PRACTICES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF US AND CANADA PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

Traditional analyses of operational effectiveness often lack consideration of civil-military relations. However, in operations with complex and ambitious political aims, such as democratization, stabilization and reconstruction, economic development, and respect for human rights, taking a comprehensive approach (the co-ordination of military, diplomatic, and development efforts) is essential. The creation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan aimed to essentially operationalize the comprehensive approach but was largely viewed as ineffective. The aim of this thesis is to increase the understanding of why the comprehensive approach in PRTs failed to live up to its potential and increase operational effectiveness through a comparative case study of US and Canada PRTs.

As often is the case with complex peace operations, the mandates given to both military and civilian leaders are usually broad with little detail and thus are open for interpretation. As such, leadership has significant leeway as to how to conduct the operation, and many leaders have different ways of doing everyday things based on their own dispositions. The current theorizing of civil-military relations largely relies on rationalist and positivist assumptions which cannot readily capture the everyday experiences and dispositions of interveners and are less than insightful when it comes to describing and explaining the nuances of civil-military relations. By using a practice theory lens (specifically Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus*, *field*, *capital*, and *hysteresis*), allows one to move away from models of actions based on realist assumptions and analyze civil-military relations as the result of different processes, practices, and systems of knowledge.

The principal argument of this thesis is that because the habitus of the US and Canada were so misaligned with the field, actual operationalization (or embodiment) of the comprehensive approach was very sporadic and was largely dependent on leadership personality, which negatively effected effectiveness. Without understanding the systems of knowledge and sense-making (the habitus) that underlie decision-making processes one cannot assume that leadership will change its everyday practices to better embody the comprehensive approach. Without this understanding, it is necessary to put in place standard practices, such as training and clearer mandates, to help mitigate hysteresis (or the lag between generating practices that are in line with the new conditions).

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Preface

One of my favorite things to do with my Dad as I was growing up was watching war films and documentaries together. My Dad was particularly fascinated with WWII and Vietnam and we spent many an hour discussing those events. For me, *Black Hawk Down* was a particular favorite which covered the US military raid in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. The idea that something could spiral out of control over a matter of hours leading to a night of deadly fighting with irregular forces which resulted in 19 dead American soldiers and 73 injured was something I could not stop thinking about. Irregular warfare was something I was not as familiar with and became intensely interested in. As such, it was really only a matter of time before my Dad and I would turn our interest to Afghanistan.

I remember the moment that I decided what I wanted to write my Ph.D. thesis on. My Dad recommended a book to me titled *The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor* by Jake Tapper. It told the story of how at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of October 3, 2009, Combat Outpost Keating was viciously attacked by Taliban insurgents. The 53 U.S. troops, having been stationed at the bottom of three steep mountains, were severely outmanned by nearly 400 Taliban fighters. Though the Americans ultimately prevailed, their casualties made it one of the war's deadliest battles for U.S. forces.

However, Combat Outpost Keating was not originally a combat outpost but rather the Kamdesh Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) located in the province of Nurestan. The story of how this PRT became a combat outpost and eventually the site of one the deadliest battle in Afghanistan is one of outrageous mismanagement and poor leadership. The number of things that had to go wrong to lead to that fateful day is by no means a short list. How did this PRT/combat outpost fail so spectacularly?

It was with this question in mind that I approached my supervisor and mentor, Dr. Benjamin Zyla, as I wanted to learn more about Afghanistan and how and why the mission there was producing such mediocre results. Through his guidance, as well as many others, I embarked on this research to learn more about “what went wrong in Afghanistan.”

I must acknowledge that this research was only possible with the amazing support from family, friends, and colleagues. This thesis pushed my boundaries in every conceivable way

which led me to significantly question my ability to complete it. However, by leaning on my support network I persevered, and this thesis is the result. I also want to thank all of those whom I interviewed for this research, graciously donating their time and expertise to teach me about the mission is Afghanistan.

Lastly, this research benefited greatly from the generous funding provided by two Ontario Graduate Scholarships and a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship. My time as the Cadieux-Leger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada and my internship in the Operations Division at NATO focusing on Afghanistan and Iraq also proved invaluable as it granted me access to networks and information that I would have otherwise not been able to access.

This thesis was a labour of love and I have learned countless things about myself and the nature of war throughout the process, all errors, of course, remain mine.

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INTRODUCTION

Relevance

Over two decades have passed since NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause was invoked to intervene in Afghanistan as a result of the events on 9/11. Under *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF), the Taliban were quickly removed from power, an interim government was put in place, and Afghanistan was placed on a path of reconstruction. However, despite the incredible amount of financial resources and human capital that the US and its coalition partners poured into Afghanistan, the outcome of the mission was underwhelming. While there were some positive indicators, like in the education and health sectors (Grant and Zyla, 2021), massive corruption, poor economic growth and high levels of insecurity and violence still riddle the country (Suhrke, 2011 and SIGAR, 2018). Moreover, the Taliban managed to regroup, with the help of Pakistan, and have regained control of almost a third of the country which they continue to leverage as Afghanistan moves towards a political settlement (NATO, 2020). While there is still an international military presence in Afghanistan today, their primary mission is training the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in hopes that one day they can hand over the security of Afghanistan to its own people.

The lack of significant results is by no means unique to Afghanistan. The post-Cold War era has presented the West with a large number of internal and regional conflicts, failing states, massive human rights violations and global terrorism (Kaldor, 2006; Murshed; 2002; Rotberg, 2003, 2004). This has resulted in increasingly complex interventions, such as those found in Somalia, East Timor, and Kosovo, which have produced mixed results at best. Post 9/11, this trend towards interventions in complex emergencies has continued and has required interveners to develop new responses in order to achieve both military and political goals. As a result, there is a deeper enmeshment of security and development – commonly referred to as the security-development nexus – which has necessitated a more integrated approach to foreign intervention (Amer, Swain and Ojendal, 2012). The integrated approach (also known as the Whole-of-Government or the Comprehensive Approach) attempts to address crises by

combining political, civilian, and military instruments in a concerted effort to help achieve certain goals in a more effective way (see OECD, 2003; 2007).

Despite its supposed benefits and assumed importance to operational effectiveness, missions using a comprehensive approach have faced significant challenges and tensions. These range from conflicting political agendas or objectives to differences in organizational structures, procedures, cultures, and values. Other tensions include differences in time-horizon focus, a lack of guidance concerning the division of labor, incompatible communications systems and equipment, and a basic lack of familiarity between the two communities (Thompson *et al.*, 2018; Byman, 2001; de Coning, 2009; Fris and Jarmyr, 2008; Holton et al., 2011; Mockaitis, 2004; Olsen and Gregorian, 2007; Patrick and Brown, 2007; Rietjens, 2008; Spence, 2002; Stephenson and Schnitzer, 2006; Winslow, 2002). The Comprehensive Approach as used in Afghanistan faced many of these challenges and tensions during the mission and many were never overcome. Therefore, understanding why intervening powers' civil-military relations have operated in the way they have and why they have struggled to *effectively* produce the desired results is of vital importance and is the objective of this thesis.

Past theories of civil-military relations have helped explain both why the relationship exists and how it functions within the state. The "why" question refers to what is identified as the central *problematique* in civil-military relations: maintaining a military that is strong enough to address national security threats while ensuring that the military is subordinate enough to do only what the civilian leadership authorizes (Feaver, 2003: 2). However, in many Western democracies, the principle of subordination is almost taken as a given as the principle is often deeply embedded into the constitutional and legal arrangements that establish the state (Bland, 2000). Consequently, as Douglas Bland (2000) argues, the relative stability of Western civil-military relations in regards to this "why" question has resulted in a weak theoretical base because there has been little incentive to re-examine older theories or create new ones. Rather, he argues further, the focus should shift towards making a military "fit for purpose" and conceptualize civil-military relations in alternate ways.

The "how" question of civilian control of the military has proven to be more challenging. It is also a rich area of research and has led to the two major schools of thought in civil-military

relations theory: *separation* as espoused by Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and State* (1957), and *convergence* by Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier* (1960). On the one hand, Huntington argued for the complete separation of civilian and military institutions to ensure a politically neutral military that does not meddle in civilian affairs, thereby ensuring civilian control. Janowitz, on the other hand, took a more sociological approach arguing that the "civilianization" or convergence of the military with civilians is necessary to ensure civilian control as the military would share the same values as civilians. These two scholars and their theories have deeply influenced much of the literature that came after, but times and changing circumstances have required a rethinking of civil-military relations theory and expanding it beyond these narrow definitions, especially pertaining to complex peace operations.

In traditional peace operations, the civil-military relationship has been premised on the idea of clearly delineated roles and a sequenced interaction: the military would provide security in the wake of a peace settlement which is followed by humanitarian and development work to allow for a sustainable stabilized state (Horn, 2015). The reality of complex peace operations, however, shows a significantly different picture, one of overlapping tasks and interdependence between military and civilian actors, especially in areas of ongoing conflict. Indeed, the many connections between security and development are becoming more and more visible as global attention to humanitarian emergencies increases, creating pressure for policy convergence between, for example, development and peace operations (Keen, 2008; Duffield, 2001). It is also obvious that violent conflict carries heavy developmental costs, and that development has the potential to contribute to the prevention and promotion of conditions conducive to peace (Beall, Goodfellow and Putzer, 2006). Thus, security and development have many different connections at many different levels, including civil-military relations.

As operations become increasingly complex, there has been a trend towards multifunctional operations that integrate military, civilian, humanitarian, and development actors into a coherent operation with a common political aim in order to increase effectiveness (Egnell, 2010). In a highly insecure or non-permissive environment, like that found in Afghanistan, these activities often largely fall under the purview of the military as civilians often do not have the capabilities and safeguards in place to work effectively in an insecure area. This

means the military needs to work with civilian experts at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to help fill those knowledge and operational gaps in order to be more effective. This has resulted in a proliferation of strategic concepts -3D approach, whole-of-government (WoG) and the comprehensive approach (CA) – that aim to better integrate the military and civilian components of an operation to ensure "unity of effort" to maximize effectiveness.

As such, effectiveness in the context of complex peace operations is not about achieving military victory, it is more about creating the conditions necessary to achieve the stated political aims (Smith, 2005). In other words, effectiveness is a *process* to create an environment that is conducive to not only addressing the insurgency but also doing activities such as security sector reform, building governance capacity, rule of law and providing basic services to the population, amongst many other things. This more holistic approach suggests that more traditional types of measurements of effectiveness, that is using easily quantifiable metrics that allow for easy comparison, may actually shift the focus away from understanding the operation itself, its goals, and its conduct. Indeed, Carvalho and Aune argue that it is more important to rely on, "thicker qualitative descriptions which emphasize narrative rather that presupposed causality. *Understanding* peace operations… will tell us more than *measuring* them" (emphasis in original, 2010: 7). Therefore, this thesis takes a constructivist approach to effectiveness. Drawing from literature on aid effectiveness and the 'local turn' in peacebuilding, I use a definition of effectiveness that is more situation- specific.

There are a number of perspectives from which to evaluate peace operations like assessing policies, outcomes and impacts, internal processes, funding, or system-wide evaluations. For the purpose of this research the focus will be on the perceptions of effectiveness - specifically if international donors, local population, and civilians and military within the PRT *perceive* the projects or programs as having promoted peace in the area of intervention (this will be further discussed in Chapter 3. Questions of "hearts and mind" as well as legitimacy are becoming more and more salient as key objectives to peace operations. Gaertener and Ramnarayan's description of a successful peace operation, "is one that is able to fashion accounts of itself and its activities in ways in which these constituencies find

acceptable. By implication, effectiveness is not a state but rather a process; it is a characteristic of relations and not outputs; it is negotiated rather than produced" (1983: 97).

However, despite the recognition and effort made to implement better civil-military coordination and integration in order to create a more effective operation, the track record of contemporary peace operations is mixed at best (Howard, 2008; Page, 2008). Why is this the case? One thing that became readily apparent when speaking to people involved in the mission in Afghanistan was that while the WoG or CA was largely accepted as a philosophy, its failure to coalesce was often cited due to civil-military tensions or "personality differences" in leadership.[1]

As often is the case with complex peace operations, the mandates given to both military and civilian leaders are usually broad with little detail and thus are open for interpretation. As such, those working on the ground are not just simple implementers, rather, they must translate those instructions from the top, adapt them to the local context, and create a series of concrete tasks that would help achieve the mission objective. In other words, the on-the-ground leadership has significant leeway as to how to conduct the operation, and many leaders have different ways of doing everyday things. Therefore, identifying the factors that shape the everyday life of the military as well as the civilians in PRTs is central to this research. Furthermore, with an ever-evolving security environment, the continued examination of civil-military relations is highly relevant, despite the difficulties and limitations of existing theoretical constructs (Feaver, 2003: 2; Cohen, 2003). In order to help overcome these limitations, I apply a practice theory lens to better explain how the everyday practice of civil-military relations affects operational effectiveness of the mission.

In recent years, the "practice turn" has become more and more popular, often drawing from the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), and Charles Taylor (1985) that contend "that practices can at once underlie subjects and objects, highlight nonpropositional knowledge, and illuminate the conditions of intelligibility" (Schatzki, 2001: 10). I draw upon Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus, field, capital,* and *hysteresis* to better capture

[1] This term came up multiple times in different interviews when discussing the difficulties implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Complex Peace Operations.

the dynamics of the changing international security environment and the shift in civil-military relations through everyday practices.

The design of this study is a comparative analysis of two case studies in order to contrast and compare different structures and agents in PRTs in relation to effectiveness. The US and Canada are interesting cases because while they have a close relationship and much of what the US does influences Canadian foreign policy, they have very different histories of civil-military relations and consequently, very different practices. It is important to note that while both countries operated in the country at the same time, the context for each is quite different. Canada only commanded one PRT in Kandahar while the US commanded twelve PRTs located throughout the country which creates an unbalanced comparison. Nevertheless, despite this imbalance, the comparison is instructive in understanding how the practices of civil-military relations effect effectiveness in complex peace operations.

Why Practice Theory – A Constructivist Research Program on Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations theory, until the collapse of Soviet Union, largely emerged from the ontological standpoint of realism. The majority of theorists in this field saw their role as a promoter of democratic governance as a counterpoint to the Soviet aggressor. The end of the Cold War has led civil -military relations theorists to rethink the theoretical basis of civil-military relations.

In the case of this thesis, references to realism (which includes both classical and neorealism) schools of thought relates to their understanding of the state, in the broadest sense. For the realist, states are the principal or most important actors on the international political stage and represent the key unit of analysis (Walt, 1998). States are viewed as unitary actors that that generally behave rationally with national security issues typically dominating the hierarchy of the international agenda. Regarding other non-state actors, like international institutions, realists tend to see them as doing no more than its member states direct. Multinational corporations, terrorist groups, and other transnational and nongovernmental organizations are frequently acknowledged by realists, but the position of these non-state actors is always one of lesser importance.

For realists, military and related political issues dominate world politics. A realist focuses on actual or potential conflict between state actors and the use of force, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down, the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of any violation of its territorial integrity. Economic matters are important to the extent that they contribute to the power or relative power of the state. Given the state's objectives, goals, or purposes in terms of security, it seeks and uses power (commonly understood in material terms as capabilities relative to other states), which is a key concept to realists as is the balance of power among states. Neorealists put particular emphasis on the security implications of the distribution of power (or underlying structure) of the international system of states (Rittberger and Fischer, 2008). Realism has influenced the topic of civil-military relations more than any other theoretical model.

However, like any theoretical model, realism has faced criticism. First, is the over emphasis placed on the state as an actor to the detriment of other actors. Not only is the role of international institutions downplayed (or even trivialized), its preoccupation with national security means that other concerns such as the socioeconomic gap between rich and poor societies, climate change, and the implications of globalization rarely make the realist agenda (Walt, 1998). Second, realists often simply assume state interests with little information provided on how states come to define their interests, or the processes by which those interests are redefined. Interests are not simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered but are constructed through social interaction. Indeed, Alexander Wendt (1999) and other constructivist claims came about in large part as a critique of realist thinkers.

The assumptions of realism are also essentially positivist, insofar as it concentrates on measurable outputs and inputs within the framework of unitary state actors within an anarchic international environment (Waltz, 1959). This notion of measuring variables within an international system, as neo-realism does, assumes that like natural science, social science is the study and accumulation of knowledge of an objective reality. It is also assumed that the role of the social scientist is as a neutral observer of this objective reality. As such, realist thought argues for the maintenance of the status quo within international relations, as this is the observed reality of the supposedly neutral observer. This complacency also led to the

stagnation of civil-military relations theorizing, which has struggled to move beyond the realist paradigm. For the most part, those who take a realist approach to the study of civil–military relations often ignore that there are significant differences between the leaders, institutions, values, prerogatives, attitudes, and practices of a society at large, on the one hand, and those of that society's military establishment, on the other (Welch 1993:507–11). In other words, realism's limited ontological underpinning, with its emphasis on unitary state actors and their variables, such as power and power maximisation, creates boundaries against a broader understanding and explanation of civil-military relations.

Liberals, in contrast to realists, are primarily interested in explaining the conditions under which international cooperation or collaboration becomes possible. The liberal image of international relations includes not just states, but also international and nongovernmental organizations and the often cross-cutting networks that connect them (Moravcsik, 1999). The role of international organizations is a major focus, for example, in the work on regional integration and interdependence. The task is to go beyond mere description and achieve explanation Regime theory, for example, is derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states or other international actors (Rittberger, 1993). Its basic assumption is that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, as regimes are, by definition, instances of international cooperation.

Liberal IR theorists argue that states are *not* unitary actors but rather highly decentralized entities with competing interests (Keohane, 1984). States are composed of many different actors with different preferences which also play a role in determining the nature of civil-military relations. Moreover, states represent these preferences through institutions that are also regularly challenged by demands and interests of actors and/or social groupings. Moravcsik takes this a step further noting that institutions are considered an external variable to the cause of interests of states stating, "the state is not an actor but a representative institution, constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by coalitions of social actors" (1997: 518). Institutions, therefore, act as a conduit for the exchange and competition of political ideas. What emerges at the end are state preferences (or national interests). However, it is important to note the analytical differences between national

interests and strategies. Actors, too, have preferences when it comes to outcomes which may lead them to pursue calculated means to reach a preferred end (Frieden, 1999). This implies that such domestic level theories still rely on rational choice models as actor's preferences and interests are externally given rather than being affected by other rule-governed practices or the institutions themselves.

These preferences in turn influence state's civil-military relations. For example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan mission, much of US civil-military relations were influenced by the state's preference for conventional warfare. However, the enemy in this contest sprawled across numerous states and had no identifiable central location. Consequently, senior leaders, civilian and military, failed to grasp the complexities this kind of enemy presented. This undoubtedly played a role in the ad hoc nature of the intervention in the early years and lack of an overall strategy. This too bled into the US PRTs as they suffered from a lack of strategy and often cobbled together reconstruction and stabilization programmes that were most amenable to execution by the military (often against the advice of the civilians posted in the PRTs).

Both realism and liberalism can only go so far in explaining civil-military relations and its effect on effectiveness. As Zyla states, "they are overly reductionist, parsimonious, simplified, and static and clearly lack and *understanding* of states' intersubjective social structures, meanings, and their value rational motivations (2018: 5). In order to develop a greater understanding and level of complexity for analyzing civil-military relations, the introduction of post-positivist theorising is required (Booth, 2005: 10-12).

The use of constructivist analysis provides an effective theoretical model to address this stagnation. Constructivism seeks to problematize the identities and interests of states (Waltz, 1998). This is in contrast to realists and liberals who come close to believing identities and interests are givens. They emphasize the importance of subjective and intersubjective exchanges and actions taken by human beings as agents of these state and nonstate organizational entities. The state under constructivist thought is a socially constructed reality which, because of its very nature, is malleable (Zehfuss, 2002). Constructivists view international structure in terms of a social structure infused with ideational factors to include norms, rules, and law.

There are a number of constructivist streams in IR that can also potentially be used to analyze civil-military relations. For most IR theorists, how institutions change state behavior falls under two conditions. One camp argues that it is through material rewards and punishments, or in other words, "in pursuit of a (mostly) constant set of interests or preferences a state responds to positive and negative sanctions provided exogenously by the institution (rules, membership requirement, etc.) or by certain actors within the institution" (Johnston, 2001: 487). The other camp argues that it is through the changes in the distribution of power among social groups that are pursuing a fairly constant set of interests that when aggregated lead to changes in state preferences. Constructivists, on the other hand, would expand the question to include how institutions change state preferences in the absence of the previous two conditions. One answer is through socialization.

The term socialization "is the generic term used to refer to processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example – becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction (Stryker and Statham, 1985: 325). In IR, socialization if often referred to as the process "resulting in the internalization of norms so that they assume their 'taken for granted' nature" (Risse, 1997: 16). As Johnston (2001) argues, this focus on internalization has led to research on persuasion (involves changing minds, opinions, and attitudes in the absence of material or mental coercion) and social influence (process of eliciting pro-norm behavior through social rewards and punishments). However, the overt focus on social agency leaves less room for incorporating structural explanations for socialization.

Another area is the current revitalized interest in the roles individual leaders play in IR. Recent research in this area has focused on issues such as how leadership turnover affects the risk of conflict, how leadership shapes public attitudes about conflict, how leaders' experiences affect their willingness to fight, and how leaders' beliefs shape perceptions about adversaries' intentions (Horowitz and Fuhrmann, 2018). Research in this area is fairly nascent but there are number of avenues for future research that may contribute to a better understanding of civil-military relations like creating a better understanding of how leader's preferences interact with structural forces to shape political outcomes or analysis on how leaders' experiences influence their beliefs.

Lastly, there has been a constructivist stream that analyzes both the power of international institutions and their propensity for dysfunctionality (Barnett and Finnemore. 1999). There has been a variety of, largely liberal, theories presented to explain why international institutions have been created: problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, other barriers to Pareto efficiency and improvement of the welfare of their members. There are a number of studies that show international institutions can be autonomous and powerful actors in global politics (for example Cox, 1996; Haas, 1992; Snidal 1996). This power can be broken down into three broad types: (1) how international institutions classify the world, creating categories of actors and actions; (2) fix meanings in the social world, and (3) articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 710). But international institutions also suffer significant 'pathologies' due to their bureaucratic nature that can lead to dysfunction and inefficiency. One such issue is the fact that bureaucracies are organized around rules, routines, and standard procedures that are meant to trigger certain responses to certain external stimuli. This can result in a type of 'ritualized behavior' that can be increasingly separated from reality on the ground. The second issue is that bureaucracies compartmentalize. By inviting specialists into institutions to overcome certain weaknesses or incompetencies, it can create subcultures within the institution that are prone to certain types of dysfunctional behavior that may affect the institution as a whole. This institutional approach would undoubtedly be useful in analyzing certain structural aspects of civil-military relations. However, similar to socialization theory and work of leadership, the emphasis is place on structure, sometimes to the detriment of agency.

Against this backdrop, I propose a different way to analyze civil-military relations, one that puts equal weight on agency and structure: practice theory. This theory allows for the expansion beyond traditional civil-military relations theories and their associated shortcomings. War, as well as peace operations, have long been bureaucratized, rationalized, and professionalised. Consequently, much of theorizing regarding civil-military relations has been somewhat limited due to these conceptual constrictions. However, practices "follow a logic that is not the one of cost-benefit mathematical calculus, not the one of intellectual coherence with philosophical beliefs as the 'scholastic error' would induce many scholars to believe, this in

spite of what the agents themselves might say" (Bonditti and Olson, 2017: 231). In other words, agents do not generally intellectualize the beliefs, values, and objectives of their practices, but rather practices are embedded in their habitus and are a part of their 'bodily knowledge.'

In taking this approach, practice theory moves away from the rationalist assumptions and positivist approaches that often characterizes civil-military relations theory. It takes practice as the smallest unit of analysis arguing that "in everything that people do, in world politics or in any other social field, there is always a practical substrate that does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection," and that, "practice is the result of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear self-evident or commonsensical" (Pouliot, 2010: 12). As such, a practice approach focuses on how groups perform their practical activities that renew and reproduce social order. It also has the added benefit of being able to overcome many of the dichotomies that are often found in civil-military relations theories, for example, agents vs structures, subjects vs objects and ideational vs material (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015). Practices then are "socially meaningful patterns of action… [that] simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6).

Drawing from this foundation, practice theory is promising to help inform the study of civil-military relations for a couple of reasons. One, because the majority of civil-military relations theories are based on rationalist assumptions and positivist epistemologies[2] in their analysis of civil-military relations behavior (for example see Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 2003; Brooks, 2008; Desch 1998 and Egnell, 2009). These studies rely on deductive, hypothesis testing research designs and single method methodologies that limits the abilities of researchers to move outside their established models. The static ontological basis from which these studies derive see civil-military relations as rational with cost-benefits calculations driving behavior with minimal political agency of their own. For example, the military is controlled through a strict chain of command in which orders are given and are expected to be followed.

[2] This refers to Lake's conceptualization in that "(…) positivists were a grab bag of approaches grouped by a general commitment to social science as a method and the assumption that individuals and other political actors are intentionalist and calculation in their actions" (2013: 570)

Those orders are assumed to be given based on deductive reasoning from a set of data from which it is determined how best to proceed. This leaves very little room for political agency.

This leads to the second benefit of practice theory in that its relational ontology overcomes the structure/agency dichotomy that has shaped much of the previous civil-military relations literature. As stated by Pouliot and Merand (2013), practice theory in international relations is particularly well suited to this because it "is not focused on substances, such as the state and state actors… but instead on the "totality of relations involving the positions that are uncovered, structured and conceptualized in the field" (pg. 32). In other words, it is the intersubjective meanings, social forces, norms, beliefs, and values that shape civil-military relations. This is something that has been largely neglected in civil-military relations theory, namely the "systems of sense-making" that while largely unconscious, shapes civil-military relations.

In sum, the aim of this research is to better understand how civil-military relations practices affects operational effectiveness in complex peace operations looking through the lens of practice theory. Afghanistan is a recent and pertinent case study as the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) attempted to formalize civil-military integration through the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs represent a unique opportunity as they are the operationalization of the security-development/ civil-military nexus. As such, this research will be a comparative case study of the Canadian and American led PRTs that operated in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011.

Background: The Mission in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has long struggled with instability, particularly beginning with the communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979 (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). This invasion resulted in Afghan civilian casualties in the hundreds of thousands, displaced a further million Afghans to neighboring countries and did astonishing amounts of damage to Afghanistan's infrastructure (Barfield, 2010). Once the Soviets withdrew, Afghanistan became the staging ground for regional competition, eventually ushering in the Pakistan-supported

Taliban that started taking control beginning in Kandahar in 1994 and culminating in Kabul in 1996 (Davis, 1998). Despite this, the international community had little concern for what was going on in Afghanistan as it was not considered of strategic interest to foreign and development policy officials.

However, the incidents on 9/11 put Afghanistan under the international security spotlight and set in motion a number of responses from various countries and multilateral organizations such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). It was these various actors that collectively shaped the way forward in ensuring Afghanistan never again became a breeding ground for terrorists. One of the first steps included the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001 which supported the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts in Afghanistan as well as the invocation of NATO's article 5 on collective defense. The United States and the United Kingdom then launched *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) in order to dismantle the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and remove the Taliban from power. This led to the rapid defeat of the Taliban in November, leaving a significant governance gap, and as such the international community then turned to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan (Maley and Schmeidl, 2015).

On 5 December 2001, the Bonn Conference brought together representatives from different ethnic and exile groups as well as members of the international community in the former capital of Germany to discuss provisional arrangements for the reconstruction and the establishment of governing institutions in Afghanistan. It also put together an Interim Administration that would be able to govern Afghanistan until elections could be held. Immediately following the conference, an emergency *Loya Jirga,* a traditional assembly of leaders from Afghanistan, was held to select the interim head of state. Hamid Karzai was selected as Chairman of the Interim Authority in Afghanistan. Under this interim administration, a constitutional drafting committee was assembled to draft a constitution for the country to establish a state with an executive, judicial, and legislative branch of government (Fields and Ahemn, 2011). It was also during this time that the UN Security Council authorized the creation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the specific mandate to maintain peace

and security around the capital Kabul so the interim government as well as other international actors could safely operate there. Initially, this was an UN-led mission.

Later, in 2002, the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan was held in Tokyo at the ministerial level and it allowed space for the international donor community to make specific commitments to support the Afghan reconstruction process. This support was conditional on Afghan parties also contributing to the process as well as the goals agreed upon in Bonn. As such, the Afghan Interim Authority made a list of priority areas for reconstruction including enhancing the administrative capacity of the government and the economy, investing in education (with a particular focus on girls), health, infrastructure and improving food security. Finally, in January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, and an election was held that confirmed Hamid Karzai as the President of Afghanistan.

Though successful elections were held, Afghanistan never managed to develop a fully functioning government and the security situation was little improved. In order to better facilitate the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, NATO introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2003 starting in Gardez. PRTs brought together military and civilian personnel from various government agencies, including economic development specialists, diplomats, and various representatives from the Afghanistan government with the mission to promote and enhance security, facilitate humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction programs (USIP, 2005). PRTs primary objectives were to help the Afghan government extend its authority and better provide for its citizens and assist with capacity building tasks such as building schools, mediate local conflicts, provide Security Sector Reform and other public goods (Bird and Marshall, 2011). According to ISAF, the mission statement of PRTs was that they "will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a *stable and secure environment* in the identified area of operations and enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts" (original emphasis as found in ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 4, n.d.: 3).

Soon after, the UN gave ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul, first into the North and West of the country, and later to the South and to the East through the creation of PRTs (ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 4, n.d.: 92). OEF had already established eight PRTs that covered

some of the most strategically important locations: Gardez, Kunduz, Bamian, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Parwan. ISAF then began taking control of the PRTs beginning with Kunduz in the north and proceeded in a counterclockwise direction beginning in 2004 and finishing in 2006 (see Figure 1.1). During this expansion, ISAF and OEF also created a number of new PRTs besides the ones already in existence and by the end of 2006 there were 26 PRTs in operation all over the country.



Figure 1.1: NATO ISAF Staged Expansion

Source: Chief Review Services (2007). Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. 1258-156 (CRS), Ottawa: Canada, pg. 7.

However, it became quickly apparent, particularly in the South, that much of the country was still highly insecure making it difficult for the PRTs to carry out their mission of stabilization and reconstruction. As a result, much of the operation of the PRTs was directed by the military which meant that counterinsurgency practices, namely the "hearts and minds" approach, influenced many of the PRT's activities. PRTs essentially became the nexus between security and development and saw a significant clash between two very different worlds of policy and practice, that of civilians and the military. The military, on the one hand, focused on

eliminating the Taliban and providing security for both the international community as well as the local population while, on the other hand, civilians worked on the complex and arduous task of rebuilding a functioning state. This became problematic as the civilians had very limited mobility due to high levels of insecurity and relied on the military to carry out certain developmental tasks. Civilians and the military could no longer just work side-by-side, it required a deeper level of integration that saw unity of effort through a consolidated command and organizational structure that would synchronize the full spectrum of governmental organizations, military forces, international partners, and NGOs (United States Government, 2009). Civil-military integration quickly became necessary in order to effectively carry out the PRT's mandate.

As with any project taken on by different countries, PRTs began to take on different forms with different levels of integration according to the nations that were in command (some PRTs had a military commander, some had a civilian commander, and some were dual headed with both a civilian and military commander). The ratios of civilians to military also differed from PRT to PRT which usually reflected the command nation's priorities and objectives of the PRT, be it military over development or vice versa. The activities carried out were also reflective of the agenda of each nation and thus played a role in determining what the everyday looked like in different PRTs.

While there is undoubted value in analyzing PRTs using rationalist theories and methodologies, the development and operation of PRTs should also be considered a social practice, one that reflects the norms, cultures, and values of the nations in command. This in turn is reflected in the everyday practices that characterize civil-military relations: its dispositions (historical experiences and background knowledge), its standard practices,[3] and its narratives that are used to make sense of the world.

In sum, the mission in Afghanistan and the use of PRTs provides a unique window to better understand how individual countries arrange and practice civil-military relations to achieve both military and political ends. Moreover, many of the PRTs run by different countries

[3] By standard practices here, I refer to the routine activities that have social meaning but are largely viewed as common sense in nature.

created distinct approaches dependent on their area of operations that reflect previous historical precedents. It is a fruitful place to examine how the everyday practices of civil-military relations affected operational effectiveness, which is the main question for this research.

Research Question and Methodology

The changing nature of complex peace operations has resulted in the practices of civil-military relations shifting towards a more integrated or comprehensive approach. This is in part due to the increased focus on counterinsurgency operations that recognize insurgency as a political problem that requires elements other than the military to create an enduring solution and outcome (FM 3-24, 2014). As such, the military is increasingly taking on some traditional humanitarian activities as part of the counterinsurgency and stabilization doctrines while the humanitarian community seeks military assistance to carrying out their activities.

In Afghanistan, PRTs became the site of deeper civil-military integration and, thus, the site for the Comprehensive Approach as well. However, the question became that while the Comprehensive Approach and the necessity for better civil-military integration was largely agreed upon by those in PRTs, why did the PRTs fail to reach their full potential? What practice (or practices) contributed to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the peacebuilding effort? These are some of the questions this research is seeking to answer.

The current theorizing of civil-military relations is ill-equipped to answer these questions as their rationalist and positivist assumptions cannot readily capture the everyday experiences of interveners and are less than insightful when it comes to describing and explaining the finer grained nuances of civil-military relations. Conor Keane is an example of an attempt to address this shortcoming in U*S Nation-Building in Afghanistan* (2016) by moving away from what he calls the Rational Actor Model (RAM) to the bureaucratic politics approach and focusing on the 'gears and levers' of the decision-making structure. He argues that RAM "conceives of the state as unitary and purposive, making consistent, value-making choices," which is rarely the case (Keane, 2016: 37). Rather each actor is engaged in "complex political game where decisions are made not by a single rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics" (Ibid.: 40). Nor does RAM account for the way in which competing ideas impact the behaviour of

individuals. The basic framework of the bureaucratic politics approach argues that there is no unitary actor but rather there are many players who go beyond focusing on a single strategic issue but rather on many intra-national problems as well (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Expanding on Allison and Halperin's (1972) work, Keane breaks the bureaucratic politics approach into four variables: bureaucratic interests (what is beneficial to the agency), perceptions (the ways that agency personnel tend to see the world and their role in it), culture (helps to shape interests and perceptions) and power (the likelihood that one actor of agency will be able to carry out their own will, despite resistance). These variables help explain how agencies function as a single unit, how agencies interact with other agencies and how different factions and individuals behave in a single agency.

The bureaucratic politics approach, while trying to directly tackle issues beyond the RAM, does not fully capture the nuances of civil-military relations. Allison and Zelikow (1999) point out a number of criticisms and shortcomings. First, it has been criticized for not providing solutions but just focusing on disorder and obfuscation in order to improve management techniques rather than directing policy. It also pays little attention to the role of low-level officials and structures, both of which influence the flow of information and implementation. Moreover, the context of the decision is not paid its due as it determines who will be included in the decision-making process as well as how the narrative will be presented. Lastly, it does little to account for the influence of other nations over decision-making (Ibid.).

Keane's work does expand the bureaucratic politics approach from the basic framework model and adds key variables needed to deepen analysis. However, it focuses on actions that are the outcome of the decision-making process rather than the practices that come *before* those actions. Therefore, practice theory provides a lens to better examine the everyday of civil-military relations and how practices may contribute to or limit the effectiveness of an operation. Therefore, my research question is as follows:

> How do the everyday practices of civil-military integration contribute to or limit the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

One of the most important contributions of practice theory is its recognition that practice occurs at the confluence of agency and structure (habitus and field in Bourdieu's terms). By implication, the nature of the research is best served by taking a constructivist approach in the field of international relations that is centered on practices. Following Pouliot (2008), constructivism in this sense is based on three tenets: first, an epistemological claim that knowledge is socially constructed; second, an ontological claim that social reality is constructed; and third, that knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive (Guzzini, 2000; 2005: Adler, 2002 and Hacking, 1982; 1999).

Using this constructivist style of reasoning means that, first, this research is primarily inductive because it is the agents themselves that define reality and not the analyst. Second, interpretation plays a key role in order to objectify subjective meanings. Third, this approach is inherently historical as the mutual constitution of knowledge and social reality is an ongoing process and as such requires a process-oriented approach. Following Vincent Pouliot, I will apply the methodology he developed that aims to capture these three lines of inquiry called *sobjectivism* (this will be further discussed in Chapter 4) that uses interviews, historical and discourse analysis as the main methods to acquire the appropriate data needed to do the analysis.

Case Selection

As mentioned, this research is a comparative study of PRTs commanded by Canada and the US. Regional Command (RC) South consists of Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Day Kundi provinces. The headquarters is located in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city and former capital making it a particularly important political target. Culturally, the south is dominated by Pashtuns and has been the home of several prominent leaders, including former President Hamid Karzai (Holland, 2010). It was also the birthplace of the Taliban who ruled the country from 1996-2001. There are four PRTs located in the south: Kandahar City, Kandahar led by Canada; Lashkar-Gah, Helmand led by the United Kingdom; Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan led by the Netherlands; and Qalat, Zabul run by the United States (see Figure 1.2). RC South consisted of a rotating leadership shared by Canada, Britain and the Netherlands, which is unique to RCs.



Figure 1.2: PRT Locations in 2007

Source: Chief Review Services (2007). Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. 1258-156 (CRS), Ottawa: Canada, pg. 7.

In selecting which nations were best suited to this comparative case study, I looked for a variance in civil-military integration, as well as some resemblance of case background conditions (Van Evera, 1997: 77). For example, it can be argued that integration lies on a spectrum with the UK civil-military relations being considered more integrated – or a more Janowitzian approach to civil-military relations – the US on the other end – one that embraces more of Huntington's ideals of separation – and Canada lies somewhere in between as it has been heavily influenced both by Britain and the US (Rietjens, 2015; Kitzen, Rietjens & Osinga, 2013; Zaalberg, 2007; Roi & Smolynec, 2010; Leprince, 2013). That is not to say that there are not aspects of both separation and integration within each PRT, it is just a broad classification to help with the selection process of cases. By selecting the US and Canada for research allows for a significant enough variation in civil-military relations to determine how civil-military integration effects operational effectiveness.

The second selection criteria, the resemblance of case background, looks for key contextual factors that may play a role in civil-military integration. This includes motivation and threat environment. The 2005-2006 time period proved to be a critical time for expanding NATO operations into the south for several reasons, as Steve Stapleton reminds us,

> NATO member states' unwillingness to commit forces to the south risking strategic failure as this would have cemented a de facto North/South split of Afghanistan and in the process [create] an ungovernable Pashtun belt in the South; failure to expand NATO forces country-wide would have brought NATO's efficacy and future role into question and; the continuing US focus on Iraq during 2004-2005 and mainly on counterterror operations against Al Qaeda via Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2015: 29).

To those operating in Afghanistan at the time, it was obvious that NATO's phased expansion was progressing very slowly as it would require member states' forces to commit to kinetic (the use of lethal force) operations in the south. The extreme reluctance of some NATO members to move south, as well as political pressure from NATO, led to the decision by the British, Canadian and US governments to finally commit forces to the south (Stapleton, 2015). The expansion of NATO operations into the south resulted in similarity in motivation for the cases when considering their involvement with operations in the south. The US was the progenitor of the PRT concept in Afghanistan, informed by their experience in Vietnam, and was keen on securing the turbulent south as it was a strategically important area for them. The United Kingdom was also a significant player in developing the PRT plan and was in strong support of US policy post 9/11. Canada too felt strongly about showing solidarity with the US and wanted to play a significant role in ISAFs campaign (Marten, 2010; von Hlatky, 2013).

Another factor that played a role in case selection concerns the availability and accessibility of data. Often case study methodology suggests using cases with extreme values on the independent variable, dependent variable, or conditional variable since they can teach us the most (George and Bennett, 2004). As such, the inclusion of the US commanded PRTs would seem to be a most pertinent choice as their design of PRTs is the typical divided approach to civil-military relations. While the US already had a well-established presence in the south through OEF and therefore did not face as much political pressure to commit troops, the

area was still seen as strategically important for the mission as a whole. Consequently, the US thoroughly documented the experiences of the PRTs as they had a huge, vested interest in seeing them succeed. For the Canada case, I also had significantly more access to documentation and people as I was located in Ottawa and worked directly with people that were in Afghanistan.

Overall, the choice of looking at PRTs in Afghanistan as the source for empirical data was made because it represents one of the most recent, interesting, and complex peace operations against an insurgency. It also allows for a comparative study of several multinational agencies functioning within relatively the same context. Furthermore, this type of comprehensive peace operation with multinational actors and agencies functioning towards a particular political goal will most likely be the model moving forward so it is increasingly important to understand what does and does not work, and this research on civil-military integration will contribute to that discussion.

Data Collection

According to the selected methodology, it would have been ideal to be able to observe the operation of the PRTs firsthand through participant observation. However, this research began once the PRTs were disassembled in 2014 making this approach not possible. The only alternative available to gather the necessary subjective knowledge was through formal and informal interviews. In order to better grasp the tacit knowledge that makes everyday practices and routines possible, interviewees were asked to describe their daily activities as well as activities done by their colleagues, both military and civilian. I also presented hypothetical scenarios and asked for the interviewee to describe how they would deal with the scenario to better understand where he or she was coming from. The questionnaire itself was only semi-directed in order to allow the interviewee to determine the direction the interview would take, which is another way at getting at tacit knowledge as it gives direction to what that person thinks is important or relevant. In total, I conducted forty formal interviews and thirty informal interviews as those being interviewed did not wish to be recorded and wanted to remain anonymous. Many of the interviews were a result of cold-calling people whose contact

information was available publicly that were either part of the leadership of a PRT (both civilian and military), part of NATO operations overseeing the PRTs, a number of lower ranked officers that did a tour through a PRT as well as academics from universities and think tanks. During my research, I also received the Cadieux-Leger Fellowship at Global Affairs Canada which allowed me much more access to people that were involved with the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. I also received a NATO internship in the Operations Division that oversaw the PRTs, once again giving me more access to people that were involved in Afghanistan operation.

It is important to note that some people were more willing than others to have an interview for various reasons, such as still being active in the public service or military. As such, I had to seek out "proxies" to help ameliorate this shortcoming. This resulted in interviewing academics and think tank consultants that have researched Afghanistan or in some way took part in the mission. This is clearly not ideal but given the difficulties in getting people to accept interviews, it was the second-best solution.

The other part of this research is objectifying this subjective knowledge through interpretation and the inclusion of history. In order to historicize civil-military relations in the context of PRTs in Afghanistan, I focus on the evolving strategic culture of the different militaries to better capture how each country conceives its civil-military relations. This is then followed by analyzing the history of civil-military relations. These two components will then be discussed in the context of the Afghanistan mission under the umbrella of the Comprehensive Approach, which is needed to establish the intersubjective framework. I supplement these data with a discourse analysis of official documentation on the operations of PRTs, mandates and doctrines, and lessons learned reports. To access the data for the discourse analysis, I used official government portals to search for documentation on Afghanistan as well as documentation from NATO and the UN. I also accessed a number of third-party evaluations done on the PRTs through simple internet searches that had first-hand access to the PRTs, and the people involved in them. All of these documents allow me to better grasp the intersubjective meanings created by the interaction between civilians and the military.

Discourse analysis was then conducted on the transcripts of the interviews and the documents I collected by inputting them into NVivo software. I initially developed a set of codes

based on recurrent themes, for example, civil-military tensions, chain of command, communications, and the Comprehensive Approach as a whole, amongst others. After a couple more read-throughs, I refined my coding to better grasp the nuances of the broad themes and separated by country. I began with broad themes like Effectiveness, Comprehensive Approach, Lessons Learned, PRTs etc. I then broke these categories down further. For example, under the Comprehensive Approach I included the following themes:

- Adaptation
- Civil-military relations
    - Positive experiences
    - Tensions
        - Strategic-operational-tactical
        - Daily practices
        - Unity of effort
- Detainee Crisis
- Iraq
    - Similarities
    - Differences
- National Security Council
    - Roles
    - Coordination
- NGO's
- Vietnam
    - Similarities
    - Differences
    - Lessons learned.

Through this process it became apparent that each country had similar issues but with a particular twist based on the nation's habitus. This then became the basis of my comparative analysis between the PRTs.

The discourse analysis then feeds into the larger approach of process tracing. However, process tracing in this context is not seeking to identify causal mechanisms, rather, it focuses on constitutive mechanisms[4] – how a social fact came into being. The interviews, the discourse analysis, and historicization of civil-military relations suggests that both the US and Canada were woefully underprepared and did not have the doctrine or structure in place to tackle such

[4] This will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

a complex mission while operationalizing the comprehensive approach within PRTs. This led to a mission that was poorly strategized and largely reactionary to the situation at hand. This type of peacebuilding had a steep learning curve of which very few could live up to.

Structure of Thesis

This thesis is constructed in three parts. The first part sets the foundation and constructs the theoretical framework for analysis. Chapter 2 describes the strategic context of complex peace operations, specifically how war and peace operations are conceptualized. This is followed by a discussion on how PRTs evolved and how they are supposed fit into the current strategic context. Chapter 3 is discusses and defines effectiveness starting with how the military traditionally conceptualized it and how that needs to be expanded to include metrics outside easily quantifiable indicators. It introduces the approach used in this thesis, specifically a perception-based approach to better grasp the nuances of such a complex mission. Chapter 4 covers the formulation of the theoretical framework beginning with a review of civil-military relations literature and how practice theory complements that literature by introducing a way to analyze civil-military relations that moves away from the traditional rationalistic approaches to allow for the analyses of the role dispositions and personalities play in civil-military relations regarding effectiveness. This is followed with a discussion of the methodology as developed by Vincent Pouliot – sobjectivism – in Chapter 5.

The second part of the thesis cover the two comparative cases of PRTs commanded by Canada and the US. Chapter 6 covers the Canadian case and Chapter 7 covers the US case. The chapters are laid out according to the sobjectivism methodology. The first section reconstructs insider knowledge through analyzing the data gathered through interviews as well as documentation. The second section gleans the intersubjective context through discourse analysis of doctrine and other relevant material to better capture *why* each nation approached PRTs the way they did. It also discusses how each nation approached the question of effectiveness. The last section historicizes the first two sections by identifying the constituent mechanisms as to how the Afghanistan mission was conceptualized and how PRTs were executed. This is followed by the section concluded.

The last part is the conclusion and discussion of the thesis. The begins with a brief overview of the research question and approach taken for this thesis. This is followed by a comparison of the two cases broken down into four broad areas – historical precedents, doctrine, civil-military relations, and effectiveness. This if followed by a discussion of the theoretical implications and policy implications of this research.

CHAPTER 2: CONDUCTING COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction

The relatively simple days of the Cold War in which the main military focus was countering the Soviet threat are long gone and we are now regularly confronted with irregular and asymmetric wars. These wars are different to traditional wars in terms of their goals, methods of warfare and how they are financed. These intra-state wars cannot be tackled by military force alone so they require a much more multifaceted response that incorporates such things as good governance, development, reconstruction, stabilization, and diplomacy, amongst others. However, the military is an old institution whose foundation evolved largely separate from civilians as they are the sole purveyor of deadly force. This separation between civilians and the military is a long-standing norm that has only recently been challenged by the complexity of contemporary conflicts.

Indeed, many of the lessons learned from contemporary peace operations often stress the need for increased integration of civilian and military components (Horn, 2015). Consequently, there has been a flourishing of strategic concepts that look to improve coordination; integrated missions within the UN, whole-of-government approach, 3D approach (diplomacy, development, and defense), and the comprehensive approach within the EU and NATO, amongst others (Egnell, 2009: 16). However, operational conduct and competence can only be assessed within the context to which it is applied and, as such, the following sections outline a number of relevant elements that have shaped the current strategic context.

The following literature review covers how the evolving strategic context has created fundamental shifts in how war is conceived and fought as well as how the international community responds to these crises. This will help set the foundation for further discussion on how practices have changed over time, specifically the dispositions, standard practices, and narratives of complex peace operations. I will begin with discussing how war has changed since the end of the Cold War, followed by a discussion on the definitions and history of peace operations that shows how increased civil-military integration is increasingly needed to

effectively respond to these various crises and conflicts. The final section discusses the comprehensive approach, an umbrella concept that was developed in recognition of the need for better integrated and coordinated military, political and developmental dimensions of operations.

