


M.A. (History)



The Expeditionary Force Designed for the West Indies, 1740.

by

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I

Introduction

Naval historians generally fall into two categories; those who are interested in great personalities, ships, and battles, and those who are concerned about how ships got to sea. Historians such as Campbell, Clowes, and Richmond¹ typify those writers who move vast numbers of ships across the oceans of the world, recount in great detail their every military encounter, and glorify the heroes. They seldom mention how these ships were able to get underway in the first place, and, once at sea, how they were able to maintain themselves. These writers rely heavily on admirals' and captains' dispatches, officers' logs, and private papers, which material, however useful for a study of naval operations, provides only a very narrow and one-sided view of naval administration. On the other hand, historians such as Ehrman, Baugh, and Glasgow²

¹ John Campbell, Lives of the British Admirals, (London, 1814) and Naval History of Great Britain, (London, 1818). W.L. Clowes, The Royal Navy, (London, 1898). H.W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, I-III, (Cambridge, 1920.)

² John Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697, (Cambridge, 1953). Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, (Princeton, 1965). Tom Glasgow, "Maturing of Naval Administration 1556-1564", The Mariner's Mirror, 56, no.1 (Jan. 1970), 3-26.

represent those who concern themselves with the administrative problems encountered in getting ships to sea. They depend in part upon the material used by the narrative naval historian, but, in addition, upon the correspondence of the various boards, offices, and personalities on the administrative side of the navy. Few writers, with the notable exception of Piers Mackesy,³ have been able to combine successfully analysis of naval administration with narratives of important naval operations to show how ship design, armament, logistics, choice of officers, and many other things affected actions at sea.

This presentation is an attempt to analyze several of the more important administrative problems encountered by the navy in getting its ships to sea at a crucial moment during the Spanish War, 1739-1748. It uses as the basis for its observations and conclusions the correspondence between the major administrative organs of the navy. It only mentions in passing the preparation of the land forces. Unlike Professor Baugh, whose book "deals largely with the reaction of naval administration to the demands of the war of 1739-1748",⁴ this dissertation focuses on one small but

³ Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783, (Cambridge, 1964).

⁴ Baugh, op. cit., 21.

important part of the Spanish War: the administrative problems encountered in outfitting, manning, and victualling the squadron under the command of Sir Chaloner Ogle which sailed from St. Helens⁵ on October 26, 1740. This squadron had the task of convoying the troop and supply ships destined for the West Indies to bolster the forces of Vice Admiral Vernon, already at Jamaica, who had been given the responsibility of mounting an offensive against the Spanish possessions there. A study of this kind, which examines the effectiveness of naval administration by looking at the largest naval expedition to sail from England during the war, also offers an opportunity to test Baugh's conclusion that it took several years of war for Britain to reach a position of administrative competence before the necessary naval successes at sea were achieved.

When Ogle's squadron was being prepared to undertake its task, England had already had been at war for a year. This should have given the navy sufficient time to get itself on a war footing to deal with the administrative problems that would arise in the carrying out of its duties. That the navy was not in a position to bear the strain put upon it perhaps indicates the government's essential lack of interest in or knowledge of how to wage a large-scale far-reaching war for empire. Certainly the delay between

⁵ See Appendix A.

the decision to mount an attack in the West Indies and the completion of the first phase of the operation, that is, the collecting of the expeditionary force and the sending of it to sea, was so great that it threatened to frustrate the government's stated aims.

If the government was uncertain about strategic aims, as was the case in the initial stages of the Spanish War, the Admiralty found itself in the difficult position of having to put into operation hastily drafted orders into which little long range planning could go. In the case of Ogle's squadron, this resulted in serious shortages, great expense, enormous strain on some administrative units, and loss of morale among administrative personnel and sea-going officers and men. The Admiralty was dependent upon the cabinet for a clear set of objectives in matters of naval strategy, but at the same time contributed substantially to the direction this strategy took by the advice it gave the cabinet. "Newcastle may have 'controlled the fleets', but he did not do so at important junctures without expert counsel" ⁶ which was given him by Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John Norris, Admiral of the

⁶ Baugh, *op. cit.*, 74. The seven commissioners who made up the Board of Admiralty during the early years of the Spanish War were Sir Charles Wager, Sir Thomas Frankland, Thomas Clutterbuck, Lord Harry Powlett, Sir Thomas Lyttleton, John Campbell, and Lord Vere Beauclerk. Most of the Board were members of Parliament. From my readings, the first four commissioners were the most influential.

Fleet. As First Lord, Wager was a member of the inner cabinet. Norris' position and the high regard in which he was held won him an appointment as a special advisor to the cabinet in September 1739. Although both admirals were sexagenarians and had achieved flag rank in the first decade of the eighteenth century, their voices were strong and respected. When cabinet direction was forthcoming, the Admiralty could turn its attention to the day to day operation of the navy in a way that contributed to the most effective implementation of policy. Once these decisions had been reached and translated into orders the cabinet secretary, Andrew Stone, conveyed them to the Board of Admiralty secretary, Josiah Burchett, who laid them before the seven Board commissioners. It was these seven men that bore overall responsibility for all ships, officers and men, and facilities. However, the power and influence of Burchett in their deliberations should not be overlooked. Appointed to his position during the War of the Spanish Succession, he never reached the prestigious heights of a Pepys, but held his position much longer because he remained aloof from the political fortunes of the commissioners.

Once the Admiralty knew the objectives given it by the cabinet, it could then direct the administrative organs under its control as to the particular duties they were required to perform. The most important of these units was the Navy Board which was made up of approximately

thirteen principal officers and commissioners. They were responsible for the material condition of the ships of the fleet, the control of naval expenditure, victualling, and the health and subsistence of seamen. The two most important individuals on this Board were the comptroller, Richard Haddock, and the commissioner resident at Portsmouth, Richard Hughes. Both men held positions formerly occupied by their fathers and had gone to sea in order to qualify themselves for their professional careers ashore. Of the two, Hughes was perhaps the more important. Although his position was that of a senior civil servant, he used the political network built up by his father to fulfill the difficult obligations of a post that in many cases demanded action first followed by approval from higher authority. The latter two responsibilities of the Board were delegated to the Victualling Office and the Sick and Wounded Office. The Victualling Office had seven commissioners and looked after the drawing up of all contracts. It accounted for about one quarter of naval expenditures. The Sick and Wounded Office was less important before 1750 because there were few hospitals and no permanent medical officers ashore. Contractors looked after the sick on a salary plus payment per man per day basis.

In order to ensure that the captains applied themselves to the preparations of their ships when they were under orders to sail, the Board of Admiralty appointed

commanders in chief resident at the principal ports. Admiral Philip Cavendish was the commander in chief resident at Portsmouth, and, as such, it was he who bore the major responsibility for getting the ships of Ogle's squadron to sea. His duties were made more difficult and at times frustrating because he had no authority ashore. Most of his time was spent dealing with the problems on the ships, answering the captains' complaints and the seamen's petitions, carrying out the Admiralty's orders, and keeping Burchett informed about the progress of preparations. Of all the individuals, boards, and offices that played a part in getting the squadron to sea, Cavendish must get the most credit. Although his duties were difficult, time-consuming, and wearying in that he had to make it his business to know everything that was going on ashore and afloat, he did a remarkable job.

The Admiralty also controlled the promotion and assignment of officers. It was important to have a high degree of impartiality in these areas because they were so basic to morale in the fleet. But it was very difficult for the Admiralty to be impartial when it was made up of politicians who were part of a political system that thrived on patronage. It constantly was being pressured by aristocrats eager to provide careers for younger sons, favour-seeking relatives and friends, and government members who viewed the navy as a means to increase their prestige

in their home constituencies. "The true test of any particular Board's performance lay in its ability to resist these pressures".⁷

Before the navy could be expected to carry out effectively the part that it was required to play in any military operation, several basic requirements had to be met by the cabinet. The navy had to be provided with a definite plan on which to base its decisions, sufficient money to carry out its role, and adequate time to allow its administrative units to prepare themselves to meet the demands that would be made upon them and to function smoothly together. In the case of the West Indian expedition, the cabinet had determined its military objectives early in 1740 - the reduction of a principal Spanish settlement in an operation similar to that of Porto Bello. Unfortunately, the cabinet was undecided on when the troops should be transported to the West Indies and the size of the naval squadron that should do the convoying. When these decisions finally were made and passed on to the Admiralty for implementation, it was caught off balance by the large size of the squadron and the very short time in which it

⁷ Baugh, op. cit., 502.

had to ready the squadron. Similarly, the major administrative organs of the Admiralty were subjected to tremendous pressure at a time when ships were at a premium, manpower was inadequate to meet even normal demands, and certain foodstuffs necessary to provision the squadron were selling at famine prices.

II

The Background of the Anglo-Spanish Conflict

Although the Treaty of Utrecht brought peace to Europe in 1713 by preventing Louis XIV of France from securing the vast dominions of Spain for his family and the commerce of the Indies for his people, that same treaty contained the seeds from which the next major European conflagration would develop between England and Spain. Through hard bargaining brought on by the realization that the fate of the Tory party depended upon popular acceptance of the terms of the treaty, the English negotiators managed to squeeze from the Spanish special concessions with regard to trade in the West Indies.¹

Assientos were contracts between the king of Spain and other countries for supplying the Spanish colonies with slaves. At this time these assientos generally were granted for a ten year period. By successfully arguing that they had given up legitimate claims elsewhere in the peace negotiations, the English negotiators were able to win an assiento for thirty years instead of the usual ten. At first glance the assientos did not appear to be particularly attractive; their terms were inflexible and most

¹ H.M.V. Temperley, "Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3rd Series, III, 1903, 196-237.

difficult to fulfil, they abounded in red tape, and profits usually were small after expenses such as heavy duties had been met. But there was another side to the assientos. They were the thin edge of the wedge in that they granted to foreign traders legal entry into the lucrative Spanish colonies. It took little imagination on the part of most foreign traders, in particular the English, to realize that the assiento provided a unique opportunity for selling merchandise as well as slaves.

The second special concession that the English negotiators obtained from the Spanish was the right to send a ship of five hundred tons to the fair at Porto Bello each year. The South Sea Company assumed the responsibility for providing the annual ship, and had no reservations about exceeding the specified tonnage and using the ship as a floating warehouse, which they replenished from the accompanying tenders as the original merchandise was sold.

No sooner had the peace treaty been concluded in 1713 than the major trading nations began to interpret the treaty in the light of their own national interests.

It might be foreseen that France would become the champion of the Cadiz trade while England would turn the patronage of smuggling into an important article of national policy.²

² Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763, (London, 1963), 13.

The Spanish themselves had no intention of allowing English traders complete freedom of movement within Spanish territorial waters. In order to protect what they considered to be their national interests, the Spanish authorities built up their fleet of *guarda-costas* or coast-guard ships.

Had the major terms of the Treaty of Utrecht dealt with anything else but trade, there might have been a better chance of a workable and peaceful relationship between England and Spain in the West Indies. But trade was vital to the economic prosperity of England. Coupled to this need to trade was the realization on the part of the English merchants and traders that the Spanish possessions in the West Indies offered lucrative opportunities for economic gain. The result of this realization was an interpretation of the terms of the treaty in a narrow nationalistic fashion and an attempt by the English to squeeze every possible economic advantage out of the *assiento* and annual ship. Even unauthorized English traders and privateers had few second thoughts about trying to exploit the situation. The *guarda-costas* reacted to these high handed incursions by the English merchants and traders in such a way that they soon were overstepping their original purpose. It was not uncommon for the *guarda-costas* to seize ships, confiscate goods, and commit atrocities. The English merchants and traders proved not at all reluctant to react in kind.

The acts of hostility were not to be acts of war but reprisals, blows directed against Spanish commerce in reply to the injuries Spain had inflicted upon British trade.³

As friction between the two groups increased, the royal navy found itself in the position of sometimes having to defend traders against the wrath of the guarda-costas. To make matters worse, the navy often was defending merchants and traders under questionable circumstances. As matters neared the boiling point, English and Spanish authorities tried to bring a return to some semblance of order by setting up courts to hear cases and assess blame. However, decisions took a long time to be reached, and damages infrequently were paid in full. Further, the guilty party almost always appealed to patrons, pressure groups, and senior governmental officials, which contributed to increased friction.

Walpole tried in vain to prevent England from drifting into open hostilities with Spain, but unfortunately changing political conditions were eroding his position of power. The prestige of his government suffered badly as a result of his handling of several difficult domestic issues. Within his cabinet he was no longer the undisputed leader. Newcastle, Harrington, and Hardwicke began to have second thoughts about their leader's ability to handle all matters of state effectively. But most important, the opposition

3 Richmond, op. cit., I, 24.

was using every means to capitalize on the friction between England and Spain.⁴ Every alleged act of Spanish hostility fanned the fires of English nationalism and put Walpole in a more untenable position with regard to pursuing his policy of peace and prosperity. As late as 1738 the government was able to defeat a private member's bill that would have authorized letters of marque and reprisals against the Spanish, but England was on the road to war. English public opinion was not to be denied the opportunity of humbling the Spaniard.

With the collapse of negotiations between England and Spain in June of 1739, the last barrier preventing open hostilities between the two countries was swept aside. The groundwork for these negotiations had been laid by the Convention of El Pardo in January of 1739. By the terms of the Convention, England was to receive £95,000 compensation for Spanish depredations, and formal negotiations were to be opened to discuss and to settle differences in America.⁵

⁴ The opposition even managed to get Captain Jenkins, accompanied by his severed ear in a glass bottle, to address the commons in 1738 on the details of his misfortunes at the hands of the guarda-costa in 1731. This may explain in part the fact that this Anglo-Spanish conflict is often referred to as the War of Jenkins' Ear.

⁵ Pares, op. cit., 30-36.

Although the chances of settling their differences appeared good at first, it soon became obvious that the economic policies of the two countries were fundamentally incompatible. Realizing that the government's position hinged on the success of the negotiations, the opposition⁶ used every means at its disposal to apply pressure to the government. The ambitious commercial classes, convinced that they would benefit by war, threw in their lot with the proponents of war. The fact that Benjamin Keene, ambassador at Madrid and chief English negotiator, was also the agent of the South Sea Company did little to contribute to the prospects for peace.

Immediately upon the collapse of the negotiations the Admiralty sent orders to all ships at home and on foreign stations to open hostilities against Spain by attacking Spanish shipping, whether merchant vessels or war ships, and taking whatever prizes they made to the nearest English port. In this way the English government hoped to compensate those merchants who had suffered at the hands of guarda-costas since 1713. The orders also encouraged all English war ships in America and the West Indies "to annoy the Spaniard in the best manner you shall be able."⁷

⁶ David Hannay, A Short History of the Royal Navy, (London, 1909), 98. Hannay sees the opposition as a group of disappointed and frustrated office-seekers who took up the cause of the West Indian traders as a vehicle for bringing down the government.

⁷ Burchett to ? , 11 June 1739, Adm. 2/55.

When war finally was declared in October of 1739, it became obvious that a stalemate existed with regard to what the aims and strategy of the war should be. Walpole's supporters feared any involvement other than that required to maintain the English position abroad and the status quo at home, while the opposition and commercial interests argued for a war of plunder and a concerted effort to squelch the Spaniard abroad. Though Rear Admiral Haddock was dispatched to the Mediterranean and Vice Admiral Vernon to the West Indies, the government did not contemplate an expeditionary force to attack Spain itself. It was Vernon's capture of Porto Bello in November of 1739 that forced the government to adopt a more warlike stance. When news of Porto Bello's fall reached England, joy knew no bounds. Vernon became the man of the hour and thoughts of further successes at the expense of the Spanish in the West Indies filled English minds. The opposition and commercial interests lost little time in taking advantage of the political opportunities offered by the Porto Bello success. They were quick to argue that Porto Bello proved the truth of their theories about how the war could best be conducted.

Over the objections of Vernon,⁸ who argued that a strategy of hit and run would be most beneficial to English interests, the duke of Newcastle who had assumed

⁸ Douglas Ford, Admiral Vernon and the Navy, A Memoir and Vindication, (London, 1907), 93-137.

major responsibility for the English war effort was carried away by the popular clamour for further English successes against more important military and commercial Spanish land-⁹holdings in the West Indies. The result was a decision by the government to send another expeditionary force to attack either Havana or Cartagena, both of which were of far greater importance than Porto Bello and much more strongly fortified. Such a formidable objective as Havana or Cartagena would require a much larger expeditionary force than the predominantly naval force which had taken Porto Bello. Troops were to be despatched from England and volunteers raised in the colonies. The final selection of an objective was to be left to Vernon and the commander in chief of the land forces when they met together at Jamaica.

