


A THEORY OF BELIEF AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
IN THE LIGHT OF A CONVERSION

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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

The writer was born in Welland, Ontario, on February 21, 1923, and received his primary education in the schools of that city. He attended Holy Rosary Scholasticate, Ottawa, from 1942 to 1949, and in 1949 was awarded the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Saint Patrick's College of the University of Ottawa.

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of religious conversion is one which is of interest to the psychologist as well as to the theologian. The factors involved in the attitude and belief changes of conversion, the subsequent behaviour of the convert, the subject's own impressions of what took place in the process, all these have been the object of natural as well as supernatural science.

While much fruitful work has been done in the study of religious conversion, it would appear that more remains to be done in the study of conversion as a phenomenon in the field of social psychology. At the same time, there exist theories of attitude change which have been tested experimentally but which do not seem to have been considered in the light of religious conversion. Such a theory is that propounded by David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield in their manual Theory and Problems of Social Psychology.

In this book, the authors lay down certain principles of cognitive organization and re-organization which they maintain are operative factors in any change of attitude or belief. The authors are able to demonstrate the working of these principles in various types of attitude and belief changes involved in various fields of human

activity. They do not, however, make any detailed application of their principles to the phenomena of religious conversion.

It is the object of the present work to make such an application. One particular conversion, that of John Henry Newman, will be examined in detail to determine whether or not the basic principles of attitude and belief change of Krech and Crutchfield are found operative. In order to facilitate this work, the notion of conversion will be studied in some detail to determine whether or not the type of conversion as exemplified by that of Newman can be considered as a valid tool for the measurement of the theory under discussion. Then too, the validity of the conversion account itself as outlined in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua must be examined. If the conversion story of the Apologia cannot be trusted as an objective account of the changes of attitude and belief involved in Newman's approach to Catholicism, then it cannot be used as a measuring instrument.

If the use of the Apologia is justified, then, before the actual examination of the main principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory in the light of the conversion is made, a synopsis and analysis of these principles will be given to facilitate the work of application of theory to conversion account.

In the actual comparison itself each principle will be considered in turn and evidence of its operation or non-operation in the Newman conversion will be noted. When this is done, it is hoped that there will be sufficient material to warrant the assertion either that the particular conversion account under consideration does or does not substantiate in general the main principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory.

Finally, and dependant upon the results of the study, some attention will be given to the applicability of the main principles of the theory in the field of convert work and suggestions made for further avenues of exploration in the work of testing the theory in the light of conversion accounts.

CHAPTER 1

THE NOTION OF CONVERSION

The word "conversion" lends itself to a number of interpretations. Etymologically, the word suggests the idea of change, not so much an evolutionary change from one stage to another in the same process, but rather a change involving opposition towards one and the same object. The logician, the chemist, the mathematician, have their own specific meaning for the word. In the present study, the meaning of the word will be restricted to the field of religion.

1.- The Catholic Approach.

It is in the bible that we find some of the earliest references to the process of conversion. Generally, conversion for the Old Testament writers signified a change of state or "return" from aversion to God to union with Him. "Return to God and turn away from thy injustice", says Ecclesiasticus¹;

¹ Ecclesiasticus, xvii, 23.

"... return as you had deeply revolted, O Children of Israel"²; "Let us search our ways and seek and return to the Lord."³

In Isaias the idea of conversion becomes more specific when it is predicted that the Gentiles will be won over to belief in God.⁴ Here not only is there a moral change involved but also a change in religious belief.

The New Testament uses conversion in the same general sense of a change from a state of being far from God to one of close union with God or Christ. Thus it is foretold to Zachary that his son shall "convert many of the children of Israel to the Lord their God".⁵ A more restricted meaning is given to the term in the Acts of the Apostles where it is used to signify a change of belief.⁶ The conversions made by Peter which are recorded in the fourth chapter of the Acts are doctrinal conversions involving the acceptance of new beliefs.⁷ At the same time, however, Peter uses the term in the wider

² Isaias, xxxi, 6.

³ Lamentations, lll, 50.

⁴ Isaias, xi, 10-12.

⁵ Luke, i, 16.

⁶ Acts, xi, 21

⁷ Acts, IV, 21.

sense when he exhorts his hearers to "be penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out".⁸

The Fathers consider conversion as a turning to God requiring the help of actual grace. Thus, St. John Chrysostom, "Vocamur autem non ex merita sed ex gratia"⁹. Theodoretus considers conversion from the same theological point of view.¹⁰ Speaking of his own conversion in The Confessions, St. Augustine says, "For thou convertedst me unto Thyself, so that I sought neither wife, nor any hope of this world, standing in that rule of faith where Thou hadst showed me unto her (his mother) in a vision so many years before".¹¹ And although St. Augustine uses the term in the general sense of a turning to God, we know that the intellect as well as the will are involved in this change. He tells us himself that when he closed the epistle of St. Paul after "taking and reading", "all the darkness of doubt had been taken away".¹²

For St. Thomas Aquinas, conversion is the movement by which the rational creature turns towards God.¹³ In the Summa he speaks of a three-fold conversion to God:

⁸ Acts, III, 19.

⁹ Rouet de Journel, Enchiridion Patristicum, Freiburg, Herder, 1913, p.447.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.683.

¹¹ St. Augustine, Confessions, New York, Modern Library, 1949, p.168.

¹² Ibid., p.167.

¹³ St. Thomas Aquinas, II Sent., d.5, q.2, a.1.

first, that of a creature already enjoying the beatific vision "per delectionem perfectam"; secondly, the conversion "per meritum beatitudinis", for which is required habitual grace; and thirdly, a conversion "per qual aliquis praeeparat se ad gratiam habendam", for which, he points out, habitual grace is not needed but rather "operatio Dei ad se anima convertentis".

Concerning the place of reason in the process of acquiring faith, St. Thomas points out those things which come under faith can be considered "sub commune ratione credibilis et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit", for the unbeliever would not believe unless on the evidence of signs or something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.¹⁴

Session III of the Vatican Council, in its condemnation of Traditionalism, defends the place of reason in the acquiring of faith, declaring that "God, the beginning and end of all things, may certainly be known by the natural light of human reason by means of created things".¹⁵

Conversion itself, according to the Catholic view, is a supernatural act involving the acceptance of truths on the authority of God revealing them, and it requires the

¹⁴ St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, IIae, Q.1, Art.4, ad 2.

¹⁵ Dogmatic Canons and Decrees, New York, Devin-Adair, 1912, p.270.

influence of supernatural grace.¹⁶ This act of faith is ordinarily preceded by two natural acts, namely an investigation into the claims of the Church ending in an intellectual conviction that what the Church teaches has been revealed by God, and secondly, the act of will to believe. In approaching the problem of the relation of human reason to religion, the Catholic theologian begins with the premise that the human mind is capable of attaining truth. He leaves to the philosopher the task of justifying the first principles of reasoning and proceeds to consider the place of reason in the preliminary movement towards faith.¹⁷

One must be careful of generalizations, and yet it seems safe to say that it is chiefly among Catholic writers that an attempt is made to investigate the phenomena of conversion on a level above that of the physical. We shall have occasion to see that other schools which have made studies of conversion have not made extensive studies of what might be called intellectual conversions. Catholic writers on the subject have rightly insisted on the validity of such an investigation and an abundance of source material has been provided in the writings of Noyes,¹⁸

¹⁶ Denzinger and C. Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 8th ed., Freiburg, Herder, 1952, p.452.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.295 and p.492.

¹⁸ A. Noyes, The Unknown God, London, Sheed and Ward, 1934, 383 pp.

Lunn,¹⁹ Johnson,²⁰ Knox,²¹ and many others.²² The work of Sheen,²³ Howley,²⁴ Bruehl,²⁵ and MacDonald,²⁶ to be referred to in a later chapter, is concerned to a considerable extent with the intellectual aspects of conversion.

Penido, who makes ample defence of the reality of intellectual conversion, is at pains at the same time to point out that there is no such a thing as a purely intellectual conversion. A man is converted, not merely a mind, and it is impossible for any man to undertake a study of religion, the result of which study might alter his whole life, with the same detachment with which he might approach a mathematical problem.²⁷

¹⁹ A.Lunn, Now I See, London, Sheed and Ward, 1933, viii-275 pp.

²⁰V. Johnson, One Lord, One Faith, London, Sheed and Ward, 1929, 208 pp.

²¹ R.A.Knox, A Spiritual Aeneid, London, Longmans, 1918, 111-263 pp.

²² J.A.O'Brien, Editor, The Road to Damascus, New York, Doubleday, 1949, 248 pp.

²³ F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Religion, New York, Appleton, 1948, xvii-409 pp.

²⁴ J. Howley, Psychological and Mystical Experience, London, Trubner, 1920, 275 pp.

²⁵ C. Bruehl, "Psychology of Conversion" in "The Homiletic and Pastoral Review", Vol.29, No.3 to No.12, issues of December 1928 to September, 1929.

²⁶D.J.MacDonald, "The Psychological Factors in Conversion" in The American Ecclesiastical Review, Vol.88, No.4, issue of April, 1933, p.336,351.

²⁷ M. T-L.Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, Paris, Tequi, 1935, p.92.

Mainage, although admitting the place of intellectual activity in the process of conversion, is able to show that the causality of conversion cannot be restricted to this factor alone. He points to cases of conversion wherein there was a long delay in taking the last step even when the point of intellectual conviction had long been reached.²⁸

The Catholic view of conversion, then, is that it is a supernatural event, an effect of grace, but one which can be preceded and accompanied by the use of reason. How far removed this notion is from the position maintained by the theologians of the Reformation will be seen in the section to follow.

2. The Protestant Approach

It is in Martin Luther, and from his principle of justification by faith alone, that the main stream of Protestant teaching on conversion finds its source.²⁹ Convinced of the absolute corruption of human nature, Luther felt that God had revealed His law to man only to make him

²⁸ T. Mainage, La Psychologie de la Conversion, Paris, Beauchesne, 1915, p.53.

²⁹ K. Algermissen, Christian Denominations, St. Louis, Herder, 1948, v-1051.

despair completely of his own human power. It is only when man is stricken with the consciousness of his own guilt that he is impelled to submit completely to God and permit God to pour over him His redeeming love. Consequently, conversion is reduced to two stages; first, a sense of terror or dread at the thought of one's faults and completely corrupt nature; secondly, the appropriation to oneself of the justice of Christ by an act of trusting faith.³⁰

We find this same idea in the teachings of Wesley in the 18th Century. Wesley held that a person was converted or had "experienced the New Birth" only when he became conscious of the fact that Christ had died for his sins and had accepted him.³¹ For the Calvinists, on the other hand, conversion consisted in the realization of one's predestination to glory.³²

It was from the Moravian Brethren in Germany that the Wesleyan revival movement accepted the belief that conversion must be a conscious experience coming suddenly to the soul of man and that feelings of peace must accompany this realization.³³ For Methodism and certain revivalist sects, conversion marks the beginning of the

³⁰ H. Pinard, "Expérience Religieuse", dans Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, Paris, Letouzey, 1924, Vol.5, p.1809.

³¹ R.A.Knox, Enthusiasm, New York, Oxford, 1950, p.495.

³² Ibid., p.495.

³³ K.Algermissen, op.cit., p.840.

Christian life. Among these sects we find the same notion of conversion as that developed by Luther, the awareness or consciousness of one's sinful state and the assurance that one is "saved" by Christ. The first of these states is accompanied by feelings of sadness, the second by feelings of great joy.

The emotions are seen to play the all-important part in this type of conversion. The subject must feel that he has been saved. Pinard, commenting on this characteristic of the Protestant conversion, comments: "Pourquoi toute conversion protestante relève essentiellement du type émotionnel, le lecteur le voit sans peine. Il faut sentir l'action de la grâce."³⁴ The definitions of conversion developed by Protestant theologians of later times bear out this fact of the essentially emotional nature of conversion. Seeberg, in his article on conversion in the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, describes it thus:

"... the dogmatic conception (of conversion) may be framed as follows: God frees man from the old tendency through the personal operation of the Holy Spirit. When the spirit makes man feel the reality of his presence and of the new aims thus brought home to man's consciousness, man is inwardly made free to let God influence him and to place his life in the service of God. But this last act can happen only when man himself experiences God and gives himself with full purpose to God, ..." ³⁵

³⁴ H. Pinard, "Expérience Religieuse", p.1811

³⁵ Seeberg, "Conversion" in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, New York, Funk and Wagnalls, 1908, Vol.3, p.262.

Man must feel the reality of the Spirit's presence. He must "experience" God. Conversion for the evangelicals has been reduced, therefore, to an affective experience. Studies of religious revivals from the time of the Wesleys reveal the essentially emotional nature of this type of religious phenomena. Famous revivalists such as J. M. Moody and Billy Sunday converted hundreds of men and women in revivals and camp meetings in Europe and America. The subjects in these cases were carried away not only by the fiery eloquence of the preacher, but also by the emotional tension set up in the congregation itself.³⁶

3. The Rationalistic Approach

Strachan, in his article on conversion, attributes to the publication of Starbuck's Psychology of Religion³⁷ the marking of an epoch in this modern (Protestant) church. "In this book and its numerous successors, the whole spiritual realm has been annexed by science."³⁸

The benefits of this annexation either to "the church" or to science are somewhat questionable. Even

³⁶ Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.51.

³⁷ E.D.Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion, 2nd ed., London, Scott, 1901, xx-423 p.

³⁸ J.Strachan, "Conversion" in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, New York, Clark, Edinburgh, 1908, Vol.4, p.108.

the casual observer is not long in seeing that the type of conversion studied by Starbuck and his successors is exclusively the emotional type of evangelical Protestantism. Starbuck's studies are carried on exclusively in a specialized class of non-Catholics of American communities. These studies involve a statistical analysis of conversion using the personal testimonials of hundreds of people who maintain that they have undergone religious conversion. The result of Starbuck's investigations lead him to co-relate the phenomena of conversion with the growth period.

Conversion, for Starbuck, is therefore a natural concomitant of the emotional and physiological equilibrium shifts which take place during adolescence. For Starbuck, conversion is a distinctly adolescent occurrence. He apparently makes no attempt to study the religious conversions of a predominantly intellectual character which he most certainly would have encountered had he widened the scope of his investigations.

James, who took a keen interest in the work of Starbuck, agrees with the latter in considering conversion an essentially emotional change occurring chiefly among adolescents. He developed a theory of conversion which Howley reduces to three fundamental principles:

1. the existence of fields of consciousness and variations in these fields with the consequent formation of the subconscious;

2. the tendency of psychological elements withdrawn from the realm of the conscious to organize into a new synthesis;
3. the emergence or irruption of this new synthesis under the influence of some exterior cause.³⁹

Explaining how it is that this change effected in the mind takes place, James says:

The collection of ideas alters by subtraction or by addition in the course of experience and the tendencies alter as the organism gets more aged. A mental system may be undermined or awakened by this interstitial alteration just as a building is, and yet for a time keep upright by dead habit. But a new perception, a sudden emotional shock or an occasion which lays bare the organic alteration, will make the whole fabric fall together; and then the centre of gravity sinks into an attitude more stable, for the new ideas that reach the centre in the re-arrangement seem now to be locked there and the new structure seems permanent.⁴⁰

"To say that a man is converted", says James, "is to say that religious ideas previously peripheral in his consciousness now take a central place and that religious aims form the habitual centre of his energy."⁴¹

Although it would appear from these statements that James is a defender of the intellectual form of conversion, the implication is not supported by the evidence at hand. There is a change of ideas involved in

³⁹ J. Howley, Psychological and Mystical Experience, p.59.

