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**Between Friends:
Censorship of Canada's Media in World War II**

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**Between Friends:
Censorship of Canada's Media
in World War II**

Mark Bourrie

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the Ph.D degree in History

Department of History
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Canada

Abstract

On paper, Canada's World War II censorship system was among the toughest of those imposed by any Allied countries. In reality, it was a very Canadian endeavor. The censorship system usually respected the liberty of the media. It was, however, inconsistent in the application of media control rules laid out in the *Defence of Canada Regulations of the War Measures Act*, which was the censorship system's enabling legislation. This was partly because of the vague regulations; partly, especially in the early years of the war, because of ineffective management and inconsistent decisions at the national and local level. It is difficult to know whether press censorship was an effective counter-intelligence apparatus, which was the main justification for the system, or whether censorship was an important tool for maintaining morale. In Quebec, it appears to have failed on both counts. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's government was reticent to further antagonize the nationalist press by stifling coverage of anti-participationist dissent and reporting of naval action in the St. Lawrence River.

The value of censorship was, in fact, unclear to some of the managers of the system. The censors, however, did their work system with a surprising level of deference to the needs of the press. They also played an important role in information dissemination and even protected a Japanese-Canadian newspaper from suppression. In the end, the Canadian public was well-served by the very small group of former journalists who worked as press censors during the war.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not exist without the help of the late Fulgence Charpentier, Canada's last Director of Censorship. He encouraged this project, and, equally important, carefully packed away the voluminous records of the Directorate of Censorship in 1946.

I have had amazing luck since starting this project. Maj. James McKillip of the Department of National Defence's Historical Section, a life-long friend, introduced me to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Jeffrey Keshen of the University of Ottawa, who read this thesis several times with varying degrees of frustration, especially when it was considerably longer. Prof. Keshen is the author of the definitive history of Canada's World War I censorship and propaganda system. He is a skilled editor whose patience and encouragement saved me from my own rather low tolerance for bureaucratic stupidity and frustration with mediocrity.

My good fortune continued when I found myself sitting across a National Archives desk from Dr. Roger Sarty, one of the country's foremost naval historians, at a time when I was researching the censorship of stories about U-boat attacks in the St. Lawrence. Mr. Sarty was asked to be external advisor on the thesis and contributed very productive edits to it. A few months later, Mike Gasher, my department head at Concordia, introduced me to Prof. Mary Vipond, who is a scholar of the history of Canada's broadcast system.

Profs. G. Stuart Adam and Joe Scanlon of Carleton University gave me valuable insight into the personality of Wilfrid Eggleston, who had taught both of these distinguished professors when they were undergraduates. Senator Joyce

Fairbarn was also helpful with insights on Eggleston, who was one of her professors at Carleton, and on Tommy Shoyama, whom she knew through her years working in Pierre Trudeau's Prime Minister's Office.

The thesis was, in parts, greatly improved by the internal examiners at the University of Ottawa. I am especially indebted to Prof. Eda Kranakis for her very positive remarks.

Friends in the media were also extremely helpful. Steve Maher of the Halifax *Herald* lent me material on the history of his newspaper and contacted the Dennis family, owners of the paper, to ask for information on Eric Dennis, the journalist who dominated coverage of the Battle of the Atlantic. Terry Guillon of the Parliamentary Press Gallery was very helpful with information on the workings of that organization and supplied me with booklets issued to Press Gallery members and guest journalists in the 1930s. E. Kaye Fulton was a constant support and worked hard to track down information on the Vancouver censors.

This project was encouraged by my wife, Marion van de Wetering. She and our children took up the slack in our household while I was chained to the keyboard. I also got wonderful support from my friend and book editor Janice Zawerbny of Thomas Allen in Toronto and her publisher, Patrick Crean, whose father had an interesting career in Canadian espionage and intelligence.

I had very valuable help from Library and Archives Canada and the Library of Parliament. Staff at both institutions tracked down books and files with a level of skill and determination that was impressive.

I am also very grateful to the University of Ottawa for the generous financial assistance provided to me during my years as a doctoral student.

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Introduction

In times of total war, governments can easily justify using their latent powers to shut down newspapers, magazines and book publishers, ban articles and prosecute journalists. In both World Wars, the Canadian government imposed a rigid set of censorship rules, showed its fangs enough to remind journalists who was in charge, then largely left journalists to censor themselves. English-Canadian journalists and most of their colleagues on French-language publications were willing – sometimes even eager – to be guided by the strong hand of government. They were so pliant, in fact, that penalties for real resistance are difficult to determine because, in English Canada, so few writers and editors tried to knowingly evade the censorship rules, especially on important issues. In Quebec, *Le Devoir*, *Le Soleil*, *L'Evenement Journal* and a few less important publications consistently broke censorship rules but the government refused to charge them, fearing further splintering of the façade of wartime national unity. On paper, the system was one of the most draconian among the Allies. In reality, during World War II only the fringe Communist, Fascist and ethnic press suffered serious penalties.

In the winter of 1998, I visited the Ottawa home of a 100-year-old semi-retired political columnist, Fulgence Charpentier. He was the longest-serving member of Canada's Parliamentary Press Gallery, having joined it in 1920. In World War II, Charpentier was the lead French-language newspaper and periodical censor and, during the closing months of the war, headed the entire Directorate of Censorship, which handled press and radio censorship, short-

wave radio and telegram interceptions and mail-openings. Charpentier told me the records of the Directorate of Censorship, which he had packed more than fifty years before, were a potential gold mine of articles. In fact, they have turned out to be more than just a lode of suppressed stories from World War II. They are a very complete record of the way wartime news was manipulated by people like Charpentier, who believed managing the news was an important part of Canada's war effort, but who also knew investigative journalism is vital to a democratic society.¹

Censorship was part of the mobilization of the economy, government, and social structures for total war. Just as factory owners and technocrats went to Ottawa as "dollar-a-year men," many Canadian journalists tried to find some way to use their skills against the Nazis. Some ended up staffing the censorship system and the government's propaganda arm, the Bureau of Public Information that, after May 1942, became the Wartime Information Board.

The senior administrators of the censorship system were, in the main, drawn from the Parliamentary Press Gallery, the public relations industry and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.² Local censors, headquartered in Canada's larger cities, were seconded from the Canadian Press news service and editorial departments of major local newspapers. Censors were deliberately left in their

¹ Wilfrid Eggleston, probably the most influential of the wartime censors, was extremely reluctant to take on the work and only accepted the post because he believed he would quickly be transferred to propaganda work. See Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, 256-257.

² The most notable exceptions were Maurice Pope, a career Army officer who designed the censorship system and held the post of Director of Censorship in 1940-42 and O.M. Biggar, a lawyer who was brought in to restructure the censorship system in May, 1942.

home towns to monitor and evaluate the work of their former colleagues and to use their connections to manipulate news coverage.

Several reasons lay behind these decisions. For two generations, William Lyon Mackenzie King had cultivated Canada's media leaders, especially newspaper publishers, and rightly believed journalists and publishers of major English Canadian sources enthusiastically supported the war effort or, if they had doubts, would keep them to themselves. King and his senior officials believed journalists understood their colleagues' attitudes, work environment, professional culture and competitive instincts. Journalists were less likely to resist coercion from respected members of their own craft who might either supervise them after the war or be useful colleagues throughout their careers. And finally, English-Canadian reporters and editors had shown themselves to be pliant during World War I, when they had, in the main, co-operated enthusiastically with censorship authorities who imposed far greater restraints than they were to face in World War II.

In theory, the World War II press censorship system was voluntary. Rulings of the Directorate of Censorship were not binding, nor were journalists required to submit articles for pre-publication screening. If, however, a story was passed by the Directorate of Censorship and approved by the censors, charges would not be later laid under the *Defence of Canada Regulations* against its author and the media outlet even if facts or opinions were published that could damage the war effort.³ Those journalists who did not seek a ruling from the

³ While this was the policy of the censorship system from the outset, it did not have the force of law until the summer of 1942.

Directorate of Censorship published at their own risk, hazarding both the penalties of the law and the stigma of being accused of disloyalty. CBC reporter Peter Stursberg, in his autobiography, *The Sound of War* (1993) summed up the government's powers under the *Defence of Canada Regulations* as "dis-accreditation, disgrace, even imprisonment," and noted no Canadian journalist wanted to be labeled as unpatriotic.⁴

Criticism of the Directorate of Censorship typically came from newspapers that had submitted stories that had been censored and were subsequently "scooped" by competitors that had not. The *Vancouver News-Herald*, on July 20, 1942, ran a boxed message on its front page after it was beaten on a story about a ship launch: "Gladly We Serve," the headline said. After vaguely describing how it had sent a reporter and photographer to cover an event the previous day at a shipyard, "Dutifully... we submitted our copy and pictures to the Censor and he in turn to Naval Authorities for approval. Today our articles and pictures were returned with the august approval of the Navy – after the news had first been published in the afternoon papers. Gladly we serve the common cause and bow without protest to the authorities in their wisdom – even when they let our contemporaries scoop us."⁵ Most other papers simply complained to the censors and let the matter rest.

Canada was naturally conducive to censorship. The country had no constitutional protection for the press. Journalists in Canada worked under criminal and civil libel laws heavily weighted against them and Criminal Code

⁴ Peter Stursberg, *The Sound of War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, 57.

⁵ "Gladly We Serve", *Vancouver News-Herald*, July 20, 1942, 1.

contempt of court rules that gave sweeping powers to judges to jail journalists for criticizing any aspect of the justice system. The newspapers had accepted a tough censorship in World War I and were exhausted from a series of attacks on their independence and power through the Depression, especially from provincial governments.⁶

Journalists in Canada often did not have a clearer grasp of the war than their readers. Even after the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, most Canadian journalists stayed home and the war correspondents who did go to the fronts were as much propagandists as they were observers, coerced by the military's rules and indoctrination techniques as any 21st century "embedded" reporters. As well, coverage from the front was censored by military officers and, usually, by British domestic censors who handled the articles as they were cabled to Canada.⁷ The reporters had no illusions about their work. "It's humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war," Canadian war correspondent Charles Lynch told author Philip Knightley in the 1970s. "It was crap ... We were a propaganda arm of our governments. ... We were cheerleaders. I suppose there was not an alternative at that time. It was total war. But for God's sake, let's not glorify our role. It was not good journalism. It was not journalism at all."⁸

⁶ In Quebec, the media tended to support Premier Maurice Duplessis's curtailment of press freedom but Alberta journalists successfully fought the *Alberta Press Act* (1936) all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. O.M. Biggar, later Director of Censorship, represented the Government of Alberta at the Supreme Court of Canada.

⁷ This thesis does not deal in detail with front-line censorship of war correspondence, which was not under the control of the Directorate of Censorship. For work on such military imposed and directed censorship, see Claude Beauregard, *Guerre et censure au Canada, 1939-1945: L'expérience canadienne durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale*. Sillery: Septentrion, 1998.

⁸ Philip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, 333.

That is not to say Canadian civilians were entirely naïve about what was happening on the front lines: thousands of men, now approaching middle-age and including men in positions of responsibility in politics and the media, had, as young men, seen war close-up in Flanders. Enough coverage of the horror of World War II made its way to newsreels, radio newscasts and newspapers to ensure Canadians understood, at least in vague ways, the brutality in Europe and Asia.⁹

The censors were under constant pressure from the military to toughen the rules. Some news, such as reports of convoy departures, obviously should have been banned, but what about items about radar, which, as the censors themselves proved, had plenty of pre-war coverage? Why ban stories about the Japanese balloon bombs that drifted over British Columbia in the last year of the war when every teacher in the province gave lessons to children on how to avoid being blown up by one? Which political stories, if any, were so damning of the government's war management that they hurt recruiting efforts? Was there a point to killing stories about U-boat attacks in the St. Lawrence River when so many people on the coast could hear torpedo and depth charge explosions at night and saw survivors coming ashore? Should censors kill stories that were simply wrong or did they have an obligation to correct errors in the interest of maintaining accuracy? Most important, especially to military intelligence officers and government officials, did the censors have a duty to maintain morale by killing bad-news stories?

⁹ Most of the front-line censors were World War I veterans, though notable exceptions included Wilfrid Eggleston, who dominated the English press censorship system.

As chief English-Canadian press censor Wilfrid Eggleston stressed time and again in memoranda to government officials, the military and to some journalists, the suppression of bad news would create a fool's paradise, one in which people would eventually learn the truth only after failings in the system had cost lives. For instance, suppressing stories about shoddy war equipment did not make that material any better, Eggleston argued. Spiking stories about domestic dissent actually caused long-term political problems as society could not develop consensus without free debate, and any decisions made with faulty information could hurt the war effort.

Nearly all the press censors had been working journalists, though typically they lacked management experience, even in newspapers. The government shook up the management of the system in 1942, under pressure from the American and Canadian intelligence agencies.

Eggleston, the point man on English-language censorship through most of the war, did keep his job. An intensely shy man who avoided eye contact with people, Eggleston was one of the more thoughtful members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery.¹⁰ He marveled at the government's decision to put him in charge of English-language press censorship and, eventually, all of the machinery of press, radio, telegraph and mail censorship. "I seemed about as unsuitable a personality to cast in the role of censor as anyone in Ottawa," he wrote in his memoirs.¹¹ He did, however, have excellent press and political connections across the country and a good reputation for accuracy and fairness. He also had

¹⁰ E-mail correspondence with Prof. Stuart Adam, Carleton University, Spring 2008. Adam was a student of Eggleston's from 1961 to 1963.

¹¹ Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 268.

an obstinate streak. "It was not easy to budge me once I was convinced I was on the right track," he later wrote.¹² This stubbornness would serve Eggleston well in many of his disputes with the press, the government and the military.

During the war, differing levels of political pressure were placed on the censorship system and several times the Directorate of Censorship was accused by the press of being a politicized organization that served an image-management function rather than a military one. Certainly, any government would be tempted to use the power of censorship for its own ends. The Canadian Liberal Party under Mackenzie King faced the voters twice during the war, and implemented a plebescite on conscription that threatened the unity of the country. A strong anti-participation and even pro-Vichy sentiment existed in the political and media elite of Quebec. Certainly the King government could have found excuses to take draconian actions against the press in a time of total war, and in a few instances of weakness, considered doing so. At several key points in the war, the censors actually became the bulwark of the free press. Wilfrid Eggleston talked his minister out of several attempts to politicize censorship and was pushed "at least once" to the brink of resigning, but these confrontations were rare. Fortunately, he had the backing of King, who believed in the voluntary censorship system.¹³

There was one key difference between the censorship systems of World War I and World War II: Mackenzie King, unlike Robert Borden, was a serious student of media and public relations techniques. King took a personal interest in

¹² *Ibid.*, 269.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 265.

the censorship system to the point of at least once rescuing it from the army and the censors themselves.¹⁴ The system in the Second World War placed much more responsibility into the hands of working journalists. Indeed, when some of the country's top reporters asked Eggleston and his staff to pre-censor their articles, the censors told them to think for themselves.

Censors Wilfrid Eggleston and Maurice Pope wrote memoirs, but neither dealt in detail with their censorship work. Of the two, Eggleston's *While I Still Remember* (1968) discussed censorship's philosophy but gave very little detail of the way the system operated. In his memoirs *Soldiers and Politicians* (1961), censorship director Maurice Pope mentions in passing pre-war censorship planning, claiming it was one of the few war preparations allowed by the government from 1933 to 1937.¹⁵ His stint as head of censorship is discussed very briefly, interspersed in details about his career as a war planner and staff officer.¹⁶ This, in fact, mirrors the personal organization problems Pope had during his term as head of the system.

Jeffrey Keshen has written two books that discuss wartime censorship. His first, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War* (1996),¹⁷ is a comprehensive examination of the media manipulation system World War I. Keshen determined the government conducted a draconian censorship of the

¹⁴ This occurred during the Terrace B.C. "mutiny" of conscripted soldiers in the fall of 1944. See chapter "Censorship and the Zombies".

¹⁵ Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 126-128

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 141-144.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Keshen, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992

press that was aimed at preventing the publishing of anything that might cast the country's war effort, or the war itself, in a negative light. While the censorship system was a threadbare operation, it was backed by federal regulations that made it feared by all of the country's newspapers, even those in Quebec that would defy the censors in World War II. Not only were the censors looking out for stories that might subvert the war effort, they were also looking for *subversives*. Keshen's *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers* (2004)¹⁸ is a detailed examination of the "home front" in World War II that has considerable discussion of the wartime media and its impact on society but does not examine censorship in detail.

A considerable literature has been written on Canada's naval services in World War II. Control over stories of action off Canada's coasts was one of the major focuses of wartime press censorship systems, and the actions of the censors are mentioned in most of the best books on Canada's World War II navy. W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling's *No Higher Purpose: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, Volume Two, Part 1* (2002)¹⁹ and their second volume, *A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1943-1945* (2007)²⁰ discuss censorship within the context of Canada's inshore and offshore naval war. The second volume is especially valuable for its material on

¹⁸ Jeffrey Keshen, *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004.

¹⁹ W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby with Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston, William G.P. Rawling. *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943 Volume Two, Part 2*. St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Pub., 2002.

²⁰ W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby with Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston, William G.P. Rawling. *A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1943-1945. Volume Two, Part 1*. St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Publishing, 2007.

the government's attempt to undermine its own censorship of the 1944 U-boat campaign in the St. Lawrence. Michael Hadley gives passing mention to censorship in *U-Boats Against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters* (1985)²¹ as does Nathan Greenfield in *The Battle of the St. Lawrence: The Second World War in Canada* (2004).²² The best examination of the Halifax censor, H. B. Jefferson, is in Stephen Kimber's *Sailors, Slackers and Blind Pigs* (2003).²³ By mining Jefferson's journals and papers in the Nova Scotia provincial archives, Kimber skillfully uses Jefferson to weave a convincing and illuminating picture of wartime Halifax.

Forrest E. La Violette's *The Canadian Japanese and World War II* (1948)²⁴ touches on a few aspects of censorship of the Japanese-Canadian press in World War II. Ken Adachi devotes considerable space to the issues of print and mail censorship in *The Enemy that Never Was* (1976)²⁵ and deftly places the sole wartime Japanese-Canadian newspaper, *The New Canadian*, (which was heavily censored during the war), into its social and historic context. Barry Broadfoot mentions censorship and interviewed Tommy Shoyama, editor of *The New Canadian*, for his oral history *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame* (1979)²⁶ but the book suffers from many drawbacks, especially its failure to name its sources and even its interview subjects. As well, Broadfoot's interview tapes appear to

²¹ Michael Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990.

²² Nathan Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence: The Second World War in Canada*. Toronto: Harper-Collins, 2004.

²³ Stephen Kimber, *Sailors, Slackers and Blind Pigs*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2003.

²⁴ Forrest E. LaViolette, *The Canadian Japanese and World War II*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948.

²⁵ Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*. Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1976.

²⁶ Barry Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame: The Story of the Japanese Canadians in World War II*. Markham, ON: Paperjacks, 1979.

have been lost. None of these authors had access to the records of the Directorate of Censorship or understood the partnership that developed between *The New Canadian* editor Tommy Shoyama and the Vancouver censors, John Graham and Lew Gordon. This work is the first to explore it.

As for media histories, W. H. Kesterton devotes just four pages in *A History of Journalism in Canada* (1967)²⁷ to censorship in both world wars and none of his facts are cited. Presumably, from the wording of the section, he relied on Gil Purcell's unpublished thesis on the World War II system and advice from Eggleston, his colleague at Carleton University's journalism department. Pierre Godin, *La Lutte Pour L'Information: Histoire de la Press Ecrite au Quebec* (1981), mentions wartime censorship of the Quebec press but notes at the time he wrote his book the files of the Censorship Branch were still sealed.²⁸

Wartime censorship is mentioned in passing in the autobiographies of several reporters and editors who were active in this period, some of which have been useful for seeing journalists' side of major censorship controversies. M.E. Nichols's *The Story of Canadian Press* (1948)²⁹ has a fairly detailed account of the news agency's dealings with the censorship system. Nichols had been president of the Canadian Press (CP) and presumably drew on Purcell's expertise. The chapter on censorship reflects Purcell's almost uncritical support of the censors. Floyd Chalmers's *A Gentleman of the Press: The Story of John*

²⁷ Wilfrid Kesterton, *History of Journalism in Canada*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967.

²⁸ Pierre Godin, *La Lutte Pour L'Information: Histoire de la Press Ecrite au Quebec*. Montreal: Le Jour, 1982

²⁹ M.E. Nichols, *The Story of Canadian Press*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1948.

Bayne Maclean and the Publishing Empire He Founded (1969)³⁰ is useful to understand J.B. Maclean's feud with Mackenzie King, to see how George Drew emerged, with Maclean's help, as both a politician and a muckraker, and the views of people inside a news organization that was critical of the war effort. Charles Bowman's *Ottawa Editor* (1966)³¹ is particularly valuable since Bowman discusses how he was charged (and acquitted) twice for breaching the censorship law. Unfortunately, no history of the Vancouver *Sun* or *Province* has been written. The fact that George McCullagh of *The Globe and Mail* and John Bassett of the Montreal *Gazette* have never been subjects of full biographies attests to the lush fallow fields available to media historians. They warrant the type of study done by Ross Harkness in *J.E. Atkinson of The Star* (1963),³² which remains one of the best media history books published in Canada, though unfortunately Harkness gave very little space to wartime censorship. William March's *Red Line: The Chronicle-Herald and the Mail-Star, 1875-1954* (1986)³³ is one of the few Canadian books that gives serious effort to examining the history of an important regional newspaper. Fortunately, March devoted some effort to detailing the running battle between Halifax censor H.B. Jefferson and *The Herald's* star reporter, Eric Dennis.

During World War II, there was some discussion in academic journals of the Canadian censorship system written by Canadian and foreign observers.

³⁰ Floyd S. Chalmers, *A Gentleman of the Press: The Story of John Bayne Maclean and the Publishing Empire He Founded*. Toronto: Doubleday Press, 1969.

³¹ C.A. Bowman, *Ottawa Editor*, Sidney, B.C.: Gray's Publishing, 1966.

³² Ross Harkness, *J.E. Atkinson of the Star*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.

³³ William March, *Red Line: The Chronicle-Herald and the Mail-Star, 1875-1954*. Halifax: Acadiensis Press, 1986.

Eggleston wrote a ten-page paper in the August 1941 edition of the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*³⁴ discussing the challenges faced by the censorship system. Sociologist William Swindler of the University of Idaho, writing in *Public Opinion Quarterly* just after the U.S. entry into the war, analyzed the work of the Canadian censors and argued the system showed Canada did not have a truly free press.³⁵ Swindler wrote about the government's anger at U.S. publications that carried stories criticizing the Canadian war effort and warned his readers Canada's administration considered cutting off newsprint exports to U.S. publications that angered the King government.

Eggleston replied with a brief article in *Queen's Quarterly* (Fall 1942) that defended the censorship system against what he saw as the only possible alternative: censorship run by the military. He started from the presumption that censorship was a necessary evil in wartime, a position that he never publicly reconsidered.³⁶

Since the war ended, two major academic articles were written on the wartime censorship system. George Kerr's 1982 article on the censorship controversy surrounding the reporting of the speech that led to Montreal Mayor Camillien Houde's arrest and internment examines a small part of the Quebec press' rebellion against censorship and concentrates mainly on the reaction of the English-language press to the censors' attempts to suppress the content of

³⁴Wilfrid Eggleston, "Press Censorship," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. 7, 3 (1941): 4-5.

³⁵William Swindler, Wartime News Control in Canada. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn, 1942, 442-449.

³⁶Wilfrid Eggleston, "Press Censorship". *The Queen's Quarterly*, XLIII, No. 4, 556.

Houde's statement.³⁷ This thesis will take this study farther to show censorship in Quebec was, in the main, a failure, and that the Houde controversy needs to be placed within the context of a six-year running battle that began during the Quebec provincial election in the fall of 1939. National archives researcher Daniel German was the first scholar to use the newly-released Censorship Branch files as a basis for research. His 1996 article "Press Censorship and the Terrace Mutiny: A Case study in Second World War Information Management" concentrated on the censors' and government's reaction to the unrest among conscript soldiers at Terrace, B.C., in the fall of 1944.³⁸ The article is a very detailed discussion of one small part of the history of World War II press censorship. However, it does not follow the issue through its entire course as mass desertions occurred in southwestern Ontario six weeks after the Terrace disturbances.

Immediately after the war, the Canadian Press's general manager, Gil Purcell,³⁹ wrote a master's thesis⁴⁰ on the censorship system, using as his primary sources the voluminous files of handbooks and directives his office received during the war. He also had personal access to censorship's managers and appears to have been given or shown a copy of the Directorate's final report. Purcell's 156-page thesis examined the concept of the voluntary principle of

³⁷ George Kerr, "Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 1940. *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 8, No 2 (1982), 46-64.

³⁸ Daniel German. "Press Censorship and the Terrace Mutiny: a case study in Second World War information management". *Journal of Canadian Studies - Revue d'études canadiennes*. Vol. 31, no. 4 (Winter 1996-7), 124-142.

³⁹ Purcell took a leave from the Canadian Press in 1940 to serve as Press Relations Officer for the 1st Canadian Division. In 1941, his left leg was crushed by a supply canister dropped from an airplane during a training exercise and had to be amputated above the knee. After convalescing in Britain, Purcell returned to his job as general superintendent of the Canadian Press.

⁴⁰ University of Toronto, 1946

ensorship, censorship's basis in law, and some of the political decisions made regarding censorship. Most of his focus was on the censorship directives that were sent to the print media during the war and the evolution of censorship policies.

Less than a decade later, historian Ramsay Cook wrote his Master's thesis on the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, focusing on some of the more egregious attacks on free-speech rights in Canada during the war.⁴¹ William Young (1978)⁴² wrote an authoritative doctoral thesis on the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, in which he touched upon the Directorate of Censorship. Both Cook and Young were hampered by the unavailability of the directorate's records, which were not released until the late 1990s. Reginald Whitaker (1986)⁴³ focused on the censorship of Communists and Daniel Robinson (1993)⁴⁴ dealt briefly with the suppression of the foreign language press. Claude Beauregard's short work, *Guerre et censure* (1998),⁴⁵ analyzed the censorship of Canadian material written by Canadian correspondents overseas but did not examine the operations of the Directorate of Censorship, the backgrounds of its staff, their relationship with members of the Canadian media, and the mechanisms used by the Directorate to manipulate the media.

⁴¹ Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Liberalism in Wartime: A Study of the Defence of Canada Regulations and Some Canadian Attitudes to Civil Liberties in Wartime". MA Thesis, Queen's University, 1955.

⁴² William Young, "Making the Truth Graphic: The Canadian Government's Home Front Information Structure and Program During World War II." Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1978.

⁴³ Reg Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism during World War II," *Labour*, 17 (1986): 135-166.

⁴⁴ Daniel Robinson, "Planning for the "most serious contingency": Alien Internment, Arbitrary Detention and the Canadian State," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 28, 2 (1993): 5-20.

⁴⁵ Beauregard, *Guerre et Censure*.

This thesis' main sources are the voluminous records of the Directorate of Censorship, the archival biographical material on political actors, senior public servants, members of the censorship staff and Canada's journalism elite, post-war autobiographies of senior journalists, and Canadian newspaper libraries.

The Directorate of Censorship records in Library and Archives Canada are impressive. Sixty-eight 15 cm-deep boxes, nearly 10 metres of files, contain the press rulings and memoranda of the censors, along with correspondence, news clippings, minutes of meetings and an unpublished final report of the Directorate that was probably written by Fulgence Charpentier and Warren Baldwin. These boxes of files also contain the employment and business records of the censorship branch.

The records of the Department of National Defence are remarkably thin regarding press censorship, although some pre-war and post-war censorship material, both domestic and British, are among its files. The Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery has some records pertaining to its members' actions during the war. Newspapers have been less careful with their records, with most papers failing to keep historical material (other than clippings) or donating it to archives. Prime Minister King, the real driving force behind the voluntary press censorship system wrote sparingly in his diaries about censorship but his personal correspondence contains some pertinent material on the subject, including letters and memoranda that clearly show he reaped some of the political benefits of the system.⁴⁶ Eggleston, Maurice Pope, the architect of the

⁴⁶ His commitment to it was shown very clearly during the Cabinet meeting of November 29, 1944, at the height of the Terrace "mutiny" when King effectively rescued the voluntary system from the military and

system, and Oliver Mowat Biggar, who restructured it in 1942, left some of their papers to the Library and Archives of Canada, though they make little reference to censorship. Of the regional press censors, H. B. Jefferson was the most diligent in preserving his personal diaries and papers. Jefferson had an amazing capacity for work: he handled almost all the censorship work on the Battle of the Atlantic and the U-boat forays into Canadian waters, wrote many very detailed and entertaining memoranda for his supervisors and colleagues in the censorship system, and kept a very detailed diary of his time in Halifax during World War II. Jefferson's papers are housed in the Nova Scotia Provincial Archives, with copies at the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History in Ottawa. Of the journalists involved, few left any papers of value to censorship research. The exception is the collection of Winnipeg *Free Press* parliamentary reporter Grant Dexter, which is kept at Queen's University. While Dexter did not give much thought to the censorship system itself, he did mention its actions several times, especially in late 1939, and gave insider information on events that were extremely important to the context of the censorship system and about the people involved in them.

This thesis initially examines the foundations of censorship, both in the World War I censorship system and in interwar years planning and the dominant journalistic political culture in which it functioned. It explains how the original Press censorship system was established and its personnel hired. As the censorship system underwent two important institutional reorganizations, these

from Eggleston, who considered handing censorship over to the armed forces. See Chapter 12, "Censorship and the Zombies," below.

changes are discussed in detail, with an explanation of the government's rationale.

The censorship system was decentralized. Each of its regional offices had specific tasks and challenges. Most of the censorship of Canada's involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic was handled by the directorate's one-man Halifax office, staffed by H. Bruce Jefferson. Montreal censors, assisted by Ottawa-based Chief Press Censor (French), Fulgence Charpentier, dealt with Quebec's French and English-speaking media. The Ottawa censors handled the Parliamentary Press Gallery and dealt with government and military intelligence officials. Toronto's press censorship office, headed by Bert Perry and Warren Baldwin (who later moved to Ottawa), worked with most of the newspapers in Southern Ontario. In Vancouver, John Graham and Lew Gordon had censorship duties for all of Western and Northern Canada, a daunting task that involved handling naval censorship along the Pacific Coast, censoring the surviving Japanese-Canadian newspaper, *The New Canadian*, dealing with Edmonton-based U.S military authorities in Edmonton on stories of the construction of the Alaska Highway and the Canol pipeline, and suppressing stories of the Japanese balloon bombs that drifted over Western Canada in the last year of the war.

I have focused much of the thesis on the larger issues faced by censorship and on major media that refused to conform to the censorship system. The most important military issue, by far, was censorship of news from Halifax. The port was this country's major embarkation port for troops and for freight convoys. The German navy craved information on convoy sailings. Near

the end of the war, conscription and the reluctance of draftees to be shipped overseas became an issue that threatened the country's war effort. Censorship almost collapsed during the mutiny at Terrace, B.C. and the mass desertion of conscripts in Southern Ontario in 1944.

Domestically, the government faced challenges to its handling of the war effort from nationalist politicians and activists in Quebec and from Conservatives across the country and their allies, the provincial Liberals in Ontario. Both groups had important media support, which is examined in two chapters of this work.

The government dealt with the small foreign language press through a policy of suppression, banning such domestic and imported publications if there was any suspicion they might be sympathetic to Fascism and Communism. Three of the four Japanese-Canadian newspapers published in Canada were suppressed within days of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The fate of *The New Canadian*, the surviving newspaper, and its editor, Tommy Shoyama, is the focus of a chapter.

Structurally, then, it is difficult to place wartime censorship of domestic and military news in English, French and foreign languages into a neat package, nor does the study of wartime press censorship lend itself to quantification or mathematical analysis. It is a study of hundreds of decisions made by men working in a liberal democratic journalistic and political milieu. Many of those decisions were surprising. It very much goes against the stereotypes of censorship that Canada's World War II press censors would turn out to be vigilant guardians of press freedom. Simplistic views of press censorship are

shaken when one examines the ways the censors protected Tommy Shoyama or how the censors stood up to military intelligence officers.

The attitudes of journalists during the war are also examined, and Canada's media fails, usually by choice, to live up to its self-proclaimed role of watchdog. Only two major newspapers, *The Globe and Mail* and *Le Devoir*, took on the censorship system, and their opposition was usually based on furthering the political agendas of their editors and proprietors. Most newspapers simply handed over their editorial choices to the press censors. They seemed more concerned with ensuring their competition did not "scoop" them on a story than on breaking war news. They also devoted a considerable amount of energy informing on each other. By the end of the war, even the press censors believed the country's newspapers had done a poor job of informing the public through the war. Radio was still the only electronic media in Canadian homes, and its journalists faced an even greater level of control than their newspaper and magazine colleagues. The CBC, a Crown agency, took charge of the censorship of the small community of private broadcasters. After a rough start during the 1939 Quebec provincial election and the 1940 federal election, radio stations rarely caused serious problems for the censorship system.

The wartime press censorship system dealt with so many issues, so many publications and across such a large span of time and space that it is difficult to determine whether it was successful. As will be seen in this thesis, Wilfrid Eggleston, who effectively led the English-language press censorship system, did not believe it was. Eggleston was unsure that any type of press censorship

could stop the flow of information through society and to enemy agents in Canada. Eggleston and his colleagues believed the free flow of information – even news of military or domestic war effort failures – improved Canada’s ability to wage war. Incompetence, corruption and waste were fostered by totalitarian methods of press censorship, they contended. Over time, however, inconsistencies in actions and policies cropped up. This is understandable when one realizes the censorship was, especially in its greatest crises, reactive. *Ad hoc* decisions made by a small group of men spread across five time zones were bound to show signs of inconsistency. As well, by the fall of 1944 when censorship faced its greatest crisis with the Terrace “mutiny”, administrative fatigue appeared to be a contributing factor to the Directorate’s problems.

In the end, history is made by people, and Canada’s domestic press censors were burdened by the social constructs within which they functioned, along with competing military, government, political, social and press interests. Determining whether they succeeded or failed at their tasks requires an examination of their routine work as well as their handling of important crises.

Chapter 1

Prelude: The World War I Press Censorship System

Canada's censorship systems in both world wars were adapted from the British system that began taking shape during the Boer War and the Anglo-German crises that predated World War I.¹ While Canadian journalists worked far more co-operatively with their censors than did their British colleagues, Canadian press censorship rules were more stringent than Britain's. In fact, Canadian censors in World War I banned some material that was approved by British censors for publication in the United Kingdom, believing it was too graphic for a Canadian audience.²

At the outbreak of World War I, the Canadian government had no plan for a press censorship system but military officials had been communicating with their British counterparts since 1904 regarding controlling public information about naval activities at Halifax, N.S., and Esquimalt, B.C.³ The British retained control over Canadian censorship until 1915.

During the opening days of the war, editors and reporters were caught in a conflict between the public's hunger for news and the military's demand for secrecy. The issue came to a head on August 12, 1914, at a meeting between senior military staff and the editors of most of Canada's major newspapers.⁴ The

¹For a detailed examination of the British system and its origins, see Dean Hopkin, "Domestic Censorship in the World War I," *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 5 No. 4 (1970) 151-169.

²Keshen, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1992, xiv.

³Report of the First Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, February 17, 1928. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

⁴Report of the Chief Censor (WWI), Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5439 (No File).

editors pledged their co-operation with a new censorship system as long as there was no interference with what they termed “safe and legitimate news” and no attempt to interfere with the debate of purely political issues. Journalists were expected to shy away from stories that would deter recruitment and publish articles that instilled confidence in the Allied effort. The government and newspaper executives settled on a voluntary press censorship system that placed the onus on publishers to ensure their papers did not cross the lines, whatever the government determined them to be.

The Postmaster General, acting as Deputy Press Censor for the British Chief Press Censor, could ban any publication or writing and publishing of information respecting the war, or its causes, contrary to the government’s version of the facts. The maximum penalty for writing, publishing, circulating or possessing anything banned by the Postmaster General was a fine of \$5,000 and/or five years imprisonment. The owner of the print shop where the material was published, along with the directors and officers of the corporation that controlled the premises, were each subject to the same fines and jail terms. The printer could be shut down indefinitely and the presses could be seized along with and all copies of the offending publication.

The agreement was enshrined in the *War Measures Act*, passed on August 22, 1914 but made retroactive to August 4. Five days later, the Secretary of State invited leading editors and publishers to a second conference in Ottawa to discuss the types of news and commentary that should be censored. A four-member committee was struck to help the Under-Secretary of State and a

military officer appointed by the Postmaster General to write the main regulations of the new censorship service. The committee worked very quickly. The next day, delegates were presented with the draft of a schedule of rules and regulations for the press censorship system, which were printed in a pamphlet and mailed to newspaper offices, publishing firms, advertising and public relations agencies, government departments, police departments, intelligence officers, and to allied governments.⁵

The censorship system became increasingly invasive and powerful as the war went on. An Order in Council passed September 12, 1914,⁶ similar to one issued in Great Britain under the *Defence of the Realm Act*, was aimed at suppressing spies. Anyone who transmitted information “with respect to the movement or any disposition of the armed forces of His Majesty or His Majesty’s Allies” was guilty under the *War Measures Act*. This law could also be used against the press. Less than two months later, Cabinet passed a second Order in Council which outlawed publications “calculated to be, or that might be, directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, or containing articles bearing on the war and not in accordance with the facts.”⁷

This remained the legal underpinnings of the press censorship system until the spring of 1915 when the government created the Chief Censor’s post.⁸ Ernest J. Chambers (1862-1921), a former journalist and militia officer who

⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶ PC 2358, Sept. 12, 1914.

⁷ PC 94, October 8, 1914.

⁸ PC 1330, June 10, 1915.

served as Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod of the Canadian Senate, was appointed chief censor.⁹

As the war dragged on and casualty lists lengthened, the government tightened the censorship screws. Films and theatrical productions fell under censorship.¹⁰ In the last months of the war, the censors began poking through record stores and demanded catalogues from the major U.S. record companies.¹¹ Thirty-four recordings were banned, all of them foreign-language songs, including a recorded version of *Deutschland Uber Alles*.¹² Just a few weeks before the end of the war, the government banned all printed material in the languages of the enemy powers, a large swath of publications considering the ethnic mixture of the Austrian empire.¹³ Even after the Armistice, the government continued toughening the censorship rules. On November 13, 1918, Cabinet passed an Order in Council that effectively outlawed the publication of anything advocating socialist revolution or undermining capitalism.¹⁴

The censorship system had been, throughout the war, a mechanism for rooting out subversives and non-conformists. The focus was on German and Slavic ethnic groups, pacifists, defeatists or people who just doubted the sense of the war. The Borden government continued to use censorship to beat back the “Reds” after the Armistice. This was the only time in Canadian history when

⁹ The position of Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod is often described as ceremonial, but the holder is responsible for much of the security on Parliament Hill.

¹⁰ P.C. 146 January 17, 1917.

¹¹ P.C. 1241, May 21, 1918. The censors discuss their examination of catalogues and record store inventories in the Report of the Chief Censor (WWI), Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

¹² Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda During Canada's Great War*, 109.

¹³ P.C. 2381, September 25, 1918.

¹⁴ P.C. 2786, Nov. 13, 1918.

editorship was imposed on the press in peace time. The system survived, with a few tweaks to lift censorship on some foreign language publications, until December 20, 1919, when all of the Orders in Council dealing with press censorship were repealed.

Press censorship in World War I operated as a voluntary system, with editors and publishers engaged in self-censorship. When in doubt about a story, they looked to the censorship staff to “advise” them.¹⁵ Opinions from a perspective outside the English- and French-Canadian cultural mainstream were not tolerated, nor were the writings of authors who showed any sympathy for the revolutionary movements sweeping Eastern Europe in the last years of the war. The censors insisted they looked for the leakage of facts that might be useful to the enemy. Political discourse was not suppressed, they argued.¹⁶ In fact, it was confined to a narrow Anglo-centric, Imperialist, capitalist paradigm.

Except for the *Victoria Week*, the *Sault Ste. Marie Express*, *Le Bulletin* of Montreal and Quebec City’s *La Croix*, all of which were banned, editors of commercial newspapers toed the line. They chose to discuss political issues from angles that did not reflect overly negatively on Canada’s war effort and did not, like the Sault Ste. Marie paper, question the reasons for sending more Canadian soldiers to the front.¹⁷

For an organization with such power, the censorship system was remarkably small. Its Ottawa head office was staffed by the Chief Press Censor;

¹⁵ Report of the Chief Censor (WWI), Chap. 13 Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5439 (No File).

¹⁶ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship (World War II). Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (No File).

¹⁷ Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda During Canada’s Great War*, 76.

two press censors (one for French-language papers, the other for English); an office manager; a German translator who was also an assistant censor; and a messenger. The department employed translators in thirty-one languages on a freelance basis. The department also had branch offices in Toronto, Winnipeg and Vancouver, where the editors of Canadian Press were paid honoraria to be press censors. A very similar system of organization was established during World War II but on a slightly larger scale.

During the early stages of the war, editors were unsure of the rules and regulations and censors received "a considerable amount" of news copy which they tried to process as quickly as possible. Later, as editors became more familiar with the demands of the system, fewer articles were submitted to the censors. Editors also consulted the censors by telephone and telegraph on specific questions. Periodically, the Chief Press Censor's office sent circulars to some 1,800 editors and publishers of newspapers, periodicals and books, booksellers, advertising agencies and job printers, explaining the requirements of censorship. As well, senior officials within the government received the circulars. In all, seventy such circulars were issued. Each was approved by the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Naval Service. When publishers crossed the line, Chambers initially sent them a warning letter.¹⁸

Although there were no formal links with the armed forces, censors corresponded with senior officers in military intelligence and with high-ranking army and naval officers. The Chief Press Censor's Office also maintained strong

¹⁸ Report of the Chief Censor (WWI), Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5439 (NF); Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda During Canada's Great War*, 75.

links to the office of the Commissioner of Customs, the North West Mounted Police, and with censorship authorities in the United Kingdom, the British dominions, and, after the entry of the United States into the war, with the Committee of Public Information, which administered the U.S.'s voluntary press censorship system.

Much of the censors' efforts concentrated on suppressing news of troop movements, which was also one of the main jobs of their World War II counterparts. They managed to maintain secrecy on the departure of troop transports from Halifax even though there was no censor in the city. The World War I censors searched the newspapers for any hints of troop departures and even sent staff into churches to monitor the prayers of priests and ministers for the safe arrival of soldiers in Europe. As well, they hunted for clergymen who spoke in churches of casualties at the front, revealing information "in direct contravention of the Censorship requirements imposed by the General Officers Commanding in Chief in the Field."¹⁹ Some newspapers picked up these announcements and printed them. Censors met discreetly with offending clergy and gave them copies of the censorship rules and regulations.

Censorship authorities banned 253 publications, approximately 90 per cent of which were American-based and two-thirds written in a foreign language.²⁰ Ninety-three of the publications were Marxist-oriented.²¹ In World War II, the censors banned a similar number and type of publication but were

¹⁹ Report of the Chief Censor (WWI), Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5439, (No File).

²⁰ Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda During Canada's Great War*, xiv.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

more selective about the foreign-language press. The World War II censors would agonize over whether small ethnic papers might be breaking the law. Chambers shut them all down.

It was rare for English-Canadian journalists to be “unpatriotic”. Most of them were first- or second-generation young male immigrants from the British Isles, the same demographic group that made up the bulk of the early enlistments. Chambers could win most arguments by appealing to the loyalty of the journalists. The same held true in World War II: no mainstream journalist, even among those Quebec journalists who supported Vichy France in World War II, beat the drum for Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo. In English Canada, debate in both wars usually started from the premise that Canada was engaged in a righteous struggle.

In both world wars, the censors were vexed with *Le Devoir* and other Quebec nationalist papers. They were isolationist, not pro-German. The situation was worse in World War II, with a large block of the Quebec press opposed to the war from the beginning and some publications evolving into Petainist organs after the fall of France. Chambers was thwarted in his attempts to rein in the *Québécois* press. The World War II censors would be, too.

The United States posed problems for the censors in both wars. In World War I, some English-Canadian publications criticized the U.S. for not siding with the Allies (a theme that would be picked up by Canadian journalists in World War II). The Chief Press Censor issued instructions to Canadian editors asking them to abstain from publishing material “likely to cause irritation” in the U.S. and other

neutral countries. Chambers was much tougher on U.S. publications coming into Canada, cowing some U.S. publishers and editors into asking the censors for guidance on the acceptability of literature for circulation in Canada. That did not happen in World War II. Instead, the censors and some government officials made empty threats against mainstream U.S. publications that opposed the allied cause or broke Canadian security law. These were ignored by the American press.

There was another difference between censors in the two world wars. When Chambers saw stories he disagreed with, he issued press releases to set the record straight or demanded Canadian editors insert his version of the “facts” into newswire copy. The World War II censors did not try to tamper with copy or challenge the facts of news stories in the mainstream press or act as monitors of press accuracy. They believed accuracy was outside their legislative mandate.

Chambers’s office began the war with responsibility for planting propaganda, handing out press releases and military photographs, and spreading counter-propaganda. The chief censor eventually allowed a press agency in Montreal to distribute authorized military and naval pictures, once they were received from the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Canadian military. On November 9, 1917, the government appointed a Director of Public Information, whose job was described as “furnishing to the Press and the public the fullest possible information concerning the progress of the war and measures adopted by the Government for the prosecution of the same.” Still, the Censorship bureau continued to be the official channel for communicating all information

coming from cable and telegraph “through military and naval secret channels, such as news respecting purely naval and military matters, the movements of troops and shipping of all sorts, casualty lists, etc.”²² These were jobs that were never undertaken by the censors in World War II, who saw their jobs as advisors who interpreted the two sections of the *War Measures Act* dealing with preventing material from being printed or broadcast that might be of value to the enemy or detrimental to the war effort.

As will be seen throughout this thesis, Wilfrid Eggleston, who headed the English-language print censorship system through most of the war, found the idea of censorship distasteful. He tended to give journalists, whether foreign or Canadian, English, French or ethnic press, as much leeway as possible as long as they did not come out against Canadian participation in the war. Chambers set out to forge the press into a tool for total war, shut down all foreign-language papers, and tackle the Quebec French press. Chambers and Eggleston had two very different views of the value of the press in wartime. To Chambers, it was a recruiting tool, morale booster and an instrument for distributing government-approved news. To Eggleston, the press was an important mechanism within the democratic system that, when functioning properly, could do everything Chambers wanted along with ferreting out waste, corruption and incompetence in

²² Report of the Chief Censor (World War I), RG2, Privy Council Office (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5939, (No File).

government and the the military. An aggressive and inquisitive press, Eggleston believed, was better for the war effort than a press that was muzzled.²³

The two world wars were very dissimilar contests. In 1914, despite twenty years of friction, Germany (and Prussia) was a traditional ally of Great Britain and the two countries had never gone to war against each other. The Kaiser, for whatever his failings, was, at first, difficult to accept in the role as a war criminal and enemy of civilization. In 1939, the memories of the agonies of the previous war were very clear. This time, the Allies were fighting an ideology, Fascism, which really did seek to dominate the world. Hitler's regime was more militaristic than even the Kaiser's and much more aggressive. The Nazis had already siezed two central European countries before the war began and the Allies suffered one setback after another until the summer of 1942. Losing this war was a real possibility when Germans governed most of mainland Europe and U-boats sank ships within sight of the banks of the St. Lawrence River. There usually was no need to use a stick to keep the English-Canadian press in line. Everyone was on the "team". When, however, the goal of censorship seemed to be to make the government look good, the newspapers rebelled, providing drama that the World War I censors never faced.

²³ Eggleston makes that case in a memorandum written to the head of Canadian Military Intelligence, T.A. Stone, on August 13, 1941 that is reproduced as Appendix 3.

Chapter 2: Theory and Planning in the Interwar Years

The architects of the Canadian censorship system in the Second World War drew on Chambers's final report and the work of social scientists who, during the interwar years, studied issues of wartime information management and propaganda. This literature was in the mainstream because it was part of American soul-searching about how it was drawn – some critics said tricked – into World War I. In 1922, Walter Lippmann opened a debate on British news manipulation in World War I with the publication of *Public Opinion*.¹ In it, he argued Britain had used the most sophisticated media manipulation the world had yet seen to draw the U.S. into World War I. Even during the war, the British had studied their own system and those of their opponents.² German generals rushed their own analyses into print, with Erich Ludendorff's reaching the bookstores, in both German and English, before the end of 1919.³ Ludendorff argued the Wilhelmine regime's rough censorship and clumsy propaganda had hampered the German war effort.

Much of the effort of the propaganda and censorship system of the Allies and the Central Powers was directed at the United States. The Allies wanted the U.S. to fight on their side, while the best Germany and Austria could reasonably

¹ Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1922.

² Peter Chalmers Mitchell, *Report on the Propaganda Library in the Intelligence Division of the War Office*. Cited in Ralph Haswell Lutz, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December, 1933), 496-516.

³ Erich Ludendorff, *My War Memoirs 1914-1918*. London: Hutchison Ltd., 1919.

hope for was the maintenance of American neutrality. Throughout the war they were usually on the defensive, attempting to negate the bad press heaped on Germany by the pro-British U.S. eastern seaboard newspapers over alleged German atrocities in Belgium and the toll taken by German U-boats.⁴ Sir Edward Cook's description of his life as Britain's chief press censor was printed in 1920.⁵ In it, and in other books by censors and journalists -- including Sir Douglas Brownrigg's *The Indiscretions of a Naval Censor* (1919),⁶ Sir Philip Gibbs's *Realities of War* (1920),⁷ Neville Lytton's *The Press and the General Staff* (1920),⁸ and Maj.-Gen. Charles Callwell's *The Experiences of a Dug-Out 1914-1918* (1920)⁹ -- were candid discussions of the new press manipulation techniques used on those U.S. Eastern seaboard newspapers. A decade later, Henry Hamilton Fyfe covered the wartime propaganda role of *Times* of London owner Lord Northcliffe in *Northcliffe, an Intimate Biography* (1930),¹⁰ as had the extremely well-connected Canadian press baron Max Aiken (Lord Beaverbrook) in *Politicians and the War, 1914-1916* (1928). Beaverbrook, who had worked as Canada's unofficial delegate at the British War Office, then as "eye-witness,"¹¹ the sole official source for front-line news on Canadian activities at the front, was intrigued by the power of wartime news manipulation. In 1916, he became

⁴ Within a decade, American writers, starting with H.L. Mencken, who had supported Germany in World War I, would turn this success against the British, arguably delaying their country's entry into World War II by convincing Americans that British reports of Nazi brutality were simply propaganda stories. Lippman's work sold well, as did Arthur Ponsonby's *Falsehood in Wartime, Containing An Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout the Nations During the Great War*. New York: Dutton, 1928.

⁵ Sir Edward Cook, *The Press in Wartime, with Some Account of the Official Press Bureau*. London: Macmillan, 1920.

⁶ Sir Douglas Brownrigg, *The Indiscretions of a Naval Censor*. London: Charles Doran, 1920.

⁷ Philip Gibbs, *Realities of War*. London: Heinemann, 1920.

⁸ Neville Lytton, *The Press and the General Staff*. London: W. Collins, 1920.

⁹ Charles Callwell, *The Experiences of a Dug-Out 1914-1918*. London: Constable, 1920.

¹⁰ Henry Hamilton Fyfe, *Northcliffe: An Intimate Biography*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930.

¹¹ See Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda During Canada's Great War*, 31.

director of Britain's War Office Cinematograph Committee and, the following year, Britain's first Minister of Information. In the interwar years, he studied the subject of media manipulation intensely, wrote glowingly of Britain's success in this domain, and in World War II, stepped into Northcliffe's shoes as one of Britain's most successful propagandists.¹²

In the 1930s, American isolationists analyzed British propaganda and censorship and concluded the U.S. had been tricked into declaring war on Germany in 1917. Throughout the Great Depression, social scientists in the former Central Powers, the Allied countries and the Soviet Union expanded this literature and drew from the World War I experience. New theories on propaganda and censorship were developed and even applied by totalitarian regimes, as in both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the ruling party also directly controlled the newspapers.

Wartime censorship was a military issue given serious planning during the interwar years, probably because of Mackenzie King's interest in media manipulation and because censorship and propaganda planning was relatively inexpensive.¹³ On December 14, 1927, G. J. Desbarats, Deputy Minister of Defence, wrote to the Under-Secretary of State, asking him to appoint members of an Inter-departmental Censorship Committee. On February 17, 1928, the committee held its first meeting in the Ottawa office of the Department of National

¹² For a more complete discussion of how Britain's World War I censorship and propaganda system was adapted as a model for World War II, see Philip M. Taylor, "If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935-1939". *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1981) pp. 51-75.

¹³ For a comprehensive description of the state of the military in the interwar years, see James Eayers, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

Defence's Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.¹⁴ Planners had the report of the Chief Press Censor, dated March 21, 1920.¹⁵ They also had two documents, *Press Censorship in Time of War, (1925)*, and *Regulations for Press Censorship in Time of War or Emergency, (1925)*, whose authorship are unclear and which now appear to be lost. At that meeting, members of the committee were briefed on the history of press censorship in Canada and were told the British planned to create a War Press Bureau, operated by an officer in the Military Operations and Intelligence Branch called the "Controller of Censorship" to manage newspaper and periodical censorship, while radio censorship would be operated by the Admiralty, should another major war break out.¹⁶ At its second meeting, on February 24, 1928, the committee decided to recommend a wartime censorship system similar to Canada's World War I structure.¹⁷ Under-Secretary of State Thomas Mulvey, a lawyer who had worked with the World War I press censorship office, was appointed liaison to the Canadian Press national news co-operative.

¹⁴ The committee's members were: Col. H.H. Matthews, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (chairman); Thomas Mulvey, K.C., Department of Secretary of State; Comdr H.B. Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence; Lt.-Comdr C.P. Edwards, Director of Radio Services, Department of Marine and Fisheries; Col. C. F. Hamilton, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Arthur Webster, Post Office Department; and P.L. Young, Department of National Revenue. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

¹⁵ (A heavily-censored version of this report was published by the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada on May 31, 1928 as "Report Respecting the Organization and Operations of the Canadian Press Censorship Service June 1915-December 1919"). A copy of the report is in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5939 (NF).

¹⁶ Minutes of the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, February 17, 1928. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

¹⁷ Minutes of the second meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, February 24, 1928. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

In the spring of 1928, Mulvey wrote to Canadian Press president J.H. Woods, asking Woods to choose “five representative newspaper men” to confer with the Inter-departmental Committee on the question of censorship of the wire service within Canada.¹⁸ Mulvey met Woods and the board of directors of Canadian Press on May 4, 1929, and, at the following meeting of the Inter-departmental Committee on Censorship¹⁹ was instructed to begin adapting the “various Committee of Imperial Defence documents dealing with Cable and Land Telegraph Censorship” to suit the Canadian situation.²⁰

That fall, the secretary of the Inter-departmental Committee drafted a letter detailing the structure of the proposed wartime censorship system, and, on November 26, 1929, sent an organizational chart to other members of the committee. The censorship structure, which placed press censorship under the jurisdiction of a war press bureau answering to the Secretary of State, was approved, but Lt.-Cmdr Edwards, who represented the Department of Marine and Fisheries, insisted that his department have control of radio censorship in wartime. The committee was deadlocked on this issue and it was referred to a subcommittee made up of representatives from the Department of Marine and Fisheries and the Department of Transport.²¹ By June 1930, the Department of Marine and Fisheries, which dealt with offshore issues, had won its fight for

¹⁸ Minutes of the third meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, August 17, 1928. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

¹⁹ By 1929, official interest in censorship seems to have waned, as the committee met on January 30, 1929, and did not reconvene until September 5, 1929.

²⁰ Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, September 5, 1929. LAC RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3

²¹ Ibid, January 16, 1930. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

control of radio broadcast censorship, with the added proviso to the organization chart that “co-ordination of all censorship... will be carried out by Information Section, N.D.H.Q.”²² This organizational structure was confirmed at a meeting of the interdepartmental committee on June 27, 1930.²³

The National Defence Committee on Censorship did not meet again until March 16, 1933. At this meeting, which lasted just twenty-five minutes, members approved the Post Office’s request for organizational changes, approved the revised censorship structure, and appointed a committee²⁴ to compile and edit the Canadian Censorship Regulations, “using the British Regulations [Committee on Imperial Defence Secret document 984-B] as a general guide as to the form and arrangement.”²⁵ This committee did not meet again for five years.

In 1936, Dr. E.H. Coleman, the Under-Secretary of State, discussed the question of wartime censorship with representatives of the country’s major newspapers. A committee of Canadian Press directors headed by E.J. Archibald of the *Montreal Star* went to Ottawa and received a confidential briefing on censorship plans, including Chambers’s report following the World War I. Some consideration was given by Coleman to placing the censorship system under the

²² In the end, the Department of Marine was frozen out of the censorship system. In World War II, mass-media radio censorship was handled by the Director of Censorship, who answered to the Secretary of State and delegated most of his power to the head of station relations of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Personal radio broadcasting, such as ham radios and marine band radios, were censored by the Department of Transport, which shut almost all of them down at the beginning of the war. Crerar’s letter to Mulvey, dated June 11, 1930, is in Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

²³ Minutes of the seventh meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, June 27, 1930. In *Ibid.*, Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

²⁴ Members of the committee were: T.A. Crerar, a former minister in the Borden government; G.R. Shibley, Dept. of Secretary of State; F.E. Jolliffe, Post Office Dept.; Donald Manson, Dept. of Marine; and Lt-Comdr. E.R. Mainguy, National Service, Dept. of National Defence. Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, March 16, 1933. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

control of the Minister of National Defence. The censors would later applaud the government's decision to keep censorship at arm's length from the military, but they did, by the end of the war, see the value of close co-operation between at least National Defence and the censorship system.²⁶ The lack of communication between the military and the censors was often embarrassing to the censors, who were often blind-sided by reporters who had better military information. Part of this disorganization and decentralization was deliberate: King was leery of professional information manipulation techniques and feared the rise of a "Canadian Goebbels".²⁷

Major Maurice Pope,²⁸ a professional engineer and one of the staff officers responsible for interwar planning, specialized in developing organizational systems for military units and cultivating liaisons with countries that he expected would be Canada's Allies in the coming conflict. He disagreed with the King government's apparent reluctance to consider involvement in a European war and worked quietly on war planning.²⁹ Pope drafted revised censorship regulations in August 1938, "taking as my model those prepared under the direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence for use in the United Kingdom and throughout the Empire."³⁰ Pope worked on censorship plans in spite of

²⁶ Final Report of Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (No File).

²⁷ William R. Young, "Academics and Social Scientists versus the Press: the Policies of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, 1939-1945." *Canadian Historical Association Papers* 1978 219-239. Young cites an interview with Hon. Jack Pickersgill for the comment.

²⁸ Pope held the rank of Major during his war planning years, Colonel during his term as chief censor, was promoted to Brigadier soon after leaving censorship in 1942, and retired with the rank of Lieutenant-General.

²⁹ For a thorough examination of King's policies on war planning in the 1930s, see James Eayers, *In Defence of Canada Volume II: Appeasement and Rearmament*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

³⁰ Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, 128.

resistance from officials at the Department of External Affairs, who, reflecting the nationalist views of King and his close advisor, undersecretary of state O.D. Skelton, tried to dampen contact between Canadian and British military planners.³¹

Pope was Secretary-General of several interdepartmental defence committees. He had the political connections and the skills to act in ways that today might seem inconsistent with his rank as a relatively junior officer. Pope's father was private secretary to Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald and stayed in the government after the Prime Minister's death, managing Canadian foreign affairs under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Robert Borden and during Mackenzie King's first administration. His grandfather, W.W. Pope, was a Father of Confederation. His mother was a member of the powerful Taschereau family of Quebec. Educated at McGill University, from which he graduated with a degree in engineering, Pope worked for two years for the Canadian Pacific Railway before joining the Army in 1915. He was commissioned as a lieutenant in the militia but moved to the Permanent Force in 1917. He attended the Imperial Defence College before undertaking a two-year stint as a liaison officer in Washington (1931-32). He returned to National Defence Headquarters, where he became the workhorse of the military's war planning system. Fortunately, Pope, unlike so many of his political superiors, had a clear view of the strategic situation that was unfolding in the second half of the 1930s. In a memorandum entitled *A Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence*, drafted in April 1937, Pope warned that the tinderbox political situation of 1914 Europe was being

³¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

duplicated, with the added complication of the rise of a belligerent, expansionist Japan. Pope pointed out the necessity of liaising with officials of the British telegraph cable companies operating in Canada, and reminded Cabinet “any form of press censorship would require the loyal co-operation of the press and to that end the counsel of the Canadian Press Association would be found desirable.” He urged cabinet to read his “Co-ordination of Departmental Action on the Outbreak of War” (the “War Book”) and think about issues such as war emergency legislation, censorship, the treatment of enemy aliens, planning for the possibility of air raids, and invoking policies to deal with neutral countries, especially the U.S.³²

Executives of the CP wire service were asked by Pope in 1938 to recommend personnel to staff the offices of the Directorate of Censorship in time of war. Canadian Press could be trusted to be discreet. The agency’s board of directors was involved in the pre-war discussions of the government’s inter-departmental committee on censorship.³³ The news service had shown its ability to shield Canadians from controversy during the Abdication Crisis in 1936. Subscribing newspapers received no Canadian Press dispatches on the King’s affair with Wallis Simpson and the ensuing political crisis until the day of Edward VIII’s radio broadcast announcing his abdication. Canadian Press refused to move any of the American Associated Press copy on the story, even though Canadian Press was entitled by reciprocal agreement to use it. In effect, Canadian Press, rather than the editors and publishers of its subscribing

³² *Ibid.*, 128

³³ See above, as well as Purcell, “Wartime Press Censorship in Canada,” 11.

newspapers, determined the story would be suppressed.³⁴ Canadian newspaper editors, who could read the coverage in any major U.S. and most British papers as well as in the Associated Press wire copy, obviously supported Canadian Press's decision.

Cabinet order P.C. 531, issued on March 14, 1938, gave legal standing to the Inter-departmental Committee on Censorship. The committee met through the spring and early summer of 1938 to develop plans for wartime censorship.³⁵ In its first interim report, submitted to the Minister of National Defence in August 1938, the committee recommended it be instructed to draft an Order-in-Council for the imposition of censorship under the provisions of the *War Measures Act*.

The interim report identified the objects of wartime censorship as:

- (a) To prevent the enemy, so far as may be possible, from obtaining naval, military, air or other information of a nature inimical to the national interest through
 - (i) the action of spies or other agents;
 - (ii) the transmission and publication of news;
 - (iii) the transmission of all personal and business messages which may innocently, or otherwise, include particulars from which information as to the composition or movements of the defence forces may be deduced.

- (b) To stop the delivery of all messages which might
 - (i) injuriously affect the civil population or the morale of the defence forces;
 - (i) cause disaffection in home, British, allied or other territory;
 - (iii) prejudice our relations with allied or neutral powers.

- (c) To put pressure on the enemy by preventing all messages to and from him relating to the obtaining of supplies, etc., or, in the case of postal packets, might contain contraband goods or documents, etc. and thereby interfere with his trade, economic life, and

³⁴ George D. Kerr, "Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 1940." *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1982).

³⁵ The original membership of the Inter-departmental Committee on Censorship was: Lt.-Col L.R. LaFleche, Deputy Minister of National Defence (Chairman); Comdr. C.P Edwards, Department of Transport; J.F. Delaute, Department of the Secretary of State of Canada; Major J.G. Parmelee, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce; J.S. Macdonald, Department of External Affairs; H. Beaulieu and F.E. Jolliffe, Post Office Department; P.L. Young and A.W. Merriam, Department of National Revenue; Lt. Col. Maurice A. Pope and Lt. Comdr. F.R.W.R Gow, Department of National Defence; and Major H.A. Young, Department of National Defence (Secretary). First Interim Report, Committee On Censorship (C.C. 1 Draft) In Library and Archives Canada, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

activities generally, while, at the same time, using every endeavour to safeguard national, British and allied interests and the legitimate trade of neutrals.

(d) To obtain information of value to the Canadian, British, allied or other governments for naval, military, air, political or economic purposes, for securing supplies and generally for maintaining the trade, economic life and activities of the countries concerned.³⁶

The committee considered, and rejected, the idea of a complete “inland censorship” of communications, and believed a censorship of information flowing between Canada and the United States (which censors correctly believed would be neutral at the beginning of the war) would present “insoluble problems.”³⁷ The committee recommended strict censorship of overseas cable traffic, a ban on short-wave, aircraft and marine radio communication, and a postal censorship system for limited examination of domestic and foreign mails.

The committee, using the model sent by the British, suggested an advisory press censorship system similar to the one in World War I that would rely on newspapers to self-censor. This would be “a very mild form” operated by “experienced newspaper men” that would sanction journalists only if they deliberately ignored the censorship rules.³⁸ These recommendations were adopted by the government.

Rather than have one official controlling all aspects of press, cable and mail censorship, as had been the case in World War I, the Inter-departmental Committee argued for a decentralized regime, with a department head for each aspect of postal, cable, and press censorship reporting to the minister whose department most was most closely concerned with that aspect of

³⁶*Ibid.*, 3.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 6.

communication.³⁹ It is unclear why it made this decision, which would cause interdepartmental communication problems until the system was brought under one roof in May 1942. News censorship would be overseen by the Secretary of State, and, "in view of the wide degree of decentralization contemplated, the most frank and intimate co-operation of the several Departments concerned will be essential if censorship is to be effectively instituted."⁴⁰ Cabinet accepted this report on August 24, 1938. The power to enforce censorship existed under the provisions of the *War Measures Act, 1914* and the *Act's Defence of Canada Regulations*, although they would not be enacted until the outbreak of the war.

In August 1939, twelve days before the war broke out, Canadian Press's general manager, E.J. Archibald (who had previously been involved with censorship planning in 1936 when he was employed by the *Montreal Star*) was approached for recommendations for censorship staff. He responded by submitting a list of twenty names.⁴¹ Soon afterwards, the list was forwarded to government.⁴² By then, German armies were assembling at Poland's borders. On Labour Day weekend, Hitler's armies violated the frontier. Press censorship would be among the first items on the King government's wartime agenda, with censorship rules enacted on September 1 and September 3, 1939.

³⁹ Cable censorship, given the vast potential of this medium as a military intelligence source, was to answer to the Department of National Defence. Radio censorship was under the purview of the Department of Transport, which issued radio licenses. Postal censorship was under the jurisdiction of the Postmaster General. See *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8

⁴¹ M.E. Nichols, *The Story of CP*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1948 251

⁴² Ernest Lapointe letter quoted in *Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship*. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF)

Canada went into World War II with a full censorship plan in place. There was no apparent challenge to the idea that governments had the right to censor the press in wartime. In fact, managers of Canada's major print media, along with military officers and government officials, had a major role in planning the system and recommending staff. The press censorship system did require several major personnel and organizational overhauls during the war, but its essential component, a voluntary press censorship with journalists on the government payroll providing advice to their former colleagues, backed by the extreme powers of the *War Measures Act*, survived throughout the war. Several times, the system was challenged by the press and, at times, it appeared the government lost faith in it. With some tweaking, especially the splitting of censorship and propaganda functions very early in the war and the amalgamation of press, mail, and cable censorship in 1942, it lasted relatively intact through the war. Pope had cobbled together consensus from the major Canadian media, especially the powerful Canadian Press wire service, and had made journalists co-architects of the system. This gave journalists some ownership in the system that was designed to limit their freedoms. While this may seem anachronous to the ideal of media as public watchdog, it did, in fact, fit well with Canada's media culture, which sought political and social power by compromising with Canada's political elite. It was a system that, for the most part, was effective when not placed under a great deal of stress.

Chapter Three: The Establishment Men: Mid-Century Canadian Journalism

The Reading Room is, after the House of Commons and the Senate, the largest room in Canada's Parliament Building. Its walls are adorned with paintings depicting the importance of the press. Above a fireplace is an allegory called *The Spirit of the Printed Word*. A woman wearing a gilt cap of the messenger god Mercury holds a mirror that reflects the light of a torch of liberty. Two cherubic children stand beside her, one holding a page of lead type, the other a stack of paper. Across the room, there is an equally-large painting of a print shop. Four other pictures on the theme of news - of people conversing under a blossoming tree, loggers talking in the woods, a reporter noting the incoming cargo of a ship and dogsledders sharing a newspaper - dominate the corners. In the hallway leading from the Hall of Honour to the Reading Room, sculptors cut the image of the faces of ten leading journalists of the early 20th century into the limestone. They were the only living people so-honoured. Not even the sovereign was granted this privilege until the reign of Elizabeth II, and no prime minister, living or dead, has been memorialized in stone inside the Parliament Building.¹

The Reading Room was one of the meeting places of the people of the community that was Parliament Hill in the second quarter of the 20th century. It was an important clearinghouse of information, holding copies of most of the newspapers and magazines published in Canada. The printed

¹ Since the mid-1980s, this room is used for committee meetings and important receptions. A small space inside the main Library of Parliament has been set aside as a news and periodical reading area.

word was important to the generation that moved into the rebuilt Centre Block in 1920. In the new building, the press had a modern newsroom strategically situated on the third floor between the House of Commons and the Senate. The reporters were also given a wood-paneled lounge with a postcard-quality view of the Ottawa River and the Library of Parliament. This room is dominated by a fireplace inscribed with a quotation from Lord Byron: “But words are things. And a small drop of ink falling like dew upon a thought produces that which makes thousands, perhaps millions think.” The words were chosen by Charles Bowman, editor of the *Ottawa Citizen*, along with one of the biblical quotations on the Peace Tower: “Give the King Thy Judgments, O Lord; Where there is no vision, the people perish.”²

Yet, in 1941, a major historian writing in the country’s most prestigious historical journal believed journalists no longer ranked among the country’s elite. “That the journalist today is without considerable influence in political life in Canada, it would be futile to assert,” W.S. Wallace wrote in the *Canadian Historical Review* in 1941. “But it is obvious that this influence is less than it was in the days when public men were ‘made’ and ‘unmade’ by the editor of the *Toronto Globe* (sic). The reasons for this decline in the influence of the journalist in Canadian politics may well be left to the historian of the future to determine.”³

This view was shared by John Porter in *The Vertical Mosaic*, the book that defined Canada’s elites in the 1960s. While noting Mackenzie King’s cultivation of *Globe and Mail* publisher George McCullagh and Toronto *Star*

² Charles Bowman, *Ottawa Editor*. Sydney, B.C.: Gray’s Publishing, 1966 271-273.

³ W.S. Wallace, “The Journalist in Canadian Politics: A Retrospect”. *Canadian Historical Review*, 1941 Vol. 22, No. 1, 26.

publisher Joseph Atkinson in the mid-20th century, Porter still insisted journalists were not especially important.⁴ Porter argued there was “of course, nothing professional about the role of newspaper reporting,” since, as a group “reporters have no disciplined academic training in any particular sphere, although they seem prepared to write about almost anything.” He further observed that they did not license themselves, govern their own affairs, or establish their own standards of performance. “As Bernard Shaw pointed out so long ago they have no public register. As an occupation group they are not highly paid, nor do they seem to have high prestige.”⁵

Porter’s work is invaluable to social historians, but several aspects of this analysis are inaccurate, at least as they concerned the coverage of Parliament, both during the war years and at the time Porter wrote *The Vertical Mosaic*. Even in the early 20th century, members of the Ottawa journalistic elite were usually well educated (and almost always well-read and travelled). The Press Gallery included a professional engineer who had toured four continents (the Ottawa *Citizen’s* Bowman) and a Rhodes Scholar who held a master’s degree in economics from an Ivy League university (the Winnipeg *Free Press’s* George Ferguson).⁶ Almost all of the Toronto *Star’s* reporters, both in Ottawa and at the home newsroom, were university educated. *Star* publisher Joseph Atkinson hired primarily from the graduating classes of the University of Toronto and recruited Canada’s first Rhodes Scholar for his newsroom.⁷

⁴ John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965 535.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 485.

⁶ Ferguson was awarded his Rhodes Scholarship at the University of Alberta in 1923.

⁷ Ross Harkness, *J.E. Atkinson of the Star*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963 135.

The Ottawa reporters did have a “public register,” membership in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, which was by no means automatic to applicants. Members were bound by rules set by the membership of the gallery. Most members were adequately compensated by their employers for their work. Their wages were supplemented by income from freelance writing to Canadian and foreign newspapers, books and magazines articles, and by “hack”⁸ writing for politicians and government officials. By the late 1940s, most press gallery reporters stopped writing for politicians and political parties, but the loss was offset by the work they found as paid panelists on radio.⁹ Senior reporters like Grant Dexter and Blair Fraser earned enough from these various sources to live among the elite in Rockcliffe, Ottawa’s most expensive neighbourhood.

These journalists worked in a milieu of influence and power. They understood their own leadership role in the formation of public opinion but were deferential to authority, knowing that the coveted label “insider” denoted the ability to gather and keep secrets. During this period, reporters who joined or visited the Parliamentary Press Gallery were given a small booklet written by newspaper reporter Kennedy Crone explaining the history of the Press Gallery and the expectations placed upon journalists who used its facilities:

He chats with members in their rooms or at lunch; drops into the government or opposition lobby, listens to rumor, gossip, fact, and attempts to sort them out. Great discretion is often necessary in what must be fairly reported and what must be kept as a confidence. Members of the Gallery often obtain access,

⁸ By “hack”, I refer to the traditional meaning of the word, which arose from the 19th century slang for “taxi” and originally denoted the availability of a horse and buggy for a “one-off” hire. One aspect of that meaning, that anyone could hire a hack, was suggestive of a sort of prostitution. This meaning, which is usually in error, has clung to many freelance writers and authors who write commissioned articles.

⁹ C.W. Seymour-Ure, “Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa,” MA Thesis, Carleton University, 1962, 40.

either through the cooperation of news sources or their own enterprise, to secrets of state, details of government plans not yet ready for disclosure. A good reporter is often torn between his zeal to publish news and his determination to 'play the game' with his sources of information. Aside from the ethics of the profession, a prudent reporter is aware that his future success depends on his present honor and discretion. This is true of reporters everywhere in Canada, but it applies with special force at the Gallery at Ottawa.¹⁰

Journalists were expected to follow a code of conduct, laid down by the Press Gallery, which prevented ministers from being embarrassed by the reporting of loose talk: "The leaders in public life have come to feel free to talk with the utmost frankness to the members of the Press Gallery, it being understood that only those portions of the interview so indicated are to be quoted, or attributed to the speaker, or even used as background, as the case may be..."¹¹

Crone effectively explained the situation of the "insider," the reporter who knows much more than s/he writes and who shares secrets sparingly to prove and to maintain status. In this environment, discretion is at least as important as interviewing and research skills. Indiscretion, Crone made clear, is a career-killer to the "insider". The insider does not ferret out news. He acts as a strict self-censor, determining, presumably with guidance from sources and colleagues, when to share information and how much to dole out. Wilfrid Eggleston, who was president of the Press Gallery in the mid-1930s and went on to become Canada's Chief Press Censor, found it onerous to carry around so many secrets: "It frequently disturbed me to be invited to share secrets of the most indiscreet

¹⁰ Kennedy Crone, *The Press Gallery (Ottawa) 1937-38*. Montreal: Beaver Hall Press, 1936, 20-21

¹¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 38.

and embarrassing nature, embarrassing, that is, to the cabinet minister or government official if ever divulged.”¹²

People who possess secrets have something of value, not only to the public but also to their employers. The Winnipeg *Free Press*'s Grant Dexter shared his “insider” knowledge with his newspaper's owner and its editor. Dexter believed his published work gave enough information to the public. He decried the cynicism of some members of the press: “The people who are responsible for our laws deserve respectful attention, and a spirit of levity and disrespect will not improve our government,” Dexter wrote. “Once the public thinks all people in public life are crooked, hypocritical, and entirely lacking in any spirit of public service, a good man would not risk his character by becoming a member of parliament. The problem of democracy is a problem of education and will never awaken an interest in politics in a person when he has been led to believe that only grafters sit in legislatures and only warped laws are passed.”¹³

This culture of information manipulation and secrets-sharing explains why, in a world in which journalists and politicians are supposed by the public to be adversaries in a war over information and public opinion, journalists helped design the censorship system and volunteered to be wartime censors. The government could count on most of them to be loyal, patriotic members of the chartering class. Mid-century reporters, whether working on Parliament Hill, a provincial legislature or on the city desk of a newspaper, rarely engaged in gaffe and scandal-driven news coverage. They were bound by their own unofficial and

¹² Wilfrid Eggleston, “Press Censorship”. *The Queen's Quarterly*, XLIII, No. 4, 556.

¹³ Frederick Gibson and Barbara Robertson, *Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945*. Winnipeg: The Manitoba Record Society, xv.

official codes of ethics, by links between the papers' proprietors and senior government officials, and by the public expectation that serious journalists would not engage in scandal-mongering.

