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**COMPARING SERBIAN AND CROATIAN VIEWS OF HISTORY: AN  
ANALYSIS OF BIBLICAL AND CYCLICAL TELEOLOGY IN SERBIAN AND  
CROATIAN NATIONAL DISCOURSE**

**by**

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the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfilment of  
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## ABSTRACT

**This thesis compares Serbian and Croatian ethnic nationalist movements and ideas from 1985-1996, arguing that irrespective of the many self induced differences between these two nations, the way in which each understands their own group in relation to outsiders and enemies is remarkably similar. This thesis also examines the influence and importance of biblical and Zionist notions of *self* and *other*, time in history, good and evil, and conceptualisations concerning the end of history, comparing them to Serbian and Croatian views of self identity, history, other nations and states, and world events. Important here is a qualitative discourse analysis of primary source material from the Yugoslav civil war (1991-1996) originating from Serbia and Croatia.**

**The author of this thesis will posit that Serbian and Croatian nationalist movements have sought to legitimate the often violent acts of statecraft by creating a national conception of the *self* which borrows literal, metaphorical and mythic elements from very traditional and mainstream sources, namely biblical or Christian and Zionist conceptions of fall and deliverance. This thesis reviews the nature of these original conceptions of group self identity, then compares these to Serbian and Croatian myths of the righteous nation in history. These myths include a series of mythic types: myths of the original and heroic nation, myths of the Fall (persecution myths), myths of renaissance or awakening, and myths of deliverance and redemption. These myth types are organised into a four stage model based on a structure borrowed from biblical cyclical teleology. These borrowed mythic elements form the core of modern Serbian and Croatian national identity, contributing to a type of attribution theorising where the *self* can do no wrong, and all *others* can do no good.**

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## **Thesis Introduction**

## Introduction

On June 25, 1991, armed units of the *Jugoslav National Army* (JNA) rolled into the Eastern Krajina section of the Croatian border. Their mission was to "protect Yugoslavia's borders", in other words, to suppress the secessionist ambitions of the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, who had on that day declared their sovereignty and independence from the *Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia* (SFRY). The results of skirmishes between the regular army of the JNA and Croatian irregular militia units would inaugurate arguably one of the bloodiest and most intriguing conflicts since the Second World War. The collapse of the SFRY after almost 50 years of relative peace and stability took most Western policy makers by surprise, although Yugoslav observers had been predicting immanent disaster since the mid 1980's. Almost immediately after the Yugoslav civil war began, a spate of books analysing the conflict and the reasons behind the break-up appeared on news-stands and in bookshops around the world. These works, many by authors who have lived in the region, have been excellent in terms of their structural analysis of the collapse of the Yugoslav federal institutions as well as in their descriptions of the key players and events which have led to the current state of affairs.

Where most analysts, journalists and policy makers have failed, however, is in understanding the mindset or worldview of those parties involved in the conflict. This has largely been attributed to the confusing and often contradictory publications originating from the region, authored by Croatian and Serbian intellectuals and nationalist ideologues. While many analysts have included in their works a cursory and often superficial analysis of Serbian and Croatian national discourse, there has been little, if any effort to undertake a serious analysis of this discourse, in terms of its style, theme and content, and only two attempts, to my knowledge, of any academic study which has tried to isolate any sort of patterns inherent to this discourse. Further more, there has been no serious comparison of Serbian and Croatian discourse, with the objective of isolating a current world view which could serve to help policy makers and observers in understanding why the war has dragged on for as long as it has.

This lack of understanding has led many observers to dismiss both Serbs and Croats as fascists and genocidal killers, while describing their antagonism as the result of 500 years of bloodshed and hatreds (to paraphrase one journalist). This general attitude was described by Croatian American historian Ivo Banac, in his contention that: "The assumptions on the part of these powers that be is that these *subhumans* will get tired of

killing one another, and then perhaps outsiders can step in and do something to patch up the situation".<sup>1</sup> As Banac is well aware, the failure to comprehend the underlying world views of the principal actors in the conflict has led to much of the confusion of policy makers, which has in turn worsened the situation in the Balkan Peninsula.

My thesis will not be dealing with the errors in judgement committed by Western policy makers. Books and articles dealing with this theme are rife, and many of these are cited throughout this work. Nor will my discussion centre on Western misconceptions of the conflict, and the types of discourse which have emerged from ignorance.<sup>2</sup> My thesis will endeavour to analyse Serbian and Croatian national discourse (as reflective of Serbian and Croatian world views), using a four stage model, the nature of which I will later describe. My purpose is therefore to understand the reasoning behind Banac's "subhuman killers", to isolate a consistent worldview which might explain why certain elements of discourse keep reasserting themselves, and to also understand why the national discourse emerging from the region appears to strike such a chord with Serbs and Croats, both within the Balkan Peninsula, and further away, in Europe, North America and Australia, among South Slavs in the *Diaspora*. I will thus attempt to isolate key elements and themes in Serbian and Croatian national discourse, in the process using a theoretical model to see if there is indeed a pattern to this discourse, and if so, what objective the constant reiteration of certain elements serves in this volatile situation.

Before continuing further, I should add my definition of **National Discourse**, that being the written interpretation of political, social and economic developments and history from within a national paradigm or world view, an "optic" which has the object of providing a very narrow focus on general and broad sweeps of history. In the context of Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourse, interpretation has largely been through a cyclical optic, a four stage framework which I will describe in **Chapter 1**. This optic allows Serbs and Croats to situate events in history and in the present day in terms of a series of elements: the former greatness of the nation; the sacrifices and goodness of the nation; the violence or atrocities committed against the nations (*Falls*); the justification for violence committed by one's nation (always seen as self-defence) and the need to justify territorial aggrandisement at the expense of other nations.

#### **The Research Problem and Question:**

Rather than beginning, *apriori* with a series of general research questions and problems related to the re-emergence of ethnic nationalism in the post Cold War

environment, my research problems and questions are more *a posteriori* in nature, that is stemming from my observance of certain recurring themes and elements in both Croatian and Serbian nationalist discourse. Having studied the emerging conflict for almost four years now, I was fortunate last year to have engaged in research at Carleton University on the various elements of the break-up of Yugoslavia. My thesis then was primarily descriptive, focusing on the breakdown of federal political and economic institutions in Yugoslavia. I also wrote a short 20 page chapter on national discourse in Serbia and Croatia, and it was at this time that I began to notice certain recurring themes, which I at that point described but was unable to explain, or fully understand. My research questions thus emerged from the observance of these frequently occurring elements of national discourse from both Croatia and Serbia. The two questions I therefore had to ask were:

**1) Is there any pattern to these frequently occurring elements, or do writers simply throw these elements in at random?**

**2) If there is a pattern, on what is it based?**

Many of these elements involved Biblical and religious imagery, as well as frequent references to suffering, comparisons between the nation and the Jewish nation in history. After much research, it is my contention that these elements do not exist randomly, but are part of a pattern, a teleological cycle, or framework, through which ethnic national elites in Serbia and Croatia view events in history. This framework which I will later elaborate is based on Northrop Frye's analysis of Biblical teleology, on the writings of several political scientists on mythology, and on elements of political Zionism. An understanding of the model allows the ethnic nationalist to tap into a generally accepted paradigm, allowing him or her to legitimate actions by a national elite, perceived to be in the best interests of the nation.

#### **A Brief Definition of Terms:**

Before delving into this thesis, it will be important to define the various theoretical terms which I will be using, not because the reader will be ignorant of them, but rather to specify what definitions are important for my analysis.

**Myth:** For my definition of *myth*, I will defer largely to Northrop Frye, and have tried to summarise his definition as: a group of stories in allegorical or epical form originating from a distinct self-defined collective of individuals. These stories, while

loosely based on historical events are meant to situate a collective in history, proscribing its role in the world, outlining the collective's view of other people and other groups, nature, the afterlife; in short all intragroup and intergroup attitudes and actions. To this I would add Henry Tudor's definition of *political myths*, which he conceives of as myths which enable:

the members of a group to see their present condition as an episode in an ongoing drama. A political myth may explain how the group came into existence and what its objectives are; it may explain why the group finds itself in its present predicament; and more often than not identifies the enemy of the group and promises eventual victory. It offers in short an account of the past and the future in light of which the present can be understood.<sup>3</sup>

To this Tudor adds: "Myths do not merely preserve the memory of actual historical events but preserve the religious or symbolic significance of these events."<sup>4</sup>

**Nation:** For a definition of *nation*, I would describe this as a named, self-conscious collective of individuals, possessing a *national consciousness*, that is, a belief that they together share values, beliefs, mythology, history, culture and tradition. They may also share a common language, religion, ethnic origin, and sense of persecution from one or more outside groups.

**Nationalism:** For a definition of nationalism, I defer to Micheal Ignatieff's analysis in his seminal work on modern ethno-nationalism: *Blood and Belonging*. Ignatieff views nationalism from political, moral and cultural standpoints. As a political doctrine, he views nationalism as: "the belief that the world's peoples are divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right of self-determination, either as self governing units within existing nation states or as nation states of their own." As a cultural ideal, Ignatieff posits that while the individual is simultaneously able to identify with many movements and beliefs, nationalism provides them with their primary sense of belonging. As a moral ideal, Ignatieff writes: "[N]ationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifices, justifying the use of violence in the defence of one's nation against enemies, internal or external". As Ignatieff reveals, these three claims underwrite each other. As he explains:

The moral claim that nations are entitled to be defended by force or violence depends on the cultural claim that the needs they satisfy for security and belonging are uniquely important. The political idea that people should struggle for nationhood depends on the cultural claim that only nations can satisfy these needs. The cultural idea in turn

underwrites the political claim that these needs cannot be satisfied without self determination.<sup>5</sup>

**Civic Nationalism:** Ignatieff further divided nationalism between its civic and ethnic variants. Civic nationalism, as he describes, maintains that the nation should be composed of all those (regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity) who chose to subscribe to the nation's political creed. As he further describes: "This nationalism is civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values." Ignatieff adds that since sovereignty is vested in all its citizens, this nationalist form is necessarily democratic.<sup>6</sup>

**Ethnic Nationalism (or ethno-nationalism):** Ignatieff describes ethnic nationalism as the belief that the individual's deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. Thus, as Ignatieff asserts: "It is the national community which defines the individual, not the individuals who define the community."<sup>7</sup> To this definition, I would add that ethno-nationalism maintains a racial or blood-oriented set of symbols in addition to those symbols possessed by a regular nation. This race based form of identification allows one to make sweeping psychological or physical conclusions about his/her ethnic nation and others

To this I would add my definition of **National Discourse**, that being the interpretation of political, social and economic developments within one's own nation, as well as those of other nations, within and without the state where the nation exists. In the context of Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourse, interpretation has been through a cyclical optic, a four stage framework which I will describe in Chapter 1. This optic allows Serbs and Croats to situate events in history and in the present day in terms a series of elements: of the former greatness of the nation, in terms of the sacrifices and goodness of the nation, in terms of violence or atrocities committed against the nations (*Falls*), in terms of the justification for violence committed by one's nation (always seen as self-defence) and in terms of the need to justify territorial aggrandisement at the expense of other nations.

National Discourse may also be understood by its more pejorative label: **Propaganda**. This is, as Laswell: "the manipulation of public opinion by means of political symbols and of the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of

significant symbols." As Oliver Thomson elaborates, it includes "any means of projecting or transmitting images, ideas or information which influences behaviour in an active or passive sense. This covers every aspect of art and communication, because nearly all messages have either deliberately or accidentally some persuasive content."<sup>8</sup>

#### **An Introduction to the Four Chapters of this Thesis:**

As we should understand, the claims of ethnic nationalists that all self-aware nations should have the right to their own nation state exists in theory, but not often in practice. The right to statehood is not an axiomatic right, nor should it be. As Walker Connor reminds us, only about 10% of states can claim to be true nation states, in the sense that the state's boundaries coincides with the nation's and that the total population of the state share a single ethnic culture.<sup>9</sup> Certainly the greatest myth surrounding the current conflict in the Balkans is the notion that once a self-defined nation has proven its existence to the world, as well as its national suffering (or martyrdom) it axiomatically has a right to its own autonomous nation-state. As I will posit, an understanding of Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourse can be gained through an understanding of Biblical myth and teleology, as interpreted by Northrop Frye, and through an understanding of the elements of political Zionism. Political Zionism compliments Frye's theoretical ideas by providing an example of how an understanding of Biblical cyclical teleology has functioned in forming a successful nationalist movement in the 20th century.

In Chapter 1, I will explore the writings of various authors on political mythology. I will begin with a general discussion of mythology and its importance to the cohesion of social groups, in particularly national groups. In this discussion, the works of Henry Tudor, Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith will prove useful. I will then examine two works of literary critic Northrope Frye, who analyses Biblical time as being cyclical. This will become important in the later chapters of this work, when I shall attempt to explore instances of a cyclical time and Biblical thinking in Serbian and Croatian national discourse.

In the two works reviewed in this chapter, Frye discovers a four stage cycle in his analysis of the Bible: an *idealistic* stage, a *Fall* stage, a *resurrection* stage and a *deliverance* stage. These four stages encapsulate Biblical history, since the culmination of history for the Hebrews according to Biblical teleology consists in the attainment of the *deliverance* stage, after the *Fall* stage. Central to this notion of Biblical teleology is the concept of good versus negative agency. The Hebrew people as inherently good suffer under a series

of Falls in world history, as a direct result of the intercession of the negative agency. The interplay of good versus evil becomes the primary "dialectic" which moves history forward, culminating in the final deliverance (or fourth stage), where the evil is finally vanquished and the Hebrew people are delivered, thus heralding the triumph of the good. Frye provides a clear and concise description of this process.

Important to understanding the Serbian and Croatian world views is also an understanding of political Zionism, one of the first modern nationalist forms to assimilate this Biblical teleological view of time into its discourse. This will be included in its own subsection. Political Zionism compliments the work of Frye by demonstrating a concrete example of how Biblical teleology has been concretely employed to form a nationalist ideology focused on the attainment of a national homeland. Viewing their history as a series of idealic stages, followed by Falls and then deliverance, Zionists employed a cyclical view of time to advance the notion that their last Fall (the Holocaust) destined them to be delivered by being granted a national homeland. The genius of political Zionism was that it completed Biblical teleology in a new way. No more was the day of judgement to result in a kingdom of heaven in the sky, but rather a national homeland very much on Earth. As we shall see in the coming chapters, Serbian and Croatian national writers have used Biblical and Zionist ideas throughout their national discourse. Central to their thinking is the notion that if they are able to prove one or more national Falls, they are then able to prove that they need deliverance, in the form of a ethnic national homeland, in order to be free from the aggression of their enemies.

In Chapter 2, I provide essential background information on the history of the Balkan Peninsula. The primary purpose of this chapter is to portray as accurately as possible the history of the South Slavs, so that the reader will be able to discern fact from fiction, and myth from reality when he/she encounters Chapters 3 and 4. Merely presenting Serbian and Croatian national discourse without any historical grounding would leave the reader not knowing what was true and what was not. This chapter provides a *relatively* unbiased overview (perhaps I am too much the post-positivist to assume that I am bias-free) of Serbian and Croatian history.

This background will begin with a discussing of the often contested origins of the Croats and the Serbs, when Slavic tribes immigrated from the East to Central Europe. I will then describe the 19th century manifestations of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, demonstrating that in fact most of the divisions separating Serb from Croat stem from the

work of 19th century nationalists, who practically invented religious, linguistic and territorial divisions, to form a nationalism capable of consolidating the people against colonialist oppression. I then delve into the first Yugoslavia, which was a centralised Serbian monarchy. Here I will focus on the another form of invented nationalism, under the Serbian king Aleksander, who used forced centralisation and repression of Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian national identity as a means of creating support for his Yugoslav nationalism.

In the second main section of this chapter, I will review the creation and collapse of Tito's *Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia* (SFRY), which was formed in 1945. This state began with a strong centralised economic, political, social, educational, communications and military structure, designed to insure that ethnic nationalism would never again assert itself. Tito's would invent three main methods by which to create a governmental structure different from other communist countries, while simultaneously trying to develop loyalty for the regime: *Worker's Self-Management*, *Yugoslavism* and the *Non-Aligned Movement*. The slow and steady decentralisation of all federal powers to the individual republics, coupled with the rise of a republican bureaucracy and elite structure would reduce the loyalty of both elites and the people to the federal centre, allowing people to turn towards their individual republics. The death of Tito in 1980, coupled with the economic and political collapse of the SFRY spelled the end of central control as republican elites began consolidating and centralising power for themselves at a republican level. This occurred in all republics, including of course Serbia and Croatia.

In Chapter 3, I will describe the way that the four stage cycle has been interpreted in Serbian national discourse. I will begin with a description of Stage 3 of the model, since it is at this stage the national reawakening occurs. One is unable to understand the other stages of the model without knowing how and why Stage 3 occurred. Stage 3 is thus the necessary stage which must pertain in order for the other stages to come into focus. It is therefore essential to begin with it. This section will begin with the rise of ethnic nationalism in Serbia, specifically the rise of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and the subsequent decentralisation and re-Serbianisation attempts of his government. Central to understanding his rise is the oppression of Serbs by Albanians in the province of Kosovo, and the backlash amongst Serbian elites that this engendered. As I will discuss, the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences laid the groundwork for much of the discourse which would follow, in its portrayal of Serbs as

victims of Albanian genocide and Croatian assimilationism, who needed to be united in a single Serbian national state to avoid "genocide".

As I will demonstrate, the theme of the Serbs as a good, democratic, freedom loving people becomes central to discourse, as well as the idea that the Serbs were historically great, thus conforming to Frye's idealic or Original state. As well, the concept of negative agency becomes important, again reflecting Biblical imagery, as Serbian nationalists find enemies everywhere. These nationalists have charted the progress of "Anti-Serbianism" (which they liken to Anti-Semitism) as a political project which seeks the genocide of the Serbs, as well as their expulsion from their historic national lands. In this, Serbs are able to posit that by unifying Serbs in one state (from the *Diaspora*) by reclaiming historical Serbian lands, they will be safe from their enemies. These enemies include Croatians, the Bosnian Moslems, as well as all other Islamic countries, Germany, the Vatican and the United States. Central to Serbian national discourse are the constant parallels made between Serbs and Jews, as well as the constant portrayal of Serbian "enemies" as Nazis and Fascists.

The deliverance, I will posit, is largely illusory, since deliverance can only occur when all Serbs are living on their historic lands, and the culture has largely been purified of foreign influences. This is almost impossible to achieve, and exists more as a sort of utopian goal to inspire mobilisation for war, than a reality that members of the nation think will be achieved.

In Chapter 4, I will apply the same analysis to the study of Croatian national discourse. Beginning with the rise of nationalism, I will describe the rise of President Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ), as well as his centralisation and monopolisation of state instruments of coercion and persuasion. Important to Croatian discourse is the theme of Croatian suffering in history, primarily at the hands of the Serbs in the two Yugoslavias. As Croatian discourse argues, the Serbs and their "Greater Serbian" project, to invade Croatian lands and enslave or annihilate Croats, become the central justification for creating an ethnic homeland. They apply similar arguments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, viewing Bosnian Moslems as ethnic Croats who must join in a Croatian state.

This "Greater Serbia" project becomes the central preoccupation of Croatian nationalists, and becomes the central element of the Croatian Fall. As with the previous chapter, the concept of negative agency becomes central to Croatian self identity, and

Croatian nationalists document this "evil" project from the mid 19th century into the present time. This allows Croats to compare themselves, as do the Serbs, to the Jewish people in history, who, after suffering a series of *Falls* at the hands of the Serbs have the right to their own unified state, where they can be free of oppression. Central to Croatian and Serbian discourse is the concept of the *Diaspora*, defined as those Serb or Croat nationals living outside of the national state. The re-uniting of the *Diaspora* (and their lands) becomes a central part of Croatian nationalism. In my *Conclusions*, I will reiterate what was learned from these four chapters, discussing the implications of this nationalist form, stressing its possible ramifications for the study of other nationalisms.

#### **The Methodology:**

For this study I will be using secondary and primary source materials. In terms of primary sources, many of these are official Serbian or Croatian government publications, or government funded publications, directed through private research institutes and foundations. Because of the importance of financial aid and lobbying from Croatian and Serbian expatriots, many primary sources are focused on appealing to a Western audience. Many also originate from Canada and the United States, where expatriates continuously promoted an ethnic consciousness and solidarity during the communist period and afterwards. For this reason, much of the primary source material is in English and French. Many of the secondary sources are analyses of primary sources written in Serbo-Croat, details of media repression, general human rights abuses, linguistic revisionism, and descriptions of government tactics in Croatia and rump-Yugoslavia.

#### **Discourse Analysis:**

Using qualitative discourse analysis techniques, such as hermeneutical analysis, I will carefully examine the concepts, symbols and elements of interest to my research. This analysis will comprise an examination for elements of my four stage cycle, using Frye's teleological cycle. Frye uses a form of discourse analysis in his examination of the Bible. He inductively surveys the texts in question for both imagery and narrative structure.<sup>10</sup> As Oliver Thomson notes, content analysis by theme, style and techniques is very much in its infancy and it is naturally much more difficult to quantify abstract ideas than individual words or phrases. He suggests drawing attention to "the more obvious pattern frequencies that come from a general view of contents"<sup>11</sup>. Following these guidelines, I will examine each work of ethnic nationalist discourse, looking for general themes as well as specific ideas, in order to test the validity of my model and my hypothesis. In my case

study chapters, I will divide the information reviewed by the central themes detected within them, or by devoting an entire section to the study of one piece of writing.

This is not to dismiss the value of quantitative discourse analysis. This too has its place in recent research. In a 1993 study commissioned by the *Styrelsen for Psykologiskt Forsvar* (Centre for Psychological Research) in Sweden, Marjan Malesic and her team evaluated 213 articles originating from Serbian and Croatian newspapers between August 1991 and January, 1992. Using a wholly quantitative approach, they drew up tables, charting the number of frequently occurring topics and terms used by the media to describe themselves, the war and perceived enemies. Many of their conclusions were similar to my own, suggesting that either method can prove useful in an analysis of nationalist discourse. I will review their findings in the **Conclusions** section of my thesis.<sup>12</sup>

## **Chapter 1: Biblical Cyclical Teleology and National Mythology**

*The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time honoured disguise and borrowed language.*

-Henry Tudor in **Political Myth-**

## **Introduction**

In researching this theoretical chapter, I was reminded of a succinct passage by the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, which has functioned as a mission statement over the course of this research. Cassirer notes, with some degree of concern: "Perhaps the most important and the most alarming feature in this development of modern political thought is the appearance of a new power: the power of mythical thought. The preponderance of mythical thought over rational thought in some of our modern systems is obvious... We should carefully study the origin, the structure, the methods and the techniques of the political myths. We should see the adversary face to face in order to know how to combat him."<sup>13</sup> Bearing this thought in mind, I have undertaken a study of mythology and its links with political ideology, in an attempt to come to terms with the resurgence of ethno-nationalist *Weltanschauung*, or world view in our Post-Cold War environment. In this chapter I aim not to overreach myself by proclaiming a general all encompassing theory to explain all ethno-nationalist discourse. I endeavour here to simply establish a model through which Serbian and Croatian ethnic-nationalist discourse can be more easily understood.

I will begin this chapter with a general discussion of the importance of myth in uniting individuals within a national collective, allowing them a national identity capable of superseding all other forms of identification. I will also chart the importance of mythology in allowing members of a nation to situate events internal and external to the nation within a general world view or paradigm. National members are then able to share the same view of events, thus distinguishing themselves as members of the same collective. Mythology also allows a national groups to maintain strong ties to a select territory, or *homeland*.

In the next section, that dealing with Frye and the Bible, I will discuss specifically the role of mythology and Biblical teleology (or ultimate destiny) in the development of political ideology. Frye presents a four stage cycle in his analysis of Biblical teleology, which I will use as a framework in the coming chapters to analyse ethno-nationalist

discourse in Serbia and Croatia. I begin this section with Frye's work on the structure and mythology of the Bible, then examine his work on the elements of mythology inherent in modern political ideology.

In a subsection, complimenting the work of Frye by demonstrating an example of Frye's analysis, I will examine the importance of political Zionist teleology to the writings of Serbian and Croatian nationalists. I will posit that this importance lies in the nature of Zionist discourse, which adopts Frye's cyclical view of time, but anchors the Biblical struggle of the Hebrew people in the present day. Instead of being saved at the end of history by being sent to heaven, the Zionist is saved by being granted a national homeland. For nationalists, such as those in Serbia and Croatia, an understanding of political Zionism has been central to the argument that if they are an oppressed nation (having suffered a Fall or Falls), then their destiny consists in a deliverance, which is to take the form of a unified national homeland, free of foreign intervention. I will attempt to demonstrate how many of these elements have been "borrowed" in the service of modern ethnic nationalist discourse. This subsection is important, because it grounds the theories of Frye's four stage cycle, by providing a concrete example of how they can be applied.

In the final section, I will endeavour to juxtapose the various theories presented in the preceding sections to create a workable four stage teleological cycle through which the ethnic-nationalist writing in our two cases studies can be better understood. As previously mentioned, this model will largely be based on the four stage cycle Frye identifies during his analysis of Biblical teleology and structure. I will then obviously conclude with my conclusion and summations. I have also composed 3 Figures (or models) of the four stage cycle, found at the end of this thesis.

### **Section 1: A General Understanding of Myth:**

To begin with the most general understanding of myth in society, we must commence with Benedict Anderson, and his seminal work on mythology: **Imagined Communities**. Herein he argues that the nation, as an imagined community (made *real* only through the imagination of its members) is itself a product of the underlying myths which allow it to be imagined. This is the case, he posits, since: "[T]he members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them. Yet in the minds of each, lives the image of their communion"<sup>14</sup>, echoing perhaps Ernst Gellner's observation that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to

self consciousness: It invents nations where they do not exist."<sup>15</sup> For Anderson, myth acts to create a feeling of community, a body of collective symbols which binds the nation together. These shared symbols allow members of a nation to "imagine" that they form part of a larger whole, through their shared beliefs. Anderson notes that the nation within a nationalist mythology is compared to the individual, thus allowing adherents of a national ideology to readily identify with it.<sup>16</sup>

Henry Tudor has taken his analysis on a path different to that of Anderson, noting that while the community may indeed be imagined, there must be some underlying purpose to the creation of that collective imagination. In this search for an underlying purpose, Tudor examines the more instrumentalist goals of political myth, beginning with a study of how the interpretations of political myths (the meaning of the myths) are manipulated by an elite in order to mobilise a target population. Starting from the standpoint of the mobilisation for war, Tudor examined George Sorel's theories of political myth as propounded in his Reflections on Violence. Here, Sorel was largely concerned with why men were often willing to engage in violent popular upheavals with a degree of courage and readiness for self-sacrifice which could not be accounted for in narrow pragmatic terms. Such men, he reasoned were inspired by the power of great myths, which permitted them to "picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause [was] certain to triumph."<sup>17</sup> Myth, as Sorel understood it, provides a vision of the future which makes crude but practical sense of the present. It gives men a fixed point of reference to which they can express their feelings and explain their experience.

A political myth, as Tudor explains, is one which recounts the origins and history, as well as the character of people in a political society. In many cases, it is the story of a political society that existed or was created in the past and which must now be restored or preserved. In other cases, it concerns a political society destined to be created in the future, and is told in order to encourage mobilisation, "to hasten its advent". Tudor posits that the political myth is always that of a particular group. While individuals may sometimes figure in these, they do so only as a representative of the group, or as an allegory for certain perceived group traits. As with Anderson, the individual traces his/her identity within the confines of the imagined community.

The importance of myth in society is also centred on the concept of time in history.<sup>18</sup> As Tudor explains, the political myth-interpreter orders his experience on the assumption that the present is an episode in a story, an incident that enables him to

distinguish between what is significant and what is not, in contrast to the empirical thinker who sorts through events based on their intrinsic merits. In other words, myths enable individuals to understand their nation's role in history, and the specific stage or time in history where the nation finds itself. That the Albanian riots in the Serbian province of Kosovo were seen by Serbs as an act of genocide against the Serbian minority, rather than a call for more civil rights, offers an insight into how this mentality operates. For Tudor, mythical time is cyclical, and this is significant, as Northrope Frye advances the same idea in his study of Biblical structure. As Tudor asserts: "Mythical time is reversible; What was done is not forever lost. It may in the fullness of time repeat itself. Every myth is a story of death and rebirth, of an end or *eschatos* with simultaneously a new beginning."<sup>19</sup>

In this sense, events in the past or present fit into a complex paradigm by which the world is viewed. Events thus claim significance far beyond their present day reality. As Tudor posits, this applies not only to historical events, but also to land, where national territory can carry with it certain mythical and emotional connotations. As he elaborates: "Depending on the myth to which he subscribes, he (the myth-interpreter) will see a particular tract of land as part of the territory from which the chosen people were expelled, a particular year as the one in which Christ will establish his kingdom on earth, a particular trade-unionist as an agent of a world-wide communist conspiracy, or a particular industrial dispute as a crucial incident in the class war."<sup>20</sup>

This idea is supported by sociologist Anthony Smith, who views that the nation, which is "a community of common myths[,] symbols and memories" is also a "territorial community", possessing strong mythical attachments to certain stretches of territory.<sup>21</sup> Like Tudor, Smith sees various important cyclical elements in national mythology. Generally, he refers to the importance of shared historical memories or myths centred around a given territory. Specifically, these memories include: "the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims or ethnic title-deeds."<sup>22</sup> Once Smith elaborates further, we observe many similarities between his analysis of nationalist mythology and what Frye will soon be arguing:

Nationalism promises a status reversal, where the last shall be first and the world will recognise the chosen people and their sacred values. This is where ethno-history is so vital. Not only must the nation boast a distant past on which to base its promise of immortality; it must be able to unfold a glorious past, a golden age of saints and heroes, to give meaning to its promise of restoration and dignity. So the fuller and richer that ethno-history, the more convincing becomes its claim and the deeper the chord it can strike in the hearts of the nations members.<sup>23</sup>

In this short section, we observe that political myth performs several functions. The first is to create a sense of community amongst individuals through the creation of imagined common symbols and structures. Mythology also acts to create a time line, sometimes cyclical, within which events in the daily lives of the members of a national group can be situated. Members of a nation can hope for better times in the midst of chaos, by appealing to a mythological framework which describes the nation as one which always triumphs, even in adversity. Thus myths can be a source of hope and inspiration to members of a nation, who, believing that better times are to come, will work harder to hasten their advent.

## **Section 2: The works of Northrop Frye:**

### **Section 2.1: Frye's *Great Code***

In this study of myth and national discourse in Serbia and Croatia, two of Northrop Frye's books are of central importance. The first, entitled **The Great Code** was published in 1982, while the second, **Words With Power**, was published eight years later. Frye begins his analysis by examining the unconscious social value of myths. Frye notes that while there are to be found an infinite number of individual myths, there are only a finite number of species of myth. As he describes, these "express the human bewilderment about why we are here and where we are going, and include myths of creation, of Fall, of exodus, of migration, of destruction of the human race in the present (deluge myths) or the future (apocalyptic myths), and of redemption."<sup>24</sup> Such myths, he posits, outline humanity's vision of its nature and destiny, its place in the universe, and its sense both of inclusion and exclusion from an infinitely bigger order. In this sense, the Biblical mythology is of a common type, exhibiting many of the general characteristics which Frye identifies.

Northrop Frye defines mythology (more or less) as: a group of stories in allegorical or epical form originating from a distinct self-defined collective of individuals. These stories, while loosely based on historical events are meant to situate a collective in history, proscribing its role in the world, outlining the collective's view of other people and other groups, nature, the afterlife; in short all intragroup and intergroup attitudes and actions. As Frye asserts, everyone lives in a mythological world, based on traditional paradigms and world views. As he posits:

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Man lives, not directly or nakedly in nature like the animals, but within a mythological universe, a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his existential concerns. Most of this is held unconsciously, which means that our imaginations may recognise elements of it, when presented in art or literature, without consciously understanding what it is that we recognise. Practically all of what we see of this body of concern is socially conditioned and culturally inherited.<sup>25</sup>

It is through this optic that he seeks an understanding of Biblical structure and mythology. That there are more than 63 ancient flood myths from around the world, for example, suggests that even the most characteristic Biblical stories may have more ancient and widespread origins than previously imagined. It would seem that for Frye, individuals in society cannot be separated from the mythology which binds that society together. For Frye, the individual's identity is centred on a mythical identity, an identity based first on a sense of being a member of the collective, then situating the collective in a historical drama.

### **Section 2.2: Frye's Biblical Teleological Cycle: "The Divine Comedy"**

Important for my research is Frye's analysis of Biblical structure. Frye describes time in the Bible as "U-shaped", in the form of a "Divine Comedy". As he writes:

[The] apostasy [is] followed by a descent into disaster and bondage, which in turn is followed by repentance, then by a rise through deliverance to a point more or less on the level from which the descent began. This U-shaped pattern recurs in literature as the standard shape of *comedy*, where a series of misfortunes and misunderstandings brings the action to a threateningly low point, after which some fortunate twist in the plot sends the conclusion up to a happy ending. The entire Bible, viewed as a *Divine Comedy*, is contained within a U-shaped story of this sort, one in which man loses the tree and water of life at the beginning of Genesis and gets them back at the end of Revelation.<sup>26</sup>

Within this large U-shaped cycle, which encapsulates the totality of Biblical history, are a series of smaller U-shaped cycles. Together this collection of similar cycles comprises Biblical structure. As Frye describes: "In between, the story of Israel is told as a series of declines into the power of heathen kingdoms: Egypt, Philistia, Babylon, Syria, Rome, each followed by a rise into a brief moment of relative independence."<sup>27</sup> There are thus a large number of these cycles in the Bible, from the very small, covering several days, to the largest cycle, comprising the entire history of the world from its creation to its destruction.

Frye remarks that in this sequence of *mythoi*, all the high points and low points, are metaphorically related to one another. That is, the Garden of Eden, the Promised

Land, Jerusalem, and Mount Zion are interchangeable symbols for the home of the soul. Similarly, Egypt, Babylon and Rome are all seen as spiritually the same place (a symbol of Fall), and the Pharaoh of the Exodus, Nebuchadnezzar, Antiochus Epiphanes and Nero are spiritually the same person as a personification of the negative force which brings about a Fall. And the deliverers of Israel, Abraham, Moses and Joshua the judges, David and Solomon are all prototypes of the Messiah or final deliverer.<sup>28</sup> Thus Frye suggests the concept of agency. Pharaoh as an agent of the Fall, an agent of evil, Moses as an agent of deliverance, of good. Evil forces cause the Falls, good forces engender the redemption. This constant struggle of negative versus positive agencies, or forces, allows the forward movement of the historical process in the Bible, allowing the Hebrew people to achieve their teleological destiny.

### **Section 2.3: Frye's Four Stage Cycle (see also Figure 1)**

Frye examines in detail the four stages of this Biblical cycle, beginning of course with Genesis and the myth of creation. What fascinates Frye about the Biblical creation myth is that the sudden *coming to being of the world* occurs through articulate speech, conscious light and stability, as opposed to a universe begat from sexual copulation. As Frye posits: "Rather than a sexual creation, the forms of life in Genesis are *spoken* into existence."<sup>29</sup> In this sense, Frye concludes that it is in fact language that creates nature. The Garden of Eden is then somehow a reconciliation between the Platonic absolute and reality. In the Garden, the two are equal and interchangeable. This allows Frye to posit that in the paradisaical state, man, nature and language are somehow equal, and interrelated. This type of creation imagery suggests that the concept and symbol exist before the actual form comes into being. Thus logos and spirit beget the natural world. The actual will to create is more indicative of the power of God than the act of creation itself.

The Fall for Frye occurs on several different levels. The first level is the physical banishment from the Garden of Eden, which represents humankind's alienation from nature. At this level, the Fall is concomitant with the acquisition of both sexual knowledge, and the knowledge of good and evil. As Frye describes: "Man becomes ashamed of his body and performs his sexual acts in secret."<sup>30</sup> Frye also envisions a second level to the Fall, positing that "[M]an's alienation from nature through the fall constitutes also an alienation from language." The myth of the *Tower of Babel* (Genesis 11: 1-9) becomes significant here, as the attempt to again reach the Garden of Eden, to build an edifice to overcome the Fall.<sup>31</sup> This attempt to bridge the gulf between man and

God leads only to a further alienation, the confusion of tongues, which not only continues the alienation between man and nature, but heightens the alienation of man from man. The Fall is now complete, with human beings now alienated from God, nature, language and each other.<sup>32</sup>

It is from this low point that the epic struggle of the Hebrew people begins. It is at this stage, this third stage of the cycle, where the individual dispersed units become joined together. After the Fall, the individuals consolidate to form a collective unit, a *one-ness*. As Frye explains, the notion of oneness after the Fall is now sexual:

There is a common stock of metaphors connected with two bodies becoming one flesh in sexual union...The one flesh metaphor is Biblical, and of course the starting point of every human life is the identity of one flesh resulting from the meeting of two bodies. This notion reoccurs in the sense of a tribe as an extended family, everyone simultaneously the product of one flesh and that flesh concomitantly.<sup>33</sup>

As Frye further describes, the notion of an "oceanic sense of submergence in a larger unit" is also present in the New Testament, where he posits that "the conception of Christ in relation to the rest of humanity has a double focus. Paul speaks of all Christians as being one in Christ, where Christ is the whole of which individuals are parts. But he also speaks of *Christ in me* where Paul is an individual of which Christ is a part, though a part that has the capacity to turn him inside out at any time."<sup>34</sup> Various positive leaders or Messiah figures, from Abraham and Moses to Christ perform the role of joining the people together, of making them aware of themselves and their historic quest for deliverance. With the spiritual joining together, each body is seen as a temple of God. As Frye describes, each person is seen individually as a temple, while at the same time being seen collectively as the *living stones* of a larger temple, of which Christ is the corner stone.<sup>35</sup> Thus we see here very much the same idea as that advanced by Anderson and Tudor, the individual becomes submerged in the collective, as the stone in the temple, contributing by his/her mere existence to the integrity of the structure.

In the fourth and final stage of the Biblical cycle, the Apocalypse occurs, where "the people of God are raised into recognition and the heathen kingdoms are cast into darkness."<sup>36</sup> Frye divides the Apocalyptic vision into two parts: the *panoramic* and the *restoration*. In the first part, we find that humanity is expected to use its knowledge of good and evil (acquired following the consumption of the fruit of the tree of life) to live a good and pious life. Those who followed their morality, or choose wisely their path based

on right thinking are to be delivered during the period of final judgement. As Frye interprets this stage:

[T]he world disappears into two unending constituents, a heaven and a hell, into one of which man automatically goes, depending on the relative strength of the cases of the prosecution and defence. Here the positive and negative agencies, whose constant antagonism constituted the motor of world history, are finally separated.<sup>37</sup>

Following the panoramic stage, the restoration begins, as God "makes all things new". During this stage, those whom God delivers are returned to the paradisaical state, with the restoration of the tree and the water of life.<sup>38</sup> At this point the cycle is complete, humanity's telos has been achieved. In this phase, the former balance between language, nature and man is restored, and a new harmony is achieved between these formerly alienated elements.

Even before the final compilation of the Bible at the council of Nicea, there were prophecies foretelling a great catastrophe, from whence would arise a "Palestine which would be nothing less than a new Eden, a paradise regained." As political philosopher Norman Cohn reports, the imagery of the ritual purification and judgement was strong in this period: "There must indeed be a judgement, when the misbelievers, those in Israel who have not trusted in the Lord and also Israel's enemies, the heathen nations, will be utterly destroyed. But this is not the end. A saving remnant of Israel will survive these chastisements and through the remnant the divine purpose will be accomplished."<sup>39</sup> Here the image of purification, of correcting past injustices becomes central to the Apocalyptic vision of the end time. This imagery was elaborated in the *Book of Ezra*, where it was predicted that the ten lost tribes of Israel would be reunited from alien lands, to establish in Palestine a kingdom for a united Israel.<sup>40</sup> Similar to Frye's observations, Cohn concludes that the constant antagonism between good and evil acts as the motor of world history, allowing a series of smaller cycles encapsulated within the larger cycle of world history, which in turn allows the target group in a saga to achieve its teleological destiny.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Section 2.4: Frye on Mythology and Political Ideology**

Frye in his second work draws the link between mythology in general and Biblical teleology with modern political ideology. Sensing in his first work the sociological and political ramifications of mythology and Biblical teleology, Frye observes the evolution of mythology, from a general species of myth, to Biblical teleology, to literary themes, and finally to ideology. For Frye, every society, irrespective of time, place or size, has myths,

and while a society may have an oral mythic tradition, more often than not, mythology is inherited, transmitted and diversified through literature. Myth is certainly not specific to nationalism, but the manipulation of mythical interpretation has proved a useful tool in nationalism, as we shall see.

As a literary critic, Frye notes that in general: "[L]iterature derives from myth, the principles that give literature its communicating power across the centuries through all ideological changes."<sup>42</sup> In layman's terms, Frye basically accounts for literary themes as originating from the mythological traditions and historical context of a society, as opposed to simply the whim or fanciful imagination of an author. Frye describes the origins of ideology in a similar sense. As he posits: "An ideology starts by providing its own version of whatever its traditional mythology considers relevant, and uses this version to form and enforce a social contract. An ideology is thus an applied mythology, and its adaptations of myth are the ones that, when we are inside an ideological structure we must believe or say we believe."<sup>43</sup> Ideology is then an interpretation of the mythical elements which form the base of a society.

Because myth is so central to a people's understanding of their place in the world, an ideologue may borrow elements of a common mythology, incorporating these into a world view. Frye warns us that while this process may not produce the best governmental or institutional structure, an elite deriving its authority from a mythic framework is able to claim a large measure of unquestioned authority over the population. As he explains:

Persecution and intolerance result from an ideology's determination as expressed through its priesthood, or whatever corresponds to a priesthood, backed by its ascendant class in general, to make its mythological canon the only possible one to commit oneself to, all others being denounced as heretical, unreal or evil. This means that there is a strong resistance within an ideology to placing its excluded initiative, the myth it lives by, into focus and examining it in a broader perspective.<sup>44</sup>

Frye further warns that because of the highly subjective nature of mythological interpretation, in that it presents a very loose interpretation of what actually happened in history, it can be very easily manipulated to suit an elite's desired ends. Because mythic stories and sagas are largely based on the unconscious values and norms of a particular society, an elite is easily able to misinterpret and invent various lessons emerging from a collection of myths, interpretations designed specifically to bolster an elite's legitimacy, while justifying one course of action over another. As he describes: "When mythology

modulates into ideology and helps to form a social contract, it presents data asserted to be historical, actual events in the past, but presents them so selectively that we can hardly take them to be really historical."<sup>45</sup>

As Frye further describes, myths become a useful tool by the elite in justifying one course of action over another, or in convincing the population that a negative event in the present will have positive future consequences. As he observes: "Myths exert a counterbalancing force to such history as they know, with [their] suggestion that the events they (the people) encounter are repeating their ancestral myths or working out their decreed meanings. Such myths are confrontations with a present significance, drawing out the reserves of courage and energy needed to maintain routine or to meet a crisis."<sup>46</sup>

Frye chooses the example of Marxism, and its borrowed mythical elements. As he describes, myth implies not simply a historical process, but also a social vision, which looks towards transcending history. In the case of Marxism:

It is very difficult, perhaps impossible to suggest a social vision of this kind woven within an ideology without invoking some sort of pastoral myth, past or future. The Communist Manifesto [uses] the historical process to deliver humanity from the class struggles of history... restore[ing] some of the pre-bourgeois personal relationships to human life. Such mythical features in social vision do not denigrate history, but help to clarify its function.<sup>47</sup>

Frye cites Marxism as a prime example of an ideology derived from mythological, specifically divine concepts. As he discusses: "It is possible to have an ideology that substitutes concepts for divine personalities, such as we have in Marxism. But the absence of personal gods did not prevent Marxism from developing a parallel apparatus of inspired texts, saints, shrines and martyrs, a professional hierarchy corresponding to a priesthood, orthodox and heretical beliefs, and commitment to an accepted ideology."<sup>48</sup> Frye describes Marx's Communism as an ideology which used the Biblical idea of a historical struggle between good and evil, together with the idea of a people's ultimate destiny. Here we see the constant struggle between the *good* Proletarian Class versus the *evil* Bourgeois Capitalist Class in history, a struggle which culminates in the victory of the Proletariat through revolution, thus bringing about the teleological destiny of the Proletarian Class: the Communist state, where that amorphous entity, *the people* control every aspect of their lives.<sup>49</sup>

Central to ideology for Frye is also the concept of *kerygma*<sup>50</sup> or revelation. The elite is constantly called upon by the population to interpret and clarify current events

through their ideological optic. Reviewing the example of Maoist China, Frye notes how Chinese Communism was forced to graft traditional Chinese history and mythology with Marxist principles, for the simple reason that: "political kerygma lacks a mythology of traditional stories and archetypal allusions, and the sense of a shared cultural tradition that only such a mythology can provide. A kerygma without the full support of a mythology soon becomes a rhetorical vacuum, and a vacuum is something that consciousness, like nature abhors."<sup>51</sup>

While Frye found Communism to be reflective of the cyclical Biblical mythological tradition, political theorist Norman Cohn adds, that in general, the messianic tradition prioritised the importance of the collective over the individual, and thus contained useful elements for the development of other ideologies. As he explains: "The Heavenly City is to appear on this earth, and its joys are to crown not the peregrinations of individual souls but the epic exploits of the *chosen people*". As he reveals, both Communism and Fascism borrowed the concept of messianism, incorporating it in a teleological manner. Thus Cohn observes: "What has set these latter-day movements so utterly apart from the ordinary run of political parties in Europe, whether conservative or reformist, is precisely their way of endowing social conflicts and aspirations with a transcendental significance."<sup>52</sup>

What I will posit in this thesis is that not only Fascists and Communists, but ethnic nationalists as well have used a cyclical view of history and time, based on Biblical structure to legitimate their past, present and future actions, to apply this same form of *transcendental significance* to their actions. In Serbia and Croatia, two former Communist nation-states with ethnic nationalist governments, we should certainly see examples of the cyclical framework in the national discourse churned out by the various government and private publishing houses in these two countries.

Certainly the great fear of applying Frye's four stage cyclical structure (by itself) to an understanding of ethnic nationalist discourse is the danger of finding oneself in a *rhetorical vacuum*, of trying to prove that nationalist writers are so influenced by the Bible alone that they would base a war-time public relations campaign on its structure. This is where political Zionism becomes of central importance, since this nationalist movement did indeed successfully use elements of Biblical teleology to advance its national claims. This was certainly no accident, since the Jewish Zionists who created the movement saw in their historical situation the continuing mythical saga of the Hebrew

people in history. The Biblical myths functioned in the manner described by Anderson and Tudor; they allowed Zionists to interpret current events in light of their past *Falls* and *Deliverances*.

### **Section 2.5: Concretising Frye's Theories with the Example of Political Zionism**

*We Serbs feel today as the Jews did in Hitler's day. We are a people who are [considered] guilty...Today, Serbophobia in Europe is a concept and an attitude with the same ideological motivation and fury as anti-Semitism had during the Nazi era.*

**-Former Yugoslav President and Serbian Author Dobrica Cosic-**

*The fervour that is being excited in the Serbian nation today is growing into a war cry...This agitation in fact reminds us of Hitlerism, which also used the myth of the German nation being oppressed by all their neighbours in Europe (even by the Jews) to prepare the ground for aggression against the whole world.*

**-Croatian writer Miroslav Brandt in the Antimemorandum-**

*In the modern era, as in Egypt of old, the threat of extinction was the preamble to redemption. In the first cycle of recorded civilisation, Israel's redemption revealed the spiritual factor in human destiny. At the present time, Israel reborn affirms anew the lasting truth of spiritual values and the prophetic interpretation of the human story. Jewish statehood as the fulfilment of an historical process is now a subject for the historian, theologian, sociologist and political scientist.*

**-Former Israeli President Chaim Herzog-**

**Introduction: (see also Figure 2)**

Political Zionism provides a concrete example of how Biblical structure (as analysed by Frye) has been useful in the formation of a nationalist political ideology. As we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, important to Serbian and Croatian national discourse has been the legacy of Zionist discourse, which culminated ultimately in the creation of the state of Israel. That much of Croatian and Serbian discourse focuses on direct and indirect comparisons between the struggle of the nation and that of the Hebrew people, while comparing aggressors and their political projects to National Socialist projects is no coincidence. That Israel was one of the few nation states to have been created with the support of the Western powers in the 20th century suggests that their discourse was both meaningful and effective. This section will review the nature of that discourse.<sup>53</sup> The constant portrayals of enemies as Nazis, the importance of a territorial nation state as the

telos of the ethnic nation, and the importance of the Fall all depend on the elements of Zionism to complete the four stage model

In general, modern Zionism views the creation of the State of Israel as the culmination of Biblical teleology, as the final destiny of the Jewish people. The Zionist thinker substitutes an earthly kingdom for the Heavenly variety, thus concretising the concept of deliverance from an heavenly utopian promise to a realistic, plausible prospect. This seamless grafting of secular, modern territorial nationalism to the Biblical epic created a moral, highly convincing ideology, which has resulted in arguably one of the most successful nationalist movements of the 20th century. In our four stage model, this has the effect of grounding Frye's fourth stage of deliverance. No longer does deliverance imply a heavenly kingdom for all good members of the nation, but a territorial homeland for all those who work for the betterment of the nation. Zionism for the Jewish people had the effect of uniting them in their struggle against oppression, in order to create a homeland where they would be free of persecution.

Where Frye has charted the importance of the negative agency in the Bible as the constant companion of the Hebrew people in history, bringing about a series of Falls, so too do Zionists employ the same elements, thus complimenting his analysis. The central agency of the Fall for Zionists is *Anti-Semitism*, a very real and potent agency which resulted in a constant mistrust of and discrimination against Jews in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. It also resulted in pogroms of Jewish villages and towns throughout Europe, and ultimately in the rise of the German *National Socialists* and the advent of the Holocaust, one of the blackest periods of modern history.

The importance of Anti-Semitism as a political concept<sup>54</sup> was stressed by many early Zionist writers, such as Theodor Herzl, Chaim Weitzman and Asher Ginsburg, who premised the need for a Jewish State (or *Judenstaat*) on the need for the Jewish people to escape from European Anti-Semitism, while at the same time proving to the Europeans that they could also be a nation building people. The importance of the good agency finally being delivered from the evil agency by gaining their own state became a powerful concept. It thus became central for early Zionists, as it has for Serbian and Croatian nationalists, to describe the creation of a nation state as the culmination of a national destiny. Only then could the means necessary to further its creation be justified.

**George Steiner and Modern Jewish Identity**

Philosopher and literary critic George Steiner has written much on Zionism and the moral impact of the Holocaust on the Jewish people and the creation of Israel. Steiner begins from a general outlook, concluding that most history seems to "carry on its back vestiges of paradise." This historic memory of paradise (or stage 1) he terms the *golden time*, a time when "a deep concordance lay between man and the natural setting." This was followed by a *Fall from Grace* (or stage 2). As Steiner posits: "The myth of the Fall runs stronger than any particular religion. There is hardly a civilisation that does not carry inwardly an answer to the intimations of a sense of distant catastrophe."<sup>55</sup> This general notion of the Fall pushes Steiner to question the original Fall in the Bible, and the images of the Fall for the Jewish people. This allows him to conclude that for the Jews, the Holocaust represents, from a theological perspective, a second Fall, where again, harmony is destroyed, and the people find themselves uprooted and alienated in their "adopted" countries.<sup>56</sup>

In his work: *The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H.*, Steiner discusses the Jewish preoccupation in the late 20th century with the search for Hitler as an a-historical negative agency, and the concomitant evilness which surrounds him. In many ways, he views the Hitler image as central to modern Jewish identity. The Jewish legacy of persecution becomes a strong element, endowing the people with a mission: to identify and destroy the evil of the present, while avenging the wrongs of the past.<sup>57</sup> For Steiner, the enemy exists largely through the perception of his victims. While Hitler was once a real man, it is the symbolic Hitler, as a personification of Anti-Semitism which becomes the central preoccupation of Steiner's characters.

Steiner takes this principle to the extreme at the end of his book. In *Portage*, the still living Hitler is captured in South America and brought to trial. In Hitler's monologue, Steiner asserts his importance as the negative agency which brought about this second Fall. He is also important as the negative element needed to unify the Jews, giving them the moral impetus, the drive for a national homeland. As Steiner's Hitler quires:

[D]id Herzl<sup>58</sup> create Israel or did I?... Would Palestine have become Israel, would the Jews have come to that barren patch of the Levant, would the United States and the Soviet Union, Stalin's Soviet Union have given you recognition and guaranteed your survival had it not been for the Holocaust? It was the Holocaust that gave you the courage of injustice, that made you drive the Arab out of his home, out of his field, because he was in your divinely ordered way... Perhaps I *am* the Messiah, the true Messiah, the Sabbatai whose infamous deeds were allowed by God in order to bring his people home...*The Holocaust was the necessary mystery before Israel could come into its strength.*<sup>59</sup>

In this sense, he posits that the Holocaust as a second Fall was an essential requirement for the Jewish nation's deliverance, in the form of a territorial nation state. Since the Jewish people are locked into a Biblical cycle, (thus Frye's cycle) they can only be delivered after having experienced a Fall, and if they experience a Fall, then logically they will eventually be delivered. Here we see a concrete manifestation of the four stage model, with the Fall largely responsible, as "the necessary mystery" before the ethnic homeland can come into being. This same theme we shall see echoed in Serbian and Croatian national discourse. The idea that the nation somehow deserves to be delivered because of its numerous Falls largely reflects this central Zionist theme.

### **Zionist Conceptions of Anti-Semitism in Jewish Identity**

Historian Walter Laqueur picks up on ideas similar to those of Steiner. Where Steiner encapsulated the negative agency in the personage of Hitler, Laqueur simply refers to it as Anti-Semitism, concluding that without it, Zionism would have been impossible. As an "all pervasive and changing force throughout time and space", Anti-Semitism becomes the negative agency necessary to band the Jewish peoples together under the rallying cry of a single homeland. He thus concludes: "[I]n a world without Anti-Semitism, Zionism would not have flourished."

