

University of Ottawa
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
Hegemony Needs Society; Gramsci, the Ford Foundation and Democracy in
Poland, 1980 to 1994
March 26, 2012
Student: Andrew Deruga
Student Number: 3819513
Major Research Paper
Supervisor: Srdjan Vucetic

Abstract

Non-state actors have always participated in public policy processes. Viewed through a Gramscian lens, a key dimension to the struggle for power in state-society relations concerns the role of ideas. In contrast to statist, Marxist, and liberalist models of politics, the Gramscian view merges economic arguments with cultural concepts, and develops the notion of 'cultural hegemony'. Foregrounding the operation of cultural hegemony, this paper traces the activities of the Ford Foundation in Poland from 1980-1994. The main argument is that Ford significantly contributed to the empowerment of the Polish civil society and therefore to the democratization process in Poland. The paper concludes with reflections on the essential role of non-state actors in the politics of public policy making.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	3
THE PRIVATE ACTOR-PUBLIC POLICY NEXUS.....	6
IMAGES OF THE STATE.....	8
WHAT IS THE FORD FOUNDATION?	15
THE 1980s: SHIFTING POWER CONSTRUCTS.....	25
RE-IMAGING THE STATE.....	36
CONCLUSION: RE-CONSTRUCTING POWER.....	44
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	49

Introduction

What role do non-state actors play in public policy making? From lobbying groups, think tanks, foundations, advocacy networks, rights activist groups, and more, non-state actors have always played a role and are now proliferating into the public policy debate on a wide variety of issues. Conceptualizing and measuring the impact of these non-state actors on policy outcomes is difficult, but not impossible. Donald E. Abelson¹ stated, in order to avoid the problem of conceptualization and measurement of the role or effectiveness of these non-state actors, scholars should seek to determine if, when, and under what conditions these actors can be seen to have contributed to the broader policy-making environment. Other theorists are reluctant to divorce the national interest from the private policy making actors because of the many linkages that exist between the two.²

Following Abelson's framework, I will examine the role of foundations in American foreign policy by focusing on the role of the Ford Foundation and similar organizations in Poland in the 1980s to the 1990s. Research on the influences on political processes by U.S. based foundations has been limited in international relations literature, but here I will assess the extent to which the Ford Foundation and other similar foundations can and did create an impact on the policy-making process in the United States and democracy promotion efforts in Poland. Providing independent evaluations to conclude on Ford's specific

¹ Donald E. Abelson, "What Were They Thinking? Think Tanks, the Bush Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*, ed. Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 94.

² Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change," *The Journal of American History*, 70, no. 4 (1984): 799.

efforts in Poland would be ideal, but unfortunately is not the case herein given the level of research available to gauge the specific impact on Poland's democratization. In particular, I will argue that non-state actors can empower civil society, a vital aspect of power and an integral component of hegemony. Soviet hegemony was oppressive and lacked the flexibility and combination of consent and coercion that Western hegemony provided and promoted. Therefore, understanding how private actors contribute to and empower civil society, through a case study of Poland's push for democracy, will better underscore the significance of private actors in power relations and public policy making. However, it is important to recognize that democracy was not imposed upon Poland in the 1980s, as Polish demand for democratization existed.

This analysis will draw upon a discussion of state theory and lends itself to a Gramscian view that merges economic arguments with cultural concepts, placing importance upon the construction of ideas in the struggle for power. The Gramscian view taken, attempts to highlight the significance of the cooperative nature of public and private actors, cultural power, and the ceding of state power in particular instances, while distancing itself from solely economic-Marxist analysis, a realist or statist focused understanding of power and the liberalist perception of neutrality of private actors in power relations.

Additionally, broader questions about American foreign policy are addressed, including democracy and trade promotion, as well as the importance of civil society in shaping international outcomes.

The Ford Foundation interest as an international private actor and in Poland, emerged as early as the 1950s, in a targeted effort to establish Eastern

Europe studies at American universities. The recognition of the importance of U.S. interest in the Soviet Bloc countries and the steadily evolving nature of American presence in the international arena were among the contributing aspects of private actor interest in Poland and will be explained in further detail throughout this paper.

In the early 1980s, a series of events pushed Poland into the spotlight of American foreign policy. Those events included most notably, the rise of *Solidarność* (Solidarity Movement)³, the subsequent imposition of marshal law in Poland and a new American foreign policy, led by President Ronald Reagan. A separate and more complex effort of private actor funding, which included Ford, was launched during this same period and culminated in direct funding support for democratic institutions, women's rights initiatives, and educational institutions in Poland. Ford's policies, for the most part, were based upon liberal democratic values and aligned well with those of numerous American administrations from its early American based education initiatives to later full-fledged democratization efforts in Poland.

While modest contributions from the Ford Foundation and similar private actors laid the groundwork for broader government aid in the 1980s, the surprising demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s re-invigorated private actors and pushed them toward further involvement in Eastern European democracy initiatives. Poland was a test ground for educational programs, and just as the Ford Foundation sought to educate

³ See Norman Davies' "The Solidarity Decade," In *God's Playground, A History of Poland, Volume II*, Revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 482-508.

America's future leaders in U.S. schools from the 1960s to 1980s, Ford was putting together strategies for the support of Poland's civil society movement against communism in the early 1980s and democracy promotion efforts in the early 1990s.

In focusing on the initiatives of the Ford Foundation from 1980 to 1994, the impact of private actors in the field of democracy promotion can provide an "example of how an important aspect of United States foreign relations can be understood 'less from the study of diplomatic correspondence in government archives than from an examination of extra governmental forces.'"⁴

Access to an abundance of the Ford Foundation's archive material was made available for analysis through the Ford Foundation. The archive material forms the baseline for which an understanding of the implications of the Ford Foundation in democracy efforts, in Poland from 1980 to 1994, can be examined.⁵

The Private Actor-Public Policy Nexus

Viewing philanthropic foundations through a positive lens provides foundations' private business backers with a sense of moral accountability, or what is now commonly referred to as corporate social responsibility. The Warren Buffet's of today, who call upon the moral obligations of the wealthy in society, are not unlike Henry Ford, John Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie, who also

⁴ Ninkovich, *The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change*, 799.

⁵ Special thanks to Ms. Idelle Nissila-Stone at the Ford Foundation, who provided me with the archive material I used in this paper.

attempted to temper the mass accumulation of wealth with altruism. However, the act of giving, at least in terms of philanthropic efforts, has evolved.⁶

Critical readings of foundations peg these organizations, including the Ford Foundation, as imperialist or hegemonic, placing importance on the ideology of a foundation rather than their contributive or non-contributive role to public policy. Paul Di Maggio stacks many of these views and theorists into what he calls “A Jaundiced View of Philanthropy,” whereby people believe foundations play disruptive and overall negative roles by controlling societies in various ways.⁷ For similar views from Marxist theorists, see Arnove, “Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: Foundations at Home and Abroad;” Fisher, “Fundamental development of the social sciences: Rockefeller philanthropy and the United States Social Science;” and, Berman, “The ideology of philanthropy: the influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations on American foreign policy.” However, a broader scholarly consensus does not exist.⁸

In this paper, the case of the Ford Foundation in Poland will be examined from the perspective of four approaches to the private actor-public policy nexus: statism, Marxist, liberalism, and Gramscian theory. As this paper will show, an evaluation of these different theoretical frameworks against a single body of evidence can illuminate important dimensions of the importance of private

⁶ For an interesting take on the changing nature of philanthropy, see “The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism,” *The Economist Magazine*, February 26, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/5517656> (accessed December 20, 2011).

⁷ Paul Di Maggio. “A Jaundiced View of Philanthropy,” *Comparative Education Review* 27, no. 3 (1983), 442.

⁸ See Bulmer, Martin. “Philanthropic Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences in the Early Twentieth Century: A Reply to Donald Fisher.” *Sociology* 18, no. 4 (1984): 572-579.

And, see Ahwad, Salma. “American Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences between the Wars: Comment on the Debate between Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher.” *Sociology* 25, no. 3 (1991): 511-520.

foundations in the making of American foreign policy. Moreover, the complex historical and contextual linkages between foundations and national interest will be identified.

Images of the State

According to statism, power is held within the state and over all other societal actors, including private groups. Parmar noted the statist logic “would predict that the American state would not only be highly proactive in its attempts to mobilize public opinion, but would be the most powerful force in that sphere of activity.”⁹ While this theory lends itself to the argument that the state is the most powerful and often solely important actor, the argument by Parmar is that it neglects the clear and evident use and reliance of the state (i.e. the U.S. in post-war times) on private groups for the dissemination and promotion of political positions and American global power.¹⁰ C. Escudé argued liberal philosophers have often been statist, “inasmuch as without the state it is impossible to defend the rights and interests of the citizen;” however, in mainstream international relations an oversimplification is attempted using the state as “analogous to the individual and totally eliminating the individual from analysis.”¹¹ An attempt by Statist theory to determine the role and participation of private actors in public policy would be difficult, if not avoided. Therefore, if statisticians are right,

⁹ Inderjeet Parmar, “Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations”, *Studies in American Political Development* 13, (1999): 370.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 371.

