

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

**The Framing of Myth in the Creation of a Palestinian Identity: Hamas, Fatah and
Children's Media**

Master of Arts in Globalization and International Development

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to all those striving for a better and more peaceful tomorrow.

Abstract

This thesis is an exploratory examination of identity construction and children's media, with a focus on the Palestinian political groups of Fatah and Hamas. It looks at how children's media are framed within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It examines how internal and external social factors contribute to identity formation and the interaction among these elements during times of conflict and war.

This thesis hypothesizes that both Fatah and Hamas use various myths to differing degrees in order to frame their conception of a Palestinian identity. Specifically, it explores the use of the *Myth of Battle*, the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Religion*, the *Myth of Land* and the *Myth of Other*. It seeks to determine which of these myths each group emphasizes through a qualitative and quantitative visual ethnographic content analysis.

The quantitative analysis uncovered interesting, albeit not statistically significant, differences between Fatah's and Hamas' use of all of the myths in their videos. Specifically it found that both groups made equal and great use of the *Myth of Religion*; that Hamas produced the videos with the greatest focus on the *Myth of Battle* and the *Myth of Hero*; and that neither group greatly emphasized the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Land* or the *Myth of Other*. Finally, the analysis discovered positive correlations between the *Myth of Hero* and the *Myth of Battle* as well as between the *Myth of Battle* and the *Myth of Other*.

Key Words: Identity, Myth, Palestinian Discourse, Hamas, Fatah, Children's Media

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The causes and effects of conflict and war have caught the attention of theorists over the course of history. Underlying these explorations are questions such as: what social causes spark war? What factors determine whether a conflict will be short-lived or intractable? And what are the long-term effects on a population? This analysis investigates some of these broad questions from the vantage point of identity construction and children's media. Motivated by the assumptions that identity is influenced by and influences internal and external social factors, that children represent the future of any given society, and that media are ever-advancing means of communication in society, this analysis investigates how these factors interact in times of conflict. Looking specifically at the way the Palestinian political groups of Fatah and Hamas frame media for children in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this analysis investigates which myths each collective emphasizes in its efforts to create and disseminate its own conception of identity for its future generations. It must be noted that the target audience's reactions to these myths is not considered in this thesis' analysis. This chapter begins with a background of the thesis as a way of orienting the research question and hypotheses. These sections are followed by an exploration of the limitations and the structure of this thesis. It concludes with a discussion of the significance of the research.

1.1 Background of the Thesis

As a primarily exploratory study, this thesis involves an overview of theoretical perspectives related to the acquisition and dissemination of identity. Specifically, it explores the construction of identity from the vantage point of acquisition and dissemination at both an individual and a collective level. It also looks at the relational process of the *self-other dichotomy* and investigates the use of myths throughout this process. In its exploration of how identity is externally constructed, it discusses theories of propaganda and framing as a means of highlighting how myths are used to create an identity and draw out action. On the basis of these theoretical perspectives, this analysis identifies the following six myths of

interest to its exploration: the *Myth of Battle*, the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Religion*, the *Myth of Land* and the *Myth of Other*.

With all these elements in mind, this thesis also pairs its framework with an exploration of some of the main historical events of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the development of Fatah and Hamas, the two political groups upon which this thesis is based. Doing so is motivated by the theory that the historical realities within which an identity is formed will be substantially reflected in its discourses, narratives, myths and symbols.

As such, this analysis explores multiple Palestinian discourses, narratives, myths and symbols. Three of which that stand out include the Myth of Descent, which highlights historical and religious ties to the land; the myth of “*Al-Nakba*” (or ‘*Nakba*’) or the “catastrophe”, which refers to the 1948 loss of land; and the “Meta-History” or “Master-Narrative” (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 116-117; Birnbaum, 2009, p. 144). The Meta-History combines both the Myth of Descent and the *Nakba*, linking the Palestinian people to the land and states that it will be liberated and returned to the Palestinian people. This narrative describes this liberation as a result of a struggle, which can appear insurmountable, but can in fact be won, as evidenced by past historical victories (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 144). This narrative seems to be contained throughout the three Palestinian discourses of Tragic, Liberationist and Nation-Statist that this thesis addresses. All of these employ the six myths of *Battle*, *Hero*, *Victim*, *Religion*, *Land* and *Other* in diverse frames that call upon the historical experiences of both Fatah and Hamas.

1.2 Research Question and Hypotheses

Specifically, this thesis asks: which of these myths does each group emphasize? To begin to answer this question, this analysis explores the historical context of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as each group’s respective history and stated political goals.

The use of these six myths is based both on the ubiquitous nature of myths in society and to the creation of identity, as well as the specific nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Fatah and Hamas are hypothesized to use the *Myth of Battle* in their videos because conflict and combat have been waged over the course of each group’s development and would, therefore, have had an impact. Furthermore, both Hamas and Fatah have historically made use of guerrilla fighting and each makes varying claims to violent uprisings in their

respective founding documents. Hamas is hypothesized to use more of the *Myth of Battle* because when Fatah moved towards negotiations with Israel and the West, Hamas stayed its course of violent attacks.

The loss of land in 1948 (*Al-Nakba*) is arguably the central event in the formation of current Palestinian identity. It underscores multiple Palestinian discourses, which emphasize the tragedy of this loss, the desire for liberation and the establishment of a nation; varying from feelings of victimhood to those of triumph. These speak respectively to the *Myth of Victim* and the *Myth of Hero*. Understanding the *Myth of Victim* to be a part of the Tragic Discourse, which is frequently utilized by humanitarian groups in a bid to secure support, and that this thesis addresses the way these groups frame identity for their constituents, it is hypothesized that neither group will include a large emphasis on the *Myth of Victim*. It should be noted, however, that this discourse has also been used internally to legitimize nationalistic claims and actions (Khalili, 2007a, p. 38). Accepting that Fatah makes use of history and that it seeks to garner as wide ranging an audience as possible, it is predicated that Fatah would make slightly more use of this myth than Hamas (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 135; 137). Alternatively, Hamas is predicted to use the *Myth of Hero* to a larger extent than Fatah because of the heroic nature of its covenant and its use of martyrs. Fatah is also hypothesized to use this myth because, in its early days, it too venerated and financially remunerated martyrs. In its current state, which negotiates with the West and Israel, however, it is not predicted to use as much as Hamas, as it considers external perceptions.

Both Hamas and Fatah have connections to Islam. Hamas is an Islamist organization and, as such, is predicted to utilize religious symbols throughout its videos to motivate and justify its actions. This is contrasted against nationalistic Fatah's historic use of Islamic symbols both because its founding members adhered to the religion and, arguably, in a bid to regain the support it lost to Hamas. Given this, it is hypothesized that Hamas will make greater use of the *Myth of Religion* than Fatah.

The *Myth of Land* is argued to be central to Palestinian history; its loss and the desire and efforts to regain it. This thesis looks at this myth as a central part of the Palestinian Myth of Descent, which highlights past connections to the land (Litvak, 2009b, p. 97). While both Hamas and Fatah center on the goal of attaining land, the nationalistic character of Fatah leads to the hypothesis that it will make greater use of this myth than Hamas.

Finally, the *Myth of Other*, or the referential entity used in the formation of the identity of the ‘*self*’, is considered. This thesis considers the *Myth of Other* as an entity formed in the context of conflict and, therefore, it is the component against which the Palestinian *self*, or identity, is formed. Looking at the history of two of the groups in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is interesting to note the evolution of Fatah, from a collective that was openly reliant on violent conflict, to one engaged in negotiations and subsequent accords and monitoring. This is starkly contrasted against Hamas’ past refusal to do likewise. Because of these negotiations, it is hypothesized that Fatah will make little use of the *Myth of Other*, perhaps due to its awareness of the possibility that this portrayal might undermine its negotiations and its local support. Hamas, on the other hand, is theoretically unbound by such considerations. Furthermore, it makes frequent reference to the demonized ‘*other*’ throughout its covenant (“The Covenant”, 1988, Introduction; Articles 7, 13, 15, 20, 28, 32). Therefore, Hamas is predicted to make greater use of this myth.

1.3 Consideration of Limitations

In constructing the analysis of these six myths, several limitations have been considered. To begin, the analysis explores Palestinian media, which is generally broadcast in Arabic. Because the researcher does not speak Arabic, the analysis narrowed its focus to visual symbols. While the inclusion of verbal language would have added an additional layer to the exploration, focusing solely on symbols lent itself well to the typically symbol-laden nature of media directed to children. Furthermore, the fact that the researcher did not comprehend the accompanying words enabled an enhanced focus on the symbols.

It should be noted that, while visual symbols allowed for a unique focus, the researcher is analyzing a culture from an outsider’s perspective. Indeed, inherent to every analysis in which a researcher is looking in on a culture other than his/her own, there is the possibility for misunderstanding. However, even when a researcher reviews his/her own culture there are inherent challenges. Considering Cooley’s (1969) assertion that cultural belief systems exist because they are unchallenged and that “no group is a trustworthy critic of its own conclusions” (p. 292), this thesis acknowledges its limitations, while simultaneously positioning itself amidst literature that enables the relevant introduction of a new analysis.

Structuring this analysis in consideration of certain challenges was additionally evident when determining the source of the television media. Before the thesis could outline its construction, it was essential to determine the accessibility of the sources. Numerous attempts were made to secure this access, including emailing every available contact at Al-Aqsa TV, PATV (the Palestinian Broadcasting Company's television station, also known as "Palestine TV") and the Palestinian Broadcasting Company (PBC) directly. Research also brought contacts at *Ma'an*, an independent Palestinian news outlet which is primarily based in Bethlehem, which provided additional regional contacts. Ultimately, these attempts at directly culling information failed to yield the desired results, which led to the investigation of websites. Although Al-Aqsa TV's website and its children's website (Kids Aqsa TV) linked to videos used in this thesis, the same was not true for the Fatah-linked media outlet (PATV).

This resulted in the inclusion of videos from Palestinian Media Watch (PMW or PalWatch) and the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project (MEMRI TV or MEMRI). Both these media watch organizations were contacted and asked for uncut children's television videos (as defined in Appendix 1) from 2000-2009. PMW sent over 200 videos directly.¹ Some of these fit the research criteria and others did not. This was fleshed out by researching the organization's website. MEMRI, likewise contacted, insisted that it does not keep record of uncut videos beyond that which was made available online and, as such, its website provided some applicable videos that were included in the analysis. For a list of all the videos and their sources please see Appendix 2.

¹ It must be noted that PMW did not specify whether these videos were cut or uncut and no information regarding the length of these videos was found. As such, this was not a criterion for inclusion, but was part of the desired criteria when initially gathering research material.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the analysis by stating the motivation, background, research question, hypotheses, considerations of limitations, structure and significance of the research. Chapter 2 reviews pertinent literature in the construction of the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 builds on the theoretical framework by exploring the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the establishment of Fatah and Hamas, as well as each group's discourses, narratives, myths, symbols and media. Chapter 4 outlines the qualitative and quantitative methods used in this study. It identifies the population, the data collecting processes, data outliers and the use of descriptive statistics, cross tabulations and correlations. It also discusses issues of generalizability. The findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses are recorded in Chapter 5 and are discussed in the context of the theoretical framework as well as history and discourse in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 provides an overview of all of the findings, discusses certain limitations of the analysis and provides recommendations for future avenues of research and development.

1.5 Significance of the Research

In spite of the material and practical limitations of this thesis, it remains significant as it highlights a field of research worthy of future investigation and consideration. While scholarship has explored children's roles in conflict and children's media both in times of conflict and peace, this analysis takes a different perspective by considering the way myths are framed in children's media as a means of deciphering the disseminator's perspective of how identity should be carried out by society's youngest members. As such, it is hoped that this thesis will contribute to current and ongoing research into the social aspects of war through the investigation into the role of children's media during conflict.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Identity is the seminal concept of this thesis and is a topic that has garnered much attention among scholars. Multiple theoretical perspectives are met with an equally varied focus of exploration regarding what identity is as well as how it is created, accepted and distributed. In its review of literature, this chapter broadly divides its examination according to acquisition and dissemination. It must be noted that these two elements are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the two have a symbiotic relationship. The discussion will begin with general theories of identity, as well as the concept's relational aspect, the *self-other dichotomy*. This will be followed by an exploration of myths and symbols, which are central to both the acquisition and distribution of identity. Propaganda will then lead the discussion on the role of social actors, or identity disseminators. Finally, the theory of framing, with a focus on media, will further explore the ways identity is contextualized and circulated. Throughout this literature review, the perspective of this thesis will be discussed and its position amidst the theoretical framework will be identified.

2.1 The Acquisition of Identity

2.1.1 The Definition and Creation of Identity

Identity literature defines the concept with both general and specific foci. Falling into the broad theoretical perspective, Elbedour et al. (1997) discuss identity "... as the vehicle through which individuals understand and act upon their environments", thereby introducing the notion of identity as an active process (p. 218). Relating it closely to societal influences, the authors go on to define identity as a "cognitive scheme", or a process of knowledge acquisition (Elbedour et al., 1997 p.219). This is in line with the exploration of Cooley (1926). He proposes that the concept of identity is a part of knowledge that is specifically concerned with the pursuit of meaning (p. 68). He emphasizes that its 'function' serves to give "... us adjustment to, and power over, the conditions under which we live" (Cooley, 1926, p.59). Knowledge has an "external" aspect, which includes the understanding of the scientific, or material parts of reality, and an "internal" aspect, which involves emotions and

instincts, and is based on the interactive communication between members of society (Cooley, 1926, p.60). Identity as a broad concept, then, is an advanced and interactive process of knowledge acquisition that is created and sustained by numerous elements. These elements are explored by theorists such as Hall and Osborne, both of whom build on the general approach by specifying the compositional aspects of identity (Hall in Osborne, 2001, p. 30).

Hall², for example, emphasizes the importance of time, proposing that identity is defined according to experiences of the past (Hall in Osborne, 2001, p. 30). This echoes Said's (1979) argument, in which he explains that identity is created and re-created over the course of time (p. 121). Osborne (2001) also theorizes that no one social element is solely responsible for identity, but that it is informed through the interaction with a multitude of influences including gender, religion, class, ethnicity, nationality and connections to "... local, regional, and national associations" (p. 30). While each can appear disparate, these multiple emphases can be connected. For example, an identity, or knowledge, informed by nationalism (Osborne, 2001) is also constituted by all of nationalism's supportive elements, which include the practice of commemoration and the creation of heroes (Sa'di, 2000), all of which are sourced to the past. Sa'di (2000) adds that these constitutive elements are inter-subjective, "... constantly reproduced and bolstered through invented traditions ... and the creation of national cultural canons ..." (Sa'di, 2000, p. 176).

Cooley (1926) specifies how identities are constructed over time. He defines this creation as a linear progressive process beginning with a set of conceptions granted at birth, opening up onto an ever-increasing field of influence through communication. This includes a dichotomous interaction between the manner in which an individual self-defines and how he/she is defined by some external force (Cooley, 1926, p. 63).³ Elbedour et al. (1997) add the idea that the individual and the collective are functions of the same process of identity creation. While this thesis focuses on the collective, it agrees with Elbedour et al.'s (1997) and Cooley's (1998) theories that individual identity is partly informed by, but is not entirely

² Hall, Stuart. (1993). "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." In *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Osborne, Brian S. (2001). Landscapes, memory, monuments, and commemoration: putting identity in its place. *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal*.

³ It must be noted that the term "process" can be misleading as it connotes the notion of 'predictability'. As Cooley explains, however, the latter two phases can occur in order, out of sequence and/or simultaneously, thereby adding the element of fluidity or variability to identity construction.

absorbed into, the collective, as confirmed by the fact that individuals have multiple identities, or the simultaneous existence of various levels of understanding (e.g., individual and collective) (Khalili, 2007b, p. 278). What is consistent in identity construction, according to Cooley (1998), is the tension between the two levels, "... between natural impulses that an individual must actively develop and social structures he must actively appropriate" (Cooley, 1998, p. 20).

2.1.2 The Representation of the Self-Other

The concept of tension highlights the elements of dichotomy and, potentially, struggle between different collectives in the process of identity construction. It should be noted that 'tension' can be synonymous with 'relational'. That is to say, a group understands itself in relation to another group. Although this process need not always comprise conflict, this thesis makes use of multiple theories that explore the dichotomy with an element of competition. Elbedour et al. (1997), for example, describe identity construction as a competitive process between two or more groups, wherein one group actively attempts to distinguish itself from and thwart the efforts of the *other* group or groups (p.220). Basically, this is a differentiation between collective identities, with one positioning itself, or the *self*, against another group or the *other* in a dichotomous construct this thesis terms the *self-other dichotomy* (the *self-other*). Benford & Hunt (1992) propose that this dichotomy is a natural and central part of identity construction (Benford & Hunt, 1992, p. 36-37).

As one of the key components of identity, then, the *self-other* is affected by societal influences. In times of peace, Woehrle & Coy (2000) suggest that this dichotomy is of minor importance, but can take on a different meaning and can be exploited for the purpose of control in times of conflict (p. 8). This reinforcement of the *other* has been termed "enemy imaging" and is a common identity process in light of a situation or a people deemed to be an "external threat" (Woehrle & Coy, 2000, p. 6). During this time, the differences between the collectives deepen, as one group attributes negative qualities to the *other*. Petonito (2000) suggests that an enemy is created with the use of pre-existing constructs in society, such as collective experiences or qualities a society considers negative. For example, powerful social actors create projections of the *other* that depict it as losing its humanity. Furthermore, when there is minimal interaction between the two identity groups, each collective tends to rely more on stereotyping the *other* (Elbedour et al., 1997 p.220). Cooley (1998) furthers that

conflict provides collectives with the opportunity to alter, establish and enhance internal self-conceptualizations as they relate to “important issues and concerns and ongoing changes of personal identity and the collective” (p. 25).

Woehrle & Coy (2000) add that conflict serves as a means of testing the pre-established bonds of the *self*, or the pre-existing content of identity. This introduces the notion of older and younger identities. While certain theorists, such as Litvak (2009a) propose that a ‘younger’ identity is “fragile” and, therefore more susceptible to influences, such as conflict, this thesis proposes that the concept of a ‘young’ or ‘old’ identity is a description political actors themselves can use to describe their longevity (p. 15). Therefore, this analysis subscribes to the more general theory that any group that experiences conflict will have its identity shaped and informed by this conflict. This is combined with the length of the conflict itself. Anderson (1995) states that even if some form of peace is attained, sustained warfare can leave individuals rejecting reconciliation initiatives with the *other*, on the basis of persistent support for the righteousness of their identity (p. 27). Smith (1986)⁴ adds that “the frequency, intensity and duration of wars between rival polities is itself a significant factor in crystallizing ethnic sentiments among an affected population” (Smith in Litvak, 2009a, p. 11). This thesis proposes that the longer a conflict persists the more likely it will become integrally linked to how a group self-identifies, to the detriment of any other aspects of the group’s identity (Woehrle & Coy, 2000, p. 7).

It must be noted that the analysis of dichotomies in conflict frequently supposes a real and tangible opposition. But even where identities appear to be fully dichotomous, Brubaker (2002) reminds us that there is nothing ‘objective’ here: that most oppositional *self-other dichotomies* are “... not things *in* the world, but perspectives *on* the world” (p. 174-175). Of course, for groups and individuals, these oppositional relationships may seem real, and may be felt as such. Analysts, however, must not take this ‘reality’ as a given. Rather, they need to understand how these ‘dichotomous’ perspectives have been constructed over time, through what political and social processes these have been reified. That is, how individuals and groups have come to feel and perceive these dichotomies as real “things in the world”.

⁴ Smith, Anthony D. (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell. Cited in Litvak, Meir. (2009a). Collective memory and the Palestinian experience. In Meir Litvak (Ed.). *Palestinian collective memory and national identity* (pp. 1-26). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

2.1.3 Myths and Symbols

The identity literature indicates that the acquisition of an identity often requires two key supportive elements: myths and symbols. This literature, however, does not always clearly distinguish between the two. Indeed, these theories explore multiple concepts with different titles, and nuanced definitions, such as discourses, narratives, myths and symbols. This analysis focuses primarily on myths and symbols, but addresses these four concepts from a macro-micro perspective, with ‘discourse’ broadly encompassing narratives, myths and symbols (Khalili, 2007a, p. 11).

To begin with, Segal (2004) defines ‘myth’ as a story that expresses a conviction and is tenaciously held by a target population (p. 6). Osborne (2001) specifies that this ‘story’ is “... ‘an arrangement of the past, whether real or imagined, in patterns that resonate with a culture's deepest values and aspirations ... so fraught with meaning that we live and die by them ...’” (p. 10). This definition is similar to that of ‘narratives’. Khalili (2007a), for example, defines narratives as a means of conveying memories (p. 5). The author, however, provides a slight distinction, by stating that narratives can also contain myths. This is in line with Ellul’s (1965) description of myth as “... an image-evoking belief ...”, suggesting that it is comprised of multiple parts, such as symbols (p. 246). Building on this, Cooley (1926) notes that “... the symbol is nothing in itself, but only a convenient means of developing, imparting, and recording a meaning ...” (p. 68). Accordingly, this thesis explores myths and symbols based on the proposal that myths are manifested in symbols, with the latter evoking the meaning of the former (Cooley, 1926, p. 68).

2.2 The Use of Myths: From the Acquisition to the Dissemination of Identity

2.2.1 Myths and Propaganda

Although different disciplines within the social sciences explore myths from diverse perspectives, Ellul (1965), in his exploration of propaganda, condenses all of these by examining the “origin, function, and subject matter” of myths (Segal, 2004, p. 2). This leads to the question: why do myths exist and persist? This thesis proposes that the answers must be found in the straightforward and symbolic needs of both the acquirers *and* the disseminators of the myths (Segal, 2004).

Both Sorel (1999) and Ellul (1965) view myths as constructs that can be used to elicit the goals of propaganda; the overarching of which is to prime and call a society to action. It should be noted that myths do not exist solely to serve the needs of propagandists, nor are they necessarily constructed by propagandists. Instead, myths often exist in society and propagandists can make use of them for their purposes (or ‘needs’). Indeed, Sorel (1999) states that it is “... through myths that we understand ‘the activity, the sentiments and the ideas of the masses as they prepare themselves to enter the decisive struggle’” (Sorel, 1999, p. xiv). In this vein, Ellul describes propaganda as “... a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulation and incorporated in an organization” (Ellul, 1965, p. 61). Among the many methods used to address the goals and incorporate the requirements of effective propaganda are myths.

It must be noted that this thesis’ theories of propaganda are from the specific vantage point of Ellul (1965), a French philosopher whose conceptualization has proven seminal to the field of propaganda and resilient to the passage of time. Like the early theories of Lasswell (1927)⁵ and Catlin (1936)⁶, Ellul proposed that propaganda is a method of controlling public opinion and action by multiple available means (Lasswell & Catlin in Black, 2001, p. 123). Ellul built on these theories to identify the subject as a ubiquitous social reality. Unlike Chomsky (1989), who equates propaganda with media, Ellul sees propaganda as a more complex phenomenon, which includes, but is not limited to, media. This thesis, then, draws extensively upon Ellul’s theories to build its theoretical framework.

Ellul’s (1965) theories rest on several criteria regarding the disseminator and recipients of propaganda as well as the qualities required for it to be effective. To begin, Ellul describes propaganda as a system that works best within a hierarchical context, where a central body governs a group, nation or society (Ellul, 1965, p. 22; 94; 138). The disseminator, or “propagandist”, must be removed from the “propagandee” or target collective/population. Furthermore, the propagandist must believe in the cause for which he/she works but need not believe in the specifics of the arguments he/she tailors for the

⁵ Lasswell, H. D. (1927). The theory of political propaganda. *American Political Science Review*, 627. Cited in Black, Jay. (2001). Semantics and ethics of propaganda. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, 16(2&3), 121-137.

⁶ Catlin, G. E. G. (1936). Propaganda as a function of democratic government. In H.W. Childs (Ed.), *Propaganda and dictatorship: A collection of papers*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cited in Black, Jay. (2001). Semantics and ethics of propaganda. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, 16(2&3), 121-137.

propagandee (Ellul, 1965, p. 24). That is to say, the content of the myth must primarily serve the overall purpose of the cause for which the propagandist works.

Furthermore, the content of propaganda messages must strike a balance between the needs of their creators and the requirements of the target audience. This introduces the debate over the truthfulness of myth. Authors hold different views regarding the requirement that myths need to be ‘true’.⁷ For Segal (2004), myths can be both real and fictional, but the quality of truth is not a pre-requisite for the target audience’s acceptance or effectiveness (p. 5-6). Ellul, on the other hand, argues that truth must always underlie or accompany a message in order for it to be socially accepted, effective and resilient (Ellul, 1965, p. 57). Ellul seems to speak to the quality of resonance. That is to say, for a myth to be accepted, the message must resonate among the audience, or reflect the audience’s personal experience. This also serves the audience’s need to validate, or make sense of said experience. In this way, myths must call on, but need not completely reflect, the experiential ‘truth’ (Ellul, 1965, p. 22; 94; 138). This analysis agrees with Ellul: the greater the resonance of the myth, the greater the probability that an audience accepts a myth, and that it persists in its acceptance. This is particularly interesting for identities formed in conflict, in that the myths reflect the experience of conflict, thereby perpetuating the experience at the level of identity.

In addition to, and perhaps reflected in, resonance, is the notion that rather than thoughts, these myths must elicit feelings such as heroism, nostalgia, love, fear, or courage (Ellul, p. 175). An additional one of these feelings that Ellul (1965) insists upon is hatred; a universal quality in human societies. This provides the foundation for his theory that propaganda brings conflict to the forefront of social priorities by presenting a release for the need to hate through the creation of an enemy and calls for action (p. 152). This situation is based on more than the simple provision of a target, but furnishes the propagandee with “ready-made judgments” to bring him/her to a point of action (p. 163).

2.2.2 Specific Myths

Ellul (1965) discusses multiple myths that are ever-present and across all societies. He maintains that one of the most “fundamental” myths of society is History. Drawing on this, are what Ellul describes as “collective myths” which he explains as “man’s principal

⁷ ‘True’ is in quotations because it acknowledges that there is no objective truth. For the purpose of this specific exploration a ‘true’ myth is opposed to a myth created to intentionally deceive.

orientations”. Ellul specifies that these are: “... the myth of Work, the myth of Happiness ... the myth of the Nation, the myth of Youth, the myth of the Hero” (Ellul, 1965, p. 40). Sorel adds the myth of Violence to these five. Considering Violence as a myth indicates that the visual or symbolic representation of violence is subject to countless interpretations and responses. Indeed, according to Cumberbatch et al. (1987) “This is very far from suggesting that violence is a myth, but rather that surrounding the concept-and indeed subjectively defining it-exist sets of myths held by different people” (p. 1).

This thesis proposes that these seven myths (History, Work, Happiness, Nation, Youth, Hero and Violence) serve as broad categories and are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, these can overlap. That is to say, heroic acts can be specifically heroic due to an association with Youth; Nation can be defined on the basis of Work, and so on. This is, perhaps, most evident with the myth of Violence. Indeed, depending on how the myth of Violence is defined, elements of it can exist throughout other myths, especially those of the Nation and the Hero. Furthermore, these myths are not comprehensive. For example, beyond the myth of the Hero exists the myth of the Victim and within History, there is the myth of Religion and the myth of Land.

These distinctions are also apparent in the discussion of the representation of the *self-other*. As a human conceptualization, the *self-other* can take on a mythic quality, as a tenaciously held story with the contemporary purpose of unifying society. It can stand apart as a myth or incorporate the aforementioned constructs. As a concept, however, it is deeply embedded in identity and its construction. In spite of this, it must be noted that within the relational nature of the *self-other* exists its constitutive parts: the *self*, or identity, and the *other*. While the *self* can be mythically-formed, it is the *other* that this analysis considers a myth; constructed to serve the purpose of the *self*. Furthermore, considering this analysis’ exploration of the *other* in times of conflict, as well as its interest in the role of conflict in identity construction and the potentially ubiquitous nature of the myth of Violence, this analysis specifies the myth of Violence as the myth of ‘Battle’. This distinction goes beyond semantics. Indeed, it acknowledges the multiple possible interpretations relating to the myth and enables the investigation of how identities conceptualize the role of conflict. Taking all of this into consideration, this thesis will focus specifically on the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of*

Victim, the Myth of Land and the Myth of Other, as well as the Myth of Battle and the Myth of Religion.