Instead of acting quickly to exploit the obvious advantages gained by Vernon's victory, the government lost the momentum that had been inherited with the capture of Porto Bello. It was not until September of 1740 that Vernon finally was joined by a squadron of store ships and eight¹⁰ transports bringing land forces from North America. In the interval, Vernon's lack of naval stores diminished the usefulness of his squadron with each passing month and

⁹ Campbell, Naval History of Great Britain,
op. cit., IV, 489.

¹⁰ Ford, op. cit., 149.

obliged him to turn in desperation to the American colonies¹¹
for any supplies that were available.

By the summer of 1740, the Admiralty at last was ready to get the expeditionary force under the command of Lord Cathcart to sea. Although uncertain about the intentions of the French and Spanish in the West Indies, on July 24th Captain Gascoigne, commander of the Buckingham, was ordered by the Admiralty to convoy the expeditionary force. Their Lordships allocated six men-of-war to Gascoigne including the Buckingham, two fireships, and a hospital¹² ship. As a precaution against an unexpected encounter with enemy ships on the cruise, Gascoigne was ordered to accompany Vice Admiral Balchen's squadron on the first leg of the journey. As a further safeguard, Captain Anson's squadron, bound on its memorable voyage around the world, was directed to sail from Spithead with Gascoigne's convoy¹³ and to keep it company as long as possible.

By mid-August of 1740 Gascoigne and his squadron had not yet set sail from St. Helens. This in part was due to inclement weather, the difficulty encountered in getting the naval ships ready for sea, and the increasing concern

¹¹ Vernon Papers, ed. B. McL. Ranft, Navy Records Society, Vol. 99, 1958, 57-63, 67-73, 126.

¹² Burchett to Gascoigne, 24 July 1740, S.P. 42/23.

¹³ ibid.

of the Admiralty as to whether Gascoigne's squadron was indeed of sufficient size and strength to carry out its orders successfully in the light of disturbing rumours that large squadrons of Spanish and French war ships were outward bound for the West Indies. Acting on the basis of these rumours which could not be disregarded without threatening the safety of the whole expedition, Gascoigne was directed not to sail and was superseded by Sir Chaloner Ogle then anchored at Torbay with Admiral Sir John Norris.¹⁴

English intelligence proved to be remarkably accurate with regard to French and Spanish intentions of reinforcing their positions in the West Indies. Admiral Torres, with the Ferrol squadron of fourteen ships, sailed during the second week of August to increase the strength of the six ships already there. Yet what staggered but "not for a moment intimidated"¹⁵ Newcastle was Fleury's decision to send Admiral Laroche-Alart with a squadron of eight ships to the West Indies on August 26th. To further increase the French presence there, Admiral d'Antin also was despatched on September 3rd with thirteen ships. By November, Newcastle's concern about the possibility of a combined Franco-Spanish naval presence became a reality when France came to

¹⁴ Gascoigne to Burchett, 22 August 1740, Adm. 1/1828.

¹⁵ Pares, op. cit., 167.

an understanding with Spain about combining their squadrons to meet the threat presented by Vernon, who, they knew, would soon be joined by Sir Chaloner Ogle.

III

Sir Chaloner Ogle

In the light of the latest intelligence indicating that French and Spanish squadrons were on the way to the West Indies and the over-riding necessity of convoying the expeditionary force to Jamaica quickly and safely, the Admiralty's choice of a commander in chief of flag rank was of particular importance. It was doubtful if the Admiralty realized the magnitude of the task that it was delegating to the new commander in chief. By the time the fleet sailed in late October, the original ten ships of Gascoigne's squadron had been increased to thirty-three naval ships with a total complement of over 16,000. This greatly enlarged naval squadron was responsible for convoying one hundred fifty transports carrying 12,000 troops as well as vast quantities of naval stores and other supplies. In order to get this formidable fleet of ships to sea, the Admiralty was forced to employ nearly every ship-of-the-line¹ at home and to solve the most difficult manning and victualling problems that it had faced since the struggle with Louis XIV a generation earlier.

1 Monthly List, 1 October 1740, Adm. 8/21.

The appointment of Sir Chaloner Ogle as commander in chief of the West Indian squadron was not surprising on the basis of the information contained in the naval seniority lists.² In August 1740 the Admiralty had nine flag officers, including Ogle, who were eligible for appointment as commander in chief of the West Indian squadron. With the exception of Ogle, who was the most junior, having been appointed the previous year, all the other flag officers had their own strategically important commands. Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John Norris, Admiral of the Fleet, could not be chosen because they were needed at home to deal with day-to-day naval matters. Sir John Balchen, commander in chief at Plymouth, and Philip Cavendish, commander in chief at Portsmouth, were unlikely choices. Appointing the Honorable Charles Stewart was impossible because Stewart just previously had voted against an important piece of legislation endorsed by George II, and the king's approval was needed for every appointment. Edward Vernon already was in the West Indies. George, Lord Forbes, the Earl of Granada, also was out of the question because he was the Governor of Barbados. Nicholas Haddock was a possible choice, but he was in the Mediterranean. This left only Ogle. The Admiralty knew that he would be returning to England soon with Norris'

2 Baugh, op. cit., 132-135.

fleet and that he was on the Augusta, which would be one of the ships used to augment the West Indian squadron. Thus Ogle was the logical choice for the appointment if for no other reason than that he would be the only flag officer at the very place where the need existed. Two other facts also must have influenced the Admiralty's decision; Ogle had just completed seven years service in the West Indies, and of the nine flag officers, he was the only one junior to Vernon who would become commander in chief of the squadron as soon as it reached Jamaica. Other than these three factors, there was little else to recommend Sir Chaloner Ogle for this appointment.

Although it is impossible to assess the character of Ogle at this point in time because few of his personal papers exist, it would not be unfair to say that he was a man of average talent who had had one fortunate moment of fame in 1722, but had failed to capitalize on it. Throughout his career he had displayed little leadership and no qualities of active disposition such as aggressiveness that would have made him a man to be reckoned with. But if he lacked the characteristics of greatness, this was balanced out in part by the fact that he had managed to keep his naval career untainted by any serious incidents. This had enabled him to achieve flag rank, which was the ambition of every post captain.

Born of a very old and respected Northumberland family in 1681, Ogle joined the navy in July 1697 as a volunteer per order or king's letter-boy serving on the Yarmouth commanded by Captain Cleveland. In April 1702 he was promoted third lieutenant of the Royal Oak. By 1705 he had been promoted master of the Deal Castle, which was captured by three French war ships in 1706. Acquitted of all blame for the capture at the court-martial, Ogle was promoted captain of the frigate Tartar in 1707 and served in the Mediterranean for the duration of the war, where he had the good fortune to capture several valuable prizes which gave him wealth but not fame. At the conclusion of the war, he was appointed to the Plymouth and served for three years with Sir John Norris in the Baltic, where international tensions threatened to engulf England in war, first with Sweden and then with Russia. In 1719 he took command of the Swallow (60) and convoyed the trade from Newfoundland to the Mediterranean. Disabled by ship's sickness in 1721, the Swallow returned to England. By year's end she was again in a state of operational readiness and was despatched to West African waters. It was here in 1722 that Ogle got the opportunity to make a name for himself. With a surprising display of personal initiative, daring, and courage, Ogle single handedly captured the notorious pirate leaders Skyrm and Bartholomew Roberts, their men,

and their ships at Cape Coast Castle.³ On his return to England in April 1723 via the West Indies, he was acclaimed as a national hero and received the honour of knighthood. In addition to recognition and all that meant to a career naval officer, the king himself made a special gift of the pirates' ships and their effects to Ogle, subject to the usual legal charges and the payment of head-money to his officers and men.⁴

In the first part of his career from 1697 to 1723, Ogle had succeeded in establishing a name for himself among the list of career naval officers. With the exception of his spectacular success against the West African pirates in 1722, this had been done in relatively undramatic fashion. In addition to attaining the rank of captain and building up a modest personal fortune, he had seen service in the Baltic, the Mediterranean, North America, and briefly in the West Indies.

³ John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, Brazil and the West Indies, in His Majesty's Ships the Swallow and Weymouth. Describing the Several Islands and Settlements... The Colour, Diet, Languages, Habits, Manners Customs and Religions of the Respective Natives and Inhabitants. With remarks on the Gold, Ivory and Slave Trade and on the Winds, Tides and Currents of the Several Coasts, (London, 1735), 123-127.

⁴ John Charnock, Impartial Memoires of the Lives and Characters of Officers of the Navy of Great Britain from the year 1660 to the Present Times, (London, 1795), III, 404. Charnock states that the king's special gift was worth about £3,000 to Ogle.

After a six year period on half pay from 1723 to 1729, the second phase of Sir Chaloner's naval career began with his appointment as commanding officer of the Burford (70), one of Sir Charles Wager's **squadron**. In 1731 he was appointed to the Edinburgh (70) and returned to the Mediterranean with Wager until his appointment to Jamaica in 1732 as commander in chief of a small **squadron**. Ogle returned to England in 1739, and was promoted to Rear Admiral of the Blue in the same year. When news reached England that a large flota⁵ was on its way from the West Indies to Cadiz, Ogle was ordered to hoist his flag in the Augusta (60) and sail with a **squadron** of twelve ships for Gibraltar, where he was directed to act either independently or to put himself under the command of Haddock, commander in chief in the Mediterranean, depending on the progress of the flota. While Ogle was attempting to track down Haddock, the flota succeeded in reaching Cadiz unchallenged. Ogle remained with Haddock until the spring of 1740 when he returned to England to take up his new appointment as third in command of a fleet commanded by Sir John Norris which was to cruise in the Bay of Biscay.

⁵ Pares, op cit., 3. A flota was a small fleet of Spanish galleons that sailed at regular intervals from Havana to Cadiz carrying valuable cargoes of West Indian goods.

Although Whitehall and the Admiralty already had begun the buildup of the West Indian squadron before the last week of August, it was surprising that Ogle, who obviously had been chosen as commander in chief of the augmented squadron, did not receive official notification of his new appointment until September 14th. This oversight of the Admiralty in not notifying Ogle of his appointment might be explained by the fact that Ogle was at sea with Norris' fleet. However this explanation must be rejected on the basis of the information contained in the Sydney Papers,⁶ which point out that Norris, in his position as Admiral of the Fleet, was kept abreast of events. On August 22nd Norris was ordered "to send only one Ship of 60 Guns, one of 70, & one of 60, to join Ld. Cathcart in his Passage".⁷ Four days later Norris was directed to turn over the men of the Victory to four of the naval ships that were going with Cathcart to the West Indies. On September 2nd, Ogle must have realized what was in store for him when the Augusta, his flag ship, was detached from Norris' fleet and directed to join the West Indian squadron.⁸

6 Sydney Papers. "Extracts of Letters, To and From, Rear Adl. Haddock; Sir John Norris; and Sir Chaloner Ogle." 1740 Feb. 14-Oct. 15. Many of the twenty ships-of-the line in Norris' own fleet were being allocated to the West Indian squadron.

7 ibid., 22 August 1740.

8 ibid., 2 September 1740.

Three days later Norris was ordered "to detach Sr. C. Ogle with 1 Ship of 80, 4 of 70, & 2 of 60 Guns, to join Ld. Cathcart, or to follow him".⁹ To weaken further Norris' fleet, six more ships were to transfer to the West Indian squadron in addition to a sizeable number of seamen and marines. By the time that Norris and the remaining ships in his fleet had returned to Spithead on September 14th, he had orders in his possession to victual and to store these remaining ships so that they also might proceed to the West Indies.

It was not until September 9th that the cabinet officially notified the Admiralty of its decision to appoint Ogle commander in chief of the West Indian squadron. The Admiralty was informed "that Sir Chal. Ogle should...convoy Lord Cathcart to Jamaica, and put Himself¹⁰ under the command of Vice Adl. Vernon there". The Admiralty's orders apprising Ogle of his new appointment and dated September 10th were not delivered to Ogle until his flag ship, the Shrewbury, moored at Spithead on

⁹ ibid., 5 September 1740. Ogle by this time had transferred his flag from the Augusta to the Shrewsbury. The incredible vagueness of Norris' orders would seem to indicate that the Admiralty foresaw an early sailing of the West Indian squadron. It is also interesting to speculate how Ogle could be an effective commander in chief of this squadron if he was following it.

¹⁰ Stone to Burchett, 9 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

September 11th. Ogle acknowledged receipt of his orders the same day. The official papers from the Admiralty commissioning Ogle in his new command arrived on October 4th.

Within a three week period, August 22nd to September 10th, the Admiralty had made three important decisions. Gascoigne had been superseded by Ogle, who was a very questionable choice as commander in chief considering his rather ordinary background when compared to the importance of the mission; the original squadron had been increased in size from nine to thirty-three ships; and Vernon's advice that the squadron should be small and manageable in size because of the limited naval supplies and facilities in the West Indies had been disregarded. As a result of these decisions, the Admiralty had created for itself the very difficult task of manning, victualling, and outfitting the ships that it intended to send to the West Indies. It was important that this task be completed quickly because changing weather conditions at this time of year would severely restrict the sailing of such a large convoy. If

11 Ogle to Burchett, 14 September 1740, Adm. 1/380. In the Norris Papers, 14 September 1740, Addl. MSS. 28133, Sir John notes that he "found by...order from the Admiralty Sir Chaloner was to take under his command all the ships here and proceed with Lord Cathcart to the West Indies". The appointment of Ogle could not have come as any great surprise to Norris, considering the flurry of messages to him from the Admiralty regarding the buildup of the West Indian Squadron.

12 Burchett to Ogle, 4 October 1740, Adm. 6/15.

the sailing of the convoy was delayed unduly, it would mean at least another year before the land forces could be used in the West Indies, and by that time all advantage would be lost.

IV

Ogle's Orders and Instructions

The orders and instructions that were despatched to Sir Chaloner Ogle were issued in direct response to two earlier events; the capture of Porto Bello in November 1739, and the government's decision to capitalize on this success by sending an expeditionary force under Lord Cathcart "to make such Attempt or Attempts on the Spanish Possessions and Settlements as shall be thought proper to be particularly recommended or prescribed".¹ Although the news of Vernon's victory did not reach England for several months, it was only in May 1740 that George II ordered the cabinet in the typically vague language of the times "to annoy and distress the Enemy"² in any way that would best serve the interests of England.

Ogle received his orders from the Admiralty when his flag ship the Shrewsbury moored at Spithead on September 14th. After being informed that he had been appointed commander in chief of the West Indian squadron, the ships

¹ Wager Papers, 12 May 1740, Addl. MSS. 19039. Sir Charles Wager's Papers contain a "Copy of Instructions for the Lord Justices from George II R."

² ibid.

under his command were listed, and he was instructed to get them ready for sea by victualling them for six months, and loading them with naval and ordnance stores.

Then you are to take under your Convoy the Transports with the Forces under the Command of Lord Cathcart, and with the first Opportunity of Wind and Weather, to put to Sea with the Men of War & Transports aforesaid, and Proceed to Jamaica, where you are to put yourself under the command of Vice Adl. Vernon.³

After being directed to keep the transports together on the passage, Ogle was ordered to include in the convoy any other merchant ships whose masters wished to sail in company with the convoy.

On September 25th, the cabinet sent "Secret Instructions for Sir Chaloner Ogle".⁴ After explaining the progress of the English war effort in the West Indies, Spanish and French reaction to the English initiatives, and the purpose of the expeditionary force, Ogle was directed "to convoy the Land Forces under the command of Lord Cathcart to Jamaica".⁵ Once at Jamaica, Ogle was to act in accordance with the instructions given to Lord Cathcart and to put himself under the command of Vernon. If enemy ships

3 Burchett to Norris, 10 September 1740, Adm. 2/56.

4 Ogle Papers, 25 September 1740. See Appendix B.

5 ibid.

were met on the passage, he was to "take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy" these ships "without hazarding or too much exposing the Transport Ships".⁶ Finally, he was to gather any intelligence that might prove useful to Vernon and keep in contact with a principal secretary of state.