To Laqueur's assertions, Zionist ideologue and intellectual Yehuda Gothelf adds: "Anti-Semitism [has been] the companion of the people of Israel from the time it was exiled from its homeland...Anti-Semitism is ever changing in form and essence, and defies all definitions, except one, that Jews as a minority have been the permanent victims of religious, national, class and other wars and strife."<sup>60</sup> Echoing Steiner's ideas, Gothelf views Anti-Semitism as the most important negative force which led to the creation of Zionism and ultimately the State of Israel:

*Anti-Semitism...may also serve as a force for moral renewal, and for uniting the masses of Jews to make them struggle for their national and individual liberation. There is no chance for normal national existence of Jews in the lands of the Diaspora...Zionism is not only the outcome of Anti-Semitism; but it puts in concrete form the longing for redemption, the national-religious yearning of the past two thousand years.<sup>61</sup>*

It is the concretisation of the redemptive or Deliverance phase which is of interest in this case. As will be obvious in Chapters 3 and 4, both Serbs and Croats have used the general concept of Anti-Semitism to describe those all pervasive evil forces which they posit are bent on the destruction of their individual nations.

### **Zionist Ideologues and Politicians and their Teleology**

Steiner shares much with other more nationalistic thinkers on the subject of Zionism. Former Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban also makes the link between past and present, building a strong symbolic bridge between the *Fall* and the *Deliverance*. As he said during one address in 1955:

At the centre of Israel's historic experience stands the interpretation of the universal design in terms of order and progress. We, the descendants of the ancient Jewish kingdoms stubbornly preserved our identity and union for two thousand years of exile until we achieved the restoration of Israel's sovereignty in the aftermath of the Jewish people's most agonising disaster. Our modern state is the *linear heir* of this long tradition... The Biblical literature, the Hebrew language, the pursuit of universal order and progress are the spiritual roots of our nationhood.<sup>62</sup>

Here we see the importance of Biblical mythology to the legitimacy of Zionist claims. Using the Biblical myths as a basis by which to situate events in history, Eban describes a 2,000 year old dream for the restoration of the Hebrew nation's former glory. This glory, as former Israeli President Chaim Herzog notes, is represented by the deliverance of the Jewish people from their so-called rootlessness. The final Redemption now assumes the form of a territorial nation state, the *concretisation of longing* that Gothelf describes. As Herzog writes:

There have been other periods of calamity in Jewish history, but none was followed by immediate recompense and revival. Seventy years elapsed from the exile to Babylon, after the destruction of the First Temple, till the return of the land of Israel under the mandate of the emperor Cyrus of Persia. From the destruction of the second Temple until the beginning of the restoration of the Third Commonwealth, there was a lapse of over 1,800 years. In our day and before our very eyes, the revival and restoration came immediately in the wake of destruction. Only six years after the greatest crime in history had been perpetrated against our people, the international community recognised Israel's right to exist as an independent national entity in the land of its fathers. The scar of exile was healed, the continuity of Jewish statehood was restored; Jewish dignity was rescued and uplifted. A nation regained the sources of its eternal inspiration, an immortal prophecy was vindicated before its very eyes.<sup>63</sup>

It is indeed this immediate redemption after the Fall, which some Zionist thinkers and politicians posit may be central to the modern day importance of Zionism to other nationalisms, in that it gives nationalists hope that their national grievances might be quickly resolved, should they appeal to a sense of being the victim of some unspeakable horror, such as "ethnic cleansing". This quest for immediate redress of perceived injustices, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, lies at the heart of Serbian and Croatian national discourse, or where possible, the justification for those actual "redresses" which are currently occurring.<sup>64</sup>

The *Diaspora*, representing those of Jewish ancestry who do not live in Israel, becomes another important element of Zionism. As Herzog explains, Israel and the *Diaspora* is at once a dichotomy and a unity, the *Diaspora* being "diffusion and dispersion", while Israel expresses: "coherence, entrenchment and ultimate destiny". He thus expresses a principle which as we shall later see is borrowed by both Serbs and Croats. The *Diaspora*, while always unified spiritually with the State of Israel, is politically separate. The *Diaspora* is thus understood teleologically, according to its ultimate destiny: which is political unity with the State of Israel. This concept of the *Diaspora* has become central to Jewish identity and, and as we shall see, an important part of both Serbian and Croatian national identity. That someone can be spiritually a member of one nation state and politically a member of another is a recent concept, and one that stems from the Zionism tradition.<sup>65</sup> Remarkable similarities between the nationalist themes here and those advanced by Serbs and Croats will be apparent in later chapters of this thesis, where, like the Biblical creation which is based on *will*, once the *Diaspora* as a demographic or geographic concept is ascertained, *will* becomes the important element in mobilising action.

Unlike more ardent Zionists who see the experience of Israel as unique, Yaakov Tzur asserts, reflecting Goshel and Herzog, that other nations have gone through similar histories, and that the Zionist experience, as a sort of national renaissance shares much in common with other nations. As he describes:

The essence of Zionism is a rebellion through will power against the process of the liquidation of the Jewish people. It has parallels in the history of other peoples... the course of Greek history was interrupted by the Ottoman conquest and was only renewed with a national renaissance at the beginning of the nineteenth century. *This too happened to the Slavic people of the Balkans. They continued to exist and revived because they had preserved their religions and language. The only difference between them and the Jews is that these nations remained rooted to their land.*<sup>66</sup>

Tzur's parallel between the Slavic peoples and his own is certainly telling, and this type of parallel in many ways foreshadows what we shall find in Serbian and Croatian discourse. But while Tzur asserts that the Slavic peoples always retained their land, the idea of the demographic and geographic *Diasporas* become important. The demographic *Diaspora* consists of those national members outside of the nation-state. Unlike the Jewish people, who are "rootless", Serbs and Croats are very much rooted, implying that the demographic *Diaspora* cannot be united until the geographic *Diaspora* is also reunited. The existence of this merging of Biblical and Zionist cyclical teleology will be obvious by

the end of this thesis, when the links between these elements and the national discourse embraced by Serbs and Croats will be clear.

While maintaining a teleological view of history, Zionism uses the concept of the Fall, and the a-historical negative agency to create a nationalist ideology. The saga of the moral, unified Jewish nation moving throughout history functions as the positive agency, constantly at odds with the ubiquitous and a-historical Anti-Semitism, which initiates Falls, large and small. The end of history, for the Zionist, is the achievement of a national homeland, a state where the Jews can be reunited and finally delivered from Anti-Semitism. At this point, as in the Biblical *Book of Revelations*, the constant antagonism between positive and negative agencies draws to a close, and the Hebrews are able to live in a state where they can at last be free from persecution. As we shall see in Chapters Three and Four, this idea becomes of central importance to the arguments of Serbian and Croatian nationalists, who contend that only when the nation state comprises all its ethnic peoples, and only when the leaders of the nation have control over all the members of that nation will the telos of the ethnic nation be achieved.

### **Section 3: The Four Stage Cycle**

**Introduction: (see Figure 3)**

In this final section, I have endeavoured to use the various theories on mythology and nationalist teleology discussed in the previous sections to create a framework for analysing ethno-nationalist discourse. By borrowing Frye's four stage cycle, drawn from his analysis of Biblical teleology, combined with the writings of the above thinkers, I have devised a four stage cycle which will hopefully allow some new insights to emerge as to the nature of Serbian and Croatian ethno-nationalism. The proof being always in the pudding, I will draw no conclusions about the validity of this model until I have fully examined its usefulness for analysing my two case studies. Here, briefly are the four stages of the cycle:

**1) The Myth of the Original Nation:** This phase covers the creation or past greatness of a national group. This may include a myth of origin, and tales of past heroic battles won or lost. Encapsulated in this phase is usually a discussion of past historical geographic borders, based on linguistic, religious, cultural or racial criteria. These borders are almost always larger than the present borders of a nation's territory, if indeed it possesses any autonomous jurisdiction over its own land. At this stage, there is also a

mythology surrounding a cultural purity, with regards to language, religious, artistic and cultural expression. Clear symbols and group traits differentiate this "in-group" from all "out-groups". There can be no mistaking who is a member of the nation and who is not. During this "golden time", there is a heightened group awareness and solidarity, and a high level of cohesion and pride amongst members of the national group.

**2) The Myth of the Fall:** During this stage, the nation may suffer from a variety of ailments. This includes the loss of parts of a territory over which the original nation had autonomy, foreign domination, colonisation and/or enslavement of the population by a foreign invader, or division of the original nation amongst two or more invading groups. This Fall may occur at a linguistic or cultural level, with the corruption of original "pure" symbols and modes of intragroup expression by outside influences. This would have the result of reducing a group's sense of collective awareness, and would reduce group cohesion. Forced conversion to another religion or governmental system that was seen as alien to the original nation could also qualify as an element of a Fall. From a racial perspective, intermarriage between members of an original nation or "in-group" with members of various "out-groups" could also reduce group cohesion, by the slow erosion of defining cultural, physical or psychological traits, perceived as characteristic of the original nation. At the most extreme level, a genocide would most certainly qualify as a Fall. The Fall generally creates a dispersion and submergence of the original nation, and a dark age ensues.

**3) The National Rejuvenation:** During this stage, the reasons for the Fall are carefully examined and revealed. The concept of negative agency becomes important, as certain individuals, speaking for the group, identify one or more "out-groups" or "others" as the reason behind the Fall of the nation. This "other" is demonised and viewed as a trans-historical phenomenon, such as "English-Canada" or "Great Serbian Hegemonism". The myth of the interplay of these two agencies, one creative, pure and original, the other, destructive, corrupt and barbaric, creates the moral outrage necessary to re-unite the "in-group" into a cohesive unit. At this stage, the myth of the original nation and the myth of the Fall are created, based on a mixture of historical fact, outright lies, and traditional stories and mythology.

For the modern ethno-nationalist in Serbia and Croatia, comparisons of the "in-group" with the Jews will create an axiomatic link between past suffering and redemption through statehood. The plight of both the modern and historic Hebrew/Jewish nation

becomes central to the collective's view of itself and the Other (referring specifically to my two case studies). This occurs at a literal level, where ethno-national ideologues parallel their struggles with those of the Jews, while equating the enemy with the Nazi, thus legitimating their struggle for a pure homeland. This also occurs at a metaphorical level, as seen through the internalisation of a Biblical teleological view of time, as seen through the eyes of the Hebrew people. At this stage, the ethno-nationalist has specific aims, namely to consolidate and mobilise the people for action, in order to increase the size of the national territory through irredentism, to gain territorial autonomy through war or referendum, and to re-purify the culture by reducing or eliminating perceived foreign elements through a purgative process.

**4) The Apocalypse/Homeland Acquisition Phase:** The achievement of statehood for the nation and the inclusion of all members of the nation within a defined historical territory allows the purgative process to take effect. In this phase, the myth of the original nation is used as a template to change anything not seen as pure and original. Any perceived foreign bias or "cultural pollution" is purged. Attribution theory is promoted, whereby the "in-group" is seen as incapable of doing wrong, while any targeted "out-group" can do no right. History and language are often revised, along with the enhancement of collective national myths; the creation or strengthening of national spiritual institutions, such as church, cultural or historical organisations; the displacement or devaluing of minority groups; and the consolidation of state organs of mass communication, such as radio, television, magazines and newspapers. I term this phase apocalyptic for the simple reason that one who is a member of the nation is somehow redeemed and delivered from his/her supposed oppression, while those who are not members of the nation may indeed suffer the fate of unbelievers.

### **Conclusions and Hypothesis**

In the five preceding sections, I have reviewed and discussed various thinker's views on cyclical teleology and its role in political ideology. Frye notes the cyclical nature of most mythology, including the Biblical variety. Cuthbertson, Tudor, Anderson and Smith have all noted similar cycles in mythology which modulate into political ideology. Juxtaposing these theories on nationalist mythology and teleology, I have devised a four stage model which will hopefully prove useful, in the chapters to come, for analysing the ethnic-nationalist conception of time in history.

On the basis of this theoretical chapter, I can now hypothesise that Serbian and Croatian national discourse will maintain a view of time in history as being cyclical. The current policies of government should reflect stage three of the four stage model, that is the re-awakening of nationalism, and the interpretation of national *original nation* and *Fall* myths. There will be constant examples of a golden or idealic stage, followed by instances of Falls, at the hands of various enemies. There will also be numerous concrete examples of processes by which the state is being purified and changed, to reflect a more national consciousness. Although it will not be possible to arrange the case study chapters according to the four stages, the elements of each of these stages will be clearly visible when Serbian and Croatian discourse is studied by general theme, and by detailed analysis of documents. If we find that the elements of the cyclical framework exist, then we can conclude that Biblical teleology has indeed inspired the manner in which Serbian and Croatian national writers view time and their nation's place in history.

## **Chapter 2: A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples**

*We were facing each other, two empty mirrors, from which the images were erased by persistence, we were exchanging speechless words and just feeling, how slowly, but in perseverantly increasing number, we get eaten by worms, our encounter was simple, short and completely inexplicable, like death.*

-Lela B. Njatin in The Day Tito Died-

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the relationship between Serbs, Croats and other South Slavic nations in the Yugoslav region. This chapter is meant to furnish the reader with a concise and relatively unbiased history, so that many of the myths and fabrications studied in Chapters 3 and 4 can be objectively studied, with the true facts in mind. I will thus endeavour here to present the facts in the most accurate method possible, so that the reader may readily observe many of the glaring differences between myth and reality.

What I will attempt to demonstrate in this chapter is that the past 150 odd years of South Slav (or Yugoslav) history have been comprised of efforts by various political leaders and intellectuals to centralise what were largely diverse groups of people, whose religion, linguistic dialects, folklore and traditions were often more regionally based than national. There has been a constant antagonism between various national ideologues who have attempted to unite peoples, based on nationality, on perceived common symbols such as religion, language, myth, and historic geography and those pan-Slavists who have struggled to achieve a consciousness or identity above the level of nationalist particularism. At all times, the image of an "other", a negative agency attacking the group was seen as essential towards banding the citizens together.

In this chapter, I will attempt to provide an overview of South Slavic (or Yugoslav) history from the early migrations of Slavic tribes into the Balkans during Roman times, to the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. Throughout this chapter, I will stress the continuous importance of regional identity as a focus of the South Slav peoples' primary loyalty and identity. Indeed the efforts of ethnic nationalists, pan-Slavic nationalists and Communists have all been of a similar type. They have all sought to erase the differences between the peoples on their

territories through linguistic, religious and cultural standardisation, while appealing to a sense of common origin and collective destiny.

I will then move to the beginnings of a pan-Slavic or Yugoslav consciousness. What followed pan-Slavism was the dawning of a new form of nationalism, based on Fichtean principles. The 19th century Croatian and Serbian nationalist reformers would initiate a new type of identification for the South Slavs, based on a nationalist particularism designed to bind the people together against colonial domination. The confrontations between different nationalities and differing interpretations of identity, both pan-Slavic and ethno-nationalist, would emerge in the history's first Yugoslav state, in 1921. The collapse of this first Yugoslavia was due to the confrontation of the different optics through which politicians viewed the new state, together with Hitler's invasion of the region in 1941.

The second Yugoslavia (SFRY) suffered from similar problems, as Tito tried to broker divergent Croatian and Serbian views of the state, while attempting to reconcile Communism, pan-Slavism and nationalism. As Aleksander had done, Tito and his chief ideologue Edvard Kardelj created a strong centralism, which was meant to erode and eventually eliminate nationalism as a focus of identity. Tito and Kardelj's *Yugoslavism* and *Worker Self Management* were both based on a working class identity, which, as we shall see, was as unrealistic for the South Slavic peasants as was King Aleksander's *Yugoslav Consciousness*. The collapse of the Yugoslav federation had been predicted since the mid 1980's as the rigid centralised state apparatus was decentralised to the point where the federal centre maintained very little control of what was happening in the republics. The end of the Cold War unleashed the passions of nationalist elites, and very soon after, the result was full scale war.

### **Section 1: Early History of the Balkan Peninsula:**

The first reported incursions of Slavic tribes into the Balkan Peninsula occurred during the late Roman period, around 500 A.D.. These tribes, as most historians described, maintained some functional differences within a tribal or small group context, but no national or-pan tribal form of consciousness, which would allow for national or racial differentiation. As the UN Council of Experts reports, the evolution of tribal differentiation may have occurred around the 9th or 10th centuries A.D., but these were extremely fluid.<sup>67</sup> Religion, as with any cultural or tribal distinction, was based largely on

region. The great schism with the division of the Christian Church in 1054 would divide up the Balkans into Orthodox, Catholic, and later Moslem.<sup>68</sup> But, as the Council of Experts describes: "Over the following centuries, western and eastern influences, especially Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox frequently transgressed the borders, which were never firmly established anyway between Serbian and Croatian tribes, creating an overlapping and pluralistic mosaic rather than a simple division between *western* Croats and *eastern* Serbs."<sup>69</sup>

The first stirring of any type of pan-Slavic identification came in 1377, when the Bosnian King Tvrtko sent troops to the Battle of Kosovo, to help the Serbs in their fight against Turkish incursions. The subsequent defeat of the Serbs at Kosovo, and the earlier defeat of the Croatian and Slovenian populations by the Hungarians in 1102 had the effect of dividing the populations between the Ottoman and the Hungarian (later Austro-Hungarian) Empires. This would later change, as the Russian Empire gained control of much of Serbia, while the Ottoman Empire conquered parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mediaeval period saw the establishment of small autonomous kingdoms in the region, such as the royal city state of Dubrovnik.

The first modern strivings for pan-Slavic autonomy came in the 16th century, where Croatian jurist Juraj Krizanic pushed for a pan-Slavic union of Russians and Southern Slavs and pressed for unification of Eastern and Western churches, to form a single Slav church. Krizanic also believed that all Slavs should have one language, one religion (Catholic) and one national state under the Russian Tsar. This initiative was later followed in 1790, by a professor's council of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Zagreb, who petitioned that the academy be made a university for all Yugoslavs, thus developing the idea of eventual Yugoslav union.<sup>70</sup>

The early 19th century initiated a sharp break with the past. A new nationalism was awakened in Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian coast, when Napoleonic forces invaded the region. Under this government, a new form of consciousness arose, as coastal Slavs began to identify themselves as *Illyrians*, borrowing for themselves the ancient Roman designation. These regions, together with Trieste, formed the *Illyrian* provinces, and were joined to the French Empire in 1809.<sup>71</sup>

### **1.1: The Development of Serbian Consciousness:**

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Serbia slowly evolved from a backwater principality of the Ottoman Empire to a kingdom in her own right. The first step, although largely ineffectual, came during the early part of the 18th century, under the 1718 *Treaty of Pozarevac*, which obliged the Ottoman empire (namely Turkey) to retreat from the northern part of Serbia, leaving a large part in Austrian hands. As Toynbee and Mitraný report, Austrian rule did not imply any liberties for the Serbian peasantry, and they soon found themselves in the same position as they had been under the Turks.<sup>72</sup>

The liberation of Serbia from Turkish domination was a slow affair, largely due to problems of internal dissent. Much of 19th century Serbian politics revolved around a feud between the Karagjorgjevic and Obrenovic dynasties. In 1803, the two families would finally make an alliance against the Turks, and fought with Russia against the Turks in 1807, and in 1809-11. In 1811, Karagjorgje (or Black George) was elected *Gospodar* (or sovereign) by popular assembly, but Serbia remained a Turkish province and the new sovereign had little power.<sup>73</sup> As Stavrianos reports, the Obrenovic dynasty began to gain political power once again, as Milos Obrenovic was accorded the title of supreme knez of the pashalak of Serbia by 1815, and was allowed to hold a national assembly (skupstina) in the capital. While this was a step forward towards independence, the pashas and spahis and Turkish garrisons were to remain as before, and taxes and tribute were to continue to be sent to Constantinople, the seat of the Ottoman administration.<sup>74</sup>

Siding with the Russians once again against the Turks in 1828, Serbia at last secured her virtual independence from Turkey with the *Treaty of Adrianople* (1829), and was granted among other concessions, its own hereditary prince (in the person of Milos Obrenovic), and the emancipation of the Serbian church. Serbia was still, however, considered a tributary to the Sultan and as such was still obliged to pay taxes to the Turkish empire.<sup>75</sup> The day of independence finally arrived on March 3rd, 1878 with the *Treaty of San Stefano*, signed between Russia and Turkey.<sup>76</sup> This treaty secured the independence of Serbia and Rumania, while increasing Serbia's size and stature in the region.<sup>77</sup>

### **1.2: The Development of Croatian Consciousness:**

Croatia was also slowly evolving from a mere principality of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the 19th century, the Croats made strategic alliances in order to promote the increased autonomy of their region against the encroaching power of Hungary. Indeed, Hungarian politics was to play a pivotal role in the development of Croatian nationalism in the 19th century. The primary objective of the Magyar (or Hungarian) nationalists under Kossuth was the elimination of the control of the Vienna government in the region, and the establishment of Hungary as both a completely independent and enlarged state, united with Austria only through the person of the ruler. This enlarged state was to include Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania and the Serbian Krajina region. The expanded and reformed state would have its capital at Budapest.<sup>78</sup> The Croats were certainly afraid of losing both lands and autonomy should Kossuth's nationalist program be implemented.

It was in this spirit in 1848 that the Croatian *Sabor* (parliament) elected Colonel Josip Baron Jelacic governor of Croatia, in the hopes of gaining increased Croatian autonomy from Hungary. Jelacic first directed Croatian officials to ignore any instructions except those issued in Zagreb. Henceforth, all legislation passed by the Croatian Sabor would conflict directly with the power of the Hungarian Diet. Demands from the Sabor included the abolition of serfdom and feudal relationships, the establishment of a regular Croatian government and parliament, and increased freedom from Hungarian control.<sup>79</sup>

These matters as well as friction between Vienna and Budapest lead ultimately to a series of battles between the Hapsburgs and Croats on one side, versus the Hungarians on the other. Ban Jelacic found himself leading the attacking forces against the Magyars, with the result that Kossuth and his Magyar forces were defeated at Schwechat on October 30th of 1848. Unfortunately the results of Croatian support did not yield the expected rewards, and the political reforms sought by the Sabor did not materialise.<sup>80</sup> In fact, things only worsened. Croatia was divided into six administrative regions, whose officials were appointed in Vienna. Jelacic was stripped of any real power and the Sabor no longer met. As Barbara Jelavic writes: "All vestiges of Croatian autonomy disappeared."<sup>81</sup> It was this period which marked the turning point in Croatian national consciousness, for here developed a sense of Croatian nationhood, defined specifically through struggle against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

During this period, the political situations of Serbia and Croatia were certainly different. However, both national entities found themselves under the sway of a great power protector, even if they had succeeded in gaining independence from direct rule. As well, both nations were struggling to define themselves as nations, based on the emerging German romantic tradition. As we shall see, imported wisdom would have similar effects in both areas.

For an understanding of the ethnic composition of the Balkan Peninsula in the 19th century, see Map 1.

## **Section 2: The Rise of Nationalism and Standardisation**

### **Section 2.1: Fichte's Linguistic Territorial Nationalism**

Much of the pioneering work on language, geography and nationalism was achieved through the works of German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Much of his writing was in reaction to French predominance in Europe, and in reaction to Godfried Herder's nationalist theories. Fichte declared in his **Characteristics of the Present Age** (1805) that linguistic criterion constituted the essential component of nationalism and national self-awareness. As Fichte describes, only: 'those who speak an original language are nations, and those who are nations speak an original language.'<sup>82</sup>

Fichte's 1807 **Addresses to the German Nation** was a veritable German nationalist and anti-French manifesto, extolling the virtues of the German people, whose mission, he concluded, was to save the world, after it had accomplished its own moral regeneration.<sup>83</sup> Herein he argues that:

Men are formed by language more than language is formed by men...Language is in no way dependant on arbitrary decisions and agreements. On the contrary, there is, to begin with, a fundamental law in accordance with which every idea becomes in the human organs of speech one particular sound. Just as objects are represented in the sense organs of an individual by a definite form, colour, etc, so they are represented in language, which is the organ of social man by a definite sound. It is not really man that speaks, but human nature speaks in him and announces itself to others of his kind.

As Fichte further described in a later work, any foreigners entering into the national space were to "remain dumb" so as not to corrupt the purity of the language. In only this way could what Fichte termed the *supersensuous* continue to be kept alive through original or natural symbols. To introduce foreign terms would destroy the true goal of language which, as Fichte described, was to re-present nature through collective

symbol.<sup>84</sup> For Fichte, language created a closed communications system within the nation. Any attempt to change the nature of language, spread the language around or initiate any manner of *unnatural* linguistic processes results in a Fall, causing a breakdown in national self-consciousness.<sup>85</sup>

Employing decidedly Biblical imagery, Fichte concludes that "The words of language in all its parts are life and create life". It is thus language which engenders action, and the word made flesh which allows eternal life. When people sacrifice for the nation, it is in the hope of creating an eternal heavenly kingdom on earth, something to pass down to their children and grand-children, or as he puts it "to plant and cultivate the eternal in the temporal".<sup>86</sup> Any notion of the *Fall*, then for Fichte, was the separation of a nation or a nation's people from their language, which would mean that they could not properly express themselves, and would therefore lose their *supersensuous* consciousness, and therefore their spiritual unity. As far as Fichte was concerned, the mental culture and normal life were united when a nation spoke its original language. Speaking the original language facilitated both spiritual and cultural growth.<sup>87</sup>

For Fichte, the corruption of the language through the assimilation of outside words and symbols would initiate a type of *linguistic fall*, bringing about a degenerative process. In Fichte's words: "The mere presence of foreign vocables within a language can do great harm, by contaminating the very springs of political morality...When foreign terms relating to political and social life are introduced into the language, those who speak it are unsure of the exact connotation of those terms and they fall into confusion which can lead to great harm." Fichte was thus in favour of a linguistic purification, as the only measure able to regenerate the nation once the language had become corrupted. As Fichte describes: "Since a nation, ipso facto must speak an original language, its speech must be cleansed of foreign accretions and borrowings, since the purer the language, the more natural it is and the easier it becomes for the nation to realise itself".<sup>88</sup>

Unlike later writers, Fichte viewed the German nation as one which was cosmopolitan, with the ability to become increasingly universalised. The processes he envisioned for the German nation were possible only because of the living nature of the German language. As he wrote: "Germans continue to speak a living language, always drawing from original sources, where as the language of other Germanic peoples lives

only on the surface and its roots are dead. Fichte laid the ground work for linguistic nationalism, founded on the conception of living and dead languages.<sup>89</sup> He thus did not exalt the virtues of an ethnic chauvinism but rather advocated a spreading of German virtues, since he viewed these as universal, and not necessarily solely German.

The works of Johann Fichte had great influence on South Slavic nationalism in the latter half of the 19th century. His basic hypothesis that a nation consists of a people speaking a common language within a designated historical territory was of great benefit to the emerging Croatian and Serbian nationalists, who saw in Fichte's nationalism, a way to legitimate their people's aspirations for autonomy.<sup>90</sup> Since South Slavs were divided among three distinct empires, a vision of nationalism was essential to furthering calls for independence. Instead of uniting all Slavs against two or three empires, it was far easier to use Fichtean nationalism to create a stronger nationalism among fewer people in a smaller region against one empire only.

#### **Section 2.2: Ante Starcevic's Greater Croatia:**

Much of the philosophy behind Croatian nationalism stems from the works of Ante Starcevic, (1823-1896) heralded as the 'Croatian father of the homeland'. Starcevic is credited with the standardisation of the Croatian language and orthography in an effort to create as much as possible a unified Fichtean type of "original language" for the Croatian "original nation". He was also able to define the exact parameters of Croatian distinct culture and history, thus for the first time creating concrete, if however imagined distinctions between Croats and Serbs. In this sense, he created a Fichtean style nation, complete with its own language and territorial linguistic frontiers. Unlike his Serbian contemporaries, Starcevic rejected any notion of Slav unity as a 'metaphysical fabrication'.<sup>91</sup> Founding the first *Party of Rights* in 1861, with Eugen Kvaternik, Starcevic introduced the idea of a "Greater Croatia". Modelled on the Hungarian ideal, this Greater Croatia would extend its boundaries from the Alps to the Prokletje Mountains, based on linguistic criterion.<sup>92</sup> (See Map 2 for *Greater Croatia*)

Much of Starcevic's legitimacy was based on historical documents, which he claimed proved the formal legal continuity of the Croatian state. For him, Croatian statehood had never been extinguished, and had actually been confirmed rather than lost by the 1102 *Pacta Conventa* with the Crown of Hungary. With their insistence on the legal continuity of the Croatian State, Starcevic and his *Party of Rights* imbued the Croatian consciousness with ideas of state and sovereignty. This national consciousness

rejected any political bonds, loyalties or obligations outside the Croatian nation, with Budapest or Vienna, or with Rome, by way of Catholicism. It demanded that alliances be forged solely on the basis of national, and once independence had been achieved, state interests.<sup>93</sup>

Starcevic's views on other South Slavs were controversial. The Bosnian Moslems he saw as blood brothers, separated from the Croatian nation only by Ottoman invasion. The Serbs he dubbed *Slavoserbi*, double slaves, since they supposedly derived their name from the Latin words *slavus* and *servus*, both meaning slave.<sup>94</sup> While seemingly a virulent anti-Serb, Starcevic was no more anti-Serb than his Hungarian contemporaries, and while he appeared to wholly abandon the notion of pan-Slavism, he did not reject the idea entirely. Arguing that anyone who adopted the Croatian national consciousness was Croatian, Starcevic tacitly allowed for a type of South Slavic consciousness, but of course on his terms.

He further asserted that the Serbian nation was not real. The Serbs were in some manner "Croats who had been enslaved and had lost their way". Serbs in Serbia were seen as Orthodox Croats, while Slovenians were Mountain Croats.<sup>95</sup> The genius of Starcevic's theories was this central idea of a Croatian renaissance; after centuries of colonial domination, the Croatian resolve was unbroken. The continuity of the state continued to exist in the minds of all Croats, thus creating the conditions for a national re-awakening, which would be manifest in the nation-state. He also gave Croats a dream for the future, of eventual autonomy from Hungarian imperialism. He posited that once all South Slavs realised that they were in fact Croatian, they could all eventually join together to form a Greater Croatian state.

### **Section 2.3: The Origins of "Greater Serbia"**

The idea of *Greater Serbia* traces its roots to the 1844 article by Serbian government minister Ilija Garasanin, who advocated the expansion of the small Serbian state, to unite Yugoslav *plemena* (or tribes) into a single state. A largely imperialist tract, the document has become famous, less as a rallying cry for Serbs than as "proof" of Serbian imperialism and intolerance. (See Map 3 for *Greater Serbia*)

Another Greater Serbian thinker was Vuk Stefanovic-Karadzic, whose ideas were remarkably similar to those of Starcevic, primarily because they too were influenced by Fichtean nationalism. It should be noted too that Karadzic and Starcevic were contemporaries, and no doubt borrowed from each other many of their political and

nationalist ideas. Karadzic's theories were also centred on a linguistic interpretation of the nation. Thus, anyone who spoke the Stokavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian was in fact Serbian and thus a member of the Serbian original nation. This he posited in his famous book ***Serbs All and Everywhere***, wherein he asserted that Serbs could be found anywhere the Stokavian dialect was spoken, and that Serbs could be Catholic, Orthodox or Moslem. As he posited: "When the Churches split, the main concern and business became the question whose side to stay on and thus the Serbs found themselves between Rome and Constantinople."<sup>96</sup>

To these musings would later be added the works of Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic (1865-1927). Using Fichte's ideas that the borders of the speakers of an original language formed the natural borders of the nation, Cvijic posited that the Serbian people were the most widely dispersed in Europe, and from this analysis introduced cartographic proof of the Serbian nation's right to huge tracts of land which they had never before owned. Part of the imaginary borders were drawn from the 14th century Serbian kingdom which had existed under Nemanjic dynasty.<sup>97</sup> Like Starcevic and Karadzic, Cvijic too documented the progress of his nation, viewing history as the rise, fall and rise again of the Serbian nation. His dream, to recreate the former greatness of the Serbian mediaeval empire was indicative of the general nationalist mood of the region, to reawaken a nationalism after it had long been submerged under colonial domination.<sup>98</sup> This is not to suggest that there was a lack of liberal thinking within Serbia at that time. Indeed, the *Young Serbian Society* (formed in 1847) was comprised of young German educated intellectuals advocating liberal and even democratic thinking in Serbia. This was largely in reaction to the long rule of Prince Milos Obrenovic, who had been ruling as hereditary sovereign since 1829. His so-called Oriental despotism (as William Langer describes it) had by that time so enraged the rising generation that they were very open to new ideas and movements from abroad.<sup>99</sup>

#### **Section 2.4: Origins of Serbo-Croatian: Language or Languages?**

Much dispute has arisen over the origins of the Serbo-Croat language. What we do know to be true is that the language, as with the Slavic tribes that entered the Balkan Peninsula during Roman times, was not classified according to national criteria (which would have been impossible at that time) but rather according to region. The monk brothers Cyril and Methodius are credited with the invention of both the Glagolytic and

Cyrillic scripts, based on Greek letters, which constituted the basic form of Staroslavonski (old Slavonic). This later branched into Serbo-Croat, Bulgarian, Russian and Ukrainian variants.<sup>100</sup> As Balkan observer Paul Garde notes, even today, dialects and accents are regional, not national, thus one cannot define a Croat or Serb "accent", as one would distinguish between a Marseillaise or Quebecois accent.<sup>101</sup>

While recent Croatian mythology surrounding their linguistic Fall a-la Fichte is rife, Weinstein notes that linguistic standardisation was initiated by both Croats and Serbs acting in concert, in an effort to unite against Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman domination. In 1850, Serbian and Croatian intellectuals together accepted the *Stokavski* variant of the Serbo-Croatian language as their literary form. Spelling reforms and common terms were agreed to, in an effort to reduce dialectical differences as much as possible. As Weinstein notes, this facilitated the expansion of literary activity, while creating a common symbol to which South Slavs could pledge their loyalty.<sup>102</sup> As he argues, the objectives of Croatian and Serbian linguistic reformers such as Ljudovik Gaj (Croatian) and Vuk Karadzic (Serbian) were no different than those of Martin Luther and his *Hoch-Deutsch* (Standard-German) when they advocated a standard language not based on regional dialectical differences.<sup>103</sup>

To be precise, Serbo-Croatian is a literary language created by 19th century Serbian and Croatian intellectuals. Popular speech is divided into several dialects and sub-dialects, but this is of little help in separating Serbs and Croats. The *Stokavski* dialect, for instance which served as a basis for the creation of literary Serbo-Croatian is spoken by most Serbs, but also by millions of Croats and others. Some Croats, however, especially those around Zagreb use the *Kajkavski* dialect, while those around the Adriatic coast speak *Cajkavski*, both dialects being quite far removed from the *Stokavski* dialect. There is no such language, in other words, as Croatian or Serbian, but there is a Serbo-Croatian language and a number of ethnically blind dialects.<sup>104</sup>

#### **A Summation of Section 2**

This short section had two objectives. The first was to demonstrate the intermingling and fluid nature of Serbian and Croatian nationalist symbols. Linguistic, cultural and religious standardisation are a relatively recent phenomenon, born of the work of 19th century nationalists who chose to create unified Serbian and Croatian nationalisms in order to counter the empires who dominated them. Serb and Croat scholars have thus literally invented their communities (to paraphrase Benedict Anderson). Rather than

engage in a form of pan-Slavism, which involved uniting various disperse regional groups into a larger whole, in order to counter two or three empires, it was in fact far simpler to override regional differences in a smaller area, in order to fight one empire directly. One can posit then, that Starcevic and Karadzic's nationalist forms developed as they did because of necessity, not from some sort of Croatian or Serbian group psychology or collective "evilness".

While the definition of Serb and Croat relied on a series of descriptors, namely language variant, region and religion, these descriptors, up until quite recently, were far from accurate. Many Serbs were Catholic, while some Croats were Orthodox. A true *harkening back* to the way things used to be would have involved a large measure of regionalisation and de-standardisation, since there is little which can be said to be *natural* about either of these nationalist forms. The fact that one was able to, and still may, change one's national affiliation, by slightly changing their name and switching religions demonstrates how very trite the actual differences are. The second point I wish to stress here is the constant tension which existed during the 19th and 20th centuries between a pan-Slavic, or trans-national form of identification when faced with an outsider, versus a smaller more concentrated national consciousness. This constant tension between these two ideas was to come to fruition in both Yugoslavia's, with the antagonism leading to obvious results.

### **Section 3: The First Yugoslavia**

#### **Section 3.1: "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes"**

The decline of both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires paved the way for the creation of a new state in the Balkan Peninsula. British and French foreign policy, with its practice of maintaining buffer zones welcomed the creation of a new buffer state on the *three fault lines of Europe*, especially during the time of the First World War. While Ante Starcevic's work had been influential in Croatian intellectual circles, Croatian intellectuals also steered towards their old ideas of a pan-Slavic consciousness, primarily in the belief that Croatia was simply too small to resist any belligerent invader, and that only through unification with its Slavic brothers could it be safe from Italian or Hungarian incursions.<sup>105</sup>

As Canadian political scientist Lenard Cohen notes, and quite against the assertions of modern Croat nationalists, the advocates of Yugoslavism were primarily

Croatian, as evidenced by the most important advocate of South Slav unity in the 1920's. This was the *Yugoslav Committee*, composed primarily of Croatian leaders, together with a number of Yugoslav oriented Serbs and Slovenes.<sup>106</sup> By contrast, the Serbians had received a good deal of autonomy under the Ottoman empire, (having received independence as a state in 1878 and a Serbian King in the same year) and thus maintained a national consciousness that embraced a Yugoslavism based primarily on Serbian, as opposed to pan-Slavic traditions. Most Serbians were less enthusiastic than their Croatian counterparts about the new state, which did allow for the unification of all Yugoslav regions, but at the expense of Serbian autonomy.

Appealing to Wilsonian principles, the new state was to be an expression of the right of nations to self determination. It was thus imagined that within this state, a South Slavic culture composed of many regional variants would be allowed to grow and flourish.<sup>107</sup> The 1917 Corfu Declaration announced the birth of this new state, in which the three flags, three religions and two alphabets of the constituent nations would be respected.<sup>108</sup> In December, 1918, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was born. (See Map 4)

Within the framework of their different political and socio-economic backgrounds, Serbs and Croats had fundamentally different interpretations of its political meaning. For the national elite of the Serbs, the common Yugoslav state was not only a viable framework for their national unification, but also the first step towards the merging of the three-tribe nation into a new national entity, a single Yugoslav nation. For the elites of the Croats and Slovenes, the common state was considered only as a suitable protection for their national rights and as a starting point towards their future national integration. Conceived as a bridge over the *millennium wide abyss* that had separated these nations for centuries, the Yugoslav state, due to different levels of national integration, soon became the scene of major disputes.<sup>109</sup>

Serbia gave the new state its dynasty, its military and administrative apparatus, a centralist manner in organising administration, as well as the developed and well-established institutions of a parliamentary monarchy. Considering the national question to be permanently resolved, the Serbs, and their King Alexander, from the Serbian Obranic Dynasty, strived for centralised statehood following the French model, while forging democratic competition between various political parties. Contrary to this, the main Croatian and Slovene political parties, fearing hegemonism and "Greater

Serbianism", resembled national movements more than political parties.<sup>110</sup> These national parties, such as the *Croatian Peasants' Party*, under Sjepan Radic, advocated increased autonomy and collective rights for Croats, who argued for a more federal state, less under the control of the Belgrade elite. The early parliamentary experiments of the young state were cut short when Radic was shot dead on the floor of the National Assembly in Belgrade. It was at this point, in 1929, that King Aleksander dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, in the process assuming legislative powers. Changing the country's name to Yugoslavia, Aleksander brutally suppressed all opposition to his administration, in his attempts to overcome all differences between his subjects.<sup>111</sup>

### **Section 3.2: Aleksander's Royalist Yugoslavia**

Aleksander's Yugoslavism was a radical attempt to wipe out historic divisions. As Aleksa Djilas puts it: "The king hoped to solve the national question by simply abolishing it."<sup>112</sup> Dividing the Yugoslav territory geographically, the king sought to erase all state traditions of the various Yugoslav nations, as well as ethnic and religious borders.<sup>113</sup> During the interwar period, two different administrative divisions emerged, composed first of 33 administrative units, then, after 1929, of 10 (9 of which became known as *banovine*, plus the city of Belgrade). These units were innovative insofar as they did not correspond to ethnic divisions; instead they represented geographical configurations, as each *banovine* carried the name of its principal river. As the Yugoslav Communists would later do, Alexander sought to destroy nationalism by increasing the strength of regionalism and centralism. (See Map 5)

This increased centralisation brought with it a form of Yugoslav consciousness. Rather than allowing the separate nations to grow together, Alexander chose to negate the importance of ethnic nationalism, and in its stead substituted a new Yugoslav identity. The rationale for this was explained by Alexander's hand-picked premier, Petar Zivkovic: "The old traditions and separate flags of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes belongs to the past. The true Yugoslav acknowledges the national tricolour only and does not know any racial or religious differences among the nations inhabitants."<sup>114</sup> In keeping with this philosophy, the new constitution advocated in September 1931 strengthened the power of the crown and central authorities, and banned political organisation committed to religious, regional or national goals.

Alexander's strategy was basically to institute a federalism based on regional non-national provinces strongly tied to a central administration. Alexander's primary problem

was his inability to stir up any real feelings of Yugoslav consciousness among "his" people. His new state sponsored Yugoslavism proved unable to transcend the strong national conflicts in the country or to legitimise the central government. It was equally impossible to expect that a regional *banovine consciousness* would somehow supersede national identification. The central government was also never able to dispel the feelings amongst its constituent peoples that there was little difference between Yugoslav consciousness and Serbian nationalism. As we will see in Chapter 3, this view of the first Yugoslavia is still held today in Croatia.

Although new laws banned the traditional party activities and created electoral rules favouring the new government sponsored *National List of Candidates*, popular commitment to regionally based ethnic leaders and movements opposed to Alexander and the Serbian controlled regime continued to flourish.<sup>115</sup> The inevitable eventually happened, as Croatian and Serbian nationalists began to form political parties on the same territory as their former nations. This occurred in the Croatian banovines, as Vladko Macek resurrected the (Croatian) *Peasants' Party*, and used this as a platform to argue for increased Croatian autonomy and collective rights.<sup>116</sup> Macek openly proclaimed in the 1930's his distaste for the central regime: "If the Serbs turn to the left, we will have to turn to the right. If a war breaks out, we will be left with no choice but to join with the opposite side to the one Belgrade chooses to support".<sup>117</sup> In 1939, Serbian officials were finally forced to accept the Croatian demand to create a separate state unit, the Banovina of Hrvatska (Croatia).<sup>118</sup> This split was achieved through the *Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement*, which created of Yugoslavia an asymmetric federalism, essentially a unitary state with one autonomous region.<sup>119</sup>

This asymmetric federalism would also be short lived. The Nazis had strategic need of Yugoslavia as a springboard by which to invade Greece, as the Bulgarian border faced the dreaded Metaxis Line, a string of Greek fortifications along the mountain frontier. This strategic importance made Yugoslavia ripe for Axis invasion.<sup>120</sup> This invasion took place in April, 1941, when Axis forces overran Yugoslavia and set about dismembering the region. Within two weeks of the invasion, the central government capitulated and the new Yugoslav King fled to London, where he formed his government in exile. Slovenia was divided into two parts, split between the Germans and Italians. Following a policy of de-nationalisation in their zone, the Germans deported Slovenian intellectuals and professionals, while bringing in German settlers from around central

Europe. Voivodina was also divided by the Axis, while Macedonia was handed over to the Bulgarians, where the region underwent a program of Bulgarisation. The Serbian province of Kosovo was handed over to the Italian Albania, and Montenegro was taken over by the Italians.<sup>121</sup>

All that remained of the former Yugoslavia were two rump states with puppet status, Serbia and Croatia. The borders of the newly "independent" Croatia were expanded to include Bosnian-Herzegovina, while parts of Dalmatia were carved off and joined with Italy. In May 1941, the kingdom of Croatia was announced, and Ante Pavelic, leader of the Croatian Ustashe fascist organisation was installed as Poglavnik (or Fuehrer) in Zagreb. Pavelic and his Ustashe enjoyed some public support, although the movement was largely alien to the region. The Ustashe had been Italian trained and backed, and were largely parachuted in by Mussolini in 1941.

Under the slogan of *Za dom spremni* (ready for the Fatherland), a policy of persecution began against the Serbian population, with the objective of deporting one third, killing one third and converting one third to Catholicism, thus effectively making them Croatian. Thus a series of massacres began, with the Serbs retaliating in kind. The Bosnian Moslems were also involved in the massacres of Serbs and Croats, and had organised themselves into an SS division, the Hanzar, or Scimitar Regiment.<sup>122</sup> Much of the extermination was centred around the Ustashe death camp Jasenovac, where large numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Communists were mercilessly slaughtered. In total, conscientious historians place the figure on those killed by Ustashe hands at 330,000, lower than the 700,000 suggested by Serb sources and higher than the 60,000 suggested by Croatian sources.<sup>123</sup>

While Croatia was allowed some freedom from direct Nazi control, Serbia was subject to the direct authority of the local German commanders. A puppet government was created with former Yugoslav army chief of staff General Milan Nedic placed at the head of a "government of national salvation". While Nedic was allowed a small military force called the Serbian State Guard, control over military and government activities was completely in German hands. In this war time situation, large numbers of Serbs, Croats, Jews, Gypsies and Communists were killed.<sup>124</sup> The Nedic regime strung together a coalition government of right-wing parties, among them Dimitrije Ljotic's nationalist party. Ljotic's followers and their *Serbian Volunteer Corps* fought with the Germans against the Communists and Jews.<sup>125</sup>

Opposition to the occupation was divided between the Royalists or Chetniks, loyal to the Yugoslav government in exile, and the Communist Partisans. The Chetniks were a series of fighting brigades, guerilla soldiers under Serbian general Draza Mihailovic. While generally anti-Nazi, the Chetniks were more anti-Communist, and displayed a reluctance to engage Axis forces, preferring to lay low and conserve men and supplies. This was perhaps a result of the 1941 German directive, ordering the execution of 100 Serbs for every German killed and 50 Serbs for every wounded German. As Barbara Jelavic reports, in one extreme instance, in October 1941, 10 Germans were killed and 26 wounded in Kragujevac. As a result, 7,000 of the city's inhabitants were killed by German troops.<sup>126</sup> The belief that the Allies would win the war anyway spurred caution on the part of the Chetniks, who believed that while the Germans and Italians would soon be defeated, the Communists posed a much greater threat.

This strategy was in contrast to that adopted by Tito's Communist *Partisans*, who engaged the enemy at every opportunity, under the slogan "Attack the enemy wherever and however you can". Tito had no illusions as to his enemies, and fought the Germans at every opportunity. Such actions forced Churchill and the Allied powers to eventually shift their support away from the Chetniks to Tito's Communist Partisans.<sup>127</sup>

The end of the war, and the creation of the *Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia* at Jajce, Bosnia in September 1943 led to the installment of Josip Broz Tito and his Partisans as the legitimate government in the country. Henceforth, the Yugoslav government abroad was deprived of all the rights of a legal government.<sup>128</sup> The interwar period distinguished itself as the only time when Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had lived together in a single state. Its decline and dismemberment during World War II also inaugurated an extremely bloody period in Balkan history, complete with death camps, forced religious conversions, the forced shifting of populations, and mass killings.

#### **Section 4: The SFR of Yugoslavia:**

##### **Introduction**

Josip Broz Tito and his Communist *Partisans* emerged during World War II as the only credible force capable of withstanding and defeating the quisling governments established by Hitler in the Balkan Peninsula. Rallying South Slavs of all nationalities, Tito and his guerrillas bands eventually succeeded, with allied support, in defeating Ante Pavelic's Croatian Ustashe forces, as well as Milan Nedic's Serbian Fascists and Draza Mihalovic's Serbian Chetniks (a guerrilla movement loyal to the Yugoslav government in

exile). With the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, Tito and his Council of Anti-Fascist Liberation (AVNOJ) set about creating a new Yugoslavia, one based on Communist principles and the proletarian revolution.

#### **Section 4.1: Foundations of the SFRY: Nationalism versus Communism**

The same problems found in the first Yugoslavia preoccupied the creators of the second. From the onset, divergent views emerged about the nature of the Yugoslav state. While some advocated splitting the region into several states, others advanced a more unitary arrangement, such as that established by King Alexander in 1929.<sup>129</sup> Even before the end of World War II, the *Social Democratic Party of Serbia* (which later joined the Yugoslav Communists) rejected national equality, embracing a Stalinist ideal of the state, where the strongest nationality would control and dominate the central party and government, thus forcing the assimilation of lesser nations.<sup>130</sup> By contrast, Croatian, Slovenian and Montenegrin Communists embraced the idea of a loose confederal arrangement, allowing some degree of autonomy from central control. Although these regions were permitted their own regional communist parties, this would not be at the expense of rigid centralisation.

What was therefore important then was to seek a compromise between the Croatian, Macedonian and Slovene demands for equality and the former dominant force of pre-war Yugoslavia: Serbian centralising hegemonism. What had to be created was a system where all nationalities would be respected, in a strong centralised state where Tito and his Partisan colleges could control and consolidate state power.<sup>131</sup>

From its very outset, in Jajce, when the second meeting of the *Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia* announced the creation of the SFRY, Yugoslavia was organised around two principles: one federalist and one communist. The justification for the re-creation of Yugoslavia was to be found in a curious amalgam of class consciousness and national awareness. The idea of the Yugoslav nation was achieved by emphasising the victory of the constituent nations of Yugoslavia against the Nazis and their quisling supporters in Croatia and Serbia. Yugoslavs as a nation had defeated Fascism and thus together their struggles had brought about the state of Yugoslavia. Since traditional Leninist doctrine placed nationalist divisions far below class distinctions, it was thus assumed that the uniting of the constituent nations based on class prerogatives would eventually lead to the withering away of nationalism, and its concomitant: the capitalist system.<sup>132</sup>

Federalism in this phase was simply a "facade federalism", since the system was thoroughly centralised.<sup>133</sup> Thus, as Dennison Rusinow asserts, federal arrangements were "carefully counterbalanced by a highly centralised but carefully multi-national one party dictatorship [with regional communist parties], with police apparatus and a centrally planned command economy."<sup>134</sup> The largely decorative role of the federal system, as Lenard Cohen describes, reflected the regime's assertion that ethnic and regional identities were becoming less salient facets of Yugoslav society. As Cohen notes: "Basic manifestations of ethnic and cultural distinctiveness were not prohibited, but traditional expressions of nationalist fervour, particularly regional based ethnic affirmation were harshly suppressed."<sup>135</sup>

The internal borders of the SFRY would be considerably different from those of Aleksander's Yugoslavia, with six republics and two autonomous provinces. Tito divided pre-war Serbia into Macedonia and Montenegro.<sup>136</sup> Vojvodina and Kosovo were then shaved off what remained of Serbia. Macedonia and Slovenia would receive their own republic status. While expanding the Croat borders to include Dalmatia, Tito cut away Eastern and Southern portions of Croatia, according them to Serbia. He also established a multinational government in Bosnia, with Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Moslems.<sup>137</sup> (See Map 6)

From the SRFY's beginning until Tito's death in 1980, a rigid ethnic key was employed in determining employment, the dispensation of justice, and the allocation of regional powers. Tito attempted to strike a balance between all constituent nations and republics. Henceforth, all appointments, from local military leaders and enterprise directors to cabinet ministers and members of the federal presidency would be based entirely on ethnicity.<sup>138</sup> A curious paradox emerged where all expressions of nationalism were violently suppressed, while nationality (or ethnicity) became the key determinant in all political and most military appointments. Thus, while citizens were forbidden to feel any national pride, they were daily reminded of their national self consciousness.

Tito's so-called "people's system", established a federation over which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exerted total control. No competing groups or influences would be tolerated. Tito established four institutions which would act as pillars of the new state: The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), Department for the Protection of the People (UDBA), The Communist Party of Yugoslavia/League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the federal and republican bureaucracies.<sup>139</sup> The rigid state control of

the media in conjunction with the party agitprop specialists insured the quelling of opposition. There would be no private radio stations, publishers, theatres or cinemas.<sup>140</sup> The Stalinist nature of the regime was stressed by Alexander Rankovic's secret police, who, in the first years of the dictatorship arrested and killed large numbers of people in various purges.<sup>141</sup>

The nature of the regime would later change, following the famous Tito/Stalin split in 1948, when Yugoslavia was ejected from the Soviet Comintern. This forced Yugoslavia to assume a new course, one determined by the desire to distinguish Yugoslavia from other Communist countries. In the quest for Western aid (since Yugoslavia was no longer being helped by the East) various programs were introduced to show the West how Yugoslavia was progressing towards a more "democratic" form of socialism. Thus Worker's Self Management was introduced, a more decentralised version of communist ownership, where the workers of individual factories owned the means of production instead of the state or "people". This was coupled with the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (in 1955) a large group of countries who were allied to neither East nor West. This non-alignment was enough to convince the West that Yugoslavia could indeed be the bridge between East and West, and was thus a useful country to aid with its economic development.

#### **Section 4.2: The *Club of 1941*: The New Class & Elite Socialism**

In what amounted to a fair election by Communist standards, an overwhelming percentage of voters affirmed Tito's mandate in 1945.<sup>142</sup> This first government, dubbed the *Club of 1941*, was primarily composed of Tito's *Partisans*, and would, over the course of the SFRY's short life, constitute an elite which would control political power within the federation until well after Tito's death. It was precisely this "Club of 1941" and its subsequent patronage machine which would lead to most of the regime's future problems.