2.3 A Practical Focus on the Dissemination of Identity

2.3.1 Propaganda and Framing

Many similarities exist between propaganda and framing. Both propaganda and framing make use of myths. Like propaganda, frames serve as mechanisms, which use discourses, narratives, myths and symbols to construct meaning for its target population (propagandeas). While Ellul uses the term of “propagandist” to refer to those responsible for disseminating propaganda, the framing literature prefers to use the term of “framing actors” or “signifying agents” to similarly describe those who ‘frame’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). Furthermore, like propaganda, frames have parameters of reference within which societal constructs are contained, all of which aim at simplifying, orienting and explaining the conceptualization of local and global social realities for a target audience (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Pappas (2008) and McCann (2003) add that this may be completed through symbolic mechanisms for the purpose of drawing out action (Pappas, 2008, p. 1121; McCann, 2003, p. 160).

In looking at the distinctions between the two terms, one explanation provided explores semantics. Indeed, it has been posited that because ‘propaganda’, as a term, took on many negative connotations, both in regards to its purpose and the motivation of its disseminators, after the atrocities of World War II, its name, and not its practices, changed over in favor of ‘framing’. This is a broad distinction and it should be noted that ministries of propaganda still exist throughout the world.

There are, however, more substantive variations between the two concepts. Ellul’s (1965) propaganda, for example, is tied closely to its effects on its propagandeas, which necessitate a “total” or all-encompassing process (Ellul, 1965, p. 11). This is conducted through a multi-disciplinary approach to human tendencies, examined through fields such as psychology and sociology, as well as historic occurrences the author observed. Some of this has been criticized as being outmoded or erroneous, such as the human need to hate. Framing, on the other hand, largely concerns itself with the process. Indeed, Loizides (2008)

notes that “... what distinguishes framing from other comparable terms is the degree of strategy involved, particularly in appropriating, challenging or negotiating the shared meaning of a given situation” (p. 4). However, it is posited that propaganda both inspired and continues to underlie much of the framing literature. As such, both are discussed.

In this vein, the goal of both propaganda and framing is to elicit an action. In effect, what Ellul calls “classical” propaganda⁸ seeks to specifically bring about action through agitation, the manipulation of hatreds and enemy imaging (p. 62; 67). These mechanisms are also contained in the framing category of “Collective Action Frames”, which similarly aim to bring about a certain desired action, by framing experiences as significant and by legitimizing and inspiring the select endeavors, by constructing meaning for all actors of society (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613-614). These frames are carried out through the method of “Core Framing Tasks” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). These are broadly divided into three consecutive framing functions, within which several frames can exist.

The first among these is termed “Diagnostic Framing”, which diagnoses a situation by determining what the problem is and who or what party is responsible for the offending state of affairs (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616; Loizides, 2008, p. 4). This is followed by “Prognostic Framing”, which is the phase during which strategies are developed to address the diagnosed problem in the process of further differentiating the *self* from the *other* (Loizides, 2008, p. 4; Benford & Snow, 2000, 616-617). Finally, “Motivational Framing” supplies the rationale and vocabulary to elicit a desired action from a target population (Benford & Snow, 2000, 617). Like Burke (1968), Benford (1993) discusses these “Vocabularies of Motive” as expressing “... severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety” with the goal of bringing the *self-other* concept into action by identifying, strategizing and motivating the *self* against the *other* (p. 617).

Adding to Motivational Framing, Benford & Hunt (1992) discuss the dramaturgical method of “Staging”. Similar to the functions of Collective Action Frames, “Dramaturgy” is the study of the dramatic frames used in what the authors describe as the ubiquitous social pursuit of, and interaction with, power (p. 36). Staging emphasizes the logistics involved in

⁸ Ellul distinguishes between “sociological” or “pre-propaganda” and “political” or classical” propaganda. The initial or “pre” form attempts to integrate society’s members into a cohesive collective identity by streamlining the population’s thought process and behavioral patterns to render its members amenable to political propaganda (p. 62; 67). This can be carried out through multiple mechanisms including technology and education.

bringing about action and communicating goals to the desired audience (Benford & Hunt, 1992, p. 43). This involves the "... promotion and publicity" of events and activities, which is frequently carried out through pamphlets, posters and, pertinent to this research, media (Benford & Hunt, 1992, p. 43). The mechanism through which a social movement's message is conveyed can, and for the purpose of this thesis, does, take on a variety of forms, including music videos and television shows.

2.3.2 Media

Media are tools of both propaganda and framing. Devoting much of his seminal work to the exploration of its study, Ellul proposes that "... an opinion cannot form itself in entire societies unless media of communication exist ... without mass media there would be no modern propaganda" (Ellul, 1965, p. 102). It should be noted that while media are presented as central means of disseminating information, not all forms are suitable for every situation and the author notes that the choice must reflect the specificities of the target audience and the goals of the disseminator. For example, Ellul (1965) and Wolfsfeld et al. (2008) specified that television provides viewers with a feeling of comfort and friendship, afforded to them by the familiar and repeated appearance of recognizable myths, symbols, cultural references and personalities (Ellul, 1965, p. 175; Wolfsfeld, et al., 2008b, p. 402). This is conducted in an effort to simplify the perception and understanding of a situation, by subtly embedding a desired message into an audience's cultural language, to facilitate internalization and acceptance.

Transitioning from the broad scope of propaganda into the procedural nature of framing, Wolfsfeld et al. (2008a) describe the situation reflected in media as conflict and specify that framing actors construct the content of conflict media in much the same way as Collective Action Frames make use of the *self-other*. Indeed, "the standard definition of what is considered news generally ensures a steady flow of negative and threatening information about the other side" (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008a, p. 375). Looking specifically at the flow of news between Jordan and Israel, the authors divide conflict media coverage into the "Victims' Mode" and the "Defensive Mode" of reporting. The former relies on content that evokes an emotional response and justifies retributive action against the *other*, or the enemy, by dramatizing an event, showing images of the dead and the emotional bystanders and personalizing the victims (Wolfsfeld, et al., 2008b, p. 403). In contrast, the Defensive Mode

is an un-emotional approach that seeks to minimize the appearance of fault by the *self*, by intellectualizing the content of the report and reducing victims to statistics to offset any perception of error (Wolfsfeld, et al., 2008b, p. 405). Although these arguments specifically focus on Jordanian and Israeli news reports, this analysis will consider the way these modes apply to the presentation of victims and aggressors in times of conflict in Palestinian videos for children.

2.4 Summary of the Theoretical Framework

The numerous theoretical works of this chapter bridge a plethora of fields of exploration with respective and varied emphases. While acknowledging the process of the individual acquisition of identity, this thesis will focus on the framing of collective identity through an investigation of the *Myth of Battle*, the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Religion*, the *Myth of Land* and the *Myth of Other* through media. Guided by Ellul's theory of propaganda and informed by the framing methods of the Core Framing Tasks and the dramatic frames described in Dramaturgy, this analysis will look at these myths as a way of understanding how Fatah and Hamas frame the Palestinian identity in its media directed to children. The following chapter will explore the history of Fatah and Hamas. This exploration will enable the specification of distinctly Palestinian discourses as well as its narratives, myths and symbols. This will aid in the illumination of the content of frames used in this thesis' Palestinian case study.

Chapter 3: Palestinian History and Discourse

This chapter provides an overview of key historical and current Palestinian events that are pivotal in the formation of Fatah and Hamas. Given space constraints, the historical review will be necessarily brief and will be followed by an exploration of Palestinian identity, discourse, narratives, myths and symbols as well as the two groups' media outlets. While Fatah and Hamas are not the only groups involved in Palestinian history and politics, they are arguably the most prominent today and, as such, are the focus of this thesis.

3.1 Palestinian History

As the analysis of Palestinian history is diverse and multifaceted, this section focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has garnered global attention from the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel. This conflict demonstrates the recent evolution of events that began with Arab countries co-opting the Palestinian cause as their own and on into the process of Palestinian self-determination (Lesch, 2006, p. 79). The 1948 War, the establishment of Fatah, the 1967 War, the *First Intifada*, the establishment of Hamas, the Oslo Accords, the *Second Intifada* and the current events regarding Fatah and Hamas will be examined in order to present an overview of the conflict and recent Palestinian history.

3.1.1 The 1948 War

Lesch (2006) states that the core issue of contention between Palestinians and Israelis is the conflicting claims of ownership of the same piece of land by the two groups (p. 79). The 1948 War, however, highlights the multiple Arab countries involved. Following Israel's declaration of independence on May 15, 1948, Arab countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon mobilized their troops for a war that lasted from May until December 1948. The war resulted in Israel increasing its territorial holdings by 20% including West Jerusalem and Jordan annexing East Jerusalem and the West Bank into the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" (Lesch, 2006, p. 12-15). Most pertinent to the Palestinians was the displacement of 750 000 of their people, many of whom became refugees living in camps throughout numerous Arab countries with varying degrees of freedom and integration

(Lesch, 2006, p. 80; Sorek, 2008, p. 337). The establishment of Israel and the resulting mass-displacement is known as “*Al-Nakba*” (or ‘*Nakba*’), or the “catastrophe” to the Palestinian people and it is a pivotal moment in their history and identity formation (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 116-117).

3.1.2 Fatah

3.1.2.1 The Formation of Fatah

These refugees became important actors and symbols for the Palestinian movement, as guerrilla groups began to appear in the 1950s and 1960s (Lesch, 2006, p. 82). Khalili (2007a) notes that the Diasporic Palestinians became emblematic of the revolution or “*Thawra*” against Israel by transforming from peasants into “*Fida’iyin*” or guerrilla soldiers (p. 49). Fatah became most prominent among these early revolutionary actors (Schanzer, 2008, p. ix).

“Fatah”, which translates into “opening” and is the reverse acronym for “*Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini*”, which means the “Palestinian National Liberation Movement”, was founded in 1958 in Kuwait by eight Palestinian activists, including Yasser Arafat (Hasson, 2010, p. 389; Schanzer, 2008, p. 17). Although its members were influenced by Islamic teachings, Fatah was by and large a nationalistic organization with the goal of establishing a secular Palestinian state (Schanzer, 2008, p. 17).

In its constitution, which was written in 1964, Fatah specifies that this state would be established after the “the Zionist state is demolished” (Article 19) through “armed public revolution” (“The Fatah Constitution (1964)”, n.d.; “The Fateh Constitution”, n.d., Article 17). Making use of these tactics, Fatah, in collaboration with Syria, launched a series of small-level attacks through Lebanon and Jordan (Schanzer, 2008, p. 17; Lesch, 2006, p. 22). Lesch (2006) describes these *Fida’iyin* attacks as “... mere pinpricks, but they signalled a renewed activism and heightened self-awareness” (p. 22-23).

3.1.2.2 The Formation of the PLO

In order to control this activism, Egyptian President Nasser sponsored the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was formally established at the Arab League Summit Conference in 1964 (Lesch, 2006, p. 23; xvi). The PLO was a hierarchically-

structured umbrella organization that included Fatah as well as other guerrilla groups. Notably missing amongst these primarily nationalist collectives were the newly forming Islamist groups of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which supported a religious approach to liberation, thereby opposing the PLO's secular mandate (Shikaki, 2009, p. 4; Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 117; Lesch, 2006, p. 83; 88). While these and other groups were not members of the PLO, an organization still under Arab control, its establishment served as a preliminary acknowledgement of a Palestinian identity by Arab countries and inspired Palestinian support (Lesch, 2006, p. 83; Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 117).

3.1.2.3 The 1967 War

The acceptance of Arab centrality ended with the loss of the 1967 War by Egypt, Syria and Jordan to Israel. The defeat, which was paired with a substantial loss of strategic land including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, marked a major turning point for Palestinian self-determination (Lesch, 2006, p. 23-24; Schanzer, 2008, p. 16). "With no one else to turn to, the Palestinians looked to their indigenous freedom fighters for salvation" (Schanzer, 2008, p. 18-19).

3.1.2.4 Fatah's Rise to Power

Specifically, Palestinian support shifted towards the revolutionary nationalism of Fatah because it was widely seen as the only collective that actively sought to liberate Palestinian land. Strazzari & Tholens (2010) outline the importance of this by stating that "... armed struggle generated a sense of coherence and purpose that had until then been weak among the Palestinians" (p. 112). It also served to inspire, as demonstrated by Fatah's 1968 resistance to the Israeli attack on Fatah's headquarter city of Karameh in Jordan, which also contained a Palestinian refugee camp. This perception of strength exhibited by Fatah against Israel, in spite of the loss of life, inspired thousands of Palestinian youth to join the ranks of the *Fida'iyyin* (Lesch, 2006, p. 83; 26). Building on this support, Fatah informally became the dominant party in the PLO and in the same year, its leader, Arafat, was granted control over the organization (Schanzer, 2008, p. 16).

Reflecting Palestinian sentiment and Fatah's guiding principles, the PLO's legislative body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), amended its focus of operations to reject Arab oversight, although it emphasized unity among Arab nations. Like Fatah, the PNC also stated

the importance of armed struggle and *Fida'iyin* in the destruction of Israel for the ultimate purpose of establishing a Palestinian state (Lesch, 2006, p. 83). Guided by Arafat, Fatah and the PLO's terrorist campaign against Israel caught the attention of the Arab world and, in 1974, the Arab Summit "... officially recognized Arafat and the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"" (Schanzer, 2008, p. 19).

It should be noted that Fatah and the PLO, like many Palestinians, primarily operated externally to the land which it sought to reclaim, in every country around Israel, with varying degrees of collaboration. For example, although briefly backed by Jordan in the Karamah conflict, tensions between the increasing number of Fatah and Palestinian *Fida'iyin* with the Jordanian government contributed to Black September, a conflict with high Palestinian losses (Dobson, 1974; Bregman & El Tahri, 1998, p. 173-190). Many Fatah members fled the region for Lebanon where they set up a new, albeit temporary, PLO headquarters in West Beirut in the 1970s (Bregman & El Tahri, 1998, p. 172; Khalili, 2007a, p. 48). There, they emphasized the social activities alongside those related to armed conflict. Indeed, the PLO financed health services, education and emphasized raising the standard of living of those in the camps. This involved support for the families of the *Fida'iyin* who were killed and considered 'martyrs'. "Whether explicitly or not, the celebration of heroic figures - *the fida'iyin* (sic.) and martyrs was woven into the infrastructure of service-provision" through financial support and formal commemorative practices (Khalili, 2007a, p. 48-49).

3.1.3 Challenging Fatah's Power

3.1.3.1 The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood

Israel sought to undermine Fatah's growing strength and its increasing use of violence against Israeli civilians by lending support to Fatah's most direct competition: the Muslim Brotherhood (Schanzer, 2008, p. 19; Hasson, 2010, p. 396). Initially, there were two divisions of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (PMB): one in the West Bank that was established between 1946 and 1948; and one in Gaza, that was established by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in the 1970's (Gunderson, 2004, p. 21; Schanzer, 2008, p. 15). Both were outcroppings of a group with the same name that was founded in Egypt in 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood "... "envisioned the return to a time marked by a global Islamist order (the caliphate) in which Islam reigned supreme through one devout Muslim ruler (the caliph)""

and identified secularism as a danger (Schanzer, 2008, p. 13). The group made early use of armed activities against those Egyptians it deemed a secular threat. In its early years, however, the Palestinian branches, which would develop into Hamas, relied almost exclusively on social programming (Schanzer, 2008, p. 13-19).

Similar to Fatah, PMB gained support after the loss of the 1967 War. This specifically occurred when an explanation of these events was sought from a Muslim perspective, especially with the loss of Jerusalem, which is considered a “*waqf*” or land granted to Muslims by Allah (Schanzer, 2008, p. 13-19; Gunderson, 2004, p. 21). Unlike its Diasporic counterpart, however, Israel’s administrative control enabled the Muslim Brotherhoods of the West Bank and Gaza to unite and function in the territories. The now-united group was additionally aided when Israel permitted Yassin to establish “*al-Mujamma’ al-Islami*” (the Islamic Center) in Gaza, which facilitated substantial and sustained outreach to Palestinians through social services as well as religious and political activities (Schanzer, 2008, p. 19-20).

During this time, internal divisions developed within the Muslim Brotherhood, with the younger members urging violence as a means of overtaking Israel, as opposed to the older members who espoused social outreach as the best means of Islamicization. This discord resulted in a fissure that created Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza, which introduced confrontation with Israel for the purpose of establishing an Islamist nation. While Israel targeted and substantially eroded the strength of PIJ, the group’s efforts and methods garnered much attention amongst Palestinians (Schanzer, 2008, p. 20-22).

3.1.3.2 The First Intifada: Shifting Power and Focus

A combination of violence and retribution, restrictions and frustration over living conditions and location led to the *First Intifada*, or uprising, which began in 1987 and ended around 1993 (Lesch, 2006, p. 37; Schanzer, 2008, p. 49). Schanzer (2008) cites the funerals of four Gaza workers killed by an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) truck on December 8, 1987 as the single moment that began this series of spontaneous protests and violence against the Israeli occupation (Schanzer, 2008, p. 23). Although its start was principally an unplanned and diffuse endeavour contained in the West Bank and Gaza in a bid to enhance the population’s living conditions, it soon became a political endeavour. Indeed, this *Intifada* laid the foundation for older collectives, like Fatah/PLO, to show its strengths and

weaknesses and newer factions, like Hamas, to form and challenge existing perceptions (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 117; Lesch, 2006, p. 88-89).

In this vein, the spontaneity of the *First Intifada* gave way to the reinvigoration of grassroots organizing (Lesch, 2006, p. 88). Several small collectives operating out of the West Bank and, later, Gaza formed the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which organized the distribution of information to the territories, and orchestrated both violent and non-violent protests. Fatah and the PLO, then in Tunis after being exiled following the Lebanon War, were taken off guard by this *Intifada* and were disadvantaged by their exiled position (Bregman & El Tahri, 1998, p. 172). The PLO did, however, manage to gain control of the UNLU and temporarily maintain its role as the Palestinian people's leaders (Schanzer, 2008, p. 23).

3.1.4 An Introduction to Hamas

Meanwhile, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood experienced another, almost identical, crisis of identity (as previously experienced with the PIJ) relating to the benefits of social and religious outreach vs. violence during the *Intifada*. The younger members emphasized the Islamist revolutionary tactics and, between December 1987 and January 1988, they formed a new Palestinian umbrella organization called "*Harakat al-Muqawamma al-Islamiyya*" or HAMAS (Hamas), which translates into the "Islamic Resistance Movement" (Schanzer, 2008, p. 26). The Sunni organization was founded by PMB Gaza founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as well as Mohammad Taha (Hasson, 2010, p. 397). Hamas paired its *jihad* (religious war) tactics with social outreach, blending the old with the new. While it emphasized collective action and stated that it did not pose a challenge to other groups, it refused to join the UNLU, instead operating as a relatively self-contained entity with multiple divisions including: political, communication (leaflets and information distribution), *Intifada* (for fighters), which would later become the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades* military body, as well as a youth wing ("... for coordinating the *Intifada*'s demonstrations and rock-throwing") (Hasson, 2010, p. 397; Schanzer, 2008, p. 24-25).

As Hamas intensified its actions within the territories, there were two important occurrences. The first was Jordan's King Hussein's public relinquishment of his country's claim to the West Bank in July 1988. This bolstered the confidence of the *Intifada*'s participants and established a link between the actions of the Palestinians and the goal of

ending the occupation. This altered the focus of the *Intifada* from improving basic living conditions to forming a Palestinian state (Lesch, 2006, p. 90; Schanzer, 2008, p. 25-28). The second important occurrence was Fatah's change in its course of action. This was either caused by, or coincided with Fatah's realization that its exodus status meant it could not fight alongside those in the West Bank and Gaza, like Hamas, and it feared it was losing its support (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 117; Schanzer, 2008, p. 26). Arafat changed the course of the Fatah-backed PLO by accepting the UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which outlined the establishment of both a Palestinian and an Israeli state. Arafat further renounced the organization's guerrilla tactics and, on November 1988, declared Palestinian independence and called for a peace conference to discuss the UN Security Council resolution 242, through which he tacitly accepted Israel by addressing the return to the 1948 borders (Lesch, 2006, p. 37; Schanzer, 2008, p. 26-28).

As Fatah pulled away from militarized and revolutionary actions, Hamas clung tighter. In 1989 it took credit for the local violence and affirmed its connection to Islam. This move coincided with Israel's declaration that Hamas was an illegal organization, which only served to bolster its support, showing that it was in direct conflict with Israel, unlike Fatah (Schanzer, 2008, p. 34). Hamas also emphasized family values, morality and education, most of which the PLO was thought to lack (Schanzer, 2008, p. 31).

These principles were mirrored in Hamas' covenant, which was published in August 1988. The document's 36 articles, which will be explored in greater depth below, emphasize a violent approach to establishing an Islamist state over all the land currently occupied by Israel (Schanzer, 2008, p. 27). It also refuses any political negotiations or agreements with Israel and claims that Hamas is "... the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people" (Hasson, 2010, p. 397). It makes repeated use of Islamic texts such as the *Qur'an* and the *Hadiths* to justify its non-negotiable stance on Israel. The covenant frequently defines its enemy as the 'Jew' as well as the Zionist and references anti-Semitic literature such as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, as further justification for its actions ("The Covenant", 1988, Article 32,). In addition to violence, the document calls for the use of education and media and looks to involve women and children in its holy war ("The Covenant", 1988, Articles 13 & 15).

In 1990, Arafat called a meeting between the PLO and Hamas regarding the *Intifada* initiatives and invited Hamas to join the organization. While Hamas agreed to work with Fatah against Israel, collaboration was never fully realized and the ideological divide between the two groups only widened. This was especially evident when Arafat continued with his diplomatic path and participated, first in the Madrid Conference for Peace in 1991 and then, directly with Israelis in the Oslo Process. The mere participation in these conferences was starkly opposed to Hamas' core principals and the differences between the collectives appeared irreconcilable. Indeed, Hamas leader, Yassin, publicly decried these efforts. He spoke against the possibility of Palestinian unity and in 1991 Hamas established precedence for targeting civilians, with the group's first attack on an Israeli citizen in Gaza. The attacks increased and by December 1992, Israel deported hundreds of Hamas members to Lebanon. This action enabled Hamas to build a relationship with Hezbollah; a group also backed by Iran, and allowed Hamas to take additional power and support away from Fatah's Lebanese stronghold of refugee camps (Schanzer, 2008, p. 38-39).

3.1.5 An Introduction to the Oslo Accords

The ebb and flow of Palestinian sentiment and support persisted as the Oslo Process continued. Schanzer (2008) describes 1993 as a hopeful year, as Arafat and Israeli Prime-Minister Yitzhak Rabin took steps towards establishing Palestinian autonomy over Gaza and the West Bank by signing the Declaration of Principles ("Oslo I") in September (Schanzer, 2008, p. 39-40). The Declaration also established an interim governing body largely run by Fatah and the PLO, called the Palestinian Authority (PA or the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)) (Shikaki, 2009, p. 4). While the continued Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza dramatically limited the actual freedom afforded to the PA, it was allotted "complete freedom of action" in the area of media and education (Litvak, 2009b, p. 111). Another notable feature of this process was that in 1994, after Arafat officially became president of the PA, PLO officials were allowed back into the territories for "the first time since 1967" (Lesch, 2006, p. 93).

It is during this period that a certain convergence in the discourse of these organizations occurred. That is to say, Fatah's and Hamas' actions were not without some level of ambiguity. For example, Arafat used Islamic rhetoric to appeal to those Palestinians who were aligning with Hamas. Arafat also likened the current treaty with Israel "... to the

treaty of Hudaibiyya, which was concluded and then broken to achieve the military conquest of Mecca by the Prophet of Islam” (Schanzer, 2008, p. 43). In 1995 Arafat tried to seek collaboration with Hamas by offering it participation in the PA, while permitting its men to carry arms (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 121). Hamas, on the other hand, saw the Oslo negotiations as a possible means of governance and power but after some deliberation, it refused to lend its support to Oslo I, or the PA. Instead, Hamas aligned itself with like-minded groups to form the Democratic Islamic National Front, to hamper the peace process. This was in line with an increasing number of Palestinians who likewise rejected this process and were frustrated by the limited self-rule it afforded. With collaboration, training and financial backing from Muslim countries like Iran, Hamas began suicide attacks against Israel (Lesch, 2006, p. 39; Schanzer, 2008, p. 40-41).

Perhaps inspired by Hezbollah’s use of suicide bombs, Hamas’ violence only intensified in 1994. This destabilized the peace process and the newly signed Declaration of Principles and undermined Arafat’s legitimacy, both as a peace actor and as a Palestinian leader. Indeed, “His attempts to suppress Hamas weakened his popularity, and his reluctance to confront it directly weakened his authority” (Schanzer, 2008, p. 42). This only increased support for Hamas that was seen as effective, whereas Fatah appeared to stumble (Hasson, 2010, p. 398).

The year 1996 marked another important series of events beginning with PA elections, which Hamas boycotted. As the PA impressed the international community with its democratic inroads, Hamas continued its violence. In response, Israel launched an aggressive military offensive against Hamas, with some PA collaboration. This attempt to thwart violence and the collective responsible for it saw few successes and multiple failures (Schanzer, 2008, p. 44-48). Indeed, as Israel continued to expand its settlements, the peace process appeared to be facilitating colonialism to many Palestinians. Furthermore, Fatah’s ineffectual attempt to thwart Hamas’ violent tactics stalled the peace process, highlighting Fatah’s stasis and Hamas’s efforts (Usher, 2006, p. 22). The back and forth violence and retribution, attempted and failed negotiation efforts and increasing frustration culminated in the *Second*, or *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in 2000.

3.1.6 The Al-Aqsa Intifada

Strazzari & Tholens (2010) argue that this uprising began as a result of then-Israeli-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's walk on the Temple Mount (p. 121). Schanzer (2008), on the other hand, states that this was part of Arafat's plan to avoid further negotiations as peace talks centered on massive compromises regarding Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees. It was thus an attempt at re-establishing the PA's support by consolidating its usage of Islamic language and establishing the *Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade* to compete with Hamas. For Schanzer (2008), then, Arafat made use of PA media to draw out revolution (p.10; 49). Beyond its debated causes, what is agreed upon is that the *Second Intifada* was far more militarized and violent than the first (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 122). Accordingly, the death toll was quite high, and included a 27% increase in children's deaths from the *First Intifada* (Schanzer, 2008, p. 58).

Schanzer (2008) discusses the involvement of children as martyrs in this uprising. While conventionally, this act is linked to Hamas, the PA granted \$2000 to the families of martyred children and 300\$ to those with injured children (p. 59). This recalls Fatah's history of martyr support. Furthermore, the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* set itself apart in its commemoration of martyrs (Allen, 2006, p. 109-110). This *Intifada* resulted in multiple deaths, as well as substantial loss of faith in the PA by both its negotiating partners and its Palestinian civilians. This was due in large part to Arafat's inconsistent leadership; sometimes speaking to Islamic principles and other times vowing peace and negotiations. All the while Hamas remained constant in its message and only gained support (Schanzer, 2008, p. 63).

3.1.7 Fatah vs. Hamas: Recent Events

Fatah's external inconsistencies mirrored its internal discord. For example, in 2003, PLO Prime Minister and one of the founders of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, supported political, financial and security reform, while Arafat opted to stay the old course and blocked any such changes (Lesch, 2006, p. 127). This meant spending a considerable amount of resources on security structures in a bid at maintaining and strengthening its power amid Israeli and Hamas attacks (Strazzari & Tholens, 2010, p. 121). This continued until Arafat's death, at which point Abbas took over the eroding governing structure which was divided according to old and young leadership (Hasson, 2010, p. 398; Shikaki, 2009, p. 4).