This journalistic culture existed, with slight variations, across the country. Editors of regional papers had access to the members of Parliament and Cabinet ministers who represented their region, and had strong influence on provincial politics. When war came, they were eager to do their part. Even the country's small gutter press insisted on patriotism. Scandal sheets like Toronto's *Flash* and *Hush* were among the most obsequious followers of wartime censorship rules. Their editors often wrote pious letters to the World War II censors insisting on their loyalty to Canada and the cause.¹⁴ The French-language newspapers, however, reflecting a different political milieu, especially with respect to the war, did take on the censors many times, the anti-participation press like *Le Soleil* and *Le Devoir* growing more emboldened as the censorship system showed itself to be a paper tiger.

In wartime, the journalists of English Canada were expected by their readers and the government, and by their own peers, to give complete support to the Allied cause. For the most part, they showed this support by backing off on stories once they were informed that their work might impede the war effort. It was only in cases in which news suppression was obviously misused by the government to protect itself against criticism that the English-language press showed signs of rebellion.

¹⁴ See Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5968 Files: "Flash" and "Hush".

These journalists functioned as elements of a political and social system that was, at least outwardly, ideologically supported by its participants. In wartime, especially in the face of Nazism, this system was threatened. Those journalists who recognized the threat of Nazi world domination knew they would be among the first to be silenced if the Axis succeeded in remaking Western society.

Canada's capital, during the King years, was tiny, a city of just 100,000 people with two major employers: the federal government and sawmills along the Ottawa River. The press gallery had about thirty members during the Depression, rising to forty-five during World War II. The gallery was almost exclusively male and overwhelmingly Anglophone. It was, literally, exclusive, keeping out magazine writers until 1942 and radio reporters until the late 1950s.¹⁵

The tiny social scene, especially for journalists like Grant Dexter and Bruce Hutchison, who were members of the exclusive, male-only Rideau Club, gave journalists easy access to people in the highest levels of the government. Reporters mingled with politicians and senior bureaucrats at parties, the most intimate of which was the annual Press Gallery Dinner, where journalists and politicians performed rowdy and often lewd skits. Women, even those who were members of the press gallery executive, were excluded from these dinners until 1962.¹⁶ Trusted reporters were invited on canoe trips – popular among the Ottawa elite through to the mid-20th century -- and to join the small, private

¹⁵ Seymour-Ure, "The Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa", 25.

¹⁶ Even then, women members of the gallery had to fight to get into the Press Gallery Dinner. Joyce Fairbairn, a Southam News Service reporter, broke the barrier by being elected to the press gallery executive, thus earning a head table seat. Conversation with Senator Fairbairn, October 6, 2006.

fishing clubs established in the Gatineau Hills.¹⁷ The likelihood of acceptance by the capital's elite was governed by the partisan position of the newspaper or magazine, its circulation, and its location,¹⁸ but journalists' social skills, personal wealth, family and school connections, hospitality and intelligence counted, as did discretion and personal habits. King, for instance, could not abide the company of smokers and heavy drinkers.¹⁹

In 1994, Patrick Brennan examined the careers and political connections of several top-tier Canadian political reporters.²⁰ Brennan argues persuasively that a Liberal press establishment emerged in Canada during the latter part of the King regime. He views the development of this group as the result of a convergence of several streams of political and media development. Most of the successful Press Gallery journalists were nationalists when this was the prevailing ideology on the upper echelons of the federal government. Brennan examined the connections – personal, political, and ideological – between senior journalists and the elite of the public administration, the so-called “Ottawa men,” and convincingly argues that Parliamentary Press Gallery members often saw themselves as part of that exclusive group. Brennan did not give adequate attention, however, to explore the importance King placed on public relations and the effort the Prime Minister put into it.

¹⁷ Seymour-Ure, “The Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa”, 133.

¹⁸ David Taras, *The Newsmakers: The Media's Influence on Canadian Politics*. Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1990, 46.

¹⁹ Charles Lynch, *You Can't Print That!* Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983, 129.

²⁰ Patrick Brennan, *Reporting the Nation's Business: Press-Government Relations During the Liberal Years 1935-1937*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

Writers like Bliss,²¹ Granatstein,²² and Nolan²³ have examined the wartime politics of the King government, while Stacey²⁴ laid the groundwork for the popular interpretation of King as an introvert dominated by his neuroses, but considerable study needs to be done on the ways modern prime ministers, including King, handled the media. King understood what motivated journalists. He came onto the Canadian political scene with an impressive amount of experience as both a journalist and a friend of important members of the press establishment. King took office just as major Canadian newspapers shed their blatant party affiliations (and party financing) and began showing some signs of independent editorial thought.²⁵ Still, King was able, over a span of thirty years, to manipulate most of the members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery to report favourably on him and the Liberal party. He did so by drawing them – and their employers -- into his political and, to a limited extent, personal life. Throughout King's political career, Toronto *Star* publisher Joseph Atkinson, *Globe* publisher George McCullagh, and many other journalists were, or believed they were, *ad hoc* advisors to the Prime Minister of Canada and important members of the country's governing elite.

²¹ Michael Bliss, *Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Mulroney*. Toronto: Harper-Collins, 1994.

²² J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: the Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975; Granatstein, *Mackenzie King: His Life and World*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977.

²³ Brian Nolan, *King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War 1939-1945*. Toronto: Random House, 1988.

²⁴ Charles P. Stacey, *A Very Double Life: The Private World of Mackenzie King*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1976.

²⁵ For an excellent discussion of how this happened, see Minko Sotiton, *Newspapers: From Politics to Profit*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997.

King was the only Canadian prime minister to make a living as a news reporter (though Mackenzie Bowell, Wilfrid Laurier, Pierre Trudeau and Joe Clark were involved with journalism, to varying degrees). In 1895, he worked as a student reporter at the *Toronto News* and, after a few weeks, switched to the police beat of *The Globe*. After his return from graduate school at the University of Chicago, he wrote some articles on economics for the *Mail and Empire*.²⁶ Then he went to Ottawa and moved swiftly into the senior bureaucracy before being appointed Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Minister of Labour, the first person to hold this cabinet post.

In 1914, King accepted John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s offer of a short-term job as a labour advisor. His work went far beyond that. King rebuilt Rockefeller's reputation. While working for the Rockefeller interests, he learned and pioneered some of the new arts of public relations. Kirk Hallahan²⁷ explored King's career with the Rockefellers and argued King was a brilliant public relations strategist, far ahead of his colleague on the Rockefellers' staff, the famous media relations pioneer Ivy Lee.

In the Ludlow Massacre, eight coal miners were shot and thirteen women and children were smothered when company police fired into a crowd of protesters during the Colorado coal strike of 1913-14. The Rockefeller interests were the dominant employers in this dispute and much of the negative public reaction was focussed on John D. Rockefeller Jr., who had just assumed control of the family interests. Lee tried to manage press reaction to the Ludlow

²⁶Allan Levine, *Scrum Wars: The Prime Ministers and the Media*. Toronto: Dundurn, 1993, 126.

²⁷Kirk Hallahan, "W.L. Mackenzie King: Rockefeller's 'Other' Public Relations Counsellor in Colorado". *Public Relations Review* 29 (2003) pp. 401-414.

Massacre by providing the U.S. print media with pre-packaged features and publicity opportunities that were designed to rehabilitate John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s public image. King's strategy was far more subtle and mirrored the approach he would bring to Canadian politics when he returned to Parliament in 1919. Rather than use Lee's public relations tactics of spoon-feeding press releases to reporters, King employed personal diplomacy to ingratiate Rockefeller with the most unlikely potential allies. In King's six months with Rockefeller, he organized successful meetings with Colorado labour icon Mother Jones, local and national leaders of the coal miners' union, and political leaders of all factions in Colorado. King met with these activists and political leaders in advance, using his own analytical skills to size up Rockefeller's adversaries and to determine the strategies Rockefeller would employ in his own meetings with them.²⁸ These were eagerly covered by mainstream press reporters.

Rockefeller later credited King with organizing a successful tour of the Colorado mine camps: "I could never have made the trip without him. He knew exactly what to do. I learned more from him than anyone."²⁹ King did not conduct the tour as a "photo opportunity" for the eight newspaper reporters who accompanied Rockefeller on the tour. Instead, he fed reporters information and worked to ensure that the people interviewed by the reporters spoke fondly of Rockefeller.

Hallahan notes King stayed in the background, carefully but very quietly steering events and publicity. Four years after the massacre, King

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 405.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 407.

organized a pivotal meeting between Rockefeller and Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor. The meeting was not a publicity stunt. King had prepared the groundwork so well that Rockefeller and Gompers, who had been bitter enemies in public, had a solid piece of common ground. Gompers and Rockefeller both feared Bolshevism, and Gompers asked Rockefeller for money for his American Alliance for Labour and Democracy.

Hallahan notes King was “an early advocate of the notion that public relations is ideally practiced as a two-way communication.” In contrast to Ivy Lee, who depended on the power of mediated communications, King’s brand of public relations emphasized “person-to-person interfaces with publicity... Few prominent world leaders from the 20th century have played such a direct role in the evolution of modern public relations as Mackenzie King – at least outside of their role as political figures.”³⁰

In later years, as *prime minister*, King clearly demonstrated he knew parliamentary reporters wanted to be “insiders.” Journalists hoped to have access to power and to be brought into the often-secretive governing class. King obliged many key media people. He did this very subtly and privately, leaving few tracks except in the memoirs of some Canadian journalists and in his own diaries. Each one of King’s relationships with journalists was a stand-alone affair, one in which he compartmentalized the relationship with the reporter or editor while maintaining a reputation for secrecy. Because most press gallery reporters were members of one or two-man bureaus in friendly competition with the

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 410.

journalists representing other publications, each could be isolated and dealt with as a separate entity.

Modern writers have tended to view King as a loner, even a comic neurotic. One of King's former speech writers, E.K. Brown, described King in a 1943 *Harper's* article as friendless, "one of the loneliest beings alive."³¹ Paul Roazen believed King distanced himself from reporters to prevent them from understanding his spiritualism.³² Still, as long as there was a chance a journalist could be brought into the tent, King tried to seduce him.

Although the Ottawa *Citizen* leaned editorially towards the Conservatives, and, at times, Social Credit, King cultivated the paper's editor, Charles Bowman. On a trip back to Ottawa from Washington in 1922, King invited Bowman to dinner in his private railway car to talk about Bowman's editorial that attacked King for his handling of the Chanak crisis. King appeared to have been hurt by the *Citizen's* article. He told Bowman of the pressure he was under from the British and the high-handed way that, he felt, he had been treated by Whitehall. Then the talk shifted to the cabinet, which Bowman had criticized for being mainly narrow-minded holdovers from the Laurier administration. King told Bowman he needed the older politicians to season his cabinet.³³ "As our train backed into [Ottawa's] Union Station," recalled Bowman, "we parted with a good understanding. Before launching out with editorial criticism, I should avail myself of an open door to the prime minister's office. I seldom did; but I enjoyed many

³¹ E.K. Brown, "Mackenzie King of Canada," *Harper's Magazine* Vol. 186 (January 1943), 192-100, cited in Paul Roazen, *Canada's King: An Essay in Political Psychology*. Oakville, ON: Mosaic Press, 1998, 7.

³² *Ibid.*, 9.

³³ Bowman, *Ottawa Editor*, 62.

other, less formal, opportunities to exchange views with Canada's new man at the helm."³⁴ He did not seem to have understood that his relationship with the prime minister was far from unique.

King's diaries show he approached many members of the press during his travels. As Prime Minister, King imposed himself on journalists, staying at the homes of selected writers and publishers when he traveled out of Ottawa. In the capital, reporters were invited to King's East Block office, to Laurier House, King's Ottawa home, and to Kingsmere, his retreat in the Gatineau Hills. Reporters who lived in Ottawa usually returned home the same day but out-of-town media figures stayed as overnight and week-long guests of the Prime Minister.³⁵

King was also a dedicated correspondent and an enthusiastic user of the telephone. In fact, his diaries show this man, who lived all of his life as a bachelor and who has the modern reputation of a recluse, spending most of his waking hours communicating in person, in print, or on the telephone. He worked very hard to ensure that no potential supporter or friend became estranged because of lack of contact.

Throughout his political career, King knew J.W. Dafoe, one of the country's most powerful journalists. Dafoe edited the Winnipeg *Free Press* from 1903 until his death in 1944. The *Free Press* was the most powerful newspaper in western Canada, and its owner, Clifford Sifton, was a former Laurier cabinet minister and

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 63.

³⁵ King's diary entries regarding his interactions with members of the press are far too numerous to list in their entirety.

a powerbroker in his own right.³⁶ On King's invitation, Dafoe became a *de facto* member of the Canadian delegation to the Imperial Conference of 1923, receiving daily briefings on Canada's strategies and freely offering advice to King and his assistant, Oscar Douglas Skelton.³⁷ King offered Dafoe a House of Commons seat in 1926. Dafoe turned him down, believing his position at the *Free Press* preferable to politics, but in 1938 he did accept an appointment to the Rowell-Sirois Royal Commission on federal-provincial relations.³⁸

King believed he had to send a steady stream of information to the Winnipeg editor because Dafoe, while leaning toward the Liberals, assessed each policy carefully before offering editorial support. King did this through the *Free Press'* Ottawa correspondent, Grant Dexter, with whom King seems to have developed a very strong and genuine friendship.³⁹ Dexter had access to the very heart of government policy-making. Sometimes, he was able to use that access to gain exclusive stories, such as the first North American report of Neville Chamberlain's 1938 flight to Munich to meet with Hitler to resolve the Czech crisis (a story given to Dexter by Lester B. Pearson, then a senior official of the Department of External Affairs).⁴⁰ Very often, the memos show Dexter sat on very important "scoops" to maintain his good relations with King. For instance, on November 7, 1941, King or one of his ministers told Dexter that Franklin Roosevelt expected the Japanese would attack U.S. military installations within

³⁶ Sotiron, *From Politics to Profit*, 48.

³⁷ Levine, *Scrum Wars*, 141. For a very detailed account of the dealings between King and Dafoe at this conference, see Ramsay Cook, "J.W. Dafoe at the Imperial Conference," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. XLI no. 1, 19-40.

³⁸ *Ibid.* Wilfrid Eggleston worked as a researcher and writer for the commission.

³⁹ *Ibid.* 141-142. Dexter's own memos suggest this was one relationship valued more by King than by the journalist involved.

⁴⁰ Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War*, xix.

the next thirty days. Dexter did not write a story for his newspaper but did send the tip to Dafoe in a memorandum.⁴¹ King took Dexter into his confidence before the allied occupation of Greenland in 1940, news of which was suppressed because, according to Dexter, "the British say it would be unwise to give Japan any precedent for the occupation of territory: they might adopt the practice with respect to the Dutch East Indies."⁴² Dexter kept that secret, too. King kept him informed of the low morale within the British government during the Blitz, the progress of U.K.-Canadian-American negotiations regarding the possible transfer of the Royal Navy to U.S. control if Britain fell, and the real extent of the U-boat problem in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. King often called Dexter to give his candid, and often very negative, views on members of his own cabinet and on divisive issues like conscription.⁴³

King's cozy relationship with many members of the press was not public knowledge, nor was membership into his inner circle automatic. Editors of the *Montreal Gazette*, who were not among King's favoured journalists, likely because he detested the paper's publisher, John Bassett, wrote in a 1948 opinion piece that King was as "informative as a gagged clam."⁴⁴ Some new Ottawa correspondents were told to submit questions to King's staff in advance. These could be answered with a list of King's speeches, which were offered as the definitive policy statements of the government (as happened to newly-posted

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 71.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 378.

⁴⁴ Levine, *Scrum Wars*, 124.

reporter Charles Lynch).⁴⁵ Allan Levine, author of the most comprehensive history of federal political reporting, did not understand how King operated, claiming “this complex, curious and cautious man, who ruled Canada for nearly twenty-two years, was extremely secretive. Fearful to the point of paranoia of being misunderstood, undermined or embarrassed, King rarely made impromptu public comments – especially not to the press.” King kept himself prepared with stock answers, Levine argues, as a way of hiding “his insecure and obsessive nature (some have said neurosis).”⁴⁶

A telling contrast to Levine’s opinion is King’s behavior in an off-the-record session with reporter and future King biographer Bruce Hutchison, who met King in the prime minister’s office in the fall of 1941. King was almost hysterical, using Hutchison as both a sounding board and a therapist. The prime minister was enraged that Arthur Meighen was attempting a political comeback, taking over the Conservative leadership from interim leader Richard Hanson. As Hutchinson recalled:

He paced up and down the office and muttered more to himself than to me. Did I understand what Meighen was doing? Yes, I understood that Meighen had resigned from the Senate, resumed the leadership of the Conservative Party without benefit of any convention, and was running for the House of Commons in South York, Ontario. Ah, but there was much more to it, said King, than the pending by-election. Meighen planned to smash the government and divide the Canadian people by advocating conscription for overseas service, which King had rejected and would always reject. If Meighen re-entered the Commons, life would become ‘insupportable’, the nation disrupted. ‘Insupportable,’ King repeated... He was simply distracted and no longer King when he pounded his little fist on the desk and declared that Meighen’s return to politics would mean the introduction of fascism to Canada... I can still see him clearly now as he paused in the middle of the room, raised his fist above his head and cried out: ‘The people, mark my words, will have their rights!’⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁴⁷ Bruce Hutchison, *The Far Side of the Street*. Toronto: MacMillan and Co., 1976, 157-158.

King knew that no journalist could survive in Ottawa without the backing of the publishers who owned Canada's major newspapers and set their editorial policies. The relationship between *The Globe and Mail's* publisher George McCullagh and King was remarkable for the speed at which it developed and collapsed. In January 1937, McCullagh, who had never met King, visited the prime minister in his office, where McCullagh told King the most intimate details of his purchase of the *Mail and Empire* and *Globe* newspapers.⁴⁸ In their long conversation, McCullagh and King gossiped about Ontario premier Mitchell Hepburn's alcoholism, discussed Christian virtues, and planned the editorial policies of *The Globe and Mail*. McCullagh came back the following day for another long meeting. Two days later, McCullagh dined with the federal cabinet at Laurier House.⁴⁹

In March 1937, King visited McCullagh at *The Globe and Mail's* Toronto office, arriving by the back door. At this meeting, King updated McCullagh on several federal initiatives and read to him a portion of a private letter sent to King by President Franklin Roosevelt.⁵⁰ King appears to have been attracted to McCullagh by the publisher's charm, his wealth, and his pledge of support to the federal Liberals. McCullagh's personality, King said, strongly resembled that of John D. Rockefeller Jr., and he noted in his diary the coincidence – one that King took quite seriously as a cosmic-inspired event -- that McCullagh arrived at his office just as King was dictating a letter to Rockefeller.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Diary of W.L. Mackenzie King, January 6, 1937. Searchable at www.archiva.ca,

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, January 9, 1937.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, March 27, 1937.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, January 6, 1937.

Still, politically, the newspaper was McCullagh's personal instrument. King tried through the late 1930s to remain on McCullagh's good side but the publisher was one of Ontario premier Mitchell Hepburn's best friends and supporters. He took Queen's Park's side during Hepburn's vicious political (and very personal) wars with Mackenzie King. He also very secretly handled some of Hepburn's personal investments.⁵² During the war, *The Globe and Mail* was, by far, the Canadian media's most vocal critic of censorship, which, the paper's editors argued, was part of King's plan to establish a dictatorship.

McCullagh's competitor at the *Toronto Star*, Joseph "Holy Joe" Atkinson, was a fierce prohibitionist who, in the early years of the century, was willing to support any party that opposed the liquor trade. For more than fifty years, Atkinson was King's closest media confidante. He knew King's parents when the Prime Minister was a young man, and the two men shared a desk when they were cub reporters at *The Globe* in 1896.⁵³ Atkinson and King were frequent visitors to each other's homes. The friendship lasted some fifty years. In 1911, Atkinson advised King and senior Ontario Liberals on strategy for the federal election⁵⁴ and King went to Atkinson's office at the *Star* on election night to watch the results arrive by telegraph.⁵⁵ Three years later, Atkinson gave King personal advice about King's plan to run in a by-election in North York⁵⁶ and offered King a

⁵² Several biographers of Mitchell Hepburn have documented this relationship. For a discussion of McCullagh's investments on behalf of Hepburn, see Brian J. Young, "C. George McCullagh and the Leadership League." *The Canadian Historical Review*, September 1966. 201-226

⁵³ Harkness, *Atkinson of the Star*, 46.

⁵⁴ Diary of W.L. Mackenzie King, November 27, 1911.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, December 11, 1911.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, November 11, 1914.

job at the *Star* when he was defeated.⁵⁷ Between 1915 and 1935, the two men spoke often on the telephone and continued traveling to each other's homes. In 1927, King offered Atkinson a Senate seat.⁵⁸ The day in 1935 when King was re-elected Prime Minister, Mrs. Atkinson placed a wreath on the grave of King's mother and father in Toronto's Mount Pleasant cemetery.⁵⁹

On October 18, 1935, King had a "long talk" with Atkinson by telephone about Cabinet choices and the policies of the new government, including King's plan for an unemployment insurance commission. King invited Atkinson to visit him and stay at Laurier House. Atkinson arrived on October 23 and stayed, alone with King, for two days.⁶⁰ In return, Atkinson put the pages of the *Toronto Star* at King's disposal.⁶¹ Atkinson could be sure that the Liberal platform reflected his views, because, since 1919, he had been chairman of the committee that drafted it.

During the war, there were no serious run-ins between the *Star* and the censors, no serious published criticisms of the censorship system, and no opposition to the King government's war effort. The *Star* ignored some of censorship's greatest failures, such as its clumsy attempt to manipulate coverage of Montreal mayor Camillien Houde's controversial statements on manpower registration in 1940 and attempts to suppress George Drew's 1942 criticism of the preparation for the deployment of Canadian forces to Hong Kong.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, undated entry, early 1915.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Harkness, *Atkinson of the Star*, 151.

⁵⁹ Diary of W.L. Mackenzie King, October 23, 1935.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, October 23 and 24, 1935.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1936. A reading of the diary entry shows Mrs. Atkinson had a special bond with King, as she was a friend of his mother.

King's diplomacy was not perfect. For instance, despite King's overtures, Bowman's *Ottawa Citizen* was, throughout the war, a constant irritant of the Liberal, nationalist prime minister, going so far as to advocate union with the United States in a 1941 editorial.⁶² Still, its conservative Parliament Hill reporter, Charles Bishop, was a friend of King's and, in 1945, the Prime Minister appointed him to the Senate.

The Vancouver newspapers, on the other hand, were focussed on issues peculiar to their corner of the country and did not garner much attention, especially positive notice, from the Prime Minister. The *Montreal Gazette*, embattled with its powerful rival, the *Montreal Star*, was a vocal supporter of the Conservatives and a sporadic critic of the censorship system, especially at the time of the arrest of Montreal mayor Camillien Houde. Its publisher, Conservative stalwart John Bassett, used the incident to do as much damage as possible to King. It was almost a mathematical certainty that the *Winnipeg Tribune* would oppose government policy since it competed with the *Winnipeg Free Press* under the ownership of the Sifton family and in the editorial control of J.W. Dafoe, and, after the great editor's death, editors who had learned the trade at Dafoe's feet.

King also had to deal with magazine writers. In the mid-20th century, mass circulation magazines were an important part of the media of public information. The market, however, was dominated by U.S. periodicals, namely: *Time*, *Life*, *Look*, and *The Saturday Evening Post*. Two Canadian magazines, *Maclean's Magazine* (a monthly) and *Saturday Night* (published weekly), did have some clout in Ottawa but magazine writers were barred from the Parliamentary Press

⁶² "For Union Now to Maintain Freedom," *Ottawa Citizen*, June 13, 1941.

Gallery by the print journalists who had sole rights to the Parliamentary turf. The Gallery members used their power over membership to maintain their grip on magazine freelance work.

Liberal-leaning writers like Dexter, Blair Fraser and Bruce Hutchison often submitted articles to *Maclean's*,⁶³ and Arthur Irwin, the magazine's assistant editor, was so loyal to the Liberal party's policies that he quit *The Globe* in 1925 to protest its Conservative editorial policies.⁶⁴ King was usually hostile to the magazine. His enmity was focused on Colonel J. B. Maclean, a man who, in many ways, was King's polar opposite. Maclean was a self-made millionaire, an extrovert who worked tirelessly to develop connections among the business community. He made his money publishing trade magazines that relied on the goodwill of business owners for circulation and advertising. Maclean was also a Conservative who came to despise King, but he refused to become openly politically active, having turned down a Senate seat offered by Sir Robert Borden in 1913.⁶⁵

King's enmity may have been sharpened by the fact that Maclean had been friends with members of King's family, and the two men had started out on very good terms. Maclean had taken Bible study classes from King's father and the senior King, a lawyer, was Maclean's advisor on libel matters. The future prime minister's brother, Max, had been Maclean's physician at the turn-of-the-century.

⁶³ David MacKenzie, *Arthur Irwin: A Biography*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, 143.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁵ Floyd S. Chalmers, *A Gentleman of the Press: The Story of Colonel John Bayne Maclean and the Publishing Empire He Founded*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1969, 264. Maclean came close to head-on confrontation with the chief censor during World War I when he wanted to publish a British story on the Allied defeat at Cambrai. Chambers threatened to shut down the magazine unless Maclean dropped the story. After a short argument, Maclean gave in. See Keshen, *Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War*, 76.

King, who, in 1908 had written a sessional paper on the British Columbia opium trade, supported Maclean's life-long campaign against illicit drugs. King stayed at Maclean's house in Toronto shortly after he won the Liberal leadership in 1919. Maclean maintained a steady correspondence with King for the first two years of King's premiership. Good relations between the two men lasted until King was returned to power in 1935. Maclean's advertising staff created campaign pamphlets for the Liberals in the 1935 election, and it was a Maclean's advertising copywriter who coined the election slogan "King or chaos."⁶⁶

The falling-out was gradual. Maclean opposed King's choice of ministers.⁶⁷ The publisher also disagreed with King's Canadian nationalism as Maclean, despite an almost pathological hatred of Winston Churchill, was a proponent of Imperial federation. The falling-out was also business-related because King refused to exempt Canadian magazines from duties on paper, ink and machinery, and from sales taxes. Maclean, as head of the Periodical Press Association, had lobbied King and the opposition Conservatives for these exemptions through the 1920s, and, during the Depression, for a tariff on foreign magazines.⁶⁸

When King was returned to power, Maclean immediately asked for tariff exemptions on the materials he needed to print his magazine. King refused. The prime minister tried to soften the blow with a four-page letter that heaped flattery on Maclean but it failed to assuage the publisher's anger. Gradually, the

⁶⁶ Chalmers, *A Gentleman of the Press*, 268.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 268-69.

⁶⁸ For a thorough analysis of the Canadian magazine industry's push for tariffs at this time, see Mary Vipond, "Canadian Nationalism and the Plight of Canadian Magazines in the 1920s." *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. LVII No. 1 (March 1977), 43-63.

government gave the Canadian magazine industry the tariff breaks it wanted but the damage to the relationship was done. It ended with a series of letters that, even after they were edited by senior members of Maclean's staff to remove some of the bile, were still very nasty.⁶⁹

Once the friendship was poisoned, it never revived. While King was in opposition, Maclean added George Drew, a Conservative political comer who later became premier of Ontario, to his stable of writers. When King returned to power, Maclean let Drew loose to expose graft in Canada's munitions industry. In 1938, *Maclean's* published Drew's series of articles on alleged corruption surrounding the manufacturing and sale of Bren light machine guns. The first article was published under the rather anti-corporate headline of "Salesmen of Death."⁷⁰ After the successful German military campaigns of 1940, *Maclean's* shifted its coverage to positive articles on the country's war effort, and, in the latter part of the war, to Canada's rosy post-war future. Blair Fraser, a King stalwart, was hired from the *Montreal Star* to report from Ottawa and articles continued to be purchased from Bruce Hutchison, Grant Dexter and other King supporters, but the personal rift between publisher and Prime Minister never healed.

The censorship system was built on the British model but it worked in Canada partly because of King's ability to effectively size up and manipulate the press. While Maurice Pope may have worked out the details, the principles were, according to Eggleston, dictated by King and then justice minister Ernest

⁶⁹ Chalmers, *A Gentleman of the Press*, 290.

⁷⁰ MacKenzie, *Arthur Irwin, a Biography*, 108.

Lapointe. The latter's commitment to civil liberties were, at best, exaggerated by Eggleston. Lapointe did defend the voluntary censorship system during the Quebec provincial election of 1939, but he had refused to intervene in the 1938 controversy over Duplessis's Padlock Law,⁷¹ neither disallowing the bill nor challenging it in court.⁷² "(T)he voluntary self-censorship of the press on a liberal model was only possible in Canada because of the wisdom of yourself and your colleagues especially the late Hon. Ernest Lapointe," Eggleston wrote to King after his resignation from the position of chief press censor. "All that I and my associates did was to carry into effect as well as we could the principles which you had already enunciated."⁷³ In fact, during the "Zombie" riots of October 1944, when censorship faced its greatest crisis and Eggleston was willing to hand the system over to the military, it was King who kept a level head and ordered the system to remain voluntary.⁷⁴

Despite the imposition of censorship, the war was a good time to be in the news business. It was certainly a boon to newspaper proprietors, as most newspapers and magazines enjoyed record circulation and surveys showed about three-quarters of Canadian adults listened to a radio broadcast about the

⁷¹ The law's proper name was *An Act to Protect the Province Against Communist Propaganda* and was passed by the Quebec legislature in March 1937. The law gave the government the power to close any building used for the creation of Communist propaganda for one year and subjected the makers of the propaganda to three to thirteen months incarceration. The Supreme Court of Canada struck down the law in 1957.

⁷² For an examination of Lapointe's rationale in the Padlock Law debate, see John MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec's Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, 89-90.

⁷³ Wilfrid Eggleston to Mackenzie King, March 7, 1945. Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm Collection, Spool C-9873.

⁷⁴ Mackenzie King Diaries, October 29, 1944.

war every day.⁷⁵ Many of the newer hires, however, would not enjoy the opportunities that came with the wartime news boon. The newsrooms of Canadian Press and the newspapers of the country were depleted as reporters left their jobs to join the military for active service, as war correspondents or as military public relations officers. Almost half of Canadian Press's reporting staff enlisted in the first year of the war, and nine of them died in action.⁷⁶

Patriotic Canadian journalists hoping to stay home and aid the war by lending their pen or blue pencil to the effort found a welcoming government in Ottawa. Bureaucrats and politicians encouraged newspaper managers to volunteer for the Publishers Committee for War Finances, which publicized Victory Bond drives. Executives like Clifford Sifton, who controlled the *Winnipeg Free Press*, were brought to Ottawa as "dollar-a-year" men to advise on wartime economic management.⁷⁷

During the war, some senior journalists were drawn into secret work for the government, especially in the years before the United States' entry into the conflict. Bruce Hutchison, then a *Winnipeg Free Press* reporter in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, eagerly accepted two invitations to become a government agent. In the summer of 1940, his bureau chief, Grant Dexter, ordered Hutchison to break off his vacation in British Columbia and return to Ottawa as quickly as possible. Hutchison caught a flight to Toronto, where a telegram from Dexter awaited him, ordering Hutchison to hurry to Barrie to meet a special train. Hutchison paid a cab driver the then-hefty sum of \$50 to drive him

⁷⁵ Keshen, *Saints, Sinners and Soldiers*, 14.

⁷⁶ Nicholls, *The Story of CP*, 230.

⁷⁷ Sifton headed the Munitions Board, which mobilized Canadian industry for war production.

the 100 kilometers between Toronto and Barrie, where Hutchison found, parked in a siding, a lavish government-chartered train carrying distinguished U.S. reporters. The train, with two dining cars, gourmet food, and ample liquor, took the journalists through Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes, ostensibly to visit arms factories and military bases. Mostly, the trip was a boozy ride meant to develop the near-unbreakable “drinking buddy” bond between the American reporters and their Canadian brethren, but it had elements of cloak and dagger. In Halifax, Dexter and Hutchison were told to watch one U.S. reporter who managed to elude them, board a ship and return to the U.S.

That fall, Hutchison was given what was, at the time, a huge bankroll of \$5,000 by “a group of five leading Canadian newspapers” to travel with the Wendell Wilkie Republican campaign and attempt to sway journalists he met on the tour. The money, and the idea, belonged to the Canadian government, Hutchison believed. Wilkie was an isolationist but Hutchison did not attempt to lobby the candidate, who, he rightly believed, had little chance of being elected. Hutchison visited newspaper editors in cities where Wilkie’s campaign train stopped to try to influence them to press for U.S. entry into the war, or at least support Britain’s war effort.

The Canadian journalist received a mixed response. Some editors made him feel unwelcome while others treated him with kindness and allowed him to plant articles in their newspapers. Hutchison, however, returned from the trip believing he had failed: “What had been done in the peaceful United States by my ludicrous mission while better men were fighting and dying in the war

overseas?" he asked. "Nothing, as far as I could see, beyond the expenditure of about five thousand dollars in precious Canadian foreign exchange, and possibly some education for the spender."⁷⁸

Of course, not all journalists got to be clandestine government agents, but the wartime censorship system gave even the lowliest journalist a taste of the delicious secrecy of official Ottawa. Every editor and reporter with access to the numbered confidential circulars of the Directorate of Censorship knew war secrets. Every subscribing paper received the entire set. There was no attempt to create separate handbooks for different parts of the country, so an editor in Regina received the same naval secrets as his or her counterpart in Halifax. Nor was the size of the publication a bar to access to those secrets: the staff of the twice-weekly newspaper in Midland, Ontario, received the same handbook as the reporters and editors at *The Globe and Mail*.

Most of the secrets contained in the circulars were of little real value to the Axis, but the material was sensitive enough to give its holder a feeling of importance. For example, Rule 15 of the *Censorship Handbook* of 1940 contained the fact that there were student pilots training in Canada "in excess of the establishment authorized under the original plans of the British Commonwealth Air Training Scheme," and that student pilots from Australia and New Zealand were in training in this country. On January 9, 1940, the journalists who received circular C-42 were given a strong hint of major gold shipments between the European Allies, Canada and the U.S. Circular, C-87, sent June 27,

⁷⁸ Bruce Hutchison, *The Far Side of the Street*, 145-152.

1940, informed journalists that the 1st Canadian Division had finished its training and was deployed in the United Kingdom.⁷⁹

Of course, not every war secret was printed in the circulars. For instance, Grant Dexter was given King's almost psychic prediction that the Japanese would attack American military installations in the first week of December, 1941 and Gil Purcell was given the secret of the atomic bomb by one of the censors in 1944.⁸⁰ Neither man printed the stories. Reporters would, of course, come across facts through the course of their work that they could not print, adding to their inventory of personal war secrets. The Wartime Information Board also shared secrets with reporters as part of its propaganda efforts.⁸¹ Journalists who stayed in Canada could easily believe they were part of the great crusade, instrumental in counter-intelligence work as well as in maintaining civilian morale

This was the political and journalistic environment and culture that gave rise to the censorship system and to the censors themselves. The system was based on the idea that the press would function within the norms and rules of a liberal, democratic society that was engaged in total war. The journalists were coerced by rules, but also motivated by their sense of belonging to a society

⁷⁹ Copies of all of these directives can be found in Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5942 (NF).

⁸¹ After the failure of the 1942 Conscription plebiscite to achieve a national consensus, King cleaned house at the Bureau of Public Information, replacing many of its social science propaganda experts with journalists, and reconstituting it as the Wartime Information Board, which enjoyed a far larger budget. See William R. Young, "Academics and Social Scientists versus the Press: the Policies of the Bureau of Public Information and the Wartime Information Board, 1939-1945". *Papers of the Canadian Historical Association* 1978 219-239.

under threat, one that they could serve by using their skills as shapers of public opinion. Many, too, had loyalty for Britain, which is often referred to as “the old country” in correspondence of the Directorate of Censorship. At the same time, these journalists were offered the currency of their own profession: access to “insider” secrets and respect by members of the political power structure, including a Prime Minister who had, throughout his life, cultivated Parliamentary reporters, important regional editors and powerful publishers so well. The censorship system was not unanimously accepted by the press, nor was it leak-proof, but while its decisions and its motivations were, on rare occasions, called into question by the mainstream media, its right to exist and its employment of journalists never was.⁸²

⁸²As in World War I, snitching and complaining made up a large part of communication between journalists and censors. Reporters and editors were very quick to inform censors of alleged transgressions by their competitors, hoping stories would be suppressed, charges would be laid, and, in at least one case, a competing paper would be put out of business and its editor interned. In some cases, these complaints were generated by the belief competitors had broken censorship rules to unfairly compete with papers that rigorously followed them. This type of complaint was often made by the Halifax *Chronicle* against its rival, the more aggressive Halifax *Herald*, and the Chronicle’s opinion was often shared by Halifax censor H.B. Jefferson. In Vancouver, the *Sun* and the *Province* went at each other, using censorship as a cudgel. In smaller cities, rival newspapers also tried to enlist the help of censors. In Orillia, the editor of the city’s second-largest paper demanded the suppression of his rival, the *Packet*, and the internment of its editor for the duration for publishing a relatively harmless editorial advocating a wartime coalition government and an end to partisanship in Parliament. See Library and Archives Canada RG2, (Files of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969, File: “Packet and Times”.

Chapter Four: The Legal and Political Foundation of the Press Censorship System

Censorship was established on September 1, 1939 by PC 2481 which, in part, read:

No person shall print, circulate, or distribute any book, newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, picture, paper, circular, card, letter, writing, print, publication, or document of any kind containing any material, report, false or otherwise intended or likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces or of the forces of any allied or associated Power or intended or likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline or administration of any of His Majesty's forces, or which would or might be prejudicial to the safety of the state or the efficient prosecution of the war.

This was the same wording as the *War Measures Act* provisions that established censorship in World War I. The censorship system was erected on the legal foundations provided by the *Defence of Canada Regulations*¹ enacted under the *War Measures Act* on September 3, 1939.² (See Appendix I for the provisions applicable to press censorship). The cabinet put no thought into the decision to adopt Maurice Pope's censorship system. Most members of cabinet did not even read the censorship regulations before voting to accept them, Mackenzie King would later say.³

¹ The law and its regulations were modeled on *Britain's Defence of the Realm Act*. The Canadian regulations gave the government sweeping powers to suspend civil rights. It allowed internment without trial, seizure of property, banning of associations, and press censorship. By the third day of its implementation, Cabinet ordered the internment of 325 people, of which 260 were German nationals and 65 were naturalized Canadians. Many more arrests were to follow. See J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statescraft 1929-1968*, Toronto: Deneau Publishers & Co., 86. Also see D. Robinson, "Planning for the Most Serious Contingency: Alien Internment, Arbitrary Detention and the Canadian State, 1938-39" (Summer 1993) *Journal of Canadian Studies* 5-28, and Reginald Whitaker, "Official Repression of Communism during World War II," *Labour*, 17 (1986): 135-166.

³ Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson (eds.), *Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945*. Winnipeg: The Manitoba Record Society, 1994 19.

Unlike in the United Kingdom's *Defence of the Realm Act*, which had to be renewed by Parliament every year, the restrictions on rights engendered by the *War Measures Act* and the details of those curtailments of civil rights spelled out in the *Defence of Canada Regulations* were not debated by Canada's parliament, nor were censorship activities scrutinized by any parliamentary committee.

Censorship was imposed by the Cabinet without any public discussion whatsoever. On September 5, 1939, under P.C. 2513, the Acting Secretary of State designated Major L. Clare Moyer, K.C. and Oswald Mayrand to be the two "Press Censors for Canada". The Minister of Transport, who held jurisdiction over the country's radio waves, appointed Lt. Col. R.P. Landry, corporate secretary of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, as his representative on the Censorship Co-ordination Committee to manage radio broadcasting censorship.

The Governor General, on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State, approved the establishment of the press censorship system on September 6.⁴ Four days later, the Censorship Co-ordination Committee held its first meeting, with Walter Thompson, newly-appointed Chief Censor for Canada, presiding. At that meeting, Thompson "spoke of the multiplicity of use of the title 'Censor,'" which he thought should be minimized. "The aim of press censorship,"

⁴ Permanent membership in this committee was set at six: two people appointed by the Secretary of State; two by the Minister of Transport; one by the Minister of Defence; and one by the Postmaster General. In fact, the membership was extremely fluid. Depending on the issues involved, the number of people in a meeting of this committee could range from six to about twenty, including cabinet ministers, senior military officers, top bureaucrats, liaison officers from Britain and the U.S., representatives of the RCMP, and government officials from war agencies such as Internment Operations. At its first meeting, Thompson said he did not plan to frequently convene the committee and preferred to work directly with individual departments. Maurice Pope took over as chairman of the committee in the fall of 1941, but it did not meet from the time he was sent overseas in April 1940 until the summer of 1941. The committee was revived and re-invigorated in August 1941, when the Minister of War Services took over as chairman. See Memorandum on the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, by F. Charpentier and W. Eggleston, July 31, 1941. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: Censorship Co-ordination Committee 1-A-3.

he said, “should be to afford the Press a guidance service.”⁵ Thompson expected to run press censorship as part of an information management system.

The focus of censorship was sharpened in early January 1940, when Sections 39 and 39A of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* were amended to clarify the press censorship rules and to provide a “fair comment” defence for loyal political commentators who, in good faith, criticized aspects of the country’s war effort. The committee members also decided to try to improve the machinery for prosecutions under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. Censors were to approach individual ministries whose secrets had been published and urge them to press the Department of Justice to launch prosecutions against offending journalists and publications.⁶ As well, members agreed to ask the government to create a mechanism for controlling information released by cabinet ministers.⁷

While the censors pressed for more prosecutions of the publications that they believe deliberately ignored censorship and published material that breached the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, they held a carrot out to the media: complete legal protection from prosecution on stories that were pre-screened. In August 1942, an order-in-council codified what was already a policy of the government, but Canadian Press, among other news agencies, wanted it

⁵ Minutes of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, September 7, 1939. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3

⁶ The censors, during meetings to discuss a tougher prosecutorial regime, noted that in Britain individual ministries approached prosecutors directly, with no urging or guidance from the censors. See Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, July 29, 1942. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

⁷ Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, July 22, 1944. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

enshrined in law.⁸ O.M. Biggar, appointed chief censor in May 1942, wrote the new law after meeting with executives of the Wartime Information Board and two months later, the major wire services. Biggar hoped to settle most disputes through meetings with media executives and, in more serious cases, with written reprimands, but he also developed a procedure for clipping contentious news stories and sending them to the appropriate armed service or government department for determination if charges should be laid.⁹

No person would be guilty of an offence under the regulations if the information published had appeared or was fairly deducible from news that had already appeared in any printed publication distributed in Canada. This legalized what by then was a longstanding practice of the censors to pass military information automatically when it had previously been widely publicized by press or radio, or both.

These were the statutory and regulatory frameworks for censorship. They remained in place until August 17, 1945. On paper, the government had given itself draconian powers of news suppression. The censors, however, had no real authority. The system was voluntary: the censors had no mandate to seek out stories to censor. They could only make recommendations on material submitted to them by the newspapers and radio stations, and they could not lay charges against publications that breached censorship. That power lay in the hands of the Minister of Justice. Also, the censors did not handle copy from the war fronts. It

⁸ PC 6331, August 13, 1942.

⁹ Memorandum, Eggleston, July 22, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956 File: General.

was censored by Canadian and British military censors before being cabled to Canada.

The press censorship system was not monitored by a standing committee of Parliament, but it sometimes was the focus of questions in the House of Commons. The Conservative Party's questions inside and outside the House of Commons often implied a vast cover-up of wartime information by the Censorship Branch and its successor, the Directorate of Censorship. In July 1943, during debate on censorship of news of the previous year's submarine attacks in the St. Lawrence River, the Conservatives sponsored a motion demanding War Services Minister Leo-Richer LaFlèche produce "all censorship orders, regulations and instructions issued under Government authority since the outbreak of the war."¹⁰ Later that summer, the government used its majority to vote down the motion but King said he would table Directorate of Censorship documents that did not endanger the public interest.¹¹

Any government would be tempted to use a wartime press censorship to improve its political situation. Sometimes, the Opposition's claims of the politicization of print media censorship rang true. The criticism of the radio censorship in the Quebec election of 1939 and the general election of 1940 are also convincing. Certainly, a close relationship existed between the censors and the Prime Minister's Office. In late October 1940, Progressive Conservative leader R.B. Hanson wrote to Eggleston and Charpentier to ask what "general or special instructions ... [were] issued to you by any one in authority regarding your

¹⁰ "LaFlèche Asks Further Delay," *The Globe and Mail*, July 8, 1943, 23.

¹¹ "Move to Table Orders by Censors Voted Down," *The Globe and Mail*, July 20, 1943, 13.

duties[?]"¹² Eggleston and Charpentier replied, "Neither of us since our appointment has received either general or specific instructions regarding our work from anyone in authority during that time. We have continued to administer the policy established by our predecessors which in turn quite closely followed the policy in practice adopted in the war of 1914-1918."¹³ That claim had a slightly hollow ring, however, as the correspondence with Hanson was forwarded to the Prime Minister's Office. The Directorate of Censorship memorandum of October 22, 1940 to the Minister of War Services on the attempts to censor coverage of a speech by Hanson in Charlottetown was also sent by Eggleston to the Prime Minister's private secretary, W.J. Turnbull.¹⁴

Tommy Church, Co-operative Commonwealth Federation MP for the Toronto riding of Broadview, was one of a very few parliamentarians who seriously questioned the idea of wartime press censorship. On November 20, 1940, Church said in the House of Commons: "I believe the time has come when the press censorship in Canada should be abolished entirely and we should go back to the good old British system, leaving the responsibility for censorship as largely as possible to the voluntary effort of the press."¹⁵ In July 1942, he questioned the qualifications of the censors, the cost of the operation, and the right of the censors to interfere in the coverage of speeches in parliament (in this

¹² Mackenzie King correspondence, November 1, 1940 Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4568.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Mackenzie King correspondence, October 23, 1940 Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4567.

¹⁵ Church went on to advocate a system with a small number of censors coordinating a voluntary press censorship system, which was, effectively, what Canada already had. See chapter "The Globe and Mail, George Drew and Censorship," regarding Church and his comments on censorship during the 1940 federal election campaign.

case, a speech by a Quebec MP on the German submarine attacks in the St. Lawrence River).

The following July, Church analyzed censorship's spending estimates. "I think the time has come when the whole system should be revised," he told the House of Commons. "I fail to see the value of any censorship of publications, or what it has accomplished." In his answer, LaFlèche, who was still in charge of censorship, told the House that Canada had no choice but to join its Allies in having a censorship system. "I think it is timely to say that the censorship exercised in the United Kingdom and the United States, and possibly in other nations, could not be carried out unless we had a censorship such as we have in this country... Censorship as practiced in Canada is a part of what might be termed joint censorship carried out as well by the authorities in the United Kingdom and the United States. Many of the things we do, although not everything, are done at the request of the United Kingdom or United States authorities."¹⁶

There was no serious opposition to censorship from the rest of the CCF's MPs. In fact, the CCF leadership demanded charges against the *Ottawa Citizen* for an editorial inciting veterans to use force if necessary to stick up for their post-war pension and benefit rights. In many ways, a government always has an advantage over its political opposition in dealings with the press, as the people in power control most of the information generated from within the civil service. During World War II, this situation was reinforced by a Conservative opposition that was in disarray. The Conservatives had three leaders and one interim head

¹⁶ *Hansard*, July 22, 1943, pp. 5248-5250.

during the war, one of whom, Arthur Meighen, could not win a seat in the House of Commons and another, John Bracken, did not try for one during the war despite becoming leader in 1942. The King government, despite the cleavages that became apparent during the conscription crisis, tended to present a strong, capable image to journalists. Its members also worked to cultivate the media, both journalists who needed war information, and publishers who profited from the advertising and printing contracts that were handed out during the war. As information was amassed by news censors over whom the government had control, technically those in power enjoyed an almost insurmountable monopoly on politically-valuable data and news. Moreover, most real war news originated with the government and armed forces. As well, in wartime the dichotomy between policy makers and public servants tended to crumble as the government assumed vast powers of regulation, taxation, and information gathering while, at the same time, suspending or severely curtailing civil rights. In that environment, objectivity of the press and the censors was extremely difficult to maintain.

From the outset of the war, the Prime Minister's Office began implementing the censorship plans in a way that buttressed those who the King government wanted in charge. Still, there were notable growing pains. Canada had five chief censors during the first seventeen months of the war.

On September 2, Canadian National Railway's publicity director, Walter Thompson, was using one of the perks of his job, a private railway car, as lodgings for a fishing vacation in an isolated part of Western Canada when Maurice Pope finally tracked him down and asked him to come to Ottawa to run

the new press censorship system. Apparently, it was the first time Thompson had heard that he was being considered for the job.¹⁷

Thomson had cut his teeth in newspapers on Fleet Street, Australia and New Zealand before arriving in Canada shortly before the outbreak of World War I. He worked as city editor of the *Montreal Witness* and the *Montreal Herald* before taking a job as media relations director for Canadian National Railways. Thompson made many friends among the country's top journalists when he handled the logistics for the media covering the hugely successful 1939 Royal Tour.¹⁸ He began his new job as Chief Censor with the good wishes of the journalism fraternity. For instance, in an editorial entitled, "The Man for the Job," *The Globe and Mail* wrote:

Censorship, a wartime essential, is not popular, but all affected by it will be pleased by the choice made for this office. Mr. Thompson is a man of calm disposition, wide information and a great fund of common sense. He will neither overdo nor underestimate his authority. He is known to virtually all newspaper publishers and editors, and these have faith that his work will be done conscientiously and well. Mr. Thompson's success as chairman of the press subcommittee during their Majesties' sojourn in Canada, revealed his tact, ability – and affability. The general consensus among those concerned is that he is the man for the job.¹⁹

A few weeks later, the *Globe* called Thompson a "great and good friend of all newspapermen".²⁰ His diplomatic skills were immediately put to good use. He met most of the editors of the major newspapers in the country and very quickly developed relationships with senior reporters in Ottawa. Thompson preferred to deal directly with reporters without using the threat of Defence of Canada Regulations-based sanctions. This quickly left him open to charges of running interference for the government, an allegation that was made by *The Globe and*

¹⁷ Gil Purcell, "Wartime Press Censorship in Canada" Chapter 1.

¹⁸ Keshen, *Saints Sinners and Soldiers*, 15.

¹⁹ "The Man for the Job," *The Globe and Mail*, September 8, 1939, 6.

²⁰ "Capital Pauses and All Mourn Roger Lipsett," *The Globe and Mail*, October 3, 1939, 11.

Mail and other Conservative papers within a few months of the start of censorship.²¹

Most of the day-to-day decision making in the Press Censorship Branch²² was made by chief English-language censor Wilfrid Eggleston, who also signed almost all of the English-language censorship correspondence originating from the Ottawa head office. For most of his journalistic career, Eggleston was employed by the Sifters and by Joseph Atkinson and shared the *Star* publisher's liberalism. In the days after following the invasion of Poland, Eggleston, then 37 years old, seriously considered enlisting, but realized he would probably be turned down as too old.²³ At first, the idea of being a press censor did not sit well with Eggleston. The word "censor" carried with it an ugly stereotype. "(O)f all the wartime tasks I had considered, not one had been as obnoxious as this." He told his friend Clare Moyer, clerk of the Senate, and newly-appointed Press Censor for Canada (English) he'd take the job if Canada's existence was at stake.

Thompson called Eggleston into his office the next day and talked him into taking the job by explaining the government's plans for a system based on self-censorship and with a promise – later to be broken – that Eggleston could work at the Bureau of Public Information, the government's proposed propaganda section, "in a few weeks."²⁴ Eggleston believed the censorship system should do

²¹ For example, in November 1939, Thompson phoned Floyd Chalmers, Ottawa correspondent for the *Financial Post*, to ask him to back off of his criticisms of the Department of National Defence. This request was conveyed with a "delicate threat." Chalmers let his colleagues know about Thompson's call. Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda: 1939-1945*, 16.

²² From the outbreak of the war to the consolidation of radio, cable, mail and press censorship under the auspices of the Ministry of War Services in 1942, the press censorship office referred to itself as the Censorship Branch. Afterwards, it was styled the Directorate of Censorship.

²³ Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, 255.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 256.

more than just try to keep information of use to the enemy out of the print and broadcast media. He argued the censorship could be useful to journalists, and could build their trust by acting as a bridge between the media, the government and the armed services. "The job needed tolerant and reasonable people," Eggleston wrote in his memoirs, "needed good judgment and wide comprehension, sound ideas on how to reconcile the need of keeping secrets from the enemy while not hindering the vital flow of information in a democratic state." For outright military secrets there was no leeway: they had to be bottled up as tightly as possible. Still, it was important to keep the public as well informed on the progress of the war as possible. "It would be futile to expect the great mass of the Canadian public to cooperate with the government if it was not told what was going on."²⁵

In those first months of the war, Eggleston believed the power of the state to censor opinion had to be kept under tight limits. "I could see how abuse of such a regulation could stifle honest criticism, could justify the suppression of bad news, could censor legitimate political or party comment. The opposition in Parliament and legislature could be hamstrung by rigid interpretation of the regulations." Eggleston believed a free press was even more valuable in wartime than it was in times of peace. He believed public complacency, fostered by overly-rigorous censorship, was dangerous and had contributed to the fall of France. The press had to be allowed and even encouraged to print news of military setbacks that angered and upset people.²⁶ In his memoirs, Eggleston

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, 255.

said the Prime Minister and his senior ministers held the same faith in a free press. "Fortunately Mackenzie King and his minister of justice, Ernest Lapointe, were liberals with a small 'l'. The former had instructed Walter Thompson, so Walter told me, to 'preserve and foster the freedom of the press in Canada so far as was consistent with winning the war.'"²⁷

In his letter to Ephram Weber, Eggleston explained to his friend that he had come to see censorship as "more than a negative thing." In the letter, written at Christmas, 1939, Eggleston said: "The job needed tolerant and reasonable people, needed good judgment and wide comprehension, sound ideas on how to reconcile the need of keeping secrets from the enemy while not hindering the vital flow of information in a democratic state." Eggleston believed military secrets needed to be held as tightly as possible, but the war effort would be much more efficient if the public was kept informed on the true progress of the war. The great mass of the population would not, Eggleston believed, give the government its full support if people believed they were being lied to or manipulated.²⁸

Eggleston took over the post of chief English-language press censor just as the Germans launched their offensive in the West in the spring of 1940 and "the mood of the press and the public moved through alarm to something at times bordering on panic and hysteria."²⁹ The institutions of a democratic state,

²⁸Eggleston to Ephraim Weber, December 26, 1939. Library and Archives Canada, MG2-382 Wilfrid Eggleston Papers, Container 30, File: 2.

²⁹ Wilfrid Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968, 255.

including a free press, were tested as Hitler's forces crushed Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France.

Eggleston was not sure press censorship of domestic news was of any value. He noted an article written by George Creel, chairman of the U.S. Committee on Public Information in World War I and published in *Collier's* magazine in which Creel expressed his belief "that press censorship as practiced in the United States in the last war was a farce." Creel, wrote Eggleston, contended thousands of people knew all the vital war secrets, so "it was a joke to ask the press not to print them." Information, wrote Creel, needed to be controlled at the source, with monitoring at communications facilities such as cable offices.³⁰ Bad news should be disclosed, but in measured ways, by domestic authorities. "It is by no means certain that any attempt should be made to restrict the circulation of bad news. Censorship is probably an inappropriate method in this case. Better for bad news to be disclosed by our authorities themselves, if possible immediately after the disaster, and for enemy propaganda rumours to be invalidated or decontaminated by official refutation or modification. Action of some sort may be imperative."³¹

Censorship had more value as a tool to fight the import of enemy propaganda, Eggleston wrote. In World War II, the Germans were engaged in psychological warfare that was designed to break down the will of the Allies. Some sort of information control system was needed to counter this effort. "And while censorship may not be the only or even the most effective weapon of

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

reply,” contended Eggleston, “it is a useful element of our psychological arsenal.”³²

The fall of France was a shock to the Canadian political system and caused some people in the government and military to question its policies, including censorship. “In the twilight war everyone had been reasonable and tolerant; as the bad news poured in and the foundations of life were shaken, reason gave way to passion and tolerance to blind fury,” Eggleston wrote in his memoirs.³³ He also commented that so long as people like O. D. Skelton and Ernest Lapointe were powerful figures in government and a man of Mackenzie King's temperament was head of the government, the censors could ward off demands from ministers and military officers for tighter censorship on Canadian newspapers and publications that came into the country from the U.S.³⁴

From the beginning, and despite its similarities to the British system, the Canadian censorship system remained independent of Britain's. The decision to sever the link that existed in World War I between the two countries' censorship systems came from the Department of External Affairs' nationalistic, isolationist Under-Secretary of State, O.D. Skelton,³⁵ who wrote a memo to Thompson in the fall of 1939 blocking Thompson's plan to exchange information on censorship procedures and methods with his British counterparts.³⁶ Almost immediately, the British complained that too much war information was being printed in Canadian

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 262.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ For a discussion of Skelton and his fellow mandarins' views, see J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935-1957*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, especially Chapter 4.

³⁶ O.D. Skelton to Thompson, Sept. 5, 1939. Library and Archives Canada, RG25 (Department of External Affairs Records), Vol. 1915, File: 724A. Part I.

newspapers.³⁷ External Affairs stayed involved with censorship through the war, placing its senior intelligence officers on management committees and liaising with the British, and, later, the Soviets and Americans.

At the outbreak of the war, the Directorate of Censorship sent a pamphlet drafted by Pope that included a copy of the Censorship Regulations to every known publisher in the Dominion of Canada, and to many individual correspondents and freelance writers. In October 1939, Thompson invited the publishers and editors of the major newspapers in Canada to visit Ottawa to discuss “the way in which newspapers could co-operate with censorship in helping to win the war.”³⁸ Regional censors addressed local meetings of the Canadian Press, and senior Directorate of Censorship officials, along with their liaisons in the intelligence branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force, went to Canadian Press’ annual conventions.³⁹ Censors often visited the head offices of British United Press and Canadian Press, and most major newspapers had at least one friendly visit from a press censor during the war. Editors and publishers received personal, or personalized, letters from the Prime Minister asking them to co-operate with censorship.

By late fall, 1939, some members of the Canadian Press had become so disenchanted with what they saw as the vagueness of the voluntary system under Thompson that, at a regional directors’ meeting in Moncton, they passed a

³⁷ John Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Vol. I The Early Years 1909-1946* Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990, 268.

³⁸ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

³⁹ Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, August 27, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), 5945 File: 1-A-3.

resolution that the military take over censorship.⁴⁰ By the end of November, after the furor raised by the Union Nationale over the censorship of Quebec radio stations and newspapers during the provincial election campaign and embarrassing fights between journalists and censors over coverage rules concerning the deployment of the 1st Canadian Division from Canada to Britain, Mackenzie King expressed displeasure with the press censorship system. He admitted to a group of reporters that many mistakes had been made and that discussion had been harmfully restricted. According to Grant Dexter, the Prime Minister said he would deal with censorship as soon as he could get around to it.⁴¹

In early January, the Prime Minister talked to reporters again, saying that he did not want the military to interfere with the censors, and would instruct the censors to that effect.⁴² King believed most censorship of news was a waste of time. If it went too far, he told the reporters, Canadians would try to get their news from the U.S. press.⁴³

The government expected Thomson to develop a publicity section, the intention evidently being to keep him as head of both. This did not happen. In December 1939, Thompson, who had been frustrated and exhausted by what he saw as the print media's lack of respect and support for censorship efforts, and who had been seen by them as running an administration that was not forceful

⁴⁰ Nicholls, *The Story of CP*, 252.

⁴¹ Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945* 19.

⁴² If King did so, there seems to be no paper trail in his records or of those of the censors.

⁴³ Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War*, 33. The press conference was held January 2, 1940. The reporters promised not to write stories about King's views on censorship.

enough for its mandate, retired, citing poor health.⁴⁴ Clare Moyer also left his position of chief press censor and was replaced by C.J. Hanratty.⁴⁵

At the beginning of 1940, Thompson was replaced by Col. Maurice Pope, the architect of the censorship system, who was now a fast-rising star in the military. Pope took over a system plagued with problems. He tried to win editors over by sending out a pamphlet explaining the need for refraining from publishing information that would be useful to the enemy but "editors were quite unreceptive and I had the feeling they consigned it to their waste paper baskets."⁴⁶ At the same time Pope was trying to patch up the censorship system, the government continued to keep him busy with military planning, including an aborted Canadian invasion of Greenland in April 1940.⁴⁷ The following month, Pope sailed for Britain, effectively leaving press censorship in the hands of Eggleston.⁴⁸

Whatever leadership problems regarding censorship that existed in Cabinet were amplified by the lack of bureaucratic experience at the top of the press censorship system, its general disorganization, and the high staff turnover rate. Part of the problem lay with Pope, who, after succeeding Thompson, was willing to load his subordinates with work but was unwilling to delegate official responsibility over the system, even during the long periods when he was serving in Britain and at times when he was trying to juggle jobs as senior wartime intelligence officer and chief censor, responsible for press, mail and cable censorship.

⁴⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 41.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴⁷ This action was quashed by the U.S. State Department, which invoked the Monroe Doctrine.

⁴⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 144-145.

For his part, Pope wished there had been more pre-war planning for press censorship and believed the system had started poorly. Pope saw the press as obstructionist and believed Thompson needed support from cabinet, perhaps “an authoritative, but yet conciliatory, statement by a responsible minister, but this was not given.” This was part of a bigger problem, namely the government’s inability to explain to the public, in clear language, its war aims and objectives in those months before Hitler’s breakthrough in the West.⁴⁹

In August 1941, Eggleston and T.A. Stone, who headed External Affairs’ intelligence section, and was, at the time, Acting Chairman of the Censorship Coordination Committee, had, during the course of a committee meeting, an argument over the extent that the press in Canada should be censored.⁵⁰ During the meeting, military intelligence officials argued that the Canadian press was one of Germany’s most valuable intelligence sources. The Canadian intelligence officers claimed to have intercepted instructions to Nazi agents telling them that practically all of the information needed by Germany could be obtained from Canadian newspapers, radio broadcasts and copies of *Hansard*. Eggleston was prompted to write a four-page letter (see Appendix 3) to explain his view on the value of a free press in wartime. He quoted three paragraphs from an article in the June 1941 issue of *Fortune* magazine. One paragraph acknowledged that much important information on a country – its population, government, the location of rivers, cities, ports, its resources, its ethnic and linguistic composition

⁴⁹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 141.

⁵⁰ The dispute might have been caused by Eggleston’s article in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, (“Press Censorship,” *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. 7, 3 (1941): 4-5) which was published that month. In it, Eggleston argued for a censorship system free of military and political interference.

– is always in the public domain in a free society. While military planners may wish the material was secret, there is no way to recall or suppress it when a war breaks out. Censorship, *Fortune* argued, could lead to the cover-up of important problems and “to false optimism with consequent reaction of despair” when the truth eventually comes out. Repressive censorship had, in fact, undermined the German war effort, the magazine claimed: “A German deputy after the last war declared before the Reichstag that military censorship had done more harm -- militarily -- than all the papers in Germany could have if the censorship had been lifted entirely.”

Eggleston said some reporters, including Grant Dexter of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, had performed an important public service by carefully analyzing manpower figures from the 1930s to determine Canada's potential support for the Allies and publishing his findings, even though his work might well be valuable to the Nazis. Eggleston could see no way to limit the debate on political issues, especially conscription, without undermining Canadian democracy. Censorship authorities, he contended, had an obligation to analyze from more than just a security standpoint whether an article violated the *Defence of Canada Regulations'* prohibition of “information of value to the enemy”. The blame for an overly-secretive press censorship system that impaired the democracy and kept the public in the dark would fall onto the shoulders of the press censors. In the end, he argued, censors should concentrate on the question: “On balance, will

the publication of this item aid or impede Canada's war effort?" Of course, he added, the censors could not satisfy everyone all the time.⁵¹

In the early months of 1940, the press censorship system went through several shake-ups. Hanratty left in the spring of 1940 for the Bureau of Public Information and Eggleston took his place. Jules Leger, then a young lawyer, very briefly joined the press censorship office in Ottawa as Assistant Censor. Journalist Edward McMahon was appointed Assistant Press Censor at Montreal and began his duties there on February 18th. Claude Melancon, who was chief censor of French-language publications, went to the Bureau of Public Information. On February 28th, Fulgence Charpentier, Chief of French Journals of the House of Commons, was named to succeed Melancon.

Pope was a fine planner but in censorship, to which he could never give his full attention, he was a substandard administrator. The Censorship Coordination Committee rarely met. The lack of a central policy structure allowed the Secretary of State (who controlled press censorship), National War Services (in charge of broadcast censorship), the Post Office (which ran the mail censorship) and the Department of National Defence (which operated the cable censorship) to exert greater control. Pope could not bear the full burden of military planning and censorship administration, especially after he was transferred overseas for ten months, beginning in May 1940.⁵² Pope lasted, in name, until May, 1942, when, at the request of Norman Robertson,

⁵¹ W.E. Eggleston to T.A. Stone, August 13, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: Memoranda re: Meetings of Various Committees. 1-A-3.

⁵² Pope says in his memoirs he usually worked six or seven 12-hour days a week. At the end of 1940, Pope was hospitalized for 10 days in England, suffering from exhaustion. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 158.

Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Colonel Oliver Mowat Biggar was appointed director and the censorship system was restructured.

The poor co-ordination of information gleaned from mail and cable censorship had the potential to adversely affect the country's intelligence-gathering capabilities. External Affairs' T.A. Stone tried to salvage something from the disorganization by using his position on subcommittees to try to co-ordinate intelligence-gathering and censorship management, going to the extreme of setting up a shadow Censorship Co-ordination Committee at External Affairs.⁵³ Stone was soon overwhelmed with other work.⁵⁴ He asked G.P. Glazebrook, the temporary wartime assistant to Robertson, to take over. Glazebrook realized the divided jurisdictions were inefficient, so he advised Robertson to recommend to the War Cabinet Committee (of which Robertson was a regular participant) to create a centralized system. The War Committee agreed.⁵⁵

Making the announcement in the House of Commons on May 4, 1942, King said the reorganization would result in "a consistent policy for all aspects of censorship" and duplication of effort would stop. The new system should be more effective at both collecting data for Canadian military intelligence and thwarting the intelligence-gathering efforts of the Germans. As well, the censorship

⁵³ Stone: Memorandum on the Activities of the Censorship Coordination Committee which has been meeting in the Department of External Affairs, August 11, 1941, Library and Archives Canada RG25 (Records of the Department of External Affairs), Vol. 199, File: 724-AD-39.

⁵⁴ His intelligence duties at the time included planning for the possibility of Canada seizing St. Pierre and Miquelon, and, after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, liaising with the Americans.

⁵⁵ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs. Volume 1: The Early Years, 1906-1946*, 269.

systems in the United Kingdom and United States, each of which was under unified control, would be better able to deal with Canada's censors.⁵⁶

Oliver Mowat Biggar was a logical replacement for Pope. Born in Toronto in 1876, he was, like Pope, a grandson of a Father of Confederation. He was the eldest grandson of Sir Oliver Mowat, one of the drafters of the 1864 Quebec Resolutions and later the Liberal premier of Ontario whose provincial rights cases at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council re-defined the political balance between the national and provincial governments. Biggar was educated at Upper Canada College, the University of Toronto and Osgoode Hall. After his call to the bar, he set up practice in Edmonton, Alberta. At the outbreak of World War I, he joined the army, was commissioned and soon afterwards became Deputy Judge Advocate General in Calgary. By 1918, he was Judge Advocate General of Canada and a full colonel. He met King at this time, and, by 1919, King was an overnight visitor at Biggar's summer cottage.

Biggar was a member of the Canadian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, working on the Commission of the Authors of War and Penalties. Upon his return to Canada, he served as vice-chair of the Air Board and organized the Air Department. In 1920, he was appointed Canada's first Chief Electoral Officer by the House of Commons, a position he held for seven years before leaving the public service to found the Ottawa intellectual property law firm Smart and Biggar.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ *Hansard*, May 4, 1942, pp. 2079-2100.

⁵⁷ *Saturday Night*, December 23, 1944.

Biggar's connections to King's Ottawa were deep. He was one of the first friends King's future right-hand man, Norman Robertson, made when Robertson arrived in Ottawa in the early summer of 1927 to work as a summer student at the Advisory Board on Tarrifs.⁵⁸ Biggar suggested Robertson become a lawyer and offered him a potentially lucrative position as junior partner at Smart and Biggar.⁵⁹ When Robertson applied for a First Secretary position in the Civil Service in 1928, Biggar was one of Robertson's three references.⁶⁰

The Social Credit government of Alberta hired Biggar to litigate legal actions testing the constitutionality of the *Social Credit Act*, the *Bank Taxation Act* and the *Press Act* (all of which he lost). Despite Biggar's choice of provincial government client, King invited Biggar to important dinners and social events, including an intimate evening with Neville Chamberlain at Kingsmere in August, 1932.⁶¹

As Prime Minister, King took legal advice from Biggar on federal-provincial constitutional issues⁶² and government organization questions.⁶³ Early in his first term, King also turned to Biggar for advice on foreign affairs.⁶⁴ While chief electoral officer, Biggar served as chairman of the Canadian Bar Association's Committee on International Law and chairman of the League of Nations Society's executive committee. In 1924, Biggar served as King's advisor on League of

⁵⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, 21.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁶¹ Mackenzie King Diary, August 15, 1932.

⁶² Mackenzie King Diary, May 15, 1922 and February 20, 1926, February 25, 1926.

⁶³ Mackenzie King Diary, March 15, 1926.

⁶⁴ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs Vol. I The Early Years 1909-1939*, 89.

Nations' affairs.⁶⁵ He also worked with King on St. Lawrence Waterway discussions with the Americans⁶⁶ and on the Tariff Commission. In 1930, King called in Biggar to salvage the electoral system, claiming "the Chief Electoral Officer is no good ... & the whole machinery of elections might collapse in an hour without Biggar."⁶⁷ In 1938, King engaged Biggar to draft a bill to fight political corruption.⁶⁸

Early in the war, Sir Lyman Duff, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, suggested King ask Biggar for a briefing on the troubles the Borden government endured over the conscription issue. Biggar had already told Ralston how "embarrassing" the crisis had been to the federal government, and how the exercise had generated few extra troops.⁶⁹ Biggar worked on the War Manpower Committee and the board of Research Enterprises Limited, the company set up by the Department of Munitions and Supply to manufacture sensitive and secret equipment under the wing of the National Research Council.⁷⁰

Biggar's links with Robertson were important to the censorship system. External Affairs had been involved in censorship since the beginning of the war, when the British complained to External Affairs about the publication in Canadian newspapers of information valuable to the enemy, such as about Asdic, a type of submarine detection system similar to Sonar. The department's intelligence experts, Stone and Glazebrook, had taken up the slack when Pope could not

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 997.

⁶⁶ Mackenzie King Diary, January 12, 1924, also May 5, 1924.

⁶⁷ Mackenzie King Diary, May 27, 1930.

⁶⁸ Mackenzie King Diary, March 4, 1938.

⁶⁹ Mackenzie King Diary, December 15, 1941.

⁷⁰ Mel Thistle (ed), *The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, 49 (Mackenzie letter of September 28, 1940).

effectively manage censorship. Its intelligence department was the closest thing the country had to a foreign spy agency.

King announced the restructuring of the censorship administration and the creation of the office of Director of Censorship a week after the 1942 conscription plebiscite. The following September, the government replaced the Bureau of Public Information with the more substantive Wartime Information Board (WIB). Both moves were designed to better serve the government and the Allies' intelligence-gathering needs. The new WIB was designed to more effectively gauge and mobilize public opinion in Canada, namely through extensive polling and more extensive propaganda. As for the revamped censorship system, King told the House of Commons that "Its conduct requires, in the highest degree, judgment, skill and devotion to duty. I should like to say that the government is highly appreciative of Colonel Biggar's acceptance of the arduous and responsible duties which he has been asked and undertaken to perform."⁷¹

Biggar had a mandate to pull all aspects of censorship together to harmonize its policies, focus its work, and to better ensure that any useful information gleaned from it would be caught and understood. Control of press censorship passed from the Secretary of State to the Minister of War Services, along with the other censorship systems - mail, radio and cable communication.⁷² Biggar took an active role in management by chairing the revived Censorship Co-ordination Committee. At this point, according to John Bryden, who has written extensively on Canada's signals intelligence system, cable and mail censorship

⁷¹ *Hansard*, May 4, 1942 pp. 2078-2100.

⁷² C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945*, Ottawa: The Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970 124.

was largely tailored to meet the needs of military intelligence, which would have more clout through the entire system. Theoretically, at least, the people working in the new system “could look out for the counter-espionage and security concerns of the military, the RCMP, and Britain’s Security Service (MI5), while procuring general intelligence for any interested British or Canadian government agency.”⁷³ The censors now also had fast access to cables sent between newspapers, and from newsrooms to reporters in the field.

Bryden believes the impetus for restructuring the system came from the Americans. Having entered the war, they wanted to join the British in an effort to gain “total control of world communications” by eavesdropping on every telecommunications cable sent into and out of the geographic spheres controlled by the Axis powers. The more interesting material in this traffic came from enemy agents, especially those in South America.⁷⁴ The material intercepted by Canada was passed to the Allies by the Department of External Affairs, which shared it with the Allies.⁷⁵

The huge growth in signals interception would have an impact on Canadian press censorship. Canadian cable and telegraph censors watched carefully for cables from news organizations, picking up telegrams from editors to reporters in the field, freelance story pitches, and communications between news organizations. At times, especially when dealing with journalists’ communications in the Atlantic provinces and with phone calls to and from the Japanese-

⁷³ John Bryden *Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War*, Toronto: Lester, 1993, 151.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 151-152.

⁷⁵ Hillicker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs Vol. I: The Early Years 1909-1939*, 268.

Canadian newspaper *The New Canadian*, wire censors did more than eavesdrop: they refused to put through telephone calls and held telegrams. Bryden says this system, unlike press censorship, survived the war and was turned toward people suspected of Communist espionage, Marxist sympathies and supposed other forms of subversion.⁷⁶

The Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information, established in 1940, made up of officers from the three armed services, intelligence specialists from External Affairs and senior officials from the Directorate of Censorship and the Wartime Information Board, gave considerable direction to the censors. It became quite active in 1943 as Biggar placed greater emphasis on consultation with the military and government.⁷⁷ The committee was called upon to deal with individual cases that proved challenging or controversial. It gave advice to the censors on material to be included in the censorship directives. With military officers forming the bulk of the committee, its recommendations tended to be biased towards stricter suppression of news.

⁷⁶ Bryden, *Best Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War*, 306. Since foreign spies sent their most important messages in code, Canada and its Allies employed a small army of cryptographers. The signals interceptors and code-breakers found a home in the Canadian Security Establishment, an Ottawa-based agency whose activities still remain rather shrouded. The code-breakers began their work in a house next to King's on Laurier Street.

⁷⁷ Membership was somewhat fluid, but during the course of the war it included Lt. Commander C.H. Little, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy); Capt. C.G. Jones, Directorate of Intelligence (Army); Col. W.W. Murray and Capt. E.L. Williams of the Directorate of Intelligence (Army); Lt. Col. F.X. Jennings, Chief Press Relations Officer (Army); G.M. Brown, Chief Press Relations Officer (Air); Group Capt. H.R. Stewart, Directorate of Intelligence (Air); Wilfrid Eggleston and Fulgence Charpentier of the Directorate of Censorship; J. Girouard, Dept. of External Affairs; T.A. Stone, Dept. of External Affairs; Col. M.H. Vernon, Dept. of Munitions and Supply; A.D. Dunton, Wartime Information Board; Capt. George McCracken, Wartime Information Board; John Grierson, General Manager, Wartime Information Board; J.W.G. Clark, Chief of Information, Armed Forces; Rielle Thomson, Publicity Branch, Dept. of Munitions and Supply; H.C. Howard, Director of Information, (Navy); G.H. Sallan, Director of Information, (Army); and G.M. Brown, Director of Information (Air). This list of members was collected from the minutes of the committee's meetings.

Biggar held the job of Director of Censorship until the summer of 1944, when he suffered a heart attack. Perhaps his health failed because of the pressure of his work: he kept several other wartime committee jobs while he ran the censorship system.⁷⁸ Once Biggar's restructuring of the Directorate of Censorship was complete, power over censorship of the press was concentrated in the hands of Eggleston, and to a lesser extent, Ottawa-based censor Warren Baldwin and chief French-language press censor Fulgence Charpentier.

Eggleston took over the position of Director of Censorship in August 1944. This was a huge job compared to his position of press censor. He was responsible for about 1,000 employees, mostly in Postal Censorship. He was still chief English-language press censor and much of his daily routine focused on that aspect of the job.⁷⁹ Eggleston stayed through the tumultuous weeks in the fall of 1944 when conscripts rioted in British Columbia and the censorship system was nearly taken over by the military. In the early winter of 1945, Eggleston resigned, leaving English-language press censorship in the hands of his assistant, Baldwin, who stayed on with Charpentier, the new Director of Censorship, through 1945 to deal with post-war "now it can be told" stories, wind up the head office and write the official report.

