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**ETHICS AND IMAGINATION:
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE WORK OF
PAUL RICOEUR TO BERNARD LONERGAN'S
INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS**

**Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the
Ph.D. (TH) degree to the**

**Faculty of Theology
Saint Paul University
Ottawa, ON**

27 June 1994

by Michael Bruce Patrick George



Michael Bruce Patrick George, Ottawa, Canada, 1994



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PRECIS of Ph.D.(Th.) Thesis for St. Paul University, Ottawa

ETHICS AND IMAGINATION: contributions from the work of Paul Ricoeur to Bernard Lonergan's Intentionality analysis

by Michael George

This thesis is an exploration of the nature of the relationships that exist between the process of ethical deliberation and the operations and roles of imagination. The general problem is well known since the engagement of ethicists and theologians with the areas of hermeneutics and narrative theology is widespread. Ethicists are starting to demand a more systematic study of these relationships and their import for human activity. After a general overview of the basic concerns of moral theologians in this area, the work of Bernard Lonergan is presented as a potential avenue for discovering and analysing the ethics-imagination relationships. Lonergan's intentionality analysis provides a differentiated framework for addressing specific operations within larger cognitional fields of intentionality. A brief overview of the Lonerganian project and selected scholars who utilize this framework in their ethical reflections is followed by the identification of three specific junctures of the ethics-imagination relationship. These are imagination and truth of value, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history. This provides the basic framework of this thesis which is supplemented by the insights of Paul Ricoeur in the field of metaphor and narrative analysis.

Ricoeur's work studies the process of the carrying and creation of meaning that is effected in language. Within these studies Ricoeur identifies certain processes which are linked to the imagination. An analysis of the operations and roles played by imagination is based on a close reading of Ricoeur's texts. This reading is guided by three sets of

criteria, namely, the structural features of imagination, imagination and mediation, and performative aspects of imagination. These provide a group of insights which are selected for their contributions in supplementing and clarifying the three junctures of ethics-imagination located in the Lonerganian framework. The main body of the text concerns the lengthy reading and analysis of Ricoeur's four books The Rule of Metaphor and the three volumes of Time and Narrative. These insights are applied to the Lonerganian project in order to discern the significance of an enhanced understanding of imagination's various roles in the shaping and influencing of humans as potential agents of value as issues which need to be considered and taken up by theologians and ethicists. The thesis suggests some general and generic features of these processes and their respective implications for the fields of moral activity and of ethics.

Certain operative social patterns can be discerned in the cultural realm that affect the possibility of ethical development. Lonergan's analysis of the constitution of humans as transcendently oriented to ethical action provides a grounds for discerning normativity in a self-reflexive manner. Ricoeur's insights into imagination as a differently operative in the human engagement with stories supplements this understanding and suggests the wider sets of human behaviour which need to be understood as directly affecting the possibility of ethical activity. Lonergan's focus on the practical dimensions of ethics provides the basis for evaluating normativity in culture. Certain sets of human operations and the nature of mediately appropriated understanding are identified which lead subjects to intend and actualize value in their deliberate activity. Some avenues of interest and concern for theologians and ethicists are identified in terms of the analysis based on Lonergan's

cognitional framework and the enhanced understanding of imagination which Ricoeur provides. The project is exploratory in nature and not prescriptive or definitive. The wealth of insights about the roles of imagination reveal ethical potential as a necessary attribute of all human engagement where success lies in the critical development of understanding and skills necessary for actualizing value.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND IMAGINATION

1.1 The Nature of the Problem

Since the Second Vatican Council there has been a gradual movement away from the understanding of Catholic morality which focussed primarily on rules derived from natural law. This understanding incorporated a notion of necessity with a perceived separation between the realms of the secular and the sacred which affected the conception of human activity. The new discussion in moral theology appropriated a desire expressed by Pope John XXIII for the Church to become cognizant of the "signs of the times." This shift required moral theologians to consider the new types of data provided by the human and social sciences. The purpose of this shift was to understand the modern world within a faith tradition that had been accustomed to considering itself unaffected by external social forces. Charles Curran has provided an ongoing discussion of the main trends in this continuing discussion, where the expansion of the notion of sin from the personal to the social, embedded in social structures, has resulted in the need for more precision in ethical analysis. Contextuality and freedom have emerged as significant factors affecting ethical consideration.

The Christian can never be content with

the status quo and can never identify the existing order or structure as the perfect reflection of the eternal plan of God. This does not mean that every proposed change is necessarily good and to be embraced, for this would be the most naive of approaches and in its own way be against the horizon of Christian ethics which tends to point out the ambiguities of all existing and proposed orders and structures.¹

A critical concern for the good involves Christians necessarily with the world and with their own critical and moral development. Curran calls for the inclusion of anthropological resources with the sacramental understanding that informs Catholic identity, as "morality and moral theology, which reflects systematically on the moral life, involve more than just moral norms and moral acts viewed in themselves apart from the person."² Such considerations require an understanding that accounts for all the relationships that engage a person meaningfully in the world, which he identifies as grounded in Christological and soteriological concerns.

All these considerations point to the need to understand the Christian person as moral agent and subject in terms of the multiple relationships within which the Christian disciple finds oneself. Specifically, the Christian person as moral agent and subject should be understood in terms of one's relationships with God, neighbor, world, and self. By simultaneously holding on to all these multiple relationships one does justice to all the different aspects of Christian discipleship and avoids any

unnecessary dualisms or separations.³

Curran's discussion of the new context of moral theology raises the issue of the relationship between Christian and non-Christian perspectives on ethics. Curran insists that there is no distinction between the way in which Christians are supposed to act and the way in which non-Christians are supposed to act; however, one of the methodological developments proposed by the Second Vatican Council was to relate the gospel more directly to social existence by incorporating it into the process of ethical understanding. He considers this to reflect the universal salvific will of God and the availability of grace to all, which are aspects of the fullness of humanity realized in Christ. Nevertheless, the gospel must be accounted for as a significant aspect of Christian moral thought.

Christian ethics reflects in a systematic, reflexive, and coherent manner on Christian life and existence. By its very nature Christian ethics or moral theology must appeal to distinctive and even unique Christian concepts (e.g., the reign of God in Jesus), symbols (the cross), and sources of ethical wisdom (Scripture). In accord with the understanding developed earlier, my approach to Christian ethics gives a great place to human reason, the sciences, and human experiences as mediating the gospel values and symbols. The morality proposed in Christian ethics, however, cannot claim to have a unique content but is available to all human beings. Christian belief will affect our motivation, intentionalities,

and reasons, but not the material content as such.⁴

The significance of symbols and story are linked to the impulses and affects that inform and shape the Christian's responses to the demands of the world, and thus require some systematic consideration as pertaining to ethical deliberation.

Curran feels that any account of moral development must include among its considerations "growth in the relationships involved in being a person and in the attributes and virtues that should guide and direct these relationships."⁵ Curran identifies the work of Stanley Hauerwas as developing this important, although neglected, aspect of Christian ethics, which uses a narrative-based theology to emphasize the importance of the personal character and vision of the Christian disciple.⁶ The story of Jesus found in the gospels provides the impetus and information for those who claim to act as Christians, where the telling and retelling of the story becomes the source of the virtues necessary for the community's identity and action. Curran is concerned that Hauerwas's approach neglects aspects of the tradition by overemphasizing the role of Scripture in the formation of Christological understanding. Curran wants to maintain an ethical perspective that is not exclusive to Christians. He doubts that narrative and story are a sufficient base for

understanding the Gospel message, let alone the moral life of the individual and the Christian community. He calls for a greater role "for reason and experience in mediating the Christian faith experience to the questions of moral methodology, the meaning and understanding of the moral person, the process of decision-making, and the morality of acts."⁷ The inclusion of the imaginative, in terms of narrative and vision, within a coherent and comprehensive ethical perspective becomes an issue requiring further elaboration, especially for those who link their ethics and normative understanding with a particular text or narrative.

Alasdair MacIntyre, in his much quoted text After Virtue, makes the claim that contemporary moral discourse is largely incoherent because the language is no longer systematically related to a conceptual scheme that would allow for ethical comprehension.⁸ MacIntyre addresses this issue by critically examining the history of ethics where the foundational ethical paradigms may be discovered and traced through culture. Like Hauerwas, MacIntyre identifies virtue as essential in the promotion of viable ethical agents, which he feels is the center of any discussion of a relevant ethics. The requirement of an intelligible account of virtues as they shape and inform human lives becomes an essential part of ethical deliberation. As virtues are applied to various situations in a person's life, in a fashion similar to the

application of personal skills (such as compassion or bravery) , a unified account of virtue and tradition is required both in order to identify previously normative patterns and standards in culture and to locate a focus for contemporary questions of ethical deliberation.

The unity of a virtue in someone's life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole. . . . So now, in defining the particular pre-modern concept of the virtues with which I have been preoccupied, it has become necessary to say something of the concomitant concept of selfhood, a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.⁹

The significance of understanding narrative becomes central both to the critical evaluation of the contemporary state of ethics, via historical narratives, but also in the construction of standards and criteria which operate at the level of self-reflexivity. Examining the issue in his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre links the emergence of different traditions with the need for persons to be able to "translate" from one tradition to another the key cultural patterns that are embedded in images, symbols, and narrative accounts.¹⁰ He proposes that if this translation is successful then the varying accounts of ethics can be judged on the basis of rationality and comprehensiveness, with one account emerging as more or less

superior to the other. Such an argument negates emotivist arguments and may have considerable appeal for mainstream analytical and phenomenological ethical thinkers. The affective dimension of experience carried in language and symbol requires further exploration. This dimension is taken up explicitly by William Spohn under the headings of "Parable and Narrative in Christian Ethics" and "Passions and Principles" both of which are found in recent "Notes On Moral Theology" in Theological Studies.¹¹

Spohn views narrative theology as providing a new focus for moral theology concerning the issues of contextuality, interpretation of theologically normative material (found within Scripture), and the examination of the Jesus story as revelatory of virtues and norms proposed by Hauerwas.¹² While parables challenge the ethical assumptions of the hearer, biblical narrative is taken to provide a more direct form of moral guidance. World views, normative paradigms, the shaping of disposition, imagination and emotion are all aspects of narrative influence on the growth and development of both the ethical agent and the community. Spohn claims that the biblical narrative is a critical resource for Christian ethicists.

Biblical images and stories ought to challenge the prediscursive patterns of self-understanding that the secular culture has inculcated in the agent, stimulating insight like the parables do.

Moral philosophers and theologians have neglected this prediscursive and imaginative side of moral recognition in favor of the more intellectual justification of choices accomplished by providing publicly intelligible reasons. As moral theology expands its scope to include character, dispositions, and community ethos, it needs a richer model of moral discernment than the practical syllogism. Narrative theology will be an important resource in expanding the range of moral deliberation to include both the disclosive and pragmatic meanings of truth.¹³

Although narrative theology is closer to persons' experience than most speculative thought, it does not provide a sufficient basis for moral analysis since identity is shaped also by principles, ritual, and liturgy. Despite the recognition that the Christian story will not have the resources to answer all moral issues, Spohn concludes that narrative theology provides a shift of focus that "can support a broader definition of ethics that recognizes the normative guidance that symbolic material brings to disposition and character."¹⁴ Spohn ends his essay with a warning to ethicists who diminish the practical significance of the symbolic in ethical deliberation:

The variety of moral perspectives is fed by different imaginative and symbolic traditions that lead to different definitions of the moral issues involved in such areas as abortion; the different definitions lead to intractable disagreements. Until these imaginative frameworks are brought to the surface, diatribe and denunciation will substitute

for actual debate.¹⁵

Spohn's review of the literature on the role of passions and principles in ethics illuminates the connection between reason and affectivity in moral experience. Emotions are identified as belonging to the prereflective stage of rationality, organizing experience in meaningful ways.¹⁶ The relationship between emotions and judgments is a matter on which there is considerable disagreement because there is no agreement on how, or if, emotions participate in rational deliberation. Those who insist that there is a cognitional aspect to emotions suggest that emotional states provide the basis for principles, although not all agree that moral principles carry a truth value.¹⁷

Three positions concerning the moral role of emotions are proposed. These suggest alternative perspectives which seek to avoid some of the problems that arise when emotion functions in a critical capacity. The first position proposes that emotions are evaluative, as attitudes, where the criteria resides in the appropriateness of the response. This allows for the simultaneous commitment to differing points of view.¹⁸ Some insight into contextuality may be provided by this approach, but from an evaluative stance there are substantial problems. The second position examines emotions as "construals," which are "mental events or states in which

one thing is grasped in terms of something else."¹⁹ The emotions are not appropriated until they are used to interpret the self; the synthetic role of construal allows for a flexible approach to situations where appropriateness is linked to the pragmatic. There must be a correspondence between the factual reading of the situation and the emotional construal for things to work out. The third position identifies emotions as appropriate only when "the evoking object or situation warrants the emotion."²⁰ In this perspective, emotions direct attention to the salient features of a situation, shifting on the basis of intuition. Emotions are links between situations and developed paradigms, which are more or less appropriate according to how well the emotion "fits."²¹ Consequences an virtuous character are suggested as essential criteria in choosing the proper paradigms for each situation. Spohn states that well-ordered emotions, critically grounded through connection to a sound moral community and a critical self-awareness, are necessary for practical reflection to be appropriate.²²

Emotions have to be formed appropriately through education in the significant patterns of culture. Christians emphasize the movement away from egocentricity and the significance of paradigms and ritual in specific cultures.²³ Religion has resources which supersede those available to philosophy, especially since the affective dimension can be

utilized to promote ethics as more than a minimal response to established principles. Spohn notes that the movements in this direction are still tentative and the resources of Scripture for schooling the emotions are still not adequately recognized.

It is regrettable that moral theology has neglected the role that emotions play in the moral life. The legal paradigm that dominated the history of theological ethics since Augustine was reinforced first by a rationalist natural law approach and then, in some circles, by a Kantian ethics of principles. Even the efforts by narrative and biblical theologians to establish alternative paradigms have not carefully worked out how convictions, stories, and metaphors shape emotions. Too often, Catholic treatments of the virtues ignore specifically Christian experience in favor of very general philosophical analysis.²⁴

Spohn concludes his survey of the literature by raising questions that emphasize the significance of affectivity for the moral life and ethical deliberation that at the same time demand more comprehensive and systematic approaches than are currently being undertaken. The questions, which include "how do emotions support moral commitments?, how are they socially formed through language and custom?, and how should one sensitively and critically determine one's personal mix of the various sets of preferences that are mandated by the different 'worlds' we inhabit?", are foundational concerns. These concerns are considered three theologians. The work of

Philip Keane, Stanley Hauerwas, and Eric Mount, Jr., address the foundational questions around the relationship between ethics and imagination, implied in the concern for symbol, affectivity, narrative, and language, which have been identified as central to the project of contemporary ethics. Each theologian's analysis and responses will be examined in turn. An overview of these perspectives will provide an account of the current state of the ethical discourse relating to imagination and the unresolved concerns.

1.2 Ethics and Imagination in the Work of Philip Keane

Keane's book Christian Ethics and Imagination: A Theological Inquiry, suggests that moral theology has been limited to a discursive approach that neglects the prediscursive and affective dimensions necessary in understanding the role and application of moral principles in ethical deliberation.²⁵ He outlines the following three reasons for a study of imagination and moral theology: first, imagination has not been given the attention that related issues of narrative, virtue, and vision have; second, imagination might provide more insights into the actual role and function of story and symbol in the concrete moral development of the person; and third, the larger issue of aesthetics and moral theology is opened up through the examination of imagination, which allows the integration of

non-discursive elements of human activity, such as music and literature, into the considerations of moral theology.²⁶ In his analysis of the development of philosophical approaches to the issue of imagination, Keane highlights the work of Paul Ricoeur. He focusses on Ricoeur's insights about the role of texts considered as multi-layered discourses about the world, the metaphor as the quintessential textual paradigm where meaning is constructed, and his view of the imagination in allowing the expansion of perspective through image where new meanings can emerge.²⁷

Keane adopts a general perspective from the work of Daniel Maguire in Catholic theology which attempts to "recognize that imagination is an intellectual function but at the same time to work an affective element into the moral theology of imagination."²⁸ Keane identifies a difference in emphasis between those theologians who connect imagination and ethics as revealing traditional moral commitments, following the approach of Hauerwas, and those who see imagination as leading to new insights and new principles, such as Daniel Maguire.²⁹ The joining of the discursive and the non-discursive remains Keane's primary objective.

Keane, following the insights of Aquinas, identifies imagination as "the basic process by which we draw together the concrete and the universal elements of our human

experience."³⁰ The critical function of imagination lies in its ability to provide adequate images of all dimensions of our experience which can lead to better judgments. Keane links the processes of conversion and abstraction as the essential modes of understanding through which attention to concrete experience leads to insights about meaning and relevance.³¹ Imagination is central to moral theology because the forms of expression in which our tradition is embodied are never completely adequate and because new moral experiences have to be integrated into the larger context of our lives.³² For Keane, imagination pertains to both sense and intellect, considered as different faculties, which also includes the human will and discipline, as opposed to those who would see imagination as either a sense faculty or an intellectual operation.³³

Keane lists three dimensions of the imaginative process which address the epistemological concerns of contemporary thinkers. Intuition (understood as pre-reflective openness), emotion, and learning experiences all participate in the development of the productive imagination. Learning experiences are singled out as the most influential aspect of imagination; Keane points to the concreteness of experience as primary in shaping intuitive and emotional responses to symbols and differing aspects of culture.³⁴ The connection of imagination and moral principles lies in the flexibility

that is afforded the person with which he or she can appropriate moral principles. The deep truth of the principles can reveal more and profounder insights, pointing to the transcendental dimension of reality that informs all human searching.³⁵ The significant question for ethicists remains how to apply moral principles to specific situations. Keane finds a response in the work of Ricoeur where moral principles, considered as texts, can open us up to the play of behaviours and moral reflection. Texts can also be applied to specific moral dilemmas.³⁶ Imagination and moral principles are necessary corollaries for effective moral reasoning, as Keane views imagination as linking past and future in a mutually enriching manner. He suggests that imagination may provide a means of bridging the separate concerns of conservatives and progressives by creating a sense of the present which is critical and constructive.³⁷

Moral imagination is important for theologians since it permits an expanded understanding of the role of natural law and an enhanced critical view of reality. In addition, imagination re-emphasizes the role of personal discernment with significant social implications as intrinsic to moral thinking.³⁸ The creative role of images shaped by the social context of specific cultures as economic class, institutional and cultural paradigms, and power relationships can affect the possibility of imaginative growth in both

positive and negative ways.³⁹ Keane identifies the critical function of imagination in the following quotation:

If we consider that human imagination always involves a sense element, the themes of figure and form might help us get a clue to imaginative judgment. Imaginative judgments, even when very abstract, involve matter and space; they involve the way in which things are arranged or fit together. Imaginative moral judgments thus concern how our actions and principles fit together; they are judgments of the fitting or of the coherent.⁴⁰

To expand his discussion of imagination and moral theology, Keane provides concrete examples from the areas of biomedical ethics, sexual ethics and peace and justice issues. Imagination functions here by forming images, associating images, or making appropriate moral judgments.⁴¹ Keane's final concern is the connection of imagination and education in which imagination is promoted by an adequate grasp of the basic skills of language and through the study of a tradition's classics.⁴² A critical overview of developmental theory is provided which points to the lack of the non-discursive elements in most analyses; the inclusion of imagination in educating youth about sexuality and social justice is seen as addressing this imbalance and promoting a more inclusive understanding of the issues. Those approaches to moral understanding which are purely prescriptive are not appropriate for understanding the complexities of the issues

involved and the essential role played by the individual in ascertaining the proper course of action. Imagination provides resources for moral theology, especially in the areas of vision and motivation; joined with moral principles, a properly contextual and critical perspective can be achieved which will offset those approaches which focus exclusively on logic and discursive rationality.⁴³

Keane's book provides a general account of the importance of including imagination in the discussion of moral and ethical deliberation. The main questions concern the applicability of imagination to ethics and the nature of the role and operations performed by imagination in such issues. Keane's suggestion that imagination pertains to both sense and intellectual faculties, and the will is a movement forward, but a sufficiently integrated account of their inter-relationships remains to be provided. The basic application of imagination to ethical dilemmas is indicated in terms of anticipations rather than in a theoretically differentiated fashion. Specifically, analysis, coherence, and vision are attributes of the imagination that would supplement the existing discursive ethical discourse. Keane points to the need for a heightened awareness of the richness of human experience and the requisite flexibility of consciousness to incorporate all the relevant data.

1.3 Ethics and Imagination in the Work of Stanley Hauerwas

The work of Stanley Hauerwas incorporates imagination into ethics primarily through the interpretation of the role and significance of narrative in developing a moral perspective. The three works that establish the foundation of Hauerwas's approach are Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics, and A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic.⁴⁴

The self is privileged as the locus of moral determination, so that character and virtue become essential aspects of the moral enterprise. Hauerwas states that: "Christian ethics is the conceptual discipline that analyzes and imaginatively tests the images most appropriate to score the Christian life in accordance with the central conviction that the world has been redeemed by the work and person of Christ."⁴⁵ The fundamental concern articulated by Hauerwas is that every coherent ethical perspective is grounded in a distinctive communal narrative. Here character, value, and normative relationships are given a specific focus and content through symbol and image, without which ethics could not provide the critical assessment of reality necessary for moral growth.⁴⁶ In the Christian ethical perspective, the Scriptures provide the normative account of reality. However, this norm is continually re-established in the context of a community which lives out of, and is formed by, this narrative.⁴⁷

Hauerwas attempts to establish a conceptual account of morality that will be informed by the Christian perspective in which religious language and symbols will not be deprived of their proper import and context. Among a range of possible considerations, Hauerwas identifies the Christian recognition of life as gift, the ethical significance of human models as primary (through imitation), and the Christian emphasis on conversion (rather than on development), as concepts that must be safeguarded and promoted in order for Christian ethics to remain viable.⁴⁸ He suggests that virtue and character are ethical concepts that permit a Christian moral analysis but they must be supplemented by a larger narrative framework.

The kind of character the Christian seeks to develop is a correlative of a narrative that trains the self to be sufficient to negotiate existence without illusion or deception. For our character is not the result of any one narrative; the self is constituted by many different roles and stories. Moral growth involves a constant conversation between our stories that allows us to live appropriate to the character of our existence. By learning to make their lives conform to God's way, Christians claim that they are provided with a self that is a story that enables the conversation to continue in a truthful manner.⁴⁹

Hauerwas is interested in promoting the growth of personal integrity in which narrative provides the foundational moral ground. The problem of distinguishing between personal and public responsibility is a non-issue in

Hauerwas's perspective, since no moral theory can close this gap in his opinion. What is called for is:

. . . An account of how my way of appropriating the convictions of my community contributes to the story of that people. I am suggesting it is useful to think of such an account as a narrative that is more basic than either the agent's or observer's standpoint. To claim responsibility for (or to attribute responsibility to) the agent is to call for an agent to be true to the narrative that provides the conditions for the agent to be uniquely that agent.⁵⁰

The narrative must be flexible enough to account for the diversity in human life given that moral growth is a tenuous achievement which requires constant attention. Hauerwas considers Kohlberg's attempt to provide a coherent framework for moral development but rejects (any) universal principle as insufficient given the complexity of moral life. The narrative must be able to account for new experience and the successes and failures in the agent's life. The truth and constitution of the narrative relies on "the claim that we cannot know the story simply by hearing it, but only by learning to imitate those who now are the continuation of the story."⁵¹ Hauerwas views the church as essential to the possibility of ethics, since it constitutes the community where the truth of the Gospel is revealed, which corresponds with the attempt to live one's life according to the Christian story.⁵²

Considering the relationship between religion and morality, Hauerwas states that the underlying narrative provides specific direction for moral agency since there is a theological bond between the religious faith and the moral perspective.⁵³ He identifies ethical principles and rules as reminders derived from stories which need to be explicated for the principles to be fully understood.⁵⁴ The motivation for moral action is directly linked to the specific nature of the narratives that provide ethical standards.

Our cognitive capacities as moral agents are dependent on our being timeful beings who are able to form our intentions in efficacious ways. But the very efficacy of our intentions is dependent on the content of our beliefs about ourselves, others, and our environment. In other words, our beliefs, desires, and intentions cannot be isolated as "motives" of our moral action where motive is understood to be independent of the description of the action as a moral action. The motive certainly cannot be thus isolated if the agent's intention is taken seriously as part of his moral activity since intentionality cannot be reduced to psychological-causal accounts of motivation.⁵⁵

Hauerwas understands the relation between thought and action to be necessary rather than causal.⁵⁶ The universality of ethical principles is a foundational condition for the possibility of moral discourse, but this does not

preclude, nor is it negated by, specific accounts of moral contents. This is the basis of his claim for the uniqueness of Christian ethics. For Hauerwas, Christianity does not allow for a sharing of its stories and metaphors to provide a general account of moral life although there is some overlap with "non-Christian men of good will."⁵⁷ Hauerwas understands narrative as providing the basis for a morality that avoids the problems posed by minimalism and relativism. Motivation towards value and specific contents of principles are supplied by the religious narrative including the recognition of general ethical foundations. The truth of narrative is carried in the efficacy of the moral action that is informed by the story.

Even though moral principles are not sufficient in themselves for our moral existence, neither are stories sufficient if they do not generate principles that are morally significant. Principles without stories are subject to perverse interpretation (i.e., they can be used in immoral stories), but stories without principles will have no way of concretely specifying the actions and practices consistent with the general orientation expressed by the story.⁵⁸

The Christian narrative allows a variety of responses, both in the development of the understanding of the self and as a response to particular ethical dilemmas and issues.

Hauerwas stance is fundamentally conservative in that the traditional narrative remains the fundamental locus of all ethical deliberation. This position is nuanced by his understanding of the contextuality of lived interpretation and by his recognition of the openness of the narrative itself to various renderings of truth. Putting aside the exclusivity of the Christian narrative, the actual process of interpretation and role of imagination is neglected in his work in favour of the question concerning the nature of the Christian character and community. This is a relevant and significant insight yet an account of the role and function of imagination, central to the creation and reception of narrative, remains to be developed in Hauerwas' work.

1.4 Ethics and Imagination in the Work of Eric Mount, Jr.

In his book, Professional Ethics In Context: Institutions, Images and Empathy, Eric Mount, Jr., develops an ethical perspective emphasizing narrative concepts which clarify the complexity of ethical contexts.⁵⁹ Following the authors examined in this study, Mount identifies the person as the locus of ethical meaning, but emphasizes the influence of social structures. Rather than study normative codes of behaviour in professional ethics, Mount suggests that a

heightened ethical awareness might lead to a greater moral clarity.

By looking critically at what shapes the outlooks of professionals, as well as people in general, we expand our ethical sensitivity. The way we know is as much a moral matter as the way we choose between alternative actions, and the contexts within which we function are at least as important as the codes we develop and observe. Enlarging the scope of professional ethics moves us beyond the ethics of individuals in institutions and professions to the ethics of institutions and professions and to the images and myths they embody and transmit.⁶⁰

Mount identifies the metaphor of sight as encompassing those attributes of human experience that standard ethical paradigms do not permit. Metaphors allow a flexibility and awareness that supersedes the rational, by calling attention to "the fullness of the setting in which the person is interpreting, deciding, and acting."⁶¹ Mount uses metaphors of sight, but not exclusively.

Seeing, of course, helps us interpret what we hear, locate what we smell, and recognize what is touching us. But the point is not to argue over which metaphor makes the most sense; it is the total person who has a certain moral character and engages in moral action. Seeing involves

intellect, will, and emotions;
 sensing involves seeing,
 hearing, smelling and the
 rest.⁶²

He is interested in promoting the idea that the institution is a significant setting in which moral development occurs. Responsibility entails understanding the moral context of persons, the moral context of institutions with their attendant values, and the link between them.⁶³ Mount points to a shift in the understanding of profession from an earlier concept of a calling or vocation, where the individual understood his or her role as contributing to the community, to the more modern perspective where a profession is considered a career and the primary motivation is personal success.⁶⁴ He identifies the deleterious affect that professional training has on personal moral understanding given its inculcated social roles and narrowly specialized attitudes.⁶⁵

Mount introduces a critical perspective by linking the assessment of institutional norms, codes, and paradigms to the concept of covenant, which he understands in the following manner:

The virtues, ends, and obligations advocated here are rooted in a covenantal understanding of institutions that stretches the reach of covenantal obligation beyond

the institution to a universal community encompassing animal life and the good earth as well as human membership. The covenant originates in indebtedness to others; it entails obligation to others; it is sustained by care and fidelity that seek to include universal community in the scope of concern. Institutions as such cannot be worshipers of an ultimate covenantal giver, but they can build in sedition to undermine the pretensions of anything else that bids for worship.⁶⁶

The religious implications of the project are assumed rather than explicit, but Mount provides a persuasive account of the inter-connectedness of social reality. The inclusion of the historical dimension supports his proposal of covenant as foundational to morality in institutional settings. The promotion of critical self-reflection is, in Mount's estimation, the proper and necessary role of the ethicist.⁶⁷ The generative power of metaphor aids ethics in providing avenues for understanding problems. Apt metaphors allow character development and positive choices as we interpret reality in terms of the "telling slant" provided by each metaphor.⁶⁸ Root images or metaphors affect the sense of self and the resulting actions, in which integration of images of the self becomes a means of interpreting the value of specific images. Mount suggests that models extrapolate the essence of metaphors and images to provide clarity; the

danger lies in the forgetfulness of origins and the possible exclusive focus on a particular rendering as completely sufficient. There is an inevitability to this process which is necessary for an adequate understanding of moral contextuality.

All of these aspects of the universe of language that we inhabit and that indwells us are creations of the human imagination. They are contexts of ethics because they are part of our social world. They are points of view and also points of contact. They are both because we never see and touch our world naked. . . . Like the institutions we inhabit, these imaginative contexts are both filters of our perceptions and settings of our moral choices.⁶⁹

The foundational paradigms of ethical awareness reside in the stories which shape our myths, worldviews, and ideologies. Mount singles out stories that emphasize the interdependence of human life as most ethically appropriate but adds a number of critical criteria to this factor. Humility, integrity, respect for others, honesty concerning the potential for evil, the interactional nature of human experience, faith, inclusiveness, and hope are authentic imaginative perspectives according to Mount. These reflect his own particular situation: Christian, western, and liberal. These criteria are also informed by the exposure to the stories of others from outside his cultural perspective.⁷⁰ He claims that

without an account of the imaginative dimensions of experience ethics cannot be properly contextualized.

Differences in faith and moral vision are more critical than differences over specific ethical questions. And the differences in faith are not only divisions over the gods we trust; they are also conflicts over the way we put our trust in the same God.⁷¹

Individuals must consider the story of the other so that they can connect empathetically with foreign experiences and perspectives and critically inform their own particular worldviews. Sharing stories provides common ground whereby community is created and celebrated in the diversity of perspectives and not negated or reduced to a uniform account of experience. Discovery and the embodiment of moral understanding are the initial fruits of sharing stories. Common concern for global issues can provide a means of bridging cultural differences where a common faith is not present; the key, for Mount, is moving past an "us against them" perspective to a point where the shared humanity allows a greater comprehension for all parties involved.⁷² Personal experience and the experience of others in story is the essential data from which a moral perspective is developed.

There are three sets of stories that are continuously challenging each other in terms of the adequacy of

interpretation that shape moral perspective: the stories of our lives, of our culture, and of the roots of our faith and traditions.⁷³ Although harmony between these three different sets of stories is the goal, an exact agreement can never occur. The ongoing dialogue and discussion within ourselves, and with others, promotes an attitude of constant attention to our interpretations of reality and the recognition of the need for a creative tension that promotes ethical awareness and integrity.

Mount creates an ethical paradigm that seeks to resolve the gap between the personal and the social by focussing on the mediating role played by image and imagination. He justifies the notion of covenant as a sufficient ground for situating a critical ethical perspective by identifying the connection of professional activities and institutions with the social context of culture. The inter-relatedness of the social order involves certain fundamental characteristics that Mount identifies as pertinent both to the moral person and to the institution considered as an instance of concrete value. Responsibility becomes the motivating bond that shapes the development of character and the selection of appropriate moral alternatives. Mount provides many insights regarding the manner in which particular images affect the possibility of moral awareness. As theory, his account is strongest as it describes the ethical possibilities that a Christian liberal

approach, utilizing the metaphor of covenant, would allow. The imagination is noted as the fundamental mode of interpretive consciousness, in which the metaphoricity of metaphor is extended to account for the affective dimension of experience in a deliberate manner. Particular virtues and values that enhance the growth of identity are suggested. The actual operations of imagination are alluded to rather than explicated and the relationship of imagination and ethics is discussed primarily in terms of the significance of contextuality.

1.5 Summary of Current Positions of Ethics-Imagination Relationship

The discussion to this point indicates the necessity of systematically including within ethical discourse the dimensions of human experience that fall outside the "rational," conceived primarily in terms of logic and the intellectual faculty. The areas of human activity that are identified as including this aesthetic/affective/emotive realm of experience are the development and education of character and identity. There is a structural and moral significance assigned to the role of metaphor and narrative in these areas. The significance of story as carrying values and shaping identity is recognized as central to the Christian faith and requires inclusion in theological and ethical

thought. These dimensions of experience are identified as imaginative, although precision in the use of the term imagination is neither present nor accounted for in the previous analyses. This is partially due to the prevalence of a faculty psychology approach in which intellect, will, and the aesthetic (under which term symbolic, affectivity, and imagination are located) are considered distinct operations and discernible as such. The theologians studied note the significance of human intent which is affected and influenced by emotive, symbolic and narrative factors in the process of moral deliberation and recognize the need for a framework within which intellectual and imaginative elements can be coherently discussed. Often the description of imagination and its related terms uses the language of intentionality analysis, but the analysis of the connection between the imaginative elements and the formal, intellectual principles of ethics are explained using a faculty psychology approach. The imaginative or aesthetic dimension of experience is conceived in this framework as a single cognitive operation. The faculty of will is considered the foundation and orientation of motivation and, until recently, the aesthetic faculty has been perceived as only incidentally involved in shaping and mediating motivation. Attempting to address this, the theologians in this study have made the aesthetic realm the object of their systematic inquiry, noting the importance of imagination and its related attributes, However, they fail

to provide a comprehensive account of how imagination systematically interacts with the intellect and the will to provide a comprehensive understanding of ethical deliberation, indicating only the significant role played by metaphor and narrative in this process.

When imagination is considered as a single operation (through the faculty psychology approach), it can be discussed only in terms of other objects, i.e., religious imagination, ethical imagination, narrative imagination, and other related terms. The need to incorporate these elements and the specific roles played by imagination within a comprehensive framework of ethical discourse requires a more differentiated approach than is presently utilized.

In evaluating these new ethical proposals it becomes clear that new ethical paradigms are required. These authors suggest ways in which this might be accomplished among which are a focus on contextuality, the highlighting and expansion of particular values as foundational, and making narrative the sole factor that determines ethical normativity. The relationship between moral principles and story/metaphors has been identified as foundational. These attempts at grounding normative criteria in a coherent ethical theory, where logical consistency and a priori prescriptive principles are not sufficient without the range of imaginative elements,

require a differentiated framework. A framework within which value is identified and sought as the identifying characteristic of human behaviour is required. Bernard Lonergan provides an account of ethics that allows the full range of human experience to be considered systematically as legitimate and significant through an intentionality analysis based on cognitional operations. Within this framework, value sublates all cognitional processes where imagination is reconceived as a range of distinct operations with particular ends. This approach offers new possibilities for addressing the ethics-imagination relationship.

1.6 The Relevance of Lonergan to the Ethics-Imagination Relationship

I propose that the work of Bernard Lonergan provides a framework within which the new ethical projects can be profitably situated. Lonergan develops an analysis of human cognitional operations that locates the subject as the locus of meaning. In Lonergan's work, intentionality analysis rather than concepts derived from faculty psychology underlies the explanatory schema. The human project is understood to be an engagement with value which results in various forms of activity which shape and inform the different patterns of experience and cognitional operations that constitute human

consciousness. It is the intentionality of the subject as it utilizes the manifold of experience and cognitional operations more or less successfully to correspond with identifying and creating actual value which provides the integration and criteria for ethics rather than specific cognitional operations considered as autonomous or self-sufficient in their activity.

Lonergan's cognitional framework is extremely complex, and this paper will examine in detail only those aspects of his thought related to ethical deliberation. However, there are two ideas that are significant to the undertaking of this study which need to be articulated as they shift the nature of the questions raised in the earlier part of this chapter. First, the understanding of understanding provides not only self-knowledge and self-understanding but also a criterion of the real.⁷⁴ Second, the shift from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis means that imagination is now considered to consist of different operations which function individually as elements in sets of operations with specific goals set by the subject's intended end rather than a single operation which is utilized in all situations. The following quotation from Lonergan's work indicates the nature of the shift and the significance for ethics:

The subject is a substance that is present to itself, that is conscious. When I say "I", I

am already conscious. I am a subject.

.....
The third transition is from faculty psychology to flow of consciousness. There is nothing wrong with faculty psychology, but it is not enough for our present purposes because it does not take us near enough to the concrete. We have to be in the concrete if we wish to study development.⁷⁵

Lonergan came to see the faculty psychology perspective as lacking the analytical precision necessary to study human process and value as it actually exists. In his later work Method in Theology he identifies the shift in understanding and the resulting relationships that constitute human knowing.

From the very first chapter we have moved out of a faculty psychology with its options between intellectualism and voluntarism, and into an intentionality analysis that distinguishes four levels of conscious and intentional operations, where each successive level sublates the previous levels by going beyond them, by setting up a higher principle, by introducing new operations, and by preserving the integrity of previous levels, while extending enormously their range and their significance. Several consequences follow. The fourth and highest level is that of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It

follows that the priority of intellect is just the priority of the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging.⁷⁶

Within the framework provided by this movement, the questions concerning the nature of the relationship between ethics and imagination can be posed without having to reduce or neglect one set of considerations in favour of another. Fourth level intentionality, the concern for value, is the level of ethical engagement which orders and sublates intellectual concerns. The essential data of consciousness is always the data of the subject and the subject is the operator who intends value and utilizes the various operations and skills that we commonly associate with the imagination.

The greater part of Lonergan's work was concerned with establishing intellectual clarity and precision which would provide a method for fruitful intellectual work. The functions of the imagination are anticipated rather than fully developed. Lonergan noted the significance of aesthetic experience, art, creativity, and the central role of the image in the generation of the insight for understanding especially in his early works Insight and Lectures on Education. In these works his primary focus was on the first three levels of intentionality. His later distinction between the third level of judgment and the fourth level of

value and decision in Method in Theology accounts for imagination as a skill which mediates experience. The imaginative operations in moral affectivity, appropriation and decision are indicated rather than developed in any detail.⁷⁷ It is the intellectual coherence of the theological project within which value is central instead of the systematic exposition of the role of imagination in ethical deliberation which is the focus of Method in Theology. Due to the formal structure of the cognitional heuristic developed by Lonergan, distinct patterns where imagination affects the emergence of value are discernible. Some of these elements have been taken up and elaborated by followers of Lonergan but an overall account of imagination's contributions to ethics remains to be provided. An overview of Lonergan's ethical framework and a brief review of the extant Lonerganian work which illustrates dimensions of the imagination-ethics relationship will provide the basic outlines of such a general account in the next chapter. The structural features of the specific roles of imagination pertaining to ethics require elaboration that is not provided in sufficient detail by Lonerganian scholars. Such an analysis is provided by Paul Ricoeur's studies on metaphor and narrative - elements that have already been identified as central to the discussion of ethics and imagination.

1.7 Contributions of Paul Ricoeur to the Lonergan Framework on Ethics-Imagination Relationship

The work of Paul Ricoeur provides a resource for identifying the role of the imagination, especially as it is engaged in creating and appropriating meaning in language, the foundational symbolic structures of consciousness. Ricoeur's studies in metaphor and narrative provide data that can expand the understanding of the role of imagination as it affects the ethically oriented subject. Ricoeur's works, The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative, encompass both previous analytical accounts and the examination of actual texts and images. His studies provide concrete data that accentuates the connection of contemporary consciousness with historical-traditional formulations on which identity and activity are based. Like Hauerwas, Ricoeur privileges the narrative as crucial to moral identity and character. Unlike Hauerwas, Ricoeur does not focus on the Christian narrative exclusively but rather excludes explicitly religious texts from these studies and develops a notion of narrative which contributes to the possibility of a unified, but not homogeneous, humanity.

Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics is grounded in his multi-faceted proposal of a philosophy of the will (noted in passing by Lonergan).⁷⁸ Ricoeur's analysis focusses on the human project of creating meaning and value which is

mediated by language, specifically in metaphor and narrative. While there are obvious differences in the initial assumptions of Ricoeur and Lonergan, there are sufficient grounds of compatability in the joint concern for the subject as the locus and originator of value. In the particular instance of Ricoeur's work in symbolism and imagination, Lonergan recognized the value of Ricoeur's work well before the publication of the texts studied in this paper. In an interview, published in A Second Collection, Lonergan noted Ricoeur's more extensive analysis in relation to his own:

"Well, I can't match Ricoeur on symbolism. The symbol for me is the "affect-laden image". It's evoked by an affect, or the image evokes the affect. They're linked. It's the means of internal communication between psyche and mind and heart. Where mind is experience, understanding, judgment; and heart is what's beyond this on the level of feeling and 'is this worthwhile?'- judgment of value, decision. Without feelings this experience, understanding, judgment is paper-thin. The whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling.⁷⁹

Here Lonergan identifies the primary link between affectivity and image, a necessary connection between intellectual assessment and ethical reflection and activity identified earlier in this chapter as central to the current

discussion concerning ethics and imagination. Lonergan's framework allows general features of the relationship of ethics and imagination to be discovered which can then be augmented by insights about the structure and role of imagination in Ricoeur's studies on metaphor and narrative. Metaphor and narrative are privileged points of access to the imagination because language is the means by which consciousness becomes present to itself and in which psychic data attains form and structure. If the essential problem for theologians and ethicists consists of accounting for the integration of the affective and creative capacities with the analytical and discursive capacities in a coherent explanatory framework, then the study of those aspects of language which engage and structure the affective and creative dimension of human experience in a meaningful way is clearly foundational.

