

Insecurity communities:
Technologies of insecurity governance under the European Neighbourhood Policy

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Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a doctoral degree in Political Studies

Political Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
DEDICATION	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION	1
Insecurity Communities: An Introduction.....	1
Outline of the dissertation.....	16
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION, AND METHODS	21
Research Design.....	21
Data Collection.....	23
Data Analysis.....	28
Conclusions.....	30
CHAPTER 3 - INSECURITY COMMUNITIES	32
Introduction.....	32
Meanings of insecurity.....	34
Security Communities.....	44
Insecurity Communities and Technologies of Insecurity Governance.....	49
Conclusions.....	58
CHAPTER 4 - TERRITORIAL TECHNOLOGIES OF INSECURITY GOVERNANCE: EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY	60
Introduction.....	60
Europe: What is in a word?	68
What kind of European Neighbourhood?	73
What kind of European Neighbourhood Policy?	80
Conclusions.....	94
CHAPTER 5 - INSTITUTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES OF INSECURITY GOVERNANCE: MOBILITY SECURITY PRACTICES OF THE EU	97
European mobilities: of Persons and Things.....	97
A (very) brief note on decision making in the EU.....	98
The Schengen Area.....	100
The Single Market.....	104
Human Mobility Insecurity Regimes in the European Neighbourhood.....	109
Transportation Security Regimes in the European Neighbourhood.....	118
Material Technologies of Mobility Insecurity in the European Neighbourhood.....	124
Conclusions.....	132
CHAPTER 6 - THE E-PASSPORT	134
Introduction.....	134
Discursive Technologies of Mobility Insecurity and the e-Passport.....	135
Institutional Technologies of Mobility Insecurity and the e-Passport.....	139
Material Technologies of Mobility Insecurity and the e-Passport.....	143
Territorial Technologies of Mobility Insecurity and the e-Passport.....	153
Conclusions.....	164

CHAPTER 7 - THE INTERMODAL SHIPPING CONTAINER.....	165
Introduction: Little Boxes Ticky-Tacky?.....	165
Discursive Technologies of Transportation Insecurity and the Container.....	167
Institutional Technologies of Transportation Insecurity and Container.....	174
Material and Territorial Technologies of Insecurity Governance and Containers.....	181
Conclusions.....	190
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS: MANAGING INSECURITY COMMUNITIES.....	193
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	201

**Dedicated to the loving memory of my grandparents: Bedriye, Neriman,
Ömer Faruk, and Sebahattin whom I miss everyday.**

Abstract

This dissertation explores the European Union's (EU) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a technology of insecurity governance in order to better understand insecurity management practices of the EU bureaucracies and policy elites. The central argument of the project is that security communities are insecurity communities. Rather than trying to maintain a state of non-war, insecurity communities establish and further develop a constant productive field of insecurity management that aims to identify and govern threats and unease. The projects core contributions rest with the security community theory and the literature on the EU's external governance literatures. Empirically, the dissertation focuses on the human mobility and transportation insecurity management practices of the EU in relation to the uses of e-Passports and intermodal containers.

Keywords: Security, European Union, Mobility, Transportation, European Neighbourhood Policy

Acknowledgements

Writing a doctoral dissertation requires an effort that can be compared to sailing around the world solo. It is a task you will have to do on your own, but you cannot do it without the support of those that care about you. While I wrote this dissertation on my own, it was not a task that I could have completed without the much felt love and support of a close-knit circle of friends and family. That is, however, not to say that this process has been nothing short of amazing. In the process of researching, writing, and presenting aspects of this dissertation I have been to amazing places and met with some really inspiring people. From climbing up the Sugar Loaf mountain in Rio de Janeiro to having late night strolls in Stockholm, to presenting my work in Sapporo, the last five years has been full of great memories that I will always cherish.

For their financial and institutional support, I would like to acknowledge, University of Ottawa's School of Political Studies, especially Diane Deziel, Sylvia Lachapelle, and Anick Mineault, Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies, Ontario provincial government's Ontario Graduate Scholarship, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council workshop grant, and several other grants from the European Union's Lifelong Learning programme, and the Economic and Social Research Council. Without their generous support, this project would have been very difficult to complete.

All of this would not have been possible without my supervisor Dr. Mark B. Salter. Mark has been everything you can expect from a supervisor, and some more. He has been there for me the entirety of the journey, as my co-author, mentor, and most importantly a true friend. His continuous encouragement, guidance, and generosity allowed me to be a better scholar. I have also been extremely blessed with the feedback, guidance, and support I received from my committee members: Dr. Nisha Shah and Dr. Michael C. Williams. Nisha's generous comments and thoughtful provocations significantly improved the quality of this work and made me a better scholar. Conversations I had with Mike allowed me to reflect on the bigger picture and make connections between literatures, while maintaining a reflexive posture. Mark, Mike and Nisha's help has been indispensable to make this text what it is today. I wish everyone could be so lucky to have such an amazing group of thinkers in their committee to guide them through this process. I also would like to thank Dr. Alexandria Gheciu and Dr. Vincent Pouliot for their comments and suggestions at the thesis defense. Their input will make this project stronger as I move forward for publication.

In this journey, I have been fortunate enough to develop friendships with some of the most inspiring of academics. I feel extremely lucky to be able to call them friends. Samer Abboud, Marc Doucet, Miguel de Larrinaga, Benjamin Muller have been great role models and their work and academic presence is a source of inspiration for me. Philippe M. Frowd, Christopher C. Leite, and Adam Sandor have been the best of friends and colleagues with whom I have had the pleasure of sharing these formative years. Our debates allowed me to clear my own ideas. I look forward to pursuing many more endeavors with them. Outside of academia, the support of Katie-Sue Derejko was essential. She supported me through some of the hardest parts of this process and listen to me vent when I needed to. I am lucky to have her as a friend.

But none of this would have been possible without my family. Ayse Erođlu, Renan Erođlu, Aslıhan Mutlu, Haluk Mutlu, Ömer Emre Mutlu, and Eren Yanardađ' s love and support meant the world to me. My aunt and uncle, Nilgün and Genç Emre have always been there for me. I owe them a great deal for providing me with, among other things, my work ethic and sense of responsibility. In the past three years, I have been blessed with another family in Ottawa. Erica and Philip Pinnington have always treated me as part of their family, for which I am truly grateful. They have not only been generous in sharing their love and support for me, but they have provided me with two new brothers: Thomas and James Pinnington, and most importantly, they gave birth to my better half: Sarah Pinnington.

My beloved wife Sarah has been the source of inspiration for me in this process. Her love and support has been unparalleled. I owe her a great deal for her friendship and support. She not only helped me edit and format this dissertation, but she also kept me 'off the ledge' many times when I was frustrated, or simply "very grumpy" to keep writing. I would not have been able to complete this without her love, support, and patience. I feel extremely lucky.

My only regret in this process was being away from my family in Turkey for so long and not being there for them when my grandparents Bedriye and Sebahattin Kürklu, and Neriman and Ömer Faruk Mutlu passed away. Being away from my family in Turkey has been the most difficult part of this journey and the one thing that I struggled the most with. That is why I dedicate this dissertation to the loving memory of my grandparents whom I miss everyday.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Insecurity Communities: An Introduction

Security communities have traditionally been characterized by the elimination of the possibility of war, and/or other forms of large-scale violence, as an option for solving differences among their members (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998). This line of argument, however, leads us to the key puzzle behind this current project: how should we conceptualize security today? As the core thesis of this dissertation, I argue that security communities are insecurity communities.

Insecurity, in this case, refers to a different technology of government than security. Whereas security, in security community theory, refers to a state of non-war (Wæver 1998), insecurity refers to a prominent logic of government that is addressed by a constant productive field of management that aims to identify and govern threats and unease associated with the contemporary socio-political landscape. Within an insecurity community this logic manifests itself through the collectivization of duties and responsibilities among the members of the community and further institutionalization of security discourses and practices. In other words, insecurity communities are not just about maintaining a state of non-war among their members but are about developing ways to manage various forms of threats associated with contemporary global order.

Conceptually, security is a contested term. Ranging from freedom from threats (Walt 1991), to a historically variable condition (Krause and Williams 1997), to a [specific] claim

to politics (Booth 2004), to references to existential threats that necessitate emergency measures (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998), there are multiple definitions of the concept. In this dissertation I interact with three such definitions of the concept: security as peace – or non-war – (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998), security as exception – or emergency – (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, Balzacq 2011), and security as risk management (Amoore and De Goede 2005; 2008, Aradau and van Muenster 2007, Bigo 2002, de Goede 2008, Neal 2009, Rasmussen 2006, Salter 2008). Within the context of the security communities literature, Deutsch *et al.* and Adler and Barnett have used the concept to refer to a state of “non-war,” (Wæver 1998) or a state of peace, among – and within – the members of a specific community.

The European Union (EU) represents an interesting case study with which to approach security community theory – both conceptually and empirically. On the one hand, the EU has successfully eliminated the possibility of large-scale violence among its member states (MS) since the Second World War. According to the prominent logic of the security community theory presented by Deutsch *et al.* and – to a certain extent – Adler and Barnett, the successful elimination of the possibility of large-scale conflict within the EU, as well as the establishment of “shared interests, values, and meanings” and “many-sided and direct relations [...] and reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism” (Adler and Barnett 1998, 31) should have led to the cessation of the EU’s involvement in “security” governance. If Europe is secure, and security refers to a state of non-war, what else is there for security?

There is, however, a gap between the empirical/historical realities of insecurity climate in Europe and conceptual debates over the meaning of insecurity. This gap is

apparent when looking at the EU's security policies. Since the end of the Cold War in late 1980s, the possibility of large-scale violence has almost disappeared in continental Europe. While the exception of Bosnia haunts those that witnessed it, the gradual expansion of the EU – and NATO – to include Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) has made large-scale conflict unimaginable between EU MS. While this state of non-war became the norm, the EU institutions' involvement in, and jurisdiction over, insecurity practices increased steadily. How can we account for this conceptual and analytical gap in the literature?

In particular, since the 1990s, the EU has taken part in constructing, identifying, and managing the insecurity landscape in Europe by creating various agencies, databases, networks, and standards of insecurity governance. The question that is raised in regards to defining European security as a state of peace or non-war for the security community theory is as follows: If Europe is secure, why are the EU institutions still involved in drafting, evaluating and exporting security discourses, and practices? In other words, why are the EU institutions still involved in drafting security policies (European Commission 2005a; 2010a; 2010b; 2011c, European Council 2003; 2005a)? What does this situation tell us about the conceptual meaning(s) of security as insecurity?

Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has created an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice that “has not only become one of the most important Treaty objectives but it has also proven an exceptionally dynamic and expansionist area of the EU integration” (Kurowska and Pawlak 2009, 476). The EU also established supranational agencies such as the European Police Office (EUROPOL) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European

Union (FRONTEX). These developments indicate that there is more to security than being a state of non-war in the context of the EU.

Wæver (1998) attempted to conceptualize this concern by making a distinction between three kinds of security prevalent in Western Europe: security, insecurity, and asecurity. Wæver argues that: “security and insecurity are not exhaustive options, and more attention needs to be given to a-security. Usually, those who do not feel insecure, do not self-consciously feel (or work on being) secure; they are more likely to be engaged in other matters” (Wæver 1998, 71). According to him asecuritization is a form of de-securitization, or a disassociation of issues with security.

Wæver’s conceptualization of security as “a specific way to frame an issue” (Wæver 1998, 79) in his chapter is in line with the discursive approach with which he has been associated with as a member of the Copenhagen School that originally developed “Securitization Theory” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). According to the Copenhagen School,

any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decisions and resource allocation or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside of the normal bounds of the political procedure).

(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 23-24)

Such a discursive “framework for security” is built upon a tri-part structure that consists of a legitimate securitizing actor, an audience, and a [valued] referent object. Not all

securitization moves, however, occur through discursive moves that associate issues with exceptions. This is one of the reasons why the EU has proven to be a difficult case for Securitization Theory scholars. Whereas the EU successfully constructed Europe as a [valued] referent object that requires securing against various threats – both external and internal – , it did not always do so through securitizing speech acts that evoked existential threats. In other words, the discursive framework presented by the Copenhagen School does not fully overlap with the ways EU constructs, identifies, or manages security threats. On the one hand, within the EU’s institutional maze interactions between the pieces of the tripart structure are occasionally manifested in the form of practices (Léonard 2010) along with discourses. This is one of the contributions of the so-called Paris School of critical security studies, which focuses on sociological methods to demonstrate the “field effect” of security practioners in order to highlight securitization processes (Bigo 2002, Bigo *et al.* 2010, Bonditti 2004, Ceyhan 2008, Salter 2012). Rather than solely looking at legitimate securitizing discourses, this group of scholars also focuses on the relationalities of actors and their practices to identify a “field.” On the other hand, security practices in the EU often occur in the form of discursive moves that refer to “risk factors” rather than “existential threats” (Corry 2012, Neal 2009). Risk in this context does not necessitate exceptional measures, rather it is something that is factored into the technologies of government; they are manageable, rather than existential, threats. While the discursive construction of issues into risk factors, or the riskification process (Corry 2012), results in the disassociation of issues with existential threats, they maintain an element of “security-ness.” Unlike existential threats, risks can be managed. Whereas this is not what Wæver (1998) had in mind when he formulated the concept of asecuritization, riskification can be

seen as a form of de-securitization. Asecuritization as a concept is an interesting one that requires further mentioning. While Wæver introduced the concept in 1998, he has not revisited it since. The concept does relate to the technicalization of issues which is often associated with the (neo)functionalist theories of European integration (Haas 1958; 1961, Rosamond 2000). Wæver's provocation presents an interesting analytical challenge to those studying security politics in Europe: how do we know when an issue is "really" a security issue? In Europe, security has been evoked in instances where there have been no existential implications. Issues such as the environment, mobility, or transportation do not pose "existential" threats to the EU MS, yet they nevertheless have security implications. What we have seen with European integration since the 1990s is not asecuritization but rather "insecuritization." In other words, for the most part the EU is neither desecuritizing issues, nor associating them with existential threats. Instead, the EU is presenting issues as insecurity concerns that can be managed through certain technologies of government. This is, in many ways, not surprising given that the EU is a rational actor that is trying to justify its existence to the broader European publics. These attempts are a part of the institutional struggles within the EU between various levels of governments, agencies, and bureaucracies. To that end, constructing insecurity as a manageable, yet ever-present, threat is more logical than approaching security as a temporal/spatial exception or a state of non-war, as it provides a long-term *raison d'être* for the Union's institutions.

Rather than looking at security through the spectrum of norm/exception, the argument presented in this dissertation is informed by the distinction made by Foucault (2007) in *Security, Territory, Population* between "centripetal" and "centrifugal" *dispositifs* of security. According to Foucault,

[d]iscipline is essentially centripetal. [It] functions to the extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a segment [...] It isolates, it concentrates, it encloses, it is protectionist, and it focuses essentially on action on the market or on the space of the market and what surrounds it. In contrast, you can see that the apparatuses of security, as I have tried to reconstruct them, have the constant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal. New elements are constantly being integrated: production, psychology, behavior, the ways of doing things of producers, buyers, consumers, importers, and exporters, and the world market. Security therefore involves organizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.

(Foucault 2007, 67)

The distinction between the two is important. In contemporary practices of insecurity communities we no longer see an effort to “isolate, concentrate, or enclose” an issue, space, or territory. In other words, security manifests itself in ways that are more than just norm/exception relations. Threat-language is only one of these technologies of government. Looking at the ways through which the EU addresses insecurity concerns, what we see is an effort to govern or manage insecurity through “the development of ever-wider circuits.” This is why the EU is actively involved in its borderlands through socialization practices such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This is also the source of the central tension that constitutes the internal-external insecurity continuum that Bigo and Huysmans talk about when focusing on the significance of the governance of unease in relation to mobility security (Bigo 2001; 2002, Huysmans 2000; 2006). The EU as an insecurity community is also like a “centrifuge,” in that the constant productive field of insecurity management perpetually evolves to react to the changing insecurity landscape in Europe, and beyond.

According to Lentzos and Rose (2009), this distinction

describes the form of governmental reason that underpinned actually existing liberalism across the nineteenth century and as it developed into the social government of the twentieth century, which had “social security” as its central element. Indeed social government is essentially government of a certain type of “social” insecurity – accident, illness, old age, unemployment – in the name of “social” security, and as the underpinnings of a certain kind of freedom embodied in social citizenship. As Francois Ewald has argued, these insurantal logics are based on the presupposition that risk is calculable according to a logic of probability, that it is collectivized across a social space and that it is compensatable in the form of capital (Ewald, 1991).

(Lentzos and Rose 2009, 233)

This last point on the “insurantal logics of security” is exactly the point I am trying to make with the concept of insecurity communities. Rather than looking at security as a state of non-war or as an exception, I use the term insecurity to describe a prominent logic in the EU – the government of insecurity. Insecurity represents a constant productive field of management that aims to identify and govern risks and uncertainties associated with the contemporary threat landscape by collectivizing their effects. Insecurity communities are about the collective management of these threats, while addressing insecurities as manageable risk factors, and reducing the transaction costs of insecurity governance by sharing the duties and responsibilities involved in the process.

Empirically, this project focuses on understanding how insecurity communities govern insecurities associated with mobility of goods and persons. It focuses on the EU as an example of a successful insecurity community. The EU has not only maintained a state of non-war among its member states (MS) since 1957¹ by preventing war through political integration but also developed common institutions, policies, and practices that govern

¹ The founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957.

collectively defined insecurities. We can trace the origins of the EU to the Paris Treaty, signed in 1951, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC oversaw the pooling of Franco-German coal and steel production industries, which at the time were an indicator for militarization. Subsequently, the two Treaties of Rome founded the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The past seven decades of European integration have led to a flourishing community that became known as the EU following the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and, in 2009, following the Lisbon Treaty, established a constitutional basis for its institutions. European integration has successfully steered its members away from the prospect of war among themselves. The EU, over the course of the past five decades, has also developed a significant number of agencies, bureaucracies, and other institutions designed to focus on the pressing challenges of governing insecurities.

In particular, this dissertation takes as its main case study the EU's mobility and transportation security practices under the ENP. The ENP is an external policy framework developed, in 2004, after the sixth round of enlargement to address the pressing challenges of acquiring a new external border to the East and the subsequent economic, political, and security challenges. The ENP was originally revealed in 2003 as the Commission's post-enlargement foreign policy tool (European Commission 2003b; 2004b) and complements the existing frameworks of reference for the EU's "external" relations with its immediate neighbours to the South and East by providing specialized economic and technical assistance in return for policy harmonization and political cooperation.

Alongside the 10 new member states, as a result of the 2004 enlargement, the EU also acquired a new Eastern border with a number of relatively unstable and undemocratic

countries such as Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (Dimitrova 2008, Kostadinova 2009, Smith 2005). The socio-economic status of these states made questions of mobility and border interactions a particular source of insecurity for the EU institutions and MS. The empirical focus of the dissertation on the mobility security components of the ENP that focus on the insecurities stemming from the circulation of goods and persons – cargo and immigrants – provides a way to understand how the EU institutions address the management of external insecurities. Rather than approaching these issues as existential threats, the EU has developed a number of insecurity governance technologies and under the ENP framework to identify, monitor, and govern insecurities associated with having a new borderline to the East.

What we see under the ENP is the emergence of an external policy that attempts to “externally govern internal security” (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009). This approach is in line with the prescriptions of the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003) that identified the neighbourhood countries as a possible source of insecurity if left unaddressed due to apparent socio-economic disparities and poor governance structures plagued by corruption. The document suggested that the EU was required to take an active role in creating a well-governed and stable “ring of friends” surrounding the Union (European Commission 2003b, European Council 2003). The ENP reflects this language almost verbatim and should be seen as an attempt to develop means to address insecurities associated with this new boundary. The ENP is, thus, an insecurity governance technology that attempts to develop tools of association with the neighboring countries – without offering the prospect of membership – in order to ever-widen the EU’s insecurity governance “circuits.”

Methodologically, this approach focuses on the emerging bureaucratic and elite technologies of insecurity governance between the EU and the “European neighbourhood” countries. In particular, the dissertation studies the role of these technologies in helping to shape efforts to implement e-Passports and intermodal containers as EU-standards in the ENP countries. These four technologies of insecurity governance are: discursive, institutional, material, and territorial. Before I go any further on discussing the project, I would like to briefly expand on what is meant by the concept of “technology” and unpack the four types of technologies that are reflect on in this dissertation.

Foucault defines technology as “a matrix of practical reason” (Foucault 1988, 18). More specifically, by the concept of technology he refers to “certain modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring certain skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes” (Foucault 1988, 18). This definition is in many ways similar to the definition of practice as presented by Adler and Pouliot (2011a) who define the concept as:

competent performances. More precisely [...] socially meaningful patterns of action which in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world. Practices [...] are not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structure.

(Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 6)

This definition of practice is relevant for this project given both authors’ significance for the revised version of security community theory (Adler 1997; 2008; 2009, Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998, Adler and Greve 2009, Adler and Pouliot 2009a; 2009b, Pouliot 2006;

2007; 2008; 2010a; 2010b). In particular, Adler's work on "communities of practice" (Adler 2008) that studies the role of "like minded groups of practioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice" in relation to the post-Cold War expansion and transformation of NATO provided an inspiration for looking at the role of the EU institutions and bureaucracies. Similarly, Pouliot's work on the "logic of practice" that looks at practices as a "result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear 'self-evident' or commonsensical," (Pouliot 2008, 295) and on the "material of practice" that shows how the traditional descriptions of materials as "material objects, social facts, and organizational features fail to capture their ontological continuity at the level of practice," (Pouliot 2010, 295) have informed the argument on "technologies of insecurity governance" presented in this dissertation presented in this dissertation in a way that made the mental connection for me between practices and materialities, which constitutes an important part of the argument presented in Chapter 5, 6, and 7.

In this dissertation, by European insecurity governance technologies, I am not only referring to a set of common attitudes that inform shared understandings of insecurity among the EU MS. I am also referring to the collectively developed "EUropean" discourses, infrastructures, institutions, standards, and territorialities that are regularly deployed as part of the said technologies in an attempt to "secure" Europe. Within the mobility and transportation security practices under the ENP, these technologies are manifested in the form of the acquisition of certain skills and attitudes, and development of certain object with "security capital," such as the e-Passport and the intermodal shipping container. These "EUropean" technologies inform and shape the Union's internal and

external practices. The EU as an insecurity community is built on such technologies that contribute to the drafting of collective meanings of insecurity.

What I refer to as the discursive technologies of insecurity governance follow closely the theoretical arguments on the construction of threats. Originally developed by scholars working on Securitization Theory (Buzan *et al.* 1998), the *securitization* approach broadly refers to the discursive practices and/or processes through which issues become related to security. As per the discussion above, however, this project does not necessarily look at securitization or riskification *per se*, but rather the argument presented in later chapters focuses on threat construction in general. For that, securitization provides a discursive model, or a methodological approach, to study threat construction practices. In other words, this dissertation seeks to understand how the EU as an insecurity community constructs its collective insecurity discourses and how those discourses, in return, inform policy practices. Starting with chapter 3, I look at the construction of the mobility of goods and persons in and out of the EU territories as insecurity threats. I develop the rest of my argument based on this widely agreed-upon understanding that the mobility of goods and persons is related to insecurity in the EU (Bigo 2002; 2009, Bigo and Guild 2005, Guild 2005, Huysmans 2000; 2006, Léonard 2010, Pellerin 2005, Vaughan-Williams 2008; 2010).

These discursive technologies, in return, are negotiated and acted upon within the existing institutional frameworks of the EU – spread across supranational and national authorities. In other words, the limits of the institutional technologies of insecurity governance in the EU determine the structure of policymaking. At the EU level, institutions such as the European Commission (Commission), the European Council (Council), and the

European Parliament (EP), and various sectoral Directorates General (DGs) and specialized agencies take part in the decision-making processes along with national authorities and governments. Actors within these institutional arrangements develop, negotiate, implement, and promote integration through long-term “**policywork**” frameworks such as the ENP. With this concept of “policywork,” which is reflected on further in chapter 4, I am referring to a set of policy practices such as convergence through policy harmonization, (de)regulation, coordination, and practices of socialization that foster “Europeanization.” As a process that drives the collectivization of interests and strategies for governing insecurities, policywork constitutes an important part of the institutional technologies of insecurity governance in the EU.

The EU, as a European integration project, is built on territorial technologies of insecurity governance, which are constantly in flux. Inside/outside dynamics that (re)negotiate the boundaries of Europe also help shape various meanings of insecurity by “locating” their sources on the map, while identifying what needs to be secured. This practice of locating insecurities takes place in relation to the spatial definitions of Europe, as a referent object. As territorially defined international organizations, insecurity communities such as the EU require “**borderwork**,” (Rumford 2006; 2008, Vaughan-Williams 2008) or the (territorial and/or social) construction of borders, boundaries, and limits (Walker 2008). Policy frameworks, such as the ENP, target neighbouring countries in an attempt to externally govern the internal security of the EU (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009). The ENP as a borderwork project has two contradictory consequences in terms of its territorial implications. On the one hand, as Guild (2005) argues, “[i]n both law and practice the border for the movement of persons to and within Europe is no longer

consistent with the edges of the physical territory of the member-states” (1). In other words, recent trends of extra-territorialization of border controls under the EU’s mobility security practices blur the inside/outside distinction by pushing certain practices that have traditionally been considered to be internal, outwards. On the other hand, the ENP as an “external” policy framework solidifies the external borders of the Union by clearly stating that the neighbours will not be granted access to the EU institutions (Dimitrovova 2008, Kostadinova 2009). These conflicting outcomes, however, are indicative of a structural tension.

Territorial technologies developed on the principles of inside and outside are failing the EU institutions in finding a solution to the blurring boundaries between the traditional understandings of internal stability and external unpredictability; these understandings are no longer proving useful for effective policymaking in post-Cold War politics in Europe. The insecurity continuum (Bigo 2001) is undermining territorial technologies of security governance, which were previously considered to be effective. In other words, the EU authorities are struggling to find new technologies for governing the insecurity continuum.

In an attempt to address this issue, European policymakers are increasingly relying on “smart” objects of border security. These objects are developed based on international standards, or “secure formats,” and are endorsed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), border security experts, and technology developers. The proliferation of these “smart” objects, which incorporate biometric data, radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips, GPS locators, and other capabilities, is considered to alleviate some of the insecurity externalities that derive from the failure of territorial technologies of insecurity governance.

The digitalization, or virtualization, of border controls and related risk-assessment processes, along with the emergence of smart objects – such as the e-Passport and the intermodal container – with a certain kind of “**security capital**” based on conformity to ISO standards contribute to the emergence of material technologies of security governance. With this concept of “security capital,” I am referring to the perceived security credentials of an object. These credentials require a reasonable level of trust on an object’s safety and security. Building on this understanding of material technologies of insecurity governance and “security capital of objects,” in chapters 5, 6, and 7 I look at the reconfiguration of border controls and customs management practices in the EU around the e-Passport and the intermodal-shipping container. The analytical approach that focuses on technologies of insecurity governance allows me to focus on both the practices and materials of border security. Through my focus on e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers, I try to understand the role these secure formats play in governing insecurities associated with the movement of goods and services. In the following chapters of the dissertation, I unpack these important questions and arguments regarding insecurity communities in detail.

Outline of the dissertation

Chapter 2 reflects on important issues regarding case selection, methods, research process, and research design. It presents the evolution of this project, discusses the data collection process, the identification of sources of data, and expands on the strand of (critical) discourse analysis that is central to the argument presented in this dissertation.

Chapter 3 begins to unpack the main theoretical premise of this dissertation on insecurity communities. It provides a review of the existing literature on security communities and develops main arguments on insecurity communities. The chapter presents a grounded critique of the security community theory. This critical review functions as the basis of the argument on insecurity communities. Further developing the discussion from the beginning of this chapter, chapter 3 creates a dialogue between the security communities and critical security studies literatures in order to demonstrate the added value of the insecurity communities approach to studying contemporary security policies of the EU. In particular, the objective of the chapter is to incorporate five key findings from the past two decades of reflections on insecurity studies into discussions on security communities, thus placing the emphasis of the argument on the meaning of security as a practice of governing insecurity.

Building on these theoretical discussions, chapter 4 discusses the significance of the ENP as a technology of insecurity governance of the EU. In particular, it reflects on the grand narrative of the ENP as captured by three words: European, Neighbourhood, and Policy. The chapter suggests that these three keywords define the parameters, objectives, and core practices of the ENP. The chapter is structured around three questions: What kind of Europe is projected to the neighbours under the ENP? What kind of neighbourhood is produced by the ENP? And finally, what kind of policy is conducted under the ENP? Especially of importance, this chapter further develops “policywork” as a key concept, and demonstrates its uses in the external relations of the EU under the ENP. The chapter argues that the ENP is a product of (supra)national negotiations and compromises between various EU institutions.

Chapter 5 reflects on the institutional technologies of insecurity governance and presents an overview of the institutional landscape that shapes mobility and transportation security practices in the European neighbourhood, while focusing on the mobility and transportation security practices under the ENP, as the main sector of interest in this dissertation, and mapping out the institutional relationalities that shape the bureaucratic-elite field(s) of practice. To that end, the chapter provides a detailed description of the role of various institutions and policies, spread across three levels of government, that shape the internal and external aspects of the EU's mobility and transportation security policies.

Whereas chapters 3, 4, and 5 expand on the theoretical and empirical foundations of the core argument on insecurity communities, chapters 6 and 7 provide two empirical case studies that not only reflect on discursive, institutional, and territorial technologies of (in)security governance, but also provide examples for the material technologies of (in)security governance.

Chapter 6 provides a reflexive study of the EU-level elite and bureaucratic processes that led to the implementation of the e-Passport as a trustworthy standard, or an object with “security capital” in the EU under the ENP. The chapter is driven by the question of why the e-Passport in particular was adopted over other formats. To answer this question, we need to look at the role of (in)security governance technologies. The e-Passport, as an object with biometric data storage capabilities and certain “electronic” specifications, was chosen over other travel identification document formats because it was designed to address insecurities that are collectively constructed by EU institutions and are acted upon via the discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance. The chapter is structured around these four technologies of (in)security governance and it

reflects on how these technologies contributed to the emergence of the e-Passport as an EU-standard for human mobility and how they are promoted under the ENP framework.

Similarly, Chapter 7 focuses on the EU-level elite and bureaucratic processes that led to the adoption of intermodal shipping containers as a trustworthy standard for cargo security in the EU under the ENP. It looks at why the EU authorities are promoting intermodal shipping container over other standardized objects for cargo transportation in the European neighbourhood. The intermodal shipping container, as a standardized object with structural integrity and appropriate safety and security measures, not only makes international trade more efficient but it also makes cargo transportation more “secure.” This chapter follows the same template as the previous one. It provides a systematic treatment of the adaptation of intermodal-shipping containers as an EU standard in relation to the four technologies of insecurity governance. It focuses on the impact these technologies had on shaping the processes that led to the adoption of the intermodal shipping container as an object with a security capital.

Finally, the dissertation concludes in chapter 8 by reemphasizing the take-home points of the project. These points reflect on my thesis: security communities are in fact insecurity communities. Establishing a security community requires a great deal of policywork. Chapters 2-6 demonstrate that insecurity communities require *securitization*, *policywork*, *borderwork*, and increasingly, “*smart*” *objects with security capital*. In particular, these chapters argue that securitization moves help collectively define insecurities at the EU level. These insecurities are addressed through institutional channels that, in return, require policywork. Institutions have territorial footprints; membership is based on inclusion/exclusion dynamics, which in return are based on inside/outside. This

requires borderwork. Territorial technologies of insecurity governance are increasingly incapable of addressing the insecurities of the post-Cold War landscape in Europe and policymakers are relying on a number of smart objects with security capital.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION, AND METHODS

This chapter reflects on the ways through which I pursued the information presented in this dissertation,¹ discussing three issues in particular: research design, data collection, and data analysis. By doing so, I seek to address a set of questions: 1) What kind of data is targeted, and why? 2) How did I go about finding the data? 3) How was the data sorted? What kinds of analytical tasks did I perform to make sense of the data? 4) What were some of the challenges along the way and how did they modify the methodological approach?

Research Design

The European Union (EU) institutions represent the current configuration of the European integration project. As a supranational organization with established institutions, collective decision-making processes, shared interests, values, and meanings, the EU is an example of a successful security community, as defined by Adler and Barnett (1998, 31). While the EU today has competence over a wide range of issues that include monetary policy, trade, energy, and transportation, to list a few, the origins of the Union rest with concerns over security and stability among major powers in Western Europe.

¹ This chapter is mostly written in first-person. This is a conscious stylistic decision. My preference is informed by approaches that promote the importance of autoethnography, or the “I in IR” approach to the International Relations scholarship (Inayatullah 2011, Löwenheim 2010). In particular, I strongly believe in the impact of personal experiences and histories – in sum our own identities – have on our methodological preferences. Mark Salter and I have championed this approach by promoting an honest and frank discussion of research design and methods in our edited volume (Salter and Mutlu 2012). Building on that momentum, I hope to pursue this principle in my future research including this dissertation.