The young leadership consisted primarily of those who lived and fought inside the territories and sought to establish a "... highly functioning, democratic, economic and social movement committed to peace with Israel" (Shikaki, 2009, p. 5). Ultimately, this group wrested power from the old members who supported maintaining its tactics and were accused of corruption and incompetence (Shikaki, 2009, p. 4-5). This marked a change of focus from the Diaspora to those living in the territories and from an un-relatable hierarchy to Fatah leaders who lived and experienced alongside their constituents (Shikaki, 2009, p. 6).

The new Fatah leadership, however, did not renounce its old ways completely. Indeed, this change in focus did not mean a complete rejection of violence. This was exemplified when, over 30% of the delegates involved in electing this new Fatah leadership believed "... that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, willingness to compromise on the various issues of the permanent settlement were low ..." (Shikaki, 2009, p. 7). That said, many of these Fatah members supported Abbas' requirement that in order to collaborate as a united government, it is necessary to accept the agreements signed with Israel. Hamas' rejection of this requirement pointed to persistent and strong ideological differences. In spite of this, "The perception that Hamas is such a significant threat to Fatah did not lead the young guard to reject the movement as a political actor, but it did reduce the chances that Fatah would willingly allow Hamas to rebuild its armed moderation" (Shikaki, 2009, p. 7).

3.1.8 Elections and the Palestinian Leadership

Ultimately, this internal change addressed the issues of weak and fragmented leadership, but it still failed to secure support (Shikaki, 2009, p. 9). The best example of this was the loss of the first free and internationally approved Palestinian democratic election in 2006 (Usher, 2006, p. 20). With Hamas' win of 72 out of 132 of PA's parliamentary seats, the Palestinian discord with Fatah's political stance solidified in favour of Hamas' Islamist and armed approach (Usher, 2006, p. 20-21). The election results were followed by sporadic violent clashes. The two groups came to an agreement in February of 2007, with Abbas outlining requirements to Hamas, in a bid to maintain governance. Hamas rejected these, the agreement collapsed and civil war broke out, resulting in a deep divide between the West Bank and Gaza (Hasson, 2010, p. 398). On June 2007, Hamas loyalists took control over Gaza in a military offensive (Schanzer, 2008, p. 2). This split Palestinian governance into

two sections, with Fatah maintaining globally-recognized control over the West Bank, and Hamas, without similar support, holding Gaza (Hasson, 2010, p. 399).

Milton-Edwards (2008) asserts that Hamas has moved to thwart internal dissent, including its political rivals such as Fatah, and has increased its emphasis on arms-acquisition and training (p. 1591-1594). Usher (2006), on the other hand, describes Hamas' strategy as "flexible", seeking to form a coalition government with other Palestinian parties including Fatah. He goes on to note that Hamas will accept PLO-Israel agreements as long as these do not conflict with its principles. Furthermore, the author states that if Israel withdraws to the armistice lines of 1948 Hamas will consider a long-term ceasefire (Usher, 2006, p. 34).

While these two positions seem to be irreconcilable, Palestinian history and the historic interaction between Fatah and Hamas have shown that neither side is starkly dissimilar. Although it can be argued that Fatah has changed the most in a bid to establish support, its time in power has required new actions in light of different opportunities, moving it away from a primarily militarist stance, into a largely political pro-negotiation one. Likewise, the mere fact that Hamas participated in democratic PA elections demonstrates a possible change in principles. At the very least, it indicates a change in strategy. While the full breadth of Hamas' actions remains to be seen, its current status as a governing body has presented it with different responsibilities and political change is not out of the question.

3.2 An Exploration of Palestinian Identity and Discourse

3.2.1 Palestinian Identity

History or a Myth of Descent is central to all recognized collective identities (Litvak, 2009b, p. 97). This is perhaps most essential to the identity of the Palestinians, as both a people whose mere existence has been called into question and one that has been substantially splintered (Masalha, 2008, p. 136; Khalili, 2007b, p. 299). Indeed, according to Khalili (2007b), among the most significant aspects of the "... Palestinian national struggle has been the affirmation of a Palestinian collective identity" (p. 300).

Litvak (2009b) describes the creation of Palestinian national history as one that has been revised over the following three periods: the "Arabization of the Past" between 1920

and 1967, with an emphasis on Arab culture and history; the “Palestinization of the Past” between 1967 and 1994, which involved asserting its distinct Palestinian identity through self-reliance and self-representation; and finally, the “PNA and the Past” (p. 98-112). This latter phase occurred after the 1994 establishment of the PNA (PA). With elements of the two previous periods, this one could be called the “*étatisation*”, or the nationalization of the Palestinian identity. This means that the ‘state’ becomes a new and central pillar of the Palestinian identity, which offsets its shortcomings by emphasizing nationalism, power and independence. All of these elements are made tangible through a series of key rituals associated with ‘the state’, such as holding military parades, issuing passports and supporting national education. An essential part of these efforts involved “... the construction of an official historical narrative of Palestine and the Palestinians from prehistoric times to the present, which simultaneously weaved itself into Arab and Islamic history and demonstrated its unique Palestinian traits” (Litvak, 2009b, p. 112).

These three periods manifested themselves within two national myths. The first of which is the “Canaanite Myth of Descent” which identifies the Canaanites as Arabs, thereby emphasizing ancient genealogical ties to the land as well as the resiliency of their ancestors in adverse times. The second myth advocates ancient and holy Islamic ties to Palestine. While the first myth is nationalistic and the second is religious, both the nationalist and Islamist Palestinian groups make use of these, forming a “Unified National Narrative” in opposition to, but in a way that mirrors the Zionist movement (Litvak, 2009b, p. 112-113).

3.2.2 Palestinian Discourses, Narratives, Myths and Symbols

Although Litvak argues that the Canaanite Myth might not be very meaningful for many Palestinians, the general and more recent history of the Palestinian people is. Arguably the most central contemporary Palestinian myth is the 1948 *Nakba*, which comprises the loss of land, the mass displacement of Palestinians and the fracturing of a people that has reverberated into the present time, all of which can be represented visually with maps, peasants, refugees, etc. This period has served Palestinian identity as a means of highlighting victimhood and heroism; land and displacement; triumph and loss, all in reference to an enemy. The *Nakba* and the events that followed it have been commemorated from all of these perspectives, over the course of the three major periods, and prominently underlie most

discourse (Litvak, 2009a, p. 15-16; Webman, 2009, p. 27-28; Hasson, 2010, p. 389; Sa'di, 2000, p. 195; Masalha, 2008, p. 143).

According to Khalili (2007a) “Discourses include symbols, songs, images, and, most importantly, narratives articulating the history, meaning, and strategies of struggle” (p. 11). She identifies multiple discourses that “... have been appropriated and adapted by various strands of the Palestinian national movement since the mid-1960s” (p. 13). Most interesting to this analysis are the “Tragic”, “Liberationist” and “Nation-Statist” discourses.

The Tragic Discourse can be applied externally by humanitarian efforts in a bid to garner international support, or internally “... as an authorizing discourse which legitimates a stateless and “powerless” public’s persistent nationalist claims (Khalili, 2007a, p. 38). Its tragic narratives focus on loss and makes use of victims and suffering (Khalili, 2007a, p. 34-36; 90). This loss is, of course, epitomized in the 1948 loss of land. In the middle to later stages of the Arabization period, Palestinian literature discussed mourning and emphasized the suffering and depression of the refugees as well as the desire to return to their homeland (Webman, 2009, p. 30).

According to Khalili (2007a), the Liberationist Discourse combines Palestinian history with the narratives of heroism in order to reclaim Palestinian history as inspirational and interject the idea of violent struggle and martyrdom for the purpose of national liberation (p. 13-19). As opposed to tragic narratives which use deaths to highlight suffering, the heroic narratives use grief and fear as inspirational mobilization mechanisms, envisioning an inevitable victory (Khalili, 2007a, p. 90-94). This is in line with the late Arabization and the early Palestinization periods during which time Palestinian literature began to switch from tragedy to resistance and aspirations of victory and revenge to re-establish “lost Arab dignity” (Webman, 2009, p. 31).

An important means of mobilization for the heroic narrative is the intense focus on the image of the “enemies”, which helps to “... create a community centered on acts of bravery and self-sacrifice ... thus reinforcing the boundaries of the “imagined community” of the nation” (Khalili, 2007a, p. 111). This speaks to the Palestinization period of 1967 onwards, during which time the literature focused on resistance. This was a move away from an expressly Arab identity and Arab conception of the *Nakba* (which included victimization),

into a Palestinian self-definition which began with an aggressive vision of Palestinian liberation (Webman, 2009, p. 31).

Some of the popular Palestinian symbols of the heroic narrative relating to armed resistance are guerrilla fighters with a Kalashnikov as well as the "... Zionist enemy, the ultimate other, that helped crystallize Palestinian self-identity" (Webman, 2009, p. 31). There are also symbols relating to an idealized version of land and return such as olive and orange trees, cacti, and keys (Khalili, 2007a, p. 94; Webman, 2009, p. 31; Sa'di, 2000, p. 194-195; 181). Another element of the Liberationist Discourse is "*sumud*" or steadfastness. This is also meant to challenge the tragic narrative, but is subtler than the ultimate sacrifice epitomized by the hero narrative. Instead, this demonstrates resilience in symbols such as destroyed houses, resilient families and elements of quiet daily resilience to surrounding chaos (Khalili, 2007a, p. 102; 111; Sa'di, 2000, p. 181).

The Nation-Statist Discourse also makes use of the heroic and martyrdom narratives of the Liberationist Discourse, but it differentiates itself by its neo-status of nationhood. That is, this discourse is frequently used at the end of a revolution and refocuses sacrifice as legitimate and "... authorized in the cause of the nation" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 23). Highlighting the validity of the nation, then, the Nation-Statist Discourse makes use of tales of future unity and sovereignty (Khalili, 2007a, p. 22-26). This is in line with the PNA Period and speaks to the change in *Nakba* commemoration around the time of the Oslo Accords. While elements of victimization and loss underlie all periods of *Nakba* commemoration, this timeframe was an attempt to remedy the effects of this event and motivate a better future (Webman, 2009, p. 32-33). The symbols associated with this discourse revolve around activities that reproduce "the heroic story of the nation's birth" and reference genealogy, create national holidays and make use of visual iconography (Khalili, 2007a, p. 24). While only granted limited sovereignty, the PA made use of such discourse (Khalili, 2007a, p. 26).

This period was only temporary as the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* broke out, which reinforced the *Nakba*'s victim or Tragic Discourse. However, it incorporated the heroism and steadfastness associated with the Liberationist Discourse, creating a hybrid of interactive narratives that reinforced the Palestinianness of identity against an enemy in a bid to overcome the oppression and dispersion that began in 1948 (Webman, 2009, p. 40).

3.2.2.1 *Fatah vs. Hamas: Similarities and Differences in Discourse*

These three discourses are analyzed from a largely nationalist point of view, with the loss of land and refugees epitomizing the Tragic Discourse; heroism and steadfastness as means of reclaiming the nation for the Liberationist Discourse; and, the Nation-Statist Discourse, which celebrates the land and its control. According to Khalili (2007a) Islamism also makes use of these three discourses. Indeed, the author proposes that the nationalist and Islamist discourses bear a striking resemblance to each other, with Islamists claiming the nation "... as the fundamental unit of politics" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 27-29). This could be because Islamist movements, such as Hamas, emerged in response to failures of nationalist movements like Fatah. Additionally, both are derived from similar historical, cultural and political backgrounds. Indeed, Khalili (2007a) states that "it is often difficult to tell whether nationalism borrows tropes and transcendence of religion to appeal to a larger public ... or Islamism the symbols and narrative of nationhood ..." (Khalili, 2007a, p. 29). However, despite these resemblances, ambiguities between nationalist and Islamist discourses will persist because the 'nation' can denote three very distinct territories. For Islamists, the nation they aspire to, ultimately, is the 'Islamic nation', the "*umma*", which includes all Muslims of the world, and is therefore not limited to Palestine. But neither is the 'Arab' nation, with boundaries that ignore those of Arab *states* and include all Arabs. Therefore, whether one refers to the Muslim nation, the Arab nation, or the Palestinian nation is difficult to say in discourses that refer to the 'nation' (Barnett, 1998). This level of ambiguity is reflected by the nuanced variations that exist between both groups' discourses.

For example, Islamist discourse makes use of history, just as in the Liberationist and Nation-Statist discourses, but uses it to demonstrate the strength of Islam in attaining its goals of establishing an Islamist nation (*umma*). Furthermore, the narrative of hero is replaced with the Islamic fighter, the "*mujahid*" and the struggle is "*jihad*". Additionally, both Islamists and nationalists have adopted similar commemorative practices for martyrs, such as taping the last wills and testaments, burial in bloodied clothes and the use of martyr's pictures accompanied with revolutionary slogans (Khalili, 2007a, p. 30-33).

Another similarity is that of the "Meta-History" or "Master-Narrative". These concepts point to "... a system of deterministic laws that dictate the course of history, so that single events cannot affect its overall course" (Birnbbaum, 2009, p. 144). The Palestinian

Master-Narrative consists of the idea that the Palestinian people are tied to the land from a nationalist and/or Islamic perspective. This connection is verified and justified on the basis of history. Importantly, this land will be liberated and returned to its rightful Palestinian nation (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 160). This is a cyclical narrative in that Palestinians have struggled historically against oppressors, have triumphed and will triumph once again (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 144)

While following similar Meta-Histories, there are, however more substantive practical differences between the nationalist (Fatah) and the Islamist (Hamas) discourses, many of which can be identified in these two organizations' founding documents (Birnbaum (2009). It should be noted that the explorations of these documents have limitations. For example, the Hamas covenant was written by a small number of senior PMB members and was not subject to any democratic process. Furthermore, like any political organization (including Fatah), whether the common activists and supporters of Hamas have any knowledge of this text is difficult to say, and therefore it is difficult to deduce their motivations solely from this text. However, it remains Hamas' only founding document and, as such, holds great importance in the understanding of the group's motivations and actions (Nimer, 2009, p. 115-116).

In consideration of this, Hamas' covenant follows in line with a relatively clear set of goals and practices that it has held consistently since its inception. Following the Palestinian Meta-History, the document makes reference to historic battles that appeared insurmountable, but that were eventually won. This serves as a means of preparing its constituents for a difficult conflict (Nimer, 2009, p. 117-118). This struggle is justified on religious terms and is for a land that is holy, combining Islam with nationalism throughout ("The Covenant", Article 11; Introduction). All of this is waged against an enemy that the covenant refers to as both the Jew and the Zionist, and describes the enemy as an insidious threat that has co-opted and now controls many essential social structures, such as the media (Nimer, 2009, p. 121; "The Covenant", 1988, Introduction; Article 7). To combat this enemy and liberate the land, one third of the covenant lays out the strategy, which emphasizes armed revolution for the purpose of liberation (Nimer, 2009, p. 118; "The Covenant", 1988, Articles 34 & 35). It also includes a focus on media and educational control. While its covenant does reference victimization, it is immediately followed by a religious-based

strategy that is promised to deliver retribution (“The Covenant”, Introduction; Articles 15, 22, 30).

This is contrasted with the Fatah constitution with its more nationalist and secular overtones. It outlines its political, economic, cultural and military nature (“The Fateh Constitution”, n.d., Article 12 & 19). Like Hamas, Fatah also makes use of armed resistance as a means of liberating territory through the destruction of its enemy (“The Fateh Constitution”, n.d., Introduction; Essential Principles 1, 2, 4e; Articles 10, 17, 19). Unlike Hamas, however, and in line with its secular tone, it defines this enemy specifically as the ‘Zionist’ (and not as “the Jews”), pointing at a ‘nationalist’ *other* (Zionist), not a ‘religious’ *other* (Jew). Article 22 of the constitution specifies that Fatah will not negotiate with the Zionists or any external international body, which has been contraindicated in recent history. Overall, the document seems to be written in the spirit of democracy and nationalism, but still contains references to religion and faith. For example, Article 9 states that “Liberating Palestine and protecting its holy places is an Arab, religious and human obligation”. It is worth noting here that the term ‘holy’ is used, not ‘Muslim’, given that the conception of Palestine includes places that are holy for Muslims *and* Christians (including Palestinian Christians, like those in Fatah and other Palestinian organizations). The similarities and differences between Fatah’s and Hamas’ discourses, narratives, myths and symbols are best exemplified in what is contained in each group’s media.

3.3 The Evolution of Palestinian Media

Throughout Palestinian history, both Fatah and Hamas have made use of media. Indeed, even before the Oslo Accords afforded freedom of the media to the PA, both groups identified and utilized various means of communication (Litvak, 2009b, p. 111; Batrawi, 2001). For example, in the 1960’s, in Fatah’s early years, Arafat published a magazine called “*Filastinuna: Nida al-Hayat*”, which means “Our Palestine: The Call to Life” and it reported on the plight of the Palestinians (Schanzer, 2008, p. 17). Khalili (2007a) notes that Palestinian party periodicals were essential for identity formation by announcing important dates of commemoration, printing meaningful iconic images and recounting stories of martyrs and guerrillas. These publications also legitimized their party of distribution (p. 74). Furthermore, information leaflets were a means of communication and mobilization used

during the *Second Intifada*, especially by Hamas (Schanzer, 2008, p. 25). The centrality of media is perhaps most evident in Hamas' covenant, which directly refers to the role of media actors in a bid to combat the 'Zionist' media control and general influence ("The Covenant", 1988, Articles 15, 22, 30).

Beyond being a part of history, Palestinian media has a history of its own. Since 1948, journalism and media have been essential in the propagation of Palestinian nationalism; a part of the overall national strategy (Jamal, 2003, p. 23-24). A substantial moment in the history of media was the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords between the PLO (which, combined with Fatah to become the PA) and the Israeli government. This afforded media independence to the PA, which almost immediately established "The Voice of Palestine" (radio) and "Palestine TV" under the control of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) (Batraawi, 2001). The broadcasts, based out of both the West Bank and Gaza, were initially comprised of 3-4 hours of daily programming, which included "... Palestinian-produced news as well as entertainment programs provided by other Arab stations, primarily Egypt. Over time this changed and the station began to develop and produce its own programs" (Jamal, 2005b, p. 78).

"The importance the Palestinian leadership attributed to these media is expressed by the fact that Arafat created the PBC even before his arrival from exile to Gaza in July 1994" (Jamal, 2005b, p. 78). This perceived importance can be explained by the Diasporic nature of many Palestinian people. Indeed, media can connect those living in the territories to Palestinians living in refugee camps, helping to create unified myths (Batraawi, 2001). It should be noted that the PBC, now controlled by the PA, continues to broadcast Palestine TV, which has also been called PATV (Toameh, 2009⁹). Furthermore, this analysis considers PATV as Fatah television. It is important to mention, however, that, as of February 2009 there has been discussion of establishing a specifically Fatah media outlet to counter Hamas' powerful media (Waked, 2009; Mar'i, 2009).

While Litvak (2009b) stated that the PA was granted autonomy over the media, Jamal (2003) proposed that this freedom was hampered by the dictates of the Oslo Accords. This, in addition to the Fatah-loyal leadership of the PBC and Palestine TV, meant that the PA

⁹ While this source is not academic or peer-reviewed, it is deemed relevant as a current news source on a subject that occasionally has scant resources.

exerted hegemonic control over the media, thereby limiting the expression of opposition (Jamal, 2003, p. 9-12; Jamal, 2005b, p. 78). Given this, only a certain amount of communicative space was permitted to social movements external to the PA. That is to say, few private television stations were permitted broadcasting space. And, when granted, it was under the stipulation that these groups not criticize sensitive subject matters and/or threaten national unity (Batrawi, 2001; Jamal, 2005b, p. 87). This was a vague stipulation that permitted some opposing thoughts to be shared, and many incarcerations and repercussions to be laid against those who failed to comply with the unclear requirements of the media regime (Batrawi, 2001). As of 2001 there were 31 private stations that represented diverse elements of Palestinian society. In spite, or perhaps because of the control exerted by the government, these private stations have emphasized culture, an over-arching aspect of which includes the “culture of resistance” (Batrawi, 2001).

Among the few groups to which the PBC initially permitted broadcast space were the women’s movement, Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Jamal, 2003, p. 9-12). Hamas sets itself apart, both as the first private television station in Gaza, and because of its power. Although broadcasting before, following Hamas’ 2006 election victory, it launched a “new” station called “Al-Aqsa TV” (Westervelt, 2006; Al-Aqsa TV (ADL), 2010¹⁰). The station was modeled after Al-Manar, Hezbollah’s TV station and its programming includes news, “political commentary”, *Qur’anic* readings and children’s shows. After Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, it banned Fatah-run television from broadcasting into the territory (Al-Aqsa TV, ADL, 2010).

The content of Fatah’s and Hamas’ programming is basically in line with Palestinian Meta-History, discourses, as well as the specifics of each group’s guiding principles and respective historical experiences. As a means of disseminating the message of the PA, PATV (Palestine TV) has emphasized accessible history to the masses to strengthen and justify Palestinian nationalism and its content (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 142). One specific technique that the party has used includes guiding questions provided by an interviewer. The main goal of the PA media is to bolster support to as wide ranging an audience as possible and, therefore,

¹⁰ These sources are, respectively, from the American National Public Radio (NPR) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The latter is an organization that focuses on issues of anti-Semitism. While these are not academic sources, the nature of exploratory research dictates that some sources might not always be ideal. That said, the information contained in these sources is considered reliable.

includes programming in French, Hebrew and English, in addition to its primarily Arabic content (Birnbaum, 2009, p. 135; 137).

Hamas's message centers on the illustration of its power. Throughout its daily programming, Hamas emphasizes "... high morale and military strength and unity" instead of suffering. Hamas also makes use of military spokespeople (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009, p. 209; 211).

According to Blondheim & Shifman (2009), Hamas uses the following three distinct conflict frames or "scripts", which have been illustrated throughout the discourse: Disaster, Power and Vulnerability. These are similar to the Core Framing Tasks of the Collective Action Frames. The Disaster script highlights "massive destruction and the distant suffering of helpless victims". It can be combined with the Power, or resilience script, in which the party is presented as being destined to triumph in conflict, as well as the Vulnerability script, which highlights weakness in the face of a threat (p. 207). For Hamas this means that it simultaneously broadcasts images of injury and destruction, while highlighting its own victory (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009, p. 213). Some of Hamas' specific content is Islamicized nationalist history such as the Canaanite Myth, the Palestinian struggle as well as anti-Semitism; all as a means of highlighting the negative qualities of the enemy and the attributes of heroes (Birnbaum, 2006, p. 142-156).

3.4 Summary of Fatah's and Hamas' Interactions and Discourses

While Palestinian history has shown that conflict has broken out between the two warring factions of the nationalist Fatah, in all its political manifestations (the PLO and the PA/PNA), and the Islamist Hamas, both groups, in fact, share many similarities. With Hamas as a more tightly defined group that has not wavered much since its establishment, the Islamist principles are far more pronounced than with Fatah. Indeed, the nationalist group has been caught between serving the interests of its people and those of its international negotiation partners. As such, Fatah has wavered in its identity and discourse. This is exemplified in its use of Islamic rhetoric, while still maintaining a nationalist secular bent. Hamas, for its part, has moved into a democratically-elected position and has discussed the possibility of accepting certain UN resolutions regarding Israel. Collectively, both groups face an enemy. Independently, their focuses vary, but never fully diverge.

3.5 Overview of the Exploratory Theoretical and Historical Framework

This chapter marks the end of the exploratory stage of this thesis. In combination with Chapter 2, the theoretical framework of this study has emerged: Hamas and Fatah¹¹ are framers of a Palestinian identity. These two political groups support and perpetuate many elements, including those of the six identified myths. The following methodology chapter will explain how the data were collected and analyzed within this theoretical framework.

¹¹ It should be noted that this exploration followed the historic development of both groups and, as such, looked at Fatah first and Hamas second. Given Hamas' apparent emphasis on children's media, the order in which these groups are hereafter discussed is reversed, with Hamas first and Fatah second.

Chapter 4: Methodology

The analysis of framing identity in media directed towards children is a complex endeavour and a number of methodological approaches can be used. This chapter will identify the population, units of analysis and the sampling process this study uses. It will go on to explain why a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analysis is the most appropriate choice. Finally, this chapter will specify the research procedures that have guided this analysis.

4.1 Population

This analysis investigates videos directed to children by Hamas and Fatah between the years of 2000 and 2009 inclusively. This is the population, or the collective that is to be analyzed (Archer et al., 2004, p. 207). Ideally this analysis would include *all* videos directed towards children created by these two groups. However, due to a variety of limitations, such as the inability to gain unrestricted access to all these videos and to ensure that the desired audience is indeed children, this study has instead defined the parameters of its own population based on the definitions of: videos, the source of each video, as well as ‘children’ and children’s programming.¹²

To begin, ‘videos’ (the units of analysis) are defined as shows which were broadcast and/or made available online, either directly from an online version of the television station, or by online monitoring projects. Specifically, these videos are from Al-Aqsa TV and Kids Aqsa TV as well as Palestinian Media Watch (PMW or PalWatch) and the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project (MEMRI TV or MEMRI). Al-Aqsa TV is the television station run by Hamas which also has videos available on its website (<http://www.aqsatv.ps/ar/>). Kids Aqsa TV contains Al-Aqsa TV’s children’s programming and has a specific website geared to children (<http://www.aqsakids.com/ar/>) which links directly to its YouTube¹³ channel that contains television clips

¹² It must be noted that when these definitions are met and, therefore, the videos are included in the analysis, this thesis assumes that these videos are indeed directed to a youth audience.

¹³ YouTube is a website on which members can share videos.

(<http://www.youtube.com/user/kidsaqsatv>). PMW (<http://www.pmw.org.il/>; <http://www.palwatch.org/>) is an Israel-based initiative that analyzes Palestinian media and schoolbooks. Finally, MEMRI TV (<http://www.memritv.org/>) is an American organization's website, based out of Washington D.C., which monitors the content of Arab media and textbooks. It is basically a publicly-accessible site, but some of the access to videos requires either a free or paying membership.

Due to the reliance on visual representations, 'children' are defined on the basis of stature, overall appearance and/or context. Context is determined by the activities and individuals in the videos, such as playing with toys or other children, respectively. It is not possible to use a stricter definition because of material limitations. For instance, it is impossible to define 'children' as individuals below the age of 18. This is the case for two reasons: 1- 'Child-ness' is culture-dependent, or context-dependent, and does not easily conform to one simple legal criteria. 2- Even if it were possible to use this legal definition, it is impossible to know the age of the children on the show. Hence, this analysis relies on more impressionistic definitions. To begin, then, a children's television program is defined as a broadcast that involves toys, acts of play and children interacting with other children in formats such as children's series, cartoon, talk show and music video. While 'children's series' can use cartoons, talk shows and music videos in its content, these are mere components of a show with a set format that is repeated in a series.

In addition, this analysis has taken its cues from Kids Aqsa TV in determining what is to be considered as children's programming. Doing so has broadened the scope of analysis, based on the site's inclusion of videos that prominently feature elements such as adults and violent acts. Indeed, because this study focuses on the framing of these videos by Hamas and Fatah, and not on audience reactions, broadcasts that feature military training, violent actions such as gun battles and images of injured and dead individuals, as well as adults and noted Palestinian politicians addressing a crowd of children, for example, are included. This is because the source indicates that this type of content, while not necessarily part of a conventional definition of children's programming, meets the research question's exploration of how these two groups frame their understanding of the Palestinian identity. In summary, any video from Hamas and Fatah between the years of 2000 and 2009 (inclusively) in formats such as children's series, cartoon, talk show and music video, that

involves elements fitting the analysis' definition of children and/or adhere to the examples set by Kids Aqsa TV, is considered children's programming (see Appendix 1).

Choosing which units of analysis to use is called "sampling". This analysis' population is all *available* videos directed towards children, broadcast by Hamas and Fatah between the years of 2000 and 2009 inclusively. The availability of these videos is emphasized because all videos that met the above definitions from the above sources were included. This means that the sample is synonymous with the population. For this analysis, then, out of over 200 videos, 109 met the criteria, with 56 sourced to Hamas and 53 to Fatah. These videos ranged in time from 8 seconds to 408 seconds (or 6 minutes and 48 seconds). By virtue of restricting the analysis to this population, the results determined can only be claimed as applicable to these 109 videos, and not to all videos produced by Hamas and Fatah (for a list of the videos and video information used in this analysis, please see Appendix 2).