Despite its high turnover at the very top and its organizational problems, especially between 1939 and 1942, the press censorship system proved to be

⁷⁸ Biggar's health improved after he resigned and he lived another four years.

⁷⁹ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 269.

quite resilient. While its senior manager never lasted much more than two years in the job, the core staff of the press censorship system – Eggleston, Charpentier, Baldwin, and the regional censors in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver – were in place through most of the war. They provided continuity and experience to the system, writing the press directives and eventually developing a massive file of rulings that would be periodically bound and circulated to the country's journalists.

The evolution of censorship from a decentralized and *ad hoc* system to one headquartered in Ottawa and based on a set of written policies was complete by the summer of 1942, but the censors could never bring the entire machinery of press censorship under one roof in a country as large and diverse in Canada. Regional censors still had broad discretionary powers and were relied upon to use their expertise to deal with the local challenges, most of which were unexpected and unanticipated. Still, the integrated system that was created gave the censors greater surveillance powers over the media and also ended the administrative isolation of the censorship system. It was designed to act as part of an over-all intelligence strategy to deny open-source information to the Axis. The system was also expected to reap valuable information for the Allies and the mechanisms of censorship – for example, cable interception and press censorship – could be combined to monitor the press's own communications and anticipate movements of reporters and their coverage of events. While Pope had not been able to fix some of the problems left by Thompson, he did go on to very senior positions in Canada's military, leaving the agency with an important

contact who understood the system very well. Robertson and King's continued interest in censorship would continue to crop up as the directorate met various challenges, such as over the coverage of conscription.

Chapter Five: Organizational Structure, Resources and Methods of Action

Compared to postal censorship, with 1000 people involved in opening mail across Canada, the press censorship system was very much a shoe-string operation. Its Ottawa headquarters was, in the first weeks, a small room in the Ottawa train station. Later, it moved into the Victoria Building across the street from Parliament Hill. Regional offices were usually set up in rooms borrowed from the Post Office. Censors were not even granted extra gas rations, so in 1943 Vancouver censor Lew Gordon could not afford to drive the seven miles between his office and local Naval Headquarters to check on a story.¹ Journalists were allowed to call the censors collect, but the censors seemed to begrudge the cost. The *Hamilton Spectator* and small-town Ontario papers were often mentioned in censorship memos and rulings for reversing phone charges, with the implication that the costs saved by the newspapers was a burden to the censorship system.

With only seven censors² operating outside Ottawa and a very small staff in the capital, the press censorship system barely had the human resources to do its job. The censors had to fill in for each other on holidays, with Ottawa censors sometimes traveling to Halifax and Vancouver to cover the shifts of their colleagues. The areas that each censor had to cover were vast: the one-man Halifax office was responsible for all of the Maritimes and sometimes the Gaspé

¹ Ruling, Vancouver, September 22, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953 File: Miscellaneous.

² This number fluctuated with the addition of part-time censors in Montreal and Alberta, but there were never more than nine working outside Ottawa.

Peninsula. The two full-time Montreal censors were given the daunting task of monitoring and advising the newspapers in Quebec, where much of the press, in both languages, was hostile to them. The Ottawa office was in charge of the copy from the Parliamentary Press Gallery, the three daily papers in Ottawa, the Kingston *Whig-Standard* and the smaller papers in eastern Ontario. Toronto censors handled the city's three big dailies, the large Canadian Press newsroom, the magazines headquartered in Toronto, and the print publications in the rest of Ontario. The area covered by the Vancouver censors was huge: everything west of the Ontario-Manitoba border including the northern territories.

Censorship orders and directives, sent by letter, or, in urgent cases, by telegram, were the reporters' and editors' primary guide. During the course of the war, the Censors of Publications issued nine editions of *Press and Radio Censorship Directives*. They were published as booklets with several blank pages in the back where journalists could paste new directives as they arrived. When a new volume came out, the old one, with its pasted-in supplements, was supposed to be destroyed. Each booklet was individually numbered and had to be signed for. Along with specific rules on what could or could not be printed, the directives provide an outline of the development of censorship policy, copies of the relevant Orders-in-Council and *Defence of Canada Regulations*, and usually had a brief overview of the war situation and a discussion of current censorship policy.

At the end of the war, the censors noted the directives showed several distinct periods in the history of the development of censorship. From the

beginning of the war to the spring of 1940, the “phony war” period was “a time of exploration” that ended when Nazi successes forced the government, military and censorship systems to take the war more seriously and solve organizational problems. The first period was a time of disorganization and *ad hoc* policy-making as a flurry of directives, averaging one a day, was issued to plug what the censors called “gaps in the security wall.” This finger-in-the-dike approach was confusing to journalists and the censors themselves and resulted in dissatisfaction with the system at the highest reaches of the government. Even the censors realized the directives sometimes overlapped and contradicted each other. Some contained wide loop-holes “which, if newspapers and radio stations had been intent on evading Censorship, would have created serious problems.”³

In March 1940, once Maurice Pope took over press censorship, publishers began receiving background directives explaining the need for censorship policies. Censors concentrated their attention on studying broad security problems and obtaining information from the armed forces. The edition of July 1940, written in the days following the German blitz of Western Europe, was meant as a guide to the principles behind the censorship of naval and army news. Editors were expected to match their stories against these ideals to determine if the articles posed a possible threat to Canadian security. The onus had shifted: censors would not make lists of banned topics and details; editors would self-censor using criteria set out by the censors. Since the Allies were so obviously losing the war, journalists with any patriotism at all fell quickly into line.

³ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (No File).

Censorship directives issued in January 1942 reduced the ninety-six outstanding directives to twenty-two, each of them addressing a broad subject. The new set of directives covered the Air Force and British Commonwealth Air Training Plan; the Canadian army; casualties in the armed forces; military and civil aviation; gold movements; escapes of POWs and political refugees from enemy territory; shipping information and naval operations; war industries, ship building and secret war equipment; weather; and arrests of spies, internment, enemy aliens and sabotage operations.⁴ For the first time, the censors spelled out the rules for coverage of possible carrier-based air attacks on Canadian coastal cities, warning against the release of any information without approval by the censors. In early 1942, Canadian authorities had to work quickly to develop linkages with their new colleagues in the U.S. censorship system and, in February 1942, Canadian publishers were asked to follow the United States' Code as well as Canada's. That meant a new, strict censorship of news of domestic production and infrastructure development, including the construction of the Alaska Highway and U.S. military bases in Newfoundland and Atlantic Canada.

The directives set over-arching rules. For stories that straddled the line between security and politics, censors were asked by editors to make case-by-case decisions. Drafting one-off rulings took up most of the censors' time and proved to be extremely challenging, especially when the same news item (usually, but not always, foreign wire-service copy) was simultaneously submitted

⁴ Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5942, (NF).

to censors in two or more cities. Usually, this happened by accident, but sometimes editors, especially the Vancouver *Herald's* City Editor, Pierre Berton, an opponent of censorship, tried to trick the censors into making confusing and contradictory rulings.

Rulings were usually made over the telephone, although some papers, notably the Toronto *Star*, brought news copy to the local censorship office. The censor typed up rulings that were passed on to the Ottawa head office and to any journalist who was deemed likely to need it. Censors could make dozens of very brief rulings each day, mostly on innocuous stories that needed few or no changes.

There was a double standard between this treatment of the commercial, mainstream press and the way the censors and the rest of the government manhandled the small-circulation newspapers of political fringe groups and ethnic minorities. Midway through the Quebec provincial election campaign of 1939, the Communist newspaper *Clarte* was suppressed by the Secretary of State, without consulting the censors. Police raided its offices on October 4, after a short but vocal Union Nationale-inspired newspaper campaign against it. *Clarte*, whose editors had fled the province, was used as a whipping boy for weeks after it was shut down. Duplessis insisted that if *Clarte* was suppressed – a move he, in fact, agreed with - all of the Communist press, including the Toronto and Winnipeg *Clarion*, be padlocked. *Clarte*, Duplessis and his

supporters claimed, had been closed because of its anti-war stand, not because of its Marxism.⁵

Clarte's English-language counterpart, the Toronto and Winnipeg-based *Clarion*, were raided and shut down within weeks of *Clarte's* suppression. The *Clarion* found no solidarity among its professional colleagues. *The Globe and Mail* was typical of Canadian newspapers that approved of the closure of the *Clarion*.⁶ That fall and winter, nine other papers were banned by the Secretary of State under Section 15 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* and a small ethnic leftist paper was temporarily suspended (See Appendix F). These bannings took place without reference to the censorship system and usually happened after complaints from the RCMP because the newspapers opposed Canadian participation in the war.

On September 18, 1941, three months after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, a subcommittee of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee considered lifting the ban on Canada's Communist press. The Press Censors first wanted to know if the papers would get behind the Canadian war effort.⁷ The next day, at a special meeting with E.S. Herbert, the chief British censor, who was visiting Ottawa, Eggleston asked the British censor for advice and was told: "Do not make any alterations for the time being. We want to see what is happening in the

⁵Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5968 File: 2A/E-35.

⁶"Nazi Doctrine Spread is Tried in 'Red' Papers," *The Globe and Mail*, April 6, 1940, 1

⁷ Minutes of the Subcommittee on Review of Foreign Publications of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, September 18, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: Minutes of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee 1-A-3.

Communist Party.”⁸ Two months later, on November 20, Lester B. Pearson, representing the Department of External Affairs, urged the subcommittee to begin lifting restrictions on the domestic Communist press and Soviet publications that were banned from Canada. The Soviet Embassy in Washington was pressing Canada and the U.S. to lift its ban on domestic and imported Communist publications. Pearson recommended “that this reconsideration be done in a liberal spirit.” The censors pointed out that a large number of foreign Communist publications had been banned, and recommended the restrictions should be lifted gradually.⁹ Eventually, most of the Communist papers were allowed to re-open and the Soviet Union sent representatives to the Parliamentary Press Gallery.

Faced with the steady flow of bad news from the U.S. during the collapse of the western front in 1940, some politicians and very senior officials demanded the censors take action against U.S. publications. By then, Eggleston had replaced Hanratty as chief English-language press censor and was privy to the demands that the open side of the “three-walled house” be closed. In his autobiography, Eggleston wrote that he had to fight to prevent serious abuses of the censorship system, which, he believed, would have done the Canadian war effort no good. The censorship system was stretched to its limit in the spring and summer of 1940. Eggleston knew the bad news from Western Europe could not

⁸ Minutes of Censorship Meeting held September 19, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: Censorship Co-ordination Committee 1-A-3.

⁹ Minutes of the Subcommittee on Review of Foreign Publications of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, November 20, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: Minutes of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee 1-A-3.

be hidden, but Canadian newspapers could not be allowed to print “enemy claims,” which, while usually somewhat accurate, “were usually dressed up with the most ingenious devices of psychological warfare.” Would a frank discussion of the military situation undermine the war effort or hinder recruiting? “Bad news might conceivably spur on our efforts; but bad news doctored up it enemy propaganda might sap our will to continue by making the enemy seem irresistible and the outcome foreordained.” Nothing could prevent news coming in from the United States, which was a neutral country where the Axis powers maintained ambassadors, consuls, and information offices. The Axis was free to use the United States as a base for psychological warfare directed at Canada and other allied countries, as well as at all the neutrals. At least half the Canadian public could pick a U.S. radio station, and hundreds of thousands of people crossed the border every day. “Trying to insulate Canada from the propaganda circulating in the United States” was, as Walter Thompson said, “like trying to heat a Canadian house in winter if it had only three walls.”¹⁰ In the end, the censors had to thwart attempts by the government (and by media competitors in Canada) to keep major U.S. publications like the *Saturday Evening Post* and the *Chicago Tribune* out of Canada.

Size mattered, too, when the censors and the government dealt with U.S. newspapers and magazines. The Canadian government and *Chicago Tribune* had brawled in World War I over the paper’s Anglophobia, and within weeks of the new war they started again. The *Tribune* had a large mail circulation in Canada and was sold at newsstands in major cities, especially in southwestern

¹⁰ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, Chap. 15.

Ontario. Like the Hearst press, which was banned in World War I for its anti-British stance, the *Tribune* opposed the entry of the U.S. into the war. It also dodged the British chokehold on military news and carried uncensored stories from the front.¹¹

Some Canadian newspapers advocated the banning of the *Tribune* and the seizure of its paper mills and forest leases.¹² On May 28, 1940, the *Ottawa Journal* ran an editorial calling for both. Eggleston, in a May 30, 1940, memo, told his superiors, including the prime minister, that some of the Canadian media rage against the *Tribune* was inspired by greed. Agents of the *Tribune* told Eggleston the powerful Commercial Newsprint Manufacturers Association of Canada had turned on the *Tribune* and its paper-making subsidiaries because McCormick, its major subsidiary, refused to join the Canadians in a newsprint price-fixing scheme. The Canadian mills had used their influence with publishers to plant editorials calling for the *Tribune* to be excluded from Canada.¹³

Protecting the Chicago *Tribune* was a tough job. Its erratic publisher, Col. Robert McCormick, opposed any help for the Allies, just as he had during World War I. McCormick opened his pages to the critics of American intervention and constantly demanded toughening of the *Neutrality Act*. He also took to the U.S.

¹¹ For example, the major U.S. radio networks had correspondents in Germany until the summer of 1941. William Shirer discusses his wartime reporting in Nazi Germany in the second volume of his memoirs, *This Is Berlin: Broadcasting From Nazi Germany*. New York: Hutchinson, 1999. U.S. newspapers and news services had reporters in Germany until the attack on Pearl Harbor and bought copy from German news services until Hitler declared war on the U.S.

¹² Among the mills owned by the *Tribune* was the giant pulp and newsprint plant in Baie Comeau, Quebec, that employed Brian Mulroney's father.

¹³ Memorandum, Wilfrid Eggleston, May 30, 1940, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4567, under cover letter of June 11, 1940. Not all Canadian papers joined in the campaign. On August 2, 1940, the *Montreal Gazette* ran an editorial supporting the *Tribune*, saying it agreed with a pamphlet put out by the *Tribune*'s subsidiary, the Ontario Paper Company, that the *Tribune* had been unfairly attacked and was, in fact, pro-Ally. See also Carl Wiegman, *Trees to News: A Chronicle of the Ontario Paper Company's Origin and Development*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1953, Chap. 15.

airwaves, becoming, along with the famed aviator, Charles Lindbergh, one of the principal public faces of Isolationism. During the desperate summer of 1940, the Conservatives tried to make the *Tribune's* presence in Canada a political issue.

Speaking in the Senate on July 18, 1940, Arthur Meighen demanded a crackdown on American publications "which militate against the war efforts of this Dominion" and said he "could not impress upon the Government with sufficient earnestness the imperative need of action now."¹⁴ He singled out the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Saturday Evening Post*, which had printed articles on German military strength in Europe and anti-British attitudes in the Irish republic. Rookie MP John Diefenbaker, in his first speech in the House of Commons, had already demanded that the *Tribune* and the *Saturday Evening Post* be kept out of Canada.¹⁵

Senator Raoul Dandurand, Leader of the Government in the Senate, had shown Meighen some of the censorship memos on the two publications, which advised against suppression.¹⁶ The *Chicago Tribune*, in an article headlined "Wings of Atonement", had, Meighen said, heaped ridicule "on the capacity, the sense of duty, and the manliness of the British people, and to undermine the war spirit of this country." The question, Meighen said, was: "Are we at war or are we not? If we are at war, do we permit the likes of this to continue? Do we permit poison to permeate, poison which if it originated in our own country would be immediately suppressed and the poisoner punished or hanged?"¹⁷

¹⁴ Canadian Press, July 19, 1940.

¹⁵ *Hansard*, June 13, 1940, 751.

¹⁶ *Senate Hansard*, July 18, 1940, 1118

¹⁷ *Senate Hansard*, July 18, 1940, 1118.

But there would not be a lynching of the *Chicago Tribune* or any of its financial interests or employees in Canada. On October 25, 1940, Eggleston wrote a memorandum on United States publications entering Canada that was given to the Prime Minister. In it Eggleston claimed readers weren't swayed by the isolationist editorials or the gruesome war reporting in some U.S. papers and had become toughened, even callous, about violence.¹⁸ Bad news from Europe reported "coldly" in magazines like *Time* and *Newsweek* might seem defeatist to Canadians, but it could actually frighten some undecided Americans off the fence and remind Canadians that they needed to work harder to turn the situation around, he wrote. Banning any major paper would deny Canadian readers "a great deal of friendly and useful material," cause strain between the Canadian and American governments, and would be useless because the papers would be smuggled into Canada anyway. The following winter, the *Winnipeg Free Press* argued that ignoring the *Tribune* would prevent Col. McCormick from becoming a martyr, something it insisted the publisher craved.¹⁹

Almost every Canadian criticism of the *Chicago Tribune* was accompanied by a denunciation of the *Saturday Evening Post*. In June, 1940, Charpentier wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister about a *Saturday Evening Post* article entitled, "Your Son Will Not Return! Heil Hitler!," which discussed the German preparation for that spring's blitzkrieg in Western Europe. He said that the piece "may be defeatist to that extent that some people may believe that the

¹⁸ Mackenzie King correspondence, Library and Archives Canada MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4861, October 25, 1940.

¹⁹ Editorial, *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 4, 1941, 6.

strength of the German army is such that it cannot be beaten...”²⁰ However, Eggleston wrote a memorandum saying a ban on the *Saturday Evening Post* would likely have been extended to *Time*, *Life*, *Colliers* and other mass-market U.S. magazines, and would, if “carried to an extreme, imply that Canadians like Germans must be carefully protected from hearing anything but their own side of the story.”²¹

On February 15, 1941, Charpentier and Eggleston wrote to Secretary of State Pierre-F. Casgrain, offering up the small circulation, anti-British magazine *Scribner's Monthly* in lieu of the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Saturday Evening Post*. *Scribner's Monthly* had argued for a negotiated peace with Hitler. It was a mouthpiece for McCormick and Charles Lindberg, the censors wrote. However, they neglected to tell Casgrain the magazine was already out of business.²²

Even after Pearl Harbor, when most of the isolationist press quickly jumped on the war bandwagon, Canadian censors still had reason to be enraged with some American journalists. In the fall of 1942, during an internecine fight between the Associated Press, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Chicago Sun* over franchise rights to AP service in Chicago, *Sun* publisher Marshall Field denigrated the *Tribune* and AP's business practices at a meeting of newspaper circulation managers in Peterborough, Ontario. McCormick mocked Field for spouting off “on a spot where freedom of the press does not exist,” a remark that *The Globe and Mail*, usually no friend of the censors, denounced as “totally

²⁰ Eggleston memorandum, Mackenzie King correspondence, Library and Archives Canada MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4567, June 11, 1940.

²¹ Memorandum, Wilfrid Eggleston, May 30, 1940, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4567, under cover letter of June 11, 1940.

²² Mackenzie King correspondence, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4860.

irrelevant and untrue.” The press in Canada, the *Globe* editorialized in a piece that undermined more than eighteen months of its own criticism of the censors, “has all the freedom it could desire or ever had, apart from the limitations imposed by the war. It is not even prevented from reproducing the diatribes in Colonel McCormick’s paper which Canadians deeply resent.”²³

Just over a year later, McCormick wrote a piece in the *Tribune* saying Americans got little news from Canada because of Canadian government control of the press, which “is ... as complete and unscrupulous as the censorship in Germany.” The censors, he said, had a choke hold on the Canadian news supplied to U.S. wire services. The papers in Canada, he argued, were so unprofitable and beholden to the government that they had abdicated their watchdog role. Again, *The Globe and Mail* came to the defence of Canada’s censors.²⁴ Obviously its editors considered Canadian disputes over censorship to be no business of foreigners.

The entry of the U.S. into the war solved several of the problems faced by Canadian press censors. The U.S. closed down the pro-Nazi and pro-Communist publications that operated in the U.S. and were banned from Canada. The isolationist elements in the mainstream U.S. press quickly changed sides after Pearl Harbor.

At that time, the Canadian censors also saw an opportunity to construct a continental censorship system that could keep information from reaching the Germans through the use of rigorous cable censorship. In early January 1942,

²³ “Col. McCormick’s Latest,” *The Globe and Mail*, October 8, 1942, 6.

²⁴ “News About Canada,” *The Globe and Mail*, December 30, 1943, 6.

Eggleston and Charpentier traveled to Washington to meet their counterparts in the U.S. press censorship system to discuss ways of sharing information and policies, and, through the war, officials were in touch daily by telephone and teletype. "(T)here was an almost uncanny unanimity in the handling of similar problems," the censors wrote in their final report.²⁵

Yet, in fact, there were serious differences between the Canadian and U.S. censorship systems. The rights of U.S. journalists and publishers to print material that could, under Sec. 39A of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, be labeled subversive were protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. censors, Charpentier argued, never faced the problems of a "large segment" of the country, presumably Quebec, with "no particular ties of sentiment to any of the United Nations and in some cases a definite Anglophobe complex," nor was the U.S. war effort undermined by the "constant assault by Communist and Nazi propagandists" from material coming over the border from a neutral neighbour, a challenge that Canada's censors dealt with from September 1939 until the end of 1941.

U.S. publishers faced libel laws that were less draconian, and huge corporations like Time-Life, the New York *Times*, the Chicago *Tribune* and the Hearst newspapers had a level of financial and mass media clout that was unrivalled in Canada. The U.S. censorship system recognized "appropriate authority" for release of any information. For example, a Lieutenant Colonel in command of a military establishment could release information on the installation

²⁵ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

under his command. A military Public Relations Officer could, on his own responsibility, give permission to publish some stories and the Office of Censorship in Washington had no authority to countermand the decision.²⁶ More important information could be released by the War Office, or any member of the Cabinet.²⁷ This allowed journalists to deal directly with the military and with senior government officials and politicians. Trouble sometimes arose when U.S. military officers tried to use their system in Canada, not taking into account the different practices of the Canadian censorship system.

Serious conflict did not arise between officials of the two countries' censorship systems, but Canadian censors did have problems with some American military officers. The U.S. military sometimes ignored the Canadian censorship system by dealing directly with Canadian military intelligence officials. In early 1942, General O'Connor, the U.S. commander in Edmonton overseeing construction of the Alaska Highway and the Canol oil pipeline, tried to establish his own censorship system, run by the base's chief public relations officer. O'Connor's makeshift censorship office contacted Alberta journalists who, at first, were willing to accept his office's guidance. When Canadian censors learned of the deal, they appointed a Canadian censor to work part-time in Edmonton.²⁸ The system was little more than a face-saving measure, since the new Canadian censor in Edmonton accepted O'Connor's chief public relations officer as a military adviser on all subjects dealing with his command.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

The North was to hold more challenges for censors. In the summer of 1942, the shipment of military airplanes from the U.S. to the Soviet Union across the Northwest Staging Route was, by agreement between the Canadian, U.S. and Soviet governments, still secret, although most military officers involved believed the Germans were aware of the traffic.²⁹ In a bid for publicity of the new Soviet-American alliance, the Bureau of Public Relation of the United States Army released magazine articles for publication both in the United States and Canada dealing with the air traffic. Neither the American nor Canadian censorship authorities were consulted, nor were the Soviets, whose diplomats in Washington and Ottawa protested and demanded the suppression of the articles. The Canadian censors told the Soviets that the Canadian censors “would not override the American Army ruling in Canada unless publication was also stopped in the United States,” but did promise the Soviets that the Canadian censors would prevent any more information on the transit system from being published in Canada. This was a promise the censors were unable to keep. “We had hardly given this assurance before it became known that a senior officer of the American Transport Command had arranged a press conference in Edmonton for the purpose of giving new details about the Russian plane traffic,” the censors later wrote. American censorship could do nothing to stop the interview which had been approved by United States War Office. Rather than

²⁹ The Northwest Staging Route was used by the US to ship planes sold to Russia through Canadian, Alaskan and Siberian airspace without risk of interception by German forces. For details on the U.S. projects in the Canadian Northwest, see Bob Hesketh, (ed.), *Three Northern Wartime Projects: Alaska Highway, Northwest Staging Route, Canol*. Edmonton, Canadian Circumpolar Institute and Edmonton and District Historical Society, 1996, and Kenneth Coates, (ed.), *The Alaska Highway: Papers of the 40th Anniversary Symposium*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985.

break their agreement with the Russian ambassador, therefore, the Canadian censors, through the Department of External Affairs, complained to the United States War Office, which immediately cancelled the press conference.³⁰

The Americans' openness was limited to its own press. Washington objected to Canadian coverage of U.S. forces' activities at Churchill, Manitoba, and Southampton Island in the Canadian north. At the first meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Publication of Military Information (April 16, 1943), John Grierson, the general manager of the Wartime Information Board, pointed out the inconsistencies between U.S. and Canadian censorship policies regarding publishing stories about military infrastructure in northern Canada. He said the *Saturday Evening Post's* story of April 17, 1943,³¹ titled "Arctic Outpost", was an example of the type of story that U.S. authorities allowed American journalists to write about shared facilities that Canadian authorities had tried to keep secret.³² In fact, one weekly Canadian magazine and two newspapers were holding detailed accounts of the air base at Goose Bay, pending release of the story by Canadian censors.³³ The *Saturday Evening Post* article had placed the Canadian government in an "embarrassing position."³⁴ W.G. Clark, Chief of Information, Canadian Armed Forces, said the Canadian military had an agreement with its U.S. counterparts that "there would be no release of

³⁰ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

³¹ The magazine's cover date was obviously post-dated, a common practice in the trade.

³² The article was about the then-secret air base in Goose Bay, Labrador, which was a partnership between the two countries.

³³ Draft Note to the United States Government making certain proposals in respect of publicity arrangements, April 22, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940 File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

information about projects in Canada except by arrangement and concurrently.”³⁵

The U.S. War Department’s publicity office had breached the agreement and had apologized, but the Directorate of Censorship pushed for a binding agreement between the two countries on the release of war information.³⁶ Canadian censors and staff of the Wartime Information Board took the unusual step of informing magazine and newspaper publishers of the official Canadian complaints.³⁷

Canadian censors also had to deal with tricky issues of racism directed at African-American soldiers, some of whom were deployed on guard duty at American installations in Canada. In March, 1942, the *Sault Ste. Marie Star* submitted a story on “negro” soldiers in the U.S. Army defending the Canadian side of the St. Mary’s River and its strategically-important Soo Locks (St. Mary’s Falls Ship Canal). Baldwin asked the paper to spike the story, believing, with some accuracy, the U.S. censors would oppose its publication.³⁸ The following summer, Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn, who hoped to embarrass King by showing Canada’s military was too weak to protect Ontario military installations from saboteurs, told a civic dinner in Fort William, Ontario, about the Black troops. “We ought to hang our heads in shame”, Hepburn told his audience. This time, Ottawa-based censor Jacques Girouard passed a story, saying it did not

³⁵ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information, April 16, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940 File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information, May 18, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940. File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings. Usually deliberations and decisions of the advisory committees were considered confidential. At this meeting, Grierson and Clark discussed the reasons for their decision to break this policy, saying “the maintenance of relations between the Government publicity agents and publishers were of such importance and the exigencies of the situation such that there was no alternative but to notify the publishers of the action taken.”

³⁸ Ruling, R.W. Baldwin and W. Eggleston, March 4, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954 File: I-B-2 Composition of Army.

matter to the enemy what colour the soldiers were that guarded the canal. "The fact that Hepburn was using it as a political attack was taken into consideration in passing the item," Girouard wrote.³⁹

The following year, Norman Robertson intervened with Biggar to kill a story from British Columbia on a charges of rape laid against a Black U.S. soldier. The censors decided not to suppress coverage of the charges, but asked local papers to tone down their stories "in view of the explosive angle attached to the incident."⁴⁰ Two months later, when a similar situation arose in Edmonton, the censors asked the newspapers to kill the story completely.⁴¹

The evolution of the censorship system from an agency that sent out *ad-hoc* rulings to one that crafted over-arching policies based on the military's need for secrecy was rewarded with improved relations with Canadian Press, the huge news agency that dominated national news coverage in Canada and whose executives had played such an important role in designing the censorship system. Canadian Press had rebelled during Thompson's tenure as Director of Censorship over what its editors saw as disorganization in the censorship system but supported censorship fully from the time Pope took over and began codifying the censors' rulings. Without the support of the news agency, which was a co-operative owned by the subscribing newspapers, the censors would have been on very difficult ground.

³⁹ Ruling, J. Girouard, August 25, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954 File: I-B-2 2. Composition of Army –Military.

⁴⁰ Memorandum, W. Eggleston, February 11, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B Miscellaneous.

⁴¹ Memorandum, J. Graham, April 12, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B Miscellaneous.

In its annual report of 1941, the agency made its position on censorship very clear: "It has been the consistent policy of the Canadian Press to comply implicitly with the directive instructions issued by the Press Censors. While this policy has at times placed us at disadvantages as compared with other news agencies serving some Canadian newspapers, it is felt there was no alternative consonant with the national interest." The agency acknowledged the readiness of the censors to listen to Canadian Press' arguments and sometimes change their rulings, and noted the censors had sometimes intervened with the military for greater openness.⁴²

The agency's superintendent, (in effect, its chief operating officer), Gil Purcell, was an enthusiastic supporter of Canada's war effort, even after losing a leg above the knee while watching a training exercise in England early in the war. As one of the country's most important and well-connected journalists, Purcell had a fine vantage point to consider the roles and actions of the censors and the press. His views on the value of the censors shed light on Canadian Press's attitudes toward the system during the war.

Purcell was a public supporter of the censorship system and an eager student of news management who collected all of the Directorate of Censorship's circulars (which were, under the censorship regulations, supposed to be destroyed when a new directive was issued) to use them as the basis for his 1946 Master's thesis on the Canadian wartime censorship system. Purcell also had excellent access to the censors themselves. The censors realized the value

⁴² Quoted in Purcell, "Wartime Press Censorship in Canada," 30.

of Purcell and Canadian Press's support, praising the agency in their final report, which they appear to have shown Purcell. "It [the Canadian Press] used fine judgment in self-censorship and it always or almost always submitted items if there was the shadow of a doubt about their usefulness to the enemy," read the report. Most of its journalists accepted the advice of the press censors, although sometimes they fought over the fine details of the material that the censors wanted cut.⁴³

In the preface to his thesis, Purcell said many journalists simply abandoned inquisitive journalism and allowed censorship to take the blame for the mediocrity of the news pages of major Canadian newspapers. The censors realized this was happening. "This was the danger point when freedom of speech hung in the balance," Purcell wrote. "This was the time when the censors, knowing facts the press could not know, pressed hardest for the rights of the people against the conservative nature of bureaucracy." It was surprising to ambitious journalists and to the censors themselves that so much of the print media simply abdicated its decision-making. By the end of the war, Purcell argued, the censors felt that censorship in Canada would have been improved had there been greater pressure on them by journalists. If the Canadian media had fought harder, the censors would have had a stronger case to make to military officers who were hostile to the release of information.⁴⁴

The second major non-U.S. wire service operating in Canada, the now-defunct British United Press, differed in Canadian Press's structure and purpose.

⁴³ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (No File).

⁴⁴ Purcell, "Wartime Press Censorship in Canada," preface.

It was a commercial, profit-making organization rather than a co-operative enterprise owned by Canadian newspapers. The censors said it “did not quite reach the lofty standards of *The Canadian Press*, but gave the censors courteous and willing support.”⁴⁵

Outside of the sustained campaigns against censorship launched by *The Globe and Mail* and *Le Devoir*, which are examined in subsequent chapters, the most serious criticism of the system came from senior reporters on some of the country’s better newspapers. Bert Richardson, who held a Master’s degree from Cornell University and was a reporter at the *Winnipeg Free Press’s* parliamentary bureau, was a frequent and often thoughtful critic of the wartime information control system. On May 18, 1942, the Directorate of Censorship’s Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, discussed an “editorial”⁴⁶ that Richardson had contributed to the *Winnipeg Free Press* and the *Regina Leader* in which the directors of intelligence of the three military services were named and criticized for suppressing information to which Richardson believed the newspapers were entitled. The committee wanted Richardson and the paper warned.⁴⁷ Richardson was not the only writer on the *Winnipeg Free Press* to criticize the censorship system. On October 15, 1943, the paper published an editorial that poked fun at the censors for letting the book *Arctic Trader’s* reference to the secret air base at Churchill, Manitoba, slip by them for more than

⁴⁵ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

⁴⁶ Actually, an opinion column.

⁴⁷ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, May 18, 1942. In Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: Minutes of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee 1-A-3.

three months. It was, Biggar said, “a matter of regret that cause should be given to a paper of the standing of the ‘Winnipeg Free Press’ to hold up the conduct of the censors to ridicule.”⁴⁸

Canadian book publishers, whose work required a long lead time, were governed by the same censorship rules as newspaper and magazine journalists. Only one publisher, the Oxford University Press, submitted to the press censors all manuscripts pertaining in any way to the war. Several book publishers who bought Western Hemisphere rights to books published in France during the Vichy regime also asked for the Directorate of Censorship’s opinion and were warned the books were of “a doubtful character, either because they were anti-British or because they were ‘collaborationist’, and a number were kept out of the country.”⁴⁹

MacMillan Publishing Co., which, in 1943, published the book *Arctic Trader* by Philip H. Godsell, was warned by the Directorate of Censorship that the epilogue of a version published shortly before the outbreak of the war contained information about Arctic airports that was not public knowledge and that military authorities were “serious to keep secret.” The book came to the attention of the censors three months after its publication, when reference was made to it in the *Winnipeg Free Press* article mentioned above. MacMillan pulled the book and re-issued it without the offending information after the Directorate of

⁴⁸ Minutes of the Wartime Information Board Advisory Committee on the Publication of Military Information, October 27, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940, File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings Vol. 1.

⁴⁹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

Censorship warned the publisher, but about 500 copies were already in circulation.⁵⁰

The Directorate of Censorship worked with the Department of National Revenue's Customs agents to keep "subversive" publications out of Canada, but the Directorate of Censorship did not consider most foreign-published books and magazines to be a threat because of their very low circulation figures. Here, they broke the pattern set by Chambers in World War I. Even Nazi propaganda was allowed into the country, if the person importing it had some scholarly reason for doing so.⁵¹

The censors faced a tricky situation with Parliament's official record of debate, *Hansard*. Meddling with it left the censors and the government open to charges of denying the rights of MPs and manipulating the historical record. The Army and Navy's intelligence agencies (and the censors) believed cabinet ministers were sloppy with information, even using sensitive material to score political points. In a memorandum dated July 29, 1942, members of the Directorate of Censorship's security and intelligence advisory committee told the Minister of National War Services his cabinet colleagues had spilled secrets "of high value to the enemy" that, had they come from anyone else, would have spawned charges under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. (He was probably talking about Navy minister Angus Macdonald's detailed descriptions of St.

⁵⁰ Minutes of the Wartime Information Board Advisory Committee on the Publication of Military Information, October 27, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940, File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings Vol. 1.

⁵¹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF). Unfortunately, the censors left no record of what, if any, Nazi propaganda actually entered the country for scholarly use.

Lawrence U-boat attacks given to the House of Commons in May, 1942. See chapter below on Naval War Censorship). Because of ministerial indiscretion, security and intelligence officers felt “their duties have been made more difficult to discharge, and the Censors have been exposed to criticism as having transgressed the limits with which they should have confined their activities.”⁵² The public, they believed, would be “quite satisfied” to be denied information about the “location of Canadian forces and factories, and to the production of munitions of war by Canada” since they knew “that information of this kind is greatly desired by the enemy.” On August 15, 1941, the Censorship Co-ordination Committee considered the possibility of censoring the published records of the debates of the House of Commons. The censors were embarrassed when information they had kept out of the newspapers and off the radio was spilled by MPs in the House of Commons and distributed across the country in *Hansard*. The Censorship Co-ordination Committee considered asking the House of Commons to set up a committee to censor *Hansard*, or seeking a Parliamentary resolution to give the editors of *Hansard* the power to censor their own publication. Four senior military intelligence officers were appointed to a subcommittee to examine the issue.⁵³

In the fall of 1942, Capt. C.R. Jones of the Army’s Intelligence service, who was not a member of this committee, pressed the censors for some type of control over *Hansard*, and was told by Biggar the government had been

⁵² Memorandum, Directorate of Censorship h Committee on Security and Intelligence to the Minister of National War Service, July 26, 1942. In Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940 File 1-A-3.

⁵³ Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship, August 15, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

considering the issue for some time and had not made a decision.⁵⁴ On January 23, 1943, Biggar told the Directorate of Censorship's Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security that drafts of resolutions on censorship of *Hansard* had been drawn up by the clerks of the Senate and the House of Commons and given to the Minister of War Services for cabinet discussion. If approved, the resolutions would be submitted to Parliament. If the resolutions were enacted, Ministers would no longer give interviews on military subjects. They would deal with the press only through written statements vetted by the entire war cabinet, and even then, the statements would be vetted by the censors. In the end, the proposal was shelved.⁵⁵

The censors were never able to develop a good working relationship with the RCMP, especially regarding censorship of news stories about the agency. The police force wanted a complete news blackout of their activities, and "could not accept the fact that censorship was not all powerful and could not control what was said in the newspapers." The RCMP resisted all of the Directorate of Censorship's attempts to clear stories involving RCMP investigations. The Directorate of Censorship was, however, sometimes able to help reporters who had somehow alienated local RCMP detachments. For example, censorship officials in Halifax negotiated access to Halifax docks for Halifax *Herald* and Halifax *Mail* reporters who were "again in the RCMP dog-house."⁵⁶ Still, the

⁵⁴ Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship's Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, November 5, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee Intelligence & Security.

⁵⁵ MPs did, and still do, have the right to edit their own statements in the House of Commons before *Hansard* is published.

⁵⁶ Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5946 File: 4.

mounted police fed the censors information and complaints about anti-participation activists in Quebec. The RCMP also monitored the French-language press in Quebec and sent memoranda to the Directorate of Censorship on articles that senior officers felt violated the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.

The relationship between the Directorate of Censorship and Canada's media was complex and was not limited to simply offering advice on material to be redacted from press articles. Quite often, the censors sought to facilitate coverage of stories that had elements of controversy. As Purcell wrote, the censors were not engaged in a campaign to stifle media coverage. Instead, with a few exceptions that will be discussed below, they worked to maintain a free flow of information between the press, the military, the government and the RCMP, as long as the coverage involved did not breach the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.

Broadcasting

Since most radio news came from Canadian Press or was taken from the country's newspapers, the censors believed the press censorship system would handle most radio news before it made the airwaves.⁵⁷ In effect, much of the power over broadcast censorship was placed in the hands of executives and managers of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). On September 1, 1939, H.N. Stovin, the Toronto-based manager of station relations for the CBC, sent directives to all broadcasting stations in Canada "for the security, defence,

⁵⁷ Memorandum, Charpentier and Eggleston, December 11, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 6. Miscellaneous Military.

peace, order and welfare of the country,” warning them not to broadcast material that might be of use to a potential enemy. On September 13, acting on instructions from R.P. Landry, corporate secretary of the CBC, who was appointed Chief Radio Censor by the Minister of Transport, Stovin followed up by issuing Circular Letter C3, which relied on Pope’s 1938 plans. All broadcasts in languages other than French and English were banned. “Talks”, spoken word broadcasts other than brief statements by radio hosts, were subject to censorship as far in advance as possible. Live broadcast scripts were also subjected to censorship, and no deviation from the scripts was allowed. These directives were subsequently revised and expanded by the broadcast censorship staff hired in the last week of September 1939.⁵⁸

The broadcast censors faced their first major challenge during the thirty-day Quebec electoral campaign that ended October 25, 1939. The day after Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis called the election, the Minister of Transport officially appointed Stovin to be Radio Broadcasting Censor. He remained manager of the Station Relations Department of the C.B.C. and appointed the managers of the CBC’s 31 radio stations to positions of assistant censors. To monitor coverage of the Quebec election (the details of which are discussed later in the chapter “Censorship and the Quebec Media”), Stovin turned to lawyers who were already employed by the federal government and were willing to be temporarily seconded from their Ottawa offices. On September 28, Paul

⁵⁸ The policy on live political broadcasts was approved by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, meeting on September 22, 1939, in Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe’s office, with ministers P.J. Arthur Cardin, J.E. Michaud and C.G. Power also present. See minutes of the Censorship Coordination Committee, September 22, 1939. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

Fontaine, K.C., Romeo Gibeault, advisory counsel of the Department of Justice, and Dr. Maurice Ollivier, K.C., Law Clerk of the House of Commons, were appointed assistant censors (broadcast). On the same day, an office was opened in Montreal. Fontaine was transferred from Montreal to Quebec City October 3 and set up an office in the Chateau Frontenac hotel. Two days later, Jacques Fortier, solicitor for the Department of Transport, was appointed assistant censor at New Carlisle. However, due to illness in his family, he had to return immediately to Ottawa and was replaced by J. E. Gaboury, K.C., solicitor for the Department of National Revenue. On October 13, René de la Durantaye, a lawyer in the Department of the Secretary of State, was appointed censor at Rimouski. The radio censors who remained, mostly senior CBC managers appointed by Stovin and Landry, soon faced a second crisis in the federal election in the winter of 1940, drawing the same criticism in Ontario over their demands for pre-submission of written radio scripts as they had faced just a few months earlier in Quebec. The government responded by loosening its grip on election broadcasts after several failed attempts to work out a compromise between the radio censors and opposition candidates. At issue in both the Quebec and federal campaigns was the pre-censorship of live speeches. The CBC, however, was to bear the brunt of criticism throughout the war for its inconsistent censorship, including, in 1944, accusations by Halifax press censor H. B. Jefferson that the popular radio program *The Happy Gang* engaged in loose talk by mentioning the names of Canadian military units deployed abroad.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, June 10, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 (Records of the Privy Council Office), Vol. 5953 File: 1-A-5 Marine Miscellaneous.

On December 17, 1942, at the request of military intelligence officers, Charles Shearer, Chief Censor of Publications (Radio), was asked to present a report on the procedures for censoring CBC news and entertainment programs to the Censorship Directorate's Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security. Shearer said "as a result of one or two recent incidents" CBC program directors had decided to submit to the Censors of Publication "all material dealing with war matters." Shearer, at the request of CBC program directors, had prepared a flyer listing the "Don'ts" – the information that was banned from broadcast. The list included warnings against broadcasting ship movements, escapes of German POWs held in Canada or Canadians who had escaped from Axis detention, and stories that mentioned the names of Canadian casualties unless the military had confirmed the notification of next of kin. The radio stations were also told not to mention arrests or internments, U.S. military activity in Canada, or to give weather reports. They were also forbidden to broadcast musical requests or greetings requested by telephone.

Directive books similar to those issued to the print media were sent to the radio newsrooms of Canada. Many of their regulations were taken word-for-word from the print directives, but they included rules specific to broadcast, such as the scope of weather report bans. The directive issued in February, 1943, was the most comprehensive set of censorship instructions sent to broadcasters during the war. With more than 8,000 words, the handbook outlined the news censorship rules and spelled out the policy on political speeches and interviews. They reflected the censors' concerns about reporting anything that would tip off

U-boats to troop transport sailings. They were also loaded with rules about reporting manufacturing activity, a focus of U.S. censorship. Broadcasters were warned against carrying anything that might cause trouble for the U.S. military, including reports of American projects in the Canadian north, obviously meaning the construction of the Canol Pipeline and the Alaska Highway.⁶⁰

The handbook attempted to put to rest the controversy over political talks, free-time political broadcasts and paid political advertising. Throughout the war, the CBC was accused of censoring politicians by refusing them air time on the network, both free-time and paid advertising. The CBC issued a "Statement of Policy with respect to Controversial Broadcasting" on July 8, 1939. Prior to that time, the political parties had to pay for CBC air time but there was no limit on how much time they could buy.⁶¹ This resulted in "a chaotic condition" because "the heavy volume of political broadcasts during elections was obviously harmful to the best interests of broadcasting, eliminating as it did a great number of normal entertainment and educational programs."⁶²

The issue was discussed at the House of Commons Committee on Broadcasting in 1939, and it recommended the CBC provide a limited amount of free airtime to political parties, allotted in a way that was supposed to be fair to

⁶⁰ The Canol project was a 1000-kilometre pipeline from Norman Wells, NWT, to a refinery in Whitehorse. It was built to provide fuel to American forces dispatched to stop a Japanese invasion of Alaska. Built between 1942 and 1944, the 10 cm pipeline turned out to be one of the war's biggest white elephants. For more information on the pipeline and its role in U.S. military strategy in the Canadian Northwest, see Kenneth Coates (ed.), *The Alaska Highway: Papers of the 40th Anniversary Symposium*.

⁶¹ Memorandum, CBC, History of the Evolution of Canadian Broadcasting Policies in respect to Political Broadcasting with some reference to the application for time on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation National Network by the Progressive Conservative Party for the Honourable John Bracken. Ottawa, December 11, 1943, Library and Archives Canada Microfilm MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-7052 under cover letter December 13, 1943.

⁶² *Ibid.*

them. The CBC's Board of Directors voted on January 22, 1940, just as the country headed into a federal election campaign, to suspend all "paid political or controversial broadcasts, except during elections," for the duration of the war. Nine days later, representatives of the political parties accepted the board's decision limiting paid political broadcasts but wanted the CBC board to accept the *White Paper's* recommendation on free air time during elections. The CBC board quickly agreed. This left the CBC with no provision for broadcasting political material, free-time or paid, between elections. The CBC's General Manager was advised by the board on March 24, 1941, to make provisions for a reasonable amount of free time for premiers and provincial opposition leaders to discuss provincial issues. The CBC held meetings with Ontario premier Mitch Hepburn and Opposition leader George Drew to draw up a plan for air time allocation, subject to four conditions: agreement of parties on the subject; a prohibition of discussion that would be harmful to Canada's war effort, either in provincial or federal jurisdictional fields; observance of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*; and avoidance of program dislocation and a reasonable limit on "talk commitments."⁶³

On May 6, 1941, the CBC's General Manager invited representatives of the major federal parties to a meeting to discuss drawing up a similar plan for national political broadcasts. The Liberals boycotted the meeting, but Conservatives, CCF and Social Credit representatives accepted a proposal for three broadcasts (one for each of the parties attending the meeting). On June 9, the CBC's board blocked that plan. The issue came to a head again in the

⁶³ *Ibid.*

autumn of 1942 when Conservative leader Arthur Meighen asked for permission to broadcast a speech from the Progressive Conservative leadership convention in Winnipeg. The request was refused by the CBC, although in September, the CBC broadcast an address by the Prime Minister from the Liberal Convention in Ottawa. In January 1943, the CBC's board decided to offer John Bracken, the new Progressive Conservative leader, free time for a national address. Soon after Bracken's broadcast, CCF leader M.J. Coldwell asked for similar free time. Throughout the rest of the war, the CBC was caught in disputes over the amount of free time it would give to politicians.

The censors maintained a sharp distinction between reporting what a speaker said before an audience and broadcast from a studio. While, until 1943, speeches could not be broadcast live,⁶⁴ statements made before an audience outside a radio studio could be reported, whether or not the words were "subversive". This policy was tested several times early in the war and became entrenched after the controversy over George Drew's criticism in early 1942 of the leadership and training of the Canadian force that was lost at Hong Kong. In the case of political advertisements and speeches broadcast from radio studios, the management of the CBC or private radio station (or network) was held jointly responsible with the politician for the information and opinions that were sent over the airwaves. Station managers were reluctant to accept this responsibility

⁶⁴ The censors noted that, after the prohibition against the live broadcasting of speeches was lifted in 1943, very few stations actually took advantage of the relaxation. Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

and asked the censors to handle the scripts.⁶⁵ Censorship, then, limited the ability of critics of the government to express themselves during election campaigns and prevented a full debate of public policy between campaigns. Effectively, speeches broadcast on the radio were pre-censored: radio stations, whether they belonged to the CBC or were privately-owned, were loathe to assume responsibility for the facts and opinions broadcast by politicians.⁶⁶

Censorship of smaller radio transmitters was stricter. On September 4, 1939, all 33 radio coast stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts (the stations on the Great Lakes were exempted) were placed under censorship. The manager of each station was appointed as a censor. Within days of Canada's entry into the war, the licenses of all 5,770 amateur experimental radio stations (Ham radios) were cancelled. Censorship was also imposed on the 700 privately-owned point-to-point radio stations that were the only link to the outside world for many isolated communities, with each officer-in-charge assuming responsibility for censorship. Radio broadcasts of weather reports for the Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence River from Montreal east, and for the Pacific coast, were banned, and this prohibition would later be extended throughout Canada to prevent the Axis, especially the *Kriegsmarine's* submarine arm, from tracking weather patterns.

Film

⁶⁵ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Films shown in theatres, schools and sometimes in private homes had become, in the interwar years, the dominant visual media. (Television had made its Canadian commercial debut at the 1939 Canadian National Exhibition. As in the United States, its development was shelved for the war's duration.) Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. newspapers, magazines, and radio commentators were divided between policies of isolationism and support for the British. Hollywood was not. The big studios supported American intervention, or, at least, did not oppose it. If Hollywood had come out with a pro-Nazi film, the provincial censors, who normally looked for smut, were empowered to screen it and pass their recommendations onto the federal censors. Pre-Pearl Harbor newsreels from the US were slightly more vexing to the censors, as they sometimes contained material shot by German military film units.⁶⁷

On May 10th, 1940, as the German army sliced into France, Pope took the provincial movie censors under his wing. The chairmen of the provincial censor boards were officially appointed agents or delegates of the Censorship Branch to review films for content that might breach the *Defence of Canada Regulations* and to determine local morale and to tailor their decisions accordingly.

Some Canadian films that were exported to the U.S. were believed by both Canadian and U.S. authorities to be in breach of the respective countries' censorship rules. After Pearl Harbor, the United States Censorship authority set up Boards of Review in New York and Los Angeles to review foreign films, and,

⁶⁷ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

several times, complained to Canadian censorship authorities that films exported by the Canadian government's National Film Board (NFB) did not always conform to either Canadian or American censorship requirements. In late 1942, the NFB's production *Battle for Oil* was criticized by U.S. censors for showing scenes of sailors from tankers sunk by U-boats being pulled from the water into lifeboats and rescue steamers. The Americans objected to the scenes, claiming they might adversely affect the recruitment of sailors. The Directorate of Censorship's Intelligence and Security Committee was told of a similar scene in a U.S. film that had been censored. The members of the committee, however, decided to support the NFB, citing the need for "education of the public on the realities of war" and noting the Noel Coward film *In Which We Serve* (1942) had similar scenes of sailors' rescues and drownings.⁶⁸ Beginning in 1943, press censors and military intelligence officers began censoring films once they reached "a sufficiently finalized form."⁶⁹ In the spring of 1943, the Directorate of Censorship asked the National Film Board's Deputy Commissioner to nominate an NFB representative to the Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security. Dan Wallace was appointed to the position.⁷⁰ The committee passed on all war-related productions of the National Film Board or Associated Screen News - the only two sources of Canadian-made films. For instance, the Montreal and

⁶⁸ Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, December 30, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940, File: Minutes of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security Vol. 1 Meeting 1-20.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, minutes of the meeting of February 26, 1943.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, minutes of the meeting of March 24, 1943.

Toronto Censors of Publications attended a weekly showing of Associated Screen News reels.⁷¹

Censorship Enforcement

The most drastic actions were taken against the press without any due process, or even notice that the government planned any action. The government's suppression of the ethnic, Communist and extreme-right press at the outbreak of the war and the closing of three Japanese-Canadian newspapers in the weeks after Pearl Harbor was done by government fiat, with officials of the Secretary of State's department using the powers given to them under Sec. 15 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. Not a single Canadian city or town saw one of its community papers shut, though several publishers were threatened and warned. Unlike Chambers, who closed four city papers, the World War II press censors, when dealing with the popular press, always followed quiet diplomacy and, at worst, prosecutions that resulted in relatively small fines.⁷²

The Southam chain, controlled by the four surviving sons⁷³ of founder William Southam, which owned newspapers in every major city in English Canada except Halifax, Toronto and London, allowed its publishers a remarkable amount of editorial freedom and its newspapers responded by being among those that gave the censorship system the most difficulty. Both English-language

⁷¹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF) Chap. IV.

⁷² Like Chambers, the World War II censors did unsuccessfully recommend the suspension of *Le Devoir*, although the latter censors wanted the paper shut for a limited time, not for the duration.

⁷³ See Charles Bruce, *News and the Southams*. Toronto: MacMillan, 1968, chap. 7.

daily newspapers charged under the *Defence of Canada Regulations* for breaches of censorship belonged to the Southam chain.

The Ottawa *Citizen* was acquitted in 1940 when its editor, Charles Bowman, proved the information in his paper's description of Asdic submarine detection technology (a type of sonar) had been in the public domain long before the outbreak of the war. Bowman mentioned Asdic in an editorial advocating the conversion of fishing trawlers into sub hunters. The piece was hardly subversive: Bowman had been inspired by a discussion he had with the Governor General, Lord Tweedsmuir. Censor Clare Moyer warned Bowman off mentioning Asdic, but Bowman had a defence: he possessed an earlier article from the *Christian Science Monitor*, giving him the defence that the material was already in the public domain. Despite Eggleston's advice to ignore the *Citizen* editorial, Naval Intelligence pressed for a prosecution. It was, the censors believed, one of the low points of their wartime work.⁷⁴

In April 1941, the Ottawa *Citizen* was prosecuted for publication of an editorial attacking the King government over war profiteering. CCF MP M.J. Coldwell complained to justice minister Ernest Lapointe about a line in the editorial stating: "When the Canadian lads come home from overseas, after some years of service at the real business end of the Bren gun, they will know better where to shoot than the Canadians did in the years of debt and privation after the last war." In the House of Commons, Coldwell said the RCMP were wasting their time shutting down small extremist newspapers and hunting Communists when

⁷⁴ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF); see also Bowman, *Ottawa Editor*, 217-218.

there were powerful people in Canada who despised liberty more than they feared Fascism. "When our mounted police turn their eyes to seek those who sympathize with the dictators, let them look above the gutter and the beer parlour, then perhaps they will find where the real danger to our democratic institutions lies." Coldwell asked his colleagues if they had ever heard a clearer case of incitement to men in uniform. "I believe in the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech," the CCF MP said, "but the government adopted regulations under which men have been prosecuted and interned for far less than this."⁷⁵ Bowman wrote in his autobiography that Coldwell hated the paper and was looking for an opportunity to complain about it.⁷⁶ The *Citizen* was charged by the Department of Justice but quickly acquitted by Ottawa provincial magistrate Glen Strike on the ground that it merely intended in good faith to point out defects in the government.⁷⁷

Southam's Vancouver *Sun*, on the other hand, embroiled in a nasty circulation war with the Vancouver *Province*, was a staunch regionalist voice that was keenly interested in making headlines and selling papers. In March 1942, the *Sun* assigned Alan Morley to write a series of articles about the supposed weakness of the defences around Canada's Pacific Coast cities. Some of the stories were not submitted to the censors. The third article, called "The Derelict Defences" was submitted to Vancouver censor Lew Gordon, who heavily edited it

⁷⁵ *Hansard*, February 27, 1941, 1070.

⁷⁶ Bowman, *Ottawa Editor*, 224-225.

⁷⁷ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF) Chap. 3

and returned it to the newspaper.⁷⁸ The following day, after being told by Eggleston to take a hard line on Morley's series,⁷⁹ Gordon received the fourth story on the lack of naval guns around Vancouver and rejected it outright, stamping it "Not for Publication".⁸⁰ The *Sun* ran the piece anyway. Eggleston tried to talk Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston out of laying charges against the *Sun*, but the government went ahead with its prosecution.⁸¹ On April 21, 1942, the newspaper pleaded guilty to two of the five counts filed under Sec. 16 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* but was only fined the modest sum of \$300.⁸²

At almost the same time, the Department of Justice launched a prosecution against the Ottawa French-language newspaper *Le Droit* for publishing stories condemning the Allied bombing of German-occupied France. The paper objected to the fact that civilians were killed when the British bombed the Renault plant near Paris. The censors were angry that the story came from Vichy France's news service. In its March 4, 1942 edition, the paper carried under a six-column headline "Six Hundred Dead in an R.A.F. Air Raid Over France" the writer's opinion that "it is admitted the enemy should be destroyed. But the desolation and destruction at Billancourt, that is not the war. At Billancourt...workers' children at the Renault plant used to come in the morning and play along the river. This morning they do not play anymore; they are at the

⁷⁸Lew Gordon Memorandum, March 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: I-B-1 1.Troop Movements & Embarkation 3/1/42 - 22/9/42.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰Lew Gordon, Memorandum, March 17, 1942 Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: I-B-1 1.Troop Movements & Embarkation 3/1/42 - 22/9/42.

⁸¹ Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War*, 299.

⁸² *Ibid.*

morgue of Coubevoie...they are dead. It is war! Let God punish Hitler... and the others, too!" The newspaper was convicted on two counts, but the \$200 fine was a slap on the wrist.⁸³

In December 1944, Quebec City's *Le Soleil* published (without submission to the censors) a story describing the sinking by a U-boat of the Canadian National steamship *Cornwallis* off the coast of Maine. The Royal Canadian Navy had demanded the censors kill any stories on the attack and the censors sent warnings to the publishers of newspapers in the region, including *Le Soleil*. The Department of Justice launched a prosecution against *Le Soleil*, which eventually pleaded guilty to a charge of violating Section 16 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. The newspaper was given a token fine of \$50.⁸⁴

One journalist, Ed Rohrbough, a U.S. citizen working as a freelancer for *Time* magazine and the *Toronto Star*, was charged and convicted under the press censorship sections of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. Rohrbough had mailed a story to *Time* about the POW riot at Bowmanville, Ontario, on the Thanksgiving weekend of 1942. On Justice Minister St. Laurent's behalf, Deputy Minister of Justice F.P. Varcoe instructed the RCMP to lay charges against Rohrbough under Section 16. Because they had respected the news blackout, few Canadian newspapers came to the aid of Rohrbough.⁸⁵ Rohrbough pleaded

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Press' reaction to Rohrbough's breach of the news blackout can be found in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5983 File: Bowmanville Incident.

guilty to the charge. He was given a one-year jail sentence, which was suspended.⁸⁶

More often, journalists received verbal and written reprimands. Among the more spectacular was Vancouver censor Lew Gordon's face-to-face reprimand of Vancouver *Sun* columnist Don Mason, who, while drunk, wrote a column about a burial at sea on a Canadian naval ship. Written reprimands were often sent to newspapers.⁸⁷ For example, Eggleston and Charpentier recommended *The Globe and Mail* be reprimanded for a February 26, 1941 story written by R.A. Farquharson that described medical research being done by Sir Frederick Banting and a scientist on the staff of the Banting Institute on a device to prevent pilot black-out, which was accurately described in the article as one of Canada's main war secrets.⁸⁸

Often, personal diplomacy was an effective way of dealing with disputes, especially those involving some of the "characters" who ran small newspapers in rural Canada. J. Herbert Cranston had been a powerful journalist at the *Toronto Star* and had been one of Eggleston's direct supervisors before running afoul of

⁸⁶ Memorandum, Nov. 30, 1942, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5983 File: Bowmanville Incident. Rohrbough continued to work as a *Toronto Star* stringer after his conviction, reporting on military matters including military training at CFB Borden and on POW stories. (See memo BBP Toronto, April 9th. 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: I-B-1 1.Troop Movements & Embarkation 30/10/43-16/7/45 for a detailed account of a later encounter with the Toronto censors). He was, in fact, one of the reporters who covered a POW break-out in Washago, just north of Orillia, Ontario in December 1942. On December 12, 1942, press censor R.B. Perry heaped fulsome praise on Rohrbough's article, "How to Find a Nazi", a detailed magazine article submitted for censorship scrutiny by the *Star Weekly*. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5962 File: Escapes of Prisoners.

⁸⁷ Memorandum, Vancouver, Aug 18, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948 File 1-D3-10.

⁸⁸ Eggleston and Charpentier to Capt. T.S. Stone, acting chairman of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee March 5, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5982 File 29.

publisher Joseph Atkinson and Atkinson's son-in-law Harry Hindmarsh, who edited the newspaper. Cranston was fired from his job as editor of *The Star Weekly* in the midst of the Depression and used his severance money to buy the Midland *Free Press Herald*, a struggling newspaper in a bankrupt town on southern Georgian Bay. There, Cranston published an interesting newspaper while maintaining many of his big city newspaper contacts. This did not prevent him from coming under the professional scrutiny of R.B. Perry, the censor responsible for the southern Ontario community newspapers along with the Toronto dailies and weeklies. Most of the *Free Press Herald's* problems arose from coverage of the Midland shipyards, which produced small warships. Cranston, angered by Perry's criticism of the *Free Press Herald's* censorship breaches, wrote to Eggleston: "I do not know who the high and mighty R.B. Perry, regional director of the Censorship Board for Ontario is, but I keenly resent the insolent tone of a letter I received from him yesterday." Cranston also forwarded Perry's letter to his son William, a "\$1-a-year man" at the Wartime Prices and Trade Board in Ottawa.

Perry, Cranston said, did not understand the difficulties of getting out a weekly paper with a staff "which has been all shot to pieces by enlistments, which is made up largely of inexperienced girls who fail to understand the importance of instructions passed onto them." He also said that Perry had no right to charge him with deliberate disobedience of censorship regulations, and was clearly insulted by Perry's threats to take action against the paper. "(T)his damned whippersnapper dares to tell me I am deliberately disregarding

instructions and that no explanation of carelessness on the part of the staff is acceptable," Cranston stormed. Toronto papers like the *Telegram*, Cranston wrote, often breached censorship with negative stories from the Midland shipyard.

Eggleston handled the situation very gingerly, telling Cranston he was fortunate to count both Cranston and Perry among his best friends.⁸⁹ Perry, Eggleston wrote, was a veteran of World War I and a conscientious and fair censor. Eggleston said he did not want to express an opinion on whether Perry's letters to Cranston were unnecessarily harsh, but he told Cranston that Perry had been informed of the *Free Press Herald's* staffing troubles.⁹⁰

Bruce Jefferson used similar diplomacy dealing with the *Truro News*, whose manager, A.R. Coffin, had very firm views about how the war should be run. Beginning with the British move to support Norway, the *News* played armchair general, criticizing what Coffin and his writers saw as military incompetence. On April 25, 1940, Jefferson visited Truro to talk to Coffin. Through the war, Jefferson continued to run interference for the Truro paper when it got into minor scraps with Ottawa. Jefferson also protected the Sydney *Steelworker and Miner*, a leftist newspaper run on a shoestring by an elderly labor activist. Charpentier and Eggleston believed the paper was pro-labour but probably not Communist, and that its tone "indicates the rather fanatical and irresponsible attempts of a sincere patriot to expose abuses rather than

⁸⁹ Eggleston to Cranston, November 15, 1940. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5946 File 4.

⁹⁰ Cranston to Eggleston, November 12, 1940. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5946 File 4.

deliberate propaganda of a Communist agent.” Its editor, Eggleston believed, was “something of a local character” and any action against the paper would give it national publicity that it did not deserve.⁹¹

The Sydney paper ran a tagline across the top of the front page: “The Press Is As Free As A Caged Canary – And As Yellow. Workers of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains; you have a world to gain – MARX.” On the September 4, 1940 edition saved in the Censorship Branch files, R.W. Baldwin wrote: “I believe it is our duty to inform the S&M that the carrying of this quote might at any time be interpreted by authorities as evidence of illegal connections if not violation of DCR itself & to advise him to cease using it. If he doesn’t take our advice it’s his lookout,” to which Eggleston replied non-committedly: “But surely it is clear to the S & M that they run this risk?”⁹²

Censorship was a subjective system that operated in a complex political and journalistic milieu. Overseeing the system was a government dominated by Mackenzie King, a Prime Minister who abhorred confrontation. His government tried to maintain national unity while the country split on linguistic lines over the degree of Canada’s participation in the war. As will be seen below, despite pervasive patriotism within the fourth estate, the censors were regularly challenged by journalists who often tested the limits of responsible wartime

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

reporting, and who, at least in the mainstream press, realized that, in the end, the penalties for ignoring censorship were likely to be little more than a reprimand. As a regulated industry dominated by a Crown Corporation, the medium of radio had far less room to maneuver under its manager-censors. Film, which already functioned under provincial censorship, readily agreed to submit to what was, effectively, pre-publication censorship.

Despite its mechanisms of control, the censorship system was faced with many challenges to its authority and its decisions throughout the war. The goal of the censors was to protect military secrets and to prevent the publication of material that might deter enlistments and harm relations with Canada's Allies. This was a very large mandate for a small group of people. Censorship could only be effective if the country's media placed the government's goals ahead of its own interests. Normally, this was the case, to the point that even the censors believed the press did a poor job of covering war issues. The radio censors had an easier time monitoring their medium, since they were entrenched within the radio management hierarchy. Because each CBC station manager was a censor, every station had a censor who had far more coercive powers than the press censors.

Rather than face systemic opposition, the censors, very thinly spread out across the country, dealt with a series of crises and skirmishes with a select few editors. Most, such as Perry's clash with Cranston, were no threat to the war effort. Others, such as the government's decision to charge Bowman over his Asdic article, appear to have been spurred on by over-zealous military officers.

The more important conflicts were, at least partly, politically-motivated on both sides and would be the true tests of the press censorship system.

Chapter Six: Censorship and Military Intelligence

The press censorship system had a complicated relationship with military intelligence. While mail and cable censors collected information of value to Canadian intelligence agents, both in the military and in the Department of External Affairs, the press censors brought in very little useful data. They did, however, play a role in combating enemy propaganda and collecting material on the type and quality of information that found its way to journalists. They also, by preventing publication of military secrets, including weather forecasts, denied the enemy open-source information. Censorship was a complementary operation essential to the successful interpretation of both military and non-military intelligence obtained by other means.¹ The monitoring of information that moved through the mail, telephone and telegraph cable systems was the main focus of military intelligence's interest in censorship. The press censorship played a secondary role, but it overlapped with signals intelligence in several spheres: with naval intelligence, where press coverage was believed to be of use to German submariners trying to dodge discovery by Allied direction-finding efforts; with counter-intelligence, especially the attempt to turn Werner von Janowski, the Nazi spy picked up in 1942 in the Gaspé; and in efforts to keep secret Allied troop movements. The directorate's French-speaking staff also monitored the press in France and Quebec, looking for links between Quebec nationalist journalists and the Vichy regime, who were believed to be tightly controlled by

¹ Bryden, *Canada's Best Kept Secret*, 4.

the Nazis.² They also kept track of journalists visiting Canada from neutral countries, including those from South America, and advised military intelligence and External Affairs on the background and credibility of some Canadian journalists.³

While the Censorship Branch had its own press monitoring and news analysis system, the military, RCMP, and other branches of government also scoured the press looking for any news items that breached the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. Still, until the appointment of O.M. Biggar as Director of Censorship and the restructuring of censorship in the spring of 1942, there was very little co-ordination of this effort.

On June 29, 1942, Biggar called a one-time meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Reading of Publications to try to bring some order.⁴ The Censors of Publication, the Chief Postal Censor, and representatives of the Directorate of Public Information, the Department of National Revenue, the Naval Intelligence Branch of the Department of National Defence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police discussed the types of publications that their staff monitored and read. Committee members agreed that there was obvious duplication in the work they were doing, and promised to send the Director of Censorship a list of publications being read, and decided to meet again within a

² For example, see Charpentier to Stone, July 30, 1942, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974, File: Le Devoir2.

³ See Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5982 File: External Affairs for correspondence on visiting foreign journalists.

⁴ The list of the committee's members is found in Appendix E.

week to discuss the overlaps.⁵ The lists were not forthcoming. The number of publications proved to be too large for the preparation of a consolidated list on such a tight deadline. However, a summary was presented to the July 3, 1942, meeting, listing the department or agency and the number of publications it monitored:

Chief Censor of Publications: 1348
Director of Public Information: 378
RCMP: 73
Chief Postal Censor: 302

The military, especially the Department of Naval Intelligence, was also heavily engaged in newspaper and magazine monitoring. The services agreed to try to reduce overlap and to leave responsibility for media monitoring to the Censorship Branch, but the committee never met again because of the restructuring of the committee system that summer.⁶

Senior officers passed on orders to the Intelligence Directorates that the censors be instructed to stop publication of specific information. To get around this interference, censors discussed the stories with intelligence officers to determine if there were real security risks, then, if there were none, officially advised the media against publication but at the same time unofficially admitted that there could be no real security objection.⁷ Trouble arose between the censors and the military when the censors tried to build an inventory of pre-

⁵ Advisory Committee on Reading of Publications, Minutes of Meeting of July 3, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940, Portfolio: Minutes of Various Advisor Committee Meetings Vol. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Minutes of Meeting of July 3, 1942.

⁷ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

cleared information so that they could give quick rulings to journalists. The censors very often found themselves explaining to senior military officers that, when asking if there was a security objection to the clearance of a piece of information, they were not actually asking for permission to give the information to journalists. There was a near-unbridgeable gap: the censors believed the military did not own its information; the military believed all war information was under its control.⁸ The Navy was particularly prone to this attitude, which partly arose because of its close links to the British Admiralty, which was obsessed with secrecy.⁹

In a 1941 draft memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, senior military intelligence officers on the Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security were critical of the way the press handled war news.¹⁰ Military intelligence agents decided to visit press conventions and newsrooms and found “Canadian newspaper owners and their staffs are themselves imbued with a spirit of lofty patriotism.” The intelligence officers acknowledged “the unassailable right of the press to full freedom of expression” though with the caveat that all citizens had a responsibility to do their part in safeguarding the national interest in wartime.¹¹

German agents, they believed, monitored the press and believed - as was the case in Nazi Germany – every fact and opinion published in a Canadian

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Draft Memorandum for submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on Co-operation of the Press with the Defence Forces in the Interests of National Security, January 22, 1941. In Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

newspaper had the approval of the government. They did not understand the Canadian media's practice of speculative journalism, in which commentators tried to anticipate new government policies.¹²

Not only did Canadian journalists engage in speculation, but also republished unconfirmed stories from U.S. newspapers and magazines. This was frequently the cause of "deep concern," especially when "such American items bear upon shipping, the movement of aircraft, details of technical equipment and supply." By publishing speculation, and by getting local angles on speculative stories from the U.S., Canadian newspapers and magazines had printed material "that ought never to have been divulged," material "of great importance to the enemy." Usually, this happened by accident, but Canadian journalists had tried to get around censorship rules by selling their stories, or story ideas, to U.S. publications that employed them as "stringers." Then, after the U.S. publications used the material, the Canadian reporters asked censors to clear it for publication in Canada on the grounds that United States newspapers containing it were already circulating in Canada and the Canadian newspapers were being discriminated against in the publishing of their own domestic news.

Canadian media had also published and broadcast news of fake distress calls from ships in the Atlantic, a ploy used by the Germans to gather information on Allied shipping (and, presumably, to attract rescue ships to waiting U-boats). Canadian reporters had helped the U-boat captains by publishing information about ship movements, as well as news that troops and civilian passengers were sometimes carried on the same ships. "Thus," the intelligence officer believed,

¹² *Ibid.*

“the enemy’s propaganda bureau has been gratuitously furnished with a priceless argument why German submarines should attack ALL liners. (The disaster to the “City of Benares” is an illustration of what develops from this).”¹³

The intelligence officers also wanted a clampdown on coverage of radar and gagging of all speculation on secret devices used in airplanes. They argued the threat to Britain was far greater than the value of satisfying the curiosity of Canadian readers.¹⁴

Still, more than fifty years after the end of World War II, Fulgence Charpentier, the last director of the Directorate of Censorship, believed his department’s disputes with the press and politicians were not the department’s greatest challenge. In an interview with the author, Charpentier said, “(T)he biggest problem was with people in the army. They just talked all the time. I remember having to pull people away at a party and tell army officers ‘don’t say that.’ It was a strange position for a journalist to be in.”¹⁵ This talkativeness appears to have been a problem that was, at the time, identified within the Canadian military and among soldiers in the United States forces. On March 30, 1943, Lt. Col Francis J. Graling, the U.S. military attaché in Ottawa, wrote to Group Capt. H.R. Stewart, secretary of the Department of National Defence (Air), noting their recent discussions “regarding security and publicity” and passing

¹³ *Ibid.* The *City of Benares* was sunk by U-48 on September 17, 1940, with the loss of 248 people, including 77 of 90 child evacuees traveling from Britain to Canada. The loss of the vessel caused the cancellation of the program of sending British children overseas.

¹⁴ Draft Memorandum for submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, on Co-operation of the Press with the Defence Forces in the Interests of National Security, January 22, 1941. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information.

¹⁵ Interview with author, published in “100-year-old journalist still writes weekly column,” *Toronto Star*, March 29, 1998, E1.

along instructions he had received from the U.S. War Department to stop talking about the movements of senior officers and government officials.¹⁶

While Pope was active in setting up much of Canada's military intelligence system in the interwar years, the press censorship system's Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security did not meet regularly until May 21, 1942, during Biggar's term as chief censor. It continued to function until August 6, 1945. The committee was cumbersome, with about 30 members drawn from the various censorship departments, External Affairs, the Wartime Information Board, the National Film Board, the directorates of intelligence of the navy, army and air force, the Department of Munitions and Supply, the RCMP and liaison officers with British and U.S. censorship, who met in the Supreme Court of Canada building. Its size was not the committee's only structural problem. Membership was extremely fluid, with the armed forces, the U.S. legation and the British often changing the person sent to fill their chairs. Its meetings were sporadic, sometimes once a week but usually about twice a month. The committee dealt with issues that arose in press, broadcast, cable, and mail censorship, along with control of foreign travel, secret government documents and word-of-mouth spreading of news, especially by merchant sailors and members of the armed forces.

Other government departments shared information on news that was important to the domestic front, on issues such as food production, rationing, and price controls, but the military rarely gave the censors any advance warning of plans or events that were bound to cause a flurry of press inquiries. The censors

¹⁶ National Defence (Canada) Historical Section, File Folder 112.3M2 D77 (Censorship).

had, at their fingertips, figures on the production of parsnips in Canada but learned of the invasion of Sicily over the radio.¹⁷

Eggleston made his case for more openness in a memorandum to Capt. T.S. Stone, head of External Affairs's intelligence section, dated August 13, 1941. Eggleston explained the censors were placed in an often awkward situation where they had to balance issues of morale and national security. The latter was something in which the censors had more than a "detached academic interest." In fact, wrote Eggleston, the censors' main duty was to interpret the clauses of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* that spoke of somewhat vague concepts such as "information of use to the enemy." What was "information of use to the enemy?" Eggleston asked. By *Fortune's* definition, virtually no newspapers should circulate. Nor, in fact, should *Hansard*. The Bank of Canada should stop circulating its economic analysis and censors should block government departments like the Department of Munitions and Supplies from publishing contract information.

Eggleston could see the military justification for the blackout of news of convoy sailings from Halifax, but not the government's attempt to suppress news of the four-day strike at the aluminum smelters in Arvida, Quebec, in July, 1941. In the latter case, Eggleston argued, a public airing of the dispute might have cleansed the communication channel between management and the workers, exposed real grievances, and led to a quicker settlement. In the end, everything

¹⁷ Minutes of Censorship Committee on Intelligence and Security, January 8, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee Intelligence and Security.

had to be weighed to determine what would be the most beneficial to the war effort. It was an interesting stand for a press censor.¹⁸

The censors also faced off against military intelligence officers at the Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information, which met fourteen times between April 16, 1943 and August 9, 1944. The meetings were chaired by Biggar or A.D. Dunton, general manager of the Wartime Information Board. Much of this committee's work dealt with placing limits on journalists' visits to North American military facilities and imposing restrictions on describing them in publications. This committee dealt with the sensitive issue of reporting about U.S. bases in Canada and Newfoundland. It was also the battleground between Commander C.H. Little, head of naval intelligence, and Eggleston over censorship of news of submarine attacks in the St. Lawrence River in October 1943.¹⁹

At this committee, Col. W.W. Murray and Lt.-Col. Eric Acland of army intelligence pressed for a tightening of Directive 4A that had allowed war correspondent Ross Munro to name the Canadian units at Dieppe because he had already mentioned their names while covering their training in England.²⁰ External Affairs, on the other hand, wanted suppression of all news that might undermine Canadian faith in the war. On April 24, 1944, External Affairs's representative, T.A. Stone, wrote to Eggleston to complain about Canadian

¹⁸ The full memorandum is reproduced as Appendix C.

¹⁹ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Publication of Military Information, October 21, 1943 Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee Intelligence and Security.