I focus on technologies of insecurity governance that are an integral part of the constant productive field of management that aims to identify and govern risks and unease associated with the contemporary threat landscape under the ENP. To substantiate my claim that security communities are insecurity communities, I focus primarily on the role of EU institutions – a combination of EU bureaucracies and policy elite – in: a) coordinating efforts to harmonize various “meanings” of insecurity, b) drafting discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance.

In particular, I study the ENP to ground my thesis on the EU being an insecurity community. The ENP covers a wide range of sectors, as defined by country-specific ENP Action Plans. These Action Plans are negotiated between the European Commission and the ENP countries. The prominent logic behind the ENP, which was clearly laid out by the Solana-Patten joint letter (Solana and Patten 2002) and subsequent Thessaloniki Council Conclusions (European Council 2002), addressed the main security concerns of the EU policymakers leading up to the 2004 enlargement: different forms of instabilities, stemming from economic and political problems in the neighbouring countries, spilling into the EU.

The argument regarding the insecurity logics of the ENP is based on my previous research on the EU’s role in improving relations between Georgia and Turkey (Mutlu 2011). During my research in 2007-2008, I started paying closer attention to the ENP as a viable alternative to the enlargement framework. The ENP promotes Europeanization, a form of European socialization, as a way for establishing stability and security in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.

Under the ENP framework, I focus on mobility security policies. I look at how these policies shape the EU’s external border controls; I focus primarily on the Council and

Commission decisions and policy-initiatives between 2004-2012 that address human mobility and cargo security practices at the external borders of the EU. The EU's own security discourses, which construct external instability and uncertainty as an internal security risk (European Commission 2010b, European Council 2002; 2003; 2010, Solana and Patten 2002), inform my focus on these practices.

During the course of my research I narrowed down the object of my analysis even further. I identified the e-Passport and the intermodal shipping container as objects that are being promoted by the EU bureaucracies under the ENP. I arrived at these objects due to their *panacea*-like status among bureaucratic and elite driven-discourses on mobility security. In other words, documents that promote their implementation as EU-standards (European Commission 2004; 2007b; 2008a; 2010a; 2011c; 2012, European Council 2004a; 2005c; 2010, European Union Data Supervisor 2008, among others) address both of these objects as “smart” solutions, or remedies, to a two-fold problem: how to address concerns over security and demands for increased speed at the border simultaneously. Upon further reflection, I decided to study the process that led to the implementation of the e-Passport and the intermodal shipping container as EU standards.

Data collection

Upon establishing the parameters of my research during the design phase, I started the research process. This stage of my research lasted for approximately two years and was primarily archival in nature. In this section, I reflect on that period by addressing two

questions: What kind of data did I target during the research phase, and why? How did I go about finding the data?

In this dissertation, I focused primarily on EU policy documents. These documents allowed me to identify prominent discourses that shape insecurity governance technologies. The documents used include, but are not limited to: EU policies and law, communications, memoranda, minutes, and conclusions from various meetings, strategy and position papers, PowerPoint presentations, and the official opinions of EU agencies and institutions on various policies involved in mobility security practices. Drafted by the European Commission, its DGs, the European Council, the European Parliament, and specialized EU agencies such as FRONTEX, these documents provided an insight into the policymaking process. These documents allowed me to identify instances of securitization, understand the stakes of the negotiations, and map out the mobility security sector of the EU.

EU documents often refer or respond to various third-party documents. Some examples of these documents include: international agreements, national policies of non-EU MS, the Group of Eight (G8) resolutions, and internationally agreed upon “best practices” such as the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) identity document codes or ISO and International Container Bureau (BIC) standards for container security. In such instances when there were references to external documents, I tried to complement the information I was presenting with the original source references from these third-party documents. I did so in order to map out the evolution of discursive, institutional, and material technologies of insecurity governance.

In particular, with the empirical cases I present in Chapters 6 and 7 – the e-Passport and the intermodal container – I found that having some software coding skills helped me

understand the external documents regarding different information technology (IT) standards better. Coding skills and ability allowed me to understand how RFID technology works and how hackers that have successfully hacked the e-Passport. I supplemented that information with documents from product developers, NGOs, as well as international associations and organizations such as BIC and the ICAO. In particular, I found promotional documents such as brochures and advertisements from product developers to be extremely helpful in explaining the (social) significance of their products and both benefiting from and contributing to discourses of (in)security in the process.

In an attempt to understand the effects of EU-level policies at the external borders of the EU on the ENP countries, I looked for instructions, reports, and other procedural documents from national port authorities, border security agencies, and trade and citizenship ministries. Compared to the EU and private sector sources, these proved to be more difficult to access. A combination of security/clearance issues and citizenship/language barriers had direct consequences on the amount of access I had with the national departments and ministries. Most of the instructive/procedural documents on border security practices are unavailable to the general public. There are some documents, as well as software, available on the Internet that are either leaked or somehow misplaced by those with access.

One of my biggest regrets from this process was my inability to receive a Schengen visa from the Belgian consulate in Montreal in a timely manner, which meant that I was unable to conduct semi-structured interviews. In the fall of 2011, I was scheduled to have a month-long trip to Brussels, during which I had scheduled 15 interviews with EU bureaucrats from the Commission's DGs and the Council. I received two fellowships from

the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa and the Carleton University's European Studies programme, as well as institutional support from Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. These generous fellowships would have covered the financial and logistical aspects of this trip, but they were only available for a 60-day window during the Fall 2011. After being forced to cancel my trip due to issues with the visa, my contacts in Brussels either did not want to have a telephone-interview, or only responded with very brief answers during these interviews. Those that preferred to respond to my questions via email only repeated official lines and did so very briefly with no real option to follow up. I did not have a chance to conduct a semi-structured interview that could have snowballed into acquiring different contacts and/or related topics. Overall, the information I received from these correspondences and telephone-interviews was not helpful, so I decided against including them in the dissertation. This decision was informed by opportunities to talk to other scholars from Britain, France, and Netherlands that share similar research interests.² In light of our conversations about these "logistical" difficulties and the data I already accumulated, I was assured that unless I was making sociological claims about the internal dynamics of the Commission or Council, or about "everyday" aspects of bureaucratic and elite policy practices, I had all the necessary information I needed.

In this process, my primary source of information has been the EU's legislative archives. *EUR-Lex* is a thematically sorted, searchable online archive of all the EU legislative documents. Alongside the *EUR-Lex*, I have also benefited greatly from the EU archives in Canada, located at Carleton University. I supplemented the information I

² I want to thank Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, Jef Huysmans, Julien Jeandesboz, and Dagmar Soennecken for their encouragement and generous support.

acquired from the *EUR-lex* and the EU archives at Carleton University with the information I sourced from the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament websites, as well as from the FRONTEX, EUROPOL, and European External Action Service (EEAS) websites. The Commission's website on the ENP has been extremely helpful in finding core ENP documents. As a thematically and chronologically sorted resource, it was ideal for the kind of archival research I was pursuing. For mobility security related documents, I looked at the DG Home Affairs and DG Mobility and Transportation websites, as well as Council conclusions, minutes, and resolutions and Parliament reports. They have proven to be useful in providing more "behind-the-scenes" information regarding the nature of debates between various actors and stakes and compromises that shaped the negotiations.

In my approach to locating data, I used two techniques that allowed me to map out the fields involved in shaping mobility security policy in the EU. The first technique focused on identifying and locating documents through cross-references. I used this approach to find numerous EU documents that would not have been otherwise listed in the Commission's ENP website because they would have been considered to be unrelated. Once I found a reference to a related document, I located that document and looked for other references there. I did this until I exhausted all my sources. This approach allowed me to map out the field. The information presented in Chapter 5 is an outcome of this technique.

The second technique became clearer after I identified the two empirical cases presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Once I identified these two objects, I started mapping out the field that emerged around these objects. In other words, I looked for the institutional

relationalities that oversaw the implementation of these objects as EU-standards. I researched for any references to these objects in official documents, institutional archives, and public speeches by EU policy elite such as the Commissioners, national ministers, and other high-ranking officials. This allowed me to map out different actors involved in decision-making processes surrounding mobility security practices at the EU-level. Between these two mapping exercises I successfully identified fields involved in shaping mobility security policy in the EU and located all the information that is publicly available on mobility security practices under the ENP in general and e-Passports and intermodal-shipping containers in particular.

Data Analysis

During this two-year research process, I collected approximately 750 policy documents and read about an equal number of academic articles and books on EU mobility security practices and the ENP. These proved useful for mapping out the bureaucratic and elite “field” of mobility security policymaking in the EU. I sorted these documents both chronologically and thematically. Each document was tagged with the authors’ name, year, and the title of the document.

I used different thematic categories to sort these documents: European integration with subcategories on liberty, security and home affairs portfolios; institutions; border security with subcategories on human mobility and cargo transportation; external relations of the EU with subcategories on the ENP and enlargement files as well as ENP-East and ENP-South portfolios; as well as specific folders for the e-Passport and the intermodal-

shipping container related documents. Thematic sorting allowed me to be efficient when searching for developments in a specific sector. Along with thematic categorization, I sorted each (sub)category chronologically. This allowed me to trace the progression of discourses and identify silences and/or important interventions.

Relying primarily on discourse analysis, I treated the content that was available to me systematically to trace the progression of bureaucratic and elite practices that shape mobility security under the ENP. My goal in this kind of content-driven discourse analysis was to identify instances of continuity, change, and rupture in discourses. I further developed this approach to discourse analysis in a co-authored chapter with Mark Salter (Mutlu and Salter 2012), where we focused on these three “strategies” that are used to pursue discourse analysis. Continuity “identifies an organizing principle through which deviation from [an] organizing narrative can be understood” (Mutlu and Salter 2012, 114). In this dissertation, by focusing on continuities, I demonstrated the successful securitization of mobility in the EU. In particular, I was able to show how securitized technologies shape mobility security policies under the ENP. Focusing on change “attempts to plot the changes or transformations over time of discourses, to trace the new relations between signs, tropes or metaphorical schema” (Mutlu and Salter 2012, 114). In this case, focusing on changes allowed me trace introduction of new ideas or compromises in negotiations over the future direction of mobility security policies under the ENP. In particular, the introduction of e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers overlapped with such changes in discourse over insecurities. In other words, these objects were justified by re-defining insecurities and placing emphasis on the changing insecurity landscape and necessity of technological innovation. Studies that focus on ruptures study “silences, breaks, marginalized voices or

subjugated knowledges” Mutlu and Salter 2012, 114). In this dissertation, I do not pursue genealogical research. As such, I cannot claim to have a specific focus on silences, marginalized voices, or subjugated knowledges. However, whenever there were breaks or significant gaps in the official discourse, I did my best to explain the reason and provide references to documents that instigated those breaks.

Security professionals are inherently secretive. As such, rather than looking at the material-turn in IR and/or everyday uses of security objects, I am only focusing on the role of insecurity technologies in shaping mobility security in the European neighbourhood. I derive my information from bureaucratic and elite documents that constitute the official discourses of the EU. In my future research, I hope to pursue a more sociological approach and try to discuss how the bureaucratic and elite-driven technologies of insecurity governance play out in everyday practices at the external borders. But for now, this project shies away from those aspects of mobility security due to lack of empirical proof.

Conclusions

Each manuscript is a journey for both the researcher and the reader. As researchers, however, we are paranoid travellers; we like to cover our tracks. As part of our professional development, we are taught to present polished final products that suggest to the untrained eyes of the reader that we had a clearly defined itinerary from the first moment we started our journey; as this section tried to demonstrate this is never the case. Failure and challenges are part of the process – they are the rite of passage. Given personal investment in methods, clarity, and frankness (Salter and Mutlu 2012), however, I wanted to provide an

honest account of my own journey and be direct about the complicated itinerary of this journey. Starting with the next chapter, I present the findings of my travels.

CHAPTER 3

INSECURITY COMMUNITIES

Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the security community theory as a non-war community theory (Wæver 1998), while also unpacking the central arguments of this dissertation on insecurity communities and technologies of insecurity governance. The added value of this chapter is that it presents a clear and constructive definition of insecurity communities. The aim of this chapter is thus to develop insecurity as an analytical concept, one through which we can examine contemporary technologies of governance used in the management of threat landscapes.

The first section of the chapter provides a review of the meanings of insecurity by focusing on analytical, conceptual, and empirical debates surrounding the concepts of security and insecurity, and develops a working definition of insecurity in relation to security. Building on this conceptual definition of insecurity, the next section reviews the literature on security community theory in order to further develop some of the central arguments of this dissertation. The emphasis in this section is on developing the analytical and conceptual value of security community theory to demonstrate the added value of the insecurity concept. The final section of the chapter contextualizes the insecurity community theory and technologies of insecurity governance in relation to the EU's external mobility and transportation security policies under the ENP framework.

Security community theory has a dual intellectual appeal: conceptual, and empirical.

On the one hand it has traditionally interacted with International Relations theories of cooperation and security under the structural constraints of anarchy. A number of articulations of the theory (Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998, Deutsch 1954; 1968, Deutsch *et al.* 1957, Pouliot 2008; 2010a; 2010b, Williams and Neumann 2000) focused on the possibility of community by looking at empirical evidence of cooperation and integration.

Empirically, the security community concept has been used to analyze instances where states cooperate in the field of security despite the conditions of anarchy that shape the international. International organizations such as NATO (Adler 2008, Pouliot 2010a, Williams and Neumann 2000), the OSCE (Adler 1998), ASEAN (Acharya 1991; 1995, Garafano 2002) and the EU (Christou 2010, Christou *et al.* 2010, Krahman 2005) as supranational organizations have been used as examples both to both support and undermine the concept in the literature. In line with these contributions, empirically this article focuses on the EU. The EU represents an example of a community within which “there is real assurance that the members of the community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 5). The EU, as an integrated supranational polity, is a successful example of a non-war, or security, community (Wæver 1998).¹

Focusing on the contemporary security practices of the EU led me to observe a gap between the analytical and empirical appeal of security community theory. Even though the EU has successfully managed to create a state of non-war among its MS, EU institutions’

¹ Whereas one can identify similar “European” security communities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU as a comprehensive integration project stands out from these other organizations due to the scope and depth of integration among its MS.

continuous (and ever increasing) involvement in insecurity management practices would suggest that a sense of insecurity might have been built into the European integration project. This sense of insecurity is used by the EU bureaucracies and elites to actively (re)construct a certain kind of “Europe,” which not only gets re-negotiated regularly between various actors involved with various practices of European integration, but also requires further securing against an insecurity continuum that continually transforms.

This chapter (and by extension, this dissertation) argues that defining security as insecurity allows for a more representative analytical tool for scholars working towards conceptualizing the changing insecurity landscape in the EU and beyond. Furthermore, the analytical appeal of the technologies of insecurity governance concept complements the “practice-driven” research on security communities (Adler 2008, Adler and Pouliot 2011a; 2011b, Pouliot 2008; 2010a; 2010b) by helping understand the underlying logics of government that continuously transform the functions of EU bureaucracies and institutions. These institutions, as actors of insecurity governance, exist within productive fields of insecurity management that work towards identifying and governing threats and unease that may affect the EU. Before I unpack this argument further by grounding it in my case study on the ENP framework, the next section introduces debates surrounding the definition(s) of security while providing a working definition of insecurity.

Meanings of insecurity

In recent decades, both the conceptual and analytical meanings of security have transformed. The end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and other former

socialist states, and increased transnational terrorism de-stabilized the relative peace in the European continent. Academic debates on security communities, for the most part, failed to account for this deepening and widening of the insecurity landscape by opting to maintain their definition of security as a state of non-war.

The concept of security is central to International Relations theories. Whether its object of analysis is economic, environmental, human, societal, or national, the construction, distribution, and execution of security practices have been central to the historical construction of an “international.”² The international is full of assumptions and presuppositions that often go unacknowledged; security, along with anarchy, is an ontological condition, or central characteristic, essential to the co-production of an “international” where the national (or the inside), is assumed to be secure under the control of a sovereign, whereas the outside is considered to be a space of/for anarchy and insecurity (see: Walker 1993, Wendt 1992).

While anarchy, or the apparent lack of an overarching polity or governance structure, is considered to be one of the defining conditions of international relations (see: Bull 1977, Keohane 1986, Keohane and Nye 1977 [2011], Morgenthau 1948 [1985], Walker 1993, Walt 1987, Waltz 1954, Wendt 1992; 1999), insecurity, often in the form of state-centric warfare, is considered to be an expression of this condition; this results in balances of power, security dilemmas, or struggles for survival. Alternatively, variants of liberalism either refute this anarchic system altogether, or try to “govern” it along with its externalities through the creation of international institutions, norms, and regimes that bring a form of

² The security/anarchy binary is central to the domestic/international distinction in politics. For more on the “domestic analogy,” see: Bull 1977, Suganami 1989.

order to the structure. Security, in this case, commonly understood to be the absence of war among states, functions as a point of measurement to assess the successes of liberal institutionalism. The assumption here being that institutions, and in particular, certain practices of liberal institutions result in the creation of structures of interdependence (ranging from cooperation and interdependence to integration) that minimize the security costs of anarchy (Checkel 2001, Haas 1958, Keohane and Nye 1977 [2011], Mitrany 1975, Moravcsik 1993; 1998).

In the last two decades (critical) security studies scholars have engaged in a productive debate over the meanings of security in an attempt to deepen and widen the concept (see: Baldwin 1997, Balzacq 2010, Burke 2002, Booth 2005, Buzan *et al.* 1998, c.a.s.e Collective 2006, Chilton 1996, Krause and Williams 1997, Lipschutz 1995, Wyn Jones 1999). Conceptually, security can refer to a number of logics, practices, or processes. Walt (1991) used the concept to refer to freedom from threat and identified it with the security of the state. For Booth (2004), security concept is a claim to politics. For Krause and Williams (1997) security refers to a historically (and geographically) variable condition. For Campbell, it is performative of (national) identity (Campbell 1998). For Huysmans (1998), it is about weaving a particular social order. For the Copenhagen School, security refers to “the move that takes politics beyond the established rule of the game” (Buzan *et al.* 1998, 23); security, in that formulation, refers to existential threats. For the scholars researching security communities, security generally refers to a state of non-war, or peace (Wæver 1998). This definition of security is inspired by both the political events in Europe leading up to and following the Second World War, and – to a certain extent – by the Kant’s reflections on security as perpetual peace. The multiplicity of these definitions

even pushed one scholar to refer to the concept as an “*aporia*” (Burke 2002). Alternatively, in its colloquial uses, security may refer to a degree of resistance to, or a state of being that is free from, threats and dangers. In that usage, it is considered to be the norm, and is a condition of possibility for the functioning of our society. Similarly, the term may also refer to persons and institutions that provide the act of security by securing those that they are responsible for. Security, in many ways, represents a practice, and/or a technology of government.

Foucault (2007), while observing the significance of security to contemporary society, identifies two “dispositifs,” or mechanisms of security: centripetal and centrifugal (45). On the one hand, centripetal mechanisms of security represent a closed, or centralized system that focus on discipline. On the other hand, centrifugal mechanisms of security represent a dynamic system, within which “new elements are constantly being integrated [...] allowing the development of ever-wider circuits” (Foucault 2007, 45). Building on this distinction, Lentzos and Rose (2009) argue that contemporary rationalities of security

differ from discipline in a number of ways. First they do not operate in the closed space of institutions, but across the many planes of movement of persons, commodities, knowledge, communications within and between nations. Second, because of this plurality of planes and vectors, and the plurality of agencies and forces involved, strategies of security cannot be those of a single, all-seeing and all-controlling State: they must give a high priority to mechanisms of coordination, the linking together of very diverse agencies, involving the invention of novel ways of thinking, calculating, acting, and intervening. Third, the norms of security are no longer, as with discipline, fixed criteria for judging infractions of conduct, but neither are they the vicissitudes of natural phenomena [...] Fourth, strategies of security are not simply addressed to states of affairs but also to beliefs, affects, feelings [...]

(Lentzos and Rose 2009, 234)

These four points put forward by Letzos and Rose start to address the gap between the conceptual debates and the empirical realities that stem from the limited uses of the security concept within the security community theory. The traditional definition of security as a state of non-war used by security community theorists does not account for the productive characteristic of insecurity in the EU and beyond. Considering security to refer to maintaining a state of non-war does not account for the productive and ever-transforming nature of insecurity governance. To paraphrase Foucault, technologies of insecurity governance require the development of “ever-wider circuits” in the form of competent bureaucracies and fields of governance. The conceptualization of security as insecurity can account for the practical transformation of the insecurity landscape in Europe. This transition from security logic to insecurity logic can also help capture the productive nature of insecurity governance; a constant productive field of management that governs insecurities associated with threats.

Whereas one dictionary definition of insecurity refers to it as “the opposite of security,” I am not referring to an insecurity community within which a state of war or conflict is the norm or an imagined possibility. Rather, I am referring to a state where threats are constant, but remain (for the most part) managed through “technologies of insecurity governance.” In that sense, the definition of insecurity as a “condition of not being sure; want of assurances or confidence; (subjective) uncertainty” (Oxford English Dictionary) corresponds better with the kind of insecurity that is referred to by the insecurity community concept.

Governing threats within insecurity communities necessitates a trans-sectoral approach that is not solely about maintaining a state of non-war between members of a

community. Technologies of insecurity governance consist of multiple layers, including discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies. I introduce the significance of these technologies of insecurity governance in relation to the EU's neighbourhood policy below. Before I move forward to provide a review of the security community theory, and expand on the empirical aspects of my discussion of the EU as an insecurity community, the remainder of this section presents a critique of the traditional definitions of security commonly used in security communities by reflecting on five different meanings of insecurity.

Firstly, *prevalent logics of security are no longer solely about war and peace, whereas logics of insecurity are about governing threats and unease that not only include but also move beyond war and peace.* Beyond the transformations in the “art of war” (Der Derian 2003, Gray 1999, Van Creveld 1991), students of security studies pushed the discipline beyond its traditional focus on war in recent decades. This was justified by the collapse of the so-called bipolar world order. While Mearsheimer (1990) predicted that the end of the Cold War would increase instability and generate conflict among states, in fact the fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in numerous intra-state conflicts and increased insecurity originating from drugs and weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and transnational terrorism. In other words, the post-Cold War era did not bring us “back to the future” (Mearsheimer 1990), in the sense that the period has not been defined by traditional interstate war, but rather, saw the rise to prominence of other forms of insecurity. In the last two decades we have not only started to think (critically) about the concept of security (Baldwin 1997, Burke 2002, c.a.s.e Collective 2006, Chilton 1996, Krause and Williams 1997, Lipschutz 1995, Wyn Jones 1999), but we have also come to associate different

sectors of socio-political life such as the environment (Dalby 2002, Homer-Dixon 2001), economy (Cable 1995), and immigration (Huysmans 2000, 2006), among other sectors, with security.

Secondly, in the new insecurity landscape, *insecurity is no longer provided only for the state, by the state*. This “deepening” of insecurity meant that human (Paris 2001) and regional (Buzan and Waever 2003) insecurity all became legitimate levels for practices of insecurity operators/thinkers, opening room for discussions of emancipation (Booth 1991; 2005) and practices of foreign intervention in the name of a “Responsibility to Protect.” Similarly, this proliferation of actors also meant that sub-state-level actors, such as transnational terrorist organizations unified around a broad ideology (e.g. *Al-Qaeda*), or trans-national criminal organizations such as the Italian or Russian mafias, as well as weapons and human traffickers, play a central role in the so-called asymmetrical insecurity threats facing states.

Thirdly, *we can no longer differentiate absolutely between internal and external insecurity threats. Insecurity technologies are designed to address threats that stem from this insecurity continuum*. Bigo (2001) used the “*möbius ribbon*” analogy to describe the blurring boundaries between the traditional division of inside and outside in relation to the homogenization of police and military forces’ jurisdictions and mandates. This transformation of insecurity practices undermined the state monopoly on the use of violence. On the one hand, increased demand for security professionals resulted in increased supply through proliferation of private insecurity actors, creating a new source of security that was much less accountable and more costly (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, Berndtsson and Stern 2011, Leander 2005). On the other hand, increased globalization and

interconnectivity resulted in the transnationalisation of criminal and terrorist organizations. Terrorist attacks in the early 21st century demonstrated the critical vulnerabilities of Western countries to horrendous acts of terrorism by a small group of individuals driven by ideological beliefs. The so-called “asymmetrical warfare” doctrine widely adopted by insurgents in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Iraq has been a direct challenge to the military supremacy of superpowers such as the United States and Russia and has required a substantial rethinking of their military doctrines to include the policization of military practices. Similarly, the interconnectedness of transnational criminal organizations such as drug cartels, human trafficking rings, or arms dealers has resulted in, to varying degrees, the militarization of policing.

Fourthly, *states are not the only actors that shape insecurity discourses; insecurity discourses are shaped by a multitude of actors and practices*. Especially since 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOt), critical security studies scholars have extensively focused on securitization practices (Buzan 1983 [1991], Buzan *et al.* 1998, Balzacq 2005; 2008; 2011, c.a.s.e Collective 2006, McDonald 2008, Salter and Mutlu 2013, Stritzel 2007, Williams 2003). Securitization moves refer to the association of an issue with existential security, thus enabling a sense of urgency that takes the issue “beyond the established rules of the game” (Buzan *et al.* 1998, 23). Securitization theory, as articulated by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), established a three-part structure consisting of securitizing *actors*, *referent objects*, and the *audience* that is essential to each – successful – securitization move.

According to Buzan *et al.* “in the case of security, textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this

issue is more important than other issues and should take priority” (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). The original conditions for a successful securitization move were: reference to an existential threat to a referent object that is tied closely to the identity of the audience, a securitizing actor with legitimacy, and acceptance by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). The act of taking the issue “beyond the established rules of the game” (Buzan et al. 1998, 23) requires the successful alignment of a *holy trinity*: the securitizing agent, the referent objects, and the audience. While the centrality of this alignment remained unchallenged in the last two decades, a second generation of securitization theory scholars engaged with certain shortcomings of and within this tripartite structure (See: McDonald 2008). Through the works of these scholars, securitization theory has evolved to include images, and silences, alongside words, as different types of securitizing “moves” beyond the speech act (Williams 2003, Hansen 2000; 2011). It started to pay particular attention to contextualized and historicized discourses of the existential threat (Balzacq 2005, Barthwal-Datta 2009, Stritzel 2007, Vuori 2008, Wilkinson 2007) and created a distinction between successful and failed securitization moves by looking at different audience reactions (Salter 2008; 2010, Balzacq 2008, Léonard and Kaunert 2010).

Fifthly, *existential security threats are not the only kinds of threats that require states’ attention. Insecurity is about the management of unease.* As such, alongside securitization moves, we need to pay close attention to “riskification” (Corry 2012) as a *central practice of insecurity governance*. The concept of risk has gained widespread traction in the social sciences and humanities following Beck’s *Risk Society* (1992), which defined risk logic as a systemic way of dealing with uncertainties caused and introduced by modernization. The transformation of the post-Cold War security landscape in general, and

the post-9/11 GWoT in particular, has introduced the literature on risk to security studies (Amoore and de Goede 2008, Rasmussen 2006, Salter 2008). Beck (1992) argues that we live in a “risk society,” which refers to “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (21). A number of scholars have demonstrated the implication of the “risk logics” of security practitioners. Salter (2008) looked at the role of risk logic in aviation security, while de Goede (2012) focused on the EU-US “SWIFT affair” and the role of “risk-based and data-led (internal) security measures” (216) in the way EU officials addressed this issue. As Corry (2012) argues, “[i]ncreasingly, security practices are about prevention, probabilities, possible future scenarios and managing diffuse risks rather than about deterring foes or defending against identifiable and acute threats” (236). This argument is in line with the prevalent risk logics that are an integral part of the *habitus* of insecurity professionals. Furthermore, as Aradau and van Muenster argue, increasing incorporation of risk thinking into counter-terrorism measures has in turn resulted in the “double infinity of risk,” which led to the “emergence of a ‘new’ dispositif of risk, precautionary risk, which has been grafted upon the ‘old’ technologies of risk management.” (Aradau and van Muenster 2007, 101). The significance of risk logic for the insecurity community concept is that risk management strategies are not knee-jerk reactions such as exceptional measures following an event, but are rather long-term preventative or preparatory measures. Furthermore, while exceptionalism is by definition out of the ordinary, risk management tools are often presented as business-as-usual.

Insecurity, rather than security, is the prevalent logic that oversees the management of threats in Europe today. Insecurity technologies of the EU focus on governing a constant

productive field consisting of threats and unease. This definition of security as insecurity provides a solid grounding to account for the conceptual and practical developments in the field of insecurity. For the reasons listed above, we can no longer justify an exclusive focus on the traditional conceptualization of security in security community theory as a state of non-war. Before I go on to elaborate on the EU as an insecurity community, the next section provides a review of the security community theory literature to demonstrate what insecurity community theory can add to the existing debates in the literature.

Security Communities

Originally articulated by Deutsch *et al.* (1957), and further developed by Adler and Barnett (1996; 1998), security community theory refers to an analytical framework that theorizes peaceful relations among a community of states with shared interests that deem large scale violent conflict unlikely or even unimaginable. According to the theory, members of security communities settle their differences through diplomacy and the structures of liberal-institutionalism that contribute to the emergence of (complex) interdependence structures (Keohane and Nye 1977 [2011], 20-21). If successful, processes and structures of mature security communities improve relations among their members, and often contribute to establishing multiple channels of communication across multiple sectors, and even instances of altruism (Adler and Barnett 1998). According to the articulation of the theory by Deutsch *et al.* (1957), the concept applied to “a group integrated by a sense of community that have come to agreement on at least one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change” (5).

The concept distinguishes two kinds of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic (Deutsch *et al.* 1957). An “amalgamated” security community is formed through a “formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation” (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 6). Federations and confederations are examples of amalgamated security communities. Within an amalgamated security community decision-making structures formally merge and result in a single polity. Deutsch *et al.* particularly focused on the historical processes that led to the creation of the federal governance structures of the United States, Italy, and Germany to provide examples for amalgamated security communities.

Pluralistic security communities “retain legal independence of separate governments” (Deutsch *et al.* 1957, 6). While members of a pluralistic security community maintain their individual autonomy, they nevertheless choose to take part in an interdependent structure. International alliances such as NATO or the EU represent examples of successful pluralistic security communities. While EU MS maintain their national institutions and rights as sovereign entities, they agree to pool their resources and harmonize their policies under a supranational polity to improve the collective internal security of the Union.

Conceptual and theoretical developments that inform the discipline of IR are historically and geographically contextual; they are shaped by the empirical realities of the time in which they were written. To understand the context within which Deutsch *et al.* have developed their argument, we need to look at the political and economic developments that led to the Second World War in Europe and the disastrous consequences of the war. Deutsch *et al.* and their contemporaries (Haas 1958; 1961, Mitrany 1975, Waltz 1954), however, were not only reacting to the brewing Cold War between the Soviet Union and

the Western allies but also to the institutional developments in Western Europe that eventually came to be known as European integration project. If we were to situate Deutsch *et al.*'s theoretical contribution on a mental spectrum of post-WW2 international relations theories, they would form the liberal-intergovernmentalist middle ground in relation to functionalist idealism and realist pessimism. Whereas today we can study the European integration project from various angles, it is undeniable that the visionaries of the project originally had peace and war in mind, the conceptions of which had been very much shaped by the European conflicts in the early 20th century. The solutions they came up with also reflected these concerns. By pooling resources and establishing institutions to oversee the production of coal, steel, and nuclear elements, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman aspired to create an environment that could nurture post-WW2 peace in Western Europe. Today, we look back at the institutionalization process that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) as the origins of the EU.

While the EU is a successful example of a pluralistic security community, recent history has numerous examples of failed attempts to create similar regional security communities, such as the Baghdad and Manila pacts. Academic research on the subject often traces these failed attempts back to the question of anarchy and the possibility of international cooperation. At a theoretical level, critics of the concept question the possibility that a security "community" could exist in the first place by indexing its condition of possibility to the concept of anarchy. As a direct result of this, academic debate on the subject has been primarily occupied with the concept of "community" in relation to the anarchic nature of the international (Adler 1997; 2008, Adler and Barnett

1996; 1998, Deutsch 1954; 1968, Deutsch *et al* 1957). The focus of the debates surrounding the concept has been the possibility of community within an anarchic international structure.

Adler and Barnett (1996; 1998) revisited and revised the security community concept to reflect the changes to global politics and IR scholarship in the four decades since Deutsch's articulations. In their re-articulation of the concept, they included "shared interests, values, meanings" as well as "many-sided and direct relations [...] and a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism" (Adler and Barnett 1998, 31) as central characteristics of a security community. Most importantly, they incorporated aspects of social constructivism, such as the importance of interests, values, and meanings, to demonstrate their importance in shaping national preference. Building on the distinction between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, Adler and Barnett added a sub-category to the pluralistic security communities that distinguished nascent, ascendant, and mature pluralistic security communities. According to the authors,

[a] mature security community includes a mutual aid aspect and a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional centralized government that is something of a post-sovereign system with common supranational, transnational and national institutions, and some form of a collective security system.

(Adler and Barnett 1998, 36)

Similarly, they focused on the role of national interest in determining various patterns that lead to the emergence of security communities.³ Whereas in the original articulation of the concept, Deutsch *et al.* provide Canada and the United States as examples of a pluralistic security community within which over time war has become unlikely, recent (re)articulations of the concept (Adler 1997) have used to reflect on the EU (Deighton 2002, Kirchner 2006, Wagner 2003,), the OSCE (Adler 1998), and NATO (Adler 2008, Pouliot 2010a, Williams and Neumann 2000).