4.2 Methodology

4.2.1 Content Analysis and Visual Ethnography

In order to study this population, this analysis made use of "Visual Ethnography", a form of "Content Analysis". Content analysis is a systematic means of coding and classifying various forms of information through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Nardi, 2007, p. 36). It is also part of "unobtrusive research", which is a method of analysis that enables a researcher to analyze material without affecting it. This is carried out by examining primary or secondary material, which permits the exploration of the motivations of the framer (also termed 'creator' for this analysis), without influencing the content (Babbie, 2008, p. 349; Riffe et. al., 2005, p. 11; Dowdall & Golden, 1989, p. 207). The process of content analysis, then, enables the inclusion of, and facilitates access to, hard-to-find communicators and communication (Riffe et. al., 2005, p. 38).

Visual ethnography likewise combines qualitative and quantitative methodologies, but emphasizes visual symbols and their use in social interaction and communication (Frey et. al., 1990, p. 33). According to Ball & Smith (1992), the exploration of images enhances analysis of the creator's intention or perspective. This is because "The camera operates by a


mechanical process and ... is sensitive to the intentions of its operator, it permits selective and focused observation ...” (Ball & Smith, 1992, p 6). This is accessed through “layered analysis”, which consists of different stages of analysis, beginning with qualitative, or “comparison”. Throughout this part, units of analysis are observed, compared and considered in a political, cultural and historical context, to determine the visual representations of the study. The second stage is quantitative and it analyzes the frequency and patterns of the data obtained from the qualitative exploration (Dowdall & Golden, 1989, p. 187).

4.2.1.1 Stage 1: Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative research investigates the characteristics of the analyzed subjects (Archer et al., 2004, p. 36). There is a level of flexibility inherent to this approach and the majority of this study’s operationalization occurs during this stage of data collection (Neuman, 2007, p. 207).

Operationalization is the process of moving the analysis from the conceptual to the concrete; from concepts to variables; and from variables to indicators (Archer et. al., 2004, p. 25). For this study, the concept is ‘identity’; specifically the identity conceptualized by Hamas and Fatah. The independent variable is the group producing the videos (or the ‘creator’), which can have a value of either ‘Hamas’ or ‘Fatah’. Each value of the independent variable was tested separately for the dependant variables of this analysis, which are based on the *Myth of Battle*, the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Religion*, the *Myth of Land* and the *Myth of Other* (as explored in Chapter 2). As variables, they are called Battle, Hero, Victim, Religion, Land and Other. The relationship between the concept, independent variable and dependent variables is shown in *Figure 4.1*.

Figure 4.1 - Structure of Operationalization



In order to operationalize the dependent variables, this study's qualitative approach involved specific research into Palestinian symbols in order to determine popular representations of the six analyzed variables. This research was followed by viewing each video in consideration of the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), as well as Palestinian history, discourses, narratives, myths and symbols (Chapter 3). These representations, or images, are called 'indicators'. To identify these, the appearance of an image is recorded and coded according to the variables it represents in each video. This appearance will be listed and searched for in the subsequent videos, as well as additional images, in order to compile a comprehensive list of indicators pertinent to this research. It is acknowledged that there is necessarily an element of arbitrariness in deciding which criteria will belong to which. However, this should not weaken the overall quality of the research.

It should be noted that each indicator is coded separately but can maintain some level of ambiguity. This means that no one indicator identifies more than one variable. However, as with Ellul's broad categories of myths, this does not imply that the variables in and of themselves are mutually exclusive. For example, a Kalashnikov is identified as an indicator of Hero, as it is a central symbol of the Palestinian *Fida'iyin* (guerrilla) (Khalili, 2007a, p. 94). Another type of gun, however, is an indicator of Battle. This demonstrates not only that there is a fine distinction between the classifications of indicators, but also that the variables

themselves can overlap, with the gun representing both Battle and Hero in certain instances. This will be elaborated on in the results chapter (Chapter 5) that follows.

Video #1 (from PMW Direct and created by Hamas) exemplifies the process of locating these indicators. The first scene of this music video shows a young child dressed in army fatigues running up to an adult also dressed in army fatigues but with a black Balaklava (face mask) typical of Hamas' *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*, who is carrying a Kalashnikov. The army fatigues is an indicator of Battle and the Balaklava as well as the Kalashnikov are indicators of Hero for this and all subsequent videos. In the following scene, the man passes the Kalashnikov on to the boy, which leads into a scene with two boys wearing army fatigues participating in open air military training. The Kalashnikov is once again counted as an indicator of Hero and the fatigues are likewise counted again as Battle. Open air military training is another indicator of Battle. These images are repeated throughout this video along with scenes showing Israeli policemen, Israeli medics tending to the injured, an Israeli soldier, parts of martyr videos, adults taking part in open field military training, images of barbed wire and an olive tree. The Israeli medics, policemen and soldier are all indicators of Other. The injured individual is an indicator of Victim and the barbed wire and, once again, the military training, are indicators of Battle. Furthermore, the martyr is an indicator of Hero. Finally, the image of the olive tree is an indicator of Land. The variables and indicators in this and all videos will be explained and noted comprehensively in the results chapter (Chapter 5).

4.2.1.2 Stage 2: Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis involves two steps. In the first step, structured methods are used to produce numerical and reproducible data (Neuman, 2007, p. 207; Archer et. al., 2004, p. 36). This method is based on the theory that the allocation of time and/or space to an issue in a video is not random, but rather an indicator of the creator's intentions. In other words, a video's content is created because it is related to issues that its creator considers important (Riffe et. al. 2005, p. 76). Therefore, the frequency of occurrence of particular content (*e.g.*, children carrying weapons, army training, an Israeli soldier, etc.) can be deemed to indicate the importance of an issue as determined by the creator.

Given the theoretical framework of this study, both groups (creators) being analyzed for their perspective of Palestinian identity support and perpetuate six variables to varying

degrees. Therefore, each video was labelled according to its creator (the independent variable). The videos were collected from five sources (see Appendix 2), each of which may also have interests in supporting or perpetuating these variables, and thus the source of each video was also recorded as another independent variable.

Accepting that the content of the videos reflects the importance that creators attach to any of these variables, the frequencies of occurrence of all indicators were recorded. Each video was viewed thrice, each time the volume was off, and available translation (if any) was not read. The first was a cursory viewing which enabled the addition of new indicators, which were then researched for meaning. The videos were then viewed a second time in order to count and record how many times each indicator appeared in a video. Finally, a third viewing was conducted in order to verify the accuracy of data obtained during the second viewing. The three viewings involved repeatedly stopping and restarting the video so as to properly count indicator appearances.

By stopping and starting the video, two considerations must be addressed: the first is of still, as opposed to motion, images; the second is the understanding of different scenes. A typical video may contain both still and motion imagery, and typical viewers see both together. By continually stopping and starting these videos, the content becomes a series of stills that are viewed separately. This enables the researcher to carefully count the indicators that the creators included in their videos. While this thesis does not consider audience reactions, it needs to be noted that the researcher's experience differs from that of a typical viewer (Riffe et. al., 2005, p. 65; 27).

A further issue related to watching a primarily motion video as a series of stills is that it can be difficult to accurately identify repeated images because the context and layout of the scene might be missed. To address this, the research made use of scene analysis within each video. That is, each scene is indicated by fade-outs, computerized shapes opening up onto new scenes, the same character(s) wearing different clothing (which can coincide with more obvious scene-changes), camera re-focusing (*e.g.*, zooming in on an object to the point where the object fills the screen and obscures the content of the previous scene), as well as a scene change (indicated by some of the aforementioned techniques), even when the change returns to the initial scene. This process enables the consideration of multiple indicators and variables within each video (Riffe et al., 2005 p. 72).

Once the frequency of all indicators was recorded, the six dependent variables were computed using the following formula:

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^{n_V} f_{iV}$$

Where V is a variable (any of the six dependent variables *e.g.*, Hero), n_V is the number of indicators that identify this variable V (*e.g.*, n_V for Hero is equal to 21), f_{iV} is the frequency of i -th indicator of this variable V (*e.g.*, Hero). Note that $i=1, 2, 3, \dots, n_V$ in the above formula.

The second step of the quantitative analysis involved using statistical methods. The data were examined for the existence of outliers, or results that lie outside of the bulk of the results. Outliers may be deleted from the statistical analysis or they may be examined separately. In this analysis, both options were carried out, with the outliers removed from the results (Chapter 5) and examined in the discussion and the appendices (Chapter 6 and Appendix 18-34). Descriptive statistics and the univariate frequency distribution for each variable were examined. Each variable was then analyzed with crosstabs to investigate the “bivariate frequency distribution” of Hamas as compared with that of Fatah (Coladarci, 2004, p. 385). Correlation was also used to determine whether there were relationships between the variables (Coladarci, 2004, p. 3).

4.3 Summary of Variables

To summarize, the following variables will be investigated in the statistical analysis: Battle, Hero, Victim, Land, Religion and Other. These are measured according to the frequency of each. “0” indicates a lack of data while “1” or larger integers indicate the frequency of appearance of the indicators. The nominal variables of creator (Hamas=0; Fatah=1) and source of videos (PMW Direct=1; PMW website (either the old or new one) =2; MEMRI=3; Hamas Kids Aqsa website=4; Al-Aqsa TV=5) will also be measured. While these latter measurements are assigned numerical values, they are non-categorizable and cannot, therefore, be ordered or ranked. That is to say, a video from MEMRI, for example, is

not numerically higher or lower than any other source. Instead, each is simply differentiated from the other (Archer, et. al., 2004, p. 183).

Chapter 5: Qualitative and Quantitative Results

Following the process outlined in Chapter 4, this chapter will explain the six variables of Battle, Hero, Victim, Religion, Land and Other. It will present the results of the qualitative exploration in a comprehensive table for each. It will identify every indicator and briefly justify the inclusion of each. There are many indicators listed here and some might appear redundant, such as the several variations of *Keffiyeh* for Hero. This is because initial research indicated that even slightly different representations can hold a specific meaning. This is combined with the actual viewing of the video, during which time it sometimes became clear (due to context) that the theoretical distinction did not truly affect a distinction in the actual representation. In other cases, viewing illuminated additional, slightly differentiated, indicators. As such, the analysis maintains these listings, but combines the indicators appropriately so that, in effect, the variable, and not the subtle distinction of the indicators, are represented. This will be followed by the results of the quantitative study, which will begin with an overview of the data and proceed into an exploration of each variable separately. Certain practical limitations of the analysis will be outlined throughout.

5.1 Qualitative Results

5.1.1 Battle

Conflict plays a role in multiple levels of identity construction. In consideration of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as that of Hamas and Fatah, this analysis defines conflict as synonymous with elements of violent battle, which are measured in Battle (variable). It should be additionally noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict, during which both groups were formed, is both lengthy and ongoing and, as such, there is an increasing likelihood that the conflict will be integrated as an aspect of Palestinian identity. This means that it can become integrally linked to how both groups self-define, thereby influencing their symbols. This consideration should be maintained over the course of the exploration of all variables and indicators, because elements of Battle can also be found throughout. Indeed,

“Battles and massacres are the iconic events at the very center of Palestinian nationalist commemoration” (Khalili, 2007a, p. 150).

On the basis of these considerations, Battle is defined as being composed of violent actions and machinery linked with conflict and war, such as *Gun Battle*. In addition, different toy weapons are also included. While it can be considered illegitimate to count toy weapons as indicators when the same might not be similarly counted in Western media, for example, it is the context within which these are identified that orients them as appropriate indicators of Battle for this analysis. For example, *Toy Gun* is considered an image of Battle when it is held by a child dressed in fatigues who is participating in military training along with, or similar to, adults. Therefore, the context for this and other indicators is considered when locating indicators for each variable. On the basis of all this, the following are the indicators of Battle:

Table 5.1 - Battle Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Toy Gun	ToyGun	This is a gun held by a child that appears to be a toy visually. Its context in combat dictates this object’s inclusion as an indicator of Battle.
2	Toy Weapon	ToyWeapon	This is the same context-based indicator as the <i>Toy Gun</i> , but is anything other than a gun, like a toy rocket launcher.
3	Image of Child with a Weapon	ImageWeaponChild	Because this thesis deals with both the motion and still images contained in videos, this is a still image of a child with a weapon, but not a real-life representation because this would otherwise not be a mutually exclusive indicator.
4	Unspecified Gun	GunUnspecified	This is a gun that does not have the representational meaning associated with other indicators, such as the <i>Kalashnikov</i> (Hero).
5	Explosives	Explosives	These are explosives and the numeric value is determined as follows: <i>Explosives</i> are counted individually if visually represented individually (e.g. 8 sticks of dynamite), or collectively if represented collectively (e.g., a box of explosives).
6	Weapons	Weapons	These do not fall under the classification of <i>Gun</i> , but are weapons nonetheless.
7	Fire	Fire	This is fire in the context of conflict, either used as a weapon or for the purpose of a battle (like a real rocket launcher).
8	Explosion	Explosion	<i>Explosion</i> is counted when in the context of conflict.
9	Bullets	Bullets	<i>Bullets</i> are counted when focused on and not when there is a <i>Gun Battle</i> , as to do so for the latter would not be possible. Furthermore, <i>Bullets</i> are counted based on overall appearance and not the appearance

			of each individually. Frequently, this indicator is displayed collectively and is counted as 1.
10	Barbed Wire	BarbedWire	Although it can be considered restriction and therefore an indicator of Victim, <i>Barbed Wire</i> is frequently part of institutionalized conflict and, as such, will be counted as an indicator of Battle.
11	Hand-to-Hand Combat	HandtoHandCombat	This is physical combat without weapons.
12	Gun Battle	Gunbattle	This is the exchange of fire, either between formal (army), mixed (army and civilian or army and guerrilla fighters) and informal parties (civilians, guerrillas, etc.). This includes the real or replicated exchange of fire. This means that <i>Gun Battle</i> can be identified by staged, drawn, animated, or implied fire (e.g., computerized targets accompanied by gun noise).
13	Destroyed Property	DestroyedProperty	This involves the destruction of property, specifically buildings, in a conflict.
14	Destruction	Destruction	This is destruction in the context of conflict that is not of buildings.
15	Army Machinery	ArmyMachinery	This includes tanks, helicopters, etc. It represents formal warfare/conflict.
16	Military Camp Training	MilitaryCampTrain	This is structured military training. It represents formal warfare and is related to conflict. This is counted when children are involved as well.
17	Open-Air Obstacle Training	ObstacleTrainOpen	This is less structured training that can be part of formal military training, or related to guerrilla training. This is counted when children are involved as well.
18	Green Brown Army Fatigues	ArmyFatiguesBrnGrn	This is not clearly linked to any one group and instead represents the institutionalized violence of Battle.
19	Blue Grey Army Fatigues	ArmyFatiguesBlueGrey	Like <i>Green Brown Army Fatigues</i> , these are not clearly linked to any one group and instead represent the institutionalized violence of Battle.

5.1.2 Hero

The *Myth of Hero* is not unique to Palestinian identity, but is one that societies share (Khalili, 2007a, p. 121-122). Venerated martyrs and “heroic resistance” are celebrated across societies as means of orienting the cost of war and the value of its burden for the population, which includes freedom and nationalistic survival (Khalili, 2007a, p. 31; 23). It also serves the propaganda and framing goals of integrating a value of self-sacrifice into society to call on the population for action or support (Ellul, 1965, p. 62; 67; Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613-614; Khalili, 2007a, p. 18-19).

Similar to Battle, the qualities of Hero are not mutually exclusive. For example, although the indicators of martyr are categorized as Hero, it could also be classified as

Victim and Other. This is because “*sha’hid*”, a term frequently associated with martyrdom, has diverse meanings, including one who bears witness and one who self-sacrifices. “The *sha’hid*, in everyday Palestinian usage is not only the active dissident dying in the act of resistance, but also the innocent bystander, not necessarily armed and engaged in the act of fighting, who is however killed at the hands of the unjust oppressor” (Khalili, 2007a, p. 140). This serves to further highlight the overlapping of the conceptualization of variables. In the interest of this analysis, however, Hero is informed by these considerations, but defined with some level of distinction from the other five. For example, *Dead Bodies* is an indicator of Victim, but a dead body carried through the streets in a *Large-Scale Funeral* changes this dead body into a martyr. The difference here is the ceremony and veneration.

Some of the indicators of Hero are visually manifested in recognizable politicians and religious leaders who have died naturally or in times of conflict, and suicide bombers, often cloaked in the colors and symbols of their member group, thereby identifying themselves with its objectives. *Kalashnikovs* on their own, representing guerrilla fighters, and *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighter* (previously referred to as a Balaklava) are also among the numerous indicators of Hero (Khalili, 2007a, p. 6). Heroism is further broken down into heroic qualities such as resistance. These qualities can be manifest in the act of *Throwing Stones* or the representation of a *Stone on its Own*, contrasting this basic weapon against a possibly unseen force that wields much larger and more advanced artillery (Khalili, 2007a, p. 119). It is this comparative weakness and the associated bravery required to take part in some form of action that differentiates these indicators from Battle. The complete list of the indicators of Hero is as follows:

Table 5.2 - Hero Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Recognized Martyr	RecognizedMartyr	This includes civilians who have been venerated and publicized like Mohammad al-Dura, a child killed in the Arab-Israeli conflict and considered to be the “... archetypal figure of commemoration for Palestinian children” (Khalili, 2007a, p. 147-148). It also includes suicide bombers. This does not include politicians, religious leaders, etc. because there are separate indicators for these (as listed below). This is because different martyrs represent different groups’ emphases. While some are shared between groups, others represent unique realities

			important to specific collectives (Khalili, 2007a, p. 132). Furthermore, the recognition of this specific indicator is limited to the familiarity of the researcher and will therefore be combined with other martyrs that were not recognized by the researcher, but could still be considered ‘recognized’ by the creators and their target audience. It should be noted that the clothing the martyr wore, when staged, is counted separately (e.g., <i>Hamas Bandana</i>).
2	Political Martyr	PoliMartyr	<i>Political Martyrs</i> are members of the two analyzed political parties who have died naturally, or in the context of conflict, and have been venerated. It should be noted that this includes both politicians and civilians cloaked in the colors or clothing of their respective group. This does not include the representation of politicians who are currently deceased, but were broadcast at the time they were still alive (e.g., Arafat before 2004).
3	Religious Martyr	ReligMartyr	<i>Religious Martyrs</i> are leaders in the religious community who have died naturally, or have been killed in conflict. These can be religious leaders within the political party and serve a political purpose but are foremost religious leaders, such as Sheikh Ahmad Yassin of Hamas (in broadcasts after their death only).
4	Cartoon Figure of Handala	HandalaCartoon	Handala or “Hanzala” is a famous figure of a young boy standing with his back facing the audience, observing whatever situation is before him. He is drawn by famous Palestinian political cartoonist, Naji al-Ali, who was assassinated. “In death, al-Ali and his creation became one ... al-Ali as a shahid (sic.) then became both martyr and witness” (Khalili, 2007a, p. 134) (see Appendix 3).
5	Human Standing in the Posture of Handala	HandalaPostureReal	The same as the cartoon form, but applied to a human (see Appendix 3).
6	Poppy	Poppy	This is a flower that contains all the colors of the Palestinian flag. It represents Palestinian resistance, as well as the qualities of “... renewal, resurrection and life”. It is a symbol of the sacrifice of martyrs, with the red indicating their blood and connecting it to the land. This shows the symbiotic relationship between the land and the Palestinian. This connection to the land, however, is secondary to its heroic connotations, which is how it will herein be considered (Abufarha, 2008, p. 359-362).
7	Keffiyeh	Keffiyeh	The <i>Keffiyeh</i> was popularized on a national level by Arafat. While it used to be a peasant head-covering, it is now frequently linked to guerrilla combat, and has therefore taken on the heroic quality of resistance (Swedenburg, 1990, p. 20-25; Khalili, 2007a, p. 143). This specific indicator will serve as the catch-all for the <i>Keffiyeh</i> indicators that do not fit the definitions of the specific <i>Keffiyeh</i> indicators that follow (see Appendix

			4).
8	Keffiyeh in the Context of Conflict	KeffiyehConflict	Same symbol of resistance as the above, but in the context of conflict.
9	Keffiyeh Pattern	KeffiyehPattern	Symbol of resistance, superimposed on an object which will also be considered (coded separately for the <i>Keffiyeh</i> indicator as well as the object it is on).
10	Keffiyeh Scarf	KeffiyehScarf	This is a longer version of the <i>Keffiyeh</i> with the colors of the Palestinian flag at the ends.
11	Kalashnikov	GunKalashn	Armed resistance is cited as being a central part of the Palestinian heroic narrative. Part of this is the <i>Kalashnikov</i> , the foremost symbol of the Palestinian guerrilla (Khalili, 2007a, p. 94) (see Appendix 5). It should be noted that "... guerrillas in particular came to be not only iconic figures, but also concrete embodiments of social mobilization" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 144).
12	Stone on its Own	Stone	The <i>Stone on its Own</i> represents the heroic quality of resistance.
13	Conflict Wedding	WeddingConflict	This includes images relating to weddings (brides, etc.) in the context of conflict or battle and can be symbolic of martyr-veneration. This is based on the consideration of martyrdom as a wedding, reaffirming "... hope amidst death, and allows for transformation ... of ... human loss into a meaningful and heroic death that can give dignity and honour" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 125).
14	Throwing Stones	StoneThrow	Like <i>Stone on its Own</i> , the act of throwing stones is a popular symbol of the heroic quality of resistance. For example, Khalili (2007a) notes that the images of a child throwing stones at a tank are images of martyrdom and are frequently represented throughout Palestinian refugee camps (p. 119).
15	Large-Scale Funeral	FuneralCeremonyLrg	This is synonymous with a martyr's funeral, which typically involves an unwashed, bloodied body being carried through the streets in blood-spattered sheets or wrapped in a flag. It is frequently considered a symbol of injustice and a promise of resistance (Khalili, 2007a, p. 126). The size of these functions serves the additional purpose of validating the cause for the living members (p. 124). "Collective mourning and ecstatic celebrations of martyrdom both create a sense of community among the mourners, and the dead body appeals to observers' emotions of sympathy and fury and act as potent instruments of political mobilization" (p. 126).
16	Cactus	Cactus	The <i>Cactus</i> encompasses the myth of history through its past demarcation of Palestinian farm land. It can also represent Victim and the connection to land, as it is a representation of <i>Al-Nakba</i> and the resulting de-territorialisation. It is considered an indicator of Hero, however, because of its resilient nature in the face of death, manifest in its ability to re-grow out of destruction (Abufarha, 2008, p. 364; Sa'di, 2000, p. 194-195).

17	Hamas Bandana	HamasBandana	This bandana is associated with Hamas' armed branch called the <i>Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades</i> . While it has proved problematic to find an academic source for this political group's uniform, the branch's website has a collection of photos of their martyrs (Al-Qassam, n.d.). Throughout these images there are repeated appearances of the bandana (one of which can be viewed in Appendix 6), and therefore, it is considered an indicator of Hero, even when not worn by an identified martyr.
18	Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters	BlackMaskHamas	In the same way that the Hamas bandana is associated with the <i>Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades</i> , the black mask is also frequently seen in the staged pictures of the martyrs as well as on the branch's website (Al-Qassam, n.d.). As such, it is considered part of their typical clothing and, therefore, an indicator of Hero (see Appendix 6).
19	Black Hamas Clothes	BlackClothesHamas	This is another element associated with the <i>Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades</i> . It is counted when accompanied by other more identifiable clothing, such as the mask and/or the bandana.
20	Lion	Lion	The Lion ("Asad"), once the name of a pre-Islamic Arabic tribe, has been associated with the heroic quality of bravery (Foltz, 2006, p. 13). Furthermore, its position as the king amongst animals has also linked it with the qualities of strength, nobility and ferocity, all of which lends itself to Hero (Foltz, 2006, p. 60).
21	Horses	Horse	According to pre-Islamic Arabic tradition, <i>Horses</i> are believed to carry blessings (Foltz, 2006, p. 13). They are also linked with the quality of power (Foltz, 2006, p. 82). Khalili (2007a) further notes that galloping horses are considered symbols of heroism (p. 119). This analysis will, therefore, make use of <i>Horses</i> as indicators of Hero.

5.1.3 Victim

The *Myth of Victim*, which is measured by Victim (variable), is derivative of the relationship with Hero and can motivate the Liberationist Discourse. Additionally, Hero and Battle have some overlapping conceptions. Furthermore, the loss inherent to Victim can be sourced to the loss of land (Land variable) (Khalili, 2007a, p. 34-36; Litvak, 2009a, p. 15-16). An example of the combination of these elements is a dead body lying in the streets amidst a raging combat, which can motivate action to remedy past loss (Webman, 2009, p. 32-33).

Underlying the multiple manifestations and connections of Victim is the Tragic Discourse's theme of loss and suffering (Khalili, 2007a, p. 34-36; 90). This includes the

more conventional images of loss such as *Dead Bodies*. It also highlights death in a personalized way (and not with veneration, as with Hero) through images like small-scale family funerals. Another part of this discourse highlights the victims of the Palestinian tragedy of the loss of land, as well as the resultant suffering, with images such as refugees and refugee camps (Webman, 2009, p. 30). Given this focus, the indicators of Victim are as follows:

Table 5.3 - Victim Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Orange on its Own ("Al-burtuqal")	OrangeOwn	The orange symbolized the loss of nationhood after 1948, which is also known as <i>Al-Nakba</i> , or the disaster. "For Palestinians the robbery of a nation was exemplified in the orange robbery. The loss of the orange groves, the loss of Palestine, the ruined communities and nationhood, and the loss of life itself were all signified by the orange that was robbed and left behind. In this respect, the orange became the symbol of loss, a robbed nationhood" (Abufarha, 2008, p. 349).
2	Orange Tree	OrangeTree	This is the same as the above, but is a tree instead of a singular orange.
3	Mnemonic Device: Nursery	NurseryMem	This, like the following three indicators, is a quotidian memory place. "Though these spots became places of mourning ... they have been maintained and incorporated into broader Palestinian commemorative practices by political organizations" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 137). As scenes of past conflict, or burial grounds, the representation of these as heroic or tragic is contested. While specific sites call upon specific historical contexts which would inform this debate, the appearance of these edifices in states of destruction indicate victimhood. It should be noted that the inclusion of the context of destruction and reference to conflict could cross over and be classified as indicators of Battle, like <i>Destroyed Property</i> . However, these mnemonic devices are distinct because the destruction does not occur in a representation of conflict and instead appears already destroyed in a context of mourning, or loss, such as someone quietly walking through rubble of this type of building. Typically, these mnemonic devices are specific buildings that hold meaning of a specific event. Because of the possibility that the researcher does not recognize these events, these indicators represent the disruption of daily life, which leaves victims in its wake (and not a specific historic situation).
4	Mnemonic Device:	SchoolMem	The school, either recognizable as a part of Palestinian history or in various states of disrepair, is another

	School		mnemonic device and is considered an indicator of the <i>Myth of Victim</i> .
5	Mnemonic Device: Hospital	HospitalMem	Like the above two, this hospital is either a recognizable part of the Palestinian past and/or in a state of disrepair. As an essential service, it indicates a disruption to life and a challenge for survival, thereby reinforcing its classification of “Victim”.
6	Mnemonic Device: Mosque	MosquesMem	Once again, this mnemonic device meets the criteria of the above three. This analysis is careful to identify the mnemonic device of the Mosque as distinct from the indicators of Religion (listed below) by making sure it does not meet the criteria listed below. It is instead identified as a specific historical indicator, or one that highlights the loss through its appearance of disrepair.
7	The Date of <i>Al-Nakba</i>	AlNakbaDate	This is the visual identification of “1948”, the date of the Palestinian <i>Nakba</i> . This is an essential point for the Palestinian Tragic Discourse.
8	Refugees	Refugees	This is another manifestation of <i>Al-Nakba</i> , wherein Palestinians, who were formerly territorialized, are now in a state of displacement. The refugee is also a clear victim of circumstance left to deal with the repercussions of being without a formal territory, or one they consider their own.
9	Refugee Camp	RefugeeCamp	This is the collective living arrangement of the refugees, once again representing a collective of victims displaced from land. While this seems to incorporate elements of Land it is foremost a representation of Victim.
10	Small-Scale Funeral Ceremony	FuneralCeremonySm	As opposed to large-scale or martyr funerals, the small, often family-centered, funeral emphasizes loss and victimhood (Khalili, 2007a, p. 122).
11	Binds	Binds	Chains or bounds indicate a quality of victimhood such as restriction.
12	Dead Bodies	DeadBodies	<i>Dead Bodies</i> are, perhaps, one of the more typical indicators of Victim. Indeed, the following five indicators can be considered more conventional indicators of this variable. This indicator shows bodies of dead individuals that are not in a funeral. They are typically in the context of a conflict (e.g., still bodies on the ground amidst ongoing violent battle) and are representative only of the state of being dead and not based on political affiliation, age or sex. Also, the bodies of dead individuals that appear in scenes before resurrection are included in this category.
13	Bandaged Limbs	BandagedLimbs	Like <i>Dead Bodies</i> , <i>Bandaged Limbs</i> are generally identified in, but are not limited to, the context of combat.
14	Injured Bodies	InjuredInd	These are images of injured individuals that do not fit the above criteria and are frequently found in the context of conflict. It should be noted that when it was unclear whether the individuals were dead or injured, they were counted as ‘injured’.
15	Bloody Bodies	BloodBodies	These are specifically bloodied injured or dead bodies.

