ministers or are former Ministers or other political officials. In others, they are career diplomats or sometimes other political appointees but below a Minister in importance. In both cases, the flow of authority from the centre to New York may vary, and Permanent Representatives themselves matter and are part of relational interactions between states. This is where the practice of diplomacy matters very much. As Pouliot writes, Permanent Representatives “do not simply represent their state inside headquarters, as the traditional image of the conveyor belt would suggest. As a result of powerful though often overlooked social dynamics, perm reps are also implicated in the conduct of global governance itself”.⁷⁴⁴

Similarly, the act of “vote trading” is directly related to these questions – countries make decisions on the process of vote trading based on whether it is in their interest, which is meaningfully connected to policy positions. Country A does not say “I’ll vote for you if you vote for me next time or on another UN body” if they think that Country B’s advocacy and policy work on the Council would be bad for them; rather they work through a conversation and negotiation about why each should trade a vote. Canada first used a vote trading approach in the 1988 election, but it was not unconnected from geopolitical and policy positions or the substantive importance of the bodies upon which votes were being traded.⁷⁴⁵

Ultimately, what appears here is that both clear policy issues and softer perception matters. In seeking status, states are seeking individual acts of recognition from every UN member, or at least enough votes for the 2/3 majority needed to win – 159 total members in 1988 and 185 total members in 1998. As membership continued to grow through the 1980s and 1990s, this had to be considered, especially when it comes to how some blocs of states may coordinate regionally. For example, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Europe group grew drastically, and many new states and their international and regional political dynamics had to be considered. Each member matters. While the day-to-day politics of the UNSC dominated by the P5, the process of social closure by which recognition and status are conferred is highly disperse and dependent on the issue of universal membership. While a status competition for membership in a hierarchical structure, the process of joining that hierarchical organization (and achieving status) is actually a democratic and flat one that requires thinking about many bilateral relationships.

⁷⁴² Interview #1.

⁷⁴³ Interview #18.

⁷⁴⁴ Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Practice of Permanent Representation to International Organizations’, in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 82, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316162903.004>.

⁷⁴⁵ Interview #18; Interview #19; Interview #20.

This also means that different issues have different salience and certain ones stick out more than others depending on what captures the attention of multiple UNGA members at certain times. This returns to the central question of the project – how do states navigate this status-seeking process? What do they do to manage these dynamics identified above? I argue that their relationship to liberal internationalism is central – how they envision the *use* of status matters. It has responsibilities, expected behaviours, practices, and a mandate that all stem from liberal internationalism – each of the four factors feeds into this. States are seeking status by demonstrating in the 159 or 185 bilateral relationships their view of the responsibilities, behaviours, and practices of having a UNSC seat, aiming to secure. For Canada, the goal was to demonstrate not just competency but leadership on these things. As status is both read and sought through liberal internationalism, so too are the issues and relationships that make election to the Council possible. Again, this may be performative, or it may be authentic, or it may be somewhere in between, but this is less important than the articulation and communication of the relationship. The performative dimension is what matters here – others must see the commitment and recognize it in order to vote for a state. I now turn to the story of the 1988 election to demonstrate these trends and theoretical points in action.

Walking and Chewing Gum at the Same Time

Elected in 1984 after a second Trudeau era, Brian Mulroney's government would hold power for almost a decade. Having been Prime Minister briefly in the inter-Trudeau period, Joe Clark was Secretary of State for External Affairs. While one might have expected significant change on the foreign policy file, changes from the Trudeau era were not huge. Mulroney had a different style of international engagement and wanted to re-orient Canada on some issues, but in general, the Cold War consensus and lack of partisanship in Canadian foreign policy remained.⁷⁴⁶ The structural constraints of the Cold War saw general agreement across the aisle for Canadian policymakers and Mulroney did not rock the boat.⁷⁴⁷ In fact, part of this agreement was a sense that after years of Liberal governments, a Progressive Conservative government could lead on foreign policy just as effectively as any other.⁷⁴⁸ This required a commitment and buy-in to liberal internationalism in the multilateral context.⁷⁴⁹ Mulroney and Clark's initial priority was to "refurbish" the Canada-US relationship, as Trudeau's differences with neighbours to the South was occasionally a point of tension.⁷⁵⁰ Moreover, as part of a turn towards continentalism, the creation of a free trade agreement between the two countries would become a central focus of foreign policy more broadly.

⁷⁴⁶ Brian Bow, 'Parties and Partisanship in Canadian Defence Policy', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 64, no. 1 (March 2009): 67–88, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400105>; Brian Bow and David Black, 'Does Politics Stop at the Water's Edge in Canada? Party and Partisanship in Canadian Foreign Policy', *International Journal* 64, no. 1 (7-27): 2008–9.

⁷⁴⁷ Bow, 'Parties and Partisanship in Canadian Defence Policy', 73.

⁷⁴⁸ Interview #21, 21.

⁷⁴⁹ Interview #21, 21.

⁷⁵⁰ Roy Norton, 'Posture and Policymaking in Canada-US Relations: The First Two Mulroney and Chrétien Years', *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 5, no. 2 (January 1998): 17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1998.9673130>; Kim Richard Nossal, 'The PM and the SSEA in Canada's Foreign Policy: Dividing the Territory, 1968–1994', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 50, no. 1 (March 1995): 201, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209505000109>.

While Mulroney and Clark agreed strongly on Canada-US policy, they did have differences at first and it took almost a year to “stabilize the relationship”.⁷⁵¹ In many ways, Mulroney allowed Clark a fair bit of independence, but they did disagree on a few issues. Notably, Nossal indicates that initially, they disagreed on the US embargo on Nicaragua and Clark’s criticism of Israel on human rights issues (a turn that followed his ill-advised move as PM of planning to move the embassy to Jerusalem).⁷⁵² Where they shared an agreement was on South Africa and apartheid, both taking a much stronger position against it than Pierre Trudeau had. Ultimately, as they worked through these three major issues and the Canada-US relationship, they figured out a way to best cooperate relatively quickly. Clark took the lead on most international issues outside of the United States, which Mulroney dominated.⁷⁵³ Relationships with both the US and the UK remained effective, as part of a strong commitment to these pillars as constitutive of Canadian foreign relations, despite the major disagreements I will describe below. The late 1980s were also one of relative Cold War cooperation – many have noted Mulroney’s friendly relationship with Gorbachev in multilateral settings. At the UN, policy change was minimal and voting patterns remained similar to those of the Trudeau era and were later consistent under PM Chrétien.⁷⁵⁴ With the Department of External Affairs, Mulroney held some skepticism of them initially, worrisome about a loyalty to the Liberal Party, but quickly learned that was not the case and relationships between the political and civil service levels strengthened quickly.⁷⁵⁵ Similarly, Stephen Lewis was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative in New York in 1984, which quickly led to good working relationships with his staff. While he later criticized the lumbering bureaucracy of the federal government, his day-to-day work in New York was built on good relationships.⁷⁵⁶

Overall, despite differences on specific policy issues, Mulroney and Clark brought a shared vision of Canadian foreign policy. This vision was ambitious, and they were determined in their attempt to put forward an “activist” and “effective” foreign policy that included partnerships both with traditional allies and the Global South.⁷⁵⁷ It was multilateral, but not limited to the UN, and it was constructive, developed out of the capacities that Canada had built throughout the post-war era. After 40 years of liberal international work in the multilateral arena, both the new Minister and Prime Minister, as well as the Department of External Affairs, viewed leadership for Canada as a practical and valuable goal.

Key International Issues

⁷⁵¹ Nossal, ‘The PM and the SSEA in Canada’s Foreign Policy’, 201.

⁷⁵² Nossal, 201–2.

⁷⁵³ Penny Bryden, ‘Foreign Policy Advice in the Prime Minister’s Office: Mackenzie King to Brian Mulroney’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 4 (December 2020): 526, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020976614>.

⁷⁵⁴ Srdjan Vucetic and Bojan Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 1 (March 2020): 79–98, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423919000507>.

⁷⁵⁵ Interview #19.

⁷⁵⁶ Interview #20; Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 127.

⁷⁵⁷ Interview #21, 21.

I now turn to the Central American peace process, South African apartheid, and the Middle East as the key issues for Canada in the mid-1980s approaching the 1988 UNSC election. While policy was never decided with the goal of the election in mind, officials had to consider existing policy on these issues in the election period. Moreover, policy on each issue emerged from the relationships that Canada had with the United States and the United Kingdom, whose imperial histories and global presence continued to influence global politics and multilateral agenda.

Following a violent period of war across Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and especially Nicaragua, the Central American Peace Accords, including the Esquipulas agreements were signed in 1986 and 1987. They built upon earlier work through the Contadora Group, led in part by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in 1987. American intervention, including CIA-led coups, had been common in the region for decades and the American government was supporting “some of the most reprehensible allies in the region”.⁷⁵⁸ This period certainly illustrated many of the worst excesses of modern American imperialism. By the mid-1980s, the most pressing US-intervention was in Nicaragua. Taking power in 1979, Nicaragua’s Sandinistas established a leftist revolutionary government. The CIA backed the Contras, the right-wing opposition, in overthrowing the Sandinista government. The Sandinistas later won an election in 1984, but conflict continued in subsequent years. Crucially, two international events followed. In 1986, the International Court of Justice ruled that the United States had violated international law in its support of the Contras. Moreover, between 1981 and 1986, the United States had been violating the arms embargo on Iran by selling arms to the Iranian government in order to use profits for support of the Contras.

Although engagement across Latin America had increased under PM Trudeau, especially in the development aid realm, Canada’s relationships in its own hemisphere were still somewhat peripheral and considered both the domain of the US and outside Canada’s traditional relationships (Commonwealth, Francophonie, etc.).⁷⁵⁹ The Canadian government was aware of the region’s politics but mostly through the lens of observing US actions there, as seen in the previous chapter. The Canadian public was generally disconnected from international politics in Latin America, but civil society organizations in Canada were well-equipped and heavily pushed for the Canadian government to act and engage in the peace process. Of course, Canada’s relationships with the United States were central to navigating new policy in the region, as the United States was both Canada’s most important bilateral relationship and the major power disrupting the region. Initially, Clark and Mulroney did not see eye to eye on Central America, with Mulroney more intent on following the American lead and not intervening in the US “backyard”,⁷⁶⁰ especially given his positive relationship with Reagan. Ultimately, Clark took more control over policy and had a willingness to depart from agreement with the United

⁷⁵⁸ Stephen Baranyi and John W. Foster, ‘Canada and Central America: Citizen Action and International Policy’, in *Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy*, ed. Peter McKenna (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 240.

⁷⁵⁹ Laura Macdonald, ‘Canadian Development Assistance to Latin America’, in *A Samaritan State Revisited: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Aid*, ed. Greg Donaghy and David Webster, Beyond Boundaries : Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies Series (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 2019), 275–76.

⁷⁶⁰ Baranyi and Foster, ‘Canada and Central America: Citizen Action and International Policy’, 240.

States.⁷⁶¹ In 1984, Clark indicated that he did not “condone the violation of international law” and “regretted the imposition of the embargo. It is their [American] policy, not ours. I think it holds the very real possibility of worsening the situation in central America and of weakening the Contadora Process”.⁷⁶²

Civil society organizations in Canada through this time continued to criticize the government for being too soft in its disagreement with the United States and were also involved in both aid and peacebuilding work in the region, including Track Two diplomacy efforts.⁷⁶³ Ultimately, with this pressure, “Canada came to play a more active peace support role than may have been contemplated by External Affairs or its ministers in the early 1980s. Canada’s diplomatic views became distinct from those of the US, particularly in encouraging the Contadora and Esquipulas peace initiatives”.⁷⁶⁴ Changes in Canadian aid policy and multilateral policy also changed, moving away from supporting Contra-aligned governments, as well as supporting various UN human rights initiatives.⁷⁶⁵ Canada would later join the UN Observer Group in Central America (UNOCA) in 1989 to monitor Esquipulas agreements.⁷⁶⁶ Similarly, Canada would later join the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990. In general, civil society organizations were quite successful in their efforts to push Canadian policy in their preferred direction and certainly Canada’s positioning in the 1985-1988 period was well-received internationally.⁷⁶⁷ Two key points flow from this: (1) civil society is an important component of a foreign policy apparatus and part of the complex push-and-pull of policymaking, as well as key actors in the complex context in which diplomats work; (2) This ability to work on improving friendly Canada-US relations while also opposing the United States on major multilateral issues was seen by many at External Affairs at the time as an important skill for Canada and the development of an independent foreign policy. It demonstrated a desire to be recognized *as* independent of major powers in a new way, as part of an “activist” foreign policy and one where Canada was a leader multilaterally. For such leadership to emerge in all areas of foreign policy, Canada had to stand outside of the British and American shadows. As an interviewee described it, Canada could “walk and chew gum at the same time”.⁷⁶⁸

Walking and chewing gum at the same time was not limited to Central America; it was central to Canadian positioning on many issues. It was also not limited to just the United States, as seen in the evolution of Canada’s policy on South African apartheid. For the fourth successive decade, Canada’s position *vis-à-vis* the Security Council was influenced by the political situation of Southern Africa, emerging from both British colonialism and the apartheid government’s settler colonialism. Having been on the Canadian agenda since Diefenbaker’s time in office, no

⁷⁶¹ Nossal, ‘The PM and the SSEA in Canada’s Foreign Policy’, 201.

⁷⁶² Norton, ‘Posture and Policymaking in Canada-US Relations’, 24.

⁷⁶³ Baranyi and Foster, ‘Canada and Central America: Citizen Action and International Policy’.

⁷⁶⁴ Baranyi and Foster, 246.

⁷⁶⁵ Baranyi and Foster, 246.

⁷⁶⁶ Macdonald, ‘Canadian Development Assistance to Latin America’, 280; ‘United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)’, Government of Canada, 16 August 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/central-america/sultan.html>.

⁷⁶⁷ Baranyi and Foster, ‘Canada and Central America: Citizen Action and International Policy’; Macdonald, ‘Canadian Development Assistance to Latin America’.

⁷⁶⁸ Interview #11, 1 September 2020.

moment was more important for Canada on the issue of apartheid than the 1985-1990 period. Manulak describes Canada's approach in this time as "constructive" rather than "dramatic"⁷⁶⁹, where it "became a diplomatic battleground between its Western partners, anti- and pro-apartheid activists, and Pretoria".⁷⁷⁰ Supporters of the Canadian approach saw this as more productive than simply moralizing, whereas critics, including Linda Freeman, saw this as symbolic and often morally empty, focused more on Canada's self-image when in fact its contributions were less than its Scandinavian counterparts.⁷⁷¹ Freeman's assessment is very useful and also takes into account the complexity of forces in creating a state's policy on an issue. She also highlights that the Mulroney and Clark approach to apartheid had its hypocrisies and weakened over time past the first few years. Moreover, civil society strongly shaped foreign policy on the issue and had been working hard on it for multiple decades, in which earlier governments had weaker stances.⁷⁷² However, even symbolism at a bare minimum is politically salient and useful, and mattered in shaping Canada's multilateral relationships, inter-Commonwealth dynamics, and Canada (and Mulroney's) relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom. At the end of the day, it shaped Canada's relationships abroad, which is relevant takeaway for this analysis. The goal here is not to litigate the effectiveness of Mulroney and Clark's actions on ending apartheid, but rather to situate their actions within these relationships (among others) to set the stage for what later followed at the UN.

Pearson and Trudeau's positions on apartheid had been half-hearted at best, owing to the former's attachment to the Commonwealth and the latter's lack of criticism for human rights violations.⁷⁷³ Mulroney and Clark were staunchly and openly opposed, and as PM and SSEA, agreed with one another. Of course, individual leaders are not the entirety of a country's relationship to an issue – those with decision-making power do so within a broader context and network of relations and constraints. Into the late 1980s, Canadian businesses were heavily invested in apartheid South Africa and interested in maintaining such corporate activity. Portions of progressive Canadian civil society had been vocal in anti-apartheid activism, including Stephen Lewis, prior to his time as Ambassador and Permanent Representative. As such, domestic pressures in both directions on Canadian political leadership were at times as significant as international ones. Notably, Lewis was incredibly outspoken on many occasions at the UN, especially in ways that others in government were not or could not be.⁷⁷⁴ Moreover, in 1985, Mulroney addressed UNGA, forcefully criticizing South Africa and in collaboration with Lewis, including a line that the Department had removed from his speech: "if there is no progress in the dismantling of apartheid, our relations with South Africa may have to be severed

⁷⁶⁹ Daniel Manulak, "'An African Representative': Canada, the Third World, and South African Apartheid, 1984–1990", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 30 June 2020, 84, <https://doi.org/10/gg94gm>.

⁷⁷⁰ Manulak, 84.

⁷⁷¹ Linda Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years* (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

⁷⁷² Freeman.

⁷⁷³ Marq De Villiers, 'Review: South Africa: The Ambiguous Champion', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 53, no. 4 (December 1998): 783–85, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070209805300413>.

⁷⁷⁴ Interview #5, 5.

completely.”⁷⁷⁵ This speech helped energize the diplomatic struggle against apartheid within the halls of the UN in New York, though it never saw follow through. It was a rhetorical declaration that Canada stood apart from the United States, the United Kingdom, and most of Western Europe. It stood on the side of Commonwealth members in the Global South and with Black South Africans. For the UNGA audience, it signified that Canada was willing to risk its special relationships. Even if it would not sever diplomatic relations or take significant economic action, symbolic politics still has value, especially in the context of both liberalism and hierarchy, as Mulroney and Lewis demonstrated that they were willing to risk a diplomatic challenge from those more powerful.

In general, Manulak argues that the Mulroney government made “attempts to maintain international attention through agenda setting and consensus-building in multilateral fora and [in] Ottawa’s diplomatic activities in South Africa”.⁷⁷⁶ Much like Australia and Sweden, Canada’s main focuses were on diplomatic pressure on the South African government, which was traditional for “middle powers” doing “niche” activism, though on a large scale.⁷⁷⁷ In August 1986, the Commonwealth adopted limited and select sanctions. This was a shift for Canada, which had opposed sanctions under previous governments. That said, due to business interests and corporate connections with white South Africa, “in none of these cases did sanctions involve truly significant economic costs or adjustments”.⁷⁷⁸ They were more aggressive than Britain and the United States were willing to take on, but solidarity amongst capital remained. Economic sanctions were seen with some skepticism at the time but it was efforts after the imposition of the sanctions that made Canada stand out amongst its allies.⁷⁷⁹ Many other Western countries stepped back after this moment in 1986, much like Canada had after earlier crisis points, but leadership in Ottawa saw an opportunity to hold leverage in Pretoria and push further in diplomatic circles,⁷⁸⁰ especially with its partners in Bonn, London, and Washington. Anti-apartheid leadership in South Africa supported this and “the Mulroney government thus found itself engaged in a tightrope act on the apartheid issue. Its outspoken rhetoric had ensured that its credibility at home and abroad was contingent on further action, while its value to the Third World depended on its access to its major Western partners”.⁷⁸¹

As the white violence against the Black population worsened in South Africa, Canadian civil society pushed for the end of diplomatic ties, as Mulroney had promised in 1985. The Department of External affairs pushed to maintain the High Commission, arguing that it was an avenue to make clear “Canada’s disapproval of Pretoria’s racist policies and assisting the victims

⁷⁷⁵ Michael Valpy, ‘Brian Mulroney and Stephen Lewis on Principled Leadership in Foreign Affairs’, *University of Toronto News*, 15 April 2014, <https://www.utoronto.ca/news/brian-mulroney-and-stephen-lewis-principled-leadership-foreign-affairs>; Interview #5.

⁷⁷⁶ Manulak, “‘An African Representative’”, 85.

⁷⁷⁷ David R. Black, ‘Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian, and Swedish Policies in Southern Africa’, in *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War.*, ed. Andrew F Cooper (London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1997), 108, <https://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5645087>.

⁷⁷⁸ Black, 106.

⁷⁷⁹ Manulak, “‘An African Representative’”, 85.

⁷⁸⁰ Manulak, 85.

⁷⁸¹ Manulak, 86.

and opponents of apartheid”.⁷⁸² This echoed Mulrone y’s view that he could advocate on behalf of the anti-apartheid struggle in places like the G7 in 1987, of which many members (the US, the UK, West Germany) were not willing to criticize the South African government. In August 1987, Joe Clark visited Southern Africa and by October, the Commonwealth leaders had to come to Vancouver for the Heads of Government meeting. British PM Margaret Thatcher had long resisted sanctions and supported the South African government. She had been confronted by Canadian protesters in Montreal at Expo 86 in July of the previous year and Mulrone y had made clear his frustration with her unwillingness to impose sanctions, which later came to fruition in limited form in August.⁷⁸³ By the Commonwealth meeting in 1987, Clark and others had calculated that maintaining the open High Commission was not only useful (from their perspective) for applying pressure on South African leadership but to prevent Britain from having the only open mission in the country, which they could then use to “argue that they were the only country well-placed to make an “objective” assessment of the situation”. Canada’s presence theoretically allowed for another voice and opportunity.

Thatcher and Mulrone y clashed in Vancouver. Thatcher was isolated in her unwavering support of South Africa, as Commonwealth members in the Global South led strong criticism of her position and the escalating oppression in South Africa. The rest of the Commonwealth maintained the position that comprehensive sanctions were necessary, the African National Congress should be recognized, and Nelson Mandela should be released from prison.⁷⁸⁴ Mulrone y sought to convince Thatcher of this position, but failed, though their clashes were reminiscent of an earlier disagreement among allies: that of Pearson and Johnson over Vietnam. Coming out of the 1987 meeting, Clark chaired a new initiative called the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA).⁷⁸⁵ The goal of this initiative was to continue the conversation between governments between Commonwealth summits. Thatcher refused to participate and Clark was left with a difficult dynamic, often trying to connect with the British position to the understandable strong frustration of the Global South’s members.⁷⁸⁶ This was a difficult moment for Clark and Mulrone y, who became increasingly frustrated with the efforts.⁷⁸⁷

Canada continued to maintain diplomatic presence in Pretoria, and Pretoria continued to attempt to undermine Canadian efforts, even attempting to spy on civil society anti-apartheid organizers in Canada.⁷⁸⁸ Canada also continued to convene multilateral efforts to support the anti-apartheid fight, through CCFMSA, the UN, the G7 and other IOs, aiming to maintain momentum. The ANC continued to value Canada’s diplomatic access to Reagan and Thatcher, despite the difficulty in getting them to budge. Ultimately, the struggle would not end by 1988 or

⁷⁸² Manulak, 88.

⁷⁸³ ‘When Protesters Met Margaret Thatcher’s 1986 Stop in Montreal’, *CBC Archives*, 13 July 2019, <https://www.cbc.ca/archives/when-protesters-met-margaret-thatcher-s-1986-stop-in-montreal-1.5197098>.

⁷⁸⁴ Andrea Janus, ‘Thatcher’s Time with Mulrone y, Trudeau: “Bruising Battles” and “a Naughty Schoolboy”’, *CTV News*, 8 April 2013, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/thatcher-s-time-with-mulrone-y-trudeau-bruising-battles-and-a-naughty-schoolboy-1.1229526>.

⁷⁸⁵ Interview #21.

⁷⁸⁶ Manulak, “‘An African Representative’”, 88.