Another aspect worth mentioning of this renewed interest in the concept is the “practice-driven,” (Adler and Pouliot 2011a; 2011b) approaches that focus on the role of “practical logics of day-to-day diplomacy” (Pouliot 2010a, 1) or “socially meaningful patterns of action, which in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 6). These developments are important because they provide a methodologically sound alternative for constructivist scholars that seek to move beyond discourse analysis by developing “not only objectified, but also subjective knowledge about social and international life” (Pouliot 2007a, 359) that shapes practices of security communities.

Security community theory is conceptually significant for International Relations. Proponents of the theory consider the concept of community as an alternative to anarchy, or at least as an option for governing anarchy (Adler and Barnett 1996). In these discussions

³ For a general review of this renewed discussion in security community theory see: Adler 1997; 2008, Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998, Adler and Greaves 2009, Bøås 2000, Pouliot 2003; 2006; 2007; 2010, Pouliot and Lachmann 2004, Tuscisny 2007, Williams and Neumann 2000, among others.

the question of “security” is often reduced to a state of non-war. War, according to this approach, is seen as a systemic externality of an anarchic international order. Whereas the recent articulations on security community theory (Adler 1997; 2008, Adler and Barnett 1996; 1998, Adler and Greaves 2009) focus their attention on the social construction of collective identities and mutual interests through diplomatic practices (Pouliot 2006; 2007; 2010a), with the notable exception of Bøås (2000), this renewed interest in the concept has also failed to incorporate a broader definition of security in their analysis.

In relation to the empirical puzzle addressed in this dissertation, the mature pluralistic security community concept is applicable to the EU: the EU, as a comprehensive integration project that covers not only defense and security issues but also economic, social, and political cooperation, represents a successful example of a mature pluralistic security community. In light of the discussion of insecurity above, what we see with the EU is in fact a mature insecurity community. Building on the working definition of insecurity developed in the previous section and the review of security community theory presented in this section, the next section provides the empirical background necessary to establish the EU as an insecurity community.

Insecurity Communities and Technologies of Insecurity Governance: EU’s mobility and transportation practices under the ENP

The EU represents an insecurity community within which there are not only real assurances that violent conflict among its MS is unimaginable, but also agreements over both the meanings and sources of insecurity. The Union embodies a constant productive field of insecurity management that develops technologies to manage threats and unease. EU

institutions and bureaucracies facilitate such processes by providing the fora for negotiations and structures that enable many-sided and direct relations as well as reciprocity between the EU MS. Such ways of addressing insecurities generate technologies of insecurity governance. In this dissertation, I focus on four such technologies: discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance.

The debates in (critical) security studies discussed in the previous section have addressed practical developments surrounding discourses, governmentalities, practices, and technologies of insecurity. This section incorporates some of those findings into the EU's relations with its neighbours under the ENP framework. In particular, the chapter serves to contextualize the insecurity community and technologies of insecurity governance arguments in relation to the EU's external mobility and transportation security policies under the ENP framework.

The EU's decision-making practices are structured around three institutions: the European Commission that represents the EU-level bureaucracies, the European Council that represent Member States' (MS) interests, and the European Parliament that is directly elected and that, as such, represents the European public. The legal basis of these institutions is a series of treaties that correspond with the European integration process (which resulted in the EU).

In the case of the EU's external mobility and transportation security policy under the ENP we can identify the Council, in consultation with the Parliament and the Commission, as the securitizing agent that establishes discursive technologies of insecurity governance. In particular, both the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003) and the Stockholm Programme (European Council 2010) had direct securitizing effects on shaping

the Commission's mobility and transportation security policies under the ENP (see: European Commission 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2011b; 2012). Furthermore, these discursive and institutional technologies shaped material and territorial technologies of insecurity governance, such as the process leading up to the implementation of e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers under the ENP-related processes on visa and trade liberalization with the neighbouring countries.

The internal dynamics of the EU, as an insecurity community, are interesting on their own right. From an IR perspective, however, the EU's external relations with its neighbours present a unique window into studying the external practices of insecurity governance of a mature pluralistic security community. In particular, institutional and practical differences between the internal and external aspects of European integration present interesting findings regarding the bureaucratic and elite policymaking practices of security communities.

Five points raised in the previous section are all applicable to the contemporary insecurity landscape in Europe. The EU institutions, that collectively constitute an insecurity community, factor these different developments into their insecurity policy decisions: 1) The EU actively pursues insecurity practices that are no longer solely about waging war or forging peace. 2) The EU's insecurity practices are no longer provided only for the state, by the state. 3) The EU's insecurity practices factor in the realities of blurring boundaries between internal and external security threats. 4) In developing security practices, EU bureaucracies take insecurity discourses of non-state actors such as NGOs, international organizations, and citizen groups into consideration when drafting policy. 5)

The EU's insecurity policies internalize risk management as the central logic of insecurity governance.

Internally, the EU MS have an established set of institutional arrangements that include discourses, institutions, and technologies of insecurity governance used to manage the threat landscape in Europe. EU institutions, due to their role in creating, facilitating, and maintaining these relations, stand out as both drivers and outcomes of insecurity integration in Europe. Externally, however, the EU is struggling to establish a similar structure within which the EU institutions have significant governing powers. In particular, the EU is struggling to become a credible alternative to the US-led NATO and Russia as an influential global actor in its immediate neighbourhood. The enlargement framework was successful in socializing, or "Europeanizing," former Soviet countries in Central and Eastern Europe and bringing them into the European insecurity community. The ENP as a post-enlargement policy, however, is failing to have a comparable impact. The lack of compliance structures and the promise of EU membership under the ENP framework result in limited cooperation between the EU and ENP countries. Under the ENP, the EU is failing to create an external "synergy" comparable to that of the enlargement framework that develops common interests, values, or meanings for what counts as insecurity with the neighbours. The EU, nevertheless, remains attractive to the neighbours due to its common market, purchasing power – regardless of the current economic crisis – and its global reputation as a "soft-power." In return, Brussels' attempt to develop common interests, values, and collective definitions of insecurity with the "neighbours" is important to the EU's continuing efforts to maintain internal security and stability as an insecurity community.

Building on the points raised in this chapter, the remainder of this dissertation focuses on the external dimensions of the EU's mobility and transportation policies under the ENP framework. Mobility and transportation security policies under the ENP represent instances of EU-level insecurity policymaking where the focus is not on preventing war among the members of a security community but on actively managing a constant productive field of insecurities. Studying these policies provides opportunities to discuss practical implications that the switch from security logic to insecurity logic had for policymaking practices in the EU. To provide an example, e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers have very little to do with traditional definitions of security, yet mobility and transportation insecurity management policies developed around these objects have significant insecurity implications for the EU.

The argument presented in the rest of the dissertation is structured around discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance. I expanded on this concept of technology in the introduction, but will develop it further here. In the Foucauldian sense of the word, technology refers to "certain modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes" (Foucault 1988, 18). In the case of the EU's management of insecurity, these technologies contribute to the development of certain *habitus* and *doxa* among the members of the "field" of insecurity professionals in the EU. On the one hand, insecurity governance technologies, in the sense that they are used here, contribute to the emergence of "socially meaningful patterns of action" (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 6). On the other hand, technologies are different from practices. They are "the techniques and procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct of others"

(Foucault 2008, 4). They represent the mechanisms through which the insecurity professionals practice a dispersed, or networked, power that includes discursive, practical, and material technologies.

Technologies of insecurity governance are central to the constant productive fields of insecurity management in the EU. Each one of the discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies contribute to insecurity governance in the EU by identifying, assessing, and managing the insecurities that threaten Europe. In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide a brief introduction to these technologies and expand on how they relate to the empirical cases presented in this dissertation. Focusing on these technologies allows me to pursue a systematic treatment of the EU's mobility and transportation security policies under the ENP framework. This brief discussion serves as an introduction to the more in-depth reflections presented in the chapters to come.

Discursive technologies of mobility and transportation insecurity governance refer to the discursive practices and processes through which the mobility and transportation policies of the EU are constructed as threats. The association of the trans-border movement of goods and persons in the EU with insecurity has been described elsewhere (Balzacq 2008, Bigo 2009, Bigo and Guild 2005, Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, Guild 2005, Huysmans 2000; 2006, Lavenex and Ucarer 2004, Neal 2009, Vaughan-Williams 2008; 2010, Walter 2004; 2006). I will not revisit that debate here. It is, however, important to note that while members of this community do agree on the fact that mobility insecurity practices are built upon an ontology of exclusion (Mountz 2011) that intend to keep flows of persons and things outside a given territory, there is a debate about the nature of this association of mobility with insecurity. The debate here is whether these exclusionary practices are based

on securitization moves or riskification moves. Here, I agree with Neal (2009) who suggests that the EU's practices in border security resemble risk management more closely than exceptional measures associated with successful securitization moves. While "riskification" (Corry 2012) is representative of the EU's border security approach, we must also keep in mind that the EU's border insecurity practices have what Aradau and van Muenster (2007) call "pre-cautionary" principle that attempts to address the "double-infinity" of the contemporary risk climate.

Instead of focusing more on this debate, I will discuss the discursive technologies used by the EU bureaucracies to associate mobility and transportation policies with security under the ENP framework. Mobility and transportation policies promoted under the ENP represent the association of these sectors with insecurity. In particular, key Commission (2005a; 2008b; 2008c; 2011b; 2011c) and Council (2003a; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) policy initiatives all refer to two important EU documents: the Council Framework decision on Combatting Terrorism (European Council 2002), and the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003). Furthermore, when discussing mobility and transportation in relation to the external borders of the EU, key ENP documents associate these sectors with security (European Commission 2003b; 2004a; 2004b; 2005a). These documents, which serve as the basis for the EU's official discourses, also underline the importance of the external dimension of the mobility and transportation insecurity for the Union's internal stability.

Under the ENP, the Commission's official policy discourses successfully associate mobility and transportation with security (European Commission 2003a; 2006; 2007d; 2007e; 2008a; 2008c; 2010a; 2012a; 2012b). The successful securitization of mobility and

transportation policies has resulted in the prioritization of these policy areas under the ENP Action Plans. In the case of mobility and transportation insecurity, the EU institutions created a number of agencies: the European Union's Justice Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST), the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), and agreements such as the Schengen Treaty, as well as databases and networked infrastructures such as the Schengen Information Systems I and II and the European Dactyloscopy database (EURODAC), whose main purpose is to manage the threat landscape in the EU by governing insecurities associated with the external flows that enter the EU. These agencies play an important role in overseeing the collectivization of national interests and strategies for governing insecurities at the supranational level. Their significant role in policywork practices constitutes an important part of the institutional technologies of the EU. I discuss this concept of policywork in more detail in the next chapter.

Mobility and transportation security have territorial significance for EU policymakers. As sectors that address trans-border flows, governing mobility and transportation sectors requires international cooperation. Such cooperation, in return, requires willing partners on the other side of the border. Discursive and institutional technologies of mobility insecurity governance regularly underline the importance of the territorial dimensions of insecurity governance. Locating various forms of insecurities takes place in relation to the territorial manifestations of Europe. Within these spatial discussions, the role of borders and the significance of inside/outside dynamics require particular attention. The ENP addresses two issues. First, it functions as a common foreign policy for

the EU MS and addresses their collectivized insecurity concerns. Second, the ENP tries to develop certain incentives to reward cooperation and compliance. In other words, the ENP presents incentives for neighbours to cooperate in the field of insecurity.

The territorial complexities of mobility and transportation security policies require EU institutions to pay particular attention to the blurring boundaries between internal and external insecurity threats. The ENP is an outcome of a risk logic that tries to mitigate risks associated with insecurity flows crossing EU's external borders. Territorial technologies of insecurity governance require "borderwork." Borderwork refers to the (social) construction of borders and the role of policymaking in these processes (Rumford 2006). The ENP, as an external governance framework (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009), represents an attempt by EU institutions to govern the insecurities associated with the blurring of territorial boundaries through borderwork initiatives. Territorial technologies of insecurity governance developed on the principles of inside and outside are failing to find a stable long-term solution to an unpredictable insecurity landscape in post-Cold War Europe. The insecurity continuum increasingly requires EU institutions to rely on material technologies of insecurity governance.

EU policymakers are relying more on smart technologies of border security (European Commission 2004d; 2008a; 2008c; 2011c, European Council 2004a) to address the shortcoming of the institutional and territorial technologies of insecurity governance. These smart objects are built in accordance with international standards (ICAO 2005; 2006a; 2006b, IMO 1972; 2011, ISO 2007); experts, policymakers, and border security practitioners endorse them. They come equipped with state-of-the-art technological specifications – RFID chips, and GPS transmitters, among others – that facilitate secondary

security checks through databases. These smart objects have “security capital” as a result of their assumed level of safety and security.

Focusing on these four technologies of insecurity governance allows for a comprehensive analysis of the EU as an insecurity community. Conceptually, insecurity provides a way to incorporate a wider and deeper understanding of security that corresponds with the empirical realities that face contemporary security communities. Empirically, insecurity provides a way to conceptualize the security practices of the EU in its neighbourhood.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to achieve three tasks: a) providing a review of the security community literature and introducing a broader understanding of security as insecurity to improve the analytical, conceptual, and empirical purchase of the security community theory; b) unpacking the main theoretical argument presented in this dissertation on the EU as an insecurity community; and c) establishing the connections between the theoretical framework and the empirical case presented in the later chapters of this dissertation.

Security community theory provides a useful framework to understand international security cooperation. In particular, it provides a way to understand the European integration project as an effort to prevent similar atrocities to those seen in first half of the 20th century. As demonstrated in this chapter, the literature can benefit from a broader definition of security as insecurity. Emphasis on debates surrounding the possibility of an international security community in the face of the unpredictable externalities of anarchy undermined

meaningful debate on the meaning of international insecurity as a constant productive field that requires management. This would not only allow for an improved analysis, but also allow the security community theory to account for the changes to the international insecurity practices since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror.

International insecurity cooperation requires defining insecurities collectively. Security communities are insecurity communities because they require the collective management of discourses and practices of insecurity. Studying the EU as an insecurity community and its practices of mobility and transportation insecurity under the ENP led me to focus on four different technologies of insecurity governance.

Pursuing the full potential of insecurity community theory requires sociological research. Further focus on practices and materialities is a way to pursue this in a methodologically rigorous way. Starting with the next chapter, I present an analysis of the EU as an insecurity community by looking at the EU territorial, institutional, and material technologies of mobility and transportation insecurity governance under the ENP's mobility and transportation insecurity components.

CHAPTER 4

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

Introduction

This chapter is on the origins of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a framework that oversees the technologies of insecurity governance. It provides a systematic treatment of territorial projections of Europe and key mechanisms employed under the ENP policy framework.

The location of the elusive European borders that demarcate the European neighbourhood depends on *which* Europe we refer to; the territorial footprints of various European projects differ significantly across different spaces and sectors. Due to various opt-in and opt-outs, as well as variability and differentiation of integration, the EU is not, and never has been, a coherent, or singular integration project (Dyson and Sepos 2010, Stubb 1996; 2002). The territorial manifestations of these multiple integration projects do not overlap on the map. Instead the EU and its subset of integration projects resemble a collection of Venn diagrams. This is in part due to the fact that the Commission, which is a relatively weak part of the EU bureaucracy, initiated the ENP, rather than the Council that represents the EU MS.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and improvement of relations between the Eastern and Western European states, the external borders of the EU have been a source of vibrant interdisciplinary debate (Anderson and Bort 1996, Balibar 2002; 2003, Barbe and Johansson-Nogues 2008, Bigo and Guild 2005, DeBardeleben 2005, Delanty 2006, Diez

2006, Grabbe 2000, Groenendijk *et al.* 2002, Rumford 2006, Scott 2005; 2006, van Houtum 2010, van Houtum and Pijpers 2007, Walters 2002; 2004, Zielonka 2001; 2006). Whether we are using the analogy of containers, fences, gates, regulators, or choke points, any discussion of European borders must be grounded in, and specific about, which Europe we are referring to.

The EU, manifested through its numerous metamorphoses, can be both Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde simultaneously. The issue of human mobility is an example commonly used in this regard (Boswell 2003, Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002, Huysmans 2000; 2006). The extent of one's subjection to the EU's mobility management practices depends on one's citizenship, point of departure, destination, and how that identity and location are perceived by the EU authorities and EU member states (MS) through a rubric of risk analysis, related geopolitical calculations and more specific individual data. Different interpretations of these factors greatly affect mobility experiences in and out of the EU. The subjectivity of mobility experience, thus, provides a tangible data marker for understanding the topologies of the European project.

Mobility has been an important signifier for normative evaluations of European integration (Maas 2007). The unrestricted mobility of persons, goods, services, and capital (*the Four Freedoms*), and the policies, practices, and standards are often presented as both the outcome and *raison d'être* of the European project. In this argument, mobility and circulation establish a community of networks across multiple levels and sectors that contribute to a liberal or cosmopolitan understanding of peace as envisioned by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. The EU is often referred to as a liberal (intergovernmentalist) project (Haas 1958, Hoffmann 1966, Moravcsik 1998) built upon

the belief that increased interdependence and cooperation will result in peace and stability. The limits of this insecurity community, in terms of participation, however, are dependent on one's location: inside or outside of territorial footprints of the project; territorial technologies of insecurity governance are central to determining that boundary.

The territorial technologies of insecurity governance of the EU are essential to conceptualizing the inside/outside dynamic in Europe today. The Commission has historically used the enlargement framework as a "delivery method" for exporting policywork to countries beyond the EU MS. The enlargement process has been a framework that attempts to "socialize" the periphery of Europe into core Europe through a comprehensive and binding policywork driven by the promise of complete integration into various EU projects (Checkel 2001; 2005, Engert 2010, Gheciu 2005, Hooghe 2005, Lewis 2005, Schimmelfennig 2000; 2005, Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). Along with the enlargement framework – which is still the basis of ongoing relations with Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro, FYROM, and Turkey, today the EU conducts its foreign relations through the ENP framework.

Integration requires long-term commitment in the form of policywork: a set of practices associated with policy reforms such as convergence through policy harmonization, (de)regulation, coordination, and practices of transborder policy mobility. Policywork, as such, is central to the European integration project. The Commission's ability to conduct policywork rests in its capacity to initiate, coordinate, execute, and evaluate policy practices between and beyond the EU MS.

The purposes and practices of policywork differ for those on the inside and outside of the EU. As seen from Brussels, the EU is a praise-worthy example of post-Westphalian

political imaginary: one that represents a move beyond the state-centric politics. It is a “polycentric polity” that is governed through networks and politics of scale (Zielonka 2006). This European imaginary, at least internally, is presented as a borderless, smooth space, a networked territory that provides economic, political, and social stability and prosperity. Under the enlargement framework, the EU democratized formerly authoritarian countries to the South – Spain, Portugal, and Greece – and stabilized and developed the economies of the post-Communist countries to the East following the 2004 enlargement.

European integration is not a de-bordering but rather a re-bordering project. The effects of this are clear in the heavily guarded borders of Spanish enclaves in North Africa (Mutlu and Leite 2012), Ukraine’s borders with Poland (Allina-Pisano 2009), and in detainment camps in Lampedusa and on the Greek-Turkish border. There is always an outside to the inside and the aim of territorial technologies of insecurity governance is to keep risky flows outside of the border.

The ENP framework is the EU’s most recent attempt to develop a technology for the diffusion of European discourses, governmentalities, policies, and practices beyond the Union’s external borders. In practical terms, the framework has been an extension and intensification of the EU’s existing relationships with its neighbours based on *Partnership and Cooperation Agreements* (PCAs). Similarly, the financial and technical assistance provided under the ENP builds on the existing mechanisms developed under the *Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies* (PHARE) and *Technical Aid to Commonwealth of Independent States* (TACIS) programmes. PHARE was originally designed to provide financial assistance to Poland and Hungary and it was subsequently expanded to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,

and Slovenia – other CEECs that joined the EU in 2004 – and Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007. Similarly, TACIS provided foreign and technical assistance to the post-communist countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in their efforts towards socialization into norms and practices of liberal market economy and liberal democracy.

In 2003, as a response to this risk of establishing new dividing lines in Europe, the Commission presented a communication titled “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood” (European Commission 2003b) which proposed the establishment of a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).¹ As a result of a series of consultations by the Commission with the European Parliament, the Council, and several Committees, the ENP came into effect in March 2004 (European Commission 2004a; 2004b), a few months before the fifth round of enlargement in May 2004. The ENP was presented as an alternative framework to enlargement in order to address pressing challenges associated with having a vast external boundary bordering a diverse group of relatively underdeveloped countries to the East and South.

Unlike the 8 CEECs that joined the EU in 2004, these new neighbours, by virtue of being “neighbourhood” countries, did not have any short or mid-term prospects for full membership to the EU. By being neighbours, they were *de facto* “outsiders” (Smith 2005). This would not have been a problem if the EU did not expect a similar level of cooperation and compliance from these neighbours as it did from accession countries. The

¹ For an overview of the policy process leading up to the ENP, see: Committee of the Regions 2004; 2005, Council of the European Union 2003, European Commission 2003b; 2004a; 2004b, European Council 2002; 2004, European Economic and Social Committee 2004, Solana and Patten 2002.

enlargement process embodies a concrete incentive, “a golden carrot,” of full membership. The incentive of becoming an EU member is strong enough to establish and sustain cooperation and compliance structures with candidate states. These cooperation and compliance mechanisms, albeit unevenly, structure the socialization process of candidate countries into liberal market economics and democracy. Due to compromises during the negotiation phase of the ENP over the possible inclusion and exclusion of neighbourhood countries into the EU’s institutional structures, the Commission has been unable, or unwilling, to establish similar mechanisms that award cooperation and compliance for the ENP countries.

The challenges of the European neighbourhood are vast. On the one hand, participating countries, for the most part, lack democratic governance structures, suffer from chronic corruption, and are often involved in some form of military conflict with their neighbours – often over territorial disputes. As a result, a majority of the ENP countries are prone to political, social, and economic unrest. On the other hand, cultural, historical, geographical, and social differences between the Eastern and Southern neighbours, as well as differing ambitions and expectations from the EU, makes it difficult for the Commission to have a coherent policy to match these diverse challenges. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to address these challenges.

In terms of its territorial impact, the ENP is a paradoxical policy (Pace 2009, Tocci 2008). On the one hand, the stated intention of the Policy is to avoid future dividing lines between the EU and its neighbours to the East and South (Commission 2003a; 2003b; 2004a; 2004b, Kelley 2006, Prodi 2002). On the other hand, the ENP and individualized ENP Action Plans include discourses and practices of bordering; in the process of

demarcating borders, the management of trans-border security risks (human trafficking, weapons and illegal drugs smuggling, terrorism, etc.) often include readmission agreements and technical conditions for mobility governance such as e-Passports, intelligence sharing, construction of databases, and implementation of surveillance measures, among other practices (see: individualized ENP Action Plans). These territorial technologies are not the causes, but rather the symptoms, of a wider grand narrative on Europe, its competing identities and self-perception, various bureaucracies, diplomacies, and constructions of insecurities. The remainder of this chapter deconstructs this “grand” narrative of the ENP as captured by three words: European, Neighbourhood, and Policy. These three keywords define the key parameters, objectives, and core practices of the ENP.

Firstly, I answer: what kind of Europe is projected to the neighbours under the ENP? As it has developed since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU is a multi-level polity that is built on a structure of perpetual competition among numerous levels of governments and governance as well as multiple layers of identities and territories. EU institutions, member states, (trans-border) regions, municipalities, individual citizens, and sectoral lobbies are among a long list of actors that contribute to policymaking in the EU. In their contributions as stakeholders in EU policymaking, these different groups, with different territorial identities, project radically different understandings of Europe as they see it in relation to their core identities. In this regard, the first section of this chapter looks at two strands of “Europeanness” that are projected by the ENP: territorial and sectoral Europes. These often-competing spatio-sectoral projections of Europe co-produce a certain kind of “neighbour” and “neighbourhood” characterized by inside/outside dynamics that delimit Europe from its neighbourhood. What different actors of the EU policymaking apparatuses

refer to when they speak of neighbours and neighbourhood differs greatly based on the limitations of their imagination of the European project; the neighbourhood projected in the ENP is not an outcome of a widely accepted “natural” external border or a policy limit, but it is rather the outcome of a negotiation between the EU institutions, MS, and other stakeholders of the policy.

This takes us to the second question addressed in this chapter: What kind of neighbourhood is produced by the ENP? The Commission, the Council, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Commission’s Directorate Generals, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), as well as numerous specialized EU agencies, all play a significant role in shaping “European” practices that define, delimit, and act upon the European neighbourhood. The neighbourhood, however, is an umbrella concept; for both political and practical reasons, the ENP is a quixotic challenge.

Thirdly, this chapter addresses the question: what kind of policy is conducted under the ENP? What are the stated policy objectives? What are the types of policy tools used in the process? The ENP is a European policy. It was drafted by a group of Commission bureaucrats working for the Wider Europe Task Force that was originally under the DG Enlargement (Kelley 2006); as a result we see a path dependency of institutional knowledge spilling over from enlargement practices into ENP practices (Kelley 2006). Jeandesboz (2007; 2009) presents a detailed sociological account of this “field effect” and the effects of the inter-institutional competition between various Commission DGs, the Council, and the interests of different EU MS. The kind of policy constructed by the ENP reflects the perception of European integration, by the various actors involved, at the time.

Europe: What is in a word?

The idea of Europe is a complex one; it is contradictory, evasive, and (inter)subjective. In many ways, “Europe,” as a singular entity, is nothing but an idea, and a Platonic one at that – the reality of which often fails to meet the expectations of the concept. Europe has multiple manifestations. Europe, as a word, can refer to a continent, a geographical formation, the basis of a collective identity, a political project, a set of values, a historically embedded set of norms and practices, a reference to modernity, a reference to colonialism; it can be all or it can be none of the above.

According to Burgess (2002), Europe is “a complex set of deeply historical values issuing from the Greco-Latin synthesis, a constellation of ideas about rights and obligations of human beings that emerged from the Renaissance, and a set of politico-moral principles that served as the motor for the American and French revolutions” (468). In this section, my attempt is not to make “Europe” die a death of a thousand qualifications; rather, I argue that it is imperative that we are clear about which Europe we refer to when speaking of a European integration, neighbourhood, or even Union.

This section of the chapter looks at the different meanings of Europe as they are projected in the “European” Neighbourhood Policy. Specifically, I look at two categorical uses of Europe under the ENP: spatial and sectoral. The production of these Europes is a result of competition among different actors with different agendas, expertise, and practices, and these have a direct impact on the kind of neighbourhood and policy that is constructed through the ENP.

Where is Europe? The Role of spatiality in the ENP discourses

Europe, as a territory, has multiple spatial manifestations (Burgess and Vollaard 2006, Jones and Clark 2010). Europe can imply a supranational polity, a collection of states, regions, or cities; connections and relationalities within Europe such as trans-European energy, transportation, or communications networks; or different European integration projects such as the Schengen zone or the European Common Market. Depending on the place, scale, territory, or positionality of analysis (Brenner 1999; 2001, Castells 2000, Cox 1998, Macleod 1999), Europe can have multiple maps. These different maps, however, often do not overlap. Specifically, in the case of the EU, disparities among different “footprints” demonstrate the limitations of supranational policywork projects. Subsequently, these differences highlight the limitations of the territorial technologies of governance.

The territorial dimensions of European integration are often treated as externalities of policywork, rather than key factors driving policywork. There are obviously some exceptions to this. Along with some of the constructivist and post-structuralist approaches (Diez 2006, Risse 2005, Walters 2002; 2006), theories of multi-level governance (Hooghe 1996, Hooghe and Marks 2001; 2003) are the closest EU studies have to theories that take territory into account in their analysis. Such a gap in the literature, however, has serious implications, especially in regards to the external governance practices of the EU.

Under the ENP framework, it is impossible to speak of a single vision for Europe. The ENP is a compromise policy; the EU stands, but also falls, divided when it comes to its neighbourhood. On the one hand, at the supranational level, the Commission has a

relatively open imagination for where the EU begins and ends. On the other hand, the geopolitical calculations of different MS result in contradictory projections of Europe that often run counter to the Commission's discourses. For example, Southern Neighbourhood means something different to the EU MS bordering the Mediterranean, whereas Germany, Poland and Sweden, among other MS, have different priorities regarding the Eastern Neighbourhood.

The ENP is an outcome of the negotiation of these multiple institutions, opportunities, and visions. While the enlargement and the ENP frameworks are path dependent in terms of their practices (Kelley 1996), they are divergent in their spatial imaginaries of where Europe is. The difference between ENP and the enlargement is, thus, a difference of demarcation. The ENP represents a practice of differentiation (Browning and Joenniemi 2008). The – political – decision to consider countries of South-Eastern Europe such as the former Yugoslavian republics and Turkey in the enlargement framework while leaving out the Ukraine and Moldova for the ENP is a manifestation of this spatial politics of differentiation.

Under the ENP, the Commission has been the central actor since the conception of the Policy. It is important to note two things here. First, the Commission has jurisdiction over the EU's foreign policy objectives; these objectives can differ from MS national foreign policy objectives. Second, the EU MS, through the Council, play an important role in this policy field. Major shifts in policy initiatives as well as the initiation of relations with third parties require the Council's approval. Once approved the Commission is responsible for the everyday practices of the ENP. Looking at the pre-Lisbon Treaty setup,

Smith (2000) identifies the Commission as the central actor in shaping and balancing the internal-external Europeanization dynamics.

Under the ENP, the EU governs its periphery through a politics of spatial differentiation (Dyson and Sepos 2010; Edwards 2010). Rather than producing an inside/outside dynamic, the ENP produces a paradoxical multitude of boundaries defined by functional inclusions and institutional exclusions. The socio-political and economic calculations that shape the spatio-temporal criteria for “Europeanness” under the external relations of the EU become secondary when it comes to functional or sectoral considerations. Consequently, under the limited scope of the ENP, sectoral Europe gains importance over spatial projections of Europe, while the latter remains its importance in EU discourses and power politics in relation to the ENP countries.

What kind of Europe? Sectoral Europes

The EU, as a supranational polity, is involved in two different types of “borderwork:” bottom-up and top-down borderwork. Broadly speaking borderwork refers to citizens’ ability to participate in the making of borders (Rumford 2008, Vaughan-Williams 2008). Internally, the EU institutions provide the means for citizens to pursue this kind of “bottom-up” borderwork. Citizens of EU MS, often organized through a regional association, initiate borderwork processes by lobbying the Commission to acquire a “protected geographical status” (PGS). PSG represents a bottom-up approach to borderwork; it is a legal framework under EU law, which protects names of regional products. “Melton Mowbray porkpie,” “Stilton cheese,” or “Champagne,” among others, are examples of PGS designated

products. The Commission, however, is also involved in top-down borderwork through the construction of harmonized European spaces with unrestricted flows in functional sectors through policywork that enables mobility. The idea of a Europe of sectors proposed in this section builds on this top-down conceptualization of borderwork and refers to the “policywork” driven by the Commission.

Policy practices have spatial effects. The Commission’s supranational policywork results in a top-down “borderwork.” Examples of this include the Trans-European Networks in the transportation, energy, and communications sectors. The set of policy reforms involved in the transformation and standardization of practices result in networked European spaces. Policywork has its limits. Integration is not automatic and *ad infinitum*; it does not occur through continuous/endless “spillovers.” The idea of further integration is not received evenly across the 27 MS populations; states often intervene to take control of the direction of the integration project. The differentiation and variability of integration, along with the possibility of disintegration, thus, are central to integration through policywork.

Differentiation, and the variability of membership, in various integration projects in Europe undermine the territorial coherence of the EU. It is impossible to speak of a single Europe. This is not a post-Second World War phenomenon either; historically, borders in Europe have been multiple and overlapping (Sahlins 1991). Today, this differentiation of European territorialities can be seen in the layered membership in various European institutions and regimes such as the Schengen Area, the Common Market, or the Eurozone. According to Dyson and Sapos (2010), “[d]ifferentiated integration is the process whereby European states, or sub-state units, opt to move at different speeds and/or towards different

objectives with regard to common policies.” (4) The literature on “variable integration” (Stubb 1996; 2002) focuses on the practices and outcomes of this type of multi-speed integration.

This differentiated integration results in “a complex and problematic territorial uncoupling of politics and policies that offer new and varying opportunities” (Dyson and Sepos, 5). The ENP is a policy practice that operates through regulatory incentives and capacity building instruments (Balzacq 2008) that result in this kind of territorial uncoupling. Under the ENP, the “neighbours,” as outsiders, are not likely to join the Eurozone or the Schengen area. In other policy areas such as trade (the common market), transportation (trans-European networks), energy (trans-European grid and pipeline networks), or even mobility (under the visa facilitation agreements and implementation of biometrics and surveillance technologies), however, the EU is involved in active “policywork” that expands sectoral European spaces beyond the territories of the MS well into the neighbourhood. In the context of the ENP, however, the effects of sectoral Europes are not simply internal to the EU. The ENP as an external policy co-produces a certain kind of neighbourhood and a set of associated practices and discourses. The next section focuses on the kind(s) of neighbourhood constructed by the ENP.

What kind of European Neighbourhood?