			When they are bloodied and lying on the ground, they are considered <i>Bloody Bodies</i> and are not counted as any other indicator, such as <i>Dead Bodies</i> . This was specified as a distinct indicator because Khalili (2007a) notes that it can be part of Hero as it indicates the “vulnerability of the human body”. This can, therefore, highlight the heroic sacrifice inherent to fighting (p. 126). While this provides an interesting theoretical element, in practice, this is considered a more conventional, albeit gruesome, indicator of Victim and is considered as such for this analysis.
16	Blood External to Bodies	BloodNotBodies	This is the appearance or presence of blood in scenes, either on its own, or focused in upon. While, like <i>Bloody Bodies</i> , this can indicate heroic sacrifice, it is considered as a more concrete representation of Victim (Khalili, 2007a, p. 126).
17	Cemetery	Cemetery	According to Khalili (2007a) this indicator theoretically represents a connection to land through the physical territorialisation of an individual which symbolically reaffirms nationalistic ideologies (Khalili, 2007a, p. 135). While considering this symbolic aspect, the context shown throughout the videos indicates the victimhood associated with death and, as such, <i>Cemetery</i> is considered an indicator of Victim.

5.1.4 Religion

Both Hamas and Fatah are variously connected to the religion of Islam. Hamas is an Islamist organization. Islamism is a typically expansionist ideology that stipulates direct adherence to Islamic principles in political, social and personal life by following a strict interpretation of the *Qur'an* and Islamic law (*Shari'a*) (Berman, 2003, p. 257-272; Schanzer, 2008, p. 5). It also sees “... in Islam a guiding political doctrine that justified and motivated collective action on behalf of the doctrine” (Hafez, 2003, p. 4). On the other hand, Fatah was founded by Muslim individuals and the group has made use of Islamic symbols in its rhetoric (Schanzer, 2008, p. 43). While there are many religions involved in the conflict, including Judaism (which will be discussed for Other) and Christianity, this analysis will look specifically at Islam for the variable of Religion, due to the role it plays for both Hamas and Fatah. On this basis, the indicators supporting Religion are as follows:

Table 5.4 - Religion Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Dome of the Rock	DomeRock	Believed to be the spot from which Mohammed ascended to heaven, this gold-domed structure is important to the Islamic religion (Reznick, 1990, p. 111). This is counted when it is represented separately from its commonly associated structures.
2	Aqsa Mosque	AqsaMosque	The name “Al-Aqsa” means “far-away sanctuary” (Klein, 1986, p. 134). This grey-domed structure is another important edifice to the Islamic religion. This is counted when it is represented separately from its associated structures.
3	Temple Mount Minarets	TempleMtMinaret	These are structures that are part of the collective of buildings on the Temple Mount, and by association, are important to the Islamic religion. These are counted when represented separately from their associated structures.
4	Temple Mount	TempleMt	Also known as “ <i>Harem esh-Sherif</i> ” or “noble or venerated sanctuary” this collective of buildings on Mount Moriah are important to the Islamic religion and prominently feature the <i>Dome of the Rock</i> and the <i>Aqsa Mosque</i> (as well as the minarets) (Klein, 1986, p. 134). This is counted when the collective is viewed and not when all three of the composite parts are viewed separately, thereby avoiding multiple counting.
5	Female Headscarf	MuslimFemHeadScarf	Specifically termed the “ <i>Hijab</i> ”, this scarf, or veil is the traditional Muslim head covering for women and is a symbol of modesty and morality. It should be noted that different regions and practice dictate the type and frequency of head covering. This image is determined to be an appropriate indicator of Religion (Esposito, 2003).
6	Male Head Covering	MuslimMaleHeadCovering	This refers specifically to the skullcap or head covering and not other forms of scarves, like the one traditionally associated with the peasant, as the latter is an indicator of Land. Like the female head covering, that worn by males expresses the Muslim practice of modesty and is considered an indicator of Religion for Muslims for this analysis (Esposito, 2003).
7	<i>Qur'an</i>	Koran	Directly translated to mean “recitation”, the Koran or ‘ <i>Qur'an</i> ’ is thought to be the words of God, as recorded by the Prophet Mohammed. Considered the fundamental text of Islam, it serves as a guide and a central source for the religion and lifestyle of Muslims and Islamists. It is, therefore, an important representation of religion and is determined through its visual

			appearance and the context within which it is presented (with a recognizable cover or books in the context of prayer) (Esposito, 2003) (see Appendix 7).
8	Crescent and Star	CrescentStar	The Islamic calendar is lunar and, as such, the moon plays an important role in the religion (Esposito, 2003). Originating in the Byzantine era, the crescent and star together was adopted as the symbol of Islam when the Ottoman Empire ruled the Muslim world. While not all Muslims consider this to be an Islamic symbol, its role during Ramadan as well as its conventional linkage makes this an indicator of Religion for this thesis (<i>The meaning behind religious symbols</i> , n.d.) (see Appendix 8).
9	Prayer Mat	Prayermat	Termed the “ <i>Sajjadah</i> ” from the “... root meaning “to prostrate””, this mat is used for prayer. Traditionally, Muslims pray five times a day. This practice involves kneeling and bowing on prayer rugs that face Mecca, Mohammed’s place of birth and Islam’s holiest city located in Saudi Arabia. These mats, therefore, link to Islam and are counted as indicators of Religion (Esposito, 2003) (see Appendix 9).
10	General Mosques	MosqueGeneral	Mosques are important religious components of Islam. The indicator is listed as “general” because it is a religious edifice other than the ones listed for this and other variables, and exists intact (thereby distinguishing it from the mnemonic device of Victim) and externally to the context of conflict.

5.1.5 Land

The *Myth of Land* (from which the Land variable is derived) holds an interesting and central place in Palestinian identity. It speaks to the Myth of Descent, by establishing physical and religious ties of a people whose identity has been questioned, to a conceptualization of a land to which they feel they have been denied access (Palestine). This is done through the Canaanite Myth of Descent and the myth that Islam has ancient and holy religious ties to Palestine (Litvak, 2009b, p. 112-113). This is coupled with the more recent and, arguably, more relevant Palestinian myth of the 1948 *Nakba*, which underlies the current struggle for land (Litvak, 2009a, p. 15-16; Webman, 2009, p. 27-28; Hasson, 2010, p. 389; Sa’di, 2000, p. 195; Masalha, 2008, p. 143). Land, then, is the physical manifestation of

both the Palestinian identity and the aspiration of the Palestinian cause; it embodies what they are fighting for (Battle); who they are fighting against (Other); Heroes and victims die for it; and religion is contained within it and practiced on it.

Therefore, Land can be conceptualized in multiple ways. This analysis explores an idealized representation of land, the emotional connection to it as well as its tragic loss. This conception can underlie three of the major Palestinian discourses of this thesis, with the loss emphasized in the Tragic Discourse; the desire for its reclamation in the Liberationist Discourse and its celebration in the Nation-Statist Discourse, all of which can motivate action and reference the Palestinian Master-Narrative (Khalili, 2007a, p. 90-94). As will be represented in the following table, Land is identified according to traditional peasant work and edifices, symbolic vegetation, keys to homes lost, as well as the physical representation of aspired borders.

Table 5.5 - Land Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Cactus Fruit/“Saber”	Saber	The Cactus Fruit represents the Palestinian community before 1948 and is a part of the Palestinian Myth of Descent, which establishes Palestinian historic ties with the land (Litvak, 2009b, p. 97; Masalha, 2008, p. 136; Khalili, 2007b, p. 299). It is synonymous with the qualities of patience (<i>saber</i> means patience in Arabic), resilience and protectiveness (Abufarha, 2008, p. 346-347). It represents rootedness to the land and the community, as well as the time before the <i>Nakba</i> .
2	Potted Cactus	PottedCactus	As with the indicator of the resiliency of the <i>Cactus</i> for the Hero variable, this too demonstrates resilience (Abufarha, 2008, p. 364; Sa’di, 2000, p. 194-195). Its visual representation in a flowerpot, however, sets it apart as an indicator of Land. That it is potted represents a change from “... its living environment to representational terrain” after 1948. It demonstrates the transitory reality of many Palestinians. It is symbolically carried with every Palestinian as a reminder of their displacement and the aspired return to a homeland (Sa’di, 2000, p. 19-195). This shows the seminal importance of land to Palestinian identity, even as a symbol.
3	Peasant Clothes	PeasantClothes	The peasant, as represented through this and subsequent indicators, is a seminal symbol of Palestinian identity and the Myth of Descent. It confronts the denial of Palestinian existence by showing men and women at work on the land wearing traditional peasant clothing

			(see Appendix 10). The peasant, then, is a human representation of rootedness to the land before the <i>Nakba</i> as well as the emotion of “<i>sumud</i>” or “steadfastness” which indicates a commitment to return to the land in the future. It is used as a means of unification and mobilization of the Palestinian people against the occupation (Khalili, 2007a; Abufarha, 2008).
4	Farm Work	FarmWrk	<i>Farm Work</i> is another symbol of the peasant and likewise indicates a historic connection to the land. It includes traditional farm work such as ploughing land and harvesting fruits and vegetables.
5	Peasant Keffiyeh	KeffiyehPeasant	The Keffiyeh is a Palestinian head covering conventionally considered part of peasant and Bedouin attire. While it is also used to indicate Hero, its context with peasants and peasant work classifies it as an indicator of Land (see Appendix 10).
6	Olive Tree “Al-zaytuna”	OliveTree	The olive, or its tree, is an important and central Palestinian symbol, like the peasant. As an essential means of sustenance, it is linked to the physical and economic livelihood of the Palestinian people. The growth and harvest of the olives is one that emphasizes the generational sharing of both this sustenance and the land. Its existence is sourced back to 8000 BC and, combined with its physical prominence in the West Bank, serves as a part of the Myth of Descent. (Abufarha, 2008, p. 352-358). While the trees might not always be recognizable (as they might be drawn), the act of harvesting is distinct and recognizable (see Appendix 11). Therefore, this indicator is identified both according to its visual representation and its context.
7	Olives	Olives	This indicator is the same as the above tree, but is instead olives on their own.
8	Palestinian Map	PalMap	This is all of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza as Palestine. It is generally represented by a map in the shape of all these places without current geographical and/or political boundaries and sometimes with the Dome of the Rock on top of Jerusalem.
9	Shape of the West Bank	ShapeWestB	This is the shape of the West Bank. Like the map of Palestine, this visually territorializes the Palestinian connection to land.
10	Map of the West Bank	MapWestB	This, like the shape of the West Bank, territorializes the connection to land.
11	Shape of Gaza	ShapeGaza	The visual representation of the physical shape of Gaza indicates the connection to land.
12	Map of Gaza	MapGaza	The Map of Gaza indicates the connection to the land.
13	Key on its Own	KeyOnOwn	This symbol of the connection to the land, or “home” represents both a life that came before the loss of land as well as the possibility of returning to that life (Sa’di, 2000, p. 181). In this way, it can be synonymous with Victim, but strongly serves as a physical symbol of return, thereby representing Land. The specification of the key on its own is contextual, insofar as it is not in the context of a family.

14	Key in the Family Setting	KeyFamSetting	This is the same as the key on its own, in principal, but has the added element of being granted in the context of inter-generation, or the family. This is, theoretically, an important part of Palestinian identity. Hamas is reputed to emphasize this element to a greater extent than Fatah. The key in the context of family, then, shows the passing of Palestinian existence, including the connection to the land and the struggle, from generation to generation. Indeed, the key traditionally represents a legacy passed on from father to son (Sa'di, 2000, p, 181).
15	Traditional Arab Houses	TradArabHouses	The key symbolizes the way back home, which can be understood as a Traditional Arab House (Sa'di, 2000, p. 181). The Traditional Arab House is comprised of two parts: the inside, which is more important and lavish as compared with the outside, which is frequently plain and unassuming. Furthermore, this house is described along with indicators such as the <i>Olive/Olive Tree</i> and <i>Peasant Clothes</i> associated with "prelapsarian village life in Palestine, and were invoked as signifiers of Palestinianness once the nationalist movement re-emerged in the mid-1960s" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 6). As such, this unassuming stone construction with lavish decorations on the interior is considered an indicator of Land.

5.1.6 Other

The *self-other* is an essential part of identity construction. Palestinian history and the Arab-Israeli conflict show multiple instances of this. Some examples of this are: the Palestinian displacement, which is linked to the Israeli occupation of land; the Arab-Israeli conflict which, historically, has largely involved Israel as well as the United States; and religion, with the majority of Israelis being Jewish, whereas the religion of Hamas and Fatah is primarily Muslim. All these relational elements, and more, form the *other*, against which the *self* (Palestinian identity, in this case) is conceptualized.

It should be noted that the conception of the actions of the *other* and the *self* are impossible to measure in the way this analysis has been constructed. For example, although the actions of the *other* might be linked to combat, Battle and Other are measured separately, with Other measured according to the main participants and not their actions. It should be noted that these actions are, however, discussed in Chapter 6. Indicators of the variable of Other, then, are based on the main religion of the Israelis and nationalistic indicators of Israel

and the USA. While both the founding documents of Hamas and Fatah substantiate the inclusion of these groups as the Other, this is most evident in the Hamas covenant with its references to the “Jew” as the Palestinian enemy and the assertion that Jews have infiltrated American organizations, such as the Rotary and Lions Clubs (“The Covenant”, 1988, Articles 32 & 24).

Judaism is identified according to conventionally-linked physical representation of the religion, such as the *Jewish Skullcap* (or *Yamuka*), *Jewish Black Hat*, etc. Indicators of nationalism, such as flags, will also be addressed. In consideration of all this, the indicators for Other are as follows:

Table 5.6 - Other Indicators

#	Indicator	Indicator Name	Explanation
1	Jewish Skullcap	Yamuka	This is a head covering traditionally worn by Jewish men. “... above all it is a sign of man’s humility in his relationship to God” (Ouaknin, 2003, p. 118). Because it is conventionally associated with visual representations of Judaism, it is, therefore, considered an indicator of Other.
2	Payes	Payes	These are long sideburns that are traditionally worn by Orthodox Jewish men. The origin of these types of sideburns, as well as long beards (the latter of which cannot be exclusively considered an indicator of Judaism, but is noted in Appendix 34), stems from the Old Testament’s prohibition of using cutting or slicing mechanisms on the face (Ouaknin, 2003, p. 114). Because of its conventional visual association with Judaism, it is considered an appropriate indicator of Other.
3	Candelabra	Candelabra	Biblically, the candelabra are among the objects God required for the Temple. Also called a “Menorah”, it has seven branches. “The description given in the Bible ... is like that of a tree of light” and remained lit symbolizing “eternal light” (Ouaknin, 2003, p. 76). This is conventionally linked to the Jewish Other, especially when considered amongst additional indicators of Other.
4	Jewish Star	JewishStar	This is a symbol of Judaism, but is not on the Israeli flag or on a uniform (<i>e.g.</i> , medic).
5	Jewish Black Hat	JewishBlackHat	Many Jewish clothing traditions vary from country to country and according to the level

			of practice. Certain Eastern-European Jews (and their descendants) wear black hats from “turn-of-the-century fashion styles”. In spite of the select group of Jews who make use of this type of clothing, it is a common item in popular depictions of Jews and, as such, is considered an indicator of the Jewish individual (Other) (Ouaknin, 2003, p. 114).
6	The Wailing Wall	Kotel	This is the Western support wall of the Second Temple that survived this Jewish holy site’s destruction (<i>What is the Western Wall?</i> n.d.). It is a holy site for Jews and has been a point of contention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with Jews and Muslims both claiming its centrality (the Jews for the <i>Kotel</i> and the Muslims for the Temple Mount beyond it).
7	Israeli Flag	IsrFlag	This is the nationalistic representation of Israel in its clearest sense.
8	Checkpoint	Checkpoint	While a checkpoint can indicate Victim and Land, this is herein considered a symbol of Other because it is a physical manifestation of the restriction imposed by an external force (Israel) that prevents Palestinians from accessing the land for which they yearn.
9	Israeli Wall	WallIsr	This is a wall separating Palestinian territory from the border of Israel and, like the checkpoint, is seen as an indicator of the Other.
10	Israeli Politician	IsrPolitician	This is the representation of Israeli politicians, past or present, and indicates the political affiliation of the Other.
11	Israeli Police Uniform	IsraeliPoliceUniform	This represents the Israeli (Other) and consists of a light blue shirt with dark blue lapels and a dark blue crest with white Hebrew writing.
12	Israeli Medic’s Uniform	IsraeliMedicUniform	This likewise represents the Israeli (Other) and consists of an orange and black vest with Hebrew writing. This is frequently accompanied by injured Israelis, and can emphasize the weakness, or susceptibility of the Other.
13	Orange Star of David Ambulance	OrangeStarDavidAmbulance	This is an orange star of David on the side of an ambulance, indicating the same as the Israeli medic’s uniform.
14	American Flag	AmFlag	This is the American flag and represents the USA (Other).
15	Additional Indication of the USA	USA	This is an indication of the USA (Other) external to the American flag and can include writing as an indicator of this affiliation (e.g., “U.S.A.” written on the side of a building).
16	Israeli Fatigues	GreenFatiguesIsrael	These plain green fatigues, frequently shown with an army helmet, are associated with the Israeli (Other).

5.2 Quantitative Results

5.2.1 Introduction

As outlined in the methodology section, a count of occurrences of all 98 indicators was recorded for each of the 109 videos. The six variables (Battle, Hero, Victim, Religion, Land and Other) were also computed for each of the 109 videos. *Table 5.7* shows the summary of results. It lists the number of hypothesized indicators per variable in the row titled “*Number of Theoretical Indicators*”. Some of the hypothesized indicators were not actually found to be present in any of the videos that were analyzed in this study. The next row (titled “*Number of Observed Indicators*”) of *Table 5.7* shows how many indicators were actually observed to be present in any of the 109 videos for each of the variables. The next row shows the maximum value (number of occurrences) for each of the variables. It should be noted that variable values varied between zero and the maximum value. Further, variable values taken are not continuous, *i.e.*, there are gaps. For example, although the maximum value of Battle is 199, there is no video in the population that has a value of Battle equal to 198. The following two rows identify the number of Hamas and Fatah videos that have a value above zero, when all videos were analyzed (including the outliers). Univariate outliers (*i.e.*, videos with excessive values) were identified for each variable and the next row in *Table 5.7* indicates the number of outliers per variable. Excluding outliers from the analysis generally decreased the size of the population. The following row indicates that the number of observed indicators per variable did not change when outliers were removed from the analysis. The last row shows the maximum value for each variable when the outliers were removed.

Table 5.7 - Summary of Results

	Battle	Hero	Victim	Religion	Land	Other
Number of Theoretical Indicators	19	21	17	10	15	16
Number of Observed Indicators	19	17	12	9	11	16
Maximum value	199	224	56	51	74	53
Number of Hamas Videos with a Value above Zero*	33	21	23	42	23	21
Number of Fatah Videos with a Value above Zero**	24	25	17	33	22	15
Number of Outliers	5	5	1	3	2	1
Number of Observed Indicators without outliers	19	17	12	9	11	16
Maximum value without outliers	45	47	13	26	17	23

*This is the number of Hamas videos that have a value above zero when all videos were analyzed (including the outliers). This number is out of the 56 Hamas videos.

**This is the number of Fatah videos that have a value above zero when all videos were analyzed (including the outliers). This number is out of the 53 Fatah videos.

The sub-sections below report the following results for each variable: definition of outliers, frequency distribution, number of indicators used in the analysis and the observed differences between Hamas and Fatah videos. Assessments of differences between Hamas' and Fatah's videos were run using cross tabulations wherever cell count allowed assessing the statistical significance. For example, Pearson Chi Square ('Chi Square') cannot be computed if there are cells in which the count is less than five. This section is followed by a report concerning correlations between variables.

It should be noted that by combining the indicators into variables a certain level of detail is lost. That is to say, a given value for a variable does not indicate whether all or only some indicators contributed to this numeric value. For example, the value of 45 for Battle may be due to the fact that five indicators occurred nine times each, or one indicator occurred 45 times. Furthermore, this analysis does not weight indicators according to perceived potency, as audience reactions are not considered. For example, *Toy Gun* is given the same 'weight' as *Gun Battle*. That is to say, the frequency of each of those indicators contributes in the same manner to the computed value of Battle. While this is justified in this analysis on the basis of its focus on the framer's perspective, as opposed to that of the audience, some of the specific indicators are discussed in this section and elaborated upon in the following discussion chapter, as a means of reinstating some of the lost detail.

5.2.2 Battle


Throughout this analysis it was determined that five Hamas videos had values of Battle ranging between 59 and 199 (inclusively). The remaining 104 Hamas and Fatah videos had values of Battle ranging from 0 to 45 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat those five Hamas videos as outliers when examining the frequency distribution of Battle. These outliers will be further explored in the discussion section as well as in the appendices. The outliers are charted in *Table 5.8*. The last two columns in this table indicate the source of each video and where readers can find a summary of each video.

Table 5.8 - Battle Outliers

Battle Values	Video ID	Creator	Source	Summary Location
59	34	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 18
75	44	Hamas	Al-Aqsa TV	Appendix 19
93	14	Hamas	MEMRI Web	Appendix 20
106	36	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 21
199	53	Hamas	MEMRI Web	Appendix 22

Figure 5.1 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Battle without outliers:

Figure 5.2 - Battle in Videos



In *Figure 5.1*, it was observed that 50% of the 104 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=51 and Fatah=53 to a combined total of 104) had a Battle value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Battle were found in 52 videos. Hamas has a lower number of videos with Battle equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 52 videos (Hamas=23, Fatah=29) that did not display any indicators of Battle, 44% (23/52) were made by Hamas. This also means that 56% (29/52) of the videos with a zero Battle value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Battle (Battle was equal to zero) were found in 45% (23/51) of the videos produced by Hamas. In contrast, 55% (29/53) of the videos produced by Fatah had a value of Battle equal to zero. However, using Chi Square, it was determined that there is no statistically significant difference in the frequency distribution of Battle between the Hamas and Fatah videos.

It should be noted that a removal of the outliers from the sample only impacts on the frequency of indicators. That is to say, while all hypothesized indicators for Battle were present with and without outliers, the actual frequency did change when the outliers were removed. For example, *Bullets* appeared in three videos in the population with outliers. When the outliers were removed the same indicator only appeared in one video. This shows that this particular indicator was largely observed in videos that were not typical of the population (see Appendix 12 for changes in the frequency of indicators with and without outliers).


5.2.3 Hero

It was determined that five Hamas videos had values of Hero ranging between 96 and 224, while no Fatah video had a value of Hero larger than 33. The remaining 104 videos had values of Hero ranging from 0 to 47 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat those five Hamas videos as outliers when examining the frequency distribution of Hero. These outliers will be further explored in the discussion chapter (Chapter 6). The outliers are charted in *Table 5.9*. The last two columns in this table indicate the source of each video and where readers can find a summary of each video.

Table 5.9 - Hero Outliers

Hero Values	Video ID	Creator	Source	Summary Location
96	47	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 23
118	52	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 24
142	31	Hamas	PMW Direct	Appendix 25
151	36	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 26
224	53	Hamas	MEMRI Web	Appendix 27

Figure 5.2 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Hero without outliers:

Figure 5.3 - Hero in Videos

In Figure 5.2, it was observed that 61% of the 104 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=51 and Fatah=53 to a combined total of 104) had a Hero value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Hero were found in 63 videos. Hamas has a higher number of videos with Hero equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 63 videos (Hamas=35, Fatah=28) that did not display any indicators of Hero, 56% (35/63) were made by Hamas. This also means that 44% (28/63) of the videos with a zero Hero value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Hero (Hero was equal to zero) were found in 69% (35/51) of the videos produced by Hamas. In contrast, 53% (28/53) of the videos produced by Fatah had a value of Hero equal to zero.

Based on the above visual representation (*Figure 5.2*) and the compared percentages of videos where Hero was found equal to 0, it seems possible that values of Hero between 0 and 4 could show significant differences between the two groups. However, no significant differences were found when this notion was tested. At the upper end of the range of 0 to 47 (inclusively), videos with the larger numbers of indicators seemed to alternate between Hamas and Fatah in an almost consistent manner. It is noted, however, that Hamas dominates within the group of five outliers where the value of Hero is very high.


As stated in the section's introduction, of the 21 hypothetical indicators of Hero, the results showed that there were no occurrences of *Religious Martyr*, *Cartoon Figure of Handala*, *Keffiyeh in the Context of Conflict* and *Conflict Wedding*. This means that, from the outset, the analysis of Hero was based on 17 indicators and not 21. By removing the outliers, both the indicators of *Hamas Bandana* and *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters* went from occurring in seven videos to occurring in three videos each. This shows that these particular indicators were emphasized in four out of five of the outlier videos (see Appendix 13 for additional changes in the frequency of indicators with and without outliers). This issue will be further explored in the discussion chapter (Chapter 6).

5.2.4 Victim

It was determined that one Fatah video had a value of Victim of 56 (Video ID = 87; Source = PMW Web; see the Appendix 28 for the description of this video), while the remaining 108 videos had values of Victim ranging from 0 to 13 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat that Fatah video as an outlier when examining the frequency distribution of occurrences of indicators of Victim.

Figure 5.3 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Victim without outliers:

Figure 5.4 - Victim in Videos



In *Figure 5.3*, it was observed that 64% of the 108 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=56 and Fatah=52 to a combined total of 108) had a Victim value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Victim were found in 69 videos. Hamas has a slightly lower number of videos with Victim equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 69 videos (Hamas=33, Fatah=36) that did not display any indicators of Victim, 48% (33/69) were made by Hamas. This also means that 52% (36/69) of the videos with a zero Victim value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Victim (Victim was equal to zero) were found in 59% (33/56) of the videos produced by Hamas. In contrast, 69% (36/52) of the videos produced by Fatah had a value of Battle equal to zero.

The above visual representation (*Figure 5.3*) demonstrates that most of Hamas and Fatah videos do not have any (0) indicators of Victim. No statistically significant differences between Hamas and Fatah were found. However, it is worth noting that the single outlier, which had a substantially higher value of Victim (56) than the other videos analyzed here, belonged to Fatah.

As stated in the introduction (*Table 5.7*), not all hypothesized indicators occurred. Indeed, of the seventeen theoretical indicators of Victim, there were no observed occurrences of *Mnemonic device: Nursery*, *Mnemonic device: School*, *Mnemonic device: Mosque*,

Refugees and *Bandaged Limbs*. This means that, from the outset, the analysis of Victim was based on twelve indicators and not seventeen. It should be noted that when the outlier was removed, there was minimal corresponding change in the indicators. Indeed, the only change was that the indicators of *Orange on its Own* and *Orange Tree* went from appearing in two videos to appearing in one, meaning that these two indicators also appeared in the outlier video (see Appendix 14).