⁷⁸⁷ Manulak, 88.

⁷⁸⁸ Manulak, 91.

even 1990 and at points, international allies of the anti-apartheid movement made errors. By 1990 though, Namibia became independent from South Africa, concluding a long struggle that Canada had supported (though not the Cuban funding of the fighting) since its previous campaign to the UNSC in 1976.⁷⁸⁹ Namibian independence was a significant agenda item for Canada in 1977-1978, as well as in other UN bodies in the years that followed. It was once again an issue on the Canadian radar and would remain so in 1988. Linked to the civil war in Angola, armed resistance in Namibia had been ongoing to win independence from the South African government. Transition towards independence began in August 1988, assisted and brokered by the United Nations, an effort to which Canada contributed.⁷⁹⁰

While Southern Africa had been a long-standing issue of imperialism and colonialism in the multilateral arena, there was another that had been on the Canadian agenda even longer. Like each decade before it, Canada's relationship to Israel and to Palestinian self-determination in the 1980s was front and centre. Much like apartheid, others noticed Canada's position on this cluster of issues, especially at the UN. In the brief inter-Trudeau period, Joe Clark became Prime Minister. In his campaign, he made a critical and unwise promise to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem. The reasoning behind that decision is unclear – the Department of External Affairs did not support it and it went against Canada's existing support for UNSC Resolution S/Res/242 which opposed the occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, calling for negotiated settlement and Israeli withdrawal.⁷⁹¹ Canada had voted in favour of this resolution as well as UNGA A/RES/2253 “condemning any unilateral alteration to Jerusalem's status by Israel”.⁷⁹² Consequently, this was unpopular internationally and was widely condemned, especially by Arab states, when he became PM. Clark chose to appoint Robert Stanfield to produce a study on relations with the Middle East. Stanfield quickly urged the government not to follow through on this promise. President Jimmy Carter advised the same.⁷⁹³ Canada did not follow through and Joe Clark's later time as SSEA Affairs from 1984 on demonstrated that he too learned this was a mistake and shifted his stance. That said, as Wildeman argues, this error in judgment still strongly influenced policy and relationships throughout the Progressive Conservative 1980s, both internationally and at home, with many in the Department of External Affairs worrying that Canada's “neutrality” was damaged.⁷⁹⁴ Of course, neutrality was also up for debate, as Pearson's 20+ year legacy suggested.

Stanfield's report emphasized the “Palestinian people's right to a homeland and self-determination”⁷⁹⁵, which would both shape the way that Canada engaged at the UN but also become a point of contention, as Mulroney considered himself a friend to Israel and Israeli

⁷⁸⁹ Interview #1.

⁷⁹⁰ ‘Canada-Namibia Relations’, Government of Canada, 31 January 2022, <https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/namibia-namibie/relations.aspx?lang=eng#a1>.

⁷⁹¹ Jeremy Wildeman, ‘Assessing Canada's Foreign Policy Approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 27, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 65–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1850488>.

⁷⁹² Wildeman, 66.

⁷⁹³ Wildeman, 67.

⁷⁹⁴ Wildeman, 65–67.

⁷⁹⁵ Stanfield, ‘Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa’.

leadership at a time when Israel was becoming increasingly hostile. That said, “Clark became something of a champion” of the recommendations⁷⁹⁶ and Canada’s voting patterns at the UN tended to return to that Canadian liberal ideal of “balance” or seeing itself as a mediator, if in some ways less pro-Israel than the Trudeau era. Clark also openly criticized Israel’s human rights violations from time to time. Moreover, Canadians at home tended to increasingly sympathize with the Palestinian cause during the first Intifada and following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.⁷⁹⁷

However, in terms of voting in favour of Palestinian self-determination, this was not always the case for Canada at the UN; for example, Canada often did not vote in favour of resolutions where it may have supported it in principle but found the language included by Arab states “too strong” in criticizing Israel.⁷⁹⁸ Ultimately, Canada’s voting record was more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause than at earlier points but it was still quite muddy and often defended Israeli offences. Arsenault and Musu point to UNGA Resolution 43/177, where Canada abstained on the issue of “recognition of the state of Palestine and Palestinian sovereignty over the territories occupied since the 1967 war”. Only Israel and the United States voted against it; “therefore, Canada’s decision to abstain from the vote, alongside a number of Western allies, was likely due to strategic considerations regarding Canada’s relationship with the United States... The abstention reflected an attempt to balance Canada’s bilateral relationship with the US with its global reputation, its respect for international law, and its relationship with other states”.⁷⁹⁹ This resolution took place in December 1988, just after Canada was elected to the UNSC and so it did not influence Canada’s reputation going into the vote. That said, its contents and Arsenault & Musu’s informed conclusions make clear the bottom line about Canadian foreign policy: no bilateral or multilateral relationship stood fully independent from the special relationship with the United States. Much like in decades before, Canada’s international positioning could not be separated from the Anglo-American empires and even with more “progressive credentials”, it was not willing to shake this bond, even when doing so might lead to a moral high ground. Walking and chewing gum at the same time was an exercise in negotiating that and often meant *not* siding with the oppressed.

It should be highlighted that there is an elephant in the metaphorical room when it comes to the above-described issues. While Canada found itself in a more “progressive” position relative to some of its allies in the 1980s, it came with a hollowness at home. That there was a fine line between what could be “too” progressive or activist also at times appeared hollow. The issues of South African apartheid and Israeli occupation strongly resemble Canadian settler colonialism. While some may point to the hypocrisy or shallowness of Canada here, but these are not ‘separate’ domains of governance that contradict one another, rather part of the same global systems of domination. Using a wide lens on the conceptualization of imperialism and a long

⁷⁹⁶ Wildeman, ‘Assessing Canada’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019’, 69.

⁷⁹⁷ Amelia C. Arsenault and Costanza Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 27, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 103, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1867596>.

⁷⁹⁸ Interview #18; ‘Provisional Verbatim Record of the 89th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 2 December 1987: General Assembly, 42nd Session’ (United Nations, 1987), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/151116?ln=en>.

⁷⁹⁹ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 103.

view of its history allows one to see phenomena under the same umbrella of domination that is transnational in nature. It is important to see the interconnectedness between systems of colonialism across borders both in sociological view and in historical context. The line between the foreign and the domestic is not a clear one in historical perspective, especially when practices of colonialism appear in different places. Moreover, while each of the three appear to be discrete states, understanding their shared British imperial origins (by using a GHS view, for example) allows one to see the structures of relations that emerge from that and how they affect both policy at home and abroad in each.

The imposition of white South Africa, settler Canada, and Israel on Indigenous populations all stem from the same logics and structures of the British empire in the 19th and 20th century. All three remained ongoing structures of colonization in independent form (but not politically bracketed off) from their British predecessors. Like the British empire before them, each maintained global forms of hierarchy gift-wrapped in liberalism. In fact, the expansion of liberalism in each justified imperialism's forms of domination – it was both a reasoning and a deflection for imperialism's inequalities and violence.⁸⁰⁰ These same features that shaped the “domestic” sphere of each state (while different in each historical context) were also the ones at the root of liberal internationalism and institutions, as described in earlier chapters. Thus, foreign policy of Canada should not be considered hypocritical vis-à-vis domestic policy and settler colonialism, rather a feature of 20th century liberalism and liberal internationalism. The inherent, baked-in contradictions of liberalism in the construction of settler colonies as well as liberal international institutions remained on display in the 1980s for Canada. Paired with managing its relationships to the US and the UK, Canada's global positioning and foreign policy reflected a country built on shaky footing within an imperial-derived global hierarchy.

In this historical and sociological context, each of these three issue areas juxtaposed Canada's relationships with the United States or the United Kingdom on the one hand, with different bilateral relationships, positions on human rights, and interpretations of international law on the other. Balancing and managing this was the challenge at hand from the perspective of those making policy decisions – this is a large part of why the three issues were identified as the main ones shaping perceptions of Canada in the 1988 UNSC election. In this context, the campaign branded Canada as “constructive internationalists”,⁸⁰¹ focused on cooperation, compromise, moderation, and solution-building. This was the essence of Canada's status-seeking in 1988. It was especially effective because the UN and the UNSC were highly functional in the late 1980s (particularly so in comparison to when Canada left the UNSC a decade earlier). Paired with a Canadian foreign policy that sought to increase communication and cooperation between other states, the moment was ripe for Canadian success. Where the 1960s and the 1970s saw a UNSC campaign as more of an opportunity for *maintaining* existing status and re-imagining liberal internationalism within it, the 1980s were about harnessing that past contribution and making sure it paid off. Canada used status by fulfilling responsibilities and could now plan to acquire more and make a sizable contribution to the increasing momentum of multilateralism. This was especially important as the government in the 1980s saw effective multilateralism as

⁸⁰⁰ See: Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal Internationalism: Historical Trajectory and Current Prospects’, *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (1 January 2018): 43–61, <https://doi.org/10/gcwwnw>; Jeanne Morefield, *Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁸⁰¹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 120.

supportive of Canada's interest in the Pearsonian tradition. Canada *could* make a difference at the UN and that itself was in Canada's interest.⁸⁰² What Chapnick calls "one of the most successful election campaigns in UNSC history"⁸⁰³ was about turning Canada's "walking and chewing gum at the same time" in foreign policy into seeking status as constructive internationalists. In the eyes of Canadian leadership, Canada could be a leader internationally through this approach and sought to be rewarded and recognized as such. Constructive internationalism was an articulation of the leadership Canada sought to pursue. They hoped others would see this too.

The Constructive Internationalist Strategy

Prior to the Progressive Conservatives forming government in 1984, the Liberal government had decided to run for the available 1989-1990 seats.⁸⁰⁴ The Department of External Affairs sought approval in May 1984 and announced it to WEOG in June.⁸⁰⁵ Tradition played a large part in this; it was something that Canada did every decade; it had benefited Canada in the past and it was time to do it once again.⁸⁰⁶ The Liberal government announced the candidacy in June 1984.⁸⁰⁷ By the end of the summer, Brian Mulroney was the new Prime Minister. The new government was not initially aware of the commitment to running for a seat but quickly embraced it upon finding out from the Department. In addition to appointing Joe Clark as SSEA, he appointed Stephen Lewis as ambassador to the UN. Lewis had been leader of the Ontario New Democratic Party and had a long activist career in Canada. He and Mulroney were long-time friends and he was also quick to make friends in New York. The trio, combined with a well-resourced, well-staffed, and experienced team in the Department of External Affairs, would be nearly impossible to beat.

Lewis had an extraordinary amount of freedom and direct access to the Prime Minister. He did not have to balance electoral politics nor was he burdened by bureaucracy in the way that the Clark was.⁸⁰⁸ His relationship with Clark and with the Department of External Affairs was solid, but he had freedom to speak his mind, push his own moral convictions, and take initiatives at the UN that otherwise may not have happened.⁸⁰⁹ His ability to build good working relationships at the UN was unparalleled and both Mulroney and Clark were committed to making the UN and multilateralism a priority and signalling as such.⁸¹⁰ For example, they deliberately paid Canada's UN fees on the first day possible to signal that Canada took its role

⁸⁰² Interview #21, 21.

⁸⁰³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 117–18.

⁸⁰⁴ Chapnick, 119.

⁸⁰⁵ Michael Shenstone and de Montigny Marchand, 'Memorandum for The Deputy Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs: Canadian Candidacy for Election to the United Nations Security Council', 14 May 1984, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, part 4., Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁰⁶ Interview #1; Interview #5; Interview #12, 20 October 2020; Interview #7, 27 July 2020; Shenstone and Marchand, 'Memorandum for The Deputy Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs: Canadian Candidacy for Election to the United Nations Security Council'.

⁸⁰⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 119.

⁸⁰⁸ Chapnick, 120; Interview #5.

⁸⁰⁹ Interview #5.

⁸¹⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 120.

seriously.⁸¹¹ Similarly, funding for development aid was high, also demonstrating a multilateral commitment to investing in the global community, which was a priority of the new government. Canada was looking ahead to engaging in major upcoming UN summits.⁸¹² In general, Lewis's freedom to be himself served the Canadian mission well, as did the general alignment between the three leaders. Lewis occasionally also made statements that rubbed the Americans the wrong way, but was well-liked at home, abroad, and by the PM, thus precluding any consequence.⁸¹³

Initially, Finland was also running for the other seat and the race seemed uncontested. By December, "Ottawa delivered a formal note to all of its embassies in WEOG countries indicating that it, along with Finland would be seeking the endorsement of their candidatures at the next group meeting in mid-January".⁸¹⁴ This followed a request from the Department to proceed with the campaign in October.⁸¹⁵ On December 3rd, Lewis wrote to the Chair of WEOG, indicating that Canada "believes that it is time to assume once again the responsibility and leadership which is incumbent upon a member of this highly important United Nations body".⁸¹⁶ There was a possibility that Greece or Turkey putting forward their candidacy but the likelihood remained unclear, especially given their own bilateral politics. Canada began preparations and consultations with UN experts, former representatives to the Council, civil society organizations, and the Australian government in the expectation that they would need to be prepared to join the Council.⁸¹⁷ In January 1987, Greece entered the race and it became incredibly competitive.⁸¹⁸ Finland and Canada considered campaigning together for the two seats, but Finland later declined.⁸¹⁹ It was a three-way race. Canada would pull out all the stops over the next ~22 months. In doing so, its resourcing needs would increase from what was previously expected, including more staff.⁸²⁰

Most of 1987 was dedicated to planning. A big campaign required participation of those in Ottawa, those in New York, and every embassy and High Commission abroad. Foreign governments in other capitals, Ambassadors in Ottawa, and officials in New York would be the object of Canada's campaign and figuring out how to balance this in each different country was important. It required figuring out who would be the most influential in decision making and

⁸¹¹ Chapnick, 120; Interview #5.

⁸¹² Interview #5.

⁸¹³ Interview #5.

⁸¹⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 121.

⁸¹⁵ Alan Sullivan and J. H. Taylor, 'Memorandum for: The Secretary of State for External Affairs: Security Council Membership', 20 October 1986, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, part 4., Library and Archives Canada.

⁸¹⁶ Stephen Lewis, 'Letter to the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Austria from the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada', 3 December 1986, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, part 4., Library and Archives Canada.

⁸¹⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 121.

⁸¹⁸ Chapnick, 121–22; Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: Canada's Candidature to the United Nations Security Council', 27 May 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 6, Library and Archives Canada; Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, New York, 'Security Council: Cdn Candidature', 8 April 1987, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, part 4., Library and Archives Canada.

⁸¹⁹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 122; Department of External Affairs, 'Security Council Election', 1987, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, part 4., Library and Archives Canada.

⁸²⁰ B.M. Mawhinney, 'Canadian Candidacy for the Security Council 1989-1991', 19 February 1987, RG 25-12144, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 7, Library and Archives Canada.

which issues stood out the most. It also required figuring out how to connect and communicate when it came to the bigger geopolitical policy issues on which impressions of Canada tended to be constructed (those discussed earlier). Getting commitments was important and sorting out how sincere they were was even more important. Where Canada had sent letters out to every member state previously, this practice required a much more complex system and strategic approach. Led by Chris Westdal at the Director-General level in Ottawa, the planning and campaigning involved a large portion of the Department.⁸²¹ Many of the staff who worked on the campaign for Westdal (as well as in Clark's office) went on to very prolific careers in the Department.⁸²² The work of these teams was primarily focused on communications, official visits and meetings, tracking who was likely to vote for Canada, and how different states had committed their votes (verbal vs. written). By early 1988, campaigning was intense and the Department established a working level committee and an executive committee that both met regularly.⁸²³ Connections with all UN member states would be made regularly, in different places, and by different people throughout the campaign, depending on who/what was particularly relevant or salient. It was a cross-Department approach, illuminating the different negotiations, constraints, and opinions that shaped individual Canadian decisions. With more competition, the decision-making for status-seeking was far more complex and it is important to understand the nature of the relationships and tasks that went into that, as well as the sociological context in which they existed.

The available number of votes for each seat in 1988 was 159 UN members. Each seat required a 2/3 majority. In January 1988, the Department of External Affairs asked its missions abroad to poll their states. Canada had 7 commitments and expected 85 votes. They expected that Finland had 71 and Greece had 66, leaving 94 still open. This sort of math continued at regular intervals throughout the campaign, often aiming to predict where support was in different regions.⁸²⁴ At this point, the Department expected that on the whole, WEOG members may prefer to have one NATO country and one non-NATO country to represent it, making Canada's main competitor in that context Greece.⁸²⁵ Each region required a different outlook and strategy based on the different political issues that were relevant and the different organizations, memberships, and alliances that overlapped. As competition escalated, a briefing for the Prime Minister indicated that "membership in the Council remains one of the most influential means by which middle-ranking member states can pursue their foreign policy objectives within the larger framework of the United Nations".⁸²⁶ Speaking to what those were for Canada, it went on to say,

⁸²¹ Interview #19; Interview #18.

⁸²² Interview #19.

⁸²³ See, for example: Westdal, 'Security Council Campaign Working Committee - Communications Strategy'.

⁸²⁴ Department of External Affairs, 'First Polling of Posts', 12 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, 'Estimate of Possible Votes for Canada By Region', 10 June 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 7., Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, 'Summary Sheet of Demarche Results', 13 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸²⁵ Department of External Affairs, 'U.N. Security Council: Canadian Candidature', 29 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada; High Commission of Canada to the United Kingdom, 'Cdn Candidacy for UN Security Council', 22 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 5, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸²⁶ Department of External Affairs, 'Security Council Elections', 29 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

“our objectives in seeking a Security Council seat are to pursue our fundamental interests in international peace and security; to express our commitment to constructive internationalism, to multilateralism, and to the United Nations; to fulfill our responsibility to contribute to international order; and to enhance our international image and reputation as a responsible, competent, moderate middle power”.⁸²⁷ For Canada, election to the Council would mean the opportunity to *use* status in a meaningful way both for itself and for its vision of stronger institutions of peace and security. To take on the responsibility of the Council’s mandate was front and centre once again and to acquire status would mean the opportunity to fulfill it and to be recognized as a leader on such issues, such that most other states would want to see Canada do so.

Canada had a clear vision aligned with the liberal ideal of multilateralism and internationalism. It had evolved since 1946, but fundamentally, Canada was committed to liberal principles in the pursuit of cooperation. In this case, it was not just aligning with and articulating being “good” at liberal internationalism, but rather Canada was framing itself as a leader. It sought recognition as such and as a champion of cooperation within the multilateral universe. This rhetoric began early. The same February 1988 talking points for the Prime Minister read, “we believe that our strongest assets as a candidate are our unique multilateral credentials”, citing the different bodies on which Canada was a member and a leader.⁸²⁸ A later memo expanded on this for the broader strategy, noting that few countries had membership in so many IOs and even fewer had a leadership role in them with such large regional and issue-based reach. From the government’s perspective Canada could be a connection between states, including as a “bridge between North and South”.⁸²⁹ With awareness of which issues were at the forefront of the minds of voting states, it concluded with a note on “Canada’s deep commitment to the maintenance of peace through the United Nations, of our significant contribution to peacekeeping, and our positive record on many major world issues.”⁸³⁰ Canada’s foreign policy was “independent and principled”, and the campaign wanted to draw particular attention to that.⁸³¹

Importantly, Canada’s membership in multiple multilateral fora was both a selling point for the campaign and an opportunity for *doing* campaigning. Canada’s credentials as a multilateral leader could be demonstrated by showing how broadly and deeply it was committed to the cause but also allowed access to many more spaces for bilateral connections within them and their associated social and political events. This strongly built upon hosting both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie in 1987. Interestingly, one of the places in question was the Socialist International. Canada’s primary spaces of concern in terms of blocs where they needed to garner support were the European Community, the lingering Non-Aligned Movement,

⁸²⁷ Department of External Affairs; Department of External Affairs, ‘Background to the Security Council Elections’, 18 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸²⁸ Black, ‘Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian, and Swedish Policies in Southern Africa’, 527.

⁸²⁹ John Ausman and A.W.J. Robertson, ‘Security Council: Cdn Candidature’, 29 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸³⁰ Department of External Affairs, ‘Security Council Elections’.

⁸³¹ Department of External Affairs.

and the Socialist International.⁸³² In fact, given concern about the strength that Finland and Greece may have had with its members, the Government asked NDP Leader Ed Broadbent to advocate for Canada at the Socialist International congress.⁸³³ Though he did not attend, other NDP representatives did and agreed to advocate.⁸³⁴ Other special envoys were also named to help in different for a where they could support the campaign in particular regions. It was a national effort that spanned partisan lines. Within different regions and multilateral bodies, the campaign also identified “opinion leaders” in February 1988 who they thought would support or not support the campaign and could possibly convince others to vote for Canada.⁸³⁵ This included those who were leaders in the AU, CARICOM, ASEAN, NAM, the Arab League, and the EC. At that point in time, they identified 31 opinion leaders, expecting 24 would be in favour of Canada and 7 would be against.⁸³⁶

Throughout the first half of 1988, the Department was meticulously tracking commitments for votes and opportunities to meet bilaterally with voting states. Individual memos and talking points were produced for nearly every country that highlighted key policy issues, Canada’s positions, and recommended language for discussing them. In addition, a late February memo on communications strategy focused on creating “fact sheets” for the UN audience that summarized Canada’s positions on: (a) its “commitment to multilateralism (Constructive Internationalism)”; Peacekeeping; (c) Disarmament; (d) the Council itself; (e) three regional issues – Central America, South Africa, and the Middle East.⁸³⁷ Notably, it indicated that “what we should seek to demonstrate in alluding to our past involvement on the Council is our objectivity and our role as the ‘honest broker’ in resolving disputes. We should, where possible, employ examples of regional disputes where we have acted independently of the United States”.⁸³⁸ Discussion of the three regional issues themselves also mentioned countering the point that Canada “toes the American line”.⁸³⁹ Of course, while these certainly exist, there are many examples of Canada’s following of the United States and the United Kingdom in the multilateral context, as earlier chapters of this dissertation have discussed. Separating the image, narrative, and policy positions of Canada from the grip of the United States was central to the status-seeking process. Part of the identity for which Canadian officials sought recognition was one that was constructive, independent, and progressive; to achieve and use status required the conferral of such recognition, meaning that it had to be credibly communicated. This is both important for understanding the narrative of the campaign but also for the theoretical relationship between recognition and status. For Canada to acquire status, as dependent on recognition, it

⁸³² Department of External Affairs, ‘Opinion Leaders’, 16 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada; J.H. Taylor, ‘Security Council Election: Canadian Candidacy’, 16 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸³³ Canadian Embassy to Spain, ‘UN Security Council Elections: Greek and Finnish Campaigns’, 20 April 1988, RG 25-12144, Vol. 24-13-4-1-1988, Pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸³⁴ Canadian Embassy to Spain.

⁸³⁵ Department of External Affairs, ‘Opinion Leaders’.

⁸³⁶ Department of External Affairs.

⁸³⁷ A.W.J. Robertson, ‘Security Council Communication Strategy: Publication of UN Fact Sheets and Special UN Issue of Canada Reports’, 29 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸³⁸ Robertson.