⁴⁰ W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, Random House, 1902, p.194.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.193.

his definition of conversion, but in this change the subject appears to be a passive bystander. There is no question of an active process of reasoning from observed facts on the part of the convert himself.

It is in his choice of the case studies upon which he bases his theories that James is criticized. Thus, Hall: "Most of the cases and experiences which constitute so large a part of his (James') volume are abnormal ... Many if not most of these 'experiences' are the yellow literature of religious psychology."⁴²

Pinard's criticism is even more penetrating:

La question ... c'est de savoir si l'on peut échauffer une théorie de la conversion sur la psychologie de l'abandon, prédominante en effet dans la conception protestante accessoire ou nulle dans la mentalité catholique; s'il est scientifique de baser une thèse sur l'étude du type émotionnel, en négligeant presque entièrement le type intellectuel et volontaire.⁴³

J. H. Leuba distinguishes in the conversion process a sense of sin followed by a surrender of self which he holds is the turning-point in conversion. This latter act results in faith and its concomitant feelings of joy, confidence and a sense of forgiveness.⁴⁴ Once again the shadow of Luther falls across the path of a

⁴² G.S.Hall, Adolescence, New York, Appleton, 1904, Vol.2, p.293.

⁴³ H. Pinard, "Expérience Religieuse", p.1810.

⁴⁴ J.H.Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena" in The American Journal of Psychology, Vol.7, No.3, issue of April, 1896, p.347.

student of conversion and once again we find the Lutheran rejection of the place or power of man's reasoning ability. Leuba discards the work of reason in the preliminary stage of conversion and maintains that the state of certainty after conversion is not based on reason but on ~~emotional~~ feeling. For Leuba, the objects of faith may even be preposterous. This makes little difference for "the affective stream will float them along and invest them with an unshakable certitude".⁴⁵ Should there be any doubt as to Leuba's prominent position in the affectivist school, one final quotation should suffice to justify his inclusion:

... The mystery (of how a man of broad culture and good common sense can give assent to doctrines to him, the cold philosopher, so preposterous) vanishes when the slavery of the intellect to the emotions and sensations is fully realized.^{45A}

De Sanctis seems to hold the theory of the rebirth of infantile complexes as an explanation for some conversions. Ideas of God and religion absorbed by the individual in childhood and then forgotten are revived, or reborn, according to de Sanctis⁴⁶ under the influence of some external impetus. He distinguishes between the rebirth of an old complex found in some types of conversions and the substitution of a new complex or structure for an old in other types. This substitution very often is brought

⁴⁵ and ^{45A} J.H. Leuba, "A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," p.394.

⁴⁶ S. de Sanctis, Religious Conversion, London Kegan, 1927, p.105.

about by a struggle between the old and the new psychic systems. Complex substitution, according to de Sanctis, may be partial or total. In the former, only the ideative composite structure is changed, the affective content remaining the same. In the latter, the complete complex is replaced by another as in the case of adolescent conversions where a specifically sexual complex is replaced by a religious complex.⁴⁷

De Sanctis does not rule out the possibility of the function of the intellect in the conversion process. But his theory rejects the possibility of a conversion being based on intellectual principles. For him, conversion is a phenomenon of the affective life of man.

Since true conversion profoundly agitates the depths of the individual's affective system and gives new meaning and new values to the elements it agitates and since the most important of the elements to feel these vibrations is sensuality, it seems self-evident that the process of conversion consists in a practical revision of love.⁴⁸

De Sanctis discusses Newman's conversion in the light of this theory. Referring to a passage in the Apologia "... I love the Church of Rome too well ...", de Sanctis writes off the account of Newman's change of belief as "a love story".⁴⁹ The testimony of those who maintain that emotion did not have a predominant

⁴⁷ de Sanctis, Religious Conversion, p.106.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.143.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.110.

part to play in conversion is rather airily dismissed by de Sanctis: "Those who deny having experienced fervour (in their conversion) like Monsignor Hugh Benson are probably not good witnesses".⁵⁰

It is only fair to add here, however, the fact mentioned by Penido⁵¹ that de Sanctis, later in life, himself underwent a religious conversion and intended to amend his theories in the light of this experience, but ~~he did not succeed~~ ^{he did not succeed} before his death.

4. The Psychoanalytic Approach

Jung might be taken as a fair representative of the psychoanalytic approach to conversion study. He believes in a form of unconscious incubation before conversion and explains the famous conversion of St. Paul on the Damascan road in this manner. He maintains that Paul was already unconsciously a Christian before his conversion; that his fanatical opposition to the Christians was a compensation for secret doubts concerning his own conscious doctrinal position. On the Damascus highway, the unconscious Christian complex, now fully incubated, broke through with great force. Paul's subsequent blindness was naturally psychogenic, being the somatic expression of his unwillingness to see, i.e. to understand.⁵²

⁵⁰ de Sanctis, Religious Conversion, p.106

⁵¹ Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.33

⁵² C.C.Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1928, p.297.

Pregoff, explaining Jungian doctrine, discusses the notion of rebirth generally associated with conversion or entrance into religious life of Christianity. The individual identifies himself with Christ who was born of a virgin. The new life is thus acquired through this identification with the Christ-symbol.

The individual's libido has been in regression ... for the testifiers, each a modern St. Augustine, always begin with a tale of their "sin" and "failure". The result of "believing", that is, of identifying with the symbol, is that the libido is born again, is set free through being identified with the son of a virgin mother who has "eternal life" ... the symbol indicates that the libido, having regressed, seeks a new source from which its potency can be renewed.⁵³

The present writer does not pretend to be prepared to make a criticism of this psychoanalytic theory as such. Suffice it to observe the connection between this theory and those listed above. There has been a development, but this mainly in the jargon employed to outline the theory. It is necessary too, to point out that the more recent students of conversion commit the same methodological error as their predecessors by restricting their studies to a particularized field and ignoring the possibility of a conscious, rational attitude change very definitely found in a host of bona fide conversions.

⁵³ I. Pregoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning, New York, Julian, 1953, p.128.

Penido sums up the situation quite well when he says:

La psychologie religieuse, même la plus empirique en ses prétentions, est commandée par des pré-supposés théologiques (ou anti-théologiques). Il ne s'agit pas, on le voit bien, du légitime refus, par le psychologue, de poser la question de la transcendance, qui est hors de ses prises. Il s'agirait simplement de reconnaître, que l'on peut rendre raison d'un changement d'opinions religieuses, principalement pour des motifs intellectuels, et c'est précisément ce que voulut faire Newman, en son Apologia. Mais pour nos psychologues -- et bien davantage pour nos psychanalystes -- tous ces motifs ne sont que pur camouflage: l'intelligence du converti rationalise, tant bien que mal, les poussées de l'instinct.⁵⁴

5. A Typology of Conversion

Having examined the various schools of opinion concerning the nature of conversion, we are ready to turn now to the examination of one particular conversion, that of John Henry Newman. Before doing so, however, it might prove of some benefit to consider for a moment the problem of the classification of conversion types. A clearer notion of the various possible kinds of changes in religious belief provides a safeguard against the errors which we have seen result from generalization.

Because each change of belief is, in a way, sui generis, there is no such thing as a series of air-tight categories of conversion. It would seem impossible to make workable distinctions between conversion types and therefore impossible to talk about such a thing as an "intellectual" conversion. Possibly the greatest contribution Penido makes to the study of conversion is the typology he is able to

⁵⁴ M. T-L Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.101.

draw up for conversion types.⁵⁵

The basis upon which Penido builds his distinctions is the existence of what he calls "dominants" in the conversion process. We are not, in the study of a conversion, to look for the exclusive influence of one factor, but rather for the dominant factor in that conversion.⁵⁶ No two conversions are exactly the same and unless some distinction is made on the basis of the dominant factor involved in the conversion, a workable typology is impossible.

Penido establishes a two-fold typology, genetic and structural. In the former he postulates a distinction between "exogenous conversions" which are effected chiefly through outside influences and "endogenous conversions" which are those effected by immanent action within the subject himself.⁵⁷

The first division of exogenous conversions is by subject into group and solitary conversions. In discussing the causes of these, Penido maintains that these can often involve a mass conversion at the time of some cataclysm or the conversion of individuals or whole groups by suggestion.⁵⁸ Conversions achieved through the power of suggestion can be of adolescents or adults and include the well-known

⁵⁵ Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.50, p.85.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.45.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.46.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.50-54.

evangelical type of the revival or camp meeting. These conversions in either case may be slow or sudden and consist chiefly in a re-birth of a pre-existing religious structure.

In the case of endogenous conversions, these are not to be found in group conversions, but only in individual cases; they may be slow or rapid and are brought about either by the re-birth of a formerly existing religious complex or by the substitution of a new complex for an old.⁵⁹

In his structural typology, Penido distinguishes in non-pathological conversions, three major groups; dogmatic, which include conversions from unbelief and those from other sects; moral, which include the conversion of the sinner to a virtuous life and of the just to a higher state of perfection. A third category, Penido tags as "mixed conversions", which division, he admits is a catch-all for those conversions which defy all effort to classify the structural dominant, and which refuse to fit in anywhere else in the typology.⁶⁰

This classification of conversion in the structural typology is made on an objective basis, i.e. on the types of mental structures changed. Subjectively these same conversions could be divided according to the psychic factor which played the predominant part in the conversion. A

⁵⁹ Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.74.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.89

dogmatic conversion, Penido points out, need not necessarily be an intellectual one.⁶¹ He cites a case wherein an English woman, influenced by sentiment, not reason, became a Catholic in order to be able to do something for her deceased daughter. It was Catholic doctrine that one could pray for the dead. She therefore became a Catholic. Her conversion was dogmatic but certainly not intellectual.

Conversions thus subjectively considered may be, according to Penido, divided into intuitive, the flash conversion which is an indistinguishable synthesis of intellect and emotion; volitional, a conversion wherein the subject decides that he must submit himself to God and to His Church; affective or emotional; and, finally, the intellectual conversion. Throughout all these distinctions, it must be remembered, Penido is basing his divisions on the existence of dominants, not of exclusive single factors.

It is felt that such a lengthy account of Penido's typology is justified as it is a most useful tool in the study of conversion. Other typologies have been drawn up, but these, for the most part, err on the side of generalization and incompleteness. Penido's distinctions provide a very neat way of categorizing conversions and should prove extremely useful to the student who undertakes a

⁶¹ Penido, La Conscience Religieuse, p.91.

study of a large number of conversions. The study of this careful division and distinction of conversion types serves to throw into greater relief the definitely unscientific approach of those who would draw up universal laws concerning the process of conversion from studies on one isolated area in the whole field.

It is hoped that from a consideration of the various schools of thought on conversion and from a study of some of the weaknesses involved in those theories which are essentially anti-intellectual, sufficient has been said to justify the study at hand, i.e. the analysis of an avowedly intellectual, ~~dogmatic~~ conversion. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that conversions wherein intellectual factors have been predominant have either been ignored by the majority of psychologists or discredited by them as rationalizations. That a predominantly intellectual type of conversion does exist seems sufficiently attested to by numerous reliable converts themselves and by an important number of capable students of conversion.

CHAPTER II

THE VALIDITY OF THE APOLOGIA

As indicated in the introduction, the conversion account to be used in the present study is that provided by Cardinal Newman in his "Apologia Pro Vita Sua"¹. This work was chosen, not because of the reputation it enjoys as one of the classics of English literature but because it provides one of the most detailed and most fully documented accounts of a conversion in the English language. It was the avowed purpose of Newman to:

... set nothing down in it (the Apologia) as certain for which I have not a clear memory or some written testimonial, or the corroboration of some friend ... Moreover, I mean to be simply personal and historical ... I wish as far as I am able, simply to state facts, whether they are ultimately determined to be for me or against me.²

Newman maintained that his conversion was an intellectual one. It should be pointed out that it is the concern of the present writer to establish that Newman is to be taken at his word, not so that he might be able to point to a bona fide intellectual conversion but to assure himself that the document he is dealing with is a valid one. If the investigator cannot satisfy

¹ John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, London, Dent, 1912, x-326 pp.

² Ibid., pp 27-28.

himself that the document on which he bases his study is itself valid, his work is pointless. If Newman's conversion on the natural level is not mainly the result of the use of reason, as he himself says that it is, if it can be shown that unconscious motives or emotional forces unperceived by the author of the Apologia effected the change of religious belief, the basis for the present work vanishes.

A survey of the literature on the Apologia and its author soon brings the reader into contact with those who would cast doubts upon the validity of Newman's account of his conversion and with those who would call the veracity of Newman himself into question.

Among the first to attack the Apologia, were, naturally enough, those whose ranks Newman had left to join the Catholic Church. Darby undertakes to criticize Newman's historical findings which led him to leave the Anglican fold and goes on to deny his sincerity in looking for the truth.³ Speaking on this latter point he says of Newman: "He never possessed the truth nor in the process he describes (i.e. in the Apologia) sought it."⁴

Abbot⁵ admits candidly that he can make no pretension to an intellectual sympathy with Newman. Speaking

³ J.N.Darby, Analysis of Dr. Newman's Pro Vita Sua, London, Broom, 1866, 171 pp.

⁴ Ibid., p.2.

⁵ E.A.Abbot, The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman, London, Macmillan, 1892, Vol.1, 2-415 pp, Vol.2 xii-480 pp.

of his own views as to the worth of the Apologia, he says:

On the contrary, he (i.e. Abbot) does not conceal his opinion that Newman's imagination dominated his reason even more than his spiritual fears perverted his imagination, that he was led to wrong conclusions by hasty judgment and insufficient study; that the Apologia is by no means so accurate in its representation of facts as it is delightful in its literary style ...⁶

He develops too a neat insinuation against Newman's veracity when he quotes Newman's own fallen-away brother as saying of the Apologia that "it must be expected that the more mythical the narrative, the better it will sell".⁷

In a previous work, Philomythus, Abbot had attacked Newman as a lover of fables, declared that he had been guilty in his Essay on Miracles, of a degree of prejudice and almost wilful exaggeration which a scientific man, in the interests of science, would consider not only professionally mean and discreditable, but as tainted with "moral turpitude".⁸

The thesis of Cross⁹ is that "psychological" (i.e. non-intellectual) forces were the dominant factors in Newman's conversion. Cross, in agreement with Abbot,

⁶ E.A.Abbot, The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman, p. viii.

⁷ Ibid., p. viii.

⁸ R.H.Hutton, quoted in Cardinal Newman, 2nd ed., London, Mettuen, 1892, (xi-268 pp), pp.254-255.