²⁰ Memo re: Directive 4A. Minutes of the Censorship Co-ordination Subcommittee Intelligence, September 25, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3 Advisory Committee Intelligence and Security.

papers printing photos of bomb damage of German cities, which Stone saw as propaganda against bombing of civilian targets. He was especially concerned about two photos in the Winnipeg *Free Press* of April 15, 1944, one showing the devastated Potsdamerplatz section of Berlin and another the destroyed Charlottenburg Opera House. Stone said the issue would be referred to the Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information, but the censors did not change their policy and ban the pictures.²¹

It is difficult to know how much of a role any type of censorship played in counterintelligence. Direct German intelligence-gathering in Canada seems to have been, at best, weak. Before December 1941, German consuls in the U.S. clipped Canadian papers, and it is possible that envoys of Spain and Vichy France in Canada did the same.²²

Vichy France remained an intelligence problem until Canada severed relations with the regime in the November, 1942. Canada did not break off relations with France after its June 1940 collapse. While the senior Canadian diplomat in Paris, Georges Vanier, escaped Paris for Bordeaux and sailed for London, not to return until the war ended, the Canadian first secretary, Pierre Dupuy, made several trips back to Vichy. The results of Dupuy's adventures were, apparently, minimal. Britain seized French ships wherever possible and broke off relations with Vichy in July 1940, attacked the main French fleet at Oran in Algeria, but still wanted a window into Vichy. Britain's needs were to leave Canada open to propaganda distributed by Vichy diplomats and sent directly

²¹ Stone Memorandum, April 22, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5982 File: 2A-G (External Affairs).

²² Graeme Mount, *Canada's Enemies: Spies in the Peaceable Kingdom*. Toronto: Dundurn, 1993, 66.

through the mails from unoccupied France. In Canada, Vichy's ambassador, René Ristelhueber, who took over from the Count de Dampiere in February 1940, was a man of dubious politics and questionable loyalties. He sought to purge any Jews employed in French diplomatic missions in Canada, but there were none.²³ On October 22, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs O.D. Skeleton asked Ristelhueber to give his word Vichy's diplomats in Canada would not collect or send any information on Canadian shipping. While Vichy's diplomats in New York were transmitting shipping information to Europe, there is no proof that those stationed in Canada broke the promise.²⁴

Vichy's diplomats' telephones were bugged and their mail was steamed open, but they still had use of diplomatic pouches and couriers to carry their most secret mail to New York, then to Axis-friendly Spain.²⁵ Ristelhueber's cipher privileges were withdrawn in 1941 after he was found to have sent a cable boasting about his work promoting the work of pro-Vichy Canadian authors. Henri Coursier, Vichy's consul in Montreal, made "sizeable" contributions to anti-conscription groups in Quebec.²⁶ Despite the activities of Vichy's agents in Canada, Ristelhueber was given asylum in Canada when Canada and Vichy ended diplomatic relations and the diplomat joined the faculty of the University of Montreal.²⁷

The French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland, also posed both an intelligence and political problem between

²³ *Ibid.*, 72.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 84.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 84.

²⁷ Ristelhueber researched refugee issues until his retirement from the university in 1975.

June 1940 and Christmas 1941, when they were seized by Free French forces. Although far from mainland France, the islands had a strong attachment to their motherland. For much of their history, smuggling was almost as important – and during Prohibition, much more so – than its fishery operations, which was its largest employer. France tried to suppress illicit trade and, from time to time, faced unrest in the islands. Still, about 400 men from the colony served in the French military in World War I, with an appalling 25 per cent fatal casualty rate. In World War II, 500 men served and 27 died. These enlistments were drawn, without conscription, from a population of less than 5,000.²⁸

After the British attack on the French fleet at Oran (Mers-el-Kebir) on July 3, 1940, public opinion in St. Pierre split into pro-Vichy and pro-Free French camps. Most of the war veterans and crews of ships from metropolitan France opposed the 1940 Armistice and supported de Gaulle. The administrator of the colony, Count Gilbert de Bournat (and his Alsatian German wife Suzanne), most of the civil servants and the more prosperous merchants in the town of St. Pierre sided with Vichy.

Local war veterans pushed for a referendum on maintaining links to Vichy or going over to the Free French. The administrator made vague promises, but the vote was not held until Free French forces arrived. In 1941, locals brawled with sailors on a Vichy warship when the vessel's anti-aircraft guns were trained on a low-flying Canadian airplane. In an attempt to quell the anger in the colony, de Bournat held public meetings and tried to create a split in the veterans' group.

²⁸ Douglas Anglin, *The Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affair of 1941*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, Chap. 1.

Many of the young men of the colony voted with their feet, quietly leaving the islands to join the Free French. Some who stayed behind began a leaflet war with the Vichyite colonial elite.²⁹ The Free French faction in the town of St. Pierre demanded that Canada censor all of the French newspapers that came into the colony in order to remove pro-Vichy propaganda.³⁰

Canadian signals intelligence officers worried that French authorities in St. Pierre and Miquelon were transmitting shipping information obtained locally and from the regime's diplomats in Canada, to France, which forwarded it to the Germans.³¹ From May 26 to June 11, RCMP Inspector Oscar LaRivière visited the islands with permission from Ristelhueber and the local administration, ostensibly to check on liquor smuggling. Instead, he found a powerful shortwave transmitter.

The RCMP Commissioner, T.S. Wood, wanted the islands seized and the transmitter shut down.³² Canada's reaction, on August 19, 1941, was to open a consular office on the islands, staffed by Christopher Eberts.³³ This replaced the British consulate, which had been closed by the St. Pierre administration in the spring of 1942.³⁴ Eberts was unable to find out what was happening at the transmission station.³⁵ On December 1, 1941, Robertson proposed to the War Cabinet Committee that Canada dispatch the ubiquitous External Affairs

²⁹ The colony had a long-time agreement with France that it would not be subjected to conscription. *Ibid.*, 53.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 35 (reproduced Free French leaflet).

³¹ Mount, *Canada's Enemies: Spies in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 79.

³² Wood to Robertson, August 4, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG25 (Records of the Department of External Affairs), Vol. 8, 836-37.

³³ Hilliker, *Department of External Affairs, Vol. I The Early Years 1909-1946*, 248-249.

³⁴ Anglin, *The Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941*, 54.

³⁵ Wood to Robertson, August 4, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG25 (Records of the Department of External Affairs), Vol. 8, 840-842.

intelligence chief T.A. Stone, an expert in signals intelligence, and military censors to the island in a corvette. Prime Minister King, who had not been apprised of the plan, reacted in horror when he found out and killed it out of fear of the German, American and Quebec reaction.³⁶ Cabinet did approve a proposal to make a deal with de Bournat to send Stone to St. Pierre to pre-censor the radio transmitter.

Through the fall, King and Norman Robertson argued over whether to use force if de Bournat rejected Stone. Robertson favored backing Stone's mission with naval power, while King believed the Canadian seizure of the Vichy colony could give Petain an excuse to turn the remnants of the French navy over to the Germans.³⁷

In the third week of December, in what Halifax censor Jefferson called a "Gilbertian expedition," Free French force left Halifax on the giant monitor submarine, the *Surcouf*, bound for the islands.³⁸ On Christmas Eve, French Vice-Admiral E.H. Muselier seized the town of St. Pierre and fired de Bournat and the rest of the Vichy administration.³⁹ The United States, which had an agreement with Vichy that its colonial properties in the western hemisphere would be left

³⁶ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Vol. I The Early Years 1909-1946*, 255.

³⁷ Mackenzie King Diary, December 1, 1941.

³⁸ Since the censors did not know the Free French had gained control of the monitor submarine, they were reluctant to pass stories mentioning its presence on the expedition. On the night of January 8, 1942, some two weeks after the seizure of the islands, they needed to "dig someone of the Navy out of bed" in Halifax or wake Brand in Ottawa, "which I [Baldwin] did not relish" to ask who owned the vessel. If it was Free French, rather than Canadian or British, the censors would let the press say anything they wanted about it. See Memo Ottawa January 8, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

³⁹ De Bournat was promoted within the Legion of Honor and awarded the Francisque medal by Petain on December 29, 1941. He was repatriated to France in March 1942 but returned to St. Pierre in 1945 in a doomed bid to run for the National Assembly. After the war, de Gaulle sent him to Madagascar to head up construction projects. Anglin, *The Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941*, 180.

unmolested, suspected Canadian complicity and, on December 26, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a press release saying Canada should restore the status quo in the colony.⁴⁰ Canada did nothing, although de Gaulle was taken off the External Affairs Christmas card list.⁴¹

Upon his arrival in St. Pierre, Muselier seized the records of the transmitter and found, he said, evidence that the authorities in the colony were sending "very secret" information to France in codes that could be read by the Germans and Italians.⁴² Strangely, Vichy diplomats in Canada continued to transmit ciphered messages to St. Pierre. Canadian code-breakers were unable to read them,⁴³ but later Sir Desmond Morton, Churchill's personal assistant, said the transmitter was "one of the chief means whereby the Vichy and German Governments were able rapidly to communicate instructions in cipher to their agents and supporters in the Western Hemisphere, and to receive secret information in return."⁴⁴

With Muselier's attack, the obscure islands suddenly became news. The *Toronto Star* tried to hire Etienne Daguerre, the manager of the St. Pierre branch of Toronto-based Tip Top Tailors clothing stores, to file a 1,000-word story but Daguerre did not deliver.⁴⁵ The *Toronto Telegram* was luckier, finding a

⁴⁰ There is a reasonable suspicion the Americans wanted to seize the islands themselves. As was often the case, Roosevelt sent mixed messages, inviting the Canadian government in March 1941 to take St. Pierre. See Anglin, *The Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941*, 56-57.

⁴¹ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Vol. I The Early Years 1909-1946*, 254.

⁴² Ruling, Jefferson, Halifax, January 7, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

⁴³ Mount, *Canada's Enemies: Spies in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 82.

⁴⁴ Anglin, *The Free French Invasion: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941*, 135.

⁴⁵ *The Star's* cable was intercepted by cable censors in Toronto and copied to the Toronto press censor office. Memo, Perry, December 26, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office,

freelancer on the island who sent daily stories to Toronto for about a week.⁴⁶ The Canadian Press office in Halifax was tipped off by the Free French to the timing of the raid and carried bulletins of the take-over while it was happening. On Christmas Day, Andy Merkel, Canadian Press's manager in Halifax, called Ottawa-based censor Warren Baldwin⁴⁷ to ask him to clear news stories submitted from St. Pierre.⁴⁸ Charpentier, listening to Montreal AM radio, learned of the take-over and was shocked to hear commentary that the occupation "would throw the Vichy Government into the hands of the Nazis," which, as the day progressed, turned out to be Washington's official line. The following day, British United Press (BUP) submitted a story to Baldwin suggesting the Canadian government "was really chuckling up its sleeves," (i.e. secretly happy with the way events unfolded) which Baldwin believed "is probably the case" but Baldwin told BUP to take those inferences out of its story.⁴⁹

A packet of photos of the take-over arrived in Halifax on December 27. The new Free French regime in St. Pierre asked the Canadian censors to clear them before giving them to Canadian Press, which, in turn, was supposed to put them on the Associated Press wire. Someone in St. Pierre had improperly

(Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon. In his memos, Perry calls Daguerre "the Tip Top Correspondent."

⁴⁶ Memo, Perry, December 29, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

⁴⁷ Memo, Jefferson, Halifax, January 3, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

⁴⁸ The Free French did have a correspondent from the US news service NANA with them on the expedition. Jefferson expected something to happen in St. Pierre but the timing was a surprise to everyone, including the press in Halifax. Ruling, Baldwin, Ottawa, December 25, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon and Ruling January 3, 1942, Jefferson, Halifax Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon

⁴⁹ Ruling, Baldwin, Ottawa, December 26, 1941 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

packed them, causing ink to smear on some of the pictures. Jefferson cleaned them up as well as he could and took them to the Canadian Press office, where he gave the staff advice on how to use their new photo wire machine. Through the rest of the evening, Jefferson followed the progress of the wire photos by reading cable censor intercepts.⁵⁰

Jefferson, Charpentier, and the rest of the censors had been taken by surprise by the capture of St. Pierre and Miquelon. If Canadian military intelligence or External Affairs' intelligence agents knew of the Free French plan, they did not let the press censors in on it. This was the normal state of affairs in World War II.⁵¹ More often, the censors were on the receiving end of lectures from intelligence officers who believed the press had been allowed to run wild. On May 13, 1942, at 9:20 a.m., in Girouard's words "Captain [Eric] Brand [the censors' naval intelligence liaison] opened the day's hostilities with the usual irate phone call." Brand had received a signal from the British Admiralty questioning a story circulated in England by the Exchange Telegraph based on a statement by Canadian Lieutenant Commander T.P. (Two-Gun) Ryan that Canadians were operating a captured Nazi submarine in the western Atlantic. Brand threatened to write "another letter" to the Secretary of State asking for "a complete overhaul of Press Censorship so far as Naval information is concerned." Moments later, Brand admitted he knew very little about the story, which, later that morning, Girouard tracked down to the *Victoria Daily Times*, which had published the story

⁵⁰ Memo Jefferson Halifax December 27-28, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: St. Pierre and Miquelon.

⁵¹ For a typical encounter between Naval Intelligence and the censors, see Memo, Eggleston, June 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-2.

without vetting it with the censors. The *Times* had been given the story by a senior naval officer who, Girouard told Brand, could reasonably be expected to be a discreet and credible source.

Brand immediately flew into a rage and said "he expected that we would get after the 'Times,'" Girouard reported. Brand was "told we would do nothing of the kind. If any bawling out was to be done in this connection, the Captain would have to do it himself and aim it at his own men rather than at us or the Press. It was pointed out that the "Times" is one of the responsible papers in Canada and would not take any chances with dangerous naval information. When an editor obtained a statement from a high naval officer he could reasonably assume that it could safely be published." Brand then demanded pre-publication submission of all naval news items to the censors, but Girouard told Brand the censors could not expect newspapers to submit for censorship material that came from senior officers within the navy. "The Captain's reaction was plaintive in its briefness and consisted merely of a very weak 'All right,' which marked the end of the scuffle."⁵²

The censors banned almost all reporting on Axis POWs held in Canada and tried to block any reporting of voice broadcasts of Canadian POWs held by Japanese forces and all attempts by Canadian journalists to report the contents of Japanese propaganda broadcasts. The censors believed the Japanese faked some of the POW broadcasts, using Canadian or American collaborators, or recorded the voices of prisoners and broadcast them without regard for whether

⁵² Memorandum Jacques Girouard, Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: 1-A '3' 2. Action-Marine.

or not the prisoners were still alive.⁵³ The censors also prevented reporting of Allied forces' killing of Japanese prisoners. For instance, on October 5, 1944, the *Toronto Star* submitted a story based on an interview with Signalman R.A. Duthie, a Toronto man serving with U.S. forces in the Pacific. The censors cut the following section: "Prisoners," he said. "Yes, we take some but the Aussies don't. We have a good many prisoner of war camps but the Aussies don't need camps because they don't bother with prisoners – and the Japs know it."⁵⁴

The censorship system was also responsible for managing news of recruitment of Allied espionage agents. In June 1942, the British Colonial Office approached several Francophone journalists on behalf of its government's intelligence agencies, offering them jobs conducting propaganda and intelligence activities in French Equatorial Africa. Newspapers in Quebec printed stories saying the journalists were going to work for the Free French, an error the censors did nothing to correct. The British hired several Quebec-based journalists, including Willie Chavalier, the *Le Canada* reporter who had worked part-time as a press censor.⁵⁵

Censors prevented the publication of material on Allied espionage operations in Canada. In January 1945, Perry, the Toronto censor, suppressed a "perfectly delightful" CBC story about the spying activities of British actor David

⁵³ See Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5962, File: Internment and Prisoners of War. For a memorandum detailing an incident with specifics and evidence, see Memorandum, Lew Gordon, July 22, 1943, in Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5962 File: Internment-Miscellaneous.

⁵⁴ Ruling, Toronto (C.S.G.), October 5, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5962 File: Miscellaneous.

⁵⁵ Memorandum June 11, 1942 Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-2.

Niven, who was visiting Toronto. Journalist Nancy Anderson told the censors Niven had traveled to the German-occupied Channel Islands and, disguised as a local resident, had talked freely with German officers and men about the strength of the local garrison. Anderson planned a story that would have left out Niven's name but Perry spiked the piece out of concern for the residents of the islands, who were still under German control. Anderson agreed to hold the script until the islands were liberated, which did not occur until Germany's general capitulation on May 8, 1945.⁵⁶

The German attack on the Soviet Union brought a new challenge to the censors: dealing with Russian reporters posted to Canada. They were treated by Canadian and U.S. authorities as agents of the Soviet state. In September 1942, after complaints by Nicholai Zhivaynov, the Ottawa correspondent of Tass (the Soviet news agency), that his copy was being cut by U.S. telegraph censors in New York, the Canadian press censors agreed to pre-screen his stories and stamp them "passed by Canadian censors."⁵⁷ At the same time, the Toronto censors were asked to intervene in the tricky issues raised by exiled Yugoslav journalists who sometimes fronted for the various factions fighting the Germans and each other in the Balkans. Three reporters who met Secretary of State Pierre-F. Casgrain on August 18, 1942, wanted the censors to intervene with the federal government to withdraw its support from Gen. Draza Mihailovich, leader

⁵⁶ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, January 21, 1945 Library and Archives Canada , RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967 File: general-1.

⁵⁷ Memorandum, J. Girouard, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-1.

of the anti-Communist Chetniks.⁵⁸ The journalists, Edward Yardas of *Novosti*, the leading Croatian paper, George Matesic of *Edinost*, and Steve Macievich of *Ukrainske Shittyta*, argued Mikailovich was secretly collaborating with the Nazis.⁵⁹

A far greater challenge for the censors was the suppression of the story of a genuine Nazi spy caught by a 14-year-old boy in the Gaspé Peninsula. That area was seen by the Canadian government as a front-line position in the defence of Canada from incursions by submarines and spies. Military Intelligence actually advocated the publicizing of defence efforts in the region as long as articles played up the presence of Québécois units and was vague about the details of the coast-watching. The articles, Canadian intelligence officers believed, might deter small landings or foraging parties of German submariners and the landing of spies on the Gaspé coast, and bolster martial spirit in Quebec.⁶⁰

The arrest of nine German spies in the United States in 1942 had caused a sensation throughout Canada and especially in the Maritimes, with its thousands of miles of nearly unguarded coastline. That spring and summer, newspapers in the region frequently carried erroneous articles about the landing and capture of German spies. The Halifax *Herald* ran a story April 1, 1942, saying "Sub Reported Landing German, on Coast - Spies Come Ashore, Report Back to Boats." Three days earlier the Toronto *Star Weekly* published a full-page color

⁵⁸ The Chetniks, who claimed loyalty to the Yugoslav King, did, at times, collaborate with the Germans and engaged in "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Mihalovich, a Serb, was captured by Tito's partisans and executed in 1946.

⁵⁹ There is no record of whether the government changed its policy. Memorandum, August 16, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956 File: 1-general.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, Dominion Military Operations and Planning to Department of Military Intelligence, June 3, 1943. National Defence (Canada) Historical Section file, 112 3M2 D77 (Censorship).

map revealing "North American Towns and Cities Now Shadowed by Axis Bombers" and warned its readers a Pearl Harbor-style attack "can happen here." Spy landings, the paper said, would be the opening gambit of such an operation. Quebec's French-language press also predicted spy landings.⁶¹

On August 13, 1942, a reporter for the *Halifax Star*, in one of his paper's few "scoops" of the war, picked up a rumor from the local police that German agents had been landed in Nova Scotia. The *Star* checked with Jefferson, who traced the rumor to an RCMP circular sent across the country. For the next week, police in Nova Scotia stopped cars and searched farm areas in the Yarmouth area. Jefferson passed the *Star's* original story, but refused to clear any other articles until police determined whether the story was true or just a rumor.⁶²

The *Halifax Herald* asked on July 29, 1942: "Can spies and saboteurs land on Canada's East Coast?" The answer, it insisted, was "yes they can." However, the paper also predicted that any spies would find their way to the nearest jail. In one case, this turned out to be an accurate prediction.

When a spy finally arrived on Canada's shores, the censors were not surprised. In the pre-dawn hours of Monday, November 9, 1942, *U-518* cut its engines and drifted toward the rocky shore of the Gaspé Peninsula about four miles west of New Carlisle, Quebec, touching bottom at the base of a 40-foot bluff. The submarine barely escaped detection by a car driving along the coast road. A dinghy launched from the U-boat carried 38-year-old Werner von

⁶¹ Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, 151

⁶² Memoranda, H.B.J. Halifax (H. Bruce Jefferson), Aug 12, 1942 and August 19, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5961 File: Sabotage.

Janowski,⁶³ wearing a tailor-made German naval sub-lieutenant's uniform sporting an Iron Cross, 1st Class. Janowski struggled with a satchel holding civilian clothes and a wooden box containing a wireless radio. He had been given a shave and a haircut by one of the crew of U-518 but he must have reeked of sweat and diesel oil, since Janowski had been in the sub for nearly six weeks without bathing. It had been an eventful cruise. On its way to the Gaspé, *U-518* had stopped at Bell Island, Newfoundland, raided the iron ore docks at Wabana and sank two ships in a daring night attack.

Once ashore, Janowski changed into civilian clothes, buried his uniform with a shovel he carried with him for precisely that purpose, chucked the shovel into the sea, hitchhiked to New Carlisle and checked into the village hotel. He told the 14-year-old desk clerk he was not planning to stay, he just needed a bath. Janowski smoked strange-smelling German cigarettes. He lit them with matches from a box that clearly said on it, in English, "Made in Belgium," and paid for his room with 1917 Canadian currency, over-sized dollar bills that had been taken out of circulation in 1935. The suspicious boy asked his father, the hotel's owner, to call the Quebec Provincial Police and by lunchtime Janowski was in jail, waiting for the RCMP and angling for a new life as a double agent.

One of Janowski's first acts after his capture was to lie to his interrogators, telling

⁶³ Janowski is a colorful character. He was a dedicated Nazi who had spent some time in Canada before the war, leaving the country after fleecing his first wife, a woman in Ailsa Craig, Ontario. The *Toronto Star Weekly* had published a feature on Janowski in 1932 and this story was republished after VE Day. Like Alfred Langbein, the other German spy known to have been dropped by a U-boat in Canada, Janowski had made some money in Canada as a freelance news reporter. Langbein's rather ridiculous sojourn in Canada, which ended when he frittered away a very large amount of U.S. money and surrendered to the RCMP in Ottawa in 1944, was kept from the censors and the media until after the war. Whether other spies landed in Canada during the war or operated as moles sent before the fall of 1939 is still a matter of conjecture. See Dean Beeby, *Cargo of Lies: The True Story of a Nazi Double Agent in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

them he was at New Carlisle waiting for a submarine to pick him up. He misled Canadians long enough for *U-518* to escape from the area.⁶⁴

The “turning” of Janowski could succeed only if news of his capture was kept out of the newspapers. At the Directorate of Censorship, Biggar received one of censorship’s few important tips of the war, a call from the Director of Naval Intelligence on the evening of November 9, telling him a German agent had been caught in the Gaspé. Biggar told the wire and telegraph censors to look for any stories on the arrest. He then called Jefferson in Halifax and asked him to warn papers in the Maritimes not to run stories on Janowski’s capture and told the censor to immediately call the radio station at New Carlisle to put a lid on local coverage.⁶⁵ McMahon was called at Montreal and told to stifle coverage in the Quebec media. Canadian Press was also informed of the spy’s capture and told not to move anything on that subject.

Shortly before noon on November 10, Warren Baldwin got a call from RCMP headquarters, saying reporters were calling the police asking for information “and to ask if we could shut these up”. Baldwin wondered how reporters knew about the arrests, but the RCMP call was soon followed by one from Jack Marshall of the Windsor *Daily Star*, who advised Baldwin the Detroit *Times* was carrying a story that several German agents had been landed on the Gaspé Peninsula and that one of these men had been caught. Biggar asked

⁶⁴ Douglas, Sarty, Whitby et al., *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943*. Volume Two, Part 1, 467.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, November 10 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

Marshall to "hold everything" and called the RCMP back. By then, the RCMP had phoned the FBI to ask for its help in killing the story.

Meanwhile, staff of the *Detroit Times* had phoned friendly reporters in Windsor and had reached Perry in Toronto. Officials of the U.S. press censorship system told Baldwin the *Detroit Times* got the story from the Detroit city police officers, who had been tipped off about the arrest by the RCMP constables working at border crossings in Windsor. This information was relayed back to the RCMP headquarters.⁶⁶

In fact, police gossip had spread the story through the U.S. Northeast. At 3 p.m., Baldwin received a call from U.S. press censors in Washington saying news of Janowski's capture had been carried on the New York State Police teletype system. Soon afterward, the RCMP contacted the New York State Police and asked the force to send a message across its communications system telling all of its officers to stop talking about Janowski's capture. In light of the leaks, pressure built in Washington for an official release on the capture of the German spy. Baldwin reported hearing from his colleagues in the U.S. press censorship office "a Col. Glavin, Public Relations Officer for the Eastern Command, was now firmly of the opinion that a statement should be issued and said he was attempting to get FBI and Navy cooperation." At the same time, regional offices of the Directorate of Censorship fielded calls from reporters who had learned of

⁶⁶ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, November 10 1942. November 10 1942 Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

the arrest.⁶⁷ By the end of the work day, the *Windsor Star*, *Toronto Star*, *Toronto Telegram*, *Le Soleil*, *Montreal Star* and *Montreal Standard* knew the story.⁶⁸

The censors' decision to suppress the spy story was taken particularly hard by *Le Soleil's* editors. When Fulgence Charpentier applied for a job at the paper after the war, he was rudely turned away by its angry editors, who accused him of suppressing the best story the paper ever had. In fact, it was Biggar, Baldwin, McMahon and the RCMP who had killed the story.⁶⁹ Eric Dennis of the *Halifax Herald* not only had been tipped off, but was calling around trying to make travel arrangements to New Carlisle. Dennis was not planning to make the trip himself but was enquiring in his role as a freelancer, planning the trip for *Toronto Star* reporters who arrived in New Carlisle by train on the afternoon of November 11.⁷⁰ By November 13, Montreal's *La Presse* had the story.⁷¹ Under pressure from Biggar, the *Toronto Star* called off its reporters from New Carlisle and their story was spiked for the duration of the war, as was copy filed by a *Montreal Standard* reporter who was in New Carlisle by November 18.⁷²

On November 19, the U.S. magazine *Newsweek* came out with a one-sentence story on Janowski's capture in its weekly "Periscope Notes" feature: "Watch for an announcement revealing the capture of a German submarine

⁶⁷Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, November 10 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

⁶⁸ Memoranda, McMahon and Perry, November 10, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

⁶⁹ Personal communication with Fulgence Charpentier, 1999.

⁷⁰ Memorandum, Halifax Jefferson, November 10, 1942. RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

⁷¹ Memo, McMahon, November 13, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

⁷² Memo, McMahon, November 18 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

commander near New Carlisle, Quebec."⁷³ This was enough to convince Baldwin and Perry that the black-out should be lifted and Perry told the *Toronto Star* it could prepare to publish the stories and pictures gathered earlier in the week by its team in New Carlisle. The *Toronto Telegram* was also tipped off, and editors from both papers arrived in Perry's office with long articles and bundles of photographs. The New Carlisle residents who had been involved in the case had been very friendly to reporters, giving them information about Janowski's arrest and posing for pictures at the various places the spy had been before and after he was caught. The *Star* also had pictures of his German cigarettes and his old-fashioned money. However, at 4:10 Baldwin called Perry to say the stories and pictures could not run.⁷⁴

Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Little, who was in on the plan to turn Janowski⁷⁵ and was the naval intelligence member of the Censorship Coordination Committee, was willing to let the Toronto stories go, telling Baldwin the *Newsweek* item "had ruined the whole Navy plan and that they had no further interest in whether or not Censorship was lifted."⁷⁶ The RCMP, which, by then had Janowski in custody and was working on a plan with MI5 to make an offer to Janowski to betray his German handlers, gave Baldwin "confidential reasons why this story should be held at least for two weeks longer." Censors in Washington

⁷³ The magazine said its information came from a "high political leader in Ottawa." See Memorandum Ottawa November 20, 1942 (Baldwin), Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

⁷⁴ Memorandum, B.B. Perry November 19 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: general-4.

⁷⁵ Beeby, *Cargo of Lies*, 121.

⁷⁶ Memorandum, Ottawa (Baldwin) November 20, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: general-4.

promised to try to prevent the export of that edition of *Newsweek*, and U.S. chief press censor wrote a letter of warning to the publishers of the magazine.⁷⁷

Janowski was ensconced in a Montreal house, sending messages to Germany at the behest of the RCMP and MI5 when Quebec MLA Onesime Gagnon rose in the legislature on March 4, 1943 and announced Janowski's arrest. British United Press put the story on its radio wire twice on March 13. Baldwin told BUP's management the story had important security implications and the news agency, which had acted within its rights to quote the proceedings of the National Assembly, promised to use discretion. Stories on Gagnon's comment were also printed in *La Presse* and *La Patrie* (Montreal), *L'Action Catholique*, *L'Evenement-Journal*, the *Quebec City Telegraph*, the *Chronicle* (Quebec City), *Le Droit* (Ottawa) and *Le Petit Journal* (Montreal).⁷⁸ On March 17, J.F. Pouliot told the House of Commons about the arrest. Louis St. Laurent, the Justice Minister, interrupted debate and moved a motion that the comment be removed from *Hansard*. The motion passed and the censors warned newspapers not to print anything about Pouliot's remarks.⁷⁹

That spring, rumors of new arrests of spies circulated through the Maritimes. It is difficult to say whether they aided the Germans or helped cloak the fact that Janowski had been picked up. The stories circulated by word of mouth and through the mails. Baldwin and Eggleston checked with Canadian

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Memorandum, Montreal, March 5, 1943, Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: general-4.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, March 17th, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: general-4.

naval intelligence to see if the stories were true, then called censorship's regional offices in Eastern Canada to warn them to watch for any coverage of them.⁸⁰

The censors and military intelligence officers were shocked when the June 14, 1943 edition of the Fredericton *Daily Gleaner* carried the full story of Janowski's arrest. It was based on the reportage of the Toronto *Star* team sent to New Carlisle the previous November. The story was somehow released to the *Gleaner* by the *Star's* syndication service. The RCMP believed the story may have been read by German POWs being treated at the Victoria Public Hospital in Fredericton.⁸¹ By then, senior RCMP officials believed it was likely Janowski's double-cross was known by Germany.⁸² The Montreal *Star* report on July 29, 1943, of yet another public leak of the secret, this time by Lieutenant-Colonel Leon Lambert, assistant director of the Quebec Provincial Police, who was speaking to a Montreal convention of police and fire chiefs, probably added to that suspicion.⁸³

This was the last breach of this news blackout until the end of the war. When the ban was lifted, a remarkably large number of newspaper reporters knew the main elements of the story of Janowski's arrest, although the fact he supposedly had become a double agent was still secret. On May 9, 1945, Baldwin asked reporters to hold the story for three months, but they refused, so on May 14, 1945, he lifted the embargo. Montreal *Gazette* reporter Larry Conroy

⁸⁰ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, April 28, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Records of the Directorate of Censorship, Vol. 5952 File: general-4.

⁸¹ Beeby, *Cargo of Lies*, 131.

⁸² *Ibid*, 132.

⁸³ Memorandum, Montreal McMahon July 29, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952 File: 1-A '2' 4. Marine Experiences – Marine.

broke the story of Janowski's "turn" on May 15. The RCMP and the military were horrified by the leak and confronted Conroy. It turned out Conroy had pieced the story together from threads of facts he had picked up while working the police beat. Refusals by police to confirm or deny in 1943 whether Janowski's case was closed led Conroy to suspect Janowski was still in Canada. Starting there, he was able to weave together the story from strands of information picked up while working his beat. The RCMP and the censors managed to convince the Canadian Press and the country's newspapers to ignore Conroy's scoop.⁸⁴ On August 9, 1945, Canadian Press moved a story on Janowski, written by one of its reporters, Jack Brayley, saying the German was a double agent and had sent radio messages to Germany from Montreal. The story, which was carried in most of the country's newspapers, contained several major and minor errors, including the claim that Janowski was back in Europe working as an investigator and translator for Allied war crimes investigators. In fact, Janowski was in a British jail and was released from detention in 1947. He bounced from one low-paying job to the next before landing a position in 1963 with the German navy. He died in 1978.⁸⁵

Janowski's arrest was one story that could justify a censorship blackout. The German government (if it had not, as author Beeby suspects, been involved from the start in a con of Canadian and British military intelligence) would have a keen interest in any stories on his arrest. The sheer number of reporters, police officers, parliamentarians, and public servants who knew this secret, and the

⁸⁴ Beeby, *Cargo of Lies*, 173-177.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 190-191.

number of censorship breaks, both in the widely-read *Newsweek* magazine and in local papers, raises suspicions that the Germans would have had little trouble tracking Janowski if they had any reasonably effective intelligence-gathering network in eastern Canada or the United States. While the censors continued through the war to suppress the story, it may well have made its way back to Germany within days of Janowski's arrest and compromised his value as a turncoat. The fact that the German military stopped paying him the week he was caught casts a strong hint that this was the case.⁸⁶

Either way, landing in Canada saved Janowski's life. Whether he was part of the German campaign of 1942 to land spies and saboteurs along the U.S. eastern seaboard or a one-off agent sent to Canada to gather information, his capture left him open to very serious repercussions. The German agents caught in the U.S. in the summer of 1942 had committed no acts of terror. In fact, they had gone their separate ways and used the money issued to them to try to settle quietly in the U.S. for the duration of the war. The Germans were caught when one of them turned informant, thereby saving his own skin while dooming six of his colleagues. The spies were tried by a military tribunal, the first since the Civil War trials of the alleged co-conspirators of John Wilkes Booth, and the last until the Guantanamo Bay internees in this century. As well, fourteen U.S. residents who helped the spies were rounded up, prosecuted and jailed. On August 8, six of the eight German spies went to the electric chair in the Washington city jail. Rather than parade Janowski in front of reporters, as the FBI had with its

⁸⁶ Hadley speculates the Germans may have trusted Janowski until the end of the war, using information sent by his handlers in the UK to determine submarine deployments in the spring of 1945. See Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*, 289.

collection of German spies, the RCMP decided to forego the propaganda benefits of Janowski's capture and get as much use as possible from the agent.⁸⁷

In this instance, the censorship system failed Canada's intelligence community, although the RCMP continued to act as though Janowski's "turn" had not be compromised. The press, eager to print something as exotic as a spy story, exceeded the boundaries of a censorship system that was voluntary, and that had as its underpinning principle the need for secrecy of any fact of military value to the enemy. Janowski's capture certainly fit the description.

Military intelligence could not draw the type of information from press censorship that it received from mail censorship, cable monitoring and signals interception. Its interest in press censorship lay primarily in preventing the publication of material that it believed should be kept from the Axis, and to keep German propaganda out of the Canadian press. The challenges were daunting. Intelligence officers in the three armed services as well as at External Affairs dealt with a relatively decentralized press censorship system whose senior actors argued for a very limited censorship system. This was bound to cause personal friction and communication breakdowns. The inability of the military services to respect the censors and deal with them likely resulted in much more information finding its way into the media than would have been the case if the Censorship Co-ordination Committee had been an efficiently functioning body.

⁸⁷ For excellent examinations of the capture, trail and execution of the German agents in the U.S., see Louis Fisher, *Nazi Saboteurs on Trial*. University Press of Kansas, 2005 and Pierce O'Donnell, *In Time of War: Hitler's Terrorist Attack on America*. New York: The New Press, 2005.

It appears the communication problem was compounded by attitudes of individuals on both sides, especially the naval officers, whose release of information to the censors usually took place only as a reaction, thereby allowing censors to be blind-sided by journalists. The military should have taken the senior censors into its confidence to allow them to be ready when there was a surge of requests for vetting of important war news stories. Instead, the censors must have come across to the press as ineffective and out of the information loop, and as people who could be easily evaded.

Losing control of the publicity of Janowski's arrest was a major censorship and intelligence failure. It did not, however, result in the deaths of Canadians or Allied personnel. Only in one Canadian city, Halifax, could a censorship and intelligence failure of this magnitude have devastating results. Fortunately, the censorship system found a man with the stamina to maintain secrecy of convoy sailings and U-boat attacks. H. Bruce Jefferson would be censorship's front-line soldier in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Chapter Seven: Naval War Censorship

Senior military and censorship officials knew very early in the war that Halifax would be a focal point of news manipulation. Censorship operated on the unproven but fairly sensible premise that German agents combed the Canadian press and scanned the radio dial looking for news. Anyone in Canada with the slightest grip on current affairs knew the shipping lanes between Halifax and Great Britain were stalked by U-boats. How much detail on sinkings to give to the press and the timing of the release of news on the submarine war was a constant source of controversy between the censors, the Navy, and Canadian journalists. Only rarely did the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Angus L. Macdonald, make public statements that gave the real number of ships sunk in the St. Lawrence and the Gulf by U-boats.¹

The Navy's attitude toward information was summed up well by one of its officers, who said: "It must be realized that only by observing the traditional silence of the Navy can we hope to place the enemy in that state of doubt, disturbance and mental distress which we conceive to be his proper state of mind. Upon sealed lips depend not only our ships, not only the lives of fighting seamen in our warships, and merchant seamen engaged in holding the lifeline

¹ Macdonald made a statement in the House of Commons May 14, 1942 (*Hansard*, May 14, 1942, 2553) and at a press conference on November 27, 1942 (*Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada*, 3).

firm, but the success or failure of our arms. Should we lose command of the sea, we cannot hope to win the war.”²

Maintaining a blackout on ship movements in Halifax was a daunting task: anyone could climb a hill in the city or look out from a high building and watch the comings and goings of convoys, warships, and troop transports, including Cunard's *Queen Mary* and *Queen Elizabeth*, ships the U-boat commanders lusted for.³ On November 11, 1940, Thomas A. Stone of External Affairs and Navy Captain Eric Acland wrote to Eggleston and Charpentier asking for tougher regulations for the censorship of shipping information. “Information leakages”, they said, were responsible for recent losses at sea.⁴ Four days later, Stone hosted a meeting in his Ottawa office with Eggleston, Charpentier, Herbert Lash of the Wartime Information Board, and officials from the Department of National Defence. Lash wanted a publicity campaign to warn of the dangers of carelessness with information, but Charpentier and Eggleston did not offer to make any changes in the censorship regulations.⁵

Very quickly, the censors learned to ignore some of the Navy's more extreme demands. In his autobiography, Eggleston wrote about the Navy's attempt “to keep out of the Canadian papers accounts of a naval engagement in the South Atlantic [probably the fight between British warships and the *Graf*

² Quoted in Greenfield, *Battle of the St. Lawrence*, 180.

³ The “Queens” were used as troop transports during the war and were prime targets for the U-boats, which hunted them relentlessly but without success. John Bryden, *Canada's Secret War*, 123 quotes a March 9, 1942 Canadian intercept of a message from an *Abwehr* spy in Brazil who believed he had located the *Queen Mary* to his handlers in Germany: “With QUEEN MARY falls Churchill. Therefore, good luck.”

⁴ Thomas A. Stone to Wilfrid Eggleston and Fulgence Charpentier, November 11, 1940, in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

⁵ The minutes of this meeting are Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3.

Spee] which were currently being spread around the world by the AP and endless radio stations.”⁶

Captain Eric Brand, who liaised between the Navy and the censors, sometimes kept Halifax censor H. Bruce “Jeff” Jefferson in the dark about major sinkings, and censors were embarrassed by reporters’ questions.⁷ “If Capt Brand had not been quite so mysterious in his recent disclosures we easily could have prevented even the vague and uncertain publicity that appeared this morning,” the Halifax censor wrote in 1942 after being surprised with questions about a major sinking.⁸

Through the war, censors kept a lid on details of U-boat attacks off Canada’s coasts, usually suppressing them completely or delaying them until they had become old news. Still, keeping the most dramatic stories under wraps was nearly impossible. The Atlantic coast was Canada’s front line.

Attacks by German U-boats along the Canadian and Newfoundland coasts – some of which, like the German daylight raids on iron ore docks at Bell Island, Conception Bay, Newfoundland, killed scores of people⁹ – were common knowledge to people in the Maritimes and Quebec. Enemy submarines penetrated the St. Lawrence River to almost to Rimouski and sank ships within

⁶ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 264.

⁷ This happened, for example, in the sinking of the liner *Lady Drake* in early 1942. The *Lady Drake* was one of the ill-fated “Lady” ships of the Canadian National Steamship Line. Four of the five liners were sunk during the war, but one was re-floated and converted to a hospital ship. The *Lady Drake* was sunk May 8, 1942, while returning from Bermuda to Halifax. The 260 survivors of the sinking were brought to Halifax. Because the liner sank slowly, only 12 people were lost in the attack. See Censorship Ruling, May 11, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: 2. For an interesting article on the “Lady Boats,” see *Legion Magazine*, January/February 2007.

⁸ Censorship Ruling, May 11, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: 2.

⁹ Two U-boat raids at Bell Island, in Conception Bay, in 1942 resulted in the deaths of 60 sailors.

easy sight and sound of the Quebec shore. Everyone in Halifax knew German submarines lay in wait just outside the city's harbour to pick off stragglers from convoys. Survivors of attacks were landed at communities along the Gaspé, in Charlottetown, Halifax and Sydney and were usually talkative with friendly reporters, especially journalists like Eric Dennis who trolled the waterfront bars.¹⁰

The government and the Navy were not eager to spread the news of U-boat losses off Canada for several reasons. Immediate media reports of submarine attacks allowed the Germans to know if the U-boats had found a convoy. News of successful U-boat raids was useful propaganda to the Germans, while those same stories in the Allied media could undermine morale. As well, Canadian military and government officials had an obligation to their U.S. and British Allies to maintain a common media strategy in the face of the U-boat threat. Yet, the British Admiralty wanted a lid on U-boat stories while Washington was open about setbacks.¹¹ While the Royal Canadian Navy demanded a complete blackout on all submarine attack news, the censors pressed for as much openness as possible, as long as Canada's war effort was not compromised. The censors passed human interest stories on U-boat attacks

¹⁰ Censoring news of the submarine war was also a challenge, and a priority, to postal and telecommunications censors. Mail censorship was particularly intense in Halifax, where civilian and military letters and parcels were opened by a large staff of inspectors. See Department of National War Services Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Service Intelligence minutes of May 21, 1942; July 29, 1942; September 10, 1942; September 24, 1942; October 8, 1942; November 5, 1942; November 19, 1942; January 27, 1943; February 26, 1943; and March 10, 1943. In Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3 Memoranda re Meetings of Various Committees.

¹¹ Memorandum, Ottawa, February 20, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine. In October, 1943, British and U.S. naval authorities agreed to issue monthly reports on sinkings. See Memorandum, Ottawa, October 14, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

as long as they did give details of shipping losses.¹² The censors believed Canadians would become complacent or suspicious of government media manipulation if all bad news was censored, so they needed to know that the war had come to Canada's shores.¹³

The censors, after briefings by Naval Intelligence officers about High Frequency Direction Finding "huff duff" anti-submarine radio location technology used to triangulate the position of U-boats sending radio signals, argued to the press that there had to be a substantial delay between submarine attacks and media stories about them. German submarines usually fled the scenes of the attacks and later surfaced to contact their base to file a report. They would not have to take the risk if German intelligence could pick up details of submarine attacks from the Canadian media.

Censorship power on Canada's Atlantic coast was placed in the hands of Jefferson, a man for whom the shopworn word "cantankerous" is a good fit. Jefferson was a round, bald, middle-aged man who could not qualify for military duty in World War I because his left eye wandered. He was a natural reporter with a keen eye for detail and a remarkable ability to cultivate sources, including Angus Macdonald, who left his job of Premier of Nova Scotia to be naval minister in the federal government.¹⁴ Jefferson had bounced around the East Coast newspaper business for nearly three decades. During the Depression he leased

¹² Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Stephen Kimber, *Sailors Slackers and Blind Pigs*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2002 29-35. For a description of Macdonald's role in government during the war and his advocacy on behalf of the Navy, see T. Stephen Henderson, *Angus L. Macdonald: A Provincial Liberal*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, especially Chap. 3.

a small-town Nova Scotia newspaper but had been unable to turn a profit. Just before the outbreak of the war, he accepted a staff job as an editorial writer on the Halifax *Chronicle*, a newspaper that was struggling in a circulation war with the Halifax *Herald*. The latter paper was owned by the Dennis family, and the reporting of one of its members, Eric Dennis, would dominate Jefferson's censorship workload.¹⁵

Dennis worked Halifax's dockside and wrote dozens of stories based on interviews with sailors who recounted their survivals of U-boat attacks, harrowing escapes from wrecks, long voyages in lifeboats, prisoner exchanges, and U-boat sinkings. There was a strong local demand for this news. The Halifax dailies went into the war locked in a nasty circulation war. The *Herald* combined an aggressive home distribution sales campaign with a ferocious approach to news gathering.¹⁶ Eric Dennis believed his dominance of the coverage of wartime Halifax shattered the spirit of his competitors at the *Chronicle*. Certainly, it hurt their business: The *Herald's* circulation rose by 55% during the war, while the *Chronicle's* stayed flat. (After the war, the *Chronicle* was absorbed by the *Herald*).¹⁷ Jefferson believed Eric Dennis and Dave King, a *Herald* photographer, deliberately provoked military authorities by refusing to show passes at the

¹⁵ Dennis left Halifax after the war for a distinguished two-decade posting as *The Herald's* reporter in the Parliamentary Press Gallery. He served as president of the gallery in 1968. At the time of writing, he was living in Oakville, Ontario, in very poor health. (Personal communication, Stephen Maher, Ottawa bureau chief, *Halifax Herald*).

¹⁶ Halifax newspapers and radio stations were forbidden from announcing the arrival and departure of troop ships until the ships were long-gone from the city. This prohibition sometimes allowed Central Canadian reporters to beat their Halifax colleagues on stories in their own back yard and caused serious disputes between Jefferson and editors of the *Halifax Herald*. While there was no commercial gain in beating the Central Canadian newspapers, which had no circulation in the Halifax region, it was obviously a matter of pride. A number of complaints by the *Halifax Herald* can be found in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine

¹⁷William March, *Red Line: The Chronicle-Herald and The Mail-Star*. Halifax: Chebucto Agencies Limited, 1986 333.

harbor and sneaking aboard ocean liners arriving with service personnel.¹⁸ The Halifax censor believed the *Herald* was simply more aggressive, and he admitted he gave into its persistent demands simply to get the paper off his back.¹⁹

The *Herald* tended to support the federal and provincial Conservatives. Robert J. Rankin, its managing editor, believed politics lay behind many of the censor's decisions. Jefferson, for his part, thought Rankin was short-fused and unreasonable.²⁰ Frequently in his rulings, Jefferson mentioned Rankin's outbursts of rage and his allegations that the censors were engaged in a campaign to cover up government inefficiency and stupidity. For example, when the CBC broke an embargo and beat the *Herald* on a U-boat attack story, "Mr. Rankin went through the usual *Herald* 'frightfulness' [sic] routine, enlarging upon the various degrees of Hell they expect to raise at Ottawa over this... scoop."²¹ In September 1941, when Australian airmen destined for Britain walked off the *Empress of Asia*, saying the ship was filthy, Rankin called Jefferson "in great glee to announce that at last they had something with which they could 'go to town' on us." Censorship, Rankin said, was covering up official inefficiency. "Mr. Rankin said he was going to play this story to the limit, appeal to the Prime Minister, rouse the country, and generally show up everybody, including the embarkation people and press censorship," Jefferson told censorship headquarters in Ottawa. The airmen later sailed on another ship. The story was held for several days

¹⁸ Censorship Ruling, Halifax, July 4, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948 File: 1-D3-10.

¹⁹ Memorandum by H. B. Jefferson, n.d., in Jefferson Papers, Vol. 1224, Nova Scotia Public Archives, quoted in March, *The Red Line*, 333.

²⁰ Censorship Ruling Halifax, January 29, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

²¹ Censorship Ruling Halifax January 12, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

because it violated directives against describing troop movements until they were completed. Through the censors, the Royal Canadian Air Force asked the *Herald* and Canadian Press to tone the story down, “not only for its effect against recruiting in Canada, but because of its possible use in the United States and on German radio.”²²

Halifax reporters used the military’s bureaucracy to circumvent the news blackout on activities in the port. In the third week of June 1941, a tanker arrived at Halifax shot full of massive holes. “She is quite a curiosity,” the Halifax censor wrote. The Halifax *Herald* and the Halifax *Star* asked, in the last days of the month, for permission to photograph the damage. Jefferson said he would approve a photo if it was limited to the damaged hull and not the full ship, but only if the Navy agreed to allow the picture to be taken. The censor, who actually made the approach to the Navy, was told by naval officers that permission would not be granted, but the afternoon edition of the Halifax *Star* carried a front-page photograph of the damage. The *Star’s* photographer had called the chief of convoys, whose assistant had given permission to take the photograph. When the picture ran, an enraged Commander George Mitchell, a Navy intelligence officer, called Jefferson to complain about the incident and to try to blame him.²³

None of the Halifax papers were hauled into court during the war, even though the actions of their reporters generated a blizzard of memos between Jefferson and his superiors. Sometimes, the censors dealt with immediate

²²Censorship ruling, Halifax, September 17, 1941 and Memorandum, Ottawa, September 22, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948, File: 1-D3-11.

²³ Censorship Ruling, Halifax, June 30, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948, File: 1-D3-9.

threats to Canada's security. At the end of 1940, Canadian authorities were startled by a major breach of censorship when the British liner *Western Prince* was torpedoed off the Irish coast. C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, was aboard the vessel on his way to England with his advisors: financier E.P. Taylor; W.C. Woodward, head of the Vancouver-based department store chain that carried the family name; and the Hon. Gordon Scott, along with several members of Howe's staff. The Canadians were forced to abandon the ship and Scott was killed when he fell between one of the boats and the hull of the sinking ship. The captain, second officer and captain's steward went down with the ship and several people were killed when one of the lifeboats rolled in the heavy seas. For eight grim hours, Howe and the rest of the 152 survivors waited for rescue. They were finally picked up by a collier and arrived in London on December 18.²⁴

New York-based MacKay Radio, an agency that sold story tips to the U.S. press, intercepted the ship's distress call and passed the news to a New York newspaper. The Ottawa *Citizen* picked up the story, confirmed with Howe's wife that the minister was on the ship,²⁵ and published it under the banner front page headline "C.D. HOWE AND PARTY ON TORPEDOED STEAMSHIP?" while Howe and his assistants were still in the lifeboat. The censors recommended the

²⁴ Leslie Roberts, C.D.: *The Life and Times of C.D. Howe*. Toronto: Clark Irwin, 1957, 96-97.

²⁵ Eggleston and Charpentier to Secretary of State P-F. Casgrain, December 16, 1940. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5982 File: 29.

laying of charges against the *Citizen*, but the matter was not pursued by the Department of Justice.²⁶

Despite Eggleston's belief that Canadians needed to be toughened by bad news stories, articles that suggested setbacks for the Allies were usually eviscerated of any interesting facts or killed outright. In April 1941, Eggleston, in Ottawa, cut a line in an article picked up by the Ottawa *Citizen* from the New York *Mirror* that said: "... and no matter now you look at it, the Royal Navy is losing the battle of the Atlantic today."²⁷ At the same time, material that put a happy face on the off-shore carnage was passed. Photos of the survivors of the Canadian destroyer *Margaree*²⁸ were allowed to be published as they showed "happy, laughing groups of sailors bicycling or walking along Bermuda roads."²⁹ Stories that were depressing to sailors were, when possible, kept out of the Halifax newspapers. Jefferson was keen to avoid details of drownings and the even more terrifying stories about sailors who burned to death in U-boat attacks on oil and gasoline tankers.³⁰

The censors did pass a few stories that put U-boat captains in a positive light. Following the daring raids by Otto Kretschmer in U-99 off the English coast

²⁶ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

²⁷ Memorandum, Wilfrid Eggleston, April 29, 1941 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

²⁸ H.M.C.S. *Margaree*, formerly HMS *Diana*, was a River Class destroyer built for the British navy in 1931 and transferred to the Canadian navy on September 6, 1940. She sank, taking with her 142 crew members, on October 22, 1940 after colliding with the freighter *Port Fairy* in the North Atlantic while escorting convoy OL-8.

²⁹ Censorship Ruling, B.B. Perry, Toronto November 9, 1940. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5946, File: Part 4.

³⁰ Rulings re: *Halifax Star*, February 23, 1942, and *Halifax Herald*, February 24, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

and Gunther Prien at Scapa Flow,³¹ some U-boat captains had developed a dark glamour in Canada. On December 16, 1940, Dennis submitted a story based on an interview with a local survivor of the cargo ship *St. Malo*, sunk by *U-101* October 12 while it was straggling from convoy HX-77, describing how the U-boat came alongside a lifeboat. The U-boat commander expressed regret for sinking the *St. Malo*, but added "war is war." He then asked *St. Malo's* crew if they needed anything. The answer was, of course, "smokes" and the captain tossed a large package of English cigarettes to the sailors before saying good-bye and leaving the scene.³² The censors also passed stories about friendly encounters between U-boats and Canadian fishing schooners, which frequently occurred in the early years of the war.³³ The stories were of interest to the RCN's intelligence officers, who asked Jefferson to track down the sources of the articles to determine if they were true.³⁴

Dennis was more likely to have his stories passed by the censor than were out-of-town reporters, unless they were old friends of Jefferson.³⁵ Indeed, *New York Post* freelancer Eve Fayne, who arrived in Halifax in February 1942 and set up headquarters in the Lord Nelson Hotel (where Jefferson lived), was targeted by Jefferson, who effectively ran her out of Halifax. Fayne's presence was detected by cable censors who intercepted a message between the *Post*

³¹ Prien commanded *U-47*, which made a daring night raid into the British base in the Orkneys on the night of Oct. 13-14 1939 and sank the dreadnought *Royal Oak*. Prien and *U-47* disappeared at sea in 1941.

³² Ruling, Dec, 16, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine- Miscellaneous.

³³ These ended in the summer of 1942. See below.

³⁴ Memorandum, Halifax (Jefferson), March 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Marine-Action.

³⁵ In a memo dated January 21, 1941, Jefferson wrote about how he had helped a writer of a *Maclean's* magazine piece get favored access to Halifax naval authorities. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

and the London-based reporter after she arrived in Halifax. Fayne was assigned to confirm rumours that the submarine war had shifted from the eastern Atlantic to the Canadian and U.S. coasts, and that there had been more attacks in the Halifax area than in British coastal waters (a claim that was, in fact, fairly accurate). Working with the cable censors, Jefferson delayed the telegrams to force Fayne to come into his office to discuss her assignment, then made it so difficult for her to operate in Halifax that she gave up on the *Post's* assignment and left for Capetown, South Africa. She had lasted just two days in Halifax.³⁶

Still, Jefferson actually acted as a buffer between naval authorities who wanted a complete blackout on all naval action off Canada and the reporters who knew Halifax was a front-line position in the Battle of the Atlantic. Jefferson often tangled with Naval Intelligence (whose complaints were sometimes called “bleats” in Jefferson’s correspondence)³⁷ and Navy Public Relations Officers (PROs) who, Jefferson and censors in Ottawa believed, tried to prevent, for political reasons, legitimate press investigations of incompetence, bungling and waste. Most newspapers, Jefferson believed, were happy to accept Navy news handouts and did not have the courage to take on the PROs.³⁸

³⁶ Censorship Ruling, Halifax, February 12, 1942, with appendixes. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine. Jefferson had little use for women reporters. When June Callwood of *The Globe and Mail* (whom Jefferson referred to in his memoranda as “June Callwell, *Globe and Mail* sob sister”), was given an interview with naval Lieutenant Alex Joy, Jefferson praised Joy as “a true member of the silent service and Miss Callwell, a very charming person, could not get him to say much. . .” Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

³⁷ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, February 24, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

³⁸ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, January 14, 1945 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine Miscellaneous.

Partly to get around Jefferson, the three Toronto dailies used local “stringers,” reporters on the Halifax papers who made money on the side as freelancers. The *Toronto Star* had deals with Eric Dennis and Nathan Dreskin of the St. John *Times-Globe* to file stories to the *Star* before they ran in their own newspaper. It is unlikely the *Herald's* management knew the extent of Dennis's work, which ran in the *Star* without bylines.³⁹ Dreskin's deal was discovered by the *Times-Globe* when Dreskin sent an uncensored version of a U-boat attack story to the *Toronto Star* and Jefferson, alerted by telegraph censors, contacted his employers.⁴⁰ After talking by telephone with Tommy Lytle, the *Toronto Star's* news editor and stringer den mother, the Halifax censor wrote that he had found Lytle surprisingly personable as “from some of our experiences with *Star* enterprises down this way, I had been inclined to visualize Lytle as a gent with horns and tail.”⁴¹

Jefferson had to deal with a major hole in the censorship system: stories coming from St. John's, in the British colony of Newfoundland. On June 16, 1941, the Halifax censor complained about a Canadian Press dispatch from St. John's that went into detail about the recent sinking of two British steamers and the rescue of 64 members of their crews. It was time, he said, to shut down the St. John's leak. The cable censors could help, Jefferson said, because all telegraph

³⁹ At that time, most news stories ran without writer credit.

⁴⁰ It was common practice for cable censors to hold telegrams of news stories until the press censors examined them. If instructed by the censors to kill the articles, they did not allow them to be transmitted in Canada or abroad. See Memorandum, W. Chevalier, May 16, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5947 File: Press Rulings.

⁴¹ Memorandum, Halifax, July 14, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948 File: 1-D3-10.

lines out of Newfoundland passed through Canada.⁴² Eggleston agreed, telling Jefferson to enforce the same censorship rules on stories from St. John's as on those originating in Canada. He also tried to set up better communications between Canadian censorship officials and their colleagues in St. John's.⁴³

Reporters writing about ship arrivals and departures were required to be vague about the locations involved. On January 27, 1942, Jefferson asked the censorship office in Ottawa to issue a circular with new, standardized place names to obscure the locations of naval action. "Western Atlantic" was to include any place between Halifax and a point about 100 miles east of Newfoundland, "Mid-Atlantic" anywhere between 100 miles east of Newfoundland and Greenland, and "Eastern Atlantic" the part of the ocean between Iceland and the mainland of Europe. The censorship headquarters sent out a circular that incorporated Jefferson's recommendations and published it in the handbook issued in August, 1942.⁴⁴ Ship names were routinely stricken from stories and censors sometimes asked reporters to cut the names of sailors on merchant and naval ships from Nazi-occupied countries to prevent reprisals against their families.⁴⁵

The censors sometimes passed articles that they knew contained factual errors, such as a June 1941 Canadian Press story that claimed 40 sailors in the

⁴² Memorandum, Halifax, June 16, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous. The August, 1942 handbook can be found in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5944 (NF).

⁴³ Memorandum, Ottawa, June 17, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine Miscellaneous.

⁴⁴ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, January 27, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine

⁴⁵ Censorship Ruling, Ottawa, May 1, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948 File: 1-D3-9.

port of Halifax had received \$100 bonuses from the Admiralty. This story could have caused problems for naval authorities but the piece did not breach the security rules.⁴⁶

In 1942, German admirals Karl Doenitz and Erich Raeder pushed the U-boat fleet inshore to attack shipping in Canadian and U.S. coastal waters. In the first months of the year, they prowled the Grand Banks and the southeast coast of Nova Scotia. In the summer, some of the submarines moved north into the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. Along the American and Canadian coasts, the strategy was very successful: U-boat crews called this new campaign "The Happy Time." News of these attacks, which often occurred within sight and earshot of Canadians living along the coast or fishing on the continental shelf, was more difficult to manage than the stories of the wolf pack attacks in mid-Atlantic along the main convoy routes between Halifax and the United Kingdom. On May 11-12, 1942, *U-553*, which had moved from a position off Halifax to quieter waters between Anticosti Island and the mainland to make repairs, sank the British freighter *Nicoya* and the Dutch ship *Leto*, killing seventeen sailors.⁴⁷ That month, the Directorate of Censorship issued a circular, "Notes on Publication of News Stories," which ordered newspapers not to print the names of ships, the place of attack or details such as whether the ships were in a convoy.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Censorship Ruling, Halifax, June 28, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5948 File: 1-D3-9.

⁴⁷ For very detailed accounts of the submarine campaigns in the St. Lawrence, see W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, Michael Whitby, *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943 Vol. II Part 1*; Nathan Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence: The Second World War in Canada*. Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004; and Michael Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985.

⁴⁸ This directive, along with all the rest issued by censorship authorities, is in Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5942, (NF).

The attacks in the St. Lawrence began just six days into O.M. Biggar's term as Director of Censorship and only two weeks after the conscription plebiscite that had split English and French Canada. News of *U-553's* daring raid reached the Prime Minister on the morning of May 12 as he was about to enter a Liberal caucus meeting to discuss the political ramifications of the plebiscite results. King was dejected before receiving the briefing on the sub attacks. The news revived his spirits. He saw the sinkings as a political windfall that would show Quebeckers the dangers of the war and still justify to English Canada his policy of hoarding Canadian military resources in Canada. He wrote in his diary *U-553's* exploits was "evidence of guidance" from the spirit world in the wake of the conscription plebiscite. The Prime Minister spent much of the caucus meeting giving a dramatic and detailed account of *U-553's* attack. Far from hurting Canada, the torpedoing of the *Leto* and the *Nicova* put a spring in the step of the Prime Minister.⁴⁹

Not surprisingly, Naval Service Headquarters immediately issued a press release on the submarine attack, saying one freighter was lost and forty-one survivors had been landed. The press release said no more news on shipping attacks would be released because it would be of use to the enemy. This strange release was the first and last time the press would receive prompt news of an attack in Canadian inland waters. At the time the release was issued, the cable censors and Montreal press censor had already imposed a news blackout on the sinkings. The news statement can only be interpreted as a political act to point

⁴⁹ Mackenzie King diary, May 12, 1942, quoted in Douglas, et al, *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943 Vol. II Part 1*, 431.

out to Quebecers that the war was a real threat to their province, and, like Macdonald's announcement in the House of Commons of a second sinking the following day, was seen that way by the Navy.⁵⁰ It may have also been seen that way by "a member of the intelligence staff of the British admiralty" who talked to Macdonald on the morning of May 14, shortly before the minister announced in the House of Commons that there would be no new information about the St. Lawrence attacks.⁵¹

The first call for a news blackout on the St. Lawrence sinkings came from Montreal's chief cable censor, who phoned Montreal press censor Ed McMahon during the lunch hour on May 12 to say a ship⁵² had been sunk in the St. Lawrence by a U-boat, and that McMahon had to stop all stories on the attack. From Ottawa, Baldwin advised at 4:50 p.m., after the press release was issued, "that the usual survivor stories could be allowed and that the usual regulations would prevail." This meant that the name of the vessel, the scene of the sinking, the nationality of the vessel, the name of its captain and officers, the names of the places where survivors landed or were interviewed and the cargo of the ship, could not be mentioned. McMahon contacted editors at *La Presse*, the *Montreal Star*, and the Quebec *Chronicle-Telegraph*, saying that interviews could be used if the papers respected the limitations imposed by his department. Telegrams to the same effect were sent to *Le Soleil*, *L'Evenement Journal* and *L'Action Catholique* of Quebec City; *L'Action* in Gaspé; *L'Echo du Bas St-Laurent* and *Le*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁵¹ *Hansard*, May 14, 1942 2553.

⁵² Actually, two ships, the *Nicoya* and the *Leto*.

Progres du Golfe in Rimouski; *Le St-Laurent* in Riviere-du-Loup; and *La Voix de Gaspé* in Montmagny. McMahon also notified British United Press.⁵³

When a British United Press reporter submitted an item from Mont Louis saying survivors had landed there, the censor told him to change the place to "a St. Lawrence shore village."⁵⁴ McMahon passed a story written by H. Higgins of the *Montreal Star* for the *Boston Sunday Advertiser* describing reaction of French-speaking Québécois to the attack and saying recruiting offices, particularly those of the Navy, were crowded that night.⁵⁵ When the cable censors reported a Canadian Press journalist was phoning Gaspé towns and asking to speak to any survivors, the cable censors asked McMahon to warn the news agency the telephone line would be cut if its reporters asked for names of places or ships.

Canadian Press managed to pull together a complete description of the May 11-12 attack, but censors in Ottawa killed the article. A *Montreal Gazette* story, which was a combination of the information supplied by Canadian Press and obtained independently by the *Gazette* and left out all mention of the Gaspé, referring instead to "villages on the shores of the St. Lawrence," was approved. Censors also passed a story from Quebec's *Le Soleil*, which contained an interview from Rimouski with one of the ship's officers. No names were given and Rimouski was called "a town on the shores of the St. Lawrence." At noon on May 13, a journalist at the *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph* called McMahon to say he

⁵³ Ruling, Montreal McMahon, May 12, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

⁵⁴ Memorandum, Montreal, May 13, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

had received instructions from a Lt. Barrow of the Navy to use "East Coast Port" instead of "town" or "village on the shores of the St. Lawrence." McMahon told the journalist to continue using the latter terms, explaining: "As it had already been announced by Hon. Mr. Macdonald that the sinking had taken place in the St. Lawrence River, this change would be silly and I told Brehaut [the journalist] to leave it 'a St. Lawrence shore village or town.'"⁵⁶

Conservative leader R.B. Hanson demanded Macdonald "review" his news blackout policy "in view of the fact that the enemy must have information of these sinkings and that the government of the United States are announcing their losses from time to time, and that periodically Britain has announced similar losses." The Navy's silence caused rumours to take the place of fact, Hanson argued "and the stories grow in repeating them." Macdonald replied he could "see no reason whatever for changing the policy... If I say why we are withholding this information, or if I said when would be the proper time to announce a sinking, that explanation in itself might give information to the enemy."⁵⁷

The German press picked up on these stories in a rare instance when Canadian media coverage can be shown to have been monitored by the enemy. At 9:15 a.m. on May 12, Berlin radio broadcast a report on the previous day's attack: "German U-boats are now operating in the St. Lawrence River, the nearest approach to land. A German U-boat sank an American 6,000-ton freighter yesterday, carrying a cargo of jute from India for Montreal. The ship had

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Hansard*, May 14, 1942 2553.

made the long voyage from India safely, only to be sunk in the St. Lawrence. This is the first time that U-boats have operated so far from the sea." The Nazi paper reported the news of the sub attacks "broke like a bombshell in Canada and the United States."⁵⁸

Macdonald's news blackout did not stop reporters from trying to get accurate accounts of the St. Lawrence attacks. In Toronto, Perry passed three pictures from Rimouski, including a photo of the survivors, but would not authorize a photograph of an officer of the vessel, probably the captain, and one of the other members of the crew gazing into the open coffin of a crew member who had died of exposure before the men were rescued. The picture was apparently taken at the Rimouski cemetery. The undertaker was holding the lid of the coffin while giving the victim's friends a last look. The dead man could be plainly distinguished in the coffin.⁵⁹

All of this loose talk of sunken ships was bound to cause a reaction from the "silent service." On May 15, Captain Eric Brand of Naval Intelligence called Eggleston "to complain that the press was running wild on the St. Lawrence sinking." Brand objected to the dateline "a St. Lawrence port", rather than "an Eastern Canadian port," and was angry the censors had allowed the press to publish the number of survivors. Eggleston explained to Brand that the Navy, not the censors, released the fact that the sinking had taken place in the St. Lawrence River. "St. Lawrence port," Eggleston said, added no new information. Eggleston asked Brand what information was given to the enemy by telling the

⁵⁸ Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*, 88-89.

⁵⁹ Ruling, Toronto (Perry), May 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

number of survivors. The change in numbers, Brand argued, from forty survivors to eighty clearly showed that there was at least one more ship involved. He said the press “had now gouged this information out [of the Navy].”

Eggleston told the Captain he was surprised to hear of the second ship. The censors “were going on the information that we received from him and conclude[ed] that there was only one ship. He admitted that he had only known a short time ago of the second sinking.”⁶⁰

Independent MP J. P. Roy used his parliamentary immunity to ask questions in the House of Commons about the sinkings in May and June. *L’Action Catholique* reported Roy’s speeches, thereby giving Quebeckers a fairly detailed report of the first St. Lawrence U-boat battle.⁶¹ The Canadian Press asked Eggleston on June 9 if it should quote Roy’s information. Eggleston told the news agency it could use anything printed in *Hansard*.⁶²

At the beginning of July, naval intelligence officers warned Eggleston of another U-boat foray. Eggleston passed the vague report to McMahon, who was ready on July 8 when he received an early-morning call from the newsroom of *L’Action Catholique*, whose reporter said he had heard that another ship had been sunk in the St. Lawrence. The paper was tipped off by a sailor of an inbound vessel who reported shipping had been blocked by naval patrols and that survivors had landed at Cap Chat. On July 6, 1942, *U-132* had launched its first torpedoes in the St. Lawrence River, striking at a fourteen-ship convoy near

⁶⁰ Memorandum, Eggleston, May 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

⁶¹ Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence*, 2.

⁶² Memo, Eggleston, June 9, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: Marine Experiences.

Cap Chat and sinking three freighters, the Greek *Anastassios Pateras*, the Belgian *Hainaut* and the British *Dinarik*. Two weeks later, *U-132* torpedoed the British *Frederika Lensen*, killing four men but leaving the ship salvageable.

McMahon told *L'Action Catholique* to hold the July 8 story until Ottawa issued an official statement. McMahon immediately called Baldwin in Ottawa, who told the Montreal censor the Navy wanted the story held for at least a couple of days while the Navy hunted the sub. Within an hour, Quebec City's *Le Soleil* called McMahon about the same story and was given the same advice. By the end of the day, the story was known to the *Toronto Star*, which sent a reporter to Montreal to interview survivors and get photos.

Meanwhile, in Halifax, Jefferson learned from a Canadian National Railways official in Moncton that the U-boat attacked the car ferry *Prince Edward Island*, narrowly missing it but hitting a munitions ship nearby. Survivors of the attack had been landed at Rimouski. Jefferson called Baldwin to tell him he would kill any stories in the press of the Maritimes.⁶³ Baldwin called Lieutenant Commander C.H. Little of Naval Intelligence to ask how long the press had to sit on the story. Little promised Baldwin the press could publish full accounts once the hunt for the sub had ended.⁶⁴

The Navy warned the censors that the submarine had not signaled its kills to Germany, so it was still vulnerable to "huff-duff" direction-finding,⁶⁵ but attempts to squelch the media reports of the submarine attack were thwarted by

⁶³ Memorandum, Jefferson, Halifax, July 8, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Marine-Action.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Memorandum, Baldwin and Charpentier, August 10, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

Roy, who rose in the House of Commons on July 10 to announce details of the raid and to demand better protection for shipping.⁶⁶ The censors received calls from frantic Canadian Press editors who said the story was known in newsrooms across the country because Parliament Hill reporters had phoned or wired the news to their home papers. Charpentier told them the story was still embargoed. He called Jack Marshall, President of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, to ask for his co-operation in controlling the item.⁶⁷

Baldwin believed it would be futile to try to stop coverage of Roy's remarks and any answer the government gave. Naval Intelligence said it would issue a short statement; nothing was sent out, so Baldwin told the wire services they could send their stories across the country.⁶⁸

By mid-July, Canadian Press and newspapers in Eastern Canada were sitting on some very dramatic stories. In Sydney, reporters interviewed survivors of the Cap Chat attack but could not print them. The crew of the car ferry *Prince Edward Island* arrived at Charlottetown in the second week of July and spun yarns about how they "escaped under forced draught and by the skin of their teeth."⁶⁹ Jefferson wanted to pass the stories about the attack on the *Prince Edward Island*, as the ship was not part of a convoy, but Eggleston asked him to forward the stories to Ottawa to be vetted by Naval Intelligence, where

⁶⁶ Memorandum, Jefferson, July 10, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, Baldwin, July 10, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Memorandum, Halifax, July 13, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

Lieutenant Commander C.H. Little tried to kill them.⁷⁰ Once references to other ships were removed and the destination of the *Prince Edward Island* was changed from Charlottetown to the ubiquitous “Eastern Canadian Port,” Little dropped his objections and Eggleston passed the Canadian Press stories.⁷¹

When Angus Macdonald issued a statement July 13 criticizing Roy’s lack of discretion, Jefferson sat in the CP Halifax newsroom and edited the minister’s statement as it came across the teletype, “fuzzifying up” some of the details that Macdonald had given the press.⁷² Meanwhile, in Montreal McMahon eviscerated copy submitted by Joan Capreol of the *Montreal Gazette*, removing facts from an interview with the Greek captain of one of the submarine’s victims.⁷³ A few hours later, the *Montreal Star*’s story based on the interview with the same captain was similarly sanitized.⁷⁴ The cuts to these dramatic survivor stories did not deter Capreol, who returned to McMahon’s office two days later with a story based on interviews with nineteen survivors of the submarine attack. Capreol strongly argued with McMahon over cuts to her story. Still, enough interesting material survived to make it appealing to the seasoned U-boat story chasers at the *Halifax Herald*, who picked up the story from the *Gazette* later that night.⁷⁵

U-517 and *U-165* arrived in the St. Lawrence in late August 1942. On August 27, *U-517* sank the U.S. freighter *Chatham* with the loss of fourteen

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Memorandum, Ottawa, July 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Memorandum, Montreal, July 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Memorandum, Montreal, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

sailors, while *U-165* sank the USS *Laramie*, killing five men. The two submarines continued their attacks through the middle of September. *U-517*'s kill tally included: *Arlyn* (U.S), with the loss of twelve sailors on August 28; the Canadian ship *Donald Stewart* on September 3 (three killed); the Greek ships *Mount Pindus* and *Mount Taygetus* and the Canadian ship *Oakton* on September 7 (eight men lost); the HMCS *Charlottetown* on September 11 (ten sailors killed); and the Dutch freighter *Saturnus* and the Norwegian *Inger Elizabeth* (four killed) on September 3. *U-165* sank the HMCS *Raccoon* on September 7, with the loss of thirty-six sailors. It sank the Greek freighter *Joannis* on September 16 and damaged the British ships *Essex Lance* and *Pan York* the same day before leaving the St. Lawrence. Two more U-boats arrived in early October to take the place of *U-517* and the *U-165*. On October 9, *U-69* announced its presence in the St. Lawrence River by sinking the freighter *Carolus* near Metis Beach, killing twelve men. Two days later, *U-106* sank the British freighter *Watertown*.

Because of censorship and the tight control of information by the Navy, the press killed some of the most dramatic local stories of the war. The Canadian public did not know that more than 500 passengers heading to the Goose Bay, Labrador air base construction site managed to escape the *Chatham* in the half-hour before she went under in the Strait of Belle Isle.⁷⁶ Censors killed eyewitness stories from Boston and northern Ontario, spread by construction workers who survived the attack.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Douglas, Sarty, Whitby, et al, *No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943 Vol. II Part I* 444-446.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, Ottawa, September 6, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

Raccoon's loss did not become public until September 13, when *Le Soleil* published an article entitled "Cinq navires ont été coulées." The *Raccoon* had been on the bottom for five days when the *Ottawa Evening Journal* reported on the "daring midday attack" that had damaged SS *Frederika Lensen* the previous July. On September 8, the Montreal cable censors intercepted a tip telegraphed from the National Maritime Federation to the *Toronto Star*, saying there were "developments" in the St. Lawrence River east of Quebec City. On the advice of press censor Ed McMahon, the cable was held "for good."⁷⁸ Six days later Adam Marshall of the *Montreal Gazette* asked McMahon for clearance on a story saying three Greek freighters and a Canadian naval patrol boat were lost on the St. Lawrence. It was the first story of the loss of *Raccoon*. McMahon told him he could not run the time, place, identity or number of vessels lost, to which Marshall replied, "Oh hell!"⁷⁹ The next day, Ottawa censors cleared stories of arrival in Montreal of eighty survivors of merchant ships sunk in the St. Lawrence, plus survivors of *Raccoon*, without naming any ships or allowing any details of their loss.⁸⁰ The Ottawa and Halifax censors also passed reports of a German torpedo striking the Gaspé shore and blowing out some windows.⁸¹

On September 27, Jefferson received a late-night phone call from Baldwin, who reported the new submarine action off the Gaspé. Baldwin told Jefferson to sit on any stories on the attacks until an official announcement was

⁷⁸ Memorandum, Montreal (McMahon) September 8, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁷⁹ Ruling, Montreal, September 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁸⁰ Ottawa, September 18, 1942. Library and Archives RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁸¹ Ruling, Halifax, September 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

made in Ottawa. Baldwin also mentioned that steps had been taken to black out lights on portions of the lower St. Lawrence shores as a prevention against enemy activities in that region.⁸² Censorship successfully stifled the story until October 13, when the Wartime Information Board organized a reporters' trip to Métis Beach. The Montreal *Herald* and the Toronto *Star* submitted stories to McMahon that were edited to remove the references to the times and places of the attacks. McMahon reported he cut a Canadian Press article on the attack so heavily that by the time it was returned to the news agency it was "quite innocuous and uninteresting."⁸³

On the night of October 14, 1942, *U-69* sank the Newfoundland to Nova Scotia ferry *Caribou* in the Cabot Strait, killing 137 people.⁸⁴ In the early hours of the next morning, Jefferson was told of the attack by the local Army public relations officer. Baldwin was in Halifax helping Jefferson deal with the U-boat attack stories. Neither man got much sleep. At 7:30 a.m., Baldwin was awakened by a reporter from the Halifax *Herald* who insisted on permission to contact the relatives of *U-69's* victims on the *Caribou* to obtain stories to be held for release. Despite being warned off the story until the next of kin had been officially notified, the *Herald* pressed on. At 9:30, cable censors reported the *Herald* was trying to get wires through to the families of casualties in the Kentville district. Those telegrams were stopped, so the *Herald's* switchboard began placing long-

⁸² Ruling, Halifax, September 29, 1942 Library and Archives RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁸³ Ruling, Montreal, October 13, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁸⁴ 135 people drowned or froze to death in the water. Two people who were rescued later died of exposure.

distance calls.⁸⁵ The local newspapers created a code name for the attack, “swim meet,” and cobbled together a rough list of casualties.⁸⁶

The first day’s coverage in the *Halifax Herald* consisted of a bare-bones story on the attack. These were fleshed out by the end of the day with details from two women survivors who had been landed at Halifax. Jefferson removed from the *Herald* story the details about the counter-attack by the minesweeper *Grand Mere*. The *Chronicle* story quoted one survivor saying two torpedoes had struck the *Caribou*. This was left in since other stories reported only one “and this would confuse rather than inform the enemy.”⁸⁷

Life for the censors was made more difficult by the split in jurisdiction between Newfoundland and Canada. The ship was a Newfoundland vessel lost in Canadian waters. The Newfoundland censor wanted control over the timing of the release of the story. Eventually, the Newfoundland papers were given first crack, as many of the victims, including the ship’s crew, were from the island.