The basic difference between the Admiralty's orders and the cabinet's instructions was that the former were concerned primarily with quickly getting the naval squadron in a state of readiness so that it could escort the convoy to the West Indies safely, while the latter were interested in the naval squadron and the convoy as parts of a larger operation. As usual, the person to whom the orders and instructions were addressed was left the widest latitude in interpreting them. No explanation was given as to how Ogle was to man, victual, and supply his ships. No date of sailing was laid down. Not only were the orders and instructions interesting for what they did not say, they were surprising in what they did say. At one place in the "Secret Instruction", Ogle was ordered to abide by Lord Cathcart's instructions when he reached Jamaica while at the same time putting himself under the command of Vernon. What was to be the position of Ogle when Cathcart's instructions clashed with Vernon's orders? Ogle's passive nature -----

6 ibid.

must have proven a real asset when Wentworth⁷ and Vernon disagreed on how the Cartagena operation should be mounted.

⁷ Pares, op. cit., 91-93. Brigadier-General Thomas Wentworth took over command of the expeditionary force when Lord Cathcart died on the voyage out. Pares describes the calamities that resulted from the disagreements between Vernon and Wentworth.

V

The Ships in Ogle's Squadron

When war was declared with Spain in October 1739, the navy appeared to be in remarkably good condition. The Navy Board listed 121 ships-of-the-line, that is ships of fifty guns or more, and forty-nine frigates, that is ships of twenty to forty-four guns, for a total of 170 ships. Between 1714 and 1739, the total number of naval ships had decreased from 197 to 170, a loss of ten ships-of-the-line and seventeen frigates.¹ However, all 170 ships listed by the Board were not in a condition to be fitted for sea. Of the 170 ships listed, 117 actually were in service or could be readied for sea on short notice, and fifty-three required major repairs before they could go to sea. The great majority of these 117 ships were built or rebuilt between 1714 and 1739. The remainder, fewer than a dozen, were survivors from the reign of Queen Anne.² Many of the 117 ships already were deployed outside home waters; Vernon was in Jamaica with seven ships, Anson had just left for the Far East in

1 Navy Board to Burchett, 3 December 1739, Adm. B/110.

2 Baugh, op. cit., 515-529.

command of a fleet of eleven ships³ of-the-line, the Mediterranean squadron still numbered twelve ships, five ships were in the Baltic, four ships were in the Leeward Islands, seven ships were in waters off the east coast of North America, and two ships were cruising off the coast of West Africa. In addition, two ships lay off the coast of Ireland and Scotland, and five guard ships were stationed along the English coast from the Thames River to Portsmouth.⁴ In all, fifty-five ships were carrying out duties abroad and at home. Of the remaining sixty-two ships, the navy had available for sea duty four 100's and seven 90's.⁵ But ships of this size were unsuitable for operations such as that planned for the West Indies. Having been designed primarily as floating gun platforms, they were too large, clumsy, and unsafe to risk on an Atlantic crossing. The fact that when fully manned they had a complement of over 800 ruled out their use, especially in the early years of the war when seamen were at a premium. This left fifty-one ships from which thirty-three were chosen to make up Ogle's squadron. Leaving aside the eleven 90's and 100's, eighteen ships were available for service in home waters. But many

³ L.A. Wilcox, Anson's Voyage, (London, 1969), 9. Although Anson sailed with eleven men-of-war, seven of these ships left Anson's squadron in pursuance of their own orders.

⁴ Monthly List, 1 October 1740, Adm. 8/21.

⁵ Navy Board to Burchett, 3 December 1739, Adm. B/110.

of these remaining eighteen ships could not be counted upon either because the navy had insufficient seamen to man them or they had not yet been readied for sea. Sir John Norris voiced his concern and that of the cabinet with regard to this state of affairs. "It was considered that when Sir Chaloner should be sailed, that we had no men of war manned⁶ at home."

By the time that Ogle's squadron began to assemble in September-October 1740, the total number of ships in the navy had changed very little from 1739.⁷ This was a matter of great concern to the Admiralty and to Newcastle who as principal secretary of state was the minister with overall responsibility for the direction of the war. On September 12th, the Admiralty ordered the Navy Board to cause "his Majesty's Ships...now under repair or rebuilding in his Majesty's Yards and also Eight Ships of 40 Guns building in Merchant Yards to be finished and fitted for the Sea with⁸ all possible Dispatch". A month later, Newcastle himself asked for "An Account of all the Ships that can be ready⁹ by the first of April next". The Admiralty replied on

 28133. 6 Norris Papers, 24 September 1740, Addl. MSS.

7 Richmond, op. cit., I, 261-264.

8 Navy Board Minutes, 12 September 1740, Adm. 106/2554.

9 Burchett to Newcastle, 21 October 1740, S.P. 42/23.

October 21st that eight ships-of-the-line and two frigates would be ready by Christmas 1740. An additional six ships-of-the-line, nine frigates, and two sloops would be available by April 1741.¹⁰

Ironically, at the same time the Admiralty was making every effort to get as many ships into service as possible and encouraging a more active policy of impress-¹¹ment, George II decided to make a state visit to Holland thus draining off much needed crews. On the very same day that Burchett ordered Captain Powlett of the Portmahon to "make all possible dispatch in proceeding to the Nore" and there to hold himself "in a constant readiness to proceed on Service",¹² he directed the converted frigate "Royal Carolina and the several Yachts in the River... to be ready on Tuesday next at farthest to proceed to Holland".¹³

But of all the problems facing the Admiralty in the autumn of 1740, it was the West Indian squadron under the command of Ogle that required the most attention. No effort was spared to provide Ogle with the best ships that

10 ibid., Abstract

11 Burchett to Cavendish, 16 October 1740, Adm. 2/472.

12 Burchett to Captain Powlett, 13 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

13 Burchett to ? , 13 September 1740, Adm. 2/472 and Stone to Burchett, 15 September 1740, Adm. A/2287.

were available. The squadron consisted of twenty-five ships-of-the-line, six fireships, and two hospital ships.¹⁴ The twenty-five ships-of-the-line were made up of nine 80's, five 70's, ten 60's, and one 50. Although frigates would have offered the squadron more versatility and required less men, there were few frigates available. Of the twenty-five ships-of-the-line, nine had been built new and seven had been rebuilt in the 1730's. The remaining nine had been rebuilt between 1714 and 1729 with the exception of the Princess Amelia which had been built in 1693.¹⁵ Even so, the 3rd rates (70's and 80's) and 4th rates (50's and 60's) were not noted for their good design. They were a poor gun platform because they heeled over so much in moderate winds. However they did have the necessary size and firepower to match any of the enemy's ships they might encounter in West Indian waters. More than half of the twenty-five had been cleaned in 1740 but only two were sheathed,¹⁶ a surprisingly low number, considering the destination of the squadron and the strong possibility that the hulls would be eaten by the worm (tereda navalis) in

¹⁴ Burchett to the Navy Board, 10 September 1740, Adm. 2/201. See Appendix C.

¹⁵ T.D. Manning and C.F. Walker, British Warship Names, (London, 1959), 67-493.

¹⁶ Monthly List, 1 October 1740, Adm. 8/21.

tropical waters. The Admiralty did the next best thing and ordered the Navy Board to provide all the ships of the squadron with graving so that each ship could be "Boothose-taped with Graving"¹⁷ after it had been scrubbed down.

In addition, the dockyard officers at Portsmouth were ordered to go aboard each of the ships of the squadron to "Survey their Hulls, Rigging, Masts, and Yards and to make good what is wanting to be done to them with all possible dispatch".¹⁸ Although some defects were discovered in several of the ships, notably the Elizabeth and the Falkland, most were in good shape. This was due in large measure to the Navy Board which spared little expense to¹⁹ obtain the best naval stores and timber.

Even though much of the timber and naval stores used in the building and rigging of a ship came from abroad, the navy seldom was troubled by shortages. This was due to the Navy Board's policy of stockpiling material well in advance of use as in the case of masts, which required careful ageing, the practice of rebuilding rather than replacing ships-of-the-line, which allowed valuable pieces of

¹⁷ Burchett to the Navy Board, 16 September 1740, Adm. 2/201.

¹⁸ Navy Board Minutes, 15 September 1740, Adm. 106/2554.

¹⁹ Baugh, op. cit., 276.

undamaged timber to be salvaged, and England's control of the seas which meant that the navy could rely on an uninterrupted flow of naval stores and timber from abroad in time of war. Oak timber, some iron, and sailcloth could be obtained in England, but masts, plank, tar, pitch, hemp, and turpentine had to be imported.²⁰ Most of the imported timber and naval stores were procured from the Baltic countries as North American imports were considered inferior. In times of national emergency, when great urgency was attached to getting the ships to sea quickly, problems relating to naval stores sometimes arose, but these difficulties usually were caused by the limited number of skilled workers that could convert the raw or roughly finished materials into usable naval stores. For example, the small number of competent sail makers sometimes resulted in delays in getting ships to sea. During the period that Ogle's ships were being readied for sea, naval stores presented few problems comparable to those of manning or victualling.

Of all the supplies that had to be taken on board the ships of the squadron, ordnance (guns, powder,

20 Corbett MSS., XW, "Naval Stores". Corbett points out that ships on foreign voyages carried a twelve month supply of naval stores, "but the generality of those Stores will serve much longer with good husbandry".

ball, and shot) presented the least difficulties. This was quite surprising because the Board of Ordnance that was responsible for supplying both the army and the navy was an autonomous body. The Admiralty did not appoint any of its members and had no power to coerce them. This sometimes caused delays in the outfitting of fleets. In the case of Ogle's squadron, the Board supplied its requirements quickly and efficiently well before its departure. One example of Ogle's ordnance demands can be seen from the Ordnance Treasurer's Ledgers in which Robert Norman was paid £330.10.0 for supplying the squadron with 772 tons of ²¹saltpetre, the main ingredient of gunpowder. Most of the ordnance was carried by naval supply ships from the ²²naval depot to the squadron. One other factor that made ordnance of little concern was that once it was on board the ships of the squadron, no replenishing was necessary as with provisions for it would not be used until the squadron encountered the enemy at sea or land operations began in the West Indies.

Although most of the ships of the squadron were well built and adequately supplied with naval stores and

²¹ The Ordnance Treasurer's Ledgers, 30 September 1740, W.O. 48/81. This volume is a receipt book listing moneys paid to civilian contractors by the Board of Ordnance.

²² Burchett to Montague, 5 September 1740, Adm. 2/201.

ordnance, individual ships did complain of real or imagined problems in getting themselves readied for sea. Two of the more serious cases were those of the Elizabeth and the Falkland. On the eve of the squadron's first attempt to set sail, the Elizabeth sprang a leak and became "disabled from proceeding on that Service".²³ The cabinet directed the Admiralty to replace the Elizabeth with the Kent. The desperate shortage of seamen on the Kent necessitated a large turn over of men with all its repercussions. The administrative machinery of the Admiralty, in particular the Navy Board, reacted so quickly in the case of the Elizabeth that several days later Cavendish found himself in the embarrassing position of explaining to Burchett that he "never knew anything of it, till by chance, I heard it talked of in a Coffee house, three or four days ago".²⁴ Captain Oliphant of the Falkland was more fortunate than Captain Falkingham of the Elizabeth. Oliphant discovered the defects on his ship in mid-September.²⁵ But on the basis of his description of the defects, the Navy Board judged them to be minor and advised the Admiralty to order the Falkland into Portsmouth harbour where she was "to be -----

23 Stone to Burchett, 9 October 1740, S.P. 43/23.

24 Cavendish to Burchett, 11 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

25 Burchett to Ogle, 15 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

Sheathed Graved Refitted & Stores for Service in the West Indies".²⁶ On September 26th she was docked because the dockyard officers were unable "to give any account of her,²⁷ till they see her in the Dock". When she was examined, her defects proved serious enough to prevent her sailing with the squadron. The fireship Aetna was more fortunate than either the Elizabeth or the Falkland. After reporting rudder difficulties she was ordered into Portsmouth harbour where corrections were made.²⁸ On September 17th a leak was discovered in the transom of the Cumberland by the dockyard officers carrying out their survey of the ships of the squadron.²⁹ By September 22nd this problem had been corrected and the Navy Board could report that the Cumberland "may now in our humble opinion proceed to Sea with Safety".³⁰

26 Burchett to Ogle, 16 September 1740, Adm. 2/56.

27 Cavendish to Burchett, 26 September 1740, Adm. 1/904.

28 Burchett to Cavendish, 24 September 1740, Adm. 2/56.

29 Westfield, Palmer, and Thomas to Stuart, 17 September 1740, Adm. A/2287.

30 The Navy Board to Burchett, 22 September 1740, Adm. B/113.

Although most of the defects reported proved to be quite legitimate, there also were unfounded claims and several blatant attempts to use imagined deficiencies to escape service in the West Indies. Lord Augustus Fitzroy, commanding officer of the Orford, was representative of those captains who occasionally complained to the Admiralty about supposed structural defects or inferior naval stores which they felt adversely affected the sailing and handling of their ships. Fitzroy asked for sixty or seventy tons more iron ballast in order to improve the handling of the Orford. The Navy Board provided him with another fifteen tons but told him that his ship sailed quite well without additional ballast.³¹ Captain Mayne of the Lenox who had served before in the West Indies and had no intention of returning complained bitterly to the Admiralty about the defects on his ship. Unfortunately for Mayne, his reputation for lack of tact was well known and the Admiralty³² directed him to approach Ogle with his problems. Ogle was informed by the Admiralty that it saw "nothing in what he represents, but what is loose and general, without pointing out any particular Defects that are of consequence".³³

³¹ The Navy Board to Fitzroy, 16 September 1740, Adm. 106/2554.

³² Burchett to Mayne, 19 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

³³ Burchett to Ogle, 23 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

In the same letter Ogle was told that he "should not encourage Applications of that kind, where there appeared to be no better Foundation for them".³⁴ The importance of an officer's family connections became quite apparent when the Admiralty received an anonymous letter "representing the Weymouth to be in so bad a Condition as not to fit to go to the West Indies".³⁵ The commanding officer of the Weymouth was Lord Aubrey Beauclerk, the brother of Lord Vere, a member of the Board of Admiralty. Lord Vere was politely asked by Burchett to speak to his brother "to know in what Condition the Ship really is in".³⁶ This was a very reasonable request considering that the Weymouth had been built only four years before. Had the commanding officer been anyone other than Lord Aubrey it was quite likely that the Admiralty would have dealt with him as it had Captain Perry Mayne of the Lenox.

When Ogle's thirty-three ship squadron finally did get underway for the West Indies on October 26th, Ogle could count himself most fortunate as far as the number and quality of his ships were concerned. Without exception he was in command of the best England had available for

34 ibid.

2/472. 35 Burchett to Beauclerk, 27 September 1740, Adm.

36 ibid.

service. So intent was the Admiralty in achieving success in the West Indies that it provided Ogle with such a large squadron that the defence of England was left somewhat in doubt. No less a government figure than Sir Robert Walpole expressed his doubts about the size of Ogle's squadron.

I oppose nothing. I give in to everything, and said to do everything, am to answer for everything, and yet God knows I do not do what I think right. I am of opinion for leaving more ships of Sir Chaloner Ogle's squadron behind, but I dare not, and I will not make any alteration. 37

The Admiralty felt justified in weakening England's naval defences because it had conclusive evidence that large French and Spanish naval squadrons had sailed for the West Indies. Thus neither Power singly or jointly could pose a threat to England at home. On the basis of Richmond's figures which show that the navy of Spain totalled forty ships while that of France numbered fifty,³⁸ the Admiralty's policy probably was well made. However, the very size of this squadron created almost insoluble problems in manning and victualling. Our attention must now be directed to these two important matters.

37 Ford, op. cit., 150

38 Richmond, op. cit., I, 14-15.

VI

The Manning Problem

Of all the problems that Ogle had to face after his appointment as commander in chief of the West Indian squadron, none was of the magnitude of the manning problem. Yet ironically, even though the government and the Admiralty realized that "there were not enough seamen to supply the wartime needs of both the navy and the merchant service",¹ not even the vaguest reference was made to the manning problem in Ogle's orders and instructions.