Interventions in the Post-Cold War World

The end of the Cold War reignited academics interest in asymmetric and irregular warfare. Martin van Creveld (1991), who wrote *The Transformation of War,* he argued that traditional large-scale warfare is in decline and that future wars would take the shape of extensive small-scale wars that will cause a distinct blurring between government, armed forces, and civilians. Armies would take the form of police-like security forces and their opponents would be non-state actors like gangsters and warlords. Indeed, Rupert Smith expands on this notion in his seminal work *The Utility of Force* where he quite bluntly states in the opening sentence that "war no longer exists," (2005: 1). This is not to deny that conflict and combat no longer exists, but rather traditional large-scale warfare has been replaced by irregular forms of confrontations, or what he refers to as 'war amongst the people.' As noted by Smith: "war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists" (Ibid.: 1).

Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars shows a significant increase in the number of governments directly involved in population-centric or irregular warfare, as compared with traditional and colonial wars, for each year since World War II (Figure 2.1). In 2016 alone—in addition to the major multinational irregular wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen—there were 47 population-centric conflicts involving 49 governments, including the contest between Ethiopia and the Oromo Liberation Front, Turkey's struggles with Kurdish separatists, and 14 separate contests involving the Islamic State.

Figure 2.1: Prevalence of Population-Centric Warfare Since World War II



Source: Cleveland, Charles T. and Daniel Egel, The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA301-1.html.

There is some consensus about certain features of irregular forms of conflict. Irregular warfare is often fought using tactics that both draw on guerilla techniques and insurgency in order to control a given population while cleansing those of a different ethnic identity (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). Large decisive confrontations are avoided with preference focused on the use of fear and political manipulation to control territory. Funding often comes through the black market, like the opium market in Afghanistan, or through theft and the appropriation of different funds like development aid (see Duffield, 2001). This means certain groups can benefit from this type of war, giving minimal impetus for quickly ending the conflict which can result in certain side-effects such as famine and disease (Keen, 2008). In short, contemporary conflicts are largely characterized as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will" (Department of Defense, 2007: 5).

Responding to Conflict – The Evolution of Peace Operations from Traditional to Complex

Peace operations as we know today differ significantly from the original conceptualization of peacekeeping as established post-WWII and during the Cold War. However, there are important threads of continuity and parallels that exist between older practices and the practices today. Unfortunately, any discussion of peace operations is complicated by the fact that there is not a commonly agreed definition on what they exactly entail (see Koops, Tardy et al., 2015). By elucidating the conceptual distinction between the different kinds of peace operations, it will be easier to understand how peace operations have changed over time and how it influenced the mission in Afghanistan. So, to start it is necessary to offer a brief discussion on the definition of peacekeeping which will be followed up by a brief historical overview of peace operations which will lay the foundation for how and why peace operations are run today.

Definitions

The difficulty with defining peacekeeping began with the fact that nowhere in the 111 articles of the Charter of the United Nations is the word peacekeeping used. This has led to a proliferation of definitions proposed by journalists, diplomats, academics, and many others which has resulted in a conceptual muddle (Jett, 1999). However, one of the earlier attempts by the International Peace Academy defined peacekeeping as,

> the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace (1984: 4).

It was quickly realized that this definition was both too broad as it captures almost any attempt at third-party mediation and too narrow because the insistence on the use of multinational troops leaves out any mission conducted by a single state (Bellamy and Williams, 2010). Another attempt at a definition by Diehl saw peacekeeping as,

> the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory those forces

> are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved" (1994: 13).

This definition too suffered shortcomings, particularly by limiting it to only "lightly armed" forces. These debates and others contributed to the eventual publication of Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) in which a broader conceptualization of peacekeeping was introduced. More specifically, it saw peacekeeping as only one of several ways in which third-parties could contribute to preventing, managing, or resolving a conflict. It presented the following four different types of operations:

> *Preventive Diplomacy:* action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
>
> *Peacemaking:* action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
>
> *Peacekeeping:* the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
>
> *Peacebuilding:* action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (paragraph 20).

This document clearly defines the limits of peacekeeping as a concept. However, one of the Agenda for Peace's more important contributions was the introduction of the concept of peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali speaks of peacebuilding as the "construction of a new environment" (1992: para 57) which significantly broadens the possible activities undertaken by peacekeepers. As such, there are several dimensions which are often associated with peacebuilding. The first dimension is regarding the goal of peacebuilding which is to prevent the recurrence of conflict. This dimension has stirred up significant debate whether this idea should go beyond "negative peace" (the absence of conflict) and include aspects of "positive peace" such as reconstruction, reconciliation, value transformation, and good governance (Diehl, 2008). The second dimension is the strategies and accompanying activities designed to

achieve the stated goal which is consequently very dependent on the first dimension if the goal is negative or positive peace. Third, is the timing in which to undertake these activities, whether it be during or after the conflict. Lastly, are the actors who will carry out the peacebuilding be it multinational, bilateral, or unilateral.

These four dimensions are indicative of just how complex contemporary peace operations can be, but for the purpose of this thesis a more general understanding of complex peace operations, as developed by Egnell (2009), will be used. Complex is a term used to characterize military operations with many actors, interests and activities that have far-reaching, yet limited political aims and places significant importance on strategic narratives, global and local legitimacy. Peace operations often take place in urban areas, among a civilian population where it is difficult to separate friend from foe, and information flows and narratives are impossible to control. In other words, as Egnell states, "complex peace operations take place among the people and involve both sub-state and supra-state actors in a struggle for legitimacy and far-reaching political changes. For the most part they involve low-intensity, counter-insurgency-type operations between regular armed forces of the West and loosely formed networks employing asymmetric tactics," (2009: 10). Due to the complexity, these peace operations are often long, drawn-out affairs, more often measured in decades rather than years that encompass kinetic military operations, reconstruction, stabilization, development, capacity building, justice and reconciliation, and culture and value transformation, often all happening at the same time. This is what was attempted in Afghanistan.

The next section considers the history of peace operations to better understand how the previously mentioned dimensions came to be and, ultimately, how peacekeeping and peacebuilding became merged. It is also important to illuminate the normative shift in civil-military relations from one of sequenced interaction to one of integration.

Brief History of Peace Operations

In the 70 or so years since the creation of the United Nations, peace operations have seen a number of distinct shifts in scope, size and mandates of operations. The UN's early

activities after its creation in 1948 were limited to observer missions in both Israel (UNTSO) and Kashmir (UNMOGIP), as WWI and WWII made the UN averse to using force (Jett, 1999). Later in the 1960's, with renewed conflict in the Middle East and the first attempts at decolonization, UN operations went through a period of expansion and innovation. This resulted in the launch of three major operations with more complex duties in the Congo, West New Guinea and Cyprus. This was the first significant shift as it was the first time the UN assumed temporary authority over a territory in transition to independence, included civilian police in a mission, became involved in a civil war and allowed peacekeepers to carry arms for self-defence purposes (Jett, 1999: 24).

One of the most significant missions during this time was the mission in Egypt as a result of the 1956 Suez Crisis, called UNEF I. It was the first large-scale operation with armed forces as well as the first mission to be explicitly called "peacekeeping." UNEF I also brought other important innovations that were to guide most subsequent peace operations: 1) require the consent of the parties in dispute; 2) the use of force would only be in self-defence; 3) troops would be contributed voluntarily by neutral countries; 4) will operate under the principal of impartiality; and 5) will be under the control of the Secretary General (Ibid.). UNEF I largely succeeded in fulfilling its mandate by securing the ceasefire and monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, which created optimism about the potential of peacekeeping operations.

However, this optimism proved to be only temporary following the result of the mission in the Congo. The mission in the Congo (Operation de Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC) was launched in order to restore stability after the country fell into disorder following independence in 1960 (Boulden, 2015). It was the first time the UN intervened in a civil war and while it eventually succeeded in putting down the secession attempt made by Katanga province and kept the Congo together, it failed in several other areas. ONUC essentially violated all of those principles that were previously established in UNEF I, particularly the non-use of force, impartiality, and the consent of all the parties involved. As the operation became more costly, in both lives and dollars, and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union, France and others to help fund the operation, it was shut down in 1964 with the UN on the verge of bankruptcy. This was

the UN's first attempt at a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, and while it managed to fulfill its mandate and restored order in the Congo, it came at a very heavy cost (Jett, 1999).

Following the Congo operation, the UN once again became relatively dormant. It was not because there were no conflicts during this time, rather none reached a level of crisis which would prompt the UN to act after what happened with ONUC. Rikhye also suggested that the hiatus may have also been due to "the deadlock between the Super Powers over matters of procedure and principle and the inflexibility of their positions in the Security Council," which "prevented any real progress in developing new concepts for peacekeeping" (1974: 5). As such, no new peacekeeping operations were launched until 1973 when conflict renewed in the Middle East. Three large operations were then launched: the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai; United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL I). However, with the memory of the Congo still fresh, the UN limited its operations once again to the relatively simpler task of assisting in the resolution of interstate conflicts (Koops *et al.,* 2015).

But this all changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the almost complete collapse of the Soviet Union. This new international security environment was characterized by greater complexity, ambiguity, and a myriad of threats and enemies embedded in failed and failing states (Horn, 2015; Kaldor, 1999). Therefore, peace operations went through another significant transformation in the 1990s with mandates now pushing to create conditions for long-lasting peace. This came about for a number of reasons. First, the UN conducted more peace operations than it had in the last 40 years put together. Second, there was a growing belief that there should be a normative shift to widen the mandate to include the promotion of stable or positive peace as opposed to a negative peace which is simply the absence of conflict (Fukuyama, 2004). Lastly, due to the normative shift, the UN was increasingly asked to take on more complex missions similar to that in the Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia by marrying peacekeeping with humanitarian aid, state building and peace enforcement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). This amalgamation of various practices resulted in the introduction of the new concept of peacebuilding as discussed in the *Agenda for Peace* (1992) which went well-

beyond the defined boundaries of peacekeeping and saw peace operations reach an unprecedented level of complexity.

Unfortunately, the UN's institutional capacity did not keep pace with the expanding mission mandates. Peace operations in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia were dispatched despite lacking proper mandates, information, resources, and political support with disastrous results (Howard, 2008). This greatly harmed the reputation of the UN and put doubt on its ability to deliver successful peacekeeping operations.

However, another significant change occurred with the onset of two military operations in 1999 that created a fresh demand for peacekeepers and restored optimism in what international peace and security forces could achieve. First, NATO launched Operation Allied Force in order to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Serbians in Kosovo after the uprising of the Albanian population against the Serbian government. After several failed attempts to find a peaceful resolution, NATO intervened *without* the authorization of the Security Council as Russia threatened to veto any such resolution and the mission was successful (Bellamy and Williams, 2010). The other military mission was an Australian-led coalition called INTERFET that intervened in East Timor to stop the violence perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militia following the referendum on independence. INTERFET significantly improved the security situation (Roberts, 1999; Smith and Dee, 2003).

These military operations were then followed up with two UN peace operations; UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor. NATO also launched a large operation in Kosovo called KFOR which is still in operation today. The UN Security Council also approved the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sierra Leone, effectively doubling the number of peacekeepers across the globe in the span of twelve months.

There were several reasons for this rapid expansion. First, as noted, there was an increased interest in humanitarianism as well as the merging of international development and security agendas (Duffield, 2001). This "new aid paradigm" or "security first" philosophy essentially argued that "a prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself"

(Cooper and Pugh 2002: 14). Second, in both cases of Kosovo and East Timor, operations were undertaken by states without placing their own troops under the UN's command structure. In other words, these forces were working outside, but in support of, the UN. NATO in particular argued that in Kosovo, its already well-established and unified command structure allowed for quicker decisions, better inter-operability, better coordination mechanisms as well as ensuring that the mission would be properly staffed and resourced (Bellamy and Williams, 2010; Diehl, 2008). Third, there was a concerted effort to learn from the mistakes of the 1990s and develop new doctrine, approaches, and procedures across multiple multilateral institutions. NATO developed a new set of missions under the rubric of "crisis response," the EU announced the creation of a multinational rapid response force, and the UN produced the Brahimi Report (2000).

The Brahimi Report was the result of a panel chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, that was comprised of various diplomats and soldiers. Its main task was to identify the weaknesses of UN peace operations and provide recommendations on how to overcome them. The report provided dozens of recommendations but, in short, those recommendations can be boiled down to five broad strategic goals: (1) enhancing the rapid deployment capability for peacekeeping operations; (2) strengthening the relationship with member states and legislative bodies; (3) reforming the Department of Peacekeeping Operation's (DPKO) management culture; (4) reforming the DPKO's relationship with field missions and; (5) strengthening relationships with other parts of the UN system (Annan, 2001: para 7).

In the years following the release of the Brahimi Report, an increasing number of large-scale operations were launched by both the UN and non-UN groups, including the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The operations launched during this time covered a broad spectrum of types from observation missions to complex peace operations. It is important to note that traditional practices of peacekeeping were not necessarily replaced by newer doctrines as a large portion (about a third) of missions still fall under traditional and observation-style rubrics. However, the larger-scale and more complex missions did show a willingness to "fit forces to

missions," showing a flexibility in the composition of missions, especially by increasing the number of police and civilians involved, if the situation called for it (Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 146).

However, it became quickly apparent that the increased involvement of different actors outside the military structure created significant issues as values, ideals as well as structures did not allow for effective operations. There was a lack of coordination and coherence between these various actors which has resulted in inter-agency tensions, duplication of effort, and competition over resources. To overcome these shortcomings, various organizations developed specific approaches or strategic concepts in order to create more coherence and cooperation. Some approaches were mentioned earlier – 3D approach, whole-of-government and integrated missions– but regardless of what the approach was called, all these initiatives have a similar aim to foster deeper integration and coherence across the various civil-military actors from local to international as well as across strategic planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of operations (de Coning and Friis, 2011). These approaches can fit more broadly into what is termed as the comprehensive approach (CA) which will be the term used moving forward.

The Comprehensive Approach in Complex Peace Operations

The theoretical assumption behind CA is that "peace and stability operations will be more efficient and effective, and thus have a more meaningful impact, when the different actors engaged have a common strategy, based on a common understanding of the problem, a common theory of change, and an agreed synchronized plan for implementing and evaluating a strategy" (de Coning and Friis, 2011: 251). In other words, fragmented policies and programmes create a higher risk for inefficient use of resources and human capital limiting service delivery and opportunities for capacity building in conflict and post-conflict states.

This basic assumption has fueled a significant body of literature in regard to various aspects of CA as well as a number of multilateral organizations and states developing their own particular approaches to CA including the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The following paragraphs will give a brief

overview of these different approaches and their principles as well as a discussion on the limitations of taking a comprehensive approach.

The EU has always pushed to find a better coordinated approach between its political, and security and defence policies. Much of what has influenced the current manifestation of these efforts were shaped by the end of the Cold War, the growth of the EU foreign policy institutions and the strategic goals as laid out in the 2003 European Security Strategy (Gross, 2008). The European Security Strategy (2003) set the foundation for the EU's crisis management capabilities, and it aimed to fully utilize military and civilian assets in peace operations to address the root causes of conflict. Indeed, the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* confirmed this approach by stating the EU has, "worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity" (2008: 2). The Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 provided institutional provisions that solidified this more integrated approach to crisis management by calling for "consistency between different areas of EU external action and between these and its other policies" (European Commission, 2013: 2). However, it was not until 2013 with the release of the Joint Communication "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict in Crises," that the EU set out their common understanding of CA and defined the guiding principles and actions needed to implement them.

The UN has created one of the more sophisticated systems for CA (de Coning, 2008). Back in 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan introduced the 'UN Integrated Mission' and described the concept as follows:

> An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process…integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.

This was later refined to the 'integrated approach' by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon which considers that structural integration is not always necessary or beneficial but allows for it when

needed. Moreover, the original concept of integrated missions was limited to *post-conflict* countries, the integrated approach expands it to include those countries currently in conflict. It more directly refers to the type of processes and designs in which different actors or agencies with their unique organizational processes, are integrated into a single UN-led system to undertake complex peace missions efficiently and effectively.

As an important multilateral alliance, NATO too has made explicit reference to the importance of the CA in facing international challenges, particularly during the 2006 Riga Summit as well as the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declarations. However, as NATO is essentially a military alliance, its role is limited to participating in a larger comprehensive approach. Indeed, the Bucharest Declaration clearly states that NATO should solely be a contributor to the comprehensive approach as to not come in direct competition with other international organizations such as the EU and the UN that have civilian capabilities (paragraph 11). However, NATO has been slow to fully integrate the concept of CA into its own activities and finds it difficult to achieve the level of cooperation needed to effectively implement CA with other actors and organizations. This is due to several reasons like the disagreements over NATOs role in world politics, the extent to which NATO should use its military capabilities to fill civilian gaps due to non-permissive environments and its general hesitance to engage in such civilian tasks (Jacobsen, 2008). These disagreements especially came to head with NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as the military had to take on certain civilian tasks in absence of other civilian actors in the field. The introduction of the PRTs in which civilian actors were integrated into the military units were an attempt to address these issues. It is still an ongoing process to determine the role NATO will take in future operations under the CA umbrella.

Other Western nations have also developed whole-of-government or comprehensive approaches to direct their international engagements. The UK released a Joint Discussion Note in 2005 that defined CA as, "commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation" (UK-JDN 4/05: 1-5). It further identifies four guiding principles: (1) a proactive cross-Whitehall approach, (2) shared understanding, (3) outcome-based thinking and, (4) collaborative working.

The US defined CA as "an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal" (FM 3-07: 1-4). It too defined four underlying tenets or "guiding principles" of CA; (1) *accommodate* the concerns and contributions of all participants, (2) *understand* that each actor contributes a distinct set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values and perceptions, (3) *based on purpose* so it is a cooperative effort toward a common, purpose-based goal and, (4) *cooperative effort* that is reinforced by institutional familiarity, trust and transparency.

The Canadian comprehensive approach evolved from its 3D (defence, diplomacy, and development) approach which first emerged in 2003 that was then followed by the Whole-of-Government approach in 2005. The 3D approach drew on concepts like Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) approach (Dion, 2014). However, it was not until the publication of the 2008 Canadian Army Counter-Insurgency manual as well as the Land Operation manual that Canada's Comprehensive Approach was clearly defined and, somewhat surprisingly, copied the original UK definition despite the unique approaches from which it stems (National Defence, 2008: 5-1 and National Defence, 2008: 5-14). The three basic principles guiding Canada's approach include a unifying theme, collaborative working, and comprehensive response.

While each of these approaches mentioned previously may use slightly different terminology, the underlying philosophy and guiding principles remain essentially the same. However, the necessity of this approach to effectively conduct complex peace operations cannot be underestimated. It was former Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay that well-articulated the importance of CA in 2009 at the Munich Security Conference:

> Canada has been on the leading edge of putting into practice what NATO has come to call the "comprehensive approach" … If we have learned nothing else from conflicts around the world – whether Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa – we must have learned that security is the necessary precursor for sustainable development, democratic governance, and prosperity. But military and civilian efforts must be

integrated. There is no military solution to the insurgency in Afghanistan – any more than there is elsewhere.

Military engagement is simply not sufficient in and of itself. Long term security cannot exist in the absence of justice and development. And this isn't sophisticated strategic doctrine. It is common political and human sense that tells us that people in war torn, fragile, disintegrating or disintegrated societies want stability; want good governance from their leadership; want their dignity; and, frankly, want hope.

What's my take-away from this experience? If we don't go comprehensive – with integrated civ/mil, multinational and multi-organizational approach, and all that means in terms of building, rebuilding, and restoring governance, prosperity and hope – we put out mission fundamentally at risk and we should seriously consider whether we go at all (quoted in Wells, 2009: XX).

It is important to note that there have been certain concerns raised with the use of CA, particularly in non-permissive areas of operation. The humanitarian aid community has been quite vocal regarding the "erosion of the humanitarian space." Humanitarians have framed their policies and activities around the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. As interventions become increasingly complex, military forces take on humanitarian-like activities under the pretext of reconstruction and stabilization (Meharg, 2007; Seybolt, 2007; Smyser, 2003). Some argue that this has resulted in blurred lines between civilian and military activities, decreasing the safety and effectiveness of humanitarian aid workers (Fast, 2010). This "politicization" of aid has decreased the perceptions of neutrality as it is increasingly seen as being a "force multiplier" to achieve certain political ends. As Adams and Bradbury argue, "the causes of the conflict become confused with international geopolitical agendas. One consequence is the increased targeting of aid workers by combatants" (1995: 33-34). Similarly, Macrae and Zwi argue that "the refusal to acknowledge explicitly the political function of relief in conflict situations contributes to the maintenance of violence, playing into the hands of the powerful, while the politicization of humanitarian assistance, through selective provision and the militarization of delivery, increases the security threat to agencies" (1994: 30). On the other hand, some argue that this effect is over-exaggerated and that there is more to the explanation

for decreased aid worker security than increased civil-military integration and the politicization of aid (Mitchell, 2015; Barnett, 2004; Fast, 2010). According to the 2020 Aid Worker Security Report, the reason for the majority of violent incidences against humanitarian aid workers falls under five broad categories.

- requests for preferential treatment and violence at the moment of intake;
- violence linked to perception of unsatisfactory treatment;
- looting and destruction of health centres for economic gain or other reasons;
- attacks on health centres as part of the battlefield;
- persecution of patients or civilians seeking sanctuary in health centres.

Despite this contravening data, it still raises the question of whether humanitarian and military activities actually benefit from increased integration. Duyvesteyn (2009), using quantitative data from peacekeeping operations, highlights that interventions in ongoing conflicts to promote peace are problematic and military performing humanitarian-type activities often produce counter-productive results such as undermining local NGO efforts or making humanitarian aid workers targets of the insurgents.

The concerns over the shrinking humanitarian aid space are valid, however, the reality of the international security environment and peace operations suggest that the blurring of lines between military and civilian will continue, and in all likelihood civil-military integration will become obligatory to ensure the effectiveness of an operation. This was clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan and the use of PRTs. The next section will discuss the origins of PRTs beginning with a discussion on Vietnam and the CORDS model followed by how PRTs were deployed in Afghanistan.

Conceptualizing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

After the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 and the installation of an interim government, there was a general consensus around taking a comprehensive approach to security, governance and reconstruction in Afghanistan. This approach was an extension of previous "stabilization and reconstruction" efforts that characterized the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo

in the 1990s. However, the Afghanistan mission required an even more comprehensive effort that included the *de facto* rebuilding of an entire country and its institutions from federal to local levels while simultaneously conducting an active counterinsurgency campaign (Chief Review Services, 2007). While the mission in Afghanistan was unique in its large, comprehensive scope, the concepts behind this approach have a much longer history.

Vietnam – CORDS and Pacification

An early form of the comprehensive approach as well as PRTs were developed, largely by the military, during the Vietnam war to help deal with the insurgency. As a communist insurgency swept through southern Vietnam, one of the South Vietnamese government's key responses was to implement a "pacification" program – a program not much unlike what is considered counterinsurgency today. In the 1960's, effective pacification meant:

- Establishing or re-establishing a local government responsive to and involving the citizens;
- Providing sustained, credible security;
- Destroying the enemy's underground government;
- Asserting or reasserting Government of South Vietnam (GVN) political control;
- Involving citizens in the central government;
- Initiating economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion (McCollum, 1983).

These goals for pacification show the extensive scope of the mission (not dissimilar to contemporary operations today) which requires expertise in many governmental specialties, many of which the Vietnamese government lacked.

For the first ten years of the program, there were disparate efforts made by the military and a number of other agencies to try and implement the pacification program, but these efforts greatly suffered from a lack of central coordination. In order to address this situation, former President Lyndon B. Johnson called for the formation of an organization that was to be composed of both military and civilian members, to provide American advice and support to the South Vietnamese pacification efforts. Titled Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support – or CORDS – it incorporated all American agencies in South Vietnam dealing with pacification and civilian field operations (with the exception of covert operations headed by the CIA). The CORDS approach attempted to directly address the primary impediment to the pacification program – the lack of unity of effort by partnering civilian and military entities. This arrangement shows a fairly high level of civilian integration into what was primarily a military operation.

Special Assistant to the President Robert Komer was assigned to command CORDS as the field director and he insisted putting CORDS under the purview of the military – specifically under the United States Military Assistance Command (MACV) – stating, "let's face another fact: the military are far better able to organize, manage, and execute major field programs under chaotic wartime conditions than are civilian organizations by and large" (Komer, 1970: 19). As such, Komer reported directly to General Westmoreland and later General Abrams. In general though the military-oriented assignments were handled by the military and civilian-oriented tasks were directed by civilians.

At the regional level, the commander had a civilian counterpart of equivalent rank. At the provincial level, the senior advisor directed both civilian and military programs and, depending on the orientation of the programming, could be either military or civilian. At the district level, at least 20% of the senior district advisors were civilian. Most of the district teams had at least one civilian in a key position (McCollum, 1983: 112).

The CORDS approach contributed to the mission in Vietnam in a number of important ways. First, CORDS primary contribution was how well it complemented allied security operations. As stated by Major Ross Coffey, "by denying villages and hamlets to the Viet Cong, civil-military operations enabled the US Army and Army of the Republic of Vietnam military forces to concentrate on North Vietnamese main forces" (Coffey 2006: 30). Second, CORDS fostered the creation of an organized People's Self-Defence Force that was composed of local inhabitants who would defend their villages and hamlets when need be (Davis, 1971). Third, CORDS enhanced local protection and area security to facilitate a large number of development initiatives, such as the creation of a functioning rural administration, better health and education services, and the rebuilding of roads and waterways (Ibid.). Significant strides were

made towards improving the living condition of the south Vietnamese while tackling an active insurgency.

However, the CORDS program was not without its shortcomings. If fact, Komer is quick to point out that like most things in Vietnam, the CORDS program suffered from being overly cumbersome, poorly executed and only spottily effective (Komer, 1970: 6-7). Other criticisms of CORDS largely focused on its limited duration and scope. Since CORDS was focused on the insurgency, it did not possess the personnel, organization, or structure to enhance the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government. Komer addresses this too stating that "perhaps the most important single reason why the US achieved so little for so long was that it could not sufficiently revamp, or adequately substitute for, a South Vietnamese leadership, administration and armed forces inadequate to the task" (Komer: 1986: 160).

The goals set out in Vietnam and the means to achieve these goals have strong parallels to the Afghanistan mission. The similarity between CORDS and PRTs are undeniable. The following table summarizes the objectives of CORDS and PRTs (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Comparing CORDS and PRTs

CORDS Objectives	**PRT Objectives**
• Establishing or re-establishing a local government responsive to and involving the citizens; • Providing sustained, credible security; • Destroying the enemy's underground government; • Asserting or reasserting Government of South Vietnam (GVN) political control; • Involving citizens in the central government; • Initiating economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.	• Support the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to develop a more secure and stable environment; • Assist in extending GOA's authority; • Support security sector reforms; • Enable unity of effort amongst civil actors; • Demonstrate the international community's commitment to Afghanistan.

While the language between the two are different, the fundamental mission is largely the same: stabilization and reconstruction. However, several key lessons from the CORDS experience in Vietnam were not carried over, especially concerning counterinsurgency and peace operations in general. The failure in Vietnam saw both the military and civilians wanting to largely "brush the experience under the rug" and focus on what the US does best – conventional warfare. This conventional warfare bias resulted in few conceptual changes to counterinsurgency doctrine post-Vietnam and a general aversion to that kind of conflict in general. It essentially hamstrung any efforts to prepare for any type of new war and limited itself to fighting wars as it wants to fight them. Furthermore, at the operational level of PRTs, the CORDS experience was largely discounted.

First, like in Vietnam, only a small percentage of the forces in Afghanistan had their primary mission as reconstruction (less than 5 percent of the US forces) and civil-affairs missions remained the lowest priority for the military, minimizing the ability of civilians to leave to compound and get a better read on local needs (Johnson and Mason, 2009). Second, in replication of the Vietnam War, was the mistake of administering the country and prosecuting the war from the provincial level or national level. As stated by Johnson and Mason, "…provincial boundaries were artificial administrative constructs that did not, *and do not today,* correspond to any political reality on the ground" (2009: 9). These boundaries do not correlate with local identities or power structures essentially forcing a fragmented approach due to the mission being multi-national with many provinces being occupied by a different coalition member that have their own rules of engagement and national caveats. For example, in general, Canada had the fewest national caveats or restrictions placed on how they operated so they could move and engage more freely with combatants while Germany had very tight restrictions placed on them to the point that Germany, despite being one of the largest contingents in Afghanistan, refused to operate outside Regional Command-North and were prohibited from engaging in offensive operations (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012). Lastly, there was a distinct lack of cultural understanding in Vietnam and Afghanistan which is well summarized by Arnold Isaacs in his book *Without Honor, Defeat in Vietnam in Cambodia*:

> From start to finish, American leaders remained catastrophically ignorant of Vietnamese history, culture, values, motives and abilities. Misperceiving both its enemy and its ally, and imprisoned in the myopic conviction that sheer military force could somehow overcome adverse political circumstances, Washington stumbled from one failure to the next in the continuing delusion that success was always just ahead. This ignorance and false hope were mated, in successive administrations, with bureaucratic circumstances that inhibited admission of error and made it always seem safer to keep repeating the same mistakes, rather than risk the unknown perils of a different policy (1983: 489).

Overall, the experience of CORDS in Vietnam strongly shaped what would become PRTs in Afghanistan as it informed counterinsurgency doctrine. Unfortunately, the lessons learned in Vietnam were not applied to Afghanistan for unclear reasons and consequently PRTs suffered many of the same weaknesses. Most importantly, these weaknesses also affected the ability to foster productive civil-military integration, often emphasizing differences in leadership, mandate, and resources, which will be further discussed in the analytical chapters.

The CORDS program in Vietnam set out to help build a long-lasting peace with mixed results. However, it also set a precedent for what peacebuilding practices could look like. When faced with the Afghanistan environment, which was even more complex than that of Vietnam, it is no surprise that the US introduced a system similar to what they have once experienced before. The PRTs took the CORDS model and tried to fit it into the Afghanistan context with mixed results.

Structure of PRTs in Afghanistan

From its earliest conception, PRTs were seen as having an important role in stabilization and reconstruction but it was never made clear what kind of role. Initially, PRTs were called Joint Regional Teams but it was President Karzai who asked for the name to be changed to PRT to emphasize the importance of reconstruction (DND, 2007: 5). The deployment of PRTs in Afghanistan began in Gardez in 2003, headed by the US and UK as part of OEF, and primarily consisted of military members with a few low-level civilians that spent only a short period in the field (McNerney, 2005). In their first months of operation, PRTs struggled to be relevant in the

broader military and political mission due to a lack of resources and civil-military tensions. These tensions were often fueled by the vagueness of their mandate, identifying mission priorities, and access to resources. However, towards the end of 2003, civilians began to play a larger role in PRTs as they were needed to fill certain expertise gaps, particularly around development and politics. Soon most of the PRTs had relatively high number of civilian representatives from the State Department, USAID, and Agriculture, amongst others. Civilian tours were extended to one year to allow for increased situational awareness and relationship building but, most importantly, the civilians at the PRTs brought more resources to support more long-term development projects (McNerney, 2005).

As such, PRTs swiftly became the forefront of the operational level of the mission to help facilitate the provision of development projects (Maley and Schmeidl, 2015). This was not the original intent as PRTs were created just to provide a temporary stopgap to buy time in which the government of Afghanistan would develop the capacity for service delivery at district, provincial and state levels (Stapleton, 2015). But when it became apparent that the Afghanistan government was not going to be able to resume its role as service provider, the PRTs became the main means through which the international community maintained a political and developmental presence throughout the country (Abbaszadeh et al, 2008). PRTs provided momentum and support for the reconstruction and stability process beyond Kabul that was outlined in the 2001 Bonn Agreement (section I) and reflected international political and military priorities that went well beyond Afghanistan (Stein and Lang, 2007).

In the broadest sense, the PRT's key objectives were reconstruction and stability but other objectives included supporting the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to develop a more secure and stable environment; assisting in extending GOA's authority; supporting security sector reforms; enabling unity of effort amongst civil actors and, demonstrating the international community's commitment to Afghanistan (Savage 2008: 113). ISAF also released a PRT handbook with an extensive list of principles to help guide PRTs, some highlights include:

- Work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort;
- Focus on achieving effects, not outcomes (e.g., what effect will help the [Government of Afghanistan] to begin building a road from point A to point B have on extending the

reach of government security and other services, particularly in comparison with the easier to achieve but less significant "outcomes" of completing a few [Quick Impact Projects] during a four-month rotation?);

- Respect and be aware of civil-military sensitivities – lives may depend on effective planning and coordination with each other; and
- Work towards a finite lifespan for the PRT, linked to an end-state of improved Afghan stability, governance capability and sufficient reconstruction to enable drawdowns and closure of PRTs (2009: 4-5).

PRTs became an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations in Afghanistan. Despite being heavily criticized for their over-emphasis on military objectives as well as their failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with civilian organizations, the utility of PRTs was recognized by NATO who encouraged the expansion of PRTs (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008). During its peak years from 2007-2008, there were a total of 26 PRTs operating across Afghanistan, led by multiple NATO countries and each evolved in response to different conditions.

It was not long before three distinct organizational models for PRTs emerged. First, the German model of PRTs emerged in Kunduz which had an average of 400 personnel (one of the largest in the country) and had approximately 20 civilian specialists and took a duel-headed leadership approach with one military and one civilian leader focusing on long-term sustainable development in permissive environments (Maley, 2015). However, it suffered from a lack of civil-military coordination and had few links with the local government (Burton, 2008). Second, the American model of PRTs, averaging 80 personnel of which 3 to 5 were civilian specialists and led by a military commander, lacked cultural and regional understanding resulting in an overemphasis on quick impact projects (Kilcullen, 2015). Lastly, the UK model operated with an average of 100 personnel of which 30 were civilian specialists with a civilian leader and placed a strong emphasis on working with local Afghan politicians for long-term sustainable development with an ability to work in volatile areas (Burton, 2008; Abbaszedeh et al, 2008). These three models lie on a spectrum of how PRTs were organized as other individual sponsoring nations also tended to organize PRTs according to their own particular agendas. This

led to a type of national stove piping with little or no coordination or cooperation amongst PRTs (Hodge, 2009). While there were a number of models and approaches developed for PRTs, this thesis is focused on the US and Canadian set ups.

The US approach, as stated in a Report to the US Congress in 2009, drew from the NATO mission statement in which the PRT's goals were to extend the authority of the central government to help facilitate stabilization and security sector reform (SSR). This was reflected in US PRT Handbook (2011) as Figure 2.2 illustrates.



Figure 2.2: Spectrum of intervention

Source: Centre from Army Lessons Learned. (2011). Handbook Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team. No. 11-16, retrieved from https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/11-16.pdf, pg. 7.

According to Figure 2.2, Commanders consider the concurrent conduct of the different components of full spectrum operations in every phase of an operation. For example, as the operational focus shifts from offensive tasks to stability tasks, it is important to identify and address the operational gaps that can inhibit the development of local capability and capacity that supports the country's transition to peace and stability. If areas of the country can get "stuck" in instability, they may "slip back" into conflict and insecurity if security forces are removed. As such, stability operations in these areas lay the groundwork for sustainable, transformational development efforts so they do not "slip back" into instability or violent conflict.

In retrospect, this order of activity is more reminiscent of British objectives as American PRTs sought more to engage with key government, military, tribal, village and religious leaders in the various provinces as well as working with authorities to improve the military and police force's ability to provide security (Labarre, 2011). Indeed, based on Figure 2.2's spectrum of intervention, the recommended command structure is as follows (Figure 2.3):



Figure 2.3: PRT Proposed Command Structure

Source: Centre from Army Lessons Learned. (2011). Handbook Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team. No. 11-16, retrieved from https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/11-16.pdf, pg. 56.

This guidance envisioned civilian representatives and military officers working as an integrated team – the Commander being responsible for improving security and logistical support for force protection; USAID being responsible for reconstruction; and Department of State (DOS) being responsible for political oversight, coordination and reporting. However, the reality of the US PRTs command was much different (Figure 2.4):



Figure 2.4: Actual US PRT Structure

Source: Labarre, Frederic (2011). Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Comparing the American, British and Canadian Models. Defence R&D Canada, DRDC CORA CR 2011-082, pg. 7.

In comparison to the recommended command structure, USAID, the State Department and the Department of Agriculture are clearly subordinate to the PRT military commander. The "close collaboration" with UNAMA, NGOs and IOs was voluntary. Moreover, the organization shows that there are other organizations at work in theatre but does not suggest the need for close coordination to better leverage one another's effort. The different strands of funding located within the PRT, in particular the very flexible Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and development funding provided through USAID, often clashed putting the military and civilians at odds with one another. However, the organization did provide a civilian-military coordination function that was effective in a number of ways, as described by Labarre:

> The civilian component provides a readily recognizable (and acceptable) interlocuter between NGOs and humanitarian and development IOs already in theatre and provide critical project objective and assessment skills between these actors and the military. The military component of the PRT, which working with the civilians, assist in planning so that the stabilization work undertaken under the PRTs aegis (or with its funding, as

> many initiatives are CERP-funded QIPs) conforms to DOD planning guidelines and performance evaluations metrics. *In other words, a PRT is the expressions of the whole-of-government approach, but it is also the expression of all the disciplinary friction between the civilian and military actors, between the government agency and the NGOs* (emphasis mine, 2011: 9).

The lack of clarity of roles for the military and civilians, especially with the US military performing reconstruction and development using CERP funds, created confusion and contention. This facet of the civil-military relationship in PRTs is a common thread throughout this analysis and deeply affected the effectiveness of the PRTs, including Canada.

Canada's international and domestic reputation upon taking command of the KPRT was one of a benevolent benefactor and peacekeeper, not one of counterinsurgency and kinetic operations. This became difficult to reconcile amongst the domestic population, government agencies and other international agencies. The lack of COIN doctrine and civil-military tensions was symptomatic of this. Moreover, this was a distinct hostility towards the military moving into the development and humanitarian space. This ultimately meant that much of what happened in the KPRT was rather incoherent, reactionary, and *ad hoc.* Steps were made to help improve this situation.

In 2008, DFAIT created the Stability and Reconstruction Team (START) to act as the lead interlocuter for the Government of Canada in developing a strategic framework and the application of the comprehensive approach. In 2009, DND published its first COIN doctrine which drew heavily from the American experience. Other publications were released to help further develop the strategic framework, to little avail as many still struggled with being unfamiliar with strategic thought. DND and START too tried to co-publish a paper that would seek to highlight the gaps in capabilities and solidify the framework but that was eventually put on hold indefinitely. As such, the mission of the KPRT became highly dependent on the quality of the civil-military relationship between the PRT members, which was far from consistent.

In other words, the 330-stong KPRT developed its mandate through several years of experience that combined diplomats, development workers, military, and police (Figure 2.5).



Figure 2.5: Kandahar PRT Command Structure

Source: Brown, Andrea L. and Barbara D. Adams (2010). Exploring the JIMP Concept: Literature Review. Defence Research and Development Canada, CR-2010-021, Ottawa: Canada, pg. 19.

The first clear difference with this command structure when compared with the American structure is the co-leadership aspect between the military commander and the civilian representatives from DFAIT, CIDA and the RCMP. It more closely aligns with CALL's recommended structure based on NATOs mission statement. Later in the mission, an additional diplomatic position was added that had essentially the same authority as the PRT commander, – the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). In 2010, the RoCK became the Director of the KPRT, a significant shift in comparison with the US. Moreover, the Canadian military was much less reluctant to have more civilians within the PRT. Indeed, one of the strengths of the KPRT was its ability to integrate members from other government departments and even from foreign governments including members from the US State Department, USAID, and UKs DfID. The KPRT structure was flexible and adaptable enough to allow for certain organizational impediments to be resolved to better utilize these assets. This is more consistent with basic

COIN practice as the military element should have a light footprint. Regardless of these improvements, civil-military relations were rife with tensions within the KPRT, including long-standing stereotypes that continue to influence civilian perceptions of the military and vice versa.

In sum, despite the differences in concepts, doctrines, resources, and rules of engagement amongst the PRTs, attempts were made at better facilitating civil-military integration under the rubric of the comprehensive approach for improved effectiveness. In other words, the PRTs became a space in which the history of civil-military relations for each leading country played out in real time providing a unique window for which to view specific practices around civil-military integration.

PRT Activities

United States

The US oversaw the PRTs starting in 2003, well in advance of Canada agreeing to taking command of the KPRT in 2003. In February 2003, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued a general set of parameters for PRTs in a document entitled *Principles Guiding PRT Working Relations with UNAMA, NGOs and Local Government* (USIP, 2005). These principles established three primary objectives for the PRT program: extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction.

Despite their restrictive mandate and practical limitations, US PRTs played an important role in providing a security presence and in helping to improve the security environment. Afghans saw American forces nearby as a welcome indication of US concern and international support (Ibid.). PRT commanders attended monthly meetings of the Governor's Provincial Security Committee, which brought together Afghan security units to improve. situational awareness and coordinate operations. US PRT military units engaged in frequent patrolling, while their commanders called on local Afghan government officials and tribal leaders to discuss their security concerns.

US PRTs also played a key role in supporting the program for disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR) led by UNAMA. They monitored heavy weapons

cantonments and reported on troop strength and the movement of armed groups. US PRTs also supported Afghan government efforts to disarm illegally armed groups. Near Asadabad, a local militia commander fled to Pakistan in disgrace after the Kunar PRT publicly confiscated his cache of illegal weapons (USIP, 2005).

One of the largest US PRT security-related contribution was the training, technical assistance, and equipment provided to the Afghan police. US PRT construction of police stations, courthouses, jails, and border checkpoints also filled an important role (SIGAR, 2018). In cases where US PRTs were co-located with Afghan National Army units with embedded American training teams, Afghan units were brought along on joint patrols and provided support when challenged. In Kunar, the PRT assisted the local police in executing the provincial governor's order to remove illegal roadblocks (Ibid.).

As military units operating in a nonpermissive environment, US PRTs also used 'Quick Impact Projects' (QIP) for village improvement projects to demonstrate goodwill and encourage a favorable reaction to their presence. US PRTs would hire local contractors to construct schools, clinics, wells, and other small village improvement projects to establish good relations with Afghans and collect intelligence on local events and personalities. These projects were financed by funds from the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) that could be disbursed on the PRT commander's own authority. However, the QIP's faced significant criticisms. Amongst the numerous problems, quick rotations, pressure from senior military authorities to demonstrate progress, and limited knowledge of local conditions often resulted in the hasty construction of buildings without doing a needs-based analysis or reference to the Afghan government's capacity to support these activities in the long-term (SIGAR, 2018). For example, schools were built without teachers, clinics without doctors, and multiple wells dried up shallow aquifers. These activities did little to further the international cause in Afghanistan. Moreover, CERP was not designed or intended as a tool to extend the reach of the government, though PRTs and used CERP to achieve try and achieve it (Ibid).

There were other projects that were either executed by the US PRT or worked in conjunction with the PRTs. For example, the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) provided humanitarian relief to victims of the conflict and was designed to have a stabilizing

effect on communities. The program also emphasized support for women's social and economic participation. ACAP II worked closely with PRTs to identify incidents reported by potential beneficiaries. This broad mixture of activities was typical of most PRTs in Afghanistan, and Canada was also no exception.

Canada

Before taking command of the KPRT, Canada did not frame development and reconstruction as a strategic priority. Rather, Canada focused on providing humanitarian assistance and social protection. In 2005, when Canada took command of 330+ person KPRT based at Camp Nathan Smith in the city of Kandahar did strategic priorities change and logic models were developed to enhance their development programming.

There were a number of themes that the KPRT was focused on during its tenure: education, women's rights, security sector reform, health, amongst others. This included both national and provincial programming. It is not possible to do a comprehensive review of all of the KPRT activities so, drawing from previous research that I conducted, I will just give a sampling of some of the areas Canada and the KPRT contributed to (see Grant and Zyla, 2021 for a more comprehensive review).

Canada had supported the education sector in Afghanistan since 2004, though a more defined strategy did not emerge until after 2006. From 2004 to 2006, education programming was subsumed under the Rural Livelihoods and Social Protection program for which Canada funded a variety of activities, including microfinancing and community grants. Some of these grants were put toward rehabilitating schools and some for training and education activities, some of which took place through the KPRT. In 2006, the Afghan Ministry of Education released the *National Education Strategic Plan I* (NESP-I) which Canada used as a guide to better target its education programming.

One of the largest education programs that Canada invested in was the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP), one of the better designed and implemented programs. The size of the program alone ensured that its outcomes and impact would be notable; it was also well-managed and made appropriate adjustments in strategy and mandate in accordance with

the changing conditions. It was also one of the few programs with monitoring and evaluation embedded in its original design. The Basic Education for Afghanistan Consortium (BEACON) project was also a largely successful initiative that laid the foundation for a strong community-based education program. The vast majority of the 25,000 students in the program improved their literacy and numeracy skills significantly. Also, the more than 900 community-based education classes will significantly improve access for many rural students, especially girls. There were a number of smaller programs like Excel-erate Teacher Training Project and Vocational Training for Afghan Women. However, many of the programs did suffer shortcomings in design, limiting their potential. These shortcomings often contributed to larger issues like “ghost schools,” teacher absenteeism, problems with pay, and maintenance of schools as well as the questionable quality of education as a whole in Afghanistan.

Health did not appear as a strategic priority for Canada until 2008. Before that, health sector support was provided through Canada's humanitarian assistance program. After 2008, Canadian health efforts in Afghanistan were strongly focused on polio eradication which was identified as a signature project and accounted for more than half of Canadian expenditures in the health sector. Canadian health programming was largely aligned with the Government of Afghanistan’s listed national priorities since 2008. Initial programming from 2008 to 2011 focused on eradicating communicable diseases (polio and tuberculosis), increasing access to health care for women and children, and capacity building programs.

Many of the health programs and projects had at least some positive effect simply because the baseline statistics were so poor. One of the strongest initiatives, with consistently good outputs and outcomes as well as good monitoring and evaluation, was the Strengthening Health Activities for the Poor (SHARP) program. It aligned well with government priorities, was directed to the population that needed it most, and had a strong gender component. There were a number of other projects focused on immunization, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure, and training and the outputs for these programs were not insignificant.

Throughout its engagement in Afghanistan, the Canadian government also felt an obligation to help improve women’s rights in Afghanistan, their access to health and education, and representation in government. Gender was a cross-cutting issue and much of the later

programming included a gender component. Similar to the US, the KPRT also played a significant role in security including in DDR which did manage to secure numerous weapons caches, but it was less able to successfully reintegrate former combatants. This is only a small sampling of projects Canada contributed to, but it gives a sense of the activities that the KPRT undertook.

In sum, the development and reconstructions activities that the KPRT and US PRTs undertook were varied and fell under numerous themes. The focus on the certain themes changed over time and priorities shifted in accordance with the changing security environment. However, both US and the KPRT were victim to poor guidance and lack of strategy. For example, how to integrate the PRTs within the wider COIN strategy started much too late for the PRTs were already on a path that would prove difficult to change. Despite these issues, the PRTs did see some success in project implementation and significantly improved the lives of some of the recipients. This is one of the reasons why I take a more situation-specific conceptualization of effectiveness, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3: DEFINING EFFECTIVENESS IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

As peace operations become more complex with broader mandates, defining effectiveness too becomes more complex. As established earlier, the nature of contemporary conflict requires a multifaceted approach to intervention, which creates very substantive challenges for military and civilian institutions writ large. It is no longer about overcoming an enemy using superior force, claiming military victory, and quickly exiting. Applying these traditional methods of warfare, as Rupert Smith (2005) argues, often leads to protracted conflicts and a failure to achieve political aims. He goes further on to say that effectiveness is more about creating the security, developmental, and economic conditions necessary to achieve the stated political goals. As such, there are many factors at play that are part of the explanation of effectiveness in complex peace operations like domestic politics, military doctrine, military culture and history, geography, resources, and enemy tactics. But the research for this thesis aims to further understand the understudied effect of civil-military relations on effectiveness by looking at how everyday practices affect effectiveness.

But first, as peace operations are still largely military operations it is important to understand how traditional conceptualizations of military effectiveness plays into everyday practices. Therefore, the following sections will discuss different conceptualizations of effectiveness, the role that civil-military relations can play in effectiveness and how this all contributed to the development of the comprehensive approach concept and PRTs in Afghanistan.

What Constitutes Effectiveness?