1.8 Ricoeur's Oneself As Another

A brief analysis of Ricoeur's most recent book will help to establish a common ground for the ethical significance of the subject shared by Lonergan and Ricoeur. This essential compatibility reinforces the appropriateness of applying Ricoeur's insights on imagination to the ethical perspective found in Lonergan's work. Oneself As Another is Ricoeur's attempt to identify the significant issues raised by the consideration of identity as essential to the foundational

ethical enterprise. Ricoeur's starting point and the instance of his initial insights concerning identity are the grammatical structures that indicate the being of self and its attendant possibilities. Language is where being and its potentiality is revealed and actualized. The theologians examined in the first part of this chapter indicate in their works the significance of the shift from a naively objective ethical perspective to the more contextual approach where the ethical agent, in all of his or her complexity, becomes the focus of moral analysis. Ricoeur suggests that the study of the constitution of personal identity reveals basic ontological and ethical characteristics that inextricably link all persons in a context of value.

Oneself As Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms. To "as" I should like to attach a strong meaning, not only that of a comparison (oneself similar to another) but indeed that of an implication (oneself inasmuch as being other).⁸⁰

The core of Ricoeur's argument concerns the dual understanding of the significance of the term "identity." Ricoeur proposes that there is a core element that remains constant and orders experience (named idem) and an element

which contains no implications of unchanging personality or fixedness (named ipse).⁸¹ The self, as active agent in time, is engaged in the development of selfhood, where basic speech acts ground meaning precisely as activity. "It is not statements that refer to something but the speakers themselves who refer in this way."⁸² Ricoeur points out that reference to the notion "I" is fraught with ambiguity as a singular perspective on the nature of personal agency is subject to a great many variables. Nonetheless, in the actual act of discourse a series of social relationships are recognized and constituted in a meaningful fashion. Development in this context is also social.

Every advance made in the direction of the selfhood of the speaker or the agent has as its counterpart a comparable advance in the otherness of the partner.⁸³

Considering the relationship of motivation and cause to human activity, Ricoeur notes that "it is the feature peculiar to emotion, from the perspective of its linguistic expression, that its object is its cause and vice versa."⁸⁴ The import of this observation is that deliberate action involves more than purely rational features. Action is an embodiment of meaning as operation and as a result of deliberate intellectual activity; in short, the person is both engaged in the making happen of activity and the

happening.

The connection between narrative identity and personal identity lies in the presentation of activity as inherently valuable.

Narrative theory can genuinely mediate between description and prescription only if the broadening of the practical field and the anticipation of ethical considerations are implied in the very structure of the act of narrating. . . . There is no ethically neutral narrative.⁸⁵

Ricoeur highlights the role of imagination in the possibility of mediating both the notion of sameness and selfhood and context and prescription within narrative, in which variation is a value. Besides carrying and creating value, narrative is an ethical action. Narrative fiction is essential to understanding the nature and extent of personal connection to the social reality.

Literary fictions differ fundamentally from technological fictions in that they remain imaginative variations on an invariant, our corporeal condition experienced as the existential mediation between the self and the world.⁸⁶

In essence, we mediate our selves to ourselves in

language more or less meaningfully. Ricoeur, drawing on the same Aristotlean background that informs Lonergan's project, provides the following account of the practical field of human endeavour which has a number of structural similarities with Lonergan's account of human process. The interplay of personal skills and capacities within the context of a particular culture which provides operative norms and criteria provides the setting for ethical action.

It [the practical field] is formed in accordance with a twofold movement of ascending complexification starting from basic actions and from practices, and of descending specification starting from the vague and mobile horizons of ideals and projects in light of which a human life apprehends itself in its oneness.⁸⁷

Ricoeur notes an affinity with MacIntyre in terms of the ethical significance of narrative identity, in which considerations of authenticity become prominent. "Life must be gathered together if it is to be placed within the intention of genuine life."⁸⁸ The story remains significant for Ricoeur as the place where moral possibilities are projected and evaluated; he promotes the aim of ethics as more fundamental than moral norms and therefore defines "'ethical intention' as aiming at the "good life" with and for others, in just institutions."⁸⁹ Affectivity both promotes and connects the self to others. Another's weakness becomes the

occasion of the recognition of the limits that all are subject to.

Let us confine ourselves here to emphasizing the role played by feelings - which, in the last analysis, are affects - in solicitude. For it is indeed feelings that are revealed in the self by the other's suffering, as well by the moral injunctions coming from the other, feelings spontaneously directed toward others. This intimate union between the ethical aim of solicitude and the affective flesh of feelings seems to me to justify the choice of the term "solicitude."⁹⁰

Solicitude encompasses the recognition of the value of the other as essential to our own sense of self at the level of individual concern and at social and institutional levels. Common aims provide the basis of authentic power, and concerted action constitutes both the means and ends of power. In considering the role of justice in his ethical paradigm, Ricoeur attempts to mediate the Kantian perspective concerning motivation and orientation toward the good with that of Aristotle. "The will, however, takes the place in Kantian morality that rational desire occupied in Aristotlean ethics; desire is recognized through its aim, will through its relation to the law."⁹¹ Essentially, the ethical argument of Ricoeur seeks to articulate the tension between the invariant in ethics, the universalizable norm, and the fundamental moral anticipation that informs all human

activity, more or less. The same dimensions are reflected in his analysis of the self in which the tension between continuity and change is the locus of concrete deliberation and movement toward value. The existential tension is articulated metaphorically. The structures of language intend and carry value. His major contribution is to reveal that this tension that shapes personal identity consists of the recognition and appropriation of the other as constituting the identity of self. The field of ethics is necessarily the field of discourse where authentic communication leads to authentic lives.

The articulations that we never cease to reinforce between deontology and teleology finds its highest- and most fragile-expression in the reflective equilibrium between the ethics of argumentation and considered convictions.⁹²

Ricoeur's ethics is founded on his understanding of symbolic interaction, in which the relationships that characterize human activity are given form and a means of expression. The recognition of human intention as fundamental to the ethical enterprise links his ethics with that of Lonergan. By extension, his analysis of metaphor and narrative reveals modes of human activity where imagination intends value that can be legitimately and constructively applied to the ethical schema of Lonergan.

Finally, Lonergan recognizes the legitimacy of Ricoeur's formulation of a significant methodological problem, namely, the disjunction between the hermeneutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of recovery, a problem which plagues many theologians and ethicists as they attempt to determine what constitutes authentic human praxis.

It is to ask whether there are basic theological questions whose solution depends on the personal development of theologians. Again, to use a distinction made by Paul Ricoeur, it is to ask whether issues on which theologians are badly divided call for the employment of both a hermeneutic of suspicion and a hermeneutic of discovery, a hermeneutic of suspicion that diagnoses failures in personal development and a hermeneutic of recovery that generously recognizes the genuine personal development that did occur.⁹³

A number of structural and intentional similarities between the works of Lonergan and Ricoeur have been provided which indicate not only the nature of their compatibility but also the suitability of Ricoeur's insights on imagination's roles and features. Both thinkers take up positions which respond to the problems identified in relating imagination and ethics. Lonergan provides a systematic account of the specific patterns of cognitional operations where value is the normative end of all authentic human activity. Ricoeur

develops an existential hermeneutic where value is the result of authentic communication with all that it entails. The specific insights in his foundational works in metaphor and narrative will add to the explanatory power of the Lonerganian framework.

1.9 The Thesis Project

The goal of this thesis is to explore the relationship of ethics and imagination, in order to expand the possibilities of ethical discourse. There are few works which explore systematically the links between imagination and ethics. This is due in part to certain prevailing misconceptions concerning the nature of imagination and human understanding which do not allow for such studies. I propose that the cognitional framework developed by the theologian and philosopher Bernard Lonergan provides an opportunity for such a study. Lonergan's differentiated analysis of understanding allows an examination of ethical deliberation where the full range of cognitive operations is directed towards the identification and actualization of value. By examining these operations in the work of Lonergan and those who use his framework, certain functions and roles of the imagination can be identified as contributing to the ethical project. Because the question of the relationship between ethics and imagination is not posed directly by Lonergan or his students in their own works, general features of the relationships can be identified; however, more information is required for greater precision in understanding. Insights concerning the structural features and functions of imagination can be found in the work of Paul Ricoeur which can augment the foundational insights of Lonergan.

Chapter two will present a brief overview of Lonergan's cognitional framework and then focus on the structure of ethics in his understanding. The connections between imagination and ethics found in Lonergan's works will be laid out through an examination of selected works of Lonergan scholars where issues of ethics and value provide the focus of their studies. A general outline of the basic features of the ethics-imagination relationships will be provided in which shifts in the paradigms of understanding from a faculty psychology approach to an intentionality analysis framework allow for an expanded account of the roles and functions of imagination. Three particular junctures of the ethics-imagination relationships will be identified providing avenues for re-evaluating the problematics identified earlier in this introductory chapter. The three junctures, with their attendant questions, concerning the ethics-imagination relationship will include imagination and value/truth, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history. To provide further clarification concerning the nature of these relationships Paul Ricoeur's insights concerning imagination derived from his studies into the functions of metaphor and narrative will be utilized to add clarification and precision to the perspective provided by the Lonerganian cognitional framework.⁹⁴

Each of the next four chapters, three through six, will consist in a close reading of Ricoeur's text, The Rule of Metaphor, and the three volumes of Time and Narrative respectively.⁹⁵ The criteria which will guide the examination of Ricoeur's work will be the roles and functions of imagination as value and meaning are identified and created through the formal structures of metaphor and language. These fairly dense chapters of exposition will each be concluded by a brief section of analysis. From this analysis a single insight that addresses each one of the three junctures identified through the Lonergan framework will be briefly described in terms of its implications for ethical understanding in each chapter. The attempt to provide a coherent set of criteria for identifying and applying the functions of imagination to ethics as concretely as possible will be the means used to choose the most appropriate insight in each instance.

Chapter seven will summarize the major implications of the study and re-examine briefly some features of the ethical/imaginative relationship in Lonergan's work. This summary will be structured according to the three junctures of ethics and imagination with the insights from Ricoeur's works included which indicate changes for the current ethical understanding. The conclusion of the thesis will suggest some possible implications that this study may have for the

understanding of ethical deliberation in light of the problematics posed at the outset of this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

ETHICS IN THE WORK OF BERNARD LONERGAN

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role and structure of ethics in Bernard Lonergan's overall work, focussing in particular on how imagination relates to and operates in different ways at the level of ethical intentionality. A general overview of Lonergan's ethics will be presented through a general introduction to Lonergan's larger cognitional project followed by a discussion of the structural aspects of ethics in Lonergan's work. The brevity of this first section reflects the detailed work already completed by scholars on Lonergan's ethics and the focus of this paper on particular implications of this work not widely noted. The next section will consist of an examination of some of these scholars utilizing Lonergan's understanding of ethics with emphasis on the ethics/imagination relationship in their work. Following this the chapter will examine the significance of the shift from a faculty psychology approach to an approach based on intentionality analysis, effecting a shift in understanding from imagination conceived as a single faculty to imagination playing different roles and operations depending on the particular intention of a subject. By identifying three major junctures of imagination and ethics, a movement towards a new understanding of the nature of ethical deliberation is anticipated. Imagination and the

truth of value, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history will provide the focus for the inquiry concerning ethics-imagination relationships. Finally, it will be argued that the work of Paul Ricoeur on metaphor and narrative provides an extensive analysis of structural and functional features of imagination which can be extricated and fruitfully applied to enhance the analysis derived from Lonergan's cognitional framework.

2.1 Lonergan's Cognitional Theory

The focal point of Lonergan's cognitional theory is the subject considered as the locus of meaning. In his major work, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Lonergan examines the subject as motivated by an unrestricted desire to know, from which he discovers an invariant structure that is common to all acts of understanding.¹ This invariant pattern in cognitional operations can be identified and appropriated by a subject who is self-reflexive in whom consciousness provides the data that leads to a differentiated understanding. In identifying the questions that lead to understanding, Lonergan identifies the three distinct levels of experience, understanding and judging as constituting the invariant structure that underlies every question that is asked and responded to. The key to understanding, noted in the title of the book, is the

insight, the mental act which grasps a possible coherence or response to a situation which has hitherto been problematic. The insight is an occasion of clarity in which a possible intelligibilities provided by clues into an image or set of images replaces the existential tension of an unresolved question or problem. The insight is an intentional cognitive grasp of the relationships that constitute the perceived intelligible object or event, which remains to be evaluated as true or not.² In his later work, Method in Theology, Lonergan adds a fourth level to the three levels of intentionality identified in Insight, namely the level of decision making which had previously been considered to be part of the third level of judging.³ The intentional dynamic that informs the analysis of the activity of the subject is primarily intellectual in the first work and shifts in Method to a greater recognition of the significance of affectivity, especially as the subject is transformed through the process of conversion and oriented towards value in a foundational manner.⁴ The dynamic that informs the activity of the subject is a transcendental impetus, driving the inquiring subject beyond the limitations of his or her understanding, aiming ultimately at complete knowledge and truth, found only in God. Lonergan identified the gratuitous love of God as the foundation and goal of all human striving.⁵ Accordingly, at each level of intentionality there is a corresponding transcendental precept which informs the authentic subject: be

attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.⁶ The authentic subject, then, is the subject who is consciously engaged in posing questions about being, understanding, and truth. The subject is transformed as he or she successfully acquires answers by recognizing the distinct levels of consciousness and developing the appropriate skills and operations that are required to meet the demands of each distinct level of intelligibility.

Lonergan's theory indicates that reality cannot be adequately grasped by merely taking a look at the "already out there real."⁷ Reality is constituted by acts of meaning in which intelligible patterns are recognized and correctly judged to be present where reality consists of isomorphic relationships between the consciousness of a critically intentional subject and recognized patterns. Cognitive operations include both affective and intellectual dimensions of experience and Lonergan identifies the biological and aesthetic as distinct patterns of experience along with the intellectual.⁸ The dramatic pattern of experience is the most significant for those concerned with ethics because it is the pattern of day-to-day human living.⁹ With the shift noted in Method, conversion becomes the central factor in determining authentic motivation and action. Lonergan identifies three main types of conversion: intellectual, moral, and religious.¹⁰ Walter identifies affective conversion as a

central aspect of the moral conversion process and Robert locates psychic conversion at a primary level so that consciousness might function in a fruitful and creative fashion.¹¹ Religious conversion sublates all the other forms of conversion since it consists in total being-in-love which is the efficacious grounds of all self-transcendence.¹² The authentic subject as a locus of value becomes the criteria of determining objectivity since the world is understood to be mediated by meaning and informed by value; objectivity is not adequately grounded in an unreflexive and naive appeal to immediate experience.¹³ Intellectual conversion consists in this recognition that truth is attained by cognitional self-transcendence and moral conversion is the shift in the criterion for decision-making from satisfactions to values, which are realized in self-transcendence.¹⁴

The process of upward development in the subject toward higher levels of intelligibility is complemented by a corresponding movement downward informed by the values and behaviour patterns of the culture within which every subject is immersed. In the upward process of personal development, the level of experience provides data and content for questions which are reflected on at the level of understanding, in which images provide the potential and material for insights. These are then critically evaluated at the third level of judgment which leads to questions

concerning value and appropriate action that the subject either may or may not implement. The downward movement, then, is characterized by the intersubjective reality that constitutes human life, in which love informs judgment and belief and leads to understanding which is confirmed in one's experience.¹⁵ Each stage of intentionality is sublated, that is, informed by but not reduced to the higher stages of intentionality, in which the lower stages provide the necessary foundation for the next stage of intentional activity while maintaining their own integrity.¹⁶ The significance of this dual pattern of development is that social and historical relationships which influence development become as important as the exigences that affect the transcendently aspiring subject. The questions for meaning are always grounded in concrete and particular circumstances which require the constant development of the subject's affective, intellectual, moral, and religious capacities.

2.2 The Structure of Ethics in the Work of Lonergan

The fourth level of intentionality is the level of deliberation, evaluation, and decision, and is the foundational stage of human consciousness.¹⁷ Value is recognized as a major constituent of human reality and it is sought and implemented in the concrete circumstances of

subjects' lives. The value which is intended is given form and identifiable goals in the notion of the good. Lonergan organizes his understanding of the human good in a hierarchical manner by linking the individual and the social in terms of intended ends.¹⁸ The first end, the particular good, is achieved by an individual meeting her or his need by specific operations in cooperation with those subjects that each individual encounters. The good of order, the second end, is the set of relationships that meets the recurring instances of demands for particular goods by ordering operations in a cooperative fashion so that the good will be produced. There is a recurring correspondence between the desires and decisions which leads to the appropriate activity by the cooperating subjects.¹⁹ The good of order requires that subjects develop skills and assume certain roles in social structures or institutions and that the patterns of relationships that form the good of order function in a more rather than less harmonious fashion. The third level of the human good concerns terminal values, the actual values that inform the identity of subjects and communities. The self-authenticating subject achieves self-transcendence by choosing well. This level of the human good identifies conversion as foundational in which here value and authenticity are promoted in others and liberty shapes relations with others so that self-determination is a communal project and succeeds inasmuch as real goods, and not apparent

goods, are chosen.²⁰

The deliberation of ethics must be grounded in concrete instances of the human good to have any practical significance and import. As such, ethics must take into account in a systematic fashion the distinctions between the types of goods listed above. Ethics must provide an explanatory heuristic that recognizes operative schemes of the good and obstacles to them which are grounded in terminal values more or less efficaciously. The notion of the scheme of recurrence, already linked to the good of order, provides one element of such an explanatory framework. Kenneth Melchin provides the following definition:

The recurrence scheme is reflexive in the sense that the functioning or operation of the scheme has the effect of curling back upon itself and fulfilling the conditions for the scheme to recur. And this reflexivity is a part of the internal structure of the scheme. . . . For what is significant about the scheme is that the events recur over and over again in the same pattern or order of succession. . . . The point of Lonergan's notion of the recurrence scheme is that events conceivably can link together in such a way that it is not an antecedent line or string of conditioned events that accounts for the recurrence of any event but a circular or reflexive structure linking a determinate set of events into an ordered

pattern.²¹

The concept of skills, linked to the good of order, is an example of a recurrent scheme for Melchin which is directly related to the capacity of a subject to assert control over an environment while at the same time engaging the subject in self-constitution as meaningful actor and mediator.²² In Insight, Lonergan recognized that classical laws accounted for only a limited aspect of reality in which necessary connections between cause-effect relationships held true only insofar as certain conditions were met. No absolute law of necessity existed that would account for the specific configuration of the relevant conditions.²³ The classical law provides a means of understanding reality in a systematic fashion; Lonergan added the notion of statistical law to supplement the classical. Statistical laws account for intelligibility but in a non-systematic fashion, so that each actual event cannot be predicted with the same degree of certainty that a classical law would allow.²⁴ The assumption "all things being equal" (referring to necessary conditions) which is found in classical law does not hold true for statistical laws. The notion of probability is introduced to provide a way of accounting for frequencies of occurrences of events. When the notion of probability is introduced to the concept of the recurrence scheme to account for the difference between the determinate set of events that constitutes the

scheme and the coincidental convergence of factors that constitute the necessary conditions of the particular events that make up the scheme, an explanatory framework that Lonergan names emergent probability is created.²⁵

Emergent probability provides a means of accounting for the existence of higher levels of intelligibility and the probable emergence of intelligibilities when the necessary conditions and the statistical probabilities of their occurrence are met. These intelligibilities remain open to change but are not arbitrary in that they reflect actually existing or potentially existing intelligible structures which can be accounted for with the laws of statistical probability combined with classical laws. These structures can be known by a subject who grasps the intelligibility intelligently and then verifies it.²⁶ The play of possibilities remains open because reality is contingent and verified knowledge requires intentional subjects.

A comprehensive ethics then, must account for the factors which influence the subject to identify needs and desires in terms of particular goods and the increasingly complex sets of social relationships that are required for the recurrence of particular goods. This leads to the subsequent recognition that value has an intrinsic social dimension which is realized in subjects as originating sources of value and the defining

set of values that influence and shape the long-range goals and identity of a given culture. Higher and more complex forms of organization are indications of the transcendental dynamism that seeks ever greater value, truth, and comprehensiveness. The criterion of truth is always the self-transcending subject. Truth and falsity are linked to the authenticity or lack of authenticity in the subject. Truth of fact refers to judgments which state "what is or is not so"; self-transcendence is cognitive in these judgments of truth. In truth of value, the judgments refer to "what is or is not truly good or really better"; the subject's self-transcendence is moral in these judgments because the content of the judgments involves the subject's relationship or potential relationship to value, primarily in terms of relating to other subjects.²⁷ Authenticity and truth are achievements of self-transcending subjects where recognition of error and repentance leads to greater authenticity.²⁸ The possibility of such development in the social order is the converted subject but such developments do not occur of necessity, which has been demonstrated through the premises of emergent probability. As well, systemic distortion and bias can disrupt the normative development of the transcendental precepts at the level of the subject, the group or community, and in the long-term, the historical potential of a culture. Each level of ethical deliberation requires of the subject a corresponding movement in intellectual and moral understanding

and commitment, since the problems that attend each stage of development are specific to each level. The different obstacles to normative development are identified as dramatic, individual, group, and general bias. A brief description of each problem and some possible responses posited by Lonerganian scholars follows.²⁹

The dramatic bias is characterized by the subject's refusal or exclusion of insight which is a rejection of reality and withdrawal into phantasy.³⁰ There are two dialectically-linked principles of change which are operative that orient the subject in affective and intellectual desire, namely the drive to psychic integration and the exigences of neural demands for integration.³¹ The practical demands of life that occur in the dramatic pattern of experience are thwarted as the two sets of demands do not always correspond. The psychic ordering of the data of experience may block the emergence of images for insight the or affect may not be permitted forms of appropriate expression. Doran notes that dramatic bias is conditioned by factors beyond our control and identifies the source of the bias and its consequences as residing in the dialectics of culture and community rather than as a form of self-abuse of the subject's freedom.³² The notion of psychic conversion is the transformation of the psychic censor from a repressive to a constructive agency which enables the psyche to participate in intentionality and

intentionality to be embodied in feeling.³³ This conversion allows the subject the capacity to develop affectively, intellectually, morally, and religiously in a normative fashion in which errors that the subject makes are not embedded in systematic distortion.

Individual bias is the rejection of the larger and more differentiated questions of value inasmuch as the ego-centered subject is concerned only with meeting his or her needs and does not extend his or her concern to how others will be affected by his or her actions. Unlike dramatic bias, in individual bias the subject has a conscious awareness of the dimensions of his or her actions.³⁴ Individual bias is an incomplete development of understanding and intention as the subject effectively his or herself and remains unaware of the actual constitution of value. Walter Conn identifies cognitive, moral, and affective conversion as requirements for individual bias to be overcome. Cognitive conversion is required because the recognition of the self as the criterion of the real in self-transcending judgment is necessary for critical moral conversion. This is linked in Conn's schema to Kohlberg's notion of post-conventional morality where the subject becomes morally autonomous.³⁵ Affective conversion is the actual being-in-love that enables a subject to effectively respond to the challenge of oneself as originating value and the resulting demands that arise from the moral

conversion.³⁶ The importance of affective conversion is that feelings which disclose value are intentional responses, hence cognitive and not merely physiological in nature.³⁷ The apprehension of value in feelings corresponds to the hierarchy of value formed by the movement from vital to social, cultural, personal, and religious values. We become aware of these values through our imagination.³⁸ The loving of value instigated by affective conversion engages the imagination which is active in the discernment and cultivation of moral sensibilities.³⁹

Group bias consists of egoism operating in a collective capacity, in which the good of order is not oriented towards an intelligently and morally conceived goal, but rather in terms of the limited and self-serving interests of the particular group.⁴⁰ Cooperative complementarity constitutive of the good of order suffers as vested interests reject the insights which are necessary for the vitality of the sustaining relationships of value. Those subjects whose action is informed by group bias are unable to grasp the fact that virtues are foundational for the good of order and that these patterns rely on shared values manifested by the participating members. At higher levels of integration these values form the community precisely as cooperation and interaction are ends in themselves, apart from the actual products of the particular goods that may result from their

skilled operations.⁴¹ The neighborhood community can be considered an example of a recurring scheme of the good of order in which small acts of virtue create an atmosphere of trust and the residents' reciprocal activity leads to more involvement and potential growth.⁴² Melchin provides an analysis of how drunk driving undermines the social good of order which consists of the patterns and behaviours that drivers follow to drive safely. He suggests that the recurrence scheme provides a method of ethical analysis which situates human meaning at the heart of these schemes in which prescriptive notions must

. . . intend the total set of relationships expressed by the movement from social recurrence schemes which define historical contexts, through types of actions, towards intended goals and foreseeable consequences.⁴³

This type of analysis challenges the traditional mode of assigning blame or value to individual actors on the basis of their intentions or the consequences of their actions. It also challenges the concept of social ethics as consisting of the general application of selected values to situations in an undifferentiated fashion. Group bias can be seen as an inadequate grasp of the nature and purpose of the functional sets of relationships that make up a community; conversely, for ethicists to undertake a constructive analysis of group bias much more than staking a claim to the principled moral

highground is required.

General bias, also known as the bias of common sense or the longer cycle of decline, is a bias of the practical intelligence against the posing of questions of theory, long-range consequences of action/inaction, higher integrations, and ultimacy.⁴⁴ This bias can affect any culture's, group's, or individual's achievements by resisting the further developments made possible by intelligence.⁴⁵ As the general bias becomes ingrained in social reality history becomes grounded in "false facts." This lead to a general feeling of resignation towards the recurring distortion and violence which are taken as a an normative account of the nature of reality. The longer cycle of decline is characterized by an inability to distinguish between social achievements and social surds, between growth and decline.

Intelligence is not critically oriented by the self-authenticating dynamism of value which is the ground of normativity.⁴⁶ F. Lawrence offers the following account of normativity for Lonergan:

To recall that meaning, think of his oft repeated phrase with regard to human conscious intentionality to the effect that its dynamic pattern of operations of experiencing, inquiring, reflecting, and

deliberating as we come to know is "immanent, operative, and normative." This means: (1) It is intrinsic to the verifiable intelligibility of the concrete unfolding of human knowing. (2) It is actually at work any time we know. (3) There is an exigence built into our consciousness for us to attain knowledge in this way: we ought to operate this way because, if we don't, we won't come to know anything.⁴⁷

Normativity then, has practical relevance, but in order for it to be critical it must include theoretical considerations and common sense excludes theory from its operations. The higher integrations that make up the social order have a dialectical constitution in which the good must be affirmed and the negative reversed. Intelligibility is a function of the integration of intersubjectivity and practicality. Normativity requires that both elements be integrated in a concrete unity. This is the function of culture which requires that insight and freedom must be actualizable by the subject.⁴⁸

Cosmopolis is the term Lonergan used to designate the worldview based on emergent probability which accounts for and attempts to reverse the longer cycle of decline. The goals of cosmopolis are cultural values which are located at the meta-

theoretical level and are capable of reversing negative patterns of behaviour.⁴⁹ Authentic subjects who realize the need for cultural regeneration increase the possibility that historical and theoretical factors can be recognized and addressed as ethically relevant. An increase in the subjects' abilities to handle greater levels of complexity is demanded by the increasingly complex patterns of culture. The movement toward higher integration and the emergence of more complex schemes of recurrence characterizes the normative process of development that Lonergan named finality.⁵⁰ Cosmopolis intends finality as the remedy to the longer cycle of decline. The longer cycle of decline functions according to statistical law. Decline is overcome, according to Melchin, to the degree that the emergence of the required competence and skills of subjects is affected positively by the frequent event of conversion.⁵¹ There are certain conditions which must be met if authentic human subjects are to emerge in sufficient numbers to make culture a viable project in a more systematic fashion. The role of the imagination in promoting fruitful ethical deliberation will now be examined, in which the subject's capacity to recognize and appropriate value is a central issue.

2.3 Approaches to the Ethics-Imagination Relationship Within the Lonerganian Project

The varieties of perspectives that Lonergan's work makes possible in the field of ethics is a testimony to the comprehensiveness of his thought. The range of questions and studies extends from the role of the individual psyche in determining the ethical and moral capacity of the subject to the largest concerns with the reversibility of decline in culture. All of the approaches identify the central role of the subject as the primary locus of meaning. The differentiated levels of social and cultural patterns of relationships require the critically self-mediating subject as responsible initiator and actor. The different foci of the ethical studies utilizing Lonergan's framework are a result of the different questions and concerns that motivate the respective authors, displaying the heuristic perspective central to Lonergan's work.

Although there are no hard and fast distinctions that can be adhered to when categorizing the type of ethical projects that students of Lonergan engage in because of the differentiated nature of the enterprise, I propose for reasons of exposition to divide the literature into two sections: material primarily concerned with ethics and the individual subject and material that has more obvious social

and cultural implications. Clearly, the two sections are inherently related, especially given the centrality of value in Lonergan's work. The work of Walter Conn, Frederick Crowe, Stephen Happel and James Walter, Robert Doran, Richard Gula, and Brian Johnstone will be used to explicate the development and appropriation of ethical discernment by the subject. The work of Matthew Lamb, Frederick Lawrence, and Patrick Byrne will provide examples of how social and cultural conditions affect the possibility of ethical development.

2.3.1 The Subject and Ethics in the Lonerganian Framework

The notion of conversion is a central one in the work of Lonergan and the notion has been developed most extensively in the work of Walter Conn.⁵² Combining developmental models of moral growth with Lonergan's cognitional heuristic, Conn identifies conscience with the morally conscious self that aims at self-transcendence by intentionally identifying and appropriating value.⁵³ Moral conversion consists of the shift in criterion for decision-making from personal satisfaction to value. Value is recognized as occurring at the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious levels in an ascending order.⁵⁴ For Conn, imagination has a significant role to play in the subject developing an authentic and autonomous self. The imagination is most closely linked to the concrete for Conn, although images do

serve as a springboard to conceptual thought and analysis; the import for ethics lies in the fact that images are affect-laden and that value is apprehended through feelings.⁵⁵ For Conn, imagination is important both in that reality is apprehended symbolically and that the human subject, as concrete, must act in the world. The cultivation of imagination becomes a necessary part of the development of conscience; in fact, Conn develops a concept of imaginative conversion which is linked to affective conversion since imagination and feeling are inextricably linked in an undifferentiated fashion in the symbolic world.⁵⁶ This conversion of the imagination has a cognitive dimension, for its aim is to create the appropriate images for discovering and communicating personal meaning. Conn specifies a role for imagination in moral judgment inasmuch as creative interpretation of value is required in concrete situations.⁵⁷

Conn's ethics recognizes the developmental nature of human growth but his focus is on the dynamism that leads humans to seek value and meaning beyond their immediate circumstances. The self-constituting nature of the subject highlights the mediative role played by imagination in Conn's moral analysis. For Lonergan, the image was necessary for the subject to have an insight which could lead to full-fledged understanding. Conn takes up this notion in ethics and adds

both the idea of the imagination as something to be developed and the corollary role of the educative role of art. This essential element contributes to affective moral growth in Lonergan's discussion of the liberating dimension of the aesthetic pattern of behaviour, its providing of content to the operations of understanding, and the expression necessary for human development.⁵⁸

The work of Frederick Crowe, S.J., explores many avenues in Lonergan's thought, ranging from the exposition of the ideas to their application in theology and education.⁵⁹ Two essays in particular are directly concerned with matters related to the study of ethics, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value", and "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value."⁶⁰ The first essay examines the shift in the notion of the good from consistency in intellectual endeavour, the focus in Insight, to the notion of the good as a distinct goal with a distinct fourth level of intelligibility which corresponds to the concern with values, set out in Method in Theology.⁶¹ The emphasis of the shift, according to Crowe, is the inclusion of the affective dimension of experience to what had been a predominantly cognitive framework. The affective dimension is included in the dynamism that motivates the subject as an operator intending to make morally sound decisions on the basis of a verified understanding.⁶² In the second essay, Crowe

develops the notion of value as consisting of two distinct but related movements. The first movement is conceived of as an upward dynamism, consisting of the subject as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible intending terminal values. The second or downward movement is a cultural dynamic which consists of the passing on of the tradition's most significant values and beliefs.⁶³ Crowe identifies the transcendent drive upwards of the subject with the capacity of each subject to be loved, while the downward dynamic of the love of a parent or God provides the experience of being loved that sustains the upward dynamism.⁶⁴ The dialectic, apart from its already metaphorical nature, has an impact on the function of image. In the upward movement from experience to understanding the insight emerges from the image, whereas in the reverse case, the subject seeks appropriate images to illustrate insights already possessed.⁶⁵ Crowe works out some of the practical implications of this dual role of the imagination in his book, Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education.⁶⁶

Stephen Happel and James Walter utilize Lonergan's thought on ethics and morality to establish a framework that will connect ethics and Christian doctrine in a coherent and foundational manner.⁶⁷ Happel and Walter use Lonergan's theory to claim that moral knowledge is a legitimate form of understanding and that it is verifiable, inasmuch as it is

informed by the process of conversion.⁶⁸ Imagining plays a foundational role in this process, first, as it mediates the apprehension of values in the affective dimension of experience through intentional response, and second, with the interpretation of value, considered in terms of "what might be".⁶⁹ Happel and Walter identify the authenticity of the subject and the subject's actions as connected to the process of conversion; therefore, they posit the creative imagination as the most important resource of normative decision making. Its significance lies in the imagination's capacity to discover latent value in the existent and new connections between values.⁷⁰ Following Conn, Happel and Walter suggest that the imagination requires education and cultivation, with the symbolic resources of the tradition (in this instance Christian) providing the pedagogical means and content. They are aware that imagination can be diverted away from authentic development and suggest that an awareness of systemic evil in society is required as a critical reference point.⁷¹

The work of Robert Doran introduces the new element of psychic conversion to Lonergan's basic structure of affective, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Doran identifies psychic conversion as "the transformation of the psychic component of the censorship exercised by our orientation as dramatic subjects- a censorship over images for

insight and over concomitant feelings- from a repressive to a constructive role."⁷² Doran links the hermeneutic notion of being found in Insight with the notion of value in Method in Theology. He identifies conscious desire in the subject as consisting of a dialectical unity between psyche and intentionality which requires an account of the psychic development of the operator who is oriented towards being, value, and transcendent mystery.⁷³ Doran feels that a re-examination of depth psychology is necessary if the relations of feelings to values and feelings to symbols, which characterize the existential nature of ethical and self-constitutive engagement are to be understood at a foundational level. This indicates that the self-appropriation of the subject is intrinsically linked with the basic symbols that shape consciousness.⁷⁴ Doran lays out an extensive examination of these ideas as they relate to the constitution of value in the subject, in the community, and in history. He then connects this entire process with the theological component which accounts for the redemptive and mediative action of God's love and grace which informs and enables the entire project of meaning. The role of the imagination is central to the apprehension of symbols and through symbolic systems to one's affective orientation and the apprehension of possible values.⁷⁵ Doran identifies dreams as providing the primary data for understanding the connection of the prediscursive aspect of the psyche with its

conscious counterpart, necessary inasmuch as affective images are the basic means by which subjects express their orientation in life. This extensive work is an attempt to ground theology and value in a foundational manner which reconceives human meaning and the project of culture. While certainly significant, the larger import of Doran's work for a re-examination of ethics requires much greater analysis than the specific demands of this thesis allows for.

Richard Gula uses Lonergan's notion of critical realism to ground his analysis of the appropriate methodology for moral theology.⁷⁶ The main significance of Lonergan's cognitional theory for Gula lies in the recognition that the real is not identical with what is immediately perceived. Gula uses Lonergan's four levels of intentional cognition to reformulate the concept of objectivity as it relates to moral norms.⁷⁷ This provides a means of circumventing the subject/object split that characterizes much contemporary ethical thought by situating the subject as a significant locus of moral activity and by recognizing the legitimacy of moral subjects' experience as contributing significantly to the formulation of moral norms. Gula recognizes that in Lonergan's work there exists a critical foundation for establishing the possibility of judgment of truth, in fact and value, while at the same time realizing that moral formulations are never complete or absolute in themselves.⁷⁸

Brian Johnstone, in his essay "The Experience of Conversion and the Foundations of Moral Theology," examines the role of narrative in providing a means of reflecting on moral conversion, which he considers to be the main task of moral theology.⁷⁹ He identifies the encounter with the Other, as personal meeting or through narrative, as providing the possibility of new interpretations of one's life experience. This highlights the role played by effective communication in mediating experience at the social level and within the inner world of the person.⁸⁰ Accordingly, Johnstone establishes three stages of transformation through conversion: first, the initial set of interpretive paradigms which inform the identity of the self; second, the process of breaking down the affirmed perspective and re-constituting a new interpretation with the new experience; and third, the incorporation of the more differentiated perspective which gives a new direction to intentional activity.⁸¹ The means of establishing the truth of the various narratives that may inform the personal or collective identity is provided only by reference to the converted subject who is in the constant process of evaluating his or her more or less responsible affirmation of value.⁸² Image has a formative role in this understanding of moral development which is connected to the affective dimension that is transformed by God's love. For Johnstone, story appears to be a necessary aspect of communication and understanding since the fragmentary and

limited capacities of humans to engage in the process of conversion requires some common and readily available means of establishing at least partial coherence in their experience.

The discussion of the relationship of the subject to the recognition and appropriation of value demonstrates clearly that personal capacities cannot be considered apart from the social and cultural conditions which shape and mediate the actual contexts where value exists. The following scholars emphasize the larger sets of relationships that affect ethical possibility at both the personal and social levels.

2.3.2 Society and Ethics in the Lonerganian Framework

The work of the Lamb, Lawrence, and Byrne reflect a greater emphasis on the social implications of Lonergan's thought, although the foundational role of the subject is always present. Matthew Lamb studies the significance of Lonergan's work in the social and political realms of ethics and theology.⁸³ Lamb establishes the connection between the transcendently ordered dynamism or desire that motivates the subject and the practical exigences that must be met in the social realm, such as the building of community through the creation and maintenance of the concrete good of order.⁸⁴ The methodological resources of Lonergan's cognitional heuristic provide the means of identifying both the patterns

of recurrent schemes that constitute social order and the basis for cultural and personal meaning. Conversely, the distortions and structural flaws which limit growth or threaten the stability of order are also revealed.⁸⁵ Lamb identifies the isomorphism between language and meaning which arises from Lonergan's notion of the subject as locus of originating meaning. This isomorphic relationship provides the resources for critically engaging the historical distortions embedded in language that threaten to deny the possibility of communicative praxis and a practical theology.⁸⁶ These discussions at the level of meta-theory indicate the complexity of the problems that beset humanity, while indicating at the same time the nature of the appropriate responses that need to be initiated by intellectually, morally, and religiously converted subjects who are critically engaged in asserting value. The enormity of the problems require the social interaction of subjects with differentiated skills as no single person has the knowledge nor the power to single-handedly reverse the negative movements in history.

Frederick Lawrence takes up the issue of political theology through the questions posed by hermeneutics and the problems of communication that obstruct value and community.⁸⁷ While his analysis engages many thinkers and schools of thought, the main thrust of his work seems to lie in emphasizing the practical and concrete implications of

intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and the necessity of uncovering the theoretical and structural obstacles that prevent people from developing the differentiated awareness required for positive development. Lawrence identifies the transformation of the subject's "heart" through the gift of God's love as the foundational experience which then becomes the basis for the subject's motivation to engage in the social relationships that are necessary for healthy human lives.⁸⁸ The realization that value is terminal and that it originates in the subject establishes a connection with the notion of the subject as oriented towards the absolute which informs finite choices as morally good. Concrete acts, therefore, are recognized as contributing both to the various goods of order and to the development of subjects as loci of originating value understood in terms of a hierarchical structuring of value, informed at the top by religious or ultimate value.⁸⁹ Judgments of value in this perspective reflect both on the nature of the subject and on the nature of the universe. Critical moral awareness consists of recognizing the inherent exigences in the self and the possibilities that remain to be actualized. Imagination plays a significant role in mediating this awareness of the critical dynamic exigence and possibility of value to the subject's reflexive self-consciousness.

Patrick Byrne's essay "Jane Jacobs and the Common Good" identifies concrete schemes of recurrence as dynamic instances of the good which are brought into being and maintained by deliberate judgments and decisions.⁹⁰ The different aspects of the human good are understood in terms of their functional roles in relationship and to the extent that they provide the necessary conditions for further development.⁹¹ This analysis underlines the importance of differentiated theoretical understanding so that members within communities can reflect critically on and evaluate their performance and success in articulating and achieving the aspired-to values that inform the identity and patterns of behaviour that constitute the community as an intelligible unity. The recovery of the philosophical assumptions that shape the organization of societies and the subsequent changes in conditions and understanding that inevitably occur are essential data for a properly informed moral subject to evaluate the relative success or failure of projects in meeting their intended goals. Morally converted subjects remain the foundation on which any sustainable moral projects must rely. Providing the necessary environment and support for the number of differently skilled and self-appropriating subjects that are required to participate in more or less complex schemes of recurring social value remains a constant challenge to every community.