Ogle himself must have been well aware of the complexities of the manning problem that would demand his special attention after he had received his orders on September 14th. All he had to do was to reflect on his last two commands. By the time his Mediterranean squadron had limped back to Portsmouth on July 8th, Ogle had put ashore at Gibraltar 344 sick men and had another 621 sick men for transfer ashore at Portsmouth. Of a total complement of 3,475 on the nine ships of his squadron, only 2,573 able-bodied men could be mustered.² Two weeks later when Ogle's

1 Baugh, op. cit., 147.

2 ibid., 190-191.

squadron was required to sail for the Bay of Biscay as part of Sir John Norris' fleet, only seven of the original nine ships that made up the squadron had sufficient able-bodied men to get under way.³ Norris' fleet had been at sea for less than a week when inclement weather, mounting sickness, and inexperienced seamen forced the hapless fleet to anchor at Torbay and to remain there until it was ordered to return to Spithead.

A year earlier, the manning problem had prompted Norris to suggest that he "thought it mout be best for the present to suspend the declaration"⁴ of war with Spain since it was "two well knone to Everybody"⁵ that the navy was having little success in getting men to man the ships. The continued shortage during the summer of 1740 and his own unhappy experiences anchored at Torbay must have explained Norris' decision to delay his departure for London on September 14th long enough to discuss the manning problem with Ogle. Norris advised Ogle to employ fresh ships and to be on the look-out for Indiamen homeward bound.⁶

3 Richmond, op. cit., I, 88-89

4 Norris Papers, 2 October 1739, Addl. MSS.
28132.

5 ibid., 29 October 1739.

6 ibid., 14 September 1740.

The most reasonable method of raising seamen for naval service was that of encouraging volunteers. The difficulty was that few good seamen would volunteer in time of war because the merchant service offered more advantages. Of the seamen who volunteered for naval service, many had little inborn ability, and in an age of sail it was a liability to have too many landsmen aboard a fighting ship. However the government did hold out certain inducements.

When a Fleet is ordered to be fitted out, the King generally issues out (especially in war) a Proclamation promising a Gratuity in Money to such as shall enter themselves within such a time on board any of His Ships, which is called Bounty Money

Another Encouragement to the Men is the Allowing them Conduct Money, and Waggon to carry the Chests and Bedding of such as enter for Ships at Portsmouth ⁷

This system of encouraging volunteer enlistment enabled the navy to meet most of its manning requirements in peace time. In the summer of 1739 on the eve of the war, anti-Spanish fervour enabled Vice Admiral Edward Vernon to recruit a large number of volunteers. Of the complement of 3,670 in Vernon's squadron, 2,157 were volunteers while only 623 were pressed men. Before being allocated to Vernon's squadron, eight of the nine ships had been guard-ships, ships placed in reserve a year earlier, but ready

⁷ Corbett MSS., X, "Raising Seamen".

for sea in all respects except for victuals and a full complement. Each of these eight ships carried a skeleton crew of 100. Thus Vernon had the good fortune to acquire 800 seamen when the eight guardships reverted to active service and became ships of his squadron.⁸ That it took only six weeks to get the nine ships of Vernon's squadron manned and ready for sea was remarkable in itself. However this did not prevent Vernon from complaining bitterly that his squadron "was the worst man'd...that ever went out of England".⁹ By the summer of 1740, the situation had changed for the worse. The success of Porto Bello was not reflected in the number of volunteers recruited. Those who enlisted were used to make up the complements of the ships in the squadrons of Sir John Norris, Sir John Balchen, and Captain George Anson. By September, when Ogle began to put unprecedentedly large demands on the Admiralty for men, the situation had become virtually impossible. What volunteers the navy managed to entice into the service were "the Scum of the World".¹⁰ Worse still, few of these men had any hope of becoming worthwhile seamen. Yet the navy continued

8 Cavendish to Burchett, 19 July 1739, Adm. 1/902.

9 Vernon to Burchett, 22 July 1739, Adm. 1/710.

10 Cavendish to Burchett, 18 July 1739, Adm. 1/902.

to try to attract volunteers for the simple reason that they were needed to carry out duties that the pressed seamen could not be relied upon to undertake.

Cavendish may not have been alone in his assessment of the volunteers. The following extract of a letter to Ogle from Burchett showed Ogle being severely chastised by the Admiralty for his poor accounting methods. This may have been Ogle's way of making the point that he had the necessary bodies on board his ships, but that he still lacked competent seamen.

I have received your letter of Yesterday Date, and communicated it to my Lords Commissrs. of the Admiralty, who do not understand the Meaning of what you write, that none of the Ships of your Squadron have any Men lent to them, since it appears by the Account that you have enclosed of the State of the Ships, that there are 82 Supernumeraries on board the Shrewsbury, 198 on board the Boyn, and others on board several of the other Ships, and if they are not Men lent, their Lordships desire to know what they are, and that you will explain in all your future Accounts, what the Men said to be Supernumeraries are, since they do not understand how most of the Ships are said to have Supernumeraries and yet are short of complement. 11

With the quality and quantity of volunteers rapidly dwindling, the navy was forced to turn to other methods in its search for seamen. Although impressment had been authorized by the King in June 1739, the Admiralty had

11 Burchett to Ogle, 19 September 1740. Adm. 2/472.

been reluctant to employ it with all of its onerous ramifications. Impressment ashore relied, in large measure, on the support of local authorities who had at their disposal the machinery of local government that was needed to apply constant pressure to the hunted seamen. But the local authorities were unwilling to risk the possibility of stirring up a hornet's nest within their borough or county by openly siding with the press gangs. In many cases, the local officials knowingly obstructed the press gangs unless the opportunity presented itself for foisting upon the unsuspecting navy some of the more unmanageable inhabitants of the local asylums or jails.

Impressment afloat offered greater chances of success because the men obtained were experienced seamen and fewer complications were encountered. Unable to take seamen from outward-bound merchant ships, the navy was forced to confine itself to intercepting homeward-bound merchantmen. But this in itself caused problems because the navy was obliged to provide 'men in lieu' to man the merchant ship after her seamen had been impressed.¹²

When our Officers met with Ships homeward bound...they always put onboard as many Men as they take out, under the care of an Officer, who are to see them safely moored.¹³

¹² The importance of a ready supply of reliable volunteers can be seen in an instance like this.

¹³ Corbett MSS., X, op. cit.

But as Corbett was quick to note, "No Press is so strict where there are not granted many Protections", ¹⁴ documents issued by the Admiralty to seamen serving on ships carrying goods or performing functions that the privy council considered necessary in the national interest. Protections were given to the seamen of outward-bound merchant ships, and the crews of coasters and fishing vessels. Any seaman with a protection could not be impressed. Unfortunately for the navy many of these protections were in existence, some authentic and many counterfeit. The only alternatives open to the navy were the withdrawing of protections or the placing of embargoes, orders issued by the privy council forbidding all outward-bound merchant ships from sailing until the navy had manned its ships. In both cases the navy was very wary because it immediately would find itself in a confrontation with the merchants and their strong parliamentary allies. The navy was the first to realize that it needed all the support it could get in parliament and that it could ill afford to be at odds with the very influential traders in whose interests they were at war. On the other side of the coin, the traders realized that it was in their interests to have naval ships that were properly manned on

¹⁴ ibid.

the high seas. The problem, with all its implications for the traders, was that of deciding what proportion of their men they should be required to give up under an embargo so that the navy could be operational. The problem was left in the hands of the traders when parliament decided that a merchant ship in port, having turned over a certain number of her crew to the navy, then would be allowed to sail and would receive a proportional number of protections for the remainder of her seamen.

By the time that Ogle arrived to take up his appointment as commander in chief, the embargo had been abandoned. The merchants disliked it and the small number of merchant seamen acquired by the navy made the whole thing an exercise in futility.

The effect of a policy of forcing the merchants to hand over seamen to the navy was to drive the seamen deeper into hiding. Moreover, the effect of the embargo on other sources of seamen had to be considered, for the vessels that did not go out could not come home as quarries for the press gangs afloat, and it was easier to take men out of ships than houses. ¹⁵

Ogle found himself in the position of having to rely upon impressment of homeward-bound merchantman as the most ready source of seamen. The Admiralty also recognized the need for hasty and effective impressment if the West

¹⁵ Baugh, op. cit., 177.

Indian squadron was ever to get to sea.

Sr. Jn. Norris has likewise Communicated to me your Letter to him of the 11th Instant directing him to send out Proper Cruizers to Impress the Sea Men out of the India Ships, which are Daily Expected. I shall forthwith Order out Cruizers Accordingly¹⁶

Most of these 'Cruizers' centred their operations in the Downs for the simple reason that it was in this area that many merchant seamen took to the boats and made for the safety of the land. Frequently the merchantmen would be brought into London proper by seamen with protections who contracted with the owners to meet the ships as they approached the Downs. Thus the navy found itself in the doubly difficult position of having to intercept the merchant seamen who had jumped ship as well as the ship which would have been considerably easier. The success of the merchant seamen in avoiding their predators can be seen from the following extract of a letter from the Admiralty to the cabinet.

Having stationed some of his Majesty's Ships in the Downes, at the Nore, and at other proper places to be in the way of procuring as many Seamen as they could, out of the homeward bound East Indies Ships, for his Majesty's service, have been greatly disappointed in their Expectations¹⁷

16 Ogle to Burchett, 14 September 1740, Adm.
1/380.

17 Burchett to Stone, 22 September 1740,
S.P. 42/23.

Even when the naval press gangs were fortunate enough to come across the merchantmen with their original complement of seamen on board, the task of impressing the merchant seamen proved anything but easy. The length of time away from home, the nearness of home port and their final payment of wages, and the thought of their future in the navy as impressed seamen all were great inducements to go to any lengths to resist the naval press gangs. It was almost like warfare with the enemy.

Two such examples among Ogle's squadron best illustrate the situation. Captain Crawford of the Roebuck had a rather harrowing experience when he and his men attempted to board one of "Twelve Sail of East India Ships under the Convoy of His Maty's Ships Rochester and Chester"¹⁸ in the Downs.

On Tuesday Evening...my Boats put alongside of Four of the Ships, but the Men having got Pikes, Handspikes & other Weapons, rose in a Body & would not suffer them to come on board, and in their Attempt made a very violent Opposition by which Five of my Men have been very much wounded. ¹⁹

For all his efforts, which later included a brawl on the beach when one of the merchantmen lowered its longboats in order to let its men escape, Crawford impressed eighteen

¹⁸ Crawford to Burchett, 18 September 1740, S.P. 42/23.

¹⁹ ibid., Enclosed Letter.

men. Captain Mitchell had comparable success when he "was obliged to go alongside of him [an East Indiaman] with the Ship, & while I was shifting the Men, the Rest made Sail & would not bring too". With escape impossible, the other East India ships anchored, "manned and Armed their Boats, and for want of more strength a great number of them got away".²⁰ Even Captain Allen of the Biddeford encountered much the same type of opposition.

I sent my Lieutenant & went myself...to impress their men, but was resisted the People appearing with Arms, and declared they would not be imprest, but would sink the Boat. The Richmond Captain Weston fired several Shott as to bring him too,²¹ but he would not take any Notice of it.

The Admiralty recognized the truth of Captain Mitchell's "want of more strength" argument and frequently ordered lieutenants, who had escorted impressed seamen from ship to shore, to "attend on the regulating captains and follow their orders for procuring Men".²² One cannot help but wonder at how the loss of a sea-going lieutenant must have affected the organization and efficiency of his ship in its efforts to carry out impressment afloat.

As soon as an appropriate number of merchant seamen had been impressed, they were transported quickly by sea to Spithead and the waiting ships of Ogle's squadron.

20 ibid., Enclosed Letter.

21 ibid., Enclosed Letter.

22 Burchett to Jasper, 22 September 1740, Adm. 2/472

Ogle himself was notified by Burchett concerning their arrival and what was to be done with them.

Whereas We have given Orders to Captain Cooper of the Chester to repair to Spit-head with Such Men as he has procured for the Service, and to bring with him the Men raised by any other Ships in the Downes, You are hereby required and directed, upon his arrival there, to dispose of the Said Men among the Ships under your Command as you shall judge proper. ²³

Unfortunately for all concerned, the matter of impressment did not come to an end when the pressed seamen were billeted on board the naval ships. In many cases, the quality of the seamen was so unsatisfactory that captains sometimes refused to sign the imprest account which was required if the officers and men who had done the impressing were to be paid. In cases of this kind, the Admiralty again found itself involved. The dispute between Captain Smith and Captain Steuart of the Cumberland was typical of this type of disagreement.

Capt. Smith having represented, that he shewd you his Imprest Account, and that you refused to sign it, it is their Lordships Direction, if the same be true, that you should let them know what objections you had to it. ²⁴

2/56. 23 Burchett to Ogle, 22 September 1740, Adm.

2/472. 24 Burchett to Steuart, 15 September 1740, Adm.

The frustration of the cabinet and the Admiralty that resulted from the vigorous opposition to impressment²⁵ of the incoming merchant seamen can be appreciated, but there really was very little that could be done to prevent this opposition because the whole system of impressment was so repugnant to the merchant seamen. In very serious cases of opposition to impressment, prosecution in the courts of ship owners and merchant seamen was a possibility, but even then, any chance of success was remote. Any legal action launched by the navy in the courts against civilians had little chance of success under the rules of common law. The cabinet certainly realized the difficulty of prosecuting opponents to impressment.

Your Lordships should refer the said Informations when taken, to His Majesty's Advocate and Attorney General, and to the Judge Advocate of the Admiralty, to report their Opinion, what Prosecution may be proper to be commenced for the said Facts, and in what manner, and against whom. 26

While the Admiralty's attempts at impressment to supply the manning requirements of Ogle's squadron were meeting with limited success, the number of desertions

25 Norris Papers, 16 October 1740, Addl. MSS. 28133. Certainly Sir John Norris, Admiral of the Fleet, appreciated this problem. "This evening was at Cabinet at Duke of Newcastle's office to consider the methods to procure men for manning the navy."

26 Stone to Burchett, 2 October 1740, Adm. 1/4109

continued at an alarming rate. Every desertion weakened the strength of the squadron and put even greater pressure on the press gangs. Admiral Cavendish encouraged every captain in the squadron to take any precaution necessary to minimize the risk of desertion. Ships of the squadron were moored or anchored at Spithead and St. Helens, ships' boats could be lowered for use only if they carried an officer, and to reduce further the chances of desertion, ships' boats sometimes were removed completely from the ships. But where there was a will there was a way.

Admiral Cavendish must have wondered if the squadron would ever get to sea when letters such as the following from the Orford's commanding officer, Lord Augustus Fitzroy, continued to cross his desk with regularity.

In pursuance of Your Direction, I gave orders to my Lieuts. that The Long Boat Should never come from the Ship, without a Lieut. in her, I Must Therefore Acquaint You Sr., That Mr. Seymour the Second Lieut. being commanding officer on bd. his Majesty's Ship under my Command, first on bd. a Merchant Vessel for Wine, & then on Shoar for Water Casks without and Officer, the Consequences of Which has been, Every Man's Leaving the Boat, & now She is Lying on Godspört Beach; without a Man in her, except a Midshipman. 27

27 Fitzroy to Cavendish, 9 October 1740, Adm.
1/904.

As well as being the recipient of news regarding every desertion, Cavendish was responsible for passing on this news to the Admiralty. Comments made in passing about "a great many of the Victory and Falklands men are walked of to London"²⁸ certainly must have raised a few eyebrows at the Admiralty.

One can sense the futility that the whole question of desertion must have assumed when one reads Cavendish's despatches to the Admiralty as the time of departure of the squadron drew closer. The fact that the squadron was under sailing orders during October, but could not sail because of contrary winds and ships that were under-manned, greatly increased the risk of desertion. With insufficient volunteers who could be trusted to carry out duties ashore and then return to their ships, the necessity of using inadequately supervised pressed men to carry out some duties ashore contributed in no small measure to the high rate of desertion. Officers often were responsible for this state of affairs.

Lieutenant Goodall, who sent in the long boat for Water a week ago, and returned but last night, the Men having all deserted; Another Lieutenant instead of carrying a Long boat full of Stores, went to see his friends with the Stores in her, and left her Stores and all aground, and the Men gone and some of the Stores too I suppose. 29

1/904. 28 Cavendish to Burchett, 4 October 1740, Adm.

1/904. 29 Cavendish to Burchett, 16 October 1740, Adm.

Cavendish recognized this laxness on the part of the officers and on several occasions suggested remedies such as calling the people responsible for desertions to account for themselves.³⁰ He further developed this argument in a letter to the Admiralty.