Traditional Conceptualizations of Military Effectiveness

Despite initial appearances, military effectiveness is a nebulous concept, one that to this day remains ill-defined. That is not to say that there has not been significant research done on what constitutes military effectiveness. For example, researchers from a sociological perspective

focused on such factors as unit cohesion, group solidarity, and leadership. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (1948) argued that an effective military is one whose soldiers exhibit high levels of unit cohesion. The willingness to fight does not stem from patriotism but rather from the interpersonal bonds formed between soldiers, so they fight for each other not for their nations. In contrast to this is the work by Omer Bartov (1991) who argued that effective militaries are ones that show high morale due to the belief in the cause and the honor in fighting for that cause.

Another stream of research looked at the role of technology in the effectiveness of operations. This research was used to examine force design, force structure and resource allocation issues at the operational and tactical levels (Bonder, 2002). However, this research was almost solely focused on militaries' hard assets, neglecting other such factors as organizational structures and other practices that may limit the effective use of those assets.

A more recent stream of research comes from the political science perspective. For example, Stephen Rosen (1995) explored the effects of class stratification on the Indian army's effectiveness concluding that despite the Indian military being on par with the British and having larger numbers, the Indians lost because divided societies have difficulty generating military power. Other researchers, like Reiter and Stam (2002), analyzed the effects of regime type on military effectiveness finding that, on the whole, democracies' dependence of public consent often led to more effective foreign policy.

A final stream of research comes from military historians that utilize narratives to show the importance of leader personalities, trust, intelligence, and doctrine in influencing effectiveness (for example see van Creveld, 1991; Keegan 1998).

It becomes obvious from the previously mentioned studies that effectiveness is no longer considered synonymous with military victory. It is no longer about crushing the enemy through the use of force. As Millet and Murray note, "victory is an outcome of battle; it is not what a military organization does in battle. Victory is not a characteristic of an organization but rather a result of organizational activity. Judgements of effectiveness should thus retain some sense of proportional cost and organizational process" (1988: 3). Put differently, effectiveness is closely related to the conduct of operations. Effectiveness is about a military organization's

ability to undertake certain tasks efficiently that create certain effects necessary to achieve the desired end state, rather than focusing solely on immediate outputs that are easily quantifiable (Millet and Murray, 1988). With effectiveness being more about the process of creating certain conditions, an increasingly important variable in this process is civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Relations and Effectiveness

The literature that uses civil-military relations as an explanatory variable for effectiveness is relatively sparse (Nielsen, 2005). One exception is Biddle and Zirkle's (1996) study that shows how high levels of friction in civil-military relations in Vietnam undermined the US's ability to take advantage of the air defense technology they possessed when compared to Vietnam's more harmonious civil-military relations which allowed them to utilize its technology to good effect against the US. Another exception Rosen's (1995) work that examines the characteristics of the societies from which armed forces stem. Rosen's (1995) work on societal structures argues that the degree to which military organizations divorce themselves from society negatively affects the military strength a country can obtain from a given amount of material resources. Along the same lines, Brooks' (1998) work on Arab armies looks at the impact of highly centralized and rigid command structures. Her results suggest that such command structures not only repress initiatives at lower levels but also that the adjustment of command chains for purely political purposes inhibits the effectiveness of armies.

A more recent study by Robert Egnell (2009) looks at the indirect and direct impact civil-military relations has on effectiveness and argues that civil-military integration is key for more effective operations. He developed a framework to analyze how different patterns of domestic civil-military relations affect operational effectiveness in two ways: *indirectly*, by being the arena in which decisions regarding size, culture, equipment and doctrine of the armed forces and other agencies from international development and security are made, and *directly* by providing the highest levels in the operational chain of command where situations are analyzed, strategic aims are set, and operational plans are made. The indirect impact is determined by the definition of the functional imperative or the type of threat being faced and

thus the civil-military interface must be constructed in such a way as to facilitate an accurate interpretation of the imperative to create armed forces and other relevant agencies 'fit for purpose.' The direct impact is defined by the quality of command-and-control structure and whether experts from the relevant departments and agencies are brought into the planning process. His measures of effectiveness are drawn from the work of General Sir Robert Smith (2005) that argues while effectiveness can be related to outcomes, in an ongoing conflict like that in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is also useful to look at the conduct of operations which then can be evaluated against established best practices. By focusing on the conduct or "practice" of operations, it opens the door to include more intangible aspects. In the case of Smith's work, he focuses heavily on political will and moral factors as shown by the following formula he created to determine a military's capability:

$$\text{Capability} = \text{Means} \times \text{Way}^2 \times 3\text{Will}$$

In other words, the means are multiplied by the way these means are utilized in relation to the opponent, multiplied again by the way, and then multiplied by the morale or will times three (Smith, 2005: 242). Means are utilized according to strategy, tactics and doctrine and the will includes political will to employ force as well as the morale of the fighting forces. These are all aspects not traditionally considered for military effectiveness but are increasingly important if an operation is to be successful in a complex environment. This thesis will expand this approach and include other relatively intangible aspects like dispositions, standards of practice and narratives that all play a role in determining effectiveness.

Returning to Egnell's study on civil-military integration, he focused particularly on strategic and tactical level indicators of best practice drawn from counterinsurgency doctrine, such as the identification of political aims and the importance of civil-military cohesion and coordination. He examined two case studies, the US and UK operations in Iraq. Egnell is quick to acknowledge that the UK experience in Iraq cannot serve as a complete comparison to the US experience as it only served as a junior member of the coalition and was only located in the south, however, the lessons derived from the UK experience is instructive. The UK has a history of strong civil-military cooperation through the successful counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya and by establishing stability in Sierra Leone. While the UK has mechanisms in place to

facilitate civil-military integration and cooperation, the mechanisms failed to facilitate cooperation in Iraq and the military had great difficulty working properly with local dynamics and politics to achieve long-term stability goals.

The US experience was qualitatively different as the US civil-military system that was largely founded on checks and balances largely independent from civilian influences which has created such a deep interagency divide that tension quickly mounted, limiting or even preventing cooperation and coordination. It was only at the highest level with the President being Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defence that civilian oversight embedded in the Department of Defense (DOD) did some integration to occur. That is not to say there were no efforts made at integration but numerous task forces, working groups and the National Security Council all failed to create interagency coordination. None of these structures encourage the development of relationships or trust between civilians and the military, critical components to effectiveness according to Egnell. Indeed, during post-conflict planning the State Department was isolated from the DOD and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (later the Coalition Provisional Authority) refused to share headquarters with the US military command in Baghdad. In sum, Egnell's results show that the US divided approach to civil-military relations fails to achieve effectiveness in the complex case of Iraq and that the UK integrated form of civil-military relations was better suited to the context, despite them losing Basra to insurgents.

All these studies suggest that civil-military integration is key to becoming more effective. However, there are those who do see integration as problematic, particularly those who fear the erosion of the humanitarian space as described in the Introduction. Another example of concern regarding increased integration is Risa Brook's (2008) work that argues that increased integration between civilians and the military can create competition if their preferences are highly diverged leading to impairment of strategic coordination as military and civilian leaders grow weary of participation in joint forums and sharing information. Each side tries to protect certain routines or practices that favor their preferred strategies or policy outcomes, essentially stalling the entire process of strategic coordination. Similar work by Donna Winslow (2002: 38) explores five potential sources of tension related to differences in terms of organizational

structure and culture, tasks, and ways of accomplishing them, definitions of success and time frames, abilities to exert influence and control information, and control of resources. Understanding these differences is key to promoting deeper integration between civilians and the military.

Alternative Definition of Effectiveness in Afghanistan

As mentioned previously, despite the mission in Afghanistan and the PRTs being primarily military run, there was significant amount of human and economic capital poured into development, reconstruction, and stability. After Bonn in 2001, a number of critical questions and policy dilemmas were raised about how the process of development would proceed, such as:

- How to funnel resources through, and build the capacity of, the central state without a) overwhelming the administration's capability to absorb funds, b) distorting accountability relations and recreating the rentier state, c) fueling rent seeking and corruption, and d) creating imbalances in state capacity and authority.
- How to build security institutions robust enough to counter growing insecurity, but also fiscally sustainable and not prone to abuses of power and violations of rights.
- How to strengthen institutions at the center, while also ensuring the delivery of tangible services at the sub-national level.
- How to catalyze economic growth and investment, while promoting redistributive policies that generate social inclusion.
- How to provide economic incentives that co-opt political and military elites, without promoting cronyism and corruption and undermining state reforms.
- How to counter illicit economic activities without destroying safety nets, livelihoods, and broader economic recovery.
- How to 'deliver' reconstruction programmers in a situation of growing insecurity (Goodhand and Sedra, 2010: S80).

Afghanistan's development and economic growth has been largely dependent on foreign aid since the Soviet invasion, even more so after the US intervention began in 2001. Not

only was a large portion of Afghanistan's GDP funded by foreign aid but close to 100 per cent of its development budget and approximately 35 per cent of its operating expenditure are paid for through external assistance (Bawaar Consulting Group, 2010). According to the OECD, Canada spent approximately US$1.76 billion on Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 2003 and 2014 but the subsequent underwhelming results have brought into question the effectiveness of how aid was delivered.

The issue of aid effectiveness has a long history, spanning from the end of the Second World War to the present. However, aid effectiveness only came under a critical spotlight with the end of the Cold War as former Soviet republics and countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffered massive socio-economic degradation in spite of the massive inflows of aid (Lancaster 2006). That brought into question the fundamental assumption that aid can be used to effectively bolster economic growth and improve the lives of those in developing countries. The 1990s thus became characterized by aid fatigue as more and more Western countries looked at development aid with increasing skepticism, causing a decline in official aid flows. For example, in 1992 the US was the largest single aid donor with disbursements of ODA totaling US$11,709 million, but by 1995 its aid had fallen to US$7,367 million, below the aid disbursements of Japan, France, and Germany (Bird, 2004). However, increasing levels of poverty in some countries after 1997 (such as Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea) provided a strong rationale for redirecting aid to alleviate poverty and for helping to build institutions that could help increase a country's resilience to exogenous shocks (Thorebeck, 2000). The interest in aid was thus renewed despite the lingering questions about how to make aid more effective. A global effort then began to try improving the effectiveness of development aid, culminating in the release of the Paris Declaration in 2005 which stressed the importance of aid effectiveness, partnership, ownership, and participation (**see Table 3.1)**

Table 3.1: Paris Declaration Commitments

Commitment	Description
Ownership – "Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their	*Partner countries commit to*: (1) Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies; (2) translate national strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes and; (3) take the lead in

development policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions."	coordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors, encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector. *Donors commit to*: (1) Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.
Alignment – "Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures."	*Donors commit to*: (1) Base their overall support on partner country's development strategies and periodic reviews of progress and; (2) link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or set of indicators derived from the national strategy. *Partner country commits to*: (1) integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies and pursue their implementation through country-led capacity development strategies were needed.
Harmonisation – "Donors' actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective."	*Donors commit to*: (1) Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating, and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows and; (2) work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic reviews and promote joint training and sharing of lesson learnt. *Partner country commits to*: (1) make progress towards building institutions and governance structures that deliver effective services and; (2) encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting development priorities.
Managing for Results – *"*Managing resources and improving decision-making for results."	*Partner country commits to*: (1) strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and budget processes and; (2) endeavor to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions with a manageable number of indicators. *Donors commit to*: (1) link country programming and resources to results and align then with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks and; (2) harmonize their monitoring and reporting requirements.
Mutual Accountability – "Donors and partners are accountable for development results."	*Partner country commits to*: (1) strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets and; (2) reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies. *Donors commit to*: (1) provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.

Source: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, 2008: 3-8.

However, much of what was released around the time of the Paris Declaration were extremely vague on the matter of ownership, merely stating that there is a need to align with local priorities and/or systems, but not specifying how local priorities are decided or how one addresses the problem of 'poor performance' (in both the domestic and international arenas). Although broad based ownership may be a desirable end goal, what this means in practice and how it might emerge in such a volatile place like Afghanistan remained unclear.

The issue of aid effectiveness has contributed to the so-called "local turn" in peace studies. The local turn poses a fundamental challenge to the dominant liberal ways of thinking and acting about peace. Existing research on peace lacks analysis of what allows peacebuilding to succeed at the subnational level (Autesserre, 2017; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Instead, most scholars focus on peacebuilding failure and macro-level dynamics – by this measure it would be easy to say that the mission in Afghanistan was an abysmal failure. This approach is unfortunate because the obstacles to peacebuilding are such that the most puzzling question is why international efforts sometimes succeed, rather than why they fail. This is why creating a better understanding of how PRTs operated in Afghanistan can still provide valuable lessons on effectiveness. Identifying the factors that influence the effectiveness of these initiatives is critically important to not only scholars but practitioners and people living in post-conflict states as well.

However, the local turn is not the silver bullet for effectiveness. Peacebuilding efficacy relies primarily on the actions, interests, and strategies of national and local actors and of potential outside spoilers. Foreign interveners can, at best, support peace initiatives and undermine efforts to resume violence. External contributions, however limited, can mean the difference between war and peace. Regardless of local conditions, foreign peace interventions increase the chances of establishing a durable peace. Recent quantitative analyses show that international interventions have significantly improved security conditions in many places where they have been deployed, even if other measures of peacebuilding success are less optimistic (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; and Goldstein, 2011).

The lack of consensus between the effectiveness of local turn and external interventions is not confined to scholarly debate. Moreover, external definitions of effectiveness can also be at odds with local ones. Richmond (2011) has demonstrated that peace (and therefore peacebuilding effectiveness) means different things to different people and organizations at different places and times. In other words, the concept of effectiveness is also socially constructed.

As such, this thesis uses a more situation-specific definition of effectiveness, one that is better suited for analyzing efforts on the ground as suggested by Autesserre (2014). A peacebuilding project, program or intervention is effective when the large majority of the participants (international donors, local population, and civilians and military within the PRT) *perceive* it as having promoted peace in the area of intervention. This definition does not require that a program or project garner universal praise—some individuals or groups will always be dissatisfied. Nor does it demand that the initiative's contributions to the establishment of peace take one specific form over another. Some efforts can directly reduce or prevent violence. Others can do so indirectly by creating the broader conditions that facilitate peace, for instance by strengthening institutions that address conflict. My definition simply reflects a general consensus among the people involved in and affected by a given initiative that it has advanced, in one way or another, the establishment of peace.

This definition is useful for two reasons. First, it is perception-based making it context specific. It is not about how many weapon caches were destroyed or how many schools were built, it is about how participants perceive the intervention, whether positive or negative. Second, it is not limited to focusing only on civilian or military outputs but rather the impact these interventions have had combined on the ground. Furthermore, it allows to differentiate between different levels of intervention from the effectiveness of an individual project to sector strategy, to the mission as a whole. During several interviews, I received comments like "this project significantly improved the lives of the targeted population, but the overall strategy in the area was poorly planned and executed." Does that mean they were effective or ineffective? That is part of the reason why effectiveness is a tricky concept. However, by using a

situation-specific and perspective-based approach, one can understand how practices contributed to or limited effectiveness.

Overall, effectiveness in a complex peace operation is not easily captured by any one approach to measurement or indicators. It necessitates a multi-dimensional and multi-layered approach to effectively evaluate and this is not within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I am relying on a more symbolic or perception-based approach of civilians and military because perceptions can easily be just as important as other measures of effectiveness. For example, while a development worker may see a project as underdeveloped and poorly implemented, it still may have a made a large difference to a group of people. Using perceptions also fits well into the use of practice theory which will be further discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Decades have passed since the publication of the two books that essentially defined the field of civil-military relations theory: Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960). Both wrote during a time when maintaining civilian control of the military was of paramount concern, overriding other concerns such as effectiveness, largely in response to the fear of *coup d'états*. Indeed, in the US, as early as 1949 during the first Hoover commission, one of the major reasons for strengthening civilian control over the armed forces was to "safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism" (Lyons 1961: 53). Other occurrences of successful military uprisings like those in Thailand, Pakistan, Iraq, Burma, Argentina, and Syria during the 1958-1961 period further prompted this overriding concern of civilian control (Finer 1988 [1962]: 1). In other words, the central *problematique* of early civil-military relations theory is the need to maximize the ability of the armed forces to maintain and enforce national security while minimizing the domestic coercive powers that those same forces inevitably possess in order to have *effective armed forces under democratic civilian control* (Feaver, 1996). As such, Huntington wrote to show the value of an armed forces separate from society with distinct values based on corporateness and expertise to maintain objective civilian control. In contrast, Janowitz saw this separation between civilian and military cultures problematic, arguing the 'civilianization' of the military is the only way to guarantee civilian control. These two scholars created the two basic schools of thought in civil-military relations theory: separation and convergence.

After WWII and during the Cold War, there began a distinct blurring of civilian and military spheres. The responsibility of the military clearly increased beyond the sphere of war and conflict to include things such as assisting with the reconstruction of war-torn western Europe to help ward off the threat of communism. However, despite the increase in responsibilities, the military's authority was eroded. Military policy became political and political leaders became more and more concerned with the problems of war, strategy, and military affairs in general. Consequently, these two spheres became much more interrelated in

this particular security environment than they had been previously (Ginsburg, 1964). In fact, Janowitz noted that "to analyze the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large-scale non-military bureaucracy" (1965: 17). However, at the same time, this convergence leading from common organizational forms has not led to the elimination of the fundamental differences between civilian institutions and the military (Segal et al., 1974).

These differences, often referred to as the civil-military gap, shaped much of the debate in the 1990's, a decade characterized by a large amount of friction between military and civilian leadership (see Feaver, 1996; Dunlap, 1992; Kohn, 1994; Cohen 1995; and Avant, 1998). There was a general consensus that this 'gap' negatively affects the military's ability to effectively address complex emergencies. As such, other scholars sought reconciliatory theoretical frameworks in order to mitigate this gap to improve effectiveness while recognizing the fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the two institutions (see Bland, 1999; Schiff, 1995; and Desch, 1996).

After 9/11, the gap debate was reignited once again as questions were raised about the utility of civil-military integration for effective peace operations. The security environment at this time was characterized by the large number of internal and regional conflicts, failing states, massive human rights violations, and global terrorism (Kaldor, 2006; Murshed; 2002; Rotberg, 2003, 2004). It was recognized that these conflicts cannot be won simply by defeating the enemy with military strength; rather, they require multifaceted operations that include development, security, reconstruction, good governance, and rule of law. This implicitly challenges traditional conceptualizations of civil-military relations theory in that the military as an institution cannot be isolated or separated from other civilian institutions, instead better integration of military and civilian policy, values and culture is needed to improve the effectiveness of the military.

Indeed, the many connections between security and development are more visible today as global attention to humanitarian emergencies increases, creating pressure for policy convergence between, for example, development and peace operations (Keen, 2008; Duffield,

2001). These connections, often referred to as the security-development nexus, is at the forefront of much of the contemporary debate surrounding civil-military relations. As a result, there has been an increasing trend towards multifunctional peace operations that integrate military, civilian, humanitarian, and development actors into a coherent operation with a common political aim to increase effectiveness (see Egnell, 2009; Brooks 2008 and Mitchell, 2015).

With the previous in mind, the following sections delve a bit deeper into the key literature of civil-military relations theory literature, beginning with a discussion of Huntington and Janowitz. This will be followed by a section on a selection of post-Cold War literature with the intent of drawing attention to the shortcomings in the current civil-military literature and the lack of attention paid to the cultural and normative aspects of civil-military relations. Practice theory is then well suited to capture these aspects, using the approach as established by Bourdieu. Practice theory moves beyond the static ontological basis that often underpins civil-military relations theories as well as the false dichotomy of agency vs structure. It recognizes that the taken-for-granted knowledge that influences actions that renews, reproduces, and sometimes changes social order which is key to better understanding civil-military relations.

As such, following the civil-military relations theoretical discussion, I review the practice turn in the field of International Relations (IR) and its applicability to civil-military relations. These two literatures combined create the theoretical framework on which I base my analysis. Subsequently, the methodology that is well-suited for this type of inquiry is Vincent Pouliot's *sobjectivism* which will be further explained in Chapter 4.

Cold War Classics – Huntington and Janowitz

Much of the literature during the Cold War period was focused on the theoretical debate over the nature of the relationship between the military and civilians in regard to maintaining civilian control of the military. As noted, there were two scholars in particular that shaped the civil-military relations debate and continue to deeply influence even today's scholarship - Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Huntington's concept of military

professionalism assumes that it is possible to segregate the military from political purpose. This separation, he argued, is necessary to ensure civilian control. Janowitz, on the other hand, agreed that the uniqueness of the military mission created a particular culture, but the changing security environment and the development of new technologies were fundamentally changing the military's mission and the military culture should adapt accordingly to meet the needs of the state. As such, he argued that the "civilianization" of the military to bring the military values more in-line with the broader population is the only way to maintain civilian control. This gave rise to two schools of thought, one of separation and one of convergence, both of which continue to heavily influence civil-military relations theory today.

Huntington's work stems from the assumption that military institutions of any society are essentially shaped by two forces: the functional imperative as defined by the threat to the society's security and the social imperative as defined by the ideologies, social forces, and institutions predominant in that society (1957: 2). How these two imperatives influence the structure and culture of the military and the impact this balance will have on effectiveness has been one of the main challenges of civil-military relations theory. This challenge is predominant in many works due to the traditional *zero-sum* view of the civil-military problematique: one can maximize either military strength or civilian control, but not both (for example Feaver, 2003; Betts, 1977; Brooks, 1998, 2008; Strachan, 2006; Schiff, 1995).

Huntington's basic methodological assumptions posits that it is possible to define an equilibrium called "objective civilian control" that ensures civilian control and maximizes security at the same time by reducing the tendency for military professionals to become involved with the political affairs of the state (1957: viii). This is in opposition to what he terms "subjective control" which maximizes civilian power in relation to the military which would result in the "civilianizing" of the military, meaning the military is more likely to become more involved in political affairs. Maximizing the professionalism of the military it the best way to ensure "objective civilian control." He argues that "in practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal" (1957: 11). In other words, an officer is professional to the extent he or she displays expertise, responsibility and corporateness. This not only

increases effectiveness but also enhances civilian control as it renders the military "politically sterile and neutral" (1957: 83-83). Political meddling in military affairs only weakens military professionalism (and thus effectiveness), so Huntington calls for a strictly divided approach in which the functional imperative takes precedence over the social imperative. Overall, Huntington's framework, as shown by Feaver (2003: 7), can be reduced to three core claims: "there is a meaningful difference between civilian and military roles," "the key to civilian control is professionalism," and "the key to professionalism is military autonomy."

The focus of Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* is similar to the concerns Huntington addresses in *The Soldier and the State*. Janowitz is concerned with both civilian control and the military's ability to meet the security needs of the state. In contrast to Huntington, however, Janowitz argues that achieving "objective civilian control" is an unrealistic approach. The transformation of the military profession after World War I and II resulted in a blurring of distinction between military forces and the civilian population "both [became] the subject of military organization and the objects of attack, propaganda and political warfare" (1960: viii). Thus began the convergence of military and civilian organizations and "it became appropriate to speak of the "civilianization" of the military profession and of the parallel extension of military forms into civilian social structure" (1960: ix). Janowitz further argues that it is inevitable that the military will come to resemble a political pressure group which is not necessarily problematic as long as it remains responsive to civilian authority. In other words, civilian control cannot be achieved solely through the rule of law and a professional tradition of political sterility but must also come from "self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values" (1960: 420). Other measures that he advocates include increasing legislative oversight, extending civilian control into lower levels of military organizations and increasing civilian involvement in officer professional training (1960:420). In Janowitz's conception of civil-military relations theory, the functional imperative and the social imperative are far from being mutually exclusive and instead advocates civil-military convergence in order to achieve and maintain civilian control.

Janowitz introduces the concept of a constabulary force which differs from Huntington's professional soldier. Janowitz argues that the military profession requires a new set of self-

conceptions as the traditional officer corps are trained for limited war and not necessarily strategic deterrence (the difference between wartime and peacetime). As Janowitz describes:

> The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine (1971: 418).

Janowitz's concept still somewhat relies on a professional military ethic for maintaining control and thus it is tied to effectiveness which is similar to Huntington's argument (Feaver, 1996). An important contribution that Janowitz makes as part of the constabulary concept is that effectiveness is very context dependent. In other words, a "political warfare" dimension has become commonplace in many operations and thus the military must be sensitive to the international political consequences of military action. Overall, Huntington's conceptual framework tended to treat the principles of military subordination and separation as absolutes, Janowitz's analysis offers a more nuanced and perhaps more realistic perspective on the behaviour of the military as a public institution.

The reliance on professionalism by both Huntington and Janowitz witnessed a fair amount of criticism following their publications. For example, S.E. Finer (1988[1962]) wrote on the motives for why militaries may challenge the government, claiming most motives actually stem from professionalism. As military leaders are highly devoted specialists in their field, they may feel they alone are competent to determine size, organization, recruitment, and equipment of the armed forces. On every single one of these points, the military may be at odds with the government. Termed 'military syndicalism,' Finer argues that the military may believe they themselves are above the petty politics of government and attempt to establish security of the civilian base as they see fit in order to safeguard the state. Professionalism does not guarantee civilian supremacy, as Huntington suggests, rather it can also be a source of discord and only through the firm acceptance of civilian authority can the military be checked (Finer 1988[1962]: 24-26).

Other analysts extended Finer's argument that civil-military discord is the result of the gradual erosion of military authority after WWII, despite the fact that the responsibility of the

military has increased (Brodie, 1959; Masland and Radway, 1957 and Huntington, 1961). Colonel Robert Ginsburg argues that it is not that the military questions the principle of civilian control nor that it is simple a power struggle, rather the military is principally reacting to the implicit challenge to their professionalism (1964: 255). Since the beginning of WWII, as Ginsburg (1964) points out, there has been an increasing number of civilian experts on military policy, and that these civilian experts are being used more and more to challenge the views of the professional military. This challenge to military expertise is at the heart of the civil-military discord and only through the reestablishment of those military aspects of national security under military authority will relations improve.

More recent critics are quick to point out that Huntington's model is undermined by the fact that many of his theoretical assumptions are not readily supported by empirical evidence. As Feaver (2003) notes, the US prevailed in the Cold War despite failing to adopt many of the principles Huntington cited as critical, like maintaining objective control and seeing a shift in civilians from liberalism to the conservatism that is epitomized by West Point which he considers the ideal.

Another empirically based critique comes from Eliot Cohen (2003) is his work titled *Supreme Command* where he makes the argument that the truly victorious wartime leaders have all heavily interfered in the military sphere, something that Huntington strongly opposes. By drawing on the examples of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion he concludes that political leaders should become more involved and exercise more control over the military. While this limited study cannot be seen as an alternative to Huntington's theory, it does show some of its empirical shortcomings.

Janowitz's school of thought also faced a fair amount of critique. For example, most convergence theorists do not assert that total convergence or even structural isomorphism will ever be achieved, rather they argue that "the convergence function...as an asymptotic one, with military and civilian structures becoming increasingly similar, but failing to reach a point of intersection" (Segal, 1974: 158). Moskos (1974) takes a different spin on this argument by suggesting that the military may contain aspects of divergence and convergence at the same time – a model which he refers to as 'plural' or 'segmented.' He suggests that the most

apparent divergence will be at the tactical level concerning combat arms and the most convergent in technical support agencies. Regardless, there is undoubtedly a gap between civilians and the military that can affect how they can integrate which consequently effects operational effectiveness. The practices of civil-military relations often reflect this gap, perpetuating certain practices and making it even more difficult to find a productive balance of divergence and convergence, as Moskos (1974) describes.

Overall, the works of these two influential writers were very much the results of the geopolitical circumstances at the time. The triumphalism of the American military following the end of the WWII and the onset of the Cold War implied that the maintenance of significant military capabilities would occupy a prominent place in the political life of the US. As such, civil-military relations became a highly pertinent area of research. However, much of the debate that emerged during this time revealed more similarities than differences, particularly around the notion of military professionalism (Feaver, 2003). However, as the Cold War ended and the threat of mutual destruction decreased, it created space to re-examine civil-military relations unbounded by the Cold War geopolitical environment.

Post-Cold War Literature

The major shift in the geopolitical environment in which there was no longer a clearly defined threat resulted in analysts warning of a "crisis" in civil-military relations. One writer that has been extensively cited regarding the crisis is Russel F. Weigley (1993), who called for a re-examination of civil-military relations due to a series of very public military objections to civilian policies immediately following the end of the Cold War. General Colin L. Powell, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, vocally opposed the military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the idea of limited war in general. This led Weigley (1993) to question the assumption of assured civilian supremacy over the American military and the over-dependence on military professionalism.

It was also within the post-Cold War period that there was a distinct rise in internal or civil wars that were much more political in nature and required much more complicated interventions with high levels of coherence and cooperation between civilians and the military

(Kaldor, 1999). Consequently, there was a general consensus that the theoretical examinations of civil-military relations done by Huntington and Janowitz were no longer adequate to explain civil-military relations in this new international security environment. Some of the literature that emerged during this time still adhered to those basic principles laid out by Huntington of subordination and separation like the works done by Michael Desch (1999) and Peter Feaver (2003), but there were some writers that sought alternative theories to better explain the changing nature of civil-military relations, particularly works done by Douglas Bland (1999), and Rebecca Schiff (1995 and 2009) and Hew Strachan (2006).

In *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (1999), Michael Desch attempts to explain the relationship between the military and civilian leaders by exploring the causes of variation in civilian control. His theory is founded on the assumption that the variability in civil control of the military is dependent on the intensity and nature of the threat. Drawing from social conflict theory, Desch argues that it is the intensity of the threat that determines cohesion: weak threats result in a weak and divided military organizations and strong threats result in a more unified military organizations with higher levels of cohesion among civilian and military leaders. Furthermore, the direction of the threat also determines the orientation of the military organizations – outward (towards the enemy) or inward, where it may challenge civilian rule. Therefore, the worst civil-military relations are with a low external threat and high internal threat and the best civil-military relations are with high external threat and low internal threat. However, Desch rarely explores the effect that the rest of society has on the actions on the government and the military as well as on threat perception. In the case of Afghanistan, the use of military forces from states that do not necessarily face a compelling direct or even indirect threat makes the use of Desch's model limited. Rather, these states send military troops as a result of alliance obligations to provide assistance of a humanitarian or "peacebuilding" nature. Regardless of this, Desch's model is still a useful lens to try and explain variances in the civil-military relationship. His case studies show that domestic and international threats are an important variable for explaining the behaviors of civilian and military leaders, but his overly lean model restricts it from creating a more holistic understanding of an ever-changing civil-military dynamic.

In sharp contrast to Desch's structural theory and even to the works done by Huntington and Janowitz, Peter Feaver's "agency theory" explicitly rejects the social and value divide between the military and civilians and sees the interplay between civilians and the military in terms of strategic interaction. In *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (2003), Feaver uses a principal-agent framework that was originally developed by economists to analyze the problems associated with the delegation of authority to a subordinate to act on his/her behalf. In particular, he uses the concepts of *working* or *shirking* (obey or ignore delegations) to explain the actions of the subordinate. In the case of civil-military relations, the principle is the civilian leadership that sets the policy, and the military is the agent designated to carry out said policy. Within this framework, civilians face the problem that the military may not follow through with what is asked of them, forcing civilians to consider how intrusively they must monitor the military's activity to ensure compliance. Feaver's theory also acknowledges contextual factors, like threat environment and domestic politics, that the military may include in determining whether to work or shirk a certain delegation. Using this logic, Feaver then identifies a number of possible logical outcomes based on decisions made by principles to monitor the military intrusively or not, decisions made by the military to work or shirk and the decisions by principles to punish the military or not when shirking occurs. The resulting model has shown to be a useful interpretive tool for explaining changing patterns of civilian control of the military (for example see Auerswald and Saideman, 2014). Despite Feaver's Agency Theory as being acknowledged as an alternative to Huntington, it still is reliant on a clear separation of the military and civilian institutions and the professionalization of the military with the civilians maintaining ultimate authority over the use of force. Moreover, as a rationalist theory its does not give agents autonomy in its ontology, a gap that practice theory is well-suited to fill, as we will see below.

In looking for alternative theories to better explain the current state of civil-military relations that goes beyond the Huntington model, Douglas Bland developed a "theory of shared responsibility." His work on civil-military relations expands the problematique from a zero-sum view to argue that "civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers" (1999: 9). While he

does emphasize that this theory is based on the principle of civilian control over the armed forces, the management of the armed forces is maintained through regimes of shared responsibility: "specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable of some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused" (1999: 9). How these responsibilities are shared are determined by the regime's established norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. This implies that civilian control is "conceptualized not just as a shield against the *coup d'etat*, but as an exercise in the management of a regime that legitimizes and restricts the actions of all the players in the interest of society" (1999: 20). Bland's theory refutes Huntington's position of military separation and actually allows for a significant degree of military input into policy-making processes as well as occasional intervention by politicians in military planning.

Rebecca Schiff (1995 and 2009) saw the either-or choice between civil-military separation or integration can be detrimental as it limits the policy choices for civilians and the military. Rather, she argued, it would be more useful to allow for more fluid civil-military relationship that does not necessarily threaten national norms. Schiff (2009) introduced concordance theory as an alternative theory to separation and integration that 1) does not suggest that nations should adopt one model over another, 2) does not presume that separation is the ideal framework for civil-military relations and, 3) allows for alternative arrangements beyond separation or integration. In the context of contemporary complex peace operations this is particularly salient as civil-military relations need to be just as dynamic as the conflicts they are trying to address. Concordance theory argues that the agreement between the military, the political elite and the citizenry determines the role and function of the armed forces in society. The ability of these three partners to agree on several indicators (political decision-making, recruitment method, social composition of the officer corps and military style), which is facilitated or hindered by each country's historical and cultural experiences, explain the likelihood of military intervention. In other words, the more agreement on these four indicators means it is less likely that domestic military intervention would occur. It is Schiff's focus on culture and the introduction of citizenry in analyzing the role the military plays

in society is what sets her theory apart from other models. Moreover, this theory does not assume the necessity of civilian control, diluting the focus on military intervention in the civilian sphere. This creates an interesting side effect, as pointed out by Richard Wells: "when the military is an equal partner in a social or political process of reaching agreement, then one might reasonably presume that what we think of as intervention is not necessary" (1996: 272).

Other scholars ask for an entire reimagining of the conceptualization of civil-military relations that transcends Huntington's professionalism. For example, Hew Strachan (2006) argues that the persistence of Huntington's model of separation in the bureaucratic imagination does not allow for the harmonization of civilian and military relationships to the detriment of strategic and operational planning. While Strachan does not specifically spell out what a revised system should look like, he introduces four factors for consideration that would better reflect the changing character of war and thus the need for a more integrated civil-military system. First, wars today are not defined in a strictly legal sense but rather are de facto wars or 'operations other than war.' Second, conflicts may be low intensity but are often long-standing. Third, those fighting are usually cut off from society, voluntarily enlisted and represent a civilian society with minimal or no military experience. Lastly, how society perceives war is heavily influenced and mediated by the media. He also notes that while there have been successful campaigns in the past that better integrated civil-military rations, like the British in Malaya from 1948-1960, these instances have been *highly dependent on personalities*. Strachan states that is why it is necessary to have institutional mechanisms in place to facilitate integration across several ministries. That is not to say there has not been attempts to better institutionalize this notion of integration, like the National Security Council in the US and the War Cabinet in Britain, but many of these mechanisms have been bypassed in recent years eliminating the space for civilians and the military to have a constructive dialogue about strategy. This was particularly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, as Strachan points out on multiple occasions, "there was no strategy." Moreover, the military should better utilize the media as a powerful tool regarding debates on the use of force and step away from the belief that apolitical behaviour as the corollary of professionalism. He recognizes that the problem of civil-military integration is not an easy one and acknowledges that he has very few answers but

nonetheless makes a compelling argument as why things need to change. He states that "a revised system of civil-military relations would re-empower the constitutional controls of the executive, help reintegrate armed forces and society, and, most important of all, enable an approach to strategy appropriate to the norms of liberal democratic government" (Strachan, 2006: 79-80).

Angstrom's (2013) work furthers Strachan's idea by arguing that much of civil-military relations research is hampered by the assumed universal validity of the Western distinction between civil and military with clear boundaries between the two. Angstrom notes that to better inform an empirical strategy for research on civil-military relations, an important first step is to categorize the full width of diversity of civil-military relations so as to be no longer limited by its current narrow conceptualization. This requires looking beyond civil and military as fixed categories and argues that they should be understood as norms. She argues that the distinction between, and contents of, civil-military relations has been shaped by historical norms rather than being structurally determined and it is those norms that are being challenged today. For example, traditionally to be civil is to not be a member of the armed forces of the state and to be military means to be a member of the armed forces of the state. While these definitions appear quite straightforward from a Western perspective, it can become problematic in other situations. One issue Angstrom points out is related to time. Is it possible to be a civilian during the day and military by night? During the Vietnam War, local Vietcong units were largely comprised of part-time soldiers doing smaller operations at nighttime while being ordinary farmers during the day. This issue of time is also applicable to Afghanistan, as there is a seasonal effect to warfare with levels of violence increasing in spring and summer. This emphasizes that what it means to be civilian or military is a political choice that is strongly linked to a particular form of international and domestic political order. Without understanding this and that there is a large spectrum of civil-military relations, it is difficult to determine meaningful strategy and effective operations.

These re-examinations of civil-military relations are tied to the changing nature of peace operations and their increasing complexity. However, many of these new approaches still heavily rely on rationalistic paradigms that are often associated with the pioneers of civil-

military relations theory in that certain conditions create certain behaviours with no account for how practices can influence and inform those behaviors. For example, many interviewees, when asked why the comprehensive approach was better implemented at times and worse at other times, often brushed off the question and simply answered "personality differences." When pushed with additional questioning interviewees would often reflect on their leader's behaviours and try to interpret from which the leaders derive their knowledge and approach. These reflections suggest a level of agency in civil-military relations that are not addressed by those of Huntington and Janowitz as well as more contemporary analysts.

Huntington's emphasis on the functional imperative taking precedence, the 'professional ideal,' and military autonomy suggests that to be effective means that actions and behaviours should be solely based on reason and knowledge. The social imperative introduces problematic elements that may create a situation in which the course selected is not the ideal, therefore reducing the effectiveness. Janowitz, on the other hand, sees this separation not only unrealistic but also potentially detrimental. If the military moves further towards autonomy, separating itself from civilian influence suggests that the military will no longer have the same values of which they are trying to protect. Both of these theories, based on their ontological and epistemological assumptions, sees actors with limited to no agency and unable to participate in reproducing and changing social norms. In other words, a social theory approach is also needed to "show how agents, by participating in social conventions, generate asymmetric relations of advantage and disadvantage which implicate issues of legitimacy and authority" (Lechner and Frost, 2018: 9).

Feaver's principal-agent framework does attempt to introduce an element of agency into civil-military relations by introducing the concepts of working and shirking to help explain the changing patterns of civilian control. However, his framework predicates that depending on what is worked and what is shirked will lead to a number of logical outcomes. It is almost a purely deductive approach based on democratic theory and predicts that the result of the civilians heavily interfering with the military via monitoring, combined with shirking done by the military, would result in the highest levels of civil-military tensions and conflict. But what informed the working or shirking in the first place? Feaver's approach sees the likelihood of

shirking as an outcome of certain conditions – that is if the likelihood of being caught is high or the costs of being punished it too high than shirking would be less likely – and not because of internalized knowledge direction actions needed to be taken in a certain context. Feaver's deductive approach does not capture those particular nuances of decision-making and agency.

Other contemporary writers like Desch (1999), Bland (1999), Schiff (2009), and Angstrom (2013) are quick to point to the gaps in current civil-military relations theorizing, however, have not produced a theory that goes beyond the focus on professionalization and therefore the actions and outcomes of certain arrangements of civil-military relations, be it separated, integrated or both. None of these approaches provided adequate space to explain *why* and *how* the effectiveness of the operation often came down to 'personality differences.'

This review has highlighted the two main schools of thought as pioneered by Huntington and Janowitz and their continued influence on civil-military literature today. However, more and more contemporary writers have advocated for theories that go beyond the Huntington tradition, due its limited applicability to conflicts today, and include other aspects that play a role in civil-military relations and making a military fit for purpose. Despite the calls for change, the principles of subordination and separation continue to heavily influence the development of new frameworks. There have been some attempts to include cultural and normative aspects into civil-military relations analyses, like the works of Schiff and Angstrom, but they have had limited impact as they were secondary to the rest of their theories. As such, none of these approaches have sufficient explanatory power to explain *why* taking an integrated civil-military approach to complex peace operations have failed to prove effective. By taking a more culturally focused approach to look at the civil-military relations in PRTs in Afghanistan using a practice theory lens, it will help address some of the shortcomings found in traditional civil-military literature, especially the more rational approaches. In other words, behaviors are not simply determined by rational choices but also dispositions, standard practices and narratives which will be discussed in the following section.

The Practice Turn in Civil-Military Relations

Practice theory largely draws from the foundation laid out by Bourdieu from his work titled *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977). He introduced the key concepts of *habitus*, *field*, *capital* and, to a certain extent, *doxa*. His work fundamentally challenged the artificial divide between agent and structure, offers an epistemological position between objective and interpretive research traditions and challenges often entrenched but unsustainable dualisms (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). The practice turn eventually reached international relations (IR) theory, bringing to the fore that while world politics is a complex picture made up of a variety of everyday practices, little scholarly attention has been paid to those practices. Like IR theory, civil-military relations theory too pays little attention to the everyday practices and the "taken-for-granted" knowledge that play a key role in civil-military relations.

It does not take a huge stretch of the imagination to see how practice theory could be applied to civil-military relations. By using a practice lens, it allows one to move away from models of actions based on realist assumptions that often plague civil-military relations theory. It is no longer useful to assume that certain inputs will create predictable outcomes. The many years of a military and civilian presence in Afghanistan that is better resourced and better trained than local forces suggests that calculations simply based on inputs (like military strength) equals certain outcomes (like a decisive victory over insurgents) cannot be relied on. As Hew Strachan (2006) pointed out, Huntington's original work on civil-military relations and the necessity of separation in order to maintain civilian control continues to bind current theorizing, making it difficult to look beyond the central *problematique*. In this current security environment, which demands for much closer integration of civilian and military institutions, it is the everyday practice of diplomats, ambassadors, officers, generals, development specialists, political elites and many more that largely determines the effectiveness of an operation. Applying a practice lens to civil-military relations allows one to step away from "overly abstracted and simplified reifications" (Adler-Nissen, 2013) that often characterizes civil-military relations. In other words, the idea of civil-military relations, which began as a theoretical concept to help approach and explain the importance of civilian control, came to be regarded as self-evident and became endowed with history and geographic presence. Turning

a theoretical concept into a real-world object has a number of unwanted consequences. The world of civil-military relations was increasingly studied under a framework that was already constructed in a specific way. However, civil-military relations are the result of different processes, practices, and systems of knowledge. Thus civil-military relations cannot be studied as an entity in of itself but rather a process. For example, taking a command from an officer and transforming it into a specific tactical activity is a process rather than a simple exchange with a rational, predictable outcome. Practice theory allows a more nuanced exploration of the processes and practices of how people create and perpetuate civil-military relations through everyday practices.

The following section will review some of the key literature on the development of practice theory, beginning with a discussion of Bourdieu's key concepts: *habitus*, *field*, and *capital*. These concepts built the foundation for the practice turn in social theory, which is exemplified by the works of Schatzki et al.'s *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (2001) and Reckwitz's "Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing" (2002). It is then brought into the realm of IR by such works as Adler and Pouliot's *International Practices* (2011) and Bueger and Gadinger's *International Practice Theory: New Perspectives* (2014). While this is only a very small sampling of literature, these authors do well at situating practice theory amongst other social theories as well as in IR theory. They also introduce key concepts and methodologies that are integral to applying a practice lens for analysis of civil-military relations.

Practice Theory

The whole of Bourdieu's theoretical work on practice theory opposes to the divisions which characterize as much the social sciences as the field of sociology, like the division of the "-isms" and theory/methodology. Bourdieu's sociology tries to go beyond these divisions which he considers arbitrary, and which is why he also disagrees with the fundamental opposition objectivism/subjectivism, social physics and social phenomenology (Panagiotopoulos, 1995).

The objectivist approach, which considers that the structure (unseen relationships and entrenched institutions) exercise force on the individual and affects his socialization and his

integration into the social world. Hence, objectivism forms the social world as 'a spectacle offered to an observer who adopts a point of view against the action' (Bourdieu, 2006: 87). On the other side of this view is the subjectivist outlook. This view promotes the individual whose action is neither produced nor defined by the structure. It is actually produced and defined by the actor himself since he sets objectives, has preferences, and makes choices. Bourdieu claimed that to approach the question of the formation of the social world and its interpretation only from the viewpoint of objectivism means that we overlook the subjectivist viewpoint since the social world should be approached based on the viewpoint of people's actions as well (Grenfell, 2008; Tatsis, 2004). However, Bourdieu does not espouse objectivism over subjectivism or vice versa, rather he focuses on "space" in which the dialectic relationship between objectivism and subjectivism is expressed. That "space" is where practices are located. In other words, individuals' action is located in the dialectical relationship of 'the social', or the "objectified" history, and the incorporated history of the "habitus." which, according to Bourdieu, takes the form of 'systems of permanent dispositions.' However, this raises the questions of what defines practices. Or, in other words, what defines, within the various social situations, the automatic and spontaneous choices of the actors? Although the concept of habitus seems to have been constructed by Bourdieu in order to address the issue of the non-conscious or subjugated-to-rules orientation of practices, it does not act alone with regard to the practices (Maton, 2008; McNay, 2002).

Bourdieu's theory of practice introduces a conceptual triad that enables scientific enquiry to grasp the unconscious – *habitus, field,* and *capital* – that make up practices. Practices are understood as 'the result of an indefinite, unconscious, double relationship between habitus and the field' (Bourdieu, 2003: 147). In order to convey and summarize this relationship, Bourdieu constructed the following model:

[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice

This model reveals that practice stems from the relationship of the individual's habitus and their position (which depends on the amount and structure of their capital) within the social field (Maton, 2008). However, before moving forward it is important to provide a better understanding of the concepts of habitus, field, and capital.

Habitus

Before settling on the term of habitus, Bourdieu often used the term ethos and hexis while developing his theoretical concept. He used ethos to outline an objectively articulated system of predispositions and generative principles of practice. It highlights the unconscious, internalized schemata, the principles, and the values of the subject, which in the form of predispositions 'govern and guide' everyday practices. The hexis (*hexis corporelle*) comprises an acquired 'physical predisposition' which is expressed and depicted in the way we stand, walk, talk, or move the body from one position to another (Bonnewitz, 2009). The concepts of 'ethos' and 'hexis' constitute two potential dimensions, as well as constituent elements, of the habitus. By combining these two concepts, habitus also allows for the possibility of the relative autonomy of the actor in his everyday practices. Habitus, thus, acts as a mediator through which the individuals comprehend, evaluate, and depict reality. (Bonnewitz, 2009).

As such, Bourdieu defines the habitus as a "system of durable, transposable dispositions, which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitely differentiated tasks" (Bourdieu, 2000: 261 as quoted in Pouliot 2008: 31). Vincent Pouliot (2008) highlights four dimensions to the concept of habitus. The first dimension is that habitus is historical. The dispositions that comprise it are acquired by actors through their occupation of a particular social position that inclines them to perceive the world, and therefore act within that world in a particular way (Pouliot, 2008; Gheciu, 2015).

The second dimension is that habitus is practical in that it is learned by doing and from direct experience within the world. For example, when someone rides a bicycle or plays an instrument, it is the embodiment of unspoken knowledge corporeally deployed. Or as Charles Taylor (1993: 50) puts it, "our body is not just the executant of the goals we frame or just the locus of the causal factors which shape our representations. Our understanding itself is embodied." This bodily knowledge, in the world of politics, gives a "sense of one's place" and of the other's place thereby informing action and behaviors (Pouliot 2008: 32).

Third, habitus is relational in that agents are the products of social interactions. These interactions result in the transference of knowledge that then becomes internalized, unconsciously directing the actions needed to be taken within a certain context. For example, Taylor (1993) writes about rules and that the understanding of rules results from the embodiment of intersubjective interactions. He illustrates this example the following way:

> Some outsider, unfamiliar with the way we do things, might misunderstand what to us are perfectly clear and simple directions. You want to get to town? Just follow the arrows. But suppose that what seemed the natural way of following the arrow to him or her was to go in the direction of the feathers, not of the point? We can imagine a scenario: there are no arrows in the outsider's culture, but there is a kind of ray gun whose discharge fans out like the feathers on our arrows (pg. 45).

In other words, rules do not always come with manuals, especially those rules that are often "unspoken." These understandings only come about through social interaction.