The attack on the *Caribou* came as *L’Action Catholique* was running a series of stories on the U-boat attacks in the St. Lawrence. The paper did not grasp the fact that the Canadian response to the U-boats was, for the most part, working. While the U-boats continued to patrol the region in the fall of 1942, their success had come mainly in the first weeks of the campaign when they had the element of surprise. *L’Action Catholique*’s series, written by Edouard Laurent, was likely expected to be inflammatory. Quebec premier Adelard Godbout sent

⁸⁵ Memorandum, Halifax, October 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

the series to King saying they were "the most complete and objective articles I have yet seen on the subject."⁸⁸ Eugene L'Heureux, the paper's editor, said his writer "collected a number of impressions with which he thought the public should be acquainted, in order to stimulate, not maliciously criticize, the men responsible for the defence of our shores and the river."⁸⁹

King's ministers tried to set Godbout straight by giving the Quebec premier accurate information about the Battle of the St. Lawrence and that disproved most of Laurent and Roy's more inflammatory allegations about weak defences along the Quebec coast. Air Minister C.G. Power authorized the leaking of the dates of the sinkings, names of ships and places of the attacks to Premier Godbout and to a Liberal Party organizer in Rimouski. They were supposed to pass this information to the editors of *L'Action Catholique* and to Laurent, presumably with the understanding the newspaper would set the record straight. Historian Nathan Greenfield believes this was a risky decision that may well have backfired against Canada "given *Action Catholique's* ties with pro-Vichy forces in Quebec and the Vichy government's puppet status." He wondered whether the information Ottawa released to the paper was used in two articles published in the Nazi party newspaper *Volkischer Beobachter* on November 4 and December 18.⁹⁰

At a meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Publication of Military Information on October 20, Eggleston and Lieutenant Commander C.H. Little

⁸⁸ Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence*, 178.

⁸⁹ L'Heureux to Charpentier, October 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5972 File: *L'Action Catholique*.

⁹⁰ Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence*, 179.

fought over press coverage of the sub attacks. Little demanded a strict interpretation of the censorship directives. Eggleston said the newspapers would not comply with censorship unless editors believed there were “real security reasons” for the suppression of news. Biggar, who was chairing the meeting, stepped in to try to smooth things over. The Navy, he said, had promised to write memoranda that would help the censors understand the situation. Maybe, he said, it would finally get around to doing so.

In the end, Tory leader Hanson’s argument that rumours would replace the censored facts was accurate. In early November 1942, Naval Minister Angus Macdonald had to try to kill a very persistent story that U-boat crews were coming ashore in Quebec to buy supplies. This rumour seemed unstoppable and was embellished through the fall with details about the food, cigarettes and chocolate bars the U-boat sailors supposedly bought from the co-operative Quebec merchants.⁹¹ On November 24, Macdonald gave a press conference to kill reports that somewhere between thirty and forty ships had been lost in the St. Lawrence. The true number was twenty in the entire region, taking in the St. Lawrence Estuary, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Strait of Belle Isle and the Cabot Strait.⁹²

Some attack stories still had propaganda value. In the summer of 1942, the unofficial truce between the offshore fishing fleet and the U-boats ended. In late July, *Lucille M*, an 85-ft. Lockeport, N.S.-based school ner, was sunk by shell fire from a U-boat 100 miles north of Seal Island on the George’s Bank. Three of

⁹¹ See memo December 7, 1942, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: Marine.

⁹² Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*, 3.

its ten survivors were hit and wounded when the Germans machine-gunned one of the schooner's dories. The navy, seeing the propaganda value of the story, quickly gave Jefferson permission to clear it for the Halifax newspapers.⁹³

The sub attack stories subsided in the late fall of 1942 as the shipping season ended and the U-boats left for better hunting. In December, the Gulf was closed to ocean shipping and most newspapers lost interest in the story. However, Quebec nationalists would not let the issue of Quebec coastal defence die: it was raised in the House of Commons in early March 1943, when Onesime Gagnon announced the loss of thirty ships the previous year. On March 15, Roy rose again in the House of Commons to say he had information that thirty-seven vessels were lost. Roy claimed to have witnessed a running battle between a submarine and Canadian corvettes and told the House such sights were common along the Gaspé Peninsula the previous summer.⁹⁴ These claims were reported by most of the major newspapers in the country. Some of them ignored Macdonald's numbers and expanded on Roy's House of Commons statements to tell what they knew of the 1942 St. Lawrence attacks.⁹⁵

That month, Opposition members of the Quebec Legislative Assembly took up the sub attack issue. Censors Jacques Girouard in Ottawa and Ed McMahon in Montreal let the stories run, despite McMahon's belief they would be used as German propaganda.⁹⁶

⁹³ Halifax, July 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Marine-action.

⁹⁴ Memorandum, Toronto (Perry), March 15, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: Marine.

⁹⁵ Greenfield, *The Battle of the St. Lawrence*, 3.

⁹⁶ Memorandum, Montreal, March 10, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine Miscellaneous.

The U-boats did not come back to the St. Lawrence in 1943 but they were active in Canadian waters. The iron ore port at Wabana, on Bell Island in Conception Bay, Newfoundland, which was attacked twice in 1942, was hit again in February 1943. The U-boat attack at Wabana made the Newfoundland papers on February 19, 1943, and Jefferson approved stories on the raid the following day for publication in Nova Scotia. Baldwin, who did not like the tenor of the Canadian stories and recognized their propaganda value to the Germans, imposed a blackout on broadcasting and exporting the story.⁹⁷

Jefferson, angry with the attempts by Halifax reporters to push censorship to the limit, advocated levying small fines against newspapers that went too far. "Even a fine of \$5 is sufficient to restrain the average daily, since 95 per cent of them operate on comparative shoe-strings," he argued. "Every reporter, deskman, editor and publisher knows that if he breaks a release his sheet will have to fork over, and that payment will be accompanied by instant office retaliation upon the guilty party. The result is they simply don't do it."⁹⁸

On October 21, 1943, *U-537* moored near Killiniq Island on the north tip of the Labrador Peninsula while crewmen went ashore to set up Weather Station Kurt which automatically beamed data to Germany. The previous summer, Inuit in the region talked about a submarine they had seen in the area. The story was picked up in August by Jim McLean, a Toronto *Star* stringer based in Winnipeg,

⁹⁷ Rulings, Ottawa, February 19 and February 20, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Miscellaneous-Production.

⁹⁸Memorandum, Halifax, August 16, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine: Miscellaneous.

and was passed by the censors, who believed the submarine was stalking the supply ship for the region.⁹⁹

The U-boats made a second major incursion into Canadian coastal waters in the summer and fall of 1944. The assault began with a German mine laying foray off Halifax in the late winter and the torpedoing of the SS *Watuka* in convoy SH-125 off Halifax by *U-802* on March 22. The Canadian Press did not report on the attack until mid-July.¹⁰⁰ Grand Admiral Doenitz sent four U-boats into the Gulf of St. Lawrence that year. At 2 a.m. on the night of October 14, 1944, *U-1223* torpedoed the HMCS *Magog* as she escorted convoy ONS-33 past Pointe-des-Monts, blowing the stern off the frigate and killing three men. On the night of November 24, *U-1228*, on its way out of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, sank the corvette HMCS *Shawinigan*, killing ninety-one men. Censors slapped a news blackout on those attacks.

In December 1944, Chapentier recommended to the Department of Justice that *Le Soleil* be prosecuted under the *Defence of Canada Regulations* for its story on the sinking of the Canadian National Railways steamship *Cornwallis* off Nova Scotia. This was followed up at a meeting of the Directorate of Censorship's Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, where Eggleston said "it was important that in an open breach of this kind, every effort should be made to punish the offender, since it would be difficult to obtain co-operation from other newspapers if they should come to the conclusion that there

⁹⁹ Ruling, Perry, Toronto Aug 17, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine Miscellaneous.

¹⁰⁰ Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*, 193.

was no real strength in the law.”¹⁰¹ The Minister of Justice, Louis St. Laurent, decided to charge *Le Soleil*, and the paper was fined \$50.¹⁰²

The threat of charges may have deterred the *Halifax Herald*, which contacted Jefferson January 9, 1945 to protest against continued suppression of stories about the loss of the *Cornwallis* and other sinkings. The *Herald's* editors decided to approach Angus L. Macdonald, who was in the Halifax, to ask him to lift the blackout. By then, the *Herald* was sitting on the stories of the sinking of one destroyer, one corvette, one minesweeper and three freighters. More were to come: in the early morning of January 14, 1945, U-boats attacked a convoy “almost within sight” of Halifax, hitting at least three freighters (and, according to Ken Chisholm of the *Halifax Herald*, also a Navy frigate).¹⁰³

The Halifax newspapers believed coverage of the latest U-boat attacks off Halifax was manipulated by the King government to help Defence Minister General A.G.L. McNaughton’s campaign in the Grey North by-election scheduled for February 5. McNaughton had stayed in Ottawa through the Christmas season, rather than campaign in what was considered a safe Liberal riding. On January 26, he told a campaign rally near Owen Sound he had been too busy to campaign because “today the North Atlantic is, as it has been for months past, alive with German submarines... We are having ships sunk day-by-day.”¹⁰⁴ In frustration, the *Herald* lashed out with an editorial cartoon that ran in its January

¹⁰¹ Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security meeting of December 20, 1945. In Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945 File: 1-A-3.

¹⁰² Memorandum, Jefferson, Halifax, January 14, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5951 File: 2-Action.

¹⁰³ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, Halifax, January 4, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5951 File: 2-Action.

¹⁰⁴ Hadley, *U-Boats Against Canada*, 285.

27 edition. Entitled “Don’t Gag the Right People,” the cartoon showed three figures named “Press”, “Public” and “Radio” gagged with cloths labeled “Censorship” and held in a darkened room.¹⁰⁵

Despite the protests from the paper, the cloak of secrecy was not lifted on the Christmas season attacks until February 10. The last major attack, on the minesweeper HMCS *Esquimalt* off Halifax on April 19 1945 by *U-190*, killed forty-four sailors. Jefferson, under pressure from the Navy, kept the story secret until VE Day, knowing it would be lost in the reports of victory (and, as it turned out, in coverage of the Halifax Riot). In the last days of the European war, Jefferson approved a story by Eric Dennis about the possible surrender of U-boats at east coast ports and on VE Day Jefferson lifted censorship on all of the Battle of the Atlantic material.¹⁰⁶

Probably few people in Halifax noticed the “now it can be told” stories, even in the newsrooms. Censorship of the submarine war ended just as thousands of sailors rioted in reaction to a municipal edict to close Halifax’s beer parlors and liquor stores on VE Day. Jefferson took a keen interest in the Halifax Riots - wandering the city gathering facts for a memo sent to Ottawa – as he had actually predicted them nine months earlier, saying in a memorandum that the sailors had legitimate complaints about being exploited by Halifax businesses.¹⁰⁷ He let the newspapers run every word of their coverage of the riots, and believed

¹⁰⁵ *Halifax Herald*, January 27, 1945.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, May 5, 1945 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: 1-G-7.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum, H. B. Jefferson, September 1944, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine Miscellaneous.

they missed many details.¹⁰⁸ He also passed all of the stories submitted on the Halifax ammunition magazine explosion of July 22, 1945.¹⁰⁹ By then, the focus of the war had shifted to the west coast in anticipation of a long fight with Japan.

There was little real need for censorship on the Canadian Pacific Coast until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The censors suppressed all stories about the hapless *City of Alberni*, the last five-masted schooner on the British Columbia coast, which drew press attention when it was towed into Vancouver in December 1940. In the spring of 1941 censorship on west coast focused on the armed merchant cruiser *Prince Henry's* successful raid on German shipping along the coast of central and South America and another armed merchant ship, the RCN auxiliary cruiser *Prince Robert*, which stopped the American liner *President Garfield* off Hawaii and removed four German airmen. The Toronto censors were able to keep the name of the *Prince Robert* out of the newspapers but several Toronto radio stations and CBC's national newscast broadcast it on April 30, 1941.¹¹⁰

Japan's thrust into the Central and South Pacific immediately placed British Columbia's ports in the war zone, both as potential attack targets and as clearing houses for news from the fighting zone. In those first months of the war, that news was invariably bad. The first major challenge on the West Coast was to

¹⁰⁸ Jefferson wrote a very detailed memorandum on the Halifax Riot. It was sent to Ottawa and to the regional offices because Jefferson believed his account was far more complete and unbiased than the coverage in the Halifax newspapers. See Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, May 10, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: 1-G-7.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum, H.B. Jefferson, July 22, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

¹¹⁰ Ruling, Toronto, April 30, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

keep a lid on news of the sinking of the Canadian Pacific troop ship *Empress of Asia*, which was shattered by Japanese bombers February 5, 1942, at Singapore. Don Mason, marine editor of the *Vancouver Sun*, had the story March 9, 1942, but Vancouver press censor Lew Gordon refused to clear it.¹¹¹

The censors wanted to release the story – certainly the Japanese knew they had wrecked the transport – but they continued to suppress it on the advice of Captain Brand of Naval Intelligence, who was “not very impressed with the [censors’] argument that there was not need to withhold information from the enemy merely because we had proof that the enemy knew more than we did.”¹¹²

A complete and vivid description of the loss of the ship, written by Gordon Sinclair, was killed by the *Toronto Star* after the censors demanded the removal of the ship’s name and the ranks of the men who were interviewed. However, vague survivor stories carried by Canadian Press describing a dive-bombed ship sunk in the South Pacific, but failing to mention its name and nationality, were approved.¹¹³

The censors also suppressed all news of the presence of Soviet ships in B.C. ports. The Soviets made the request for censorship to prevent friction between their government and the Japanese, with whom they were at peace. Lew Gordon ordered the *Vancouver Province* to change the caption under the

¹¹¹Ruling, Vancouver, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), 5950, File: Action-Marine. Those survivors fortunate enough to evade capture by the Japanese at the fall of Singapore landed in Halifax April 18 and some arrived by train in Vancouver May 8, 1942. Vancouver press censor Lew Gordon was besieged with requests by the local press for permission to publish interviews. Gordon would not agree, saying stories would provide too many hints that the lost ship was the *Empress of Asia*. These requests are in the same Library and Archives Canada file.

¹¹²*Ibid.*

¹¹³Memorandum, Ottawa, April 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action: Marine.

picture of what he called a “mangey-looking Siberian bear” that was a mascot aboard a Russian ship from “Siberian bear” to “A Seagoing bear.”¹¹⁴ The censors also turned down requests from the Vancouver newspapers for permission to mention the presence of Soviet ships in the city’s repair yards and complained when newspapers quoted anonymous sailors from unnamed ships spouting the “Russian party line.”¹¹⁵ This ban lasted until the fall of 1944.¹¹⁶

The censors did suppress stories of complaints by boat and ship owners about the trigger-happy shore batteries at Vancouver firing shots across their bows as they entered Vancouver harbor.¹¹⁷ The closest Vancouver came to any real naval action was the bombardment of Estevan Point on Vancouver Island by a Japanese submarine on June 20, 1942. The submarine’s deck gun targeted a lighthouse on the isolated northwest corner of Vancouver Island. The attack, which caused no injuries and no real damage, was one of a number of ineffective Japanese raids along the Pacific Northwest coast that caused a sensation in the press. The censors kept a lid on the story until military officials in Ottawa released it on June 22.¹¹⁸

On the Great Lakes, censorship focused on U.S. defence installations at Sault Ste. Marie and the U.S. government’s ban on stories of movements of ore carriers. On November 5, 1940, the Toronto *Telegram* published a story

¹¹⁴Vancouver, B. C., March 9, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

¹¹⁵Ruling, Vancouver, February 4, 1943 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

¹¹⁶Ruling, Vancouver, June 30, 1944 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Action-Marine.

¹¹⁷Ruling, Vancouver, September 18, 1942 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950 File: Action-Marine.

¹¹⁸Ruling, Vancouver, July 3, 1945 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

reminding its readers of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, which limited Canadian and U.S. naval strength on the Great Lakes. With British and Canadian acquiescence, it was being ignored by the U.S., which used Lake Michigan for naval training. That night, the British United Press was warned by the censors not to pick up the story. The news agency moved a story anyway, and the next day was told "there had been no change, nor would there be any, on this issue."¹¹⁹ The article was removed from the wire soon afterwards. The *Toronto Star* tried to run a story November 6 saying the *Telegram's* speculation that the Rush-Bagot Agreement would be re-negotiated was inaccurate, but the censors killed that story, saying "it was undesirable that any further publicity be given to the Rush-Bagot treaty affair." External Affairs officials concurred in the decision.¹²⁰

Some censorship of east coast and Great Lakes naval issues continued in the days after the European war ended. Just after VE-Day, Perry turned down a request from Russ Whitely of Canadian Press to write about the barrage balloons that floated above the Sault Ste. Marie locks, saying these were American installations and clearance should come from the U.S.¹²¹ All Canadian Naval censorship ended on VJ Day, August 15, 1945.

The Atlantic coast of Canada was a vital theatre in the war against Germany, the one place in the country invaded by the enemy. Hundreds of

¹¹⁹ Censorship Ruling, B.B.P. (Bart Perry), Toronto November 6, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5946 File: Part 4, Press Rulings.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Ruling, Toronto, May 9, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5953, File: Marine-Miscellaneous.

Canadian, British, and other Allied sailors died in fighting, and, as such, control of intelligence was vital. At the same time, journalists had the opportunity to engage in war correspondence from the safety of the Canadian mainland, while censors were called upon to control coverage of some of the most compelling stories of the war. In selecting Jefferson for the job of Halifax censor, the Directorate of Censorship made one of its best decisions of the war. Jefferson turned out to be strong enough to resist the pressures of both the Halifax media and the city's powerful contingent of military officers. He was able to maintain consistent censorship of the U-boat war off the East Coast while allowing some important stories of ship losses to be published, sometimes after a relatively brief waiting period.

Still, any coverage of the Battle of the Atlantic and the U-boat attacks in Canadian waters drew criticism from the Navy, which sought a complete news black-out of marine actions on both of Canada's coasts. Despite Jefferson's tight censorship, relations between the Navy and the censors were strained at best, and the Navy often left the censors ignorant of important events. This placed the censors at a disadvantage when dealing with reporters, who often knew more about the Battle of the Atlantic than the censors.

The naval censorship system broke down in the St. Lawrence, where censorship was out of Jefferson's hands, there were more media competing for news, and political factors competed strongly with the needs of the military for secrecy. Canadian newspapers and radio stations also took a much more intense interest in the St. Lawrence submarine attacks because they brought the

war into Canada. In Quebec, the censorship system never operated with the consistency of Jefferson's Halifax office. In fact, Quebec's nationalist press, which opposed participation in the war and had strong sympathies with the fascist Vichy French regime, would make a mockery of this aspect of the censorship system, a situation that reflected a larger pattern in the province.

Chapter Eight: Censoring the Media in Quebec

Censorship actions and policies in Quebec in many ways reflected Mackenzie King's fear that the war, and especially the issue of conscription, could tear the country apart. Through the war, his two Justice Ministers, Ernest Lapointe and Louis St. Laurent, were also King's Quebec lieutenants. Neither had any desire to aggravate the hostile Quebec nationalist press by laying charges against them for breaches of censorship. Therefore, the censors could never get control of them. Once the editors who opposed the involvement of Quebec manpower or materiel in the war realized censorship was an empty threat, they published anti-participation, pro-Vichy and anti-Semitic articles with impunity.

Of the four "mainstream" papers shut down in Canada in World War I, two were from Quebec: *Le Bulletin* of Montreal and Quebec City's *La Croix*.¹ During World War I, Chief Censor Ernest Chambers had suggested several times that *Le Devoir* also be closed. His recommendations had been ignored. Prime Minister Robert Borden said "[Henri] Bourassa [the Quebec nationalist hero who founded the paper] would like nothing better" than to become a martyr.² In the last year of the war, however, *Le Devoir* was blamed by some English-Canadian newspapers, including the *Vancouver Sun*, for instigating the Easter anti-draft

¹ The English-language papers were the *Sault Ste. Marie Express* and *Victoria Week*. Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda in Canada's Great War*, 76.

² Borden Papers, Diary May 30, 1915. Cited in Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda in Canada's Great War*, 77.

riots in Quebec and for the tightening of censorship that followed them.³

Bourassa issued a press release in May 1918, saying he would “submit” articles to Chambers and let the future “decide whether it [was] in conformity with the best interests of the country.” Bourassa instructed the acting editor, Georges Pelletier, to show the censor in advance all potentially controversial copy.⁴ In World War II, Pelletier, now armed with a law degree, was the managing editor of the paper, and in this war he was not letting anyone vet his stories.⁵

The censors knew the nationalist Quebec press would fight them. Still, it is unlikely they went into the war suspecting Mackenzie King’s government would so completely surrender to *Le Devoir*, Quebec City’s *Le Soleil* and *L’Evenement Journal*, and to the fringe Quebec journalists who would publish some of the most racist and pro-fascist material ever to run in commercial Canadian newspapers.

At the outbreak of the war, Claude Melancon, a popular member of the Canadian National Railway’s public relations team, became responsible for censorship of the French-language press. Four days later, a temporary office was opened in Montreal and Melancon began visiting the newsrooms of the city, meeting the editors-in-chief of *La Presse*, *La Patrie*, *Le Canada*, *Le Devoir*, the *Montreal Star*, the *Montreal Herald* and the *Montreal Gazette*, distributing copies of the Censorship Regulations and seeking the cordial co-operation of the editors

³ Censorship was tightened by the passage of PC 1241 in April 1918. Keshen, *Censorship and Propaganda in Canada’s Great War*, 77

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ The editor-in-chief was Omer Heroux, but Pelletier oversaw what went into the newspaper and wrote most of its editorials, which, unlike those in English Canadian newspapers, were signed by the author. Pelletier handled all of the personal meetings and correspondence with the censors.

and their staffs. That genteel situation did not last long, as the province, and Melancon, were soon plunged into one of the roughest provincial elections in Canadian history. Maurice Duplessis, just finishing his first term as Quebec's conservative, nationalist premier, had decided to call an election on Mackenzie King's decision to go to war and raised the divisive issue of conscription.

From the day he started his censorship job, Melancon, headquartered in the Post Office Building on Place d'Armes in Old Montreal, struggled to try to keep the French-language press from breaching the *Defence of Canada Regulations* with anti-participation and anti-war articles. When the offending publications were owned by the Roman Catholic Church, Melancon by-passed their editors and went to the superiors of their religious orders. This proved quite effective.⁶ Nothing, however, stopped the privately-owned nationalist press.

Even before the German attack on Poland, *Le Devoir* and other, less important, nationalist papers and magazines had come out against Canadian participation in a war against Hitler. In the days between Britain's declaration of war and Canada's parliamentary vote, nationalists packed halls in Montreal to show their opposition to Canadian involvement. On September 6, 1939, Pelletier telegraphed Thompson: "Do we understand censorship orders to suppress all accounts public meetings held against outside participation until Parliament

⁶ Activity Report, March, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5940, File: Minutes of Various Censorship Advisory Committee Meetings Vol. 1.

decides by the end of the week about what has to be done? Please rush answer as meetings are held these days.”⁷

In fact, RCMP officers were busy in Montreal attending these meetings. They infiltrated a huge rally organized by *L'Action liberale nationale* leader Paul Gouin, son of former Quebec Liberal premier and retired federal Justice Minister Sir Lomer Gouin, in the Maisonneuve Market on September 4 and gathered information on the leaders of the city's anti-war movement. The evening Pelletier sent his telegram asking to be allowed to report on these meetings, two Mounties lurked in the crowd of about 4,000 people that filled St. Jacques Market Hall in Old Montreal. The meeting was tense, with at least one fight breaking out in the crowd. Phillippe Girard, president of the Syndicats Catholiques de Montreal, the umbrella group for much of the city's trade union movement, said the war would not destroy democracy. It would die, he said, because of “Judeo-International finance.” Addressing French-Canadian World War I veterans in the crowd, Girard said only English-speaking soldiers had been given pensions and jobs. He ended his speech by saying “Don't worry, we will have something to eat without going to war. Let's send the Jews to the war.”⁸

The Montreal *Gazette* demanded the federal government use its *War Measures Act* powers to shut down the meetings and stifle the debate on Canadian participation. “It will not do to play at this war business,” the *Gazette* editorial said. “It will not do for the Government to ignore any overt act designed

⁷ Telegram Pelletier to Thompson September 6, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1

⁸ Memorandum re: Anti-War Participation Meeting – Montreal, September 7, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1

or calculated to give comfort to this country's enemies."⁹ The Mounties agreed, asking for "a strict censorship" of any mention of the meetings in the press or radio.¹⁰ Thompson called Pelletier on September 8 to ask him not to publish anything from the anti-war meetings.¹¹

A signed editorial by Pelletier that ran in *Le Devoir* on September 16 laid the blame for the war on Britain, which it claimed had the power early in Hitler's reign to nip Nazism in the bud. He contended that the British had let the opportunity slip and had declared war only to protect their colonial interests. Had war come because "for centuries the cities of Poland have harboured thousands of Jews whom England does not want to be dispersed?" he asked. England had never fought for Quebec, except in 1759, "and that was to take us over."¹²

The provincial election campaign that began in the third week of September gave the nationalists a large stick to use on both the federal government and the provincial Liberals under Adelard Godbout, who was quickly portrayed in the Duplessis-supporting press as a stooge of Mackenzie King and his Quebec lieutenant, Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe. Lapointe, who, with Charles G. "Chubby" Power and P.J.A. Cardin, had staked his House of Commons seat on the outcome, seemed to do more campaigning than

⁹ "Ottawa and Paul Gouin" (editorial), *Montreal Gazette*, September 6, 1939.

¹⁰ Memorandum T.S. Wood, Commissioner of the RCMP, to the Chief Press Censor, September 8, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

¹¹ Memorandum, Ottawa, September 8, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

¹² The English text is from the Government Translation Office. Memorandum for water Thompson Esq. Chief Censor Re: Editorial signed by Georges Pelletier. GB. September 16, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1

Godbout.¹³ A few days after Duplessis called the election, *Le Devoir* came out with an editorial saying the broadcast censorship rules would be an issue in the campaign, and that Lapointe was the architect of those rules. The censorship regulations, the paper's editor claimed, would furnish Duplessis with another argument in favour of his contention that Ottawa was engaged in undue intervention in Quebec's affairs. "We believe he will make use of this argument," Pelletier predicted with considerable accuracy.¹⁴

Quebec City's *L'Evenement-Journal*, co-owned by lawyer and former provincial Liberal cabinet minister Jacob Nicol,¹⁵ reacted with outrage to the news that the press and radio would be censored during the campaign. How, the editors asked, could the federal government question the loyalty of Quebeckers and their government? Just a few months before, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth had been "received with enthusiasm" in the province. "Mr. Lapointe and his colleagues will have to bear the brunt of their revolting decision."¹⁶

This was the same newspaper that had carried, in the first three weeks of the war, a series of long articles under the standing headline "Daily Letter from Adolf Hitler." In the first letter, supposedly written to his sister, "Hitler" wrote: "This news that Canada declares war on me has caused me great sorrow. For, after all, those Canadians, I have done them nothing. In the past, their country belonged to France; later, England grabbed it; the Germans have never mixed in

¹³ John MacFarlane gives almost all the credit for the provincial Liberal victory in the 1939 Quebec election to Lapointe. See John MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec's Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, Chap. 9.

¹⁴ Memorandum, September 28, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

¹⁵ Nicole was appointed by King to the Senate in 1944.

¹⁶ Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File:2A/E-35.

this squabble, now forgotten, anyway.” The bogus Hitler informed readers he had asked Hermann Goering to undertake research to find out if there were any linguistic, cultural or political affinities between the Poles and the Canadians. The writer wondered “what in the world has urged the government of His Very Canadian Majesty to declare war on me. If it is another country which has forced her hand, I shall protest, on the principle that peoples have the right to dispose of themselves.”¹⁷ In the next letter, “Hitler” said he could understand why England and France had declared war, “But the Canadians! They know, the Canadians, that never shall I go to war against them at home. I had decided not to bother them, for the good reason that I even ignored their existence, but, if they declare war on me, who has done them no wrong, I will certainly have to make them pay for it.” The writer claimed Hitler craved nothing in North America and knew, in any case, the United States would intervene if Canada was attacked.¹⁸

By September 14, “Hitler” was no longer writing to his sister, but to a friend, “Baptiste”, in Canada. “Dear Mr. Baptiste,” the pseudo-Hitler wrote, “you have indeed reason not to want to get killed in Europe, as Europe would not want death in America for your sake - not even England.”¹⁹ Two days later, “Hitler” thanked Britain on the editorial page of *L'Evenement-Journal* for selling Germany steel and machinery before the Labour Day weekend attack on the Poles: “We will give it all back to them, in the shape of bombs or other things, in the garden of France.” The writer said Mackenzie King's slogan was “Canada first...at war”

¹⁷ The translations are in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File:2A/E-35.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

which meant "England, once more, would fight to the last Canadian. It is, I am told, the application of one of the principles of economic warfare." Canada, "Hitler" said on September 19, is a country of North America and so "should stay silent."²⁰

The censors had the "letters" translated and circulated them among government officials. Melancon took the train to Quebec City and visited the paper's editor, Bruno Lafleur, to complain about the articles. He got a promise of co-operation, but they continued to be published until the end of the first week of the election campaign.²¹

Meanwhile, *Le Devoir* made a bizarre claim in an editorial published September 16 that men were being fired from good jobs across Canada to compel them to enlist. That allegation was picked up by Duplessis's candidates who used it throughout the election campaign. Two days before the election, Union Nationale candidate Dona Dussaul added some more detail to the myth, telling a small-town crowd in Portneuf, near Quebec City, that in Toronto "young men are fired from their offices so as to force them to enlist. The same thing has been done in Montreal and the young unemployed, so as not to starve to death, have enlisted." The censors documented the spread of this allegation but, because of the voluntary nature of their work, they could not stop the rumour.²²

In the last week of the campaign, *Le Devoir* and several smaller newspapers carried an attack on Canadian participation by American aviation

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ The last one ran September 29, 1939.

²² The paper supported the accusations. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

hero Charles Lindbergh. *L'Evenement-Journal* used Lindbergh's statement as a cudgel to beat the federal government and the censors. Lapointe might be able to stifle the Quebec press, *L'Evenement-Journal* said, but it was afraid to censor comments made by the United States' national hero. "Mr. Lindbergh has stated that Canada had no business to enter this war. By preferring the British Crown to America's independence, Canada has broken the continental peace, says Lindbergh."²³

Anti-war sentiment in Quebec was Lapointe's fault, *L'Evenement-Journal* argued, because things would have been peaceful if he "had not provoked French Canadian opinion and had not reopened the question of his war policy." Lapointe, the editors argued, was prepared to risk the unity of the country to help Godbout beat Duplessis. Voters had the right to use the election as a referendum on the King government's war policies. Everything should be open to debate, argued the editors, "from the declaration of war itself through the war measures, censorship and the loan of \$200,000,000 [to Britain], up to the means employed by Mr. Lapointe to gag public opinion in view of conscription. No power on earth can now prevent the French Canadian voice from being heard." Duplessis beat the censorship gong through the election and promised, if he was re-elected, "the newspapers will publish all that they want: popular liberties shall be reestablished."²⁴ Again, the censors reported the comments to their superiors but took no serious action.

²³ Memorandum, Montreal, Oct. 23, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

²⁴ Censorship Memorandum, Oct. 24, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

In the rest of the country, the anti-participationist Quebec press and any other publications that did not instinctively oppose Duplessis got little sympathy. Even the *Montreal Gazette*, a Tory paper but hardly a mouthpiece for Duplessis, was attacked. *The Globe and Mail* criticized the *Gazette* for playing “a role offering plausible excuses for Mr. Duplessis’s ‘active treachery.’” The *Gazette* had questioned the right of the Censorship Coordination Committee to impose restrictions “upon the Crown’s First Minister in an autonomous province.” The *Globe* said the *Gazette* had no right to assume a provincial party leader “for the time being enjoys citizenship privileges distinct from those of the common herd.”²⁵ Later, the *Globe* would be far less forgiving of the press censorship system, especially when it showed signs of political bias.

When the storm broke, though, it was not over *L’Evenement-Journals* fake letters from Hitler or *Le Devoir’s* isolationism. The first big fight was over radio censorship. Quebec’s Francophone print media joined with Duplessis in attacking the tough new broadcast rules. The press anger was not confined to Quebec. Nine days after it had attacked the *Montreal Gazette* for opposing press censorship in the Quebec election, the *Globe* was singing a different tune about radio. CCF MP M.J. Coldwell’s protests to the Prime Minister about the censorship of political speeches, the *Globe* said, “probably expressed the fear in the minds of many liberty-loving people that we are in danger of losing permanently those privileges fought so dearly by our forefathers. Considering the

²⁵ “Censorship is for All,” editorial, *The Globe and Mail*, September 29, 1939, 6.

recent rulings of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the fear is not unfounded."²⁶

Even the Communist paper *Clarte*, which Duplessis wanted shut down, carried a cartoon on the editorial page showing a huge figure of Lapointe towering over a cringing censor. The censor, scissors in hands, reads manuscripts marked "Speeches." On the same page, a small note repeated that it was forbidden to mention weather forecasts.²⁷

L'Evenement-Journal was among the first Quebec newspapers to criticize the broadcast censorship, arguing in a mocking editorial October 2 that Duplessis was being censored while Hitler's speeches were broadcast uncut.²⁸

The censors then approached Joseph Bernard, Editor-in-Chief of *Le Soleil* of Quebec City, whose company was a major shareholder in *L'Evenement-Journal*, complaining Bruno Lafleur, *L'Evenement-Journal's* editor, refused to buckle to censorship. Claude Melancon visited Conservative Senator Lucien Moraud and lawyer Frederic Dorion, two other co-owners of *L'Evenement-Journal*. Dorion admitted the paper breached censorship regulations and said the owners were not happy with Lafleur's conduct, but they would not fire him. Instead, Moraud and Dorion suggested, the censors should appoint someone to work full-time in the newsroom of *L'Evenement-Journal*.²⁹ The censors may well have been tempted: the next day, the paper ran a patch of blank space on its editorial page, claiming interference by federal censorship. The front page of the October 5

²⁶ "A Wartime Exception." Editorial, *The Globe and Mail*, October 9, 1939, 6.

²⁷ *Clarte*, September 27, 1939.

²⁸ *L'Evenement Journal*, October 2, 1939.

²⁹ Memorandum, October 3, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

edition of the paper carried a note under the heading "Broadcast Speeches" saying the censorship system was simply Lapointe's political tool in Quebec. *L'Evenement-Journal* told its readers it was poorly regarded in Ottawa, and that its editors published "at their own risk."³⁰

The next day, the paper carried another editorial hammering censorship. Headlined "Lapointe's radio-decision," the editorial attacked the Justice Minister for his "revolting procedure," of gagging the media in Quebec. "When the public realized," it added, "that Mr. Lapointe wished to prevent its being informed, it was filled with disgust." Broadcast censorship, *L'Evenement-Journal's* editors charged, was Lapointe's "air-raid."

Ten days later, Thompson sent Dorion another letter, this time complaining about an article by Lafleur in *L'Evenement-Journal's* October 15 edition containing material Lafleur said had been cut by the censors from a radio speech. The speech was illustrated with drawings of a pair of scissors and a gagged CBC microphone. Thompson objected to a paragraph in the article that said "Mr. Lapointe should know what he has done for the young people; he has given them all the necessary chances to become cannon-fodder. What the young Frenchmen and the young Englishmen would do if they were in our place: they would remain at home, because they are intelligent..." Lafleur's words were, according to Chief Censor Thompson, a violation of Section 39(a) of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. "Moreover," Thompson wrote, "the sensational title across the front-page of the same issue, through the importance given to it and

³⁰ October 17, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

the general attitude of the newspaper, can be considered as insidious." The paper's editors had already run a front-page editorial entitled "Censorship and Weather," saying *Le Soleil* and several radio stations had declared the day before that on orders from the censors it was forbidden to announce the weather for the next day. *L'Evenement-Journal* would print the day's weather forecast, stating sarcastically that it "was not officially notified that such a stupid decision had been taken" and that it "hope[d] this will in no way affect the success of His Majesty's and the Allied armies, nor the health of Honourable Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Censorship in Canada." In the same issue, the paper carried another editorial, headlined "First Encroachment," which denounced the broadcast censorship and laid the blame for it on King and Lapointe.³¹

In an October speech in Sherbrooke, Lapointe went after censorship's critics. In answer to Duplessis's promise to never submit his speeches to Lapointe's men in Quebec, the Justice Minister said: "Who are these censors? The Radio representative on the Censorship Committee is Mr. [R.F. Landry, Corporate Secretary of the C.B.C.] Landry, Secretary of the CBC, a grandson of Senator Landry and a son of General Landry's. He comes from a Conservative family so he is not an employee of Lapointe. I have the greatest confidence in his impartiality." The lawyers sent to Quebec to handle radio censorship were also apolitical, Lapointe said. "Paul Fontaine could not be accused of ever having been interested in politics... Mr. Gibeault, who came to the Department of Justice under Mr. Bennett, is a Conservative and an honourable gentleman." Warming

³¹October 27, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

up in front of a friendly crowd, Lapointe finished: "if I control Censorship, you must admit I must be a good fellow to allow myself to be abused as I am every evening on the air."³²

In many ways, the critics of radio censorship misrepresented it to the people of Quebec as something crafted in a totalitarian state. Still, it was a heavy-handed system that was bound to create hard feelings in an election campaign that saw isolationists fighting for their political lives and, in the short-term, losing. Beginning September 1, 1939, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation had taken precautionary measures and issued directives to all broadcasting stations in Canada "for the security, defence, peace, order welfare of the country."

Landry, was, in fact, appointed radio broadcasting censor by the Minister of Transport. Before the Quebec election was called, Landry and the Censorship Coordinating Committee had decided that all political broadcasts concerning municipal, provincial and federal issues (which, in those days were almost always broadcast live from radio studios) would be pre-censored. He issued a directive requesting all stations to supply to the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC, H.N. Stovin, an outline of all talks and commentaries before permission for broadcasts was granted.³³ If Stovin or his delegated censor had concerns that a broadcast might contravene the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, the person applying to make an on-air speech was required to submit the full texts of

³² Precis of the Quebec Press, October 16, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: LeDevoir1.

³³ For most broadcast journalists, Stovin became the "face" of censorship as directives and rulings were usually issued over his signature.

the talk for examination. The committee decided on September 22 to confine all on-air political addresses to radio stations; speeches from public meetings would not be broadcast. The directive on this policy was sent to radio stations on September 25. The mechanism for vetting political broadcasts had not been created, but it was not expected Stovin, the Supervisor of Station Relations, would vet every outline or script himself.

The day before the directive went out, Maurice Duplessis called the election. The Censorship Co-ordination Committee decided to appoint federal lawyers as broadcast censors in Quebec, placing them in Montreal, Quebec City, Rimouski and New Carlisle. Certainly, it was a decision that could raise suspicion of interference by the Justice Minister. The government had never employed lawyers as front-line censors and would not do so again. These censors made deletions to approximately 250 of the scripts and texts submitted during the election campaign.

The cuts did not stop the Union Nationale Party from getting its message onto the airwaves. Duplessis's people simply ignored the censors' decisions and broke the rule against mentioning their speeches were censored. On October 4, a Mr. C. Coderre, representing the Union Nationale, announced on the Montreal station CBF that he would not give his radio speech because his party would not submit to censorship. The broadcast was immediately switched to recorded music.³⁴

³⁴ Censorship memorandum, October 5, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

In at least one instance, the station manager literally pulled the plug on a Union Nationale speaker. This was an October 7, 1939 broadcast by Noel Dorion over CBV, Quebec City's CBC station. The studio operator switched off the power to Dorion's microphone when Dorion began reading sections of the speech that had been deleted by censors. Dorion later told Aurele Seguin, the station manager, that Duplessis had instructed him to ignore the censors.³⁵

The following day, Jean Blais of the Union Nationale repeated Dorion's actions. This time, Landry sent a telegram to all radio stations in Quebec telling censors to use scissors to cut out parts of texts that violated the DCR. Other speakers told their audience their scripts had been cut by "the censorship of Mr. Lapointe." CBF Montreal began announcing at the end of each political broadcast that it was not censoring on its own accord, but because of orders from Ottawa.³⁶

Stovin sent a telegram October 12 to stations in Quebec telling them to read a statement over the air if a speech was cut off in mid-sentence. In English it read: "We regret to inform you that we have been obliged to discontinue the address of Mr. X by virtue of the Defence of Canada Regulations and the directives issued there-under." Landry was willing to live with a more neutral

³⁵ Censorship memorandum, October 8, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

³⁶ Landry, who could not speak French, had the announcement translated by the federal government's Bureau of Translation. Their interpretation was: "The Committee of Censors entrusted with the administration of the Defence of Canada Regulations is alone responsible for the censorship of all political speeches, and neither the CBC nor any other Government authority have [sic] any say in the matter." Memorandum, October 13, 1939 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

statement, but, on October 17, the Censorship Co-ordination Committee held firm.³⁷

The manager of Montreal's Radio Canada station tried to hold Landry to his earlier position that it would be permissible to broadcast a simple statement that all broadcasts were censored, but Landry had been over-ruled. To make its position more clear, the censors sent another telegram demanding pre-censorship of all "political news" carried on Radio Canada. Another telegram went out on October 19 over Stovin's name warning all stations not to broadcast anything about the provincial election in the two days before the vote. To do so would violate the *Broadcast Act*.

On election night, there were no interviews of candidates or broadcasts of the victory and concession speeches of the candidates. Announcers read the results and reporters had to stick to pre-censored scripts. In his report on the election broadcast censorship, submitted six days after the election, Landry praised the CBC's staff for its help.³⁸

The pro-Duplessis papers would not forget. Their party had suffered a crushing defeat, winning only fifteen seats while the Liberals won seventy (one independent was elected). *L'Evenement-Journal*, in its November 21, 1939 issue, quoted Duplessis saying in Montreal: "Mr. Lapointe had insulted the Province of Quebec by preventing the broadcast of speeches from meetings." According to Duplessis, "Hitler in Germany was favoured by the CBC, to the detriment of the

³⁷ Censorship memorandum, October 17, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

³⁸ Censorship memorandum, October 31, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

Province of Quebec... Under Mr. Lapointe in this Province, one cannot sing, play the piano or the violin.”³⁹

It would not be long until the Quebec press got another chance to take on the King government’s censorship. *Le Devoir’s* challenge of facts in a news release from the French High Command in November sparked a letter of protest from Count Robert de Dampierre, France’s Minister in Canada, who said the *Le Devoir* story showed Montreal news copy was being written in Berlin.⁴⁰ The complaint was passed on to censor Claude Melancon, who was told by Pelletier that the paper had not meant to impugn the honesty of the French. The wording, Pelletier said, was innocent but a grammatical error had crept in. “I warned him that the defeatist [sic] attitude of his newspaper might lead to serious trouble,” Melancon told the Ottawa headquarters, “and he re-expressed his desire to avoid any kind of trouble.”⁴¹ Censorship was getting under Pelletier’s skin. On December 9, 1939, he wrote a long article about the difficulties of publishing a paper under the censorship regime.

In February 1940, just as Canada headed into a federal election, Melancon wrote to J. F. MacNeill, Deputy Minister of Justice, enclosing several clippings from *Le Devoir* to show “the insidious way” the paper conducted its campaign against participation. MacNeill replied, reminding Melancon the paper’s articles “could be a good deal worse.” He said he did not believe the paper could

³⁹ Clippings of these articles are in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 6968 File: 2A/E-35.

⁴⁰ De Dampierre to Thompson November 16, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁴¹ Melancon to H.G. Lash, Executive General Assistant, Censorship Co-ordination Committee, November 23, 1939. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

be stopped “unless we put into effect very rigid censorship regulations and I doubt very much whether the Government is prepared to do this.”⁴² During the federal election campaign of 1940, the paper did not endorse any political party, taking the editorial position that both major parties are in favor of participation in the war.⁴³

Mackenzie King’s election timing of the March election was exquisite. Just after the vote, Hitler’s armies overran Denmark and Norway, then ruptured the borders of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. The government of the Third Republic accepted a humiliating peace. German troops marched into Paris on June 14 and power fell into the hands of Marshal Phillippe Pétain, who had saved France in World War I. During the intervening years, Pétain had come to hate the Third Republic for what he viewed as its socialism and its insistence on the separation of Church and State. Within months of assuming power over the rump of France left to him by Hitler, Pétain erected from his headquarters in the resort city of Vichy a conservative corporatist state with strong ties to the Roman Catholic Church.

Le Devoir became Vichy’s most important mainstream media supporter in Canada. In early July 1940, Pelletier struck at Vichy’s critics in the English Canadian press by writing a confidential letter to Charpentier. The English-language press had no right to denounce the Pétain regime as treacherous, as had the *Ottawa Journal*, the *Winnipeg Tribune* and the *Winnipeg Free Press* in recent articles. The people of Quebec would be affronted, he said, if he reprinted

⁴² Melancon to MacNeill, February 12, 1940 and MacNeill to Melancon, undated. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Records of the Directorate of Censorship, Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁴³ Editorial *Le Devoir* March 16, 1940, 6.

the editorials. *Le Devoir*, Pelletier argued, simply spoke for French-Canadians, the majority of whom, he said, opposed participation in the war. Pelletier was trying to be civil, but he could see no reason for the Francophone press to moderate its tone while the English-language press could indulge in French-bashing.⁴⁴

Charpentier replied that the English-language press was simply reacting to signs of support in Quebec for Pétain's collaborationist regime and what he saw as a nescient (and rather short-lived) movement among Quebec anti-war activists for annexation to the neutral United States. They (unlike *Le Devoir*) had followed the censorship regulations.⁴⁵ The exchange was followed with a *Le Devoir* front page editorial lauding the end of the French-British Entente Cordiale. The censors recommended the Department of Justice lay charges, but nothing came of the complaint.⁴⁶

Through that summer and fall of 1940, *Le Devoir* continued its guerilla war with the censors. The censors wanted charges for a September 6 article written by Léopold Richer, the paper's parliamentary correspondent, who denounced England for its past iniquities, aggressions and conquests. Charpentier had already warned Pelletier that the paper's articles would be censored before publication unless he stopped publishing anti-British and isolationist material. In late November Pelletier submitted an article by Richer about the Republic of Ireland's opposition to supporting Britain against Hitler. Charpentier spiked it

⁴⁴ Memorandum, Pelletier to Charpentier, July 6, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁴⁵ Charpentier to Pelletier, July 8, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁴⁶ Georges Pelletier, "Sur un chapitre d'histoire (1904-1940)", *Le Devoir* July 13, 1940, 1.

because it was ironic and sarcastic. *Le Devoir* also raised the stakes by publishing a series of letters from Vichy Senator Alcide Ebray in the summer of 1940.⁴⁷

The censors were also dealing with another brush fire, this time coming from the English-language press in Quebec. On June 21, the day before the French government quit the war, Parliament passed the *National Resources Mobilization Act*. This law gave the federal government huge powers to requisition property and manpower for defence, but only within the borders of Canada. The law required adult Canadians to register with the federal government. Registration centres were to be set up in communities across the country.

Montreal mayor Camillien Houde opposed the use of office space in Montreal's city hall and other municipally-owned buildings to administer the NRMA. On August 2, he said publicly: "I declare myself peremptorily against national registration. It is unequivocally a measure of conscription, and the [federal] government recently elected last March, declared through the mouths of all its political chieftains, from Prime Minister Mackenzie King to Premier Adélard Godbout of Quebec... that there would be no conscription in any form whatsoever... If the government wants a mandate for Conscription, let it come before the people, without this time fooling them."⁴⁸ Three days later, Houde was

⁴⁷ Charpentier to J.W. Pickersgill, September 11, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1. This letter can also be found in the Mackenzie King records, Library and Archives Canada microfilm file C-4867. The decision on the November Richer article is in a letter from Charpentier to Richer dated November 26, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁴⁸ *Montreal Gazette*, August 3, 1941, 1.

arrested under the *War Measures Act* on a warrant signed by federal Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe. He stayed locked up at internment camps in eastern Ontario and New Brunswick until August 1944.

The censors felt bound by an opinion given by lawyers at the Department of Justice at the beginning of the war that newspapers should not report subversive speeches. If they did so, the publishers shared the guilt of the people who made them, and, in fact, by spreading the subversive statements, they might actually “enlarge the offence.” The censors did not like the ruling, which “proved to be a most embarrassing and impractical one from the very beginning, particularly in the Province of Quebec.”⁴⁹ Still, they felt bound to enforce it.

The *Montreal Gazette* carried a long story on Houde’s speech in its first edition of August 3. When Baldwin called during the press run, he was asked by an assistant city editor (a relatively junior position in a newspaper’s management hierarchy) whether censorship authorities wanted the presses to stop. According to the *Gazette*, Baldwin said “no.” Baldwin told the paper to remove the story from its next edition, and, the paper later reported, “at great inconvenience and expense to the *Gazette*, in the hour elapsing between the early and early mail [Quebec City] edition, three columns were lifted from the front page, filled in with whatever could be hastily assembled, and the paper went to press again, fifteen minutes late.”⁵⁰

The president of the *Gazette*, John Bassett, was told of the controversy. He phoned two cabinet ministers, Defence Minister J.L. Ralston and Secretary of

⁴⁹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

⁵⁰ Editorial, *Montreal Gazette*, August 6, 1940, 6.

State Pierre-F. Casgrain (the minister responsible for press censorship). *The Globe and Mail* had already picked up the story for its first edition and a Montreal radio station broadcast Houde's statement in its 10:30 newscast.⁵¹

Houde's comment and arrest generated the kind of publicity that any reasonable person would expect when the mayor of the country's largest city is carted off to prison without anything resembling due process for making a public statement that a sizeable number of his constituents agreed with. The mass-circulation newspapers like *LaPresse* believed Houde was a victim of Ottawa's pro-conscription lobby, though *Le Devoir* thought the mayor had brought his troubles down on himself. Houde's opponents relished the arrest of the flamboyant conservative mayor. On August 6, the Liberal-leaning *Montreal Star* reported with glee: "[The police] found a large part of Houde's library to consist of books about Napoleon. They had seen a similar library only a few weeks ago when they arrested and interned Adrien Arcand, leader of the Canadian Fascists. Another prominent student of Napoleonic lore is Adolf Hitler."⁵² The government could not have asked for kinder coverage.

Most major papers condemned what they saw as a crude, politically-motivated attempt to censor coverage of Houde's statement. "The reaction of the press was immediate and violent against Press Censorship," the censors wrote in their final report in 1946. "The argument most widely used was that in a democracy censorship should not restrict such statements, as the voting public had the right to know what its leaders had to say and, in the case of Mr. Houde,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Quoted in Purcell, "Wartime Press Censorship in Canada," 72-73.

why punitive action was taken.” The censors agreed, but felt they should abide by the Department of Justice ruling.⁵³

The next morning, a Saturday, Bassett called the Opposition Leader, R.B. Hanson, and read him Houde’s statement. That afternoon, debate opened in the House of Commons on Houde’s statement and the censorship of the *Gazette*. Hanson asked: “Have we any longer a free press in Canada?” Prime Minister Mackenzie King remarked in the House: “Any newspaper office that had seen it [the Houde statement] ought to have prevented its publication. Certainly, I think it was quite correct that the censor should ask that the statement be censored.”⁵⁴ Eggleston and Charpentier sent a telegram to the *Gazette* and the rest of the newspapers in Canada saying the comments in Parliament could be reported. The *Gazette* did not publish Sundays. Its editors claim to have tried to track down Charpentier and Eggleston when the Monday paper was being put together. Neither censor could be found. The *Gazette* decided to print what it had on Houde’s statement, including the material it had spiked Friday after its first edition.

In an editorial in the Monday paper, the *Gazette*’s editors said: “(T)he Prime Minister’s belief ‘any newspaper office’ should have suppressed the story on its own initiative, suffice to say that this opinion was not shared by either the *Gazette* or *The Globe and Mail*, the only newspaper offices affected on Friday

⁵³ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

⁵⁴ *Hansard*, August 3, 1940 1194.

evening.” The *Gazette*’s editors believed on August 2 that publication of the story was in the public interest, and that no valid reason existed for its suppression.⁵⁵

Eggleston and Charpentier challenged the editorial’s assertions of fact and the *Gazette*’s time line in a memorandum they wrote to the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister. Neither the *Gazette* nor the *Globe* had asked for a ruling on their Houde stories, and, in fact, it was not the censors’ job to save the papers from themselves. The censors had only done so when they learned of the Houde stories from Canadian Press. Baldwin said he had called the *Gazette* at 10:03, possibly before the press started running. The censors noted they did not have the power to order the *Gazette* to keep its first edition off the street, but they did have the obligation to warn the *Gazette* that it risked breaking the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, and Baldwin had done so.⁵⁶

The following day, August 7, *The Globe and Mail* editorialized against the “arbitrary and unwarranted actions of civil servants whose duty is to protect the lives of soldiers, sailors and airmen, and not to save the skins of politicians,” adding that, in the Houde case, “misdirected censorship zeal” was alien to Mackenzie King’s “lifetime policy of trusting the people.” The *Globe* insisted the publishers of Canadian newspapers were as well qualified as the government of Canada and the press censors to decide what is in the public interest. They had co-operated loyally in the suppression of naval and military intelligence and would continue to do so, but they were not convinced that it is their duty to submit to political censorship which would prevent the publication of news and opinions

⁵⁵ Editorial, *The Montreal Gazette*, August 6, 1940

⁵⁶ Memorandum, Wilfrid Eggleston and Fulgence Charpentier, August 6, 1940, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4567.

which were merely embarrassing to the politicians. Publishers should be trusted to maintain 'British ideals of freedom of speech and freedom of the press' and people should insist upon their right to discuss "fairly but fearlessly the shortcomings of politicians. Failure, corruption, sabotage of the war effort and other misdeeds of malefactors and Quislings must be dragged into the light of day."⁵⁷

On August 8, the censors issued Directive 61, which allowed the reporting of the facts of Houde's case as long as the statement itself was not repeated. Two days later, the *Globe* warned the censors to be careful "about playing with political fire in the future... The task of the Censors is easy if they remember that the acid test in any instance must be: 'Does it help the enemy?' The politicians will look after themselves."⁵⁸

The Ottawa *Citizen* made the issue personal, saying "Montreal's supreme demagogue", Mayor Houde had, through the actions of the press censors, received far more publicity than if the censors had not interfered. The paper singled out "Messrs. Eggleston and Charpentier" who were former members of the press gallery on Parliament Hill but now just carried out the will of Mackenzie King, "including guidance to the Canadian press on editorial policy."⁵⁹

Regulation 63A, issued two years after Houde's internment, formalized the powers of the censors. At the same time, the censors received a promise from the Department of Justice that no newspaper would be prosecuted for publishing

⁵⁷ Editorial, *The Globe and Mail*, August 7, 1940, 6.

⁵⁸ Editorial, *The Globe and Mail*, August 10, 1940 6.

⁵⁹ *Ottawa Citizen*, August 9, 1940, 1.

in good faith a subversive statement made in public, as long as that statement was not supported or exploited.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, Houde continued to wait for his release. On April 21, 1943, O.M. Biggar, who was then Director of Censorship, reported to the Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security that he had been asked to seek the advice of the committee about advertisements that ran in *Le Petit Journal* and *La Patrie* seeking money for a fund to promote measures aimed at gaining Houde's release. The committee, made up of the senior officials of the Directorate of Censorship and high-ranking military intelligence officers, decided that punishing or suppressing the publications for running the advertisements for the fund posed more of a danger to the war effort than the advertisements themselves.⁶¹ Houde was finally released in August, 1944, and won re-election as mayor that fall.

The failure of the censors to do little more than embarrass themselves during the Houde controversy gave further proof to *Le Devoir* and the rest of the anti-participation press of Quebec that the federal news management system was toothless. On September 11, 1940, Charpentier explained to Jack Pickersgill, King's private secretary, the censor's position on *Le Devoir*.⁶² The paper, he said, straddled the borderline of the censorship rules but "it is wise enough not to overstep the mark." Charpentier had sent warning letters, made phone calls to Pelletier and confronted *Le Devoir's* editor in person to tell him the

⁶⁰ For another analysis of this incident, see George D. Kerr, "Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 1940," *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 8, No 2, (1982), pp 46-59.

⁶¹ Minutes of the Directorate of Censorship Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security, April 21, 1943. In Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File 1-A-3 Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security.

⁶² Charpentier to Pickersgill, Sept. 11, 1940 Mackenzie King Correspondence, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4867.

paper would have its copy pre-censored if it did not back off, but nothing had worked.

Instead, *Le Devoir* and some of the Francophone press embraced the new authoritarian regime in France, which had the backing of much of the Roman Catholic Church.⁶³ This segment of the Quebecois press became the main focus of press censorship during the existence of the Vichy regime. One of the first warnings about Vichy support was sent by Charpentier to Eugene L'Heureux, editor of *L'Action Catholique* on September 24, 1940: "(W)e take the liberty of recommending that you use extreme caution in your comments on General de Gaulle and the government of Marshal Pétain ... Notwithstanding all the good you may think about the Vichy Government, pray do not forget that de Gaulle is an accredited ally of England and that Canada is an ally of England."⁶⁴ The message went unheeded.

Some of Quebec's conservative Francophone elite believed Vichy was determined to create in France the type of society that was already idealized in Quebec. In the early months of the new regime, the Canadian government tried to have normal relations with Vichy, and, like the U.S., recognized Petain's regime until November, 1942. When the British attacked the French fleet at Oran to keep it from falling into the hands of the Nazis, King backed the British but also praised the Vichy French sailors for gallantly defending their ships. King opposed the

⁶³ For background on Ottawa's unique relationship with Vichy, see Paul Couture, "The Vichy-Free French Propaganda War in Quebec 1940-1942" *Canadian Historical Association Papers*, 1978: 200-216. For an interesting analysis of how the Quebec nationalist elite's attitudes towards Vichy affected Pierre Trudeau, see Max Memni and Monique Nemni (translated by William Johnson), *Young Trudeau, 1919-1944*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2006.

⁶⁴ Charpentier to L'Heureux, September 24, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5972, File: L'Action Catholique.

British plan to establish a Free French base in Dakar and other policies that might cause all-out war between Britain and Vichy. British plans thwarted by King included a plot to take \$100 million in Vichy government gold on the *Emile Bertin*, a French ship that was sent to Canada by the previous French government to deposit the bullion in the Bank of Canada.⁶⁵ King also turned down British requests to capture French vessels off St. Pierre and Miquelon.

Lapointe, in September 1940, told the Cabinet War Committee that Free French leader Charles de Gaulle “had no prestige” and his broadcast to French-Canadians on August 1 “had been regarded as an insult” while, among French-Canadians, “Marshal Pétain and General Weygand stood high. They were known and respected by French-Canadians as men of courage and integrity.”⁶⁶ Canadian policy changed in early 1941 as Vichy proved itself to be a puppet of the Nazis.

Canada’s senior diplomat in France, Georges Vanier, fled France in 1940 just ahead of the Germans but Canada sent embassy staff to Vichy on special assignments. Canada also had uninterrupted mail service with unoccupied France, a situation that would vex the censors even when relations with Vichy were still good. Charpentier and Eggleston, in a memo to the Secretary of State written November 7, 1940, and forwarded to the prime minister, explained the problems caused by the continued mail service. Since the fall of France, some issues of pro-German, anti-British papers such as *La Croix d’ Auvergne*, *La Pepeche Vendeene*, *Le Messager de la Haute Savoie*, *La Croix de la Haute*

⁶⁵ Cabinet War Committee minutes September 17, 1940. Cited in MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec’s Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy*, 161.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

Savoie, La Chronique de Fougères, L'Avenir de la Loire, Le Patriote des Pyrénées, Gringoire, Le Petit Marseillais, Le Croix de l'Aveyron and Le Soleil de Marseille had been banned by the Canadian government on the advice of the censors. Still, they circulated in Canada. Drawing on information from the mail censors, Charpentier believed some, like the Roman Catholic newspaper *La Croix*, circulated throughout Quebec.⁶⁷

Finding copies of banned issues in the mails and destroying them turned out to be an overwhelming problem for the postal censors. At the beginning of 1941, the government, at the request of the censors, had banned the Vichy French weekly *Gringoire*, which mail censors said had a large circulation in Quebec and, the press censors claimed, was frequently quoted in the province's press. Despite the ban, *Le Devoir* continued to get the paper and use material from it.⁶⁸

Even Liberal papers like *Le Soleil* initially supported Pétain, preferring to lay blame for Vichy's more fascist policies on the far less palatable Pierre Laval. By 1941, *Le Soleil*, disheartened by Pétain's toadying to the Nazis, switched its support to de Gaulle. The Vichy regime continued to have the support of *L'Action Catholique*, the province's largest Roman Catholic newspaper. On April 18, 1941, the paper angered the censors by covering a speech by Father Pierre Gravel at St. Roch, praising the leadership qualities of Abbé Lionel Groulx and linking his ideals with those of Vichy: "Our people will not be saved by learning English.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, Eggleston and Charpentier, Nov. 7, 1940. Mackenzie King Correspondence, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4868.

⁶⁸ Memorandum, Willy Chevalier, April 3, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

They will be saved the day each citizen becomes conscious of his duties and has a national conscience. [Marshal Petain] is a savior for France in spite of his old age and is admired by all judicious persons. Those who criticize him and persecute him are traitors," the clergyman said.⁶⁹

In April 1942, parliamentary journalist Grant Dexter analyzed the situation in Quebec. Most of the material in his memorandum probably came from Undersecretary of External Affairs Norman Robertson, who was, at the time, conducting inquiries into the Quebec media to determine its position in the plebiscite debate of whether or not to release the King government of its previous pledge of no conscription for overseas service. Robertson wanted to find some way to sway the nationalist papers and counteract Vichy propaganda. The newscasts of the French Canadian stations were not a problem, as they were word-for-word translations of the English C.B.C. newscasts, Dexter wrote. The issue was the Vichite leanings of people who were invited to read on-air editorials. "(T)he commentators are either Vichy men or are under the impression that it is quite impossible to criticize Vichy or to praise the Free French. It is not violently pro-Pétain but it is pro-Pétain. The private stations, by and large, are more pro-Pétain than the C.B.C. stations." Dexter claimed August Frigon, the network's president, was perceived by the King government as pro-Vichy.

The government did want to remove one of its few prominent Francophone managers, so, Robertson told Dexter, an internal struggle tore the CBC apart. The government built a second managerial structure around Frigon's

⁶⁹ Memorandum, Charpentier, April 17, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5979 File: L'Action Catholique.

deputy, Gladstone Murray, who was fighting for more Free French pro-war broadcasting in Quebec. Murray and his group were not making headway against Frigon. The government, Dexter said, was afraid to help Murray because of the reaction of Quebeckers if the situation became public.⁷⁰

The federal government believed Vichy short-wave broadcasts were popular in Quebec, especially among the province's nationalist Francophone intellectuals. In his memo, Dexter claimed the chief broadcaster had been head of a college in Paris that was popular with wealthy Francophone Quebecois, so was very well known to "some hundreds of key people in Quebec." Quebec's clerical nationalists had accepted Vichy's argument that France lost God during the Revolution and has been in a state of sin, with the place of the Church taken by money. The sanctity of the family was forgotten. "The French people became materialistic, Godless, lost," Dexter wrote. "Now God has punished them for their sins...they must repent and turn back towards the light."⁷¹

Quebec was sometimes being touted within Vichy France as an ideal state, one that had not been tainted by the anti-clericalism of the French Revolution and the Third Republic. Instead, it had survived occupation by the English by reaching back to, and nurturing, its rural, Roman Catholic roots. "Quebec is a shining light to them," Dexter explained. "Quebec never turned away from God, never forsook the church, never lusted for Babylonian gals. Quebec stayed good and Quebec is reaping the reward. The golden era of France – prior to the revolution – has continued in Quebec and Quebec must

⁷⁰ Gibson and Robertson, *Ottawa at War*, 304.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

help France recover her lost soul.” Pétain was seen as the great leader who was guiding the French race to a new golden age. “This line of broadcasting is a ten strike in Quebec. It fits right in with everything the Quebeckers have been taught...De Gaulle and the Free French are a projection from the age of sin... You see, all of this ties in with all that the clergy have been preaching for the past hundred years.”⁷²

On November 7, 1941, Charpentier wrote to Georges Pelletier warning him that *Le Devoir's* support for Vichy would no longer be tolerated by the censors.⁷³ Yet Ernest Lapointe reflected much of the public opinion in Quebec when he opposed de Gaulle's invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon the following month. While King's three ministers from Nova Scotia supported the seizure of the small islands, King preferred to let Vichy believe Churchill ran the operation, thereby keeping good relations with Vichy and its supporters in Quebec.⁷⁴

There was a strong clerical link between Vichy and French Canada. In October 1940, Father Raoul Leblanc, Secretary of the *University of Ottawa Quarterly Review*, submitted to Charpentier a sixty-page article written by Julien Peghaire, a Roman Catholic priest staying in Ironsides, Quebec. The piece examined the “improvements” made by the Pétain government to the French education system.⁷⁵ Father Peghaire was a French citizen who, in the Ottawa paper *Le Droit* of July 10th, 1940, wrote “quite a strong article defending the stand

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Charpentier to Pelletier, Ernest Lapointe papers, Library and Archives Canada R8207 (formerly MG27), Vol. 13 File: 23.

⁷⁴ MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec's Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy*, 162-163.

⁷⁵ Charpentier to Norman Robertson, undersecretary of state for external affairs, December 3, 1941 Mackenzie King Correspondence, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3, Microfilm C-4861.

taken by his country in the Oran incident” in which British forces attacked French warships at anchor in Algeria to prevent them from falling into German hands. Charpentier wrote to the editor of *Le Droit* telling him “that kind of publicity was quite undesirable at the time.”⁷⁶

In the October article, Peghaire argued Pétain was saving his country from disaster. His education reforms were so successful that they had been adopted in German-occupied France as well as Vichy. Reporting this fact did little to help the priest’s cause. Obviously, Charpentier concluded, the changes to the system bore “the stamp of German approval.” The Ottawa censors decided it was not in Canada’s interest “to have the public listen to that kind of propaganda, even more so when the province of Quebec is in danger from that source.” Charpentier said he read the article and diplomatically wrote to Leblanc that the article “constitutes direct propaganda, which is not denied at all by its author, in favour of a non-ally government, at the present time under German control.” Soon afterwards, Leblanc telephoned Charpentier to say he would not publish the article.⁷⁷

The issue seemed dead until November 28, when Charpentier saw a notice in *Le Devoir* that Peghaire would speak on the same subject December 2 a meeting of L’Alliance Française at the Ritz Carleton Hotel in Montreal. Charpentier asked McMahon, the censor in Montreal, to be on the lookout for any propaganda in the news reports of that meeting. He also advised McMahon to

⁷⁶ Memorandum, Charpentier, July 11, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5970 File: Le Droit.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, Charpentier, Oct. 20, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5970 File: Le Droit.

notify L'Alliance Française that the text of the lecture had been submitted to Charpentier as an article and had been turned down.⁷⁸ McMahon contacted Ernest Tetrault, President of L'Alliance in Montreal to, in Charpentier's words, explain "certain facts." RCMP "witnesses" would be in the audience at the Ritz, McMahon said, and while censors would not prevent the priest from speaking, they would act aggressively against any breach of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.

Tetrault claimed he knew nothing about Peghaire's subject, or of the speaker himself. "A Mr. Ristelhueber," (who was, in fact, Vichy's lead diplomat in Canada) had submitted Peghaire's name and recommended him as a guest speaker. L' Alliance Française finally decided to cancel the meeting. Ristelhueber called Claude Melancon, associate director of public information, to complain the priest's opinions were harmless, and that he had every right to speak at a public meeting.⁷⁹

On November 6, 1941, Charpentier and Eggleston complained to Pierre-F. Casgrain, the Secretary of State, about a *Le Devoir* letter to the editor in which the letter writer quoted Mr. Henri-Haye, Vichy's ambassador to Washington, who accused the British of stealing \$100 worth of children's vitamins that Henri-Haye had sent to his home town of Versailles via Bermuda. The letter writer quoted the ambassador saying: "The duty of all Frenchmen is to unite around their fallen mother-country and stop giving to the world the lamentable spectacle of their

⁷⁸ Charpentier to McMahon, Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, Charpentier, November 30, 1949. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

divisions.” Charpentier also quoted an editorial by Pelletier, published October 25, 1941, stating: “To carry on like this? Perhaps. To do more? Yes, if we want to exhaust the country. No, if it is true that a nation owes its first duty to itself. CANADA FIRST, is that not the obvious truth?”⁸⁰

The censors told Casgrain the government needed to do more than just send letters of warning to *Le Devoir*. “We cannot conclude otherwise than that *Le Devoir* has since the inception of the war frequently and unmistakably opposed our national effort and has persisted in publishing subversive material despite our repeated warnings to its editors,” Casgrain was advised. They advised a prosecution of the paper or punitive action under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.⁸¹

Soon afterwards, the government received the same advice from the RCMP in Montreal. On December 4, Inspector C. Batch, Assistant Intelligence Officer, wrote to the Commissioner of the RCMP, sending a carbon copy to the press censors, in which he contended: “*Le Devoir* is aggressive in its writings which do not appear to be at all sympathetic to the British, Russians and Free French.” Its defeatist attitude, Batch believed, did not promote French-Canadian unity.⁸²

In February 1941, Willie Chevalier, assistant press censor in Montreal and a former reporter for the Liberal newspaper *Le Canada*, complained of yet another isolationist article in *Le Devoir*, calling the piece “clearly fifth column

⁸⁰ Charpentier and Eggleston to Casgrain, November 6, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*2.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Insp. C. Batch to Superintendent of the RCMP, December 4, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*2.

work” and telling his superiors in Ottawa “everyone I meet in Montreal is amazed at our tolerance of this German paper published in French.”⁸³ Less than five days later, the censors complained to Pelletier again, this time for reprinting an article by Charles Maurras from the fascist *la Nacion* of Buenos Aires, Argentina, praising the work of *L’Action Française*, which supported Petain.⁸⁴ Later that month, Chevalier wrote a memo to Ottawa listing *Le Devoir’s* anti-war articles and commenting on some of them. An article in the July 13, 1940 edition headlined “On a Chapter of History” denounced the British for the attack on Oran in language that, Chevalier wrote, “could have been written by one of Mr. Goebbel’s hack writers.” Chevalier said *Le Devoir* “carries German communiqués on p. 3, buries British ones at the bottom of the sports or financial pages.” The paper’s standing commentary section, “Le Carnet de Grincheux” (The Notebook of a Grouser), was a daily attack on the war effort.

Much of the anti-war writing, Chevalier said, was done by Richer, who constantly speculated that the war was unnecessary, would bankrupt Canada and would result in conscription. *Le Devoir* appears to have had some source of news from Vichy, though the Montreal censors did not know from where and from whom precisely. The censors also noted that *Le Devoir*, “which flatters itself on being a very good Catholic paper,” had ignored the “impressive” Mass for Victory, held at Notre-Dame Cathedral on February 9, 1941, even though the Mass was covered by almost every daily and weekly newspaper in the province. Pelletier,

⁸³ Chevalier to Charpentier and Girouard, February 6, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁸⁴ Charpentier to Pelletier, February 11, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

said Chevalier, submitted innocuous articles to the censors and held back pieces he knew broke the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. "Altogether," Chevalier wrote, "there can be no doubt that *Le Devoir*, systematically and with gross misrepresentation and distortion of facts, continually sabotages the Canadian war effort...(A)ll those who read exclusively *Le Devoir* – and they are quite a substantial proportion of its subscribers – are potential if not actual fifth columnists... Drawing the most rigid distinction between subversion and criticism, I honestly believe that *Le Devoir* is a most subversive paper."⁸⁵

After reading the memo, Eggleston decided something must be done to stop *Le Devoir*.⁸⁶ McMahon suggested a warning from the Secretary of State, then, if needed, a one-week suspension. Again, nothing happened. In mid-March, Chevalier sent a memorandum to the censorship officials expressing frustration at the paper, which had not toned down its coverage. "It sometimes seems to me quite unfair to report to the Minister on any newspaper, so long as 'Le Devoir's' bias is tolerated."⁸⁷

In response to the criticisms, Pelletier wrote to Charpentier to deny the paper attacked the "efficient prosecution of the war." Yes, he had quoted Charles Lindbergh's anti-war speeches, but he had never declared his support for them or claimed they represented the bulk of American public opinion. His paper's main attacks on the Roosevelt administration were caused by Pelletier's alarm at

⁸⁵ Chevalier to Charpentier and Eggleston, February 24, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁸⁶ Eggleston to Charpentier, February 25, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁸⁷ Memo, Chevalier, March 15, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

the pro-birth control propaganda issued by the American government and carried in its major magazines.⁸⁸

A month later, Pelletier wrote to the censors to deny that he published Vichy propaganda. Not enough news came from France over the Canadian Press and the Associated Press wire services, Pelletier wrote, so he had to go hunting for it in the major U.S. papers and in Switzerland. To force him to stop carrying news from France would be tantamount to the "encircling of French Canada by the press, information and literature of English or American origin."⁸⁹ Charpentier replied: "News emanating from Vichy certainly go [sic] through Vichy hands and I see no reason whatever why we should help in their nefarious work those who are crushing France. As soon as I have a chance to see you once the Session [of Parliament] is closed, I will have other details to give you on the underground work of German agents through the medium of Vichy."⁹⁰ In July, 1941, the censors once again recommended to Casgrain that *Le Devoir* be suspended.⁹¹

Claude Melancon, who had resigned from the Directorate of Censorship in the fall of 1939 and gone with Thompson to the Bureau of Public Information, tried, in his new job, to dampen down support for Vichy though propaganda and by pressuring editors and publishers. He made *Le Devoir* his prime target. From the spring of 1941 until the end of the April 1942 conscription plebiscite,

⁸⁸ Pelletier to Charpentier April 2, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁸⁹ Pelletier to Charpentier, May 12, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁹⁰ Charpentier to Pelletier, May 26, 1941 Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁹¹ Memorandum, July 6, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

Melancon pushed for tougher enforcement of the censorship laws. He wanted the government to send agents into churches to listen for anti-war sermons and into the universities to look for subversion. Vichy agents in Canada were the main source of German propaganda, Melancon believed.⁹²

The government knew that in July, 1941 Henri Coursier, Vichy's consul in Montreal, wrote to René Ristelhueber, Vichy's Charge d'Affairs in Ottawa, telling Ristelhueber that *Le Devoir* had negotiated a deal with him for an "alternative news service" to provide news from Vichy. The RCMP found information that convinced the police Vichy diplomats gathered public opinion information in Quebec that was sent to Vichy to help the regime tailor its short-wave propaganda broadcasts.⁹³ The censors were told of the deal with Vichy and began an investigation.⁹⁴

In November, Col. R.B. Gibson, the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the Department of National Defence, gave Eggleston a clipping from the October 13 issue of *Le Devoir*. The writer of the article asked *Le Devoir* readers to listen to short-wave radio broadcasts from German-occupied France. "Under the guise of Frenchmen or French-Canadians in France speaking to their friends and relatives in Quebec, this programme, as it has been heard by officers of this directorate, turns out to be a direct appeal by the Germans to the French-speaking Canadians of Quebec, urging them to collaborate more closely with the

⁹² Lapointe papers, R8207 (formerly MG27) Vol. 55, File: Correspondence 1942, Melancon to Lapointe; Melancon to T.C. Davis, March 15, 1942. King Correspondence, Library and Archives Canada, MG26, J3, MF 3831.

