SELF IN TIME: A RHYTHMIC READING OF THE ANTHROPOLOGY

Hegel on soul, habit, and embodiment

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Abstract

This study proposes a rhythmic reading of the Anthropology section of G.W.F. Hegel's *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (§§388-412). It argues that Hegel's account of the natural soul articulates a mode of selfhood constituted in the tension between two temporal registers: the punctual, self-enclosed eternal "now" found notably in the classical Greek conception of time, and the narrative, linear time of biographical development, the legacy of the traditionally Christian understanding of temporality. Out of this tension emerge the oscillatory rhythms through which organism and world are held in dynamic mutual relationship. This thesis locates Hegel's most original and underexamined contribution to the philosophy of self and body precisely in the irreducible interplay of these temporal registers as "systematized" in the Anthropology.

This contribution presents itself as a decisively Hegelian—and perhaps more imaginative than is customary—resolution to a problem inherited jointly from Aristotle's soul as form of the living body and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. Aristotle's account of temporal unity, anchored in the moving "now" of the *Physics*, leaves unresolved how a soul immersed in the rhythms of organic life achieves the coherence of a singular self over time. Kant's unity of apperception is made transcendental, located above empirical time, leaving unexplained the role of time in the self's persistence across the multiplicity of its perceptual experiences. Hegel's anthropological project resolves what was left "open" by those systems by introducing what we may call the "speculative rhythm": the peculiar register inhabited by subjectivity that consists of multiple temporal "orders" existing simultaneously.

Hegel's Anthropology, read rhythmically, resolves this tension by relocating the ground of temporal unity from transcendental categories to the body's own rhythmic life. Habit, the thesis argues, is the philosophical "turnkey": it is simultaneously the "eternal now" in which repetition arrests time, and the oscillatory process through which natural rhythm is preserved and carried through to conscious selfhood. The unity of consciousness across time is, for Hegel, a rhythmic achievement, enacted below the reflective threshold within the temporal architecture of the natural (bodily) soul. On this reading, the soul *vibrates* to assert the unity of its experiences over time, resisting both a linear and an eternal characterization.

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List of Abbreviations

EL	The *Encyclopedia*'s "Science of Logic", also known as the "Lesser Logic"
Enz.	*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*
- *Add.*	Addition
- *R*	Remark
- *Z*	*Zusatz*
LA	*Lectures on Aesthetics*, or *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*
PhG	*Phänomenologie des Geistes*
PN	The "Philosophy of Nature" section of the *Encyclopedia*
PSS	The "Philosophy of Subjective Spirit" section of the *Encyclopedia*
U-P-S	The terms of Hegel's speculative syllogism: Universal, Particular, Singular

.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Research focus and thesis

Natural Soul as a rhythmic-temporal medium in the Anthropology

G.W.F. Hegel's understanding of individual subjectivity, most particularly in the Anthropology section of the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, mobilizes notions of temporality and corporeality in an exposition of the human soul which seems to stand decisively against the possibility of a dualistic ontological framework. Hegel's contribution is formed against the backdrop of a philosophical tradition defined by a near-total reliance on the idea of a strictly dual possibility of existence—sensual or intelligible, material or ideal—from which a dualistic conception of the self seems to naturally arise, as it comes to be defined according to the strict duality of body and mind. Perhaps we can assume that the Anthropology is itself a reaction to what Hegel must have seen as the thoroughly mistaken tendency for binarity of a philosophical tradition that was not *philosophical enough*—that had not yet attained the coveted stage of "speculative" thought.

The aim of this project is to find in the Anthropology, the function of speculative logic as a methodological surpassing of ontological duality and dualisms—and attend to the specific temporal or rhythmic dimension of this logic which I find to be

underexamined in the literature[1]. In the rest of this introductory chapter, I will try to show why this investigation is warranted. In the most general terms, the reason is twofold:

1. The idea of the bodily "awakening" of selfhood is worth examining particularly in view of the broader structures of Hegel's logic—in terms of what it means for different "stages" or moments of the subject's subjectivation
2. Behind this aim is an underlying motivation to show that nature does not disappear in *Geist* but lingers in the form of embodied temporalized I-hood or self-hood, whose meaning may be extracted most precisely from the Anthropological discussions around repetition and habituation.

My contribution is precisely here: I read this lingering of nature in more "advanced" forms of Spirit as a temporal rhythmic manifestation whose particularly temporal nature may be extracted from the Anthropology. While there have been important contributions in the secondary literature (discussed below, pp. 24-40) engaging with the themes of time, rhythm, history, habit, and selfhood in Hegel, there is—to my knowledge—no reading of the Anthropology that brings together the elements of logical rhythm and organic temporality to show that bodiliness is preserved in the more "Spiritual" facets of humanity[2,3].

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[1] Aside from Montani's (2022) commentary, where this issue is explored in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and whose definition of rhythm I find insightful, as the "movement that takes shape and gives shape to thought and experience". See below (p. 26, 65, 159) for more on Montani's contribution.

[2] This seems especially pertinent in a sense that may be interesting and relevant to consider for us, today, particularly in light of an omnipresence—discussed in chapter 7 of this paper—that may be observed across a range of philosophies, systems of knowledge, regions and epochs, of a common thread that consists in what may be described as a gesture of surpassing the terms of a "mind-body" or "mind-body adjacent" dichotomy by refusing, precisely, to posit them as terms of a dichotomy in the first place.

[3] I find the Hegelian resolution to this question of determining the status of each of soul and mind and body, both in relation to the "speculating" I and in relation to each other, fascinating: a deliberate preservation of ambiguity, a system that erects *de facto* a logical fortress that resists any kind of

Thesis

As such, this project wants to demonstrate that for Hegel, selfhood is rooted in the body and its primary manifestation is the persistence, in spirit, of a corporeal rhythm—one that can be most consistently extracted from the Anthropology section of the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.* I will also be referring to other passages from texts such as the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, where Hegel undertakes insightful discussions around such corporeal processes as digestion and musical expression. From these discussions, I wish to show how the reader may extract further support for the idea of the bodily roots, or awakening, of selfhood in Hegel. It may then be shown that Hegel's Natural Soul acts as a temporal field in which the conditions of selfhood are enacted before they are consciously grasped by the subject—that time, then, is a concept both external to Soul and inherent to its very unfolding. This temporality of soul may be observed in such natural/bodily phenomena as circadian rhythms, repetition, and habituation, for which the Anthropology offers an exposition.

I propose to show in the Anthropology the omnipresence of a certain rhythm, one that recreates the rhythm of Hegel's speculative logic[4] itself, according to which Hegel's notion of Self seems to be structured. The Anthropology prepares for the emergence of the self-certainty of a consciousness apt to "find itself" in the world of objects, as the

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dichotomization and reduces to "one-sided" and "abstract" any philosophical attempt to dichotomize, which betrays for Hegel an attempt to dilute experience (and eventually, thought) by attempting to fit it into an artificial binary structure that ends up stripping it of its essential continuous sustained characteristic of *becoming*. Becoming is an important determinant in Hegel's metaphysics (see Chapter 3 of this paper): an account of time is, therefore, essential to a satisfactory account of Hegel's conception of self and world.

[4] See Surber 2006 and Montani 2022 for insight on the "rhythmic" pattern of Hegel's speculative logic.

Philosophy of Subjective Spirit sets the stage for the development of what Hegel calls Reason (the subject's recognition of itself in the world as a reality, beyond the consciousness of itself as idea) in the ensuing section of the *Encyclopedia*, the "Phenomenology of Mind". While this "Phenomenology" stops at Reason, it seems to already anticipate the story of Spirit (*Geist*) by laying the groundwork for the subsequent development of the forms of historical spirit in the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Right*—functioning as the initial moment of universal self-consciousness in the broader, syllogistic realization of the concept of *Geist*.

Against this conceptual backdrop, there seems to be an operative role assigned to the primordial, perhaps anticipatory form of temporality we may find in the interplay of soul and body as it unfolds in the Anthropology—in the sense that it may already contain in it the eventuality of *Geist*'s temporality, itself actualized through the necessity of the aspects of worldly consciousness, one that can find itself in a world external to it, introduced in the *Encyclopedia*'s "Phenomenology". As such, my aim is to show in the temporal rhythm of the soul-body "struggle" in the Anthropology—for which habituation seems to function as a veritable culmination, a sort of narrative climax—an anticipation of the realized temporal dimension of *Geist* in such forms of meaningful human interaction as art and religion. From there, an argument may be made for the significance of acknowledging the temporality inherent in the Anthropology's soul-body interplay and its decisive role in anticipating the important historical dimension of *Geist* itself.

It has been suggested that Hegel's philosophy of Spirit is at bottom a philosophy of time. Notably, Kojève's (1969) historical reading of Hegel points to the significance of the identification that Hegel clearly and repeatedly operates in the *Phenomenology of*

Spirit of Time and the Concept: "As for *Time*, (…) it is the [empirically] existent Notion [Concept] itself [Was die *Zeit* betrifft, … so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst] (PhG M27 & 487-88). It also explains the pertinence of the parallels drawn in the literature (see below, p. 24) between the soul-body relation in the Anthropology and the "master-slave" relation in the *Phenomenology* by mobilizing the notion of *Begierde*, desire, that functions as the point of "crisis" in the passage from the "enslavement" to the "liberation" of self-consciousness. I aim to illuminate here the thread that runs through these comparisons and legitimizes them: the primacy of the temporal determination. In the self-positing both of spirit out of nature and of the enslaved consciousness out of the dominant consciousness, it is specifically the rhythm of the speculative syllogism, one that continually dances into and away from the middle, that ensures the "achievement" or actualization of the individual(ized) subject. Spirit's—the history of human consciousness— "final" moment is never at rest: it is, ultimately "Absolute" or absolutely open to the alternance between itself (as subject) and itself (as object).[5]

A satisfactory explanation of the aims of this project must include an effort to situate Hegel's thought philosophically. Hegel's philosophy of the self, and his philosophy of Spirit understood as Kojève understands it as a "philosophy of Time", unfolds against a complex and fascinating conceptual background. What follows is an

[5] Theodor Garaets writes, "As the final moment of Absolute Spirit, […] philosophy is the actual liberation of the intellect, which is in itself free. […] Far from leading us to a definitive rest, philosophy, as an understanding of the Absolute Spirit as the opening of the System, calls us to 'carry the burden of Spirit' even further into our personal and social lives and in our very philosophy" (Garaets 1986, 13. My translation.). As this work aims to show, this restlessness is for the human subject deeply bodily. The question of the implication of this structure of temporal tension and perpetual restlessness—what I will call the syllogism's "logics of disappearance"—for the life and habits of the philosopher will be explored further in Chapter 7.

exposition of the conceptual context and infrastructure of Hegel's philosophies of self and time. I focus especially on the modern background of ontological duality and Kant, Fichte, and Aristotle's contributions to Hegel's "system". I also attempt to configure a (tentatively) coherent, preliminary conception of Hegelian selfhood—a conception that will acquire its more developed, "truer" definition at Chapter 7 of this paper, once the "rhythmic" reading of the Anthropology has been completed[6]—by bringing together, in a sort of "pilot" generalizing motion, Hegel's rather scattered thoughts around such determinations as identity, difference, time, habit, sublation, and the other. This exposition is followed by a—(n) unfortunately necessarily limited, and always-incomplete—look at the contemporary literature around the Hegelian themes raised in this project.

What of Hegel's Self in view of the so-called "soul-body dichotomy"?

As multiple commentators point out[7], Hegel does not devote a singular work to the mind/body or soul/body "problem"—the use of "problem" being, here, tentative. The question formulated as one with two poles, the relation between which is ambiguous and whose ontological status is put in question, seems to constitute for Hegel (one of, if not) the "original sin" of the modern epoch. Where Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and others of their contemporaries ruminated on the question of what kinds of thing exist and which kind of thing has metaphysical priority over the other, Hegel seems to want to make clear the futility of such ruminations—with an awareness that in the end, none of them produce

[6] I use the word "completed" with hesitation. As this paper will show, a project on Hegel's metaphysics of the soul and self is difficult to "complete" in any significant sense—it can only be initiated, *entamé*.
[7] See Testa, Lumsden, and Nuzzo's essays *in* Stern 2013; as well as Russon 1997 and Stein 2021.

a satisfactory enough explanation of such phenomena as the soul, the body, the mind, the idea, the physical, the material, and that they all end up taking recourse to a third element whose function would be to explain the apparently occult relationship between the first two (in most cases, this third element is God).

The mistake is, then, taking for granted a dualistic ontological framework where only two sorts of things, or two "substances", can exist, and extracting from such a framework a notion of the specifically human mode of being as something split into a strict dichotomy made of these two substances: the mind, or soul (*Seele*) and the body (*Leib*), or the corporeal (*Körper*). Significantly for this project's thesis, by realizing a *déplacement* of the so-called "mind/body" or "soul/body" question and putting in question its very dualistic nature, Hegel reframes the question of the Self and selfhood in a gesture that puts in effect a notion of doing, a *faire*, that forms the Self in a pattern defined by continuous motion, injected with activity: what may perhaps be a reiteration of Aristotle's *energeia*, at least to an extent.

Notably, we see in Hegel's scattered discussions around the so-called "soul/body" question that there are already problems with the nomenclature which is normally adopted in addressing it in the first place. This is clear considering the multiplicity of the terms Hegel employs in these discussions, where none is really reducible to the other: neither is "soul" (*Seele*) interchangeable with "mind" (sometimes *Verstand*, sometimes what *Geist* is translated to, though the Hegelian notion of Spirit is clearly much broader than what strictly pertains to the mental, while, curiously, his notion of "soul" seems to be narrower still than that of "mind"), nor does "body" (*Leib*) completely coincide with "corporeity" or the corporeal (*Körper*). Already in the first few lines of the

Anthropology, we learn that mind is the "truth of nature" and that it "finds all the stuff of its determination" in soul, that soul is "immediate mind", also "the sleep of mind", and that mind is "the existent truth of matter"[8]. Hegel arrives at such a multiplicity of terms, and therefore what appears to be an outright rejection of duality, through a radical redefinition of subjectivity—which transforms from that which is understood in strict contrast to objectivity and externality, to that which necessarily contains its own negation in its very concept.

Philosophical foundations of the Hegelian Self: Kant and Fichte

Hegel's conception of selfhood is constructed against the backdrop of two foundational definitions: Kant's, as overarching unity, and Fichte's, as self-positing or division. For Hegel, both gestures are found in what he calls Self, or properly human subjectivity—which seems to persist somewhat restlessly, in movement or rather perhaps in alternation, between the two. In Kant, the problem lies in the synthesis of the subject's (the "I"'s) perception of itself, or more accurately its perception of its perceptions as singularly belonging to it—the possibility for the "I" to recognize itself as a determinate amalgamated unity, wherein the amalgamation is that of the self's differentiated, individual perceptions. Kant establishes this synthesis on the basis of the functioning of his transcendental categories, demonstrating how phenomena (what appears to the "I" as perceptions) are linked or brought together through the intermediary constituted by such "categories of understanding (*Verstand*)" as quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Kant eventually concedes a necessity as concerns the meta-perception that is

[8] See *Enz.* §388-389.

apperception, as the condition of possibility of all perception and as an originary unity to which every individual perception refers, in which every individual perception is contained, and which forms the conceptual foundation of the mind, or the "understanding", as a unified self.

Whereas Kant's apport to Hegel was the necessity of this gesture of unification ("synthesis"), the coming-about of the whole presiding Self, Fichte's contribution will be directed towards the individual "I"'s internal division into what it is and what it is not, its separation into its own "internal" identity and difference. Through this, the Self is no longer exclusively differentiated from the world it encounters, its externality—but also comes to be divided from its very concept or rather comes to divide itself. In his *Wissenschaftslehre*, Fichte begins by observing in the individual "I" an inherent schism through which it becomes what it is—through which it comes to be, precisely, individuated. He explains: the first principle of a transcendental philosophy is that according to which "the I posits itself as an I" (Fichte 2020 (1794-95)). To be an I, the I must assert itself as an I—must, therefore, operate the division between itself and itself that is implied in the statement "I=I", *Ich bin Ich*.

Hegel's approach will reject the Kantian notion of the subject as something fundamentally separate from its object, assigning instead a form of autonomy to the object which will allow for a relation of reciprocity to be established between the one and the other. To understand this question of the Hegelian subject as it relates to the problematic of the identity of selfhood, it seems important to see that this notion discloses itself in Hegel's text as both a grammatical subject in interaction with a predicate, and a "psychical" subject, a real (ontological) Self, in interaction with an object. This much is

clear according to Hegel himself: in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, speculative thinking—Hegel's method, or the mode of thought he privileges in his philosophy—is explained as thinking that is predicated on a fundamental rejection of a notion of Subject that would be passive, merely receiving characterization or predication. Instead, what we have is the subject as "the object's own self, which presents itself as the *coming-to-be of the object*", not a passive subject but a self-determining, self-positing "Notion which takes its determinations back into itself" (p. 37). Fichte's "I am I" becomes Hegel's "S=P", where the subject and its predicate are now enjoined—and delimited—by a copula.

Self as other, other-in-self

The agency of the subject, no longer obviously differentiated from its object, is indicative primarily of its individuation as a determinate Self, which takes place against the act of self-positing: an ontological truth that seems to disclose itself linguistically throughout the *Phenomenology of Spirit*[9]. "The Subject that fills its content ceases to go beyond it, and cannot have any further Predicates or accidental properties", writes Hegel. "Conversely, the dispersion of the content is thereby bound together under the self; it is not the universal which, free from the Subject, could belong to several others" (PhG M37[10]). Speculative thinking acknowledges the reflexive movement of the "I" wherein it goes back into itself, as something richer and more determinate, after having been

[9] This position is based on a reading of the *Phenomenology* according to which forms of spirit are understood as forms of language. Such a reading holds that every form of consciousness, from self-certainty to absolute knowing, reveals itself linguistically in the interpretive "open" space created by the copula *is* of the speculative proposition. For a more comprehensive explanation, see Reid 2021.
[10] Page numbers preceded by "M" refer to A.V. Miller's translation of the PhG.

confronted with (negated by) the predicate which works to delimit its notion and to particularize the Subject into a single unified Self. The speculative Subject is a "knowing 'I'" that has been invested with content or meaning by virtue of its object, which is necessarily other to it.

The product of this gesture of "filling", as Hegel calls it, is a unifying determination, a bringing-together of Subject and Predicate into a single, determinate Self. The ontological weight of this Self makes itself known through the realization of the object in the Subject to the extent to which the Subject's very essence, or being, is expressed in the Predicate itself. As such, the grammatical Subject discloses itself as an ontological Self through this movement of self-positing, insofar as it is limited and defined by its other. The autonomy of thought, as demonstrated by the free dialectical movement of subject and predicate, is what gives the Subject ontological value.

To this point, introducing the second subsection of the Anthropology, Hegel begins by drawing a distinction between a subject's "substance" or "genius" on the one hand, and its "feeling individuality" on the other—its formal, immediate subjectivity which has not yet made its way out into the world of objectivity as something-unified. Rather curiously, in the remark to the first proposition of this subsection, the relationship between these two terms is understood in terms of the relationship between the mother and the child in her womb:

> Here are two individuals, yet still in undivided soul-unity: the one is still no *self*, not yet impenetrable, incapable of resistance; the other is its subject, the *single* self of both.—The mother is the *genius* of the child; for by genius we commonly mean the selfish totality of the mind, in so far as it exists *for itself*, and constitutes the subjective substantiality of another, which is only externally posited as an individual; the latter has only a formal being-for-self. The substance of the genius is the whole totality of

> reality, of life, and of character, not as a mere possibility, or capacity, or in-itself, but as activity and activation; as concrete subjectivity.
>
> […]
>
> The totality of feeling as for its self a different subjectivity, which, in the […] form of immediate existence of this life of feeling, is also another individual confronting it. But the totality of feeling is destined to elevate its being-for-self out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same individuality; this subjectivity is then its indwelling consciousness, sober, intelligent, and rational. For such a consciousness the life of feeling is substantial and merely implicit material, whose rational, self-conscious, determining genius has become sober subjectivity. (§405 R)

The relationship between the mother and the child is meant to exemplify the relationship between the overarching "self-feeling" of the individual, what Hegel calls its *substance*, and its immediate, moment-to-moment subjectivity, referred to here as its "consciousness".

In this Remark, it is the operation, the inner workings of this "*magic* relationship" between immediate individuality and its "material", its "stuff"—the (organic) totality of its Self—that is addressed. This observation seems to directly put forward a clear definition of selfhood as oscillation through an image of real embodiment, in what is perhaps the most literal iteration of the term. The individuality that is in the womb is not yet a Self because it has not encountered externality and thus has not asserted itself as such; it is rather a formal individuality, as if waiting to be filled with the content of its Other. Hegel gives this stage of the soul, in its "feeling" state, the status of animality. Still prior to the development of real, human subjectivity, the inchoate selfhood of the fetus remains in a state of immediacy with itself, a "self-feeling" through which syllogistic mediation may not pass, and which is, therefore, prey to forms of psychological falsity—Hegel's concept of *madness* or "derangement". As a result, the soul in its feeling stage, plunged into a state of what may be called predicative vulnerability, *shares out* (*Urteil*)

with[11] the realization of its potentiality—the real, concrete, individual subjectivity that determines it and delineates its definition.

This diminished status assigned to the (perhaps rudimentary) "selfhood" that is in the womb seems to reveal something important about the structure of the Hegelian Self, beyond its mere existence in a certain space of oscillation and ambiguity: it is as if the self anticipates its full realization, its truth as a Self that is both a *gathering* and a *dividing*, as it occupies its initial moment of atemporal, empty indeterminacy exhibited by the fetus—we could say, maybe, prior to the moment of its self-positing or self-assertion as an "I". To this empty formal selfhood, is attached its "genius", says Hegel: the totality of its *real*, concrete, being—its substantial subjectivity: the mother. The mother, as substance, is *other vis-à-vis* the individuality that is in her womb, and yet it is the mother that grants this formal individuality the conditions of its full realization: it is its totality that grants the child's still-formal "life of feeling" in its immediacy, its capacity to *become what it is* and therefore anticipates its real individuation. In this sense, the totality of the "genius", the *single* unifying substance, acts as the foundation of what we could call individual consciousness.

This is important chiefly when placed in the context of the overarching conflict between *Seele* and *Verstand*, which Hegel positions at the origin of this notion of "derangement"—the phenomenon of "madness", or mental illness. For Hegel, a "healthy", "sane" relation between the soul and the understanding is exemplified in what Jeffrey Reid calls a "genetic line of argument" by the relation between mother and

[11] See Reid 2017 & Reid 2024a.

fetus[12], specifically, by virtue of the eventual subversion which is anticipated, and already contained, in this initial ambiguous state that is the "feeling soul" 's rudimentary version of selfhood. As Reid explains,

> (…) according to the mother-child dialectic, the foetus, at first determined by the maternal genius, will subsequently, as developing child, adolescent etc. rise up to consciousness, to develop into 'the rational genius, conscious of itself, determining'. […] the substance-subject that was the foetus' mother is incorporated into the child as a predicate, which will now be determined by its own understanding consciousness. This predicate ("the feminine nature") is the soul of the conscious being, the natural human soul, all its inner dispositions, predispositions, characteristics. (4)

The immediacy exhibited by the soul in its feeling stage makes it "unstable", vulnerable to being overdetermined by nature. Mental illness occurs when, instead of the syllogistic development of consciousness "normally" leading to *Seele* being determined by the individual subjectivity's realized consciousness, which is the product of its interaction with and mediation by the objective world, *Verstand* itself comes to be under the sway of soul as it loses its rootedness in the world of objects, subjecting the selfhood in question to what seems to be a self-obsessive cycle of continuous self-negation—a pathological solipsism that makes of the subject itself, its own only possible reality[13].

At the same time as dividing into its immediate formal, moment-to-moment individuality on the one hand and its anchoring in a totality that is its "substantial

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[12] Reid 2024a, 3.

[13] Hegel's pathologizing of "feeling" or "self-feeling" is in line with a noteworthy change in terminology he makes between the 1827 edition and the final 1830 edition of the *Encyclopedia*: from "The Dreaming Soul" (*Die fühlende Seele*) to "The Feeling Soul" (*Die traümende Seele*). Hegel originally conceives of what eventually became feeling soul as a slumbering "state where conscious 'power over the imagination' is lost", deriving his observations on such phenomena of "derangement" as clairvoyance, somnambulism, and delusion from the contemporaneous work that was being done in the field of "empirical psychology" at the time. According to this reading, what ended up being the "Anthropological" project was always one of *rationalizing* the *madness* he had born witness to, a necessarily somatic—bodily—process of determination through which a realized Self is borne out of an initial state of pathological, self-obsessed potentiality. For more on the change from "Dreaming" to "Feeling" Soul, see Reid *in* Stern 2013.

subjectivity" on the other, the soul seems also to have a tendency to maintain. This tendency can be most clearly observed in habituation, which Hegel explores in the third moment of the second subsection of the Anthropology. In habit, Hegel says, the soul "makes itself into abstract universal being". Here, we find an almost implicit de-dichotomizing gesture towards the broader notions of Spirit and Nature, whereby it is as if the mechanism of habit plunges the individual into a sort of natural determinateness evoking in this passage a state of inescapability, or rather "indifference", which the individual comes to occupy. This "[unfreedom]" is only formal, writes Hegel, a "rational liberation" from the satisfaction of urges and desires: it is limiting in the sense that it allows the subject to effectively overcome nature through its subordination to "reason".

In this, habit is the first determination that hoists the soul out of its prior diffusion into Nature, out of its undifferentiation and indeterminacy. Through a sustained motion of *preservation*, habituation allows the self to *overcome* its Natural precondition and move into the stage of Spirit, thus "enabling the subject to be *concrete* immediacy, to be *soulful* ideality, enabling the content, religious content, moral content, etc., to *belong* to it as *this self*, as *this* soul, not in it merely *implicitly* (as predisposition) nor as a transient sensation or representation, nor as abstract inwardness, cut off from action and actuality, but in its very being" (*Enz.* §410). Through habituation, soul "[takes] possession of its body", transforms it into a "*skillful instrument* of its activity", thus establishing an identity between it and its bodiliness—a true, mediated, identity, which has gone through the machinations of the mind. At the same time as it liberates the soul from the indeterminacy of Nature, habit seems to re-place it in a different kind of universality where, by dint of anchoring the self in its *trained* bodily expressions, ends up giving it the

appearance of something-natural, or a "*mechanical* […] effect" (§410 *Z*). Hegel's Self comes to be, therefore, informed by what looks like a purposeful *maniement*, a "handling" of corporeality by the Soul—to which the former is conceived as belonging—that places soul once again in the sphere of Nature from which it had originated, and to which it returns, this time occupying a state of determinacy and limitation.

What is a real Self?

Throughout his authorship, and most clearly in the *Logic*, Hegel seems to establish a motif concerning what may be understood as the progression of indeterminate identity into true selfhood through negation. Through a sustained, temporal motion involving dynamic definitions of identity and difference, a broader, greater determination of identity comes to be established between an initial state of strict self-identity on the one hand, and a state of difference on the other—which first comes into conflict with the initial determination of identity and then gets absorbed into it. Looking to the initial, "naïve" state of self-identity, Hegel observes a structure of anticipation already contained within its concept. Importantly, this first stage of the development of a concept—pure, empty, Being— "can be determined as I=I, as *absolute Indifference* or *Identity*, and so on. Where there is the need to begin, either with the certainty of oneself, or with a definition or intuition of *what is absolutely true*, these and other similar forms can be looked upon as the ones that must come first" (*Enz.* §86). However, there seems to be some form of mediation already contained within such initial forms as pure Being or pure identity. Hegel makes this clear at §92 of the *Encyclopedia Logic*:

> In being-there the determinacy is one with being and is at the same time posited as negation; this determinacy is *limit, restriction*. Thus, otherness is not something-

> indifferent outside it, but its own moment. In virtue of its quality, *something* is first *finite* and secondly *alterable*, so that the finitude and alterability belong to its being.

Empty being contains already and always in its very concept the eventuality of its fulfillment, or of the "filling" of its empty form with some content. Accordingly, in contradistinction to what he calls "spurious" or bad infinity, Hegel comes to define "genuine" or true infinity as "not 'something' beyond the finite, but the *process* in which the two one-sided and opposing categories, namely the finitude and the 'finitized' infinity, come to be united on a higher and more comprehensive level by making plain their alternating determinations" (Lau *in* Surber 2006, 57). Hegel understands the newer notion of "genuine infinity" as one that contains in it the previous determinations of finitude and spurious infinity—not as a contrasting or opposed term to either of the two, neither still as the product of a contrast between the two. "In this respect", continues Lau, "true infinity—that is, the Absolute—is nothing but the *total comprehension of finitude from within finitude*". Genuine infinity is, in this sense, categorically different and more comprehensive in relation to both concepts of finitude and "finitized" infinity and is posited on a higher (we could say a properly philosophical) level of the understanding which undertakes this peculiar operation of speculation.

As such, Hegel's (*onto-logical*) Self is as unifying as it is dividing; it is as bringing-together as it is differentiating; it contains both concepts as *moments*—importantly, not as *parts*—of its whole manifestation. Within a single Self, we find evidence of both a self-maintaining and a limiting: both a sustaining and a never-ending, acute cutting through in order to make finite. Hegel deploys this tension which exists already in both self-as-presiding unity and self-as-self-positing as if to use as leverage for his more generalizing notion of an "oscillating" selfhood, one that is essentially defined by a state of vibratory

movement inherent to the very concept of a singular self. It is in this oscillation that a self will be able to recognize, encounter, and engage other selves in what is effectively the stage of communion, of subjectivity's becoming-object by inserting (or rather *re*-inserting) itself into the world of externality.

This project is, therefore, in part, an attempt to demonstrate that it is precisely in this conceptual framework that Hegel's Self may be best understood: one that challenges our notions surrounding terms such as "soul", "mind", "body", "material" and "immaterial" from the very outset. If we admit both a unifying and a self-positing, self-limiting dimension to selfhood, if we admit, as Hegel writes in the *Logic*, that both a thing's "finitude and [its] alterability belong to its being", then we can discern as a preliminary observation the multiplicity that seems to inhere in the Hegelian Self and the necessarily ambiguous space of "in-betweenness" it seems occupy as it continuously divides and merges. Accordingly, we can discern also the fundamental reworking Hegel operates, against the backdrop of a prevailing dualistic philosophical tendency, on the configuration of such familiar notions as the soul and the body within the grander schemas of his systematic philosophy.

Soul and time, Self and time, and Aufhebung

At the heart of every Hegelian Self is a constant oscillatory state of "both… and" which allows it to become acute—to cut up through the undefined, continuous sludge of space and bump against and encounter other selves meaningfully. This "acuteness" of Self is, then, what explains the meaningfulness of time—it is what gives a given temporal moment its "now-ness", what allows it to *be* and *pass over* into the next. As Hegel writes in the *Aesthetics*:

> Contrasted with [the] empty progress [of the uninterrupted constant moment of time], the self is what persists in and by itself, and its self-concentration interrupts the indefinite series of points of time and makes gaps in their abstract continuity; and in its awareness of its discrete experiences, the self recalls itself and finds itself again and thus is freed from mere self-externalization and change. (§91)

Reid observes in Hegel's time a distinctly Kantian dimension, describing it as a privileged expression of the negating agency of thought[14]. In this sense, time is empty—or perhaps better yet, it *is*, only indeterminately. As long as it remains the articulation of *negating* or limiting indeterminate externality, as a form of mind not yet touched by subjectivity, time remains indeterminate itself—and indeed runs the risk of being nothing at all.

As pure temporality dwells in a space of unconditioned "abstract continuity", it is only when taken hold of by human subjectivity, by *Seele*, that it comes to qualify nature—making the body "temporal" and attributing to it a certain rhythm which individuates it. The body, in turn, seems to inscribe this subjectivity into not merely an empty structure of temporality but a real chronology, a history, transporting it beyond the unconditioned abstract grip of time. As such, an ensouled body is made temporal, while an embodied soul is made historical, or human. For "soul" to receive its properly human attributes and break out, so to speak, of the undifferentiated eternity that is pure temporality, it requires its embodiment, or its anchoring in the self-imposing forms of Nature. In this way, the relation of soul to body, like that of Spirit to Nature, seems to be one of complementarity, wherein the real existence or objectivity of a self is ultimately

[14] See Reid 2024b.

insured by the necessity of its embodiment, by its submission to the "sway of self-externality" (§389 R).

We might, then, understand the temporality which first comes to characterize nature as a structure that conditions the emergence of veritable historical chronology—of the ultimate anchoring of the subject in a narrative, a determined determinable succession of events from which some meaning is apt to be extracted. It is in this sense that nature first "sublates itself", as Hegel writes at §388, in pure and abstract temporality, "as what is untrue"—throwing itself into its own negation, occupying thus a space of pure Being, or nothingness. Once, however, it is taken hold of by a Self, a subjectivity (which itself is only real, or objective, once embodied), the temporality of nature *becomes* what it is: it becomes something-identifiable, determinable, individual. The body, which makes subjectivity *historical* (and so, human), is itself made *temporal* by this corporeality through its own self-sublation, its throwing itself into the possibility of scatteredness and indeterminacy. In time, the body is as if persistently "caught by" the soul. In the structures of temporal order, human subjectivity cyclically takes hold of Nature in order to free it from its own negation, from its overdetermination, in one constant repeating motion. Soul and body continually inform and transform one another's determinations—a reciprocity without which it seems inconceivable for Hegel to identify anything, to speak of/in an "I", or to know difference and identity.

In this framework, each "now", each new moment, only *is* by virtue of its *vanishing* nature. It is the (thinking) self positing itself, the self "[recalling] itself"', that comes to break the endless indiscriminate continuity of pure temporality. In this sense, the self "frees" time from its sluggish fate—from its dissolution into the universal, its

indeterminacy—and assigns meaning to it by intervening in the constant uninterrupted state of difference in which time persists. In this, human subjectivity comes to make chronology, to make history—by cutting up through the undifferentiated sludge of continuous, undetermined material of the world. We find here, then, a peculiarly intimate relationship drawn by Hegel between Self and time: it is through selfhood, or (specifically human) subjectivity, that time itself is apt to be "historicized"—that it gains meaning, direction, determination—as a result of the self-positing gesture of the thinking Self, which is "[aware] of its discrete experiences".

We have seen how for Kant, the self's awareness of its own experiences, the self perceiving itself, is a transcendental event. It is the product of bringing together two terms—the multiplicity of my experiences or perceptions on the one hand, and the unity of my perception of the Self on the other hand, the "I" which I make use of—into a single term which includes or encompasses the two at once, or which brings about their bringing-together. In Hegel, what Kant was describing as a process of synthesizing is now rather understood as an overcoming, a *dépassement* which presumes a motion of the terms being killed and then reborn as something-more, something-"higher", what he calls sublation (*Aufhebung*). In the context of the notion of selfhood, each of the bringing-together and the tearing-apart moments of the "I"'s definition are sublated into something greater than both at each new moment. By virtue of the coexistence of what appears to be two opposite forces at one singular moment, the self comes to be precisely what it is, and traverses time and difference as a persistent object among others.

By virtue of the body's ostensible "temporalization" by selfhood, bodiliness comes to inhabit and move to its particular rhythm—one that may be observed in such

forms of corporeality as habituation. In habit, Hegel observes what seems to be a gradual tempo in the process of *ensoulment*, the process of the soul *taking hold of* the body and making it its own. Concluding the section on "Habit", the *Zusatz* to §410 explains:

> If the activities of the body to be performed in the service of mind are often *repeated*, they acquire an ever higher degree of adequacy, for the soul gains an ever greater familiarity with all the circumstances to be considered, hence becomes more and more *at home* in its *expressions* and consequently achieves a continually growing capacity for immediately embodying its inner determinations and accordingly transforms the body more and more into its own property, into its serviceable instrument: there thus arises a *magical* relationship, an immediate operation of mind on body.

Habituation temporalizes the body in this way: as the soul takes hold of the body and "[makes it] its own" (§411, it seems to perform an oscillatory, alternating, cyclical motion of turning towards its corporeality, *penetrating* it, then distancing itself, as if removing itself from it. Later in the same *Zusatz*:

> (…) that in *habit* our consciousness is at the same time *present* in the matter-at-hand, *interested* in it, yet conversely *absent* from it, *indifferent* towards it: that our self just as much *appropriates* the matter-in-hand as, on the contrary, it *withdraws* from it, that the soul on the one hand completely *penetrates* into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus giving them the shape of something *mechanical*, of a merely *natural effect*.

The coexistence of both motions of *penetration* and *withdrawal* in habit seems to denote the commencement of the self's individuation, the soul in its "actuality": the moment where the subject determinately throws itself back into universality and emerges as its own singular *motion*—its own time signature. The "identity of the inner with the outer" thus conceived, the swift grabbing and molding of the body by the soul, ensures the appearance of the individual subject—or rather the individuation of the Self and its *objectification*. The Hegelian self seems to take hold of its difference and preserve it,

sublating it into what allows it to assert itself as an "I" amenable to engage with other "I"s it encounters—what, ultimately, makes it a properly *human* subjectivity.

What is *aufgehoben* is at once posited as real and existing, and simultaneously negated in a definitive motion of *dépassement*. The notion of sublation taken to its extremity, to its absolute ideality, may perhaps be understood as manifested in the Christian notion of God, most particularly in his relationship to the human-divine figure of Christ. In a remarkably Hegelian moment—especially in the use of "vibration" to designate existence as such—in one of her essays in *Waiting for God*, Simone Weil poignantly describes something similar:

> [God] created beings capable of love from all possible distances. Because no other could do it, he himself went to the greatest possible distance, the infinite distance. This infinite distance between God and God, this supreme tearing apart, this agony beyond all others, this marvel of love, is the crucifixion. […] This tearing apart […] echoes perpetually across the universe in the midst of the silence, like two notes, separate yet melting into one, like pure and heart-rending harmony. This is the Word of God. The whole creation is nothing but its vibration.[15]

By inhabiting a space of oscillation between its dividing into divinity and humanity on the one hand and its presiding unity on the other, the Christian conception of God thus understood allows the merging of what is and what is not in a greater, truer, identity. As a result, we have a conception of something-divine according to which humanness, its fundamental negation, is revealed to be a moment in the development of its very concept.

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[15] Weil 1950, 123-4. Despite the possibility of proposing a number of interesting questions in relation to the parallels of Weil's and Hegel's conceptions of God and Christ (Christ as "body", Word as "body", the influence of the Platonic vs. Aristotelian heritage on each of their conceptions of reason and revelation, even the question of how Weil herself *handled* her own bodiliness in favor of a grander unity or "truth"…), this project will not engage with these questions for fear of straying too far from the thesis statement, itself already quite complex. I will content myself to drawing this parallel to illustrate better the meaning of *Aufhebung*, sublation, and use this moment of clarification as an excuse to share this beautiful piece of prose as real evidence of the motion of speculative logic through thought, and an example of how this motion may manifest textually.

Here is the essence of *Aufhebung*: the difference is never itself negated—only *subsumed* in a broader truth. In and through Hegel's "Natural Soul", it is Nature that may find itself subsumed in the true, full definition of Spirit itself, thus precluding the possibility of a binarity of soul and corporeality, and rooting instead the truth of *Seele* in the precondition that is bodiliness. In this way, Hegel makes of Spirit the truth of Nature, its realization in the world of objectivity—Spirit so becomes the very necessity, even the inevitability, of Nature's purposeful process.

1.2 Literature review and the current study

Hegel's treatment of the notions of soul, body (bodiliness or corporeality), and selfhood has been addressed by commentators from a few different angles. John McCumber observes in Hegel's Spirit a significant surpassing of biological determination, the product of habit—writing that "habit appears, not 'in' nature, but as the death of nature—as the boundary line between nature and Spirit" (McCumber 1990, 161). In a comparable assertion, Emmanuel Chaput writes about the body's "initial dominion" on the soul in the Anthropology. Describing the naturalness of the body as something to be overcome by the soul for the Self to *become itself*, Chaput extracts from this reading a new, *sublated* unity of the soul and its embodiment—the Self—one which will, once realized, be apt to "turn its attention to what is outside of it" and engage meaningfully with the world (Chaput 2023, 115).

Jane Dryden similarly observes in Hegel's Natural Soul an anticipation of the self's actuality and the foundation of its eventual individuation. Habit seems to reveal the role of soul's corporeality as the terrain in which its individual activity and expression is anchored; as it moves towards its full realization in the Anthropology, the soul both

negates the external determinations of nature and takes them back in, as if embracing them but only after having taken hold of them and made them its own. It is specifically through this motion of simultaneous negation and preservation—*Aufhebung*—that for Hegel, Dryden writes, "we are continually reaching out to the world and then returning home" (Dryden 2016, 9).

The insight from the literature shows that Hegel's treatment of the soul and its embodiment may lend itself to an interpretation according to which while their duality is not maintained, the soul and the body always exhibit a relation of submission and domination, with "liberation" recurring as a theme across multiple commentators (see for example McCumber 1990, Lumsden *in* Stern 2013, Novakovic 2019, and Chaput 2023). The most obvious comparative application of the question of "soul and body" in Hegel in a text other than the Anthropology, which addresses it fairly explicitly, is the so-called "master-slave dialectic" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—or the dialectic of what Hegel calls the "independent" and "dependent" consciousnesses. The relation between the soul and the body has been generally understood in analogy with this dialectic, where the soul is explained as first being under the dominion of nature, and then inverting this relation to master what was previously dominating it, the body, which it turns into its "serviceable instrument" (§410 *Z*)—most notably through habituation. The soul, therefore, liberates the Self from the undifferentiated grip of nature precisely by taking hold of its bodiliness—by "learning to work with the natural impulsion, compulsions and desires of the body" to "[overcome] the recalcitrant naturalness of its corporeity", as Chaput (2023, 106) explains, and make its corporeity *its own*.

Although many valuable contributions have been made to clarify the notions of soul and bodiliness in Hegel's text as well as explain their specific relation to individual subjectivity, there does not seem to be much literature pertaining to the specifically temporalized, temporalizing dimension of the Hegelian self in connection with its fundamental determination by its corporeality. The process through which the dominion of the body on the soul gets inverted and selfhood is arrived at as a unified concept, seems itself to be characterized by a certain *rhythmic* structure of cancelling and preserving—or "investing" and "withdrawing" in Hegel's terms—wherein the soul is perpetually, cyclically, turning towards its body then turning away from it, "filling" it with content then disengaging from it. A similar rhythmic structure may be found in the speculative proposition itself which allows the subject to simultaneously take in its predicate and remain what it is—thus embracing its negation while preserving something of itself. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel writes:

> This conflict between the general form of a proposition and the unity of the Notion which destroys it is similar to the conflict that occurs between metre and accent. Rhythm results from the floating centre and the unification of the two. So, too, in the philosophical proposition the identification of Subject and Predicate is not meant to destroy the difference between them, which the form of the proposition expresses; their unity, rather, is meant to emerge as a harmony. (M38)

Mobilizing this struggle that characterizes the speculative sentence between the form of the proposition and the unity of the concept may clarify the nature of the "struggle" that takes place between soul and body in the Anthropology. John Montani observes in the structure of the speculative proposition a "rhythm" that "secures the formal passage of the subject into the predicate not by eliminating their difference but by sublating them into the movement of the whole", "[giving] shape to the passage of one *into* the other" (Montani 2022, 256). Similarly, the Anthropology seems to display a

rhythmic, almost musical interplay between selfhood and its corporeality through which nature is continually seized by the soul and integrated into an ever greater, differentiated, determined unity. Hegel's *Seele* seems to participate in a sort of "dance" with its embodiment, taking one step towards it then another away from it, embracing it then letting it go in a repeated cyclic pattern. It is out of this dance, an ongoing uninterrupted single motion that seems to reach its climax in habituation, that selfhood is *awakened* in the Anthropology, as both the negation and the preservation of the forms of nature which are imposed on the soul—which continuously rejects them, grabs and molds them, and reclaims them as its own. The focus of this project is, then, to provide support in the Anthropology for the idea of a Hegelian selfhood that is corporeally rooted, by showing the operativity of the temporalizing dimension of what might be called the soul and the body's reciprocal, or mutual, determination.

To understand Hegel's contribution to the question of the soul and the body, we may begin by placing it in the context of the unfolding of the Hegelian System itself—thus acknowledging the meaning of such terms as "soul", "body", "mind", and "corporeality" or "corporeity" in relation to the grander narrative of Science through which speculative thought unfolds. Introducing "Hegel's Naturalism or Soul and Body in the *Encyclopedia*" in David Stern's *Essays*, Italo Testa sharply observes Hegel's distinctive approach to the soul/body question. Testa writes:

> (…) for Hegel soul and body are not things of a different kind but refer to the same object, namely, the living individual. They are to be conceived, then, as different categories under which we find the same object: the fact that we have descriptions that are not located at the same level does not mean that we are confronted with two types of being.
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> [...]

> (…) the local problem of the soul—body relation can be grasped only against the global background of the relation between Nature and Spirit. (23)

Two points are especially significant here. First, the meaning of a singular term in Hegel's discourse is only revealed through the unfolding of the broader philosophical narrative in which this term is employed. The definition of a given term cannot be arrived at independently of those of the terms from which it is differentiated—and can only be a complete definition in light of the unfolding structure, the system, in which it is inscribed. Not only does this mean that, for example, "soul" is defined according to "body", but it also means that "soul", "spirit", "body", "mind", "corporeity", etc. all acquire their respective meanings specifically from the unfolding story of thought, an unfolding which is necessarily inscribed in a particular chronology, as depicted by Hegel in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*: Logic, Spirit, Nature.