¹¹ Carlos Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem’s Argentina* (Florida; Florida University Press, 1997), 146.

foundations should have a limited or marginal impact on public policy due to the state's dominance in such a domain.

A Marxist or left-functionalist perspective argues that a capitalistic economic mindset, or the “neo-liberal corporate globalization,” is at the helm of these foundations, resulting in an elite-controlled society. To Di Maggio, left functionalism is a theoretical view, positing that “actions tend to be explained on the basis of their coincidence with the interests of dominant elites.”¹² Arnove, in his attack against the big foundations of Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford, declared, “[Foundations] have a corrosive influence on a democratic society; they represent relatively unregulated and unaccountable concentrations of power and wealth which buy talent, promote causes, and in effect, establish an agenda of what merits society's attention.”¹³ Fisher argues that the elite move freely from foundations and politics, and states, “Foundations like society are run by a carefully selected elite.”¹⁴ These elite were notorious for the stringent conditions they placed on their companies' work forces, whereby mass accumulation of wealth depended on the exploitation of workers, especially with the Ford Motor Company. Berman argues “The Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller foundations are, in the final analysis, class institutions that attempt to create a world order supportive of the interests of the class they represent.”¹⁵

¹² Di Maggio, *A Jaundiced View of Philanthropy*, 443.

¹³ Robert F. Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: Foundations at Home and Abroad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 1.

¹⁴ Donald Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993),

¹⁵ Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science*, 11.

The direct link with the support of educational institutions and civil groups that occurred in the post-World War II period is argued by such theorists to be directing the education system to support industry, capitalist hierarchy and the elite, and thus maintain the economic and political status quo. If Marxists are right, we should expect foundations to have an impact on public policy that reinforces elitism, controls societal distribution of power, and prevents social equality, while maybe not entirely from an economic perspective, still unwaveringly focused on the material essence of inequalities.

A liberal view, also known as public choice theory, and sometimes conflated with pluralism¹⁶ or corporatism,¹⁷ focuses on the power of individual choice and the view that organizations could be perceived as neutral in terms of their influence on public policy. Individual choice, in this vein, is free of state policy networks or corporate interests.

From one perspective, the ideological and political private actor groups, usually represented by lobby groups, civil society organizations, or other organized voices, have direct impacts on public policy and could involve direct connections, such as personnel and political finances, and overlap with that of parts or the whole of government. Parmar highlights this cooperative function,

¹⁶ "A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories." Philippe C. Schmitter, "The New Corporatism," *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974), 93.

¹⁷ "A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports." Philippe C. Schmitter, "The New Corporatism," *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974), 96.

stating the liberalist corporatist model relies on a weak state and the dominance of corporate interests articulated by private actors.¹⁸ However, a liberalist corporatist model differentiates itself from other perspectives as it can be seen to identify foundations, specifically the likes of Ford, as created and representing less of an ideological slant, and more arising from "the largely unintended outcome of a series of disparate interest conflicts and policy crises."¹⁹

Eldon Eisenach's argument of parastate institutions offers an interesting take on the corporatist model's view between private actors and the state apparatus. Eisenach believed the private organizations "took on "the characteristics of 'parastate' institutions," claiming to stand for the "collective ends of the national community." Their own self-concept constituted them as "the 'authentic nation,' while the existing political parties and their institutions, it was charged, stood for narrow, selfish, and sectional interests."²⁰ This does fall in line with the strategic goals of the original directors of the Ford Foundation, who exited the diplomatic and public spheres for what they thought was a more innovative private actor domain. Foundations' goals aligned well with the goals of the American government, including civil society support, strengthening democratic institutions, and improvements in the quality of life.

Liberalism would therefore frame the work of foundations and their possible subsequent impacts on public policy as in competition or in support with

¹⁸ Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 369.

¹⁹ Larry G. Gerber, "Corporatism and State Theory," *Social Science History* 19, no. 3 (1995): 317.

²⁰ Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 339.

those of the state (pluralism) or separately, controlled or granted a role by the state (corporatism).

Gramscian concepts are those that merge the economic arguments with cultural concepts, focusing on ideas of hegemony that combine the two into “cultural hegemony.” “Ideas are not determined, but rather they are constructed and are a part of a dynamic struggle for power.”²¹ Fisher uses such theoretical frameworks to analyze the reproduction of knowledge and power by a non-state actor, specifically United States Social Science Research Council. Parmar gives further layouts of Gramscian theory of private group actors stating, “Gramsci’s ideas emphasize the state’s political and ideological power as opposed to the conventional Marxist focus on economics to construct and reconstruct society, politics, and economy in the light of changing conditions and crises of social order.”²² Gramscian theory of private groups to Parmar highlights the significance of educating the governed so that the state receives consent for its actions or alternatively, a re-orientation of action occurs whereby the elite who control the education (i.e. private groups) push through change. Therefore, if Gramscians are right, we should expect foundations, such as Ford, to have a significant impact on public policy through the production and reproduction of forms of knowledge, specifically related to history, social relations, and societal structures.

²¹ Fisher, *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science*, 18.

²² Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 372.

Wanderson Chaves and Frank Ninkovich have contributed to the literature, offering arguments that support the Gramscian model and potential impact of private actors on public policy. Chaves argued there are direct links and government-recognized benefits from private actor involvement in the public policy domain. Ninkovich argued there might not exist a direct link, but the cooperative or collective goals of private actors and government in the public policy domain exist and should not be ignored. Chaves examined Ford's international strategy and argued Ford's efforts in education, among other things, were recognized by those in the state apparatus as significant and supportive of American foreign policy. Chaves argued cultural diplomacy efforts, such as support for education and civil society, are areas that the state wishes not to enter at times or is unsuccessful in entering in an official capacity; thus, foundations, such as Ford, fulfill a unique role in foreign policy that the state could not or would not want to venture into.²³ Chaves specifically identified statements made by a former Assistant Director of the C.I.A., Max F. Millikan (1950-1952), which point to state support for efforts made by foundations in education and research; "The combination of intensive research programs conducted by groups representing various social science disciplines, and training programs, could be enormously useful to government intelligence agencies."²⁴

Chaves believed these efforts by the Ford Foundation were very important to U.S. foreign policy efforts in the geographical areas they occurred. For Chaves, foundations such as Ford, were built by former statesmen, public servants, and

²³ Wanderson Chaves, "Democracy and Welfare According to Liberal and Democratic Militancy: the Gaither Report and the Ford Foundation's International Policy Agenda," *Oikos* 8, no. 2 (2009), 235.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 236.

diplomats, who spent decades debating the issues of how to spread American values and democracy. What the foundation environment and private foundation atmosphere brought for these individuals who moved to govern foundations was a place in which they could execute programs without the political restrictions or pressures that came with such activities in foreign states.²⁵ Chaves believed there was clear intent by the U.S. government to use foundations as conduits for such diplomatic or foreign activities and thus an alignment of policies existed. Frank Ninkovich further develops this thought;

If the foundation practices were precedents for the government's debut in the specialized realm of cultural diplomacy, its assumptions also transcended their immediate philanthropic locus by virtue of their lodgment in high policy. That was less a result of direct influence than of a common cultural outlook, for the foundation's views were at the same time reflections of basic American values and expressions of the American belief that the progress of world history was shaped more by cultural processes than by power relationships.²⁶

Ninkovich further argued there exists a “conviction” between foundations and government that cultural relations would be managed by non-governmental functions, or what he phrased “a liberal direction epitomiz(ing) the marriage of national interest and private policy making.”²⁷ Ninkovich used Gramscian ideas to examine the role of the Rockefeller Foundation in China during the early 20th century, pointing to the management of ideas, the role of civil society, social development, living standards, and more. These ideas questioned what exactly the role of the state was and the realist tenets that foreign policy and state relations were founded on. Ninkovich argued, “in their dogged attachment to

²⁵ Ibid., 236.

²⁶ Ninkovich, *The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change*, 819.

²⁷ Ibid., 819.

cultural modernization foundation thinkers never the less grasped the essentials of the historical situation with a more solid appreciation of the national interest than those who viewed China from the avowedly 'realistic' perspective of balance of power and political ideology."²⁸ The state, under a Gramscian understanding is much more than the materialistic underpinnings described by realist theory.

What is the Ford Foundation?

While the American government was cautious with its early and mid 20th century views on large foundations, the creation of enormous amounts of wealth to dispose of in a multitude of ways, at the time, was very unique to the United States. The wealth was so abundant for Mr. Rockefeller that in his initial efforts to create the Rockefeller Foundation, he sought to essentially hand the Foundation's wealth over to the American Congress. A representative of Mr. Rockefeller presented the following argument to Congress:

[T]he donor (Mr. Rockefeller) is perfectly content to leave this great foundation in the hands of Congress, that it may at any time in the future exercise its protecting power, not merely to protect his wishes, which are solely that this fund shall always be used for the public welfare and for no other purpose.²⁹

Mr. Rockefeller saw Congress as the best and most democratic form of control over his wealth, but also an institution that shared many of his worldviews and aspirations. Congress subsequently disagreed, but the importance of the request cannot be overlooked in terms of implications to future American public policy funding.