⁹³ Mount, *Canada's Enemies*, 84.

⁹⁴ Memorandum, July 23, 1941 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

Vichy regime," Gibson wrote.⁹⁵ Charpentier wrote to Pelletier, telling him Canada's diplomatic relations with France did not authorize anyone in Canada to disseminate propaganda harmful to the war effort, just as the country's new alliance with Russia did not legalize the dissemination of Communist propaganda.⁹⁶

The censors' concerns about *Le Devoir's* pro-Vichy attitude and a complaint from the Mounties sent November 10, 1941 that *Le Devoir* always carried German and Italian war communiqués but not British ones caused Charpentier to, yet again, ask Pelletier to curb his public enthusiasm for the collaborationist regime. Pelletier replied December 1, 1941, assuring Charpentier that "when the day comes where the Canadian Government breaks relations with the Vichy Government we will cease to champion the Vichy Government." Supporters of de Gaulle were trying to take over control the Francophone press in Quebec, Pelletier said, and were using censorship as one of their weapons.⁹⁷

While the censors had a nearly full-time job complaining about *Le Devoir*, there were other, even smaller, newspapers and magazines in Quebec that were equally frustrating. *L'Oeil* was one of the publications described by the censors in their final report as being "in the orbit" of *Le Devoir*. It was a monthly magazine that began publishing in September 1940 and came to the attention of the censors and the Department of Justice late in the following month. Girouard

⁹⁵ Col. R.B. Gibson, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Eggleston, November 4, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁹⁶ Charpentier to Pelletier, November 10, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

⁹⁷ Pelletier to Charpentier, December 1, 1941 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

concluded: "This magazine seems to have as its main objective to campaign in favour of Pétain and discredit de Gaulle. I do not see why it should be necessary to reproduce the words of the Marshal against England. A letter might, I think, remind the editor that we are in Canada and at war."⁹⁸

It did not, so the letter was followed up on October 24 with a personal visit. Charpentier summoned *L'Oeil* editor Alfred Ayotte to the censors' office at Place Des Armes. Ayotte, who held a full-time job on the editorial staff of *Le Devoir*, believed France has always suffered from its relations with Great Britain. Because French Canadians could not get newspapers from France, he believed he should print Pétain's speeches and other Vichy material.⁹⁹

L'Oeil quickly made some waves in the Quebec press. A few days after Charpentier's frustrating meeting with Ayotte, *La Voix de Gaspé* published a brief, scathing description of *L'Oeil*, calling it Duplessite, neo-fascist, and anti-Semitic. It was, the paper said, an eye that needed glasses.¹⁰⁰ Complaints about *L'Oeil* flowed freely into the censorship offices in Montreal. The first was a discreet inquiry from the Department of Justice in October. In the first week of November, 1940, Ayotte answered the charges of Vichyism in a letter to Charpentier dated November 4, rubbing Charpentier's nose in the fact that Justice Minister Lapointe had recently made a speech expressing his "affection" for the "men of Vichy." Charpentier could have saved himself a trip to Montreal,

⁹⁸ Memorandum, Girouard, October 23, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

⁹⁹ Ayotte often wrote in *L'Oeil* under the name Pierre Viviers. Memorandum, Fulgence Charpentier, Ottawa, October 28, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰⁰ *Le Voix de Gaspé*, October 30, 1940, 1. Censorship's memo on the article is in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-5969.

Ayotte said, by reading Lapointe's speech, which proved "it is at least permitted to express sympathy to the people we love."¹⁰¹

Montreal censor Willy Chevalier fought hard to have *L'Oeil* shut down.¹⁰² In a letter to Pierre Casgrain, dated May 7, 1941, Charpentier wrote that *L'Oeil* was "in the same style as "La Droite", recently banned by Order in Council, but it was more focused on art, literature, theatre, and culinary arts." Charpentier recommended the paper be allowed to stay open under strict supervision of its political content.

Louis St. Laurent weighed in on June 6, writing to the censors, asking them to make a special study of the publication and "to forward to me those issues which would appear to be most dangerous."¹⁰³ St. Laurent's query was answered with a June 10 memorandum. *L'Oeil* had toned down considerably in recent months, Charpentier claimed. The five issues published thus far in 1942 had nothing actionable in them, even though the paper had mocked Winston Churchill's speech in Ottawa earlier that year. The paper was violently anti-Semitic, but this was not actionable under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. In one editorial it claimed "the Jews wanted conscription for overseas. Shall they be the first to leave? ... Probably, we will soon be reading, both in French and English, other essays explaining why the Jews never depart." Charpentier explained Ayotte's anti-Semitism as a ploy to attract advertising from French-

¹⁰¹ Ayotte to Chevalier, November 4, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰² Memorandum, Chevalier, November 5, 1940. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰³ Louis St-Laurent to Charpentier, June 6, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol.: 5969 File: 2A/O-1a.

Canadian merchants. This was not Charpentier's finest moment. In his desire not to add to the strife in Quebec, he had become gun-shy of a small paper that had adopted the cause of people who collaborated with the country's enemies. This was a strange reversal of roles for Charpentier, who usually pressed for censure of the clerical fascist press in Quebec but was ignored by his political superiors, who feared any move against the Vichyites would damage the prospects of the federal and provincial Liberals, and that a major crackdown on them might rupture the fragile domestic peace in Quebec.

On October 2, 1941, at Charpentier's request, the magazine was banned from internment camps.¹⁰⁴ That did not stop Ayotte. The October 22, 1941 issue carried an article mocking the idea of the creation of a Jewish army. "Up to now, the Jews have found it more heroic or more profitable to make soldiers' uniforms than to put them on."¹⁰⁵ Still, the main attacks were on de Gaulle, who was chastised in July 1942 for leaving France and "sowing discord" among the world's Francophones. De Gaulle, Ayotte wrote, "is mostly supported by the Jews, the Free Masons and the Communists."¹⁰⁶ Still, the censors somehow held onto their belief Ayotte could be brought into line with threats that he would be charged, even after it became obvious that the government would not touch the mainstream Quebec press.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Col. H. Stethem, Commissioner of Internment Operations to Censorship Branch, October 2, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum, October 23, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum, Charpentier, July 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰⁷ The Press Censor (Charpentier), November 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

The paper continued its Pétainist campaign until the Vichy regime collapsed and the old marshal was trucked off to Germany, and, eventually, to de Gaulle's jails. It then focused more of its attention on the Jews, publishing, on February 15, 1945, a full-page letter under the heading "Les Juifs: racists inveteres," written by someone with the pen name Un Qui Les Connait. The writer claimed the Jews were parasites, Quebecois were their victims, and the Jewish race was damned.¹⁰⁸

Jacob Livinson, Honorary Director of the Canadian Jewish Historical Society, complained to the censors.¹⁰⁹ F.E. Joliffe, acting director of the Censorship Branch, asked the legal opinion of F.P. Varcoe, deputy minister of Justice. Varcoe said the anti-Semitic article did not contravene Regulation 39 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. On a letter written on V-E Day, Livinson demanded to know from Girouard what was being done to stop *L'Oeil*. "You who are so well aware of the injurious implications of this type of poisonous journalism of which *L'Oeil*' of Montreal is a ready and willing partner," Livinson wrote, and reminded Charpentier he was "in a key position, in times of war or in peacetime, to put a stop and halt these bad acts in print! Thousands of law-abiding Canadian citizens rely upon you and hope that you will render justice to them."¹¹⁰ It was a

¹⁰⁸ Memorandum, Charpentier, February 15, 1945. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum, April 12, 1945. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹¹⁰ Livinson to Charpentier, April 15, 1945 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

vain hope that was crushed by a letter from the censors backed with Varcoe's legal opinion.¹¹¹

Extremist Catholic publications, such as *Vers Demain*, edited and published by Louis Even, leader of the Quebec Social Credit Party, echoed Vichy's anti-Semitism, accusing Freemason-Jewish politicians of hiding, fleeing France or consenting to sacrifice the identity of the nation by fusing it with the British Empire but "Marshall and Weygand went to pray before the altar at dawn on June 14, 1940. God bent down to the France he loved, and God spoke to Petain. The victory of 1918 left irresponsible men at the head of France, [and] the defeat of 1940, by Divine Mercy, gave France a responsible chief. Responsible to France. To God. Compare this with democratic parlance: responsible to Parliament, people, electorate."¹¹²

The main target of the censors, however, remained *Le Devoir*. By February 1942 *Le Devoir's* status had evolved to "less objectionable".¹¹³ Still, the paper indulged in "suspicion and chiding for everything British, approval and praise for anything related to Vichy and Pétain."¹¹⁴

In February 1942, a by-election was held in Quebec East to gain a seat for Louis St. Laurent, newly-appointed Minister of Justice, who replaced Ernest

¹¹¹ Charpentier to Livinson, April 24, 1945, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969 File: 2A/O-1.

¹¹² Memorandum, Charpentier, May 15, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5969, File: 2A/V3 The paper also portrayed women's war work as the government's attempt to destroy the French Canadian family. On May 5, Louis Even and M.J.R. Bedard, the paper's printer, were jailed for refusing to pay a \$10 fine for circulating a publication that did not contain the name of its printer. (Reported in *La Presse*, May 12, 1943, 3 and *Journal de Quebec*, April 12, 1943, 3) The paper continued publishing through the war, often running anti-Semitic rants and cartoons.

¹¹³ The Press Censors, Confidential memo on *Le Devoir* February 11, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

¹¹⁴ Charpentier to Justice Minister Louis St. Laurent, February 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5974 File: *Le Devoir*1.

Lapointe, who died of cancer on November 26, 1941. Questions were raised in the House of Commons about the censors' role in the campaign, "and eventually the Censors were informally advised by the government that it would be preferable if no censorship was exercised."¹¹⁵

Likely for fear of inflaming opinion in Quebec, the government refused to act on the censors' complaints about Quebec media articles printed in the run-up to the April 1942 conscription plebiscite, although it is obvious King's government did watch things carefully. The Quebec anti-conscriptionists took up their radio censorship cudgel from the 1939 election, demanding equal time from the CBC¹¹⁶ *Le Devoir*, Charpentier wrote, could be blamed for violence in Montreal during the plebiscite campaign because of its anti-British propaganda. "In *Le Devoir's* idea, the enemy is not Germany... At the present, *Le Devoir* devotes all of its attention to the plebiscite to which the public is invited to answer 'No'."¹¹⁷

On March 2, 1942, the paper carried a long article on the *Ligue pour le defense du Canada's* mass meeting at Maisonneuve Market, carrying "obnoxious material" that had not been reported in the larger papers *La Patrie*, *La Presse* or *Le Canada*. Frechette, the main speaker, had told his listeners, "when the Germans and the Japanese are already at our gates ... the best policy is to laugh it off."¹¹⁸ Charpentier reported the story to Varcoe, telling him: "For your information, we may add that "*Le Devoir*" is a recidivist, and has done everything

¹¹⁵ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941 (NF).

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Pierre Godin, *La Lute Pour L'Information: Histoire de la Presse Ecrite au Quebec*. Montreal: les Idees du Jour, 1981 73.

¹¹⁷ Charpentier-Louis St. Laurent February 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5979, File: *Le Devoir2*.

¹¹⁸ Memorandum, Charpentier, March 2, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir2*.

up to date to hinder the successful prosecution of the war.”¹¹⁹ On March 16 and May 18, 1942,¹²⁰ Charpentier wrote long memoranda to Louis St. Laurent detailing *Le Devoir's* anti-conscription coverage and recommending sanctions against the paper. The government continued to do nothing to curtail *Le Devoir*, seeing the plebiscite as a political campaign and not wanting to be attacked for using censorship to stifle its opponents.

Reflecting the results of the plebiscite, in which Quebec voted 73% against releasing the government from its pledge of no conscription for overseas service (compared to the rest of the country that voted 80% ‘yes’), the censors believed they still had to contend with what they saw as pro-Vichy propaganda in the nationalist and Roman Catholic press. In May, L’Heureux of *L’Action Catholique* was warned by Charpentier not to publicize Radio Vichy broadcasts, which, he said, used Canadians interned in France to broadcast propaganda to Quebec in return for a few days’ leave from confinement.¹²¹ Responding to a series by André Laurendeau on occupied France, Charpentier wrote L’Heureux October 19, 1942: “Your newspaper has used circumspection worthy of all praise in your handling of questions pertaining to France, which you love objectively, if I may say so. I am afraid that Mr. Laurendeau in attempting to show his portraits of these gentlemen [Pétain, Laval and Darlan]... inserts some of his own fancies so dangerous in wartime to our equilibrium. As you no doubt know, unfortunately

¹¹⁹ Eggleston and Charpentier to F.P. Varcoe, March 4, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Records of the Directorate of Censorship 5979, File: *Le Devoir*1.

¹²⁰ March 8 and May 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir*2.

¹²¹ Charpentier to L’Action Catholique, May 6, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5972 File: L’Action Catholique.

most of the pro-Pétain propaganda at the present moment is not more than a pretext to anti-Britainism.”¹²² The following December the paper carried an article praising Salazar’s regime in Portugal. Charpentier complained it was fascist propaganda.¹²³

On December 17, 1942, Charpentier wrote a 10-page memorandum on *Le Devoir* with the intent of getting the newspaper banned or suspended. He compared *Le Devoir* to Britain’s *Daily Worker* and the newsletter *Week*, which had been suspended because of long-term opposition to the war. *Le Devoir*, Charpentier charged, had used the conscription plebiscite campaign to “redouble its virulence to its opposition to the success of our armies.” At the same time, the paper had pushed the interests of the *Ligue pour la defense du Canada*, of which Pelletier was a director. After the Allied invasion of North Africa in November, 1942, the paper had supported Admiral Darlan and mocked de Gaulle. He noted the paper had published a letter November 6, 1942, from an Abbé E. Galtier, of New York, saying Great Britain should be held responsible for the deaths of French-Canadian children because the Admiralty supposedly had requisitioned Quebec’s supply of vitamin pills.¹²⁴

In the Outremont by-election of Nov. 30, 1942, the paper had supported Jean Drapeau against Liberal star candidate (and future War Services Minister) Leo LaFleche, quoting extremist isolationist statements by Drapeau and his supporters, including a claim by the future Montreal mayor that French Canadian

¹²² *Ibid.*, October 19, 1942.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, December 16, 1942.

¹²⁴ Memorandum, Charpentier, December 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: Le Devoir2.

women would be drafted for overseas war service. The paper, Charpentier said, argued a Liberal victory in Outremont would be a defeat for French Canada and a “Judeo-Anglo-Saxon” victory. Charpentier noted he had complained about *Le Devoir* to the Minister of Justice in February, April, and May 1942.¹²⁵

On January 19, 1943, Charpentier wrote to Roger Duhamel, a journalist on the staff of *Le Devoir* who would later be appointed Queen’s Printer for Quebec, to complain to him about the newspaper’s January 16 reprint of a book excerpt by Paul Mousset, *Quand Les Temps Travillaient Pour Vous*.¹²⁶ Charpentier’s complaint was not about the excerpt itself, although he told Duhamel “you have extracted the most tendentious passages”; it was mainly that *Le Devoir* had added sentences such as: “The few hundred French soldiers brought to Great Britain after Dunkerque where they were more or less treated as war prisoners, could not believe their eyes,” and “The plutocrat and comfortable democracies... which believed that time was working in our favour...” The censors had allowed books printed in Vichy France to be brought into Canada, but it was “exactly comments like your [Duhamel’s] own that will force us to adopt more stringent views in the matter, to shield our people from outbursts of Anti-British propaganda and commentaries that resemble closely the Berlin and Goebbels broadcasts.” The clippings were sent to Justice Minister St. Laurent with a short note saying the censors considered them enemy propaganda.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Charpentier to Duhamel, January 19, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978 File: *Le Devoir*2.

¹²⁷ Charpentier to St. Laurent, January 19, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir*2.

On February 11, 1943, *Le Devoir* printed a long transcript of a speech by Henri Bourassa in which the elderly nationalist icon condemned Canadian participation in the war and praised Vichy. The following day, Charpentier wrote to Biggar to again ask for action against the paper for printing the speech, which he said was “a pacifist, isolationist and anti-participationist plea against the war effort.”¹²⁸ The censors’ complaints were answered by F.P. Varcoe, the Deputy Minister of Justice who indicated that the government would not lay charges against *Le Devoir* for this piece or others about which censors had recently complained.¹²⁹ Varcoe’s letter came four days after Charpentier pointed to a piece entitled “Les Nageurs de Hong-Kong” which *Le Devoir* received from the Vichy publication *La Revue francaises*. The article praised two Olympic champion Japanese swimmers who were said to be instrumental in defeating the British and Canadians at Hong Kong by swimming across the harbour and destroying important defence works on the island. It was, the censors wrote, “excellent propaganda for the Japanese.”¹³⁰

The paper’s coverage moderated somewhat through 1943, but early the following year *Le Devoir* was the focus of an investigation by military intelligence and censorship officials who wanted to know how Nazi-controlled Radio Paris was able to get the text of a *Le Devoir* article that was broadcast from France less than seventy-two hours after the paper was on the street. The station quoted

¹²⁸ Charpentier to Biggar, February 12, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978 File: *Le Devoir*2.

¹²⁹ Varcoe to Charpentier, February 5, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir*2.

¹³⁰ St. Laurent to Lafleche, February 17, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir*2.

a *Le Devoir* editorial predicting the Soviets would set up a puppet “commonwealth” in occupied Eastern Europe that was similar to the British Empire, where “in theory we [Canada] are independent but in truth England has laid down the essential conditions of a policy which now weighs heavily upon us.” Cable censors were asked to check wire copy of foreign journalists, including those from the Soviet Union, to determine if the text of the editorial had been sent to Europe by a foreign news agency.

Le Devoir's competitors in Quebec picked up the Radio Paris broadcast. One, *Le Canada*, gleefully reported on February 22, 1944, that the Nazis used a *Le Devoir* radio broadcast to divide the Allies with suspicion, hoping to win diplomatically a war they had lost militarily.”¹³¹

The elements of Quebec’s press that were anti-participationist were on the wrong side of history. They either misjudged the threat of Nazism to the world or chose to ignore it. Having at first hitched itself to American isolationism, to the point that some extremists actually floated the idea of annexation to a neutral U.S., some of the Quebec nationalist press soldiered on through the war in support of the Vichy regime in France. The Vichyists in Quebec were not a fringe group: they included many of society’s most influential people: senior Catholic clerics, the province’s most important Catholic newspaper (*L’Action Catholique*) and its most influential political newspaper (*Le Devoir*) along with many smaller publications. Some of Vichy’s vocal supporters – André Laurendeau and Jean

¹³¹ Girouard to M.E. Whittal, Press Cable Censor, February 24, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Records of the Directorate of Censorship, Vol. 5978, File: *Le Devoir*2.

Drapeau among them – went on to be very important members of the journalistic and government elite in the 1950s and later. One is left wondering how, when he made his famous *Vive Le Quebec Libre* speech at Montreal's city hall in 1967, de Gaulle felt about nationalist Quebec's wartime attitudes concerning the Free French.

That said, it would be wrong to argue that Quebec gave unanimous support to Vichy and to the segment of its elites that supported the regime. The censors were not in the business of administering praise for coverage that was loyal to the war effort. Many large, commercially-driven papers like *La Presse*, which vastly outsold *Le Devoir*, never drew complaints from the censors. It is also important to note that the fight between isolationists and the government was a fight between French-Canadians: Charpentier scolding Pelletier; Willy Chevalier advocating the suspension of *Le Devoir* before heading to Africa to work against Vichy on behalf of British intelligence. Still, the failure of the federal government to effectively rein in the worst excesses of the nationalist, anti-participationist press left a stain on the nation's war record. In many ways, King's government, especially its Justice minister, St. Laurent and his deputy, Varcoe, share the blame for this. In treading so carefully to maintain domestic political peace, they allowed Canada's Vichyist press to engage in anti-Semitic and pro-fascist propagandizing that has remained an embarrassment to a nation that contributed so much to the defeat of Nazism.

Chapter Nine:
The Globe and Mail, George Drew and Censorship

The Globe and Mail was the most consistent English-language media opponent of Canada's wartime censorship system. The paper was owned by George McCullagh, a Toronto stockbroker specializing in mining investments who had, with the help of H.H. Wright, one of the discoverers of the massive Kirkland Lake gold range, purchased *The Globe* and *The Mail and Empire* in 1935 the Depression and merged them. McCullagh's political support vacillated between the Conservatives and the Liberals. During Mitchell Hepburn's term as Liberal Premier of Ontario, McCullagh supported Queen's Park in its fights with Mackenzie King's government. McCullagh developed a close personal relationship with Hepburn, even handling some of the premier's investments. Hepburn reciprocated with very generous policies towards the mining industry.

After Hepburn botched McCullagh's plan for a Liberal-Conservative coalition government in Ontario in 1937, McCullagh's support settled on the media-savvy leader of the provincial Conservatives, George Drew. The paper initially refrained from criticizing censorship and, in fact, had welcomed Thompson's appointment as chief censor. It also supported the censorship decisions in the Quebec provincial election and advocated tough official supervision of U.S. journalists working in Canada.¹ McCullagh, however, had crossed swords with Mackenzie King over the government's refusal to allow McCullagh access to the CBC airwaves during McCullagh's "Leadership League"

¹"Freedom Works Both Ways," *The Globe and Mail*, November 21, 1939, 6.

campaign in the winter of 1937-38, and the publisher's criticisms of the Prime Minister at that time would be echoed in the *Globe's* attacks on censorship during the war.

The first signs of trouble for the censors came in November, 1939 when one of *The Globe and Mail's* opinion columnists, Judith Robinson, began a campaign against the press censorship system.² Robinson first took issue with the government's treatment of soldiers' dependants. Initially, the Toronto censors defended Robinson's right to publish her opinion, but in early December 1939 she submitted a column to the censors containing a paragraph with the statement that "Canadian boys are deserting from their units" and mentioning in passing they were "leaving for overseas." These two sentences were cut, but the following day the same phrases ran in the lead paragraph of Robinson's column and reached the streets in the first edition of the newspaper. B.B. Perry, the Toronto regional censor, had the sentences removed from later editions and complained to the newspaper's editor. Perry blamed the incident for Robinson's later criticisms of censorship. Later, when Robinson took up the cause of a Communist convicted and jailed under the *War Measures Act*, she "made an extreme attack on constituted authority," Perry wrote.³

Still, the paper seemed to, at least philosophically, support the idea of wartime press censorship, though within very specific and tight parameters. In its

² Robinson was one of the first women to win a National Newspaper Award. She was fired from the *Globe* in 1941, supposedly because of a witty come-back she made during an editorial board meeting. McCullagh told the writers he could easily talk Franklin Roosevelt into bringing the US into the war, to which Robinson answered "on whose side?" The story was told by Robert Fulford in "George McCullagh," *The Globe and Mail*, April 15, 1998, 7.

³ Memorandum, Perry, December 8, 1939, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5968 File: *The Globe and Mail*.

December 11, 1939 editorial, "Newspapers and the War", the *Globe* argued: "While the right to criticize is one of democracy's priceless privileges, self-imposed censorship in the name of patriotism is also a priceless privilege obtainable only in a democracy. Its free exercise is a more valuable demonstration than grudging concession to the censor's rules." The *Globe* believed Canada's newspapers should give the system a chance.⁴ The next day, the paper changed its position, saying Canadian censorship rules had been found "stupid and irksome by journalists in Toronto and Ottawa, who have been forestalled by absurd and anomalous decisions. One cynic has defined a censor as a person who suppresses in Canada what the enemy already knows." The paper was angry that material from a *New York Times* story on the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan could not be reprinted in Canada. "Canadian censors would do well to be guided by their British brethren, who order things better... Censorship ought to be almost an exact science. It need imply the suppression of nothing but military and naval secrets..." Canadians, especially those working at the *Globe*, would not "stand for anything that smacks of the Gestapo in regard to national affairs and the conduct of the Dominion Government. What Canada expects is a military rather than a political censorship."⁵

The censors and the *Globe's* readers could be forgiven for being confused by the paper's shifting positions, especially when, the following day, J.V. McAvee wrote under the column heading "Press Censorship in Capable Hands" that the

⁴ "Newspapers and the War," *The Globe and Mail*, December 11, 1939, 6.

⁵ "Sensible Censorship Wanted," *The Globe and Mail*, December 12, 1939, 6.

ensorship in World War I had been much more oppressive and, “generally speaking, the censorship both here and in Great Britain, has one plain and necessary duty. That is to prevent news reaching the enemy which might be useful to him.” The *Globe* and other papers had published articles that might have deterred recruiting, but had only done so to call attention to urgent problems. This type of journalism should be tolerated, he wrote, but “critics of avowed Communist tendencies can be viewed by the censors with less tolerance. The man who is against the prosecution of the war and tries to discourage recruitment is plainly in a different class from the man who favors the prosecution of the war and attacks what he considers government delays or blunders and indifference to the comfort and security of the soldiers.”⁶ The paper supported the government’s prosecution of eight people in Montreal, who were charged under the *War Measures Act* for distributing anti-war leaflets.⁷

The Globe and Mail changed course again on January 10, 1940, when both Drew and Hepburn attacked Mackenzie King’s handling of the war. In its story on the rift between Hepburn, Drew and King, the paper quoted Drew saying the press in Great Britain “does not feel constrained to criticize where it feels criticism is due.”⁸ A week later, Drew made similar charges in the Ontario legislature, denouncing “this disgraceful situation” into which the “propaganda” speeches of Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his colleagues, and the “half-

⁶ “Press Censorship in Capable Hands,” *The Globe and Mail*, December 13, 1939, 6.

⁷ The leafleteers were prosecuted by Gerald Fauteux, who later founded the University of Ottawa law school and was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

⁸ “Fear People Not Aroused to Top Pitch,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 11, 1940, 1.

hearted efforts” of the federal government generally, had hurt Canada’s war efforts.⁹

King used the attack on his government as rationale for a winter federal election campaign. The *Globe* reported on January 19 that the broadcast censorship rules for the federal election campaign were being prepared by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and would be enforced by the radio division of press censorship under CBC corporate secretary R.P. Landry.¹⁰ By the end of January, *The Globe and Mail* had taken the same position as the majority of the Quebec press had embraced the previous fall: censorship of opinion had no place in an election campaign. In an editorial entitled “Democracy Under Test” published January 30, 1940, the paper’s editors argued: “If censorship is imposed on speakers, there is no electoral freedom; if it is relaxed, the war effort may suffer. Must democracy be sacrificed in deciding which political party is to hold office in the coming five years?” It asked if censors employed by the government could be truly objective. The censor “will be less than human if he lets the Opposition leaders get rough with the government to which he owes his position, and it will not be hard to find an excuse that the criticism is detrimental to Canada’s defence...We have no hesitation in saying that because a political party is in power it should not be position to interfere with the effort of the Opposition to throw it out. There should be no suspicion of unfair advantage.”¹¹

⁹ “Drew Asks House To Sound Demand For Ottawa Action,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 17, 1940, 1.

¹⁰ “Censor Election Speeches on Radio Only for Defense Ruling Offences,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 30, 1940, 11 (second section front).

¹¹ “Democracy Under Test,” *The Globe and Mail*, January 30, 1940, 6.

The paper returned to that theme the following day in an editorial entitled "Call off the Censors." The *Globe* accused the Liberal government of using censorship to gag opposition candidates. "Before broadcasting, these men must submit their speeches to appointees of the Government of the day, for which some are campaigning and others are criticizing," the newspaper noted. "Leaving aside the possibilities of unfair discrimination, the immediate inference is that the candidates are not trustworthy. They are all tarred with the brush of suspicion or too ignorant to know how to behave themselves, although they will make up Canada' Parliament after March 26." The *Globe* warned of "a radio Gestapo" that was "an insult, not only to the candidates, but to the people who nominate them." The newspaper asked if "the Censorship Committee and the censors, and the government to which they are responsible, have a monopoly on loyalty and intelligence; if they are the only ones concerned with keeping useful information from the enemy and furthering the war effort, why an election at all? ...Why not go the full way with a dictatorship, as with a blacked-out Parliament, and have it over with?"¹² The paper accused the Prime Minister of having an unfair advantage. Maybe, like the rest of the candidates, King would submit his speeches to censors but it "would strike anyone as absurd to have a civil servant go over the Prime Minister's manuscript with a blue pencil, looking for offences against the Government's regulations."¹³

The criticism of broadcast censorship brought results. On February 7, chief broadcast censor R.P. Landry cancelled the rule that all opinion pieces had

¹² "Call Off the Censors," *The Globe and Mail*, January 31, 1940, 6.

¹³ "Put Candidates On Their Honour," *The Globe and Mail*, February 3, 1940, 6.

to be submitted to censors before they could be broadcast. Instead, station managers were made responsible for ensuring that nothing in breach of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* went over the airwaves.¹⁴

The relaxation of broadcast censorship rules did not end the criticism of the censorship system by the newspaper's editors or its writers. Judith Robinson attacked King's government the day after Landry made his announcement. In a column entitled "Between Mr. King and Quebec," Robinson said "it's comforting to know that the censor thought Mr. King's speech would not prejudice recruiting or the safety of the state. And still more comforting to know that Mr. King's government has had sensible second thought and is ready to lay off the whole silly idea of radio censorship for the duration of the election campaign." These policy reversals had been "enforced on a Liberal Government by the clamor of private citizens." King's government, she wrote, deserved no credit: "The official Ottawa attitude towards Canada's freedom ever since this war started has been that of a chicken-hearted tyrant who willed more evil than he durst."¹⁵ On February 17, 1940, Robinson's column featured an attack on censorship and mocked a promise by King that all legislation enacted under the *War Measures Act* would be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny.¹⁶

Through the rest of February, the *Globe* reported on several election-related censorship brush fires. In an editorial entitled "Radio Censorship a Joke,"

¹⁴ See Handbook, Consolidation of Directives Radio, 4/41. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5942 File: Radio Broadcasting Censorship. For the *Globe's* coverage, see "Censorship of Radio Ends, Left to Station Managers But They Would Dodge Onus," *The Globe and Mail*, February 8, 1.

¹⁵ "Between Mr. King and Quebec," *The Globe and Mail*, February 9, 1940, 13.

¹⁶ "Recalling a Bequest to Youth," *The Globe and Mail*, February 13, 1940, 13.

the paper reported on a story in *Saturday Night* magazine about a CCF candidate in Edmonton who was told by radio censors not to mention the fact that in 1914 Canadian troops were sent to England with poor performing Ross rifles and with boots whose soles were unsuited to the European climate. In another case, an Opposition candidate was warned not to say over the air that King's dissolution of Parliament in January had left Opposition MPs with many unanswered questions about the government's conduct of the war.¹⁷

George Drew was scheduled to make a major Conservative election speech on March 1. A.A. Fraser, the assistant radio censor in charge of the Toronto district, went over Drew's speech with the CBC's station manager in Toronto, and the station manager made cuts. Drew tipped off *The Globe and Mail*, which applied for, and was refused, permission from Perry to run the material cut from Drew's speech. Very quickly, the Censorship Branch regretted the decision of the radio censor and the Toronto print censor. The authors of the final report called Perry's ruling "a foolish and futile attempt to prevent public exposure of inconsistency in the censorship administration" and said the *Globe's* subsequent trashing of the censors in the March 2 story was "inevitable." The March 2 story was submitted to the censors, who cleared it "to the last comma."¹⁸

Drew was quoted in the *Globe* saying "To my own knowledge several deletions had been made by the censor which the radio station and its solicitor did not believe contravened their regulations." One such case was a reference to King's responsibility "for our disgraceful shortage of weapons." *The Globe*

¹⁷ "Radio Censorship a Joke," *The Globe and Mail*, February 23, 1940, 6.

¹⁸ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

reported Perry had granted permission to use the last sentence, even though the radio censorship had refused to pass it. Quoted in *The Globe and Mail*, Drew charged the censorship system was “nothing more than a political machine for preventing effective correction of Mr. King’s misstatements.” Hammering home his point, Drew told *The Globe and Mail* that King, in a speech at Winnipeg “gave the number and types of aircraft, engines and weapons. When I sought to give the correct figures, I was told that this was contrary to the censorship regulations.” This prompted Drew to charge King with moving to create the “machinery of a dictatorship.” Indeed, he called the censors “political police” and warned Canadians “that we are now living under the supervision of a Canadian Gestapo whose duty it is to prevent just criticism of the Government reaching the ears of the public.” But the fact remained, he said, that “Canada went into the war unprepared,” and maintained, as a Tory, that “any defence preparations that were made were done by Gen. McNaughton during R.B. Bennett’s administration.”¹⁹

Drew and the newspaper repeated the “Nazi” charge the following day. Speaking at a meeting of the West York Conservative riding association in New Toronto,²⁰ Drew accused King of establishing “a political censorship quite as effective as that imposed on Germany.” Drew also read the parts of his radio speech that had been cut by the censors. He told the crowd that some Canadian soldiers drilled with World War I weapons, while others had none at all. He also noted the Canadian army had no decent tanks or fighter planes, its artillery had

¹⁹ “Drew Holds Free Speech Threatened,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 1, 1940 1

²⁰ Now part of the City of Toronto, in the former Borough of Etobicoke.

no modern field pieces and just four anti-aircraft guns and one of its twelve-pounders was a relic from the Boer War. Drew then told his audience: "We are fighting to preserve democracy. It will do us little good if our young men sacrifice their lives to withstand the threat of dictatorship abroad while our Government destroys democracy at home." King, the Ontario Tory leader said, had "learned something about the Nazi technique" in censorship when he had visited Germany before the war. He also claimed the radio censors lied when they said they had not cut his speech about the woeful state of Canada's military preparedness.²¹

Dr. R. J. Manion, leader of the federal Conservatives, also took up the anti-censorship cause. King, Manion told 1,400 members of the Conservative Business Men's Association in Toronto March 2, was not content with "scuttling Parliament and threatening the existence of Canadian parliamentary institutions"; he was now "attempting to gag free speech over the radio by a form of censorship which has reached ridiculous heights."²² Two days later, Manion echoed Drew's accusation that the censorship system in Canada resembled the one established in Nazi Germany.²³

The Globe and Mail quoted more minor political figures making the same allegations. Earl Lawson, a member of R.B. Bennett's cabinet in the early 1930s, compared the actions of King's government to those "of Hitler in 1936,"²⁴ while Karl Homuth, the National Government (in effect, Conservative) candidate in the

²¹ "Drew Charges Censoring Here Just Like Nazis," *The Globe and Mail* March 2, 1940, 1.

²² "Manion Says Censorship of Radio Talks Carried to 'Ridiculous Heights'," *The Globe and Mail*, March 2, 1940, 4.

²³ "Manion Calls Vote For King Liberty Peril," *The Globe and Mail*, March 4, 1.

²⁴ "Non-Partisan Rule is Urged," *The Globe and Mail*, March 4, 1940 3.

Ontario riding of Waterloo South, warned “some of us might be arrested for speaking frankly from the platform.”²⁵

Judith Robinson warned her readers on March 6 that “the war for liberty is only six months old, and already the system set up by the Federal Liberal Government can get away with freedom’s murder.” Robinson was angry that the *Globe’s* censorship fight had not been taken up with vigor by any of the major English-language press in Canada. “The sooner that great truth becomes plain to all newspaper publishers in this country the more freedom they are likely to salvage for themselves and others out of a Liberal Government’s illiberal censorship system.”²⁶

Arthur “Roy” Brown, the Canadian pilot credited with shooting down German air ace Manfred von Richthofen, made the front page of the *Globe* on March 12 when he charged King had lied about Canada’s defence preparations, then banned all criticism of his government’s war effort. “The very idea of Mr. King restricting you and me as to what we may say is embittering,” he told an Ontario meeting held in support of Conservative candidates. “What did Mr. King ever do for his country in the face of the enemy that gives him any right to dictate to you and me what we shall say in a democratic country? Everybody who criticizes the Government today must pull his punches due to the censorship of the Defence of Canada Regulations, which, by their use might better be called the Defence of Mackenzie King Government Regulations.”²⁷

²⁵ “Frank Speaker Faces Arrest,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 6, 1940, 3.

²⁶ “Climaxing Censorship Comedy,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 6, 1940, 13.

²⁷ “Curb on Speech is Embittering to Roy Brown,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 12, 1940, 1. Brown ran unsuccessfully as a Liberal in the 1943 provincial election. See *The Globe and Mail*, July 22, 1943, 6.

Colonel T.A. King, running against Defence Minister Norman Rogers in Kingston, accused the minister of hiding behind censorship. "People have now found all this arbitrary censorship is not so much to keep news from the enemy as it is to prevent an open and free discussion of the failure of our Government to rise to the needs of the time. This hiding behind the enemy is not good enough for Canadians." The *Globe* picked up his attack.²⁸ In Peterborough, the local Conservative member of the Ontario legislature told a party rally that, because of censorship, the Germans knew more about the sad state of the Canadian army than did Canadians.²⁹

By the end of the federal election campaign, it had become apparent that the only people, outside Quebec, willing to make censorship a serious issue were Drew, the Ontario provincial Conservative caucus, and the *Globe*. Manion abandoned the issue early in the campaign. None of the major papers in Ontario or western Canada adopted the cause. Still, Drew used very tough language on King, saying on March 18 that "dissolution of Parliament, censorship of press, radio and public speech, and the hiding of facts from the people who have a right to know them, smacks of dictatorship."³⁰ Drew made a campaign swing through Eastern Ontario and made the same charges in small towns throughout the region.³¹

In the end, King won a landslide victory despite Drew and the *Globe's* campaign. T.L. Church, one of the few Toronto-area Conservatives to win a

²⁸ "Distrust Spread by Opponents, Rogers Says," *The Globe and Mail*, March 12, 1940, 9.

²⁹ "Censorship is Attacked," *The Globe and Mail*, March 15, 1940, 10.

³⁰ "King Charges Trickery is Used Upon Censors," *The Globe and Mail*, March 19, 1940, 1.

³¹ "Drew Charges Secret Accord For Gun Order," *The Globe and Mail*, March 21, 1940, 8.

substantial majority, blamed censorship for what he saw as his party's inability to get its message to the voters. "The people of Canada want the facts about the Canadian war effort. They did not get the truth through the election campaign."³² Despite losing the election, Drew and the *Globe* would not drop the censorship issue.³³ Church, now a member of the Conservative front bench, returned to Ottawa determined to clip the wings of the press censorship system.

The *Globe* weighed in on the side of the *Montreal Gazette* during the Camillein Houde controversy, when the *Gazette* drew criticism from the censors and the government for reporting the Montreal mayor's ant-conscription statements. The following year, the *Globe* ran a weekly series of large advertisements sponsored by an "Informal Committee on Publishing" and carrying a picture of Hon. W.A. Buchanan, "Chairman of the Newspaper Publishers Committee." The May 27, 1941 advertisement told *Globe* readers: "More than any other instrument of democracy, more than the individual rights of free speech and free assembly, it is the *newspaper* which assures you these facts. That is why we repeat: *don't take the freedom of the press for granted!* Complacency *itself* is a grave danger! As long as you, the readers of our papers, actively want a *Free Press*, the newspapers will go on giving you all the facts consistent with a strictly military censorship. But not very much longer!"³⁴ The copywriters did not explain why the newspapers were in jeopardy.

³² "Blames Defeat on Censorship," *The Globe and Mail*, March 30, 1940, 5.

³³ "Press Freedom is Held Vital to Democracy," *The Globe and Mail*, April 12, 1941, 5, and "Full Discussion of all Issues is Urged by Drew," *The Globe and Mail*, April 21, 1941, 4.

³⁴ "Let's Believe in Ourselves," (advertisement), *The Globe and Mail*, May 27, 1941 7.

The following month, readers were warned by a new ad to dig deep beneath the headlines and to give careful thought to what they were reading. The newspapers would continue to do their part: “We accept our obligations to go on covering the news completely, reporting it fairly. But the newspapers do want your understanding of the vital importance of keeping the press free... not because it is our business but because it is your liberty at stake.”³⁵

The *Globe's* motivation is difficult to determine. McCullagh did not write an autobiography and the newspaper did not keep records of the discussions of its editorial board. The publisher, however, had political aspirations of his own and had bought radio time in the four years leading up to the war to promote Hepburn and to drum up support for McCullagh's Leadership League, an early 1939 scheme to end party politics in Canada. In the latter instance, McCullagh had been denied the use of the CBC network. Drew had always courted the media and had written for *Maclean's* during the Depression. He knew the censorship issue would resonate with some publishers. It also meshed with the Tory campaign narrative that King had cynically called parliament in January, made political points from the Speech from the Throne, then immediately called an election, thereby stifling Opposition criticism in parliament.

The position of the Toronto newspapers on censorship tended to mesh with their party loyalties, since the Liberal *Star*, normally a vocal advocate of civil liberties, said nothing about censorship during the 1940 campaign. Still, McCullagh and some of his journalists maintained a steady and dedicated opposition to the censorship well after the 1940 campaign was over, which

³⁵ “Who Says It's So?” (advertisement), *The Globe and Mail*, June 4, 1941 8.

suggests they truly believed the system was flawed and was being exploited politically by the federal Liberals.

The government may have hit back at the *Globe* by targeting two of its writers. On March 14, 1942, Opposition Leader R.B. Hanson asked in the House of Commons about an article in the current issue of *Saturday Night* which said the RCMP had investigated and interviewed Judith Robinson and Oakley Dalgleish - another *Globe* writer who later became the paper's editor and publisher - "two journalists whose loyalty is unquestioned." Hanson claimed that the police, under orders from the government, had targeted Robinson and Dalgleish to intimidate journalists who have been critical of the Liberals' war effort. The freedom of the press, he said, directing his question at the Justice minister Louis St. Laurent, "is a matter of such vital importance that I believe this house is entitled to a full and complete explanation from the minister." St. Laurent gave a non-committal answer three days later.³⁶

Other reporters did not take up the issue of the rough handling of journalists by the RCMP. Even in the *Globe* it seems to have been overtaken by events: the conscription plebiscite the following month, the restructuring of censorship, and the controversy over the publication of a scathing letter written by Drew that condemned the training and equipment of the Canadian force lost at Hong Kong at Christmas 1941.

The *Globe* did not follow the lead of the Quebec press to make censorship an issue during the conscription plebiscite, but a few days before the vote the newspaper gave good play to a story on revisions to the censorship directives

³⁶*Hansard*, March 12, 1942, 1539 and March 22, 1942 1570-71.

that tightened the rules on reporting of new munitions factories, and any incident of sabotage and enemy raids against Canadian war industries.³⁷ The news story was followed by an editorial warning the government “if the latest ‘directive’ is intended mainly to save the skins of politicians by preventing the exposure of failure, there ought to be a howl from one end of the country to the other... It is to be feared that the Press Censors in Canada are not strong enough to stand up against Cabinet Ministers who would use them to prevent the disclosure of information which would lower the prestige of the said ministers.”³⁸

Sir Lyman Duff, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was appointed by the King government to serve as a one-man Royal Commission to examine whether the troops sent to Hong Kong were adequately trained and equipped. In his report,³⁹ Duff concluded the Canadian forces were ready to fight when they were attacked on December 8, 1941.⁴⁰ Drew turned to the media, alleging the Duff report was a whitewash. On July 1, 1942, Drew submitted a thirty-two page letter to King criticizing in detail the conclusions of the Duff Report. Copies were given to Canadian Press and members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery. King met that day with Hanson, who told the Prime Minister he did not agree with what Drew was doing. Hanson told King he was being squeezed by the *Globe* for not demanding enough evidence of the fitness of the Hong Kong force, while the *Toronto Star* criticized him for asking for too much. Hanson said

³⁷ “Less Publicity Will Be Given War Industry,” *The Globe and Mail*, April 21, 1942, 9.

³⁸ “Tightening Censorship,” *The Globe and Mail*, April 22, 1942, 6.

³⁹ The Royal Commission on the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, 1942

⁴⁰ Most scholarly work on the Hong Kong expedition concludes that Canadian troops were ill-trained and poorly equipped. See for example, Brereton Greenhous, “C” *Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe*. Toronto: Dundurn, 1997, and Tony Banham, *Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941*. Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2003.

Drew was simply out to make political capital as he could. Anything he did to stop the Ontario Tory leader was bound to cause a flare-up in the press.⁴¹

The same afternoon, Biggar was called into the cabinet meeting for a three-hour session on the Drew letter controversy. King asked Biggar, Ralston, St. Laurent and Campbell whether papers that published the letter were protected from libel actions because the letter had been first tabled in the House of Commons, giving the newspapers parliamentary privilege. When they could not answer, King took a copy of his father's book *Libel and Slander* from a shelf and read passages from it that convinced him Drew could, in fact, be sued.⁴²

At 9.30 P.M. on July 14, Andrew Carnegie, a Canadian Press reporter on Parliament Hill, filed a report to his wire service saying that a thirty-two page typewritten letter detailing Drew's evidence and opinions on the failings of the Hong Kong campaign and what Drew alleged were cover-ups by the Duff Commission had been sent by the Ontario Conservative leader to the Prime Minister. A copy of the letter was sent to CCF leader M.J. Coldwell, who asked King to table it in the House of Commons. King agreed to do so.

Carnegie submitted a story based on the Drew letter to the Ottawa office of the Directorate of Censorship and asked that it be approved because of King's promise. Jacques Girouard, the first front-line censor to work on the issue, was wary: "My opinion was that we would have to judge the story on its own merits, since legally we could not assume that the document was permissible because it

⁴¹ Mackenzie King Diary, July 1, 1942.

⁴² Mackenzie King Diary July 1, 1942

would subsequently be tabled. The immunity would begin only after the tabling.”⁴³ Although Carnegie decided to write the story and submit it, Girouard’s instincts were right. King changed his mind about tabling the Drew letter.

The next day, as the letter, carried on the Canadian Press wire, was waiting in many newsrooms to be re-worked into major news stories, editors across the country began to worry they would be scooped on a story they already had in their hands. Canadian Press had moved a large mass of analysis copy on the Drew letter but the censors had decided it breached Section 39(b) of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, which prohibited the publication of anything intended or likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline or administration of the armed forces, and stories based upon it could only be approved if the letter was tabled in the House of Commons.⁴⁴ At the same time, Canadian reporters were trying to sell the story to foreign newspapers. The censors were willing to approve articles about the controversy surrounding the letter as long as its sensitive contents were not divulged.⁴⁵

In the following days, Canadian Press and British United Press sent stories based on the Drew letter to their subscribing newspapers but none of it was used. The wire services and the newspapers feared both the Justice Department, with its powers under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*, and Chief Justice Duff, who could jail journalists under his sweeping power to cite for

⁴³ Memorandum, Jacques Girouard, Ottawa, July 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁴⁴ Memorandum, Eggleston, Ottawa, July 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁴⁵ Ruling, Lew Gordon, Vancouver, July 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

contempt of court. While the latter power might be arguable since the Royal Commission had ended, no editor or publisher wanted to debate the issue from a jail cell.⁴⁶

The *Montreal Gazette* probed the boundaries of the Drew letter ban in its editorial of July 16. When British United Press and the Southam newspaper chain's parliamentary reporter "Torchy" Anderson wanted to file stories based on the *Gazette* editorial, Biggar turned them down.⁴⁷ At 8 p.m. July 16, *The Globe and Mail's* first edition dated July 17 hit the streets carrying a story saying censors had suppressed the entire Drew letter. That day, McCullagh left for a fishing trip to ponder whether he was willing to risk jail by publishing the entire letter.⁴⁸

On July 16, Eggleston was called into Biggar's office to give Biggar a "chronological recital of the part played (or not played) by the Censors of Publications in the publication of Colonel Drew's original statement of June 5 and his letter of more recent date." Biggar was working on a memorandum for the minister. Soon after this meeting, Eggleston sent a telegram to all of the regional offices telling them the Directorate was refusing to pass for publication articles based on or quoting the Drew letter contained in the *Gazette* editorial that morning.⁴⁹ The *Vancouver Sun* submitted a story based on material on the Drew letter supplied by the Canadian Press. When Lew Gordon refused to approve

⁴⁶Ruling, B.B. Perry, Toronto July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁴⁷ Ruling, W. Eggleston, Ottawa, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁴⁸ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, Toronto, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁴⁹ Memorandum, W. Eggleston, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

parts of the letter, the *Sun* ran, in bold text on its front page of July 18 a statement saying: "In Vancouver today, Lew Gordon, British Columbia Press Censor, ruled that no part of the letter could be published." In a memorandum to his head office, Gordon said he had been misquoted: "This office never made any ruling that no part of the letter could be published, as alleged in the *Sun*."⁵⁰ The same day, Gordon cleared stories to Canadian Press about a telegram sent by the Calgary Trades and Labour Council to King condemning "an attitude of suppression of information" on vital questions regarding conduct of the war "as exemplified in the Hong Kong Commission report" and calling for a secret session of the House of Commons to deal with the allegations of the Drew letter.⁵¹ In Toronto, Bert Perry was handed an intercept by the cable censors of a message sent by John Bird, editor of the *Winnipeg Tribune*, to Bob Farquharson, *The Globe and Mail's* managing editor, saying Bird had mailed tear sheets of stories from the *Winnipeg Free Press* on the Drew letter.⁵²

In their July 17 editions, *The Globe and Mail* and the *Ottawa Citizen* carried stories based on the Drew letter criticizing the censorship system. These articles encouraged other major newspapers to further test the boundaries of the censors' policy. The editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press* phoned the Ottawa office that morning to say he was planning to run what he believed were the "non-actionable" parts of the letter.

⁵⁰ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, July 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁵¹ Ruling, Lew Gordon, Vancouver, July 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁵² Memorandum Bert Perry, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

The censors believed the *Citizen* had treated them unfairly, so Charpentier and Eggleston sat down to draft a letter to Canadian newspapers explaining their position. Part-way through that process, they changed their minds and decided to send a note to the Canadian Press saying the *Citizen* erred when it reported the censors had spiked Canadian Press's wire copy on the Drew letter because it had not, in fact, been presented to the censors. This strategy was scuttled when the meeting was interrupted by Canadian Press Montreal editor John Dauphinee's telephone call informing Charpentier and Eggleston that the entire 7500-word dispatch was about to be submitted. The censors read over the material and found almost all of it to be actionable and stamped it "Publication Not Authorized." Canadian Press's wire carried a note to this effect shortly afterwards.⁵³

Late that afternoon, Norman MacLeod, the British United Press parliamentary correspondent, called Eggleston to say Drew had written a second letter and British United Press wanted to carry a story on it. Eggleston reviewed the material over the telephone and passed all of it except one paragraph that the censor believed drew on secret parts of the evidence given to the Duff Inquiry.⁵⁴ Cable censors were ordered to prevent any news stories on this Drew letter from being sent to the United States.⁵⁵

⁵³ Memorandum, Wilfrid Eggleston, Ottawa, July 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁵⁴ Ruling, Ottawa, Eggleston, July 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁵⁵ Memorandum, Halifax (Jefferson) July 17 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

Many of the major Canadian newspapers published long stories and editorials on July 18 criticizing the way King's government handled the controversy. The *Winnipeg Tribune* devoted nearly a full page to the first Drew letter, with huge Xs showing sections that editors had cut to conform to censorship rules. *The Globe and Mail* published a long editorial explaining the background of the Drew letter and arguing: "The press of Canada has not opposed what it conceived to be censorship for public protection, to safeguard military secrets from the enemy." But it maintained that King had made a promise to table the letter in the House of Commons, and then broken it, and the press had showed its loyalty to Canada by refusing to leak the document. There was no need for threats of tougher censorship, since, "from the beginning of the war newspaper publishers and editors in general have accepted their responsibility, leaning backward to do it, not because of fear of the big stick, but because they wished to do their full duty."⁵⁶ The *Vancouver Sun* and *Province* also published editorials that day criticizing King's handling of the Drew letter, the latter newspaper saying, "it is futile, of course, to attempt to hide what so many people know. It is also the height of folly, because when news is suppressed, where there is news, rumor takes its place, and rumor has a way of spreading and expanding – literally feeding upon itself."⁵⁷

That afternoon, King refused to table the second Drew letter in the House of Commons. Through the evening, the censors were pressed by reporters and editors to release at least some of the material in this letter. Biggar would have

⁵⁶ "Reveal All the Facts," *The Globe and Mail*, July 18, 1942, 6.

⁵⁷ Editorial, *The Vancouver Province*, July 18, 1942, 8.

passed most of it, removing a paragraph that referred to secret messages passed between the British and Canadian governments telling of the deteriorating situation in the Pacific that should have served as a warning not to send untrained men to Hong Kong.⁵⁸ Eggleston, however, believed the letter had to be dealt with as a whole, not carved up and offered in pieces to the various offices of the Directorate of Censorship. He argued successfully that the entire letter should be stamped "Not Approved for Publication."⁵⁹

The cable censors tried to disrupt the newspapers' communication by refusing to pass telegrams between the editors of *The Globe and Mail*, *Vancouver News-Herald* and *Winnipeg Tribune*. Biggar called Girouard and cable censor Major McEvoy into his office and warned the cable censors that they had no right to suppress material that was not military secrets, but, in this case, simply a recounting of what had been published in newspapers. McEvoy claimed he had intelligence showing a conspiracy between parliamentary reporters, CCF leader M.J. Coldwell, and Drew, and that reporters had extensive information as to what Coldwell proposed to do in the House with the Drew letter. Biggar did not feel that this had any relevance. Girouard agreed, saying there was a real danger of censors appearing to be involved in politics. McEvoy angrily re-stated his position, but finally gave in to Biggar's ruling that communication between the newspapers should not be disrupted.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Memorandum, J. Girouard, Ottawa, July 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁵⁹ Ruling, W. Eggleston, Ottawa, July 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, J. Girouard, Ottawa, July 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

Two days later, Andrew Carnegie submitted the original 7500-word Drew letter to Eggleston for a ruling. Eggleston reminded Carnegie that approval of the document would allow it to be published without risk of prosecution, but the refusal by censors to approve a story did not guarantee a prosecution would follow its publication. This was, in fact, the basis of the “voluntary” Canadian press censorship system. “This seemed to strike Andy as a new idea, although we have frequently tried to make it clear to all parties concerned, and he asked whether I could write something for them as guidance,” Eggleston told his colleagues.⁶¹

On July 20, Eggleston sent a memorandum to the censorship regional offices. “Colonel Biggar takes on the whole a rather more restricted view of our functions and powers than we may have occasionally conceived in the past,” Eggleston wrote. The chief censor believed publishing an item that censors had refused to clear was not, in itself, automatic grounds for prosecution. Newspapers, however, should take a censor’s decision as a serious warning. “This policy lowers both our responsibility and our power and there might be cases where we did not feel that it gave us teeth enough,” continued Eggleston. “Perhaps it is more appropriate to political affairs like this Drew letter than it would be to the matter of vital military secrecy.” He still would not hesitate to warn a newspaper which submitted a grave military secret that not only would he not pass it, but would immediately recommend the prosecution of a newspaper

⁶¹ Ruling, W. Eggleston, Ottawa, July 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

that carried it. In fact, confidentially, Biggar did draw up an Order-in-Council to provide "greater clarification to newspapermen."⁶²

In the evening of July 21, Blair Fraser of the *Montreal Gazette* phoned Jacques Girouard to get clarification of the censors' position regarding Drew's first letter. Girouard told Fraser the censors could not give immunity to publish the entire letter or portions of it because they continued to believe the material violated the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.⁶³ Five minutes after the call ended, Fraser called McMahon. Fraser was, McMahon believed, "fishing for material" to be used in the *Gazette's* defence if the newspaper ignored the censors' advice and ran the Drew letter. McMahon ended the call quickly by telling Fraser to contact censorship's head office in Ottawa.⁶⁴

At the same time the Montreal censors were fending off Fraser, George McCullagh and Bob Farquharson were in the Toronto office of the Directorate of Censorship asking if the press censors would pass Drew's first letter to Mackenzie King. Perry refused to give in. McCullagh wanted to know what was censorable in it. Perry did not know, since he had not read Drew's original letter or in the condensed form that the Canadian Press sent out in which military information was expunged. When McCullagh asked what would happen if *The Globe and Mail* published the letter without censorship approval, Perry told him the newspaper was liable to be prosecuted under the *Defence of Canada*

⁶² Eggleston to Regional Censors, July 20, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5982, File: 29-19 Correspondence-Memoranda Re: Hong Kong Inquiry. This, in fact, became censorship policy in August 1942, when the *Defence of Canada Regulations* were amended.

⁶³ Memorandum, Girouard, July 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5950, File: Drew Letter.

⁶⁴ Memorandum, E. McMahon, July 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

Regulations. Perry drew the conclusion that McCullagh was not afraid of being charged.⁶⁵

On July 24, *The Globe and Mail* published a round-up of critical editorials from across the country under the headline “Gagging Process of Censorship Draws Protest Across Canada.” The Tory Toronto-based *Saturday Night* magazine said the “argument of possible assistance to the enemy has completely ceased to be used in defence of the policy of suppression,” while the *Financial Post* accused King’s government of a “wanton abuse of wartime censorship.” The criticism had spread to smaller papers like the Brantford *Expositor*, which said: “There must be no countenancing of any procedure which might stifle the right to free and proper expression and inquiry,” while the *Vancouver News-Herald* editorial reproduced in the *Globe* declared: “It is impossible to gag a free people or shackle a *free press* in an alert democracy. If all the people stand together to maintain their right of free speech, no Government can succeed in depriving them of it.” The *Ottawa Citizen’s* editors argued that “a re-examination of their ruling on the part of the press censors seems to be in order. Any censorship for other than the proper and legitimate purposes for which it was established is... something that is both alarming and dangerous and ought to be vigorously contested.”⁶⁶ The *Toronto Telegram*, in one of its few editorials on censorship, warned “If the newspapers remain silent under the official ban on publication and fail to urge with all of the power at their

⁶⁵ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, July 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Drew Letter.

⁶⁶ All of these editorial comments are from “Gagging Process of Censorship Draws Protests Across Canada,” *The Globe and Mail*, July 24, 1942, 6.

command a full investigation by Parliament of all evidence they will go far to forfeit the trust of the public and to demonstrate that the boasted freedom of the press is a right to which they are not entitled.” The London *Free Press*, a Conservative paper, believed wartime censorship was a “necessary evil” but added “it is a dangerous infringement on the liberties for which we are fighting when censorship is used for other than its proper and legitimate purposes. Unfortunately, this is the impression which has been given in the present instance.” Elmore Philpott, writing in the Vancouver *News-Herald*, said “Colonel Drew’s accusations are so astounding in many other respects that they demand complete publicity in parliament.”⁶⁷

On July 22, Biggar and Eggleston met with reporters of the British United Press wire service and frustrated senior journalists in the Parliamentary Press Gallery, where the censors were subjected to demands that they stop issuing recommendations and begin promulgating clear orders. Eggleston objected to that idea, saying: “in effect they were asking us to assume responsibility” that a free press “should properly exercise itself.” Yet, Eggleston thought that perhaps the censors should have more power over the publishing of military secrets under Section 16 of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. Biggar warned journalists what would be involved in far more extensive control over press material, as opposed to the current ‘voluntary’ system: “It would mean a censor in every newspaper office with dictatorial powers to order material expunged even if already in type or on the page. This smacked a good deal of the sort of

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

disastrous censorship which France had in the fall of 1939 and in the early months of 1940.”⁶⁸

Ontario premier Mitchell Hepburn finally joined the chorus in August 1942. Hepburn had no qualms about spilling military secrets if, in doing so, he could discredit Mackenzie King’s administration. In mid-August, 1942, the *Toronto Star* submitted a report of a Hepburn speech in which the premier stated: “Today there aren’t anti-aircraft guns or equipment to defend the immense power plants at Niagara Falls, which is one of the most vulnerable spots in the country next to the Sault Ste. Marie canal” Perry let the quote pass “in light of earlier rulings,” finding the material “officially unobjectionable, but privately fairly nauseating.”⁶⁹

By then, the dispute over the Drew letter had fallen from the front pages, and, by the end of the summer of 1942, the crisis was over. Drew and the *Globe* took one last shot in November, when the paper published Drew’s allegation that the federal government had tapped his telephone lines and opened his mail during the controversy. “The time has come,” Drew said, “for Canadians to assess the general condition of their country and express themselves openly on the degree to which freedom of the press and freedom of the expression of opinion have been curtailed in Canada.” The government denied the allegation.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Memorandum, “W.E.” (Wilfrid Eggleston), July 22, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5945, File: 1-A-3, Memorandums Re: Meetings of Various Committees.

⁶⁹ Ruling, B.B. Perry, August 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5965, File: general-2.

⁷⁰ “Mail Opened, Phone Tapped, Drew Claims,” *The Globe and Mail*, November 14, 1942, 13.

Unlike the Quebec nationalist press, *The Globe and Mail* did not question Canada's participation in the war. Instead, it used what it claimed were federal government failures to attack Mackenzie King's management of Canada's war effort. This was a sustained partisan campaign at least partly in support of the federal Conservatives and of George Drew's campaign to replace Mitchell Hepburn as Premier of Ontario. The *Globe's* anti-censorship campaign reached two peaks, first in the 1940 federal election campaign and later with the controversy over the Drew letter. The paper later made digs about wartime censorship, but when the system was dismantled in 1945 it buried the news on its comics page.

There were, however, *Globe* writers, especially Judith Robinson, who appeared sincerely philosophically opposed to press censorship and who, by criticizing the system, found themselves the focus of a police investigation launched by the federal government. While the paper's motivations may have been mainly political, its commentary about censorship was important to maintaining an apolitical system. With Canada's most important English-language newspaper ready to jump on any censorship mis-step and expose any evidence of political interference in the censorship system, it may well have dampened any temptation by Mackenzie King's government to harness the system to its own political agenda.

Chapter Ten

Censorship and the Japanese Canadian Press

Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Canada's Japanese press, (all of which was based on the west coast), was targeted by racist politicians. On February 25, 1941, Thomas Reid, the MP for New Westminster, spoke in the House of Commons against extending the franchise to naturalized and Canadian-born ethnic Japanese, calling them an "unassimilable race." Three days later, *The New Canadian*, a Japanese-Canadian newspaper, published an editorial attacking Reid and A.W. Neill, the MP for Comox-Alberni, who supported Reid's position. The newspaper invited Reid and his supporters "to an open debate to determine which proposition is the most valid: 'Once a Japanese, always a Japanese,' or 'Once an oriental-baiting politician, always an oriental-baiting politician.'" Even though he opposed full civil rights for Japanese-Canadians and wanted them driven out of the west coast fishery, Reid was not happy with this characterization, and on March 14, stood in the House of Commons to condemn *The New Canadian's* "vilifying personal attack," which, he said, "comes with poor grace from a race of people who enjoyed, with the exception of the franchise, every phase of our economic and social life."¹

Days after Pearl Harbor, the Directorate of Censorship sent out a directive² asking editors to refrain from stirring up hatred and outrage against

¹ *Hansard*, March 14, 1941, 1526-1537 and 1563.

² Directive No. 25, Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5942, (NF).

ethnic Japanese³ in Canada. The presence in Canada of this minority group, many of them “second generation Japanese” the directive said, “creates a difficult situation. The vast majority of these persons have so far proved themselves to be loyal Canadian citizens, and it is considered inflammatory statements in relation to them, are not in the general interest.” The directive warned editors that, in almost all cases, allegations of disloyalty turned out to be false. Instead of publishing rumor and suspicion, journalists should report any evidence of sabotage or espionage to the police, the censors urged.⁴

Not all censorship staff agreed with the directive. In a memorandum sent to the rest of the country’s press censors, Jacques Girouard, the assistant censor in Montreal, asked: “After Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. are Jeff (Halifax censor H.B. Jefferson) and (Vancouver censor Lew) Gordon on sound ground when they object to so-called alarmist stuff? Too much of it might cause harm, but might it not at the same time shake people out of their complacency?”⁵

Within weeks of Pearl Harbor, officials in the RCMP and the federal Department of Justice decided to move against the Japanese media. The Vancouver censors were blindsided in January 1942 by the RCMP’s closure of three British Columbia Japanese newspapers, *Tairiku Nippo*, *Minshu*, and the

³ I use the term “ethnic Japanese” because, according to J.L. Granatstein as many as 86% of the 23,000 people in Canada of Japanese heritage were, at least technically, still citizens of Japan. While they were immigrants to Canada, the common phrase “Japanese Canadian” implies a level of civil rights that many of these people did not have, and may hide the rather precarious situation of so many of them. See Tomoko Makabi, Canadian Evacuation and Nesei Identity, *Phylon*, Vol. 41 No. 2 (1980), 118.

⁴ Even in British Columbia, where almost all the ethnic Japanese lived, they were only 2.7 per cent of the population. See Roger Daniels, “The Decisions to Relocate the North American Japanese: Another Look,” *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1. (February, 1982), 71.

⁵ Attachment to Memorandum, H.B.J. (Jefferson), Halifax, February 20, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5961, File: Sabotage-Possible.

Continental Daily News. Lew Gordon, the West Coast censor who handled the bulk of the work on censorship related to ethnic Japanese in Canada, believed the latter, at least, was a “legitimate business.” All of them, the censors argued, had a “good record” of showing loyalty to Canada.⁶

The censors quickly identified anti-Japanese racist elements on the West Coast as the larger threats to a unified war effort. Vancouver Alderman Halford Wilson was named in a Vancouver censorship memo as “a virulent anti-Jap” who was “tossing flame on the [white] fishermen's agitation to prevent the Federal Authorities from granting fishing licenses to any Japanese in 1942.” Gordon pointed out to military officials that Alderman Wilson “as a rule tosses in anti-Jap bombs at meetings of the City Council or its committees, and it would be difficult to choke him off.”⁷ In the first week of January 1942, Wilson spread the false story that two naval personnel and three Japanese fishermen were killed at Prince Rupert in a fight that broke out when the fishermen refused to let naval inspectors board their vessel. The story, Wilson claimed, was widely-known in B.C. and he demanded authorities confirm or deny it.

Gordon chased the story down by contacting the RCMP and the navy and found it was untrue. He managed to kill stories in the *Vancouver Sun* and the *Province*. As well, Gordon reported Wilson to military authorities as an unreliable crank and an anti-Japanese agitator. “Because Alderman Wilson is continually erecting straw men in his anti-Jap campaign, and then knocking them down, and

⁶ Memo, Ottawa, December 9, 1941. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

⁷ Ruling, C. Gordon, December 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

because the Alderman has been reportedly described in Ottawa circles as an 'undesirable influence' (and here on the Coast as a menace, a nuisance and a pest) we decided to pass on to Major-General Alexander, General Officer Commander-in-Chief Pacific Army Command, the latest outbreak of the Civic Solon," Gordon wrote.⁸

While Gordon was able to kill the *Province's* story on Wilson's bogus claim of bloody fighting at Prince Rupert, the paper continued to push hard for expulsion of the ethnic Japanese on the West Coast.⁹ The *Vancouver Sun* was almost as culpable. Pat Terry, the city editor of the *Vancouver Sun*, called Gordon on January 7 to complain about a *Province* story that reported on violence against Japanese in U.S. cities on the Pacific Coast. Gordon thought Terry's complaints were somewhat hypocritical, as "Mr. Terry's white-washing of 'The Sun' in this particular did not seem to me to be in accordance with the facts. After listening to Mr. Terry's tirade for some time we asked him if his own hands were quite clean."¹⁰

In Ottawa, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson asked Eggleston for advice on how to deal with Wilson's inflammatory statements in the press. Eggleston asked Gordon to contribute to the discussion. The Vancouver censor proposed discreet visits to the Vancouver newspapers would result in a "fairly complete 'blackout' of the said alderman," a view with

⁸ Lew Gordon January 8, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

⁹ The argument has been made that senior officials in Ottawa, acting in concert with their U.S. colleagues, had already made the decision. See Roger Daniels, "The Decisions to Relocate the North American Japanese: Another Look," *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1. (February, 1982), 71-85.

¹⁰ Lew Gordon, January 8, 1942 (second memo). Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

which Robertson concurred.¹¹ Unfortunately for the ethnic Japanese on the Pacific Coast, the two major Vancouver newspapers found Wilson's quotes too tempting to ignore.

Nor was Wilson the only politician whipping up fear and prejudice in B.C.. The province's minister of forests wanted the newspapers to run stories on his plan to hire wardens to put out incendiary bombs that Japan might drop on B.C. forests or that would be set by Japan's agents in Canada. In the early winter, of 1942, Gordon killed those stories, believing they would hurt civilian morale or cause undue alarm and discourage tourism.¹² However, they made it into the papers in May, when the province's chief forester told the Victoria Rotary Club he expected the worst fire season in history because of Japanese sabotage. Since so many people heard the speech, the censors let the story go, but Gordon said in a memo to Ottawa: "If the Japs fail to sprinkle incendiary bombs on the Coastal forests of British Columbia this summer the most disappointed man in the world will be Chief forester Orchard. No amount of persuasion has induced him to refrain from issuing invitations the Japs to come over and do their worst."¹³

The brutality of the Japanese armed forces, whose atrocities at Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila were heavily reported in the first months of 1942, undercut the efforts of the censors to maintain domestic peace in B.C.. On February 15, Canadian Press carried a story about the appalling conditions of

¹¹ Memorandum, W. Eggleston, January 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

¹² Ruling, Ottawa (Charpentier) January 29, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

¹³ Memorandum, L. Gordon, May 27, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

Canadian soldiers held at Kowloon since the fall of Hong Kong. The story, datelined Chungking, told how the Canadians were held in filthy conditions without proper food and described the sight of Canadian troops begging in vain for water as they had been marched passed the Kowloon YMCA. The censors let the story go after being assured the facts, gathered by an Associated Press reporter in China, were accurate.¹⁴ However, the censors, at the instigation of the military and the Department of External Affairs, subsequently imposed a black-out on stories about the abuse of Allied prisoners by Japanese forces – in part out of respect for the families of POWS -- but the hostility of the public to the Japanese remained palpable as Japan's seemingly unbeatable forces spread unchecked through the Pacific.¹⁵

The British Columbia news media fed local citizens' fears of some sort of Japanese aggression against Vancouver Island and the B.C. mainland. A story that was to run February 15, 1942 in the Vancouver *Sun* with a staged photo of Japanese men who were brought to two power dams by reporter-photographer Art Layse did go under the censor's knife. "Mr. Layse deftly sprinkled Japs around the two hydro-electric power dams of the B.C. Electric Railway Company on Stave River," Gordon wrote, and "particularly noted in his yarn every possible outlet for possible Jap sabotage inclinations. He blueprinted and diagrammed

¹⁴ Ruling, Ottawa, February 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

¹⁵ Memo, W. Eggleston, Ottawa, April 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese. Eggleston had misgivings about the ban, which was instigated at the time of the fall of Corregidor and the subsequent Bataan Death March: "I drew to Colonel Clarke's attention, as I had to Colonel Ralston's, the difficulty of persuading Canadian editors that they should suppress items freely carried in the United States press and over U.S. radio stations. I also raised the question as to whether the general public was not entitled to know what was going on, on the other side of the world, even if this caused some incidental distress to a group of our own citizens," he wrote in this memo.

with Xes just where sabotage efforts would be best rewarded." The story had a line saying one sawmill on the Fraser River had fired 175 ethnic Japanese workers because "too many spiked logs were climbing the chain to the saws, and too much machinery was breaking down without reason." After talking to Eggleston, the Vancouver censors removed that sentence from the story, along with speculation that hydro service could easily be disrupted by sabotage, mutterings by an unnamed Canadian Legion member who said "We'll take care of ... [the Japanese] in our own way" and the alleged statement of an unnamed man "who threatened to put a bullet into the next Jap 'who gets cocky about the war.'" Gordon returned the story to the *Sun*, and "notified City Desk that this office is not passing any pictures which diagram places susceptible to sabotage."¹⁶

A story in the March 2 edition of the *Vancouver News-Herald* on an attack by six British sailors on a rooming house that was home to ethnic Japanese men brought a complaint to the censors by Commander Geoffrey Borrie, the naval officer in charge in Vancouver. Borrie believed that reports of these types of attacks would encourage other thugs. Gordon, however, told Borrie the censors could do nothing to stop reporters from mining police blotters and the courts. Gordon expected the situation to get worse as the federal government was taking over a downtown hotel "in the center of the beer parlour district" and converting it to a home for sailors.¹⁷

¹⁶ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, February 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

¹⁷ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, March 2, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

Reporters from outside British Columbia added to the Directorate of Censorship's problems. On March 18, 1942, Harry Lang, a reporter for the *Chicago Sun*, arrived in Vancouver to gather as much material as he could about the situation of the ethnic Japanese and the city's preparation for war. Lang collected "a miscellaneous assortment of more or less harmless junk published in Vancouver press, gave himself a few shots in the journalistic arm, and then did a grand job of revamping, twisting and distorting," Gordon reported to Ottawa. The cable news censor showed Gordon the story that Lang had filed. Some of the problems, Gordon reported, came from Lang's hunger for a story that justified the expense of his trip to the coast but it hadn't helped that "coincidentally with his arrival in this city, our Board of Trade initiated a scare-'em-to-death campaign," in coordination with current air raid black-out exercises, to ensure that the city met its objective of \$200,000 in Victory Bonds.¹⁸

Gordon cut a paragraph from Lang's story that said other provinces did not want the Japanese internees. He also took out the claim that rage and the potential of violence against the Japanese "has grown more serious since the revelation by Anthony Eden in the British House of Commons of Jap atrocities against British women and soldiers in Hong Kong." About three hours later, the cable censors picked up a message to Lang from his employers telling him to head to San Francisco to search for a better story.¹⁹

In the rest of the country, newspapers ran alarming stories about the imminent arrival in their regions of ethnic Japanese who were about to be

¹⁸ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, March 18, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

expelled from B.C.. The plan to move some 3,000 Japanese from the Pacific Coast to the pulp mills and railways of northwestern Ontario was greeted with alarm by Fort William mayor C.M. Ross and members of the city council, who said publicly the Canadian lakehead was far too strategic a place for the internal exiles. The local papers covered the mayor's complaints and the *Toronto Star* picked up the story.²⁰

These stories ran as the government considered what, if anything, to do with ethnic Japanese on Canada's west coast. Even today, historians disagree on whether there was a strategic necessity to move them in the winter and spring of 1942. Historians Jack Granatstein and Gregory A. Johnson have argued there was strong support among some elements of the ethnic Japanese for the cause of their former homeland, and that the government made a rational decision.²¹ Peter Ward²² and Ken Adachi²³ have made coherent cases that the expulsion was motivated by racism, and their views have been accepted widely by the Canadian public, academia and the federal government. For their part, the Vancouver censors seem to have quickly decided that all the agitation against the ethnic Japanese was cynical manipulation of public opinion by politicians.

Japanese-Canadians in Vancouver were not eager to trade the west coast for the winter bush camps of Lake Superior, the destination of the first group of

²⁰ Memorandum, Toronto (Perry) March 20, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

²¹ J.L. Granatstein, and Gregory A. Johnson, "The Evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, 1942: A Realist Critique of the Received Wisdom," in Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard For Thee: War, Ethnicity and Canadian State, 1939-1945*. Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988, Chap. 15 (pp 101-119).

²² W. Peter Ward, "British Columbia and the Japanese Evacuation", *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 3 (September, 1976), (pp. 289-308).

²³ Ken Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.

expelled men. In early March, some 100 Canadian-born Japanese men had been ordered to report to Vancouver's Manning Pool for shipment east. Only thirteen men turned themselves in. Major Austin Taylor, chairman of the B.C. Security Commission, told Gordon to "ban publication of any news stories about this trouble. He said he made this request because Mitch Hepburn and the authorities of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, if they got wind of the fact that the Japs had suddenly become fractious, might all conclude they would rather not have such people forwarded them from British Columbia." Gordon also killed a telegram from Don Mason of the *Vancouver Sun* to the *Toronto Star*, stating:

"JAPS FOR SCHRIEBER STILL HERE STOP TROUBLE BREWING STOP JAPS REFUSE TO GO TO ONTARIO STOP CANADIAN BORN JAPS ARE CLAIMING RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND IT IS INDICATED SOME MAY GO INTO CONCENTRATION CAMPS STOP MEANTIME CENSOR HAS STEPPED IN STOP ALL COPY REGARDING JAPS MUST GO THROUGH MAN HERE STOP ON NO ACCOUNT MENTION POSSIBLE INTERNMENT ABOVE STOP WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED."²⁴

Police searched for the missing men while Gordon suppressed coverage. Postal censors demanded the censors kill any letters to the editor from internees held in Vancouver who were critical of the expulsion plans. Eggleston refused, telling them "we had to be very careful not to allow ourselves to be used by any government department to hide incompetency, cruelty, corruption or other ills. Added that the privilege of 'grousing' was a fundamental British one and we

²⁴ Memorandum, Vancouver, March 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Coouncil Office (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File 1-E-1 Japanese.

thought that Japanese in Canada, unless openly pro-Axis, were entitled to complain if they could find anyone to publish their complaints."²⁵ Eggleston said he would consider sending out a circular only if the complaints of the Japanese-Canadians generated a violent backlash among the majority population.