⁹ F.L.Cross, John Henry Newman, Glasgow, University Press, 1933, 182 pp.

believes that "it can be shown that the Apologia gives a distinctly misleading account of the chief motives which led to the event, to justify which the work was written".¹⁰ For Cross, Newman's conversion was the result of a desire for some kind of retaliation after the attack of the Bishops on Tract 90. "The Church was disgusted with Newman; the only step open to him in retaliation was to disown the Church".¹¹

"Newman's temperament", he further maintains, "was far too distrustful of reason for him ever to have been led to such a radical change on primarily intellectual grounds".¹² Cross asserts this to substantiate his contention that Newman's fundamental principle of motivation was emotional rather than intellectual; that he had a psychological need for authority, a need which could be fully satisfied only within the pale of an authoritarian Church.

Bremond,¹³ while casting no reflection on the reliability of the Apologia itself, would seem to place himself in the ranks of those who accent the emotionalism of Newman. He considers the adolescent conversion of Newman in 1815, as "the most important date of his life" and that the dogmatic conversion of 1845 was almost a matter of

¹⁰ F. L. Cross, John Henry Newman, p.132.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 143.

¹² Ibid., p.123.

¹³ H. Bremond, The Mystery of Newman, London, Williams & Norgate, 1907, xvii - 358 pp.

course. He does not deny the reliability of Newman's account of his intellectual steps towards Catholicism, but seems to hold that affectivity was at least as vital a factor as reasoning, in the conversion.¹⁴

O'Faolain,¹⁵ one of the more recent biographers of Newman, actually denies the objectivity of the Apologia. Referring to it as "that utterly truthful book which no biographer can trust implicitly"¹⁶ O'Faolain tells us quite bluntly that "most of Newman's intellectualizations are autopsies or post-cogitations", that they are "quite untrustworthy as complete accounts of what happened".¹⁷ As one proof of the contention that Newman deliberately plays down or forgets the emotional factors influencing his conversion, O'Faolain points to Newman's heated attack on Faussett in Tract 80, occasioned by the latter's treatment of Froude's teaching on the Eucharist. O'Faolain points out that Newman gives this affair only five lines in the Apologia, whereas, in his (O'Faolain's) opinion, this affair was "a tidal change which had occurred ... in the depths of his being". "No memory" O'Faolain concludes, "least of all, the memory of a subjective intellectual, can be trusted implicitly."¹⁸

¹⁴ H. Bremond, The Mystery of Newman, p.183.

¹⁵ S.O'Faolain, Newman's Way, London, Longmans, 1952, xiii - 286 p.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.224.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.38.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.222.

Newman wrote the Apologia because he had been called a liar. He set out to clear himself of this unjust and uncharitable charge. Apart from the testimony of his contemporaries, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, as to his moral integrity and the eventual recognition of his true worth as a Christian and a scholar by the Church itself, common sense ought to assure us of at least the subjective veracity of the Apologia. A rational individual does not attempt to prove by lies that he is not a liar. Fully aware that Kingsly and other critics would be watching and weighing his every word, Newman was doubly on his guard against making any statement in the Apologia which he could not substantiate.

Darby's "Analysis" requires little examination to reveal that it is obviously written with the a priori bias of one who felt that anyone who fell into popery had, unwittingly or not, fallen into error. Although he "pities" Doctor Newman, it is difficult to believe, in the light of his flatly-worded assumption that Newman had fallen into error, that Darby has done him the justice of judging the Apologia on its own merits.

Abbot's unwarranted and unjustifiable attack on the moral qualities of Newman's thinking is so flagrantly biased as to be beneath comment. His malicious quoting of Newman's brother is even less worthy of attention. As for

the charge of "hasty judgement" and "insufficient study", the fact that Newman took fifteen years to become a Catholic, and did so only after an exhausting search for any historical or theological argument strong enough to keep him in the Church of England, is answer enough.

The fundamental assumption of those who would ascribe emotional rather than intellectual reasons for Newman's conversion, in contradiction of the latter's testimony to the contrary, is well expressed in these rather remarkable lines found in O'Faolain's study: "But what can we know of his heart? We know only a little; but I feel that we may, without impertinence, think we know more than he (Newman) did".¹⁹ Once having adopted this view, it is not likely that any critic will heed the protestations of Newman himself written plainly in the Apologia:

... I determined to be guided, not by my imagination, but by my reason. And this I said over and over again in the years which followed, both in conversation and in private letters. Had it not been for this severe resolve, I should have been a Catholic sooner than I was.²⁰

Cross²¹ implies, of course, that the psychological factors involved in his conversion were so deep and subtle that they were missed by Newman. It is true that Newman

¹⁹ S.O'Faolain, Newman's Way, P.38-39

²⁰ J.H.Cardinal Newman, op. cit., p.122.

²¹ F.L.Cross, John Henry Newman, p.143.

records the "enormous disappointment" occasioned by the condemnation of Tract 90, but to read into this reaction, as Cross does, a desire for retaliation, and further, to make this desire a prime motive for entering the Catholic Church, seems more than a little gratuitous.

Harrold²² explains Newman's virtual silence on his emotional reaction to the condemnation of Tract 90, as a result, not only of his naturally shy and reserved sentiment, but also because of his purpose in the Apologia of appealing to the reader's mind and sense of justice and not of his sympathies and emotions.²³

Newman was not ignorant of his emotional reactions in the various crises, minor and major, which arose in his life. He was sufficiently capable of evaluating the relative importance of these factors and introduced them into his account only when he felt that this was warranted. We shall have occasion to point out later that, contrary to the opinion of some, the emotional elements which were involved in Newman's conversion operated in such a way as to retard and not hasten his conversion.

Cross interprets Newman's rational recognition of the need of divinely instituted authority in a theological system as, instead, a fundamental psychological need.²⁴ In discussing this objection, along with all others which

²² C.F. Harrold, John Henry Newman, An Expository and Critical Study of His Mind, Thought and Art, New York, Longmans, 1945, xi-472 pp.

²³ Ibid., p.315.

²⁴ F.L. Cross, John Henry Newman, p.52.

tend to portray a sentimental and emotional Newman, the words of Reade²⁵ seem particularly apropos. Speaking of the "average Englishman" who forms a pattern out of his scant elements of knowledge, he says,

... he constructs the picture of a Newman compounded of sweetness, tenderness, perplexity, hesitation, a complexity of qualities which found appropriate issue in submission to the strongest and most absolute ecclesiastical authority regnant ... a submission which was then defended by reason disconcertingly clever but far too subtle for the straightforward British mind. This, we think is the root cause of the most common form of the "sentimental" Newman myth. Quite a simple matter ... inadequate knowledge.²⁶

Concerning O'Faolain's reluctance, mentioned above, to trust Newman's memory, little need be said. Newman, in his work on the Apologia, made use continually of documentary sources in the form of entries in his diary, letters to friends, sermons, etc., written when the memory of events and his reaction to these events was still fresh in his mind.

The opinion of those who vouch for the validity of the Apologia and who therefore acknowledge the essentially intellectual nature of Newman's conversion can be summed up in the words of the rationalist author, Sarolea.²⁷ Speaking of the absence of an emotional

²⁵ F.V.Reade, "The Sentimental Myth" in Newman Centennial Essays, London, Burns-Oates, 1945, 241 pp.

²⁶ Ibid., pp 140-141.

²⁷ C.Sarolea, Cardinal Newman, Edinburgh, Clark, 1908, vii-174 pp.

crisis in Newman's conversion he says:

I am astonished that nobody should have observed how Newman's conversion was reflective, self-conscious, methodical ... He advances step by step, methodically. His conversion is a series of logical processes and syllogisms and it takes him fifteen years to develop them.²⁸

And again, in the same work, we find

... This intellectual temperament gives us the key to many of the peculiarities of his writings, of his style and of his method. He feels an irresistible need of clearness and certainty. ... He was not converted by personal influences, not by certain events, but by certain principles and certain books and in that precise meaning I think we are almost justified in calling his conversion bookish and artificial.²⁹

Besides his intellectual honesty, for the defense of which he undertook the Apologia, Newman had two other qualifications which were essential to the writing of a factual account of his conversion. He was, first of all, an historian. His years of study of early Church history and the works of the Fathers had trained him to weigh all evidence carefully and leave aside in his work that material which could not be thoroughly documented. Apart from the care he would naturally take to safeguard himself from the attacks of his enemies, Newman employed the critical approach of an historian in his work on the Apologia.

²⁸ C. Sarolea, Cardinal Newman, p.68.

²⁹ Ibid., p.69.

Secondly, Newman was a master of the technique of introspection. The fame which he has achieved in English letters as a prose writer is a result, in no small part, of his continued, painstaking search for the most exact word to express his feelings and ideas. Manuscripts of Newman's with their frequent erasures and corrections, reflect not the mind of one in wavering indecision, but the mind of one searching for the most suitable word to express the exact nuance of his intended meaning.

In this connection, Cronin writes:

One of his (Newman's) principles was the effort at faithful mirroring and interpreting of thought as he experienced it, of the actual way of reasoning and his fidelity to this principle joined with an unusual sensitiveness of temperament, made his analysis of the human mind an enduring classic.

... Shrewd observations, such as those on the tendency of objections and difficulties to weigh on the mind, yes, even to induce scepticism, remarks on the need of responsibility in one who would approach to truth and the like, represent actual conditions of thought.³⁰

In conclusion, it can be pointed out that Newman himself foresaw that he would be accused of laying stress on little things, of being "beside the mark", but he nevertheless felt that he was obliged to "follow my own lights and speak out my own heart".³¹

³⁰ F.C.Cronin, Cardinal Newman: His Theory of Knowledge (Doctoral Dissertation) Washington, Catholic University, 1935, xviii-155 p. p.110.

³¹ John Henry Cardinal Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, London, Dent, 1912, p.28.

Despite the tribute which is paid to Newman for his integrity, his intellectual prowess, his ability as an historian, his great gift of psychological insight, his power of exact expression of thought, we still find those who blandly assert their ability to understand Newman better than he understood himself. It seems to the present writer that this claim still remains to be proven and that it is safe to proceed with the study of the conversion account as recorded in the Apologia, treating it as a valid, trustworthy, document.

CHAPTER III

THE CONVERSION ACCOUNT

1. Introduction

Several difficulties beset the investigator as he undertakes to study some of the psychological factors involved in the conversion of John Henry Newman to the Catholic faith. He is forever tempted to waver in his resolution to work from one basic document, the Apologia, in order to substantiate from other sources the various points under consideration.

One difficulty is that of determining with complete precision the complete and exact content of Newman's cognitive structure with regard to religion at any given point in time. It is true that frequently throughout the Apologia he sums up his position but the reader sometimes finds Newman referring to certain changes in his thinking which he does not mention in the summary of his religious opinions for that particular given period. We can, as we shall have to do, show what was involved in his over-all structures at various stages in his journey towards Rome. We cannot, without a complete synthesis of all his writings, hope to furnish an exact picture of the various

structures in detail. We shall have to expose ourselves to the accusation of generalizing by styling Newman at one stage of his religious progression as a "Protestant", at a later stage as an "Anglo-Catholic", and finally, as simply a "Catholic". No complete agreement could ever be had, save in a negative way, as to what formally constitutes a "Protestant" religious cognitive structure. An attempt to describe the Anglo-Catholic structure would be a little less vague. The lines of demarcation in this theological area, however, are too shadowy to allow for clear-cut divisions. It is only when we arrive at a consideration of Newman as a Catholic that we are able to say with any assurance that this and this is part of the cognitive structure. We shall not, therefore, take too great pains to recount the various minor changes in Newman's religious cognitive structure but shall centre our attention instead on those factors which were chiefly instrumental in bringing about a complete structural change.

2. Newman, the Protestant

Although Newman, as he tells us himself,¹ took great delight in reading the Bible, he still had "no formal religious convictions" until he was fifteen. In

¹ John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p.29.

the autumn of his fifteenth year, 1816, he developed certain fixed religious convictions of an essentially Calvinistic nature.

As a result of reading a book of Calvinist authorship, he underwent a religious experience which he himself terms an "inward conversion" concerning the certainty of his final perseverance. Starkman, de Sanctis, and others quite possible might write this experience off as the typical conversion of adolescence. It is of interest to us here only in as much as it is a contributory factor in the structuring of his early religious beliefs. It was during this period that Newman, from a reading of Newton on the Prophecies, became firmly convinced of the strong Protestant doctrine of the time that the Pope was Anti-Christ. This conviction was to influence Newman right up to the early 1840's.

In the same year, 1816, Newman read another book which was to have a profound influence on him. It was Milner's Church History, a book which began his great love for the writings of the Fathers. These two books, Newman tells us, planted in him "the seeds of an intellectual inconsistency which disabled me for a long course of years".² This co-existence of two ideas so inconsistent one with the other is of great significance. It should be noted, however, that it was a matter of

² Newman, Apologia, p.33.

years before this inconsistency became apparent to Newman himself and that the inconsistency ended "after many years of intellectual unrest"³ with the gradual death of the former principle.

3. Newman, the Anglo-Catholic

In 1822, Newman was subjected, at Oxford, to a series of influences which caused him to give up the remains of his Calvinism and to make "great additions" to his belief. He accepted the teaching of baptismal regeneration and the doctrine of tradition.⁴ A year later he accepted the teaching of apostolical succession.

After drifting for a time towards Liberalism, Newman changed course and, in 1827, influenced by Keble's "Christian Year", accepted the principle of the sacramental system. Froude, Newman's close friend in those days, was instrumental in causing him to modify the harsh anti-Roman attitude he held, to the extent of making the beginnings of a devotion to the Blessed Virgin and, finally, to accept the doctrine of the Real Presence.⁵

Possibly from Bishop Bull's writings, Newman accepted antiquity as the true exponent of the doctrines of Christianity and the basis of the Church of England.

³ Newman, Apologia, p.288.

⁴ Ibid., p.35

⁵ Ibid., p.48

He came finally to the point where he felt that "there was something greater than the Established Church and that that was the Church Catholic and Apostolic set up from the beginning, of which she was but the local presence and organ."⁶

Thus Newman had evolved, if we may use the term, from a completely "Protestant" position to that of higher Anglicanism. The changes involved, apart from his disowning of Calvinism, brought him to the point where he had a thorough contempt for the evangelical school and he became convinced that the "Apostolical form of doctrine was essential and imperative and its grounds of evidence impregnable".⁷

Armed with his new convictions, Newman set about after his return from abroad in 1833 to league himself with Keble, and the others in the fight against the encroachments of Liberalism within the English Church. In speaking of the work which he and his colleagues were attempting to accomplish, Newman tells us "We were upholding that primitive Christianity which was delivered for all time by the early teachers of the Church and which was registered and attested to in the Anglican formularies and by the Anglican divines".⁸

Newman tells us that in 1833 the essential propositions of his position were three-fold:

⁶ Newman, Apologia, p.53.

⁷ Ibid., p.63.

⁸ Ibid., p.63.

1. Dogma was the foundation of his religious belief.
2. A visible Church with sacraments and rites existed with an episcopal system and that this was the doctrine of Scripture, of the early Church and of the Anglican Church.
3. The Church was leagued in some way with Anti-Christ and that her offence lay in the honours which she paid to the Blessed Virgin and the saints.