The bureaucratisation and elitization of this "Club of 1941" was noticed by Edvard Kardelj, who noted a certain dizziness of power coming over his *Partisan* colleagues. In 1942 he observed that: "good fighters are becoming bureaucrats and dukes." He warned against the tyranny of the bureaucracy again in 1949, fearing that the federation could fall victim to its own bureaucrats. Kardelj's concerns were well founded, for Yugoslavia by 1949 had become a regime whose power was based almost entirely on an extensive network of patronage. As Boris Young notes, Yugoslavia was best described as a: "rent based nested-hierarchy of patron-client linkages." In simpler terms,

Young describes a system of top down patronage, where Tito would dispense patronage to his "Club of 1941", who would in turn dispense more "rents" downwards to the individual republics, to insure their compliance.<sup>143</sup>

As a rent based society, the Yugoslav patronage system was dependant on a steady continuous flow of rents (or foreign aid) through a vertical hierarchy of connections. This began at the top with a politically sanctioned monopoly, notably Tito and his Partisan comrades, who maintained a strong centralised system in order to collect and distribute rents.<sup>144</sup> The *League of Communists of Yugoslavia* became what Young terms the "authoritative allocator of rents", and acted as the "grand patron", distributing resources to the republics in return for loyalty and obedience. Republican patrons, chosen on the basis of an ethnic key, distributed the wealth down to the lower levels, to local and regional enterprises, and communes. The need for a grand allocator of rents accounts for the large number of federal programs such as the *Federal Fund for Accelerated Regional Development* (FADURK) and other regional initiatives, which helped the government maintain power.

By the 1950's the patronage system had become so entrenched that Yugoslav Politburo member Anton Ciliga noted how this "new class" of elites, high ranking communist officials, engineers and directors had effectively assumed the role of the bourgeoisie as an exploiter of the workers.<sup>145</sup> Tito's former right hand man, Milovan Djilas also spoke out against the formation of this new class, which he felt had betrayed the ideals of the revolution. In *The New Class*, Djilas observed that while everything was owned collectively within the state, collective ownership existed solely in a juridical sense. In reality the system was used, administered and controlled by the bureaucracy, who distributed everything, and consequently enjoyed the fruits of production. This forced Djilas to conclude: "The Communist system cannot attain a single one of the ideals named as its motivating force."<sup>146</sup>

Much of what appeared to external analysts to be economic miscalculations by the Yugoslav government were in fact various short term measures designed to insure a continuous flow of rents down the patronage hierarchy. When the coffers ran low, Tito and his colleagues were forced to petition outside the country for grants and loans, to maintain the system they had established.<sup>147</sup> The economy between 1950-60 and after 1970 became almost totally dependant on foreign aid. This would lead to problems throughout the regime's history. In order to maintain this *new class*, Tito and his officials

were forced to soften their central control to court more western aid, which led to increased economic decentralisation.

### **Section 4.3: Regional Elites and the 1971 Purges**

By the 1970's, control of socio-economic systems at the republican level became a convenient way to centralise bureaucratic and elite power. The slow but steady decentralisation of economic power increased the leverage of republican leaders to create economic autarkical relationships and protect republican markets.<sup>148</sup> The new elite arising from this situation championed republic rights, introducing independent economic, fiscal, investment, tax and commercial policies in their home republics, thus paying back the regional party bosses who had helped them gain power.<sup>149</sup>

Growing wary of the increasing power of this new elite, Tito secured the support of the army and initiated purges of the Serbian, Croatian and other republican Communist elites, in order to prevent what he termed the "unprincipled jockeying for power" which he had observed among this new class. He now found the party ranks full of "rotten liberalism", "bureaucratism" and "technocratism", all of which threatened central control and the self management system, which was crucial to securing foreign aid. The "Croat Spring" occurred in 1971, and a subsequent purge took place in Serbia in 1972.<sup>150</sup>

Tito's purges in 1971-2 were largely top down, and gained little international press attention, since the majority of the population were not involved. Directors of the most successful enterprises were fired, editors and journalists were dismissed, university professors were removed, and senior civil servants were fired, to be replaced with more compliant apparatchiks, obedient to the new federal and republican leadership. Marxist theory was introduced for the first time in school curriculum.<sup>151</sup> In addition to high level bureaucrats, managers and media personalities, the top republican Communist officials were removed, beginning in 1971 with the purging of the Croatian communist leadership of its two heads, Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar. This Croatian purge was followed in Serbia in 1972 by the ousting of Serbian communist chairman Marko Nikezic and secretary Latinka Perovic.<sup>152</sup> These changes allowed Tito to proceed with the decentralisation of power to the republics in response to Western exigencies, without fear of relinquishing central control. The purges he initiated were designed to get rid of these elites who threatened to split the party, replacing them with weak loyal yes men.<sup>153</sup>

The 1974 Constitution was largely a result of Tito's obligations to the West and his desire to establish a political system which would survive him after his death (he was at

this point in his late 70's). His obligations entailed further economic and political decentralisation along republican lines. As Milica Bookman reveals, the new constitution introduced widespread micro-level changes, such as the breakup of firms into constituent republic-based units, giving regions priority in taxation, monetary and fiscal policy, as well as balance of payments recording. Banking also became highly decentralised, with financial concerns operating at the republic and local levels.<sup>154</sup> Thus, federal power would be parcelled to the individual republics, while many former local powers would be increasingly centralised within the republics.

While appointing himself president for life, Tito wanted to extricate himself from the political scene, fearing that the system might collapse after his death unless he initiated a system to succeed him. After having purged the republican parties, replacing the old republican elites with his own men, he reduced the role of the central party, moving it away from its direct administrative capacity to assume a more advisory role. This invariably created a vacuum of power at the centre, and a consequent devolution of political power from the centre outwards to the individual republics, creating in effect a polycentric statism, with little central control.<sup>155</sup> The changes in the opportunity structure in Yugoslavia which emerged as a direct result of the new institutional make-up in 1974 further undermined links between the republics and the federation. "Regional leaders', as Klaus von Beyme comments, 'no longer counted on upward mobility in the central government apparatus". Instead, they created new opportunities in their republics and provinces and within their respective ethnic or national context.<sup>156</sup> The constitution served to consolidate the power of local party bosses who had long maintained economic control in their regions.<sup>157</sup> This constituted a fundamental change in the state structure, since now republican elites were no longer concerned with the federal centre.

Institutional changes in the 1970s allowed republican oligarchies to use "ethnicity" as a legitimate basis for asserting claims against each other, and all together against the federal government. Since the 1974 Constitution granted republics and provinces state prerogatives, all the appointments of resources had become the function of republics and provinces. Consequently, it became strategically more effective, as Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone observed, for communist federations in general, to aggregate interests on an ethnic base.<sup>158</sup>

The republican veto system, also introduced by the 1974 constitution resulted in political paralysis in Belgrade, as conservative blocs in Serbia and Montenegro blocked

many of Croatia and Slovenia's free-market oriented proposals. Similarly, federal monetary policy was hampered by the power balance and political structure of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. With its governors chosen by member Republican parliaments, the NBY lacked any substantial degree of independence. It thus became a further instrument in the power struggle between republics.<sup>159</sup> Moreover, regional administrations became responsible for social issues, the social security system, transportation, and law and order. The most serious aspect of this trend was the fragmentation of markets, which resulted in duplication of production and services as part of the general waste at each spacial level.<sup>160</sup> This was coupled with the republicanisation of the *Stalinist method of production*, whereby each republic was convinced of the need for standard heavy industry, such as steel production, even in the absence of local supplies of iron-ore and coaking coal. This wasteful duplication of industry in each republic, would become, as Fred Singleton writes: "an expensive status symbol and a badge of national pride."<sup>161</sup>

#### **Section 4.4: Tito's Death and the Rise of Nationality**

Tito's death in 1980 marked a further decline in the power of the federal centre. The political scene, until after Tito's death, was dominated by the old Partisan elite, the "Club of 1941".<sup>162</sup> These new leaders chose to gloss over the void left by his death, hiding behind his legacy and trying to maintain his system for as long as they could.<sup>163</sup> At the same time, the rotating presidency was composed of an elite who neither had the popular will, not the scars of battle to prove their worthiness.<sup>164</sup> With Tito's death in 1980, along with Kardelj in 1979 and Croatian Party President Vladimir Bakaric in 1983, the old guard lost its main leaders, and the remaining political elite was indecisive and uncertain. In the words of Zagreb historian Dusan Bilandzic: "It was Tito, Kardelj and the other personalities who made changes, but also halted them if things took the wrong direction. We do not have that sort of leading centre now."<sup>165</sup> The lack of leading personalities meant that when the economic and social reforms began to fail there was no strong personality trust worthy enough to lead. As the economy crumbled, the tenuous legacy of Tito's heirs evaporated, as people who had cynically tolerated elite privilege in good times were now unwilling to accept such privileges when it threatened their standard of living.<sup>166</sup>

An open conflict developed between Tito's Club of '41 and his hand picked successors and the younger newer republican elite who had carefully constructed strong

networks of support within the party. This afore mentioned new republican elite was composed of second generation populist politicians, who, in close collaboration with regional party bosses, rose quickly and quietly in the ranks of the party. Untouchables such as Serbia's Dragoslav Markovic and Slovenia's Stane Dolanc soon faded into political oblivion. Under Communist rule, no independent institutions, no assemblies or judicial bodies had been created that could mediate between the national groups once disagreements among them arose. Thus the stage was set for open confrontation.<sup>167</sup>

The need for a central state was less evident, and local republican elites, set about using Tito's strategy of consolidating power by inveighing against state enemies. The increasing detente between the US and USSR made Yugoslavia's role as a buffer zone, or a neutral ally less and less important. Commensurate with this decline in importance was a decline in foreign aid. With this decline, the central party lost its role as grand patron, a role greedily assumed by the leaders of the individual republics, who fought amongst each other for as much money as they could get.<sup>168</sup> The system by the late 1980's was doomed, with little hope of salvation. The patronage system was so destroyed that the promise of fresh loans by the US and the EC and the possibility of economic association with a united Europe were no longer enough to stop the course of the breakup. The machine had crumbled and there was no way now of distributing rents, and no trusted group of people to do it.<sup>169</sup>

This deadlock at the federal level was unresolvable, and would continue until late January, 1990, where almost all reform proposals were again turned down, and the Slovenian delegation stormed out of the assembly.<sup>170</sup> Once Slovenia left the assembly, Croatia followed suit. In both countries, referendums on separation spelled the end of the Yugoslav federation, and as we shall see in the following chapters, encouraged the rise of national elites in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, dedicated to improving their new respective republics at the expense of the federation.

## **Section 5: Institutional Constraints of the SFRY**

### **Introduction**

Throughout the 48 year life of the SFRY there existed a constant tension between regionalising and centralising forces. In this sense, the same general problem which preoccupied King Aleksander in 1921 plagued Tito and his colleagues throughout the second Yugoslavia. This problem, as Tito identified it, was how to bring the people

closer to the central government, while simultaneously overcoming historic ethnic and religious differences. The solution to his problem was to be achieved through three separate developments: the Non-Aligned Movement, worker's self-management socialism, and Yugoslav Consciousness. This final section will review the history and philosophy behind each movement, while demonstrating the interrelationships between these three elements.

### **Section 5.1: The Non-Aligned Movement**

Tito's transformation of Yugoslavia into a centralised party state that was respectful of some provincial rights was initially a great success. After World War II, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia aimed to create a united Yugoslav political consciousness on a threefold basis: ethnic and linguistic similarities and common traditions, the wartime national-liberation struggle, and the building of socialism.<sup>171</sup> For Tito, this consciousness had to be grounded in a strong unitary constitution and legal system, supported by a highly disciplined and centralised party to oversee the republic level parties. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1948 would unify the country, through the creation of a Soviet "Other" and a Western "Other". The importance of the split cannot be underestimated, for it nearly bankrupt Yugoslavia. Self management and other initiatives were essential in order to steer a new path, in the hopes of courting western aid.<sup>172</sup>

This fear of Russia and distrust of the West served to promote the Non-Aligned Movement, which increased Tito's popularity, and further served to repress internal opposition. Tito was able to maintain his tight control over the country by personally guiding her progress through uncharted waters. Yugoslavia maintained its independence through the Non-Aligned movement, a relatively large grouping of states who pledged support neither to the Warsaw Pact countries, nor to the NATO allies. Yugoslavia emerged as head of the NAM in 1956,<sup>173</sup> whose primary goal, as far as Tito was concerned, was to protect Yugoslavia from both Soviet "hegemonism" and American "imperialism". Throughout his reign, Tito used the fear of Soviet invasion to bolster his position. In 1976, Breznev would chastise Tito and his colleagues for their presentation of Yugoslavia as: "A helpless little Red Riding Hood whom the terrible bloodthirsty wolf, the aggressive Soviet Union is preparing to dismember and devour."<sup>174</sup>

Tito's policy of non-alignment was certainly one of the successes of his administration. The NAM allowed Yugoslavia to forge a rather unique role in world politics, remaining politically independent from both East and West. Of course,

Yugoslavia's economic system and most of its decentralising policies were a result of Western pressure, but the NAM allowed Tito to maintain the support of his citizens by the threat of external attack. The more dangerous the international environment, the more the country needed Tito at the helm, and the more power he was able to exercise. The movement had considerable prestige during the 1960's and 70's, allowing Tito many highly publicised junkets to various developing countries. NAM's importance declined commensurably with the end of the Cold War. As the East West antagonism declined, so too did the importance of the NAM. This loss of prestige ended the era of Yugoslavia's importance on the world stage as a *third option*, thus reducing the perception of Yugoslavia as a player in world events.

#### **Section 5.2: Yugoslav Consciousness and Nationality**

A committed Communist and virulent anti-nationalist, the furthest thing from Tito's mind after World War 2 was the creation of a new nationality to override those national identities which had spawned fascist movements. For this reason, Tito and his colleagues maintained a love/hate relationship with *Yugoslavism* throughout the lifetime of the SFRY. After the War, the Yugoslav category was conspicuously absent from the decennial census. This was due to two factors. The first was Tito's disdain for the first Yugoslavia. Any manifestation of Yugoslavism, he thought, would be somehow linked to "Great Serbian hegemonism". The second factor was Tito's desire, as discussed earlier in this chapter, to have working class identity supersede any form of national consciousness, even if it was perceived as inherently centralising.

Tito's first idea of a Yugoslav consciousness was based primarily on common struggle against fascist and tyranny.<sup>175</sup> For Tito, the only way then to reunite the Yugoslav peoples had been through the *War of National Liberation*, which acted to bind the people together, first in their hatred of the Fascists, and secondly, as workers and peasants desiring a better future. As Tito described in 1968: "Fighting for their own freedom and against the common enemy, the working class and all the peace minded forces of the peoples of Yugoslavia implemented, in action, the principle of proletarian internationalism and made a major contribution to the victory over fascism and the strengthening of the international forces of social progress."<sup>176</sup> Further, he posited that only the Yugoslav peoples as a *working class* and not a nation, were able to build the new state. As Tito further commented in 1968: "Our revolution reflected the organic link between the genuine interests of the working class... Only if the working class of each

nation plays the leading role can independence, equality and independent development be secured, and on that basis, indestructible brotherhood and unity and firm ties within the federal community".<sup>177</sup>

The hyphenated word "Yugoslavs" was never popular, and Tito insured from the beginning that it never attained the same status and recognition as other "imagined communities", such as the Macedonians and the Montenegrins in 1945, or the Bosnian Moslems in 1961.<sup>178</sup> The term "Yugoslav" was only introduced in 1961 as a new ethnic division. At this stage only 317,000 people claimed this distinction.<sup>179</sup> Officially this category was reserved for "nationally non-committed persons" and was treated as a residual category for those who offered no particular national identity.<sup>180</sup>

There were in fact some attempts at a Yugoslav consciousness. Still worried about over centralisation, Edvard Kardelj carefully advanced a form of *Yugoslavism*, known as "integralism" which would exist above, but not eliminating, national sentiments.<sup>181</sup> The same period also witnessed the short-lived campaign of *Yugoslavism* (Jugoslovenstvo), the theoretical justification of which was provided by Kardelj. "Yugoslavism" was defined as a: "pan-Yugoslav supra-national socialist patriotism that was supposed to transcend all cultural, linguistic and economic differences in the country."<sup>182</sup> This Yugoslavism, while a form of centralising nationalism maintained for its primary focus a class based consciousness. Only a good socialist, therefore, was capable of being a good Yugoslav.

This policy of "Yugoslavism" was eventually dampened by its very founders, because in many parts of Yugoslavia it was perceived as a threat to distinct national identities. Thus, republican leaders successfully discredited it as another attempt of Serbian hard-liners to create a Yugoslav identity in the image of a Serbian nation.<sup>183</sup> Not surprisingly, it was Kardelj who justified dismantling the very concept of "Yugoslavism" he helped create. In the speech given at the Eighth Party Congress in 1964, Kardelj reversed his previous position, and now depicted any form of centralised planning as the key cause of particularist nationalism. As he posited: "Centralisation, whether perceived as economic, or psychological (Jugoslovenstvo) directly provokes local nationalisms. Hence, it is not a solution to the problem, but its cause."<sup>184</sup>

A new "miraculous remedy" had to be located, and it was found in the atomisation of decisions at sub-regional levels. "The perception of decentralisation would,' according to Kardelj, 'bring about the deterritorialisation of the national rivalry and thereby move

people away from perceiving issues in ethno-national terms."<sup>185</sup> At the Eighth Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, held in September 1964, Tito followed Kardelj's lead and suddenly abandoned the idea of creating a single Yugoslav nation. He stressed that policy of Yugoslavism was an excuse for "assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, unitarism and hegemony".<sup>186</sup> Kardelj and Tito's *miraculous remedy* would of course be worker's self management, which was given more ideological importance in the 1974 Constitution.

Yugoslavism in its diverse manifestations was never popular. The overarching importance of ethnicity and the constitutionally enshrined ethnic key in determining appointment patterns and the strong attachment citizens maintained for their republics, meant that few would claim the distinction of being Yugoslav. By 1981, a larger number of people claimed to be Yugoslav, primarily those people the products of mixed marriages.<sup>187</sup> While discouraging ethnic diversity, Tito also succeeded in discouraging many of the cultural similarities between the constituent peoples, similarities which, had they been promoted, might have acted as a buffer to xenophobia and violence. By reducing the importance of a civic nationalism, the citizens of the various republics felt little attachment to the federal centre. The cult of Tito appeared to be the only symbol holding the state together. It was not surprising then, as Bogdan Denitch comments, that:

One unanticipated but in retrospect predictable result was that loyalties to the republics, which for the most part meant national loyalties, were kept high, while loyalties to a federal Yugoslavia were kept low. Even during Tito's lifetime it used to be said that he was the only real Yugoslav.<sup>188</sup>

Ironically, war and the dissolution of Yugoslavia might not have occurred, or at least not as quickly, had a strong Yugoslav consciousness existed. As Zarko Puhovski posits, the war would not have been possible without the death of the Yugoslav idea: "In ideological terms, there was some (of course perverse) logic in Serbs killing Croats for Serbia or Croats killing Serbs for Croatia. On the contrary, there was no logic at all in Yugoslavs killing other Yugoslavs for Yugoslavia."<sup>189</sup> Puhovski's logic is certainly correct. Most people identifying themselves as Yugoslav (many of mixed parentage, and I use the term advisedly) found themselves forced to choose between one nationality or another once the war began. Had the population of Yugoslavs been higher than 5.1%, perhaps 15 or 20%, a sufficient bulwark might have been created against the bellicosity of the new nationalisms. The lack of any strong central identity with strong myths, separate

**from Tito's cult of personality created the conditions whereby citizens first expressed loyalty to republican elites in order to protect their civil, cultural and economic positions, then pledged their support to nationalism, when the centre collapsed and there was no one else to guarantee their safety.**

### **Section 5.3: Worker's Self Management**

From the outset, *Yugoslavism* had to compete with Worker's Self Management. Self-management was to be the primary working class agent to bring about the *withering away* of nationality. This system was introduced in the spring of 1950, largely in response to Western demands that central control be loosened in favour of increased decentralisation and market reforms, with social versus state ownership, but also in order for Tito and Kardelj to chart a new course for Socialism, one not in keeping with traditional Stalinist dogma. Henceforth commercial practices and decisions were autonomously made by each socially owned enterprise.<sup>190</sup> The central unit of people's power would be entrenched in the self-management structure, where the workers would control all decisions regarding management and production in their factories.

Abandoning Yugoslavism, Tito and Kardelj felt that worker's self management might be the key to creating a worker solidarity in Yugoslavia, which would lead to a strong attachment of the state. Edvard Kardelj wrote that: "On the basis of inexorable socio-economic tendencies, there will be an even greater merger of the Yugoslav peoples." He based his conclusions on the premise that worker self management would accelerate the pace of economic development, thus increasing the worker's sense of gratitude to the state, while increasing the importance of worker ties within the factory. They felt that workers would abandon national or regional identification as they gained political power through the self-management system. Kardelj also posited that worker's self management as a form of class based decentralised power in Yugoslav society would reduce the threat of any one nation controlling the fate of another.<sup>191</sup>

As Kardelj revealed, self-management would allow for political and economic representation, as members of the smallest integrated economic and political unit in the worker's self management system. Rather than advocating collective rights on the basis of nationality only, the self managed enterprise was to become the primary local for worker identification: "[A]ll people employed in the socially owned sector of the economy had rights of self management to participate in the management of their firm or social service and to be politically represented as such through elected delegates from their workplace to legislative assemblies."<sup>192</sup> In his political testament "The Development of the Political System of the Socialist Self-Management" (1977), Kardelj encapsulated the essence of the self-management structure in the following manner, touting at the same time his belief in the triumph of the system he designed:

In fact, we no longer have a classical federation or confederation, but rather a self-management community of nations and nationalities of a new type, which is not based exclusively on a division of state functions, but above all on common interests determined by self-management and a democratic constitutional agreement among the republics and autonomous provinces. In this way, the self-management system has given an entirely new, democratic quality to inter-nationality relations as well.<sup>193</sup>

Northrope Frye noted that Communism in general maintained a teleological world view, that being the triumph of the workers as a class over the bourgeoisie and the culmination of historical forces in a socialist paradise. The form of Communism to which Frye referred implied two things, first the unity of the working class and secondly, state ownership of all property in the name of the people. In Yugoslavia, neither of these events occurred. Through worker's self management, workers owned collectively only the plant in which they worked. They had no spiritual or economic connections to factories or enterprises in other republics, or even in the next town. Similarly, at the level of worker solidarity, there were no pan-republican worker's organisations or unions which might have entrenched worker's rights, or a general working class consciousness. As Jim Seroka notes, there were no cross-republican class cleavages. Specifically: "[T]here was no institutional mechanism allowing workers from one union in one republic to associate with their counterparts in another. School curricula, mass media influence, tax policies etc, were republic specific."<sup>194</sup> Thus Bodgan Denitch concludes: "[T]he lack of institutional considerations led to the adoption of national identity as a focus of mass loyalty."<sup>195</sup>

While operating relatively efficiently in the 1950's, by the 1960's the Self Management system resulted in enormous waste and under-utilised industrial capacity, both of which provided workers with little incentive to work. Because workers could neither be hired or fired, except through the auspices of the Communist party, incompetence eventually ruled.<sup>196</sup> At the same time, a management elite began to rise.<sup>197</sup> This led to what Korosic terms *industrialist megalomania*, where economies of scale and productive efficiency become secondary to bureaucratic dominance over the economy.<sup>198</sup>

Rather than existing autonomously, these self-managed enterprises eventually became a powerful base for the rising republican nationalists. As well, most of the workers were themselves former peasants who never fully assimilated the class consciousness Tito attempted to foist on them. The popular slogan "We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us" was more perhaps indicative of the people's general attitude

towards their working class identity than Tito and Kardelj's elaborate and charismatic speeches.

## **Analysis & Conclusions**

As I have shown, the standardisation of national symbols as well as the consolidation of national communities was achieved in the 19th century, largely reflecting the current intellectual traditions of the time. These ideas proved useful for uniting disparate peoples speaking different dialects of the same language, having different religions and different regional histories, against common imperialist enemies; for Croats: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and for Serbs: the Ottoman Empire. The theme of uniting people under oppression would serve as the basis for the creation of Aleksander's Kingdom and his Yugoslavia. Here all South Slav were to be free from colonial oppression, joining together to form a state under Woodrow Wilson's principles of self determination.

• Aleksander's mistake was to overcentralise a system where people had already felt their regional identities strained by ethnic national identification. The King's *banovine* system, while useful administratively, denied the people any true sense of regional or national identity. If Croatian and Serbian nationalist forms could be said to be *imagined communities* (again to borrow from Benedict Anderson), then Aleksander's Yugoslavia was perhaps beyond everyone's imagination. The regime's brutality and the imposition of centralisation by force no doubt reminded many of their former colonial domination.

Tito's Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was somehow different. Largely inspired by a reaction against nationalist particularism, Tito's regime suppressed nationalism while acknowledging the importance of nationality. His ethnic key would insure that his government did not make the same mistakes as his royal predecessor. Wary of Aleksander's mistakes, Tito forged a Yugoslav identity and a mass consciousness based on the struggles of the working class, a form of consciousness which unfortunately appeared to many to be as false as Aleksander's Yugoslavism. While turning peasants into factory workers proved a relatively simple matter, it proved more difficult to imbue them with the attitudes, goals and cohesiveness of a united working class.

Like the *banovine* system, Tito and Kardelj's worker's self management allowed a fragmentation and regionalisation of identity to occur. Workers identified first with their enterprises, then with their regions, then with their republics. Any identification with the federal centre was more an identification with Tito and his cult of personality than with the state itself. While allowing the increasing bureaucratisation of the government at all levels, Tito sanctioned the increasing decentralisation of the bureaucracy, the economy,

and finally political power. As Robert Howse astutely notes, any sense of commitment in the multiethnic state was conceived in collectivist terms, as were the granting of rights. Rights were viewed as collective, as those brokered by an ethnic elite. Instead, group rights actually enforced the sense that only the collective power of one's own ethnic group could provide any guarantee of linguistic or cultural security, thereby supporting what Jajic terms "the monopolisation of ethnic politics by the governing strata in the republics."<sup>199</sup>

As Tito's old centralising bureaucrats (Club of 1941) died out, and he with them, the vacuum of power at the federal centre was filled with younger more enterprising republic based elites, who, as elites did in the 19th century and in Aleksander's Yugoslavia, found it easier to consolidate regional support within a smaller national territory than country wide support at the federal centre. As Robert Howse further reveals, the transition from Yugoslav federalism to *nationalist* particularism was actually facilitated by the nature of Tito's system. As he describes:

Class struggle was a dominant ideological doctrine, and for decades, society was indoctrinated with collectivist rhetoric. Against this background of an indoctrinated public sphere it was relatively easy to transform one form of collectivist ideology into another, even if it was distant in content, so long as the collectivist nature of the ideology was preserved. Therefore ethnonational collectivism was almost tailor made to replace the old ideological schema.<sup>200</sup>

The end of the Cold War decreased the importance of Yugoslavia as a bridge between East and West. Yugoslavia lost her special role in world politics, and with this, the constant external threat which justified Tito's strong central institutions. The dissolution of the SFRY must be seen in terms of a slow and steady decentralisation of all powers to the republics, commensurate with a decline in the importance of centralising elites and an increase in the importance of republican elites, following the death of Tito in 1980. Yugoslavia's dissolution must also be understood within the general environment following the collapse of Communism in East/Central Europe, a process which became obvious by 1989, with the fall of the *Berlin Wall*. Communism as an ideology lost much of its former credibility at this point, and this lesson was certainly learned in Yugoslavia, as Slovenia and Croatia clambered to be some of the first countries to court Western aid for planned *market reforms*.

As we shall see in the following chapters, the lack of centralising mythology and Yugoslav consciousness created a philosophical vacuum which was eagerly filled by

**nationalists in Croatia and Serbia. The preoccupation of these new leaders would be to situate the history of the Croats and Serbs within a cyclical framework, and to show how every movement which prevented the nation from achieving its telos, (ie the creation of the nation state) was inherently negative and destructive. Through this new optic, Aleksander's Yugoslavia and Tito's SFRY were merely historical aberrations in the path of national destiny.**

## **Chapter 3: Case Study 1: Serbia**

*Not only is the Yugoslav reality as twisted as the tunnels that held the Minotaur, but the observer keeps coming face to face with himself, seeing his own image spring out from what he thinks are the events of history, unable to separate projection from observation, fact from reflection, self from the other.*

-E.A. Hammel in: "The Yugoslav Labyrinth"-

## **Introduction**

As discussed in the introductory section of my thesis, I will use a four stage model to analyse the nature of Serbian ethno-nationalist discourse. Applying this four stage analytical framework to a variety of themes discussed in Serbian ethno-national discourse, I will then be in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of the model for understanding Serbian ethnic nationalism. What I will attempt to examine here are the various important and current themes in Serbian national discourse, analysing them to see if indeed they do possess one or more elements in my four stage cycle. I wish to stress at this stage that the structure of this and the following chapter will not follow the structure of the four stage cycle. That is, I will not begin with original nation discourse, then Fall discourse, etc.

While this might seem a logical method by which to proceed, the logic of discourse analysis dictates that the four stage model is an analytical tool, rather than a framework for structuring the results of analysis. For instance, in studying the SANU Memorandum, it makes more sense to study the document as a whole, analysing it for examples of original nation, Fall and deliverance forms of discourse, rather than dividing the document between three or four sections. By keeping the section together, one is able to more fully appreciate the significance of the Memorandum's contribution to national discourse.

In this chapter, the image of Serbs as inherently good, trusting people will often be stressed, as well as their willingness to sacrifice for the good of their nation, as well as for the defence of good nations everywhere. This is contrasted to images of other nations, who are similarly derided for taking advantage of Serbian goodness, thereby bringing about a series of Falls in Serbian history, which only the current Serbian nationalist government can resolve. Central to the idea of a suffering nation is the notion of "Anti-Serbianism" which can only be likened to a version of what the Jewish people term Anti-Semitism. Anti-Serbianism, as we hear, becomes the central negative agency acting against the Serbs throughout history, engendering series of Falls from grace. In this sense, the Albanians in Kosovo, the Croats in Croatia, the Vatican, the Bosnian Moslems and the

Western Powers all become practitioners of this Anti-Serbianism, and each of these "negative agencies" will have one or more sections devoted to it.

For Serbs and Croats, as with Zionists, the most important of the four stages is the Fall stage, since this stage creates the necessary gap between past greatness and present suffering, a gap necessary to demonstrate to the outside world the suffering of the nation. The gap also becomes necessary when national ideologues claim an axiomatic right to be delivered from their enemies through the creation of an autonomous nation state. Serbs take great pains to demonstrate their heritage of nobility, heroism, gallantry and sacrifice. The series of Falls as a result of treachery, betrayal and unwarranted aggression by those with an Anti-Serbian political project create martyrs of the Serbs, who are rewarded for their kindness with hatred and "genocide".

The Falls thus contribute to the myths of Serbian greatness and are an essential part of Serbian national self consciousness. Milosevic and his nationalist government emerge as the key agent which allows the Serbian nation to once more achieve what it has lost during its many historic *Falls*. This includes uniting all Serbs in an ethnic nation-state where they will be free of oppression. Likening themselves to the Jewish people after the Holocaust, Serbian ideologues conclude that their *Falls* constitute sufficient moral imperative to legitimate the creation of their own homeland. It is only when this homeland has been achieved that the completion of the fourth stage can be contemplated. Of course by homeland I mean a state which comprises all of historic Serbian lands. Serb ideologues contend that their present territorial arrangement is an artificial Titoist construction. In this stage, only Serbs will live on their historic lands, and all those who suffered in history will be avenged.

## **Section 1: The Rise of Nationalism in Serbia**

### **Introduction**

In this first section of Chapter 3, I will begin with an examination of the events before and after the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, the current Serbian President. I will also examine the centralisation and monopolisation of the media, as the central means by which information is transmitted within the state. This Section is essentially a description of Stage 3 of my four stage model. I put Stage 3 first for several reasons. The first is that, from a chronological perspective, Stage 3 must come before the other stages. This is simply because at this stage, the nation begins to reawaken, as nationalist politicians and

writers begin to revive and reinterpret old myths and stories. Without the advent of Stage 3 (the rebirth of nationalism) there would be no new Serbian national discourse. The role of myths of the original nation and myths of the Fall would be irrelevant, if there was no national movement to again "remind" members of the nation of the importance of nationalism. In essence, one could say that all Serbian national discourse is grounded in Stage 3. It is therefore important to begin with the chronological beginnings of Serbian nationalism, then move to a discussion of the other themes involved.

#### **Section 1.1: Beginnings of Modern Serbian Nationalism in Yugoslavia:**

The early roots of the Milosevic phenomenon can be traced to the purge of the early 1970's, when Tito politically expelled all leading reform minded communists in Serbia. These so-called liberals had advocated strengthening the market forces in the Yugoslav economy, a greater degree of freedom of speech, as well as party withdrawal from arts and culture, and the promotion of young people to positions of power. While democratic dissidents considered these efforts half-hearted and slow, Tito found them reactionary, and the subsequent purges inaugurated a *silence* similar to that in Croatia.<sup>201</sup>

Until the mid 1980's the Serbian Communist Party was frozen in a pattern established and maintained by Tito, and found itself incapable of reacting quickly to internal crisis. Problems became apparent in 1981, when Kosovar Albanians, demanding self determination and an end to their economic backwardness, orchestrated mass demonstrations and riots in Kosovo. At this point the Serbian government found itself incapable of protecting Kosovo's Serb minority, who felt threatened by this wave of popular unrest. Reports of Serbian women being raped, and Serbian men being assaulted angered many Serbs within Serbia proper, who felt that their brothers and sisters in Kosovo were being actively discriminated against. Tito's passive Communists were roundly condemned for their inaction.<sup>202</sup>

The Kosovo problem would emerge as a central preoccupation of most Serbs during the 1980's together with a disastrous economic decline, which resulted in a 47% unemployment rate in Serbia proper. This sense of political and economic insecurity was compounded by the feeling that the SFRY was no longer a cohesive federation. With increasing decentralisation, it became obvious that if each republic did not fight for its own rights at the federal level, they would be exploited by other more greedy republics.

The death of Tito and the end to the dictator's firm control over all aspects of Serbian political life created, as discussed in a Chapter 2, a power vacuum. The

remnants of Tito's old guard were slowly brushed aside, as a new generation of reformers pushed for economic restructuring and an end to the old centralist politics of the Tito regime. This vacuum at the centre was filled by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic (Serbian Party President), Ivan Stambolic, (President of Serbia) and Dragisa Pavlovic, (Belgrade Party President), who initially advocated economic changes, then began demanding political change as well.<sup>203</sup>

A former Belgrade banker, Slobodan Milosevic came in during this new wave as a close collaborator of Stambolic, and succeeded him in a wide range of positions from director of the Municipal Council to President of the Communist Party of Serbia.<sup>204</sup> Milosevic eventually deposed his friend and rival, along with the liberalist wing of the party in 1987, promising a strong top-down monolithic party in complete control of the government.<sup>205</sup> Hijacking the reform process, Milosevic stacked the party with former Communist apparatchiks, army and police officers who sought to protect their positions.<sup>206</sup> Much of their legitimacy was based on the maintenance of Marxist principles within the state, and the continuation of the Titoist legacy of strong central control. This central control would, however not be at the federal level, but rather at the level of each individual republic.<sup>207</sup> Milosevic cleverly allied himself with the intelligencia by adopting the proposals in the 1986 Memorandum issued by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.<sup>208</sup> He now had an ideological base from which to operate, a much needed intellectual legitimisation for his actions.

By 1987, Milosevic transformed himself from a stuffy, free market oriented banker to a "national saviour", earning this epithet while protecting a group of Kosovo Serbs from being beaten by the Kosovo police with the simple promise to all Serbs everywhere: "No one has the right to beat the people."<sup>209</sup> Within a few months, playing on the ever growing mediatisation of the plight of Kosovo Serbs, while repeating the arguments from the "Memorandum" concerning the inability of the Serbian party apparatus to address the Serbian grievances at the federal level, he managed to organise a party coup and become the undisputed leader of the Serbian party-state. Immediately a great number of Serbs, communist, non-communist and even anti-communist started to gather around him, determined not only to protect the Serbian minority in Kosovo but to suppress the Albanians as well. Soon acknowledged as national leader, jingles were invented to celebrate him, as he attempted to achieve the status of a second Tito.<sup>210</sup>

The Milosevic appeal rested on his denial of republican borders. He claimed to speak for and to all Serbs in Yugoslavia, at a time when nationality was increasing in importance.<sup>211</sup> He further promised to redress all the series of perceived *Falls* that the Serbs as a nation had undergone over the past 42 years of the SFRY's existence. These were specifically the weakening of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the denial of Serbia's right to control events in its two former provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina (which had gained autonomy under the 1974 Constitution). Further, Milosevic promised to end the so-called persecution of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and of course Kosovo, the exact nature of which had been described in the 1986 Memorandum (which we will later see).

Promoting a national consciousness, the Milosevic regime had begun, in 1987, to stir up the Serb population in Bosnia against the tri-ethnic government there, fearing that they were in danger of being swamped by the "fast-reproducing" Moslems.<sup>212</sup> Through the *Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins*, Milosevic was also able to manipulate the political system in Kosovo, bringing about the overthrow of its government in 1989.<sup>213</sup> In October, 1988 pro Milosevic forces also captured power in Vojvodina, in a coup that brought the republic under Serbian influence. He further toppled the government in Montenegro, in 1989, replacing it with his own men.<sup>214</sup> These four regions would compose the new *Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia*, which would emerge in 1991, after Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia separated from the federation. (See Map 7 for the current borders of the New Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina)

The Serb actions against the Albanians in Kosovo demonstrated definitively the collapse of the federal system. That federal institutions could not contain such a flagrant outburst of nationalist violence demonstrated the weakness and decay of the federal structure. The lesson of Kosovo was obvious. The federal system was no longer strong enough or was unwilling to restrain belligerent republics, and it was unable to protect basic human and constitutional rights within the borders of the federal state. Macedonia followed Serbia's path, instituting a state sponsored nationalism, together with a ban on the teaching of Albanian in schools and a denial of basic rights to Albanians and Turks in 1989, when they were removed from the list of protected minorities in the constitution.<sup>215</sup>

The December 9th 1990 elections in Serbia saw more than 50 parties competing for the 250 seats in Serbia's unicameral legislature. Milosevic and his SPS (Socialist Party

of Serbia) gained 2/3 of the votes for president and 77.6% of the seats. (194). Vuk Draskovic's SPO party came in a distant second with only 19 seats. 20 of the smaller opposition parties later created a coalition (the United Opposition of Serbia) to counter the Milosevic government.<sup>216</sup>

Milosevic's strategy appears to have worked well. By appealing to Serbian publicly voiced grievances and frustrations, he was able to gain maximum political capital from his machinations in Kosovo and Vojvodina, while similarly attempting to recreate a Tito-esque cult of personality, also redressing the series of Falls in Kosovo and Croatia, Milosevic became a national saviour. While politically, Milosevic was in control, this was only the beginning, for soon all institutional and organisational facets of Serbian life would be firmly under government control. The Serbian nation was about to be re-awakened from its slumber, *resurrected* after its *Fall* in the SFRY.

#### **Section 1.2: The Media in Serbia**

As Yugoslav historian Predrag Simic reports, the media in the Balkans have increasingly become the main instrument in stirring up and controlling the flow of ethnic national discourse. Simic posits that the main purpose of this media control has been to mobilise the population for war. As he describes: "The function of war propaganda disseminated by the conflicting parties has been, by turn, to mobilise and intimidate, glorify and demonize, justify and accuse, bearing out the assumption that the media bears a large part of the responsibility for the outbreak and tragic course of the war in former Yugoslavia."<sup>217</sup> This sadly, has been the case in Serbia *and* Croatia, where the only sources of information accessible to the average citizen have been tainted with slanted reporting, omissions and falsehoods, designed to demonize opposition both inside and outside the nation, while simultaneously upholding the government position as an absolute good.

Under the 1990 *Serbian* and the 1992 *Federal Constitutions*, some freedom of the press was guaranteed, but this was heavily limited by provisions under the *Serbian Penal Code*, specifically *Article 98*, which provided enhanced protection to government officials. Three years imprisonment would be the result of any infractions of the new laws. These included "public ridicule [of] the Republic of Serbia or another Republic within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, their flag, coats of arms, or anthems, their presidencies, assemblies of executive councils, the president or the members of the presidencies..." *Article 218* also contained vague provisions against the spread of false

information, such as "spreading false statements with intent to provoke disquiet among citizens or to threaten public order and peace or to prevent the implementation of government decisions or measures, or to diminish the confidence of citizens in such decisions or measures shall be punished by imprisonment of up to three years."<sup>218</sup>

Together, these sections allowed the *Serbian Ministry of Information* and the *Ministry of the Interior* to censor, delete or change any aspect of reporting found to be critical of the government or somehow "depressing" to Serbians. The Milosevic regime has done its best to limit if not destroy the independent media, by imposing swinging taxes, restricting access to more powerful broadcasting transmitters and cutting supplies of newsprint and fuel to the independent media. Newsprint in Serbia and Montenegro is manufactured by a state owned business, Metroz, and is often refused to papers who refuse to comply with government exigencies (such as *Borba*<sup>219</sup>, *Vreme* and *Republika*). Those papers who do buy from the government are forced to pay up to four times more for their paper than loyal government controlled papers, such as *Vecernje novosti*.<sup>220</sup> Steps were also taken to take over troublesome media. The prestigious *Politika Group*, which owned twenty publications, a radio station and a television channel, while formally independent under the Yugoslav socialist system, became an appendage of the Milosevic government in 1987.<sup>221</sup>

The *Serbian Radio-Television (RTS)*, currently the most important news medium in the country, holds a monopoly on state-wide broadcast. There are three channels, which broadcast to 96% of Serbia as well as parts of Croatia and Bosnia. The July 1991 *Law on Radio and Television* transferred parliamentary powers over radio and television directly to the government. In total, over 1,000 staff members were cut from *RTS* in a January 1993 "necessary rationalisation". As a result, the network has openly sided with Milosevic, specifically during elections, where they accused Milosevic's presidential rival, Milan Panic, of being a criminal.<sup>222</sup> In 1993, the Serbian information minister, Milivoje Pavlovic commented on the importance of *RTS* to the Serbian government, specifically since it tied Serbian communities in Greece and Hungary to one another, and to all Serbs in the *Diaspora*: "Thanks to the advantages of electronic media, *RTS* provides for a precocious level of spiritual unity of all Serbs world-wide in the times, when neither justice nor truth prevail, but are regulated, if not contaminated by Serbophobia and other products from the kitchens of the creators of the new world order."<sup>223</sup>

The emphasis on *RTS* coverage has stressed the defensive nature of Serb activity. As Mark Thompson reveals in his analysis of the Serbian media, the Serbs were "fighting for freedom", "defending" and "guarding" their native soil against the Moslems who were waging a religious war, and wanted to force Serbs to join an Islamic state; and from the Croats, who wanted to unite with Croatia, whose "anti-Serb fascism" was already known. Radivoje Gitic, reporting for *RTS* from Hercegovina proclaimed early in the war: "Croatian and Muslim forces want to destroy everything Serbian in these areas. Terror, fanatical hatred and physical and spiritual *genocide* against Serbs in Hercegovina are the basis of their political and military effort, and permanent aggression against Serbian territories."<sup>224</sup>

Predictably, much of the Serbian media campaign has focused on the demonization of other republics. In a campaign designed to remind Serbs of the evils of the Croatian Ustashe perpetrated during World War II, the Ministry of Information, followed by *Serbian TV*, began systematically unearthing mass graves of Serbs killed by the Croatian Ustashe 50 years before. Bone-counting supposedly increased the number of reported Serbs victims beyond the seven hundred thousand claimed by Serbs previously.<sup>225</sup> This has been coupled with series of historical documentaries on *Belgrade TV*, showing footage from the Second World War, of Slovenians welcoming Hilter's army with open arms.<sup>226</sup> The connotations are clear: the evils of the past are not only far worse than previously imagined, they are being revisited in the present.

The purpose of Milosevic's control of the media appears to be two fold. Firstly, central control of the media has allowed the regime to consolidate its power by inhibiting any opposition or anti-Milosevic sentiments from being aired publicly. Similar to Tito's self-management or Aleksander's direct democracy between King and people, Milosevic's mass rallies and direct control of the media allows him a form of direct democracy with "his" people. Each person, while watching the television, reading the newspaper or attending a Serbian nationalist rally instead of demonstrating against the regime, tacitly lends it their support.

Secondly, control of communications allows the government to perpetuate a cyclical view of Serbian history. Since the government portrays itself as the representative of the Serbian nation, and not so much the representative of the citizens of Serbia, all opposition, from internal dissent to Western sanctions, to Croatian policies against Serbs in the Krajina region is placed in a historical context as an agent liable to engender another

*Fall* of the Serbian nation. This constant theme of persecution serves to create a division of "self" and "other". The Serbian government, as a representative of "self", is constantly contrasted to any external forces, which become an "other". As in Biblical teleology, the constant antagonism of "self" versus "other" serves to justify actions on the part of the representatives of "self" to reduce the power of the "other". This sense of good versus evil becomes extremely useful for the Serbian state, since it can now claim to be inherently good, while those opposing the regime become inherently evil.

This dichotomisation, as we shall see has manifested itself in a constant sense of persecution. The old Bolshevik theme that "those who are not for us are against us" serves to eliminate any grey areas, which, in an authoritarian system, become dangerous to the perceived legitimacy of the government. In this sense the government, which is seen in Serbian discourse as synonymous with the Serbian nation-state is imbued with a historic mission: the defend itself against all "others", who through this binary optic are seen only as aggressors. This protection against "others" as understood through a cyclical conception of history is to culminate in the creation of an autonomous Serbian nation-state, where Serbs can reclaim their national identity, free from persecution.

### **Section 1.3: The Serbian Orthodox Church:**

Concomitant with the re-emergence of nationalism in Serbia has been the rise of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which, as a distinctly national church had been weakened during the Communist period. This occurred when Tito assumed power in 1945, during which time, the Serbian Church lost 70,000 hectares of agricultural land during early periods of forced collectivisation, then a further \$8 billion worth of urban church property, including 1,180 buildings. In spite of these drawbacks, or *Falls*, the Church was slowly able to resurrect itself, and by 1970 had built 181 churches and restored 841 more, built 115 chapels and restored another 126, as well as building 8 monasteries, while restoring another 48.<sup>227</sup>

The Orthodox Church, while slowly emerging during the 1980's, has seen much of her former glory restored with the advent of the Milosevic regime. The Church has benefited from Milosevic's rule in concrete ways. First, it was allowed to undertake a vigorous construction program, including regions barred during the communist period. It was also granted permission in 1989 to sell its magazine, *Pravoslavlje*. Christmas was publicly celebrated in downtown Belgrade for the first time in four decades, and the

government began to promote religious education, removing Marxism classes from school curricula.<sup>228</sup>

Milosevic's support of the Church has of course been a quid-pro-quo endeavour, and both Church and State have openly collaborated to promote a Serbian ethnic national identification. In token of the new atmosphere, the Serbian Orthodox Church co-operated with regime in organising Orthodox services connected with the commemoration of the Serbian Battle of Kosovo, where pictures of Milosevic could be seen with religious icons, suggesting the strong links between the two organisations.<sup>229</sup>

## **Section 2: Myths of Serbian Greatness**

### **Introduction:**

The Serbs "self" image is one of a good and trusting people, always prepared to help those in distress, to sacrifice for the greater good of humanity. This is contrasted to the image of the "others", who through their evilness, bring about the conditions whereby the Serbs are betrayed and suffer a *Fall*. One is reminded here of Frye's description of the Bible as a divine comedy, where the hero, because of his tragic flaw (his kind and trusting nature) always *falls* in distress, only to be recompensed at the end, when scores are settled in his favour. The image reminds one also of a Christ like figure, able to turn the other cheek, to sacrifice himself, and die if necessary for the sins of others. For example, as former Yugoslav President and author Dobrica Cosic stated before the European Communities: "Ours is a state whose people are faithful to their peace-loving and democratic traditions, their Hellenistic Christian culture, their historical determination to be an organic part of Europe in every respect."<sup>230</sup> This theme of Serbian greatness has been propagated in a series of myths about the origins of the Serbian nation. As Balkan historian Norman Cigar has noted, the notion of Serbia as the "new Byzantium" and of the Serbs as a "heavenly people" [nebeski narod] were to become increasingly frequent motifs in both popular and intellectual circles in Serbia.

### **Section 2.1: Serbians as an Original Nation:**

Although some individual clerics seem to have become uncomfortable with the implications, the Serbian Orthodox Church has reinforced this self-image of uniqueness, bestowing an almost messianic quality to the nation. Speaking of his fellow Serbs, Metropolitan Amfilohije of Montenegro preached: " Our destiny is to carry the cross on this blazing divide between different worlds...therefore the Serbian people are also

divine...Our people preserves in its bosom, in its collective memory, Jerusalem's holiness."<sup>231</sup>

Serbia's minister of culture, focusing on Serbian greatness, concluded that the Serbs are one of five imperial peoples: "It is an ancient people and one of the most Christian ones". In fact, according to another minister of the Serbian government: "Today, many around the world dream about being Serb...Be happy you belong to this people. You are eternal." Likewise, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Velibor Ostojic, President of the executive council of the dominant Serbian party, the SDS announced that: "every nook of Serbian land and the Serbs themselves are a heavenly wonder, and an inspiration and example to all other peoples and countries."<sup>232</sup>

A spate of books and articles, propagating a patriotic view of the superiority of the Serbs, have appeared in Serbia during this period. One such book by Olga Lukovic-Pejanovic was suggestively titled: **The Serbs: The Oldest Nation**. Such writing claimed, among other things, that the biblical Garden of Eden was located in present day Serbia, that the Serbs invented writing, that the poet Ovid composed his works originally in Serbian, and that Serbian books had been among those destroyed when the conquering Arabs allegedly burned the library of Alexandria, Egypt in the seventh century.<sup>233</sup> Similarly, Zeljko Kruselj has argued the notion, in his text "Serbs-Nations Most Numerous", (published in *Panorama* in 1991) that Serbs have been the most numerous nation throughout history, having inhabited India, Mesopotamia, Siberia and Africa. Claiming that Alexander the Great was in fact a Serb, Kruselj echoes a theme first introduced by Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, arguing that Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and Croats are in fact all of Serbian origin.<sup>234</sup>

The eternal, divine, and messianic qualities of the Serbs all reinforce one stereotype: The Serbs are inherently good, and anyone who goes against them must necessarily be evil. This simplistic analysis formed the core of author and Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic's nationalist rhetoric. Draskovic, in a speech in December 1991, claimed that "within the Yugoslav area, biologically, we [the Serbs] are the strongest nation and have the strongest historic roots; we have the breadbasket [Vojvodina] we have the most intelligent people, the best writers, the best theatre, and the best soldiers."<sup>235</sup> But while being the strongest and the best, the Serbs are also victims because they sacrifice their greatness in service of others. This he used to justify Serbian belligerency in Yugoslavia. As he explained in this February, 1992 interview: "The

Milosevic regime has not infringed or jeopardised the rights of any Serbian minority... We are the *victims* first and foremost... at the time of the Yugoslav civil war, not one Croatian house was destroyed... This is not to the credit of Milosevic, but it is thanks to the tradition of the Serb people, because *Serbs cannot hate*."<sup>236</sup>

By contrast, as Norman Cigar notes, other national groups in the region are seen as capable *only* of hate. In 1994, the pro-government weekly *Ilustrovana Politika* had recourse to a leading Belgrade psychiatrist to provide an explanation for Serbia's surprise at finding itself "surrounded by hatred, when it awakened three years ago". The doctor asserted that "Serbia has always been the object and the sweet prize for those who surround it, and I believe that will always be the case whatever trends civilisation takes." Asked for his analysis of "this pathological hatred for the Serbian people, the Serbian leadership and Serbia", he placed the blame on non-Serbs, concluding that the "pathological hatred for all that is Serbian stems from a guilt complex [on the part of non-Serbs] which is anaesthetised precisely by hating".<sup>237</sup> Presumably the guilt complex is derived by those who are unable to achieve the greatness of their Serbian neighbours.

#### **Conclusions:**

In this section, the self image perpetuated by national ideologues of Serbs as an original and heroic nation becomes obvious. These myths of former Serbian greatness serve to create a sort of classicalism. This appears to perpetuate the message that: "Serbs were once great, and now, because of a series of *Falls*, must now, in a form of national renaissance, recapture the classical ideal of Serbianism". As I posited in Chapter 1, this myth of the original nation gives the "self" a proud and noble distinction among nations, and sets the stage for one or more *Falls*, by the "others" who are seen as jealous, barbaric and power hungry. The importance for myths of Serbian greatness serves to demonstrate to Serbs and the rest of the world that something great was destroyed. If Serbs are perceived as nothing but a backward, tribal people who have been consistently the hapless slaves of colonial empires, then their *Fall* becomes nothing more than a consequence of their weakness and unimportance. By the obverse, if Serbs are presented as a great and heroic people, then their *Fall* becomes the stuff of legends, of "Greek tragedy" and their re-emergence becomes even more important.