2.4 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship Identified in the Work of Lonergan

The shift from the use of faculty psychology structures and terminology concerning the material of understanding that was anticipated in Insight to the use of an intentionality analysis explanatory framework is made explicit in Method, especially as it concerns fourth level intentionality and value.⁹² In intentionality analysis, the various cognitional elements and their respective operations are organized by the intended goal towards which the subject is oriented. This replaces the faculty psychology concept of the will with the notion of a manifold of skills which aim towards the intelligent integration of data which will inform the course of action that affects the subject and his or her environment. Melchin identifies the significance of the shift from perceiving the intellect and the will as separate faculties (in Insight) to the intentional framework wherein will becomes a part of a larger recurring skill or scheme of acts. The intentional activity leads to an integration of experience which is oriented towards the understanding, affirmation, and implementation of courses of action that lead to the transformation of the subject.⁹³ This expanded notion of the volitional aspect of consciousness also leads to the recognition that there is an exigence that demands consistency between a subject's knowing and acting. Knowing in this

context refers not to the knowing of the truth of facts but to the knowing of value in a possible course of action. This requires the comprehensive integration of the manifold of skills of the person, or persons, informed by the probable course of action.⁹⁴ In an analogous fashion, it is no longer appropriate to consider the imagination as a single faculty, separate from intellectual and volitional orientations, but rather as an element within a larger manifold of skills and operations, in the instance of fourth level intentionality aimed at the recognition and constitution of value. Imagination and cognition are linked performatively in terms of ends of meaning and intelligibility, always with the immanent demands set by the concreteness of the particular situation. Melchin discusses how meaning is better understood as a result of operative skills:

While many of the operative images and meanings of culture can be agents of human and cultural value they are so only when selected and integrated appropriately in concrete contexts. Consequently Lonergan's account of the role of cognitional acts in the intersubjective world of human meaning is relevant, not only as an explanation of the original genesis of common meaning but also as explanation of the concretization of meaning in individual acts of intelligence and responsibility. Meaning is public and is transformed in accordance with recurring structures of symbol and image. But unless some measure of selection, differentiation, evaluation and attention (all of which involve some measure of cognitional "representation" and mediation) are a part of the routinely operative skills of common

culture, current meanings and the suggestive power of images supplant the concrete exigences of human situations, and values are transformed randomly into agents of destruction. One implication of this analysis would be that what is most significant for ethics is not so much the currency of knowledge of concrete values (although such knowledge remains important) but rather the developed competence of skills whose performance results in the cognitional genesis and actuation of value in concrete circumstances.⁹⁵

The following reflections on the role and the function of the imagination in the construction and transmission of meaning and value can be drawn from this quotation. An unreflective subject is affected by the dominant images that inform a society and the effect on behaviour can be calculated and manipulated so that the subject's freedom to effectively act is restricted. National elections and the mobilization of a country's resources for war illustrate some of the less subtle ways in which this occurs. On the other hand, the conception of ethics as a set of skills whose actuation leads to concrete instances of value, as well as the authentic transformation of the subject, indicates the significance of imagination as creative or representative in generating images for insights. From these insights emerge possible combinations of skills, values, and actions for consideration thereby increasing the probable emergence of value and potentially effecting the transformation of public meaning in

a positive way. Imagination has been identified as an essential element in the ordering of psychic data as it emerges in images for consciousness. Doran identifies the larger implications of the foundational tension that informs the being of the subject as extending to culture.

The explanatory retrieval of the psyche depends on that shift in the subject's self-understanding that I have called psychic conversion. The explanatory retrieval of intentionality is effected through what Lonergan calls intellectual conversion in its philosophic form as self-appropriation. The philosophic recovery of the structure of intentionality must be the ground of psychic self-appropriation. And nothing short of the articulate shift in the mediation and constitution of meaning and value that these conversions effect can provide more than localized and fragmentary retardations of the death of history. Contrary to Marx's view, history became the form of order, the radical constitutive element of human self-understanding, with the earlier axial shift from psyche to intentionality and from cosmological to anthropological and especially soteriological truth. The present, equally axial exigence calls for the sublation of that previous development by the explanatory retrieval of (1) the prehistoric rhythms of psychic process, (2) the history-constituting operations of intentionality, and (3) the inexorable and unsurpassable tension between psychic limitation and intentional transcendence. This tension constitutes the integral dialectic of the subject; it lies at the root of the integral dialectic of community; and it is the key to understanding and appropriating a dialectic of culture out of which the cultural values of a world-cultural humanity can be generated through crosscultural exchange, dialogue, and cooperation.⁹⁶

The articulation of meaning that is necessary to inform the converted historical consciousness requires structures and symbols that enhance the possibility of insights and the ongoing process of conversion. While an examination of the prehistoric rhythms of psychic process lie beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to articulate the main junctures where imagination and ethics are connected within the Lonerganian framework and the issues requiring clarification that are raised at these points.

Imagination, then, is reconceived as a diverse range of functions and operations in which the primary role of the image is to provide a link between sensory and affective operations and the cognitive operations of the subject. As a common sense term, imagination is conceived and used in an undifferentiated fashion and is not connected systematically with theoretical considerations. Given the extent of Lonergan's explanatory schemes and his cognitional heuristic, imagination will be engaged whenever image is related to the sets of operations that, in the case of this study, play a role in the project of ethical deliberation. Image has already been identified as central to the emergence of the insight and to the general grasp and control of meaning that characterizes intentional activity. The apprehension of value and the shift from truth of fact to truth of value is another area where image plays a pivotal role. Image reflects

already existing relationships, patterns, and relationships and also creates new visions, new possibilities which can be translated into potential plans for action. Image would also seem to play a part in the possibility of actualization of freedom in the subject, both as essential and effective, since the recognition of subjective capacity and the avenues within which freedom can be actualized are conditioned by the dominant existing images. Image is connected to judgment, in which the criteria of normativity must be intelligible and accessible to be recognized and communicated. There is a critical dimension of consciousness that image allows through the process of contrast. This process affects shifts in world perspective - a result of conversion - and allows for a perspective on the role of history as it affects the present and future.

I propose that these various dimensions of imagination can be focussed under three basic headings which cover the range of issues listed: first, imagination and the truth of value; second, imagination and the subject; and third, imagination and society/history. These headings are not exhaustive, but provide a way of identifying the main functions of imagination within the Lonerganian framework of ethics. The three headings intend to highlight respectively the skills and operations in which imagination plays a role in the processes which lead to judgments of value, the role of

the imagination in constituting the subject as locus of meaning and originator of value, and imagination's role in communicating the content of value, necessarily involving the subject with social reality.

2.4.1 Imagination and Truth of Value

The recognition and appropriation of value involves a complex set of operations that integrates sensory and affective data and gives it an intelligible form in which it becomes part of the larger intentional cognitive patterns. The formative role of skills provides the subject with the ability to control and manipulate his or her environment. Mediation refers to the capacity of the subject to operate without the need for the actual presence of the objects of the operations, inasmuch as imagination, language, and symbols allows for the representation to consciousness of objects not present.⁹⁷ This abstraction opens up the dimensions of temporality as past and future, the conceivable, the fantastic and the ideal, all become accessible to consciousness. At higher levels of intentionality, language expands the control of the recurrence schemes to include past personal experience and cultural meanings, stories, and habitual anticipations.⁹⁸ The range of data available to the subject and the performative level of skills which manipulate the data to give rise to new insights and judgments

is of considerable importance to the ethical capacity of the subject. Conversely, restrictions on data or images and experiences with pre-dominantly negative affects limit the effective freedom of the subject to develop authentically. The role of image in the generation of insights into both fact and value is crucial.

Access to education becomes a critical component of the development and cultivation of the imagination. Conn, Happel, and Walter have all identified this as a necessary component of ethical discernment and growth. Crowe notes the significance of the cultural concerns and tradition which affect the context of education. The process of mediation and imagination's role in the functioning and development of the subject's control and creative manipulation of the data of consciousness leads to further, more complex skills and the increased probability of the occurrence of insights. The key here is the movement from the random occurrence of insight due to accidental formations to the increasingly systematic integration of the symbolic structures through which conscious subjects control meaning and intend value. These operations introduce the notion of temporality, here considered in a more pragmatic fashion than at the level of theory, in which the historical as given provides the context and content of subjective operations. The apprehension of value through feelings, which Lonergan identifies as the link between

knowledge of fact and knowledge of value, is an intentional response which responds to ontic value in persons or to qualitative value.⁹⁹ The subject matter of judgments of value is not the same as judgments of fact; the movement to moral self-transcendence is constituted by the judgment of value itself. There is a self-fulfilling aspect to the authentic value of judgment. Imagination is addressed here in its function(s) of contributing specific capacities to the operations of understanding and judging of truth and value. The complexity of these operations indicates that a certain mastery or level of skill relating to imagination becomes a prerequisite for effective ethical deliberation. The mediating role of image, particularly as carried in language, allows the subject to integrate and reflect on the nature of one's experience in a more or less coherent fashion. At the fourth level of intentionality, the integrating capacity of image links understanding, affectivity, and the intention of value. The goal is both the realization of value and the simultaneous growth in authenticity that occurs in the subject. Identifying some of the particular features and roles played by imagination in ascertaining the truth of value will be a goal of this thesis.

2.4.2 Imagination and the Subject

The project of value involves subjects who are

transformed as they engage in moral activity leading to relationships of value which transform the social world. As an originating value, the subject's identity is affected by imagination especially as motivation, orientation, and anticipations set one's ethical agenda. Affective conversion is necessary for a subject to actualize the dictates of moral intentionality; yet, there is a more foundational level at which experience emerges into consciousness with particular shapes and affective connotations. The Lonerganian concept of elemental meaning is relevant here, as pre-thematic influences affect the possibility of conversion, which we have seen to be essential for authentic understanding and activity.

Lonergan's account of understanding starts with a number of examples taken from the realms of mathematics and physics. Here understanding is working within boundaries established through sets of rules and axioms which identify the nature of the relationships of the constitutive elements and variables in an intelligible fashion, which is accessible to and can be verified through conscious application of the intellect. The basic forms which make experience recognizable, hence intelligible, are recognized as significant but are largely taken for granted by Lonergan due to his methodological concerns with the larger patterns of meaning. His concern was with the operations and skills required to recognize and

actualize meaning rather than with the more basic forms and patterns in which meaning first emerges and which ground the possibility of different aspects of experience emerging in recognizable forms. This form of meaning, named elemental meaning, is defined by Ben F. Meyer as

purely experiential meaning,
which neither is nor can be
critically or scientifically
patterned. . . . elemental
meaning finds expression not
only in the contexts of
psychological or aesthetic
inquiry, but in ordinary
language, imaginative
literature, and art.¹⁰⁰

Sean McEvenue identifies the foundational aspect of elemental meaning encountered through the intended meaning of a text which includes the intention of the text's author in the following statement:

My stress is on the recognition that intended meaning cannot be paraphrased, and that it includes within itself, as elemental meaning (i.e., as a kind of body language, tone of voice, facial expression of the text), a foundational stance of expectancy regarding meaning and the locus of ultimate meaning.¹⁰¹

Robert Doran examines the implications of an examination of elemental meaning and suggests that such an interpretation would ground the understanding of the relationship between symbolic expression and the corresponding level of

differentiated being of the subject.

The principal elements in that theory would be, first, the position that interpretation in general is to determine differentiations of the notion of being, and, second, the position that such differentiations would have psychic correlatives and correspondences in the realms dialectically differentiated by mystery and myth. These latter expressions would be understood as themselves symbolic precisely of the differentiation of the notion of being reached by the individual whose work is being interpreted. The history of elemental human symbolizing would be understood, on such an analysis, as the history of the sequences of expression of the dialectic of the psyche with the intentional consciousness that is a notion of being. This dialectic is the source of the understanding of symbolic expressions. These expressions are elementally meaningful dramatizations of the successive differentiations of the notion of being that constitute the history of human consciousness.¹⁰²

Texts in this framework are privileged points of access to the more or less differentiated understanding and intention of value that characterizes human endeavour. The dialectic of intentional consciousness and symbolic expression is the context within which value is revealed as constitutive of human being, embodied in dramatic form and accessible to succeeding generations. Texts, as such, are an invaluable resource for ethical deliberation.

Ethics, as fourth level intentional activity, must

mediate the concerns of the practical, those objects and events that relate to and affect us, and the theoretical which is necessary to understand the intelligibilities that constitute the objects of our inquiry, both of fact and value. But as ethical engagement is fundamentally about self-constitution, identity and the factors that shape it are ethically relevant. The meaning that emerges in metaphor and narrative, like images, is oriented to truth and value, albeit in a pre-thematic fashion. Continuity and coherence for meaningful images and symbols are provided in the formal structures of narrative. Creativity, affectivity, and anticipation are characteristics of this elemental meaning carried primarily in language which is concerned with the general orientation of humans to construct their lives in ways that impart intelligibility and significance to personal and social activity. The recognition and creation of images marks the emergence of experience to consciousness, opening the possibility of further and more complex stages of awareness and deliberate conscious activity. An examination of the formal structures of language which carry meaning and intend value would reveal the increasingly differentiated understanding that is characteristic both of personal growth and historical progress.

The subject acting in accord with the transcendental precepts seeks continuity in his or her knowing and acting;

while psychic conversion allows the possibility of normative development, it is religious conversion which informs and underlies the attempt for authentic subjectivity. The recognition that truth and value necessarily engage us in a transcendental fashion and that our trust in the essential goodness of reality is borne out in our creative activity points to the essential and ultimate truth which is source and goal of our being. Moral conversion (the shift from being motivated by satisfactions to being motivated by value), intends practical ends; the possibility of ethics involves the more or less successful symbolic mediation of reality by the subject. Recognition of value involves imagination by linking affect and understanding; creative applications of value involve imagination in interpretation of value in the concrete instance and inasmuch as the project of value is an ongoing intentional activity in which possibility is as important an element as actuality. The subject is developing the imaginative skills necessary for the realization of value at the same time that he or she is being affected by imaginative constructs which are already operative in the social world. The interaction and the nature of these operations of imagination in shaping the ethical capacity and skills of the subject provide the second perspective from which the ethics-imagination relationship can be examined.

2.4.3 Imagination and Society/History

The social and historical concerns of ethics are primarily questions about the content and transmission of value. The role of converted subjects (and the possibility of these existing in sufficient numbers) in positively affecting society relies in large part on the pre-existing forms and expressions of value. Given the movement from the individual's needs and desires as particular instances of the good to the socially recurring schemes that constitute the good of order and the general historical reality that conditions both structures towards either progress or decline, imagination conditions potentiality, actuation, social relations, and ends. The status of the subject's level of self-consciousness provides one focus for this question, especially as possibility, probability, and capacity for action are considered. Value is primarily constituted in the relations that link and constitute subjects as social beings. The actual products of the schemes of the good of order are sublated by the value and virtue that characterize the nature of the relationships that give rise to the scheme, and become instances of operative value. The social reality which conditions subjects is always a reality which is symbolically mediated; instances of operative value include educational systems, both formal and informal, in which conditions are provided for subjects both to gain insights through images and

to identify images appropriate to given insights. The creation of socially recurrent schemes requires systematic correspondences between language and meaning; value is implied in every act of communication as communication is the primary social relationship on which all higher instances of value are based. In the more complex relationships which constitute higher goods of order, differentiated skills and understanding require an appropriate means for systematic integration. The common value which is the goal of the project can be identified in schemes, subsuming and integrating the specific elements which constitute the recurrent scheme. The authenticity of the self-transcending subject is the outcome of a deliberate engagement of the converted subject's skills with the existing social conditions in which real value is identified and pursued more or less successfully. All of these operations entail an adequate set of conditions where subjects systematically encounter true values that are symbolically mediated through narratives which are identified as significant by the culture.

Language is the tool by which meaning is appropriated and controlled by subjects. Imagination involves the engagement of the inherent capacities of language to mediate meaning to consciousness. Ethical possibility is conditioned by adequate articulation of the affective dimension of experience oriented to value in which language and language situations contain

sufficient resources to overcome the varieties of bias and to revitalize history. It is clear that understanding is a social enterprise affected by imagination and that critical consciousness requires an adequately differentiated account of the role of imagination in cognitional operations.

The operative schemes of recurrence that more or less efficaciously constitute the good of order are affected by, and affect in turn, the understanding of tradition and history that shape our social relationships. The possibility of reversing cultural decline depends in large measure on our understanding of how the images, narratives, and models function that give us our sense of place and role in society. The social mediation of value and personal engagement and appropriation of value in the social realm indicates the performative dimension of symbolic interaction. From personal ambitions and relationships to global political and economic affairs, imagination influences our ability to understand and act. The operational and structural features of the social and historical dimensions of imagination which influence the possibility of ethical development is the third juncture of the ethics-imagination relationship which will be examined in this study.

2.5 The Project

In the Lonerganian cognitional framework, ethics is identified as the deliberative operations of the fourth level of conscious intentionality where value is intended, judged, and acted upon more or less efficaciously. Moral self-transcendence generates a good conscience in an ongoing dynamic process enacted in a given social, cultural, and religious context. Authentic moral development requires an adequate grasp of reality, an apprehension of value, and a critical judgment of value resulting in potential courses of action that lead to concrete instances of value. The mediating role of the image is central in each set of operations in which imagination is understood to consist of a variety of functions. The particular function in each instance is set by the specific end intended by the patterned set of cognitional operations. To address the nature of these different functions, three areas in which the ethical process is influenced by imagination were identified. Imagination and the truth of value, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history indicate that the differentiated process of ethical deliberation involves systematic development of higher order skills where the affective and intellectual dimensions of human experience are integrated in order that value might be realized. The fundamental criterion of this process is the self-reflexive

deliberative subject who engages in the pursuit of value as a locus of originating value. The intentional engagement of value is itself a transformative value in which the social context of meanings within which value is enacted is symbolically mediated to and by the subject.

In order to gain further clarification and insights concerning the nature and functions of these three areas of the ethics-imagination relationship, I propose to examine the work of Paul Ricoeur which examines the nature of metaphor and narrative. Specifically, insights concerning the role and function of imagination found in Ricoeur's texts, The Rule of Metaphor and the three volumes of Time and Narrative, will be used to supplement the three junctures of the ethics-imagination relationships identified in the Lonerganian framework. While the essential compatability of Ricoeur's work to the Lonerganian project has been addressed in the introductory chapter, additional points of compatability can be added.

Ricoeur's analysis of metaphor and narrative identifies the roles and functions of formal structures of language in carrying and mediating meaning whereby subjects appropriate and interact creatively with a social milieu. The forms studied, metaphor and narrative, are those identified as central to the constitution of communities in which identity

and activity are linked and given an orientation towards value. The dialectical relationship between the subject and the social order is prefigured but not necessarily constrained by the meaning symbolically mediated in metaphor and story. The creative capacity of metaphor and narrative is essential to the critical reflexiveness and possibility necessary for subjects to become ethically aware and self-transcendent moral agents.

The systematic analysis of metaphor and narrative provides insights into the actual functions of language in mediating reality to subjects. Thus makes The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative more relevant for the purposes of this work than other studies Ricoeur has undertaken. The nature of interaction between a reader or an audience and a text is precisely the issue identified by theologians and ethicists who seek to ground communities in specific traditions of value given form and substance in particular significant narratives. The systematic exposition of fourth level intentionality provides a framework within which these relationships are identified; Ricoeur's work provides added clarification and precision to this analytical structure.

Ricoeur has a number of studies in which social constructs of imagination are examined in terms of shifts in

consciousness and in terms of how ethical possibility is affected by these movements in social awareness. The texts The Symbolism of Evil, several collections of essays, Ideology and Utopia, right up to Oneself as Another all indicate that Ricoeur has a consistent regard for the ways in which meaning is mediated to culture and value is assessed. Whereas these texts reveal how imaginative constructs affect consciousness, The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative provide a means of assessing the operations of imagination in the structural examination of how metaphor and narrative carry meaning and mediate reality to conscious subjects. This understanding is more immediately relevant to the issues posed in this work than the insights gained from the other works, valuable though they are.

While Lonergan and Ricoeur have different starting points in their work, there is sufficient common grounds to allow insights from one to be applied to the work of the other. In Method in Theology Lonergan identifies intentionality analysis as the basis for his understanding of the complexity of cognitional operations in conscious subjects. Ricoeur's project is informed by his initial intention of developing a philosophy of the will which has involved him in studying the means and motivation of human action especially as these are symbolically mediated. In The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative the analysis is primarily phenomenological in which

the subject's role as the receiver and creator of meaning provides the central focus. When addressing cognitional operations specifically, Ricoeur uses Kantian concepts to identify the intellectual and imaginative operations. The central focus on the subject as an agent of value in both analyses, where the intention of value is the common basis for structuring the argument from both the explicit intentionality analysis and the existential phenomenology, mitigates the differences that arise from Ricoeur's cognitional understanding derived from faculty psychology. The centrality of ethical intent in Ricoeur's understanding is clearly present in the exposition of Oneself As Another provided in the introductory chapter of this thesis. In addition, the main argument used by Ricoeur in his exposition of narrative is derived (and largely expanded by Ricoeur) from Aristotle's understanding of mimesis. This focus on the dramatic pattern of experience as central to understanding the subject as an ethical agent is foundational in Lonergan's work and provides the essential element of Ricoeur's analysis in Time and Narrative.

A close reading of the Ricoeur texts is necessary in order to identify the insights concerning imagination that are applicable to the three areas of the ethics-imagination relationships identified in the Lonerganian framework. The reading will focus primarily on those aspects which influence

the recognition of and creative responses to value in the subject. Imagination is not the systematic theme of Ricoeur's exposition,¹⁰³ so references to structural features which shift the levels of comprehension in the subject and lead to greater possibilities of the actuation of value will provide the criteria for noting relevant data in Ricoeur's work. The parameter of the reading will be informed by Ricoeur's dominant themes which correspond roughly to The Rule of Metaphor and the three volumes of Time and Narrative respectively. These are the creative and re-generative capacities of metaphor and the three elements of mimesis identified by Ricoeur - prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration represent mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3.

Three main insights which seem to be most applicable to the relationships of imagination and truth of value, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history will be selected in each of Ricoeur's four books according to the criteria identified above. The limit of three insights per book is necessary to maintain the limited and indicative nature of this study, rather than engaging the multitude of insights relating to imagination and the pursuit of value that a comprehensive and inclusive study would require. The intent here is to provide enough structural precision to the three junctures in the Lonerganian framework to suggest that systematic ethical deliberation

needs to expand the range and comprehensiveness of the questions and data to be considered in order for an adequate understanding of ethical subjects to emerge.

CHAPTER THREE

IMAGINATION IN THE WORK OF PAUL RICOEUR - THE RULE OF METAPHOR

3.1 Analytical Themes Concerning Imagination in The Rule of Metaphor

The goal of this chapter and the three that follow is to identify features of the imagination which can be related to the process of ethical deliberation within the Lonerganian framework. The exposition of The Rule of Metaphor is intended to remain faithful to Ricoeur's own aims but seeks insights which will add precision to the three junctures of ethics and imagination. Given the fundamental similarity of the significance of the role of the subject who intends value in both Lonergan's and Ricoeur's works, certain criteria for analysis are suggested. The creative capacity of language is the underlying theme of The Rule of Metaphor; insights concerning imagination in its structural or formal features, the ways in which transitions in consciousness are mediated or effected, and the performative and transformative aspects of imaginative engagement by the conscious subject can be located in Ricoeur's analysis of the creative capacities of language. These three sets of criteria are not autonomous standards, but all are linked. A conscious subject is presupposed in all three; performance is present in the identifying of specific features of consciousness as well as

in the shifts in consciousness which may occur when these features are adverted to. The different emphasis provided by each criterion, however, illustrates foundational aspects of the significance of imagination which can be linked to ethical understanding.

The structural and/or formal features of imagination are those which can be identified through the examination of the artefacts of imagination. In the case of metaphor, language provides the basic set of symbolic images with which humans are consciously reflexive and which they use to identify and create meaning. Metaphor is identified as the semantic structure in which creativity in language and meaning is engaged. The mediating effects of imagination are revealed in the process of creativity where possibility becomes a criterion for understanding. Different levels of meaning carried in language, such as the literal and the figurative, are necessary to integrate and express the different elements of human experience in a more or less coherent fashion. Value, which is essentially relational, depends on the shift from immediacy to project engendered by imagination. The process of mediation is one in which the complexity of human experience is integrated in terms of greater comprehension, a necessary condition and element of value. The performative dimension of imagination is revealed in every act of communication. Imagination is an intentional process where

the subject's engagement contributes to the construction of self and meaning and insights generated by novel expressions can become instances of potential value. At a fundamental level, imaginative process indicates dissatisfaction with the limits of the human condition and the nature of the dynamism that drives subjects to always intend more.

3.1.1 Structural Features of Imagination

Ricoeur identifies specific elements in metaphor which contribute to its creative capacities. Semantic analysis reveals the complexity of language and the irresistible human intention towards meaning which provides humanity with its dynamic nature. The following are structural features of imagination which allow the possibility of meaning to be generated.

Metaphor is the primary structural component of language out of which new meaning emerges. The particular juxtaposition of semantic features that comprise metaphor reveal foundational components of creativity. The cumulative character of language allows for continuity and identity while at the same time novelty may emerge. There is a flexibility in language which allows dissonance to co-exist with identity because of layers of meaning in language which emerge in different patterns of relationality. The juxtaposition of

different semic fields in which similar aspects of isolated features of the previously unconnected terms through resemblance give rise to new pertinent relationships, is particularly due to the shifting contexts of language in speech events. The existential and ontological tension of identity and difference takes formal and figurative shape in metaphor. Differing spatial and temporal dimensions of experience are superimposed and held in tension in the new image which is itself an event of meaning; identity and difference give rise to figurative meaning. Metonymy and contiguity are contributing factors to the new unity, the new semantic pertinence, of metaphor. There is a visual aspect of figurative meaning in which conceptual experience and feelings are conjoined since recognition is both structural and existential when the depth of language permits new permutations especially through definitively closed speech acts. Metaphor brings new terms and new vision where structural features recognized as logically consistent intersect with isolated features of different semic fields.

3.1.2 Imagination and Mediation

Metaphor, in Ricoeur's analysis, is both an event and meaning in which meaning and consciousness itself are mediated, that is, apprehended symbolically rather than purely present in themselves. The imaginal quality of metaphor

permits a subject "to see as." The scope of consciousness and intentionality is expanded beyond present space and time so that the existing reality does not necessarily constrain the consciousness and possibilities of action available to the subject. Ricoeur points out that there is an underlying metaphoricity to metaphor which extends to all mediated awareness. All symbolic coherence relies to some degree on the mediating and integrative power of image carried in its transitional nature as quasi-visual, affective, and conceptual.

Metaphor affects shifts in consciousness through the perception of similarity in objects which can range across the entire variety of classifications used to identify human experience. Language, as symbol, includes more than itself as its content; this leads to shifts in the contexts of engagement which allow for the expansion and richness of meaning available to conscious subjects. Assimilation and construction are two ways in which new meaning can come into being. Novelty is introduced through apparently compatible, but isolated, features which resemble known fields of reference, or when two or more known terms can be juxtaposed so that previously undisclosed or undiscovered intelligibilities might emerge. Metaphor links feelings with images and the limit condition of the present is superseded and series of linked images and feelings produce a sense of

participatory engagement in the subject. The juxtaposition of dissimilar terms or fields of reference does violence to the dominant conventional criteria of symbolic reference, but this tension held in the figure or image created by metaphor permits critical reflection on the adequacy of the symbolic expression available to subjects to emerge. This is clearly of benefit to those engaged in the process of ethical discernment.

3.1.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination

The fact that Ricoeur identifies metaphor as an event indicates the centrality of deliberate engagement by the subject. Indeed, most of the language used to describe metaphor and metaphoricity are active terms. Meaning and the subject are simultaneously transformed as shifts in meaning affect shifts in perception and consciousness and vice versa. Metaphor is first described by Ricoeur as it occurs in discourse, where the process of predication entails critical judgment on the part of the subject to ensure clarity and appropriateness. Language is interactive and the construction of meaning is an intentional activity. In language, the subject is engaged socially; in metaphor, the subject is creatively engaging and refiguring the social realm. This is meaningful activity both for the originator of

the metaphor and those who appropriate it. The community of discourse enables the continuity and integration of individual speech acts with socially relevant patterns of intelligibility. The "art" of metaphor is an interpretive skill through which consciousness is focussed on the data of experience which is considered and then configured as possible intelligibilities suggest themselves and are deemed to be more or less relevant to the subject's range of intentions. Isomorphism, an aspect of resemblance, allows subjects to discern intelligibility in previously unconnected patterns of experience through analogy; the usefulness in terms of application of a metaphor is judged on how meaning is enhanced and expanded rather than in terms of relationships of strict identity. The need and desire for more meaning becomes a criterion of truth which expresses the human condition. Value is performatively and transcendently intended and engaged in metaphor. The reading of The Rule of Metaphor that follows will reveal the grounds of these three sets of insights and their essential connection.

3.2 Exposition of Imagination in The Rule of Metaphor

The complete title of the first work, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language, indicates both the range of this study and the significant role that language plays for Ricoeur. He

starts with a discussion of rhetoric and poetics, noting that Aristotle assigns metaphor to both.¹ The characteristics of metaphor, "[t]o apprehend or perceive, to contemplate, to see similarity", are what mark both the poet and the philosopher and Ricoeur notes that metaphor will have to link poetics and ontology (p. 27).² He finds in Aristotle's mimesis (which will be dealt with throughout Time and Narrative), the "truth of imagination, poetry's power to make contact with being as such" (p. 43).³ Poetic fancy and allegory are instrumental in the presentation of thought in sensible or tangible forms, referred to as "image" (p. 60). The tropes, or figures of speech, that are related to metaphor have in common the function "to see as", which is not identical with making visible (p. 61).

The 'figures of thought' themselves, although they 'have to do with thought alone,' come close to metaphor and analogy; thus the 'figures of thought' by imagination and by development exhibit the general character of figure,... of providing thought with a stage setting.

(p. 61)

Ricoeur identifies predication as the central act of discourse and notes that this is possible only when metaphor is not limited by the tropes of a single word (p. 61). The conditions for a good metaphor are listed as: realism, clarity, nobility, naturalness and coherence (p. 62). Further,

. . . besides being needed in view of the deficiency of vocabulary, the figure trope is occasioned by another cause, that is, pleasure. 'The chosen, the stylistic tropes, the figure- tropes, are also brought about by the delight and pleasure that, as if by a sort of instinct, we first anticipate and then experience in them'. So this pleasing quality acts as an incentive to invention, as opposed to just being necessary.

(p. 63)

The generative causes of tropes are identified as imagination, spirit, and passion (p.63). Ricoeur identifies discourse as the necessary field for the most authentic tropes, those of invention (p.64). This indicates the communal and interactive nature of language in general, as well as the proper grounds of possibility for invention. Ricoeur also moves the discussion from a consideration of individual words to the sentence since "the sentence, an undefined creation of limitless variety is the very life of human speech in action" (p. 68).⁴

Ricoeur's analyses of the various forms of language and their roles provides access to the imagination because meaning and consciousness are mediated primarily through language. The compilation of these ideas and insights can lead to an understanding of the ways in which we situate ourselves in the world in a meaningful fashion. The social dimension of our personal being is also highlighted. ". . . To be distinctive

and to be meaningful are the same thing" (p. 69), while, "there is meaning because there is sameness of meaning" (p. 70). Ricoeur identifies a fundamental aspect of language as it mediates being as follows:

The notion of existence is linked to the singularizing function of language. Proper logical subjects are potentially existents. . . . By contrast, in having the universal in view, the predicative function concerns the nonexistent. (p. 71)

The significance of the predicative, already noted, is clearly connected to the imagination. Ricoeur notes that confusion over these two aspects of language led to confusion in the Middle Ages over the existence of goodness, when the question which should have been posed was 'whether some thing, which is good, exists?' (p. 70). By engaging in acts of language we commit ourselves in particular and distinctive ways. ". . . The locutionary act allows one to anchor elements in language that are considered to be psychological- belief, desire, feelings, and in general, a corresponding 'mental act'" (p. 73).

The possibilities inherent in language are freed by the sentence, in which language moves beyond itself and is no longer self-referential. This is how language can mediate "between man and man, between man and world, and so integrat[e] man into society and assur[e] the correspondence

between language and world" (p.74). Because reference is the mark of the self-transcendence of language, Ricoeur can agree that "Husserl's phenomenological analysis based on the concept of intentionality is completely justified: language is intentional par excellence; it aims beyond itself" (p. 74). The context of discourse, which is part of a larger context constituted by the question and answer, is significant because "it is the fact of change that makes the context primary. 'We are things peculiarly responsive to other things'," according to I.A. Richards (p. 78). The issue of belief is linked to the question which relates metaphor and reality. "Must we believe what an utterance says in order to understand it fully? Must we accept as true what the Bible or the Divine Comedy says metaphorically?" (p. 83). Here the question of interpretation is immediately relevant. Max Black, after rejecting a number of approaches to metaphor, identifies organization as its primary function.

In this way metaphor confers an "insight." Organizing a principal subject by applying a subsidiary subject to it constitutes, in effect, an irreducible intellectual operation, which informs and clarifies in a way that is beyond the scope of any paraphrase.

(pp. 87-8)

As this concept runs into some difficulties concerning the role of commonplace connotations. Black returns to the significance of the individual in the process. "What is called the 'weight' or the 'emphasis' attached to a particular use of

an expression depends largely on the intention of the one who uses it. ... It must be admitted, then, that metaphor owes as much to 'pragmatics' as to 'semantics'" (p. 89).

Ricoeur proceeds to link the term "reference" with the ontological import of a work through the questions that occur spontaneously to a reader. "Meaning is the projection of a possible and inhabitable world" (p. 92). Thus, in spontaneous discourse, understanding does not stop at the sense but passes by sense towards reference (p. 92).

The question of relativism is raised in terms of a text being contextual and having meaning assigned to it. How does one decide between various connotations in explicating a poem or text? Truth is also an issue for a meaning that is momentary, an "emergent meaning." Ricoeur raises the possibility of the reader's preference being the crucial factor, especially when direct

recourse to the writer's intention is usually not available (p.94).⁵

In response to these and other problems of assigning meaning to the poetic, a number of theorists posit the notion of "logical absurdity" (p. 95). Metaphor is understood here as a kind of "attribution" particularly in the case of

logically empty attributions and self-contradictory attributions. An oxymoron is an extreme example of this self-contradiction (p. 95). Such a movement confers more responsibility on the recipient of the text, a reading with which Ricoeur concurs.

. . . [the production of meaning] It is the reader, in effect, who works out the connotations of the modifier that are likely to be meaningful. A significant trait of living language, in this connection, is the power always to push the frontier of non-sense further back. There are probably no words so incompatible that some poet could not build a bridge between them; the power to create new contextual meanings seems to be truly limitless. Attributions that appear to be 'non-sensical' can make sense in some unexpected context. No speaker ever completely exhausts the connotative possibilities of his words.
(p. 95)

Ricoeur goes on to say that "an entire logic of explication is put into play in the activity of constructing meaning" (pp. 95-6). The principles that govern the explication of the metaphor can be expanded to the poem, the major principles being selection (or congruence), and plentitude where the two principles counteract each other (p. 96). Thus, meaning can be assigned but it must meet certain criteria of appropriateness and the meaning is never complete or fully exhausted. Relativism is mitigated in that each reading is unique and adds to the range of possible appropriate meanings.

Ricoeur then introduces the very important concept of semantic innovation.

To say that a new metaphor is not taken from anywhere is to recognize it for what it is, namely, a creation of language that comes to be at that moment, a semantic innovation without status in the language as something already established with respect to either designation or connotation.

. . . One must adopt the point of view of the hearer or reader and treat the novelty of an emerging meaning as his work within the very act of hearing or reading.

(p. 98)

Metaphor is described as a semantic event caused by the juxtaposition of semantic fields in which the words taken together make sense, creating "the metaphorical twist () at once an event and a meaning, an event that means or signifies, an emergent meaning created by language" (pp. 98-9).

In the metaphorical statement, . . . the contextual action creates a new meaning, which truly has the status of event since it exists only in the present context. At the same time, however, it can be reidentified as the same, since its construction can be repeated. In this way, the innovation of an emergent meaning can be taken as a linguistic creation.

(p. 99)

At the last stage, when the metaphor has become part of the general community of discourse, it is a dead metaphor and it is only "authentic metaphors, that is, living metaphors,

[which] are at once meaning and event" (p. 99).

In the next study in The Rule of Metaphor, the problem of abstraction is identified as the central problem of metaphorical denomination (p. 106). Metaphorical classification consists of the intersection of the structural (logical) classification and the classification based on isolated features (p. 108). A concept that links representation, abstraction, generalization, and concretization in metaphor is described in the following statement. "Metaphor names an object with the help of the most typical representative of one of its attributes" (p. 108). A distinction is introduced between linguistic metaphor (creating new words, filling gaps in vocabulary) and aesthetic metaphor which functions by creating illusion so that the world is seen in a new light (p. 108). Ricoeur has problems with this way of presenting the data on metaphor because the splitting of the denominative function and the aesthetic function does not preserve the unity of metaphor, nor can denomination alone emphasize metaphor's creative dimension adequately (pp. 108-10).

Changes of meaning are innovative and spontaneous events but Ricoeur believes that "the foundation of the explication of innovations lies in the descriptive point of view" (p. 116). Words have a cumulative character that opens language

to innovation (p.116). Words can also acquire new meanings without losing their former meanings. Polysemy is the chief descriptive characteristic according to Ricoeur:

Polysemy attests to the quality of openness in the texture of the word: a word is that which has several meanings and can acquire more. Thus it is a descriptive trait of meaning that leads into the theory of change of meaning- namely, that there can be more than one sense for a name and more than one name for one sense.

(p. 117)

The change of meanings in a descriptive framework involves substitution on the level of sense and of name, or at both simultaneously. It is through association by contiguity and resemblance that these shifts in meaning occur (p. 117). Following this pattern of thought, Ricoeur points out that a psychology of association creates bridges between individual acts of speech and the social character of language, which includes uniting classification with explication (p. 118).

The shift from consideration of metaphor as word to metaphor as sentence has already been noted, including the resulting heightened emphasis on the community of discourse. New meaning, or semantic innovation "is a way of responding in a creative fashion to a question presented by things" (p. 125). In his analysis of semantics, Ricoeur suggests that direct connections between terms and the extra-linguistic

reality they signify must be mediated:

... one must detour through discourse and pass through denotation of the sentence in order to arrive at denotation of the word. This detour alone allows one to interrelate the denotative operation at work in metaphor and the predicative operation that gives it the framework of discourse.

(p. 125)

This statement identifies significant patterns for analysis in this chapter and for the general theme of creation of meaning. Language provides the evidence which can lead to an understanding of the workings of the imagination and it is through the affects and effects embedded in language that we are able to explicate the originating human acts of creativity. Context affects the meaning assigned to individual words; denotation and predication are both creative operations in the construction of meaning. The operations of imagination are never available in an unmediated fashion for our study or perusal. The project of interpreting imagination is itself an aspect of metaphorical discourse that Ricoeur has explicated in the process of studying the grounds of creative discourse. The project reveals a self-referential aspect and the drive to self-transcendence both of which are conditions of critical engagement.

Reversing the order of connections noted in the last quotation, Ricoeur identifies the inherited wealth of

language.

The word preserves the semantic capital constituted by these contextual values deposited in its semantic treasury. What it brings to the sentence is a potential for meaning. This potential is not formless: the word does have an identity. Certainly, this is a plural identity, an open texture, . . . But this plural identity is also a plural identity.

(p. 130)

The sentence is necessary to provide the context within which the particular aspects of the metaphor's identity are emphasized. Ricoeur contrasts the respective roles of metaphor and metonymy in providing contextual references. ". . . Metonymic relationships are external and given in reality whereas metaphorical equivalences are created by the imagination, [and] metaphorical equivalences set predicative operations in motion that metonymy ignores" (p. 133). Imagination plays different roles in the mediation of reality through language.

The concept of "figure" is used to introduce the spatial dimension of metaphor, especially in terms of the notion "figures of discourse." This is not a true figure since it is metaphorical. Instead, it is considered a figure by analogy (p. 143). The spatial notions introduced by figure are a quasi-corporeal reality, and then contour, feature, or form (p. 144). "The expression exterior form unites them in

the suggestion of something like a milieu of spatiality overlaid by a design" (p. 144). In analyzing the structure of poetics, Ricoeur joins semantics with phonetics and function and finds a movement from explanatory structures to a theory of operations in poetics.

At the semantic level, the identification of the three functions of predication, determination, and co-ordination permits the distinction of a predicative operator, metaphor; a determinative operator, epithet; and an operator of co-ordination, incoherence. Accordingly metaphor is opposed on the one hand to rhyme, as semantic operator versus phonic operator, and on the other hand to epithet among the semantic operators.

(p. 150)

This methodological framework is linked to "deviation" by which metaphor creates new meanings out of the stuff of existing meanings.

. . . [Deviation] as a systematic violation of the language code, is in effect nothing but the other side of another process: "Poetry destroys ordinary language only to reconstruct it on a higher level. The 'de-structuring' done by the figure is followed by a 'restructuring' of another order".

(p. 150)

In order for deviation to be systematic and relevant it must occur in terms of an already established "code of pertinence", which governs the interrelationships of signified entities (p.151). A sentence can be syntactically

correct, but incorrect in meaning, through the impertinence of the predicate. This demonstrates a dominance of speech over language in which the latter shifts to give meaning to the former. Ricoeur suggests there are two aspects to this procedure.