The last dimension of habitus is that it is dispositional. It is not deterministic; rather, it inclines or disposes agents to act in certain ways that is contextually dependent. As Pouliot (2008: 33) puts it "habitus is an 'art of inventing' that introduces contingency into social action: the same disposition could potentially lead to different practices *depending on the social context*," (emphasis mine). The idea of social context influencing dispositions is further captured in Bourdieu's concept of field.

With the previous in mind, it is no surprise that the complex concept of habitus has been seen as a controversial concept in social sciences. A comprehensive review of the critiques of habitus is outside the realm of this thesis, therefore, I will only refer to some of the main critiques. The first critique is that habitus does not necessarily escape determinism nor the objective-subjective dichotomy. Jeffrey Alexander in *La reduction. Critique de Bourdieu* (2000) is particularly critical of the concept of habitus. He argues that Bourdieu defines habitus in and unclear and ambiguous manner which is far from systematic. More importantly, while habitus appears to favor voluntarism since it allows for improvisation, within limits, ultimately it always tends to function in the direction of determinism (Alexander, 2000). Taking a similar viewpoint, Margolis (1999: 64–69) claims that Bourdieu's conceptualization of habitus fails to avoid and

resist the fundamental opposition objectivism-subjectivism in the field of sociology. He remains trapped in a structuralist viewpoint, where the acting subjects resemble actors, and even in those situations where they improvise when playing a role, their improvisation is ultimately governed by the structures.

The second main criticism is the limited capacity for the concept of habitus to understand and explain the problem of social change. According to the Calhoun (1995), while the concept of habitus contains and expresses a dynamic in relation to actors' improvisation, creativity, and flexibility, it cannot be linked to more general character strategies which that could bring about social change. In other words, "by making habitus's essential logic of practice unreflexive, Bourdieu denies the ability of practicing agents to critique, reinterpret, and thereby revise their practical logic and behavior, thus compelling them to sustain the social domination incorporated in the habitus that allegedly directs their practical action" (Shusterman, 1999:7).

Overall, much of the resistance to the habitus derives from the assumption that it must function somehow as an underlying causal mechanism. However, scholars, including Charles Taylor, have successfully elaborated the usefulness of habitus precisely for "overcoming our dualistic inability to account for purposeful, intelligent behavior that is not the following of explicit conscious rules" (Ibid.: 5). This idea alone makes habitus a useful tool for analyzing civil-military relations.

Field

While the genesis of fields is at the core of his theoretical framework, Bourdieu is lax in that he does not really propose a theory of the conditions under which fields are formed (Lemieux 2011). Usually, a field is identified when a group of agents struggle in a structured way over a specific kind of scarce resource like influence over a decision. Fields can be small or large, more or less important, more or less autonomous. Because the field is a social space, once the main object of struggle is identified, its important to know its topography: what is the population, where are agents positioned, and what are the boundaries of the field? Basically, a field is defined by the relationships that objectively link different positions around a given set of stakes

– for example, political economy, science, or literature – be it at the national level or at the global level (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Fields are social configurations that are structured, sustained, and reproduced by the agents that participate in them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 19). Each field is characterized by "unspoken rules of the game" and a common sense of what is at stake within that field. Basically, a field is structured along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle, and taken-for-granted rules. First, fields are comprised of positions where some actors are dominant, and others are dominated. It is the control of a variety of historically constructed capitals, from economic through social to symbolic, that defines the structure of power relations in the field and the positions that result.

Second, fields "are defined by the stakes which are at stake." Fields are relatively autonomous from one another because they are characterized by certain struggles that have been socially and historically constituted (Leander 2008: 15). All contestants agree on what it is they are seeking— political authority, artistic prestige, economic profit, academic reputation, and so on. Thus, the field is a kind of social game, with the specificity that it is a game "in itself" and not "for itself": "one does not embark on the game by a conscious act, one is born into the game, with the game" (Bourdieu, 1990:67).

The third characteristic of fields, which is that they are structured by taken-for granted rules. This "doxa" is comprised of "all that is accepted as obvious, in particular the classifying schemes which determine what deserves attention and what does not" (Bourdieu, 1980: 83). As a form of immediate adherence, a field's doxa is obeyed not only by dominant agents who benefit from it but also by the dominated ones who clearly do not. Hence the importance of symbolic power relationships.

To think in terms of fields, is to think in terms of relations (Bourdieu, 2000). Applying this concept in IR allows for a relational approach that facilitates a level of analysis that is quite distinct from the discipline's dominant schools of thought: "it is not focused on substances, such as the state and state actors, or essentialized concepts such as politics or globalization, but instead on the "totality of relations" involving the positions that are uncovered, structured, and conceptualized in the field" (Pouliot and Merand, 2013: 32). In other words, there are no

privileged actors, but rather relations of dependence, contestation, or distinction (what Bourdieu calls "practical" solidarities and rivalries) that depend on the positions occupied by agents in the field. These agents are then led by their *illusio*, or the emotional and corporeal investment in the social game. Bourdieu used the concept *illusio* rather than interest as he found the concept of interest tied to tightly to rational choice theory. Applying this terms to IR, one could say for example that the notion of "national interest" captures the *illusio* involved in civil-military relations, but it is not an essential aspect of civil-military relations.

As fields are socially constructed, the number of fields that can exist within a given space is potentially unlimited. The fact that there could be so many theoretically possible fields raises the question of their boundaries. According to Bourdieu and Wacquant "the limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease" (1992: 100). The potentially unlimited number of fields also raises the question of relations between fields. On one hand, as long as the rules are clear, the borders clearly demarcated, and the struggles around the stakes that structure the field are sufficiently understood by actors, we can say that the field is autonomous. On the other hand, there are fields that overlap, interpenetrate, and mutually determine each other. A field can be continuously shaped by the logic of other fields and some fields are nested within larger fields (or meta-fields) that can wield great influence. For instance, the state and its claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is a meta-field and greatly influences the field of civil-military relations (Adler-Nissen, 2013).

But how to the habitus and field interact? Pouliot nicely sums up the role of habitus and field in social action:

> The intersection of a particular set of embodied dispositions (constituted by a historical trajectory of subjectivized intersubjectivity) and a specific field of positions (comprised of power relations, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted rules) is the *engine of social action*—be it rational, rule-based, communicative, or unreflexive throughout (emphasis mine, 2008: 41).

In civil-military relations in the PRTs there are a number of fields at play like national interest, domestic politics, international institutions, and US – Canada relations, to name a few. In certain situations, these fields could be seen as autonomous but in the case of the PRTs these

are often overlapping, mutually constituting, and penetrating fields. For example, the field of domestic politics can influence US – Canada relations and vice versa. Relations between fields are often complex and difficult to entangle but it allows us to analyze the totality of social facts that combine both national and international logics which is a significant contribution to IR theory (Pouliot and Merand, 2013: 35).

Capital

Bourdieu's notion of capital expands upon the conventional economic meaning and breaks it down into economic, social, cultural, and symbolic forms. Economic capital refers to financial resources available to an agent including income, property, material possessions and savings and is often seen as the easiest to convert (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital is comprised of social networks or "relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 12). Cultural capital comes in three forms. First is institutionalized capital like academic qualifications or military rank that confers legitimacy to its owner in a given social context. Second is embodied capital which refers to experience gained through work or experience of living in a particular society. Third is objectified capital that exists in a material state like books, equipment, and dress (Bourdieu, 1986). Symbolic power then is the culmination of economic, social, and cultural capital that manifests itself in social ranking, class position, level of influence, etc. Capital then becomes the basis of power and often underlies implicit forms of domination. Therefore, agents often try to increase or manipulate their capital (or even the field to increase the worth of their capital) in order to "play the game" more successfully (Pouliot, 2008).

To draw a more concrete example of Bourdieu's triad as it functioned in Afghanistan, one simply need to look at how military commanders approached the mission. Military commanders often decided on strategy based on previous experiences of deployment be it in a peacekeeping role, a kinetic operations role, or something else. This informs their disposition to develop a strategy that has a more long-term development and reconstruction focus or one that is more focused on eliminating the enemy. This disposition also informs the way they view and/or value their civilian counterparts and the utility of their expertise. A PRT commander

which does not value development as a way to address conflict will often disregard their advice and undervalue their expertise. There are many incidents in which commanders overvalued their experience in conflict areas and utilized resources in such a way that was a force multiplier to move their specific strategy forward, regardless of the consequences, both intended and unintended. For example, building a health centre and putting an American flag on it is not a way to create sustainable change.

Hysteresis

These three concepts do well to capture the constant interplay of structures, agents and capital that results in practices. However, these concepts do not readily capture how social phenomena change over time. Bourdieu introduces the concept of *hysteresis* to better capture how change comes about:

> The hysteresis of habitus, which is inherent in the social conditions of the reproduction of the structures in habitus, is doubtless one of the foundations of the structural lag between opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them which is the cause of missed opportunities and, in particular, of the frequently observed incapacity to think historical crises in categories of perceptions and thought other than those of the past (Bourdieu, 1977: 83)

In other words, despite the ability of the habitus to adapt and adjust to changing conditions of the field, the habitus does have instances or "critical moments when it misfires or is out of phase," often as a result of when a field undergoes a major transformation that changes its rules or regularities (Bourdieu 2000: 162). The habitus often suffers a degree of inertia due to its tendency to reproduce itself, and thus the objective structures that produce it, and some agents may have difficulty generating practices that are in line with the new conditions. Hysteresis then occurs when agents' "dispositions become dysfunctional and the efforts they make to perpetuate them help to plunge them deeper into failure" (Bourdieu, 2000: 161). The concept of hysteresis highlights the disparity between new opportunities created by changes in the field and the agents whose habitus leaves them unable (at least temporarily) to recognize the value of the new positions. As such, hysteresis provides a means to link the changing nature

of war and the subsequent deeper integration between the military and civilians and the subjective nature of individual responses.

Overall, in outlining these concepts, Bourdieu's talk of practices speaks of a desire "to free activity from the determining grasp of objectified social structures and systems, to question individual actions and their status as the building-blocks of social phenomena, and to transcend rigid action structure oppositions" (Schatzki, 2001: 10). This gives practice theory a unique position in social theory, and consequently IR theory.

Positioning Practice Theory Within Social Theory

Reckwitz (2002) does well in positioning practice theory in relation to other forms of social theory. First, he identifies three types of social theory: purpose-oriented theories (behavior is explained in terms of individual purposes, intentions, and interests), norm-oriented theories (behavior is explained through collective norms and structures) and culture theories (behavior is explained through collective structures of knowledge). He then identifies practice theory as a form of cultural theory but notes that not all cultural theorists are practice theorists (see Figure 4.1 below). Some culturalist approaches differ in how they conceptualize these collectively shared orders of knowledge.



Figure 4.1: **Conceptualizing Practice Theory**

Source: Adapted from Kuijer, Lenneke (2014). Implications of Social Practice Theory for Sustainable Design (Doctoral Dissertation). Delft University of Technology: The Netherlands.

Reckwitz (2002) breaks down these different forms of culturalist theorizing into mentalist, textualist and intersubjectivist approaches to help distinguish the distinct approach that practice theory takes.

Mentalist approaches locate the social within the human mind. Culture is understood as a cognitive phenomenon and thus is based upon "the idea that mind is a substance, place or realm that houses a particular range of activities and attributes" (Schatzki 1996: 22). As such, the smallest unit of analysis, in this case, is mental structures. Such works like the classic structuralism first developed by Ferdinand de Saussure and further developed by Claude Levi-Strauss, as well as the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz or Edmund Husserl are typical of this approach (Reckwitz 2002: 247). In opposition to mentalists approaches, textualist approaches see symbolic structures not located on the 'inside' but rather on the 'outside' in things such as chains of signs, symbols, discourse, or texts. The social need not be explained by mental qualities but can be explained by focusing on "public" signs and texts. Analysts tend to rely on discourse analysis to help decipher these symbolic structures and their rules of formation. Foucault's (1972) *Archeology of Knowledge* and Geertz's (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures* are emblematic of this approach. Lastly, intersubjectivist approaches locates the social in interactions, most often within the use of ordinary language. As such, interaction represents a transference of meanings that have been internalized by the agents' minds. Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action is a classic formulation of this approach. It should be noted, however, that in later works Reckwitz (2008)[5] acknowledged that the differentiation between practice theory and intersubjectivism can be neglected due to the strong convergence of interests in both approaches (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015).

In sum, practice theory does not place the social in mental qualities, social discourse, or interactions; it suggests locating the social within practices. Its distinctiveness resides in taking patterns of activity as the smallest unit of analysis. As Bueger and Gadinger (2015:451) describe the focus of practice theory as "neither on the internal (inside the head of actors), or on the

[5] For example, see Reckwitz, Andreas (2008). *Unscharfe Grenzen: Perspektiven der Kultursoziologie.* Bielefeld: transcript.

external (in some form of structure)," but rather see "practice as ontologically in between the inside and the outside." More specifically, practice theorists

> identify the social in the mind (since individuals are carriers of practice), but also in symbolic structures (since practices form more or less extra-subjective structures and patterns of actions). Practice theorists foreground an understanding of shared knowledge as practical knowledge. They are interested in concrete situations of life in which actors perform a common practice and thus create and maintain social orderliness (Bueger and Gadinger, 2015: 451).

With the previous description in mind, the term practice does not always lend itself to an easy definition. However, for the purpose of this research, Reckwitz's definition of practice is useful: "a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge" (2002: 249). In other words, the existence of a practice is wholly dependent on the existence and specific interconnectedness of all these different elements. A practice cannot be reduced to any one of them. It is within this "nexus of doings and sayings" (Hui, Schatzki and Shove, 2016) that is the site of the social in practical activities (see Figure 4.2). All dimensions are linked, and they influence and form each other.



Figure 4.2: Locus of Practice

In applying the concept of practice to IR, its main strength is in its ability to address the structure agency dichotomy. This is especially notable when considering the role of the state, as Pouliot and Merand write:

> The conception of the state, as a field of institutionalized power that articulates relations between other fields, is in marked contrast to the definition most commonly held in IR. Essentially, the state cannot be considered as only an *actor;* it is first and foremost a *space* of positions, the core of which sees different groups of actors struggling to impose their 'principles of vision and division.' (2013: 36)

Those groups of actors performing in this field become part of the struggle to define reality itself. Agents use time and capital to face off against others who want to impose their vision of the world. A vision that is often expressed in dispositions, positions taken and "common sense" (Bourdieu refers to this as *doxa)* that indicates an "unspoken submission to everyday life" that often reinforces the status quo (Pouliot and Merand, 2013).

Supporting Concepts

The previous review breaks down the basic tenets of practice theory, how it has been applied to IR and why it is useful for analyzing civil-military relations. However, as practice theory is relatively new to the field of IR, let alone civil-military relations, certain concepts – dispositions, standard practices, and narratives – need further discussion. It will help enhance the clarity in what shapes the everyday dimension of civil-military relations.

Dispositions

Why do certain military and civilian leaders make the decisions they do? Why did some better implement the comprehensive approach than others? How does background knowledge influence behavior? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the disposition of the individual, the community, and the institution. For example, the Canadian military institution has values and practices that have developed over a long history that was influenced by England, France, Indigenous peoples, the US, the UN, and NATO amongst many other things, which created certain dispositions towards war and peace operations. This institution then influences the dispositions of the military communities – the army, the navy and the air force as well as civilians – which then trickles down to the individual. Much of the knowledge that informs dispositions is doxical in that it is a deep-seated system of beliefs, understandings and practices that appear self-evident or commonsensical.

The term disposition, for the purpose of this thesis, draws heavily from Bourdieu's concept of *habitus.* As described previously, habitus is a "system of durable, transposable dispositions, which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation and action, making possible the accomplishment of infinitely differentiated tasks" (Bourdieu, 2000: 261 as quoted in Pouliot 2008: 31). The historical, practical, and relational aspects of habitus create inclinations towards certain behavior, making habitus essentially dispositional.

By focusing on disposition as a concept, it allows one to locate and analyze the source of practices. To review, a practice is a process of doing something that is usually patterned in that it shows some regularities over time and space and is socially meaningful in a recognizable way.

Most importantly it rests on background knowledge that is both ideational and material and represents preferences and policies that makes use of a variety of materials (Pouliot and Adler, 2011). It is that background knowledge that shapes dispositions and informs practices. The habitus is composed of dispositions that are largely acquired through historical experience, both individual and collective, that are in turn used as a set of guiding principles that are used constantly, if unconsciously. With little if any deliberate conscious thought, these dispositions form a tacit, inarticulate know-how that therefore appears self-evident of commonsensical in nature. For example, the military and the civilians clearly have differing dispositions towards intervention and complex peace operations. During several interviews with military leaders that commanded PRTs in Afghanistan at one time or another, the disposition towards viewing civilians as less disciplined with poor planning capabilities became evident. This disposition could have come from a variety of sources like military training and personal experiences and reinforced through practices and narratives. In some cases, these dispositions contributed to the tension between the military and civilian components of the PRTs resulting in limiting coordination, cooperation and information sharing between groups, negatively affecting the operation.

Standard Practices

A standard practice refers to a specific kind of practice – a type of routinized response to a specific context. Standard practices are actions that are patterned, competent, and socially meaningful but are also almost entirely automatic. These practices are the security routines followed when deployed outside the wire in a conflict-zone, or they are the response when an officer enters the room, or it is following the chain of command. As these standard practices are automatic and largely not reflected upon, they can both enable and act as a barrier to working together with people and institutions that have different practices than one's own. Throughout the interviews, many people observed that the military planning machine demanded much more than what civilian development planning could quickly deliver, creating doubt about each other's competency. While these examples suggest only instances of standard practices,

practices are much more complex and interact in a myriad of ways which is why they are important to understand when studying civil-military relations.

Ann Swidler's (2001) concept of "anchoring practice" is particularly useful here. Anchoring practice is a "bundle of interwoven practices" that makes other, more specific practices possible by providing "a common reference-point, and infrastructure for interaction that allows actors to engage in other, non-anchoring practices" (Sending and Neumann 2011: 232 and 236). For example, the practice of intervening in a conflict-ridden fragile state that is a threat to international security, makes possible numerous other practices that characterize contemporary complex peace operations like counterinsurgency, humanitarian aid, and development. These standard practices encompass a large variety of actions like writing reports, collecting data on security incidents, following security protocols, attending meetings, interacting with the local population, deriving lessons learned and developing "best practices." For example, those deployed to PRTs were quick to learn the parlance and rhythms of the PRT, adopting standard practices to "fit in" and follow established protocols.

This type of standard practice also includes the patterns of relationships between and among groups. These relationships can be characterized by conflict (like those between NGOs and the military), cooperative (like international organizations working in the same field) or mixed (like between civilian interveners and the local population) (Hopf, 2010). These patterned relationships are often sustained by dispositions that can "yield systematically biased perceptions, attitudes, and practices toward these automatically categorized" groups (Ibid.: 549).

However, it is important to note that standard practices can also have the negative side-effect of essentially minimizing conscience reflection in that these practices are routinized and executed without thinking. This can effectively minimize or eliminate a vast array of behaviors from the repertoire of available actions (Autesserre, 2014). For example, despite the vast amount of literature written on the detrimental effects of taking a blue-print approach to development, this practice is still rampant due to the limiting effect of certain standard practices.

Narratives

The last concept of narratives, as developed by Autesserre (2014), is also useful in analyzing the everyday of civil-military relations. Narratives act as frames which render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action. They exist both within an individual as well as in social routines, practices, discourses, technologies and institutions. As stated by Autesserre, frames "can consist of ideologies (such as liberalism), assumptions and definitions that are taken as a given (for example, host populations lack capacity), and paradigms… which include standard operating procedures (such as election organization) and shared definitions of the environment" (2014: 34). Some of the more common narratives found concerning complex peace operations have to do with the primary causes, consequences, and solutions to the conflict in a country or that foreign interveners are trying to help the population by strengthening the government.

Narratives and frames develop over time and can change (albeit slowly) with changing circumstances. For example, consider how peacekeeping has been framed over time. Traditional peacekeeping was underpinned by the principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force while contemporary peace operations can, and often do, sidestep some or all these principles but are still considered peacekeeping. Afghanistan is a telling example that while the interveners are there at the government's request, there is no impartiality as the interveners are working of the side of government and no minimum use of force as kinetic operations are regularly conducted to fight and kill the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Narratives can also emerge from various sources at differing levels to become to dominant collective understanding. Such sources can include international organizations (for example, the "do no harm" narrative), interveners working on the ground (like the view of interveners being distinct from the local population), or the global stage (that statebuilding is necessary to end or prevent conflict). In Afghanistan, states too played a significant role in determining the dominant narrative that directed their operations. For example, Germany did not conduct kinetic operations due to its history and national interests, Canada wanted to prove its military capabilities on an international stage, and the UK was working in solidarity with the US.

Moreover, practices are constantly interacting, informing, and influencing narratives. Some narratives emerge directly from practices, some narratives are sustained by certain practices and some narratives enable and justify specific practices. For instance, in Afghanistan, the dominant narrative was that the host government and elites lack capacity to effectively govern and provide public goods, thereby justifying foreign intervention. Narratives ultimately provide a vantage point from which to understand and analyze differing situations that interveners may face. For example, the Canadian government's narrative was heavily focused on improving the rights of women and, as such, interveners sought ways in which to frame their work as improving the lives of women. However, like most things, these narratives are also open to interpretation and some may use these narratives in a different way. Like everything, there are always exceptions to the dominant view.

CHAPTER 5: A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Defining *Sobjectivism*

Constructivism constitutes a 'style of reasoning' of its own in social science, a claim that has several methodological implications. According to Stefano Guzzini (2000), constructivism is a 'metatheoretical commitment' based on three principles: ontologically, social reality is constructed; epistemologically, knowledge is socially constructed; and knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive. The constructivist style of reasoning underscores that, throughout history, there have been "new modes of reasoning that have specific beginnings and trajectories of development" (Hacking, 2002: 162). In this sense, the way forward consists of building on the social facts[6] that are naturalized by social agents. The focus, therefore, is on what it is that *social agents*, as opposed to analysts, take to be real. Ultimately, to know whether a social fact reflects actually reality makes no analytical difference; the whole point is to observe whether agents take it to be real and to draw the social and political implications that follow.

How does one grasp subjective social facts and move it into objective reality? This is where Pierre Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) become useful. One of the things that Bourdieu's works made clear is that is that practices occur at the confluence of two things: bodies (habitus) and things (field). Bourdieu states that practices are "the encounter between two histories," and that "the principle of action lies in the complicity between two states of the social, between history in the bodies and history in things, or, more precisely, between the history objectified in the form of structures and mechanisms (those of the social space or of fields), and history incarnated in bodies, in the form of habitus" (2000: 150 – 151). In attending to both dispositional and positional logics, it implies a need for a constructivist methodology that can combine inductive, interpretive, and historical modes of analysis to capture both subjective knowledge that is captured by the habitus and objective knowledge that is captured by the field. Drawing from the works of Clifford Geertz on experience-near

[6] According to John Ruggie, social facts are "those facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist"; Ruggie 1998, 12.

(phenomenological inquiry to try and accurately grasp an agent's reality) and experience-distant (the outsider viewpoint of a situation at hand) concepts, Vincent Pouliot (2010) developed a constructivist methodology called *sobjectivism* in order to better capture subjective and objective knowledges.

First, a necessary starting point for any constructivist enquiry is taking an inductive approach to analysis (Pouliot, 2010: 59). It is a research strategy that moves from the individual to the general, necessarily avoiding any imposition of specific categorization of agents' taken-for-granted realities. For example, development workers were frequently referred to as tree huggers which made it reasonable to conclude that there are certain stereotypes that drive the military's perception of civilians working in development. Induction also allows constructivists to access meanings and workings of the world as it exists to the agents in a specific context. For example, lessons learned are often a result of induction. The Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) produced multiple lessons learned reports based on extensive field visits and interviews. One example of a lesson learned SIGAR notes is that "increased funding alone cannot compensate for stabilization's inherent challenges and believing that it can exacerbate those challenges" (SIGAR, 2018: 187). In other words, many countries, but the US especially, tried to throw money at Afghanistan assuming it will lead to stabilization but often the opposite was true.

Second, constructivism's epistemological approach requires interpretation to be an intrinsic part of social research (Adler, 2005). As Geertz (1973) argues, the interpretive moment is necessary for any social inquiry: identifying that a twitch is not a wink is based solely on intersubjective meanings. More importantly, it is through interpretation that meanings can be objectified as part of a larger intersubjective context (Pouliot, 2010: 62). However, thirdly, it is also important to acknowledge that these subjective and objective meanings are far from static and are part of a larger dialectical process between knowledge and reality that are constantly evolving over time. Consequently, constructivism is by necessity historic. As Pouliot states, "a historical methodology is concerned with the genesis of its object of study, that is, with the historical processes that make possible the constitution of specific social contexts. Since no social realities are natural, they are the results of political and social processes that are rooted

in history" (2010: 63). In order to trace these processes, it requires the building of a narrative, "a dynamic account that tells the story of a variety of historical processes as they unfold over time" (Ibid.). Using narrative in this case does not necessarily focus on causality but rather it traces the contingent practices that have historically made a social fact possible.

A Three-Part Methodology

In tying these three modes of inquiry together (inductive approach, interpretation, and historical processes), Pouliot developed three-part methodology that moves along a continuum from subjective knowledge to objective knowledge. The first step is to "recover subjective meanings." This step is largely inductive in order to better capture agent's meanings and intersubjective knowledge. There are a number of ethnographic methods that are well suited for this purpose like participant observation. However, ethnographic methods in active conflicts, like in Afghanistan, are largely infeasible due to safety and security concerns. As such, for the purpose of this research, I undertook over 70 qualitative interviews, both formal and informal. After all, interviews are "attempts to understand the world form the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meanings of peoples' experiences, to uncover their lived world to scientific explanations" (Kvale, 1996: 1). In other words, interviews are specifically geared to recover subjective knowledge that then can objectified through the use of interpretation and historicization.

However, it is also important to note that interviews also suffer several limitations. First and foremost, is that the very act of posing questions can result in an agent adopting a "quasi-theoretical posture" that imposes meaning as opposed to "expressing the truth of his practice" (Bourdieu, 1990: 91). Second, the previous limitation further implies the possibility of deception, whether intentional or not. As such the recovery of subjective meanings should always be supplemented with objectifying methods to better ensure validity. In order to overcome some of these limitations, I developed questions that would help retrieve the inarticulate, like asking questions about a hypothetical situation or having the interviewees retell the practices of others. This allowed me to understand better where they were talking *from* rather than just what they were talking *about* (Pouliot, 2010: 68).

For the purpose of this thesis, in order to parse the insider knowledge of the interviewees and evaluate the extent to which the comprehensive approach was embodied through PRTs, I have drawn out three empirical indicators that have been made evident across the case studies (see Table 5.1 below). These indicators are far from mutually exclusive, but they have significant heuristic value for organizing all the information I have gathered from my interviews and ethnographic observations. Put together, these indicators reveal the degree of self-evidence of the embodiment of the comprehensive approach.

Table 5.1: Indicators of the Embodiment of the Comprehensive Approach in PRTs

Indicator	**Assessment Questions**
Normalization of civil-military tensions	What is the nature of the tension? Do practitioners have the belief that tensions can be overcome? How do practitioners handle tensions when searching for a solution? What lessons from past and present tensions do practitioners draw from?
Everyday cooperation on the ground	What institutional forms or routines do daily interactions take place? Do certain practices limit certain courses of interaction? What kind of background knowledge or dispositions do standard practices embody?
Unity of Effort	Are there mutual perceptions of military and political goals? How do practices foster or minimize trust? How do civilian and military leaders embody the comprehensive approach?

These indicators will feed into the second part of the *sobjective* methodology which is "putting meanings in context" (Pouliot 2010: 72). The goal here is to understand individual parts of intersubjectivity as part of a larger whole. Identifying these 'meanings' cannot happen in isolation but on through the web of meanings. These meanings are usually interpreted through discourse analysis that allows to take meanings from people's heads and place them within a wider intersubjective context. The inductive acquisition of these meanings through discourse analysis lead to a bit of a methodological dilemma – what are the boundaries of the relevant discourses? Based on her research questions, Crawford noted that, "the analyst must

make choices about the kind of discourse they will focus on and the boundaries of the discourse—both temporal and genre—that they will examine" (2004: 22). Discourse analysis needs to be focused on a number of specific elements rather than trying to explain everything at a time. It would be nonsensical to abstractly establish uniform criteria for what (and how much) needs to be read. Such criteria should derive from the context, that is, from examining the political and analytical depth of any given discourse. For this research, I established those boundaries based on what was found during the ethnographic and interview stage. Interviewees often pointed to documentation, texts, and narratives that played a key in shaping the larger intersubjective context. From this I drew up a list of documents on which to do the discourse analysis. As such, it is primarily focused on official documentation, reports on lessons learned, military doctrine and mandates from each of the case studies.

The last part is "setting meanings in motion," that is to objectify meanings by introducing time and history. Meanings are ever evolving as a result of the dynamic dialectic between reality and knowledge, and it is historical analysis that can reveal those dynamics. There are a number of methods that can be used for this type of inquiry. One particularly popular choice is process-tracing as described by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2004). Simply defined, the process tracing method "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between the independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2004: 206). The focus is chains of cause-and-effect relations.

George and Bennet's conceptualization builds the foundation but the debate on the relationship between historical narratives and theoretical explanations continues to explore the conceptualization of the relationship between theory and method. One definition to what can be largely termed the "theory-guided process tracing" (TGPT) method explains that TGPT provides theoretically explicit narratives that trace and compare the sequence of events of a process of interests. As Ronald Aminzade (1993: 108) explains, narratives

> allow us to capture the unfolding of social action over time in a manner sensitive to the order in which events occur. By making the theories that underpin our narratives more explicit, we avoid the danger of burying our explanatory variables in engaging stories. By

comparing sequences, we can determine whether there are typical sequences across [cases] … and can explore the causes and consequences of different sequence patterns.

Other approaches include Robert Bates et al. (1998) "analytic narrative", Tim Büthe's (2002) "historical narratives," and Peter Hall's (2003) "systematic process analysis." Bates combines theoretical tools of rational choice and game theory with the narrative method. It attempts to account for outcomes by exploring the mechanisms that generate them. Büthe argues that narratives should provide support for a theoretical argument that can be viewed as a simplification of reality that depicts a "deductively sound, systematic, regular relationship between variables" (2002: 482). Lastly, Hall's work gives a higher epistemological view to "systematic process analysis." He explains that theories of strategic interaction and path dependence have further emphasized the complex ontological aspects of social phenomena. He proposes specifying a set of theories that identify the causal factors and how they operate.

Unfortunately, these positivistic conceptions focusing on causal mechanisms make it largely incompatible with interpretivism (Checkel, 2008). However, Pouliot argues that process-tracing is amenable to constructivism given two amendments. First, the focus on causation needs to be enlarged to include constitutive mechanisms – that is the mechanisms of how a social fact came into being. Second, that those mechanisms should be seen as a heuristic device that researchers can apply to observations in order to classify them. As described by Pouliot (2010:77), these constitutive mechanisms can be characterized by the following formula: X counts as Y in context C. Pouliot refers to an example given by Searle (1995: 28): "Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (X) count as money (Y) in the United States (C)." In order to account for the processes that lead to C, one must identify the social processes that lead to the constitution of Y by X. C then stands for the context that makes it possible for social facts to be socially constructed. Therefore,

> In order to provide a dynamic account of the social processes that lead to C, one must identify constitutive mechanisms—heuristic devices about the social processes that lead to the constitution of Y by X. Constitutive mechanisms help understand what brings about context C, rendering possible the constitutive relation. Theorizing constitutive mechanisms allows for a better understanding of how the historical conditions of

possibility of any social fact are generated and allows for analogies across cases (Pouliot 2010: 75).

For this thesis, a simplified way of the thinking of it is that "civil-military relations (X) as established by practices (Y) determines the conduct of the mission in Afghanistan (C). In sum, these constitutive mechanisms can historicize social meanings. This slightly altered form of process tracing will then be used alongside discourse analysis.

The utility of discourse analysis in this research derives from two characteristics of discourse, according to Amir Lupovici – "it enables the actors' understanding of the social world of which they are part, and it constitutes and defines the social parts and practices of this world" (2009: 202). This suggests that discourse analysis should not be limited to more positivist approaches that seeks causation but can also be used as a discursive method that aims to discover a broader understanding of specific discourses and their emergence like the emergence of the concept of peace building, its precedents, and how it contributed to the narrative of the mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, discourse analysis can contribute to understanding a chain of events, the context of those events as well as the constitution of actors' practices and dispositions. This is the approach to process tracing and discourse analysis that this thesis will take to allow for the objectification of subjective meanings.

To perform the discourse analysis, I collected official documentation, reports on lessons learned, military doctrine and mandates from each of the case studies from both prior and during the mission in Afghanistan. I began by coding similarly to the approach I took to the coding the interviews; beginning with broad themes and narrowing down as more patterns were identified. As it progressed, it became clearer that much of what was written was highly influenced by past and current military doctrine. Therefore, I began to focus the coding on references to military doctrine specifically using codes such as Comprehensive Approach, integration, and counterinsurgency, which was further separated by country. This was further broken down into time periods, changes in definitions, recommendations, amongst others, to get a better sense of how things evolved which allowed for easier identification of the constitutive mechanisms. The constitutive mechanisms for the US were much more clear cut, especially relating to COIN, due to the US's expansive military history that has been studied

more than any other country. The Canadian case proved much muddier as many of the concepts were borrowed from the US or other multilateral institutions and little adjustment was made to tie it closer to the Canadian context. This analysis will be further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

These three approaches allow a researcher to grasp collective meanings as constituted by bodies and things. It moves from recovering subjective meanings and through interpretation and historicization move them to objectified knowledge. However, it is important to note that these three steps should *not* be seen as a linear, unidirectional analysis. Rather, it allows a researcher to move back and forth along the continuum as the analysis proceeds and new knowledge and understandings come to light.

CHAPTER 6: CANADA

Introduction

The first section captures, as according to the *sobjectivist* methodology, the "historization" of meanings as meanings are ever evolving due to dynamic dialectic between reality and knowledge and it is only historical analysis that can reveal those dynamics. According to Pouliot, "since no social realities are natural, they are the result of political and social processes that are rooted in history" (2010: 63). This will be analyzed using process tracing – identifying the constitutive mechanisms that determined the conduct of the mission in Afghanistan as described in Chapter 4. Knowing these historical processes is necessary to understand what fed into the current constitution of civil-military practices, and therefore the comprehensive approach, possible as well as the role these relations play in determining effectiveness.

What becomes apparent in analyzing the history of civil-military relations in Canada is that many of the trends established in the 1990's continued well into the 2000's. The Canadian military was often stripped of resources and funding during peacetime and was essentially forced to reprofessionalize during each conflict. Politically, the military was undervalued and used as a bargaining chip on the international stage. This created essentially the perfect storm for Canada to be underprepared for Afghanistan.

The second section will more deeply contextualize Canada's civil-military relations in relation to the mission in Afghanistan. Despite Canada having moved towards deeper integration of civil-military relations as a result of a history of international engagement, advancing global security, and development in failed and fragile states, this was not necessarily reflected in doctrine and other official documentation. To better understand why this was the case, it is important to look at how Canada arrived at the mission in Afghanistan. Analyzing civil-military relations through a practice lens necessitates an understanding of its history, in combination with other cultural, structural, and value-based factors, in order to help form a deeper understanding of its various practices. In other words, as socially constructed meanings

only emerge from past social struggles, it is necessary to include a diachronic analysis to help "set meanings in motion." Hence, the objective of the second section is to further objectify the knowledge from the previous section by locating the Afghanistan mission subjective and practical knowledge into the larger Canadian intersubjective and historical context. To do so, I conduct a discourse analysis that is primarily focused on official documentation, reports on lessons learned, military doctrine and mandates from each of the case studies.

The analytical narrative of the second section suggests a type of paradox in that there was little hesitation to get involved in Afghanistan and to improve Canada's relationship with the US. However, there was lack of consideration of the capabilities and capacity of the CAF to take on such a mission. The moment that Canada made the decision to move into Kandahar was only reconciling the forced changes to the CAF as a result of the Somalia Affair. In 1999 the CAF was short of funds, short of equipment, poorly trained and undermanned. There was some progress made in 2000 to modernize the CAF but it still had significant challenges that needed to be addressed. In other words, civil-military relations had not established the practices that would have allowed for more effective operations and better implementation of the comprehensive approach. To better understand how it got like this, the next section will continue to contextualize the mission in Afghanistan.

The last section of this chapter approaches PRT civil-military relations through a practitioner's point of view. It reconstructs insider knowledge of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) and its operations from 2005-2011. It attempts to grasp how different practices played themselves out or changed over time. Or, in more methodological terms, this section is the first part of the three-part *sobjectivist* methodology that "recovers subjective meanings." This is done in two ways. First, by analyzing interviews and ethnographic notes of the people that were directly involved with the KPRT as well as other experts in Ottawa, Brussels, Washington, and London. Second, I focus on how the different groups that composed the KPRT interacted on the ground to help distil background knowledge from joint actions as set out in Table 4.1. Where needed, this will be complemented by other official doctrine to help contextualize the data. As this research is inductive, I proceed through this

section as athoretically as possible as I am trying to avoid imposing any type of analytical framework on the data.

SECTION 1:

History of Canadian Civil-Military Relations

Canada's military history, as well as its history of civil-military relations, is a rich tableau of different experiences drawing from its frontier history as a site for British and French colonialism, its extensive population of Indigenous people and, of course, its relationship with its southern neighbour, the United States. Unfortunately, a comprehensive review of the entirety of Canadian military history is not within the scope of this study so instead, it will cover certain episodes or events that were likely to have had significant impact on the armed forces and its relationship with civilians.

This section will more predominantly feature the concepts of habitus, field, and capital. I locate the mission in Afghanistan (the KPRT) in the field of peacebuilding and describe the evolution of the practices of civil-military relations within that field. My historical narrative hinges on the changing civil-military positions and dispositions during war and during peace after WWII. In the first section, I describe the repeated misalignment between civilian defence policy and the military's position. There are a number of incidences of imbalance between what civilians were expecting of the military and military capabilities and how the military perceived civilian capabilities. This created a power dynamic in which the military would play a more dominant role over civilians in peacebuilding – despite the traditional conception of the necessity of civilian control over the military. However, this began to shift in the 1990's with the recognition that the Canadian military needs to be fit for purpose while being able to work with civilians. However, defence policy was slow to reflect this practice.

The second section describes how these civilian and military positions and dispositions fed into the mission in Afghanistan. Despite the move towards a better homology between the field's structure and the player's habitus, there was still a clear misalignment between civilians and the military at the beginning of the mission and later when the government agreed to take command of the PRT in Kandahar. The KPRT became a site of both hysteresis as well as

embodiment of the comprehensive approach, creating fertile ground for the formation of doxa and the practice of civil-military relations.

The Cold War and the Peacekeeping Canadians

Canada's military history is unique in that it was largely beholden to the British after confederation and often joined in wars as required by the British Crown. As such, much of the structure and training of the then militia was modeled after the British, carrying over many of their traditions, like the regimental system and civilian control over the military. Indeed, when the British declared war on Germany in WWI, Canada was automatically brought into the war. However, this relationship often confused the chain of command and the Canadian military had to both answer to Ottawa as well as the British War Office which created resentment of the military towards civilians, both the leadership as well as those still at home, namely the French-Canadians that refused to participate. But, over time, the Canadian military was able to adopt what they learned from the British as well as from direct combat experience to create a distinct Canadian mandate, and by extension, Canada's first *professional* military.

Unfortunately, this professionalism would not last long after WWI as it settled back into pre-1914 conditions with minimal training and almost no budget. When rumblings of WWII rolled around, Canada was less enthusiastic to join the war and did little to prepare themselves. However, once the decision was made to send men to war, training had to start essentially from ground zero. While the Government of Canada insisted that training lay with Canadian authorities, much of Canadian training, organization and armaments were still the same as the British army, allowing Canadians to work well within the British military framework. Canada went to play an important role in several notable battles in WWII. Canada's military reputation was particularly strong at the end of WWII, but the Cold War was on its way and it required a new approach to war and overseas operations.

At the intersubjective level, the World Wars saw the first significant shift in rules of Canadian engagement overseas. First, with the development of the first true Canadian military doctrine during WWI and professionalization. Second, with the Canadian military commanding and training their own people to participate in a war overseas and proving that Canada was

prepared to actively engage in war. It became a legitimate player in international security which helped to set Canada up to not only become a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) but to also become one of the most active participants in peace operations.

However, like the end of WWI, the Canadian Army that was created during WWII quickly disappeared. The Canadian government was quick to minimize the defence budget (as the Canadian government had the largest deficit in its history) and soldiers and civilians were eager to put the war behind them and move forward with their lives. The Canadian Army was ultimately reduced to three infantry battalions and an artillery regiment which was formed into a single brigade for the defence of Canada (Bercuson, 2008). Convinced they hardly had use for the brigade, the reserves too were left to languish. Once again making the Canadian military relatively unprepared for what was to come.

On June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea and as soon as news of the Communist invasion reached Western capitals and the UN, it was determined that the invasion could not be left unchallenged. Furthermore, President Truman and other leaders of the newly created NATO believed that if the North Koreans annexed South Korea by force, Western Europe could be next (Kasurak, 2013).

Canada was not only a charter member of NATO; it was also a strong supporter of the UN. As such, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent was quick to send military assistance. First, St. Laurent sent both naval destroyers and air support, but under intense pressure from English-speaking Canadians, the US, Britain and the UN, St. Laurent agreed to send a brigade group of roughly 8,000 soldiers to help fight the invasion under UN command. However, due to the severe reduction of troops over those few years between WWII and the Korean War, a recruiting drive was put in place targeting WWII veterans to fill in the gaps (Ibid., 2013).

While Canada had sent 21,940 of its soldiers to fight in Korea, many of whom were veterans from WWII, they were nevertheless a new generation of postwar soldiers (Bercuson, 2008: 289). They were soldiers that fought in a faraway land not because the fate of their nation was at stake but because of ideologies. Moreover, the Korean War was viewed by those in NATO as a test of their ability and willingness to resist a potential Soviet invasion. Post-

Korean War, NATO then turned its focus to building up sufficient military force to deter Soviet aggression and Canada had to contribute its share. The days of a small standing Canadian force were over.

Consequently, NATO benefited from expanding military superiority while maintaining its role as a benevolent force in international security. It boosted is identity as the protector and advocator for democracy and human rights on the international stage. From the beginning, Canada emphasised that NATO needed to be more than just a military alliance, it needed to also promote political, economic, and cultural bonds between allies. It transformed the field of military conflict, and by extension peacekeeping, by turning it into an arena of cultural struggle in which democratic values and human rights were championed. It became a key force, alongside the UN as described in Chapter 2, behind the development of specific strategies and forms of cultural capital in peace operations.

This new commitment to NATO required Canada's military to roughly triple in size in a very short time. The Canadian brigade assigned to NATO would also be permanently stationed in Germany alongside the British army of the Rhine which was the first time Canada had a significant military presence outside of Canada. Subsequently, this required significant regimental reform and a clearer delineation of duties. As such, the first national regiment was created, the Regiment of Canadian Guards, which was a significant departure from previous regimental practices that recruited regionally. Moreover, the reserves were cut down and would take on a new domestic role of rescue and recovery (Morton, 2007). This was in response to the possibility of a nuclear strike which would require significant domestic military capabilities to help protect the population. It was also a significant turning point for the Canadian military as it clearly began to distinguish itself from its British and American counterparts and develop specific practices of its own.

It was also during this time that the army's regular regiments became more involved with UN operations, the most notable for Canada being the 1956 Suez Crisis. Israel, the UK, and France created a major diplomatic crisis by attacking Egypt. France and the UK moved to seize the Suez Canal while Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. The US and Russia were quick to denounce the occupation and demanded withdrawal. In a stroke of genius,

Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, engineered a solution that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in which a force under UN Command – called the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) – replace the British, French, and Israeli forces as they withdrew and to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt along the Gaza and Sinai border. Canada also contributed a regiment to UNEF in order to help keep the peace between US and the UK (Donaghy, 2016). UN peacekeeping operations were born, and Canada contributed to almost every single one that fell under the UN until the mid-1990s creating a reputation for Canadian soldiers as peacekeepers that continues to this day.

Canada actively took this position within the field of peacekeeping for a number of reasons, including the need to differentiate itself from the US and moving away from kinetic operations while creating its own unique identity as "helpful fixer". As such, Canada began to wield a certain amount of symbolic power when developing peacebuilding practices and doxa which peaked in the 1990s.

Unfortunately, the 1960's once again saw massive cutbacks in reserve spending and infrastructure. In 1964, the Pearson government introduced a white paper that laid out a process for the unification of the army, navy, and air force into a single service to become known as the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The Minister of National Defence at the time, Paul Hellyer, saw this as a great strategy to reduce waste and redundancies while making the force more effective by fostering cooperation across the different groups. It also meant there would only be a single Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) (Kasurak, 2013). There was significant resistance to this idea, especially in the navy that saw a number of high-ranking officers resign over it but on February 1, 1968 unification was officially enacted (Morton, 2007).

Once again, a significant reshuffling occurred across the three groups including the army which saw regiments moved around, combined and some eliminated altogether. The massive reorganization was a significant blow to morale for all three groups as it challenged their identity, cohesiveness, and pride. But this was not the end of the military's troubles. The election of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1968, a leader who had little interest in or understanding of defence issues, left the army adrift in an increasingly complex era (Granatstein, 2011).

Trudeau was quick to criticize Canada's heavy commitment to NATO arguing that Europe has largely recovered since 1945 and that Europeans should bear the burden of defending themselves. If anything, Trudeau argued, Canada should demonstrate its solidarity in the smallest military way possible. As Granatstein cheekily states, "a war against the USSR in all likelihood would quickly become general nuclear war, and one Canadian was as good a symbol of support as a brigade. Or so Trudeau believed" (2011: 361).

Changes to the defence policy created cuts that came swiftly and brutally, halving the soldiers stationed in Germany, reducing the armed forces by 20 percent (to just above 80,000) and significantly cutting down the reserves. Canada's reputation in NATO suffered as it was no longer perceived as having front line capabilities and was relegated to "third line" or what would be considered reserve capability. The Canadian Armed Forces were struggling under a government that continually undervalued their capabilities. This only fed into the division between the two institutions and created significant resentment and mistrust.

In 1971, Defence Minister Donald MacDonald, introduced a new white paper that saw the responsibilities of the military expand despite the significant cuts that were underway. The CAF saw their responsibilities in "national development" which previously included only assisting during natural disasters expand to include research, communications, and the protection of the environment. Peacekeeping also became a priority but not the Pearsonian conception of the "helpful fixer" role but rather that Canada would only be deployed to missions that had realistic terms of reference, if all parties agreed on the purposes and roles, and that there was an actual prospect of success (Granatstein, 2011).

Another important reform that occurred in 1971 was that the civilian and military aspects of the Department of National Defence were united. The CDS and the Deputy Minister would be equal in status with a combined staff serving both. The deputy would be responsible for management while the CDS was responsible for operations. However, the process of integration clouded lines of responsibility and accountability (Herspring, 2013). Since both the CDS and deputy minister shared responsibility, it created confusion about who was actually in charge and who had the final say. Moreover, the CDS was only in office for three years while civilians were allowed to stay in a leadership position for much longer. The resulting

"civilianization" of the department and the dominance of managers over the military and of the military bureaucrats over operational commanders had major long-term implications for the practice of civil-military relations. Over time civilians and military managers gradually gained more control over the operational side of the forces. As Douglas Bland succinctly summarizes, "civil control of the armed forces was compromised, military advice was buried in efforts to forge bureaucratic collegiality, and some officers in the headquarters lost touch with the operational and human needs of the Canadian Forces" (as quoted in Herspring, 2013: 168).

CAF continued to struggle under the Trudeau government, especially due to the rapid rate of inflation and minimal budget increases. Concerns were also raised that Canada was not pulling its weight in the alliance with the significant cut to troops stationed in Germany. There was a brief hope that these issues would be rectified when Brian Mulroney's Conservative government was elected in 1984 with his campaign promise to increase the size of the CAF and increase the defence budget by 6 percent every year (Bercuson, 2008). The 1987 White Paper proposed a long-term plan to reinvigorate the CAF stating, "all elements of the Canadian Forces are to augment existing capabilities. Priority will be given to three clusters of military activity such as the maritime forces, surveillance and control capabilities, and the reserve forces" (Byers, 1987: 16). It also identified NATO and NORAD as key organizations in which Canada needed to have credible military forces. However, those hopes were quickly dashed as the large deficit and the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in military spending only slightly increasing during the Mulroney years (Herspring, 2013: 180). The Canadian military continued to stagnate with only minimal budget increases coming from the government. However, despite this, Canada remained active in many UN peacekeeping operations, pulling the CAF quite thin.