## **Section 2.2: The Kosovo Myth**

*We have to persevere or else we are lost. It's similar to the problem the Jews had. Kosovo is our Jerusalem. We'd rather defend it as it is, rather than have just one wailing wall. Kosovo is a place of Serbian national identity that we cannot give away, just as Israel can't give away Jerusalem.*

-Serbian writer and musician Aleksander Pavlovic in an interview with Florence Levinsohn-

The Serbian province of Kosovo has figured greatly in Serbian mythology as the epicentre of Serbian culture and heritage, a distinction which prompted Balkan historian Sabrina Ramet to dub Kosovo "the Serbian Jerusalem". Historically, the roots of this national obsession lie in the last battle that was fought unsuccessfully against the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in five centuries of domination by the Turks. The mythology created around the Battle was passed from generation to generation and fuelled the rebellion which ultimately led to the independence of Serbs from the Turks.<sup>238</sup> As the *Serbian Ministry of Information* describes, the defeat at Kosovo represents the "pivotal historic event in the mythology of the past, symbolising the heroic, Freedom-loving and distressful fate of the entire Serb people."<sup>239</sup>

Using Serbian historian Paul Pavlovich's description of the Battle as a guide, we are able to essentialise the important facts of the myth. In 1389, Serbian King Lazar was defeated by the Turks on the field of the Blackbirds in Kosovo-Polje, subjecting the Serbian people to Ottoman rule for almost five centuries. The defeat has been the subject of ballads, plays and poems, and has formed an integral part of the Serbian psyche.<sup>240</sup> In popular myth, King Lazar sacrificed his earthly kingdom for one in heaven. The lessons from the myth were obvious; even in defeat the Serbs were victorious. As Pavlovic recounts: "As victory could not be his, King Lazar died a martyr's death and to create such a lasting impression of despair upon those who survived the fall, that they would mend their ways, be inspired by the Kosovo sacrifice to regain and then preserve the will to fight for the time when revenge was to be possible."<sup>241</sup>

For Serbian nationalists, Lazar is more than a mere martyr, he becomes a Christ like figure, who dies so that his people might inherit a heavenly kingdom. For this reason, the Kosovo sacrifice becomes a proto-type for other Serbian battles, while the general spirit of sacrifice becomes central to Serbian identity. At the same time, the Kosovo myth presents another instance of the Serbian view of themselves as a great and heroic nation, one that was not afraid to risk overwhelming odds to fight against an enemy far stronger

than them. This Balkan scholar Carl Jacobsen of Carleton University has termed "the Masada Psychosis", after the Hebrew battle at Masada where the protagonists held out until the last man to defend their fort against invading armies, never surrendering, and never enslaved by their enemies.

Of course, great myths are useless if not somehow relevant in the every day lives of the peoples involved. As we hear from Balkan historian Dusko Doder, this has not been a problem for Milosevic, whose genius Doder cites as the ability to mould a medieval myth of Serb identity to his political purposes today, in promoting the idea that "Serbs are more sinned against than sinning".<sup>242</sup> The Milosevic government has indeed capitalised politically on the Mediaeval Kosovo myth. In 1988 King Lazar's coffin and remains were paraded through Serbian villages and towns, to be reburied at Ravanica, its original historic place of rest.<sup>243</sup> Harkening back to World War II, Milosevic had the bodies of Serbs murdered in Bosnia-Herzegovina excavated and displayed. These actions had the effect of stimulating Serb nationalism and hatred towards Moslems and Croats.<sup>244</sup> Milosevic would speak of the unifying force of the Kosovo Myth, designed to unify the Serb Diaspora throughout Yugoslavia, calling them to arms, according to ancient traditions: "Today, six hundred years later, we find ourselves again fighting and in battle".<sup>245</sup>

Stressing the importance of the theme of fall and sacrifice current in nationalist discourse, the Serbian Church has also used its influence to further push the importance of the Kosovo myth. With King Lazar's martyrdom, the whole Serb nation becomes a nation of martyrs.<sup>246</sup> In 1991, The Serbian Orthodox Patriarch declared a year of commemoration for the past 500 years of suffering inflicted on the Serb people.

Kosovo has become once more the proving ground for the Serb nation, which must do battle with the rest of the world for its salvation. As Dobrica Cosic warns his fellow Serbs: "The United States, Catholic Europe, Islamic Fundamentalism, the spirit of the German "Reich", in short all the neo-colonialist and territorial ambitions directed towards Serbia will use the "denial of human rights in Kosovo" as a pretext to convince and morally legitimate the advancement of Albanian secession."<sup>247</sup> Cosic elaborates on the importance of the Kosovo myth to the Serbian Nation in the Twentieth century:

*C'est avec cette idéologie empreinté de mythes nationaux serbes, de morale et de l'eschatologie chrétiennes, d'une conscience épique issue de la défaite de Kosovo et de l'exemple des héros serbes qui, dans l'âme et l'esprit du peuple, ne cessaient de guerroyer contre le croissant islamique et pour <<la croix honorable et la liberté dorée>>, avec cette énergie spirituelle en somme qui deviendra un moteur vitale, que*

les Serbs iront de soulèvements en guerres de liberation durant tout le XIXe siecle, et jusqu'aux deux conflits mondiaux.<sup>248</sup>

Thus, the Kosovo myth also serves to delineate Serbia's role as the great defender of Western civilisation against barbarism and Islamic expansionism. By fighting, Serbs are actually serving God, in their defence of good against evil. But the Kosovo Myth may indeed have a deeper nationalistic meaning. Many writers, as we shall see, both Serbian and non-Serbian have seen connections between Serbs and Jews. For American journalist Florence Levinsohn, these connections are found first in mythological similarities. As she writes of Kosovo:

The great legend of the Serbs, the historic battle to save their extensive and highly developed kingdom from the Turks in 1389 corresponds directly to the Jews' legend of Masada, where some thousand Jews committed mass suicide rather than surrender to the Romans.<sup>249</sup>

Levinsohn again found the same link between a Jewish and a Serbian mentality, when interviewing former Yugoslav diplomat Milan Bulajic on the importance of Kosovo in the Serbian world view. As she quotes Bulajic: "There is something that seems to be in the genes [of the Serbs] in the mentality of the people who see themselves as victims by destiny, that they are the chosen people, like the Jews. They have chosen the heavenly kingdom symbolised by Kosovo."<sup>250</sup> It appears that the Kosovo sacrifice imbues the Serbian nation with elements of a divine consciousness, delineating for Serbs a very specific role in world history.

One example of this delineation of the Serbian role in world history is revealed by historian Brian Hall,<sup>251</sup> who recounts another famous Serbian battle, where their role was premised largely on their perception of history based on the Kosovo myth. As he explains, this battle, that of Cegar, conforms to a type, which Hall describes as "in the *Biblical exegical* sense of the battle of Kosovo Polje." The Serbs in this battle were again outnumbered due to incompetence of one of their own leaders. This leader and hero, Stevan Sindjelic offered his men the opportunity to abandon the fortification receiving the main brunt of the Turkish attack. Not a single Serb absconded, even through to remain meant certain death. As the Turks pressed closer and the end was obviously near, Sindjelic's crowning deed of heroism was to fire his pistol into the gunpowder magazine, causing a titanic explosion which killed all of the remaining Serbs as well as a number of Turks. As Hall read in one description: "That heroic deed has inspired generations to come to follow his example".<sup>252</sup>

In short the Kosovo myth performs a specific function in current Serbian nationalist discourse. Firstly, it proves to Serbs that they were once a strong heroic people, able to withstand any challenge; able to fight against great odds to overcome adversity, in the quest for national freedom. At the same time, it is meant to give them the will to fight, and the courage to continue in their daily lives despite western sanctions and economic ruination. Secondly, the myth serves to buttress the legitimacy of the Milosevic regime. By personifying the resurrected Prince Lazar, Milosevic becomes the proud hero, defending the Serbian nation against the foreign invaders. By linking himself with this myth, Milosevic becomes the saviour of his people, who will deliver them in battle from the oppression of their enemies. He thus becomes a catalyst of positive change, instead of being seen for what he really is, a communist authoritarian dictator, who has turned the resentment and disapprobation of the world against himself and his people. Thirdly, the Kosovo myth somehow joins Serbs with Jews, as persecuted peoples who see in mythology, inspiration to fight against oppression.

### **Section 3: Serbs and Albanians in the Kosovo Province**

#### **Introduction:**

Continuing this theme of Serbian persecution in Kosovo was the advancement of various conspiratorial theories to explain why Kosovo was not majority Serbian, and why the Albanians continued to compose some 90% of the population. The notion of the *Fall* of Serbs in present day Kosovo at the hands of the Albanians has spawned a number of theories, ranging from the spectre of a "Greater Albania" to various fears of a gynaecological plot to overthrow the Serbian nation, by out-birthing them.

#### **Section 3.1: The Communists and Albanian Separatism in Kosovo:**

Kosovo as a territory has been a contentious issue since World War II, when the quisling Albanian government forcibly deported Serbs from Kosovo-Polje, while at the same time encouraging Albanian immigration into the region. While Tito and the Communists were credited with bringing Kosovo into the Yugoslav federation, some Serbian historians, such as Bozidar Zecevic, posit that the Tito's true purpose in bringing Kosovo in was not to unite former Serbian lands, thus contributing to Serbian greatness, but rather to use the province as an instrument to reduce the power of the Serbian nation.

Bozidar Zecevic describes the "treacherous nature" of the Yugoslav Communists, who encouraged Albanian separatists to attack Serbs in Kosovo, forcing them to escape

to the Serbian republic. He further blames the Communists for encouraging Kosovar Albanians in their separatist ambitions. Zecevic writes that since the 1960's, the Albanians have been guided by a determination to secede from Serbia, then from Yugoslavia, to join with Albania. Viewing Albanian attempts at secession as treachery against the Serbs, Zecevic couples the communists with the Albanians, in their *unified desire* to reduce the power of the Serbian nation.<sup>253</sup> As he writes: "The leadership of the LCY branch organisations in Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo readily offered their services to secessionist forces there, in order to aid Kosovar Albanians in their determination to create a Greater Albania."<sup>254</sup>

Paul Pavlovich concurs with this analysis, maintaining that the communists were largely to blame for the problems Serbs are having today in Kosovo. It was the removal of Serbian secret police director Aleksander Rankovic from office, the only "true voice of the Serbian nation", which "opened the flood gates to Albanian nationalism", as Pavlovich asserts. The 1981 situation in Kosovo was a direct result of a lack of central control, claims Pavlovich, which resulted in a 'counter-revolution of Albanian chauvinism and irridentism'.<sup>255</sup> Once again, the theme of persecution and of Fall is stressed by Serb historians. Communists and Albanians conspired against the Serbs, to reduce their power in Yugoslavia, so that they would not be able to achieve their former greatness.

### **Section 3.2: Kosovar Albanians and the destruction of the Serbian Nation:**

As Balkan historian Vladimir Gligorov notes, the historical importance of Kosovo for Serbian nationalism did not by itself justify a police state or ethnic cleansing. A stronger justification was needed to legitimate extreme "solutions".<sup>256</sup> In the case of Kosovo, he posits that Albanians were presented as perpetrators of the politics of *genocide* against the Serbian people, which served as justification for the policy of *all necessary measures*, perpetrated by the Serbian government. Given the crime, Gligorov remarks wryly that "the punishment seemed appropriate".<sup>257</sup>

This theme of Albanians is certainly not new; it figured as a central plank in the 1986 SANU Memorandum. This fear emerged during the 1980's, particularly with the highly publicised attack on Serb Djordje Martinovic by Albanian separatists in May, 1985, and the frequent reports of Serbian women being raped at the hands of the Albanian majority. These incidents, coupled with Albanian riots in 1980 and 1981, prompted 200 Belgrade intellectuals to sign a petition in 1986 urging action to prevent the atrocities, and

were of course a major impetus for the publication of the **Memorandum** in the same year.<sup>258</sup>

As soon as Milosevic attained power, the stage was set for even more vilification of the Kosovar Albanians. Dobrica Cosic began stirring up the spectre of a *Greater Albania*, an ethnic homeland for the Kosovar Albanian Moslems, in the centre of the Serbian homeland: "[The Albanians] finished by taking the dramatic form of a national revolt, with violent persecutions of the Serbs of Kosovo and Metohija, with the aim of creating an ethnically pure Kosovo republic, in other words, an Albanian state in Yugoslav territory."<sup>259</sup> Cosic, again writing of the Albanian conspiracy to ethnically cleanse Serbs from the region, spoke also of their biological conspiracy, to birth more children than the Serbs and thus reduce the relative numbers of Serbs in the region, while simultaneously driving them out. As Cosic explains the two-pronged strategy:

An extreme and aggressive Albanian nationalism is at work in Kosovo-Metohija, accompanied by a demographic explosion and attempts to bring about their separatist aims, separating Kosovo-Metohija from the state of Serbia and later joining it to Albania-by sheer force of numbers. It has been forgotten that over 200,000 Serbs left Kosovo under *Albanian terror*, and that in their stead, since 1945 alone, with the *blessing* of the Yugoslav authorities of the time, between 350,000 and 400,000 refugees from Albania have been settled there. In this way the ethnic structure of the population was forcibly changed in the long term and conditions created for Albanians to appear on the international political scene with demands for a separate state.<sup>260</sup>

In this form of conspiracy theorising, Cosic was certainly not alone. In 1990 the notion of a gynaecological conspiracy was given credibility by the support of the *Serbian Association of Professors and Scientists* who came out with a scientific treatise exposing an Albanian plot by which Albanian women were made more fertile, so they could engender a "demographic explosion never before seen, the most potent in the world". Claiming that the Albanian population had risen by a factor of 50 (the number was actually 3.3 times from 1941-81) the Serbs could then justify oppression and forced deportations in the region, in order to restore an ethnic balance to the region, correcting the past demographic wrongs perpetrated by the Communists and Albanians acting in concert.<sup>261</sup>

### **Conclusions**

The current Serbian aggression against the Kosovar Albanians is seen in the light of rectifying past injustices, while seeking to prevent new atrocities from occurring. Serbs are thus fighting Albanians in Kosovo for two reasons; firstly, to defend themselves against *genocide* at the hands of the evil Albanians, who are trying to simultaneously, kill

them, deport them, and out-birth them. Secondly, they are fighting against the threat of "Greater Albania", another form of ethnic nationalism which finds itself in competition with Serbian land claims. Should Albanians succeed in taking over Kosovo and merging it with Albania, as some Serbian nationalists suggests, then the Serb nation again suffers a *Fall*, and a monumental set-back in its strivings to create a nation-state where all Serbian lands are united. Both of these themes figure into a cyclical or teleological understanding of history. The Albanians are simply another negative agency operating against the Serbs, who have brought about a *Fall* in Kosovo for the Serbian population, and will continue to oppress the Serbs by their aggressive ethno-national program. Serb ideologues therefore couch their desire for a unified "homeland" in terms of defending a Serbian minority from genocide. Because Albanians are a "genocidal people", they must be suppressed before they can do more harm.

#### **Section 4: The SANU Memorandum**

##### **Introduction:**

Important to an understanding of the modern rise of Serbian nationalism is an examination of the SANU Memorandum, which was published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. The document was written primarily as a reaction to the passive stance of the Serbian government at that time to Albanian nationalism and separatism in the former Serbian province of Kosovo. Serbian grievances against Albanian nationalism, which had resulted in sporadic acts of violence against the Serbian minority in Kosovo was to form part of the Memorandum. The rest of the document would provide an overview of the general sufferings of Serbs in Yugoslavia, and would act as the central ideological core of Milosevic's emerging nationalist program after 1986.

This document is central to the discussion of modern Serbian ethnic nationalist discourse for several reasons. From a purely strategic and political standpoint, the Memorandum's role as the central ideological pillar in Milosevic's nationalist campaign confers on it a high degree of status, which would exist, even if the document had been complete gibberish. Purely from a historical standpoint, the Memorandum as the first piece of ethno-nationalist discourse to be widely read after the death of Tito makes it equally worthy of study. The final reason why it figures as something of great import for my research is that the document encapsulates the general Serbian world view, at this

point in time. It has largely set the tone, as well as the limits and possibilities of Serbian nationalist discourse. For these reasons, the **Memorandum** grows in importance as time progresses.

From the onset, it must be noted that the **Memorandum** is certainly not the most graphic, nor the most virulent of the Serbian discourse reviewed in this chapter, but it was the first nationalist documents released officially during the communist period, and must be remembered in that light.<sup>262</sup> But, while being less virulent, perhaps lower on the evolutionary chain of ethnic nationalist discourse emanating from the region, it nevertheless reflects in brief many of the themes central to my study, and central to the current Serbian perception of other "nations" and former republics.

#### **Section 4.1: Economic, Political and Cultural *Falls* of the Serbs in the SFRY:**

Throughout the document is evidenced a sense of persecution, the idea of a Serbian *Fall*, which has occurred as a direct result of the Serbian nation's membership in the SFRY. As the SANU authors assert: "[B]y being labelled as tyrannical, unilateral, centralist and gendarme, the Serbian people could not establish equality in Yugoslavia, for whose creation they had sacrificed."<sup>263</sup> This feeling becomes more developed as the document continues, first referring to the economic plight of the Serbs: "The attitude towards the economic lagging of Serbia shows that the revengeful policy towards Serbia [by the other republics] has not weakened as time went by. On the contrary, fed by its own success it has strengthened, which has finally resulted in *genocide*."<sup>264</sup>

This theme of genocide, in terms of the political and economic subjugation of the Serbian nation was continued and later elaborated. As the SANU authors further argue, a form of Anti-Serbianism (which, as we later see for Serbs, becomes analogous to Anti-Semitism) was the root cause behind this denial of Serbian national economic rights in Yugoslavia. Thus: "The anti-Serb coalition revealed itself more openly and with less political tact than ever before in the matter of the rate of contribution to the Federal Fund...The attitude towards Serbia's economic disaster shows that the politics of *anti-Serbian revenge* has not weakened with the passage of time. On the contrary, pushed onwards by its own success, it has grown steadily stronger, ending ultimately in genocide."<sup>265</sup> By genocide the authors refer here to the fact that Serbs do not possess their own unified province, since both Kosovo and Vojvodina were at this time autonomous. This form of anti-Serbianism becomes central for the **Memorandum** authors in defining the place of the Serbian nation in the SFRY. That this form of hatred

exists on all levels becomes manifest proof of the persecution of the Serbian people, providing an impetus for collective action by the "self" against any "others", of course only for the purpose of "self-defence".

Moving from the economic and political subjugation of the Serbs in the SFRY, the **Memorandum** authors then shift to an analysis of the destruction of Serbian culture and tradition in Yugoslavia. As they write: "No Yugoslav nation was so cruelly denied cultural and spiritual integrity. No literary and artistic heritage has been so ruined, ransacked or ravaged." The idea that the Serbs have been treated the worst out of all of the Yugoslav nations is again stressed in a discussion of the educational system in Yugoslavia:

Renowned Serbian writers are the *only* ones blacklisted on all Yugoslav mass media. The list of set texts in schools has been largely composed at the expense of Serbian literature...In the curriculums in some republics and provinces, the history of the Serbian people is not only cruelly ideologically reduced but exposed to chauvinist interpretations. Thus the Serbian cultural and spiritual heritage seems smaller than it really is, while the Serbian people lose an important prop of their moral and historical self-awareness.<sup>266</sup>

The loss of this "important prop" serves to conjure up images of a concerted effort by the federal government to deny the Serbian nation any sense of "self" awareness, unlike the "other" nations in Yugoslavia who are consequently over represented in school curriculums and the mass media. Since Milosevic used the **Memorandum** as a template for political action, it makes perfect sense that one of his first objectives after assuming office was to centralise and Serbianise the educational system, while similarly re-vamping the Serbian mass media.

#### **Section 4.2: Physical *Falls* of the Serbian People in Kosovo and Croatia:**

Added to this sense of an economic, cultural and political *Fall* or genocide are references to a more violent *Fall* of the Serbian population, in terms of a destruction, not only of national culture or tradition, but in terms of a physical threat, an actual danger of violent aggression against the Serbs. Thus the threat from the collective "other" and their program of Anti-Serbianism takes on more drastic proportions. This, the **Memorandum** authors stress, occurs in both Kosovo and Croatia. Speaking first of Albanian aggression against the Serbs in Kosovo, the SANU argues:

Banishment of the Serbian people from Kosovo is a spectacular proof of their *historical defeat*. In the spring of 1981, a special, open and total war was declared on the Serbian people. The war had been prepared in various periods of administrative political and legal changes....The *physical, political and cultural genocide* of the Serbian population

in Kosovo and Metohije is the worst defeat in the battles for liberation that Serbia waged from 1804 until the revolution in 1941.<sup>267</sup>

In this sense, the 1974 constitutional changes were seen as having been part of a cleverly orchestrated conspiracy by Yugoslav Communists and Kosovar Albanians against the Serbs, to banish them from their homeland, thus initiating a *Fall*.<sup>268</sup> At the same time, the SANU authors create a direct link between the 1986 program of Anti-Serbianism, and Nazi aggression. They thus posit that: "A true showdown with the Neo-fascist aggression has not been undertaken, all the measures taken so far only removed that open aggression from the streets at the same time strengthening its awakened objectives, which are to be fulfilled by any costs and by any means available."<sup>269</sup> This concept of a violent "other" trying to destroy the Serbian "self" was certainly a revolutionary thesis, considering that it appeared at a time when all nationalist stirring had been violently suppressed by the Yugoslav federal government since the end of World War II.

Continuing with its documentation of Anti-Serbianism in Yugoslavia, the *Memorandum* authors also described the Serbian situation in Croatia in terms of a National *Fall*, where Serbs found themselves losing their language and culture in a slow process of Croat assimilation. Conjuring images of Ante Starcevic's assimilationist program from the 19th century, the imagery of the *Fall* is again reproduced, as: "Serbs in Croatia have been exposed to other means of subtle and effective assimilating policies. An integral part of these policies was the ban on all Serbian associations and cultural institutions in Croatia...accompanied by the imposition of an official language carrying another name (Croatian) which was an expression of national inequality".<sup>270</sup> Thus, Serbian "cultural genocide" is also concomitant with the destruction of the Serbian nation, since a loss of cultural symbols, such as language, implies a loss of national self awareness, a-la Fichte, and initiates a process of assimilation.

### **Conclusions**

The SANU *Memorandum* becomes important, for its depiction of the SFRY as a hot bed of collective Anti-Serbianism by Albanians, Croats and Federal oriented Communists. Everyone who is not a Serb (and therefore an "other") becomes part of a collective negative agency seeking the destruction of Serbian identity. As a call to action, the *Memorandum* was brilliant, demonstrating to Serbs that the present state of affairs could not continue. In this sense, the *Memorandum* created the Milosevic phenomenon

as much as Milosevic used the document to engender Serbia's current political and economic conditions.

## **Section 5: Serbs in the First Yugoslavia and World War II**

Beginning with an analysis of this Serbian theme of "good" versus "evil" in the 20th century, we must commence with a description of the Serbian view of their role in Aleksander's Yugoslavia. Here the Serbian image of goodness is stressed as they understand their role here as an attempt to *liberate* the South Slavs from the yoke of foreign imperialism. They believe they came to the rescue of Croatia in 1915, whose territory was about to be invaded by the Italians. The *generous* Serbs, as Serb historian Paul Pavlovic writes, magnanimously allowed the Croats to: "cash in on the prestige of the Serbs, in the process saving for themselves some of their lands."<sup>271</sup>

At the same time, Dobrica Cosic notes the enormous sacrifices which Serbs were forced to undertake in order to provide this "opportunity" for the other South Slav nations. Noting the high number of Serbian males (some 60% of the population) who died during the First World War to liberate and unite the South Slavs, Cosic concludes: "I know of no other people in modern Europe who have similarly pushed the limits of its biological capacities."<sup>272</sup> This of course serves to prove the great pains under which Serbs went to liberate their enslaved brothers. Serbs here, instead of being strong centralists who tried to create a state which dominated Croats and Slovenes, become their saviours, who were stabbed in the back by the very people they tried to help.

This theme of the "good" Serb being betrayed is continued in the Serbian Ministry of Information InterNet Web Site's analysis of the Serbian role in World War II. Turning the other cheek against their betrayal by the Croats, the authors of this document note: "In World War II, after the *fall* of the first Yugoslavia, contributed to by Croat treachery in the Yugoslav Royal Army, Serbs once more showed their freedom-loving, democratic and anti-fascists tendencies by their opposition to Nazi plans to enslave Yugoslavia."<sup>273</sup> Once again, the Serbs come to the rescue of their Slavic brothers, protecting even those who betrayed them in the first Yugoslavia against the Fascist evil.

Smilja Avramov, in his Genocide Against the Serbs continues this theme of sacrifice, noting the large percentage of Serbs in the Partisan forces who "died for Yugoslavia" in the Second World War.<sup>274</sup> As he continues, the Second World War was "in essence a war against Serbia and the Serbian people, where Germans committed wide scale murders, burning of entire villages, raided and bombed cities." While he views the war as being primarily against the Serbs, Avramov recognises the persecution of the Jews, whose sufferings he *generously* places on par with those atrocities committed against the

Serbs. Symbolically linking Jews and Serbs, Avramov posits that both were killed for espousing the same values. As he explains: "The Jewish-Serbian-Capitalist-Democratic front had to disappear forever from the world...Jews and Serbs were struck with the same dagger".<sup>275</sup> Again a sense of the Serbian Fall is stressed, with the curious imagery of Jews and Serbs sharing the same fate. In this sense also, Jews and Serbs become united in their sacrifices for democracy and freedom, while they also share in the same persecution because of their love of capitalism and their hatred of communism. Both Serbs and Jews, because of their inherent "goodness" are willing to sacrifice themselves in order to defeat the evil "other": the Nazis.

The theme of suffering as interpreted in modern Serbian discourse continues into the lifetime of the SFRY, where Tito and the Soviet Comintern become a negative force, seeking only to suppress the Serb's righteous strivings for an autonomous state. Referring back to the first Yugoslavia, Avramov views the Communists as a negative agency, like the Croats, who betrayed the Serbs and destroyed their state, simply because of a pathological hatred of Serbs. As he writes: "It would be wrong to ascribe the causes of *Serbophobia* exclusively to the separatist party and the Ustashe. It had a strong foundation in the Balkan tactics of the Comintern which divided nations into the oppressed and oppressor, with the Serbians in the latter category."<sup>276</sup>

As Miron Rezun notes, the figure of Tito assumes the identity of a devil in Serbian history. By engendering the fall of the Serbian Karadodevic dynasty and defeating Serbia's Royalist Army, Tito becomes a personification for the negative agency that engendered the *Fall* of the Serbs at the end of the Second World War. By executing Serbian Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic, Tito betrays all Serbs, including the ones who "died in great numbers" in his Partisan army. This serves to create another Christ-like martyr for the Serbs, the great Chetnik hero who gave his life to save Serbian lands from Fascist and Communist alike.<sup>277</sup> Serb historian Dusan Batakovic also notes the same betrayal, in the process describing Tito's primary motive as the desire to "crush Great Serbian hegemony" by "manipulating national frustrations". Batakovic thus views with disdain Tito's SFRY, since "Communist Yugoslavia was conceived as a negation of the Kingdom's regime".<sup>278</sup>

Dobrica Cosic's analysis of the SFRY follows this same general theme, although he compares the "enslavement" of the Serbian nation during this period to their 19th century subjugation under the Ottoman empire. As he writes: "La republique serbe etait reduite

au *pachalik* de Belgrade, infeodee aux *beys* de Pristina [, Kosovo] et aux *voivodes* de Novi Sad [Vojvodina], et la direction politique de ce *pachalik*, volontairement ou non, devait produire des actes d'allegeance perpetuels vis-a-vis de la cour de Tito et de la nomenklatura antiserbe du Parti."<sup>279</sup> Serbia thus becomes nothing more than a 19th century Turkish administrative unit. Here the allusion is made to the Serbs once again suffering the tyranny of an overlord, with the Communists as merely another form of oppressor, like the Nazis and the Croats before them.

Thus, in his overview of the past 50 years of Communist rule in Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic lambasted the Titoist regime for "seeking to annihilate" the Serbs through the destruction of their national culture and history, while similarly destroying their ability to view history in terms of a cyclical movement. As he explains:

In the course of the four decades of Titoist tyranny, the Serbian people suffered from a veritable de-historification. Serbian identity and historical, spiritual, economic and political integrity were systematically demolished. The symbols and the fruits of the war of liberation belonging to the Serbian people were denigrated and falsified, while confiscating our magnificent Middle Age, shortening our history... In this way the entire history of the Serbian people was reduced to the history of the socialist movement, while the history of the communist party itself was reduced to the era of Tito.<sup>280</sup>

While the death of Tito and the end of Yugoslavia should allow a re-awakening of the Serbian nation from "decades of Titoist tyranny", Cosic warns that this task will be exceedingly difficult, thanks of course to Tito's legacy, which was to lay the groundwork for the re-emergence of Croatian fascism. As Cosic writes, there was no purge of the fascist tendencies of the people, thus facilitating later on the re-emergence of the Ustashe and in general, national chauvinism: "[The] Communist party, in its desire for the conquest and conservation of power, prohibited all *real spiritual and political denazification* in Yugoslavia." Thusly, the entire history of both Yugoslavias is seen as a series of betrayals against Serbian goodness, leaving no doubt in the minds of those readers who chose only to read that material emanating from Belgrade, that Serbia is indeed (and to again quote Cosic) the "martyr of all Yugoslavia."<sup>281</sup> Cosic as we saw, made the point of linking all "others" together, thus continuing the same form of "self" versus "other" identification. Thus, Communists and Croatian Fascists are somehow united against the Serbs, who must suffer under the brunt of this oppression.

### **Conclusions**

Ironically, Communist Yugoslavia, while being perceived as a period of *Fall* for the Serbian nation actually served as more of an instrument for the resurrection of Serbian ethnic nationalism. As historian Robert Howse noted in the previous chapter, nationalism was suppressed in Yugoslavia, allowing for a ethno-national sense of *Fall*, but at the same time, rights were ascribed to nations (ethnic or otherwise) in terms of collective rights, not individual rights, perpetuating the understanding that identification with a nation was the only manner in which to secure rights and privileges for oneself. This sense of collective rights, together with a strong centralised authoritarian system has served as the basic political model of both the Milosevic regime in Serbia, and Franjo Tudjman's nationalist one in Croatia. Thus, Yugoslav communism, engendered a *Fall*, while simultaneously creating the conditions for the re-emergence of Serbian ethno-nationalism after the Cold War.

### **Section 6: Serbs and Croats in Croatia**

*The Serb national minority in Croatia have no human rights and I think that in Croatia they must actually feel like a Negro living in a village where all the others are members of the Ku Klux Klan.*

-Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, Chairman of the Croatian Human Rights Committee-

#### **Introduction**

As should now be clear, the Croats as an agency of the Serbian national *Fall* has figured as a central plank in Serbian ethnic national discourse. Demonizing the Croats, by portraying them as a negative agency which has suppressed Serbia since the beginning of the 20th century remains important to vindicate any action by Serbs against Croats, while legitimating Serbian violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similarly, portraying Croatian Anti-Serbianism in the same manner as Anti-Semitism gives further moral justification for Serbian land claims, while serving to vindicate Serbian incursions into Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Krajina region of Croatia.

#### **Section 6.1: Croats and Serbs in World War II:**

The Serbian Orthodox Church has been one of the most vocal critics of the Croatian government, in particular the past actions of the Croatian Ustashe, who killed large numbers of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Communists during World War II. Croats have been blamed as the main aggressors in history, specifically that of the Second World War. As Patriarch Paul asserted: "Forgetting is a grave sin, constituting a complicity with

the *monsters* who effectuated the genocide on our innocent people". The Patriarch has also attacked the Croats for their historic role in advancing the "Anti-Serbian" project, through the World War II Jasenovac concentration camp, run by the Nazis and Ustashe, where between 40,000-100,000 Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Communists were killed by various horrible tortures. As the Patriarch writes of this famous camp:

Nothing can be worse than Jasenovac, where during four years of war, 700,000 people were killed...Jasenovac is the scene of the most important horrors committed against the Serbs, the place of their "aneantissement" (de-birth) their annihilation, their extermination, their execution, their torture, where they suffered under a blood lust, the like of which could not be paralleled by the antiChrist himself...This is the new crucifixion of Christ. This is the sin of sins.<sup>282</sup>

This Croatian blood lust serves once again to "otherise" the Croats, who become a form of Anti-Christians (or as the Serbian Church terms it: a "degenerate form of the true faith"<sup>283</sup>), operating against the Orthodox Serbs, in possession of the true faith. In this sense, Jasenovac becomes a Golgotha (Place of the Skull), where Serbs are sacrificed for the sins of the Croats. Where Christ in his death was resurrected, so too does the Serbian nation re-emerge from the grave of Yugoslavia, similarly "rolling the stone away", proving to Serbs that even in the midst of death, they are in life. As we saw previously, the same imagery occupies the minds of ideologues when dealing with the Battle of Kosovo. Again, the theme of a Serbian resurrection after death plays a central role in the Serbs' self designation as a holy people in possession of a divine consciousness. In this convoluted sense, Frye's *Kerygmatic* form of revelation asserts itself in the various *Falls* of the Serbian nation. Through the *Falls* and resurrections of the Serbs, a more powerful internal cohesion and sense of holiness emerges.

Extremely adept at mixing Biblical and modern nationalist imagery, Serbian Patriarch Paul again described the Serbian Genocide in his 1991 address: "Ce sont les signes des nouvelles intoxications incurables qui menent vers de nouveaux crimes, vers un nouveau deicide a travers un fratricide".<sup>284</sup> Metropolitan Amfilohije also described the danger to the Serbs in virtually cosmic proportions. As previously stated, Amofilhije's gestalt of the Serbs as a holy people allows him to dream of their eternal struggle at the hands of their demonic enemies, operating, he reveals, in an attempt to at last exterminate "the last island on which holiness is preserved". For this, he reasons that "all the demonic forces are directed against the last redoubt of unsullied holiness, or untroubled and unpolluted truth."<sup>285</sup>

### **Section 6.2: Croats in The SFRY:**

Serbian historian Bozidar Zecevic, in his **Uprooting: A Dossier of the Croatian Genocide Policy Against the Serbs**, again draws out the theme of Croats as an evil agency, specifically operating in the SFRY, where they manipulated the Communist system in order to engender a further set of *Falls* against the Serbs. Here he points to the 'political assassination' of Serbian Alexander Rankovic, who was chief of the secret police until 1966, until his dismissal by Tito. It was not only Tito (himself half-Croat), Zecevic maintains, but Croatian Communist Stevo Krajacic, who was responsible for the ousting of Serbia's most important Communist politician. This Zecevic contends, was manifest proof of the Croats taking control of the country, through their despotic leader, the 'conducator of separatism' (Krajacic). It was Krajacic, as Zecevic asserts, who set about tearing down Orthodox churches throughout the country, while at the same time driving out the use of the Cyrillic script and eliminating Serbian history from the school curriculum.<sup>286</sup> For Zecevic, the Communists were merely weak bystanders in Yugoslavia. The true power resided with the Croats and their *despotic* Krajacic, whose sole purpose, it seems was to destroy all elements of Serbian national identity.

### **Section 6.3: Croats in Their own Nation-State:**

In November, 1995, The *Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences*, in conjunction with the *Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, again published a **Memorandum**, this one focusing less on the Kosovo question and the destruction of Serbian national identity in the SFRY (which was by now defunct), and more on the problems of the Serbian minority in Croatia. Tactically the document was brilliant. By decrying the sufferings of the Krajina Serbs at the hands of the Croatian government and army, any violence by the Serbs in the Krajina region, or actions taken on the part of the Belgrade government or the Yugoslav army were justified in terms of self defence. Central to the arguments of this new **Memorandum** were descriptions of how the Serbs were being annihilated by the Croats in their ancestral lands. As the SANU authors assert:

**Having Lived in Krajina, Western Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem for centuries, the Serbs there today are facing *extinction* and the *obliteration* of all traces of their existence in these lands. Employing brutal military and police force the Croatian government has been and is forcing Serbs to abandon their ancestral homes and regions which they have managed to safeguard preserve in the face of earlier cataclysms.<sup>287</sup>**

While the newness of this campaign provided a need for instant mobilisation, to defend "Serbian brothers" in Croatia before it was too late, the **Memorandum** authors

also reawakened the spectre of Croatian fascist terror, suggesting that while the violence was immediate and new, the plan for the extermination of the Serbs was not, and in fact had been hatched well before the collapse of the SFRY:

Deliberately planned psychological and physical pressures were exerted on the Serbs for decades in preparation for *repeated genocide*, much like the one from the period of the Nazi puppet State *Independent State of Croatia*, when over 700,000 Serbs, Jews and Romanies were *liquidated* in the Jasonovac concentration camp there. Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1991, caused by the forcible and unconstitutional secession from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, over 300,000 Serbs have been forcibly expelled from Croatia.<sup>288</sup>

The links drawn between the Croatian Ustashe massacres during World War II and the present atrocities serves to demonstrate that while Serbs are doomed throughout history to be the perpetual victims, fighting only for national survival, the *telos* of the Croats is to annihilate Serbs. Indeed the history of the Croatian people from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day has been encapsulated in a series of conspiracies and sinister plots, aimed at destroying the Serbian nation.

Svetozar Durdevic, in his anti-Croatian work entitled: **The Continuity of a Crime: The Final Settlement of the Serbian Question in Croatia**, published by the Serbian Ministry of Information, continues with the popular nationalist theme of portraying Croats as fascist aggressors. Again drawing historical links between past and present Croatian actions, Durdevic writes of the "shameless manner" in which Franjo Tudjman's government has welcomed back former fascist criminals into Croatia, "opening their doors wide to Ustashe criminals":

The fear of new *pogroms* the Serbs have felt after the forceful secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991 has proved to be completely justified and understandable. The unprecedented national-chauvinist euphoria in Croatia has resulted in the renewed hoisting of the chequered banner under which the *Ustashe* in World War II *exterminated* innocent Serbian civilians, the aged, women and children. The political scene of Croatia has been filled again with ideologists of the Ustashe ideology and their progeny.<sup>289</sup>

Tudjman himself is invariably tarred with the "genocidal fascist" brush, being the instigator, as Durdevic posits, of a policy of "ethnic cleansing" in the Krajina region of Croatia. Sharing the same views as the authors of the second Memorandum, he cites both the "speed at which the inhuman and uncivilised method of Croatization of the Krajina has been carried out" as well as the "legal initiatives which have reduced the rights of national minorities down to a farce" as proof of the "*vandal destruction* and

*annihilation* of all the traces and symbols of Serbian life, culture and spirituality in the region". Concluding his analysis he asserts that: "Franjo Tudjman is only continuing to pursue the *fascist policies* of the former Croat leaders who treated Serbs as a 'disturbing factor' and the main obstacle to their attaining the Croat national goals."<sup>290</sup>

Akin to the second Memorandum, Durdevic bases his analysis of Croatian aggression on the incompatibility of Serbian and Croatian national goals. Durdevic's understanding of national destiny and history is cyclical, and through his optic, the Croatian nation seeks to "annihilate" Serbs in the Krajina, in order to establish an ethnic homeland. Croats then, while employing violence, have essentially the same goals as Serbians, and it is the collision of these competing interests which has led to conflict. As he theorises:

The essence of the antagonism of the Croats towards the Serbs and the genocidal politics and practice permanently implanted by Croat rulers in relation to the Serbian population in that area lies in the frustrated and unrealised ambitions of Croat nationalists to establish a *national state of their own*, basing their actions primarily on the efficient *removal and annihilation* of the Serbs, qualifying them as the basic obstacle to their attaining their goal. That is the source of continuous aggressive, brutal and racist theory, deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Croats, according to which the Serbs are a people of an inferior race, primitive and oppressive.<sup>291</sup>

Durdevic in some ways appears to view history as a dialectical struggle between Croats and Serbs, where, for Croatian interests to be met (thus an end of history), the Serbs must be annihilated. The parallels drawn here to the Nazi ideology are striking, where ideologists such as Rosenberg and Stricher posited that only through the destruction of the Jewish race was the *telos* of the German people possible. Here Durdevic draws on a similar theme. The Croats become fascists, because of their desire to annihilate as a necessary condition of their historical destiny.

To this, former Serbian President Dobrica Cosic adds his own view of the situation, which supports Durdevic's view that the Croats are no less than Nazis, who are once again emerging after the end of the Cold War. As Cosic states, in a French translation of his book, **A Dissident's Position**:

On assiste, en Croatie sous bien des aspects a un renouveau *Nazi*. Cet Etat est gouverné par un régime *totalitaire* et chauvin, qui a aboli les droits civiques et nationaux élémentaires des Serbes en les radiants tout simplement de sa Constitution. Cela a provoqué une insurrection des Serbes de Croatie, qui craignaient à juste titre une nouvelle tentative d'*extermination*, pareille a celle dont ils avaient été *victimes* durant la *Seconde guerre mondiale*.<sup>292</sup>

As he further notes, 300,000 Serbs by 1994, had been chased from Croatia, while a further several thousand were forced to trade their Serbian names for Croatian, conforming to another part of the World War II Ustashe program of converting 1/3, deporting 1/3 and killing 1/3 of all Serbs in Croatia. Since Cosic views the regime as inherently fascistic, with a totalitarian and chauvinist administration, denying basic civil and national rights to its Serb inhabitants, Serbs have no option but fight or flight. Of course, flight would be contrary to the lessons established by Serbian history; therefore, Serbs must fight for their ancestral lands, as Cosic asserts: "Ayant deja subi un genocide et craignant d'en subir un deuxieme, les Serbes se sont lances dans une guerre defensive."<sup>293</sup>

### **Conclusions**

Again, the theme of the Memorandum comes to a head. The Serbs as a former great original nation are being persecuted by Croats, whose a-historical program of Anti-Serbianism continues throughout history, as a constant negative agency operating against Serbian territorial ambitions. Further, the comparaisons between Croats and fascists serves to "otherise" the Croats to the extent that any sharing of territory becomes impossible. Croats as genocidal killers cannot be reasoned with, they must be attacked, solely in a self-defensive capacity, to halt their evil designs on Serbia. In this sense Croats become the complete opposite of Serbs, but at the same time compliment each other. Serbs and Croats are thus two sides to the same coin. When Croats must kill, Serbs must suffer. A relationship defined in sum zero terms also emerges, where the Serbs are unable to accomplish their telos while the Croats continue theirs.

### **Section 6.4: Serbian Musings on "Greater Catholicism"**

The Catholic Church, as the official religion of Croats since the time of Ante Starcevic's standardisation attempts, has figured prominently as a focus of Serbian attacks. As stated in Section 3, the Serbian media has been active in vilifying the Catholic Church for its role in the conflict. While denouncing Catholicism as somehow degenerate, the Catholic Church itself, and its "sinister master": the Vatican are viewed by Serbian nationalists as the direct opposite to the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this vein, the Vatican becomes a personification of the Anti-Christ, since the Serbian Church, as the saviour of the Serbs assumes Messiah-like pretensions. This religious imagery, coupled with the Croatian nature of the Church allows Serbian ideologues to conclude that since the Vatican is evil, and the Croats are evil, a series of evil conspiracies must therefore be the result of the merging of the two.

#### **Section 6.4.1: Conspiracies of the Catholic Church in Croatia: Then**

Serb nationalists, such as Bozidar Zecevic, envision a Catholic conspiracy, the roots of which are traced back many years, to the first Yugoslavia, when the Catholic Church broke its 1914 concordat with the Serbian Monarchy and declared "holy war" against the Yugoslav state, encouraging the masses to rally for the victory of the Austro-Hungarian army against the 'schismatic' enemy.<sup>294</sup> The Church is thus condemned for initiating a full scale war against the Serbs before the beginnings of the first Yugoslavia, at the same time plotting the destruction of the Serbian nation.

Central to the idea of an evil Church is again a harkening back to the Ustashe period, when the Catholic Church played a large part in the Croatia Fascist state, through the support by many of the Catholic clergy of the Pavelic regime. As Svetozar Durdevic explains, the Catholic Church was central during this period, as a focus of loyalty and identity for the average Croatian, and abused its moral legitimacy to commit genocide against the Serbs: "The Catholic Church has also always lent them [the Croats] support for their atrocities."<sup>295</sup> In one article, Serbian historian Radovan Kovacevic further describes the negative role of the Catholic church in the conflict. Beginning with a description of how Pope Pius XII supported Ante Pavelic and his regime, he then concludes: "Ever since 1900 and the all-Catholic Congress in Zagreb, when the guidelines for the Balkans were formulated, the Vatican has stuck to its anti-Serbian concept...The Vatican heartily welcomed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1941 and especially in 1991, thus contributing to the outbreak of the war."<sup>296</sup>

The inevitable question arises as to why the Catholic Church hates the Serbs and wished to bring about their demise. Of course, Serbian historians can explain this as well. As Smilja Avramov notes, the Serbs' role in history has been not only to protect the West from the evils of Islamic expansionism, but also to protect the East from the perils of Catholicism. As Avramov maintains: "The Vatican and Pope Pius X were the main proponents of the idea that the Serbian people should be punished and the strongest measures taken against them...The Roman Curia considered the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to be solely a Serbian Orthodox unit and an obstacle to the realisation of the Vatican's expansionist policy towards the East."<sup>297</sup> Thus the Serbs once again suffer for their benevolence. While trying to save the East from the evil Catholics, they are again betrayed and suffer a *Fall*, a genocide, at the hands of their enemies.

#### **Section 6.4.2: Conspiracies of the Catholic Church: Now**

Of course, reminiscences of past atrocities, as we know, mean nothing if not directly connected to present events. Thus Serbian ideologues have made the modern link with the Catholic world conspiracy, either on its own, or acting in concert with other nations<sup>298</sup>. Smilja Avramov has thus noted the timeless quality of Catholic aggression against the Serbs, as others note the a-historical nature of Anti-Serbianism. As he writes: "The striving of Catholic Central Europe to establish its frontier on the Drina river is only just a spiritual source of the contemporary genocide in our countries. The first victims have always been the Serbian people and their religious characteristics the only source of inspiration."<sup>299</sup> So once again, we get the sense of the Catholics as the permanent foil of our Serbian protagonists. The Catholics as the "anti-Church" operates against the Serbian Orthodox Church in history, locked into a battle like any other dialectical movement of "self" and "other".

Radovan Samardzic, one of the architects of the SANU Memorandum, buttresses this same belief, with his assertion that the Vatican's role in the Yugoslav crisis has largely been motivated by "what it saw as an opportunity 'to push the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox people out of the neighbouring Balkan Peninsula once and for all."<sup>300</sup> In support of these charges, the Belgrade daily *Politika* accused the Vatican of plotting to break up Yugoslavia by negotiating a \$4 billion loan to the Croatian government, thus not only trying to destroy the Serbian national faith, but also destroying the SFRY in the process.<sup>301</sup>

Much of the latest national discourse has focused on the forced assimilation of Serbs on Croatian soil from Orthodox to Catholic, again making a direct parallel with the policies of the Pavelic regime and the current State of Croatia. As Jovan Pokrajac of the Serbian Ministry of Information wrote in early 1995, harkening back to Ante Starcevic's assimilationist policies of the 19th century:

*The conversion to Catholicism has invariably been the first step in that centuries long assimilation process. The conversion to Catholicism of the remaining Serb population of Croatia is under way once again. Available data show that religious instruction is conducted in preparation for conversion to Catholicism, unless, the latter has already been done. Two and one half years ago, [it was] found that 11,000 Serbian children had been converted to Catholicism...It is estimated by the Serbian Orthodox Clergy in Croatia that about 90% of Serbian children are taking Catholic religious instruction in schools. According to Dr. Pupovac, over 14,000 children are involved.*<sup>302</sup>

Pokrajac reveals the inherent evilness of this strategy later in his work: "Once they convert to Catholicism, the former Orthodox people will *automatically* become members of the Croatian nation, because Catholicism and Croatian nationality are equated in Croatia." Drawing the links with the Pavelic regime, Pokrajac concludes: "All this is so much akin to the situation which existed in the quisling Ustashe run so-called NDH. As soon as Pavelic took the decision relating to the conversion to Catholicism, Archbishop Stepinac issued instructions for conversion."<sup>303</sup> Again, the comparisons between Starcevic's political program is linked with the policies of Pavelic's HDZ, which is then linked with the present policies of the Tadjman regime.

While Pokrajac views the prime purpose of the Vatican as the conversion of Serbs, Ileana Cosic, of the same ministry stated in one interview that the Vatican always supports Moslems over Serbs, since these are easier to convert. Thus she remains certain that the Vatican has been operating in Kosovo, stirring up Albanian nationalism and separatism. As she posits: "The Vatican considers the Orthodox to be more dangerous than the Moslems. They are harder to convert. The pope paid one of his recent visits to Albania because they are trying to convert them to Catholicism. They are easier to convert because they are attracted by money".<sup>304</sup> As we shall see, the idea that Moslems are opportunists who will readily convert for money forms part of the Serbian view of Bosnia and Kosovo, that the Moslems are merely practitioners of an artificial faith.

#### **Conclusions for Section 6.4**

Again, the dialectical theme of a good nation and a good church versus evil nations and evil churches becomes a central preoccupation of Serbian national ideologues. Through destruction in war and forced conversions, the Catholic Church assumes its former role as a fascist ally, bent on the destruction of the Serbian nation. As we shall see in the next section, all this fascist imagery is not without motive, for the Serbs often liken themselves to the Jewish victims of Fascism during World War II, and have used this as a legitimisation for much of their present actions.

### **Section 7: Serbs and the Jews**

#### **Introduction**

The continuous theme of suffering, persecution and sacrifice has played a central role in Serbian nationalist discourse. As discussed in Chapter 1, the importance of political Zionism on the nature and tone of ethnic propaganda in Serbia has been great.

The idea that a long suffering nation has the right to fight for a national homeland has been central to the Serbs' understanding of history. The theme has also prompted overt comparisons in Serbia between Jews and Serbs, in an effort to demonstrate the evilness of the Croats, as well as the moral legitimacy of Serbian land claims. If Serbs and Jews are alike, and Croats hate the Serbs, then their hatred is then akin to Anti-Semitism, and loses its legitimacy.

#### **Section 7.1: Serbs and Jews as Victims:**

As discussed previously, Serbian nationalist writers have drawn strong links between Serbs and Jews. This has been manifest in a variety of ways, the first of which was the formation of the *Serbian-Jewish Friendship Society* in 1988 by a group of eminent Serbian intellectuals, among them, Dobrica Cosic. The Society, as Florence Levinsohn reveals, was established to strengthen the contacts between Israel and Serbia. There are now 22 twin city projects between Israel and Serbia, that is, a city in Serbia is twined with one in Israel, the most important being the Belgrade-Tel Aviv twinning.<sup>305</sup>

Because of the perceived closeness between Serbs and Jews, there has been little if any vilification of Israel's official anti-Serbian position in the current war. One Society member explained this reaction to Levinsohn, who claimed that "Jewish support for aggression against Serbia is an extraordinarily cynical policy that results from Israel's dependence on the United States." The same member added that the idea of Jews going against Serbs was a "terrible violation of the Jewish ethic", since "they have forgotten how Serbs tried to save Jews from the Nazis and how Serbs and Jews were slaughtered together..."<sup>306</sup> In this way, Israel is seen as another victim of American foreign policy, rather than an aggressor.