⁸³⁹ Robertson.

must reflect on how it is seen by others, not just itself, and the status-seeking process must be in pursuit of coherence between those two. Highlighting the places where Canada could credibly claim independence and “honest broker” status was central to the idea that Canada had earned the position of leadership on the UNSC.⁸⁴⁰ These themes were also highlighted in a series called *Canada Reports* that were instructed to reflect “Canada’s ongoing commitment to improving and ensuring the long-term viability and effectiveness of multilateral cooperation through the UN system”.⁸⁴¹ For each, the Department highlighted that it would not be useful to focus on Canada’s specific positions on UN reform, rather to highlight that Canada supported reform more generally and openly, so not to alienate those with differing positions on how reform should be done.⁸⁴²

Also in February 1988, a strategy document indicated that prior to UNGA in the Fall, the messaging would be “carefully modulated to appeal most effectively to each individual country”⁸⁴³ and would strategically take three paths⁸⁴⁴: First, discussion with other states as well as the “opinion leaders” in other IOs and regional groups would be central.⁸⁴⁵ Second, vote-trading would be attempted for the first time, something that Canada had previously considered taboo.⁸⁴⁶ A final path would later come at UNGA. As more regional blocs were voting strategically, competitions were becoming more intense, and Canada had lost smaller elections recently (i.e. the Food and Agriculture Organization, to Clark’s dismay)⁸⁴⁷, vote trading was worth reconsidering.⁸⁴⁸ The Department created strict guidelines for how the process would go and “would only exchange votes with states that could make a valuable contribution to the organizations upon which they sought standing”⁸⁴⁹, from the perspective of Canadian policymakers and Canadian interests, which would “not be compromised”.⁸⁵⁰ What followed was a generally smooth process with the exception of deciding to vote trade with Cuba over their campaign for the UN Human Rights Commission, to the anger of the United States. While Canada-US relations had generally been smooth (and personally strong between leaders), Washington was frustrated and threatened to punish Canada. Cuba had been identified in the “opinion leader” memo as an NAM leader and not likely to vote for Canada so it was an

⁸⁴⁰ Department of External Affairs, ‘Campaign Plans and Strategy’, 18 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁴¹ Robertson, ‘Security Council Communication Strategy: Publication of UN Fact Sheets and Special UN Issue of Canada Reports’.

⁸⁴² Robertson.

⁸⁴³ Department of External Affairs, ‘Campaign Plans and Strategy’.

⁸⁴⁴ J.H. Taylor, ‘Memorandum for: The Secretary of State for External Affairs’, 15 February 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁴⁵ Taylor.

⁸⁴⁶ Taylor.

⁸⁴⁷ J.A. Judd, ‘Canadian Candidacy for Election to the United Nations Security Council’, 20 January 1988, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁴⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 124; Interview #18; Interview #19; Interview #20.

⁸⁴⁹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 124.

⁸⁵⁰ Chapnick, 124.

opportunity that could not be turned down.⁸⁵¹ Through this “tempest in a teapot”⁸⁵², it became ever more pressing that Canada convince the United States that a difference of position on relations with Cuba was necessary and that the United States should still vote for Canada and only Canada. In general, the P5 did not declare their voting intentions ahead of time and they were only 5 of the total members, but it was important for Canada to try and secure their votes. Meanwhile, Canada convinced New Zealand and Australia to support its campaign and lobby others. This would be the start of future CANZ cooperation in helping one another get elected.⁸⁵³ In general, Commonwealth support was strong, especially in Africa and the Caribbean.⁸⁵⁴

The spring of 1988 contained both communications work and comparative work on the central policy issues. This included significant discussion of Canada’s policies as well as analysis of those of Greece and Finland across regions and issues.⁸⁵⁵ A February memo had made clear that “Canada’s position on certain foreign policy issues likely to come before the Security Council could affect our prospects in the campaign for a seat – the Israeli Occupied Territories, or Namibia, for example – and will require careful managing during the pre-election period”.⁸⁵⁶ The government was seeking to “highlight our particular views on such international security issues such as Southern Africa, the Central American peace process and disarmament” to demonstrate Canada’s independence of action and global leadership.⁸⁵⁷ By June, concern remained within the Department that “support is also relatively weak in the Middle East where we are not perceived to be as forthcoming on Middle East issues as Greece and Finland”.⁸⁵⁸ In other words, “Finland’s voting record on Middle East questions is clearer and consistently stronger than Canada’s”.⁸⁵⁹ Demonstrating Canada’s independence in the region from the United States was also a priority for Clark and others.⁸⁶⁰ Another problem noted (roughly) was “Canadian profile on human rights issues”⁸⁶¹ – this could refer to many things, such as the previous government’s record on human rights internationally as well as Canada’s ongoing colonialism at home. Regardless, the central concern was in demonstrating that Canada was a leader and anything that contradicted that had to be addressed and managed. On Israel, Palestine, South Africa, and Namibia, the Department had tracked how their competitors had voted at

⁸⁵¹ Taylor, ‘Security Council Election: Canadian Candidacy’.

⁸⁵² Department of External Affairs, ‘Canada’s Candidature to the U.N. Security Council; American Irritation over Canada’s Vote Trade with Cuba’, 8 June 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 17, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁵³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 125.

⁸⁵⁴ Interview #5; Interview #20.

⁸⁵⁵ R. J. Lysyshyn, ‘Un Security Council Elections (with Attached Chart)’, 15 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; D. Horak, ‘Greece-Finland Campaigns Assessment’, 15 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, ‘UN Security Council Campaign Communications Plan’, 1 June 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 17, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁵⁶ Department of External Affairs, ‘Background to the Security Council Elections’.

⁸⁵⁷ Department of External Affairs.

⁸⁵⁸ Department of External Affairs, ‘UN Security Council Campaign Communications Plan’.

⁸⁵⁹ Department of External Affairs, ‘Estimate of Possible Votes for Canada By Region’.

⁸⁶⁰ Fred Bild and J.H. Taylor, ‘Canadian Candidacy for Election to the United Nations Security Council’, 29 December 1987, RG 25-12144, File no. 21-13-4-2, Part 7, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁶¹ Department of External Affairs, ‘Agenda’, 8 April 1988, RG 25-12144, Vol. 24-13-4-1-1988, Pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

UNGA compared to Canada and detailed the policy on each.⁸⁶² They also tracked contributions to the UN.⁸⁶³ Each of these required sizable input from Canada's missions abroad and geographic desks on how these policy issues had been managed in recent years and the implications of each for the campaign.

Up from January and February estimates, Canada estimated they could receive 106 votes on June 10, 1988.⁸⁶⁴ This included 70 written and oral commitments combined and 36 "positive noises".⁸⁶⁵ This was also up from 47 commitments in April.⁸⁶⁶ The number 106 was the base threshold for a 2/3 majority of 158. There was work still to do, but the situation was looking positive. The team did not want to get too confident or take anything for granted. The push through UNGA would be busy. The memo to Clark in April had called for personal contact between himself, the PM, Secretary of State for International Cooperation Monique Landry, and a handful of special emissaries to their counterparts.⁸⁶⁷ The Department sent a similar memo the PM in May.⁸⁶⁸ This would remain the strategy through the summer.

The summer strategy and these two memos were heavily guided by a Memorandum to Cabinet from May 27th that requested funding to cover the rest of the campaign as well as to resource the UNSC seat if Canada were to win.⁸⁶⁹ The analysis and recommendations in this MC were illuminating. First, it identified (like other documents before it) the criticism that some may ask why Canada is seeking a seat for the fifth time when others have not served as much. In response, it cited the evergreen functional principle and its role in the charter – Canada could contribute and so it should hold the seat.⁸⁷⁰ Second, it countered the criticism that a seat on the UNSC does not serve Canada's interests. Making clear that the acquisition of status and the associated benefits were important, the memo read "Membership of the Security Council

⁸⁶² Department of External Affairs, 'Canada and the Middle East: Continuing Support for Peace', 13 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, 'Canadian Approaches to the Arab Israeli Dispute', 13 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; C.E. Garrard, 'Candidature Du Canada Au Conseil de Sécurité - Comparaison Avec Nos Compétiteurs', 13 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; Ron Waugh, 'Voting of Security Council Resolutions and VETOES (1977-1988)', 25 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 13, Library and Archives Canada; 'Records in 42nd Sess- Finland, Greece, & Cda', 12 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; Department of External Affairs, 'Voting on South Africa Resolutions at UNGA 42nd', 18 April 1988, RG 25-12144, Vol. 24-13-4-1-1988, Pt. 1, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁶³ C. Brown, 'Comparative Data on UN Contributions', 12 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada; Robert Grauer, 'Security Council Election: North-South Factors', 31 March 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 11, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁶⁴ Department of External Affairs, 'Estimate of Possible Votes for Canada By Region'.

⁸⁶⁵ Department of External Affairs.

⁸⁶⁶ J.H. Taylor and F. Bild, 'Memorandum for: The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada's Candidature to the UN Security Council', 25 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 13, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁶⁷ Taylor and Bild.

⁸⁶⁸ Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, 'Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Canada's Candidature to the UN Security Council', 17 May 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 13, Library and Archives Canada.

⁸⁶⁹ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: Canada's Candidature to the United Nations Security Council'.

⁸⁷⁰ Department of External Affairs; C.W. Westdal, 'Summary of Minutes of Seminar on Security Council Campaign - Friday, April 15, 1988', 19 April 1988, RG 25-12145, File no. 24-13-4-2, Vol. 2, Library and Archives Canada.

remains one of the most effective means of pursuing foreign policy objectives within the UN framework. Canada has consistently championed the relevance of the Council in efforts to maintain peace and security, and the Council's opportunities to play an effective role are greater than ever in the current atmosphere of reduced East/West and North/South tensions".⁸⁷¹ Moreover, "a loss to these two countries would constitute a blow to Canadian foreign policy".⁸⁷² A loss would not just be a lack of status-conferral, rather because Canadian officials sought recognition as a leader, not having the opportunity at all to undertake the responsibilities, behaviours, and practices had the potential to be a loss of existing status in the broader world of multilateralism.

In terms of messaging, Canada's campaign communicated that it sought to *use* status to be a leader on UNSC issues, and that its existing leadership and desire to mobilize that was at the root of its pursuit of a seat. "If elected, the election constitutes a recognition by the world community of Canada's constructive internationalism. Canada welcomes the opportunity to play a leadership role in the area of international peace and security".⁸⁷³ Within the liberal international apparatus, Canada sought to be not just any member, but a leading member on the Council's norms, responsibilities, and mandate – this was the crux of Canada's status-seeking. Published in English, French, and Spanish, the summer issue of *Canada Reports* covered both Canadian social and cultural contributions (from fashion to art to neuroscience to the "capital lifestyle" of living in Ottawa) as well as multilateral policy content.⁸⁷⁴ Canada's commitment to multilateralism was highlighted, with a headline calling Canada "a faithful friend" to the UN and a "recognized authority".⁸⁷⁵ Canada's peacekeeping contributions were "soldiers of peace".⁸⁷⁶ Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, had a long interview where he pointed out that Canada had a reputation as "fair-minded".⁸⁷⁷ Additionally, there were features on Canada's opposition of apartheid and its contributions to the African recovery program.⁸⁷⁸ *Canada Reports* hit all the key points of the campaign in magazine form. Canada's leadership could not only be expressed behind closed doors but also in brightly coloured print that was exceptionally crafted. Interestingly, in a likely effort to quell questions of Canada's occupation of Indigenous nations, the publication featured John Kim Bell, a Kanien'kehá:ka symphony conductor and North America's first Indigenous conductor. He was described as a "man on a mission" to build the Canadian Native Arts Foundation.⁸⁷⁹ No stone was left unturned in anticipating how Canada may be viewed internationally, but the story being told about Bell's Canadian success conveniently left out the reason a charitable foundation was needed in the first place: Canadian settler colonialism. Canada's liberal narrative of *goodness* would not be interrupted by its own imperial past and present.

⁸⁷¹ Department of External Affairs, 'Memorandum to Cabinet: Canada's Candidature to the United Nations Security Council'.

⁸⁷² Department of External Affairs.

⁸⁷³ Department of External Affairs.

⁸⁷⁴ Irenka Farmilo, Mary Anne Dehler, and Leeann McKechnie, eds., 'Canada Reports' (Department of External Affairs, Summer 1988), Jules Leger Library.

⁸⁷⁵ Farmilo, Dehler, and McKechnie.

⁸⁷⁶ Farmilo, Dehler, and McKechnie.

⁸⁷⁷ Farmilo, Dehler, and McKechnie.

⁸⁷⁸ Farmilo, Dehler, and McKechnie.

⁸⁷⁹ Farmilo, Dehler, and McKechnie.

The autumn phase of the campaign began in September at the opening of the General Assembly. The strategy would pivot to being New York-facing, rather than global.⁸⁸⁰ The focus would move to connecting with Permanent Representatives at the UN and Ministers and leaders visiting for UNGA. Permanent Representatives in many cases had a fair bit of room and leverage, much as Lewis did, and could be very influential in vote decisions. The communication objective was “to inform target audiences that Canada is highly qualified to sit on the UN Security Council.”⁸⁸¹ Highlighting Canada’s accomplishments and global leadership was central. By July, the autumn phase and UNGA were set to go differently than originally imagined. Citing differences around the “pace of sanctions against South Africa” and support of American policy in the Persian Gulf, Lewis announced his retirement.⁸⁸² He could no longer find common ground with the Mulroney government on these issues. He would continue to support the campaign personally, but he could not represent Canada with his own convictions.⁸⁸³ Following his departure at the end of July, Yves Fortier was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative. He was an accomplished lawyer, close friend of Mulroney, and a Liberal partisan. A new deputy to Fortier was also announced: career diplomat and future president of the International Criminal Court, Philippe Kirsch. Kirsch was well-acquainted with the UN system and very knowledgeable.⁸⁸⁴ Fortier and Kirsch kicked off the autumn phase together and began immediately campaigning in New York, beginning with phone calls to introduce the new leadership and carry on the campaign.⁸⁸⁵ Chapnick notes that Fortier made 61 individual calls between September 22 and October 24 in both languages and official letters followed.⁸⁸⁶ Like Lewis, Fortier developed strong personal relationships with his colleagues and was impressed with the quality of Canada’s reputation in New York.⁸⁸⁷ Once again, personal interactions and the actions of individual diplomats and diplomatic practice were important to the operation of the campaign. As Minister, Clark participated in a large number of events at UNGA and Monique Landry as well as Margaret Catley-Carlson, President of the Canadian International Development Agency visited as well.⁸⁸⁸ Interestingly, of many Ministerial letters seeking support written to states, nearly all in Africa were signed by Landry as opposed to Clark, with the exception of those with whom he had important personal relationships. The division of Canada’s diplomacy between those for whom international development was the focus vs. more “high diplomacy” was subtle but perhaps indicative of how recognition (of others) worked within the larger hierarchy of global governance, structured by imperialism, within which the UNSC sat.

⁸⁸⁰ Department of External Affairs, ‘Memorandum to Cabinet: Canada’s Candidature to the United Nations Security Council’.

⁸⁸¹ Department of External Affairs.

⁸⁸² Interview #5; Interview #4; Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 127.

⁸⁸³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 127.

⁸⁸⁴ Interview #4; Interview #5.

⁸⁸⁵ Interview #5.

⁸⁸⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 130.

⁸⁸⁷ Interview #4; Interview #5.

⁸⁸⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 130.

The Prime Minister spoke at the General Assembly. At this time, the Department had 111 written or oral commitments and 14 “positive responses”.⁸⁸⁹ He did not speak directly to the politics of the election, but rather highlighted Canada’s commitment to the United Nations, its historic contributions, and made clear Canada’s positions on apartheid, nuclear weapons, human rights, and more.⁸⁹⁰ He called on his fellow leaders to work towards increased free trade, increased development assistance, and a commitment to fighting both poverty, and more importantly, the environmental crisis.⁸⁹¹ In closing, he quoted Pearson, and stated that “the United Nations, in my judgement and in the judgement of my government, reflects the vision of our predecessors and the hope of our children”.⁸⁹² The same day, the Nobel Committee awarded the peace prize to UN peacekeepers.⁸⁹³ The invocation of Canada’s history at the UN and its most important practice of liberal internationalism could not have been better timed. It was unexpected, but it serendipitously matched exactly the narrative the government was aiming to tell: Canada had earned a leading place at the liberal table.

By October 20th, the Department noted that it had 129 written or oral commitments and 8 “positive noises”.⁸⁹⁴ They informed Clark of a more conservative estimate of 132 commitments seeming more likely.⁸⁹⁵ They also expected that not all would come through. In the end, on October 26th, Canada received 127 votes on the first ballot.⁸⁹⁶ Greece and Finland went to a second ballot, where Finland won the second seat.⁸⁹⁷ Much of Canada’s success likely came from non-aligned countries, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Clark’s statement indicated that “Canadians are honoured by this expression of confidence in Canada’s role in world affairs and the government’s constructive internationalism”.⁸⁹⁸ This sentiment was also reflected by an interviewee indicated that success in UN elections comes from being “open to the interests of the majority of UN members”.⁸⁹⁹ Canada had successfully navigated the central UNSC paradox – the interests of the majority and the interests of the powerful (i.e. the P5) are often contradictory. By maintaining loyalty to the P5 while being willing, within limits, to stand up for the concerns of less powerful members, Canada was walking and chewing gum at the same time. That balance was the bottom line of Canadian international leadership, and that leadership was what the government felt should earn it the seat. This strategy worked, though it certainly involved moral compromise, as Lewis learned in making his difficult decision, and as others pointed out in criticizing Canada for not going far enough on apartheid or for remaining

⁸⁸⁹ Chapnick, 131.

⁸⁹⁰ Brian Mulroney, ‘A/43/PV.11 Forty-Third Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eleventh Meeting, Address by Mr. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada’ (United Nations General Assembly, 29 September 1988), Dag Hammarskjöld Library, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N88/641/88/PDF/N8864188.pdf?OpenElement>; <https://ask.un.org/faq/71867>.

⁸⁹¹ Mulroney.

⁸⁹² Mulroney.

⁸⁹³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 132.

⁸⁹⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 132.

⁸⁹⁵ Chapnick, 132–33.

⁸⁹⁶ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

⁸⁹⁷ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’.

⁸⁹⁸ ‘News Release: Canada Becomes Member of the United Nations Security Council’ (Department of External Affairs, 26 October 1988), Jules Leger Library.

⁸⁹⁹ Interview #8, 4 August 2020.

loyal to the US line on Israel. While cordial, disagreement existed over where the balance of Canada's special relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom should sit in opposition to Canada's liberal commitments of human rights, peace, cooperation, and democracy. This disagreement is the inherent contradiction of liberal internationalism and one that successive governments have also struggled to balance. While not without difficulty, the 1988 campaign convincingly argued that its leadership in managing great powers and small states should accord it appropriate status in a way that was more confident and clearer than ever before. It was in many ways another version of the functional principle; Canada's capabilities were in this case about managing the David and Goliath of the international and those capabilities should accord a particular status and responsibility. Arguably, the campaign a decade later built on this success and continued the status-seeking strategy of branding Canada as a true multilateral leader.

The Post-Cold War era: Canada in the 1990s

The end of the Cold War was the largest rupture in UN dynamics to date. The Council upon which Canada served in 1989-1990 would be vastly different than the one upon which it would serve a decade later. For all the differences that emerged in the nearly decade-long gaps between Canada's terms, none would be as significant as the 1989-1990 vs. 1999-2000 gap. Canada also experienced a large transition at home. In 1993, the Liberal Party formed government once again, beginning Jean Chrétien's decade as Prime Minister. The government renamed the Cabinet role of Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs that same year. André Ouellet was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, followed by Lloyd Axworthy, who took on the position in 1996 and very much made the UNSC election of 1998 his priority.

While the 1990s were in many ways the most explicitly liberal international period to date, the hope of a cooperative, peaceful, and prosperous post-Cold War era cracked early. Having been at a peak of UN involvement through the transition to the American-dominated decade, Canada was a key voice in the coming 10 years as the UN figured out its role, its purpose, and its failures. Modern multilateralism could not function the same way that it had during the Cold War and the new Liberal government was equally as enthusiastic as its predecessor in contributing to what it might become, even if its vision had differences.

Canada's engagement with the UN in the 1990s was vast. Multilateralism remained central to Canadian foreign policy and Axworthy was a determined champion within the organization. Axworthy's leadership, combined with forceful and principled leadership within the newly named Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), continued the positioning of Canada as a leader on peace and security issues, not just any candidate for an elected UNSC seat. The final two sections of this chapter now cover Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s, particularly under Axworthy, and then the successful 1998 election to the UNSC. In the former, I discuss Canada's relationship to multilateralism and key foreign policy highlights of the decade (including the 1994 policy review) followed by the concept of human security, which was central to Canada's 1998 campaign. Throughout, I demonstrate the ways that Canadian officials branded Canada as a leader in their UNSC campaign, much like the 1980s, as a particular approach to status-seeking. In this case, rather than seeking to find balance between

the P5 and the rest of the world, Canada found ways to push back against it more strongly and find specific initiatives to champion.

Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s

The end of the Cold War briefly represented a victory for liberalism internationalism. The rhetoric of the UN system became explicitly liberal, as did its practices and tools, including peacekeeping.⁹⁰⁰ The United Nations had always been a product of liberal ideology, as is central to the thesis of this dissertation, but the 1990s were a return in many ways to the explicit rhetoric and practice of liberalism in ways that reflected its 1940s origins. Where the creation of the UN represented an ideological construction of the victors of the Second World War, the post-Cold War era was similar. Both were liberal internationalisms. In the 1990s, the liberal West had “won” and the UN would follow its direction and converge on a modern liberal internationalism. Yet, for its part as the leader of the victors, the United States was unenthusiastic about the United Nations, continuing to rely on its military dominance and regularly rejecting major multilateral treaties and initiatives in the 1990s. Similarly, they vetoed the re-appointment of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and consistently did not pay their UN dues.⁹⁰¹ Like each decade before it, the institutions and actors of liberal internationalism were both incoherent and yet seeming to work in exactly the way they were intended.

Canadian policy makers were unapologetically enthusiastic about the UN and multilateralism in the 1990s at almost all levels. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien sought to decouple Canada from its continental integration under Mulroney, with a Pierre Trudeau-inspired view of Canada as independent from the United States.⁹⁰² This vision saw Canada as having a “voluntary, independent, and internationalist’ role” in global politics⁹⁰³ that did not prioritize loyalty to the great powers.⁹⁰⁴ It was about finding a way to demonstrate Canada’s ability to stand on its own two feet. Central to this was a projection of so-called “Canadian values”, representing a mix of liberal internationalism with Canadian nationalism.⁹⁰⁵ Canadian international values and the new liberal UN strongly coalesced. While Chrétien was experienced and qualified to manage foreign policy, his eye was primarily towards domestic politics, giving his ministers and DFAIT a fair bit of independence.⁹⁰⁶ André Ouellet issued a new a foreign policy statement in 1995, titled *Canada in the World*, which would both set the direction for the government but also stand as his primary contribution to Canadian foreign policy. Echoing the

⁹⁰⁰ Caroline Dunton, Gino Vlavonou, and Marion Laurence, ““Pragmatic” Peacekeeping in a Multipolar Era: Liberal Internationalism and the Normative Trajectory of UN Peace Operations”, forthcoming in the *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, n.d.

⁹⁰¹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 154–55.