The devaluing of the Canadian military by a number of administrations and its disintegrating international reputation put Canada in a weaker position in the field of international security despite its large presence in UN peacebuilding operations which created a large gap between how the Canadian military was perceived and what it actually managed to do. Consequently, within Canada, there was a recognition that this dissonance needed to be addressed and that put Canada in a position to make several meaningful policy contributions to

the rapidly evolving security environment post-Cold War, particularly around human security, which fed into the mission in Afghanistan.

A Peacebuilding Habitus?

By 1991, Canada was providing 10 percent of the UN peacekeeping force despite its worn out and outdated equipment (Herspring, 2013: 180). The CAF and National Defence Headquarters were in chaos as the navy, army and air force were effectively bypassing the unified promotion system and creating their own staff colleges to provide training that was not taught at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. However, the Canadian Government remained keen on establishing the image of Canada as a kinder-gentler nation that does not make war, differentiating themselves from the US. Many of these problems finally came to a head with the Somalia deployment in 1992.

CAF was stretched thin with its other peacekeeping commitments at the time, but the CDS, after much discussion, decided to send 750 soldiers under Operation CORDON that was meant to patrol the port city Bossaso in northeast Somalia. Later, on March 16, 1993, several soldiers of the Airborne regiment killed a Somali teenager. Beyond this horrible event, what was further inexplicable was that the other officers and non-commissioned personnel heard the teenager's screams but chose not to intervene. The inquiry into this event revealed deep-seated issues within the officer corps showing deception and dereliction of duty – essentially questioning civilian and military leadership capabilities.

Little improved with the election of Prime Minister Chrétien in 1994. Indeed, when President Bill Clinton requested soldiers to be sent to Haiti, Chrétien agreed but with the following stipulation: "Okay, I send my soldiers. And then afterwards, I ask something in return" (as quoted in Bercuson 1996: 53). Using the CAF as political bargaining chips only emphasized the low value placed by the government on the military. The 1994 White Paper also did little to improve CAF's situation with more proposed budget cuts while still accepting UN requests for peacekeepers. Canada was beginning to get the reputation as an extremely risk-averse military, often refusing tasks that would put them in the line of fire (Herspring, 2013: 187). Things had to change.

In other words, the peacekeeping habitus of Canada and the military was starting to conflict with the disposition of civilian leaders, creating hysteresis in civil-military relations. The demand on the CAF was high yet they were underfunded, underequipped, and did not have the much-needed support of the government. It is no surprise then that Canada's position in the field continued to rapidly deteriorate and they had little capital to spend to better influence the international peacekeeping field and improve their reputation when compared to during the Cold War.

Significant reforms of the CAF began taking place in 1997, overseen first by Defence Minister Doug Young and then by his successor Art Eggleton. Things were just beginning to improve in 1999 and 2000 with Eggleton's announcement of 28 new helicopters, $50 million towards refurbishing the Sea Kings to keep them flying and a series of reforms to improve Canadian military medical care. These reforms were occurring alongside other foreign policy shifts towards improving responses to failed, fragile, and post-conflict states. With a legacy of leadership in UN peacekeeping, Canada became a leader in promoting the concepts of human security and peacebuilding; led the international campaign to ban land mines and; established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which led to the development of the "responsibility to protect" agenda. Other noteworthy efforts of this trend include the creation of a Peacebuilding Fund by CIDA in 1997, the development of a Human Security Program within DFAIT in 2000 and Canada helped to lead the drafting of the OECD/DAC *Guidelines on Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation* (Patrick and Brown, 2007).

The shift in foreign policy towards human security and making the CAF a more responsive and capable military can largely be credited to the perceived lessons of peace operations during the 1990s, particularly the Balkans, Bosnia, and Kosovo, that did well to highlight the limitations of an uncoordinated approach to security, development, and governance. Bosnia in particular was a telling tale of the *ad hoc* nature of civil-military coordination (Longhurst, 2006/2007). It was because of that experience that the Department of National Defence released a CIMIC doctrine in 1999, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War.* Canada borrowed heavily from NATO CIMIC doctrine as well as US

Civil Affairs doctrine and UK experiences and developed the following definition of CIMIC in an international environment:

> In peace, emergencies, crisis or war, the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between Task Force Commanders and foreign national authorities, military, paramilitary, as well as civil populations and foreign national governments in an area where Task Force elements are or plan to be deployed, employed, and supported. Such measures would also include cooperation and coordination of activities and operations between Task Force Commanders and non-governmental and international agencies, organizations, and civil authorities (DND, 1999: 1-15)

CIMIC was considered a *force multiplier* and integrated PSYOPS into its operations – that is the "planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, adversary(ies), friendly and neutral audiences, within the [area of operation], in order to influence emotions, perceptions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives" (DND, 1999: 1-15). CIMIC was ultimately a military-led cooperation mechanism but there were no dedicated CIMIC dedicated troops within the CAF and no formalized structure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, minimizing its actual utility (DND, 1999: 1-3). Moreover, CIMIC was not meant to replace civilian organizations that have greater capacity and knowledge to undertake large development projects. CIMIC is a small component of the military mission and an even smaller component of the peacebuilding effort writ large.

These experiences showed the Canadian government and the international community that there was a lack of appropriate tools and mechanisms to address crises falling between traditional peacekeeping on one end and traditional development on the other. Canada was particularly ill-equipped to address areas like rule of law, policing, judicial and security sector reform, and transitional administration. Canada needed a more integrated approach between DND, DFAIT and CIDA (amongst others) to address these challenges. However, traditional civil-military relations theories were not suited to analyze the sociological implications of a more integrated military as their theoretical paradigms left very little room for such analyses. Practice theory, on the other hand, is better suited to grasp those nuances to help *understand* peace

operations rather than *measuring* them. This conclusion would only be reinforced with the Canadian experience in Afghanistan.

SECTION 2:

Canada in Afghanistan

The incidents on 9/11 brought Afghanistan to the forefront for the international community. It also set in motion several responses from various countries as well as supra- and international organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the United Nations (UN), that collectively shaped the way forward of how to 'deal' with the country at an international level as Afghanistan had become a problem for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Canada also joined the voices of response, and clearly sided with the United States on the importance of ousting the Taliban, endorsed the various UN Security Council Resolutions, as well as the invocation of NATO's Article 5. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien addressed Canadians in a nationally televised broadcast on 7 October and confirmed that Canada would be participating militarily in the international intervention in Afghanistan that aimed to overthrow the Taliban regime. Chrétien indicated that "the principal role that we hope they [the troops] will have whenever and if they go there – because there is no final conclusion yet – will be to make sure the people who are going into Afghanistan with food and clothing and so on can go to the people who need it" (Laghi, 2001: A1). The Prime Minister went on to note that Canadians "do not have a big fight there. We want to bring peace and happiness as much as possible" (Ibid.). This statement represents the newfound homology between civilians and the military. The Canadian military are peacebuilders and that was the role they would play in Afghanistan.

Shortly after that statement was made, the government announced that it would contribute forces to OEF. Former Defence Minister Art Eggleton offered "unqualified support of the Canadian Forces for US military efforts to strike at terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan and elsewhere" (McCarthy, 2001: A1), and reassured Canadians that the roughly

2,000 troops serving in Afghanistan would be there no more than six months and would be pulled out immediately if the mission evolved into a "full-conflict situation" (Laghi, 2001: A1; Lang and Stein, 2007). However, Afghanistan was wildly underestimated and would prove to be one of the most challenging environments CAF had ever faced (Gimblett, 2002: 14-16; Welsh, 2004).

After ousting the Taliban in 2001 there was a significant governance gap. The first significant step in rebuilding of the country was the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2001 set Afghanistan down a path of reconstruction and development. Canada laid the groundwork for its development engagement in Afghanistan with around $100 million of disbursements per year (DFATD, 2013: 24), largely through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the UN. Canada's objective was to help build a centralized state in Afghanistan that can deliver public goods to the Afghan people with a focus on democratic governance and economic growth as the key areas of development. Canada also took part in the 'International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan' in Tokyo, which was held at the ministerial level and provided the international donor community with an opportunity to support the Afghan reconstruction process with specific commitments and pledges while reaffirming the time frame that was set in the Bonn agreement (please see Figure 6.1 for a basic timeline of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan). In turn, the Afghan Interim Authority itself laid out several key priority areas for reconstruction, including enhancing the administrative capacity of the government and Afghanistan's economy, as well as investing in education (especially for women/girls), health and sanitation, infrastructure (roads, electricity, and telecommunications), and addressing issues of food security. These became the priority areas for Canadian developmental efforts in Afghanistan.



Figure 6.1: Timeline of Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). (2015). Synthesis Report – Summative Evaluation of Canada's Afghanistan Development Program Fiscal year 2004-2005 to 2012-2013, pg. 13.

Besides development and reconstruction, Canada also had a strong military presence in Afghanistan due to the high rates of insecurity. There were three reasons why Canada was quick to provide military troops to Afghanistan. First, Canada wanted to assist its American ally in a time of need while bolstering the CAF's reputation with them; second, it responded to the invocation of NATO's collective defence clause in Article 5; and third, Canada supported UN-Resolution 1363, which determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and implemented international sanctions against Afghanistan (Zyla and Sokolsky, 2010). Both the military and civilian commitment to Afghanistan was embedded in Canada's 3D approach (defence, development, and diplomacy), which for the purposes of this thesis, and to streamline the terminology, will be referred to as the Comprehensive Approach (CA).

The US had asked Ottawa to provide troops for a combat mission under US control in southern Afghanistan (Graham, 2015: 54-56). The US request would involve up to 750 Canadian troops in the initial deployment, which "represented a 'better fit' with Canada's capabilities." According to Defence Minister Eggleton: "This is the first time that the Americans have asked a coalition ally to join them on the ground with their operations in Afghanistan. This is the first time they have done that for any country, and they asked Canada first" (Knox, 2002). Canada was perceived in Washington as a serious partner in the fight against terrorism, which would hopefully produce an environment of goodwill between Canada and the US (von Hlatky, 2013: 94).[7]

This sense of goodwill was important because on 17 March 2003, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien told the House of Commons that Canada was not going to participate in the invasion of Iraq. In February 2003, the new Defence Minister, John McCallum had announced the government's decision to return back to Afghanistan and send troops there again ("Canada to

[7]For example, increased border security cost about 300,000 people and $2 billion in trade cross the border daily, which explains the primary focus of politicians to maintain the free flow of goods and people across that border. In short, Ottawa's first and foremost national security objective after 9/11 was to keep the border with the US open for trade and commerce.

send troops," 2003: A1) to take part in ISAF's mission to maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. Canada also opened its embassy in Kabul.

Canada's Afghanistan mission was now largely defined in terms of Canada's liberal internationalist tradition (Sjolander, 2009: 85), including that of a helpful fixer, honest broker, and global mediator. It was also important to clearly support NATO in the expansion of the ISAF mission. This expanded commitment was estimated to require between 1,500 and 2,000 troops. In August that year NATO took command of the UN-sanctioned ISAF mission and began to expand its activities to other regions of Afghanistan outside of Kabul. Former Prime Minister Paul Martin provided this rationale: "As members of NATO, which is after all a self-defence pact, we had a moral if not a legal duty to support them" (Martin, 2009: 361).

NATO's plans for expansion, including the creation of more PRTs, saw it moving in a counter clockwise direction in four stages to cover all of Afghanistan with each stage expanding NATO's responsibilities. The PRT's primary objectives were to help the Afghan government to expand its authority to its citizens beyond the capital of Kabul, and assist with capacity building tasks (Stapleton, 2015) such as building schools, mediate local conflicts, provide Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and public goods to Afghans (Bird and Marshall, 2011; NATO, 2015). As then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew, told the House of Commons,

> I can say that the Provincial Reconstruction Team reflects precisely what we have in our international policy statement. We want defence, diplomacy and development to work in a more coordinated and integrated way. It is clear that for now, the work is focused more on stability, with a significant military presence. Eventually we expect elements of diplomacy and development to become more of a priority. It is essential that we take responsibility for a territory. However, in addition to the military effort, we must ensure that other aspects of development are included. That is why CIDA is very involved in this exercise (Pettigrew, 2005).

In August 2005, Canada assumed command of KPRT and deployed approximately 35 personnel including military, police, diplomats, corrections officers, and development experts assisting the Afghan government with providing governance, security, and development throughout the province. However, the challenge presented in the south was once again underestimated as the

growing insurgency in Kandahar that would significantly shape the practice of civil-military relations and limiting development and stabilization activities.

Overall, the decision to move into Kandahar was largely political (as opposed to being based on military capability and resources available) in that Canada wanted to improve its military reputation and relationship with the US (especially after its refusal to contribute to the mission in Iraq), ensure its "sharing the burden" with other NATO allies, and improve its international profile. However, the newly appointed CDS Rick Hillier saw this as a great opportunity for the Canadian military to prove that CAF could rise to the challenge and take on one of the most high-profile and unstable provinces in the country, punching well-above Canada's assumed weight. This was a dramatic departure as the newly appointed CDS saw the Canadian military potentially moving beyond its peacekeeping habitus to show the CAF as multi-disciplinary military that can take on any type of operation. As Stein and Lang astutely observed, "Canada would no longer be on the margins" (2007: 184). This laid the seeds for the hysteresis that would be found within the KPRT.

Despite the eagerness to take on this high-profile role, there was little actual discussion about the operational challenges of southern Afghanistan in general and Kandahar more specifically. The overarching narrative for Canada's role in southern Afghanistan early on was described as Canada taking on a more "robust peace support role" rather than countering an active insurgency.[8] Moreover, there was little in the way of doctrine in place to help guide CAF in the PRTs, let alone the counterinsurgency operation itself (Chief Review Services, 2007). This would play a significant role in the overall operation of the PRT as well as its practices.

Canadian Doctrine

With the agreement in place between DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, and DND to take command of the KPRT in 2005, the government began establishing the PRT structure based on the previous US and UK experiences as well as the security situation in Kandahar. However, as mentioned

[8] In the early days, no civilian or military official used the word *war* or *insurgency* to describe what was happening in southern Afghanistan. It was only in early 2006 that it was recognized as a counterinsurgency operation (Chief Review Services, 2007; Stein and Lang, 2007)

previously, there was little doctrine in place to help guide the actual activities of the KPRT as this was a relatively new concept and Canadian doctrine was underdeveloped for complex peace operations. But before moving forward, it is necessary to understand, very briefly, what doctrine is and why it matters.

While there are likely slight variations in national definitions of doctrine, the Canadian definition is the same as the US definition; the "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application" (Joint Doctrine Branch, 2010: 1-1). In other words, doctrine is the officially sanctioned approach to military activities that is understood as the best way to go about things. According to Robert Cassidy (2004), doctrine is salient because it mirrors actual behavior and is therefore an important variable that affects operational practices and consequently operational mistakes can be explained by the quality of the doctrine. On the other hand, Gavin Bulloch (1996) argues that doctrine often lags actual events and therefore can be detrimental to operations. It describes the best practices of the last war and fails to attend to contextual changes and conflict specifics. Regardless of the pros and cons of doctrine, this research treats doctrine as a conceptual artefact that reflects a nation's strategic and military culture. Doctrine, at the very least, describes past behavior of military organizations while also serving to reproduce certain practices. Therefore, doctrine is essential for "putting meanings into context" to better understand the practice of civil-military relations.

Returning to the KPRT, when Canada assumed command, there was no "capstone" doctrine manual in place nor were there updated and relevant keystone doctrines available to help inform PRT activities. A capstone doctrine manual, in essence, describes the Canadian "way of war." It is a high-level CAF military-strategic doctrine that "specifies the roles and missions assigned to [CAF]; describes the fundamentals of warfare; provides guidance for command, control and organization of the [CAF]; authorized command relationships and the authorities that military commanders can use; and formulates guidelines for operations activities embodied in strategic policy" (CFJP 01, n.d.: v). Moreover, it also provides the doctrinal basis for interdepartmental and interagency action that falls under the rubric of the comprehensive approach.

Hierarchically, the Capstone doctrine is then followed by Keystone publications which are main or key publications within each functional area such as Intelligence, Operations, Personnel etc., which is then followed by additional supporting documentation. The CAF doctrine hierarchy in the initial stages of the KPRT was as follows:



Figure 6.2: CAF Doctrine Hierarchy as of November 2006

Source: Chief Review Services (2007). Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine. Department of National Defence, 1258-153 (CRS), Annex B: B-1/1, Ottawa: Canada.

With the exception of a few specialized joint publications, this joint operational-level doctrine hierarchy was outdated and ill-suited for the KPRT. At the operational level, with no capstone document, there was also no designated process owner for interagency operations. For example, while the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) employed CAF, they

were not responsible for force generation resulting in uneven participation amongst not only the different military branches but as well as civilians. Moreover, there were a number of areas that CAF had never previously developed a joint capability, like amphibious warfare, and more importantly in this case, counterinsurgency (COIN). Additionally, both the UK[9] and the US released doctrinal notes on PRTs, but Canada had made no effort to do so, leaving the KPRT in doctrinal limbo (Chief Review Services, 2007). It was only late in the mission that the capstone doctrine (2009) and COIN manual (2008) were released giving some much-needed terms of reference and operational guidance, but at that point it was also expected that combat mission would end in 2011 giving little opportunity to apply the new doctrine.

The KPRT Experiment

Returning to the initial command takeover in Kandahar in 2005, it is safe to say, that PRTs were a new construct to the Government of Canada so there was an inclination of all KPRT partners to try and integrate as much of the experiences from Bosnia and Kosovo into their planning and conduct of operations (Chief Review Services, 2007). However, as history has taught time and time again, simply transferring an approach developed in one context to another does not work. Kandahar required a significantly different set of skills, unique dispositions for deployed leaders at all levels, and a different kind of training. Moreover, with no available doctrine defining and guiding counterinsurgency operations or PRTs, different governmental agencies often had different ideas as to their role in the operation creating, at minimal, civil-military tensions or, at worst, severely hampering the effectiveness of the PRT. Despite these issues, the KPRT quickly became recognized as the "centre of gravity" or even the centrepiece of the Canadian campaign as well as a litmus test for the Canadian comprehensive approach (Maley & Schmeidl, 2015).

The initial structure of the KPRT for Roto 0 (the initial rotation) is as seen in Figure 6.3 below:

[9] For example, see Doctrinal Note (January 2005). 05/1 AC 71882, Provincial Reconstruction Teams.



Figure 6.3: **Roto 0 KPRT table of organization and equipment**

Source: Brown, Andrea L. and Barbara D. Adams (2010). Exploring the JIMP Concept: Literature Review. Defence Research and Development Canada, CR-2010-021, Ottawa: Canada, pg. 19.

The first rotation of the KPRT consisted of a military headquarters (PRT HQ), a composite force protection group (Patrol Company (PTL Coy); Patrol Platoon (PTL PL), a field engineer section (Engineer Operations (Engr Ops); improvised explosive devices (IED)/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD); (Fd) Section)), a CIMIC and PsyOps/Intelligence Operations (IO) cell, an Intelligence cell split between Kandahar Airfield and the PRT (All-Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC)/Field Support Team (FST)), and a combat service support group split between the KPRT base and the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) (Combat Service Support (CSS); PRT Sp; KAF Sp; Convoy Escort). The structure of the PRT allowed for a certain level of flexibility to help adapt to changing circumstances. Subsequent rotations of the KPRT have changed in composition to reflect the changing security situations in Southern Afghanistan but remained predominantly military (Chief Review Services, 2007: 11-12).

Integrating flexibility and adaptability of the PRT structure proved incredibly prescient not only because the security situation proved to be particularly volatile but also because the operational plan changed with every command rotation. This was due to a lack of clarity coming from Ottawa regarding the activities of the PRT. For example, the Roto 0 command officer only received verbal directions from the CDS regarding his "Commander's Intent" for the PRT but formal order for the PRTs mission were never given. It proved challenging to translate the CDS' *de facto* vision into tactical activities. As Hillier saw the CAF differently than what civilian leadership and established practices envisioned, it became a significant source of tension and created hysteresis effects. As such, the initial focus was placed on ensuring successful elections (Chief Review Services, 2007). However, after November 2005, there was little direction provided to guide the PRT towards what could be understood as an overarching strategy for the region or the country writ large. It was up to individual commanders to plan and execute tasks based on their own understanding of the PRT mandate.

This lack of strategic direction sometimes served to exacerbate existing tensions between the civilian and military components of the KPRT. However, it is important to note that this experience was not entirely unique to the KPRT as stated by Robert Perito of the US Institute of Peace, "absent any established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was problematic because military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different 'corporate cultures' and had different, sometimes competing, mandates" (2005: 11).

An effort to redress this lack of overarching strategic narrative happened in 2007/2008 when the government convened a panel to assess Canada's engagement in Afghanistan and what the future of that engagement was to look like. The release of the *Independent Panel of Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* in January 2008*,* more commonly known as the Manley Report, was the first significant attempt at creating a strategic narrative to explain to Canadian's what Canada was doing in Afghanistan but to also give broad strategic direction to DND, DFAIT and CIDA. The Government of Canada's response to the report saw it defining six policy priorities and three signature projects (see Figure 6.4); a shift in development programming focus to 50 per cent of programming being Kandahar-centric; a more

comprehensive approach with the involvement of the Privy Council Office for the planning and management of the engagement in Kandahar (this was tied to tasking David Mulroney for better interagency coordination) and; with the withdrawal of CAF in 2011, the development program return to a national focus with those activities specific to Kandahar be phased out.

Six government priorities and three signature projects 2008-2011

The first ***four priorities focus primarily on Kandahar:***

- maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police, and support complementary efforts in the areas of justice and corrections;
- provide jobs, education and essential services, like water;
- provide humanitarian assistance to people in need, including refugees; and,
- enhance the management and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The last **two priorities have a national focus**:

- build Afghan institutions that are central to our Kandahar priorities and support democratic processes such as elections; and,
- contribute to Afghan-led political reconciliation efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a sustainable peace.

The **three signature projects** are:

- rehabilitating the Dahla Dam and its irrigation system in Kandahar province;
- building and repairing 50 schools in targeted districts of Kandahar province; and,
- eradicating polio at the national level.

Figure 6.4: Government of Canada's Response to the Manley Report

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD). (2015). Synthesis Report – Summative Evaluation of Canada's Afghanistan Development Program Fiscal year 2004-2005 to 2012-2013, pg. 15.

Another issue that became apparent in the early days of the KPRT was that initial training efforts saw practices from previous missions replicated, perpetuating certain practices, and limiting the ability to take a more innovative approach in a challenging environment. This would significantly improve over time but in the early days the principle of "best professional judgement" on what training would be required was exercised. Training activities mostly featured basic scenario training, training in the new organizational configuration, and a couple weeks of training on Afghan languages, customs, and culture. However, there was no "collective training" that included other government agencies at this time (like incorporating CIDA or DFAIT individuals in military training and vice versa). In fact, there was even little

opportunity for the CAF members to be stationed at the KPRT to train together prior to deployment. It was not until Roto 2 that a more coherent training package was put together that allowed the CAF KPRT team to train together to help build trust and cohesion prior to actual deployment (Chief Review Services, 2007). More emphasis was also placed on language and cultural training over time as well, but that component would continue to fall short for the remaining time Canada was operating in Afghanistan.

These shortcomings set the mission in Afghanistan down a path that was not easily rectified. As one interviewee stated, "in such an unforgiving environment, if you make your mistakes early, it's really hard to reel it back in" (Interview #12). The fracturing found at the strategic level due to a lack of direction and clarity of purpose of the KPRT filtered its way down into both operational and tactical levels. It also cascaded into other areas exacerbating other issues. For example, communications and reporting not only up the various chains of command but also between the different components of the PRT became problematic. According to several interviews (Interviews #2; #4; #5; #6; #14), there were cases in which reports were altered to show more favorable results or even to make one group appear more effective over another. There were also cases of civilians bypassing the military reporting chain to reach those in Ottawa through informal lines of contact. This structural context only fed into the power struggle between civilians and the military, confirming certain dispositions while undervaluing the symbolic capital presented by these two groups. These fractures were also indicative of larger civil-military tensions (or even antagonism) and the lack of trust between the two groups.

The Struggle for Better Coordination

Another issue that consistently plagued the entire mission was poor interagency coordination. Interagency command and control suffered from a lack of capstone doctrine and there was no unity of effort in interagency decision-making. As Marcella notes, "the principal problem of interagency *decision-making is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge*. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable" (2006: 278, emphasis

in original). This dependency on having the right personality in the right position at the right time is extremely problematic and incongruences severely hampered the mission at times.

Attempts were made to remedy the lack of interagency coordination, first, with the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in 2005 in DFAIT. Consisting of approximately 70 personnel, mostly from DFAIT, START was mandated to ensure greater coherence, coordination, and integrated planning across government agencies involved in fragile and conflict-affected states. Despite the good working relationships amongst the START member departments, reporting was still done through independent reporting chains, often reinforcing departmental siloes giving little opportunity to draw the connections between security, governance, and development (Office of the Inspector General, 2016). There was also only minimal representation of CAF/DND (one Lieutenant- Colonel Liaison officer position and two Reserve Lieutenant-Colonel/Major project officer positions) which did not provide a balanced approach to interagency coordination and planning (Chief Review Services, 2007). Overall, while START saw some success it "struggled to assert its coordinating leadership in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, having to contend with bureaucratic turf battles and departmental preferences for template-driven, stove-piped programs" (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 57).

The second attempt was at the strategic level. In 2007/08, David Mulroney was named Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and was tasked with interdepartmental coordination for the engagement in Kandahar which included the ability to "convene the Canadian forces" (Interview #22). While this approach was effective for the first year or so, eventually the Canadian military began to pushback against the "civilian interference" in military affairs which created significant tension in Ottawa. Mulroney stepped down and moved on to his next assignment once it was recognized that the position was creating more problems than solutions. This situation was evidence of the continued misalignment of the field's structure and the player's habitus and the resultant hysteresis only continued to perpetuate certain practices that were not well-suited for the mission in Afghanistan.

The third attempt was when the Government of Canada tried to improve coordination by appointing a Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) in 2008. The role of the RoCK was

to lead governance and development efforts in Kandahar and reported to DFAIT and CIDA headquarters. It was incumbent on the RoCK to oversee all the civilian agencies' activities and ensuring that the priorities identified by the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan were being implemented. The RoCK was primarily located at Kandahar Airfield, so a civilian director position was created in the KRPT to support the RoCK in meeting her objectives on coordination (Leprince, 2013). This was a significant shift in the decision-making structure of the KPRT as the military commander previously had veto power but with this new appointment, the KPRT had civilian and military leaders of equal rank. Unfortunately, the creation of these new appointments failed in overcoming bureaucratic restraints and stove piping in Ottawa as a number of civilian organizations were reluctant to include the RoCK in reporting structures and chains of command.

In sum, the Government of Canada did take attempt some novel and innovative approaches to overcome bureaucratic siloes and but only saw limited success due to entrenched practices in the different agencies. However, despite these many issues as identified in the last three sections, a large number of interviewees had a positive perception of the KPRT and what it managed to achieve – which will be reflected in the following section.

SECTION 3:

Indicator 1: Normalizing Civil-Military Tensions

Interview and ethnographic data indicate that, despite the recognition of the value of the comprehensive approach which more deeply enmeshes the work of the military and civilians, civil-military tensions are still alive and well in the KPRT. These tensions existed at all levels of the operation - strategic, operational, and tactical. This was partly due to long-standing stereotypes that were deeply embedded into both civilian and military psyches with civilians seeing the military as "knuckle draggers" and military seeing civilians as "tree huggers," often working at odds (Interviews #3; #4; #7; #23; #24; #29). These perceptions often increased tensions initially, fostering mistrust and doubt in one another's capabilities and knowledge. However, especially at the tactical level and somewhat at the operational level, practitioners in the KPRT would often (but not always) adopt a more practical, down-to-earth approach to help

minimize these tensions. Over time, these tensions were often treated almost as business-as-usual with the reasonable expectation that these tensions would be overcome in order to do what was needed to be done. This suggests a partial embodiment of the comprehensive approach as these tensions were not always overcome, particularly at the strategic level, and limited the effectiveness of the KPRT.

Overcoming Stereotypes (or not)

The institutional and cultural divide between the military and civilians has a long history and is not one that will soon be overcome. The military is the sole purveyor of force and soldiers are asked to perform tasks that the civilian populations are not expected to do, often risking their lives to do so. The strict hierarchy and unlimited liability that the military adheres to creates a culture of values notably different from civilians, which was noted by both Huntington and Janowitz. This divide has long been embedded in military and defence doctrine in Canada since even before the introduction of the Militia Act in 1868, which was later reinforced by subsequent doctrine and mandates. As such, the civil and military spheres have existed and worked alongside each other for a long time, but it is only recently that these two spheres have begun to converge more fully. This confrontation of the 'other' has served to highlight civil-military tensions and the necessity to overcome them to successfully implement the comprehensive approach.

In the early days of the KPRT in 2005, there was a distinct lack of understanding of the purpose of the PRT and the roles and responsibilities of the military and the civilians, especially when it came to reconstruction and development. As one advisor stated "as they were setting up their operations CIDA didn't really move any people in right away because the relationship among CIDA, DFAIT and the military was a mess. It was really a mess" (Interview #24). Traditionally, development has almost always fallen to civilians, usually in the wake of a peace settlement. However, in Kandahar there was still an active insurgency going on which created high levels of insecurity that limited the ability of the civilians to move "beyond the wire" and work with Afghans to help inform, plan, and implement development projects. This ability was further limited with the death of Glyn Berry, a Canadian diplomat who was killed in a car bomb

attack in Kandahar in 2006. Consequently, development and reconstruction largely fell to the military as they were the ones who had the resources and capability to regularly leave the KPRT.

There was a distinct sense amongst the development and political advisors that the military was ill-suited to take on such a role. That the 'knuckle draggers' lacked the fundamental understanding of what development actually is and what it is trying to achieve (Interview #23). Moreover, the 'quick impact projects' implemented by the military (the CIMIC group more specifically) often undermined the longer-term development projects developed by CIDA as it created false expectations and rarely achieved what it was meant to achieve. For example, quickly erecting a school and putting a Canadian flag on it did not actually have a positive effect on the hearts and minds of the population because building a school and not providing teachers and teaching materials often meant the school was next to useless and the building would be appropriated for other uses.

The military, on the other hand, saw development projects as either a possible 'force multiplier' that can be utilized to further military goals or something that puts restrictions on the military. As one development advisor mentioned, the military, "were very impatient with the development types, because there was nothing that they could grab in terms of what these guys were doing and what their value added was." The advisor went on to describe her role as a "marriage counselor" because she "was in the middle constantly trying to make everybody happy, trying to explain CIDA world to the military and the military world to CIDA and the KPRT" (Interview #29). Another advisor remembers "being deeply disappointed watching these folks go at each other like children as recess sometimes" (Interview #26). One CIDA employee even went so far as to accuse a commander of using children as 'weapons of war' as the commander funded the building of a school as a tool to be used for the counterinsurgency campaign. These are just a couple of examples of the kind of tensions and stereotypes that existed within the PRT.

However, these tensions were also regularly overcome as the civilians and the military increased their exposure to each other, especially at the tactical level within the KPRT. One member of the Strategic Advisory Team stated "my stereotypes of the knuckle dragging soldier

was blown totally out of the water by this, this team. They were some of the finest, sharpest, most caring individuals I've ever had the pleasure of spending time with" (Interview #23). Another advisor during his time at KPRT saw civilians and ambassadors that "were all extremely experienced, very good and were quite capable at navigating those fractures" (Interview #26) and creating synergy amongst the military and civilians to implement development projects. This was particularly evident in the health and education sectors where significant strides were made, for example, towards eradicating polio and getting children (especially girls) into school (Grant and Zyla, 2021). However, a number of interviewees discussed the rather unexpected consequence of this type of deeper integration in that those not within the KPRT would occasionally accuse those within the KPRT of "going native." For example, one development advisor was accused of this by a CIDA colleague back in Ottawa as they believed the advisor in question was working on the side of the military and favoring security priorities over development even though she was still perceived by the military as a "tree hugger." Being placed in this type of grey zone is indicative of the lack of trust and understanding between civilians and the military. Regardless of these perceptions, through building trust, she was able to work closely with the military and CIDA to help the two groups better communicate with one another.

Unfortunately, overcoming tensions and stereotypes was less prevalent at the higher, more strategic levels. Silos were the norm and were very difficult to overcome. One advisor described his experience in Ottawa:

> I was sitting at my desk one day as the desk officer for Afghanistan, and I was told "Oh, we're going to create a taskforce and NATO is going to up its ante and we're going to have to figure out how we are going to play [together]." And I had in my mind, "Oh, great, we're going to have a taskforce, we're going to do this properly." And I had in my head we were going to have the Armed Forces, DND, Public Safely, CSIS et cetera all in one place working the specs. And of course, what actually happened was five different task forces were set up in five different ministries…and it was – it just didn't work (Interview #26).

Consequently, each ministry interpreted the mandate differently and lacked understanding of how the other ministries worked and what they prioritized resulting in competing priorities and perceptions as well as creating a competition for resources.

If the tactical level saw the highest levels of integration that helped minimize tensions and the strategic level saw the lowest levels of integration maximizing tensions, the operational level appeared to have both high and low levels in accordance with the personality that commanded the KPRT. Those interviewees that spoke to the importance of leadership in effectively implementing the comprehensive approach often referred to the issue of "personality." Certain leaders would come in and welcome the civilians into all the briefings their security clearance would allow. Some even went so far as to restructure the PRT so both military members and civilians were co-located and had regular interaction. Others, however, saw civilians as a source of tension and, frankly, a detriment to the mission and minimally involved the civilians. Undoubtedly, all this tension effected how the everyday was conducted which leads to the next indicator.

Indicator 2: The Logistics of Everyday Cooperation on the Ground

The comprehensive approach is essentially about cooperation between civilians and the military and, as such, daily cooperation on the ground as an indicator is the best way to demonstrate if the comprehensive approach is self-evident (or at least *becoming* self-evident). The KPRT faced numerous challenges in ensuring everyday cooperation on the ground, particularly due to the contrasting organizational structures and the value and culture systems of civilians and the military. This was most evident in the barriers to communication, training regimes, and certain embedded standard practices that had the side-effect of limiting innovative thinking. There is also strong evidence that this type of everyday cooperation on the ground can be significantly influenced by those in leadership positions and their disposition towards deeper civil-military integration which can either encourage or discourage the embodiment of the comprehensive approach. In other words, it was often the leadership of the KPRT that determined the value of the symbolic capital possessed by civilians. Over time it

became apparent that the only way these two very different groups would begin to share a strategic perspective was simply by doing things together.

Speaking Each Other's Language

Strong communication is essential to help overcome barriers to cooperation. The free flow of information, inclusion in the decision-making process, access to leadership, and knowing how to speak to one another is fundamental to the comprehensive approach. The early days of the KPRT proved to be especially problematic regarding communication as there was little guidance provided as to what KPRT was to do, let alone how the two groups would work together and coordinate efforts. The equipment provided was not only inadequate as the separate computer systems of DND and CIDA/DFAIT were incompatible with one another, but also required different levels of security clearance. The training provided for both groups was also not well suited to prepare the individuals sent to the KPRT to implement the comprehensive approach as it was based on previous regimes of training that did not include more substantial cultural and language training making them underprepared to operate in the Afghan context. Moreover, there was little cross-fertilization between the groups in that only a small number of civilians trained with the military and vice versa. Fortunately, improvements were made as the mission progressed.

As mentioned previously, with the agreement of the Canadian government to take command of the PRT in Kandahar, the CAF was quick to send out personnel but CIDA and DFAIT were a bit slower as they did not have expeditionary capabilities, nor was the mission entirely clear. However, once the KPRT was staffed, tensions were quick to arise regarding how to employ the KPRT: was it there to support the battle group? Was it there to facilitate and coordinate aid and reconstruction? What would be the nature of the relationship between the PRT and the provincial government? There was also a large amount of other uncoordinated security and reconstruction efforts going on in the region and it was difficult to place what kind of effect the KPRT was to have. It was quickly decided that the KPRT would turn its efforts to supporting the election and gathering information in areas that had little reconnaissance thus far (Maloney, 2007). As such, information became paramount to the PRT mission, but two

issues arose around standard practices that significantly affected the nature of everyday cooperation.

First, information coming from Special Forces and other conventional forces in the area were either blocked or filtered for the civilians in the KPRT, giving only a partial picture of the security and development situation in Kandahar (Interview #13). Information sharing was voluntary between different allies as well as to NATO Headquarters (who was by then in command of ISAF and therefore the PRTs) (Interview #14). The voluntary nature of external information plagued the Canadian mission as key decisions were often made with incomplete or even inaccurate information (Interview #19). This also had the negative side effect of creating silos which meant that the Canadian effort was rarely coordinated with other allies in the region as well as OEF, limiting effectiveness.

Second, internally, there were three computer systems being used within the KPRT, all of which could not speak to each other. There was the Secret-level system used by DND and the military called TACNET, the unclassified civilian system called SIGNET used by CIDA, and the ASF system used for intelligence often requiring Top Secret clearance. According to one advisor, "in terms of having one place where you could find information, that wasn't possible" (Interview #29). Consequently, there was not a common way of reporting either. For example, information coming from the District Stabilization Teams (DST) or the battle group was inaccessible to almost all the civilians as it was only available on TACNET and was often not shared with CIDA due to lack of security clearance.

Due to this incompatibility, civilians and the military often fell back on standardized practices as established by the ministries on reporting and performance management. The military heavily relied on metrics that were easily quantified, like number of the enemy killed, at the expense of metrics that would be more suitable for a state-building effort. But CIDA's measurement and evaluation tools also suffered significant shortcomings. The model used in Afghanistan was Results-Based Evaluation and the logic model was as follows:



Figure 6.5: CIDA Results-Based Management Model

Source: Government of Canada (2018) Results-Based Management Lexicon. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-evaluation/results-based-management-lexicon.html

The logic of this model shows that inputs and resources are used to carry out activities; activities lead to services or products delivered (outputs); outputs contribute to change (outcomes both direct and indirect); and outcomes, usually over a long-time horizon, will contribute to the impact. While this diagram suggests that these different areas are easily distinguishable, in practice this can be more difficult to determine. For example, one common confusion is between outputs and outcomes. The difference between these two concepts can be subtle and may depend on the nature of the development project or programme, and the executing organization's definition of the concepts. The OECD DAC definition of outputs does tacitly acknowledge this when it states that an output "may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievements of outcomes" (OECD, 2010: 28). For example, some organizations only list deliverables as outputs while others list initial changes, like the knowledge gained from a training course, as an output as well. This can become a particularly sticky point in a multinational intervention where the different executing organizations may define outputs and outcomes differently. Moreover, due to the high levels of insecurity, there was sometimes little opportunity to properly apply the logic model and there was more reliance on anecdotal evidence to show improvement or not. This meant that

development projects once implemented were placed on a set path and were not adjusted in accordance with the local population's needs. The insecurity also limited the opportunities to do mid- to long-term evaluations of the development projects. As such, both the military and CIDA had too much focus on outputs rather than the long-term impact of the projects.

That is not to say there was not opportunities for leaders to share information and improve communication through frequent interaction and inclusion of everyone in briefings and decision-making (Interview #31). It was mostly under these commanders that the PRT flourished as it allowed the civilians and the military to better coordinate and leverage one another's efforts to improve the KPRT's impact. There were also attempts made to reconcile the three different computer systems and create a common database with a common way of reporting, but it was not accomplished before Canada handed command of the KPRT to the US in 2011. Overall, standardized practices of communication and the dispositions of the leaders of the civilian and military groups limited certain courses of interaction, which in turn placed limits on the effectiveness of the KPRT.

The last factor that played a significant role in everyday cooperation on the ground was pre-deployment training. Much of the military training fell under the standard rubric of participating in large exercises with stabilization elements included. There was less focus on language and cultural training and, initially, there was virtually no cross-training between civilians and the military. It was upon the military commander to take the initiative to learn all they could about Afghanistan prior to deployment with no standardized or systematic approach to training the commanders (Interview #12). Civilians, on the other hand, had no real program or mechanism in place to help prepare for this kind of deployment. Due to the lack of clarity of the role of the KPRT it was difficult to determine what kind of skills were necessary to fulfill the role. One advisor during his interview demonstrated this issue when he spoke of his team being approached by those soldiers in the civilian training unit and were asked questions like: what do you want to achieve? What kind of skills would you like to be developed? What kind of competencies do your existing personnel have (Interview #24)? None of these questions could be answered because while a competency-based model works well for the military, it is not well

suited to those working in public service. As such, much of this early training only served to highlight the large institutional divide between civilians and the military.

Fortunately, these training programs were quick to improve by expanding language and cultural training and creating exercises more representative of the situation in Afghanistan. Canadian civilians and military were even sent to train at a miniature version of Afghanistan located in Southern California, which included a PRT group, to better simulate the scenarios that they would likely face in Kandahar. The military began to incorporate the civilians into their training programs allowing for a type of cross-fertilization between the two groups. However, it is also important to note that most of this training was civilians going to the military and not the other way around. Civilians were able to gain a better understanding of military policy and procedures while learning to speak their language, but the military had significantly less exposure to the policies and procedures of CIDA or DFAIT. Nevertheless, this type of training became the standard for deployment to Afghanistan and allowed some space for the mutual building of trust and understanding between the two groups.

Overall, as the mission progressed, more and more tools and mechanisms were put in place to better foster everyday cooperation on the ground, but a number of standard practices continued to limit certain courses of interaction like communication systems and military training programs. Certain leaders were able to overcome some of these disparities due to their particular dispositions toward the mission and the comprehensive approach as a practice, however, relying on the unpredictable nature of leadership dispositions is untenable in the long run.

Old Habits Die Hard

Certain dispositions and standard practices often become entrenched through experience and training and, for better or worse, will play a role in effectiveness. For example, a development officer working for CIDA will adopt certain social habits, standard practices, and approaches to understanding their area of operation that are significantly different than that of the military or other personnel working in a fragile state. These differences are often reinforced by incentive structures, access to high-quality information, and access to resources or aid

money. While it is these standard practices that allow these institutions to function in a systematic (or regimented) way to fulfill their mandates, they also have the side-effect of limiting alternative modes of thinking or approaches.

Autesserre in her book *Peaceland,* quite accurately captured what is was like as someone trying to understand the area of operation based on limited access to information and within certain institutional dispositions:

> The analogy that came to my mind was the experience of standing in the dark with only a blinking flashlight. The fleeting illumination reveals one fragmentary image after another. The pictures are limited to the immediate surroundings, so the observer can make little sense of what lies beyond the circle of light. The scene is disjointed. At any moment, a change in one shadow can occur undetected while the flashlight is pointed somewhere else. Ultimately, this experience provides sparse and fragmented information, which cannot help one develop a clear image of the overall conditions (2014: 115).

This fragmented and disjointed information is then interpreted based on institutional or, in some cases, individual frameworks. People with different cultures, values, ideologies, political views etc., when looking at the same information, can produce very different inferences. One interviewee from the military spoke of colleagues who took a more conventional line of thinking – that the military is there to "kill the bad guys" (predominantly the Taliban in this case) and that is what will stabilize the country. Other commanders saw it very differently and attempted to look at the situation from a "behavioral conflict" point of view. While not a Canadian example (but still pertinent), a British Commander of the Helmand Task Force took a purely behavioural approach[10] to the operation in Musa Qala, convincing "moderate" local fighters to separate from the more extremist fighters, contributing to the overall capture of the town.

Moreover, interviewees often pointed to the incentive structures which also make for risk-averse interveners as failure can have serious consequences while maintaining the *status*

[10] See Mackay, Andrew and Steve Tatham (2011). *Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and their Motives will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict,* Safron Walden, UK*:* Military Studies Press.

quo will likely result maintaining one's position, if not a promotion. As one senior civilian in NATO stated:

> Everybody thinks, "well this is just a stage in my military career, so do I really wanna do anything risky? I wanna keep my nose clean for the next appointment, you know so just to have a smooth passage. Play it safe, don't take any risks, don't criticize and then, you know, up I go to Colonel or, you know Brigadier General" (Interview #16).

Both military and civilians were often given promotions upon return, not necessarily due to performance in the field but because they went to the field in the first place. These conditions created an environment in which innovation is quashed in favor of more standard approaches.

Development officers too can have vastly different interpretations of the operating environment. One may interpret the environment as suitable for a project that was implemented elsewhere taking almost a blueprint approach – transplanting a program from a different context with little to no adjustment to the new context. Others will take a more innovative approach to problem solving, incorporating their past experiences and training to designing and implementing projects. For example, the Polio Eradication signature project hit a significant roadblock in 2011 when there was a surge in reported cases in the southern provinces. The situation required creating a new innovative approach to reach the most vulnerable in highly insecure areas (Grant and Zyla, 2021). After this reorganizing, health workers from UNICEF and WHO were able to steadily improve immunization rates in even the most remote communities (DFAIT, 2015).

The rapid influx of aid money also influenced those in the KPRT on how programs and projects were planned and implemented. Many interviewees mentioned that the massive amount of capital being poured into Afghanistan only hindered implementation of meaningful and sustainable reconstruction and development projects. It became more about spending the money quickly rather than spending the money *well.* One of the more controversial Canadian examples of this type of ill-conceived development project was the Canadian Dahla Dam Signature project. The project's objective was to improve agricultural production in Arghandab Valley by repairing and cleaning the network of canals coming from the Dahla Dam reservoir. However, the project did not include what was considered more important to the success of

the irrigation project – the reconstruction and refurbishment of the central reservoir to increase the dam's height thus increasing its water-holding capacity. Consequently, while most of the canals were repaired or cleaned, the inadequate water supply did little to improve irrigation in the valley. The USD$50 million price tag for such a poorly conceived and executed project only raised questions domestically of the viability of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan while tarnishing Canada's international reputation (DFAIT, 2015). As one American military officer quite creatively described the development situation in Afghanistan; "we would have been more effective if we would have just flown a C-17 over [Afghanistan] with pallets of cash in the back, 500 C-17's, covered them in gasoline, lit them on fire and push them out the back. That would have been more effective than what we did from a whole-of-government approach in terms of over-resourcing and unnecessary solutions" (Interview #4).

In sum, Afghanistan was, and still is, a very fragile and very complicated state and as such Canada heavily relied on training and previous experience working in fragile states to help inform the standard practices taken in the KPRT. However, the Canadian military had relatively little previous experience with counterinsurgency and reconstruction so applying previous conceptions and frameworks developed in other contexts proved largely inadequate. Moreover, the KPRT structure was a new concept to the Canadian military as well as to CIDA and DFAIT so there were significant growing pains as the KPRT developed and evolved over time. Moreover, incentive structures and the rapid influx of aid encouraged and even facilitated those in the KPRT to fall back on previously established standard practices as opposed to adapting to the reality on the ground. Overall, this resulted in limiting the effectiveness of the KPRT.

Indicator 3: Unity of Effort

Unity of effort, simply put, is harmonizing efforts across multiple organizations or agencies and working towards a common goal. This is done in order to minimize redundancies and ensuring efforts are not being undermined by other organizations. One of the most common ways to achieve unity of effort is through established and shared common objectives. Unfortunately, the strategic direction and narrative surrounding the Canadian mission in

Afghanistan was vague at best. In Canada, this concept of unity of effort often falls under the 3D approach (defense, development, and diplomacy), which encompasses a wide range of security, governance, and development tasks. However, it provides little direction on specifically how these are to be integrated. Integrating policy in a coordinated and comprehensive fashion is a challenging exercise. It poses unique problems, raises conceptual difficulties, and demands a clear appreciation of potential trade-offs.

This lack of guidance created more tension between civilians and the military set it on a path of conduct that was not easily rectified. According to Hartwell (2016), the civil-military relationship began deteriorating early on when the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) closed in 2003 and was incorporated into the newly formed UNAMA and only one officer was assigned to civil-military affairs for all of Afghanistan (in comparison to ISAFs 35 CIMIC officers in Kabul). There were also CIMIC officers belonging to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) whose role was to facilitate civil-military relationships, interactions, and dialogue with civilian humanitarian and development organizations. However, CIMIC was a new concept to the Canadian military, one that was only in the process of being included in doctrine and the roles and responsibilities remained unclear or undefined. These issues only fed into the challenge that would be achieving unity of effort in Afghanistan.