²⁸ Ibid., 819.

²⁹ Raymond Blaine Fosdick, *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1952), 16.

D. MacDonald focused attention on the creators of the largest American foundations; “[o]f the thirteen major family-interest groups which President Roosevelt’s Temporary National Economic Committee in 1940 identified in the ownership of the 200 largest non-financial corporations, all but one had their own foundations [...] Ford, Rockefeller, Dupont, Mellon, McCormick, Hartford, Harkness, Duke, Pew, Clark, Reynolds, and Kress.”³⁰ MacDonald noted that in 1955, Europe had only one similar foundation operating in a non-financial international scope, the European Cultural Foundation. To put post-World War II Europe into context, the continent was in disarray; Germany was divided and the colonial powers rescinding their influence from all parts of the world, while the American economy and military was firmly entrenching itself globally. MacDonald makes an interesting observation; “it is only in the United States that wealth has been amassed enough on a large enough scale to make its disposal a problem.”³¹

The initial social idealism of foundations, such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, and later Ford, brought about unquantifiable benefits to American and Western society and their values, as they worked to “promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding;”³² the continued need for this social idealism in the 21st century is clear. The philosophy behind the philanthropy of the past century and the corporate social responsibility of today is not all that

³⁰ Dwight MacDonald. *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions*. (New York: Reynal, 1956), 20.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

³² Economist Magazine, “The Centenarians Square Up”, Magazine Article, *Economist Magazine*, June 9, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18802844> (accessed on August 14, 2011). This article notes that “Over the following 20 years (since the Carnegie Foundation’s creation), spanning America’s first golden age of philanthropy, rich donors endowed around 250 new foundations with combined assets of \$32 billion in today’s money, according to *Philanthropy Magazine*.”

different; the actions performed by either foundations or corporations endeavor to rationalize, organize and optimize how money is distributed be that for idealistic projects or for specific interests.

Large foundations continued to emerge in post-war American society, exerting a different discourse and projecting a different image that further promoted American cultural values and the spread of democracy and capitalism, while separately making an effort to contribute to American universities.

The Ford Foundation's creative management team was assembled in the 1950s by then Ford Foundation President Paul Hoffman, who previously oversaw the Marshall Plan, from 1948 to 1950 in Europe. Hoffman, a former advisor to President Eisenhower, later became the first administrator of the United Nations Development Programme. Among the team assembled was the noteworthy George Kennan, an expert in Russian or Soviet politics and much credited for the containment policy. Others included Milton Katz, who worked on the Marshall Plan; Dr. Shepard Stone, who was director of public affairs for the United States High Commission for Germany; and John McCloy, a former World Bank President and esteemed diplomat who later became President Kennedy's chief arms disarmament advisor and negotiator.

Ludovic Tournés, who examined the cultural diplomacy of Ford, identified Katz, Kennan, Stone, and McCloy as the key individuals that Hoffman brought together to push a diplomacy of culture intended to slow the influence of communism and, in the long term, to bring about a larger comprehension and

appreciation among different people of the need for preserving international peace.³³

As the Ford Foundation's management team was assembled the foundation's accumulated wealth in the early 1950s was astounding, as \$643 million was amassed by opening the Ford company up to the public and selling one fifth on Wall Street; out of this, \$500 million was set aside for philanthropic activities in an eighteen-month period alone with \$300 million alone going to education related grants and donations.³⁴ Factoring in inflation, whereby \$1 in 1950 is worth \$8 in 2011, about \$4 billion was set aside for donation in less than two years. If you break those numbers down further into area-specific international affairs and higher learning programs, "By the mid-1960s the Ford Foundation had allocated the staggering sum of \$138 million to a limited number of universities for the training of foreign-area and international-affairs specialists,"³⁵ or equivalent to about \$1.1 billion in 2011. Comparatively, the Carnegie Corporation, with a longer history than the Ford Foundation, had an initial endowment in 1911 of \$125 million or about \$3 billion today, and "27 times bigger than the annual federal government education budget."³⁶

The rationale for Ford's 1960s funding and Carnegie's initial endowment was much more than simple interest in philanthropy; it was also an example of the well coordinated understanding that the United States was becoming a major

³³ Ludovic Tournés, "La diplomatie culturelle de la Fondation Ford. Les éditions Intercultural Publications (1952 – 1959)," *Revue d'histoire* 4, no. 26 (2002): 66.

³⁴ Dwight MacDonal, *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions*, p. 4-5.

³⁵ Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 99.

³⁶ Economist Magazine, *The Centenarians Square Up*, <http://www.economist.com/node/18802844>.

player in the international arena. “Hoffman considered it quite appropriate for the foundation to strengthen and supplement government efforts, especially where government activities were inappropriate, ineffective, or warped by political partisanship.”³⁷ Hoffman had assembled a group of key individuals to guide Ford’s future efforts, which included the same men who played a part in cementing American hegemony on the international stage in post-war Europe.

Ford opened its East European Fund in the early 1950s with George Kennan at the helm with an emphasis on the need for more education (at American universities) and a completely separate stream of economic support for civil societies in Soviet-dominated or -influenced territory. In 1951, Hoffman “testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, calling for consolidation of economic and military aid;” he believed that “economic aid should enjoy an equal voice with military aid.”³⁸ It is rather ironic that as new threats face the United States 60 years later, the presidential administrations of today are calling for similar programs that Hoffman was calling for to combat post-war international instability and communist fears – the 1951’s version of today’s “smart power.”

A complicated relationship between occupied Poland and the United States unfolded in the 1950s. The Eisenhower administration was considering the level of economic relationship the U.S. should forge with communist-controlled Poland and how to adequately approach the matter with a growing population of

³⁷ Allan R. Raucher, *Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 86-87.

³⁸ Raucher, *Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid*, 86.

Polish-American émigrés.³⁹ When the Kennedy administration entered office, economic aid to Poland flowed in the form of economic credits, but Poland continued to strengthen its economic ties with the rest of the Eastern Bloc.⁴⁰ With the issue of economic aid politically conflicting in American government, caused by a divergence between the White House and Congress over aid programs for Poland, private foundations took the initiative and entered the field to provide modest cultural aid programs devoid of political brinkmanship.⁴¹

Ford, like Rockefeller, began providing support, separate from U.S. university grants, to Polish cultural programs in the late 1950s. Specifically, the Ford Foundation sponsored Eastern European and Soviet refugees beginning in 1951 in addition to supporting education programs for Eastern Europeans.⁴² Among the educational initiatives and cultural exchanges were programs that saw hundreds of Polish academics, journalists, artists, professional specialists and others sent to the U.S. or Western European countries for training.⁴³

In April 1957, Ford gave “half a million dollars to finance the exchange of intellectuals, students and professors and to assist Polish universities and libraries. Two months later the Rockefeller Foundation set aside \$475,000 for similar purposes.”⁴⁴ Ford viewed itself as capable to make significant strides in various areas of Polish society, specifically in education and civil society, areas

³⁹ Piotr Stefan Wandycz, *The United States and Poland* (Harvard University Press, 1980), 366.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 366.

⁴¹ Wandycz, *The United States and Poland*, 375.

⁴² Ford Foundation, “Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw,” Poland 1993. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives* (60706). Dinner with Former Ford Fellows, Foundation for European Intellectual Cooperation and Exchange Alumni And Central and Eastern European Publishing Project Grantees. September 27, Belvedere Restaurant, Board of Trustees Meeting briefing information.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, *Ford Foundation Archives*, (60706).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 366.

that the U.S. state apparatus could not always enter due to the politics behind such a decision.

In the 1960s, Ford staff emphasized “the need to improve the capabilities of the United States in meeting its responsibilities in world affairs more especially for maintaining the strength of the non-Communist nations and for assisting the social and economic development of the emerging nations.”⁴⁵ The methodology of the Ford Foundation, much like other large foundations, was multifaceted, and as Edward Berman noted is very much an ideology behind philanthropy. Berman described the influence of foundations in supplementing the top universities of the U.S. in fields respective to international or area-specific studies (or creating new programs for these fields) - the exact universities that produced the high caliber individuals that government hired or sought research and advice from, in the field of international affairs:

Between 1959 and 1963, for example, Ford made direct grants of approximately \$26 million to support non-Western language and area-studies programs at fifteen universities; Boston, California, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Indiana, Michigan, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Stanford, Washington, Wisconsin, and Yale. These same universities are the leaders in the production of Ph.D. degrees and, because of their prestige, generally manage to place their graduates in the upper echelons of the American corporate, political, and academic strata, from which their graduates' ideas frequently dominate their respective fields.⁴⁶

Essentially a generation of academics, policy analysts, and diplomats were developed through programs specifically created and or targeted for funding by foundations. An American base of knowledge was sprouting in the early 1960s

⁴⁵ Ibid., 101.