The devastating effects of the 1993 economic sanctions placed on Serbia have again prompted more comparisons between Serbs and Jews. As Florence Levinsohn writes: "Serbs intense identification with Jews as fellow victims of the criminality of nations leads them to a series of comparisons between the Jews and themselves."<sup>307</sup> As Levinsohn writes, another member of the Society discussed the economic sanctions in terms of genocide. As she quotes him: "What is happening to us now is cold genocide, not the hot genocide as happened in the war [W.W.2] with death by gas and gun, but by deprivation and starvation, and perhaps, at some point, by guns as well."<sup>308</sup>

In another instance, Levinsohn described how another member compared Western vilification of the Serbs to the Nazi and Communist vilification of the Jews. As she writes:

One of the members pointed out to me a strong parallel between Nazi propaganda against the Jews, and the current propaganda against the Serbs. For example, the accusation of mass rape by the Serbs, he said, was comparable to the accusation of ritual child killing levelled for many years against the Jews. The accusation against the Serbs of wanting to control all of Yugoslavia was comparable to the age old accusations against the Jews of wanting to take over the world, of controlling various industries, and so on. Another said 'All these accusations are pure propaganda. Rape is a traditional part of war, but there were no more rapes by Serbs than by Muslims [sic] and Croats.'<sup>309</sup>

In addition to this Society, various other groups have sprung up around Belgrade, the Serbian capital. In Zemun, just North of the city, the supposed home of Theodor Herzl, the "Father of modern Zionism" has been restored and turned into a museum. This house is purported to have been the ancestral home of the Herzl family since 1739.<sup>310</sup>

In a 1992 speech in Sarajevo to the last *Congress of Serbian Intellectuals*, the Serbian academic Milorad Ekmečić delivered this curious statement, first of all discussing the inherent right of all nations to create an ethnic homeland, then linking Jews and Serbs as victims of historical hatreds:

The Serbian people do not want a state determined by the interests of the great powers and of European Catholic clericalism, but one which emerges from *ethnic and historical right* possessed by every people in the world. In the history of the world only the Jews have paid a higher price for their freedom than the Serbs. Because of their losses in the war, and because of massacres, the most numerous people in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, have, in Bosnia Hercegovina, fallen to second place, and today our policy and our general behaviour carry within themselves the *invisible stamp of a struggle for biological survival*.<sup>311</sup>

This quote becomes telling. All nations, we hear have the right to self determination, the right to create their own nation-states. At the same time, the Jews and the Serbs are compared as two people fighting against genocide. These strong parallels between Jews and Serbs serves to create a sort of Serbian political project along the Zionist model. As we saw in Chapter 1, the image of a long suffering nation at last achieving a national homeland formed the central core of 19th and 20th century Zionism. This theme gains a good measure of credence, once Anti-Semitism and Anti-Serbianism are linked together. Since both nations suffer from an a-historical, pan-national program bent on each's destruction, then Serbs, like the Jews before them must gain a state where they can be free of oppression from "others".<sup>312</sup>

Dobrica Ćosić's writings on the Serbian Nation have also consistently stressed strong links between Serbs and Jews. Ćosić, for example, equated the Serb's ostracism in

Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina with that of the Jews in an earlier period: "We Serbs feel today as the Jews did in Hitler's day. We are a people who are [considered] guilty... Today, Serbophobia in Europe is a concept and an attitude with the same ideological motivation and fury as anti-Semitism had during the Nazi era. That of course is not by chance, since Germany and its allies from the First and Second World Wars are the deciding force against both the Jews and Serbia".<sup>313</sup> In order for the Serbs to be likened to the Jews, they must suffer as much as did the Jews, in this case, more, as Cosic reveals: "After the *fall* of [the first] Yugoslavia during the war in 1941, the extreme fascist wing of the Croatian national movement, the Ustashe, founded the Independent State of Croatia on the territory where the Serbs would become victims of a genocide which surpassed the Nazi genocide in its methods and its bestiality."<sup>314</sup>

As pro-Serbian author Arnold Sherman reported, in a book commissioned by the Serbian publishing house in Greece, *The Mayor of Belgrade*, with funds from Milosevic, was lobbying for a Serbia day in Israel. She boasted to Sherman that she had orchestrated a public relations campaign in which an Austrian irregular soldier, Captain Dragan was draped in the star of David and became the centre of numerous articles on the tremendous love between Serbs and Jews. As Sherman reports, one interview in Belgrade with a certain Dr. Gams at Belgrade University was sufficient to convince him that: "Serbia has no anti-Jewish tradition at all...Serbia's rulers have always been great friends of the Jews. There was never any discrimination".<sup>315</sup> The intention seems clear. If Croats are to be Nazis and Anti-Semites, than Serbs must be freedom loving and philosemitic. General Mladic of the Bosnian Serb Army has stressed similar claims: "Fate has connected the Serbs and the Jews. We too cannot lose a battle because it would mean our extermination...Are the Germans to tell me whether I live or die? They tried twice, they didn't succeed".<sup>316</sup>

More concretely, As Radmila Nakrada reports, Serbs have complained of discrimination and unfair treatment in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in particular, against an 'ethnic' tax imposed on Serb properties on Croatian territory, which they view as inherently fascist.<sup>317</sup> Since all Croats are once again Ustashe-fascists, the Serbs become again the persecuted people. The "Holocaust" ideal prompts reports of a 'formal brand' which all Serbs supposedly now receive in Croatia. As Zecevic reported, each Serb in Croatia was given the number 3 on the 8th figure of his uniform personal identity number. Thus Serb Krajina President Goran Hadzic remarked: "The number three was

nothing else for us than the David's star, our race label". Again, Serbs liken themselves to the Jews in Hitler's Germany: "Serbs were killed for only one reason: being Serb".<sup>318</sup>

### **Section 7.2: Serbs as a *Diasporic* People: Assimilating a Zionist-like Identity:**

As Dobrica Cosic has noted, Serbs, like the Jews, are a *Diasporic* people, and because of this have been doomed through much of their history to live outside of their natural ethnic borders. As Cosic concludes, this has prevented them in the past from achieving a national identity like that of the Croats, Macedonians, or Slovenians.<sup>319</sup> This *Diasporic* identity was also noted by author and nationalist politician Vuk Draskovic, who equated Israel's tenuous position in the Middle East with that of the Serbian one in Yugoslavia: "Israel and the Serbs live in a hellish siege where the sworn goal is to seize and to cover with mosques or Vaticanize the lands of Moses and the people of St. Sava [Serbia's patron saint]."<sup>320</sup>

Indeed, this form of identification has served to justify Serbian aggression against other regions of Yugoslavia, as Balkan historian Bogdan Denitch has observed in the case of the Kosovar Albanians. As he notes of this phenomenon:

Ironies abound: some East European nationalists see Israel's present relationship to the West Bank as an explicit model of how to treat areas inhabited by other national groups. This even extends to those nationalists whose predilections to right wing populism and organic nationalism emphasising blood and soil might under some circumstances have been expected to turn anti-Semitic. The parallels between right wing Zionist attitudes towards the Arab majority on the West Bank and the expressed Serbian attitude toward Kosovo are striking. These parallels are even explicitly recognised by the Serbian nationalists.<sup>321</sup>

To this, Brian Hall adds further comparisons of Jews and Serbs: "Serbs looked at Israel's policy of militant vigilance against its Arab neighbours, its reliance on the offence as the only trustworthy defence. They had even borrowed the Jews' rallying cry: Never Again! *Nikad vise!*"<sup>322</sup>

### **Conclusions**

As I attempted to explain in Chapter 1, the moral legacy of Zionism appears to have had great effect on Serbian ideologues. These writers have seen the plight of the Serbian nation in the epical struggle of the Hebrew nation in history against Anti-Semitism, and the various negative forces which have sought to weaken and destroy it. Indeed the Biblical interplay of good versus evil has proven a simple yet effective method by which to present the Serbian world view to Serbs and outsiders alike. That Serbs are supposedly imitating the Israelis in their external policy against other nations should serve

to demonstrate the central importance of the Serbian's self conscious view of themselves as a persecuted people, who, like the Jews, must do what they feel as necessary to defend themselves against genocide, or, as the Israelis have put it many times, being "thrown into the sea".

## **Section 8: Serbs and Moslems in Bosnia-Hercegovina**

### **Introduction**

The Serbian position with regards to the Croats is clear; they are an enemy nation against which Serbs must defend themselves. This simple antagonism or dialectical struggle allows Serbs to vilify Croats without fear, as any nation in wartime demonizes its enemies.<sup>323</sup> While this form of *black and white* imagery works well in describing Croats, a slightly different strategy has been used in the Serbian portrayal of the Bosnian Moslems. As we shall see in this section, the relationship between Serbs and the Bosnian Moslems is somewhat *grey*. Serbian discourse relating to Bosnia-Hercegovina maintains a continuity, but divides into an odd form of "love-hate" relationship. While most discourse posits that Bosnian Moslems are themselves not a nation, but rather ethnic Serbs who were converted during Islamic incursions into the region, they nevertheless lump Bosnian Moslems together with other Islamic peoples from the Middle East, in a giant Islamic conspiracy to enslave the West. The relationship becomes *grey* when these two views of the Bosnian Moslems at once compliment and contradict one another.

The true ethnic origins of the Bosnian Moslem is unclear, in that their Serbian, Croatian or other identities would be impossible to prove, for the simple reason that racial and national characteristics were extremely fluid, if existent at all, at the time when most Bosnians converted to Islam. Nor do the Bosnian Moslems retain clearly defined religious or national symbols which would shed some light on their "suposed" origins.

As historian Peter Sugar describes, the true nature of the Moslem in Bosnia is a "variety of European or rather Balkan folk-Islam", which included baptism, icons to prevent mental illness and many other basically non-Moslem features. As he explains: "There were mountaineers who called themselves Constantin in front of Christians and Sulayman in front of Moslems. The dead would be given a service by the Orthodox Church and a subsequent burial in a Moslem cemetery. The religious boundaries were easily and frequently transgressed".<sup>324</sup> The lack of a unified or standard form of Bosnian Moslem religious or ethnic symbolism, however does not preclude the fact that they do

identify themselves as a nation, and were recognised as such by Tito in 1961. This should be remembered, both in this chapter, and the following one, when the relationship between Croats and Moslems is discussed.

### **Section 8.1: Serbs and their *Fallen* Bosnian Nation:**

Much of the recent Serbian discourse with regards to Bosnia has focused on two primary ideas: one- that Bosnia is part of historic Serbia, and must be rejoined with the rest of the country; and two- that Bosnian Moslems are in fact ethnic Serbs, who must be converted "back" to their Orthodox religion. In these two senses, the notion of the *Fall* becomes central. For Serbian nationalist ethnographers; there is no question that Bosnia-Herzegovina has always been a part of Serbia, since the rule of Serbian king Chaslav in 927, up until 1918.<sup>325</sup> Serbian historian, Rade Korac, for example, has concluded that there is no doubt that the Bosnian Moslems are in fact Serbian and appeals to a Fichtean understanding of national identity being tied to national language. He thus posits: "The Moslem power brokers and the oppressed common people spoke the same Serbian language." Korac also negates the religious distinctions between Serb and Moslem, stating that: "There were Serbs as polytheists as Serbian, Orthodox, as Bogomils, therefore they remained Serbs even as Moslems, their ethnic character is also their language."<sup>326</sup>

Similarly, the Serbs deny the existence of the Bosnian Moslems as a racial or national classification. As the *Ministry of Information* Web Site states emphatically: "The term 'Bosnian' (Bosanac) is a regional geographic one used to designate an inhabitant of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is in no way an ethnic or national appellation."<sup>327</sup> Going into more detail, the authors of the Web Site assert the following: "The arrival of the Turks inaugurated the conversion to Islam of the majority of the Serb population. It may therefore be claimed with certainty that most of today's Bosnian Moslems are descended from Serbs." As they further recall: "Between the two world wars, Yugoslav Moslems were considerably aware of their religious identity. From the national point of view, they mostly declared themselves as Serbs of Moslem faith, a small number as Croats, while a certain number were nationally undecided." It is only because of communism that being Moslem was itself considered a separate nationality. In their minds, it is thus an artificial construction with no primordialist underpinnings.<sup>328</sup>

Since of course there is no such thing as a Bosnian Moslem Nation, under an ethnic national world-view, the Moslems have no right to their own nation-state, because

they have no place in a cyclical view of time. This was clearly expressed by Bosnian Serb General Mladic, as he explained his position to a group of journalists from Belgrade: "As far as terminology, you reporters from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have not yet learned the basic terms: I have not conquered anything in this war. I only liberated that which was always Serbian, although I am far from liberating all that really is Serbian...Even Trieste [Italy] is an old Serbian city." He later furthered the discussion with UN negotiator David Owen, speaking of himself in the third person: "General Mladic is not creating any Greater Serbia, he is only defending his country, just as Lord Owen would do."<sup>329</sup>

Like any missionary, the ethnic variety preaches conversion as the highest form of salvation. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is certainly no different. In a domestic radio broadcast he openly urged abandonment of Islam as the best solution for the Bosnian Moslems, claiming hopefully that "many Moslems who are well educated and sensible are being baptised and are becoming Christian in Europe as a way of reacting against fundamentalism and the introduction of militant Islam into Bosnia...it is clear that we must cross the Rubicon since we are dealing with exceptional people in whom the memory of their Serbian origin is alive."<sup>330</sup> Because the Bosnian Moslems, are for so many Serbs a part of the Serbian nation, it becomes of central importance for the redemption of the nation that they be brought back into the fold, to allow the Serbian nation to achieve its ultimate goal: to re-unite all Serbs in a single ethnic nation-state. That few Moslems recognise this "fact" has been an increasing source of frustration, and with that frustration, aggression as well.

#### **Section 8.2: Serbs and the "Moslem Traitors" in Bosnia-Herzegovina:**

The theme of Bosnian Moslems as Serbs, is however, only part of the story. The transitional part becomes more interesting, and this is where the "love-hate" relationship comes into play. At this point, the Bosnian Serbs, by converting to Islam, betrayed the Serbian nation, they betrayed their own brothers, and thus, in a form of *fratricide*, committed the gravest of sins, for which they must now be punished. In this sense, those of the Moslem faith rejected their Serbian heritage, and must now be cast out of their "original nation", from their previous divine Serbian identity.

Vuk Draskovic, nationalist politician and author of several controversial best sellers, such as the evocatively titled novel *Noz* (The Knife) which was first published in 1982, was perhaps the most popular and influential individual in developing early

stereotypes of the Moslems. Set largely against the background of World War II, the Moslem characters in *Noz* appear mostly as treacherous, cold-blooded murderers. Where Draskovic differentiates from those who would simply condemn Moslems as eastern and therefore barbarous, reflecting an orientalist bias, it is his assertion that Moslems are of ethnic Serbian stock, and therefore betrayed the Serbian nation by their conversion to a foreign, hostile religion. It is their mythical betrayal which brings about their demonization, as Draskovic posits, not in fact their "eastern-ness".<sup>331</sup> The same idea has been advanced by Mirosljub Jevtic, an Islamic specialist at Belgrade University, who stresses this interpretation of Moslems as traitors. As he posits:

Those who accepted Islam accepted the conquerors defacto as their brothers, and the crimes of the latter are their own. That means that their own hands are also covered with the blood of their own ancestors, the former Bosnian non-Muslim population. By converting to Islam, they destroyed Christian Bosnia and caused the Ottomans to rule over Christian Bosnia for a long time.

He further argues that: "It is well known that Serbia, by means of struggle, liberated our portion of the Balkans from the Caliphate, and it is therefore not surprising that Serbophobia is highly developed among fundamentalist Muslims."<sup>332</sup> Thus, Bosnian Moslems are traitors who hate the Serbs, but almost as a form of self-loathing. In this sense, the Moslems bring about their own *Fall* from grace, by rejecting their true and original nation, instead embracing a foreign religion which forces them to betray their own people. Once this point is clearly established, the Moslems become an "other", a negative agency for the Serbian nation, and thus fully able to plot its downfall.

From another point of view, the Serbs are weak Serbs who were unwilling to stand up to the forces of Islam, and thus lost their Serb identity. The Kosovo Myth at this point becomes important. As previously discussed, central to Serbian identity is the struggle against the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Kosovo. For Serbs, the defeat is central to their self-consciousness, since this mythical *Fall* served to unite the Serbs in their common teleological quest for redemption, in the form of freedom from colonial oppression, the resurrection of national symbols, and the re-uniting of all former Serbian lands. By accepting Ottoman rule, by refusing to continue the fight, the Bosnian Moslems lose this sense of Serbian cyclical teleology. They are no longer part of the Serbian world view, and thus become an "other".

### **Section 8.3: Serbs and the Bosnian Moslem "Other":**

Since the Bosnian Moslems are for many Serbs an alien nation, an "Other", they, as the Croats, are viewed with distrust, as a negative agency, and a "forward force of Islamic expansionism." This form of Orientalist discourse<sup>333</sup> was plainly voiced in a 1993 Serbian Ministry of Information pamphlet, intended for English audiences abroad. One of the contributors, an Orthodox priest and member of the Bosnian Serb Parliament stressed the immorality and perfidy of the Moslems and their religion, maintaining that:

*They want for the second time to create a Turkish Bosnia or a Bosnia in Turkey...with the Shariatic law and other life norms unacceptable in the twenty-first century. Behind this century old dream of a primitive man to live off the backs of a subjugated people to have his own harem, dreaming of Istanbul, where according to him there was a paradise of earth, where 'fairies are bathing in sherbet'...They [the Moslems] invited to this bloody feast all other worldly bums, murderers and dogs of war, Mujahadins and jihad fanatics from the Islamic countries came to fulfil their sacred duty and to exterminate us. This unscrupulousness completely fits their religion and tradition and culture.<sup>334</sup>*

In this way, the Bosnian Moslems, as with all Moslems, according to Serbian ideologues are bent on the destruction of the Serbian nation. Like the Croats, the Moslems have assimilated this Anti-Serbianism as a political project, and in the process have become another negative agency against which the Serbs must defend themselves. Similarly, Dobrica Cosic warned in one lecture, that a "pan-Islamic internationalisation of war in Bosnia is the greatest danger looming over both the Balkans and south east Europe." Cosic again wrote of the menace of Islam, alluding to Serbian battles of the past against Islamic invaders, who are once again trying to cross the fault-line between East and West. As he asserts in this French translation of one of his works:

*Mais nous sommes exposés aussi à l'énergie terrifiante de l'Asie, de l'Asie centrale, ancien Empire Ottoman, ou se renouvelle aujourd'hui, qui que toujours dissimule, l'expansionisme islamique. Je rappelle que les premiers affrontements décisifs entre la religion et la civilisation chrétiennes et d'islam ont eu lieu en terre serbe; c'est le peuple serbe qui a consenti, dès le XIVe siècle, les plus grandes sacrifices pour la défense de l'Europe et de sa civilisation.*

He then continues: "L'absurdité du mouvement vers la liberté des Serbes, pour employer un concept Hegélien, réside dans le fait qu'ils doivent aujourd'hui faire face, sur leur propre sol, à une énergie islamique renouvelée, transformée et soutenue par des facteurs étrangers, avant tout allemands et américains."<sup>335</sup>

Again, Cosic warns of the 'religious and ethnocentric exclusivism' of the Moslems, who he fears are belligerent and fundamentalist, and seek only to overthrow the Serbs, making them aliens in their own homeland. Thus, while Croatia is an agent of Papist

expansionism, Moslem Bosnia remains at the forefront of the Islamic Jihad in Europe and a loyal agent of Tehran. Harkenning back to historic battles, such as those undertaken against the Turks in the 19th century, where "the smallest country" to take on the Turks produced the highest number of casualties, Cosic concludes that the Serbs alone have been the main bulwark against Turkish, hence Ottoman expansionism into Europe. Thus Serbia has a patriotic duty to herself and the world to fight Bosnian Moslems to protect the free world.<sup>336</sup>

Other Serbian politicians, including Milosevic also continued to hammer this theme of Serbia against Islam, alone protecting the free world against invasion from the East. In fact, Radovan Karadzic, while believing Moslems to be of Serbian stock, remained distrustful of them, precisely because they were still Moslems, thus by their essence betraying the Serbian nation. Perhaps more afraid of the Moslems for this reason, he was to go further, describing the Moslem threat by using a metaphor of disease. The only reason, he claimed, that the Serbs were willing to accept a transnational confederation in Bosnia-Hercegovina with a Moslem state was "so that we can control it.. We are doing that for Europe, to make sure Islamic fundamentalism doesn't infect Europe from the south...They [Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey] have dark schemes, wishing to make Bosnia a springboard for Islamic penetration of Europe."<sup>337</sup>

The idea of the Serbs as the great defenders of civilisation against barbarism fits in well with the Serbian mindset, as a heroic people who always come to the defence of justice and equality, even if this implies a sacrifice on their part. In this sense, the Serbian role in Bosnia-Hercegovina proves that the Serbs are (to paraphrase George Orwell) "double-good". First, the Serbs become the defenders of Western Europe against the modern manifestation of the Islam, being positioned as they are on the fault-line between "Jihad" and "McWorld", and do so readily because of their "democratic and Hellenic traditions". Secondly, the Serbs defend the Western World, while risking the genocide of the people at the hands of the Islamic Jihad, which is for some reason set on destroying them.

#### **Section 8.4: The Moslem *Third World* (and Bolshevik-Fascist) Dictatorship:**

In a booklet published by the *Serbian Ministry of Information*, Boris Delic likens the Bosnian State to a third world dictatorship, with *sinister* President Alija Izetbegovic at the helm:

There is nothing at all that brought greater unhappiness to the people living there [Bosnia], than the creation of a new central state under Izetbegovic's rule. Supporters of that idea speak of Bosnia as of a thousand-year old state with Izetbegovic as its godsend ruler. Izetbegovic is actually a dictatorial and forcibly imposed rule according to the Bolshevik-fundamentalist model. Even a cursory analysis indicates that this president of a banana republic without a single element of statehood and unfortunately without bananas is a skilful dictator-impostor. The bases of his power are tricks, insincerity and war profiteering with stubborn insistence on the role of the victim, even at the expense of shelling his own people.<sup>338</sup>

Delic's imagery is interesting. While Izetbegovic is a third world dictator, he is also a Bolshevik and an Islamic fundamentalist. At the same time, his 1000 year old dream for a Bosnian Moslem state clearly identifies him with Fascism, and its millennial pretensions. Delic successfully tars the Bosnian government with the brush of everything a loyal Serb should find horrifying. Against such an evil as this, violence can be the only action.

Another article originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina expresses a similar theme. This one, entitled "Lying Hands on The Serbian Women", and written by a Serbian Major in Bosnia, again defines the conflict in terms of a holy war being perpetrated by the Bosnian Moslems against the Serbs. The document describes a sort of "race crime" being committed against the Serbs in the region, through the medium of rape:

By order of the Islamic fundamentalists from Sarajevo, healthy Serbian women from 17 to 40 years of age are being separated out and subjected to *special treatment*. According to their sick plans going back many years, these women have to be impregnated by orthodox Islamic seed in order to raise a generation of *janissaries* on the territories they surely consider to be theirs, the Islamic republic. Therefore, a fourfold crime is to be committed against Serbian women: to remove her from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take him away from her.<sup>339</sup>

Again, a mixture of metaphors is employed. The Bosnian Moslems are likened to Fascists, in their plans to use *special treatment* on Serbian women. They are similarly Moslem extremists who seek to raise an army of Islamic warriors at the expense of Serbian women. While Bosnian Moslems may indeed have taken part in the rape of women in detention camps, as their Serbian and Croatian counterparts in Bosnia-Herzegovina have done, it is more the language, and not the actual facts that inspire them, which becomes of central importance to this article. The women who are raped are not seen as women, but as part of the Serbian nation, and the crimes are thus perceived, not as crimes against the individual but crimes against the nation. This collective view of sexual

reproduction allows the ethnic nationalist to perceive the individual *Fall* of every woman as a collective *Fall*.

### **Conclusions**

To conclude this section, the general reaction of Serbian nationalist writers to the Bosnian Moslem question has been a mixture of hostility, fear and anger. But while the opinions and general themes of discourse may differ, the objectives behind each remain the same. Whether Bosnian Moslems are friends or enemies, Serbs or non-Serbs, good or evil, they are still on lands which are viewed as part of historic Serbia, lands which must be *liberated* in order for the Serbian national *telos* to be achieved, of having all Serbs in one state. Where writers and politicians differ is perhaps in their prognoses of what is to be done with the Moslems, once the territory is "liberated" from generations of "foreign rule". While some would re-assimilate the Moslems, bringing them into the Serbian fold, others posit that the differences between Serb and Moslem are too great, since the psychological change in the Serbian mentality at Kosovo drove a wedge between those who believed in the Serbian nation, and those who supposedly rejected their "heroic roots" and chose instead to embrace Islam.

## **Section 9: Serbs and the Western Powers**

*The West has a long hidden antagonism towards the Balkans, towards Yugoslavia. For a thousand years we [the Serbs] have felt such negative energy from the West that no wind could blow it away....The way Europe is behaving towards the Serbs is disgusting. Europe is all glamorous, with gold and diamonds, and it is beautiful and fascinating. But only on the outside. On the inside, it is a prostitute destroying herself with syphilis.*

-Serbian writer Branimir Scepanovic-

### **Introduction**

In this final section of Chapter 3, I will examine the Serbian reaction to the Western powers. As one might imagine, Serbs approach the non-Communist West with a certain degree of apprehension. Serbian nationalists remain angered by the imposed western economic sanctions which have effectively destroyed the Serbian economy, paving the way for a black market system. Similarly, Serbs remain distrustful of the West for their reaction to events in the Balkans. Serbs have found themselves condemned by Western media and governments as the sole culprit in the present war, while Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have received economic aid, and more importantly, international recognition. As they approach most problems, Serbian nationalist ideologues

seem intent on proving the Serbs blameless of any wrong doing, while vilifying all "others" for their treachery, hypocrisy, and aggression. This allows Serbian ideologues to once again don the mantle of the innocent victim, suffering for the nation against the rest of the world.

### **Section 9.1: The United States as Enemy Number One**

A feeling of victimisation is manifest in Dobrica Cosic's vituperations against the outside world:

**In our collective being a feeling of social and national revolt is mounting as a response to the existential threat from without, to the cruel punishment of and threat coming from Europe. The United Nations, The USA and Russia...[This has] led to depression of democratic forces and encouraged national and social extremism, disappointment, anger, despair of our entire nation.<sup>340</sup>**

When speaking of the United States' role in the dismemberment of the SFRY, Cosic posits that the US supported it primarily because its neutrality during the Cold War served to create a buffer state for the West. Yugoslavia, he feels was abandoned, after it was no longer useful as a foreign policy instrument. Thus he targets the US as the country to blame for leaving Serbia at the mercy of its enemies: "D'abord, en soutenant abondamment le despotisme de Tito au nom de l'antisovietisme, en ignorant la terreur albanaise et les persecutions des serbes au Kosovo qui on dure les decennies..."<sup>341</sup>

But while the US tacitly allowed all measure of atrocities against the Serbs, they are also guilty of manipulating the Serbs through their return to 19th century *Great Power Politics*. As he asserts: "It is the brutal return to traditional politics and power relationships, of spheres of interest, blackmail and protectorates...The political protagonists of the Oriental Question are grosso modo the same, as well as their victims. In this regard Imperial Russia has been replaced by democratic America."<sup>342</sup> This allows Cosic to assert that the US as the "puppet master" is currently supporting the Moslems in Bosnia, in an attempt to somehow expand American influence, at the expense of the Serbs. As Cosic explains:

**On the territory of the ancient Turkish empire, we see a renewal of Islamic militancy centred in Bosnia, [in the midst of] nationalist, statist and political upheaval. This Islamic expansion into Europe is upheld by Turkish support along with Moslem states, as well as by the preferences of American strength, who in this manner increase their domination in the world. With the economic and political penetration of a unified Germany in South-East Europe, the Balkans are once again becoming the battle field of imperial politics, the compromises and conflicts of great spheres of influence.<sup>343</sup>**

A more extreme view paints the Americans as Neo-Nazis, who are trying to destroy ethnic nations, as did Hitler's Third Reich. As New York University Professor Barry Lituchy comments in his provocatively titled article: **"The War Against the Serbs and the New American Fascism"** (1995): "The Americans are becoming the Nazis of the New World Order", now that the Soviet Union (which prevented the "realisation of both Nazi Germany and American world domination") is dead. His reasoning suggests that the US is totalitarian by dint of its imposing sanctions on Serbia, a measure designed to "allow for collective responsibility while collectively punishing a nation or race." The US is thus like Nazi Germany in its activities: "the conquest or destruction of entire nations as part of an overall strategy for total world domination".<sup>344</sup>

This is coupled with the Soros foundation, described as "a fifth column prepared to take over the governments and countries of Eastern Europe within the next several years and to govern them like banana republics, completely according to the dictates of Washington". Under the heading: **"What is this War Really About?"**, Lituchy reveals that it is a reversion to Nazi times, specifically the purifying of Croatia. As he writes: "Croatia today is a racially pure Catholic State, just as they intended during the Second World War...Not only do they kill Serbs and burn and pillage their houses, they burn all books which mention the name Yugoslavia or that have print in the Cyrillic alphabet."<sup>345</sup>

The same idea of the Americans as Nazis was expressed by eminent Serbian writer Branimir Scepanovic, who has described the US as the most genocidal nation on Earth, in an attempt to discredit their sanctions against Serbia and their military intervention in the Balkans. As he writes: "Americans are the most genocidal nation in the world. First they killed the Indians. Second, they killed thousands of Africans on those slave ships, and today Negroes have no equal rights. Third, it is the only nation in the world to have dropped two atomic bombs. Fourth, in Vietnam they threw all this napalm to kill and burn millions of people, in the name of freedom and democracy."<sup>346</sup> By discrediting the United States as a genocidal nation, Scepanovic again ties into certain central themes. Serbs must be victims, since the United States is by its nature genocidal. Thus the Serbs are being targeted by an irrational evil power, who use the facade of liberal democracy to justify atrocities.

In a paper entitled **"Pillars of the Croato-Muslim Phalanx"**, the *Serbian Ministry of Information* launched into a demonization of Republican Presidential nominee Bob Dole for his "long and tireless struggle for the ethnic Albanian, Moslem and Croatian

cause, which [was] getting close to being psychopathological". Among other things, the paper argued that Dole was obsessed with the creation of "Greater Albania". According to the *Ministry*, he is also controlled by a lady of Croatian descent, who functions as his legal and political advisor, supposedly the *mastermind* behind his team. As they write: "Her relatives live in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and her father runs a pro-Ustashe radio station in Los Angeles, which glorifies the Kansas senator in every broadcast. This radio station refers to Dole as a special friend who is heartily helping the Croats to maintain their independent state. The report also states how Dole has co-opted Newt Gingrich and Jesse Helms into a radical anti-Serb stance."<sup>347</sup>

### **Section 9.2: Germans as Nazis and Villains:**

The same sort of Nazi accusations have also been thrown at the Germans, who were the first (with the exception of the Vatican) to acknowledge Slovenian and Croatian independence in 1991. In the same year, Serbian Yugoslav General Kadijevic, Yugoslavia's minister of defence spoke of the EU initiatives for peace at Le Hague: "[U]nder the most serious threat are the unity and interest of the Serbian nation, whose considerable sections will be separated from each other, reduced to the status of a national minority and exposed to the danger of being exterminated." He further went on to cite the Germans as the prime movers of this extermination: "Germany is about to attack our country for a third time this century...today it is relying on the strategy of indirect action and a whole spectrum of special war methods, while preparing first for an economic, then a military onslaught."<sup>348</sup>

Of course, while the Americans and the Germans are seen as the worst agents of the Serbian *Fall*, Serb sources have also claimed to see conspiracies by various combinations of Germany, NATO, the Masons, the Vatican, The CIA, "American generals", Saudi Arabia and even by the *Bonn-Vienna-Zagreb-Sophia-Tirana-Rome* axis, among others. One political observer assured his readers that what he claimed was an assault against the Serbs was part of a Freemason's anti-Europe strategy designed to establish an "Islamic corridor as a pathway for the breakthrough of Turkish hegemony and of the Islamic masses onto Europe."<sup>349</sup>

### **Conclusions**

As is obvious from much of the discourse in this section, Serbian ideologues have demonised almost every conceivable country and political actor who is non-Serbian. Anti-Serbianism is found far and wide, as conspiracy theorising finds secret intrigues, from the

panelled corridors of the Vatican, to the outskirts of Los Angeles. While the targets are manifestly different from the local actors, such as Croats and Moslems in Yugoslavia, the same theme of persecution is stressed. The Western powers are against Serbia, they seek to engender the destruction of Serbia by supporting its national enemies.

In the case of the demonisation of the Western powers, the main impetus is economic. Nationalists are able to legitimate the terrible poverty, the hyper inflation and the rampant crime and the collapsed economy in Serbia by accusing the West of hating Serbia. In this manner the nationalist government is absolved of any wrongdoing. It is the West who is now solely responsible for the terrible hardships in Serbia, not Milosevic or his government. Serbia is thus prevented in attaining its goals, because of the Croats, Bosnian Moslems and Albanians who wish to destroy them, but also because of the machinations of the Western powers, who wish to further destroy the Serbian economy, thus facilitating their annihilation by the various Yugoslav nationalities who have adopted an Anti-Serbian project. If Serbia is suffering under hardships, it is thus because of the West, not because of anything Milosevic and his government has done. Indeed, Milosevic, as the reincarnation of Prince Lazar has based his political platform on an eventual redress of Serbian grievances. For the short term, however, Serbs are told that they must tighten their belts, with that oft quoted theme ringing in their ears: "guns make us stronger, while butter only makes us fat".

### **Conclusions for Chapter 3 and a Discussion of Ethnic Cleansing**

After having reviewed in detail some of the relevant themes and documents in Serbian national discourse, it is now possible to situate themes and events in Serbian discourse within my four stage framework. As should be clear from this chapter, the cyclical model has indeed been useful in explaining Serbian national discourse. In order to situate events in Serbia within this framework, I have taken the principal elements of Serbian discourse reviewed in this chapter, and have placed them within the model, according to which stage they express. As we can see, in Figure 4, the elements reviewed in this chapter do indeed fit well into the model. This allows us to review certain general themes, based on the model. I will compare and contrast this to the Croatian model in the **Conclusions** section of my thesis.

#### **Stage 1:**

As we can see from the model, there is a good deal of Serbian discourse dealing with the idea of an original nation. In general, the Serbian "self" is described in terms of a peace loving, democratic, brave and noble nation, which is not afraid to sacrifice in order to defend positive values against the onslaught of "others". Serbs become a people who have invaded Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in order to liberate their people from genocidal terror. By playing the victim, Serbian ideologues have attempted to legitimate almost every action of almost every Serbian or Serbian dominated government since the beginning of this century.

**Stage 2:**

By dividing the world between "self" and "other", the Serbian nationalists have created a *sum-zero* situation where the benefit of an "other" must necessarily infringe on the rights of the Serbian nation. In this sense, it becomes relatively easy for Serbian ideologues to create an image of the Fall. If Croatia desired to leave a federation that was in danger of political and economic collapse, this must have been done to oppress the Serbs. Similarly, if Bosnian Moslems desire a multi-national government in Bosnia, this must necessarily be a denial of Serbian territorial rights, and a betrayal by Moslems who reject their "true" Serbian nationality. It is the dangerous optic indeed, which paints everyone who is not a Serb as a standard bearer of "Anti-Serbianism".

**Stage 3:**

With regards to the Milosevic regime, there is little doubt that the regime has been instrumental in uniting various nationalist groups, such as intellectuals, politicians, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, etc. behind its national projects. There is also little doubt that the regime has used myths of the original nation and myths of national Falls to justify a collapsed economy, an overcentralized, over bureaucratized state administration, and more importantly, an irredentist war on its neighbours. I am reminded here of the words of academic and former Yugoslav Ambassador Mihailo Crnobrnja (also one of my former professors), who concluded of the current war: "It is not a war of national hatred, religious intolerance or historical animosity. All of these, to the extent that they did exist were converted into powerful instruments in a conflict, which in essence is a conflict of self-interest designed to achieve political sovereignty. Hatred was inspired, then used as an instrument to galvanise the population of respective nations to achieve concrete political objectives."<sup>350</sup>

During Stage 3, which is currently occurring in Serbia, the term "ethnic cleansing" has been frequently used to describe Serbian military tactics in various regions of the former SFRY. In the Knin and Krajina regions of Croatia, pockets of Serbs were isolated in their historic lands, when Croatia separated from the SFRY in 1991. Much of the fighting here has been by Serbian villagers and peasants, who have organised themselves into small militia units. The same holds true in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is unclear how much influence the Serbian leadership has on the actions of its irregular soldiers.

One of the myths of the Western media has been that the Serbs are somehow united in their leadership, and that Milosevic has great control over events in Croatia and Bosnia. This generally does not appear to be the case. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs and President of the Serbian Democratic Party has based much of his popularity on his opposition to Milosevic's calls for an end to the Bosnian conflict. The same is true of Krajina Serb leader Jovan Raskovic. While initially the Milosevic regime helped these regions with guns, troops, equipment, food and medical supplies, the impact of the sanctions has greatly limited Milosevic's freedom to aid anyone, much less his own countrymen, who have seen their economy destroyed.<sup>351</sup> As discussed in this chapter, most of the military incursions have been justified with the notion of correcting past wrongs, defending the people against Islamic expansionism and Croatian fascism, and liberating Serbian brothers in the midst of oppression

#### **Stage 4:**

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Stage 4 is largely a national dream. The various endeavours of the Serbian government and its affiliated institutions, such as the Church and military, to advance a Serbian political project bent on uniting Serbian lands in a single state is at best utopian. While Serbian nationalists may wish to someday see such a state, many of the military policies with regards to ethnic cleansing and mass rape will make it almost impossible for the international community to recognise such a state.

In closing this chapter, I would add only that the work of Serbian nationalist ideologues today appears no different from the work of King Aleksander or Yugoslav Communist Edvard Kardelj, in that all of these people have to apply a collective identification onto the populace from the top down. In the short term, this form of nationalism appears quite popular, but, as Sabrina Ramet notes, there are vast differences between the "disciplined imperial sons" from the former Hapsburg Military frontier, the

exponents of urban Byzantine Orthodoxy from southern Serbia, the patriarchal and natural Orthodox highlanders of Hercegovina and Montenegro, the latitudinarian kinsmen from the harbours of the Montenegrin littoral, and those Serbs living in predominantly Moslem areas.<sup>352</sup> This allows one to speculate that the Serbian nation is not as cohesive as Milosevic and his government would wish it to be. In the Balkan trend of increasing fragmentation, who it to say where the future of the Serbian nation lies.

## **Chapter 4: Case Study 2: Croatia**

*The monstrous distortion, the devilish transformation of lies and half-truths into truth of criminal actions into holy deed, this senseless mask that walks the world as a scarecrow of humanity makes the human being stop in awe and ask himself: is it really man, or is it a mythical monster created with no other purpose but to transform life into hell?*

- Petar Segedin on "Greater Serbia" in *Genocidal Nature of a Nation* -

### **Introduction to Chapter 4:**

As in the previous chapter, I will use a four stage model to analyse the nature of Croatian ethno-nationalist discourse. Again applying this four stage analytical framework to a variety of themes discussed in Croatian ethno-national discourse, I will then be in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of this model for understanding the Croatian world view. As will become obvious as the chapter progresses, Croatian ethno-nationalist writers have conjured up an image of a "Greater Serbia" as the central negative agency which had brought about several *Falls* for the Croatian nation during the 20th century. This negative force is given the same stature by Croats as "Anti-Serbianism" is by Serbs or Anti-Semitism by the Jewish peoples. For Croats and Serbs alike, the image of the Fall becomes central in legitimating land claims and aggression both inside and outside the nation state.

In this chapter, the image of Croats as a democratic and peace loving people will be stressed by Croatian ideologues, and contrasted to the barbaric, dictatorial and violent Serbs. In this sense, the Croats engage in a species of Orientalism, where Serbs are viewed as a different, eastern nation, operating against the more western Croats. Again like the previous chapter, the role of the domestic church is discussed, specifically the Croatian Catholic Church. There is also a section on the Croatian perception of the Bosnian Moslems, which as we shall see, is remarkably similar to the Serbian view.

Also important will be the image of the Croats as the victims of genocide, and the targeting of enemies, specifically Serbian, as genocidal fascists, who have tried to *annihilate* the Croatian nation in the 20th century. Using Zionist imagery, (implying a constant theme of suffering in the *Diaspora* and redemption in a national homeland) Croats and Serbs alike have created a self-image of themselves as a long suffering nation who must at last be freed from persecution in a national state which conforms to ancient geographical borders, at a time when the original nation was strong and heroic.

## **Section 1: The Rise of Croatian Nationalism:**

### **Section 1.1: The Rise of Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ:**

As I have done in the previous chapter, I will begin with an analysis of Stage 3, that being the rise of ethnic nationalism in Croatia. As discussed before, it is essential to discuss Stage 3 before delving into the other sections, since without an understanding of how and why nationalism once again asserted itself, it becomes difficult to understand the full importance of the Croatian national discourse which has emerged from the region. As we shall see, this section includes the consolidation of mass support for the national elite, as well as the centralisation of state organs of communication, education and culture, and the monopolisation of economic and political power. In these, Franjo Tudjman and his government have proved as efficient as their Serbian counterparts. Indeed, the great similarities between the two regimes prompted Micheal Ignatieff, in his study of Balkan nationalism to conclude that both the Tudjman state and Milosevic regime are post Communist, one party states, democratic only in the sense that their popular support is derived from their skill at manipulating the emotions of their people.<sup>353</sup>

As discussed in Chapter 2, the rise of Croatian nationalism (The Croat Spring) in the early 1970's provoked a series of purges. This was largely in reaction to calls by the republican elite for a variety of privileges, among them, demands for total autonomy in political and economic decisions making, including a seat in the United Nations, an autonomous army, an independent foreign policy, and complete power to promote Croat nationalism.<sup>354</sup> One of the major instigators was Croatian author Miroslav Krljeza, who had signed a petition with 130 intellectuals in 1967, calling for the designation of Croatian as a distinct language, to be taught in schools and used in publications.<sup>355</sup> Tito initiated a series of purges, which had the effect of silencing almost all nationalist opposition until the 1980s.

Also discussed in Chapter 2, was the economic and political turmoil after Tito's death, which sparked off a new wave of nationalism, as republican elites consolidated their regional power bases and began asserting republic based demands in the Federal Assembly.<sup>356</sup> This was concomitant with the rise in the popularity of a new, ethnic national form of protest. This protest was advanced by dissidents and expatriates (the *Croatian Diaspora*) who advocated the renewal of Croatian separatism and the creation of a new Croatian state, with those elements espoused during the Croatian Spring. One dissident was former Communist general and Croatian historian Franjo Tudjman, who had

become a sort of martyr for Croatian nationalism. He was twice imprisoned for his nationalist writings, which argued that the reported numbers of dead killed by the Croatian Ustashe was inflated by Communists, while simultaneously accusing Tito's Partisans of genocide. Tudjman was viewed as one of the few men with the moral legitimacy, as well as the experience and knowledge to lead Croatia out of the SFRY.

The rise of the Tudjman's right-wing *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* (HDZ) began in February, 1990.<sup>357</sup> His party gained a landslide victory in April 1990. The HDZ posters pictured Tudjman above the words "We Alone Will Decide The Destiny of our Croatia", denouncing any outside intervention from Belgrade, while perhaps alluding to the referendum on the separation of Croatia from the rest of the federation, which Tudjman would call the following year. While the re-annexation of Kosovo and Vojvodina formed a central part of Milosevic's election strategy, Tudjman focused on the annexation of Bosnia Hercegovina, referring to the unnatural shape of Croatia, like "an apple with a bite taken out of it". All this would change, he promised, once the HDZ was in power.<sup>358</sup>

Tudjman's rise was facilitated by both the timing of the election and the lack of credible opposition. Coming on the heels of the Slovenian election, the Croatian one saw the communists in a weak position, unable to transform their ideology and message in time to make their program palatable for the electorate. The stigma of economic and political failure continued to dog them throughout their campaign.<sup>359</sup> By contrast, Tudjman's well funded party, with its ethno-regional appeal, and US designed posters and slogans (in addition to polls and public opinion surveys) allowed the HDZ to appear more Western, and certainly a break with the past. Tudjman's party had also raised a large election war chest from the Croatian Diaspora in Canada, the United States and Australia, those expatriots who had left to find work in the 1960's and 70's and now sent donations to support the overthrow of the Communists.

Like Tito had done in 1945, so too did Tudjman set about centralising the school system and universities, as well as media and governmental institutions.<sup>360</sup> This would have the effect of eliminating both Communist and Serbian influences from public institutions, simultaneously replacing them with loyal Croatian nationalists who would toe the party line. Tudjman also resurrected the *Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika* (Croatian Heritage Foundation) in 1990. This nationalist organisation had been closed following the Croatian Spring and now began sponsoring exchanges for *Diaspora-Croats*. This is, as

we shall see, one of the principle sources of Croatian ethno-nationalist propaganda, through its *Croatian Information Centre*. Its representatives have established local communities and branch offices in every city, town, and village in Croatia.<sup>361</sup>

The 1990 Croatian HDZ Constitution became another contentious issue in the new state. In the Constitution that was based on the realisation of "the thousand year dream of the Croatian People" to establish a national sovereign state of the Croatian People, it was also written that "the members of other nations and national minorities, who are her citizens, will be guaranteed equal status with citizens of Croatian nationality." Yet by 1991, it was obvious that jobs, property rights, and even residence status, relied upon having Croatian citizenship.<sup>362</sup> However, the criteria for citizenship for non-Croat residents (Serbs, Hungarians etc.) included knowledge of national culture and history, and this was determined by tests administered by commissions with significant arbitrary powers.<sup>363</sup> Consequently, in the course of realising Croatian "cultural nationalism" in 1991, the Serbian Cyrillic script was practically banned, while thousands of Serbs lost their jobs. Eventually, the Croatian Serbs had turned to aspiring nationalist leaders, whose radical program of separation from Croatia only provided additional fuel for armed conflict and bloodshed in the second half of 1991.<sup>364</sup>

While this new government was in some manner a break from the past, the old Communist method of administration has been retained. Despite some selling off of state owned industry, largely to now wealthy aparatchiks, the economy has not been opened up or liberated from burdensome and complicated economic legislation.<sup>365</sup> Nor has the political system been freed from central control. If anything, control has been far more centralised than before, opposition is tolerated to a lesser extent, and human rights abuses have become increasingly frequent. Like in Serbia, strong state control of all aspects relating to internal and foreign policy has been couched in nationalist rhetoric, allowing the government a large measure of freedom to do as it pleases, with little or no public accountability.

### **Section 1.2: The Media in Croatia:**

Similar to the Serbian nationalist regime, one of the first acts of the new Croatian government was to assume control over what media was not already in republican hands by the end of the elections in 1990. The HDZ government, under Tudjman set about implementing measures to control and discipline the media. HDZ faithful were parachuted in to replace journalists and editorial staff at *HINA*, (formerly *TanJug*) the state news

agency and *Vjesnik*, the main daily national paper. Refusing to honour their promise to allow private electronic media, the government has held a virtual broadcasting monopoly. An elaborate framework was also introduced to restrict the privatisation of media, except to those firms or individuals affiliated with the ruling party.<sup>366</sup>

Among the sweeping Presidential prerogatives granted by the 1990 Croatian Constitution are two with relevance to media freedom. *Article 17* allows the president to restrict constitutional rights "during a state of war or an immediate danger to the independence and unity of the republic". *Article 101* authorises the President to pass decrees with the force of law in the event of a state of war, thus circumventing Parliament. As Balkan historian Mark Thompson noted, the latter article was used in 1991 to enact decrees granting powers to replace media editors and managers in wartime, punish journalists, and ban media (without right of appeal) for violating its strict conditions on the reporting of military affairs.<sup>367</sup>

The *Vjesnik Group*, formerly 80% privately owned, was slowly taken over through a government managing board, which was able to remove 128 senior staff, while replacing the editor in chief. This group published the two most influential daily newspapers in Croatia.<sup>368</sup> Control of the *Vjesnik Group* allowed the government to control both the distribution and printing of print media. For instance, they were able to effectively cut the circulation of the weekly magazine *Danas*, as a result dropping the circulation by between 60-70%, forcing it out of business in 1992.<sup>369</sup> Opposition media have faced stiff penalties for criticising the regime. When the *Feral Tribune*, a satirical weekly in Split, published controversial artwork: the heads of Tudjman and Milosevic on the bodies of two men stripped to the waist and snuggling in bed, the tabloid's editor in chief was drafted into the army.<sup>370</sup>

The government has made no secret of its firm control of the media. Milovan Sibl, former head of the *Croatian Ministry of Information* was candid about his views on the media. As he asserted, only pure Croatians could be trusted to give an accurate rendering of the news. All those of mixed ancestry were cast in a dubious light:

There are no real journalists in Croatia. Many of these journalists are of mixed origin, one Croat parent, one Serb. How can such people provide an objective picture of Croatia?...They hate Croatia...They hate President Tudjman and everything he stands for. The only place you can read the truth about President Tudjman is HINA news.<sup>371</sup>

Within two months of the 1990 elections, the *Croatian Radio-Television Act* was rushed through Parliament, changing the name of *Radio-Televizija Zagreb* to *Hrvatska Radio-Televizija* (HRT), signifying its intended role as media flagship of the new nation state.<sup>372</sup> The editor in chief of *HRT* Antun Vrdoljak, maintains a nationalistic view of *HRT* and *HTV* News' role in Croatia. Viewing *HRT* as a 'Cathedral of the Croatian spirit', he discussed his duty as editor, to "save the TV from foreign influences", and *HTV's* duty as "to frankly support the defence of Croat ethnic and historical space." As we shall see later in this chapter, the revision of the Croatian language has been central to Croatian nationalism. As Mark Thompson reports in his analysis of the media in Croatia, the language issue was of particular importance in the media, being as it was the vanguard of the new nationalism:

At HRT language was very important. Language changed along with faces on the newsdesk before the war. Special readers were employed to ensure that editors and reporters used 'politically correct' terms. Even before 1990, nationalist ideologues had been exhuming archaisms from Croatian dictionaries and 'cleansing' characteristically Serbian words and expressions. After the election, these changes were accelerated and imposed as a matter of policy.<sup>373</sup>

### Section 1.3: Croatian Cinema

Croatian domestic cinema has similarly contributed to the image of Croats as humane good people, who are victims only in the current war. This implies differentiating the Croatian "self" from the Serbian "other", by tapping into the publicly held stereotypes of Serbs as Eastern, bloodthirsty, barbaric, cruel, and of course inherently Bolshevik and dictatorial. The Croatian film production company, *Jadran Films* produces one film per year. Their 1994 production, entitled *The Price of Life* centres around the life of a Christ-like Croatian political prisoner in Serbia, who is sold as a slave to a Serbian farmer, where he must work without pay on a farm in exchange for his life.<sup>374</sup>

The characters are stereotypically Serb, at least through Croat eyes. There is a dark skinned seductrice, a prostitute fascinated by guns, who is mentally unstable, and has scars from where she tried to slit her wrists. The other Serbian girl is crippled, and unable to walk properly. Of the three Serbian men, one is a former Chetnik opportunist, who joined the communists to avoid capture after the war. Another is a communist bureaucrat whose desk shares photos of Tito and Milosevic. The third is the farmer's son, a soldier who comes home after looting Bosnian villages with stolen clothing, jewellery and appliances, and tries to kill the Croat. The protagonist eventually teams up with the

soldier's wife, who just happens to be Croat herself (the only blonde in the movie) and together they flee across the Macedonian border, all the while chased by the farmer and his son, both brandishing guns.

The themes echoed in the film reflect typical Croatian opinions of the Serbs. Serbs are *cruel* but *lazy*, hence they need to *exploit* the *hard working* Croats to achieve wealth and prosperity. The farm becomes an allegory for the SFRY, where *lazy dictatorial* Serbs *oppressed* the Croats in Tito's artificial state, using them as slave labour to advance Serbian power and wealth. The theme of Serbian women as degenerate merely enforces the perception that the Serbian nation is itself degenerate, since the mother, as a symbol of the continuity of the national stock represents the inherent qualities of that stock. Thirdly, the escape by both the Croatian woman, (who married the Serb because of "Titoist brainwashing" about brotherhood and unity) and the Croatian man, becomes representative for why Croats left the federation. Threatened by so-called Serbian aggression, the Croats had to leave the "farm" in order to save their own lives. Had they stayed, the Serbs would have continued to enslave them, or worse, might have *annihilated* them. As we shall see in the coming sections, these themes are largely representative of the Croatian view of both the SFRY and the Serbian mentality.

Like their Serbian counterparts, Croatian ideologues have used the media as a tool for centralising state functions, creating a strong allegiance to the Croatian government, in particular, the person of Franjo Tudjman. Also, it has allowed them to inveigh against state enemies, employing relatively the same process as the Serbian media. All perceived state enemies invariably find themselves "otherized", since the Croatia "self" will brook no rivals. Tudjman's regime, which he has defined as the culmination of the "thousand year old dream of the Croatian people" currently maintains enormous legitimacy among Croats. Painting itself as the only option to "Greater Serbian Irredentism" and Serbian "Bolshevik-Fascism", the government has successfully maintained power by a curious amalgam of force, nationalism and demonization of its enemies, both inside and outside the state.

#### **Section 1.4: The Croatian Catholic Church and their Role in the Conflict:**

Roman Catholicism has figured as an important part of Croatian spiritual identity, since Ante Starcevic first declared that all Croats should be good Catholics. Unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church in Croatia has remained largely a-political during this re-emergence of ethno-nationalism, although it has given tacit support to the Tudjman regime. Unlike the Serbian Church, the Croatian Catholic Church has refused to

conjure up any imagery of the *Fall* of the Croatian nation, nor has it participated in creating any sort of mythology or demonization of state enemies. This is largely reflective of the Vatican's general policy during the Communist period, which advocated keeping the Church alive as a spiritual institution for its members, while at the same time remaining well outside the political spectrum. This the Vatican deemed necessary for the Church's survival in countries where the official line of the government was atheism.

This policy was doubly important during the lifetime of the SFRY, perhaps in order for it to atone for its more active role in politics before 1945. The Catholic Church in Croatia, during the Second World War was far more than a spectator in the atrocities of the Pavelic regime. Rather, Catholic clergy were instrumental in Pavelic's rise to power, and proved central to his establishing legitimacy with the average Croatian citizen. Similarly, Catholic clergy were themselves involved in many of the details for and administration of the Ustashe death camps, such as the infamous Jasenovac complex, where some 70,000 Serbs, Communists and Gypsies were killed by the Croatian Ustashe.<sup>375</sup> For this reason, Tito remained wary of the power of the Catholic Church during the life of the SFRY, but at the same time tolerated it to a far greater extent than he did the Serbian Orthodox Church, primarily because it was an international institution, as opposed to the nationally based Serbian Church.<sup>376</sup>

Unlike the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church in Croatia has refused to participate in the resurgence of nationalism. While Franjo Tudjman claimed in 1990 that the Church had been "the only organising force which had provided consistent resistance to communist rule and which had nurtured Croatian national consciousness", this was simply reflective of the Church's role in most communist countries, as a repository of faith, and in general as a rallying point for anti-Communist opposition.<sup>377</sup> The Church has remained consistent in its support of democracy, and has displayed a genuine reluctance to endorse any specific political party or program. Further, as Balkan historian Norman Cigar notes, the Church has refused to recognise the legitimacy of government actions against minority groups, as well as the war in general. The Catholic Church's official publication in Croatia, *Glas Koncila* reiterated the Church's continued stand, noting that: "The Church is resolutely against ethnic cleansing...If Croatia's government leadership is obliged to accept some less humane solution, the Church will not bless it."<sup>378</sup> Similarly, through its official relief agency, KARITAS, the Catholic Church

has taken a role more conducive to peace than war, by providing aid to damaged war zones in Bosnia-Hercegovina.<sup>379</sup>

It should be noted, however, that the Serbian claim that the Vatican was interfering in the internal politics of Yugoslavia was not without foundation. The main nodal point in the Serbs' denunciation of the Vatican stemmed from its almost immediate recognition of the Republic of Croatia in 1991. The Vatican was the first to recognise the new state, with German recognition following the next day. This was to lead to international recognition, which made the separation of Croatia from the SFRY complete.<sup>380</sup>

## **Section 2: Croatian Mythology and Language Politics**

### **Section 2.1: Croatian Mythology:**

Like the Serbs, the Croats have their own series of nation-defining defeats, in the style of the Serbian Battle of Kosovo, which has served to imbue them with a sense of national heroism and sacrifice, although these myths are not of central importance to Croatian ethnic nationalism. I include this section primarily to demonstrate that Croats do indeed possess the same sort of myths as the Serbs, even if they are not as significant in current nationalist discourse. The first national battle occurred during the reign of Kraij Petar, who succeeded in uniting Croatia after the end of the Croatian Trpimirov dynasty, only to lose the country to the Hungarians in 1097, during a battle on Mount Gvorzd.<sup>381</sup> This battle inaugurated several centuries of Hungarian rule over the Croats, during which time Croatian culture became more pronounced.