Second, is the unifying role played by the gesture of de-dichotomizing soul and body in reference to Spirit and Nature, specifically the importance of this motion of completing a picture, which might also be pictured in terms of fulfilling a determinate space, or traversing a determinate time-period, for example, brought about by the deconstruction of the polarity. We may observe that such a motion of "ful-filling" (see Reid[16]) takes a retrospective shape and undertakes a work of deconstructing and reorganizing. What was first thought as an opposition of two terms is split open, so to speak, by the dialectical moment, and its inherent multiplicity revealed as this moment reaches its point of crisis, its culmination. As such, we are left with a picture where, by virtue of the ever-moving, restless activity of thought, a struggle between two poles is

[16] See Reid 2017.

bound to *melt* them into one another[17], as it were, the longer it is maintained. In the case of the so-called "soul-body" question, the more a dichotomy is maintained, the more assuredly ontological its status becomes, the more it allows itself to split open and unto its own multiple possibilities—and reveal its own pitfalls or inconsistencies. One of those possibilities is the relation of Spirit to Nature which Hegel weaves across his *oeuvre*.

Also in Stern's (2013) collection of essays, Angelica Nuzzo suggests that throughout the development of *Geist*, Hegel preserves Nature every step of the way. Nuzzo reads in the Anthropology an affirmation of the fundamental status of Nature in the notion of Spirit itself, and thus a rejection of any Nature/Spirit dichotomy[18], arguing for the necessity of understanding that Spirit is "pre" determined—as in determined by its Natural foundations, and not only by its teleological realization in the various forms of human subjectivity. In this sense, Spirit owes to Nature its very definition. Nature remains tethered to subjective Spirit from its origin in rudimentary animal selfhood, to its telos in those most developed forms of *Geist* as music, religion, and philosophy. No longer duality, Nature and Spirit become then more of an instantiation of the dialectic which is inside, and which animates, Spirit itself. This suggests that the individuation of

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[17] In a notable *Zusatz* in the *Philosophy of Nature*, the term "melting" is used to describe the relationship between the organic and the non-organic, specifically in its modulation by the mechanical digestive process. "Here the alimentary process is the main thing; the organism is in a state of tension with its non-organic nature, negates it and makes it identical with itself. In this immediate relation of the organic to the non-organic, the former is, as it were, *the direct melting of the non-organic into organic fluidity*" […] "The alimentary process is merely *this transformation of the non-organic nature into a corporeality belonging to the subject*" (§363 M397). (Emphasis added.) That an imagery of "melting" is used is particularly significant because it seems to point to a gesture akin to overlapping, where some form of unification occurs simultaneously with the preservation of difference—the significance of the notion of *Aufhebung*. As such, Hegel seems to understand the digestive ("alimentary") process as one whereby the individual's subjectivity is itself "alimented", developed, or injected with content, by reaching out to and incorporating *another* bodiliness that was previously external to it, into its definition through its own corporeity.

[18] See Nuzzo *in* Stern 2013, 13.

Seele, the emergence of a subjective individuality apt to engage with a world external and other to it, is already anticipated in its most primordial, rudimentary state of nature—and therefore, already contained in it.

Hence the importance of the notion of *natürliche Seele*, or *soul in nature*. The soul in its state of "naturalness", in its most fundamental form, *is* also the undifferentiated, atemporal state of nature. In natural soul, no distance has yet been formed between the self and its externality. However, soul is "immediate mind" and the "truth of matter": it is selfhood finding itself inhabiting a relation of duality with the world outside of it, precisely through its sensations, that sets the stage for the awakening of the soul—and, therefore, ensures its eventual "actualization" as individual subjectivity. The *Zusatz* to §398 reads:

> (…) awaking is brought about by the fact that the lightning of subjectivity pierces through the form of mind's immediacy. […] (…) the mind simply finds itself and a world in general confronting it—a *self-finding* that initially only gets as far as sensation, and still remains far removed from the concrete determination of intelligence and will. It is just in this fact, that the soul on awaking merely finds itself and the world—this duality, this opposition—, that the naturalness of mind here consists.

The struggle of soul and body as phenomenalized in the Anthropology exhibits what looks like a motion of gradual self-formation (*Bildung*) through which the soul, via repetition, gradually gains control of its body and is in this way liberated from the universality into which it first finds itself thrown.

According to Andreja Novakovic's reading, one of the purposes of the Anthropology is to explain how "an amorphous soul is able to individuate itself" to gather its inherent heteronomy into a unified concept, bringing about a new kind of universality that replaces the initial, atemporal, empty state. Importantly, *Seele* must let

itself be confronted with its externality first—it has to acknowledge the imposing, limiting influence of nature on its own determination, and therefore acknowledge the role its very difference and opposition play in individuating it and making it what it is. Novakovic writes:

> Initially, I relate to my body as to something that is just there, in the domain of being, as either a possibility or a limitation. Once I train my body, I made it "unresisting" [*widerstandlos*] and "fluid" [*flüssig*], while simultaneously unifying its functions and parts. Through this process, I achieve what might be called corporeal integrity. […] Thus, skills whose exercise demands some attention can also be described as possessing a liberating effect when they grant me ownership of my body by relieving me of attending to it and by allowing me to move in it with ease.[19]

The soul's embodiment appears to be a liberating phenomenon insofar as it inscribes Hegel's self in the structures of temporality through habituation and repetition. Through habit, human subjectivity "wins" its "liberation [*Befreiung*] from affecting feelings" (*Enz.* §410 R)—and ultimately makes it possible for the subject to develop such "higher-order" capacities as intelligence, will, and ethical activity. In this, the Anthropology seems to encapsulate perfectly the meaning of the organic characterization of Hegel's philosophy: the difference of bodiliness is preserved *because* it is necessary for maintaining the new totality that is individual selfhood, the unity of the "I".

The present study aims to bring together these somewhat scattered observations into a cohesive demonstration of the soul's—and eventually *Geist*'s—entrenchment in corporeality, by leveraging the significance of the temporalizing aspects of both *ensoulment* and *embodiment* as it is weaved through the Anthropology, as each pole determines the other in a distinct but complementary way. Through this, I suggest that it

[19] Novakovic 2019, 887.

might be helpful to understand the Hegelian Self as inhabiting a chronology, one that firmly roots it in the necessity of its (at least initial) naturalness. In other words, it seems important to acknowledge the operativity of time and temporal order, and its manifestation in both "local" phenomena—to borrow Testa's[20] terminology—such as habit as well as more "global" ones such as the structure of Hegel's speculative logic itself, which seems to evoke a certain rhythm and a cyclicality that permeate all elements of the "system" and structure them accordingly. The result of this logical tempo, this methodological rhythmic pattern, is the impossibility of a dualistic, binary theoretical framework—whatever the question may be. In the case of the "soul-body" question, this means that there can be no dualism of mind and matter in selfhood—only a continuous motion of simultaneous negation and preservation: a sweeping, generalized motion of surpassing the impoverished poles of false dichotomies to establish an ever-richer unity.

1.2.1 Allegra de Laurentiis: Hegel's Anthropology: Life, Psyche, and Second Nature

This project owes much of its theoretical framework and terminological rigor to Allegra de Laurentiis's 2021 work on soul and nature in *Hegel's Anthropology: Life, Psyche, and Second Nature*. The work certainly stands out from the multitude of recent Hegel scholarship in terms of its pertinence to the themes with which this dissertation engages, discussed below: rhythm, the "spiraling" shape of the speculative syllogism, habit, natural selfhood… and also in its introduction of useful terminology and theoretical tools through which the reader of the Anthropology may place it within its Aristotelian

[20] See Testa *in* Stern 2013.

context—a reading the author refers to elsewhere as "hylomorphic and entelechistic" (de Laurentiis 2023).

On this reading, Hegel's anthropological soul is characterized by two significant dimensions, both revelatory of the Anthropology's Aristotelian foundations: on the one hand, the dynamic interaction of "soul" and "body" in a manner where the former is understood as the living self-organizing form that animates the latter; on the other hand, the purposive direction of subjectivity's development (*out of* Nature and *toward* Spirit) which demonstrates a cyclical, or rather upwardly spiraling motion, where each moment in the process of the subject's individuation sets the stage for the emergence of the next, and where the latter constitutes the "truth" or purpose of the former, and is therefore already contained in its concept before being realized in mind's reflective capacity. In the case of the ensouled body, this reading leaves us with an image of selfhood as a process, itself outside of time, made of successive self-negating moments where the tension between the organic self-motion of subjectivity and the inorganic stillness of the body(/ies) with which it is in interaction gives meaning to the objective world. Two considerations are especially important here.

First, for de Laurentiis, this "entelechistic" dimension of Hegel's soul is particularly important to underline because it explains consciousness's emergent quality as an end-product of the spiraling movement of potentiality and actuality—polarities to which consciousness is therefore born but is not, nonetheless, bound. In fact, the status of consciousness as the end or purpose of *Seele*'s dynamic self-development, we may say, out of itself, depends on it being characterized by some extent of transcendence that allows it to definitively position itself beyond its initial (natural) determination and in the

same stroke preserve its overarching identity specifically *as natural self*. The ambiguity of selfhood reproduces itself perpetually in its *Ideal* determination: to become subject, consciousness must relentlessly assert its own unity beyond the limitations of its dialectical terms—either "soul" or "body". In this project, I would like to suggest that transposed to the broader question of spirit and nature, this interpretation of the relationship between "soul" and "body", as ontologically insufficient yet necessary dialectical conditions for the self's *coming to be*, still holds precisely because it is an instantiation of the broader framework enveloping Hegelian subjectivity: wherein the explanatory gap between the organic ("transcendental", for Kant) unity of "I"-hood and the terms leading to its advent is only filled by an understanding of the temporal nature of soul's "synthesizing" power, already present in the anthropological subject.

Second, and to this point, the "meaning" or meaningfulness with which subjectivity imbues the world of matter, and which is generated out of the tension between the self-positing movement of spirit and the *stillness* or *givenness* of the natural world, is of a temporal nature. By virtue of its negating agency over the continuous, undifferentiated space of "pure" objecthood, selfhood comes to be what it is, first and foremost, out of its constitutive anchoring in a temporal order of alternating *moments* of consciousness that are still quite far removed from consciousness itself which is, as de Laurentiis points to with her notion of *die ahnende Seele*, not yet existent in the Anthropology. Nonetheless it is hinted at or anticipated, in *some* form that approximates the advent of consciousness, prefaces it, but also determines the foundational corporeal characterization of soul that is preserved across the self-developmental trajectory of Spirit. The temporal dimension of the meaningfulness—what de Laurentiis calls the

"soul-fulness", *Seelenhaftigkeit*—, or rather the ensoulment, of the objective world by the anthropological subject, is most prominent for the author in Hegel's discussion of sleep and waking at §398-399, where in the transition from the natural to the sensing/feeling soul, a self-like unity is first arrived at out of a seemingly cyclical state of organic nature.

De Laurentiis reads in the sleep/wake cycle a necessary temporal foundation that sets the stage for "active sentience": first the *sensing* (then the "feeling") moment of soul which emerges out of its "natural" iteration and precedes its full achievement in consciousness. The ability of the subject to assert itself is present before it is even able to differentiate itself from the "outer" world, i.e., before it has a *feeling* of itself as an individuated thing in a world—which it acquires, precisely, at the subsequent "feeling" stage, and which gets sharpened further and more determinately with the advent of consciousness. As Hegel writes, "The being of feeling is […] intrinsically a completely determinate soul. The totality of the individual in this compressed form is distinct from the existing unfolding of its consciousness […]. This concentrated unity also makes an appearance in the form of what is called the *heart* [*Gemüt*] or *breast*" (§405 R). De Laurentiis explains:

> (…) it is easy to see why for Hegel the ascription of sentience either to body or to mind amounts to a false disjunction. Indeed, as the 1807 *Phenomenology* already argues, reflection shows that the concept of a pure sensing implies that simple sensation affects a natural individual only insofar as the latter does not distinguish inner from outer reality, because this distinction itself cannot be sensed. For the merely sentient subject, sense-impressions are the whole of what there is. The individual is what it senses, and so is its world: individual and world coincide in so-called simple sentience. A first tentative differentiation of interiority from exteriority emerges for the individual only in the phase of feeling. It finally becomes

> a clear distinction with the onset of consciousness, the phase of the soul's "abstract thought of its 'I,' of its unending being-for-self" (Enc §400 Zus).[21]

Sentience is when there is only sensation and not yet a "sensed" and a "senser". Yet sentience also demonstrates, in its immediacy, a gesture of transcendence that takes the self out of itself for the very first time and allows it to encounter the world in spite of its difference: out of the repetitious cycles of sleep and wakefulness, sentience emerges as it introduces in the natural subject the "self-doubling" that makes sensation possible prior to the subject developing a bodily awareness, or pre-conscious "feeling", of it. For sentience to emerge from the living cycles of the natural soul, it would have to mobilize something—a relation—that negates, and therefore is not, the immediacy of sensation and representation.

> Sentience […] does introduce a novel relation of the soul to itself. It does so by transforming […] the cycle [of sleep and waking] into a spiral. Sentience is no longer the mere counterpart of being awake but rather a "higher" unification of both poles of the oscillation: if the animal organism becomes capable of proper sentience, this is because it sublates its passive and active states into a new function.[22]

Four points require our consideration here, in the effort to show the pertinence of this dissertation within what is already in the literature, particularly as concerns the oft-underexplored issue of time and temporality in relation to Hegel's bodily self.

First, the vibratory or oscillatory nature of the soul's bodily origins is highlighted to show the persistence of the ambiguity that eventually comes to characterize the self—and, in so doing, demonstrates the ontological significance of the anticipated transcendental unity of "I"-hood at this "pre-reflective" stage of unmediated subjectivity.

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[21] De Laurentiis 2021, 131.
[22] *Ibid*., 140.

Drawing on Hegel's idea of internal vibration in sound (*das Erzittern*), de Laurentiis positions the oscillation of the body's alternation between sleep and wakefulness at the basis of soul's development *out of itself*. The vibrating body that is at the origin of selfhood realizes a meaningfulness—a "soul-fulness"—that anticipates the "achieved" organic unity of the individual by putting in place a relation of the soul to itself that already makes of human (sentient) corporeality, at the level of what Hegel calls "animal subjectivity", something *more* than the simple addition of its sensory experiences.

> (…) in the waking soul we see a relation of the soul to itself that is not merely simple, but mediated by opposition; but in this being-for-self of the soul the difference is seen to be neither so transient as in the course of the ages of life nor so fixed as in the sexual relationship, but the self-producing *enduring* alternation of the states of sleep and waking in one and the same individual. […] *Sleep* is the state of the soul's immersion in its undifferentiated unity, *waking* by contrast is the state of the soul's having entered into opposition to this simple unity. […] awaking is brought about by the fact that the lightning of subjectivity pierces through the form of the mind's immediacy" (§398 *Z*).

The product of the sustained alternation between the states of sleep and waking produces the possibility of a subjective unification beyond the limits of the natural immediacy of objects, by introducing opposition within the single bodily subject and confronting its "simple" immediate self-relation (in sleep) to the negation of this immediacy (in waking). From here, oscillation/vibration is established as an enduring structural moment in the advent of *Seele* proper.

Second, the speculative (*begreifenden*) syllogism's manifestation in natural life is made clear thanks to de Laurentiis's explication of the "syllogism of sentience" (see chapter 6 in *Hegel's Anthropology: Life, Psyche, and Second Nature*). The "sleep/wake cycle" that opposes the immediacy of self-relation to the negation of this immediacy in *sensing* adheres to the syllogistic form of thought presented by Hegel in the

Phenomenology's Preface, where "the negative belongs to the content itself, and is the *positive*, both as the *immanent* movement and determination of the content, and as the whole of this process. Looked at as a result, what emerges from this process is the *determinate* negative which is consequently a positive content as well". While the middle term of the sleep/wake dialectic is the totality of those sensations and representations gathered in both slumber and waking, the outcome of this dialectic cannot merely be the sum of those sensations and representations—because, once negated, "In order to have a [positive] content once again, something new must be taken over from elsewhere" (PhG M36). Sentience is a third state that emerges out of the dialectical interaction of sleep and wakefulness and demonstrates the ideality of the soul from its primary, "anthropological" manifestation by anchoring its origination in an oscillatory, ontologically insufficient state of polarity.

Third, as a result of its inscription in the syllogistic shape, the dialectic of sleep and wakefulness undergoes a geometric rearranging upon the establishment of a transcendent "sentient" proto selfhood in the natural moment: what was understood as a cycle is now understood as a spiral, providing a way out of the "bad infinity" of the merely cyclical (purposeless) repetition of Nature. The possibility of the I's transcendence is explained by the asymmetry between the poles of the dialectic: whereas sleep is ontologically directed at the emergence of waking, waking is not directed at the re-emergence of slumber but rather at the emergence of something new—sentience—which makes possible the advent of the "feeling" of selfhood and the first instinct of separation between self and world. The anticipation ("premonition") of a sentient self in the sleep/wake dialectic is what reveals the cycle as a spiral and, incidentally, what

ensures the *way out* of the potentiality of "madness" or derangement (*Verrücktheit*, discussed in Chapter 3 of this project) by bringing the subject out of the immediacy of its interiority.

The spiral is significant because it points to a motif that is recurrent for Hegel and characteristic of his speculative logic: that of the possibility of new-ness that emerges out of purposeful repetition. The "tension" or vibration of the soul is the coexistence—albeit conflictual—of a structure of necessity and repetition and an agency that creates an asymmetry ensuring the "way out" of the repetitive conflictual terms. In the case of the spiral of sleep and wakefulness, it is not merely the "awake" state of the soul that is being reproduced but rather the overarching objective subjectivity that keeps emerging (*advenir*) out of the spaces left open by the soul's oscillation between sleep and wakefulness. De Laurentiis points out that habit (*die Gewohnheit*) is the ultimate manifestation of this asymmetry, as the mechanism that leaves open the space necessary for the self's overcoming of and liberation from its natural determinations:

> In skill acquisition that is predominantly physical, the body is being subjected—in the double sense of submitting to and rendering subjective—to goals that are extraneous to its biological ends. The dancer's split leap does not conform to human anatomy; only arduous training makes it possible. Feats like these are real manifestations of the soul's internal rift and higher reconciliation between its "immediate" or physical and its "mediated" or spiritual (*geistig*) dimensions—between the flesh and the will.[23]

Fourth, the self-sustaining rhythmic tension between sleep and waking shows that the conscious "I" is concretely anticipated, in the body, prior to its advent. De Laurentiis introduces the "presaging" feeling soul (*die ahnende Seele*) as a self-like moment that

[23] *Ibid.,* 185.

precedes and grounds the advent of the conscious "I". The consistent gesture of "presaging" or anticipation in Hegel's speculative logic functions to put in place the bodily ground of a selfhood born out of a temporal tension that sustains itself independently of the full "achievement" of consciousness. What is anticipated in this sense is presumed to *subsist* without yet having existed, creating a sort of atemporality that is simultaneous with a necessary order of logical succession. Midway between "passive physiological passivity" (de Laurentiis 2021, 130) and feeling, this interpretation of sentience (*Empfindung*) as activity also demonstrates the significance of the shift from the dreaming (*träumende*) to the feeling (*fühlende*) soul between the 1817 edition and the mature 1827-30 version of the *PSS*. The *feeling* soul is not sealed away in the enclosed pseudo-time of dreaming—it is extended across time as endured by the living individual. Crucially, feeling *accumulates* and *orients* the soul's experiences toward the unity of individual subjectivity—capturing precisely the activity of what de Laurentiis calls "active sentience".

De Laurentiis brings out the rhythmic dimension of selfhood by reading the Anthropology's progression teleologically, with the ultimate endpoint always consciousness. While the oscillating, vibrating aspect of selfhood is picked out in its natural moment, there remains no account of the "other" kind of temporality through which the subject's nature persists throughout its progression and into *Geist* itself, through this very spiral structure of repetition and newness brought about by the speculative "syllogism of sentience". On a related note, the question of individuation may be developed on the basis of de Laurentiis's reading of the Hegelian psyche. While her work is less interested in the mechanics of how the particularized soul becomes *this*

individual self, I believe this transition is important to take into account in order to "close out" the syllogism and extract the full meaning of selfhood in relation to its rhythmic, vibratory and therefore ambiguous nature.

1.3 Methodology

Through a close reading of the Anthropology, the first subsection of the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, as well as select pertinent excerpts from the *Aesthetics* and the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Nature*, this project wants to establish clear textual support for the idea of a corporeally rooted, temporally determined selfhood in Hegel. If sufficient support is found for this thesis, this contribution may perhaps be seen as a building block in a larger project addressing the different ways Hegel undertakes to pull apart the terms of ontological dualism to reveal its pitfalls. The fundamental rejection of the "soul/body" and "mind/body" binaries may then be understood as a decisive, crucial moment in the deployment of this larger "de-dichotomizing" project of Hegel's, through which the possibility of a dualistic ontology is carefully decomposed and rejected. In a sense, it may even reject itself: the very terms of the question, says Hegel, are incorrect. The soul is not a "thing" in the measure that the body is, it cannot be "thingified" and thus cannot be conceptualized as some sort of ontological substance-counterpart for the body[24]. At the same time, we may observe that this rejection of the possibility of a dualistic ontology is as pivotal as it is axiomatic, constituting both a thesis that seems to assert itself (at least in part) through the

[24] See *Enz.* §389 *Z*: "*Speculative* logic lifts us above the whole of this merely reflective way of looking at things simply by showing that all these determinations applied to the soul—such as thing, simplicity, indivisibility, one—are, when conceived in an abstract way, untrue and veer round into their opposites".

phenomenology of the Soul in the Anthropology and a retrospective quasi-rule, a leg on which Hegel's broader system itself stands.

This project is, therefore, of a methodological nature. In my attempts to explain and interpret Hegel's claims, I am certainly not tacitly endorsing these claims; in fact, the question of their veracity is very much outside the scope of this work, although there are points at which I acknowledge that the question may be interesting and worthy of further exploration elsewhere. In general, I am more interested in the theoretical tools afforded to philosophy by Hegel's speculative method, particularly as it concerns our conceptions of what it means to be an *individual* situated in *time* and in a *body*.

As such, I propose to let my argument unfold according to the general structure of Hegel's speculative syllogism, wherein the initial, undetermined universal state gets particularized into a determined instance only to be dissolved into a state of singularity, where the understanding finally finds or realizes its meaning. Despite the form of this "method", this work is not—and cannot be, in my view—merely exegetical. First, a reading of Hegel's metaphysics of selfhood can hardly be exegetical in the sense that any meaningful analysis of Hegel's philosophy requires at least some extent of interpretation[25]. Second, beyond this observation, the constraint of determining a single "method" for a paper on Hegel is, if taken seriously, bound to manifest as the incarnation of the shape of the speculative syllogism in the text itself. As such, my argument is that the Hegelian definition of selfhood as embodied time is, and can only be, retroactively illuminated thanks to the structure (the *dance*) of Hegel's speculative syllogism. Such an

[25] This is a weighty statement that could be defended in a paper of its own.

argument would, therefore, deploy Hegel's own notion of meaning, as the gesture of fulfilling an initially atemporal, undetermined state with content—specifically in the context of a broader narrative structure according to which such a process, or movement, of ful-filling, gains significance. I will try to show how Hegel's speculative syllogism represents a structure from within which the reader can understand and assign meaning to the apparently unfolding, temporal notion of self in light of the progression of *Seele* in the Anthropology. In this way, this study may suggest a Hegelian answer to the problem of transcendental apperception—or the possibility of a unified notion of selfhood fundamentally characterized by a sort of sustained activity, ever-occupying an ambiguous space of "oscillation" between its own presiding unity and self-division.

This project will, then, mobilize the structure of the perfect, complete (*Volkommene*) form, the speculative syllogism, to follow the progression of the Hegelian soul from its initial moment of atemporal universality to its eventual "resting place" as a retrospectively individuated having-been, or a real, *objective subjectivity*. To this end, in addition to a thorough reading of the Anthropology, I will be referring to two other passages from Hegel's oeuvre, each addressing more closely a dimension, or moment, of selfhood's process—the one as rudimentary, inchoate, formal individuality or identity ("assimilation" and digestion, §§357—363 in *Philosophy of Nature*), the other as a genuine form of Spirit, having been imbued with a capacity to recognize meaning and establish it in collation with other selves: a real Being, one having been, we could say, "successfully" projected into the world of objects, of that which fundamentally negates and limits it (my focus will be on the "Music" section, Chapter II in Section III of Part III in *Aesthetics* vol. II). The significance of these two passages resides especially in their

seemingly converging pertinence to the central question of the *becoming Self*, the process of human subjectivity as "phenomenalized" in the Anthropology, in the sense that they may be interpreted as providing textual support for the very structure of this phenomenology of the Soul with which Hegel opens his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

Through this attempt to demonstrate in the Anthropology a sort of phenomenology of the soul which allows for the individuation of the Hegelian Self by inscribing it in the structures of temporality through its embodiment, this project may contribute to the discussion of the struggle of soul and body from the specific angle of the *temporalization* in which this struggle seems to be subsumed. The existing literature, while invaluable for its range of explanations of these concepts, seems nonetheless to present a gap as to the specific function of temporalizing that Hegel's (embodied) Self appears to undertake in the Anthropology. My emphasis on the "beginnings" of selfhood in corporeal, or bodily, expression, is in my view warranted by the significance of what may be called the chronology of the Hegelian Self—its temporal rootedness in nature, and the anticipation of its full realization in its initial moments of scatteredness and indetermination (which are themselves, interestingly, atemporal or eternal). Time and temporal succession seem to play an operative role in the formation of the concept of selfhood, through what appears to be a mutual determination between the individual subject and its body.

Soul renders nature finite by determining it, allowing it to yield to the very limitations of human subjectivity and therefore have meaning. For Hegel, the soul "[overcomes] what contradicts its ideality" (*Enz.* §411 *Z*)—nature—and in so doing, "liberates" the body from its initial, atemporal state of scatteredness and indeterminacy,

making it identifiable, determinable, and therefore vanishing and temporary. It is selfhood, therefore, that also ensures the mortality of the body and establishes its finitude. The mortality of the body, which Hegel interprets as "the sign" of the soul (§411),—one whose significance derives from its disappearing, *withdrawing* nature—seems to be the very product of its temporal ensoulment: its being seized by a Self and inserted, so to speak, in the structures of temporality, which ultimately allows it to inhabit a dimension of finitude within these structures. The product of such an *insertion* is the specifically human mode of subjectivity: selfhood, an "I" that makes time historical by its embodiment—in the same gesture as it itself seems to safeguard the finitude and boundedness of the body.

In this sense, my body is *mine* by and through the processes of its ensoulment—most notably in habit and repetition. The tension that is at the heart of every "I" animates the specific relationship that is established between this "I" and its temporality, or rather its temporalizing power: this means that it is individual subjectivity that seems to make matter amenable to receive determination and meaning. Through this, Hegel's Soul is also what renders the body finite as it anchors it in the structures of subjectivized time and definitively severs it from its own endless shapeless immediacy. And while it is the soul that seems to ensure the body's mortality,—a note-worthy position relative to the "traditional" understanding of the question of soul, body, and finitude—it is the body that confers to selfhood its temporality, accompanying it through both of its "rudimentary" and more "developed" forms, preconditioning its development and *processuality*, but also giving its unity a shape, ascertaining its objectivity and its reality as one among other selves.

As such, my argument would aim to show that bodiliness is as present in Hegel's Self in its initial moments of formal immediacy such as digestion and excretion, as it is in its more "realized" manifestations in forms of Absolute Spirit such as music. In other words, corporeality seems not only to intervene in those basic (in the sense of foundational) moments of subjectivity: it also appears to be an essential element in the structure of this real, objective subjectivity which will eventually be the Soul's "resting place" for Hegel. Faithful to the chronology of the speculative syllogism, Hegel's self seems firmly rooted in its corporeal foundation first and foremost, so much so that it only comes to "*[intuit] its own Self* in its *Other*" and thus veritably come into real, determinate, individuated Being, by "*[actualizing]* itself in the soul's *reality*, in its *bodiliness*" (*Enz.* §412 *Z*). We can observe in Hegel's "I", then, a clear gesture of what we could call a retrospective individuation: a movement imbued in a specific, perhaps rhythmic, pattern (whose culmination seems to be in the "Habit" section of the Anthropology) from an initial state of universal, undifferentiated self-identity, through the particularity of the body, and once again into a new "informed" universality: a singularized, determined (and therefore transient) self.

Chapter 2. Situating the Natural Soul in Hegel's "System"

2.1.The Anthropology's place in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science

2.1.1. Natural Soul as the first (initial atemporal) moment of subjective spirit

To demonstrate the function of Natural Soul as what may be called a "rhythmic-temporal field" in the dialectic of human subjectivity, it seems important to determine first the approach taken by the author of the Anthropology to time itself. *Seele*, as well as, ultimately, *Geist*, each undergo a process of unfolding that trails a spiraling, escalating movement, characteristic of the structure of the speculative syllogism according to which what was once an undifferentiated totality becomes a specific individuality by virtue of taking in its very negation. Hegel's understanding of temporality seems indeed to be defined by a continuous retroactive gesture whereby each new moment simultaneously integrates and overcomes the one preceding it. As a result, the concepts presented in the *Encyclopedia* come to be informed by a peculiar rhythmic structure where what *is*, is necessarily also what *has been*—a continuous renewal of identity through difference or opposition.

Accordingly, two notions require further definition right away: what we are calling "temporality" and what we are calling "rhythm". First, a satisfactory understanding of "temporality" in Hegel requires an acknowledgment of the ambiguity and tension, and therefore the contradictory terms, that animate it. It is in the "Feeling Soul" section of the Anthropology that the "magic relationship" between subjectivity and its substance or its corporeality is established to define the self's process through a gestational lens that posits a fundamentally *developmental* tendency and a relation of

interdependence. For the "mother" to be substance, "she" must be substance of something. Similarly, for the "fetus" to be this sort of *budding* form of subjectivity, it must be anchored in a substance that ensures its persistence. Jeffrey Reid notes[26] that the transition, between the 1827 and 1830 versions of the *Encyclopedia*, from "Dreaming Soul" to "Feeling Soul" indicates a conception of subjectivity as a slumbering state of potentiality that rationally, i.e., systematically, begins at the potential of madness or derangement, *Verrücktheit*. Reid explains:

> The sleeping soul of the [1794 Manuscript on Psychology] is one that hears and sees things that are not there. It dreams, walks in its sleep (…); it may become melancholy, mad or deranged, have premonitions or visions and may even fall into the worst excess of religious fervor. Significantly, these "*Zustände* (conditions)" are pathological, not because sleeping and dreaming are, in themselves, symptomatic of illness, but because they represent a state where conscious "power over the imagination" (*Macht über die Einbildungskraft*) is lost. […] The mature PSS's presentation of dreaming, somnambulism, folly, premonitions, visions and religious fervor as pathological states appears to be derived from the "building blocks" of the 1794 MS. The 1827 edition's references to the sleeping and dreaming soul make this particularly evident.[27]

The first tension that inhabits Hegel's notion of subjectivity is therefore one of temporal development out of what seems to be a default state of folly: by virtue of its natural tendency to be in a state of suspension from reality—sleep—and therefore by virtue of the natural rhythms of its biological determination, the self finds itself constrained to the task of bringing its body out of the blind, necessary cycles of its biology. On this reading, the self is always affirming itself, positing itself out of an initial state of potential madness—a pathologization justified by the absence or suspension of *Verstand*, which does not make an appearance in the Anthropology.

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[26] See "How the Dreaming Soul Became the Feeling Soul, Between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Empirical Psychology and the Late Enlightenment", Reid *in* Stern 2013.
[27] Reid *in* Stern 2013, 42.

This "defaulting" of folly (*la folie*) is aptly observed by Foucault in *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* as a consequence of the subject's capacity for intense or strong *feeling* ("la passion"), in line with what he sees as a generalized view in 18th century medical and psychiatric discourse of the soul and body as "unity". He writes:

> En fait, il ne faut plus essayer de situer la passion dans le cours d'une succession causale, ou à mi-chemin du corporel et du spirituel ; elle indique, à un niveau plus profond, que l'âme et le corps sont dans un perpétuel rapport métaphorique où les qualités n'ont pas besoin d'être communiquées parce qu'elles sont déjà communes ; et où les faits d'expression n'ont pas besoin d'acquérir valeur causale, tout simplement parce que l'âme et le corps sont toujours expression immédiate l'un de l'autre. La passion n'est plus exactement au centre géométrique de l'ensemble de l'âme et du corps ; elle est, un peu en deçà d'eux, là où leur opposition n'est pas encore donnée, dans cette région où se fondent à la fois leur unité et leur distinction.
>
> […]
>
> La possibilité de la folie est offerte dans le fait même de la passion.[28]

The "region where both the unity and distinction [of soul and body] are founded" that Foucault speaks about, the metaphysical space in which both the integration of soul and body and their dissociation are held simultaneously *in potentia*, precedes the possibility of their theoretical separation, even as "speculative" moments of the same organic totality. Feeling is the catalyst: the point of intersection and maybe even *inter-penetrability* between subject and world through the actualization of the permeable border that characterizes their relation. However, the relation of "passion" to folly is not merely one of primacy but one of real determination—a variant with ontological stakes for the subject's self-integration. Foucault continues,

> (…) si l'union, non mise en question, de l'âme et du corps, manifeste dans la passion la finitude de l'homme, elle ouvre ce même homme, dans le même temps, au mouvement infini qui le perd.

[28] Foucault 2015, 260-1.

> C'est que la folie n'est pas simplement une des possibilités données par l'union de l'âme et du corps, elle n'est pas, purement et simplement, une des suites de la passion. *Fondée par l'unité de l'âme et du corps, elle se retourne contre elle et la remet en question*. La folie, rendue possible par la passion, *menace par un mouvement qui lui est propre ce qui a rendu possible la passion elle-même*. Elle est une de ces formes de l'unité dans lesquelles les lois sont compromises, perverties, tournées—manifestant ainsi cette unité comme évidente et déjà donnée, mais tout aussi bien comme fragile et déjà vouée à sa perte.[29]

The *mise en question* of the initial unreflected unity of soul and body is the very *mise en oeuvre* of the speculative syllogism's rhythmic rationality: in its effort to contain within its earliest manifestation the possibilities of its development *out of* its natural determination, subjectivity risks its own integrity by leaving itself open to this movement of retroactive self-positing.

Hegel's temporality seems also to be defined by an ambiguity between two coexisting conceptions: time as an "absolute" endless "now" on the one hand, and time as a narrative, chrono-logical historical order on the other. We find in *Reason and Revelation in Hegel* (2025) a chapter titled "Hegel and Time" where the problematic of interpreting Hegel's ambiguous, dual conception of time is raised. Reid observes that Hegel's privileging of the *Perfekt* tense points to a gesture of "reconciliation" that he undertakes between Aristotelian time as eternally present and Christian time as historical and *progressively* revelatory. Within this tension, time is understood as the present that "always has been", i.e., as a truth that is oriented, constantly, toward its past in so far as this past stubbornly permeates it and determines its direction. "The temporal reconciliation operated by Hegelian thought implies two fundamental conditions", writes Reid: "first, the sense of historical movement must be apprehended in an essentially

[29] *Ibid.*, 261-2. Emphasis added.

retrospective fashion; second, this movement toward Absolute Knowing must be comprehended in terms of a self-revelation that is both human and divine" (65). Time in Hegel is not a linear concept but the expression of the very non-linearity of subjectivity, which grasps reality by exercising its negating agency and, therefore, participating in the self-revelatory process of Spirit from the very moment it still finds itself "sunken" in its natural determination.

Second, the "rhythmic" dimension of Hegelian time—especially manifest in the structure of the concept's syllogistic unfolding from universality to singularity (U-P-S)—may be best understood, as Jeffrey Reid suggests, in reference to Kant's transcendental aesthetic. Such an interpretation puts in place a framework according to which space and time are empty structures through which subjectivity may freely exercise its restlessness. Accordingly, Reid defines Hegel's time as "a fundamental expression of ideality, which may be simply defined as the negating agency of thought, whose source is transcendental selfhood" (Reid 2024b, 13). For Hegel, like for Kant, subjectivity is only able to freely exercise its restlessness by virtue of its capacity to surpass these categories of perception and assemble itself against this structural backdrop. The "I" posits its own identity on the basis of those dimensions of experience and in the same gesture affirms its transcendence over them, in a "synthesizing" move that upholds at once the necessity of those elemental structures of subjective experience, and the obligation of subjectivity to travel past these structures and "negate" them, i.e., determine their limits vis-à-vis the endlessness of its own functioning. Selfhood, within this framework, is conceived as a *movement* or a process defined by this very ability to overcome those immediate (sensory) aspects of experience and at once affirm itself as the negation of this immediacy—the acuteness, the

individuality that emerges out of the undefined continuous sameness of space-time. Hegel's discussion of music (explored in more detail in Chapter 6) makes clear, in a move away from Kant, the primacy of time over space in subjectivity's process of self-determination. Selfhood is itself a temporal "event" that operates as the interruption of the continuum of space in which the natural subject first finds itself thrown.

Looking at the structure of the Anthropology, we may note that Natural Soul is presented as first of three *Seele*-moments, setting the stage first for Feeling Soul and, next, Actual Soul. According to the general rhythm of Hegel's syllogistic philosophical "procedure", whose pattern can be noted across the length of the *Encyclopedia*, the third and final moment of a given dialectic will likely contain in its definition the elements of the first two. As such, for soul to be actualized in the Anthropology, it must traverse the modulations of each of what Hegel calls Nature and self-feeling—the simple, particular parameters of the isolated subject. Out of the interaction of these two elements will emerge a true, veritable notion of *Seele*, one which would allow the "I" not only to be individuated as a singular unity but also to be apt to engage meaningfully with other "I"s with which it is eventually in community. The "I that is We" Hegel speaks of in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* ("What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'", §177 M110) is only attained once the "I" has been hoisted out of its initial state of indeterminacy and undifferentiation, into a state where it is able to be picked out, pointed out, as a real individual subject with a singular, unified selfhood. In the Anthropology, this conceptual transition is made possible, at each step of

the development of *Geist*, precisely by the mediation realized by the very isolation of the subject, its "particularization" as a reaction to its prior over-generalization or under-determination in the Natural state.

By virtue of its position as the first moment in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, itself the third and final moment of the broader *Encyclopedic* skeleton, the Anthropology functions as the conceptual space in which the human soul forms against the backdrop of a more generalized notion of mind or spirit (*Geist*) in its first collusion with what seems to stand opposite or outside of it: Nature. As a result, the Anthropology occupies a transitional, perhaps almost liminal space between abstract, empty, free thought on the one hand, and the ultimate emergence of true self-conscious subjectivity on the other. This emergence of veritable self-consciousness, which does not yet take place in the Anthropology but is only prefaced by it, occurs *out of* the necessity of the determinations imposed on the Hegelian *Subjekt*, the "I", by Nature itself. *Seele*, most particularly *näturliche Seele*, "soul in nature", is therefore the very initial moment in the long narrative process of *Geist*'s systematization—its inscription into the larger structures of Hegel's Science, and its development into such complex spheres of meaningful intersubjective interaction as art, poetry, religion, and philosophy.

However, as in any given dialectic conceptualized across the length of the *Encyclopedia*, the central dialectic of *Geist* will have to carry with it, through its unfolding, those very determinations which launch its development. In the case of the dialectic of self-consciousness or true subjectivity, it is Natural Soul that may find itself preserved in the more "final" manifestations of Spirit: as a result, art, for example, as *embodied conceptual activity*, may be understood as a form of Absolute Spirit which,

while “liberated” from the confines of Nature, will still have to be somewhat bound by it. Similarly, other forms of Absolute Spirt emerging out of the overcoming of Spirit’s initial naturalness, will still have to answer to the parameters of the body and that which is bodily: simultaneously withdrawing from and embracing the state of nature from which *Geist* inevitably originates.

Human subjectivity is shown first as being thrown in a state of nature, as if without its consent, second as capable of differentiating itself from this state even to the point of folly or “derangement”, and third as realizing itself fully only once it acknowledges the inescapable necessity of its object’s—Nature’s—very own reality. In so doing, subjectivity anticipates its own objectification in the world into which it is immersed—from the forms of what we may call a “disciplined” embodied freedom of thought in such specifically human phenomena as music or poetry, through the more practical ethical and organizational institutions of which a society is typically made up, down to the subject’s very (Natural) body itself. We may observe this movement of anticipation recurring across the unfolding of soul in the Anthropology, characterizing the Hegelian “I” with a certain rhythm, a tempo, that brings it out of and back into itself in a circular (or perhaps spiraling, escalating) motion—the motion of *Aufhebung*—and whose source seems to come about in the field of its confrontation with that which presents itself as essentially external to it: the natural world.

This rhythmic “field” created by the immersion of Soul in Nature, while fundamentally *initial* in the sense that it necessarily precedes the later stages of self-feeling and individuation, is curiously also deeply *atemporal*. The initial atemporality of Natural Soul is precisely what ultimately individuates human subjectivity and separates it

from animal or other organic forms of "consciousness", which Hegel notes are entirely under the sway of the temporal and spatial alterations of the natural world.

> World-history is not connected with revolutions in the solar system, any more than the destinies of individuals are tied to the positions of the planets. […] the response to changes of the seasons and hours of the day is found only in feeble moods […]. But as freedom of mind gets a deeper grasp of itself, even these few and slight dispositions, based on participation in the life of nature, disappear. Animals and plants, by contrast, remain subject to such influences. (*Enz.* §392)

Crucially, Soul's place in Nature is one of participation, not submission: while it is true that subjectivity initially finds itself in a state of under- (or pre-) determination in the throes of the natural world, it is nonetheless in that moment already inhabiting a dual, ambiguous temporal order wherein it is both a part of Nature's flux and, we might say, an "outside" observer of it. Hence, Hegel explains, "Mind, as embodied, is indeed in a definite place and in a definite time, but it is nevertheless elevated above space and time" (§392 *Z*).

This means that Natural Soul does not chiefly answer to linear, "natural" time and cannot, therefore, be understood as a mere starting point in the story of subjectivity's unfolding. Instead, it seems to form something like an omnipresent foundation, an originary moment constitutive of what it means for an "I" to become true self-consciousness. If "[embodied] Mind […] is […] elevated above space and time", it is by virtue of the very entanglement of the subject's interiority with the world that is external to it: an entanglement that makes possible what Hegel calls a "magical" relationship through which the stuff of Nature—corporeality—is actively and continually modulated and transformed by Sprit's own operations.

2.1.2. The Anthropology's theoretical operativity as transition from Nature to Spirit

With this conception of temporality in mind, it may be made clear to the reader of the Anthropology that the progression of *Seele* is indeed a story: a narrative whose development is weaved through different but simultaneously occurring temporal orders. The climax of this story, the culminating point of *Seele*'s unfolding as it makes its way towards actualization, is the decisive point at which the individual soul takes hold of its body and molds it, dictates its direction by setting in place its particular limits. It is, then, through habituation and repetition that the subject is allowed to *possess itself* after first having been at the mercy of the indeterminacy of nature. Habit's mechanisms make possible the "I"'s transition from abstract universality to concrete singularity—through repetition, "mind" (soul) acts directly on "body" (nature) with no intermediary, and in this way takes hold of it fully and completely. To this point, the *Zusatz* to §410 of the *Encyclopedia* makes clear that

> If the activities of the body [des Leibes] to be performed in the service of mind [des Geistes] are often *repeated*, they acquire an ever higher degree of adequacy, for the soul gains an ever greater familiarity with all the circumstances to be considered, hence becomes more and more *at home* in its *expressions* [in ihren Äußerungen somit immer heimischer wird] and consequently achieves a continually growing capacity for immediately embodying its inner determinations and accordingly transforms the body more and more into its own property, into its serviceable instrument; there thus arises a *magical* relationship, an immediate operation of mind on body [ein unmittelbares Einwirken des Geistes auf den Leib entsteht]. (§410 *Z*/W10)

Through habituation, the immediacy of what Hegel calls "self-feeling" is continuously and repeatedly negated, or rejected, by *Seele*. The result is a form of mastery of the "I" over its bodily expressions: no longer strictly dominated by the parameters of the natural world, the habituated or *trained* body now functions according to a chronology of the soul, one that undertakes the processes of *temporalizing* itself instead of merely being the passive subject of them, as "animals and plants" (§392) are. It

is in this sense that the Anthropology sets the stage for true subjectivity by establishing the specific temporality eventually inhabited by the Hegelian "I": as *Seele* finds itself first in a state of necessary embodiment, the dialectical moment of habituation on which its development hinges ensures its progression into an *active* state of *temporalization*. In other words, Soul, even in its Natural moment, is never completely prey to a chronology that would be entirely external to it and that would impose itself on its mechanisms. Instead, the mechanisms of Soul—here, habit and repetition—are what bring about a new kind of ambiguous temporality, already anticipated in the very structure of Natural Soul.

John McCumber reads in Hegel's conception of habit "the death of nature" (McCumber 1990, 161), a limit traversing the border between Nature and Spirit towed by *Seele* in the Anthropology. The narrative laid out in the text unveils the soul's actualization as fundamentally realized on the basis of the story's most conflictual moment: that of the real confrontation between the operations of the "mind" and the behavior of the "body", through which a struggle—to the death—occurs between a polarity that leads to its dissolution, or perhaps more accurately, its integration. It is through habit that *Seele* comes to be able to grip (*à manier*) time in such a way as to undertake the body's temporalization, as it definitively inscribes it in a chronological order of its own, defiant of the chronology of immediacy and linearity imposed by the corporeal. In granting soul the ability to interact with time and temporality as a means of effectively *overcoming* its body and liberating it from the confines and scatteredness of the Natural world, the Anthropology fulfills a historicizing function in the story of *Geist*'s unfolding itself, whose development will have hinged on this gesture of overcoming undertaken by Soul as it weathers its "struggle" with the corporeal. Reminiscent of the

so-called “master-slave” dialectic previously laid out by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, this dialectic of soul and bodiliness follows a standard of what we may call conflictual development: a default wherein what first presents itself as a polarity undergoes a destabilization, the product of which is, in some sense, the victory of one pole over the other.