⁴⁶ Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, 106.

that focused on understanding the international community and ensuring American interests be protected. Not only was U.S. capitalism promoted, but the cultural dynamics between capitalism and democracy, free enterprise, free media, free speech, and access to education were also at the forefront of foundation support. The cultural power of the U.S. was being flexed and foundations could be seen as their backer.⁴⁷ The alignment of American policy and foundation efforts became more evident.

Victoria de Grazia examined the power of American culture during the pre-World War II period and identified the U.S. government's willingness to turn over "foreign policy tasks to informal diplomats – bankers, former Ambassadors, and business magnates."⁴⁸ Much of the informal ties between businessmen, American corporations, and their European counterparts in both the private sector and government created entry points for American economic expansion into Europe.⁴⁹

American governments were well aware of the benefits of these informal ties private actors had molded, both from the economic point of view and the cultural projection of America's image and values abroad. The Kennedy administration specifically recognized the work of foundation leaders and "In 1961 (President Kennedy) asked Philip Combs to assume the newly created position of assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁸ Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), 133.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 133.

⁵⁰ Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, 12.

Combs, a ten-year veteran of the Ford Foundation, was well aware of the power of cultural projection and educational programs in the United States.

In the early 1960s, the U.S. government's focus turned to Cuba, then to Vietnam, both diplomatically and militarily. The Polish communist government supported Cuba and the Vietnamese communist movement publicly, which caused divisions between the country and the United States.⁵¹ The 1970s saw Poland hit a growth spurt economically and American interests were placed more directly under an economic lens. However, the late 1970s saw Poland's thirst for change grow with a series of events and circumstances arising that contributed to the early 1980s push for a free Poland. The Poland of the late 1970s was a very different country then when it was first occupied by the Soviets: the country contained half a million university students; 65% of the population was 39 years of age or younger; the announcement of a Polish Pope; the failures of socialism to create an equal society; and strong support for cultural nationalistic symbols were all compounded together.⁵²

For the Ford Foundation, Poland was a key opportunity to provide something more than just economic relief, something more than what the American state apparatus could officially offer, and that was cultural diplomacy. Tournés identified Ford's efforts in cultural diplomacy, going all the way back to the 1950s. Tournés examined Ford's 1950s "intercultural publications," a series of initiatives by Ford which included (1) Ford's efforts to distribute American

⁵¹ Wandycz, *The United States and Poland*, 370-385.

⁵² Wandycz, 391-393.

published journals to countries in contact with communism⁵³, (2) the financial support of the distribution of translated (American to native language) publications; and, (3) to a lesser degree, the financial support for cultural art presentations abroad, identifying them as the first of a new mode of development – cultural diplomacy.⁵⁴

While Tournés was mistaken to identify Ford as altogether different from its sister organizations of Carnegie and Rockefeller in this endeavor (Frank Ninkovich studied the pre-war cultural diplomacy of Rockefeller in China⁵⁵), he does highlight the Ford Foundation’s work as fundamental in the area of cultural diplomacy. The international results of Ford’s efforts are difficult to pinpoint in this period, as they did not last long and were not well tracked, but the importance of Ford’s “intercultural publications” is a clear effort by foundations to impact American foreign policy and become legitimate players in international affairs.

An explanation for the difficulty in identifying the outcome of these efforts on Polish democracy, in this period, may be explained by the lack of Polish demand for such programs and efforts prior to the 1980s. Demand for democratization and the initiatives that precede democracy cannot be implanted into a society not willing, or what may have been the case, not permitted to accept and embrace democratization. The weakened state of Polish civil society in the early post-war period and suffocating Soviet presence, both ideologically and

⁵³ Tournés, *La diplomatie culturelle de la Fondation Ford. Les éditions Intercultural Publications (1952 – 1959)*, 75.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁵⁵ Frank Ninkovich, “The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change,” *The Journal of American History*, 70, no. 4 (1984).

militarily that continued for decades, may account for this lack of demand for democratization efforts in Poland.

The two separate streams of Ford's efforts from the early 1950s to the late 1970s provide a glimpse into the methodology and policy views of the Ford Foundation. First, the educational efforts at American universities and second, the modest democratization efforts attempted in Poland, prior to the dramatic changes witnessed in 1980s that caught the world in glaring anticipation. Few people expected the shifts in power that would emerge through civil society empowerment in Eastern Europe and theoretical frameworks struggled to understand and explain the multifaceted combination of sociocultural and economic aspects contributing to the change in power dynamics. Theoretical frameworks were for the most part locked in assumptions that included; state centric views, purely economic focused societal understandings; and, descriptions of entirely non-cooperative actors or groups, competing for policy space.

The 1980s: Shifting Power Constructs

The American foundations specifically pushed for democracy and capitalism, pushed societies against communism, and strove to promote academic, social and cultural initiatives in countries fighting for independence. What the 1980s provided to Poland and the United States was the re-invigoration of Polish civil society through the creation and official Communist recognition of the Solidarity Movement. This was the first communist state that provided legal acknowledgement and independent status free from governmental interference;

as a result the Communist government officially allowed freedom of association. While Solidarity was founded as a trade union, it exploded into much more, leading to the Communist crackdown and subsequent marshal law in 1981 and the global outcry and support for democracy led by the very vocal and newly inaugurated U.S. President Reagan.⁵⁶

In the case of Poland, as it teetered on the verge of complete economic collapse in the 1980s, the Ford Foundation again sought to find its role in supporting a struggling nation through educational support and civil society empowerment. In a submission to the Ford Foundation's International Committee of the Board of Trustees in 1982, Francis Sutton, Ford Foundation Project Officer, identified the cultural dynamics and history of Poland as of specific interest to Ford's efforts for the support of democracy, independent thought and liberalization. Compounded with this cultural undertone and the Polish national ground swelling for freedom, Sutton stated, "The importance of the Polish crisis in East/West relations, in its threats to the stability of the international economic system, and in its rather doleful implications for the possibilities of liberalization in Eastern Europe and other centrally planned economies, have made us feel that it deserves serious staff attention and claims on our (Ford Foundation) budgets."⁵⁷

President Reagan remarked in 1981, in reference to the imposition of marshal law in Poland, that, "The Polish nation, speaking through Solidarity, has

⁵⁶ See Norman Davies' "The Solidarity Decade," In *God's Playground, A History of Poland, Volume II*, Revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 482-508.

⁵⁷ Ford Foundation, Francis Sutton, "Submission to the Ford Foundation's International Committee of the Board of Trustees", 11. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1982.

provided one of the brightest, bravest moments of modern history. The people of Poland are giving us an imperishable example of courage and devotion to the values of freedom in the face of relentless opposition.”⁵⁸ The Reagan administration’s strong support for civil society movements in Poland and Eastern Europe was made clear in the early days of his administration and the vital role private actors could play in such an effort was in the works.

At a meeting of the Ford Foundation’s International Committee of the Board of Trustees in 1982, strategic discussions on aid to Eastern Europe was noted; “In conversations in Europe and in this country we (and the Rockefeller Foundation as well) have been urged to look for ways in which private unofficial deliberations might stimulate and prepare the way for the necessary governmental actions.”⁵⁹ It could be argued that the Reagan administration viewed private sector work, be it foundations, other non-governmental foundations, or religious societies, as beneficial in its greater effort in combating communism.⁶⁰ The alignment in terms of policies from policy makers and private actors was clearly evident for the case of combating communism.

While the demand for private actor involvement in Poland was on the rise, the American domestic demand to understand Eastern Europe was reinvigorated by calls from individuals in academia that was noted in a 1980s Ford Foundation questionnaire. The concerns at that time by Graham T. Allison, the Dean of the

⁵⁸ University of Texas Archives, “President Ronald Reagan Speeches,” speech, University of Texas, December 17, 1981, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/121781c.htm> (accessed August 10, 2011).

⁵⁹ Ford Foundation Francis Sutton, “Submission to the Ford Foundation’s International Committee of the Board of Trustees”, 10. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1982.

⁶⁰ For an interesting read on Reagan and Poland’s push for Democracy, see Carl Berstein, “The Holy Alliance,” Magazine Article, *Time Magazine*, February 24, 1992, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974931,00.html> (accessed August 14, 2011).