The questions of the “wider Europe – the neighbourhood” and how to interact with future neighbours of the EU to the East became a contested topic in early 2000s, towards the final years of the process that led to the fifth round of enlargement. At a time when the EU felt

saturated, the prospect of future enlargement was highly politicized. It was not until 2002, however, that the EU institutions acted upon this issue of “what to do with the new neighbours?” More significantly, the question at the time was: what is next for the EU foreign policy in the post-enlargement era?

While consecutive rounds of enlargement brought the EU close to these “new” Eastern neighbours, in the early 2000s EU institutions tried to develop a strategy to bring the neighbours closer to the European Union without offering the promise of membership. At the 2421st Council meeting on General Affairs, in April 2002, foreign ministers of EU MS “welcomed the intention of the Commission and of the High Representative Javier Solana to prepare contributions during the second half of 2002 on the possibilities for strengthening these relations [with the neighbourhood countries], taking into account the different state of relations between the EU and the countries” (European Council 2002, 10).

The Council’s decision to solicit proposals from the Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Solana, was the first of its kind by the EU MS. This resulted in a joint letter by European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, and High Representative Javier Solana (Solana and Patten 2002). The so-called *Patten-Solana joint letter* established some of the key characteristics of what eventually became the ENP. In the letter, the Commissioner and High Representative suggest: “[t]he imminent enlargement presents an opportunity to develop a more coherent and durable basis for relations with our immediate neighbours. The pace and scope of this process will have to be flexible – there can be no one-size-fits-all approach” (2002, 2). Similarly, they also planted the seeds for what eventually became the Commission’s go-to line on the *raison d’être* of the ENP:

There are a number of overriding objectives for our neighbourhood policy: stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders are all fundamental for our *own* security. Failure in any of these areas will lead to increased risk of negative spillover on the Union.

(Patten and Solana 2002, 2 *emphasis added*)

Over the years, this line has faded. The ENP is no longer presented as a security policy but rather an insecurity policy geared towards providing developmental and technical assistance to collectively manage the insecurity landscape in Europe. Later in the same year, the then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, gave a speech titled: *Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability*. Prodi's 2002 speech was one of the earlier public articulations of the ENP. In his speech, Prodi argued, "I do not deny that this process [the Enlargement] has worked very well. But we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale." (Prodi 2002, 3) Instead, he proposed creating a "ring of friends" around the EU while acknowledging the diversity of these neighbours and their willingness to engage with the EU, "[T]his encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side. Of course, geography will play a role too" (Prodi 2002, 4). This speech marked a public milestone in the EU's willingness to create a new framework for its future neighbours-to-be.

Soon after, in 2003, the Commission presented its first communication on this topic. *Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours* (European Commission 2003a) proposed a "differentiated approach"

(16) to be the basis of interactions with the EU's neighbours to the East and South. With this so-called "Wider Europe" communication, the Commission pushed forward to "avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union" (European Commission 2003a, 3) while arguing that "enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development both within and without the EU" (European Commission 2003a, 3).

The "Wider Europe" communication created a series of back-and-forth opinions and reporting from various stakeholders on the future directions for the ENP (see: European Commission 2003b, Committee of Regions 2004) This process, between various EU bodies representing different interests as well as different visions of Europe and its neighbourhood, was in fact an inter-institutional negotiation on the scope and vision of the ENP.

Along with the publication of the European Security Strategy document *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (European Council 2003), drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Solana, and approved by the European Council on 3 December 2003, the ENP was introduced at the Thessaloniki European Council Meeting (Council of the European Union 2003). Subsequently, in 2004, the Commission unveiled two documents that functioned as the basis of the Policy: *The European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper* (European Commission 2004b) and *The Commission Proposal for Action Plans Under the European Neighbourhood Policy* (European Commission 2004a). What came out as a result of this process is a policy framework that approaches security as insecurity, or a threat landscape that can be managed through a constant productive field of governance. In other words, the ENP is a policy framework that aims to incorporate the

neighbours into a European field of insecurity management in an attempt to include them in the EU's efforts to collectivize duties and responsibilities associated with the management of insecurity and unease. In particular, these attempts are practiced through the technologies of insecurity governance that aim to "Europeanize" the conducts of conducts of the neighbours under the ENP.

The discourses and practices presented in these formulations of the ENP were direct responses to the existing external insecurity policy alternatives. Policies as discourses and practices are not purely rational acts void of situated identities and historical contexts. Thus, to understand the uniqueness of the ENP, we must look at the foreign/insecurity policy practices in light of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terror. When compared to President Bush's binary statement that "[e]ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush 2001), President Prodi's vision of creating a "ring of friends" based on networked policy spaces represents a stark difference in foreign policy and what it means to be a "global" actor.

Unlike traditional approaches to foreign policy – also simultaneously used by EU MS in their own bilateral relations – the ENP presents a challenge and an opportunity. The sectoral partnerships that lead to further integration of the neighbours into various "European spaces" provides stability, prosperity and security for the EU, and to a certain extent for the neighbourhood countries. But as a non-committal policy framework, the ENP also results in poly-directional foreign policy. Partnerships constructed under the ENP do not regularly spillover into other sectors – an essential characteristic of the early European integration (Haas 1953). Similarly, lack of long-term commitment by the EU, under the

ENP, results in a policy failure, where the neighbours lack sufficient incentive to reform their policy practices.

In relation to the Ukraine and other Eastern “partners” such as Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia, the telling absence of the Russian Federation from the ENP framework is a major contributing factor. Whereas Russia was considered to be a prime candidate for the ENP in earlier reflections on the prospective policy (Patten and Solana 2002, Commission 2003a; 2003b), the Putin administration, while confirming “their commitment to further their strategic partnership” with the EU (European Commission 2004c), opted to conduct their relations under the “EU-Russia: Four Common Spaces”² framework – a failed policy initiative in a list of failed attempts to engage Russia.

By this decision to opt-out of the European “neighbourhood,” the Putin administration made a renewed case for a strong Russian presence in its “near abroad” and for continuing status as a “great power”; thus an equal to the EU. Moreover, the absence of Russia from the ENP put these European “neighbours” in a peculiar situation – stuck between a former superpower conducting a reduced yet still potent version of zero-sum *realpolitik* and a supra-national polity with commitment issues and some quite intrusive demands. In recent years, the peculiarity of this liminality became confrontational when Russia cut the gas flow to Ukraine in 2006 and again in 2009, which directly affected European gas supplies, and invaded Georgia in 2008 in an attempt to repel Georgian forces entering the autonomous republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

² These four common spaces cover: economics; the environment; freedom, security and justice; and research and education.

In 2006, the Commission again tried to bring Russia in through the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) that was aimed, along with its Southern counterpart, at establishing a trans-border synergy across the Eastern borderlands of the EU – including the ENP countries and the Russian federation – through trans-national projects in ENP priority sectors such as border management, energy, and transportation. The problem with Russia was based on Russia’s self-perception as an equal to the EU rather than a “neighbour” implication being that there is an inherently asymmetrical power relation behind the ENP. While Russia benefited from financial aid under TACIS since 1991, and currently benefits from ENPI as well as from the *Technical Assistance and Information Exchange* (TAIEX), it has not shown any interest in committing politically to European policyworks and in fact presents a major challenge to the EU’s pursuit of policy reforms in the Neighbourhood.

Given this “Russian question” and lack of commitment by the EU as a whole, the neighbourhood constructed by the ENP is a fragmented space, divided along various sectors and regions. A number of actors, including but not limited to EU MS, the European Commission, the OSCE, NATO, Russia, “neighbourhood” countries, and the United States all play a role in shaping this space through their regular interventions. A decade into its existence, the realities of the neighbourhood today are quite far away from Prodi’s vision. While the EU partially succeeded in creating energy and transportation networks, it has failed and continues to fail on its promises of prosperity, security, and stability for its partners. For most “neighbours,” the short-term benefits of mobility and improvements in visa regimes are a promise rather than a reality. These shortcomings include a lack of progress made in visa facilitation or liberalization processes resulting in costly and intrusive

visa applications processes, increased border security measures and implementation of biometric identification documents that undermine traditional regional economic and social connections for those living in the “borderlands,” and long delays at borders resulting in costly trade externalities. I unpack these issues in much more detail in Chapter 5, where I discuss institutional technologies of insecurity governance and mobility security practices of the EU under the ENP. Similarly, the political situation in the neighbouring countries has not improved either; the momentum gained by the “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine has stalled and issues of electoral fraud, freedom of speech, and human rights remain chronic. Yet, even in this pessimistic picture, the EU pushes on forward with this policy framework. The next section looks at the kind of policywork conducted under the ENP.

What kind of European Neighbourhood Policy?

Policies are courses of action. They are competent practices. The kind of policy implemented in a given situation and/or location depends on the function, purpose and vision for that specific policy; policies are situated and contextual. The ENP, as the EU’s post-enlargement external insecurity governance policy, is designed to reflect Brussels’ vision for the role of the EU in its neighbourhood. Negotiations over spatio-sectoral imaginations, as argued earlier in this chapter, shape this vision. The ENP is a non-committal policy framework in terms of membership prospects; it is a “silver carrot” (Smith 2005) to the “golden carrot” of enlargement. The ENP does not offer the promise of membership but it does not rule out that prospect. In fact, part of the ENP’s productivity

relies on playing out this tension between the two policy frameworks and exploiting the possibility of enlargement to pursue compliance. It, however, aspires to create a ring of well-governed friends that can “share everything but the institutions” with the Union.

Insecurity as a concept is central to this understanding of the ENP. “Promoting a ring of well-governed countries” is not the same thing as digging a moat or a building a wall; the ENP as a policy tool, geared for promotion of security through good governance, is indicative of the liberal logic of insecurity based on centrifugal dispositifs of insecurity that are built on ever-expanding circuits that oversee threat management. Unlike its realist counterpart, which relies on zero-sum calculations of *realpolitik* and geopolitical strategies based on traditional state power, the EU’s insecurity logic, as it is projected under the ENP, is based on the creation of institutional structures that result in complex interdependence dynamics (Keohane and Nye 1977 [2011]) and/or expanding the European insecurity community (Adler and Barnett 1998, Deutsch 1957) that oversee the management of collectively insecurities. The problem with the ENP, however, is that it considers insecurity to be a universal signifier that can be shared across borders between polities. The difficulty faced by the EU under the ENP is that the EU institutions and the neighbours do not necessarily have shared or collective understandings of insecurity. In other words, sectors such as mobility and transportation do not necessarily have the same insecurity connotations for the EU’s neighbours.

In the existing academic literature on the EU studies, two related bodies of work cover the diffusion of EU policies into the neighbourhood: Europeanization and socialization. Europeanization, defined by Radaelli (2004), refers to a process that includes the: “[...] a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal

rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (3). For the most part Europeanization literature looks at the dynamics of pooling, cooperation, and supranationalization of policy making inside the EU among the EU institutions, MS, and other levels of government. Socialization literature, however, looks at the processes of Europeanization generated by the EU’s external governance projects. In other words, socialization refers to the process, strategies, and techniques of exporting “European” practices – norms, standards, and values – beyond the EU’s borders. Among others, Bosse (2007), Lavenex (2008), Lavenex and Wichmann (2009), and Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006) study the ENP as an technique of “external governance” through which the EU socializes its neighbours by exercising political, social and economic power. In the following pages, I provide a brief review of these two literatures.

Causal and constitutive approaches to studying the External Governance Practices of the EU

Under the ENP umbrella, the EU aspires to construct a networked neighbourhood across and within sectors through Europeanization and socialization. Given the differences in hopes and aspirations between the Commission and the EU MS, however, in reality the ENP ends up constructing a patchy network with in integration. The successes and failures of the ENP are important beyond their implications vis-à-vis questions of compliance and institutional analysis driven by power and interest. In other words, if the EU only gets what

it pays for in the Neighbourhood, then we have to pay attention to those items that it decides to pay for; the successes and failures of integration speak volumes about intentionality and the conditions for the possibility of integration as an external relations practice.

In a survey of the existing literature on the ENP, Manners (2010) identifies two common difficulties of studying the ENP as a policy framework. He argues that the availability of a wide range of analytical and methodological options poses a coherence problem for researchers, as “ENP means many things to many people” (Manners 2010, 30). He differentiates these challenges along two categories: The analytical question of *what* to study under the ENP and the methodological question of *how* to study it.

In terms of the analytical aspects of the ENP, Manners argues that geographical (ENP East vs. ENP South and sub-groups within these categories), institutional (ENP, ENPI, EaP, Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and Barcelona Process), or sectoral (civil society, democracy, economics, human rights, mobility, and security) choices undermine the possibility of an analytically coherent research programme for studying different facets of the Policy (Manners 2010, 30-31). Different regions, different sectors, and different institutional arrangements and histories result in different outcomes and thus present different challenges.

The most engaging and rigorous political analyses of the EU’s external actions come from scholars attempting to negotiate these boundaries between different sub-disciplines of political science, as well as bringing in other disciplinary points of view, in order to pursue conceptual, methodological, and theoretical cross-pollination of approaches and ideas. The most intellectually stimulating and interesting publications on the ENP come from projects

situated in specific – geographical, institutional, sectoral – contexts (Balzacq 2007, Browning and Cristou 2010, Gawrich *et al.* 2010, Jeandesboz 2007; 2009, Lavenex 2011, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; 2011, Scott and Liikanen 2010, Smith 2005).

Within the context of the ENP, a growing number of scholars study the causes, consequences, and policy practices of the EU's relations with its neighbours from a number of disciplinary backgrounds. These different backgrounds within the humanities and social sciences contribute a great deal of depth to the analysis of the EU's external practices. In this sub-section, I review the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical contributions of political science and its sub-disciplines to the study of the ENP by focusing on two distinct categories of causal and constitutive approaches to studying integration under the ENP as identified by Manners.

Causal approaches

Manners' causal arguments look at the correlations between the causes and consequences of the EU's external relations. This point of departure presents the main thrust of the existing scholarship on the subject, which is heavily inspired by mainstream approaches to IR, comparative public policy, and to a certain extent law. This type of analysis focuses on questions surrounding agency, interest, and power by paying specific attention to different levels of analysis. Authors approaching the Union's external relations from causal approaches are more interested in "who governs" and why they govern, rather than how they govern.

Works that privilege the agency of EU MS over other EU institutions often focus on the concept of “cooperation” (Manners 2009) between different actors and are generally inspired by institutionalist approaches to IR. These debates in IR were famously brought into EU studies starting with Moravcsik’s (1997; 1998) close reading of the negotiation processes leading up to the Maastricht Treaty and his coining of the term “liberal-intergovernmentalism” to describe the significance of state preferences and rational decision-making practices. Inspired by the liberal-intergovernmentalist approach, a group of scholars have introduced a vibrant research agenda for studying the role of states and cooperation among states within various institutional settings, in the external relations of the EU (Bache 2010, Copsey and Pomorska 2010, Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, Vachudova 2005).

There is a second group of scholars bringing some of the existing literature on liberal institutionalism and neo-functionalism from IR into EU politics, to discuss the agency of the European supra-national institutions on the EU’s external relations (Diez *et al.* 2011, Hughes 2009, Kostadinova 2009, Yakinthou 2009). Unlike the works that focus on “cooperation,” this literature looks at the role of supranational bodies in practices of external governance (Freyburg *et al.* 2009, Lavenex 2009; 2011, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; 2011, Lavenex *et al.* 2009, Kelley 2004, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008), and Europeanization (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004). The Commission, its DGs, other EU agencies and frameworks, and other international organizations such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the OSCE, and NATO stand out as central actors driving integration in these analyses. Whereas questions of power and interest are

still central to these approaches, they place a considerable weight on the social-construction of identity, norms, and social learning as contributing factors driving integration.

External governance is one of the concepts that is used most regularly in relation to the ENP. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) coined the term “external governance” as an analytical lens for understanding instances “when parts of the *acquis communautaire* are extended to non-member states” (Lavenex 2004, 683). External governance is an umbrella concept, consisting of three kinds of institutional forms that enable its practice: “hierarchy, networks, markets” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 796-800). This perspective is “both an attempt at conceptualizing important aspects of the EU’s international role and a step towards analyzing forms of integration into the European system of rules that remain below the threshold of membership” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 792). As such, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig use “governance” to account for “institutionalized forms of coordinated action that aim at the production of collectively binding agreements” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 795).

Finally, a third group of scholars look at the role of trans-national processes such as the constitutive role of business, interest groups, regions, non-governmental organizations, and unions in driving the external relations of the EU (Allina-Pisano 2009, Frisch 2009, Mutlu 2011, Scott 2005). These approaches are inspired by the literature on mainstream approaches to globalization, multi-level governance, and trans-nationalism. In particular, this literature pays specific attention to the impact of EU policies on borders, border communities, and the creation and destruction of trans-national regions and identities.

These causal approaches present a highly successful model for a methodologically rigorous research agenda for studying the external relations of the EU, and their analysis is

most suitable for projects studying the role of different actors and competitions between and within different levels of government involved in the external practices of the EU. Whereas these approaches do a good job of studying compliance-based integration practices and other similar policy-diffusion schemes between the EU and its neighbours, in their analysis, they fail to account for the productive power of the EU. In other words, along with the EU's power over its neighbours, we also need to look at the EU's power to shape the practices of its neighbours. A more complete understanding of the EU's external practices needs to look how the EU, as a networked polity, operates through micro-practices of power. The constitutive approaches covered in the next section focus on these more nuanced conceptualizations.

Constitutive Approaches

Constitutive approaches focus on how the EU's external practices (re)constitute, or transform, the identities and core practices of actors. According to Manners (2009) "from the perspective of constitutive theory the evolution of the ENP can be best understood via three approaches – social constructivism, post-structural theory, and critical social theory" (35). Unlike approaches that look at the causes and consequences of integration, constitutive approaches focus on discourses, identities, norms, and practices involved in the EU's external practices.

Among the three approaches listed, social constructivism has the most traction with mainstream approaches to the EU's external practices (see: Checkel 1999, Christiansen *et al.* 1999, Moravcsik 1999, Risse and Wiener 1999, Risse-Kappen 1996, Rosamond 1999).

Social constructivist approaches take the power of identity, norm diffusion, and practices of socialization and social learning seriously. In particular, these approaches have provided clear and systematic treatment of the discourses and practices of EU and NATO enlargements and the diffusion of international norms, practices, and standards (Checkel 2005, Gheciu 2005, Hooghe 2005, Kelley 2004, Lewis 2005, Schimmelfennig 2000; 2001; 2005, Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006).

The acceptance of social constructivism into mainstream European integration studies is partly due to the increasing acceptance of constructivism in mainstream IR, and partly because of the productive relationship between the external governance literature and the international socialization approach. This relationship presents external governance as an umbrella concept consisting of numerous practices. External governance practices are a means to an end: the socialization of the EU's neighbours. According to Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006), socialization refers to "a process in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community" (2). Risse (1999) points out three socialization mechanisms "based on three modes of social interaction" (530). These are: "[f]orced imposition of norms, strategic bargaining, and instrumental adaptation; second, processes of institutionalization and habitualization; and third, processes of moral consciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion" (Risse 1999, 530). Whereas socialization is "a process, not an outcome" (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006, 2), it is nevertheless a process judged by its outcome (Alderson 2001, 417 quoted in Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006).

According to Schimmelfennig *et al.* this differentiation between socialization as a process or an outcome co-constitutes a methodological dilemma: whether to pursue

“backward-looking” or “forward-looking” research in studying socialization. On the one hand, we can clearly determine if an external practice in fact leads to a socialization process by looking at the results of that practice. We can study the socialization process that leads to the accession of CEECs into the EU, once they join the Union. With a backward-looking perspective, “we would know that a process has been a socialization process if and after states have adopted the constitutive rule of an international community” (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006, 2). Hindsight, however, is always 20/20. Furthermore, “this ‘backward-looking’ perspective is problematic [...] because it does not allow us to analyze international socialization as an open-ended process” (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006, 2). In other words, backward-looking perspectives undermine our capacity to study failed socialization processes. Forward-looking perspectives, according to Schimmelfennig *et al.*, allow us to study socialization “as a process *directed at or potentially leading to* rule adoption by target states” (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006, 2 [emphasis in original]).

Under the ENP, the external governance/socialization literature identifies two benchmarks that point towards a successful socialization process. These are *rule negotiation*, and *rule adoption/implementation* (Lavenex 2009, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). The rule negotiation stage overlaps with the drafting of ENP Action Plans between the EU and the “target countries.” During the negotiation stage, the neighbouring country and the Commission draft a document that sets the parameters of the individualized ENP Action Plan. This document establishes the “rules of the game”; what to expect and what to do. The final document highlights aspirations and potential for integration for both the EU and the neighbouring country.

The following stage is rule adoption. This stage refers to the implementation of policies, practices, and norms into the domestic legislation in compliance with the ENP Action Plan. Schimmelfennig *et al.* (2006) consider “rule adoption” to be a condition for a successful socialization. Under the ENP, similar to the enlargement process, the Commission reviews rule adoption through the annual country progress reports. These reports measure the level of progress towards integration with the EU based on the benchmarks established by the ENP Action Plan. One of the chronic issues faced by the EU under the ENP is sporadic and inconsistent rule adoption; there are sectoral gaps between issues of so-called “high politics,” “low politics,” and within the sectors of these broader categories.

Critical Social Theory presents an alternative to the socialization/external governance approaches. It places European integration and the external practices of the EU within the context of broader trends of cosmopolitanism and globalization. In particular, authors such as Delanty (1997; 2003; 2005, Delanty and Rumford 2005) and Rumford (2005; 2006; 2007), among others (Agnew 2001, Balibar 1996; 2003a; 2003b, Benhabib 2005, Geddes 2005) engage with the particular cultural, social, spatial, and temporal challenges that emerged as a result of increasing globalization and supposed cosmopolitanism. These authors pay particular attention to questions of belonging and (transnational) identities. As such, their work is especially pertinent to the meta-theoretical debates covered in Chapter 3, focusing on various meanings of Europe and Europeanness as defined by a combination of discourse, identity, and practice.

Finally, post-structuralist approaches trace the origins of the EU’s external practices by focusing on the networked relationalities that constitute the Union. In particular, the

approaches rely on genealogical and de-constructivist methodologies to look at how certain actors, pillars, or practices are privileged in relation to others. This group of scholars consider identity (trans)formation to be central to their analysis. In particular, within the context of the ENP, post-structuralist approaches focus on the question of European identity in relation to the neighbouring “other” (Browning and Cristou 2010, Kennedy 2008, van Houtum and Pijpers 2007, Zaiotti 2007).

In this subsection, I provided a brief review of the academic literatures on the EU’s external policy practices to provide background information on the academic debates on the subject. Building on this, the next subsection focuses on the specific practices of the ENP framework.

Policywork under the ENP

The ENP as a policy mobility tool is based on three practices: capacity assessment (*Country Reports*), policy design (*Action Plans*), and review (*Annual Progress Reports*). Following the creation of the Policy in 2004, the Commission published the ENP Country Reports in May 2004, “assessing the political and economic situation as well as institutional and sectoral aspects, to assess when and how it is possible to deepen relations with that country” (European Commission 2010a). This led to the process of negotiation of Action Plans with participating countries. The Country Reports established the EU’s expectation and how to fulfill those expectations. During the negotiations participating countries presented their demands and vision for the project. These negotiations led to the drafting of

individual ENP Action Plans that “define an agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities” (European Commission 2010a).

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan is a good example of an encompassing Action Plan and its limitations and embedded paradoxes. Ukraine, a country with stated membership goals, was one of the first neighbours to complete an ENP Action Plan in 2004. The EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan came into effect on 21 February 2005 upon the approval of the Council (European Council 2005a). Standing at 27 pages, the Action Plan lists 71 “priorities of action” ranging from security policy to trade and taxation. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan, however, is a unique document. While it covered the period between 2005-2010, it did not reflect the vision of the Ukrainian administration of the period. That is because the Commission negotiated and agreed to the EU-Ukraine Action Plan with the Kuchma administration, prior to the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution brought down the Kuchma regime and instated popularly elected and pro-EU Yushchenko as the president. While the Yuschenko administration had the strong will and necessary political capital for Ukrainian membership to the EU, the Commission was legally bound by the already signed and sealed EU-Ukraine ENP Action Plan. Moreover, due to the internal dynamics of the EU at the time - failed 2004 constitutional referenda in Netherlands and France - the Commission had no room for flexibility and/or an exceptional review of the situation. The best the Commission could do at the time was to negotiate an additional *EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice* that was regarded as a necessary first step towards facilitation of a more relaxed human mobility regime.

The example of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan demonstrates that the ENP is a liminal policy that pleases nobody. It fails to meet the Commission vision; it is not capable of

socializing extreme cases such as Libya and Belarus and it fails to meet the aspirations of willing partners such as the Ukraine. While, given the pessimistic financial situation of the neighbourhood countries, the financial benefits of taking part in the ENP are incentive enough to be included in this framework, these benefits do not exceed the costs of compliance with the EU policywork or present a substantial reward for the conditionality structures in place under the Policy.

To understand the challenges and the limits of the ENP, we must look at its central practices: conditionality, and convergence through policywork. In other words we must understand how the EU plans to do what it proposes to do. While differentiated integration is the name of the game under the ENP, integration is nevertheless practiced through conditionality. Practices of conditionality, however, are neither new nor exclusive to the ENP and given the structure of the Policy they regularly appear to be ineffective. As Kelley (2006) points out, the ENP is path dependent on the enlargement framework. This is partly due to the institutional arrangements within the Commission: most of the personnel of the Task Force on Wider Europe were transferred from the DG Enlargement but also partly due to the fact that convergence and conditionality are two of the few tools available to the Commission given the stated vision for the ENP as partnership in everything but the institutions. The list of similarities is not only exclusive to the practice of conditionality. Sectoral differentiation under the ENP follows the established *Acquis* chapters from the enlargement process. Similarly, the Annual Progress reports are also an artifact of the accession framework.

The paradox of the ENP is also the promise of the ENP. Belonging to the EU is a powerful vision, but as we have seen in the last decade, the ENP does not fulfill this

promise; it is not designed to fulfill this promise. The ENP provides a range of practices that are not very flexible due to institutional limitations of the EU. As such, the ENP is not a “European” neighbourhood policy; it is the Commission’s neighbourhood policy. The Commission, however, is not a powerful actor within the institutional relationalities of the EU; it lacks substantial jurisdiction in external relations. It is bound by the limitations imposed by the Council and internal politics of the EU MS. The ENP has been successful in constructing a more networked neighbourhood in some areas such as economic cooperation, energy, and transportation, as this has been in the interest of the EU MS, the Commission and the neighbours. The “EUropean neighbourhood” constructed by the Policy, however, is bound by the realities of the neighbourhood; the ENP operates in and acts on a neighbourhood shaped by the neighbours’ willingness to participate and take part in the Policy. In other words, while Brussels sets out visions for the ENP, the limits of the Policy are shaped by the quotidian practices of the neighbours.

Conclusions

This chapter provided a review of the last decade of the ENP as the policy framework through which the EU attempts to export its internal technologies of insecurity governance into the “European” neighbourhood. This chapter focused on the contested nature of this framework to present various debates surrounding literatures and practices of external governance under the ENP. As I suggested before, the challenges of the ENP are vast. These challenges, however, have both internal and external contributing factors. Whereas the vast majority of the literature on the ENP studies external factors due to their focus on

aspects of integration that are dependent on the neighbours (conditionality, implementation, socialization) very few authors look at the internal factors that determine the conditions of possibility for such a framework to exist in the first place (Jeandesboz 2007; 2009, Kelley 2006, Smith 2005). As such, by engaging with some of the debates surrounding various meanings of Europe, their implication on its various neighborhoods, and the EU's policy practices within these overlapping spaces of the European intervention, I provided an overview of the negotiations that resulted in the ENP as a policy framework.

First, the inside/outside dynamic that is essential to the ENP as a territorial technology of insecurity governance highlights the fluid topology of Europe's limits. In other words, rather than pre-determined lines on the map, the boundaries of Europe are based on perpetual negotiations and need to be studied within their sectoral and spatial contexts. Second, rather than be defined by its exclusion from Europe, the Neighbourhood is defined by its possibility to be included in Europe. This is dependent on the hopes and aspirations of the neighbours to be part of the EU one day. Any prospect for insecurity governance under the ENP is dependent on the attractiveness of the EU and prospect of being included in it. Finally, the ENP, as a policy, is the EU's response to the challenges of globalization and the interconnectedness of the insecurity landscape in Europe. The paradoxes of the ENP are due to the fact that it is a compromise policy negotiated between the EU MS and the European Commission.

Building on these three general conclusions, in the next chapter I further argue that insecurity, and in particular insecurity as a governmental logic that regards mobility as a manageable threat or unease, provides an insightful lens through which we can begin to

understand the ENP as an external policy framework that oversees the expansion of the EU's internal insecurity governance technologies into the neighbouring countries.

CHAPTER 5

MOBILITY INSECURITY PRACTICES OF THE EU

European mobilities: *of Persons and Things*

With more than 300 million travellers (European Commission 2008a), and approximately 3.6 billion tons of cargo (Eurostat 2012a) moving in and out of the EU territories through 1636 designated ports of entry annually, controlling various form of mobilities presents a major challenge to EU officials. As an important part of the EU's shared competence with the EU MS as defined by the *Article 2 C. 2* of the Lisbon Treaty¹ (European Commission 2007a), mobility security represents a significant component of the EU legislation. Under the so-called "Four Freedoms" principle, overseeing the free movement of capital, goods, services, and persons is central to the operation of the EU's common spaces – e.g. the European Single Market (*services*), the Eurozone (*capital*), the Free Trade Area (*goods*), and the Schengen Zone (*persons*).

Whereas free – or unrestricted – movement can be attributed to generating economic prosperity and nurturing interdependence among states, it also creates a set of insecurity problems (Boswell 2007a; 2007b, Huysmans 2000; 2006, Mountz 2011, Neal 2009). This inherent tension between economic goals and insecurity concerns manifests itself clearly in border security practices; the future direction of border management and customs practices

¹ "Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following principal areas: (a) internal market; (b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; c) economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; (e) environment; (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of freedom, security and justice; (k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty."

is driven by attempts to negotiate these opposing tensions. On the one hand, the “economics” side of border management, associated with customs and tariffs involved in the transportation of goods and services, focuses on improving speed and increasing volume at ports of entry in order to ensure the efficiency and stability of the economy. On the other hand, the insecurity aspect of border management focuses on the control of flows (Walters 2006) – of capital, goods, persons, and services – to maintain the security and stability of the internal space. As a result, the challenge for border management practitioners is to develop technologies that can manage this tension between speed and insecurity at border crossings.

In Europe, a combination of EU institutions, national ministries, and border management and customs agencies constitute the institutional technologies of insecurity governance for mobility security practices. In this chapter, I present an overview of these institutional technologies that oversee the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s mobility and transportation security regimes. Whereas chapters 3 and 4 focused on reviewing the relevant academic literatures, this chapter maps out various institutions and their roles in the management of the EU’s mobility insecurity concerns, focusing on the internal and external dimensions of the Schengen Area and the Single Market to understand the institutional arrangements required to drive the expansion of these internal spaces into the neighbourhood countries.

A (very) brief note on decision making in the EU

Institutionally, the EU has two distinct “mobility insecurity” regimes that shape the

common customs and immigration control practices of the Union. These are: 1) human mobility insecurity and 2) transportation insecurity regimes. Responsibility for managing these regimes is distributed across actors in three levels of government: national, supranational, and international. Adding to this complex governance structure, there are also specialized EU agencies that oversee specific practices such as border security and data-protection, among others.

For sake of clarity, it is important to take note of two institutional aspects of decision-making in the EU: the subsidiarity principle and the co-decision. The subsidiarity principle is one of the general principles of EU law. Established by the Maastricht Treaty and kept in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty under Article 5.3, this principle is based on the understanding that:

[u]nder the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.

(European Commission 2002, Article 5(3))

Unless specified as a policy falling under the exclusive competence of the Union, Union policy initiatives must be based on this “subsidiarity principle.” For policy areas that do not fall under the subsidiarity principle, the co-decision making process applies.

As sectors designated for shared competence under the Lisbon Treaty, jurisdiction over the EU’s mobility and transportation security regimes fall under the “co-decision process” between the EU MS governments represented in the European Council and the directly elected MEPs of the European Parliament. Traditionally, the EU policies originate

from the European Commission.² Once a proposal is prepared, the Commission submits it to the Council and the European Parliament to consider it under the co-decision process. Depending on the proposal, the legislation can either be accepted by both the Parliament and the Council or rejected by either and/or both. If accepted by both parties, the legislation would go into effect upon publication in the official journal of the EU. If either party proposes revisions, there would be a second round of readings, followed by another vote. This process will continue until both parties agree on a resolution. The co-decision process also includes input from the European Commissions and its DGs, as well as other “stakeholders” in different levels of government and the private sector. These legal principles are important to understand the practical implications of the technologies of insecurity governance covered in the next two sub-sections.

The Schengen Area

The field of European human mobility is legally defined within the context of the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985,³ establishing the Schengen Area of free mobility for European citizens.⁴ The Schengen Treaty enables free, or unrestricted, movement of EU citizens within the EU territories by eliminating internal borders while standardizing the Union’s

² While EU policies originate from the Commission, member states can pressure the Commission directly or indirectly to propose policies to the Council and the Parliament. Moreover, since the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is required by the Treaty to consider proposals with more than a million signatures by EU citizens.