⁹⁰² Nelson Michaud, ‘Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984-2009: Prime Ministers as Prime Actors’, in *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009*, ed. Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, Beyond Boundaries, Canadian Defence and Strategic Studies Series 3 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 189.

⁹⁰³ Michaud, 189.

⁹⁰⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 156.

⁹⁰⁵ Michaud, ‘Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984-2009: Prime Ministers as Prime Actors’, 189.

⁹⁰⁶ Michaud, 189.

foreign policy reviews of the Trudeau era, the statement emerged from a 1994 parliamentary review of foreign policy and the government response to the review that followed.

The 1994 parliamentary review was titled *Canadian Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*. A Special Joint Committee in the House of Commons and the Senate led the process to create an 8-chapter document covering all aspects of foreign policy, including security, multilateralism, trade, and even the environment.⁹⁰⁷ It involved significant consultation with civil society and experts and produced a comprehensive report. At its core, the review wrestled with the post-Cold War international system and the unpredicted challenges with which Canada's multilateral engagement found itself. From a changing UN and conflicts laying bare its failures, to the continued blurring of domestic and foreign via globalization, the Special Joint Committee aimed to make sense of that which was increasingly unclear. Heather Smith wrote at the time that the review:

*“tries to assess the international system and attempts to define some place for Canada in the world. The problem is, however, that the international system is one that is predominantly characterized by ambiguity. The committee clearly recognizes this and yet still tries to lay out some principles and priorities for the future. Perhaps this is admirable given that it is useful to have some foundations for Canadian foreign policy. By the same token, the quest for certainty and direction is undercut by the pervasive uncertainty about how to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially when it is unclear where Canada fits in the world. In the end, the 1994 Special Joint Committee’s review is best described as “seeking certainty and finding none”.*⁹⁰⁸

A few months later, in early 1995, the Liberal government produced a comprehensive response to each of the recommendations of the review. This would shape the subsequent foreign policy statement (*Canada in the World*) as it set out exactly what the government would do based on the review. The response statement indicated agreement “with the overwhelming majority of [the] many useful recommendations”.⁹⁰⁹ It also stated that the focus of Canadian foreign policy would follow “three key objectives: promoting prosperity and employment; protecting our security within a stable global framework; and projecting Canadian values and cultures”.⁹¹⁰ This reflected a continued growth of the engagement of civil society and civil society organizations with Canadian foreign policy, as seen under previous governments, and it would later continue more deeply upon Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Minister. Such an engaged civil society also embraced liberal internationalism; while it often challenged the government, it was often also operating within a liberal paradigm that also had its own political goals, inclusions, and exclusions.

⁹⁰⁷ Heather A. Smith, ‘Seeking Certainty and Finding None: Reflections on the 1994 Canadian Foreign Policy Review’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 3, no. 1 (January 1995): 117, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1995.9673061>.

⁹⁰⁸ Smith, 124.

⁹⁰⁹ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’ (Government of Canada, 7 February 1995), 1, Jules Leger Library.

⁹¹⁰ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 2.

In tandem with a Defence White Paper of the same year, the Government listed *security* as the first priority in its response. This included peacekeeping as the “primary international contribution of the re-balanced Canadian Armed Forces” and a “need to adopt a broader concept of security encompassing both military and non-military factors” as “serious threats to collective, shared security over the long term derive from global environmental, demographic, migration, ethnic, health and development trends”.⁹¹¹ This would remain the foundation of the human security agenda that Canada championed throughout the rest of the decade and reflected similar trends at the UN. Importantly, this *security* section explicitly stated that Canada “will support reform of the UN and the UN Security Council....and will seek membership on the Security Council for the 1999-2000 term”.⁹¹² A seat on the UNSC was at the core of Canada’s policy objectives.

Expanded trade relationships and a “multilateral trading system based on rules and not power relationships”⁹¹³ followed as the second priority, seeking to link trade to “human rights, the environment, and labour standards”.⁹¹⁴ This led to the third priority, *international business development*⁹¹⁵, and the fourth, *the environment and sustainable development*⁹¹⁶, which would remain both a hallmark of liberalism and neoliberalism ideologically and the Liberal Party of Canada into the 21st century: the idea that capitalist economic growth and environmental sustainability could be coherent goals. This is an example of explicitly liberal global policy goals of the early 1990s that, in a Gramscian way, became the accepted cultural and economic norm in the intervening 30 years between then and the present. Moreover, *development assistance* and the re-organizing of Official Development Assistance flowed from each these, with its purpose defined as in support of the broader security agenda, economic development, and environmental sustainability.⁹¹⁷

The projection of Canadian *culture and learning* followed, as did respect for *human rights*.⁹¹⁸ For each of these seven priority areas, multilateralism was central. The government identified multilateral fora and linkages that would be relevant for each and how multilateralism and Canadian goals could be symbiotic. Additionally, engagement with each of these, multilaterally and otherwise, saw the cooperation of the multiple constitutive actors of Canadian foreign policy, from civil society to business leaders, to DFATD, to other government

⁹¹¹ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 2.

⁹¹² ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 2.

⁹¹³ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 2.

⁹¹⁴ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 2.

⁹¹⁵ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 3.

⁹¹⁶ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 3.

⁹¹⁷ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 3.

⁹¹⁸ ‘Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy’, 3.

departments, to provincial governments, and to elected officials themselves. This was referred to as Team Canada and demonstrated the government's view that Canadian foreign policy was not a clear-cut unit, but rather a series of actors contesting and cooperating to produce engagement with international actors.⁹¹⁹ This portrayed the PM as “the captain of a united team”, both a rhetorical move for the international and in support of national unity at a point where it was in question: the 1995 Quebec referendum.⁹²⁰

The foreign policy statement, *Canada in the World*, logically followed, but with a heavier focus on trade. It built on the idea of “Team Canada” and outlined three objectives:

- “The promotion of prosperity and employment;
- The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and
- The projection of Canadian values and culture”.⁹²¹

Much like decades before it, but with a post-Cold War twist, the Canadian position emphasized a key premise of modern liberal internationalism: interdependence matters, both in terms of states' relationships with one another and with global issues (i.e., security and development). Countries did not exist in vacuums and one's self-interest required an investment in their perceived view of global stability and global ordering. The statement reflected this in many places, including stating that “the measure of our success in this world will be our ability as a society to effectively focus our international efforts in a spirit of a shared enterprise”. Notably, in both the security and economic realms, this document branded Canada as a leader, much like the Liberal government's predecessors in the 1980s:

*“Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced societies which are becoming increasingly influential as world power is dispersing and becoming more defined in economic terms...Canada, thus, is in a privileged position to influence change and to benefit from opportunities as we move toward the end of the twentieth century. The Government will exercise that influence responsibly to protect and promote Canada's values and interests in the world”.*⁹²²

On multilateralism, the document indicated that “Canada's history as a non-colonizing power, champion of constructive multilateralism and effective international mediator, underpins an important and distinctive role among nations as they seek to build a new and better order”.⁹²³ Not only is this empirically significant for the narrative of the campaign but it is theoretically significant for the ideas of liberalism, sovereign inequality, and hierarchy. The myth of Canada as a non-colonial power is both pervasive and explicitly an erasure of Indigenous peoples in Canada.⁹²⁴ It continues to persist today but has not been challenged even in academic literature

⁹¹⁹ Michaud, ‘Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984-2009: Prime Ministers as Prime Actors’, 190.

⁹²⁰ Michaud, 190.

⁹²¹ ‘Canada in the World: Government Statement’ (Government of Canada, 1995), i, Jules Leger Library.

⁹²² ‘Canada in the World: Government Statement’, i.

⁹²³ ‘Canada in the World: Government Statement’, i.

⁹²⁴ Liam Midzain-Gobin and Heather A. Smith, ‘Debunking the Myth of Canada as a Non-Colonial Power’, *American Review of Canadian Studies* 50, no. 4 (1 October 2020): 479–97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02722011.2020.1849329>.

until more recently.⁹²⁵ It suggests that Canada has never engaged in colonialism as a practice, which is false, when what it means to say is that Canada has never occupied an overseas actor and territory that is now considered a sovereign state within the liberal, multilateral system. Canada has in fact practiced (and continues to practice) colonialism but it becomes omitted from these contexts because the occupied Indigenous nations are not considered Westphalian states (or UN members), rather they are considered in the eyes of the Canadian state to be a contiguous territory of “Canada”. This is not simply a feature of Canadian settler colonialism, but rather also one of the nature of the international system that privileges a particular form of liberal sovereignty over others. It is very much a form of sovereign inequality that is theoretically overlooked in discussions of the concept, as only certain forms of sovereignty and therefore colonialism are considered legitimate in the liberal international context. Moreover, this conceptualization of sovereignty suggests a form of equality between these types of liberal, formal states where hierarchy does not exist. Of course, through different forms of social closure in international the institutions where these liberal, formal states interact, hierarchy does persist.⁹²⁶ In fact, this same framing of Canada as a multilateral leader placed it within a status hierarchy, also produced by the nature social closure within the UN – for Canada to be a leader, there must be some form of social hierarchy. This description of Canada’s relationship to colonialism in many ways created a paradoxical relationship to multilateral and institutional status hierarchy.

Following this series of documents, Lloyd Axworthy became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996. Axworthy was one of Canada’s most passionate Ministers, rivalling Pearson in both his knowledge and experience globally. Axworthy was “unafraid of disrupting the status quo”⁹²⁷ in global politics and was invested strongly in the multilateral system. He was often labelled an “activist” foreign minister and took on multiple causes about which he was passionate. Of course, both the status quo *and* the Axworthy approach were explicitly liberal; they were both within the bounds of the liberal international tradition and worldview. At the end of the day, while he had large ambitions, he shared values and goals with the organizations he sought to disrupt. Axworthy maintained a solid relationship with DFAIT but like Clark before him, had an engaged office of his own and worked closely with civil society groups.⁹²⁸ He also developed “close relations with Kofi Annan and members of the global governance community in New York”.⁹²⁹ Axworthy’s commitment and dedication to the job meant that Chrétien could continue his primary interest in domestic affairs, as opposed to international ones.

Central to the Axworthy agenda was the concept of human security. Originally coined in 1986, under Axworthy it “became the basis of Canada’s global engagement strategy”.⁹³⁰ The human security agenda reverberated amongst some of Canada’s like-minded friends and different portions of the UN, including Kofi Annan, who also cared deeply about the

⁹²⁵ For the detailed deconstruction of this myth in detail, see: Midzain-Gobin and Smith.

⁹²⁶ Viola, *The Closure of the International System*.

⁹²⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 157.

⁹²⁸ Chapnick, 157.

⁹²⁹ Chapnick, 157.

⁹³⁰ Chapnick, 157.

functionality of the UN system.⁹³¹ In this case, Canada was a first mover in integrating human security into policy and pushing it through the UN system. Moreover, it continued to gain attention in the wake of 1990s conflicts and their associated UN failures, from Somalia to the former Yugoslavia, to Rwanda (for all of which Canada also had its own experiences and failures). Human security shifted the focus of security to the individual, putting a human face on conflicts, interventions, and other forms of violence, and re-invigorating debates about human rights, especially in the context of security.⁹³² Security could be defined from the perspective of the individual in terms of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”.⁹³³ Specifically, it was directly connected to liberal conceptions of human rights, especially for the individual, and much like human rights themselves, complicated ideas of group rights, further obscuring and putting into the background the power that imperialism and its legacies still held. This critique is not limited simply to human rights in policy, but also in scholarship, such as that which sees individual rights as connected to increasing neoliberal inequality as it ballooned in the 1990s.⁹³⁴ These critiques are indeed also connected in the same stream of thought that articulated the contradictions of liberalism in the UN’s foundations, despite being by imperial design. The failures of liberalism in human rights in the 1990s are part of a larger trajectory that saw the imperial internationalism of the League of Nations and the early United Nations in the 1940s.⁹³⁵ This Canadian focus on rights was a merging of development agendas and security agendas, in a way that also engaged civil society groups, NGOs, and IOs, reshaping the multilateral environment and landscape itself in many ways.⁹³⁶ In doing so, liberalism became further entrenched across many facets of UN work.

The human security agenda was large and included initiatives (as they unfolded over the next decade) as diverse as the landmines ban, the Responsibility to Protect, the International Criminal Court, and initiatives to protect civilians, especially children, in armed conflict. For David Black, both its potential and its problems stem from its “simultaneous foci on the local and the global, the immediate and the long-term” and its potential to “act as a bridge between real time responses to immediate crises and long-term processes of transformation”.⁹³⁷ It was an

⁹³¹ Chapnick, 155–56.

⁹³² Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 221.

⁹³³ Timothy M. Shaw, Sandra J. MacLean, and David R. Black, ‘Introduction: A Decade of Human Security: What Prospects for Global Governance and New Multilateralisms?’, in *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. Sandra Jean MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, Global Security in a Changing World (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2006), 3.

⁹³⁴ Samuel Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018).

⁹³⁵ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); See, for example: Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁹³⁶ Shaw, MacLean, and Black, ‘Introduction: A Decade of Human Security: What Prospects for Global Governance and New Multilateralisms?’, 9.

⁹³⁷ David R. Black, ‘Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian Experience’, in *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. Sandra Jean MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, Global Security in a Changing World (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2006), 54.

“evolving concept”⁹³⁸ that moved away from the dominance of the state in the Cold War but also entrenched some existing structures of power.⁹³⁹ It both challenged and cemented status quo, with critique stemming from whether the “values” being promoted through the human security agenda were free of domination and imperialism.⁹⁴⁰

The human security agenda also linked Canada to its peers. Canada partnered on many initiatives with Norway and the Netherlands and created a small community of those in human security’s favour. This was part of a broader norm evolution on the concept within both civil society organizations and the UN apparatus, both of which collaborated closely with states.⁹⁴¹ Rhetorically, having peers and similar discourse at the UN legitimized Canada’s commitments and appealed to nostalgia of “Canada as a leader in the UN”.⁹⁴² Part of this was the explicit focus on liberal “good”-ness as it applied to Canada. Human security was “a moral impulse embedded in liberal internationalism. The discourses imply that Canada must actively engage the world as a good international citizen and adopt policies that serve the well-being of others”.⁹⁴³ As part of the broader trend in Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s, human security also aimed to engage in “values” promotion, which exists as another tangible intersection of liberalism and imperialism. This is much like the explicit liberal-ness of key tools and practices in the 1990s such as peacekeeping and its embeddedness in broader forms of intervention.⁹⁴⁴ As Smith and Ajadi write, “there are embedded assumptions about the export of Canadian values abroad to others who would presumably benefit from Canadian values”.⁹⁴⁵ Simultaneously, it also ignores Canadian history at home and the failures of these so-called values.⁹⁴⁶ This values promotion is also about the management of the world outside of Canada” and making sense of the political disorder of the world abroad.⁹⁴⁷ Central to the process of making sense of global political disorder, the Canadian position was that the UN was the primary body upon which responsibility should fall. The Canadian role was therefore to restructure and re-invigorate the UN.

In 1996, Axworthy addressed UNGA, arguing,

⁹³⁸ Heather A. Smith, ‘Diminishing Human Security: The Canadian Case’, in *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, ed. Sandra Jean MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, Global Security in a Changing World (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2006), 76.

⁹³⁹ Smith, 82.

⁹⁴⁰ Smith, 82.

⁹⁴¹ Heather Smith and Tari Ajadi, ‘Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy and Human Security Compared’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 3 (September 2020): 372, <https://doi.org/10/ghn4dc>.

⁹⁴² Smith and Ajadi, 372.

⁹⁴³ Smith and Ajadi, 374.

⁹⁴⁴ For a few of many examples on the liberal-ness of peacekeeping, see: Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 337–65; Marion Laurence, ‘An “Impartial” Force? Normative Ambiguity and Practice Change in UN Peace Operations’, *International Peacekeeping* 26, no. 3 (27 May 2019): 256–80, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1517027>; John Karlsrud, ‘From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism’, *International Peacekeeping* 26, no. 1 (January 2019): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040>.

⁹⁴⁵ Smith and Ajadi, 378.

⁹⁴⁶ Smith and Ajadi, 378.

⁹⁴⁷ Smith and Ajadi, 378.

*“internationalism is ever more important for all nations – large or small, weak or powerful – both as an organizing principle for international relations and as a means to deal with crises. Changing times have set us a new and broader agenda, which includes focusing on the security needs of the individual – in other words, sustainable human security”.*⁹⁴⁸

For Axworthy, the best way to do this was through recommitting, renewing, restructuring, and refocusing the United Nations to better prepare it to manage conflict in a collective manner.⁹⁴⁹ The human security agenda was integral to this vision and Canada, in light of the last 50 years of UN engagement, was to be a leader in doing so. Axworthy brought Canada a “pragmatic political realism” and a “strong idealist streak”.⁹⁵⁰ This would become the central organizing principle of the UNSC campaign for the 1998 election.

The 1998 election

Campaigning for a seat on the UNSC had taken place in a growing electorate from 1946 to 1988, with some increases from decade to decade being more dramatic than others. Membership in the United Nations skyrocketed upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. There had been no change of this magnitude since the 1960s. Where there had been 159 members in Canada’s UNSC election in 1988, there were 185 by 1994 when Canada entered the race for the 1998 seat.⁹⁵¹ In addition to the former Soviet states joining the UN, newly independent states from the former Yugoslavia joined throughout the 1990s, and as did many in the South Pacific that would become an important voting bloc for UNSC elections.⁹⁵² Not only was the political landscape different due to increased membership, but given that individual bilateral relationships are central to UNSC election success, management and engagement of 185 relationships was a larger task than 159. Canada would need all the energy and organization of 1988 and more. As one interviewee put it, “you have to be considered an interesting and attractive partner to a broad cross-section of the membership” to win a UNSC seat.⁹⁵³ The potential iterations of those cross-sections was new and unique once again, with 26 more members to consider.

The decision to run came strongly from a place of tradition, much like 1988.⁹⁵⁴ The decade-long gap between elections approached and the consensus across the political level and DFAIT was that it was time. The government decided to run in 1994 and announced the run in December of that year – between the release of the Special Joint Committee’s foreign policy

⁹⁴⁸ Lloyd Axworthy, ‘A/51/PV.7 General Assembly Fifty-First Session 7th Plenary Meeting Statement by Lloyd Axworthy’ (United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1996), Dag Hammarskjöld Library, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/862/57/PDF/N9686257.pdf?OpenElement>; <https://ask.un.org/faq/71867>.

⁹⁴⁹ Axworthy.

⁹⁵⁰ Greg Donaghy, ‘All God’s Children: Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996–2000’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 10, no. 2 (January 2003): 39, <https://doi.org/10/bqm9hj>.

⁹⁵¹ ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present’.

⁹⁵² ‘Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present’.

⁹⁵³ Interview #12.

⁹⁵⁴ Interview #12; Interview #7.

review and the government's response to it (which referenced the election).⁹⁵⁵ Ouellet was still the Minister at the time and stated in the public announcement of the decision that "Canada has made a tremendous contribution to the work of the UN since its establishment 50 years ago, most notably in the areas of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance; our efforts in both have alleviated the suffering of millions around the world. With a seat on the Security Council, we will be able to play a vital role in guiding the organization into the next millennium".⁹⁵⁶ The announcement then went on to include a regurgitation of the Charter's stipulation for elections, including the functional principle.⁹⁵⁷

In addition to the foreign policy review, response, and statement, the announcement to run also took place in the context of work and statements on Canada's positions on UN reform, which had formed a substantial portion of Canada's agenda at UNGA in 1994.⁹⁵⁸ Ouellet's speech at UNGA in September 1994 also indicated that Canada intended to lead a study on the UN's "rapid reaction capability in the field of peace operations".⁹⁵⁹ By January 1995, the study was officially announced. Canada's focus in this campaign would centrally be about how Canada thought the UN should operate and what it could look like in the post-Cold War world.

When Canada decided to run in 1994, only the Netherlands was in the race. Officials hoped that seeing two strong candidates might dissuade others from joining the race.⁹⁶⁰ In 1996, Greece entered the race, once again setting up a contested race for Canada. It seemed that Greece was the lesser of the two threats, but nonetheless, a large campaign was needed.⁹⁶¹ The 1996 election also changed the game for Canada. Australia had been favoured in WEOG as had India in Asia-Pacific, but Portugal and Japan respectively defeated them, to the surprise of many. Canada could not take anything for granted. In line with the decade before, work would take place in foreign capitals, in Ottawa, and in New York. Each was equally important and while Ottawa and New York's officials sometimes differed or disagreed, it allowed for fine tuning of the campaign.⁹⁶²

Appointed in 1995, Robert Fowler was the Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, leading the campaign from New York. Fowler is also the person responsible for coining the term "elected members" or the E10, as opposed to non-permanent members, ultimately giving them a shared sense of importance and legitimacy in contrast to the P5.⁹⁶³ At

⁹⁵⁵ 'News Release No. 240: Canada to Seek Membership on United Nations Security Council' (Government of Canada, 1 December 1994), Jules Leger Library.

⁹⁵⁶ 'News Release No. 240: Canada to Seek Membership on United Nations Security Council'.

⁹⁵⁷ 'News Release No. 240: Canada to Seek Membership on United Nations Security Council'.

⁹⁵⁸ 'News Release No. 188: Ouellet Outlines Canadian Priorities for UN Reform' (Government of Canada, 29 September 1994), Jules Leger Library; 'Canada Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 4' (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, October 1995), Jules Leger Library.

⁹⁵⁹ André Ouellet, 'A/49/PV.10 General Assembly Forty-Ninth Session 10th Meeting Statement by André Ouellet' (United Nations General Assembly, 29 September 1994), Jules Leger Library, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/864/51/PDF/N9486451.pdf?OpenElement;https://ask.un.org/faq/71867>.

⁹⁶⁰ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 158.

⁹⁶¹ Chapnick, 158.

⁹⁶² Interview #7; Interview #15, 13 November 2020.

⁹⁶³ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 157.

home, David Malone and Paul Heinbecker led the campaign from Ottawa at the Director-General and Assistant Deputy Minister levels respectively. Each was very experienced in UN and UNSC affairs. Among other important positions, Malone had served as Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN from 1990-1994, and Heinbecker had served PM Mulroney and his Cabinet in a variety of key positions. Fowler had been part of Canada's 1976 campaign and the term on the UNSC in New York and had held senior positions in the Privy Council Office (serving multiple prime ministers) and the Department of National Defence in the intervening years. Fowler also had what was described as an "activist" streak at the time – he and Axworthy were quite different, but both were passionate and bold on different issues and Fowler was never afraid to speak his mind.⁹⁶⁴ Fowler was well-suited to handling the political nature of an election campaign.