Accordingly in the Anthropology, most particularly through the temporalized, temporalizing motions of habit and repetition, *Seele* struggles with and comes to dictate, or direct, its bodiliness. The polarity of the soul and its corporeality *disintegrates to reunify*, forming a new, organic, “third” totality: the Self, characterized by consciousness proper (*Bewusstsein*) which Hegel will introduce in the section of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* following the Anthropology, the “Phenomenology of Mind”. As it moves towards the moment of its actuality, “the soul becomes master of its *natural individuality*, of its *bodiliness*, reduces this to a subservient *means*, and projects *out* of itself as an *objective* world that content of its substantial totality which does *not* belong to its bodiliness. Reaching this goal, the soul emerges in the abstract freedom of the *I* and thus becomes *consciousness*” (§402 *Z*).

McCumber’s interpretation of habit as the “death of nature” may in this sense point to a crucial transition, characteristic of the structure of Hegelian selfhood, that takes place in the “guts” of the Anthropology’s text from the broader more overarching category of Nature to that of Spirit. It is in habituation that what is of Nature becomes spiritual—or what was once discrete and inchoate becomes lasting and moves towards unification and individuation. As such, “When a living thing develops generalized responses for dealing with different types of situation”, explains McCumber, “it ceases to be caught up in

passing circumstance, and some of its lower functions can be understood only in terms of higher ones" (McCumber 1990, 161). A subject's capacity to form habits through repetition is understood here as a sign of a real transition, a movement, from a Natural to a Spiritual state—evidence of Nature's overcoming in the formation of the individual's self-consciousness, and the systematic entrenchment of those "lower" natural, bodily functions into the "higher" soul-functions which eventually contain and make sense of them, or give them significance.

This explanation may be where the "narrative" structure of the Anthropology mentioned above is best placed: the earlier elements of *Seele*'s story seem to only gain meaning in view of the later ones—meaning that (1) the structures of the Soul's moments—Natural, Feeling, Actual—contain each other, or, better yet, *share in* each other, as they both anticipate and preserve one another's conceptual patterns, which means that (2) the Naturalness of soul is necessarily present in its truest, most "Actual" iteration (itself still pre-subjective or pre-conscious) precluding it from serving the mere function of an introductory stage, a preface or a prelude to the story of selfhood's unfolding. Instead, by virtue of its aptness to be *trained*, instrumentalized by the "higher" order functions of the Spiritual, the Naturalness of soul is used as something akin to a narrative device that pushes the story forward only by being present in all its states and stages of development. Nature contributes to the very Actualization of Soul not simply by introducing it but by preserving its own elements through every moment in its becoming.

By framing habit as what McCumber describes as a foundational, low-level element of the "higher" function of Spirit (as opposed to the "lower" strictly bodily functions, which are at the immediate mercy of Nature's *externality*), the Anthropology seems to

find itself ensconced in a motif whereby the spiritual is necessarily accessed through its inevitable passage across the fields of what is natural or corporeal. Similarly, the natural (the body) anticipates characteristics of Spirit in its fundamental structures, exhibiting an aptness to be *trained* in the way of the spiritual in such phenomena as habituation. As a result, there is hardly any real demarcation between the moments of Nature and Spirit: rather, what takes place in the Anthropology is the very towing of this boundary line between the two categories by the "I" in question—a process characterized by a peculiar relationship of the self to time and temporality through which the former manipulates the latter and generates a chronological order suited to its own specific (individual) unfolding.

In the Anthropology, even Actual Soul retains a fundamentally "pre-conscious" status, as it occupies a moment of *Geist*'s unfolding which is still (onto-logically) prior to any real contact of the subject with the world of objects—or rather, any real recognition by the subject that the external world is separate from its interiority. At the level of its actualization, made possible by the properly *human* mechanisms of habit and repetition, Soul is still only dealing with itself, its own reality: "As this identity of the inner with the outer, the outer being subjected to the inner, the soul is *actual*; in its bodiliness it has free shape, in which it feels *itself* and makes *itself* felt, and which, as the soul's work of art, has *human*, pathognomic and physiognomic, expression" (§411).

According to the *Zusatz* to §411, the difference between "pathognomic" and "physiognomic" expression is indeed of a temporal nature: the former is described as transient, relevant to moods and "passions", while the latter is permanent, falling under "character". The former becomes the latter, progressively and through habit: "The lasting

passion of anger, for example, firmly ingrains itself in the face, and so too a sanctimonious nature gradually impresses itself in an indelible way on the face and on the whole bearing of the body" (§411 *Z*). Here, again, we find the peculiar tempo of a sort of *dance* between two poles that are initially different, yet end up blending into, or *melting* into, one another. The soul's actuality is the product of this dance, the completion of its mastery over its corporeality, producing something like a harmony of the self's interiority with its exteriority—a state wherein the self comes to be in agreement, in accordance, *with itself*, through the dialectic of soul as it unfurls across the Anthropology. It is this state of *Seele*'s accordance with itself, brought about by its struggle with its body, that makes the truth of selfhood: the "I" becomes what it is precisely by reaching this stage of self-agreement, and becomes a *thing* (*Ding*) susceptible to being pointed out and individuated because it has finally achieved what may be understood as a sort of congruence of itself with itself.

Therefore, in Actual Soul, the "I" still expresses only self-relation—albeit one that is mediated by its bodiliness and thus more solid, more thorough compared to the immediate and scattered self-relation displayed in the universal moment of Natural Soul, where "soul still lies in *immediate*, *undifferentiated unity* with its objectivity" (§402 *Z*). Natural Soul's empty, simple "self-relation", soul "in its immediate *natural determinacy* […] which only *is*" (§390) is in fact made complex, *compounded* and internally differentiated, by the processes of habituation and repetition. In this, Soul's relation to itself is also, therefore, *made finite*, as it gets acquainted with its own status as object—and becomes a discrete temporal moment in the broader arc of Spirit's development. The self-relation that exists in actualized Soul is one of the Soul to its own "externality" or

corporeality, the body that Hegel refers to as the "sign" (§411) of the soul. If body becomes the sign of soul, it is by virtue of the repeated negation and overcoming of the former by the latter: a conflictual temporalized, temporalizing motion of *reaching out* and *withdrawing* undertaken by the "inner" towards the "outer" that brings about the foundation for *Seele*'s later development, in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*'s "Phenomenology of Mind", into what Hegel calls consciousness (*Bewusstsein*).

As "sign" of the soul, the body takes on the function of that which announces the presence of the conditions that make possible the emergence of an "I", fully fledged and apt to be made objective. That a "death of nature" occurs at the pre-conscious stage of the Anthropology reveals something important about the role Hegel assigns to bodiliness in the dialectic of subjectivity: thanks to the body's operations, *entrained* by *Seele* yet almost autonomous and independent from the control of any real consciousness, which transpires later, selfhood proceeds to *achieve* or *complete itself*, makes itself the case, without (or prior to) the intervention of a self-conscious, deliberate subject. In other words, the self's very embodiment is sufficient to safeguard the grounds of its realization, setting the stage and providing the conditions of possibility for the emergence of self-consciousness *from without* the realm of self-consciousness itself. This is what Russon, in his 1997 *The Self and its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, points to with his assertion that the Hegelian body "has a life of its own": the Naturalness of soul constitutes the field in which *the self makes itself* before being able to (consciously) grasp itself as such. The body's rhythms, while unbeknownst to subjectivity proper, are continually at work, in activity, from beneath the subject's grasp and recognition, to establish and maintain its reality.

2.2.Definitions and ambiguities

2.2.1. Hegel's use of Soul (Seele) vs. Spirit (Geist) vs. consciousness (Bewusstsein)

It would be worthwhile here to name, distinguish, and clarify in more detail the terms used by Hegel throughout the Anthropology—and more generally also throughout the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*—that would possibly refer to what McCumber may call the "Spiritual", or all that pertains to the soul as *other* to the bodily and the corporeal. Because they are multiple, and because they are often used both interchangeably—or rather interrelatedly—and differentially, it may be argued that Hegel's intention behind this plurality of ambiguous terms is one of communicating a plurality and ambiguity in the notions of soul, self, and spirit themselves which would be inherent to them.

The transition from "Natural Soul" to "Feeling Soul", namely the "Sensation" section of the Anthropology, discloses an architecture of subjectivity constructed on the principle of retroaction, or reflexivity, through what Hegel calls "the sentient soul"—the soul that senses. Here, what is "of soul" and what is "of body" meet and *share in* one another: we witness "the healthy participation of an individual mind in its bodiliness" (§401 R), an engagement of the soul's interiority (the soul's "being-for-self") with its own externality (the soul's "embodiment", or "natural bodiliness") by means of the organism's sensory apparatus. Comprising an initial point of contact between the individual and the Natural world (here, still the soul's own Naturalness or bodiliness), sensation makes possible the move of *Seele* from its universal to its *particularized* moment, precisely by allowing the individual to preserve its "being-for-self" in its encounter with its difference and reduce this difference to a mere *moment* in its own manifold interiority. Accordingly, in sensation, the soul "not merely *is* for itself, it also

posits itself as for itself, as subjectivity, as negativity of its immediate determinations", and reaches "the stage where the universal constituting its nature becomes for the soul an immediate determinacy" (§399 *Z*). Not yet apprehensive of any distinction between subject and object, the soul here only differentiates itself from itself—operating an inner division that functions as what substantiates the subject's later grasp (in the "Phenomenology") of an "opposition between a senser and a sensed" (§400 *Z*).

This is important because the order by which *Seele* evolves into *Bewusstsein* and is later integrated into the structure of *Geist* makes clear to the reader that soul is indeed able to possess itself and posit itself as such, as a determinate *unity*, without having yet emerged in conscious mind or seized by the mechanisms of reason. When the soul posits itself at this stage of its development, it is operating a self-division through which it ascertains its own mine-ness—through which, therefore, it determines the borders of its corporeality and in this delimits the measure of its extension in the world of objects to be encountered "later". This temporality, the *before* and *after* of *Geist* and the chronology it is inscribed in—the succession of "moments" within the unfolding of the notion of Spirit—is, while certainly historical in the sense that the dialectic of subjectivity is precisely what attributes specifically human dimensions to *Seele* and pushes forward its realization in something perhaps akin to "ways of life" that manifest as unfolding reflexively, is not necessarily linear or "chronological" in the sense ordinarily assigned to the term. The temporality of *Geist* seems to be inscribed in an order that is not strictly "chronological" but is rather of a more logical nature, something like a conceptual rhythm that gives the concept shape.

Montani (2022) explains the rhythm of Hegel's speculative logic as "a fluid structure that allows negativity to pass through [the propositional] form but preserves form in its passing within the element of knowing", enclosing thus the dialectic between the structure of the subject/predicate proposition and the germinating unification of its terms, which constitutes as Hegel writes a "counter-thrust" (PhG §61, M38). to the proposition itself. This conflictual moment of dramatic logical subversion, the recurrent destabilization of the terms of a proposition by the structure of speculative thought, may be what best encapsulates the specific temporality in which *Geist* is imbued and which it exhibits throughout its unfolding. From Natural Soul to Absolute Spirit, subjectivity is inscribed in a sort of chrono-logic of nonlinearity that assigns to it its very identity in a single, multi-layered, fluid motion. Accordingly, *Seele*'s passing over into *Bewusstsein* constitutes a decisive moment in the dialectic of the Hegelian subject whereby the "predicates" of soul, most fundamentally its own Naturalness, are *as* preserved *as they are* negated. Through such a peculiar temporal order, *Geist* forms against the backdrop of a logic that continually strips it of its own differential elements by subverting their difference and integrating them into ever-broader singularities. The product of this repeated motion of integration through negation is a Subject, an "I" that is increasingly *rich in content*, whose "externality" is repeatedly absorbed into its concept as it unfolds across the conceptual chain of Hegel's speculative syllogism.

We may notice reading the Anthropology that the notions of "mind" or "consciousness" and "subjectivity" are already mentioned in the exposition of "soul", notably in its initial, Natural moment. §391 reads:

> Thus [the universal soul] presents itself as an individual soul, but immediately only as a soul which just *is*, with natural determinacies in it. These determinacies have, so to speak, *behind* their ideality a *free* existence: i.e. they are natural objects for consciousness, though the soul as such does not respond to them as external objects. Rather, these determinations are *natural qualities which it has in itself*.

Those determinations that are "natural objects for consciousness", but that soul "does not respond to […] as external objects", are first homogenous with the constitution of soul—with the implication that they are to be heterogenized as soul inexorably encounters them as other to it by taking hold of them and asserting its possession of them, notably in habituation. "Mind has *come into being* as the truth of nature" (§388), "Soul is the *substance*, the absolute foundation of all the particularizing an individualizing of mind, so that it is in the soul that *mind* finds all the stuff of its determination" (§389). Hegel opens the Anthropology by placing mind in the purview of soul, as if reminding the reader that mind is precisely what the phenomenalization of *Seele* in the Anthropology is meant to lead up to. Although conceptually separate, "soul", "mind" and "consciousness" all seem to be ontologically, ultimately, if not the same, then certainly *in* the same place.

Although these develop further down the speculative syllogistic chain, "mind", "consciousness", and "subjectivity" are present as if retrospectively at the point that is logically prior to them. Significantly, this reveals something about the specific chronology inhabited by selfhood: that it consists in a series of spiraling, retroactive gestures that continually feed and animate the whole of its dialectic. Just as in the *Logic* the subject/predicate opposition comes to be destroyed by the very integration of its poles, which therefore *always* pre-exist in each other, regardless of their *conceptualization*, the relationship of soul to mind and Spirit is here progressively destabilized and dismantled as we get closer to the highest, most Absolute form of *Geist*.

Importantly for this thesis, *Seele* can, therefore, be interpreted as having always preexisted in the notion of *Geist*—only revealing itself to it gradually and in logically discrete moments which can be *spoken* or described and conceptually differentiated.

In this way the dialectic of subjectivity feeds on the burgeoning notion of Soul as conceptualized and "phenomenalized" in the Anthropology. It is, by implication, through the bodiliness of the inchoate, universal form of subjectivity in which Natural Soul exists that the stuff of nature is itself ultimately transformed or reconfigured by selfhood. In her essay "Anthropology, *Geist*, and the Soul-Body Relation", Angelica Nuzzo underlines the systematic significance of Soul's Naturalness within the broader context of *Geist*'s development, observing that the reality of Spirit is always "measured, in the first place, by its contrast to Nature, that is, by Spirit's entanglement with corporeality" (Nuzzo *in* Stern 2013, 12). Spirit's rootedness in *the soul's body* is what makes of Hegel's definition of *Geist* a "genetic" one, as Nuzzo points out, tracing the origins of Spirit to its interaction with Nature, and drawing in this sense a genetic ontological association between each of the Spiritual and Natural poles which then precludes them from forming anything resembling a strict dichotomy.

As a result of making necessary the de-dichotomization of Nature and Spirit through connecting them "genetically", Hegel's stance on the so-called "soul-body" relation is made ever clearer: the soul is *entrenched in a bodiliness* which it comes to *possess*, making it *its own*, and could not therefore be in a relationship of binarity with it. Spirit's unfolding hinges specifically, and at each turning point especially across the length of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, on its relation to (namely, its opposition to and struggle

with) corporeality or the natural world—which includes the subject's own individual body. As Nuzzo explains:

> While the soul is immersed in [its body] and hence unfree and does not recognize corporeality as its own, the conscious spirit is free in its own body and capable of developing "out of itself" through it. […] Finite spirit stands between nature or its corporeality and the infinite and is characterized by a double movement: by a projection towards the external world (*Ent-äusserung*) and by a concentration within its own depths (*Er-innerung*). In both respects the relation to corporeality remains the basis of spirit's development.[30]

The Anthropology acts as the space in which the transition occurs from "the soul" that is immersed in its body to "the conscious spirit" that recognizes its bodiliness as other to it and thus as *belonging* to it. The ambiguity of those terms referring to all that is other to the body proper, or to what is strictly of Nature, i.e., "soul", "mind", "subjectivity", "consciousness", and "spirit", is therefore explained by the space of liminality in which the Anthropology unfolds and through which it comes to disclose the fundamental, genealogical role of Nature in determining and defining Spirit as such. That the threshold between *Seele* and *Geist* is traced by the Anthropological project reveals Spirit's initial ambiguity to itself and the obscurity of its Natural condition which must be overcome for true self-knowledge, what we may understand as the definitive purpose of *Geist*, to transpire. "To act freely and to determine itself according to freedom", writes Nuzzo, "the human being must know the 'nature of spirit', which is first and foremost its natural condition or the condition of spirit sunken in its natural corporeality" (8).

The immediate, "natural condition" of soul is therefore what ensures its aptness to recognize itself as its own object or operate this inner division that allows it to

[30] Nuzzo *in* Stern 2013, 7.

differentiate itself from its bodiliness and ultimately become a for-itself, come to know itself as its own *essence* and therefore become an "I", a true consciousness, through habituation. Soul's status as the "*immediacy* of mind" is lost, Hegel writes, once soul grasps itself and objectifies it, coming into a relation of possession to it and asserting its body's mine-ness: "in its externality [the actual soul] is *recollected* into itself, and is infinite relation to itself" (§412). The gradual progression from *Seele* to *Bewusstsein*, and the way these notions come to fit within the broader structures of *Geist*, conform to a form of temporality that *reveals* their truth to the knowing "I", instead of making it the case, or establishing it, in absolute terms. In other words, mind or consciousness has always been the truth of soul but only comes to disclose itself to itself as such once it undertakes, pre-consciously, the inner separation that allows it to then perceive, speak, and ultimately know itself as its own other. The anthropological project is one of establishing a temporally determined motif in which the mind gradually uncovers its own reality to itself: "the self has […] actualized itself in the soul's *reality*, in its *bodiliness*, and, conversely, has posited being within itself; so that now the self or the I *intuits its own self* in its *Other* and is *this self-intuiting*" (§412 *Z*).

We may then say that the space drawn by Hegel between each of *Seele*, *Bewusstsein* and *Geist* is one in which the "I" progressively forms—indeed, *Bilden*—the content of its epistemic capacity. Self-consciousness is only reached by the "I" once the stage of *Seele*, primarily in its Natural moment, has been incorporated into the scope of the "I"'s perceptions, so to speak. Kant's apperception must now include the *knowledge* of one's embodiment and "entanglement with corporeality", as Nuzzo writes, in order to confirm its originary status and fulfil its function as that which provides the condition of

possibility for true selfhood to arise—which is, for Hegel, self-knowledge. The Self must *know* itself to *become* itself, which is what it always *has been*: for mind to grasp its reality, it must make ideal its bodiliness and acknowledge the necessity of its aptness to transfigure Nature, and it does so by first asserting its division from its bodiliness and therefore from itself. The Hegelian Self's becoming is in this way dependent on the historicizing power of the body, exercised on "mind" in the elementary, Natural moment of *Seele*.

It does indeed appear that it is the corporeality in which *Seele* is first "sunken" and to which it is first tethered that allows it to be later inscribed in a historical process, one wherein, by virtue of its development into what Hegel calls Reason, soul can create a meaningful, purposeful, chain of events, patterns, and realities that may be ascribed to humanity proper—and that may be termed historical. These historical forms are precisely those that belong to *Geist*: the "higher-order" iterations of Spirit emerge chiefly as the product of this chrono-logic of non-linearity proper to *Seele*, whose struggle with the *Körper* is what makes possible the ongoing transfiguration of Nature by Spirit first through such particular (social) phenomena as law and morality, community, State politics, and institutions in the *PSS*'s "Objective Spirit", and second through those phenomena of Spirit's highest realization in the spheres of art, religion, poetry, and philosophy in "Absolute Spirit". In each of those manifestations, what is taking place is an interaction of (fully developed) subjectivities, as it were, in view of an End broader and farther-reaching than each subjectivity's own individuality. The properly *human* characterization of such an interaction had been made clear in the Preface of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where Hegel writes that "it is the nature of humanity to press

onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level" (PhG §69).

Hegel reminds us throughout the length of the *PSS* that "temporality", like "spatiality", belongs chiefly to the realm of the natural: these two attributes are understood foremost as those of the world of *externality*, where objects are "asunder" or scattered until they are gathered by a consciousness that grasps them and, in so doing, grasps itself as an "I". The *Zusatz* to §448 in the "Psychology" section of "Subjective Spirit" reads:

> [Abstract externality] (…) has the dual form of *space* and *time* (Cf. §§254—259.) Sensations are thus posited spatially and temporally by intuition. […] the *temporal* (…) presents itself as the form of *unrest*, of the *internally negative*, of *successiveness*, of *arising* and *vanishing*, so that the temporal *is*, in that it *is not*, and *is not*, in that it *is*. (…) the two forms of abstract externality are identical with one another in the sense that each is utterly discrete *within itself* and at the same time utterly continuous. Their continuity, containing within itself absolute discreteness, consists precisely in the abstract *universality* of the external, a universality coming from the mind and not yet developed to any *actual* individualization.

Similar to an extent to Kant's notion of time, temporality for Hegel seems to fulfil the function of a core component of *intuition*, the immediate, naïve form of knowing that corresponds to the pre-conscious moment of "sense-certainty" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, revealing thought's negating agency to itself and acting as a condition for the self-realization of Spirit by letting itself be spanned, ordered and put together by the later emergence of true consciousness. In the introductory "Concept of Mind":

> We know that what is natural is spatial and temporal, that in nature this stands next to that, this follows after that, in brief, that everything natural is mutually external, ad infinitum; further, that matter, this universal foundation of all formations to be found in nature, not only offers resistance to us, subsists outside our mind, but holds itself

> asunder against its own self, divides itself into concrete points, into material atoms, of which it is composed. (§381 *Z*)

Later, in "Consciousness", the first subsection of the *PSS*'s Phenomenology, which immediately follows the Anthropology:

> Spatial and temporal individuality, the *here* and the *now*, (…) strictly [belong] to intuition. Here the object is initially to be taken only in accordance with the relationship which it has to *consciousness*, namely something *external* to consciousness, and is not yet to be determined as external within itself, or as being outside itself. (§418)

Time *is* the very indeterminacy of Nature: it is selfhood that organizes time and makes it so that time becomes an attribute assignable, as temporality, to the objects of consciousness.

Time belongs to the "I"; not in the sense that makes it a property of consciousness, but rather in the sense that it is *for* the "I" to grasp—if (at first) immediately, pre-consciously—and give meaning and direction to. The universality in which the state of Nature exists also seems to be for Hegel what ensures its *timelessness*: its simultaneously being one with time as an empty form on the one hand and exhibiting properties akin to eternity and persistence on the other. It is because the "I" has recognized bodiliness as its own, and therefore has successfully made it its object, that it can insert it into the structures of temporality—in this way, we may say that the self-conscious subject will be able to *make* body *temporal* with its grasp of Nature, while the Natural Soul *makes* consciousness *historical*, acting as the eternal (ever-present) origin and condition of the ensuing forms of Absolute Spirit. Spirit's relation to and interaction with bodiliness is crucial to a complete understanding of the structure of Hegel's speculative philosophy itself, which seems to immediately reject the very possibility of a *binarity* of mind and body or a *mutually exclusive* relation of mind to body. As Nuzzo

concludes, "(…) Hegel transforms within his speculative consideration of spirit the traditional, early modern soul/body problem. […] (…) the articulation of the soul/body relation should be read within the framework provided by the systematic transition between nature and spirit" (14).

2.2.2. The pre-reflective status of Natural Soul

From here, it may become clearer how Natural Soul can be atemporal while retaining something of a chronology of its own, one that collates immediacy with timelessness and universality. As soul is immersed in the infinite indeterminacy of nature and Life by virtue of the latter's obscurity to it: in its Natural moment, subjectivity seems to be halted by its absorption in the singular *now*-ness of corporeality, leaving itself vulnerable to the body's overdetermination. For the subject, this is the first instance of what may be called predicative vulnerability: in its struggle with corporeality, soul is open to being "ruled" by the body until it takes hold of it and makes it its object, its "serviceable instrument" (§410 *Z*)—notably in habituation as it unfolds towards its *actualized* state. In this state of openness or predicative vulnerability, selfhood, still "inchoate" and "naïve", finds itself in the thick of its conflictual encounter with its body, struggling under the weight of Nature's endless, and therefore *timeless*, continuity, to liberate itself from its entrenchment in the never-ending self-identical cycles of the corporeal world. It is in this moment of the anthropological project that the necessity, even the urgency of individuation makes itself clear: whenever the soul fails to "liberate" itself from "the immediacy of its substantial content" (§402 *Z*), it falls into madness; where time and space no longer are *for it* but are *imposed on it*: where it severs itself from

its body without however coming back into itself and including this difference in the scope of its own notion.

The "liberated" soul comes out in discrete moments, sticking its head out from the perpetuity of bodiliness by asserting its own inner division: it says, I am I since I have recognized that "I" must contain what confronts it—and is now conscious of its object's persistence, in its plurality, in its own notion. As explained in the introductory "Concept of Mind":

> When we say *I*, we indeed mean an individual; but since everyone is I, we thereby say only something entirely universal. The universality of the I enables it to abstract from everything, even from its life. But the mind is not merely this abstractly simple counterpart to light, which is how it was regarded when they talked about the simplicity of the soul in contrast to the complexity of the body; on the contrary, in spite of its simplicity the mind is differentiated within itself, for I posits itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference […] to unity with itself. This being-together-with-itself of the I in its differentiated is the infinity or ideality of the I. But this ideality authenticates itself only in the relation of the I to the infinitely manifold material confronting it. (§381 *Z*)

This may be the passage that best explains the dual chronology of selfhood, which itself has its source in the temporality specific to the natural soul; and where Hegel's caution against—if not explicit rejection of—a mind-body or soul-body dualism is most clearly manifest. Where the "traditional", early modern conception of the "mind" and the "body" places these terms in an absolute polarity based on the first's simplicity and the second's complexity, Hegel's notion of selfhood allows for what is called "mind" or "soul" to contain the multiplicity of the bodily world inside of its very concept—and makes it so that selfhood is *made true*, is only fully realized, in its recognition of this multiplicity that is inherent in it. In this, the body no longer solely confronts the mind but is now also integrated into its notion by virtue of the very fact of this confrontation. Because "I" am

in relation with the world of externality, "I" am made real by virtue of the infinitely expanding multiplicity of this world. As a result, the "I" finds itself inhabiting a temporal order that engages both the "temporality" and "spatiality" of nature, where things take place successively *for* a consciousness that receives them, and its own infinitely transmuting relation to itself which is built on the basis of the consciousness's constant interaction with the Natural world.

Out of this picture emerges a certain rhythm according to which what we may call a "dance" of soul and body is choreographed. As proposed in the *Zusatz* to §411, in habituation selfhood "just as much *appropriates* the matter-in-hand as […] it *withdraws* from it, […] the soul on the one hand completely *penetrates* into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus giving them the shape of something *mechanical*, of a merely *natural effect*". The *dance* of soul and body is established in the moment of habituation, in the transition from the "Feeling" to the "Actual" moments of soul, where subjectivity—still, here, incomplete, "abstract", or preliminary—finally wins in its struggle with corporeality by *appropriating* and *integrating* the bodiliness that confronts it, i.e., by delimitating the boundaries of its *own* externality. Emmanuel Chaput writes of habituation:

> (…) the soul substitutes its own will to the body's natural idleness and gives it a new purpose and strength through habit and training. This training is directed toward goals that spirit gives itself, but which also, incidentally, makes something of its own corporeity. [...] (…) to achieve this, the actual soul—or spirit at this level of its journey—must understand its own embodiedness and take care of it. Even more, neglecting one's body would entail the risk of falling back into its dominion. (115)

The *freedom* of Spirit, the manifestations of *Geist* which show a sense of accordance between something inner and something outer, starting most fundamentally in the

subject-object relation, depend on the pre-reflective, "pre-conscious" soul's ability to take hold of its bodiliness and direct it in such a way that creates a state of harmony in the whole of the organism.

Indeed, setting up for the emergence of Actual Soul, the *Zusatz* to §410 states: "If […] I conduct myself in accordance with the laws of my bodily organism, then my soul is free in its physical body". For soul to operate freely within the bounds of its bodily manifestation, it must first turn it into a "*pliant* and *skillful instrument*" capable of demonstrating such concordance of inner and outer by acting as an intermediate between selfhood and the external world which confronts it. To do so, soul relies on its individuating power, its ability to make of its body *this body*, to grab it and declare its possession of it as it retreats from it at once by undertaking the inner separation of self and self: subjectivity *pre-reflectively* makes of the "I" its own object. In habituation, and precisely through the mechanism of repetition, soul is able to inscribe its body in certain temporal structures that make it possible to identify and determine *this* body's specific time-signature, as it were, and assign to it individual spatiotemporal coordinates that give it its place in the world as an object among objects.

> Something of bodiliness remains, therefore, purely organic and consequently withdrawn from the power of the soul, so that the soul's pervasion of its body is only one side of the body. The soul, when it comes to feel this limitation of its power, reflects itself into itself and expels bodiliness from itself as something *alien* to it [reflektiert sie sich in sich und wirft die Leiblichkeit als ein ihr Fremdes aus sich hinaus]. By this *reflection-into-itself* the mind completes its liberation from the form of *being*, gives itself the form of *essence* and becomes the *I*. (…) the I is this universal, this simple entity that in truth exists only when it has itself as object [in Wahrheit erst dann existiert, wenn es sich selber zum Gegenstande hat], when it has become the *being-for-self* of the *simple* in the *simple*, the *relation* of the *universal* to the *universal*. (§412 *Z*/W10)

As such, the realized organism is in a constant state of *active* self-maintenance—indeed, it *is* a constant process of "self-production", as Russon (1997) writes: one which is continuously made and *re*-made the case by the choreography of soul and body initially set in motion at the decisive, pre-reflective moment of habituation. The importance of the anthropological project seems to lie in the ontological weight Hegel gives to the natural soul, whose operations are not yet privy to their own status as object, but which make possible, and act as the *grounds* for, their imminent objectification. As it treads this ambiguous space of pre-conscious "self-production", the soul establishes a motion of _repetition which will become as if the default rhythm of the dialectic of subjectivity, and according to which all subsequent subject/object relations may be ordered. The *reality* of Natural Soul ensures selfhood's inner division into its own subjectivity and objectivity, allowing the "I" to come about and recognize its own "implicitly infinite nature" (§412 *Z*). The natural soul represents the stage at which it is *possible* (but not yet actual) for the "I" to become a *for-itself* over against the external world's necessarily endless heterogeneity and expansion.

The possibility of the "I"'s realization in its recognition of its body's status as its own object, anticipated in Natural Soul and established in the decisive moment of habituation, is only actualized in consciousness (*Bewusstsein*), which is beyond the scope of the Anthropology. In consciousness, the dramatic division of the self in two—its fluxing *now*-ness on the one hand, and its overarching composite, complex identity on the other—finally takes place, albeit progressively and, in true Hegelian fashion, in a tripartite evolution: (1) consciousness, a subjectivity which is now apt to have and engage with an object in general, (2) self-consciousness, or the I "for which *I* is the object", and

(3) reason, where the "I" recognizes itself as *being* this very "self-intuiting" it undertakes in self-consciousness (§417) and for which it is now possible to engage with other "I"s as it recognizes its own selfhood as part of the world of objects which first confronts it. In reason, the duality of the "I" is reintegrated into a "unity of consciousness and self-consciousness": this unity discloses itself as having been the "*original* […] *truth*" of those two abstract terms, or what their overcoming reveals to have been the case, retroactively. Reason is, therefore, revealed to be the "*first* term" (§417 *Z*) and not the third, though it seems to be *grasped* only as the third moment in what Hegel calls the dialectic of mind, disclosing itself only after the first two moments have been worked through—*thought* through—and their respective incompleteness brought to light.

The consciousness that grasps, thinks, and speaks the terms of the dialectic (and which is the only terrain in which the dialectic *can* be grasped or spoken at all) functions according to a temporal order that seems to be categorically different from the order in which the dialectic itself unfolds. The "third" term—here, reason—is each time revealed to have been the originary term, the foundation of the subsequent duality or division of *itself* in two incomplete, "one-sided", abstract determinations. We may find here in between Hegel's explicit assertions and categorizations something akin to Kant's distinction between things *as they are* and things *as they appear to be* to a consciousness that recognizes them: each concept, when worked through according to the logic of speculative thought, reveals itself to have its own architecture—one that the mind itself stubbornly resists, and which, as a result, seems to be profoundly incompatible with the structures of the mind that attempts to think and speak it.

In the *Zusatz* to §402, in the discussion of "sensation", we get important insight as to the peculiar mode of operation of Hegel's logic and a look into the workings of the modalities of possibility and actuality within such a logic:

> First of all, we must note that the distinction between external and internal sensations considered by us in the preceding Paragraph is only for *us*, i.e., is for the reflecting consciousness, and is definitely not for the soul itself. The *simple unity* of the soul, its serene ideality, does not yet grasp itself in its distinction from an external reality.
>
> (…)
>
> Just as objectivity displays itself to our intuition not as something *separated out* into *different aspects*, but as a *concrete* divided into distinct objects, each of which is in turn for itself a *concrete*, a complex of the most diverse determinations, so the soul itself is a *totality* of infinitely many distinct determinacies which in the soul unite into one, so that in them the soul remains, *in itself*, infinite *being-for-itself*. In this totality or ideality, in the timeless, undifferentiated interior of the soul, the sensations which crowd each other out do not, however, vanish absolutely with no trace, but remain in the soul *as sublated*, obtain in it their subsistence, as an initially merely *possible* content, which only advances from its *possibility* to *actuality* by becoming *for* the soul or by the soul's becoming *for itself* in it.

The transition from possibility to actuality seems to have a strictly "subjective" dimension, in the sense that it occurs only *for* a subject that acknowledges and speaks—and therefore negates, delimits—its existence. The "soul's becoming *for itself* in [the content of its undifferentiated interior]" is nothing more than the moment of transition from consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) to self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*): "consciousness as such involves the *independence* of the subject and object relatively to each other. The I in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from itself—*itself, – self-consciousness*" (§423). For the I to have itself as an object, it must be *for itself*—as it is initially *for-another,* in its pre-reflective natural state.

Perhaps, then, what operates the transition from the former to the latter is the natural development of subjectivity, *over* time and *in* time: initially fastened to what will

become its object—itself—the subject recognizes its own status as an object independent of this act of recognition and must now think and speak this new objectivity with which it is confronted. The *processuality* of this self-objectification is itself what we may call selfhood: the continuous, cyclical movement of a subject making an object out of itself—expressing it linguistically, logically, and making it external once again. For the natural soul to be pre-reflective means, therefore, that it participates in consciousness's initial state of *possibility* and, in its existence as continuous process, transfigures this possibility and transports it into a new space of *actuality* where reflection can occur, and where the object is now at once distanced from and identified with the subject that grasps it. Here we may find Fichte's conceptual contribution to the Hegelian conception of self: the reality of consciousness is ultimately constructed in the space between the I and the not-I, where selfhood builds its own concept in constant interaction with that which it is not and through this acquires the characteristics of a dynamic self-maintaining, self-fulfilling *act*.

*2.2.3. Soul as universal life (*allgemeines Leben*) and individuality (*Einzelseele*)*

Understanding selfhood as activity, in this way, may help clarify how soul can have multiple, ambiguous, and sometimes overlapping definitions at one and the same time. Soul is at once a state of undifferentiated universality and one of individualized or singularized multiplicity, where what is general and scattered becomes unified in a singular unity which is, internally, still manifold. "The soul is not only immaterial for itself", writes Hegel at §389, prefacing the first subsection of the "Natural Soul" section. "It is the universal immateriality of nature, its simple ideal life. Soul is the *substance*, the absolute foundation of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind". The *process* that is selfhood is therefore one by which the universality ("generality") of Nature is

preserved and integrated into a singularity that is itself mediated by the struggle between the immediate and the substantial characterizations of soul, its initial state of "one-ness" with its bodiliness on the one hand, and its inner multiplicity, resulting from its encounter with objects that it recognizes as being outside of its own concept, on the other. The latter does not replace the former but is rather recurring and its notion expanding as it gets invested with content and as its capacity grows for a *knowing* that travels beyond the immediate, universal determinations of the soul towards laying the grounds for something like a meaningful, formulable, and purposeful history of humanity—the history of *Geist*—to unfold.

If soul is the *substance* and the "absolute foundation" for the operations of a consciousness that divides, particularizes then individuates itself, it is also and at the same time the product of this individuation—the singular unified subject who is undertaking these conscious operations. As such, determinations like "initial" and "final" are in Hegel indicative more of a conceptual succession than a real chronological (or linear) one. In his exposition of *Seele*, Hegel seems to place and keep its characteristics in a space of ambiguity, one that seems almost deliberately maintained. In the *Zusatz* to §396:

> When the soul, which at first is completely universal, particularizes itself (…) and finally determines itself to singularity, to individuality, it enters into opposition to its inner universality, to its substance. This contradiction between the immediate individuality and the substantial universality implicitly present in it, establishes the life-process of the individual soul, a process by which the immediate individuality of the soul is brought into conformity with the universal, the universal is actualized in the soul and thus the initial, simple unity of the soul with itself is raised to a unity mediated by the opposition, and the initially abstract universality of the soul is developed to concrete universality.

What comes "later" is usually the substantial pole of the opposition, or the *truth* that exists behind the initial manifestation of the concept in question—which, while it discloses itself as the *third*, is always shown to be the real *first* term of the dialectic. From universal life (*allgemeines Leben*) to individuality (*Einzelseele*), as it necessarily stands as an object of consciousness, soul traverses something like a reverse-singularization whose parameters disclose themselves to a "knowing 'I'" (PhG §60) progressively and from their *supposed first* or real *third* moment (natural soul) to their *supposed third* or real *first* moment (consciousness). It is the natural soul that shows itself to have been the case *to* a consciousness that is re-cognizing it as such—the directionality of this logical order, which is the order of speculative thinking, presents itself textually through a movement from the supposed first term to the supposed third, while it is really (fully, *for* consciousness) taking the opposite direction.

Soul is, therefore, simultaneously both universal life (*allgemeines Leben*) and individuality (*Einzelseele*). The closer it gets to undoing its "initial" entrenchment in nature, the more limited its concept becomes, the more multiple and content-ful its interiority, the better it gets at thinking, speaking, and transfiguring itself as it becomes its own autonomous unit—the ultimate product of its conflictual relationship with its bodiliness. The *Zusatz* to §396 explains: "This immediate and therefore unspiritual, purely natural unity of the individual with its genus and with the world generally, must be sublated; the individual must advance to the point where he opposes himself to the universal as the finished and subsisting substance that is in and for itself, to the point where he apprehends himself in his independence". Soul and Body are, like Spirit and Nature, not in a relationship of pure opposition but in a continuous dynamic interaction,

each of them moving across intersecting ontological lines. In the moment of *Einzelseele* the soul prepares for the transition from complete entanglement with its corporeality to those manifestations that are particular to *this* organism in its interaction with the natural world, notably sensation, habit, and "self-feeling". Though soul is here no longer *allgemeines Leben*, it is not yet completely singularized—it is only "particularized", in the language of the speculative syllogism—occupying, we may say, the "middle" term of the dialectic of subjectivity as an object which can be pointed out among others, carrying the potentiality of its own individuation and self-recognition.

Hegel's logic seems to function according to the following rule: the third term of the dialectical unfolding of a concept—its truth, what it reveals itself to have been—is simply the core of its definition. It exists already in its first manifestation, regardless of how incomplete, "one-sided" or "abstract" it may still be: in the concept of soul, the natural (general or universal) determination is also the individual one, the natural becomes individual as consciousness tightens its grip around it, so to speak, and assigns to it a discrete, particular conceptual space with discrete, particular spatial-temporal coordinates. The modulation of this *becoming* is undertaken by a chronology whose specific operations answer to the laws of Hegel's speculative logic: according to a rhythm of "give and take", a continuous motion of push and pull with bodiliness, inchoate subjectivity is in a state of continuous development into an object that exists in the here and the now. In this Hegel's self attains a state of *situation*, where it is now *this* self-contained object which is apt to be pointed out according to its specific relation to the "externality" of space and time. Time is especially significant because it seems to penetrate even the concept's structure, making the soul temporal, limited and determined

by time—meaning the "I" is not only *in* nature but *of* it as well, a particular moment in what Hegel calls nature's "purposive" process. In the *Philosophy of Nature*:

> Even man, who is spirit—the absolutely weightless (*das absolut Leichte*)—is still heavy. But the coherence of bodily parts is now determined from within outwards by a principle of form which is independent of heaviness. Here, therefore, we encounter for the first time the purposiveness of Nature itself: a connection of different indifferents constituting a necessity whose moments have a stable existence, or an inwardness (*Insichsein*) which is there outwardly—a spontaneous intelligent act of Nature itself. […] Here (…) there is a unity of indifferent moments or of moments, each of which has free existence in relation to the other. […] they have meaning solely in relation to each other—the End constitutes their unity and their meaning (§315 *Z*).

The purposiveness of Nature is a "spontaneous intelligent act": it unfolds according to the "End" of its individual elements, themselves made of multiple (therefore, different) elements in their *inwardness*. This element of *directionality* penetrates the determination of time as well, as part of nature's status as "abstract externality" (§448 *Z*).

That the soul is temporal and therefore limited by the natural determination of time has far reaching ontological implications—chiefly that it is bound, in some significant way, by its bodiliness, and that it cannot be, as is typically philosophized of the soul, "eternal" or outside of worldly time. As a result, the logic of speculative philosophy forces the soul to be as if halted by its relationship to its corporeality and makes it so that all its subsequent determinations and particularities rest on its (logically) "first" interaction with its own *natural* dimension: its characterization as *allgemeines Leben*. If soul is conceived first as "universal life", it is to demonstrate that the possibility of overcoming its naturalness is already found in its initial manifestation. This first manifestation's concept only attains *unity* and *meaning* in view of the way it fits in relation to the other elements with which it is in interaction—its otherness, its difference or alterity. As concerns the soul, the concept of its characterization as universal life is

only properly understood in relation to that of its characterization as individuality: and both are only properly understood in relation to their logical "End", the fully developed, free self-consciousness for which the anthropological project establishes the theoretical backdrop.

2.3.Overview of the Anthropology's stages

2.3.1. Natural Soul, Feeling Soul, Actual Soul: rhythmic transitions and anticipatory structures

In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the architecture of the speculative proposition depends on the movement of the object *back into* the subject—the "counter-thrust" (PhG §61) to the apparent unidirectionality of the proposition from subject to predicate. The subversive nature of the speculative counter-thrust is indeed what drives the movement of the proposition and gives it its decidedly dynamic, *restless* characterization: as Hegel writes,

> The philosophical proposition, since it *is* a proposition, leads one to believe that the usual subject-predicate relation obtains, as well as the usual attitude towards knowing. But the philosophical content destroys this attitude and this opinion. We learn by experience that we meant something other than we meant to mean; and this correction of our meaning compels our knowing to go back to the proposition, and understand it in some other way. (PhG §63)

The speculative ("philosophical") proposition is *misleading* in this way, as it presents itself as something other than what it ultimately reveals itself to be in terms of its content. The result is a subject-predicate relation that seems less solid, perhaps, than that of a typical (ordinary or *non-philosophical*) proposition, where each of the poles is fixed and fully, statically, inhabits its role as subject or object, generating the abstract "one-sidedness" of a conceptual apparatus that comes into contact with non-philosophical

content. What Hegel calls "speculative thinking" creates a state of restlessness, or something like a contained but continuous state of *activity* within the proposition, where subject and object float around each other's notions, forcing thought to be "thrown" back and forth from the one to the other—as if impeding it from settling indefinitely on either side of the proposition. In the structures of speculative philosophy "Thinking […] loses the firm objective basis it had in the subject when, in the predicate, it is thrown back on to the subject, and when, in the predicate, it does not return into itself, but into the subject of the content" (PhG §62). The speculative proposition seems to be defined by a continuous undertaking of *shifting* and *expanding* the meaning of the Subject, injecting its notion with the elements of the Predicate as they reveal themselves to a consciousness that receives them.

This same movement is replicated in the syllogistic development of selfhood, for which the bases are set in the Anthropology: the progression of *Seele*'s concept and its ultimate self-revelation as a singular (and internally multiple) unity, setting up for its self-formation into a selfhood apt to engage and interact with other selfhoods, is gradually revealed to a consciousness that is able to receive it and that is, therefore, fully formed, complete or "achieved"—no longer at the stage of its own development it is *grasping*, and which it can only *grasp* once it has overcome. The gesture of overcoming, characteristic of *Aufhebung*, is synchronous with the advent (and advancement) of speculative thinking: only once the subject has moved past its sunkenness into its object can it grasp it for what it is, which is its own. This act of grasping itself is a retroactive gesture of mind, one whereby selfhood makes itself its own object and can therefore *re*-cognize (*Anerkennen*) itself and reflect on itself. Within the bounds of speculative

thinking the object's "counter-thrust" ensures that the subject is not immobile in relation to what is predicated of it but is rather in a continuous mode of flux, its notion at once expanding and self-limiting as it takes in the multiplicity of what constitutes its "externality" and situates itself in the world by "[excluding] itself" (§413 *Z*) from it. For *Seele*, this takes place in the transitions from Natural, to Feeling (or sensing), to Actual Soul, the one moment setting up for and anticipating the next as it integrates into its very essence—into its definition—the elements of the one prior, severing itself from them in the same stroke.