This situation made leadership personalities and dispositions an important factor in determining the level of embodiment of the comprehensive approach as they were often free to interpret the mandate as they saw fit (Interviews #1; #3; #4; #5; #7; #12; #15; #19; #25). Incoming commanders would take it upon themselves to research the area of operation and determine a strategy or operation to be undertaken during their rotation. As command rotations were often a year or less, which undoubtedly contributed to the notion of "fighting a new war every year," difficulties arose with continuity between commands. This issue was further compounded by the fact that the Canadian military could provide little guidance on how to conduct a counterinsurgency/state-building campaign as there was no official manual or guidelines available. It was only in December 2008 that the first ever Canadian counterinsurgency manual was published to help better guide this type of population-centric

mission (Department of National Defence, 2008). As such, unity of effort was far from consistent during the mission. Indeed, one interviewee said unity of effort only became manifest during the detainee crisis[11] in 2007, as he described:

> I host a meeting for the Judge Advocate General's people, Task Force Kandahar is on the line, our ambassador in Kabul is on the line, our ambassador in Brussels in NATO, we've got Washington on the line, we got the Department of Justice… and we put in a matter of weeks a new regime where Foreign Affairs is involved in monitoring, we have a diplomatic strategy, so if we have any concerns, it gets elevated to senior people in Kabul. We raise it with our allies. We're doing training, CIDA is helping us do the training. We've got Correctional Services and the RCMP involved. And it becomes the first really whole-of-government activity because the military wants it to succeed, we want it to succeed, and people start to work together (Interview #22).

The frequency of rotations (six months for the military and around a year for civilians), the lack of institutional and operational memory, conflicting objectives, and poor communication of strategy and common goals both operationally and to the Canadian population created a situation in which unity of effort was the exception, not the rule.

Stops and Starts

The lack of institutional guidance and mechanisms to foster unity of effort often meant that there was little continuity across the Canadian mission in Afghanistan as it progressed. Some commanders and civilian leaders did well to embody the comprehensive approach, but this was often short-lived as usually within a year those leaders rotated out. As one civilian advisor described, "people often ask me, 'what ambassador did you serve with?' And I say, "well I served under four ambassadors in my time there.' Or, "who was the commanding general when you were there of ISAF?' I'm like 'well, there were five'" (Interview #26).

[11] The detainee crisis concerns CAF's awareness of the abusive treatment faced by Afghan detainees. These detainees were originally captured by CAF and then transferred to the Afghan National Army. This issue raised debates about Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention which gives responsibility for the treatment of detainees to the original 'detaining power,' possibly making Canada guilty of war crimes.

Relationships also suffered due to the quick rotations, not only relations between civilians and the military but also with the Afghan population. This created significant issues with development planning as civilians had limited mobility outside the KPRT and depended on those in the military to gather information from the population to help inform development projects. But as those military members rotated out there would be a break between the KPRT and the population, losing valuable sources of information and influence as well as trust between the KPRT and the population.

Transitions between rotations were also difficult as it was often incumbent upon the intervener to sufficiently prepare for the handover so those rotating in could quickly get up to speed. In some cases, civilians would arrive and there would be no package prepared and it would take months rather than weeks to learn the job. Military commanders also rarely took previous commander's assessments of the area of operation and what needs to be done at face value. Rather, each new commander saw an opportunity to put their own mark on the mission. As a result, handovers were not consistent and institutional memory suffered for it. One Major described the KPRT as an "experiment" stating "we were making things up as we went along almost every single day, knowing we had very, very little time to work with" (Interview #25) Overall, operational momentum proved largely elusive and the KPRT was unable to create as significant of an impact as was intended.

In addition, some interviewees pointed to one other exogenous factor that contributed to determining unity of effort: the NATO command and control system. With the establishment of ISAF, five regional commands were created to coordinate all regional civil-military activities conducted by the military component of the PRTs (NATO, 2009). The KPRT fell under Regional Command South (RC(S)). Unlike other RCs, Canada, UK, and the Netherlands rotated command of RC(S) with the US taking command in 2010 and these rotating commands often created some tension between the KPRT at the RC. A development officer found difficulty with this situation as it created a gap in the operations:

> I was quite frustrated when I first arrived, RC South was basically being directed by the British and they have their own operational plan that we were able to sort of align our Memoranda to Cabinet to that. And their plan was actually not bad, and I was really

> happy that they had results and they had indicators and they had targets and there I said, "Oh, I can work with this." But then the Americans came. And well, every time a new command structure comes in, they come in with their own prepopulated plan and so there was that break. And so all the reporting that we had been trying to do at the RC South level basically stopped. We still did our own reporting to Ottawa and the development program still did its own reporting every year… but as soon as the Americans came, we gave up on the RC South stream, because they had the most ridiculous detailed, unnecessary and not really effective set of what they called effects that there were trying to achieve (Interview #29).

Such a break in the command-and-control chain would have significant detrimental effects to unity of effort and how things functioned on an everyday basis in the KPRT. Without that regional coordinating body monitoring and reporting military efforts of the four PRTs in southern Afghanistan, the likelihood of redundancies, duplication of effort and undermining one another's efforts only increases. Moreover, having to realign the KPRTs efforts to each rotating regional command to help match various metrics and styles of reporting also made continuity difficult, contributing to the lack of momentum.

Moving up the chain of command, Command ISAF (COMISAF), which fell under the command of NATO and SACEUR, also suffered under short rotations of command, as a Canadian senior civilian in NATO Headquarters explained, "the problem is, and they said the same in Vietnam, we fought in Afghanistan 16 years, 16 different times with 17 different COMISAFs. So no COMISAF could develop a strategy, implement it and then be responsible and accountable for that strategy… [it] promoted all the wrong things in the military professional system. There was no institutional memory. The high turnover was an Achilles heel" (Interview #13).

With country and regional commands providing no overarching strategy or mechanisms for cooperation and coordination, with frequent breaks in the command-and-control chain due to short rotations, and little strategic or narrative direction from Ottawa led to a fragmented effort that created and fostered silos not only between nations operating in Afghanistan but between the different departments working within the PRT itself. In this environment, creating

even moments of unity of effort that fully embodied the comprehensive approach becomes an achievement in itself. Achieving unity of effort throughout the mission became no more than a lofty ambition.

The Manley Report in 2008 did serve to provide some guidance for the KPRT while more clearly explaining to the Canadian public what is trying to be achieved in Afghanistan. The three signature projects and six priorities gave direction and purpose to the efforts of the KPRT and marked a watershed moment for the mission in Afghanistan, shifting it towards a more positive direction. However, several interviewees argued that the Manley Report was nothing more than an exit strategy for Canada with one describing, "it was no longer about Afghanistan at that stage. It was about domestic politics at home and it's not surprising that we went from the Manley Report to the decision to shut her down in 2010… everyone after 2008, basically after the Manley panel, was widely constrained to the terminus station" (Interview #26). In other words, while the Manley Report gave more direction, it also provided the recipe for exit: once these projects and objectives are achieved, Canada can withdraw.

It is no surprise then that the KPRT was never able to achieve any significant amount of momentum as the challenge of reconstructing such a complex state like that of Afghanistan was constrained by a number endogenous and exogenous factors. The mission was not created in such a way to encourage unity of effort which ultimately limited the ability for the comprehensive approach to be embodied.

Conclusion

Reconstructing insider knowledge of the KPRT allows for a glance into the daily practices that shaped the civil-military relationship. Interview data suggests that much of what influenced that relationship came from entrenched notions of how civilians and military are conceived which is further compounded by the organizational and structural challenges. These factors fed into a symbolic struggle over their respective statuses – the military as the sole purveyor of force and civilians as development and political experts. This had negative consequence in terms of the embodiment of the comprehensive approach. Tensions were rife within the KPRT and the military disposition of "getting things done" and the civilian's longer-

term outlook continually saw the two groups at odds with each other. But continued exposure to one another's practices via training and simply working together in the KPRT created space to overcome some tensions, particularly at the tactical level.

However, the organizational and structural challenges proved more difficult to overcome. The flow of information was often stymied between the two groups due to incompatible systems, incomplete or inaccurate information and because the systems of reporting and metrics used varied greatly across the different agencies. There was no single place someone could go to find information. Short rotations, lack of institutional memory and broken incentive structures also made unity of effort a challenge. It often came down to leadership dispositions to determine how much the comprehensive approach was embodied. Some training programs helped to bridge some of these gaps, but it remained a challenge for the military and civilians to speak the same language. Moreover, the standardized practices as established in each of the different agencies both helped and hindered the effectiveness of the KPRT as the various collections of practices, habits, and narratives shaped their every attitude and action.

In sum, the civil-military relationship in the KPRT is best captured, from the intervener's point of view, by the tensions inherent in civilian perceptions of the military and vice versa which fed into a symbolic power struggle between the two groups that plagued the entire mission. What role did this play in effectiveness? This question will be addressed in the next section.

Effectiveness

As described in Chapter 3, determining effectiveness in complex peace operations is no simple task. As the mission in Kandahar was primarily driven by the military, the majority of indicators used were traditional military-determined metrics which proved problematic as it overly focused on easily quantifiable indicators as opposed to metrics that are more suitable to capturing the complexity of the environment in Kandahar. Moreover, there was little to no work done prior to deployment to determine how things would be measured and the indicators

used. As one CAF member put it, “when I was there, there were no real measures of effectiveness. We had cooked up metrics and stuff like that. They were useless” (Interview #25).

This research points to a different model beyond such measures like *ad hoc* metrics and indicators that had a narrow focus on outputs or measuring military conduct according to best practices. It uses a more context-specific approach that is perception-based. This suggests there are different understandings of effectiveness, that different levels of the operation can be perceived as more effective than the operation as a whole, effectiveness can be time-bound, and can mean different things to different people. For example, in the early days there was an overall belief that the mission would make a positive difference. As one UK civilian described the mission, “I don’t know that anyone really believed that it was not going to have any impact in the long-term… I think most folks, myself included, were optimistic about where the trends were headed” (Interview #20). Most interveners in conflict zones arrive with good intentions. They may pursue additional selfish motives (like promotions), but they do want to help improve local conditions. Most of the time, interveners use their own categories of meaning to interpret the foreign situations in which they work. Moreover, many of the challenges they face require quick responses, so most interveners cannot weigh the merits of their decisions or perform a thorough analysis of the conditions on the ground. They follow the standard actions that they have acquired through previous deployments and that other interveners also use. As a result, their good intentions often lead to ineffective strategies and regularly have unintended consequences.

The interveners’ personal and social practices can also create boundaries between them and host populations. The intervener’s narrative that they come to “help” host populations enables them to claim the moral high ground, while symbolic and material resources place interveners in a dominant position. Thematic expertise legitimizes overwhelming reliance on external knowledge and solutions rather than drawing on local solutions. The security routines, the obsession with quantifiable outputs, and the rituals of visibility, reporting, and impartiality further widen the chasm between interveners and their local counterparts, often emphasizing

the superiority of the former. These dominant modes of operation also prevent local authorship and decrease local ownership.

These issues characterized much of what Canada did in Afghanistan and which was often reenforced by the leadership of the KPRT. Many successive governments have made great effort to instill the notion of Canada as a helpful fixer and peace builder both domestically and internationally (Sjolander, 2009). It is no surprise then that much of what informed the practices of the KPRT came from this domestic narrative. However, it is also important to point out that this international reputation did not always reflect the reality of the CAF on ground. As mentioned previously, former CDS Rick Hillier and the CAF wanted to prove themselves as a more 'legitimate' military force that can take on high-profile and dangerous missions. This not only contributed to civil-military tensions at the highest levels, but also contributed to the mismatch between the disposition required to command the KPRT using the comprehensive approach and how the military was trained.

Because of this disconnect, there were significant problems with the metrics, indicators, and reporting processes. As a result,, they often relied on other ways of understanding if what they were doing was effective, often based on their own habitus and disposition. One UK civilian advisor did well to capture this sentiment:

> At the tactical level it was very hard to measure progress day to day. We would do, in retrospect, would seem like meaningless or maybe even silly things to measure. But the amount of activity in the market. So, when the Taliban were in control, the district market would have very few goods, and varied people would be out. When the US and UK would provide security in the local market, we would stimulate the economy with some programs. We would suddenly see activity, to the point where in the local markets people were selling generators, and they were selling tractors, and there were selling livestock. It was night and day. I don't know how to measure such a thing. You know what I mean, how you measure a value to a picture but that's what we would do when we would brief higher headquarters… We would always include these slide decks of pictures, because you couldn't really quantify it but you could say this was last year and this was yesterday afternoon. It was very powerful (Interview #20).

This interviewee perceived this as being effective while being completely aware that if the security forces were to leave the district market it would likely revert to its previous state. This civilian understood effectiveness and the area of operations differently than someone from the military would. For example, a retired Canadian Brigadier-General who has studied the mission in Afghanistan suggests that effectiveness of the Canadian mission should be looked at from a different angle:

> I think too that Canada, the government, the Canadian and the media have missed the whole point of our success in the province of Kandahar. And the people who say, well, you know, after all this time in Kandahar and all the casualties we have, is it a better off place, or was it sort of worth it? I would say that is not the question you want to ask. If you look at it another way, and say that, in our period there, the military, we had succeeded in the end by keeping it out of the hands of the Taliban… I think our main success, it the question's asked in the right way, is the defence of Kandahar (Interview #24).

Kandahar was the heartland of the Taliban, and from a military perspective, Canada was effective in ensuring that Kandahar did not come under the complete control of the Taliban again. This perspective overlooks the other aspects of the mission, like stabilization and reconstruction, and is informed by military practices and dispositions.

These perceptions often conflict with the overall sense of disappointment in the long-term impacts that the Canadian population often conveys. However, for those more intimately involved in the mission, particularly at the operational and tactical levels, saw effectiveness in many different forms. Measuring effectiveness against the stated political goals is taking a myopic view of what it means to be effective. Understanding what works and does not work and taking into account how people think about these issues is key to improving effectiveness in the long-term.

Overall, these perceptions should not be discounted as they will inform lessons learned, future doctrine, and future mandates for future missions currently undetermined. Including the role that practices of civil-military relations in effectiveness is important to any analysis of complex peace operations. Understanding that interests and dispositions are not necessarily

exogenously given, which characterizes more rationalist analyses civil-military relations, allows to draw more applicable lessons for other missions. In other words, those moments of perceived effectiveness will undoubtedly influence civil-military practices in future missions.

Chapter Conclusion

One of the greatest influences on Canadian military history is the notion that Canada is simultaneously indefensible and invulnerable (Morton, 2007). The early years were tumultuous and full of colonial and indigenous warfare and the odd skirmish with the US, which served to shape Canadian identity. But since about 1815, Canadians have had to go abroad to fight. Canada's military is unique in that the majority of operations were for causes far beyond Canada's shore. After almost every large conflict, Canada drew sharply back on defence budgets and disbanded most of the military to the bare minimum. This pattern largely continued through the World Wars with Canada having to re-professionalize for each war. But WWII marked a paradigmatic shift for the Canadian military as it wanted to maintain a large capable force, making it a policy priority for the first time (Bland, 2000).

After the 1968 unification, the Canadian military had a hybridized culture from its British roots and increasingly close alliance with the US and its practices followed suit. As Canada worked hard to create its own unique reputation as a "helpful fixer" and "global mediator" to help differentiate itself from its southern neighbour, it became a leader in UN peacekeeping operations. As these peacekeeping operations became more and more complex, Canada began moving towards a more integrated approach between its government agencies to address failed and fragile states. All of these factors have contributed to what could be called the Canadian "way of war" and its associated practices, establishing a specific habitus and even doxa. Unfortunately, successive administrations created a significant imbalance between Canadian civilian dispositions and the military's position in the field. The undervalued role of the military and the high demand placed on it fuelled a high level of discontent until things began to change in 1997 when the dispositions of the civilians become more in-line with the habitus of the military. Canada began to better position itself in the field of peacebuilding and made significant policy contributions to human security and responsibility to protect.

However, these changes came quite late in the game as only a few years later 9/11 occurred and the subsequent mission in Afghanistan proved to be of a scale that Canada was ill-prepared for. There were few doctrines in place to facilitate civil-military cooperation and the comprehensive approach which meant, once again, Canada had to learn how to conduct this new kind of mission under the pressures of war.

The KPRT was largely an experiment in implementing the comprehensive approach that was meant to help facilitate deeper integration between civilians and the military. However, Canada was ill-prepared for such an experiment as established practices were misaligned with the field's structure. The political decision to take command of the KPRT as well as RC South saw little consideration for how volatile Kandahar province would prove to be. This meant that the military would have to take on a role that was not aligned with established dispositions and habitus from previous peacebuilding operations. The consistent under resourcing of personnel for both the Battle Group and the KPRT – civilians, in particular, were hard to recruit to send to such a dangerous area – saw Canada pulled too thin across a vast space. Doctrine was slow to catch up to the reality of the situation in Afghanistan and Kandahar as key documents were only released a few years before the end of the combat mission in 2011. Strategic direction and narrative proved a challenge throughout the mission as it was difficult to pinpoint how the Canadian mission fit into the larger mission overall, including the KPRT. Overcoming agency siloes and facilitating better coordination, too, was a challenge and while some innovative approaches were developed during the mission, nothing proved to be the key for fostering deeper and lasting interagency cooperation and coordination. Training did improve over the duration of the mission but there was not enough cross-fertilization between the military and civilians, and those training regimes that were established were largely discontinued after 2011. Opportunities to build trust between civilians and the military were too far between and many aspects of the KPRT suffered for it, especially communication.

In terms of practices, the KPRT was a space in which hysteresis, or the misalignment between the practices of civil-military relations and implementing the comprehensive approach, frequently occurred but, on the other hand, it also became the space in which developing doxa and habitus, that is internalizing the comprehensive approach to make it a

self-evident, also occurred. The leaders whose habitus and dispositions that were more aligned with the comprehensive approach created opportunities and mechanisms for which better integration could be achieved. However, as said before, relying on the unpredictable nature of leadership dispositions is untenable in the long-term, so certain practices need to take on a more self-evident nature in order to have more consistency across the mission. In other words, the embodiment of the comprehensive approach was sporadic and unreliable, so any progress made was often stymied by incoming rotations whose dispositions were misaligned.

This environment also proved difficult for the use of consistent and relevant metrics and indicators to measure effectiveness. Therefore, as was shown by multiple interviewees, effectiveness came to be understood in a myriad of ways, often based on player's habitus. For this research, effectiveness is not seen as a static concept in which it can only be defined in strict, well-established ways but rather it provides a more dynamic sense of how effectiveness was perceived. Multiple interviewees saw what they were doing as effective as their interventions appeared to significantly improve the lives of the target populations while acknowledging that certain aspects were poorly planned and executed and did not necessarily improve the overall stability of Afghanistan. This is reminiscent of the micro-macro paradox as established by Paul Mosley in 1986 which refers to one of the most controversial issues of aid in that no significant correlation can be established between the inflow of aid and GNP growth for the recipient country even though project evaluations show a positive rate of return. In other words, why do small but successful interventions not necessarily contribute to the overall stability of the country? For example, Canadian programming in Afghanistan proved quite effective in increasing enrolment rates of girls in school but the overall education picture is still quite bleak. It is difficult to say that the intervention was wholly ineffective because certain positive outcomes are also seen. Overlooking these perspectives of effectiveness would ultimately be short-sighted as those lessons learned can contribute to informing future missions.

Overall, analyzing everyday practices of civil-military integration in the KPRT using a practice theory lens allows one to better understand the nuanced interaction between agency and structure (or habitus and field) and the role it plays in effectiveness. When Canada first

took command of the KPRT, the habitus of the leadership and the structure of the field were ill suited for the actual embodiment of the comprehensive approach. The reason behind this becomes more apparent after looking at Canada's military history and its development of doctrine. More specifically, the routine disbursement of the military after a major conflict combined with the majority of administrations undervaluing the military led to the underdevelopment of doctrine. This led to a deep divide between civilians the military and laid the foundation for the symbolic power struggle that was present throughout the mission, shaping both the field and habitus of those involved in the KPRT. It was only shortly before 9/11 that things began to improve for the military as new investments were made in better resourcing the military and updating/drafting doctrine which was to late to meaningfully impact the mission.

However, as the mission progressed, Canada was praised for its flexibility and ability to rapidly adapt to the evolving security situation. Canada's military throughout its history has always had to do more with less as it was continuously spread thin by its overrepresentation in UN peacekeeping missions overseas. Moreover, the underdeveloped doctrine may have also allowed for significantly more flexibility when it came to shifts in approaches and better integrating the military and civilians. As such, the effectiveness of the mission can not be just pinned to the organizational structure or leadership dispositions but rather to the confluence of the two that creates and maintains certain practices. It is by better understanding this confluence that allows one to better understand effectiveness as a process rather than an outcome. In sum, Canada's everyday practices limited the effectiveness of the KPRT due to the long-established divide between civilians and the military, but it also contributed to the effectiveness due as the underdeveloped doctrine allowed for flexibility in the habitus of leadership as well as in the construct of the field.

CHAPTER 7: UNITED STATES

Introduction

This chapter will is structured the same as the Canadian chapter. The first section will analyze the history of civil-military relations in the US focusing on a few key events that helped shape civil-military relations leading up to Afghanistan. This captures the historicization of the sobjective methodology. It sets the stage for identifying the constitutive mechanisms as part of the process tracing approach for this thesis. Luckily, like the interviews, the history of civil-military relations in the US is well recorded in a rich literature including the writings by Huntington and Janowitz. The analysis shows a long history of a clear separation of the civilian and military spheres to the point if one steps out of line there are usually severe consequences. If a military officer steps too far into the political sphere with opinions criticizing civilian leadership, it often resulted in the very public outing of said officer. On the other hand, if a civilian tried to micromanage the military and force certain policies on them it would result in tensions not easily rectified and trust would have to slowly be rebuilt. This state of mistrust and tension typified civil-military relations going into Afghanistan and those issues led to fracturing at every level of the operation.

The second section will be the discourse analysis which will contribute to understanding the chain of events, the context of those events as well as the constitution of actors' practices and dispositions for the US mission in Afghanistan. The goal of this section is to help objectify the knowledge from the previous section by locating the Afghanistan mission's subjective and practical knowledge into the larger American intersubjective and historical context.

The US was the progenitor of the PRT concept as they arose from the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells that the US military forces in OEF established in early 2002 (Perito, 2005). The US then expanded this program into PRTs with the first appearing in Gardez in November 2002. Thus, the US had a heavy hand in determining the role and mandate of PRTs, frequently updating, and introducing doctrine to improve the effectiveness of PRTs. However, despite trying to address some well-known issues, little improved and issues identified early on

in the mission more often than not continued throughout the mission and were never fully resolved. This often points to the structures, organizations, cultures, and values as being significant barriers to implementing the comprehensive approach.

The last section will reconstruct the practitioner's point of view by inductively analyzing interviews from those directly or indirectly involved with US PRTs as well as other experts. There is a rich database to draw from regarding how the US was involved in PRTs, how they were structured and how they were run. There is a collection of 54 interviews done by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)[12] in 2005 of civilians, military and NGOs that speak to the early experiences of PRTs. The interviews I did are more of an exercise in retrospect of the whole experience, so the two sets of interviews are complimentary. These interviews are well positioned to "recover the subjective meanings" and to distill the embodiment of the comprehensive approach.

The interviews show quite conclusively that the US approach to PRTs were wracked with issues creating a largely dysfunctional operation. An operation with ad hoc strategies and approaches, inconsistent metrics for measuring effectiveness, and little space for creating unity of effort. While some things improved over time, like pre-deployment training, there was a lack of adaptability and innovation when addressing the underlying issues that fueled the conflict. Why was this the case? To answer this question, the next section delves a bit more into the nuances of the mission to better contextualize why they did they things they did.

SECTION 1:

History of Civil-Military Relations in the US

Similar to the Canadian chapter, instead of a comprehensive study of US military history, I will highlight key events and trends within the US military that had significant impact on the culture of the armed forces and its relationship with political leadership. These events shaped the habitus and dispositions of the military writ large as well as civilian leadership. It also contributed to establishment of the field in Afghanistan in which civilians' symbolic capital

[12] The interviews can be found here https://www.usip.org/publications/2005/11/oral-histories-afghanistan-provincial-reconstruction-teams-2004-2005

could do little to compete with the military's symbolic capital. The US was fighting a war against terrorism and it is the military who have the expertise and resources to do so and any other aspect of the mission should be utilized as a force multiplier. This is unlike civilians whose primary experience is working in post-conflict societies on long-term, sustainable projects.

As such, this section will cover the birth of the US military, its professional development following the Civil War, WWII, the Cold War, and Vietnam, which deeply affected the development of the mission in Afghanistan. The last section will cover the time between post-Cold War leading up to Afghanistan.

The Early Years

The civil-military *problematique* in the US is as old as the nation itself. The fears of a standing army during peacetime were very real, as Samuel Adams states:

> A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the citizens. They have arms always in their hands. Their Rules and Discipline are severe… Such a power should be watched with a jealous eye (as cited in Millet 1979: 1).

In the 1780's, there was a genuine fear that the military may take control or that a government no longer in power will use the military to remain in power. The creators of the US Constitution wanted to create a series of checks and balances that would limit the power of the military while limiting the ability of political leaders to exploit that power. This created a system of shared responsibility and diffuse power to better control the military (Avant 1994: 21). Indeed, the US has assured civilian control in the Constitution by making the democratically elected president the civilian commander in chief. It also allows Congress the power to declare war and to raise and equip the armed forces. Finally, the Constitution mandated additional safeguards, like state militias, as insurance against the possible rise of a standing army (Johnson and Metz, 1995:3). From the beginning, the division between civilians and the military was well-entrenched and not something that would be easily overcome.

However, these formal institutional rules only lay out the broad contours of the principles in which US civil-military relations are conducted. The practice of civil-military relations may diverge from those principles. Indeed, Huntington was apt to point out that the principles by themselves did not sufficiently address the gap between the civil-military configuration demanded by the changing circumstances and the configuration that emerged as a result of American history.

Professionalization: World Wars and the Cold War

The idea of professionalization of the American military started well before independence as Washington managed to turn colonial militias into an effective force to expel the British. As early as 1775, Washington planted the seeds of professionalization with the recognition that without high-quality officers it would be impossible to instill the training and discipline needed. He also urged every officer to "impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to the lowest, the importance of the cause, and what it is they are contending for" (as quoted in Glatthaar, 2018: 10). In other words, liberty became and the driving force for a motivated and cohesive military. Moreover, Washington was fully committed to civilian control of the military and worked closely with Congress as well as several committees to oversee the military.

After Independence, the military saw mostly small wars largely along the Western frontier. These skirmishes made apparent the wisdom of a militia system and Congress passed the Militia Act in 1792 in which militiamen would serve three months per year and states would designate officers and organizations. This disjointed approach of citizen-soldier failed to establish a professional system as there was no authorized financing, no uniforms, no standardization of organizations, and no oversight to ensure compliance or training. Having the militia under local control denied the federal government a reserve force for over a century (Sweeney, 1996). This undoubtedly contributed to the incredible mismanagement of the War of 1812 and despite Britain being distracted by the Napoleonic wars still managed to ensure that Canada would remain under British control.

In the aftermath of 1812, most politicians understood the need for a small standing army and navy in peacetime. Dramatic changes occurred in the administration of national defence: command structures were streamlined, the positions of surgeon general and judge advocate general were created and linked the military establishment with national goals which allowed for the institution of important improvements including the creation of the US Military Academy at West Point. Indeed, until the mid-1840s the army's strength averaged around 10,000 despite it eating up 40 percent of the federal budget as Congress' demands were very extensive (Glatthaar 2018: 27).

Various structural issues, like promotion systems, and high attrition rates due to the low pay and harsh conditions leading up to the Civil War (1861-1865) saw both sides unprepared. The Civil War is often cited as the first total war as it involved entire societies. It also introduced mass conscription, trench warfare, military railroads, and technological innovations like machine guns, submarines, and rifles (Egnell, 2009: 40). The broad participation on both sides also escalated the severity of the violence – the large number of deaths in camp, wartime hardships and the strong commitment to their causes – proved devastating. The Union ultimately won but the political ramifications of the war saw the US military go through what Samuel Huntington (1957) referred to, quite paradoxically, as the 'golden ages of professionalism.'

> Huntington describes the attitude towards the military post-Civil War as follows:
> The prevalence of business pacifism made the dominant feature of post-1865 civil-military relations the complete, unrelenting hostility of virtually all the American community toward virtually all things military. The military's source of sympathetic conservatism had gone with the South. The blanket hostility of American society isolated the armed forces politically, intellectually, socially, and even physically from the community which they served (1957: 227).

Much of the armed forces at this time were either serving in the frontier and later the Spanish-American War resulting in many soldiers being socially and physically isolated from civilians. Military influence in the political sphere was next to nil and as such many of the officers and West Point 'went their own way' (Huntington 1957: 228). This separation created the ideal

situation in which to foster high standards of professionalism. The citizen-soldier accepted by liberal society no longer existed, they were replaced by the professional soldier who was a stranger in his own home with values separate from that of civilians. According to Huntington, this birthed the real problem of civil-military relations – the clash between the professional officer and liberal society.

Moreover, this freedom allowed the military to analyze the experiences of many countries, but the one most favored at the time was Germany. Even Clausewitz, when translated into English in 1873, extolled the virtues of the Prussian military. Indeed, strides were made to change the 'backwardness' of the American model to better reflect the German model and taking a 'science of war' approach. This was the approach that argued that the only purpose of the military forces was to fight wars and nothing else and as such all training and organization must be geared toward combat. However, according to Huntington, "the German lessons were frequently misinterpreted and misapplied, but the desire to imitate German institutions was an important force in furthering American military professionalism" (1957: 235).

By 1914, the American policy on war was almost entirely Clausewitzian and there was a fear that policy would be defined before a strategy would be prepared. Consequently, the military beseeched the government for something like the Council of National Defense to define policies that the military would follow. Without such a body the military was largely directionless. Finally, in 1916, Congress created a Council of National Defense, but it was far removed from what the military wanted. Not only was the Secretary of State not a member, but it also had no provisions for regularized professional military advice. It mostly focused on economic mobilization.

With the decision to join WWI it became apparent that professionalism had not quite been achieved to the level needed for what WWI demanded. The rapid changes in technology and mechanization forced the Navy and Army to move beyond nineteenth-century military culture and embrace a professional ethos that would help translate the US into a military power with high-levels of effectiveness. Essentially, WWI served well to confirm the US emphasis on

large-scale offensive and decisive warfare. The next significant shift in US civil-military relations did not happing until WWII.

According to Huntington (1957), WWII marked a new era of civil-military relations. While civilian control was paramount since the 1870's, and persisted after 1945, a new balance needed to be found between civilian control and military professionalism as the old system became broken by American participation to fight against the Axis. According to Huntington, the three key aspects to civil-military relations, boiled down, were as follows:

> First. So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war.
>
> Second. In this area of policy and strategy, the military ran the war just the way the American people and American statesmen wanted it run.
>
> Third. On the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared between the military and civilian agencies (Huntington, 1957: 315).

In other words, military leaders reached such a high level of influence the military essentially ran both the war and the country using civilian leadership as political advisors. The military moved from strangers in their own home to one that blended well with the liberal environment. This approach inevitably created a shift in their perspectives and policies.

Indeed, Janowitz (1960) points to the effect that the World Wars and the trends in invention, organization, and fire power had on the 'civilianization' of the military profession. He deemed it necessary to speak of the military to better reflect the values and culture of civilians and of the parallel extension of military practices into civilian social structure. This idea became especially pertinent during times of peace when very few soldiers would actually face combat situations and were more likely to participate in a wide-range of politico-military assignments in the future. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Janowitz introduced the idea of a constabulary force in order for soldiers to have "an effective career without ever fighting," and still "enjoys a widespread but superficial acceptance" (Janowitz, 1960: xiii). This would create a different balance of civil-military relations that is far from what Huntington describes as the ideal but also, it can be argued, better suited for the changing security environment.

Throughout WWII, there was astounding harmony of purpose and policy on the international front as the military took on more civilian goals. It was quite the opposite on the domestic front as the military and civilians continued to clash in the forwarding of their individual interests. Huntington does point out that despite the acrimony on the domestic front, economic mobilization was an outstanding success but there was a lack of harmony on the international creating lackluster results. It can be posited that the more harmonious strategic conduct of the war was creating poor results but that may be an oversimplification. Regardless, the external and internal war policies only exacerbated the difference in military and civilian roles in each.

However, at the end of WWII the military influence on decision-making was hard to reel back in. Over history, the general mistrust of a standing army resulted in scaling back the military between wars, but the Soviet threat meant that a large standing army had to be maintained during peace. A large-scale peacetime military created an unbalance between civil-military relations as it increased the military's influence in society as well as security policymaking.

At this time there was a general acceptance of the liberal approach to civil-military relations, but the intensified threat of Communism maintained the relevance of the military ethic in national policy. The dynamic between the US and Russia and the development of thermonuclear capabilities meant "military requirement… became a fundamental ingredient in foreign policy, and military men and institutions acquired authority and influence far surpassing that ever previously possessed by military professionals on the American scene" (Huntington, 1957: 345). The possibility of a Third World War meant that budgets and practices had to support large-scale warfare. However, the Korean War showed that the military was ill-equipped to fight that kind of war and lessons learned previously had limited application to limited warfare (Avant, 1994: 35).

The Korean War saw opposing lessons as civilians saw the benefits of a more graduated response with limited political aims while the military saw that the only solution was complete military victory and had difficulty with civilians trying to limit them (Huntington 1957: 389). The Korean War became a proxy for the control of strategic aims. Indeed, General MacArthur, who

was in charge of operations in Korea, pushed back against limited aims and quite infamously said “there is no substitute for victory” (Huntington, 1957: 390). This clash between civilians and the military resulted in President Truman firing MacArthur and this ‘control over personnel’ proved costly both politically and militarily. One such consequence, as Avant (1994) argues, is that the military lacked a culture flexible enough to adapt to irregular operations. She even goes so far as to say this was why the US never developed the military doctrine that would facilitate effective COIN operations. This deficiency became especially apparent as the US became involved in Vietnam.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War’s legacy in Afghanistan is not only pronounced but also an example of a monumental civil-military failure, making it extremely pertinent to my analysis of PRTs in Afghanistan. While the war was successful in limiting communist expansion in South-East Asia, it is debatable whether the war was ‘victorious’ or not. In strategic, operational, and tactical terms, the Vietnam War was largely a failure.

As instability began to run rampant in Vietnam, it was President Lyndon B. Johnson who escalated American involvement in the war. However, of all of America’s post-WWII presidents, he played the most negative role in American civil-military relations. Similar to Pierre Trudeau, he made his feelings of contempt of the military no secret. Johnson viewed the military as arrogant, avoidant of new ideas, and that the generals were thoughtless when dealing with their subordinates (Herspring, 2013). It is no surprise then that as time passed that those feelings were reciprocated by the Joint Chiefs creating a situation far from ideal to tackle the extremely complex Vietnam War. This was further exacerbated when Johnson appointed McNamara to Secretary of Defense who also had some strong feelings about how the military should be directed.

McNamara’s attitude towards the military was one of total civilian control. In other words, when developing strategy for Vietnam he forced his own ideas on the military. He wanted to take a more diplomatic approach and aimed for, “not imposing his will on the enemy, but to communicate with him” (as quoted in Herspring 2013: 24). He was also in favor

of quantification which meant that he believed that the military must be monitored and use easy metrics to measure the war, including the infamous body count metric. It was something easy to bring to the President to show that they were winning in Vietnam. This meant that at the operational level these goals had to be translated into action on the ground, which fell to General William Westmoreland.

In following McNamara's direction, Westmoreland employed a "search and destroy" strategy, also known as a "war of attrition." However, Vietnam was not a total war, rather it was an asymmetric war deploying irregular tactics, so this strategy was ill-suited to the context. Westmoreland would later combine his search and destroy tactics with pacification, as discussed it Chapter 2. Pacification is not entirely unlike counterinsurgency as it was trying to gain the support of the rural population for the government of South Vietnam. Even with these two programs in place, the US proved largely ineffective in Vietnam.

In retrospect, as John Nagl (2005) argues, the main cause of failure was the military's inability to adapt to irregular warfare as the military's culture was solely focused on conventional warfare. Avant (1994) goes on to describe why this was the case. First, civilian control was incoherent as the President was pushing counterinsurgency while Congress was focusing on the budget on Europe. The political leadership lacked influence in the field to enforce change. Second, the structure of the military favored those who were focused on conventional warfare. Many career officers largely saw the involvement in pacification as a "duty without opportunity to shine" (Glatthaar, 2018: 106). Others contend that the failure was not because the military did not become unconventional, rather it was not conventional enough. Because of regular civilian interference in military strategizing, the army was not allowed to use its firepower as liberally as they wanted (Summers, 1982). This ultimately ended up confirming the conventional war bias.

Civil-Military Relations Stretched Thin

After Vietnam, things began to slowly shift towards what is the current model of operation for the US military. Beginning in 1984, under the Reagan administration, Secretary of

Defense Casper Weinberger released what would be termed the Weinberger doctrine. The six key points or "tests" for war as termed by Weinberg are as follows:

1. The United States should not commit forces to *combat* overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies.
2. If we decide that it *is* necessary to put *combat* troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.
3. If we *do* decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed – their size and composition – must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance [that] we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.[13]

The Weinberger doctrine's goal was to avoid another Vietnam. This was confirmed by the tremendous success of military operation in the Gulf War which unfortunately once again confirmed the conventional warfare bias. However, in the background the security environment was changing to smaller more complex conflicts.

The other shift occurred in 1986 when Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It was one of the most sweeping changes in command since the end of WWII. It allowed for the unified command in joint operations. More specifically, the law placed clear responsibilities and authority on unified and specified commands for planning, joint resources, and execution. It also enhanced the power of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and moved to service chiefs to focus on training and equipping troops.

In some ways, Reagan was quite the departure from the previous administrations. He listened to the Generals during Grenada and publicly praised the military and improved the defense budget and provided resources – though the rationality for how resources were

[13] Excerpts from the Weinberger speech appearing in the above and following paragraphs are drawn from "The Uses of Military Power," speech before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984.

allocated was unclear. Regardless, Reagan saw value in the military increasing its symbolic capital and its influence in the field of civil-military relations.

With the election of George H.W. Bush in 1989 the positive momentum created by Reagan continued. Bush moved away from micromanaging the military and only expected to be consulted. He believed collegiality was the best way to ensure that his cabinet officers were involved in policy making process. The only hitch in this administration when it comes to civil-military relations was Bush's Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney. Cheney had no prior military experience, and he went in wanting to show who is in charge and consequently he clashed with the military as he tended to micromanage. Despite Cheney, the operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf went relatively smoothly due to the shared responsibility between the military and civilian leaders.

Unfortunately, any goodwill established over the past two administrations diminished with the election of Bill Clinton in 1993. With no military experience he had very little understanding of military culture resulting in him taking actions that went against military principles. Indeed, many officers believed that Clinton did not respect them or their ideas (Herspring, 2013). Clinton also moved to freeze military pay even though it had fallen significantly behind the private sector. It appeared he was more interested in saving money than planning for possible future missions and what they may look like.

And then Bosnia happened. It was a bloody affair as the Serbian Bosnians were trying to take control of the province by either ejecting or exterminating the other two ethnic groups – Muslim Bosnians, and Croatian Bosnians. Clinton sought a way to stop the killing which culminated in a large bombing campaign – Operation Deliberate Force. While the Bosnian Serbs did agree to cease offensive operations and to remove all heavy weapons, it came at a steep cost. The subsequent peacekeeping operations following the Dayton Peace Accords took on a complex security environment that still had high levels of violence. There was no peace to keep and the efforts made proved mostly ineffective.

The last military action that Clinton faced was Kosovo. Clinton essentially ignored the deep divide between civilians and the military over Kosovo. This meant that much of the decision making was happening between Secretary of Defense William Cohen and recently

elected SACEUR, General Clark. There was great tension between the two as Clark's loyalty was not the Secretary of Defense but rather to his own ambitions. Clark wanted boots on the ground, but the Joint Chiefs were determined to limit US military involvement and ultimately decided to conduct a bombing campaign. This remains a controversial decision as it did not gain the approval of the UN Security Council and resulted in a significant number of civilian deaths. Overall, the trust between the military and civilians were virtually non-existent and Clinton was rarely on top of foreign affairs issues as he focused on domestic issues. This was the state of civil-military relations when 9/11 happened.

SECTION 2:

The Afghanistan Challenge

The attacks on 9/11 marked a significant shift in how the US conducts war. While some changes, like the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a welcomed response, others, like preemptive attacks on likely aggressors while signing onto a war with no clear end, became some of the more controversial decisions of the era (Ballard, Lamm, and Wood, 2012). The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon generated a response with huge international support with a coalition of over fifty nations. The *Operation Enduring Freedom* was an act of collective self-defense found under Article 51 of the UN charter. Not only that, but NATO also invoked Article 5 of the Washington treaty, the first time in history. *OEF* went practically unquestioned both domestically and internationally.

However, after quickly ousting the Taliban the waters became much murkier as to how to ensure that Afghanistan never became a haven for terrorists again. One answer was presented at the Bonn conference on 5 December 2001 which discussed how to rebuild Afghanistan's political institutions (Rubin and Hamidzada, 2007). It brought together representatives from different ethnic and exile groups in Afghanistan as well as members of the international community in the former capital of Germany to map out provisional arrangements for rebuilding Afghanistan and establishing permanent governing institutions. Specifically, it established a five-year plan towards the creation of parliamentary and

presidential elections, including an Interim Authority that would be able to govern the country politically.

The other answer was to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign, also known as COIN, in parallel. However, it is important to point out that the campaign was not immediately framed as a COIN operation. Rather, it was first presented under the strategic framing of counterterrorism which was broadly defined as "defeating and dismantling Al Qaeda, denying state support to terrorism, and preventing the reemergence of terrorist safe havens" (Kilcullen, 2015: 13). Stabilizing Afghanistan at this point was only a means to an end – preventing the reemergence of safe havens – thus supporting the broader effort of the war on terrorism. It was only in 2005-2006 that counterterrorism campaign transitions to a full-blown COIN campaign.

The quick victory over the Taliban in 2001 bred optimism – if it was so easy to defeat the Taliban with a light footprint approach, how hard can reconstruction be? Retrospect tells us this was wildly inaccurate. The light footprint approach only hampered stabilization efforts and civilian agencies found it incredibly hard to operate outside of Kabul with few support systems in place to help guarantee safety and security. This combined with Washington focusing on the Iraq war saw a strategic inattention towards what to do with Afghanistan.

While Iraq was stealing the spotlight from Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency had grown to a point where it demanded a much more serious engagement. The transition to a COIN campaign while minimizing the siphoning of resources from Iraq saw the US looking towards NATO to expand its initial mandate of securing Kabul and its environs to all of Afghanistan. This began the NATO expansion counterclockwise around Afghanistan and ISAF taking command of a number of PRTs, as discussed previously. By December 2006, NATO was responsible for the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. However, NATO is a military alliance and could not deploy civilians in a capacity of reconstruction. Indeed, some NATO countries operated under certain legal constraints that prevented civilian agencies from working with military forces. To implement a COIN strategy, some nations looked towards the European Union (EU) to supply civilian capacity but overall, many NATO nations became

dependent on the US for civilian capacity, particularly the PRTs. In other words, the necessity of civilians and the military working together to achieve certain goals was recognized early on.

As the US developed the conceptual framework for PRTs, they represented a unique position when compared with other countries. Instead of commanding a single PRT like Canada in Kandahar, they commanded twelve of the twenty-six PRTs including Asadabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Khowst, Mehtarlam, Farah, Qalat, Sharana, Nurestan, and Panjshir. However, despite the US having the majority control of PRTs as well as having some sort of presence (either civilian or military) in all the other PRTs, it was only in 2009 that there was an attempt to develop an integrated civilian-military campaign plan. Co-developed by former Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, the plan lays out seven core principles needed to move the campaign forward:

- *Afghan Leadership, Afghan Capacity, Afghan Sustainability* – every effort should be aimed at assisting Afghan leadership to become more effective.
- *Action is Required at All Levels* – increase focus on subnational levels.
- *Unity of Effort Comes Through True Integration* – civilian- military teams will organize more effectively at the district, provincial, and regional levels to implement the COIN mission and reduce stove piping. Additionally, civilian structures will be reorganized to better civilian-military integration.
- *The International Community is a Key Partner* – success depends on close collaboration with allies in ISAF and UNAMA as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations.
- *Giving Guidance, Resources and Authority at the Right Levels* - focus more tools and resources at the sub-national level to allow civilian and military teams in the field, working in partnership with the Afghan people, to lead security, reconstruction, and governance initiatives.
- *Progress must be Visible and Measurable* - Showing tangible progress to the Afghan population and the international community is crucial, particularly in the short-term. Using clear criteria for gauging this progress against clear goals and measuring success

will help to properly allocate resources to ongoing initiatives and adapt strategy in a timely manner.

- *Accountability and Transparency* – holding efforts to the highest standards of best practices of accountability and transparency. Ensuring efforts do not feed corruption or the abuse of power in the government and amongst partners in the field.

This became a key document in providing guidance to the PRTs, though in retrospect not all of these core principles were followed through on or even provided good guidance for sustainable change. For example, the last two principals were extremely difficult to implement that late in the game and the focus of short-term visible results is not necessarily in-line with good development practices. Ultimately, this document acknowledges the difficulties implementing COIN with fractured civil-military relations, especially with civilians not prepared to act in this type of capacity.

In this situation, it became blaringly apparent that American civil-military relations were critical for Afghanistan for a couple of reasons. First, the US is a decisive coalition member in that if it withdrew the mission would come to a screeching halt (unlike say if the Dutch withdrew). Second, by carrying the lion's share of military and financial contributions, it largely shaped the framework for reconstruction and stabilization. It is not a stretch to say that much of the war's outcome was dependent on the decisive actions of the US – US combat operations, political leadership, intelligence, diplomacy, logistics, development, and civil-military relations.

It is important to note that the Iraq war also significantly shaped the mission in Afghanistan, especially PRTs. It was 11 November 2005 that the first PRT was inaugurated in Iraq, which were modeled on the PRTs in Afghanistan. As former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice explained, the PRTs in Iraq were meant, "to marry our economic, military, and political people in teams to help local and provincial governments get the job done" (as quoted in USIP, 2007: 1). While the conceptualization of PRTs in Iraq came from Afghanistan, they bore little resemblance, especially in composition (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Comparing Afghanistan and Iraq PRT Models

Afghanistan PRT Model	Iraq PRT Model

Purpose	To help extend the authority of the Afghan government into the provinces in order to develop a stable and security environment, enable security sector reform and economic and social development. PRTs are located in provincial capitals where they interact primarily with the governor, provincial level representatives of the central government ministries and elected provincial councils.	To assist Iraqi provincial and municipal officials and civil society groups to improve governance, reconstruction and security through capacity building and by creating political space for moderates to operate. PRTs are also expected to assist the U.S. military by providing the political component of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The role of PRTs is to help strengthen provincial authorities and assist them in undertaking local initiatives in an historically centralized state.
Leadership	Military Commander	Senior State Department Official
Civilian-Military Composition	U.S. model for PRTs has 80 personnel: three are civilians representing the State Department, USAID and the Department of Agriculture. The military component includes the PRT commander and his staff; a force protection unit (usually an infantry platoon of National Guard); two Army Civil Affairs teams, each with four soldiers; and several small units of military police, intelligence officers and other specialists.	Iraq PRTs had up to 80 mostly civilian personnel from the Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture and USAID. The military component included the deputy leader and military liaison officer, civil affairs soldiers that performed various functions and a representative from the Army Corps of Engineers. The PRT also included USAID civilian contractors and Iraqi personnel. For these PRTs, force protection was provided by the U.S. military or contact security

PRTs established during 2006 in Iraq were led by a senior State Department official and composed primarily of civilian personnel. The first three of ten PRTs were established at Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hilla through existing regional embassy offices which were the functional equivalents of a U.S. consulates. The compositions of these PRTs included representatives from the State, Justice, and Agriculture Departments and USAID, a USAID commercial-contract firm, plus Army civil affairs teams and other military personnel. U.S. military forces or commercial contractors provided security.

These two types of PRTs running concurrently influenced each other in the evolution of the different iterations as well as lessons learned. However, both of these models of PRTs had many problems associated with them, especially regarding civil-military coordination and coherence. This raises the question about how prepared the US was to run a COIN operation in Afghanistan (or Iraq for that matter). American confidence in its military and its ability “to get things done” may have bitten off more than it could chew with Afghanistan.

As will be discussed in Section 1, the overconfidence by the US government in the US military has many historical precedents. Similar to Canada with its peacebuilding habitus, the US habitus is built on its long and bloody history of conducting conventional warfare. The idea of superb training, superb technology, and access to significant resources has fueled this idea that the US cannot be defeated. However, the Afghanistan mission is far removed from the conventional type of warfare that the US does best. The established practices of civil-military relations were not up to the task in Afghanistan and the hysteresis of civil-military relations became almost palpable. The power dynamic already established was not easily rectified and American doctrine provided a strong backstop to make that extremely difficult to change.

The next section will review American doctrine, particularly around counterterrorism and COIN. This will be followed by the discussion of PRTs and their associated challenges. Lastly, will be a discussion on effectiveness and the American conduct in Afghanistan.

American Doctrine

The limitations of military doctrines and associated practices are often exposed, not by debates within certain circles, but by events. Indeed, it was Afghanistan and Iraq that exposed the weaknesses and inadequacies of the so-called 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) which was a popular idea in the US from the mid-1990s to around 2003 (Roberts, 2009). The revolution suggested a major change in the nature of warfare brought on by the innovative application of new technologies which, in combination with changes in military doctrine and operational and organizations concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations, including counterinsurgency (NATO, 1998). Afghanistan proved to be a hard test for these revived ideas of counterinsurgency.

Classical COIN approaches emphasized the need for a large military contingent that is committed to prioritizing civilian security, despite the considerable risk for casualties, for a long period of time. However, the RMA envisaged commanders deploying minimal troops and resources at minimal cost/risk in theatre in order to attain a quick, decisive military victory. The contradiction between COIN and the RMA consequently pushed certain military establishments

to tailor more to swift, conventional conflicts rather than protracted COIN operations (Stibbe, 2012).

On the other hand, the information and communications technology innovations brought about by the RMA were highly relevant to COIN operations. The gathering and manipulation of information is key to minimize people joining ranks with the insurgency. For instance, the ISAF/NATO Command and Control system enables HQ commanders to share information and communications near-instantaneously with military units – in several Areas of Operations (AOs) – across an entire military theatre. It can also provide key information on the location of insurgents for precisions attacks. However, this technology, too, can be used by insurgents to better their position.

This very simplified overview shows contradictions between the RMA and what is needed for an effective COIN operation. So how did this all play out in Afghanistan? This section will discuss the US military doctrine hierarchy and the key documents that played a role in determining the framework in which the mission in Afghanistan was run.

The US has a long military history and, as such, has seen many changes in doctrine. To give a comprehensive review of these changes is outside the scope of this thesis; so, I will focus only on the evolution of a particular section of doctrine – counterinsurgency. In order to better understand how doctrinal evolution shaped the mission in Afghanistan, particularly its COIN operations, it is important to step back and look at the only other significant COIN operation that the US undertook – Vietnam – and its influence on doctrinal change.

Prior to Vietnam, there was little guidance on how to effectively implement a COIN operation, even though the US had already participated in a number of irregular or unconventional campaigns throughout its history (Kretchik, 2011). However, in 1961, the US published a lower-level manual titled FM 31-15 *Operations Against Irregular Forces* (Birtle, 2006). This document broadly (and somewhat vaguely) defined irregular to refer "to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations, and methods" (FM 31-15: 3). It is this document whose concepts would be incorporated into FM 100-5 *Operations* published in 1962 that would help guide the operations in Vietnam.

Despite the publication of these manuals, conventional warfare tactics still weighed heavily in the collective military mind, so it was decided that the only ones even remotely capable for this type of combat were the Special Forces. Little changed doctrinally as the war progressed, despite the innovation of the CORDS program and pacification as discussed in Chapter 2, providing little guidance on how this war should be conducted. In 1968, General Westmoreland decided to execute a strategy of attrition based on finding and defeating Vietcong guerrilla forces and North Vietnamese conventional forces (Gallo, 2018). The logic was that once the North Vietnamese forces were destroyed, the South Vietnamese government would be able to police the rest of the country, restore order, and defeat or neutralize any remaining irregular threat. Apparently, the COIN strategy was not quickly achieving the desired effect and it was decided to shift back to more conventional military tactics. History shows that this was not the winning strategy, indeed, there was no winning in that war at all as the US was not prepared to take on such a complex mission.

In retrospect, it is clear the over-reliance on two documents to guide such a complex war meant that the organization's ability to prescribe or regulate every type of operation in explicit detail was limited. The post-Vietnam war period too proved to be inhospitable for developing COIN doctrine. Indeed, after the war a Strategic Assessment Group was developed to review the Army's experience in the Vietnam War and to develop a roadmap for the organization's future (Kretchik, 2011). Based on the conclusion that the American public would no longer stomach foreign intervention except in those cases where America's vital interests were at play and concluded that the defense of Europe with conventional forces should be the Army's primary focus. The preference for conventional warfare was made clear and the military was more than willing to jettison any practices and lessons learned developed during the Vietnam War regarding how to conduct more effective counterinsurgency operations.

It was not until the early 1990s, in the face of strategic uncertainty and bureaucratic competition for increasingly sparse resources, that the military focused on readiness and the exploration of new technologies to address the limitations exposed during previous conflicts, especially the Gulf War. The military released the 1993 Field Manual 100-5 *Operations* manual on June 14, 1993 whose doctrine "is no longer just AirLand Battle, a doctrine steeped in Cold

War assumptions of a forward defense … it is now a doctrine of full-dimensional operations for a force-projection Army whose units will normally act in conjunction with air, naval, and space assets and seldom be involved in operations outside the United States separate from the forces of allied nations" (McDonough, 1993: 11). While maintaining many similarities to previous Field Manuals, it was unique in that it included a chapter on "operations other than war" or "low-intensity conflicts." Despite the military having recently engaged in two such operations - Panama (1989) and Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq (1991) - some senior commanders argued against the incorporation of those concepts in FM 100-5. The debate over the degree to which FM 100-5 would focus on these types of operations was a major point of contention over the new doctrine (Kretchik, 2011; Gallo, 2018). Unfortunately, the manual only had eight pages on operations other than war which still lacked significant detail on the planning and execution of such operations.

However, after the military's experiences in Somalia in 1993 and the Balkans in 1995 and 1999, senior leaders thought it was necessary to update the 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations* manual to reflect lessons learned from those experiences, to clarify ambiguity regarding military operations other than war, and to align Army doctrine with joint doctrine (Gallo, 2018). The primary emphasis in the new 2001 FM 3-0 *Operations* manual was on a concept termed Full Spectrum Operations. According to the manual, "full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations" (FM 3-0, 2001: 1-15). Stability operations were those that required "a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in response to a crisis" (Ibid.). Support operations were those that required "Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign and domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering" (Ibid.: 1-16). Rather than consolidating operations into two distinct categories - war and operations other than war - the new doctrine emphasized overlap between the categories and acknowledged that the military would often have to conduct multiple types of operations in the same conflict (like in Bosnia).

It is with this doctrine in hand that Afghanistan came to the fore, which would come to challenge everything assumed and developed in counterinsurgency doctrine. Indeed, the

Afghanistan mission and Iraq mission were the events that drove the reexamination of COIN doctrine (Roberts, 2009). One of the most important documents that came out of this reexamination was the 2006 US Army Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (see Table 7.1 for full doctrinal hierarchy). While it has some flaws, this document was a significant contribution to the counterinsurgency literature. It is also where it is acknowledged that the comprehensive approach is necessary for a successful operation:

> COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population's support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of nonmilitary and [host-nation] agencies in a comprehensive approach (FM 3-24, 2006: 1-28).



Figure 7.1: US Doctrine Hierarchy 2020

Source: Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Hierarchy-Chart/

However, the weaknesses of the doctrine became very apparent in Afghanistan. First, there was a serious lack of coverage regarding systems of justice, particularly those imposed by insurgents. Insurgencies commonly use their own judicial procedures to reinforce their claims to be able to preserve the status quo to or create a better one. The Taliban have always placed emphasis on the provision of a system of Islamic justice and they took advantage of the weak governmental systems already in place in Afghanistan to further their cause. However, in addressing the problem of undermining and weakening insurgencies, both traditional counterinsurgency theory and its revived versions in the twenty-first century place heavy emphasis on the role of state institutions like the political structures, the administrative bureaucracy, the police, the courts, and the armed forces (Roberts, 2009). There is a base assumption that the institutions are in place and are viewed as a legitimate source of authority. This is clearly out of line with the reality of failed or fragile states, including Afghanistan.

Another critique regarding the manual comes from Stephen Biddle when he questioned some of the manual's key assumptions:

> It is far from clear that the manual's central prescription of drying up an insurgent's support base by persuading an uncommitted population to side with the government makes much sense in an identity war where the government's ethnic or sectarian identification means that it will be seen as an existential threat to the security of rival internal groups, and where there may be little or no supracommunal, national identity to counterpose to the subnational identities over which the war is waged by the time the United States becomes involved (Isaac, Biddle et al., 2008: 348).

It became clear in Afghanistan the focus on government and legitimacy at the national level was not an effective means to address the insurgency. After 2008, the focus was placed on provincial and regional state structures, moving away from the state-based approach which is contrary to the established counterinsurgency doctrine.

In summary, the US had plenty of opportunity to develop COIN doctrine that would have better aligned with the realities of complex peace operations, particularly after Vietnam.

However, Vietnam also showed that conventional warfare is what the American military is good at, and it was argued that is what it should focus on. It became apparent though that that approach was not what was needed in the rapidly evolving international security situation and some concessions needed to be made for operations that did not fall under conventional warfare. Even then, the term counterinsurgency was avoided, and the focus became on operations other than war, low-intensity conflict, or even full spectrum operations. With a more fulsome discussions of COIN in the 2001 and 2006 document, there was still a lack of coherence about what was to be achieved, which meant COIN doctrine suffered many weaknesses. Indeed, the military's inability to stabilize both Afghanistan and Iraq after invading is telling in that it suggests that the military was incapable of conducting the stability operations that were emphasized in both the 1993 and 2001 keystone doctrines and the counterinsurgency doctrine. These doctrines also played a key role in directing US PRTs, and as such, PRTs too suffered significant shortcomings.

Fractured PRTs

From the start, the PRT program was a means of burden-sharing among countries participating in the U.S.-led Coalition as well as a mechanism for expanding the reach of NATO-led ISAF beyond Kabul (Leprince, 2013). As more allies took command of various PRTs, the proliferation of different national approaches created confusion on how PRTs would prioritize their objectives, implement programs, or fulfill their responsibilities. The a-strategic nature of the PRT meant that personality and local circumstances largely drove operations and relationships. Moreover, in the early days of the PRTs, ISAF PRTs were often located in relatively stable areas of Afghanistan while U.S. PRTs were in the more volatile areas. Operating in relatively peaceful areas, ISAF soldiers donned "soft cover" traveled in small groups on weeklong driving tours of district capitals and worked directly with local police and militia forces (USIP, 2005). In contrast, American PRTs emphasized village improvement projects as a means of "winning hearts and minds," particularly in the Taliban heartland in the south, which is typical of a COIN strategy. This organization of PRTs meant there was little coordination or coherence amongst the PRTs, including between US commanded PRTs.

In an attempt to remedy this, the Executive Steering Committee adopted the *Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan* (2005). Unfortunately, this did little more than restate the original objective of assisting the Afghanistan government while recognizing that PRTs obligations are subject to where expertise and resources permit. It also reinforces the voluntary nature of reporting to others than direct superiors and that the primacy of national priorities and the individual commander's discretion were clearly acknowledged. The document gave no direction on the distinction between military and civilian personnel, working with other international organization, and UNAMA's role. In other words, it did little to improve PRT coordination and coherence.

Another significant issue was that US PRTs often did not have a full complement of personnel. As mentioned previously, the size and composition of US PRTs often varied depending on local circumstances as well as the availability of personnel from civilian agencies. Indeed, early there was little incentive for civilian personnel to take such a hardship position as it often either stalled their careers or took their careers off course (Interview #2). But to reiterate, the basic command structure that was often used can be seen in Figure 7.2:



Figure 7.2: US PRT Command Model

Source: Labarre, Frederic (2011). Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Comparing the American, British and Canadian Models. Defence R&D Canada, DRDC CORA CR 2011-082, pg. 7.

The roles and responsibilities of each of the sectors can be broken down to the following:

Military Commander: Usually a Lieutenant Colonel, the commander maintained regular contact with the provincial governor, police chief, city mayors, and influential Afghans. The commander also attended the Provincial Development Council, which coordinated development efforts, and chaired the PRT Project Review Committee, which vetted proposals for reconstruction. He also chaired meetings of the commanders of CFC combat units that were co-located with the PRT to coordinate military operations. The commander also liaised with the regional UNAMA office and international NGOs.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams: At the forefront of the "hearts and minds" objective. Civil Affairs "A" Teams conducted assessments of reconstruction needs and handled the contracting with Afghan firms to build schools, clinics, bridges, and wells. Civil Affairs "B" Teams operated the PRT's Civil Military Operations Center and coordinated with the UNAMA regional office and international NGOs engaged in providing humanitarian relief and development assistance.

Military Police (MP) Teams: These three-member teams were responsible for assessing the needs of the local police and for providing training and material assistance where possible. MP teams offered training in public-order functions, such as crowd control, operating vehicle checkpoints, and conducting building searches. They also provided vehicles, communications gear, uniforms, and office equipment.

State Department Representative: While there was no standard job description, assigned for a one-year tour of duty, State Department officers served as the following: political advisors to the PRT commander and the provincial governor, resources for the PRT on matters related to Afghan culture and provincial politics, members of the Project Review Committee, and assistants to the USAID officer on development projects. They also functioned as regional reporting officers for the U.S. Embassy, providing fifty percent of the reporting to Washington.

U.S. Agency of International Development Representative: USAID representatives were present at all levels of the U.S. PRT structure, including regional commands and Coalition headquarters. They advised the PRT commander, provincial governor, and other Afghan authorities on development matters while reporting to the U.S. Embassy on conditions in the field and the development capacity of local governments. They were key members of the PRT's Project Review Committee, which considered project proposals to ensure suitability.

U.S. Department of Agriculture Representative: The agency provided PRT advisors in six-month rotations whose task was to foster reconstruction of the agricultural sector and to enhance the central government's ability to provide services to the rural population. USDA fielded a mix of veterinarians, soil specialists, food safety experts, forest conservationists, plant pathologists, and agriculture extension specialists.

Afghan Ministry of the Interior Representative: A colonel from the Afghan National Police represented the Afghan central government and the Interior Ministry. This officer advised the PRT commander on local personalities and conditions. He was also the primary liaison and point of contact with local Afghan authorities (USIP, 2005: 5-6).

These positions were considered the maneuver components of the PRT which meant they could operate outside the PRT. Other members of the PRT, that were usually limited to working inside the PRT, could include an intelligence team, a medical team, a force protection unit, and an explosive ordinance unit. However, many PRTs had less than two civil affairs teams, military police positions often remained unfulfilled, and other special units were often unavailable. This lack of expert and skilled personnel proved to be a significant constraint on the effectiveness of US PRTs.

There were several other publications meant to help address the shortfalls identified with US PRTs. There were a number of lessons learned reports on PRTs issued including the 2007 Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* which introduced a number of principles particularly focused on civil-military integration and stabilization. It placed significant emphasis too on unity of effort and the role of leadership:

> The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful stability and reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host nation's government (local and national) and the populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors… Effective PRT leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, military and civilian. PRT leaders must orchestrate their efforts to achieve unity of effort and coherent results (CALL, 2007: 10).

Indeed, unity of effort is a commanding theme regarding PRTs as it is something that has been a challenge throughout the mission. It was important to clearly outline the interagency coordination mechanisms and to designate those who would address interagency disputes (see Figure 7.3):



Figure 7.3: Interagency Coordination Mechanism

Source: Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). (2007). PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, pg. 23.

It is clear when looking at Figure 7.3 that the National Security Council (NSC) should have played a significant role in interagency coordination. However, this was not necessarily the case as several interviewees pointed out. In order for information to move up the different levels, it required consensus at the lower levels and consensus was rarely reached meaning that those "big decisions" often did not reach the level where the decision should be made, stalling the whole process. Furthermore, as one interviewee stated regarding the many agencies involved all operating under different assumptions:

> How can you have a comprehensive approach if you have 20 different operating pictures? It's impossible. Now, the theory is that the NSC provides that common operating by bringing these folks all together. Doesn't happen, it's not real. Good in theory, difficult in practice. The mechanics and the structure, it's just not there (Interview #4).

This "bureaucratic paralysis" meant that the NSC did not play the role it was intended creating a significantly fractured picture amongst the PRTs.

Another significant document, as mentioned previously, was the 2009 *Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.* It was the first document co-authored by civilian and military leadership. It attempted to shore-up civil-military integration by describing a more nuanced approach to various areas of issues (e.g., agricultural opportunities, sustainable job creation, narcotics, corruption etc.) while laying out national-level objectives. This section is particularly interesting as the mission was already moving towards focusing on provincial and regional levels as national level interventions were being perceived as ineffective. Furthermore, it laid out an integrated civilian-military decision-making structure that included all levels, from the Principal's Group down to the District Support Teams. The document was an honest effort at improving coordination and coherence amongst US PRTs but fighting against a well-entrenched structure and culture of civil-military relations is not something that can be changed quickly. In other words, despite these multitude of efforts,

improving civil-military integration to better counter the fractioning at all levels of the PRT did not necessarily happen during the Afghanistan mission.

SECTION 3:

Indicator 1: Normalizing Civil-Military Tensions

According to the data gathered, civil-military tensions were rife within the US PRTs as well as within the entire chain of command. As Section 1 covered, there is a history of dissent between the military and civilians and thus, within the US, it is viewed as a vital necessity to keep the military and civilian spheres separate with absolute civilian control. This has left little space for the organizations to overcome such tensions and fully embody the comprehensive approach. Indeed, I interviewed people on both the military and civilian side of US PRTs and there appears to be a general mistrust, even dislike, between the two groups, much more so than in Canada. It was an issue that began early on in the mission and became a theme throughout. For example, an interview done with a USAID Field Program Officer who was embedded in a PRT in mid-2003 described his experience:

> You have a lot of people competing for resources; financial and political. You have let's face it, the U.S. military is not going to be beholden to anybody out there. So it does, as I said, it's the biggest gorilla in the room, it does what it wants to do. But I think, having said that, it does make a valiant effort to work especially in its special affairs side, to do the things necessary, we're discussing the coordination. But I think that it's restricted just by the nature of military hierarchy and what their protocols are. They can't coordinate quite at the level that we'd like them to. Believe me in saying that the blame doesn't fall squarely on the military's shoulder. It falls with the U.S. government, State Department, USAID, the Afghan government. Believe me ... (USIP Interview #24).

As this quote demonstrates, there were issues at every level and every agency when it came to civil-military relations and coordination. When comparing the military practice of unlimited liability and the high pressure from the chain of command to "get things done" and civilian practice of working on longer timelines and not as beholden to a strict hierarchy of command

meant these two cultures clashed to the point that they would freely disregard one another. Two interviews do well to illustrate this. First, a Foreign Service Officer that was stationed at the PRT in Herat in 2004:

> No, [the commander] saw no reason to have anything to do with the civilian component of the PRT. He had a great deal of money to spend on projects. He did not want the advice or the assistance of anyone who was trained in civil affairs missions to help him spend his money wisely or logically. He would simply select projects that he liked and demand that they be pushed through. In general, much of what he tried to select and push through did not receive clearance eventually at the highest levels in Kabul. He very often would try to spend money unwisely and was not particularly interested in follow up or financial accountability (USIP Interview #1).

Second, a scholar who took part in a 2009 external evaluation of a PRT:

> The military will go in and write the plan and come back and brief the civilians. The civilians go, yes, and they'll make a few different suggestions, and the brigade commander can say, I've got a civil military plan, and I've agreed with the head of the PRT. When reaction, reality to what's happening is that the civilians are just ignoring the military plan. Cause it's not their plan. And rather than have an argument with the military, they just, they just say, yes that's fine (Interview #11).

These quotes are obviously on the extreme ends of the spectrum of civil-military tensions as this was clearly not always the case, but they are also very telling of the preconceived notions of each group towards one another. This suggests that there was little opportunity to fully embody the comprehensive approach overall, but there are clear differences of embodiment at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Tactical vs Operational and Strategic Tensions

Like Canada, mitigating tensions was the strongest at the tactical level (though not as strong as for Canada). This is of little surprise as even simple exposure to socialize on a regular basis can have a significantly positive effect on the ability to work together. For example, the high levels of dependency of civilians on the military to mobilize outside the PRT, while largely

seen as a negative for the purpose of the mission, also had a positive effect on relationship building between civilians and the military. However, this type of relationship building needed to mitigate tensions faced significant challenges at the tactical level.

As mentioned previously, there was a significant shortage of civilian experts willing to take on an expeditionary position in a dangerous country. One staff officer for Combined Forces Command under Lieutenant General Barno was assigned to monitor major activities of the PRT strongly felt the shortage of civilian expertise: "the military, yes, they may have doctors, they may have engineers – and the engineers did a wonderful job over there, the Corps of Engineers and the engineers that I worked with on General Barno's staff. They did a great job, especially working on the ring road and some of these other major projects. But you need a more robust civil affairs presence because civil affairs brigades and command elements have experts" (USIP Interview #15). In other words, at the tactical level, there was greater appreciation for the expertise civilians could provide, increasing the value of their symbolic capital and, therefore, their influence in the field. General Barno went so far as to keep the tactical units together in the same geographic area to better develop long-term relationships not only with the leadership but also their colleagues. In this case, the commander's disposition towards facilitating coordination and communication between civilians and the military made significant strides towards mitigating civil-military tensions at the tactical level.

In addition to the lack of expeditionary capacity of civilians, there were other hurdles for civilians to overcome to help mitigate tensions. First, it was a steep learning curve to understand what was meant by tactical level operations. A Foreign Service Officer who also acted as a political advisor describes her time in PRT Herat: "my experience in Afghanistan is the State Department people are doing tactical work, which we are not trained to do. We don't know what tactical work is. State Department functions on a strategic level. I mean, that's clear when you go to War College. The military starts out at tactical and if you become a three-star general you get to strategic. But State starts at strategic" (USIP Interview #14). Second, she goes on to further argue, there were essentially two sources of tension, one is personnel and the other is communications. Communications remained an issue throughout the mission and

this interviewee did well to boil it down two common themes, “it was very difficult to get people to A: pay attention and B: coordinate on fixing the problems.”

Overall, several interviewees described their civil-military relations experience in PRTs as a “generally good relationship.” As one interviewee stated, “I think at the local level, there were a lot of really good news stories in terms of people that found credible partners to work with on the Afghan side, some really great — at a local level — civ-mil efforts of USAID, OTI working side by side with not just special operations forces but more broadly our conventional forces and in the short- to medium-term, definitely making some credible gains” (Interview #2). But these statements were often qualified with mention of such things as tensions around, for example, “the speed of things. We would always want to be, you know, like day 1 this is gonna happen. Day 2 this, you know, how is that gonna fit in. And the civilian approach was more, you know, more long term” (Interview #9). Another example is confusion over responsibilities, as one interviewee stated, “the military would show up and the civilians wouldn’t, because they’re just — “I’ve got a PhD, I’m only required to do this.” Or the mil guys were like, “No, no, we’ll let the leafeaters do that sh**. We’re going to go out, find and fix the enemy” (Interview #3). In short, the tactical level did create some space for better cooperation and implementation of the comprehensive approach, but it was sporadic, and little changed in the structure or culture to minimize these tensions as the mission progressed. However, these tensions were also fuelled by what was going on at the operational and strategic levels as well.

At the operational and strategic levels, since PRTs are a civil-military organization, doctrinal relationships regarding chain of command and command and control are often less than perfectly clear. Moreover, even when strategic and operational level doctrine is clear, it is not always followed at the tactical level as personality, maturity, experience, and resources often drive the local situation. Successful and efficient PRT efforts require full value from the participation and expertise of these organizations. Clarification of the relationships between US departments and agencies, other government organizations, UN, and other international organizations (IOs), and NGOs is a necessity. However, these issues were never fully addressed throughout the lifespan of the US PRTs. There is a particularly telling example of these issues with that of General Stanley A. McChrystal.

McChrystal took command in Afghanistan on 10 June 2009, assuming control of NATO's 65,000 troops. He already had a reputation for being a "straight talker" about the war and the bleak progress that had been made against the Taliban. In August 2009 he released a sixty-five-page assessment that outlines what he believed needed to be done to win the war. McChrystal argued that to counter the threat in Afghanistan requires ISAF to make the population – its security and its support – the military's principal focus. This required a significant increase in troop numbers on the ground and a more comprehensive civilian contribution to support economic, social, and political development. The additional troops would be responsible for seizing the initiative from the Taliban, securing the population, and interacting closely with the Afghan people to gain their confidence. In short, McChrystal believed that only an appropriately resourced and oriented civil-military counter-insurgency campaign has a chance of being effective.

This change in strategy and the following "surge" of troops and civilians in Afghanistan marked a profound shift in the conduct of fighting the war. This was full-on classic counterinsurgency tactics to win over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, unlike the previous more watered-down approaches to counterinsurgency that were largely under resourced. However, McChrystal's outspoken nature was soon to prove problematic as his feelings towards the war and civilian efforts became public knowledge. The release of a profile of the general in *Rolling Stone* magazine catalogued every unguarded sentence he, or his aides, might have uttered. McChrystal and his staff mocked civilian government officials, including Joe Biden, National Security Advisor James L. Jones, US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry, and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke. McChrystal even spoke of his disappointment in President Obama (Hastings, 2010). This very public breakdown of civil-military relations at the highest levels in indicative of the culture and organization that separate the two spheres.

This article soon drew the attention of the White House and McChrystal called Vice-President Biden to apologize and later tender his resignation. In under a year, McChrystal not only created a significant shift in strategy on Afghanistan but also showed the large fractures between civilians and the military. McChrystal's resignation was necessary for civilians to

restore control and minimize the appearance that Obama's administration was kowtowing to the military in foreign affairs. Such fracturing at the highest levels is highly likely to have a trickle-down effect to the other parts of the operation resulting in a transfer of tensions contributing to the continued hysteresis of the civil-military habitus. The field was rife with conflicting dispositions which meant that capital was not spent on improving the mission in Afghanistan but to control the field of civil-military relations. Overall, the ability for the US to effectively embody a comprehensive approach was largely stymied by the well-entrenched culture and structure of the individual agencies.

Indicator 2: The Logistics of Everyday Cooperation on the Ground

Cooperation is endemic to the comprehensive approach. Without it, people and agencies will work at cross-purposes and have even more limited information about what is happening on the ground. As such, when looking at the US mission in Afghanistan, it is important to account for how people conducted themselves at the lowest levels to see if the comprehensive approach was becoming more self-evident. As with the Canada case, this indicator will be broken down into discussions about communication and information sharing, standardized practices, and pre-deployment training.

There were many barriers to good communication practices from the start of the mission. Like Canada, the separate computer systems with different levels of classification were a significant barrier, particularly to civilians. One State Department representative at PRT Mazar-e-Sharif in 2003 was frustrated throughout his tour in that classified and unclassified communication in the State Department channels was virtually impossible and he often had to "piggy-back" on military or commercial networks (USIP Interview #16). He also only had access when the military was not using the system, so he described being awake at 3 a.m. just to fill out the necessary reporting to send to Kabul. This was only exacerbated by the poor management at the Embassy in Kabul which meant that some of his reports were not relayed back to Washington and he felt forced to establish parallel lines of reporting. He was criticized for having done this by USAID Kabul as those reports were of interest to Congressional staffers.

It was only near the end of his tour that State set up an independent system for unclassified information which only addressed a small part of the issues.

Another State Department representative deployed to the Bamian PRT in 2003 described his frustration with communications systems:

> But another thing that was very strange was that we didn't have any communication capability. That is, you had no telephones. We didn't have radio interoperability with the NGOs. Very strange. Think of how illogical it is that here we are in the 21st century and we had no real ability to communicate with these other groups, from our PRT, across the airstrip, to their offices. So oftentimes we did have to just drop in, and I did that quite a bit, but it was awkward. I think that the lesson learned is that we have to come up with a communication system that works, reliably, and other methods for being able to communicate in a timely fashion instead of just dropping in (USIP Interview #20).

Another interviewee pointed out that sometimes communication boils down to a personnel problem; "that changes depending on who is sitting where in your chain of command. Sometimes there was good communication on that and sometimes there was not good communication on that. Sometimes that was on purpose and sometimes that was not on purpose" (USIP Interview #14). Moreover, depending on who was deployed to the area, some personnel may have had better relationships already established with the Embassy and information flowed more freely.

Lastly, there was little communication about the role civilians were meant to play in PRTs: "[the military] were facilitating our work which really had nothing to do [with them] as far as they could tell, because they weren't informed, with what their mandate was. So, there could have been a lot more facilitation of communication about why what we were doing was actually the same mission and contributing to the same objectives as the mandates of the PRTs" (USIP Interview #31).

These interviewees covered many of the typical complaints and concerns around communication and information sharing. There were steps taken to try and structure communication to be better suited for the mission in Afghanistan but many of these barriers were never overcome, including the incompatibility of the computers systems, and limiting

informal lines of communication. Some new computer systems were introduced to help facilitate civilian communications, but one interviewee described his experience as a guessing game when it came to information coming in and going out (USIP Interview #14).

These communication issues also fed into the discussion about standard practices and the role they play in everyday cooperation. Standard practices as established before the mission in Afghanistan both helped and hindered the mission. For the military, there were basic mandates in place to guide the military in military activities but there was little guidance for interacting and working with civilians. This meant that the commander of the PRT often "set the standard" for the operation (USIP Interview #33). Some standards were as basic as if the soldiers could have beards to as complex as building civil-military relationships to better encapsulate the comprehensive approach. This type of freedom afforded to the commanders led to significant fracturing amongst different commands and how the PRT was organized. As one British commander illustrated,

> I think organizations are important. It's not a very sexy subject, but how an organization works internally, externally, where authorities lie, where responsibilities lie, where functional areas sit, how they relate to each other are all massively important. And we had given — paid no attention to that, any kind of organizational theory because when you then start combining lots of different organizations to try to achieve a common aim, it becomes rapidly dysfunctional. If you don't get the organization, your piece right, you're pretty much fighting with one hand behind your back (Interview #12).

Consequently, this often resulted in drastic changes in standards from one commander to another. As one interviewee pointed out, without any overarching direction, "causes massive confusion on the ground, as each commanding officer and each force commander, effectively a division commander, comes in with their own preconceived ideas and desire to do" (Interview #25). In other words, the organization piece was never really addressed.

For civilians, standard practices often were a barrier to civil-military relations and working in a non-permissive environment. There were no expeditionary capabilities built into the agencies nor was there a lot of guidance on how to work with the military. Many approached the mission according to already entrenched standard practices as determined by

the individual agencies. This meant that much of the conversation was about what each agency wanted to achieve rather than how to work together to achieve a specific political goal. As one interviewee stated, "I remember early conversations being about the competing views and not — who saw what, what resources should be given to what industry to do what. And the whole time, there was ever a conversation that I can recall about what we were actually trying to achieve" (Interview #26).

There was also only a relatively small pool from which to draw civilian expertise and even then, it was difficult to convince people to go:

> Just even for the people you did have, the incentive structure, until — it wasn't until the civilian surge that the State Department put in incentives in place to incentivize people to go to a place like Afghanistan. Historically, the golden ring was, "I want to go to Paris, I want to go to London, I want to go to Berlin, I want to go to Ottawa." It was not, "I want to go to Afghanistan." And so, to get people to go to these hardship posts like Afghanistan and Iraq they had to put in place extraordinary incentives. Like A, this is going to help your promotion potential and B, you're going to get to pick your next assignment, pretty much. And then, they'd get people, but it was only for that one year. And then, they were sort of out of their supply (Interview #7).

As a result, as the mission progressed the civilians willing to go to Afghanistan did not necessarily have the experience or expertise needed to take on such a complex mission which made it even more difficult to influence the field and decision-making with regards to how development and reconstruction should proceed. As one interviewee described "we didn't have, at least on the US side, a terrible amount of expertise in that part of the world in terms of people that spoke the languages, that knew the history. There was a small cadre of folks, but not the level of expertise that was needed to really understand how to implement the provisions and visions of Bonn in a way that would be enduring and sustainable in Afghanistan" (Interview #2).

The shortcomings of some of theses standard practices really came to a head in Afghanistan as the military and civilian ways of doing things often clashed. However, there were times when standard practices allowed for more practical cooperation, as one interview said,

"if I go back to square one when I said that was a new experience for us… we found ourselves in, in one location and at the beginning it was kind of, everyone was running like a chicken without its head, until we managed quickly to regroup and reorganize ourself" (Interview #27). It became about "just making things work" within the structures already established.

The last issue that played a significant role in the logistics of everyday cooperation was pre-deployment training. There were great strides made in pre-deployment training as the mission progressed but prior to that there was very little information provided on strategy and purpose, especially to the civilians. As one interviewee stated that in 2005, "we didn't give them any deployment training at all, pre-deployment training, so literally you could raise your hand at ISAF, volunteer, on a Monday and on Friday you could be on some firebase in Helmand province" (Interview #5). It was quickly realized that some training needed to be provided, however, there was initially significant push-back due to the lack of resources:

> [I] convinced the administrator that we needed to have some formalized training. But AID had no money, had no — and neither did the State Department. They had not gone to Congress and asked for any appropriations for training, because they felt literally that they needed no training. I talked to very senior officials in both State Department and AID and I was told point-blank that career foreign service officers had all the tools necessary to survive and succeed in conflict and post-conflict environments. They needed no training, no further training (Ibid.).

How can civilians who are used to working in a large bureaucracy in small cubicles with little to no exposure to the military possibly be prepared to work in Afghanistan? In comparison to the military who trains for years to take on such a mission, stating that foreign service officers need no further training is quite shocking. As one civilian pointedly stated,

> You're saying that your division commander, two-star general of a US military formation, getting ready to go, the army spends one year to train. Very — crawl, walk, run training, until you culminate in one big exercise, and then you deploy. So, if a guy who's got — who's in charge of 14,000 men and women going into combat, and needs one year to get prepared for that, and this person has a minimum of 25, 26 years in the

> army, then tell me why you think you're better than that? You foreign service officers think you're better than that (Ibid.).

The shift to better integrate civilians in training only happened when the army realized they were being pulled too thin operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq and they decided to implement a program called Blue to Green. This meant utilizing the navy to provide some of the personnel and expertise to help fill the gaps in the army. "The navy guys who were designated to go into Afghanistan went to this course and it wasn't a harassment course — literally, it was: how do you operate on land. How to you shoot a weapon — I mean, a rifle and a pistol, which navy guys don't get, unless you're a SEAL. How to drive in a Humvee or an armoured vehicle. All these kinds of things. So, they allowed — they agreed to allow us to tag on, AID civilians to tag on to that training. And that was a first and it began the conversation" (Ibid.). There was a clear and recognized benefit to having this type of cross-fertilization in training for both military and civilians. A senior development officer then took it upon himself to try and move this idea forward:

> So, I went to brief the three-star out there and he said, "You know what? That's a great program. I'm going to give you access to the training brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, who trains the Army National Guard to be the security force for PRTs. And why don't you then bring — if you bring AID and you bring State in there and you bring the USDA in there, I'll do it for free, I'll even pay for your guys to come down there, since I know you don't have any money." And so, that's how it started. There was a training brigade at Fort Bragg, and they just said, "Hey, what a perfect opportunity here to have this combined team actually work — train as a team before they deploy (Ibid.).

While this was a huge step in the right direction, they were unable to solve the issue of synchronizing the deployments. So, while certain groups may have trained together and developed rapport that did not mean they would be sent to the same place at the same time. This improved over time as the realization that this mission would be multi-year effort.

> On the DoD side, we basically got into a thing where we created a pipeline of units so that we knew not only who is deployed next, but who would follow them and who would follow them, so that you could create — you had enough time to say, "OK, these

> guys are going in a year, so let's make sure — as this PRT is identified, that they get trained with the unit that's going to deploy during their time." But it took some… extension of our rotations planning to be able to identify who is going to go there so that the training could be done with the civilians beforehand (Interview #7).

Running in parallel with developing these mechanisms for better training for civil-military components, was addressing the actual content of the training. There was a distinct lack of cultural and language training for the military at the beginning and some commanders did not immediately see the value of working with the Afghan militia, which later became the Afghan National Army, which was very short-sighted. The effect of this lack of training, particularly for the officers became very apparent and one officer describes how much the military training improved by 2005:

> We went down to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and watched some of their preparations, training exercises. They called it Operation Braggistan. There were 6,000 82nd Airborne soldiers down there. They had simulated villages. They had Afghan-American contractors that role played the situation. The military has improved some other areas of training. For instance, the naval post-graduate school has a class called Leadership Development for Sustained Peace. They have had several rotations of classes where the senior NCOs and the officers of these organizations come out for a week-long graduate level seminar on Afghanistan or Iraq (they also do the Balkans and Kosovo), and they just teach them about these cultural sensitivity issues, political figures they might have to deal with, issues, customs, and courtesies you should respect when you're going into a village, and general ideas (e.g. understanding Islam…). They have one of the two Muslim Navy chaplains come out. He talks about Islam and he answers questions. It's a "there are no dumb questions" kind of thing (USIP Interview #33).

However, the same military officer points to the issue that much of the training was not necessarily at the appropriate level for the junior enlisted soldiers creating a high-level of dependence on officers and commanders for cultural guidance:

> It's the junior enlisted folks, whose education level… Your senior NCOs and

> your officers, a lot of them now in the U.S. military have college experience. Their focus is a lot longer. They're able to pay attention. Your junior enlisted guys are going in maybe to go to college. They haven't gotten there yet. They have to have a high school equivalent degree. Perhaps they wouldn't be able to sit through a graduate level seminar to receive this kind of cultural sensitivity training. So they really depend a lot on their sergeants and their officers. They have to depend on them to give them that kind of direction and guidance. So if you've got a poor quality leader, these other guys – it's just out of ignorance. They're only doing what they're told. They're inexperienced.

This creates a situation that is tenuous at best for several reasons. First, the general lack of cultural understanding and sensitivity amongst the lower ranks meant that tensions and misunderstandings could be easily made between Afghans and US personnel, creating an atmosphere of mistrust. Second, new commanders that take over who have different personalities, dispositions, and understandings of the situation from previous commanders could mean competing narratives and general confusion about strategies and goals, especially for the lower ranks that have been put into a situation they do not fully understand or are sensitive to. Lastly, these issues could have a negative cumulative effect on the effectiveness of the mission mistrust can easily snowball not only between Afghans and US personnel but also between civilians and the military.

These issues were not entirely unique to the military as civilians suffered similar shortcomings in the content of the training. There were few resources provided to civilians that agreed to be deployed to Afghanistan. One civilian described her training experience as "slow" and it was up to her initiative to learn as much about Afghanistan as possible prior to deployment. She also only received one month of language training which was entirely insufficient. As one State Department representative lamented:

> I would highly recommend some Dari language training. Our interpreters are okay, but it would be really good to at least have a basic grip on the language to be able to conduct at least some pleasantries in Dari…Getting some sort of acquaintance with military structures and military operations would be very useful. There are a lot of acronyms

that fly around and a lot of things that are just a common language for everybody involved with the military and really alien for people who aren't (USIP Interview #4).

Indeed, several interviewees noted the incredibly steep learning curve for civilians when arriving in Afghanistan. It sometimes took months for a civilian to become acquainted with working with the military as well as the operational environment and with such short rotations (often only six to eight months) that left precious little time for the civilian to make actual contributions to the mission.

Overall, the logistics of everyday cooperation were deeply affected by communication, standard practices, and pre-deployment training, for better or for worse. However, despite these issues, often depending on leadership, there were moments when the comprehensive approach was nearly fully realized. This often meant the military commander went against standard practices and adapted to the situation on the ground. By inviting civilians into briefings, joint reporting, and commanders actively listening to civilians led to a tactical and operational situation better suited to the mission. This makes the lack of continuity between command rotations a larger problem than it should have been, which also feeds into the next indicator – unity of effort.

Indicator 3: Unity of Effort

Looking at the two previous indicators and the issues associated with civil-military relations and fostering everyday practices, it is no surprise that this would affect the ability to create a unity of effort. Unlike Canada, the US had a more established history of doctrine for both CIMIC and counterinsurgency, but there was still a great deal of confusion on how to implement the comprehensive approach and facilitate unity of effort in Afghanistan. This issue was endemic throughout all the levels of the operation – strategic, operational, and tactical – and fractioning at one level often fed into the other levels. On the other hand, sometimes adaptations and innovations at the tactical level would flow into the other levels. It was a two-way street amongst all the levels sometimes creating moments of unity of effort and sometimes fostering discontent and tensions.

At the strategic level, there was confusion right from the beginning about military and political goals in Afghanistan. With the memory of Vietnam and the Soviet Union's effort in mind, the US immediately opted for a light-footprint approach (Suhrke, 2011). Despite the early military victory ousting the Taliban, it became apparent that the issue of Afghanistan would continue to be problem as the Taliban began regrouping in Pakistan and still causing high levels of insecurity in many parts of the country. Plans began to form around how to hold successful elections and jump-start the statebuilding process. However, the priority for the US administration at this time was Iraq which drew many resources and media attention from Afghanistan. Indeed, so little attention was paid to Afghanistan in the early days that in 2004 members of the House Armed Services Committee were surprised when the Department of Defense told them that the US had 17,900 troops in Afghanistan because they believed it to be much lower – around 12,000 (Suhrke, 2011: 42-43).

The deteriorating security environment called for more assistance and stronger commitment. The underinvestment in Afghanistan, as many organization and agencies rightly pointed out, allowed things to slip. With the creation of PRTs and handover of command to ISAF (NATO) things quickly came to a head. A *New York Times* article on the 2006 NATO Summit did well to capture this sentiment:

> NATO is failing its most significant post-Soviet test: stabilizing Afghanistan. Violence in spiraling as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda reassert their power. The economy is addicted to opium production. The pro-Western government in Kabul looks increasingly powerless and irrelevant. Unless NATO's members commit to sending in more troops and more resources, Afghanistan could go the way of Iraq. There may not be many more chances after this week's meeting.

With this sentiment in mind, one of the most divisive questions became whether implementing the comprehensive approach meant classic counterinsurgency strategy of clear-hold-and-build or whether it should privilege reconstruction and Afghan capacity building in a mission framed as stabilization rather than combat. This question was never clearly answered on a strategic level, but the narrative put forth was one of stabilization to help garner domestic support. These mixed messages had to be parsed at the lower levels which meant that it was incumbent

on the commanders to translate the strategic picture into operational and tactical goals and deliverables. This meant there was no agreed upon universal approach to Afghanistan thus it changed with essentially every rotation.

There was an effort made by NATO to help provide some sort of guidance to the PRTs through the PRT Executive Steering Committee. The committee was an umbrella mechanism to try and create unity of effort amongst the many different PRTs, but to little success (Interview #13). UNAMA too tried to play a role in facilitating coherence. While it was recognized that the mechanisms need to be in place, they were better in theory than in practice.

When looking at US PRTs at the operational and tactical level, it becomes apparent there was a definite issue with unity of effort. As one State Department official, who had experience at the PRTs in Khowst and Paktia as well as experience in Regional Command East saw this struggle for unity of effort repeatedly:

> One of the things we're struggling with still is the unity of effort, unity of command idea, too. It's not easy anywhere. But the military is really the big dog of the PRTs and the regional commands. They are the show of their maneuver battalions. So it's still figuring out how to bring in USDA and how to bring in USAID and how to bring in State and the government of Afghanistan and the U.S. military and coordinate things and work together (USIP Interview #17).

The muddled strategy since the beginning of Afghanistan continued to frustrate military and civilians alike. With the election of President Obama, he followed through on one of his election promises to progressively withdraw from Iraq and funnel those resources back to Afghanistan. After several strategic reviews of Afghanistan that repeatedly called for more troops and more civilian advisors, the roadmap for the 2010 surge was laid out. However, General McChrystal was quick to point out:

> Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or 'doubling down' on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate (ISAF, 2009: 1-1).

A population-centric COIN approach became the new strategy, as defined by McChrystal (see Figure 7.4 below). While this refocusing of strategy was necessary, this proposal received a mixed reaction at best as it was an incredibly complex approach (as the image suggests). This approach was quick to fall to the wayside, especially with McChrystal's resignation.



Figure 7.4: General McChrystal's COIN Strategy

Source: Bumiller, Elisabeth (2010). We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint. The New York Time, April 26. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html

The overreliance on the operational level to fill in strategic gaps created a new war with every rotation. There was little continuity and institutional memory allowed for with the short rotations and the relationships with Afghan government agencies, Afghan population, and NGOs suffered greatly for it. The Afghan population became weary of NATO-ISAF campaigns, especially in Kandahar as one analyst stated, "there are operations all the time, they don't change anything… the whole subject seemed a distraction from the real issues: why is the situation getting worse all the time and why is there still no serious strategy, after more than eight years?" (van Bijlet, 2010). It was at this point, it can be argued, that the US shifted focus to establishing an exit plan with a narrower focus on training the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

In sum, according to a number of interviewees, unity of effort never really coalesced as it should have. There were good commanders, good ambassadors, and good civilian representatives from NATO that were suited to navigating these fractures and lack of strategy but relying on the unpredictable nature of dispositions and personalities to foster a unity of effort is not a long-term solution.

Conclusion

The insider knowledge gleaned from these interviews paints a picture of dysfunction at almost all levels. Despite being the progenitor of the PRT concept and integrating military and civilians, the US had little space structurally, organizationally, and culturally to actually implement the needed approach. Transfers of civil-military tensions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels often created a negative feedback loop that was hard to reverse. Many of the experiences that were described in the interviews, particularly the issue with the resignation of General McChrystal, perfectly captures the symbolic struggle of the military and civilians and the US's continued effort to keep the military completely separate from politics. History shows these isolation tactics towards the military is a long-standing practice which will be further discussed in the sections below.

There are some immediate comparisons that could be made with the Canadian experience, particularly the lack of flexibility in the structure and command of the PRTs. On the one hand, first, both Canada and the US suffered logistical issues with incompatible communication systems, informal line of communications, and training regimes that were outdated and lacked cultural sensitivity training – which did improve over time for both Canada and the US. Second, the military and civilians preconceived notions of one another often fed into civil-military tensions until some space was created to reconcile those differences through socialization, especially at the tactical level.

On the other hand, while both the Canadian commanded PRT and the US commanded PRTs suffered shortcomings in communication, training, and structural issues, the most notable difference was Canada's ability to better adapt to the security environment while trying to implement the comprehensive approach. This can be attributed to the built-in structural

flexibility and a willingness to have civilians more heavily involved in the PRT. This is somewhat surprising as the US has a longer, more well-established, doctrinal history concerning counterinsurgency and CIMIC. Therefore, those approaches, and associated practices are not entirely new to the US military and, to a certain extent, the civilians. For Canadians, to recall, doctrine was only starting to be established for CIMIC before 9/11 and the Canadian military did not even have a counterinsurgency manual until 2009, well into the Afghanistan mission. That is not to say the Canadian government was unaware of the comprehensive approach (also known at the 3D approach) but its roots were developed in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) that pushed for the harmonization between defence, diplomacy, and development. It was not codified in a military manual before the mission in Afghanistan.

Perhaps because of, or despite, Canada's history and lack of military doctrine, the KPRT was more agile and flexible to address clear gaps in its operating picture, including by introducing a civilian co-commander with the same rank as the military commander to help guide the KPRT. This is unlike the US operating picture in which the PRTs started as a military endeavor and remained so throughout the duration of the mission, despite the emphasis placed on cooperation between civilians and the military.

Effectiveness

While the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom was described as successful as it quickly and decisively removed the Taliban from power, the post-conflict period has been perceived as largely unsuccessful. The military victory has been overshadowed not only by the re-emerging insurgency and political machinations of the Taliban, but also the difficulty of establishing security, creating long-term and sustainable development programs, and the incredibly high human, military, and economic costs with seemingly little return. However, it is an oversimplification to say it was a failure. As established in Chapter 3, this thesis is using a perception-based approach to move away from the focus on macro effects. This approach allows for a more nuanced look at the practice of civil-military relations with regards to the

intervention and the programs developed and implemented through the PRT. It also allows for both time-bound and different levels of effectiveness.

Similar to the Canadian experience, much of what was developed to measure the effectiveness of the PRT were ad hoc metrics, largely determined by the military, that focused overly on outputs over impacts. Indeed, not only were the role of civilians and the role of the military in PRTs was relatively unclear from the start, but how stabilization and reconstruction was implemented was highly dependent on the commander of the PRT. As one interviewee (Interview #19) during his time in Afghanistan (2007-10), describes how the military conducted themselves in some of the PRTs when doing stability operations:

> But most of their time was spent on drills, protecting themselves, combat lifesaver, weapons qualifications. So, it was only a minor part of the program to do that [stability], number one. Number two, when they got out there, nobody held them accountable for doing stability, so they could just do s***. They'd get money coming in, and they would just do projects, because if you're reporting up the chain, "hey we're doing these five projects." "Oh, that's great, good, you're spending X amount of money." That's what they looked at. They didn't look at is the area becoming more stable or more secure. The metrics were all output.

Another soldier deployed to Afghanistan from 2011-12 was given a list of indicators and he was amazed at the ad hoc nature of it stating, "they were measuring 348 different indicators across all battle spaces. No delineation between outputs, outcomes, impacts, and overarching stability" (Interview #3). He goes on further to explain that the right questions were not being asked which was severely detrimental to the PRT effectiveness writ large.

There were attempts to help create a more standardized and systematic approach to measuring effectiveness. One attempt was made by the US military with the development of the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) tool kit. It was created for the District Stabilization Teams which were teams comprised of small groups of American and Canadian governmental advisors, with military assistance, that worked closely with their Afghan counterparts in the district line ministries and with district governors to increase local capacity while also gathering information. The first page of the tool kit is the basic four question

questionnaire: (1) Have there been changes in the village population in the last year? (2) What is the most important problem facing the village? (3) Who do you believe can solve your problems? (4) What should be done first to help the village? This is followed by five questionnaires for advance assessments on security, governance, rule of law, essential services, and livelihoods – to be used at the discretion of the person conducting the assessment (CALL, 2010). The data collected from this tool kit would then be used to inform, stabilization, reconstruction and development programs.

Unfortunately, this was a short-lived experiment. The British trialed it in Helmand for less than six months before moving on to a different method of measurement. Due to the nature of the questionnaire and the method of delivery, which in most cases was a guided discussion or a focused interview by a soldier, led to TCAF being employed with large amounts of variation. The lack of training for the soldiers to conduct the interviews, the biased responses from the population (Afghans often told the interviewers what they wanted to hear), small sample groups due to security issues, translation issues, and the expectations the questions created meant that TCAF did not deliver any significant increases in information, nor was it any more accurate than any other information (Wilson and Conway, 2009). While TCAF did not meet expectations, it was a notable attempt as it was a distinct step in a different direction of measurement both for the military and civilians away from easily quantifiable measures often used in conflict zones, to one more qualitative in nature.

This example is important because it shows how some interveners resist and challenge the dominant modes of thinking and acting. Throughout the interviews, this example of trying something new came up frequently. However, while it was an attempt to change how interveners measured things in PRTs, it failed on several fronts. The system was designed by the military and consequently took a very specific approach to gathering data. While the creators of this system spent a lot of time in Afghanistan, they did not necessarily socialize with local people, rather than with other expatriates, to find the best way to conduct surveys and the best type of questions to ask.

Moreover, local knowledge is just as important for successful combat operations development and reconstruction - as stated in the counterinsurgency manual that the U.S.

Department of Defense drafted in 2006 under the impetus of General Petraeus (Patraeus, 2006). Yet counterinsurgency efforts struggle with biased processes of knowledge construction, burdensome security procedures, and top-down approaches to local sources of violence (Jones and Smith, 2010: 83-83). Attempts at drawing on in-depth understanding of local conditions in addition to thematic knowledge show as much promise for counterinsurgency operations as they do for international peace initiatives (Autesserre, 2010). For example, combat teams throughout Afghanistan reported up to a 60 percent decrease in the need for combat operations once local conflict experts joined their ranks (Rhode, 2007). However, these initiatives were the exception, not the rule. The broader mission suffered from "a lack of understanding of Afghan society" and a "short-term" outlook that sharply decreased the potential effectiveness of the counterinsurgency efforts (Paris, 2013).

With the lack of reliable data flows, it is no wonder anecdotal information from the tactical level became the go-to for many people. As one scholar stated about his time in Afghanistan, "the most common measure of success cited to the author by PRT representatives was (no kidding) 'the number of smiling Afghan children'" (McNerney, 2005: 39). The positive impact PRTs had was seen in the changing attitudes of the local population, one of disparaging to welcoming. As one State Department Officer in Khowst PRT stated, "the biggest achievements of the PRTs, which you can't really define, you can't quantify it, it's not all that measurable, is that they have given confidence to the Afghans, the Afghan civilian population, government of Afghanistan, security forces" (USIP Interview #17).

As the previous information suggests, it is at the tactical level that any significant impact is seen. Moreover, it was at that level that some if not most of the civil-military tensions could be managed in such a way to make the PRT more effective. This can be in large part credited to the socialization process that were present. As an interviewee stated, "the problem is as you went up higher — very good at the tactical level. As you went higher, higher-up headquarters wants to say, "Let's aggregate all the data and tell me what the biggest problem is in Helmand province." Well, that doesn't work. *Politics is local, so's conflict. Literally*" (emphasis mine, Interview #4).

Another aspect that is important to note of the US PRT effort was the consistent attempts to draw lessons learned from the experience to improve effectiveness (unlike Canada). There has already been mention of a number of publications on lessons learned including those done by USIP, CALL, and SIGAR. When looking at PRTs and their development over time and measured against such criteria as coordination, relationship-building, and capacity-building the PRTs did show improvement. PRTs were also eventually better integrated with the overarching counterinsurgency strategy, especially in the south and east (SIGAR, 2018). In was recognized that PRTs have the potential to serve as a showcase for tactical interagency jointness and to do so required military and civilian personnel to be educated, trained, and equipped for stabilization and reconstruction in tandem – not for just six weeks prior to deployment but for their entire careers (McNerney, 2005). This would allow for many of the barriers to civil-military cooperation and coherence to be overcome or managed, especially at operational and strategic levels.

Undoubtedly, the lessons learned reports drawing from the Afghanistan experience will be key to developing new doctrine and will help reshape the structure and organization of civilian and military agencies. These changes will probably still have some resemblance to previous doctrine as it is hard to "teach an old dog new tricks" but it will also include an expanded view on what it means to conduct war and stabilization operations using a comprehensive approach. However, to better understand how the form of civil-military relations in the mission in Afghanistan came to be it is important to look back and understand the historical precedents of US civil-military relations.

Chapter Conclusion

The history of civil-military relations in the US is both simple and complex. It is simple in that throughout its history the concept of absolute civilian control was one of the constants in civil-military relations. It is complex in that many of its operations brought about unprecedented challenges that forced the military to adapt to new ideas and redefine the shared responsibility between civilians and the military. In other words, the line between civilians and the military constantly shifted between the military having more influence in the sphere of politics and

civilians having more influence in the military sphere. This was often determined by the international security situation at the time. As the Afghanistan mission began after the very controversial Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns that tested civil-military relations and under an administration that did not value the military and its role, there were many tensions between the two groups.

This symbolic power struggle shaped the field within which the Afghanistan mission was conducted. The military was much more interested in moving in quickly and having a decisive military victory over the Taliban while trying to avoid a repeat of Bosnia. Civilians, on the other hand, wanted a more gradual approach to help address some of the underlying issues that brought the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to power in the first place. This resulted in OEF ousting the Taliban and then an international effort to develop a plan to help reconstruct and stabilize the country while improving the capacity and legitimacy of its government institutions. This mixture of an insecure operating environment and the need for development meant integrating civil-military components under what became to be known as the comprehensive approach.

As such, the US looked to the Vietnam campaign that had counterinsurgency components to help develop the concept of PRTs. However, like in Vietnam, the US was not well situated doctrinally to implement such a complex operation. Their COIN doctrine was frankly underdeveloped in comparison to the US's experiences with operations other than war. Moreover, many of the classic counterinsurgency tactics were revised to better suit to recent RMA, meaning a lighter footprint and minimal input of resources.

This decision put the Afghanistan mission on a path that would have severe repercussions for the effectiveness of the mission that would be difficult to reel back in as the mission progressed. As the insider knowledge gleaned from the interviews suggests, it was a constant battle for resources and expert personnel to deliver both the military and the political goals. Moreover, the lack of attention paid to Afghanistan due to the US's attention being drawn towards Iraq meant little guidance coming from Washington and much of what was happening operationally and tactically was highly dependent on the personalities and dispositions of the military leadership.

This meant that what happened with every rotation largely relied on the disposition and personality of the military commander and each commander was interested in putting their "stamp" on the mission. Some commanders were only interested in killing the enemy, other commanders were more interested in facilitating civil-military cooperation and pushing for reconstruction. Consequently, there was little continuity between the rotations. This was a constant challenge for US civilians working in PRTs as development and reconstruction have significantly longer timelines than what military planning cycles allowed for. This combined with the high pressure to deliver results to show the US population that what they were doing in Afghanistan was worth it led to significant tensions between the civilians and the military. These tensions came to a head with General McChrystal's very public condemnation of the civilian leaders and the mission as a whole which led to his forced resignation to help shore up the narrative of civilian control of the mission.

These issues were only exacerbated by the poor communication, pre-deployment training, and standard practices that were not aligned with the mission. Each civil and military member of the PRTs were largely functioning under individual conceptions and assumptions of the operational picture, many of which were not conducive to the comprehensive approach. As many interviewees pointed out, the ad hoc and fractured approach to the mission was the rule not the exception. Unity of effort was few and far between and even when unity did occur it was often short-lived.

Upon reflection of the constitutive mechanisms that drove the conduct of the mission – history of civil-military relations, doctrine, and civil-military tensions – it is no wonder that the US mission in Afghanistan struggled to decide on a strategy, set specific operational goals, and the means to achieve them. This hysteresis of practices found within the PRTs meant they were not necessarily fit for purpose and were often slow to adapt.

However, it is from this hysteresis that some of the most significant lessons learned can be drawn. One of the most pertinent examples of this was the rapid improvement of pre-deployment training regimes. It was learned early on that in order to implement the comprehensive approach in the field, it needed to begin at home. Learning skills needed to effectively operate in a PRT in a complex culture and security environment meant developing

mechanisms to facilitate training that occurred concurrently for both civilians and the military. This would help build relationships, understanding, and trust. Unfortunately, translating this rapport into the theatre of an active conflict was less clear-cut. Another lesson learned from this hysteresis, while still be far from being solved, was the selection of metrics in which to measure effectiveness. There were some innovative attempts to try and address this issue, like TCAF, which unfortunately fell short, but nevertheless it was recognized that it needed to be changed to better capture the operational picture.

The many issues discussed in this chapter point to a highly dysfunctional mission that was largely unable to overcome civil-military tensions and, therefore, unable to embody the comprehensive approach. The US military habitus of conventional warfare only further hindered innovative thinking and adaptability. However, it is important to not discount the perceptions of the mission – perceptions of military, civilians, Afghans, IOs and NGOs alike. Clearly, there were moments when the US PRTs were able to identify and address issues important to Afghans, IOs, and NGOs that led to a more positive perception of the mission and it is important to capture those moments to better inform future complex peace operations or any statebuilding effort. The US needs to deeply analyze and reflect on what worked well and what did not in Afghanistan to better inform the development of new doctrine and what it means to take part in these kinds of missions.

Overall, when analyzing the US experience with PRTs, practice theory allows one to better understand how the confluence of structures and agency determine practices and how those practices contribute to or limit effectiveness. Unlike Canada, professionalization of the US military began much earlier (almost a century before Canada) and, as such, certain practices were more well entrenched, like the clear separation of the military and civilian spheres as described by Huntington. Absolute civilian control was the foundation of the civilian and military relationship and much of the doctrine developed reflected that. Moreover, the many early successes utilizing conventional warfare tactics created a clear bias towards developing doctrine that focused on conventional warfare tactics despite the clear shift towards asymmetric warfare as telegraphed particularly by the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War could have been a turning point for the US military to develop doctrine and practices more aligned

with the changing international security environment, however, the perceived failure of that war saw the US military pushing aside those lessons learned and continued focusing on what the US did well – conventional warfare.

Upon reflection of these key aspects, it is no surprise that its historically established habitus was hard to shift to better mesh with the field presented in Afghanistan. The US PRTs lacked flexibility and leadership dispositions were less inclined towards civil-military integration. Many of the established interagency systems relied on checks and balances which fostered distrust and competition between civilians and the military. This competition was especially evident in the symbolic power struggle between the military and civilians in the PRTs as the military's capital was overvalued while the civilians were undervalued making it a very difficult to bridge that divide. This confluence of structures and agencies shows that the likelihood of embodying the comprehensive approach in the US PRTs in a meaningful way was practically nil. As such, while the Canadian case saw the everyday practices both limit and contribute to the effectiveness of the KPRT, the US case saw those practices largely only hinder the ability to be effective. The habitus and field were so misaligned, and the hysteresis so pronounced the perception of the effectiveness of the mission is largely a negative one in that the majority of the participants (international donors, local population, and civilians and military within the PRT) did not perceive the intervention as having promoted peace and stability in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to contribute to a growing body of literature that seeks to better understand how civil-military relations affects operational effectiveness in complex peace operations. More specifically, this thesis has analyzed the everyday practices of civil-military relations for both the US and Canada and how it affected the operational conduct and effectiveness of civilians and their armed forces in one of the most important complex peace operations of the contemporary strategic context – PRTs in Afghanistan.

The development of this thesis was driven by the question of why, despite the creation of PRTs to better facilitate civil-military integration, the mission in Afghanistan failed to achieve certain goals. Indeed, initial inquiries suggested that while the value of civil-military integration was relatively unquestioned, the comprehensive approach failed to coalesce. When asked why this was the case, an overwhelming number of answers referred to the issue of "personality differences" of both the civilian and military leadership. In other words, some personalities facilitated the comprehensive approach, and some personalities were a barrier to it. However, upon reviewing the current theorizing around civil-military relations and effectiveness, it becomes apparent that little has been done to address this aspect.

The majority of civil-military relations theories are based on rationalist assumptions and positivist epistemologies in their analysis of civil-military relations behavior (for example see Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 2003; Brooks, 2008; Desch 1998 and Egnell, 2009). These studies rely on deductive, hypothesis testing research designs and single method methodologies that limits the abilities of researchers to move outside their established models. These theories provide little basis for analyzing of aspects the more complex and nuanced sociological issues of civil-military relations in regard to effectiveness.

In Afghanistan, as often is the case with complex peace operations, the mandates given to both military and civilian leaders are usually broad with little detail and thus are open for interpretation. As such, the on-the-ground leadership has significant leeway as to how to conduct the operation, and many leaders have different ways of doing everyday things.

Therefore, identifying the factors that shape the everyday practices of the military as well as the civilians became critical to answer the "why" question. As such, complementing civil-military relations theory with practice theory allows space for this kind of analysis. Therefore, the research question was as follows: How do the everyday practices of civil-military integration contribute to or limit the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

As this type of inquiry was not suitable for using a rationalistic, deductive approach, this thesis employed the constructivist methodology of sobjectivism as established by Vincent Pouliot. Any constructivist enquiry requires taking an inductive approach to analysis. It is a research strategy that moves from the local to the general, necessarily avoiding any imposition of specific categorization of agents' taken-for-granted realities. More specifically, sobjectivism allows for the recovery of subjective meanings and through interpretation and historicization move them to objectified knowledge.

This was done through three lines of inquiry. First, in order to parse the insider knowledge of those embedded in PRTs, I utilized three empirical indicators: normalization of civil-military tensions, everyday cooperation on the ground, and unity of effort. Put together, these indicators reveal the degree of self-evidence of the embodiment of the comprehensive approach. Second was "putting meanings and practices in context" (Pouliot 2010: 72). These were interpreted using discourse analysis which allows to take meanings from people's heads and place them within a wider intersubjective context. For this research, the discourse analysis is primarily focused on official documentation, reports on lessons learned, military doctrine and mandates from each of the case studies. The last part was "setting meanings in motion," that is to objectify meanings by introducing time and history. Meanings are ever evolving as a result of the dynamic dialectic between reality and knowledge, and it is historical analysis that can reveal those dynamics. This was achieved using an altered version of process tracing. First, the focus was placed on identifying constitutive mechanisms – that is the mechanisms of how a social fact came into being. Second, those mechanisms were utilized as a heuristic device in order to better classify observations.

Taking this approach allowed for a comparative case analysis of Canadian and American commanded PRTs and how their patterns of civil-military relations affected effectiveness and to

better understand the influences of practices. The next section will compare the cases in four broad areas – historical precedents, the challenge of doctrine, civil-military relations, and effectiveness. This will be followed by a discussion of theoretical implications, policy implications, and future research directions.

Canada and the US in Comparison

Historical Precedents -The Development of Habitus and Field

As the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 show, despite sharing a border and having a close relationship, the US and Canada have vastly different military histories. For much of its military history, Canadians have had to go abroad to fight due to it being beholden to the UK. They were drawn into wars that had relatively little to do with protecting Canada and its interests, which can be argued as the beginning of developing the Canadian habitus as a friendly helper. As such there was a distinct lack of value placed on the military and after almost every major conflict, Canada quickly disbanded the military only leaving a small number of reserves. This was far from the ideal conditions to promote professionalization and effectiveness. This pattern largely continued until WWII which marked a paradigmatic shift for the Canadian military as it wanted to maintain a large capable force, which meant making it a policy priority for the first time.

This is in sharp contrast to the US experience. Professionalization of the military began much earlier in 1775 under George Washington when he recognized the value of highly trained and professional officers. However, like Canada, it did take some time to recognize the value of having a standing army during peacetime. The recognition began after the War of 1812 and was solidified after the Civil War, which then became, as Huntington states, the golden age of professionalization. Drawing on lessons from militaries from around the world, but particularly from Prussia, the US created a unique conservative military habitus, one of clear separation between military and civilian spheres.

WWII marked an important shift for both Canada and the US. The creation of the UN and NATO as well as the Cold War significantly changed the field in which Canada and the US operated. For the US, the intensified threat of Communism maintained the relevance of the

military ethic in foreign policy giving the military unprecedented influence in political affairs. This also meant that the separate fields of civilians and the military was becoming more muddled and creating significant civil-military tensions. Indeed, there are several notable occasions of military leaders publicly criticizing political leaders which almost always resulted in the forced resignation of those military leaders. Moreover, the US solidified its standing as one of the most powerful militaries in the world despite the challenges it faced in Korea and Vietnam in the fight against communism. Regardless, the US did well to shape the field in favor of its military prowess and helped counter the communist threat.

Canada, on the other hand, took a vastly different approach that was more aligned with its experience fighting oversees. Indeed, while Canada participated in the Korean War they fought not because the fate of their nation was at stake but because of ideologies. As such, Canada became a well-known contributor to operations overseas, particularly those that fell under the rubric of peacekeeping. Unfortunately, while Canada significantly influenced the field of peacekeeping, particularly after the Suez Canal Crisis, the Canadian government became weary of its military being overseas and costing money when it was a battle for ideologies and not necessarily protecting or promoting Canadian interests. Nevertheless, Canada's reputation as friendly helper, neutral broker, and peacekeeper became solidified in the Canadian mind and it is that reputation that drove many of its operations, including Afghanistan.

As such, with the attack on 9/11, the approach taken by both Canadians and the US were much aligned with the habitus as was historically determined. The US went in and quickly achieved a military victory by ousting the Taliban by overpowering them with its military might. Canada then became involved, at the request of the US, to take command of a PRT and help push the Bonn agenda of reconstruction and stabilization to ensure Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven for terrorists again. However, the Canadian military saw this as an opportunity to increase its international reputation and influence as a military capable of kinetic operations in a non-permissive environment – an attempt to essentially change the narrative surrounding the CAF. Indeed, the newly elected CDS Rick Hillier saw the CAF differently than what civilian leadership did and it became a significant source of tension and created certain hysteresis effects.

It can be argued that this is similar to what the US was trying to do – change the narrative – to one in which the US does not only solve political problems through firepower alone. It was just as committed to preventing Afghanistan from being a haven for terrorists through reconstruction and stabilization. Also similar to Canada, this created significant tensions between civilians and the military. The military was simply not organized to allow for this type of collaboration and cooperation with civilians creating significant tensions.

In other words, both Canada and the US were ill-equipped to make such a drastic change in approach from their well-established habituses. This is only reinforced when looking at the structures, organizations, and doctrine in place when the Afghanistan mission began.

The Challenge of Doctrine – Grasping Intersubjective Meanings

There are some immediate and obvious contrasts between Canadian and American doctrine. American doctrine is much more mature than Canadian doctrine in a number of ways. The US already had CIMIC doctrine in place and included the discussion on counterinsurgency operations in several field manuals prior to Afghanistan. Moreover, the US had a capstone doctrine to help define the US way of war including clarifying roles and responsibilities, chains of command, and formulates guidelines for operations activities embodied in strategic policy. Canada virtually had none of these things in place apart from CIMIC but that was only in the process of being included in doctrine and the roles and duties remained unclear or undefined. Canada had little to no experience with counterinsurgency and it was only well into the mission, in 2008, that Canada published a manual on COIN, largely copying the US experience. This was followed by Canada's first ever capstone doctrine which was published in 2009.

However, despite the more well-developed US doctrine hierarchy, it was still ill-suited for what was wanted to be achieved with the PRTs and the counterinsurgency campaign. In retrospect, the US consistently showed its dislike of irregular warfare as it was just not something they were comfortable with. During the 80's and 90's, the US demonstrated its problems with counterinsurgency and related types of operations. In Lebanon in 1983, in Somalia in 1993, in the non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994, and even in the long-range

standoff attacks against Al-Qaeda assets in Afghanistan in 1998 amongst others, the nation's armed forces were rather ineffective against irregular threats (O'Hanlon, 2009).

In contrast, Canada had very little experience with counterinsurgency which was reflected in its doctrine. This is evidenced by the belief that 2,300 Canadian troops could fight an insurgency in a province of 1 million Afghans. Canada relied heavily on following the examples of the US and the UK when developing guidance for the counterinsurgency campaign. Even ISAF did not release an ISAF-wide counterinsurgency doctrine until 2009. As such, Canada had a steep learning curve for operating the KPRT in a wider counterinsurgency and reconstruction context.

With this wider intersubjective context in mind, it is no wonder that both the US and Canada were underprepared for what PRTs demanded operationally. The US PRTs suffered from a lack of strategic guidance, effective mechanisms for coordination and cooperation, and the chain of command remained primarily military with civilians having little influence on the operation. This was detrimental as it did not allow for the flexibility and adaptability needed to address such a complex mission. In other words, the well-embedded doctrine was difficult to reel back in and did not necessarily allow for space for looking at other possible approaches.

Canada, in contrast, had adaptability built into the design. It is difficult to conclusively say that the lack of doctrine allowed for commanders and civilians space for innovation and adaptation, but the KPRT approach did change over time to allow for civilian and military co-commanders which was better suited for what the PRT was trying to achieve. The military was not afraid of adding additional civilian expertise to help fill some of the military's gaps in knowledge when it came to reconstruction and development. That is not to say the Canadian PRT was perfectly fit for purpose, but its developmental legacy does show some well-designed and well-executed programs that did have some long-term impact (Grant and Zyla, 2021).

For both nations, the ad hoc approach to PRTs really emphasized the historically embedded civil-military tensions. Without a clear strategy in place and without guidance of how the PRTs would fit into the wider operation, it became a symbolic power struggle between civilians and the military, which will be discussed in the next section.

Civil-Military Relations in the US and Canada – The Symbolic Power Struggle

The analyses of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 show that Canadian and US civil-military relations have some similarities but also some important differences. First, the US government structure involves a system of interagency working groups and committees at higher levels of the government hierarchy, including the National Security Council with its staff. Canada, on the other hand, lacked mechanisms for better interagency cooperation until the introduction of START which was essentially meant to take on responsibilities similar to the NSC but at a lower level.

In the US case, the interagency system is caught in the political system of checks and balances, in which distrust and competition are considered virtues and upholders of democracy (Feaver, 2003). Regardless of the democratic virtues of checks and balances, the system has reduced the importance of the work done in interagency committees. While the interagency structures were well-established, the executive authority of these committees and working groups are minimal and did not carry much influence. For example, the NSC, despite its inclusion of all the major players involved in national security matters, has virtually no mandate beyond an advisory function. The meetings of interagency working groups were largely for information sharing, during which the different representatives describe their own views on different issues. Negotiations, discussions, modifications of positions or mutual decisions rarely took place (Egnell, 2008).

For the Canada case, in order to overcome the lack of interagency structures, START was created. Prior to the creation of START, policy and programming in fragile and conflict-affected states were fragmented between different Government of Canada departments and agencies. This deficit called for the development of a standing capacity to monitor crisis situations and to plan for and rapidly deliver integrated policy and programming responses, drawing upon the collective and coordinated contributions of government departments. To recall, START consisted of approximately 70 personnel, mostly from DFAIT, and was mandated to ensure greater coherence, coordination, and integrated planning across government agencies involved in fragile and conflict-affected states. Despite the good working relationships amongst the START member departments, reporting was still done through independent reporting chains,

often reinforcing departmental siloes, which did not allow for much more than some information sharing (Office of the Inspector General, 2016). Moreover, there was minimal representation of CAF/DND which did not provide a balanced approach to interagency coordination and planning. Later, at a higher level, the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was tasked with interdepartmental coordination for the engagement in Kandahar which included the military. This position was quickly eliminated as the military did not appreciate that level of civilian interference in military affairs.

By comparing the interagency mechanisms in these two cases, the structural and cultural differences become clearer. While Canada had minimal in place to facilitate interagency coordination, the US was clearly divided into a military and a civilian side. Indeed, the US DoD has very limited integration of its civilian and military staff, even at the heart of the Joint Staff. In other words, the level where meaningful civil-military interaction and co-ordination in the US case take place is at the very top levels – often at the level of the Secretary of Defense. For Canada, civil-military interaction was more reactionary and different agencies were brought together to tackle a specific issue, like the case of the detainee crisis.

The civil-military divisions and fracturing at the strategic level are clear and, unfortunately, these issues often trickled down to the other levels of the operation. It fueled a symbolic power struggle at the operational level that affected the effectiveness of PRTs. To recall, according to Bourdieu, symbolic power is the culmination of economic, social, and cultural capital that manifests itself in social ranking, class position, level of influence, etc. Capital becomes the basis of power and often underlies implicit forms of domination.

When considering the military's symbolic power, it is clear it was the dominant form in the US case and less so in the Canadian case. History shows, for the US, the military is something to be feared and controlled even if that meant reducing its effectiveness to address conflicts. Civilian control is embedded in the Constitution and the President is the Commander in Chief. However, the military is greatly respected for its unlimited liability and putting lives at risk to protect US interests. It has significant economic, social, and cultural capital available when it comes to directing operations in conflict-ridden states. In Afghanistan, the military had easier access to financial resources through CERP funds, it was well known for its ability to

quickly plan and carry out operations, and it was the agency with the most experience working in a conflict zone. This is in sharp contrast to the capital available to the US civilians in Afghanistan. Attaining funding for development projects took significantly longer as it had to go through several levels of approval; also, civilian planning practices focused on the long-term which was contrary to what the military was trying to achieve, and the distinct lack of experience in operating in a conflict zone meant that US civilians carried little influence or weight in decision-making processes. The only capital on which civilians could rely was its social and cultural capital or its expertise and experience doing development and reconstruction. This type of capital proved to be largely ineffectual in the symbolic power struggle as the military maintained its dominance throughout the mission. This did not allow for the practice of the comprehensive approach to become embodied as civil-military tensions were rarely overcome.

For Canada, the military does have access to economic, social, and cultural capital but it is no where near the amount the US military had. The capital offered by civilians was not as nearly undervalued as it was in the US case. Indeed, as the mission progressed a civilian co-commander was integrated into the chain of command with the recognition that the KPRT would not be able to achieve their goals without the expertise and experience that civilians could provide. In other words, the early military dominance transformed into a more equal sharing of responsibility with civilians. While it cannot be definitively stated that civilians and the military had equal dominance, it can be argued that the military dominance was well tempered by civilian capital. As such, there are more cases in which civil-military tensions were ameliorated to better embody the comprehensive approach therefore improving the effectiveness in some areas of the operation, especially in development.

In sum, the US case is extreme in its adaptation of the divided approach, which is not surprising as the US case is what Huntington sought to describe and explain in his seminal work. The Canadian case leans more towards the Janowitzean type civil-military relations, although not quite as clear cut as the US case. By contrasting the two cases it also becomes clear that where the US system stresses civil-military division and the importance of pure policy advice and pure professional military advice to the top-level policymakers, the Canadian system tried to better facilitate integration and reconciliation between policy matters and military matters.

Effectiveness in Afghanistan

When comparing the effectiveness of the PRTs commanded by the US and Canada, there is one thing that becomes apparent – the flexibility and adaptability of the Canadian PRT allowed for better implementation of the comprehensive approach leading to some more positive impacts. That is not to say that Canada did not suffer some similar challenges as the US when it came to determining effectiveness. For both missions, it became apparent to many of those involved that there were problems with the metrics, indicators, and reporting processes. As such, they both often relied on other ways of understanding if what they were doing was effective, often based on their own habitus and dispositions. They relied on anecdotal evidence as there was little in place to better capture the qualitative changes caused by their efforts.

For the US, there were attempts to help create a more standardized and systematic approach to measuring effectiveness. One attempt previously mentioned that was made by the US military was the development of the TCAF tool kit. While short-lived, it was one of the more innovative changes attempted by the US. Canada did not make a similar effort, it largely relied on the reporting done by the third-party program executioners (like World Bank, UN, Global Polio Eradication Initiative, World University Service of Canada, etc.) to provide feedback on effectiveness and impact. This reliance on other parties' evaluations was a double-edged sword. While those implementing the projects and programmes had significant experience in designing and execution, they were often not prepared to work in the non-permissive environment. This meant that some of the reporting and evaluation that occurred may not have been entirely accurate and, more often than not, they were unable to do any long-term assessments on impacts due in inaccessibility to insecure areas (Grant and Zyla, 2021).

Putting these logistical barriers aside, it is important to recall that the measure employed in this thesis is perception based. More specifically, a peacebuilding project, program or intervention is effective when the large majority of the participants (international donors, local population, and civilians and military within the PRT) perceive it as having promoted peace in the area of intervention. This definition allows for evaluations to be more context specific. For example, it is not about how many weapon caches were destroyed or how many schools

were built, it is about how people perceive the impact of the intervention, whether positive or negative. It also allows to differentiate between different levels of intervention from the effectiveness of an individual project to sector strategy, to the mission writ large.

Despite the overall sentiment of disappointment in the effectiveness in the mission, for those more intimately involved in the mission, particularly at the operational and tactical levels, saw effectiveness in many different forms. These perceptions are not easily discounted as they will inform lessons learned, future doctrine and future mandates for missions currently undetermined. Saying that the Canadian and US effort in Afghanistan was an overall failure is to take a too narrow view of what it means to be effective in a complex peace operation. Those moments of perceived effectiveness will undoubtedly influence civil-military practices in future missions.

However, there was one thing that the US did significantly better than Canada – capturing lessons learned. Throughout the US mission information was often fed back to help further develop PRT guidelines, often through the Center for Army Lessons Learned. They also created the position of the Special Investigator General of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) that would do independent lessons learned reports. Those reports cover areas such as stabilization, narcotics, corruption, private sector development, and training the Afghan military and police forces. Nothing similar has been generated by Canada. There are only two significant publicly available reports on lessons learned in Afghanistan - *Summative Evaluation of Canada's Afghanistan Development Program Fiscal year 2004-2005 to 2012-2013* (2015) and *Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team* (2007). It is important to note, that while the US did significantly better to capture lessons learned the real test will be if they are incorporated into future doctrine and policy.

Undoubtedly, the lessons learned reports drawing from the Afghanistan experience will be key to developing new doctrine and will help reshape the structure and organization of civilian and military agencies. These changes will probably still have some resemblance to previous doctrine as it is hard to "teach an old dog new tricks" but it will also include an expanded view on what it means to conduct war and stabilization operations using a comprehensive approach.

Theoretical Implications

There are a number of implications of this analysis for both civil-military relations theory and practice theory. First, research on effectiveness must include the civil-military dimension. The civil-military dimension has the potential to influence the physical, the conceptual, and the moral factors of military effectiveness, and should therefore be part of any analysis of military effectiveness. It can even be asked as to what extent it is relevant to speak of military effectiveness, or 'fighting power', in a context where operations are inherently multidimensional, involving diplomatic, military, and development aspects, especially under the umbrella of the comprehensive approach. In other words, instead of focusing on narrow, quantitative metrics to determine whether the military is fit for purpose, the question should be whether a country's entire security apparatus is fit for purpose. For both Canada and the US, with national security depending on international stability combined with ambitions for spreading democracy, they can no longer rely on traditional measurements of effectiveness.

PRTs in Afghanistan are an excellent example of the operationalization of the comprehensive approach and when determining whether the means fit the end goal, the findings of this thesis stress the need to understand how civilian practices interact with military ones. The lack of civilian planning structures, capable civilian experts, and civilian expeditionary capabilities available for implementing comprehensive operations is a serious deficiency in most states today. Complex peace operations become essentially unfeasible with a comprehensive approach that is unable to utilize all instruments of national power. Doctrine as well as strategic and operational planning must be adjusted accordingly despite the lag often associated with doctrine development.

Another implication concerns the conceptualization of civil-military relations. Traditionally, civil-military relations theory deals with the relationship between the armed forces, the political leadership, and civil society. The operational aspects of this relationship are a remarkably understudied area. However, at the same time, there is a field of study that deals with different aspects of civil-military relations in the field of operations, involving civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of ex-combatants (DDR),

and security sector reform (SSR). None of these fields are entirely mutually exclusive and should be incorporated into a more holistic view of civil-military relations. A useful comparison can be made when discussing the UN's different functions, particularly the distinction that is often drawn between the UN as an actor and the UN as a field. The civil-military relations field is where decisions are made regarding sharing responsibility, access to resources, priorities, and how to facilitate (or hinder) civil-military cooperation.

Moreover, it is important to recognize that civilians and military are not unitary block of actors but, rather, a diverse set of actors with differing and sometimes competing interests. This became more apparent when looking at civil-military relations through a practice theory lens. The internal tensions between strategic and operational military actors are particularly notable. For example, in Canada, the role of domestic politics in shaping Canada's foreign policy and thus military strategy in Afghanistan created increased pressure for the military to focus on reconstruction and development efforts which the military was not necessarily prepared to take on. Creating a balance between what was demanded domestically and what was required operationally saw leaders within the PRT to make choices that satisfied neither party but were more aligned with their own dispositions. This helped explain why the answer to the questions regarding if the comprehensive approach worked or not was often "personalities." As mentioned previously, the role of leadership in conflict is still largely understudied and this is an area that would benefit from applying practice theory.

This brings us to the implications for practice theory. Practice theory is still an emerging approach in international relations and has yet been applied to civil-military relations. Practice theory indeed has utility when analyzing civil-military relations particularly on shedding light on how dispositions and systems of sense making shape civil-military relations, but it also has its weaknesses. Bourdieu-inspired practice theory has faced heavy criticisms in itself particularly for being too materialist, structuralist, or determinist (Yang, 2013). For Bourdieu, life's trajectory is constructed by those choices made under the constraints of an individual's inherent disposition (habitus), which is the internalization of the social fields. The inability to anticipate change and the lack of rationality are believed to be the most crucial weaknesses of his theory. While this issue was somewhat moderated in Bourdieu's later writings that

introduce hysteresis, conditions of change, and the possibility of conscious strategy (Bourdieu, 2000), it is still quite contested.

This weakness undoubtedly came into play when applying it to civil-military relations. Dispositions of leaders did appear to be rather deterministic in establishing, maintaining, and/or overcoming civil-military tensions. In the case of Afghanistan, this durability of habitus created little space for any significant change in disposition toward implementing the comprehensive approach that required a deeper integration between civilians and the military than either were prepared for. While this can provide a partial explanation for why the comprehensive approach did not become fully embodied within PRTs, it struggles to explain why there were steps towards embodiment (such as introducing the RoCK in the KPRT) while the mission progressed. Hysteresis does well to capture the effects caused by a lag in the habitus in adjusting to changes in the social field, but it does not sufficiently capture the mechanism of change. This would require a different theoretical approach to fully capture those aspects.

Finally, the findings of this thesis also suggest that Huntington's conclusion that military strength and effectiveness are best maximized through objective control of the armed forces, involving a clear separation between the political and military spheres is not true in this new international security environment. This approach creates civil-military dysfunction in that the embedded dispositions and habituses, standard practices, and narratives are constantly competing with one another, fueling the symbolic power struggle between civilians and the military. Instead of seeing the civil-military problematique as a zero-sum game in which an ideal balance between military strength and democratic civilian control should be found, the field of civil-military relations should, in theory as well as in practice, seek synergetic effects that strengthen both military effectiveness and civilian control.

Regarding the application of a practice lens to civil-military relations, it allows one to move away from models of action based on realist assumptions that often plague civil-military relations theory. It helps to expand the conception of civil-military relations to one that allows for the analysis of how certain leadership dispositions (or habitus) can greatly influence the field in which civil-military relations operate. In this current security environment, which

demands for much closer integration of civilian and military institutions, it is the everyday practices of diplomats, ambassadors, officers, generals, development specialists, political elites and many more that largely determines the effectiveness of an operation. It creates space to step away from "overly abstracted and simplified reifications" (Adler-Nissen, 2013) that often characterizes civil-military relations, towards a more nuanced exploration of how people create and perpetuate civil-military relations through everyday practices. Practices become the unit of analysis and it is those practices that either create or perpetuate the nature of civil-military relations.

This thesis advocates for the inclusion of a more sociological understanding of civil-military relations, one that reflects what is actually happening on the ground and how historical experiences influence leadership dispositions. It is often through examining the history and intersubjective meanings that one can get a better sense of where practices came from and how they function. This in turn helps to understand how practices continue of change overtime. Those military leaders that fully embraced the comprehensive approach attempted to change well-entrenched practices to better facilitate cooperation. On the other hand, there where those leaders who chose to perpetuate certain, ill-suited practices, often to the detriment of the comprehensive approach and therefore effectiveness.

Applying a practice lens to civil-military relations allows for an analysis that creates a better understanding of the practices different actors use that often take on specific configurations in order to address (in)security, the priorities of different fields of struggles, and the techniques that need to be used in order to foster stabilization and reconstruction. Actors negotiate positions in the narratives concerning threats, risks, and necessity as well as the choices regarding terms of struggles, all of which is often highly dependent on their dispositions and available capital (Bigo, 2013). In other words, by using this lens allows for a better understanding of the underlying issues that led to civil-military tension as well as a way to help mitigate it. This is critical to understand in order to increase the effectiveness of complex peace operations.

Policy Implications

The policy implications of this thesis arose, to a large extent, from the question of why, despite the comprehensive approach being embraced, the Afghanistan mission did not meet expectations. This is derived from the normative ideal that operations planned and executed comprehensively with all stakeholders and instruments of national power involved and armed forces and civilian counterparts on the ground operating jointly increases effectiveness. This thesis argues that without understanding the everyday practices of civil-military relations it will be near impossible to fully embody the comprehensive approach and therefore increase effectiveness. So, what can be done within civil-military leadership in order to create the dispositional and field fundamentals that are needed in order to embody the comprehensive approach and achieve increased effectiveness?

Before moving forward with this discussion, it should be acknowledged that all political systems are unique and that solutions in one country may not be applicable to other countries and systems. Clearly the political systems and cultures of Canada and the US are different. Both are successful democratic systems, including certain strengths and weaknesses. Drawing policy implications that are not sensitive to the foundations of a nation's political system risks being an exercise in futility. However, despite all political systems being different does not mean that lessons from other systems are irrelevant, it simply means that lessons from across borders must be adjusted and implemented in accordance with the cultural circumstances of the system.

First, while individual state histories of civil-military relations cannot be changed, there are mechanisms available to help override those histories and ameliorate civil-military tensions. At the highest level, it is critical to have policy and guidance available. As one interviewee stated, "but at the end of the day, it all still comes to top-level policy guidance with a clear purpose and state, which we still do not have… for any of the problems that we face today. Nothing on Russia, nothing on China, nothing on North Korea, nothing on ISIS, nothing on Afghanistan. What's next? There's no — what are we really doing?" (Interview #4). It is also critical to have a high-level body that would better coordinate activities at the operational level. The US has the NSC which was good in theory but did not work in practice because its primary role is providing strategic guidance. Information needs to freely flow to those bodies and not

rely on a consensus-based approach to determine what moves up the levels. START for Canada did not have a balanced representation of interests and did not have the executive authority it needed to make high-level decisions.

Interagency reforms need to take place to build on strengths and remedy weaknesses. In both Canada and the US new interagency planning units have been set up in order to facilitate co-ordination between the military, the development agencies, and the Foreign Affairs/State Department. For Canada, the main problem has been the slow development of new mechanisms for increased interagency co-operation. START has evolved into the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) but has been slow to making any significant changes. Moreover, working in committees is often too slow for the effective implementation of contemporary military operations that often require quick decision-making by the political leadership. There are calls for stronger formal structures being made to better facilitate the comprehensive approach. These developments seek to increase interagency co-ordination and co-operation within a strengthened permanent interagency and planning structure.

These high-level policies and guidance as well as lessons learned also needs to be better reflected in doctrine. Doctrine should not only be adapted after the mission; it should be more proactive in developing innovative approaches for complex peace operations. This would also mean a more collaborative effort between civilians and the military when developing doctrine, which is rarely the case now. Indeed, a number of efforts of co-developing doctrine in Afghanistan was shut down because there were strong feelings towards civilian interference in military affairs and vice versa.

At the operational level, there needs to be clear guidance on how civilians and military work together to achieve the stated political goals. Moreover, there needs to be much more cross-fertilization on the structures, culture, and standard practices between civilian agencies and the military. In Afghanistan, this began to take place in pre-deployment training but for this kind of complex peace operation, training and exposure needs to happen much earlier or even continued during times of peace. For example, having members of the military integrated into USAID or DFAIT. Civilians should also be included in military training regarding planning and execution, so they have a better idea of the culture and values of the military.

These cross-fertilization efforts would also influence the dispositions of military and civilian leaders. With more knowledge of how civilians work and vice versa would allow leaders to see the value of the culture and expertise of the different agencies. The issue of 'personalities' should not be the key determinant of whether the comprehensive approach is embodied or not. Obviously, personalities and dispositions will never be fully overridden by these efforts and they may remain an issue but it should allow for the normalizing of civil-military tensions so what needs to be done gets done.

Lastly, another policy implication is derived from the norm that integrated civil-military structures within the defense ministries are more effective than divided structures, especially in the current international security environment. The US separated view of war and peace as well as of military and civilian affairs has not served the country well in past operations. It is time to acknowledge that the separated view of civil-military relations is no longer applicable in a context where there really is no such thing as a purely military operation other than at the tactical level. In the current security environment, the Clausewitzian idiom, that war is the continuation of policy, is more relevant than ever. Military advice needs to understand the political context of the decisions that are to be made just as much as policy advice needs to be well-informed about military consequences and imperatives. Such mutual understanding is only achievable through integrated structures, in which civilians and the military meet on a daily basis to exchange ideas and knowledge.

Afghanistan After the Intervention

Several years have passed since I gathered the data necessary for this thesis and, as such, things have changed significantly in Afghanistan. In 2014, operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT was launched by NATO to continue the training of the Afghan National Army as well ass the police in hopes that once NATO pulled out of Afghanistan it would be able to provide continued security. In late 2018, negotiations between the US and Taliban began. The talks between U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and top Taliban official Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar centered on the United States withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in exchange for the Taliban pledging to block international terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil. Khalilzad also insisted that

the Taliban agree to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue on the country's political structure, as well as a cease-fire. In late 2019, President Trump abruptly broke off peace talks shortly after Khalilzad announced that an agreement in principle had been reached with Taliban leaders. In February 2020, Khalilzad and the Taliban signed an agreement that paved the way for a significant drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and included a guarantee from the Taliban that the country will not be used for terrorist activities again. This agreement also stipulated that intra-Afghan negotiations should take place shortly after signing. However, since the deal did not call for an immediate cease-fire, violence continued to escalate within Afghanistan. Later, in November 2020, the US announced the withdrawal of US troops despite intra-Afghan talks being in deadlock. Lastly, President Biden announced that all remaining US troops in Afghanistan would be withdrawn by September 2021 (Zucchino, 2021).

Facing little resistance, Taliban were quick to take over Kabul, followed by a rapid advance during which all but two of Afghanistan's provincial capitals were seized. The Taliban's return to power means they are systematically rolling back much of what the international community did, especially pertaining women's rights and girls' education. The country is also now on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe with nearly 23 million people facing food insecurity (Afzal, 2021).

With these recent events in mind, it is hard to draw anything positive from the massive amounts of economic and human capital poured into Afghanistan since 2001. What was the point of all that time and effort when it was so easily reversed in a matter of months? How can one analyze effectiveness when neither the PRTs nor the mission writ large achieved their stated goals? I argue, however, that like Vietnam there are numerous lessons that can be drawn from Afghanistan, including lessons on effectiveness, that can help inform mandates and doctrine moving forward. The political community would be remiss if they ignored the lessons gleaned from Afghanistan. Furthermore, Afghanistan would be an excellent testing ground to see what kind of reforms managed to be durable despite the Taliban returning to power. As pointed out by Autesserre (2014), the most puzzling question at this point would be which international efforts were effective, rather than why they failed.

This also give impetus to look at effectiveness of development and reconstruction programming at sub-national rather than national levels. By focusing on the perceptions of effectiveness, rather than strict outputs, allows for a more nuanced analysis of what happened on the ground. For example, Theissen (2012) wrote about how perceived insecurity deeply affected the issue of local ownership in peace building. In short, he argues that because of the perceived current and future high levels of insecurity by both Afghans and the interveners forced the international community to retain greater levels of ownership, to act unilaterally, and limit consultation with local Afghan groups and individuals. This in turn gave US military commanders more motivation to take control of certain programs, like the ANA, knowing full well that the Afghan government would be unlikely to sustainably fund and maintain such a large force. Several interviewees pointed out this critical flaw and that there were few participants (including international donors, local population, civilians, and military) that viewed this tactic as a means to promote peace and as such was perceived as ineffective.

How does a peace building programme then make it more likely to be sustainable? I would argue that the more positive perception of a programme would result in deeper investment by both the international community as well as the local population and essentially 'future proof' the programme. Provincial, district, and community buy-in would likely result in a more resilient intervention. Indeed, recent news from Afghanistan show that women and girls are strongly advocating for their right to education and finding different ways to access education which suggests that education programming in Afghanistan played a role in women's rights recognition, even amongst the Taliban. Overall, only time will tell what parts of the intervention proved sustainable and looking back at how that was achieved would prove to a fruitful area of future research.

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APPENDIX

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

1. Describing the Comprehensive Approach (CA)
    a. In your view, what is the meaning of CA?
    b. What was it all about and why? (i.e. integration, coordination, cooperation, etc).
    c. In your view, what are the antecedents of CA?
    d. What, if anything, is the significance of such an approach today?
2. CA and Departmental Perspectives
    a. How was it set up, and why?
    b. Who were the key individuals?
    c. And where did the come from? (DND, State, USAID, CIDA… or?). What was their background or previous training?
    d. who was responsible for the success of CA, and why?
    e. What was the coordinating body and how did it function (National Security Council, START, etc.)?
    f. What were the lines of accountability?
    g. In your view, what were the departmental perspectives on their role in CA?
    h. Were there any disconnects between that role distribution among the departments?
3. Making CA Work (or not)
    a. How was CA being practiced in Afghanistan?
    b. What were the tools, techniques, and processes that enabled (or hindered) CA?
    c. Is it any different today?
4. What went wrong?
    a. What were the things that made it not work? Or what went wrong?
    b. At which level did it not work, and why?
    c. What were the problems at the departmental level?
5. Measuring Effectiveness

a. What were the benchmarks of effectiveness? How did your organization/unit measure effectiveness?
b. From your perspective, do you view what you did in Afghanistan a success? What about the mission writ large?
c. How can effectiveness be improved?

6. Lessons Learned
    a. What are the main lessons learned trying to implement CA?
    b. What needs to happen moving forward?
    c. Who needs to do that?

List of Formal Interviews (recorded)

- Interview #1 (06/13/2017)
- Interview #2 (two people 06/14/2017)
- Interview #3 (06/14/2017)
- