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
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THE CONCEPT OF MIND AS REFLECTIVE TOTALITY

by Francis Patrick Forde

Thesis presented to the School of Psychology
of the University of Ottawa as a partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology.



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CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

The writer was born March 2, 1924, in Bluebell, County Dublin, Ireland. He attended the National University of Ireland (Dublin Constituent College), where he took his primary degree in Philosophy in 1945. Following four years of Theological Studies at the Irish Scholasticate of the Oblate Fathers (Piltown), he returned to the National University of Ireland and, in 1950, was awarded a post-graduate Diploma in Education. In 1956, he took a Social Science Degree at the same University. After completing two years of professional training in Clinical Psychology, in 1962, he received the Diploma in Psychology also from the National University of Ireland.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to explain and develop a basically significant theme in the psychology of Saint Thomas Aquinas whose deeper dimensions and implications appear to have gone unappreciated. It is the concept of the mind of man as a *totum potentiale* (potential totality or, alternatively, reflective totality) and the fundamental role of *intellectus*, or understanding, within this dynamic totality. This concept provides the key to the thinking of St Thomas on the nature and unity of human cognitive experience.

St Thomas Aquinas has long been renowned for his treatment of the vexed problem of the mind-body duality in man. It is, nevertheless, a great irony of history that, even among those who have acclaimed St Thomas for the masterly ingenuity of his solution to this problem, few appear to have perceived his deeper, underlying reason for proposing it as he did. Commonly, it seems, the solution of St Thomas has been seen as a satisfactory and convenient '*via media*' for reconciling the two great psychologies inherited from the ancient world, the moral and spiritual psychology of Plato and the naturalistic and biological

psychology of Aristotle¹; or, as a device for safeguarding the immortality and spirituality of the soul, while remaining faithful to the hylomorphic principle of Aristotle².

What has frequently not been appreciated is that, in the thinking of Saint Thomas, resolving the dualistic mind-body dilemma was not the end of the problem. If the natural unity of man was important to St Thomas, it was because it alone provided the basis for an adequate and realistic idea of the human mind as he understood it, its functioning and growth. For St Thomas, the natural spirit-body unity of man and the nature of the human mind cannot be understood apart. In other words, while a solution to the problem of the body-mind duality was vitally necessary, for St Thomas it was an intermediate step towards solving the pressing cognitional problem which

1. Anton C. Pégis, "St. Thomas and the Unity of Man", in Progress in Philosophy (Ed. J. A. McWilliams), 1955, p. 153 - 173, discusses the influence of both Plato and Aristotle on St Thomas' thinking in regard to man, as well as St Thomas' own "original and even revolutionary" conception.

2. F. C. Copleston, S.J., discusses this viewpoint in Aquinas, 1955, p. 158 & sqq.

concerns the basic integrity of the human mind: the problem of the duality of sense and reason; the problem of a unity which was seen, not as an accomplished fact of nature, but as a challenging possibility, a merely potential unity. It is with St Thomas' handling of this potential unity that the present thesis is concerned.

The Concept of Totum Potentiale

The solution of Aquinas to this further and, to his mind, more crucial problem is found, in essence, in the proposition that the primary principle of cognition in man is the substantial form of the body. In light of the long-established and respected position of Augustinian Neo-Platonism, with its insistent emphasis on spirit to the virtual repudiation of the body, the proposal that the spirit of man was actually the substantial form of his body represented a revolutionary and much-controverted innovation³.

3. Daniel Callus, O.P., details the historically conflictual setting of St Thomas' insistence on man's essential unity in The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, Aquinas Papers No. 5, 1946.

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However, the full originality of the solution of St Thomas becomes evident only with the realization that the mind of man is to be understood as a potential totality.

A *totum potentiale*, considered generally, is a totality of power, a dynamic totality, made up of part-powers. The peculiar significance of the *totum potentiale* concept is that, while the totality is considered to be essentially present to each of its parts, it is not present to each part in the fulness of its power. This power is found fully only in one of the potential parts and to a less degree in the others. Hence, the totality is indeed truly predicable of its parts but with the recognition that the more principal parts receive the more proper predication. "The point of a potential whole is ...that each potential part truly (essentially) shares" in the perfection of the whole but "only one of these parts possesses the full power of that perfection, whereas the others share in that power in a decreasing series of less perfect ways"⁴.

4. Carl A. Lofy, S.J., "The Meaning of 'Potential Whole' in St. Thomas Aquinas", in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXXVII, November 1959, p. 48.

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St Thomas' application to the mind of man of the concept of potential totality (also called by St Thomas "virtual totality" or "potestative totality") leads to certain basic conclusions whose significance for human life and living it is the intent of this thesis to explore and emphasize. Some of these basic conclusions are briefly indicated in the paragraphs which follow.

Firstly, the human mind is a complex totality. It is a complexus of powers, all deriving from and differing in degree of proximity to a single dynamic source, which is *intellectus* or understanding, the distinguishing characteristic of man. These manifold powers are ramifications of intellect and, without them and their functioning through bodily organs, intellect, which begins as possible intellect only, could not achieve its actualization.

Secondly, the human mind is a reflective totality. It constitutes itself as an actual understanding through a re-flection, or return, to itself, having penetrated sensibility in the process of striving to understand reality. The unity of the human mind is not something already given; nor is it a precious 'inner core' to be preserved and protected from all that is 'extraneous' to it, as the world

of sense has often been construed to be. The unity of the human mind is a goal to be achieved by a gradual process of simplification, through ordering, of the manifold which exists and operates within the one.

Thirdly and likewise, self-consciousness is to be understood, not as a given, but as a goal. It derives progressively from non-self-consciousness, through consciousness of the other. The human spirit comes to a knowledge of itself only through that which it posits of itself in sensibility. It is destined to become an understanding by means of a constant reflectivity, returning to its own reality through processes which are not peculiar to it but which, basically, it shares with other living beings. While the proper function of the human spirit is understanding, in order to have understanding there is a need for sensing and, for sensing to be humanized, there is a need for understanding. The terms, *emanatio* or *processio* and their counterpart, *conversio*, adopted from Neo-Platonism, are the terms familiarly employed by St Thomas to express the dynamic interplay and interpenetration involved.

Finally and most importantly, there is no "exteriority" of sensibility and intellect. With each succeeding *conversio* of intellect through the effort to understand,

it is the totality which becomes more intellectual, not any "isolated" power. Each moment of progressive understanding implies a greater penetration of rationality into the less rational powers. The whole person grows in understanding. And this without force, subjugation or compromise in regard to so-called "inferior" powers or capacities.

Purpose of Thesis

The above listing of some of the themes subordinate to and contained within the major theme of mind as potential totality will have provided, it is hoped, some indication of the psychological potential of the concept itself.

As the development of the first Chapter will show, St Thomas' treatment of the human mind involves three levels of consideration: mind as substantial form of the human composite; mind as spiritual entity, a "*habens esse*" with body-transcending capacities; and mind as "*totum potentiale*".

The first two identifications concern the essential reality of the human mind. Though St Thomas establishes that the human soul is indeed a spiritual substance, it is

clear from the direction and development of his thought that his main concern is with its incompletion as a spiritual substance, the fact which necessitates its condition as substantial form.

This point is basic for an appreciation of the mind as a *totum potentiale*. St Thomas uses the concept, as third identification of mind, precisely to describe the existential condition of a spiritual being which seeks its actualizing as an intellect through functioning as the substantial form of a body.

It is suggested that it is here, in this third identification of mind, that St Thomas offers his most fruitful contribution to psychology. It is here that St Thomas unfolds his theory of the ultimate psychological primacy of spirit in the life of man, identifying spirit as a complex dynamism which is in process of constituting itself as an intellect or understanding; which begins as a possible intellect only; and which actualizes itself only to the extent and in the degree that it reaches and maintains the level of activity specific to intellect, namely, the activity of understanding and love.

The pages which follow represent the attempt of a student in the psychology of man to bring to the attention

of other psychologists this original and highly significant conception of the human mind. The hope is that scientific psychology, so eager historically to cut loose from its philosophical moorings, may find a value in returning to the sources which served it well for so long. To the extent that modern psychology is seen and recognized to be in need of a concept of mind which is inspiring and, at the same time, adequate to encompass all of the human reality, it is respectfully suggested that such a concept is available in St Thomas' presentation of mind as a potential totality; as potential spirit and subject, source and seat of autonomy, spontaneity and inviolability.

As will be evident, the emphasis throughout St Thomas' treatment is on possibilities which, in the event, may or may not be actualized. Granted, then, that the actualization of the human spirit's potential, as conceived by St Thomas, is a matter of crucial importance for individual human destiny, of equally crucial importance is the obligation of society generally and of its various institutions specifically, in particular its educational institutions, to provide the conditions which will consistently favour rather than impede such actualization.

It is the contention of the writer that the implications of the psyche for today's psychology lie in the concept of mind as a *totum potentiale* which constitutes itself progressively as understanding and love. It is the intention of the present work to present and, to some extent, develop the thought of St Thomas, within the broad perspective of dynamic psychology, and to evaluate it in terms of its basic implications for the individual and for society generally. The development of St Thomas' thought will form the subject matter of Chapter II, while certain broad implications will be considered in Chapter III.

There is much to the conception of St Thomas which the writer feels he is justified in considering as incidental to this study. Thus, as a student in psychology, he will attempt to expose, examine and appreciate the psychological impact of St Thomas' ideas. A lexicographic analysis of textual material is not intended. Nor is it the writer's intention to detail the origin and history of the concept of the *totum potentiale* from its reputed beginnings with Boethius, or to describe its evolution in the writings of St Thomas himself. The former task has

already been undertaken by Pius Künzle, O.P.⁵, though in a limited perspective and in an essentially theological frame of reference. The latter task appears uncalled for since, as Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., has noted⁶, the thinking of St Thomas on this subject was clearly and confidently established from the start of his career, gaining only in ontological solidity with his later development.

Sources and Approach

St Thomas nowhere presents a systematic and developed body of theory concerning the human mind as a potential totality. That he possessed a completed and fully operative conception appears certain; also that, as Geiger testifies, it was viable from early in his career and that it served him as an assured source of enlightened explanation, comment and correction, even while often remaining as implicit background. What is certain too, as this study hopes to confirm,

5. Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin, 1956.

6. Bulletin Thomiste, Vol. X, 1957 - 1959, p. 245.

is that the concept of *totum potentiale* was central to his view of man's mind, its capacities, functioning and growth.

This study will concentrate on those texts in the major writings of St Thomas which apply the concept to the mind of man and its various powers; more particularly, on the development and application of the concept as it is presented in Part I, Questions 75 - 89, of the *Summa Theologiae*, which is universally regarded as containing the mature and definitive thought of St Thomas. Parallel and complementary texts in other writings of Aquinas will be referred to whenever such reference helps to clarify or otherwise promote an understanding of his thought on the subject.

The study will attempt, by presentation and examination of the major texts and their contexts, to uncover and re-fashion, as far as possible, the image of the human mind as St Thomas envisioned it, and to describe it, not structurally nor statically, but from the viewpoint of a dynamic and humanist psychology, and in line with the spirit and general approach of the modern science of Hermeneutics. One of the basic principles of modern

Hermeneutics is that earlier concepts, even in cases where they were fully grasped and appreciated at an earlier age, need to be periodically re-examined in the light of later developments within the same or related disciplines and so be made applicable and relevant to the needs of later times. The concept of mind as potential totality appears to be a very appropriate case in point.

Richard Palmer states that "the task of interpretation may in some cases be to take what seems to be dead and to show its relation to the present, i.e., the present horizon of expectations and the present world of self-understanding"⁷. Palmer's reference to "the present world of self-understanding" is noteworthy in the present context and his statement has considerable relevance to the concept of the *totum potentiale* as applied to the mind of man. Although the concept of St Thomas cannot be regarded as "dead", it may be fairly described as generally unappreciated and unexploited, as will be made clearer in the section of the Introduction

7. Hermeneutics, 1969, p. 251.

to follow, which considers the recognition and use of the concept by recent and contemporary writers on psychological aspects of St Thomas' thought.

The "Totum Potentiale" Concept in Modern Thomistic Writings

George P. Klubertanz, S.J., commenting on the repeated studies which have been done on St Thomas' "doctrine of the unity and composition of human nature", insists that the unity of human operation also is "an essential part of Thomist psychology" and points to the regrettable fact that most studies "have concentrated on the method of faculty analysis", the result being that "human operation is looked at as sensation, imagination, reasoning, willing, and so forth"⁸.

The analytic, "piecemeal" approach to the dynamically unitary activity of human knowing, which Klubertanz describes,

8. "The Unity of Human Activity", in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXVII, January 1950, p. 75.

is undoubtedly typical of much of the writing done over recent decades in the name of St Thomas and serves to illustrate the too ready structuralism, the "anti-historical immobilism" and the "excessive abstractness" which Bernard Lonergan, S.J., has heavily criticized⁹, when he advocated studies which would take into account the living, historical subject in his time and milieu. It also serves to suggest, as was indicated above, that St Thomas' solution to the problem of the sense-reason duality, though by no means a dead letter, as will be seen, is in fact largely unappreciated and unexploited.

Perhaps this is the place to note that a concept as basically dynamic and developmental as the potential totality concept would, understandably, have particular difficulty finding accommodation within the structures which have been erected, and that this may help to explain why, as Albert Plé, O.P., complains, Thomism, far from producing a psychology truly worthy of St Thomas, appears not even

9. The Subject, 1968, p. 10.

to possess a concept of nature which could serve the purpose¹⁰.

That Plé's complaint is by no means universally justified is evident from the work of the writers mentioned and of others, including particularly: Anton C. Pégis, Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Benoît Garceau, O.M.I., Karl Rahner, S.J., Louis-M. Régis, O.P.¹¹. The work of these writers clearly testifies to a lived appreciation of the concept under discussion, even if, in fact, the concept itself still awaits development by philosopher-psychologists who can recognize and do justice to its potential. Pégis, in an article written in 1940, pinpointed the potential totality concept, though without mentioning it, with the significant comment: "There are virtualities in this Thomistic idea for a philosophical psychology that still await to be explored"¹². Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., though

10. Collections: Problèmes d'Aujourd'hui: Actualité de Saint Thomas, Fr. Plé writes: "Après des siècles d'essentialisme (dont les thomistes n'ont pas été indemnes) notre conception de nature n'a plus grand-chose avec ce que saint Thomas appelait ainsi; on en a fait une idée statique, immuable, universelle: elle n'est plus dans la réalité de la vie".

11. See Annotated Bibliography.

12. "In Umbra Intelligentiae", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. XIV, 1940, p. 155.

in a more individualized context, has also expressed the need for such a development.¹³

It would seem that St Thomas' concept of *totum potentiale* applied to mind, if it is to receive the treatment which it deserves, needs to be taken in hand where it properly belongs, namely, within the specialized discipline of dynamic psychology, since it is dynamic psychology which is concerned with man as process, man responding to changeful situations which call for an answer in terms of realistic adaptability and adjustment, man as undetermined and required to determine himself through his values and choices. As was indicated earlier, it is in the interest of promoting such an espousal by dynamic psychology that this present work has been written.

The Originality of St Thomas

That some such specialized and open-minded interest is called for, if only to demonstrate and vindicate the

13. Bulletin Thomiste, Loc. cit.

value and originality of St Thomas' thought on man, was made evident to the writer on first consulting the recently¹⁴ published and much publicized Blackfriars (English Dominican) authoritative edition of the *Summa Theologiae*. In this elaborate work, St Thomas' so-called Treatise on Man (Part I of the *Summa*, Questions 75 - 89) occupies two volumes: Vol. II, Man (Qq. 75 - 83), edited and translated by Timothy L. Suttor, and Vol. 12, Human Intelligence (Qq. 84 - 89), edited and translated by Paul R. Durbin.

The two editors are clearly concerned to claim some measure of originality for St Thomas but, as it happens, their efforts amount to hardly more than a "damning with faint praise". Durbin states quite categorically in the opening words of his brief Introduction that "what St Thomas offers to the reader in his treatise on human knowledge is a succinct and precise summary of the Aristotelian *via media* between Platonism and pre-Socratic sensism"¹⁵. This declaration leaves Durbin with little scope for his

14. Publication commenced 1964. Since then, sixty volumes have appeared. It seems that the final volumes are still in preparation.

15. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol. 12: Human Intelligence, Edited and Translated by Paul R. Durbin, 1968, p. xxi.

particular claim on behalf of St Thomas and, apart from a half-hearted gesture in the direction of the "agent intellect"¹⁶, Durbin can recognize no "genuine originality" in St Thomas other than that "displayed in fitting the scattered insights or incomplete treatises" of his predecessors "into a coherent synthesis"¹⁷. Even this limited originality is reluctantly conceded since Durbin notes that "St Thomas' organization may be too neat, as some have said"¹⁸.

Suttor is prepared to be more magnanimous. Even though he dismisses Aristotle as having been only "a useful catalyst" to St Thomas, whose "authentic genealogy as a psychologist", he claims, "is found in the first six

16. Durbin states: "The accusation has been made more than once that in all this there is nothing truly original in St Thomas. It may be granted that he made the so-called 'agent intellect' a part of man, but the concession will be made grudgingly, and it will be added that in doing so he was very likely departing from the true meaning of Aristotle. In a sense this is true - nearly every element in his treatise on human knowledge can be found present in some other author..." - Ibid., p. xxi.

17. Ibid., p. xxii.

18. Ibid.

Councils"¹⁹ of the Church (the treatise on man being "a footnote to their work"²⁰), Suttor considers that this portion of the *Summa Theologiae* can be classed with the Aristotelian Categories and the theological works of Boethius as having been responsible for the "orientation of a culture"²¹. Moreover, Suttor underlines the significance of St Thomas' insistence on the natural unity of man, on the fact that body and soul "are not two things but two sides of one single thing, a man"²². "What was original", he states, "was the analysis of the conspiracy of flesh and spirit in man's yearning for God"²³.

While there is no denying St Thomas' concern for the divine, Suttor in his Introduction to St Thomas' treatment of man, is so exclusively insistent on St Thomas' theological orientation that he does scant justice either to man or

19. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol. II: Man, Edited and translated by Timothy L. Suttor, 1970, p. xv.

20. Ibid., p. xv.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. xvi.

23. Ibid.

to Saint Thomas.

"Man's yearning", as intellectual being, is for fulness of truth and love, culminating in God. "The conspiracy of flesh and spirit" begins in the intimacy of the essential union of soul and body but it does not end there, as so many writers on St Thomas, including Suttor, seem to think. "The analysis" of the ongoing conspiracy is, in a sense, what this thesis attempts to provide. That there can be found in St Thomas Aquinas, despite Suttor's misgivings²⁴, "a convincing alternative" to "a faculty psychology" it is the hope of this writer to point out, to the possible enrichment both of man and of the reputation of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

24. Ibid., p. 262.

CHAPTER I

THE TOTUM POTENTIALE IN AQUINAS' CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN MIND

The intention of this chapter is to delineate the particular concept of the mind of man which Thomas Aquinas presents in his *Summa Theologiae* and other writings¹, with the purpose of explaining the notion of the *totum potentiale* and of establishing its significance as an integral and indispensable element in his perception.

St Thomas' treatment involves three levels of consideration of the human mind which constitute three cohesive and complementary identifications. St Thomas identifies the mind of man, firstly, as the unique substantial form of the human composite; secondly, as a spiritual entity, with powers transcending the capacity of the organism and capable of existing in its own right; and thirdly, as a *totum potentiale*.

1. Cfr. H-D. Gardeil, O.P., Initiation à la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Vol. III: Psychologie, 1952. Besides the Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Qq. 75-89, which he describes as "un véritable Traité organique et à peu près complet sur l'âme, ses facultés et ses actes" and "incontestablement ...l'exposé le plus riche et le plus achevé" of St Thomas' Psychology, Gardeil makes special mention of the Quaestio Disputata de Anima as constituting "un vrai petit traité de l'âme" - p. 169.

Other major sources of reference for purposes of the present topic are St Thomas' De Veritate, De Spiritualibus Creaturis and the Quaestiones Quodlibetales, as well as sections of the Commentarium in IV Libros Sententiarum.

The first and second identifications may be considered to convey St Thomas' perception of the ontological or entitative status of the human mind both in itself and in its relation to the body, thus indicating its nature, place and significance in the world of being. They describe its essential reality. These two primary identifications were directed to vindicating the completely natural unity of the human being and, at the same time, to defending the essential spirituality of the human soul. They constitute Aquinas' official stand on highly controversial issues of his day².

The third identification, that of mind as a *totum potentiale*, describes the human mind in its existential aspect; in the dynamics of its need and of its functioning and development as an intellect. It constitutes the natural and necessary corollary to the two earlier identifications. It supplies the psychological or, more precisely, the psychodynamic dimension, thus giving completion, clarification and depth to the other identifications with the concept of intellect as a potential totality in the process of its self-constitution.

2. An account of the position of St Thomas in the context of his times is found in Daniel A. Callus, O.P., The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, Aquinas Papers No. 5, 1946. Also in Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Mediaeval Philosophy, Vol. 2, Part II, 1950, Chapter XXXVII.

Part I. The Primary Identifications of Mind

The first part of this chapter will be concerned with Aquinas' two primary identifications of mind and specifically in so far as they together form the natural antecedent to the third.

Section 1. The Mind of Man as Substantial Form

As vehicle of expression for his original conception of the relationship of mind to body in man, St Thomas chose the hylomorphic theory of Aristotle in the full comprehensiveness and rigour of its application and implication³. The intellectual soul of man, in consequence, is identified as the unique substantial form of the human composite, joining with the *materia* or corporeal element to constitute the human substance or essence in such direct and intimate union as to exclude all possible duality of being and nature⁴.

3. Though Aquinas applied the hylomorphism of Aristotle in full rigour to the mind-body relationship, his concept of mind differed significantly from that of Aristotle. Cfr. Frederick Copleston, S.J., Aquinas, 1955, Chapter 4, Man (I): Body and Soul.

4. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 1, resp.: "It must be said that the intellect which is the source of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts

(Footnote 4 continued)

is a form of the thing to which the act is attributed...Now the first thing by which the body lives is manifestly the soul. And as life is manifested through various activities in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary source of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this primary source of understanding in us, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body."

(Note: All texts of St Thomas quoted in this work are given in English translation. Texts from St Thomas' treatment of man in the Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Qq. 75 - 89, are taken from James F. Anderson's St. Thomas Aquinas; Treatise on Man, 1962. All other quotations from the Summa Theologiae are from the English Dominican translation. Quotations from other works of St Thomas, except when noted, have been translated by the present writer, in default of satisfactory renderings.)

While hylomorphism, here applied by Aquinas, itself insists on the unicity of substantial form in any natural substance, St Thomas adds four further articles (3, 4, 6, 7) within the same Quaestio 76 to make his meaning absolutely clear. As Daniel A. Callus, O.P., comments: "Assuming that the soul and the body are so intimately united as to form one single essence, Aquinas further inquires whether the determining principle whereby man is what he is, namely, is constituted in his specific nature, is one only. His reply is that there can be only one single soul or determining vital principle in man. Yet some, while admitting one single soul in man, postulate three substantial forms. St Thomas avoids all equivocation by showing that 'there cannot be in man any other substantial form besides the intellectual soul. Any other form coming after the substantial form is not a substantial, but simply an accidental, form. Whence, since the intellectual soul virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things...' Finally, to remove any possibility of evasiveness, he proves that the union of the soul and the body is immediate and not through the means of light, or any other bodies or dispositions." Op. Cit., p. 24 - 25.

As the substantial form of the human organism, the intellectual soul is the unique principle or source of bodily being and of life at all levels, vegetant, sentient and rational. Furthermore, the capacities of the lower forms of life, sentience and vegetancy, are contained within the virtuality or dynamic ambit of the intellectual soul as "motor" of all activity within the organism⁵. As stemming from a superior form, these capacities exist more perfectly in the human being, since they are naturally intended to subserve the higher, rational functioning of the human soul⁶.

5. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 3, resp.: "...the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensory soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants."

Ibid., Q. 76, art. 6, reply to obj. 2: "...The more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; and therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man."

6. Ibid., Q. 76, art. 5, in corp.: "...the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness, because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior..."

Q. Un. de Anima, art. XI, reply to obj. 15: "...the sensible soul in man is not an irrational soul; it is at once both sensible and rational." (writer's translation)

Ibid., Art. XI, reply to obj. 19: "It must be said that animal as such is neither rational nor irrational; the rational animal is man, the irrational animal is the brute animal. In the same way, while the sensible soul as such is neither rational nor irrational, in man the sensible soul is rational, in the brute animal it is irrational." (writer's translation)

As is the case with every hylomorphic unity, the being possessed by the total composite is the being of the formal component or substantial form, in this case the intellectual existence of the human mind⁷. Moreover, according to Aristotelian hylomorphism, the body of man, in its disposition and organization, naturally exists for and is subordinate to the soul's inherent need to achieve its own actualization or completion as intellect or mind⁸.

7. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 1, reply to obj. 5: "The soul communicates that being in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which, with the intellectual soul, there results one being; so that the being of the whole composite is also the being of the soul itself. This is not the case with other forms, which are not subsistent."

Cfr. Q. Un. de Spir. Creat., art. XI, reply to obj. 14: "It must be said that the soul, insofar as it is the form of the body by its essence, gives being to the body as its substantial form; and that it gives to the body that being which is life, insofar as it is that kind of form, namely, a soul; and that it gives to the body life in an intellectual nature, insofar as it is that kind of soul, namely, an intellectual soul." (writer's translation).

8. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5, resp.: "Since the form is not for the sake of the matter, but rather the matter for the sake of the form, the reason why the matter is such as it is must be derived from the form; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul...holds in the order of nature the lowest place among the intellectual substances. So much so, that it is not naturally endowed with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are, but has to obtain knowledge from individual things by way of the senses...That is why the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding but also with the power of sensing. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a bodily instrument. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to a body which could be the fitting organ of sense."

Cfr. Q. Un. de Anima, art. X, reply to obj. 1: "Since matter is for the sake of form, and form is ordained to its own proper activity, the matter of each form should be such as befits the activity of that form;

Section 2. The Mind of Man as Spirit

In the second identification of mind, St Thomas establishes that the intellective soul of man is an essentially spiritual entity, capable of existing independently of the body⁹. The mind of man, consequently, is not only the substantial form of the human body but it is also a spiritual reality in its own right.

This second identification can be and commonly appears to have been interpreted simply as upholding, for theological reasons although on philosophical grounds, the spirituality and, hence, the immortality of the human soul. So construed, it is understood as a declaration, duly demonstrated, to the effect that the soul of man, in addition to being the substantial form of the body, is also spiritual and immortal.

(Footnote 8 continued)

thus, the matter of a saw should be iron which, because of its hardness, befits the action of a saw. Since, therefore, the soul, due to the perfection of its power, is capable of various activities, it is necessary that its matter should be a body constituted of parts which are congruent to the soul's diverse activities and which are called organs; and, on this account, the whole body, to which primarily the soul answers as form, is an organ." (writer's translation)

Cfr. Ibid., reply to obj. 2: "Since matter is for the sake of form, form gives being and specific nature to matter in the way which is congruent to its activity." (writer's translation)

9. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 75, art. 2, in fin. corp.: "...the human soul, which is called 'intellect' or 'mind', is something incorporeal and subsistent."

While it is true that, as Christian and theologian, St Thomas was concerned to defend the spirituality of the human soul, it is evident from the entire direction and development of his thought that such defence was neither his only interest nor even his main interest in the present context. Although he establishes that the human soul is indeed a spiritual substance, his predominant concern is with the fact of its incompleteness as a spiritual substance, the fact which necessitates and explains its condition as substantial form of the human body¹⁰. What is therefore being identified here is not

10. The opening words of the 'Treatise on Man' identify the human being clearly as "spiritual and bodily in his substantial make-up" (S. Theol., Ia Pars, Q. 75, Preface). Indeed, the description of the human spirit in Aristotelian hylomorphic terms as "soul" and "substantial form" clearly establishes its condition as an incomplete being substantially.

The point is made explicitly in Q. 75, art. 2, reply to obj. 1, where St Thomas justifies the description of the soul as "subsistent" and as "this particular thing" but denies that it is complete in its specific nature. "The expression, 'this particular thing', can be taken in two senses: (1) for anything subsistent; (2) for that which subsists and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part. Thus a hand can be called 'this particular thing' in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, since the human soul is a part of the human species, it can be called 'this particular thing' in the first sense, as being something subsistent, but not in the second; for in this sense it is the composite of body and soul which is said to be 'this particular thing'."

Cfr. also Q. Un. de Anima, art. 1: "The mode of being of the human soul can be known from its activity. For, insofar as it has an operation which transcends matter, its being is elevated above the body and does not depend on it. However, insofar as it naturally acquires immaterial knowledge from material things, it is clear that the completion of its species is impossible apart from union with the body. For nothing is complete in its species, unless it possesses what is needed for the activity proper to that species." (writer's translation)

substantial form as spiritual reality but spirit as substantial form. What is being stated by St Thomas is that the human soul is an incomplete spiritual substance which can find its natural completion, as a substance and as a spirit, only through its functioning as substantial form of the body; that man, in other words, is essentially a spiritual reality but a spiritual reality which is incomplete and imperfect in its spiritual nature and which, therefore, needs to be united to a body as its substantial form in order to achieve its actualization and destiny as spirit.

This clarification is crucial as indicating the basis for recognition and appreciation of the mind of man as a *totum potentiale*, since St Thomas uses the *totum potentiale* concept, in reference to man, precisely to identify the existential condition of a spiritual being which seeks its actualization as an intellect through functioning as the substantial form of a body. It is in the context of its imperfection as an intellect and of its consequent need for substantial union

(Footnote 10 continue)

Cfr. also: Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 75, art. 7; Q. 76, art. 1, corp. and replies to obj. 1, 4, 6; Q. 76, art. 5, corp. and replies to obj. 2, 3; Q. Un. de Spir. Créat., art. V, resp.

with a body that St Thomas applies the concept of *totum potentiale* to the human mind¹¹.

Since its imperfect or incomplete condition is the reality which not only dictates that the human intellect function as a substantial form but also justifies and explains its description as a *totum potentiale*, it is important, before giving detailed considerations to this third identification of mind, to examine more closely in what consists this imperfection or incompleteness, in the perception of St Thomas.

The radical deficiency of the human mind is its naturally undeveloped condition as an intellect. In the thought of St Thomas, it occupies the lowliest rank in the order of intellectual beings¹². Human nature is the ultimate

11. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 8. St Thomas introduces the *totum potentiale* concept in the context of the soul's presence to each part of the body as substantial form and, hence, as primary source of activity.

12. Ibid., Q. 76, art. 5, resp.: "...the intellectual soul... holds in the order of nature the lowest place among the intellectual substances."

Ibid., Q. 89, art. 1, in corp.: "It is evident that, among intellectual substances, the lowest in the order of nature are human souls." (writer's translation) At the close of the article, St Thomas notes that, in comparison to pure intellects, human souls are "like rustics" who "can be led to knowledge only with the help of concrete examples". (writer's translation)

Cfr. also: In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1, art. 6, in corp. and reply to obj. 2.

intellectual nature¹³, so much so that, in the beginning, it is an intellect only in potency, a possible intellect¹⁴. Its actuality or realization as a spiritual being is so minimal, according to St Thomas, that it is comparable in the line of spiritual substances to prime matter in the line of physical realities¹⁵.

This lack of spiritual or intellectual reality results directly and naturally in its being the substantial form of a body. Since, as Aquinas explains, it is not naturally endowed with knowledge of truth, as superior intellects are, it does not possess within itself what is necessary for its fulfilment as an intellect. It must seek truth outside itself. Hence, the intellective soul of man must have not only the power of understanding but also the power of sensing. Hence, also, it must be rational¹⁶.

13. In II Sent., Dist. IX, Q. 1, art. 3, reply to obj. 2: "Every angelic nature is a greater unity and simplicity than is human nature, which is the last of intellectual natures." (writer's translation).

14. Q. Un. de Spir. Creat., art. 10, in corp.: "The human soul in the beginning is found to be a potentiality regarding intelligibles, besides being imperfect in understanding..." (writer's translation).

15. In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1, art. 6, solutio. See footnote 17 below.

16. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5, resp. See footnote 8 above.

In a more elaborate explanation of his thought¹⁷, St Thomas makes it clear that the human mind's low level of spiritual actuality, means, in fact, that it is intellectual only defectively and in a clouded fashion. Consequently,

17. This paragraph and the following attempt to summarize a portion of the lengthy and important art. 6 of In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1. This article has received extensive and profound commentary from Anton C. Pégis in "In Umbra Intelligentiae"; The New Scholasticism, Vol. XIV, 1940. The following relevant quotation is taken from Pégis' translation which appears in the same article.

"Since in the order of simple substances specific difference is marked according to the degree or rank of potentiality in these substances, the human soul differs from angels because it holds the last place among spiritual substances, even as prime matter does in the order of sensible substances. Hence, since the human soul has a maximum of potentiality (that is, in the order of spiritual substances), its being is so near to material substances that a material body can share in such a being when the soul is joined to the body through one esse. From this diverse degree of possibility in the soul and in the angel, the soul is rational, while the angel is intellectual. That is to say, the angel, possessing more actuality and less potentiality than the soul, participates in intellectual nature as it were fully and hence is called intellectual, while the soul, holding the last rank among intellectual substances, shares in intellectual nature in a more defective way and is as it were darkened... Since the soul, lowest intellectual substance that it is, is the form and actuality of the body, there proceed from its essence certain powers, such as that of sense, that are joined to organs, from which the soul receives intellectual knowledge. That is why the soul is rational, for it has knowledge that proceeds from one thing to another, since it arrives at what is intelligible from what is sensible..."

Cfr. also: reply to obj. 2: "In man there is intellect, but not on this account is he given a place among intellectual beings, because the name intellectual belongs to that substance whose total knowledge is by way of intellect...and so (man) is called rational, because his knowledge is intellectual only as to its term and principle...thus he does not possess intellect as his proper nature but by a certain participation..." (writer's translation).

although man, as a spiritual being, truly possesses an intellect, he possesses it only by participation. His is not an intellectual nature; only in his highest power is he truly an intellect. Hence, man cannot be called intellectual in the strict sense of the term. Those beings alone, St Thomas explains, are properly called intellectual whose entire knowledge is by way of intellect only.

The profound lack of actuality which requires that the human intellect be the substantial form of the body also requires, in the same measure and for the same reason, that it should function and be known as rationality; indeed, it is because the human intellect must operate as a rationality that it is a substantial form. And it is for the same reason, as St Thomas points out, that there must proceed from the essence of the intellective soul the powers of sense.

St Thomas, throughout, is describing the same unique form, the intellective soul of man; a form which, because it is intellectual defectively and by participation only, must function as rationality and sensibility; a form, therefore, which, though it is simple in essence, is manifold

in its power or capacity¹⁸. It is the mind of man thus perceived as a complexity of powers which, though diversified as intellect, rationality and sensibility, stem from a single source, namely, the intellectual soul, that St Thomas identifies as a *totum potentiale*.

18. Summa Theologiae, Q. 77, art. 2, reply to obj. 3: "One thing has one substantial act of being, but may have several operations. So there is one essence in the soul, but several powers."

Cfr. also: In I Sent., Dist. VIII, Q. 5, art. 3, reply to obj. 2: "The soul, although it is a simple form, is nevertheless manifold in power, since from its essence arise diverse capacities"(writer's translation). Also Contra Gent., Book II, chapter 72, in fin.: "The soul, which is the noblest of lower forms, although simple in substance, is nevertheless manifold in power and has many operations" (writer's translation).

Part II. The Mind of Man as Totum Potentiale

In the Aristotelian-Thomistic system of thought, every form, by definition, is incomplete in itself and, moreover, in a condition of privation which, by necessity of nature, generates within the being a purposive tendency or drive towards fulfilment¹⁹. "Dans les êtres perfectibles", writes Dom Odon Lottin, "la forme est une perfection en travail qui se réalise progressivement par une tension de l'être vers son idéal ou sa fin naturelle."²⁰ It is this thrust of finality, inherent in every finite being, which causes all

19. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 19, art. 1, corp.: *Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam; et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae.*"

Etienne Gilson writes: "A human soul, or any corporeal form, is a kind of incomplete perfection. But it is fitted for completion and feels the need and experiences the desire for it. This is why form, tormented by privation, is the principle of the operation of natural things. Each act-of-being, according to the measure in which it is, wishes to be. It only acts in order to preserve itself in existence and to assert itself more completely." The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1956, Part Two, Chapter 4, p. 191.

20. Odon Lottin, O.S.B., Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles, Tome III, Problèmes de Morale, 1949, p. 558.

form to be dynamogenic²¹ and action-oriented. Furthermore, it results in a natural subordination of the entire being to the production of activity conducive to its actualization²².

Regarding the particular case of man, St Thomas applies the general principle in a passage²³ which emphasizes the total natural orientation of man's being and activity to the actualization of the intellectual soul, which consists in the perfecting of understanding, the activity which sets man above all other beings in the world of nature.

The process of progressive realization of intellect is, therefore, simply one instance, however significant, of a phenomenon which is universal throughout creation²⁴. The

21. The term is borrowed from A-D. Sertillanges, O.P., La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Vol. II, 1940, p. 176.

22. See footnote 8 above.

23. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5, resp.
Cfr. also footnote 8 above.

24. "This is not a theory forged expressly for the particular case of the soul. Rather, it is the case which is necessarily governed according to metaphysical principles, and their scope is universal. The less perfect is ordered toward the more perfect as toward its end; it is for it, not against it. Within the individual, each organ exists with a view to its function, as the eye to allow vision. Each lower organ exists in view of a higher organ and a higher function, the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart. The array of organs, in its turn, exists only in view of the perfection of the whole, as matter for form, the body for the soul. For the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. It is exactly the same if we consider the disposition of the individual beings within this whole. *Each creature exists for its own act and its own perfection...*" E. Gilson, Op. Cit., p. 190. (Italics added).

concept of *totum potentiale*, as used by St Thomas in reference to man, serves to explain his perception of that process. It describes the dynamic strategy of a spiritual being which seeks to actualize its potentiality as an intellect in the only way that is naturally available to it, that is, by functioning as the substantial form of a body²⁵, thus deriving from the material world of sense realities the intellectual nourishment required for its growth and development.

The word *totum* in the term *totum potentiale*²⁶ (translated potential totality or, more clearly perhaps, totality of power) means, as St Thomas explains, a certain perfection of power, in the sense of fulness or

25. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 89, art. 1, in fin.: "...in order that they (human souls) might have perfect knowledge of things, they were so constituted as to be joined to bodies and to receive proper knowledge of sensible things from these things themselves..."

26. Besides *totum potentiale* (e.g. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 8), the most frequently occurring term, St Thomas also uses *totum potestativum* (e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 1, reply to obj. 1), *totalitas virtutis* (e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 8, in corp.), *totalitas secundum potentiam seu virtutem* (e.g., Q. Un. de Anima, art. X).

completeness²⁷. The word *totum* thus serves to convey that the human mind or psyche as a totality, that is, globally considered, is possessed of power adequate to the achievement of its actualization as an intellect. However, as the term, totality of power, further conveys, it is not the instantaneous and brilliant adequacy of an intellectual nature which functions as one simple

27. St Thomas, describing the powers of the soul, refers to them as "proper accidents". He then goes on to say: "They also pertain to the integrity of the soul itself in so far as it is *a potential whole, having a certain perfection of power, which is made up of different capacities*" - In I Sent., Dist. III, Q. IV, art. 2, sol. Elsewhere in the same work (Dist. VIII, Q. V, art. 3, reply to obj. 1), St Thomas states that *totum* and *perfectum* mean the same thing. (Italics added).

St Thomas nowhere appears to give a formal definition of *totum potentiale*. However, various informal or quasi-definitions occur throughout his works, such as the following: "The power of the potential whole is in its parts; in one part it is found completely present, but in the other parts in a diminished way" - In IV Sent., Dist. XV, Q. II, art. 2. Also: "The potential whole is present to each part in terms of itself, and also in terms of some of its power; not, however, in terms of perfect power; as to perfect power, it is present only to the supreme capacity..." - In I Sent., Dist. III, Q. IV, art. 2, reply to obj. 1.

Carl A. Lofy, S.J., explains the notion of potential totality in general and provides extensive references to Thomistic texts in "The Meaning of 'Potential Whole' in St. Thomas Aquinas", The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 37, 1959, p. 39 - 48.

power²⁸. It is the long-term and difficult adequacy of a low-level intellectual nature whose capacity "is made up of different powers"²⁹.

The conceptualization and terminology employed by St Thomas in this context are borrowed from two traditional, dynamic concepts which are often considered to be mutually exclusive. One is the notion of *participation*³⁰, according to which an inferior entity is what it is through

28. Cfr. In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1, art. 6, reply to obj. 2.

The following is a translation, with commentary, on this text of St Thomas, from Anton C. Pégis: "...we can bring out this natural deficiency in intellectuality in man by observing that that substance is said to be intellectual all of whose knowledge takes place according to intellect, for an intellect is in the presence of all it knows immediately and without inquiry. That is not the case with the knowledge of the human soul, for it arrives at the knowledge of a thing through the inquiry and discursive movement of reason. The human soul is therefore called rational because its knowledge is intellectual only initially and terminally; initially, because it knows first principles immediately without inquiry, which is why the habit of first principles is called intellect; terminally, because the inquiry of the reason terminates in the intellection of the thing. That is why the human soul possesses intellect not as its proper nature but through a certain participation..." - "In Umbra Intelligentiae", The New Scholasticism, Vol. 14, 1940, p. 175.

29. See footnote 27 above.

30. Cfr. W. Norris Clarke, "The Limitations of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism", in The New Scholasticism, 1952, Vol. 26, p. 167 - 194.

Cfr. also: Louise Cazeault, La Notion de tout potentiel et la structure de la théologie comme science chez Thomas d'Aquin, 1971, p. 13.

sharing in a limited and imperfect way the totality of a superior entity. The other is the dual concept of *emanation* and *conversion*³¹, according to which the superior is what the inferior is not and the inferior is what the superior is not. St Thomas' presentation of the reality of mind is a singular and masterful combination of the two ideas.

In describing the human mind or psyche as a *totum potentiale*, St Thomas is describing a capacity which is essentially intellect but which, because of its merely potential condition as an intellect, must issue as rationality and sensibility in order to realize itself as intellect³². He is describing a single root-dynamism which, because of its insufficiency at the strictly intellectual level, must emanate from within itself a multiple dynamism at the levels of sense and reason.

This process of emanation-conversion is set within the framework of participation. The potential totality is perceived by St Thomas as a totality by participation at the level of activity. The power described throughout is that

31. Cfr. M-D. Chenu, O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 1964.

32. See footnote 17 above.

of a nature which is capable of becoming an intellect but which actually possesses intellectuality only in the diminished ways in which it is realized in rationality and sensibility.

It is this diminished or adumbrated realization³³ of intellectuality in the human being that St Thomas is concerned to stress when he repeatedly contrasts the attribution of whole to part, as it is verified in the case of the potential totality, with that found in the case of the integral and universal totalities³⁴. Regarding the point of contrast, namely, predication of whole to part as to essence and power, the potential totality, according to St Thomas, falls mid-way

33. Ibid.

34. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 8, in corp.: "... there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into quantitative parts, such as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts, as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into parts of power."

The applicability of these totalities to the soul is discussed extensively in the body of the same article. Parallel texts can be found in the following: In I Sent., Dist. VIII, Q. 5, art. 3; Contra Gent., Lib. II, chapter 72; De Spir. Creat., art. 4; Q. de Anima, art. 10.

between these two other totalities. While it is present to and, therefore, can be fully predicated of each part with respect to its total essence, it is not thus predicable equally of each part as to total power³⁵. Only in regard to one of its powers is such predication fully justified³⁶; the highest power of the human psyche, the *pars intellectiva*, is alone properly and univocally intellect³⁷ and, even then,

35. Summa Theologiae, Q. 77, art. 1, reply to obj. 1. Commenting on a text of St Augustine, St Thomas writes: "...this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power, as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, either according to its whole essence, or according to its whole power. Therefore in no way is it predicated of the individual parts...But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, though not according to its whole power. Therefore it can in a way be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole."

Cfr. also: In I. Sent., Dist. III, Q. 4, art. 2; Quodlibetales, X, Q. 3, art. 1; De Spir. Creat., art. II; Q. de Anima, art. 12.

36. In I Sent., Dist. III, Q. 4, art. 2, reply to obj. 1. See footnote 27 above.

37. In IV Sent., Dist. XLIV, Q. 3, art. 3, reply to obj. 4: "The powers of the soul are not called its integral parts but its potential parts. It is the nature of such totalities that the complete power of the whole is found in one part perfectly, but in the others only partially. Thus in the case of the soul, the power of the soul is found perfectly in the intellective part, but in the others only partially..." (writer's translation).

only in respect to the initiation and termination of its activity³⁸. The other powers are only partial or diminished sharings in intellectuality.

The general characterization of man's intellectuality as weak or diminished, or of the human soul as possessing minimal spirituality, was not, to the mind of St Thomas, a pejorative characterization. On the contrary, man's participation in intellectuality, however poor, raised him, according to St Thomas, to a position transcending all other earthly being³⁹. To stress the weakness of the human intellect was, for St Thomas, to focus attention on the essential feature of the human situation; to describe scientifically the existential condition of an intellect naturally destined to

38. See footnote 28 above.

39. "...the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas Aquinas has accustomed us to looking at intellectual knowledge as that operation in the upward gradation of nature which is the first in which bodily organs do not share. Yet there is also another way of looking at this perfection of the human soul...For while from the standpoint of Aristotelianism we are enabled to see in man an unusual and noble animal, we shall not understand the full meaning of that nobility unless we see man as situated not only above the brute animal, but also below the angel...It is man's place in the descending order of intellectual substances, a place which St. Thomas has marked as an extremely humble one, that gives its full significance to his appearance and eminence in the order of nature below him." - Anton C. Pégis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 157.

In the *Contra Gent.*, Lib. II, chapter 72, St Thomas describes the human soul as *nobilissima inter formas inferiores*.

grow, from pure potentiality to fullest possible actuality, as incarnated, that is, as the substantial form of a body⁴⁰. It also explains St Thomas' determined and outright rejection of any kind of duality of mind and body in man. The human spirit, in St Thomas' perception, was never something accidentally linked to or even grafted onto a body. It was never a purely spiritual nature somehow harnessed to and burdened by a sluggish earthly mechanism⁴¹. Nor does it seem consistent with the thinking of St Thomas to suggest that the human intellect's piecemeal and progressive acquisition of knowledge is due to the fact that the human

40. "Knowledge itself must contain within its structure and in all its phases the original condition of the being in which it exists - a being that lives and acts on the confines of two worlds, and one whose essential actions reveal the characteristics and influences of both in a proportionate measure. It is natural to the human soul to know not only humble things, but also in a humble way... The origin of human knowledge in sense experience is...not merely an historical fact. It is a metaphysical fact indicating the leastness of the human soul in the order of intellectual substances. It is the mark of what may be called the natural metaphysical poverty of man." - Anton C. Pégis, Op. Cit., p. 155.

41. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, articles 3, 4, 6 and 7. See footnote 4 above.

soul has "bowed to the measure of matter"⁴². If there is a time-consuming and heavy quality to the operation of the human intellect, this is inherent in its weak nature and in its unavoidable mode of functioning through the participant levels of rationality and sensibility.

The unequal quality or intensity of the sharing in intellectuality of the various subordinate powers of the human psyche is explained by St Thomas in terms of their origin. While all the powers are described as perfections of the intellective soul, as agents instrumental in the completion or actualization of intellect; while, moreover,

42. "...the human soul must receive by abstraction from matter below it the object of its knowledge, and, because it has bowed to the measure of matter, it is then forced to investigate this object piecemeal and progressively." - Anton C. Pégis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 158. This statement seems not only inconsistent with the thought of St Thomas but also out of character for the author and the general tenor of his writings.

Out of line with authentic Thomism also is the suggestion contained in the following observation which appears in a footnote by Kenelm Foster, O.P., to the *Summa Theologiae*, Ia Pars, Q. 54, art. 3, in the Blackfriars Edition, Vol. 9, p. 80: "...the angel, as a non-material form, possesses himself by an act which is entirely inward or 'immanent' (not drawn off, so to say, in the determining of a 'matter', in the organizing and constituting of a body, as the act of the human soul very largely is)..." The expression, "drawn off", is unfortunate since it suggests that "organizing and constituting" a body is somehow diversionary for the soul, hindering its self-possession, whereas the soul's informing of the body is its only natural way to attain to self-possession.

all originate or flow as natural derivations from the essence of the intellective soul, there is a natural hierarchical order in their derivation, according to St Thomas, which determines the degree to which they are each participant in the distinctive capacity of their source⁴³. This order of priority and proximity, St Thomas explains, is due to the fact that the soul's aptitude for different

43. Q. 77 of the Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, constitutes a lengthy discussion of "what belongs to the powers of the soul in general". In art. 6, St Thomas describes the powers of the soul as its "natural properties", proceeding "from its essence as from their cause". Their "emanation...is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural derivation; just as one thing results naturally from another, as color from light."

Art. 4 concerns "the threefold order" which exists among the powers of the soul, "two of these corresponding to the dependence of one power on another, the third deriving from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways: 1) according to the order of nature, in that perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and 2) according to the order of generation and time, inasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus; according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sense powers; and consequently they direct and command them. Likewise, the sensory powers are in this order prior to the powers of the nutritive soul.

In the second kind of order, the reverse is true. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior in generation to the powers of the sensory soul; and therefore they prepare the body for the actions of the sense powers. The same is to be said of the sense powers with regard to the intellectual. But according to the third kind of order, certain sense powers are ordered among themselves..."

actions itself follows a certain order⁴⁴. Those powers which derive or emanate directly from the essence of the intellectual soul are those whose activities bear more closely upon the essential purposes of mind; they are described by St Thomas as "more powerful"⁴⁵. The derivation or emanation of other powers is indirect and is mediated through the prior powers⁴⁶. Their origin from the soul's essence being less proximate, they are weaker or less intense participations in its intellectuality.

The origin of the more remote or inferior power through mediation of the more proximate or superior is an element of fundamental significance in St Thomas' perception

44. Ibid., Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 4, reply to obj. 2: "This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, is disposed to various acts in a certain order), and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts..."

45. De Spir. Creat., art. XI, reply to obj. II: "Potencies moreover are in a certain sense more powerful the closer they are to those acts whereby the soul attains its goal."

46. In I Sent., Dist. III, Q. IV, art. 3, sol.: "...since many powers come from the essence of the soul, we say that among the powers of the soul there is a natural order; and, although all flow from the essence, one flows through the mediation of another; and hence it is that the ulterior power postulates the prior power in its definition and that the act of the ulterior power depends on the prior power..."

of the existential reality of mind. The concept of mediation envisages a form of causative influence of peculiar intimacy and efficiency which requires that it be distinguished from the regular forms of causality made familiar by Aristotelian metaphysics. It is for this reason that St Thomas qualifies his application of causality in this context by use of the word *quodammodo*⁴⁷. It is causality of a certain kind, causality in a special sense.

As illustration, St Thomas chooses the crucial instance of mediation in the human psyche, the mediation of sensibility through intellect (rationality). Stating the principle that those powers which are prior in the order of perfection and nature are the efficient and final causes of the others, he points to sense as existing for the sake of intellect and as being "a certain imperfect participation of intellectuality". In terms of its natural derivation,

47. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 7, resp.: "In things which proceed from one thing according to a natural order, just as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, *in a way*, the cause of those which are more remote...Since the essence of the soul is related to the powers both as an active and final cause, and as a receptive cause...it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others in the order of perfection and nature are the causes of the others after the manner of an end and an active source..." (Italics added).

therefore, he concludes, sense "in a way proceeds from the intellect, as the imperfect from the perfect."⁴⁸

There is more, however, to the significance of mediation as causative. Besides the order of priority of nature and perfection which obtains among the powers, there is "the order of generation and time", according to which "from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect". In the order of generation and time, which here concerns the mind's receptive capacity for knowledge, the causality of the mediation process is reversed: "the imperfect powers are causes in relation to the others".⁴⁹ Thus, sensibility is causative relative to rationality or intellect.

48. Ibid.: "...sense is for the sake of intellect, and not conversely. Sense, moreover, is a certain imperfect participation of intellectuality, and therefore, in terms of an order of natural origination, it in a way proceeds from the intellect, as the imperfect from the perfect..."

49. Ibid.: "But considered as receptive factors, the more imperfect powers are causes in relation to the others. Thus the soul, with respect to the power of sensation which it enjoys, is considered as the subject, and as something material in relation to the intellect. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man."

What the language of mediation is attempting to describe is a mutuality of causative influence which does not allow of expression through normal causal concepts. It is the phenomenon of interiority, which implies that intellect (rationality) and sensibility are so intimately present as causative, one in regard to the other, that no separation or juxtaposition of these powers is possible⁵⁰. St Thomas' denial of all duality in man culminates in this concept of interiority. Just as there is no duality of mind and body, so neither, and for the same reason, is there any duality of intellect and sense. Man is intellectual being and sensible being totally and simultaneously. Neither "level" of power exists or functions outside of the other.

The mediation of sensibility is both liberating and circumscribing. While it provides intellect with the

50. "A l'anthropologie dualiste de l'Ethique à Nicomaque, saint Thomas substitue un analyse autrement profonde, dont nous trouverons les lignes essentielles dans les textes qui examinent les rapports entre l'*anima intelligibilis* et l'*anima sensibilis*. Il devient impossible... de penser la raison et la sensibilité comme deux régions séparées et simplement juxtaposées: l'homme n'est pas d'une part être de raison et d'autre part être sensible, il est à la fois et tout entier l'un et l'autre. Le rapport entre les deux 'parties' de son être doit être pensé selon un schème d'intériorité." - Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 29.

exteriorization necessary for its growth, it also conditions that growth, since sensibility is interior to intellect as the limiting factor within the thing limited. This, as Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., explains, is the essential contingency of the human intellect; it can never posit itself without positing its limit⁵¹.

Its identification as a *totum potentiale*, as this chapter has been concerned to establish, is the final and culminating level in the three-level consideration wherein St Thomas presents his radically original perception of the human mind in the process of its self-constitution as an intellect.

The earlier levels of consideration are concerned with the human mind as an incomplete spiritual substance which, as a form, finds in substantial union with the body

51. *Ibid.*: "La sensibilité n'est pas dans la raison comme une chose est dans une autre chose, mais *comme la limite est dans le limité*. Conditions de possibilité, limite, médiation, tous ces termes ne veulent, en dernière analyse, qu'exprimer la contingence essentielle à la raison humaine; on veut dire que le propre de celle-ci est de ne pouvoir se poser qu'en posant en même temps sa propre limite." p. 30.

the basis for its fulfilment through a completely natural complementarity which rules out all duality of being and nature.

The third level completes the identification of the human mind by describing the dynamic reality of an intellectual principle which needs a body because it needs to exteriorize itself as sensibility in order to reach its proper object in the essences of material realities.

In the perception of St Thomas, the absence of duality in the nature of man postulates and justifies the absence of duality in his cognition. Intellect is his only cognitive principle and a mediated sensibility is its mode of functioning.

For St Thomas, man is ontologically one. He is also cognitively one in principle though highly diversified in his cognitive dynamisms. The natural goal of his development is dynamic unity through growth to psychological supremacy of that power which distinguishes him as man: the power of understanding. The manner in which, according to St Thomas, this psychological supremacy is reached, in the circumscribing conditions of sensibility, is the subject-matter of the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN POTENTIAL

This chapter will attempt to explore the thought of St Thomas regarding the essentials of human dynamic development. It consists of three Parts. Part I, The Given of Nature, considers the human being in his initial endowment. Part II, The Growth of Understanding, is directed to explaining, in Thomistic terms, the process of human growth and its distinctive achievements. Part III, The Ordering of Sensibility, specifies the manner in which, according to St Thomas, man's sensibility becomes humanized through virtue.

Part I. The Given of Nature

This Part, which consists of two Sections, describes the human being in his native endowment: as a mere capacity for understanding (Section 1), whose lack of actuality necessarily impels it to fulfilment (Section 2).

Section 1. The Possibility of Man

The image of man which emerges from a co-ordinated study of St Thomas' threefold identification of the human mind, such as was delineated in the first chapter, is

much less sharply defined and, at the same time, much more profoundly original than is commonly understood¹.

In view of the final and culminating identification, that of the human mind or psyche as a potential totality, the human being emerges as much less and, at the same time, much more than the clearly established spirit-body entity presented by the Aristotelian hylomorphic approach taken alone. As a potential totality, man, in the perception of St Thomas, is less than an already constituted, even if embryonic, human and spiritual reality, needing only time and the maturing process to bring to fruition already existing spiritual capacities. Man, as actual spirit-body composite, is not a given of nature because, according to St Thomas, the human spirit itself is given only as possibility. What is given, therefore, though ontologically less, is humanly more in terms of challenge and eventual achievement.

In the perception of St Thomas, the human being, as a spiritual possibility only, is called upon to constitute

1. The originality of St Thomas' perception of man has been noted in the Introduction, p. xxiii & sqq.

himself in his spiritual reality and in the full functioning of his highest capabilities, those of understanding and love. His *raison d'être* and distinctive achievement as man is to create his own humanity; to develop and maintain a life at the highest level of objectivity, in terms of truth sought and values chosen.

Such is the possibility and the natural destiny of the human being, according to St Thomas. The reality and the point of departure is the subjectivity, immediacy and determinacy of a sensate existence.

However, the sensibility from which the spirit of man is destined to grow is a sensibility which, in the interiority of the mediation process whereby St Thomas explains the functioning of the human spirit as a potential totality, carries within itself the possibilities of broader and deeper perspectives since, as a potential part, it is the particularization of intellect and has for sole subject the human spirit itself².

2. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 7, resp.: "For we see that sense is for the sake of intellect, and not conversely. Sense, moreover, is a certain imperfect participation of intellectuality, and therefore, in terms of an order of natural origination, it in a way proceeds from the intellect, as the imperfect from the perfect."

Section 2. The Thrust to Fulfilment

The progressive "in-forming" of man's being by spirit, to the point where his sensibility is impregnated with rationality, is, for St Thomas, not simply an ideal of human development. It is also and primarily the natural goal towards which man is impelled, due to the presence within him of an ontological need for completion which is at the heart of every finite nature. This ontological drive for fulfilment was briefly referred to in the previous chapter as the thrust of finality. It is described by St Thomas as a tendency or inclination, consequent on every form and inherent in every nature, whereby each naturally seeks its own good. The principle is variously repeated as an axiom of being in many passages of his works, the terms, "natural appetite", "natural

(Footnote 2 continued)

Cfr. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P.: "L'être de l'homme - son *anima* - apparaît sous une double forme; elle est *anima intelligibilis* et *anima sensibilis*. L'*anima intelligibilis* est affectée d'une priorité de nature et de perfection: c'est elle qui constitue l'homme dans son être spécifique et le distingue, par exemple, de l'animal. Mais il faut penser correctement cette hiérarchie... St Thomas le (l'ordre qui existe entre elles) comprend comme un ordre à l'intérieur d'une totalité une qui est rigoureusement sans dehors. Cette totalité est l'*anima humana*". In "Le Sujet Pratique Selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin", Recherches de Philosophie, Vol. VI, 1963, p. 29.

desire", and even "natural love", being used to designate the dynamism in its broadest and most basic reference, where it is applied not only to animal and human affectivity but also to the purely physical affinities discernible in the world of non-living matter³.

Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., commenting on "appetite" as thus employed by St Thomas, describes it as constituting "comme un lien dynamique entre le sujet et son bien"⁴,

3. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 80, art. 1, resp.: "It is necessary to attribute an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must consider that some inclination follows every form; e.g., fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like..."

Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 19, art. 1, in corp.: "Now the bearing of a thing to a form natural to it is this: that when not possessed it tends there, and when possessed it stays. Such is the case with any natural completion that is a good for the nature in question. When cognition is absent this bearing on good is called 'natural appetite'". (Blackfriar's translation, Vol. 5, 1967)

Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 60, art. 1, in corp.: "Now every nature, without exception, is the subject of some tendency or other, which is its natural appetite or love." (Blackfriar's translation, Vol. 9, 1968)

Summa Theologiae, I - II Partis, Q. 26, art. 1, in corp.: "In the case of the natural orexis, this cause, which might be called 'natural love', is a sense of affinity with the object in question..." (Blackfriars' translation, Vol. 5, 1967)

See also: Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 6, art. 1, reply to obj.2; Q. 59, art. 1, in corp.

4. Cfr. Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., Le Problème de l'Amour chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1952, p. 41.

while the good itself, he notes, "vu du côté du sujet qui tend vers son développement complet, ou simplement se maintient dans l'existence, ne peut donc être que ce développement, cette existence, et tout ce qui peut les favoriser"⁵.

Form or nature itself, then, in its incompleteness, is perceived as the principle or source of this urge for fulfilment⁶. "La forme", as Odon Lottin, O.S.B., observes, "est une perfection en travail", a perfection which progressively realizes itself "par une tension de l'être vers son idéal..."⁷

Guérard des Lauriers centres his discussion of the finality inherent in form on the Aristotelian dictum:

5. Ibid., p. 43.

6. Cfr. Etienne Gilson: "A human soul, or any corporeal form, is a kind of incomplete perfection. But it is fitted for completion and feels the need and experiences the desire for it. This is why form, tormented by privation, is the principle of operation of natural things". In The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1956, p. 191.

7. Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles, Tome III, 1949, p. 558.

"forme et fin sont un". Adopting the terminology of Aristotle and applying the principle to man, he distinguishes form as "*morphê*" (form concretized in the individual human being) from form as "*eidos*" (the universal; human nature in its fullest conceivable perfection). des Lauriers continues:

La *morphê* est actuellement possédée par le sujet; elle est la mesure explicite de sa perfection *actuelle*; l'*eidos* est, également, dans le sujet, puisque toutes les déterminations qu'elle comporte peuvent être atteintes par lui, mais certaines de ces déterminations ne seront jamais réduites à l'acte, et absolument parlant aucune d'entre elles ne sera jamais parfaitement actualisée; un homme n'est jamais pleinement homme, et il est plus homme sous tel rapport, moins sous tel autre; l'*eidos* est donc immanente au sujet mais d'une manière *potentielle*, comme la mesure, inscrite en lui, de la perfection maximum qu'il puisse atteindre...⁸

Form as *eidos*, since it is only virtually possessed by the individual being, is described as "*fin inspiratrice*". Form as *morphê*, on the other hand, since it accounts for the activity of the being and is the beneficiary of the perfection realized through that activity, is designated the "*fin réceptrice*"⁹.

8. Dimensions de la Foi, Vol. II, 1952, Excursus III: La Finalité dans l'Ordre Naturel et dans l'Ordre Surnaturel, p. 228.

9. Ibid.

At the basic level of entitative incompleteness, the urge of "natural appetite", according to St Thomas, is as authentically present in man as in any other imperfect nature and, although in a higher modality, the thrust to understanding¹⁰ presses as naturally and as inexorably on man as the urge which causes smoke to rise and fire to conserve itself by burning. Man's most natural need is to live by truth. This need to understand, according to St Thomas, is absolutely primordial; it characterizes human nature essentially¹¹, since it is bound up with the very form of life. The reality of man identifies him as "a creature directed by his whole being to mind, to such

10. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 12, art. 8, reply to obj. 4: "The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything which pertains to the perfection of the intellect..."

11. Cfr. Q. Un. de Spir. Creat., art. XI, reply to obj. 14: "...the soul, insofar as it is the form of the body by its essence, gives being to the body as its substantial form; and that it gives to the body that being which is life, insofar as it is that kind of form, namely a soul; and that it gives to the body life in an intellectual nature, insofar as it is that kind of soul, namely, an intellective soul. 'Understanding' is sometimes taken to mean activity, and in this sense its principle is a power or habit; sometimes, however, it is taken to mean the being of an intellectual nature and, as such, its principle is the essence itself of the intellective soul". (writer's translation)

an extent that even his body participates in mind"¹². He is ontologically marked to become a total understanding, as other beings are ontologically marked for their natural completion.

What makes man unique among perfectible beings is the fact that, while other beings are contained within a total natural determinism to live their finality blindly and uncomprehendingly¹³, in the case of man, nature in its thrust to finality provides the means and points the

12. Antonin-D. Sertillanges, O.P., Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy, 1931, p. 202.

13. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 18, art. 3, resp.: "...some things move themselves without consideration of the form or end in view provided for them by nature, but only so far as concerns the carrying into effect of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end for which they act, are determined for them by nature. Such things are plants...

Other things move themselves in a further sense: not merely with respect to the carrying into effect of the movement, but also with respect to the form which is the principle of movement, which form they acquire for themselves. Such are animals...But although such animals receive through the senses the form which is the principle of their movement, they do not independently determine for themselves the end of their activity or of their movement; that is implanted in them by nature, and an instinct of nature moves them to a particular activity by means of the form apprehended by the senses. Higher than such animals are those which move themselves with reference also to the end in view, which they provide for themselves. This can be done only by reason and intellect, to which it belongs to know the relation of end and means to end, and direct the one to the other. Thus beings which have intellect have a more complete kind of life in that their self-movement is more complete."

direction only; it does not impose the goal. The natural appetite of the human spirit for understanding is inevitably present but, unlike natural appetite in lesser beings, it does not function automatically and uni-directionally to produce a pre-determined effect. Man, as potential spirit and *tabula rasa*, is open to infinite possibilities¹⁴. He is "rien de déterminé"¹⁵, a free being who determines himself by existing. The direction of his development, as well as its quality and pace, is his to choose. Other forms besides his *forme native* can become the effective movers of his life¹⁶. His choice, in its broadest scope, lies between feeling and idea. As a sensible being, he

14. Ibid., Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5, reply to obj. 4: "The intellectual soul, as comprehending universals, has a power that is open to infinite things".

15. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 32.

16. Cfr. A-D. Sertillanges, La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Vol. 2, p. 176: "Connaître, c'est être. Connaître, c'est être autrui en même temps que soi-même. On est soi-même naturellement; on est autrui par une intervention sur laquelle réagit l'action vitale. Or, si l'on tend selon qu'on est: si l'être est dynamogénique, aux tendances naturelles qui correspondent à ce que nous sommes, il faut ajouter les tendances acquises, relatives à ce que nous devenons par autrui. Notre forme native est le moteur immanent de notre évolution inconsciente - on a dit en quel sens. Les formes de second degré qu'introduit en nous la connaissance y seront motrices aussi".

can become lost in sensibility. He can choose *inversio* in place of *conversio*¹⁷.

Willing oneself to be what one is in truth, the desire for self-actualization at the level of total objectivity: this, according to Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., in his interpretation of St Thomas, is the practical expression and implementation in man of the tendency to being which is the *appetitus naturalis*¹⁸ built into every nature but here raised to full consciousness.

17. Cfr. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 35.

18. "L'amour de soi...constitue, traduit sur le plan de la conscience vraie, la tendance vers l'être, inscrite en tout être..."
- Philosophie et Spiritualité, 1963, p. 305.

Part II. The Growth of Understanding

The development of man, as seen by St Thomas, is a process which results in unity, through the simplification of complexity. Part II, which comprises three Sections, concerns this process. Section 1 points to the unique unity envisaged as the goal of development. Section 2, under the heading, Dynamisms of Growth, considers the significance of participation, immanence or interiority, and processio-conversio, dynamic features which are integral to St Thomas' conception of the growth of understanding. Section 3, the Actualizing of Man, indicates two features of the growth of understanding which are unique to St Thomas' perception of it: it is creative, and it is pervasive.

Section 1. The Goal of Unity

As spiritual reality and substantial form, the intellectual principle holds the *ontological primacy* within the essential structure of the human being¹⁹.

19. Cfr. Footnote 8 of Chapter I, p. 5.

As possible intellect, its destiny is to become a fully functioning understanding. Its role is to be the effective principle of unity in the life of man, through establishing its *psychological primacy* as the immanent mover of man's total being.

The unity which St Thomas envisages as brought about by the intellect within the being of man is a unity which is achieved by a process of simplification, through ordering, of all the dynamisms of life. Man is a manifold being, his soul a multiplicity of powers. He achieves himself through the progressive integration and unification of his various possibilities in the realization of his most basic and distinctive possibility: understanding. As the following section will attempt to show, the unity which St Thomas sees as the destiny of man is a unity which can be understood only within the context of mind as potential totality.

It has no parallel in the history of psychology. It is not a unity to be achieved through elimination or purification, as with Plato. It does not require the sacrificing of any so-called "lower elements" for the benefit and enhancement of any so-called "higher element", as in Stoicism. For St Thomas, there is no question of "voluntarism", a sensibility dominated by an act of will

or an emotionality which is subjugated and silenced by rational supremacy, as in the early instrumentalism of the Nichomachean Aristotle²⁰ and the ethics of Victorianism. Nor is there any place for a Freudian compromise solution, wherein instinct and emotionality are forced to yield place to the "reality principle" and, though driven underground by cultural dictate, remain intact and active within the "seething cauldron" of the Id. There is no rejection or denial of emotion. There is no appeal to calculated motives of expediency or face-saving. Nor is it ever simply a matter of "looking for a reason" or of learning to live with what cannot be absorbed or excluded.

Section 2. The Dynamisms of Growth

1. Participation

The dynamism of participation or sharing of power, to which St Thomas has recourse in order to explain the reality and functioning of intellect as a *totum potentiale*, does not involve the idea of a largesse bestowed by a

20. Cfr. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 28.

superior power upon inferiors, to the benefit of the participants. On the contrary, it can be truly understood only as the groping diffusion of an intellect in need, as the only way in which a merely possible intellect can come to grips with reality.

The powers which comprise the potential totality, which is mind, are not to be conceived of as powers which "participate in" intellectuality, as though they were independently or previously existing entities now receiving, thanks to intellect, an additional capacity. The powers of the human psyche are themselves participations or particularizations of intellectuality²¹. That is their *entire being*; they are nothing other than or beyond that.

It must also be recognized that the participations which make up the potential totality of mind lose nothing of their reality nor are they in any way superseded as

21. Cfr. In III Sent., Dist. XXXIII, Q. 3, art.1: "... *potentialis pars aliquid de potentia totius participat...*"

Also In IV Sent., Dist. XV, Q. 2, art. 2, sol. 2: "The whole power of the soul is found in the rational, but in the sensible it is found in a diminished way, and in the vegetative in a still more diminished way".

intellect becomes actualized and human understanding grows. Human intellectual functioning always and inevitably requires them²². They are the potential intellect in its functioning.

2. Immanence

A possible understanding is driven to know the reality which surrounds it. Its proper object is the essences of material realities but, in order to attain its object, it must make contact with its world through the complex apparatus of sensibility²³. It must exteriorize itself, in fact, by mediating sensibility²⁴, through participation.

22. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 51, art. 1, resp.: "its (the human soul's) natural aptitude for union with a body is due to its low degree of intellectuality, to the fact that as intellect it begins in a state of potency, not possessing by nature all the knowledge of which it is capable but having to acquire this gradually, through a bodily experience of the sensible world."

Also Q. de Spir. Creat., art. 5, resp.: "...it is necessary for the soul to be united to a body, since it requires activities exercised through the body to complete its intellectual operation, in that it understands by abstraction from phantasms."

23. Cfr. Footnote 25, Chapter I, p. 16.

24. "En l'homme, l'*anima intelligibilis* ne peut accomplir sa propre essence si elle demeure enfermée en soi; il lui est interdit de n'être que raison; il faut qu'elle s'exteriorise et se fasse autre que soi sous la forme d'une sensibilité." - Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 30.

This is the permanent reality of the human mind. As Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., has noted, all that there ever is actually is an understanding which exists as a mediated sensibility²⁵ and which inevitably carries with it the limitations of its condition. This is the meaning of interiority and immanence; an understanding which exists within sensibility, which always permeates and is permeated by sensibility.

The immanence of intellect to sense, in the thinking of St Thomas, may perhaps be brought into clearer light through setting in contrast the Neo-Platonic conception of the life and growth of the mind with that of St Thomas²⁶. The Neo-Platonic tradition utilized the triadic schema of sense - reason - intellect for the purpose of distinguishing the different stages through which human consciousness

25. "Ce qui, en réalité, est donné par nature, c'est la médiation de l'*anima intelligibilis* par l'*anima sensibilis*." - Op. Cit., p. 34.

26. Special thanks are due to Benoît Garceau, O.M.I., who kindly allowed the writer access to some pages of his forthcoming work, Essai d'Epistémologie, when preparing these paragraphs.

risers to knowledge of truth. Thus, the function of sense was the perception of material objects in their multiplicity and diversity. The task of reason was to make judgments concerning these realities in the light of concepts and norms deriving from intellect. To become possessed of truth, man had to pass successively from sense perception, through rational judgment, to the intuition of intellect. At this final level of intellectual intuition, man found himself in a position where he could recognize the regulatory basis of all his judgments, namely, ideas, without having the capacity, however, to pass judgment on them. In the Neo-Platonic context, then, intellect is presented as the supreme power of the spirit and the source of man's most intimate capacity: the vision or contemplation of the rules and principles which served as norms for all his evaluations of reality.

The same triadic schema of sense - reason - intellect is found in the Aristotelian tradition but is given a different interpretation, especially as it appears in St Thomas. Again, intellect represents the highest possibility of spirit, that of grasping reality. However, this capacity to understand, since it is the capacity of a finite spirit which does not create being but comes to knowledge of it

only by way of sensible things, is an intellect mediated by sensibility and reason. For man, understanding reality means discerning, in the data of sense, the presence of something which exists determinately, and seeking, through the discourse of reason, to signify more and more adequately this determinate mode of being. In the Thomistic context, then, sensibility, rationality, and understanding are not stages of consciousness so much as the different and complementary functions of a single capacity. A single capacity which is essentially understanding, insofar as it is the power to grasp the being of things; which is sensibility, to the extent that being cannot be present to consciousness except in the form of something sensible; and which is rationality, to the extent that our understanding of being must increase progressively in detail and precision, through the formation of concepts, definitions, propositions and systematizations.

3. Processio - Conversio

The reality which exists before the actualizing of understanding is a totality or complexity of mediated and undifferentiated sensibility. Intellectuality is simultaneously present in the mediation but intellectuality is potential only; sensibility is actual, alive, acting and reacting. Man is a sensible being; all contacts with

reality are sensibilized and concrete, and they remain at that level. Before they can become more, the differentiation of rationality from sensibility must occur, within the mediation and without loss of interiority. It is this differentiation which marks the emergence of intellectual consciousness and puts an end to the pure exteriority wherein mind and world were relatively identified. It is only through this differentiation of rationality from sensibility that the complex totality of mind can be fashioned into an operational or dynamic unity²⁷.

The event whereby rationality becomes a differentiated reality and understanding thus becomes the active principle of unity and harmony within the complex life of man is the second phase of the process described by St Thomas, in the language of Neo-Platonism, as the phenomenon of *processio - conversio*.

The crucial significance of *conversio*, as well as St Thomas' entirely original use of the concept within the context of man's development, warrant a closer examination of the human dynamics which the term *processio-conversio* describes.

27. Cfr. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 29.

The ontological primacy of spirit in the essential structure of man, as was indicated in Section 1, call for the dynamic or operational primacy of understanding in human life. But a spirit so low in actuality as to be comparable to *materia prima* is totally incapable of development from within itself²⁸. All its actualization must come from outside²⁹. Hence the need for exteriorization through sensibility. The entire *raison d'être* of the human spirit's existence as form and potential totality is its *eros* or native urge to attain to this dynamic primacy by the only means available to it and which is described by St Thomas as *processio-conversio*. Terms such as *eros*, *emanation*, *mediation*, *procession*, *conversion*, as is evident, can never be more than inadequate attempts to indicate the ceaseless strivings of spirit for actualization and the stratagems adopted for its accomplishment.

The reaching-out, through sensibility, of spirit as possible understanding, to its object which is being, truth,

28. See footnote 17, Chapter I, p. 11.

29. See footnote 22 above.

objectivity - this is the *processio*; it is rationality positing itself in the sensible. But, since rationality to constitute itself as rationality must mediate sense, rationality must always be burdened, as well as benefited, by the mediation. Rationality never functions without sensibility, which is interiorly present as the limiting factor within the limited, as the condition within the conditioned.

Conversio, which is also called "reflection", describes that aspect of the process in which the knowing capacity, which issues as sensibility, returns to its roots - without ever losing its interiority, that is, without leaving sensibility behind. It identifies the completion of the mediation cycle begun by the *processio* or emanation of sensibility from intellect. It describes the "turning back" to itself of intellect, which thus completes the circuit wherein, from being a possible intellect only, it became a mediated sensibility in order to find itself actualized.

Conversio describes the event whereby, in a theory of human cognition which precludes all duality of sense and reason, the sensibilized intellectuality of man becomes intellectualized sensibility, and the sensing-emoting experience is changed, through the mind coming back, by way of the senses, to itself in an effort to understand. For

man to become fully man, the senses must thus be returned to and anchored upon their source, intellect.

So, for example, in a case of real or phantasied injury or insult, the hurt and angry emotions are not side-stepped or forced under. Instead, through the effort to penetrate the emotional experience with understanding, there comes the realization that the real or supposed cause of the injury or insult is not reducible to my negative feelings concerning it or, for that matter, am I. In achieving this return to itself, through sense and emotionality, understanding creates a new kind of relationship to the person and to the event, a relationship more completely attuned to reality.

In *conversio*, the sensible experience is never "de-sensibilized" or abstracted from its sense-emotional setting, but is viewed in a larger and deeper perspective; while remaining truly a sense-emotional experience, it is given a new dimension of spiritual depth. It is no longer subjective; it becomes objectified, detached, as it were, from the concretizing and "personalizing" of sensibility. *Conversio*, or reflection, when it occurs, brings the sensible experience back, so to speak, through reasoning, to the ultimate experiencer, which is spirit or understanding.

Conversio implies both an assertion and a denial. More basically, it is an assertion which, *pari passu*, involves a denial or negation. It is the psychological process in which the human spirit, as potential totality, negates one level of possibility, on appreciation of another level of possibility which is higher and more interior and, hence, more intimately and more truly itself. As in the illustration used above, the person facing the hurtful experience recognizes that there is only one truly human way to act, that is, to try to understand, to try to reach beyond the immediate experience. The denial involved is the negation, not of sensibility, but of the limitations of sensibility. The facts are not altered nor are they ignored or reasoned away, but the experience is removed from sensibility's limiting conditions. In the recognition of a higher possibility within spirit, the experience becomes objectified. The experienter, too, is objectified and is thus rendered capable of a relationship of being-to-being with the other. I, the experienter, am thus enabled to meet the other in my truer and better possibility and I am able to perceive and appreciate the other more in his reality, rather than in the subjective negativity of my emotional reaction.

Section 3. The Actualizing of Man

1. Man's Self-Creation

The odyssey³⁰ of the human intellect from mere potentiality to its open-ended actualization, through the progressive interiorization of sensibility, begins, as was indicated in the previous section, with intellect's exteriorization as sensibility.

The reason is found in the human spirit's initial and fundamental lack of actuality, its existence in the beginning as a possible intellect only³¹. Lacking the

30. "Instead of divorcing man from the physical world in order to emphasize that he is a person and not a thing, St. Thomas rather incorporates the world of nature within man in order to show thereby that nature is a part of him and also that in his substance man is *a spiritual pilgrim*, nature is the proper instrument of his pilgrimage, and to grow by means of the intelligible rhythm found in the world of physical motion is his intellectual gait". - Anton C. Pégis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man, 1963, p. 55. (*Italics added*).

31. Q. Un. de Spir. Creat., art. X, in corp.: "The human soul is found in the beginning to be in potency to intelligible things, and it is found to be imperfect in understanding, because it will never attain in this life to the entire truth of intelligible things". (writer's translation).

efficacy to be a fully functioning intellect within itself, it must, as form of a material body, seek its object in a way which befits its status as the lowest of spiritual substances; that is, as a potential intellect, it must seek its formal perfecting from material substances which can supply that formal perfecting only in a potential way³².

The development of intellect thus begins in exteriority. Its first being is the sensate being of other things. The hold of intellect, that is, of form as intellect, is so tenuous in the being of man that the forms of sense become his effective forms and movers. Man is sensibility and he is taken in tow, as it were, at the level of sense and emotionality, by a rich and confusing variety of sense attractions and aversions, each concerned with its own immediate and

32. Ibid., art. V, resp.: "...the human soul needs to be united to a body, the reason being that it needs the activities exercised through the body in order to complete its intellectual activity, since it understands by abstraction from phantasms. Now this is something accidental to intellectual activity and is due to the imperfection of that activity, that it should draw its knowledge from things which are intelligible only in potency, just as with the imperfect vision of the bat, which obliges it to function in twilight." (writer's translation).

subjective satisfaction³³.

Sensibility, for all its limitations and determinations, is the indispensable condition of spirit's contact with its object - the world of being in all its reality - as well as the soil of its growth and development. Man's dynamism as a potential totality holds him midway between the intellectual unconsciousness of the animal, for which reasoning is impossible, and the complete consciousness of the pure intellect, for whom reasoning is unnecessary. His *eros* (the ontological urge of his nature) and his destiny is to overcome the sensibly determined and circumscribed, to push back the boundaries of the unconscious, that is, of the unreasoning and the unfree, in the interests of his specifically human growth as understanding. Thus, the "appetite" for actualization becomes in man the need to question, enquire, and reflect.

Despite the presence of this *eros* for understanding, human beings can, for practical purposes, remain exteriorized

33. Cfr. Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., Philosophie et Spiritualité, 1963, p. 300: "...l'affectivité sensible, qui a pour sujet les pouvoirs sensibles et pour objet propre des biens sensibles, se caractérise essentiellement par son caractère concret. De soi elle porte sur des choses bien déterminées..."

in sensibility, affectively locked in a limited world of concrete interests, where knowledge serves little purpose beyond signaling to the self-interest of the organism, and where realities are valued only as utilities and are judged by the standard of the emotional reaction, positive or negative, which they provoke³⁴. Saint Thomas would appear to support the conviction that the majority of human beings are limited all their lives to this lower order of determinism, being unable to find within themselves the resources or the spiritual attractions necessary to transcend it³⁵.

Reflection, as was seen above, is the key which unlocks the human spirit from the confined horizons of sensibility. The moment of reflection is the moment when the human being becomes aware of broader horizons than

34. Referring to sensibility, Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., writes: "La connaissance, plus ou moins précise, des objets n'a pas valeur pour elle-même. Elle fonctionne surtout comme signal de la présence de l'objet, déclenchant à son tour la réaction affective s'il y a lieu."
- Op. Cit., p. 300.

35. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I - II Partis, Q. 31, art. 5, reply to obj. 1: "since most people are unable to achieve spiritual pleasures, which only the virtuous can do, they fall back on physical pleasures."

those of sense, of possible enlargements of reality within himself, of wider and deeper possibilities of being and seeing and judging. It is the moment when understanding ceases to be a mere potentiality and sensibility begins to be freed from its subjectivity.

It is in the interiorizing of sensibility that the human being discovers his own higher possibilities and those of his world of people and of objects. This is the meaning of interiorization: the lifting of life and of life's experiences to deeper levels of reality, meaning and value. Human nature has been described as the notion of a free being who defines himself by existing. Interiorization is the process wherein man truly defines himself, becoming *the maker of his own humanity* in terms of the reality which he, as a reflective totality, discovers within himself and ascribes to himself and to his world. Interiorization means self-realization; the two necessarily go hand in hand; each is the condition of the other. So that man's creating of himself is, in fact, his *consenting to be* the reality which he progressively discovers he can be and to the extent that he discovers it. It also implies his consenting to and appreciation of the world of people and objects as

it is in its reality. True values are objective values. They are values which are not invented and imposed, but discovered and recognized. Value judgments are judgments concerning the realities themselves in their objectivity, and interiorization calls for a valuing which is objective, not selectively, but totally in terms of its range while, ideally, it becomes increasingly enriched in terms of its depth³⁶.

The process can go on limitlessly because, unlike animals "whose souls are endowed with a knowledge and a power for fixed particular things", man, being spirit, "has a power which is open to infinite things"³⁷. Man is open to indefinite growth and, hence, to the challenge of progressive self-constitution³⁸.

36. Louis-B. Geiger, O.P., speaks of the "effort de vérité totale", Op. Cit., p. 302.

37. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5, rep. to obj. 4.

38. "Man...comes to realize sooner or later that the freedom of which he is capable and for which he yearns is a prize to be won as well as a birthright..." - John P. Reid, O.P., St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars' Translation, Vol. 21, Appendix 3, p. 153.

The price of growth is sustained living at the peak of intellectual consciousness where interiorization takes place, so that man is consistently required to be present to himself at the level of his highest possibility and to be present likewise to the world of people and objects.

2. The Psychological Primacy of Understanding

The dynamic process described as *conversio*, as is clear, has meaning for St Thomas only in the context and against the background of spirit as potential totality, with the interiority which this concept necessarily implies. It is the process whereby man is enabled to gain growing access to being, through the increasing discovery and appreciation of the potential depths of reality and meaning in self and in the other. In regard to his own reality, as has been seen, it is the process whereby man, in effect, discovers and constitutes himself through the progressive realization of his highest and truest possibilities. In regard to the world of his sensibility, it means the progressive "in-forming" of the less adequately "in-formed" areas of his personality by the native and essential form of man,

which is his *forma intellectiva*³⁹. The statement of Legrand, that "l'activité sensible se présente donc à la façon d'une matière que l'activité spirituelle perfectionne comme une forme"⁴⁰, derives a richer significance from the context of interiority. Likewise, the simplification, which was earlier described as the necessary condition for unity and harmony within the being of man, is seen to be the spirit of man simplifying its own complex reality, as a *totum potentiale*, through this progressive "in-forming" which gradually orders all of man's virtualities in consonance with the growth and enhancement of that virtuality which is his highest and most distinctively human virtuality, namely, understanding.

The psychological primacy of understanding in the life of man, which at first existed only as a possibility, which began to take hold with the initial differentiation, through *conversio*, of rationality within the interiority of sense, is, ideally speaking, perfectly realized when

39. See footnote 16 above.

40. J. Legrand, S.J., L'Univers et L'Homme dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas, 1946, Vol. II, p. 156.

the essential form of man becomes *fully functional* on its own terms throughout man's complex being. As is clear from St Thomas' perception of *conversio*, this growth of understanding to psychological primacy can in no way be reconciled with the idea of domination by "rationality" over "sensibility". On the contrary, it can be realized only through the progressive rationalization of sensibility, the gradual interiorization by spirit of all of human nature. Understanding is a potentiality but, according to St Thomas, it is a potentiality which is essentially spread throughout the whole being of man and realizable throughout, although to varying degree. This is the significance of the predicability of the *totum potentiale* in regard to its parts, which St Thomas was concerned to clarify. Hence, whatever development of spirit occurs, it occurs to the *totum* and not to rationality as such since, as the concept of interiority makes clear, rationality does not exist "as such". If the totality is actualized to any degree, the actualizing resonates and is effective throughout the being of man; it is the whole man that is pervaded by understanding. Memory, imagination, commonsense, emotionality - these capacities may not be reified as "independent" and "isolated" entities;

they are the particularizations and ramifications of an understanding in its strivings for growth. The end-result of intellect's actualization, therefore, is to be conceived of, not so much as growth of understanding within the person, as growth of the entire personality in understanding.

While this thesis, in line with its expressed purpose, has been mainly concerned with the cognitional aspect of human development, it is very evident that, at the transcendent level of understanding, it is impossible, if one accepts the position of St Thomas, to think any longer in terms of cognition alone. In a system of thought such as St Thomas', where understanding means the awakening of the human spirit to the truth and goodness of reality, to understand the truth without loving the goodness would be metaphysically monstrous. Hence, to speak of growth of the entire personality in understanding is inevitably to speak of growth of the entire personality in love⁴¹.

41. The necessarily correlative theme of love and loving, as will be seen, is the underlying concern of much of the development of Chapter III; this is so, particularly of Section 3 (p. 112), which deals with psychotherapy, and of Section 4 (p. 131), which considers the humanizing and refining of sense and sense affectivity.

The Thomistic ideal of human development reaches its magnificent climax, after all, in the idea of a life lived in the keenest possible awareness and appreciation of reality, especially the reality of the human other; a life which is freely created, which is spontaneously lived, selflessly loved and constantly developed, in order to be offered and dedicated as a gift of love to the spiritual enrichment of the other.

Part III. The Ordering of Sensibility

While St Thomas speaks of intellect as offering man a way in which to transcend sense and sense affectivity, transcendence in this context carries no disdain for the limitations of the lesser powers involved. On the contrary, transcendence is significant precisely because of its beneficial influence on the constitution of these limited realities; it is not a surpassing but an enhancement of sensibility, not a going beyond but an uplifting. Thus, far from being disowned or outstripped, sensibility and the sense experience of reality begin, in the process of interiorization, to be truly appropriated by the spirit of man and, in the deeper reality and meaning with which sensibility becomes invested by understanding, it is stamped as authentically his and human.

This final Part of Chapter II, which consists of two sections, concerns the ordering of sensibility in its basic elements, following St Thomas. Section 1 considers the natural destiny of sensibility as subordinable to reason. Section 2 describes the key role of the cogitative power.

Section 1. The Finalities of Sensibility

In the perception of St Thomas, man's essential constitution places him midway between pure matter and pure spirit⁴². As a sensibility, man naturally functions under pressure of the automatic dynamisms of sense and finds his satisfactions within the subjective world of limited and concrete interests. On the other hand, as a potential spirit, called to full actualization, the only true and authentic response which man can make is the response of *total human presence*, that is, his presence to all of reality, himself included, in terms of what is distinctively man, namely, understanding. Man's complex dynamism, accordingly, engages him to a constant struggle between the intellectual consciousness of spirit and the merely sensible consciousness of the animal; he is destined to a continual search for understanding through the obscurities of sense. In this context, the ontological desire for understanding, man's intellectual appetite,

42. Q. Un. de Anima, art. 1, resp.: "If, therefore, the human soul, while united to the body as its form, has a being elevated above the body and not dependent upon it, it is clear that it is constituted on the confines of bodily and separated substances."

becomes, in practical terms, an urge to overcome the unconscious of sense and to liberate his perceptions and evaluations of reality from sensibility's subjectivity and limitations⁴³.

The sustained effort to live the ontological attitude, to maintain intellectual awareness at its highest level, is St Thomas' answer to the subjective automatisms of sense; for St Thomas, there is no other way for sensibility to lose its determinacy⁴⁴. Thus, to the problems concerning sense affectivity, which the younger Aristotle raised by his concept of "exteriority", St Thomas, with his concept of spirit as potential totality,

43. "L'affectivité spirituelle, appelée souvent l'affectivité intellectuelle ou rationnelle, se distingue essentiellement de (l'affectivité sensible) par son objectivité. Au lieu de se guider formellement par les indications du plaisir et du déplaisir, elle suit en nous un jugement de valeur qui est un jugement sur les biens eux-mêmes." - L-B. Geiger, O.P., Philosophie et Spiritualité, 1963, p. 300.

44. "La volonté humaine, dans la psychologie thomiste, n'a pas d'autre moyen de dominer l'affectivité sensible qu'en orientant l'attention de l'intellect..." - B. Garceau, O.M.I., Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1968, p. 229.

offers the ongoing solution of interiorization.

Basic to St Thomas' solution is the natural subordinability of sense affectivity to reason as a participation in rationality⁴⁵. In this perception, man's sense appetite is such that it can be moved either by images spontaneously produced, or by ideas consciously and deliberately worked out. This, for St Thomas, is the human situation regarding emotionality⁴⁶, and human affectivity differs essentially from animal affectivity because of this⁴⁷. The functioning and direction of affectivity in man, in other words, depends on the quality

45. Summa Theologiae, III Pars, Q. 18, art. 2, in corp.: "It is further to be observed that sensuous impulse or the sensuous appetite is said by Aristotle to be *rational by participation* inasmuch as it is destined to obey reason." (Italics added).

46. Summa Theologiae, I - II Partis, Q. 53, art. 3, corp.: "The case is similar with regard to intellectual dispositions, which give man facility in judging rightly what is presented to his imagination. If a man ceases to exercise an intellectual disposition of this kind, there come into his mind irrelevant, and sometimes misleading, images; and unless these are as it were cut down or checked by a frequent use of his intellectual disposition, he becomes less skillful at making the correct judgments, and sometimes wholly biased in the opposite sense."

47. See Chapter III, Section 4, p. 131.

of forms conceived in human consciousness. It is precisely because we are capable of conceiving forms from our own understanding that we can prevent the perceptual-evaluative process from being closed-off or short-circuited at the level of sensibility and can thus integrate into total truth what is only partial or relative truth⁴⁸.

Sensibility's openness and availability to such integration is explained in terms of its ultimate finality. As the "faculty of specifically human spirituality"⁴⁹, sensibility's supreme *raison d'être* is to function as spirit's faithful and indispensable index to the discernment of objective truth and goodness in the individual instance, "in the transition from the general to the particular"⁵⁰.

St Thomas recognizes four levels of finality for

48. "Et s'il est impossible d'unifier notre vie sur la base des instincts, puisque c'est nécessairement étouffer la vie face à la vérité, l'affectivité spirituelle vraie peut et doit assumer, au titre d'appels partiels à intégrer ou d'appels maladroits à éclairer, les indications de la vie affective sensible." - L-B. Geiger, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 302.

49. Cfr. Karl Rahner, S.J., Spirit in the World, 1968, p. 240.

50. George P. Klubertanz, S.J., The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the 'Vis Cogitativa' according to St. Thomas Aquinas, 1952, p. 284.

the functioning of sense within the human context⁵¹. Firstly, for the external senses, there is finality at the level of the *sensibilia propria* - the finality of sight to see, of hearing to hear. This is the primitive and basic level, where the only condition for perfect functioning is the physically healthy state of the organism. In discussing this first finality of sense, St Thomas point to the healthy, well-balanced organism's immediate, spontaneous and faithful registering of reality as a model of the reality-perception achieved in its perfection by the fully formed and fully informing spirit⁵².

Secondly, there is finality at the level of the *sensus communis* whose function it is to combine the data of the external senses to provide an integral knowledge of external reality and distinguish it from phantasy. The individual senses are participations in the *sensus communis*.

51. These finalities of sense are dealt with extensively by B. Garceau, O.M.I., in the closing sections of his work, Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1968.

52. Cfr. Ibid., p. 244.

which is the only true cognitive power at the level of sense⁵³.

Thirdly, there is finality at the level of the crucial *cogitative* power, crucial since this is the internal sense which provides practical value-judgments of the sense-emotive kind⁵⁴. In itself, it is the level of merely biological finality and the judgments which issue from it are essentially emotional judgments, subjective, pragmatic, reactive to the here and now. Communication and interaction at the level of the *cogitative* belong to the category of signals rather than of meanings. We perceive, interpret, react to people and things as signaling the sensibly desirable or undesirable.

The ultimate finality of sensibility is at the level of *understanding and meaning*; its natural destiny,

53. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 78, art. 4, replies to obj. 1 and 2: "The interior sense is called 'common' not by predication, as if it were a genus, but as the common root and source of the exterior senses...To it, as to a common term, all sense perceptions must be referred, and by it, again, all the 'intentions' of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees..."

54. Cfr. B. Garceau, O.M.I., Op. Cit., p. 248 and sqq.

according to St Thomas, is knowledge of the true and the good⁵⁵. Since the *cogitative* is the power of practical judgment at the level of sense and participates more proximately in rationality - St Thomas refers to it as the *ratio particularis* or the *ratio circa particularia*⁵⁶ - it is through the *cogitative*, at the summit of human sense cognition, that the interiorization of sensibility essentially takes place. It is through the *cogitative*, as properly concerned with the singulars of action, that rationality "penetrates into all the innumerable fields of human activity"⁵⁷.

55. "Etant une puissance issue de l'âme intellectuelle, dont elle participe d'une certaine façon le pouvoir judiciaire et discursif et par laquelle elle est régie dans son fonctionnement, la cogitative juge des choses comme ayant valeur d'objets pour un être intelligent..." - Ibid., p. 249.

56. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 81, art. 3, resp.

57. George P. Klubertanz, S.J., Op. Cit., p. 279.

Section 2. The Cogitative Power

St Thomas compares the *cogitative* in man with its counterpart, the *estimative*, which is the supreme cognitive function in the animal, directing all activity. The estimative judges of the world around in reference to action and in view of the "value" which the animal attaches to the object - value being indicated by the sense-images evoked and always dictated by the animal's "good" or finality⁵⁸.

Failure of the *cogitative* to function adequately in response to understanding's need reduces man to purely biological functioning at the estimative level of the animal⁵⁹.

It is, therefore, to the *cogitative* power as the "intellect" among the senses and the linchpin of sensibility in the interiorization process that the attention of understanding must primarily be directed, according to St Thomas. Understanding's basic role in regard to sensibility

58. Cfr. B. Garceau, O.M.I., Op. Cit., p. 249.

59. "...la cogitative...privée de la régulation de la raison, est réduite à estimer les choses à la façon de l'estimative animale." - Ibid., p. 253.

is to train, correct and refine the value-judgments of the *cogitative* and bring them in line with reality⁶⁰.

The special vulnerability of the *cogitative* is its liability to disturbance and distortion, due to the pressure of sense affectivity acting upon it through emotionally-charged phantasy representations of reality⁶¹. Phantasy, according to St Thomas, is the crucial point, since it is both the trigger of emotionality and its plaything.

The influence of imagination, however, can be controlled by a vigilant understanding⁶². St Thomas sees imagination as a sort of two-way permeable psychological

60. "C'est par entraînement de la raison (*per refluentiam, per motionem, ex conjunctione ad rationem*) que le sens, chez l'homme, peut s'élever à l'*expérience* proprement dite..." - A-G. Sertillanges, O.P., La Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin, 1940, p. 118. (Italics added).

61. Summa Theologiae, I - II Partis, Q. 77, art. 1, corp.: "The perception and judgment of reason is thwarted by a strong and unruly imagination and a distorted estimative..." St Thomas goes on to point out that the imaginative and estimative powers are affected by "the emotions of the sense appetite, just as the discrimination of taste" is affected by "the condition of the tongue". (Note: Blackfriars' Translation is faulty in this instance.)

62. S. Contra Gent., Book 2, Chapter 73: "...it is in our power to form images appropriate to the consideration which we desire..."

"membrane", open to the influence of emotionality on the one hand, and to the influence and control of understanding on the other. Will is helpless to handle emotionality except through directing the attention of understanding to the control and counteracting of imagination⁶³.

The effort of spirit to maintain intellectual vigilance over imagination and resolutely to oppose phantasy's representations with reality forms of its own conceiving is, for St Thomas, the key to control of sense affectivity and to the *cogitative*'s progressive attunement to objective evaluations. The attentiveness of understanding in seeking out and pointing out the good which corresponds with the breadth of spirit's aspirations harnesses the *cogitative* to discern the same good at its level.

The goal of interiorization is a sensibility, more specifically, a *cogitative*, judging the particular ends of action with discernment of the true and the good for

63. See footnote 44 above.

the total person and thus achieving its ultimate finality through integration with authentically human finality. This, in the view of St Thomas, is not only possible but natural because the *cogitative*, being a power of the intellective soul, shares to some degree its discursive and judgmental capacity⁶⁴, and because its authentically human functioning is assured by acquired virtue, particularly with respect to the sense appetite where moral virtue is the messenger of rationality, not

64. *Summa Theologiae*, Ia Pars, Q. 81, art. 3, corp.: "In man, the estimative power...is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the "particular reason", because it compares individual notions. Hence in man the sense appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is in man naturally guided and moved according to his power of universal rationality... Clearly, therefore, this universal reasoning power directs the sense appetite..."

Commenting on the above passage, B. Garceau, O.M.I., *Op. Cit.*, p. 249, writes: "La signification ou la valeur d'une chose pour le sujet vivant humain c'est d'être un bien pour tout l'homme, doué d'intelligence et d'affectivité spirituelle. Etant une puissance issue de l'âme intellectuelle, dont elle participe d'une certaine façon le pouvoir judiciaire et discursif et par laquelle elle est régie dans son fonctionnement, la cogitative juge des choses comme ayant valeur d'objets pour un être intelligent: elle les perçoit comme objets, non seulement de désirs et de craintes, mais de connaissance désintéressée, mieux comme des sujets auxquels on peut attribuer l'être et le bien."

only bringing rationality to the emotions but maintaining and reinforcing its presence⁶⁵.

Man, being what he is, is constantly called upon to evaluate. He evaluates best when he knows best the real meaning of the things which he is evaluating.

Ultimately, this depends on how real he is in

65. Odon Lottin, O.S.B., writes of the double role of reason in the moral development of sense appetite: "d'abord de dicter la norme à l'activité de ces facultés...puis de fixer cette orientation des actes en une disposition habituelle qui sera la vertu morale." - Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles, 1949, Tome III, p. 573.

Moral virtue, according to St Thomas, is the ordering of reason in sense appetite. "The formal principle of virtue...is value in accord with reason. This can be considered in two ways. First, as lying in a judgment of reason; in this way there is one principal virtue, called prudence. Secondly, according as reason puts its order into something else, either into what we do...or into what we feel..." (Summa Theologiae, I - II Partis, Q. 61, art. 2).

B. Garceau, O.M.I., points out that the essential role of moral virtue, for St Thomas, is: "d'assurer l'emprise de la rationalité sur l'affectivité sensible et, par là, que les sens intérieurs soient disposés à estimer bonnes les choses sensibles selon qu'elles sont conformes au point de vue de l'intellect, et ultimement à l'amplitude de la volonté". - Op. Cit., p. 229.

Note: This theme receives further development in Chapter III, Section 4: Human Sensitivity, p. 131.

his own being, in his own reality-orientation.

Man's capacity to evaluate, therefore, is a function of his bent for truth. It depends on the extent and depth to which his total being is responsive to the urge to understand. In other words and following Saint Thomas, just as the eye at its healthiest registers colour most faithfully and accurately, so the more completely a man is attuned to truth in his entire being the better he can discern and judge people, situations and things at their true value.

CHAPTER III

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

As stated in the Introduction, it was mainly with a view to drawing the attention of psychology to the rich potential of St Thomas' concept of mind that this thesis was undertaken. The third and final chapter represents an attempt to focus on some of the concept's broader implications.

Sections 1 and 2 deal respectively with the Subject and his Society; the individual engaged in the process of self-creation within the sovereign interiority of his spirit; society as destined to subserve the essential purpose of his humanization. Section 3 describes how a psychotherapist, working with the Thomistic concept of man as inspiration, might set about the task of helping to counteract the failures and shortcomings of society. Finally, Section 4 tries to envisage how, according to St Thomas, understanding and spiritual love ultimately issue in the fine flowering of human sensitivity.

Section 1. The Concept of Subject

In the anthropology of St Thomas, man exists as a living body with spiritual possibilities; as a living body whose life principle, besides being the substantial form of

the body, causing man to be living and sensible, is naturally endowed with the joint intellectual capacities of understanding and spiritual love, which place him in the category of spirit and subject.

These transcendent capacities, however, are mere potentialities, as unformed and impotent of themselves in the spiritual order as prime matter in the physical order¹. Their actualization can come about only through a rationality which is mediated by a sensibility, with the result that man, in the beginning, is an understanding knowing only sensible reality and exists actually only as a sensible being².

As such, man stands alone in the world of creation, a unique type of intellectual being, naturally oriented and,

1. In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1, art. 6. The relevant passages of this important and lengthy article have been quoted in Chapter I, footnote 17, p. 11.

2. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 7: "...one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul through the mediation of another."

In a comment on this statement of St Thomas, Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., writes "L'*anima humana* n'est rien hors de la raison et de la sensibilité; elle n'est ce qu'elle est, - à savoir *anima humana* - qu'en se différenciant en ces deux types de facultés. La raison et la sensibilité doivent donc être comprises comme des *moments* de l'*anima*. L'ordre que saint Thomas établit entre ces deux moments est un *ordre de procession* et, lorsqu'il dit que l'*anima intelligibilis* est supérieure à l'*anima sensibilis*, il entend signifier que c'est l'âme raisonnable qui émane en premier lieu de l'essence de l'âme humaine." - Op. Cit., p. 29.

indeed, obliged by nature to find his ultimate and full development, as an intellect, through the instrumentality of an embodied existence³. As the noblest of bodily forms and the lowliest of spiritual entities⁴, man holds a solitary position "on the horizon of intelligence"⁵, located "on the confines of two worlds"⁶, the spiritual and the material. He also occupies a singular position in creation as the only being capable of constituting his own reality.

If man were merely animal, his natural development, given adequate conditions, would be assured and his destiny totally predictable. If he were pure spirit, no developmental process would be involved; from the start, he would be

3. "For St. Thomas, too, man is a strange being...his nature is not to be a defiant part of a physical universe in which he remains forever a stranger; it is to be wholly and entirely a rational spirit, incorporating the world of physical nature within his own spiritual being so that, by moving spiritually with the intelligible steps he can gather from the world of matter, he may play out a personal drama within himself." - Anton C. Pégis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man, 1963, p. 54.

4. See footnote 39 and 13, Chapter I, p. 22 and 10.

5. A phrase of Isaac Israeli from the Liber de Definicionibus, referred to by St Thomas in In II Sent., Dist. III, Q. 1, art. 6.

6. Q. Un. de Anima, art. 1, resp.

complete and perfect in his being and, living in the full light of truth, he would be immovable in regard to his destiny⁷. As a compound of sensibility and intellectuality, man is both determined and undetermined. As an actual sensibility, he is effectively held within a closed system dominated by emotionality; as a potentiality at the threshold of spirit, he has a basic plasticity, a spiritual openness⁸ to all being in that, himself "rien de déterminé", he can be all other things and, in fact, must become other than himself through exteriorization in order to posit his own reality⁹. Unique among souls and unique among spirits, a human being only potentially, man is the maker of his own humanity, involved in the incomparably significant process of his own constitution.

7. Q. de Malo, Q. XVI, art. 5, resp.: "Now it belongs to angelic natures that they possess in actuality knowledge of all that they are naturally capable of knowing...And thus, just as we are held immovably in knowledge of first principles, so their intellects are immovable in regard to all that they naturally know. And because will is proportionate to intellect, it follows that their will also is immovable naturally in regard to what pertains to the order of nature."

8. Cfr. Anton C. Pégis, Op. Cit., p. 46.

9. "...l'homme peut être tout, parce qu'il n'est en lui-même et actuellement rien de déterminé...L'homme nous apparaît ainsi comme un être qui doit s'extérioriser; il ne s'accomplit que dans l'altérité..." - Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 32.

It is intellectuality which distinguishes man in his specific being but the priority of intellectuality over sensibility, of which St Thomas speaks, is in the beginning a priority of nature and perfection only, not of fact. The psychological primacy, *de facto*, is with sensibility: the imperfect is first in the order of generation and development¹⁰. In the human organism as a sensibility, as L-B. Geiger points out¹¹, there is neither egoism nor altruism, there is only pleasure and non-pleasure; "good" and "bad" simply reflect the emotional reactions aroused; values are dictated entirely by subjective interest.

Man, however, in his highest and characteristic virtuality, is fashioned to recognize and appreciate truth, to know reality. Intellectual desire is marked by objectivity, and this need to know reality is ontological: "Soul summons idea and being to itself to satisfy the

10. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 77, art. 7. corp.: "But considered as receptive factors, the more imperfect powers are causes in relation to the others...On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man."

11. Philosophie et Spiritualité, 1963, p. 300.

natural desire for its own completion."¹²

There is only one way in which the being of man can be constituted human: through rising to the level of objective values in order to live by the truth recognized by intellect. This is the *sine qua non* condition for man's humanization. The indispensable means to this achievement, according to St Thomas, is the *conversio* or reflection of spirit described in the last chapter¹³, with the progressive interiorization of sensibility to which it is the key.

Since this interiorization of sensibility is a phenomenon which occurs only in the intimate depths of the self, at the peak of intellectual consciousness, and is the result of the human spirit's willing openness and receptivity towards reality; since, moreover, it demands a sustained and courageous personal discipline if it is not to be aborted through *inversio* at the level of sense or of

12. A-G. Sertillanges, O.P., Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy, 1931, p. 27.

13. Chapter II, Part II, Section 2, p. 50.

reason,, it is evident that man's constitution can never be other than a self-constitution. The making of man, in the taking-over and enhancement of sensibility from within, through a vigilant intellectual awareness, must be a self-making. Any other making of man can only be an inauthentic fabrication, a facsimile. What is truly created must be fully and freely wanted and accepted. If man is not self-constituted, he is a forced product: "ce qui agirait sans désir, serait l'objet d'une violence."¹⁴ Man's interiority is his castle and he is the lord. The options are his alone; either man builds himself or he is not built.

It is this unassailable fact which establishes the sacred autonomy and inviolability of the human being, qualities which are intrinsic to every authentically human life. These were the qualities which St Thomas was powerfully, if indirectly, instrumental in promoting as integral to the "cultural rebirth" of the Middle Ages when, as M-D. Chenu, O.P., records¹⁵, the Christian West began to recognize "nature as autonomous in her order within the framework of a Christian

14. A-G. Sertillanges, O.P., La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Vol. 2, p. 177.

15. Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 1964, p. 30.

universe"¹⁶ and "man in the midst of it all and revealed to himself for his own regeneration."¹⁷ Chenu writes of St Thomas establishing "the status of human reason in a Christian regime of thought"¹⁸; of reason itself seeking to "enlarge its boundaries by conquering for itself a new understanding of the world"¹⁹, and of "the thirst for knowledge, the relish for freedom" awakening in a people "recently liberated from the passive kind of life (they) had lived as serfs."²⁰

Thoughtful writers²¹ have expressed profound concern in our own day over the spiritually and morally debilitating atmosphere which, due to a variety of influences at work in society, pressures man to perceive himself more

16. Ibid., p. 36.

17. Ibid., p. 30.

18. Ibid., p. 25.

19. Ibid. p. 53.

20. Ibid., p. 40. Chenu deals more elaborately with the topic touched on in this paragraph in his monograph L'Eveil de la Conscience dans la Civilisation Médiévale, 1969.

21. Cfr. writers such as Erich Fromm, William Whyte, C. Wright Mills, Richard Hoggart. See footnote 66 below.

as an object than as an agent active in his own right. It may not be farfetched to suggest, granted human nature's ontologically embedded urge for self-realization, that the undercurrent to much of today's agitation and protest regarding human rights is a deep though often inarticulate resentment and frustration over society's failure to recognize and respect the sacred and essential inviolability and autonomy of the human spirit²², for man's most imperative right must be his right to the freedom and security necessary to constitute himself in his humanity.

The goal set for man's understanding is the limitless and, in the final analysis, naturally unattainable goal of a total objectivity²³. L-B. Geiger, O.P., speaks of the

22. In 1968, the year of his death, Robert F. Kennedy wrote: "Every generation has its central concern, whether to end war, erase social injustice, or improve the condition of the working man. Today's young people appear to have chosen for their concern *the dignity of the individual human being*. They demand a limitation upon excessive power. They demand a political system that preserves the sense of community among men. They demand a government that speaks directly and honestly to its citizens..." - quoted from Manchester Guardian Weekly, Vol. 118, No. 25 (June 18, 1978), p. 17. (*Italics added*).

23. L-B. Geiger, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 302.

"effort de vérité totale"²⁴ and of the total willingness to be guided by "la vérité des valeurs"²⁵. Within man himself, this openness to all truth is directed at the subordination of sensibility but through its integration only; otherwise, the unity and harmony of human life would be artificial and ineffectual²⁶.

The goal of total objectivity, viewed universally, is the goal of reality sought consistently and non-selectively over the entire range of values in its full extent and, then, ever more in depth, through an interiorization which never succeeds in plumbing the final reaches of spirit. The interiorization process is the functional reality of spirit, giving increasing access to being and leading to a progressively more profound presence to the reality of self, of other subjects, of the material world and, ultimately, of God.

24. Ibid., p. 302.

25. Ibid., p. 302.

26. Ibid., p. 302. Writing of sensibility's subordination through integration, Geiger insists: "nous devons la vouloir et la poursuivre totalement, sous peine d'enlever au propos par lequel nous la formulons son authenticité et son efficacité."

St Thomas perceives man's self-realization, his seeking of his own reality, not only as his primary and most natural response to the call to being but also as the necessary foundation and pre-condition of his response to and appreciation of the rest of reality. As a spiritual understanding and will, to realize his destiny of knowing and valuing all of reality, *man first must be* and, to realize his destiny fully, he must be to the fullest extent of which he is capable²⁷. Moreover, since truth, reality, is one, to create one's own being in truth is to create one's being within the matrix of total truth and, hence, as an essentially referenced self²⁸. It is within this context that the paradox can be stated and resolved that, for St Thomas, man's most complete subjectivity is his most complete objectivity.

27. "Il faut...affirmer avec saint Thomas que l'amour de soi... est le premier de tous les amours, condition de tous les autres. Rien n'est cependant plus évident. Pour aimer...il faut être, et il faut dès lors vouloir être si l'on veut aimer et pour pouvoir aimer..." - Ibid., p. 306.

28. Geiger writes of "Relations nécessaires, inscrites dans notre être même...que nous ne pouvons négliger jamais, sous peine de nous évader de l'ordre de la vérité..." - Ibid., p. 307.

The same considerations serve as context for the further reflection that living in terms of reality imposes its own values, since the values of objective truth and goodness are discovered, not made. For this reason, man's self-making is, in reality, a consenting to be what he discovers he can be. And, since man is never fully what he can be²⁹, it implies a sustained openness to discovery and a refusal to set a '*ne plus ultra*' to his constant re-making. It also implies a wholesome and honest spontaneity in his consenting to his own latest and truest reality.

There is one further consideration which, while serving to close this Section, will appropriately link it with the Section on society to follow. If the authentic making of man is a self-creation, taking place within the sovereignly free interiority of his spirit as the product of a sustained and selfless openness to total truth and

29. See Guérard des Lauriers, quoted in Chapter II, p. 38. Also L-B. Geiger, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 302.

goodness, fundamentally what the human being creates is his gift to his world, the gift of a unique understanding and spiritual love. And since, his way to self-realization being through otherness, he owes all that he is to the other and specially to the human other, his free gift of himself is supremely a gift of *pietas*, a gift in lieu of payment of a debt which he can never discharge³⁰.

Section 2. Role and Responsibility of Society

St Thomas perceives society as having for global *raison d'être* the promotion of man's humanization, by means of the rationalizing of sensibility achieved through the inculcation of moral virtue³¹. It is a vision of society which is both disturbing and provoking. It is disturbing

30. "St. Thomas speaks of (piety) as a part of justice... Justice itself is concerned with the exact payment of what you owe; but there are some debts that cannot, of their nature, be exactly repaid: you cannot repay God for all that He gives you, and so you speak of religion rather than of justice in his regard; and you cannot repay the debt you owe parents and fatherland, and so you speak not of justice so much as of *pietas*, of the virtue of piety." - Gerald Vann, O.P., The Divine Pity, 1945, p. 54.

31. Cfr. Jean-Yves Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 31 and sqq.

because it stands in such strange contrast to the materialistic pragmatism of today's politics that it seems naively utopian, and yet it is founded on the simplest and most sober of metaphysical principles. It is provoking in that it declares man, already unique among creatures as defining his own reality, again unique in being faced with the responsibility, as well as the privilege³², of creating a social milieu which will favour and foster his own human making.

St Thomas' perception of society postulates a social ordering which, in its principles, practice and basic structures, promotes authentic human growth, encouraging and guiding its members in the pursuit and attainment of objectivity because, as human nature's peculiarly adapted creation, it is itself the fruit and

32. "Le Politique apparaît d'abord comme la manifestation de l'exigence rationnelle. C'est précisément parce qu'elle est telle que l'homme désire naturellement - d'un désir que saint Thomas juge aussi profond que celui qui porte l'homme vers la connaissance de Dieu - s'élever à la communauté politique. En elle et par elle, peut s'accomplir concrètement la tension vers l'universel qui définit la rationalité." - Ibid., p. 37. In commenting on the related text of St Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I - II, Q. 94, art. 2, Jolif refers to "le privilège du Politique".

functioning of rationality and wisdom³³. It is a social ordering which is subordinated to the essential purposes of man and which, accordingly, is powerfully instrumental in fostering the positive willing of the rational good.

The rationale of St Thomas' vision of society is acutely realistic. Man, as a rationality or intellectuality mediated by sense, is in fact a sensibility, functioning for all practical purposes, as has been indicated, at the level of a finality which is merely biological. The realism of St Thomas cautions that the ultimate transcendence of spirit is by no means assured and emphasizes the fallibility of the individual human being who may well remain immersed in his sensibility³⁴.

33. "Saint Thomas insiste sur cette idée que l'Etat est à la fois même et autre que le citoyen, qu'il n'est, en définitive, que la représentation objective de la raison immanente au sujet..."
- Ibid., p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 37.

St Thomas finds the rationale for his original conception of society and its role precisely in this naturally and necessarily sensibilized condition of the human spirit and in its crucial consequence: namely, that knowledge is mediated by action, the speculative by the practical, since it is in positing sensibility that man achieves his reality as an understanding³⁵. Given that understanding cannot be constituted except in dependency on sense, the awakening of reason, for St Thomas, is always tied, through his sensibility, to the milieu in which man lives.

Considering the practical realism of his perception of the human situation and its vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that, according to St Thomas, the way to

35. The idea has been elaborated in Chapter II, Part II, Section 2, The Dynamisms of Growth, p. 45.

foster human growth, through promoting the psychological primacy of understanding in the life of man, is to recognize the *de facto* psychological primacy of sensibility in human life and, hence, to recognize the necessity for the active presence of rationality in sense affectivity through moral virtue. Moral virtue ensures the obedience of sensibility to the rule of understanding³⁶. Moral virtue and the experience of virtuous living constitute the rationality of the practical which, in turn, conditions and renders possible the release of the rational functions of man "from the dominance of non-rational or pre-rational factors".³⁷

The moral virtuousness to which St Thomas refers in this context is not the virtuousness achieved through personal asceticism, since such virtue already presupposes in the virtuous personality the lived reality of reason. The

36. See Chapter II, footnote 65, p. 79.

37. E. F. O'Doherty, in a Paper later abridged and published as Chapter 3 of Vocation, Formation, Consecration and Vows: Theological and Psychological Considerations, 1971.

virtuousness to which St Thomas refers is the virtuousness of the social milieu and it is mankind's understanding generally, as "the immediate rule and measure of action" that he challenges to create the environment³⁸, establish the goals and choose the means which will provide the appropriate setting for the making of men.

Man can order and legislate for his world not, however, as an autocrat but as embodying an understanding of reality which recognizes itself as derived and so acknowledges at its roots an objectivity which it can neither judge nor surpass³⁹.

38. "Le sujet morale n'est pas seulement le législateur de son intérieur: il est aussi et en même temps le *législateur du monde*, il ne parvient à la raison qu'en ordonnant le monde et en y réalisant l'harmonie universelle de la raison." - J-Y. Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 35. The words which appear in quotation marks in the text above translate St Thomas' reference to man as: "*regulans et mensurans*". See Summa Theologiae, I - II, Q. 91, art. 3, rep. to obj. 2.

39. "...la loi du monde est une oeuvre de la raison pratique, l'homme est providence...c'est sur sa raison que se fonde la *loi naturelle*, mais c'est en cela même, ajoute saint Thomas, que l'homme se soumet à la *loi éternelle*...Dire que cette loi naturelle renvoi à une loi éternelle, c'est affirmer que la raison humaine n'est pas première, qu'elle est posée et dérivée et qu'elle rencontre en elle-même une objectivité indépassable." - J-Y. Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 36. Cfr. also: B. Garceau, O.M.I., Op. Cit., p. 234 and sqq.

Human growth requires the search for such objectivity; moral virtue is, for a sensibilized understanding, the way to its discovery and social living, of the kind envisaged by St Thomas, is the educator *par excellence* of moral virtue. The reason, and here again St Thomas reveals his eminent practicality, is that, in the context of the law-ful society, the requirements of rationality, endorsed by coercive power, are given a palpable objectivity, thus providing an additional impetus to the urge to interiorization, which otherwise might not prevail with a recalcitrant sensibility⁴⁰.

Throughout his treatment of this topic, his justified reservations notwithstanding, St Thomas, in the thirteenth century, maintained a solid confidence in the fundamental capacity of mankind to constitute and manage the kind of society which it naturally required and desired. It is a confidence consistent with his exaltation, unsurpassed, of man, the most singular of God's creatures. Unfortunately,

40. Cfr. J-Y. Jolif, O.P., *Op. Cit.*, In society, Jolif explains, "l'exigence rationnelle s'y manifeste sous la forme d'une objectivité en quelque sorte visible, qu'elle y apparaît comme une contrainte concrète." - p. 37.

it is a confidence which has not been shared to any noteworthy degree by significant social institutions before or since St Thomas. Paternalism or despotism, in various forms and motivated by a wide range of philosophical, religious and politico-economic considerations, has, for all practical purposes, preferred to leave man in the obscurity of his struggle with sensibility rather than positively encourage him to reach for an enlightened maturity. Perhaps the most graphic and, certainly, the most obvious example of this institutional neglect is the pre-Conciliar Christian Church generally, which has traditionally insisted on regarding man as a soul to be saved rather than as an understanding to be achieved; which has habitually acted and reacted "as though", to quote E.F. O'Doherty, "the goal of the fully formed, mature human being on the natural plane were...in conflict with the goal of the believing, practising, morally good Christian living the life of virtue"⁴¹; and which has failed to recognize that "we are specified in our very nature by the intellect,

41. E. F. O'Doherty, Op. Cit., p. 4.

so that to extol the value of the cultivation of the intellect is, in fact, to extol the most essential component of human perfection"⁴² at the level of nature.

O'Doherty concludes his observation on this matter with a pointed comment and question: "For many centuries we have thought in terms of making men Christians. Is it possible now to begin to think of making Christians men?"⁴³ The same question, *mutatis mutandis*, can be asked with equal pertinence of any organization or social structure which, in the pursuit of its own more limited goals, functions in a way which runs counter to society's global *raison d'être*, that of promoting man's broadest humanization.

For St Thomas, human growth is experiential, not something hothoused from within. It is a social development, feeding on the lessons of practical living. Since man is a sensibilized understanding, reality must

42. Ibid., p. 5.

43. Ibid., p. 6.

come to him in sensible form⁴⁴; it is the rationality of the practical which conditions his knowledge and makes its advancement possible⁴⁵. The process of human growth, consequently, calls for a comprehensively and profoundly educative social milieu; a social milieu which incorporates rationality in its way of life; which provides its members with the sensibilized presence of rationality in its structures, laws and institutions; which inculcates rational behaviour through virtue and, even in the absence of developed insights, takes an authoritative stand for rationality, thus schooling and disciplining sensibility for human living⁴⁶.

Evidently, it is in the early stages of life, when the human condition is one of practically undifferentiated sensibility, that the need for the sensibilized presence of reason in the milieu is at its greatest and its impact most enduring. The basic human need for a rationality sensibly

44. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5. The relevant section has been quoted in Chapter I, footnote 8, p. 5.

45. "...la rationalité de la pratique conditionne et rend seule possible l'accomplissement du pouvoir humaine de connaissance métaphysique." - J-Y. Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 35.

46. Cfr. A-D. Sertillanges, O.P., La Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Vol. 2, p. 116 and sqq.

experienced in the social environment is balanced, it would seem, by an equally powerful and, incidentally, much better documented need for a human love which can be experienced physically⁴⁷. Human growth, then, whether one thinks of it in terms of cognition or affectivity, of understanding or love, is most lastingly grounded, for good or ill, in the early lessons of practical living. A-D. Sertillanges speaks of sense, enriched by reason, awakening the child to experience⁴⁸. The humorist writer, John D.

47. Writing in the Pelican Book abridgment of his classic WHO reports on Maternal Care and Mental Health, 1951, Dr. John Bowlby describes the condition of "children who have been completely deprived and left emotionally lonely and untended." He states: "It is exactly the kind of care which a mother gives without thinking that *is* the care which they have lacked. All the cuddling and playing, the intimacies of suckling by which a child learns the comfort of his mother's body, the rituals of washing and dressing by which through her pride and tenderness towards his little limbs he learns the value of his own, all these have been lacking. His mother's love and pleasure in him are his spiritual nourishment..." - Child Care and the Growth of Love, 1953, p. 16.

48. "On peut noter que ce voisinage de raison, qui enrichit le travail de l'*estimative* naturelle et en fait une réelle expérience... prend aussi une forme sociale. Par l'hérédité d'une part, de l'autre par l'éducation et l'influence..., l'intelligence provoque le jugement sensible et lui fait produire infiniment plus que ne peut l'instinct livré à lui-même. L'enfant, dont l'intelligence est encore endormie, s'éveille ainsi à l'expérience. La raison des siècles lui fournit de quoi vivre raisonnablement sans raison. Plus tard, ayant au service de sa sensibilité une raison personnelle, il n'en continuera pas moins à profiter de celle des autres." - Op. Cit., p. 119.

Sheridan, in his lighthearted but penetrating way, makes essentially the same point when he asserts that "the bedroom in which you sleep as a child helps to make you what you afterwards become"⁴⁹. Sheridan would no doubt agree that the bedroom of childhood was instanced as being symbolic of an entire atmosphere and mode of human living. It was not simply the room in which we slept as children which helped to make us what we are, but all that accompanied it as well. The experience of security, peace, order; of cleanliness of person and place. The sense of belonging, of being valued, loved, cared for, considered and planned for. The concern, the thoughtfulness, the sacrifices; the overall sense of purpose and of dedication on one's behalf. The consequent sense of worth, of self-respect, of respect for others. The genuine interest in one's development and achievements, great and small. The encouragement; the pain and displeasure, disappointment: the honest pride and satisfaction.

49. Sheridan continues: "Children who sleep in high rooms with dormer windows are not likely to grow up into stockbrokers, bankers, town councillors or undertakers...They usually take to something splendid or deplorable - like the sea, poetry or strong drink - live with foolish dreams and keep clear of the surtax net".- Bright Intervals, 1958.

In sharp contrast is the home and milieu described as "culturally defective and socially inadequate"⁵⁰. The parents are haphazard and inconsistent, not only in their attitudes towards each other, towards the children and the upbringing of the children, but towards life in general. There is no sense of genuine involvement in the vocation of parenthood. "Unconcerned" is the word which naturally suggests itself; not that these parents lack affection, but that their affection is short-sighted and very much qualified by their limitations as human beings. The unconcern of these parents is particularly evident in the matter of schooling, formal and informal. Sociological studies have effectively demonstrated that the stimulating, or frustrating, effects of parental attitudes towards the children are enormous⁵¹. The same holds for the effects of the relations which exist between the parents themselves. Parental interest in and parental attitudes towards achievement and failure very powerfully influence the child's attitude to new things, to learning to stand and walk, to speak, to play. It is

50. The phrase and much of the accompanying description is taken from Subnormal Personalities by C. J. C. Earl.

51. Cfr. Philip E. Vernon, Intelligence and Attainment Tests, 1960.

similar with regard to encountering strangers and exploring the environment. And all these attitudes are basic to school learning, intellectual development and social competence.

E. F. O'Doherty, writing as a psychologist and describing conditions similar to those outlined above, conditions which he identifies as "determining co-ordinates of living"⁵², helps to place in sharper psychological focus the realities involved in Jolif's "rationality of the practical", understood within the Thomistic context.

O'Doherty, having first drawn the very important distinction between cause and condition, and between condition positive and negative, goes on to speak of life situations of a negative and destructive kind, both within the nuclear society of the family and in the larger social environment. He notes that many people tend to think that anti-social personalities, juvenile delinquents, for example, "behave as they do because they are determined by the presence of positive factors in their environment...", while the more privileged

52. "Freedom, Responsibility and Guilt" in Studies: Irish Quarterly Review, Winter 1963, p. 368.

are not so determined."⁵³ O'Doherty points out that, "paradoxically, it is the other way round. We are safeguarded, prevented from behaving in many ways which are still physically possible to us, but which in a sense have become 'psychologically impossible' to us, by the presence within us of determining factors which are absent from personalities in more depressed circumstances."⁵⁴

O'Doherty describes these "determining factors" which are present in us but which are "not present in the delinquent, the suicide, or the psychopath" or in many who never, in fact, transgress the law. They fall into three categories which he lists as follows: "(a) Knowledge - of many kinds: of right and wrong, of moral principle, of social and personal relationships, of the morals of the larger society, of law, history, geography, politics, and a host of other factors. (b) affective attitudes, or the set of feelings (revulsion, reverence, reverential fear, self-esteem, loyalty, etc.) which already establish and guarantee certain lines of conduct.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 369.

(c) a highly complex system of unconscious controls" which, O'Doherty notes, "may also operate at the conscious level"⁵⁵.

"It is *we* paradoxically", O'Doherty concludes, "who are determined, by the process of internalization of sanctions, though it is not, of course, an accurate statement to say without qualifications 'we are determined'. More accurately, we should say that the internalization of sanctions at a pre-rational or sub-rational level, frees the intellect and will from some of the pressures (determining tendencies, or factors of instinct, emotion, concupiscence, libido) of the non-rational processes within us, increasing our freedom, though narrowing the range of our behaviour within certain dimensions. Our freedom is increased in all that is most specifically and appropriately human conduct while, within the dimension of possible physical actions...the range of those remaining psychologically possible is narrowed"⁵⁶.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

In this discussion and explanation of the "determining co-ordinates of living", O'Doherty effectively illustrates, using psychological concepts and terminology, the "rationality of the practical" in the ideal functioning of the human community as inculcator of rationality through the influence of virtuous living and the promotion of pre-virtuous disposition. It is thus, in the view of St Thomas, that man first learns to understand - by experiencing, living and doing the reasonable thing. And this, through simply belonging to a rational environment and having his actions and reactions trained and molded, corrected and refined, by the positively influential factors within that environment; through being confronted and challenged, as it were, by a lived rationality. In this context, one can indeed speak validly, it seems, of the psychological primacy of sense for St Thomas: the actual living of rationality preceding its articulated possession because of virtue, the "intellectuality" of sense, transmitted by the human community.

Society's role and responsibility relative to man's humanization is clearly not that of making man in its own

image, since the human being is alone and inviolably the maker of his own humanity. Its role, nevertheless, is a crucial one, in the perception of St Thomas. since it is intended by nature to be for man the embodiment of his own rationality, the externalizing of the rationality which is potential and immanent within him, thus serving as the indispensable spur to his self-creation⁵⁷.

Since, without society, man could not escape his sensibilized existence with its emotionally determined and limited interests, society for St Thomas is, in fact, the subterfuge of rationality itself, intended to stand before man as his pedagogue, so to speak, constraining him to his fulfilment. As such, society's role is fundamentally a liberating role, as E. F. O'Doherty has shown. It is intended to liberate man's potential for growth, firstly, by removing the barriers to humanization, especially the barriers of "poverty, fear, aggression and, above all

57. See J-Y. Jolif, O.P., footnote 41, above.

ignorance"⁵⁸; secondly, by assuring man the freedoms and securities which are his basic right and the indispensable condition of his development; and thirdly and most importantly (since it is here pre-eminently that society incorporates rationality), by opening to man and making available to him the world of the human other. If the individual is to develop his possibility as an understanding through becoming other than he is, it is essentially through communication in the human encounter that he emerges from his particularity to recognize and seek the truths and values which authentically define the human spirit⁵⁹.

58. "The 'self-realization' of the contemporary psychologist requires society and the means it provides for this, just as surely as it needs an appropriate genetic inheritance. The processes of formation which turn us into human beings are at once a limitation and a liberation..." - E. F. O'Doherty, Op. Cit., p. 3.

59. "...l'intersubjectivité nous est présentée par saint Thomas comme une tâche de la raison pratique...: l'homme se pose en constituant cette forme d'intersubjectivité qu'est la communauté politique." - J-Y. Jolif, O.P., Op. Cit., p. 38.

Section 3. The Experience and the Goal of Psychotherapy

In attempting to situate St Thomas' conception of man within the theoretico-practical perspective of psychotherapy⁶⁰, it would seem desirable to establish an anchorage, in the form of a key concept or set of concepts, which, while being faithful to and distinctive of the thought of St Thomas, would also function to polarize or centralize it, thus providing a helpful frame of reference for the ideas to be developed.

Such key concepts have been an interest of M-D. Chenu, O.P., in his studies of St Thomas. Referring specifically to St Thomas' "theses in anthropology" as an example, Chenu has noted how all of them "are controlled, over and beyond demonstration of any kind, by two or three master perceptions

60. Due to what J. Warkentin describes in New Horizon for Psychotherapy, (Ed. R. Holt), 1971, as "the almost unlimited variation in what is called 'psychotherapy'" (p. 107), a satisfactory global definition of psychotherapy is not practical nor is one really necessary for present purposes. It seems sufficient to note: 1) that today, as Warkentin observes, "psychotherapeutic experience is more an investment in living than a curative enterprise" (p. 101) and 2) that, ideally, psychotherapy postulates a philosophical orientation which "sees" man "as presenting the various facets of body-soul-spirit-emotion...inextricably woven" and involves "sincere consideration of all the facets of man..." (p. 109).

on man's condition"⁶¹. Chenu, at this point, does not elaborate on these key concepts nor does he identify them. One radical concept, however, which is undoubtedly Thomistic, universally comprehensive in its application, and integral to St Thomas' perception of man's development, is the "master perception" of *order*⁶². Adequately explained and understood, as St Thomas applies it specifically to man, the concept of order serves very powerfully, in this writer's estimation, not only to indicate the potential of a psychotherapy inspired by Thomistic principles but also to establish its profound originality.

Psychotherapy, taken broadly, is familiar with the objective of unification and integration of personality. The unification and integration of man, as St Thomas envisages it, essentially involves order. As was described

61. M-D. Chenu, O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 1964 p. 196.

62. John H. Wright, introducing his work, The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1957, gives a good description of "master perceptions", such as those envisaged by Chenu, when he writes: "It is characteristic of genius to think in great and comprehensive ideas. These ideas themselves are not always expressed at length in a unified and developed manner...They manifest themselves in the solutions to other more specific...questions as the framework in which these questions and their answers become intelligible." - p. 8. Wright goes on to note: "Such an idea is the order of the universe as used by St. Thomas Aquinas."

earlier⁶³, it is a goal to be attained by the gradual simplification, *through ordering*, of the manifold within the one. According to St Thomas, man is naturally destined to achieve his actualization in the progressive integration and unification of his various virtualities, through their *subordination* to the realization of his highest virtuality, which is understanding. It is clear that, for St Thomas, order is at the root of man's becoming.

Moreover, the ordering which is to take place within man's being necessarily involves his *ordering in terms of the world* which surrounds and contains him. It requires that he locate himself authentically in the universe of being, finding his true bearings in relation to reality as a whole⁶⁴.

In light of such emphasis on ordering, as indispensable to man's self-realization, and bearing in mind the confusion and disorientation typical of clients in psychotherapy, the phrase of L-B. Geiger, O.P., "*se mettre à sa place..., se voir toujours dans l'ensemble pour lequel on est fait*"⁶⁵,

63. See Chapter II, Part II, Section 1, p. 43.

64. L-B. Geiger notes that "L'amour de soi, loin de faire remplir au moi tout l'horizon de son amour, descend vers le sujet à partir de l'horizon général de la vérité. Il ne constitue qu'un cas particulier de l'amour objectif..." - Op. Cit., p. 305.

65. Ibid., p. 307.

suggests itself as epitomizing the goals and direction of a psychotherapy based on Thomistic principles, since it offers a readily recognizable focus for the concepts involved.

"Se mettre à sa place", in the Thomistic context, would point to the basic need for ordering and, within this framework, to the need for the recognition and location of oneself in terms of basic identifications and relationships, with the values, commitments and responsibilities which naturally ensue.

If the description of the approach to therapy, derived from St Thomas, were to end here, it might easily be concluded, firstly, that the "se mettre à sa place" of Geiger - and the Thomistic conception of man's ordering, which it essentially reflects - means little more, in fact, than a willing conformity to the requirements and expectations of the prevailing socio-cultural milieu; and consequently, that the psychotherapy described could not be credited with any greater breadth of vision or originality than the majority of existing therapies which, whatever their theoretical underpinnings, are generally regarded as, at least implicitly, reinforcing the status quo and geared in practice to the

formation of the well-adjusted member of society⁶⁶.

In a society subserving the essential purposes of the human being and, hence, consistently incorporating rationality in its way of life, such a psychotherapy (if indeed any form of psychotherapy were needed) would probably find acceptance with St Thomas, since it would be essentially supportive of society's role as man's primary pedagogue, instituted precisely to urge him to his personal fulfilment⁶⁷. Given the actual conditions of human life in society, however, a psychotherapy based on Thomistic principles would more likely find itself obliged to compensate radically for society's derelictions.

In no set of social circumstances, however, can the ordering of man, the "se mettre à sa place" of Geiger and St Thomas, be properly understood as conformity to an

66. The view expressed by Erich Fromm in Fear of Freedom, 1942, that "psychiatry...has made itself an instrument of the general trends in the manipulation of personality" (p. 212) is shared by many thoughtful people and extended to include psychology and psychotherapy. Cfr. William Whyte, The Organization Man; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite.

67. See Section 2 above.

externally imposed ordering, however ideal it might be.

In the conception of St Thomas, man's *raison d'être* and supreme achievement is to create his own humanity, that is, to discover for himself, develop and perfect, a life at the highest possible level of objectivity in terms of truth sought and values chosen. This necessarily implies that while, for St Thomas, the rest of nature fits into a pre-determined pattern of order, no such situation exists or is even possible in the case of man. Man is the originator of his own ordering. In his self-actualizing, in establishing his own being as an understanding, man establishes his own ordering.

The "place" of man, as referred to in the phrase, "*se mettre à sa place*", is therefore to be understood, in its authentic Thomistic context, as indicating, not any pre-determined "setting" in the world where man "fits" and is required to establish himself, but his *presence* in and to total reality, as understanding and love; a presence which he alone can create. The mode of his presence and its degree decide the ordering of his life, in its relationships commitments and responsibilities. Man's own reality, his

realization, as understanding and love, is the measure of his capacity to relate to and communicate with the rest of the world, the world of nature included. It is this reality of man which establishes the ordering of his life.

The profound and radical originality of St Thomas in his conception of man as potential totality is, perhaps, nowhere more clearly evident than in the autonomy, spontaneity and sacred inviolability which he claims for the human being as the maker of his own universe of meaning; a universe which he creates and in which he thereby establishes himself, consciously and by choice, as understanding and love, open and responsive to all of reality. This is man "putting himself in his place". His place is his own creation. It is his by free, spontaneous election. As the outcome of understanding and love, it is his gift to the world of his fellow-beings, the gift of himself; a gift of understanding and appreciation which is his unique contribution to the universe of being and, supremely, of the human being, in its reaching for fulfilment.

In a perspective such as this, there is obviously no room for concern over possible anarchy or lawlessness. If man orders his own world, he does so as an understanding and love whose very existence is conditional on the recognition

of objectivity, on a consenting to the objective truth and goodness of all being and of each being in its "place".

Geiger's phrase, though ultimately it implies a conviction of deep-rooted, ontological belongingness and security - experiences which the client in psychotherapy typically needs at some level and will, it is hoped, eventually appreciate at their deepest level - initially may sound "ego-deflating"; and, in fact, Geiger uses the phrase in reference to exaggerated self-preoccupation, whether positive or negative, and the need to transcend it⁶⁸. This is appropriate to the present discussion since, fundamentally, the person who would commit himself as a client to a process of psychotherapy, based on the Thomistic conception of man, is challenged to recognize and accept himself for what he truly is, neither more nor less. He is called upon to discover, acknowledge and live his truth.

68. When a person loves himself authentically, Geiger explains, "le moi cesse d'exister comme grandeur autonome, aussi bien au titre d'idole qu'on nourrit et qu'on flatte qu'au titre d'ennemi contre lequel s'acharne une agressivité, dont on peut soupçonner qu'elle n'est souvent qu'une défense... Notre importance n'est pas telle qu'elle méritent ces soins ni cette haine." - Ibid., p. 307.

Within the Thomistic framework, the crucial feature in any problem requiring psychotherapy can be identified as a failure in objectivity; in more dynamic terms, as a failure in presence to reality. The client, for whatever reason, lacks objectivity in his perceptions. He is not present in his own reality as an understanding. What he experiences, therefore, is not understood but is simply reacted to on the level of sensibility. His presence is the limited, subjective presence of a sensible being, reacting in terms of imagery and emotion, that is, in terms of emotionally-charged representations of reality. The other exists only as a signal to sense affectivity; as something to be desired and enjoyed; or to be feared, avoided, rejected, much as all indices of authority are read by the rebellious adolescent as threatening to his fledgling independence and, hence, globally and automatically distrusted and rejected. There is no presence of being-to-being.

Because of this failure in presence to reality, the authentic identification, either of self or of the other, is impossible. If the other is diminished in his being, through my narrow and limited perception, to the status of, for example, a powerful and threatening rival or competitor, then this is the measure of his identity for me at the moment;

my own identity is correspondingly limited to that of threatened opponent and potential loser. It is clear that relationships and interactions will reflect these identifications and that the perception of values, responsibilities and commitments will be likewise affected.

The possibility of man is his complete humanization in a total objectivity. The actuality of the individual confronting the psychotherapist is likely to be the immediacy and determinacy of a being still more or less immersed, perhaps even traumatized, in the subjectivity of his sensibility. Factors of various kinds operative in the milieu, previously or currently, may effectively hold the individual in the non-rational and even in the grossly irrational, over large areas of his life; factors such as an extremely domineering and critical father, an hysterically demanding and manipulating mother, a destructively "religious" upbringing; factors engendering and perpetuating a psychologically incapacitating degree of inferiority, fearfulness, distrust and rejection, prejudice.

The actualities which the psychotherapist faces, viewed against the background of St Thomas' conception of the human being and his development, point to the failure of society, macrocosmically or microcosmically, to fulfil its natural

purpose⁶⁹.

The role of the psychotherapist within the Thomistic setting could be broadly described as that of stimulating, guiding and encouraging the client in meeting the challenge of his nature to overcome the limitations of his intellect's sensibilized condition; of urging and fostering the discovery of broader and deeper perspectives. Fundamentally, it is the role of providing the kind of presence and milieu which favours the client's creation of his own presence to the world of reality, as a growing understanding and love.

The approach adopted in psychotherapy - one hesitates to say "method" and, even more, "technique", since these words tend to signify something pre-scheduled and quasi-automatic - would, it seems, be essentially heuristic, utilizing the dialectic of the actual and the possible to induce the client to reflection and so to recognition of his capacity to perceive more to a person, a situation or an event than his sensibility has been able, or has been trained, to grasp. The purpose of this approach would be

69. See Section 2 above.

to facilitate the process of interiorization, the lifting of life and of life's experiences to higher and deeper levels of reality, meaning and value⁷⁰.

In such reflection, the client can transcend his sense affectivity; he can come to appreciate something of the potential depths of reality in himself and in the other; he, the experiencer, as well as what is experienced, can be objectified so that a relationship of being-to-being becomes possible.

The reflective process, in a Thomistically derived psychotherapy, would be focused on certain hoped-for developments in the life of the client: the transcendence of representations to reveal realities; the recognition of his essential being as possibility of understanding and love; the conforming of his manifestations with his essence⁷¹. The first development concerns the overcoming of the affect-laden imagery which clouds and conceals from the client the reality of himself (e.g., images of superiority or self-sufficiency or, more commonly, of worthlessness), of others (e.g., prejudices regarding educational or socio-economic standing,

70. See Chapter II, Part II, Section 2, p. 47

71. See Section 4 of this chapter, p. 143.

sex, ethnic origin), of God (often pictured as the unattractive creature and property of organized religions, or as a sentimental childhood dream outgrown). In the transcendence of such representations, with their deadening impact, the limitless possibilities of being-to-being relationships begin to be discernible to the spirit.