. . . Two inverse and complementary phases- (1) situation of deviation: impertinence; (2) reduction of deviation: metaphor.

(p. 152)

A clue to this process is given when semantic incompatability is contrasted with semantic analogy.

As opposed to logical comparison, which by definition does not break out of the isotopy of the context- only what is comparable is compared quantitatively- semantic analogy institutes a relationship 'between an element belonging to the isotopy of the context and an element that is foreign to this isotopy and for this reason produces an image.'

(p. 186)

Ricoeur agrees with those commentators who do not associate literal meaning with proper meaning. Therefore, since lexical value is literal, metaphors and their meanings are non-lexical; their values are generated by context (p. 188). Ricoeur poses a question which reflects on the provocative nature of the metaphor. "If metaphor engenders thought throughout a long discourse, is this not because it is itself a brief discourse?" (p. 188). The iconic nature of

metaphor functions by indirectly designating another situation which is similar to the situation which the metaphor identifies in the literal sense. Ricoeur notes that iconicity calls to mind Kant's notion of the productive imagination, which is identified with the schema as a method for constructing images (p. 189). The notion of resemblance is crucial to the function of metaphor.

In symbolizing one situation by means of another, metaphor 'infuses' the feelings attached to the symbolizing situation into the heart of the situation that is symbolized. In this 'transference of feelings,' the similarity between feelings is induced by the resemblance of situations. In its poetic function, therefore, metaphor extends the power of double meaning from the cognitive realm to the affective.

(p. 190)

Ricoeur disagrees with the opposition of description and feeling which leads to an emotionalist theory of metaphor, but affirms that the analysis above "recognize[s] perfectly the connection between the workings of the resemblance and the capacity for further development on the cognitive plane itself" (p. 190).

In developing the notion of the skill of metaphor, Ricoeur borrows from Aristotle's Poetics. "But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a

sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars" (p. 192). Asking himself what it means to perceive similarity, Ricoeur sets out a number of problematic issues ranging over a number of different fields of inquiry. He ends this reflection with the proposal that all the questions seem to converge on the single question, "what constitutes the metaphoricity of metaphor?" which leads to the issues raised by the "metaphor of displacement, of change of location" (p. 193).

In affirming the significant role of resemblance in the theories concerning metaphor, Ricoeur makes two claims. First, resemblance is not only what the metaphorical statement fashions, but also what guides and produces the statement. Second, the iconic character of resemblance must be reformulated so that imagination becomes itself a properly semantic moment of the metaphorical statement (pp. 193-94). To support the first claim, Ricoeur unites intuition, Aristotle's epiphora, which refers to "transposition, transference as such, that is, the unitive process, the sort of assimilation that occurs between alien ideas, ideas distant from one another," with diaphor, or construction (p. 195). Ricoeur raises the possibility that the dynamic which informs the metaphorical process is the same dynamic that gives rise to classification.

The same operation that lets us 'see the similar' also 'conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the

genus.'

(p. 198)

Ricoeur characterizes metaphor here as "a semantic phenomenon, [which consists of] assimilation to each other of two networks of signification by means of an unusual attribution." This makes metaphor, as a semantic process, "perhaps even the genetic phenomenon par excellence in the realm of the instance of discourse" (p. 198). Considering the iconic moment of metaphor, Ricoeur suggests that imagination has something to do with the conflict between identity and difference (p. 199). The verbal event of language maintains the creative tension.

Treated as a schema, the image presents a verbal dimension; before being the gathering point of faded perceptions, it is that of emerging meanings.

(p. 199)

Ricoeur then connects the Aristotlean "to see the similar" with the iconic moment in metaphor, clarified by the Kantian schema.

This schematism turns imagination into the place where the figurative meaning emerges in the interplay of identity and difference. And metaphor is that place in discourse where this schematism is visible, because the identity and the difference do not melt together but confront each other.

(p. 199)

The question of the mental operations of creative attribution is taken up via the work of Albert Henry in psycholinguistics. "For Henry, a single mental operation is at work in the synecdoche-metonymy-metaphor triad; and this operation appears in its first degree in metonymy (and synecdoche), and in its second degree in metaphor" (p. 201).

. . . this operation is the perceptive synthesis that allows the mind to focus or to diffuse its inquiring searchlight. . . . If 'semic field' is the name we give to the collection of elementary constituents of a concept-entity, then a semic field is something that can be traversed. (. . .) Three aspects are to be considered, therefore: articulation of the semic field as a state of language, 'more or less free and more or less felicitous mental inspection,' and the naming of the object considered by the seme on which the mind focuses.

(p. 201)

The deliberative act of the subject is the decisive factor given the range of possible outcomes. "Semic focalization, then, is the fundamental 'creative mechanism.' And metonymy, furthermore, is the simple expression of this mechanism on the level of figures" (p. 202). Ricoeur claims that "the linguistic shift permits the construction of metaphor on the basis of metonymy as a double and superimposed metonymy" (p. 202). Ricoeur suggests that the predicative relation is not one of identification. The

relations of predication are constituted by the copula.

Ricoeur suggests that:

. . . a schematism of attribution constitutes the point on the frontier of semantics and psychology where the imaginary is anchored in a semantic theory of metaphor.

(p. 208)

With respect to the concept of iconicity, Ricoeur suggests that the act of reading reveals the essential function of poetic language which is "the fusion of sense with a wave of evoked or aroused images" (p. 201). The notion of the fictive is reintroduced through the iconic which is non-referential.

It is epoche, the suspension proper to the imaginary, that withdraws all reference to empirical reality from the verbal icon. It is also imagery, through its quasi-observational character, that grounds the characteristic of quasi-experience or virtual experience - in short, the illusion attendant to reading a poetic work.

(p. 210)

Affectivity is allowed form and expression when pragmatic concerns are suspended or superseded; this allows the imagination to combine sensible data with concepts in the image.

The major theme of The Rule of Metaphor is the analysis of metaphoricity as "seeing as." In essence, "seeing as" is

"the intuitive relationship that makes the sense and image hold together. [Further], seeing as . . . is half thought and half experience" (p. 212).

Seeing as is an intuitive experience-act by which one selects from the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of such imagery. . . . The mass of images is beyond all voluntary control; . . . there is no rule to be learned for "having images." . . . "Seeing as" is an act. To understand is to do something. . . . The image is not free but tied; and, in effect, "seeing as" orders the flux and governs iconic deployment. . . . "The same imagery which occurs also means." (p. 213)

Resemblance is the ground or foundation of "seeing as," not as the resemblance between two ideas, but as the resemblance established in the process of "seeing as." Similarity is what results from this experience-act and resemblance is defined by the "seeing as" rather than the reverse (p. 213).

Thus, "seeing as" quite precisely plays the role of the schema that unites the empty concept and the blind impression; thanks to its character as half thought and half experience, it joins the light of sense with the fullness of the image. In this way, the non-verbal and the verbal are firmly united at the core of the image-ing function of language. (p. 213)

In metaphor, the literal "is not" accompanies the metaphorical "is", so that the "borders of meaning are

transgressed but not abolished" (p. 214). Ricoeur notes that the "fusion of sense and the imaginary which is characteristic of 'iconized meaning,' is the necessary counterpart of a theory of interaction" (p. 214). Ricoeur adapts the following idea from the work of Gaston Bachelard:

. . . The poetic image 'becomes a new being in our language, expressing us by making us what it expresses; in other words, it is at once a becoming of expression, and a becoming of our being. . . . What was 'a new being in language' becomes an 'increment to consciousness' or better, a 'growth of being.'

(pp. 214-5)

The next study in The Rule of Metaphor examines the relationship of metaphor and reference. Nelson Goodman's work is utilized by Ricoeur because of the pragmatic nature of his approach to meaning. "Symbolic systems 'make' and 'remake' the world. . . . The aesthetic attitude 'is less attitude than action: creation and re-creation.'" Further, "in aesthetic experience the emotions function cognitively" (p. 231). Ricoeur accepts the category of 'poetic qualities' proposed by Goodman, as "true to the extent that they are 'appropriate,' . . . that they join fittingness to novelty, obviousness to surprise" (p. 238). Ricoeur concludes that "the enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it 'invents' in both senses of the word: what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents" (p. 239).

The notion of "model" found in the work of Max Black and Mary Hesse is used here as an instrument of redescription (p. 240). Model refers to "the logic of discovery," which "involves a cognitive process with its own canons and principles" (p. 240). Analogue models effect translation from one system of relationship to another through "isomorphism" in which resemblance in structure, not in sensible features, is primary (pp. 240-41). Theoretical models are not things; instead, they introduce a new language in which the original is described without being constructed (p. 241). The model's efficaciousness lies in its "deployability":

To speak of intuitive grasp is only a shorthand way of indicating ease and rapidity in mastering the far-reaching implications of models. . . . It is the isomorphism of relationships that grounds the translatability of one idiom into another and, in so doing, provides the 'rationale' of the imagination. . . . Isomorphism . . . [is] between that domain and something 'described.'

(p. 241)

"To the simple idea of 'to see new connections,' a philosophy of imagination must add that of a breakthrough that is both profound and far-reaching, thanks to 'radical' and 'inter-connected' metaphors respectively" (p. 244). The juxtaposition of muthos, or emplotment, and mimesis is reintroduced by Ricoeur as being equivalent to the relationship of heuristic fiction and redescription in the

theory of models (p. 244). The result is a pragmatic appreciation of the role of affectivity.

The paradox of the poetic can be summed up entirely in this, that the elevation of feeling to fiction is the condition of its mimetic use. Only a feeling transformed into myth can open and discover the world.

If the heuristic function of mood is so difficult to recognize, it is doubtless because 'representation' has become the sole route to knowledge and the model of every relationship between subject and object. Yet feeling has an ontological status different from relationship at a distance; it makes for participation in things.

(pp. 245-6)

". . . 'Poetic textures' of the world . . . proclaim the reciprocity between the inner and the outer. . . . Poetic feeling itself also develops an experience of reality in which invention and discovery cease being opposed and where creation and revelation coincide" (p. 246).

Tension, which Ricoeur also names controversion, is identified as the theme which has linked the study of the metaphor to this point; it is now applied to the referential relationship of the metaphorical statement to reality (p. 247). Tension is present 1) within the statement, 2) between two interpretations, and 3) in the relational function of the copula, that is, between identity and difference in the interplay of resemblance (p. 247). After studying the range

of responses in philosophy and literature to the issue of truth in metaphor, Ricoeur asserts that "critical consciousness of the distinction between use and abuse leads not to disuse but to re-use of metaphors, in the endless search for other metaphors, namely a metaphor that would be the best one possible (p. 253). This process is not value-free. "Can one create metaphors without believing them and without believing that, in a certain way, 'that is'?" (p. 254). In terms of the poetic enterprise, textural metaphor is central to poetic possibility.

The phenomenological objectivity of what commonly is called emotion or feeling is inseparable from the tensional structure of the truth of metaphorical statements that express the construction of the world by and with feeling. The possibility of textural reality is correlative to the possibility of a metaphorical truth of poetic schemata; the possibility of one is established at the same time as that of the other.

(p. 255)

The last study in The Rule of Metaphor articulates a concern that the autonomy of speculative discourse be maintained vis-a- vis poetic discourse. Ricoeur suggests that it is the philosophical act which allows discontinuity in discourse. This allows the emergence of the ontology that underlies the entire work (p. 258). Therefore, the question of being is not reducible to poetic discourse.

However, the relationship of metaphor to philosophy is not so clear or obvious. The problem is that "discourse on metaphor is itself infected by the universal metaphoricity of philosophical discourse," which leads to a "paradox of the auto-implication of metaphor."

The paradox is this: there is no discourse on metaphor that is not stated within a metaphorically engendered conceptual network. There is no non-metaphorical standpoint from which to perceive the order and the demarcation of the metaphorical field.

(p. 287)

Certain metaphors create the possibility of coherent philosophical discourse. "And so, by reason of their stability, their perdurance, the dominant metaphors ensure the epochal unity of metaphysics" (p. 289). Light and sojourn are given as examples of images that characterize thought and discourse about idealization and appropriation (p. 289).

The gain in meaning that the metaphorical statement creates is a result of the tension between the terms of the statement, and of the tension between two interpretations, the literal and the metaphorical (p. 296). Metaphor, or "semantic shock produces a conceptual need, but not as yet any knowledge by means of concepts" (p. 296). The significance of resemblance is that gain in meaning is achieved by predicative

assimilation, although assimilation does not produce an identity of meaning.

The tension of metaphor can be linked with the copula of the utterance. "Being as, we said, means being and not being. In this way, the dynamism of meaning allowed access to the dynamic vision of reality which is the implicit ontology of the metaphorical utterance" (p. 297).

The dynamism of meaning is shown to be a dual and intersecting dynamism where any progress towards concepts has as its counterpart a more extensive exploration of the referential field.

. . . So we master meaning by varying the conditions for use in relation to different referents. Conversely, we investigate new referents only by describing them as precisely as possible. Thus the referential field can extend beyond the things we are able to show and even beyond visible, perceptible things.

(p. 297-8)

This central insight provides access to the operations and processes of the imagination by designating a basic dynamic and function of the imagination at the level of language.

. . . So what Jean Ladriere has termed the power of signifying, in order to stress its operative and dynamic character, is the intersection of two movements. One movement aims at determining more rigorously the conceptual traits of reality, while the other aims at making referents appear (that is, the entities to which the appropriate predicative terms apply). . .

.
This semantic dynamism, proper to ordinary language, gives a 'historicity' to the power of signifying. New possibilities of signifying are opened up, supported by meanings that have already been established. . . . Meaning appears less like a determined content, . . . than . . . like an inductive principle capable of guiding semantic innovation.

(p. 298)

The role and function of speculative discourse may also provide an understanding of the role of imagination by defining and contrasting the different approaches to the larger issue of meaning that both intend.

Speculative discourse . . . draws on the resources of a conceptual field, which it offers to the unfolding of a meaning sketched metaphorically. The necessity of this discourse . . . proceeds instead from the very structures of the mind, which it is the task of transcendental philosophy to articulate.

(p. 300)

Ricoeur uses Husserlian analysis to further describe the role of speculative discourse in its relation to the metaphorical.

The speculative is what allows us to say that 'to understand a [logical] expression' is something other than 'finding images.' . . . [It] is the very principle of the disparity [inadequation] between illustration and intellection, between exemplification and conceptual apprehension. If the imaginatio is the kingdom of 'the similar,' the intellectio is that of 'the same.' . . . 'wherever

things are "alike," an identity in the strict and true sense is also present. . . . Speculative discourse does [this] by reversing the order of precedence of metaphorical discourse, which attains 'same' only as 'similar.'

(p. 301)

It is in interpretation that speculative discourse affects

the metaphor. Interpretation is the work of concepts ordered systematically which strive for univocity. ". . . Interpretation is necessarily a rationalization that at its limit eliminates the experience that comes to language through the metaphorical process. Doubtless it is only in reductive interpretation that rationalization culminates in clearing away the symbolic base" (p. 302).

Interpretation is then a mode of discourse that functions at the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and speculative. On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the concept; on the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that the concept holds and pins down.

(p. 302-3)

The similarity between the different modes of discourse is (re)affirmed through the offices of analogy. Poetic discourse, with its creation of meaning through two fields of reference, "is governed by the power of redescription belonging to certain heuristic fictions, in the manner of scientific models (p. 305). The upsetting of logic on the

first order by metaphor, and the introduction of second order reference "seems to mark the invasion of language by the ante-predicative and the pre-categorical, and to require a concept of truth other than the concept of truth-verification, the correlative of our ordinary concept of reality" (p. 305). Ricoeur states that "the semantic aim of metaphorical utterance does intersect most decisively with the aim of ontological discourse, not at the point where metaphor by analogy and categorical analogy meet, but at the point where the reference of metaphorical utterance brings being as actuality and as potentiality into play" (p. 307). Ricoeur refers to Aristotle's comments on ontology, where "potency and actuality are defined correlatively, that is to say, in a circular fashion; the corresponding discourse is not demonstrative but inductive and analogical" (p. 307). One implication of this approach is to "see things as actions, [which] is certainly the case in tragedy, which shows men 'as acting, as in act'" (p. 308). This is, after all, the foundational genre for Aristotle's reflections on poetics, and the starting point of both The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative. Ricoeur suggests that the modern philosopher has the speculative task "to seek after the place where appearance signifies 'generating what grows,' . . . no longer to be sought in the region of objects, . . ., [but] at the level of appearance as a whole and as such that the poetic verb 'signifies things in act'" (p. 308). The study concludes with

an assessment of the roles of metaphorical and speculative discourse.

. . . Poetry, in itself and by itself, sketches a 'tensional' conception of truth for thought. . . . Tension between subject and predicate, between literal interpretation and metaphorical interpretation, between identity and difference. Then these are gathered together in the theory of split reference. They come to completion finally in the paradox of the copula, where being-as signifies being and not being. By this turn of expression, poetry, in combination with other modes of discourse, articulates and preserves the experience of belonging that places man in discourse and discourse in being. Speculative thought, on the other hand, bases its work upon the dynamism of metaphorical utterance, which it construes according to its own sphere of meaning. Speculative discourse can respond in this way only because the distancing, which constitutes the critical moment, is contemporaneous with the experience of belonging that is opened or recovered by poetic discourse, and because poetic discourse, as text and as work, prefigures the distancing that speculative thought carries to its highest point of reflection. Finally, the splitting of reference and redescription of reality submitted to the imaginative variations of fiction strike us as specific figures of distancing, when they are reflected and rearticulated by speculative discourse.

(p. 313)

A final note of interest is provided by Ricoeur's reflection on his previous study on Freud, found in the "Appendix" of The Rule of Metaphor. Suggesting that there is a conflictual structure to hermeneutics, and so to self-

knowledge, he claims that "self-knowledge is a striving for truth by means of this inner contest between reductive and recollective interpretation" (p. 318).

3.3 Review of Insights on Imagination in The Rule of Metaphor

The creative capacities of metaphor provide the data for examining the attributes of imagination in The Rule of Metaphor. Ricoeur's study of the semantic and linguistic characteristics of metaphor emphasizes its centrality in the promotion of meaning through the links with disparate dimensions of experience that are conjoined in the figure of metaphor. Meaning is shown to be essentially relational and dynamic, a matter of interest for those interested in identifying and assessing the nature of value in the human project. Imagination is both synthetic and constructive. In imagination, cognitional operations that are linked include the perceptual, the aesthetic, the affective, and the speculative or intellectual. The respective ends intended in each set of operations that imagination schematizes are recognition, the criteria of appropriateness, sensible feelings, and concepts. The foundational role of metaphor and imagination in the interpretation of all dimensions of human experience reveals the flexibility inherent in the project of appropriating and creating meaning. The artefacts of imagination are guides to the state of our reflexive sense (or the lack thereof) of where value is to be found and in what forms. The underlying metaphoricity of language ensures that the operations of imagination are continuously, if somewhat obliquely, engaged in each act of discourse. The three themes

used to identify imagination (structural features, mediation, and performative aspects) in Ricoeur's text reveal common features in their analyses.

3.3.1 Structural Features of Imagination in The Rule of Metaphor

The image portrayed in the figure of speech is the feature that unites the conceptual and the sensible so that new possibilities arise in the consciousness of the subject. Imagination is involved in the operations of recognition, synthesis, and projection, all of which are creative activities. The foundational concept in metaphor is "seeing as" in which creative tension between identity and difference is maintained in the metaphorical image. This tension reveals an underlying ontological condition of human experience which is implied in the creation and existence of each metaphor- the simultaneous assertion of that which is real and that which is not. This tension is present to a certain degree in each communicative act where the attempt to create a meaningful relationship is always present, more or less according to the intention and level of consciousness of the participating subjects. Imagination in the metaphorical process permits the juxtaposition of dissimilar elements of experience so that the range of consciousness is augmented. The dialectical nature of imagination is essential to its role in cognitional

operations. The familiar data of our consciousness is taken up and reconfigured in the effort to find intelligible patterns which will bring the subject to new levels of awareness. The metaphorical image embodies this juxtaposition of the familiar and the unfamiliar which serves to challenge the subject's habitual anticipations and assumptions. Essentially, the metaphorical image disrupts the habitual pattern of anticipations and assumptions formed by the subject's conventional symbolic structure (language) and forces the subject to re-examine the data of consciousness in order to re-establish at least the semblance of coherence.

3.3.2 Imagination and Mediation in The Rule of Metaphor

Metaphor, like all language, is a tool of mediation. Metaphor is a creative process in mediation which opens possibilities up to the subject. The Rule of Metaphor reveals that while reality and meaning are mediated through language to the subject, the subject is mediated to itself in language. Despite its having the appearance of a mere truism, the study of metaphorical process indicates that consciousness, with its grasp of meaning and value, is prefigured by the metaphorical background from which language gains its coherence and value as a means for realizing value. Accordingly, value is always mediated and is subject to the vagaries of those factors which influence the process of interpretation. Conventional

standards of meaning and value must meet the continuous challenge posed by the creative dimensions inherent in the linguistic process. More complex relationships of value are grounded in the efficacy and creative possibilities that are found (or not found) in language situations. The linking of affective experience with the conceptual in metaphor provides the motive dynamism that pushes subjects to engage reality meaningfully and also provides affirmation of the significance of such activity. Where the speculative dimension of experience intends consistent and reliable order, the imaginative dimension intends patterns which open up possibilities.

3.3.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination in The Rule of Metaphor

To engage in the creation or appropriation of metaphor is to intend the development of meaning and consciousness. This engagement is critical in nature as the selection and organization of material from which metaphors are created entails choice and decision, even though at this level the judgment is pre-thematic. Metaphor will heighten the ability of the subject to perceive dimensions of reality without always leading to the further developments of description and explanation. The creation of metaphor entails the discernment of pattern where previously there was none. The

new pertinence that is given in language allows the subject to identify and examine the significance of experience so that consciousness can become self-reflexive. Metaphor is linked with inductive process in cognitional operations which indicates the dynamic nature of meaning and social reality. When metaphor is considered an act of discourse, it serves to provide the data and grounds for the possibility of later systematic reflection in which specific values can be related to the original insight.

Three insights on imagination will be drawn from this body of material in order to add clarification and precision to the three junctures of ethics and imagination identified in the Lonerganian schema. This project is exploratory and indicative in nature rather than comprehensive and definitive as the material's complexity defies any attempts to be easily reduced or schematized.

3.4 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship in the Work of Lonergan

3.4.1 Imagination and Truth of Value

The primary contribution to the understanding of imagination and truth of value made by The Rule of Metaphor is to the nature of the operations through which language expands the control of recurrence schemes in order to

integrate wider ranges of personal experience and cultural meanings. An account of the manner in which insights into fact and value occur is provided in Ricoeur's analysis of metaphor. His discussion of metaphor, in its structural and contextual complexity, is an exposition of the workings of consciousness oriented towards understanding, through the working and reworking of the resources of language. The existence of metaphor reveals both the richness of history and culture and the performative capacities of subjects to engage, create, and sustain meaning. In the creation and recognition of metaphor, insights into both value and fact arise, in which the subject's habitual understanding and expectations are challenged.

Ricoeur's analysis reveals that metaphor achieves this challenge through the introduction of unfamiliar material into the symbolic resources from which the subject, and society, identify meaning and possible action. This tension that is maintained in metaphor, the juxtaposition of the concordant and the discordant, is most clearly seen in Ricoeur's analysis of "seeing as." The definition of this process as "half thought, half experience" indicates the range of cognitional operations that are required for the subject's actions to be coherent. Emergent intelligibility is clearly a project where affect and intellect are linked by the attraction exerted by coherence. The basic function of metaphor is to create and

reveal possibility. Insights into value and fact increase the possibility of new and/or more comprehensive horizons both to encompass novelty and to maintain a coherent worldview within which intelligible action is possible. The insights provided by metaphor indicate that coherence is neither fixed nor absolute inasmuch as it is accessible to human subjects; however, coherence remains a fundamental orientation of all conscious activity and links both fact and value in an ongoing dynamic.

When applied to ethical understanding, the operations involved in the creation and appreciation of metaphor suggest that ethical capacity is less about fixed habitual orientation than it is about critical self-reflexivity. Value depends on the ability to recognize the good while the subject's habitual orientations are being challenged by engagement with the unfamiliar. This introduces questions concerning the respective value of specific goods and the subject's role in such patterns that challenge the subject's existing horizons. New horizons entail new sets of questions and yield new ranges of relevant data. This underlines the recognition that ethics is always subject to performative critique. The recognition of value requires an attention to detail where the subject's emotions, anticipations, and social context becomes significant data in the search for and engagement with greater and more diverse levels of value. Metaphoricity emphasizes

the essential nature of the project, providing an ontological ground wherein value is always coming into being.

Ricoeur's work suggests that an exploration of the performative dimensions of "seeing as" would lead to a greater understanding of the relationship of the transcendent dynamism of subjects, which is often articulated in the realm of religion with the field of ethics. The idea of value as a continually regenerative project, in which one's ethical skills become the primary laboratory and data, remains to be established as foundational in the discourse.

3.4.2 Imagination and the Subject

Ricoeur's discussion of metaphor and metaphoricity provides insights into the operations of elemental meaning in the Lonerganian framework. Pre-thematic in nature, metaphor allows the incorporation of experience in forms that expand the level of the subject's awareness and engagement. The nature of a subject's response to ethical dilemmas is strongly affected by the images through which one's feelings are shaped and oriented. The popularity of the notion of the "root metaphor" has been taken up by social scientists in an attempt to determine the range and nature of social behaviour. Ricoeur provides an understanding of image that stresses the mediated nature of human reality. The form of

consciousness is largely influenced by the dominant images of the social order; the subject's successful engagement with reality requires the ability both to perceive and creatively interact through the creative potential of language. Metaphor in this basic sense provides both the ground and the possibility of creative response to the exigences which face the subject. This discussion also indicates the conditions within which essential and effective freedom are experienced and realized more or less effectively. This indicates that possibility is a fundamental aspect of all reality and a basic human prerogative. The virtues of hope and belief are grounded in this realization; performatively, the subject recognizes that human activity is always a creative movement, whether the specific outcome is positive or negative.

Imagination is an essential attribute of all cognitional operations as human reality is always interpreted reality. While Ricoeur distinguishes the speculative and the poetic, the precision of the speculative operations is identified as the specific use of images which recognize identity. The possibility of identity relies on the wider foundation provided by similarity. Ricoeur's analysis reveals that the creative perception of similarity always includes elements of dissonance; personal and social identity are also informed by the dynamic created by this tension. The process of mediation allows, in fact demands, choice in all subjects at all times.

Incorporated into systematic ethical deliberation, this would suggest that no bias or prejudice is absolute, and that responsibility is an inherent dimension of human being.

3.4.3 Imagination and Society/History

The most interesting aspect of metaphoricity at a social level is the cumulative nature of language that metaphor utilizes to create novelty. Immediate similarities between historical events and traditions that inform current activity come to mind. Language may carry the affective dimensions of images that have long been separated from the original symbolic framework in which they formed part of a coherent worldview. This may indicate one of the elements which explains why group bias can continue to maintain the allegiance of its members even in the face of repeated demonstrations of its ability (or inability) to effect practical changes. The regenerative capacity of image, which incorporates affect and understanding, is demonstrated in most social encounters. Shared experiences, biases, or hopes can all be brought to consciousness through the offices of specific images and terms. The ethical significance of the cumulative and sedimentary nature of language is that language is irreducibly political. By implication, temporality which encompasses all human activity is necessarily political as well.

Because language is cumulative and links affectivity with specific forms, affective responses can be generated in subjects even though they may be unaware of their reactions and the causes of them. It would seem that there is an ethical imperative to study the artefacts of culture which continue to affect behaviour in ways that are largely unrecognized. At the level at which experience is first given form and emerges into consciousness, psychic and emotional disorders can occur due to the preponderance of social images whose influence is primarily negative. There would seem to be enough empirical evidence to make it worthwhile for ethicists to engage in a critical study of the images which inform their deliberations. At the very least, a recognition of the factors that shape one's operative biases would allow for the discernment of negative influences which disrupt dialogue.

CHAPTER FOUR

IMAGINATION IN THE WORK OF PAUL RICOEUR - TIME AND NARRATIVE, VOLUME ONE

4.1 Analytical Themes Concerning Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One

Ricoeur examines the relationship that exists between readers/audience and texts which affects the creation and reception of human worldviews. The exposition of metaphor as a discourse event developed in The Rule of Metaphor is extended to the more comprehensive and formally structured dimension of language that exists in narrative in the three volumes of Time and Narrative. The essential link between subjects and texts is the field of human action where subjects' performance provides the content of narratives. The ethical implications of creativity in metaphor are made explicit in Ricoeur's discussion about the centrality of human action which is carried and influenced by narrative. Ricoeur develops the Aristotlean concept of mimesis (which roughly corresponds to the creative imitation of activity), in a threefold manner, each stage of which represents a particular level of engagement with texts or narratives.

The major focus of Time and Narrative, Volume One is mimesis¹, the initial point of engagement for praxis in the real world. This stage is concerned with prefiguration, the

initial state of naivety, the state of consciousness that establishes the subject's range of anticipations. Mimesis₂ is the creative stage of configuration which leads to mimesis₃, the stage of refiguration in which the subject is potentially capable of acting out of a reconceived level of consciousness with corresponding shifts in anticipations. The mimetic process can be considered a recurrent scheme because the dynamic which drives the subject from mimesis₁ to mimesis₃ results in a return to mimesis₁, the initial naivety, albeit a reconfigured initial naivety. The construction of meaning in language, specifically in narrative, provides an analogous structure for examining the process of human acting and reflecting.

4.1.1 Structural Features of Imagination

The central element of narrative identified by Ricoeur is muthos or plot. Plot provides coherence to the data of human experience so that intelligible patterns can be recognized, projected, and brought into being. Deliberate or intentional activity requires a framework within which experience can be translated into meaningful patterns. These patterns of activity can then be identified, reflected upon, altered, or appropriated and acted upon. Similar in function to metaphor, plot creates intelligibilities that incorporate the familiar and the unfamiliar, that which is with that which is

not, the concordant with the discordant. The intelligibility that the narrative constructs is a creative interpretation of the data of consciousness in which particular elements are highlighted according to the narrative demands for integrity and wholeness. Mimesis₁ identifies the features of recognition required for a subject to orient him or herself adequately towards meaningful and significant engagement in the world. Plot, at the stage of mimesis₁, provides the basic forms and sets of anticipations to subjects in the existing narratives recognized and legitimized by the social order. The creative possibilities inherent in narrative structures allow for a certain degree of openness and possibility which is realized more or less effectively depending on the level of critical reflexivity of the subjects in question.

4.1.2 Imagination and Mediation

The mediation effected in mimesis₁ is twofold. Personal experience is given form and a more or less coherent foundation from which personal identity emerges through the patterns of intelligibility encountered in narrative plots. Through these same plots the subject encounters and is enabled to interact with social reality, especially if the narratives in question are dominant in the given culture. The initial grounding in a social order is a prerequisite of praxis, for

both meaning and action are contextual. The initial exposure to the dimensions of temporality are carried in narrative when the subject becomes aware of the continuity of meaning and the temporal nature and limitations of human action. The transition from the demands of immediacy to the data of memory and the hopes for the future is made possible by the mediating operations of imagination. Awareness of the temporal limitations of praxis reveals aspects of the ontological dimensions of human life that can only be adequately articulated and addressed within the boundaries of narrative which generates its own level of temporality. Fiction, an imaginative construct, plays an essential role in establishing the conditions of everyday life; the possibility of shifts in a subject's worldview or horizon is likewise dependent on the resources provided by narrative plots.

4.1.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination

The entire mimetic process is necessarily performative from the initial sets of assumptions and motivations that engage a subject to the refigured understanding which entails new forms of activity. Narrative contains an imperative that a reader engage and critically reflect on its import and implications; otherwise, the narrative remains inert and non-consequential. The project of creatively reformulating

aspects of human activity in narrative plots implies that there is a value in this type of endeavour and that the value is only recognized when the action configured in the narrative is apprehended by an audience. Reflecting back on Ricoeur's characterization of metaphor as an act of discourse, the narrative is also presented as a significant event where social relations are constituted in order that value might be communicated and reflected on. The constitution of the initial social relations in which narratives are presented and apprehended are foundational instances of value which ground any coherent form of activity which might lead to specific values being realized in the social order. The possibility of community depends on the availability and appropriation of a common text. Ethical possibility depends in large measure on the inherent potential of the particular narrative and the efficaciousness with which the text is promoted and apprehended. The exposition of Ricoeur's text will provide systematic reflections on the details of these three dimensions of imagination carried in narrative structures.

4.2 Exposition of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One

In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur examines the nature of the

relationship that exists between the text and the reader/audience. The technical analysis found in The Rule of Metaphor is supplemented by the study of humans as creative actors. Semantic innovation provides the link between metaphor and narrative. While metaphor gains a new pertinence in predication, the synthetic operations of the plot in narrative provide "a new congruence in the organization of events" (p. ix).¹ Both instances of semantic innovation are products of the productive imagination and of the schematism that is the signifying matrix of the productive imagination (p. ix). This productivity is an ordered creativity that unites visual and conceptual/logical aspects of experience in language.

It is this change of distance in logical space that is the work of the productive imagination. This consists of schematizing the synthetic operation, of figuring the predicative assimilation from whence results the semantic innovation. The productive imagination at work in the metaphorical process is thus our competence for producing new logical species by predicative assimilation, in spite of the resistance of our current categorizations of language. The plot of a narrative is comparable to this predicative assimilation. It "grasps together" and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole.

(p. x)²

Rather than the synthetic, or combinatory, rationality which creates order in metaphor and narrative, Ricoeur is

trying to understand the rationality that "aims at simulating, at the higher level of a meta-language, the kind of comprehension rooted in this schematization" (p. x). In both the case of metaphor and narrative, more explanation leads to better understanding. In chapter three, the functions and capacities of metaphor were discussed, with the goal of new semantic pertinence providing the intention of the various operations. In the discussion of narrative in which plot is the organizing principle, understanding consists in "grasping the operation that unifies into one whole and complete action the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, initiatives and interactions, the reversals of fortune, and all the unintended consequences issuing from human action" (p. x). This task is undertaken by Ricoeur in the three volumes of Time and Narrative. Imagination is central to this unifying operation where the stuff of human lives is given intelligibility. The operations of the productive imagination are recognized as proceeding according to certain standards and codes of pertinence (previously noted in the discussion of metaphor) and the 'seeing-as' that summarizes the extent of metaphor's power is also revealing of ontological dimensions, as 'being-as' (p. ix-xi).³

And whereas metaphorical redescription reigns in the field of sensory, emotional, aesthetic and axiological values, which make the world a habitable world, the mimetic function

of plots takes place by preference in the
field of action and its temporal values.
(p. xi)

The significance of this shift in emphasis is important for ethics and introduces the value of temporality, especially history, as a question for Ricoeur's study of action and temporality in narrative plots. Temporality is introduced as a problematic issue via the work of Augustine, in addition to the questions raised by the nature of Aristotle's notions of plot and mimesis. Clarity concerning the understanding that recognizes and gives rise to intelligibility in human lives and narrative's role in that process, is the goal of Time and Narrative.

Temporality, for Ricoeur, becomes significant for humans insofar as time is organized through, and by, narrative structures (p. 3). It is through language that temporality is maintained as meaningful since our speech concerning time "shores up an assertion about the being of time" (p. 7). Borrowing from Augustine, Ricoeur identifies the relationship between expectation, memory, and attention as central in the human effort to fix and maintain the order necessary for coherent activity. Narration implies memory through which images of events past remain as impressions in the mind (p. 10). Expectation, which is of central significance to ethics, is "the analogue to memory [which consists of] . . . an image that already exists, in the sense that it precedes the event

that does not yet exist" (p. 11).

Augustine's notion of a three fold present, where attention is focussed on either the past of the present, the present, or the future of the present, or a combination thereof, provides a clue as to how time can be talked about meaningfully.

... we have found in the mind itself the fixed element that allows us to compare long periods of time with short periods of time. With the impression-image, the important verb is no longer "to pass" (transire) but "to remain" (manet). In this sense the two enigmas- that of being/non-being and that of measuring what has no extension- are resolved together.

(p. 18)

This shift is from that of assigning primary importance to external activity in delineating and understanding temporality to consciousness as foremost, that is, the subject's central role in perceiving and assigning significance to time. We intend ourselves in time, as much as we are affected by time, and this tension is part of the human condition.

The image is an attribute of the human activity in attempting to situate oneself meaningfully in the world. The enigmas of time provide some of the realized tensions that are present in human attempts at meaning. Aristotle suggests that

poetics, and by extension narrative, affords us the possibility of addressing this problematic dimension of experience as "distention of the soul" in which each level of narrative provides different responses to the issue; any final resolution is continually put aside by the shifting concordance/discordance that characterizes human reality (pp. 21-2).

The tension provided by the contrast of eternity with finitude is linked by Augustine to the radical difference between the creator and the created. We are other than God and this realization affects human activity. "If, however, the ability to distinguish the similar from the dissimilar belongs to the intelligence that 'compares' (6:8), its reverberation profoundly affects both the scope and the depth of feeling" (p. 27). The intensification of the dialectic between intentio and distentio linked to the dialectic of eternity and time is not to bring dismay and discourage human hope, but "aims more fundamentally at extracting from the very experience of time the resources of an internal hierarchization, one whose advantage lies not in abolishing time but in deepening it" (p. 30). For Ricoeur, this means that chronology (understood in a linear fashion) has as its opposite temporality itself, which can be discovered in its richness and diversity in narrative and so brought to consciousness (p. 30).

The tension between concordance and discordance is resolved in favor of concordance through the act of composing a tragic poem, according to Aristotle (p. 31). Ricoeur uses this response to meet the angst in Augustine and focuses on the concept of mimetic activity or mimesis, which raises the issue of creative imitation in terms of the emplotment of lived temporal experience (p. 31). Unlike Aristotle, Ricoeur extends the notion of mimesis to include the discussion of poetic activity in terms of temporality. The central point here is the plot which constitutes the imitation of action (p. 34). The consideration of the temporal dimension of human activity leads Ricoeur to the following observation.

It is in ethics that the subject precedes the action in the order of ethical qualities. In poetics, the composition of the action by the poet governs the ethical quality of the characters.

(p. 37)

The plot, which is the organizing principle of narrative, imitates activity rather than human beings, although characters are central to any story. Action is given primary importance in part because order through activity is "pursued to the exclusion of every temporal characteristic" (p. 38). Muthos or plot achieves concordance by organizing events according to three aspects: completeness, wholeness, and an appropriate magnitude (p. 38). The role of narrative is thus essential for giving experience a shape and orientation, as "it is only in virtue of poetic composition that something

counts as a beginning, middle, or end" (p. 38). The poetic activity is a form of learning for Aristotle in which interpreting the significance of an image provides an enjoyable undertaking for all people; "Learning, concluding, recognizing the form- here we have the skeleton of meaning for the pleasure found in imitation or representation" (p. 40).

The images and structures that poetry uses to create and inform are universal because they address human questions. Therefore they are not merely Platonic ideas but related to practical wisdom and connected to the ethical and the political (p. 41). The plot organizes these practical insights by discerning intelligibility in the accidental, by drawing the universal truth from the specific incident, and by finding purpose and relationality in the otherwise circumstantial (p. 41). This process of understanding engages the subject affectively and creatively and Ricoeur notes that "this pleasure of recognition ... presupposes I think, a prospective concept of truth, according to which to invent is to rediscover" (p. 42).

The perspective afforded by poetic creation recognizes the tension of harmony and disharmony that characterizes human existence but, unlike real life, concordance is not deposed by the discordant in tragic art (p. 43). In narrative, the plot holds the two dynamics together, without

negating either.

By including the discordant in the concordant, the plot includes the affecting within the intelligible. Aristotle thus comes to say that pathos is one ingredient of the imitating or representing of praxis. So poetry conjoins these terms that ethics opposes.
(p. 44)

Praxis belongs at the same time to the real world, the realm of ethics, and the imaginary world where poetry reigns; mimesis identifies not only the separateness of the two aspects but also the connection between them. The mimetic activity is not constituted solely by the dynamism of the poetic text; a reader or viewer is required as well. Ricoeur explains:

. . . By so framing the leap of imagination with the two operations that constitute the two sides of the mimesis of invention, I believe we enrich rather than weaken the meaning of the mimetic activity invested in the muthos. I hope to show that this activity draws its intelligibility from its mediating function which leads us from one side of the text to the other through the power of refiguration.

(p. 46)

We find here the three dimensions of mimesis as conceived by Ricoeur. Mimesis1 has to do with the starting point of praxis in the real world; mimesis2 is the pivotal point of creativity; mimesis3 is the incorporation of the new or refigured understanding which becomes the impetus for a new praxis, a new practical wisdom. Imagination is linked to both

the recognition of the what is the case (mimesis1) and what might be the case (mimesis2) in which the activity's significance is attributed to its mediating function. Since the starting point and the ending point of the mimetic process is the real world, the ethical criteria are derived from practical wisdom and not poetics. The possibilities of creation are not unbounded at least inasmuch as texts carry or promote ethical relevance; in the imitation of praxis in muthos there must be coherence in ethical quality between the real world and the poetic (p. 47).