John F. Kennedy School of Government, were of the neglect of Eastern European studies at American institutions. Mr. Allison noted in the Ford questionnaire that the condition of Eastern European studies was in dire need of support. “It’s a secret that should be known: Most university programs exist on paper... not in reality. [...] There are fewer than a handful of tenured faculty at all Ivy League universities specializing in Eastern Europe.”⁶¹

In a 1982 internal Ford Foundation report, views such as Allison’s were similarly expressed; “New positions do not appear and existing ones are being lost. Only at Columbia is Eastern Europe institutionally separate from Soviet Studies and when contradiction comes, East-European tends to be sacrificed to maintain Soviet strengths. In our perceptions only Southeast Asian studies compare in precariousness of their future.”⁶² The Ford Foundation gave \$60 million, from the 1950s to 1989, to a variety of efforts focusing on Eastern Europe; of that \$60 million, \$11 million was given during the height of the Polish civil society’s strengthening in the mid-1980s. A variety of programs in Poland were supported, “from academic, government and professional exchanges to the [further] development of East European regional studies [in the U.S].”⁶³

The separate funding for universities in the U.S. cannot simply be dismissed as unrelated to democratizing efforts of private actors abroad, but should also be recognized to provide context for the broad array of actions

⁶¹ Ford Foundation, “Inter-Office Memorandum - Carnegie Corporation of New York, Conference on Western Proposals for Assistance to Poland and Hungary and Ford Foundation Follow-up”, December 21, 1989. “”. Letter from G.T. Allison to Charles Gati. Background Papers 1989-1990, *Ford Foundation Archives* (12590).

⁶² Ford Foundation, Francis Sutton, “Submission to the Ford Foundation’s International Committee of the Board of Trustees”, 10. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1982.

⁶³ Ford Foundation, Inter-Office Memorandum, December 21, 1989, *Ford Foundation Archives*, (12590).

foundations engage in. The immediate transition years after the fall of communism in Poland, which lasted from 1989 to 1993, was a period Ford grants to Poland totaled \$4.1 million to support numerous projects, some more directly relating to democracy than others. The \$4.1 million included grants such as, \$400,000 that supported projects for the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture, \$335,000 that supported sustainable development projects, and \$200,000 that supported program activities including human rights, education, advocacy and monitoring through the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights.⁶⁴

The first table below, regarding the Ford Foundation Grants Related to Poland 1989-1993, provides a detailed list of Ford grants. Despite the detail of Ford's grants below, it was difficult to capture the same information for similar foundations as well as government aid over this same period; however, the second table (page 35) – Comparison of Public and Private Donations to Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union - Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 – provides a broader comparison of private and public aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

⁶⁴ Ford Foundation, "Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw", Poland 1993. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives* (60706) - Grants Related to Poland: 1989 to 1993.

Table 1: Ford Foundation Grants Related to Poland 1989-1993⁶⁵

Fiscal Year and Total	Grant Amount	Description of Grant
1989 \$131,250	\$118,050	The University of Chicago – Support for a postdoctoral fellowship program for Polish sociologists at American Universities
	\$13,200	Columbia University – Support for Polish public opinion experts to travel in the U.S. for seminars, lectures and discussions with policy makers
1990 \$1,295,605	\$50,000	Regents of the University of Minnesota – Support for research on institutional management of environmental policies and practices in Poland
	\$25,000	Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Law – Support for a five-day seminar on human rights and pre-trial detention to be held in Lublin, Poland
	\$30,000	Netherlands Institute for Human Rights – Support for a workshop on the European human rights system at Poznan University’s Human Rights Research Center in Poland
	\$19,000	The Neighbourhood Institute – Technical assistance to assess and improve the supply and quality of water in rural Polish communities
	\$250,000	The Foundation for Water Supply to Rural Areas – Support to strengthen programs to improve the supply and quality of water in rural Polish communities
	\$20,000	Foreign Trade Research Institute – Support for Ninth International Conference in Poland on Soviet and East European Agriculture
	\$45,600	Economic Council – Support to enable foreign experts to participate in two consultative meetings in Poland
	\$174,500	Columbia University – Support for the Polish Finance Ministry Advisory Project
	\$122,000	Columbia University – Technical assistance and acquisition of reference materials for the Constitutional Drafting Committee of the Polish Parliament
	\$109,505	Columbia University – Support for an economics project of a Polish Policy Research Group at Warsaw University
	\$50,000	Centre for Social and Trade Union Studies – Study of local elections and political change Poland
\$400,000	American Trust for Agriculture in Poland – Support for four projects of the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture	

⁶⁵ Ford Foundation, “Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw,” Poland 1993. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives* (60706) - Grants Related to Poland: 1989 to 1993.

Fiscal Year and Total	Grant Amount	Description of Grant
1991 \$948,000	\$50,000	Warsaw University – Planning grant for the establishment of a School of Diplomacy in Poland
	\$103,000	Stefan Batory Trust – Support for an international relations summer school at Oxford for Polish and Hungarian academics and foreign ministry officials
	\$100,000	Stefan Batory Foundation – Support for a summer school program in market economics for faculty members from Poland and other Central European Countries
	\$50,000	Rutgers, The State University – Pilot training program in public management and service delivery for local government officials in Poland
	\$110,000	Regents of the University of Minnesota – Support to promote planning environmental protection and sustainable development in Polish institutions
	\$50,000	University of Pittsburgh – Support for a project in Warsaw on “Macro-economic Developments in Central Europe: Beginning of a Transition Program”
	\$35,000	Osiatynski, Wiktor – To write a book in Polish entitled, “Constitutionalism: The Rule of Law and Individual Rights” for publication
	\$225,000	The Institute of Sustainable Development – Support to establish the institute
	\$25,000	Institute of Agriculture and Food Economics – Support of research on socio-economic changes in private farming in Poland
	\$100,000	University of Illinois – Support for MBA program development at the University of Warsaw
	\$50,000	Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights – Planning grant to develop a medium-term program of activities with Helsinki Committee in Poland
\$50,000	The Gdansk Institute for Market Economics – Support for a small privatization project and a capital market and financial system project	
1992 \$801,300	\$133,800	Stefan Batory Foundation – Support for a summer school program in market economics for faculty members from Poland and other Central European countries
	\$60,000	SOS Social Assistance Foundation – Support for the activities of a Foundation related to training of private social welfare activities
	\$200,000	Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights – Support for a program of activities including human rights, education, advocacy and monitoring
	\$100,000	The Gdansk Institute for Market Economics – Support for research on Polish economic and social policy
	\$232,500	Columbia University – Support for an economics project of the Polish Policy Research Group based at Warsaw University
	\$75,000	Center for Strategic & International Studies – Support for the U.S.-Poland Action Commission’s work in developing small and medium-size businesses in Poland
1993 \$947,700	\$47,700	Borderlands Foundation – Support for projects to foster inter-ethnic understanding in Poland’s border regions
	\$300,000	Stefan Batory Foundation – Support for a retraining program in market economics for faculty from the former Soviet Union and Central Europe
	\$150,000	CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research – Support for a research project on “The Fiscal Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe Under Transformation”
	\$450,000	American Trust for Agriculture in Poland – Support for four projects of the Foundation for the Development of Polish Agriculture
Total Grants Given from The Ford Foundation to Poland from 1989-1993 was \$4,123,855		

Official U.S. aid followed Poland's adoption of shock therapy reforms, the rapid transition from a command economy to an open market economy. A total of \$200 million in United States Agency of International Development (USAID) contributions, as well as a huge political push, was made to support local organizations in Poland in order to establish a stronger civil society.⁶⁶ While not all aid packages directly dealt with creating democratic institutions, significant programs were established. USAID identified the creation of one such NGO as key in their activities; the "Foundation in Support of Local Democracy (FSLD) was established to build NGO support for the legal activities concerning local government in Poland. By 1990, FSLD would have received its first support from USAID which will help the institution evolve into the major support organization for local government programs."⁶⁷

While direct U.S. aid was significant and supported civil society, Ford's modest initiatives moved faster than official aid, as they were more targeted and strategic in terms of their distribution than the wide brush strokes of the official U.S. aid packages. Ford's funding in Poland ventured into every aspect of Polish society and culture. Moreover, Ford donated huge sums of money to support the creation of the Stefan Batory Foundation, a domestic Polish foundation founded by George Soros. The Stefan Batory Foundation was founded in 1988 and was recognized by Ford as the largest private philanthropic organization in Poland. It

⁶⁶ USAID. "USAID Mission to Poland," timeline, *USAID*, March 13, 2002, <http://www.usaid.gov/pl/timeline.htm> (accessed, August 10, 2011).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *USAID Mission to Poland*, <http://www.usaid.gov/pl/timeline.htm>. For information on the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy, visit - http://www.frdl.org.pl/english/index_e.htm.

was seen as a key player and was in existence for a full two years prior to the official U.S. government sponsored FSLD.⁶⁸

In 1991, the Ford Foundation's work in Eastern Europe was given more focus within the foundation beyond simply grant-giving. Two full-time staff members were appointed to the Ford Eastern Europe file, under the International Affairs Program. Three priorities were identified for Ford grant making in Eastern Europe:

- 1) The promotion of economic reform and the amelioration of its negative social consequences;
- 2) The consolidation of democracy through the reform of political and legal institutions and the integration of international human rights standards in domestic law and practice; and
- 3) Strengthening institutions of higher education, principally in the social sciences and law.⁶⁹

Within review of these priorities in 1994, significant strides were made, argues one Ford report; "With Foundation support, they (the region's policymakers) have also begun the long-term process of developing a professional policy analysis capacity. Other grantees have used Foundation support to build important non-governmental organizations ranging from think tanks to civic

⁶⁸ Ford Foundation, Shepard Forman, "Ford Foundation Grantee: Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw, Poland)," Grantee Request No. 376. *Ford Foundation Archives*, June 20, 1996. Throughout the 1990s Ford gave approx. \$1,419,000 to the Stefan Batory Foundation Summer Schools programs. "Evaluation of Institutions of Higher Learning Supported by the Ford Foundation in East-Central Europe in the 1990s, and Recommendations for the Future," submitted by Daniel Chirot and Mirosława Grabowska, *Ford Foundation Archives*, August 16, 1999.