The first development necessarily implies the second and both would be abortive without the third. Though listed as three developments, they are essentially the facets of a single development in the life of the client: the client's emergence to objectivity, in virtue of which he puts himself in his place as a presence to all of reality.

The pace and intensity of growth to reality are for the client to decide. The choice remains his to seize or not to seize upon reality as it becomes revealed to him. The qualities in the client which the psychotherapist will look for, count on, and cultivate are a basic receptivity and honesty, and a certain resoluteness in the face of challenge. The most valued ally, especially of the experienced therapist, one which he relies upon and implicitly trusts, and which he can recognize even in the oddest

disguises, is what L-B. Geiger, O.P., describes as "la tendance vers l'être"⁷², the eros to understanding, the basic need of the human being to live by truth.

A psychotherapy inspired by St Thomas would, it seems, inevitably pose a peculiarly intimate challenge to the authenticity of the therapist's own humanization. His role, as was suggested earlier, obliges him to function, in a very real sense, as surrogate of a delinquent society, compensating to the client in his own person for society's failure to be the mediator of rationality in his regard. In normal circumstances, as was pointed out, experiencing the human other, who manifests rationality in his way of being, is crucially important, since it is pre-eminently through the human encounter that the individual overcomes his particularity to recognize objective truth and goodness. The human burden of witnessing to objectivity, widely shared in a society functioning consistently as St Thomas would have it function⁷³, would seem to become the concentrated burden of the therapist. It is he who offers the client the

72. Op. Cit., p. 305.

73. See Section 2, above.

opportunity of experiencing, possibly for the first time, a genuine presence in a being-to-being interaction. As a presence, the psychotherapist recognizes the possibility of another presence and directs his efforts to the release of those inmost possibilities, helping the client to free himself from the limitations of his sensibility, in order to become what he is capable of becoming. The therapist also recognizes that his role, however vital, is an essentially limited one. He realizes that he is assisting at the work of humanization, the creation of a human being and that it is a work which proceeds totally, if at all, by the clear-sighted and deliberate choice of the client and within the inviolability of the client's own interiority. If his efforts are successful, he is aware that, in the nature of things, he will not see the final fruits; that the lasting value of his psychotherapeutic intervention lies in the experience of reflection, in full intellectual awareness, which he has worked to make available to the client and which he hopes will stay with the client to enhance the gift of his presence to the rest of his world.

In the foregoing pages, the concept of order and ordering was chosen as providing a logical focus for reflection on a Thomistically inspired psychotherapy because order, as visualized by St Thomas, plays a fundamental role in man's humanization: that is, in establishing the psychological primacy of understanding and love, and in bringing about the unity and integration of the human being.

The concept of order and ordering was chosen for a second reason: to draw attention to the originality of a psychotherapy based on St Thomas' concept of man. Needless to say, the concept of order as such is not new to psychotherapy. The ordering of human life in some fashion is a common theme in all conventional forms of therapy and calls for adjustment to the demands of reality, as is clearly illustrated, for example, in the work of Percival M. Symonds⁷⁴. However, in traditional and conventional forms of therapy, all adjustments tend inevitably to mean a

74. Symonds' Dynamic Psychology, 1949 (previously published as The Dynamics of Human Adjustment), describes "normality" (Chapter XXI) in terms of adjustment under the subheadings: integration, ego development, acceptance of reality, responsibility for self, social relationships, emotional perception of the world, etc., all of which expressions would receive new and profounder interpretations from a Thomistically based psychodynamics, because of the richer meaning of "reality".

fitting-in-with or a measuring-up-to pre-existing external demands; successful adjustment is taken to mean recognition of and ability to live, positively and constructively, within the pattern of life already established as acceptable⁷⁵. The emphasis, however implicitly, is on conformity; what is required is an acquiescence with being held to conventional standards and being molded into "place".

In the Thomistically oriented psychotherapy, on the other hand, the ordering of life is essentially dynamic and individually unique; the emphasis is explicitly on spontaneity and autonomy. It calls for an ongoing action of creativity in a very true sense of the word. The individual originates his own ordering through growth to presence as understanding and love. His "placement" in the world is the spontaneously free gift of himself to reality, especially to the world of his fellow human beings. Such an adjustment, by definition, is conducive to mental health and well-being, whereas the adjustment aimed at in

75. The Psychiatric Dictionary (4th Ed.), 1970, of Hinsie & Campbell, defines adaptation as: "Fitting or conforming to the environment, usually with the implication that advantageous change has taken place...The end result of successful adaptation is *adjustment*..." - p. 14 (italics added).

other approaches may mean a virtual capitulation to forces and processes which ultimately negate authentic and, therefore, healthy self-actualization.

Symonds, in common with most psychologists, as he believes, maintains that the distinction between mental health and mental illness involves no qualitative difference but is "merely one of degree"⁷⁶. E. F. O'Doherty, on the other hand, is convinced that "the healthy mind, the healthy person, is something much more than a mind or person free from pathological processes"; that it is a mistake to "identify mental health with the mere absence of mental illness, as though sight might be defined as absence of blindness...or in general as though a positive concept is defined through a privation, instead of *vice versa*"⁷⁷. O'Doherty clearly supports a qualitative difference when he notes that "there is not just one scale but two of mental health. One is the scale of psychopathology, running from serious illness up to the modicum of mental health which

76. Symonds writes: "it is generally agreed that the difference between the normal individual and the pathological individual is mainly quantitative and not qualitative...The difference is merely one of degree." - Op. Cit., p. 384.

77. The Priest and Mental Health, 1962, p. 8.

is the condition of most people. The other is the scale of positive mental health, running from this modicum or absence of illness, up to the full natural perfecting of the personality..."⁷⁸

"The full natural perfecting of the personality", taken in the context of St Thomas, would undoubtedly imply qualitative change of a very profound kind since, in the transformation of the life lived from the plane of the sensible to that of the spiritual, from subjectivity to objectivity, it postulates, in the words of B. Lonergan, S.J., "an intentional self-transcendence" which takes the subject "beyond what he feels, what he imagines, what he thinks, what seems to him, to something *utterly different*, to what is so"⁷⁹.

78. Ibid.

79. The Subject, 1968, p. 3 (*italics added*).

Section 4. Human Sensitivity

Since it is not of the essence of intellectuality to emanate a sensibility⁸⁰, the fact that the human spirit alone naturally requires, as a soul, to express itself as a sensibility, makes it unique among spiritual beings. Similarly, since it is not of the essence of sensibility to be the mediation of intellectuality⁸¹, the fact that sensibility in man alone so ministers to intellectuality sets human sensibility apart from all other.

80. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 51, art. 1, resp.: "...what is merely incidental to a given nature is not realized universally wherever that nature is found...to be joined to a body is not of the essence of intellectual being, and where such conjunction occurs it must have a special reason other than intellectuality as such. So it is with the human soul: its natural aptitude for union with a body is due to its low degree of intellectuality, to the fact that as intellect it begins in a state of potency..." Cfr. also: Q. de Spir. Creat., art. 5, resp., quoted in Chapter II, footnote 22, p. 47.

81. Cfr. Q. Un. de Anima, art. XI, reply to obj. 19: "It must be said that animal as such is neither rational nor irrational; the rational animal is man, the irrational animal is the brute animal. In the same way, while *the sensible soul as such is neither rational nor irrational*, in man the sensible soul is rational, in the brute animal it is irrational". (Italics added). Cfr. also: Ibid., reply to obj. 15; Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 76, art. 5 in corp.

There are numerous texts in St Thomas attesting the nobility and superiority of human sensibility⁸², the reason adduced depending on its relevance to the particular context. It is the concept of potential totality, however, which provides the ultimate explanation, such as it has been expressed above. While, physiologically, it shares the same basic mechanisms as brute animal sensibility⁸³, man's sensibility belongs to a different order; it is '*sui generis*'⁸⁴, because it is naturally destined to serve

82. For example: Q. Un. de Anima, art. XI, reply to obj. 12: "The sensible soul is more noble in man than in other animals because in man it is not only sensible, but also rational." See also footnotes immediately following.

83. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia Pars, Q. 75, art. 6, reply to obj. 1: "The process of life is alike as to the body...But the process is not alike in the case of the soul, for man has understanding, whereas animals do not..."

84. Q. Un. de Anima, art. XI, reply to obj. 14: "If the sensible soul which is in the brute and the sensible soul which is in man were to be classed of themselves as to genus and species, *they would not be of the same genus*, except logically perhaps in accordance with some common intention". (Italics added).

C. Fabro, commenting on this text of St Thomas, writes: "The species *homo* is included under the genus *animal*; animality in its logical aspect is predicated *ex aequo* of every species included under the common genus...This is all the more true of the 'sensibility' that is the constitutive formality of this genus. All this is clear as long as we stay in the realm of logic, but when we pass on to consider

spirit⁸⁵, because it stems from spirit as from its root⁸⁶, and because it is spirit by participation⁸⁷. Anton C. Pégis, though making no reference to the potential totality concept, aptly describes the superior reality of human sensibility as perceived within that context when he speaks of man's nature as "an intellectual nature endowed, *in its very intellectuality*, with both intellectual and sensible powers"⁸⁸ and describes these sensible powers as "an expression"⁸⁹ of man's intellectuality.

(Footnote 84 continued)

the real mode of being and actuation of these common formalities, the whole problem changes its aspect. Genus indeed is realized only in the species, and the species alone express the real mode of being in nature. Animality and sensibility therefore are realized *differently* according to the grade of perfection of the various animal species, and therefore, while the abstract formality can be said to be identical, its mode of being in nature is different..." - "Knowledge and Perception", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. 12, 1938, p. 350.

85. See Chapter I, footnote 8, p. 5.

86. See Chapter I, footnote 5, 6, and 7, p. 4 and 5.

87. See Chapter I, footnote 42 and sqq., p. 24.

88. At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man, 1963, p. 42.

89. Ibid., p. 43.

It is sensibility as "an expression" of the intellectuality and, therefore, of the spirit of man that this Section attempts to explore and evaluate, in relation to man's progressive humanization, as previously described⁹⁰.

A basic feature of sensibility in man, as the potential totality concept logically implies, is its developmental capacity; its initial lack of fixity and structure; its native plasticity. George Klubertanz, S.J., in his treatment of man's discursive power, draws attention to this feature when he speaks of man as having "the essentials of sensitive nature in a generic sense"⁹¹. His elaboration of this point is enlightening with regard to the present theme. Klubertanz continues:

Considered simply in itself, this sense nature has an indetermination, an incompleteness, a potentiality about it. We can see this sense nature, as it were in a kind of pure state, in the very young infant or the complete moron. In these cases, the human estimative manifests itself as a sense power. On this level, the human estimative shows itself to have only a very few innately determined judgments, and

90. See Chapter II, Part II and III, p. 43 and 67.

91. The Discursive Power, 1952, p. 279.

even these lead only to a kind of generic activity. The same indeterminate end result can be seen in adults, when sensory reaction escapes the bonds of reason and habit: there is a violent upsurge of activity which is not channelled to a definite result.⁹²

Completing his thought, Klubertanz comments that, "considered in itself, in abstraction from the rest of man, the human estimative" - or the cogitative, earlier described as the "linchpin" of sensibility, standing at the summit of sense cognition - "is a very imperfect power"⁹³. In view of the conception of the intellectual soul as a potential totality, it is justifiable and more pertinent, perhaps, to think of the 'imperfection' of the human estimative and, indeed, of human sensibility generally in terms of pliability, openness and availability for spiritual integration, through interiorization, because of what has been described as its "ultimate finality"⁹⁴, namely, knowledge and appreciation of

92. Ibid., p. 279.

93. Ibid., p. 279.

94. See Chapter II, Part III, Section 1, p. 68.

the true and the good for man. This is sensibility's natural destiny as a participation in the reality of the human spirit.

The growth of man's understanding begins in complete exteriority, when, as was indicated earlier, the 'hold' of form as intellect on the body and sensibility of man is merely potential and so tenuous that the forms of sense function as man's only effective forms and movers⁹⁵. From such limited and unpromising beginnings, man is destined to become a fully actualized understanding and spiritual love. Within the conceptual context of potential totality, it is a becoming which supposes the spiritualization of man's body and its sensibility to the point where, from being only the material basis and condition for mind and thought, they become the subtle vehicle and conveyor of presence and meaning.

Such a conceptualization of man's growth to full spiritual stature is distinctively Thomistic and stands in striking contrast to the traditional Augustinian ideal

95. See Chapter II, Part II, Section 2, p. 50.

of the spiritual man⁹⁶. For Augustine, the attainment of the ideal was conditional on the purification and liberation of spirit from sense, in preparation for the reception of full divine illumination. For Aquinas, in his humanist realism, the ideal of man's spiritualization, of natural necessity, could never be more than an approximation since, in his view, the spiritualizing of man meant the spiritualizing of the *total man*, through the progressive realization of his spiritual potential in every aspect and element of his nature. The "ideal of the well-poised man", to quote Thomas Gilby, O.P., was not only "his psychological and moral ideal"⁹⁷ but, as embracing these, his spiritual ideal as well. Man's sensibility, as a participation in and "expression" of his intellectuality, was to have its full sharing in his perfection.

96. Cfr. B. Garceau, O.M.I., Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1968, p. 233.

97. St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 17, (Ia2ae, 6 - 17), 1970, p. 200, footnote 7a.

Moral virtue, according to St Thomas, is the key to sensibility's humanization. As was indicated before⁹⁸, moral virtue spells the presence of rationality to sensibility, "ordering" sensibility and ensuring its harmony with reason.

Against the background of St Thomas' ideal of total spiritualization for man, and in view of human sensibility's uniqueness as a participation in man's intellectuality, plastic in itself and congenial to rationality's molding, it is evident that the ordering of sensibility through moral virtue means much more than a mere "policing" of sensibility, to ensure law-and-order in sense affectivity and guarantee rational control.

The role which St Thomas assigns to moral virtue can be properly appreciated only in terms of the faithful *resonance to reality* which St Thomas sees as characterizing the ideal outcome of human development⁹⁹. That his entire being should faithfully judge of reality, as the eye, in

98. See Chapter II, Part III, Section 2, p. 75.

99. Cfr. B. Garceau, O.M.I., Op. Cit., especially p. 227 - 234 which treat in depth of the ideal of human judgment in St Thomas.

the perfection of its healthy functioning faithfully and unerringly judges of colour - this, for St Thomas, represents the natural goal set for man; that he should "ring true" to reality as he discovers it ever more and more in himself and in the beings which surround him. "As a man is, so will he judge"¹⁰⁰, is St Thomas' criterion: the more completely a man is attuned to truth *in his entire being*, the better he will discern and judge all being at its true value.

This exquisite precision is called for in judgment made at the level of practical living and so, necessarily, involves sensibility. Such judgment, in the mind of St Thomas, pertains to intellect, since there are principles to be applied, and to sense, since the application is in the concrete¹⁰¹.

100. This statement paraphrases a basic principle of St Thomas, taken from the Ethics of Aristotle, Book III. The principle, as stated by St Thomas, reads: "*qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei*". See Summa Theologiae, I - II, Q. 58, art. 5, corp.

101. Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 49, art. 2, reply to obj. 3: "The correct appreciation of a particular end is called understanding, as being about a principle, and sense, as being about the particular".

It is moral virtue (truly virtue, according to St Thomas, only as partaking in intellectual virtue) which brings sensibility in man into resonance with truth, so ordering man's virtualities at the level of sense that, being fully attuned to reality, they 'strike the right note' in presence of the good, the true, the sacred, the beautiful¹⁰².

The price of man's humanization or spiritualization, as was pointed out earlier, is consistent living at the peak of intellectual awareness. It is only thus that man can maintain his being-to-being presence at the level of his highest possibility. Moral virtue, in the thought of St Thomas, is the "wakefulness" of sensibility, so to speak, assuring to sensibility the acuity of vigilant awareness necessary for all-round perfect judgment of reality¹⁰³.

102. "C'est là le rôle essentiel des vertus morales, pour saint Thomas, d'assurer l'emprise de la rationalité sur l'affectivité sensible et, par là, que les sens intérieurs soient disposés à estimer bonnes les choses sensibles, selon qu'elles sont conformes au point de vue de l'intellect, et ultimement à l'amplitude de la volonté." - B. Garceau, O.M.I., Op. Cit., p. 229.

103. Ibid., p. 235.

At this point in the development of our theme, human sensibility can more appropriately be given the name "sensitivity", a word which seems to come closer to expressing the precision and delicacy of "touch" which St Thomas appears to have in mind.

The requirements for a dynamic description of the roundly "mature" personality, following the ideal of human development proposed by St Thomas, would seem to be contained in essence in his treatment of human sensibility as outlined above. The originality of such a description would be profoundly striking since its basic feature, it seems, would be a natural dynamism of concordance, what B. Garceau, O.M.I., describes as "une certaine parenté"¹⁰⁴, established between such a man and his world by reason of the resonance to reality spoken of.

Right living, mature human living, would be much less a matter of evaluating by measuring according to

104. Ibid., p. 234.

rational rule; much more a matter of the degree of dynamic health and balance obtaining within the person himself¹⁰⁵. St Thomas is proposing that the "well-poised" man has a special flair, an almost instinctive aptitude, for discerning the reality of what he is evaluating because, underlying and inspiring his evaluation of it, is his "kinship" with it - "empathy for it" is hardly too strong an expression for the idea which St Thomas is conveying. It is a kinship, or empathy, arising from his resonance to reality. Such a person is in tune with the reality of his world because he himself is real. Reality vibrates and resonates to reality; the natural and the real in the world responds to the natural and the real in him. The truth of being yields itself to his healthy intellect; the truth of sense yields itself to his healthy, balanced sensitivity. 'To man such as he *is*' - if he is as he ought to be, as he is by his nature - 'things appear as they *are*'.

Earlier in this section, reference was made to the

105. Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I - II, Q. 58, art. 5, corp.

gradual spiritualizing of man's body and sensibility, culminating eventually in transforming body and sensibility from mere condition of mind and thought to vehicle and conveyor of presence and meaning.

One of the specifically looked-for results of the reflective process in a Thomistically oriented psychotherapy, as was mentioned, is the progressive conforming of the client's manifestations with his essence¹⁰⁶. To the degree that the client is not present in his reality as an understanding, his manifestations or self-presentations do not convey what he essentially is, to his world, especially to the world of the human other. He communicates with reality not as being-to-being but, since basically he is still a sensibility reacting to emotional signals, as object-to-object, and in the constricted, stereotypical and "impersonal" fashion familiar to the experienced psychotherapist.

Psychotherapy challenges the client to full presence; to discover, acknowledge and live his truth. In light

106. See Chapter III, Section 3 above.

of St Thomas' perception of sensibility's progressive humanizing, as an increasingly authentic resonance to reality, the spontaneous and often subtle changes noted over a wide spectrum of the client's behavioural modalities - voice, gesture, posture, facial expression, eye-contact - will reflect the transformation of sensibility and reactivity to sensitivity and responsiveness. As evidence of sensibility's being taken over, so to speak, by rationality, they will also reflect a new depth of self-possession; the sense of selfhood and self-regard now extended to include a new awareness of, responsibility towards and care for the body, sometimes silently but eloquently witnessed to by a new concern for appearance and for quality, taste and appropriateness in dress.

While there may be little value in recording the observable phenomena of change since they are already familiar, it seems worth noting that, in a psychotherapy based on St Thomas' conception of man, such changes are in no way incidental or extraneous but entirely integral to the process of man's humanization so that, if they fail to appear when and where expected, it can be clearly assumed that presence to reality has not yet been adequately or securely established.

The idea of body and sensibility as vehicle and conveyor of presence and meaning is not limited, in St Thomas, to *expressivity*. Sensibility's growth to appreciation of truth as part of the human mind's growth in understanding of reality not only enables it to resonate with fidelity to the reality developing 'within' but also, as was noted, to experience a deep kinship with and empathy (understood as "fellow-feeling" at the inmost level of being) for all of reality, though the point is being made here particularly with regard to the world of things, of nature.

"Le sens du vrai et du bien" is the expression whereby B. Garceau, O.M.I., identifies the quality in question¹⁰⁷. It describes sensibility's responsiveness to the presence of being in the given of sense. It is the presence of this quality, above all, which testifies that the human spirit is harmoniously at one with itself in its being and functioning, and that it enjoys openness of communication and fruitfulness of interaction with the rest of reality.

107. Op. Cit., p. 235.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has been an initial attempt to explain, develop and evaluate, from the thought of St Thomas Aquinas, a theme which is of basic significance for human psychology but whose deeper dimensions and implications have for long gone generally unappreciated. It is the concept of the human mind as a *totum potentiale* (potential or, alternatively, reflective totality); a concept which, the writer claims, provides the key to the thinking of St Thomas, not only with regard to the unity of human cognitive experience, but with regard to the nature of the human reality itself.

As the development of the first chapter has shown, St Thomas' treatment of the human mind involves three levels of consideration: mind as substantial form of the human composite; mind as spiritual entity, a *habens esse* with body-transcending capacities; and mind as *totum potentiale*.

The first two considerations identify the essential reality of the human mind. Though St Thomas establishes that the human soul is indeed a spiritual substance, it is clear from the direction and development of his thought that his main concern is with its incompleteness as a spiritual substance. It is also clear that it is this fact which necessitates its condition as substantial form.

This point is basic for an appreciation of the mind as a *totum potentiale*. St Thomas uses the concept, in his third consideration of mind, precisely to identify the existential condition of a spiritual being which seeks its actualizing as an intellect through functioning as the substantial form of a body. This thesis suggests and endeavours to establish that it is here, in this third identification of mind, that St Thomas offers his most fruitful contribution to human psychology.

A *totum potentiale*, considered generally, is a totality of power, a dynamic totality, made up of part-powers. The peculiar significance of the *totum potentiale* is that, while the totality is considered to be essentially (truly) present to each of its parts, it is not present to each part in the fulness of its power. This power is found fully present only in the supreme part-power and is found present to a less degree in the others.

It is with the help of this concept that St Thomas unfolds his theory of the ultimate psychological primacy of spirit in the life of man, identifying spirit as a complex dynamism which is in process of constituting itself as an intellect or understanding; which in the beginning is a possible intellect only; and which actualizes

itself only to the extent and in the degree that it reaches and maintains the level of activity specific to intellect, namely, the activity of understanding and love.

St Thomas' application to the mind of man of this concept of potential totality (also called by St Thomas "virtual totality" or "potestative totality") calls for recognition of certain features of the human dynamic whose significance the thesis (Chapter II) has been concerned to explore and emphasize.

Firstly, the human mind is a complex totality; a complexus of powers, all deriving from and differing in degree of proximity to a single dynamic source, which is *intellectus* or understanding, man's distinctive characteristic. These manifold powers are particularizations or ramifications of intellect and, without their functioning through bodily organs, the merely possible intellect of man could not achieve realization.

Secondly, the human mind is a reflective totality; that is, it constitutes itself an actual understanding through a re-flection, or return, to itself, having posited itself in sensibility in the process of striving to understand reality. The human mind is not a unity already

given; nor is there a precious 'core' of spirit to be preserved and protected from 'extraneousness', as the world of sense has frequently been construed to be. The mind is a dynamic complexity whose unity is a goal to be achieved by the gradual process of simplification, through ordering, of the manifold which exists and operates within the one.

Thirdly: like unity, self-consciousness is to be understood, not as a given, but as a goal. It derives progressively from non-self-consciousness, through consciousness of the other. The human spirit comes to a knowledge of itself only through that which it posits of itself in sensibility. It is destined to become an understanding by means of a constant reflectivity, returning to its own reality through processes which, basically, it shares with other living beings. While the proper function of the human spirit is understanding, in order to have understanding there is a need for sensing and, for sensing to become truly human, there is a need for understanding. The terms, *emanatio* or *processio* and their counterpart, *conversio*, adopted from Neo-Platonism, are the terms employed by St Thomas to express the dynamic interplay and interpenetration involved, while the notion

of *participation* , applied at the level of activity, underlies his entire approach to the concept of potential totality.