The second nation defining defeat occurred in the Knin region of the Dalmatian coast, where Croats suffered at the hands of the Turks during the 16th century, creating a 'Croatian Diaspora', forcing the Croatian population to move South, West and North.<sup>382</sup> As historian and present head of the *Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika*, Ante Beljo writes, some 1,600,000 Croats were forcibly deported by the Turks between the 15th and 18th centuries.<sup>383</sup> The Croats, with the equal credibility of their Serb counterparts, have thus established Knin, now the capital of the Milosevic backed Serbian Republic, as one of several cradles of Croatian statehood.<sup>384</sup>

While important to the self identity of the Croats, these historic battles do not inspire the Croats in the same manner as they do to Serbs. This is partly because the Turks and Hungarians no longer pose any sort of threat to the Croats today, thus they are

useless in the current war of competing nationalist discourse. In Zagreb, the statue of Ban Jelacic, the former Croatian Duke during the Austro Hungarian empire at one time pointed his sword in the direction of Budapest. Today the Ban and his sword faces East, to Belgrade.

As we shall see, Croats take greater pride in themselves as an original nation in terms of language and culture. In this their nationalism is more Fichtean in content, viewing language as one of the central defining national characteristics. But the most fundamental reason behind the relative unimportance of these myths is the central theme of the Serbs as oppressors. Any other enemy serves to obscure the Croatian preoccupation with the Serbs as the central negative agency in Croatian history, which has been responsible for a series of Croatian *Falls*, through their evil and a-historical "Greater Serbia Project".

#### **Section 2.2.1: The Croatian Language and *Rjecnik* Cleansing:**

The politics of language in Croatia have largely functioned as a central element in their identity, encapsulating three stages of the four stage model. First of all, the myth of a separate and developed Croatian language has acted largely to distinguish Croats from Serbs, refuting claims that Serbo-Croat has always existed as a unified language. Since, under a Fichtean conception of nationalism, different languages imply distinct nations, it becomes imperative for Croatian linguists to create a mythology of the Croatian language, in an attempt to distinguish the Croatian "self" from the Serbian "other". Secondly, the *Fall* of the language, thus its corruption and mixing with foreign words becomes analogous with the *Fall* of Croatian national identity and self consciousness. Thirdly, the "re-purification" of language which is currently occurring, serves to re-awaken Croatian national identity, allowing the Croats to once again attain the self consciousness described by Fichte in his Addresses to the German Nation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, language standardisation and revision was central to Ante Starcevic's national program. In this sense, Croatian linguistic nationalism has changed little since the 19th century. Language continues to remain of great importance, for two reasons. The first is that the original nature of the Croatian language serves to show their complete differentiation from the Serbs, as discussed above. Secondly, the *Fall* of the language becomes an allegory for the suffering of Croats under Yugoslav Communism, and under "Greater Serbian hegemonism". In this sense, the Croats as "self" become oppressed by the "others" who seek to destroy their particularity through

assimilation. For Croatian national ideologues, the reduction of their particularity and their forced assimilation into the general constitutes a *Fall* in its worst manifestations. Croatian linguists maintain a "post-colonial" attitude with regards to their language, which was suppressed and changed under "foreign" masters, and is now reawakening, through the process of "Rjecnik cleansing"<sup>385</sup>. In some ways, the Hrvatski govor (Croatian vernacular) is like the Kosovo myth to the Serbs. It functions largely as a nation-defining myth. By reclaiming the language, Croats reclaim their national soul.

### **Section 2.2.2: The Original Croatian Language:**

In the first stage, it becomes central for Croatian linguists to prove the originality and distinctiveness of the Croatian language. This is done firstly by pointing to differences in the original scripts of Serbs and Croats. While Serbs have their Cyrillic script, Croat linguists point to the Glagolitic script as being exclusively Croatian in origin. It was during the 9th century, according to Croat historians, that the Glagolitic script was introduced, heralding the appearance of Croat art and culture.<sup>386</sup> They deny that Cyril and Methodius invented the Glagolica, which they claim had its origins with pre-slavic Illyrian tribes.<sup>387</sup> As Croatian historian Boze Covic argues: "It is very significant for Croatian culture that popular speech was used very early in literature. Written documents like the Baska Plaque (late 11th century) the Vinodol Code (1288) the Poljica Statute (1440) the Croatian version of Pop Dukljanin's chronicles (14th century) and a series of gospels in Croatian only prove the fact". In this sense, the standard Croatian, as distinct from Serbian was present since at least the 11th century.<sup>388</sup>

### **Section 2.2.3: The Fall of the Croatian Language:**

Croats see the suppression and assimilation of their language by Serbs as yet another manifestation of "Greater Serbian aggression". Serbs destroyed the vernacular culture and laid siege to the "pure Croatian language" during the first Yugoslav state. The "Serb controlled" Tito did the same thing in the SFRY, by viewing the Serbo-Croatian language as the same language, but divided by Occidental (Croatian) and Oriental (Serbian) variants.<sup>389</sup> Tito's refusal to allow Croats the designation of their "dialect" as a separate language constitutes a *Fall* in the sense that language could no longer form a central plank in national identification. This sense of *Fall* was further enhanced when Tito imprisoned Croatian author Miroslav Krleža in 1971 for his nationalist writings, and calls for the designation of Croatian as a distinctly national tongue.<sup>390</sup>

#### **Section 2.2.4: The Resurrection of the Croatian Language:**

As Dr. Ivo Pranjoć of Zagreb University (A Croatian linguist) notes, language has been used to achieve political ends, to define good and bad Croatians. Strange and new problems have developed along with this *Rjecnik cleansing*. For example, the word for one thousand in Serbo-Croat is *tisuca*. This word was outlawed by the Communist government and substituted with *hiljada*, paradoxically an archaic Croatian word. Now, *hiljada*, which is more authentic, has been rejected by nationalists who now insist on *tisuca*, because it was banned by the Communists.<sup>391</sup>

Modern Croat nationalists seeking to engender the renaissance of the Croatian language, have purged it of "Serbianisms". Even modern Croatian language textbooks contain impurities, such as "Dobro Doslji", where the "Serbian" flavouring particle "Da li" had to be removed from the book after printing, due to complaints by Croat linguists.<sup>392</sup> Croatian academics are quick to dig up ancient "Croat" vocabulary to insert in academic journals and publications. Croat language revisionism spawned Stjepan Brodnjak's **Razikovni Rjecnik** (Separate dictionary) with 35,000 entries, composed mainly of technical terms and archaisms. Similarly, as Catherine Samary writes of the new linguistic movement in Croatia: "The works of one of the greatest Croatian writers, Miroslav Krleža has just been translated into "Croat" from its original language (Serbo-Croat) for the new school textbooks".<sup>393</sup>

Even Franjo Tuđman has taken part in this linguistic revisionism, and invented new tennis terms (many of them unwieldy) such as *priptavanje* for tie-breaker. The most voracious advocates of a pure Croatian now have a bill before the Croatian Sabor proposing fines and prison terms for those who use words of perceived foreign origin.<sup>394</sup> The type of havoc such legislation would create is unimaginable, since there is no Croatian equivalent to "Hoch Deutsch", which could serve as a guide to promising young nationalist who wished to speak only the proper way. For the simple country farmer or villager, the problems would be insurmountable.

#### **Conclusions:**

The language politics in Croatia would appear to have three clearly defined purposes. The first is to rally the Croatian people together by creating a new common base of symbols. Since every nation needs common symbols, Croatian linguists add to the collection of flags, war songs and shared mythology, a common language, able to bind the people together, to achieve a Fichtean form of national self-consciousness. Secondly, the

re-emergence of the Croatian language serves to further differentiate Serb from Croat. Not only are Serbs from a different geographical region, have a different mentality and world view, different sized skulls (a theme we shall later see), different origins and psychological problems, they also speak a different language.

Thirdly, and most importantly for my research, the Croatian language movement serves to demonstrate another aspect of the Croatian cultural and spiritual *Fall from grace*. Where before Croats were oppressed by the heavy Serbo-Croat language, this *unnatural* Serbian construction cobbled together by the Serb's puppet: Tito, they now speak a more *authentic* language, and are now able to begin a spiritual renewal and cultural renaissance. Clearly a language which is unwieldy and in constant flux has been the result of Croatian linguists' efforts to achieve complete linguistic separation.

### **Section 3: The Antimemorandum:**

#### **Introduction:**

Five years after the publication of the SANU Memorandum, Croatian historian Miroslav Brandt published his "Antimemorandum", largely to refute any claims by Serb nationalists that they suffered in the SFRY. Brandt's opus has essentially two main themes: a description of the suffering of the Croatian people and Croatia, and a discussion of how the Serbs have dominated and oppressed Croatia since 1918. In this sense he is able to conjure up the image of a "Greater Serbian Project", similar in its dynamic to Anti-Serbianism for the Serbs or Anti-Semitism for the Jewish people.

#### **Section 3.1: Miroslav Brandt's Opus**

Brandt begins by describing how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has enslaved the Croatian people since the Second World War, thus refuting the Serbian claim that they were helping other South Slav nations. As he writes, the Serbs as the guiding force behind the SFRY developed the state only in order to dominate and enslave the Croats: "The way in which the CPY took advantage of the people's freedom loving aspirations was essentially a new *conspiracy* against their freedom and against the right to independent decisions and survival, similar to the Bolshevik subjugation of the Slavonic and non-Slavonic peoples on the territory of the USSR after World War II."<sup>395</sup> As Brandt further states, The CPY was primarily composed of Serbs, who manipulated the Party in order to create a dictatorship to suppress the Croats and their democratic tendencies:

[T]he CPY persistently used all sorts of propaganda, defamation and deceit with the aim of alienating the Croatian people from the political leadership of the Croatian Farmer's Party...The continuous legacy of defamation and non-communist components of the antifascist movement was entirely supported by influential Serbian members of the so-called People's Liberation Movement political leadership. Their political goal was in fact to prevent a successful conclusion to the war from bringing the resurrection of freedom for the Croatian people, in terms of their true statehood within a union of equal Yugoslav countries.<sup>396</sup>

Brandt continues this theme in his work, in the process uniting Aleksander's Yugoslavia and the SFRY, in terms of a continuation of Serbian centralism and despotism. In his view, Serb domination in both Yugoslavias and the sharing of certain symbols implies that there has been a continued and unabated dominance of Serb over Croat. As he describes the SFRY: "It was a resurrected ghost of the expansionist, hegemonistic, unitaristic and centralist state of the old Yugoslavia type, this time in a more horrible form[,] enabled by the centralised, monolithic political power of the Communist Party, by a military, police and administration apparatus which were predominantly Serbian".<sup>397</sup> These linkages between the first and second Yugoslavias are again stressed, as Brandt discussed the federal institutions in the SFRY:

Belgrade became the capital, as it had been during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Serbian nationals took over all positions in the central administration, and in political, military, police and economic institutions. So the so-called new Yugoslavia remained essentially a Serbian state in which the leading political and military cadres continued to work on the realisation of Greater Serbia, this time known as Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism, but in its essence following the course of Illija Garasanin, the Black Hand, Nicola Pasic, Slobodan Jovanovic and Draza Mihailovic.

This allows Brandt to conclude that the SFRY was simply "a new artificial Greater Serbian nation concealed under the name of Yugoslavia", entrenched "behind the facade of pretended socialism".<sup>398</sup> In this way, Brandt is able to posit that the SFRY was an unnatural creation from the onset, and never reflected Croatian interests or aspirations. The only natural thing the Croats have done in the past 50 years, Brandt asserts, was to leave the federation in 1991.

Brandt, following the same theme from the *Price of Life*, casts the Serbs generally as a lazy, despotic exploitative people, who have grown rich at the expense of the hard working Croats, although he acknowledges that not all Serbs are like this. In order to increase the sense of colonial oppression, Brandt asserts that the Serbs in general form an

exploitative class, who became wealthy from years of oppressing the Croats. In this sense, Milovan Djilas' *New Class* was a class entirely composed of Serbs. As he explains:

[T]he great majority of Yugoslav millionaires are ethnic Serbs, ie that almost every millionaire we know of is a Serb. This of course does not mean that all Serbs, within or without Serbia are rich profiteers from the resources confiscated from the oppressed, exploited majority of Yugoslavia, something that is supposed to be non-existent in a socialist state. But the one party political system and the entire establishment enabled the plutocrats to decide in favour of Serbs, especially those in Serbia and above all those in Belgrade.<sup>399</sup>

By contrast, the Croats have been the exploited class and nation, rolled into one. In this passage Brandt mixes Communist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric: "Croatia is a thoroughly oppressed country enslaved, plundered, pauperized, brought down to the verge of existence, forced to massive emigration of its population seeking a way to survive, exposed to national liquidation under a military and police regime or occupation". The connotations are obvious; Serbs are simultaneously bourgeois overlords, colonial oppressors, Bolshevik dictators and Fascists. The communist revolution must therefore have been a failure, since Tito's "pretended socialism" did nothing to eliminate the economic exploitation by the Serbian/Bourgeois/ Class/Nation over the Croatian/Proletariat/Peasant Class/Nation. Concocting a form of pseudo communist dialectic, Brandt manages to merge class and nation to demonstrate how Serbs have always got the better of Croats, in the process proving that Tito's communist revolution was unsuccessful, as it merely served to further entrench the historical Serbian position.<sup>400</sup>

Employing a specific example of Serbian domination of the Croatian economy, Brandt describes the supposed decline of the Istrian Peninsula, in Northern Croatia: "The federal authorities kept this province in such poverty that economically its population had been better off even under the directly preceding fascist rule. Istria recovered only with the development of tourism." While acknowledging that the federal government initiated and funded the tourist industry, Brandt wonders "how much profit from Istrian tourism is collected by the omnipotent centre of Belgrade". Brandt informs his readers of the Serbian policy with regards to this region, which was to "de-croatize Istria by means of pauperization which forced the people into emigration, and to colonize it with new settlers (mainly Serbs)."

He fails to note that in fact Istria was one of the wealthiest regions of Yugoslavia, while Serbian regions, such as Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Coastal Croatia

were much poorer by comparison.<sup>401</sup> On the destruction of natural beauty of the region, Brandt posits that "the natural beauty of the Mediterranean forests of Croatia have been systematically destroyed for several decades by fires." While this may or may not be true, he reveals that the culprits were in fact deliberately setting fires because they were "Croat haters" and "Great Serbian fanatics".<sup>402</sup> We see here that Serbs as a Nation/Class not only exploited the Croatian Nation/Class but also exploited Croatian lands as a means of attacking the nation. In this sense, the territory of Croatia is as symbolic of the nation as its people, language, religion or culture. An attack on any national elements thus constitutes an attack on the nation itself.

So what does Greater Serbia imply for the Croatian population? As interpreted in his "Antimemorandum", Brandt describes the Serbian utopia as: "a centralised, hegemonistic, exploiting Greater Serbian state in which non-Serbian peoples would be slaves, a subjugated mob, expected and doomed to extinction as separate national entities in the future, their land, area for colonisation and a target to exploit, brought to the level of provinces working for the benefit of a new giant, super-wealthy and carefree state centre of Belgrade".<sup>403</sup> Again on the same topic, Brandt concludes: "The main purpose [of Serbs] is to suppress the autonomy of the republics and provinces and to form unlimited centralist dictatorship by the Greater-Serbian plutocratic oligarchy, thus re-instituting the type of rule of the Karadjodjevic era and the political program of Draza Mihailovic's Chetnik movement."<sup>404</sup>

This demonization of the Serbs and their "Greater Serbian hegemonism" performs the same function as Dobrica Cosic's vituperations against the Croats. It serves to justify the nation's aggression against its enemies, casting all violence in a purely defensive light. Thus Brandt draws on the already familiar theme of describing Croatian activities as merely defensive, against not only Serbian domination, but Serbian genocidal ambition. As he asserts:

*These regions are simply resisting the annihilation of their particular national cultures, the persistent proven widely organised and continuous decades long activities of the Greater-Serbian plutocratic oligarchy to primarily deprive the Croatian people of their own language, to impose upon them the Serbian language, to suppress Croatian literature and other forms of Croatian culture, to wipe out the Croatian national awareness, to destroy and prevent Croats from learning their own history and to crush their dignity, to annihilate their faith, to impoverish them, and by a discriminatory economic policy to drive the Croats away from their own millennium long ethnic homeland and then systematically colonise these regions with Serbian nationals.*<sup>405</sup>

Brandt here alludes not only to currently held stereotypes of Serbs, but also to Vuk Stefanovic-Karadzic's "Greater Serbia" program, which advocated the assimilation of Croats by colonising their lands and calling their language a variant of Serbo-Croatian. Here Brandt is able to conjure up the spectre of "Greater Serbia", again proving that Croats had to leave the SFRY to create their own nation-state, in order to prevent their own cultural and physical annihilation.

### **Section 3.2: Other Writers on "Greater Serbia"**

The theme of a "Greater Serbian" project has gained currency in Croatian nationalist discourse. One of the most vocal critics of "Greater Serbia" has been Slaven Letica, one of Franjo Tudjman's advisors. Letica describes, in: **Roots of Serbian Aggression**, "Greater Serbia" as being a "transhistorical phenomenon", "frozen and suppressed into the subconscious".<sup>406</sup> For Letica, Tito and Kardelj's "Yugoslavism" was nothing more than a substitute for "Greater Serbianism" in the Communist period, forcing the Serb's political project to remain dormant, until the collapse of the SFRY allowed "Greater Serbia" to awaken from its slumber. As he writes of the phenomenon:

The moment these SUBSTITUTES (Yugoslavism etc.) begin to wear out, become routine or fail, the Greater-Serbian and All-Serbian assertions re-emerge. They experience renaissance, new political and intellectual articulations; again they draw large-scale political attention; they become the basis for new-old All-Serbian populist ideologies and movements...this represents a dull easily predictable and unavoidable historical repetition. "Serbs All and Everywhere" and the "Memorandum" are only opposite ends of the same prejudiced historical arch, whose goal and means are the same; its goal is to conquer and its means are to dominate and to exercise force.<sup>407</sup>

In this vein, Boze Covic, after reviewing several Serbian texts from the 19th century concludes: "[E]ach of these texts, regardless of historical period is manifest proof of the Serbs' susceptibility to the obsession of building a Greater Serbia by crushing all neighbouring non-Serbian nations' rights to exist." Thus the continuity across time is stressed, the holistic quality of Serb negative agency remains constant.<sup>408</sup>

### **Conclusions**

The purpose of Brandt's tract as well as Letica and Covic's writings have several motives. The first is to demonstrate concretely the a-historical and evil nature of "Greater-Serbianism", which implies that anyone foolish enough to enter into dialogue (or God-forbid) any political or economic arrangements with the Serbs will find themselves dominated, colonised, and eventually enslaved and possibly annihilated. The second motive is to excuse any and all action of the part of Croats to create their own ethnic

homeland. In this any force or oppression is justified, since the a-historical evilness of the Serbs and their political program precludes any form of peaceful negotiation or compromise.

The third motive is to stress the importance of the *Fall* in the Croatian view of history. The Serbs as Fascists, Philistines and Barbarians perform the role of a negative agency, acting throughout history against the righteous dreams of the Croatian people for a state where they can at last be safe. Greater Serbianism, in its many forms and timelessness performs much the same role for Croats as Anti-Semitism did for Zionists in the 19th and 20th centuries who contemplated the creation of the State of Israel, or as "Anti-Serbianism" has done to justify the Milosevic regime.

#### **Section 4: Orientalism: The Serbs as Barbarians:**

One plank in the Croatian propaganda platform has been to stress the fundamental differences between Serbs and Croats as a division, at once territorial, psychological and racial, between East and West. In a sense this forms part of the original nation myth of the Croats. By comparing themselves to the Serbs, Croats see themselves as better, more enlightened people, while the Serbs are largely seen as "Byzantine", Eastern, foreign and barbaric. The Croats have largely used the Byzantine idea, the idea of the division between East and West to promote a separate consciousness.<sup>409</sup> This occurs in all levels, as we shall see, and serves several purposes. The first of which is to assert that the SFRY was an artificial construction, a meeting of peoples who did not belong together. Thus the collapse of the SFRY was a natural and positive outcome of history. The second is again to differentiate "self" from "other", showing in relatively the same manner as the Serbs, that since Croats are inherently good, then Serbs are inherently bad.

Once elected, Tudjman clearly expressed the view that Croats and Serbs were fundamentally different. In a short speech, he outlined Croatia's Western attitude, as contrasted with the "Eastern-ness" or "Turkish-ness" of Serbia: "[We have included Croatia] in the states of central Europe, the region to which it has always belonged, except for the recent past when balkanism has constantly subordinated the Croatian State territory to an *Asiatic form of government*, while the justified anger and protests of certain Croats have been qualified as terrorism and even fascism."<sup>410</sup> Tudjman, whose credentials as a historian are more than dubious comments: "Croats belong to a different culture- a different civilisation from Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the

Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and Moliere, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks and the Albanians. They belong to the Byzantine culture."<sup>411</sup>

The 1993 work, ***Habits of the Balkan Heart***, presents a fine example of a form of Croatian Orientalism. Written by two Croatian Americans, Stjepan Mestrovic and Miroslav Goreta,<sup>412</sup> this book reflects the same general orientalist theme in much of the Croatian national discourse. Not unlike Samuel Huntington's thesis "***The Clash of Civilisations***"<sup>413</sup>, Mestrovic & Goreta's work portrays the war in terms of clashing cultures, between western, peaceful and democratic cultures (Slovenia and Croatia) and those which are eastern, primitive and backward (Serbia and Montenegro).<sup>414</sup> Through their optic, the "Dinaric social character" of the Serbs, habituated by "fraud" and "deceit", has led them not only to symbolically destroy the Oedipal figure of Tito (reflecting a psychiatric theme) but to destroy his creation, by attacking Croatia. On the other side, the authors posit that Croatia is represented by the symbolism of the "Croatian Lady", the Virgin ("Mother of God") who has supposedly appeared to the faithful in Medjugorje, Western Herzegovina, several times since 1981.<sup>415</sup>

Thus, against the "father-dominated" and "war-loving" Serbs, the Croats emerge as peace loving people with faith in their "Gothic" hearts for the Virgin Mary. However, the significance of Medjugorje supersedes the Croatian borders for at least two reasons. First, the location of Medjugorje symbolises the dividing line between Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, thus performing a role as a border between civilisations. It is located in western Herzegovina with its Croatian majority, while across the Neretva river lies eastern Herzegovina with its Serbian majority. Secondly, the vision of the Virgin represents a species of *kerygma* or revelation, a-la-Frye, where, as Mestrovic & Goreta explain: "[T]he Virgin emerges as the symbol of the discovery of one's [right to] national self-determination versus a slave morality that surrenders to the expansionist aim that emanated from Belgrade and Moscow."<sup>416</sup> Similar perhaps to the Kosovo Myth, the appearance of the Virgin creates the conditions whereby Croats receive divine recognition for their actions, and the moral impetus to continue with their struggle for their ethnic homeland.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Croatian and Serbian ethnic nationalism revolve around the idea that the nation cannot be complete without its language and national territory. Croatian geographer Zalijska Corak in his analysis of the war makes reference to

the territorial land mass of Croatia, and how its geography has in many ways determined the character of the Croatian people. In this passage he suggests that the present land mass is somehow unnatural, and in some ways advocates an expansionist policy:

Croatia is a historical artefact. Its shape is unique on the geographical map of the world...The very shape of Croatia, the way it looks now is a dramatic sign that its existence has been endangered. It represents a kind of visual unrest which should also be removed as an error... A country the shape of which is not the product of a *long* and *authentic historical process* cannot assess the *paradigm of historical space* that Croatia represents. But Croatia's shape is at the same time a shape of resistance. By standing for centuries on the military border of the western world, Croatia is now fighting for a world which can only survive if this historical space survives.<sup>417</sup>

In this sense, the geography of Croatia is indicative of its role, to protect the West, perhaps in the same manner as the Serbs propose. Geography also becomes indicative of the historical destiny of the Croatian nation, the telos of which can only be complete once all parts of Croatian territory are under Zagreb's control. Similar to the writings of Serbian President Cosic, Corak conveys the image of a Croatia protecting the west from a barbarous east, thus perpetuating an orientalist theme, which, as we shall see has proven extremely popular amongst Croatian ideologues. This theme is further elaborated in the same work, when he states:

This is an attack by the last of the barbarians coming from their darkness to the lights of Mediterranean, to Rome. Those barbarians who would like to think of themselves as being the successors of Byzantium or what is more, as Byzantines themselves...Their conduct is Eastern and different in the sense of different ethics.<sup>418</sup>

This sense of the Serbs as Eastern and barbarian serves again to reinforce the fundamental and opposing natures of Serbs and Croats.

This image of the Serb as invading barbarian is further elaborated by Croat writer Ivo Skrabelo, who further draws the links between Serbs and the invading hordes from the "East", who follow strategies unsurpassed in their brutality. As Skrabelo describes:

Now, with the war going on, one aspect is obvious: annihilating Croatian cultural heritage is an important and essential part of the strategy, aimed at humiliating and defeating once and for all the Croatian national spirit. The same doctrine requires the destruction of all traces of Croatian history, the removal of all signs of Croatian material *renaissance of a nation* considered to be by its very existence an obstacle to Serbian expansion as the Greater Serbia ideologists have maintained for two centuries. This retrograde national program, based on a mythomaniac understanding of the nation's past, coincides with a barbaric concept of war necessitating the total destruction of the enemy dating back to the prehistoric times of humankind. This is what makes

the Serbian urge to conquer, destroy and dominate so similar to the wars of the Vandals or the raids of Asian hordes.<sup>419</sup>

From a more political perspective, bearing in mind the civilizationist differences between Serbs and Croats, Croatian writer Radovan Pavic expands this Orientalism further, noting that Serbs and Croats have, because of their cultural background, completely opposite political traditions and attitudes. As he asserts:

Bearing in mind this idea of a Greater Serbia, it is possible to fully comprehend the conflict between Croats and Serbs. It is an ethnic conflict only in form but in its essence it is an expression of deeper contrasts: First it is a confrontation between two politicogenetic ideas, the former Croatian idea, federalist and republican in nature and the Serbian centralist and monarchist one; second between present day democracy and national bolshevism, and third, it is a confrontation between territorial expansionism on the one side and the defence of one's own national territory on the other.<sup>420</sup>

Thus the centralist and dictatorial nature of the Serbs was fundamentally at odds with the freedom loving Croats in the Yugoslav state. Since the Serbs supposedly controlled everything, as Pavic states, the denunciation of the Serbs becomes another reason for why Croatia left the federation.

Boze Covic continues in his denunciation of the Serbs, particularly those in Croatia. As we hear from this passage, Krajina Serbs were in fact Turkish pawns, who were placed in Croatia by the Turks, and thus do not really belong there, since they were merely serving a Turkish invasionary force. As Covic writes:

[T]he Chetnically oriented minority of the Serbian population in Croatia rose in rebellion, alleging that the Serbs in Croatia are oppressed and threatened although by the constitution they are guaranteed complete equality with the rest of the population of Croatia and complete cultural autonomy. The text and ideas presented in the Memorandum have a crucial programmatic importance for the destructive endeavours of the Chetnik group in Croatia, where, as a result of their migration to Croatia because of Turkish advances, the Serbian population have a relative or absolute majority.<sup>421</sup>

The Serbs thus have no place in the Krajina region, since they are only there because of the Turks, who sent them there to oppress Croats. The Serbs and Turks, against which Croatian Orientalism aims, become part of a lesser civilisation, which invaded the region, and are thus unable to legitimately claim any lands in Croatia.

A curious consequence of the Yugoslav wars has been that even serious western academics have joined in the jingoism, conjuring up all manner of racial theories. One academic of this stripe is Yale historian Ivo Banac (of Croatian origin), who, while initially critical of the Croatian nationalist regime, has in recent years become one of its

proponents in the United States. Banac echoes a sort of ethnic revisionism indicative of many Croatian ethnologists when he writes of the origins of the Croats: "The Croat national name is itself not of Slavic origin, and probably stems from an Iranian group that was assimilated by the Slavs sometime before their settlement in the western portions of the Balkan Peninsula."<sup>422</sup> By contrast, Banac posits that the origins of the Serbs were more dubious: "Many Orthodox Balkan Vlachs, came to Croatia and neighbouring Bosnia as Christian auxiliaries in Ottoman service." The Vlachs were Wallachians, who came from the Turkish provinces, and settled primarily in Hungary.<sup>423</sup>

Another theory holds that the Croats are the only true Slavs, having been in the Balkan region at least four hundred years before the Serbs. This forms the central thesis of Zagreb University historian, Trpimir Macan's nationalist writings. Macan uses as proof two Greek tablets from the 2nd century AD containing the words, *Horathos* and *Horuathos*, from whence derived the name *Hrvat* (Croat).<sup>424</sup> Claiming that Serbs were descendants of a different set of tribes altogether, Macan posits that the Serbs were never a Slavic tribe. While the Serbs assumed control of a Slav population, they were really Vlachs, or Gypsies, and were mainly Romanized shepards. This mentality serves to reinforce the distinctly different racial origins of Serbs and Croats, leaving no doubt in the minds of Croat nationals that they could never have been Serbian, at any stage in their history.<sup>425</sup>

Generally, impressions of the genetic origins of the Serbs are far ranging. One reactionary group based in Zagreb, describe Serbs as having Arab blood, as evidenced by their square fingers, as opposed to Croats whose fingers are more rounded.<sup>426</sup> A team of Croat scholars are currently trying to prove that Croatian ancestors were Aryans who came from Persia, and not ancient Slavs who originated from Northeastern Europe. Ethnographers posit that the word *Hrvat* derived from the ancient Persian word *Hu-Urvat*, the name of the inhabitants of the ancient province of Harahvati during the rule of King Darius at the beginning of the 6th century BC. An Iranian News Agency story carried by the *Tehran Times* revealed that there is no material evidence to substantiate the thesis, except for the fact that the ancient Persian word *Hu-Urvat* sounds similar to *Hrvat*, a word which was found carved on a rock in the Ukraine, formerly part of the ancient Persian empire. The IRNA reports that Tudjman sent a message of support to the scholars who plan to go to Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan in search of the Aryan origin of the Croats, as part of the largest archaeological project in Croatian history.<sup>427</sup>



## **Section 5: Psychological Propaganda**

A strong element of Croatian ethno-nationalist discourse has been a focus on the psychological differences between Serbs and Croats. While this has manifested itself in Orientalism and demonization at a general level, Croatian psychiatrists and medical doctors have also joined the war against Serbia, asserting that the differences between Serbs and Croats exist on a level deeper than that conjured up in the popular imagination.

In 1995, Ivica Kostovic, dean of the medical school in Zagreb, released the findings of the *Croatian Institute for Brain Research*, which stated conclusively that: "It can not seriously be claimed that there are differences between brains of Serbs and Croats,' and that 'only differences in outward forms, skulls can be established". As he further wrote: "These anthropological differences are evident especially at the racial level...but hardly any conclusions about differences at the level of brain functioning can be drawn from them." Kostovic's claims that Serbs and Croats are racially and physically different merely compliments the work of Croatian ethnographers, serving to buttress any argument that Serbs and Croats were of two distinct racial stocks not of one basic tribal stock, who were psychologically and racially different from the onset. If we are to believe his findings, it can only be through *divine intervention* that a pure ethnic stock of Croats was preserved through over 1000 years of *racial mixing*, and that somehow, Croats and Serbs individuals did not assume each other's national identity through the various wars, empires, religious and linguistic changes over the past 200 years.<sup>428</sup>

While Kostovic refrains from discussing the levels of brain functioning differences between Serbs and Croats, the Croatian psychiatric profession has apparently eagerly taken on this role. In his article entitled "Yugoslavia as a Group", published in 1991 in the *Croatian Medical Journal*, Eduard Klain, a psychiatrist, described the Serbs as a people, and proceeded to isolate certain inherent group traits, which *explain* the Serb's supposed love of aggression. As he notes:

The Serbs are burdened with an inferiority complex compared to the peoples of the western part of Yugoslavia, for they are conscious that they are on a lower level of civilisation. They try to get rid of that feeling by means of various defence mechanisms, such as negation, projections, denial and destruction. The Serbs are inclined to regress to a schizophrenic position and exhibit an archaic type of aggression which can explain the torturing of the wounded and massacring dead bodies.<sup>429</sup>

Here, the Serbs are not only an aggressive blood thirsty ethnic-nation, but they are also aware of being of a lesser civilisation. They, in effect, have self consciously internalised the Croat's orientalist view.

In another issue of the *Croatian Medical Journal*, psychiatrist Viktor Gruden identifies the Serbs as being in a "vicious circle of frustration aggression" compounded with a "collective paranoia". He further concluded that "Serbs have a disintegrated self" which manifests itself in "their tendency to massacre the Croats". As he further writes:

Most Serbs have an impoverished personality with simultaneous idealisation of a leader, (ie creation of a personality cult.) Regressive phenomena prevail, there is oceanic omnipotency, guilt, envy, delusions of grandeur which can be seen in the works of Vuk Karadzic. "All Serbs Everywhere" which elaborates in detail the idea of a Great Serbia and manifested oceanic omnipotency.<sup>430</sup>

He further concludes that Croats are the object of Serbian aggression, simply because: "the Serbs envy them and because they are inferior...The Croats are not only a biological being (like the Serbs) but a psychological one as well. The Serbs also feel guilty, therefore their only reaction is a tendency to destroy the source of frustration, hence the source of destruction and the impulse to demolish everything that is related to the Croats." Gruden's theory is certainly interesting. Serbs as a group destroy only because they are guilty, inferior and violent. These *natural* inherent Serbian traits become useful in proving that all aggression in the present conflict has been caused by Serbs, and not because of any real provocation, but solely as a result of the "Serbian mind".<sup>431</sup>

Like the two previous authors, M. Jakovljevic explores the "paranoic collective unconsciousness" and "malignant ethnocentrism" of the Serbs. Through his analysis, the war is being waged by a "paranoic political culture against a narcissistic political culture", the former (Serbian) being the result of a demented political mind. The latter (Croatian) is of course denoted as peaceful and "on a higher level of civilisation". Jakovljevic further concludes that "Serbs are militant and primitive, a nation of death and necrophilia, wild barbarians, the greatest vultures of political victories, descendants of Turkish bastardism a disturbing factors in Croatia". He rounds off his attack with the general conclusion "[U]nhappy is the nation that has Serbs as its neighbours."<sup>432</sup>

Speaking of the Communist period, Jakovljevic concludes that the psychological make-up of the Serbs allowed them to flourish in such a system. As he explains: "Communist ideology based on the political mechanism of splitting, paranoid projection,

dual thinking and double standards...has struck the deepest roots among the Serbs". He further concludes that the Serbian culture is inimical to democracy, when he states that "Democratic elections in Croatia...markedly increased the frustrations and anxiety of the Serbian paranoiac political mind. The fear of something new and of the arrival of democracy, the likelihood of losing unjustly obtained privileges...result in aggressive impulses (displacement of frustration by aggression)".<sup>433</sup> Jakovljevic's assertions square well with those of his colleagues. Croats must have been the victims in Yugoslavia because their minds cannot accept Communism, since they are freedom loving democrats. At the same time, Serbs must be the oppressors, since their minds thrive in such an environment. His theories also justify why Serbs in the Krajina boycotted the 1990 elections. It had little to do with their disapproval of Croatian ethno-nationalism and separatism, and everything to do with their *barbarian* minds and culture.<sup>434</sup>

Veering away from strictly psychiatric language, psychiatrist A. Barath writes of Serbs as being criminals, waging "a neo-barbarian invasion on western civilisation." He concludes that "The Great-Balkan and Great-Serbian ideologies were coined by four generations of Serbia's ethnocentric, ethno-fascist intellegencia". Barath thus proposes the acronym "EFCHER-BOY" (ethno-fascist-chetnik-religious-bolshevist-Yugoslav) as the best term for describing the "all-Serbian coalition of ideological and military fanatics". Advocating further study into the Serbian conspiracy, concluding that multi-disciplinary research is "urgently needed in order to provide appropriate political means and socio-cultural resources in helping Croatia as well as other societies to oppose further involvement of Serbia's self-imposed predatory behaviour."<sup>435</sup> Again, the a-historical, ubiquitous nature of "Greater Serbianism" is stressed. Serbs function as an all encompassing negative agency, whose minds and *lesser* civilisation is geared solely towards destruction, aggression, and genocide.

### **Conclusions**

The first rule of psychiatry is to approach each subject as an individual, not as part of a collective. While individuals may be influenced by members in a collective, no two individuals possess an identical psychology. One is only able to comprehend the psychology of an individual after many hours of patient study and interview sessions. To lump a group of diverse individuals into a racial category, treat them as a individual and study them accordingly is an entirely pointless endeavour, from a psychiatric position. From a political standpoint, however, it makes perfect sense. Again, the theme of the

"Antimemorandum" and the assertions of Croatian ethno-nationalist writers is reiterated, this time in a new form. Because the Serbs are seen as aggressive and evil, they cannot be reasoned with. Because Serbs are viewed as liars and are predatory, one cannot trust their claims to any land in the present day Croatia. This form of discourse also serves to prove that Serbs and Croats cannot live together. The collapse of the SFRY is thus solely a result of the Serbs, as is the present conflict. Croats, by contrast, are peaceful, freedom loving, democratic victims of Serb aggression.

### **Section 6: Views of Serbs in the 20th Century**

The first Yugoslavia has figured prominently in the works of Croatian ethnic-nationalists, who view this period as the first instance of Croatian domination by Serbia. This period also marks one of many recent *Falls* of the Croatian nation at the hands of "Greater Serbia". Croatian Ethnologists, such as Vitomir Belaj from the University of Zagreb, blame the Serbs for the destruction of the Croatian spiritual identity and the vernacular culture, destroyed in 1918 by forced conversions into "Serbs of the Catholic religion" and then later under antideistic Communist rule, where the Soviet centralised model merely enhanced the legacy of Serb domination.<sup>436</sup> In spite of this, the concept of the Fall was never stressed until Croat contact with the Serbs in a unified state. As Boze Covic recalls, the *Fall from grace* occurred in 1918, at which time: "Croatia broke the continuity of statehood, which it had for more than one thousand years."<sup>437</sup>

#### **Section 6.1: Croats and Serbs in King Aleksander's Yugoslavia**

Croat historians contend that the only reason that the Independent State of Croatia was created was to combat greater Serbian hegemonism in pre war Yugoslavia. **The Black Hand over Europe** by Henri Pozzi has been reprinted by the Croatian Information Centre to establish the link between "Greater Serbian" policies of the first Yugoslavia and now the third. In the introduction they state: "The contemporaneity of Pozzi's work derives from the concord of present and past historical manifestations and circumstances...a grave warning to all those who still, like their predecessors underestimate the Balkan precedent."<sup>438</sup> This work delves into the historical evilness of the Serbs, their warlike character, and their manipulation of the Royalist government through the all seeing 'Serbian Black Hand'.

Croat historians today have conjured up the spectre of the Black Hand, again asserting the a-historical nature of the Serbian national project. The group which

assassinated Archduke Ferdinand of Austria is again in full vigour, as Boze Covic asserts: "The methods and philosophy of the Black Hand can be recognised in many of the present actions of Serbian politicians and generals."<sup>439</sup> Contending that the prewar Yugoslavia was a "prison house of nations", the first example of Serb dominance, Croatian ideologues are thus able to justify Ante Pavelic's Fascist Ustashe regime. As Josip Sentija of Zagreb University states: "1941 showed that the creation of Yugoslavia was an ideological creation and politically an expression of Greater Serbian hegemonism"<sup>440</sup> The significance of this propaganda form is twofold, excusing much of the Ustashe brutality from World War II as a reaction to Serbian evilness, while excusing any present day atrocities by the same logic.

### **Section 6.2: Croats and Serbs in the SFRY:**

In a similar attempt to justify their separation from the SFRY, Croatian nationalists have insisted that Serbian dominance remained the central focus in Tito's political project.<sup>441</sup> Looking at the communist period, Sentija sees it as obvious that the Serbs dominated the state by controlling everything from Belgrade, both the Capital of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Croats dismissed Kardelj's "Yugoslav consciousness" as an attempt at greater Serbianization. In general, the Croats sensed a paranoia regarding this issue, as Sentija again reveals: "[the Titoist government] began to build a "Yugoslav" nation and gave to the old ideology of Croat-Serb-Slovene national unity a new socialist and communist flavour in the drive towards creating a so-called Yugoslav socialist patronism; analogously: Serbian nation!"<sup>442</sup> Of particular importance was the crushing of the 1971 "Croat Spring" which proved to Croats that the regime was against their best interests. Serbian machinations in Kosovo were for Croats merely an example of how the Serbs would in practice build a "Greater Serbia" on the ruins of Yugoslavia.<sup>443</sup>

### **Conclusions**

In this section, the tactics of Serbian and Croatian historians appear quite similar. Each has demonised the other by asserting that it was the other which controlled the SFRY. While Serbs point to their goodness and sacrifices in creating the first Yugoslavia, Croats point to Serbian treachery and duplicity. Again, we see the image of "Greater Serbia", which as I will later explain functions as an all encompassing a-historical entity, a negative agency operating through history to oppress Croats.

## **Section 7: Greater Serbia as Naziism**

As we saw with Serbian ethno-nationalists, accusing the "other" of being a Nazi carries with it a tremendous moral weight. If the enemy is in fact a Nazi, one may legitimate any form of aggression as merely a defence against an evil movement. The Nazi also performs the necessary role as the negative agency which brought about the second Fall of the Jewish people. Similarly, if Croats suffer the same fate as the Jews, they must necessarily be granted the same rights and moral legitimacy as the creators of the Israeli state. Having dispensed with the notion that Croats are Fascists, as we saw in Section 10, Croatian ideologues are able to instead accuse the Serbs of being Nazis.

Petar Segedin, in his "**Genocidal Nature of a Nation**" refers to the *mythical imperial mission* of the Serbs, and how this mission was crystallised in both the first and second Yugoslavias. In this passage, Segedin asserts that the Serbs indeed owe much to the Fascist tactics of the Second World War. As he explains: "The tenacity with which Greater Serbian propaganda tries to present Croatia as a genocidal nation serves the purpose of satisfying the dark ambition of their being able to justify *their* great ambitions of territorial conquest and fulfil their *mythical imperial mission*. This ambition is pursued with such lascivious hatred, necessary to fulfil their wish of greatness, that a moral person can only be appalled. The period of the Second World War is one of the basic sources of the contemporary inspiration."<sup>444</sup>

Similarly, Radovan Pavic, in an article entitled "**Greater Serbia from 1844 to 1990/91**" traces the historic *evilness* of the unchanging Serbian political project, from Ilija Garasanin to Slobodan Milosevic. For Pavic, there are no real differences between 'Greater Serbian Hegemonism' and Naziism. As he explains:

On the one hand we are faced with territorial expansion for the purpose of bringing together all Serbs with no regard for other ethnic corps and expanding their *Lebensraum* and on the other hand with the ambition to constitute such an expanded area in such a way as to guarantee a flow of income into Serbia and its leading role. It is natural that such a Serbia cannot and does not wish to satisfy its various and great needs by means of its own labour and endeavour.<sup>445</sup>

Here, Pavic asserts that not only are Serbs colonialists and Nazis, they are also lazy.

This theme is again reiterated in Boze Covic's **Roots of Serbian Aggression**, beginning with a comparison between Serbian and Nazi tactics. As he asserts, the "Greater Serbian" project has again been reflected in the machinations of the Milosevic regime: "This Greater Serbia according to those beast-like people could only be created

by the biological destruction of the Croatian inhabitants of "Serb" lands."<sup>446</sup> Like Pavic, Covic views Serbian actions today as nothing but the "finale in a long prepared Serbian plan of conquest". As Covic comments: "We are faced with an aggressive and expansionist strategy, identical to the plans and policies pursued by Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin in their time, seeking to conquer the territories of other countries, while systematically destroying whole nations and ruthlessly violating the freedom and dignity of human beings."<sup>447</sup>

In his discussion of Serbian machinations in Kosovo, Miroslav Brandt could not help but add his own comparison between Serbs and Nazis. As he writes: "The fervour that is being excited in the Serbian nation today in connection with the Kosovo problem is growing into a war cry...This agitation in fact reminds us of *Hitlerism*, which also used the myth of the German nation being oppressed by all their neighbours in Europe (even by the Jews) to prepare the ground for aggression against the whole world".<sup>448</sup> Again, Brandt's writings are highly ironic, since in his "Antimemorandum", he clearly expressed, with regards to his people, the same persecution complex he accuses the Serbs of possessing. We are to assume obviously that the Croats claims of persecution are well founded, while the Serbs, whom Brandt takes great pains to vilify must indeed be liars, seeking to mask their aggression.

Harkening back to Hitler's use of a victimisation complex to justify his invasion of Poland, Sentija echoes a theme similar to that of Brandt: "The propagandists of the Serbian militant policies make the same claim today. They say that this is a war to defend the Serbian people and Serbia- at the time when neither is under any form of threat."<sup>449</sup> Thus: "It is a question of *lebensraum* and the concept of "*blood and soil*" which ensure the new nation building ambitions of Greater Serbia. The problem of ethnic cleansing [is] forcing Croats and all other ethnic groups to flee, so that only Serbs remain, and secondly, settling Serbian colonists in the emptied areas."<sup>450</sup>

### **Conclusions**

Following a common theme in Croatian discourse, the Serbs and their "Greater Serbia" project are a constant evil, seeking to destroy the Croatian nation. As with Pokrajac's assertions on the incompatibility of Croatian and Serbian national projects, so too do the authors here evince a sense of a historical struggle between Croat and Serb, as a constant antagonism between good and evil. Bearing in mind that the "best defence is a good offence", Croatian ideologues were the first in the current Yugoslav civil war to

accuse their enemies of following the example of the Third Reich. As with the Serbs, accusing the enemy of Fascist aggression has served to justify the continued belligerency of "self" versus "other", while legitimating the authoritarian regime which is acting in the name of the people to prevent another "Holocaust" from occurring, with the promise of leading the people to safety in their own nation-state.

While it is certainly true that Serbs appear as Nazis in Croatian discourse, there does not seem to be a strong identification between Croats and Jews, as was the case with the Serbs. Nevertheless, Croatian ideologues view themselves as victims of genocide, at the hands of a variety of enemies. As we shall see in the next section, Croats appear to place more emphasis on proving that they are not Nazis and that their enemies are, rather than focusing on their identity.

### **Section 8: Holocaust Revisionism**

Another theme in Croatian discourse has been a form of Holocaust revisionism. While Croat historians have come under increasing fire for changing the numbers of war dead by Croatian Ustashe hands during World War II, this revisionism has been largely in reaction to the ban on discussions of this sort in Tito's SFRY. Tito used the legacy of the Croatian Fascist Ustashe and the Serbian Royalist Chetniks to discredit ethnic nationalism, and as a result, tended to downplay any wartime atrocities committed by Partisan troops, while exaggerating the numbers of dead killed by the Fascist and Royalist forces during the Second World War. This sparked a reaction by Croatian academics in the late 1980's which has continued into the present.

The motives behind this revisionism are open to interpretation, but rest on two specific objectives (as I would see it). The first is that the Croats are unable to portray themselves as victims of aggression if they are viewed as historic killers and fascists. The Ustashe State,<sup>451</sup> as we shall see had to be justified as merely a bulwark against Greater Serbian expansionism and terror, in this sense a sort of "lesser evil" which emerged as a result of a greater evil, namely "Greater Serbia". Similarly, any atrocities had to be downplayed, as either insignificant by the standards of Serbian kills, as by-products of the Nazi occupation, or else as exaggerations on the part of the Serb controlled Communists who wished to bring about a Fall of the Croatian nation by branding them "genocidal fascists". The second objective is to reaffirm the Croat's position as freedom loving democrats, while casting the Serbs in a negative light. It is the Serbs, as we saw in the

previous section, who are *truly* to blame for the conditions which led to the creation of a Croatian fascist state, and the subsequent terror which "they brought upon themselves".

While quibbling over the numbers of dead by Ustashe hands is a favourite Balkan pastime, Croatian revisionist historians, such as Ante Beljo in **Genocide in Yugoslavia** (1985) have denied the existence of atrocities in any form. As Beljo writes: "The very fact that the killings which are attributed to the Croats range from one hundred thousand to one million seven hundred thousand are a *fabrication*."<sup>452</sup> Through a wealth of statistical evidence, he manages to prove that there were more Serbs in Croatia after the war than before. Beljo also excuses the Ustashe state's existence as an attempt to quell the "hegemonic tyranny over the Croatian people in Yugoslavia under the monarchy."<sup>453</sup> He denies the importance of Jasenovac, which, according to his statistics killed only 10,000 people, and of these, mainly "leftist Croats, followed by some Serbs, Gypsies and Jews, but mainly Communists."<sup>454</sup>

Curiously, Croatian President Tudjman was one of the strongest advocates of this form of revisionism. In one of the English translations of his works, **Wilderness of Historical Reality: A Treatise on the History and Philosophy of Evil Brutality**, he denounces both Communist and western figures of the number of dead killed by the Ustashe. In this work, he blames the Tito's communist regime for inflating the numbers of dead precisely to demonize Croats as "genocidal fascists". In another of his works (translated into English), Tudjman again remains convinced that the numbers of Serbs killed during the war were inflated by Serb opportunists in the Communist party, and by Tito himself, who wished to punish the Croats for their disloyalty during the Partisan revolution. On the basis of 'German documented material', Tudjman first maintained in his book **An Endless Multitude of Historical Truth** that the total number of Serbs killed during the Second World War was somewhere around 30-40,000. In 1991, he dropped this figure to some 20,000 victims.<sup>455</sup>

With regards to the Jewish victims in Croatia, Tudjman has similarly revised the figures, as well as the role the Ustashe played in World War II atrocities. First discussing the Holocaust in general, Tudjman writes: "The estimated loss of up to 6 million dead is founded too much on emotional, biased testimony and on exaggerated data in the post-war reckoning of war crimes and squaring of accounts with the defeated."<sup>456</sup> When referring to the Croatian death camps, specifically the most infamous one, Jasenovac, Tudjman attempts to divide the blame by asserting that the camp administrations were

controlled by both Ustashe and inmates. As Tadjman asserts: "The inmates administration consisted of a kind of capos and all of them were Jews." Citing the statements of alleged witnesses, Tadjman hints and sometimes openly accuses the Jews in the inmates' administration for the killing of Serbs and Gypsies, as well as Jews themselves. He also accuses them of looting the Gypsies for their gold, which, he claims was the reason why Jews were executed.<sup>457</sup>

Tadjman also accused the Jews of committing genocide against the Arab populations of Israel, once they had achieved their state in 1947. As he writes of the events after Israeli independence:

After everything that it had suffered in history, particularly because of the monstrous suffering in the Second World War, the Jewish people would in a very short time initiate such a brutal and genocidal policy towards the Palestinians people that it has rightly been named as "Judeo-Naziism".<sup>458</sup>

Tadjman's revisionist writings have been so well known and documented that Anto Knezevic, a Croatian American, was commissioned by the Croatian Matica to write a book in response to these attacks, solely to discredit any attacks that Tadjman might be Anti-Semitic.<sup>459</sup> Tadjman, he claims has no problems with the Jews, and points to the fact that officials of Jewish origin include the Minister of Health, the President of the Constitutional Court, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Attorney General, two Judges of the Supreme Court and one Judge of the Constitutional Court.<sup>460</sup>

### **Conclusions**

Despite frequent accusations that Tadjman is Anti-Semitic and a fascist, based on his earlier writings, there is little in the present governmental policy of the HDZ administration to suggest that any Anti-Semitic policies have been introduced against the Jewish people in Croatia. Nor have there been any reported cases of violence perpetrated against Croatian Jews. Again, Tadjman and Beljo's philosophical musings, while certainly in poor taste and lacking in academic rigour, appear to simply serve the same ends as other forms of national discourse arising from the region. Through a reduction in the number of war dead by Ustashe hands, Beljo and Tadjman are able to demonstrate two things. Firstly, they are able to claim that the Croats are certainly not as bad as they have been made out to be. They have killed far less people than public opinion suggests. Also, they did not work alone, for the supposed victims of Croatian Fascism were actually co-perpetrators in the violence, thus absolving the Croatian nation of further guilt. Further, because the Jews themselves committed genocide against the Palestinians, the Croats can

retain their image of being a righteous nation, like the Jewish nation, even with "blood on their hands".

Secondly, because the Croats have been unjustly condemned for more killings than they actually perpetrated, and were victims of an inflation of war crime figures, they once again become that victims of Tito and his slanderous communists, who are again, dominated by the Serbs. This allows the Croats to claim another *Fall* of their nation, since "Greater Serbian hegemony" in the first Yugoslavia was responsible for the creation of the NDH, and "Greater Serbian hegemony" in the SFRY was responsible for the supposedly unjustified vilification of the Croats for their role in World War II. "Greater Serbia" again emerges as the culprit, with Croats as the eternal victims.

While one is able to situate the works of Beljo and Tadjman within the general framework of Croatian nationalist discourse, this still fails to excuse this type of revisionist writing. The world would understandably be outraged if US President Bill Clinton began a series of books absolving the US Army from its responsibility in the genocide of Amerindian tribes, or if German Chancellor Helmut Kohl began a lecture series on the benefits of National Socialism to the economic and industrial reconstruction of Germany after the Treaty of Versailles. One wonders why Tadjman and Beljo assume that a post-Communist dictatorial government is able to tread safely where democratic leaders could not.

As a second point, Tadjman and Beljo posit that by reducing the number of dead killed by the Ustashe, they somehow vindicate or reduce the evilness of the regime. This is indeed another fallacious argument, for the simple reason that the true evil consists, not in the numbers of people killed, but in the fact that a government would act in the name of its people to institute a policy of genocide. The true evil lies as much in the philosophy which inspired the killing as it does in the killings themselves. Had only one person been killed as a result of these policies of hatred, the nature of this evil would not have diminished significantly.