⁶⁹ Ford Foundation. "Russia and Eastern Europe: Program Priorities and Office Structure," Board of Trustee Meeting, June 1994, 2. Briefing Materials for Grantee Visit to Poland 1996 (85481 also classified under 013737), *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1996.

organizations, contributing to the creation of a vibrant NGO sector.”⁷⁰ The Ford report goes further, identifying the future goals specifically in terms of effecting public policy;

Our grantmaking will seek to strengthen the research, training, and policy analysis capacity of indigenous institutions in such fields as international economics and peace and security while promoting closer ties with Western counterparts doing work on related subjects. Continued close collaboration with International Affairs Program colleagues in these fields, as well as on issues of U.S. foreign policy, inter-ethnic relations, and international human rights, will complement and reinforce our efforts to build open, democratic and market-oriented societies in the region.⁷¹

Private actors such as the Ford Foundation were significantly involved in cultural relations in Poland through various programs mentioned above, but also women’s rights groups, NGO support, and other initiatives, and “provides an example of how an important aspect of United States foreign relations can be understood ‘less from the study of diplomatic correspondence in government’ archives than from an examination of extra-governmental forces.”⁷²

The embrace of the American presence in Poland during the transition years was not only evident through the acceptance of large financial aid packages, which satisfied the gap created by the Soviet exit, but also a Polish domestic demand for civil society engagement with democratic state institutions, enhanced by Poland’s eagerness to open up to the West.

⁷⁰ Ibid, *Ford Foundation Archives*, (85481 also classified under 013737), 3.

⁷¹ Ford Foundation, *Russia and Eastern Europe: Program Priorities and Office Structure* (85481 also classified under 013737), 5.

⁷² Ninkovich, *The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change*, 817.

Table 2 below, indicates a comparison of assistance provided by the U.S. government and private actors to Eastern Europe.

Table 2: Public and Private Donations to Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union – Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993⁷³

Actor	1992			1993		
European Community	TACIS \$561 mil	PHARE (includes TEMPUS) \$1.1165 bil	TEMPUS \$108.13 mil	TACIS \$561 mil	PHARE (not available)	TEMPUS \$108.13
U.S. Gov't	Eastern Europe \$357.5 mil		Former USSR \$4.1 bil (was appropriated)	Eastern Europe \$400 mil (appropriated)		Former USSR \$4.3 bil*
Ford Foundation	\$6.7 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union) \$801,300 (Specifically for Poland)			\$5.9 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union) \$947,700 (Specifically for Poland)		
Soros Foundation	\$48 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)			(not available)		
PEW Charitable Trusts	\$7.2 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)			Estimate - \$10.2 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)		
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation	\$8.7 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)			Approx. \$4.3 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)		
Rockefeller Brothers Fund	\$2.3 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)			\$2.5 mil (Eastern European and Former Soviet Union)		
German Marshall Fund	\$2.9 mil (Albania, Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia)			\$2.9 mil (Albania, Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia)		
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation	\$2 mil (Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union)			\$2 mil (Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union)		
NOTES: The \$4.3 Billion does not include \$1.8 Billion in President Clinton's aid proposal, aid to international financial institutions, or the \$2 Billion Eximbank gas and oil loan. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TEMPUS – Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia. • PHARE – The Programme of Community Aid to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. • TEMPUS – Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies. 						

⁷³ Ford Foundation, "Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw, Poland 1993." Report, *Ford Foundation Archives* (60706) – Donors to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

Re-imagining the State

The Ford Foundation in Poland targeted education, NGOs, and civil society groups such as women's rights groups due to the importance those areas play in the birth of a democratic society and the foundation of a liberal democratic state. This raises the important question of what the state is, but also the essential question of the role in which foundations play in the policy making process.

The statist view of such an argument would overwhelmingly signal the non-importance of foundations' efforts in respect to supposedly state-run activities such as diplomacy. As previously stated by Parmar, statist "would predict that the American state would not only be highly proactive in its attempts to mobilize public opinion, but would be the most powerful force in that sphere of activity."⁷⁴

In terms of Poland and its transition to democracy, a statist view could not be further from the reality that took place. Civil society groups, unions, women's groups, and NGOs efforts all reflected public opinion during the transition to freedom and democracy and the state apparatus (i.e. the U.S.) wished not to originally or overtly get involved in certain affairs that were politically difficult to enter.

The Ford Foundation's support of educational institutions, education exchange programs, social policy programs, and women's groups were fundamental in laying out necessary steps for the transition to a democratic state,

⁷⁴ Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 370.

as mentioned in the program priorities of the Ford Foundation on earlier pages. Statists would therefore expect to see the role of the state to intervene directly to support these non-governmental initiatives in Poland that were supported by the Ford Foundation. Without diminishing the U.S.'s state capacity and significant contribution to democracy efforts in Eastern Europe, the statist view does not place organized private capacity and efforts of private foundation on the same level of contributions to U.S. foreign policy. However, as Parmar identifies in his examination of the role of the Council of Foreign Relations on American foreign policy, what statist tend to overlook is “a vital aspect of power in a democratic society: the freedom to organize privately, to propagandize publicly around a specific program, and to attempt to influence public opinion.”⁷⁵

The Ford Foundation, through support for education programs at American universities and the exchange of students, professors, and professionals, was able to spread ideas through cultural diplomacy in American society and abroad, particularly in Polish society, and legitimized the power of private actors in American foreign policy. Parmar identified this phenomenon, and what is relevant to the case of the Ford Foundation in this regard was pointed out by Chaves, who argued, “the legitimacy of a respectable private group (Ford) was used by state managers to promote official policy and policy ideas.”⁷⁶

The statist theory has difficulty in explaining what Parmar called the “Power over versus power shared” argument. Parmar argued that the statist view does not allow for an understanding of private actors working with the state

⁷⁵ Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 371.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 371.

cooperatively, even if not directly cooperating, or as Ninkovich called working “in congruence with each other.”⁷⁷ Just as Parmar noted the Council on Foreign Relations spent a great deal of effort trying to enable the state to do what the Council was already doing, the Ford Foundation through its education exchange programs and American based university sponsored programs did the same. These were efforts aimed to enable the state elite and the state apparatus to understand Eastern European society, history, and politics, and therefore make more educated and well-founded policy decisions.

From another angle, Ninkovich in his examination of the Rockefeller Foundation in China presented an argument seen to stand against realism’s strict adherence to the role of the state as the sole actor in international relations. Ninkovich argued that foundations play a role in the cultural relations of states, one that the statist view cannot explain through its model. The strategic aims of foundations such as Ford in Poland are incomprehensible from a statist model of understanding, with these aims focusing on civil society, social policy, the strengthening independent policy analysis, and assistance in installing public-private partnerships.

A statist view of the Ford Foundation’s work in Poland may simply identify it as a product of state-led efforts through different means, but possesses significant problems with acknowledging the fact a private actor could be so heavily involved with the promotion of democracy and civil society in the domain of foreign policy.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 371.

As for the case of Ford in Poland, the U.S. government was in neither competition nor conflict with Ford's efforts in Poland or the region. The problem with interpreting a corporatist outlook on Ford's efforts in Poland is that, it is left up to the researcher to develop their perspective on whether Ford was "recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state" as the definition coined by Schmitter, used by other theorists (e.g. Gerber) and in use here indicates.⁷⁸

It is hard to follow the argument that the Ford Foundation saw itself as a parastate organization, as Ford's efforts were by no means superior on a whole to those of the state, but they did have a cooperative function, focusing on the same goals and problems in Poland.

While it could be argued that foundations such as Ford led the way in cultural diplomacy and specific initiatives that seemed ahead of the American foreign policy bend, the foundations were clearly subordinate to the state apparatus in regard to their overall activities in Poland and other Eastern European states. Subordination in democracy promotion initiatives was also in no way a sign of competition or struggle for more power between the state and the Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation did not seek an area in which there was competition with the state apparatus, but in which it could be most effective with its aid programs, as identified in its 1994 Program Priorities and Office Structure.⁷⁹ Ford brought new energy and ideas, and laid the groundwork

⁷⁸ Gerber, *Corporatism and State Theory*, 315.