For the first time, officials constructed a more formal election "platform".⁹⁶⁵ The three pillars of the campaign were: "human security, Council leadership and effectiveness; and making the Council more open, transparent and responsive".⁹⁶⁶ These were politically important positions, as many states had a stake in UN reform, and this allowed Canada to frame its positions on international and bilateral issues in a UN-focused way. Human security encompassed multiple initiatives in which Canada was involved and created an umbrella of issues by which states assessed their bilateral relationships. Canada presented itself as a leader for the human security agenda, not just any state. As it was a signature issue for Axworthy, Canadian officials embraced the role of champion for it. The agenda's components such as ICC, R2P, the landmines treaty, etc. were crucial, not just because they were hot button issues, but because they got to the core of how states consider candidates. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, states are not voting based on who has the best platform or who could objectively best fill the mandate, rather they are considering their own political relations with that state and with different understandings of the mandate and the issues at hand. These include questions of "would Canada stand up for us if we became an agenda item on the UNSC?" "Would Canada assess our situation fairly if we were invaded by a major power?" "Could something like R2P go against our own interests?"⁹⁶⁷ In the wake of the early 1990s conflicts and in the context of those active in 1996-1998 (i.e., civil wars in Angola, Afghanistan) this was on the minds of many leaders around the world, regardless of their political orientation and positioning. The P5 also had differing opinions – for example, the Americans were not shy about intervening abroad for their own interests and China saw sovereignty as absolute.⁹⁶⁸ In addition, many of the post-Cold War conflicts were still conflicts stemming from decolonization or from great power proxy wars. The reverberations of global imperialism remained and UN policy was still responding to them.

Briefing materials from UNGA in 1996 for Axworthy outlined many of the priority areas that were central to the campaign. They were not a focus for the purpose of winning a seat, rather they were part of a larger agenda on which the campaign later capitalized. These included:

⁹⁶⁴ Chapnick, 157.

⁹⁶⁵ Chapnick, 159.

⁹⁶⁶ 'Canada on the United Nations Security Council: An Update' (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2000), https://web.archive.org/web/20010718112133/https://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/wv_10/10t6-e.htm; Interview #2, 20 July 2020.

⁹⁶⁷ Interview #1.

⁹⁶⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 162.

“Canada’s commitment to children; Canada and peacekeeping; towards a rapid reaction capability for the United Nations; comprehensive test ban treaty; towards a global ban on anti-personnel mines; Canada and the global land mine crisis; Canada and the former Yugoslavia”.⁹⁶⁹ Ultimately, Canada was taking a pro-multilateralism and anti-great power position in this campaign, which proved to be very popular with many small and medium states and very unpopular with others. Canada’s pro-multilateralism position focused on improving the functionality of the UN and update it for the approaching 21st century; it was a view of how the UN should operate from Canada’s perspective of what the world needed. Making that agenda happen was at its core, about how Canada could fulfill responsibilities at the UN. Seeking status was about using it and “getting things done”.⁹⁷⁰ This is what separates status from something like prestige or reputation – it requires responsibility and active political negotiation once acquired. Seeking status therefore requires engaging with this active role in the process.

Reaching back to the 1940s through the 1960s, a stable world with multilateral cooperation was in Canada’s interest and that of others and so Canada felt the best way to find stability was to invest in the UN. In essence, it was a re-articulating of the founding forms of liberalism of the UN, updated for the late 20th century. More importantly, “a robust, intelligent United Nations was the best thing for the world and the best thing for Canada because it served as a mitigating influence on our neighbour”.⁹⁷¹ The increasingly unchecked and unilateral United States and its post-Cold War imperial expansion was strongly disliked by many states across the globe. Canada maintained a good relationship with the United States bilaterally, but constraining it multilaterally was both important for Canada’s interests and a way to push back against it without directly implicating or upsetting bilateral relations, especially on economic matters. In addition, many of the constituent parts of the human security agenda were disliked by the P5, especially the United States, such as the ICC. Advocating for its creation as a new liberal institution represented a differing path for Canada in a multilateral setting.⁹⁷² Where previous campaigns had put more weight on relationships with principal allies (i.e. 1966), there was more room to push back against them in the 1990s. Doing so did not mean pushing back against liberalism though, rather it indicated yet another contradiction of liberalism: a state could push forward its ideals as they exist within multilateralism while both overlooking their problems *and* pushing back against its anti-multilateral, imperial actors (the United States). It may seem incoherent, but that political incoherency is what is baked into the very foundations of the UN.

Mid-to-late 1996 featured work on thinking about the UNSC’s future and the conflict events of 1992-1994. Canada had many experts on the UN system and the inner workings of the UNSC, especially coming off the 1989-1990 term. This was the type of work that shaped the details of the campaign platform and the ideas of what Canada could contribute. For example, in September 1996, David Malone and a DFAIT policy advisor, John Cockell, hosted the annual Jules Léger Seminar titled, *The Security Council in the 1990s: Lessons and Priorities*. It was not an event for strategizing about Canada’s campaign, but rather bringing experts together with Canadian UN leadership to discuss the technical details of how the UNSC could improve and

⁹⁶⁹ ‘Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy at the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 24 September 1996), Jules Leger Library.

⁹⁷⁰ Interview #7.

⁹⁷¹ Interview #1.

⁹⁷² Interview #2.

become more functional, along with ways that Canada could be a part of this. A discussion on Canada's past work on the UNSC from previous terms helped inform the future potential for Canada's role.⁹⁷³ This work continued throughout the campaign, even into 1998 when the government "supported a UNA-Canada initiative to hold a seminar...on opportunities for Canadians to effect change at the Security Council."⁹⁷⁴ Additionally, "Axworthy's Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development organized meetings with members of civil society".⁹⁷⁵ It was not just a whole-of-government effort, but rather a multi-faceted effort from multiple stakeholders that fed into the campaign in different ways.

DFAIT spent the Fall of 1997 strategizing internally. This meant learning from the past, focusing on a communications strategy, selecting special envoys, and meetings with ambassadors in New York.⁹⁷⁶ With 185 countries to lobby, ensuring that every state had appropriate attention, time, and respect mattered, regardless of size.⁹⁷⁷ In December 1997, a more public campaign began. At this point in December 1997, Canada "had secured 106 commitments".⁹⁷⁸ Much like the 1980s, vote trading was to become part of the game, but they could not conflict with basic Canadian policy on specific issues.⁹⁷⁹ Canada would not alter its policies for votes. Votes mattered less than policy positions and vote trading could only be done on issues that were aligned with existing policy.

At the same time, states signed the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines on December 3, 1997. Axworthy's work on the process saw success at a convenient time, both in terms of demonstrating Canada's leadership as well as having the time to turn to the campaign.⁹⁸⁰ He began meeting with Permanent Representatives and foreign leaders consistently and took on more public engagement.⁹⁸¹ For example, of the \$1.9 million budget for the campaign (including special envoys etc.), \$50 000 was allotted for a Cirque du Soleil performance in New York for permanent representatives and spouses in early 1998.⁹⁸² These types of events, which were becoming more common in the 1990s, were not simply spectacles. While understandably controversial from a public perspective,⁹⁸³ they were strategic efforts to get the entire constituency (or close to it) of voters at a single event to address them and give multiple Canadian officials direct access to those who would be casting ballots. Hurd argues that these types of investments do pay off for those that win, not just for reputation, but rather because the

⁹⁷³ David M. Malone and John G. Cockell, '1996 Jules Leger Seminar: The Security Council in the 1990s: Lessons and Priorities' (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 1996), Jules Leger Library.

⁹⁷⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 161.

⁹⁷⁵ Chapnick, 161.

⁹⁷⁶ Chapnick, 159.

⁹⁷⁷ Interview #1.

⁹⁷⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 159.

⁹⁷⁹ Chapnick, 159.

⁹⁸⁰ Chapnick, 160.

⁹⁸¹ Chapnick, 160.

⁹⁸² Chapnick, 160; Hurd, 'Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council', 43; 'Dancing to the UN Beat: Canada's Battle for a Security Council Seat Has More to Do with Prestige than with Policy', *Maclean's*, 24 August 1998.

⁹⁸³ 'Dancing to the UN Beat: Canada's Battle for a Security Council Seat Has More to Do with Prestige than with Policy'.

conferral of status and recognition provides a form of authority.⁹⁸⁴ That authority is exactly what *using* status is all about – having a seat at the table if and when a crisis arises.⁹⁸⁵ In this case, especially since other states want that seat for various reasons, Canada could be a leader at that table.

Tracking work continued at the working level through 1998, much like the decade before, with staff keeping tabs on different types of commitments, communications with different officials, and the issues that were on the radar of different states.⁹⁸⁶ This also included examining Canada’s voting record on key issues, as others would clearly pay attention. Officials had to manage internal politics of the EU which put Canada at a disadvantage as a non-member, as well as other regions, including the “newly” populated ones.⁹⁸⁷ Canada maintained popularity in (the sometimes overlapping) Africa, the Commonwealth, and the Francophonie. Its policies vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine remained constant from the previous government and was not front and centre in the UN context compared to other wars and occupations (and despite the importance of the Oslo Accords). Canada maintained a general trend towards voting for self-determination rights for Palestinians at UNGA while also voting in support of “Israeli security considerations”.⁹⁸⁸ It was a somewhat stagnant policy that maintained an illusion of a two-state solution being feasible. Towards the late 1990s, Canada’s votes began to sway more towards sympathy towards Israel and “began abstaining from voting on resolutions that were perceived as singularly placing blame on Israel for ongoing hostilities”.⁹⁸⁹ These were meant to recognize Palestinian concerns while siding with Israel in the context of Palestinian people still not having membership at the UN as a state.⁹⁹⁰ In general, Canada’s UNGA votes were aligned with Canada’s European allies, with some difference from the United Nations, but never too much.⁹⁹¹

By UNGA of 1998, the campaign was in its final push. Cross-partisan support for the campaign existed at home and multiple ministers and the PM were making calls and statements. Press coverage at home and abroad was widespread. Axworthy addressed UNGA, singing the praises of the UN but cautioning about its shortcomings. His speech comprehensively covered all three campaign areas, including multiple aspects of the human security agenda. In response to threats to human security, he proclaimed that:

“There is an urgent need for solutions. The interdependence of all of our lives is unprecedented. It is essential for us to work together to confront these challenges. This means working through a vibrant United Nations. For Canada, the universal values set out in the Charter have acted as our moral compass in setting our global agenda. The United Nations system serves as an instrument in achieving our goals.”

⁹⁸⁴ Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, 43.

⁹⁸⁵ Hurd, 43.

⁹⁸⁶ Interview #15.

⁹⁸⁷ Interview #15.

⁹⁸⁸ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 104.

⁹⁸⁹ Arsenault and Musu, 104.

⁹⁹⁰ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’; Arsenault and Musu.

⁹⁹¹ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 105.

*At the same time we recognize that the United Nations faces its own worries, and it, too, must change. But a strong, reinvigorated United Nations is still the best foundation for the future. As the contours of that future emerge, there is reason for hope. While old realities of power persist, a new system based on humanitarian standards, practices and law based upon needs and human security is beginning to show through”.*⁹⁹²

Axworthy was re-iterating Canada’s commitment and the UN’s obligations to liberal internationalism, even in a world far different than the one of the 1940s. The Canadian vision of how the organization should run was clear. Linking human security to the technical challenges at hand, Axworthy finished the speech by discussing Canada’s view of the Security Council that were central to the campaign:

“The Council needs to broaden its horizons in addressing threats which impact our security. Thematic debates on these issues, in which all Member States can participate, are a good step. The addition of peacebuilding to the Council’s range of responses to threats to peace and security is also welcome.

But the Council must also be more willing and more consistent in both how and when it becomes involved. The Council belongs to all Member States. It cannot be allowed to focus on solving the problems of one region and be indifferent to those of others.

*The way the Council does its work must be more open and transparent. For example, Member States involved in and affected by matters before the Council must be allowed to exercise their charter rights. Far from constraining the Council’s efficiency, this will improve the decisions it takes and render its actions more effective. The trend for permanent members increasingly to assume more control over the agenda, thereby marginalizing elected members, runs counter to the democratic principles which so inform our political institutions at the close of the twentieth century. The distinctions between permanent and elected members need to be narrowed rather than widened.”*⁹⁹³

This link between human security and the role and mandate of the Council was important because it allowed Axworthy to position Canada as a country that stood up for less powerful states and one that could advocate against P5 dominance, both in the Council and in geopolitics more broadly. In doing so, Canada was positioning itself as a leader in redefining the liberal purpose of the Council and demonstrating how it would use its status vis-à-vis the Council’s mandate. For Canada, status through election to the Council required not just recognition of it as deserving membership, but recognition of its self-projection as a team leader in handling the responsibilities at hand. Axworthy concluded by saying, “in sum, the Council we need for the next century must be more responsible, more accountable and less impenetrable. We hope that members will support Canada in advancing these aspirations”.⁹⁹⁴

⁹⁹² Lloyd Axworthy, ‘A/53/PV.15 General Assembly Fifty-Third Session 15th Plenary Meeting; Statement from Lloyd Axworthy’ (United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1998), Dag Hammarskjöld Library, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/858/88/PDF/N9885888.pdf?OpenElement>; <https://ask.un.org/faq/71867>.

⁹⁹³ Axworthy, 1998.

⁹⁹⁴ Axworthy, 1998.

On October 8th, the General Assembly elected Canada with 131 votes.⁹⁹⁵ Canada and the Netherlands served for two years in 1999 and 2000. On the agenda were many major issues, but notably civil war in Angola and the sanctioning of Iraq.⁹⁹⁶ The war in Angola called back to previous Canadian service on the Council, relating to decolonization and anti-apartheid positions in Southern Africa. Sanctions in Iraq would divide the P5 and carry over into the 21st century amongst the continued resurgence of American empire. Imperialism was never far away in the re-envisioning and problem solving of the Council.

Axworthy commented to Maclean's magazine that Canada's "most effective role is in finding consensus" and in bringing human security issues previously ignored by the Council onto the agenda.⁹⁹⁷ Canada could be a leader in the human security agenda and bring more voices onto the Council: "We will ensure that both our concerns and those of smaller nations will play a role in creating more transparency".⁹⁹⁸ For Canada World View, a DFAIT publication, Axworthy noted the "tremendous recognition of Canada's international stature" and argued that the world "acknowledged Canada's solid international peace and security credentials...Canada's leadership... put [it] in an excellent position to play an effective and constructive role on the Council and help prepare it to meet the challenges of the coming century".⁹⁹⁹

This would be the last election that Canada would win. After two overwhelming successes in 1988 and 1998, losing in 2010 and 2020 would become issues of public debate and outrage. In fact, it was the extreme success of 1988 and 1998 that made the losses feel so extreme in public consciousness. The successful campaigns had effectively sold Canada as a *leader* for the E10 and for the Council and had championed key issues under the UNSC's peace and security mandate. Canada had not simply achieved recognition and status just to take on the responsibilities, behaviours, and practices of the Council on their own. Canada had done so with the explicit goal of being a leader on those things and being an experienced leader of liberal internationalism in that context.

⁹⁹⁵ 'Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018', 2019.

⁹⁹⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 162.

⁹⁹⁷ 'Joining the UN's Power Body (Canada Elected to Security Council)', *Maclean's*, 19 October 1998.

⁹⁹⁸ 'Joining the UN's Power Body (Canada Elected to Security Council)'.

⁹⁹⁹ 'Canada World View Issue 2: Canada on the UN Security Council: Opportunities and Challenges'.

(8) Canada is Back (and more partisan than ever): The 2010 and 2020 elections

Introduction

In October 2010, Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon marked Canada's loss for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat by casting blame in an unexpected direction – at an opposition leader.¹⁰⁰⁰ The opposition leader on the receiving end of the blame was not just any Canadian politician; it was Michael Ignatieff, who was also both a public intellectual and the son of a Canadian ambassador to the UN who had served on the UNSC in the 1960s. While Ignatieff had been openly critical (a rare rhetorical move), he had no part in the campaign, making it a strange accusation to level, especially given the complexity of multilateral politics. This incident was representative of a larger shift in Canada's campaigns to the UNSC. It was a shift towards a significant importance for domestic politics that took place both in Canada's 2010 campaign and in its later campaign in 2020. Both were losses that generated a large volume of media coverage connecting to larger issues about what is “going wrong” in Canadian foreign policy.

In this specific chapter, I focus on Canada's status-seeking relationship to liberal internationalism in its 2010 and 2020 campaigns to the UNSC. Rather than simply articulating a commitment, like in the past, there was partisan debate about what liberal internationalism should mean for Canada. The shift towards a domestic partisan politics of UNSC campaigns was representative of a marked shift in Canada's broader foreign policy debate over liberal internationalism – the process of status-seeking allowed for the articulation of different visions of how liberal Canadian foreign policy, and subsequently Canada, should be. Where there had been little substantive difference in the liberal cross-partisan consensus in previous decades, Stephen Harper's government took a notably different approach to its predecessors on foreign policy and much of Justin Trudeau's view of foreign policy exists (and has existed) in reaction to the Harper approach. Here we have two different visions of how Canada should fit into global order that become distilled in a UNSC campaign; a UNSC campaign is lens into Canadian foreign policy at a particular point in time. Takeaways exist about both foreign policy and status-seeking. The contestation over liberal internationalism in Canada at both moments demonstrates two different visions and interpretations of how Canada would seek to take on the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices that come with status (a UNSC seat). By looking at the different partisan politicization of both campaigns, I aim to illuminate the ways that status-seeking can be influenced by domestic political contestation.

Notably, Canada is an exception here. None of its peers in the Western European and Others Group have seen such a strong partisan bent to their campaigns to the UNSC. Certainly, it is possible that other Western democracies may experience similar challenges, but at this point in time, Canada is an outlier. What I aim to develop in this chapter is therefore *not* an argument about how partisan politics affects status, but rather use the stark partisan differences to illustrate the ways that dramatic shifts in domestic narratives about liberal internationalism can shape the status-seeking process. This can be applied elsewhere and in other periods where domestic debate, narrative, and contestation may appear in partisan or non-partisan ways. It is an

¹⁰⁰⁰ ‘Cannon Blames Ignatieff for Canada's UN Vote Loss’, *CBC News*, 12 October 2010, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/cannon-blames-ignatieff-for-canada-s-un-vote-loss-1.874121>.

illustrative entry point that allows for a better understanding of status-seeking as a process to identify similar status-seeking patterns and histories elsewhere and the role of domestic ideological contestation within them.

It is important to examine the partisan debate because liberal internationalism is both an embedded historical feature of Canadian foreign policy *as well as* the United Nations itself, and both are rooted in historical relationships to imperialisms and domination by imperial powers. Subsequently, to have domestic contestation over liberal internationalism is to really contest the heart of Canada's own sense of self and how different domestic actors see the role of the United Nations.

A roadmap of the 2010 and 2020 UNSC elections

Canada's 2010 and 2020 campaigns to the UNSC were indeed both products of and drivers of the larger question of how contemporary Canada and the historical liberal international vision of foreign policy fit together. This was especially so as two different governments envisioned and approached the 21st century security environment differently, from the War on Terror to changing post-Cold War relations. For the Harper government, a revised Canadian foreign policy was an attempt to move away from liberal internationalism, especially multilateralism, a feature that was strongly associated with the (similarly named) Liberal Party and its history in foreign policy. This was a central tension in the campaigns, as the *raison d'être* of a campaign is to participate in the multilateral organization that is the UNSC. Harper shifted away from the historical tradition of liberal engagement for Canada within liberal institutions since 1945, meaning that as the Prime Minister and his foreign ministers sought to move away from that, contestation (not necessarily conflict) emerged domestically with their public service, the Canadian public, and their political opposition. While taking this somewhat oppositional view to liberal internationalism, through contestation, the Harper government still engaged in a campaign for a UNSC seat, as they inherited a commitment and still managed to see the rewards of the Council as valuable. This meant that rather than interpreting the UNSC and its liberal international mandate in a traditional way, the 2010 campaign articulated an alternative vision of liberal internationalism, one that drew compromise between opposition to liberal internationalism and a need to still pursue its rewards. Therefore, status-seeking involved relating to the expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices of the UNSC in new ways and committing to the UN's liberal internationalism in ways that still expressed skepticism of the entire endeavour.

By late 2015, Justin Trudeau's government had asserted that "Canada is Back"¹⁰⁰¹, pointing towards a return to the pre-Harper liberal past, as created by many of Trudeau's Liberal Party predecessors (including his father). This return to wholeheartedly embracing liberal internationalism, at least rhetorically, was a feature of both Canadian foreign policy from Trudeau's 2015 election onward *and* the 2020 campaign that emerged from that moment as well. It allowed for an embrace of the UNSC and broader UN mandate and responsibilities through embracing liberal internationalism once more. Moreover, this narrative was constructed directly in opposition to the Harper government's vision of Canada in the international and registered

¹⁰⁰¹ "We're Back," Justin Trudeau Says in a Message to Canada's Allies Abroad', *The National Post*, 20 October 2015, <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/were-back-justin-trudeau-says-in-message-to-canadas-allies-abroad>.

heavily with many areas of Canadian policymaking and civil society that had grown tired of the Harper approach. It too was a product of domestic politics.

Each of these UNSC campaigns as status-seeking processes were part of domestic political referenda on Canada's relationship to liberal internationalism, both as an actor within a system dominated by it and a historical defender of it. This bears similarity to the *theories of international status* as described by Paul Beaumont, and it also shares a relational logic about the construction of actors.¹⁰⁰² Drawing on Benedict Anderson, Beaumont argues that states "have varying degrees of leeway to develop and maintain competitive hierarchical constructions that are not actively shared or recognized by international audiences, yet remain salient and have political effects domestically".¹⁰⁰³ While there is a clear hierarchy in the case of the UNSC rather than a fully domestically constructed one, the idea that there are "hierarchies of their own making" exists here¹⁰⁰⁴; in this case, each political party has a particular view of liberal internationalism and how Canada fits into the liberal UN hierarchy at hand. Canadian governments and domestic audiences form unique versions of status competition within which they seek status, by re-constructing different visions of liberal internationalism.

Regardless of whether international actors and audiences share the view of either Harper or Trudeau's governments, each constructed narratives about liberal international hierarchy that shaped how they sought status within it and campaigned on behalf of Canada. Legitimation of these policies as approaches to status-seeking also came from domestic environments such as political parties, civil society, and the public service rather than solely international ones. Disagreement around what Canadian foreign policy is, what it should be, and where it has been, were at the root of the contestation between each of these constitutive components of Canada. Beaumont argues that this domestic view of status helps scholars understand why "states could 'compete' for positional status without it manifesting in a zero-sum game. It would also help explain why states undertake what look like wasteful status-quests, despite international recognition being so difficult to come by".¹⁰⁰⁵ It is the complexity of the social construction of the state – domestic audiences & civil society, bureaucracies, political parties – that allows this sort of status-seeking to take place with such deep roots in domestic politics.

Over two campaigns, very different visions of Canada were brought forward for UNSC seats. In 2010, Stephen Harper's campaign sought to break from the Canadian view of liberal internationalism of the past, consistent with his broader foreign policy goals. In 2020, Justin Trudeau's campaign sought to return to the liberal internationalism of the past, consistent with his broader foreign policy goals. Partisanship and the government's presentation of Canada's place in the world mattered in losses.

In the remainder of this chapter, I begin by sketching Canadian foreign policy in the 21st century as it relates to multilateralism. Through interviews over four decades of campaigns, as well as policy document analysis, a pattern emerged in this dissertation suggesting that a state's

¹⁰⁰² Beaumont, 'The Grammar of Status Competition International Hierarchies as Domestic Practice'.