### **Section 9: The Bleiburg Myth**

While the supposed manipulation of Ustashe statistics at the hands of the Communists serves to demonstrate a *Fall* for the Croatian nation, this *Fall* is not sufficient to create a true sense of *Fall*, in a manner similar to the Serb's "Holocaust" in Yugoslavia or the more horrendous Jewish Holocaust in Europe. What was needed,

therefore was a *Fall* serious enough to make the Croats appear as the victims of World War II, rather than one of its aggressors. The search for such a "Holocaust" was found in the Battle of Bleiburg.

As the story goes, after the end of World War Two, many of the Ustashe members, including soldiers and government officials were marched out of Zagreb at gun point by the Allied Expeditionary Forces. As McAdams describes, an *exodus* began in May of 1945, with 200,000 civilians and 200,000 soldiers. All these were apparently led to Bleiburg by the Allies, then handed over to the Communists, who executed all of them. As McAdam writes: "Some were shot at the border, while others joined the infamous death march which took them deeper into the new People's Republic for liquidation...The total number of people liquidated may never be known but figures of 100-180 thousand have been voiced by some, up to one-quarter of a million by others".<sup>461</sup> McAdams is one of many who was hired specifically by the Croatian Matica to produce a book on the history of the Croatian nation. Here the language used is interesting, with references made to a *death march* and a *liquidation*, both terms used frequently in descriptions of Nazi atrocities against the Jewish people.

Ante Beljo's *Genocide* also recounts the incident, suggesting that the Partisans, composed primarily of Serbs, killed as many as 15,000 Croats per day.<sup>462</sup> As Beljo writes: "The Yugoslav determination to liquidate the retreating Croats was so predetermined that they would clash even with the allies if these would take the Croatian refugees under their protection."<sup>463</sup> Ante Beljo's book is ironic in the sense that while he accuses Tito's Partisan forces of committing grave atrocities, only to cover them up and deny them, he in effect does the same thing with the Croatian death camp figures.

These references to Bleiburg perform a very important function. In the first instance, they make martyrs of the Croatian Fascists, who are brutally killed simply for wanting an independent state for Croats, who were in the first place trying to escape from "Greater Serbian Hegemony". Secondly, they are martyred at the hands of the Communists, and not just Communists but Serbian Communists, again proving the theory that all harm committed against the Croats is a result of "Greater Serbia", and its disciples. By the Myth of Bleiburg, the Ustashe is redeemed, losing their status as genocidal killers, while gaining a mythological significance as innocent martyrs for the Croatian nation. Again, this restores to the Croatian nation its prestige, while again allowing for the vilification of the Serbs.

At the same time the Myth of Bleiburg serves to encapsulate the supposed antagonism between the Croatian "self" and the Serbian dominated communist "others" in the SFRY. In this sense, the "Holocaust" against Croats continues for another 45 odd years after the Second World War, since Croats are forced to live and work in a state controlled by their aggressors. This makes Croatian involvement in the SFRY seem more even more un-natural than before, which again justifies their separation from the SFRY as the only natural reaction of an oppressed people, forced to live in the same country with "genocidal killers".

## **Section 9: Croats and Moslems**

### **Section 9.1: The Bosnian Moslems as the "Other":**

Croats and Bosnian Moslems maintain a relationship in some ways quite similar to that of Serbs and Moslems. Like the Serbs, Croats believe that Bosnian Moslems are in fact of their ethnic stock. Also like their Serbian counterparts, Croatian nationalists remain confused over whether Bosnian Moslems are friends or enemies. The *enemy* theme is an easy one for Croats to conjure up, and when Tudjman began his control of the media in 1990, the media bought into the general orientalist theme concerning the Moslems, which was working so successfully against the Serbs. In this it was quite clear. The Moslems were an "other", an Islamic fundamentalist power, like perhaps the Biblical Philistines who were set on destroying the Croats in their just fight for a national homeland. The Croats were also able to emerge as saviours of the free world, defending the West from an Islamic power bent on expanding their evil influence into Western Europe. The Croats could then claim to be defending the West against Islamic incursions, by attacking Moslem villages and imprisoning the inhabitants.

The government controlled portion of the media in Croatia had already sent anti-Moslem rhetoric into motion by late 1992. By early 1993 slanted media coverage has escalated, although it was not always based on religious themes. Initially, accusations often centred on charges against officials in the Bosnian government by alleging their co-operation with KOS, the Yugoslav military intelligence. However, the focus soon shifted to Islam, with news reports about "fundamentalist extremism" and an alleged threat to Western civilisation.

By early November, 1992, Croatia's hard line defence minister, Gojko Susak sought to use a threat of Islamic Fundamentalism to court Israeli support. He alleged that

there were 11,000 Bosnian Muslims studying in Cairo alone, and appealed to his Israeli audience by saying: "can you imagine a fundamentalist state in the heart of Europe?". Tudjman likewise referred often to a threat of Islamic Fundamentalism and to an Islamic holy war. He justified Croatia's policy by maintaining that the goal of the Bosnian government was to 'set up an Islamic state in Europe, which was part of a conflict between the Islamic and Catholic worlds, and of a confrontation between the Islamic world and the West. The portion of Croatia's media which is government controlled also routinely presented exaggerated accounts of Moslem attacks against Croats, often by means of HVO representatives and reporters from Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>464</sup>

### **Section 9.2: The Bosnian Moslems as "Self":**

This *enemy* theme was juxtaposed with an often controversial idea that in fact the Bosnian Moslems were Croatian themselves, having been converted during the Ottoman period, but still very much aware of their Croatian national self consciousness. This brand of discourse fit well with the historic view of Moslems as originating from Croatian stock. Again the assimilationist theme of Ante Starcevic would be introduced: "You are a Croat but a fallen Croat, who must re-awaken, abandon artificial traditions and embrace your true nationality". This form of discourse proved more promising, since it allowed Croats to view the Moslems as Croats who have been the victims of the worst sort of *Fall*, a Fall which deprived them of their Croatian identity and their national self-consciousness, foisting upon them a false identification. This also proved useful in justifying incursions into Moslem held areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Moslems were now being *liberated* for their own national good, where before they had been killed for the good of the democratic West.

As discussed in the last chapter, Croats had long allied themselves with the Bosnian Moslems. In World War II, Ustashe leader Ante Pavelic took great pains to establish linkages with the Bosnian Moslems, in the belief that they were of Croatian national stock. The "Poglavnic" (Croatian Fuhrer) went so far as to commission famed Croat artist and architect Ivan Mestrovic to build a Mosque in downtown Zagreb in 1941, to honour those Moslem regiments who formed part of the Croatian SS (the Scimitar Division) during the period of the NDH.

The first post war stirrings of this idea in the SFRY had come from famed Bosnian Croatian writer Ivo Andric in his Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule (1961). Andric was the first in the Tito's Yugoslavia to write

about the Bosnian Moslem nation (as it had become) in terms of a fallen part of the Croatian nation. His description of Croatian Moslems during the 19th century is telling: "Having fallen to Islam, it (Croatian Bosnia) lost the possibility of fulfilling its natural role of participating in the cultural development of Christian Europe. Instead, Bosnia became a mighty fortress against the Christian West. Bosnia was to remain in the unnatural position for the remainder of Turkish rule."<sup>465</sup> This theme of the *Fallen* Croat nation was to re-emerge as nationalism once again visited the Balkan Peninsula.

Croat historian Abdulaf Dizdarevic has also asserted the claim that the Moslems of Bosnia were indeed of Croatian origin, and like many Croatian ethnographers, has employed distinctly racial characteristics in his definition: "The uniformity of the physical features of our Croatian nation which, along with its language is one of the dominant characteristics of the same racial group...They preserved [the Croatian] language in its purest form and as a dialect of clear and undeniable Croatian origin." The presence of these national traits is, for Dizdarevic, proof of the continued Croatian spirit that beats, consciously or unconsciously, in the hearts of every Bosnian Moslem. It is on this basis that he writes in somewhat dramatic terms about the *Fall* of the Croats to Islam:

The religious wars that broke out when foreign religions mixed in with our common ancestral Slavic paganism, raged in the midst of our nation for centuries, destroying its most powerful forces, erased that unique national image which reflected the uniformity of national traditions...The historical moment of converting to Islam was without a doubt the most decisive moment in the history of the Croatian nation...Thus began the long era in the history of Bosnia, cut off from its mother country...Never in history was there such a case of injustice as this one. It oppressed a handful of people who it seems, were condemned by God himself to bathe in the blood of their own children.<sup>466</sup>

Similarly, Tadjman advanced the same position, positing that the Bosnian Moslems were in fact Croats, and on this basis argued that the Moslems, together with those Croats living in Bosnia-Hercegovina be included in the new affirmation of Croatian sovereignty. Moreover, he implied that this new perspective might eventually involve certain adjustments in the territorial boundaries between the existing units of the Yugoslav state. In his words: "Croatia and Bosnia constitute a geographical and political unity and have always formed a joint state in history".<sup>467</sup> On this basis, while Moslems might outwardly be victims of Islamic indoctrination, they could indeed be *saved* by Croatian military forces, and in the process made to *redeem* themselves by joining the new Croatian state.

This saving does not necessarily imply conversion to Catholicism, however. During the Second World War, Croats and Bosnian Moslems held a strong alliance during the Fascist period. Because the current war is one of territorial aggrandisement, simply having Bosnian Moslems accept their Croatian national identity would be sufficient to justify Croatian military attempts to "liberate" their lands.

### **Conclusions**

The Croatian Fall in Bosnia Hercegovina becomes of central importance for Croatian national identity. The Croats are now able to complete their state, bringing back to the fold that chunk of Croatia that was bitten off (to use Tadjman's apple metaphor) by the forces of Islam. Similarly, because all Bosnian Moslems are Croatian, the lands in Bosnia taken over by Croats are merely being liberated from centuries of colonial oppression. Not only will the annexation of Bosnia by Croatia correct past injustices and redeem the Croatian nation, it will also allow the Croats to achieve their telos of having all good Croats in one country, united under one flag and one language. In this sense, the negative agency which is the Barbaric East is vanquished, and by rather ironic twist of fate, the "Other" returns to the "Self". As with Weizman's concept of the *Diaspora*, so too do the Croatian Moslem *Diaspora* return to the homeland to complete their destiny.

### **Conclusions and Analysis for Chapter 4**

This four stage framework has proven extremely useful in the understanding of Croatian ethnic national discourse. As I have done with the previous chapter, I have read the literature intuitively, using the four stage framework as the centre of my analysis. In Figure 5, I have placed the principal elements of Croatian national discourse within the four stage framework, which will allow me to compare and contrast Serbian and Croatian discourse in the **Conclusions** section of my thesis.

The framework in Figure 5 begins with the Croatian myths of the original nation, which portray the Croats as Western, democratic and peaceful. Embracing a Fichtean form of linguistic nationalism, the Croatian language encapsulates the four stage model. By reclaiming the national language, Croats reclaim their national identity, and their separateness. Croatian ideologues have used the "self" and "other" dichotomy to draw a complete differentiation between Serbs and Croats, on the levels of physical attributes, psychology, political orientation, language, religion, culture and history. In this the

Catholic Church has played a small part, far less involved than the Serbian Orthodox Church has been in Serbia.

The central plank in the Croatian world view has been the incompatibility of Serbian and Croatian interests and the diametric opposition of Serb and Croat national projects. As we have seen, this argument is not without foundation, not because it has always been this way, but because Serb and Croat ideologues have willed this to be, and have taken concrete steps to differentiate themselves entirely from each other.

In Croatia, this differentiation has carried with it a hatred and distrust of the "other". Thus Croats see in everything Serbian, elements of a "Greater Serbian" project, bent on destroying Croats at the expense of Serbian national interests. This Serbian evil allows Croats to play the victim, casting themselves as the permanent victims of Serbian oppression and violence. This has indeed allowed the Croats to continue with their own human rights abuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia itself, while justifying their actions as self-defensive only. That the Croatian government operates 9 detention centres in Croatia is perhaps proof that the Croats are doing somewhat more than just defending their historic borders from "fascist aggression".<sup>468</sup>

In the previous chapter, I concluded by comparing Serbian ethnic nationalism to those failed attempts at a Yugoslav consciousness, in the sense that an overarching form of identification was thrust down upon the people from on high. In the Croatian case, nationalism has become so dichotomized that one is either a loyal Croatian, or a traitor; there is little middle ground. No one has better expressed this sentiment than Croatian writer and journalist Zlavenka Drakulic, who in her latest book *Balkan Express*, described Croatian nationalism as an ill fitting shirt, with sleeves that are too short and a collar that is too high. But, she notes disdainfully: "You might not like the colour and the cloth might itch. But, there is no escape; there is nothing else to wear."<sup>469</sup> One wonders indeed if, like an ill fitting shirt, ethnic nationalism too will eventually fall out of fashion, as the more stylish "garments" of the European Union are hung out on display, or as Croats and Serbs discover that their "political capital" can purchase more than they currently realise.

## **Thesis Conclusions and Analysis**

*We suffer from an addictive weakness for large illusions. A weakness for ideology. Power in our civilisation is repeatedly tied to the pursuit of all inclusive truths and utopias.*

**-John Ralston Saul in *The Unconscious Civilisation*-**

## **Introduction**

In this final section of my thesis, I will begin with a comparison of Serbian and Croatian national discourse, employing the four stage model as the central part of my analysis. As we see from Figures 4 & 5, Serbian and Croatian discourse share far more in the way of a worldview than either would like to think. I will begin with the similarities between these two countries' discourse, then review the differences. Following this section, I will either confirm or refute my hypothesis, that *Serbian and Croatian nationalism follow a cyclical teleological understanding of events*. The next section will review the validity of my qualitative discourse analysis method, then contrast it with a similar study done using a quantitative approach. I will conclude my conclusions section by offering some personal insight into the applicability of the model used in this thesis as a tool for analysing ethnic nationalism in other regions of the world.

## **Section 1: Serbs and Croats Compared: Similarities and Differences**

The easiest way to compare these two nationalist forms involves using the four stage model as a framework, reviewing each phase and the Serbian and Croatian elements within it. **Stage 1:**

Beginning with the myth of the original nation, we see many similarities between the two groups. Both nations view themselves as democratic, peace loving and somehow "western". Both view the Bosnian Moslems as Eastern (in their mentality), but also as part of their former ethnic stock, who suffered a *Fall* when converting to Islam. Both nations have a sense of historical greatness, and their mythology reinforces this idea of past struggle. Both nations share an orientalist view of those "others" that are perceived as Eastern and foreign. In this sense, Serbs and Moslems have been denounced by Croats as Eastern, while Serbs view the Moslems in Kosovo and Bosnia with similar disdain. Both nations also share views on national territory. Serbs and Croats at one time or another occupied much of each other's historic land. Therefore the territorial claims of Serbs and Croats overlap, bringing each's territorial ambition in direct conflict with the other's.

Another similarity between Serb and Croat is the Serbian preoccupation with the idea of sacrifice. Serbs as a "freedom loving people" constantly stress how much they as a nation have sacrificed for the good of others, defending the West from Islamic fundamentalism, while protecting the East from Vatican expansionism. This has become an important theme in Croatian discourse. Against the forces of the East, Croats become the saviours of the West, protecting Europe from Bosnian Moslems and their Islamic project, while defending themselves against "Greater Serbia".

In terms of differences between these two nations at the first stage, there appear to be several major distinctions. The first can be expressed in the difference between the general and the particular. Serbs as the general have espoused a more assimilationist nationalism. While "other-izing" their enemies, Serbs similarly see all South Slavs as having descended from the same racial stock. They have stressed the common ancestral origins of all Slavs, as well as the common origins of the Serbo-Croat language. Where Serbs and Croats differ, for Serbian ideologues, are in their attitudes, their role in history, and their inherent goodness, not in their physical features, language or racial origin. By contrast, the Croats have developed their particularity, or uniqueness. This is evident in the Croatian view of their national language, which they claim is unique, having roots completely separate from those of the "Serbian" language. This is also evident in their psychiatric discourse, as well as their ethnographic revisionism, which posits racial origins distinct from Serbs and other South Slav nations.

From a religious perspective, Serbians appear far more influenced by their Church than are their counterparts in Croatia. Serbs appear to identify far more with their epica myths and stories as do the Croats. As Florence Levinsohn has noted: "No people in Europe are so intensely exposed to the radiation of their epic poetry than are the Serbs. They believe in this poetry as pure truth, even though it is only the product of the poet's imagination." Based on these observations, she concludes: "It is a nationalist subconsciousness. History supplied the models for the heroes of today".<sup>470</sup> As we saw in the Kosovo myth section in Chapter 3, the Serbs do feel strong attachments to the Jewish people, and draw frequent parallels between both nationalities. For Croats, this attachment is not as strong, but is nevertheless present..

While some differences do exist between Serbian and Croatian discourse, the similarities are overwhelming. Each nation has developed a set of myths to inflate its

greatness, and its contribution to history. Each has attempted to show itself as a great and original nation, setting up the conditions by which any Falls will be more devastating.

### **Stage 2: The Fall**

In Stage 2, we see many more similarities between Serbs and Croats. In this Fall stage, the concept of the national Fall is stressed. In this each nation has selected each other as the central negative agency which is responsible for their Falls. Thus for Serbs, Croats are the chief architects of "Anti-Serbianism", while for Croats, there remains little doubt that the Serb's "Greater Serbian" project is aimed primarily at the destruction of the Croatian nation. That each sees the other as the primary negative agency allows each to posit that the other was responsible for their oppression in the first and second Yugoslavias, and in the First and Second World Wars. As well, each posits that the other was able to manipulate Tito and his communists to gain the upper hand during the lifetime of the SFRY.

Each likens the "other" to Nazis, while presenting the "self" as a victim of genocide and brutal aggression as victims of an evil united force which has operated against them throughout history. For Serbs, this is Anti-Serbianism; for Croats, it is "Greater Serbian Hegemonism". While the comparisons between Serbs and Jews are obvious, Croatian nationalists merely allude to this connection. The fact that Croats were Nazi allies during World War II implies that when Croats conjure up images of a Nazi menace trying to destroy them, they are not harkening back to their own past, but rather, they are borrowing a sense of persecution from another nation's experiences. Because of this comparison between "self" and the Jewish people, each is then able to claim a major Fall during the Second World War, the Serbs at the hands of the Croatian Ustashe at Jasenovac, and the Croats at the hands of the "Serb dominated" Communist Partisans, at Bleiburg. Each have also tried to steal national lands of the other, while similarly trying to convert the other's population to their religious faith.

As noted earlier, both Serb and Croat share similar views on the Bosnian Moslems, each claiming them for himself, while similarly denouncing them as an Islamic "other", seeking to establish a fundamentalist government in the region, to the detriment of their nation. It should come as no surprise to learn that Milosevic and Tudjman actually hatched a secret agreement (which was never articulated) to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between them, at the expense of the Moslem population. As Bogdan Denich noted astutely of the general strategy behind this *Fall* stage:

Each side consistently presented itself as victims, or potential victims, the Other as threat or potential threat, so that neither party responded to the Other directly, but only to its own projections of the Other. Each reacts to the Other as a threat, and in its reactions, reinforces the behaviour that appears threatening. Nor were these perceptions questioned by those who increasingly identified with their own "people." *Victimisation appeared to be an all-powerful mobiliser of ethnic solidarity.*<sup>471</sup>

At this stage there are only three fundamental differences (of import to this thesis) between these two nations, in terms of their national discourse. The first concerns the general demonisation practised by the Serbs against all perceived enemies. While Croats focus on Serbs and Bosnian Moslems as their negative agencies, Serbs have targeted not only Croats and Bosnian Moslems, but Kosovar Albanians, the United States, Germany, and the Vatican. In this sense, their *Fall* is all the greater, since most of the Western and Eastern worlds appear to be betraying the good Serbs who have sacrificed themselves over the centuries. The second concerns the role of language in the conflict. The Croatian language has figured prominently in Croatian discourse. Its *Fall* initiated a cultural and spiritual *Fall* of the Croatian nation, heralding their assimilation and loss of uniqueness. The Serbs have no parallel to this national *Fall*. Their views of language, as we saw earlier, are fundamentally different to those of Croats.

The third and final significant difference is that of the importance of the "nation-defining defeat". While the Croats have their defeat at Knin, this has not formed a central rallying point for the nation. For the Serbs, the Myth of Kosovo has indeed performed this role, giving Serbs the will to fight, even against great adversity. The transformation of the Serbs from an earthly people to a heavenly people, thanks to Prince Lazar, allows the Serbs to view themselves as holy, touched by divine revelation. While the Croatian language and the Kosovo myth are fundamentally different, they both perform the same role of uniting the people behind a common culture and set of symbols.

With the exception of a few differences, both Serbs and Croats have had relatively the same objectives at this stage. Each has successfully demonised the other, by showing the other to be the central negative agency in the 20th century which has brought about a series of national *Falls*. Each has also proved their national righteousness, by comparing themselves to the Jews during the Holocaust, while comparing the "other" or "others" with Nazis. In short, the techniques used by Serbs and Croats to describe their national *Fall* stages have been almost identical.

### **Stage 3: The Re-awakening of Nationalism**

At Stage 3, we again see more similarities than differences. Each nationalist government is composed of former Communists, who gained power as a result of nationalist agendas. Both regimes are authoritarian, and both have rigidly centralised and monopolised all state organs of coercion, communications and persuasion. Further, each system has similar tactics in promoting myths of the original nation and myths of the *Fall*. Both regimes have also used the fear of genocide to legitimate military invasion into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both have attempted to cast their nation's role in the conflict as simply defensive.

In both countries, the philosophers and historians have revised history, to make their nation's historic role one of peace. Indeed intellectuals in both countries have taken an active part in whitewashing their nation's part in history. Both manipulate ethnography and historical fact, distort linguistic realities and employ attribution theory to develop their respective national discourse. As British journalist Cvijeto Job has asserted throughout the conflict: "Even in a closed society it is the duty of the intellectuals to examine objectively the collective madness of the state."<sup>472</sup> Job has concluded in his study of the conflict that the intellectuals in both countries, which should have been a voice of sanity against this "collective madness" have in fact increased the negative perceptions of "others", thereby exacerbating the conflict. As he reviews the current situation:

All nations have self serving myths, which play havoc with historical truths. But the public life in many countries permits the challenge of these myths. Stabler and more tolerant cultures leave room for the puncturing of their own egos, but in Yugoslavia, the pervasive culture of ethnocentric myths unchallenged even by their intellectuals weighs down the lives of the people. Yugoslav peoples have indeed been betrayed by their intelligencias.<sup>473</sup>

This serves to further demonstrate that the strategies of ethno-nationalists in both countries have been remarkably similar. The only main difference is that in Serbia, the Orthodox Church has taken a central role in the promotion of ethnic nationalism, while the Croatian Catholic Church has actively criticised the regime for its aggression and human rights abuses.

### **Stage 4: The Deliverance**

In terms of the political objectives of Serbian and Croatian nationalists, both appear to share similar goals. Each desires to increase its national territory at the expense of each other, and the Bosnian Moslems. For both Croat and Serb, the culmination of

their history would consist in the establishment of national borders which contain all historic national lands. That the deliverance of the nation is complete when the unified national territory is gained suggests that elements of Zionist discourse have indeed contributed to Serbian and Croatian national discourse. The culmination of history in the nation-state, as I have tried to demonstrate throughout this work, finds many of its origins in political Zionism.

The theme of first protecting, then uniting the *Diaspora* (those nationals not living within the nation-state) has been a central preoccupation of both Serbs and Croats alike. This would also coincide with a strong national culture and spiritual identification with the nation. In the cases of both Serbian and Croatian nationalism, this may also imply the assimilation of the Bosnian Moslem nation, their forced conversion to the national faith, and their embracing of national symbols.

Sadly (at least for Serbs and Croats) Stage 4, as with any utopian project is almost always unattainable. Since Serbian and Croatian land claims overlap, it is impossible for both Serbian and Croatian national ambitions to be satisfied at the same time. Even a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in half, as well as the forced conversion of Bosnian Moslems to Orthodoxy and Catholicism would not be wholly satisfactory to both parties, since they would still see part of *their* historic territory in the hands of their enemies, while similarly finding some of *their* people under foreign rule. With the current cease-fire agreements reached by the warring parties, it appears that utopia may at last be abandoned in favour of a more realistic solution.

As I have maintained throughout this thesis, Biblical cyclical teleology has been of central importance to my analytical model. In my analysis of Serbian and Croatian national discourse, I would have to conclude that my hypothesis has been proven; both Serbian and Croatian discourse do indeed reflect elements of these forms of discourse, and appear to view history in a cyclical manner, with the present merely a chance to recapture what was once theirs.

### **Section 2: On the Effectiveness of the Four Stage Model:**

My four stage model for the qualitative analysis of national discourse in Croatia and Serbia has proved useful for two things. The first has been to understand the way in which Croat and Serb nationalists have both viewed events in the current conflict, and in history. Understanding the optic through which nationalists in both countries view events

helps us to understand why both the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes have been able to claim so much legitimacy amongst the people, at a time when national borders are under attack, and at a time when their respective economies are in such terrible shape. In these periods of uncertainty, a holistic national project has had the effect of stimulating a great deal of national loyalty, allowing people hope for the future, based on an interpretation of the past.

Secondly, the model has allowed me to isolate the fundamental differences and similarities in both Croatian and Serbian discourse, something which has not before been the subject of serious study. In this way, I was able to confirm my hypothesis, that both countries have used this cyclical teleology in a similar manner, to demonize opposition internally and externally, while justifying the authoritarian and arbitrary exercise of power.

### **Section 3: Quantitative Discourse Analysis: Is it viable?**

In their methodology, the Swedish team at *Styrelsen for psykologiskt forsvar*, led by Marjana Malesic, conducted a quantitative analysis of public media material related to the conflict between Serbia and Croatia. This analysis was designed to chart the frequency of key words and metaphors relating to the conflict, to quantify any patterns in terms of frequently occurring vocabulary. They covered nine publications; for Croatia: two dailies (*Vecernji List* and *Vjesnik*) and two weeklies (*Globus* and *Danas*) and for Serbia: two dailies (*Borba* and *Politika*) as well as three weeklies (*Vreme*, *NIN* and *Intervjuju*). In total, the analysis covered 213 articles, 143 from Croatia and 70 from Serbia. In their review of the Croatian press, they noted frequent "home land related metaphors" based on so-called "blood and soil" imagery, as well as "peace oriented political activities" and a general denunciation of the accusations of Tudjman's regime being protofascist. With regards to defence, they noted that the war is seen as defensive; against a "genocidal" Serbian aggressor. Malesic noted much the same attitudes among the Serbian press, save for the fact that the Serbian press tended to play up the issue of Croatia's fascist past and the plight of the Serbian minority in Croatia more than did the Croatian press.<sup>474</sup>

Their summary of the findings of the press analysis found that "Communications in abnormal and extreme situations are characterised by generalisations combined with the use of categories, stereotypes, labelling and value-weighted, emotionally charged attributes." They further noted that:

Such simplifications can be productive in the short term, especially in abnormal situations, since they ensure the required speed and simple identification. At the same time the effect of categorical patterns of thinking and of labelling is still further enhanced by the use of value weighted and emotionally negatively charged characterisations, which possess a powerful mobilising force.<sup>475</sup>

In their final conclusions about the role of the media in the conflict, Malesic and her team concluded: "Mass media completely accomplished the role of political propaganda and war-mongering given them by the politicians."<sup>476</sup>

In effect, Malesic's methodology was not so different from my own. While Malesic focused on key words only, and I concentrated more on the general theme and ideas presented, I was nevertheless cognisant of the importance of certain key terms, while Malesic appears to have chosen words for her analysis which conformed to several general themes. In this sense, our analyses were very much the same, and the conclusions were also similar. Malesic's observation of blood and soil imagery when referring to "others", and peace and land based metaphors when referring to the "self" squares well with my observations, suggesting that while my methodology might be denounced as less "scientific" than that of the Malesic team's, my conclusions as to the central themes in Serbian and Croatian discourse are certainly legitimate, and are generally supported by analysts of the Yugoslav conflict.

In the final analysis, then, it appears that both qualitative and quantitative methods are useful in such a discourse analysis. I chose the qualitative variety of analysis in order to understand frequently reoccurring words, not in statistical terms, but in terms of a framework or pattern. For my research then, a study of key words only would have ignored their context, which was an essential condition to the testing of my hypothesis.

#### **Section 4: A Few Words on the Four Stage Framework:**

As I have endeavoured to reveal throughout this thesis, the four stage framework has proven useful to our understanding of ethnic national discourse in Serbia and Croatia. The inevitable question arises: Is it useful for analysing other forms of nationalism around the world?

Of this model's general applicability, we can certainly see its usefulness in analysing German National-Socialism or Italian Fascism, both of which incorporated Biblical symbolism and classicalism in their respective ideologies, as well as myths of the Fall. Even in today's Quebec nationalism, we see strong elements of original nation myths,

focusing on language, religion and culture, as well as strong myths of the Fall, brought about by an "English Canada", which performs the role of a negative agency, seeking to assimilate and destroy French Quebec culture. Under the reign of Maurice Duplessis, the concept of a French Canadian *Diaspora* was stressed. This idea has long since been abandoned, as Quebec nationalism has adopted a more territorial form of nationalism. Now only Quebec as a French nation will secede, leaving the other Acadiens, Fransaskois, Franco-Ontariens, etc. to fend for themselves. Here of course the similarities end, for Quebec would never dream of invading New Brunswick to "liberate" the Acadian population. Nor would Quebequois wish to return to the "old days", when the Catholic Church controlled education, and most people made a living on the land. Nor indeed would it advocate civil war as a means to leave Canada.

In short, while elements of this four stage model no doubt exist in many countries around the globe, it would certainly be premature to conclude that this cyclical teleological view of history is present in anywhere other than Croatia, Serbia, and Israel. I have no wish to embody John Ralston Saul's "addictive weakness for large illusions" by proposing this model as an optic through which to understand the world. Perhaps after careful study of nationalist discourse in other countries, a cyclical nationalism could be found in some of these. Nevertheless, it falls far beyond the boundaries of this thesis to tout this model as generally applicable to the study of ethnic nationalism. For the present, if this model has helped us better understand events in the Balkan Peninsula, then it has succeeded in achieving its own telos.

### End Notes for Thesis Introduction:

- <sup>1</sup>Ivo Banac, Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz: "The Last Days of Bosnia?" in: *Boston Review* (Boston: Feb/March 1994) p. 47
- <sup>2</sup>An excellent study of Western misperceptions, based on an Orientalist model developed by Edward Said has been compiled at Carleton University by former Yugoslav diplomat Dejan Guzina. It is the definitive work, in my opinion, on the subject, and while only a Master's Thesis, contains a great deal of content and analysis. See Dejan Guzina: *Yugoslavia's Disintegration: An Interpretation* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1995) ps 23-40.
- <sup>3</sup>For an overview of mythology in society and government, see Henry Tudor: *Political Myth* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972) ps. 138-9
- <sup>4</sup>*Ibid.* p. 24
- <sup>5</sup>For an excellent overview of modern manifestations of ethnic nationalism in six countries, including Yugoslavia, see Micheal Ignatieff: *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Viking Books, 1993) p. 3
- <sup>6</sup>*Ibid.* ps. 3-4
- <sup>7</sup>*Ibid.* ps. 4-5
- <sup>8</sup>Oliver Thomson: *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977) p. 3+7
- <sup>9</sup>Quoted in: Anthony Smith: *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1990) p. 15.
- <sup>10</sup>Northrop Frye: *The Great Code* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982) p. xxii.
- <sup>11</sup>Oliver Thomson: *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977) p. 9.
- <sup>12</sup>Marjan Malesic: *The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict* (Stockholm: Styrelsen for psykologiskt forsvar, 1993) ps. 43-6.

### End Notes for Chapter 1:

- <sup>13</sup>Quoted in: Gilbert Cuthbertson: *Political Myth and Epic* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1975) p. 1.
- <sup>14</sup>Benedict Anderson: *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) p. 6.
- <sup>15</sup>Quoted in: *Ibid.* p. 7
- <sup>16</sup>*Ibid.* p. 26.
- <sup>17</sup>For an overview of mythology in society and government, see Henry Tudor: *Political Myth* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972) ps. 14-5.
- <sup>18</sup>*Ibid.* ps. 138-9.
- <sup>19</sup>*Ibid.* p. 61.
- <sup>20</sup>*Ibid.* p. 36.
- <sup>21</sup>*Ibid.* p. 40.
- <sup>22</sup>*Ibid.* p. 39.
- <sup>23</sup>Anthony Smith: *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1990) p. 14.
- <sup>24</sup>Cuthbertson (1975) p. 24.
- <sup>25</sup>Northrop Frye: *The Great Code* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982) p. xviii.
- <sup>26</sup>*Ibid.* p. 169.
- <sup>27</sup>*Ibid.* p. 169.
- <sup>28</sup>*Ibid.* p. 171.
- <sup>29</sup>*Ibid.* p. 106.
- <sup>30</sup>*Ibid.* p. 109.
- <sup>31</sup>Of course, in the act of manipulating nature in order to construct this monstrous edifice, the builders of the Tower further alienate themselves from nature, building solely to overcome it.
- <sup>32</sup>*Ibid.* p. 142.
- <sup>33</sup>*Ibid.* p. 78.
- <sup>34</sup>Northrop Frye: *Words With Power: Being a Second Study of "The Bible and Literature"* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) p. 89 *italics mine*.
- <sup>35</sup>Frye (1982) p. 157.

- <sup>36</sup>Ibid. p. 135.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid. p. 136. Here we see a fine example of Frye's wry wit, referring to the Apocalypse as a sort of court trial in an adversarial system, to decide the fate of the soul. This perhaps provides some insight into his remarkable popularity as a lecturer and scholar at the University of Toronto.
- <sup>38</sup>Frye (1982) p. 137.
- <sup>39</sup>By the term Millenianism, Cohn refers to any movement which follows a similar teleological outlook to that of the Bible. This would include mythology surrounding a high point, or golden age, followed by a fall, a progression towards the original high point, followed by the re-attainment of that high point.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid. p. 5.
- <sup>41</sup>Ibid. ps. 71-2.
- <sup>42</sup>Frye (1990) p. xiii.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid. p. 24. An example of this idea might be found in the works of Saskatchewan Premier T.C. Douglas, who applied his strict religious understanding of the world to his politics. Viewing the role of "man" as one of service to others, he used the example of Christ to posit that the state should have a responsibility to heal the sick, feed the hungry and clothe the poor. Of course, Douglas' ideas were never manifested in authoritarianism, as Frye suggests in his discussion of the possible uses of mythology in politics.
- <sup>44</sup>Ibid. ps. 24-5.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid. p. 26.
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid. p. 26.
- <sup>47</sup>Ibid. p. 60.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid. p. 97.
- <sup>49</sup>Ibid. p. 97.
- <sup>50</sup>Frye describes in his work, the term *Kerygma*, which adequately describes what the propagandists goal essentially is. Kerygma, as Frye describes it is a mode of rhetoric, but more a vehicle of what he calls revelation, the conveying of information from an objective divine source to a subjective human receptor. Frye (1982) p. 29.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid. p. 117.
- <sup>52</sup>Ibid. p. 308.
- <sup>53</sup>I should like to point out here that this is in no way meant to belittle the importance or moral legitimacy of Zionism, or to imply that the creation of the state of Israel was in some way the product of deceitful propaganda. It must be noted that the author has tremendous respect for the Jewish people and what they both individually and collectively have accomplished since 1945. I merely wish to show in this section that, right or wrong, many of the ideas and concepts central to Zionism have been "borrowed" by Serbian and Croatian nationalist writers and politicians to further new and different political objectives.
- <sup>54</sup>This is not to suggest that Anti-Semitism did not exist before this time as a moral concept. Indeed it did, but it had little political significance until Herzl dreamed of a nationalism which was able to transcend linguistic and geographical boundaries. Anti-Semitism was to be the extreme external force which would compress the Jewish coal into the Zionist diamond.
- <sup>55</sup>George Steiner: *In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) p. 4.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid. p. 46. I placed adopted in quotes precisely because much of the Anti-Semitic rhetoric of the time reflected a belief that Jews were merely foreigners, like Gypsies, who were in possession of no land to call their own. The concept of *rootlessness* was therefore central to these attacks.
- <sup>57</sup>George Steiner, George: *The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H.* (London: Faber & Faber, 1981) p. 45.
- <sup>58</sup>This is a reference to Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Zionism, who, together with Asher Ginsberg and Chaim Weizman created a Jewish congress and organised Jewish colonisation in Palestine during the 19th century.
- <sup>59</sup>*Italics mine* Steiner (1981) p. 126.
- <sup>60</sup>Walter Laqueur: *A History of Zionism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1989) p. 590 & Yehuda Gothelf: "Zionism's Adversaries at Home and Abroad" in: Yehuda Gothelf (editor): *Zionism: the Permanent Revolution of the Jewish People* (Israel: World Labour Zionist Movement, *no date given*) p. 81.
- <sup>61</sup>Quoted in: Irving Miller: *Israel: The Eternal Entity* (New York: Farrar/Straus and Cudahy, 1955) ps.

vii-viii

<sup>62</sup>Ibid. ps. vii-viii

<sup>63</sup>This address, entitled "The Spiritual Dimension" was delivered to the Federation of Welfare Funds in Chicago, November 18, 1958. It is found in: Herzog (1975) p. 140-42.

<sup>64</sup>Chaim Herzog: A People That Dwells Alone (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975) p. 142.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid. p. 119 from an address to the "Canadian Jewish Congress" in Montreal, November 14, 1971

<sup>66</sup>Gothelf p. 26.

## End Notes for Chapter 2:

<sup>67</sup>For a concise, unbiased view of the Yugoslav civil war, see United Nations Council of Experts: Report on the Historical Background of the Civil War in the Former Yugoslavia (Geneva: United Nations Office, March, 1994) ps. 3 + 13.

<sup>68</sup>Rade Korac: "Anti-Serbianism as the State Program of Yugoslavia" (Pittsburgh: American Serbobran, 1985) p. 45 & Mihailo Crnobrnja: The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: McGill/Queen's University Press, 1994) p. 17 Former Yugoslav Ambassador to the European Communities, Crnobrnja remains a convinced Yugoslav.

<sup>69</sup>United Nations Council of Experts (1994) ps. 3 + 13.

<sup>70</sup>Miron Rezun: Europe and War in the Balkans: Towards a New Identity (Westport: Praegar, 1995) p. 37.

<sup>71</sup>Alex N. Dragnich: Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia (London: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1992) p. xvi.

<sup>72</sup>Arnold Townbee, David Mitrany, Nevil Forbes & D.G. Hogarth: The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915) p. 105.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid. ps. 111-113.

<sup>74</sup>Leftin Stavrianos: The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart & Company Inc. 1958) p. 249.

<sup>75</sup>Townbee et al. p. 119.

<sup>76</sup>Ferdinand Schevill: The History of the Balkan Peninsula (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971) p. 323

<sup>77</sup>R. W. Seton-Watson: The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966) p. 107.

<sup>78</sup>William Langer: Political and Social Upheaval: 1832-1852 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) p. 357.

<sup>79</sup>Barbara Jelavic: History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 316.

<sup>80</sup>Ivo Lederer: "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs" in: Peter Sugar & Ivo Lederer (editors): Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969) ps. 416-18.

<sup>81</sup>Jalavic (1983) p. 318.

<sup>82</sup>Smilja Avramov: Genocide Against the Serbs (Beograd: Museum of Modern Art, 1992) p. 71

<sup>83</sup>Gerard Baudson: A Europe of "Apatrides" (Paris: Editions des Luyne, 1994) p. 51

<sup>84</sup>Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation Edited by George Armstrong Kelly (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968) ps. 57-8 By *supersensuous*, Fichte refers to that part of the individual, perhaps the subconscious mind, which is capable of communicating intuitively with others with which he/she is "in sync". Fichte's notion of the supersensuous implies that everyone in a distinct nation interprets and object in nature in the same way, and assigns to it the same mental image or picture. For Fichte, the original language in fact aids the members of the nature to visualise and image or re-presentation in exactly the same way, thus achieving a higher level of communication.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid. p. 48

<sup>86</sup>Ibid. p. 58

<sup>87</sup>Ibid. p. 53

<sup>88</sup>For an excellent discussion of Fichte's nationalism, see Elie Kedourie: Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971) p. 64

<sup>89</sup>Baudson (1994) ps. 51-2

<sup>90</sup>As Peter Sugar notes, this form of autonomy necessarily implied a shifting of borders, since: "[T]he frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern...to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands". from: "Eternal and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism" (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969) p. 10 This

quotation is found in: Dejan Guzina: Yugoslavia's Fragmentation: An Interpretation *Master's Thesis* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1995)

<sup>91</sup>Smilja Avramov: Genocide Against the Serbs (Beograd: Museum of Modern Art, 1992) p. 20.

<sup>92</sup>Bozidar Zecevic: The Uprooting: A Dossier of the Croatian Genocide Policy Against the Serbs (London: Velauto International, 1992) p. 35.

<sup>93</sup>For an excellent overview of the early Communist and pan-Slavic movements, see Aleksa Djilas: The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and the Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991) p. 103.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid. p. 106.

<sup>95</sup>Brian Hall: The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia (Boston: David Godine Publishers, 1994) p. 141. Hall's book presents a travelogue from the end of Yugoslavia to the beginning of the present civil war. Herein he conducts interviews with regular Serbs and Croats as well as government officials.

<sup>96</sup>Dusko Doder: "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds" in: *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1993) p. 36.

<sup>97</sup>For a somewhat biased but interesting review of Jovan Cvijic's ethno-geographical writings, see Stanko Zuljic: "Review of Some Messages in J. Cvijic's Anthropogeographic Research" in: Boze Covic (editor): Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates/Documents/ Cartographic Reviews (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) p. 365.

<sup>98</sup>Zuljic (1991) p. 369.

<sup>99</sup>For further discussion, please see William Langer: Political and Social Upheaval: 1832-1852 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969) Especially: "Stirrings of Liberalism in the East". ps. 142-180.

<sup>100</sup>Elie Kedourie: Nationalism (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971) p. 67.

<sup>101</sup>Bodgan Denitch: Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) ps. 28-9. Denitch's work provides a clear unbiased view of the development of the conflict and the subsequent civil war in Yugoslavia.

<sup>102</sup>Brian Weinstein: "Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices" in: *World Politics* Vol 31 (1979) p. 347. As Ivo Lederer notes on the later work of Ante Starcevic to create a standard Croatian: "The Croatian acceptance of the Stokavian dialect as the literary Croatian language represents a clear cut case of the ways in which nations are created through invention and imagination. Croatian national identification might have taken a completely different route if they had opted for the Kajkavian dialect instead. At the same time, Slovenians rejected the Stokavian dialect in favour of a separate local dialect that eventually became a distinct Slovenian language." For more insight into language politics and history in the Balkans, see Ivo Lederer and Petar Sugar (editors): Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969) ps. 396-438.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid. p. 355.

<sup>104</sup>Istvan Deak: "The One and the Many" from: *The New Republic* (September 21, 1992) reprinted in: Nader Mousavizadeh (editor): The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement (New York: New Republic Books, 1996) p. 7.

<sup>105</sup>in: Ivo Banac: The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1992) p. 76. The idea of pan-Slavism was strongly advocated through the *Illyrian* movement of the 1860's. During this period, Croats Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Racki advocated the formation of a state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. As Dejan Guzina explains: "Both Strossmayer and Racki believed that a supra-national Yugoslav ideology of accentuating common ethnic, cultural and political bonds [could] transcend differences that [were] fostered through centuries of South Slavic subjugation to foreign rule" in: Guzina (1995) p. 52.

<sup>106</sup>For a complete and detailed view of the collapse of the Communist bureaucratic system in Yugoslavia, see Lenard Cohen: Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 11.

<sup>107</sup>Valdimir Gligorov: Yugoslavia's Disintegration (Sweden: Uppsala University, 1994) p. 79. As his name suggests, Gligorov is the son of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.

<sup>108</sup>Banac (1992) p. 45.

<sup>109</sup>Dusan T. Batakovic: Yugoslavia: nations, religions, ideologies (Lausanne: Editions l'Age d'Homme, 1994) p. 2.

- 110 Ibid. p. 2.
- 111 Zecevic (1992) ps. 7-8.
- 112 Deak (1996) ps. 14-5.
- 113 Jasminka Prpa-Jovanovic: "The Making of Yugoslavia 1830-1945" in: Jasminka Udovicki & James Ridgeway (editors): Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995) p. 51.
- 114 See Lenard Cohen: The Socialist Pyramid: Elite and Power in Yugoslavia (New York: Mosaic Press, 1988) p. 16.
- 115 Cohen (1995) ps. 16-7.
- 116 Prpa-Jovanovic (1995) p. 51.
- 117 Batakovic (1995) p. 3.
- 118 Milica Bookman: Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) p. 50.
- 119 Gligorov (1994) p. 79.
- 120 For a concise history of the military tactics employed in the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Axis forces, please see: George Constable (editor): Conquest of the Balkans (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1990) p. 23
- 121 Leftin Stavrianos: The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958) p. 771.
- 122 Ibid. ps. 771-2.
- 123 Jasper Ridley: Titu (London: Constable, 1994) ps. 163-5.
- 124 Stavrianos (1958) p. 772. Jelavic attributes more benign motives to Nedic, stating that he was merely a caretaker administration: "Nedic, the head of the government during German occupation, regarded it as his major task to act as caretaker until the end of the war and the possible return of the previous government: his administration thus had no ideological coloration." in Barbara Jelavic: History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) p. 263.
- 125 Ridley (1994) p. 171.
- 126 Jelavic (1983) p. 268.
- 127 Stavrianos (1958) p. 774.
- 128 Ibid. p. 784.
- 129 Viktor Meier: "Yugoslavia's National Question" in: Lyman H. Letgers (editor): Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution 1945 - 1991 (Toronto: DC Heath and Company, 1992) p. 103.
- 130 Sabrina Petra Ramet: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) p. 45.
- 131 Ibid. p. 49.
- 132 Cohen (1988) p. 342.
- 133 Vojislav Stanovcic, "History and Status of Ethnic Conflict" in: Dennison Risonow (editor): Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1988) p. 33.
- 134 Pedro Ramet: "Nationalities Policy and the 'National Question'" in: Pedro Ramet (editor): Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985) p. 134.
- 135 Cohen (1995) p. 28.
- 136 Doder (1993) p. 10.
- 137 Bebler (1993) p. 77.
- 138 Ramet (1992) p. 23.
- 139 Anton Bebler: "Yugoslavia's Variety of Communist Federalism and her Demise" in: Communist and Post Communist Studies Vol 26 (California: The Regents of the University of California, March 1993) p. 77.
- 140 Alex N. Dragnitch: "The West's Mismanagement of the Yugoslav Crisis" in World Affairs (London: Fall 1993) p. 130.
- 141 Ibid. p. 119.
- 142 Joseph Rothschild: Return to Diversity: A Political History of East-Central Europe Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 104.
- 143 For an excellent discussion of the patronage apparatus in Yugoslavia from 1945-1990, see Boris Young: "With Axes in Their Eyes: Retierism and Market Reform in Yugoslavia" in: Studies in

- Contemporary Communism* Vol 15 No 3 (California: University of California, September 1992) p. 275.
- 144 *Ibid.* p. 277.
- 145 Cohen (1988) ps. 39-41.
- 146 Milovan Djilas: *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1957) ps. 30-1. Milovan Djilas is undoubtedly Yugoslavia's most famous dissident. Expulsed from the League of Communists and imprisoned by Tito, Djilas was one of the first and most important Communist leaders to speak out against the stagnancy of liberal reform initiatives, and the authoritarian nature of the regime.
- 147 Young (1992) p. 278.
- 148 Carl-Ulrik Schierup: "Quasi-Proletarians and a Patriarchal Bureaucracy: Aspects of Yugoslavia's Re-peripheralization" in: *Soviet Studies* Vol 44 No 1 (Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1992) p. 92.
- 149 Jim Seroka & Vukasin Pavlovic: *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 104.
- 150 Denitch (1994) p. 60.
- 151 Vojin Dimitrijevic: "The 1974 Constitution and Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia" in: Payam Akhavan & Robert Howse (editors): *Yugoslavia, The Former and the Future: Reflections by Scholars in the Region* (Geneva: Brookings Institute/United Nations Research Institution for Social Development, 1995) p. 52.
- 152 The Croat spring saw the imprisonment of 2,000-5,000 people; 12,000 enterprise directors and engineers were fired, 50,000 people lost their party cards, and 50,000 students were identified as class enemies; 270 partisan officers were expelled from the party while 14 generals were removed. Roughly the same figures are true for Serbia. Ramet (1992) p. 202
- 153 Cohen (1988) p. 155.
- 154 *Ibid.* p. 84.
- 155 Ramet (1992) p. 252.
- 156 Klaus von Beyme: "Regime Transition and Recruitment of Elites in Eastern Europe" in: *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* Vol 6 No 3 (July 1993) p. 413.
- 157 Magas (1993) p. 81.
- 158 R. Wesson (editor): *The Soviet Union: Looking to the 1990s* (Washington DC: The Hoover Institution Press, 1980), ps. 129-155 (summary)
- 159 Milan Cvikl, Evan Kraft and Milan Vocopivec: "Costs and Benefits of Independence: Slovenia" in: *Communist Economies & Economic Transformation* Vol 5 No 3 (1993) ps. 310-11.
- 160 Bookman (1992) p. 84.
- 161 Singleton (1992) p. 277.
- 162 Remington (1984) p. 254.
- 163 Crnobrnja (1994) p. 82.
- 164 Bebler (1993) p. 79.
- 165 Cohen (1988) p. 63.
- 166 *Ibid.* p. 442.
- 167 Aleksa Djilas: "The Nation That Wasn't" from: *The New Republic* (September 21, 1992) reprinted in: Nader Mousavizadeh (editor): *The Black Book of Bosnia: The Consequences of Appeasement* (New York: New Republic Books, 1996) p. 29.
- 168 Young (1992) p. 283.
- 169 Bebler (1993) p. 85.
- 170 *Ibid.* p. 81.
- 171 Deak (1996) p. 17.
- 172 Meier (1992) p. 108.
- 173 For an excellent description of life in Post-Cold War Yugoslavia, see Paul Garde: *Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie* (Paris: Fayard, 1992) p. 92.
- 174 Barbara Jalavich: *History of the Balkans II* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 402.
- 175 Gligorov (1994) p. 57.
- 176 Christman (1970) p. 181.
- 177 *Ibid.* p. 180.
- 178 The importance of creating a Bosnian Moslem national distinction is explained by Ivo Lederer, who

notes that both Serbs and Croats claimed the Bosnians as part of their nation. As he explains: "The Croat view of Bosnians as Croats and the Serb view of Bosnians as Serbs produced diatribes on both sides and an avalanche of 'scientific' treatises on the historical, linguistic, ethnic religious [and] anthropological facts involved. The problem however, became as insoluble for the generation before World War I as it did for the generation after World War II". from: Nationalism and the Yugoslavs (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969) p. 425 *Quote from: Guzina (1995) p. 50.*

<sup>179</sup>Ramet (1992) p. 51.

<sup>180</sup>Dusko Sekulic, Randy Hodson & Garth Massey: "Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia" in: *American Sociological Review* Vol 59 (February 1994) p. 84.

<sup>181</sup>Meier (1992) ps. 106-7.

<sup>182</sup>Walker Connor: The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 434-437.

<sup>183</sup>Ibid. ps. 134-135.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid. ps. 440-441.

<sup>185</sup>Ibid. ps. 440-441.

<sup>186</sup>Batakovic (1995) p. 8.

<sup>187</sup>Meier (1992) p. 110.

<sup>188</sup>Connor (1984) 39.

<sup>189</sup>Payam Akhavan & Robert Howse (editors): Yugoslavia, The Former and the Future: Reflections by Scholars in the Region (Geneva: Brookings Institute/United Nations Research Institution for Social Development, 1995) p. xviii.

<sup>190</sup>Fred Singleton: A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985) ps. 227-7.

<sup>191</sup>Sekulic et al. (1994) p. 87.

<sup>192</sup>Susan Woodward: The Destruction of Yugoslavia (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1995) p. 30.

<sup>193</sup>Vojislav Kostunica: "The Constitution and the Federal States" in: Dennison Rusinow (editor): Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Washington DC: The Wilson Center Press: 1988) p. 83.

<sup>194</sup>Seroka & Pavlovic (1992) p. 72.

<sup>195</sup>Denitch (1994) p. 58.

<sup>196</sup>Florence Hamish Levinsohn: Belgrade: Among the Serbs (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994) p. 22.

<sup>197</sup>Robin Alice Remington: "Yugoslavia" in: Teresa Rakowska Harmstone (editor): Communism in Eastern Europe (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984) p. 245.

<sup>198</sup>Schierup (1992) p. 87.

<sup>199</sup>Akhavan & Howse (1995) ps. 6-7.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid. p. 3.

### End Notes for Chapter 3:

<sup>201</sup>Aleksa Djilas: "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic" in: *Foreign Affairs* (Summer, 1993) p. 85.

<sup>202</sup>Jim Seroka & Vukasin Pavlovic: The Tragedy of Yugoslavia (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 113.

<sup>203</sup>Ibid. p. 113.

<sup>204</sup>Nebojsa Popov: "Le populisme serbe" in: *Les Temps Modernes* (Paris: May, 1994) p. 41.

<sup>205</sup>Branka Magas: The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Breakup (London: Verso, 1993) p.

197.

<sup>206</sup>Dusko Doder: "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds" in: *Foreign Policy* (Summer, 1993) p. 15.

<sup>207</sup>Popov (1994) p. 42.

<sup>208</sup>Mihailo Crnobrnja: The Yugoslav Drama (Toronto: McGill/Queen's University Press, 1994) p. 97.

As Crnobrnja notes, the *Memorandum's* message, that Serbs were suffering under the tyranny of Croats in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo, was adopted by Milosevic as a central plank in his nationalist campaign. During one meeting with the author of this thesis, Dr. Crnobrnja spoke of his former close association with Milosevic, when he had been president of the Beogradska Banka. During this period, Crnobrnja noted that Milosevic had been a loyal Tito supporter and had never expressed a nationalistic

sentiment until he deemed it politically expeditious to do so.