³ Whereas under Article 3c, the free movement of labor was included in the Treaty of Rome (EEC) that established European Economic Communities in 1957, the goal of the free movement of persons, services, and capital was only listed as an “intended activity” under the Article 48.

⁴ The Schengen Treaty was further supplemented by the Convention on Implementing the Schengen Agreement signed in 1990 and in 1997 following the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen Agreement has been incorporated into EU law.

external border control practices as defined by the Schengen Borders Code (European Council 2006). Whereas internally the Schengen zone requires the elimination of internal borders between the EU MS in order to supplement the smooth functioning of the “Four Freedoms” principle, externally it involves a process of re-bordering that includes the harmonization of border insecurity practices as well as the implementation of a unified visa code for granting short-term travel visas (Dimitrovova 2008, Grabbe 2000, Guild *et al.* 2008, Jeandesboz 2008, Leonard 2009, Neal 2009, Rees 2008, Vaughan-Williams 2007, Zaiotti 2011).⁵ I cover these externalized practices of the Schengen area later in this chapter.

Elimination of the EU’s internal borders and harmonization of border controls at the Union’s external borders required further clarification and negotiations in order to determine the EU’s mandate over issues surrounding citizenship and immigration regimes. This resulted in what Lavenex and Wallace (2005) call the “uneasy communitarization” of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) sector following a series of EU treaty processes and Council summits.⁶ Since the Lisbon Treaty and the abolition of the EU’s pillar structure, the JHA policies now fall under the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice and are coordinated by DGs Home Affairs (HOME) and Justice (JUST). This “uneasy

⁵ Under the Schengen Agreement, participating countries maintained the right to grant long-stay visas and permanent residency status.

⁶ Lavenex and Wallace (2005) provide a good overview of this communitarization process, which began with the TREVI network (1975) to cooperate efforts against terrorism, then the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and the creation of the EU’s “third pillar” on Police and Judicial Cooperation Matters. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) established the Justice and Home Affairs as a central component of European integration. The Tampere Council Decisions (1999) outlined a five-year plan to create a European “area of freedom, security and justice,” and finally the Nice Treaty (2001) approved these changes and consolidated the institutional structure proposed by the Amsterdam Treaty.

communitarization” resulting in the development of the JHA (Lavenex and Wallace 2005) and the creation of a common “Schengen culture” establishing practices of control at the Union’s external borders has been covered elsewhere in detail (Berg and Ehin 2006, Bigo and Guild 2005, Geddes 2005, Huysmans 2000; 2006, Lavenex 1999, Zaiotti 2006; 2011).

Institutional arrangements associated with the Schengen agreement form the internal dimensions of the institutional technologies of insecurity governance behind the Union’s human mobility insecurity technologies. The broader “field” of the EU human mobility, however, involves a multi-layered structure that includes several agencies spread across three different levels of governance, private “stakeholders,” as well as specialized programmes such as the Stockholm Programme,⁷ standardized practices such as the Schengen visa, and networked databases such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS) and European Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC), all of which enable the EU’s human mobility insecurity governance technologies. It is important to note that the current institutional arrangement of the EU’s mobility regime is the result of continuous negotiations between various parties – with varying degrees of power over different decision-making processes – interested in the everyday practices of control at the border. As such, the Schengen area, as a system, is a fragile one that goes through

⁷ In terms of the EU-level cooperation over mobility insecurity within the broader perimeters of the JHA field, we can identify a series of EU programmes that started with the Tampere European Council conclusions – the “Tampere programme” (European Council 1999). With the Tampere programme, the leaders of EU MS drafted a road-map to establish a European Area for Freedom, Security, and Justice, that bridged the existing divide between discourses and practices of European citizenship, justice, and insecurity regimes. The goals outlined under the Tampere programme – establishing a Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy, creation of a European area of justice, a Union-level stance against trans-national crime, and increased external action in these fields – were mostly materialized during the five-year tenure of the Hague programme (European Commission 2005a, European Council 2005a). Since 2010, the Stockholm Programme overseeing the development of guidelines for community policies on issues pertaining to the JHA sectors until 2015.

continuous transformations that result in institutional and material re-configurations.

At the national level, the actors involved in the policymaking processes include border management agencies and immigration, judicial, and police authorities. At the EU level, the Council and the Parliament have the final say on policymaking. DG HOME oversees issues pertaining to policy coordination in asylum, border management, crisis and terrorism, immigration, and internal insecurity as well as the fight against organized crime and human trafficking, while DG JUST focuses on the fundamental rights and citizenship policies of the Union. Whereas the DGs are primarily involved in policy design and implementation, the coordination between EU MS required for these everyday practices is conducted by specialized EU agencies such as FRONTEX, EUROPOL, the EU's judicial cooperation unit (EUROJUST), and the *European Asylum Support Office* (EASO). In return, the EU's Data Supervisor, the European Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA), as well as specialized NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Statewatch, and national social and legal associations assess the secretive and increasingly de-politicized practices of the EU agencies involved in the decision-making processes of the Union's human mobility practices.

At the international level, the EU agencies and MS regularly consult and coordinate their efforts with specialized institutions such as the Group of Eight (G8), International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), the ICAO, and the ISO in order to keep up with globally recognized "best practices." The material technologies implemented through these practices, however, are dependent on another level of input that often goes unmentioned within scholarly accounts. The role of "technology providers" such as *3M*, *Gemalto*, *HID*, and *Semlex*, among others

involved in developing and producing biometric identity documents, radio frequency identification (RFID) chips, and scanners, are either taken for granted or ignored altogether; the private-public partnerships at the heart of the political economy of mobility insecurity often get overlooked as a result of state-centric accounts of security studies scholars. These private actors, nevertheless, regularly take part in lobbying officials in order to keep them informed about developments in possible technological “solutions” to their “problems.”

Internally, the discourses, practices, and materialities of the Schengen Area co-produce the EU’s human mobility regime. As I demonstrate in the next sections of this chapter, under the ENP the emphasis of these mobility practices shifts away from free movement to insecurity logic that is practiced through technologies of insecurity governance under the ENP framework.

The Single Market

The EU transportation networks, which enable the movement of goods and services, are governed by the Title VI (Articles 90 to 100) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (European Union 1992). The treaty, in return, is supplemented by the Commission’s White Papers (2001a; 2011a) that provide specific policy direction. Since the Rome Treaty’s entry into force in 1958, this policy has been focused on removing borders between EU MS while contributing to the free movement of individuals and goods. It is important to note that transportation insecurity policies are developed at the national or sub-national levels under the subsidiarity principle of the EU. However, “a large proportion of transport operations occur among Member States and it is clear that there is an added

value to certain actions being taken at the EU level” (European Commission 2012a, 3).

Traditionally, the Commission has approached the field of transportation with a specific focus on the sector’s perceived impact on economic stability, environmental sustainability, and the safety – rather than insecurity – of those involved in the process of moving persons and things within the proposed “European Single Transport Area” (European Commission 2011a). Unlike the Union’s human mobility regime, an insecurity logic has not been as central of a focus for the transportation sector since the conception of the Union’s common transportation policy. In order to make a clear distinction between the existing mandates of DG HOME and DG Mobility and Transport (MOVE), in relation to their input on the Union’s mobility regimes, we can argue that whereas DG HOME’s practices within JHA field are designed to control mobility, DG MOVE is involved in facilitating mobility.

Currently, coordinating the Union’s transportation policy falls under the jurisdiction of DG MOVE, which is responsible for the development of efficient, safe, and sustainable policy solutions for the challenges facing the EU’s internal markets. This includes investing in infrastructure projects such as “trans-European transportation networks” (TENs), promoting the principles of “co-modality” and “inter-modality” of different modes of (air, maritime, road, and rail) transportation, and ensuring the successful implementation of sustainable energy resources into existing European transportation practices, among other policies.

With such a vast mandate, DG MOVE and the field of transportation are of central importance to the Single Market. DG MOVE is responsible for overseeing cooperation between EU MS, private stakeholders, and various Union frameworks involved in the

processes of governing the circulation of goods, services, and persons in and out of the EU. The successful functioning of European transportation regimes, which are spread across various modalities and designed to manage the flow of persons and things, requires a multi-layered institutional arrangement.

At the national level, we can identify EU MS transportation ministries, other regulatory bodies such as customs and safety agencies, and semi-private actors such as port authorities and local transportation officials. At the EU level, as a sector that cuts across various policy initiatives, transportation policy requires input from different branches of the Commission. In particular, in relation to cargo transportation, we can identify at least three DGs – MOVE, the Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), and Trade (TRADE) – providing input at different stages of policy-making. Similarly, the Union has specialized agencies focusing on transportation: the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Maritime Security Agency (EMSA), the European Railway Agency (ERA), and the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA). At the international level, the activities of EU agencies are supplemented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as more specific institutions such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Association for European Transport (AET), the European Intermodal Association (EIA), and the ISO.

Transportation regimes within the institutional technologies of the EU are divided along their respective modes: air, marine, and land transportation. Traditionally, cost-saving measures, sustainability, and safety have been important considerations for these modality-specific agencies and institutions (European Commission 2001a; 2006c; 2007c). In light of the 9/11 attacks in the US, the 2004 Madrid Train bombings in Spain, and 7/7 bombings in

the UK, all targeting, as well as using, various modes of transportation, the EU's transportation agencies have been forced to consider internal as well as external strategies for improved and better integrated approaches to transportation insecurity management (European Council 2003, European Commission 2006; 2011a; 2012).

In particular, the Commission's communication on "Transportation Security" (2012)⁸ sets out the institutional parameters of the EU's involvement in the insecurity governance aspects of transportation policy. Among the conclusions of the Union's proposed transportation insecurity management policy, three points stand out: simplification for transport operators by having common insecurity management requirements – *with consequential cost savings*; simplification for security providers – *both equipment and personnel* – by having common performance requirements; and having a stronger voice in international fora" (European Commission 2012, 11).

Whereas these conclusions have different implications for each mode of transportation, for cargo transportation, as an "intermodal" activity that is involved in movement of goods, the policy proposes that the EU institutions should push for increased cooperation surrounding three issues: standardization of insecurity management practices, emphasis on insecurity management measures at the point of departure to ensure supply chain integrity, and emphasis on the international dimension of transportation in pursuing bilateral agreements with third countries to ensure implementation of EU transportation insecurity management standards.

⁸ This document builds on the EU's security framework established by the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003), and in particular responds to the Action #3 mentioned in the Commission communication "The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure Europe" (European Commission 2010b).

This last point demonstrates that the question of insecurity, and in particular mobility and transportation insecurity governance in the EU, cannot simply be addressed by the Union's internal capacities. This also overlaps with a central point of chapter 3: that insecurity communities need to cooperate with their neighbours in areas pertaining to insecurity governance technologies.

Whereas the Union's mobility and transportation regimes differ in terms of their institutional arrangements and discourses, and their respective strategies and objectives, they overlap in their external objectives: the insecurity management and sustainability of the Union's mobility and transportation policies not only require, but in fact depend on, external partners. In this regard, insecurity technologies behind the proposed mobility and transportation reforms listed under the individualized ENP Action Plans with the neighbours are a concrete manifestation of the EU's dependence on the neighbours for its internal stability.

Building on this observation, the next two sections go into more detail regarding the institutional aspects of the Union's mobility and transportation insecurity governance technologies under the ENP. The first section focuses on the human mobility insecurity management regimes under the ENP. The subsequent section reviews the transportation insecurity management regimes under the ENP. The third, and final section of this chapter introduces the material technologies of insecurity governance in relation to the mobility security practices of the EU under the ENP.

Human Mobility Insecurity Regimes in the European Neighbourhood

Immigration and population circulation is a reality of the European socio-political landscape. Controlling human mobility is a major political issue that involves all levels of government – local, regional, national, supranational. According to the Eurostat (2011), 6.5% of the EU's overall population is made up of immigrants, and 9.4% of EU citizens were born outside of the Union. As a result of the elimination of internal borders under the Schengen agreement, the management of external borders plays a central role within discourses and practices of immigration policy at the EU-level.

In terms of their geographical location, the ENP countries are deemed to be of most importance to the Union's external border management practices (European Commission 2003b; 2004a; 2004b, European Council 2004); the EU's maritime borders, and its land borders to the East are assessed quarterly by the Union's external border management agency FRONTEX in order to determine their presumed risk factor. This sub-section presents an overview of the EU's efforts to manage human mobility insecurity in the European neighbourhood. In particular, the section maps out practices in place to control two types of human mobility: regular and irregular.

Mobility policy is a "big-ticket" item under the ENP framework. It represents a priority area under the ENP Action Plans. Mobility as a concept, however, has different meanings and implications for the EU and the ENP countries. From the perspective of the EU institutions, mobility is an insecurity concern that requires active management. On the one hand, mobility insecurity management only recently came under EU jurisdiction following decades of integration in more functional, or "low" policy areas. As a result, EU-

level input in this sector was missing from the previously existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) between the EU and its neighbours – which function as the basis for the ENP Action Plans. Consequently, it is not surprising to see the EU institutions prioritizing integration in this field under the ENP in order to make up for this gap. On the other hand, the *a priori* association of mobility with insecurity, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, is an alternative reason for the extra emphasis on this sector; the “Four-Freedoms” principle of the EU mentioned above and the externalization of border controls within the Schengen Area have all raised questions of insecurity management in relation to mobility (Bigo and Guild 2005, Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Whereas European integration as a process, and enlargement as a policy framework, traditionally aimed to eliminate insecurities through internalization, prior to the ENP the Union did not have a collective technology to address the external governance of the Union’s internal insecurity.

From the perspective of the neighbouring countries, mobility to/from the EU is not perceived to be a similarly pressing risk factor or an insecurity concern. Rather, the prospect of establishing mobility partnerships represents an economic opportunity (Kirisci 2005). Either in the form of visa-free travel of persons, or the free movement of capital, goods, or services, the neighbourhood countries regard free(r) mobility as a reward for bringing their internal policies and practices in line with the EU’s mobility insecurity management standards. It is not surprising to see their voluntary participation in the so-called “mobility partnerships” programmes that are both intrusive and require a long-term commitment (Kunz *et al.* 2011).

The association of human mobility with insecurity has resulted in the criminalization of irregular human mobility through the adoption of preventative legal measures at the EU

level. Mountz argues that this is in part informed by the “exclusive ontologies” of border security practices (Mountz 2011). In practical terms, the association of mobility with insecurity has also resulted in increased cooperation among EU MS to establish a network for active cooperation among judicial and police agencies of the EU MS as well as in the creation of several EU agencies tasked with overseeing coordination among EU MS in areas pertaining to what eventually became the JHA field. These agencies are in line with the argument about the EU as an insecurity community that attempts to govern insecurity as a constant productive field through insecurity management technologies.

The earliest example of this type of cooperation at the EU-level was the TREVI forum, which was established following the Rome European Council as a result of the increasing number of transnational terrorist attacks affecting the European continent, the Black September attacks on Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics being the most influential one in this regard. Following the Maastricht Treaty the institutional arrangements of the Forum were absorbed into the EU’s Three Pillar structure under the JHA pillar. Whereas the TREVI forum originally focused on counter-terrorism measures, the JHA pillar focuses on a wide-range of policies that deal with citizenship, immigration, judicial, and police cooperation, as well as the external dimensions of these policy areas. The relatively limited cooperation that started with the TREVI forum has turned into a flourishing EU-level policy sector under the Lisbon Treaty; the JHA field now oversees the EU’s involvement in everyday insecurity management practices affecting millions of EU citizens.

Under the EU-level initiatives overseen by the Stockholm programme, the EU institutions are involved in practices controlling two types of human mobility: regular and

irregular. The Schengen short-stay visa regime, supplemented by national visa regimes governing long-term residency permits, governs the status of “regular” migrants. A second group of irregular, or “illegitimate,” migrants consist of asylum-seekers, refugees, and the “illegal immigrants” that often enter the EU legally with proper Schengen visas but “overstay” once their visas expire.

One of the difficulties facing the EU’s irregular migration regimes is the issue of multiple claims by asylum seekers. The “multiple claims” issue refers to an applicant’s ability to move between countries within the EU territories – due to the elimination of internal borders – while making multiple asylum claims in different EU MS and receiving benefits from multiple countries. The EU authorities have been working towards developing a “community-level” policy solution to address this type of immigration fraud, which is a symptom of the Schengen area, and to develop a “coherent and comprehensive migration policy” (European Commission 2011b, 2) to address its root-causes. Thus far, the Commission has only been able to produce a limited number of policy solutions. These solutions were originally proposed by the Tampere Council decisions (Council of the European Union 1999) and further developed under The Hague and Stockholm programmes.

The first proposal was the transformation of Dublin Convention (Council of the European Union 1997) into the Dublin Regulation (European Council 2003a), or Dublin II, in an attempt to ensure that “only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application” (European Council 2003a, 5). The most concrete outcome of the Dublin Regulation is the further development of EURODAC, the Union’s dactyloscopy database, to include the fingerprints of irregular migrants in order to reduce the number of

multiple-claims; with the help of EURODAC, the EU MS authorities are now able to cross-check each applicant's biometric information against the database.

Similarly, under the Union's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (European Commission 2011b), which builds on the Hampton Court European Council conclusions (Council of the European Union 2005), the Commission has created opportunities for bilateral mobility partnerships and visa dialogues with the ENP countries that proposes possibilities for visa facilitation in return for the successful signing of readmission agreements, among other requirements.⁹ These readmission agreements oversee the legal conditions of return for irregular migrants to their country of entry into the EU rather than their country of origin – in instances when the latter cannot be identified due to missing identification documents.

These external insecurity governance practices under the ENP generally result in the extra-territorialization of the EU's external border management practices (Balzacq 2009, Groenendijk *et al.* 2009, Vaughan-Williams 2008; 2010). Along with expanding EU norms and standards into the ENP countries, the requirements of mobility partnerships result in the relocation of the EU's external border practices further away from the actual boundaries. The extra-territorialization of border insecurity management practices eliminates the possibility of due process for irregular migrants.¹⁰ The legal basis of these

⁹ These requirements include: 1) increased identity document security, including passports, ID cards, and breeder documents, 2) a commitment to control illegal migration into the EU, including signing of readmission agreements, bringing border management practices in line with the EU, and concluding a working arrangement with FRONTEX, 3) a demonstrated commitment to increase public order and security by taking part in fight against trans-border organized crime, 4) institutionalized judicial and law-enforcement coordination with EU institutions.

¹⁰ These extra-territorial practices have been further complimented by the creation of FRONTEX, the Union's external border management agency. Many of FRONTEX's critics argue that the

extra-territorial practices is embedded in a number of regional frameworks. These practices are often supplemented by bilateral agreements between the EU MS and ENP countries as well as other agreements between EU agencies, such as FRONTEX and the national border management agencies of countries bordering the EU.

Specifically in terms of the geographical regions covered by the ENP, the governing principles of the Stockholm programme and the goals established by the EU's "global approach to migration and mobility" are further complemented by a number of sub-regional multi-lateral agreements. The Budapest and Prague processes deal with the promotion of regular migration and migration partnerships between the EU MS and authorities in the "Wider Europe." The "Euro-Africa Migration and Development Process" (the *Rabat Process*) deals with irregular migration flows originating from Sub-Saharan Africa and affecting the Southern EU states and North African states. In terms of the ENP-East countries, the *Söderköping* process was designed as a "proactive initiative to respond to the challenges of EU enlargement eastwards, and to promote better cooperation on asylum and migration related issues among the countries situated along the future eastern border of EU Member States" (Söderköping Process 2011).

The Union's mobility control practices are not only limited to regulating "irregular" migration. The Schengen visa regime manages the mobility of "regular" migrants travelling in and out of the Union. As countries falling under the non-visa waiver regime, the rules and regulations governing the Schengen visa practices are important for the ENP countries.

Agency's Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) function as deterrence forces to prevent irregular migrants from reaching the Union's borders. Furthermore, FRONTEX's direct involvement in border security operations in the Union's Southern and Eastern borders demonstrate that the Agency has an increasing mandate that now expands beyond risk-analysis but also includes operational capacity.

Under the ENP, the prospect of acquiring a visa-waiver status through a visa liberalization roadmap is one of the driving incentives for the neighbouring countries to commit to comprehensive “policywork.”

The regular migration category consists of three sub-categories: short-term stay, temporary residency (study and work permits issued for a limited period), and permanent residency categories (which grants indefinite residence or a path to citizenship for the holder). Under the Schengen Agreement, long-term residency permits for “visits exceeding three months remain subject to national procedures and only authorize the holder to stay in the one national territory” (European Council 2005b). Short-term visits to the EU territories for under 90-days, however, fall under EU jurisdiction and as such are regulated by the Schengen Borders Code (European Council 2006a) and the Union’s Visa Code (European Council 2009), which is an updated version of the Common Consular Instructions (European Commission 2005b) that outlines a common set of practices and procedures to be followed by EU consulates for issuing Schengen visas.

The Schengen visa is an outcome of the integration process that led to the creation of the Schengen area and the elimination of external borders. Visa regimes establish the legal parameters of a traveller’s visit prior to their arrival at their destination. Visas, as such, are task-specific (there are study, work, travel visas). Whereas having a visa does not guarantee entry into the country that granted the visa (the border official always has the final say on that matter), it is one of the ways that states control flows entering their territory (Salter 2006).

The Schengen short-term visa regime is a unique example of a “communitarian” or supra-national visa regime. It allows entry into not only the country that grants the visa, but

also the territories of all Schengen area countries. On paper, a citizen of a non-visa-waiver country, holding a valid visa, upon entry into the Schengen Area country that issued the visa should be able to move around the Schengen area without being subjected to any further border checks. Based on this expectation, the Schengen visa, along with the Schengen area, is often applauded as one of the great success stories of the European integration process. However, the Schengen visa has numerous shortcomings and a corresponding number of critiques.

One of the biggest issues in this regard is the difficulty of acquiring a long-term/multiple-entry Schengen visa. A short-stay Schengen visa application requires the following: two passport-sized pictures, a valid passport, additional documents demonstrating the purpose of travel (an invitation letter, event/conference acceptance letters, hotel and travel reservations), bank account information (including account balance, detailed account statements from the previous six months, as well as credit card information, the card balance, and detailed card statements from the previous six months).¹¹ On top of these already intrusive requests, the EU embassies require further information regarding the applicant's attachment to, or existing roots in, the country of citizenship/departure. Demonstrating one's roots requires proof in the form of records of employment, including a letter from the employer describing your duties and tasks as an employee; rental agreements, registration documents for cars and houses that the traveller may own, and tax records from the previous year(s). Furthermore, the Schengen visa also requires that the traveller be covered by a travel/medical insurance that insures the traveller

¹¹ The German consulate in Kiev requires the documents listed. For more information see: <http://www.kiew.diplo.de/Vertretung/kiew/uk/05/Visa/Schengenvisa.html> [last accessed on July 13, 2012].

for possible medical expenses incurred if hospitalized or require medical attention while visiting the EU territories to avoid any burden on the EU MS taxpayers. Another stage of this already costly, intrusive, and time consuming process is the acquisition of biometric data at the EU consulates; persons travelling into the Schengen zone are required to provide their fingerprints at the EU consulates, which are then cross-checked at the port of entry to ensure the identity of the traveller. At the end of these applications, if deemed trustworthy, applicants are often issued with a visa for the exact duration of their travel. It is very common to receive a visa for 3-4 days. With each new trip to the EU requiring a new visa application and re-collection of these documents, travelling from the neighbourhood to the EU is a costly endeavor.

The Commission and the EU MS, however, are aware of these difficulties. As a result, they are working towards a “common visa policy [that] should facilitate the entry of *bona fide* visitors and enhance security” (European Commission 2008a, 11). The proposed improvements to the Schengen visa regime will include individual assessment of travellers based on their personal merits and risk factors, rather than national risk assessment portfolios. These individualized portfolios, however, require a technological infrastructure that would allow for the decision-making process to be scaled down. In other words, the process of sorting out *bona fide*, or trusted, travellers from those that are not necessitates a material infrastructure that facilitates the EU’s mobility insecurity technologies.

Technological developments are already listed as a significant factor under the proposed mobility regimes with the ENP countries; the Commission proposes that “[n]ew technologies should be used, where appropriate, to enable differentiated, risk-based checks on visa applicants with extensive sharing of information between Member States”

(European Commission 2008a, 11). This is to say, improvements to the EU's regular and irregular migration practices are very much dependent on future developments to material technologies.

The proliferation of biometric identification documents and networked databases that crosscheck the biometric data is becoming increasingly central to the contemporary border security practices at the EU's external borders. Mobility security practices are becoming dependent on the mobility of data and data mobility requires that there be agreements on various norms and standards of practice. The final section of this chapter looks at the role of material technologies of insecurity governance in mobility security practices of the EU. The next section provides an overview of the EU's transportation security regimes in the European neighbourhood.

Transportation Insecurity Regimes in the European Neighbourhood

When it comes to the EU's mobility insecurity governance technologies, human mobility forms only one side of the coin; various considerations involved in the transportation of goods and services form the other. As the recent global economic crisis has demonstrated, the stability and sustainability of the EU's internal markets are increasingly dependent on the external markets and suppliers; global supply-chains and "just-in-time" production strategies implemented by multi-national corporations have resulted in increased reliance on the cross-border flow of goods and services. As the Commission points out, "[c]itizens and businesses in the EU and in neighbouring regions are the direct beneficiaries of improved transport cooperation, which aims to reduce the time and resources spent on

transportation of goods and passengers” (European Commission 2011b, 1). The functioning of the EU’s common market depends on a fine balance of efficiency and security in border management and customs practices at the Union’s external borders; border transactions need to be not only secure, but also swift.

As choke points, border crossings and customs have an effect on transportation regimes. Finding a balance between costly delays and the security risks of unregulated mobility is the central challenge of mobility security practitioners. The transportation component of the ENP is no exception in this regard; finding the fragile balance between efficiency and security is a central concern highlighted under various ENP Action Plans. Unlike the external dimensions of the Union’s human mobility regimes, the movement of goods across the EU’s external borders is not solely associated with security; questions of energy efficiency, environmental sustainability, infrastructure, interoperability, and intermodality all play an important role in the ENP’s transportation dimension.

Given the multi-sectoral appeal of transportation policy, reforms proposed under the ENP are often developed in tandem with broader initiatives such as EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), environmental projects like the Danube River and Black Sea Environmental Protection Task Force (DABLAS), or broader human mobility projects similar to the Single European Sky project, aiming to reform air traffic control infrastructure on the European continent. “[C]loser market integration will rely on the ability and readiness of neighbouring countries to move towards standards equivalent to those applied in the EU in areas” (European Commission 2012, 3).

The Commission has identified the efficiency, multi-modality, and sustainability of transportation practices as priority targets under the ENP (European Commission 2003).

Building on these broad “targets,” the individualized ENP Action Plans developed deliverables in three specific-areas of practice: 1) further expansion of the existing Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) to include the neighbourhood countries; 2) reforms to ensure efficient and standardized border management and customs practices; working towards simultaneously ensuring the management of insecurity and speed; 3) harmonization of standards to ensure co-modality and inter-modality across borders and platforms; in particular ensuring that railroad gauges between the EU countries and ENP countries become interoperable.

One of the biggest challenges facing the reforms proposed under the ENP’s transportation component is the discrepancy between the EU and its neighbours in terms of transportation infrastructure. As it stands, there are major gaps in the transportation networks connecting the EU and its neighbours. In line with the ENP objectives, the Commission has pushed for the expansion of the existing Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) to include Southern and Eastern neighbours, resulting in regionalized Transportation Action Plans.

On the Eastern borderlands, the Commission has successfully negotiated the Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor (TRACECA 1998), establishing Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus Asia. Similarly, the Commission also successfully negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the Eastern neighbours, establishing the modalities of the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics (European Commission 2009a). Whereas the TRACECA programme covers, amongst others, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine, the Northern Dimension Partnership on Transportation

and Logistics (NDPTL) also covers Belarus.

In the Southern neighbourhood, the Regional Transport Action Plan for the Mediterranean Region (2007-2013), created under the EUROMED framework, guides transport cooperation among the Mediterranean countries. The EUROMED Transportation Action Plan (European Commission 2007d) builds on the Blue Paper drafted by the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum (EMTF 2005a) and the Conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Transport – the Marrakech Conclusions (EMTF 2005b). Whereas TRACEA is specifically related to the West-East infrastructure expansion, the EUROMED Transport Action Plan covers a wide range of issues including cohesion and integration of transportation systems and sustainability of transportation practices across all modalities in countries bordering the Mediterranean sea. The EU has also allocated a great deal of financial and technical support to neighbourhood countries for infrastructure modernization; under the ENPI, the Commission has provided financial and technical assistance to improve the physical infrastructures of border control and customs areas at the EU's external borders.

Whereas the physical expansion of the transportation infrastructure facilitates the movement of goods and services in and out of the EU, the infrastructure-related issues only constitute one side of the transportation sector reform under the ENP. The other side consists of reforming border management and customs practices. Border management and customs reform is an important part of the EU's external governance priorities with its neighbours. The Commission focuses on the integrity and swiftness of customs practices as crucial elements for the “just-in-time” practices of multi-national business. On the question of swiftness, one of the main challenges is the bureaucratic complexity; each neighbour has

a different set of bureaucratic practices for clearing goods from customs. As the Commission points out, “[o]n average, 40% of total transportation time is lost at the borders due to discrepancies in administrative procedures. Facilitation of border crossing procedures is therefore of key importance in stimulating trade by cutting time and costs” (European Commission 2012b, 8-9). Whereas bureaucratic complexity is an efficiency problem, economic discrepancies between the EU and its neighbours have possible insecurity effects on the EU’s internal stability. In particular, corruption among customs officers in neighbourhood countries is a major concern that affects supply chain integrity. Under the ENP, the Commission’s proposed border management and customs sector reforms “include safe and fluid trade lanes, risk management and combating fraud, as well as support for the modernization of customs infrastructure and procedures.” (European Commission 2012b, 9). Similarly, FRONTEX regularly organizes training seminars for border guards and customs officials from neighbouring countries in order to bring border management standards in the neighbouring countries closer to EU standards.

Discrepancies in border management practices are not the only standardization-related issues between the EU and the neighbours. Difficulties with co-modality and inter-modality present a major cause for concern. In particular, the railroad standards used in the former Eastern Bloc countries present a serious obstacle to the EU’s cargo transportation regime. The problem, in this case, is caused by different gauge standards used in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine (1520mm) and the rest of the EU (1435mm). This issue presents a major challenge in that railroad cargo must be transferred into different carriages at the EU’s external borders, causing bottlenecks.

Given its multiple forms, modalities, and regions, transportation is a vast policy area

for the EU. Unlike human mobility, transportation policy is, in both academic and practical ways, approached through a multitude of lenses. Insecurity does not have a monopoly over approaches to transportation policy. Yet, insecurity concerns are becoming important for transportation policymakers: “[s]ecurity in a transport context seeks to prevent acts of unlawful interference against passengers, freight or the transport infrastructure” (European Commission 2012b, 2). Similarly, “[t]ransport – and thus transport security – has also an important international dimension: in order to ensure security within the EU it may be necessary for transport security to be performed outside the EU before a journey to the EU commences” (European Commission 2012b, 2).

The ENP countries, as the external points of departure for flows entering the EU, play an important role in the Union’s transportation insecurity management technologies. Under the ENP, the insecurity logic of transportation is manifested in proposed reforms to the way customs officials are trained, the designation of airports and container ports as high-risk areas, as well as the identification of TEN-Ts and shipping ports as critical infrastructures that require insecurity management.

Similar to the human mobility-related insecurity management practices, transportation related insecurity management practices have extra-territorializing effects. Under the ENP’s transportation insecurity management component, the EU is pushing for the implementation of European standards for practices that ensure the integrity and security of cargo transportation to/from the ENP countries. Whereas customs official training forms a component of this process, these training programs often include an introduction to material technologies that allow for efficient and secure movement of goods. The extra-territorialization of practices often manifests itself with the simultaneous

expansion of the EU's material technologies into the neighbours. The implementation of port insecurity management measures that include increased surveillance practices, biometric identification of port personnel, digital surveillance of cargo movement, and various scanners and readers that interact with RFID tags placed inside cargo shipments to ensure the integrity of cargo from the point of shipment to delivery are some of the many examples of this phenomenon.

Thus far this chapter has reflected on the institutional technologies of the EU in the human and transportation mobility insecurity fields. In particular, it focused on the institutional and legal frameworks upon which the EU's internal and external mobility insecurity management practices are based upon. The final section of this chapter serves as both an introduction to the material technologies of insecurity communities and as an introduction to the chapters 6 and 7, which focus on e-Passports and intermodal-shipping containers respectively.

Material Technologies of Mobility Insecurity in the European Neighbourhood

Both the internal and external dimensions of the EU's mobility practices are becoming increasingly dependent on material technologies of insecurity governance, including e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers. These are often referred to as "smart" objects due to their ability to facilitate the functioning of related databases, networks, sensors, scanners, and RFID tags. Similarly, these object are built on "secure formats," as their production process is based on commonly agreed-upon international standards such as file formats, encryption keys, and protocols for communicating meta-data. These "smart" and

“secure” objects provide necessary conditions for the digitalization, or virtualization, of border controls and related risk-assessment processes. The smartness and secureness of these objects contribute to their “security capital.”