In the last section of the Anthropology, Hegel provides an explanation for this phenomenon of simultaneous embracing and rejecting that seems to be undertaken by *Seele* as it actualizes its concept. He writes,

> The soul, which has set its being in opposition to itself, sublated it and determined it as its own, has lost the meaning of *soul*, of the *immediacy* of mind. [Die Seele, die ihr Sein sich entgegengesetzt, es aufgehoben un dals das ihrige bestimmt hat, hat die Bedeutung der Seele, der Unmittelbarkeit des Geistes, verloren.] The actual soul in the *habit* of sensation and of its *concrete* self-feeling is in itself the *ideality* of its determinacies, an ideality that is for itself; in its externality it is *recollected* into itself, and is infinite relation to itself. This being-for-self of free universality is the soul's higher awakening to the *I*, to abstract universality in so far as it is *for* abstract universality, which is thus *thinking* and *subject* for itself [Denken und Subjekt für sich] […]. (§412/W10)

As it moves into its "feeling", *sensing* state, the soul both overcomes its strictly natural or corporeal limitations and takes them back into its concept, preserves them as a sort of foundation for its definition. The "I" of a true, achieved consciousness is still delimited, particularly through the determination of time, by its bodiliness and retains it as its logical backbone: as the actual soul reaches beyond simple sensuous information and places itself in a reflective position—undertakes a "self-intuiting"—it is also making possible the situating of this sensuous information into its (the soul's) own structures.

The "Actual Soul" section, noticeably short[31] especially relative to the preceding section, opens with the mention of bodiliness as Hegel explains how soul is only actualized once it has asserted its power over its corporeality: the "inner" triumphs over the "outer" as soul decidedly moves out of its moment of animality and is made properly *human* by its harmonious relationship with its bodiliness. Here, the soul has attained the conditions necessary for is "higher awakening to the *I* (…) *consciousness*" (§412), and is ready to surpass the pre-reflective anthropological stage:

> (…) the *human* soul, in contrast to the *animal* soul which remains sunk in the individuality and limitation of sensation, has raised itself above the limited content of what is sensed, a content that contradicts its implicitly infinite nature, has posited this content ideally, and particularly in *habit* has made it into something *universal*, *recollected*, *total*, into a being. (…) the self has […] *actualized* itself in the soul's *reality*, in its *bodiliness*, and, conversely, has posited being within itself; so that now the self or the I *intuits its own self* in its *Other* and is *this self-intuiting*. (412 *Z*)

Perhaps paradoxically, it is only by virtue of its specific relationship to its corporeality that selfhood, for Hegel, is worth demarcating so elaborately from what he calls "animality" or animal subjectivity. It is precisely the relationship to the *I*'s body that individuates selfhood and gives it its human status, a "raised" status according to other manifestations of subjectivity—and such a relationship is permeated, from circadian rhythms and aging[32] into habituation and the repetitious "training" of the body by the

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[31] Perhaps consciousness, once arrived at its apprehension of the "actual" soul, finds nothing more to say about it beyond what has already been revealed dialectically, speculatively, through thought's retroactive voyage into its more fundamental *natural* and *feeling* (dreaming) moments. The "inner" and "outer" are now once more in union, only now no longer immediate but mediated: the relationship of thought to its bodily self has been deconstructed and put back together again; it has, as it were, been wrung through the structure of the speculative syllogism. However, this alone might not be a satisfactory explanation for the puzzling length of this section. More on this below, p. 204.

[32] These "rhythms" of the natural soul (the notions of aging and development, repetition and habituation, sleep-wake cycles, and "sanity" and "derangement") will be fleshed out in more detail in the next chapter.

soul, with a temporal dimension by virtue of which the soul remains determined by its relation to its body as it develops into consciousness and, then, self-consciousness.

The product of such a logical and temporal order is the notion of a self that finds itself both (first) scattered across its own inward multiplicity, as simultaneously all of its natural, sensing, and actual moments (as simultaneously, therefore, inhabiting the logically successive moments of its conceptual *unfolding*), and (second) taken back into itself, self-apprehended as a single unity, thus making universal what was particular and multiple—the "limited content" of sensuous experience. The different moments leading up to the soul's individuation—including the initial, atemporal moment of the soul's complete "entanglement with corporeality", in Nuzzo's words, or its sunkenness into and undifferentiation from its bodiliness—are all as if angled towards the eventuality of a mind. Within the structures of Hegel's logic the body (more accurately, bodiliness) seems therefore to be conceived as something *of* the mind, as being perhaps interior to its notion: as Russon points out, "the 'natural body'—the *phusis*—of the self-conscious self cannot be this in it-self unconscious body, but must be a body that has been 'built' by self-consciousness; it must be a 'second-nature' or 'habit', that is, literally, a *hexis*" (Russon 1997, 10). The naturalness of the Hegelian self is ultimately directed towards the eventuality of its status as a free self-consciousness, by virtue of its inscription in a kind of temporality that precisely defies the linear nature of the chronology of the Self's "mind". Indeed, the body "returns", for consciousness, to the dialectic of subjectivity, only now having been mediated by influence of the soul—the "training" of bodiliness and its transfiguration into "a serviceable instrument". What was initial is also enduring and, in a sense, *a*temporal: the natural soul does not participate in the linear passage of

time. Instead, it inhabits its own temporal order, perhaps has its own “chronology”, and constitutes in this way an organic, self-maintaining totality.

Chapter 3. Natural Soul as Temporal Organism

3.1.Reading §§387-398 of the Anthropology

3.1.1. The notion of "organism" and organic philosophy: the subject as a dynamic, self-regulating whole

Hegel writes that "There is *nothing at all* anywhere, in which contradiction […] cannot and should not be exhibited" (EL §89R). The *Logics* seem to make clear, at multiple points, that opposition is necessarily present within all that may be grasped by mind[33], and that opposition is therefore characteristic of a thing's being or essence rather than of our cognitive structures. It is not the mind that imposes contradiction on extant objects, but objects that contain in themselves what Hegel calls "opposing determinations", which are, nevertheless, only revealed to a cognitive structure that embraces the logical form and constraints of speculation. This means that for the mind to grasp "philosophically", fully, the truth of an object, it must embrace a rhythm that defies the linearity and finitude implied by binary and dual kinds of philosophies. Thought, for Hegel, cannot "stop" or become stagnant at one or the other of its objects: it is "absolutely restless, pure activity" (*Enz.* §378 *Z*).[34] The mind is "in itself eternal" (§386 R), in that it possesses an absolute, infinite capacity for negation: by virtue of its peculiar status as "essentially only what it knows itself to be" (§385 *Z*), mind is bound to the rules

[33] See for example EL §82, 119 (particularly *Add.* 2), 130, and 200.

[34] This point is also made clear in an earlier *Zusatz*: "Ordinary logic is […] in error in supposing that mind is something that completely excludes contradiction from itself. On the contrary, all consciousness contains a unity and a separation, hence a contradiction. […] But contradiction is endured by mind, because mind contains no determination that it does not recognize as a determination posited by itself and consequently as a determination that it can also sublate again. This power over all the content present in it forms the basis of the freedom of mind. […] (…) actual freedom is thus not something that is immediately in the mind but something to be produced by mind's activity. So in science we have to regard *mind as the producer of its freedom*" (§382 *Z*; emphasis added).

of its own realization or "liberation" from its supposed finitude—and is therefore bound to its own self-overcoming in coming to know both its objects and itself (as object, for itself).

Given this, it may be helpful to understand Hegel's notion of selfhood through an analysis of the logical category of becoming as it is defined and presented in the *Encyclopedia*'s *Logic*. Becoming, for Hegel, displays what Michael Inwood refers to as "instantaneous contradiction" (see Inwood 1992), a simultaneous co-existence of opposites wherein something both is and is not what is predicated of it; a mediated identity of "opposite determinations" which, while, we may say, *ontologically overlapping*, retain their autonomy and independence in relation to one another and so *retain* their respective concepts while *sharing in* them at one and the same time. In this vein, the Anthropology shows that the self both is and is not its body: in its relation to its corporeality, the "I" seems to display a repeated pattern of merging and retreat from its corporeality that places it in a relationship of ambivalence with it, allowing it to both *be it* and be *in relationship* to it. This relationship of selfhood to bodiliness is what Russon describes as "the way the self achieves itself without conscious self-control" (Russon 1997, 58), and what Dryden refers to as the self's relationship with an "ambiguous other"—an Other whose very otherness is put in question by virtue of its constituting a fundamental part of the self's notion, which is both its body and not, simultaneously: indeed, the body is "undoubtedly part of us, but also other to us" (Dryden 2016, 7), in a way that makes it retain some sort of autonomy *vis-à-vis* of the self's consciousness or conscious control.

The body seems indeed to have a "mind of its own" (Russon, 58) and a status of (at least relative) independence towards consciousness within Hegel's system. Curiously, relative to the notions of "mind" and "soul", the Anthropology does not seem to show much conceptual exploration around the notion of "body" or "bodiliness" as such but for (a) certain empirically-backed observations surrounding what Hegel calls mood and temperament, as well as *derangement* or mental illness in "Feeling Soul", and (b) an impressively sustained mass of Eurocentric statements regarding race and ethnicity occupying part of the subsection *Natural Qualities* in "Natural Soul", spanning sections §§393-394.

To begin, I will only grant (b) the measure of attention that this project's problematic strictly requires of me, namely in the sense of proposing a series of follow-through questions to those statements on ethnicity and nationality, to get to their implications as concerns Hegel's overall view on the Subject and the self—which is indeed a "racialized" view, and whose "racial" undertones must not be ignored precisely because they do contribute to Hegel's systematic philosophy of the self, as the moment of "Natural" differentiation cannot be set aside in favor of the more "spiritualized" or developed moments of the Hegelian subject but must instead be understood as an integral aspect of its self-realization. Hegel explains that the "natural mind" is first divided into the universal races of humankind and gets particularized when it presents itself differently in the "minds of peoples". In this sense, a people or a nation embodies a determinate historical configuration of selfhood that varies depending on such determinations as geography and climate—but also some mysterious notion of "disposition" (e.g. §394) which puzzled me the most, particularly in those passages

where Hegel describes the violent colonization of the American continent as proof of the natives, he writes, being a "vanishing, feeble breed" that magically "goes extinct" when introduced to rifles (§393). As unfathomably dehumanizing as this remark is, it also points to a larger and legitimate problem in Hegel's system, couched into layers of Eurocentrism, which is that of the passage from this idea of spirit qua capacity or disposition vs. qua particular, then individual, actualization. Hegel's Eurocentrism, besides being problematic for obvious racist reasons, is also problematic because it is accorded a legitimate function in the deployment of his "system"[35].

For Hegel, Europe is understood as the endpoint of the developmental sequence of the natural mind—which makes of European self-consciousness *the* form in which Spirit finally becomes adequately conscious of itself. Geographical difference is understood as temporal or historical difference: the non-European peoples occupy a stage of *Geist* that has been presumably already surpassed by Europe. Europe then becomes the sole subject of universal history—and any ensuing discussion on the "subject" or subjectivity is therefore a discussion on the European subject conceived as historically more developed compared to the non-European subject. This leads to several problems, each of which deserves its own separate enquiry: Are non-European peoples retrospectively interpreted in relation to the "final" European standpoint? What to make of such a "final" standpoint particularly as concerns the question of Absolute Knowing: if selfhood is temporal self-differentiation, then there would presumably be a people that

[35] Which is why, as Robert Sparling pointed out in his evaluation of this manuscript, we cannot separate these remarks from the whole of the philosophy in Hegel like we could, for instance, in Kant, for whom there is a fundamental categorical distinction between "metaphysical" and "empirical" statements.

"counts" as fully participating in Spirit? How may we understand the reflexive standpoint of history and spirit itself if such an endpoint seems to be determined in advance?

I will leave these questions here for now. On the other hand, point (a) is more directly pertinent to this project as it offers an important supplement to Hegel's thoughts around mind and bodiliness: particularly that selfhood, as an integrated unity of different mechanisms and relations, faces the possibility of being destabilized or perhaps disintegrated. This becomes the case, it seems, whenever the rhythms of the natural soul are disrupted. When there is mental illness, Hegel writes "the subject finds itself in the *contradiction* between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy in that consciousness, which is not pliable and integrated into an overarching order" (§408). In mental illness something in the self-integrating process of the "I" goes awry, and some element of the "overarching order" diverges from the homogeneity of the individual's particular *time signature*, as it were. This rogue element is what Hegel describes in the Remark to §408 as "a particularity [...] fixed in self-feeling". It is the making real of the struggle between the opposing forces of reason, "the evil genius of man […] in contradiction to the better and more intellectual side, which is also in man": and the result of an imbalance in the psychical make-up of the individual.

Likening it to physical ailments with quite noticeable emphasis, Hegel treats *derangement* or mental illness as a genuine battle between the self and a "feeling" which is (1) bodily and, therefore, natural; and (2) also "immediate", spontaneous with and inseparable from the determinations of Nature itself. The proximity between *derangement* and disease seems to be, therefore, based on a shared point of origin in the Natural world. Notably, in mental illness, it is whatever arises from the bodiliness of the

individual that is incapable of integrating itself into the conscious whole of the subject, and not the conscious subject that is inapt at integrating this element of its body into its unity. The distinction is significant: while in "the sober and healthy subject" the dominant force is the *gathering*, unifying power of individuated consciousness, in *derangement* the dominant force is the corporeality of the subject, as if a sustained evasion of reason by the body. This view of mental illness is worth highlighting as it may serve as a preliminary model for more contemporary frameworks of psychology, specifically in shifting the locus of "madness" from the individual's conscious mind to the individual's bodiliness which, evidently for Hegel and as shown in Chapter 2, displays a certain measure of autonomy in relation to the subject's consciousness. Mental illness is not a failing of a reason that could have done otherwise, but a sort of *disorganization* or dysregulation which has its source in the organism's bodily dimension—closer perhaps to a spontaneous error (in this vein, therefore, irrelevant to morality and moral judgments) in the normal functioning of some moment in the complex *organic total* process that is the "I".

In *derangement* therefore we have an inversion of the product of what we may call the "soul-body struggle" in a healthy or "sane" individual, what Emmanuel Chaput explains as "the process of [the self's] liberation from the immediate dominion of nature" (Chaput 2023, 106), whereby the subject's bodiliness somehow declares its dominion over the mechanisms of soul into which it is incapable of integrating itself, and with which it proves incompatible. Instead of a unification of different terms where the singularity of the organism is preserved, as in the delicate balance struck by a healthy consciousness, we have a genuine *split* in the individual's selfhood, and the consistency

of the self with its concept is not attained. Prevented from completing its *normal* unfolding as it takes place in the anthropological story, so short of its full realization, the "I" that is in a state of derangement does not grasp itself in its entirety, almost as if a portion of its bodiliness misses the eventuality of the scope of consciousness which, instead of integrating it in its concept, is forced to leave it behind as it remains sunken in the immediacy of its naturalness. Here *derangement* seems to be present as if in potentia in the constitution of the human mind.

Presenting the individual self as an organic totality has important implications for the construction of a complete and, in Hegel's words, "concrete" definition for the notion of selfhood. The "I", once *achieved*, is the individual's "cultivated mind" (§396): while it cannot be reduced to any of its particular differences (moments), for example, its temperament and character, or also its childhood, adulthood, or old-age, it contains within its concept the mass of its moments as it maintains its singularity: the *alterations* of an achieved consciousness only gain significance once understood in relation to the overarching subject—a consciousness that gathers, limits, and unifies these alterations within the borders of the "I". This makes of the Hegelian subject an entity always in motion: the "I" is not any of its individual moments but rather the ongoing activity of these moments—which are collected, grasped, and made meaningful by the "I" in its *complete(d)* iteration: the individual.

Drawing on the classical notions of *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*, Russon (1997) reads in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* a robust theory of embodiment according to which Hegel's "body" is a crucial element of the subject's fully developed self-consciousness. Russon argues that as described in the *Phenomenology*, the Hegelian body is akin to the

Aristotelian physical body in that it is in a state of self-sufficient, pre-reflective auto-completion: it is, he writes, "that which […] gets its own work done for the self of which it is the body without that self ever having to enter into self-conscious reflection". At the same time, the body is a "seamless whole, a single functioning system in which the significance of the various body 'parts' is understandable only in terms of the relevant contribution of these parts to the carrying out of the overarching project" (5). Russon designates this dimension of the Hegelian body with the term *phusis*, underlining the constitutive role of the body's capacity to organize itself into a singularity: an autonomous "system of subsystems" in which the ongoing tension between the body's overarching unity and the multiplicity of its pre-reflective operations make possible the (logically) subsequent advent of the full, reflective subject.

Once the "feeling" soul is realized, the Anthropology moves into the soul in its state as now actualized in its interaction with the world of its externality, through an exposition of the notion of habit. Russon interprets the notion of habit as a "second nature", designating it by *hexis* and assigning to it a constitutive role in the definition of selfhood. We may note, here, the significance of the occurrence of a gesture of *adding and integrating*, underlined by the author in *The Self and Its Body*. The operation that becomes habitual is one that has achieved the status of a new sub-system in the overarching system of the body: it is both an addition, a new element in the complex architecture of corporeality, and, at the *moment* of its becoming-habit, an integral part of that architecture as well[36]. The result is an arguably strange kind of temporal order across

[36] To make this point, Russon uses Merleau-Ponty's example of the blind person's cane. "(…) we must understand […] the habitual dependence upon a cane on the part of a blind person to be that person's

which are weaved the different iterations of the self's corporeality, making of the body a self-contained yet ever-changing, enclosed organism.

In the Anthropology, this gesture manifests as what assigns to the natural soul a sort of temporalizing, organizing power, ostensibly independent from the conscious "I"'s control.

> Habit is not an *immediate*, *first* nature, dominated by the individuality of sensations. It is rather a *second* nature *posited* by soul. But all the same it is still a *nature*, something *posited* that assumes the shape of *immediacy*, an *ideality* of beings that is itself still burdened with the form of *being*, consequently something not corresponding to free mind, something merely *anthropological*.
>
> […]
>
> (…) in *habit* our consciousness is at the same time *present* in the matter-in-hand, *interested* in it, yet conversely *absent* from it, *indifferent* towards it; that our self just as much *appropriates* the matter-in-hand as, on the contrary, it *withdraws* from it, that the soul on the one hand completely *penetrates* into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus giving them the shape of something *mechanical*, of a merely *natural effect*. (§410 *Z*)

In habituation the soul is, although in a relationship of dominance over its bodiliness, still attached to it by this very *grip* it now has on it. Nature appears to be both inside and outside of the soul's reach, and the soul itself in a constant, almost choreographed motion of grasp-and-retreat with its body. The *dance* of soul and body in the Anthropology seems to predict the upcoming restlessness in which mind will find itself in perpetuity. In its continuous, repetitive motion, habit ensures the organic status of the subject's bodiliness—in other words, it ensures the possibility of the coexistence of the subject's

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development of *a new bodily organ*. *From the point of view of our lived relationship to our world*, the cane must be understood as a functioning part of the body of the blind person" (6).

constant interaction with a world in (or with) which it is on the one hand, with the persistence of its singular, perhaps internally dynamic identity on the other.

The final moment of Hegel's "theory of embodiment" as proposed by Russon is that of *Logos*, wherein the body moves into its truly *rational* moment and fully actualizes its attribute of reflective, expressive self-consciousness. The ensuing rationality of the subject, anticipated and contained already in the manifestation of the natural soul or corporeality, seems to contain itself, in turn, the necessity of interaction and *intersubjectivity*. We know that the *ultimate* manifestation of soul is self-knowing Spirit (see §377), and that it is precisely this self-knowledge that is in view of which all the "moments" involved in the unfolding of the dialectic of subjectivity are constructed, and what they are directed at. Notably, in the Introduction to his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel's hierarchy of the forms of Absolute Spirit also makes it clear that the most Spiritual manifestations of the human mind—the ones closest to "absolute truth"—are those that are *linguistic*, and therefore communicative:

> Owing to [their] sameness of content the three realms of absolute spirit [art, religion, and philosophy] differ only in the *forms* in which they bring home to consciousness their object, the Absolute.
>
> The differences between these forms are implied in the nature of absolute spirit itself. The spirit in its truth is absolute. Therefore it is not an essence lying in abstraction beyond the objective world. On the contrary, it is present within objectivity in the finite spirit's recollection or inwardization of the essence of all things – i.e. the finite apprehends itself in its own essence and so itself becomes essential and absolute. Now the *first* form [art] of this apprehension is an immediate and therefore *sensuous* knowing, a knowing, in the form and shape of the sensuous and objective itself, in which the Absolute is presented to contemplation and feeling. Then the *second* form [religion] is *pictorial* thinking, while the *third* and last [philosophy] is the *free* thinking of absolute spirit. (LA K101)

The more *conceptual* the form Spirit takes, the closer it is to Absolute truth—the self-apprehension of *Geist* in its fullest iteration. Spirit only fully comes to know itself in philosophy, which is its most conceptual exercise: it "recognizes the Concept [of the harmony and unity which is truth] in everything"; "true thought, the Idea, is […] the most real and most objective universality which only in thinking can apprehend itself in the form of its own self" (LA K104).

Although I find Russon's methodology somewhat awkward, of drawing an interpretation of the successive elements of a single concept's development in Hegel's system from authors as fairly diverse as Aristotle, Merleau-Ponty, and Plotinus (in that order), there is certainly merit to the ideas contained in each interpretation, and, of course, clear basis for the choice of said authors. Especially noteworthy for this project's thesis is the simultaneously restless and self-contained dimension of bodiliness highlighted by Russon, particularly in view of the mind's "freedom": in line with Russon's interpretation, the anthropological project cements in Hegel's system an ever-dynamic, autonomous conceptual space for bodiliness which allows it to gain or lose certain determinations while retaining its identity. In the Anthropology the self-sufficiency of the body is preserved despite its infinite capacity for modulation—and its relation to "soul" is predicated on the *reality* of the extent of independence the body possesses in relation to it. This means that the soul's developmental arc into "mind" depends on the potentially endless multiplicity of the body's pre-reflective operations, which "free up", so to speak, in an anticipatory gesture, the ontological space necessary for the fulfilment of consciousness and self-consciousness—and, ultimately, for the advent of *Geist* itself.

In this sense, the Natural works tirelessly—and continuously—to safeguard the conditions of Spirit's full realization. The freedom of the Hegelian mind is only achieved by virtue of its ongoing struggle with its corporeality—a reality that makes of the body the initial manifestation of mind's aptness to freely traverse the world within which it is embodied and with which it is in constant interaction, and reach beyond its solipsistic entrenchment in its own initial—atemporal—naturalness. This means that at a certain point in the trajectory of Spirit's development, the individual self-consciousness must have both grasped its own finiteness and separated itself from it, as *mind*—as what "sets out only from its own being and is in relationship only with its own determinations" (§440), as "[the] elevation above nature and natural determinacy and above the involvement with an external object" (§440 R). In this sense, mind is "essentially activity" (§443 *Z*): it permeates all stages of *Geist* in some form or the other, depending on the extent of Spirit's sunkenness in its natural state.

As demonstrated by the Anthropological project, Hegel's Spirit is properly human: it cannot be something pure of matter or corporeality. The Spirit that is Hegel's object of study is an "I" that knows itself and *speaks to* itself, separates itself from itself, acknowledges (*recognizes*) its own alterity and reiterates it in its speech[37]. The development of consciousness and self-consciousness seems to hinge on the Self's ability

[37] It may be argued that it is this particular component of Hegel's philosophy that is preserved in Marx and Engels' dialectical materialism: "From the start", they write in *The German Ideology*, "the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language *is* practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. […] Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all." (see Marx & Engels 1972, 50-1).

to know (and, implicitly, *speak*) its self-division into both what it is and what it is not. The eventuality of being social (the subject-matter of the *Encyclopedia*'s ensuing *Philosophy of Right*) is, for one, contained in the very conceptual composition of "the natural soul". That the soul is temporal means not only that it unfolds within the structures of human chronology, but also that it anticipates the negation of its own timelessness. In inhabiting its initial space of atemporality and in being fully immersed in its corporeality, the soul is already acknowledging a distinct moment of its own notion from which it will have to sever itself in order to *become what it is*: an individual whose individuation only gains significance in view of the individuation of its other, and thus in view of its own otherness or alterity.

The *spiral* of selfhood seems to place Hegel's idealism in an ambiguous category wherein the concepts of "mind" and "matter" are simultaneously inside and outside of each other's scopes. The mind is corporeal and the body is soul-*ful*, in the sense that both come to be what they are by virtue of their relation to the other. This relation (of body to soul and soul to body) is of a temporal nature: the "magic" (§410 *Z*) Hegel mentions in the Anthropology occurs precisely at the moment of the soul's simultaneous investment in and disengagement from the body. What makes this simultaneity possible is the ubiquity of *continuous time* as an empty "form" (see Reid, *The Meaning of Music in Hegel*) whose shape and direction are left up to the different manifestations of selfhood. It is time that mediates the ongoing struggle between consciousness and corporeality, which means it is time that ensures and preserves what we may call the "I"'s *manifold singularity*.

That a multiplicity can at once be an individual is only explained here with a conception of time that gives ontological weight to the logical, non-linear chronology of the mind. The coexistence, in the "I", of such a chronology with the contrasting, linear chronology of the corporeal points to the necessity for philosophy of re-evaluating its concepts of time and temporality, most particularly as concerns questions of selfhood and otherness. The bodily element is especially interesting: to what extent is the body universal? How does each individual participate in the idea of bodiliness? How important is it to define the "mine-ness" of the body, and in what contexts? Etc.... Additionally, if the ensoulment of the body is what gives it a temporal horizon, then the body's atemporality would necessitate the soul's "intervention" at the level of corporeality—by virtue of the need to fulfil the criterion of finitude that selfhood requires.

3.1.2. The anticipatory structure of Seele: the function of nature and the retroactive character of mind/consciousness

The trajectory of *Seele* drawn by the Anthropology makes clear two significant points: (1) the conceptual proximity of soul to body points to what looks to be an overlap between the two notions in which the soul is both always tethered to its body *and* always potentially beyond its bounds, and (2) the anthropological project, which is one of tracing the trajectory of the development of human subjectivity, is constructed according to the structures of a mind that grasps nature, retroactively, and recognizes it as a moment of its own identity. As suggested in the last chapter, Hegel seems to employ a motif, across the *Encyclopedia*, in which the *third* term of a concept's unfolding is revealed to be its *first* real term: for instance, in the case of the dialectic of consciousness and self-consciousness in the Anthropology, Reason (*Vernunft*)—presented as the outcome of this

dialectic and the unification of its terms—is revealed to be the real "first term" (see §417 *Z*) of this dialectic, but it is only grasped by the mind as the third term, following the reflective process of self-consciousness. The non-linear chronology in which the Hegelian Concept unfolds is necessary to the understanding of Self as process and resolutely glues the notion of mind to its essential determination of bodiliness, setting in place the conceptual grounds for ideas like "embodiment" or "embodied consciousness" to emerge[38]. This is so not only by virtue of the seemingly *plural* non-dual understanding of selfhood (as a *multiplicity* of integrated components) Hegel presents in this text and in his *oeuvre* more broadly, but also more precisely because of the unique status assigned to the body itself, which I argue may be extracted from the Anthropology's very textuality.

Although not explicitly stated by Hegel, something like an ontology of the body (or a "theory of embodiment") may be found in the text of the Anthropology. Most significantly, the discussions around habituation and the subjugation of bodiliness to the soul that "breaks with" it (§409) show a rigorous commitment to the ontologically determinative role of the body—or more precisely *the soul's bodiliness*—in the achievement of Spirit. This point will be discussed at length in the following chapter, as the "Habit" section is rich and insightful enough to warrant its own chapter. For the purposes of this section, it seems sufficient to try to formulate a clear basis for the place of corporeality in Spirit in the "Feeling Soul" moment more generally, through a focused

[38] It may be suggested that Hegel replaces the traditional "mind/body" dualism with a more obscure dualism, woven into the lines of his text, between the internal *logical structure* of a concept on the one hand, and the way it is received by the conscious "I" on the other. it may then be understood as an opposition between a concept's reality, which may be split open and examined by a consciousness *only retroactively* on the one hand, and a concept's *immediate* iteration, as it immediately presents itself—prior to conceptual modulation.

exegesis of those dispersed parts of the text in which the body as such is addressed philosophically, i.e., in such a way that gives it a determinate space *of its own* in Hegel's ontology—"outside" or alongside the relationship it has to *Seele* and to the mind. This means answering the question of the body's own ontological status and whether it can be said to have one in the first place within the bounds of Hegel's anthropological framework.

Apart from habituation, one of the focal, perhaps more prominent themes of bodiliness in the Anthropology can be found in the metaphor of the mother and the fetus in the womb suggested by Hegel in a Remark toward the beginning of the "Feeling Soul" section. He writes: "In immediate existence this [*the relation of substance to subject*] is the relationship of the child in its mother's womb, a relationship neither merely bodily nor merely mental, but *psychical*—a relationship of the soul" (§405 R). The fetus in the womb is the substance of individuality: not yet a self itself, yet possessing, as if in advance, the truth of its own realization and individuation as an entity apart from the *totality* of its reality: the *actual* subject, the mother. The existence of the fetus is predicated on its own eventual self-overcoming and its transfiguration from a rudimentary, preliminary, potential subjectivity in the womb, to actualized subjectivity once it separates from its "substance"—once, therefore, it completes the time required of it to undertake this separation. We find, here, something like a gestational understanding of the temporality of subjectivity, wherein the "birth" of the subject only actualizes what was always the case in potentia, in the "womb": that the "I" is a self-maintaining, self-producing, *living process* of infinite self-relation.

The naturalness of soul, its corporeality, is precisely the element on which the individuation of the subject turns and on which the realization of subjectivity, *in reality*, hinges. The *becoming* of individual selfhood, the arrangement of its logical moments in a particular pattern that ensures its own self-differentiation, is presented in the Anthropology as a process of *emergence*: the anthropological story is that of the self *becoming* what it always was in potentia and its truth emerging, making itself known to itself (to consciousness) from its initial "slumber" and scatteredness in corporeality. The way the soul struggles against its bodiliness is the way it exists: if the eventuality of the soul is to operate an ontologically defining (individuating) self-separation, it is because it is first tethered to something, both *one and other* to it, that it can seek to overcome and grasp as an object *for* itself: its body. The body cannot, therefore, be relegated to some marginal element of Hegel's understanding of mind: instead, it appears to be an enduring characteristic of the self-conscious Subject in a way that preserves it in the very definition of Spirit itself. In this way, bodiliness is understood not as a static "thing" that exists to satisfy the demands of consciousness but as a dynamic, moving semi-autonomous *living* entity, through which mind's processual nature itself may be understood.

This conception of bodiliness makes clear the relation "soul" has to it in terms of the soul's temporal (and *temporalizing*) status. That the soul is in and of time, and that it is necessarily, ultimately, in accordance with the structures of temporality—though it may be characterized by its own "chronology" whenever it is engulfed in the universality of its Naturalness—is a metaphysically profound statement that breaks quite notably with a traditional understanding of soul the as something eternal and necessarily outside of time (and therefore, necessarily separate from the body). The soul's bodiliness, as shown

in the Anthropology, determinately anchors it in the structures of nature's rhythms and makes it so that the soul is not some counterpart of the body, some *thing* that accompanies it—but rather a moment alongside bodiliness of the broader, dynamic process that is selfhood, or the "I". Soul is both of the body and beyond it: as *Geist*, it incorporates both its anchoring in bodiliness and its subsequent transcending of it through its manifold *spiritual* activity. The link between soul and its bodiliness is weaved into the temporal dimension of this activity in relation to the broader dialectic of subjectivity: the "I" is a *developing, active* process that traverses a chronological order of self-differentiation and self-affirmation, in which it reiterates its relation to itself in different, increasingly "spiritual" (and therefore decreasingly "natural") manifestations.

Also worth noting here is the recurring motif of retroaction, most particularly in Hegel's use of the notions of recollection (*Erinnerung*), and recognition (*Anerkennen*) throughout the *PSS* and the *Encyclopedia* more generally. The use of the prefix re- (*er*-) suggests that repetition, or a *backward* motion, is especially significant. The subject's individuality only actualizes what was contained in it *in potentia* "after" having undertaken its logical separation from its substance, its body. In this separation the subject re-cognizes its own alterity: that the body is a moment among multiple in its own identity, and achieves its individuation as an inwardly multiple unity. The different motifs used by Hegel in the *Encyclopedic* system that invoke time, among which is also, for example, that of "spurious" (finite) infinity and "true" infinity, all seem to point to an understanding of subjectivity that instrumentalizes time in order to realize its (subjectivity's) own mode of being *in* and *with* time: as a finite unity of infinite inward multiplicity.

Time is, at first, nothing: as Hegel writes in the *Philosophy of Nature*: "Time is *continuous* […], for it is the negativity abstractly relating self to self, and in this abstraction there is as yet no real difference" (§258 R). It is the subject, first and foremost "the natural soul", that imposes the ubiquity of *difference* on the endless flow of time and makes it possible for a meaningfulness, a *qualitative* difference, to emerge out of its initial infinite undifferentiated continuity. The soul's bodiliness seems, therefore, to act as the condition for temporality's realization: in its "Feeling" (sensing) moment, just out of its initial immersion in its naturalness, the soul provides a rhythmic blueprint for the realization of consciousness through the patterns that characterize its embodiment. The difference between "mind" and "body" is, then, the extent to which or perhaps the form in which each is grasped by mind itself. This difference is of a chronological nature, meaning that it pertains to time and the conceptualization of time: while the mind itself reflectively (retroactively) grasps itself as a singular, unified entity, it cannot grasp the body as anything other than *living*, unfolding in the now-ness of time's heteronomy.

The body's sovereignty seems to manifest precisely as its failure to be fully grasped and incorporated into the temporal, retroactive structures of mind and its ongoing, almost unrelenting influence on the very definition of selfhood and the "I". As perhaps the ultimate example of the Hegelian thematic of "otherness in self", the Self's body is both that which is radically different from the "I" and that which is a crucial part of it: an "ambiguous Other", perpetually partly evasive of the Self's grip—precisely because it is under the dominion of the temporality of "now-ness" and refuses to be *reflectively known*, as "mind" is. It is this temporal tension between selfhood and its bodiliness that operates as a foundation for the initial separation of "soul" and "body",

animates the ensuing dialectic of subjectivity as a whole, and ensures that the properly *human* dimension of the "soul" is preserved in the arc and vocabulary of the Anthropology. By virtue of its fundamental naturalness, whose manifestations seem to be enduring and persistent throughout its development, the soul cannot constitute a strictly non-physical entity that can be conceptualized in abstraction from its presence and activity in a body (and *with* bodiliness, *with* the corporeality of the Natural world).

The body is thus shown as a necessary and subsistent moment of selfhood, participating in the "I"'s unfolding multiplicity while retaining a measure of ontological autonomy. This autonomy is only possible because the body relies on this "temporality of now-ness" to function: the structures of mind, knowing only the backward motion of *reflection*, prove unable to grasp fully (and therefore incorporate as their own) the ongoing linear character of the chronology of bodiliness. As a result, some part of the body is "left out" of the scope of the mind's determination and we obtain a distinction between the former and the latter, as if the initial prevalence of the body serves to uphold the structures of mind by freeing up the necessary ontological space for these structures to undertake such complex operations as reflection.

3.2. Temporalities of organic life

3.2.1. Aging and development (§396)

Hegel's organismic Self is characterized by its developing, dynamic form: conceived as a process and a *becoming*, selfhood unfolds within the structures of time as it actively completes, or realizes, its own definition in relation to the multiple moments contained within it—what Hegel calls its "alterations". The first type of alteration, or multiplicity, contained in the organismic, whole Self, is the "natural course of the ages of

life" (§396 R)—the trajectory of the body from its earliest to its latest iterations, understood as exhibiting the trajectory of mind itself from its most preliminary (pre-reflective) to its most advanced (Absolute) iterations. If the crux of the Anthropological story is Spirit's self-temporalization through *owning* its body's rhythms, the focus on aging and the stages of life offers the reader a real, universal manifestation of the moments of soul's unfolding from its Natural, strictly self-identical moment, to its Actual, individual, potentially relational moment. The singular "I" contains in its singularity all its age modulations: it is all of its childhood, its youth, its adulthood ("manhood"), and its old age. It is neither any of them in isolation, nor does one permanently replace the other: the "I" is, at any given point in time, simultaneously all of its moments, from immediacy through particularity to individuation and Absolute freedom.

The intersection of soul and its embodiment is significant in this section and manifests as the necessary contiguity between the biological sequence of aging and development and the rhythms of *embodied consciousness*. "As they are at once physical and mental differences", writes Hegel, "a concrete definition or description of [the alterations in the single subject] would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the cultivated mind" (§396). Here we find explicit evidence of the anticipatory nature of speculative thought: in order to form a complete understanding of individual consciousness's inner *multiplicity*, it must be conceded first that such a multiplicity is geared towards the achievement of a higher-order, richer singularity in which it ultimately comes to dwell. Understanding the process of the soul's particularization in time and the sequence according to which it *becomes what it is* requires understanding

that the soul's initial, Natural appearance essentially and crucially prefigures and contains its own subsequent self-overcoming—in other words, that the soul's bodiliness, by virtue of its continuous negation by the self, remains ever-present in the soul's *Entwicklung* (development) towards Spirit.

In §396, the body seems to be clearly conceived as the manifestation of the soul's occupancy of time and the transposing of its processual dimension onto the ontological spheres of externality and immediacy. This mirroring that Hegel observes between spiritual and bodily activity is directly captured by the processes of aging and biological development, wherein each stage of the human body's development is linked to a moment in the development of the "I" and constitutes, therefore, a distinct moment in the overall pattern of the speculative syllogism that may be extracted from the Anthropology's dialectic of subjectivity. As such, the relationship between the spiritual and the corporeal takes on a different *shape* at each stage of the body's development, as it does in the process of selfhood's realization. The "I" cannot be outside of the temporality of the natural world: it is rather *in it* and perhaps *with it*, as it occupies its structures and experiences them, first and foremost, corporeally.

As the body ages, the "I"'s relation with its own alterity—with itself— which is essentially one of struggle, becomes increasingly pronounced. The longer the struggle goes on, the more cemented the soul becomes in its self-knowing and advanced in its self-recognition, and the more it distances itself from, negates, and overcomes the body's immediacy. Aging is a sign of the soul's advancement towards Spirit (and "away" from Nature): more precisely, it is the exemplary corporeal manifestation of this spiritual advancement. Hegel's discussions around the themes of aging and biological

development are indicative of a reinvention of the soul-body relation in such a way that predictably evades the question of Hegel's philosophical allegiance to either ontological dualism or ontological monism. If the temporality of bodiliness is what acts as the means for the soul's rational "liberation" (see for example §370 *Z*) from the immediacy of its natural determination, then soul and body cannot be in a relation of mutual exclusion, nor can they be part of a dichotomous dynamic as strictly distinct "things" that exist counterpart to each other, each on its respective metaphysical plane. Soul and body exist, for Hegel, in a *changing*, dynamic dialectic through which the individual Self is constructed against the backdrop of time's modulations in relation to the subject: from empty undifferentiated immediacy, to a more concentrated self-relation that is turned entirely inward, to a mediated, negating and reflexive universal singularity.

As mentioned in the previous section, we find elsewhere in the *Encyclopedia* a definition of time as "negativity abstractly relating self to self", the negating power of mind—itself empty of content and "*continuous*" (§258 R), still untouched by difference. In light of this claim, made in the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel's thoughts around the processes of aging in the Anthropology may point to a profound commitment to the ontological weight of *embodiment*—and may shed further light on Hegel's seemingly purposefully ambiguous and oft puzzling use of the words "soul", "mind", and "*bodiliness*/corporeality" (*Körper*). The aging body seems indeed to constitute the material manifestation of the soul's infinitely conflictual self-relation: as its corporeality negates and overcomes itself in time through the stages of its biological development (advancement), the soul is continuously making an object of its own immediacy in accordance with the temporal nature of its body. The product of this is *a temporal "I"*, or

a selfhood that is capable of gaining a grasp of time, making it its own, and incorporating itself into its structures thanks to the temporal structures of corporeality itself. The soul's "experience" of time in the throes of its natural moment, in such processes as biological development, circadian rhythms, and habits, prefigures its logically subsequent temporalizing power—which it attains once it has completed its transfiguration into *Geist*. The infrastructure of Spirit assembles itself from within the bounds of Nature's pace and patterns, wherein the Self is fundamentally *temporally rooted* in the body and achieves itself against the repetitive backdrop of its rhythms.

For Hegel, aging is that which makes visible the overarching dialectic of Spirit and Nature. The closer the individual gets to old age, the farther away then back they move from their sunkenness in nature; the more the individual detaches from the minute, repetitive variations of nature, the more their selfhood is "spiritualized" and its temporal immediacy overcome and sublated (*aufgehoben*) into Spirit's own meaningful self-relation and self-recollection. Aging is a bodily decay simultaneous with the subject's "spiritual" advancement that allows the individual to sink back into the preliminary *fact* of its corporeality: the individual's biological developmental trajectory seems to be premised on a kind of temporality that is first a means, and second a hurdle, to the Self's ultimate *liberation* from the limitations of its Natural immediacy. The emerging (child) Self incorporates itself into the structures of time through its corporeal rhythms, while the developed (elderly) Self progressively hoists itself out of these structures as it anchors itself back into the primary activity of its corporeality:

> *Old age* […] is the return to a lack of interest in things; the old man has lived his way into things and just because of this unity with things, in which the opposition is lost, he abandons active interest in things. (…) this lifeless, complete coincidence of subjective activity with its world, leads back to oppositionless childhood, in the same way that the

> growth of the activity of his physical organism into a static habit leads on to the abstract negation of the living individuality, to death. (§396 *Z*)

Prefiguring the "gestational temporality" of the "I" suggested in §405 R's mother-fetus paradigm, Hegel seems to introduce something like a *developmental understanding of subjectivity* through his exploration of the individual's inner biological alterations: the "I" is an active process with a definite, determinate direction. The alterity contained in the single individual is immediately followed by "the moment of real opposition of the individual to itself": the sexual relationship, where the subject "seeks and finds *itself* in *another* individual" (*Enz.* §397). As Hegel points out repeatedly throughout the Anthropology, the structure of *conceptual unfolding* the structure of the text itself comes to take necessitates the anticipation of the eventual form of the concept in question at any given point: to understand the dialectic of aging we must anticipate the advent of the "concrete mind", or the achieved state of consciousness which is not yet addressed at the level of the Anthropology. Here, the sharp turn to the sexual relationship points to the significance of the relational aspect of the organic Self: following an exposition of the multiplicity that can be found in a single individual, Hegel pivots to the necessity of the very relationality of individuality itself—underlining that while the plurality of the world is first taken inward by the subject and manifests physically in the stages of the subject's biological development, its upshot is to be made external to the subject once again, for that subject to be apt to achieve its full individuation. The "I"'s internal contradictions are bound to be expressed outward as a search for the self in an Other. The stages of aging and development preface the move to a more universal, more "stable", and ever-self-generative unity: that of life itself, whose particular determinations can be found in social

and ethical institutions, such as the family, the University and the State, which will be the subject of the *Encyclopedia*'s subsequent *Philosophy of Right*.

3.2.2. Repetition and habituation (§409-412)

For Hegel, *life* as such is endowed with rhythm. The organism is shown to continuously negate itself—its immediacy—then restore itself, find itself again (*re*-cognize itself) in this immediacy and reclaim it as a pivotal, foundational moment of its most developed and truest being. This pattern of repetition, *Wiederholung*, crucially informs the constitution of the bodily (organic) Self and explains the particular importance of the theme of habituation in shaping the Anthropological project. For Hegel, the organism *be*comes what it is by "repeating itself":

> In [habit] the soul has the content [of bodiliness] in possession, and contains it in such a way that in such determinations it is not actually sentient, it does not stand in relationship to them by distinguishing itself from them, nor is it absorbed in them, but it has them in itself and moves in them, without sensation or consciousness. The soul is free of them, in so far as it is not interested or occupied with them; while it exists in these forms as its possessions, it is at the same time open to other activity and occupations, in the sphere of sensation and the mind's consciousness in general [der Empfindung sowie des Bewußtseins des Geistes überhaupt]. (§410/W10)

In its continuous self-maintaining activity, "selfhood" thus conceptualized, as essentially corporeal, emerges and re-emerges out of its ongoing, unremitting conflict with its own alterity. The body participates in time becoming inward to the subject through habituation, with the mechanism of repetition cementing the temporality of natural life into the very fabric of selfhood. Selfhood makes bodiliness *its own* by engaging with its rhythms in such a way that keeps it invested enough to be simultaneously detached, or "*freed*", from their recurring patterns and oscillations, or what Hegel calls "the limited interests and entanglements of the external present" (§396 R).