<sup>209</sup> Interestingly enough, during student anti-Milosevic demonstrations that were held in Belgrade in March 1991, the same man who gained fame by protecting the "people" from police justified the use of the riot-police and the army with the words that "the destructive march of chaos and violence" has to be stopped. See Thompson, 204-205.

<sup>210</sup> One such tune, as Aleksa Djilas recalls is the "catchy" refrain:

*Slobodan, they call you freedom  
you are loved by big and small  
So long as Sloba walks the land  
the people will not be in thrall.  
Djilas (1993) p. 83.*

<sup>211</sup> Magas (1993) p. 110.

<sup>212</sup> Christopher Cviic: "Who's to Blame for the War in Ex-Yugoslavia?" in: *World Affairs* (Fall, 1993) p. 73.

<sup>213</sup> Magas (1993) p. 160.

<sup>214</sup> For an excellent overview of the conflict, see John Zametica: *The Yugoslav Conflict Adelphi Paper # 270* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992) p. 11. In 1988-1989, Milosevic's orchestrated campaign of massive marches of the Kosovo Serbs was directed towards gaining full control over the Serbian autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the course of events, those marches turned into mass rallies that were held across Serbia under the slogans of "the happening of the people" and "the anti-bureaucratic revolution". As Dejan Guzina notes, the peak of these marches was reached with the one-million-people rallies in Belgrade (in the autumn of 1988) and Kosovo (on June 28, 1989). The message that Milosevic sent from these rallies to the rest of Yugoslavia did not leave any doubt that the "rallies of truth" represented a point at which Serbia's acceptance of Yugoslavia as the framework for addressing Serbian national interests became dubious at best. from: Guzina: (1995) p. 36.

<sup>215</sup> Magas (1993) ps. 140 + 225.

<sup>216</sup> For probably the most complete description of the conflict, see Lenard J. Cohen: *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 155.

<sup>217</sup> Predrag Simic: "The Former Yugoslavia: Media and Violence" in: *RFE/RL Research Reports Vol 3 No 5* (February 4, 1994) p. 40.

<sup>218</sup> For a complete and unbiased analysis of media coverage in the war, see Mark Thompson: *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina* (London: Article 19/ International Center Against Censorship, 1994) ps. 59-60.

<sup>219</sup> As Markotich reports, *Borba* was eventually taken over by the Milosevic regime, and its original editorial and journalistic staff were forced to start a new *Borba* (*Nasa Borba*), which eventually lost 3/4 of its previous customers. At one time on a par with Canada's *MacLeans'* or *Time*, *Nasa Borba* is now almost bankrupt. For more details, see: Stan Markotich: "Milosevic's Renewed Attack on the Independent Media" in: *Transition Vol 1 No 3* (March, 1995) p. 26.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.* ps. x + 65.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.* p. 73.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.* see pages 85-91.

<sup>223</sup> In May 1992, Stojan Cerovic of *Vreme* wrote accurately that the director general of RTS, Milorad Vucelic, can now "calmly invite the opposition to say whatever it wants on television because he knows that anybody who explains the truth can do so only at his own cost. Reality sounds like the blackest anti-Serbian propaganda, and anyone who describes it will frighten people and turn them against him." in: Thompson (1994) ps. viii-xi.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.* p. 102 *Italics mine.*

<sup>225</sup> Milan Milosevic: "The Media Wars" in: Jasminka Udovicki & James Ridgeway (editors): *Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995) p. 109 While he shares the same last name as Serbia's President, Milan Milosevic's analysis is unbiased.

<sup>226</sup> Brian Hall: *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia* (Boston: David Godine Publishers, 1994) p. 237.

<sup>227</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet: *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991* (Bloomington: Indiana

- University Press, 1992) p. 154.
- 228 Ibid. p. 161.
- 229 Ibid. p. 161.
- 230 Dobrica Cosic: "Statement by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Academician Dobrica Cosic in the Foreign Relations and Security Committee of the European Parliament" (Brussels: March, 1993) *passim*. Another such example of such discourse is Bosnian Serb General Radko Mladic, who saw the Serbs as veritable martyrs and victims of betrayal across the ages. In one statement he observed: "It seems that we Serbs always wait until it [the threat] reaches our throats. Only then do we retaliate. In the Thirteenth century, we were more numerous than the Germans. Now there are just over 12 million of us, while they have grown to 150 million. It is not that their women are any better at giving births than ours. It is because [our] dead have given their contribution to freedom." Norman Cigar: Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Texas: A & M University Press, 1995) p. 78.
- 231 Ibid. p. 73.
- 232 Ibid. p. 74.
- 233 Ibid. p. 74.
- 234 Petar Segedin: "Genocidal Nature of a Nation?" in: Zvonimir Separovic (editor): Documenta Croatica (Zagreb: VIGRAM-Zagreb i VIDEM Krsko, 1992) p. 46.
- 235 Cigar (1995) p. 73.
- 236 Cohen (1995) p. 369.
- 237 Cigar (1995) pp. 75-6.
- 238 Milica Bookman: Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) p. 62.
- 239 Serbian Web Site (1996) p. 12.
- 240 Pavlovich (1988) p. 50.
- 241 Ibid. p. 56.
- 242 Doder (1993) p. 15.
- 243 For a more historically oriented travelogue, in the style of Brian Hall, see Robert Kaplan: Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: Thomas Dunn Books, 1993) p. 38.
- 244 Slobodan Milosevic's politics in Serbia since his rise to power in 1987 have aptly been called in Belgrade: "caesarism by plebecite". Mastering the use of visual kitsch, his first television megaspectacular took place on June 28, 1989, St. Vitus' Day, commemorating the battle of Kosovo. As commentator Milan Milosevic recalls: "The commemoration had all the trappings of a coronation staged as a Hollywood extravaganza. Milosevic descended by helicopter from the heavens into the cheering crowds. The camera focused on his arrival. In some vague way the commentator placed Milosevic at the center of the Serbian ancestral myth of Prince Lazar, the hero of the Kosova battle." in: Milosevic (1995) p. 107.
- 245 Cigar (1995) p. 13 To insure that the imagery of the Kosovo myth would become a central rallying point, the relics of Prince Lazar were paraded around Serbia, previously in a procession accompanied by unprecedented media pomp, as Milan Milosevic notes ironically "through virtually all Serb-populated regions where the war would later break out." in: Milosevic (1995) p. 107 This display was accompanied by a proclamation, as Norman Cigar reveals, warning enemies of the "bloodied and long suffering Serbs" that "we will do our utmost to crush their race and descendants so completely that history will not even remember them." in: Cigar (1995) p. 35.
- 246 Bogdan Denitch: Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 114.
- 247 Cosic (1994) p. 72.
- 248 Ibid. p. 34.
- 249 Florence Hamish Levinsohn: Belgrade: Among the Serbs (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994) p. 16.
- 250 Ibid. p. 251.
- 251 Istvan Deak describes the continued importance of the Kosovo Battle for Serbs during the First World War, when "as legend had it, when the Serbian troops withdrew across the snow-covered Kosovo battlefield in 1915, they held their boots in hand, so as not to disturb the sleep of their fallen heroes." in:

Deak (1996) 16.

<sup>252</sup>Hall (1994) p. 296.

<sup>253</sup>Bozidar Zecevic: The Uprooting: A Dossier of the Croatian Genocide Policy Against the Serbs (London: Velauto International, 1992) By this point in his work, Zecevic has fully assured his readers that the Serbs have suffered terribly under Tito's SFRY, and that the Yugoslav communists existed only to oppress the Serbian nation, and their desire for dignity and equal rights. That communists and Albanians would be in league is moot.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid. p. 122.

<sup>255</sup>Pavlovich (1988) p. 236.

<sup>256</sup>This punishment has assumed extreme proportions. The Kosovo provincial assembly was shut down by Milosevic in July, 1990. At the same time, while the Serbian government continued to fire Albanian employees in Kosovo indiscriminately, local Albanian and Serbs organized antagonistic, self-defense units, arming themselves for a showdown. (Ramet: 1992, 47) As Mark Thompson notes, in Kosovo, the Serbian government ran an "apartheid system" for the Albanian population, dividing Serb and Albanian, while suspending civil rights. Universities and schools have been closed, Albanian doctors and judges have been dismissed; Albanian language television has been suspended and many (although not all) Albanian newspapers have been closed down. in: Thompson (1994) p. x.

<sup>257</sup>Vladimir Gligorov: Yugoslavia's Disintegration (Sweden: Uppsala University Press, 1994) p. 69.

<sup>258</sup>Hugh Poulton: Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991)

p. 17

<sup>259</sup>Cosic (1994) p. 45 In their "unjust struggle", Cosic further asserts that the Albanians have manipulated the Western powers, in order to promote *Greater Albania* at the Serbs' expense: "In the name of protecting human rights, the Albanians are strongly supported in their fight by the American Congress and Senate, the European Parliament, the Islamic centers of power, and the Albanian lobbies, financed by drug dealers and gun runners." p. 31.

<sup>260</sup>Ibid. p. 43.

<sup>261</sup>Le Nouvel Observateur et Reporteurs Sans Frontieres: Le Livre Noir de L'ex-Yugoslavie: Purification Ethnique et Crimes de Guerre (Paris: Publications Arlea, 1993) p. 286.

<sup>262</sup>SANU (A group of members of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts on current questions in the Yugoslav society): "Memorandum" reprinted in: Boze Covic (editor): Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates/Documents/Cartographic Reviews (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) p. 290.

<sup>263</sup>Ibid. p. 318.

<sup>264</sup>Ibid. p. 321.

<sup>265</sup>Catherine Samary: La déchirure yougoslave: questions pour l'Europe (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994) p.

52.

<sup>266</sup>SANU (1993) ps. 331-2.

<sup>267</sup>Ibid. ps 323-4.

<sup>268</sup>At this stage, I will not elaborate further on the significance of Kosovo to Serbian heritage and tradition. In a later section I will fully explore the myth of Kosovo and its effects on the Albanian population.

<sup>269</sup>Ibid. p. 323.

<sup>270</sup>Ibid. p. 327.

<sup>271</sup>Paul Pavlovich: The Serbians (Toronto: Serbian Heritage Books, 1988) p. 214.

<sup>272</sup>Dobrica Cosic: L'Effondrement de la Yougoslavie: Positions d'un Résistant (Lausanne: Editions L'Age D'Homme, 1994) p. 36.

<sup>273</sup>For the Serbian Ministry of Information: "Facts About the Republic of Serbia" access *Web Page: yuamba@yuamba.pp.fi* (Helsinki: Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1996) p. 26.

<sup>274</sup>Smilja Avramov: Genocide Against the Serbs (Beograd: Museum of Modern Art, 1992) p. 217.

Avramov's book is a curious blend of historical revisionism and extremely gruesome photos, black and white images from World War II, and colour close-ups from the current war.

<sup>275</sup>Ibid. ps. 12-3.

<sup>276</sup>Avramov (1992) p. 19.

<sup>277</sup>Miron Rezun: Europe and the War in the Balkans: Towards a New Identity (Westport: Praeger

Publishing, 1995) p. 133.

<sup>278</sup>Dusan Batakovic: Yugoslavia: nations, religions, ideologies (Lausanne: Editions L'Age D'Homme, 1994) p. 5.

<sup>279</sup>Cosic (1994) p. 41.

<sup>280</sup>Ibid. p. 40.

<sup>281</sup>Ibid. p. 27 *Italics mine*. To this, Zecevic asserts that the Communists were later blamed for covering up the Serb "Holocaust", the Croat's "Final Solution", in a vain attempt to promote the success of Edvard Kardelj's Yugoslav consciousness. see Chapter 2 Zecevic (1992) p. 5.

<sup>282</sup>Nouvel Observateur (1993) p. 277.

<sup>283</sup>Ramet (1992) p. 150.

<sup>284</sup>Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara & Neven Simac: Le Nettoyage Ethnique: Documents Historiques Sur une Ideologie serbe (Paris: Fayard, 1993) p. 279.

<sup>285</sup>Cigar (1995) p. 78.

<sup>286</sup>Zecevic (1992) p. 117.

<sup>287</sup>Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/SANU: "Memorandum on the Ethnic Cleansing of and Genocide Against the Serb People of Croatia and Krajina" in: *Review of International Affairs Vol XLVI* (Belgrade: Assembly of the SFRY, November 15, 1995) p. 13.

<sup>288</sup>Ibid. p. 13 Smilja Avramov has reached the same conclusion: "As emigrants, the Ustashe consolidated their ranks and immediately started terrorist activities. From 1945-74 more than 400 acts of terrorism were committed domestically and abroad...After Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, the reorganized and rejuvenated Ustasa organization returned to the country with its membership...the legal system and religion were put to the service of a genocidal policy in 1941 and 1991." in: Avramov (1992) p. 20.

<sup>289</sup>Svetozar Durdevic: "Continuation of a Crime: The Final Settlement of the Serbian Question in Croatia" (Belgrade: IDEA Publishing House, November, 1995) p. 13 Durdevic further retraces the actions of and the motive behind Croatian aggression against Serbs: "The fierce and reckless way in which the Croat army dealt with the innocent people, the shelling of civil objects, villages, towns, schools and hospitals, the massive liquidation of feeble aged people, women and children, the air strikes launched at the refugee columns and the brutal actions of cleansing the territory were undertaken with the aim of ethnically cleansing that area of the Serbs within the shortest possible time and as effectively as possible. So the Serbs, horrified with what was happening to them and knowing, even vividly remembering what had happened to their fathers and grandfathers would not even dream of returning home." (p. 5)

<sup>290</sup>Durdevic (1995) p. 7. Bozidar Zecevic's analysis is the same. As he adds: "It was more than obvious that a physical and spiritual genocide of the Serbs had been relaunched in Croatia as an extension of the 1941 Ustashe program." see Zecevic (1992) p. 17.

<sup>291</sup>Ibid. p. 11.

<sup>292</sup>Cosic (1994) ps. 58-9.

<sup>293</sup>Ibid. ps. 59-60

<sup>294</sup>Zecevic (1992) p. 17.

<sup>295</sup>Durdevic (1995) p. 12.

<sup>296</sup>Radovan Kovacevic: "How Could the Serbs Forgive Vatican" in: *Serbia: News, Comments, Documents, Facts, Analysis No 41* (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of Information, February, 1995) p. 46.

<sup>297</sup>Avramov (1992) p. 18.

<sup>298</sup>As T.D. Allman notes, one absurdist piece of nationalist discourse tied the Germans and the Vatican together is a plot which was both religious and architectural! As Allman reports, one Serbian military press release in Bosnia-Herzegovina, entitled "Catholicity Keeps Imposing Its Attitudes by Force" described the Germans as pawns of the Vatican, in a fiendish military plot to take over Serbian portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina by force. As the document asserts: "In this war in Yugoslavia too, [the] Vatican keeps insisting on a sort of national-religious team because of the fact that, through the medium of faithful Germans, they have germanized the Croats, as Catholics, and used them as *live flesh-meat*. That's why the Vatican is to be responsible for churches [that] were built to be compared more to military bunkers and armament store houses than to temples of God." in ; T.D. Allman (1993) p. 49.

<sup>299</sup>Avramov (1992) p. 75.

- 300 Cigar (1995) p. 77.
- 301 As Miron Rezun noted dryly, *Politics* "fueled the usual conspiratorial theories about the Vatican, the Comintern, Islamic fundamentalists, Nazis, Freemasons, the United States, all lying in the same bed". Rezun (1995) p. 137.
- 302 Jovan Pokrajac: "Religious Instruction for News Croats" in: *Serbia: News, Comments, Documents, Facts, Analysis* No 41 (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of Information, February, 1995) ps. 22-3.
- 303 *Ibid.* p. 22.
- 304 Levinsohn (1994) p. 203.
- 305 *Ibid.* p. 51..
- 306 *Ibid.* ps. 52-3.
- 307 *Ibid.* ps. 52-3.
- 308 *Ibid.* ps. 52-3.
- 309 *Ibid.* p. 53.
- 310 *Ibid.* p. 199.
- 311 Christopher Hitchens: "Appointment in Sarajevo: Why Bosnia Matters" in: Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschulz (editors): *Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan Wars* (Stoney Creek, Ct: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) p. 9.
- 312 Of course, as we well know, the creation of the State of Isreal faced negative reaction from its Arab neighbours, a situation which has not yet been resolved almost 59 years after Isreal's creation.
- 313 Cigar (1995) p. 78.
- 314 Cosic (1994) p. 24 *Italics mine.*
- 315 Arnold Sherman: *Perfidy in the Balkans: The Rape of Yugoslavia* (Greece: Psychogios Publications, 1993) ps. 234-5 By Yugoslavia, Sherman of course refers to the Post SFRY one, comprized of Serbia and Montenegro.
- 316 *Ibid.* p. 257.
- 317 Radmila Nakrada: *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the New World Order* (Belgrade: Institute for European Studies, 1994-5) p. 378.
- 318 Zecevic (1992) ps. 8 + 126.
- 319 Cosic (1994) p. 44.
- 320 Cigar (1995) p. 76.
- 321 Denitch (1994) p. 84.
- 322 Hall (1994) p. 98 *Italics his.*
- 323 I would hasten to add that this black and white, or binary perception of truth is certainly not confined to ethnic national ideologies, since it has formed also a part of civil nationalist strategy in war from time immemorial. One has only to look at the US demonization of Saddam Hussein or Manuel Noriega to appreciate the wide spread nature of this simple form of discourse. Of course the US and most other civic nationalisms do not maintain a cyclical outlook on history, but they often view the world in terms of a dialectical struggle against competing opposites, thus Realist Theory's contribution to International Relations of the notion that the most stable world is one which is Bi-Polar, implying as equal but constant antagonism between two world powers.
- 324 Ajami (1996) p. 41.
- 325 Pavlovic (1988) p. 59.
- 326 As Aleksa Djilas reveals, the subordination of Muslim identity to Serbian and Croatian nationalism is not new. Since the early 19th century, Serbian nationalists have claimed that Bosnian Moslms were Serbs of Islamic faith, while their Croatian counterparts professed with equal zeal that Bosnian Moslms were actually Croats of Islamic faith. Most Bosnian Moslms, however, never identified themselves as either. Bosnian Moslms have distinct customs, dress, architecture as well as political traditions and historical memories. Djilas (1996) p. 20.
- 327 Serbian Ministry of Information (1996) p. 23.
- 328 *Ibid.* p. 24.
- 329 Cigar (1995) p. 81.
- 330 *Ibid.* p. 59.
- 331 *Ibid.* p. 25.
- 332 *Ibid.* p. 29.

- 333 As Edward Said explains: "Orientalism refers to pervasive patterns of representation of cultures and societies that privilege a self-confidently progressive, modern and rational Europe over the putatively "stagnant", "backward", "traditional" and "mystical" societies of the Orient." as defined in: Hayden-Bakic (1992) p. 1.
- 334 Cigar (1995) p. 99.
- 335 Cosic (1994) p. 76.
- 336 Ibid. p. 76.
- 337 Cigar (1995) ps. 99-100.
- 338 Boris Delic: "Power Without Political Legitimacy or Moral Credibility" in: *Serbia: News, Comments, Documents, Facts, Analysis* No 41 (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of Information, February, 1995) p. 51 Much of the ammunition against Izetbegovic in Serbian discourse stems from a reading of Alija Izetbegovic's book, *Islam Between East and West*, published in 1980, which was supposedly a fundamentalist tract and a political program on Islamic expansionism into Western Europe. As Ajami states on the true nature of this document: "Izetbegovic's book should have been a defense lawyer's dream. An amateurish work, an intellectual hodge-podge, it is the product of an anxious assimile, a child of the Western tradition reassuring himself that all the sources of his mind add up to a coherent whole, a man of our messy world born at the crossroads of cultures. The index alone is sufficient proof of the man's eclecticism. This must be the only book on Islam with nine references to Dostoevski, seven to Albert Camus, eleven to Engels, nine to Hegel, three to Malraux, two to Rembrandt, ten to Bertrand Russell, eight to Kenneth Clark and so on. This is not the work of a Moslem fundamentalist or a traditional apologist." (Ajami: 1996, 51)
- 339 As Roy Gutman reports, Major Milovan Milutinovic was responsible for this document, which also boasted lurid accounts of Moslem atrocities, such as: "necklaces have been strung of human eyes and ears, skulls have been halved, brains have been split, bowels have been torn out, human spits and children's bodies have been pierced by bayonets...&c." from: Roy Gutman: *A Witness to Genocide* (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1993) see ps. ix-x.
- 340 Cosic (1993) p. 67.
- 341 Ibid. p. 51.
- 342 Ibid. p. 21.
- 343 Ibid. p. 20.
- 344 Barry Lituchy: "The War Against the Serbs and the New American Fascism" in: *The College Voice* (New York: College of Staten Island CUNY, October 1995) ps. 2-4.
- 345 Ibid. ps. 3-6.
- 346 Quoted in: Levinsohn (1994) p. 179.
- 347 (untitled editorial) "Pillars of the Croato-Moslem Phalanx" in: *Serbia: News, Comments, Documents, Facts, Analysis* (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of Information, February, 1995) ps. 31-2.
- 348 Cohen (1995) ps. 237-8.
- 349 Cigar (1995) p. 77.
- 350 Crnobrnja, Mihailo: "The Roots of Yugoslavia's Dissolution" in: Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschulz (editors): *Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan Wars* (Stoney Creek, Ct: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993) p. 273.
- 351 For an excellent discussion of "ethnic cleansing" and the military movements of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Serbian irregular forces, see Laura Sibling and Allan Little: *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1995) ps. 186-208 and 269-284.
- 352 Ramet (1992) p. x.

#### End Notes for Chapter 4:

- 353 Micheal Ignatieff: *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism* (Toronto: Viking/Penguin Books, 1993) p. 14.
- 354 Ranko Petkovic. "'Will Yugoslavia Survive?'" *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade: Assembly of the SFRY, February 20, 1991) p. 34.
- 355 For an excellent historical overview of Serbia and Croatia and their historic role in Central European history, see Barbara Jelavich: *History of the Balkans Vol II* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

p. 396.

<sup>356</sup>Jim Seroka & Vukasin Pavlovic: *The Tragedy of Yugoslavia* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) p. 110.

<sup>357</sup>Smilja Avramov: *Genocide Against the Serbs* (Beograd: Museum of Modern Art, 1992) p. 79 While this is indeed a Serbian publication, it does nevertheless contain some factual information of an unbiased nature.

<sup>358</sup>The elections were a rout for the Communists and an impressive victory for the HDZ, which won a total of 205 of the 356 seats in the Croatian Sabor. The majority winner take all electoral system allowed for this impressive majority. Designed by the Communists who were overly confident of election victory, the system in fact resulted in the Communists placing a distant second, with only 75 seats. see: Lenard Cohen: *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) ps. 98-9.

<sup>359</sup>Ibid. p. 95.

<sup>360</sup>Bogdan Denitch: *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 45.

<sup>361</sup>Milorad Ekmecic: "Historical Roots and Possible Consequences of the Yugoslav Crisis" in: *Review of International Affairs* (April 1, 1993) p. 5. While this document is indeed published in Serbia, the author of this thesis can assure his readers that the information on the H.M.I. was verified by the author, while living in Zagreb in the Summer of 1994. The information in Ekmecic's article was verified with the current head of the Matica, Dr. Ante Beljo.

<sup>362</sup>By this I of course refer to citizenship in the Communist sense, that being the possession of state documents, such as an identification card, similar to our social insurance cards, which must be carried at all times. Without proof of citizenship, gaining legal employment is virtually impossible.

<sup>363</sup>Cohen (1995) p. 18.

<sup>364</sup>Ibid. p. 345 Tudjman observed in late May, 1994: "The Serbs in Croatia must recognize one thing, that they are a minority here and they must recognize Croatia as their *homeland*. They can take an equal part in it, but they cannot, as they did in the past, impose solutions on state policies".

<sup>365</sup>Vesna Pusic: "A Country by any Other Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia and Yugoslavia" in: *East European Politics and Society* Vol 6 No 3 (Washington DC: American Council of Learned Societies, Fall 1992) p. 259.

<sup>366</sup>While pretending to privatize the press in Croatia, the government, as Catherine Lalumiere, General Secretary of the Council of Europe discovered had in reality orchestrated a series of *show privatizations*, to maintain the illusion that the press was somehow impartial. As Lalumiere explains: "There are problems relating to privatization of the press [in Croatia], there are fake privatizations, friends of members of the government are buying media, which is dreadfully cunning." in: Mark Thompson: *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: Article 19/International Center Against Censorship, 1994) p. 146.

<sup>367</sup>Ibid. ps. 138-42.

<sup>368</sup>Ibid. ps. 176-7.

<sup>369</sup>Ibid. p. 195.

<sup>370</sup>Cohen (1995) p. 338. This cartoon was a criticism of Milosevic and Tudjman's secret plans for the dividing of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia.

<sup>371</sup>Thompson (1994) p. 147.

<sup>372</sup>Ibid. p. 152.

<sup>373</sup>Ibid. p. 160.

<sup>374</sup>The author was privileged enough to have seen this film in Zagreb at its first showing, sponsored by the Croatian Matica. Ante Beljo, current head of the Croatian Matica, was kind enough to provide simultaneous interpretation for those who had a less than perfect understanding of Croatian, since the film was neither dubbed nor subtitled. After the film, Dr. Beljo revealed that the exaggerated portrayals of Serbs in the film was to his mind accurate. In fact, he was surprised that the Serbian camp where the Croat was imprisoned during the beginning of the movie was not shown in its true horrors. This, he posited was because of the nature of cinema, which tries to portray conditions better than they actually are.

<sup>375</sup>United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: *Genocide in Yugoslavia During the Holocaust*

(Washington D.C: 1995) As the authors further state, some 300,000-400,000 Serbs in total were killed by the Ustashe from 1941 to 1945.

<sup>376</sup>On June 25, 1966, Belgrade and the Vatican signed a Protocol and exchanged government representatives, thus ending Tito's stalemate with the Vatican. In this Protocol, Belgrade guaranteed the Roman Catholic Church free conduct of religious affairs and rites, confirmed the Vatican's authority over the Catholic clergy in Yugoslavia on religious matters, and guaranteed the bishops the right to maintain contact with the Vatican. On the other side, the Vatican pledged that priests would respect Yugoslav laws, while refraining from using their religious and Church functions for "aims which would have a political character". This agreement allowed the Church to retain much of its strength as well as its following, while at the same time assuring Tito that it would not become a focus of national identification and republican particularism. From: Rabrina Petra Ramet: Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) p. 133.

<sup>377</sup>Ibid. p. 121.

<sup>378</sup>Norman Cigar: Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Texas: A & M University, 1995) p. 130.

<sup>379</sup>During his stay in Zagreb, the author interviewed several members of the Canadian delegation to the *European Community Monitoring Mission to Croatia*, who revealed that while KARITAS was certainly well meaning, their aid convoys were often prevented from entering into conflict areas. Those that did were often ransacked by guerrilla troops in many of Bosnia-Herzegovina's mountain passes.

<sup>380</sup>This recognition became politically charged for two reasons. The first was that as an ethnic-national state, Croatia's constitution provided little recognition for its minorities, specifically the 600,000 strong Serbian population in the Krajina region of Croatia. Further, the speedy recognition of Croatia created problems because the administrative borders drawn by Tito reflected neither the historical boundaries, nor the "ethnic boundaries" of the nations involved. This was of course done by design. Tito's objective was to prevent ethnic nationalism from resurging in the SFRY. By creating republics which did not necessarily conform to historic divisions, he hoped to permanently put to rest the territorial ethnic nationalism that had so devastated the country between 1941 and 1945.

Of course, the recognition of Croatia on these administrative borders became a contentious issue for the Serbian minority in the Krajina, and also for the Serbian majority in Serbia, who had resented these borders from the SFRY's beginning. Nor has Tudjman been satisfied with the current borders of Croatia, which has isolated large chunks of historic Croatia, and large numbers of ethnic Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This helps explain Tudjman's irredentist ambitions with regards to Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus the constant theme in Tudjman's rhetoric about the unnatural shape of Croatia, "like an apple with a bite taken out of it". Indeed the ethnic and historic borders of Croatia have served to stimulate debate, both on the part of Croats and Serbs. That each wishes to redraw the borders of his/her ethnic state by force does indeed create a situation of competing interests, that has resulted in a good deal of aggression on both sides.

<sup>381</sup>Trpimir Macan: "The History of the Croatian People" (Zagreb: University of Zagreb/Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 1994) p. 1.

<sup>382</sup>Boze Covic: "Policy of Deceit and Violence" in: Boze Covic (editor): Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) p. 20.

<sup>383</sup>For an excellent summary of Croatian revisionist history on the emigration of Croats to the Balkan Peninsula, see Ante Beljo: Yugoslavia Genocide: A Documented Analysis (Sudbury: Northern Tribune Publishing, 1985) p. 292.

<sup>384</sup>Cvijeto Job: "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies" in: *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1993) p. 63.

<sup>385</sup>I use the term somewhat cheekily, since *Rjecnik* is the Croatian word for dictionary, which has undergone a so-called purification, not unlike many regions in the former SFRY. As with the ethnic cleansing of human beings, it falls to subjective interpretation to judge whether or not the process serves any inherent good.

<sup>386</sup>Fred Singleton: A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 14.

<sup>387</sup>Paul Garde: Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie (Paris: Fayard, 1992) p. 129.

<sup>388</sup>Covic (1993) p. 24.

- 389 Jasna Baresic: **Dobro Dosti 1: Učebnik i Rječnik** (Zagreb: Skola za Strane Jezike, 1993)
- 390 For an excellent historical overview of Serbia and Croatia and their historic role in Central European history, see Barbara Jelavich: **History of the Balkans Vol II** (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 396.
- 391 Ibid. p. 396.
- 392 Having witnessed and unwittingly participated in the process, the author of this thesis was suprised to see a constant and daily revision of even the newest Croatian language textbooks, such as University of Zagreb Grammatician Jasna Baresic's **Dobro Dosti**, currently the only Croatian language grammar textbook available.
- 393 Catherine Samary: **La déchirure Yougoslave: Questions pour Europe** (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994) p. 27.
- 394 For an excellent discussion of linguistic changes in the new Croatia, see Chris Hedges: "Words Replacing Bullets in Latest Balkan Battle" in **The Globe and Mail** ( May 16, 1996)
- 395 Miroslav Brandt: "The Antimemorandum" in: Boze Covic (editor): **Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews** (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) p. 232.
- 396 Ibid. ps. 232-5 By *Croatian Farmer's Party*, Brandt refers to Stejan Radic and Valdko Macek's *Peasants' Party*. As discussed in Chapter 2, the *Peasants' Party* was no failure, and in fact was instrumental in securing for Croatia is separate *Banovine* status in 1939.
- 397 Ibid. p. 237.
- 398 Ibid. p. 238.
- 399 Ibid. p. 273.
- 400 Ibid. p. 269.
- 401 Ibid. p. 251.
- 402 Ibid. p. 151.
- 403 Ibid. p. 241.
- 404 Ibid. p. 245.
- 405 Ibid. ps. 247-8 *italics mine*.
- 406 Slaven Letica: "Preface" in: Boze Covic (editor): **Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews** (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) p. 5.
- 407 Ibid. p. 9 In this sense, one is reminded of the Black Plague as described in Albert Camus' **La Peste**: "The plague never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and lined chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks and bookselves, and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it would rouse up in rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city". (London: Penguin Modern Classics) p. 252.
- 408 Covic (1993) p. 21.
- 409 Ibid. p. 31 Edward Said contends that in the case of Serbia, certain descriptions such as 'Balkan' and 'Byzantine' become axiomatic descriptions for backwards, anti-modern and non-Western. Under this rubric, religions are also stratified, with the Orthodox faith placed somewhere above Islam but definately under Catholicism or Protestantism. Thus Said envisions a system of "nested" orientalisms: the further East you go: the more "backwards" you appear in Western eyes. see Robert M. Hayden & Milica Hayden-Bakic: "Orientalist Variations on the Theme Balkan: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Politics" in: **Slavic Review** (London: Spring 1992) ps. 2-4 .
- 410 Ibid. p. 9.
- 411 Cohen (1995) p. 211.
- 412 Stjepan Mestrovic & Miroslav Goreta: **Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism** (College Station: Texas University Press, 1993).
- 413 Samuel Huntington based his theories on the concept of clashing civilizations, which he posits constitutes the highest level of human association. While one may simultaneously be a Rhinelander, a German and a Western European, any form of cosmopolitanism (ie: being a cultural or spiritual member of two civilizations) is impossible, since there are no bridges between civilizations, and the differences between them are irreconcilable. from: Samuel P. Huntington: "The Clash of Civilizations?" in: **Foreign Policy** Vol 3 No 5 (Summer, 1993) Mestrovic & Goreta develop their own version of Huntington's thesis. As they assert: "We thus arrive at the following tentative hypothesis: reconstruction following the

war of 1991 in Yugoslavia will depend upon furthering the democratic cultural base and overcoming the aristocratic, even barbaric influences of other cultural bases. Specifically, Slovenia and Croatia tend toward Western cultural values in that they display anti-Communist patterns, a Catholic and therefore universalist base, a tendency toward pluralism, a recognition of values pertaining to human rights, European political values, and a willingness to adopt a free-market economy. By the contrast, Serbia and Montenegro have espoused neo-Communist orientations, an Orthodox cultural base that tends to share power with government, a tendency towards unitary state, and tendencies to dominate existing power structures". (Mestrovic & Goreta: p. 36) As we see here, since civilizations are irreconcilable, and since Serbs and Croats belong to two separate civilizations, one Eastern and one Western, any differences between them have never been, and can never be resolved. *Mestrovic & Goreta quotations from: Dejan Guzina: Yugoslavia's Fragmentation: An Interpretation Master's Thesis* (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1995) ps. 43-8.

<sup>414</sup>Ibid. p. 36.

<sup>415</sup>Ibid. p. 36.

<sup>416</sup>Ibid., 125-126.

<sup>417</sup>For an excellent discussion and philosophy of the damage done to Croatian property during the current war, see Zaljka Corak: "Croatian Monuments: Wounds Suffered from Other People's Illnesses" in: Zvonimir Zeparovic (editor): *Documenta Croatica* (Zagreb: VIGRAM- Zagreb i VIDEM Krsko, 1992) ps. 100-1.

<sup>418</sup>Ibid. p. 101.

<sup>419</sup>Ivo Skrabelo: "They Shoot Monuments Don't They?" in: Zvonimir Zeparovic (editor): *Documenta Croatica* (Zagreb: VIGRAM-Zagreb i VIDEM Karsko, 1992) p. 97.

<sup>420</sup>Radovan Pavic: "Greater Serbia from 1844 to 1990/91" in: Boze Covic (editor): *Roots of Serbian Aggression: Debates, Documents, Cartographic Reviews* (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike/AGM, 1993) ps. 212-3.

<sup>421</sup>Covic (1993) p. 39.

<sup>422</sup>Ivo Banac: "Main Trends in the History of Croatia" in: Zvonimir Zeparovic (editor): *Documenta Croatica* (Zagreb: VIGRAM-Zagreb i VIDEM Karsko, 1992) p. 9.

<sup>423</sup>Ibid. p. 11.

<sup>424</sup>Macan (1994) p. 1.

<sup>425</sup>These statements were made by Dr. Macan during a lecture at Zagreb University in the Summer of 1994, with the author in attendance. During his presentation, Dr. Macan proceeded to draw various diagrams depicting the specifically Croatian method of herding cattle, building houses and organizing villages, quite in contrast, he assured his listeners, to those methods employed by the Serbs.

<sup>426</sup>Brian Hall: *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through The Last Days of Yugoslavia* (Boston: David Godine Publishers, 1994) p. 19.

<sup>427</sup>The research objectives were outlined in a statement made by the head of the team Andrija Zelko Lopcic to the correspondent of the Iranian News Agency (IRNA) located in Zagreb. *TanJug News Agency* (Belgrade: November, 1995) p. 4.

<sup>428</sup>This interview was first published by the Croatian independent newspaper *Globus* in 1995, and reprinted in Predrag Kalicanin: *Stresses of War* (Belgrade: Institute for Mental Health, 1993) p. 2.

<sup>429</sup>Evard Klain: "Yugoslavia as a Group" in: *Croatian Medical Journal War Supplement No 2 Vol 21* (Zagreb: 1991) p. 12.

<sup>430</sup>Viktor Gruden: "Psychological Sources of the Serbian Aggression Against the Croats" in: *Croatian Medical Journal War Supplement No 2 Vol 21* (Zagreb: 1991) p. 7. Curiously, the Western media appears to have jumped on the psychiatric band wagon. In an article that is as virulent as any propaganda, American psychiatrist Mary Coleman described the Serbs as a primitive tribe engaged in a "group-fantasy", led by Slobodan Milosevic. The purpose of her article was to compare the Serbs to Nazis, and thus to draw out analogies between the two. As she wrote of Serbian mass rapes: "[T]his particular mass rape, with its elements of detaining women in custody until it is too late to have an abortion and telling the women that they will "give birth to little Chetniks" has the more sinister aspect of being part of a deliberately thought out group-fantasy of the Serbians. They impregnate their victims on purpose to produce their bloodline. Like the Nazis, their blood is superior. Perhaps because their victims

- are so identical to themselves in so many ways, because it is a civil war, the Serbian's twisted ways of acting out this group-fantasy is by impregnating their victims with their superior blood, rather than following the Nazi model of simply destroying them". (Coleman: 1994, 165) I would dismiss this more to Coleman's general incompetence as a psychiatrist than to a pro-Croatian bias.
- <sup>431</sup>Ibid. p. 9.
- <sup>432</sup>M. Jakovljevic: "Psychiatric Perspective of the War Against Croatia" in: *Croatian Medical Journal War Supplement No 2 Vol 21* (Zagreb: 1991) p. 15.
- <sup>433</sup>Ibid. p. 10.
- <sup>434</sup>Ibid. p. 10.
- <sup>435</sup>A. Barath: "Towards an Understanding of War in Croatia during 1990-1991: Sociopolitical Perspectives" in: *Croatian Medical Journal War Supplement No 2 Vol 33* (Zagreb: 1993) p. 21.
- <sup>436</sup>Job (1993) p. 63.
- <sup>437</sup>Covic (1993) p. 31 I would refer to this as a form of myth, since Croatia fell victim to French, Hungarian, Austrian, Italian and Turkish invasion. The idea that Serbs only have dominated the Croats is a relatively new phenomenon with little grounding in historical fact.
- <sup>438</sup>Henry Pozzi: *Black Hand Over Europe reprinted from 1935* (Zagreb: Croatian Information Center, 1994) p. 2.
- <sup>439</sup>Covic (1993) p. 26.
- <sup>440</sup>Josip Sentija: "Croatia from 1941 to 1991" (Zagreb: University of Zagreb/Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 1994) p. 10 This article formed part of the standard curriculum for the Zagreb University Croatian Language and Culture Program (Summer, 1994)
- <sup>441</sup>Ironically, Josip Broz Tito was born half Croatian and half Slovenian, and far from supporting ethnic Serbs was extremely wary of Serbian dominance throughout his life.
- <sup>442</sup>Ibid. p. 7.
- <sup>443</sup>Le Nouvel Observateur et reporters Sans Frontieres: *Le Livre Noir de L'Ex-Yugoslavie: Purification Ethnique et Crimes de Guerre* (Paris: Publications Arlea, 1993) p. 125.
- <sup>444</sup>Petar Segedin: "Genocidal Nature of a Nation?" in: Zvonimir Separovic (editor): *Documenta Croatica* (Zagreb: VIGRAM-Zagreb i VIDEM Karsko, 1992) p. 9.
- <sup>445</sup>Pavic (1993) p. 216 *Italics mine*.
- <sup>446</sup>Covic (1993) p. 54.
- <sup>447</sup>Ibid. p. 89.
- <sup>448</sup>Brandt (1993) p. 278.
- <sup>449</sup>Sentija (1994) p. 10.
- <sup>450</sup>Covic (1993) p. 90.
- <sup>451</sup>As Aleksa Djilas describes the Ustashe: "In many respect the Ustashe were confused epigones of the European fascist and National Socialist ideologies, unable to create a coherent doctrine of their own and to unify different influences into one whole. They were at once a modern totalitarian and terrorist organization, conservative traditionalists, Roman catholic clerics, and primitive populist rebels. Their ideology mixed pseudo-romantic populism with social-Darwinist ideas, racism with traditional nationalism, respect for the church with the glorification of armed struggle, revenge and terrorism." As Djilas continues: "For the Ustashe the nation and national state were the supreme goals, while for the fascists and the Nazis, were were but instruments of the will to power. Fascism and Naziism were what might be classed permanently dynamic movements that believed in a certain kind of life: militaristic, based on struggle and domination, ruthless. In contrast the Ustashe were ultimately a static movement, since they aimed for a stable state of affairs: the creation of a homogenous nation state". for Djilas therein lies the difference between Ustashi and Fascist movements, and the teleology perhaps of the Ustashe period. see Djilas (1991) p. 114-5.
- <sup>452</sup>Beljo (1985) p. 27 *italics mine*.
- <sup>453</sup>Ibid. p. 41.
- <sup>454</sup>Ibid. p. 42.
- <sup>455</sup>Bozidar Zecevic: *The Uprising: A Dossier of the Croatian Genocide Policy Against the Serbs* (London: Velauto International, 1992) p. 98 The information in this book was verified with a number of the author's sources, among them Knezevic and Beljo who supported the figure of 20,000 offered by

Tudjman.

<sup>456</sup> Anto Knezevic: ***An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda: The Misrepresentation of the Writings of Historian Franjo Tudjman in Light of the Serbian-Croatian War*** (Zagreb: Croatian Information Center/Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 1992) p. 28.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid. ps. 318-9.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid. p. 32. Ironically, Knezevic quoted this passage from Tudjman's book in order to allay fears that Tudjman was anti-Semitic. American author Robert Kaplan's article in *The New Republic* had earlier cited Tudjman as a Fascist. This quote was part of Knezevic's denunciation of Kaplan's article, for not noting that "Tudjman writes 'Judeo-Nazi' in quotation marks". This was to prove that Tudjman had borrowed the term, rather than inventing it outright. (p. 33)

<sup>459</sup> One such attack was levelled by no less a personality than Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal, who compared Croatia with Nazi Germany, and was promptly denounced in the Croatian press as a collaborator of Serbia's secret service. (Pregled Vesti: 1995, 3)

<sup>460</sup> Knezevic (1992) p. 44.

<sup>461</sup> Micheal McAdams: ***Croatia: Myth & Reality***, second edition (New York: Croatian Information Center, 1994) ps. 56-8.

<sup>462</sup> Beljo (1985) p. 69.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid. p. 191.

<sup>464</sup> Cigar (1995) p. 124.

<sup>465</sup> Quoted in: Corak (1992) p. 38.

<sup>466</sup> Quoted in: Ante Beljo (editor): ***War Pictures 1991-1993*** (Zagreb: Croatian Information Center/Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 1993) ps. 115-6. By his reference to "bathing in the blood of their own children", Dizdarevic echoes a theme which we saw in Serbian national discourse, that being the idea that Islamic converts were forced to kill their own ethnic stock in the various battles waged by the Ottoman empire. Unlike Cosic and other Serbian writers, there is little sense that Bosnian Moslems betrayed the Croatian nation. Rather, they were merely victims of this Fall, rather than a group who suddenly decided to turn against their own nation.

<sup>467</sup> Cohen (1995) p. 97.

<sup>468</sup> According to Helsinki Watch, Croat forces maintain more than nine detention centers, where Helsinki Watch has documented repeated cases of torture and mistreatment of prisoners. In addition the infamous "pale blue book" entitled *Who's Who in Daruvar* (a region of Eastern Slavonia) was passed around to police and army units throughout Croatia. This was a list of all the Serb families in each town and village, so that they could be rounded up and "arrested". Much the same thing happened in Serbia; Croats were hauled off to detention camps, after their houses had been torched. This information was viewed by the author during an interview with Dr. Carl Jacobsen in October, 1994.

<sup>469</sup> For an excellent series of articles on the personal effects of the Balkan war, see Slavenka Drakulic: ***The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of the War*** (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) p. 52.

<sup>470</sup> Levinsohn (1994) p. 272.

<sup>471</sup> Bogdan Dennis Denitch: ***Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) p. 56 *Italics mine*.

<sup>472</sup> Cvijeto Job: "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies" in: ***Foreign Policy*** (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Fall 1993) p. 64.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid. p. 64.

<sup>474</sup> Marjan Malešic: ***The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict*** (Stockholm: Styrelsen for psykologiskt forsvär, 1993) see ps. 43-51.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid. ps. 81-3.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid. p. 125.

## General

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\*- Denotes unpublished material collected by the author.  
\*\*- Denotes official and unofficial government sources.

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
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## **Appendix 1: Historic Maps of the Yugoslav Region**


## A Note on the Maps and their origins

Please note that the origins of these maps are from Serbian and Croatian sources, and may have the appearance of being yet another form of revisionist history. To my knowledge, the maps are authentic and have not been retouched or somehow changed. Maps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 come from Boze Covic's **Roots of Serbian Aggression** (Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezika/AGM, 1993), which contains numerous maps and cartographic references. Those maps which may have been "revised", specifically those used as proof of the existence of a larger Croatian state based on Mideaveal political arrangements, have not been used. Map 7 is taken from Arnold Sherman's **Perfidy in the Balkans** (Athens: Xeros Press, 1994) book on the Yugoslav conflict. While he maintains a pro-Serbian bias, I checked his map against those available in any atlas, and the map is, in my opinion, an accurate depiction of topographic reality

**Map 1:**  
**Ethnic Map of the Balkan Peninsula**



**Map 2:**  
**Map of 19th Century "Greater Croatia"**



**KEY**

- Crete about 927 A.D.
- Bulgaria until 924 A.D.
- Red Crete
- Bulgaria
- Hungary
- Debasia and D.T. - theme of Durrës

Scale: 1 : 2,700,000

**Map 3:**  
**Map of 19th Century "Greater Serbia"**




**INDICATIONS**


- ▣ Populations Serbes.
- ▣ Principauté de Serbie.
- ▣ Populations Euro-Serbes.
- ▣ Albanais.
- Limites de l'Empire de  
Douchan (1346-1381).
- ..... Limites de l'Autriche.

**CARTÉ**  
**DES POPULATIONS SERBES**  
 DE LA TURQUIE D'EUROPE DE L'AUTRICHE MERID.  
 AVEC LES LIMITES DE L'EMPIRE SERBE  
 DE DOUCHAN - LE GRAND. (XIV<sup>e</sup> Siècle)

**Map 4:**  
**Map of the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes"**



**Map 5:**  
**Map of the Banovine Borders of the First Royal Yugoslavia**




**Map 6:**  
**Map of the Republic Borders of the S.F.R. of Yugoslavia**




**Map 7:**  
**Current Map of the Region**

NEW BORN STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF  
THE FORMER SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC  
OF YUGOSLAVIA



**Figure 1: Frye's Biblical Cycle**




**1) The Garden of Eden** - The original people, Adam and Eve, share a perfect balance between humans, God and nature.

**2) The Myth of the Fall** - The Falls occur frequently in the Bible due to a series of united negative forces, which engender and Fall or series of Falls. The greatest Fall is of course the casting out of the Garden of Eden.

**3) The Resurrection** - This phase represents the slow rise from the Fall to the stage of deliverance, or a return to the original high point. Here people become aware of their place in the world, and try to overcome the results of the fall, re-uniting themselves in a common struggle.

**4) The deliverance** - This stage completes Biblical cyclical history. Here the good believers are delivered, while the unbelievers, those who refused to follow God's teachings, are condemned. Thus a judgement occurs at this level.

**Figure 2: The Zionist Cycle**




**1) The Myth of the Original Nation** - The Jewish people are seen as strong, and imbued with divine attributes, having maintained national survival and continuity of traditions for over two thousand years. Much of the Zionist mythology is derived from the Bible. The modern Jewish people are seen as the linear heirs of Biblical tradition and history.

**2) The Myth of the Fall** - There are numerous Biblical Falls, all of which are suffered by the Jewish people. But a new type of negative agency emerges: Anti-Semitism, making it impossible for Jews to live in Europe. The agency engenders several Falls, culminating in the Holocaust.

**3) The National Re-awakening** - This occurred once Zionists targeted Anti-Semitism as the central force responsible for their series of Falls. They then created a nationalist movement based on Biblical cyclical teleology advancing the idea that Jewish history could only culminate successfully in the creation of an ethnic national homeland where Jews could be safe from persecution, including uniting the Diaspora Jews.

**4) The Israeli State** - This stage successfully resulted in the creation of a national homeland, and a partial re-uniting of the Jewish Diaspora.

**Figure 3: The Thesis Model**




**1) The Myth of the Original Nation** - This is a body of myths which distinguishes the national groups as being distinct from and often better than other national groups. These myths may describe the heroic origins of the nation, tales of its national heroes, past greatness, or may deal with certain nation defining traditions or characteristics, such as territory, language, or empire building.

**2) The Myth of the Fall** - The Falls occur when the nation begins to lose its special status due to the intervention of outside groups or influences, each with a political project aimed at the weakening or destruction of the nation, or its national symbols. This may take the form of assimilation into another, limits on national expression, linguistic problems, or more in more extreme cases, genocide and physical removal or annihilation from historic national lands.

**3) The Resurrection** - This phase represents the slow rise from the Fall to the stage of deliverance, or a return to the original high point. Here the nation and its thinkers resurrect the two previously mentioned myth forms, and again try to mobilize the nation, uniting it for a common struggle against external and perhaps internal aggressors. What they will aim for will be the national homeland or unified nation-state, where members of the national group can live free of persecution.

**4) The deliverance** - This stage completes the model. Here the national group gains its own territorial nation state, wherein it is able to implement national policies in order to purify the nation of foreign elements creating a distinctly national culture and ideology.

## Figure 4: The Serbian Worldview



### 1) **The Myth of the Original Nation** - Serbs portray themselves as being:

*Good, Peace-loving, holy, sacrificial, generous and unique* - Versus the "fascistic, aggressive, violent, greedy Croats, whose false language and culture is illegitimate by Serbian standards

*An ancient & original nation*- A holy nation, which a cult of martyrs, like Prince Lazar' also versus the Bosnian Moslems who do not possess a true nation, but rather one which was invented in the 19th and 20th centuries. These are actually ethnic Serbs.

*A Nation not afraid to Sacrifice*- Fighting against terrorism and fascism in the First and Second World Wars, as well as in the first and second Yugoslavias, and now, after the collapse of the SFRY. & Myths of a larger Serbian historical state, where all Serbs were united in one national homeland

### 2) **The Myth of the Fall** - Serbs portray themselves as having Fallen numerous times:

*At Kosovo and Cegar*- By the Ottoman Empire in the 14th and 19th centuries.

*In Aleksander's Yugoslavia*- By the Croats co-operating with the Fascist powers and the Vatican.

*In World War II*- By the Communists, the fascists and of course by the genocidal Croatian Ustashe and the Catholic Church (and Vatican)

*In the SFRY*- By the Communists, Albanian and Bosnian Moslems, the Western powers (The United States, Germany, the Vatican, etc.) Croats, and Russia.

*Today*- By the Bosnian and Albanian Moslems, the Croats, the Western Powers and Russia


*The Principle Negative Agency is "Anti-Serbianism", frequently compared to Anti-Semitism, thus likening the Serbian national struggle to that of the Jewish people.*

### 3) **The National Re-awakening** - This has involved numerous things for the Serbs:

The Memorandum, the rise of Milosevic, the centralization and monopolization of media, the army, education. Historical revisionism, demonization of all "others", well as military incursions into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo & Croatia, proliferation of nationalist discourse, as well as resurrection of the historic role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and of course the creation of national discourse.

4) **The Pure Nation State** - Serbian nationalists dream of: A Serbian nation-state encompassing all historical lands, and including all those of Serbian ancestry (including Bosnian Moslems), further centralization of state institutions, and a resurrected national Church. Also important is "rebalancing" the ethnic situation in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Figure 5: The Croatian Worldview**



**1) The Myth of the Original Nation - Croats portray themselves as being:**

*Good, Peace-loving, Democratic & Western-* Versus the "fascistic, aggressive, violent, Bolshevik and Eastern Serbs and their "Greater Serbian" political project, and versus Eastern, Islamic Bosnian Moslems

*An ancient & original nation-* An older and distinct nation, separate from the Serbs, with an ancient and pure Croatian language; also versus the Bosnian Moslems who do not possess a true nation, but rather one which was invented in the 19th and 20th centuries. These are actually ethnic Croats.

*A Nation not afraid to Sacrifice-* Fighting for freedom against Greater Serbian hegemony in the First and Second World Wars, as well as in the SFRY

& Myths of a larger Croatian historical state, where all Croats were united in one national homeland

**2) The Myth of the Fall - Croats portray themselves as having Fallen numerous times:**

*At Knin-* By the Ottoman Empire (11th century) & invasion by the Austro-Hungarian Empire

*In Aleksander's Yugoslavia-* By the Serbs, and their centralized monarchy

*In World War II-* By the Communists (Bleiburg) & Serbs

*In the SFRY-* By the Communists & Serbs

*Today-* By the Bosnian Moslems & Serbs

*The Principle Negative Agency is "Greater-Serbian Hegemonism"*

**3) The National Re-awakening - This has involved numerous things for the Croats:**

The Antimemorandum, the rise of Franjo Tudman and the HDZ, the centralization and monopolization of media, the army (HOS), education, etc., the rise of the Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, Historical revisionism (including Holocaust revisionism), demonization of all "others", well as military incursions into Bosnia-Hercegovina, & proliferation of nationalist discourse, as well as resurrection of the Croatian language, oppression of minorities in Croatia.

**4) The Pure Nation State - Croat nationalists dream of:**

A Croatian nation-state encompassing all historical lands, and including all those of Croatian ancestry (this may include Bosnian Moslems), further centralization of state institutions, and a re-purified Croatian language. The notion of Croats as Europeans has also prompted dreams of Croatian entry into NATO and the European Union.