As the term muthos, or plot, indicates discontinuity in the movement from the real world to the poetic the term praxis is what maintains continuity between the ethical and the poetic (p. 47). The issue of credibility in the acceptance of a text by an audience is identified as a subjective factor, in addition to the issue of the probable, objective dimension of a narrative; accordingly, "the logical connection of probability cannot therefore be detached from the cultural constraints of acceptability" (p. 47). The implications of this statement for the process of ethical deliberation are considerable given the affective and institutional social factors linked to the performative efficacy of any given text. The issue of the significance of social conditions on the appropriation of a given text is raised; these factors have a profound impact on the very

possibility of ethical discourse. The creative dialectic between the practical (ethical) and the poetic works both ways; while ethics has to be grounded in the practical, its own ground of possibility is largely set by narratives given normative status in/by the culture. Thus, recognition of the given aspects of the practical realm (mimesis₁) is already affected by a narrative; the legitimacy or range of possibilities raised by mimesis₂ are likewise affected, and mimesis₃ may be curtailed or truncated inadvertently by the pre-existing narratives afforded normative status. Imagination has an irreducible social dimension.

Ricoeur addresses the issue by identifying Aristotle's attempts to articulate the problematic aspects of addressing the astonishing and paradoxical elements in poetics.

. . . Aristotle determines those norms that ought to guide criticism in resolving "problems," he classes representable things under three rubrics: "things as they once were or now are; or things as people say or suppose they were or are; or things as they ought to be" (60b10-11) But what do present (and past) reality, opinion, and things as they ought to be designate if not the realm of the readily believable? We touch here on one of the more concealed sources of the pleasures of recognition, namely, the criterion of what is "persuasive," whose contours are those of the social form of the imagination.

(p. 49)

Accordingly for Aristotle "possibility means credibility," though Ricoeur follows this by asking what

impossibility or extreme discordance means for a given structure if not judged by its persuasiveness.

Hence, by its very nature, the intelligibility characteristic of dissonant consonance- what Aristotle puts under the term 'probable'- is the common product of the work and the public. The persuasive is born at their intersection.
(p. 50)

Catharsis (which for Aristotle provided the basic purpose of tragedy) acts on the audience through the emotions of pity and fear. The experience of catharsis consists of the transformation of the pain raised by these emotions into pleasure through the poetic activity of representing these emotions in the plot through the mimetic activity. The poetic representation of pity and fear is a result of the narrative composition. Ricoeur adds:

In this sense, it is not too much to say, with recent commentators, that the purgation [catharsis] first of all is in the poetic construction. I myself have elsewhere suggested treating catharsis as the integrating part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling.
(p. 50)

The practical dimensions and goal of Ricoeur's project are to identify and interpret the operations by which a narrative created by an author can be appropriated by an audience whose perception and action are thereby changed (p. 53). The reader of the text is engaged in activity that actualizes the three dimensions of the mimetic process which is only potentially present in the text alone. In terms of

the temporal dimension of the process, Ricoeur states: "We are following therefore the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time" (p. 54). Ricoeur identifies a basic requirement in both author and audience if plot, which is an imitation of action, is to exist, namely, "the capacity for identifying action in general by means of its structural features" (p. 54).

Next, if imitating is elaborating an articulated significance of some action, a supplementary competence is required: an aptitude for identifying what I call the symbolic mediations of action in a sense of the word "symbol" that Cassirer made classic. . .

(p. 54)

The social dimension of meaningful activity which has already been raised as a potential problem is, of course, also the ground and possibility of culture itself. Understanding a story requires both that the language of activity is comprehended and that the traditional narratives of the culture are recognized. Human activity can be narrated because it is already given in signs, symbols, and rules. For Clifford Geertz, "culture is public because meaning is" (p. 57). There is an ". . . initial characterization which clearly indicates that symbolism is . . . a meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay" (p. 57). Symbols exist in relation to other symbols which interact with and on each other, but "before being submitted to interpretation, symbols

are interpretants internally related to some action" (p. 58). Action has intelligibility that is mediated through and by symbols.

If we may nevertheless speak of action as a quasi-text, it is insofar as the symbols, understood as interpretants, provide the rules of meaning as a function of which this or that behavior can be interpreted. . . The term "symbol" further introduces the idea of a rule. . . in the sense of a norm.

(p. 58)

The introduction of norms brings us back to practical and ethical considerations. "As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences" (p. 58). The question of the social role of art in the creation and sustenance of morality becomes paramount from a foundational perspective as well as in its institutional aspects.

The very project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical quality of action on the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself only a corollary of the major characteristic of action, that it is always symbolically mediated.

(p. 60)

In establishing the correlation that exists between the conceptual framework concerning action and the conceptual framework that is used to discuss temporality, Ricoeur indirectly identifies an important aspect of ethical deliberation's orientation.

It is easy to see that the project

has to do with the future, in a very specific way that distinguishes the future from prevision or prediction. The close kinship between motivation and the ability to mobilize in the present experience inherited from the past is no less evident.

(p. 60)

Ricoeur now states the role and significance of mimesis₁ which includes the dimension of temporality.

"To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand what human acting is, in its semantics, its symbolic system, its temporality. Upon this preunderstanding common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics"

(p. 64)

The next stage, mimesis₂, is the stage of creativity, which "opens the kingdom of the as if" (p. 64). Mimesis₂ involves emplotment drawing a pattern or intelligibility out of what before was simple succession.

I cannot overemphasize the kinship between this "grasping together" proper to the configurational act, and what Kant has to say about the operation of judging.

(p. 66)

There is a critical imaginative component in both the formative and the reflective stages of configuration. Both form and functional capacity require the subject's recognition and acceptability in which criteria is linked to possibility and appropriateness. The social factors that ground the possibility of discourse, delineated in mimesis₁, are necessary for the creative movement proper to mimesis₂ to

be received and understood. The patterns that emplotment gives to events have both a traditional (or generic) aspect and a novel (or creative) aspect. Emplotment has to be decipherable, but it also has to bring to light new ideas, insights, experiences, or language and human culture would cease to remain viable.

It is this "followability" of a story that constitutes the poetic solution to the paradox of distention and intention. The fact that the story can be followed converts the paradox into a living dialectic.

(p. 67)

Ricoeur returns to Kant in an attempt to identify the structural features of the imagination, especially concerning the interaction of the intellectual and the affective dimensions.

. . . we ought not to hesitate in comparing the production of the configurational act to the work of the productive imagination. This latter must be understood not as a psychologizing faculty but as a transcendental one. The productive imagination is not only rule-governed, it constitutes the generative matrix of rules. In Kant's first Critique, the categories of the understanding are first schematized by the productive imagination. The schematism has this power because the productive imagination fundamentally has a synthetic function. It connects understanding and intuition by engendering syntheses that are intellectual and intuitive at the same time. Emplotment, too, engenders a mixed intelligibility between what has been called the point, theme, or thought of a story, and the intuitive presentation of circumstances, characters, episodes, and

changes of fortune that make up the
denouement.

(p. 68)

The claim that the productive imagination is transcendental in orientation has import for its role in the ethical realm, especially as it is linked to the formation of norms. One implication is that any given rules can be superseded by new rules as the transcendental dynamism gives rise to them, at least to the extent that the new formulations more adequately encompass the range and expression of human experience. The notion of normativity takes on a whole new meaning insofar as the significance of contextuality is highlighted in ethical deliberation.

Anticipating this development, Ricoeur suggests a new way of conceiving tradition and its role in culture.

Let us understand by this term [tradition] not the inert transmission of some already dead deposit of material but the living transmission of an innovation always capable of being reactivated by a return to the most creative moments of poetic activity.

(p. 68)

Tradition and the normative sense of a culture are usually passed on through narrative, this imagination has an impact on the types of narrative and the shaping of tradition. "If we encompass form, genre, and type under the heading 'paradigm,' we shall say that the paradigms are born from the labor of the productive imagination on these various

levels" (p. 69). It remains to be determined how the creative aspect of tradition identified above would function in a culture which has its own maintenance as a goal, if maintenance was conceived of in static terms. Ricoeur provides a dialectical response to the issue rather than a prescriptive one.

Innovation remains a form of behavior governed by rules. The labor of imagination is not born from nothing. It is bound in one way or another to the tradition's paradigms. But the range of solutions is vast. It is deployed between the two poles of servile application and calculated deviation, passing through every degree of "rule-governed deformation."

(p. 69)

The rule-governed deformation noted above is the process through which a history of narrative is made possible, as the various literary paradigms undergo changes. This movement, which makes a tradition of narrative possible, also gives the productive imagination a history (p. 70). Although Ricoeur is aware that people can let themselves be deluded by narrative's fictional properties when they lose sight of the artifice of fiction, he is equally on guard against the rejection of all paradigms, the radical honesty that attempts to embrace formlessness. "It is only through a kind of nostalgia for order that we resist this fascination and that we adhere desperately to the idea that order is our homeland despite everything" (p. 72). This indicates that some of the more popular conceptions of imagination that envision complete

absence of restraint as the ultimate form of creativity are wrong. Ricoeur's interpretation of the Kantian productive imagination, with its role in generating and producing rules, which operates according to standards of taste and appropriateness puts the lie to the notion of an unhindered imagination both in its functional and its affective capacities. Nevertheless, Ricoeur adds that, "emplotment is never the simple triumph of 'order'" (p. 73).

The potential story raises the issue of the story that provokes and intrigues all, namely, our own stories. The significance of the concept of identity has become a modern concern for contemporary culture, especially as the insights of Freud and his followers have informed the modern quest for knowledge. The recognition of our own involvement in the creation of our selves is a powerful motivation to action. "It is the quest for this personal identity that assures the continuity between the potential or inchoate story and the actual story we assume responsibility for" (p.74). This responsibility has a social dimension as well as a personal one, which is not only the general task of preserving culture.

We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative.

(p. 75)

The refiguring of understanding and behaving which is the goal of the three stages of mimesis is interactive in nature. ". . . If emplotment can be described as an act of judgment and of the productive imagination, it is so insofar as this act is the joint work of the text and reader, just as Aristotle said that sensation is the common work of sensing and what is sensed" (p. 76). The act of reading "accompanies the interplay of the innovation and sedimentation of paradigms that schematizes emplotment" (p. 76-7). The relationship between the reader and the text is one of great import as it influences almost every dimension of culture. Iser and Jauss, two theorists who studied this issue, both agreed that "the text is a set of instructions that the individual reader or the reading public executes in a passive or a creative way" (p. 77). The difference between the possible responses is not incidental. Ricoeur identifies reading as the functional process that joins mimesis₂ to mimesis₃ (p. 77).

Raising the issue of the reception of a text also raises the question of reference, those events, worlds, horizons that the text purports to be about. The ability to receive such information is unique to each person. ". . . The listeners or readers receive it according to their own receptive capacity, which itself is defined by a situation that is both limited and open to the world's horizon" (p. 77). The juxtaposition of different horizons, or an exclusively focussed fictional

perspective, can give rise to many types of conflict. There must be a means of mediating the tensions that arise without artificially curtailing or dismissing genuine differences of opinion or perspective. This issue has to be resolved on the individual level as well as on the social level, as there are different agendas at each stage. The personal capacity for openness at the first stage and social or political agendas at the second stage can serve as examples of potential conflicts that would need to be resolved. Ricoeur intends to hold structure and change together in a creative tension.

The shock of the possible, which is no less than that of the real, is amplified by the internal interplay, in the works themselves, between the received paradigms and the proliferation of divergencies, through the deviation of individual works. Thus narrative literature, among all poetic works, is a model of practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its paradigms.

(p. 79-80)

The question of reference involves the role of language in the process of mediating and creating horizons and perspectives. The creative process of language, especially as we have examined it in metaphor, lays the groundwork for the ontological re-orientation of our lives in the world.

Metaphorical reference, it will be recalled, consists in the fact that the effacement of descriptive reference- an effacement that, as a first approximation, makes language refer to itself- is revealed to be, in a second approximation, the negative condition for freeing a more radical power of reference to those aspects of our

being-in-the-world that cannot be talked about directly.

Again,

This articulating of a metaphorical reference on the the metaphorical sense cannot be clothed with a full ontological meaning unless we go so far as to metaphorize the verb "to be" itself and recognize in "being-as" the correlate of "seeing-as," in which is summed up the work of the metaphor.

(p. 80)

The world is comprised of the combined sets of references that have been made accessible through all the poetic texts that have been encountered, read, and cared about." . . . (L)iterary works depict reality by augmenting it with meanings that themselves depend upon the virtues of abbreviation, saturation, and culmination, so strikingly illustrated by emplotment" (p. 80). The literary work takes the world of human action for its reference.

For some years now I have maintained that what is interpreted in a text is the proposing of a world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers.

(p. 81)

The fundamental connection between the practical world of action and the creative process enacted in the narrative emplotment of events involves the common subject matter, human action, and the fact that all action is symbolically mediated, in mimesis1 as well as in the latter two stages. "Human action can be oversignified [a clue to the creative enterprise

that heightens possibility in narrative] because it is already prefigured by all the modes of its symbolic articulation" (p. 81). The connection between practical action and ethics may be easy to draw, but Ricoeur recognizes that literature can never equal the reality of actual events, which have a profound impact on the intentionality of actors. History has a very significant role in the shaping of behavior when history is given and interpreted through "traces" or remnants of past periods and events. This real past, because it is past, is mediated, and the process of mediation involves creativity. Ricoeur addresses the interplay of history and fiction which gives us access to the past.

[The real past] . . . about what this reference through traces borrows from the metaphorical reference common to every poetic work, inasmuch as the past can only be reconstructed by the imagination, and also what it adds to it, inasmuch as it is polarized by past reality.

(p. 82)

The limitations placed by temporality on human lives necessitates a continuous creative movement if the human spirit is to maintain itself against the diminution of time, which is posed most radically and inexorably by the fact of human finitude and our own impending deaths.

In part two of Time and Narrative, Volume 1, Ricoeur studies the relationship of history and narrative. One of his basic contentions is that if history did not share the

operations and basic competence which are necessary for following a story, it would lose its place in the social sciences (p. 91). Temporality influences human behavior; therefore, the manner in which we apprehend time is significant. "The refiguring of time by narrative is, I hold, the joint work of historical and fictional narrative" (p. 94). Ricoeur notes that the ordinary understanding of history is more problematic than helpful. "Prior to reflection, the concept of a historical event shares the misleading assumptions of most common-sense notions" (p. 96). Lonergan too, expressed serious reservations about the efficacy of common-sense in dealing with complex or long term problems. The problem, for Ricoeur, is that the historical event is viewed as an absolute, independent of the subject's reflections and interpretations concerning the event. The absoluteness attributed to the event is extended to the radical exclusiveness of the action in time and to its character as other (pp. 96-7). As action is always symbolically mediated, if it is to be decipherable then "understanding- even the understanding of another person in everyday life- is never a direct intuition but always a reconstruction" (p. 97). The historical is not removed from the present intentions of subjects that have questions about meaning.

Understanding is always more than
simple empathy. In short, no "such thing
as a historical reality exists ready

made, so that science merely has to reproduce it faithfully." "Jean sans Terre was there" is a historical fact only in virtue of a whole bundle of intentions, motives, and values that incorporate this statement into some intelligible whole.

(p. 97)

Ricoeur utilizes the work of Raymond Aron to explicate the significance of the historical in a way in which ongoing human projects would be privileged over the past as given.

"As for the probability born of the partial character of historical analyses and causal relations, it exists in our minds, not in things." . . . In this respect, historical appraisal of probability differs from the logic of the scientist and is closer to that of the judge. For Aron, the philosophical stake in all of this was the destruction of every retrospective illusion of fatality and the opening of the theory of history to the spontaneity of action oriented toward the future.

(p. 98)

The question of the historian is the source of initiative in history, not the document or trace. Similarly, the subject's initial curiosity and capacity for creativity is the focal point for historical understanding. "Marc Bloch grasped perfectly that historical explanation essentially consists in the constituting of chains of similar phenomena and in establishing their interactions" (p. 100). The awareness that history brings to the social and human sciences is that there is a plurality of public times and spaces that must become part of all methodological considerations (p. 103). The issue of continuity in change is also dealt with by

history.

history reaches an intelligibility that belongs only to the long time-span, a coherence that belongs only to durable equilibriums, in short, a kind of stability within change.

(p. 104)

Among the questions considered by historians, issues of value and purpose are of particular interest inasmuch as social structures reflect particular biases that give way to new ones. Particular ideologies may have a certain internal coherence without reflecting the actual concerns and experiences of those who ostensibly live according to the particular ideological guidelines.

Causal analysis . . . is a causal criteriology . . . [with] essentially two tests. The first is an inductive one. The factor in question must be a really necessary one. The second is a pragmatic test. There must be a reason for selecting the condition in question from among the conditions that as a whole constitute the sufficient condition for the phenomenon.

(p. 126)

Imagination plays a role in both the inductive and the pragmatic aspects of causal analysis. Necessity is a feature that can be established only by projecting negative and/or alternative possibilities. A coherent world perspective is required for choosing a reason that legitimately meets practical demands, as otherwise any response would suffice. The role of imagination involves the notions of appropriateness and interpretation as context has to be

created and explored for meaningful selection to take place. Narrative opens a range of possibilities because of polysemy, which allows for the insertion of definitive and prescriptive laws into narrative texts according to the interests and relative levels of maturity that subjects manifest in the act of interpretation. Ricoeur accepts this occurrence by noting that he "would prefer to emphasize the fact that laws are interpolated into the narrative fabric instead of insisting upon their inappropriateness" (p. 127).

A number of theories pertaining to causality are studied resulting in the recognition that human action has ontological and logical primacy over causality which is in part characterized by "an originary capacity of apprehension as regards the meaning of human action" (p. 132). Action is also implied in the discovery of causal relations since "the capacity to put systems in motion by producing their initial states is a condition for their closure," in which systems refers to various states of the world (p. 137). Ricoeur also suggests that intentionality and teleology are overlapping terms, inasmuch as human activity is presupposed in both.

In narrative, explanation is linked to description because intelligibility is an essential part of any good narrative. Comparison by way of analogy and description of

past and present events implies at least a nascent understanding and, from a structural perspective, the basis of an emerging plot (p. 148). Although narrative forms and genres are recognized through their common characteristics and are capable of mediating information, predictability in outcome is not the point of a narrative conclusion; rather it is an acceptable conclusion that is required, raising again the role of appropriateness in determining what is properly normative (p. 150). There seems to be a continual, if implicit, demand in narrative for the subject to have and develop a critical perspective, if narrative is going to inform and shape human intentionality.

Consequently, our most elementary narrative understanding already confronts our expectations governed by our interests and our sympathies with reasons that, to fulfill their meaning, have to correct our prejudices. In this way, critical discontinuity is even incorporated into narrative continuity. We thus see in what way the phenomenology applied to every story's followability is capable of extension, to the point of inserting a critical moment into the very heart of the basic act of following a story.

(p. 152)

Creativity is required to construct narrative and to appropriate it where the critical perspective necessitates an alternative to what is given. In the absence of creativity, the given attains normative status by default, especially when expressed through inadequate theories of understanding which constrain the possibilities and range of ethics.

Analogously, in the realm of history, "the great historian is the one who succeeds in rendering acceptable a new way of following history" (p. 155). Ricoeur introduces the argument of the "narrativist" concept, "that narratives are highly organized wholes requiring a specific act of understanding that takes the nature of a judgment" (p. 155). In history, the overall view is accomplished by means of "imaginative reconstruction" because "the task of an overall view is 'comprehending [the constitutive events] in an act of judgment which manages to hold them together, rather than reviewing them seriatim'" (p. 156).

The social character of historical thought has much to do with the manner in which cultural expectations are formed. The shape of social anticipations affects the manner in which behavior is evaluated; as a result, historical paradigms can also effect behavior in the present. "The presuppositions of the ideological mode bear on the nature of historical consciousness, and therefore on the tie between explaining past facts and present practice" (p. 165). The ethical agendas of ideologies therefore shape the modes of expression that govern the culture.

Ideological preferences bearing in the final analysis on social change, on its desirable scope and its desirable rhythm, concern metahistory insofar as they are incorporated into the

explanation of the historical field and the construction of the verbal model by which history orders events and processes in narratives.

(p. 165)

The issue of the reliability of historical accounts raised by relativism reveals that the arbitrariness of narrated events is limited not by the narrated events, but by "the reader's expectation of encountering known forms of encoding" (p. 168). The sharing of common plot structures is a significant way of making sense of personal and public history, but it may also indicate one of the ways in which bias operates, both in its positive and negative aspects.

The encoding is thus governed more by the expected meaning effects than by the material to be encoded. Such meaning effects consist essentially of making the unfamiliar familiar.

(p. 168)

The relationship of sets of anticipations to the unfamiliar reveals the significance of appropriate images and symbols in constructing new, but tentative, patterns of meaning. The unfamiliar has to be recognized in some way as analogous to something already present in the subject's horizon for coherent discussion to take place. The tension between continuity and the challenge of change requires a creative synthesis which continually examines its own precepts in terms of providing a more or less adequate response to the demands of the world.

Emplotment is the factor in narrative that unites the traditional aspects and the challenge of the new in a dynamic articulation of new patterns of meaning. In narrative, "emplotment is much more than one level among many. It is what brings about the transition between narrating and explaining" (p. 168). As a narrative attempts to provide a coherent and intelligible account of circumstances and not merely a list of data, probability is present as a characteristic of the plot. As a result, "there are no grounds for distinguishing between narrative, understanding, and explanation" (p. 171). The persuasiveness of a plot addresses the plausible interaction of all these factors. Ricoeur states that "to explain more is to narrate better." (116) Again, the synthetic nature of the process is apparent- an attribute already noted as belonging to the imagination. Creativity in this instance has at least two major components. The first is connected to the formative dimension, both in the initial making of the story-teller and in the re-making of the reader's appropriation of the narrative; the second has to do with the ability to judge, akin to Kant's notion of aesthetic taste, which has to be present both in the author and the audience.

In history, as in most fields of human endeavour, understanding seeks actual causes of events and courses of action since there is a practical value for human action in

terms of efficacy and probable outcomes. In history, identifying the main cause of an event is a way of relating the myriad factors that influence our activity. Ricoeur, utilizing the work of Max Weber, outlines the process as follows:

This kind of logic [i.e. singular causal imputation], consists essentially of the constructing by our imagination of a different course of events, then of weighing the probable consequences of this unreal course of events, and finally in comparing these consequences with the real course of events. "In order to penetrate the real causal inter-relationships, we construct unreal ones." . . .

This probabilist, imaginary construction presents a twofold similarity, on the one hand, with emplotment, which is itself a probable imaginary construction, and, on the other hand, with explanation in terms of laws.

(p. 183)

The critical and dialectical function of imagination in identifying the significant factors that determine concrete activity is emphasized.

It is the phrase "all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no other" that marks the entrance on the stage of the imagination. Reasoning, from this point on, moves in the arena of unreal past conditionals. But history shifts into the sphere of the unreal only in order better to discern there what is necessary (p. 184).

History, despite its being concerned with the actual course of events in the past, is also involved with the probable. In the various forms of narrative emplotment employed by historians, probability engages the historical data (p. 184). Ricoeur identifies two types of criteria present in narrative which affect historical accounts: analysis of data into factors and rules based on experience (p. 185). As these criteria are not precise, it is not surprising that there is discontinuity between emplotment and the historian's search for a singular, causal imputation as well as continuity, which "resides at the level of the role played by the imagination" (p. 186). Northrop Frye provides a literary reference in support of this assertion. "Poets begin with the form, historians move towards it" (p. 186). The interaction between the poetic and the historical is further complicated by "the uncertainty which lies in the fixing of the limits of systems and series, with the plurality of fortuitous constructs which the scholar is free to set up or imagine" (p. 187). The problematic nature of imaginative constructions does not outweigh their usefulness: "unreal constructions must remain an integral part of science; even if they do not go beyond an uncertain probability, for they offer the only means of escaping the retrospective illusion of fatality" (p. 188). The impact that imagination has on historical process goes beyond the search for understanding; there are affective and social dimensions, as well as the

reconstitution of temporality itself.

The retrospective estimation of probabilities thus contains a moral and a political significance that exceeds its purely epistemological one. . . . Due to its probabilist character, causal explanation incorporates into the past the unpredictability that is the mark of the future and introduces into retrospection the uncertainty of the event.

(p. 188)

Ricoeur is careful to maintain the connection between the concerns of history and the present of the inquirer. Extending the analysis of the singular causal imputation to ranges of events, he recognizes an analogous structure wherein what he designates "quasi-events" are present whenever one can discern, however indirectly, a quasi-plot and quasi-characters (p. 224). Ricoeur discovers in all historical accounts traces of emplotment, which is necessary if there is to be effected a comprehensive synthesis of the factors that are taken to provide an account of meaningful human action. All action, albeit on different levels, shares in a narrative structure to the extent that we are able to recognize and account for it.

4.3 Review of Insights on Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One

In Time and Narrative Ricoeur extends his study of the creative capacities of language in metaphor to the larger stage of narrative. The constitution of the subject's worldview or horizon is identified in terms of foundational narrative plots, wherein potential courses of action are perceived as possible and desirable. The awareness that is mediated by narrative also models a fundamental form of human learning, namely creative imitation of other subjects' activity, which Ricoeur labels mimesis in narrative structures. Basic skills of perception and pre-thematic critical awareness are called forth and enhanced in the subject by the demands made on consciousness for a story or narrative to be apprehended and appropriated. Consciousness is pre-figured by those narratives which are dominant in the subject's social environment. As a result, certain configurations are considered embodiments of value where other intelligibilities are valued to the extent that they share common features of these pre-eminent narratives. Human action is given orientation and an implicit set of criteria which is internalized by the subject who is developing a personal identity, largely narrative in structure in which personal aptitude and social patterns of consciousness are combined in a more or less coherent fashion. The problem of continuity in

the expression and significance of human activity is articulated in narrative which recognizes and creates levels of temporal awareness, a major element in understanding and evaluating the importance of contextuality as an ethical factor. Imagination enables foundational apprehension of intelligibility and creates and provides a cognitional space. Within this space subjects can consider possibility as strong an ethical imperative as necessity. Imagination also carries and mediates the social forms of meaning to the subject who is then enabled to act (more or less efficaciously) in a socially significant manner. Specific features of this material will be examined in the three sets of criteria which have informed the exposition of imagination in Ricoeur's texts.

4.3.1 Structural Features of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One

The centrality of plot in narrative indicates how imagination is involved in the process of ordering sets of disparate elements. The basic features of intelligibility when concerned with human activity, involve form and temporality. A story must have a beginning, middle, and end to be recognizable; these features involve framing activity within a field of reference so that the activity can be identified as purposeful and significant within the larger context of social reality. The referential framework includes discernible links to semantics, symbolic systems, and temporality. The

imagination synthesizes these features of meaning in such a way that significance can be carried in the discrepancies that characterize the open-endedness of narrative and the unpredictability of human reality. The narrative simultaneously provides order and structure for experience while framing the problematic nature of human existence which requires creative interpretation and responses from all conscious subjects. Praxis is presented as more or less probable in narrative in which the subject's imaginative capacities allow images to reveal aspects of cumulative correspondences which may permit insights into action with which practical concerns are not immediately involved. At the level of mimesis¹, though, the primary influence of imagination is to reveal that the world is intelligible and that certain orders are to be preferred over others. The extent of activities thereby opened to the subject are not limited, as the imaginative process is dynamic and dialectical. The personal skill and capacity of the subject with regards to the operations of imagination affects the level of awareness which is brought to bear on social reality.

4.3.2 Imagination and Mediation in Time and Narrative, Volume One

Mimesis¹ identifies the necessary conditions for a subject to apprehend and appropriate a social world of meaning. Consciousness is formed according to certain plots

which accord normative status to certain forms of intention and activity. The nature of the process of interpretation is prefigured towards anticipations and values that have become habitually engrained in the collective consciousness of the society. This would entail social determinism if the narrative process was not dialectical and required the active and critical participation of the subject as a reader or member of an audience. Ricoeur identifies the imagination not only as synthetic but also as transcendent in its orientation. The prefigured dimensions of consciousness articulated and presented in narrative are never fully integrated understandings. The real and the not-real are presented in narrative so that the real does not pre-empt the possibilities raised by the non-real. The intent of the plot is itself a creative engagement with the data of consciousness; mimesis is the creative imitation of human action, where imitation is understood to selectively choose and emphasize certain elements which will permit reflection on the nature of the activity and its implications for further human behaviour. The narrative which prefigures consciousness also entails developments in anticipation which are not definitively articulated or mandated by the narrative itself.

4.3.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One

The interactive and dynamic engagement of subject and

narrative text is performative and has implications for the subject, the society, and the constitution of meaning. Human activity, the subject of narrative plots and the end of intentional subjects, is articulated by choosing among ranges of experience and emphasizing certain sets of criteria around a problematic which leads to certain types of resolution. In activity in the practical realm the implications of activity are immediate and real; in narrative, the implications exist as possibilities, where even the problematic can be re-considered. Critical skills are engendered in the subject by the exposure to narrative. The recognition and resultant grasp of meaning involves the subject as an active participant in the constitution and maintenance of meaning. The narrative plot allows the subject to discern and reflect not only on patterns of meaning, but also on the limitations of human understanding and the continual problems that require the synthetic order provided by narrative.

The material on imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume One focusses on the role and capacity of the subject to apprehend and intend meaning in narrative. Accordingly, the category of the relationship between imagination and the subject seems the most relevant place to start the discussion of the contributions of Ricoeur's work to the understanding of the ethics-imagination relationships articulated in the Lonerganian perspective. Again, the discussion that follows

is to be understood as indicative in nature, rather than comprehensive and prescriptive.

4.4 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship in the Work of Lonergan

4.4.1 Imagination and the Subject

The subject's identity as an agent and source of value is always grounded in a particular context. Ricoeur addresses the limits and conditions which constitute the subject's habitual orientation as an ethical agent by raising the question concerning the nature of virtue. This habitual orientation encompasses the subject both as already more or less engaged in patterns of value and as the condition of possibility within which more extensive engagement with value is more or less probable. In his discussion of mimesis¹, Ricoeur examines the basic capacities that each subject exercises in order to function in the world. As historical beings, our anticipations and abilities to appropriate virtue are shaped in large part by the pre-existing social patterns into which we are born and educated; our individual experiences determine the particular nature of our appropriation of these larger patterns.

Ricoeur identifies narrative emplotment and temporality as the essential forms which give human activity its

distinctive character. Inasmuch as identity encompasses the fact of historical reality, the particularity of personal experience, and the possibility of meaningful activity, narrative provides a coherent framework within which temporality becomes human and action is provided with both a purpose and orientation. The subject is a source and agent of value who operates intentionally. The significance of narrative in providing an avenue for appropriating time and making it human, directly affects the intentionality of the subject. Identity incorporates the memory of the past, the self-consciousness of the present, and the project of the future; all of these aspects of temporality have and require intentional agendas. Authentic subjectivity is a result of authentic intention and cognitional engagement; the normative dynamic that informs identity is given shape by narrative. Essentially, past, present, and future are connected in the intentional project of emplotment. Possibility is a condition of the future which relies on an adequate appropriation of the past and present. Whereas affective experience is relatively easy to identify in terms of its motivational significance, the dimension of temporality within which all activity transpires remains out of touch, and usually out of mind. As ethical agents it is clear that there is a temporal dimension which informs our self-understanding and motivation. This most obviously functions as a limit condition but allows for flights of fancy and reflection wherein our existence is

recognized as essentially (if not effectively) free. All human action is temporal and its intelligibility is given shape through narrative emplotment.

Lonergan's notion of value, understood in terms of the project of fourth level intentionality, benefits from this discussion of the understanding of temporality in narrative. The form of value recognized in narrative plots and modelled on actual events is temporal. Narrative intelligibility articulates the temporal nature of the project that ethical intention focusses. The depth of meaning carried in the cumulative aspects of language and its creative manipulation are indications of the temporal characteristics of human meaning. Continuity and contiguity are dimensions of the critical engagement with the "stuff" of meaning, which are inherently temporal. Ethical intentionality is understood as grounded in the concrete, and it continually anticipates greater intelligibility and value. The play of temporality provided for by narrative means that the subject is not constrained by history, but benefits from it.

Imagination is the ground and avenue through which temporality is accessed. The ability to become conscious of what is not, or is not yet, opens possibility as an element of identity. Intentionality which is conscious of the multiplicities of time has a significant edge in being able

to locate itself meaningfully in the world. Temporality is a feature of consciousness which can temper emotive response and promote intellectual endeavours by circumventing the data and exigences of immediacy. Through imagination, the subject is neither constrained by temporality nor a victim of temporality. Possibility becomes multi-faceted and ethical intention is recognized as liberating and creative.

4.4.2 Imagination and Truth of Value

Ricoeur's development of the notion of pre-figuration identifies the operations of recognition and discernment as foundational attributes of understanding. Lonergan develops the concept of skill as a recurrent scheme in which subjects exercise and develop control of their environment. Ricoeur suggests that imagination provides the ground of possibility from which more complex skills and mastery will later emerge mediated by control of the symbolic understanding in language. In relation to the understanding and judgment of value and truth, recognition and discernment involve the identification of intelligible patterns and a sufficiently strong indication that the perceived context manifests the characteristics usually associated with the pattern or image. Cultural traditions and history are appealed to in these instances. Judgment consists of an alignment of affective, sensual, and intellectual experience, which is recognized and

communicated through the appropriate image.

The capacity to recognize something provides an orientation and implies a reference point. Discernment is necessary as reality does not show the same face twice. The significance of discernment, which provides insight into judgment, is the realization that the familiar provides the structural features for judgment, rather than identity. This is rarely relevant in human interaction except at the pattern of intellectual operations. Judgment, then, consists of a combination of the familiar and the novel in which congruence consists of a mixture of experiential patterns, informed equally by structural, affective, and intellectual data. At the level of mimesis¹, judgment is primarily about fact rather than value. While the existence of patterns of anticipation shaped by dominant narratives indicates ethical intention, the full play of consciousness necessary for the recognition and choice of value in the judgment of value is not present at the level of mimesis¹. The intention of value requires the shift from the slavish or identical imitation of existing patterns to the creative imitation of value expressed in human activity. This entails a creative response and the translation of fictional possibilities to potential courses of action. Ethical intentionality is seen to function as a proximate and anticipatory concern at the stage of mimesis¹ rather than in a precise and prescriptive manner, which seems

still to be the assumption held at the common sense level concerning the role and function of history and tradition in shaping ethical norms.

4.4.3 Imagination and Society/History

Culture is public because meaning is public. Ricoeur establishes the imaginative bond which constitutes the human community as necessarily responsible for each other. The theodicy question is reformulated by Ricoeur who recognizes the suffering of innocent people as the suffering of all, across time and cultures. Because this is a foundational argument based on forms of communication which link all people in a shared reality, Ricoeur's proposal is not utopian dreaming, but a legitimate proposal. The ethical import of this is that the concerns of human suffering are by definition the concerns of every ethical subject. By participating in human discourse, all share a common orientation and understanding. The differences in experience and their forms of articulation affect the capacity of all to reconcile crises and problematic elements of the social order. The affective response to suffering is clear to Ricoeur. It is the only direct moral imperative he makes in the four texts being examined here. The constraints of culture are as ineffective as the passing of time in removing the responsibility from every conscious being to recognize and reject suffering as an

acceptable burden for other people to bear. Imaginatively, our identities are shaped by past events which are carried into the present in stories, artefacts, and activity. We can ignore the past only at our peril, which Ricoeur demonstrates to operate simultaneously at the literal and figurative levels. Imagination carries an implicit critical capacity which is first recognized in the mediation of meaning to the subject but which becomes a formal element of ethical analysis on the modes of reflection and appropriation of those texts which set social agendas. Since Freud, our psychic health has been recognized as subject to many variables, most of which we encounter in a relatively unconscious fashion. Ricoeur demonstrates that there is an adequate basis for reflecting on the impact of social reality on the individual psyche regardless of the differing levels of self-consciousness.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMAGINATION IN THE WORK OF PAUL RICOEUR - TIME AND NARRATIVE, VOLUME TWO

5.1 Analytical Themes Concerning Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

The second stage of mimesis is the focus of the second volume of Time and Narrative. The temporal space and awareness created by narrative texts provides the content for Ricoeur's study. This is articulated in terms of the creative process of configuration which allows the interaction of the subject's world with the worlds created and carried in the texts. The social forms of meaning, carried in tradition and history, influence the nature of the creative interaction of mimesis² through the connection of possible actions with more or less probable plots. The expansion of possibilities for consideration and reflection is a movement away from the demands of the practical realm and so involves different sets of criteria. The cumulative weight of past meanings are given new relevance in the creative and synthetic process of configuration in which the subject is able to encounter potential intelligibility in a space where action does not immediately entail responsibility. The imaginative variations of possible worlds allows subjects to reflect critically on their own assumptions and social constraints that habitually orient their activity. Again, the familiar serves to

accommodate the unfamiliar through the association generated by resemblance which is the creative essence of metaphor. At the level of narrative there is an interplay between the creativity of images and symbols and the limits which the narrative structures contain. The primacy of praxis is supplanted by creativity and possibility at the level of mimesis².

5.1.1 Structural Features of Imagination

Ricoeur identifies the productive dimension of imagination, which generates rules and schemas for assessing the appropriateness of images and symbolic structures, as also containing elements which continually act to challenge and disrupt the accepted forms. Temporality, carried in texts, is an example of this essential dimension of experience which can only be adequately expressed and challenged within the confines of narrative worldviews. Key notions in this process include the significance of resemblance, which brings union to dissimilar elements, and literary symbols, which carry levels of affective and conceptual meanings. The internal coherence of literary symbols are given a specific pattern and significance by the plot which allows for the emergence of varying levels of meaning when realized by a subject who recognizes the significant clues and indicators provided by the narrative. The historicity of language and of narrative

is demonstrated in the operations which first recognize the dimensions of the narrative and then creatively reflect on the implicit possibilities suggested by the developments shaped by the specific plot. Human actors most often are the subjects of narrative plots in which the attempt to render otherwise overwhelming and chaotic dimensions of experience provides models for subjects to render their own lives in more rather than less meaningful ways. Activity is given meaning to the extent that continuity with past patterns of action judged to be significant can be discerned by the subject who encounters the text.

5.1.2 Imagination and Mediation

Configuration is the stage of mimesis where the space for reflection on the nature of experience is provided. The congruence which may be recognized in configuration is a potential intelligibility which may or may not be appropriated by the subject. In positing and reflecting on the significance of alternative perspectives the subject is engaging the world creatively. Due to the fact that most narratives concern the activities of human actors, configuration carries an inherent concern with value which is articulated in the emergence of possible motivations and avenues of action. The nature of action is understood to be both practical and project. Deliberate activity results in

certain ends being met when it is successful. The impetus to action clearly precedes the action itself, but since experience continually challenges our ability to render it in a coherent and meaningful fashion, the motivation is never fully satisfied by the successful outcome of any number of specific activities. The open-ended nature of narrative articulates this dimension of human experience by revealing the tension and at the same time suggesting means of dealing with it. The imaginative space created by narrative allows the questions which challenge subjects' self-understanding and assumptions about the constitution and purpose of reality to emerge and be reflected upon. This reflection, more or less free, is an integral element in human process and is directly related to the subject's ability to make judgments about facts and values.

5.1.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination

The transformative capacities of mimesis² have the effect of generating new patterns of intelligibility which the subject uses to reassess his or her own experience. It is precisely as an actor intending value that the issue of self-identity is such an important feature of narrative intelligibility. The subject is able to assess those factors which have influenced him or her and to reflect on the implications of this experience as it affects his or her

ability to act effectively. A constant subtext of each narrative is the moral transformation of the characters in the story which becomes a vicarious but engaged means of exploring the subject's own moral culpabilities. The engagement occurs because of the affective meaning carried in the images and symbols which generate strong affects in the reader. Identity is created by an ongoing personal narrative which draws on the resources of the social order. The specific nature of each particular narrative involves the nature of individual experience and imaginative skill with which the subject attempts to understand his or her life as more or less meaningful. The specific features of these insights will now be examined by a close examination of Ricoeur's text.

5.2 Exposition of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

Ricoeur begins his discussion in this volume by clarifying his use of the term fiction, which includes folktale, epic, tragedy, comedy, and the novel. He contrasts fiction with historical narrative, considered as the attempt at true narrative (p. 3).¹ Nonetheless, he recognizes that narrative and fiction can generally be considered synonymous terms.

The focus of this section of the work on narrative is configuration, which is the second stage of mimesis. The

manner in which time is made accessible to human consciousness through configuration provides the subject matter for the study.

On the one hand, in effect, our temporal ways of inhabiting the world remain imaginary to the extent that they exist only in and through the text. On the other hand, they constitute a sort of transcendence within immanence that is precisely what allows for the confrontation with the world of the reader.

(p. 6)

This precarious experience is the experience of fiction, an experience within which a subject can discover new worlds and new possibilities, and in so doing, discover something profound and true about his or herself. The creative imitation of action through emplotment expands to cover a larger sense of action in which inchoate feelings, dreams, and questions become the stuff of which plots are constructed.

Action, in this enlarged sense, also includes the moral transformation of characters, their growth and education, and their initiation into the complexity of moral and emotional existence. It also includes, in a still more subtle sense, purely internal changes affecting the temporal course of sensations and emotions, moving ultimately to the least organized, least conscious level introspection can reach.

(p. 10)

A recurring structural theme involving creativity and innovation that links The Rule of Metaphor and Time and

Narrative is resemblance. It is central to the functioning of analogy and necessary for the communication and maintenance of tradition. It is also essential to the successful outcome of making the unfamiliar familiar. Unfortunately, the tension that seems to characterize much of human existence is not avoided entirely in fictional literature. The novel, in which plots developed to levels of complexity far exceeding the genre's predecessors, came to be distrusted as a provider of truth as it had originally been welcomed.

If, indeed, resemblance is only a semblance of truth, what then is fiction under the rule of this semblance but the ability to create the belief that this artifice stands for genuine testimony about reality and life? The art of fiction turns out to be the art of illusion.