By the “security capital” of an object, I am referring to its perceived security credentials. The security credentials of these objects require a reasonable level of trust of an object’s safety and security by the bureaucratic and elite fields involved in the management of the constant productive field of insecurity. These objects with security capital serve an important purpose within the broader technologies of insecurity governance as material artifacts that contribute to the active management of threats and unease. They provide a level of predictability and stability necessary to maintain a field of insecurity that depends on managing insecurities. In other words, as objects with security capital, these standardized artifacts are perceived to be reliable and trust-worthy and as such they take an active role in the management of insecurities.

From the moment we purchase a plane ticket for international travel, or arrange a transportation company to move cargo across national borders, a digital paper trail is generated by the vendor and shared with national authorities. This is a result of the ever-expanding circuit of insecurity governance that includes discourses, practices, and material and governmental technologies of insecurity governance. The contemporary insecurity management practices at the border have an *a priori* digital component that precedes the physical searches and interrogations. For persons travelling in and out of the Schengen zone, this file, known as either the Passenger Name Record (PNR), or Advanced Passenger Information (API) (Brouwer 2009, Guild and Brouwer 2006, Salter 2010, Hobbing 2010) includes personal information (passport number, citizenship, name, address), purchase

information (method of payment, date of purchase), personal preferences (meal requests, seat selection), and frequent flyer programme information. This PNR data also includes information about the vendor and will occasionally have additional information entered into the system by the vendor about the passenger. The information gathered in the PNR then gets crosschecked against the already available information on the passenger and against “watch lists” as well as existing insecurity assessment rubrics. This “intelligence” file often includes the information collected during previous travels or visa applications, as well as any other information collected by the intelligence and police agencies of the EU MS. Similarly, when we are shipping goods across a border we are required to provide information about the sender, receiver, and the transportation company, as well as specific information about the cargo (a list of items being shipped, commodity description, the weight of the freight) which are then checked against the information gathered at the port of entry and crosschecked against existing intelligence and risk factors.

None of these central practices of mobility and transportation insecurity management can be possible without a material infrastructure that enables them. The circulation of data that facilitate the contemporary insecurity management practices at the border necessitates material technologies of insecurity governance. Furthermore, these material technologies rely on objects with security capital that in return function as commonly agreed-upon standards for practice. These objects provide a level of trusts and reliability necessary to have a functioning field of insecurity governance that is supposed to govern threats and unease.

The methodological value of the e-Passport and the intermodal container as key objects for this project is due to their centrality to human mobility and transportation

insecurity management practices: travellers use passports and immigration officials authenticate the passports, cargo companies pack goods in containers, and customs officials design their processes and practices around the specific standards of the container. These objects not only function as platforms through which the border interactions between the traveller/supplier and immigration/customs officials take place, but, by the virtue of their technical capabilities and specifications, operationalize various networks that oversee the insecurity management component of border interactions. Methodologically, these interfaces provide an entry point to conceptualize the EU's border insecurity management technologies.

The proliferation of material technologies and the re-configuration of mobility and transportation insecurity management practices around certain interfaces is visible in the organizational, practical, and spatial aspects of insecurity management at the border. At a practical level, decision-making processes at the border are becoming increasingly reliant on material technologies that include biometric readers, remote databases, surveillance cameras, x-ray machines, and y-ray radiation meters, among others. In spatial terms, the architectural elements and everyday spaces of border crossings are being designed around such key objects as the e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers. Technological advances and the design of border security infrastructures are becoming interdependent, if not symbiotic. Similarly, in organizational terms, we are witnessing a (re)alignment or configuration of relationalities and practices around certain interfaces that enable the free flow of information, which in return facilitates the smooth functioning of global mobility regimes. To give an example, the intermodal container serves as a platform, or an agreed-upon standard with an associated set of practices such as pre-set dimensions and

construction materials, commonly agreed-upon security and surveillance technologies that come embedded in the container, as well as standardized serial numbers that make a container easier to distinguish and track among millions of others like it. Furthermore, these standardized characteristics and specifications of the intermodal container serve as a platform for the workings of insecurity management technologies that are an integral part of global transportation regimes.

The EU's border insecurity management and customs practices are no exception in this regard. They are also increasingly becoming reliant on material technologies. The Commission actively solicits and funds research projects that aim to “[d]evelop an integrated approach to enhance the use of new technologies, including existing and planned IT tools, moving towards integration of the individual functionalities of different systems forming part of the overall IT architecture” (European Commission 2008b, 12) overseeing the management of mobility insecurity practices. As the Commission puts it, “[s]ecurity in the Union requires an integrated approach where security professionals share a common culture, pool information as effectively as possible and have the right technological infrastructure to support them” (European Council 2010, 18). The material technologies of mobility insecurity form a significant component of the overall mobility insecurity technology *repertoire* of the EU.

Under the EU's human mobility security regime, the practices of control regulating (ir)regular flows are dependent on the functioning of various material technologies of insecurity governance. For example, the internal/institutional coordination between EU MS consulates and border agencies ensuring the everyday practices of the Schengen Visa regime is very much dependent on the successful functioning of the Schengen Information

Systems I and II (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS), which in return are dependent on secure and trust-worthy travel identification documents. In other words, whereas the cooperation and harmonization necessary for the everyday functioning of the Schengen Area are dependent on the binary codes, processors, hard disks, and encrypted networks that constitute SIS-I, II, and VIS, these databases, in return, are dependent on the e-Passport, which serves as a platform for the collectively agreed-upon protocols and content formats that operationalize these databases.

From the perspective of policy-makers and insecurity management practitioners, material technologies such as the SIS and VIS ensure maximum control over flows coming in and out of the EU. As the EU's border insecurity agency FRONTEX suggests "A fully operational and developed VIS is a prerequisite to making border checks more efficient and thereby enhancing security, for example by helping to avoid identity theft" (FRONTEX 2012). Along these lines, the proposed long-term goal of FRONTEX is "to shape the future of border checks by researching in close contact with Member States and industry – how to integrate different information management systems and tools towards the framing of a 'virtual border' concept" (FRONTEX 2012). The emergence of this "virtual" border will not only depend on the integration of various databases, enabling effective and free exchange of information between databases, but also on the reliability and security of travel identity documents.¹² In other words, the prospect of a virtual border that pre-sorts populations is dependent on a secure and commonly agreed-upon platform, or interface.

¹² Whereas it is not only plausible but also very likely that the identity documents as interfaces will be replaced with simple RFID chips with our biometric information embedded, which will then be crosschecked against our fingerprints or retinal scans, as it stands, the prospect of a "virtual border" is dependent on a secure and trusted identity document.

EU institutions are becoming increasingly dependent on developments in material technologies to pursue their policy objectives. In other words, they are increasingly placing their hopes and trust upon material technologies to solve some of the more pressing challenges of the EU today. To give an example on this point:

[t]he European Council considers that technology can play a key role in improving and reinforcing the system of external border controls. The entry into operation of the second generation Schengen Information System II (SIS II) and the roll-out of the Visa Information system (VIS) therefore remains a key objective and the European Council calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure that they now become fully operational in keeping with the timetables to be established for that purpose [...] The setting up of an administration for large-scale IT systems could play a central role in the possible development of IT systems in the future.

(European Council 2010, 27)

This is, however, not to say that the machines have full control over the decision-making processes – *just yet*. Even the so-called “Automated Border Control Systems” (ABCs) require at least an immigration officer to oversee the authentication process. Artifacts and interfaces still require human supervision. It is undeniable that the human actors still play an important role in border insecurity management; the consular personnel of the EU MS continue to interview applicants for Schengen visas, and border guards still have the right to deny someone entry to a national territory regardless of what the computers and scanners tell the guards to do. Technological advances in identification technologies and the increased speed and reliability of networked interfaces continuously undermine the “present” configuration and plant the seeds of future transformations. Whereas the ABCs are the current “innovation” in border security practices, we can foresee how an interface such as the AVATAR, an emerging technology that combines affective markers with biometrics by digitally assessing the risk-factor of the traveller, may eventually replace the

human element in border security (Muller 2012) and move towards the completely virtual decision making practices at the border.

Border officials are always on the look out for new technologies. FRONTEX, for example, lists “exploration of the potential offered by new border management technologies to meet the dual objective of enhancing security while facilitating travel” (FRONTEX 2012) as one of its core mandates. The agency openly admits that it “proactively monitors and contributes to developments in research relevant to the control and surveillance of the external borders” (FRONTEX 2012). It is, thus, not surprising that the EU’s external border with the Ukraine was one of the pilot-tests for the AVATAR platform (Muller 2012), or that ABCs are now common in such “hub” airports within the EU as Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and Paris.

It is, however, important to note that this transformation is equally driven by the fact that criminal elements are constantly seeking the next loophole in the system; they are always looking for ways to bypass the authorities and practices of control to pursue illegal activities such as smuggling and trafficking. Driving innovation in mobility insecurity management practices is not a practice exclusive to the policy-makers and border security professionals; insecurity professionals also have a say on the matter.

Material technologies of insecurity governance are not peripheral, or passive, tools for mobility insecurity management. In Europe and beyond, technology plays an important role in contemporary practices of control, surveillance, and sorting of populations and things. We can observe a material culture of mobility insecurity governance emerging. These material technologies are no longer an option, but rather a requirement for governing mobility and transportation insecurity regimes. Whether we consider this to be a result of

the changing trends in international mobilities in light of global interconnectedness, or an emergent state-technology to find a balance between tensions of security and speed, we need to take these developments seriously and address them both in terms of their academic and practical implications.

Conclusions

This chapter presented an overview of the institutional technologies of insecurity governance surrounding the EU's insecurity management practices in mobility and transportation sectors under the ENP. The chapter focused particularly on the institutional and legal aspects of the EU's mobility and transportation insecurity regimes by mapping out the institutional relationalities that create and sustain human mobility and transportation insecurity management practices of the EU.

Institutional technologies are a necessary step for the management of insecurity. The institutional technologies covered in this chapter reflect on the developments in the EU's mobility insecurity management practices that have been designed to address insecurity as manageable threat. These agencies, networks, databases etc. are designed to facilitate technologies that address insecurities. Supranational institutions, as products of insecurity communities, play a central role in translating shared concerns over insecurities into shared technologies. They create new bureaucracies and/or complement existing ones that actively take part in the management of threats and unease. Within in the mobility and transportation insecurity management policies of the EU DG HOME and DG MOVE play an important role for overseeing policy developments on human mobility and transportation

policies, task-specific EU agencies such as FRONTEX, TREVI, and TRACEA serve important purposes for insecurity management that shape the border and customs policies of the EU.

Within this institutional maze, the Council, as a body that represents EU MS' interests, along with Parliament has the final say over the policy directions of the EU. The subsidiarity principle discussed earlier in this chapter applies here. Similarly, as discussed in chapter 4, negotiations between different EU bureaucracies often results in compromise policies. Under the ENP, the goals and ambitions on the Commission has been curbed by the demands of the Council.

Building on the analysis of the EU's institutional technologies for mobility insecurity governance, the final subsection of the chapter, while focusing on developing the concept of material technologies of insecurity governance, also unpacked some key terms and introduced some important observations that will be further developed in chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER 6

THE E-PASSPORT

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the use of the e-Passport as a material technology of insecurity governance under the ENP framework. In particular, the chapter studies the bureaucratic and elite discourses and practices that shaped the process leading up to the implementation of the e-Passport as a condition for visa liberalization processes under the ENP. As part of the broader discussion on technologies of insecurity governance presented in this dissertation, this chapter considers the e-Passport to be an object within the broader material technologies of mobility security.

The e-Passport, or the biometric passport, emerged as an international standard following the ICAO's recommendation in 2006 (ICAO 2006a 2006b; 2008).¹ The e-Passport is the third such recommendation that the ICAO has made since its creation in 1947. The first two generations of ICAO standards for travel documents included the standard, or paper-based, travel documents and the machine-readable travel documents (MRTDs). I discuss the technical aspects of these passports in detail below. The e-Passports biometric data storage capabilities and the embedded RFID chip make it much harder to counterfeit. The development of the e-Passport was a direct response to the problems associated with counterfeited travel documents. In that regard, e-Passport developers have

¹ In anticipation of the ICAO's new standard, the European Council has started working towards incorporating the e-Passport, and in particular the e-Passport's biometric capabilities, into their mobility security practices by 2004 (European Council 2004a).

worked in collaboration with national border security agencies and the ICAO in an attempt to address the “real world” insecurity threats associated with increased transnational mobility of persons.

This chapter is structured around four sections that look at how the technologies of insecurity governance presented in this dissertation contributed to the implementation of the e-Passport as a material technology of insecurity by the EU in an attempt to manage the insecurities associated with human mobility. In general, the chapter addresses the question “why the e-Passport?” To do so, the first section focuses on bureaucratic and elite-driven discursive technologies of insecurity governance. The following section looks at the institutional technologies of insecurity governance and traces the role of different actors in shaping the EU’s mobility insecurity practices. The third section focuses on the role of e-Passport under the ENP framework in order to discuss the overlaps between territorial and material technologies of insecurity governance.

Discursive technologies of mobility insecurity and the e-Passport

The first known account of a travel identification document appears in the Old Testament, referring to a letter drafted by King Artaxerxes of the Persian Empire for his messenger Nehemiah to ensure his safe passage across the Empire.² History is full of similar anecdotes on different forms of documents that share a common purpose: identifying their holder while recognizing their issuer. Identification through documentation is a necessary

² “[...] Moreover I said unto the King, if it pleases the King let letters be given me to the governors beyond the river that they may convey me over till I come into Judah [...] Then I came to the governors beyond the river and gave them the King’s letters [...]” (Nehemiah 2: 7-9 quoted in Lloyd 2003, 29)

condition for contemporary practices of mobility insecurity governance. Practitioners of border insecurity require identification documents to separate visitors from citizens, and threats from trusted persons.

As Salter (2003) notes, passports serve a central purpose in addressing the anxieties of states as “material markers of identity that structure legitimate and illegitimate [forms of] international movement” (2). The passport serves as a “secure format” that is central to the efforts to manage insecurities. Identification processes are dependent on “making people legible” to the state (Scott 1998, 65). Accordingly “[e]stablishing the identity of individual people – as workers, taxpayers, conscripts, travelers, criminal suspects – is increasingly recognized as fundamental to the multiple operations of the state” (Caplan and Torpey 2001, 1). Just as legibility as a process is dependent on technologies and techniques such as the alphabet, reading, and writing, associating mobility with insecurity and establishing a mobility insecurity regime around individual(ized) identities to manage said insecurities is dependent on commonly agreed-upon formats and standards for identification purposes. These formats, objects, and standards, among others, constitute the material technologies of mobility insecurity governance.

Demand for the development of these “secure formats” has traditionally been driven by political pressures to have “secure” borders. The association of migration with insecurity in the EU and North America and subsequent proliferation of practices of insecurity governance at the border has been discussed widely elsewhere (see: Boswell 2007a; 2007b, DeBardeleben 2005, Epstein 2007, Mountz 2010; 2011, Muller 2010, Salter 2004; 2006). Within the context of the EU, Bigo and his colleagues in the so-called Paris school (Bigo 2010, Bigo and Guild 2005, Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002,

Huysmans 2000; 2006, Neal 2009) look at extra-territorialization, intelligence gathering and sharing, and surveillance as central practices of mobility insecurity management. In general, these authors all agree that Western governments have successfully associated migration and mobility with insecurity in a way that they now regard these activities as manageable threats.

Within the EU, the Council has primarily been behind the efforts to establish migration with insecurity and develop the necessary technologies of insecurity governance to manage these insecurities. The EU-level discourses on the subject are shaped by the EU MS. The European Security Strategy (European Council 2003), the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA (European Council 2005a), the Schengen Borders Code (European Council 2006a), as well as the more comprehensive Stockholm programme (European Council 2010) and the Dublin II regulation (European Council 2003a) have all been developed by the Council and function as the basis for the Union's mobility insecurity management practices. Similarly, the majority of times that the Commission has taken the initiative to develop policy on mobility insecurity, they have been invited to do so by the Council (European Commission 2005a; 2008a; 2008c; 2011b; 2011c).

At the national level, EU MS politicians regularly express their frustrations with the reduced power they have to control their national border as a result of the elimination of internal borders within the Schengen Area (Zaiotti 2011). This frustration stems from the "irregular migrant problem" that was covered in chapter 5. The elimination of internal borders has resulted in a number of insecurity externalities that a) require further integration, and b) have uneven effects on EU MS; MS bordering third countries have to spend more on border security and immigration controls than other EU MS. The multiple-

claims phenomenon and the regular migrants that over-stay their visas have been identified as important factors that contribute to the “Schengen-related” immigration problems in the EU. While national discourses on the topic are often fueled during election campaigns, and increase during major external catalysts such as the Arab Spring, in the past decade there has been a sustained level of discourses that associate the mobility of persons with insecurity among EU MS bureaucracies and policy elites.

EU institutions actively take part in the management of insecurities associated with human mobility; the increased emphasis on defining immigration as an “insecurity problem” has resulted in further institutionalization through increased cooperation and integration at the EU-level. On the one hand, the EU MS authorized the Commission to create FRONTEX and EURODAC and gave the Commission the mandate to negotiate and sign readmission agreements and visa-liberalization roadmaps with third-countries. On the other hand, the Council, in cooperation with the Commission and the Parliament, has passed regulations that require the development of an EU-wide “smart” entry/exit system to be developed (European Commission 2008a; 2008c; 2011b; 2011c, European Council 2003a; 2006a; 2010) as well as improvements to the EU MS national travel documents and visas to include biometric data (European Council 2004a; 2005b; 2009).

The particular attention to travel documents with biometric capabilities has been further fueled by sensationalized instances of document fraud and counterfeited passports and promotional discourses of biometric identity solution providers that present their technologies as a remedy to this problem. I discuss the role of private companies in relation to the introduction of the e-Passport further below. It is, however, important to remember that the authorities do not have a monopoly over the pace or the direction of technological

developments. They are one of the stakeholders in a marketplace that includes corporations and criminals, among others. Criminals, just like government officials, are interested in technological developments to find new loopholes in the system. Whereas private-public partnerships often fund innovation, the vibrant culture of hacking also results in security breaches, or exposes secrets of the art to the public, which in return drives innovation. Having such a fast-transforming system results in overlaps in technology. These overlaps result not only in the proliferation of travel documents, but also require insecurity professionals and technology developers to maintain backwards compatibility.

In the case of the management of mobility as a source of insecurity, national level discourses on (im)migration result in pressures on the EU bureaucracies through Council resolutions. In return, the Commission identifies common concerns of EU MS and negotiates with the Council members in an attempt to harmonize different meanings, or interpretations, of insecurities stemming from the elimination of internal borders under the Schengen Agreement and develop collective technologies of insecurity governance. Alongside the translation of these collective discourses into common practices, EU institutions develop institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance.

Institutional Technologies of Mobility Insecurity and the e-Passport

The EU is one of the many actors that contribute to contemporary global mobility insecurity regimes. Within these regimes, passports emerge as a commonly agreed-upon format for controlling human mobility. The agreement that established the passport as a

common format was codified during the interwar period “by the League of Nations at a conference on Provisional Committee on Communications and Transit Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and Through Tickets held in 1920 in Paris” (Salter 2003, 77, *see also*: League of Nations 1925).

Building on the precedence of this League of Nations agreement, “ICAO’s mandate [...] stems from the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) which covers the full range of requirements for efficient and orderly civil aviation operations, including provisions for clearance of persons through border controls” (ICAO 2008, 1). This mandate includes the harmonization of technical standards for international travel documents. In 1980, in accordance with this mandate, the ICAO published the first edition of Doc 9303, titled A Passport with Machine Readable Capability (ICAO 2008, 1). Since 1980s, the ICAO’s Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) published three updated versions of document 9309, each corresponding with a generation of international travel documents.³

The Assembly of the ICAO establishes these standards and produces the documents in consultation with the ISO, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the Airports Council International (ACI), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (ICAO 2006a, 2). The ICAO’s stated purpose for pursuing such a level of

³ Currently, ICAO standards for international travel documents are based on the latest version of document 9303 on *Machine-Readable Travel Documents* (MRTDs) (ICAO 2006a; 2006b; 2008). In particular, Document 9303 volume 1, parts 1 (ICAO 2006a), 2 (ICAO 2006b), and 3 (ICAO 2008) establish technical specifications for MRTDs with optical character recognition format (ICAO 2006a; 2008) and the e-Passport (ICAO 2006b). These documents outline general technical specifications for MRTDs (including the e-Passport), and technical specifications for the security practices associated with their design, manufacturing, and issuance.

international cooperation is to ensure that:

[I]f public authorities are to facilitate inspection formalities for the vast majority of air travellers, those authorities must have a satisfactory level of confidence in the reliability of travel documents and in the effectiveness of inspection procedures. The production of standardized specifications for travel documents and the data contained therein is aimed at building that confidence.

(ICAO 2006a, 2)

The harmonization of international practices, procedures, and processes requires a competent central actor. As such, the ICAO's role as the central authority for all aspects of international civil aviation is essential for ensuring the standardization of insecurity management practices associated with air travel across all nations.

In the four decades since the Chicago convention, ICAO has been forced to revisit its standards for travel documents three times to maintain a "satisfactory level of confidence," or "security capital" among border insecurity practitioners. ICAO is pressured to upgrade the technical specifications of the MRTDs in order to keep up with the pace of technological developments and the perpetual fight against illegal activities such as counterfeiting, fraudulent alterations, and, more recently, hacking. ICAO defines counterfeit as "an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means" (ICAO 2008, xii). Similarly, fraudulent alterations refer to "the alteration of a genuine document in an attempt to enable it to be used for travel by an unauthorized person or to an unauthorized destination. The biographical details of the genuine holder, particularly the portrait, form the prime target for such alteration" (ICAO 2008, xiv).

The current generation of travel documents represents a shift towards further digitalization of insecurity management practices at the border. In the EU, the

implementation of the e-Passport allowed for the operationalization of various mobility insecurity management databases. These databases include: the SIS-I (and eventually SIS-II), the Visa Information System (VIS), the PNR, and the EURODAC and EUROPOL databases. The creation of these databases requires further institutionalization at the EU-level. The use of the e-Passport has become central to the practices of the Schengen short-term visa regime, visa waiver programmes, and practices associated with the Dublin-II regime that governs the mobility of irregular persons between the EU and non-EU countries. These practices, due to their significance for the countries bordering the EU, are central to the ENP's human mobility insecurity components.

The members of the Schengen Area have already agreed to replace their second generation MRTDs with e-Passports (European Council 2004a). Similarly, under the visa-liberalization roadmaps with the ENP countries and mobility partnership Action Plans with the ENP countries (European Commission 2007e; 2008c; 2011b), the Commission has presented the implementation of the e-Passport as a requirement for visa-facilitation and/or visa-waiver (see: European Commission 2008d). In other words, the implementation of the e-Passport, along with mobility sector reforms and the signing of a readmission treaty, have emerged as conditions for visa-free travel between the EU and its neighbours under the ENP framework.

Governance of mobility insecurity in the EU requires institutional cooperation at the supranational level and development of task-specific agencies. In the case of the ENP, the challenge is to develop the capacities of neighbouring countries and provide satisfactory incentives to attract them into entering partnerships based on shared technologies of insecurity governance. By addressing these issues, this section of the chapter focused on

developments related to the e-Passport and the institutional technologies of mobility insecurity governance in the EU. The next section focuses on the e-Passport as a material technology of insecurity governance, looking at the e-Passport's technical specifications. The subsequent section of the chapter focuses on the e-Passport's role in the EU's territorial technologies of insecurity governance under the ENP, looking in particular at the role of e-Passports in EU mobility partnerships and visa-facilitation programmes, as well as changing practices at the EU's external borders.

Material technologies of mobility insecurity governance and the e-Passport

There are currently three different technical standards for travel documents in circulation. First is the "standard passport," with the identity information presented in written form, which is gradually being phased out of international circulation. Second, the MRTD has been in place since 1980s and is the predecessor of the e-Passport. MRTDs contain a barcode with biographical data on the identity page, encoded in optical recognition format. Finally, the most up-to-date travel identity document is the e-Passport, equipped with a RFID chip and biometric data storage capabilities. The RFID chip is embedded inside a "contactless smart card," which is used for the swift transmission of biometric data at the ports of entry.

While there are some major differences between these three versions of the passport, these documents also share some important commonalities. First, they are all based on the ISO/IEC 7810 ID-3 standard that determines the physical characteristics of passports (125x88mm or size B7 format). Secondly, each passport also includes biographical data

(i.e. the name, birthdate, gender, place of birth, and country of citizenship of their holder along with a picture). Thirdly, in order to ensure the integrity of the document, each passport is assigned with an individual “control” number, which is “a number assigned to a document at the time of its manufacture for record keeping and security purposes” (ICAO 2008, xii). Finally, they are only valid for a finite period of time (usually 5 or 10 years, depending on the country of issue).

Unlike standard passports and MRTDs, the e-Passports have certain technological specifications that allow them to digitally store various forms of data including biometric, biographical, and meta-data. ICAO defines e-Passports as:

A machine readable passport (MRP) containing a Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC) chip within which is stored data from the MRP data page, a biometric measure of the passport holder, and a security object to protect the data with PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] cryptographic technology, and which conforms to the specifications of [ICAO] Doc 9303, Part 1.

(ICAO 2008, xiii)

As a result of their technical specifications, e-Passports are able to interact with other forms of identification technologies much more easily and are regarded as an efficient and secure standard by insecurity professionals involved in the border management practices. Ceyhan (2006) defines identification technologies as “interrelated systems working together to collect, process, store, and disseminate information to support law enforcement agents in their decision-making coordination, control, analysis and visualization” (109). As an object of identification technologies, the e-Passport allows border officials to crosscheck the information written on the document against biometric data stored inside the RFID chip as well as the information stored in networked databases.

Given their capacity to operationalize other forms of identification technologies, e-Passports emerge as smart objects with security capital within the broader material technologies of insecurity governance mechanisms. Keeping identity documents secure within an environment defined by insecurity is not only dependent on government spending or innovation driven by private-public partnerships; it is also dependent on being ahead of counterfeiters. Spending increasing amounts of money on improving the security of identity documents does not necessarily result in actual improvements to their security. Governments and corporations do not have a monopoly over technological innovation and the digitalization of biographical data and the introduction of biometric information do not necessarily prevent counterfeiting or document fraud. Rather, the digitalization of travel documents replaced paper-based counterfeiters with hackers; counterfeiters no longer need their “X-Acto” knives and fountain pens, which have been replaced with computer programs that can be downloaded for free from the Internet, and RFID writers that can be found for \$30 on eBay. With a necessary set of coding skills, hacking the RFID chip inside e-Passport, which cost taxpayers hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars of public funds, can be done for less than \$100.

Avoiding hacking and being ahead of the criminals are part of the ever-expanding circuits of insecurity governance. In other words, technologies of insecurity governance – material or otherwise – factor in these threats and try to mitigate them through insecurity management. Just as the introduction of MRTDs and e-Passports occurred as a response to the ease with which standard passports were counterfeited or fraudulently altered, future developments in identification documents will respond to the shortcomings of the e-Passport. The proliferation of fraudulent documents is a serious concern for border control

authorities but one that can be managed. Fraudulent and/or counterfeited travel documents undermine the integrity of the global mobility insecurity management regime as a whole.

The remainder of this subsection looks at the three stages of technological innovation which led to the introduction of the e-Passport as an international standard: emergence, continuity, and transformation. Emergence refers to the period leading up to the e-Passport's introduction as the recommended format by the ICAO. Continuity focuses on the period during which the travel document's role is stable within the material-somatic network. Finally, transformation refers to the period where the role of the e-Passport is undermined either through technological innovation or security failures.

Transformation is written into the processes of innovation. Whereas "ICAO's work on machine readable travel documents began in 1968 with the establishment, by the Air Transport Committee of the Council, of a Panel on Passport Cards" (ICAO 2008, 1), it was not until 1998 that the Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents (TAG/MRTD) began work to "establish the most effective biometric identification system and associated means of data storage for use in MRTD applications" (ICAO 2008, 1). The outcome of the TAG/MRTD's conclusions led to the introduction of MRTDs and eventually eMRTDs – or e-Passports. Since the early 2000s, e-Passports have started to replace MRTDs.

Under the Chicago Convention, ICAO is tasked with ensuring standards for travel documents. Such a process requires international cooperation. The process leading up to the introduction of e-Passports was pursued in consultation with national governments, national border control authorities, and specialized international organizations such as INTERPOL, the IOM, and the ISO for ensuring practices of standardization. These consultations took

place to ensure that this new generation of travel documents met the expectations and requirements of ICAO members and national authorities responsible for authorizing, issuing, and processing travel documents. These expectations and requirements are informed not only by the (supra)national legislations and other international commitments of ICAO members, but also by the failures of previous formats.

The emergence of e-Passports needs to be contextualized in relation to the vulnerabilities of previous forms of travel documents. The e-Passport is considered to be a combined paper and electronic passport that is “designed for both visual and mechanical reading” (ICAO 2008, 2). The biographical data printed on e-Passports includes the full name, birthdate, place of birth, and sex of the holder, a unique passport number, the date of issue and expiration, and a picture that meets biometric specifications set out by the ISO/IEC 19794-5 standard. Additionally, e-Passports are equipped with a barcode based on the optical recognition format (a technology that was also available in the previous generation MRTDs), as well as a “contactless smart card” that consists of an RFID chip and a transmitting and receiving antenna which stores the data doubles of the biographical data, as well as biometric data and a security encryption.

The contactless “smart” card consists of a microprocessor chip and a RFID antenna that is used to conduct power/data; it is in fact a semi-conductor device that stores biographic and biometric data and communicates it with a reader using radio frequency energy (ICAO 2006b). The ICAO standards require this microprocessor to store a minimum of 32 kilobytes in its Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) memory card (ICAO 2006b). This EEPROM technology is very similar to the data storage options available to the general public via flash storage keys, albeit in a micro

scale at mere kilobytes rather than gigabytes. Given the limited storage capacity, the data stored within the EEPROM is generally limited to the biometric information of the passport holder. This biometric data includes the JPEG – or JPEG 2000 – file of the passport holder’s digital image and can include the fingerprints of the holder as well. The data stored within the EEPROM also includes an individualized key that ensures that the data stored within the passport has not been tampered with via the digital certificate issued by the national PKI protocol. I unpack the functioning of the national PKI protocol in detail below. Finally, the functioning of the e-Passport necessitates that the data stored in the microprocessor be transferred to a “proximity-coupling device” or an electronic border control (e-Border) system that exchanges necessary certificates with the contactless smart card to gain access to the data stored within. This process is based on the ISO/IEC 14443 standards.

The biometric data stored within the smart card, and the card’s ability to digitally transmit data, are the major difference between e-Passports and their predecessors. The card’s capabilities present two solutions. First, the contactless transmission of data between e-Passports and border control databases allows for the smoother movement of “trusted travellers.” Smart, or automated, border control practices developed to facilitate the unrestricted movement of trusted travellers, however, require biometric data (Ceyhan 2006, Muller 2004; 2005; 2010, Salter 2004; 2006). Ceyhan defines biometrics as “the automated use of physiological, biological, genetic and behavioral features to assess the uniqueness of one person and to determine, verify and authenticate his/her identity” (Ceyhan 2006, 113). According to ICAO (2008)

The optional introduction of biometric identification with data stored on a contactless integrated circuit will provide greater security and resistance to fraud and thus make it easier for the legitimate document holder to obtain visas for travel and to be processed through border inspection systems.

(ICAO 2008, 2)

The biometric data stored inside the smart card serves as a benchmark for comparison with the biometric data collected at the port of entry. This process is designed to prevent counterfeiting and document fraud; however, this assumption is based on the actual integrity of the smart card. E-Passports are not completely secure or tamper-proof, and since their introduction there have been numerous instances of hacking, and cloning of the smart cards (Fallon 2008, Zetter 2008). While they have proven to be secure formats with security capital that facilitate digitalization of border control practices, they have not proven to be a tamper-proof format; virtually nothing is tamper-proof when it comes to digital artifacts.

Insecurity concerns are not the only problems with e-Passports. Privacy concerns associated with unencrypted data storage and remote surveillance have attracted criticism. Critics have pointed out that the e-Passport is neither tamper-proof, nor quantifiably more secure than its predecessors, suggesting that its implementation was premature or outright unnecessary (Chotia and Smirnov 2010, Heimo *et al.* 2012, Hoepman *et al.* 2006, Richter *et al.* 2008, Schouten and Bart 2009). Opponents of the e-Passport have repeatedly demonstrated that the RFID tags embedded within the contactless smart cards are prone to remote cloning (or contactless copying of the embedded data) and can be traced by sensors calibrated to “snoop” for RFID antennas nearby (Goodin 2010). Given the 10-meter radius on some of the RFID antennas used in e-Passports, “snooping,” or eavesdropping on the

smart card creates the possibility for remote surveillance by non-authorized state or non-state actors. Targeted persons carrying e-Passports are more vulnerable to yet another form of individualized surveillance that is capable of tracking them remotely without their knowledge.