Hegel's brief note on the sexual relationship is significant here: through the constancy and recurrence of this temporal relationship that involves two individual selves, the unity of the notion of *life* itself is generated and functions as a condition of *Geist*'s possibility as conceptualized by Hegel: as a living, self-maintaining, self-relating, universality (for expressions of life as self-maintaining organic totality, see for example *Enz.* §377 *Z*, 379 *Z*; *Enz.* §163 *Add. 2*; PhG §25). The wholeness of Spirit and its ability to re-produce itself over time and engrave itself in overarching structures of meaning mirrors the ever-moving, self-generating process of individual selfhood: both Spirit and Self are sustained and become what they are by virtue of moving through their internal contradictions and re-cognizing them as moments of their identity, thus integrating and making inward what was outward in order to maintain the unity of the whole. Once the Self is borne out of *Seele*'s initial entrenchment in its bodiliness, having acknowledged it at once as its *own* and as its "*other*", both its own and *not itself*; it now turns to the radical alterity of the true Other, and seeks its own essence in a different selfhood.

The sexual relation (*das Geschlechterverhältnis*) is also mentioned elsewhere in Hegel's work, most notably in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Right*. "(…) the supersession of individual existence is equally the production of it", writes Hegel at §171 of the PhG: here, the sexual relation is understood as the re-production of life itself through a process of unification where the Other is not consumed but rather merged with, and where difference is fundamentally preserved. This definition of life as a continually self-generative motion of negation and reproduction, "the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself" (PhG §171), prefigures Hegel's comments around the generation of the

life of the species, the *genus,* in the Anthropology. Later, in the *Philosophy of Right*, *das Geschlechterverhältnis* manifests implicitly in the structures of ethical life, namely in the institution of the family where the naturalness of the sexual relation becomes *spiritual* with the advent of consciousness, and moves from the mere meaningless cycle of reproduction and generation to the purposeful, perhaps now *historical* (in the sense that it is embedded in recognizable, meaningful temporal structures) unfolding of subjectivity in the spheres of social life.

*3.2.3. Sleep/wake cycles; "sanity", clairvoyance (*Hellsehen*) and derangement (*Verrücktheit*)*

The temporality that constitutes a theme of the Anthropology seems to be, first and foremost, one that belongs to the body—an *affective* temporality structured according to the rhythms of the Self's organic life. As such, as the Self makes its way out of its initial indeterminate state and into the individuated state of the "I", the body progressively makes outward once more what the soul had brought inward in habituation: the rhythms belonging to the subject's individual, inner "alterations". The product of this is a "sane" individual: an "I" that displays a sustained harmony between its inner alterations and those of the world in and *with* which it emerges—in other words, a Self that has a firm grasp on its bodiliness, through its modulations and transfigurations from childhood to old age. The *sane*, harmonious Self remembers itself, re-collects (*erinnern*) itself as a self-contained unity across the flux of the changes experienced by its body: "The sober and healthy subject has an alert consciousness of the ordered totality of its individual world, into the system of which it *subsumes* each particular content of sensation, idea, desire, inclination, etc., as it arises, and inserts in its intelligible place in

the system. It is the *dominant genius* over these particularities" (§408 R). This moment is described as the soul's *being with* its body ("(…) die Idealität des Äußerlichen, die aus ihrem Anderssein in sich zurückkehrende Idee oder, abstrakter ausgedrückt, das sich selbst unterscheidende und in seinem Unterschiede **bei und für sich seiende** Allgemeine"[39]) and represents the emergence of a subjectivity that has decisively overcome its sunkenness in its own affective, or sensuous, field. From this point forward, assuming the occurrence of a healthy, "sane" development, the self is no longer plunged in the minute events of its corporeality, rather, it gathers its own identity from within the bounds of its bodiliness, integrating and re-integrating the body's multiplicity in its own, ever-expanding yet individual, concept.

Hegel writes at §406: "The life of feeling, when it becomes a *form*, a *state*, of the self-conscious, educated, sober human being, is a disease, in which the individual stands in *unmediated* relationship with the concrete content of its own self and has its sober consciousness of itself and of the intelligibly ordered world as a state distinct from its feeling-life". The subject veers away from "sanity" whenever its "life of feeling" is singled out and does not get fully absorbed back into the newfound, *third-term* universality of the achieved, coherent "I". As a result, the soul remains stuck in an aspect of its naturalness and is unable to integrate the full extent of its bodiliness in its own notion, creating an imbalance between the subject's inner and outer determinations. In its semi- or quasi-autonomy, the body's potential to stray from the grip of mind and place an aspect of itself at the periphery of the subject's consciousness allows it to establish a state of disbalance and stagnancy and declare in its turn its dominion over the soul which

[39] Werke Band 10, 26; emphasis added.

attempts to tame it through such mechanisms as repetition and habituation. This potential points to a case where the cyclical temporality of nature and the continuous, uninterrupted now-ness of the Spiritual are, instead of being hinged together by the "normal", self-consistent, coherent subject, now disjointed and operate as if separate one from the other. In such a case of *Verrücktheit*, the subject is denied the status of person, in the sense that they are unable to achieve the freedom of *mind* that is (a) required for personhood and (b) premised on a certain harmonious accordance between the temporal modes of linear chronology and eternal now-ness.

The soul in the PSS seems to present a stubbornness and an unpredictability in relation to the whole individual, as Jeffrey Reid points out in his paper on the transition from the dreaming soul to the feeling soul between the 1827 and 1830 editions of the text[40]. There seems to be some innermost part of the soul" that persists just outside of the conscious subject's reach: "(…) a person can never know how much information he really *has in him*, even if he has forgotten it. It belongs not to his actuality, not to his subjectivity, but only to his implicit being" (§403 R). If sanity constitutes the joint between the rhythms of the subject's bodily organism and the retrospective temporality of conscious mind, it is therefore what safeguards the possibility of actualized selfhood by ensuring the self-maintenance of *Geist* within the living, moving, unity between the machinations of "soul" and then "mind" and the operations of the Natural body. Sanity anchors the "I" in the world of objects and sense-reality at the critical juncture of self-feeling, where the soul seems to be at great risk of losing its grasp on the full spectrum of its bodiliness and devolving into self-obsession and pathology. The states of *Verrücktheit*

[40] See Reid *in* Stern 2013.

and *Hellsehen* arise whenever the soul becomes improperly invested in the rhythms of bodily life and turns instead excessively inwards, melting the boundaries between inner and outer and suspending the normal rhythms of waking and sleep exhibited by the *sane* subject: "the clairvoyant soul also rises above the condition of *time*, just as it rises above the condition of *space*" (§406 *Z*).

According to Reid, Hegel's grounding of subjectivity in the immediacy of bodiliness and affectivity is further supported by a significant terminological shift between the second (1827) and third (1830) editions of the *Encyclopedia*'s *PSS,* from "Die träumende Seele" (the *dreaming* soul) to "Die fühlende Seele" (the *feeling* soul). This marks an important conceptual revision of the decisive, "middle" moment in the dialectic of soul and body and definitively fastens the Hegelian "I" to the boundaries of its contact with its externality, the world of sense-reality, by sustaining the focus of this moment on the possibilities of the unity of soul and bodiliness through the capacity of sensing—and the failure of this unity in the pathological cases of "sickness" and "self-feeling". Hegel's turn from the terminology of "dreaming" and "sentience" to the terminology of "feeling" indicates an emphasis on the contemporaneous manifestations of pathology and mental illness that had moved away from such Romantic-era phenomena as somnambulism and clairvoyance, towards a supremacy of empiricism and skepticism (Schleiermacher's *Gefühlsreligion*, see Reid, *The Anti Romantic: Hegel Against Ironic Romanticism*, 2014 for further insight into the rivalry between Hegel and Schleiermacher), a symptom of a widespread cultural arrogance according to which the truth is only attained on the basis of what is ultimately the "I"'s perception of its own inner alterations. Plunged in "self-feeling", the unfolding Self perpetually seems to

inhabit the risk of slipping into pathology through channels of self-obsession and excessive inwardness, trading the mediated rationality of the world of objects for the immediacy of the body's rhythms.

Chapter 4. Rhythm and Habit: The Temporalities of Bodily Self

4.1.Analysis of habituation in §§409-410

4.1.1. Habit as internalization of rhythm?

From the immediacy of self-feeling and the risk of slipping into the I's potential for mental illness emerge the repetitive, stubborn mechanisms of habituation. In habit, the soul is *saved* from its potential for madness and self-alienation and is, here, able to take hold of its bodily extension. "The *natural* qualities and alterations of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural; habit is the determinacy of feeling (as well as of intelligence, will, etc., in so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into something that is natural, mechanical" (*Enz.* §410 R). Here, Hegel writes about the "embodied [determinacies of representation and of the will]" and emphasizes the dual status of habit as both immediate and pertaining to Nature on the one hand, and *posited* and mediated by the mechanisms of the soul on the other. *Made* to look like it arises spontaneously, habit appears uncaused: hence the designation "second nature". This tension that characterizes "second nature", between the immediacy of bodiliness on the one hand and the mediateness, the difference, of the soul's *embodiment* on the other, can be found in the ambiguous notion of Selfhood itself: Hegel insists that the *form* of habit "embraces all kinds and stages of mind's activity" (§410 R) and permeates the I's unfolding throughout.

Hegel places special emphasis on the tension created by the coexistence of habit's immediate dimension and its *positedness*: significantly, habit is "burdened" with being *of the body*, since it takes on the shape of something natural and mechanical, and is consequently "something merely *anthropological*" (§410). This makes habit one of the Hegelian Self's enduring manifestations of corporeality. As what emerges out of Nature,

"traverses", in a sense, the machinations of the soul, and returns to the regularity and repetitiveness of the body, making of it "pervious" to the soul's influence and an "instrument" at its disposal (§410 *Z*), habit occupies a peculiar space of both persistence in and disengagement from the mechanisms of the I's corporeal reality. This allows the "feeling" (*sensing*) individual to retain a firm grip on its bodiliness—and concurrently maintain some extent of distance from it.

The soul's dimension that undertakes operations such as sensing and perceiving and that makes primary contact with the world external to the "I" is at the same time the locus of the subject's *dominion* or control over its corporeality, which is constituted at the level of "feeling" and for which the dialectical grounds (temperament, physiognomy, aging, sleep/wake cycles, etc.) are established in the exposition of Natural Soul. As the "bridge" between the *feeling* soul and the *actual* soul, habit exists on the border between the Natural and the Spiritual and unfolds in those operations of the soul that still fundamentally pertain to its natural process. In habit, we find no real separation of soul from bodiliness, despite what we've called the soul's state of disengagement, its gesture of retreat, in which it is "free of [sensation or consciousness]" (§410) and which occurs simultaneously with its interest and investment in its body's operations.

> In that the soul has become self-relating ideality in the manner indicated above, namely, by overcoming its disruption, its inner contradiction, it has extruded from itself the bodiliness with which it was previously immediately identical, and at the same time exerts the power of its ideality on the bodily element thus released to immediacy. At this standpoint, therefore, we have to consider not the indeterminate separation of an interior in general from a world it finds before it, but the subjection of this bodiliness to the dominion of the soul. [Auf diesem Standpunkt haben wir daher nicht die unbestimmte Abtrennung eines Inneren überhaupt von einer vorgefundenen Welt, sondern das Unterworfenwerden jener Leiblichkeit unter die Herrschaft der Seele zu betrachten] (§410 *Z*/W10)

That the soul *temporarily*, or *partly*, disengages from its corporeality in this way means that it is still tethered to it and that its body constitutes for it a sort of obstinate anchor: that the soul moves cyclically back and forth from being enmeshed with it to turning away from it precisely in order to shape and mold it according to its (imminent) aspirations. As Guido Seddone explains,

> In Hegel's philosophy habits represent the first step of subjective spirit in overcoming nature as "permanence of otherness" […]. They are the result of the soul's capacity to incorporate the body's feelings and to mould them into universal practices characterizing a social group and eventually the human species itself. […] (…) our species cannot be exclusively described by means of biological requisites and characteristics since it determines itself through practices that are autonomous acts of actualized freedom and emancipation from nature's otherness. (80)

The advent of habituation seems to indicate the soul's readiness to fulfill or realize its defining capacity for negation. Habits serve, in part, to highlight the urgency for the soul to move past its Natural moment: this is where we may decipher most clearly the function and operativity of *necessity* in the development of Hegelian dialectics. Perhaps this is also where the essence of selfhood is found in its fullest manifestation: as the very ability to overcome a difference that initially presents as "permanent", endless, not *of time*—in short, a seemingly radical alterity it first encounters as *insurmountable*. The ambiguous relationship of the soul to its corporeality constitutes itself according to the pace of habituation, the repetitive cyclical shaping of bodiliness by the processes of Soul, where time itself works to ensure that the mechanisms of habituation realize their *telos* in the body: to effectively contribute to its ensoulment and its investment with another, autonomous, presiding identity that determines its way of being in the world, which is inexorably one of difference.

The temporal "order" that is in effect in the Anthropology is the expression of a sort of vibratory ambiguity that is inhabited by the subject, or the "achieved" consciousness. In habit, the soul oscillates between the posited-ness of the repeated act on the one hand and the immediacy of the body's sensuous experience on the other. Habit, understood as the rational liberation of the self from its bodily determinations, is modulated against the subject's positioning within Hegel's system as the retroactively true *synthesizing movement* of the body's universal Naturalness and the mind's particular "spiritual" manifestations. The first, the expression of the Greek conception of time as "Absolute Now", necessitates the second, the expression of the Christian (narrative), linear understanding of time as "history"[41]. In this sense, habit individuates the "I" by establishing an oscillating temporal order within which its development can take place. This leaves us with a double sense of temporality, or a dual temporality, that contains at once the component of sensuous immediacy and the necessity of retroactive understanding (this gesture of "conscious grasping" undertaken by the subject).

As such, we also have a dual determination of habit: the mind's—the Anthropology's—, or the moment at which soul takes hold of its bodiliness and claims it as a means of overcoming its determinacy, and the body's—in the *Philosophy of Nature*—, or the cycles of corporeal repetition that safeguard the body's operations and make of them the constant, "normal" or healthy backdrop of conscious activity. We may extract, at first view, from this dual determination what looks like a polarity: between (1) the entrainment attached to the *Bildung* of the self as a rational self-liberation from nature, and (2) the dull, endlessly repetitive biological processes of nature itself that

[41] See Chapter 4, "History and the Absolute Now", in Reid 2025.

nonetheless are revealed to make possible the imminent operations of conscious mind. Still, speculative thought requires that we overcome the "antithesis" itself: and question whether these dualities are themselves illusory and whether, therefore, the tension itself between two poles is not generative of a complete yet processual identity that does not require the flattening of the "I" into a frozen moment in chronological time.

The necessity is, then, that of the body overcoming its own otherness through its *submission to* the soul's temporal order. Habits are nothing more than the soul's ability to regulate its corporeality and *free* itself—its future iteration(s)—from having to supervise its minute, perhaps elemental alterations, thus emancipating itself from the perceived false necessity of the natural order encountered in its initial (atemporal) moment of indeterminacy. Accordingly, we must recognize in Hegel the idea that freedom is nothing if it is not embodied: if it is not rationally anchored in a body that enjoys immediate contact with the world of "externality", the liberation of Spirit would be substance-less, form-less, and unknowable. In the remarkable 2004 work *The Future of Hegel*, Catherine Malabou points out that the mechanism of habit is one which "familiarises spirit with its own development just as it brings the individual into familiarity with its own spirit" (152), and one of "gathering together and [reanimating] traces 'long since absorbed'" (188). This makes of the individual something "plastic" that "elevates itself" (6) and is in a constant upward motion: as much from reason to revelation as from sense-perception to Absolute knowing. What makes the emergence of a notion such as *Bildung* possible and even necessary is precisely the acquaintance ("familiarity") that selfhood comes to have with its own *motion* and development, whereby it assembles a real epistemic repertoire of the whole of its changing, *advancing* iterations.

Through Hegel's notion of *Vereinfachung* (simplification), Malabou explains how meaning is made by the understanding's dialectical operations which, while themselves "plastic" and ever-changing, *produce* a certain conceptual "rigidity" (*Härte*) that "sharpens" the manifold sensuous experience into universal concepts and makes identification and individuation—and, indeed, meaning—at all possible. This process of sharpening and *Widerstand* (resistance) begins at the moment of habituation and sustains itself through to ethical life, the subject of the *Philosophy of Right*:

> In habit, the opposition between the natural and the subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken; to this extent, habit is part of ethical life, just as it is part of philosophical thought, since the latter requires that spirit should be trained to resist arbitrary ideas and that these ideas should be destroyed and overcome to clear the way for rational thought. (§151 *Z*)

The crux of habituation is in realizing a true struggle with self—a resistance to the constraints of Natural life coupled with a certain flexibility, a fluidity (*Flüssigkeit*) manifested in the soul's generative ability that *overcomes* and *integrates* itself, and so *re-news* itself, in a single continuous motion.

Here, as in the case of the organic body's rhythms of sleeping and waking (see Chapter 3), the relationship between habit and rhythm must be explained. Malabou defines plasticity as "first of all the excess of the future over the future", while temporality, she writes, means simply "the excess of time over time" (Malabou 2004, 6). That the operations of the mind are plastic means that they serve a fundamentally anticipatory function: in other words, that their determinations are generated according to the rhythms of the speculative syllogism, where the "third term" is always contained in the "first term" as if latently and its foresight necessary for a full understanding of the first. The soul's mastery over its bodiliness generates a dual subjectivity, one that is

continually new to itself—and continually reiterates itself to itself and to the world, *as this* subjectivity. In being *ahead of* itself in this sense and "[clearing] the way" for it to freely realize its own self-determination, training its corporeality through repetition and habituation, the "I" becomes allied with the plurality of its iterations: its Natural and Spiritual moments cannot henceforth be separated, but are instead joint in their retrospective *containment* in the fully realized Self.

The subject comes to be what it is and acquires its necessity through factors that are themselves "accidental". By means of habit, the Self at once cements its wholeness and determines its identity *and* keeps itself open to its own renewal and regeneration in the face of new environments and contexts. The distinctiveness of habit may be found primarily in its seemingly infinite integrative power, whereby it makes possible the recurrent advent of the "I" against the constant backdrop of its alterations and its inner multiplicity. Habit is the cornerstone of selfhood and the turning point in the story of subjectivity precisely because it is a requirement of the soul's very definition to make of its bodiliness something complex, whose operations overcome the simple rudimentary operations of the animal body:

> The body is the *middle term* by which I come together with the external world in general. So, if I want to actualize my aims, then I must make my physical body capable of carrying over this subjectivity into external objectivity. My body is not by nature fitted for this […] for this service my body must first be trained. Whereas in animals the body, in obedience to their instinct, immediately accomplishes everything made necessary by the Idea of the animal, man, by contrast, has first to make himself master of his body by his own activity. (§410 *Z*)

As a result of habituation, the anthropological subject becomes what it is—a constant process of self-generation and re-generation—and so fulfills the concept of its selfhood

by realizing the requisite for its body to be trained and molded in a determinate, individuating direction defined according to the temporal architecture of Natural *Seele*.

It is habit, then, that ensures the body's determination of "sign" of the soul that "represents" its interiority in such a way that fully realizes its individuation as a "subject for itself" (§411). The self realizes itself by suspending itself, dividing itself temporarily from its bodiliness in habit and turning its particularities into universal patterns, or *rules* (see §410 *Z*), that it can then safely disengage from without compromising its identity. This self-division is the product of the development of a "sane" selfhood: one that has successfully moved past the danger of becoming excessively absorbed with its body's innermost particularities and getting lost in its infinite multiplicity. The soul generalizes its Natural moment in order to be capable of turning away from it and moving to its increasingly Spiritual—and properly *human*—operations, those that begin to arise as subjectivity begins to make itself into a "subject for itself"—effectively, to make itself objective.

Hegel writes at §409: "[The] particular being of the soul is the moment of its *bodiliness*; here [in habit] it breaks with this bodiliness, distinguishing from it itself as its *simple* being and becomes the ideal, subjective substantiality of this bodiliness, just as in its implicit concept (§389) it was the only the [sic] unqualified substance of bodiliness". The self faces itself off in the suspended state created by habit and finds itself as if forced to establish a definitive equilibrium between the soul's fundamental naturalness on the one hand, and its inclination for "the Absolute", the metaphysical and the conceptual, on the other. When *Seele* "breaks with" its corporeality by making it its own, it moves definitively past its initial sunkenness in and undifferentiation from the rules of Nature

and begins to embed itself in the structures of Spirit, thus demonstrating both the simultaneity of the Natural and the Spiritual in the constitution of the anthropological "I" on the one hand, and the pivotal role played by habit in establishing the advancing, we may say auto-reproducing, form (*Gestalt*) the Hegelian Subject takes on the other. The product of this "break" is a Self that is both pre-determined by its Natural foundations, and reflexively self-determined by its ongoing mental activity—whereby the mechanisms of habit are ultimately transfigured and integrated into social and ethical life in the ensuing *Philosophy of Right*.

Here, we find a sort of double leap completed by the soul: first, beyond the immediacy of its Natural moment, and second, beyond even the "second nature" of habituation and towards the realization of a true, *relational* subjectivity where the "I" completes its definition and fulfills its concept through another "I". In habit, this dimension of relationality is prefigured by the mind's "spontaneous activity" wherein the natural-feeling soul "incorporates the particularity of feelings by producing general forms of action, which can be shared with similar individuals" (Seddone 2018, 80) of the same species. The emergence of habit indicates the *mise en place* of a temporality that distances itself from the simple, pre-determined chronological cycles of animal biology and now belongs instead properly to the soul, to human subjectivity—grasping in this way the reality of the world through a resolutely repetitive and ever-integrative, ever-expansive doing that also necessarily involves a dimension of commonality and sharedness. Hegel's insistence on the universality of habit already "primes" the reader for the arrival of the universal dimension of *Geist* itself—without yet realizing the steps necessary for the advent of Spirit proper, i.e., the process of "idealization" by way of

which the alterations of the body retroactively reveal their ontological dependence on the whole, organic, relational (social and ethical) Self, and eventually on the Absolute (God, etc.).

Allegra De Laurentiis explains the significance of *Seele*'s universality as follows:

> (…) the peculiarity of the human kind consists of the fact that what are mild individual deviations from the norm in other animal species become significant variations among human individuals. (…) the human individual is itself a microcosm of differences and oppositions. This individual is even able to develop 'in opposition to itself' (*Enc* §395 Zus), that is, in opposition to the givens of its family, its race, its people, its local spirit[42]. (…) the animal spirit's placid self-sameness in human beings becomes disrupted by the widening ripples of individualization.[43]

This disruption begins at the moment of habituation—where, through the gesture of *Widerstand*, the soul definitively parts with Naturalness and its infinitely expanding self-identity in order to find its singularity and determine itself in the "sea" of difference in which it finds itself. By recognizing its own internal difference, Hegel's (human) individual is able to "develop 'in opposition to itself'" and realize its truth, that which traces a categorical line between it and its merely "animal" counterpart (stuck in its *natural* moment)—the *overcoming* of those determinations that are imposed on it and that remain nonetheless, and linger, in its "full" definition as Spirit.

The sanity and the full integration of the individual soul will then depend on this individual's bodiliness lingering *appropriately*, so to speak, without attaching any one part of itself to spirit's achievement and the advent of the I, where "the universal [exists] for the universal" (§409 R)—in other words, where the exteriority of the body is transfigured in such a way that its forms become conceptually directed towards, that it

[42] And, we may add, its bodily functions. See section 4.2. of this chapter.
[43] De Laurentiis 2021, 104.

becomes there for, the soul's interiority. The individual's sane development ensures the vanishing of these very notions of "interior" and "exterior" at the moment of their conflictual contact in habit: once soul takes hold of body and works it in line with its own developmental ends, it can no longer claim its status as purely "interior" to selfhood—similarly, once body is fashioned in this way by the soul's repetitive, cyclical mechanisms, it can no longer be something strictly "exterior" in relation to selfhood. What was the point of contact between soul and world in Sensation becomes the temporal *process* of sublating the latter to the former in Habit—and the advent of the individual Self as an ensouled body apt to engage in universal, communicable, meaningful acts that make of it what it is, particularly in relation to its belonging (and its becoming) within a larger community of other Selves.

Whenever the I is denied the opportunity to develop "in opposition to itself" it risks sinking back into its "unsettled", undefined, confused disposition—a state that seems to be always *in potentia* for Hegel, yet also amenable to being offset by the proper *mise en place* of habituation. It seems especially important to address the ramifications of such a view of selfhood—as potentially, initially, "disordered", as if "deranged" by default—in terms of the *timing* of the soul's "work" on its bodiliness and the importance of the punctuality and regularity, as it were, of its intervention. The terrain on which the interaction of soul with body takes place is presented as fragile grounds, a space that requires for its actualization the delicate balance of bodily entrenchment and spiritual overcoming—the toggling, rhythmic, almost structured back-and-forth motion of "preserving" and "cancelling" carried out in *Aufhebung* (see *Enz.* §96 Add.). The temporalities of organic life, which come about in the Natural moment of selfhood, seem

to be highly attuned to the forthcoming *needs* and requisites of the healthy individual—to the point of anticipating them in their repetitive, cyclical activity. Any disturbance in those natural cycles engenders a disturbance at the spiritual level: by stagnating on this or that organic process and not allowing it to take its course and integrate into the mechanisms constitutive of Spirit, the body places a hindrance on the free, cohesive development of selfhood and ensures it stays stuck in, as if obsessive over, one or more of its pre-reflective operations. As a result, the "deranged" self falls short of its full realization and fails to make universal and share in the aspects of its humanity that give it its place and its meaning in relation to the outer world of difference.

It seems also pertinent to address here the pivotal, transformative role assigned to the soul's bodily moment and the manifestation of this sort of "revolving" corporeality, which displays in *Gewohnheit* an incessant and sustained back-and-forth between the interiority of the individual and the externality first of this individual's body and second of other Selves with which the individual inevitably comes into contact. The I's unfolding "in opposition to itself" is meaningful not only in terms of the self's internal chasm between itself and its body, but also in terms of the self's ultimate constitution as *an Other* in relation to the manifold of the world of difference in which it finally finds itself once it moves beyond its "merely anthropological" moment and towards its subsequent realization in the worldly forms of Objective Spirit. The soul needs first to recognize the otherness that is present in its own constitution to be able to move on to a real recognition of other selfhoods. Whenever it fails to do so, *Seele* becomes too self-obsessed, too turned towards its own inwardness, and succumbs to its own inner radical alterity instead

of negating it and integrating it into its definition by husking it of its power and liberating the "otherness" of nature itself from its own immediacy and scatteredness.

> For the *individual* soul, therefore, the attainment of free, internally harmonious self-feeling appears as something *contingent* [*Zufälliges*]. But *in itself* the absolute liberation of self-feeling, the soul's untroubled being-together-with-itself in all the particularity of its content, is something thoroughly necessary; for *in itself* the soul is absolute ideality, that which overarches all its determinacies [die absolute Idealität, das Übergreifende über alle ihre Bestimmtheiten], and it lies in the *concept* of the soul that by sublation of the particularities which have become entrenched in it, it proves to be the unlimited power over them, that it reduces what is still *immediate*, what is in it as a *being*, to a mere *property*, to a mere *moment*, in order by this absolute negation to become *for its own self* as a *free individuality*. (§410 *Z*/W10).

4.2. Repetition and integration: the individuating chronology of habit

The gesture of repetition that is characteristic of habit is not only disruptive to a certain Natural order but also, importantly, integrative of its traits and generative of a new, more comprehensive, order, of which the Self can be part fully and completely. In gaining the ability to suspend its attention from the body's repetitive mechanisms through habituation and making of the body's particularities a simple matter of fact, a determination "that just *is*", the soul, now transitioning out of its Feeling moment and into its Actual moment, may turn to what's important: the advent of consciousness and self-consciousness.

> [In habit] the soul has [the particularity of feelings and of consciousness] *in possession*, and contains it in such a way that in such determinations it is not actually sentient, it does not stand in relationship to them by distinguishing itself from them, nor is it absorbed in them, but it has them in itself and moves in them, without sensation or consciousness. The soul is *free* of them, in so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them; while it exists in these forms as its possessions, it is at the same time open to other activity and occupations, in the sphere of sensation and the mind's consciousness in general. (§410)

By carving time in the body, the repetitive motion of habit *frees* up the ontological room necessary for the conceptual "assembly" of selfhood and cements the individual in their

own singular back-and-forth, their own dance with the world of *Körper*—starting with their own body. The soul takes possession of its mass of "feeling and consciousness" and makes it "pervious" to its own ends in order to become able to sever (or perhaps rather suspend) itself from this same mass safely, as it were, without risking reducing or simplifying its identity.

Hegel's "I" is thoroughly embodied and those repetitive, habitual (perhaps toward the Greek sense of *ethos*) mechanisms of its bodiliness (breath, circadian rhythms, biological development, digestion), still here at a "merely anthropological", rudimentary moment in the story of *Geist*, are constitutive of its very definition. In other words, it is precisely the struggle of the soul with its Natural moment that sets in motion the upward, "plastic" trajectory of the Self, by enjoining time and the body and inserting, in this way, the parameters of its body into the structures of temporality through the "spiritual" interventions of repetition and habituation. The body is trained to behave a certain way in accordance with the trajectory of Self, a process of *entrainment* that takes a cyclical, rhythmic, predictable form. Hegel's "I" is the product of the body's temporal *entrainment* by a "soul" still in its pre-reflective moment, yet still enforcing some sort of reflexivity, or re-collection, on the processes of its bodily functions. In a sense, Hegel's body comes to "remember" or re-collect (*erinnern*) the content of its mental interior and keeps a record of it, and in this universalizes it and turns it into a convention—a repeated, "thoughtless" or pre-intellectual act whose details have become so *natural*, so "mechanical" (§410 *Z*) that only their outline is manifest and present to consciousness at any given moment.

We may find here the full importance of Hegel's concept of "second nature", particularly in view of its intersection with the biological, rhythmic patterns of the human body (breath cycles, sleep cycles, circulation, digestion and excretion): in both its immediacy and its posited-ness, habit *is* those very natural cycles coming out of their interiority and their immediacy, into the increasingly spiritual(ized)—and, therefore, common, shared, communicable, even discursive (or at least linguistic)—forms and expressions of selfhood. Hegel's self is bound to this upward "plastic" trajectory: once it has crossed the threshold of habit, the subject, as Malabou explains, "is now opened to the possibility of 'seeing (what is) coming' [*voir venir*]" (Malabou, 38): it is now engaged with its own unfolding, which it anticipates and enacts by freeing up the conscious "space" necessary for such unfolding—and liberating therefore the I's potential from the bounds of Nature's externality. In this way the "I" is differentiated from the animal, but also from its own primary, rudimentary sort of subjectivity which it now interacts with as an *object* and a *moment* in its complex, still-developing identity.

At the crux of this conception of a selfhood whose habitual mode of being acts as an anchor and a turning point for its becoming, is Hegel's interpretation of the Aristotelian *nous* (νοῦς) in his reading of *De Anima*. De Laurentiis explains that the simultaneous immediacy and posited-ness of habit (or rather the simultaneous immediacy and posited-ness that habit confers on *Seele* in its Feeling moment) that Hegel insists on may be found in Aristotle's simultaneous use of the verbs πάσχειν (*paschein*) and ἐνεργεῖν (*energein*), which share a root and mean opposing things, in his descriptions of *nous*. Aristotle's *nous* has the "power both to make and to undergo, to fashion and to be fashioned" (Malabou., 34): in typical Aristotelian fashion, opposing powers—here

undergoing and *undertaking*—are present in the singular notion, deterring it from getting stuck in a form of conceptual stiffness and adding a layer of ambiguity to its meaning. This dynamism and *activity* that permeate the architecture of *De Anima* are taken by Hegel and speculatively reworked, so to speak, in order to make clear the particular maneuvers of speculative thought through which, he contends, the soul may be fully understood.

Hegel's reaction to Aristotle's gesture is to apply some sort of inversion to the order of the *nous* (as intellect) that is fully formed and "achieved" on the one hand, and the *nous* that is passive (ἕξις) or "primary" on the other, specifically by instrumentalizing the Aristotelian notions of πάσχειν, ἐνεργεῖν, potentiality, and actuality and deploying them systematically throughout the Anthropology's narrative. For Hegel, the mode of possibility that is Aristotle's *nous* in its highest-order manifestation—its openness to the endlessness of the possibilities of its unfolding, the culminating point of soul as "intellect"—becomes the initial, foundational but impoverished (content-*less*) moment of natural soul, or what is characterized as animal subjectivity. It's in this way that "for Hegel, Aristotle's text presents a mirror of the psyche, in which spirit recognizes something essential about itself, a vision which necessarily involves the coming into being of man" (Malabou, 39).

The treatment Aristotle gives to *nous* is itself, for Hegel, revelatory of something of Spirit: by inverting the order of "intellect" and *hexis* Hegel brings out and makes visible the underlying nothingness of abstract "Spirit"—and the constitutive role of Nature without which *Geist* fails to appropriate (*make its own*) its meaning and its identity. Similarly, of course, nature fails to fulfil its concept (or be anything) in

abstraction from its *maniement* by human consciousness. Hegel's reading of Aristotle is directed towards the explicit purpose of the Anthropological project, which is one of providing philosophical grounding for the notion of the specifically human soul. As such, Aristotle's *nous* serves for Hegel as a reflective surface against which the activity of *Seele* as process, as self-generating and self-maintaining unity, is measured. Hegel takes from Aristotle a conception of the human psyche as process in motion and a *living* reality and inserts it in the structures of his I's syllogistic unfolding.

This speculative inversion of *nous* as intellect and *nous* as pre-conscious habitual patterning is not without conceptual ground. First, it explains Hegel's conception of Nature as a "purposive"[44] (self-organized, self-propelling) process whose most developed iteration is Spirit, and therefore his dismissal of a sort of *nous*-exceptionalist view of human subjectivity as definitively separate from the influence of nature (*physis*) of the kind that may be extracted from *De Anima*. Second, it provides support for the constitutive role of what was passive *nous* in Aristotle and what becomes the natural soul in Hegel, in the *advent* of selfhood and the triumph of Spirit over Nature—and, on a more

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[44] In the Remark to §360 of the *Philosophy of Nature*:

> The basic determination of the living being seized on by Aristotle, that it must be conceived as acting purposively, has in modern times been almost forgotten till Kant, in his own way, revived this concept in his doctrine of *inner* teleology, in which the living being is to be treated as its own end (*Selbstzweck*). The difficulty here comes mainly from representing the *teleological* relationship as *external*, and from the prevalent opinion that an *end* exists *only* in *consciousness*. Instinct is a purposive activity acting unconsciously.

Even those processes that precede consciousness in the constitution of the organism, are characterized by a "purposiveness" or an agency according to which the organism propels itself forward on a determinate ontological trajectory that is *its own*. Hegel's speculative take on Aristotle's *nous* acknowledges the necessity of such a principle as purposiveness for a satisfying understanding of life but questions the directionality and positioning of this principle, insisting on the presence of some extent of agency or autonomy even in the "pre-conscious" throes of Nature. This shift underlines the distinctly retroactive character of Spirit and puts in place a *living* temporal order in which both the sensuous, immediate character of the abstract "Now" in which the body is inscribed and the content-ful character of historical (meaningful or narrative) time in which *Geist* is ultimately inscribed may be found in tandem.

methodological note, the triumph of speculative dialectics over fixed "category" thinking. Hegel's spirit is not dependent on some exogenous, "higher-order" intelligence to emerge: its emergence is rather intwined with the alterations of its Natural, pre-conscious moment and always simultaneous to it.[45]

De Laurentiis highlights Hegel's translation, in his Jena manuscripts, of a passage from Book III, 4 of *De Anima*[46] as follows: "So on the one hand *nous* is constituted as that through which everything becomes what it is, on the other hand as that which produces everything, as an active being like light: for in a certain way light makes the potential colors into actual colors". In this passage Aristotle defines *nous* as an act of unveiling, a revelatory power that becomes perpetual and ever-self-renewing. The *potential* or possible dimension of *nous* is understood as the highest realization of its aptitude to contain in itself the infinitude and endlessness of all its possible manifestations, past and future—and it only appears in Book III, as the culmination of

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[45] This point is introduced earlier in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, in the discussions around ideality, finitude, and infinitude: in an addition it is noted that

> The distinction between nature and spirit has been interpreted quite correctly as meaning that we must trace nature back to 'reality' as its basic determination, and spirit to 'ideality'. But nature is not just something fixed and complete on its own account, which could therefore subsist even without spirit; rather, it is only in spirit that nature attains its goal and its truth. Similarly, spirit, for its part, is not just an abstract world beyond nature; on the contrary, it only genuinely *is*, and proves to be spirit, insofar as it contains nature sublated within itself (*Enz.* §96 *Add.*).

This remark alone may serve as a sort of flash-explanation of Hegel's understanding of the relation of Nature to Spirit: neither a dichotomy nor exactly a "spectrum", this relationship is perhaps more akin to a warring situation out of which emerges a clear victor and an "other" that has been structurally *incorporated* into and *handled* (*manié*) by the former, and *entrained* by it in a determinate direction. The "ideality" of spirit points to its status as a relatively more complete, more comprehensive, *broader* terrain within which the "reality" of nature is only a sublated, integrated moment. This also means that without this "mere" moment of naturalness, and without the incompleteness of this moment, spirit no longer measures up to its concept and is denied the achievement of its *is*-ness qua spirit: "(…) the negation of the negation is not a neutralization; the Infinite is the affirmative, and it is only the finite which is sublated" (§95). Nature is not "neutralized" in selfhood but *confronted*, resisted and incorporated by the organism in a fluid movement made up of successive dissolutions of contradictory states.

[46] See Aristotle ed. Barnes 2014, 684.

soul as its highest-order manifestation: the intellect. In Hegel's inversion, the passive *nous* becomes precisely the "atemporality" of the natural soul: instead of simply reiterating the terms of Aristotle's hierarchy in a different order, Hegel rearranges these terms to show how this initial atemporality imbues the entirety of Spirit's unfolding—and how this continuity is precisely what makes Hegel's subject specifically *anthropological*. Hegel finds in Aristotle's active, internally manifold, developing *nous* a precedent for the speculative mediation of *Seele* and reads in its structure the conceptual foundations for the "coming into being of man" (Malabou, 39), the subject of the Anthropology. *Hexis*, Hegel's *Gewohnheit*, is deployed in the Anthropology to serve as the narrative node of the story of "man" and ensures thanks to its universal dimension and its dual status as that which is at once immediate and posited, "man's" full *realization* as a Self that is apt to engage, ultimately linguistically, with other Selves.

The soul is only actualized, in other words individuated or past its strictly passive moment, once it achieves the enmeshment that takes place in habit of its interiority with its externality. Habit constitutes, therefore, a necessary condition for the realization of soul—for its definitive undoing from the giant atemporal field of difference that is the initial, Natural moment, but also for its eventual advancement into the world of Spirit beyond mere self-difference. There is something to be said, here, about the achievement of Spirit relying fundamentally on the advent of the exteriorization of soul, and correspondingly the interiorization of nature, in what has been understood in the literature as the moment of "the death of nature" (see for example McCumber 1990). Rather than totally reject nature, in habit, Hegel's anthropological subject emphatically rejects and struggles against *its own* primary unmediated, unregulated *entanglement with* nature.

Hegel's subject seeks here to rid itself of the apparent Natural necessity in which it first finds itself immersed and to shape its natural dimension—its "bodiliness"—in such a way that makes the insertion of the latter into the more general structures of selfhood possible. In this gesture of simultaneous retreat and progressive integration, the subject demonstrates both the atemporality of its corporeality and the temporality of its developing spirit, and shows also the first as the condition for the realization of the second: in the sense that the body's universal[47], moldable, shapeable rhythms and cycles lay the grounds for the constitution (the *coming into being*) of selfhood's manifestations in the chronologies of human time, which appear in the various forms of "Absolute" *Geist*.

The "absolute" dimension of Spirit serves as a sort of resolutive horizon, an infinitely expansive *ensemble* into which the finite, acute attempts of human subjectivity get absorbed and against which they are ultimately ontologically "measured". This Absolute, the Idea, presents itself to subjectivity as "the revealed Other against which human reason endlessly strives, in its infinite progress of self-knowing and self-liberation" (Reid 2025, 5). Time, for the human subject, is directional and meaningful because it is limited conceptually by the horizon of Absolute Spirit (God, the True, the Good, etc.)—which, at once atemporal and temporalizing, acts as that which may determine the limits of human reason within its capacity for infinite, ever-expansive self-knowledge. The limit of human time is the atemporal *horizon* of the Absolute Idea, toward which reason "endlessly strives", in an interminable spiral through which thought *recognizes itself* in the realm of all that is worldly and other to it.

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[47] See above, section 4.1.

The product of this recognition is the plurality of *Geist*'s manifestations in ethical and social life, but also in "spiritual" life forms such as art, religion, and philosophy, cutting through the sameness of empty time and, we may say, augmenting Nature with meaning and a direction. In contrast with the traditional Western discourse around the relation of each of soul and body to time, we may find in Hegel's "system" an affirmation of the necessary temporality of "Spirit" defined as a fundamentally *human* (anthropological) activity. In meticulously anchoring the realization of *Geist* in its anthropological, "animal" *beginnings*, Hegel puts in place a notion of selfhood as thoroughly temporal specifically by virtue of being thoroughly bodily. It is, then, the body that makes the Self temporal by enclosing it within a certain order out of which it may develop and which it may overcome, or outgrow, in its spiritual activity.

4.2.1. Digestion in Enz. *§§357-363: the process of integrating negation & the Self's "ambiguous other"*

One flagrant instantiation of the ambiguity of the notion of Hegelian identity, or selfhood, can be found in the "Assimilation" section of the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Nature* (§§357-366). In it Hegel traces the trajectory of the Self from its "self-feeling" and its inwardness all the way to its integration of (and with) its externality, the "non-organic nature which stands over against [confronts]" (§357) the organic, individual, living totality, through the specific processes of alimentation, digestion, and excretion. Still in its pre-reflective moment (Hegel writes here about the "animal organism"), in assimilation subjectivity is faced with a *material* that is other to it, a mass of stuff, both distinct from it and necessary for its existence as individual.

> Because the living being is the *universal* power over its outer nature which is opposed to it, assimilation is, first, the *immediate* fusion of the ingested material

> with animality, an infection with the latter and *simple transformation* […]. Secondly, as *mediation*, assimilation is *digestion*—opposition of the subject to the outer world, and, as further differentiated, the process of animal *water* (of the gastric and pancreatic juice, animal lymph as such) and of animal *fire* (of the gall, in which the accomplished return of the organism into itself from its concentration in the spleen is determined as *being-for-self* and as an active consuming): processes which are, all the same, particularized infections. (§363)

Here again, as in the case of *Gewohnheit*, we find the coexistence of both immediacy and posited-ness within a singular notion. Assimilation is both immediate in the sense of its primary, simple melding with and *infection* (influence on, affectation) of the subject (this is its *oppositional* or *dissolvent* moment), and mediated in the sense of the transformational, generative powers of its mechanisms (its *extractive* or *solvent* moment[48]), wherein the irreducible tension between the "living organism" and the "non-organic" mass external to it is realized within the structures and chemical operations of the body itself. In its *oppositional* or *dissolvent* moment, the digestive process involves a mechanical breaking down, the *grinding down* of the material. In its *extractive* or *solvent* moment, digestion functions as a chemical process through which the alimentary material is structurally transformed by a digestive agent (a "bilious" substance) and becomes something different (*for* the body) once it has undergone the machinations of the body. Finally, the material, *now transformed*, is rejected, definitively and with a manner of "anger"[49] (M397), by the organism in excretion. The organism "in thus separating itself

[48] This distinction can be found in recent Hegel literature (see Richter 1998, Dryden 2016, Reid 2022) and refers to the competing chemical and mechanical theories of digestion in the 17th and 18th centuries—a "debate" not unlike others in the history of science whose poles will dissolve in favor of an integrative "synthetic" unity that involves and transcends both at once.

[49] Richter (1998, 19-20) notes: "Insofar as this fundamental relation between the animal organism and the external world is seen as one involving negation and destruction, the production and reproduction of the self in the face of opposing forces, it is not surprising that Hegel casts the relation in terms of violence. Readers familiar with the Phenomenology and the explication of the master/slave dialectic, a fight to the death, will recognize the terms. The teeth and claws are understood as weapons (393). The process of

from itself is disgusted with itself for not having more self-confidence; this is what it does when it abandons the struggle, rids itself of the bile which it has discharged" (M405). In excretion, the organism discards the unnecessary components of the alimentary material alongside its own fluids and enzymes: what is excreted is no longer strictly the "non-organic" (as in not of the organism) material to which the organism was first confronted, but something of the organism itself, its own "disposition" to get lost in the Natural world, this "slippery" tendency of subjectivity that we saw manifest in derangement or mental illness—which it finds itself continually shedding in order to preserve its identity. This means that it is not the external alimentary material that the organism disposes of so vehemently, but rather its own entanglement with its externality and its involvement in it.

As a result of assimilation, the subject reproduces itself by reaching out, so to speak, and engaging with its externality, then allowing itself to be transfigured by this externality and *returning to itself* having integrated some part of this "non-organic" (as in not of the organism) material into its very ongoing, cyclically self-reproducing identity specifically by expelling its *involvement* with it: "(…) the organism is in a state of tension with its non-organic nature, negates it and makes it identical with itself" (M397). In so doing, Hegel's I "[triumphs] over the outer non-organic object [and], more importantly, […] over its own digestive entanglement with that object" and "affirms itself as its [own] end qua pure ideality" (Reid 2022, 26-7). By getting involved with its difference in this way and using it as a means to the end that is its own realization and self-*re*-production,

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digestion, Hegel says, 'consists in this, that the organism in angrily opposing itself to the outer world is divided within itself' (402)".

the individual establishes its *ideality*: the "truth of [its] reality" (*Enz.* §96 *Add.*), the *truth* (meaning) behind its being-there: its status as a *whole* and a totality whose unity necessarily exceeds the mathematical sum of its parts. The *Gestalt*, the form ("Shape") of the animal organism is first an Idea that reaches out to its difference, its "nonorganic nature", and incorporates it into itself ("die *Gestalt* […] als Idee, die sich zu ihrem *Anderen,* ihrer unorganischen Natur verhält und sie ideell in sich setzt,", *Enz.* §352/W10).