Finally, in St Thomas' perception of the human mind and its functioning, there is no exteriority of sensibility and intellect. Intellect exists within sensibility; it always permeates and is permeated by sensibility. With each succeeding *conversio* of intellect through the effort to understand reality, it is the totality which becomes more understanding, not any "inner" and "isolated" power. Each moment of progressive understanding involves a greater penetration of rationality into the less rational powers. It is the entire person that grows in understanding, and this without force, subjugation or compromise in regard to so-called "inferior" powers or capacities.

The image of man which emerges is that of a living body with spiritual possibilities; a living body whose life principle, besides being the substantial form of the body, causing man to be living and sensible, is naturally endowed with the joint intellectual capacities of understanding and spiritual love, which place him in the category of spirit and subject. These transcendent capacities, however,

are mere potentialities; their actualizing can come about only through a rationality which is mediated by a sensibility, with the result that man, in the beginning, is an understanding which knows reality only as sensible and which exists only as a sensible being.

As such, man stands alone in the world of creation, a unique type of intellectual being, naturally oriented and, indeed, driven by his nature to find his ultimate and full development, as an intellect, through the instrumentality of an embodied existence. If he were merely animal, his natural development, given adequate conditions, would be assured and his destiny totally predictable. If he were pure spirit, no developmental process would be involved; from the start, he would be complete and perfect in his being and, living in the full light of truth, he would be immovable in regard to his destiny. As a compound of sensibility and intellectuality, man is both determined and undetermined. As an actual sensibility, he is effectively held within a closed system dominated by emotionality; as a potentiality at the threshold of spirit, he has a basic plasticity, a spiritual openness to all being in that he can be all other things and, in fact, must become other than himself through the exteriorization of sensibility in

order to posit his own reality. Unique among souls and unique among spirits, a human being only potentially, man is the maker of his own humanity, involved in the incomparably significant process of his own constitution.

In his highest virtuality, man is fashioned to recognize and appreciate truth, to know reality. Intellectual desire is marked by objectivity, and this need to know reality is ontological. There is only one way in which the being of man can be constituted human: through rising to the level of objective values in order to live by the truth recognized by intellect. This is the inevitable condition for man's humanization. The indispensable means to this achievement, according to St Thomas, is reflection of spirit, with the progressive interiorization of sensibility to which it is the key.

The goal set for man's understanding is the limitless and, in the final analysis, naturally unattainable goal of a total objectivity. Within man himself, this openness to all truth is directed at the subordination of sensibility, but only through its integration; otherwise, the unity and harmony of human life would be forced and ineffectual. The goal of total objectivity, viewed universally, is the goal of reality sought consistently and non-selectively over

the entire range of values in its full extent and, then, ever more in depth, through an interiorization which never succeeds in plumbing the final reaches of spirit. The interiorization process is the functional reality of spirit, giving increasing access to being and leading progressively to a more profound presence to the reality of self, of other subjects, of the material world of nature and, ultimately, of God.

The emphasis throughout St Thomas' treatment of man is on possibilities which may or may not be actualized. Granted, then, that the actualization of the human spirit's potential, as conceived by St Thomas, is a matter of crucial importance for individual human destiny, of equally crucial significance is the obligation of society generally and of its various institutions, specifically its educational institutions, to provide the conditions which will consistently favour and promote, rather than impede, such actualization.

It is the contention of the writer that the implications of the psyche for today's psychology lie in the concept of mind as a *totum potentiale* which constitutes itself progressively as understanding and love. The intention of this thesis has been to present and, to some extent, develop the thought of St Thomas within

the broad perspective of dynamic psychology and to evaluate it in terms of its basic implications for the individual and for society generally. To the extent that modern psychology is seen and recognized to be in need of a concept of mind which is both profound and, at the same time, adequate to encompass all of the human reality, it is suggested that such a concept is available in St Thomas' presentation of mind as a potential totality; as potential spirit and subject, source and seat of autonomy, spontaneity and inviolability.

In support of this position, four major areas of application of the concept are selected and considered in Chapter III: its application to the notion of subject; to the role and responsibility of society; to psychotherapy; and to human sensitivity.

Further possibilities of research suggested by the theme under discussion might include: the development of a dynamic psychology based on the potential totality concept; emotional integration within a psychotherapy derived from Thomistic principles; reaction to the rationality, or otherwise, of the social milieu in some of its more obvious modes of impact, e.g., the advertizing media; a comparison of human sensibility at different

developmental levels or in different cultural settings; the role of science as essentially ministering to human understanding.

Interest in undertaking this research was initially stimulated by the promise of originality and depth of meaning held out by a concept which assigned the primary role and responsibility for human integration to man's distinctive capacity, understanding. To the writer, privileged, over a number of years spent as a psycho-therapist, to learn something of the intimate and, at times, very intense aspirations to fulness of life experienced by many human beings struggling painfully in the obscurities of sensibility, a concept of growth focused on understanding appeared to offer much that was more vitally relevant to and more worthy of the human reality than was offered in most current approaches to human betterment. It is the writer's conviction that the unique Thomistic conception of the human being, outlined in this research, contains the seeds of a rich harvest for modern man if studied and applied, not only to psychotherapy, but over the wide range of the human sciences.

What ought not to be forgotten is that the age of St Thomas Aquinas was an age of intellectual and moral, as well as social, emancipation, an age in which human reason strove to broaden its horizons with a new understanding of the world. It was an age which witnessed the birth of a new type of man. In the vast ferment of the renaissance taking place around him, St Thomas Aquinas was the first philosopher and psychologist of the human person. It seems that St Thomas' theory of man must be viewed as a vital part of the inspiration of his revolutionary days in order to be appreciated in our own.

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Main interest is to show that the Plato v. Aristotle conflict was not as great as often presumed. The Platonism inherited by St Thomas from Plotinus, through Augustine, Boethius, the Pseudo-Denis, had much of Aristotle, especially in psychology. Maintains that St Thomas used a characteristically Plotinian principle to reconcile spirit and form in man. Useful as historical background.

-----, The Greek Philosophical Background of the Psychology of St. Thomas, Aquinas Papers No. 19, London, Aquin Press, 1952, 19 p.

Contrary to the widely prevailing view that St Thomas' teaching on the unity of man is anti-Platonic Aristotelianism, the author maintains that St Thomas transplanted the Aristotelian idea of the nature of man into a Platonic context. Useful background reading.

Callus, Daniel, O.P., The Condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford, Aquinas Papers No. 5, London, Aquin Press, 1946, 35 p.

Places St Thomas' innovative teaching on the unity of form and the immateriality of spiritual substances in historical perspective. Maintains St Thomas was bitterly opposed mainly because he was seen as destroying the relation of philosophy to theology by giving it complete freedom in its own domain. Valuable as emphasizing St Thomas' insistence on man's essential unity in its historically conflictual setting.

Cazeault, Louise, La Notion de tout potentiel et la structure de la théologie comme science chez Thomas d'Aquin, Dissertation M.A. Philosophie, Université d'Ottawa, Ottawa, 1971, 130 p.

While the author notes that the theory of the *totum potentiale* is primarily directed, in St Thomas, to an understanding of man, the concern of the thesis is the general meaning of the concept itself, presented as a theory of participation. The basic elements of the theory are identified and its specific features underlined. There is thus provided, as the author intended, an initial approach to the technical notions involved.

Chenu, M.-D., O.P., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, Translated with Authorized Corrections and Bibliographical Additions by A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes, O.P., Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1964, viii, 386 p.

A comprehensive and insightful background to St Thomas, his mind, milieu and works. Specially useful for the reader needing to familiarize himself with the styles, techniques and forms of medieval writings. The opening three chapters are particularly valuable from this point of view: The Work in its Milieu, Works of St Thomas and Their Literary Forms, The Language and Vocabulary of St Thomas.

-----, L'Eveil de la Conscience dans la Civilisation Médiévale, Montreal, Institut d'Etudes Médiévales, 1969, 81 p.

This brief but highly significant work describes the awakening of the Middle Ages to the reality of man: "un être irréductible se voulant lui-même dans son ouverture au monde, et trouvant en cela sa norme."

Durantel, J., Saint Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis, Paris, F. Alcan, 1919, iv, 273 p.

The author prefaces his work with a list of all the references to the Pseudo-Denis occurring in the writings of St. Thomas. Chapter IV, "La Doctrine que Saint Thomas s'est assimilée", contains an excellent account of the Platonic influences which are discernible in St Thomas. The areas influenced include: movement, procession, the human soul, knowledge.

Garceau, Benoît, O.M.I., Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin, Montreal, Institut d'Etudes Médiévales, 1968, 286 p.

Motivated to clarify the precise, technical meaning of "judicium" in the language of St Thomas, the author was led, by lexicographic analysis, along completely original lines of research which concerned the literary influence of earlier traditions on the noetic vocabulary of St Thomas. The author substantiates that reflexion is not of the essence of "judicium"; that judgment, a simple act and the act proper to intellect, is: "discerner avec certitude la vérité". Garceau's work, in elaborating this truth and its profound ramifications throughout human life, provided very valuable insights for the present writer.

Gardeil, Ambroise, O.P., "Le 'Mens' d'après S. Augustine et S. Thomas d'Aquin", in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Vol. 13, 1924, p. 145 - 161.

The "mens" for both Augustine and Aquinas was "the superior part of the soul". The article researches the use of the term particularly in relation to St Thomas, for whom it represented the essence of the soul as emanating intellectual power in the generic sense of "*quoddam genus potentiarum animae*".

Geiger, Louis-B., O.P., Le Problème de l'Amour chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Institut d'Etudes Médiévales, Montreal, Rockland Avenue, 1952, 131 p.

In this work Geiger addresses himself to the problem of interested and disinterested love which P. Rousselot, S.J., had attempted to resolve but without complete success. Placing the problem in a richer and more authentically Thomistic context than did Rousselot, Geiger bases his solution on the principle that the nature of love differs depending on different types of knowing; the form, structure and laws of love differ in their very constitution with the type of knowledge and the ontological status of the being which loves. Personal interest does not have to be, indeed cannot be, excluded. The sole requirement is that we love the loved object for its own sake, objectively. Just as the intellectual activity of the knower, seeking total objectivity, nevertheless enriches the knower, so, in loving other beings for their own sake and in total objectivity, we likewise cannot fail to be enriched. Geiger's treatment of the interiorization of sense appetency complements and clarifies much in the thesis topic.

-----, Philosophie et Spiritualité, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1963, 2 Volumes, 511 p.

This 2-volume work is a collection of papers and articles from the pen of this Thomistic writer, noted for his authenticity in his interpretations of St Thomas. The majority of essays in Vol. 1, concerns "l'être et la connaissance"; Vol. 2 is taken up mainly with "problèmes de théologie spirituelle". Both volumes contain the valuable insights and applications of a dynamically oriented thinker.

Gilson, Etienne, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, English Translation by A. H. C. Downes, London, Sheed & Ward, 1934, x, 490 p.

The author describes the creative role of Christian Theology in the reception and transformation of Greek philosophical ideas in the Middle Ages. A classic work of interpretation and synthesis which did much to awaken modern interest in St Thomas.

-----, "L'Ame Raisonnable chez Albert le Grand", in Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Age, Vol. XIV, 1943, p. 5 - 72.

The main point of interest in this article for present purposes is the idea of *totum potentiale*, taken by Albert The Great from Boethius and applied to the soul, never as radically, however, as St Thomas applied it. The reason why St Thomas could apply the concept as profoundly as he did lies with his idea of soul as incomplete substance and substantial form of the body. Albert hesitated to tie soul to body too closely for fear of compromising its immortality.

Hawkins, D. J. B., The Problem of Christian Humanism, Aquinas Papers No. 1, London, Aquin Press, 1944, 16 p.

Humanism seen as concern with human intellectual and aesthetic values as ends. Maintains that the 13th century saw the provinces of sacred and profane knowledge settled and their mutual alliance ratified. Sees the integral humanism of St Thomas best portrayed in his Ethics; otherwise, in the consequences of his system as a whole. Helps to locate St Thomas and his significance within a movement coeval with Christianity.

Hislop, Ian, O.P., The Anthropology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Papers No. 13, London, Aquin Press, 1950, 10 p.

Contrasts St Thomas' interpretation of man as a *minor mundus*, in which elements of all things are found, with that of Hobbes and Locke. Useful summary of St Thomas' views of man as rational and social and his consequent rights, especially inviolability to exploitation.

Huit, C., "Les Eléments Platoniciens de la Doctrine de S. Thomas", in Revue Thomiste, Vol. XIX, 1911, p. 724 - 766.

Considers what are, to the mind of St Thomas, serious deficiencies in the philosophy of Aristotle relative to God and the soul; St Thomas' lasting interest in and reverence for the Pseudo-Denis, St John Damascene, Boethius - all strongly Platonist; deals with the dependence of St Thomas on Platonic elements, specifically regarding psychology and the theory of knowledge in Section V (p. 751 - 757). Valuable background material.

Jolif, Jean-Yves, O.P., "Le Sujet Pratique selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin", in Recherches de Philosophie, Vol. VI; Saint Thomas d'Aquin Aujourd'hui, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1963, p. 13 - 44.

A broadly-based examination of the relevance of Thomist morality to today's world. Relevance depends on adequate recognition of St Thomas' anthropology, the essential lines of which, the author contends, are laid down in those texts in St Thomas which concern the relation between the *anima intelligibilis* and the *anima sensibilis*. The author shows his appreciation of the "*totum potentiale*" concept in stressing the significance of the principle of the emanation of powers but does not elaborate. Chief concern is with the implications at the level of social education and law.

-----, Comprendre L'Homme, I: Introduction à une Anthropologie philosophique, Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1967, 302 p.

This volume introduces a planned series, aimed at explaining present history to the Church. To understand history is to understand man; the essential matter for the future is the rapport of men. Jolif maintains that man is more denied than affirmed, that it is time to affirm humanity in all its richness.

The over-all work is intended to reassert fundamental structures which give its original form to all human experience. Jolif uses terminology basic to the thesis topic but 1) applies them on a universal scale to humanity and its endeavours, 2) makes only parenthetical reference to St Thomas. Valuable because of broad conceptual framework.

Klubertanz, George P., S.J., "The Unity of Human Activity", in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 1950, p. 75 - 103.

Notes that most Thomist studies of human activity, besides being theological-ascetical, are typically flawed by their faculty analysis approach. Instead, the author attempts to apply the principles of Thomistic psychology, stressing that the unity of human activity, as of man himself, is the unity of composition, the higher powers 'informing' the acts of the lower, thus rendering them instrumental. While the article is useful to the thesis topic, no attempt is made to offer or explain the basic rationale.

Knowles, David, The Historical Context of the Philosophical Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Papers No. 30, London, Aquin Press, 1958, 14 p.

Treats of the significance of the works of St Thomas in the stream of history; what was owed to the past, what was original. Explains why the thought of St Thomas had little influence on subsequent currents in the Schools.

Künzle, Pius, O.P., Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von Augustine bis und mit Thomas von Aquin. (Studia Feiburg., neue Folge 12). Freiburg (Schw.), Universitätsbibliothek, 1956, xxii, 245 p.

Historical commentary on the relations of the soul and its powers, beginning with St Augustine's two psychological trinities: *mens-notitia-amor* and *memoria-intelligentia-voluntas*. Problems of identity and distinction. The second portion of the work concentrates on St Thomas. Orientation is metaphysical and historical. Does not develop the notion of *totum potentiale* and the emanation of powers.

Legrand, Joseph, S.J., L'Univers et l'Homme dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1946, 2 Vol., (xi, 280 p.; xi, 306 p.).

Sensibility, as a power of the soul, is ordained to the spiritual as matter which spiritual activity perfects as its form. The spiritual influence over sensibility is explained in terms of formal and efficient causality. Intelligence, by its formal influence, Legrand explains, penetrates the phantasm with intelligibility, thus transforming, unifying and simplifying it, in view of the use to be made of it. Legrand speaks of the natural suppleness of sense activity under the action of spirit but does not provide any basic rationale. (Reference: Vol. 2, L'Action de l'homme sur l'univers, p. 154 - 164.)

Lofy, Carl A., S.J., "The Meaning of 'Potential Whole' in St. Thomas Aquinas", in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXXVII, November 1959, p. 39 - 48.

Helpful in that it explains and illustrates the three kinds of totality: integral, universal, potential. The author's simple reference to the soul as "perhaps the most frequently used instance of potential whole" in St Thomas, as well as his disinclination to accept it as a satisfactory instance, suggests a failure to recognize that, for St Thomas, the soul was the paradigm of the potential whole, other instances being analogical.

Lonergan, Bernard, S.J., The Subject, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1968, 35 p.

Critical of the "schematism of older categories" which concentrated on the study of the soul to the neglect of the subject; the willingness to be content with "excessively jejune" conjunctions between abstract concepts and sensible presentations. Insists on the importance of recognizing subjective dynamics and limitations in the advance of truth. Discusses the meaning of subject, consciousness, value. Valuable resource for expression and confirmation of central themes of thesis.

Péguaire, Julien, C.S.Sp., Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin, Paris, J. Vrin, 1936, 318 p.

Contains a thorough compilation and comparison of texts from St Thomas on these closely related topics. Very useful reference work from that point of view. Disappointingly, however, the author appears to have totally ignored references to *totum potentiale*. Further, he appears to consider that union of the intellectual soul with the body causes defective intellectuality rather than being something called for by a defective intellectuality.

Pégis, Anton C., "In Umbra Intelligentiae", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. XIV, 1940, p. 146 - 180.

In resolving particular difficulties concerning the human soul, the author explains extensively and by comparison with pure intellect that the soul's imperfection as an intellect is the reason why there are found within its essence infra-intellectual powers requiring a body. The writer's concern here, as in writings listed elsewhere, is mainly to explain and defend the complete naturalness of the body-soul unity. The article is valuable as illustrative introductory material, besides providing a compendium of Thomistic texts on intellect generally.

Plé, Albert, O.P., "Saint Thomas et la Psychologie Contemporaine", in Collections: "Problèmes d'Aujourd'hui": Actualité de Saint Thomas, Paris, Desclée, 1972, p. 59 - 73.

The author concentrates primarily on Freud and, specifically, on Freud's "metapsychology" which, he considers, invites confrontation with St Thomas. Areas of comparison dealt with include: human nature, hylomorphism, finality, and evolutionary dynamism - concepts of particular relevance to the thesis topic, although no reference is made to the dynamism of mind as potential whole.

Régis, Louis-M., O.P., Epistemology (Translated by Imelda C. Byrne), New York, The Macmillan Company, 1959, xii, 549 p.

Like Verbeke (and others) but in a fully elaborated manner, Régis examines the development of human knowledge as a complex experience, paradoxically characterized by perfect interiority and by the constant invasion of outer reality. He studies the object in its causal activity upon man's cognitive powers, sensible and intellectual, reconciling the antinomy inherent in man's knowledge by distinguishing the exercise of knowledge from its specification. Thus, the progressive immanence of knowledge, far from hindering objectivity, promotes it; the external thing is never more independent in its physical being than when grasped in its inmost wealth, i.e., as existent. Régis draws timely attention to Thomistic epistemology as characterized by its distinction of science (*rationalis consideratio*) from wisdom (*intellectualis consideratio*), a distinction which makes science dependent on wisdom as on its source and term. Like Verbeke, Régis makes no explicit reference to the *totum potentiale* concept.

Robb, James H., Man as Infinite Spirit, Milwaukee, The Marquette University Press, 1974, 64 p.

Underlines existential fulness and profound uniqueness of St Thomas' teaching on man. Having considered man as finite spirit and his creations (history, culture, science, art), focuses on man as infinite spirit, i.e., not terminated or limited in extensity, hence, open to fulness of being. Comments on man's refusal to deny his metaphysical dimensions. Valuable as summary of Thomist conception of man and its deeper implications.

Verbeke, G., "Le Développement de la Connaissance humaine d'après St. Thomas, in Revue Philosophique Louvain, Vol. 47, 1949, p. 437 - 457.

This article is noteworthy as a comprehensive, though highly succinct, survey of the progressive character of human cognitive life, which grows, as the author stresses, not by addition, but by the immanent precisening of a content virtually and confusedly present in the human spirit. The author notes how closely cognitive development is linked with judgment, the seat of truth. Continual synthesis is necessary because of intellect's potential character and the only partial grasp of reality through sense. The theme is authentically Thomistic though no reference is made to the potential totality concept.

Weisheipl, James A., O.P., "The Concept of Nature", in The New Scholasticism, Vol. XXVIII, October 1954, p. 377 - 408.

The concept of *appetitus naturalis* gains in lucidity and depth from a study of Weisheipl's article. The concept of "nature" originally, according to Aristotle, meant "the process of growing". Eventually, through refinement at the hands of St Thomas, it came to mean the double principle, active and passive, of movement in natural bodies. "Nature", as active principle of movement, is essentially a source of spontaneous activity, intrinsically purposeful; as passive principle of movement, it indicates a natural potentiality which intrinsically tends towards perfect fulfilment.

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ABSTRACT OF
THE CONCEPT OF MIND AS REFLECTIVE TOTALITY¹

This study concerns a significant but hitherto undeveloped concept in the thinking of Saint Thomas Aquinas regarding man; a concept which is rich in implication for modern psychology, dynamic and developmental particularly.

St Thomas Aquinas is well known for his solution to the problem of mind-body duality in man; what has been little appreciated is that solving this problem as he did, in terms of Aristotelianhylomorphism, was for St Thomas an intermediary step towards solving a more pressing cognitional problem affecting the basic integrity of the human mind: the problem of the duality of sense and reason. His answer to this further problem is found in his concept of the mind as a *totum potentiale*, or reflective totality. In this concept, not only the integrity of the human mind but the reality of man himself is

1. Francis P. Forde, doctoral thesis presented to the School of Psychology of the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, August, 1978.

presented, not as a given of nature, but as a challenging possibility only. The explanation, development and evaluation of the human mind as a *totum potentiale* is the subject of this present thesis.

A *totum potentiale*, considered generally, is a totality or complexity of power, a dynamic totality, made up of part-powers. Its peculiar significance is that each part-power shares in the capacity of the whole but, while one power possesses that capacity in its fulness, the others share in it only in a decreasing series of less perfect ways.

St Thomas' application of this concept to man's mind leads to certain conclusions whose significance for human life and living this thesis explores. First, the human mind is a complex totality; a complexus of powers, all deriving from a single dynamic source, intellect or understanding, the distinctive characteristic of man. These manifold powers are ramifications of intellect and, without them, intellect, which begins as a possibility only, could not achieve actualization. Secondly, the human mind is a reflective totality; it constitutes itself as an actual understanding through a return to

itself, having posited itself in sensibility in its effort to understand reality. Thirdly, self-awareness likewise is not a given but a goal; it derives progressively through consciousness of the other; the human mind comes to know itself only through positing itself in sense. Fourthly, there is no exteriority of sense and intellect. Intellect exists within sensibility; it always permeates and is permeated by sensibility.

While it is clear, as this study claims, that the potential or reflective totality concept was central to St Thomas' view of man's mind, its capacities, functioning and growth, St Thomas nowhere presents a developed body of theory on the subject. The present study attempts, by presenting and examining the major texts and their contexts, to uncover the image of the human mind as St Thomas envisioned it and to describe it, not structurally nor statically, but from the viewpoint of a dynamic and humanist psychology and in line with the approach of modern Hermeneutics, one of whose basic principles is that earlier concepts need to be periodically re-examined in the light of later developments within the same or related disciplines and so be made applicable and relevant

to the needs of later times.

It is the contention of the writer that the implications of the psyche for today's psychology lie in St Thomas' concept of mind as a *totum potentiale*. In support of this contention, four major areas of application of the concept are selected and considered: its application to the notion of subject; to the role and responsibility of society; to psychotherapy; to human sensitivity. To the extent that modern psychology is seen and recognized to be in need of a concept of mind which is both profound and adequate to encompass all of the human reality, the writer suggests that such a concept is available in St Thomas' presentation of mind as potential totality; potential spirit and subject, source and seat of autonomy, spontaneity and inviolability.