5.2.5 Religion


It was determined that two Hamas videos had values of Religion of 43 and 51, while one Fatah video had 33 occurrences of indicators for Religion. The remaining 106 videos had values of Religion ranging from 0 to 26 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat the two Hamas and one Fatah videos as outliers when examining the frequency distribution of Religion. The outliers are charted in *Table 5.10*. The last two columns in this table indicate the source of each video and where readers can find a summary of each video.

Table 5.10 - Religion Outliers

Religion Values	Video ID	Creator	Source	Summary Location
33	97	Fatah	PMW Direct	Appendix 29
43	3	Hamas	PMW Direct	Appendix 30
51	26	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 31

Figure 5.4 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Religion without outliers:

Figure 5.5 - Religion in Videos



In *Figure 5.4*, it was observed that 32% of the 106 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=54 and Fatah=52 to a combined total of 106) had a Religion value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Religion were found in 34 videos. Hamas had a lower number of videos with Religion equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 34 videos, (Hamas=14, Fatah=20) that did not display any indicators of Religion, 41% (14/34) were made by Hamas. This also means that 59% (20/34) of the videos with a zero Religion value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Religion (Religion was equal to zero) were found in 26% (14/54) of the videos produced by Hamas. In contrast, 38% (20/52) of the videos produced by Fatah had a value of Religion equal to zero.

Based on the above visual representation (*Figure 5.4*), it seems as though Fatah has more videos with Religion equal to zero than Hamas. Overall, however, both seem to have a comparable number of videos within the range of Religion between 0 and 9. Indeed, the Chi Square statistic did not show a statistically significant difference between Hamas and Fatah in the Religion variable. It is, however, interesting to note that Hamas made 100% of the videos between the ranges of 9 to 26 (inclusively) and is also responsible for two of the three outlier videos.

As indicated in the introduction (*Table 5.7*), of the ten hypothetical indicators of Religion, the results showed that there were no occurrences of *Crescent and Star*. This means that, from the outset, the analysis of Religion was based on nine indicators and not ten. It should be noted that removing the outliers had only a minimal effect (see Appendix 15).

5.2.6 Land


It was determined that one Hamas video had a value of Land of 74, while one Fatah video had a value of Land of 36. The remaining 107 videos had values of Land ranging from 0 to 17 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat the videos with values of Land higher than 17 as outliers (one Hamas video and one Fatah video) when examining the frequency distribution of Land. The outliers are charted in *Table 5.11*. The last two columns in this table indicate the source of each video and where readers can find a summary of each video.

Table 5.11 - Land Outliers

Land Values	Video ID	Creator	Source	Summary Location
36	109	Fatah	PMW Direct	Appendix 32
74	39	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	Appendix 33

Figure 5.5 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Land without outliers:

Figure 5.6 - Land in videos



In *Figure 5.5*, it was observed that 60% of the 107 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=55 and Fatah=52 to a combined total of 107) had a Land value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Land were found in 64 videos. Hamas had a slightly higher number of videos with Land equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 64 videos (Hamas=33, Fatah=31) that did not display any indicators of Land, 52% (33/64) were made by Hamas. This also means that 48% (31/64) of the videos with a zero Land value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Land (Land was equal to zero) were found in 60% of both the videos produced by Hamas (33/55) and those produced by Fatah (31/52). Using Chi Square it was confirmed that there was no statistically significant difference between Hamas and Fatah.


As stated in the introduction (*Table 5.7*), of the 15 hypothetical indicators of Land, the results showed that there were no occurrences of *Saber*, *Farm Work*, *Olives* or *Map West Bank*. This means that, from the outset, the analysis of Land was based on 11 indicators and not 15. It should be noted that the exclusion of the outliers had a minimal effect on the individual frequencies of the indicators. This means that 11 indicators were found in the analyzed videos with and without outliers (see Appendix 16). This will be addressed further in Chapter 6.

5.2.7 Other

It was determined that one Hamas video had a value of Other of 53 (Video ID = 51; Source = Kids Aqsa TV; see the Appendix 34 for the description of this video). The remaining 108 videos had values of Other ranging from 0 to 23 (inclusively). Thus, it was decided to treat this Hamas video as an outlier when examining the frequency distribution of Other. This outlier will be further explored in the discussion section and in the appendix.

Figure 5.6 below is a graphical representation of the frequency distribution of Other without outliers:

Figure 5.7 - Other in Videos



In Figure 5.6, it was observed that 68% of the 108 videos (population without outliers, with Hamas=55 and Fatah=53 to a combined total of 108) had an Other value equal to zero. In other words, no indicators of Other were found in 73 videos. Hamas had a slightly lower number of videos with Other equal to zero when compared with those from Fatah. That is, of the 73 videos (Hamas=35, Fatah=38) that did not display any indicators of Other, 48% (35/73) were made by Hamas. This also means that 52% (38/73) of the videos with a

zero Other value were made by Fatah. Furthermore, it was determined that no indicators of Other (Other was equal to zero) were found in 64% (35/55) of the videos produced by Hamas. In contrast, 72% (38/53) of the videos produced by Fatah had a value of Other equal to zero. However, using Chi Square it was determined that there was no statistically significant difference in the frequency distribution of Battle between Hamas and Fatah videos.

Based on the above visual representation (*Figure 5.6*), it appears that there is virtually no difference in the frequency distribution of Other for Hamas and Fatah. Together with the Chi-Square result, this indicates that there is no evidence to support a claim that Hamas and Fatah used Other in their videos in a dissimilar manner.

All of the hypothetical indicators of Other were present throughout the entire analysis, although there are minor differences in values of Other when the outliers were excluded (see Appendix 17).

5.2.8 Correlations

The seemingly interlinked nature of the variables introduces the question of whether they are indeed connected. For example, Battle can be argued as a major variable of the analysis, with elements of it present in Hero and Victim. In order to test whether these variables are indeed related, the bivariate correlation coefficients were examined. This procedure is used to determine how much variance in variables is due to random errors and how much variance in variables can be explained by relationships between them.

The following table (*Table 5.12*) shows the bivariate correlation coefficients between all variables for all videos:

Table 5.12 - Correlations between Six Variables (all 109 videos)

		Battle	Hero	Victim	Religion	Land	Other
Battle	Pearson Correlation	1	.762**	.153	.066	.044	.303**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0 ¹	.111	.497	.646	.001
Hero	Pearson Correlation	.762**	1	.080	.118	.004	.200*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0		.409	.221	.966	.037
Victim	Pearson Correlation	.153	.080	1	.082	.087	.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.111	.409		.396	.371	.790
Religion	Pearson Correlation	.066	.118	.082	1	.078	-.090
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.497	.221	.396		.417	.352
Land	Pearson Correlation	.044	.004	.087	.078	1	-.015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.646	.966	.371	.417		.878
Other	Pearson Correlation	.303**	.200*	.026	-.090	-.015	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.037	.790	.352	.878	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

¹ 0 indicates that the p-value is less than .001

The above table (*Table 5.12*) is based on all videos, including the outliers. It shows a strong correlation between Battle and Hero ($r=.762$), which explains over 58% of the variance ($R^2=0.58$ or 58%). There is a weaker, but still significant, correlation between Battle and Other ($r=.303$), which explains just under 10% of the variance ($R^2=.09$ or 9%). Hero is only weakly related to Other ($r=.200$, $R^2=0.04$ or 4%). No other variables were found to show significant correlations.

To further investigate the relationships between the three variables: Battle, Hero and Other, the correlation coefficients between these three variables were computed for a population from which all outliers for these three variables were removed. *Table 5.13* shows the results:

Table 5.13 - Correlation Coefficients between Battle, Hero and Other (100 videos):

		Battle	Hero	Other
Battle	Pearson Correlation	1	.396**	.452**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0	0
Hero	Pearson Correlation	.396**	1	.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0 ¹		.305
Other	Pearson Correlation	.452**	.104	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	.305	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

¹ 0 indicates that the p-value is less than .001

This table (*Table 5.13*) shows a lower correlation coefficient between Battle and Hero ($r=.396$), explaining only 16% of variance. At the same time, the correlation coefficient between Battle and Other went up to $r=.452$ explaining 20% of variance. The relationship between Hero and Other is no longer significant.

Chapter 6: Discussion

In a quest to identify which myths Hamas and Fatah disseminated in order to determine each group's conception of a Palestinian identity, this analysis focused on the six specific myths (variables) that were analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively in the previous chapter. This chapter will explore the results and discuss the indicators of individual variables in the section called "*Discussion of Variables*", which will be followed by the section called "*Discussion of Relationships between Variables*". Both of these sections will explore the results in the context of framing and propaganda theories as well as Palestinian history and discourse.

6.1 Discussion of Variables

6.1.1 Battle

There was no statistically significant difference between both groups in terms of frequency distribution for Battle. However, the quantitative analysis of all videos for Battle showed that 59% (33/56) of all Hamas videos had a value of Battle above zero and only 45% (24/53) of all Fatah videos had a value of Battle above zero. Furthermore, all outliers (Battle larger than 45) were produced by Hamas. This seems to indicate that Battle is a more important myth in Hamas' conception of the Palestinian identity than in Fatah's conception. Alternatively, it can be argued that the videos which were collected in the course of this study do not, in fact, represent the creator's intentions. This could be caused by the possibility that the indirect sources of videos (the media monitoring projects of PMW and MEMRI) were biased in their selection of the content of videos. However, *Table 5.8* shows that three out of five of the Battle outliers are from Kids Aqsa TV and Al-Aqsa TV, *i.e.*, directly from Hamas. This is significant because it shows that the majority of videos with very high values of Battle, as coded by this analysis, were directly from one of the creators this analysis explores. Hence, although not statistically significant, the results of this analysis appear to support the hypothesis that Hamas uses more of the *Myth of Battle* than Fatah.

This result highlights Khalili's (2007a) Liberationist Discourse, which uses violent struggle to secure national liberation (p. 13-10). This also speaks to Hamas' historic use of violence, as opposed to Fatah's more recent move towards the negotiation table.

It should be noted that this myth is shown in a variety of ways. This is exemplified in the five outliers, which highlight the content when the *Myth of Battle* is emphasized. For example, [Video #34](#) depicts the Israeli soldier as weak and ill-prepared. This calls upon the Master-Narrative, demonstrating the possibility of victory, thereby motivating action (see Appendix 18). [Video #44](#) shows images of dead children, destroyed property, links to land and the destruction of the *Temple Mount*. This demonizes the enemy, thereby justifying retributive action, which can be contained in the *Myth of Battle*. This addresses Hamas' three scripts (frames) of Disaster, Power and Vulnerability, in the face of an unspecified enemy. It takes elements of the Tragic Discourse and emphasizes the Liberationist Discourse, thereby motivating action (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009, p. 207).

A final interesting component is the manner in which children are depicted amidst the indicators of Battle. [Video #53](#), which is an outlier for both Battle and Hero, shows children dressed in clothing associated with both the military and the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*, often imitating military training. This is shown amidst scenes of adults doing the same in war-time situations. This can be understood as showing children as exemplifying what others his/her age should do. At its base, it seems to highlight the inter-generational sharing of responsibility, that children and adults equally share the burden of, in this case, battle. This speaks to Hamas' historic emphasis on family and its inclusion of all levels of society in their battle (Schanzer, 2008, p. 31; ("The Covenant", Articles 13, 15, 18). In spite of the different stories, all these videos focus heavily on the armed conflict and all have high values of Battle. What is important then, is the total value of Battle and not the story of the video itself. This is based on the theory that the higher the value of Battle, the greater its importance to the creator.

6.1.2 Hero

There was no statistically significant difference between the two groups' frequency distribution for Hero. What is interesting here is that the quantitative analysis showed that 38% (21/56) of all Hamas videos had a value of Hero above zero as compared with 47% (25/53) of all Fatah videos that had a value of Hero above zero. This seems to indicate that

Hero is a more important myth in Fatah's conception of the Palestinian identity than in Hamas' conception. However, the five Hero outliers are exclusively produced by Hamas. Hamas, then, produces fewer videos but with higher values, whereas Fatah produces more videos with lower values. A possible explanation for this result is that multiple Hero indicators are specific to Hamas' *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*, which Fatah would not make use of. However, research did not indicate similar symbols for Fatah, which could mean that Fatah understands heroism differently, or that Hamas generally possesses more heroic symbolism from which to draw than Fatah. While, overall, the *Myth of Hero* appears to be an important aspect of the framing of Palestinian identity for both groups, the results suggest that Hamas and Fatah make different use of the myth, indicating different strategies.

Indeed, the use of martyrs by both these groups highlights both the Liberationist and the Nation-Statist discourses. Both of these make use of the *Myth of Hero*, but in different ways, respectively emphasizing the differences of both Hamas and Fatah. The Liberationist Discourse seeks to motivate action through the use of heroic narratives, which emphasize grief and fear as motivating tools against an enemy (Khalili, 2007a, p. 90-94; 111). The Nation-Statist Discourse likewise uses the heroic and martyr narratives, but does so in the context of presenting a legitimate use of force, or as a means of gaining legitimacy in the form of a state (Khalili, 2007a, p. 22-26). While both groups can highlight elements of these two discourses, and both seem to call on the action part of the Master-Narrative, which invites action as a means of confronting the conflict, it seems that the Nation-Statist Discourse speaks to Fatah's forays into legitimacy, whereas the Liberationist Discourse seems in line with Hamas' approach of motivating all levels of society to join its *jihad*.

Hamas' approach is exemplified in the five Hero outliers' depiction of children (all created by Hamas). Relying primarily on the heroic and martyr narratives inherent to the Liberationist Discourse, these videos variously show children, dressed in the clothing of the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*, participating in training alongside similarly dressed adults, or being taught how to shoot a gun by an adult. They also show children taking on the role of adults, such as giving emotional presentations, while dressed in the clothing of the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*' fighters (Video #31). This shows children as either in training to take on the adult responsibilities of battle, dressed as heroes, or illustrates the equality between the adults and the children in terms of Hero. This validates participation and makes the

heroic actions of the adults more accessible to children, thereby orienting the child in the conflict, not as a victim, but as a hero (*Videos 52 and 31*).

It should be noted that the following six indicators of Hero occurred frequently: *Stone on its Own* and *Throwing Stones* (both found in 8% (8/104) of the videos without outliers); *Keffiyeh Pattern* and *Keffiyeh Scarf* (both found in 9% (9/104) of the videos without outliers); *Kalashnikov* (found in 7% (7/104) of the videos without outliers); and the highest among these, *Keffiyeh* (18% (19/104) of the videos without outliers). What is interesting here is that these five indicators highlight the more general Palestinian symbolism of Hero, with *Stone on its Own* and *Throwing Stones* representing a typical Palestinian act of heroism, generally directed at a target that is comparatively better equipped for combat (Khalili, 2007a, p. 119). This highlights Hero in the context of the seemingly insurmountable nature of the Palestinian Master-Narrative's battle. The *Keffiyeh* and the *Keffiyeh Pattern* show light ties to the peasant past and current ties to the armed and heroic struggle of the Palestinian guerrilla fighters. The latter quality is also reflected in the *Kalashnikov*.

Like Battle, Hero's specific indicators and context can illustrate different emphases. The above mentioned six indicators, for example, appear to highlight the violence of Hero and the association between the *Myth of Hero* and the *Myth of Battle*. This seems to fall under the Liberationist Discourse, which combines Palestinian history with violent struggle along with the martyrdom of heroism, to attain national liberation. Indeed, two of the Battle outliers with the highest values are also the Hero outliers with the highest values ([Video #36](#) and [Video #53](#)).

6.1.3 Victim

Victim was not found to have a statistically significant difference between both groups' frequency distribution. This variable occurred in the second lowest number of videos of all the variables, while Other had the lowest occurrences. However, as will be discussed below, there is reason to believe that the results of Other were an underestimate, whereas no similar indication exists for Victim. This means that Victim can, in fact, occur in the lowest number in actuality, although such was not recorded. That said, the quantitative analysis of all videos for Victim showed that 41% (23/56) of Hamas and 32% (17/53) of Fatah videos have a value of Victim above zero. Furthermore, Fatah produced the only outlier video ([Video #87](#)) which shows themes of the loss of land, calling on history and serving as a

motivator for resistance. Consequently, these findings support the hypothesis that neither group promotes the *Myth of Victim*.

A possible reason for these results is that this research considers *Myth of Victim* as the manifestation of the Tragic Discourse, which has been used largely by humanitarian efforts in a bid to garner support from the international community. The population of videos examined in the course of this study, however, was theoretically addressing the domestic community. While this discourse has additionally been used internally by political groups to justify "... persistent nationalist claims" (Khalili, 2007a, p. 38), it does not appear to be emphasized by itself. Understanding propaganda and framing as means of eliciting action, the *Myth of Victim* can be useful as part of larger discourses, but alone, does not seem to serve a desired purpose. Indeed, the Liberationist Discourse takes this tragedy and brings about action. The *Myth of Battle* and *Myth of Hero*, therefore, seem to be more potent tools in motivating the local population to participate in the conflict.

6.1.4 Religion

There was no statistically significant difference between both groups, in terms of frequency distribution for Religion. However, 75% (42/56) of all Hamas videos and 62% (33/53) of all Fatah videos had a value for Religion above zero. Furthermore, Hamas created two of the three outlier videos. Hence, the results of this analysis seem to support the hypothesis that Hamas uses the *Myth of Religion* more frequently than Fatah.

It is interesting to note that 69% (75/109) of all videos had Religion larger than zero. That is to say, one or more indicators of Religion were found in a large number of videos. In this sense, Religion differs from the other five variables, with the highest percentage of videos for which the value of the variable is larger than zero. Hamas historically has strong Islamist ties, with its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood. These ties are mirrored in both its history and its founding document, which repeatedly cites the *Qur'an* and the *Hadiths* to justify its actions, which follow Islamist principles ("The Covenant", Article 32). Hence, it is understandable that Hamas would frequently use the *Myth of Religion* and that this myth is the most important aspect of Hamas' conception of the Palestinian identity.

While it was hypothesized that both groups would make use of this myth, Fatah's relatively high use is interesting. This could show the importance of the *Myth of Religion* to the group's conception of the Palestinian identity. However, an alternative explanation

exists, which proposes that this usage is distinctly political. That is to say, with Islamist Hamas having garnered substantial support to win the recent election, Fatah and Hamas are embroiled in a political conflict with one another. As such, it is possible that the nationalist Fatah is making use of the *Myth of Religion* as a means of regaining the support it lost to Hamas. Indeed, with the possible *Islamicization* of political life, as seen in many other Muslim countries, it is feasible that Fatah has no choice but to begin drawing on religious discourses as well, if it wants to capture the support of the average Palestinian (Roy, 2002).

6.1.5 Land

There was no statistically significant difference between both groups in terms of the frequency distribution of Land. Indeed, the quantitative analysis for all videos for Land showed that 41% (23/56) of all Hamas videos and 42% (22/53) of all Fatah videos had values of Land above zero. Furthermore, the outliers are equally shared among the two groups, with one from Hamas and one from Fatah. It should be noted that the Fatah video (*Video #109*) shows the connection to the land and peasant past in a celebratory way. Hamas's outlier (*Video #39*), on the other hand, focuses more on tragic loss, thereby furnishing the audience with a Vocabulary of Motives as a part of calling its viewers to action.

In spite of the different stories told in the two outliers, at its base, the *Myth of Land* was hypothesized to be central to both groups. This is because the connection to land and the Myth of Descent is theoretically essential for the Palestinian identity, both as a means of orienting their identity and substantiating their cause (Litvak, 2009b, p. 97). Part of this myth, is the Canaanite Myth of Descent which states that Arabs, as Canaanites, are historically tied to the land. The second myth ties Islam to the land. These combine to form a Unified National Narrative which links the Palestinian people to the land (Litvak, 2009b, p. 112-113)

Given this, it can be surprising that the *Myth of Land*, while emphasized, is perhaps less ubiquitous than might be expected. This could be because the myth itself is less important than hypothesized. Indeed, Litvak (2009b) argues that the Unified National Narrative is less meaningful in recent history, which speaks to the proposal that the longer a conflict persists, the more likely it will become a central part of a group's identity, overshadowing the importance of other aspects of the identity (Woehrle & Coy, 2000, p. 7).

That is to say, the need to reclaim the land is shifting focus towards the *Myth of Battle* and the *Myth of Hero*, the active parts of the Palestinian Master-Narrative, in the pursuit of victory. Another possibility is that the *Myth of Land* is actually an important element in defining the Palestinian identity. However, in this research, the variable Land was operationalized in a way that this myth is not conceptualized. For example, the myth of the *Nakba* is a central Palestinian myth and it is related to the *Myth of Land*. Yet, the only five indicators of Land that can be associated with the *Nakba* are: *Palestinian Map*, *Shape of Gaza*, *Shape of the West Bank*, *Map of Gaza* and *Map of the West Bank*. With the exception of *Palestinian Map* (7% (7/107) of videos without outliers), these indicators were rarely present in the videos. Finally, it could be due to the possibility that the *Myth of Land* is more difficult to represent visually in a video. Had the analysis undertaken an investigation of words and speeches, it is possible that its occurrence would have been higher than the results of the *visual* analysis indicated¹⁴.

6.1.6 Other

There was no statistically significant difference between both groups in terms of frequency distribution for Other. Indeed, the quantitative analysis of all videos for Other showed that only 33% (36/109) of all videos (including outliers) had a value of Other above zero. Specifically this means that 38% (21/56) of Hamas videos had a value of Other above zero and 28% (15/53) of Fatah videos had a value of Other above zero. Furthermore, there is only one outlier ([Video #51](#)) and, while it was created by Hamas, both groups seem to possess similar production tendencies.

In light of the hypothesis that the *Myth of Other* is a ubiquitous element of identity construction, it could be expected that Other would occur with a high frequency. Furthermore, given the importance of Battle, which must be waged by and/or against a collective enemy, it seems strange that neither group had high frequencies of this myth.

One possible explanation is that the *Myth of Other* has been present throughout the six variables, but it has not always been identified. For example, when there are *Explosions* without a source, the one responsible for the act is implicitly the *other*, i.e., the enemy. Calling on historical experience, it is theorized that the audience is aware of whom this *other*

¹⁴ The same can, ultimately, be argued for any of the six variables. This is discussed in the conclusion (Chapter 7).

is, but analyzing the visual manifestation of this entity was not possible for this analysis. For these reasons, it is still important to note that the theme of the Other is, perhaps, more ubiquitous than the results of this variable show.

6.2 Discussion of Relationships between Variables

Interesting issues that remain to be discussed are the relationships between the six variables. The results of the correlations showed that some variables are indeed related while others seem to be independent. The strong positive relationship between Battle and Hero reflects a general truth: heroes are made on the battleground. In most cultures, heroism is associated with warriors. Outstanding diplomats, scientists or any other professionals are unlikely to be seen as heroes in most cultures. Hence, it is not surprising that when these Palestinian videos focus more on images of war, they would simultaneously focus more on symbols of heroism.

When the outliers for both Battle and Hero were removed, the relationship between the two variables weakened, but remained significant. This is possibly due to the fact that most outliers that were common to Battle and Hero were made by Hamas and a number of indicators of Hero are associated with Hamas, *e.g.*, *Hamas Bandana*. It seems to indicate that Palestinians, like many other cultures, share this link between heroes and battles. But Hamas, as an organization committed to the armed struggle, has made a number of videos (outliers in the context of this study) in which Battle and Hero are strongly linked and in which symbols of Hamas fighters as heroes are glorified.

Correlations between Battle and Other, on the other hand, showed a weak (but still significant) relationship when all videos were included. Given that battles are waged by and/or against the enemies (Other), it is rather surprising that the relationship between these two variables is so weak. When the outliers were removed, however, the relationship became stronger. This supports the idea that the outlier videos appear to focus on including images of war and heroism while leaving the identity of the enemies to be implicit. Videos that represent the more general trends within the population studied are more likely to include explicit symbols that identify who the enemy is when a battle is waged.

Interestingly, the three remaining variables of Victim, Land and Religion were not correlated to any one of the other variables. This implies that there is no relationship between

any of these variables nor is there any relationship between these and the three other variables of Battle, Hero and Other. It is of note that Victim, Land and Religion did not vary greatly. That is to say, the values of Land and Victim were uniformly low in all videos and the values of Religion were uniformly high in all videos. The low variation of values of these three variables explains why their correlations are low. If one assumes that battles are usually waged over the possession of land or in support of religious rights, one would expect that videos with high values of Battle would also have either high values of Land or high values of Religion or both. This is not the case in this population. The battle is glorified in some videos (specifically the outliers) by connecting symbols of battle with symbols of heroism only. The reasons for waging the battle (*e.g.*, Land or Religion) as well as the identity of the enemy (Other) are left as implicit, or secondary, in those videos. This leaves the question of the correlation for the entire population (all videos *including* outliers). Accepting that the goals of propaganda and framing, as analyzed here, are to draw out action, and that this action is Battle, it is possible that Hero and Other are far more motivating than Victim, Land and Religion, thereby providing a possible explanation for the correlation results (for all videos *including* outliers).

6.3 Summary of Discussion

In the above discussion, as well as in the quantitative results (Chapter 5), the segment of the population which represents the general trends was distinguished from the segment of the population that was labelled as outliers. Any video that heavily focused on a particular idea was very likely to become an outlier. When examining the population of outliers, Hamas` videos are overrepresented. In other words, a large number of the Hamas` videos tended to have a single focus while most of Fatah`s videos tended to be more general. This distinction implies that when examining the differences between Hamas` and Fatah`s messages framed in their videos, one has to focus on both the general trends, as well as on the outliers.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The results and discussion of the investigation of the way Hamas and Fatah frame each group's individual conception of a Palestinian identity with a focus on the *Myth of Battle*, the *Myth of Hero*, the *Myth of Victim*, the *Myth of Religion*, the *Myth of Land* and the *Myth of Other* did not fully confirm any of this thesis' hypotheses. This final chapter will summarize the results and trends, discuss the general limitations and conclude with recommendations for future research.

7.1 Summary of Results

The six myths of this thesis were chosen as a means of exploring common myths found throughout societies, selected on the basis of the theoretical framework. These myths were operationalized through a visual ethnographic study of this theoretical framework, Palestinian history and discourses, as well as an examination of the videos. It was hypothesized that the examined groups of Hamas and Fatah would make different use of each of these myths. Possibly due to the small population and low cell counts, no statistical significance was found. However, the results themselves yielded interesting (albeit, not statistically significant) differences, which are herein summarized.

Religion occurred in the largest number of videos, followed closely by Battle. In descending order, Hero and Land occurred in a mid-range number of videos, followed by a lower occurrence of videos with Victim and, finally, Other occurred in the lowest number of videos.

The inclusion of Religion in the greatest number of this analysis' videos is surprising largely because both groups had a similarly high number of videos with Religion values. Although nationalist Fatah does make some use of Islamic rhetoric, it was hypothesized that Islamist Hamas would make substantially greater use. While Hamas dominated the upper range of values (from 9 to 51 inclusively), 62% (33/53) of all Fatah videos (including the outliers) had some value of Religion, suggesting that Fatah might be making greater use of this myth than anticipated (Religion variable). This could show that Fatah is using this myth as a means of competing with Hamas for the support of the Palestinian people.

A relatively large number of videos contained scenes of combat (Battle) and scenes of heroism (Hero). These inclusions were not surprising, given the history of Hamas and Fatah. Indeed, both organizations were hypothesized to include these myths in their respective conceptualizations of a Palestinian identity.

In addition, the results showed that Battle and Hero are strongly related in general, but not as strong when the outliers are removed. This means that the outlier videos that emphasize Battle are more prone to use symbols associated with heroism. Battle and Other were weakly related in the population of videos examined, but when the outliers were removed, this relationship strengthened. This could be because the videos that focused on the battle (outliers) were more likely to imply who the *other* was, while the general population of videos were more explicit in identifying the *other*.