I dare say there have been at least, four Hundred of the best Men Deserted from this Squadron since it came to Spithead, purely through the neglect of the Officers, which if they are not called to account for, there will be an end to all order and Discipline in the Navy, I have recommended to Sir Chaloner Ogle to enquire into these two facts, and there are many more, not taken notice of.³¹

Parliament itself was partially responsible for the desertions. In 1728,³² it had passed legislation to prevent the exploitation of its seamen by authorizing that seamen had to be paid twelve months wages every eighteen months. The Admiralty had chosen to interpret the legislation in such a way that it became general practice to hold a pay parade for all ships outward-bound for foreign duty. The thinking of the Admiralty was that general payment, made just before departure, would minimize desertions. In theory, this thinking was valid. However, in the case of Ogle's squadron, general payment was initiated the first

1/904. 30 Cavendish to Burchett, 15 October 1740, Adm.

1/904. 31 Cavendish to Burchett, 16 October 1740, Adm.

32 Baugh, op. cit., 199.

week of October, but the squadron was delayed in its sailing until October 26th. The results can readily be guessed as the following example shows.

Yesterday the Ships Company of his Majestys Ship Superbe, under my Command, was paid their Wages to the 30th of June last 1740, and between twelve and four, last night, the seven Men whose Names are here enclosed left the Ship, and took away with them... two Boats. ³³

Of all the manning problems that Sir Chaloner Ogle faced, the one over which he had least control was that of sickness. In an age that was still ignorant of even the most basic of medical knowledge that we take for granted today, it was not surprising that typhus or 'ship fever' was ever present. Unknown to contemporary medical authorities, typhus was caused by vermin. "Admiral Cavendish's fears...about the pestilential effect of the human flotsam recruited in 1739 were fully realized by the spring of 1740." ³⁴ By the summer of 1740 "the Scum of the World", ³⁵ who were the real carriers of the disease, were being distributed among the various ships which were short of complement. By the time that the buildup of Ogle's

33 Hervey to Burchett, 5 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

34 Baugh, op. cit., 179.

35 Cavendish to Burchett, 18 July 1739, Adm. 1/902.

squadron was underway, in late August of 1740, ship fever was reaching epidemic proportions. Although statistical tables from this period perhaps are more significant for what they did not say, the following information is still worthy of note; if for no other reason than that it shows how the seamen used sickness to desert.

Seamen Sent from on Board the Ships of War to Hospitals,
Hospital Ships, and Sick Quarters.³⁶

	<u>Received</u>	<u>Discharged</u>	<u>Dead</u>	<u>Deserted</u>
August 1740	987	1,408	117	297
September 1740	2,151	1,104	122	219
October 1740	1,166	1,419	145	287

The only hospital in the Portsmouth area was the 380-bed hospital at Gosport operated by a surgeon-agent, Sir. James Barclay. Any over-flow of sick seamen was put in rented accomodation in the Gosport area at seven shillings per man per week. In June 1740, the hospital and sick quarters at Gosport were attempting to administer to the needs of 1,897 sick seamen.³⁷ The impersonal money-orientated system under which the sick quarters were administered contributed to an overall laxness and a resulting ill-treatment of the sick. By October 1740, so many

³⁶ Wager Papers, Addl. MSS. 19031, folio 29.

³⁷ Admiralty Medical Minutes, 10 October 1740, Adm. 99/12.

complaints about the sick quarters had been received that the Admiralty informed Cavendish that "Mr. Hill, one of the Commrs. for the Sick and Wounded, is directed to examine strictly into the abuses complained of, and to make an impartial Report of how he finds the same to be".³⁸

The complaints themselves are very enlightening as to conditions faced by the sick. In "the humble Petition of us the Sick Persons belonging to the Gosport Hospitale" addressed to Admiral Cavendish, one gets some inkling of conditions.

Humbly sheweth the bad Usage we are trated with, The medicens that are Prescribd for us by the Physitions being Utterly Neglected & are obliged for the most part to take the Contrary - besides Sometimes we are utterly neglected. Therefore we...desireth your Honr. would take our Case into Consideration and redress our Injury.³⁹

The complaints of the petitioners appear to be very moderate indeed when compared to Gregory Carloson's report on his experiences at Gosport.

The many abuses in medicine that hath been practised in this hospital for a long time to the great prejudice of the lives and healths of the poor seamen coming daily under my inspection thought I could not excuse myself from the greatest sense of inhumanity if I did not using Utmost endeavours to rectify such prejudicial practices.⁴⁰

38 Burchett to Cavendish, 16 October 1740, Adm. 2/472.

39 Cavendish to Burchett, 14 October 1740, Adm. 1/904, Enclosure.

40 ibid.

Carloson goes on to speak of "abuses committed", "evils", "Barboarous and cruel Usage", and "Errors committed".

If conditions in the hospitals were bad ashore, they were much worse for the sick afloat. Improper hygiene, poor diet, overcrowding, bad ventilation between decks, and the careless attitude of the seamen towards their own health and the health of their ship mates all made it imperative that the sick be taken ashore if matters were not to be further complicated. Any ship's log in the squadron made frequent mention of the sick sent ashore - "Longbt. on Shore with Sickmen"⁴¹ and "sent ashore the sick Men".⁴² Even the soldiers were affected and had to be removed from their transports ashore, the only difference being that "They will be taken Care of by the Surgeons belonging to those respective Regiments".⁴³

Ogle's weekly account, dated September 14th, showed how sickness within the squadron was having its affect on the manning of the ships.⁴⁴ It also put the whole manning problem in perspective.

⁴¹ Captain Baker's Log, (Dunkirk), 23 September 1740, Adm. 51/285.

⁴² Ogle's Log, 27 September 1740, Adm. 50/18.

⁴³ Stone to Burchett, 18 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

⁴⁴ Ogle to Burchett, 14 September 1740, Adm. 1/380. Enclosure.

Short of Complement	922 Borne
Sick ashore	371
Sick onboard	737
Short of Complement	3,108 Muster'd

When Ogle reported to Cavendish in late September that he still had between five hundred and six hundred sick men on board the ships of his squadron because there were no billets ashore for them, the Admiralty was quick to recognize the gravity of so many sick men left uncared for among the healthy. Ogle was instructed immediately to "Cause proper Care to be taken for their Reception on Shore, either by hiring large houses, or taking such other Measures as may be proper for their Preservation & Cure."⁴⁵

Perhaps the most startling case of shipboard sickness was on board the Cambridge. Cavendish best summed up the seriousness of the whole matter when he informed the Admiralty that "the Cambridge is in that Sickly Condition that it will be Destruction, either to put any men into her, or to remove any from her into other ships".⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Burchett to the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, 30 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

⁴⁶ Cavendish to Burchett, 1 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

The Cambridge (80) had been recommissioned in February 1740 and fitted out at Chatham.⁴⁷ Like all other ships of eighty guns, she had a complement of 600. The seriousness of the situation aboard the Cambridge was brought formally to the attention of the commanding officer, Captain Whorwood, early in September when the commissioned and warrant officers made representations in writing. Although their letter dealt primarily with "a Malignant Distemper raging among them", mention was also made "of raw & unskilled Sailors (the very worst that any of us were ever at Sea with)".⁴⁸

In the least rough weather we could never work her without all our hands, and now it appears by this Day's list that there are One Hundred and thirty one afflicted with the Said Distemper, and not thirty Able Seamen in health before the Mast.⁴⁹

By the last week of September, conditions had deteriorated to such a state that Captain Whorwood informed Cavendish that "we have put sick a shore two hundred forty two, aboard the Doctor's list was yesterday thirty eight, this Morning fifty three". He went on to point out that out of the six hundred man complement only three hundred "good"

⁴⁷ Monthly List, 1 October 1740, Adm. 8/21.

⁴⁸ Commissioned and Warrant Officers to Whorwood, 1 September 1740, Adm. 1/904.

⁴⁹ ibid.

seamen remained, and that "they would soon be struck with the ships distemper, having by Experience found the fresh people soonest taken".⁵⁰ At the request of Cavendish, Ogle visited the Cambridge on October 5th "and mustered her Company the Number of Men is 185 of whom about Twenty are good Seamen, about Ten old and unfit for Service, the rest are young and lively, & may do well with good men". Ogle's conclusion was that "she can't be in a Condition to proceed with me to the West Indies".⁵¹ On the basis of Ogle's conclusion, Cavendish recommended to the Admiralty that the Cambridge "should be ordered to the upper end of the Harbour, and every thing taken out of her, and well Smoaked and Aired, before she can be fit for service".⁵²

The situation in general was so confused that Ogle never really knew how many fit men he had. During the month of September, Admiral Cavendish was under considerable pressure from the Admiralty to supply exact figures of the number of men needed to complete the complement of Ogle's squadron. Even Ogle was at a loss to inform the Admiralty "what Number of Men have been lent to any of the Ships of [the] Squadron, and to what Ships they properly

⁵⁰ Whorwood to Cavendish, 29 September 1740, Adm. 1/904.

⁵¹ Ogle to Cavendish, 5 October 1740, Adm. 1/940.

⁵² Cavendish to Burchett, 6 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

53 belong". Both Cavendish and Ogle were unable to give exact figures to the Admiralty because the manning question was in a constant state of flux. With the exception of volunteer enlistment which had dropped off dramatically, every day brought varying numbers of pressed men, frequent desertion, and increasing sickness. By the time one set of figures was drawn up, they were outdated. The Admiralty's concern about the manning question was occasioned by the urgency of getting the squadron to sea quickly. However, to get the squadron to sea, more men were still needed. Continuous use of the established methods of recruitment offered little chance of making up the complement of the squadron and a speedy sailing. The only alternative at this late date was the implementation of the manning technique known as 'the turn-over'.

The procedure of turning over was nothing new to the navy. Corbett described it as "Another method, much used, and may be reckoned one of the Diseases of the Navy". Turning over was simply the arbitrary transferring of men from their own ships into others "against their will". On the surface, turning over seemed like a sensible

2/472. 53 Burchett to Ogle, 15 September 1740, Adm.

54 Corbett MSS., X, op. cit.

55 ibid.

solution to a difficult problem, but on closer examination, turning over seriously could damage more than it could accomplish. The navy had developed a system that encouraged both officers and men to be loyal first to their ship and superior officers, and then to the naval service. Promotion for all ranks depended on favour. In return for loyalty, ability, and hard work, a commanding officer saw to the needs of his favourites. The King's Regulations specified that when a commanding officer moved from one ship to another, he could take a certain proportion of his officers and men with him to his new command. Captain Gascoigne's requests to take officers and men with him when he changed commands from the Buckingham to the Torbay just about drove Cavendish to distraction.

Every Captain removed by Commission from one Ship to another is allowed to carry with him a certain number of Men (including his servants) according to the rate of the Ship he is serving from: I did accordingly upon my being removed by Commission from the Command of the Buckingham to that of the Torbay make a list of that established number, all of them (except eight) the same people I brought with me out of the York into the Buckingham by the same established privilege. 56

1/1828. 56 Gascoigne to Cavendish, 6 October 1740, Adm.

Not content with taking seventeen officers and men with him from the Buckingham to the Torbay, on October 20, he told Cavendish that he hoped "to be allow'd Two of the four Boatswain's Mates [he] was to leave in the Buckingham".⁵⁷

Turning over then was a bad practice at the best of times. Once started, it resulted in further turn-overs to make up for lost seaman. This created difficulties in knowing where particular men were at any one time and kept nominal lists of ship's companies in a constant state of flux. It also created problems of morale and was the contributing factor in many a desertion. Most important of all, turning over was very difficult to stop after it had begun.

On September 23rd, Whitehall ordered that "All the Men, on board the Victory, be turn'd over"⁵⁸ into the ships of Ogle's squadron. This turn-over was more justifiable than many others because the Victory had been in collision in July⁵⁹ and was alongside for repairs. However, this did not prevent a great many of the Victory's

1/1828. 57 Gascoigne to Burchett, 20 October 1740, Adm.

1/4109. 58 Stone to Burchett, 23 September 1740, Adm.

1/904. 59 Cavendish to Burchett, 4 October 1740, Adm.

seamen from taking off for London with the result that Cavendish was able to draw only about two hundred men from the Victory.

61

The injustice of the whole system of turning over can be seen in the case of the Roebuck, the Chester, and the Rochester which were ordered to carry pressed men from the Downs to Spithead. When these three ships had arrived at Spithead and transferred the pressed men to Ogle's squadron, the regular seamen of the three ships themselves were turned over. The difficulty faced by Cavendish in executing these orders was particularly burdensome because turning over overlapped other problems such as sickness.

62

I know they would have this Squadron manned, where ever Men can be got from, I am not in haste to remove the Men, till Sick quarters can be had for the Sick men aboard, to put well Men into the Sickly Ships, is the way to Destroy them all. 63

On September 25th, Whitehall ordered that "Four of His Majesty's Ships that were appointed to go to the West Indies...should not proceed on that Service".

64

60 Sydney Papers, op. cit., 12 July 1740.

1/904. 61 Cavendish to Burchett, 28 September 1740, Adm.

1/4109. 62 Stone to Burchett, 23 September 1740, Adm.

1/904. 63 Cavendish to Burchett, 28 September 1740, Adm.

42/23. 64 Stone to Burchett, 25 September 1740, S.P.

Rather, the complements of these four ships, the Lenox and the Kent (70's) and the Falkland and the Litchfield (50's),⁶⁵ were to be turned over to Ogle's squadron. Cavendish expressed reluctance about turning over the men of the Falkland to Ogle because earlier the Admiralty had spoken of the Salisbury being "wanted upon Service of great Consequence".⁶⁶ The urgency of getting Ogle's squadron to sea was underlined again when Whitehall⁶⁷ commanded the Admiralty to turn over the men of the Falkland to Ogle.

What was particularly significant about the turn-over of men from these four ships-of-the-line to Ogle's squadron was that all four of these ships were operational in the sense that on paper they still could be used to defend home waters should the need arise. However, in truth, none of these ships was in a state even to slip, let alone to get underway, because they had been stripped of men. If the ships were to be made operational in the real sense of the word, men would have to be drafted from elsewhere to make up their complements. But no other men could be obtained unless there was a further turn-over, and that

2/472. 65 Burchett to Cavendish, 25 September 1740, Adm.

1/904. 66 Cavendish to Burchett, 27 September 1740, Adm.

42/23. 67 Stone to Burchett, 30 September 1740, S.P.

was ruled out because Ogle's squadron got precedence in manning over all else.

As it turned out, the Kent was forced to sail. On October 9th "the Elizabeth, one of the Ships appointed to go with Sir Chaloner Ogle to the West Indies had sprung a Leak, by which She [was] disabled from proceeding on that Service".

Your Lordships should appoint Captain Falkingham, who commanded the Elizabeth, to command the Kent, and that the Men should be turned over from the Elizabeth to the Kent, and that all possible Care be taken to prevent any Desertion, on Occasion of turning over the Men.⁶⁸

On the eve of the squadron sailing, the Cumberland, the Shrewsbury, and the Deptford were still under complement and Cavendish was forced to turn over "forty out of the Elizabeth to the Deptford, and Twenty to each of the two others out of the Grafton".⁶⁹ The state of the few ships remaining behind after Ogle's sailing surely must have caused concern at Whitehall and in the Admiralty.⁷⁰

In the navy's search for able-bodied men to man its ships, the presence of a sizeable number of land forces was not overlooked. As early as May 1740⁷¹ Sir John

68 Stone to Burchett, 9 October 1740, S.P. 42/23.

69 Cavendish to Burchett, 16 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

70 Cavendish to Burchett, 13 October 1740, Adm. 1/904, Enclosure. See Appendix D.

71 Baugh, op. cit., 187-190.

Norris had proposed to the cabinet that marines and
soldiers⁷² could be used to man the ships. Although Wal-
pole opposed the use of soldiers and marines as seamen,
Norris' plan was adopted, thanks to the support of New-
castle and Hardwicke. Unfortunately, the marines were not
in a position to be of much help to the navy because they
were having their own recruiting problems. Therefore,
much of the responsibility for providing seamen fell to
the army. Serious morale problems resulted when the
soldiers and marines were used as seamen. The difficulty
of keeping track of the men after they had been transferred
to the ships and the shortage of officers contributed to
the confusion. Discipline problems often arose because of
their unfamiliarity with shipboard routine. Conflicts fre-
quently developed among the officers of the three services
over how the men were to be employed and who was respons-
ible for them. The result was desertion and feigned or
actual sickness.⁷³

⁷² Corbett MSS., XVI, "Marines". Originally the
marines were "land soldiers raised to serve in the Fleet".
Provision was made for their becoming seamen if they were
judged to be up to naval standards. Soldiers could also
become seamen, but they were rated as volunteers and were
paid by the paymaster of the army.