Although the continued influence of Froude modified Newman's feelings concerning this third point of belief, still, he tells us "my judgment was against her (i.e. the Catholic Church) when viewed as an institution, as ever it had been".⁹

In order to formulate an ordered Anglican Theology, and also to provide a rational basis for his own belief, Newman, over a period of three years (1834-1836) wrote "The Prophetical Office of the Church, viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism".¹⁰ In this volume, Newman developed his doctrine of the Via Media, a system based on the three principles already mentioned. This theory involved acceptance of a position resembling that of the branch theory, namely that the Catholic Church, originally one, had, over the centuries, divided into three sections, Greek, Latin and Anglican. Each branch was identical with the primitive Church and

⁹ Newman, op.cit., p.71

¹⁰ Ibid., p.79.

that in that unity the three branches possessed a unity one with the other. According to Newman's opinion at this time, it was only in the English Church that a middle way of Catholic orthodoxy could be found. Rome had added to the original deposit of faith; Protestantism had taken away from it. In via media, so held Newman, stood the Anglican Church.

Newman's purpose in working out this theory was to "bring out in a substantive form a living Church of England in a position proper to herself and founded on distinct principles".¹¹ It was with these tenets that Newman proceeded up till the year 1841. In this year, in Tract 90, he maintained that the Thirty-Nine Articles did not oppose Catholic teaching; that they only "partially opposed 'Roman' dogma and, for the most part, the dominant errors of Rome".¹²

The furor raised by the publication of this Tract was such that Newman felt it necessary to withdraw from the Oxford movement.

4. The Beginning of Uncertainty

Newman's decision to withdraw from active leadership of the Tractarian movement was not the result of doubt concerning his position. He was as confident as

¹¹ Newman, Apologia, p.85.

¹² Ibid., p.91.

ever of the soundness of his stand. However, he does tell us that he had lost absolute confidence in himself. He foresaw that he might not always think as he thought then.

In an article in the British Critic, April, 1839, Newman reviewed the current state of affairs and spoke about the future. He pointed out that "the safe man and the hope of the Church" was he who could steer a middle course between contradictory propositions and beliefs. He goes on to point out, however, that such a situation could not last; that people could not go on "standing on one leg"; that some consistent view, whatever it might be, would have to be taken eventually.¹³ Newman, though still feeling about for some workable middle way, was beginning to show the first signs of the instability of his position.

In the summer of 1839, Newman received the first blow which was to mark the beginning of his feeling of insecurity as an Anglican. Reading the history of the Monosophite heresy, he suddenly saw that the position of the Anglicans with regard to Rome was identical to that of the Fifth Century Monosophites. Shortly afterwards, an article by Wiseman on the Donatist controversy and the unshakeable stand of the Church at that time, added

¹³, Newman, Apologia, p.110.

so much to the initial shock of the Monosophite question, that Newman was forced to conclude that "the theory of the Via Media was absolutely pulverized".¹⁴

Though Newman, after his momentary start, retained his old convictions, the destruction of the Via Media forced him to fall back on his original three propositions (vide supra (p.40)). He was, as he admits, "very nearly a pure Protestant, but without a theology of any sort".¹⁵

A change had begun in his thinking. He began to modify his anti-Roman attitude and although he had finally quietened himself and determined to proceed in a careful, logical manner, still, as he tells us himself "he who has seen a ghost cannot be as if he had not seen it".¹⁶ Not only did he begin to worry about the fairness of his former utterances against Rome, but he found himself beginning to wish for Anglican union with Rome.¹⁷ Harrold, speaking of this period, points out that Newman's correspondence during the winter of 1839-1840, shows a growing unrest and a feeling of insecurity with the authorities of the Anglican Church and of the University.¹⁸

Despite his change towards Rome with regard to doctrinal matters, Newman found sufficient reason in what

¹⁴ Newman, op.cit., p.121.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.123.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.121.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp 123-126.

¹⁸ Harrold, John Henry Newman, etc., op.cit., p.40.

he considered to be her "inconsistencies", her "ambition", "intrigue", and her "sophistries" to justify new attacks against her. Newman, in his own words tells us, rather significantly, that he did so "by way of a relief".

Newman's purpose in writing Tract 90 was "to remove all such obstacles as were in the way of holding the Apostolic and Catholic character of the Anglican Church; to assert the right of all who chose to say in the face of day 'Our Church teaches the Primitive, the Ancient Faith' ..."¹⁹ It was, for Newman, a "matter of life and death" to prove the identity of Anglican and Catholic doctrine. Despite the general outcry which had been raised against Tract 90, Newman still felt secure because the Tract had not been formally condemned. He had not been asked to withdraw it.

In the summer of 1841, Newman was again visited by the "ghost" which had frightened him in 1839. Working on a translation of St. Athanasius, he saw, with sudden clarity, that the Anglican position was the same as that of the semi-Arians and that "Rome was now what it was".²⁰

This new unsettling discovery left Newman miserable, but hard on its heels came an even greater shock.

¹⁹ Newman, Apologia, p. 133.

²⁰ Ibid., p.140.

The Anglican bishops, one after another, began to denounce Newman's stand. They were rejecting his Catholic interpretation of Anglican doctrine. Their attitude constituted, in effect, a condemnation.

A third and final blow was dealt Newman when, by Act of Parliament, October 5, 1841, British bishops, consecrated abroad, were given spiritual jurisdiction over the ministers of British congregations of the United Church of England and Ireland and over "such other Protestant Congregations as may be desirous of placing themselves under his or their authority".²¹ "This was the third blow", says Newman, "which finally shattered my faith in the Anglican Church". It was this case of the Jerusalem bishopric that brought him to the beginning of the end.

5. The Beginning of the End

Newman himself sums up succinctly his exact religious position at the end of 1841. He was intending to return to lay communion in the Anglican church. He says quite definitely that he "never contemplated leaving the Church of England"²², but felt that it was impossible to hold any office in the Church were he not allowed to interpret the Thirty-Nine Articles in a Catholic sense.

²¹ Newman, Apologia, p.142.

²² Ibid., p.147.

Corporate union of the Anglican church with Rome he desired but personally felt it impossible for him to go over as an individual as long as the Church, as he put it "suffered honours to be paid to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints which I thought incompatible with the Supreme, Incommunicable Glory of the One, Infinite and Eternal".²³ Indeed, this obstacle, the Catholic Mariology, was the main stumbling block for Newman. Despite the fact that he himself had what he calls a "true devotion to the Blessed Virgin",²⁴ he found it impossible to reconcile the Catholic teaching of Mary's mediatory and intercessory role in the Divine plan with what he had always believed about man's relationship to God. His uneasiness, however, was still as strong and his state of mind is revealed in a letter he mentions writing probably early in January 1842 wherein he disclosed his fear that both he and the friend to whom he was writing might be "out of the Church".²⁵

A second difficulty for Newman was the suspicion he had towards the activities of Catholics in the political field. He maintained in a letter to a Catholic in September, 1841, that "suspicion and distrust" (aroused by the political activities of certain Catholics) "are the main causes at present of the separation between us ... You

²³ Newman, Apologia, p.148.

²⁴ Ibid., p.160.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 151.

do not fear us; we fear you. Till we cease to fear you, we cannot love you."²⁶ These fears, aroused by alliance of Catholics with the Liberals, Newman predicates of the whole Anglican Church. There can be no doubt, however, that this fear was a very real and personal one for Newman himself. It is in this same letter that Newman mentions again his feelings against Catholic devotion to Mary and mentions, further, that transubstantiation, since it is to his mind "not primitive" was a great difficulty to him.

It seems quite safe to say that even at this juncture, despite his growing misgivings and his admissions of the existence of "disorders" in the Anglican Church, Newman was still what he had admitted being some years previously, very nearly a pure Protestant". His attitude of suspicion towards Catholics, his rejection of the Church's teachings concerning the Blessed Virgin, despite his strong Catholic tendencies, were fundamental Protestant tenets forming key-stones in the structural arches of his religious beliefs.

6. Newman, the Catholic.

Newman acknowledges that a good Catholic friend of his, Dr. Russell, later President of Maynooth, had more to do with his conversion than anyone else. Russell was

²⁶ Newman, Apologia, p.180.

most unobtrusive. As Newman says, "he let me alone".²⁷ He did, however, send Newman a volume of sermons of St. Alphonsus Liguori, and it was from a careful perusal of these sermons and later, of a large number of Catholic pamphlets and books of devotion that Newman saw, to his astonishment, that his concept of Catholic teaching concerning the Blessed Virgin was erroneous. It should be noted that Newman did not rid himself of his difficulties overnight, after this startling revelation. In fact, it took well over a year for him to reach a proper understanding and an acceptance of the Catholic notion of dulia and hyperdulia. A study of the Ignatian Exercises also served to alter his ideas concerning the Catholic view of man's relation to God.²⁸

It was about this time that the second and even more important consideration came to his mind, namely the principle of development of doctrine in the Church. Newman saw how the idea of the Blessed Virgin was "magnified" in the Church, but realized then, too, that all the Christian ideas were so developed not ex nihilo, but from the implicit to the explicit. He saw for the first time how unfair it was to take one Catholic idea, viz., that of the Blessed Virgin, as he says "out of what may be called its context".²⁹ Not, by any means, the

²⁷ Newman, Apologia, p.183.

²⁸ Ibid., p.184.

²⁹ Ibid., p.184.

originator of the notion, Newman had considered the idea of doctrinal development before this time, but only after 1842 did he begin to study it intently and see in it a possible solution to his intellectual difficulties.

He began his "Essays on the Development of Christian Doctrine" towards the end of 1844, but even before that time he had come to the point where he felt "very far more sure that England is in schism than that the Roman additions to the Primitive Creed may not be developments arising out of a keen and vivid realizing of the Divine Depositum of Faith".³⁰

To list the various steps of Newman's gradual withdrawal from the Anglican communion would not seem to be necessary in this present work. He tells us that by September, 1843, having resigned his living of St. Mary's, there remained only "one more advance to make and that was to be certain of what I had hitherto anticipated, concluded and believed".³¹

It was in order to allay his vague misgivings concerning the taking of the final step that Newman resolved to write his essay on Doctrinal Development mentioned above. He determined that, if he still felt as convinced of the veracity of the Catholic stand when the work was finished, he would seek admission into the

³⁰ Newman, Apologia, p.194.

³¹ Ibid., p.198.

Church.³² He began his work early in 1845 and worked at it steadily until the fall. Before the work was completed Newman resolved to become a Catholic and on October 8th he was received into the Church by Father Dominic Barberi (Sp). The conversion had been effected. Newman, the Protestant, had now become Newman, the Catholic.

³² Newman, The Apologia, p.208.

CHAPTER IV

THE KRECH-CRUTCHFIELD THEORY OF COGNITIVE RE-ORGANIZATION

Thus far we have analyzed the meaning of the term "conversion"; have examined a particular example of this process and have attempted to justify the use of this example in the present work. What follows in this chapter may appear tangential in that there will be no mention of religious conversion as such. However, it should be recalled that the stated purpose of this study is to measure a theory in the light of a fact. Having as our measuring stick a factual account of a conversion, one chosen specifically because of its abundant documentation, and its author's admitted skill in introspection, we now proceed to examine in detail that which is to be measured, the Krech-Crutchfield theory of cognitive re-organization.

In this chapter the writer intends to give an outline of the Krech-Crutchfield theory of cognitive re-organization. Principles of cognitive organization will have to be examined in order that the theory of re-organization may be properly grasped, but the same order or development as employed by the authors of Theory

and Problems of Social Psychology¹ will be followed throughout. As far as is practical, the same examples Krech and Crutchfield employ to clarify their various principles will be reproduced in brief. Nothing more is intended then, than a concise and accurate summary of the basic principles of cognitive reorganization as expounded in the Krech-Crutchfield theory.

In their book, David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield develop a theory of cognitive re-organization, examining the major factors involved. One of the most important of these, as we shall see, is goal blockage. When a certain end cannot be attained, so hold our authors, man will tend to re-organize his thinking and acting in such a way as to reduce the tension induced by goal frustration. The reorganizational process thus set in motion consists in a hierarchically-related series of organizations. The facility and rapidity of the changes involved will depend on the way in which earlier cognitive organizations were brought into being. Such is the theory to be examined here.

1. The Sources and the Status of the Theory

Before studying the theory of cognitive organization and re-organization in detail, however, it would be well to indicate the sources of the theory and its position in the contemporary field of psychological theory.

¹ David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948, xv-639 pp.

In the introduction to their book, the authors acknowledge their indebtedness to Köhler and Lewin and to their former teacher, E.C.Tolman. The first two psychologists are Gestaltists of the Berlin school. Though no specific mention is made of the fact, both Krech and Crutchfield must have come into close contact with the mind and work of Köhler when he was on the staff at Swarthmore College. This fact leads us to surmise that the Gestalt psychology found in the Krech-Crutchfield approach to social psychology could be that of the Berlin school.

As far as Krech himself is concerned, we find a clearer picture of his exact position from his theory of the use of the hypothetical construct, the "Dynamic System". In the article outlining this theory, Krech states

... henceforth our hypothetical constructs (through the use of which we hope to understand all behaviour and experience) are to be conceived of as molar neurological events -- that and nothing more! ²

Should there be any doubt as to Krech's particular position it is removed by his declaration that "the Dynamic System is to be conceived of as a field of electrical-chemical activity".³

² David Krech, "Dynamic Systems" in The Psychological Review, Vol.57, No.5, issue of September 1950, pp 283-290.

³ Ibid., p.288.

Concerning the position of Crutchfield, nothing conclusive can be obtained from the material he has published.

It would be wrong to identify Krech at least, as a genuine Gestaltist, for we find him in later works as he develops his own theory criticizing the Gestaltists for their "lack of attention to the data, and observations of the clinician, the personologist, the social psychologist".⁴ He admits, at the same time, however, that he is much beholden to this same school.

The terms "cognitive organization" and "cognitive structure" will appear constantly in the pages to follow which outline and apply the Krech-Crutchfield theory. It is necessary to understand these terms do not signify for the authors what they might for one trained in Scholastic philosophy. In his hypothetical construct approach to the problem of the relationship between the cognitive and motivational life of man, Krech says

Western philosophers, or the Church, or Western folklore split asunder what nature had put together and spoke of "cognition" and "emotion" as two basically separate functions or processes. Modern psychology has discovered that these two are not independent but continues to think in terms of this dichotomy.⁵

⁴ D.Krech, "Dynamic Systems as Open Neurological Systems", in The Psychological Review, Vol.57, No.6, issue of November, 1950, p.348.

⁵ D.Krech, "Towards a Psychological Theory" in the Journal of Personality, Vol.18, No.1, issue of September, 1949, p.81-82.

However, in an earlier work, he suggests, and reinforces this opinion from his experimental work, that:

... man is not altogether a victim of his environment in the sense that each specific sentiment or attitude is the result of a specific momentary stimulus; that from the very beginning of his existence as a social animal, man regards his society in an organized manner wherein each attitude is not to be considered by itself, but as a meaningful part of his total behaviour ... a cold, sober scientific analysis of man is not synonymous with a description of man as a chaotic, senseless, irrational aggregate of stereotypes, prejudices, biases and conditioned responses fortuitiously acquired.⁶

Although in this present work we are more concerned with the principles of cognitive re-organization than of organization, as we shall see, these two processes are intimately linked and the latter cannot be understood properly without a grasp of the former. For this reason we shall have to sketch briefly Krech and Crutchfield's propositions of dynamics of behaviour and perception before going on to a study of the principles of re-organization.