(pp. 12-3)

Despite the fact that all action is symbolically mediated and given intelligibility through narrative structure, narrative is not always trustworthy and so rules that govern the interpretation of texts must be provided. A culture is already implicitly engaged in this task to the extent that certain stories are taken to be normative in that they provide a foundation for identity and purposeful activity. As literary genres increase in complexity, more explicit standards are called for and the development of criticism occurs.

Its proper function is to discern a style of development, an order in movement, that makes this sequence of developments a significant heritage. . . . In my programmatic chapter 3 in volume 1, I proposed comparing this prerational intelligibility to the intelligibility of the schematism from which, according to Kant, proceed the rules of the categorial understanding. This schematism is not atemporal, however. It itself proceeds from the sedimentation of a practice with a specific history. It is this sedimentation that gives this schematism the unique historical style I called "traditionality."

(p. 14)

Imagination is not completely unbounded; indeed, for Ricoeur, it has a history with which it must continually come to terms. The generative matrix that is the source of rules and is itself bound by rules, concretizes itself in time through the generation of images and symbols which connect particular affects with specific cognitive contents. In narrative, the extent of the possibilities that certain images and symbols give rise to can be explored.

A literary symbol, in essence, is a "hypothetical verbal structure"- in other words, it is an assumption, not an assertion- in which the orientation "toward the inside" is more important than the orientation "toward the outside". So understood, the symbol provides a hermeneutic key for the interpretation of the line of fictional modes.

(p. 17)

The line of fictional modes refers to the developmental

stages that symbols pass through, according to Northrop Frye. The stages are respectively the literal, the formal, the archetypal, and the final stage where the symbol is a "monad," by which "Frye means imaginative experience's capacity to attain totality in terms of some center" (p. 18). The last stage is not to be understood as functioning in a prescriptive manner. Rather, the movement between the stages is fluid and continual.

For Frye, the progression from the hypothetical [the literal stage] toward the anagogical is a never completed approximation of literature as a system. It is this telos, in return, that makes plausible an archetypal order that configures the imaginary and finally organizes the hypothetical into a system.
(p. 19)

It is the historical dimension, the sedimentation, that makes the systematizing possible. Ricoeur sums up Frye's project in the following:

First, it is because cultures have produced works that may be related to one another in terms of family resemblances, which operate, in the case of the narrative modes, on the very level of emplotment, that a search for some order is possible. Next, this order may be assigned to the productive imagination for which it constitutes the schematism. Finally, as an order of the imaginary, it includes an irreducible temporal dimension, that of traditionality.
(p. 19)

This is a direct statement about the major source of

normative criteria in the productive imagination, namely narrative genres; this normativity is necessarily mediated in time and thus is irreducibly human. Traditionality is much more than an interesting journey through the past; it provides the ground, and the possibility, of value. It is through narrative that human action has been identified, categorized, and evaluated in its historicity. This indicates the truth of the statement that we are all historical beings.

We are beings with stories. Stories we are born into shape us and we create and tell our own stories. We share our stories and our stories change. We have a certain understanding of what is appropriate, but that too can change. "An unexpected conclusion may frustrate our expectations modeled on older conventions but reveal a more profound principle of order" (p. 22). A fundamental trust in stories must exist for human life to exist. History's illusion of fatality that can undermine purposiveness is only part of a greater negativity which might occur. "Beyond every possible suspicion, we must have confidence in the powerful institution of language. This is a wager that brings its own justification" (p. 22).

The problematic nature of life is imitated in emplotment by means of the crisis, which has the dramatic impact of heightening the discordant which is always potentially

threatening to human subjects. Whatever the outcome in any given narrative to a crisis, it is indicative of the power of narrativity that events which are potentially nihilistic can be engaged in a meaningful fashion. "Crisis does not indicate the absence of every end but the conversion of the imminent end into an immanent end" (p. 24). The fact that we engage in telling stories about ourselves and others indicates that there is a basic urge to affirm and to understand which is fundamentally constitutive of who and what we are.

For my part, I hold that the search for concordance is part of the unavoidable assumptions of discourse and of communication. Either discourse or violence, Eric Weil has said in his Logique de la Philosophie. The universal pragmatics of discourse says what amounts to the same thing. Intelligibility always precedes itself and justifies itself.

(p. 28)

While it may appear self-evident from these statements that humans are engaged in a collective project of meaning, not all persons are convinced that the project is inevitable. Ricoeur refers to the literary critic and man of letters, Walter Benjamin, whose own tragic end makes the following statement more difficult to ignore.

Perhaps we are at the end of an era where narrating no longer has a place, he says, because human beings no longer have any experience to share. And he sees in the rule of advertising the sign of this retreat of narrative, a retreat without return.

(p. 28)

There are inherent limitations on the range of possible configurations that are available to imagination. These limitations include the communicability and coherence of particular structures.

Narrative, to me, introduces into doing anything supplementary constraints, other than those of a logic of possible narratives. Or to say the same thing another way, a logic of possible narrative units is still only a logic of action. To become a logic of narrative it has to turn toward recognized cultural configurations, toward that schematism of narrative constituted by the plot-types handed down by tradition. Doing something becomes recountable only through the schematism. It is the function of a plot to bend the logic of possible acts toward a logic of probable narratives.

(p. 43)

This structural capacity of narrative is not derived from a prescribed set of rules as much as it is from the actual doing of narrative.

. . . Plot stems from a praxis of narrating, hence from a pragmatics of speaking, not from a grammar of langue. This pragmatics is presupposed by, but cannot be produced within, the framework of the grammar of roles.

(p. 73)

The roles, the parts played by the characters in the narrative, influence the orientation of emplotment, affecting

especially the possible fields of enterprise that might be entered into (p. 44). As human action has been clearly identified as constituting the starting point, the basis of criteria, and the end of narrative, then the issue of change and continuity must be dealt with. The role of tradition and structure has already been identified as necessary to the maintenance of recognizable structures and the possibility of communication, since they provide the setting for the introduction of the new and the strange. The patterns that govern syntagmatic development display a similar function in linking stability and change.

The idea that homogeneous transitions assure the consistency of the text, while heterogeneous transitions assure the wealth of its information-content, finds a direct parallel in the theory of emplotment.

(p. 73)

Material which would otherwise be largely unintelligible is capable of effecting change by fictionally bridging the given and the possible. "Fiction, . . . continually makes the transition between the experience that precedes the text and the experience that follows it" (p. 73). The interval provided by the fictional narrative is necessary if our lives are not to be solely guided by the demands of necessity and the pragmatic. For Ricoeur, the genre that best epitomizes this is "still the fairy tale. More than any other, it takes us out of our everyday life and distances us from it" (p. 69).

The worlds that are created in narrative and that we reflect upon have a substantial impact on our behaviour. "However, a narrated world and a commented world remain worlds nonetheless, whose relations to the world of praxis are only held in suspension, following the law of mimesis²" (p. 74). To account for the temporal dimension that narrative mediates, Ricoeur suggests that there is a link between narrative and memory that is also held in suspension.

How could we explain that narrative tenses are also those of memory, if there were not between narrative and memory some metaphorical relation produced by neutralization?

(p. 74)

In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur introduced the notion of semantic impertinence through which new meanings and configurations were introduced by the deliberate subverting of semantic order. It required juxtaposing different levels of meaning simultaneously and not confusing the attributes of each. The suggestion made here concerning narrative and memory is similar to this operation, and is supported by this statement concerning temporal complexity. "Fictive time is never completely cut off from lived time, the time of memory and of action" (p. 75).

As the creative work of the narrative is not limited by

the demands of necessity, it can include things that would not otherwise be considered and thus relate them to human endeavour thereby enriching the scope of our experience.

Even when the narrative intends to render what is senseless, it places this in relation to the sphere of making sense. Therefore, if we were to eliminate this reference to life, we would fail to understand that the tension between these two times stems from a morphology that at one and the same time resembles the work of formation/transformation active in living organisms and differs from it by elevating meaningless life to a meaningful work by the grace of art.
(p. 80)

This statement displays one dimension of the generative capacity that not only is a function of imaginative operations, but that gives rise to and informs the creative dynamism. The ability to assign meaning to events and occurrences is one of the defining characteristics of human beings and this is one of the primary functions of emplotment. The question of perspective, or of holding or promoting a specific point of view, is raised by the fact that the narrator of a given account has a privileged position that seems to be beyond the range of a critical response. The omniscience of the narrator in shaping the form and impact of the story is not an absolute power that rests solely with the narrator, according to Ricoeur. "This privilege [of the omniscient narrator] no longer appears scandalous if we are willing to admit with Jean Pouillon that it is any case by

means of the imagination that we understand all other minds" (p. 90). Thus, the privilege of the narrator is a privilege that we all share, to a greater or lesser extent. The imagination is accorded here a type of sympathetic synthesis that enables us to share the perspectives of other persons which is a foundation of our sociability.

The issue of perspective is further posed by the differences between the text and the reader that challenge common assumptions about meaning and temporality. "Only the confrontation between the world of the text and the life-world of the reader will make the problematic of narrative configuration tip over into that of the refiguration of time by narrative" (p.100). This refers to mimesis³ wherein new perspectives affect the possibility of new forms of action. Temporality itself is affected and expanded by the creative developments in fictional narrative.

I shall speak of "imaginative variations" to designate these varied aspects of discordant concordance, which go far beyond the temporal aspects of everyday experience, whether in the sphere of praxis or of pathos, as I described them in volume 1 under the title of mimesis¹.
(p. 101)

The starting point of lived time is refigured through the operations of the imagination. Ricoeur examines three novels in Time and Narrative, Volume 2, to see how time can be

reshaped through fictional modes of narrative. He examines Mrs. Dalloway by Virginia Woolf, Der Zauberberg by Thomas Mann, and A la recherche du temps perdu by Marcel Proust as all three are not only "tales of time" but are also "tales about time" (p. 101).

Literature proceeds by way of imaginative variations. Each of the three works under consideration, freeing itself in this way from the most linear aspects of time, can, in return, explore the hierarchical levels that form the depth of temporal experience.

(p. 101)

The exploration of the depth and dimensions of time has a subversive aspect to it, since ordinary time is brought into question. One of the functions of fiction is that it is able to display discontinuity without having to effect immediate reconciliation, whether the differences be formal, philosophical, or ideological. "Only fiction, precisely can explore and bring to language this divorce between worldviews and their irreconcilable perspectives on time, a divorce that undermines public time" (p. 107).

The role of imagination in holding together various disparate objectives is examined in the novel by Thomas Mann.

The conjunction, through the narrative technique, of the novel about time, the novel about sickness, and the novel about culture is the medium that the poet's imagination produces to carry as far as possible the lucidity required by such an

exploration.

(P. 129)

The synthetic role of imagination is highlighted here in its function in creating and maintaining coherence via the narrative structure and not merely in terms of an arbitrary juxtaposition of random elements. The critical dimension is thus aligned with the synthetic in that the creation of new perspectives involves appropriateness both in terms of structure and potential in furthering understanding.

The role of the reader which has been recognized especially in mimesis² and mimesis³ has a significance that goes beyond the relationship of the reader to the text. One of the insights that Ricoeur discovers through his studies on language and narrative is that there is an irreducible social dimension to all humanity that language and story emphasize; the creation of our worlds is a joint project, entailing a collective responsibility for all to engage creatively in the process. Ricoeur recognizes in Proust the fact that literature provides a unique means of gaining access to this understanding about ourselves.

. . . Reading the book of life is "an act of creation in which no one can do our work for us or even collaborate with us."
(p. 150)

There is an individual dimension to this responsibility

which is unique to each person, and inasmuch as each person takes up their own "story" in a creative and significant manner the larger social body will benefit.

Ricoeur recognizes two main "paths" at work in Proust's novel; at the level of style there is the way of metaphor, and on the level of vision, there is the way of recognition (p. 151). The relationship between these two paths reveals some of the structural features of the image and the impression.

Metaphor and recognition make explicit the relation upon which the impression regained is itself constructed, the relation between life and literature. And in every instance this relation includes forgetfulness and death.

(p. 151)

This relation displays the tangible dimensions of the image via recognition (including for Proust all sensual data) and the creative possibilities provided by the metaphor in which the ordinary constraints of time and human limitations are superseded through the regenerative power of narrative. The affective limitations are recognized, but held in stasis in narrative. For Proust, however, the damning aspects of temporality are that human frailties are emphasized, which are ultimately related to us in terms of our finitude. Human activity cannot escape into narrativity, but it can be ennobled and given meaning through the offices of fictional narrative.

Ricoeur suggests that in the exploration of temporality and the creative synthesis effected by emplotment there is an additional aspect which demands a critical reformulation of the notion of human action.

I claim that the modern novel demands of literary criticism much more than a subtle reformulation of the principle of the synthesis of the heterogeneous, by which I formally defined emplotment. It produces in addition an enrichment of the very notion of action, proportional to that of the notion of emplotment. . . . At the limit, the "narrated monologue" to which the "Penelope" episode at the end of Joyce's Ulysses can be reduced, is the supreme illustration of the fact that saying is still doing, even when the saying takes refuge in the voiceless discourse of a silent thought which the novelist does not hesitate to narrate.
(p. 156)

Action is given primacy as the means by which new intelligibilities are brought into being in a manner analogous to that of narrative emplotment. The link between narrative and action is one of degree where the emphasis falls alternately on the structure of emplotment and on a notion of action that displays characteristics most clearly displayed in fictional narrative. Shifts in tense and voice provide an example of this, as does the expanded notion of consciousness that has become commonplace since the work of Joyce in literature and Freud in psychoanalysis. It is not merely coincidental that Freud's basic data came from his own case studies, texts structured in narrative form. The form of the

case study closely approximates the form of everyday attempts to communicate anything of significance to another; we tell each other stories and we rely on these stories to give us information about the world.

The largest part of our information about events in the world is, in fact, owing to knowledge through hearsay. In this way the act- if not the art- of narrating or recounting is part of the symbolic mediations of action that I have related to the preunderstanding of the narrative field, which I placed under the title of mimesis¹.

(p. 156)

Preunderstanding as a basic capacity provides a critical awareness that allows us to recognize and interpret fundamental patterns that we use to orient ourselves meaningfully in the world. The movement to configuration in mimesis² is a movement where the immediate concerns of everyday existence are suspended, by virtue of the suspension and consequent expansion of lived ordinary time.

The universal character of the formal principle of narrative configuration was thereby confirmed, to the extent that what this understanding confronts is the emplotment, taken in its most extreme formality, namely, the temporal synthesis of the heterogeneous.

(p. 158)

In his encounter with the three novels, Ricoeur

identified three aspects of the act of emplotment that corresponded temporally to the creative synthesis of the heterogeneous. "I was thus able to define a sort of transhistorical, but not atemporal, identity of the operation of configuration, by linking together the three notions of innovation, perennality, and decline, whose temporal implications are obvious" (p. 159). The dialectic that these three notions form defines the essential tension that characterizes the temporal nature of human life, namely, the confrontation of continuity and change. The challenge operates at the personal level, at the level of the social group, and at the level of culture, and it must be identified and dealt with at each specific stage for development and growth to occur. Narrative opens up its own time which manifests the space of possibilities inherent in the structure, within which creative responses and human time can emerge.

Ricoeur identifies a fundamental dimension of experience which corresponds to the creative dynamic inherent in narrative emplotment. "By fictive experience, I mean a virtual manner of living in the world projected by the literary work as a result of its capacity for self-transcendence" (p. 159). This basic capacity, the ability to engage oneself in the world that the text creates, is as necessary as the preunderstanding of mimesis¹. The text

leads beyond itself and this capacity is required if we are to engage creatively with our reality with any hope of success. Yet the laws that govern the text are not the laws that govern practical action; despite the fact that there may be explicit ethical content in the narrative, it would be a mistake to confuse the possibilities encountered in the world of the text with the pragmatic demands of the world of action.

Even if I have to admit that at this stage the problematic of configuration is open to a very strong attraction exerted by the problematic of refiguration- and this is so by reason of the general law of language that what we say is governed by that about which we are speaking- I still affirm with equal force that the boundary between configuration and refiguration has not yet been crossed, as long as the world of the work remains a transcendence immanent in the text.
(pp. 159-60)

The actual operations that might govern the movement from mimesis₂ to mimesis₃ have been inferred, but Ricoeur does not assign any normative status to texts or their potential roles in determining how human action might, or might not, be affected. "I am also suspending any decision concerning the capacity of a fictional narrative to disclose and to transform the actual world of action" (p. 160). It is clear from this statement that ethics (in mimesis₃) has its own set of operating principles; any movement from possibilities for action encountered in narrative will have to be mediated and critically evaluated according to the demands and specific

conditions required for praxis in the real world. The connection has been made between the first two stages of mimesis and the capacities and skills required of the individual at each stage have been examined. The specific influence and role of a text in transforming the capacity of a subject to act in an enhanced manner in the social order remains to be established.

5.3 Review of Insights on Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

Configuration entails the creative interaction of the personal world of the subject with the worlds conceived and carried in narrative. The element of value is present inasmuch as the incentive to give order to disparate elements of experience takes primacy over most human drives. Value is also carried in those texts and plots which the culture identifies as embodying the traits and features deemed to be most desirable. The drive to order is a drive to specific types of order which are accorded normative status in the social order. The continuity essential to a society's collective identity is carried and renewed in those narratives. The ability to maintain consistency in identity along with the necessary flexibility to deal with the changing demands of reality is encompassed by narrative emplotment.

Ricoeur identifies three features of configuration which allow the temporal and problematic dimensions of human experience to be articulated and reflected upon. Innovation, perennality, and decline are elements present in each articulation of the human drama. Innovation refers to the creative interaction of the subject with the frameworks of action presented in narrative. Perennality is the dimension of recognizability which allows subjects to identify and appropriate specific patterns of intelligibility in their own

and in narrative plots. The cumulative dimension of language and the development of literary models are the vehicles for the continuity of meaning promoted in narrative form. Decline emphasizes the temporal limitations on every human attempt to adequately create meaning. The shifting nature of reality and of developing human consciousness entails constant reformulation and the search for more comprehensive frameworks for interpreting the significance of human activity. The open-ended nature of experience in its temporality and significance is highlighted by the creative process of configuration.

5.3.1 Structural Features of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

Specific plots carry specific codes for identifying and promoting certain patterns of intelligibility. Ricoeur identifies this historical dimension of language as an aspect which informs the generative capacity of the imagination. The cognitional operations which intend coherence in the interpretation of experience are, more rather than less, governed by criteria of appropriateness because of the historical patterns of symbolic relationships. Imagination permits the subject to creatively interact with the stuff of his or her own experience and of others encountered in narrative form. There is, however, a predisposition to specific types of affective and cognitive relationships

carried in narratives which are both cause and effect of this patterned behaviour. The reality of this predisposition is recognized in the ability of subjects to recognize and empathize with the stories of others. Certain narratives engender responses that show the sympathetic and synthetic nature of human affectivity. Again, the imagination's power to discern resemblance is a key factor where similar formal features of disparate ranges of experience are recognized in the relationships made possible by the symbolic referents assigned to experience. Symbols and images are already part of a symbolic framework where intelligibility is largely pre-thematic. The creative play of the subject with images is extensive but not unbounded. Likewise, more appropriate connections of affectivity and concepts can be linked with specific sets of images in which the value is discerned in each instance to the extent that the dynamism to higher and transcendent values is present or enhanced in the images and plot. Imagination is not anarchical or chaotic; rather it intends order that will more adequately allow the fullest range of expression necessary for meaning to emerge.

5.3.2 Imagination and Mediation in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

The critical capacity of imagination lies primarily in its power to generate cognitional space where the subject is permitted a certain degree of psychic distance from the

exigences and problematic aspects of his or her existence. Here problems can be examined and re-evaluated without requiring immediate resolution by the subject. The discordance in habitual orientation which is the indication of a problem's existence is itself a useful piece of information about the nature of the worldview and social reality that the subject inhabits. Events which might not be considered significant or relevant are re-examined in the process of configuration and incorporated in a meaningful fashion which enhances the subject's self-awareness and narrative identity. Configuration permits the subject to exercise effective freedom by examining and choosing those elements in narrative that he or she considers to be most efficacious in helping to determine which concepts, affects, and courses of action are most appropriate. Mundane activity can be transformed into events of monumental significance in the creative composition of configuration. Value which might otherwise pass unnoticed can become the focus of narrative process so that human activity can be seen to participate in the intention and creation of value in the widest and most comprehensive sense. This understanding would most certainly shift the grounds of ethical possibility to a much higher level were it to become instrumental in everyday consciousness.

5.3.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Two

The recounting of narratives is a primary form of human action according to Ricoeur. The process of communication is a deliberate intention to create a significant relationship between subjects. The value of communication is performative and transformative. Identifying and transforming crises and discordance in the configuration of narrative effects changes in the narrator and in his or her audience. Tradition is encountered in the present through the auspices of narrative in a manner in which the original truth and significance of the formative event can be discerned, enhanced, and possibly acted upon. The future is also affected by the subject's greater capacity to envision potential and legitimate courses of action. The unfamiliar and the frightening is juxtaposed with the familiar so that the continuity of the subject's identity is maintained and simultaneously enhanced if his or her capacity to intend and realize meaning continues to grow. A crisis which might otherwise overwhelm a subject can be contextualized in narrative so that its appearance of absoluteness can be mitigated and defused. The extent and nature of temporal constraints on human existence are featured in many of the narratives which are accorded normative status from culture to culture. The element of crisis in narrative tends to heighten the awareness of the discordance which

exists between intention and goal which can spur the subject to critically transform him or herself to the extent that the subject is aware of his or her ethical culpability.

Some of the particular contributions of imagination found in configuration will now be discussed in terms of their applicability to the ethics-imagination junctures previously identified. The contributions of imagination to the understanding of truth of value and society/history are emphasized in this chapter although the implications of Ricoeur's insights are not fully applied in any of the three junctures.

5.4 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship in the Work of Lonergan

5.4.1 Imagination and Truth of Value

The particular question that is addressed in Time and Narrative, Volume Two is how insights into value and truth function. What Ricoeur discovers is the nature of the relationship by which imagination provides access to reality, through the mediation and the creation of a reflective space in which consciousness can play and possibilities emerge. Truth and value are recognized as linked to creative consciousness, not immediately as judgments, but as potential in which the creative performance of the subject is itself an

affirmation of possibility. Ricoeur's analysis of emplotment provides the framework and operative norms of imagination which give rise to these insights into truth and value.

The process of configuration identified by Ricoeur as emplotment suggests an understanding of how these creative operations proceed which might later lead to understanding and judging of value and truth. Configuration refers to the construction of new intelligibilities; the intelligibilities are new because they were not present or recognized previously. Ricoeur warns against drawing courses of action directly from the process of configuration as the pragmatic and the poetic do not share the same agenda. On the other hand, human activity is the subject matter of narrative emplotment and meaningful action is the goal of ethical deliberation. The history of ethics has, in a sense, provided the data for narrative emplotment. Creative insights extend the process of understanding and judging truth and value synthetically. Configuration builds on the operations of prefiguration, focussing on resemblance rather than recognition and discernment as the operative principle. Resemblance establishes its basis to truth through the performative establishment of congruence. There is a stronger appeal made to the affective dimension of experience than the more discerning intellectual dimension in resemblance as identity is neither the aim or a possibility of the

process.

The implication is that there is an aspect of judgment, especially concerning value, which requires an element of discordance in order to function. Precision is not possible in matters of politics and ethics, according to Aristotle. He also believed that people who sought precision in endeavours where there was none were foolish. Possibility, which is an essential characteristic of a judgment of value, where it remains to be implemented, relies on the tension of the familiar and the unfamiliar. While it is conceivable that one might be able to make all of one's ethical decisions on the basis of mathematical observations, the odds are against a successful outcome. There is an element of value where truth resides in the appeal to risk, which is a more honest reflection of the reality within which ethical projects are deliberated and decided upon.

5.4.2 Imagination and Society/History

Ricoeur recognizes in existing social narratives a resource for discerning principles of understanding and action, as well as the repository of imaginative resources with which the society functions more or less adequately. His examination of narrative provides an understanding of how imaginative constraints can limit ethical development, which

also allows for a critical and creative appropriation of cultural resources which would otherwise be ignored or rejected as non-vital and irrelevant. Dominant narrative paradigms are excellent indicators of the level of social consciousness and the imaginative capacities that inform ethical deliberation. Ricoeur recognizes that narrative creates communities and affects the possibility of development. An ongoing critical engagement is required for possibilities to result in value which in turn regenerates the communities.

The social forms of imagination that are accorded normative status are probably the largest single factor that affect the possibility of ethical development at any level of society. Fairy tales, music, horror movies, the six o'clock news, beer commercials; all of these factors have affective influence that directly shapes behaviour. Often the reason for the predominance of particular forms of expression are not legitimately linked to the values which purportedly are being promoted in and by them. A causal understanding of the social sets of images and their respective affects allows social behaviour to be manipulated in ways that subjects are not critically aware of. Experience is anticipated and selectively judged on the basis of already established imaginative paradigms.

Our social identities consist of the stories we hold in common with others. The question becomes one of ascertaining the extent to which one's stories support and correspond to actual values, and not only apparent values. Given certain social conditions, these issues may never be raised in a manner which encourages critical self-reflection but rather support the continuation of the embedded biases that seek narrowly conceived interests at the expense of real value. "Everyone has a story" becomes "everyone is in a story." The range and extent of the effective freedom that the subject exercises in his or her intentional movement towards value is linked to personal imaginative capacity and the existing forms of socially approved narratives. The extent of one's imaginative capacities influences the relationships that one considers possible given the constraints of imaginative possibilities effected by social conditions. These conditions are themselves a result of certain narratives being given or accorded a predominant place in a given culture. The question is not whether one is affected by stories; the question is rather what are the stories one encounters and how is one is affected by them?

5.4.3 Imagination and the Subject

The engagement with narrative requires a certain degree of trust on the part of the reader. One has to trust the

narrator, trust one's own responses, and trust the story. In the instance where the story is one's own, there is a necessity for the story to provide meaning as one's experience requires an intelligible and communicable form for meaning to emerge. Trust seems to be a prerequisite attribute for meaning to emerge; trust in language, as these are the tools with which reality is built and controlled, and trust in story, so that experience is given shape and possibilities explored. The revelation that most of our knowledge is grounded in belief rather than understanding indicates the reliance on patterns of relationships that are historically grounded and that have been proven to provide a certain pragmatic efficaciousness in shaping behaviour. The developmental nature of human engagement with reality is mirrored in the growing skill and awareness of the depth of meaning carried in language demonstrated by the subject who succeeds in the ability to identify and seek meaning as the complexities of the symbolic framework of language are mastered.

Trust is revealed as foundational to human interaction and it is continually tested as people engage each other openly. The social order and the promotion of culture depends on the possibilities created by communities which are instances of shared discourses. Difference and crisis require a social space where reflection on their nature and larger

significance can transpire without the very existence of social life being immediately and seriously threatened. The trust in one's own developing capacities for value and relationship are challenged as well in the day to day attempt to make sense of one's life. The bottom line in this respect is identified by Ricoeur as trusting one's ability to mediate reality. The continuation of the human project relies on the recognition that trust is the basis for all significant relationality.

CHAPTER SIX

IMAGINATION IN THE WORK OF PAUL RICOEUR - TIME AND NARRATIVE, VOLUME THREE

6.1 Analytical Themes Concerning Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

The final stage of mimesis is the stage of refiguration. A shift is effected between the temporality of configuration and the actual lived time of the reader, now considered explicitly as potential actor. The appropriation and utilization of past experience, carried in either personal or social narratives, is explored in terms of its affects on the ability of the subject to discern value and act creatively. The historical dimension of consciousness is recognized as a primary element in influencing the direction and motivation of ethical activity. The reliability of the social order carried and appropriated in specific narrative forms becomes an issue for critical reflection which in turn is seen to have a direct impact on the individual subject's ability to adequately orient him or herself towards value. Imagination shapes the necessary conditions for ethical engagement and is present as an operative skill that the subject requires to mediate the dimensions of experience opened up through the intelligibilities made possible by symbolic fields of reference.

Ricoeur identifies the refiguration of the subject's worldview and the ability to realize value as the necessary end of each significant encounter with narrative meaning. The translation of the poetic dimension of configuration to the pragmatic demands of the lived world, which sets a new range of considerations for the reader of the text, engages the subject as a creator of meaning. At this level the results of this new meaning are to be engendered in the social order. This enables actors to realize value more effectively and simultaneously regenerate the traditional sources of meaning which are recognized as significant ethical resources.

A differentiated understanding of the levels of temporality is required of the subject in order that the levels of meaning already operative in the social order be identified and correctly assessed. The historical nature of the ontological and existential problems that beset human actors is revealed in the shape and content of narratives which have provided meaningful orientation and frameworks for interpreting the vagaries of life in the past. The generative capacities of the imagination at the level of configuration revealed the same temporally constituted constraints in the capacity to discern potential patterns of intelligibility and in the predilection for specific combinations of affect and image. The narratively effected constitution of ethical agents of a refigured history, who

collectively and conscientiously seek value, is the project of mimesis3.

Ricoeur identifies this stage as potentially present in the existing relationships between readers and texts. The extent to which this normative dynamism becomes an intentional social project depends in large measure on the adequate articulation of the essential components of temporal activity and the requisite skills necessary for subjects to discern the possibilities for value opened up by this creative appropriation of temporality. The extension of the concept of action to saying and communicating noted in Time and Narrative, Volume Two indicates the foundation of ethical activity and means of translating possibility into actualized instances of value.

6.1.1 Structural Features of Imagination

Mimesis3 emphasizes the synthetic features of imagination. The existence of time depends on the consciousness of subjects who perceive, discriminate and compare the different modalities of temporality. These critical and reflexive operations permit the integration of different types of experience through the offices of the synthetic dimension of language which is given formal structure in metaphor. The affective dimension of experience

is central to the subject's engagement with and motivation towards value which is engendered at a foundational level by those images which intend wholeness and integrity. These images with ontological significance carry strong affective and conceptual attraction for subjects who recognize the comprehensive ends and intelligibilities to which such images refer. The level of the subject's motivation towards projects of value affects the apprehension of time as human. This critically implicates and indicates the relative value of the existing social narratives which either are giving rise to adequate levels of engagement within subjects or are not.

Repetition provides the pattern for imaginative operations to generate synthesis between disparate elements. The coincidence of similar features is repeated until identification between the two objects or fields of reference is created. Coincidence provides the invariant element in the synthetic project in which novel or unfamiliar imaginative variations are juxtaposed with ideal sets of images and memories. Identity is a result of resemblance which comes about through this fabricated congruity. The highlighting of repetition indicates that pattern has particular rhythms, the result in part of the narrative sources of temporality. Rhythm is an intelligibility which is temporal. Certain affective responses are called forth in subjects by particular rhythms. While music and tonal

resonances immediately come to mind as examples of this patterned response, fundamental forms of narrative intelligibility share similar features. Intentionality is linked with the subject's ability to discern and retain temporal patterns in consciousness in the passage of time. Coherence and anticipations are shaped by these operations in which constancy and continuity are primary values and novelty is peripheral. Recognition through the perception of apparent resemblance is guided by the terms of reference already instituted by the dominant narrative structures. Again, imagination's creative capabilities are shown to be a result of the historical patterns carried in language.

6.1.2 Imagination and Mediation

The shift between different temporal dimensions of experience is the primary feature of mediation detailed in mimesis³. The fictive time of configuration is translated in such a manner that new possibilities of action are realized by the subject in real time or the time of praxis. This is partially due to the generic nature of time as it is identified as a social object. The interchange of points of reference from the social to the personal and vice versa allows subjects to apprehend time in an impersonal fashion. This negation of the personal and the existential dimension of the apprehension of time allow more general accounts of

history to be made and promoted in the social realm. The generative capacity of metaphor in creating figures through which meaning can be assigned and apprehended allows historians to reconstruct and renew the past. The creative interaction of the subject with his or her own worldview with the worldview(s) promoted by the narrative maintains a certain openness in the possible interpretations and courses of actions that might be legitimately perceived by a subject. Besides the data of past and present experience, the sets of expectations linked to the images are likely to be re-examined in terms of their adequacy in comprehending the significance of the refigured perspectives which the subject has generated. The scope of the subject's understanding and the strength and appropriateness of the particular sets of motivations by which the subject is driven to act are linked in refiguration. The level of integrity present between understanding and affectivity is an indication of the subject's ability to intend and maximize value in his or her activity.

6.1.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination

Ricoeur makes an equation between subjects being affected and subjects producing or acting at the stage of refiguration. The end result of the engagement of the reader with the text is essentially moral since Ricoeur identifies the new evaluation of reality as the outcome of the mimetic process.

The significant contribution of mimesis to the project of ethics is primarily affective because of the synthesis of feeling and concept which occurs in the image. The perception and appropriation of meaning is an intentional activity in which the past and present are continually combined in the attempt to foster greater insight into the intelligible patterns of which our reality consists. The subject as actor which is the main content of narrative emplotment is the primary focus of mimesis³ in a pragmatic fashion.

The struggle to maintain coherence in the face of diversity is mirrored in the narrative identity of the subject and in the social narratives where continuity and consistency are virtues which do not rule out the legitimacy of innovation and change. This apparent contradiction is resolved in the layers of meaning carried by the cumulative nature of language. The most effective criteria in evaluating the worth of particular narratives is the extent to which the refigured subject is able to utilize the new perspective gained by engaging the text to explicate or illuminate the significance of his or her own experience. The practical demands of ethics are highlighted in refiguration where the integration and effectiveness of the subject as an ethical actor provides the order and orientation of the cognitional operations. In the ongoing project of self-understanding, which is shaped in

personal narrative, Ricoeur identifies ethical responsibility as the highest factor in self-constancy. It is critical self-appropriation and not behaviour which is effected through manipulation or coercion -the goal of refiguration. This indicates the nature of a foundational set of criteria for developing an ethics of art and of differentiating art and propaganda, both of which are perennial problems in the promotion of cultural value.

6.2 Exposition of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

Ricoeur begins this volume by addressing the connection between narrative and life which is the main theme addressed in the text.

. . . The effort of thinking which is at work in every narrative configuration is completed in a refiguration of temporal experience. Following our schematism of the three-fold mimetic relation between the order of narrative, the order of action, and the order of life, this power of refiguration corresponds to the third and last moment of mimesis.

(p.3)¹

Ricoeur discerns a pattern at work in the conscious mind that contributes to the temporal appropriation of reality.

Whatever the mind contributes to the grasping of before and after - and we might add, whatever the mind constructs on this basis through its narrative activity - it finds succession in things before taking it up again in itself. The

mind begins by submitting to succession
and even suffering it, before
constructing it.

(p.16)

Ricoeur makes the point that the soul or intelligence is necessary for the apprehension of time and that time does not have independent existence apart from human consciousness. Perception, discrimination, and comparison are all critical capacities very similar to those already linked to mimesis¹ and mimesis². Edmund Husserl expanded the Aristotlean concept of the "now" from a point-like instance by studying the phenomenology of a sound.

Husserl's discovery here is that the "now" is not contracted into a point-like instant but includes a transverse or longitudinal intentionality (in order to contrast it with the transcendent intentionality that, in perception, places the accent on the unity of the object), by reason of which it is at once itself and the retention of the tonal phase that has "just" [soeben] passed, as well as the protention of the immediate phase.

(p.26)

Ricoeur claims that the synthetic function is taken up through the metaphorical use of language, especially in consideration of how the term "retention" serves to explain the accessibility of events that have already passed (p.27). The notion of secondary remembrance is introduced to account for the difference between the event as perceived and then as re-perceived or recalled. The continuity in consciousness

that apprehends the event and its recollection includes difference and is a fundamental aspect not only of temporality but also of perception. The recollection is not fundamentally different in type from the original perception. There is a link between the two that is characterized by a continuous temporal space. Separation, in terms of longer periods, involves a different set of cognitional operations.

. . . The continuous fading-away characteristic of retention must not be confused with the passage from perception to imagination that constitutes a discontinuous difference.

(p.33)

There is a movement from perception to imagination that is generally misconceived, according to Ricoeur. The reason for the misunderstanding is that there is an inadequate appreciation of the dimensions of temporality.

It is the deep-rooted prejudice of the point-like present that continually gives rise to the illusion that the extension of the present is the work of the imagination. The gradual fading away of the present in retention is never the equivalent of a phantasy.

(p.34)

The connection between the present and the past is mediated by creative alteration of images, in addition to the recollection of the immediately past. "But the 'I can' (of 'I can recollect') cannot by itself ensure continuity with the past, which in the final analysis rests on the retentional modification that lies in the order of affection rather than

in that of action" (p.34). The affective dimension through which the past is engaged is complicated by a problem that was raised by the study of historical narrative, namely, the claim to truth that separates historical narrative from fiction. "Recollection must now be distinguished from imagination by the positional value (Setzung) attached to recollection but absent from imagination" (p. 35).

Imagination plays a central role in the Kantian system of understanding and appropriating time especially within its mediating function which operates according to the a priori principles.

Time, once again, does not appear but remains a condition for objective appearing, and this is the theme of the "Analytic." In this respect, giving a figure to time by means of a line, far from constituting a basis extrinsic to the representation of time, is an integral part of its indirect way of manifesting itself in the application of a concept to the object by means of the imagination.

(pp.48-9)

Indirect in nature, temporality is determined by a particular lapse of time, according to Kant. Accordingly, all determinations of time and the schematism share in being "a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept," which because of their a priori nature do not allow insight into their actual operations (p.49).² Ricoeur suggests that the schematization of categories provides

insights into the functioning of intuition, perception, experience, and principles of modality as they are mediated through subsumption (p. 49). For Kant, time has a transcendental orientation which is present to consciousness as mediated because time cannot be perceived in itself. For Kant, "time and space mutually generate one another in the work of the synthetic imagination" (p.55). Since there is a connection between time and space, there is likewise a connection between action and affectivity. "We are temporally affected insofar as we act temporally. Being affected and producing constitute one and the same phenomenon" (p.56).

For Heidegger, there is an affective dimension to being that reveals the ontological grounds that otherwise go unnoticed. Ricoeur takes this further, claiming interpretation is necessary to work out the relationships which mediate this dimension of life.

If it is true that "only as phenomenology is ontology possible," phenomenology itself is possible only as hermeneutics, inasmuch as, owing to this forgetfulness, hiddenness is the first condition of any effort at finally showing something.
(p. 62)

Heidegger addresses time in terms of "Care" which unites the three dimensions of temporality and demands differentiation in apprehending the significance of time. Temporality, historicity, and within-time-ness expand the consideration of time from a purely epistemological perspective to include

ontological and existential concerns (p.64). This indicates the shift to affectivity in which a synthetic juxtaposition of intellectual, intentional, and affective dimensions of experience requires an operational and mediating explanandum, namely the imagination. The inescapable nature of time and its impact on humans is highlighted. Heidegger's insights reveal the different ways in which we attempt to recognize and live out the challenges of time. There appears to be an analogous relationship between Heidegger and the generative matrix of the schematism of Kant in both its structural and hierarchical aspects. The focus on being provides the means for addressing the combined concerns of the human project, yet, it is a mediated understanding that will be reached.

Ricoeur's contention that ontology requires an interpretive framework is born out by Heidegger's analysis of the notion of the present.

But the present, according to Heidegger, cannot assume this function of articulation and dispersion because it is the temporal category least apt to receive an originary and authentic analysis, by reason of its kinship with the fallen forms of existence, namely, the propensity of Dasein to understand itself in terms of things present-at-hand (vorhanden) and ready-to-hand (zuhanden) that are the object of its present care, of its preoccupation. Here already, what seems closest in the eyes of a direct phenomenology turns out to be the most inauthentic phenomenon, while the authentic is what is most concealed.

(p. 64)

The tone of the last part of the statement is reminiscent of the earlier warnings concerning the inadequacy of a common sense approach to handle the larger questions of existence posed by temporality. Heidegger indicates his criteria by using the term "authenticity" which has a value that is foundational and necessary in a critical sense, as there are no guarantees in nature or time that indicate the consistent unfolding of an authentic life. " 'Existence' means a potentiality-for-Being - but also one which is authentic" . . . Without the guarantee of authenticity, the analysis also falls short of insuring primordially" (p.65).

Primordially here refers to the ground of being concealed in the fallen and degraded concepts that are characteristic of inauthentic and undifferentiated consciousness. "The reign of inauthenticity never ceases, in fact, to reopen the question of the criterion of authenticity. Conscience (Gewissen) is supposed to provide this confirmation of authenticity" (p.65). Thus, authentic being is self-reflexive. The focus on Care, from which the concern for wholeness gives rise to conscience, is central to the reordering of time in which the real authentic values can then be sought and recognized. The shift in focus that is effected is from the present to the future which is a shift that is reflected in the ethical concerns of Being.

"As authentically futural, Dasein is

authentically as 'having-been'. This summing up is in fact the turning back upon the self inherent in any act of taking responsibility. In this way, having-been stems from coming-towards.
(p. 70)

The present, which temporally is the least revelatory of authentic being, is focally restructured by Heidegger's highlighting of the role of the future in uncovering Care.

Anticipatory resoluteness alone escapes the dilemma: always having time or not having time. It alone makes the isolated now an authentic instant, a moment of vision (Augenblick), which does not claim to control things but contents itself with "constancy" (Standigkeit) that embraces future, past, and present, and fuses the activity expended by Care with the original passivity of a Being-thrown-in-the-world.
(p. 83)

The existential concerns of human beings make time significant and the retrieval of these concerns strips away the public dimensions of time that obscure this reality. "The history of the measurement of time is that of forgetting all the interpretations traversed by making-present. At the end of this forgetting, time itself is identified with a series of ordinary and anonymous nows" (p.85). The public dimension of the measurement of time, characterized by linearity, is not reflective of the lived concerns that epitomize human life (p.90).