⁷³ Store to Burchett, 18 September 1740, Adm.
1/4109.

With the manning question still not sorted out in a way that would allow Ogle to take the ships of his squadron to sea, the Admiralty ordered Cavendish "to remove from the Transports...Six Hundred Marines to be taken out of the Six Regiments under the Command of Lord Cathcart". These marines were "to Serve in the Said Ships as part of their Complements".⁷⁴ Only Vernon and Cathcart were to have the power to remove the marines from the ships for use ashore.

When Ogle informed the Admiralty, in early October, that his squadron was still short of complement by 1,300 men, Cavendish was aghast and hoped that "their Lordships [would] not attribute it to any neglect in me, for I have turned over into that Squadron all the Men I could find".⁷⁵ On the basis of Ogle's figures, Cavendish concluded that "If this Fleet is intended to be completely manned, it must be with more Marines Soldiers, for there are no Seamen".⁷⁶ There were in fact more seamen, but their turning over would further weaken the limited operational readiness of the home fleet.

2/56. 74 Burchett to Ogle, 24 September 1740, Adm.

1/904. 75 Cavendish to Burchett, 13 October 1740, Adm.

76 ibid.

As to Ogle's figure of 1,300 seamen short of complement, one cannot but wonder if perhaps Ogle had not inflated his figures to get more men and at the same time to protect himself in the eventuality that some of the ships in his squadron ran into difficulties on the crossing to the West Indies.

Although not as urgent as the recruiting of seamen, the problem of obtaining and keeping sufficient experienced commissioned officers to make up the officer complement on the ships of the West Indian squadron caused Ogle considerable difficulty. One of the most significant advantages that a naval officer had over a seaman was that the Admiralty could not force him to take up employment when ordered. Since prize money was the chief attraction of the naval service in time of war, and the underlying philosophy of the navy encouraged personal initiative and aggressiveness, most serious career officers looked upon service in certain geographical areas as offering more chances for fame and fortune. Aside from expeditions such as Captain Anson's,⁷⁷ whose purpose was the plunder-----

⁷⁷ An expedition such as Anson's was referred to as a 'favourite cruise'. Anson left England in the late summer of 1740 on a round the world cruise. By making the most of his vague orders, which for practical purposes had been written by himself, Anson returned to England a hero and a wealthy man.

ing of merchant shipping belonging to the enemy, service in the Mediterranean was considered among the most advantageous because of the climate and the lucrative opportunities for prizes. On the other hand, many officers regarded service in the West Indies as undesirable because of the great risk of contracting serious tropical disease. The fact that there were merchantmen to be captured in the West Indies did little to add to the appeal. Professor Baugh has pointed out that "of the captains promoted between 1700 and 1748 fifty-two eventually died in the West Indies of natural causes; only nine of the same group died natural deaths in the Mediterranean."⁷⁸

Any naval officer who was determined not to serve in the West Indies had a good chance of being appointed elsewhere. The only problem was that the reluctant naval officer usually had to achieve his end without losing his right to half pay.⁷⁹ Since patronage in large measure determined appointments and promotions, the right patron could arrange a new appointment or half pay. When

78 Baugh, op. cit., 115.

79 Half pay was a money payment made to active naval officers who for one reason or another did not have a commission. Naval officers regarded half pay as a reward for past services, while the Admiralty regarded it as a way of maintaining a ready reserve.

Captain George Clinton learned that his ship had been ordered to the West Indies as one of Ogle's squadron, he was horrified and immediately appealed to his patron the⁸⁰ duke of Newcastle, and was removed to another ship.

Although successful in avoiding West Indian service, Clinton never again served at sea being named Governor of New York in 1742 and serving there until 1753. Some officers such as Captain John Hildesley were not as fortunate as Clinton in their family connections and were forced to resort to other methods. Hildesley tried in vain to resign his command of the Grafton when he discover⁸¹ed that she was to be one of Ogle's squadron. As it turned out, the Grafton proved unfit to sail when the West Indian squadron finally did get underway. The only problem with opposing the wishes of the Admiralty was that the Admiralty had exclusive control over all promotions to flag rank. Perhaps this explained why Hildesley was passed over for promotion to flag rank in 1744.

Two other common methods were used by naval officers to withdraw from unwanted appointments without a

⁸⁰ Clinton's brother Henry was married to Newcastle's sister Lucy.

⁸¹ Hildesley to Burchett, 2 and 6 September, 1790, Adm. 3/44.

loss of half pay, but both offered less chance of success than the use of patronage. Officers often would plead that their private affairs were in such a state of disarray that a particular appointment would result in personal ruin. This method had a much greater chance of success if the officer had a suitable patron or obliging creditors to back up his case. The second method, the feigning of sickness, was used by both officers and seamen to good effect. With any luck the officer could arrange his transfer ashore sick until his ship had sailed. Unfortunately, this ploy sometimes misfired when the officer's ship was one of a squadron and the officer found himself transferred not ashore, but to a hospital ship that was sailing with the squadron.

This reluctance of some naval officers to serve in the West Indies put the Admiralty under great strain when the ships of Ogle's squadron were being readied for service abroad. The situation became so serious that Ogle was directed "not to admit any Officer, who shall apply to you, to lay down his Commission, and to declare to all such, they shall not be put upon Half Pay, nor employed any more in the Navy".⁸²

But the navy was no match for a determined officer. If an officer was prevented from resigning his

82 Burchett to Ogle, 10 October 1740, Adm. 2/56.

commission, he could resort to a patron, use the private affairs ruse, or feign sickness, all with little chance of losing his half pay.

The manning problem faced by Ogle was caused by a system that had changed very little over the years. No attempts had been made to reorganize the methods used to recruit and to keep seamen because it honestly was believed by all but a few that an adequate reservoir of seamen existed. But such was not the case. There was no permanent organization or peacetime reserve. They would have been too expensive and parliament shied away from the added expense because it would have meant increased taxation. Yet trained seamen existed, if one adhered to the accepted belief that they belonged to the country as a whole, serving in the merchant service in peacetime and transferring to the fleet in wartime. However, in a time of national emergency, the number of experienced seamen proved insufficient to meet more than the basic requirements of the merchant marine and the navy. Further, the seaman's pay was ridiculously low in the navy when compared to that offered by the merchants. Although the navy was moderately successful in developing morale by providing its ships with adequate victuals and medical services, the merchant service could offer much more and the average seamen realized this. Perhaps Professor Baugh is a little

harsh, but his assessment of naval service is difficult to refute.

The men recognized the king's service for what it was; they refused to enter it willingly and deserted it whenever opportunity offered. Ships became floating prisons, and the dockyard and victualling services were thus required to undertake tasks that might otherwise have been accomplished by the fleet.⁸³

Although the basic system of manning had become more elaborate and sophisticated, it still was considered an evil, something that was necessary but remained "irregular, unreliable, and inadequate".⁸⁴ But if the system continued to exist much as before, an intractable problem, the character of the navy had changed dramatically. Seamen no longer were required on a seasonal basis as in earlier times. Now recruitment meant service at the king's pleasure or until the cessation of hostilities. This reduced the number of seamen available when other ships had to be manned. Ogle had the two added difficulties of manning ships that were destined for the West Indies, an unpopular theatre of war, and being the last of four squadrons to draw on the limited number of available seamen during 1740.⁸⁶

⁸³ Baugh, op. cit., 500.

⁸⁴ ibid., 147

⁸⁵ Corbett MSS., XI, "Sea Pay and Naval Expenditures". Corbett estimated that the number of seamen in the navy tripled from 20,000 to about 60,000 from 1739 to 1740.

VII

The Victualling Problem

By 1740, the major victualling difficulties which earlier in the century had restricted the operations of the fleet and forced the alteration of plans finally appeared to have been overcome. Professor Baugh argues that at last "British naval administration had developed an effective solution to the problem of victualling".¹ This "effective solution" was achieved by a more highly organized system of planning set up by the Admiralty and a government that was willing to pay the increased costs of this improved arrangement. Although techniques of preserving and packing had changed very little, better purchasing methods and improved distribution provided a higher standard of service. But the crucial factor that allowed better planning was adequate notice given by the government of impending demands that would be made upon the navy. If the Admiralty had sufficient time to get itself organized, it could deal quite adequately with the demand created for victuals. The victualling of the Anson and Balchen

¹ Baugh, op. cit., 374.

squadrons, and the Norris fleet, in 1740, had been accomplished in an organized manner and within a reasonable time. Each of the commanders in chief had complained about the limited quantities and inferior quality of their provisions, but had sailed when ordered. Complaints about victuals were quite common because this sometimes was considered to be a valid excuse in the event of a captain or squadron commander being unable to carry out his orders to the satisfaction of his superiors.

The first serious breakdown in administration occurred with Ogle's squadron. Unfortunately, in the case of this squadron, the Admiralty did not know the size of the military operation that the country was committed to until late August. However, once the size of the squadron was settled upon and a commander in chief had been chosen, the Admiralty found itself in the near hopeless position of having to provision thirty-three ships with a time of sailing tentatively set for late September. The victualling system just was not set up to function on such short notice and under such intense pressure. It took time to gather momentum. This was especially true considering the demands that had been made on the system by earlier squadrons. Thus, it was not surprising that after manning, the most difficult problem facing Ogle's squadron proved to be that of victualling.

The administrative organ charged with provisioning the ships of the fleet was the Victualling Board which was made up of seven salaried commissioners. They were delegated their responsibilities for victualling by the Navy Board. The major function of the Victualling Board was the letting of contracts which accounted for almost one quarter of the naval expenditures. During the war of 1739-1748, the majority of naval contracts for provisions were negotiated in London by the commissioners with merchants and tradesmen who usually were responsible for delivering the food stuffs to a pre-arranged naval supply depot. Sometimes local agents acting upon the orders of the commissioners did the purchasing as was the case when² beef and pork were bought in Ireland.

In the autumn of 1740, the Victualling Board was responsible for provisioning the West Indian squadron, the transports, Vernon's ships in the West Indies, and the home fleet. In addition, the Board was overseeing the build-up of provisions in the West Indies in anticipation of the arrival there of Cathcart's troops by year's end. Every day's delay in getting the ships of the squadron to sea meant that the victuals consumed by the seamen, marines, and soldiers had to be topped up. The transports

2 Burchett to Courand, 4 September 1740, S.P.
42/23.

that were to carry Lord Cathcart's officers and men to the West Indies offered a good example of what happened when ships did not sail after they had been victualled. Cathcart's transports were supposed to sail in late July in convoy with Gascoigne's squadron, but at the last minute plans were changed and Ogle replaced Gascoigne as commander in chief of a larger naval squadron. On September 15th, James Wallace, the agent for the transports, informed Cathcart that "forty four days of the Six Months Provisions on Board the Transport Ships were expended by the Forces being on Board"³ and that it was time that Cathcart revictualled for six months. The same day, Cathcart wrote to Newcastle and asked that Newcastle give the necessary directions to initiate the revictualling. As the key figure behind the whole West Indian venture, Newcastle lost no time in getting things moving. The next day, Whitehall ordered the Admiralty to "give the proper Orders for Revictualling all the Transport Ships...so that They may have on board Provisions for Six Months compleat, when They shall proceed on the Expedition".⁴ When the

³ Wallace to Cathcart, 15 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

⁴ Stone to Burchett, 16 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

commissioners of victualling finally received the executive order to revictual the transports for six months, they also were directed by the Admiralty that the victuals were "to be kept up compleat to that time till they proceed to Sea".⁵ The Victualling Office suddenly found itself with the responsibility of feeding an additional ten to twelve thousand men right at the time it was attempting to secure the victualling needs of Ogle's thirty-three ship squadron with a total complement of approximately sixteen thousand officers and men.

According to the 1734 edition of the Regulations and Instructions pertaining to the navy, the basic victuals that went to make up the seaman's diet were biscuits, beer, pork, beef, peas, oatmeal, butter, and cheese.⁶ Served in proper proportions, these basic items would give the seaman approximately 4,000 to 5,000 calories per day.⁷ Unfortunately for the average seaman, things were not always as they were supposed to be, because, unlike manning shortages, the navy had no reluctance in despatching

⁵ Burchett to the Commissioners for Victualling, 17 September 1740, Adm. 2/56.

⁶ Other basic items included rum, wine, and grotts. Frequently basic items were combined as in the case of pease.

⁷ J.C. Drummond and Anne Wilbraham, The Englishman's Food, (Toronto, 1939), 313.

ships that were short of victuals. The urgency of getting the squadron to sea quickly can be seen from Whitehall's instructions to the Admiralty.

Victual the Thirty Three Ships...for Six Months, if possible; But if that cannot be done, That They should be victualled for as long a Time, as is practicable; and that an account be laid before Their Excies. as soon as Four Months Victuals shall have been put on board the said Ships.⁸

In a situation where ships were required to sail with insufficient victuals, the navy paid short allowance money to the seamen in lieu of the provisions not supplied.

On September 10th, the Admiralty ordered Ogle to use his "utmost diligence in getting the said Ships victualled".⁹ The provisioning appeared to progress quite well in the initial stages. By September 17th, the first of four supply ships arrived from London with provisions "to be distributed amongst the Ships of the Squadron".¹⁰

But two very important factors were working against the Admiralty's attempts to get the squadron victualled and to sea. Firstly, the demand for victuals in the fall of 1740 had far outstripped the supply, and secondly, in

8 Stone to Burchett, 9 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

9 Burchett to Ogle, 10 September 1740, S.P. 42/23.

10 Burchett to Ogle, 17 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

many cases, the Victualling Board was not in a position to be able to buy up bulk quantities of farm produce to be turned into finished victuals at its own bases. Instead of being in a position to buy at source and finish itself, the navy found itself as simply one more competitor trying to buy from civilians on an open market where supply was limited and demand was great. This resulted in inflated prices which the navy was forced to pay if it hoped to get its ships provisioned and under way.

These inflated prices were caused by extreme weather conditions during the winter of 1739-40, a late spring, and a summer drought. The summer harvest of 1740 was disastrous and could not be started until autumn. Scarcely had the harvest been completed when severe early frosts returned catching much of the unripened fruit on the trees. The outcome of this unfortunate weather was "extreme famine"¹¹ throughout England. Professor Ashton describes the relationship between weather, harvest, and prices quite dramatically.

Between Michaelmas 1739 and Michaelmas 1740 the price of wheat rose from 4s. 11d. to 7s. 10½d., and in the following winter the scarcity was intensified by a freezing up of the corn mills. In December 1739 the Assize price of the peck loaf in London

83. 11 L.M. Cullen, Life in Ireland, (London, 1968),

was 23d.: a year later it was 39d. According to one observer two barren winters in succession swept away half of the sheep; the starving cattle were unable to produce calves; and the oxen were so weak that it was only with difficulty that the seed was got into the ground. The scarcity of hay and roots, as usual, meant that large numbers of cattle were driven to the slaughter houses; and though, for a time, beef could be had at 1d. a pound there was a steep rise in the prices of dairy produce. Only a few years earlier butter had sold at 2½d.: now it cost 7d. Cheese which had been at 15s. was now 35s. a cwt. 12

During the summer of 1740 the shortage of wheat caused the price to jump approximately eighty per cent over that of the previous year. With wheat in such short supply, the navy bought up what it could on the open market and hurriedly added to its own baking facilities in an attempt to cut costs further by producing its own biscuit. But the navy could not keep up with its own demands and was forced to turn to the commercial bakers. However, they were reluctant to sell to the navy when prices for finished products on the open market were so high. The result was an overall shortage of biscuit for the squadron because the navy was not in a position to purchase large quantities at the high prices it was being forced to pay.