Prior to outlining these propositions, Krech and Crutchfield tell us that the analysis of the individual's behaviour proceeds by

a determination of the properties of the psychological field of the individual -- what his existent goals and his persistent tensions are; what he perceives and how he perceives it; how his perceptions are organized together to make up the cognitive structure of his psychological environment and how the present organizations give way to subsequent organizations. These field

⁶ D.Krech, "Attitudes and Learning, a Methodological Note", in The Psychological Review, Vol.53, No.1, issue of January, 1946, p.293.

properties, to repeat, can be understood in terms of motivation, perception and learning, the development of which has been the major task of general psychology.⁷

For Krech and Crutchfield, as for the Gestaltists, the proper unit of motivational analysis is "molar behaviour which involves needs and goals".⁸ This they assert in opposition to the molecular approach of the behaviourists, who based their studies on artificially isolated segments of a whole situation. The individual person is a dynamic unity, a whole person and it is as such, with his needs, emotions, thoughts, perceptions, actions, etc., that he must be studied in any given situation. Moreover, molar behaviour consists of relatively discreet, unified episodes with a beginning and an end, each episode made unique in character by its direction -- its "tendency to succeed the preceding phase in a way that is consistent, bringing the end of the episode closer and closer and thus reaching a point where the tensions that initiate the activity are eliminated".⁸

The next fundamental principle of behaviour dynamics laid down by Krech and Crutchfield is that the "dynamics of molar behaviour result from the properties of the immediate psychological field". Psychological field is defined as "the dynamic unity of the person's external physical environment, his internal physiological state and neural traces of past experiences".

^{7,8} and *

Krech and Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, pp 30 to 140, passim.

The authors feel that a proper analysis of the present given psychological field of an individual precludes the necessity of the genetic, psychoanalytic or biocentric approach to the explanation of behaviour. To explain motivation, say the proponents of these latter schools, you must look into the individual's early history, uncover his repressed desires, determine the nature and direction of his biological drives. Krech and Crutchfield, with no intention of denying the value of the contributions of these approaches, maintain that they are not necessary for an analysis of the present psychological field. Rather is it desirable and feasible to look "for the properties of his (the individual's) behaviour in the present nature of the psychological field rather than in the history of their past development".*

The third fundamental principle of behaviour dynamics according to Krech and Crutchfield is as follows: "Instabilities in the psychological field produce tensions whose effects on perception, cognition and action are such as to change the field in the direction of a more stable structure". The authors point out that the history of an individual's psychological field is one of changing equilibriums in which the psychological field restructures continually, never returning to a state in which it existed before. The individual achieves a certain goal and thereby reduces a

tension which began his action but this new position is one which creates other instabilities and tensions and sets a new kind of goal.

The tensions brought on by instabilities in the psychological field make themselves felt in a number of ways, as vague feelings of restlessness, dissatisfaction, discomfort, moodiness, etc; as feelings or desires, wants or needs (e.g., loneliness, desire for safety, etc.,) directed towards explicit features of the field; as demands, perceived as emerging from explicit features of the field -- the feeling of being ordered about, that some action is required on the part of the subject.

The authors point out the possibility of tension effects being hidden from the individual in the case of unconscious motivation. It is necessary, they therefore feel, to avoid taking conscious motivation completely at face value. At the same time, they are aware that Freudianism has gone too far in sacrificing the conscious to the unconscious and that "because some motives are unconscious need not impugn the meaningfulness of all conscious motives".

The three valid means of ascertaining the presence and types of needs and demands are: inference from present behaviour, introspection, and the use of projective techniques. Introspection, Krech and Crutchfield feel,

can reveal a great deal about motives, and the main behaviour patterns which can be recorded by a competent observer have an internal co-relation which can be reported on by one skilled in introspection. Thus, for typical behaviour trend towards a given goal, the search for and selection of a certain specific object or class of objects, the exhibition of characteristic feeling or emotion and the expression of satisfaction at specific goal achievement, there are internal feelings of needs and demands, perceived goal objects, emotions, feelings of success and failure, which can be detected and recorded by the experienced introspectionist.

Concerning the use of introspection in detecting unconscious motivation the authors state that:

... a proper analysis of the entire introspective account, with its description of the appearance and meaning of various features of the individual's psychological field, may for the astute analyst serve to reveal the unconscious dynamics ...⁹

The fourth principle of behaviour dynamics is enunciated by Krech and Crutchfield as follows: "... the frustration of goal achievement and the failure of tension reduction may lead to a variety of adaptive or maladaptive behaviours". The sources of frustration are varied as are the consequences of such frustration. The former could be the physical and social environment, biological limitations, conflicting needs and demands. The latter are many and

⁹ Krech-Crutchfield, op.cit., p.49.

varied. The most important among the adaptive consequences however, is the re-organization of the perception of the problem at hand. This will be considered at greater length below. Among the maladaptive consequences of goal-achievement frustration are aggression, regression, withdrawal, rationalization, etc.

The fifth principle or proposition of behaviour dynamics has to do with characteristic modes of goal achievement and tension reduction. These, the authors feel, can be learned and fixated by the individual. Here the authors discuss variety in goal preference and the influence of need intensity on preference. Past experience, success or failure with certain modes of tension reduction, determines the particular method of tension reduction which the individual will employ.

The sixth and final proposition of behaviour dynamics, according to Krech and Crutchfield is: "The trend of behaviour often involves progressively higher levels of stable organization of the psychological field". As we shall see later, in our consideration of the principles of re-organization, successive states of equilibrium in the psychological field are constantly changing. Psychological equilibrium, unlike mechanical or physiological equilibrium is not static but dynamic. As new goals are reached, new needs are developed. Very often these newly

developed needs and demands express themselves as new ideals, new sets of values and urge the individual on to higher levels of equilibrium.

2. Principles of Perception or Cognitive Organization

Having outlined their principles of dynamic behaviour, Krech and Crutchfield next proceed to outline their principles of perception or cognitive organization. These principles are basic to the understanding of cognitive re-organization, but since many of the propositions of organization and re-organization are similar, we shall here list the principles of organization and give a very brief explanation of those which have a bearing on cognitive re-organization.

We have already seen that our authors do not understand the term "cognitive" in the same sense as do the Schoolmen. For them a cognitive organization will be the "organization and integration of perceptions, memories, and fantasies, into a psychological 'whole'". It is important that this definition be borne in mind throughout the present study.

What Krech and Crutchfield do in their discussion of the laws of organization is to generalize the laws of simple perception developed by the Gestaltists and to apply them to social, material, and cognitive processes.

In their outline of these propositions, demonstrative experiments are cited and examples of their application to the field of social psychology, are given.

Proposition I.- "The perceptual and cognitive field in the natural state is organized and meaningful". Even an infant, according to this principle, when confronted with a red balloon placed on a white table will form a perceptual field consisting of at least two discriminable, meaningful structures. A child, hearing unfamiliar sounds tends to organize them meaningfully. Thus, according to the humorous example of the authors, "Gladly the cross I'd bear" becomes "Gladly, the cross-eyed bear". Krech and Crutchfield point out how this principle accounts for the reluctance of people to abandon or discard an old theory or belief even in the face of undeniable contradicting evidence. Man, they maintain, has a tendency to organize facts in a meaningful way and will maintain an old theory for the want of a better way of organizing them.

Proposition II.- "Perception is functionally selective". Only certain objects play a major role in one's perceptual organization. Thus, those accentuated in perceptual organization are usually those which are functionally significant for the individual or which have some immediate purpose for him. Needs, moods,

mental sets, culture, are all factors exerting an influence in perception selection. A thirsty man will tend to notice on a menu only those things which will satisfy his need. The authors point out that there are no such things as impartial facts; that data are perceived and interpreted in terms of the individual perceiver's own needs, emotions, personality, etc.

Proposition III.- "Perceptual and cognitive properties of a sub-structure are determined in large measure by the properties of a structure of which it is a part. Perceptions do not exist by themselves. Rather do they become involved in an organization with other perceptions with the result that a specific cognitive structure is set up. This principle is demonstrated on the visual level and then is applied to the field of social phenomena. Thus generalized, the original principle is re-formulated by the authors in the following manner:

1. When an individual is apprehended as a member of a group, each of those characteristics of the individual which correspond to the characteristics of the group is affected by his group membership, the effect being in the direction of assimilation or of contrast.
2. Other things being equal, a change introduced into the psychological field will be absorbed in such a way as to produce the smallest effect on a strong structure.

Proposition IV.- "Objects or events that are close to each other in space or time or resemble each other tend

to be apprehended as parts of a common structure". The authors point out the fact that "some people have a cognitive structure in which socialism and Christianity are organized together, while other people have a cognitive structure in which socialism and atheism are found together". In explanation, the above principle is invoked. The needs, moods, past training of an observer play a large part in his selection of what may be proximate or similar. If the observer perceives in a number of people one factor important to him though possibly insignificant to others, he will tend to link these people together and organize them into one whole. Thus, a man might find socialism detestable as he finds atheism detestable. He will, according to the above principle, tend to link the two terms together in one cognitive structure. Those finding socialism acceptable and desirable will tend to link it with Christianity which they also find acceptable and desirable.

The above are the main principles of cognitive organization as outlined by Krech and Crutchfield. As they are anxious to point out at the outset of their theory outline, they do not maintain that these propositions or those to follow are of such a comprehensive nature as to be able to explain all aspects of motivation, perception and learning, but only those which are, in their opinion, essential to an understanding of social behaviour.

3. Principles of Cognitive Re-organization

We turn finally to a consideration of Krech and Crutchfield's principles of cognitive re-organization. Since it is with these that we are chiefly concerned in this work, we shall have to consider each of them in greater detail and at greater length.

Why, it might be asked, do individual cognitive structures change in their properties and complexities? The answer, in brief, is to be found, according to our authors, in an understanding of the principles of behaviour change. Three factors exert an influence in behaviour change. They are:

1. The incipience of a problem situation;
2. The occurrence of a physiological change; and
3. The operation of dynamic factors involved in retention.

In the application of this theory we shall be concerned with only the first of these factors.

Proposition I.— "As long as there is blockage to attainment of a goal, cognitive reorganization tends to take place; the nature of the reorganization is such as to reduce the tension induced by the frustrating situation". The block to the goal may be any one of a number of factors, e.g. a fence which must be crossed, the weight of tradition when there is a need felt to re-formulate a scientific problem or the presence of an unpleasant but necessarily

acknowledged fact in the face of a religious cognitive structure with which this fact is incompatible.

Sometimes re-organization may involve differentiation, the breaking up of a large monolithic structure into a number of meaningful sub-structures. Thus, in his political thinking, a man might come to think in terms of pro-English Canadians, anti-English Canadians, liberal-minded Canadians, reactionary Canadians, and so on.

A blocked goal will lead to distorted or adequate cognitive re-organization depending on the strength of the need involved. If this is too strong, the psychological field becomes too narrow and elements necessary for a proper solution are overlooked. Perception of the block is most important in determining the nature of the cognitive re-organization. Sometimes the block is not perceived at all; sometimes the wrong factor is taken as the block. The latter case is considered to be the more frequent but in either instance the adequacy of cognitive re-organization will be a reflection of the adequacy of block perception.

Proposition II.- "The cognitive re-organization process consists of a hierarchically-related series of organizations". Each successive step in the learning or thinking process is, according to Krech and Crutchfield, meaningfully organized. Continuity in cognitive

re-organization is not a "whole-chaos-whole" sequence but rather a series of meaningful organizations wherein certain specific events which influenced any one of these organizations may have little to do with the final resulting structure. However, the series of structures which are considered but rejected in the movement towards the final re-organization are considered parts of one whole process since all the organizations reflect the activity of the same individual attempting to solve the same problem.

It is important to note that this view of problem solution denies the validity of the assumption that specific cognitive organizations are built up by a simple succession of events plus consequences and that only by several of such repeated successions does cognitive organization begin to take shape and acquire goal meaning. In other words, in the view of the authors, cognitive organization or re-organization is not a cumulative process building up by repetition to a final structure. It is the newly perceived factor in the cognitive field which causes the structure change. This fact, the authors hold, can explain why people fail to learn from experience. They can live through a period of suffering or deprivation time after time but until they become aware of the correct cause of their trouble they will fail to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

Krech and Crutchfield stress the fact that the entire process of cognitive re-organization at each stage will consist of organized structures and the particular organization occurring at any stage will be a function of what the individual perceives at that time. These structures are hierarchically arranged, however, in the sense that the sequence of re-organization involves a sequence of hypotheses from general to specific within the general hypothesis. Each hypothesis reflects the nature of the preceding one and the narrowing-down process continues until a satisfactory conclusion is reached or the whole problem is recast in terms of a completely new general hypothesis.

The authors themselves point to the relation of this principle of hierarchical arrangement to the third proposition of perceptual organization (vide supra p.63). Just as our perception of an individual's personality traits is determined by our cognitive structure of the group to which this person belongs, so our various cognitive re-organizations are influenced by the more general cognitive structures that precede them. When the original or general hypothesis is, say, anti-liberal, the consequent sub-structural cognitive organizations will never lead to a pro-liberal position on any particular problem. Hence, if there is going to be a change of attitude, opinion, or belief, the basic hypothesis must be altered.

Sometimes this major structure is so basic and firmly established as to escape notice, or is never called into question, even by the person who makes a critical examination of his own thinking. To illustrate this fact, Krech and Crutchfield give the example of a group of diplomats meeting after a war to seek a solution to world problems. All their proposed solutions -- to ally with other strong nations, to isolate themselves from international politics, the fighting of a preventive war -- all reflect the presence of their unexamined basic cognitive structure that their countries' national sovereignty must be maintained at all costs, and that the spheres of influence of these countries must be extended if possible. The authors suggest that were this basic re-organization recast in entirely different terms, vastly different solutions would be arrived at.

Proposition III.-- "Cognitive structures, over time, undergo progressive changes in accordance with the principles of organization". According to this principle, the process of forgetting must be added to that of tension reduction as a cause of cognitive re-organization. Important changes take place between the time of the formation of the original structure and the time it functions again in the behaviour of the individual. This proposition can be demonstrated experimentally and its operation deduced by careful observation.

It is to this proposition, in effect at least, that those who attack the validity of the document to be used in this study have recourse. Fortunately, as we shall see, what would otherwise have proven an insurmountable obstacle is overcome by the fact that the author of the document in question recorded his impressions, his changes of attitudes, his reactions to situations as they occurred or came into being. He did not, therefore, have to rely solely on a memory which admittedly could have played him false or have operated in a selective fashion later in his life.

This proposition, therefore, has no bearing on our study, and for this reason an extensive discussion of it here does not seem necessary.

Proposition IV.- "The ease and rapidity of the cognitive re-organization process is a function of the differentiation, isolation and rigidity of the original cognitive structure."