¹⁰⁰³ Beaumont, 3.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Beaumont, 3.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Beaumont, 3.

bilateral relationships with others matter and those bilateral relationships, when it comes to a UNSC campaign, can be influenced by how each country understands the other's positions on major multilateral policy issues. As such, a review of key issues in Canadian foreign policy that garnered multilateral attention as well as Canadian behaviour within the UN is necessary. I then turn to a short section on the mechanics of competitive campaigns before discussing each campaign chronologically, outlining their key features and differences, their relationships to domestic politics, and their relationships to liberal internationalism. For this section of the project, I completed 8 interviews with anonymous individuals who worked on the campaigns (of 21 total from 1976 onward). I also draw heavily on policy documents emerging from 46 Access to Information and Privacy packages, publicly available statements & speeches, and media coverage of both campaigns. It should also be noted that while the Cadieux-Léger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada, members of the 2020 campaign team consulted my knowledge of the history of campaigns to the UNSC for a brief report and various questions in 2019. I did not have access to any privileged information and nothing from that work appears in this section of the dissertation.

Canada and the UN: Multilateralism in the 21st Century

Coming out of the 1990s and its term on the UNSC in 1999-2000, Canada was well respected in New York and seen as an effective leader on the Council and other UN bodies. Owing to its “activist” bent and strong leadership as well as the general functionality of the Council in the 1990s, Canada had spearheaded a number of Council initiatives and developed strong bilateral relations in the multilateral setting, particularly in the Global South.¹⁰⁰⁶ It had built on the successes, both reputational and in policy, of the 1989-1990 term as well as those of other UN work in the early post-Cold War years.¹⁰⁰⁷ Moreover, the international environment had been relatively cooperative and stable, allowing countries like Canada to benefit from having their policies advanced. For other UN members supporting liberal internationalism, Canada was a solid teammate in such a project. Canada had also been relatively consistent, despite shifts and ruptures in policy priorities in the Cold War decades; partisanship had rarely shaped Canadian foreign policy and the overall vision of liberal internationalism remained relatively consistent.¹⁰⁰⁸ Certainly, in multilateral settings, as Vucetic and Ramadanovic have found, Canada's positions in UNGA were relatively consistent over time internally from the late Cold War until the Harper era and also consistent with other liberal allies, notably Western Europe.¹⁰⁰⁹

In more detail, Vucetic and Ramadanovic find that from 1980-2017, “Canada's overall voting record tends to align closely with that of Western European democracies”, including both larger European states and the “middle power peers”.¹⁰¹⁰ Looking West, Canada's voting is

¹⁰⁰⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 172.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Interview #2; Interview #1.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Bow, ‘Parties and Partisanship in Canadian Defence Policy’; Bow and Black, ‘Does Politics Stop at the Water's Edge in Canada? Party and Partisanship in Canadian Foreign Policy’.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’, 79.

¹⁰¹⁰ Srdjan Vucetic and Bojan Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’, *The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy*, 2020/12/08, <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/12/08/canada-among-democracies/>; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

similar to that of Japan and Australia.¹⁰¹¹ There are inconsistencies when it comes to the United States and similarity in voting pattern, though that may be more due to the US moving “out of sync” with like-minded states in the 1990s.¹⁰¹² Notably, they find a significant shift in pro-US voting pattern in the Harper government, demonstrating the first major partisan shift in UN activity in Canadian foreign policy.¹⁰¹³ Of course, this is directly related to the shift that I argue takes place in UNSC campaigns – broader policy and UN voting are indeed the larger context under which a UNSC campaign takes place. The most significant shift was on the issue of Israel and Palestinian self-determination, a theme that had been central to Canada’s UNGA and UNSC activity since 1946 and has come up in nearly every chapter of this dissertation. Steven Seligman’s similar study on UNGA votes from 1994-2015 finds that this was the one major issue in which there was a substantive change.¹⁰¹⁴ Vucetic and Ramadanovic note that sharp turns existed on other issues too, which I would argue points to the fact that a numerical pattern in number of votes does not necessarily point to the weight of the issue. For example, they note the significance of the “withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011” and “a refusal to sign the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013” as major shifts for the Harper government.¹⁰¹⁵ While there may not have been a statistical pattern of changes, they are substantial issues and votes for which a change is notable (and noticed by other UN members). This becomes important when thinking about UNSC campaigns and will be discussed further in the next section.

On Israel and Palestine, many note that the changes to a more US and Israel-aligned position began under Paul Martin but escalated significantly under Harper.¹⁰¹⁶ Not only was this issue notable multilaterally, but it was a central plank of the Harper doctrine of foreign policy.¹⁰¹⁷ On this issue, Canada set itself apart from its traditional like-minded countries (primarily Western Europe), isolating itself with the United States, Israel, and a few small island states. This was not just an issue of UNGA votes – Stephen Harper’s and his government’s public positions on issues of Israel-Palestine were also a large shift, even if Canada’s official policy statements never changed on paper. On paper, Canadian official policy has remained relatively constant over time, supporting a negotiated two-state solution, similar to that of its

¹⁰¹¹ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

¹⁰¹² Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

¹⁰¹³ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’, 81.

¹⁰¹⁴ Steven Seligman, ‘Canada and the United Nations General Assembly (1994–2015): Continuity and Change under the Liberals and Conservatives’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 22, no. 3 (September 2016): 276–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1235595>.

¹⁰¹⁵ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

¹⁰¹⁶ Costanza Musu, ‘Canada and the MENA Region: The Foreign Policy of a Middle Power’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 18, no. 1 (March 2012): 65–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2012.674379>; Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’; Seligman, ‘Canada and the United Nations General Assembly (1994–2015)’; Wildeman, ‘Assessing Canada’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019’.

¹⁰¹⁷ Adam Chapnick, ‘Stephen Harper’s Israel Policy’, in *The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 106.

European peers, and “recogniz[ing] that Israeli settlements in occupied territories represented breaches of the 4th Geneva Convention”.¹⁰¹⁸ Moreover, much of the 1980s-early 2000s pro-Israel positions of Canada were around language – where Canada in theory supported resolutions of the Arab states of the UN but criticized language around equating Zionism with racism or the use of the language of apartheid. This occasionally led to abstentions on votes.¹⁰¹⁹ What appears here is not only a clear shift in UNGA voting on this issue but a clear difference between the official diplomatic position advised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade during the Harper era and the stance of the Prime Minister and Ministers.

Arsenault and Musu note that “Canada’s UN strategy throughout the Harper era presented support for Israel as indicative of morality and justice, suggesting that support of Israel was the ‘moral’ or ‘right’”.¹⁰²⁰ Moreover, such support was framed in the language of the War on Terror that structured much security discourse of the mid-2000s,¹⁰²¹ both in the US-dominated environment and in international organizations. Framed through the context of the War on Terror, “Canada’s Conservative government was the first to withdraw financial aid to the Palestinian Authority after Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006” and in 2010, funding to UNWRA was also cut.¹⁰²² “By 2008 January, Canada distinguished itself as the only country to vote against a Human Rights Council resolution calling for Israel to immediately lift its siege on Gaza and for the protection of the Palestinian civilians, in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law”.¹⁰²³ Where earlier policies had certainly been more implicitly anti-Palestinian, the Harper government made it explicitly clear that it was openly hostile to the Palestinian cause. This also became the central core of Harper-era policy to the broader region.¹⁰²⁴ Rather than the soft liberal endorsement of upholding imperial formations in the Middle East, the shift away from liberal internationalism also came with a shift towards openly supporting imperial and colonial violence across the region.

In addition to the overwhelming nature of the War on Terror, the influence of the United States, and other factors, some argue that this pro-Israel shift had domestic roots related to votes at home (much like other diaspora-related shifts including that of the Sri Lankan civil war).¹⁰²⁵ Beyond electoral concerns, the Harper era shift in foreign policy was strongly oriented around setting itself apart from the liberal international past, and ultimately the Liberal Party of Canada legacy that came with that. As Roland Paris wrote in 2014,

¹⁰¹⁸ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 109.

¹⁰¹⁹ Arsenault and Musu, 105; Interview #20; Interview #18.

¹⁰²⁰ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 109.

¹⁰²¹ Arsenault and Musu, 108.

¹⁰²² Arsenault and Musu, 108.

¹⁰²³ Wildeman, ‘Assessing Canada’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019’, 72.

¹⁰²⁴ Musu, ‘Canada and the MENA Region’, 72; Jeremy Wildeman and Emma Swan, ‘What Lies Ahead? Canada’s Engagement with the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinians: An Introduction’, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 27, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2021.1888761>.

¹⁰²⁵ Wildeman, ‘Assessing Canada’s Foreign Policy Approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding, 1979–2019’; Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’.

*“Although there are still fragments of liberal internationalism in Harper’s foreign policy – including his party’s attention to negotiating new trade agreements and its promotion of religious freedom and certain other rights – the Conservative government has clearly, if not ostentatiously, distanced itself from this broad approach to international affairs. Harper and his colleagues seem to regard the principles of liberal internationalism as more Liberal than liberal – that is, as a hallmark of the Liberal Party of Canada – even though they provided a largely non-partisan basis for foreign policy over the preceding 60 years”.*¹⁰²⁶

With the UN as the crown jewel of liberal internationalism, the Harper government expressed significant skepticism of the organization as early as Harper’s first address to UNGA in 2006.¹⁰²⁷ Disdain for the UN was also tied up in a desire for a “principled” foreign policy especially on issues of human rights, with notable efforts in the areas of religious freedom and the highly criticized Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health initiatives.¹⁰²⁸ Ultimately, the agenda of Conservative foreign policy in the Harper era was highly partisan and highly ideological – it represented a departure from liberal internationalism, but yet could not get away from it entirely. Indeed, it continued a campaign for the UNSC in 2010, attempting to shape Canadian liberal internationalism in its own image, one that was not that of the Liberal Party of Canada.

Formed in late 2015, Justin Trudeau’s government brought with it two key claims, one that promised a revitalized turn towards gender equality, and one that announced: “Canada is Back”.¹⁰²⁹ To be “back” meant a return to the liberal international (and oft mythological) “good old days”. Initially, many expected a re-embracing of multilateralism and a shift towards policy positions that reflected those of Canada’s more progressive allies. Rhetorically, it was very clear that Trudeau’s claims are to be “not Harper” and to be the Liberals of the past. Substantively, many Harper-era trends remain. “Canada is back” was met with significant excitement at UNGA in 2016. Promising that Canada would re-engage and that “we’re here to help”, Trudeau attracted large crowds of UN delegates and civil society alike across New York that Fall, his first UNGA since announcing the campaign.¹⁰³⁰ By 2022, much of that is still left to be desired.

The early years of the Trudeau government were busy. In 2017, the government launched three planks of what they referred to as their feminist foreign policy: one on international assistance, one on defence,¹⁰³¹ and one on women, peace, and security, with a later addition of

¹⁰²⁶ Roland Paris, ‘Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 69, no. 3 (September 2014): 275, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014540282>.

¹⁰²⁷ Arsenaault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 107.

¹⁰²⁸ David Petrusek and Rebecca Tiessen, ‘The Shaping of a Conservative Human Rights Policy in the Harper Era’, in *The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Adam Chapnick and Christopher J. Kukucha (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 181–94.

¹⁰²⁹ Rebecca Tiessen and David Black, ‘Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy: To Whom Is Canada Back?’, in *Canada, Nation Branding and Domestic Politics*, ed. Richard Nimijean and David Carment (Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2019), Chapter 4.

¹⁰³⁰ Matthew Kupfer, ‘Trudeau Makes 1st Major Speech at UN as Canada Bids for Security Council Seat’, *CBC News*, 20 September 2016, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-un-general-assembly-1.3759656>.

¹⁰³¹ ‘Is the Future of Foreign Policy Feminist?’, *OpenCanada*, 2018, <https://opencanada.org/indepth/future-foreign-policy-feminist/>.

gender-informed trade policy in 2019. While notably rhetorically dense in terms of promoting feminist ends, many scholars and civil society organizations have been critical of each of these planks for issues of substantive hollowness, incoherency, a lack of consideration for identities other than gender, a neoliberalization of feminism, and a flattening of women and gender as concepts.¹⁰³² Overwhelmingly, many have identified a shift in foreign policy in Canada rhetorically and on some issues, but a lack of change from the Harper era persists.

At UNGA, Vucetic and Ramadanovic find that until 2019, there is no real change in the voting pattern from the Harper era; the Trudeau era voting pattern remains more aligned with the US and less with its other allies.¹⁰³³ Gradual change begins to appear from 2019-2021, but it is still early. Notably, with respect to Israel and Palestine, the UNGA voting pattern from the Harper era remained until late 2019, when Canada voted in favour of a resolution “affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination”. This was a sizable shift but “following the 2019 vote in favour of Palestinian self-determination, Canada joined Israel and the U.S. in voting against UNGA resolutions pertaining to the Syrian Golan Heights, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat”.¹⁰³⁴ As tends to be the case with the Trudeau government, it is very unclear whether any shift is substantive or only rhetorical. This is not to say that one would expect liberalism and liberal internationalism to necessarily support self-determination of Palestine at the UN, let alone many other countries, as the historical chapters of this dissertation demonstrate across the Global South. Certainly, imperial internationalism and British liberalism in the foundations of the UN were central to the partition of the British mandate of Palestine. This is simply to say that even in a “return” to a more traditional Canadian foreign policy rhetoric, much remains the same as it was in the preceding decade. Ultimately, what is on display here is yet another step in the long-term trajectory of liberalism having both contradiction and yet coherence; its principles are often contradicted by actors who adhere to it, yet the idea that some stand to benefit from liberalism’s rights at the expense of others remains. Liberalism’s rights and privileges are applied unequally.

Campaigning for the United Nations Security Council

¹⁰³² Liam Midzain-Gobin and Caroline Dunton, ‘Renewing Relationships? Solitudes, Decolonization, and Feminist International Policy’, *Millenium - Journal of International Studies* Forthcoming. (2021); Smith and Ajadi, ‘Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy and Human Security Compared’; Rebecca Tiessen and Emma Swan, ‘Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy Promises: An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality, Human Rights, Peace, and Security’”, in *Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy: Canada Among Nations*, ed. Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé (Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 187–205, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73860-4_13; Sheila Rao and Rebecca Tiessen, ‘Whose Feminism(s)? Overseas Partner Organizations’ Perceptions of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 3 (September 2020): 349–66, <https://doi.org/10/ghn4c8>; Tiessen and Black, ‘Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy: To Whom Is Canada Back?’; Sam E. Morton, Judyannet Muchiri, and Liam Swiss, ‘Which Feminism(s)? For Whom? Intersectionality in Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy’, *International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 75, no. 3 (September 2020): 329–48, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020953420>; Yolande Bouka et al., ‘Is Canada’s Foreign Policy Really Feminist?’ (Network for Strategic Analysis, 23 September 2021), <https://ras-nsa.ca/publication/is-canadas-foreign-policy-really-feminist-analysis-and-recommendations/>.

¹⁰³³ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

¹⁰³⁴ Arsenault and Musu, ‘Canada, the United Nations, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 112.

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are four main trends that emerge from the rules and procedures of elections. These indicate what Canada prioritized in its four elections based on norms and trends in how states tend to cast their votes. At their core, they are patterns that indicate that bilateral relationships matter most. A state has a bilateral relationship of varying types and degrees with every other UN member and each of those cumulatively shape a campaign. The four trends that influence the bilateral relationship in voting for a UNSC seat are: (1) perception of the competing state's commitment to multilateralism; (2) the competing state's positions on issues of interest to the voting state; (3) the competing state's positions on issues of relevance to the UNSC, relative to those of the voting state; (4) personal relationships and general relations/friendliness between countries. Different issues have different salience and certain ones stick out more than others for different states and for the majority. States often gather information on these based on how others behave and vote at UNGA, where different issues may be more politically salient at different times (for individual states or a critical mass of states) or be on the agenda more frequently at different times.

2010: A Sizable Turn?

In early 2001, just months after leaving the Council, the Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Paul Heinbecker, notified WEOG that Canada would run again for the 2010 election.¹⁰³⁵ At that point, only Portugal had declared candidacy and the issue became quite dormant. By 2004, Paul Martin succeeded Jean Chretien as a successive Liberal PM and the issue of running again was brought to the ministerial level by the Department. The Department recommended that Canada “maintain our existing intention to seek election”.¹⁰³⁶ The memo noted that contested elections were becoming “increasingly difficult, expensive and unpredictable”.¹⁰³⁷ It was noted as important that Canada maintain its excellent reputation and its credibility multilaterally, as it was known for “keeping its commitments and for working cooperatively and as transparently as possible with other governments”.¹⁰³⁸ In that moment, running again was business as usual.

Stephen Harper became Prime Minister in 2006. Upon arrival in government, it seemed that with his lack of enthusiasm for the UN, Harper was in no rush to make any moves related to the campaign and was “content to confine the campaign...within the public service”.¹⁰³⁹ Later that year, Germany declared candidacy for the same election, as one of the G4 states who advocated for permanent seats for themselves. In 2005, Canada had joined the Group of Friends for the Reform of the United Nations and had been consistently involved historically in UN reform initiatives.¹⁰⁴⁰ Canada was opposed to additional permanent membership, like the rest of

¹⁰³⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 173.

¹⁰³⁶ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister/Mémoire à Des Fins d’intervention à l’intention Du Ministre: An Early Canadian Security Council Candidacy’ (Global Affairs Canada, 18 March 2004), ATIP: SA202100090_2022-01-27_13-42-41.

¹⁰³⁷ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister/Mémoire à Des Fins d’intervention à l’intention Du Ministre: An Early Canadian Security Council Candidacy’.

¹⁰³⁸ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister/Mémoire à Des Fins d’intervention à l’intention Du Ministre: An Early Canadian Security Council Candidacy’.

¹⁰³⁹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 174.

¹⁰⁴⁰ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs: A Canadian Position on Reform of the Security Council’, n.d., ATIP: SA202100089_2022-01-27_11-38-51.

the Group of Friends.¹⁰⁴¹ Canada had its own review on reform that it had articulated in 2004 and 2005 as part of this. Notably, in its considerations, the Canadian report recommended “specific criteria for membership”,¹⁰⁴² echoing the ghosts of its functionalist past and demonstrating a remarkable consistency in Canadian liberalism from 1945 to 2005. The recommendation specifically linked contributions to the UN to involvement and decision-making, again articulating a relationship between the responsibilities of the Council and the process by which membership and status were accorded.¹⁰⁴³ In light of not having a permanent seat, Germany, like the other G4 states, decided to run in every election in which they were eligible. Thus, by late 2006, Canada, Portugal, and Germany were contesting the 2010 election. As Adam Chapnick writes,

*“The Conservative government had two decisions to make. First, how would it respond to Germany’s entry? Second, might it be worthwhile to abandon its opposition to new permanent Security Council members in order to improve relations with the G4? The answer to the latter question does not appear to have been difficult. A Security Council with more permanent veto-wielders would only increase the deadlock. There were ways to assuage the concerns of Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany. As for the 2010 campaign, the Conservatives chose to continue it at the official level but deferred a decision on committing politically. Canada’s recent victory over Portugal in an election for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council, which would have suggested to Ottawa that the UNSC contest was winnable, likely reduced the pressure to fully commit right away”.*¹⁰⁴⁴

Almost immediately, it was clear that no matter how competent they were, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was not going to be unified with its political masters. The actors making up Canada were not fully aligned, once again demonstrating both the importance of domestic politics and the fluidity of actors making up Canada. A 2006 memo to Minister Peter MacKay asked for confirmation that Canada would continue running and allowing the Department to continue “existing campaign efforts” until the next set of recommendations.¹⁰⁴⁵ The attached briefing package indicated that “election to the Council would enhance Canada’s ability to pursue its objectives on the world stage and influence key decisions in a forum that matters. As a member of the Council, Canada would have the opportunity to assume the Presidency, which rotates on a monthly basis”.¹⁰⁴⁶ Notably, Canada had excelled in the Presidency role in its previous 2 terms. It continued, “Canada’s membership on the Council would be an opportunity to promote effective multilateralism, including action against terrorism, on failed and failing states, on peace-support operations and on the protection

¹⁰⁴¹ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs: A Canadian Position on Reform of the Security Council’.

¹⁰⁴² ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs: A Canadian Position on Reform of the Security Council’.

¹⁰⁴³ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs: A Canadian Position on Reform of the Security Council’.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 175.

¹⁰⁴⁵ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’ (Global Affairs Canada, 2006), ATIP: SA202100092_2022-02-04_12-44-08.

¹⁰⁴⁶ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’.

of civilians”.¹⁰⁴⁷ Moreover, it would be an opportunity to further pursue reform and increase legitimacy of the Council if Canada were an effective member.¹⁰⁴⁸

In essence, the memo was strongly advocating for a continuation of Canada’s liberal international legacy. It cautioned that withdrawal of candidacy would have reputational costs and argued in classic Canadian fashion that global security was in Canada’s national interest, as was the role of UNSC membership in enhancing “Canada’s stature in other major international fora (NATO, G8, etc)”.¹⁰⁴⁹ Finally, it noted that “consideration also has to be given to how Canada’s policies on political and security issues and on bilateral relations may affect our electoral prospects among members of key voting blocs”, including the European Union, the African Union, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference... “A contested Security Council campaign offers a choice to major voting blocs between candidates with (potentially) different policy postures on issues of interest to that group”.¹⁰⁵⁰

Despite the fact that “by early 2007, it had become clear to DFAIT officials that Portugal and Germany were campaigning more intensely than they had anticipated”¹⁰⁵¹, Cabinet did not plan to secure a full commitment to the campaign until May 15, 2008, under Minister Maxime Bernier.¹⁰⁵² In the days leading up to this, there was a leak of the content of Bernier’s presentation, resulting in a Globe and Mail article suggesting that the government was considering giving up the campaign.¹⁰⁵³ Bernier’s removal from Cabinet due to scandal followed soon after, as did another federal election.¹⁰⁵⁴ The September 2008 election also prevented Harper from addressing UNGA, which “reinforced popular views at home and abroad that the Conservatives did not take the United Nations seriously”.¹⁰⁵⁵ It was not until December 2008 that new Minister, Lawrence Cannon, the fourth minister since 2006, made public the commitment to continue campaigning.¹⁰⁵⁶ It is unclear how much they ever really intended to campaign, had these events not occurred in 2008.

In the time between December 2008 and the election in October 2010, questions about the Prime Minister and the Minister’s investment in the campaign remained, coming publicly from opposition members and the media. While they were certainly part of the game of domestic politics, they were neither unfounded nor unnoticed internationally. While both Harper and Cannon were noted by their civil service as sharp and attentive, dislike for the UN and dismissal of its importance were strong features of the Harper government and many also observed a distrust of the civil service itself that went along with a broader lack of investment in it. Similarly, there was a sense that beating Portugal should not be difficult, despite the fact that

¹⁰⁴⁷ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’.

¹⁰⁴⁸ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’.

¹⁰⁴⁹ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ‘Annex 1/Background Paper on Canada’s Security Council Candidacy for the Term 2011-2012’.

¹⁰⁵¹ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 175.

¹⁰⁵² Chapnick, 175.

¹⁰⁵³ Chapnick, 175.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Chapnick, 175.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Chapnick, 175.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Chapnick, 175.