Hegel's self is at once its inner particularity and its relation to what is strictly outside of its limits: alimentation makes clear the process of *Aufhebung* by which an elemental selfhood is formed on the basis of a bodily mechanism wherein the otherness of the external, alimentary material is itself ambiguous since it seems to renounce its seemingly fundamental (categorical) otherness upon contact with the bodily Self[50]. Once the "non-organic" is integrated into the organic structure of the individual, it positions itself as this individual's "ambiguous Other"[51]: as it maintains its constitutive distinction from the organic, whole, singular body, this "non-organic" alimentary "material" also becomes part of the individual body's rhythmic, cyclic becoming. The organism here *preserves* something of its relation to its externality. At the same time, the "end-product", the culminating step of the digestive process—excretion—is also somehow involved in the animal, preliminary subjectivity manifest in the alimentary process, constituting in contrast the *retreating* gesture: what the organism excretes is "nothing else but the organism's own process which it gets rid of in material shape" (M404).

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[50] The "non-organic" (here meaning strictly, that which stands in opposition to the organic) ceases to be what it is and is transformed upon its contact with the living organism: "The non-organic is determined as something having 'no enduring existence of its own'. It is a 'nullity as soon as it comes in contact with a living being' [(EN 365 Add.)] that eats it." (Reid 2025, 152-3)

[51] See Dryden 2016.

What the organism excretes, it turns out, is of the chemical makeup of the organism itself. In the analysis of fecal matter presented at M405, it is made clear that what the individual does in and through digestion is re-produce itself only to negate and discard itself—the pattern typical of human subjectivity that we have seen also in the Anthropology, at the junction of the "natural" and "feeling" moments of *Seele* where habituation bridges the distance between the soul's naturalness (its *embodiment*) on the one hand, and the body's inner organization and autonomous chronology, its "intelligence" (*ensoulment*) on the other—evident at its most rudimentary stages. That the organism rejects its "initial" enmeshment with nature means that it is at the same time affirming its status as distinct from otherness, as *its own* subject—the act of self-positing that explains Hegel's formulation "the organism, *recognizing its error*, gets rid of its entanglement with outside things, and this is confirmed by the chemical composition of the excrement" (M405, emphasis added). There seems to be a distinct point at which selfhood comes about (*advient*, to use Malabou's vocabulary), *awakens*, as it were, and gains awareness specifically of its own individuality. This self-positing moment has its origin in the spaces of bodiliness: the Self's homelands, so to speak, are the cycles and rhythms of its corporeality.

This observation may perhaps make clearer the idea of the soul's settling into its body's rhythms, an idea most broadly prominent at the moment of habituation—and maybe more implicitly broached in Hegel's discussions around digestive assimilation. As was hopefully shown in my analysis of mental illness in the Anthropology (see Chapter 3), the "soul" must first adapt to its body's rhythms, and refrain from breaching the "laws" of the body (see §410 *Z*), to be able to negate and resist its dominion in

habituation. The soul's initial *dwelling* is in the structures of the pre-reflective, repetitive, almost alchemical cycles of the body. In these cycles, the organism's inner and outer determinations are incorporated into one another through processes that exceed the merely physical—biological—operations of the body proper, whether "solvent"[52] or dissolvent. In view of the completion of subjectivity and its *becoming* towards Spirit, anticipated in these early natural moments, the animal organism, in its struggle with its corporeality (first in digestion then in habit), seems to prepare itself for its imminent self-negation and self-*Aufhebung* (or, the negation of the difference within itself) in the increasingly spiritual forms it takes as it makes its way through its development toward *Geist*. There is therefore a form of subjectivity, elemental relative to the fully achieved, social and ethical "I", that establishes itself as the originary seat of selfhood, where individuation is first anticipated in the cyclical process of bodily rhythms.

The biochemical processes of the body discussed in these sections of the *Philosophy of Nature* come to be part of a recurrent motif in Hegel's understanding of subjectivity: that of the truth of the anticipated conceptual "resolution" being established at the midpoint of the concept's syllogistic unfolding. This privileging of the particularizing moment in the pre-determination of the self's eventual self-achievement puts at work a "negation of the negation" at the innermost, central, oppositional moment of the concept's structure, where the ideality of the concept—here the "I"—is first put in place and its "resolution" first hinted at. As Reid explains, the digestive process already presents the animal organism as an (*formal?*) individual with its own ends and trajectory:

> (…) in excreting its involvement with non-organic otherness as a means to an end, the animal organism affirms itself as that end qua pure ideality, which is the essence of its

[52] See Reid 2022.

> purposiveness. […] Briefly, we may surmise that the result of mediated digestion is circulatory fluidity within the organism. The power that drives the inner circulatory movement essential to the animal organism, that which animates it and constitutes its *anima*, is the purposiveness of pure ideality expressed as formal subjectivity.[53]

If the organism can take what it needs out of its opposition with the non-organic matter it encounters and discard the rest in a self-corrective motion, it is because the organism is able to reach beyond itself and go back and forth with itself, taking its distance then merging back, in line with those its own ends and trajectory. Atop itself and in dynamic relation (return) to itself, the organism becomes *ideal*: always (something) more than its physical manifestations and the mechanical-chemical operations of its body[54]. This is how Hegel's subject can eventually "[move] beyond purely animal organicity and [recognize] that its 'life' (EL 216) is [eventually] supplemented with 'cognition' (EL 23)" (Reid 2022, 27).

The imagery of, as Reid puts it, "digestion [taking] place in the 'guts' of the syllogism"[55], is significant. In the *viscera*, the nucleus of the speculative syllogism, the human individual's real guts are at work—in *action*—breaking down the organism's identity: integrating it as object in alimentation then rejecting its object in excretion. As such, it's the confrontation of the self's organicity on the one hand and the "non-organic"

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[53] Reid 2022, 27.

[54] As Dryden explains in "Digestion, Habit, and Being at Home" (2016), "Assimilation is not a mechanical or chemical process, in which the substances remain external to each other (§363Z and also 365Z [398]), but the work of an organism. It comes in two parts: first the animal takes in the material, and then, in digestion, it makes it into its own, underscoring its own subjectivity in the face of the external world (§364), and thus achieving its unity with itself (§365)" (11). The organism *exceeds* its internal processes and contradictions and this excess (what Malabou defines as "excess of the future over the future") explains and gives grounds for the mode of existence of human subjectivity as a process that is as fluid as it is self-contained.

[55] "The section on digestion and excretion occurs in the most 'middle', internal moment of Hegel's presentation of the animal organism, in the middle of the middle. (…) we find ourselves in the particular moment of the particular moment (…). Digestion takes place in the 'guts' of the syllogism". (Reid 2022, 10)

(*Unorganisch*) matter that enters and modulates it on the other that brings about but also predicts the eventual overcoming of this oppositional state in the particular, particularizing digestive moment. This means that the digestive process itself involves the disintegration, the "fluidification" (Reid, 11) of the terms of this "organic-nonorganic" dichotomy itself—and the following reorganization of the terms of its very own syllogistic unfolding as a result. What was first, in alimentation, the initial moment of *encounter* and confrontation between a subjectivity and its externality and an activity emanating from the subject and directed outwards, is now internalized in digestion and becomes the moment of particularity within the same individual where the opposition of the "internal" organicity of the subject with the "external" organic material is itself instrumentalized and comes to function as a moment—one that is to be overcome—of the overall unfolding of the natural Self.

Hegel's deliberate placement of digestion at the dialectical moment within the topography of subjectivity explains the speculative gesture of anticipation: as the processes of digestion and excretion reveal themselves to be neither solely solvent (mechanical) nor fully dissolvent (chemical), there must be a third term that (1) ensures the transition from the organic-nonorganic opposition to the establishment of a new integrative organic whole and (2) maintains the mystery of the body vis-à-vis of the self: the incompleteness of the soul's grasp of its bodiliness and the ever-present potential for something of corporeality "slipping by" the scope of soul's grip—ensuring thus the soul's status as *ideal*. This third term safeguards the ontological "space" necessary for the organism's subsequent self-development, securing the permanence of a gap between what the organism *is* in this moment and what it is *becoming*, its overarching singular

identity that may take spiritual "shape". The dialectical moment of particularity involved in the development of selfhood serves to put in place the oppositional states that are to be overcome in the process of establishing the I's full, realized identity: in Hegel, "the passage to true identity must [always] involve the dialectical overcoming of binary oppositions" (Reid, 10).

The soul is so adamant to undertake this return to itself upon its encounter and entanglement with (and transfiguration of) the alimentary material because it is as if impatient to *accomplish* its truth and establish itself as a Self, as an identity "over against" the heteronomy and indifference of the natural world—and liberate it of its atemporality. In this sense, "I" am first my own externality, and my first Other is my own selfhood: divided in two, I am first confronted to the world through my struggle with my own corporeality. In digestion, I carry out this struggle by instrumentalizing successive oppositional terms, still at the pre-conscious, preconceptual level of "animal" subjectivity. In this gesture, I share in my mode of existence, as human animal, and belong with other "I"s of the same species. Beyond serving as a sort of checkpoint for the reality of human finitude, the instrumentalization of the bodily process makes of this process one that anticipates its own traveling past the scope of physicality and observable biological fact, into a "spiritual" realm into which it projects itself as if prematurely, yet still tentatively—to differentiate itself from its animality and in so doing, once more undertake what we may now recognize as the recurring cyclical movement, peculiarly preservative of difference, of integration – negation – return.

We may extract from this analysis two essential components of Hegel's conception of embodiment and bodiliness: (1) the *mystery* the body holds and preserves

in relation to the organism and (2) the consequent determination of *ideality* the Self comes to have in relation to the reality of its corporeality. Because some extent of distance seems to be carefully preserved by the body vis-à-vis of the organismic whole, the individual is as if forced to take on the role of an entity that subsumes and submits to its own iterations at one and the same time. Dryden (2016) explains the digestive system is "undoubtedly part of us, but also other to us—biologically, in the sense of our gut microbiome, and phenomenologically, in the sense of not being fully transparent to us nor under our full control" (7). The processes by which subjectivity asserts itself as a Self are, at the most rudimentary level, ambiguous and constitute a *difference* in relation to the organism—both in the sense that they involve the activity of bacteria and micro-organisms that are foreign to the body and constitutively different to it, and in the sense that their mechanisms and manifestations (particularly when they are disordered—symptoms, intolerances, disease, etc.) remain somewhat obscure and at the very least unclear, and oftentimes unpredictable, to the organism itself.

While the human subject necessarily travels past its "animal", *anthropological* moment, it remains tethered to this moment—a tethering that takes the form of a recurrence of cycles that *remind* subjectivity of its finitude by inscribing it in determinate, rhythmic temporal structures. As such, the expansion through which the dynamic, fluid Hegelian Self moves is nonetheless afforded to it within the bounds of its Natural beginnings: the spiritual manifestations of *Seele* are bound to be limited by time and place, and be structured—and their meanings established—on the basis of their *situation* within the course of the unfolding of human history, the narrative of human consciousness Hegel calls *Geist*. The importance of digestion is its status as the

preliminary, most primary, full instantiation of the motif of the "other-in-self" (see Chapter 1 of this paper) that characterizes Hegel's metaphysics. The gut is *my* other that lives inside *me* and whose variations have ontological purchase on *my* very constitution. The next chapter will attempt to show the progression of this alterity that the self finds in its own determination through the terms of the syllogistic progression of Spirit, to arrive at a definition of *self as oscillation* or vibration between what it is and what it is not—a wholly temporal, embodied definition (self as *becoming*) whose significance can only be captured in reference to syllogistic temporality specific to the originary, Anthropological "dance" of soul and body.

Chapter 5. Affective Rhythms and Feeling Soul

5.1. Analysis of sensation (*Empfindung*) and affect in §§399-408: soul as "general medium" between self and world

5.1.1. After habit: what repetition does not exhaust

As the Anthropology shows, and as has hopefully been made clearer by the previous chapters, for Hegel, habituation is a stabilizing, *bodily* force that anchors the subject in its status as something beyond bodiliness. Whenever *Gewohnheit* is precluded from taking its "natural" course, by which it stabilizes the soul through the mechanisms of repetition and consolidation and allows it to "settle in" to the rhythms of its bodiliness, the product is a disruption of the soul—a *Verrücktheit* that brings the self to a state of quasi-halt. As a result, the self lingers on a singular aspect of its bodiliness and finds itself unable to integrate this bodiliness into its overarching concept. To use Hegel's terms, this means that the self's ideality is ensured by the well-functioning of the activity of habit. The present chapter argues that this *ideality*, the ability of the I to expand beyond the mathematical sum of its bodily operations and achieve a reflexive unity on the basis of the very multiplicity of its corporeality (without getting "stuck" on any one in particular), is also dependent on what we may call a *remnant* of its Naturalness: sensation and affect, in a sense that does not seem to be reducible to its dependence merely on habituation. Constructing this argument requires that we move "back" from habit and the outskirts of the soul's actualization to its earlier, feeling (*fühlende*—sensing, sentient, etc.[56]) moment

[56] Hegel writes about the distinction between *sensing* and *feeling*: "Sensation is connected with sensitivity; it seems plausible therefore that sensation emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of finding, i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling, whereas feeling looks more to the selfishness involved in it" (§402 R). This distinction is important for a complete understanding of the "feeling soul" as the product

where the world is received in its sensuous immediacy: marking the first real point of contact between the I's "interior" and that which is outside of it.

In sensation (*Empfindung*)[57], the self encounters or *finds* (*finden*) its alterity through its own body—the sensuous moment of the soul's process functions as a medium between the subject and its world. This moment is particularly characterized by its immediacy, as the initial encounter between self and world renews itself at every new instant in a series of indefinitely reproducing, therefore infinitely persisting, experiences. As the Anthropological story progresses, it becomes clear that Hegel's soul is committed to *preserving* certain aspects of its immediacy without which its imminent *subjectivation*, its self-positing into the world as forms of *Geist*, would not emerge. The soul remains tethered to the manifold of its potentiality (the richness of its interior, the I's "implicit being") and *brings it out*, contextually and acutely, *into* existence whenever it requires it. Writing about memory, Hegel argues:

> Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensation-determinations, representations, information, thoughts, etc.; yet *I* am for all that an entirely *simple* entity,—a cavern without determinations, in which all this is stored up, without existing.
>
> […]
>
> Thus a person can never know how much information he really *has in him*, even if he has forgotten it. It belongs not to his actuality, not to his subjectivity as such, but only to his implicit being. The individuality is and remains this *simple inwardness*, amidst

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of both poles, or, more precisely, as an integration of the passive immediacy of sensation into the broader, self-involved notion of *feeling*.

[57] The use of *Empfindung* ("sensibility" in Miller's translation) and not, for example *Sinnlichkeit* deserves to be highlighted, as an indicator of the nuance between this "anthropological" pre-reflective (not yet properly "Psychological") capacity of sensing/feeling on the one hand, understood as the mere disposition to come in contact with the world of alterity, and the more "advanced" more *actual* faculty of sensing on the other, understood as the specific capacity to see/hear/touch/etc. that appears only later, once subjectivity has decidedly moved past its relatively rudimentary "feeling" moment. The shared root with "*finden*", finding, points to a posture of relative passivity in comparison with the more engaged, active *actually* sensing capacity of seeing or hearing, for example. *Empfindung* is simply the disposition—the capacity, unrealized—of the subject to become in contact with the world of externality.

> all the determinacy and mediation of consciousness that is later installed in it. Here we must keep in mind that the soul to which this *simplicity* belongs is at first the feeling soul, in which bodiliness is contained […] (§403 R).

The *simplicity* which is first found in the "feeling" moment of soul emerges as the upshot of the ostensibly passive gesture of reception that occurs in sensation: the sheer volume of minute "interactions" the bodily soul has with the world—a world the *sensing* soul has yet to recognize as its *sensed*, its object—brings about something like a forced, continuous emptying, in which the information gathered in sensation is, while present, not strictly *existent* for the conscious "I". The individual's "implicit being", this immediate, thoroughly bodily, proto subjectivity through which the individual first makes contact with the world, is described here as timeless and infinite, always just beyond the reach of consciousness[58]—and is importantly granted an extent of autonomy that allows it to announce itself in spite of the subject's consciousness, in such states as sleep and sickness or delirium (see §403 R).

This autonomy Hegel confers to the bodily soul and the subsequent restrained access of consciousness to the manifold of its operations point to another "mechanical", "natural" in the sense of second nature, mechanism—this time *affect*—that, along with habituation, will form a stable "state" (§380) to which the developed consciousness may then "sink down" (§ 404 R) acutely and deliberately, according to its ends. Out of the ever-expansive yet dormant manifold of images, information, and sensations, those that

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[58] We may infer from this observation a noteworthy metaphysical position from Hegel: the soul *begins* as something timeless, eternal, in its bodily moment—and becomes increasingly entrenched in temporal structures the further it takes its mediation of Nature in the direction of more "spiritual" determinations. This could be interesting when thinking about our "typical" understanding of the soul-body relationship as one between something timeless and nontangible (spiritual) on the one hand, and something temporal and material (natural) on the other. Hegel's metaphysics challenges this dichotomy and proposes a way of understanding the constituent "moments" of selfhood that resists the tendency to think our experience in terms of restrictive binarities.

are relevant to consciousness in this moment or context resurface—in a retroactive gesture by which an already-achieved intellect "regresses" so that it may make sense of, or give meaning to, the world of objects. Affect, then, constitutes the foundation for the self's ability to operate meaningfully and in line with the reality of its relationship with the world (and with its own, internal self-difference) without, however, sinking into its particularities and compromising the integrated, organic conditions of its ideal status. Without this "feeling of its totality" (see §405) and the soul's generality attained in the *fühlende* moment, Hegel's *I* does not get to generalize its interaction with the world (sensations, perceptions, etc.) and transform it into a set of rules in habituation, by which it finally takes possession of its extension as its own and instigates the process of its individuation.

Habituation requires a field of affective receptivity, a moment that bridges the soul's total identification with nature on the one hand and consciousness's overcoming and sublation of nature on the other, that it cannot itself be responsible for: since "habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence" (die Gewohnheit ist der Mechanismus des Selbstgefühls wie das Gedächtnis der Mechanismus der Intelligenz) (§410 R/W10), and

> (…) whereas in mere sensation I am contingently affected now by this and now by that, and in sensation the soul is immersed in its content, *loses* itself in it, does not sense its concrete self […] in habit, by contrast, one enters a relationship not to a *contingent individual* sensation, representation, desire, etc., but to *one's own self*, to a *universal mode* of action which constitutes one's individuality, which is posited by oneself and has become one's *own*, and just because of that one appears as *free*. (§410 *Z*).

If habit is the "mechanism" of self-feeling, then the realization of the former depends on the presence of the latter. For habit to come about, the anthropological subject must

already have an extant affective repertoire of its immediate, pre-reflective contact with the world through its senses, in order then to properly, in habit and through the "repetition of many individualities", draw the distinction between its own body and the corporeality of the world with which it initially finds itself enmeshed. As such, the "universal mode of action" brought about by such repetition is the product of the feeling individuality's anticipatory ("plastic", cf. Malabou) *aboutissement* in the eventuality of habit: in other words, habit is the product of the process of laying the groundwork as it were for the imminent negation of and resistance to what is being established, which is the soul's undifferentiated, immediate entrenchment in nature.

We may now read sensation, as *Allgemeines Medium* between self and world, from the standpoint of habit. Assuming habit has been established as a motif of subjectivity, what becomes—or is left of—the mass of "[sensations], representations, information, thoughts" acquired by the pre-conscious, sentient subject? In other words, does habit exhaust the entirety of the bodily soul's previous "attempts" at self-preservation, its sporadic yet endless, indeterminate turn toward the world, through the mechanisms it employs as a means of consolidating itself within its corporeality? The question concerns primarily the "passive" status Hegel assigns to sensation—albeit, notably, not to *feeling* which already involves some rudimentary sense of self, or "selfishness", see §402 R, §405—and the extent to which this characterization may be incorrectly *stretched*, so to speak, to make of this sensing-feeling moment a mere prelude to the upcoming modulations of the soul. As is obvious in Hegel's text, and as is typical of the gesture of *Aufhebung* that characterizes his systematic Science (the self-propelling, self-positing agency of thought), habit does not indeed exhaust the full range of the

body's affect in the soul's pre-reflexive move to grasp and grapple with its corporeality. Instead, the mechanisms of habituation are predicated on the condition of resisting the atemporal immediacy of the feeling soul, and the continuous advent of habit and repetition as self-differentiating, "sharpening" (*Härten*) mechanism is dependent on the presence of an undifferentiated, "un-sharpened" bodily state that necessarily persists past the advent of habituation as an ever-expanding terrain of primary contact between self and world, and makes learning (and integrating) new information and *entraining* the body in new patterns of behaving in the world, at all possible.

Let us note also that this passivity that characterizes soul in its *affective* state does not make of soul a mere passive receptacle of outside data, just as the activity that characterizes its "interaction" with what is outside of the bounds of immediate subjectivity does not yet make of it an active or actual (mediated) individuated subject. The imagery of "general medium" serves to highlight both the universal and absolutely relational (relative?) qualities of bodily soul and make clear the logical precedence, over conscious reflection, of the body's configuration as the *field* or the terrain in which the inner and the outer are not yet opposed—yet where the "impressions" of the one over the other are preserved and carried onto the developing iterations of spirit, saturating its foundation. Hegel's organic Self, a singular process in continuous motion and transfiguration, does not abandon its affective rhythms—the back-and-forth that takes place within the undifferentiated immediacy of its *fühlende* subjectivity—as it "arrives" at the full realization of its consciousness. Instead, the realized subject continues to pick out, both consciously and inadvertently, as in "sickness" or in sleep, elements of the determinations contained in the infinite relational sensuous field of its bodiliness.

It may be useful here especially to linger on the notions of rhythm and rhythmic embodiment within the broader context of Hegel's systematic Science. Reading the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Montani (2022) notes that "Speculative logic is not a shapeless repetition of old formulas but an *immanent rhythm* that gives shape to knowing and carries out the sublation of forms into each other" (256). Hegel's very method is constructed according to an architecture of fluid, continuous change, constituting a rhythmic backdrop for the progressive unfolding of the speculative proposition where subject "[passes] into" its predicate and both undergoes and undertakes a transformation out of which is generated the meaningfulness of Hegel's philosophical language. As such, "The speculative predicate negates and preserves the form and difference between itself and the subject" (256): for such a movement of simultaneous negation and preservation to be possible, it seems that some extent of space must be conserved between the proposition itself and the ecosystem of meaning into which it fits, granting the latter's (rhythmic) topography explanatory power over the former's activity—and making of that ecosystem an impressively self-organized whole that functions by virtue of the remnants of those conceptual gaps that spring among its contradictions. The ambiguous space left by the *Aufhebung* of the content of the predicate in its subject is the specific space out of which the meaning of truly philosophical determinations may arise. The product of this self-propelled activity—agency—of speculative thought is a "system" whose elements as if catch each other in their insufficiency and compensate for the inconsistencies that seems to arise, inevitably, from the coarticulation of different, particular propositions within the same discursive space: "The diversity of content within the *Phenomenology*

and the opposing shapes of spirit must be understood in terms of their immanent movement within the whole" (257).

The notion of rhythm may make clearer what I am attempting to show is a *temporal articulation* of self and world by the bodily soul, particularly explicit in Hegel's discussion of the *fühlende Seele*, and how such articulation (and pacing) explains Nature's persistence in Spirit by underlining the restless, active characterization of the organism's affective life. Without representing or becoming either, the Feeling Soul stands between the subject and its world as a self-differentiating terrain on which their preliminary encounters, and so their preliminary oppositions—in habit and the *ensoulment* of the body—may be joined in time and made concurrent, producing a sustained multiplicity within a singular, integrated whole. The atemporal, or pre-temporal, rhythmic "field" of affect provides and safeguards this concurrence of opposites: it is because the one sensation or perception is integrated, *with* the other, into a broader field of meaning, according to a cyclical architecture of continuous preservation and cancellation, that the manifold of sensations and perceptions can persist in the same individual, as *this* individual's own experience. In other words, it is pre-reflective, pre-chronological, rudimentary contact with the world, carried out through the most fundamental bodily operations, that sets the grounds for the anthropological subject's individuation and objectivation in the spheres of social life—but also in manifestations of the Absolute dimension of Spirit such as art, religion, and philosophy.

"Initially", Hegel writes, "the feeling individuality is indeed a monadic individual, but, being *immediate*, it is not yet *Itself*, not a subject reflected into itself, and is therefore *passive*. Hence its *selfish* individuality is a subject different from it, a subject that may

even be another individual" (§405). This is where Hegel uses the imagery of the fetus in the mother's womb, to underline the ambiguous relationship of the soul to itself in this state of sensing: not yet able to recognize itself as a subject for itself, *fühlende Seele* depends on an overarching substantiality, a totality in which its determinations may be preserved, safeguarded—*for* the subject's emerging consciousness.

It may be pertinent to question, at this point, the translation of *fühlende* as "feeling" and not "sensing": the text seems to draw clearly at least some degree of distinction between the "sensing" (strictly receptive) and "feeling" (apparently more modulated, more complex) moments of *fühlende Seele*, designating the second as a less immediate, more self-ish development of the first. Hegel acknowledges this distinction, rather in passing, in the short Remark to §402:

> In ordinary linguistic usage, sensation and feeling are not sharply distinguished. Still we do not speak of the sensation of right, self-sensation, etc. but of the feeling of right, self-feeling. Sensation is connected with sensitivity [sensuousness]; it seems plausible therefore that sensation emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of *finding*, i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling, whereas feeling looks more to the selfishness involved in it.

This distinction, that seems to exist inside the moment of *fühlende Seele* itself, constitutes yet another iteration of the *self-developmental* tendency of spirit and the progressive, retrospective revelation of its moments, each of which anticipating the realization of the next by exhibiting its dependence on an increasingly ideal, increasingly broader determination. The "assembly" of sensations and information in the immediate aftermath of the soul's confrontation with nature is not without purpose: it comes to form something like a sensuous, epistemic base, perhaps an intuitional "sense" of self, a preliminary "feeling" of being in the world, against which the contents of consciousness will be developed and integrated, and, ultimately, communicated in different forms of

what Hegel calls Absolute Spirit—the coalition of revelatory (divine) agency and the agency of human reason in art, religion, and philosophy. In the early iterations of subjectivity, still far from consciousness and self-consciousness, we have already the idea of *revelation* in the soul that "finds"—*finden*—and receives the world's sensuous manifold as-is, as it impresses itself on its body, with no differentiation or modulation, in immediate sensation—*Empfinden*. As *Seele* gets closer to consciousness and self-consciousness, it gets more entrenched in the structures of representation and almost loses itself in them—just as the natural soul almost loses itself in its own particularities as it approaches, in increments, its *actualization*:

> (…) consciousness activates its independence from the material of sensation by raising it from the form of *individuality* into the form of *universality*, omitting what is purely contingent and indifferent in it and holding on to the *essential*; by this transformation, what is sensed becomes something *represented*. This alteration effected by abstract consciousness is something *subjective*, which can go as far as *wilful-ness* and *unreality*, can generate representations with no actuality corresponding to them (§402 *Z*).

The distance between immediate sensuous experience and the activity of consciousness, evidenced, Hegel says, by the fact that we (as consciousnesses) can "be aware of something that is not sensibly present", demonstrates both the overcoming of sensation and its preservation, perhaps in a formal sense, in the modus operandi and structures of consciousness. "Sensation" (*Empfinden*) understood as the field of the subject "finding" (*finden*) itself in the immediacy of the natural world implies already a dimension of activity that was not, for instance, present in the 1827 *dreaming* (*träumende*) soul. The shift from "dreaming" to "feeling" is accompanied by a proportional shift from "sensing" to "feeling" between the 1827 and 1831 manuscripts, which may perhaps point to a tension within Hegel's thought between the receptive and

active (or actual) characterizations of pre-reflective subjectivity. Of course, this nuance that exists within the notion of *fühlende Seele* is, as is often repeated throughout the *Encyclopedia* concerning the differences Hegel finds in each of his philosophical objects, only "for us" and not for the subject-matter of our philosophizing, which is the soul itself. Recognizing the reflexive gesture of thought is especially important here: while we can draw such distinctions (only retroactively) within those manifestations of "soul", these distinctions are nonetheless not real for the soul itself, whose natural moment is defined by the *indifference* in which it is plunged—and whose actualization and transfiguration into self-consciousness and "Reason" depends on this initial state of indifference.

> Just as objectivity displays itself to our *intuition* not as something *separated out* into *different aspects*, but as a *concrete* divided into distinct objects, each of which is in turn for itself a *concrete*, a complex of the most diverse determinations, so the soul itself is a *totality* of infinitely many distinct determinacies which in the soul unite into *one*, so that in them the soul remains, *in itself*, infinite *being-for-itself*. In this totality or ideality, in the timeless, undifferentiated interior of the soul, the sensations which crowd each other out do not, however, vanish absolutely without trace, but remain in the soul as *sublated*, obtain in it their subsistence, as an initially merely *possible* content, which only advances from its *possibility* to *actuality* by becoming *for* the soul or by the soul's becoming *for itself* in it. (§402 R)

The totality of the "undifferentiated interior of the soul" is also atemporal: in its timelessness and all-encompassing general (*Allgemeines*) immediacy, soul constitutes in its feeling moment the necessity, the condition of possibility, required for the advent of a consciousness. Just as "reason would have nothing to strive for" without its immediate apprehension of the Absolute's revelatory agency[59], so does the animal subjectivity have nothing to strive for if not for its coarticulation with its logical *fulfilment* in consciousness. It is in this way that consciousness is contained prematurely, in the most

[59] See Reid 2017, 97.

rudimentary stages of subjectivity, as the soul's ability to "see what is coming", Malabou's notion of "*voir venir*"[60] (see Chapter 4) not in a predictive sense but rather in the sense of pre-reflective *orientation* with a determinate rhythmic, cyclic, direction: first outward, then inward. This is what is meant by the "anticipatory" structure of soul: the self *sees itself coming* in its pre-reflective, natural state, and directs itself (its corporeality) according to this orientation. As such, the self's plastic trajectory is set in motion by its initial, atemporal embodiment and ensured by the persistence of the atemporal field of bodily cycles just below the operations of achieved consciousness. What Malabou describes as "the excess of the future over the future" may then be understood as the initial saturation of the senses with the natural world, both preliminary to and concurrent with the self's *advent*—a persistent, "background tone"[61] of immediate reception whose fate is to get engulfed and remain in an overarching individual unity that gives it meaning and direction. In contrast to the resistance (*Widerstand*) displayed in habit towards the fluid indeterminacy of nature, we find here the "unresisting weakness" of the feeling individuality, which has no choice but to resolve itself to its dependence on the substantial subjectivity in which it finds itself—and of which it is not yet conscious.

Because the immediate sensuous information stored in the *fühlende* soul is itself the naturalness of soul, its bodily disposition, it does *vanish*—just not "absolutely without trace", and only for the developed consciousness: it remains in the soul latently, as the totality of the possibility (potentiality) of the soul's relationship to nature, similar to

[60] See Malabou 2004.
[61] With reference to Reid's (2024) work on Hegel's philosophy of music in the *Aesthetics*, the next chapter will develop this idea of the *Ur-tone* and the self-negation that determines the identity and unity of the whole.

Aristotle's *nous* as Intellect. This relationship is first the relation of the subject to its own body. In this relation, spirit, still completely saturated with its involvement with the world, grounds itself in the back-and-forth of nature through its entrenchment in its own rhythms and cycles (of aging, of sleeping and waking, of digestion and excretion, etc.)—and attunes itself to its own imminent outward expansion without yet taking hold of this expansion as an object *for itself*. The notion of orientation may be especially helpful in making clear the resulting tension between the passivity (the "latent" characterization of soul's immediate sensuous apprehension of the world) and activity of spirit in its *fühlende* moment (the organizing, "concrete subjectivity" according to which the individual is "gestated", as it were, and develops), out of which the way is cleared for a self to emerge (*advenir*) as a determinate individual already inhabiting the spaces of its subjectivation, and utter outward the opposition that was previously enclosed within it, in the *embodiment* of inner sensation and feeling into moods and "bodily expressions" such as laughter and crying. This is the "struggle for liberation which the soul has to wage against the immediacy of its substantial content in order to become completely in control of itself and corresponding to its concept" (§402 *Z*): the emergence of individuality outward from the "womb" of its enmeshment with the world of its substantial reality.

Both immediate in its unregulated sensuous "interaction" with the world and self-positing in its "totality", the *fühlende* individual splits open to reveal within itself two forces in constant tension—the one (the "medium") gathering information, the other (the soul's substantial totality) directing, organizing, and regulating this information to preserve its enclosed, organic, selfhood ("not as mere possibility, or capacity, or in-itself, but as activity and activation, as concrete subjectivity"). The meaning of *fühlende*

emerges precisely from this tension, between the receptive and active (organizing) dimensions of sensation and feeling, as the immediate sensuous apprehension of the world by some preliminary form of human subjectivity in which there is not yet any recognition of difference between itself and what will be "outer" to it. "At [the] standpoint [of sensation and feeling]", the *Zusatz* to §402 explains, "what I sense, I *am*, and what I am, I sense. I am here *immediately present* in the content, which only subsequently, when I become objective *consciousness*, appears to me as a *self-dependent* world confronting me". In the feeling moment there is no confrontation or real encounter between "self" and "world", but rather the consolidation of a field within which a self may be apt to develop into a relationship with the world, out of its initial (atemporal) immediate entrenchment in it—and may be apt, therefore, to make it an object of its consciousness and cognition. The feeling moment is the very tension (rhythm) that makes of the gestational environment of the womb the condition necessary for the emergence of the *life* of the "I" and its continuous self-(re)generation as an organism at once enclosed within itself and outward-facing, in relationship with its otherness.

This means that the functioning of habit, as a mechanism of the body's *ensoulment* and of its inscription in the structures of a specifically human narrative, takes for granted the field of affective receptivity generated by the feeling moment and which it cannot itself generate: since for habituation to take place, the subject's "self-feeling" moment (and the default danger of *Verrücktheit*[62]) must have been overcome and

[62] The *Zusatz* to §408 explains: "the […] question […] 'How does mind come to be deranged?'[…] already presupposes the firm, objective consciousness not yet attained by the soul at its present stage of development; […] at the point we have now reached in our enquiry, it is rather the *converse* question that should be answered, namely the question: 'How does the soul that is *enclosed* in its *inwardness* and is immediately identical with its individual world, emerge from the merely *formal*, empty difference of the

swallowed into the integrative whole of the individuality, which is henceforth becoming an object for itself and thus gaining control of itself as an other within its own concept.

> In [habit] the soul has become self-relating ideality […] by overcoming its disruption, its inner contradiction, it has extruded from itself the bodiliness with which it was previously immediately identical, and at the same time exerts the power of its ideality on the bodily element thus released to immediacy. At this standpoint […] we have to consider not the indeterminate separation of an interior in general from a world it finds before it, but the subjection of this bodiliness to the dominion of the soul. (§410 *Z*).

The image of the soul *ejecting* ("extruding") its bodiliness out of itself evokes a specific sense of identity characterized by a certain ambiguity, and an openness to variation that remains *enclosed* within its organic totality: while the self's ejection of its immediate entrenchment with the corporeal definitively brings it past its natural moment, it also

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subjective and objective and attain to the *actual* difference of these two sides, and thus to the *genuinely objective*, intellectual and rational consciousness?'". We are reminded that a complete understanding of the human "soul" requires that we strip it of those determinations that it acquires only after its transfiguration into something it no longer is. The soul's course of action past its feeling moment and into habit is not simply a given, or a predictable succession of events: rather it is the manifestation of a real struggle between selfhood's inward direction and its outward expression as an I among other "I"s—and the necessary outcome of the soul's "dominion" of its body which takes place in the torturous cycles of repetition, over time and across the length of the subject's *travels* into its predicative singularity. These travels, as we have hopefully seen, contain both forward and backward gestures: the movement of the I into its determinate, mediated individuality displays both a *reaching toward* motion (that of Malabou's plasticity, or "*voir venir*"), which is that of the body; and a *retroactive*, reflexive motion which is that of the achieved consciousness, and which anchors it in its bodily origins and allows it to unfold in time (both the historical/narrative time of *Geist* and the momentary now-ness of sensation and perception). The sustenance of this struggle between the body's immediacy and the mind's reflexivity, and the emerging tension between the two, are precisely what ensure the I's self-integration and its movement past the hazard of derangement. If, by contrast, the free movement of the body's integration by the developing consciousness is halted or held back in some way, i.e., if the mind lingers on its contradictions and is incapable of "looking" past them and toward its unified, integrated eventuality, it runs the risk of slipping into the self-obsessed, "one-sided" state of *Verrücktheit*, which tears the body out and away from the rhythms that normally integrate (in a "sane", "healthy" consciousness) all of bodily self-feeling, world, and the mediating function of habit and repetition. When a determinate element of the I's *affective* encounter with the world is abstracted by the mind and "sharpened" or hardened to the point of becoming exclusive, stagnant, or immobile, it no longer fits within the whole Self's malleable, unfolding concept—and stays back as a marker of *falsity* (*Unwahrheit*) in the organism's development. Hegel seems to situate mental illness prior to the subject's grasp of itself—conceiving the *coming to be* of an emerging consciousness in habit as a pre-reflexive yet *active* moment of rapture by which the self liberates its concept from the necessity of nature's determinations *before* it can speak or think any real distinction between itself and nature.

leaves it open to its influence retroactively, by virtue of nature's ontological "imprint" on the very structure of selfhood. It is as if the self's bodiliness leaves behind a sort of *nature-shaped* indentation that persists in the movements of the I's self-reflective consciousness: both outward toward its external difference, and inward toward its own self-negation and self-overcoming. The *Gestalt* of the body remains defining of selfhood's individuation and provides the terrain necessary for the subject to meet itself outside of its own bounds, i.e., in its encounter with other selfhoods.

5.2. The chronologies of mood (*Stimmung*), drive (*Trieb*), and disturbance (*Erregung*)

The openness displayed by *fühlende Seele* leaves it vulnerable to alterations that bypass the defenses of habituation's mechanisms and persist in the realized, integrated subject, the "I"—and do not, therefore, qualify as "derangement". These pertain to mood, *Stimmung*, and correspond to the variations in the subject's disposition that seem to be fragile compared to those disturbances engendered by *Verrücktheit*, and that are affected by Nature's minute, cyclical (recurring) changes. For example, it is mentioned in the *Zusatz* to §392 that "we are in different moods in the morning and evening", and "There is […] a certain relation between the times of day and the public life of peoples", but that "[the] moods produced by the times of the day are modified by climate; in hot countries, for example, one feels at midday more disposed to rest than to activity". In addition, "the sympathetic moods of ensouled life become more visibly apparent in animals than in human beings, since animals live in an even closer unity with nature"; and in the variations of mood "we are not yet in relationship to an external object distinct from us, we are not yet consciousness" (§401 *Z*). In contradistinction to the contingent throes of

derangement, variations in mood constitute something like a symptom, or a natural offshoot, of sensation: "the healthy participation of the individual mind in its bodiliness" (§401 R) entails a necessary variation at the level of *Stimmung*, where those "states" of the soul ostensibly so affected by the mere passage of time (morning and nighttime, changes in weather) are explicit yet temporary, apt to be offset by determinations that are beyond the subject's control and that preface the preservation of some extent of distance between self and world. In other words, the difference between self and world is established on the terrain of the body and affirmed in sensation before it reaches the emerging subjective consciousness.

In the *Zusatz* to §401, we find a definition of *Stimmung* as "an appearance of the mind of which, admittedly, we find an analogue in animals" and which also "at the same time has a peculiarly human character […] by being something not yet known with full consciousness by the subject". The subject's moods "correspond to an external factor": they are aroused by elements of the subject's environment. Hegel seems to linger the most on color and sound—particularly the modulations in human voice, "the principal way in which a human being discloses his interior"—as significant external factors that are productive of alterations in these moods. For such modulation to occur, i.e., for external stimulation and the resulting bodily sensation to arouse some "feeling" or "emotion" in the individual's inner life, there must be some extent of self-organization at the level of this interior—which does not yet have a grasp of its own operations as its own, and exists only in relation to a world and a corporeal life form with which it finds itself enmeshed.

This is simply because there is a clear distinction that we may draw from Hegel's text between certain *appropriate* and *inappropriate* reactions to the bodily self's most fundamental, "rudimentary" interactions with the world—a distinction that underscores the incidence of a self-organizing bodily "system" whose operations are prior to those of mind or consciousness, and whose functioning may go awry and steer away from normalcy (sanity). *Verrücktheit,* the soul's capacity to devolve into self-obsession as the body fails to latch on fully and be brought to stillness by the Self's integrative anchor, as it were, is not simply—as disturbance and moods are—a symptom or a natural consequence of the soul's bodily moment in which there is not yet an "I" and yet there is conflict and opposition. *Verrücktheit* is something Hegel cautions against and determines very clearly as a deviation from a certain standard of normalcy—a range of alteration within which a healthy, sane individuality may operate. In this range, which is one of appropriate equilibrium between the soul's self-differentiating and receptive, outward abilities, we find *Stimmung* and *Erregung* (disturbance, see below), whose alterations are explained as a sort of necessary instability, a tension out of which the Self finally emerges (*advient*). It may also be interesting to note that the mention of those themes (mood and disturbance but also drive or *Trieb*) is sparse as to their function within the dynamic architecture of the Hegelian Self—particularly within the ambiguous, even perhaps mysterious field that is the *fühlende Seele*. They do not acquire the status of a standout determination, as *Verrücktheit* does, and remain within the boundaries of a "normal" selfhood—normal meaning, in this case, a selfhood whose relationship with its own existence in a world that is different to it and that confronts it is not disordered, or *un*-sane, and does not generate either a state of internalizing self-obsession (*Selbstsucht*)

or a state of externalizing deflection and delusion (*Täuschung*) but keeps instead a balanced grip on its worldliness—precisely by keeping a balanced grip on its bodiliness, namely in habituation.

Mood may therefore be understood as evidence of the body's ability to respond to, and thus distance itself from, the "sensed" world in a gesture that demonstrates an unconscious, or pre-conscious, *orientation towards an otherness* on the basis of which the subject's individuation is set in motion. As such, mood is "the *unconscious* relatedness of outer sensation to the mental interior": it is the fundamental bodily state of modulation between the emerging determinations of "self" and "world" through sensation and affect, already internally organized toward the decisive moment of individuation—setting the stage for habit, where this individuation begins to take concrete (mediated) shape. The idea of the body's affective rhythms constituting something like an orientation, or a turn, towards a "sensed" objective world that is not yet recognized as such, will be the object of the next section. For now, let us attempt to understand more fully the topology of the feeling soul and see how affect, from its seat in the subject's body, seems to build a web of possible self-world interactions within which consciousness may then unfold and affirm its individuation.

In addition to *Stimmung*, there are two other "fringe" notions that, in view of this project's overarching aim to situate the body in the story of Self and time, I find are warranted for an analysis of the body's affective rhythms in Hegel: drive (*Trieb*) and disturbance (*Erregung*). While neither of these appears as a standalone theme either in the Anthropology or in Hegel's oeuvre more generally, both do seem to stand out as necessary components of the push-and-pull characteristic of animal individuality, in the

specific sense of its simultaneous self-propelling towards an otherness (desire, *Begierde*) and its self-regulatory capacity and ability to determine its own limitations within the broader scheme of difference in which it is itself unfolding. As such, both notions of *Trieb* and *Erregung* are important additions to a full understanding of the notion of mood especially as it relates to the broader, ambiguous field of "feeling" in which the *fühlende Seele* operates: if the individual has the capacity to experience a range of "feeling" or moods between sunrise and sunset, it is by virtue of subjectivity's continuous *drive* toward that which is outside of its limits, a continuity which points to at least some measure of the drive outward being left unaddressed, or unsatisfied. Still at this preliminary stage of "animality", the subject both undertakes and undergoes (see de Laurentiis 2021) a series of confrontations with an otherness it has not yet grasped as other to it, and so exists, to itself, in a state of self-conflict and self-contradiction. The result of this (self-) propelling motion is the necessary, *vanishing*[63], cyclical alteration in affect we may find sparsely referred to as *Erregung* in Hegel's text.

> The sexual relationship is, therefore, the highest point of living nature; at this stage, nature is exempt in the fullest measure from external necessity, since the distinct existences related to each other are no longer external to each other but have the sensation of their unity. Yet the animal soul is still not free, for it always appears as one with the determinacy of the sensation or excitation, as bound to one determinacy; it is only in the form of individuality that the genus is for the animal. The animal, only senses the genus, it is not aware of it; in the animal, the soul is not yet for the soul, the universal as such is not for the universal. [Dies empfindet nur die Gattung, weiß nicht von ihr; im Tiere ist noch nicht die Seele für die Seele, das Allgemeine als solches für das Allgemeine.] By the sublation of the particularity of the sexes which occurs in the genus-process, the animal does not attain to the production of the genus; what is produced by this process is again only an individual. Thus nature, even at the highest point of its elevation above finitude, always falls back into it again and in this way exhibits a perpetual cycle. (§381 *Z*/W10)

[63] See Reid 2021 for the full explanation of the "vanishing" status of meaning in Hegel.