Furthermore, 41% (45/109) of both groups' videos (including outliers) have included scenes that show Land. As hypothesized, the *Myth of Land* is emphasized in a similar way in the videos produced by both organizations. This is probably due to the centrality of this myth to both nationalist and Islamist discourses. However, it is surprising that, given the centrality of this myth, it was not included in a greater number of videos. This can be because this myth is not, in fact, as important as hypothesized, or that it was present in words and speeches but less so through visual symbols. It is additionally possible that the two groups do not identify the *Myth of Land* in the way this thesis has conceptualized it. This can mean that the *Myth of Land* is implied in other variables. For example, Battle is being waged for land. This mirrors Other. While it occurs in the lowest number of videos, the analysis of outliers showed that themes of the *Myth of Other* can be present throughout. For example, the disembodied gunmen who are shooting at children represent an *other*; and the one responsible for the destruction of property is an *other*. This calls on the community's historical and current experience and cannot be coded, but, as noted in the correlation results, is nonetheless present.

This is contrasted with the *Myth of Victim*, which was found in the second to lowest number of videos. Given the possibility that Other is more commonly used than the quantitative results showed, Victim might, in fact, have occurred in the lowest number of videos, suggesting that neither group highlights victimhood. Indeed, considering the mobilization techniques and discourses that this analysis identified, this is unsurprising.

Furthermore, the Liberationist Discourse shows the empowerment and value of symbolism that emphasizes overcoming the tragedy of victimhood in order to take the steps to liberate the land. In other words, action symbols and myths are far more effective motivational tools and, as evidenced in this analysis, are more used than others.

7.2 Limitations

The limitations inherent to this exploratory research have been addressed throughout. Beginning with the introduction, this thesis worked around language barriers, cultural considerations and issues of access. The qualitative and quantitative results chapter discussed the challenge of considering all indicators as equal. In the discussion chapter, it became apparent that by not investigating the emotions of the subjects in the videos and not looking at the overall themes of the video, certain elements could go under-reported, such as Victim and Other.

Furthermore, by separating out the variables and indicators, some of the nuance is lost. While the correlation grants insight into some interaction between the variables, overall, additional and comprehensive exploration of how these variables interact and how some videos, for example, emphasize the heroic nature of Battle, while others seem to show its victimized nature, is recommended. An additional consideration for future research is the inclusion of multiple coders. Due to material considerations, this thesis was only able to include the one researcher. It should be noted that attempts were made to offset this challenge, such as multiple viewings and a comprehensive methodology chapter (Chapter 4), which outlined the quantitative approach, thereby enabling replication. However, future investigations should consider the benefits of multiple coders for inter-coder reliability.

It should be additionally observed that this thesis looked specifically at six myths and selected frames, discourses and narratives. While motivated by multiple theoretical works, it is possible that additional myths might illustrate different emphases. Finally, this analysis did not consider audience reactions, largely due to material limitations (such as travel). Although investigating the framers' perspectives provides valuable insight into their perception, considering the effects that the videos and their content have on the target audience would only enhance future investigations.

7.3 Recommendations for Future Research

In consideration of the limitations, there are certain areas where additional research can be carried out. To begin, as with all exploratory works, this analysis introduced an area that would benefit from additional exploration, specifically with enhanced resources that would permit access to a population of videos that would yield broadly generalizable results. Ideally, future analyses would include emotion as well as the themes of the videos. This can be carried out in an exploration of the verbal content that accompanies the visual content. Additionally, a more in-depth exploration of the portrayal of the *other* that includes its actions would enhance the ability of future explorations to understand this important element of discourse.

7.4 Concluding Thoughts

This thesis was inspired by the images of youth disseminated over the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict and concern over reports of casualties of all ages. The images of small children dressed up in *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*' uniforms led to questions of whether children are being used in the context of war, and if so, how. Intrigued by issues of identity, propaganda and conflict, this analysis oriented itself in an essential field of inquiry that asks about the acquisition and dissemination of identity and the use of children's media in times of war. While the results of this analysis cannot be generalized beyond the population herein analyzed, it is hoped that the central themes of inquiry will be further researched in order to approach war differently and offset its casualties, young and old.

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Videos

Fatah

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Fatah. (Creator). (2000). *Kids garden - map in chains* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2000). *Music video to children: fight and “don’t be afraid”* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 28, 2010, from <http://www.pmw.org.il/>¹⁵

Fatah. (Creator). (2000). *Summer camp 2000s settlers kill farmer* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2001-

Fatah. (Creator). (2001). *Farewell letter* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2001). *Leave toys take up stones* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=984&year

Fatah. (Creator). (2001). *MV AS violence mother not humiliate* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2001). *PA teaches young children to replace toys with rocks* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 29, 2010, from <http://www.pmw.org.il/>

-2002-

Fatah. (Creator). (2002). *Arafat to kids -Faris Ouda* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2002). *Jews kill because of religion and falsify Bible* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2002). *Walla Yoursa* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

¹⁵ This website was combined into the new website (PalWatch) and no more specific link for this and other similarly-sourced videos currently exists.

-2003-

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Arafat kids (2)* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Debka Turmus* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Heart dripping blood* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Kids – expel all Israelis – came from Holland* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Music video depicts Israelis murdering school children* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 4, 2010, from <http://www.pmw.org.il/>

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *MV hate violence rocking horse* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 4, 2010, from <http://www.pmw.org.il/>

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *PA music video: Israelis demonized as killers of mother* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=1126&year=2003

Fatah. (Creator). (2003). *Tarabisho - the talking chick, educational program* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2004-

Fatah. (Creator). (2004). *Israeli soldiers shooting at Palestinian kids playing soccer* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=1124&year=2004

Fatah. (Creator). (2004). *Tarabisho* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2005-

Fatah. (Creator). (2005). *Grandson receives key* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2005). *Maps – 3 kids paintings* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2006-

Fatah. (Creator). (2006). *Al-Dura calls children to follow him to Paradise* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=1180&year=2006

-2007-

Fatah. (Creator). (2007). *My enemy* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2007). *Name unknown* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 5, 2010, from <http://www.pmw.org.il/>

Fatah. (Creator). (2007). *Rafah-RoshHaNikra is Palestine* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2008-

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Acre emek Yizrael shahad* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Baladi Ana* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 6, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=139&doc_id=471

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Beautiful virgins await Muslim martyrs in paradise* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 28, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/site/modules/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=131&doc_id=1486&genre=131

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Children's show: Liberate Palestine and return to Jaffa* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=972&year=2008

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Dalal Mughrabi- child's poem role model* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Fares Ouda on kids show* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Israel endangers Al-Aqsa mosque* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Kidnap babies* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Mickey Mouse quiz – Dalal* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Mickey Mouse quiz – Pal is all Israel* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Nakba clip 2008* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from
http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=619&year=2008

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *PA school children want to be martyrs* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Safad Haifa Beersheba occupied telegame* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Tiberias Pal city kids* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2008). *Zefat N capital and Miron - telegame* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

-2009-

Fatah. (Creator). (2009). *Kids quiz - Acre in Palestine conquered by Napoleon* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2009). *PA kids taught Lod is occupied Palestine* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (2009). *PA TV children's quiz: Israeli cities Haifa, Jaffa and Acre are "Palestine"* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from
http://www.palwatch.org/SITE/MODULES/videos/pal/videos.aspx?fld_id=&doc_id=1288&year=2009

-n.d.-

Fatah. (Creator) (n.d.). *Baby break rock* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Dreams* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Freedom kids* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Graduation* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Israel kills kids* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Listen listen* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Millions of martyrs marching to Jerusalem* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Fatah. (Creator). (n.d.). *Mom gives gun* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas

-2007-

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *A Hamas TV music video in Hebrew sings: "In black bags, chunks of flesh of Jews"* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1561.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Children on Hamas TV call to "liberate" Al-Aqsa mosque by force and to "wipe out" Zionists to the last one* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1625.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Child Quaran with gun* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Children will be new Ahmad Yassin* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Farfour 2 complete 2.5 min LONG* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Farfour, Hamas' Mickey Mouse character, is 'martyred' in the final episode of the "Pioneers of Tomorrow" children show on Hamas TV* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 22, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1497.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Farfour – Jews are dogs* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Farfur girl cites Hadith of genocide* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Hamas' bee Nahoul abuses cats and lions at Gaza zoo and calls to liberate Al-Aqsa mosque* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 10, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1532.htm>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Hamas cartoon - Jews dig under Al-Aqsa* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1638.htm>
- Hamas (Creator). (2007). *Hamas keys 1948 shooting back* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Hamas - kids liberate Palestine* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Hamas-style lion king vanquishes Fatah rats in an Al-Aqsa TV animated film* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 10, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1540.htm>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Hamas TV bee, Nahoul, weeps over "martyred" family and chit-chats with kids on animal slaughtering* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 11, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1639.htm>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Islamic supremacy - defeat Bush and Sharon* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Mommy Reem*. [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Nahoul the bee replaces Farfour - Hamas Mickey Mouse - and vows to continue on his path of martyrdom and Jihad* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 22, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1510.htm>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *Nahul 2 Jews killed Farfur - need journalists - Jihad* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.
- Hamas. (Creator). (2007). *TV host on Hamas TV, child Saraa Barhoum, sings: "We liberated Gaza by force"* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1637.htm>

-2008-

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Child stabs President Bush to death and turns the White House into a mosque in Hamas puppet show clip* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 25, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1729.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Grandfather of Hamas TV bunny Assud insists Tel Aviv was a Palestinian city* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1766.htm>

Hamas (Creator). (2008). *Hamas bunny Assud replaces his “martyred” brother Nahoul the bee and vows to liberate Al-Aqsa and “eat” Jews* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 25, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1679.htm>

Hamas (Creator). (2008). *Hamas bunny Assud urges boycott of Danish goods and threatens to kill Danes over Muhammad cartoon* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved March 25, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1693.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Hamas rabbit: I will eat the Jews* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Hamas TV bunny Assud is tempted by Satan to steal and is sentenced by children viewers to have his hand chopped off* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1814.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Helicopter shoots kids with kite* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Jews killed Farfour and Nahoul* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). *Nahul wedding as shahid* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). بنبارك للحركة الحرة في ذكرى انطلاقها الكبرى (Nous bénissons le mouvement libre pour commémorer son glorieux déclenchement) [Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHqa95IT06g&feature=channel>.

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). فرح وحب سراء برهوم قسم الاطفال فضائية الأقصى (Joie et amour, Sarra Barhum, service des enfants de la chaîne Al-Aqsa satellite) [Television broadcast]. (2008). Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ctiGtIxRA0&feature=channel>

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). (حكاية خروفي) قسم الأطفال في فضائية الأقصى (L’histoire de mon mouton (service des enfants, chaîne Al-Aqsa satellite))[Television broadcast]. Retrieved

November 30, 2009, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPaQTGP-fTc&feature=channel>

Hamas. (Creator). (2008). رحلتي في يوم العيد (Mon voyage le jour de l'Aïd)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JLHb8_I_13U&feature=channel

-2009-

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Hamas child soldiers vow like shahid father* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Hamas kids darts and shahada* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Hamas TV bunny Assud killed; Calls on his deathbed to liberate Tel Aviv and Haifa* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/2000.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Nassour can't study for tests* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Nassur I- Saraa ready to sacrifice* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Nassur wants to slaughter Jews* [Television broadcast]. Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *New Al-Aqsa TV teddy bear Nassur vows to join military wing of Hamas* [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 27, 2010, from <http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/2028.htm>

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). *Reem kids watch video on Reem death* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). من يجرو فليتقدم وغزة حتفه المحقق!!؟ (Que celui qui ose approche, à Gaza sa mort est assurée!)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7Bn-KeC_A0&feature=channel

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). "مقاطع من محكمة الاجيال (Extraits du tribunal des generations) Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDbr3MWWu3k&feature=channel>

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). هذه الارض لنا لنا انشودة عبرية فضائية الاقصى (Cette terre est à nous, à nous. Hymne hébreu, chaîne Al-Aqsa satellite)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved

- November 30, 2009, from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aUJDNGBW5I&feature=channel
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Lorsque nous nous sacrifions, nous allons au Paradis) [Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ajszt3YPNg&feature=related>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Hymne du soixante-et-unième anniversaire de la Nakba Nous reviendrons O Palestine, O Jérusalem)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1J9mFSEC9FU&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Lettre de Gilad Shalit) [Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IU43HmSnz60&feature=related>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Hymne Mima O Mayama)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 30, 2010, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1t46XLqEnA&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Hymne distingué Nous ne nous prosternons que devant Dieu)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 30, 2010, from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U4qFCQgengg&feature=player_embedded
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Dessin animé La victoire promise dans la guerre du Discernement Deuxième partie)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR4NTIQzrcQ&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Dessin animé “La victoire promise” Représentation de la Guerre de Gaza Première partie)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUNFUYX1pPE&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (A l’occasion de la Journée mondiale de l’environnement)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVJMOaHD0fg&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Hymne Les libres de ce monde, chaîne Al-Aqsa Satellite)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved November 30, 2009, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsvBv2WbgJI&feature=channel>
- Hamas. (Creator). (2009). (Hymne Al-Aqsa restera, Sarra Barhum)[Television broadcast]. Retrieved May 2, 2010, from
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7XKImpGXBQ&feature=channel>

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). صراع الطفولة حوار بين طفل عربي وطفل اسرائيلي (Enfance en lutte Dialogue entre un enfant arabe et un enfant israélien) [Television broadcast]. Retrieved December 11, 2009, from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-PeFaCGND0>

Hamas. (Creator). (2009). انشودة هدارة يا حماس الانطلاقة 22 انشاد الطفل خالد شيخة (Hymne Allez Hamas!, vingt deuxième anniversaire du lancement du mouvement par l'enfant Khalid Chikha) [Television broadcast]. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from <http://www.youtube.com/user/kidsaqsatv#p/u/0/XE60S7-Dhak>

-n.d.-

Hamas. (Creator). (n.d.). *Farfour 1 complete 2.3 minutes* [Television broadcast]. Israel: Palestinian Media Watch Direct.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Qualities of Units of Analysis

Components of Units of Analysis	Description
Videos	- Shows broadcast and/or made available online by the following online versions of the television station and by online television monitoring projects: Online Television - Al-Aqsa TV - Kids Aqsa TV Online Monitoring Projects - PMW - MEMRI TV (or 'MEMRI') - Sourced to Hamas or Fatah - Broadcast between the years of 2000 and 2009
Children	- Based on impressionistic definitions divided according to physical and contextual elements. Physical - Stature (compared with typical human growth patterns) - Overall physical appearance (compared with typical human growth patterns) Contextual - Activities (<i>e.g.</i>, playing with toys) - Individuals in videos (<i>e.g.</i>, interacting with other children)
Children's Television Programs	- Broadcasts involving the appearance of: - Children - Toys - Acts of play - Children interacting with other children - Based on the content of videos found from Kids Aqsa TV, this analysis also analyzes videos that do not necessarily fit into a conventional definition of children's programming. Instead, the videos can include politicians addressing a crowd of children, or military training and acts of violent battle, such as gun battles and hand-to-hand combat. - Example of children's television formats: - Children's series - Cartoons - Talk shows - Music videos

Appendix 2: List of Videos and Video Information

It should be noted that each number on the left hand side of the following table (1 through 56 for Hamas and 57 through 109 for Fatah) corresponds to a video. Next to each number are titles that were provided by the source. Some of these titles can be biased and/or reflect the content of the videos. This can, therefore, influence the analysis. To avoid such bias in the actual coding, only the numbers ('Video ID') were used as identifiers.

Video ID	Title	Type	Creator	Source	Year (Broadcast and Posted)	Length (seconds)
1	Children Will be New Ahmad Yassin	Music video	Hamas	PMW Direct	2007	53
2	Islamic Supremacy-Defeat Bush and Sharon	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneers)	Hamas	PMW Direct	April 16, 2007	27
3	Child Quran with Gun	Music video	Hamas	PMW Direct	May 2007	35
4	Mommy Reem	Music video	Hamas	PMW Direct	May 2007-2009	60
5	Farfour 2 complete 2.5 min LONG	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneers)	Hamas	PMW Direct	May 11, 2007	143
6	Farfour 1 Complete 2.3 Minutes	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	No date given	149
7	Israeli Beats and Kills Farfur (sic.)	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	June 29, 2007	283
8	Farfour – Jews are Dogs	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	June 29, 2007	37
9	Hamas Keys 1948 Shooting Back	Music video	Hamas	PMW Direct	July 2007	32
10	Hamas-Kids Liberate Palestine	Other	Hamas	PMW Direct	July 2007	15
11	Farfur Girl Cites Hadith of Genocide	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	July 6, 2007	33
12	Nahoul the Bee Replaces Farfour - Hamas Mickey Mouse - and Vows to Continue on His Path of Martyrdom and <i>Jihad</i>	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	July 13, 2007	85
13	Hamas' Bee Nahoul Abuses Cats and Lions at Gaza Zoo and Calls to Liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	August 10, 2007	275
14	Hamas-Style Lion King Vanquishes Fatah Rats in an Al-Aqsa TV Animated	Animation	Hamas	MEMRI Web	August 23, 2007	325

	Film					
15	Hamas TV Bee, Nahoul, Weeps over "Martyred" Family and Chit-Chats with Kids on Animal Slaughtering	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	December 20, 2007	173
16	Nahul (sic.) Wedding as Shahid	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	February 1, 2008	33
17	Hamas Bunny Assud Replaces his "Martyred" Brother Nahoul the Bee and Vows to Liberate Al-Aqsa and "Eat" Jews	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	February 2-9, 2008	248
18	Hamas Rabbit: I Will Eat the Jews	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	February 8, 2008	19
19	Hamas Bunny Assud Urges Boycott of Danish Goods and Threatens to Kill Danes over Muhammad Cartoon	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	February 22, 2008	400
20	Child Stabs President Bush to Death and Turns the White House into a Mosque in Hamas Puppet Show Clip	Other	Hamas	MEMRI Web	March 30, 2008	277
21	Grandfather of Hamas TV Bunny Assud Insists Tel Aviv was a Palestinian City	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	May 9, 2008	151
22	Hamas TV Bunny Assud is Tempted by Satan to Steal and is Sentenced by Children Viewers to Have his Hand Chopped Off	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	July 11, 2008	192
23	Hamas Cartoon-Jews Dig Under Al-Aqsa	Animation	Hamas	MEMRI Web	December 24, 2007	122
24	Jews Killed Farfour and Nahoul	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	August 29, 2008	11
25	Helicopter Shoots Kids with Kite	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	November 14, 2008	24
26	بنبارك للحركة الحرة في ذكرى انطلاقها الكبرى Nous bénissons le mouvement libre pour commémorer son glorieux déclenchement	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 15, 2008	359
27	فرح وحب سراء برهوم قسم الاطفال فضائية الاقصى Joie et amour, Sarra Barhum, service des enfants de la chaîne Al-	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 15, 2008	264

	Aqsa satellite					
28	(حكاية خروفي) قسم الأطفال في فضائية الأقصى L'histoire de mon mouton (service des enfants, chaîne Al-Aqsa satellite)	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 16, 2008	408
29	رحلتي في يوم العيد Mon voyage le jour de l'Aïd	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 29, 2008	211
30	Hamas TV Bunny Assud killed; Calls on his Deathbed to Liberate Tel Aviv and Haifa	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	January 2, 2009	243
31	Hamas Child Soldiers Vow Like Shahid Father	Other	Hamas	PMW Direct	February, 2009	133
32	New Al-Aqsa TV Teddy Bear Nassur Vows to Join Military Wing of Hamas	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	MEMRI Web	February 13, 2009	36
33	Nassur 1- Saraa Ready to Sacrifice	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	February 13, 2009	17
34	من يجزؤ فليتقدم وغزة حنقه المحقق!! Que celui qui ose approche, à Gaza sa mort est assurée!	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	February 14, 2009	58
35	مقاطع من "محكمة الاجيال" Extraits du tribunal des générations	Other	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	February 14, 2009	291
36	هذه الارض لنا لنا انشودة عبرية فضائية الاقصى Cette terre est à nous, à nous. Hymne hébreu, chaîne Al-Aqsa satellite	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	March 17, 2009	199
37	Nassour (sic.) Can't Study for Tests	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	March 20, 2009	23
38	لما نستشهد بنروح الجنة Lorsque nous nous sacrifions, nous allons au Paradis	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	April 28, 2009	226
39	أنشودة النكبة الـ 61 وحتما عائدون يا فلسطين ويا قدس Hymne du soixante-et- unième anniversaire de la Nakba Nous reviendrons O Palestine, O Jérusalem	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	May 24, 2009	325
40	Reem Kids Watch Video on Reem Death 2009	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	July 3, 2009	76
41	رسالة جلعاد شاليت ההקלטה של גלעד שליט Lettre de Gilad Shalit	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	July 8, 2009	190
42	انشودة ميمما يا ميمما	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa	July 22, 2009	125

	Hymne Mima O Mayama			TV		
43	Hamas Kids Darts and Shahada	Music video	Hamas	PMW Direct	August 21, 2009	18
44	أنشودة ما نركع إلا لله المتميزة Hymne distingué Nous ne nous prosternons que devant Dieu	Music video	Hamas	Al-Aqsa TV	August 23, 2009	221
45	Nassur Wants to Slaughter Jews	Kid's series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	September 22, 2009	37
46	فيلم الكرتون وللنصر موعد الفرقان الجزء الثاني Dessin animé La victoire promise dans la guerre du Discernement Deuxième partie	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	October 5, 2009	319
47	فيلم الكرتون "وللنصر موعد" تجسيد حرب غزة - الجزء الأول Dessin animé "La victoire promise" Représentation de la Guerre de Gaza Première partie	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	October 19, 2009	294
48	في يوم البيئة العالمي A l'occasion de la Journée mondiale de l'environnement	Other	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	October 6, 2009	142
49	انشودة احرار العالم فضائية الاقصى Hymne Les libres de ce monde, chaîne Al-Aqsa Satellite	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	October 6, 2009	243
50	انشودة وتبقى الأقصى سراء برهوم Hymne Al-Aqsa restera, Sarra Barhum	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	October 6, 2009	237
51	صراع الطفولة حوار بين طفل عربي وطفل اسرائيلي Enfance en lutte Dialogue entre un enfant arabe et un enfant israélien	Animation	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 3, 2009	170
52	انشودة هدارة يا حماس الانطلاقة 22 انشاد الطفل خالد شيخة Hymne Allez Hamas!, vingt deuxième anniversaire du lancement du mouvement par l'enfant Khalid Chikha	Music video	Hamas	Kids Aqsa TV	December 12, 2009	205
53	A Hamas TV Music Video in Hebrew Sings: "In Black Bags, Chunks of Flesh of Jews"	Music video	Hamas	MEMRI Web	September 19, 2007	168
54	Children on Hamas TV Call to "Liberate" Al-Aqsa Mosque by Force and to "Wipe Out"	Other	Hamas	MEMRI Web	December 3, 2007	164

	Zionists to the Last One					
55	TV Host on Hamas TV, Child Saraa Barhoum, Sings: "We Liberated Gaza by Force"	Music video	Hamas	MEMRI Web	December 20, 2007	174
56	Nahul 2 Jews Killed Farfur- Need Journalists- <i>Jihad</i>	Kids' series (Tomorrow's Pioneer)	Hamas	PMW Direct	July 20, 2007	33
57	Music Video to Children: Fight and "don't be Afraid "	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	2000-2003	40
58	Kid's Garden- Map	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 18, 2000	51
59	Kids Garden - Map in Chains	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 25, 2000	36
60	Toys Throw	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	May 2001, June 2007	59
61	PA Teaches Young Children to Replace Toys with Rocks	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	May 2, 2001	65
62	Farewell Letter	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	"Hundreds of times between 2001-2004"	87
63	MV AS Violence Mother Not Humiliate	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	"Hundreds of times 2001-2009"	43
64	Baby Break Rock	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	56
65	Arafat to kids -Faris Ouda	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	August 18, 2002	33
66	PA music video: Israelis Demonized as Killers of Mother	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	January 1, 2003	105
67	MV Hate Violence Rocking Horse	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	January-June 2003	72
68	Music Video Depicts Israelis Murdering School Children	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	February-May 2003	86
69	Arafat Kids (2)	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 22, 2003	82
70	Debka Turmus	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 22, 2003	56
71	Heart Dripping Blood	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 29-30, 2003	43
72	Tarabisho-The Talking Chick, educational program	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	August 23, 2004	32
73	Israeli Soldiers Shooting at Palestinian Kids Playing Soccer	Other	Fatah	PMW Web	September 2004 repeatedly	34
74	Tarabisho	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	October 22, 2004	27
75	Grandson Receives Key	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	May 17, 2005	42
76	Al-Dura calls children to follow him to Paradise	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	June 28, 2006	98
77	Name Unknown	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	February 13, 2007	44
78	Acre Emek Yizrael Shahad	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	June 9, 2008	10

79	Nakba Clip 2008	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	May 12, 2008	48
80	Kidnap Babies	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	May 16, 2008	30
81	Children's Show: Liberate Palestine and Return to Jaffa	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Web	May 16, 2008	42
82	Safad Haifa Beersheba Occupied Telegame	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 21, 2008	29
83	Mickey Mouse Quiz – Pal is all Israel	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 1, 2008	51
84	Fares Ouda on Kids Show	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 16, 2008	25
85	Tiberias Pal City Kids	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 20, 2008	8
86	Beautiful Virgins Await Muslim Martyrs in Paradise	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	November 2008	52
87	Baladi Ana	Music video	Fatah	PMW Web	November 1, 2008	62
88	PA School Children Want to be Martyrs	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	November 14, 2008	17
89	Israel Endangers Al-Aqsa Mosque	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	Repeatedly 2008-2009	32
90	Kids Quiz- Palestine ports Jaffa Haifa	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Web	August 26, 2009	27
91	Kids Quiz- Acre in Palestine conquered by Napoleon	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	August 30, 2009	38
92	Zefat N capital and Miron- Telegame	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 9, 2008	31
93	PA kids taught Lod is occupied Palestine	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 22, 2009	25
94	Mom Gives Gun	Music Video	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	45
95	Israel Kills Kids	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	45
96	Dreams	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	86
97	Millions of Martyrs Marching to Jerusalem	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	39
98	Freedom Kids	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	90
99	Dalal Mughrabi-Child's Poem Role Model	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	May 16, 2008	22
100	Mickey Mouse Quiz – Dalal	Kids' series	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 4-6, 2008	27
101	Kids-Expel all Israelis – Came from Holland	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	December 25, 2003	43
102	Maps – 3 Kids Paintings	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	September 11, 2005	36
103	Summer Camp 2000 Settlers Kill Farmer	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 16, 2000	40
104	Rafah-RoshHaNikra is Palestine	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	November 2007-June 2008	17
105	Walla Yoursa	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	June 2002	85
106	Jews Kill Because of Religion and Falsify Bible	Other	Fatah	PMW Direct	July 23, 2002	43
107	Listen Listen	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	56
108	My Enemy	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	October 2007-	50

					March 2008	
109	Graduation	Music video	Fatah	PMW Direct	None given	33

Appendix 3: Visual Representation of Handala

Hero indicators 4-5



(Image of Handala, n.d.)

Appendix 4: Visual Representation of Keffiyeh and Patterns

Hero indicators 7-10



(Image of keffiyeh and patterns, n.d.)

Appendix 5: Visual Representation of Kalashnikovs

Hero indicator 11



(Kalashnikov AK-47, n.d.)

Appendix 6: Visual Representation of Ezzedein Al Qassam Brigade's Clothing


Indicators of: *Hamas Bandana* (Hero indicator 17) and *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters* (Hero indicator 18).



(Martyr Ahmed Al Hajeen, n.d.)

Appendix 7: Visual Representation of a Qur'an

Religion indicator 7



(Image of Qur'an, n.d.)

Appendix 8: Visual Representation of the Crescent Moon and Star

Religion indicator 8



(The crescent moon and star, n.d.)

Appendix 9: Visual Representation of Prayer Mats

Religion indicator 9



(Images of prayer mats, n.d.)

Appendix 10: Visual Representation of Peasant Clothing

Land indicators 3 and 5



(Peasant Family of Ramallah, n.d.)

Appendix 11: Visual Representation of Olive Harvest

Land indicator 6



(Garrett, n.d.)