As a result of these serious issues with the technical aspects of e-Passports, identity document manufacturers such as 3M, Gemalto, HID, and Semlex have been forced to include further security and privacy measures that were previously optional in e-Passports. Since their introduction, there have been three generations of e-Passports. In other words, the continuity period of the e-Passport has been much shorter than its predecessors. While most of the changes addressed encryption vulnerabilities, developers have also made changes to the processes surrounding the document.

The EU MS were among the first to implement the e-Passport, in 2004 (European Council 2004a, European Union Data Supervisor 2008). In light of the vulnerabilities of the document, however, the EU MS have gradually introduced three upgrades. The first generation of electronic passport issued by the EU MS supported a technology known as Basic Access Control (BAC). The contactless chip on a BAC passport contains the passport data plus a facial image, with a digital signature to detect modification, but all this data remained static, unchanged from inspection to inspection. Furthermore, in these first generation documents, the smart card did not include an encryption for the data stored inside the chip. As such, the document was vulnerable to both cloning and snooping.

The second-generation e-Passports were introduced in June 2009. Unlike their predecessors, these documents contained fingerprints along with the facial images,

protected by the Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol. Whereas the UK and Ireland participated in the EU-wide implementation of the first generation e-Passports, as non-Schengen countries they opted out from including fingerprints in their travel documents.⁴ In light of issues with cloning and hacking, second generation passports were equipped with individual private keys to resist counterfeiting, and required inspecting parties to prove that they are entitled to extract sensitive data such as the fingerprint, using digital signatures and a PKI.

The guiding principles of the PKI originate from cryptography. It suggests that for a system to be secure, it requires a validation process that includes at least three actors: a certification authority (CA), a registration authority (RA), and a central directory built around a common or shared standard. In the case of e-Passports in the EU, the (supra)national PKI infrastructure includes: national governments (CA), border control authorities (RA), and (supra)national databases that store biographical and biometric data, overseen by the EU's data protection supervisor and the recently created European Agency for managing large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security, and justice. The PKI infrastructure, unlike previous encryption protocols, relies on networked databases to digitally authenticate the passport, thus making it harder, but not impossible, to counterfeit.

A third generation of e-Passports has provided some functional solutions to detecting counterfeit documents and solving the privacy concerns associated with snooping and eavesdropping. The improved security measures in this latest generation of e-Passports include non-traceable chip identifiers that reply to each data request with a different chip

⁴ For an individualized list of national preferences and processes among the EU MS see: European Council 2007.

number. Similarly, the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) technology was used to ensure security and privacy by encrypting the data transferred between the e-Passport and the smart reader. This process requires that the border control officer enter a code that is printed on the document into the system, which is then crosschecked and authenticated by the contactless smart card prior to data transfer. In terms of preventing cloning and ensuring tamper proofing, technology providers have also incorporated Passive Authentication (PA) protocols that prevent the modification of chip data by embedding digital signatures within the data stored in the EEPROM. One of the simplest solutions to snooping and eavesdropping is to shield the physical document by using “privacy” cases (a form of “Faraday cage”) that have thin metal mesh liners preventing radio signals from reaching the contactless smart card inside the passport.

The technical specifications of e-Passports are important to understand the significance of this material technology of mobility insecurity governance. Their continuous (re)development is a result of the constant transformation of the insecurity landscape in Europe and beyond. As criminals and hackers find loopholes, insecurity professionals develop “patches” or more permanent fixes to those vulnerabilities exploited. It is clear that there is the political will to pursue further automation and digitalization of insecurity management technologies at the border. The digitalization of identification and subsequent automation of border control is seen as a solution to the pressing need to find a balance between speed and insecurity.

In the context of the ENP, the e-Passport is emerging as a condition for “mobility partnerships” and “visa-facilitation processes.” Interfaces such as the e-Passport need to be not only seen as requirements of the EU’s material technologies of insecurity governance,

but also as objects within the broader territorial technologies of insecurity governance. In other words, the EU not only needs the neighbours to subscribe to its internal standards and practices to ensure its internal security, but it needs them to subscribe to similar objects with security capital that address commonly agreed-upon insecurities to pursue mobility-sector cooperation. Building on this argument, the next subsection of the chapter focuses on the role of e-Passports in the EU's mobility security policies under the ENP.

Territorial technologies of mobility insecurity and the e-Passport

Biometrics has emerged as the gold standard for identification technologies (Amoore 2006, Bonditti 2004, Ceyhan 2008, Epstein 2007, Lyon 2008, Magnet 2011, Muller 2005; 2010, Salter 2004; 2006, Sparke 2006). Similarly, the EU border control authorities and the Commission have also emphasized the importance of biometric data as a common format for identification technologies (Aus 2006, European Commission 2011c, European Council 2004a; 2006a, FRONTEX 2007; 2010; 2011, Lodge 2007, van der Ploeg 1999). The proliferation of the use of biometrics has become clear in at least four developments in EU mobility insecurity governance practices under the ENP.

First, biometrics are increasingly becoming an essential component of the EU's regular migration regime to and from the ENP countries, especially in relation to the Schengen visa. Currently, the member states of the Schengen area rely on the Schengen short-term stay visa to control the movement of regular migrants coming into the EU. Visas, and in particular the current generation of biometric visas (ICAO 2005), provide an opportunity to accurately identify the identity of a traveller independent of the travel

document. The overall integrity of mobility security practices is dependent on one's identification through documentation. Travel documents need to be secure for the system to be secure. In this regard, document fraud and counterfeiting presents a challenge to the border control authorities.

As a biometric visa, the Schengen short-term visa is used to authenticate the identity of the traveller through a EU-wide PKI. This "Schengen PKI," as a closed system, consists of EU consulates that issue visas and collect the biometric data (CA), EU MS border control authorities (RA) that investigate the travel document, and the SIS-II and the VIS, which serve as the central databases that store the biometric and biographical data-doubles as well as other relevant information.

Second, biometric data is used regularly in processing asylum and refugee claims in the EU irregular migration practices under the Dublin-II. The EU-wide harmonization of asylum and refugee regimes and the centralization of the EU's biometric databases function as a EU-wide PKI for irregular migrants. Biometric features introduced under Dublin-II prevent asylum-claim frauds. The "EU Asylum PKI" functions in a similar way as the Schengen PKI, in that the EU authorities collect biometric data (fingerprints) at the moment of the asylum claim. This biometric data is then entered into the EURODAC (European Dactylopsy Database). Each new entry is then crosschecked against the existing data stored in the EURODAC. The EU Asylum PKI has proven to be successful in fighting multiple claims by asylum seekers in different EU MS.

Third, the circulation of biometric data, the Schengen PKI, and the e-Passport as an interface have created the necessary conditions for the automation of entry/exit systems that can facilitate "visa-liberalization" or "visa-waiver" processes with the ENP countries.

Smart “entry/exit” systems, such as the NEXUS programme between the US and Canada, rely on biometric data to identify “trusted travellers.” The EU is in the process of developing such a system with the Schengen Information System II. Currently, the biometric data stored in the e-Passport is checked against the Schengen PKI or the national PKI (depending on the citizenship of the traveller) in order to identify trusted travellers going through these Automated Border Controls (ABCs), or e-Gates.

Finally, biometric data has been increasingly used in criminal and judicial investigations that involve multiple countries including the ENP countries. Cooperation between EU MS, as well as internationally between EUROPOL and INTERPOL, relies on biometric data for investigative purposes. The circulation of biometric data requires a material culture. Networked databases such as the SIS-I and II, VIS, and EURODAC require a material infrastructure. Identification processes that span these four developments, however, also require an entry point. Within the current configurations of the EU’s mobility security practices, this entry point is the e-Passport.

The ICAO’s recommendation of the e-Passport as the global standard for travel documents led to the adoption of the document as the required passport format for the EU MS (European Council 2004a). While this decision was a controversial one (European Union Data Supervisor 2008, FIDIS 2008, Goodin 2010), in the EU’s external governance practices the Commission did not hesitate to present the e-Passport as a condition in proposed roadmaps for visa-liberalization with the ENP countries. The visa-liberalization process, in this regard, is only but an example. Within the broader human mobility regimes of the EU we are witnessing a trend for increased automation through digitalization. In

regards to human mobility, both the material and territorial technologies are being configured around the e-Passport as a smart travel document with security capital.

In concrete terms, the role of the e-Passport as an object within the material technologies of insecurity governance in the EU's relations with its neighbours becomes clear in three cases: 1) mobility partnerships, and visa liberalization roadmaps in particular, 2) the introduction of automated border controls at the external borders, and 3) the individualization (or scaling-down) of visa regimes under the proposed next-generation visas. These three represent instances in which the EU authorities successfully convinced the ENP countries to take part in the EU's existing technologies of insecurity governance in return for freer movement of their citizens to the Schengen area.

Mobility partnerships are non-binding agreements between the EU and third countries. Based on the December 2005 EU Council conclusions (Council of the European Union 2005), and the roadmap established by EU's "Global Approach to Migration" (European Commission 2011b), mobility partnerships are designed to facilitate the legal, and in this case also circular, movement of persons between the EU and participating countries – a majority of which consist of the ENP countries. They are capacity-building projects intended to "Europeanize" the mobility insecurity practices of participating countries. It is important to note here that mobility partnerships were originally designed with the ENP countries in mind, but they are now open to any country willing to participate.

As part of the EU's involvement in mobility insecurity practices in the neighbourhood, FRONTEX regularly conducts training workshops for border management professionals (including those from the ENP countries) that focus on "language training,"

“falsified document detection,” “common training for third countries’ border guards,” and “risk assessment training,” among others (Frontex 2013). Similarly, the Commission provides financial and technical assistance for improvements at border crossings and customs areas between the EU and ENP countries. These direct assistance programmes constitute 73% of the overall ENP budget (EUNIC 2013a). In particular, these programmes are structured around two methods: a) Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) (EUROPEAID 2013a), which provides technical assistance to authorities from the ENP countries; b) the “twinning” method, which “is a European Commission initiative that was originally designed to help candidate countries acquire the necessary skills and experience to adopt, implement and enforce EU legislation” (EUROPEAID 2013b), by bringing in a EU professional to “twin” with their counterpart in the neighbouring country in order to assist them in implementing EU standards for practice. In the field of human mobility insecurity, the EU has provided technical assistance and funded a number of projects in the ENP regions.

To provide some examples, under the Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management (IBM) programme, the Commission has paid 2 million Euros to provide training to “officials from beneficiary countries on specific topics such as risk analysis, document integrity and security, the fight against smuggling drugs/cigarettes and tobacco products, the protection of intellectual property rights, and the fight against trafficking in human beings” (EUNIC 2013b). Similarly, under the ENP framework, the EU has committed to paying 60 million Euros between 2011-2015 for “supporting the border management policy” reforms in Ukraine (EU Delegation to Ukraine 2011a). Similarly, as part of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (European Commission 2005a), under the European

Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), the Commission has contributed 22.5 million Euros, in order to “to make a sustainable contribution to the development of border-management procedures that meet European Union standards” (EU Delegation to Ukraine 2011b). In relation to the e-Passport, the Commission agreed to pay for the costs associated with the introduction of e-Passports in Moldova (approximately 2.5 million Euros) and provided necessary training to the Moldovan border security officials (EU Delegation to Moldova 2011a; 2011b). These financial and technical contributions demonstrate that the EU is committed to the mobility insecurity management reforms in its neighbourhood and is willing to pay for these reforms if the neighbouring country is willing to take part in the process.

Under the mobility partnerships, in return for visa facilitation,⁵ and the possibility of visa-liberalization as well as temporary legal employment, the EU expects participating countries to reform their mobility insecurity practices to bring them inline with EU standards.. As part of the mobility partnership agreements the Commission requires ENP countries to: 1) sign a readmission treaty that not only commits to identifying and readmitting their own citizens but also to readmitting third country nationals and stateless persons who arrived to the EU through the territories of the country concerned; 2) commit to improving border control and management practices in consultation with the EU MS and/or FRONTEX, 3) improve the security of travel documents against fraud and forgery, by adopting e-Passports with biometric capabilities and improving the security of

⁵ The visa facilitation process reduces the bureaucratic aspects of visa applications discussed in Chapter 5, while cutting down costs and waiting times.

documents (birth certificates, citizenship documents etc.) used for issuing passports; and 4) commit to intelligence – and information – sharing with EU border control authorities.

The prospect of visa-liberalization and access to the common market make mobility partnerships attractive alternatives for the ENP countries. Under the framework, the EU provides financial and technical assistance under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) to cover a part of the expenses associated with these reforms (EUNIC 2013a). Whereas mobility partnerships have thus far not led to any specific short-term employment opportunities, the Council has approved for the Commission to start negotiations for visa-liberalization with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia, and more recently Turkey. The Commission also signed visa-facilitation agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia that reduce the financial costs and procedural aspects related to acquiring a Schengen visa.

The e-Passport, as a (more) secure travel document format, with biometric data storage and digital transmission capabilities, serves an important purpose in these processes. Under the visa-liberalization roadmaps, a secure format for travel documents and the integrity of the issuing processes for travel documents are of central importance. E-passports, as objects with security capital, provide a way to improve the overall integrity of the EU's mobility insecurity practices. As a first step towards a visa-waiver regime, visa-liberalization roadmaps set the conditions of possibility for eliminating the visa requirements for third-country nationals travelling to the EU. From the perspective of the EU, the Schengen short-stay visa establishes and maintains a EU-level "Schengen" PKI that allows for biometric identification of travellers. Visa-waiver regimes eliminate this

opportunity. Under the visa-liberalization process, authorities in third countries are required to develop necessary capabilities and provide assurances to the EU border control authorities that their citizens can be identified accurately and securely.

Along with the implementation of the e-Passport, the visa facilitation process requires a broader mobility insecurity reform that includes: a) the creation of proper communication channels between border control authorities from the EU and the participating countries for the purposes of intelligence sharing and joint surveillance; and b) the Europeanization of border insecurity management practices. Five years after the initial implementation of the visa liberalization roadmap, the Commission evaluates the results of the process and decides on whether to include the participating country in the Union's visa-waiver regime. The main aspect of this evaluations is to assess if the participating country has internalized the EU's insecurity logic(s) sufficiently enough to be considered a non-threat for the EU's internal stability.

Whereas the signing of readmission agreements and increased cooperation in border surveillance and intelligence sharing ensure a functioning relationship between the EU and its "mobility partners" in the field of irregular migration, improving the security standards of travel documents relates to regular migration. The incorporation of third countries into the EU's internal e-Passport PKI also allows for the proliferation of ABCs. ABCs are presented as the next generation of border controls. They are digital kiosks, or in some instances actual "gates" equipped with passport scanners, biometric readers, and x-ray scanners that combine the traditional functions of immigration and customs control. A border control officer who oversees the process operates ABCs. With the ABC, a single border officer can process multiple passengers simultaneously. ABCs cut down on the costs

associated with having a fully staffed border crossing, while arguably improving the speed of the process. In some extreme cases, ABCs have even taken over the “interrogation” aspect of border controls (Muller 2012).

The incorporation of the Union’s “mobility partners” into the EU’s e-Passport PKI provides the necessary conditions for the implementation of ABCs on the EU’s external borders. Whereas the ABCs have been available exclusively for EU MS citizens and “trusted” travellers for some time, until very recently citizens of third countries were required to be processed by border guards. With the inclusion of “mobility partners” into the Unions’ internal PKI, nationals of third countries are now allowed to be included into the “trusted traveller” category.

The inclusion of non-EU citizens into the trusted traveller category is also indicative of another development in the EU’s mobility insecurity management practices. In an attempt to mitigate the economic effects of the current generation visas, the EU officials have extended the already existing “trusted traveller” programmes to include *bona fide* non-EU nationals. This move is the first step towards the introduction of next-generation visas.

As I discussed elsewhere with Mark Salter (Salter and Mutlu 2010; 2011), EU officials have started to move towards what has come to be known as the “next-generation” or “smart” visas. The next-generation visas, unlike the current generation of visas, allow for EU border control authorities to move beyond “national” level risk-assessments and scale them down to the level of the individual traveller. Currently, EU border control authorities, in consultation with FRONTEX and DG HOME, conduct regular national threat assessments for mobility insecurity practices in mobility partnership countries. These individually developed national portfolios consist of an assessment of the political climate,

recent developments, insecurity concerns, and an evaluation of the integrity of border insecurity management technologies (including issuance processes for travel documents).

The “national” level risk assessment has undesired effects on trans-border businesses and the movement of *bona fide*, or trusted, travellers, as they do not meet the realities of global interconnectedness. Not all citizens of a “high-risk” country pose the same level of threat, and, recognizing this, the EU officials have been looking for way to scale down the risk portfolios. In other words, using national level portfolios as the basis for insecurity governance technologies has economic externalities. The biometric information stored in e-Passports, along with the inclusion of the participating countries into the EU-wide PKI, allow the EU authorities scale the risk portfolios down. This is one of the ways material technologies of insecurity governance contribute to the EU institutions’ efforts to develop more accurate, or precise, insecurity management practices.

Similar to the visa-liberalization process and the introduction of the ABCs at the EU’s external borders, next generation visas are dependent on two factors: the integrity and security of travel documents and the circulation of personal data (biometric and biographical) between the travel document and the database. Next generation visas require that the mobility insecurity practices be configured around the e-Passport as an interface that unlocks the rest of the network. Beyond their technical capabilities, e-Passports also provide tangible markers that can be traced to ensure compliance. As objects of material technologies of insecurity governance, confirming the implementation of e-Passports is much easier than evaluating the mobility insecurity sector reforms. As discussed in the previous chapter, mobility insecurity has different meanings for the EU and its neighbours. Accordingly, there are different motivating factors behind mobility sector reforms pursued

under the ENP framework. For the EU, reforming the neighbouring countries' border insecurity management practices has direct implications for its internal management of insecurity; improving the integrity of the border insecurity in the ENP countries strengthens the EU's own border insecurities. For the neighbouring countries, while the mobility of persons do have insecurity connotations, the main consideration in relation to the movement of persons to and from the EU is the prospect of gaining unrestricted mobility rights for travel to the EU. Visa-free travel to the Schengen zone is an attractive prospect that drives reform.

Regardless of the attractiveness of visa-free travel, compliance is still an issue and evaluating compliance is a difficult task. Rather than requiring EU-specific standards for practice, anchoring socialization to "global" material standards such as the ICAO's recommendations for the e-Passport has proven to be a successful strategy for the ENP framework. Similarly, regularly conducted FRONTEX training programs under the ENP framework with the neighbouring countries allow authorities on both sides of the border to speak the same "language" of border insecurity management.

Joint training missions, intelligence sharing, and everyday cooperation between authorities are dependent on this type of "tutelage." The EU's involvement in the training of border insecurity professionals in the neighbourhood contributes to the expansion of the shared European technologies of insecurity governance. Training border control officials is not the only method for expanding the field of border insecurity professionals. The standards necessary for the implementation of a given technology transform practices; an object such as the e-Passport results in the standardization of practices involved in producing, issuing, and controlling identity documents. Training processes necessary for

the implementation of necessary standards contribute to the external governance of internal insecurity of the EU.

Common formats such as the e-Passport have socializing effects. E-Passports, however, are a singularity (or a node), within the complexities of the EU's material technologies of mobility insecurity governance. They are, nevertheless, central to the current configuration of the EU's mobility security policy. The e-Passport's technical specifications as a biometric travel document with relational capabilities allow it to emerge as a central object that is part of a general trend of automation and digitalization of border controls.

Conclusions

The insecurity continuum that bridges the divide between internal and external insecurities requires practitioners of border control to develop external partnerships in their efforts to develop technologies to prevent transnational threats from crossing borders. ENP represents such a partnership. Border insecurity practices are no longer just happening at border crossings. The management of threats require insecurity professionals to constantly (re)evaluate their discursive, institutional, material, and territorial technologies of insecurity governance and find ways to improve their performances. The alignment of these different technologies necessary for the e-Passport's introduction in the EU and its relatively quick implementation as a requirement for mobility partnerships under the ENP demonstrate this.

Among the components that have been developed to manage insecurities associated with the (free) mobility of persons between the EU and its neighbours under the ENP, the

e-Passport emerges as an object with security capital. Whether we are looking at visa-liberalization processes, emerging (shared) databases, or FRONTEX-led workshops designed to “Europeanize” and standardize border insecurity practices, e-Passports emerge as the new “EUropean” norm for preferred type of identity document.

The implementation of e-Passports generates a new set of challenges. One such challenge facing border insecurity professionals and national politicians in the EU today is finding a balance between practices designed to manage internal insecurity and principles that ensure personal liberties and civil rights (Bigo *et al.* 2010). In regards to the external dimensions of mobility insecurity practices covered in this chapter, EU officials need to reflect on internal criticisms of the use of the e-Passport and address issues related to the ethics of biometrics. The Commission needs to be careful about pursuing external security practices that undermine the Union’s commitment to personal liberties and right to privacy. Brussels needs to address criticisms regarding the implementation of the e-Passport prior to further recommending its use. The participating countries in mobility partnerships and visa-liberalization processes need to be included in consultation processes, not only as participants but also as shareholders.

The emerging trend of the automation and digitalization of border control practices does not take these important concerns seriously enough. The technicalized and securitized nature of discourses surrounding the introduction of the e-Passport undermines any fruitful debate and eliminates (most) opportunities for public debate on these important issues. The implementation of the e-Passport without any meaningful public debate in the neighbouring countries undermines the broader objectives of democratization and liberalization pursued under the ENP.

Technologies emulate the prejudices of their developers and solicitors. Existing risk assessment portfolios for different forms of mobilities, as well as different genders, nationalities, and races inform the emerging material technologies of mobility insecurity governance. Far from improving the global disparities between those that can move and those that cannot, ABCs and next-generation visas contribute to the further stratification of global mobility regimes, into the mobile (or trusted) subject and the immobile (risky) subjects.

CHAPTER 7

THE INTERMODAL SHIPPING CONTAINER

Introduction: *Little Boxes Ticky-Tacky?*

The movement of goods and services is necessary for a stable global economy. Developments in logistics, emerging global production chains, and just-in-time cargo delivery techniques are not just outcomes of globalization. Rather, these emergent realities are part of a broader process that includes various discourses, practices, standards, and technologies of global interdependence that constitute what we refer to as economic globalization. Economic interdependence, as a set of practices of interconnectedness, is built upon the global transportation infrastructure. Within this global transportation infrastructure one object stands out as a central interface: the intermodal container.

The intermodal container is a standardized reusable steel box, designed for efficient and safe shipment of freight across multiple modes of transportation – trucks, trains, and ships. At face value, there is nothing appealing or romantic about the container; it is just a metal box. The idea behind the container, however, is an inspirational one: the ability to move freight uninterrupted across various modes of transportation, and the establishment of a global standard that is not only efficient but also secure have profoundly changed global transportation practices. Intermodal containers had a transformative impact on the way we move things from point *a* to point *b* around the world. In the last five decades, intermodal containers have emerged as key objects within the global transportation sector and have significantly contributed to economic globalization. The emergence of the container as a

globalized standard, or the process of “containerization,” has been studied elsewhere in detail (Jennings and Holcomb 1996, Levinson 2006, Mccalla *et al.* 2004, Slack 1985, Rodrigue and Notteboom 2009). My goal here is not to review the history of this process. Instead, I am interested in the role that the intermodal container has played in changing the transportation insecurity governance technologies of the EU.

The transformative, or “disruptive,” power of the intermodal container is visible in the reconfigurations of transportation insecurity management practices that it precipitated. The “box” has changed the physical infrastructure of logistics and the containerization of global trade has also forced border insecurity and customs officials to adapt to this new normal. As insecurity management practices at ports of entry, customs and border control authorities started incorporating various insecurity governance technologies designed specifically around the intermodal container to ensure speed and security at the border simultaneously. Intermodal containers have served as standardized platforms for technological innovations, which have been central to these reconfigurations of transportation insecurity. Containerization has both driven and also contributed to the processes of technological innovation.

The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of the transformative role of intermodal containers in the EU’s transportation security practices under the ENP. The first section of the chapter provides a very brief history of containerization and focuses on discursive technologies of insecurity governance over the role of standardization and intermodality in international trade. The second section examines the changing architecture of global transportation insecurity while focusing on the transformation of the global transportation infrastructure and its reconfigurations around the intermodal container, with

a particular focus on institutional technologies of insecurity governance. The third section is on the territorial and material technologies of transportation insecurity. It focuses on EU-level transportation insecurity practices and the transformative role of intermodal containers as interfaces in the Union's external practices under the ENP. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of some broader consequences of containerization and problems associated with it.

Discursive technologies of transportation insecurity and the intermodal shipping container

The idea behind transporting goods inside a closed container, rather than in “*breakbulk*,”¹ goes back more than two centuries. “The British and French railways tried wooden containers to move household furniture in the late nineteenth century using cranes to transfer the boxes from flat railcars to horse carts” (Levinson 2006, 29). The invention of the modern intermodal container is generally attributed to Malcolm Purcell McLean. McLean was an American trucker-turned-entrepreneur, who pursued the idea of intermodal transportation by successfully combining maritime and road transportation for the first time in the 1950s (Levinson 2006, 36-53). On April 26, 1956, McLean and his associates successfully established the first modern intermodal transportation link between Newark, New Jersey and Houston, Texas. His company was the first one to ship 58 specially designed 33-foot containers on board the world's first container ship *Ideal-X* – a refitted World War 2 merchant ship (Levinson 2006, 51, World Shipping Council 2012e).

¹ Breakbulk refers to an earlier system of moving cargo around separately rather than in containers. This was the prominent method of transportation prior to the 1950s. (See: Levinson 2006, Chapters 1 and 2).

By using the intermodal container, McLean was able to bridge the administrative and practical differences between maritime and road transportation. This new intermodal route cut shipping costs significantly; “[l]oading loose cargo [breakbulk] on a medium size ship cost 5.83\$ per ton in 1956, McLean’s experts pegged the cost of loading the *Ideal-X* at 15.8 cents per ton” (Levinson 2006, 52). While the *Ideal-X*’s journey did not save much on fuel costs, it saved significant amount of time and money by cutting down costs associated with loading and unloading practices at ports.

Today, containers, as standardized objects, are central to global transportation practices. In 2010, at the height of the global economic crisis, a total of 103,590,000 containers were shipped between China, the US, and the EU (World Bank 2010). Today it is estimated that roughly 90 per cent of the global trade of non-bulk goods is transported in shipping containers (Ebeling 2009, 8-9). Global supply chains and the internationalization of production have significantly benefitted from the containerization of the global transportation industry.

The three related process covered in the next subsection are important to understand the significance of intermodal containers as objects within the broader practices of material technologies of insecurity governance between the EU and its neighbours. Containerization as a process driven by intermodality and standardization has led to the emergence of the intermodal container as an object with security capital, which led to its adoption by the EU authorities. In order to better understand these processes, this subsection presents an overview of the processes that led to the emergence of intermodal containers. I focus on three related issues: a) discourses surrounding the emergence of global standards for

intermodal containers, b) the concept of intermodality and its impact on the way we move things around the world, and c) the containerization of global transportation practices.

Standardization

The standardization of containers was an important step towards the emergence of the intermodal container as a central interface. The early days of containerization were plagued by the kind of “format war” experienced with other types of technological innovation (Betamax vs. VHS and HD-DVD vs. Blu-ray are some examples of this phenomenon). In other words, in the early days of shipping containers there were too many different production standards for the box. This impeded the full potential of the intermodal containers; differences in widths, interlocking methods, and internal as well as external specifications undermined prospects for the containerization of international trade.

In 1963, the ISO issued its first set of international standards for containers. These were standards for “10-, 20-, 30-, and 40-foot containers” (Levinson 2006, 138). Subsequently, the ISO also issued “ISO R-668” (ISO 1968 [1995]), which defined the terminology, dimensions, and ratings of containers, ISO R-790 (ISO 1968 [1984/1995]), defining identification markings, and “ISO R-1161” (ISO 1970 [1984]), which made recommendations about corner fittings.

With regards to this standardization process, it is important to note two things. First, traditionally the “ISO’s practice, wherever possible, was to decide how a product must perform rather than how it should be made” (Levinson 2006, 137). Secondly, it was the competition between American, Asian, and European transport companies that undermined

the ISO's efforts to harmonize different dimensions for the container. While the ISO has successfully harmonized production standards, quality controls, and security features of the intermodal container, it failed to establish a single standardized size.

In the long term, these differences in container sizes have proven to be costly for the global transportation industry. Disagreements over the standardization process delayed efforts to further integrate the global transportation grids. As a result of these disagreements over the size of containers, currently we have different regional standards rather than globally agreed-upon standards for container dimensions. This is partially due to the fact that different regions of the world have different infrastructure standards (different railroad gauges, or types of trucks used) and market demands. Similarly, regional economies have different requirements. Some countries do not need large containers, as their market is not big enough to require that volume, while some countries cannot handle large containers due their transportation infrastructure. These different standards undermine efforts to create a common global standard for the container and result in inefficiencies.

For example, the North American transportation grid, which is primarily a land-based transportation system, is configured around 53-foot containers; bigger containers mean that more tonnage can be transported at once (Talley 2009, 189). China, as the world's leading exporter of non-bulk goods, uses 40-foot containers as the shipping industry, up until 2011, capped the size of on-board containers at 40-feet for safety reasons. In the EU, the Commission recently introduced the EU's own "Intermodal Loading Units" (ILUs) (European Commission 1997; 2004) standard and is championing this "European" standard to move goods in and out of the Union's Common Market across various modes of transportation (railroads, river ships, trucks) in a "green and secure way." As a result, we

are also seeing attempts by the Commission to promote ILUs in the ENP countries. Unlike human mobility and the e-Passport, where the Council has a strong presence, trade and transportation falls within the Commission's jurisdiction. DG MOVE is leading these efforts to introduce ILUs as a trans-European standard by providing financial and regulatory incentives for private companies involved in trade in the EU. The Commission's interest in this issue is due to the intermodality of containers. Along with its standardization, the shipping container's intermodal design contributed to its transformative effects. As a standardized interface that can be used across multiple modalities, the shipping container found a market not only in the maritime cargo industry, but also in railroad and road-based transportation industries.

Intermodality

According to the European Commission (1997), "[i]ntermodality is a characteristic of a transport system, that allows at least two different modes to be used in an integrated manner in a door-to-door transport chain" (1). The intermodal capacity of the modern shipping container transformed transportation practices by bridging the previous divide between the administrative and practical aspects involved in different modes of transportation.

The intermodal container allows a producer in Egypt to pack up their product at their own factory and ship it to the nearest port via truck or train. At the port, within mere minutes a crane can load the container onto a ship, and within a week that ship can arrive in Rotterdam and be on its way to its final destination in France. The intermodal container is central to the way we think about logistics and global production chains.

The intermodality of the container not only led to a dramatic reduction in transportation costs, but also changed the way we think about logistics (Slack 2001). “Just-in-time” production methods and global production chains have all been made possible as a result of the emergence of the intermodal container as an efficient, reliable, and secure platform. Because of a combination of global standardization and the ease with which a container can be moved from one mode of transportation to another, the conditions of possibility for containerization as a process were met.

Containerization

Containerization refers to the process that led to the emergence of an intermodal cargo transportation system configured around the standardized shipping container (Axe 2012, Jennings and Holcomb 1996, Levinson 2006, Mccalla *et al.* 2004, Slack 1985, Rodrigue and Notteboom 2009). The standardization of intermodal containers by the ISO and adoption of these global standards by the transportation sector had profound effects on global trade. These processes significantly contributed to the emergence of a global supply chain and the globalization of production. In many ways, intermodal containers contributed to the transformation of millions of people’s everyday lives. We can assess the impact of containerization from various perspectives, and while the next section looks at the impact of containers on the changing architecture of transportation insecurity technologies, this subsection goes over some of the other consequences of containerization.

In economic terms, the containerization of global trade had significant cost-saving consequences. Prior to the intermodal container “transporting goods was expensive – so

expensive that it did not pay to ship many things halfway across the country, much less halfway around the world.” (Levinson 2006: 1). The introduction of intermodal containers as a key interface of the global transportation regime made transnational production a profitable option for corporations. Growing cotton in Egypt and producing shirts in Italy was made much more profitable by reducing transportation costs.

One of the key factors contributing to shipping containers’ cost saving effects is the automation of loading and unloading practices at ports. Historically, loading and unloading breakbulk cargo was a time-consuming and costly process that required numerous dockworkers to work around the clock. Prior to cargo being stored in boxes, dockworkers had to carefully place each item, with not only the safety of cargo but also the stability of the ship in mind. Whereas these days it takes mere hours to unload and reload a containership with thousands of containers using two state-of-the-art cranes, in the past it took days, even weeks, to load up a cargo ship manually, costing ship owners not only the salaries of dockworkers but also the cost of having a ship waiting to sail. These were all added to the transportation costs of goods being shipped. The proliferation of intermodal containers ravaged the livelihoods of dockworkers, disbanding their once powerful labor unions, and made their profession obsolete; most of these workers recovered from these hardships and found jobs, but the container nevertheless transformed what was once a significant source of employment for thousands of people.

An increased demand for moving thousands of containers everyday undermined the existing spatial configurations of global trade (Rodrigue *et al.* 2009). Such a demanding task required that container ports be built in deep(er) waters, with appropriate container storage areas, and be connected to appropriate transportation “grids” capable of handling

the increasing volume of containers moving in and out the ports. As such, where Amsterdam and Liverpool failed, Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg succeeded. These “transshipment hubs” can simultaneously accommodate multiple containerships as well as the trains and trucks required to transport their cargo to their final destination.