In the Anthropology, *Trieb* appears rather sporadically to refer to the pre-habitual moment of activation, or a destabilized motion *towards*—the "animal" determinations of bodily need, urge and "appetite"—which in a sane and "free" selfhood will be brought under control by the mechanism of *purposive* repetition. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *Trieb* (often translated as "impulse" by most translators across Hegel's text) is mentioned within the context of the desire and the self-propelling motion of subjectivity towards its object, in search of a "satisfaction", a resolution of its inner contradictions in the form of a resting place in an Other—a place it will only eventually find in its own selfhood, only after having reached out to its difference and experienced the unfulfillment of the satisfaction it had been seeking in desire[64]. This image of a restless selfhood seeking a place of rest in its otherness is further supported by Hegel's use of *Erregung* in the *Phenomenology*, as the excitation that marks the moment at which a state of immediacy is *disturbed* by, or confronted with, difference. In the *Philosophy of Right*, both *Trieb* and *Erregung* appear in the context of impulse and excitation, as the "natural" moment of the subject's conscious capacity to *will*, and are understood not as unwanted manifestations that are to be suppressed or erased—but as natural variations that are to be mediated and freed from the constrains of nature by the soul's integrative capacity[65]. In the *Aesthetics*, Hegel writes about artistic drive and the ability of art, or the beautiful object, to arouse a disturbance as excitation, a *feeling*, in the subject's *sensibility* through variations in such elements as rhythm, tone, color, shape or form[66]. Out of each of these cases, the "feeling" subjectivity arises as the field in which the motion of self and world, the one cyclically

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[64] See PhG M115-120.
[65] See the Introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*.
[66] See LA K113, 288, 351.

going towards then retreating from the other, is established: as an ambiguous pre-conceptual terrain with a determinate self-organizing structure that is appropriate to and congruent with the structure of the objective world and that emerges in response to its primary contact with it, in sensation.

The range of the soul's appropriate reactions to the facticity of its relationship with the world contains those determinations that underline Hegel's obstruse, sort of "taut" characterization of subjectivity, held in place in between its own limits and what is outside of itself—and *Verrücktheit*, derangement, is the specific point at which this stasis breaks, preventing the Self from emerging and taking control of its corporeality. The "feeling" moment, i.e., the persistence of "immediate" sensuous alterations that are always greater than the scope of habit, as well as the dispersed way in which such notions as *Trieb* and *Erregung* are scattered around Hegel's text in his different discussions of subjectivity, show that the body is indeed understood as the terrain of the confrontation between self and world—one that remains restless, *in motion*, until its dissolution. As such, the body is always being changed by its constant immediate contact with the world's alterity, and the conscious subject only catches up in a backward motion, assembling and organizing the "data" acquired in this immediacy into a meaningful story first and foremost through habituation. The identity of the "I" emerges on the very basis of the body's continuous contact with the world and the resulting modulation of the subject by the natural world that occurs in sensation.

This means that the identity of the "I" is established not in spite but by virtue of the subject's inherent multiplicity: that it is itself the necessary manifold of its immediate, temporary affectations with the world (its sensations, perceptions, and moods or feelings)

is what *clears the way* for an understanding of selfhood as an integrative unity, meaning as a differentiated, posited individuality that exists in a relentless state of becoming. The coexistence of the self's multiplicity with its integrative unity is not an inconsistency for Hegel but rather the basis and logical conclusion of his speculative philosophy and the paradigm of his all-encompassing deployment of the notion of *Aufhebung,* a notion woven through all corners of his text—on selfhood, God, and the world, on society and politics, on biology, on art, etc.—, including the Anthropology. This point will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, where I aim to extract the manifestations of *Aufhebung* from the Anthropology's textuality in order to show that the logical fate, so to speak, of the natural soul is to be engulfed in the historical architecture of Spirit, in an ever-self-renewing motion of confrontation and reproduction which involves the continuous struggle of self and corporeality, beginning with the subject's own body.

5.3. Affective temporality as pre-reflective pre-conscious turn toward the world

In the Remark to §401 of the Anthropology, Hegel proposes that the study of sensation and feeling become a "specific science of its own", what he calls *psychical physiology*, and demonstrates special interest in the "*embodiment* assumed by mental determinations, especially as *emotions*". Hegel's treatment of mood in §399-401 demonstrates an understanding of "feeling" as a diffuse orientation towards the world that is perpetually present and operative, rather than a discrete element in the individual's psyche (such as sadness, joy, comfort, dread, etc.) taken independently from the universality of its relationship with what is external to it. Mood is the offshoot of the animal subjectivity's constant immersion in a world whose alterity it does not yet recognize: as sensation constitutes the receptive terrain in which the relationship of self to

world unfolds, so does mood constitute the sustained, *stretched* temporal field in which what is inner to the subject and what is outer to it are synthesized, brought together—a gesture that implies their separation—prior to their respective objectivation. There is not yet a real structure of temporal succession in the field of *Stimmung* but rather a pre-reflective, underlying stretch of time that allows for the subsequent conscious recollection of the self's place in the world according to the "shape" of its bodily contact with it.

In this sense, alterations in mood are the "diffuse", background moment of the anthropological self's rhythmic unfolding, directing the body toward the variations of the sensuous world and thus attuning it to the world's chronology. In mood, the temporal order of the subject's difference—its "externality"—is (1) brought inward by the mechanisms of feeling. This temporal order will find itself prone to a cyclical disturbance (*Erregung*) inscribed in a pattern of consistent desire and satisfaction, and renewal (*Trieb*), and will eventually be stabilized in the integrative, *mediated* mechanisms of habit, *Gewohnheit*—and thus (2) ejected back outward, as the self's assertion of its "dominion" (§410 *Z*) over its body.

Within the generalized continuity of mood, the urgency of *Erregung* announces itself as the interjection of subjectivity on to the natural world: taking the form of both a necessary refusal and disruption of the soul's complete immersion in its natural state and an announcement of the impending danger of mental illness, *Verrücktheit*. As it constitutes the moment of rupture between the plurality inherent to the enclosed organism and the sensuous manifold that exists outside of it, the function of disturbance is one of propelling, or setting in motion, the self's individuation by intervening precisely at the pre-conscious level of immediate, undifferentiated feeling, sharpening in this way the

subject's orientation towards its own unfolding even in its preliminary bodily moment. Since this unfolding is premised on a restless motion of "give-and-take" between the "feeling" (sensing) subject and the world, the body reveals itself, to consciousness ("for us"), to be the true site of the Self's beginning—and the terrain on which selfhood develops (*bilden*) in dialectical relation with the natural world, according to its dialectical relation and struggle with its own corporeality. The excitation that arises in *Erregung* may, then, be understood as the necessary moment of rupture that occurs periodically to disturb the neutral, homogeneous "field" of confrontation set in place by *Stimmung* and generate a new temporal order punctuated by the self's repetitive *drive* outward, *toward* its otherness.

Reading the Anthropology's reflections on *Stimmung* while keeping in view the role played by the notion of disturbance in Hegel's philosophy of the Self elsewhere in his text, it becomes clear that Hegel's self is essentially characterized in its bodily moment by both a continuity (in mood) and a recurring rupture (in disturbance)—whose intensification manifests notably in the *Phenomenology* as *Begierde* and the self-propelling motion of consciousness towards another consciousness. Without this motion, the "I" may never achieve its truth, which is its ideality: its ability to always go past its particularities and dissolve into a universal body as it preserves its singularity over time. The human subject emerges, therefore, as the product of the soul's oscillation between its eternal "present" and its chronological, progressive development and recollects itself, as consciousness, out of this space of ambiguity—a split the Self experiences first and foremost in relation to its own body, it is worth noting, from the very moment of its

initial, immediate and sustained *contact* with the world in the *fühlende* state, and so even "prior" to the logical introduction of habituation.

As such, it may be reasonably suggested here that the reason behind the desire for consciousness to find itself in its Other in the *Phenomenology*, and what motivates its "impulse" toward its own negation is precisely the guarantee of desire's endless, repetitive resurgence within the relational field established between self and world in the "sensing" moment. Indeed, we may find that in the *Phenomenology* the impoverished moment of self-certainty (perception) is superseded by the much stronger, much richer determination of self-possession, where the desiring self-consciousness recognizes its own objectivity and returns to itself having acquired this self-negating determination. It is also made clear in the *Phenomenology* that whenever there is an Other, there is a desire that ultimately goes unfulfilled—because *Begierde* incessantly resurges by virtue of the subject's fundamental openness to that which is outside of it. In the Anthropology, this self-possession is understood as the moment in which the desire for an Other, and the *Erregung* this impulse engenders in the undifferentiated "feeling" subjectivity, anticipate the imminent return of the Self from its *turn toward* its difference—its speculative predicate—back to itself and develops the capacity to be, as Dryden articulates it, "at home in [its own] body" (see Dryden 2016, 16) in the processes of habituation where a "second nature" emerges, here again out of the ambiguous coexistence of both immediacy (the *form* of habitual behaviors and actions) and posited-ness (the process of *entrainment* through which habitual behavior is made the case).

The self's aforementioned "drive toward its otherness" will be reigned back in, so to speak, through the mechanisms of habituation, where the subject begins to project its

inner organization out into the organization of the corporeal world. The result of this progression—from *Stimmung* through *Erregung* and *Trieb* to habituation—is an affective Self in constant oscillation between temporal continuity and rupture. Hegel's self seems indeed, as suggested earlier in this manuscript, to inhabit both the eternal "Now" of Greek thought and the chronological temporality—successive, narrative time—attributed to the Christian tradition[67]. This notion of ambiguous selfhood supports a rhythmic reading of the anthropological story in which the possibilities of consciousness and (self) reflection emerge as the *temporal reorganization* of the field of affect, rather than its complete refusal. Indeed, the subject's immediate relationship with the sensuous world is not merely negated in habit but *aufgehoben*, rearranged and reintegrated in order to fit the architecture of Spirit—and to prepare consciousness, as it were, for its "higher-order" tasks in which the subject's overcoming of its corporeality is already assumed. In the following chapter, the implications of this generality of the notion of *Aufhebung* across Hegel's *oeuvre* are examined more closely, particularly in relation to the question of bodiliness. Branching out of the Anthropology, the examples of music in the *Aesthetics* and ethical life in the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Right* will be used as further textual support for the thesis of Hegel's "soul" as a temporal, temporalizing process that begins with the operations of the animal body—and Hegel's Self as the product of the constant, sustained tension between the reflexive, historical mind and the immediate, sensuous body.

[67] See Reid, "History and the Absolute Now" in *Reason and Revelation* 2025.

Chapter 6. Rethinking the Role of Natural Soul: To what extent is Nature (body) sublated in Spirit?

6.1. When Nature gives over to Spirit: the Anthropology's logics of disappearance

6.1.1. Natural Soul as the vanishing ground of subjectivity

A "rhythmic" reading of the Anthropology, i.e., one that acknowledges the structural role of the dynamic of cancelling and preserving that is characteristic of the speculative syllogism in defining the narrative of the human subject, shows that Hegel's conception of selfhood may be more complex than a simple "progression" or a simple unidirectional tale of emancipatory development *out of* nature and *into* the spiritual realm, as it has tended to be described by commentators[68]. Instead, this chapter suggests a reading that positions Nature as the retrospectively grasped *ground* (*Grund*) or essence—as defined in the *Encyclopedia*'s *Logic*—of Spirit: whereby it does not merely, or *exactly*, get surpassed as a stage of the I's development but is rather tucked in, and *disappears* from view for the achieved consciousness.

Accordingly, the feeling (habituating) soul may be understood as Spirit's "reason to be": the condition of the latter's existence that then reveals its own dependence on

[68] See for example McCumber 1990, Chaput 2023, or Pippin *in* Ameriks, 2017. See also Bordignon 2019 and Nuzzo *in* Stern 2013. While such readings aptly extract the progressive, developmental ("gestational" or "genetic") nature of the truth of Hegelian selfhood, not enough attention is given to the important caveat of this development being permeated through and through by a retroactive movement that makes it so that the body is "tucked in" to the definition of self and disappears and reappears as if *as needed*. The account of habit as second nature is therefore necessary for a full understanding of Hegelian selfhood: it is the soul's capacity to take hold of its body and entrain it (within, paradoxically, the limits of Thought's free unfolding) that makes possible such a "spiraling" conception of selfhood that is both progressive (developmental) and reflexive. In this sense habit is the *tourniquet* of the "I": both the meeting (mid) point of its syllogistic extremities and the specific point at which the self is able to both *look back* on itself and *produce* itself anew.

another condition, which then reveals its own dependence on another, so on ad infinitum (see §123): the never-ending tension (between the immediacy of habit's appearance and its *posited-ness* or mediation as pre-reflective entrainment) that continually brings the self out of indeterminacy and into existence, or makes its advent out of the body possible.[69] Here again, as in the discussions of repetition and habituation, we find Hegel's notion of "bad" or "spurious" infinity, where the poles in an ontological relationship find themselves continually and endlessly spilling over into one another with no real resolution—a kind of succession that will be broken precisely by the intervention of thought, which liberates objects from their initial indeterminacy by grasping them and establishing them as identifiable, knowable, meaningful *things*.

In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, ground is employed as a relational category between a thing's "being" and *Verstand*, the understanding or the "thinking" mind that grasps it and identifies it, defines it, interacts with it, etc.:

> The *principle of ground* reads, "Everything has its sufficient *ground*", i.e., the true essentiality of something is not the determination of it as identical with itself or as diverse, as merely positive or as merely negative, but the fact that it has its being in an other, which (as the identical-with-itself that belongs to it) is its essence. The latter also is not an abstract reflection *into self*, but reflection *into another*. Ground is the essence that is *within itself*, the latter is essentially ground, and it is ground only insofar as it is the ground of something, of an other. (*Enz.* §121)

Arriving at a satisfactory definition of the body in relation to the human subject in the Anthropology depends, in my view, on understanding Hegel's conception of cognition.

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[69] The Addition to this section (§123) explains: "The term 'existence' (derived from *existere*) points to a state of emergence, and existence is being that has emerged from the ground and become reestablished through the sublation of mediation. […] Ground is the unity of identity and distinction, and as such it is at the same time the distinguishing of itself from itself. […] The ground is self-sublating and what it sublates itself toward, the result of its negation, is existence. Existence, therefore, which is what has emerged from the ground, contains the latter within itself, and the ground does not remain behind existence; instead, it is precisely this process of self-sublation and translation into existence".

This means addressing the question of the mechanism by which a thinking mind comes to "understand" or grasp those objects to which we may readily assign such qualifications as external, dependent or independent, pure, true, or "in-themselves" (see EL §124 *Add.*)—and what that makes of those objects that are separate from the mind and yet still *appropriate to* it, structurally adequate to it, as it were, and even identical to it in some ways (as the Anthropology shows, for example, the subject finds itself in the ambiguous ontological space of both being its body and being separate from it. See Russon 1997 and Dryden 2016 on the autonomy of the body and the body's function as "ambiguous other" respectively).

For Hegel, a "thing" is only picked out as such, individuated and differentiated from what it is not, and therefore *identified*, once its objectivity has been conceptualized by a subjectivity that encounters it as an other. This other is both autonomous and profoundly implicated in the constitution of the subjectivity itself that grasps and names it. The "thing" is only so, therefore, once it has become something *posited*: once it has undergone (and undertaken) the conflict, the mediation, and the integration that its encounter with its difference requires of it. "The *thing* [*Ding*] is the totality as the development of the determinations of ground and of existence posited all in One" (*Enz.* §125). We may reasonably assign this status of "thing" to the Self in Hegel, which undergoes a process of individuation and singularization itself and emerges "out of" Nature, in *feeling*, as something both identical and different to it: a negating and integrative whole that exists beyond the mere sum of its many different, intermittent, oppositional moments. In the Anthropology, the Self comes to be, *advient* as Malabou writes, as complete or "achieved" once it has incorporated its alterity into its very

process, which is its concept, and once it has, as such, *re*-cognized the irreducible difference that is part of its own self. Only then does the negating agency of thought—the self-recognition and reproduction of the I's own externality in the world—establish itself in such forms of *Geist* as cultural production, historical narratives, art, philosophies, religions, social institutions, etc.

I suggest, therefore, that Nature persists in Spirit not simply as a remnant, nor even as a conceptual anchor and foundation, but more precisely as the underlying *cadence*[70] of the soul's process—the persistent infinitely self-regenerative soul-life of "humanity" as such and its modulation over time. The inner activity of subjectivity and the patterns in which it makes itself known and reveals itself to consciousness, are first grounded (find their reason to *be*, or what it *means* to be a human subject) in the natural rhythms of the body as they first find themselves disposed to engage with their otherness (i.e., in sensation). In this sense, the body's ensoulment, meaning the decisive moment of habituation, is that which *first* temporalizes the individual self through such "preparatory", we may say proto-temporal structures as breath, circulation, pulsation, digestion, repetition/entrainment, etc. by setting in motion an open "loop" where qualitative change may happen within the (bodily) limits of subjectivity, and *then* fades into the background of its conscious operations as the self's rhythm and makes in this way the progression and the development (*Bildung*, formation, "education") of the "I"

[70] As was pointed out by Francis Peddle in his evaluation of this manuscript, while the designation of *cadence* is useful for an understanding of the Hegelian subject, it must be reminded that a healthy psyche is not simply unrestricted absolute freedom of movement but still requires some form of "well-roundedness or *terra firma*" that would ground it in the continuous negation of its default of derangement and makes possible the difference between a "sane" and "insane" psyche in the first place, and therefore the dialectic of *Verrücktheit* itself.

possible. Precisely through its disappearing configuration, the ensouled body—the body that is the object of habituation, that is *taken hold of* by the soul's operations and hoisted out of its total immersion in the natural world—ceases to exist as a mediated act and becomes, at the moment of habituation, the very foundational cadence of the subject's individuation: the shape it takes or the limits within which it may then expand and further *spiritualize* itself.

If the "essential determination" of an existent thing is "the fact that it has its being in an other", then it is this fact that also ensures the concurrent overcoming of the other, its *dépassement* by the thing in question, and therefore also a temporal progression, an unfolding that takes place in a certain order and *toward* a certain direction. The tone of the self is set, so to speak, by the cadence of the natural world, one that exists within the individual healthy body—the endless continuity of time that allows for the negating agency of thought to operate in the first place and determine the limits of its objects by determining the limits of its own expansion and anchoring itself in the structures of "reality", or the world of difference with which it finds itself in confrontation.

In the I's interaction with other Selves, the body as "ground" may show itself in the pre-linguistic, perhaps pre-cognitive recognition of selfhood and *meaning* not only in such phenomena as music and art (which will be examined in the next section of this chapter), but also in the sexual encounter. In the "Natural Alterations" section of the Anthropology, Hegel enumerates three types of difference that exist within the singular subject, which he describes as "at once mental and physical" and whose complete definition, he writes, "would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the cultivated mind" (§396): the first, aging, which separates the individual (the persistent self) from its

body in the form of sequential, progressive biological stages; the second, the sexual relationship—"the moment of real opposition of the individual to itself, so that it seeks and finds *itself* in *another* individual" (§397); the third, the "waking" state of the soul where the individual distinguishes its being as *for itself*, from its "mere being" as the universal substance underlying the "self-conscious and rational activity of the mind" (§398).

In each of these cases, the self is split in two and confronts the alterity to which it had found itself tethered, and which it now negates and treats as *object* in relation to its subjectivity. In each case, the self's progression reaches a dead-end within the bounds of the Anthropological story, where it ends up repeating, in a seemingly endless motion with no resolution—a "bad" infinity—, the terms of its contradiction: the genus (species) and the individual subject in the first case, the self's interiority and its desire for recognition by another self in the second, and the alternation of sleep and waking in the third. Specifically, the second case of the sexual relationship is one such situation where the self's internal difference is established then suspended within the Anthropological sphere, with an acknowledgement that this manifestation of difference will be returning "later", beyond the workings of the anthropological (natural) subject, in a more developed or *achieved* form that will then necessarily involve both the subject's own self-consciousness and another self. The self's desire for recognition remains therefore unfulfilled within the Anthropology, and will only find its proper resolution—i.e., for Hegel, the subsisting, socially recognized union of the sexes where raw animalistic consumptive "desire" gets channeled into its systematic, communally realized

determination—in the ethical institution of marriage, in the *Philosophy of Right* (1820/21).

In this sense, the sexual encounter and the *Begierde*, desire, that brings about its "natural" manifestation and that Hegel had qualified in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the moment at which self-consciousness becomes aware of the independent selfhood that is present in its Other and at once becomes certain of its own existence by dominating that of the other, and recognizes the other's subjectivity without which it would not have emerged, is "conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this other" (PhG §175, M109). This is why the superfluous, temporary satisfaction (which is perhaps closer to a *suspension*) of desire does not find a resolution in the still-self-focused subjective forms of spirit: its fate is to reach and want, continually, for the complete negation of its difference and bump up, continually, against the reemergence of this want by virtue of the very existence of its alterity—and the subsequent self-assertion of this alterity as a subject and a Self in its own right.

The "inchoate" subjectivity that reveals itself at the Anthropological stage of Spirit's development may be interpreted as the kind of self-certainty that had appeared in the *Phenomenology*: a moment of selfhood that exists perpetually in the "bad infinity" of mere circular repetition, or repetition without *qualitative* change, and that anticipates its own continual undoing and overcoming of those circles of repetition.

> (…) the *reflected* unity [of self and other] is different from the first. Contrasted with that *immediate* unity, or that unity expressed as a [mere] *being*, this second is the *universal* unity which contains all these moments as superseded within itself. It is the simple genus which, in the movement of Life itself, does not *exist for itself qua* this *simple* determination; on the contrary, in this *result*, Life points to something other than

> itself, viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, or as genus. (PhG §172, M108/109)

It is indeed consciousness that interferes to break the endless continuity of natural life—but it is natural life, as the "soul" process underlying the emergence of "I"-hood, that sets the temporal stage for consciousness to undertake this break and make meaning possible, then fades into the background, as "the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself" (PhG §171, M108). When Hegel writes that "Life points to something other than itself", he is making clear once more the relationship of *moment* to *process* in which the individual subjectivity and its universal essence (the capacity for *feeling* or *sensation*; the sensory apparatus?) exist respectively: and the necessity of Nature moving *beyond* itself by virtue of its own insufficiency towards its concept.

6.1.2. Habit: the mechanism of natural disappearance

As was hopefully shown in Chapter 4, habit is the decisive point at which the subject and its body come into consistent contact (conflict) and are able to generate something *new* out of their repeated encounter. As a *second nature*, habit is conceptualized in the Anthropology as a posited mechanism—a mechanism of repetition and entrainment—that becomes, or takes the form of, something immediate: something natural. Once it has accomplished this appearance of naturalness, habit is no longer what it is: it now belongs to the sphere of the natural precisely by virtue of its mediation by the subject. As Russon writes, a habit is

> (…) the developed product of a particular kind of self-consciously chosen practice that has provided the now-habituated self with an *immediate* access to the objects of its desire, that is more sophisticated than it was prior to the habituation, but that has provided this mediated access precisely though [sic] making itself *unconscious* to the habituated self and working out its own affairs independently of the self-

> conscious control of the self. In other words, just as *phusis* [nature] was always a *hexis* [habit], a *hexis* is only really a habit once it has become *phusis*. […] *Phusis* is what is in-itself unconscious, and *hexis* is what has made itself unconscious.[71]

Habit is a crucial moment in the I's unfolding specifically because it successfully moves the particularized self from a strict self-interiority—rescuing it from the dangers of madness and "derangement"—and back into a more general, more *universal* (and therefore more shared) register in which the I begins to finally realize itself, in concert with other "I"s. In this register, the I makes contact with its difference and actualizes the feebleness of its own self-identity by reaching outward and finding, or realizing, itself in the world outside of its bounds. The processes of habituation allow the self to shield its interiority from the view of self-consciousness as it anticipates the outward turn of its focus, toward this *dépassement* that is assumed in the body's state of *phusis* and moves into its more communal determination while preserving its essentially natural dimension.

A conception of the way in which this natural dimension is preserved through its disappearance, or concealment, may be found in Hegel's characterization of habit as "a hard point in the organization of the mind", and "the *mechanism* of self-feeling" (§410 R) in the Anthropology. Habit is both a fixed *space* of encounter between body and mind, and a *process* of integration, or assimilation, in which what was of mind (conscious) becomes of body (unconscious/ "natural", or invisible to consciousness, or perhaps *behind* consciousness) through repetition. This is the "liberation" that self-consciousness attains through habit: a freedom from the immediacy of its sensuous experience and a retreat of those (deliberately repeated) sensuous experiences from the field of the self's view, so that new, different, more complex operations may take place. Habit may be

[71] Russon 1997, 69.

described as a mechanism of *natural disappearance* in so far as it puts in place a recurrent pattern of directed repetition, a repetition that is undertaken "in the service of mind", the purpose of which is to integrate certain body operations—beyond the immediacy of strictly natural bodily functions—into the whole of the self-conscious subject's identity, *as if* those operations were now of the same order as those of the natural body. This is the soul becoming "more and more *at home* in its *expressions*" and the "immediate operation of mind on body", through which a "*rule*" is set in place that allows the conscious subject to turn away from the details, or the particularities, to use Hegel's language, of the habitual task or behavior in question. We are here given the example of writing[72] (410 *Z*) but may think of many other cases (driving, brushing teeth, making breakfast) where the *particularities* of the task disappear from the purview of the mind as it is freed up to undertake, perhaps, other operations, simultaneously: as if the task has become part of the body's elemental *modus operandi*, much the same as breathing or digesting or circulating blood.

It would be interesting to linger for a moment on the relation between this conception of habit as disappearance and the tension running through Hegel's philosophy—most notably in the *Encyclopedia* but also in the *Phenomenology*—stemming from the Aristotelian dimension in his understanding of time, between narrative chronological historical (Christian) temporality on the one hand, and the eternal,

[72] "When we are learning to write we must direct our attention on every individual detail, on a vast number of meditations. By contrast, once the activity of writing has become a habit with us, then our self has so completely mastered all relevant individual details, has so infected them with its universality, that they are no longer present to us *as individual* details and we keep in view only their *universal* aspect. Thus we see […] that the soul on the one hand completely *penetrates* into its expressions and on the other hand deserts them, thus giving them the shape of something *mechanical*, of a merely *natural effect*" (§410 *Z*).

ever-present (Greek) "now" on the other. Now that we have established the role of the habituated body in individuating the subject by establishing a rhythm, or a singular "time signature" according to which the development of the Self may take place and unfold, it may be useful to address the question of the ambiguous temporality which this habituated body occupies—particularly its status as a simultaneously *posited* yet *ever-present* reality. As Jeffrey Reid explains,

> (…) the eternal Hegelian moment […] is expressed through the auxiliary verb 'to have', which affirms the whole past experience as *having been* acquired and thus possessed by and constitutive of the present. […] the comprehension of the Truth of the eternal 'Now' is […] an *Erinnerung*, an internalized remembrance of its past historical course". At the same time, "the logic of the concept in its temporal unfolding shows that Hegelian history leads to a 'Now' understood as a self-knowing (*gnothi seauton*) where the selfhood of humanity recognizes itself in the history of its own course, apprehended as essentially *past*[73].

Neither is Hegelian time an expression of Christian linearity where history has an "end", nor is it strictly an expression of immediacy or some worldly eternal "now", as Heidegger or Löwith might have interpreted.

Instead, Hegel's time exists in an oscillation that makes of it an essentially, and necessarily, retroactive determination—one that comes about "too late", so to speak, and only emerges as a result of the achieved forms of mind in *Geist*. As Reid points out, the *Encylcopedia*'s *Logic* is nontemporal, though it "[embodies] the eternal Hegelian moment" in that it establishes the (logically) initial counter-thrust (*Gegenstoss*) of the subject *out of* itself, wherein the Self, in its most inchoate, indeterminate expression, and by virtue only of its mere Being, undertakes a preliminary form of recognition towards the alterity which is already present in itself and initiates a process of self-differentiation,

[73] "History and the Absolute Now" *in* Reid, *Reason and Revelation*, 2025.

that consciousness then apprehends "as essentially *past*" (Reid, 2025). In other words, Spirit's recognition of itself in the world's heterogeneity lives perpetually in the past—most accurately, for Hegel, in the temporality expressed in the *Perfekt* tense, where what took place in the past is understood as already (having been) integrated into, and now "possessed by", the present. To say that the Spirit of humanity recognizes itself in the world as some thing that *has been*, is therefore to say that the philosophical exercise, attained only at the closure of the mind's journey, is almost superfluous to the world—or that it emerges to make sense of (give meaning to) the world by revealing, by reverse-engineering in a sense, its most fundamental truths.

Throughout the Anthropological story, we may find traces of this logic of disappearance—the logical form by which certain determinations are first integrated into a more complex totality and then become almost *obsolete* in their details—in the very fabric of the text itself. For example, the deficiency and simplicity with which the immediacy of the body, or its "immediate *natural determinacy*" (§390) is characterized, presuppose at every stage their own undoing in the very terms of their identification. (e.g., "the natural soul, which only is" (§390), "immediately only as a soul which just *is*", "this subjectivity comes into consideration here only as an individualization of *natural determinacy*", "the opposition arising here is not yet the opposition which belongs to the essence of consciousness" (§395), etc.). While the reflecting mind *comes* to know the necessity of the sublation of the body's immediacy, the body itself inhabits the temporal space of constant, continuous cycles of self-*dépassement* that make this very process of knowing possible for the achieved self.

This singularity of the body, which is considered by Hegel to be the "sign of the soul" (see §411), is also what Reid refers to as a "vanishing sign" in his onto-grammatical (2021) reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: the temporary yet resurging dimension of the self's immediate, bodily contact with the world where it "finds itself" within the terms of a dichotomy it itself did not choose, and which rather was imposed on it. Much like the dependent consciousness in the *Phenomenology*'s "master-slave dialectic", the body finds itself having to undertake a struggle of liberation from the limits of this imposed dichotomy—a struggle that manifests on Reid's reading first grammatically through the terms of the speculative proposition, then ontologically through the progressive liberation of Spirit in the realization of singular, necessarily communal selfhoods that are turned essentially outward.

> In the master-slave dialectic, we have seen how the slave, as a mere predicate/sign, is consigned to the status of bodiliness. In overcoming this status and raising herself to the status of grammatical/psychical subject, the slave is no longer a 'mere' body/sign. As a meaningful word she is, in terms borrowed from the *Encyclopedia*'s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, an actual soul. […] In so doing, the slave has enacted the ambiguous reality of the copula, the speculative truth that it does not just express the unilateral self-identity of the master but that it must also represent a force of resistance, the linguistically performative counter-thrust of difference, an enactment of ambiguity (*Doppelsinnige*, M180/W3, 146) that acknowledges interpretive openness. The slave is no longer as-signed as such, anchored and fixed in her nominal reality. No longer a mere sign, ripe for heteronomous predication, the slave has become a vanishing word, whose meaning is revealed by the fact that she no longer is what she is but, rather, is what she has been.[74]

In a very practical sense, such a reading of the *Phenomenology* shows that the self-determination that is characteristic of the Hegelian subject is the result of "the habituating work that the master has imposed upon [the slave], first, in predicating his own body/sign through the habitual, even 'proletariat', self-disciplinary aspect of the

[74] Reid 2021, 49.

work itself, which is necessarily repetitive since it must feed the never-ending appetite/desire of the master" (Reid 2021, 48). The significance of the body's vanishing characterization lies both in its openness to being directionally *shaped*, so to speak, by the operations of the mind on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in its resurging status and its dimension of incompletion that makes it so that it becomes for the "I" an underlying, present-yet-invisible constancy, by virtue of its being unachievable. The "bad infinity" of the body's raw desires and processes discussed above is the very element that temporalizes selfhood by liberating it and propelling it outward; it does so by inserting it in a unique sort of chronological order that allows it to inhabit fully the space of ambiguity expressed in the speculative copula: between the incomplete, all-encompassing immediacy of its sensuous experiences and the retroactively *revealed* character of the content of its consciousness. As such, Hegel remarks in the "Psychology" of the *PSS*, "Jakob *Böhme*[75] viewed *I-hood* as agony and *torment*, and as the *source* of nature and of spirit" (§472 R): the mind is always occupied by and occupying the tension between its present (immediate) state and the larger, linear, narrative chronology of *Geist* in which its individuality as such—where the body's mechanisms have been integrated into the full concept of the individual Self—is inscribed.

The importance of this tension rests precisely in the space it leaves open for the realization of the self as something that is, *for* the mind, always beyond its current determinations or lack thereof. It is the atemporality of the soul's natural determination that allows, therefore, the mind to assemble the identity of its "I" and in so doing propel

[75] Hegel considered Böhme the figure with whom "philosophy first appeared in Germany"; see section III "Modern Philosophy" in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1806).

itself outward and into its realization as "the I that is we and the we that is I" (*PhG* M177), where subject and object are no longer bound to their natural limitations and can merge into each other as moments in the self's overall "becoming" or process (or development). What ensures this gesture of *liberation* of self from body is precisely the temporal entrainment of the former by the latter, still at the anthropological moment, and the resulting necessity of the mind anticipating, reflexively, the overcoming of this repetitive and impoverished moment that is habituation and its fusion into a new moment of subjectivity's identification with its own, real or outward difference: the other subject. As a result, the rhythms of the body are absorbed into the variations of social and ethical (communal) life, which itself is the direct offshoot of the variations that may be seen in the anthropological subject. Russon writes:

> The unhappy consciousness—the completed form of self-consciousness—recognizes itself as an empirical self *subject to* a real self, and in our account of the body as *hexis* we have seen how a singular self can become a constitutive moment of a more comprehensive, institutionally based communal self; this means that, although this 'natural' body is a *necessary* condition for human life, it is not sufficient, and we must now move on to consider this real self in Hegel's account of the logic of communal relations in Chapter VI, '*Geist*', and to uncover that 'second nature' that is the body of this spirit properly called.[76]

The body of Spirit, in its truest form, is the self as it is in relation to other selves: the "I" that is anticipated in the Anthropology and realized in the *Philosophy of Right*, and that only *achieves* its own concept once it finally reaches beyond the alterity of its own body. Habit's role is not one of mere initiation but one of *imprinting*, in a sense: the rendering obsolete of the self by the self, the self's own blueprint—the gesture of "clearing" the way—that makes room for its interaction with all that is other to it, or outside of it.

[76] Russon 1997, 76.

6.2. Music as the sensuous revelation of Spirit's rhythmic architecture: a detour through the *Aesthetics*

6.2.1. Sound: a vibrating body? The different "signs" of musical significance

In the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature*, it is explained that

> When a body sounds, we feel we are entering a higher sphere; sound affects our innermost feeling. […] Sound, by itself, is the self of the individuality, not an abstractly ideal something like light, but as it were a mechanical light, manifest only as *the time of movement in cohesion*. Individuality includes matter and form; sound is this *total form which announces itself in time*—the whole individuality which is merely this: that this soul is now posited as one with the material body and dominating it as a stable existence. (§300 *Z*. Emphasis added).

As a "thought-determination", Sound is first found by Hegel to be made object or made real by the understanding, *Verstand*. It is the achieved consciousness that assigns the status of object to Sound and defines it then as it defines other dimensions of its sensuous experience, such as heat or light. However, as is recurrently the case in the *Encyclopedia*, and as was shown through our analysis of *Verrücktheit* in Chapter 4, those thought-determinations find themselves going through a process of retroactive dissection, so to speak, and reveal themselves as constitutive of the object's innermost *truth*, i.e., its essence or meaning. The innermost truth of Sound is precisely found in the fact that it actualizes a meeting, a veritable encounter of one selfhood with another, through the register of a shared "psychic" sense of meaningfulness, or intensity.

As such sound is "this total form which announces itself in time—the whole individuality which is merely this: that this soul is now posited as one with the material body and dominating it as a stable existence" (§300 *Z*). It is another, this time more developed meeting point between the bodily and the spiritual, where the transience of this possession of the one by the other is the guarantee of its meaningfulness and the ontological "weight" of its expression, and where the enjoining of selfhood and

bodiliness by an act that trespasses each of their metaphysical scopes, as it were, is realized at a more ontologically significant scale in the enjoining of one selfhood with another selfhood. Sound, in its more "elevated" expression and as it gets closer to its Spiritual form, becomes music. Still, it is even in such expression, at its core, "reverberation, the unhindered inner vibration of a body which is freely determined by the nature of its cohesion".

Music is defined by the *tone* (*Ton*), which is "the modifications of sound produced by the recurrent regularity of the vibrations" (§300 *Z*). Much as in the case of habituation, the importance of music lies in its repetitive modality: one that produces something new out of the gestures of consolidating and structuring time. In beautiful music, there is a subjectivity that intervenes in a deliberate fashion in order to impose a certain architecture on the endless flow of time and limit it in the way of inviting the *jaillissement* of meaningfulness—a shared phenomenon—out of its infinite sameness by breaking it up and introducing in it the element of transience, or *vanishing*: music "announces itself in time" as a temporary, temporalizing element for consciousness, one that helps it recognize the truth of its own individuality within the sphere of its negation by anchoring it in the foundational *cadence* of a true merging of the bodily with the spiritual. This shows that the bodily dimension is not abandoned or simply made irrelevant by spirit, but is rather preserved in the bigger unity that is the self, as a moment in the dynamic of vibration or tension between the eternal "now" of sound and the limiting container of meaning within which such immediacy is preserved and prolonged over a given period of time by the very fact of the interaction of different subjectivities.

As Hegel writes in the *Aesthetics*, "however inward the soul, emotion, and feeling remain, they still always have a connection with the sensuous and corporeal, so that they can now disclose the inmost life and existence of spirit outwardly through the body itself, through a look, facial expressions, or, more spiritually, through words and musical notes" (LA K540[77]). Even those matters of the heart (*Gemüt*) such as love are always essentially bodily: not in the sense of their reduction to base or primitive processes and urges, but in the sense of their meaning residing in a universality that must necessarily fall outside the one-sidedness of the individual (anthropological) subject's limited inward scope. The alterity of the body constitutes the first point of contact between the spiritual and bodily realms—and puts in place through habituation the temporal basis for the self's further development as a social self whose self-consciousness is only possibly realized through its engagement with those other selves, the real outward difference, which it finds itself confronting in its initial (atemporal) natural moment. Music is one important case where the essential bodiliness of those innermost emotions is made outward and, consequently, made *real* for subjectivity as such: it constitutes therefore an instance among others (poetry, sculpture, painting, etc., although not all forms of art are of the same order of magnitude in terms of properly capturing the inner essence of spirit) of selfhood recognizing itself in the world of alterity in which it is initially thrown.

In "The Meaning of Music in Hegel", Reid argues that for Hegel, "music arises from a temporal vibration that has its source within the self, in the oscillation between its fixed self-identity and its essential self-positing" (Reid 2024b, 3). The elements of music—rhythm, harmony, melody, which Hegel orders according to their decreasing

[77] Page numbers preceded by K refer to T.M. Knox's translation.

dependence on the necessity and constraints of their specific relation to time: see *Aesthetics* Vol. II, K912—work together to generate a "feeling of meaningfulness" in the listener "without actually determining what the meaning is" (4). This ambiguity is precisely what is reflected in the musical exchange wherein composer, performer, and listener intersect at the shared point created by the "clearing" undertaken by the habituated use of the instruments, where subjectivity finds itself sharing a hermeneutically open, ambiguous space of *meaningfulness* that is not necessarily (or not yet) utterable in words—precisely because it makes external what is a profoundly felt, bodily experience whose language is perhaps different from the language of conscious mind proper.

As Reid explains, the manifestation of soul in the Anthropology most appropriate to the "inmost" truth that is felt through the experience of music is the feeling or "dreaming" soul, which contains what Hegel calls the soul's *Innerlichkeit*—inner life—as the pre-reflective apprehension of self as strict self-identification, where all that exists *for it* is only *itself* without alterity, prior still to the initiation of the struggle with bodiliness by habit. Habituation comes in fact in the Anthropology at the cusp of the feeling soul's transition into its actualization, and only after the feeling soul has made manifest its tendency to devolve into madness and "derangement". As such, music functions in a comparable way to habit in that it contributes to the universality of the pre-conscious act that consists in hoisting the soul out of the limits of its own inwardness and confronting it with its own objectivity by reminding it that it exists as part of an *ensemble* more meaningful and more *true*, in so far as it displays a cohesion or coherence with the concept of subjectivity, than the soul's own individual experiences.

6.2.2. Rhythm and mediation: selfhood as a vibration/oscillation

"Vibrations", the *Zusatz* to §301 explains, "are the inner oscillations of matter which, *qua* sonorous, preserves itself in this negativity and is not destroyed. […] A blow on a stone produces only a noise, not a sonorous vibration, since the shock, though propagated, does not return to itself". The significance of extracting a definition of selfhood as an inner *vibration* or oscillation from Hegel's discussions around music is in the crucial temporal dimension of such a conception of the soul in its most fundamental manifestation—both bodily and temporal—that bypasses what might have been considered, at the time, agreed-upon dichotomies of "mind" and "matter", or "soul" and "body", or even of what is "dependent" or "independent" of consciousness, and reshapes the discourse around selfhood and its status within broader stakes to include the necessity of its communal and eventually social (and political) characterizations. The natural soul's *temporalizing* function makes clear the basis for the ensuing universalization of the individual Hegelian subject, and its absorption back into a body larger than itself—humanity and its history being the pinnacle of that universality—as it returns to its truth, which is its dependence on its alterity, having now integrated the elements it encounters in its struggle with its difference.

In this way, "the art of tone is, like the other individual arts, suffused with the self-unfolding principles of speculative thought" (Peddle 1997, 8) our *Verstand* of music is already structured according to the topography of the speculative syllogism, and constitutes in this sense a journey from the indeterminacy of repetition to the finality of meaning and the communal truth of individual subjectivity, into which it is resorbed. In his *Aesthetics*, Hegel determines what is communicated in musical tone: not simply the

transcendent *content*, nor merely the immediate *feeling*, but rather the "abstract unity, introduced into time by the subject, which echoes the like unity of the subject" (LA K249). It is the relationship, temporal in its nature, between the vanishing immediate tonal content of the musical piece on the one hand and its overall meaning as a process and a development modulated over time by the activity of a real subject on the other, that is communicated in the act of musical recognition.

When both composer and listener *find* the essence of their shared subjectivity in a mutually witnessed musical performance, they find the universality of this gesture of *unification* that is undertaken by subjectivity at every moment as a means of hoisting it out of the impoverished, scattered state of its strictly natural determination. This is why music is, for Hegel, a privileged form of expressing the self's innermost truth. As Peddle puts it, "The place of music in Hegel's *Aesthetics* is not (…) one of a vanishing moment which must be dismissed as an indeterminate and inadequate representation of absolute spirit. […] Music is a unique and autonomous artistic discipline that can express the full gamut of human spirituality and which can, in its own right, give form, in sound, to deep spiritual content" (12). As such, "the source of [music's] self-subsistence is in spirit alone": it is the story of spirit's unification, on the basis of a necessary initial separation (differentiation), that makes of music a means through which selfhood is affirmed and recognized.

When Hegel writes about corporeality being "made pervious" and "turned into an instrument" through the repetitive mechanisms of habituation in the Anthropology (§410), he is referring to the process by which something that was first incommunicable becomes a modulating force, a bridge between self-identity and alterity, apt to make the

inner outer and vice versa. It is as if the premature subjectivity of the body *waits* for its own undoing for it to be satisfied, in a real way, and break out of the "bad infinity" of the anthropological subject's natural processes. The natural soul waits in anticipation of its sublation into the whole of the human mind as it renders the body temporal in habit, inscribing its operations in a kind of chronology that presupposes the preservation of an extent of ontological space within which individuality may expand into its own inner world while staying anchored in the necessary variations of its most fundamental, bodily reality. In this way, embodiment for Hegel may be understood as a sort of *thinning* or a progressive wearing out of the boundary between the subject and its object: wherein the former ends up succumbing to the latter's "counter-thrust" by which its true meaning is realized and in which it ultimately finds its essence, or its *raison d'être*.[78]

6.3. The "return to nature" in ethical life: communal body and communal self in the *Philosophy of Right*

6.3.1. Family, society, state: ethical life as the socialization of natural rhythm

We have seen how Hegel hints in the Anthropology at the sexual relationship being taken by the conscious subject to its "achieved" end in the social institution of marriage and the family in forthcoming manifestations of subjectivity. In the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel writes about what he calls the ethical life, the reality of the idea of "the absolutely free will" (PR §33) which goes through its own process from complete abstraction and identification with itself to integration, through its encounter with its "external reality" and its subsequent self-division in what Hegel refers to as the

[78] Reid, class notes on the *Encyclopedia Logic*'s notion of "Essence as ground". "Hegel's *Encyclopedia Logic*", Fall 2022, University of Ottawa.

stage of *Moralität*. The third and most achieved manifestation of the will, the actual encounter of the immediate and opposing wills, is the realization of the ethical life: the correspondence between the idea of the will and its particularized manifestation in individual morality—or the cohesion between the subject's *is* and their *ought*. Once more, ethical life branches out into three "realities" or moments: the first, the family; the second, civil society; the third, the "concrete embodiment" of freedom in the institution of the State. Each of these realities is only attained, in typical Hegelian fashion, once the one previous has been completed in a way that allows it to integrate into the definition of the ensuing reality.