Within a week, Alderman Wilson was beating his anti-Japanese drum again, saying he had information that Japanese agents were planning to poison the Vancouver water supply by tampering with the Capilano River Pipeline. Censor Lew Gordon believed Austin Taylor and the B.C. Security Commission were a far more important threat to social peace and civilian morale. Taylor continued to push the censors for a ban on reporting of any difficulties arising from the expulsion of Japanese-Canadians from the lower mainland, holding on to his argument that Hepburn and other premiers would refuse to take troublesome internees. Gordon believed Taylor was "throwing his weight around in a rather dictatorial way," but Gordon resolved to stand up to him. The censorship system was not an "anti-embarrassment committee," Gordon said. "[O]ur only legal justification for asking newspapers to kill copy was a sincere conviction that its publication would violate Defence of Canada Regulations."²⁶

On April 9, 1942, the Chairman of the B.C. Security Commission formerly advised the censors that another group of Japanese Canadians would be interned and sent east. Since most of them had not yet been arrested, the censors were asked to put a news blackout on the expulsion. The censors

²⁵ Memorandum, W. Eggleston, March 16, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5960 File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

²⁶ Memorandum, J. Graham, March 27, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5960 File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

agreed and also spiked a story about a strike among interned Japanese working on the Hope-Princeton Road.²⁷ Japanese-Canadian men who marched to the federal immigration shed on the Vancouver waterfront and asked to be interned in protest to the B.C. Security Commission's policy of separating the heads of families from their dependents also did not get the publicity they sought.²⁸

Passive and some not-so-passive resistance to the internment and internal exile of the ethnic Japanese continued in Vancouver through the spring of 1942. Reid, the MP for New Westminster, chose to use this opportunity to settle his pre-war score with *The New Canadian*. He questioned Secretary of State Norman McLarty in the House of Commons on May 4, the day O.M. Biggar's appointment as Director of Censorship was announced, demanding to know why the paper was allowed to publish while the ethnic Japanese refused to co-operate. Two days later, McLarty confirmed the paper would be allowed to continue publishing, with pre-publication submission of all of its articles.²⁹

Meanwhile, some ethnic Japanese resistance continued on the West Coast. On May 13, 1942, the men who had been interned at the immigration shed because they had refused to report for internment broke windows, used a fire hose to soak down a military sentry and anyone else they could reach, and shouted slogans in Japanese, allegedly including "banzai."³⁰ The RCMP asked the censors to keep the story out of the papers. Gordon refused, saying he could

²⁷Ruling, L. Gordon, April 9, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

²⁸ Ruling, L. Gordon, April 26, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship) Vol. 5960 File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

²⁹ Hansard, May 8 and May 10, 1942, 1537-37; 1563.

³⁰ Ruling, Lew Gordon, May 13, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

see no obvious breach of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. He did, however, take out the word “rioting” in stories that were sent from the *Vancouver Sun* to papers in Seattle and Toronto. Journalists were also told to leave out any mention of the reason why the Japanese men were housed in the shed. The RCMP continued to claim it was acting in the interests of the safety of the internees, who could, supposedly, face trouble in the east. Two days later, a message sent from the wire editor of the *Vancouver Sun* to his counterpart at the *Toronto Star* was intercepted by telegraph censors who passed it along to Gordon. The telegram said the rioting Japanese men would arrive in Ontario within a few days and be interned as enemy aliens. The censors held the wire and told the *Vancouver* papers not to publish stories about the departure of the internees.³¹

Finally, after months of empty scare stories, a real bogeyman showed up in the northeast Pacific: Japanese carrier-based aircraft bombed Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Newspaper reporters in *Vancouver* had the news before the censors and the Minister of Defence, who could not confirm the story when asked about it by Eggleston on the morning of June 3, 1942. That afternoon, reporters called the censors to ask what the policy would be “if the Japs started tossing eggs into *Vancouver*,” but Gordon would not discuss hypothetical situations.³²

That night was a tense one on the B.C. coast. Prince Rupert and Victoria were blacked out, air raid wardens were deployed through Victoria, an air raid warning was issued for southern British Columbia and the region’s commercial

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Ruling, Lew Gordon, June 3, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

radio stations were shut down to prevent Japanese pilots from using them to find their way to Canadian cities. The *Vancouver Province* wanted to run a story the next day saying: "Wednesday night's air raid alert swept Pacific Coast broadcasting stations off the air, but radio entertainment via short wave sets was offered up as usual by the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation." The newspaper expected "readers who possessed short wave radios - and they number thousands on this Coast - would certainly sit right down tonight and do their best to get the Japs' short wave broadcasts." Rather than drum up ratings for Tokyo Rose, Gordon killed the story.³³

The Japanese scare on the west coast subsided somewhat that summer, but on November 3 an explosion rocked the Vancouver court house. The *Vancouver News-Herald* wanted to run a story suggesting the blast was the work of the Black Dragon Society, a Japanese patriotic group, but the censors killed the piece on the grounds that sabotage could not be reported under the *Defence of Canada Regulations*.³⁴

After the expulsion of the ethnic Japanese from the Pacific region, most of the censors' attention was focused on the sole surviving Japanese-Canadian publication, the weekly newspaper *The New Canadian*. The periodical was founded in late 1938 as the newspaper of British Columbia's *Nisei* (second-generation Japanese-Canadians who had, in the main, a belief they could

³³ Ruling, L. Gordon, June 4, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

³⁴ The dynamite explosion, at 9.40 PM November 3, 1942, smashed several windows and broke two ornamental lions outside the building. Police believed a "crackpot" or "vandal" was responsible. The *News-Herald's* editor also wanted to publish a rumour that The Black Dragon Society had infiltrated the B.C. Security Commission and was extorting money from Vancouver Japanese-Canadians in return for better treatment. Memorandum, J. Graham, November 4, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5961, File: Sabotage -Possible.

assimilate into mainstream Canada) by Edward Ouchi, General Secretary of the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League, to counter the anti-Japanese propaganda spread by Chinese immigrants in North America.³⁵ It was published three times a week (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) and sold by subscription and at newsstands. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the newspaper supported Japan's conquest of China and reported favorably on the activities of the Japanese consul in Vancouver, who tried to drum up financial and political support for Japan's imperialist policies in Asia.³⁶ The paper pressed for the breaking down of the racial barriers that barred the Japanese-Canadians from full civil and economic rights. In this spirit, it also advocated the movement of ethnic Japanese away from their traditional jobs and locales on the Pacific Coast and greater efforts by Japanese-Canadians to learn English and adopt the dominant culture.³⁷

Its editor was Thomas ("Tommy") Shoyama, who was born in Kamloops in 1916. His father ran a bakery on Kamloops's main street and, through a business connection, arranged for Tommy Shoyama to live with a Japanese family in Vancouver while enrolled in university. Shoyama earned a BA in economics at the University of British Columbia, raising money for tuition, books and food by working in a pulp mill and as a houseboy at a railway bunkhouse. Friends of Shoyama described him as a humorous, charismatic man, one who, according to Senator Joyce Fairbairn, lit up a room when he walked in.³⁸ Shoyama was not

³⁵ Japan was, at the time, at war with China.

³⁶ Granatstein and Johnson, "The Evacuation of the Japanese Canadians," 109.

³⁷ Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*, 160-161.

³⁸ Personal communication by author with Sen. Joyce Fairbairn, July 30, 2008.

allowed to enroll in an accounting program, so, upon graduating in late 1938, he accepted the position of editor of *The New Canadian*. In 1941, was accepted for enlistment in the Royal Canadian Air Force, but in the fall of that year the Air Force changed instituted a policy of rejecting enlistments by ethnic Japanese and the offer to Shoyama was withdrawn.³⁹

In many ways, Shoyama was typical of the ambitious *Nisei* of the 1930s who chafed under the lowly status foisted upon them and yearned to prove their value by excelling in university, by speaking and writing English with grace and skill, and by adopting Western dress, political ideals, and economics. These beliefs would sometimes generate resentment among the *Issei*, the first-generation ethnic Japanese who still controlled much of the community's economic and political mechanisms, along with most of the ethnic Japanese media. The *Issei* saw that, despite the academic success of many *Nisei*, racial barriers had not fallen.⁴⁰

Shoyama was eager to fit into mainstream Canada. Rather than become depressed or enraged in the face of the racial discrimination that prevented him from learning his chosen profession and joining the air force, Shoyama learned how to work the system. He was one of eight ethnic Japanese (out of forty two people) who testified before the federal special investigation committee chaired by Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Sparling that met in Vancouver and Victoria in October, 1940 to take evidence on the loyalty of the ethnic Japanese in the province and determine if they posed a threat should war with Japan break out.

³⁹ Obituary of Tommy Shoyama, *Regina Leader Post*, January 24, 2007, 3.

⁴⁰ Adachi, *The Enemy That Never Was*, 158.

Later, Shoyama was one of three Japanese-Canadians appointed by Sparling to be a liaison to assist with the process of determining the loyalty of the ethnic Japanese. Shoyama wanted it to go farther, namely to include all fighting-age men so they could join regular military regiments or form special Nisei units.⁴¹ In the tumultuous winter of 1942, while censors and the British Columbia Security Commission manhandled his newspaper and new race-based prohibitions were enforced against the ethnic Japanese, Shoyama worked on the five-member, *Issei*-dominated, Japanese suB.C.ommittee that co-operated with federal officials to register the ethnic Japanese, hoping co-operation would convince military officers to allow enlistment of *Nisei* into the armed forces.⁴²

Shoyama and later writers believed the government saw *The New Canadian* as a means of getting news out to the Japanese-Canadians wherever they were dispersed.⁴³ The conduct of the censors, who fought to keep the paper going and Shoyama out of jail, suggests they, in fact, took up *The New Canadian* as their adopted cause and saved it from being shut down.

The New Canadian first made contact with the censors on January 16, 1942, when a staff member of the paper contacted Gordon asking for advice about a story on the movement of thirty to forty Japanese from Vancouver by train. Gordon advised the newspaper the story could not be used, and asked if *The New Canadian* had received copies of the Press Censorship Directives.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 165, 177, 190.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 192.

⁴³ Barry Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame*, Toronto: Paperjacks, 1975, 43. One of the great failings of this book, a collection of oral histories of the evacuation and internment of the Japanese-Canadians, is that its sources are not named. However, this piece could only be an interview with Shoyama. The four-page account deals mainly with his difficulties finding typesetting and printing facilities during the war.

When Gordon was informed *The New Canadian* did not have them, Gordon promised to mail the current volume and to put *The New Canadian* on the mailing list.⁴⁴ At that point, the censors treated *The New Canadian* the same as any other newspaper, expecting it to follow the voluntary censorship system and not requiring any pre-censorship of its copy.

Within a month, however, the censors had assumed a tight grip on the four-page newspaper. On March 10, Colonel Maurice Pope, the Director of Censorship, wired the Vancouver office to instruct Gordon and Graham to pre-censor all news and opinion articles published in *The New Canadian*.⁴⁵ Graham reported Shoyama "readily agreed," even though the censors' demand had no basis in law and no other Canadian publication had been forced to submit to this type of supervision in this or previous wars. The censors were given the copy for the next edition and immediately ordered Shoyama to remove a letter to the editor.

After that issue was published, censors, usually Gordon, vetted the English material and passed the Japanese articles to a translator. Authorities maintained the paper was censored to prevent "the position of the Japanese in Vancouver being misunderstood by any white readers of the paper."⁴⁶ In the first edition under censorship control, Shoyama was also told to remove a statement that Gordon believed was a slighting reference to the B.C. Security Commission,

⁴⁴ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, February 9, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

⁴⁵ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 11, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

as one sentence in an article about Japanese construction projects at an inland camp said the first thing the internees did was build latrines, and “and speaking of latrines, it reminds me of a local committee set up that is just as odoriferous to every *Nesei* with any guts or brains.” *The New Canadian’s* business manager told Gordon his interpretation was inaccurate, but Gordon deleted the sentence, saying in a memorandum sent to censorship headquarters in Ottawa that he had advised *The New Canadian* “that any white person reading the item might infer that the Taylor Commission [the B.C. Security Commission] was referred to and that if it was desired to slam some of the Japanese Nationals it would be a good idea to do so in some other manner.”⁴⁷

Gordon noted that “(d)uring my long association with the press I have done many queer things but the queerest of all is this job of editing a Jap newspaper. Banzai!”⁴⁸ By March 14, Gordon was describing himself as “ex-officio editor of Japanese bi-lingual newspaper ‘New Canadian,’” and passed for publication an editorial that attacked the *Vancouver Sun* for its inflammatory coverage of Japanese-Canadians.⁴⁹ By late March, Shoyama was on the verge of quitting in protest over the internment of Canadian-born ethnic Japanese, and news copy was slow to arrive because of the discontent among the newspaper’s contributors. Under the control of the censors, *The New Canadian* failed to meet

⁴⁷ Memorandum, Lew Gordon, March 15, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: 1-E-1 Japanese.

⁴⁸ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 2, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁴⁹ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

its printing deadlines and usually reached the street several days late.⁵⁰

Censors allowed members of the B.C Security Commission to vet some of the newspaper's copy, such as a story related to the expulsion of *Nisei* to an isolated camp near Schreiber, on the north shore of Lake Superior, that Major Austin C. Taylor, Chairman of the B.C. Security Commission, killed. Gordon believed Taylor "did not wish the story published because he feared that at the last moment the Japs might refuse to entrain--in other words, he wanted the Japs in the bag before he would countenance the story." Gordon knew the story did not contain anything in breach of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* but he telephoned Shoyama to tell him "it would be diplomatic on his part to agree not to use the story in the issue of March 28th." Shoyama reminded Gordon the newspaper's production was running late, and that it would not be on the street until after the deportees left for Schreiber. The censors agreed with Shoyama and, for the first time, took his side of a dispute with the authorities.

The day the paper was to go to press, Taylor issued a promised statement. It did not mention the departure of the Schreiber-bound internees. Gordon told Shoyama to use his original story, but to tone down words like "grievances" and replace them with "misunderstandings" or "problems." Gordon approved the new version, which, "while it might not meet with the approval of Major Taylor, in no way constituted breach of DCR or Censorship Directives, and with some minor deletions we passed the article as amended by Shoyama along

⁵⁰ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 26, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

the lines of the suggestions we had made to him.”⁵¹ On April 2, Gordon approved news copy from Schreiber, after removing a couple of sentences about the weather.⁵²

By early April 1942, Gordon was referring to *The New Canadian* in memoranda as “my Japanese newspaper.” Gordon had very quickly developed an attachment and loyalty both to the newspaper and its staff, noting he had “less trouble with my Japanese staff than I experience with any other Coast paper published by white men.”⁵³ Gordon began to worry about the paper making its deadlines. The censor understood the deadening effects of the restrictions placed on Shoyama and sympathized with the editor.⁵⁴ He had faced a multitude of obstacles, including the loss of *The New Canadian's* Vancouver office space, which had become a meeting hall for Japanese-Canadians,⁵⁵ and an edict against Japanese-Canadians using telephones. With the newspaper’s reliance on freelancers who, in many instances, had recently been uprooted from their homes and dispatched to unfamiliar and isolated parts of the country, Shoyama was lucky to get the newspaper out at all.

⁵¹ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 28, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: General-1.

⁵² *The New Canadian's* Schreiber correspondent also found work as a stringer for the *Toronto Star*. Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 4, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Records of the Directorate of Censorship Vol. 5965, File: General-1

⁵³ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 8, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: General-1.

⁵⁴ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 12, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁵⁵ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 20, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

The censor sometimes stayed late to make sure the paper made its press deadlines. In one memorandum, Gordon described himself as “becoming somewhat dissatisfied with my staff on the ‘New Canadian.’”⁵⁶ The inability of the tiny staff to make its deadlines was “most annoying to us, and doubtless to our subscribers.” Gordon and Shoyama shared negative opinions of the Vancouver *Sun*. However, Gordon censored a line in which Shoyama called the *Sun* a “gutter organ”.⁵⁷

Within a few weeks of assuming control of *The New Canadian*, Gordon's colleagues began chiding him as the “editor” and “advisory advisor” of the “Japalac” newspaper (so-called because ‘it is Jap and it lacks news’).⁵⁸

The censor drew the line when Shoyama suggested Japanese-Canadians had some justification for resisting the orders of the B.C. Security Commission, and when Shoyama reported non-compliance of B.C. Security Commission orders. Gordon also made deletions from copy submitted April 10, 1942, suggesting at Japanese resistance to the evacuation order, in particular, comments stating:

There are indications that the process of tearing out from their homes several thousands of people who claim the right of citizenship, and separating them from their families and friends, is not going to be as smooth as had been hoped for...The removal of enemy nationals has been practically completed. That portion of the task was relatively easy, since there it was admitted that in time of war there might be reasonable grounds to justify such drastic policy against enemy aliens. Moreover, it was ordered long in advance, as

⁵⁶ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 12, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁵⁷ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, March 20, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁵⁸ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 1, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1. Grafton, in Toronto, also chided Gordon for sending mail with postage due.

early in fact, as January 14th, and the positive deadline of April 1 was established...The problem of removing those who are classed legally as citizens, however, has not been and is not so easy. Departures for Schreiber, Ontario, and the road camps in the Revelstoke section of the Trans-Canada highway took place on Tuesday and Thursday, but the full quota of those scheduled to leave was not filled...Royal Canadian Mounted Police are detaining those who failed to leave in compliance with orders and are visiting the Powell Street section regularly.⁵⁹

Shoyama asked Gordon if he could publish the deleted material in Japanese and was refused. He then re-wrote the English copy to try to tone it down, while keeping in the factual material of the resistance of the Japanese-Canadians. Gordon cut this material and wrote to Ottawa: "This is the first occasion on which Mr. Shoyama has shown the slightest inclination to evade Censorship instructions. If he persists in this line of thought a suggestion from us to the B.C. Security Commission might wind up in short order his activities as a publisher."

Rather than shut the paper down, Gordon temporarily brought in Major A.H.L. Mellor of the B.C. Security Commission to be "co-editor" of *The New Canadian*.⁶⁰ This did not stop Shoyama's criticism of racist B.C. politicians. Gordon, while perusing Shoyama's copy later in April, encountered "a dirty crack taken by Editor Shoyama at Alderman Halford D. Wilson, the human fly in the

⁵⁹ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 10, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁶⁰ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 21, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

Japanese ointment on this Coast." He phoned Shoyama to tell warn him against antagonizing the "pestiferous Alderman."⁶¹

By then, the censors were under pressure from an angry Ian MacKenzie, Liberal MP for Vancouver Centre and Minister of Pensions and National Health, to close the newspaper. Norman McLarty, the Secretary of State, under whose jurisdiction the press censorship system fell, went to Eggleston and Charpentier's office to warn *The New Canadian* had gone "entirely too far" in its coverage of controversy surrounding the expulsion. McLarty was insistent that the censors close *The New Canadian* and turn its assets over to the Custodian of Enemy Property. Eggleston told McLarty *The New Canadian's* articles were very similar to material carried by other Vancouver papers and that it would be difficult to justify legal action against one and not the others. The minister then backed off.⁶²

In the following weeks, there was little conflict between Shoyama and the censors. On April 29, Gordon cut a line from a story submitted by a "Jap correspondent" at Cambie Station, on the Canadian Pacific Railway line in B.C., quoting RCMP Constable Bradley that police were protecting the Japanese as well as guarding the railway, since the Japanese would be blamed for any sabotage that occurred on the railway line.⁶³ While handling copy for the May 16 issue, Gordon deleted two paragraphs headlined "Gentle Art of Knifing," which

⁶¹ Memorandum by L. Graham to Censorship Headquarters and Regional Offices, April 24, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1.

⁶² Memorandum, Eggleston, April 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: General-1

⁶³ Memorandum, Vancouver Censorship Office to Censorship Directorate, Ottawa, April 29, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

criticized racists on the B.C. coast. Shoyama did not object.⁶⁴ Eventually, Gordon came to see Shoyama as "the Jap Pulitzer."⁶⁵

Still, the censors remained under pressure to shut the publication. On May 23, 1942, Gordon received a letter from Major H.C. Bray, Chief of Army Intelligence for British Columbia, complaining that *The New Canadian* had published too many details about the British Columbia road system. Bray complained that the May 14 issue contained correspondence from a road-building camp, Red Sands, described as a former relief camp five miles East of Blue River, which is the divisional point of the CNR next to Kamloops. Bray also complained that *The New Canadian* reported the numbers of men at the camp at various times and noted the story said one of the Japanese workers did not possess a camera but he had the ability to draw "excellent sketches." Gordon replied to Bray's letter, telling the intelligence officer "that we could not read into the statements made any suggestion that they might be of value to the enemy."⁶⁶

By July 1942, rumours circulated in Vancouver that *The New Canadian* would no longer be published in that city. Gordon checked into the stories and was told by internment authorities the paper would stay in Vancouver "until the last Jap is ousted - and that may be some considerable time."⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Memorandum, Vancouver, May 14, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, Vancouver, August 28, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁶⁶ Memorandum, Vancouver, May 23, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, Vancouver, July 19, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

Through that summer, the focus of *The New Canadian* was directed at the plight of the *Nisei*, who, unlike the Japanese citizen internees, were not under the protection of the Geneva Convention, which in this part of Canada was verified by the Spanish consul. On August 22, Shoyama submitted an article to Gordon dealing with the Spanish consul's visit to the internment camp at Angler, in northern Ontario, and the diplomat's announcement that he had no interest in the plight of internees who were Canadian-born or naturalized Canadian citizens. Gordon learned from Shoyama's article that some *Nisei* had been told before Pearl Harbor "that obstructionist tactics and defiance of authority would place them in internment camps where they would be well treated for the duration and upon discharge would be granted compensation by the Canadian Government." Gordon told Ottawa this was the first time "we ever heard these Canadian-born and naturalized Japs had ever been fed on any such hokum. Apparently many of them now interned swallowed this nonsense and now regret, or at least claim to regret, their credulity."⁶⁸

In July, Shoyama "scalped" an article on Vancouver's ban of ethnic Japanese children from east-end city swimming pools. Gordon refused to clear the story unless it was credited to its paper of origin, the *Vancouver News-Herald*, so readers would not think *The New Canadian* was tackling a controversial racial issue.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Memorandum, Vancouver, August 22, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁶⁹ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, July 17, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File:General-2. News scalping, now seen as plagiarism, was a common practice among journalists through the 20th century.

Relations between Gordon and Shoyama cooled dramatically in late August 1942. Looking over galley proofs after *The New Canadian's* issue of August 27 had already gone to press, Gordon found "certain objectionable material" in an article by W.R. McWilliams, former pastor of the New Westminster Japanese United Church. The material had not been pre-cleared by censors, and Gordon accused Shoyama of "evasion" of censorship. The editor believed the piece, written by a white former missionary to Japan, should not be subjected to pre-publication censorship. However, Gordon considered McWilliams's observations about the treatment of Japanese-Canadians incendiary, highlighting material such as:

Here arises much of the justification for the attitude which many of the Canadian-born Japanese take towards the treatment they receive. Canadians at heart, by choice and by intention, they see themselves debarred from army service in any form, from any necessary work unless perhaps it be as laborers on farms in some few scattered localities and this under conditions of rigorous supervision and inadequate pay. They are not treated as equals but as suspects, not as war prisoners or enemy nationals of other races, but as the white man has treated other coloured races in the past.

In his report to Ottawa, Gordon said McWilliams "is obviously pro-Jap and his propaganda, if given general press circulation, would boomerang on the Japs evacuated from the B.C. Coastal Area." If his article was submitted by another newspaper, Gordon wanted the "defeatist" words deleted. Gordon said this "evasion" by Shoyama confirmed Gordon's previous judgment that the editor

could not be trusted to conform to *Defence of Canada Regulations* and Press Censorship Directives if his copy was not subject to pre-publication censorship.⁷⁰

Despite Gordon's reluctance to let Shoyama out from under the thumb of the Vancouver censorship office, in late October 1942, Shoyama, as per the evacuation order, was forced to move to Kaslo, a ghost town in the remote Slocan Valley of B.C.. There, without the use of a telephone and with his mail heavily censored, the young editor still somehow managed to put out a newspaper and rebuild good relations with Gordon. He was a prolific letter writer with a wide circle of friends, especially young women. At least twice, Shoyama was given permission to visit his freelance contributors in Ontario. On one trip, he visited the Ottawa censors and was given a one-day membership in the Parliamentary Press Gallery so he could sit in its seats in the House of Commons and watch a debate. During his time in Kaslo he saved a \$500 nest egg and by the time he enlisted in the Army's Intelligence corps in June 1945, even had several thousand shares of stock in resource companies.⁷¹

The Vancouver office of the Directorate of Censorship continued to have jurisdiction over *The New Canadian*. Copy for the paper had to be mailed or, in times of tight deadlines, telegraphed to the Vancouver censorship office. Mainly freelance writers and one-off contributors who were able to gather and report news in spite of the constraints placed on them by the internment system wrote the newspaper. Still, sometimes *The New Canadian* broke stories that were news

⁷⁰ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, August 27, 1942. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File:General-2.

⁷¹ Thomas Shoyama Papers, Library and Archives Canada, MG R10881 Vol. 4 File: 9. Correspondence: The New Canadian.

to authorities. In June 1943, censor John Graham “needled” RCMP Inspector Jim Fripps about the employment of Japanese-Canadians as track maintenance (extra gang) workers on the main line of the Canadian Pacific Railway at Duncan, B.C.. When Fripps said Japanese-Canadians were not allowed near the strategically-important railway, Gordon showed him a copy of *The New Canadian*, which carried an article about the railway gang, noting that the RCMP had approved of it. “Faced with this evidence Fripps more or less hit the roof,” Gordon reported. “He said he had not been consulted about it and he certainly was not in favour of allowing any Japanese to work on the main line.”⁷²

Once the paper moved to Kaslo, Dr. E.C. Hennigar, a member of the Post Office Censorship staff, vetted the Japanese copy.⁷³ Almost immediately, Hennigar became a strict enforcer of what he felt were the censorship rules and, at least once, pressured the censors into ordering Shoyama to colour over an article that had already appeared in the paper.⁷⁴ In February, Gordon cleared this poem for publication:

Today as before
Eating the tossed wheat.
When the straw is eaten
We cannot move
And we fall asleep.
When hunger calls again
We moo...moo aloud.
The life of a beast.

⁷² Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, June 26, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: Miscellaneous.

⁷³ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, June 12, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: Miscellaneous.

⁷⁴ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, January 5, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: Miscellaneous.

Hennigar said the poem was inflammatory. Gordon reversed his decision and also killed a second poem, even though Gordon believed it was harmless. Hennigar said the title of the poem, "Chinook," was suggestive of a wind blowing from Japan across the Prairies.⁷⁵

Gordon and censor John Graham also decided to kill a reprinted article from the *Pacific Citizen*, the newspaper produced by Japanese-American internees in Utah. The article, written by a *Nisei*, Bill Hoskawa, stated racists obstructed the war effort. It went on to say: "They are undermining the faith of our Allies and our potential Allies in our integrity, by deliberately practicing Fascist tactics within our nation. They are real fifth columnists and they must not be tolerated. It is time that America woke up to the realization that it is not just the welfare of a tiny minority in this nation that is at stake in the unjust attacks singled on Americans of Japanese descent. Our entire war effort stands in danger of being sabotaged by Fascist-minded citizens in our midst."⁷⁶

In April 1943, Graham killed a story on a decision by the Navy to take over a boatyard seized from Japanese-Canadians and use it to maintain West Coast patrol boats, and also suppressed a piece "likening the people of Kelowna to the Ku Klux Klan; and the other linking the troubles of other minorities with those of the Japanese."⁷⁷ Through 1943, *The New Canadian* criticized white farmers and business owners in the B.C. interior for exploiting and mistreating the internees.

⁷⁵ Memorandum, L. Gordon, February 15, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: Miscellaneous.

⁷⁶ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, February 12, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: I-O-1 General.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, April 29, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: I-O-1 General.

On November 6, 1943, the censors killed an editorial in which Shoyama criticized Kelowna-area fruit growers for bringing in Japanese-Canadian fruit pickers, then demanding their immediate removal from the Okanagan Valley when the crops had been taken off. In the English text, Shoyama said the fruit growers "exploited people," while Hennigar translated the Japanese version as "tyrannized people."⁷⁸

In May 1943, R.W. Baldwin, acting as Eggleston's deputy, laid out the principle that the Japanese were entitled to draw attention to what they considered to be abuses and to discuss them in "moderate terms." Of the Ku Klux Klan editorial, Baldwin said: "If the "New Canadian" had merely reported the incident or even commented on it moderately, it seems to me it would probably have been better to let them do so." But in this case, he maintained, the censors were justified in killing the story because the article would arouse unnecessary antipathy among *The New Canadian's* readers.⁷⁹ Graham believed the Japanese were entitled to comment on their use as labour on fruit farms, but said the article should be in much more moderate terms "than the editorial submitted to us." He called the Ottawa headquarters of the Directorate of Censorship and read excerpts from the editorial to Jacques Girouard, who agreed with Graham that the phrases were much too strong and the piece should be killed. Shoyama was told he could re-write the editorial and submit it for the November 2 issue.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, November 6, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965 File: I-O-1 General.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, May 6, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: I-O-1 General.

⁸⁰ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, October 28, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: I-O-1 General.

On November 12, Graham killed an article in which the writer, under the pseudonym "Hermitage" condemned "the cheap antics of that earnest body of business men who comprise the Nelson Board of Trade," which had earlier demanded the removal of Japanese-Canadians from the Kootenays but now wanted them back as cheap labour for local industries. In one section, the article stated "the conclusion is inescapable that the Board of Trade is not influenced by a single commendable motive." In another part, it claimed that "British Columbia has given too many indications that it regards us simply as dumb beasts of burden."⁸¹ In March 1944, Shoyama set his sites on his home town, Kamloops,⁸² condemning the community for demanding the expulsion of local ethnic Japanese, even though Kamloops had no military installations other than "an adequately protected munitions dump." The censors ordered that phrase removed, saying it contravened *Defence of Canada Regulations*, and requested it be replaced with the phrase "even though Kamloops assuredly has no greater need for military precautions than any other B.C. point." Graham ended the telegram with the word "Sorry."⁸³

At that time, the censors were involved in one of their most embarrassing decisions. They killed a prize-winning essay by interned Japanese-Canadian elementary school student George Watanabe that was supposed to run in a 40-page booklet put out by the Tashme Correspondence Class. Watanabe's essay

⁸¹ Memorandum, L. Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, November 20, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: I-O-1 General.

⁸² When Shoyama died in 2006, the local Kamloops paper published a glowing obituary of the town's native son. *Kamloops This Week*. Kamloops, B.C. January 3, 2007. 1

⁸³ Memorandum, Vancouver Censorship Office to Censorship Directorate, Ottawa, March 31, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960 File: Japanese.

criticized the internment. The print run, 275 copies, was minimal. Graham had a week to agonize over his decision. He sent Watanabe's essay, "Our World Today," to Ottawa, where Baldwin read it and also expressed concern. The censors considered dropping the problem into the lap of the booklet's non-Japanese publisher but he would not touch the project unless the censors stamped it. Writing to the school principal, Graham expressed his sadness for spiking Watanabe's essay but justified it by saying Japanese forces could use it as an excuse to mistreat Allied prisoners in their hands.⁸⁴

In a memorandum sent to Ottawa on April 22, 1944, Graham noted the anti-Japanese rhetoric in the West Coast papers was heating up and Graham expected Shoyama's replies to "become more and more outspoken." He expected the censors to be drawn in as referees between *The New Canadian*, the West Coast anti-Japanese-Canadian politicians and the scare-mongering newspapers that supported them. Graham's prediction was accurate. There would be no journalistic solidarity between Shoyama and his colleagues in the British Columbia press corps. On June 14, 1944, Graham received a call from Cliff MacKay, city hall reporter of the *Vancouver Sun*, who complained about a brief item on the front page of the current edition which read: "No matter what the lyrics, Vancouver's Mayor blows a Nazi tune."⁸⁵ In MacKay's view, the line was

⁸⁴ Memorandum, John Graham to Ottawa Headquarters of the Directorate of Censorship, May 22, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: general-1.

⁸⁵ Shoyama made the remark after Vancouver's mayor tried and failed to push through a resolution at a city council meeting that all ethnic Japanese in Canada should be set to Japan after the war ended. *Ibid.*

libelous and he criticized Graham for passing it for publication. Advice on libel, Graham responded, was not within the mandate of the censors.⁸⁶

Graham did not tell MacKay that Shoyama had slipped the line into the newspaper without vetting it with the censors. Graham called Shoyama, suffering through the usual difficulty of getting a line through to Kaslo. Shoyama could not remember whether he had stuck the comment in the envelope with the rest of the copy for that issue, or just typed it as “filler,” but he stood by it, arguing the intent of the sentence “was that the attitude of Vancouver's mayor in demanding repatriation of all Japanese was similar to that of the Nazis in their attitude toward Jews and other racial minorities.” Graham resented being forced to choose either to defend something that he had no part in or admit to the critics of *The New Canadian* – who also tended to be critics of censorship – that Shoyama had slipped something by him. Baldwin, after a short telephone conversation with Graham, agreed the item probably would have been passed, and accepted his advice that the censors should defend the statement. Again, rather than curtail the newspaper and leave its editor to the mercy of his critics, the Vancouver and Ottawa censors chose to protect it.⁸⁷

After receiving Graham's memorandum, Baldwin asked for a report about *The New Canadian* and its editor. Several days later, Graham spoke frankly with George Collins, head of the B.C. Security Commission, about Shoyama, *The*

⁸⁶ Memorandum, John Graham (Vancouver) to Ottawa headquarters of the Directorate of Censorship, June 14, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese. Shoyama told interviewer Barry Broadfoot this was his “only one real awkward moment” with English-language press censors during the war. Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame*, 45.

⁸⁷ Memorandum, John Graham (Vancouver) to Ottawa Headquarters of the Directorate of Censorship, June 14, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

New Canadian, and the problems that had arisen with the comment about the mayor. Rather indiscreetly, Graham told Collins about his dealings with Shoyama and Ottawa over Shoyama's uncensored attack on the Vancouver mayor. Collins passed the information on to the *Sun* and Graham found himself, on June 28, 1944, again having to defend censorship's position on *The New Canadian* to McKay.⁸⁸

In the next issue of *The New Canadian*, Shoyama reported on a letter written by the Vancouver Consultative Council, a civil liberties group, to Prime Minister King objecting to demands for expulsion of all ethnic Japanese from Canada after the war. Nine prominent Vancouver clerics and business leaders signed the letter. One of them, N. E. E. Norman of St. George's United Church, was described as an "instructor in the Pacific Command Japanese Language School," the institution that was secretly training interpreters for the Pacific war. Graham wired Shoyama to remove any mention of the school. Shoyama was also asked to change an article written by an internee who had returned for a holiday in Kaslo after living in the east. The story was passed except for a paragraph which said that, when the writer first went east, he looked forward to nothing but hardship "and cruelty"; the reference to cruelty was taken out.⁸⁹

Pressure to shut the newspaper continued to mount through that spring. At the beginning of June 1944, Shoyama submitted an editorial which attacked

⁸⁸ Memorandum, John Graham (Vancouver) to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, June 28, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁸⁹ Memorandum, John Graham (Vancouver) to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, June 30, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

British Columbia politicians for advocating the deportation and expulsion of the ethnic Japanese. This time, he noted the threat to the survival of *The New Canadian*:

Now it is reported that a request is being made to the Minister of Justice calling for suppression of this newspaper by government action, for daring to criticize policies which by no stretch of the imagination can be called anything but Fascist in nature. It is well-known that a Fascist ideology, whether in Germany, Japan or elsewhere calls also for the suppression of a democratic *Free Press* as well as for racial intolerance.

Graham wanted to pass the editorial, as "this all sounded perfectly legitimate to me as far as DCR goes but in view of the touchy situation thought I had better consult with Ottawa to be sure they shared my views." Graham phoned Baldwin, who agreed the opinion piece should be cleared for publication.⁹⁰

Shoyama's situation in Kaslo was made worse by the policy of British Columbia telegraph censors not to connect telephone calls to the internees. Even after Collins, head of the B.C. Security Commission, and Sgt. Jack Barnes, of RCMP Intelligence, approved a request from Vancouver *Province* reporter Gordon Root to interview Shoyama about the federal government's change in policy toward the ethnic Japanese internees, the telephone censors would not put through Root's call. John Graham, filling in for Gordon, could not help. The most he could do was direct the reporter, Collins and Barnes to Capt. E.B. Punnett, chief of Cable, Wire and Telephone Censorship for the region.

⁹⁰ Memorandum, John Graham (Vancouver) to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, July 2, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

Through the latter years of the war, Shoyama enjoyed some support from Ottawa and the Vancouver censors for his attacks on racist politicians who assailed the ethnic Japanese. However, when the censors believed Shoyama's articles or those of his correspondents were tinged with "bitterness," the stories were killed even though, Graham wrote, if it they had been written by a "Canadian newspaper" he would have passed them "without hesitation."⁹¹

In February 1945, Shoyama took on J. Alex Paton, Conservative MLA for Vancouver Point Grey and, according to Graham, "one of the second-string anti-Japanese orators on the Coast." Graham appreciated Shoyama's "ironic" attack on Paton, mocking the MLA's anti-Japanese-Canadian letters to the Vancouver newspapers. Paton, Shoyama wrote, had "built a Japanese dragon and is now going to try to suffocate it with a petition against return of the Japs." A petition to deport all ethnic Japanese in Canada was "being woven out of the cloth of race hate and intolerance by the fishermen of the Fraser." With his petition, Shoyama said, Paton would "bestride the public platform, a 20th century Saint George the Deliverer... It is related, is it not, that in much the same way Der Fuhrer, bestrode a beer hall to deliver the German people."⁹² Graham was willing to pass the article because it did not compromise security in any way and he could not see any violation of the *Defence of Canada Regulations*. After telephoning Baldwin in Ottawa and receiving his support (although Baldwin told Graham "it was very

⁹¹ Memorandum, Lew Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, August 5, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁹² Memorandum, Lew Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, February 10, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

unwise of Shoyama to stick his neck out by running such articles”), Graham approved the editorial.⁹³

As the Pacific War progressed, the British and Americans realized the value of *Nisei* as translators of Japanese military radio traffic, which, at a tactical level, at least, was usually sent without being encoded. The Canadian military refused to follow the lead of the other Allies and accept internees for service in the Pacific War. Here, Shoyama realized, was a chance to begin a debate on Canada’s Japanese race policies, for the internees to prove their loyalty, and an opportunity for publicity that might help put pressure on the authorities to give better treatment to those people who remained in custody.

In late January 1945 Graham finally pushed through a censorship ruling to allow *The New Canadian*, and mainstream publications in Canada, to report on the recruitment by American and British forces of Japanese-speaking translators from among the internees. In mid-January, Shoyama clipped a short article from *Newsweek* that reported “since the British Army recently started accepting some Canadian-born Japanese for Intelligence work in the Far East, the question of Canada's refusal to use her Japs in any military capacity is expected to come up in the Commons.” Military intelligence had upheld the ban on reporting the recruitment of *Nisei* the previous September, when Graham had queried them in three requests to lift it. This time, because the item had been published abroad, Graham had little choice but to approve it for *The New Canadian*. He contacted Major Bray at the Vancouver office of Army Intelligence and told him about the

⁹³ Memorandum, Lew Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, February 12, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

break in *Newsweek*. The news “disturbed” Bray, and he told Graham some officers had been severely reprimanded for mentioning the subject. Graham informed Bray the matter was out of his hands because the subject had received wide circulation in *Newsweek*.⁹⁴

Five days later, Shoyama submitted a story about British officers recruiting *Nisei* in Canadian camps. This time, Graham received clearance from Baldwin to allow publication of any stories about *Nisei* service in the Pacific, except for articles that mentioned intelligence work behind Japanese lines. Shoyama followed up these stories in early March with a favorable editorial about the U.S. Army’s recruitment of 10,000 *Nisei* (though many were also in combat roles). Shoyama criticized the Canadian Army’s decision not to accept ethnic Japanese: “There is no question but that the majority of us are destined to remain and work out a future in Canada,” he wrote. “Nothing can or will contribute greater security or happiness to that future for all of us, than the *Nisei* actively serving in uniform.”⁹⁵

Not until the spring of 1945 did the Canadian Army reverse its policy on the recruitment of *Nisei*. Shoyama was allowed to report on the rush of ethnic Japanese candidates who wished to join the military. Apart from the positive publicity that it gave to the ethnic Japanese, Shoyama had his own reasons for closely following the policy shift. In July 1945, Shoyama joined the army’s Intelligence Corps. *The New Canadian* survived Shoyama’s departure. Its new

⁹⁴ Memorandum, Lew Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, Feb. 3, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁹⁵ Memorandum, Lew Gordon to Censorship Headquarters, Ottawa, March 12, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

editor, a Mr. Oyama, edited the newspaper from Winnipeg and had no conflict with the censors.

Even after the war, however, the censors were not finished with the Japanese-Canadian interment issue. Eggleston was the first president of the Ottawa Civil Liberties Association, which was founded in the spring of 1946 in large part to protest breaches of the civil rights of Japanese-Canadians and people suspected of being Communist agents. In July 1946, Eggleston wrote to King: "If we as citizens do not protest now against steps taken in so-called 'special' cases, we may find ourselves powerless to protest later on when the 'special' cases are found to extend to much wider fields."⁹⁶

Although the war in the Pacific ended about six weeks after Shoyama enlisted, he continued to work as a translator, rising to the rank of Sergeant by the time he was discharged in 1946. Interviewed years later, Shoyama reflected on his wartime experiences, including his success in sustaining *The New Canadian*, by saying: "We had to tell people: Look, in spite of all these terrible things that happened to you, stand on your own feet. Look within yourself, to your own strength and self-respect and your own sense of dignity."⁹⁷

After his discharge from the Army, Shoyama met a wartime friend, George Tamaki, in Regina. Tamaki was a senior bureaucrat in the two-year-old Co-

⁹⁶Eggleston to King, July 8, 1956. Mackenzie King papers, Library and Archives Canada, MG 26, J3 Microfilm Reel C-9169.

⁹⁷Obituary of Tommy Shoyama, *The Globe and Mail*, December 30, 2006, S.9.

Operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in Saskatchewan headed by Tommy Douglas. Tamaki took Shoyama to hear Douglas speak and Shoyama was so impressed with the young premier that he immediately applied for a job in the Saskatchewan provincial government. Shoyama's hiring was opposed by some CCF members, both in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, where the Vancouver *Sun* ran the headline "CCF Government Opens Posts to Japs" over a story reporting the hiring of Tamaki, Shoyama and one other Japanese-Canadian. In 1950, Shoyama rose to the rank of secretary of the Economic Advisory and Planning Board, placing him on the top tier of the legislative bureaucracy along with Treasury Board secretary Al Johnson, a civil servant with whom Shoyama would work for three more decades. Shoyama was an architect of Saskatchewan's Crown corporations and fine-tuned the province's Medicare system, acting as right-hand man and chief political strategist for the CCF in Douglas's final years as premier.

When the CCF lost power in Saskatchewan in 1964, Lester Pearson lured Shoyama and seventy other Saskatchewan bureaucrats to Ottawa. Shoyama was hired as senior economist at the Economic Council of Canada, rising to assistant deputy minister by 1968. He prepared the federal position for the Western Economic Opportunities Conference after the 1972 election, and in 1974 began a five-year term as deputy finance minister under three ministers: John Turner, Donald Macdonald and Jean Chrétien. Shoyama retired in 1980 after serving in the Privy Council as a special adviser to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on economic aspects of the repatriation of the Constitution.

For his work in public service, Shoyama was awarded the Order of Canada. After his retirement, Shoyama returned to British Columbia, where he volunteered to become a visiting professor in the School of Public Administration and the Department of Asian and Pacific studies at the University of Victoria. He taught at the University of Victoria until 1991. He stayed on at the university at a salary of \$1 a year, supervising independent studies and graduate students, until 1998. Tommy Shoyama died in Victoria on December 22, 2006, aged 90.⁹⁸

The censors, men of their times who called Japanese people “Japs,” still understood how the ethnic Japanese of British Columbia were being targeted by racist politicians and worked to protect the single surviving Japanese-Canadian newspaper. By advocating on behalf of *The New Canadian*, working to keep its editor out of jail, and supporting his bid to enter the army, the censors not only acted with integrity towards the Japanese Canadians but also helped launch the career of an outstanding public servant. They, much more than their political masters and their colleagues in journalism, came out of the internment of ethnic Japanese with clean hands.

⁹⁸ Obituary of Tommy Shoyama, *The Globe and Mail*, December 30, 2006. S.9.

Chapter Eleven: Balloon Bombs and Atomic Bombs

Technology – both Axis and Allied – played a key role in the war, and, in the Pacific Theatre, was instrumental in determining its outcome. Censoring technological advances was difficult, since the censors had no scientific training and they dealt with journalists who often did not fully understand the technological implications of the material about which they were writing. They tried to compensate by learning as much as they could from the rather tight-lipped military experts and the National Research Council and, by the end of the war, developed massive files on military hardware.

The Directorate of Censorship did ask the Department of Munitions and Supply for advice on the level of censorship that was needed to protect the secrets of the weaponry that was being used in Canada, but they did not get past the department's public relations officials, who contended their function was to give out information and not to advise the censors on its suppression. Eventually, the department gave censorship officials "Secret Lists," and, by the war's end, relied on the Directorate of Censorship for advice about their press releases. Still, the censors were left to react to coverage, rather than be properly briefed and forewarned.¹

The pressure eased somewhat in March 1942, when the British army issued a list of Stops and Releases, supplemented by a list of secret and most secret equipment covering all weapons in use or under development by the

¹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, File: Japanese.

British and Canadian forces. The Director of Censorship asked the Canadian army for a similar list, which was received by the censors in February 1943. In September 1943, the Royal Canadian Air Force forwarded a list of equipment used in Canada and of RCAF bases in the country. This information proved inadequate, and the censors had to deal directly with the Air Ministry in Britain when they needed advice on technical descriptions of new airplanes that were not in use in Canada. At the end of 1943, an Allied list was issued to cover Army equipment of British, Canadian and United States design. The Royal Canadian Navy's list of secret equipment did not arrive at the Directorate of Censorship until 1944, and the censors found it was not as useful as those of the other services, presumably because of British Admiralty secrecy. The Canadian Press censors were often compelled to turn to the British Admiralty Technical Mission in Ottawa or even the British Admiralty itself in London for rulings.²

Censors tried to drop war material from the secret list when it was known that the hardware had already fallen into the hands of the enemy. They were, however, opposed by the military and by manufacturers of the equipment. The latter feared the loss of trade secrets and argued that war equipment was constantly being improved in ways that the enemy might not know about.

Press censorship of the naval war was not limited to stories about ship losses and U-boat attacks. The censors also tried to maintain a blackout on technical advances. The control of information about Asdic – or Sonar – was a major headache to Canadian censors. Early in the war, the *Christian Science Monitor* published an article on the military uses of underwater echo location

² *Ibid.*

technology. The *Ottawa Citizen* picked up the story. The Navy demanded charges be laid against the *Citizen* but the Directorate of Censorship, after Eggleston conducted a search of the literature, argued that the story was already widely publicized. In July 1941, the Toronto censor passed for the *Toronto Evening Telegram* an interview with sailors Alan Shedden and Eddie Badger, who named Asdic as the device for spotting submarines "by means of an echo received by our earphones after sending out a sound wave." The Director of Naval Intelligence demanded the seaman be immediately disciplined, a request that resulted in Shedden and Badger facing a court martial that sentenced them to a month in jail.³

More serious, as far as Eggleston was concerned, the Navy demanded that the Toronto censor Bert Perry be fired. Eggleston researched Asdic and ferreted out eight books published between 1920 and 1939, all of which gave far more extensive information than was published in *The Christian Science Monitor* or the *Toronto Telegram*. The *piece de resistance*, however, was obtained from a volume published in Germany by Dr. Ludwig Bergman in 1938 giving full technical details. After receiving Eggleston's report, the Navy stopped demanding censorship of Asdic and Perry kept his job. Throughout the war, however, the issue of the release of information on echo location technology was a constant problem for the censors.⁴

³ Memorandum, Eggleston, August 21, 1941. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5952, File: 1-A-6 Marine Equipment.

⁴ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

The "cat gear," a very useful and simple piece of technology, was kept out of the papers for the duration of the war, and was, perhaps, Canada's most valuable naval secret of the time. It was a cluster of short pieces of pipe chained together and towed behind ships to thwart acoustic torpedoes. It stayed secret for more than three years, even remaining under wraps after Germany's surrender.⁵

The censors were also responsible for killing all mention in Canada's press of Habbakuk, a bizarre plan supported by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten to install refrigeration tubes in a two-million-ton block of ice and tow it to the coast of Europe to use as an airfield during the Allied invasion of the continent. In 1943, National Research Council scientists conducted feasibility experiments at Patricia Lake, in the Rockies. The concept was discussed at the Quebec Conference of 1943 and dropped.⁶

Japanese balloon bombs were perhaps the strangest weapon launched against the Allies in World War II. Made of paper and silk, the 12-metre balloons were filled with hydrogen and designed to catch the jet stream at 10,000 meters for a 220-kilometre-an-hour, four or five day trip to North America. The bombs were fitted with altimeters and ballast weights to keep them in the stratosphere. Each night, as they cooled and dropped below the jet stream, they dropped a sand bag. By the time they arrived on the Pacific Coast of Alaska, British Columbia or the United States, all the ballast was to be dropped. If things worked

⁵ Ruling, Ottawa, May 14, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁶ Library and Archives Canada, Wilfrid Eggleston Papers, MG30-D282 Vol. 26 Atomic Energy Grp. National Research Council, File 20.

as planned, the balloon's cluster of five small incendiary bombs and one high explosive bomb were released one-by-one as the balloon drifted inland.

A Canadian military intelligence officer called the bombs "fiendishly clever but a military failure."⁷ Certainly, terror of them, if exploited properly, could be used to maintain public fear of "duplicitous Japs." Some of the bombs traveled as far as Michigan and Texas, but they were relatively harmless. They did not start many forest fires, which was their main purpose, nor, partly because of censorship, did they instill much fear.⁸ Their singular "success" was a public relations disaster: the only fatalities were a woman and five school-aged children who were killed when they explored the site of a downed balloon near Lakeland, Oregon in May 1945.

The first wave of balloon bombs arrived in the fall of 1944. Early in the campaign, military and censorship authorities knew very little about them and the natural reaction was to stifle coverage. The papers, like the general public, were left to speculate. Some Canadian newspapers got away with printing theories the balloons might carry biological weapons but the censors cracked down on anything that discussed their success rates or flight paths. On November 13, 1944, the censors removed from a story submitted by the *Vancouver Province* a

⁷ Memo, John Graham, June 1, 1945 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

⁸ There were moments, however, when the balloons struck real fear into Canadian military authorities such as on June 11, 1945, when a "new type" of balloon was spotted over the ocean off Vancouver Island. The pilot of the Mosquito who was sent out to shoot the balloon down marveled at its strange configuration. The balloon did not carry bombs. The pilot photographed an odd-looking cylinder carried by the balloon before shooting it down. Military intelligence officials were sure the cylinder carried a biological weapon and considered a general warning to censors across Canada. Before the warning was issued, the intelligence officers were told the pilot had actually shot down a Canadian weather balloon. Memo John Graham, June 14, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

statement saying only about one out of every forty balloons launched from Japan reached the coast of North America. A picture of one of the balloons drifting over Vancouver Island was allowed to run in the *Province* but the caption was altered to remove the location. A Canadian Press story submitted to the Vancouver censors that evening was cut to remove a line saying six balloon bombs had made it to the Canadian prairies.⁹

A second wave of balloon bombs was launched by Japanese school children in early 1945. On January 5, 1945, Col. B.R. Mullaly, Head of Operational Intelligence at Pacific Command, contacted Graham to advise the censor the United States had imposed a complete blackout on the bombs. Any news about them had to be approved by the U.S. press censors or the War Department.¹⁰

Canadian newspapers were fairly co-operative. The Regina *Leader-Post's* editor did not quibble when Vancouver censor John Graham told him to spike a story about a balloon bomb landing south of Regina, near the U.S. border. Eyewitnesses told a *Leader-Post* correspondent the balloon was as high as a two-storey house and drifted along at tree-top level. The bombs had dropped but had not exploded. Graham promised the *Leader-Post* first crack at the story once it was released and gave the information to Military Intelligence.¹¹

⁹ Memorandum, John Graham, November 13, 1943. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

¹⁰ Memorandum, John Graham, January 5, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

¹¹ Memorandum, John Graham, January 13, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

Canadian journalists followed the lead of their American counterparts, who wrote in vague terms about the balloon bombs and datelined their stories “Somewhere West of the Mississippi”. This embargo on locations and specific details held until the first week of June 1945. An intrepid Japanese espionage network might have been able to put together statistics on balloon sightings by tracking the papers that gave good play to the stories. As Graham noted in a memorandum, few papers were likely to be too agitated about balloon bombs unless at least one had been spotted in their coverage area.¹²

Graham had expected weekly papers to sit on the balloon story, so he had not sent copies of his letters to them. He had not contended with George Murray who, with his wife “Ma” Murray, ran a newspaper in Fort St. John, in northwestern British Columbia. When one of the Japanese balloon bombs drifted across the town and landed in northern Alberta, Murray sold stories on the sighting to several Canadian daily newspapers. Graham had to contact Murray’s customers to kill the story and told Murray to check with them before selling any more balloon bomb news.

A task force of military and forestry officials was convened to establish a workable province-wide balloon detection organization. Since this type of news was interesting to small-town papers, the censors imposed a blackout on this group.¹³

¹²Memorandum, John Graham, June 7, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

¹³Memorandum, John Graham, January 30, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

On April 3, Hal Slaight, the managing editor of the *Vancouver Sun*, demanded the balloon bomb stories be allowed into the newspapers. They were common knowledge in the province, Slaight said, especially among forest rangers and members of the militia. School teachers in Vancouver warned their students about the bombs. Censorship wouldn't keep the Japanese from learning about the damage done by the bombs; the Germans knew of the carnage the V-rockets had caused in the United Kingdom and Western Europe, despite the British government's news blackout on the attacks. Defending the blackout on the balloon bombs, the difference, replied Graham, was the Nazi's ability to send aerial reconnaissance flights over V1 and V2 target areas. The Japanese had no planes over B.C.. If the newspapers printed stories about the balloon bombs any Japanese agent in North America would get "the very information he was seeking."¹⁴ Graham concealed another reason for the news blackout: Canadian authorities knew the balloons carried explosive and incendiary bombs, but they had not ruled out bacteriological warfare. Some of the bombs held a strange container that had no obvious purpose and might, intelligence officers believed, carry germs.¹⁵

The week that Slaight and Graham argued about censorship, balloon bombs were landing all over western North America: one near Puyallup,

¹⁴John Graham memorandum, April 3, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

¹⁵Ottawa, Baldwin, April 4, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

Washington; two in rural Montana; and one in northern California. One bomb blew up at Pine Lake, Alberta, without causing any injury.¹⁶

On April 23, Graham called Baldwin to report concerns by security officials in B.C. over a current "Tim Tyler's Luck" syndicated American comic strip which dealt with the subject of Japanese balloons and carried the suggestion of bacteriological warfare. The strip was beginning a new series called "Man Eating Enemies" in which Tim Tyler and his pals in a U.S. Navy submarine see a balloon flying low over the water. The crew finds the balloon has "Jap markings on it" and is "something like the balloons reported recently in the States." The balloon does not carry bombs, just a box containing something that looks like seeds. Graham received a call from Gordon Root, military reporter at the *Vancouver Province*, to ask for censorship's opinion on the strip, which had already run in many daily papers in Canada and the United States. Root argued his paper should be allowed to print its large collection of suppressed balloon bomb stories, since the comic strip gave them the defence of pre-publication.

Very soon afterwards, Graham fielded calls from senior military intelligence officers in Vancouver, who were also complaining about the comic strip to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.¹⁷ Acland called Baldwin the same day. The strip was distributed by the U.S.-based King Features syndication service, so Graham suggested Canadian censorship officials talk to their colleagues in Washington about having the rest of the story line suppressed.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Vancouver, Graham, April 23, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

Baldwin accepted this advice and sent a teletype to the U.S. censorship headquarters in Washington.¹⁸

The subject of the comic strip came up again May 5 at a meeting of the Joint Services Security Intelligence Committee at the Vancouver Barracks. The Committee consisted of security and intelligence officials of the Army, Navy and Air Force, RCMP, Provincial Police, US Navy and Army Liaison. Graham reassured its members Tim Tyler would no longer breach censorship rulings in Canada and the U.S.¹⁹

Not much later, the wheels came off the bomb story censorship. Radio commentator Walter Winchell broke the story of the Lakeland, Oregon fatalities, leaving out details about the balloons and saying the children had been killed by "enemy action." On May 7, the Associated Press moved a story on the tragedy with an eyewitness account from Archie Mitchell, pastor of the Christian Alliance Church in Lakeview, the only survivor who was present near the explosions. The Canadian censors allowed the story into Canada but then tried to screw the censorship lid back on.²⁰

On May 22, 1945, the U.S. press censor released a short statement on the balloon bombs, allowing the press to print the basic details. The Toronto and Vancouver newspapers tried to use the American release as a lever on Canadian censors to allow the publication of balloon bomb stories. The Toronto *Star* was

¹⁸ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, April 23, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960 File: Japanese.

¹⁹ Vancouver, Graham, May 5, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960 File: Japanese.

²⁰ Memorandum, John Graham, May 7, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

sitting on a stack of exclusive stories and pictures from across western Canada, but Perry told the *Star* to stick with the American press release carried on the Canadian Press wire.²¹ Graham, who had not been told by the American censors about the news release, believed the balloon bombs were one of Canada's best-kept secrets. "Security people here are very disturbed. They feel, now the lid has been removed, it is going to be very hard to keep the situation under control. In addition, I think that the US Censorship could quite easily have given us a few days advance notice on their decision to take the lid off, so we could have had a chance to fix a firm policy." Graham believed the news release was probably sparked by Winchell's broadcast. Canadian censors relented in early May. Stories about the civil and air defence measures taken to prevent bomb damage were allowed, but details of specific landings were still under the ban. Later, after the Washington censors put out a warning against reporting the shooting down of the balloons, the Canadian censors followed suit.²²

The confusion continued for another day as the censors, senior military officers in Ottawa and west coast reporters jockeyed to determine how much information on the balloon bombs could be released. Canadian Press and the Vancouver *Sun* believed they were free to describe the technology of the balloons. Graham and many of the military officers he contacted at National Defence Headquarters agreed, believing news stories might give the Japanese the information they needed to fine-tune the rather ineffective balloons and their

²¹ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, May 22 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

²² Memorandum, John Graham, May 22, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

bombs. The balloons had been an ineffective weapon mainly due to their high failure rate over the ocean and partly because many of their bombs were duds.²³

On May 24, Baldwin received a call from Colonel Richard Malone,²⁴ Director of Public Information (Army), saying National Defence was preparing a further official release on Japanese balloons which, when finally vetted in Ottawa and Washington, would likely be issued by the end of the month. Canada's Department of National Defence wanted the Canadian public to know more about the balloons so they could spot them and tell the difference between the bombs and weather balloons. The Americans held up the release of information for nearly a week while one faction in the U.S. Army's press relations department tried to kill it. Later, the censors speculated the Americans weren't trying to suppress the balloon bomb story; they just wanted U.S. journalists to have it first. Still, Canadian censors released descriptions of first balloon found in Montana on basis of prior publication, as well as general references to aerial patrols and to organization of spotters, including fact that occasional balloons were shot down, though with no time or location given.²⁵

The censors killed details about the heights aircraft flew to shoot down the balloons, speculation about germ warfare, and anything about the time and location of balloon landings. The Canadians noted American censors suppressed several facts the Japanese surely knew, namely that the balloons supposedly

²³ Vancouver, Graham, May 23 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

²⁴ Malone later went on to assemble the FP Newspapers Ltd. chain that included the *Calgary Albertan*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Globe and Mail*, *Ottawa Journal* and *Montreal Star*.

²⁵ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, May 24, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

carried Japanese writing denouncing the U.S. air raids on Tokyo; that they had no steering apparatus; and that some bombs exploded when they hit the ground while others seemed to have timers. They also killed stories of shoot-downs by U.S. fighters and speculation the balloons were launched from submarines.²⁶

Finally, on May 30, 1945, U.S. censors allowed the Associated Press to move a story revealing most of the balloons' secrets. The Canadian censors felt their American colleagues had double-crossed Malone and the Canadian Army's public affairs department.²⁷ The Vancouver papers jumped on the story and pressed censors for clearance to use some of their balloon pictures to illustrate the piece. The Canadians received permission, along with photographs from the Army, which ran despite mild protest from the Americans. Some restrictions did remain: nothing could be published about the time or place of balloon sightings or groundings, the damage or casualties they caused, or counter-measures taken against them, nor was speculation permitted on disease or chemical warfare possibilities they posed.²⁸

The Toronto *Star* broke that embargo on May 31 by publishing a story saying a total of 190 balloons had been seen over B.C., and that at least one balloon carried a jelly that might contain disease germs.²⁹ When the censors complained, the *Star* dropped those details from its later editions. The *Star's* rival, the *Telegram*, scalped the story and carried the "190 balloon" detail, which

²⁶ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, May 24, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

²⁷ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, May 31, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

²⁸ Memorandum, John Graham, May 30, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

²⁹ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, May 31. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

was, Graham said, “the very information the Japs are looking for - the number of balloons reaching North America.” Censors killed stories that showed the balloons had crossed the Rockies, including pictures and text about a balloon that drifted in plain sight over Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, in late June,³⁰ but the *Lethbridge Herald* did publish a story on how the bombs worked.³¹

By then, Allied scientists were putting the finishing touches on the weapon that would end the war against Japan. Arguably, the development of the atomic bomb was biggest secret of World War II. Senior censors were kept informed of the Manhattan Project, at least in a general way, by Leslie Thompson, an official of the Department of Munitions and Supply.³² Thompson was sometimes called upon to examine news stories to determine if there was leakage of important information on atomic research.³³ He also vetted some of the coverage of the mining industry, looking for stories about uranium.³⁴ Radio stations were warned by Deputy Radio Censor Charles Shearer in January, 1943, against mentioning the arrival of European scientists in Canada. This ruling was passed on to the

³⁰ Memorandum, John Graham June 22, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5960, File: Japanese.

³¹ *Lethbridge Herald*, June 22, 1945, 1.

³² It is difficult to know to what extent the censors understood the Manhattan Project. Purcell claims his sources at censorship knew at least eight months before the attack on Hiroshima that atomic research might culminate with the creation of a bomb of spectacular power. Like any other bright, curious people tantalized and intrigued by snippets of information, the censors passed information among themselves. As late as July, 1945, Graham in B.C. was forwarding clippings from U.S. publications such as *Newsweek* hinting about big news on atomic research. See his memoranda in Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: general-1.

³³ Memorandum, November 18, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5957, File: general-1.

³⁴ Memorandum, C.S. Casgrain, June 15, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: general-1.

press by Perry on January 8.³⁵ Yet, it did not prevent stories on nuclear research from finding their way into the newspapers.

One notable breach of Manhattan Project secrecy occurred in Toronto in April 1944. Dr. Joshua Haldimand, a Regina chiropractor, took the podium of the national Social Credit Party convention at Toronto's Royal York Hotel and spilled the entire story of the work on the atomic bomb. Haldimand had picked up the story from some of his patients who were working on the Eldorado uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan. A physics buff, Haldimand had correlated the information from his patients with studies he had read in U.S. science journals. Amazingly, the *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Telegram* missed the implications of Haldimand's speech. The first inkling of trouble came when a reporter from the *Regina Leader-Post* called the Toronto censorship office asking for clearance of his story on Haldimand's remarks. Perry called the *Star* and the *Telegram* and warned the papers to kill any mention of atomic research. Worried that a reporter for a weekly paper or a Social Credit publication might write a story, Perry tracked down Haldimand at the convention and asked him to make an announcement to the gathering warning delegates and press from spreading the information.³⁶

In mid-November 1944, the *Montreal Gazette* carried a story quoting Dr. F. Cyril James, the principal of McGill University, saying a cyclotron and radiation laboratory was being built at the university. Dr. James discussed the recent

³⁵ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, April 15, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5965, File: general-5.

³⁶ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, April 16, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: general-1.

experiments in “atom smashing” and, according to Baldwin, “the story pin-pointed developments in Canada and to some extent indicated progress in one of the most secret of war projects. To make it worse, Dr. James mentioned the project undertaken by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a project which has been under a very strict veil of secrecy.” Baldwin asked the Montreal censor Eddie McMahon to try to kill the story in later editions of the *Gazette*. McMahon found Canadian Press had picked up most of the story, though missing the MIT angle.³⁷

Enemy agents seeking information about Canadian participation in atomic development would have been wise to turn their attention to the business pages. There, a drama was being played out between the shareholders of the Eldorado Mining and Refining Co. uranium mine and the Canadian government. The shareholders believed the government’s expropriation of their property was illegal, or, at the very least, the government had paid too little for their mine. On April 30, 1944, the Associated Press wire carried a story about the U.S. State Department’s refusal to come to the aid of the U.S. shareholders of Eldorado. The story described Eldorado as a “radium mine” and said the Canadian government had expropriated it “in order to use the mine for war purposes.” The censors could not kill the story, since it had come from the U.S. and was likely being carried in many of that country’s newspapers.³⁸ However, censorship

³⁷ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, April 16, 1944 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5957, File: general-1.

³⁸ John Graham, April 30, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: 1-general.

authorities had already issued two directives on reporting on Eldorado, forbidding discussion of the mine's product.

Purcell claims in his thesis that one of the censors, likely Perry or Baldwin, tipped him off in late 1944 to the existence of the Manhattan Project. On July 10, 1945, Baldwin met with Purcell, Bert Buckland of the Toronto *Telegram*, and Ken Eady of the Toronto *Star* to explain to them why they should tread carefully in their coverage of the government-directed investigation into the Eldorado nationalization issue that opened in Toronto that day.³⁹ The investigation's hearings were closed to the press and public, but government officials feared the U.S. shareholders who were angry with the terms of the expropriation might take their complaints to the press. Baldwin assured the journalists the government was not afraid of the political aspects of the dispute. It did, however, want suppression of all discussion of the potential uses of Eldorado's product.⁴⁰

Another set of news stories gave snippets of information about Canadian participation in nuclear research. In 1944, the censors ordered a blackout of information on the expropriation of land at Chalk River and the development of Canada's first large nuclear reactor. In August 1944, the Ottawa *Citizen* learned of the expropriation and speculated the land was to be used by Canadian Industries Limited for a munitions plant, and carried a story to that effect in its first edition of August 10, 1945. The Ottawa *Journal* immediately complained to the

³⁹ J.G. Glassco, a Toronto chartered accountant, was appointed with broad powers to inquire into the affairs and operations of Eldorado and the sale and disposition of its products. Glassco later led a commission appointed by the Diefenbaker government to examine ways of improving government efficiency.

⁴⁰ Memorandum B.B. Perry, July 10, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967, File: general-1.

censors. Invoking the rule against mentioning the construction of explosives plants, Baldwin killed the story in subsequent editions.⁴¹ It was only after the stories were spiked that Baldwin learned from Girouard that the land was not being used for a munitions plant, but had been purchased in connection with experimental work “being carried on by Leslie Thomson of Munitions & Supply. This of course made it more important that nothing should be said about its use.” Giroard later contacted the Press Gallery and warned its members against any mention of the use to which the land might be put.⁴² The ban held until the Toronto censor allowed the publication of news of the construction of a plant for Defense Industries Ltd. at Chalk River, although no mention was made of the fact that this was a nuclear reactor. The Chalk River construction story was broken by the *Daily Commercial News* on September 14, 1944 and was quickly picked up by *Maclean's* magazine.⁴³

Military technology was one area in which an effective censorship could be of value to the war effort. Again, there was a lack of co-ordination between the holders of information, in this case the National Research Council and the Ministry of Munitions and Supply, and censorship. By the time the censors were properly briefed on weapons secrets –1943 for the Air Force and 1944 for the

⁴¹ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, Ottawa, August 10, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956 File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

⁴² R. W. Baldwin, August 10, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956 File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

⁴³ B.B. Perry, September 14, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5959 File: 1-D-3 Air Force Equipment.

Navy – the worst of the war was over. Fortunately for the censors, the media had some difficulty grasping new scientific developments and explaining them. In the case of the balloon bombs, censorship did not prevent the Japanese from learning anything about their own bombs, but it did dampen speculation on their potential as *carriers of biological weapons*. Censorship may also have served its purpose in preventing the Japanese from learning the bombs were inefficient and a waste of Japanese resources.

Censorship of news that might have tipped the Axis to the existence of the atomic bomb was crucial. The construction of the bomb relied on a huge secret industrial complex that was vulnerable to sabotage. Throughout the war, all of the major powers had developed secret weapons and managed to cloak them in secrecy. Canada's journalists accepted censorship of Japan's secret balloon weapons when they were in plain view of thousands of Canadians and kept the secret of the atomic bomb, the greatest technological advance of World War II. When the secrets of the bomb were betrayed, it was by scientists, not the press.

Chapter 12

Censorship and the Zombies

On June 21, 1940, the federal government enacted the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA), which allowed it to seize property or manpower if they were needed for the war effort. Men who were drafted under NRMA were assured they would not have to leave the North American continent. Canada's commitment to Allied cause in the early years of the war was met with men who enlisted voluntarily. After December 1941, NRMA soldiers were deployed to British Columbia to defend the coast against a Japanese invasion and, starting in February 1942, guard the flank of the strategically-vital Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline in the North.

Mackenzie King's government could present Canada's people and Allies with figures showing about 5,000 combat and anti-aircraft soldiers were deployed on the West coast. The draftees were not, from the beginning, opposed to seeing action: NRMA soldiers among the 5,000 Canadian troops sent to Kiska, in the Aleutian Islands, in 1943 were prepared to fight, but the Japanese garrison on the island had been pulled out before the Canadians arrived.¹ The 1942 conscription plebiscite galvanized NRMA soldiers' opposition to overseas deployment.

Many of the NRMA soldiers were draftees from Quebec who served under predominantly Anglophone officers in both Quebec-based and English-Canadian units. Among the draftees was a strong element of English-speaking soldiers,

¹ For the political and military context of this campaign, see Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003.

particularly those of rural background and from union ranks who believed they were needed at home. Portrayed in the popular culture as cowards and shirkers, the NRMA soldiers were often taunted by civilians as “Zombies” and harassed by General Service soldiers.

By the summer of 1944, the Canadian Army was desperate for men to replace losses in Italy and northwest Europe. In the distance loomed increased Canadian participation in the war against Japan. King’s government, along with the country, split on the issue of whether to use conscripts to make up for the manpower shortfall. A large block of English-Canadian politicians, especially Progressive Conservatives, wanted Canada to follow all of the other major belligerents in the war and send draftees to the fighting fronts. Most Francophone political leaders in both Quebec City and Ottawa opposed the deployment of conscripts. The English and French-language press generally mirrored the attitudes of the politicians.

The NRMA soldiers’ fears of conscription and deployment to the fighting theatres had already generated trouble among the West Coast conscripts, many – but, despite the common misconception at the time, not all -- of whom were French Canadians, local civilians and General Service (GS) soldiers. In mid-July, 1943, about 250 draftees, supposedly mostly French-Canadians, deserted from a base on Vancouver Island after a false rumor swept their camp that they were about to be sent overseas. Civilians on the island saw soldiers with tommy guns rounding up the deserters. Islanders tipped off the Vancouver *Sun*, which was

advised by the censors to spike its proposed article.² On July 19, 1944, fighting erupted at Currie Barracks in Calgary when the draftees broke into a song, "It's Better to be a Zombie Than a RS Man," during dinner in the mess hall. General Service soldiers in the hall charged into the draftees, fists flying. Those NRMA men who could get away rushed to their huts, barricaded the doors and armed themselves with rifles and bayonets. The General Services soldiers did likewise.³ Fortunately, everyone stayed where they were and no one was seriously hurt.⁴

Media across the country jumped on anything negative about the Zombies. Two months before the November draftee protests, the *Cowichan Leader of Duncan, B.C.*, carried an editorial about a Zombie attack on a 60-year-old man and his two sons who were GS soldiers. The father had to be hospitalized. The paper went on to criticize draftees in general for the trouble they supposedly caused in B.C. and for showing pride in the name Zombie, so much so that they had given the name to their camp's baseball team. Canadian Press editors considered picking up the editorial and sharing it with the agency's member newspapers, but decided at the last minute not to put it on the wire for fear of stirring up more resentment of the draftees.⁵

The largest breakdown of military discipline in Canadian history occurred in November and December, 1944 in British Columbia and Ontario. The British

² Ruling, John Graham, Vancouver, July 15, 1943. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, 1-B-1 Miscellaneous Military.

³ Ruling, John Graham, Vancouver, July 19, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-1 Miscellaneous Military.

⁴ The riots are analyzed in Dean Oliver, "'My Darlin' Clementine': Wooing Zombies for \$6.50 a Night. General Service-NRMA Relations in Wartime Calgary." *Canadian Military History*, Volume 7, Number 3. Summer 1998. pp. 46-55.

⁵ Memorandum, John Graham, August 16, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-1 Miscellaneous Military.

Columbia troubles, especially in Terrace, B.C., (then a tiny community of 400 people on the Skeena River, inland from Prince George) made their way into the history books, while the mass desertions in Ontario have not.

Through the summer and fall of 1944, Allied military manpower demands increased drastically, a situation that was quickly picked up by Opposition politicians who knew conscription could divide the King government. On October 5, 1944, George Drew, by then Premier of Ontario, made a speech to the Canadian Corps Association saying there was no real shortage of reinforcements “while 80,000 men wearing the same uniform are kept here in Canada in the sixth year of the war, performing no real duty of any kind.”⁶ The minister of defence, J. L. Ralston, Drew said, bore “the heaviest guilt for that situation,” an allegation that would later be shown to be ironic. Ralston, a WWI veteran and still honorary militia Colonel who used the military designation, had tendered his resignation to King (who refused it) in the autumn 1942 in response to Bill 80, which removed the geographic restriction to conscription, but only if it was ‘necessary,’ and who, in cabinet, remained the strongest proponent of conscription for overseas service.⁷

In September 1944, Ralston was overseas, visiting Canadian soldiers. While there, he grew more adamant than ever that adequate reinforcements – which were essential to maintain units at required fighting strength – could only be achieved through compulsion. King asked Ralston to reply to Drew’s attack, but Ralston privately replied from London that Canadian forces were badly over-

⁶ Granatstein, *Canada’s War*, 340.

⁷ *Ibid*, chapters 6, 9.

stretched. Ralston returned to Ottawa on October 18, armed with a memorandum from the Army saying the manpower situation was dire.

The following day, Ralston, King and the War Committee of Cabinet met in one of the most dramatic meetings in Canadian history. The cabinet was split into two factions, one supporting the Prime Minister and willing to accept conscription only if Canada seriously risked losing the war and those supporting Ralston who believed Canada needed to immediately send draftees to Italy and Western Europe. At the meeting, King considered firing Ralston and appointing Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, who did not hold a seat in Parliament, to be minister of defence, as McNaughton did not prefer compulsion. King sent Gen. Maurice Pope to Washington to explain the situation to President Roosevelt.

King had pinned his hopes on scraping the country for General Service soldiers still stationed in Canada and convincing NRMA men to volunteer for active service. Some 9,000 Zombies had volunteered in the previous six months, the Prime Minister learned. The military, however, told the Prime Minister conscription was the only reasonable solution to the shortage of front-line soldiers.

A cabinet meeting October 25 turned into a brawl, with the Prime Minister blaming the army for the manpower problem and each minister staking out his own position. Cabinet met again the following day. The ministers considered ways to get more non-combatant regular army soldiers to the front. They considered lifting some of Canada's strenuous medical rules for recruits and allowing men older than 38 to enlist. King came to believe he was the target of a

right-wing conspiracy that involved members of his own government, one aimed at destroying his plans for sweeping post-war social programs. On November 1, the day after a cabinet meeting in which King mulled resigning and challenged his opponents to try to form a government, he accepted Ralston's resignation – the same one, in fact, that Ralston had offered two years earlier, as King kept that letter.

The firing of Ralston simply added to the air of crisis. Nasty debates continued in Parliament. King believed McNaughton's rank and reputation would soothe the conscriptionists, and that he would be able to drum up enough volunteers to avoid conscription. He was wrong: McNaughton was booed when he spoke in Ottawa-area Legion halls and the minister's pleas brought very few new overseas recruits from the NRMA ranks. Within his department, officers crunched the numbers and wrote that a minimum of 16,000 men were needed and that to achieve this, conscription was necessary. By November 22, facing the resignation of many key cabinet ministers – namely Finance minister J.L. Ilesley, Munitions and Supply minister CD Howe, and Minister of National Defence (Navy) Angus Macdonald - King finally relented and committed his government to providing 16,000 conscripts from the ranks of NRMA personnel.⁸ However, Quebec City-based air minister Charles "Chubby" Power, who had staked his political career so many times on King's promise not to impose conscription, quit the cabinet in protest of King's volte-face.

On November 23, 1944, the government issued an Order-in-Council as a prelude to a bill introduced November 25 for transfer of 16,000 drafted soldiers to

⁸Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 346, 359 and 369

the European theatre. The NRMA Fifteenth Infantry Brigade in British Columbia, along with NRMA soldiers in southern Ontario and Valcartier, Quebec, were to be shipped overseas early in the new year.

The timing of the bill was terrible. Quebec was embroiled in municipal elections that provided soapboxes for anti-conscription politicians. Camillien Houde was out of jail and would be swept back into the Montreal mayor's office. While Houde stayed out of the conscription fight, his re-election showed where voters' sympathies lay. Municipal governments had no power over the drafting of troops and their deployment, but that did not stop Quebec isolationists from holding mass rallies and parades against the draft. Once the mutinies started, they were stoked by nationalists in Quebec and among the drafted soldiers. Political momentum was on the side of the anti-conscription movement: in August, Duplessis had been returned to power, in part to resist this type of action by Ottawa.

Any GS soldier or draftee who had seen British Columbia's newspapers in the days leading up to the riots was bound to have some fear and bitterness. Page 1 of the *Vancouver News-Herald* of November 20 carried a two-column headline reading "Untrained Men Being Rushed to Line Is Claim -- Cannon Fodder Say Troops." The writer described how in an attempt to fill depleted overseas infantry ranks, RS non-commissioned officers and skilled tradesmen were being taken from British Columbia bases to become "untrained cannon fodder," sent to Europe without proper weapons or tactics training.

The draftees quoted in the story were skilled tradesmen. They said military workshops in Canada did not want them to replace the men sent overseas. They further claimed that RS soldiers would not work with them and the Army did not want to give them the higher pay and the promotions to which they were entitled.

The policy of sending skilled tradesmen overseas, many GS soldiers muttered, was a plot hatched in Quebec to have a Zombie home army left in Canada while all volunteers, no matter what their skills and training, were sent to the fighting fronts. "Esprit de Corps is now a lot of hooey," one non-commissioned officer told the *Vancouver News-Herald* reporter. He said bitterly that General Service units were being broken up and their men fed piecemeal into the front line. Zombies quoted in the story said they were in no better position to fight and needed many more months of weapons training before they would be ready to go overseas.⁹

Many of the officers at Terrace were in meetings in Vancouver when radio stations began broadcasting news of the November 23 Order-in-Council. While the focus of the mutiny was Terrace, the first trouble broke out at Vernon, in the Okanagan Valley. At first, the censors passed most stories about the unrest in the draftee's camps. When the disturbances grew into a mutiny and press reaction split along linguistic lines, the government believed fighting might break out within the army itself.¹⁰

According to reporters at the scene, about 1,000 Zombies stationed at Vernon marched through the streets of the town on November 24 shouting "down

⁹ *Vancouver News-Herald*, November 20, 1944, 1.

¹⁰ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

with conscription” and “conscript wealth and industry as well as manpower.” The *Vancouver Province* reported that the draftees marched under the gaze of glaring regular army soldiers carrying machine guns. After listening to some speeches in the town park, the men went back to their barracks. One report filed by a freelancer in Vernon to the *Vancouver News-Herald* said an army captain had been punched when he ordered the marchers to disperse. The Canadian Press carried a story on the protest that moved on the wire after the Vancouver censors told CP to take out any mention of the units involved.

The next day, four units in Terrace refused to assemble for their daily parade. Le Premier Bataillon Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent, the No. 19 Canadian Field Ambulance, the 15th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Prince Edward Island Highlanders, to varying degrees, mutinied against their officers. Some of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent broke into an armory and took ammunition and grenades, an action that horrified regular army soldiers and many of the other draftees who feared serious fighting would break out in the camp. These were used to arm the soldiers who manned blockades on the roads going into the base.

For once, the censors had a fairly good idea of what the real story was. The censors went into the 1944 conscription riots knowing the fears of the draftees were well-founded. The first night of the protests, Major Bray of Military Intelligence showed Vancouver censor John Graham an order marked “SECRET” that confirmed the fears whipped up by the November 20 *News-Herald* front page story. Fighting-age draftees working in B.C.-based anti-aircraft,

signals, engineering and trades units were to be taken out of their assignments and put into infantry units bound for Europe.¹¹ Graham sent a memorandum on the B.C. troubles and Bray's disclosure to the rest of the press censors.

The night of November 24, the telegraph censor called Graham with intercepts of two brief stories sent from Terrace to the *Prince Rupert News* and the *Vancouver Sun* describing protest marches at the local draftee camp. Gordon let the stories pass. However, army intelligence officers stationed in Terrace called the *Prince Rupert News* to say their story was wrong: there were no protests in Terrace. The newspaper knew better and filed a story, carried on the British United Press wire, saying the military had tried to censor their coverage.¹²

The next day, a Sunday, Bray called Graham at home at 1 p.m. to say he was angry about "inaccuracies" in recent coverage of the conscript soldiers' protests. For instance, Bray said, there had not been 1,000 protesters at Vernon. At most, there were 200. And there had been no regular army troops brandishing machine guns, the intelligence officer insisted. Shows of force were to be used only as a last resort. Bray wanted the censors to straighten out the newspapers, but Graham said it was not his job to correct errors. He suggested Bray talk to the army's public relations department. As well, Graham wanted to know about the army's meddling in coverage of the Terrace protest. Bray said he had spoken to his men in Terrace and warned them not to do it again.¹³

¹¹ Memorandum, J. Graham, November 24, 1944. Library and Archives, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Memorandum, J. Graham, November 25, 1944. Library and Archives, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

Meanwhile, several hundred Zombies stationed in Chilliwack had taken to the streets Saturday night and had tried to burn an officer's car and beat two regular army soldiers, breaking one man's kneecap. They went back to their barracks after regular army troops carrying rifles were deployed in the town's streets.¹⁴

Pressure began building on censors in Ottawa. The Directorate received a letter from the General Staff asking that censors discuss with the military any "doubtful" stories on the Zombie troubles. Girouard agreed. The censors put up a warning on a bulletin board in the parliamentary press gallery. Telegraph censors intercepted traffic between Alan Morley, the *Vancouver News-Herald's* parliamentary correspondent and his editor, Ken Drury. Morley believed the crisis "looks political from an Ottawa point of view."¹⁵ Graham, in Vancouver, also believed the issue was political and that journalists should have "a pretty free hand" in covering the unrest.¹⁶

On November 27, King pleaded for national unity and an end to the protests. It was broadcast across the country and picked up in the NRMA camps. "If there is anything to which I have devoted my political life, it is to try to promote unity. My friends can desert me, they can remove confidence in me, they can withdraw the trust they have placed in my hands, but I shall never deviate from that line of policy," King told the House of Commons. "Whatever may be the consequences, whether loss of prestige, loss of popularity or loss of power, I feel

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵Memorandum, John Graham, Vancouver, November 27, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 6. Miscellaneous.

¹⁶Memorandum, John Graham, November 27, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5984 File: 41- G (Draftees).

I am in the right, and I know that a time will come when every man will render me full justice on that score."¹⁷

King did not realize that his speech effectively marked the end of the mutiny. Baldwin and Girouard met two senior military intelligence officers in Ottawa to try to brace them for the news stories that the censors knew would come out in the next few days. The censors insisted they would recommend cuts only if the stories were a threat to national security. The newspapers, Baldwin said, would co-operate with censorship if the censors could prove that soldiers' lives were at stake, but they would balk at any attempts at political censorship. The media would be able to mention the names of units as long as there was no hint of the timing of their shipment overseas.¹⁸

The following day, readers in B.C. and across the country learned how close the Terrace troops came to fighting a pitched battle among themselves. CBR Radio, the Vancouver CBC station, carried a story on its noon news broadcast saying the mutineers were mostly French-Canadian and demanded to be returned to Quebec. The phone at Vancouver's censorship office rang all day as reporters called to vet new details coming from the interior. Draftees had tried to stop The Prince Albert Volunteers, a Saskatchewan regiment, from leaving the camp to be entrained for Halifax. The Zombies warned the Saskatchewan soldiers they had guns and ammunition. The regular army soldiers reminded the Zombies they, too, were armed. Gordon Root, the Vancouver *Province's* military

¹⁷*Hansard*, November 27, 1944, 6614-6618.

¹⁸Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, November 28, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

reporter, had gone to Terrace with General George R. Pearkes and came across a scene "as ugly as any in the history of Canada's Militia."

Pearkes, like most senior officers, blamed the media for the crisis. The military's anger at the media was shared by much of the country, particularly in English-Canada. The federal government's national public opinion polls found Canadians believed the newspapers sensationalized the disturbances at the conscript camps and over-played stories on the entire issue of conscription.¹⁹ This gave the government, which shared the data with the censors, something of a mandate to use the full force of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* against any media outlet that was judged to have reported inappropriately on the disturbances.²⁰

During the entire crisis, King was also seriously afraid of a mass resignation of senior members of the Army. This was a fear that continued through December, and was noted by National Research Council director Dr. C.J. Mackenzie when he visited the Rideau Club on New Years Day, where he ran into King. He wrote that the Prime Minister said he expected to be "out of a

¹⁹ In a memorandum to cabinet dated December 11, 1944, Wartime Information Board General Manager A.D. Denton wrote: "There are further reports of hostilities among English-speaking people against Quebec, and of resentment against the 'Ontario conscriptionists' among French-Canadians. The crisis has been followed by a number of comments from both areas, deploring the outbursts of extremists, and regretting the lack of an educational system which makes such fundamental divergences impossible. Newspapers were again criticized for their inflammatory tactics and for sensationalism in the treatment of minor disturbances." Library and Archives Canada, RG 36-31, Boards, Offices and Committees (Records of the Wartime Information Board), File: W-34-10. Many Canadians also believed the sensational reporting of the conscription issue and the disturbances at military camps made Canada look bad, especially to Americans, and gave "aid and comfort to the enemy." *Ibid*, December 4 memorandum.

²⁰ Library and Archives Canada RG 36-31, Boards, Offices and Committees, (Records of the Wartime Information Board), Vol. 12, File: W-34-10.

job in a few hours” because of the Zombie crisis, and partly because of “a general resignation of Army officers.”²¹

Meanwhile, the *Province's* Root had gathered more material on the conflict between the Zombies and the Prince Albert Volunteers. The draftees had backed down after officers said the prairie soldiers were being moved to another B.C. camp, not overseas. When a Vancouver radio station broadcast the truth, that all of the B.C. troops were likely to be sent to Europe, Zombies surrounded the troop train and refused to let it leave. They let it go at 1 p.m. on the 25th, after holding it overnight and most of a day.

In the midst of dealing with these stories, the Vancouver censors received a call from Frank Turner of the Canadian Press who said he had been phoned by Brigadier Hyde of Pacific Command, who was furious about the "inaccurate and sensational" news and radio stories, which, he said, were fanning the flames of the mutiny. Hyde demanded reporters at British United Press, Canadian Press and local radio stations submit their stories to the Army before they were published. If they did not, he would order all soldiers under his command not to give information to reporters.

Turner dug in his heels. He told Brigadier Hyde he would not deal with a dual censorship. Canadian Press would talk only to the government's press censors. Hyde's threat to impose a news blackout was not a big problem for Canadian Press, Turner said, since most officers had been uncooperative

²¹ For a detailed look at this aspect of the crisis, see Richard J. Walker, "The Revolt of the Canadian Generals, 1944: The Case for the Prosecution" in Howard G. Coombs (ed.), *The Insubordinate and the Non-Compliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to the Present*. Toronto: Dundurn/Defence Academy Press, 2007, Chap. 2.

anyway. One Canadian Press reporter had asked the officer in charge at Chilliwack for information and had been told to go to hell. The Vernon and Terrace officers had not been any more cooperative.

Turner called Purcell, Canadian Press' general manager, who then phoned censorship headquarters in Ottawa and the Army Press Service at National Defence Headquarters. Purcell wired back to Turner that censorship and the army press officers were opposed to Brigadier Hyde's suggestion. Therefore, Purcell said, Canadian Press would not submit to Hyde's proposal. If any attempt was made to interfere with Canadian Press, Purcell threatened that the wire service would publish a complete report of the Army's request.²²

McNaughton was warned of Hyde's demands and Purcell's threat to expose the Army's attempt at news censorship. King had already decided "immediate steps should be taken to censor the press; also to see that the radio did not add fuel to the flames by making additional unnecessary sensational reports which had been the case up to the present..."

King decided to take charge of the situation. He called in Eggleston and Augustin Frigon, General Manager of the CBC. When they arrived at the cabinet meeting, Mackenzie King "told them in the presence of my Colleagues the situation as we had been reviewing it, mentioning about the use of the word 'mutiny' having got into the press, and warned of the absolute necessity of censors using the same methods and judgment in regard to the situation in Canada as they were using in regard to news affecting movement of troops and

²² Memorandum, J. Graham, Vancouver, November 28, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

sensational incidents in connection with the effect on the war effort in relation to overseas.” King wrote in his diary: “I made it clear to them this was not a matter of politics, it was a matter of patriotism ... [O]nce shots were fired and blood began to flow, no one could say where the whole condition of things would end, and we as a Government were helpless in avoiding a situation without co-operation of the press and radio.” King wanted the heads of the major media brought to Ottawa at once so the situation could be explained fully to them.²³

Eggleston was, for a moment, willing to let the military decide what was to be censored. King decided to maintain the voluntary system. McNaughton agreed, saying he would rein in the factions in the military that wanted to take control of censorship. They decided King would handle the political side, calling in the leaders of the Opposition parties to get their support for a fast evening debate in the House of Commons.

King believed the mutiny was a crisis in Canada’s war effort. He was terrified “the conscriptionist people of this country would get control of the Government and would then be for all-out conscription.” Behind all of this trouble “was the desire of the financial interests to destroy our social legislation. They had never liked the family allowances and some other measures and had blamed me for catering to Quebec and certainly if they came into power that part of our policy would be sure to be wiped out.”²⁴

Eggleston left the cabinet meeting and phoned Graham to tell him that the crisis was causing “a great deal of concern in high official circles in Ottawa.” The

²³ Mackenzie King Diaries, November 29, 1944.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

army, he said, blamed the press for sensationalizing stories that fuelled the anger of the draftees. Eggleston told Graham the situation was so serious that a system of compulsory censorship might be imposed upon newspapers and radio stations.²⁵

After the night sitting of Parliament, the lights stayed on late in the East Block. Mackenzie King, McNaughton, and St. Laurent met to discuss the situation at Terrace. "I have seldom seen a look of greater concern on anyone's face than that which came over [Justice Minister] St. Laurent's face as he thought of the situation as it might develop," King wrote in his diary. "The gravity of the situation was apparent the moment McNaughton told us what he had said in ... [cabinet] might happen."²⁶ McNaughton offered to call out the Militia in aid of the civil power but its men were for the most part employed in munitions manufacturing. The supplies of ammunition for front-line soldiers could dry up.

The next day, King was horrified by a false report that Gen. Pearkes had sent low-flying fighter planes over the Terrace camp in a show of force.²⁷ Meanwhile, Baldwin was on a flight from Ottawa that would arrive in Vancouver the next morning. He planned to meet editors and news directors from Vancouver and Victoria at the Hotel Vancouver to warn them of the dangers of the situation. Baldwin's plane was delayed and the meeting was postponed a full day.

²⁵ Memorandum, John Graham, November 29, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

²⁶ Mackenzie King diaries, November 30, 1944

²⁷ J.L. Granatsein and J.M. Hitsman, *A Trust Betrayed*, 232.

In the meantime, a new story had surfaced to add to the censorship crisis. Canadian Press had been sent a piece written by G.A. Hunter of the *Prince Rupert News*. Mutineers at Terrace told Hunter they would stay in their camp until they received discharge papers or, at least, were publicly promised by the federal government they would not be sent overseas. They would try to remain peaceful but would violently resist anyone, including their officers, who tried to move them. "We have 4000 men with us and all the brigade armament," a corporal who had served in Jamaica told Hunter. The soldier said the troops would attack any trains sent to pick them up. Graham killed that story.²⁸

Back in Terrace, General Pearkes had told the *Province's* Gordon Root that the French-Canadian units would be returned to Quebec. Pearkes was afraid to let the news out because he did not know how the English-speaking Zombies would react. The cable censors intercepted Root's telegram to his newsroom. Graham called the *Province* to make sure the paper did not use anything from Root's message.²⁹

That day, E.R. Bertram, the assistant censor in Montreal, visited some of the leading political activists in the city and the editors of all of the French and English-language newspapers in Montreal, Trois Rivières and Sherbrooke to, in his words, "appeal for calm." Bertram spelled the situation out for them in stark terms: if the media did not do its part to defuse the crisis, there would be bloodshed. The French editors, including the censors' old adversary, Leopold

²⁸Memorandum, John Graham, November 29, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5954, File: 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

²⁹Memorandum, John Graham November 28. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-1 Troop Embarkations.

Richer at *Le Devoir*, agreed to help. The *Montreal Gazette* was the only holdout. Its editors demanded a “very specific and written document” ordering them to tone down their coverage. Bertram went over their heads to the newspaper’s publisher and got promise that the paper would fall in line.³⁰

The night Bertram sent off an upbeat memo on the co-operative Quebec press, two hundred marchers took to Old Montreal’s St. James Street to protest conscription. For three days, newspapers in the city had carried ads for the rally, which was sponsored by *Le Bloc Populaire*, an anti-conscriptionist political party that emerged from *La Ligue pour le defence du Canada*, and that was led by André Laurendeau. Despite Richer’s pledge of co-operation, *Le Devoir* and most of the anti-conscription press had advertised the meeting. The marchers listened to a speech by Laurendeau, who accused Francophone Liberal politicians of betraying Quebec. Then some of the younger people in the crowd smashed the windows of the offices of the Liberal newspaper *Le Canada*. *Le Devoir* carried a story the next day denouncing the violence and blaming teenage troublemakers in the crowd.³¹

On November 30, the army began investigations at the seven camps in B.C. where there had been trouble. The conscripts at Terrace sent a list of their grievances to Ottawa, where senior soldiers and government officials had already decided to move them out of the province. The army had set up a public

³⁰B. Bertram, “An Appeal For Calm”, November 30, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

³¹Memorandum, B. Bertram, Montreal, November 30, 1944. Library and Archives Canada, RG2 Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

relations unit to deal with media inquiries and Baldwin in Vancouver met editors and radio station managers. They did not know that the mutiny was almost over.

“Everything seemed to be sweet and pretty when suddenly, at 1:15 p.m. The *Daily Province* dropped a bomb-shell into the office,” Graham wrote to Ottawa. Gordon Root, the *Province*'s military reporter, was still in Terrace and wanted to file a story on the “mutiny” (the censors replaced that word with “disturbance”) to remind his readers that about two hundred armed men were still refusing to follow orders. The story said: “A form of reprisal is now spreading [in] the camp ... and a substantial number have volunteered to go Active to escape possible Court Martial.” Graham cut out the phrase about reprisals. He also ordered the wording changed “to avoid any suggestion that a bargain was being made with the recalcitrants that they would be free from penalty by going GS.” Indeed, one soldier was quoted as saying that “the boys are just beginning to realize what they have been doing and it worries them. In his outfit alone close to a hundred have gone active since Monday.”³²

When he talked to editors at the *Province* and *Sun*, Graham asked if the military had told the newspapers to call the army to check the facts in their stories. The editors said no, but if they had, they expected they would have been ignored. In fact, the army's public relations officers were elusive that day. Graham could not even find them to confirm Root's figure of two hundred mutineers under arms. Graham decided to warn the *Province* to cut that number from Root's story, a demand that caused Syd Scott, the editor handling the piece,

³² Ruling, John Graham, December 1, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

to accuse Graham of indulging in political censorship. Scott said he would make an issue of the cuts. Graham told him to take the matter up with Baldwin at that afternoon's meeting in the Hotel Vancouver.³³

Through the next week, the censors had to deal with stories from papers across western Canada as the draftees entrained in their B.C. camps and were shipped east. On December 4, the *Toronto Star* wanted to run a story from Fort Francis, a small town in northwestern Ontario, about a three-hour brawl between one hundred and fifty Zombies and a large crowd of civilians, including army, navy and air force men returned from Europe and military cadets from the town's high school. Six people were hurt badly enough to need medical help, while many more nursed cuts and bruises.³⁴

Meanwhile, Baldwin sat down in the Hotel Vancouver and typed a memo blaming most of the censorship problem on the military. The army, and especially Hyde, had made it nearly impossible for the newspapers and radio stations to get accurate information. Hyde had over-reacted to the news coverage. Baldwin believed the B.C. reporters had, in fact, pulled their punches on "one of the most important stories of the war in British Columbia." When asked by the censors, journalists had even removed factual material that might have stirred up resentment. "We believe there is very little ground for any complaint of sensationalism," Baldwin said. The media co-operated despite, not because of, the near-unanimous hostility shown to them by military officers during the

³³ Memorandum, John Graham, December 1, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

³⁴ Memorandum, B.B. Perry, December 4, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

mutiny.³⁵ Still, King toyed with tougher censorship, including advanced vetting of military stories, something Eggleston fought until his last day on the job.³⁶

Trouble began brewing again among the NRMA men in late December, when the Fusiliers du St-Laurent, now at Valcartier, Quebec, went on a five-day strike, refusing to do anything but assemble for meals.³⁷ On December 16th, the anti-conscription activist, MLA René Chaloult, told a public meeting in Loretteville, just outside Quebec City, that Canada's constitution should be amended after the war to allow Quebec to decide its own foreign policy independently of other provinces. If Quebec did not get that power, he said it should break away from Confederation.³⁸ While the Terrace mutiny was more violent and involved a far larger number of soldiers, King believed the second wave of trouble was a potential graver threat to his government, given its possible consequences for national unity and the stature of the federal Liberals in Quebec.

Eggleston's resignation took effect New Year's Day, 1945, the same day that King told the NRC's director that he believed he had only a few hours left as Prime Minister. Charpentier took over as Director of Censorship and Baldwin remained as Chief Press Censor.

The New Years crisis started among draftees who set up camp in London, Ontario, on December 29, waiting to be transferred to Halifax and on to Europe.

³⁵ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, Vancouver, December 5, 1944 Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956 File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

³⁶ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 265

³⁷ Memorandum, R.W. Baldwin, Ottawa, December 21, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: 1-B-6 Miscellaneous.

³⁸ Memorandum, B. Bertram, December 16, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5967 File: 1-general.

About 500 draftees, mostly from southwestern Ontario, got into fights in the city. On December 30, most of these men left London, fleeing down the highways and rail lines out of the city. The censors had been left in the dark by military intelligence. They first heard about the original troop movement plan from a *London Free Press* reporter.³⁹ The army immediately asked for a very tough censorship of all details of the trouble. It also issued a statement saying there had been no problems in London. The censors were angry at this falsehood, but Charpentier, lacking Eggleston's grit and political skills, republished it in a special censorship directive that was sent to every paper in the country. Within three weeks, the lie came back to haunt and embarrass the censors.

During this round of NRMA troubles, the censors had a solid legal ground for killing stories on the mass desertion of troops from the London park and from other camps across Canada. They simply needed to point to the fact that the London soldiers were part of a major troop movement, so were automatically under a news blackout. This left the *London Free Press's* editor, Arthur Ford, in a tricky situation. Everyone in his city knew of the disorders and the AWOL soldiers, he told Charpentier. He could not put out a paper that ignored the story or print the military's ludicrous press release. The censors, however, would do nothing to help him and they also killed a story from Valcartier about deserter draftees there.⁴⁰ The censors called *Canadian Press* and the major Ontario papers and asked that they run no stories on the London troubles.

³⁹Ruling, B. B. Perry, December 29, 1944. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: Miscellaneous.

⁴⁰Memorandum, Baldwin, January 2, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: Miscellaneous.

On January 18, *The Globe and Mail* ran an editorial disclosing the desertions from London and attacking the censors. The London *Free Press'* Ford was furious at being beaten on his own turf on a story that he had in his files, and he blamed Charpentier. Censors allowed other papers across Canada to report on the *Globe* article. Two days later, the defence minister made a frank statement about the second mutiny.⁴¹

Editors across the country complained about the untrue press release and the initial clamp-down on news from London. On January 23, Baldwin, Shearer and Girouard tried to smooth things over with the country's media with a memorandum sent to all journalists, explaining the rationale of the censors during the New Year's crisis.

After publishing an angry editorial in his newspaper, John Bird, the well-respected editor of the *Winnipeg Tribune*, wrote to Baldwin on January 25, 1945 asking: "How did it happen that the Censorship Directive, on January 2, relayed a flat statement by the Department of National Defence – 'In point of fact there have been no disorders.'?"⁴² Baldwin denied the editorial's claim that the censorship had been politically manipulated by General McNaughton, claiming that "our only power is to determine what is not a violation of the Defence of Canada Regulations."⁴³ Bird believed Baldwin was playing a game of semantics. "Maybe the directorate of censorship was not playing politics," the editor wrote,

⁴¹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship, Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol.5941, (NF).

⁴² Bird-Baldwin, January 27, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: Miscellaneous.

⁴³ Baldwin-Bird, January 29, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: Miscellaneous.

“but the entire information management system of the government was holding back information that was embarrassing to King’s administration.”⁴⁴

During the 1944 Conscription Crisis, the government, faced with a breakdown in military discipline among draftees and the threat of mass resignations of officers who supported conscription gave serious consideration to amending the *Defence of Canada Regulation 16* to force newspapers and radio stations to submit before publication all military information. The Minister of National Defence (and soldiers appointed by him), the President of the Privy Council and the Censors of Publications would have been given the authority to manage the country’s news. Baldwin believed the idea wouldn’t work. Journalists would not submit to mandatory pre-censorship. As well, he argued, so many different people would have been able to rule on stories with no real guidance or rules.⁴⁵

The NRMA troop disturbances were the biggest threat faced by the voluntary censorship system. There were several important reasons why the government and the military became impatient with the system and gave serious consideration to instituting a mandatory pre-publication censorship of Canada’s news media. The King government spent the war walking on eggs on the conscription issue, trying to fend off pro-conscription forces in English Canada and re-assuring Quebec that conscription would not be implemented. It was

⁴⁴ Bird-Baldwin, January 30, 1945. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5956, File: Miscellaneous.

⁴⁵ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

Mackenzie King's good fortune that the war evolved as it did, with the European invasion occurring so late in the war and Germany collapsing relatively quickly. Censorship's situation in the fall of 1944 resembled that of the Liberal government, an institution that needed some luck to survive unscathed. That luck almost ran out when the situation in Europe required the quick movement of Canadian reinforcements. The conscription crisis that was generated shook the government and caused it to call into question its news management system. The Army quickly blamed the press for the outbreaks and attempted to institute its own censorship system. The voluntary censorship system survived, partly because of the stands taken by King and Eggleston, but also because of the fast German collapse after the failure of the Ardennes offensive. Had Canadian troops been required for a summer 1945 campaign or in large numbers for the Pacific war, the censorship system may well not have been able to withstand the pressures that would have been placed on it by the government and the press.

Conclusion

By the fall of 1944, it was apparent to most observers that the war in Europe was drawing to a close. Eggleston, convinced in the fall of 1944 the major fighting was over, announced he was leaving the Directorate of Censorship, with his resignation taking effect at the end of the year.¹ On September 7, 1944, Byron Price, head of the U.S. press censorship system, delivered a letter to Eggleston outlining his country's plans for dismantling censorship at war's end. Price wanted most press censorship to end immediately upon the fall of Germany. Postal censorship was to last slightly longer. On September 11, Eggleston replied to Price, saying the Canadian censors agreed to a quick end to press censorship. However, news from British Columbia ports would need to be censored for the duration of the war against Japan. Canadian intelligence and security services did not support a quick end to censorship, Eggleston added. They might have no choice, he wrote, since Canada would probably have to quickly adjust its policies to fit with whatever developed in the U.S.

Byron Price called a meeting in Washington on January 24, 1945, to discuss the future of press censorship. Canadian officials were briefed of U.S. plans to quickly get rid of press, wireless and mail censorship. Negotiations and discussions between Canadian, British and U.S. officials to draw up a plan for censorship demobilization continued through the spring of 1945. Ottawa censorship officials received timely updates of U.S. press censorship's draft

¹Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 254.

plans, which were being constantly updated through March and April.² The Canadian High Commission in London sent the last British draft mailed before VE Day, Circular Dispatch 16, which arrived at the office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on March 16, 1945. In it, British censorship officials summarized their negotiations with their Canadian, U.S. and Australian colleagues for domestic censorship plans for a prolonged war against Japan and for continued censorship in the parts of Germany occupied by the Western Allies. Charpentier, now heading the Directorate of Censorship, was, as late as May 4, 1945, skeptical of public statements by the British that they planned to lift most press censorship. When an official of the Wartime Information Board sent Charpentier a clipping of a *Washington Times Herald* story, dated May 2, 1945, saying an immediate relaxation of British censorship would “come with V-Day in Europe but a security check will be kept on military, naval and air news leaving Britain until Japan is defeated,” Charpentier wrote on the accompanying note: “This sounds like Press censorship to me.”³

On May 5, Charpentier received a letter, dated April 27, from Byron Price, the Director of United States Censorship concerning “X Plan,” the schedule for the reduction of U.S. censorship. Price warned that the previous day (April 26) President Truman directed major cuts to the Censorship Department budget. In the previous budget, the President asked Congress for an appropriation of

² Minutes of the War Cabinet Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Censorship: December 22, 1944; February 9, 1945; and February 15, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, File: Demobilization of Censorship.

³ Memorandum, Charpentier, May 4, 1945. Library and Archives Canada, RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, File: Demobilization of Censorship.

\$19,150,000 to run the Censorship Department. Congress had not acted on that recommendation. Now, with the end of the two-front war, Truman wanted the Censorship Department's budget cut to \$14,350,000 for the fiscal year beginning July 1. Price wanted the Canadians to read Truman's signal that the great bulk of wartime censorship was to wrap up with the German surrender. "I hope I have been able to make this clear," Price wrote. "I felt it was important for Mr. Charpentier or whoever is acting for him, to know about it, because the real point is that we are irrevocably committed by budgetary requirements to make very substantial reductions."⁴

X-Day was defined as the day on which an armistice with Germany was signed or occupation of Germany became substantially complete, whichever came first. At X-Day, Price wrote, the director was to instruct all divisions and stations in the U.S. censorship system that no personnel, military or civilian, could be added to the staff without express approval of the Director, and that "civil service promotions [were] to be made sparingly." The day after X-Day, the U.S. press censorship system was to effectively end. Within 36 days, virtually all offices of radio, print media and film censorship were to be closed, and their staff discharged.

Despite Charpentier's misgivings about the sincerity of British plans to scale back censorship with the collapse of the Nazi regime, the Canadian censors worked on a schedule that was viewed as similar to those of its Allies. On VE Day, about half of the censorship directives then in force were cancelled,

⁴ Memorandum, Charpentier, May 5, 1945. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, File: Demobilization of Censorship.

and two weeks later the Directorate of Censorship sent out a booklet listing the new, modified restrictions and attempting to shift the full attention of press censorship to the campaign in the Pacific.⁵

On August 15, 1945, the day following the surrender of Japan, the Prime Minister announced the lifting of all censorship restrictions.⁶ The Chief Censor of Publications sent notices to Canadian editors and broadcasters to advise them formally that all directives were cancelled and to thank them for their co-operation throughout the war. A censorship official, speaking anonymously, told the *Ottawa Journal* it would be "useless" to continue censorship with the war over, but, in reality, censorship had not been a serious government priority since May 1945, when the last German U-boats surrendered.⁷ This was a marked contrast to World War I, when the government continued to use censorship to deal with the post-war "Red Scare", and, in fact, tightened the rules just before the the Armistice came into effect. In this war, however, no one pressed for post-war censorship. It was anathema to King, the censors were a far different breed from their World War I counterparts, and the political press in Canada would not have tolerated censorship unless the government could identify a tangible threat to Canada.

Newspapers welcomed the end of censorship and were, in the main, kind to the censors and appreciative of their work. Quebec City's *L'Evenement*

⁵ This was a difficult task. Wartime Information Board polling showed there was almost no interest in Canada on VE day and the weeks afterwards in the Pacific, outside of British Columbia. WIB memorandum to cabinet, May 14, 1945, Library and Archives Canada RG 36-31, (Records of the Wartime Information Board), Vol. 14, File: W-34-10.

⁶ By then, King was aware of the strong public desire for signals from the government that the war was truly over and that normalcy would quickly return. Library and Archives Canada RG 36-31, (Records of the Wartime Information Board, Vol. 12 File: W-20-10.

⁷ *Ottawa Journal* August 16, 1945, 1.

Journal, which had a few rough brushes with the censors, wrote an editorial praising their tact.⁸ The Saint John *Telegraph-Journal* noted most of the censors were “trained newspapermen and it must have irked them grievously when they had to suppress news. They were men whom the newspapers respected, even if there was not in all cases complete agreement.”⁹ The Windsor *Star* said the success of the censorship system could be traced to the hiring of Walter Thompson, who “laid down a pattern followed throughout the war ... It continued under Wilfrid Eggleston, a good newspaperman with sound judgment, and latterly under Warren Baldwin, another good newspaperman.”¹⁰ However, *The Globe and Mail*, the English-language paper that had been most vocally opposed to the censorship system, still had no kind words, simply announcing the end of restrictions in a short story buried on page 10.¹¹

In the late summer of 1945, a draft history of the censorship system, probably written by Baldwin and Charpentier, was completed. Its authors devoted several pages to ideas about a censorship system in a major war. To function successfully, they argued, a censorship system needed:

1. The ability to define the true line of security in any given situation.
2. The authority and ability to make independent decisions.
3. The machinery to give adequate and willing service to press and radio at any hour of the day or night.
4. The respect and trust of publishers.
5. The confidence of the government authorities, and particularly the military services.¹²

⁸ *L'Evenement Journal*, August 21, 1945 6.

⁹ *St. John Telegraph Journal*, August 13, 1945, 6.

¹⁰ *Windsor Star* editorial, August 16, 1945, 4.

¹¹ *The Globe and Mail*, May 8, 1945, 10.

¹² Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

Publishers would, the censors wrote, willingly suppress information that hampered the war effort if the censors earned the trust of “every individual publisher.” That trust would be earned if publishers came to believe that the censors’ rules were devised solely for the purposes of winning the war, and not to protect people in the government and the military. It was also said that supporting the censors must not place a publisher at a commercial disadvantage. Publishers who co-operated with censors should not be “scooped” by publishers who did not, but Baldwin and Charpentier had no advice on how to solve this problem, which had vexed the Canadian censors so many times during the war. There were, of course, no objective criteria to measure the value of information to an enemy and its importance to the Canadian public. “It would take a superman to define this line accurately at all times,” Charpentier wrote. “In dealing with information which may affect the success of military operations where the stake is the lives of men of our forces, the censor is entitled to a safety margin on the side of caution. But to the extent that this margin is widened unnecessarily, the efficiency of censorship will be impaired. If it is to walk this tight rope without disaster a censorship administration should welcome and even encourage constructive argument and criticism from both the publisher and the security authorities and be ready openly to admit its mistakes.”¹³

By the end of 1945, the Directorate of Censorship was closed and its leadership scattered. Eggleston worked for a few months as a Parliament Hill freelancer but soon left full-time journalism to be the first director of Carleton University’s journalism school. Charpentier returned to Parliament Hill as head of

¹³Quoted in Nicholls, *The Story of CP*, 256.

the French-language journals section of the Senate, eventually accepting a diplomatic post as ambassador to several small former French colonies in West Africa. After his release from the Directorate of Censorship, Warren Baldwin joined the staff of *The Globe and Mail*, the newspaper that was so critical of his wartime work, and was posted to the parliamentary press gallery. Biggar, once he recovered from his heart attack, returned to some volunteer war work before returning to Smart & Biggar. Of the regional censors who could be traced, Perry retired after the war and H. Bruce Jefferson took a position with the Nova Scotia provincial government, running its publications department until his retirement in the 1950s. Just before his death in 1970, he founded a short-lived weekly newspaper in New Brunswick.¹⁴ Lew Gordon returned to the Vancouver *Province*.

In 1948, Army headquarters also launched a study of censorship, with a view to developing a system to better deal with information management in any future crisis.¹⁵ The planners quite accurately saw censorship as both a way of controlling information and as a means to gather it. Primarily, though, they saw censorship in terms of open-source and closed-source intelligence gathering. However, rather than model its plan on the Canadian wartime experience, the planners looked to the British wartime censorship and intelligence systems for direction. The report defined censorship's two main security objectives as:

- (a) Preventive – to deprive the enemy, as far as possible, of the effective uses of all communications and publications which might be of interest to him or otherwise injurious to national and allied interests.

¹⁴ Jefferson became a dedicated writer of letters to editors. One of his last, written in 1970, said students shot during an anti-Vietnam War protest at Kent State University were the authors of their own fate. Kimber, *Sailors, Slackers and Blind Pigs*, 321.

¹⁵ The report can be found at National Defence Directorate of History and Heritage, Folder 112 3M2 D77.

- (b) Informative – to collect information of value to the national or allied cause
- (i) in tracing the activities of enemy agents and other hostile persons and organizations
- (ii) in detecting or attempting breaches of laws or regulations passed to secure the public safety or the defence of the Realm
- (iii) in acquiring evidence of enemy plots and intrigues in British, Allied and neutral territories
- (iv) in counteracting enemy naval military and air operations.

The planners concentrated on determining ways of collecting information through signals and postal monitoring and on ways of preventing enemy agents and subversives from communicating. Planners argued for more information sharing and guidance between the “Using Departments” and the censors, who, in the proposed framework, would be primarily intelligence-gatherers with far greater expertise in telecommunication than their World War II counterparts. The study also recommended greater monitoring of mails for news clippings and journalistic copy than had been the case in World War II, and that news articles taken from the mails be subjected by postal censors to tests for invisible ink before being passed to press censors. It was further recommended that Signals intelligence staff be included in the press censorship head office to examine the mail and copy of journalists from neutral countries. Military planners wanted a tighter description of what constituted a “journalist” (a problem that to this day continues to plague the media and those who accredit reporters), and “a list of accredited Press correspondents, similar to that introduced shortly before D-day, would be compiled and maintained throughout the period of war.” The government was also urged to furnish censors with “the fullest possible data to enable Press Censorship to notify the Press ... on the

matters to which no reference should be made without prior submission to Censorship.”¹⁶

In World War II, the Canadian government tried to control news coverage as part of an effort to prevent the country's media from being used as sources of information by the Axis powers and to prevent enemy propaganda from finding its way into Canadian publications and onto the country's air waves. This was a daunting task, one that might have been easier if the government simply assumed editorial control of the country's media. Instead, it instituted a voluntary censorship system, one in which journalists could choose to submit their articles for vetting by censors, but were not obliged to do so. The country's journalists functioned under the tough rules laid out in the *Defence of Canada Regulations* of the *War Measures Act*. These regulations prohibited the publication of anything of value to the enemy, that impaired morale or could cause a rift between Canada and its Allies.

Had the Canadian media functioned as an adversarial “Fourth Estate”, the Canadian government would not have been able to censor the press and radio with the tiny staff and meagre resources dedicated to media censorship. The Canadian media, with several important exceptions, particularly in Quebec, supported the war effort. Almost all criticism of censorship outside of Quebec focussed on allegations of its use by the Mackenzie King government as a method of controlling political debate or on decisions by censors that were seen as arbitrary or capricious by journalists.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

While there is some evidence of political interference in censorship at several junctures during the war, the censors were, for the most part, defensive of their independence. Eggleston addressed the issue in his autobiography: "The gravest charge made against us by the press (which by and large supported us and at the end of the war praised us) was that on occasion we made political decisions, even that we were guilty of playing party politics." He insisted that "usually," the censorship authorities were "left alone by the government to make our own decisions." Still, he admitted, as "wartime civil servants," they were "responsible to the cabinet, which in turn was responsible to Parliament and the Canadian people." If "ordered to do something he regards as unwise, unethical, illegal," that civil servant has "two choices. He can try to persuade his minister that the request should not be pursued, or he can resign I staved off several such requests by persuading my minister that they were unsound; and at least once I was prepared to turn in my resignation if my protest was unacceptable."¹⁷ The censors were, however, men who were liberal and federalist, with political views that tended to mesh with those of official Ottawa. They shared many of those political views with the most important journalists in the country.

The censorship system could not avoid appearing arbitrary. There was no way for the *Defence of Canada Regulations* and the various directives sent out by the censors to anticipate every scenario that might arise. The censorship system was made up of a small group of men operating over wide distances at a time when long distance telephone was very expensive. They communicated through memoranda and, in times of crisis or emergency, by telegraph. There

¹⁷ Eggleston, *While I Still Remember*, 265.

was very little opportunity for face-to-face meetings. Therefore, the regional censors operated with considerable independence. But it took very little to rattle this system. During the crises over the Houde statement, the Drew letter and the Terrace "mutiny" the censorship system was barely able to function effectively in the face of a hostile press.

Fortunately for the censors, the press was rarely rebellious. In fact, as the war progressed, the press's submissive attitude began to distress Wilfrid Eggleston, a man given to deep philosophical thought about journalism. After the war, Eggleston wrote: "In its anxiety to cooperate to the fullest extent in the successful prosecution of the war, the press of Canada as a whole leaned backward in carrying out censorship directives and in 'suffering in silence' government policies of secrecy in military matters. While this compliance was highly commendable in some respects, there was, in my opinion a duty for the press to discharge even in wartime in criticizing and opposing any policies of secrecy which could be demonstrated to go beyond what was necessary and desirable...."¹⁸ It is not surprising, then, that Eggleston went on to try to change journalism by developing a professional school at Carleton University for the education of reporters and editors.

¹⁸ Library and Archives Canada, Wilfrid Eggleston Papers, MG 30, D 282, Volume 13, File "Directorate of Censorship Correspondence and Memoranda, 1945 - 1950, 1978," W. Eggleston to Gil Purcell, April 11, 1946.

Fulgence Carpentier and Warren Baldwin had advice for anyone who might someday hold the job of press censor. From the beginning, they wrote in their final report, censors and journalists needed to develop "mutual confidence and understanding." The press and radio of Canada "must feel that Censorship is being administered in a manner which, while it takes adequate account of security, is not unduly or unnecessarily restrictive, and does not worship suppression as an end rather than a means." Censorship needed to be clean of any sign of "political taint," and censors had to give advice that was seen by journalists as "honest and realistic." Charpentier was not sure the government had made the right decision to split the censorship and propaganda systems, since "the main consideration urged upon the press censors were the negative ones, consisting of the reasons for suppression advanced by the security services ... The danger of such a one-sided arrangement is the growth of an unimaginative and rigid policy of suppression whenever the matter is in any doubt as against an intelligent, well-balanced policy of considering the effect of any move upon the total prosecution of the war." As such, he advocated any future press censorship should be placed under a Ministry of Information.¹⁹

Even now, more than sixty years after the end of World War II, it is extremely difficult to determine the effectiveness of the domestic press censorship system in thwarting German intelligence, primarily because of a lack of research on German and Japanese intelligence-gathering in Canada. Perhaps some lucky researcher will find a cache of material that will shed light on this

¹⁹ Final Report of the Directorate of Censorship. Library and Archives Canada RG2, Privy Council Office, (Records of the Directorate of Censorship), Vol. 5941, (NF).

aspect of the war. Without that information, it is still safe to assume that censorship's success was mixed.

The Germans knew about U-boat successes off the Canadian coast and especially in the St. Lawrence soon after their attacks, but did not succeed in sinking any of the big Cunard Line troop transports. They did not learn about the "cat", the simple, home-made device used to thwart acoustic torpedoes. It is also seems that the Japanese did not realize the time and effort employed on the rather ludicrous balloon bomb campaign was wasted. As well, censorship and counter-intelligence in North America appears to have hidden the secret of the Manhattan Project – at least from the Axis.

Domestically, the press censorship system had problems. Perhaps it was bound to, in a liberal democracy where there was still intense media competition. The most important political newspapers in the country, *The Globe and Mail* and *Le Devoir* came out against censorship for their own reasons. Both accused the federal government of using censorship for its own ends, an accusation that must have stung conscientious censors like Wilfrid Eggleston very deeply. These were the exceptions, and perhaps Eggleston and Baldwin were right to conclude censorship had the very unexpected result of making many of the country's newspapers timid and stifled real investigation and discussion of the state of the war effort.

Censorship turns out to be one of the very few power centres that came out of the internment of the ethnic Japanese with anything resembling honour. The Vancouver censors, Lew Gordon and John Graham, protected *The New*

Canadian and Tommy Shoyama and very accurately assessed the race-baiting politicians and media on the West coast, reporting their observations to Ottawa. The censors in Ottawa and Vancouver stood up to their own minister, powerful B.C. members of parliament, provincial politicians, Vancouver's mayor and councilors, and military officers and advocated on behalf of the little newspaper and its editor. If the Vancouver censors did nothing else of value during the war, they earned their pay on this issue.

On the other hand, the censors, and, more importantly, King, Lapointe and St. Laurent, allowed the Quebec isolationist and nationalist press to engage in activities that certainly detracted from Canada's war effort and sometimes bordered on sedition. King's desire to hold power resulted in the government allowing fascist Vichy propaganda, anti-Semitic screeds and morale-sapping lies to be printed in the mainstream Quebec press during the war. The repeated warnings and pleadings by Charpentier and Chevalier were never acted upon and censorship was, at the very most, an inconvenience and mild deterrent to those who showed little concern about the possibility of the triumph of fascism.

Still, the system was an improvement on World War I's censorship system, which was directed as at least as much against rooting out domestic political dissent and stifling national debate on the war as it was at protecting the country's secrets. The World War II censors had a healthy respect for liberty, one that showed in their treatment of Tommy Shoyama and in their six-year defence of the voluntary censorship system. Their insistence on fairness and their fight for

freedom of the press reflected well on them and on Canada at a time when liberty faced its greatest modern challenge.

Appendix A

DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS RELATING TO CENSORSHIP²⁰
Regulations, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 39, 39A, 39B, 62 and 63.

11. (1) No person shall establish any radio station, as defined in The Radio Act, 1938, or install, operate or have in his Possession any radio apparatus at any place in Canada or on any ship or aircraft registered in Canada, except under and in accordance with a licence granted in that behalf by the Minister of Transport.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in The Radio Act, 1938, or in the Canada Shipping Act, 1934, or in any regulation issued under such Acts, the Minister of Transport may in his discretion cancel or suspend any licence issued on his behalf in respect of any radio station established on land or on any vehicle in Canada, or on any ship or aircraft registered in Canada, and may control the transmission of messages by such stations, or the working of any radio apparatus used therein in any manner he may deem expedient:

Provided that such cancellation or suspension of a licence shall not render the former licensee liable in any manner for retaining in his or her possession contrary to Section 5 of The Radio Act, 1938, the radio apparatus employed in the station for which such licence was previously in force, on condition that the said equipment is dismantled in such a manner as may be prescribed by the said Minister or any person authorized by him.

(3) Any person duly authorized by the Minister of Transport may take such steps and use such force as may appear to that person to be reasonably necessary- for securing compliance with any of the preceding paragraphs of this Regulation where a contravention of such has occurred, -and for enabling proceedings in respect of such contravention to be effectually taken.

12. (1) No person shall knowingly have in his possession, or knowingly send by post or otherwise to any destination, whether within or outside Canada:

(a) Any instructions for utilizing any means of secretly conveying, receiving or recording information

(b) any substance or article manufactured or designed for the purpose of secretly conveying, receiving or recording information, or

(c) any document or other article secretly conveying or recording any information.

(2) Any person who has in his possession any such instructions as are mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (1) of this Regulation, shall, if requested by or on behalf of the Minister of Justice so to do, deliver up those instructions to such authority or person as may be specified in the request.

(3) Any person who has in his possession, in contravention of this Regulation, any substance or article manufactured or designed for the purpose of secretly conveying, receiving or recording information, shall, if requested by or on behalf of the Minister of Justice so to do, deliver up that substance or article to such authority or person as may be specified in the request.

(4) Nothing in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Regulation shall be taken to prevent the prosecution of any person in respect of a contravention of paragraph (1) of this Regulation.

²⁰ These were chosen as the pertinent sections of the *Defence of Canada Regulations* by the authors of the *Handbook: Press and Radio Censorship*, issued March 1940 by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee.

(5) In this Regulation the expression "instructions for utilizing any means of secretly conveying, receiving or recording information,, includes any code or cipher, but paragraph (1) of this Regulation shall not apply --

(a) to the possession of any code or cipher which is proved to be intended and used solely for commercial or other legitimate purposes, or

(b) any document conveying or recording information by means of such a code or cipher, being a document which specifies in clear the code or cipher used.

13. (1) The appropriate Minister may:

(a) Direct or cause the whole or part of the offices, works and property of any cable, radiotelegraph, telegraph or telephone company or any radio apparatus in the possession or under the control of or on the premises of any individual or company, to be entered and possessed in the name of His Majesty, and on his behalf, and to be used for His Majesty's service, and subject thereto, for such ordinary service as the Minister may permit;

(b) Direct any person to assume entire or partial control of the transmission of messages by the cables, apparatus or wires of any such individual or company;

(c) Direct any cable, radiotelegraph, telegraph or telephone company to submit to him or to any person authorized by him all cablegrams, telegrams and messages tendered for transmission or arriving by any such company's cable, wires or radio apparatus, or any class or classes of such telegrams, cablegrams or messages, or to deliver the same to him or to his agent; the said Minister may direct any such company to transmit through certain named offices only, all messages (including oral messages tendered to or received by any telephone company) that may be intended to pass out of Canada.

(2) The appropriate Minister may require any person whom he commissions, directs or authorizes to enter; take possession of or assume control of any office, works or property or part thereof, or of the transmission of messages in pursuance of this Regulation, and may also require any person employed by or connected with any such company as is mentioned in this Regulation to subscribe to the oath appended hereunder:

In the matter of the War Measures Act and

In the matter of the Defence of Canada Regulations I, of the Of, in the of DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR that I will not, until relieved of this obligation by notice in writing from the Minister of transmit or permit to be transmitted any message (by cable, radio, ordinary telegraph or telephone, as the case may be) passing through the office or exchange in which I am employed and intended for delivery outside of Canada, unless I am satisfied on good and reasonable grounds that the said message contains no matter giving information such as is calculated to be or as might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and that I will to the best of my ability learn the subject matter of all messages, intercept any message containing any such information, and will immediately make known the terms of such message and all facts that I can ascertain as to the identity of the sender thereof to

Sworn before me at the of in the of this day of, A.D. 19 ...

(3) All persons who, in pursuance of this Regulation have entered, taken possession of or assumed control of any office, works or property or part thereof, or of the transmission of messages, and also all persons employed by or connected with any

such company as is mentioned in this Regulation, shall obey and conform to all such directions as may be issued by the appropriate Minister.

(4) Whenever in this Regulation the expression "company" is used, either in association with such words as "cable" or "telegraph" or otherwise, it shall be deemed to extend to and to include a per--on, partnership and a body corporate.

(5) In this Regulation the expression "the appropriate 'Minister'" means

(a) With reference to the operations, works or property of any cable company, telegraph company or telephone company and so far as concerns trans-oceanic radio communications with reference to the operations, offices, works or property of any radio telegraph company, the Minister of National Defence;

(b) With reference to the operations, works or property of any radiotelegraph or radiotelephone station, radio broadcasting station or any other class of radio station whether for transmission or reception, or both, which do not form part of any of the classes of telecommunication hereinbefore in this paragraph mentioned, the Minister of Transport.

14. (1) The Postmaster General may make provision by order for securing that mailable matter of any such description as may be specified in the order shall not be despatched by post from Canada to destinations outside Canada, except in accordance with the order.

(2) The Postmaster General may make provision by order for securing that, subject to any exemptions for which provision may be made by the order, and except in accordance with such conditions as may be contained therein, no document, pictorial representation or photograph or other article whatsoever recording information shall be sent or conveyed from Canada to any destination outside Canada otherwise than by post, or conveyed into Canada otherwise than by post.

No person shall have any article in his possession for the purpose of sending or conveying it in contravention of an order made under this paragraph.

(3) Any person who is about to leave Canada or arrives in Canada, which person is hereafter referred to as the "traveller" shall, if requested so to do by the appropriate officer,--

(a) declare whether or not the traveller has with him any such article as is mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Regulation; (b) produce any such article as aforesaid which he has with him; and the appropriate officer, and any person acting under his directions, may examine or search any article which the traveller has with him, for the purpose of ascertaining whether he is conveying or has in his possession any article in contravention of paragraph (2) of this Regulation, and, if the appropriate officer has reasonable ground for suspecting that the traveller has any article about his person in contravention of that paragraph, he may search him, and may seize any article produced as aforesaid or found upon such examination or search as aforesaid, being an article as to which the appropriate officer has reasonable ground for suspecting that it is being sent or conveyed in contravention of the said paragraph or is in the traveller's possession in contravention of that paragraph:

Provided that no woman shall be searched in pursuance of this paragraph except by a woman.

(4) Where any person is found on any occasion in circumstances in which it is reasonable to suppose that he is communicating with or intends to communicate with a traveller, the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Regulation shall apply in relation to the person so found as they apply in relation to the traveller; and where any person is on any occasion found travelling to or from any place in such circumstances as aforesaid, the said provisions shall apply in relation to him as they would apply if he on being so found had been a traveller.

(5) The Postmaster General may by order make provision for the censorship of all mailable matter, or of any class or classes of such mailable matter, as may pass through or be dealt with in any way in the mails of Canada and the Postmaster General may appoint a Director of Postal Censorship to carry out the purposes of this Regulation.

(6) Where there is declared or produced to the appropriate officer in compliance with this Regulation, or discovered by the appropriate officer in circumstances in which it ought to have been so declared or produced any such plate, film or other article as aforesaid which he suspects to have been exposed in a camera but not developed, he may cause to be taken, or require the person by whom it is declared or produced or in whose possession it is discovered to take such steps (including subsection of the article to the process of development) as may be reasonably necessary for enabling the appropriate officer to ascertain whether or not it has been so exposed. (7) In this Regulation

(a) the expression "mailable matter" has the same meaning as in the Post Office Act, Chapter 161, R.S. of Canada, 1927; (b) the expression "photographs" includes any photographic plates, photographic films or other sensitized articles which have been exposed in a camera, whether they have been developed or not; and

(c) the expression "the appropriate officer" means any officer of the Post Office or Customs and Excise, any immigration officer or any constable.

15.(l)The Secretary of State of Canada may make provision by order for preventing or restricting the publication in Canada of matters as to which he is satisfied that the publication, or, as the case may be, the unrestricted publication thereof would or might, be prejudicial to the safety of the State or the efficient prosecution of the war, and an order under this paragraph may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as may appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order including provisions for securing that documents, pictorial representations, photographs or cinematograph films shall, before publication, be submitted or exhibited to such authority or persons as may be specified in such order.

(2) In this Regulation--

(a) the expression "cinematograph film" includes a sound track and any other article on which sounds have been recorded for the purpose of their being reproduced in connection with the exhibition of such a film;

(b) the expression "publication" means, in relation to a cinematograph film, the exhibition of the film to the public, and includes the mechanical or electrical reproduction of any sounds, in connection with the exhibition of the film as aforesaid.

16. No person shall, in any manner likely to prejudice the safety of the State or the efficient prosecution of the war, obtain, record, communicate to any other person, publish, or have in his possession any document or other record whatsoever containing, or conveying any information being, or purporting to be, information with respect to any of the following matters, that is to say:

(a) the number, description, armament, equipment, disposition, movement or condition of any of His Majesty's forces, vessels or aircraft;

(b) any operations or projected operations of any of His Majesty's forces, vessels or aircraft;

(c) any measures for the defence or fortification of any place on behalf of His Majesty;

(d) the number, description or location of any prisoners of war;

(e) munitions of war;

(f) any other matter whatsoever information as to which would or might be directly or indirectly of use to the enemy.

17. No person shall communicate or associate with any other person if he has reasonable cause to believe that such other person is engaged in assisting the enemy:

Provided that in any proceedings taken by virtue of this Regulation in respect of any particular communication or association, it shall be a defence to prove that communication or association was not prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the State.

18. (1) Subject to any exemption for which provision may be made by order of a competent authority, no person shall, except under the authority of a written permit granted by or on behalf of a competent authority make or publish any photograph, sketch, plan or other representation --

(a) of a protected place, or of any part of or object in a protected place, or of an object, of any such description as may be specified by order of a competent authority, or

(b) of, or of any part of or object in, any area in Canada as may be specified by order of a competent authority, being an area in relation to which the restriction of photography appears to that competent authority to be expedient in the interests of the safety- of the State.

(2) A competent authority may make such orders, and any person acting on behalf of a competent authority may give such special directions, as the said authority or person thinks necessary for securing that photographs, sketches, plans or other representations made under the authority of a permit granted in pursuance of paragraph (1) of this Regulation, shall not be published unless and until they have been submitted to, and approved by, such authority or person as may be specified in the order or directions, as the case may be; and a competent authority, or any person acting on its behalf, may, if that authority or person thinks it necessary in the interests of the safety of the State so to do, retain or destroy or otherwise dispose of, anything submitted as aforesaid.

(3) For the purposes of this Regulation, "a competent authority" shall mean the Minister of Justice or the Minister of National Defence.

39 No person shall

(a) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces or of the forces of any allied or associated Powers or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign Powers;

(b) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any of His Majesty's forces; or

(c) spread reports or make statements intended or likely to be prejudicial to the safety of the State or the efficient prosecution of the war.

39A. No person shall print, make, publish, issue, circulate or distribute any book, newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, picture, paper, circular, card, letter, writing, print, publication or document of any kind containing any material, report or statement

(a) intended or likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces or of the forces of any allied or associated Powers, or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign Powers;

(b) intended or likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline or administration of any of His Majesty's forces; or

(c) intended or likely to be prejudicial to the safety of the State or the efficient prosecution of the war.

39B. (1) A prosecution for an offence against either Regulation 39 or 39A of these Regulations shall not be instituted except by, or with the consent of, counsel representing the Attorney-General of Canada or of the Province.

(2) It shall be a defence to any prosecution for an offence against Regulations 39 or 39A to prove that the person accused intended in good faith to criticize or to point out error, or defects in, the Government of Canada, or any province thereof, or in either House of Parliament of Canada or in any legislature, or in the administration of justice.

62. (1) For the purposes of the trial of a person for an offence against any of these Regulations, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed either at the place at which the same actually was committed, or at any place in Canada in which the offender may be found.

(2) In addition, and without prejudice to any powers which a Court may possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings if, in the course of proceedings before a Court against any person for an offence against any of these Regulations or the proceedings on appeal, application is made by the prosecution, on the ground that the publication of any evidence to be given or of any statement to be made in the course of the proceedings would be likely to assist the enemy or to prejudice the public safety, the safety of the State or the efficient prosecution of the war, that all or any portion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hearing, the Court may make an order to that effect but the passing of sentence shall in any case take place in public.

(3) Where the person guilty of an offence against any of these Regulations is a company or corporation, every person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a director or officer of the company or corporation shall be guilty of the like offence unless he proves that the act or omission constituting the offence took place without his knowledge or consent, or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(4) Where any act is committed by or on behalf of or in the name of any association, organization or society which if committed by an individual person would constitute an offence against the provisions of Regulations 39 or 39A of these Regulations, each officer, or person acting or professing to act or holding himself out as an officer or otherwise performing or purporting to perform any executive or official work or duty for or on behalf of any such association, organization or society shall be deemed to have committed such act and be guilty of such offence unless he proves that the act constituting the offence took place without his knowledge or consent or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such an act.

(5)(a) On the conviction of any person on indictment pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this Regulation the court may, in its discretion, if it sees fit, declare the association, organization or society by or on behalf of or in whose name such act was committed to be an illegal organization, and in that event every person who thereafter continues to be or becomes an officer or member thereof or professes to be such, or who advocates or defends the acts, principles, or policies of such illegal organization shall be guilty of an offence against this Regulation.

(b) A person convicted on indictment pursuant to the provision, of the said paragraph (4), or an executive officer of the association, organization or society involved, may appeal to the court of appeal against a declaration as aforesaid, and the Attorney-General of Canada or of the Province may appeal likewise against a refusal to make such a declaration.

(c) The procedure upon such an appeal and the powers of the court of appeal shall, mutatis mutandis and so far as the same are applicable to such an appeal, be similar to the procedure provided and the powers given by sections 1012 to 1021

inclusive, of the Criminal Code and the Rules of the Court passed pursuant thereto and to section 576 of the Criminal Code.

(d) The court of appeal on the hearing of any such appeal may

(i) allow the appeal to set aside the declaration or make a declaration as aforesaid, as the case may require; or

(ii) dismiss the appeal.

(6) For the purposes of Regulation 39 and 39A the word "persons" as used therein shall, in addition to any other meaning it may have, include any association, organization and society.

Penalties

63. (1) Every person who contravenes or fails to comply with any of these Regulations, or any order, rule, by-law, or direction, made or given under any of these Regulations, shall be guilty of an offence against that Regulation.

(2) Where no specific penalty is provided, such person shall be liable on Summary Conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or to both fine and imprisonment; but such person may, at the election of the Attorney-General of Canada or of the Province, be prosecuted upon indictment, and if convicted shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to both fine and imprisonment.

Functions of Censorship of Publications as defined by Order in Council P.C. 6331
(August 13, 1942)

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National War Services, is pleased to define and doth hereby define the functions of the Chief Censors of Publications as being:

(a) To inform themselves from any source, either within or outside Canada, and particularly from the intelligence and security officers of the three armed Services, the appropriate officers of the Department of Munitions and Supply and the Director of Public Information, as to the character of the information which, having regard to the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations and to the functions authorized to be performed from time to time by the Chief Postal Censor and the Chief Telegraph Censor in relation to the censorship of mailable matter and telegrams, should not be permitted to be printed, broadcast or distributed in Canada.

(b) Upon request to pass or refuse to pass for publication any material submitted to them for examination by any person proposing to publish any information in any form, and particularly persons intending to broadcast, to print or distribute any newspaper, periodical or book or to exhibit any motion picture film.

(c) To issue to newspaper publishers, broadcast directors and distributors of motion picture films directives indicating the subjects upon which it is not desirable that complete information should be published and the mode in which such subjects may be dealt with in order that matter referring to them may be passed for publication.

(d) To direct the attention of any department of Government to any book, to any particular issue of a newspaper or periodical distributed in Canada, and to the script of any broadcast which, not having been passed for publication, contains material relating to the activities of that department and of which the publication might in their opinion constitute an offence under the Defence of Canada Regulations.

(e) At the request of the Minister of National Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs to advise him as to whether having regard to the contents of any book, newspaper, periodical or motion picture film, the entry of copies of such book, newspaper, periodical or film into Canada for general circulation should be forbidden.

H. W. LOTHROP,
Asst. Clerk of the Privy Council.

Letter from Wilfried Eggleston, Press Censor for Canada, to T.A. Stone, Acting Chairman, Censorship Co-Ordination Committee, August 13, 1941

Ottawa, August 13th 1941.

T. A. Stone, Esq., Acting Chairman,
Censorship Co-ordination Committee,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. Stone;

Since our meeting on Monday I have been giving some thought to a couple of aspects of press censorship which were thrown up in a somewhat challenging way in the course of our discussions. As I believe there is a good deal to be gained by frank and thorough examination of our mutual problems, I hope you will bear with me while I comment as briefly as I can on these two angles.

I. I was much struck by the reference to the instructions to Nazi Intelligence Agents which are believed to have been intercepted, and the remark that practically all the information they were asked to get could be found either in the press of Canada or in *Hansard*. This may be true, and if it is, it is a highly disturbing thought, although I believe too much should not be made of the apparent implications of it. In this connection I came across what I regard as an illuminating passage in an article on press censorship which appeared in the magazine "Fortune" for June 1941. I quote three paragraphs:

"As may have been gathered by now, censorship is no fourth--grade subject. Stated at its simplest the problem is to keep from the enemy information of value. The first area of confusion centers about what is valuable. Now, all information is of value to the enemy. The population of a country, its government, the location of rivers, cities, ports, its resources, its ethnic and linguistic composition, are all of value to the enemy. These, of course, the enemy already possesses. Plants and facilities can be located from standard reference works. Naval and aircraft registers, army organization manuals, officer rosters, Congressional hearings contain 95 per cent of the material that the military considers secret, confidential, or restricted -- or will when hostilities begin."

.....

"Beyond true secrets and army and naval movements and dispositions lies endless disputed territory. Secrets may be deduced from isolated bits of apparently innocent information. (Navy's deductive classic is their cracking the dark secret of Japanese naval guns by checking the export of a special kind of steel from a small middle-western steel plant.) Disclosures of production lags may tip off the enemy to vital weaknesses. But it may also be more important that the people at home should know the weakness than that the enemy should not know. There is in all censorship a strong unconscious tendency to cut off the nose to spite the face. On technical grounds of secrecy the army, say, may show good reason to conceal the failures of a new tank, though such censorship may lead to false optimism with consequent reaction of despair. A German deputy after the last war declared before the Reichstag that military censorship had done more harm -- militarily -- than all the papers in Germany could have if the censorship had been lifted entirely."

.....

"The press in a democracy is still the fourth estate; it is almost a fourth branch of government. It is not, as in Germany or the U.S.S.R., a branch of the government, but a part of our constitutional system. There is the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branch -- and there is the press. It is impossible to imagine governmental processes in the U.S. without a press. Its first function is to inform, its second to criticize. Censorship is a direct threat to both functions and hence a direct threat to effective democracy. Without information there is no basis for criticism and without criticism there is, as the saying goes, tyranny."

Exactly the same problem crops up in connection with Canada's man power. Our public census figures are, of course, accessible to the enemy, but the press has gone considerably further. For example, Grant Dexter, in the Winnipeg "*Free Press*", has made a careful analysis of the man power available for the services, based on 1931 figures and on estimates of 1941 figures. This is precisely the sort of thing that an enemy agent might be expected to compile and forward. Another item of keen interest to the enemy is the state of Canada's morale, our unity or disunity on major issues, the political strength or weakness of the Government. Yet all this is published and a very strong case can be made out for continuing to publish it,

How can conscription vs voluntary enlistment be discussed and settled by democratic means if the press is not free to inform the public? Or, how can our leaders cope with disunity if every sign of it is suppressed? They may never even hear of it.

II. This brings me to the other challenging remark. Are the Press Censors "in the middle", i.e. between the interest of security and the interests of morale? Perhaps "in the middle" is an awkward phrasing of it, because it may suggest that we have only a detached academic interest in security which is certainly not the case. Would it not perhaps be more accurate to say that it is our duty to interpret certain phrases of the Defence of Canada Regulations, such as "information of value to the enemy"? Suppose we interpret that phrase solely from the viewpoint of security. Then, by the principles outlined above, we should have to regard vast categories of information now freely published as "information of value to the enemy", and suppress them. For example, to be thorough, we should have to urge *Hansard* be not circulated, certainly not with its wide peace-time distribution, that Munitions and Supply cease publishing information about contracts, that the Bureau of Statistics pretty will close up its printing plant, that the Bank of Canada and others stop estimating the national income, etc.

This, of course, is the absurd extreme. The Press Censor has to "draw the line". That is really what I mean by being "in the middle". But "drawing the line" involves weighing considerations. Practically everything printed has some small theoretical value to the enemy. This value must be weighed against the value to Canada and to the war effort of allowing it to be published. In other words, the Press Censors in making any ruling must attempt to weigh security against other intangibles. Sometimes there is not the least doubt as to what ought to be done. Any value for the Canadian people of knowing when a convoy sails is completely and overwhelmingly offset by its value to the enemy. When you come to a ruling like that of the Arvida strike, you run into a much more puzzling and complex weighing of values. On the one hand it is of comfort and value to the enemy to know about this loss of vital war material. Publicity, if sabotage is involved, may help the enemy to develop the sabotage or may enable the saboteurs to get away when they know they are suspected. Publicity may fan the controversy between the affected parties and make it more difficult to settle the dispute. But there are weighty considerations on the other side. If at the root of the dispute there was ignorance, indifference, lack of consideration, lack of adequate governmental or labour leadership, perhaps it is better, on balance, to give the episode the most thorough airing.

If Canada adopted a press censorship which in its zeal for security impaired the democratic method, cut off from the Canadian public information vital to a proper contribution to the successful prosecution of the war, the responsibility must lie on the Press Censors' shoulders. They have been given the job of interpreting the Defence of Canada Regulations in respect to press censorship. If they insist on security at all costs, they may do serious damage one way. If they are too much impressed by the importance of public enlightenment and morale, they may do irreparable damage the other way. That is what is in my mind. When I talk about Press Censors being "in the middle", press censorship would be very simple if we had to think only of security. In that case we could afford to be drastic and sweeping and hew to the line, letting the chips fall where they would.

In practice the whole thing boils down to a sensitive weighing of plus-es and minus-es. Our question must always be: On balance, will the publication of this item aid or impede Canada's war effort? Since we have to act quickly and under pressure and cannot possibly be in complete possession of all the relevant facts, we do not pretend that we always draw the line in exactly the right place. And wherever we draw the line those interested in security are likely to think that we went too far one way and those interested in publicity think we went too far the other way,

Pray pardon the length of this essay which got somewhat out of hand. We find it useful to analyse our problems occasionally and will appreciate any light we can get from any quarter.

Sincerely your,
(W. Eggleston)

PRESS CENSOR FOR CANADA

Advisory Committee on Censorable Communications

Membership:

(As of December 5, 1942)

Group-Capt. H.R. Stewart, Dept. of Army Intelligence
 F.E. Joliffe, Canadian Postal Censor
 A.O. Potter, Information and Records Branch
 Lt. Commander C.H. Little, Directorate of Intelligence, Navy
 Col. W.W. Murtray, Department of Wartime Information
 Wifrid Eggleston, Chief Censor of Publications
 Maj. M.W. Pearson, Int. Go.

Wartime Information Board Advisory Committee on Publication of Military Information²¹

Membership:

Lt. Commander C.H. Little, Directorate of Intelligence, Navy
 Capt. C. G. Jones, Directorate of Intelligence, Army
 Grp. Capt. H.R. Stewart, Directorate of Intelligence, Air Force
 Wifrid Eggleston, Chief Censor of Publications
 Fulgence Charpentier, Chief Censor of Publications (Press)
 J. Girouard, Censor of Publications
 T.A. Stone, Dept. of External Affairs
 Col. M. H. Vernon, Dept of Munitions and Supply
 A.D. Dunton, Wartime Information Board
 Capt. Geo. McCracken, Wartime Information Board
 John Grierson, Gen. Manager, Wartime Information Board
 J.W.G. Clark, Chief of Information, Armed Forces
 Rielle Thomson, Publicity Branch, Dept. of Munitions & Supply
 H.C. Howard, Director of Information, Navy
 G.H. Sallans, Director of Information, Army
 G.M. Brown, Director of Information, Air Force.

Advisory Committee on Reading of Publications (met on June 29, 1942 and July 3, 1942.)

Membership:

G.H. Lash, Director of Public Information
 A. Johnston, Dep. Director of Censorship
 E.E. Joliffe, Chief Postal Censor
 Wilfried Eggleston, Chief Censor of Publications
 L. Biberovich, Dept. of National Revenue
 Col. C.H. Hill, Dept of National Defence
 Insp. E.H. Perlson, RCMP

²¹ This committee usually dealt with censorship issues, rather than publicity, and its meetings were often chaired by O.M. Biggar when he headed the Directorate of Censorship.

Advisory Committee on Service Intelligence and Security

Membership (inaugural, May, 1942).²²

Lt. Col. W.W. Murray, Directorate of Intelligence (Army)
 Maj. R.T. DuMoulin, Directorate of Intelligence (Army)
 Capt. E.S. Brand, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy)
 Wing Cmdr. H.R. Stewart, Directorate of Intelligence (Air Force)
 Flight Off. J.K. Carswell, Directorate of Intelligence (Air Force)
 G de T. Glazebrook, Dept. of External Affairs
 R.W. Baldwin, representing the Chief Press Censor of Publications
 Charles Shearer, Chief Censor, Radio Broadcasting

Membership (August 13, 1942)

A. Johnson, Asst. Director of Censorship
 Lt. Com. C.H. Little, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy)
 Lieut. J.H. McDonald, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy)
 Maj. Eric Acland, Directorate of Intelligence (Army)
 Squad Leader J.H. Blackey, Directorate of Intelligence (Air Force)
 Wilfried Eggleston, Chief Censor of Publications
 Maj. T.L. McEvoy, Asst. Chief Telegraph Censor
 A.A. Gagnon, Asst. Chief Postal Censor
 T.A. Stone, Dept. of External Affairs
 G de T. Glazebrook, Dept. of External Affairs
 Insp. E.H. Perlson, RCMP Intelligence
 D.W. Mundell, Dept. of Justice
 Maj. O.T. Rayner, U.K. Censorship Liaison Officer

Membership (February 26, 1943)

Lt. J.H. McDonald, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy)
 Lt. R.L. Strina, Directorate of Intelligence (Navy)
 Maj. Eric Acland, Directorate of Intelligence (Army)
 Capt. C.G. Jones, Directorate of Intelligence (Army)
 Group Capt. H.R. Stewart (Air Force)
 Wilfried Eggleston, Chief Telegraph Censor
 Fulgence Charpentier, Chief Censor of Publications (Press)
 Charles Shearer, Chief Censor of Publications (Radio)
 A.O. Potter, Chief Censor I.R.B.
 W.A. Rush, Chief radio Censor
 F.G. Bennett, Asst. Chief radio Censor
 F.E. Jolliffe, Chief Postal Censor
 T.A. Stone, Dept. of External Affairs
 G de T. Glazebrook, Dept. of External Affairs

²² Membership on this committee was remarkably fluid. Eggleston, Charpentier, Shearer, Stone, Acland and Stewart were the core of the committee, while other members were often changed by their respective departments.

Insp. E.H. Perlson, RCMP Intelligence
D.W. Mundell, Dept. of Justice
Capt. George McCracke, Wartime Information Board
Lewis Clark, U.S. Charge d' Affaires
Jos. W. Mooney, U.S. Allocation Officer

Advisory Committee on Statistical Publications

Membership

(As of May 13, 1942)

R.W. Baldwin

S.A. Cudmore

G. deT. Glazebrook

F.E. Jolliffe

L.A. Kane

Finaly Sim

C.F. Wilson

Maj. L.S. Yuill

Canadian Newspapers Banned By the Secretary of State Under the *Defence of Canada Regulation 15*

The Clarion, a Marxist newspaper published weekly in the English language in Toronto. It was banned November 21, 1939, for its opposition to the war effort.

La Carte, published weekly in the French language in Montreal. It was banned October 4, 1939, for its opposition to the war effort.

Hlas L'Udu, published twice weekly in the Slovak language in Toronto. It was banned June 28, 1940, for its opposition to the war effort.

Jiskra, published weekly in the Czech language in Toronto. It was banned July 31, 1940, because of its Communist policies and its attacks on the Allies.

Glos Pracy, published weekly in the Polish language in Toronto. It was banned August 17, 1940, because of Communist policies. The paper was denounced to Lapointe as disloyal by the Polish Army Veterans Association of Winnipeg on May 27, 1940.

Der Veg, published weekly in the Yiddish language in Toronto. It was banned August 17, 1940, because of Communist policies.

Pravda, published weekly in the Serbian language in Toronto. It was banned August 17, 1940, because of its Communist policies.

Slobodna Misao, published three times a week in the Croatian language in Toronto. It was banned August 17, 1940, because of its pro-Nazi attitude.

Kanadsky Gudok, published three times a week in the Russian language in Winnipeg. It was banned March 29, 1940, because of its Pro-Nazi attitude.

La Voix du Peuple, published weekly in the French language in Montreal. It was banned June 23, 1941, because of its Communist policies.

La Droite, a magazine published monthly in Quebec City. It was banned April 30, 1941, for disseminating Fascist propaganda and opposing the war effort.

The Canadian Tribune, published weekly in Toronto, was suspended for three weeks, beginning with the February 28th, 1941 issue as it disseminated Communist propaganda and opposed the war effort.

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 National Defence
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 Stursburg, Peter

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Christian Science Monitor
Clarion
Edmonton Journal
Globe and Mail
Halifax Herald
Kingston Whig Standard
Kitchener Record

L'Action Catholique
La Presse
L'Evenement Journal
Le Devoir
Le Droit (Ottawa)
L'Oeil
Le Soleil (Quebec City)
Lethbridge Herald
London Free Press
Midland Free Press
Montreal Gazette
Montreal Star
Orrillia Packet and Times
Ottawa Citizen
Port Arthur (ON) Times Journal
Regina Leader Post
Toronto Star
Toronto Telegram
TIME Magazine
Vancouver Sun
Victoria Times Colonist
Windsor Star
Winnipeg Free Press
Winnipeg Tribune

Interviews/Personal Correspondence

Fulgence Charpentier
 Sen. Joyce Fairbairn
 Prof. G. Stewart Adam, Carleton University
 Prof. Joseph Scanlon, Carleton University

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