It would be incorrect to suggest that the intermodal container was the only cause of this global reconfiguration. The emergence of new container ports also overlapped with the changing global trade patterns; Asia replacing Europe as North America’s largest trading partner and the emergence of China and India as global production centers all happened around the same time. While we cannot attribute economic globalization solely to the intermodal container, as Levinson (2006) argues, the global marketplace as we know it today, would not have emerged without the significant reduction of transportation costs associated with the emergence of intermodal containers; while containerization is not the cause of globalization, it certainly is a condition of its possibility.

Institutional Technologies of Transportation Insecurity and the Intermodal Shipping Container

Economic considerations form only one side of transportation practices. Similar to human mobility practices, transportation regimes must find a balance between economic sustainability and insecurity. This is a major concern for border control and customs authorities. Container identification and customs practices are of utmost importance for the purposes of insecurity management at container ports. Developing solutions to these pressing issues require institutional technologies of insecurity governance. As a result,

today we are witnessing the emergence of institutional technologies of transportation insecurity configured around the intermodal container.

For identification purposes, each intermodal container comes with a visible label on their exterior surface (the number and letter combinations we see outside each container). These labels provide a series of identification codes that have corresponding data doubles stored in databases, which are then used to cross-check the information to verify accuracy. These identification codes include: a manufacturer code that identifies when and where the container was built, a unique ownership code identifying the owner of the container, a usage classification code identifying the type of cargo stored within, and finally a UN placard identifying if the container has hazardous cargo stored within.

The ownership code, for example, is based on the ISO 6346 reporting standard; each code is four characters long and ends with “U, J, or Z, followed by six numbers and a check digit” (Container Handbook 2012). The International Container Bureau (*Bureau International des Containers*) (BIC) is responsible for issuing these codes. As a result, these ownership codes are also known as “BIC-codes.” Classification codes and manufacturers codes are also based on the ISO 6346 standards; they do not, however, have a central issuing authority. Between these personalized ownership codes and associated databases, a central issuing authority, and corresponding Bill of Ladings,² a cargo transportation PKI is developed. This PKI is used to ensure the integrity of the global supply chain by digitally verifying each container’s content and ownership independent of the Bill of Lading.

² Bill of Lading is a transportation industry term used to describe a detailed list of a shipment of goods in the form of a receipt given by the carrier to the person consigning the goods.

Similar to the e-Passport PKI, this cargo transportation PKI is dependent on material technologies of insecurity governance to process data and analyze its content. The processing and analysis of the data plays a major role in the efforts to manage insecurity flows and prevent contraband and other forms of insecurity from entering a territory. Within this PKI, the intermodal container, as a key object, provides a standardized platform upon which developments in information technology can be incorporated.³ Today, shipping companies incorporate GPS receivers, RFID transmitters, and mechanical and electrical seals inside the container. I focus on these objects of material technologies in further detail below.

While the intermodal container's cost-saving ability has been a major factor contributing to its wide appeal, the container has also had consequences for insecurity aspects of global transportation. On the one hand, the intermodal container, as a closed box, provides an extra level of safety for cargo transportation; things do not get misplaced or stolen as easily as they did before. Intermodal containers acquired a reputation for providing a higher level of safety than breakbulk cargo. On the other hand, criminals have also been quick to adopt the container for their own purposes. While the implementation of containers significantly cut down on cargo theft, the increased privacy and anonymity provided by containers contributed to the increasing volumes of smuggling and trafficking. In this regard, the intermodal container has even been referred as a modern day "Trojan

³ Recently issued ISO standards all indicate towards this trend. See: ISO 9897:1997 (Container equipment data exchange) [CEDEX]; ISO 17363:2007 (Supply chain applications of RFID); ISO/PAS 17712:2006 (Mechanical seals); ISO 18185-2:2007 (Electronic seals); ISO/TS 10891:2009 (Radio frequency identification (RFID) License plate tag).

horse” (Keefer 2007). Similar to other transnational problems, the security “externalities” of the container require international cooperation to solve.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), “in cooperation with the Economic Commission for Europe, developed a draft convention, and in 1972 the finalized Convention [for Safe Containers (CSC)] was adopted at a conference jointly convened by the United Nations and IMO” (International Maritime Organization 1972; 2011a). The 9/11 attacks in the United States and subsequent insecurity assessments of the American transportation infrastructure led to the identification of intermodal transportation as a insecurity concern. While some of the conclusions of these assessments have been distorted to promote hysteria, such as the public debate surrounding Emirati management of container ports in the Eastern US (Washington Post 2006), in terms of actual improvements to existing transportation insecurity practices the presumed threats associated with intermodal shipping containers have led to some major reforms.

At the international level, the successful post-9/11 association of cargo transportation with insecurity resulted in the IMO negotiating and implementing an amendment to the 1974 *Safety of Life at Sea Convention* (SOLAS); the so-called *International Ship and Port Facility Security Code* (ISPS Code) came into force in 2004 (International Maritime Organization 2011b). The purpose of these developments was to manage insecurities associated with unregulated circulation of millions of containers. In the US, the ISPS established the legal groundwork for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiatives such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)⁴ and the Container

⁴ “C-TPAT aspires to expand the United States' zone of security to the point of origin; the customs-trade partnership allows for better risk assessment and targeting, freeing CBP to allocate

Security Initiative (CSI).⁵ Similarly, at the annual G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada on 26-27 June 2002, members of the G8 countries – including the EU – agreed “on a set of cooperative actions to promote greater transport security while facilitating trade” (European Commission 2003a, 9), which were subsequently approved by the EU MS as binding rules for transportation to and from the EU territories. These actions included: implementation of an improved global container insecurity regime through electronic customs reporting, as well as increasing reliance on “smart technologies” such as digital information “pertaining to containers, including their location and transit, as early as possible in the trade chain” (Government of Canada 2008). These changes not only demonstrate that the EU authorities consider cargo transportation associated with intermodal containers to be sources of insecurity but also consider this particular insecurity to be a manageable one.

Alongside these international efforts, in the EU, research and development funded by the European Commission has been a driving force behind technological innovation for insecurity governance technologies related to the intermodal container. The Commission has been actively soliciting research to develop capabilities for increased “supply chain integrity.”⁶ Transportation insecurity management is central to the functioning of the

inspectional resources to more questionable shipments” (DHS 2012: 1). In other words, by agreeing on common security standard for containerized trade with cooperating private businesses, the US DHS ensures the integrity of a container’s security from the point of its origin. In return for implementing certain security standards, “partners” or companies are given a “trusted supplier” status, which results in faster customs clearance times at the US border (DHS 2012).

⁵ CSI is a DHS initiative that extra-territorializes US customs and border security practices by pre-screening 100% of all containers before they are shipped to the United States (DHS 2011). It is a point of contention between the EU and the US. The EU claims that the CSI represents a very expensive trade barrier that disrupts the EU’s transportation infrastructure (See: European Commission 2010).

⁶ See: Integrity Programme (<http://www.integrity-supplychain.eu/>), CONTAIN programme (<http://containproject.com/>), and the Common Assessment and Analysis of Risk in Global Supply

Common Market. To this end, in their external relations the Commission has been pursuing border control and customs practices designed around intermodal shipping containers, using technological innovations discussed above to increase speed while ensuring security.

The EU “is the main trading partner of two-thirds of the planet” (European Commission 2003a, 3). Under the institutional arrangements of the EU per the Lisbon Treaty, trade as a component of the Common Market falls under the purview of Union jurisdiction. Transportation practices fall under the jurisdiction of the EU MS. Given the significance of transportation to the EU’s Common Market, however, the European Commission is actively involved in international negotiations over efforts to create global standards for transportation insecurity management.⁷ The Commission priorities in these processes are to ensure “[c]ompetitiveness, the capacity to attract traffic flows, improving safety, security, interoperability, and intermodality” (European Commission 2007, 6). The Commission generally pursues ways to ensure harmonization and (de)regulation among not only the EU MS but also externally in the European neighbourhood as a way to develop collective technologies of insecurity governance.

Given the significance of the US economy for the rest of the world, it is undeniable that American insecurity management standards play an important role in shaping global standards for transportation insecurity practices. The ISPS Code and the Kananaskis G8 conclusions were both informed by American insecurities following 9/11. It is important to keep in mind that the post-9/11 transformation of American transportation insecurity

Chain (CASSANDRA) have all been awarded the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme.

⁷ See e.g. European Commission 2010a on the Commission’s response to the US DHS’ CSI programme.

management standards had consequences for global transportation insecurity practices. Programmes such as the CSI not only extra-territorialized the American border control and customs practices, but they also had an impact on the internal insecurity standards of US trading partners such as the EU, and by proxy those of the EU's neighbours.

Currently, the international guidelines for a secure cargo transportation regime are based on the ISPS code, which in return relies on ISO standards to ensure harmonization of recommended practices and intended performances of security technologies. In particular, the ISPS code identifies two critical insecurity vulnerabilities for the global transportation infrastructure. These are: the physical insecurity of ports, and the protection and inspection of cargo containers.

The focus of practices aimed at managing insecurity at container ports has been on controlling access to the physical space of the port. The prescribed changes, in this regard, have ranged from building fences around ports, to installing closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras for surveillance purposes. Difficulties with managing transportation insecurity are due to two factors. First, containers constantly move around the world; it is very difficult to trace the movement of all containers, all the time. While containers have improved the speed with which we can move things around, their efficiency is perceived to come at the risk of insecurity management failures. Given the vast number of containers in circulation around the world, it is very costly and labor intensive to physically search each and every one of them. Doing so would not only create significant "choke points," or points of congestion, across the global transportation network, but also would cost millions, if not billions, of dollars to tax payers, consumers, and producers. Second, containers are closed

boxes. Without special “gadgets” we do not have a way of knowing what is stored inside a container by looking at it from the outside.

Intermodal containers present the risk of a trade-off between speed and freight safety on the one hand, and insecurity failures on the other. The introduction of intermodal containers had a positive effect on cutting down on cargo theft and ensuring that cargo arrives at its destination intact, but the privacy and seclusion provided by the container also allowed for increasing amounts of contraband, smuggled goods, and trafficked persons crossing international borders.

Containers form an important part of global practices of transportation insecurity management. While this section discussed institutions involved in developing technologies related to container security practices, the next section focuses on some of the technical developments surrounding container security and how they shape the EU’s transportation security practices under the ENP.

Material and territorial technologies of insecurity governance and intermodal shipping containers

Managing insecurities associated with international cargo transportation requires that border control and customs authorities rely on material technologies of transportation insecurity. The intermodal container lends itself to the kind of technological innovation necessary for processing cargo with the maximum speed and efficiency. Contemporary intermodal containers now come equipped with GPS transmitters, RFID chips, and e-Seals that can track atmospheric pressure inside the container and report if the pressure changes. These technological innovations allow for real-time tracking of freight, which contributes

to “global supply chain integrity.” Along with existing identification techniques such as markers and codes, these innovations in information technologies contribute significantly to the automation and digitalization of transportation insecurity practices.

These innovations that make the container a digital interface also contribute to the changing architecture of container ports and border crossings. From the way port authorities sort and store containers, to the way containers are processed by border control and customs authorities, technology plays a central role in the way we move cargo in and out of ports and across border crossings. Port and border control authorities have been introducing technological objects that are designed to interact with the container in to their everyday practices.

The intermodal shipping container, as an object, interacts with x-ray and y-ray scanners that are designed to detect radiation and/or look inside a container without opening it up. These objects are now commonplace in ports of entry and used by border control and customs officials as a way to manage insecurities. Similarly, customs authorities are relying on “density readers” and laser-range readers to detect compartments between the internal and external walls of containers, as well as trace-detection readers used to identify explosives and/or drugs. Furthermore, customs control officers are now equipped with RFID readers to digitally crosscheck the information codes placed inside “smart” chips on the container against the Bill of Lading filed prior to the container’s departure.

The changes recommended by the ISPS code, which are further supplemented by developments in information technologies, contribute to the emerging material technologies of transportation insecurity governance. The increased integrity of the intermodal container

contributes to the efforts to improve the efficiency and reliability with which border control and customs officers can clear containers without compromising security. Independent identification of the contents and the integrity of the container allows for further automation of customs clearing processes, which increases speed without compromising security. Similar to the principles behind the US DHS's C-TPAT initiative, ensuring the integrity of the container from the moment of shipment to the moment of delivery allows for more accurate risk assessments and more appropriate allocation of border control and customs resources. Increased security at ports also contributes to crime prevention.

The management of transportation insecurity requires global cooperation. This cooperation, however, cannot be limited to sovereign actors. Given the complexity of global trade, global transportation security regimes must also include non-state actors such as international organizations and private corporations. Currently, global efforts to manage transportation insecurity are based on an evolving private and public partnership. Increasingly, international organizations such as the EU, G8, IMO, ISO, BIC, and the World Container Organization (WCO) are playing an important role in processes that contribute to the reconfiguration of transportation insecurity.

There are currently two different approaches to the management of container insecurity. On the one hand we have the US DHS requiring all countries to scan 100% of all containers travelling to the US at ports of departure under the CSI program. The CSI program represents an approach that aspires for "complete security." As mentioned earlier, this practice is both time-consuming and expensive. On the other hand, we have the EU, along with the majority of transportation industry, pushing for increased emphasis on "supply chain integrity;" ensuring container security throughout the journey, rather than

only during specific segments. This is where the ENP comes in. The ENP represents the framework through which the EU authorities try to develop partnerships with governments and industries in the neighbouring countries to improve their collective ability to manage insecurities associated with cargo transportation.

The ENP, along with the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), functions as an umbrella framework for providing the financial and technical assistance necessary to “Europeanize” the transportation insecurity management technologies of the neighbouring countries. Examples of these sorts of “Europeanization” moves under the ENP include technical and financial assistance programmes under the EUROMED and TRACECA initiatives such as providing 1.75 million Euros for a “Ukrainian port strategy and feasibility project” (TRACECA 2009), 1.8 million Euros for a training programme on “Capacity Development for Senior Transport Officials” (TRACECA 2003), and approximately 3,7 million Euros to develop a “pre-arrival information exchange between the customs authorities” (EUNIC 2013C) in Belarus and Ukraine in order to reduce “the time required to carry out customs formalities” (EUNIC 2013C), among other projects. These projects and subsequent financial contributions and technical assistance programmes demonstrate the EU’s active involvement in the transportation sector reform in the neighbouring countries under the ENP framework.

Before detailing the differences between these two approaches, it is important to note two things. First, there is general agreement that containers provide an efficient and (relatively) secure platform for facilitating the ever-increasing volumes of international trade. There is very little, if any, debate over their continuous use. Similarly, the differences between these two approaches are not about whether containers need increased insecurity

management. Practitioners agree that containerized transportation has major insecurity vulnerabilities. The debate instead is on the methods for increased insecurity management. Differences between these approaches are cost-related. The way the Commission sees it:

[a] balance has to be drawn between security procedures fulfilling the highest requirements and the free flow of trade. For instance, the overall added value and effects of full, 100% container screening on trade flows would have to be carefully considered before making decisions. Smart technologies can be used to avoid delays. Standardization and best practice can be used to minimize the effects of security requirement on trade flows.

(European Commission 2007b, 9)

Another important similarity between these two approaches is the way they treat the question of borders, and border insecurity in particular. Both approaches are in accordance with the principles of “extra-territorialization” of border controls and customs practices. On the one hand, the CSI program pushes border control and customs practices out towards the last port before the US homeland. On the other hand, the supply chain integrity approach ensures that the security practices and standards necessary for trustworthy container transportation start at the point of shipment.

The external dimension(s) of transportation insecurity are central to the practices that focus on supply chain integrity. Instead of scanning each container at ports of departure, the supply chain integrity programs create “trusted traveller”-like categories for “trusted suppliers.” Under the EU’s “Modernized Customs Code” (European Union 2008), this group of “trusted suppliers” is given the “Authorized Economic Operator” (AEO) designation. The AEO’s voluntarily agree to implement the pre-determined insecurity management standards for container transportation. Similarly, they agree to take part in an

insecurity assessment/risk analysis process that determines if in fact they can be trusted by the EU MS' border control and customs authorities. In return, the cargo from these "trusted" companies get preferential treatment at the external borders of the EU and clear customs much faster than non-AEO cargo. The use of smart technologies and improving the physical insecurity features of intermodal containers are important considerations for proponents of the supply chain integrity approach. Given its cost-effectiveness, supply chain integrity has supporters in the US, as well as the EU.

In ensuring regional supply chain integrity under the ENP, the Commission relies on the ISPS code, ISO standards, and container insecurity principles as established by the G8 (Government of Canada 2008). As the Commission argues, "[t]ransport – and thus transport security – has also an important international dimension: in order to ensure security within the EU it may be necessary for transport security to be performed outside the EU before a journey to the EU commences" (European Commission 2012, 2). The EU's transportation sector relations with its neighbours to the East and South form an important consideration for the Commission's push towards supply chain integrity. As immediate neighbours to the EU, most of the land-based cargo enters the EU through the ENP countries. Given the EU's preference to focus on supply chain integrity, transportation insecurity management partnerships with the neighbouring countries significantly contribute to efforts to govern insecurities associated with cargo transportation.

Under the ENP, we are witnessing the Commission promoting two related practices by providing technical and financial assistance to the neighbouring countries in order to bring their national practices and standards in line with the EU's internal transportation insecurity governance technologies. First, the Commission is pushing for the integration of

transportation networks and the harmonization of transportation insecurity standards at the national level in ENP countries. Along with promoting the implementation of ISO standards and the ISPS code by competent authorities, the Commission is also proposing the use of Intermodal Loading Units. To these ends, the Commission provides financial and technical assistance under the ENP and ENPI frameworks. Similarly, through the ENP budget, the EU contributes to multi-lateral regional transportation (insecurity) sector cooperation such as the TRACECA and EUROMED initiatives that further integrate and develop an EU-transportation grid that includes neighbours to the East and South.

Along with financial and technical assistance, the EU also provides further structural incentives for cooperation. In return for the ENP countries' compliance, the EU offers increasing access to its Common Market and Customs Union through individualized Free Trade Agreements. These negotiations happen under the ENP framework.

The Commission's second avenue for transportation sector reform comes through private-public partnerships. The way the Commission sees it, "supply chain management is an industry's responsibility and therefore public/private partnership is necessary" (European Commission 2006b, 8). Voluntary participation in the AEO program is mutually beneficial for the EU and the companies based in ENP countries. The extension of AEO designation to corporations based in the ENP countries is an attractive incentive for transportation insecurity management reforms. Cutting down waiting times at the Union's external borders increases the chances for ENP countries to compete in the EU's internal markets. Given the importance of just-in-time logistics, the opportunity for timely delivery of cargo can be the difference between winning or losing a contract.

A “secure” supply chain emerges over time and it requires active management of insecurities. In its proposal for a regulation on enhancing supply chain security, the European Commission suggests that “[i]t is more realistic to set up a supply chain security framework which is allowed gradually to evolve and whose minimum requirements are step-by-step and often in line with operational and technological developments, brought to a satisfactory overall security level” (European Commission 2006, 3). A secure global supply chain cannot emerge over a short period of time. While the harmonization of global standards is a necessary step, there are also material and technological issues that need to be addressed, while institutional and discursive moves are made.

There are certain requirements for a secure supply chain to emerge, the main one being the emergence of a secure and trust-worthy intermodal container. The perceived security of the container is enough to have “security capital.” For a secure global supply chain, there needs to be a reasonable level of trust of the safety and security of the intermodal container. This security capital of the container creates suitable conditions for increasing automation and digitalization of border control and customs practices. Supply chain integrity based on e-Customs programmes and risk management practices is only possible with the introduction of “smart” objects, such as the new generation intermodal container, that are deemed to be secure by the bureaucratic and elite fields involved in decision-making practices.

Smart-technologies are increasingly common in border control and customs practices. This is an emergent reality in the EU and around the world; the belief here being that increased automation and digitalization via smart-technologies alleviates the tensions between efficiency and security at the border. In other words, authorities place their trust on

smart objects to ensure that they can maintain security while meeting the increasing demands of economic interdependence. In terms of intermodal container security,

[i]t is clear that, in the biggest ports in the Community in particular where there is a steady flow of containers, not all containers can be inspected even using x-ray equipment (scanners). On the other hand, it seems equally inconceivable to accept that in future the content of these containers should be described as ‘said to contain...

(European Commission 2003a, 13)

In other words, while the speed with which containers move across ports is a requirement of economic interconnectedness, current border security and customs practices need to be reconfigured to maintain a balance between speed and security.

Under the ENP, material and territorial technologies of transportation security ensure that this balance between speed and security is maintained in border security and customs practices. Intermodal containers are central to the way EU officials plan the future of transportation security in the European neighbourhood. This is in line with the international trend of “containerization.” The increasing use of “smart” intermodal shipping containers equipped with e-Seals and RFID tags allow for e-Customs practices and a secure supply chain. These “smart” customs practices are central to efforts to automatize and digitalize border security and customs practices. One of the outcomes of this process is the emergence of cargo transportation PKI. This PKI establishes a mechanism that can verify the contents of a given container, independent of the information provided in the Bill of Lading or the “said to contain” lists. This emergent PKI, however, is dependent on the perceived integrity of the container. In other words, the potential of the container is indexed on its trustworthiness.

Conclusions

In terms of economics, the intermodal shipping container's ability to cut down on transportation costs has contributed to increasing economic interdependence and the emergence of a truly global marketplace. In terms of insecurity, the container substantially transformed border control and customs practices associated with clearing freight at ports of entry. The safety of the container, along with its intermodal abilities and global standards, contributed to the containerization of global transportation.

There are currently two competing approaches to the management of insecurity associated with the global circulation of intermodal shipping containers. Both of these approaches are based on the extra-territorialization of border control and customs practices. The US DHS effort to scan every single container is very costly and time consuming. The Commission sees the CSI program as a "trade-barrier" resulting in bottlenecking during the global transportation of goods (European Commission 2010a). The CSI initiative, however, provides a short-term solution to the current problem of millions of containers moving around the world without any substantial form of oversight and/or surveillance. The supply chain integrity approach, championed by the EU and the transportation industry, is much more of a medium-to long-term solution; it takes time to ensure compliance and create voluntary mechanisms driven by incentive.

Regardless of the differences between these competing approaches, practitioners seem to agree that containers are both efficient and reliable. This consensus affects future directions of transportation insecurity governance technologies. As we see with transportation sector reforms under the ENP and corresponding changes to the Union's

customs practices, the future of the EU's transportation insecurity practices is being configured around intermodal containers. Similarly, technology developers are developing future innovations in cargo transportation around the ISO standards for containers.

In terms of the EU's technologies of insecurity governance, the creation of the AEO designation, as well as the overall transportation sector reforms pursued under the ENP, contribute to the containerization of transportation sector in the European neighbourhood. These changes also correspond with the emerging material technologies of transportation security. Intermodal shipping containers emerge as key objects within the material and territorial technologies under the ENP. The intermodal container as a standardized object with security capital provides the necessary conditions for the automation and digitalization of border control and customs practices. The level of standardization and harmonization necessary for increased supply chain integrity is pursued through the promotion of intermodal containers and containerization. Containers not only facilitate the circulation of data necessary for increased supply chain integrity, but they also facilitate the inclusion of ENP countries into the EU's Common Market and Customs Union.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS: MANAGING INSECURITY COMMUNITIES

This dissertation argued that security communities are more than just non-war communities; they are insecurity communities. Insecurity as a concept refers to a prominent logic of government that considers threats to be governable through a constant productive field of management. This field works toward identifying and managing threats and unease associated with the contemporary socio-political landscape. To conceptualize insecurity communities and understand their insecurity management practices, this dissertation focused on the EU as an insecurity community. It provided an analysis of the EU's insecurity governance technologies in the mobility and transportation insecurity sectors under the ENP framework. In particular, the dissertation provided an empirically grounded analysis of the bureaucratic and elite-driven technologies of insecurity governance surrounding the uses of e-Passports and intermodal containers in the EU's external governance practices under the ENP framework.

After a brief introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 presented a discussion of data collection, research methods, and research design, explaining the important decisions that were made during the course of past 5 years. Chapter 3 provided a review of the security community literature and further developed the argument of the EU as an insecurity community. Chapter 4 focused on deconstructing the last decade of the ENP as a technology of insecurity governance that addresses the insecurity continuum. The chapter focused on the contested nature of this framework to present various debates surrounding the EU's external governance practices. Building on these foundational discussions and

reviews of relevant literatures, chapters 5, 6, and 7 provided a more empirically grounded analysis of the role of mobility security technologies on the external border security practices of the EU. In particular, chapter 5 focused on institutional developments in the EU's mobility and transportation insecurity regimes. Chapters 6 and 7 discussed the uses of e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers as material technologies of insecurity governance in the European neighbourhood.

This dissertation focuses on a gap in the security community theory between the concept of security and empirical realities of insecurity. As suggested in chapter 3, even though the EU has successfully managed to create a state of non-war among its MS, EU institutions' continuous (and ever-increasing) involvement in insecurity management practices would suggest that a sense of insecurity might have been built into the European integration project. In addressing this gap, this dissertation focused on three arguments: First, there is more to insecurity than the security community literature acknowledges. Insecurity management as a set of technologies attempts to address a central concern within contemporary politics: how to address various kinds of insecurities that pose a threat to the safety and stability of the social order? Insecurity management, in this sense, is not about maintaining a state of non-war, but rather about developing technologies to provide assurances and confidence in the face of uncertainty. Second, technologies of insecurity governance are central to the efforts to manage insecurities affecting the EU today. Third, focusing on technologies as the mechanisms through which insecurity professionals practice a dispersed or networked form of management provides an empirically rigorous alternative to studying the EU as an insecurity community. These three arguments represent the central contributions of the project to the broader literatures on (critical) security studies

and the external governance of the EU. This final chapter provides a synthesis of these arguments while presenting some take-home points and drawing some general conclusions for the reader.

In developing the concept of the insecurity community and insecurity governance technologies in regards to the EU three concepts proved useful: policywork, borderwork, and smart objects with security capital have been referred to multiple times throughout the dissertation. In this dissertation, the *policywork* concept referred to a set of practices associated with EU-led policy reforms such as convergence through policy harmonization, (de)regulation, coordination and practices of transborder policy mobility. This term was introduced in chapter 3 and further discussed during the institutional technologies of (in)security governance in chapter 4. Policywork is central to the efforts to harmonize different meanings of insecurity and converge national preferences over security practices. The ENP represents such an effort by the EU institutions to Europeanize bordering non-EU MS countries to the East and South.

Borderwork was another concept used in the dissertation. While discussing the territorial technologies of insecurity governance, borderwork was used to refer to the EU institutions' ability to participate in the making of borders through practices of bordering – re-bordering and de-bordering. The discussion of the concept made a distinction between bottom-up and top-down borderwork projects. Bottom-up borderwork projects are initiated by citizen groups to acquire certain territorial designations for products, cultures, or languages. The dissertation focused primarily on top-down borderwork processes. The Commission initiates this type of borderwork. Under the ENP, top-down borderwork manifests itself through the extension of sectoral Europes – the Schengen Area, and the

European Common Market, among others. The concept was used to highlight the territorial effects of policywork, especially in regards to the ENP as a territorial technology of (in)security governance that relies on practices of bordering.

In relation to the material cultures of (in)security governance, the dissertation focused on e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers as *smart objects with security capital*. Smart objects with security capital refer to the two common characteristics found in contemporary objects of mobility and transportation (in)security governance. First, these objects are “smart,” in that they possess data-storage and surveillance technologies. RFID tags and embedded contactless chips in e-Passports and GPS trackers, and e-Seals on intermodal shipping containers facilitate the increased automation and digitalization of border security and customs practices. These “smart” attributes also operationalize a system of networked databases that provide secondary background checks while providing around-the-clock surveillance over the movement of goods and persons across borders. Second, these objects possess a security capital. Experts, policymakers, and practitioners presume that they are secure and trustworthy and endorse their use. These objects are built in accordance with the relevant international standards by product developers. International organizations such as BIC, ICAO, and ISO oversee the creation of these standards and endorse their effectiveness. These organizations and product developers regularly consult with the national bureaucratic and elite decision-makers involved in border security and customs policies to include them in the process and address their insecurity concerns. Smart objects with security capital are presented as a remedy to the pressing problems of maintaining speed and security at the border crossings. They facilitate further automation and digitalization of border and customs controls.

These concepts play an important role for the analysis presented in this dissertation. They represent the practices through which the ENP “works.” While they are important conceptually, they also contributed to the structure and delivery of the general empirical findings of the project as analytical frameworks to understand the complexities of the ENP framework. In developing these findings, the focus on the e-Passport and the intermodal container have proven to be extremely useful – both methodologically and theoretically. As “objects” of analysis, they have allowed for uncovering a glimpse of the complexities of the international system by demonstrating how often-neglected negotiations between various discourses, economies, materialities, and standards, among others, shape policies of insecurity communities.

Seemingly ordinary activities such as border controls and customs practices have important consequences for insecurity governance. Discourses, institutions, practices, and technologies of security professionals have disproportionate effects on meanings of insecurity. As discussed in chapter 3, paying closer attention to seemingly mundane aspects of security will allow us to understand how insecurity communities are maintained and nurtured. The practices, techniques, and technologies of security professionals speak volumes about how insecurity communities emerge and how they are sustained over long periods of time.

This dissertation tried to pay specific attention to pursuing an empirically grounded analysis of mobility security practices under the ENP. The focus on the e-Passport and the intermodal container provided the empirical grounding necessary for applicability and relevance. The findings of this 5-year long project led to three specific points that not only wrap up this project, but also serve as possible avenues for future academic reflection.

Material technologies are gaining importance for insecurity governance practices.

Smart objects with material technologies are gaining ground as policy solutions to the shortcomings of more traditional territorial technologies. The successes of the ENP are, for the most, part supplemented by such objects. As demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7, improvements to the mobility and transportation insecurity regimes in the European neighbourhood are, in part, due to the availability of e-Passports and intermodal shipping containers as smart objects with security capital.

Processes of standardization and technological innovation are important to understand integration in the security field. One of the discoveries of this project, for me, was the importance of standardization practices to insecurity management. The central role of objects within the broader material technologies of insecurity governance in the current configurations of the EU's border security practices is dependent on their perceived trustworthiness, or "security capital." This security capital, in return, is partially dependent on standardization. In the case of the e-Passport, as discussed in chapter 6, there are serious privacy issues and security shortcomings. For what it lacks in actual abilities, the e-Passport makes up for in potential. The promise of the e-Passport, as the closest "thing" to a failure-proof global PKI, is tempting for border control authorities. The potential of the e-Passport, however, is dependent on the international standardization of its production and consumption. Similarly, the integrity and interfacial capabilities of the new generation intermodal container provides grounds for a reasonable level of trust on its safety and security, which in return is also based on standardization of the container. The perceived security capital of these interfaces has effects for the EU's external mobility security practices. As standardized objects of mobility security, the European Commission relies on

the e-Passport and the intermodal container as smart objects to pursue mobility security reforms in the ENP countries.

Within the external governance practices of the EU, smart objects with security capital are presented as standardized objects of “Europeanization,” or “artifacts of socialization.” In the case of mobility insecurity governance, these standardized objects are not peripheral gadgets; rather they are central to the EU’s attempts to externally govern its internal insecurity. In Europe and beyond, these standardized objects of Europeanization play an important role in contemporary practices of control, surveillance, and sorting of populations and things. The e-Passport and the intermodal shipping container serve as requirements for furthering relations between the EU and its neighbours. For example, the e-Passport not only serves as a condition for the visa-liberalization process, but also creates the necessary conditions for the introduction of ABCs and the next generation visas that facilitate less restrictive movement of persons. Similarly, intermodal shipping containers not only facilitate the circulation of data necessary for increased supply chain integrity, but also the inclusion of ENP countries into the EU’s Common Market and Customs Union.

Practices that attempt to control the mobility of persons and things have become increasingly securitized over the years. Chapter 3 discussed these securitized discourses of mobility and transportation insecurity governance. These attempts are materialized in the global trend towards extra-territorialization of border controls, increasing surveillance, and the introduction of biometrics, among others. When combined with the automation and digitalization of border control practices, these developments have facilitated the movement of *bona fide* travellers and goods. They have also contributed to the furthering of global inequalities between those that can move and those that cannot. There needs to be more

awareness about these costs of efficiency and speed. In other words, a reflexive attitude towards these developments should be fostered, and questions of ethics need to be re-introduced to debates over the future directions for technologization of border security.

Increased efficiency through automation and digitalization at border crossings comes at the cost of personal liberties and privacy. The emerging global and/or regional mobility PKIs I discussed in chapters 6 and 7 come as a result of increasing surveillance and intelligence sharing by border control authorities. Mobility and transportation partnerships are as dependent on intelligence sharing and cooperation among national authorities as they are on secure interfaces. It is undeniable that there is a demand for facilitation of mobility of persons and things. Citizens of ENP countries demand the simplification of visa applications, or getting rid of visas altogether. This comes at the cost of increased surveillance and breaches of privacy rights. Technological innovation is not value-neutral; these objects possess the prejudices of their developers. Reflexivity and skepticism towards attempts to further automatize and digitalize the border security and customs practices are much needed in both academic and policymaking circles.

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