Hegel defines this third, most developed manifestation of freedom, the State, as "the ethical mind *qua* the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself". Self-consciousness, Hegel writes, "finds in the state, as its essence and the end-product of its activity, its substantive freedom" (PR §257). The thinking subject imbues the will with the rationality it acquires during its own development and makes it so that the satisfaction of its "primal" basic needs is not dismissed but rather *delayed* for the sake of allowing the reality of these needs to emerge in its fullest truth, once traversed by the machinations of reason. Much as *embodiment* is the actualization of the soul and Spirit is the actualization of Nature, the State is the actualization of free will or freedom in the *Philosophy of Right*.[79] As Michael Inwood writes in his *Hegel Dictionary*,

> The will, like the [thinking "I"] (from which it is not sharply distinct), is essentially rational. An appropriate counterpart to this rationality is to be found, not in raw impulses which come and go as they please on no rational plan, but in the structure of [ethical life], which, on Hegel's view, embodies the system of rationality that

[79] Pure freedom tends to be, as Jeffrey Reid suggested in an email exchange on April 2, 2026, "a bacchanalian riot in need of rhythmic conditioning". Freedom requires its own constraint by the limits imposed by habit and repetition.

> forms the core of the I. […] Raw urges are transformed into the [rights] and duties attached to social roles and thus imbued with rationality. Sexual urges are channeled into marriage, hunger is satisfied at organized and ritualized meals, etc. We achieve liberation from our urges not by disregarding them, but by satisfying them in their cultivated form. We are then not simply fulfilling our parochial whims, but working for the maintenance of the larger whole, the [State] and its subsidiary institutions. Each of us plays, not his own tune, but his part in an orchestra. (313)

This is precisely where, at the juncture of the Self's embodiment and its belonging to a larger *body* than its own—the social and political body of the State—, the I's truth is realized as it finally becomes a moment in its own right in the overarching unfolding of the "orchestra" of *Geist* itself and initiates its own integration into the increasingly universal (singular) forms of Spirit in mind's "Absolute" manifestations through its foray into shared, intersubjective forms of life.

Once the soul actualizes itself as *embodied ideality*, it ceases to be understood in relation to its organicity and begins instead to be considered as a posited reality, first internalized then externalized by the subject, that has overcome its difference or what negates its identity (as idea): i.e., its bodiliness (see §411 *Z*). Comparatively to those preceding it in the Anthropology, the "Actual Soul" section is noticeably brief, and almost reads like a recapitulation or the simple *aboutissement* of those transfigurations undertaken by the soul in each of its natural then feeling moments, and a transition from the soul to the mind proper, where consciousness makes its first real appearance (as opposed to the "anticipatory" appearances it had made thus far in the *PSS*). Hegel's actual written contribution in this section comes to little over a handful of lines, where the immediacy of the "soul" is definitively surmounted and the *recollected* ideality of the "I" is initiated, setting the stage for the advent of consciousness as the I that "*intuits its own self* in its *Other* and is *this self-intuiting*" (§412 *Z*). The actualized soul is, therefore, the

soul *having realized* (re-cognized) the truth of its being—its embodiment and sort of *enracinement* in a body from which it is inseparable and to which it belongs in an essential way—by *having overcome* its initial manifestation for it as a contradicting, nullifying term.

It is difficult to read the Anthropology and, arriving at the "Actual Soul", not wonder whether there would have been more to say about the moment of actuality as a reality in its own right beyond its preparatory status toward consciousness on the one hand, or its status as "product" of embodiment on the other. It does seem curious at the very least that the "final" manifestation of soul, its concrete form as a mediated posited identity, is given the least space in Hegel's consideration. Nevertheless, it may be warranted to ask, in view of what was discussed in the last paragraph, whether it is plausible to suggest that the reason for the brevity of the "Actual Soul" is simply the exhaustion of all there is to say about such a moment of *actuality*: since it is effectively nothing more than the achieved process of its actualization. Once the natural and conflictual moments of the I's existence—as "thing"—have been addressed, and once the advent of consciousness and self-consciousness has been made imminent, all there is left to do at the point of *actuality* is to transition into the emergence of mind, in what is almost an urgency to exit the anthropological space and make real what the thinking mind already knows to be true, and what is ultimately the advent of Reason: "the certainty that individual consciousness has of being all reality"[80]. We arrive at self-consciousness with

[80] Reid 2021, 68. Then again, this may still not explain the flagrant thinness of the "Actual" section relative to Hegel's usual textual habits, particularly across the *Encyclopedia*. As Francis Peddle suggested in his evaluation of this manuscript, there may have been some other external reason that would explain the length of this section. For now, I leave this investigation to future work.

a certainty that definitively situates the self in this world with which it had been confronted in its natural moment, finds itself in it as an objective posited reality that is unfolding through linear time and occupying the ever-present "now" of immediacy.

"Self-consciousness is thus the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts", Hegel writes at *Enz.* §439. We see here already signs of the imminence of "Objective Mind", the second section of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, where the forms of subjective mind are expanded into their social manifestations under the notions of right, morality, and ethical life (§§ 488-552). From the certainty that the self is itself object and that its objects are themselves subjective, emerges the possibility of the "I" interacting and engaging with other selves: and the realization of its truth, which is that of a *natural*, *social* self. To be a natural, social self, i.e., to be a self that is both fundamentally anchored in its inwardness *and* fundamentally turned outward, is to be a *temporal* self also. The self's temporality is worth particularizing specifically in terms of its ambiguity and its characterization of vibration or oscillation: between the breadth of its eternal (immediate) present and the successive, narrative property of its unfolding as re-collected and re-cognized by the reflective self-consciousness; in other words, between the eternal immediacy of its interiority and the limited, temporalizing mediation of its externality, or difference.

Understanding Hegel's embodied self as possessing the three necessary and simultaneously expressed dimensions of *natural*, *social*, and *temporal* may help us discern the mechanisms by which Nature "temporalizes" Spirit by becoming the underlying rhythm to its real expressions—of which the social institutions of the family,

the civil society, and the state, which operate as the terrain of selfhood's (long-awaited and heavily anticipated, for the reader of the Anthropology) outward projection and the moment of its confrontation with its own *otherness* as it channels, in a sense, its natural dispositions into more deliberate, systematic structures of mind. Or perhaps Hegel might argue that Nature already "pre-temporalizes" Spirit from the moment of the senses' immediate contact with the world—the "here" and "now" of the *Philosophy of Nature*. The "chronology" of the succession of "practical" mind (the necessity of societal structures and institutions) and "absolute" mind (revealed religion, and the pursuit of philosophy and art) may be explained in terms of a hierarchy of needs of sorts, where until the first is satisfied, the second is bound to be "stuck" in time and stagnate. Perhaps the temporality of the thinking "I" is best understood in these terms, whereby the integration of the natural soul in the achieved selfhood is more precisely conceived as the resorption of the subject's natural rhythms (a kind of "time-signature" that individuates the human—anthropological—subject as such) into the full breadth of its spiritual expression, all the way up to poetry and philosophy.

6.3.2. Embodied freedom: what of collective "second nature"?

The particularity of the Anthropological story is precisely its self-propulsion toward the ethical determinations of the system of Right (*Recht*) in which the human subject will have to incorporate to complete its individuation. Reading the "self-consciousness" that emerges out of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as it leads to the systems of *Recht* or recognition attained at the stage of *Geist*, Russon explains:

> *Necessarily*, […] we must recognize the human body, that is, the body of the self-conscious self, as fundamentally different from the merely natural body in that, just as the human self is necessarily social, *so is its body*. The human self *cannot exist*

> *as itself* in the absence of the material support of a social system, and the essential qualitative or formal dimension that is the definitive organization of this system is *not* that it provides life-support (although this must equally necessarily be present), but is its 'constitution', that is, the constitutive principle of recognition according to which it organizes social relations. *The nature (phusis) of the human self* is the social system in which it lives and through which it is constituted.[81]

The truth of the natural soul is realized, or made external, in the social systems that ensure its necessary coexistence with its difference—and the constitutive role played by such difference in the achievement of the subject's very identity. The naturalness of subjectivity is therefore not simply bypassed but transfigured by the necessity of the self's emergence as an outward-focused, communal reality in the "Objective Mind" section of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Nature becomes the temporal structure of Spirit's unfolding: the organic completeness of the natural body leads into and perhaps necessitates the systematic unification of the social and political body in which the self may finally appropriate its full definition as an objective reality.

Beyond the habits cultivated by the pre-reflective individual subjectivity, the social body in which individuality achieves itself is also a "second nature" in the sense that it takes on the appearance of something natural despite being posited—or mediated—by the members of this body as a reality that is *already* the case *for* a "rational" subjectivity: one that has recognized its status as objective reality and overcome the immediacy of its individualizing limitations. From here, recognition becomes possible among subjectivities. What Hegel calls the "political constitution" (*Enz.* §517), or the government, which is the final manifestation of the ethical life, is "the living totality, the preservation, i.e. the continual production of the state in general and of

[81] Russon 1997, 79.

its constitution" (§541): an active body that has subsumed in its content those forms of subjectivity that are immediate (family) and relative or particular (civil society) to the free individuality. We may suggest, then, that what the processes of habituation imprint on the natural body is the very cadence of the speculative syllogism as it is defined in the *Phenomenology*'s preface, whereby the immediacy of experience is first negated then re-generated, or rather found again, through the intervention of thought. Thus, good governance is a rational occurrence: for Hegel, the systematicity of thought ensures the social subject's eventual self-overcoming in the form of institutions that function as coherent moments of a universal whole, or "parts of an orchestra". We may, then, ask the following question: does the necessary dimension of Hegel's systematic thought function as a theoretical apparatus from within which history's violent and dehumanizing occurrences are retroactively given the status of "necessary evils"? Can a real conception of "freedom" emerge from such a framework, both for the individual subject and for the social-political subject?

Chapter 7. Discussion: Toward a Rhythmic Ontology of the Self?

7.1.Summary of key claims and findings

We may plausibly extract from Hegel's exposition of the anthropological soul and some of his reflections around the different moments of subjectivity across his work, something like a philosophy of the self. Both a process and a determination, Hegel's self seems first to resist a definition that places it in a dichotomous relationship with its body—this point is certainly uncontroversial in Hegel scholarship—and second to leave itself open to determination by both its "spiritual" and its "bodily" dimensions. This openness is of a temporal nature that manifests doubly: in the broad chronological unfolding of the Spirit of humanity itself: the history of thought, best captured for Hegel by the philosophical exercise (see "Absolute Mind" in *PSS*); but also in the distance bridged by the subject through its passage across the speculative proposition (PhG M38), i.e., in the transformation of subjectivity's status from "in-itself" to "for-itself", or from its scatteredness in nature to its taking hold of itself and establishing the foundations of consciousness; a transformation that takes on a temporal character as it (1) makes of subjectivity a moving activity, perhaps in the Aristotelian sense of *energeia*, that is always beyond the determinations of space-time, and (2) gives subjectivity a definitively chrono-logical "succession" in the sense of the purposiveness and the motifs of synthesizing unifying theoretical leaps that characterize Hegel's philosophy. The Anthropology's significance, in view of the question of the temporal nature of subjectivity in Hegel's oeuvre, resides in that it places selfhood in a definitively corporeal reality—creating a "mold" or a prototype so to speak for the human self's determinations that emerge *later* in its becoming, at more spiritualized stages.

In such manifestations of the human spirit as art or religion, there can be found a certain rhythm, proper to the soul's very bodily origin, that orchestrates the ways in which such "spiritual" truths (or essences, or meanings) get revealed to consciousness on the basis of its anchoring in its direct sensuous experience. For example, recognizing a meaningfulness that I may share with other witnesses to a piece of beautiful music requires of me a double-edged gesture of immersion in the immediacy of the "here" and the "now" that I access through my senses, and transcendence beyond this immediacy towards the deliberate, *thought-out* meaning that is being communicated through the arrangement being witnessed. The "first home" of the Hegelian subject, as Jeffrey Reid qualifies it at chapter 5 of *Hegel's Grammatical Ontology* (2021), is indeed the set of natural qualities with which the soul is essentially imbued—and from which it attains the conditions necessary for the realization of its spiritualization in *Geist*. As such, Hegel's Spirit may not be fully understood outside of an understanding of the body and, more precisely, (1) of the soul's embodiment as a mechanism by which Spirit gets to manifest as the narrative history of human thought (ultimately, in philosophy), and (2) of the body's ensoulment as a mechanism of shaping the expression of human interiority through corporeality, which is the medium that is at the disposal of the "I"'s inner life and acts as a liminal, still "preliminary" space of encounter between subject and world: the opposition in which consciousness first "finds" itself thrown, and to which it must now respond.

The response of consciousness takes, for Hegel, the form of a systematic restructuring of (Kantian) categories for the sake of rendering a clear image of Self as process; and reveals as a result an essential temporality that, on the present reading of the

Anthropology, singularly makes of the soul an open determination where transformation and qualitative change are not only possibilities but requirements for the self's very realization. The body, in this sense, in its developing ever-changing reality and relationship with the world of alterity, functions here as a site of the self's temporalization by inscribing its expressions in a container of pre-reflective, pre-conscious, perhaps (naturally) pre-determined, cyclical alterations (respiration, circulation, digestion, sleeping/waking, etc.). Such cyclical alterations set the stage for the subject's sensuous encounter with the world by introducing the subject to the alterity that already exists within itself—and therefore the extent of uncertainty and *unknowing* the self initially experiences regarding itself (through its encounter with its own corporeality).

In response to the mind's initial alterity, maybe even hostility, the pre-reflective subjectivity first works at appropriating its bodily expressions as a way of instilling a cohesion between its own experience as a subject on the one hand, and the fact of its own objectivation on the other: Hegel's self is at once subject and object of its own speculative definition, which places it at the juncture of timeless immediacy and retroactive, rational thought, or *re*collection and *re*cognition; a juncture whose very ambiguity makes possible the advent of meaning and interpretation. These are elements of subjectivity without which art, religion, literature, philosophy, music, etc. could not exist in the way they have existed throughout human history: as temporally inscribed, discrete moments of expression of humanity's spirit. In the Introduction to the *Lectures on Fine Arts* (I):

> The spirit in its truth is absolute. Therefore it is not an essence lying in abstraction beyond the objective world. On the contrary, it is present within objectivity in the

> finite spirit's recollection or inwardization of the essence of all things—i.e. the finite apprehends itself in its own essence and so itself becomes essential and absolute. Now the *first* form [art] of this apprehension is an immediate and therefore *sensuous* knowing, a knowing, in the form and shape of the sensuous and objective itself, in which the Absolute is presented to contemplation and feeling. Then the *second* form [religion] is *pictorial* thinking, while the *third* and last [philosophy] is the *free* thinking of absolute spirit. (K101)

In line with these observations, I will split the "findings" of my investigation into two broad categories: the first, the originary place of the body in Hegel's self and the significance of this status as regards Hegel's oft-misunderstood or underdetermined "idealism"; the second, the temporal aspect of the soul and the importance of highlighting the Anthropological intervention as one of complete redirection of the question of the human soul and the ways in which it may be conceived especially in relation to such "transcendent" phenomena as religion, philosophy, and art. From there, it may be pertinent to contextualize the implications of this temporal reading of bodily selfhood in the Anthropology, particularly in terms of (a) the so-called "mind-body problem" with which philosophy still finds itself preoccupied, and (b) the actual ontology that may be extracted from this reading: a rhythmic ontology of the Self according to which the human subject's particularizing mode of being is fundamentally one of temporal embodiment.

7.1.1. The originary place of body in Hegel's self

This project set out to provide support, mostly from the Anthropology but also elsewhere in Hegel's authorship, for the idea of a bodily beginning of selfhood—the term "beginning" carrying the implication of a temporal process which, on this reading, is itself Hegel's "I". The stakes of this project are twofold:

1. It places Hegel in a philosophical position thus, on my research, only marginally, peripherally addressed in the Hegel literature—yet quite in line with most contemporary readings of the Anthropology and the temporality of subjectivity, in the sense that it does not invent anything completely new—that temporalizes and gives a temporalizing power to the soul, "the natural soul" being at the source of the subject's development out of its scatteredness in the repetitious continuity of Nature and towards itself as individual. This development takes place, of course, by way of a conflictual encounter with alterity; first the self's own inwardness, and second the real Other: the self that is not me.
2. It provides thorough philosophical grounding for the idea of a "rhythmic" ontology of the self, according to which selfhood is understood as being both predicated on the limitations of its bodily expression and free to take its *individual* course and find its singularity in the spaces necessarily left open in between the strictures of the habituated, entrained body. The self is at once what limits itself and what presumes its own (temporal) overcoming: an observation that leaves open the question of the extent of freedom that may be assigned to such a selfhood—and whether the "I" can even be said to be "free" if it is stuck oscillating between the incompleteness of its immediate experience on the one hand and the backwards (retroactive) grasp of itself as a complete, individuated whole on the other. To this point, we may also ask the question of conceptualizing chronology (or rhythm), by virtue of its being carried over into forms of Spirit, as a philosophical category in its own right rather than a mere biological fact.

Reading the Anthropology with the "rhythmic" logic of Hegel's speculative philosophy in mind shows that the development and process of human subjectivity and individuality is not merely made of stages of transitional negation but is instead a motion that preserves itself and carries itself forward cyclically and, ultimately, meaningfully. In contrast, the tendency in the literature seems to be one of a *teleological-hierarchical reading* that organizes the Anthropology against its outcome (realized self-consciousness) instead of lingering on the decisive role of embodiment in subjectivity's continuous gesture of self-positing and self-overcoming. The universality of organic life as such, the particularity of embodiment, and then singularity of the achieved individual consciousness have tended to be understood as steps on a ladder where the motion of "cancelling" or negating is highlighted at the expense of the equal and opposite force of "preserving" or carrying-forward that is also characteristic of the speculative philosophical method. As mentioned at the outset of this study, McCumber's (1990) is the clearest instance of such a ladder reading: defining the Anthropology as a transition between Nature and Spirit and chiefly according to what it opens on to[82] (Reason and self-consciousness) rather than what it is (the enduring temporal ground of Hegelian subjectivity). Russon's (1997) reading is more attentive to the importance of embodiment, yet it still subordinates the natural to the reflective in a way that makes of the body a problem that selfhood has to transcend rather than a structure that it fundamentally inhabits[83].

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[82] See McCumber 1990, 164: "(…) habits contribute, not merely to survival, but to emancipation; and this is for Hegel their essence as ethical phenomena. They not only permit Spirit to rise above the biological altogether, but help it to transcend the particular limitations of given historical epochs—including, in Hegel's view, his own".

[83] See Russon 1997.

If Hegel's individual is first and foremost a bodily individual, it is because its spiritual determinations have preserved something of its originary characteristics—what is preserved being of a temporal nature itself, as the assembled self finds itself fitting into or "corresponding" with the topography of the natural world, to which it belongs and which it appropriates at the same time. Such a reading is "rhythmic" on three distinct but overlapping levels:

(1) *Thematic: rhythm in the body*

Reading the manifestations of rhythm in the text and proposing an interpretation of temporal, cyclical, and repetitive structures within the content of the Anthropology (digestion, breath, circadian cycles, circulation, etc.).

(2) *Hermeneutical: rhythm in the text*

Reading the Anthropology as a moment in Hegel's broader project and attending to the pacing and recurrence of themes, ideas, motifs; and identifying the importance of the spiraling shape of Hegel's "method".

(3) *Logical: rhythm in the syllogism*

Recognizing that the recurrent transition (U-P-S) from universality to particularity and singularity is itself a temporal form, or receptacle, in which the middle term (the "guts") resonates both backward and forward: giving the achieved whole an inner pulse and a *tempo* rather than a linear forward marching direction.

The last two points are especially interesting for the purposes of this project because they show the importance of approaching the Anthropology through a rhythmic lens (the "reading") in the project of uncovering the rhythmic dimension of the content of the text, which is the soul itself, active in the body and preserved (*aufbewahrt*) in *Geist*.

As such, this project seeks to reframe the question of "soul" and "body" in Hegel from *how does the natural (bodily) soul give way to Spirit?* To *what structures of the natural (bodily) soul remain operative in Spirit and in what form?* In this sense, the gesture of preservation contained in the unfolding of the speculative syllogism is highlighted alongside that of cancellation, making space for the temporal dimensions of subjectivity to reveal themselves more clearly in a rhythmic pattern that is one of formal carrying forward—where the container and shape of the concept's development is preserved as its content transfigures and integrates its own moments into a perpetually produced and reproduced, singular identity.

The topography of the speculative syllogism can be applied to the movement of the Anthropological story as follows: the natural (bodily) determination of subjectivity mediates between the universality of organic life as such on the one hand, and the singularity of the free, self-conscious individual on the other. Accordingly, I argue that a standard reading of the Anthropology that treats the "Particular" moment of the U-P-S structure as a steppingstone to the realization of the singular individual and a scaffolding that dissolves once the achieved product prevails, is a misreading of the *modus operandi* of speculative mediation in Hegel—which is premised on the preservation of the Natural middle term (the natural rhythms of soul) as a sort of *load-bearing cadence* on which the achieved self stands and through which it posits itself against the world and others. The "vanishing" of the body's rhythms is, then, more so a progressive rendering-natural of the posited (entrained) bodily expressions of subjectivity and their resurgence in those "spiritualized" forms of subjectivity such as music and philosophy—Hegel's systematic Science, whose organization can most clearly be picked out in the outline of the

Encyclopedia as itself a prime example of such a cyclical, rhythmic, all-encompassing formal tendency.

The rhythm of the body is, on this reading, the middle term that persists and makes the realization of the concept possible. This is precisely where the importance of the example of music, discussed in Chapter 6, resides: just as the melody of an arrangement is meaningful because it is inscribed in a broader, more general rhythmic pattern that becomes the condition of its intelligibility, so does the natural soul provide structural ground for the coherence and meaningfulness, both collectively and "sharedly" or socially recognized on the one hand and a marker of individual subjectivity that recognizes itself in its alterity on the other, of those achieved forms of spirit; not the leftover material they simply make use of then leave behind.

Hegel's understanding of music may therefore serve not only as an illustration of the rhythmic architecture of *Geist* but also as a model for the method deployed in this project (and a microcosm of the argument being defended): the establishment of the natural soul's rhythmic variations as what motivates the development and realization of the unified self-conscious subject. Habituated response, digestive repetition, circadian cycles, etc. are developed, differentiated, and overcome in a way that preserves their rhythmic "tone" or shape in the later moments of Spirit. As such, a rhythmic interpretation of the *Encyclopedia* may change what we look for and where we look in Hegel scholarship more broadly, by highlighting the function of those moments of recurrence, return, and resonance across the moments of spirit's development; not only the moments of dialectical resolution where the tension between different moments is finally sublated. As a result, what is "ideal" for Hegel is what has recognized its status as

a transcendent whole whose wholeness is premised on the necessity of the rhythmic bodily mechanisms that underly its continual advent and resurgence through time and change.

As Inwood explains, "Hegel is not a subjective idealist: he did not believe that objects as such, or as known to us, are produced by, or are, my or our sensory representations. Such a doctrine cannot do justice to the dependence of finite spirit on nature" (Inwood 1992, 128). However, Hegel's idealism is

> in a minimal sense […] the doctrine that finite entities are ideal (*ideell*): they depend not on themselves for their existence but on some larger self-sustaining entity that underlies or embraces them. What they depend on need not, at this stage, be a mind or spirit. It may be, e.g., matter, so that even a materialist is in this sense an idealist. Although, on this account, any finite entity is ideal, certain finite entities are especially so, since they belong to relatively self-developing wholes within the world: e.g., the parts of a living organism or the citizens of a state are ideal in relation to the whole to which they belong. Such finite, organic wholes within the world supply Hegel with a partial model for the world as a whole. (129)

Hegel's idealism serves as a structuring tool for understanding the world through the lens of the speculative syllogism; and explains, therefore, the rhythmic musical structure of Hegel's philosophy itself, manifest in the cyclical form and "movement" of thought throughout the *Encyclopedic* system.

7.1.2. Temporal soul, temporalized self: rhythmic bodiliness as Spirit's anchor

Perhaps the propensity for this difficult question of the "I" to remain not only unresolved but also virtually untouched in Hegel scholarship beyond its ethical dimensions, may perhaps be explained by this very philosophical inclination to resist the ambiguity Hegel mentions in the *Encyclopedia Logic* (see for example §89 R); a resistance to the gesture of allowing a measure of imprecision when addressing such complex questions as those of self, God, and world—to not strip those questions of their

complexity or flatten them into enclosed, fixed notions that are frozen in time. Hegel's self, once passed through the sieve of the speculative syllogism (and so recognized in its most true form), reveals itself as a space left open to predication within the confines of what we may say of it—which are the confines of our (sensuous) experience.

The transcendence of the Hegelian "I" is in its temporal self-overcoming: the continuous negation of its immediate reality in favor of affirming, and ultimately establishing, an overarching and perpetually incomplete identity that will have contained within itself not only the entirety of the self's iterations, but also the set of its possibilities, some of which remain unrealized. The *entelecheia*, or *energeia* of the Hegelian self is its *spiritualization* into forms of bodily life that still transcend the subject's immediate, "natural" bodily experience. This conception leaves an open space (would this perhaps be the space in which derangement occurs?) between the self's whole concept and its reality as *Geist*—which is, after all, "only" a moment among multiple in the anthropological story of subjectivity.

This Aristotelian dimension of Hegel's conception of subjectivity effectively puts at work an ontology of incompleteness, or *seeking*, or maybe perpetual toward-ness, where a thing (*Ding*) is defined retroactively, by the limits of its metaphysical alternations. These alternations are only "assembled" together as constituting *this* thing once they are grasped as such by a self-conscious, achieved "I-hood". On this reading, Hegel diverges from Kant in that what was a philosophical axiom, or a transcendental predetermination necessary for the *bien-fondé* of the categories of self-world relations (i.e., what makes sensuous experience possible in the first place), becomes in Hegel the necessary product of thought taken to its speculative end.

The overarching "I" that already contains within itself, prior even to the chronological occurrence of sense-experience, is, therefore, not a timeless philosophical given: but rather a temporally formed, *developing* whole whose incompleteness, or "predicative openness" (see Reid, 2021), grounds its very status as a unified "self" that is always bigger than the sum of its moments, i.e., that is always underdetermined by its different determinations (this is what Hegel calls *die Idealität* of the concept: the fact of its overcoming the reality of the object). Consequently, the "achieved" selfhood that has developed the ability to look back on its own unfolding and recognize its truth by recognizing those beginnings which it had resisted and overcome, "liberating" itself from the confines of the Natural world by injecting it with its own perception and grasp of it; is only arrived at once the Natural has taken its course and affirmed itself as the initial, ever-permeating moment of human subjectivity.

The cyclicality of the Anthropological, bodily soul is therefore the very form of the subject's individuation: Hegel's exposition of habit as a sort of pre-reflective rite of individuation shows that the individual is fundamentally bodily and temporal before it becomes reflective. The transition from universal "selfhood" to the singularity of *this self* or *this I* takes place at the pre-conscious, pre-linguistic level of rhythmic entrainment, which is itself the process of the body's *ensoulment*—or the soul's taking hold of its scattered dispersion in nature in order to possess nature and make it its own. The self-positing consciousness only comes about as a product of the self-relating negativity of habituation which sets in motion the advent of the individual subject *prior* to this subject having reached the moment of its outward, relational realization where it finally grasps itself in the alterity of the world's heteronomy. In habit, the pre-conscious "soul"

repeatedly sharpens its edges against the sort of proto alterity with which it is confronted in its own body, and inscribes in this way the body's expressions into a temporally predetermined container within which self-consciousness may *then* operate and engage with other selves.

Just as a piece of music is individuated and makes itself meaningful through the rhythm according to which its melody and harmony unfold, and through which it *entrains* the listener's ear to recognize the meaningfulness that is being communicated; so does the natural substrate of spirit—the rhythms of bodily soul—become the cadence of the subject's singular "I-hood". The self is the oscillation, made outward, of the tension between nature's sensuous immediacy and the reflexive movement of consciousness: a vibration that becomes meaningful from within the architecture of its material boundaries. If nature is not, on this reading, merely transitioned out of but preserved in Spirit as its underlying cadence, this leaves Hegel with a kind of idealism that posits a freedom that is attained through the making-real of natural structures in Spirit's expressions—a logical primacy of the body that seems to abolish in the same instant as it overcomes itself, the very distance between "soul" and "body" in their traditional understanding. The Anthropological project would then be understood as aiming to provide a natural, necessary basis for the outward expansion of the social self in the Philosophy of Right: and establish the ambiguous, interwoven structures of habituation and individual identity as logical precedents for the self's eventually *social* second nature, the communal crystallization of embodied entrainment shared by those members of a common (social) body.

7.2.Further questions

7.2.1. Rethinking the parameters of the "mind-body" or "soul-body" relation

The most immediate and perhaps most obvious implication of the rhythmic reading of the Anthropology defended through this project—and, besides, any reading of Hegel at all—concerns the kind of ontological question Hegel seems to reject from the outset by refusing the terms that have usually been used to formulate it. The tradition Hegel inherits left not only a metaphysics but also a philosophical method and an approach structured by dualistic terms: "soul" and body, or "mind" and body, are posited as ontologically distinct substances. This distinction is integrated into the philosophical task which becomes one of explaining how the poles interact, whether one primes over the other, or whether one is reducible to the other.

This kind of problem is taken as a given both by those authors against which Hegel explicitly builds his case as he writes (Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza) but also by contemporary theories of mind constructed on the basis of this distinction. Patricia and Paul Churchland's "eliminative materialism"[84] immediately comes to mind as an example of this philosophical gesture Hegel seems to denounce; which consists in taking for granted the predetermining existential structure of material/mental duality and building a system of ideas based on this axiom of dichotomy. Hegel challenges, then, the very structure of "traditional" philosophical thought in the same gesture as he integrates the

[84] Eliminative materialism presents itself as a solution to the "mind-body problem" that reduces it to an issue of language, affirming what it takes to be the superfluousness of "mental language", or "folk psychology" to be the cause of the existence of this problem in philosophy. "Mind" is here completely reduced to the biochemical and neurological processes of the brain and, accordingly, "physical language" primes as the only appropriate way to refer to what we mistakenly take to be "mind". All is, eventually, body. See Churchland 1981.

wisdom of his predecessors—notably, and most relevant here are Aristotle and Kant—and affirms philosophy's need to overcome itself in acknowledging the deficiencies of its previous forms, "methods" and approaches. Hegel's caution is, therefore, perhaps directed at the tendency of philosophy to stagnate in place and resist the necessity of the temporal, "restless" progression of thought—and become, in this case, closer to the "feeling", simple and immediate moment of the soul which has not yet found itself outside of itself, so to speak. In such cases, philosophy becomes only an exercise in repetition instead of an expression of the human spirit's growth (*Bildung*) and itself slips into *Verrücktheit*—the derangement or "displacement" (see Inwood 1992, 105) of thought from itself, where the moments of thought fail to integrate into its broader restless movement and become isolated, abstracted, scattered doctrines.

The question of the function of philosophy and the philosopher in the context of the speculative syllogism is especially interesting in light of the "logics of disappearance" mentioned above in Chapter 6 of this paper. Hegel's embodied "psychical" subject seems to strike a balance, to achieve health or "sanity", between the extent of its adherence to the "laws" of its corporeality and the measure of freedom afforded to it by the self-determining agency of thought in time. Too much *entrainment* and the soul becomes stuck in patterns of meaningless, unproductive repetition. Nonetheless, a "spiritual" act(ivity) is always a bodily act(ivity): transposed to the exercise of philosophy itself—at the pinnacle of the Aesthetical ladder—spirit and body seem to continually give way to one another, particularly in the act of teaching, which is an act of directed agentive *thought* that is profoundly *bodily* in the full performative sense. The body does not disappear in Spirit but rather simply acquires a "vanishing" characterization that allows it

to be at once preserved and cancelled out, or "tucked in", from the view of relational consciousness and self-consciousness.

This *vanishing* status is what makes possible Spirit's "dance" with the body: because it is able to retreat from the view of consciousness, liberating the "spiritual" space necessary for its operations, the body's role in Spirit is necessarily one of disruption. This is also why the "default of derangement" discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 of this paper is an essential piece of Hegel's puzzle of subjectivity. This default points to a state of folly that characterizes *d'emblée* human consciousness, and more precisely to the role of body as essentially *disruptive* towards the ensemble of the "mind" or "Spirit" (*Geist*). Hegel's discussions of madness and digestion have shown that the body retains a measure of distance in relation to the subject's whole conscious grasp. This distance is what makes possible both the "illness" and the "health" of the mind by setting in stone the explanatory insufficiency of mind or consciousness when it comes to a satisfactory definition of self and subjectivity. The body constitutes an integral insurmountable moment of subjectivity that is irreducible to any other moment, and whose explanatory power, like that of mind, is necessary but insufficient to account for the full expression of the Hegelian self.

The Hegelian self is, in this sense, a *mobile* concept whose ambiguity or inherent multiplicity is explained by its different moments (bodily or spiritual, waking or sleeping, sensing or feeling) *as they come up*; this "as they come up" is the very foundation of human selfhood—notably to its "hermeneutically open" relational reality and its capacity to respond to the range of situations in which it may find itself. The space between the self and *its* body (see Russon 1997) is necessary for the "I"'s individuation—both as

properly human (having negated and integrated its animality into its unfolding concept) and as *this* subject, *this* individual.

7.2.2. Rhythmic embodiment as a mode of being? The Anthropology's ontology of the self

It is warranted to think about the implications of the temporal, "rhythmically" constrained definition of freedom or, more precisely, liberation, that may be extracted from such a reading of the Anthropology. If the soul liberates subjectivity from the necessity of its natural determinations, it does so by mobilizing the body's structuring rhythms and its overarching status of *substance*, the bounds of which determine the extent of the subject's, we may suggest, metaphysical "range". As a result, the self is itself in so far as it undertakes its own self-determination within the bounds and "rules" imposed by its corporeality. The liberation of the self from the arbitrary, irrational vicissitudes of the natural world takes place precisely through those limitations imposed by the subject's own "bodiliness", its *appartenance* to nature, its participation in its process as an individual that is also consciousness. The subsistence of *die näturliche Seele* throughout the development of the anthropological self and even, in some aspects, into the advent of Spirit, shows a necessity attributed by Hegel to the simultaneous coexistence of both a body that immediately senses and a "mind" that reflexively forms an understanding of its sensed experience—and an impossibility for the human body as such to be understood independently of its "grasp" by a subjective consciousness.

If this grasp is actualized in habit, it is because it reveals the perfect intersection of self-will and natural determination: the soul's "intervention" itself, through which the body is *entrained*, systematically precedes the advent of reflexive consciousness. The

soul precedes the conscious mind in its attunement to nature's rhythms and overcomes it at once by predetermining the parameters of its imminent development: a process that grows *out of* the natural cycles of the bodily soul. The body is, therefore, both the dynamic center and the temporal beginning of subjectivity: both the site of its development and the possibility of its constancy. The problem of soul and body is solved in Hegel by unrooting its terms and putting in question, crucially, the place of the law of non-contradiction in philosophical thought, particularly in reference to the "inchoate", rudimentary subjectivity from which such thought emerges.

With these considerations in mind, it is warranted to consider the ways in which the body can be understood as providing what I have called the "structuring rhythm" of the subject's spiritual activity, especially in view of Hegel's discussions around the disorders of the organism's functioning, whether derangement or in faulty digestion and assimilation. The body's lingering "structuring" rhythms may be best understood with reference to the definition of nature's "pre-determination" of spirit as that which lays the structural foundations for Spirit's advent as what it is (see p. 29-30 in Chapter 1 of this paper). The predetermination of Spirit by Nature understood in this sense may provide the lens through which the *something of the other that remains unchanged* in the self is to be conceptualized. On my reading, which is one that privileges the movement and development of each of "body" and "soul" into consciousness and self-consciousness, this development is read as one that deploys rhythm in a multitude of ways (textual, empirical or biological, logical or linguistic) and impregnates the very structure of subjectivity's internal logic—its syllogism—with the shape of a back-and-forth of

preservation and cancellation, as it has tended to be described in the literature (for the first time, I believe, by Surber in his 1974 doctoral thesis).

I find that an answer to the question of the "lingering presence of the other within us", in digestion like in derangement and aging, can be found in the nuance we may extract from this helpful "cancelling/preservation" formulation especially when we consider the pervasive nature of this rhythmic motif and the real limitations this pervasiveness imposes on the body's possibilities—more pointedly, on the soul's possibility to take hold of its bodiliness. Disorders of the "gut" can be, in this framework, understood not as proof of a failure of our systems to work normally or however we may pathologize it, but rather proof of the constitutive role of the natural ebb and flow of body or "soul" in response to factors such as the subject's environment, history, or even trauma. As such, what gets preserved and what gets cancelled depends on the individual body's readiness to integrate new experience and eventually new forms of thought into its specific topography.

In this sense, it would also be interesting to explore this perspective in relation to the connections that have been drawn in contemporary health discourse between "gut health" and "mental health". It is also interesting, as Jane Dryden suggested in her evaluation of this manuscript, to notice the overlap between this kind of connection being drawn between digestive and spiritual health and certain "healthist" discourses of self-optimization and self-perfectioning that are in vogue today. Reading the human soul as Hegel does in the Anthropology as (1) fundamentally animal, meaning there is an "animal" or "preliminary" moment of subjectivity that cannot be completely overcome or reduced to its integration into more "developed" iterations of the subject, and (2) a

rhythmic *process* that resists fixity and inhabits instead a space of perpetual *coming-to-be*, helps to conceptualize our body's responses or reactions away from an immediately pathologizing lens and anchors these responses or "disorders" in the body's own intelligence or pre-reflective, pre-conscious organization. This sort of approach is reminiscent of and congruent with a newer current in the field of mental health and psychology—"somatic experiencing" and its related/derivative forms—that defines what tend to be described as "mental disorders" as the body's natural reaction to the limitations imposed on it by its environment and/or its history. Much more can be said about these questions of health and pathology in relation to the bodily characterization of the subject, but I will stop here for the purposes of this paper.

The question of chronology also becomes pertinent here once again, especially if we take seriously the positioning of Hegel's discussion of digestion in the "guts" of the syllogism itself, as Reid has described it in his work on digestion—the "particular moment of the particular moment" or "the middle of the middle". The fact that digestion unfolds in the "guts" of the syllogism is not arbitrary and speaks to the significance of the logical leap from the universality of undifferentiated natural selfhood to the individuality of the "ensouled" self where something of the body—its "rhythms"—is left untouched in order for the subject to reach its *Ideal* characterization, just as something of the alimentary material is left unchanged in digestion. What ensures the *Ideal* state of the subject for Hegel is precisely the sort of unexplainable "third" element that brings together the "self" and the "other" without reducing the one to the other and without still completely overcoming each moment, instead integrating them into a unity that preserves the terms of the opposition while somehow overcoming the opposition itself. In the case

of digestion, the alimentary material is preserved while being the very thing that allows for the transformation of the subject, or the individual body.

The truth of the "I" is found in the coexistence, or the identity, of its identity and difference. Therefore, a complete and satisfactory account of Self includes an account of this "contradictory" identity. Indeed, the self's own difference or alterity towards itself is a determining negation: in line with Hegel's progressive, "developmental" (see Bordignon 2017) account of truth, the negation of selfhood is ontologically productive. it produces a new unity (identity) of which it is now part, and whose unity/identity does not cancel out the difference but integrates it in its concept. This means that the "achieved" consciousness is always one that has integrated its potential for madness, i.e., one that has gotten to know its own self-division into self and other—and its potential for its own hostility toward itself.

This also means that the I's individuality, being a moment of reality itself, is characterized by this identity of identity and difference. Without this essential characterization the self becomes "disembodied", disassociated from the world—a reality *of which* it is, beyond merely externally interacting *with it*. Hegel's self does not solely interact with or oppose the world, nor does it simply become "part of" its makeup. For Hegel, the Self is also sustainedly constitutive of reality itself. The Self's inner negation is ontologically productive thanks to its status as "of the world" as opposed to merely being "in the world". This explains why, for Hegel, thought is truly *agentive* and is not supposed to represent or reflect reality, nor is it merely supposed to reflect on reality. Thought is agentive in that it does something, of its own accord, without being prompted into this doing by factors external to it. The mere fact of the Self's inner alterity is

sufficient to ground and propel forward its continuous ever-self-integrative development. Thought is subjectivity made external—made objective. Thought is, therefore, the *telos* of the subject's engagement in and with the world so that it comes to know itself as object too.

What, then, becomes of freedom in a framework that places the self's corporeality at the center of its realization and makes of it an ever-self-regenerative beginning? If freedom is nothing unless it is embodied, in both the "body" of the individual and the "body" of the State, what are we to make of the processes of liberation and self-determination themselves—particularly as they take shape against the backdrop of an increasingly violent global geopolitical reality? Hegel's understanding of free selfhood as rhythmic embodiment provides a way of conceiving of liberation as a practice of *returning* to the "homelands" of the body through the mediations of mind; and, so, of recognizing the pre-conscious wisdom of the organic whole as the source of the mind's very possibilities. The "rationality" of human subjectivity is firstly bodily—and the necessity of invoking the organic "whole" or the *orchestra* resides precisely in the preservation of this wise organization that precedes and grounds (and conditions) the advent of consciousness.

Speculative philosophy, as a result, is in this sense the relationship of "mind" to "body" taken to its natural end: as it synthesizes those movements that came before it, it anchors itself in the systematic body that brought it about and leaves itself open to the restlessness of thought. Freedom is therefore only possible if it is conceived according to the rhythms of the natural body: as the restriction of the "S is P" copula ensures the restless *activity* of consciousness between its own subjectivity and its predicate's, so the

restriction of the subject's body to those laws that safeguard its functioning ensures the freedom of individual mind. The question of freedom in Hegel and within a speculative systematic framework more generally, remains open to further research.

It may be interesting to look at the parallels between this reading of Hegel's conception of "soul" and "body" or bodiliness and different theories and philosophies of the mind and body both following and preceding Hegel's thought, such as Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology "of the flesh", more recent currents in cognitive science that engage with such concepts as "enactivism" and minimal selfhood, but also certain Indigenous philosophies such as the "vessel-based Yorùbá-Atlantic model of the person"[85], the understanding of the body as "sacred vessel" for the self-revealing divine in the Sufi tradition[86], the Buddhist and Hindu *cakra* ("cycle" or "wheel" of "energy bodies" traversing the body) systems, or the *Qi* (the "vital energy" animating the body) in Chinese philosophies.

Such comparisons, if they are interesting, are so thanks to the coexistence, in all these different conceptions, of the dual gesture of refusing the axiom of ontological dualism while insisting on an aspect of interaction, encounter, or even participation, which implies, then, a degree of separation between two poles that are, at least, conceptually—and only retroactively, says Hegel, *for us*—distinguishable. It may be significant to consider this particular mode of conceiving of embodied human

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[85] See Matory *in* Porcher 2026.

[86] See for example Barghouti 2020. She explains:

> Ibn 'Arabi refers to the body as the "all-embracing earth" in which each human being is commanded to worship her/his Lord. This earth is described as "all-embracing" because of the human subject's unique ability to embody all of the divine names, thus making the body the vessel for the self-disclosure of God. According to Ibn 'Arabi, these divine attributes are hidden in every human being, but are only made manifest in the true believer who engages in acts of worship. (239)

subjectivity—one that is perhaps primarily characterized by its embrace of the ambiguity inherent to the soul-body or mind-body relation—, reproduced throughout the history of thought and across regions, epochs and ideologies, as a significant way out of the binary of the "soul-body" or "mind-body" itself, out of which seem to emerge all other classifications (e.g. "property dualism", "parallelism", "monism", "eliminative materialism", etc.). This type of approach provides a viable alternative by subverting the terms of the "standard" question: in other words, refusing an ontological default of mind/body dualism while accepting, and partaking in, an *ad hoc* philosophical separation whose import resides in the extent to which it precisely demonstrates the mind's negating capacity, or consciousness's aptness to spill over itself and return to its more *fundamental* moments through a critical gesture of negation, i.e., without losing its ontological potency.

Evan Thompson opens *Mind in Life* (2007) with the remark that "Life and mind share a core set of formal or organizational properties, (…). […] the *self-organizing* features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life". For an account of the "I" as a *self* in *time* in a *body* to be satisfactory, a study of the subject's biological composition must function to illuminate a study of the subject's qualitative experience of the world. Similarly, phenomenological enquiry must be continually modulated by the advent of new scientific theory. At the same time, any study of the individual as such cannot but take into account, if it takes seriously the dynamic value of speculative logic, the relation of *identity of identity and difference* it maintains with all that is other—or "outer", or alter—to it. An understanding of subjectivity as the *enactment* of the body's rhythms in the development of selfhood through time opens us to

an array of areas of enquiry, each deserving of its own dedicated project: what may be said about the parallels with Merleau-Ponty's "philosophy of the flesh"? what of Fanon's oft-underexamined and underrecognized Hegelianism, particularly in light of his famous affirmation *Ô mon corps, fais de moi toujours un homme qui interroge!*[87] (Fanon 1952 [2008], 206)? What may be said about the legacy of the "oscillatory" speculative conception of self in more recent philosophical theories in cognitive science such as enactivism? How do our conceptions of time function to "other", or alienate, self and other? … With these open questions in view, I will leave the reader with the following consideration, from Johannes Fabian's *Time and the Other* (1983):

> (…) Time is involved in any possible relationship between anthropological discourse and its referents. The referent shared by various subdisciplines of anthropology is strictly speaking not an object, or a class of objects, but a relationship. […] In any *given* piece of anthropological writing the referent usually is a particular aspect of the relationship between elements or aspects of a culture or society; but all particular ethnography is ultimately about general relationships between cultures and societies. In fact, if we remember the history of our discipline, it is in the end about the relationship between the West and the Rest. (28)

[87] Thank you to Robert Sparling for raising this fascinating point during the thesis defense.

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