Portugal was running an intense campaign. In general, while Cannon became more engaged over time, the rest of Cabinet, caucus, and the PM were not taking the campaign particularly seriously.¹⁰⁵⁷ The campaign was consequently fragmented, or “disjointed”, as Chapnick writes.¹⁰⁵⁸ To the campaign’s credit, the Ambassador at the United Nations, John McNee, was well-respected and considered highly competent by many parties internationally and his own department.¹⁰⁵⁹ In time, he also held the respect of the Minister and the Prime Minister, which certainly held the fragmentation together. Those that worked with him indicated that he was able to bridge the divide between the civil service and the PM and find ways to make multilateral and traditional liberal international goals of the UN palatable and worthy of compromise for the Conservatives.¹⁰⁶⁰ From the perspective of those wanting to win a seat, he was able to translate liberal internationalism into a form that fit with the political goals of Canadian leadership (which was very anti-liberal) while attempting to not alienate multilateral partners. Similarly, in many areas where policy had not changed, he was able to lead engagement on those issues.¹⁰⁶¹ He also bridged the divide where the government showed little interest in the on the ground labour taking place in New York, Ottawa, and in international capitals. A good campaign requires the work of all three – advocating and working with delegations in New York, international governments in their capitals, and both policy work and diplomatic connections in Ottawa. In competitive elections, it is consistently a whole of Department and complex diplomatic operation. Importantly, McNee was an experienced career diplomat and notably not a political appointee. While the Harper government made many political appointments to diplomatic posts in its tenure and political appointees had served at the UN before under both Liberals and Conservatives (i.e., Stephen Lewis, Allan Rock), McNee was notably a career diplomat, which likely served the government well, even if they kept him at a bit of a distance from their own circles.¹⁰⁶²

Unlike the 1990s where there had been a substantive policy platform and agenda, the 2010 campaign was rather unremarkable. In New York, staff found ways to speak about Canada’s accomplishments of the past in order to demonstrate Canada’s potential for the future. In many ways, this is status-seeking through responsibilities in action – others were wondering what Canada would *do* with a seat? How would they act? How would they align themselves with the P5? How would they treat conflict and peace and security issues in different regions? In this case, those on the ground in New York were doing policy work in the weeds to demonstrate that Canada had the potential to *use* status in a way that built on its successful past. In general, they advocated that Canada would be productive on issues including those listed in the 2006 memo. The campaign had a slogan: “Accountable, reliable, effective”.¹⁰⁶³ In some ways, it spoke to

¹⁰⁵⁷ Interview #10; Interview #13, 22 October 2020; Adam Chapnick, ‘Canada’s Campaign for a Seat on the United Nations Security Council: The Historical Context’, *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, January 2020, https://www.cgai.ca/canadas_campaign_for_a_seat_on_the_united_nations_security_council_the_historical_context

¹⁰⁵⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 176.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Interview #6, 24 July 2020; Interview #10; Interview #13; Interview #9, 12 August 2020; Interview #16, 13 November 2020.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Interview #6, 24 July 2020; Interview #9; Interview #10; Interview #13; Interview #16; Interview #17, 5 January 2021.

¹⁰⁶¹ Interview #3.

¹⁰⁶² Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 177.

¹⁰⁶³ Chapnick, ‘Canada’s Campaign for a Seat on the United Nations Security Council: The Historical Context’.

participating in the expected behaviours of UNSC membership and Canada's legacy at the responsibilities that come with it. On the other hand, it may have also indicated the lack of creativity and enthusiasm for multilateralism and doing something new with it that came from the political level. In 2009, Harper again did not address UNGA, despite the fact that it would have been a good opportunity to network in New York for the following year.¹⁰⁶⁴ The Toronto Star reported that he was at a photo op at a Tim Hortons in Ontario.¹⁰⁶⁵ 2007 to 2009 also saw budget cuts across the department that hampered morale and effort.¹⁰⁶⁶

Internationally, three key issues overshadowed other aspects of bilateral relationships: unflinching support for Israel, the closing of eight bilateral international aid programs in Africa, and disinterest in multilateral climate change efforts.¹⁰⁶⁷ These were all incredibly unpopular moves with groups of countries that voted collaboratively: the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the African Union, and small island states. While there are never single issues that can make a campaign or secure status on their own, many, especially in combination, can break it. The pivot away from Liberal Canada was a clear partisan move, and while those in New York found creative ways to still "sell" Canada's multilateral commitments on lower-level issues where the position had not changed, it would prove far too difficult to overcome these major policy positions. In 2010, Chapnick writes that the "Conservatives realized that the campaign was in trouble", prompting Harper and other ministers to engage more.¹⁰⁶⁸ He travelled more, spoke at UNGA and the Millennium Development Goals Summit, and promised multilateral global health aid.¹⁰⁶⁹ The Ministers of International Cooperation and Environment travelled to New York to highlight elements of their work on climate and on the Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health program in an attempt to demonstrate a more progressive bent¹⁰⁷⁰, despite the fact that both the MNCH program and environmental policy already drew skepticism from civil society groups.

The previous two campaigns had used many special envoys and employed cooperation across parties, civil society groups, and civil service departments. Moreover, in those campaigns Ministers and PMs had been highly engaged in visiting New York and doing international travel. Cannon and Harper did minimal travel and "Cannon restricted his personal lobbying to elected officials", which is said to have "frustrated UN permanent representatives".¹⁰⁷¹ Eventually, the government nominated a few special envoys, of which Parliamentary Secretary Deepak Obhrai was well-liked and did a relatively high amount of travel, including with the Minister to the African Union summit in the summer of 2010.¹⁰⁷² The AU summit was the final major summit

¹⁰⁶⁴ 'Canada May Not Deserve UN Security Council Seat: Ignatieff', *The Toronto Star*, 10 September 2010, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/09/20/canada_may_not_deserve_un_security_council_seat_ignatieff.html.

¹⁰⁶⁵ 'Canada May Not Deserve UN Security Council Seat: Ignatieff'.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview #13; Jennifer Ditchburn, 'Canadian Consulate Faces the Chop', *The Globe and Mail*, 15 April 2007, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-consulates-face-the-chop/article1073935/>.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 177.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Chapnick, 178.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Chapnick, 178.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Chapnick, 178.

¹⁰⁷¹ Chapnick, 176.

¹⁰⁷² Chapnick, 178; Interview #13; Interview #9.

before the election and a chance to connect with leaders from across the continent on issues of MNCH, peace and security, development assistance, and other cooperation. Staff in Ottawa also took on international travel responsibilities to campaign abroad,¹⁰⁷³ especially as Cannon himself did not do much travelling to campaign, even back and forth to New York. This was in spite of the fact that the Department considered it both quite easy, expected by others, and important for the Minister to be visible.¹⁰⁷⁴

Linked to the three key issues hanging over the campaign, a few incidents in 2010 put the nail in the coffin. First, Canada “abstained on an unsuccessful General Assembly resolution that would have expanded the European Union’s rights at the UNGA”.¹⁰⁷⁵ Combined with a trade move that chose a Canadian bid over a Spanish bid on Subway cars, EU members were furious and with two EU members as competitors to Canada, winning that voting bloc was unlikely.¹⁰⁷⁶ At home, Michael Ignatieff made public his criticism of the campaign, as did various civil society organizations critical of the government’s positions on climate change and Indigenous rights, for whom the audience was both domestic and international.¹⁰⁷⁷ Cannon responded poorly to the criticism. This debate and the domestic pushback against the Conservative vision of demonstrates the ways that domestic partisan politics and their construction of national identity and even status itself can affect status-seeking. In this case, these domestic debates about acceptable behaviour, the norms of multilateralism, colonialism, and national identity pushed back against the Conservative construction of liberal internationalism and its role in the hierarchy of status. This back and forth affected the way that officials, both political and bureaucratic, were able to undertake campaigning and diplomatic activities in the international eye, in an effort to demonstrate Canada’s competencies.

Second, days before the election, the government also announced a new plan to “strengthen Canada’s relations with Israel”, alienating the OIC.¹⁰⁷⁸ Third, combined with a diplomatic dispute over aviation, the United Arab Emirates was campaigning against Canada to a series of receptive allies.¹⁰⁷⁹ There were few blocs of voters left on whom Canada could count. On October 12, Canada went into the election with 135 assurances of support on paper and 15 verbal ones.¹⁰⁸⁰ UNGA elected Germany on the first ballot. Canada had received 114 votes on the first ballot, only 8 behind Portugal, with neither reaching the 2/3 majority threshold.¹⁰⁸¹ On the second ballot, Portugal’s lead grew to 113 to 78.¹⁰⁸² On the third ballot, Canada withdrew

¹⁰⁷³ Interview #16.

¹⁰⁷⁴ ‘Action Memorandum for the Minister/Mémoire à de Fins d’intervention à l’intention Du Ministre: Security Council Campaign: Visits to the UN between Now and the Vote’ (Global Affairs Canada, 7 January 2010), ATIP: SA202100078_2022-02-28_12-46-00.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 178.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Chapnick, 178.

¹⁰⁷⁷ ‘Canada May Not Deserve UN Security Council Seat: Ignatieff’; Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 179.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 179.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Chapnick, 179.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Chapnick, 180.

¹⁰⁸¹ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

¹⁰⁸² ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’.

and Portugal received 150 votes.¹⁰⁸³ Cannon blamed Ignatieff only an hour later¹⁰⁸⁴, kicking off a news cycle and domestic discourse that would continue to haunt Canada a decade later. Ultimately, the fragmentation of the campaign and dissonance on policy issues sunk the ship. A civil service that wanted a seat and a Prime Minister that did not left much inconsistent in terms of Canada's status-seeking. One group could engage in liberal internationalism in a constructive way within the liberal, multilateral environment, and the other was trying to reject it. The tension between those two was the type of problem-setting within which actors were negotiating to come to final decisions on behalf of "Canada". On top of that, the government was taking unpopular stances on key issues that alienated major voting blocs, demonstrating once again rifts between the different actors constituting Canadian foreign policy and Canada and its key allies. Canada's place in the world within liberal international hierarchy was contested at home which greatly influenced the status-seeking process and the ways that Canada could "do" status-seeking; in the end, Canada sent the message that it could not be a constructive partner in its "use" of status and membership. Different visions of multilateralism, its role, and the importance of the status competition were at the heart of this.

2020: Liberals Once More?

It was not clear upon Justin Trudeau taking office in 2015 whether another UNSC election campaign would take place.¹⁰⁸⁵ Many suspected it might, given the tradition of running about once a decade. That said, it was not on the public agenda around election time or just thereafter, though the Department (now called Global Affairs Canada, or GAC) was very aware of its possibility and was preparing as such.¹⁰⁸⁶ In early 2016, following two meetings with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Trudeau announced that Canada would enter the 2020 race against Ireland, Norway, and San Marino.¹⁰⁸⁷ It was the first time Canada had entered a race that was already contested and it was clearly a competitive one – Ireland and Norway would be difficult to beat. San Marino quickly withdrew. Canada had a large challenge on its hands as its competitors were already at work. Moreover, Canada was late entering the race compared to its competitors, as the Harper government had not committed to another race in its tenure.¹⁰⁸⁸ There was catching up to do. Stéphane Dion held the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 2017 when Chrystia Freeland took over.

In a move that set this campaign apart, Canada established a unit working in Ottawa dedicated solely to the campaign. This was in addition to existing teams working on multilateralism, the UN, and other organizations, as well as those in New York working on the campaign. Marc-André Blanchard, a political appointee, became Ambassador to the UN in April 2016.¹⁰⁸⁹ Blanchard came from the private sector in Quebec but had close ties to the Liberal

¹⁰⁸³ 'Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018'.

¹⁰⁸⁴ 'Cannon Blames Ignatieff for Canada's UN Vote Loss'; Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 180.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 182.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Chapnick, 182.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Chapnick, 182.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Interview #20.

¹⁰⁸⁹ 'Meeting with Multilateral Heads of Mission' (Global Affairs Canada, 28 February 2019), ATIP: SA202000688_2022-01-27_08-52-03.

Party, Trudeau himself, and the PMO. He was a fresh face who quickly and easily established friendly relations with his counterparts in New York.¹⁰⁹⁰

The campaign fit well into the move to reclaim the level of global standing that the Trudeau government felt Canada should occupy. In terms of re-engaging with IOs and liberal internationalism, nothing could have demonstrated more that “Canada is back” than trying to rejoin the UNSC. While many were on board – MPs, civil society organizations, the Department, and retired politicians and ambassadors – others awaited with bated breath to see what kind of pivot the government would take to establish that Canada was back in practice. In the early years, as Vucetic and Ramadanovic point out, the voting pattern at UNGA was consistent with that of the Harper era. On Israel and Palestine, this was especially true. This remained the case until a small shift under Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne in 2019.¹⁰⁹¹

In 2017, a campaign management group of senior leadership was set up to steer work across government on the campaign.¹⁰⁹² The initial retreat in January 2017 included discussion on a platform, special envoys, ministerial and PM engagement, the possibility of bipartisan support in Canada, communications and public diplomacy, and the campaigns of Ireland and Norway.¹⁰⁹³ Specifically, on the agenda were also two items: “the Middle East” and “the Trump Administration”.¹⁰⁹⁴ While the details of those discussions have been redacted, one can surmise that the committee rightly concerned itself with perceptions of Canada-US relations and Canada-Israel relations. As the United States threatened to move away from liberal international institutions, how Canada might be perceived in relation to the US and how Canada might preserve those institutions was also on the broader foreign policy agenda in the Department. Discussion about the Rules Based International Order (notably not labeled the *liberal* order, likely due to the public confusion of liberal/Liberal in Canada) pervaded nearly every topic at Global Affairs Canada.¹⁰⁹⁵ 2017 also included the launch of the Feminist International Assistance Policy, the new defence policy titled *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, and the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Trudeau addressed UNGA again in 2017, something he was eager to do, highlighting re-engagement with the UN¹⁰⁹⁶ and the old Pearsonian wisdom of UNSC campaigns past that international cooperation is in Canada’s interest. The theme of the campaign was indeed *change*, but it was a change towards an old liberal/Liberal legacy and one that seemed more rhetorical than substantive. The claim was that a UNSC seat would see status used in traditional, liberal international ways, but it was unclear what that would look like.

Global Affairs Canada was busy and ambitious but major change from the Harper era had yet to be seen. Much like the previous 3 campaigns, work took place in Ottawa, in New York,

¹⁰⁹⁰ Interview #14.

¹⁰⁹¹ Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada Among Democracies’; Vucetic and Ramadanovic, ‘Canada in the United Nations General Assembly from Trudeau to Trudeau’.

¹⁰⁹² Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 182.

¹⁰⁹³ ‘Take-Aways/To-Do List from Retreat/Campaign Management Group Meeting’ (Global Affairs Canada, 17 January 2017), ATIP: A202000680_2021-08-27_13-19-39.

¹⁰⁹⁴ ‘Take-Aways/To-Do List from Retreat/Campaign Management Group Meeting’.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Interview #14.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Chapnick, *Canada on the United Nations Security Council*, 2019, 185.

and in foreign capitals – it was a coordinated effort around the world. Fittingly, the slogan was *Together/Ensemble* and the logo was a multicoloured maple leaf.¹⁰⁹⁷ The five key themes were: *Sustaining peace; Addressing climate change; Advancing gender equality; Promoting economic security; and Strengthening multilateralism.*¹⁰⁹⁸ While thematically on brand for a return to liberal internationalism, they were left very vague.

In New York, the Mission (and the Department) prioritized engagement on issues of women, girls, and gender, a recommitment to peacekeeping, financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the environment.¹⁰⁹⁹ Blanchard especially excelled amongst his peers in the financing for development area, as engagement of different sectors to meet the SDGs was a popular technocratic move in development circles and Blanchard convened a variety of events and initiatives.¹¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, in so many areas where the Trudeau government was claiming engagement, it was doing the opposite somewhere else. By 2020, Canada actually had its fewest number of peacekeepers deployed since 1956 and its mission in Mali was small and limited.¹¹⁰¹ While the government claimed to be a leader in other areas of peacekeeping policy in New York (where change was also rapidly happening), it is easy to see how other states perceived Canada's promises as less than full.¹¹⁰² Similarly, on climate change, the Trudeau government was heavily investing in the oil and gas industry at home.

While there was a risk of other states perceiving Canada as less committed than it said it was, teams at GAC were highly organized, if at times unwieldy, under-resourced, and lumbering in the logistics of strategy. From the main issues on the campaign agenda, strategies and talking points were created for different regions of the world to be able to talk to different countries about the policy issues that mattered to them.¹¹⁰³ This included small island states, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, regions that had likely not voted in support of Canada in 2010. Each of these strongly highlighted traditional liberal international positions of Canada, such as development aid, welcoming refugees, multilateral peace negotiations, and support of agreements such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.¹¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, despite overwhelmingly pro-Israel voting that had not changed from Harper (the exception being the late 2019 vote on self-determination), the Middle East and North Africa strategy statement made clear the traditional two-state solution position of Canada (where Israeli settlements are an “obstacle to achieving a just and lasting peace”), suggesting that Canadian

¹⁰⁹⁷ Caroline Dunton, ‘Canada and the United Nations Security Council: A Primer on the Upcoming Election’, *Canadian International Development Platform*, 14 June 2020, <http://cidpsi.ca/canada-and-the-united-nations-security-council/>.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ‘74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’ (Global Affairs Canada, 24 September 2019), ATIP: SA202000655_2022-02-14_08-44-12.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Interview #20; ‘Regional UNSC Campaign Narrative for Africa’ (Global Affairs Canada, n.d.), ATIP: A202000652_2021-02-09_09-37-54; ‘Regional UNSC Campaign Narrative for Middle East & North Africa (MENA)’ (Global Affairs Canada, n.d.), ATIP: A202000651_2020-12-15_11-00-14.

¹¹⁰⁰ ‘PRMNY-8128: Group of Friends of SDG Financing’ (Global Affairs Canada, 6 March 2020), ATIP: A202000658_2021-03-03_12-39-00.

¹¹⁰¹ Lee Berthiaume and Mike Blanchfield, ‘Number of Canadian Peacekeepers Deployed Abroad Hits 60-Year Low’, *Global News*, 22 May 2020, <https://globalnews.ca/news/6973212/canadian-peacekeeping-numbers/>.

¹¹⁰² Berthiaume and Blanchfield.

¹¹⁰³ Interview #14.

¹¹⁰⁴ ‘Regional UNSC Campaign Narrative for Middle East & North Africa (MENA)’.

diplomats in bilateral engagement should emphasize this.¹¹⁰⁵ It also noted Canada's renewed funding to UNWRA.¹¹⁰⁶ Canada was emphasizing a position that its UNGA votes did not match. It was striving to brand itself as everything the Harper era of foreign policy was not, but its record did not suggest that.

In the background to all of this, Canada was not only out of step with its main allies and partners on Israel and Palestine, but also on political upheaval and coups in Venezuela and Bolivia, where it unadvisedly sided with the United States' position. It was also locked in a bitter dispute with China. In each of these situations, it was closely aligned with the United States, led by a President who was increasingly reviled internationally. Canada-US relations were also increasingly complex, with the renegotiation of NAFTA remaining a difficult task for Canadian negotiating parties. Despite a strategic move towards liberal internationalism, Canada was increasingly appearing on the side of illiberalism, at least at the political level, if not at the diplomatic level. Blanchard made clear the strategic priorities. His remarks to a town hall at GAC argued that the race was "about 192 bilateral relationships...to win the campaign, we will need to listen to other member states, to hear what their priorities are, and what we can do to help them achieve them... We need to defend our values and objectives. I would argue that the most effective way to do this is to be really attuned to the needs and objectives of our partners. And when others see that we are listening and responding to their priorities, they are more likely to consider us to be a useful and relevant actor".¹¹⁰⁷ A bottom line of the suggested response elements for these prepared remarks reads:

"Our campaign is directly linked to our broader foreign policy. We are running as Canada...The campaign fits into the broader narrative of Canada in the world because it is a clear demonstration of Canada's desire to be at the table to shape the international peace and security agenda. It is also about being relevant. Being at the Council demonstrates our desire to contribute to the world and lead the way".¹¹⁰⁸

Canada also hosted the G7 summit in 2018, another opportunity to demonstrate multilateral credentials. By early 2019, GAC hosted a two-day event bringing together all of Canada's multilateral Heads of Mission (ambassadors at IOs). Central to this event was a discussion of the campaign to ensure a coordinated approach internationally. Relatedly, multilateral engagement in a shifting international order was also on the agenda. A key takeaway was that "Canada is modest but ambitious and needs to continue to promote its values".¹¹⁰⁹ This was highlighted as especially important in a world in which international order seemed more unstable. For countries that relied heavily on multilateral cooperation, "multilateral institutions need to adapt if they are to be effective in facing complex issues in a challenging geopolitical

¹¹⁰⁵ 'Regional UNSC Campaign Narrative for Middle East & North Africa (MENA)'.

¹¹⁰⁶ 'Regional UNSC Campaign Narrative for Middle East & North Africa (MENA)'.

¹¹⁰⁷ 'Global Affairs Canada Town Hall Meeting on Canada's UN Security Council Bid: Talking Points for Ambassador Marc-André Blanchard' (Global Affairs Canada, 5 September 2018), ATIP: A202000677_2021-08-26_09-17-35.

¹¹⁰⁸ 'Global Affairs Canada Town Hall Meeting on Canada's UN Security Council Bid: Talking Points for Ambassador Marc-André Blanchard'.

¹¹⁰⁹ 'Meeting with Multilateral Heads of Mission'.

environment”.¹¹¹⁰ This challenging geopolitical environment was both in the big picture sense, especially in dealing with the Trump Administration, but also in the Security Council setting, where deadlock once again increasing and the organization was increasingly struggling to deal with global conflict in meaningful ways. In this context, it was important for states to figure out how they would deal with a very deadlocked environment and uncooperative P5 members (who were very different than uncooperative Cold War P5 representatives) in taking on the responsibilities and mandate of the Council and performing expected behaviours.

As part of this, Heads of Mission were thanked because “showing Canada’s leadership and commitment to the rules-based international order on a daily basis reinforces Canada’s reputation as a strong, reliable partner in multilateral institutions, and demonstrates that we are ready for the responsibility of serving on the UNSC.”¹¹¹¹ Once again, Canada sought to take on the liberal responsibilities associated with status and demonstrating capability in doing so was central to status-seeking. GAC hoped that others would see Canada as the right country to take on those responsibilities and to see their interests and politics reflected.

Meanwhile, Ireland and Norway were running strong campaigns, highlighting their strengths, their impartiality, their strong peacekeeping legacies, and their role as small states who could stand up for other small states.¹¹¹² In 2019, Canada was engaging with Germany and France on their Alliance for Multilateralism initiative, which sought to strengthen multilateral institutions around the world.¹¹¹³ UNGA in Fall 2019 was the final major political engagement before the June 2020 election. Canada was in the midst of a federal election at the time, meaning that politicians were not present at UNGA that year. Joining Blanchard instead were two former PMs, Jean Chrétien and Joe Clark (who was also foreign minister), acting as bipartisan special envoys whose job was to highlight their experiences and relationships with other countries, supporting many of the 192 bilateral relationships.¹¹¹⁴ Following the election, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs in Justin Trudeau’s new ministry was Francois-Philippe Champagne, who became much more publicly visible and engaged in the campaign than his predecessor, Chrystia Freeland, especially in social media and traditional media.