It can be readily observed that in the process of cognitive re-organization, some individuals are slow while others are quick to erect new cognitive structures. A number of factors influence the rate and ease of this re-organization. Intelligence, differentiation in the cognitive structure, and isolation of the cognitive structure are among these.

A cognitive structure is said to be undifferentiated when it contains relatively few sub-structures. A person might hold that all religions are more or less the same, and that all are, therefore, more or less equally good or equally bad. Such a person does not distinguish between polytheism and monotheism, paganism and Christianity, etc., and consider the relative merits of each. Another person, because of study or experience may distinguish between the various forms of religion, the forms of church organization, functionaries, and so on. In this case, the cognitive structure concerning religion is highly differentiated.

A cognitive structure is said to be isolated when there is little or no inter-relation between the sub-structures of a religious cognitive structure and the sub-structures of an economic cognitive structure. When a person begins to relate his ideas of religion to his ideas of economics or in technical terms, when intercommunication is set up between the two groups of sub-structures, then isolation diminishes.

When a person has built up a greatly differentiated religious structure and closely relates this to a similarly differentiated economic structure, then he can accept or absorb some new fact or experience in either field without undergoing major re-organization of

either structure. When, on the other hand, a person has a relatively simple and isolated cognitive structure regarding any subject, he might, in the face of some newly encountered fact or experience, undergo a complete alteration of his original structure. A lack of understanding of the economic factors necessarily involved in the administration of a church or a religious organization, might, for instance, cause a person who is confronted with some incident involving church and finance, to change his formerly benign attitude towards religion to one of distrust and antipathy. The person with the complex, inter-related structure, on the other hand, understanding that economic factors have their part to play in religious affairs, would not be similarly affected by the same incident.

Whether or not a person's cognitive structures will be isolated or inter-related, simple or differentiated, depends not only on the innate capacities of the individual but also upon the conditions involved in the formation of the original structures. If, for instance, a student is instructed in economics or political science in a manner totally unrelated to religious or sociological problems, then a complex but isolated cognitive structure will be set up. A simple, isolated, structure can be caused by the constant repetition of the same simple "lie" used in propaganda techniques.

The above has been a somewhat detailed account of the theory of cognitive organization and re-organization as propounded in Theories and Problems of Social Psychology. If the writer has seemed to supply more detail than might be deemed absolutely necessary, he has done so to avoid the possible accusation of "snipping the theory to fit the facts". Whether or not the principles of the theory will be found to be operative in the conversion account remains to be seen. In any event we are acquainted now with the main principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory against which the conversion account is to be measured.

CHAPTER V

APPLICATION OF THE KRECH-CRUTCHFIELD THEORY TO THE CONVERSION ACCOUNT

Examining Newman's conversion in the light of the Krech-Crutchfield theory necessitates a certain amount of repetition. It was felt that the best approach to this comparative study was to take each of the principles of cognitive re-organization and determine its applicability or non-applicability to the conversion account. This method makes necessary the repeating of certain passages from the conversion account.

Proposition I

This proposition (vide supra p.65) has to do with the tension-reducing effect of cognitive re-organization in the face of blockage to goal achievement. Newman's ultimate goal, in theological terms, was union with God -- union with Him first of all on earth in a church which

would bring him to complete union with God in heaven after death. His proximate goal, in psychological terms, was the sense of security which would result from knowing that he was using the best means of attaining this ultimate goal. Speaking of his "religious selfishness" which impelled him to work out his own problems, and not be concerned with bringing others with him in the event of his conversion, Newman says:

Certainly to myself my own duty seemed clear ... My own soul was my first concern and it seemed an absurdity to my reason to be converted in partnership. I wished to go to my Lord by myself, and in my own way, or rather His way...¹

"Can I be saved in the English Church? Am I in safety were I to die tonight?" These questions Newman asks of himself towards the end of his conversion process.²

For a good number of years after his evolution from Evangelism, Newman was quite convinced that he belonged to a branch of the divinely-established Church, the church which was the "local presence and organ of the Church Catholic and Apostolic set up from the beginning".³ This then, his conception of the Anglican Church, is the first religious cognitive structure, however well or ill-defined, with which we are concerned in the present study. Sub-structures within this general framework were the various Catholic ideas which he had inherited from the

¹Newman, Apologia, p.201.

² Ibid., p.210.

³ Ibid., p.53.

Anglican divines, belief in the Real Presence, the sacramental system, etc., -- ideas which were to increase in the years prior to his conversion.

However, an essential part of this same cognitive structure was the firm conviction that the Pope was Anti-Christ -- a doctrine which was a carry-over from the Evangelical days of his youth and a doctrine which, even when somewhat modified, was to have a great influence over him up until 1843. This belief, coupled with his love for the religion of the early Church, constituted an intellectual inconsistency, resulting in a conflict of mind "ending in my case", says Newman, "after many years of intellectual unrest, in the gradual decay of one of them".⁴ This inconsistency -- the maintaining of an essentially Protestant principle of anti-Romanism along with a conviction of the Catholicity of Anglicanism -- made inevitable the encountering of a double set of obstacles which caused the tension, the years of unrest, to which Newman refers.

Newman encountered, as we saw in the previous chapter concerning the conversion account (Chapter III), facts which were opposed to both these aspects of his cognitive structure. The similarity of the position of Anglicanism to that of the early heresies, and the

⁴ Newman, Apologia, p.33.

renunciation of Catholic principles by leaders in the Anglican Church itself, could not be fitted in with his identification of the Church of England with the primitive Christian Church. The consistency of Rome's stand through the centuries, her universality, these could not be made to agree with Newman's idea of the Roman Anti-Christ.

Facts then, as he himself saw them, were in general, the obstacles which prevented Newman from keeping unchanged his religious cognitive structure as it existed prior to the beginning of the Tractarian movement. Intellectual unrest was the tension which arose from this blockage and which forced first a gradual restructuring of cognitive structure and finally to a change of proximate goal.

Even after he had arrived at the point (Michaelmas, 1843) where he "began to despair of the Church of England" and gave up all clerical duty and began to think in terms of submission to Rome, he still had to deal with obstacles. This time it was Catholic devotion to the Blessed Virgin and to the saints. Again the presence of obstacles to cognitive restructuring gave rise to signs of inward tension. "September 16" (Newman quotes from a letter written on that date) "I am full of wrong and miserable feelings which it is useless to detail, so grudging and sullen..."⁵

⁵ Newman, Apologia, p.208.

The overcoming of these latter difficulties was partially accomplished through what our authors term differentiation (vide supra p.71). Through pamphlet material supplied by Dr. Russel, Newman was able to develop a more detailed knowledge of Catholic belief and practice with regard to devotion to the saints in general and to the Blessed Virgin in particular.⁶ The tension of uncertainty was finally removed by Newman when he began to build up his idea of the development of Christian doctrine, the concept which facilitated his final cognitive re-organization as a Catholic.⁷

For each of the main cognitive re-organizations to be considered later there was a concomitant encounter with facts or a series of facts and accompanying feeling of frustration. The reaction to Wiseman's article, which did so much to destroy the theory of the Via Media, Newman graphically describes as a "stomach-ache".⁸ Maladaptive behaviour too (and we judge here from the psychological, not the theological, point of view) is evidenced by Newman in the face of his inability to maintain his long-standing attitude towards Rome. Forced by his reading and the influence of Froude to cease to brand Rome as Anti-Christ, yet urged on by his old feelings

⁶ Newman, Apologia, p.184.

⁷ Ibid., p.183.

⁸ M.Ward, Young Mr. Newman,

of antipathy, Newman tells us that he began to speak out against what he called the practical abuses and excesses of Rome.

To the inconsistencies then, to the ambition and intrigue, to the sophistries of Rome (as I considered them to be) I had recourse in my opposition to her, both public and personal. I did so by way of a relief.⁹

In becoming a Catholic, Newman established his final cognitive reorganization and experienced those feelings which our authors would describe as being characteristic of satisfactory tension reduction.

From the time that I became a Catholic, of course, I have no further history of my religious opinions to narrate. In saying this, I do not mean to say that my mind has been idle, or that I have given up thinking on theological subjects; but that I have had no changes to record, and have had no anxiety of heart whatever. I have been in perfect peace and contentment. I never have had one doubt. I was not conscious to myself, on my conversion, of any difference of thought or of temper from what I had before. I was not conscious of firmer faith in the fundamental truths of revelation, or of more self-command; I had not more fervour; but it was like coming into port after a rough sea; and my happiness on that score remains to this day without interruption.¹⁰

The second principle of cognitive re-organization in the Krech-Crutchfield theory maintains that the process of restructuring consists of a hierarchically related series of organizations. Fortunately, Newman several times in the course of his narrative provides us with summaries of his position at various stages in his

⁹ Newman, *Apologia*, p.126.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.215.

conversion. Such a summary is provided in Part VI of the Apologia.

Although this summary is presented in terms of his attitude towards Anglicanism and Catholicism, it serves to demonstrate a series of changes which are closely related to one another. The reader will agree that the simplest mode of presenting this series is by a direct quotation from the Apologia itself:

For the first four years of the ten (up to Michaelmas 1839) I honestly wished to benefit the Church of England at the expense of the Church of Rome.

For the second four years, I wished to benefit the Church of England without prejudice to the Church of Rome.

At the beginning of the ninth year (Michaelmas 1843) I began to despair of the Church of England, and gave up all clerical duty; and then, what I wrote and did was influenced by a mere wish not to injure it, and not by the wish to benefit it.

At the beginning of the tenth year, I distinctly contemplated leaving it, but I also distinctly told my friends that it was my contemplation.

Lastly, during the last half of that tenth year, I was engaged in writing a book (Essay on Development) in favour of the Roman Church, and indirectly against the English; but even then, till it was finished, I had not absolutely intended publishing it, wishing to reserve to myself the chance of changing my mind when the argumentative views which were actuating me had been distinctly brought out before me in writing.¹¹

The final stage in this series is, of course, Newman's cognitive structure as a Catholic.

¹¹ Newman, Apologia, p.176.

Behind these changes in attitude lies a series of cognitive changes, the narrowing down of an hypothesis in an attempt to find a satisfactory solution. When this, ultimately, is found impossible within the framework, there takes place a change of the basic hypothesis.

The first general hypothesis which Newman worked with for years, at first taking it completely for granted, was that the Anglican Church was an integral part of the Catholic Church. Within this general structure, he erected the sub-structure (Newman himself uses the term "theory") of the Via Media, as outlined in Chapter III. When this sub-structure was "pulverized", he set about finding some workable theory to enable him to retain the original hypothesis.

As soon as I saw the hitch in the Anglican argument, during my course of reading in the summer of 1839, I began to look about, as I have said, for some ground which might supply a controversial basis for my need. The difficulty in question had affected my view both of Antiquity and Catholicity ... whereas the Creeds tell us that the Church is One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic, I could not prove that the Anglican communion was an integral part of the One Church, on the ground of its being Apostolic or Catholic without reasoning in favour of what are commonly called the Roman corruptions; and I could not defend our separation from Rome without using arguments prejudicial to those great doctrines concerning our Lord, which are the very foundation of the Christian religion. The Via Media was an impossible idea; it was what I had called "standing on one leg"; and it was necessary, if my old issue of the controversy was to be retained, to go further either one way or the other.

Accordingly, I abandoned that old ground and took another ... I turned for protection to the note of sanctity, with a view of showing that we had at least one of the necessary notes as fully as the Church of Rome ...¹²

He continues ...

According to this theory, a religious body is part of the One Catholic Apostolic Church, if it has the succession and the creed of the apostles, with the note of holiness of life ... However, with events consequent upon Tract Ninety, I sunk my theory to a lower level. What could be said in apology, when bishops and the people of my Church not only did not suffer, but actually rejected primitive Catholic doctrine, and tried to eject from their communion all who held it? After the Bishop's charges? After the Jerusalem "abomination"? Well, this could be said; still we were not nothing; we could not be as if we never had been a church; we were "Samaria". This then was that lower level on which I placed myself, and all who felt with me at the end of 1841.¹³

Certainly here is a hierarchical narrowing down of the field of attention of the previous hypothesis ... a process which continues until the validity of the first general hypothesis is strongly suspected and a new one begins to take its place.

The final general hypothesis Newman formed was that the claims of Rome were valid and unanswerable and that therefore the Anglican Church was not part of the Catholic Church. Newman quotes from a letter written in the spring of 1843:

May 4, 1843 ... At present I fear, as far as I can analyse my own convictions, I consider the Roman Catholic Communion to be the Church of the Apostles, and that what grace is among us

¹² Newman, Apologia, p.149.

¹³ Ibid., p.151.

(which, through God's mercy is not little) is extraordinary, and from the overflowings of His dispensation. I am very far more sure that England is in schism than that the Roman additions to the Primitive Creed may not be developments, arising out of a keen and vivid realising of the Divine Depositum of Faith.¹⁴

Here we see the second hypothesis beginning to crowd out the first and, at the same time, an insight as to the possible structural element (the idea of the development of doctrine) allowing the erection of a new cognitive organization in place of the old. What confuses the observer is the fact that many of the "materials" destined to become part of the new structure already existed in the old edifice being dismantled. We do not find in Newman's conversion the complete demolition of the former structure before the building of the final one begins. What is completely new of course, is the foundation of the final structure, the final general hypothesis mentioned above.

The difficulty of determining the precise point of time when the change-over of structuring began is attested to by Newman himself:

Then again, when my dissatisfaction (with his position as an Anglican) became greater, it was hard at first to determine the point of time when it was too strong to suppress with propriety. Certitude of course is a point, but doubt is a progress. I was not near certitude yet. Certitude is a reflex action; it is to know that one knows. I believe I had not that, till close upon my reception into the Catholic Church. Again, a practical, effective doubt is a point too, but who can easily ascertain it for himself? Who can determine when it is, that the scales in the balance of opinion begin to turn, and what was a greater probability in behalf of a belief becomes a positive doubt against it?¹⁵

¹⁴ Newman, Apologia, p.194.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.199

Similarly he points to the great difficulty of delineating in detail the re-arrangement of the sub-structures into the new cognitive edifice. Telling us that from the end of 1841 he was on his "death-bed" as regards his membership in the Anglican church, he goes on to say:

A death-bed has scarcely a history; it is a tedious decline, with seasons of rallying and seasons of falling back; and since the end is foreseen or what is called a matter of time, it has little interest for the reader, especially if he has a kind heart. Moreover, it is a season when doors are closed and curtains drawn and when the sick man neither cares nor is able to record the stages of his malady.¹⁶

Krech and Crutchfield seem to stress the discreteness of each successive cognitive structure formed in the process of working towards the solution of a problem.¹⁷ Although, as we have seen in our present study, there are successive stages in the process of cognitive change, there is no evidence of there being a clear-cut division between each stage. As has been observed, many of the same causes which brought about the destruction of the old hypothesis were factors which operated at the same time to encourage the formation of the new hypothesis.

This particular point in the Krech-Crutchfield view re the discreet nature of cognitive re-organizations does not seem, then, to be borne out, in Newman's conversion at least.

¹⁶ Newman, Apologia, p.147

¹⁷ Krech and Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, p.118.

At the same time, however, the definite relationship between the various cognitive structures is clearly indicated. Moreover, the Krech-Crutchfield denial of the "whole-chaos-whole" theory of cognitive re-organization concurs in detail with Newman's account of his conversion. A careful check of the Apologia fails to reveal any time in Newman's conversion process when he is reduced to a state of no defineable religious cognitive structure. We see him driven back to a former position after the destruction of the Via Media¹⁸ but at no time do we find that there is a complete destruction of his religious cognitive structure, or a time when the religious elements in his psychological field are not organized in a meaningful way.

The fourth principle of the Krech-Crutchfield theory has to do with the ease and rapidity of the cognitive re-organization process. This, in the opinion of the authors is "a function of the differentiation, isolation and rigidity of the original cognitive structure".¹⁹

"Great acts take time", says Newman²⁰ and certainly the great act of his conversion bears out this truth since it took two years for him to take the very last step and fifteen years for the complete conversion process. The question that we ask ourselves at this juncture is whether

¹⁸ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.123.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.135.

²⁰ Newman, Apologia, p.164.

or not this tardiness can be explained in the light of the theory being studied.

It is the opinion of the present writer that Krech and Crutchfield, though they admit that the "biologically determined capacities of the individual are important in understanding differential rates of cognitive re-organization",²¹ tend to play down this factor in favour of the three mentioned above. A study of Newman's conversion cannot help but convince the observer that intelligence can be a most important factor not only in determining the rate of cognitive re-organization but also the nature of this re-organization itself.

It took Newman from 1843 to 1845 to take the final step into the Catholic Church. One of the chief causes of this delay was the need for intellectual certitude concerning the wisdom of this final move.

Speaking of his state of mind in 1844, Newman writes:

My difficulty was this: I had been deceived greatly once; how could I be sure that I was not deceived a second time? I then thought myself right; how was I to be certain that I was right now? How many years had I thought myself sure of what I now rejected? How could I ever again have confidence in myself? As in 1840 I listened to the rising doubt in favour of Rome, now I listened to the waning doubt in favour of the English Church. To be certain is to know that one knows; what test had I, that I should not change again, after that (sic) I had become a Catholic?²²

²¹ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.135.

²² Newman, Apologia, p.208.

or again:

I had only one more advance of mind to make and that was to be certain of what I had hitherto anticipated, concluded, and believed; and this was close upon my submission to the Catholic Church.²³

That this submission took two years is a testimony to the effort Newman made to establish this certitude.

That Newman's religious structure was highly differentiated is beyond dispute. His years of study of the Fathers, the Anglican divines and Church history had effected this. A highly differentiated cognitive structure is, by its very nature, able to absorb new ideas which, at best, could only result in a re-arrangement of minor substructures within the same cognitive edifice. The very vagueness of Anglicanism, the lack of agreement as to the nature and extent of its doctrine and the limiting power of its formularies tended to have the same effect as a highly differentiated cognitive structure. New facts, new discoveries from antiquity, could be more or less easily absorbed without any need being felt for any over-all cognitive re-organization. It would seem then, that differentiation did operate as a retarding factor in the process of Newman's conversion.

Lack of differentiation in a cognitive structure, on the other hand, was to have a similar delaying effect in Newman's conversion. Newman's knowledge of the

²³ Newman, Apologia, p.198.

Catholic faith was, with several important exceptions, rather extensive. However, his knowledge of Catholics was not. Newman saw Catholics as an undifferentiated group because he lacked contact with them. On his trip abroad in 1832-1833, he tells us that "we kept clear of Catholics throughout our tour".²⁴ And although he visited churches and attended some services, he had very few conversations with ecclesiastics. He admits that he "saw nothing but what was external. Of the hidden life of Catholics, I knew nothing".²⁵ Moreover, the inter-relationship between his cognitive organization of religion and his cognitive organization of politics was such that an upset in the latter area had an immediate effect on the former.

Instead then of speaking of errors in doctrine, I was driven, by my state of mind, to insist upon the political conduct, the controversial bearing, and the social methods and manifestations of Rome. And here I found a matter close at hand, which affected me sensibly too, because it was before my eyes. I can hardly describe too strongly my feeling upon it. I had an unspeakable aversion to the policy and act of Mr. O'Connell, because, as I thought, he associated himself with me of all religions and no religion (the Liberals) against the Anglican Church, and advanced Catholicism by violence and intrigue. When then I found him taken up by the English Catholics, and, as I supposed, at Rome, I considered I had a fulfilment before my eyes how the court of Rome played fast and loose, and fulfilled the bad points which I had seen put down in books against it. Here we saw what Rome was, in action, whatever she might be when quiescent. Her conduct was simply secular and political.²⁶

²⁴ Newman, Apologia, p.53 .

²⁵ Ibid., p.54.

²⁶ Ibid., p.127-128.

This same identification of Catholics and Liberals leads him "into the excess of being very rude" to a Catholic gentleman who called upon him at Oxford. He later wrote to apologize but, seeming almost to forget his purpose in writing, he began to denounce English Catholics:

... you are leagued with our enemies ... You consent to act hand in hand (with the Liberals) for our overthrow. Alas! All this it is that impresses us irresistibly with the notion that you are a political, not a religious party; that, in order to gain an end on which you set your hearts --- an open stage for yourselves in England --- you ally yourselves with those who hold nothing against those who hold something. This is what distresses my own mind so greatly, to speak of myself, that, with limitations which need not now be mentioned, I cannot now meet familiarly any leading persons of the Roman Communion, and least of all when they come on a religious errand. Break off, I would say, with Mr. O'Connell in Ireland and the Liberal Party in England, or come not to us with overtures for mutual prayer and religious sympathy.²⁷

Here is an almost classic example of the operation of the principle of proximity in cognitive organization²⁸ and too, of the "whole-part principle" as it is reformulated by Krech and Crutchfield

When an individual is apprehended as a member of a group, each of those characteristics of the individual which correspond to the characteristics of the group is affected by his group membership, the effect being in the direction of either assimilation or contrast.²⁹

Krech and Crutchfield observe that "among other uses, this formulation can be helpful in aiding us to understand why,

²⁷ Newman, Apologia, pp.128, 129.

²⁸ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.102.

²⁹ Ibid., p.28.

in our perception of people, we frequently are 'biased' or 'unjust'.³⁰ It would seem to aid us in our understanding of Newman's unkindness towards Mr. Spencer. This attitude towards Catholics brought about by lack of differentiation and by the identifying of two different structures was not likely to facilitate nor accelerate Newman's progress towards Rome.

Rigidity is the characteristic of a simple structure with a narrow focus, a structure brought into being by some strong need or emotional influence. The stronger the emotion involved, the more difficult is the accomplishment of cognitive re-organization. Newman, as a youth had been brought up strongly prejudiced against Roman Catholicism. We have seen how this feeling was an essential part of his original cognitive organization even after he had abandoned the Evangelicals. His imagination, as he has told us, was "stained" up to the year 1843 by the effects of the Protestant doctrine that the Pope was Anti-Christ. Speaking of the hold that this conviction had on him in his early days, he tells us:

As a boy of fifteen, I had so fully imbibed it, that I had actually erased in my Gradus ad Parnassum such titles, under the word "Papa" as "Christi Vicarius", "sacer interpres", and "sceptra gerens", and substituted epithets so vile that I cannot bring myself to write them down here.³¹

³⁰ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.28.

³¹ Newman, Apologia, p.123.

Thus, from his early days, a very strong dislike for "Romanism" and "Popery" had been emplanted in his breast. At home and abroad, as we have seen, he sought neither the company of intelligent Catholics nor authoritative Catholic literature which might have helped him to change his views. His readings from the Anglican divines served only to increase his dislike for Roman teachings and practices.

Saunders, while acknowledging Newman's immense intellectual capabilities and his honesty in searching after the truth, makes the observation that Newman's justification for remaining where he was (after he had finally realized the defencelessness of the Anglican position) was "prejudice pure and simple".³² It was the rigidity of this very important sub-structure of anti-Romanism which was a major retarding factor in the conversion process of Newman.

His attitude towards Catholic devotion in particular, his "great crux as regards Catholicism"³³ is another typical example of rigidity in a religious cognitive sub-structure. It was only in the latter days of his Anglicanism, in 1842, that he was persuaded to read St. Alphonsus on devotion to Mary. The widening of his focus of attention which resulted helped him to uncover

³² D.J.Saunders, "Psychological Reactions Before Newman's Conversion", in Theological Studies, Vol.8, No.4, issue of December, 1945, p.495.

³³ Newman, Apologia, p.183..

and employ the key to many of his difficulties, the principle of the development of doctrine.

It is interesting to note the similarity between Krech and Crutchfield's criticism of certain experimentalists in the field of attitude change and Newman's views concerning change of attitude. Speaking of the traditional experimentalist who has put aside, in the view of Krech and Crutchfield, what he knew about the interference with perception, cognition, learning and thinking by such "non-intellectual and bothersome processes such as emotion, attitudes and needs" they point out that, on the other hand, the experimentalist in the field of motivation has tended to neglect man's cognitive life, and that though a piecemeal approach under laboratory conditions might be necessary for the study of a particular process, such a method cannot be validly employed in dealing with man in society. Social psychologists, if they are to present a true picture of man in society must deal with his perceptions, non-cognitive motives, etc., not as disembodied entities, but as they are found in man at work, at home with his family, and among his friends.^{33A} Speaking of the ineffective nature of "paper logic" as a motivating force, we find Newman saying that "it is the concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and I find my mind in a

^{33A}Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.83.

new place. How? The whole man moves, paper logic is but the record of it".³⁴

Contrast then these two statements -- "the history of the cognitive re-organization process" say Krech and Crutchfield, "is not a sequence from order through chaos to order, but from one order to another",³⁵ and Newman's "I say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is not, from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes ...".³⁶ This agreement here between our authors and Newman, to the present writer, seems of no little significance.

This "wholes to wholes" theory of Newman, propounded in the Grammar of Assent, causes Harrold to point to the possibility of examining the parallels between Newman's theory of thought and "certain elements in present-day Gestalt psychology".³⁷ Theodore Haecker, whose study of the works of Newman helped to bring about his own conversion to Catholicism testifies to the influence of Newman on German religious thinking.³⁸ This influence was made possible, according to Haecker, by the appearance of Husserl's Logisch Untersuchungen. This work, in the opinion

34 Newman, Apologia, p.164.

35 Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.119.

36 Newman, The Grammar of Assent, p.330.

37 Harrold, op.cit., p.439.

38 H. Tristram, "Newman in Germany" in The Tablet, Vol.186, No.5500, issue of October 6, 1945, p.165. (Tristram quotes a letter from Haecker).

of Haecker, caused German thinkers to abandon the prejudicial views and arbitrary abstract constructions of a sceptical psychologism in favor of a candid and detached examination of the real structure of the mind. It is the similarity between the views of Newman and those of Husserl which opened the way, according to Haecker, to the influence of the former on religious thought in Germany. When one realizes the connection between Husserl's phenomenology with the Gestalt school, Haecker's observation takes on added interest.³⁹

Referring once again to the "wholes to wholes" theory of Newman appearing on the preceding page, this same parallel is suggested in another passage in which Newman describes the various steps whereby a Protestant arrives at the conclusion that he is obliged to join the Church:

... and to this conclusion he comes, as is plain, not by any possible enumeration of all the considerations, minute, but abundant, delicate but effective, which unites him to it; but by a mental comprehension of the whole case and a discernment of its upshot, sometimes after much deliberation, but, it may be, by a clear and rapid act of the intellect, always, however, by an unwritten summing-up, something like the summation of the terms, plus and minus, of an algebraical series.⁴⁰

To sum up, this careful examination of the principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory of cognitive

³⁹ E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 2nd edition, New York, Appleton, 1950, p.601.

⁴⁰ Newman, Grammar of Assent, pp 291-292.

structure appears to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the statement that the main principles of the theory are found operative in Newman's conversion. One does not pretend to find a perfect matching of theory with a conversion account, but it is significant that there is no major point in the development of the Apologia which is at variance with the theory.

Issue could be taken with the authors' tendency to describe each cognitive organization in a series as clear-cut and discreet,⁴¹ and with the lack of attention to the part played by reason in certain phases of cognitive re-organization.⁴²

On the other hand, the presence of tension as a dynamic factor in Newman's conversion has been demonstrated, the hierarchical arrangement of his series of cognitive structures noted, and the influence of differentiation and rigidity as retarding factors in the conversion process indicated.

Moreover, this critical evaluation serves, as it turns out, as corroborative evidence of the validity of the principles propounded by Krech and Crutchfield.

41 Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.118.

42 Ibid., p.135.

CHAPTER VI

SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE KRECH-CRUTCHFIELD THEORY IN THE FIELD OF CONVERT WORK

After the foregoing study of a theory of attitude and belief changes in the light of one conversion account, a detailed study of apologetics and convert work in the light of the Kretch-Crutchfield theory suggests itself as a logical corollary. But such a study would be a thesis in itself and could not be entered upon here. However, one or two principles of apologetics suggest themselves for mention here because of their similarity to principles in the theory which has just been studied.

1. Determining the Objective in Apologetics

It would be well to keep in mind that the essence of convert-making is to control or change beliefs and attitudes many of which are deep-rooted in the individual. In this connection Kretch and Crutchfield propound five main objectives in the work of changing attitude or belief, one of which will form the objective or the instructor in convert work.¹

¹ Krech and Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948, p.196.

In effecting a conversion, the instructor may be called upon to remove a certain belief or attitude altogether, e.g., the widely-held belief that Catholics adore the Blessed Virgin; or he may be required to change the "sign" of an attitude, e.g. from an anti-Papal attitude to a pro-Papal attitude. Again, he may be called upon to prevent the development of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is not enough for the instructor to remove erroneous beliefs, he must also ensure that those new attitudes which are acquired are not carried themselves into error. As an example here, in instructing the potential convert in the doctrine of papal infallibility, he must be careful to point out that the teaching of the Church is specific in that the Pope is considered infallible only when he is speaking ex cathedra to the body of the faithful on a question of faith or morals.

The fourth objective may consist of an encouragement of the development of a belief or attitude. This would be served, for instance, by bringing the convert to a realization of the need of some authoritative body to interpret the words of Christ and His teachings, i.e. to the need of a divinely-instituted Church. Finally, he may be faced with the necessity of changing the content and specificity of a belief or attitude. Faced with a difficulty in accepting Catholic devotion to the saints, he might be well advised to approach the topic from the

view of the subject's own relations with his friends on the natural plane, and extending the same rational thinking to include the friendship of the saints on the supernatural plane.

In his work of instruction, the convert-worker will have one or possibly more than one of the above objectives. The effectiveness of his work will therefore depend on his ability to determine the nature of his objective. The problem of determining the proper objective is closely allied to that of getting an accurate and complete concept of the nature of the religious cognitive structures and sub-structures of the person under instruction.

2. Diagnosing the Existing Structures

Krech and Crutchfield enumerate a number of errors in diagnosis committed by propagandists and educators in their work of attempted attitude change. In the light of what we have already seen it is more than possible that these same errors can be committed by the convert instructor.