12 T.S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800, (Oxford, 1959), 19-20.

Although barley and other grains were not affected as badly as wheat by the inclement weather conditions, there was a noticeable decline in the amount of good malt available for use in the making of beer. This was followed by a rise in malt prices from 3s. 4d. per bushell to 4s per bushell.¹³ The quantity of beer did not decrease alarmingly, but the quality of beer left much to be desired. Cavendish informed the Admiralty that "Lord Augustis's Ship which may be supposed to be quite ready, this moment acquaints me that he has but three days Beer on Board".¹⁴ This shortage certainly was due to the increased demand for beer and the limited quantities of good beer available. It also could be explained by the confusion and difficulty in getting the beer from shore to the ships of the squadron. Under normal conditions commercial brewers limited their output in the summer months because it was very difficult to control the process of fermentation. But the navy needed beer and continued to brew it or have it brewed during the summer of 1740. The results, in many cases, were disastrous. Cavendish frequently spoke of the bad beer, but also observed that

13 ibid., 132

14 Cavendish to Burchett, 11 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

"what they drink can't be supplied fast enough, so they may be forced to go without", ¹⁵ which would indicate that the beer was drinkable when it came on board, but deteriorated quickly because it still was fermenting. Some ships were unlucky enough to be supplied initially with skunky beer as was the case on the Dunkirk - "gott ¹⁶ up the rest of the Beer upon Deck which stunk". In many cases, ships received permission from the Admiralty to supplement their supplies of beer with wine and brandy. When the beer demands of the Boyne could not be met, she ¹⁷ was allowed to bring on board "1835½ Gallons of Brandy".

The two items in greatest demand were beef and pork. As a result of the agricultural revolution and more progressive methods of marketing, the navy usually could find an abundant supply of beef and pork if it knew its needs and had time to plan ahead to meet these needs. Contracts for beef and pork were made on a quarterly basis and were for either sea stores or fresh meat. The quarter in which the greatest amount of slaughtering was done took in the months of October, November, and December in England. In Ireland "slaughtering began in late August

¹⁵ Cavendish to Burchett, 13 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

¹⁶ The Ship's Log of the Dunkirk, 20 September 1740, Adm. 51/285.

¹⁷ The Master's Log of the Boyne, 10 October 1740, Adm. 52/351.

18
or early September". Although Ireland offered quality meat products in abundant supply, the Victualling Board only turned to Ireland when its demands could not be met by English suppliers.

The supplying of Ogle's squadron with beef presented the Victualling Board with particular problems because the decision to send a naval squadron of thirty-three ships to the West Indies was reached in late August and not acted upon until early September. The Board had sea stores of meat and pork on hand, but much less than was needed to supply Ogle's total complement of 16,000 officers and men for six months. As early as September 17th, the Victualling Board directed that "the following provisions be sent to Portsmouth. Briskett 2,000 baggs, Beer All in Stores, Beef 4,000 pieces, Pork 12,000 pieces".
19
With local supplies of beef and pork in quantity nearly exhausted, the post-September slaughter of animals in England not yet under way, and the need for new contracts to be drawn up to meet the increased demands for meat,

18 L.M. Cullen, Anglo-Irish Trade, 1600-1800, (Manchester, 1968), 12.

19 Victualling Department Minutes, 17 September 1740, Adm. 111/27. In the Corbett MSS., XIV, "Victualling Board; Ordnance Office", Corbett estimated that the average beef carcass dressed would "hold out 160 4-lb. pieces". He estimated the average pork carcass at about 100 pounds.

the Board was forced to turn its attention to Ireland where slaughtering already was in progress. On September 18th, Whitehall ordered the Admiralty to have the commissioners of victualling "send forthwith the proper Instructions to the Agent Victuallers in Ireland, to buy up, immediately, for the Use of His Majesty's Navy, all the Beef, Pork, and Butter, that they should be able to procure in that Kingdom".²⁰ The meaning that should have been read into this order was that only "Flesh, such as was already killed & salted"²¹ was to be purchased by the agents, which would indicate the urgency of the navy's immediate needs. However, the local agents of the Victualling Board in Ireland interpreted the order literally and contracted "for 10,000 Oxen, 15,000 Hogs & 30,000 Firkins of Butter, or as many of each as they can procure".²² The Board was not reprimanded in any way for exceeding its authority and arranging contracts with the Irish suppliers. Rather, it was chided for not sending its agents further afield in Ireland to procure all the meat and butter that were available.

20 Stone to Burchett, 18 September 1740, Adm. 1/4109.

21 Burchett to the Commissioners for Victualling, 26 September 1740, Adm. 2/472.

22 ibid.

The navy also had trouble supplying Ogle with butter and cheese. Once again, inclement summer weather contributed to low yields of dairy products. This limited supplies and forced up prices. In the case of cheese, local contractors were able to supply the basic needs of the squadron by drawing heavily on the surrounding agricultural areas. Butter presented particular problems because of its tendency to go rancid and its limited supply. Any ships of the squadron down on dairy products "have their Butter and Cheese made up by Oyl on their going out".²³ The Boyne was lucky. Three days after she had condemned and thrown overboard "36 Firkins of Butter and Cheese", she was able to acquire "Butter 46 Firkins & 203²⁴ Cheeses". The Orford was not as lucky. After condemning some of her butter and cheese, she was forced to replace the condemned victuals with "16 Jars of Oyl"²⁵ supplemented by an additional 441.2 gallons.

Contracting for provisions to feed the squadron was only part of the victualling problem. The other part of the problem was getting them on board the ships of the -----

23 Corbett MSS., XIV, op. cit.

24 The Master's Log of the Boyne, 13, 17 October 1740, Adm. 52/351.

25 The Master's Log of the Orford, 26 September 1740, Adm. 52/452.

squadron. If they arrived by sea they usually were off-loaded in the naval dockyard at Portsmouth in order to be checked for quantity and quality before being distributed among the ships of the squadron. Tenders, usually hoys, were used to transport the victuals from the dockyard to the ships.

As the victuals began to arrive at the Portsmouth dockyard toward the end of September, Cavendish and all his dockyard personnel were hard put to meet the challenge. The dockyard encountered great difficulty in sending the supplies to the ships because "several of the Ships, having Boatswains and Carpenters so worn out...they are not capable of receiving them and be charged with them".²⁶ To make matters more awkward, Cavendish had an insufficient number of tenders at his disposal to move the supplies quickly. In late September, he informed the Admiralty about the problems he was having with the tenders.

I can scarce find one that is ready to go to Sea, they pretending either to want Caulking, Cleaning, or Defects in their Masts...& for my part I see no remedy, unless they are Discharg'd out of the Service. ²⁷

26 Cavendish to Burchett, 13 October 1740, Adm. 1/904. Commissioner Hughes refused to deliver stores to the Gibraltar "until there is a proper Officer to be charged with them". Hughes to Cavendish, 3 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.

27 Cavendish to Burchett, 28 September 1740, Adm. 1/904.

Even with the tenders that he did have, all was not as it should have been. Once again Cavendish expressed his concern to the Admiralty.

I desire you will please to acquaint their Lordships that having ordered the Draper Tender Francis Moor Master to receive provisions at the Victualling Office, & to Carry it to Spithead, Mr. Shales the Agent Victualler acquaints me he refused doing saying his vessel was not fitt for that ferrie. I hope their Lordships will be pleased to order him forthwith to be discharged out of the Service, for an Example to the rest. ²⁸

Ships' longboats could not be used to carry the provisions from the dockyard because many of the ships had sent their boats ashore for repairs. Those ships that had longboats were afraid to lower them for fear the seamen manning the boats would desert.

The demand for water also taxed the tenders to the fullest. With departure of the squadron daily expected, but a date of sailing not definitely set, all the ships were scrambling to top up their supplies of water. By mid-October, the demand for water became so great that "there are five Tenders gone into Southampton River as high as Redbridge for water, this place not being sufficient to furnish as great a Quantity as the Fleet may require". ²⁹

1/904. 28 Cavendish to Burchett, 15 October 1740, Adm.

29 ibid.

Although Ogle had more than enough problems in getting his own ships manned and supplied with victuals, on September 12th, he was directed by the Admiralty to take on board the ships of his squadron "Extra Cordage and Sails and other Naval Stores they can timely provide at Portsmouth".³⁰

These naval stores were to be transported to Jamaica for Vernon's use. No doubt Vernon needed these naval stores to maintain the operational readiness of his squadron in the West Indies, but surely other ships in the convoy, not naval ships, could have been contracted to carry these supplies. Maybe even some of the transport ships might have been used if Cathcart's remarks were any indication of how the available ships were being employed.

Eleven Transports have no Loading on board that I know of, excepting some Tents, Cloathing & Arms...for the Independent Companies from Jamaica.³¹

The difficulties encountered in victualling the West Indian squadron can be reduced to one basic problem - the navy, through no fault of its own, was not prepared for the urgent demands that would be made upon it in early September by a government that suddenly decided it intended

2/56. 30 Burchett to Ogle, 12 September 1740, Adm.

42/23. 31 Cathcart to Burchett, 18 August 1740, S.P.

to increase the size of the squadron from nine to thirty-three ships. The organization of the navy and the Victualing Board were such that the machinery existed for successfully accomplishing a build up of ships. But, in the case of Ogle's squadron, it was unreasonable to expect that the Board could be made to meet the demands of the larger squadron in such a short interval while continuing to meet its normal obligations. Time had to be allowed for the whole system to gather momentum if it was to function effectively. Professor Baugh observes "that while the British navy tended to be slow to mobilize, it had unparalleled means of increasing its strength as war lengthened out."³²

Unfortunately, time was at a premium. If the squadron intended to sail before the hazardous winter weather set in, all haste had to be made to get it quickly to sea. As far as the government was concerned, lack of victuals or the inferior quality of some items were of little consequence. On October 14th, Newcastle himself directed the Admiralty to "send orders to Sir Chaloner Ogle to sail immediately".³³ But Ogle and his captains were most reluctant to sail until they had sufficient

³³ Newcastle to Burchett, 14 October 1740, S.P. 42/23.

victuals on board to see them to their destination. As late as October 16th, Ogle informed Burchett that the Chichester and the Princess Amelia were unable to join the the squadron at St. Helens because they were taking on bread and beer. The Boyne, the Cumberland, and the Torbay also were unable to get under way until they had been provided with water, beer, and other provisions.³⁴ Though Ogle attempted to sail as soon as Newcastle's orders reached him, the adverse winds made it impossible. This further unexpected delay was not wasted, the interval being used to bring on more supplies. Thus the inclement weather inadvertently allowed the squadron to sail in a better condition than it otherwise might have been.

1/380. 34 Ogle to Burchett, 20 October 1740, Adm.

VIII

Conclusion

In October 1740, the duke of Newcastle, the principal secretary of state responsible for the direction of the war, replied to a question put to him by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, his closest advisor. "You ask me, why does not Sir Chaloner Ogle sail? I answer because he is not ready. If you ask another question, Why is he not ready? To that I cannot answer."¹ This pathetic response typified the government's ineptness in war.

Sir Robert Walpole, the nominal head of government, was but a shadow of his former self. A man of peace who lacked the qualities necessary for waging a successful war, he had let matters drift during the twelve months since war had been declared. By excluding from his cabinet men of character and opinion such as Pulteney, Carteret, Townsend, and Chesterfield, he had to rely on Newcastle, Hardwicke, Harrington, and Harvey, light-weights in matters except those concerning political patronage. Walpole himself in

35406. ¹ Hardwicke Papers, 3 October 1740, Addl. MSS.

fact had ceased to be prime minister. Even on crucial issues that he felt were vital to the interests of England, he was unable to impose his will. The decision to increase the size of the West Indian squadron by transferring ships that might be needed at home to safeguard the country against invasion was made over his objections. "A cabinet such as this was not fitted to deal with the difficult strategic problems that arose."² The making of prompt decisions was further complicated by the king's unwillingness to remain at home in a time of national emergency. He refused to discontinue his jaunts to Hanover and even made a state visit to Holland during the two month period that the squadron was readying itself for the largest expedition of the war.

With a cabinet that lacked strong leadership and ministers of limited ability, it was not surprising that strategic aims were not forthcoming when war was declared in October 1739. Undoubtedly the cabinet realized that any war with Spain was bound to make tremendous demands on the principal instrument of policy, the navy. From earlier encounters, it was obvious that the best way to hurt the enemy, if a direct attack upon Spain was out of the question.

² Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760, (Oxford, 1962), 232.

was to harass her trade and threaten her colonies. But objectives as general as these were not good enough. What was needed was a more precise strategy with specific aims upon which long-range plans could be made. Instead of carrying the war to the enemy in an aggressive fashion, the hesitation of the cabinet put it in the position of having to react to events, not of its own making, which did not contribute to the success of an overall plan. When war was imminent in the summer of 1739, Walpole noted that the navy alone was not a strong enough instrument to force the enemy to a peace and that land forces would be needed to mount an attack.³ Unfortunately, England did not have a large enough army to make up an expeditionary force of the kind that Walpole envisioned. When steps finally were taken to recruit land forces in September, no decision had been reached as to why, precisely, they were being raised. News received in January 1740 of Vernon's reduction of Porto Bello provided the *raison d'être*, and orders were issued to assemble the troops and the necessary transports for an expedition to the West Indies. Once again the cabinet found itself reacting to events, but, at least in this case, the event had been initiated by one of its admirals.

³ H.W. Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, (Oxford, 1946), 113.

By July 1740, with the troops at length embarked on the transports, the ships were unable to get underway. This was due in part to inclement weather, but also to the government's concern about what the enemy was rumoured to be doing. A month later the government decided that Admiral Ogle should be appointed to command a much enlarged naval squadron. This resulted in a further delay of two months. Thus, ten months after it had been decided to employ the expeditionary force in the West Indies, it still was swinging at anchor at Spithead. By this time, its destination was known to the enemy and any hope of secrecy had been lost. In addition, the momentum gained by Porto Bello's capture had not only been lost, but the government was having to strain every sinew to avoid losing an effective presence in the West Indies.

While the West Indian expedition was being prepared, the cabinet took no steps to deal with the Spanish navy. This was a gross oversight because the expedition's chances of success were seriously threatened when the enemy's ships were allowed freedom of movement on the high seas. Throughout the early years of the war, ships continued to enter and to leave Cadiz unopposed. In one instance, Spanish squadrons sailed unchallenged to Toulon and escorted transports carrying their troops from Barcelona

to Italy.⁴ No special effort was made to contain the main naval forces of Spain which lay in Ferrol until July 13th when Norris was dispatched with twenty-two ships to blockade the squadron there. However, sickness and foul weather forced him to drop anchor at Torbay on the Devon coast. Under the circumstances, the best Norris could do was to order several frigates to cruise the waters off the lesser Biscay ports. By August 12th, at the very moment when the Ferrol squadron was rumoured to be under orders to sail, the government decided to switch Norris' attention to San Sebastian. Newcastle even went so far as to reinforce Norris with several regiments of land forces drawn from Lord Cathcart's troops who were destined for the West Indies. This lack of coordination between the West Indian expedition and the necessity of blockading or destroying the Spanish navy was the result of a strategic plan that had not been thought out clearly and lacked direction. Rather than moving step by step towards several prearranged strategic objectives, the government was put in the position of having to react to every enemy initiative because it had no plan. By reacting to every enemy initiative, the government over-extended the naval forces that it had at its disposal.

⁴ Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748,
op. cit., I, 91.

Two basic factors contributed to the navy's inability to meet the demands put upon it; a serious lack of ships, and an inadequate system of manning the ships. This shortage of ships arose out of the government's failure to maintain the navy in a reasonable state of efficiency during the years of peace. When war was declared in 1739, about one third of the capital ships were unfit for service. Of those ships that could go to sea, many were of a type unsuited to the role that they would be called upon to play in the West Indies. Although Ogle's squadron was made up of the best ships ready for service, many of them were too large and clumsy to be of much use in the type of operation planned for the West Indies. Frigates would have been ideal, but there were few available. It was not until 1740 that a major programme of frigate building was begun, but too late to be of any use to Ogle or Vernon. Ironically, even if the ships had existed, there were insufficient seamen to man them. Both the government and the opposition were responsible for this state of affairs. On the one hand, parliament was quite prepared to grant money to the navy which allowed its administrative system to achieve much better results without major reorganization. For example, money was provided to improve the facilities and the administrative units necessary to distribute victuals and naval stores. During the war, this better enabled the navy to

meet the high costs of victuals, dockyard labour, and sending supplies abroad. But, on the other hand, parliament was reluctant to vote any more money than was necessary to keep the navy at a peace time level of 16,000 men. The fact that at least three times this number would be needed in a confrontation with Spain was overlooked by all but a parliamentary committee which was appointed to examine the question of manning. Its major recommendation, the registering of all seamen, was soundly rejected by parliament. The prevailing feeling seemed to be that "a reservoir of trained seamen existed, and in principal it was felt that they belonged to the nation as a whole - to the trade in peace and to the navy and the privateers in war".⁵ Certainly trained seamen existed, but their numbers were too small to supply the needs of the merchant service. Harsh discipline, poor working conditions, and frequent dangers made the navy most unattractive to the merchant seamen. The manning of Ogle's squadron presented particular difficulties because there were very few seamen available after the manpower requirements of earlier squadrons had been met. Even an aggressive policy of impressment could not fill the seemingly endless needs of the squadron for men. The fact that the ships were destined for the West Indies did nothing to encourage enlistment.

⁵ Baugh, op. cit., 497.


If the government was remiss in fulfilling its obligations to the nation in maintaining the fleet at an adequate level of operational readiness and ensuring that there was a sufficient supply of experienced seamen to man the ships, the Admiralty, and particularly the Navy Board, did a remarkably good job of meeting the demands of a government that lacked any settled plan to conduct the war. From August, when it was decided to increase the size of Gascoigne's squadron, until October, when Ogle's squadron sailed, a period of only sixty-six days, an additional twenty-three ships, most of them 3rd and 4th rates, were provided with ordnance, a year's supply of naval stores, and victuals for six months. In the case of victuals, this was done at a time when provisions of all kinds were in very short supply and prices were inordinately high.


Where the Admiralty fell down badly was in its choice of a squadron commander. Although Ogle had managed to get through his rather common naval career with few blemishes on his record, he lacked the aggressive nature of a Vernon or a Hawke. Had the government given the Admiralty more time to make its choice, a more suitable promotion to flag rank might have been made or a shuffling of existing commands could have been carried out. It is doubtful if the squadron ever would have got to sea had

it not been for the leadership shown by Burchett, Hughes, and particularly Cavendish. Compared to the keen sense of duty shown by these men, Ogle's contribution to the preparation of his own squadron was indeed small.

Even with the sailing of the squadron on October 26th, it continued to be plagued by problems, the most serious of which was encountered off Land's End. There, on October 31st,⁶ the combined fleet of over 180 ships was overtaken by a violent gale. Not only was the fleet hopelessly scattered, the Buckingham was forced to return to Spithead. The Superbe and the Prince of Orange were so severely damaged that the Cumberland was forced to escort them to Lisbon. Surprisingly, the remainder of the ships in this vast fleet arrived safely at Prince Rupert's Bay in Dominica on December 23rd for the last leg of the journey to Jamaica.

6 Ogle to Burchett, 23 December 1740, Adm. 1/380.





APPENDIX B

Cart [eret] (a.l.s.)	By the Lords Justices,
Hardwicke (a.l.s.)	Secret Instructions -
Hervey (a.l.s.)	for Sir Chaloner Ogle,
Bolton (a.l.s.)	Knt., Rear Admiral of the
Devonshire (a.l.s.)	Blue Squadron of His Maj-
Newcastle (a.l.s.)	esty's Fleet, Given
Walpole (a.l.s.)	at Whitehall the Twenty
Wager (a.l.s.)	Fifth Day of September
	1740., in the Fourteenth
	Year of His Majesty's
	Reign

Whereas His Majesty has thought proper to send a considerable Number of Land Forces, under the Command of All His Majesty's Forces, appointed, or to be appointed for an Expedition to the West Indies, to be joined by such other Forces as His Majesty has ordered to be raised in His Colonies in America: And Whereas His Majesty has given Directions to

Edward Vernon Esq. ^r, Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of His Majesty's Fleet, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships employed, or to be employed, in the West Indies; and to the said Charles, Lord Cathcart, in what manner His Majesty's Ships, and Forces in the West Indies should be employed, in making attempts upon such of the King of Spain's Settlements, and Dominions there, the - Reduction whereof, if practicable, may be most for the Advantage of His Majesty's Crown, and Kingdoms: And Whereas His Majesty is determined, by the Blessing of God, to pursue such His Intentions; - and to take all necessary Measures for the Success of His Arms thus to be employed, in Opposition to whatever Force shall be brought against Them: And Whereas There is certain Advice, That a Squadron of Spanish Ships of War, consisting of Twelve Ships of the Line, and Two Frigates, did, on the 20th of July last, ³¹ whilst His Majesty's Fleet was detained in the Channel, by contrary Winds, sail from the Port of Ferrol, in Galicia in the West

Indies: And Whereas a Squadron of French Men of War, said to consist of Fifteen Ships of the Line, sailed from Brest on the 22 August last; and another Squadron 2 September consisting of Twelve Ships of the Line, sailed from Toulon on the 15. Augt.; Both, 26 as there is Reason to apprehend, to the West Indies: And whereas The Most Christian King has thought proper to direct the Sieur Bussy, His Minister - residing at this Court, to acquaint His - Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, with the Sailing of the said Squadrons; and that He could not suffer, That England should make Itself new Establishments in - America; and That the late Armaments in England had rendered the Sending His Ships, indispensably necessary: And whereas It appears, by the said Proceedings, and offensive Declaration, That the French King has avowedly sent His Squadrons to America to take part with the Enemies to His Majesty's Crown, and Kingdoms, and, expressly, to prevent His Majesty by all - possible means, from making any new Settlement in the West Indies; and particularly to

deliver the Spanish Dominions from the Danger, with which They are threatened; His Majesty having considered the Injustice of this Behaviour, on the Part of France, as being contrary, not only to the Friendship, subsisting between the Two Crowns, but also in direct Violation of the most solemn Treaties; and having reflected also on the Right, that every Power has, to carry on the War against His Enemy, in such Place, and in such Manner, as He shall think proper; and being determined not to be diverted therefrom, by the Declaration abovementioned; We do therefore, in His Majesty's Name, order and direct You, with a Squadron, consisting of Twenty Eight Ships of the Line, besides one Twenty Gun Ship, and Six Fire-Ships, as named in the Margin, to convoy the Land Forces under the Command of the Lord Cathcart to Jamaica, there to act pursuant to His Majesty's - Instructions given to the said Lord Cathcart and You are, upon your Arrival at Port Royal, in Jamaica, to put yourself under the Command of Vice Admiral Vernon.

Russell

Shrewsbury

Boyne

rs

P. Carolina

Chichester

And Whereas It is possible, That, in your Voyage, you may meet with one, or both of the French Squadrons, or the Spanish Squadron, abovementioned, You are, in that Case, to attack, and endeavour, by all possible means, to take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy the said French, or Spanish Squadrons, if You shall think you have a sufficient Force for that Purpose; and that It can be done without Hazard, or too much Exposing the Transport Ships, that are under your Convoy.

Torbay
Cambridge
Norfolk
Cumberland
P. Amelia
Buckingham
Elizabeth
Prince of Orange
P. Frederick

You are, in your Passage to the West Indies, to get the best Intelligence You can, - relating to the said French, and Spanish - Squadrons, and upon your Arrival at Jamaica, to acquaint Vice Adm. Vernon therewith.

Orford
Suffolk
Grafton
Superbe
Jersey
Dunkirk

You shall communicate These - Instructions to the Lord Cathcart for His Information, as soon as You shall have - opened the same. But You, and the said Lord Cathcart, are to observe the greatest Secrecy in respect thereof, and not to disclose to any Person whatsoever, That any such - Instructions have been given, in

Deptford
Weymouth
Lyon
Augusta
Fippon
York
Montagu
Assistance

Sea Horse	case there shall have been no Occasion to
F. Ships.	put the same into Execution.
Strombolo	You will receive Instructions for Vice
Vulcan	Admiral Vernon, which You are to deliver to
Phaeton	Him, immediately upon Joining Him.
Firebrand	You shall take All Opportunities, that
Aetna	may offer, to transmit to one of His -
Visuvius	Majesty's Principal Secretarys of State,
	with whom you shall correspond, an Account
	of Your Proceedings, and of what You shall
	have done in Obedience to these Instruct-
	ions; and You shall follow such Further
	Orders, as shall be sent You by the King,
	or by One of His Majesty's principal
	Secretaries of State.

The Ships in Ogle's Squadron *

Ships	Commander	Lieutenants	Built	Rebuilt	No. of		Where Fitted Out	When Commissioned	To What Time Paid	Last Cleaned	Sheathed or Not
					Men	Guns					
Ships-of-the Line											
Russell	Harry Norris	Catford Carter Carnsley Farish	1692	1735	615	80	Chatham	19 July 1739	30 July 1740	15 May 1740	Not
	Ogle (C. in C.)										
Cumberland	Stewart	Beaver Brown Rook Baughan		1739	600	80	Woolwich	30 August 1739	30 July 1740	30 May 1740	Not
Pr. Amelia	Hemington	Drake Brownjohn Porter	1692	1739	600	80	Portson	30 August 1739	30 July 1740	17 Feb. 1740	Not
Boyne	Lestock (2 I.C.)	Williams Hardy Knowlen Novell	1692	1739	600	80	Deptford	10 August 1739	30 July 1740	1 June 1740	Sheathed
Pr. Carolina	Griffin	Duncomb Forbes Adams Barton	1697	1730	600	80	Portson	12 July 1739	30 July 1740	15 May 1740	Not

* This list of ships is made up from the following sources: Monthly List, 1 October 1740, Adm 8/21; Charnock, <u>op. cit.</u>, 404-405; Ogle Papers, 25 September 1740; Manning and Walker, <u>op. cit.</u>, 67-493; and Burchett to the Navy Board, 10 September 1740, Adm. 2/201											

Ships	Commander	Lieutenants	Built	Rebuilt	No. of		Where Fitted Out	When Commissioned	To What Time Paid	Last Cleaned	121 Sheathed or Not
					Men	Guns					
Shrewsbury	Townsend	Lloyd O'Brien Hualet Carter	1695	1713	600	80	Portson	5 March 1740	30 July 1740	1 April 1740	Not
Chichester	Trevor	Harrison Watkins Mason Villiers	1695	1706	600	80	Chatham	28 February 1740	30 July 1740		Not
Torbay	Gascoigne	O'Hara Jones Goodwin Arnott	1693	1719	600	80	Chatham	28 February 1740	30 July 1740		Not
Norfolk	Graves	Withers Norris Knible Arrunvell	1693	1728	600	80	Plymouth	30 August 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Orford	Fitzroy	Robinson Seymour Greenwood Taylor	1698	1712	480	70	Chatham	13 July 1739	30 July 1740	15 May 1740	Not
Suffolk	Davers	Carey Vaughan King	1680	1740	480	70	Woolwich	1 March 1739	30 July 1740	5 March 1739	Not
Prince of Orange	Osborn	Davies Rye Clerk Holbourne	1734		480	70	Chatham	12 July 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Buckingham	Mitchell	Bellamy Innes Balfour Berenger	1731		480	70	Chatham	9 July 1738	30 July 1740	14 March 1739	Sheathed

Ships	Commander	Lieutenants	Built	Rebuilt	No. of		Where Fitted Out	When Commissioned	To What Time Paid	Last Cleaned	122 Sheathed or Not
					Men	Guns					
Prince Frederick	Beauclerk	Dovey Hughes Jasper Pickering	1679	1740	480	70	Deptford	23 February 1740	30 July 1740		Not
Jersey	Lawrence	Store Lofting Evans	1736		400	60	Plymouth	14 August 1739	30 July 1740	20 April 1740	Not
Superb	Hervey	Sbirrel Bentley Young	1736		400	60	Chatham	12 July 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Dunkirk	Baker	Dodd Callis Amherst	1651	1734	400	60	Sheerness	7 August 1739	30 July 1740	28 July 1740	Not
Deptford	Rocklington	Dove Norris Smith	1732		400	60	Plymouth	14 July 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Weymouth	Knowles	Leslie Goodall Ferrard	1736		400	60	Plymouth	12 July 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Montague	Chambers	Jefferys Langdon Pitchford	1654	1716	400	60	Plymouth	19 February 1740	30 July 1740	14 July 1740	Not
Lyon	Cotterall	Bruce Fawler Wood	1710	1738	400	60	Chatham	12 July 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Augusta	Dennison	Coachman Taylor Dent	1736		400	60	Chatham	16 May 1738	30 July 1740		Not

Ships	Commander	Lieutenants	Built	Rebuilt	No. of		Where Fitted Out	When Commissioned	To What Time Paid	Last Cleaned	123
					Men	Guns					Sheathed or Not
Rippon	Jolley	Mithers Monypenny Lee	1712	1735	400	60	Plymouth	30 August 1739	30 July 1740	4 June 1740	Not
York	Coates	Bruce Dryal Ashew	1706	1738	400	60	Plymouth	8 September 1739	30 July 1740		Not
Litchfield	Cleland	Cornish Barnsley Shanhope		1730	300	50	Plymouth	30 August 1739	30 July 1740		Not
<u>Fireships</u>											
Phaeton	Kennedy	Welden			45		Woolwich	1 March 1740	30 July 1740	28 March 1740	Not
Firebrand	Barnard	Wells			45		Woolwich	1 March 1740	30 July 1740	March 1740	Not
Atna	Fenwick	Graves			45		Woolwich	1 March 1740	30 July 1740	21 March 1740	Not
Vulcan	Pellatte	Elwall			45		Woolwich	1 March 1740	30 July 1740		Not
Vesuvius											
Strumbale	Langstaffe	Hudson			45		Woolwich	1 March 1740	30 July 1740		Not
<u>Hospital Ships</u>											
Scarborough	Carter		1740		75	18	Woolwich	2 July 1740	30 July 1740		Not
Princess Royale	Tucker				75	18	Deptford	2 April 1740		12 June 1740	Not

APPENDIX D

AN ACCOUNT OF THE NUMBER OF MEN TURNEDOVER
FROM THE SHIPS UNDERMENTIONED¹

FROM WHAT SHIPS ²	TO WHAT SHIPS	NUMBER		
Victory	York	50		
	Rippon	25		
	Elizabeth	40	185	220
Lenox	Russell	30		
	Augusta	40		
	Boyne	100		
	Chichester	25	150	152
Kent	Princess Amelia	25		
	Boyne	80		
	Prince Frederick	20	160	160
	Boyne	40		
Assistance	York	20		
	Litchfield	40		
	York	30		
	Suffolk	40	190	190
	Orford	20		
Rochester	Cumberland	40		
	Weymouth	20		
	Buckingham	92	92	164
Roebuck	Litchfield	20		
	Rupert	40	110	110
	York	30		
Chester	Weymouth	20		
	Weymouth	40		
	Buckingham	18	103	110

1 Cavendish to Burchett, 13 October 1740, Adm. 1/904.
Enclosure

2 ibid. In a second enclosure included with this letter from Cavendish to Burchett, two more turn-overs are mentioned; 35 men from the Grafton to the Torbay, and 177 from the Falkland to the Salisbury.

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

FROM WHAT SHIPS	TO WHAT SHIPS	NUMBER		
Royale Escape	Augusta	45		
	Shrewsbury	36	36	36
Truro Tender	Princess Caroline	10		
	Firebrand Fireship	6	16	16
Rochester	Princess Caroline	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u> </u>
		1059	1067	1158

Besides 50 Marines taken out of the Assistance for
Sr. Chaloner

Phil. Cavendish

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Only the items to which specific reference has been made in the thesis are included in this list.

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- Adm. 3. Admiralty Board Minutes.
- Adm. 3/44 August, September, October,
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books.
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- Adm. 8. List books.
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- Adm. 50. Admirals' journals.
- Adm. 50/18 Ogle's journal.
- Adm. 51. Captains' logs.
- Adm. 51/285 Captain Baker of the
Dunkirk.
- Adm. 52. Masters' logs.
- Adm. 52/351 the Boyne
- Adm. 52/452 the Orford
- Adm. 99. Sick and Wounded Board minutes.
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S.P. 42. State Papers, Naval.

S.P. 42/23 Letters from the Lords of the Admiralty to the secretaries of state and letters from Lords Justices to the Lords of the Admiralty.

W.O. 48. War Office.

W.O. 48/81 Ordnance Treasurer's ledgers.

B. Private

Admiralty Library

Corbett MSS. This twenty-two volume series was compiled by Thomas Corbett, deputy secretary of the Admiralty, as a handbook for his patron, Torrington, soon after the latter was appointed First Lord in 1727. The five volumes that I found most valuable are listed below:

X - Raising Seamen.

XI - Sea Pay and Naval Estimates.

XIV - Victualling Office; Ordnance Office.

XV - Naval Stores.

XVI - Marines.

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Ogle Papers. This was a very disappointing collection. It consisted of some fifty letters, none of which pertained to my topic. The only valuable find was the Secret Instructions.

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