⁷⁹ Ford Foundation, "Russia and Eastern Europe: Program Priorities and Office Structure," Board of Trustee Meeting, June 1994. Briefing Materials for Grantee Visit to Poland 1996 (85481 also classified under 013737), *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1996. The report identifies the strengths of the foundation and public and private recognition of its work during the initial transition years from 1989 to 1993.

through cultural diplomacy initiatives; more often than not, it further reinforced the American way of life, values for democracy, and a liberal economy.

Analysis through the Marxist model is limited in its effectiveness to explain the role of Ford in Poland, as contrary to the Marxist theoretical understanding, Ford did not seek to reinforce the elite dominance over other sections of American or foreign beliefs on Poland. Rather, the Ford Foundation sought to engage individuals in discussion on Poland through the promotion of education, civil society engagement, or women's programs. The American administrations, be it that of Reagan or Bush, did not attempt to reinforce elitist views on Poland. Reagan in particular had a clear attachment to Poland's search for independence and freedom from the onset of the Solidarity Movement to the eventual fall of communism in Poland. Focusing on cultural aspects of democracy promotion, such as civil society engagement, education programs, and other such projects, the Ford Foundation promoted an effort that was more than simply economic or material based.

The foreign education programs of Ford, such as the exchange programs or grants that helped set up economics programs at Polish universities, were not a conspiracy to push Poland into a liberal economic exploitative scheme, but rather the logical education of a population toward the economics that would guide Poland out of occupation and oppression.

While Marxist theorists would have us believe that "[Foundations] have a corrosive influence on a democratic society [and that] they represent relatively unregulated and unaccountable concentrations of power and wealth which buy talent, promote causes, and in effect, establish an agenda of what merits society's

attention,”⁸⁰ the truth of the matter is the Marxist theoretical framework does little to advance an understanding of foundations’ initiatives or their impact on public policy beyond ideological arguments.

Even with the ideological spin, the case of Poland does not fit within the Marxist ideological model, as vast sections of Poland’s poor during communism have achieved social upward mobility and political office, attended the best universities, and ran successful businesses amongst other successes; the best example of course is Lech Walesa, who transitioned from working in the Polish shipyards to running and winning the presidential office of a democratic Poland.

The Marxist model’s failure in explaining the role of private actors in public policy is due to the belief the material world is locked into a system of fixed meanings and discourse. Poland’s transition to democracy clearly showed that both the material world and the discourse associated with the material world had changed. The fixed meanings in explaining the material world through a Marxist model do little to explain transition and conceptual change.

The most effective theory that can be used to understand the role of the Ford Foundation in Poland is the Gramscian model. From a Gramscian view, a more complex economic and cultural analysis is possible, one that offers a more fluid approach to understanding the change that rocked Poland during the transition to democracy; “In other words, it is groups of people united by particular conceptions of the world, not classes in an economic sense, which are the main social forces on the ethico-political level [ethico-political = the mode of

⁸⁰ Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: Foundations at Home and Abroad*, 1.

thought and action as opposed to economic and politico-military].”⁸¹ From a Gramscian perspective, the importance therefore lies with the use of discourse analysis (examining thought and action) in terms of determining the role of the foundations or private actors in explaining their role vis-à-vis the state.

The aims of the Ford Foundation through its early exchange program for Poland from 1957 to 1962 or the similar program from 1967 to 1981,⁸² the grants given to support numerous projects between 1989 to 1993, or the millions given to the Stefan Batory Foundation to create a strong domestic NGO community in Poland were all actions seeking to change the ideas, frameworks of knowledge, and discourse surrounding communism in Poland, and subsequently foster the civil society that was so lacking in Eastern Europe.

Ford dedicated its efforts on cultural diplomacy, focusing on the strengthening of civil society of Poland; at the same time, it engaged the United States to change the discourse on ‘soft power’⁸³.

⁸¹ Andrew Robinson, “Towards an Intellectual Reformation,” in *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, ed. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (New York: Routledge, 2006), 79.

⁸² Ford Foundation, Francis Sutton, “Submission to the Ford Foundation’s International Committee of the Board of Trustees,” 4. Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1982.

⁸³ John Ikenberry’s offers a very well summed view on Joseph Nye’s term soft power, which originally was coined by Nye in 1980. “The term “soft power” -- the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion -- is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates [...] Nye argues that successful states need both hard and soft power -- the ability to coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences. The United States can dominate others, but it has also excelled in projecting soft power, with the help of its companies, foundations, universities, churches, and other institutions of civil society; U.S. culture, ideals, and values have been extraordinarily important in helping Washington attract partners and supporters [...] Indeed, societies often embrace American values and culture but resist U.S. foreign policies.”

John Ikenberry, “Book Review: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Magazine Article, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59732/g-john-ikenberry/soft-power-the-means-to-success-in-world-politics> (accessed Jan. 30, 2012).

The Ford Foundation, as argued by Tournés, was a game changer in pushing forward the “Intercultural Publications” that promoted different and critical ideas and theories, music, art, and other expressions of society that gave rise to different thinking not just for those who lived under totalitarian communism, but also in the United States. Ninkovich saw the Rockefeller Foundation as a trailblazer in cultural diplomacy and Tournés believed this was the case with Ford’s intercultural publications.

Under the Gramscian model, the role and effectiveness of private actors or foundations such as Ford’s cultural diplomacy, support for civil society, and democracy promotion can be better explained than those of liberalism, statism or Marxism. The overall acceptance of American cultural values that swept through Poland and much of Eastern Europe during the transition years is not simply the imposition of American hegemony, but can be seen as reflective of the demand for such values. Identifying the Polish demand for democracy does not de-value the theoretical application of the Gramscian framework in explaining democratization in Poland, but underscores the complexity of civil society and importance of cultural diplomacy as potential factors in democratization. The Gramscian model takes into account the power of civil society unlike the other models; it allows for a cooperative understanding of the relationship between the state and civil society, and can explain that the state and private actors both can have a role in the public policy making process. The Gramscian model provides an analysis that goes deep into the make-up of civil society and the interplay between the state as the institutional pillars and the social classes within civil society.

Conclusion: Re-Constructing Power

The research presented provides a glimpse into the application of explanations for the role of private actors, specifically the Ford Foundation in Poland from 1980 to 1994, in public policy making, through several theoretical models. Comparing statist, liberal, Marxist, and Gramscian theories, I provided an array of perspectives to explain the interplay between private actors, civil society and hegemony. The construction of ideas in the struggle for power should not be diminished when viewing the importance of private actors involvement in contributing to cultural power.

What I've found in respect to the models is that the Marxist model fails to bring more than an economic perspective, which limits its analytical applicability to anything except economic power relations in the case of Ford's role in Poland.

Statist analysis of state-led democracy promotion efforts and official democracy capacity-building through clear state apparatus activity limits an analysis and recognition of private actor power and influence on public policy making. Without recognition or analysis of the complex public-private relationships that exist in public policymaking, the acceptance of private actor influence on public policymaking or questions on the social structure of society, an analysis of the Ford's role in Poland is severely limited.

The liberal view is confined to two perspectives. The first perspective is one that identifies the emergence of private organizations, such as lobbying and interest groups, that are either in competition or cooperation with government public policy (pluralism); secondly, and more applicable to this analysis, the

liberal view would argue that private actors similar to Ford would either work under the control of the government or with its approval (corporatist), depending on your definitions of liberalist concepts. However, a liberal explanation of Ford's involvement of Poland does not provide analysis of private actors beyond that of identifying whether Ford could be in support of or in competition with government policymaking or existing under control or by approval from the government.

The Gramscian model's emphasis on civil society, sociocultural relations, subordinate classes, and hegemonic actors and their ideas provide the most accurate theoretical tools to explain the relationship between the Ford Foundation, their actions in Poland, and implications for American foreign policy. Recognizing the Polish demand for democratization does not limit a Gramscian explanation of what happened in Poland, but underscores the integral role of civil society in democratization. The Gramscian perspective provides an understanding of cooperation between private and state actors, whereby actors share common perception(s) of the world, be that offered by Ninkovich or through Robinson's analysis of an ethico-political common conception(s) of the world.

Robert W. Cox identified the complex nature of hegemonic power, applying Gramscian perspectives to the international fore. Cox argued that hegemonic power relies on the uses of coercion and consent; what therefore creates resilience in hegemonic powers is the strategic execution of the two

concepts.⁸⁴ American and Western hegemony is built upon liberal democratic ideals that are based upon both coercion and consent, leaving civil society to play an active role in society and social change. The difference in strategic execution of consent and coercion, as argued by B. Jessop, was present between the different power relations expressed by the Soviet bloc and the West; “In the East the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.”⁸⁵

Civil society, like that of Poland’s civil movement in the 1980s, provides an example to which the Gramscian perspective identifies as the equivalent of the creation of a new world view; “The creation of a new world-view is equivalent to the creation of a new type of political and civil society.”⁸⁶ When Gramsci analyzed social movements he placed importance on the creation of “intellectual development” in the process of social change, which A. Robinson summarized well; “Subaltern strata linger in a position of subordination partly because their conceptions of the world remain within the framework set by the ruling class. In order to become autonomous and thereby able to change the world, the subaltern strata need to develop a new conception of the world that is not dependant on ruling-class ideas.”⁸⁷ What the emerging Polish civil society in the 1980s

⁸⁴ Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983), 163.

⁸⁵ Bob Jessop, “Gramsci as a Spatial Theorist,” in *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, ed. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (New York: Routledge, 2006), 37.

⁸⁶ Andrew Robinson, Towards an Intellectual Reformation, in *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, ed. Bieler and Morton, 80.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

resembled were Western or American sociocultural aspects, such as free-market enterprise, a middle class, and freedom through democracy.

The resilience of Polish civil society was based upon the American model or the American historical bloc. To Gramsci, “The bloc represents the basis of consent for a certain social order, in which the hegemony of a dominant class is created and re-created in a web of institutions, social relations and ideas.

[further] A class maintains its dominance not simply through a special organization of force, but because it is able to go beyond its narrow, corporative interests, exert a moral and intellectual leadership, and make compromises.”⁸⁸

Ford’s cultural diplomacy in Poland can be viewed as part of maintenance of a hegemonic worldview, i.e. the American historical bloc, be it embraced by societies or cast upon them. The resilience of the American political order, unlike the Soviet order, relied on the cultural relationships and importance of consent, which were built into civil society engagements.

In performing this research, the extent to which authors attempt to ideologically pit foundations against liberal democratic values is abundant, but not overwhelmingly surprising due to the elites that stream through foundations to government and vice versa. Some research borders or, all together, places a causal relationship between wealth and negative impacts on public policy making, rather than attempting to distinguish the differences and complexities among the list of foundation bodies.

⁸⁸ William I. Robinson, “Gramsci and Globalisation,” in *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, ed. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (New York: Routledge, 2006), 170.

Criticism of the Gramscian model are sometimes attributed to its sensitivity to structural change⁸⁹, but in the case of this research project, the criticism surrounds the Gramscian model's ability to be easily conflated with an ideological discussion of western hegemony, rather than the model's ability to explain aspects of power such as civil society.

Further need in understanding the ideology of a foundation is overstated, what may be more interesting are the linkages that exist between foundations' funding (inputs) to educational institutions and the research that is produced (outcomes), and whether those outputs contribute in some way to cultural power or views of hegemony. The above research is only a glimpse into civil society's unique role in hegemony, an examination of the metrics behind not only the successes of foundations, such as Ford in Poland, but also an examination of the failures, may yield more insights into the strength of civil society's capacity to maintain hegemony or bring about a change in hegemony.

The importance of civil society cannot continue to be understated in public policy. Reflecting on the revolutions of Eastern Europe, Michael Ignatieff noted, "Without civil society, democracy remains an empty shell."⁹⁰ In light of my analysis, this metaphor/aphorism can be restated thus: without civil society, hegemony is destined to fail.

⁸⁹ Parmar, *Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations*, 372.

⁹⁰ Michael Ignatieff, "On Civil Society: Why Eastern European Revolutions Could Work," Review Essay, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 1995, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50780/michael-ignatieff/on-civil-society-why-eastern-europe-s-revolutions-could-succeed> (accessed August 13, 2011).

Bibliography

- Abelson, Donald E. "What Were They Thinking? Think Tanks, the Bush Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy." In *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*, edited by Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge, 92-105. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Ahwad, Salma. "American Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences between the Wars: Comment on the Debate between Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher." *Sociology* 25, no. 3 (1991): 511-520.
- Arnove, Robert F. *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: Foundations at Home and Abroad*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Berman, Edward H. *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983.
- Berstein, Carl. "The Holy Alliance." Magazine Article, *Time Magazine*. February 24, 1992.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974931,00.html>
(accessed August 14, 2011).
- Bulmer, Martin. "Philanthropic Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences in the Early Twentieth Century: A Reply to Donald Fisher." *Sociology* 18, no. 4 (1984): 572-579.
- Chaves, Wanderson. "Democracy and Welfare According to Liberal and Democratic Militancy: the Gaither Report and the Ford Foundation's International Policy Agenda." *Oikos* 8, no. 2 (2009), 223-246.

- Cox, Robert W. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-175.
- Davies, Norman. "The Solidarity Decade." In *God's Playground, A History of Poland, Volume II*, Revised edition, 482-508. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005.
- Di Maggio, Paul. "A Jaundiced View of Philanthropy." *Comparative Education Review* 27, no. 3 (1983): 442-445.
- Economist Magazine. "The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism." Magazine article, *Economist Magazine*. February 26, 2006.
<http://www.economist.com/node/5517656> (accessed December 20, 2011).
- Economist Magazine. "The Centenarians Square Up." Magazine article, *Economist Magazine*. June 9, 2011.
<http://www.economist.com/node/18802844> (accessed on August 14, 2011).
- Escudé, Carlos. *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*. Florida: University of Florida Press, 1997.
- Fisher, Donald. *Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993.

Ford Foundation. Daniel Chirot and Mirosława Grabowska. "Evaluation of Institutions of Higher Learning Supported by the Ford Foundation in East-Central Europe in the 1990s, and Recommendations for the Future", *Ford Foundation Archives*, August 16, 1999.

Ford Foundation. Shepard Forman. "Ford Foundation Grantee: Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw, Poland)". Grantee Request No. 376, *Ford Foundation Archives*, June 20, 1996.

Ford Foundation. "Inter-Office Memorandum, December 21, 1989. Carnegie Corporation of New York, Conference on Western Proposals for Assistance to Poland and Hungary and Ford Foundation Follow-up". Background Papers 1989-1990, Ford Foundation Archives (12590).

Ford Foundation. "Russia and Eastern Europe: Program Priorities and Office Structure, Board of Trustee Meeting, June 1994". Briefing Materials for Grantee Visit to Poland 1996 (85481 also classified under 013737), *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1996.

Ford Foundation. "Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw, Poland 1993". Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, (60706).

Ford Foundation. "Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw, Poland 1993". Report, *Ford Foundation Archives* (60706) - Grants Related to Poland: 1989 to 1993.

Ford Foundation. "Review and Meeting of the Board of Trustees – schedule of events and related reading Warsaw, Poland 1993". Report, *Ford*

- Foundation Archives* (60706) – Donors to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1993.
- Ford Foundation. Francis Sutton. “Submission to the Ford Foundation’s International Committee of the Board of Trustees.” Report, *Ford Foundation Archives*, 1982.
- Fosdick, Raymond Blaine. *The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1952.
- Gerber, Larry G. “Corporatism and State Theory.” *Social Science History* 19, no. 3 (1995): 313-332.
- Ignatieff, Michael. “On Civil Society: Why Eastern European Revolutions Could Work.” Review Essay, *Foreign Affairs*. March/April, 1995.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50780/michael-ignatieff/on-civil-society-why-eastern-europe-s-revolutions-could-succeed> (accessed August 13, 2011).
- Ikenberry, John. “Book Review: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.” Magazine Article, *Foreign Affairs*. May/June, 2004.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59732/g-john-ikenberry/soft-power-the-means-to-success-in-world-politics> (accessed Jan. 30, 2012).
- Jessop, Bob. “Gramsci as a Spatial Theorist.” In *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, edited by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 27-43. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- MacDonald, Dwight. *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions*. New York: Reynal, 1956.

- Ninkovich, Frank. "The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change," *The Journal of American History* 70, no. 4 (1984): 799-820.
- Parmar, Inderjeet. "Mobilizing America for An Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations." *Studies in American Political Development*, 13 (1999): 337-373.
- Raucher, Allan R. *Paul G. Hoffman: Architect of Foreign Aid*. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1985.
- Robinson, Andrew. "Towards an Intellectual Reformation," in *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, edited by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 75-87. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Robinson, William I. "Gramsci and Globalisation." In *Images of Gramsci, Connections and Contentions in Political Theory and International Relations*, edited by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 165-180. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. "The New Corporatism." *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-131.
- Tournés, Ludovic. "La diplomatie culturelle de la Fondation Ford. Les éditions Intercultural Publications (1952 – 1959)." *Revue d'histoire* 4, no. 26 (2002): 65-77.
- University of Texas Archives. "President Ronald Reagan Speeches." Speech, *University of Texas*, December 17, 1981.
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/121781c.htm>
(accessed August 10, 2011).

USAID. "USAID Mission to Poland." Timeline, *USAID*, March 13, 2002.

<http://www.usaid.gov/pl/timeline.htm> (accessed, August 10, 2011).

Wandycz, Piotr Stefan. *The United States and Poland*. Harvard University Press, 1980.