Ricoeur rejects the reduction of human process to mere zoological development. The setting in tension of the time-span of individual lives with the expanse of cosmic time reveals some of the major challenges to the significance of human life. The attempt to deal with the problem is made through the imagination.

To this reinscription of lived time on cosmic time, on the side of history, corresponds, on the side of fiction, a solution opposed to the same aporias in the phenomenology of time, namely, the imaginative variations that fiction brings about as regards the major themes of this phenomenology.

(p.99)

In a certain sense, fiction rescues the attempts in history to assert the meaning of human life, and revives and explores the potential of order and openness that it contains. Traditionality would function this way under optimal conditions.

The bridging of different dimensions of time and the expansion of the concepts of temporality have already been identified as characteristics of fictional narrative, and have led to the question of how these developments aid in understanding actual reality.

A general theory of effects will be the result, one that will allow us to follow to its ultimate stage of concretization the work of refiguring praxis through narrative, taken in its broadest sense. . . . These borrowings will lie in the fact that historical intentionality only becomes effective by incorporating into

its intended object the resources of fictionalization stemming from the narrative form of imagination, while the intentionality of fiction produces its effects of detecting and transforming acting and suffering only by symmetrically assuming the resources of historicization presented it by attempts to reconstruct the actual past.

(pp.101-2)

While these issues are the concern of Ricoeur's study, there are other means of mediating human life vis-a-vis larger spans of time. Societies utilize rituals to organize and provide continuity at different levels of meaning. "Through its periodicity, a ritual expresses a time whose rhythms are broader than those of ordinary action. By punctuating action in this way, it sets ordinary time and each brief human life within a broader time" (p.105). Mythic time and cosmological time are embedded in our prosaic appreciation of time as limit conditions; an example of such a limit is found in every calendar, where there is always "a founding event, which is taken as beginning a new era, . . . [where] this axial moment is the zero point for computing chronicle time" (p.106). The very possibility of historical knowledge has a prior existential basis, for "if we did not have an actual experience of retention and protention, we would not have the idea of traversing a series of events that have already occurred" (p.107).

The designating of any time as past, present, or future is not possible without designating some instant as "now" or "today", hence as present, and providing a reference point (p. 108).

The present is then indicated by the coincidence between an event and the discourse that states it. To rejoin lived time starting from chronicle time, therefore, we have to pass through linguistic time, which refers to discourse.

(p. 109)

One of the primary ways in which chronicle time is made human is in terms of the notion of generation. This provides for both continuity as well as the affirmation of the living who have replaced the dead. The rootedness of the ethical project is given a social definition in the work of Dilthey, who expands the notion of generation from the family unit to "contemporaries who have been exposed to the same influences and marked by the same events and changes" (p.111). This understanding of generation provides an explanatory dimension that expands the notion of social time.

This form of belonging together is a whole that combines something acquired and a common orientation. . . . This is a "chain" or a series arising out of the interlacing of the transmission of what is acquired and the opening of new possibilities.

(p. 111)

Mannheim adds a distinction to the notion of succession of generations that emphasizes the influence of social

conditions in a prereflective manner on human action (p.111). One can recognize the potential for the unwitting bestowal of bias in such a fashion. The images that different generations identify as significant may contain influences which escape detection and yet affect behaviour patterns.

Alfred Schutz expands the notion of generations to include the anonymous nature of most contemporary social life given in the widest range of temporally mediated inter-personal relationships (p. 112). The anonymity in this expanded notion of relationships provides the link between personal and public time and allows for the possibility of general accounts of social history and relationships.

Contemporaneity here has lost its aspect of being a shared experience. Imagination entirely replaces the experience of mutual engagement. Inference has replaced immediacy.

(p.113)

The mediating function of imagination is linked in this set of operations with projection and, by implication, with all dimensions of temporality. The reality of death that faces each and every human being is dealt with in history by associating the anonymity of the public with death itself. The tension of inevitable death is dealt with through the replacement of each dead person by the next member of the living generation (p.115). The problems raised by the fact

of death are dealt with symbolically and are found in our interpretation of the data of history.

This representation of an immortal humanity, which Kant here raises to the rank of a postulate, is the symptom of a deeper symbolic function through which we intend a more human Other, whose lack we fill through the figure of our ancestors, the icon of the immemorial, along with that of our successors, the icon of hope. It is this symbolic functioning that the notion of a trace has to make clear.

(pp.115-16)

The connection with history is not one of idle curiosity or mere speculation but is characterized by the responsibility which should extend to our own behaviour. "As soon as the idea of a debt to the dead, to people of flesh and blood to whom something really happened in the past, stops giving documentary research its highest end, history loses its meaning" (p.118). For Ricoeur, history is not just accumulation of data but is instead a means of social critique (pp. 118-19).

The effect of history is more than mere recollection; it is, in a significant sense, a reformulation and reconstitution of the past which, at its best, stimulates a creative response in individuals. The possibilities that are opened up through the historical narratives can encompass a recognition of the Other as well as a differentiated sense of time. Ultimately, the imagination is used in reconstituting

the past because even the basic data of history is not sufficient in itself, according to Levinas and Ricoeur. ". . . The trace signifies something without making it appear" (p.125).

The different possibilities of time that are opened up by fictional narrative are recognized only insofar as they are contrasted with a fixed point of reference. "This phenomenon of reinscription is the invariant with respect to which our tales about time appear as imaginative variations" (p.127). Further, the time of fictional narrative cannot be completely encompassed in a prescriptive or descriptive fashion. Because fiction is not limited to chronological time as history is, there are no set boundaries which must be always respected. "Fiction, I will say, is a treasure trove of imaginative variations applied to the theme of phenomenological time and its aporias" (p.128).

Ricoeur identifies the fact that both narrator and the main characters are fictional in narrative fiction as the major reason why historical data can be utilized without an overly great concern for the veracity of the account. This was illustrated in the three novels examined in Time and Narrative, Volume Two. An example of how the anticipation of time is restructured by fiction is provided in Mrs. Dalloway, where "common time does not bring together, it divides," as

individuals in the narrative work out their private responses to crisis in isolation, though they are gathered as a group (p. 130). It is the problem posed by the juxtaposition of personal time with cosmic time that informs the three novels that Ricoeur examined.

. . . It appears that the major contribution of fiction to philosophy does not lie in the range of solutions it proposes for the discordance between the time of the world and lived time but in the exploration of the nonlinear features of phenomenological time that historical time conceals due to the very fact that it is set within the great chronology of the universe.

(p. 132)

Fiction opens up an awareness of the magnitude of the questions posed by the nature of time. In response to the question raised by the internal constitution of time (the mediating of the past, present, and future within a given individual consciousness), Husserl reformulates the notion of the present. The temporal unity created by the juxtaposition of retentions and protentions allows the subject to contemplate possibilities in the present via imagination (p.133). The imagination makes the present expand to incorporate the range of experiences that were once present and now can be made present again in a quasi-state via memory. For Heidegger, with his notions of time centered around the existential demands of Care, time is a multi-dimensional construction that owes its being, in part, to fiction.

By joining together having-been, coming-towards, and making-present on the level of historicity, repetition links together on this median plane the deep level of authentic temporality and the superficial level of within-time-ness, where the worldhood of the world wins out over the mortality of Dasein. This same overlapping structure of time is not just described, it is set into operation - in many different ways - by the imaginative variations of fiction.
(p.133)

Repetition seems to be a pattern that is conducive to mediating different strands of data, and joined with the image of overlapping, may indicate one of the operational procedures of the imagination. Ricoeur notes the following in his analysis of The Magic Mountain: "Discordant concordance is overcome in a coincidence pushed to the point of identification" (p. 134). Here resemblance, or apparent resemblance, is the structural feature that is identified in an otherwise random set of circumstances. Ricoeur emphasizes that in fiction the creation is specific in intent when universal meaning is provided a singular figure (p. 134).

According to Ricoeur, fiction had a salvific quality for Proust that went beyond mere content.

The Proustian formula for redemption is the regaining of time lost. We have pointed out three equivalents here: stylistic, in the figure of metaphor; optical, in the guise of recognition; and, finally, spiritual, under the patronage of the impression regained. . . . In

happy moments, two similar instants were miraculously brought together. Through the mediation of art, this fleeting miracle is stabilized in an enduring work. Time lost is equated with time regained.

(p. 135)

The issue of finitude and eternity is a constant one, and provides much material for fictional narrative. The fact that all humans face death is somewhat mitigated by the possibilities that are opened up in fiction (p.136). The flexibility of the imagination enables us not only to conceive new possibilities as responses to a major dilemma, but also to reconceive the problem itself. Some of the most creative writing in the genre of science fiction and fantasy use this approach to test the imaginative limits of the reader. In challenging normative assumptions, narrative reveals aspects of our own psyches, as well as providing new information. Although fiction explores the aporias of time, it can also examine its own limits. The temporal nature of discordant concordance is a limit condition of types of narratives as well (p.137).

Fiction does examine these aspects of temporality because they affect us and because all action is temporal. One of the basic problems of time, identified by Augustine and Aristotle, is that time cannot be seen or grasped. Ricoeur finds in Remembrance of Things Past an indication of the way in which

fiction gives a certain tangibility to time.

Everything happens as though the visibility that phenomenology is incapable of according to time, without falling into error, fiction is able to confer upon it at the price of a materialization comparable to the personifications of time in ancient prosopopoeia.

(p.138)

Ricoeur finds that while stories can manifest the dimensions of time they often raise the problematic aspects in increasingly pointed ways. Addressing Husserl's phenomenological attempt to identify a unified perspective on time, Ricoeur finds that the insights, i.e., retention and protention, create still more radical aporias. Imaginative variations that were applied coincidentally uncovered dimensions of time not identifiable through phenomenology.

It is by means of imaginative variations that every eidos is revealed as an invariant. The paradox in the case of time is that the same analysis reveals an aporia and conceals its aporetic character under the ideal type of its resolution, which is brought to light, as the eidos governing the analysis, only through imaginative variations on the very theme of the aporia.

(p. 139)

This excerpt has a number of interesting reflections that relate what the imagination is and how it functions. Eidos, or form, is the invariant that reveals and conceals the aporetic nature of time simultaneously; coincidence is the

eidos which juxtaposes imaginative variations with the ideal type of groups of memories and primary remembrance in an expanded present. Imagination has a coordinating function in consciousness, as well as the function of revealing the presence of an invariant through the variations it introduces in emplotment. The fictional plot follows certain recognizable forms while adapting and expanding the form at the same time. Imagination gives rise to the structure, maintains it, and plays with it. It also indicates the presence, as a point of reference, of the invariant which gives coherence to the set of events.

The fact that Ricoeur can identify and discuss discordant concordance at various levels of temporal significance indicates that the imagination shares the dialectical tension that characterizes fictional plots. Ricoeur sets out the pattern in which imagination accomodates discordant concordance in the following statement.

We can consider as exemplary the case of the constitution of the unity of the temporal flux through the coincidence of the expansion of the living present in accordance with the force lines of retention and protention, and the recentering of scattered memories in terms of the various quasi-presents that the imagination projects behind the living present. This constitution is the model for all the discordant concordances encountered in our work. It allows us to move back to Augustine and ahead to Heidegger. (p. 139)

The juxtaposition of different times and images is held in place by the intentionality of the individual, who chooses from the assortment of images and memories presented by the imagination in accordance with the perceived demands of the temporal projections of the retention/protection dynamic. Ricoeur feels that the basic tension of the discordant concordance is the same tension characterized by Augustine as intentio/distentio, and that it addresses the tension of a life, worked out in terms of a story, or, on a larger scale, in terms of a history. It is in literature that conflict and harmony are explored, providing a means of exploring the aporia and its resolution through the various imaginative variations in the story. "In this, literature is the irreplaceable instrument for the exploration of the discordant concordance that constitutes the cohesiveness of a life" (pp. 139-40).

Ricoeur adds the insights of Heidegger in order to strengthen his hermeneutic phenomenology.

. . . Repetition is asked to reestablish the primacy of anticipatory resoluteness over thrownness and in this way to open up the past again in the direction of coming-towards. . . . Nothing is more suitable than our tales about time for exploring the space of meaning opened up by the demand for an authentic taking up again of the heritage that we are for ourselves in the projection of our ownmost possibilities.

(p. 141)

Ricoeur claims that Heideggerian repetition brings to light the most deeply concealed aspect of discordant concordance, the tension that holds together mortal, public, and world time. This proves to be the best guideline for working out the different dimensions of fictive temporal experiences and permits insights about coherence to arise (p. 141). The three novels studied in Time and Narrative, Volume Two explore the possibilities of extending time against the facticity of death.

The limit-experiences that, in the realm of fiction, confront eternity and death serve at the same time to reveal the limits of phenomenology, and to show that its method of reduction leads to privileging subjective immanence, not only with respect to external transcendence but also with respect to higher forms of transcendence.

(p.141)

The inner resources of the individual are the privileged means of confronting and dealing with the limit-situations that accentuate the finitude of human life. The expanded notion of action that Ricoeur proposes includes existential dilemmas and recognizes the value of the imagination in addressing these issues. Phenomenology highlights the interpretive role of consciousness, and acts as a counter-balance to the prevailing notions of common sense that focus exclusively on external activity.

The expanded notion of time raises the issue of reliability of our knowledge concerning the past in formulating projects in the present. Collingwood's method consists of three stages in identifying the "pastness of the past, namely the documentary aspect of historical thought, the work of the imagination in the interpretation of what is given through the documents, and finally the ambition that the constructions of the imagination bring about the reenactment of the past" (p. 144). The last two stages emphasize how closely the creative and critical operations of imagination are joined.

Every historian, according to Collingwood, is the judge of his or her sources and not the reverse; it is the coherence of his or her construction via the historical imagination, which designates the specific interest of the historian as opposed to the observation of the present, which sets the criterion of judgment. "The place supposedly assigned to intuition is occupied instead by the imagination" (p. 145). Reenactment provides evidence that cognitional operations constitute a major part of reality. In nature the past is continually superseded by the givenness of the present, whereas tradition and culture are elements of the past that are continually brought forward and acted out of in the present toward the future. It is the element of temporality that allows for the specificity and variation

that designates human activity as human and enable us to identify progress and decline.

The otherness of the past, characterized by temporal distance, raises the issue of whether we can relate to those removed from our horizon and how we should relate to them. Difference carries ranges of affective power which can either distance the subject from the unfamiliar or link the subject with the other (p. 149)

The role of affectivity in determining the nature of the bond that links the familiar and the unfamiliar even extends to determining what will be considered familiar or unfamiliar. Imagination evokes affective responses and in turn is called on by affectivity. Images mediate the range and type of affective response along general lines of similarity and dissimilarity. "But while differences conceived of as variants are homogeneous with invariants, differences as deviations are heterogeneous with them. Coherence comes first, "difference occurs at the limits" (p. 150). Comprehensibility is a necessity if communication and the recognition needed for communication to occur through time is to be possible. The anticipations of the historian are the prefiguring schemas that enable him or her to interpret the evidence of the past. Potential coherent patterns are indicated in the integrity of the images which set the anticipations of the historian (p. 152).

Ricoeur suggests that the four basic tropes of classical rhetoric (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony) are the best means available for this prefiguring process because they provide a flexible and varied means of expressing the historical object (p.153). Ricoeur gives the privileged position to metaphor since he feels that metonymy and synecdoche are forms of metaphor, and that irony introduces a negative aspect into the deliberations. The linguistic dimension of figures of speech affects and shapes historical imagination without becoming a definitive element of the explanatory framework of history (p. 153).

Figurative language, then, is the backbone of the historical imagination; the function of tropology can be extended to the role of cultural critique whenever critical reflection on the conditions of human acting occurs (p. 311). Hayden White's analysis of history links access to the past with the recognition of familiar narratives where actual is known in the contrast with the imaginable (p. 154). While Ricoeur appreciates White's analysis, he feels that an overemphasis on tropology runs the risk of obliterating the distinction between fiction and history. It is the notion of "standing-for" which through the use of figurative language allows history to bring to language the events of the past as real that Ricoeur utilizes, but seeks to clarify. It is the "as" of the "really" of standing-for, the facts as they really

happened, that Ricoeur identifies as significant in introducing the necessary corrective to a purely rhetorical solution to the issue. The consciousness of being is itself metaphorical where the figurative dimension unites the ontological dimension of experience with identifiable affects (p. 155). There is a dialectical function of the notion of standing-for that is revealed in its multiplicity of roles, which was anticipated in The Rule of Metaphor. The reduction to the same, the recognition of Otherness, and the analogizing of apprehension are all aspects of the role of imagination (p. 157). The rebuttal of the naive approach to the pastness of the past is linked to the critique of the simplistic understanding of the "unreality" of fiction. Critical reflection, in this imaginative sense, reveals dimensions of experience which enhance the possibility of the subject actualizing value (p. 158).

The novelty of the creative insight leads to refiguration; this is not an accidental aspect of the mimetic process. Through the imagination a synthesis is effected between the world of the reader and the world opened up by the text which is necessary if there is to be an exchange of meaning. It is through the relationship of seeing-as and being-as, worked out at the level of metaphor, that the linking of the fictive world of the text and the real world of the reader can be effected. Action is already symbolically

prefigured at the stage of mimesis¹ and for the text to move beyond its immanent transcendent possibilities to mimesis³, reading must occur (pp. 158-9). Just how a text actually influences particular courses of behavior has to be worked out in individual cases.

The trustworthiness of authors can be called into question in a deliberate fashion by the particular narrative structures, which call for critical responses from the individual readers. Reading can become a critical engagement with the narrative and the author's assumptions which heightens the subject's self-awareness (p. 164). Ricoeur reiterates the fact that reading is essential to the text's meaning and significance since there is no configuration or world of the text without a reader, contrary to those who believe that the text's meaning is intrinsic and reading is an accidental or contingent event (p.164).

There is an interplay at work between the anticipations incorporated in the plot of the text and the anticipations that the reader brings to the story. This affects the range of possibilities that the reader is capable of. The sets of anticipations that the reader brings to the text are successively modified by the data in the narrative. Shifts in the expected sequence of events occur through the cumulative and layered levels of meaning carried in language

(p. 168). The reader has to come to the text with an openness as well as a set of anticipations if there is to be any interaction with the text. Ricoeur takes the concept of the wandering viewpoint from the work of Wolfgang Iser which claims that the whole of the text can never be grasped at once and that reading entails a movement that corresponds to the movement in the plot (p. 168). The openness of the text is further extended by the very indeterminacy that is a deliberate part of the text itself. The discordant concordance that the text embodies requires the subject to assign a form to the text so that its meaning can be discerned and compared with the existing paradigms of meaning (pp. 168-69).

The critical capacities of the reader are required to discern absence and abundance in the text. Reading reveals a lack of determinacy and an excess of meaning where the proper perspective is never fixed as the text both attracts the reader and is perceived as unreal (p. 169). The critical dimension of emplotment is fully realized when mimesis² and mimesis³ are comprehensively engaged, when mediated through the activity of reading. The reader's interpretation of the text is a synthetic process which disturbs the habitual patterns of anticipation which orders the subject's activity (p. 170).

This shaking up of the reader has its equivalent in the text which is transformed in the reader who actualizes the role prefigured in the very construction of the narrative (p. 171). According to Jauss, the reading of a text also effects an expansion of temporal appropriation in the subject which is manifested in the juxtaposition of expectations from the past and the present (p. 172). The development of literary history is marked by texts that change perspectives, that open up new possibilities, and that provide a benchmark for literature by which to gauge itself. Classics not only reveal significant aspects of meaning to subjects, they also open up new questions and issues for reflection (p. 172).

The classical is timeless in that it is of all times, unique in that it forces continual response and not outside of time. "Literary history would not be possible without a few great works serving as reference points, relatively enduring in the diachronic process, and acting as powerful forces of integration in the synchronic dimension" (p. 173). Literary works, then, influence the range of attitudes and values that are considered acceptable in a given culture. This is accomplished by the juxtaposition of the imaginary world of narrative and the social realm of practical action which creates a new concordance (p. 173). There is a jarring affect in the juxtaposition of the imaginary and the real, but it is a creative tension inasmuch as the meeting of the

different perspectives is the occasion of possibility.

The moment when literature attains its highest degree of efficacy is perhaps the moment when it places its readers in the position of finding a solution for which they themselves must find the appropriate questions, those that constitute the aesthetic and moral problem posed by a work.

(p. 173)

Literary hermeneutics, according to Jauss, has three basic functions: understanding, explanation, and application. The primacy of understanding is due to the relationship between knowledge and enjoyment that ensues in literary hermeneutics. This relationship is analogous to that of an integrated life where affect and intellect intend the same values (p. 174). Ricoeur notes that Jauss reaffirms the significant role of affectivity in the process of meaning.

Pleasure is a perceptive reception attentive to the prescriptions of the musical score that the text is, one that opens us by virtue of the horizontal aspect that Husserl attributed to all perception. By all these features, aesthetic perception is distinguished from everyday experience and thus establishes a distance in relation to ordinary experience. . .

(p. 174)

The pleasure is of different varieties, including critical and moral dimensions that stimulate the individual to reflect on his or her experience. "A complex set of effects is attached to catharsis. It designates first of all

the effect of the work that is more moral than aesthetic: new evaluations, hitherto unheard of norms are proposed by the work, confronting or shaking current customs" (p. 176). The effect is achieved by the imaginary space that enables the examination of new and possible affects, without being overwhelmed by our own habitual affects. Catharsis allows the reader to appropriate the new understanding generated by reading in which the potential changes include both affective and intellectual dimensions of experience in the refiguring of reality (p. 176).

The interpretive process that readers utilize in dealing with narrative incorporates the same dialectical tensions that characterize the original existential dilemmas and the narrative emplotment. Freedom and constraint culminate in the apparent paradox of constrained freedom in which the order imposed by limitation permits creative refiguration of the readers' own worlds (pp. 177-78).

The ideal situation of a critically informed reading community, that reflects the values and sense of normativity in the classics that continually revitalize and stimulate the community, is based on a precarious meeting of change and stability. Continuity and change are the dynamics that inform the refiguration of the narrative world and the subject's world in the act of reading. A greater social influence of

the narrative occurs in the social world as readers move further into the imaginary world of the text (p. 179).

In terms of the role of imagination in retrieving the reality of the past through the use of fictional techniques in historical narrative, Ricoeur states that "the empty place to be filled by the imaginary is indicated by the very nature, as nonobservable, of what has been. . . . We then see that the role of the imaginary grows as the approximation becomes increasingly precise" (p. 181). It is the development of measurement and its application to the past that makes the greater precision possible. Measurement is an interpretation and so constitutes a creative understanding of the nature of reality. The comparison of two disparate entities that measurement allows leads to general formulations about reality and the means necessary to evaluate the validity of the creative hypotheses (p. 182). The assigning of dates to potential and imagined presents is another example of the interweaving of factuality and fiction. Ricoeur reexamines the notions concerning generations discussed previously and concludes that the social relationships of human generativity are imaginary at their roots (p. 183).

The trace is the primary datum that historians rely on for their reconstructions of the past. The trace reveals the imaginary links that constitute historical time in its

symbolic nature (p. 183). The representative nature of the trace indicates the creative process that is necessary for meaning to be linked or reconstructed when historians attempt to discern intelligibilities in the past (p. 184). Ricoeur insists that the historian's attempt to "provide ourselves with a figure of" opens an excellent opportunity to study the operations of the imagination. The use of the notion "standing-for" which represents the past is a prime example of the imagination at work. The Same, the Other, and the Analogous co-exist in the images which are used to re-create the past; tension is provided a figure(s) but is not resolved so questions remain to be addressed (p. 184).

For Collingwood, the imagination is not only operative in the historical process, it also rescues the past from oblivion. Reenactment is the end of history and the means by which the Other is recognized and approached. Through imagination the foreignness of the Other is both creatively and affectively respected and transcended (p. 184). In Hayden White's analysis, tropology takes on the representative task of standing-for, accentuating a visual perspective.(114) This process "consists in moving from the dated past and the reconstructed past to the refigured past, and in specifying the modality of the imaginary that corresponds to this requirement for figurativeness" (p. 185). One of the ways that the imaginary is shaped in response to this requirement

is through emplotment. The literary genres and types that we recognize also predispose subjects to interpret certain events as parts of already existing patterns (p. 185).

Ricoeur notes a peculiar effect that is created when the historian utilizes diction, for Aristotle the "making visible" of language, and fiction. "But a strange complicity is sometimes created between this vigilance and the willing suspension of disbelief, out of which illusion emerges in the aesthetic order" (p. 186). Ricoeur worries about the ideological uses that history can be put to, especially as they reflect and maintain an inequable sharing of power. The emotional connotations associated with the past can blind subjects to the excesses and problems that culture continues to carry in its traditional stories and rituals. The sacredness with which certain foundational and pivotal persons and events are viewed is, however, a necessary aspect of historical consciousness (p. 187).

This raises the interesting question of whether or not the affective dimension proper to religious experience is the same as, or linked in some way to the affective response proper to ethical reflection. Ricoeur identifies the affective response that is the proper response to innocent suffering. "Horror attaches to events that must never be forgotten. It constitutes the ultimate ethical motivation for

the history of victims" (p. 187). The techniques used by historians emphasize the figurative aspects of language to achieve the desired effects by providing images which allow the past to be appropriated (p. 188). The use of narrative is not only an effective method of drawing forth affective responses in readers, it also brings to consciousness dimensions of reality that would otherwise be neglected in everyday experience (p. 190). The temporal dimension has a profound impact on ethics; normativity is grounded in past experience and tradition. Belief is grounded in the past inasmuch as probable courses of action must share common features with what has been judged to be of value in the past (p. 191).

Fiction has its greatest impact on helping understanding when it is most flexible and least constrained by concerns about actual reality. Mimesis is the creative representation of human action and not identically imitative. The existing social and cultural patterns are therefore not reproduced in narrative but rather are considered as possibilities which are more or less probable and desirable. Both the past and the present are examined as sets of potential scenarios which increase the range of choices available to the discerning subject (p.191). The past is a resource which includes the real potentialities in history and unreal fictional possibilities carried in narrative. Absolute distinctions

between these two categories are impossible to make due to their similar operational features (pp.191-92).

Ricoeur notes that affectivity is central to the ethical quest for Hegel, as "moral conviction is nothing without the total and unreserved motivation of an idea mobilized by passion" (p.196), but rejects as unfeasible Hegel's project of an overall synthesis. No interpretive framework is sufficient to understand the ultimate plot of reality (p. 206). An outcome of recognizing the implications of historical consciousness is that the ability to understand ourselves is limited by temporal constraints. Essentially thought cannot encompass the grounds of its own temporality and so causal accounts of consciousness are limited by the subject's own finitude (p.206).

Anticipation is a synthetic, rather than a cumulative process, through which a person is oriented and affected. Expectation which is conditioned by experience is not derived from experience; the relationship between experience and expectation is temporally constituted and creatively engaged (p. 209). The activity of history displays some of the characteristics of expectation that follow from this idea. First, there is the notion of history as progress, with an emphasis on acceleration toward the novel, second, there is the concept of change, where "the word 'revolution' now bears

witness to the opening of a new horizon of expectation," and third, there is the idea of history as something to be made (p. 211). The notion that history is subject to human action is the most fragile idea that is used to delimit the horizon of expectation, according to Ricoeur. There is also a sense in which history acts as an indicator of future developments. Making and narrating are both creative acts where the historical realm is refigured (p. 212).

One of the serious problems of modernity is the lack of a critical historical consciousness. This is a result of the contraction of experience to increasingly narrow interpretive frameworks and the loss of the creative tension due to the increasing gap between experience and expectation that characterizes modern culture (p. 212). This lack of focus affects the culture's sense of its own normativity and lessens the possibility of a meaningful future. Crises of value arise when the past is not connected with the future in an intelligible and meaningful manner (p. 213).

The larger issues of history and meaning reveal a dynamic informed by a strong affective sentiment which displays the overall ethical concern that is at the root of human action. Ricoeur identifies the ethical and political dimensions of thought as integral to human practice and grounded in the truthfulness of communicative relationality (p. 214).

Creative possibility relies on the relationship between anticipations and experience which is characterized by tension: creative, affirmative, and negative tension. The dialectic between continuity and change requires the simultaneous affirmation of normative patterns and the recognition that practical exigences require flexibility and development (p. 215).

Once again, human action provides the ground, the criteria for reflection, and the end point for the interpretation of reality. Ricoeur warns that utopian projects hinder the possibility of real value emerging because of their lack of a grounding in real experience and social conditions (p. 215). Utopias do not provide the direction necessary for practical action. Ricoeur understands history as providing direction and a bond for all people. The resources of the past must be accessible if subjects are to be able to explore their future potential. Our expectations that the future is completely unfettered and the past totally determined can block both avenues. Expectation must be more focussed and experience more accessible for the past to enrich the possibilities of the future (p. 216). The affective dimension of history must be incorporated into our attitudes about the future. The suffering of past generations can strengthen the link between experience and expectation so that the future remains tenable (pp. 216-17).

The juxtaposition of perspectives entails a certain flexibility in recognizing and accepting the other as legitimate. The engagement of historical imagination entails entering the worlds of others which opens the subject's own worldview to questioning (p. 220). Engaging in the project of history also promotes the development of a critical perspective concerning the present. It is in the present of consciousness that the juxtaposition of different worlds is possible and it is out of the present that we are more or less effectively able to act as agents of value.

The mediation between present and past is possible as "the symbolic function itself is not foreign to the domain of acting and suffering" (p. 221). It is always a critical response that is called for in response to claims from history, both in terms of the recognition of our own place in history and attendant biases, and of the content of the claim. Because we act out of traditions we are already implicitly engaged in claims of truth that inform our consciousness and shape our projects (p. 223). Ricoeur indicates that while prejudice is present within the process of judgment, it is subject to the rule of reason and therefore, is challenged by the best argument put forward and not allowed to function independently as a source of judgment (p. 225). The claims of truth that are made must be situated in the context of temporality if they are to be relevant to

practical concerns.

. . . The transcendence of the idea of truth, inasmuch as it is immediately a dialogical idea, has to be seen as already at work in the practice of communication.

(p.226)

The notion of tradition carries an idea of the givenness of the past and the normative concepts that are grounded in this. This accounts for the common assumption that what exists and what is valuable are identical which is only partially true (p. 227). The untapped potentiality of the past may affect normativity and the shape of history itself. Untapped historical resources may be the necessary elements in the creation of a new historical consciousness (p. 227). Such a development has great importance for a revised concept of ethics in which the emphasis is on development rather than on prescription. The interplay of past and future in consciousness allows us to revitalize our history and our hopes in a practical and effective manner (pp. 227-28).

The process of refiguration entails a mediation between the world of the text and the world of the reader which is brought about in the present, or "now," of the reader. Praxis, which was the starting point of the process, again becomes the focus of the enterprise. The role of language in mediating ethical intentions into meaningful action is a

central element here (p. 232). An example of such an initiative is the promise, a speech act that initiates purposeful activity in a coherent and continuous sense (p. 233). The speech act not only initiates new action but provides a context within which the action can be seen to be meaningful. The linking of tradition with future-oriented action is necessary for action to be significant. Imagination mediates this transition by linking the desirable and the reasonable in images which accentuate possible courses of action (p. 235).

The selfhood of an individual is the result of the mix of history and fiction. The specific narrative identity of the individual is a practical category which affects the capacity for action (p. 246). Our meaning and our identity are intrinsically linked. "To answer the question 'Who?' as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully put it, is to tell the story of a life" (p. 246). The significance of an identity mediated in such a fashion is that there is continuity provided between the person and the individual episodes and events over time which have also changed and affected the individual. Identity is a dynamic in which self-constancy keeps a subject from becoming inflexible or distanced; the tension of personal identity shares the same temporal dynamics that are carried and refigured in narratives (p. 246).

Ricoeur explicates the significance of narrative identity by contrasting it with an uncritical and unreflective life. A life which is clarified and purged cathartically through the engagement with narratives is a life which is engaged in the work of culture by taking up and embodying the possibilities carried in the culture's stories. The individual and the community share the same patterns of self-constitution and create new history in the actuation of value (p. 247).

The "talking-cure" of Freud supports and highlights the role of the narrative identity in personal well-being, as well as the importance of the discursive aspect of narrative identity. A coherent and acceptable story are features of the subject who is self-constant in an authentic fashion (p. 247). The focus on narrative identity brings to the fore the subject, who is the means and end of the narrative process. The creation of narrative identity is the end of the mimetic process, which itself is never ending.

The first mimetic relation refers, in the case of an individual, to the semantics of desire, which only includes those prenarrative features attached to the demand constitutive of human desire. The third mimetic relation is defined by the narrative identity of an individual or a people, stemming from the endless rectification of a previous narrative by a subsequent one, and from the chain of refigurations that results from this. In a word, narrative identity is the poetic

resolution of the hermeneutic circle.

(p.248)

The process of interpretation serves an individual, not the reverse. The act of reading, which is central for Ricoeur, is what keeps the space of experience open and engages the consciousness in otherness.

Our analysis of the act of reading leads us to say rather that the practice of narrative lies in a thought experiment by means of which we try to inhabit worlds foreign to us. In this sense, narrative exercises the imagination more than the will, even though it remains a category of action.

(p.249)

The constancy of self-knowledge is not provided solely by the narrative identity; the initiative which is the ground and manifestation of responsibility is required as well. ". . . This impetus is transformed into action only through a decision whereby a person says: Here I stand! So narrative identity is not equivalent to true self-constancy except through this decisive moment, which makes ethical responsibility the highest factor in self-constancy" (p. 249). Ricoeur expands the range of ethics to include narrative by identifying underlying assumptions that inform the narrative project. Narrative is inherently ethical because it is an evaluation of the world. The reader has to make choices which are then actualized if they are true instances of value (p. 249).

The possibility of a traditionally based ethical system is grounded in the shared language that enables a community to function within a minimally accessible symbolic system. The extension of this concept leads to the notion of an inclusive history of all humankind which Ricoeur argues for as a remedy for social and political problems and as a concrete possibility. The two essential elements in this process are the conversion of utopian values to practical courses of action and the critical appropriation of tradition which promotes true values (p. 258).

Ricoeur sees a prefiguring of this shared history in the anticipations of language. These anticipations are accumulated and carried in language so that every instance of communication is prefigured in tradition itself (p. 259). The significance of the present as a time of initiative holds together all the temporal dimensions and gives them a form, again in the act of communication in which the promise epitomizes the essential values and projects that make culture viable (p. 259).

Through the operations of the imagination, and the flexibility afforded by narrative voice, all dimensions of temporality are interchangeable.

Indeed, we can consider anticipations
about the future as anticipated
retrospections, thanks to that

remarkable property of narrative voice -
. . . - that it can place itself at any
point of time, which becomes for it a
quasi-present, and, from this observation
point, it can apprehend as a quasi-past
the future of our present.

(p. 260)

The possibilities offered to the individual by fiction allow for the suspension of the necessity to make a choice, which characterizes the other spheres of human experience; the operations of the imagination do not include the same type of restrictions that influence our activity in the social world (p. 271). It continually remains to be seen whether the freedom provided by imaginative operations becomes actualized and transformative of the social order.

6.3 Review of Insights on Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

Refiguration at the stage of mimesis³ links the possibilities engendered by configuration with the demands of the realm of praxis. The result is an enhanced capability of the subject to achieve value and meaning in his or her activity. The process involves a differentiated appreciation of the dimensions of temporality and the respective roles played by levels of time in the constitution of human worldviews. The enhancement of the subject's ability to create meaning is mirrored in the revitalized history that Ricoeur envisions as a result of large scale refiguration in the social realm. The final reference of narrative is always human praxis which is the dynamic that informs the engagement of a reader with a text. The fullest significance of the manner in which meaning is mediated and appropriated by human actors is revealed in narrative emplotment in which the human project is provided form and orientation. Outside of the synthetic and creative capacities of the imagination human experience is largely unintelligible. The critical capacities of subjects to recognize and choose among potential perspectives and courses of action are a result of the operations of imagination which permit consciousness to explore experience without the urgency of immediate demands setting the primary sets of criteria. The centrality of

affectivity in engaging and motivating the subject as an ethical actor is anticipated in the reader's engagement with a narrative. Existential and ontological concerns are given specific shape in narrative which then allows the subject to explore the depth of his or her commitment to the critical engagement with meaning. Those narratives which promote this type of reflection are accorded high status in cultures which identify their past as a major resource to be appropriated if the culture is to be successfully sustained.

Narratives as carriers of meaning are inherently ethical in their function as critical evaluators of reality. The goal of refiguration is to effect an integrity in the subject's affective and intellectual experience which together intend value as the normative end of human life. The layers of complexity that condition the possibility of action are the themes that narratives explore in specific detail and imaginative variations. Narratives are privileged as the primary carriers of cultural identity which then shapes and influences the specific narratives that individual actors develop to understand their own place and role in the larger social order. The engagement with narrative is thus shown to be a necessary condition for a culture to maintain a systematic and dynamic concern with value.

The process of refiguration is an open-ended engagement

due in part to the possibilities which narrative project and the shifting conditions which constantly demand more informed choices and decisions from subjects. The limits of human existence are revealed to be as important to human understanding as the creative potential that generates action. The balance between these two factors is the source of the creative tension which characterizes human existence and the nature of narrative emplotment. The essential connectedness of human action is prefigured in the action of communication and the creative resources for the pursuit of meaning are carried in the structures of language. This provides ethics with the proof of the collaborative nature of the project and with its fundamental resources.

6.3.1 Structural Features of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

Constancy in anticipation is a major feature in the constitution of the subject as an authentic actor. Anticipation is a feature of consciousness which integrates the three aspects of temporality so that continuity and coherence are present in order to allow the subject to meaningfully appropriate his or her experience. The complexity of life and the potential richness of experience necessitate this self-constancy in the subject who comes to recognize his or her own significance as a source of value.

The creative tension carried in narrative is revealing of the underlying ontological dimensions of experience which are accumulated in language. Being is only present to consciousness inasmuch as it is articulated.

The mediation effected by imagination is multi-layered and approximate rather than immediate and definitive. Human consciousness of time is itself a sub-theme in the larger narratives in which time is the prime content of the stories. Apprehension of time depends on the perception of movement which is a creative interpretation of reality. The significance of this for human activity is that action is always part of a larger continuum in which the thematic structures which inform the social order have already established normative sets of criteria.

Imagination in its critical capacity is able to explore the established and potential relationships of value which are articulated in narratives and those attributes which result in disvalue or the distortion of human activity. The structural feature of imagination which is invariant in this critical process is the coincidence of disparate elements in which the familiar is synthetically linked with the unfamiliar. As images and language carry levels of historical meaning and affectivity, novel combinations of images can reveal potential meanings to the discerning subject. Narrative effects this

creative synthesis by substituting various contents and conditions in conjunction with the formal structures of narrative identified in specific genres. The recognition of potential intelligibilities by the reader or audience creates a positive affect which serves to further engage the reader. The apparent visual nature of imagination blinds subjects to its mediating and synthetic operations because the visual is assumed to be immediately apprehended. The primacy of the ordering principle in consciousness also contributes to the difficulty subjects have in recognizing difference or otherness without resorting to reductive means of appropriation. Imagination is necessary for consciousness to maintain its openness without which ethics is not possible.

6.3.2 Imagination and Mediation in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

Subjects are temporally mediated beings who are affected by influences and conditions on action that are not immediately apparent. The realization of the ethical significance of history is that history is constituted by actors who intend value but whose impact far exceeds the immediate or specific action itself. This mediation of the social to the personal ensures continuity in the patterns of behaviour which subjects appropriate and adapt. Developing a critical social consciousness is largely a matter of

identifying the narratives that inform personal and social identities and how they are appropriated by the different members of the social order.

The mediation of Otherness is a significant factor in ethical possibility and in the development of authentic identity insofar as the recognition of the integrity and the legitimacy of the Other entails critical self-reflection. When the object in question is the subject's own tradition the mediative and interpretive means of identifying and evaluating the foundational narratives raises questions that serve to challenge fixed or habitual understandings. Narrative engages subjects in ethical concerns first in an affective manner and later in an intellectual and conceptual manner.

Ricoeur identifies a residual assumption of truth and legitimacy in social narratives and rituals that predisposes subjects to accept the established patterns even though the participants would often be unable to identify the origins or the motives of their activity. In settings where critical engagement with culture is not encouraged it is easy to identify patterns of decline through the lack of comprehensiveness and differentiation which characterize conventional patterns of behaviour. The personal narrative of the subject provides the space for examination and selective appropriation of the elements of the social

narratives which the subject judges relevant to his or her own project of value. The historical element of imagination once again indicates that imagination is not completely unbounded or unstructured in its synthetic and creative operations. The identity of the subject is always a socially mediated identity which is created and maintained through the operations of imagination.

6.3.3 Performative Aspects of Imagination in Time and Narrative, Volume Three

The refigured subject is the end of mimesis³. The process entails deliberate action on the part of the subject both to actualize the potential of the narrative through reading and to refigure one's own worldview and potential for authentic action. The critical engagement of the reflexive consciousness is both personal and social in each instance of refiguration. The historical imagination entails revitalizing the traditional sources of understanding in narrative form and enhancing the potential of an historically grounded future. The element of self-constancy discussed under the heading of structural features of imagination is an intentional anticipation of the subject and entails ethical responsibility as its goal. The performative aspect of imagination is realized when narrative possibilities end in the attempt to realize value in specific and practical

activities.

Freedom is the imaginative dimension of possibility which is recognized as essential freedom and actualized as effective freedom. Creative action which is the outcome of imagination and ethical deliberation embodies the normative dynamism of human existence and in this capacity maintains continuity with the authentic values of past cultures. Human dilemmas are not given definitive answers in narrative but they are articulated and to this extent become factors to be considered in the process of ethical deliberation.

The primary focus of mimesis³ is the refigured reader who becomes a more effective agent of value in this transformative process. Accordingly, imagination and the subject is the first category of the ethics-imagination relationship in the Lonerganian framework that Ricoeur's insights will be applied to.

6.4 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship in the Work of Lonergan

6.4.1 Imagination and the Subject

The focus of the notion of refiguration is the transformed subject. At this level the subject appropriates his or her self precisely as an agent of value. The

imagination, through the play of possibilities, effects shifts in the ethical identity of the subject who is a source and agent of value. Narrative identity provides limits, possibilities, and purpose which remain to be actualized or not by subjects. The subject is affectively strengthened in his or her commitment to value which then remains to be translated into concrete decisions.

Identity and meaning are linked in the process of refiguration when the subject becomes aware of the temporal and ethical constraints that she or he functions under. Self-constancy is the ethical feature of identity which integrates the subject's experience in a meaningful fashion so that value might be maximized. The range of temporal anticipations connect the subject's project of value with the larger social project. The intelligibility of the personal narrative identity and the resulting action depends on the recognizable social patterns of value that have been appropriated and modified. The imaginative capacity at this stage is one of enhanced and critical self-appropriation. If the possibilities of the poetic are to be translated into effective action then the subject must become the agent of change. Affective development is required as larger ranges of images and objects are judged to be viable and relevant, and worthy of attention. The subject becomes aware that he or she constitutes the fundamental project of value and all

activity is realized to be potentially transformative.

6.4.2 Imagination and Truth of Value

At the stage of refiguration, judgments of value occur when the subject's habitual orientation is reconstituted in accordance with the new affective and intellectual appreciation of the nature of value. This means that the transformed notion of value affects the operations of the other levels of intentionality from above downward rather than the reverse. Experience is re-evaluated retrospectively in light of this shift and reveals resources and potential insights that can positively affect the subject's ability to discern and act. The newly constituted integrity of the subject reveals the ontological conditions which condition human action and which need to be consciously appropriated for authenticity to occur. This process provides an example of how conversion occurs and results in the transformation of the subject's entire project.

The process consists of imaginative elements in which a concern with temporal coherence informs the operations. One function of imagination at the level of refiguration is the reformulation of temporal experience. The operations are essentially the same as found in the first two stages of mimesis. Operational primacy is given to the ability to

recognize succession in things whereas the synthetic and creative impulse is secondary. Essentially, the concern is to regenerate a field of new possibilities within which value might be considered. The judgment of value critically projects possible intelligibilities which provide an agenda and motivation for the subject. It is the self-appropriation of this notion of value effected by imagination that leads to moral and affective conversions in the subject.

6.4.3 Imagination and Society/History

The reconceptualization of tradition as a vital source of insights for the present brings history into ethics as an element which requires systematic consideration. Ricoeur's recognition that the historical is itself always being developed, in tension with the current projects of value that subjects undertake, challenges the idea that the past is nonessential and irrelevant to the present. Inasmuch as the past is retrievable through traces, or discernible through story and patterns of behaviour, the resources and achievements of past subjects can inform our projects in the now. This is not a romantic or nostalgic enterprise but a recognition of the continuing presence of human attempts at meaning which are demonstrated in the existence of language.

Identity is shaped by factors which exert an influence far exceeding their tangibility. Embedded values and biases continue to generate new activity and responses whether or not the actors are aware of the source or the nature of these influences. The longer cycle of decline identified by Lonergan as the major obstacle to the regeneration of culture is an example not only of the continued existence of historical influence on the possibility of ethical discernment, but also reveals the affective influence which mitigates the conditions of possibility under which it might be identified and analysed. The range of effective freedom in which subjects operate is influenced by the social narratives which prefer certain types of activity over others. This tends to create the conditions which most adequately support existing patterns of behaviour. The critical operation of imagination is necessary to keep the social order from falling into complacency and to recognize and re-vitalize the ethical resources already available to the tradition. Realizing that tradition shapes and continues to influence the anticipations of future activity and that it provides the richest source of insights for possible courses of action introduces new factors into the consideration of social ethics.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NARRATIVE IMAGINATION AND LONERGAN'S ETHICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the significance of the ethics-imagination relationship in the Lonerganian framework which was presented in chapter two of this thesis. An overview of narrative imagination will provide the basic outline of Ricoeur's insights in this field which have been selected due to their relevance to the connection between ethics and imagination. The three specific junctures of ethics and imagination identified in the Lonerganian framework (imagination and truth of value, imagination and the subject, and imagination and society/history) will be examined in some detail then followed by the specific insights selected from Ricoeur's work which add clarification to the understanding of the particular relationships of ethics and imagination. The conclusion of the chapter will suggest some of the implications of this understanding of ethics and imagination for re-evaluating the necessary skills and conditions required for authentic ethical discourse.

7.1 Narrative Imagination in the Work of Paul Ricoeur

The general form of this overview will follow the main elements in Ricoeur's own analysis which are metaphor, prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration. These four

themes roughly correspond to the contents of the four works studied, namely The Rule of Metaphor and the three volumes of Time and Narrative. Because of the dynamic nature of these themes in the recognition and creation of meaning there is a cumulative and inter-connected effect in the relationships which characterize each of these processes.

Ricoeur identifies the metaphor as the essential form of language through which new meaning is created and brought to consciousness. The symbolic potential of the image is utilized in the creation of metaphor especially in its synthetic and constructive operations. Ricoeur names the process "seeing-as" which allows new configurations and patterns to emerge from the existing patterns of language. The creative process involves the articulation in an image of a creative tension which results from the juxtaposition of two or more disparate objects and/or fields of reference. This creative tension is revelatory of the ontological dimensions of human existence which are demonstrated by Ricoeur in his linking of "seeing-as" with "being-as." The creative tension is articulated variously such as the relationship between familiarity and unfamiliarity, identity and difference, continuity and change, and the real and the not-real. The effect of metaphor on the consciousness of a subject is to shift the habitual patterns of anticipation in such a way that new possibilities of understanding and acting

arise. This engagement engenders a certain degree of critical self-reflection in the subject concerning the nature and constitution of meaning and consciousness.

Prefiguration, or the stage of mimesis¹, explores the nature and function of worldviews from which subjects identify and initiate projects of meaning and value. Ricoeur identifies the central role played by narrative structure in the constitution and maintenance of these worldviews. Specifically, narrative emplotment is the structure which gives disjointed experience and events a coherent shape and purpose. By virtue of the social realm she or he inhabits, each subject participates in larger narratives which are appropriated and modified according to the subject's specific capacities and conditions. This means that a certain predisposition towards certain types of action and value is present in subjects although critical awareness of the effects of these predispositions are usually pre-thematic at this stage.

The subject's perceptual range and habitual anticipations are shaped and influenced by the socially influential narratives. These narratives also shape the subject's awareness of the significance of temporality and condition the possibility of critical and ethical reflection on the nature of reality. The subject is provided with a social

identity and shared sense of purpose through these narratives which provide intelligibility to life's experience. Because the narrative plot embodies problems and tensions without resolving them, an open-endedness of meaning is created within which subjects can reflect on imaginative variations of possible courses of interpretation or resolution. This inherent possibility in narrative is the ground of the transcendent orientation of narrative imagination which intends more variations within the perimeters set by the socially dominant narratives. The extent to which a subject realizes his or her involvement in this process is directly related to the capacity of the subject to consistently recognize and intend meaning and value in his or her life.

Configuration is the creative process in the engagement with narrative at the stage of mimesis². This creativity is the result of the juxtaposition of the worlds created in the narrative and the world of the subject who encounters the possibilities provided by the text in the act of reading. The narrative plot intends value in its creative formulations of coherent human activity. Consistency in this process is the result of recognizable identity which includes the flexibility and willingness to change and adapt when such action is deemed appropriate. The three elements that together constitute consistency are novelty which engenders creativity, constancy which allows the subject to discern familiar patterns, and

temporal limitations which generate new plots and variations in order to articulate more clearly the constraints of human action. The preponderance of certain generic plots indicates the natural inclination of humans to certain orders and the historical roots and depths of meaning which are carried in language and explored in narrative.

The synthetic process of creativity which was first encountered in metaphor links affective and conceptual experience in such a manner that the stories of others can evoke emotive responses in subjects which leads them to empathize with and synthesize these alien stories on the basis of perceived resemblances and shared meanings. The creative dimension of imagination is directed towards the emergence of order but imaginative order is not subject to the same constraints as praxis. Rather, the order of imagination creates a space for creativity and reflection separated from the demands and responsibility of action ordered by necessity. The expanse of temporality that informs and influences human life only becomes present to the subject in the creative context of configuration. The expansion of worldviews to more adequately encompass the range of human experience meaningfully indicates the centrality of the creative dimension of interpretation through which all experience is mediated to subjects. This creative engagement is essential to the development of the subject and of his or

her society in which the viability of the future depends on an adequate assessment of the past.

Refiguration is the result of the subject synthesizing the possibilities encountered in configuration with the demands for practical action demanded by the real world. The stage of mimesis³ intends the reconstitution of the reader as an agent of value who has a greater capacity for ethical action than she or he did at the stage of mimesis¹. The subject is engaged in deliberately appropriating him or herself as an ethical actor in light of the newly constituted worldview out of which he or she now acts. The reconstitution of the reader as an ethical actor corresponds to the re-vitalization of tradition and history that Ricoeur deems necessary for value to be systematically sought.

The central focus of praxis present in all stages of mimesis is actualized in mimesis³ where the affective element is primary in the subject's movement from creative possibility to responsible action. Narrative is inherently critical and ethical in its portrayal and evaluation of reality. The open-endedness of narrative reveals that the problematic dimensions of human existence are not final and definitive; rather, it is the creative and transcendent capacity of human actors which characterizes them as authentically human. The social realm is encountered in a

meaningful way through the recognition provided by narrative emplotment. Within this perspective the subject comes to understand him or herself as an agent of value who deliberates and makes choices according to his or her ability to recognize the potential for value in the social realm. The social narratives set the conditions under which subjects can reflect and appropriate themselves as ethical actors. The authenticity of subjects reflects the level of values operative at both the personal and the social levels.

7.2 The Ethics-Imagination Relationship in the Work of Lonergan

Lonergan's cognitional analysis provides a means of identifying particular sets of operations which get their specific pattern from the specific ends which are intended in each instance. The intention of value sublates all other cognitional operations (experience, understanding and judgment) but depends on the consistent and successful outcomes of the sets of operations at each of these stages for its own operations to be successful. The three junctures of ethics and imagination identify three sets of operations which intend value in a specific manner. Imagination and truth of value is concerned with the operations by which value is recognized, apprehended, and intended. Imagination and the subject examines the self-reflexive consciousness of a morally

converted subject who comes to recognize and actualize the self-fulfilment of value that he or she essentially is. Imagination and society/history reflects on the nature of socially recurring schemes which condition and intend value more or less successfully and the relationships that exist between these patterns of intelligibility and the individual subject's respective roles in each of these. The insights from Ricoeur's work on the nature of imagination that add to the understanding of these operations will be reviewed.

7.2.1 Summary of Imagination and Truth of Value

Lonergan's project is to identify and differentiate cognitional processes in terms of their intentional ends specifically in terms of understanding and judging value and truth. In Method and Theology, Lonergan identifies imagination as a mediate operation which allows access to the world mediated by meaning.¹ He identifies feelings which are developmental and intentional responses which relate our intentions and apprehensions to objects and values. These feelings give intentional consciousness its drive and orientation.² Value is identified as an object for intentional response that opens the possibility of self-transcendence which can become a permanent condition of a person's life when it is reinforced.³ Value is a transcendental notion which provides the criteria of a happy

conscience when the subject is successful in intending value, and an unhappy conscience when unsuccessful.⁴ Lonergan identifies deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action as the operations of intentionality at the level of value. The judgments of value are similar in structure to judgments of fact, but their objects are different; judgments of value purport to state what is good or actually better, without being primarily concerned with existence as such.⁵

The basic criterion for judgments of value is the authenticity of the being of the subject who is moving towards moral self-transcendence. The apprehension of value in feelings lies between the judgment of fact and the judgment of value. The judgment of value consists of knowledge of reality, intentional responses to value, and "the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself."⁶ The morally oriented subject is affected by image in at least three distinct points in this process (disregarding the role of image in the process of coming to a judgment of fact, or knowledge of reality). First, the apprehension of value in feelings is carried in symbols, and vice versa, for Lonergan points out that "it is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate."⁷ Again, "the expression of feeling is symbolic and, if words owe a debt to logic, symbols follow the laws of image and affect."⁸

The second place where image affects the judgment of value is in the connection that is made between choices of courses of action and the self-constitution that this process encourages. The latter aspect involves developing an understanding of moral identity which takes up the intellectual and affective dimensions of the subject's experience in a coherent and dynamic pattern of images, which in turn situates and informs a subject's deliberate activity. Lonergan identified imagination, language, and symbol as compound operations where the subject responds to the immediacy of the symbol and the reference or thing signified is mediately present to consciousness.⁹ The identity of the subject is morally significant because the criterion of authentic development lies within the subject him or herself in a more or less normative fashion. Imagination in its specific applications in the ethical process operates in reference to the already established images which make up the subject's identity, and through this process continue to shape and expand the moral capacity which sublates the intellectual, affective, and psychic. Effective freedom and ethical possibility are shown to be connected through the cumulative effects of images. Sets of images present possible courses of action on which the subject can examine and reflect. These possibilities are mediated by the sets of images that constitute the subject's identity which attempts to provide a coherent reading to all these aspirations and ranges of

experience.

The third role of image in the process of the judgment of value lies in the evaluative and mediative perspective that the conscience affords the subject. This is an intrinsic part of the set of images that constitutes the identity but is not identical with it, for the set of images relating to the subject's identity is not necessarily coextensive with image relating to conscience. In a fully authentic subject there would be perfect agreement between the images that constitute the narrative identity and the images which shape the conscience. The tension between these two sets of images indicates the state of ethical awareness of the subject. Usually the set of images which constitute the subject's identity encompasses and sublates the images which evaluate the potential course of action in terms of the affective and moral predispositions which are already present in the narrative identity and which constitute the evaluative dimensions of the conscience. The composition of moral identity becomes a central concern in understanding the relationship of ethics and imagination especially concerning the subject's apprehension of his or her different roles with their respective ends as true or only apparently true values.

The primary function of the apprehension of value is to provide the ground of moral consciousness to the extent that

the intentional responses intend value and not merely satisfaction, which is most singularly present in the intentional response to the ontic value of persons.¹⁰ Doran suggests that apprehension of value may be immediate, where the feelings give rise to no further questions and the subject is aware that there are no further questions, or there may be a state of tension, where the apprehension is of possible values, and therefore the process is analogous to that which informs the movement from insight to judgment of fact. In the first instance in which no further questions arise, there is a realization that the conditions for the recognition of value have been met. In the second instance, deliberation and reflection are required to ascertain whether or not real value is actually intended.¹¹ Feeling is evoked in the subject by images and feelings evoke images. Therefore, the intentional response to value in feelings needs to be developed, refined, and reinforced over time, so that there is a more or less steady movement towards genuine moral growth and self-transcendence.¹² The intentional responses through feelings reveal their objects which are values and the objects in turn give rise to feelings. In this manner the subject is motivated to realize value by meeting the needs of persons.

The particular insights that were applied to the question of the relationship of imagination and truth of value consisted of the juxtaposition of the concordant and the

discordant through the operations of "seeing as," the foundational roles of recognition and discernment, and the critical capacity of configuration. The first insight includes the complex of operations associated with metaphoricity and highlights the self-critical and developmental nature of the ethical enterprise especially as subjects become aware of their ethical capacities and potential. Truth is emphasized as something which is at once revealed and concealed, and that critical assessment necessarily engages the subject as seeker and evaluator. The process of discovering and of creating truth are found to be closely connected. Truth is not a static commodity nor do its benefits come from a passive acceptance of its claims. The establishment of truth is a project in which the multi-faceted possibilities arise in consciousness in accordance with the subject's capacity to intend and recognize them. This potential is already affected by imagination inasmuch as social narratives function in a fashion similar to recurrent schemes which affect the subject's ethical aptitude and ability.

In the second insight, recognition and discernment provide foundational anticipations in which the subject is at once affirming oneself and evaluating the particular situation or question at hand. The major implication for the operations that constitute ethical intention is that truth of fact or

value is determined through patterns of correspondence rather than patterns of identity. This allows habitual orientations to remain open to stimulation and development, as well as accounting for the need to incorporate shifting contexts which are the arena of human activity. Truth and value are proximate realities which share the conditions of temporality as do all human experiences.

The last insight, associated with the creative and critical capacities of configuration, shares many of the structural features of recognition and discernment. Its significance lies in the differentiation it reveals at the level of judgment. While recognition and discernment are foundational and involve continual affirmation of recognized criteria and reference points, configuration which is a second-order judgment emphasizes the element of risk which is required of each subject in every encounter with the unfamiliar. At a certain point, the other has to be recognized as alien and accepted as such. Truth and value contain this element which is probably the basis for the unsettling affects that truth can impart to subjects when personal identity and habitual anticipations are shaken by this type of encounter. The creative element of value lies in its dynamic discordance; it might work, it might be good, but there are no guarantees of success. Our own experience seems to suggest that pivotal events in our lives shock us into this

type of response as a condition of personal development. Change is not optional and choice engages all dimensions of our experience. The normative orientation of our activity remains to be continually established.

It is also a feature of the truth of value that shifts in the understanding and criterion of value open up the data of past experience to be re-evaluated and re-configured so that the richness of experience is neither negated nor ignored. The past at both the personal and the social levels is the richest source of insights, a fact which is already recognizable in the historicity of language.

7.2.2 Summary of Imagination and the Subject

The operations of the authentic subject are self-reflexive, inasmuch as value is recognized as the basis of one's engagement with reality. Notions of freedom and conversion are identified which contribute to the subject's increasing recognition of the extent to which value constitutes social reality. Melchin links the possible course of action mediated in images with Lonergan's notion of freedom in which freedom involves the statistical and probable account of the emergence of new skills. The creative potential of language is a primary factor in establishing control of meaning - an example of new skills emerging on the basis of

those which are already established. The element of randomness, which is the condition for self-actualizing and not predetermined action is maintained in language through metaphor and narrative plot variations. Melchin identifies this process in terms of the subject as historical actor.

Freedom . . . is not an absence but a presence; the presence of an actuated capacity to mediate the performance of sensorimotor acts and skills through the schemes or skills of intelligence. . . . It is the set of acts which grasp a possible course of action among a range of possibilities presented to the subject at a moment in world process, and which constitute an order or pattern in a manifold of skills within the repertoire of a subject, in accordance with this conceived course of action.¹³

Further,

A possible course of action, . . . , is a possibility inasmuch as the relevant conditions for the emergence (the performance) of the course of action are, in part, fulfilled, inasmuch as such conditions are known to be fulfilled (more or less completely), and inasmuch as the course of action is grasped or actuated in an insight or unified set of insights which extrapolates from present and past stages of world process to constitute imaginatively and cognitively one or more alternative future stages. While such possibilities are occasionally somewhat original, most usually they involve the re-actuation of socially, economically, culturally current routines.¹⁴

The possible course of action is presented to the subject in images, or sets of images, from which further insights

either do or do not occur. The temporal direction of the process is toward the future although it is grounded in the past and present of the subject. The freedom of the subject is an essential capacity which bears structural similarities to the process of narrative emplotment. "Lonergan's definition of freedom has as its central moment the actuation of a capacity for an emergent intelligibility to integrate or order an otherwise coincidental manifold of human skills."¹⁵ If the last term in the previous sentence is changed from "skills" to "events or situations," this becomes a relatively close approximation of Ricoeur's understanding of the function of narrative. At this level the discussion concerns a dynamic capacity of the subject which is oriented towards meaning but in an undifferentiated fashion which has been raised in terms of the orientation provided by elemental meaning.

Effective freedom, on the other hand, concerns the operative range of this dynamic capacity and the conditions and limitations which affect it. "Effective freedom involves the external circumstances of the subject's life and the subject's own sensitive, intelligent, and responsible states of habit, routine or development."¹⁶ Melchin suggests that while responsible practice is centered on the role of the practical insight which orders the subject's skills, most subjects are limited in the range of possibilities that are open to them.¹⁷ Because the occurrence of insights relies

on the availability of appropriate images the usually limited range of possibilities is a foundational concern for ethics. The imaginative capacity of the subject and the relevant social narratives and pedagogies are the key factors to be considered when evaluating the relative adequacy and abundance of appropriate ranges of images.

Effective freedom then, has to do with the connection of anticipations and appropriate skills in which the subject is attempting to mediate the socially recurrent schemes of the social order.

There also exists a set of skills wherein the subject can refine progressively the genesis of such operative integrations in accordance with his or her own reflexively transforming anticipations, in a scheme of inter-subjective exchange wherein his or her own anticipations and those of another are assessed critically, and in the interests of the ongoing development of the capacity to constitute systematically his or her own subsequent capacities. Because the emergent integrations are inertial . . . and because they reorder the subject's spontaneous engagement with his or her own environment, the practical, linguistic, cognitional skills of culture, once learned, recur spontaneously with the presence of the fulfilling conditions. . . . And so essential to the "welfare" of subjects will be a dynamic flexibility in their development and modification of skills. For this reason the notion of "effective freedom" pertains, in a minor way, to the social, economic, cultural conditions that restrict the proliferation of determinate practical forms. But in a major way effective freedom pertains to

the developmental skills wherein subjects become capable of modifying their own skilled, practical spontaneity in accordance with the shifting exigences of culture on the move.¹⁸

Freedom reflects the tension between essential possibility and social constraint, but it is in conversion that the transcendental dimension is manifested in the subject when possibility is realized. Narrative provides the means of recognizing effective freedom which is realized concretely in social, economic, and cultural schemes and the necessary flexibility in its essential open-endedness for subjects to develop their own critical capacities as responsible agents of value.

The issue of moral conversion and the related shift in horizon that conversion entails has been studied most fully by Walter Conn. In the following excerpt, he gives a basic description of what moral conversion entails, a description in which horizon refers to "a subject's world of feelings and knowledge, interests and questions in relation to his or her present reality."¹⁹

Moral conversion is basically a shift in the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values. . .

.
Still, moral conversion is a special instance of moral or real self-transcendence in the sense that moral conversion provides the programmatic base for the conscious,

deliberate development of the sustained
moral self-transcendence of human
authenticity.²⁰

The moral conversion, then, is what gives rise to the shift in one's personal horizon when the previous world perspective and standards of criteria are superseded and sublated by the new criteria. This consists of the recognition and orientation towards values, especially to the ontic value of persons. The transformation of society is also connected to this process of conversion which is the ground of effective freedom.²¹ Happel and Walter distinguish between the characteristics of the morally unconverted and the morally converted, in the following:

. . . For the morally unconverted person, the horizon of consciousness is bounded by questions about personal satisfaction, and the answers are controlled by realizations of individual selfishness. However, for the converted person the horizon of consciousness is expanded in vertical exercises of freedom to appreciate (moral conversion) and love (affective conversion) persons and the values fulfilling their needs. Here the virtues can be looked on as concrete qualities of the converted person predisposing him or her to kinds of value.²²

Happel and Walter take up Lonergan's argument that conversion is necessary for the subject to be aware of the different realms of meaning (common sense, theory, and poetic) without reducing all levels of meaning to one. This "requires attending to the fact that there is an interiority

that notices all expressions, whether those of the everyday world, of theory, or artistic symbols."²³ They go on to identify the affective conversion as that which is primarily concerned with image.

Affective conversion occurs in the appropriation of our images and symbols. . . . [and] involves three aspects of attachment and detachment: (1) a recentering in the patterns of the subject from detached scrutiny or irony to attachment; (2) a shift in the object toward which the subject's affections are drawn (from self-interest to concern for others- family, society, nation, world); and (3) the location of the appropriate aesthetic symbol to express one's affective meanings.²⁴

Conversion is involved with the various forms of expression which inform consciousness and the linking of cognitional and affective aspects of experience. Images provide the initial parameters within which the subject poses questions accompanied by corresponding sets of anticipations. The affective response and orientation towards value when there is authentic development is controlled and effected by images. The refiguration of horizon is informed by a new image or set of images which allows for a more comprehensive and authentic perspective than was the case originally. Inasmuch as moral conversion presupposes affective conversion which becomes the effective criteria for decision and choice, personal identity becomes a central element in the explanatory framework of fourth level intentionality. The

narrative identity of the person must be considered a dynamic project that intends full integration of value in which emergent probability provides an explanatory framework and an account of the supernatural and ultimate end of the process.

For there is a sense in which emergent probability generalizes the notion of disproportionate orders: each successive level of proportionate being is functionally disproportionate to the one below. . . . And finally, beyond the whole series of discontinuities that reaches from sub-atomic particles to human freedom, there is one that is supernatural in the fullest and most definitive sense: grace, which is out of proportion to even that highest integration of human being, conscience.²⁵

Identity, then, can be considered as the set of images or symbols that informs the subject's sense of self-authenticity. Identity is transitional in that it is never finally fixed in place. William Loewe provides an account of person and identity in Lonergan's work in which being a person involves identity.

. . . Our identity as persons is that of the subject of the conscious operations by which our life's story is forged. And insofar as those conscious operations do in fact constitute a life's story, a story of real change and difference and yet a single story, they comprise the unique subjectivity of each of us.²⁶

The specific insights relating to the understanding of imagination and the subject include the mediating function of

image, the relation of temporality to intentionality, and the foundational role of trust. Concerning the first insight, the transformed subject at the level of refiguration is the subject who realizes his or her true nature as a source and agent of value. Reality is always mediated to consciousness and it is in images that the disparate elements of experience are brought together and given recognizable forms. The recognition that reality is always an interpreted reality suggests that there is an ontological ground to possibility which can be subverted by fixed and determined perspectives that remain unchallenged. The significance of elemental meaning in anticipating value, and the influence of social and historical narratives in giving it specific orientations, is explicated in Ricoeur's discussion of prefiguration. The positing of the imaginative as foundational and the speculative as derivative seems to reverse the emphasis given in many ethical frameworks and introduces a new level of self-critique as an essential aspect of interpretation. The strong link between recognition and affectivity also indicates the powerful influences of symbols and images which can be used to manipulate behaviour especially as the influence remains elemental or pre-thematic and is not articulated and evaluated.

The second insight recognizes that the influence of temporality on intention manifested in the variety of images

with which identity is shaped. Certain narrative genres and plots set habitual patterns of anticipations which become self-fulfilling when the recognition of the images engender strong affective responses. The basic insight is that the demands of the present do not necessarily set the ethical agenda of the subject. The drive of consciousness to coherence can be grounded in the past or the future of the subject's consciousness. The engagement of consciousness in other dimensions of time includes the affective aspects of self in which fantasy and dreams have as much importance in the constitution of self as do the social strengths and inadequacies of subjects in actual encounters. Temporality reveals the ontological dimensions of freedom and imagination gives us access to this freedom through the possibilities inherent in narrative. This awareness of the simultaneous openness and constraints of temporality which condition human action is a requisite condition for the recognition and appropriation of value.

Ricoeur provides an explication of the performative dimensions of trust, the third insight, and establishes it as the pre-eminent value that all subjects necessarily must be involved in and with if they are to act authentically. Trust reveals at once the inter-connectedness of all human reality and at the same time the fragility of the relationships that constitute our particular goods of order. As a source of

value, the subject embodies trust in every ethical engagement understood increasingly as every intentional act in which each interaction provides the opportunity to affirm and extend value, which is signified in the mere willingness to act. Language and the symbolically mediated patterns of relationality which language carries and creates reflect the value that occurs implicitly in each intention or thought in which cognitional reflection is a creative activity that embodies the ontological truth of human existence.

The transformed subject embodies his or her creativity in the work and creation of him or herself as a source and maker of value. The personal narrative becomes increasingly integrated and comprehensive as the ability to recognize and actualize real value corresponds with the growth in the subject's authenticity. Personal growth becomes the aim and the achievement of the subject who is his or her own major ethical accomplishment. This process keeps the social order and culture viable to the extent that real value and social normativity coincide with conventional anticipations and patterns of behaviour.

7.2.3 Summary of Imagination and Society/History

Most of the social order has its origins in imaginative constructs which are mediated to consciousness through images

which shape our attitudes, values, and understanding. One major issue in ethics is to systematically assess the affective impact of symbols and narratives in culture. The foundational criteria of normativity is shaped and embedded in culture; an enhanced understanding of imaginative process is necessary for an evaluation of the specific images and narratives that most directly affect ethical process and possibility. Social values embody social tensions; as levels of social complexity increase, so too do the affective responses which are evoked by increasingly discordant images. Culture in its dominant symbolic structures shapes and maintains the criteria of normativity that provide ethical guidelines for subjects. Devising a means of assessing such a fundamentally significant set of influences on behaviour is surely an ethical imperative.

Narrative identity contributes to the authenticity of the subject's conscience by suspending the concerns of immediacy so that the facticity of the given can be examined in terms of possible insights which might lead to value. Narrative identity also provides a means of mediating the tension between experience and expectation in which the linking of affect with appropriate images is required if authentic growth is to be systematically enhanced. Narrative engages the subject in the self-reflexive process of examining the nature and implications of his or her own assumptions about

reality; this engagement is necessary if culture and common purpose are to have any practical ethical significance and if they are to remain viable as higher level integrations of human activity. Narrative provides the space and opportunity where the subject's experience can be seen to have more or less significance. The subject as self-transcendent actor critically appropriates the normative images and paradigms that accord with and enhance the already operative skills and operations that intend value.

The value of narrative identity lies in its capacity to provide more or less coherent accounts of the pre-thematic or critically undifferentiated events and their accompanying affects which indicate possible developments of meaning and appropriation. This requires the subject to reflect on the variety of possibilities and their future implications which either affirms the adequacy of the subject's horizon or worldview in dealing with the matter at hand or challenges it and gives rise to further questions. Ricoeur indicates that narrative engages the subject's expectations but does not capitulate to them. This indicates that the diversity of human reality requires sustained creative attention. It is through narrative emplotment that affectivity is given a recognizable form and means of articulation which allows for the later differentiated account of moral intentionality that is required for systematic ethical deliberation.

Moral identity is constituted by the subject's awareness of him or herself as the locus of the process of transcendent development oriented toward value. Narrative allows for the communication of the normative dynamism that constitutes the impetus and orientation of such a moral subject. There are a variety of ways for this to be understood and appropriated either by individual readers or a communal audience according to their capacity to recognize true normativity. This implies that a critical reflection on the models and plots which inform the interpretive perspective of subjects is necessary.

For Ricoeur, the classic texts that establish cultural norms do so as they have been judged as successful in mediating the tension between continuity and change that shapes human activity. Their success lies in their ability to allow subjects to seek and find within them the resources for creative responses to specific formulations of this tension. In the optimal social setting, Ricoeur would like to see more determination of expectations in terms of direction and orientation and less determination in the area of experience. Such an account agrees with the basic formulations of Lonergan's framework in which the normative dynamism is toward value. The required flexibility of human action is provided by the various contents of experience which can be organized or acted upon to realize and maximize value. The operative

socially recurring schemes which give rise to goods of order provide the frameworks within which subjects can participate and contribute to the social realm. Evaluating the efficacy with which these socially recurrent schemes intend and realize true instances of value is the ethical problem at the level of social analysis.

Ricoeur's analysis of narrative and mimesis provides an account of the anticipation of value that is taken up and informed specifically by the operations of the continually morally converted subject. By extension and through analogy similar dynamics can be identified at work at the level of social organization where the interaction between groups of subjects who intend value provides the focus of ethical deliberation. Imagination plays a significant role whenever mediation or transition occurs between differing types of experience and levels of intentionality by allowing cognitive operations to creatively and coherently incorporate the full extent of the manifold of consciousness.

The particular insights which were considered relevant to supplement the perspective of the Lonerganian framework were the cumulative or sedimentary dimension of language, the public nature of meaning, the social constructs of imagination, and the concept of tradition as a vital source for reflection and insight. The cumulative nature of language

provides the basis for subjects to act meaningfully and raises the need for a critical attitude towards established patterns of anticipations and understanding because of the overabundance of meaning that is possible in language. The critique needs to be double edged. With the critical theorists, one needs to be suspicious of the tools one utilizes (or in the case of language, the tools one is shaped by) for no term or image remains unaffected by social factors, including ideological biases. On the other hand, the fact that communication remains possible and culture continues to exist more or less effectively suggests that the resources of language have not been fully recognized and continue to retain vitality and resources with which value can be extended. Every positive social interaction is an indication of this actuality.

The public nature of meaning that Ricoeur highlights makes explicit the foundational value of responsibility. Simultaneously affectively and intellectually engaged, the subject realizes that the social roots of responsibility are located in the very substance of socially recurring schemes and most obviously in language. In this understanding, responsibility is a condition of authentic subjecthood to be developed or neglected in accordance with one's approximation of authenticity. The recognition of the extent to which responsibility pervades activity is only brought fully to

consciousness in the morally converted subject. Ricoeur demonstrates that the images and narratives in which human action is creatively imitated are always affecting subjects; the possibility of conversion is linked directly to the nature and abundance of images and narratives within which one functions.

The significance of the fact of human suffering which is carried in language and narrative across time is that it directly affects and shapes worldviews and social conditions in a pervasive manner. The suffering of humanity is literally everyone's suffering and the immediate impact of violence and unrequited suffering is the distortion of human existence and ethical potential. This becomes a social condition which sets anticipations and patterns of behaviour which further distort the possibility of the systematic intention of value. Critical reflection on the significance of symbol becomes a necessary aspect of ethical deliberation.

Another insight is that the social constructs of imagination must be studied in their particularity for any practical significance to be realized. The artefacts of imagination are not necessarily benign and their impact over time may be too great for any individual to recognize, even one who is critically reflexive. The ethical significance of this insight is related to the political dimension of language

and symbol which are carried in tradition and history and require a conscientious and critical perspective about the affects and implications of inherited patterns of understanding. This negates any uncritical assumption about human progress as inevitable. Naive evolutionary theories as well as determinative religious ideologies are refuted by the recognition of possibility that is present in a real way in every human activity.

Finally, tradition is a vital resource accessible through the operations of historical imagination that affect social reality across time. History itself is always being re-constructed, so the past does not have dominion over the present. Neither can the past be ignored; its presence is manifested in the act of communication, with all the attendant assumptions continuing to shape new generations of actors. A critical tension is created when there are serious discrepancies between the traditional resources of value identified in particular narratives and histories and the socially dominant narratives of the present which may promote radically different agendas. The realization of the continual refiguration of historical understanding is an operative example of effective freedom inasmuch as social conditions are never completely determined. This insight allows the greatest hope for those who recognize the magnitude of the problems that affect the possibility of

social values. By implication, no event or act is completely beyond redemption. This is demonstrated by the creative tension carried in narrative that continually opens experience to a new and greater potential for integration as value. The choice exists for each subject in each instance of intentionality but must be discerned, critically evaluated, and acted upon if value is to be realized.

7.3 Conclusion

The account of ethical deliberation that Lonergan's cognitional analysis gives rise to highlights the role of the subject as the locus of meaning and value. Through the various sets of cognitional skills and operations the subject is able to intend, deliberate, and choose particular instances of value which then provide a plan of action to be realized more or less successfully through the application of appropriate sets of skills. With the use of intentionality analysis as an explanatory paradigm, cognitional operations are understood to order particular skills and ranges of experience in schemes that will meet the specific intended ends of the conscious subject in each situation. In this understanding, imagination is considered not as a single or uniform operation but rather as varying types of operations that focus the mediating characteristics of images as they

form essential aspects of particular schemes of operations to realize particular goals. All of these functions are combined in the demands made on the subject for adequate understanding, judgment, and decision. This process, when consciously engaged in by the subject, provides the normative orientation and criteria for evaluating the meaning and significance of one's life. Transcendental imperatives operative in the subject organize experience so that meaning can emerge and provide the immanent data for evaluating the more or less successful attempts to move towards greater understanding, truth, and value.

This study explored some of the major roles played by the imagination in the process of ethical deliberation. Three such junctures were identified in the ethical framework provided by the cognitional analysis of Bernard Lonergan and his followers. The roles of imagination examined were neither complete nor comprehensive; however, they indicate the nature of the differentiated understanding of the complex sets of skills and operations that intentionality analysis promotes as characteristic of the human project. The relationship of imagination to truth of value, the subject, and society/history respectively were identified as primary and foundational features of the complex of operations in which imagination plays critical roles in mediating reality to the intentional subject. The examination of metaphor and

narrative undertaken by Ricoeur was analyzed to determine some of the concrete characteristics of the operations of the imagination which were then applied to the ethical framework provided by Lonergan's framework. Language and narrative are the primary means used by cultures to identify and promote the meaning and significance of human experience and activity. Ricoeur's study indicated the basic patterns within which meaning is created and communicated and the role of image in the creation and appropriation of meaning by ethical subjects. The fundamental creative aspects of language were identified as metaphor and narrative. Human praxis provides the link and focus of meaning carried in language.

The three junctures of ethics and imagination in Lonergan's framework were supplemented by insights on the nature and function of imagination derived from studies on metaphor and narrative. The fundamental contributions were in the exploration of the role of insights into truth and value through the study of metaphor and narrative. The need for continual revision of a subject's horizon indicates the creative tension which links the continuity of identity with the dynamic which informs human activity. A relationship between the critically creative subject and the subject as transformed in the appropriation of value was demonstrated. The nature of imaginative social constructs which shape the cultural environment within which subjects are more or less

able to recognize and realize value in their own activity demonstrated the power of history as operative in the present. Specifically, the relationship of imagination to truth of value was further differentiated by the application of the concept "seeing as," in which intelligibility is a result of critical performance informed by a willingness to be challenged in one's own anticipations. Recognition and discernment provide first level intentional principles which are analogous to the apprehension of value at the fourth level of intentionality which links habitual patterns and orientations. The notion of value which entails personal risk is a reflection of the nature of the ethical project.

The relationship of imagination and the subject identifies the centrality of the subject as the locus of value. The role of images allows for the play of possibility but images come with inherent limits and demands in each situation. Identity requires continual re-evaluation. The imaginative constitution of temporality and its impact on intentionality was discussed. The temporal resources for realizing personal and social value are not limited to the present. The foundational role of trust which is the ground of ethical intention is shown to be present symbolically in every human activity and to provide the basis of ethical relationality. Communication provides the basic form of this relationship.

The relationship of imagination to society/history indicates the enormity and complexity of the existing patterns that must be discerned for the continued good of social order to prevail. The public nature of meaning was used to demonstrate the necessary involvement of subjects with social problems; as we benefit from the goods of order, so too are we diminished by the suffering and neglect of others who share in our meaning. The recognition of certain enduring imaginative artefacts was shown to influence not only the possibility of emerging value, but also the possibility of imaginative development. Finally, the revised and vital notion of tradition as a legitimate asset was presented as an ethical imperative. The resources for reversing the decline of culture reside in the culture itself; the locus of meaning and value remains the authentic subject who constitutes the ground and the impetus for realizing value concretely.

This study indicates the outlines of a systematic approach to the questions raised by the relationship of ethics and imagination. Although exploratory in nature, sufficient evidence exists that allows critical reflection on the nature and function of imagination which is most closely argued in the study of language and meaning. The differentiated perspective provided by Lonergan's cognitional heuristic allows the posing of specific sets of questions and shows how the subject's own reflexive cognitional operations provide

the immanent normative criteria for evaluating the adequacy of specific responses. The primary and foundational role played by the operations of imagination indicate that solid reliance on logically compelling arguments is not a sufficiently grounded method of promoting ethical discourse. Lonergan's ethics clearly indicate that normativity requires consistency in understanding, morality, and acting. The predisposition of subjects to certain forms of order indicates that systematic reflection on the relationship of social conditions to the probability of higher forms of emergent value is required if ethics is to have any practical impact as a socially influential force. In specific cultures, a critical examination of the adequacy of the normative texts and stories that form consciousness and directly affect the possible ranges of activities and values which are potentially present to subjects has immediate pedagogical and political relevance. The continued promotion of marginalization of specific groups in the social order is maintained through narratives which do not adequately encompass or legitimate the full range of experience which constitutes the lives of these people. This cultural violence is necessarily inculcated in the favoured interpretations of the culture's normative texts; otherwise, such patterns of social behaviour would not be maintained. The problem affects the entire range of symbolic relationships which the society uses to identify, justify, and legitimate its existence. As

speakers, all subjects are affected by these dynamics; whether or not the inherent meaning in language and experience can be adequately articulated and appropriated depends in large measure on an adequate grasp of the relationships which constitute the conditions of human activity.

Ethics in this understanding is an engagement of the entire person who affirms the value of oneself and all others in all forms of activity. Ethics is essentially a project of meaning and is primarily indicative and only secondarily prescriptive. In this perspective, ethics is religious because of the transcendental imperatives which intend ultimate goodness and truth. Theologically, Lonergan's cognitional framework of ethics provides a wealth of verifiable experiential data which tangibly supports the theological claims of goodness, truth, and human potential. The truth of religion is grounded in the efficacy of its claims. Lonergan's ethical paradigm allows such claims to emerge.

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER ONE

- 1 Charles CURRAN, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 55.
- 2 CURRAN, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, p. 63.
- 3 CURRAN, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, pp. 75-6.
- 4 Charles CURRAN, Directions in Catholic Social Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp. 65-6.
- 5 CURRAN, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, p.90.
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