Appendix 12: Occurrences of Indicators of Battle in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (104)	Outliers (5)	Whole (109)
Bullets	1 (1%)	2 (40%)	3 (3%)
Weapons	1 (1%)	3 (60%)	4 (4%)
Toy Gun	2 (2%)	1 (20%)	3 (3%)
Toy Weapon	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Military Camp Training	2 (2%)	2 (40%)	4 (4%)
Open-Air Obstacle Training	2 (2%)	1 (20%)	3 (3%)
Blue Grey Army Fatigues	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Explosives	3 (3%)	4 (80%)	7 (6%)
Destruction	4 (4%)	1 (20%)	5 (5%)
Hand-to-Hand Combat	5 (5%)	0 (0%)	5 (5%)
Image of Child with a Weapon	8 (8%)	0 (0%)	8 (7%)
Fire	10 (10%)	3 (60%)	13 (12%)
Barbed Wire	11 (11%)	1 (20%)	12 (11%)
Green Brown Army Fatigues	11 (11%)	3 (60%)	14 (13%)
Gun Battle	12 (12%)	3 (60%)	15 (14%)
Army Machinery	13 (13%)	2 (40%)	15 (14%)
Explosion	15 (14%)	4 (80%)	19 (17%)
Destroyed Property	19 (18%)	4 (80%)	23 (21%)
Unspecified Gun	25 (24%)	3 (60%)	28 (26%)

Appendix 13: Occurrences of Indicators of Hero in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (104)	Outliers (5)	Whole (109)
Religious Martyr	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Cartoon Figure of Handala	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Keffiyeh in the Context of conflict	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Conflict Wedding	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Black Hamas Clothes	1 (1%)	3 (60%)	4 (4%)
Recognized Martyr	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Political Martyr	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Human Standing in the Posture of Handala	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Lion	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Cactus	2 (2%)	1 (20%)	3 (3%)
Hamas Bandana	3 (3%)	4 (80%)	7 (6%)
Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters	3 (3%)	4 (80%)	7 (6%)
Poppy	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
Horses	5 (5%)	1 (20%)	6 (6%)
Large-Scale Funeral	6 (6%)	0 (0%)	6 (6%)
Kalashnikov	7 (7%)	3 (60%)	10 (9%)
Stone on its Own	8 (8%)	0 (0%)	8 (7%)
Throwing Stones	8 (8%)	0 (0%)	8 (7%)
Keffiyeh Pattern	9 (9%)	0 (0%)	9 (8%)
Keffiyeh Scarf	9 (9%)	1 (20%)	10 (9%)
Keffiyeh	19 (18%)	2 (40%)	21 (19%)

Appendix 14: Occurrences of Indicators of Victim in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (108)	Outliers (1)	Whole (109)
Mnemonic Device: Nursery	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Mnemonic Device: School	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Mnemonic Device: Mosque	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Refugees	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Bandaged Limbs	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Mnemonic Device: Hospital	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
The Date of <i>Al-Nakba</i>	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Refugee Camp	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Small-Scale Funeral Ceremony	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Orange on its Own	1 (1%)	1 (100%)	2 (2%)
Orange Tree	1 (1%)	1 (100%)	2 (2%)
Binds	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
Cemetery	4 (4%)	0 (0%)	4 (4%)
Blood External to Bodies	5 (5%)	0 (0%)	5 (5%)
Bloody Bodies	8 (7%)	0 (0%)	8 (7%)
Dead Bodies	15 (14%)	0 (0%)	15 (14%)
Injured Bodies	23 (21%)	0 (0%)	23 (21%)

Appendix 15: Occurrences of Indicators of Religion in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (106)	Outliers (3)	Whole (109)
Crescent and Star	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Temple Mount Minaret	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Prayer Mat	2 (2%)	1 (33%)	3 (3%)
Aqsa Mosques	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
General Mosques	6 (6%)	1 (33%)	7 (6%)
<i>Qur'an</i>	7 (7%)	2 (67%)	9 (8%)
Male Head Covering	9 (8%)	0 (0%)	9 (8%)
Temple Mount	9 (8%)	0 (0%)	9 (8%)
Dome of the Rock	17 (16%)	0 (0%)	17 (16%)
Female Headscarf	57 (54%)	2 (67%)	59 (54%)

Appendix 16: Occurrences of Indicators of Land in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (107)	Outliers (2)	Whole (109)
Saber	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Farm Work	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Olives	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Map of the West Bank	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Potted Cactus	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Peasant Keffiyeh	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Shape of the West Bank	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Shape of Gaza	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Map of Gaza	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Key in the Family Setting	3 (3%)	1 (50%)	4 (4%)
Palestinian Map	7 (7%)	0 (0%)	7 (6%)
Key on its Own	7 (7%)	0 (0%)	7 (6%)
Traditional Arab Houses	9 (8%)	0 (0%)	9 (8%)
Olive Tree	11 (10%)	1 (50%)	12 (11%)
Peasant Clothes	24 (22%)	2 (100%)	26 (24%)

Appendix 17: Occurrences of Indicators of Other in Videos

Indicator	Population		
	No Outliers (108)	Outliers (1)	Whole (109)
American Flag	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
Additional Indication of the USA	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)
The Wailing Wall	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Checkpoint	2 (2%)	0 (0%)	2 (2%)
Orange Star of David Ambulance	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
Candelabra	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
Israeli Medic's Uniform	3 (3%)	0 (0%)	3 (3%)
Jewish Black Hat	3 (3%)	1 (100%)	4 (4%)
Payes	3 (3%)	1 (100%)	4 (4%)
Israeli Police Uniform	4 (4%)	0 (0%)	4 (4%)
Israeli Wall	4 (4%)	1 (100%)	5 (5%)
Jewish Skullcap	6 (6%)	1 (100%)	7 (6%)
Israeli Politician	7 (6%)	0 (0%)	7 (6%)
Israeli Flag	8 (7%)	0 (0%)	8 (7%)
Jewish Star	8 (7%)	1 (100%)	9 (8%)
Israeli Fatigues	18 (17%)	0 (0%)	18 (17%)

Appendix 18: Hamas Battle Outlier [Video #34](#)

In some ways this short animated film shows a typical battle by depicting soldiers fighting. In other ways it is unique to this specific case study. It sets itself apart largely because it seems to show the *other* as being unmatched against an unknown *self* (although the assumption is that it is the Palestinians).

The video begins with a scene that shows multiple soldiers dressed in *Green Brown Army Fatigues* under the command of a likewise dressed man with an Israeli flag on his chest. The assumption here is that the soldiers are Israeli. The man who appears to be the commander points to a map of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, the latter of which is circled and written in English. The next scene shows the soldiers in a helicopter and then engaged in *Gun Battle* amidst the rubble of *Destroyed Property*. The video follows one soldier who looks particularly scared. He is unable to properly load his gun and, in the process of trying, is shot and killed.

This video seems to show the incompetence of the, presumably, Israeli soldier (Other). This depiction can serve as motivation for those who feel the *other* is insurmountable. Furthermore, this can speak to the Palestinian Master-Narrative showing that the battle can indeed be won.

Appendix 19: Hamas Battle Outlier [Video #44](#)

This partially animated-partially real-time video shows indicators of Battle, Hero, Land, Victim and Religion. The video begins with a boy who becomes animated. He is in a dilapidated building (*Destroyed Property*) interacting with an animated grenade. This scene is interspersed throughout this video. There are multiple additional scenes of *Destroyed Property*, as well as a repeated scene with a woman wearing a Hijab and playing with a child. Other scenes include a man carrying an injured child, a man handing a boy a *Key* (Land) in front of the *Temple Mount* (Religion). In a subsequent scene, a boy stands with a *Keffiyeh* (Hero) wrapped around his face, holding a *Kalashnikov* (Hero) in front of the *Temple Mount* (Religion). There are also numerous scenes that show dead children, as well as images of military planes flying and dropping bombs on buildings. The video concludes with the image of a *Large-Scale Funeral* (Hero) and a scene that features the destroyed remnants of what can be recognized as the *Temple Mount* (Religion).

All of these elements come together to create a frame that depicts an unspecified, but substantial, enemy that threatens the happiness (woman and child), property, safety, lives (dead children) and religion of the Palestinian people. It thereby addresses all three of Hamas' typical media scripts of Disaster, Power and Vulnerability. It can serve to both justify and motivate action.

Appendix 20: Hamas Battle Outlier [Video #14](#)

This animated video shows what can be considered typical Battle through its inclusion of indicators such as *Weapons*, *Bullets*, and *Destruction*. These are shown throughout a video that depicts a landscape ravaged by rats. These rats are not intelligent and are shown as greedy. They are also seen to be collaborating with Jews and Americans (Other).

What is interesting about this video is that, while there are multiple images of the *Jewish Star* (Other), it seems that the content of the video is a criticism of Fatah by Hamas, with Fatah represented by rats collaborating with the Jews (Other). The *Lion* (Hero), on the other hand, is draped in the Hamas colors and vanquishes the rats, thereby restoring peace and beauty to the land.

This creates an *other*, through the process of enemy imaging that is different than what was hypothesized. That said, the depiction of the *other* as well as whether this video's content is truly unpredicted, must be addressed. To begin, Fatah's negotiations with Israel have led to claims by Hamas that it does not represent the interest of the Palestinian people. In this way, it is not surprising that Fatah was depicted as collaborating with Jews in this video.

Furthermore, this video might serve the purpose of capitalizing on the Palestinian public's frustration regarding Fatah and their living conditions. Additionally, this video is from 2007, which coincided with the outbreak of the civil war between Hamas and Fatah following Hamas' 2006 election win and the collapse of negotiations. This highlighted the disintegrating relationship between the two groups.

The video makes use of Hamas' three scripts (frames) of Disaster, Power and Vulnerability, highlighting its strength against an enemy and recalling the eventual and promised victory of the Palestinian Master-Narrative (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009, p. 213; Birnbaum, 2006, p. 142-156).

Therefore, this video seems to mobilize support for Hamas in its bid against Fatah, by capitalizing on pre-existing negative sentiments associated with Fatah's negotiation downfalls and linking the group to Jews, who it has consistently described as its enemy and the enemy of the Palestinian people.

Appendix 21: Hamas Battle Outlier [Video #36](#)

This music video shows a high value of Battle and is also an outlier for Hero. It shows multiple scenes of *Military Camp Training*, *Army Machinery*, *Explosion*, *Destroyed Property*, *Weapons* and *Unspecified Gun*. A large number of the people in the video are dressed as members of Hamas' *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades* and carry *Kalashnikovs* (Hero). Like *Video #44*, this video suggests that Islam itself is imperilled, with a scene showing the burning of *Qur'ans* (Religion). The indicators of Other are interspersed amidst these scenes of Battle and Hero and show Israeli medics tending to the wounded. This suggests that they have been attacked by these fighters.

It must be noted that the song in this video is in Hebrew. This can call the desired audience into question. Because this video meets the qualifications outlined in Appendix 1 and the fact that this analysis does not consider audience reactions or address verbal content, this video was deemed to be an appropriate inclusion.

This video emphasizes the strength, or Power script typical of the Hamas media described in Chapter 3. While it does contain some indicators of Victim, they seem to be of Israeli soldiers and, therefore, the video seems to emphasize strength and recalls the Liberationist Discourse. In some ways this video can motivate joining the strong group.

Appendix 22: Hamas Battle Outlier [Video #53](#)

This music video, with the highest value of Battle, is also a Hero outlier, with the highest value of Hero. It contains indicators of *Weapons, Explosives, Explosion, Bullets, Barbed Wire, Military Camp Training* and *Green Brown Army Fatigues*. There are also heroic images of men and children dressed in clothing and accessories associated with *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*, both participating in military training as well as simulated and actual armed combat (respectively).

What is interesting about the presence of children imitating combat or participating in training alongside adults (seen throughout this and other videos, such as *Video #1*), is that there is a level of inter-generational sharing of responsibilities, with the adults validating the children's actions who dress and act like the adults. Hamas has consistently emphasized family values and its covenant has called for the involvement of all members of society including children ("The Covenant", 1988, Article 18). Because of this, passing along these heroic symbols suggests that heroism is itself being passed along, as well as the cause for which these individuals fight (Battle).

In order to motivate action, this shared responsibility is combined with a focus on the Power script and the Liberationist Discourse; overcoming the Disaster and Vulnerability scripts and the Tragic Discourse. This can serve to integrate youth into a shared conflict that highlights power and strength, attempting to frame the actions as legitimate and meaningful (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616; Loizides, 2008, p. 4).

Appendix 23: Hamas Hero Outlier: [Video # 47](#)

This video combines Hero with Battle, Victim and Other. In its opening scene, this cartoon shows a meeting of *Israeli Politicians* in front of a desk that has a *Jewish Star* on the front of it. Behind the table there is a *Candelabrum* and an *Israeli Flag* (all Other). This opens up onto a scene with men dressed in *Black Hamas Clothes* standing in formation under a Palestinian flag. There are multiple fast scene changes that show a military plane (*Army Machinery* of Battle) and then the previously intact building, in front of which the men were standing, is blown up. In the wake of this *Explosion* (Battle), there is *Blood External to Bodies* (Victim) as well as *Dead Bodies* (Victim) amidst the now-*Destroyed Property* (Battle). Another plane is shown, which leads into another Explosion. This time, there is a different *Destroyed Property* and the bodies are those of children with toys, lying inert and covered in blood.

The scenes of *Army Machinery* and *Destroyed Property* are repeated, each time with a different building. Of these buildings, those recognizable were: “al Quds h_sptal” (the “o” is missing; written in English) as well as a burning UNRWA building, which is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (About UNRWA; UNRWA.org). This destruction continues and the clear perpetrators are the *Israeli Politicians* (Other).

The overall impression of the video is that of repeated, unprovoked, calculated and violent attacks that yielded multiple victims. This is considered Heroic because of the high number of *Black Hamas Clothes*. It must be mentioned, however, that without the *Black Hamas Clothes*, this video might have otherwise been identified as more heavily reliant on Victim. It is important to consider that this video is an outlier and, therefore, it does not affect the calculations or the numbers reported. It does, however, show a level of ambiguity inherent to the quantitative analysis of certain social phenomenon.

That said, while these soldiers have typically been presented in the midst of military training elsewhere, their appearance of standing still and being killed is not only unique to this video, but seems to highlight victimhood, especially when the scenes of dead children are shown. According to Khalili (2007a), however, the use of grief and fear is a mobilization mechanism, calling out for retributive actions (p. 90-94). Ellul would argue that hatred figures in here as well, elicited by the seemingly unprovoked murder of individuals from

multiple life-stages as well as the destruction of a hospital and an aid agency that seeks to provide fundamental care to the population. This video, then, seems to emphasize the insidious enemy that leaves countless victims in its wake, providing the agitation necessary for action by those identifying, or empathizing, with the victims.

Appendix 24: Hamas Hero Outlier [Video #52](#)

This video shows multiple images of male children dressed in *Green Brown Army Fatigues* with generally authentic-looking *Toy Weapons*. As such, it has a substantial content of Battle, but overall, it suggests a more heroic overtone, with children dressed like the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* fighters.

By repeatedly showing a collective of children, assumedly reflecting the target audience, who are carrying weapons, dressed in the clothes of Hamas' military wing, Hamas is setting an example for those watching. Adding the images of Hamas politicians, or leaders, validates the children's actions and calls on the inter-generational component of shared responsibility. As is typical of Hamas' daily programming, these images highlight strength and responsibility through unity, thereby seeking to furnish the audience with the motivation to join (Blondheim & Shifman, 2009, p. 209; 211).

Appendix 25: Hamas Hero Outlier Video #31

This video primarily features a young boy dressed in *Green Brown Army Fatigues* (Battle) with the *Hamas Bandana*, holding and posing with an *Unspecified Gun*, gesturing in apparent speech. He stands in front of a still background with the Hamas crest along with multiple images of men dressed as *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* fighters; many of whom are holding an *Unspecified Gun*, riding galloping *Horses* with the Hamas flag blowing behind them. This scene, shown multiple times, is interspersed with short repeated scenes of an adult male showing a child how to shoot an *Unspecified Gun*.

As with some of the previous videos, this one seems to show the inter-generational sharing of responsibility, with the adult training the child how to shoot a gun. What perhaps distinguishes this video from the others is that the main and most repeated scene shows a child taking on two adult roles without the supervision of an adult. The first role is as a politician or a committed orator and representative who speaks with great fervour. The second is as a martyr as the child preaches in a room that appears to replicate those shown in the videos of martyrs giving their last will and testament (see Appendix 6). Indeed, referencing Palestinian history, this can be one person with two functions.

This video seems to highlight the child as an equal amongst the adult fighters in front of whom he stands. While there is an adult instructing the child how to shoot a gun, these are short and fleeting scenes, with no indicator of Hero, as compared directly to the longer scenes that are Hero-laden. In this way, this video seems to motivate children to act in an adult way, made accessible by the boy featured in the video.

Appendix 26: Hamas Hero Outlier [Video #36](#)

As discussed above for one of the highest Battle outliers, this music video is also high in Hero values. The Hero indicators that occur substantially in this video relate to the clothing and accessories of the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*' fighters.

This video recalls the strength that has been seen throughout many of the Hamas Hero outliers. It also shows the inter-generational component. An example of this is children mirroring the dress and actions of adults in militarized training. All of this seems to call for the support and mobilization of youth in Hamas' collective action.

Appendix 27: Hamas Hero Outlier [Video #53](#)

This video has the highest value of both Battle and Hero, which seems to highlight the pairing of the two variables, at least in the outliers. Like *Video #36*, the Hero indicators that occur substantially in this video relate to the clothing and accessories of the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades*. The combination of Hero and Battle in this video serves to emphasize the strength of the group and provide Vocabularies of Motive based on the perceived possibility of success.

Appendix 28: Fatah Victim Outlier [Video #87](#)

This Fatah outlier combines Victim with Land and, to a lesser extent, Battle and Hero, by showing scenes of drawn pictures of *Farm Work* (Land) and the subsequent destruction of this land (*Destroyed Property* of Battle). This is accompanied by multiple images of children stranding in the Handala pose (Hero).

The theme of this video seems to be loss paired substantially with Land. Given the nationalistic nature of Fatah, as well as the central Palestinian myth of the *Nakba*, this is not surprising. In regards to this loss, there is no indication of who the perpetrator is, but Fatah is theorized to emphasize history. This, and the acceptance that effective myths speak to personal experience (Ellul, 1965, p. 22; 94; 138), can combine to suggest that the enemy responsible for these losses is well known.

Furthermore, this video seems to show resilience in the face of the loss of land. It, thereby, furnishes the audience with a Vocabulary of Motives that justifies and motivates resistance, although not of the specifically violent type.

Appendix 29: Fatah Religion Outlier Video # 97

This video involves Arafat addressing a large group of children. The Religion indicators are derived entirely from the multiple female children wearing the *Female Headscarf*. This might seem to be an inappropriate video, or an insufficient indicator of Religion, but it serves as an interesting example of Fatah's videos (albeit, not a representative one). Indeed, the more nationalistic Fatah videos typically include children who do not cover their hair, as they are, theoretically, more secular. However, this video shows Arafat addressing a crowd of chanting, seemingly engaged children with the majority of females visibly covering their hair.

This video can mirror Arafat's use of Islamic rhetoric by showing him before a crowd of modestly-dressed children, thereby suggesting a ubiquitous appeal, even amongst the more pious.

In this vein, Arafat, himself, could serve as a Palestinian unification symbol, much like his *Keffiyeh*, which became a symbol of heroic resistance (Khalili, 2007a, p. 143). Likewise, he too can take on this symbolism for the children before him and in the television's audience (Swedenburg, 1990, p. 20-25). Furthermore, the fact that Arafat has remunerated families for martyred and injured children provides an added element of interest to his presence before a large group of children, which was then broadcast, suggesting that he, himself, serves as a symbolic motivator to the audience (Schanzer, 2008, p. 59; 43).

Appendix 30: Hamas Religion Outlier Video #3

In this Hamas music video, Religion seems to go hand in hand with the more violent indicators of Hero. It begins with a child holding a *Qur'an* (Religion) who enters a building and prays with other children. He is next seen holding a *Qur'an* to his chest, with a *Kalashnikov* (Hero) in the other hand. This scene is overlaid against numerous men dressed with the *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters* of the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades* as well as *Green Brown Army Fatigues*, (Battle) carrying *Kalashnikovs*.

In the following scene, the child ties on a *Hamas Bandana*. There is a close-up of his eyes which turn into an image of different, adult, eyes behind a *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters*. When the camera pans back out to a wider view, it is indeed a man dressed in army fatigues and the same bandana, shooting with a *Kalashnikov*, at a stone structure that bears a painted *Israeli Flag* (Other). There are several scenes similar to this and several additional ones in which he appears to be shot, although the one shooting him is not visible. The following scene opens up onto a rally with many Hamas flags and finishes with a scene of men wearing *Green Brown Army Fatigues*, *Black Mask Worn by Hamas Fighters*, *Hamas Bandanas* and raising *Kalashnikovs* into the night's sky.

The overall message of this video seems to be heroism, along with the importance of faith. The latter of which is used as a means of strengthening the resolve to fight by highlighting its importance to the conflict. There is no clear use of grief and, instead, the video emphasizes heroic bravery, with the man who gets shot down having taken on an enemy. It also shows the same inter-generational themes that have been mentioned, justifying action and sacrifice. Furthermore, it highlights the Master-Narrative that the loss of one will not destroy the cause which, through the heroic strength of its fighters and, as sustained and motivated by religious faith, ultimate victory will be secured.

Appendix 31: Hamas Religion Outlier [Video #26](#)

Like *Video #3*, this music video also combines Religion with Hero. It likewise integrates the more violent Hero indicators of *Kalashnikov* and the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* accoutrement with Religion indicators; specifically the *Qur'an*.

These combinations are seen as the video primarily follows a young boy throughout the day, the storyline of whom is interspersed with scenes of Hamas politicians and Hamas religious leaders, as well as multiple scenes of rallies replete with Hamas flags, crowds dressed in the colors and the clothing of Hamas and the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* fighters. There is also military training for a group of males dressed in this way. These images also focus on children, dressed similarly, sometimes holding guns. There is also a *Large-Scale Funeral*.

The storyline of the boy shows him reading the *Qur'an* to other boys his age, who then put their hands together in what can be understood as a pact. It also shows him interacting with adults including bidding farewell to an adult male dressed in the *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* clothing. He also plays with very young children (including a toddler) dressed in *Hamas Bandanas* and holding Hamas flags. The boy also walks and imitates *Open-Air Obstacle Training (Battle)* with a man dressed as an *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* fighter. The two final scenes with the boy's story line show him sitting with a toddler who is propped up against a Hamas flag and has a *Qur'an* on his lap. The video concludes with the main boy going to a cemetery (Land) to leave carnations in the colors of the Palestinian flag (which is flashed upon and highlighted in the scene) atop a grave. He is later accompanied by numerous other children.

There are two components that make this video stand out. The first is the use of women, who march in religious clothing, while carrying Hamas flags as well as *Qur'ans* in large crowds. The scale of this type of gathering is uniquely seen in this video. Indeed, like-sized gatherings in other videos are almost exclusively male-dominated. The second is the use of children. That there are children is not necessarily unique, but the repeated and copious use of very young children, including toddlers, dressed in full *Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades'* regalia is unique here. Both of these elements speak to the Hamas Covenant's statement that all in society, including women and youth, have a role in the *jihad* (Nimer, 2009, p. 118).

This video seems to highlight the strength of Hamas, with no indicators of Victim. Therefore, it seems to almost normalize the situation by emphasizing this strength. Furthermore, the strength exhibited in the scenes with adults is replicated by the child. This speaks to the inter-generational element that has been mentioned, but goes further. Indeed, the boy seems to guide children of all ages in the tenets of Hamas, emphasizing Religion and heroic resistance, mirroring the adults, but rendering it accessible for children.

Finally, both this video and *Video #3* appear to serve as motivators to protect the religion. This serves as a justification to take action, as well as the knowledge that doing so is backed by religious decree. All of these elements speak to the content of the group's covenant and Hamas' historic emphasis on the role of Islamism as well as revolution (*jihad*) in the restoration of the land lost.

Appendix 32: Fatah Land Outlier Video #109

This music video features males and females of different ages dancing in *Peasant Clothes*. It shows a traditional connection to both Land and its culture (clothes and dance respectively). This is an example of highlighting the connection to Land without any additional variables.

Ellul (1965) would classify this type of video as “pre-propaganda” which attempts to integrate the population into a cohesive collective identity for the purpose of eventually calling them to action (p. 62; 67). This is also in line with the Fatah media narrative that focuses on history.

Appendix 33: Hamas Land Outlier [Video #39](#)

This music video shows repeated scenes of black and white still images of men, women and children dressed in traditional *Peasant Clothes*, either engaged in work, in social interaction, or selling and buying produce. In one scene, there is an image of an older woman with animated tears (she is a still image), looming large in the background of a city dwarfed by her image. The following scene shows men dressed in *Peasant Clothes* with their arms raised in surrender in front of men in uniforms with *Unspecified Guns* (Battle). There is also a repeated scene with an image of a key with land in the background. This is followed by adults and infants making their way through remnants of a building. This scene pans back to the *Temple Mount* (Religion).

This video conveys the emotion of unjust loss, reminiscent of the *Nakba* myth and emphasizes historic ties to a land that is being destroyed by some external force. All this culminates with the important Religion indicator of the *Temple Mount*. Given the preceding scenes, it could suggest that Islam is in jeopardy, or that the religion (as practiced by Hamas) will provide salvation. In either case, this video seems to motivate action by highlighting grief, as outlined by the Liberationist Discourse.

Appendix 34: Hamas Other Outlier [Video #51](#)

This video is a cartoon that centers on a conversation that takes place between a plainly dressed boy and a Jewish boy, considered as such because he has *Payes* and he is wearing a *Jewish Skullcap* that is decorated with a *Jewish Star*. This interaction occurs in front of, what appears to be, part of the *Israeli Wall*. Based on the wall and the Palestinian flag flying on the other side of it, the assumption is that the conversation takes place in Israel.

At the beginning of this video, the young plainly dressed boy picks up some money and waves at the Jewish child who refuses to talk to the first child until he realizes he dropped the money and the conversation begins. This is an interesting element because Hamas' covenant makes use of historically anti-Semitic texts, fear-mongering and prejudice, such as the connection between Jews and money.

Interspersed amongst the conversation is a scene of multiple boys wearing *Jewish Skullcaps* in a classroom setting with a man at the front, who has *Payes* and is wearing a *Jewish Black Hat* that is decorated with a *Jewish Star*. This man is hunched over and has a prominent nose. In another scene, there is a man with *Payes* and a *Jewish Skullcap* who has red eyes and a pointed beard, creating the illusion of a demon, sitting and reading with a similarly-attired child. In an additional scene an adult male with *Payes*, a *Jewish Skullcap* and red eyes oversees and instructs a male child, with *Payes* and a *Jewish Skullcap*, as he shoots a gun at unarmed, plainly dressed, children.

While the adult Jews have been portrayed as menacing and demon-like, the children tend not to be. Although the boy taking part in the conversation has a prominent nose and arched-eyebrows giving the impression of anger, the red eyes and threatening features are reserved exclusively for the adults. As demons, they have been dehumanized and this provides a clear target for action by highlighting the almost inherently negative features of the Jewish 'enemy' which are being passed along to Jewish children. The creation of enemies is an essential mobilization technique, which draw out bravery and justifies self-sacrifice (Khalili, 2007a, p. 111).

The scenes with the adults and children are reminiscent of the inter-generational themes shown in some of Hamas's other videos, but demonized when applied to the *other*. Indeed, what is perhaps most interesting in this video's portrayal is the image of the adult male teaching the child to shoot a gun. It is specifically of note because it is almost a direct

representation of an adult teaching a child to shoot in the Hero outlier *Video #31*. The difference is the target, which, herein, is unarmed children.

This is part of the Liberationist Discourse which creates and/or focuses on an enemy as a means of eliciting mobilization. It is also part of the Core Framing Tasks and highlights the enemy that must be overcome, thereby justifying and motivating action.