In early 2020, Justin Trudeau set off on a campaign trip in Africa and the Caribbean and returned early as the RCMP invaded Wet’suwet’en territory in Northern BC to remove Indigenous land defenders who were resisting the building of the Coastal Gas Link pipeline.¹¹¹⁵ The event was making headlines at home and was threatening the projected image of Canada the

¹¹¹⁰ ‘Meeting with Multilateral Heads of Mission’.

¹¹¹¹ ‘Meeting with Multilateral Heads of Mission’.

¹¹¹² ‘Ireland: United Nations Security Council’, 2018,

<https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/ourrolepolicies/unitednations/Campaign-Brochure-July-2018.pdf>; Fillion, ‘Canada, Ireland and Norway, Now Vying for the 2020 UN Security Council Vote’.

¹¹¹³ ‘74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’; ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs Alliance for Multilateralism (A4M) Ministerial Video Conference’ (Global Affairs Canada, 15 April 2020), ATIP: A202000648_2021-03-29_15-03-56.

¹¹¹⁴ ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs Call with Former Prime Minister of Canada’ (Global Affairs Canada, 14 November 2019), ATIP: A201902258_2020-03-09_11-50-39.

¹¹¹⁵ Pam Palmater, ‘Canada Does Not Deserve a Seat at the UN Security Council: Opinion’, *APTN National News*, 12 February 2020, <https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/canada-does-not-deserve-seat-at-un-security-council-opinion/>.

climate change defender and respecter of human rights. Coupled with the ongoing sense that Canada was too close to the troubled United States, its projection internationally was taking a turn. Multiple years had gone by of a strong rhetorical commitment to *change* and yet little change had been seen. Pro-Israel positions had not changed, a storm of selling weapons to Saudi Arabia had not been well-weathered, and multiple years of the Trump administration had not helped. In many ways, this was a perfect distillation of the challenges of liberal internationalism – its constant intertwining with the forces of imperialism and the effects of imperial formations are too often ignored. Without challenging its overlap with imperialism, commitments to liberalism’s principles are often vague and empty. These challenges were manifesting throughout the status-seeking process. The COVID-19 pandemic followed in March 2020, fundamentally changing the operations of the United Nations. Canada was involved in multiple multilateral initiatives of early COVID-19 response.¹¹¹⁶ It was not enough. The election was decided on the first ballot – Norway took 130 votes, Ireland took 128, and Canada took 108.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹⁶ ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs Alliance for Multilateralism (A4M) Ministerial Video Conference’.

¹¹¹⁷ Kathleen Harris, ‘Canada Loses Its Bid for Seat on UN Security Council’, *CBC News*, 17 June 2020, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/united-nations-security-council-canada-1.5615488>.

(9) Conclusion

In 2022, it is unclear when Canada will next run for a UNSC seat. There will likely be another campaign, but for the first time ever, the future of the once-a-decade tradition seems impossible to predict. After 77 years since the founding of the UN and 8 lengthy chapters on the topic, I observe enough uncertainty around Canadian foreign policy to prevent me from having an answer when I am asked when I think it will happen again. Moreover, in the nearly 2 years since the 2020 loss, I am not sure that much has been done in the way of chronicling lessons-learned or major reflection on the types of political contestation and positioning that makes Canada less revered than it once was. At least publicly, Canadian foreign policy continues to move along in the same way that it has since Justin Trudeau took office. This is not a call to nostalgia or the “good old days”; certainly, this dissertation has shown that the so-called “good old days” were not some moral beacon. Rather, this is an observation that Canadian foreign policy does not seem to be politically equipped to respond boldly and bravely to the crises of the 21st century in the multilateral environment. Certainly, other UN members do not believe so.

How did we get to 2022? How has Canada evolved? This dissertation has provided a genealogical analysis of status-seeking in the pursuit of elected seats on the UNSC. Along the way, I have also constructed, through employment of historical events, a trajectory of Canada’s path from 1945 to the present through liberal internationalism. Canada has run for a seat on the UNSC 9 times, across periods of time, types of elections, and geopolitical dynamics. Delving in depth into its 9 elections has allowed me to develop an argument about status-seeking that can be used as a framework or guide for understanding the election process and status-seeking more broadly. I have made three significant contributions in this dissertation that contribute to varying areas of literature.

First, I have clearly positioned the concept of status within the politicized hierarchy of imperialism, entering theoretical conversations about status, recognition, and social closure and linking them to those on the intersection of imperialism and liberalism. Subsequently, I have made an argument about status-seeking based on this positioning that I hope can be extended to other cases at the UNSC and perhaps allow for extension beyond this context. I have argued that status must be *used* through the UNSC’s mandate and its expected behaviors, responsibilities, and practices, and that status-seeking is the process of articulating this use of status through its relationship to liberal internationalism. This relationship can either be in support of liberal internationalism or in resistance to it, suggesting that the UN’s goals can be achieved through anti-imperial or anti-Liberal action. Of course, liberal internationalism cannot be separated from the imperial history of the United Nations and so as campaigns articulate how status will be used, they relate not just to liberal internationalism, but also imperialism in the process. This is built on the principles that status is (a) self-reinforcing; (b) predicated on social closure; (c) requires recognition. I explore and scaffold these three components of status-seeking more deeply for IR’s discussions of the concept. Through my empirical work, I develop evidence for these key components of status, drawing on issues in status-seeking such as functionalism, status maintenance, (re)-interpretation of liberalism, leadership, and domestic contestation.

Second, I have sketched the path that Canada traversed over the course of its 9 elections to trace changes in Canadian foreign policy in that time. Canadian foreign policy has come very

far since the early days of functionalism and jockeying for involvement in the affairs of great powers. Its most interesting change has certainly been its evolving yet consistently committed relationship to liberal internationalism. Even when it has sought to contest a previous liberal view of the world, liberal internationalism remains constant. Moreover, Canada has maintained a key commitment, at least rhetorically, to the idea of being middle power and believing in compromise, mediation, and balance. Of course, when situated in a political universe of liberalism and imperialism, questions arise about what that really means. In making sense of it, I find that Canada may well be a middle power, but the question is: in the middle of what?

Canada has often found itself positioned in the middle of significant power imbalance, between large, powerful states, like the United States or the United Kingdom, and smaller states, often those on the oppressed end of an imperial relationship with the former two. Finding balance has thus been, to varying degrees, not actually about a reasonable middle ground. It has been a way of managing Canada's interests in its special relationships and its commitment to liberal principles like equality. It has found itself siding with power through its commitment to liberal internationalism, often falsely equating two sides of an imperial relationship in order to find "balance" between them. This is not unlike the UN as a broader institution in historical perspective. For an institution founded on principles including sovereign equality and self-determination, it has paradoxically remained hierarchical and structured by imperialism, even into the 21st century. Both the UNSC and Canada are essential distillations of the relationship between imperialism and liberal internationalism, highlighting the limits of liberalism more broadly.

For Canada though, its own forms of colonization and domination remain part of the broader forms of colonization and domination that exist globally and its relationships to these broader forms are not inseparable from its own. This is a central tension in Canadian foreign policy over time and it naturally complicates a number of narratives about Canada in the world. Canada has positioned itself historically somewhere in the "middle" between North and South, East and West, the imperial core and periphery, the United States and the rest of the world, and more. This has shifted over time for different reasons, from commitment to liberal principles, loyalty to the Commonwealth, an unwillingness to threaten the bilateral relationship with the United States, or a broader loyalty to different forms of imperialism. It can be seen especially clearly in the multilateral context, as campaigns to the Security Council have been important moments for taking stock of Canadian foreign policy and Canadian identity. What this research has opened is a future avenue to interrogate the relationship between Canadian foreign policy and Canadian settler colonialism. Specifically, this avenue is focused on the multilateral environment and the history of the United Nations, which should sit complementarily amongst other growing interventions about Canada, colonialism, and the nature of the international.¹¹¹⁸

In exploring these tensions chronologically, I speak to a handful of different literatures, including those that, while similar, are often in solitude from one another. Primarily, these are the two literatures of Canadian foreign policy: one in International Relations and another in Canadian history. I am historicizing Canadian foreign policy but also politicizing history by embedding it within central theoretical concepts in political thought: liberalism and imperialism.

¹¹¹⁸ For example, Liam Midzain-Gobin and Heather A. Smith, 'Debunking the Myth of Canada as a Non-Colonial Power', *American Review of Canadian Studies* 50, no. 4 (1 October 2020): 479–97, <https://doi.org/10/gj74nv>.

My goal here has been to push the conversation about Canadian foreign policy forward in a way that takes both a long, zoomed-out view and a detailed, zoomed-in view. By doing this, not only am I putting these literatures in conversation with one another, but I am also deepening their engagement with archival material. Pushing this conversation is not just about politicizing and historicizing, but also globalizing. Linking Canada and its history to central, emerging debates in International Relations allows Canada to be understood in broader, global perspective and within larger narratives about status, recognition, identity, diplomacy, and hierarchy. Canada's engagement in the interconnectedness of the United Nations, liberal international order, and Anglo-American imperialism both makes for an important historical intervention on Canada itself, but also for understanding that interconnectedness more deeply.

Third, I have made a methodological intervention for International Relations. Through a theoretical approach of historical IR, specifically Global Historical Sociology, I have articulated and advocated for an analytically eclectic approach that allows for multiple methods and flexible understandings of causality. I use genealogy as a methodology and a philosophy of *doing* history. My primary commitments are to a relational ontology, including a pragmatist account of action, and historicism. Linking practice and discourse, as well as historical analysis and theory, I advocate for a methodological pluralism, bringing together methods that cut across various critical and constructivist traditions. Doing so has produced a story about seeking seats and seeking status, as one in the same, by theoretically grounding the first and making an empirical contribution to the second. Given the increasing publications on UNSC elections in recent years and their increased attention in the public eye, I do foresee increased scholarly attention. Linking theory (of any sort, including in disagreement with my own) to these cases is important and my goal has been to demonstrate how that can be done.

As I look to the bigger picture, there are ways to connect the framework I have provided to other interesting cases of UNSC elections in history. In this final chapter, I extend some of the key elements – liberalism, imperialism, status – to the following cases: Cuba and Colombia in GRULAC (1979), Guatemala and Venezuela (2006), Croatia and Czech Republic (2007). I do this because these are very interesting stories but also because the bulk of analysis on specific UNSC races at this point in time are in WEOG, as is this dissertation, and so it is important to think outside the WEOG context. Moreover, the first two are examples that follow the path of part two of my argument, rather than part one. There are many others that are worthy of attention and that certainly garnered attention in their time, such as Turkey and Poland in 1961, India and Pakistan in Asia-Pacific (1975) or any involving the G4. The G4 is the group of four countries that runs in every election in which they are eligible, owing to their advocacy for a permanent seat, a status competition and status-seeking effort of its own. The G4 includes India, Germany, Brazil, and Japan. A future project for scholars on UNSC elections could include a historical look at any of these 4 countries drawing on any of the concepts of status, identity, recognition, and more.

In 1979, Cuba and Colombia ran for the available GRULAC seat. The election went to 155 rounds of voting, having begun during the annual UNGA session on October 26, 1979.¹¹¹⁹ As neither could reach the 2/3 majority threshold, rounds of voting continued until January 7,

¹¹¹⁹ 'Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018', 2019.

1980.¹¹²⁰ At this point, both withdrew in favour of Mexico taking the seat.¹¹²¹ Mexico was awarded the seat with 133 votes.¹¹²² Obviously embedded in Cold War dynamics, the New York Times described the Cuba and Colombia competition on October 30th as one where “a few took off the gloves and scrapped with the political equivalent of bare knuckles”.¹¹²³ It was one of the first elections in the late 1970s to really become aggressively competitive publicly, with the United States and Cuba also hashing it out. While the P5 are not usually too forthcoming about their voting intentions, the United States delegates were obviously not voting for Cuba. The United States claimed that they were “not engaged in an active lobbying process” and Cuba claimed that the USA was behaving with “arrogance, prepotency and stubbornness” and creating an “impacable blockade” and “brutal challenge” to Cuba’s campaign.¹¹²⁴ The Washington Post reported that “the United States, fearing that the Cuban presence would make life more difficult for the West and would provide a rhetorical outlet for Cuban anti-Americanism, was lobbying to hold the line”.¹¹²⁵

Notably, the campaign was not only embedded in the Cold War, but also decolonization movements and the internal politics of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Post described the campaign as centred on “Havana's aspirations to an international post from which it could be seen leading the nonaligned movement”.¹¹²⁶ Looking at Cuba specifically is an interesting case of the form of status-seeking not explored in this dissertation in detail and is one of the more uncommon forms: status-seeking by pushing back *against* liberal internationalism and seeking to promote a vision of peace and security through multilateralism that is explicitly anti-liberal. Ultimately, the Non-Aligned Movement was divided.¹¹²⁷ Cuban delegates believed they had full support of the NAM membership¹¹²⁸, whereas other delegates claimed that many were voting for Colombia, including many across Latin America and China.¹¹²⁹ Cuba tried to pursue total support from the NAM, staking out key policy issues in group meetings, notably making statements about Southern Africa. At the time, Cuba was supporting liberation movements in the Angolan civil war and condemning apartheid South Africa. As discussed in many of Canada’s cases, this region of the world and the politics of its decolonization and liberation had the attention of the majority of UN membership for many decades and the continued imperial dynamics and struggle against domination were central to the politics of the UNSC and UNGA. The politics of status-seeking, through a UNSC seat, were inevitably embedded in global hierarchies of imperialism, the struggle between East and West, and pushing back against Anglo-

¹¹²⁰ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’.

¹¹²¹ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’.

¹¹²² ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’.

¹¹²³ Bernard D. Nossiter, ‘Cuba and Colombia Battle It Out For Seat on U.N. Security Council’, *The New York Times*, 31 October 1979, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/31/archives/cuba-and-colombia-battle-it-out-for-seat-on-un-security-council-a.html>.

¹¹²⁴ Nossiter.

¹¹²⁵ Michael Berlin, ‘Cuba Holds Slim Lead in Voting For U.N. Security Council Seat’, *The Washington Post*, 27 October 1979, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/10/27/cuba-holds-slim-lead-in-voting-for-un-security-council-seat/c9b88a08-8a31-4a96-854f-ff51c5f9b381/>.

¹¹²⁶ Berlin.

¹¹²⁷ Nossiter, ‘Cuba and Colombia Battle It Out For Seat on U.N. Security Council’.

¹¹²⁸ Nossiter.

¹¹²⁹ Berlin, ‘Cuba Holds Slim Lead in Voting For U.N. Security Council Seat’.

American dominance of the organization. Seeking status was about articulating how peace and security could be achieved in this context and being recognized as a fighter of resistance to the dominant powers of the Council.

Nearly 30 years later, in 2006, a similar struggle played out. Guatemala and Venezuela both sought a GRULAC seat, with voting beginning on October 16th during UNGA and running through 189 rounds until November 7, 2006.¹¹³⁰ Once again, a compromise candidate, Panama, was ultimately chosen. This was another case of pushing back against liberalism and imperialism in the process of status-seeking. Venezuela articulated its position as promoting peace, security, and cooperation – the purposes of the United Nations – through resisting American dominance. This campaign was also especially heated because the United States was once again concerned, supporting Guatemala’s candidacy through Ambassador and Permanent Representative, John Bolton. President Hugo Chavez bluntly criticized American foreign policy under the Bush Administration, seeking to “become a voice for the Third World”¹¹³¹ and “use its seat on the Council to speak out against the United States”.¹¹³² It was that Fall that Chavez had addressed the General Assembly, calling Bush “the devil”. Bolton described the situation as a rare involvement in an election due to Venezuela as a “threat”.¹¹³³

For their part, Guatemalan officials “expressed concern that U.S. campaigning on its behalf has hurt its bid, turning the contest into an America vs. Chavez battle that has sidelined Guatemala”.¹¹³⁴ The United States was incredibly unpopular globally in 2006, multiple years into wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Bush Administration, and Bolton in particular, were strongly anti-UN. Contempt between the broader membership and the United States was strong and Chavez appeared to be capitalizing on that, resisting the might of American empire and fighting “against US influence”.¹¹³⁵ Membership was ultimately divided, as the bilateral relationships of each were complex. The Financial Times reported that many could not support Guatemala due to its “relations with Taiwan”.¹¹³⁶ Venezuela’s status-seeking efforts were expensive and while bold, ultimately unsuccessful, as neither Guatemala nor Venezuela acquired the seat. Much like Cuba and Colombia, this was a fascinating story with multiple narratives at once, each articulating different relationships to liberal internationalism and imperialism: Guatemalan, American, and Venezuelan. Moreover, each party, as well as members of the General Assembly, were concerned with how the winner of the seat would *use* status once there.

¹¹³⁰ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

¹¹³¹ Christopher Toothaker, ‘Chavez Vows Venezuela Will Win U.N. Security Council Seat despite U.S. Opposition’, *Associated Press*, 16 October 2006.

¹¹³² Nick Wadhams, ‘Guatemala Tops Venezuela for Security Council Seat but Misses Needed Majority in 4 Rounds’, *The Associated Press*, 16 October 2006.

¹¹³³ ‘MEDIA STAKEOUT WITH AMBASSADOR JOHN BOLTON, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS; SUBJECTS INCLUDE: ELECTION OF FIVE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; LOCATION: OUTSIDE THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, State Department Briefing’, *Federal News Service*, 2 November 2006.

¹¹³⁴ Toothaker, ‘Chavez Vows Venezuela Will Win U.N. Security Council Seat despite U.S. Opposition’.

¹¹³⁵ Mark Turner and Andy Webb-Vidal, ‘Deadlock after Marathon Fight to Win Security Council Seat Venezuela and Guatemala Tried a Number of Colourful Strategies in an Effort to Secure Victory, Say Mark Turner and Andy Webb-Vidal’, *The Financial Times*, 21 October 2006, sec. The Americas.

¹¹³⁶ Turner and Webb-Vidal.

Would Venezuela be a threat? And to what? Would Guatemala support US policy? Which countries could support which potential actions on the Council? How might status, as self-reinforcing, be affected by the outcome of the election? What values and expected performance of behaviours, responsibilities, and practices would be acceptable? Where was the line between acceptable and unacceptable?

For a very different view of UNSC campaigns, 2007 saw Croatia and the Czech Republic compete for the Eastern European seat. On the third round of voting on October 16, 2007, Croatia defeated the Czech Republic.¹¹³⁷ Croatia is the notable competitor here, becoming a UN member in 1992 but having never served on the Council to that point. It was also not yet a member of the European Union (2013) or NATO (2009) but was engaged in the long process of accession to both. Croatia was ambitious in its run, competing against an EU member (Czech Republic) that had the institutional support and legitimacy of EU membership in theory. In some ways, it was indeed the underdog. The BBC published translated columns from Croatian newspapers that described the campaign as a “chance for Croatia”¹¹³⁸ and stated that “UNSC membership will make Croatia more relevant in EU”.¹¹³⁹ Specifically, in terms of holding and using the seat, one commentator indicated,

*“The 2008-2009 period will also be crucial for Croatia's joining the EU. Admittedly, membership in the Security Council cannot in itself make joining the Union easier. Namely, the criteria for full membership will not be mitigated, nor will the negotiations go faster just because Croatia is a member of the Security Council. However, it will get a chance to prove itself in advance as a successful co-creator and implementer of joint European foreign and security policy, and in the decisive period of its joining the Union. As a small country from the edge of the Union it can have influence on the joint foreign and security policy that is disproportionately greater than its size, but only if it establishes itself as a European "specialist" in the region”.*¹¹⁴⁰

Croatian leadership envisioned UNSC membership as status platform for demonstrating partnership and participation amongst the major institutions of liberal order. Using UNSC membership to support the liberal mandate of peace and security allowed Croatia to demonstrate that it could perform liberal membership and its responsibilities, behaviours, and practices, in other institutions such as the EU and NATO. This is both an example of status as self-reinforcing but also about the importance of liberalism and effectively articulating a commitment to it.

Upon winning the election, the President, Stjepan Mesic, indicated that “this is one of the greatest victories of Croatian foreign policy after the international recognition [of Croatia’s independence]”.¹¹⁴¹ The conferral of status comes through recognition that goes beyond identifying statehood, but also that a state is seen the way that it would like to be seen. In this

¹¹³⁷ ‘Elections for Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council: A Comprehensive Review 1946–2018’, 2019.

¹¹³⁸ Davor Gjenero, ‘Commentary: Croatia Stands Good Chance of Entering UN Security Council’, *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 23 January 2007.

¹¹³⁹ Davor Gjenero, ‘Commentary: UNSC Membership Will Make Croatia More Relevant in EU’, *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 14 December 2007.

¹¹⁴⁰ Gjenero, ‘Commentary: Croatia Stands Good Chance of Entering UN Security Council’.

¹¹⁴¹ ‘Croatia Becomes Member of UN Security Council’, *BBC Monitoring Europe*, 16 October 2007.

case, Croatia aimed to project a vision of itself as a cooperative, European, and liberal state that could participate in multilateralism just like any other: “officials said it proved that a country considered a trouble spot just 15 years ago could now be accepted as part of the West”.¹¹⁴² Status-seeking, for Croatia in 2007, was a process of demonstrating that the liberal behaviours of status could be performed with competence and used responsibly.

These are simply snapshots of three cases, but they demonstrate the diversity of types of campaigns that can be captured and researched under the framework that my argument provides. Each of these cases, and many more, offer opportunities for rich historical or contemporary empirical analysis, whether as individual histories, comparative analyses, or in historical form like my Canadian cases. There is a vast field of empirics available in terms of UNSC campaigns and the study of politics of status could benefit from additional research that goes down these paths and builds on my contribution or contests it. It would also pair nicely with the case-based research on WEOG countries that is becoming increasingly common. As the dynamics of each regional group are different, it is important to expand this sort of analysis to each of the groups rather than generalizing from the Western European/Anglosphere context, as much IR is predisposed to doing.

No two cases are the same, and each are embedded in specific historical context, but the idea that status must be used, comes from recognition, is self-reinforcing, and requires social closure is consistent as a takeaway. Reading that historical context through the lens of liberal internationalism, imperialism, and multilateralism allows one to make sense of the unique dynamics in each case. While many argue that campaigns are just horse-trading or products of great power preferences, these, much like the Canadian cases, show that status-seeking at the UNSC is actually a complex process of contestation and negotiation across bilateral relationships, multilateral membership, identity and foreign policy, and the politics of recognition. Moreover, this is an opportunity for politicians and diplomats to creatively and/or strategically work with the situation in which they find themselves, going beyond simply the practice of multilateral diplomacy and engaging in political struggle along the way. This can be seen in Canada at 10-year intervals that provide a unique viewpoint into the construction and operation of foreign policy. The analysis of status-seeking in the UNSC context nicely complements studies of broader UNSC politics across many other debates, concepts, and theoretical traditions.

Returning to Canada, while it is unclear when another Security Council campaign may take place, Canada’s position and identity within broader global politics and ordering is also unclear. While mutually reinforcing and nearly impossible to separate, this emerges both from Canadian domestic politics *and* international politics. Ultimately, regardless of which multilateral spaces Canada finds itself in, they are not the liberal international organizations of the 20th century. The P5 are increasingly unpredictable and uncooperative and existing norms are continuing to erode. Canada must adapt.

¹¹⁴² ‘Croatia Proud at Becoming UN Security Council Member’, *Associated Press International*, 17 October 2007.

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