The authors point out² that there is often a failure in diagnosis to realize the important functional value of beliefs and attitudes. Certain attitudes and

2 Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.196.

beliefs of the subject are considered to be purely the result of engrained prejudice, bad training or the perversity of human nature. It should be remembered that certain beliefs and attitudes exist and are cherished because they fulfil basic needs. Thus a strong antagonism towards the "authoritarianism" of the Catholic Church, and towards its "meddling" in the private lives of individuals may be necessary on the part of a non-Catholic to justify or defend his own feelings on such moral matters as birth prevention or divorce. The instructor must take great pains to determine why such and such an attitude or belief exists, otherwise he will be unable to find the proper means of altering it.

The authors point out an additional error of diagnosis, that of ascribing the same need or emotion to all those maintaining a certain attitude or belief.³ It would be a false assumption to suppose that the anti-authoritarian attitude of many Protestants has its origin in a defense of a personal code of morality. Intellectual or economic factors might well be the cause of this attitude and as such must be properly diagnosed before any effective remedial work can be undertaken.

Closely akin to this error is that of the instructor assuming that all non-Catholics appearing before him

³ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.197.

for instruction will, because they have the same church affiliation, i.e., Presbyterian, or Unitarian, or Lutheran, hold the same set of prejudices or errors in their understanding of Catholicism simply because they are Presbyterians, Unitarians, or Lutherans. Political percepts may be involved in one Lutheran's attitudes and beliefs; economic or racial percepts may be the explanation of another Lutheran's attitudes and beliefs. The instructor must determine what is involved in the attitudes and beliefs of this particular individual before him.

3. The Need for Factual Information

Krech and Crutchfield hold that a great many of the beliefs held by people are erroneous simply because the people maintaining them are not sufficiently informed. To make matters worse, the facts they do possess often are incapable of representing the true state of affairs with any degree of accuracy, since a correct judgment can come only with the possession of all the facts. Even though the facts are known to be correct, a lack of knowledge of related facts can actually give a distorted picture of the situation. Beliefs, according to the theory of Krech and Crutchfield, are composite structures, built up from many facts.⁴ In such a structure, the meaning of a single fact is never independent of the other facts

⁴ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., p.186.

with which it is connected. When certain essential facts about a given situation are not in the possession of the assessor, he cannot avoid a distortion of even those correct facts which he does possess. The result is, of course, that the belief on which he depends is, in itself, incorrect.

The importance of the need to present essential facts of Catholic belief, Church history, etc., and all of these facts, has long been realized by Catholic apologists. The Knights of Columbus' advertising campaign which has met with so much success in recent years, the spread of the inquiry class method, and the opening of information centres, all point to the realization on the part of convert workers that supplying correct and complete factual information is a key factor in change of attitude or belief.

4. The Non-Argumentative Approach

Krech and Crutchfield quote a study by Lewin and Grabbe to show the ineffectuality of arguing logically from point to point in the work of changing belief:

Methods and procedures which seek to change convictions item by item are of little avail in bringing about the desired change of heart. This is found to be one of the most important experiences for those engaged in the field of re-education. Arguments proceeding logically from one

point to another may drive the individual into a corner. But, as a rule he will find some way -- if necessary, a very illogical way -- to retain his beliefs.⁵

Speaking in the same vein, Newman quotes the "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo saluum facere populum suum" of St. Ambrose.⁶

The good instructor will not begin a series of interviews armed with logical arguments which he will present to his subject in a pre-determined order. He will rather begin where the individual is, not where he would like him to be. He will determine the nature and complexity of his subject's current cognitive structure with regard to religion and will seek to build upon what he finds acceptable there, rather than attempt to reduce this cognitive organization to shambles by means of relentless argument.

C. Bruehl quotes Bishop Fulton J. Sheen on this point;

We are called not only to educate those who already belong to our fold; our mission is to bring other sheep into the pastures of faith. Now, in order that we might bring the world of Pan captive to an understanding of Christ, another principle must be made use of in our educational system and that is the Principle of Integration. The Principle of Integration means that Catholic truth must be presented to the non-Catholic mind, not as something

5 K. Lewin and P. Grabbe, "Conduct, Knowledge, and acceptance of new values", in Journal of Social Issues, Vol.1, No.3, 1945, pp 53-64, quoted in Krech-
Crutchfield, op.cit., p.200.

6 John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p.163.

foreign to it, but as something capable of developing the best that is in their own system. In other words, it takes its point of departure in a truth which both hold in common, and then, once having established contact with their system, by a process of elaboration leads on the unbelieving mind to new heights of truth and fresh vistas of knowledge. This principle is grounded on the truth that nothing is intrinsically and absolutely evil; every error has within it some admixture of good; and that which is good in their system, however small it may be, but be the starting point of their education.⁷

MacDonald, speaking in terms of the Herbartian "apperceptive mass" expresses practically the same opinion:

If new ideas are to find lodgement in the mind, they must be introduced in such a way as not to disturb too much at the outset the major complexes. The new ideas will be accepted if they fit in with something of our present beliefs.⁸

The application of this technique of what Sheen has termed the Principle of Integration has a long and honorable history. In the acts of the Apostles we find St. Paul applying it to the Athenians who disputed his doctrines, when, addressing them in the Areopagus, he said:

Ye men of Athens, I perceive that you are in all things as it were too superstitious. For passing by and seeing your idols, I found an altar also, on which was written: TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. What therefore, you worship without knowing it, this I preach to you ...⁹

7 C. Bruehl, "The Psychology of Conversion", in the Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Vol.30, No.7, issue of April, 1930, p.688.

8 D. J. MacDonald, "The Psychological Factors in Conversion" in the American Ecclesiastical Review, Vol.88, No.4, issue of April, 1933, p.341-342.

9 Acts of the Apostles, xvii, 22-23

And again,

... That they should seek God if haply they may feel after him and find him: although he be not far from every one of us. For in him we live, and we move, and we are as some also of your own poets said: For we are also his offspring.¹⁰

Paul was, obviously, taking the cognitive religious structure of the Athenians and building upon it the elements of Christian belief.

For example, an instructor using the non-argumentative approach, would not, in his talks with a Lutheran, seek to bring him to the point of abandoning his old beliefs and embracing Catholicism by attacking Luther's teachings directly and stressing their divergence from Catholic doctrines. Rather would he begin by showing how much Catholicism and Lutheranism have in common: i.e., belief in the divinity of Christ, the need of a sacramental system, the reality of the True Presence and so on. Only when this area of common belief is clearly delineated should the instructor proceed to suggest Luther's stressing of certain truths to the point of excluding others.

The success of the Una Sancta movement in present-day Germany exemplifies the necessity for the non-argumentative approach in apologetics and convert-instruction work. Speaking of the new appraisal of Luther by Fr. Lortz, Karl Adam and others, the author points out that:

¹⁰ Acts of the Apostles, xvii, 28-29.

Suddenly the Catholics were the ones who demanded that the Protestants should return to Luther because then they would be already halfway in the Catholic Church ... For Luther at least recognized a certain amount of tradition (the Creeds, Fathers of the Church) and observed many forms of Catholic devotion ... Fr. Lortz demonstrates in his book on the Reformation Today that Catholicism does not totally contradict Luther but affirms more than he does. Instead of Luther's "alone", Catholicism says "and"; Scripture and tradition; Faith and conscience and authority.¹¹

It should be self-evident that any spirit of antagonism on the part of the convert-worker can only lead to a complete break in the rapport so necessary and vital in any work of conversion. There is definite danger of this when the would-be convert maker fails to establish common ground with the subject and fails to make allowances for a certain looseness in terminology and for innocent misunderstanding on the latter's part. Walsh has made this point quite clear in speaking of the "rehabilitation of the distracted modernists in a rational and progressive cosmos" when he points to this serious defect in Catholic apologists: Pointing out that

... reconciliation of the "post-Christian" mentality has immeasurably greater difficulties of retraction and humiliation than the conversion of the "pre-Christian pagan"...

he continues:

... we let ourselves resent presumptions which are to them as natural as breathing, but which they betray without the least malice. Instead

¹¹ Eva-Maria Jung, "A Modern Approach to Protestants" in The Catholic World, Vol.180, No.1080, issue of March, 1955, p.415.

of learning to speak the language they speak and make ourselves understood, we bristle inwardly at a terminology which we associate with haughty ignorances and fine-sprung sophistries.¹²

"There are three rules for dealing with all who come to us", says Bishop Sheen, speaking of the prospective convert.¹³ "These are: 1. Kindness; 2. Kindness, and 3. Kindness". In the technical language of Krech and Crutchfield, we find them pointing out that withdrawal is very often the behaviour pattern of one who would protect himself from contradictory data. Very often the hostile attitude towards faith, the result of isolation, rigidity and simplicity of a cognitive structure formed in an environment of prejudice may be overcome by personal contact, with an individual whose friendliness and sincerity overcomes this hostility:

The solution to this problem (of withdrawal) though difficult to achieve in practice, is straightforward. Ways and means must be found for destroying such barriers to fresh stimulation. Just as any step that will change the environmental supports for perceived similarities may change the content of beliefs and attitudes, so any step that will minimize autistic thinking may help change the contents of beliefs and attitudes. The significance of this point lies in its suggestion that sometimes enforced contact among antagonistic people can induce changes in their beliefs and attitudes vis-a-vis each other.¹⁴

For "enforced contact" here we might read "facilitated contact" -- a contact facilitated by the charitable and

¹² F.A.Walsh, "Task of Apologetics Today" in The American Ecclesiastical Review, Vol.91, No.3, issue of September 1934, p.266.

¹³ J.A.O'Brien, editor, Winning Converts, New York, Kennedy, 1942, p.157.

¹⁴ Krech and Crutchfield, op.cit., pp 198-199.

kindly approach of him who seeks to effect a change of belief or attitude. For the instructor, there will rarely arise an occasion of "enforced contact" save possibly in the case of the mixed-marriage instructions imposed upon the non-Catholic party by law of the Catholic Church. A charitable and kindly approach on the part of the instructor in such a situation will often accomplish a great deal in breaking down the hostility of the subject and can even lead to the latter revising not only his views on the exponents of the faith, but his attitudes towards the doctrines of the faith itself.

The effectiveness of true charity in bringing about a change of belief is testified to by one of Bishop Sheen's prominent converts, Clare Boothe Luce:

... the one Catholic argument I could not controvert, the one that was not just the most important but the transcendent argument, for it encompassed the totality of Catholic thought -- that was the argument he gave me, in epitome, at the end of each instruction when he said "God love you!"

For love is the word that begets Grace, and grace alone illumines and lifts the intellect. So in the end, all conversions are effected through Love. The mind is hungry for Truth, but the soul is athirst for Love. And it is the soul that must be touched. If the Catholic cannot successfully argue the word of Love, all his arguments fail.¹⁵

A study of the theory of Krech and Crutchfield has shown that many of the principles they develop are applicable in the field of convert work. As has been seen,

¹⁵ Clare Boothe Luce, Winning Converts, p.65.

many of these same principles have been anticipated for years by Catholic instructors in the field of convert work, and have been utilized by them to good effect. It is felt, however, that a theory of attitude and belief change such as that developed by Krech and Crutchfield in their principles of cognitive re-organization can serve as a useful guide to the instructor as he sets about his task of convert instruction. A thorough understanding of the nature of cognitive structures and the factors retarding or hastening their alteration is essential to efficient instruction. The Krech-Crutchfield theory provides such an understanding, and as such, ought to serve as a useful tool to the convert worker.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing study, the notion of conversion has been examined and the possibility of a conversion occurring on the predominantly intellectual level was established.

With the purpose of using a conversion of this type as a measuring tool, in a study of the theory of Krech and Crutchfield, the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, John Henry Newman's account of his conversion, was studied to determine its utility in such a capacity. Sufficient evidence was adduced to justify the use of the Apologia as a reliable document. A brief outline of the important phases in Newman's conversion was made, and the main principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory were examined. Following this the actual comparison was made between theory and conversion account. Each principle of the Krech-Crutchfield theory was studied in the light of the Apologia account.

The result of the study has been the finding of sufficient evidence to warrant the statement that the main principles of this theory are found operative in Newman's conversion. One does not pretend to find a perfect matching

of theory with conversion account, but it is significant that there is no major point in the development of the Apologia which is at variance with the theory. Issue could be taken with the author's tendency to describe each cognitive organization in a series as clear-cut and discreet¹ and with the lack of attention to the part played by reason in certain phases of cognitive re-organization.² On the other hand, the presence of tension as a dynamic factor in Newman's conversion has been demonstrated, the hierarchical arrangement of his series of cognitive structures noted, and the influence of differentiation and rigidity as retarding factors in the conversion process indicated.

Although the foregoing study does serve to establish that the main principles of the Krech-Crutchfield theory were operative in Newman's conversion, further work involving an extensive survey of conversion literature in the light of the same principles would have to be undertaken before any general conclusions could be drawn. The present work has served only to provide additional corroborative evidence for the validity of the theory. A limited review of some present-day writers in the field of apologetics (undertaken in the final chapter), discloses the fact that a number of principles identical to those of

1 D. Krech and R. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948, p.118.

2 Ibid., p.135.

the Krech-Crutchfield theory are fundamental in the techniques of convert instruction employed by these writers.

For this reason, some of the practical applications of their principles in the general field of attitude change made by Krech and Crutchfield in the Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, were outlined and their possible applicability in the field of convert work suggested.

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Tillich, Paul
Conversion discussed
See Romanus
Psychological Foundation
of Religious Experience
Geyser
Erik, Pargyan, S.J., Synthesis of Newman

ABSTRACT OF
A THEORY OF BELIEF AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
IN THE LIGHT OF A CONVERSION

In this study, an investigation into a recorded change of religious belief is made with the purpose of determining whether or not the main principles of a theory of cognitive re-organization are to be found operative therein. The theory being investigated is that propounded by David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield in their text Theory and Problems of Social Psychology. The conversion account in which evidence of the operation or non-operation of the principles of this theory is sought is that of John Henry Newman as recorded in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua.

To clarify the notion of conversion, an investigation is made into the meaning of the term, and its connotation in Scripture, tradition, social psychology and psychiatry. Various theories explaining conversion are considered and criticized and a defence is established for the validity of a conversion type which is predominantly intellectual in character.

To justify the use of the Apologia as a valid measuring tool, an examination is made of the arguments of Newman's severest critics and evidence both internal and external adduced to warrant the use of this document.

A synopsis of the Kretch-Crutchfield theory of cognitive organization and re-organization follows. The main principles of the theory are explained and illustrated by examples.

Newman's Apologia is then synopsized in such fashion as to indicate the main stages of his belief and attitude changes as he progressed from Anglicanism to Catholicism. In the actual testing of the theory itself, each principle of cognitive re-organization is again listed and evidence of its operation or non-operation in Newman's conversion account presented.

Before the final conclusions are drawn, some relationships between Newman's views on attitude and belief change to the Gestalt psychology are indicated and possible utilization of the Kretch-Crutchfield principles in the field of convert-work considered. Suggestions are made for more extensive research in the field of convert accounts in the light of the principles of social psychology.

The findings of the study point to the fact that the majority of the principles of belief and attitude change are found operative in Newman's conversion. This being so, further evidence for the validity of the Kretch-Crutchfield theory is provided from an area not too thoroughly considered by its authors in their text.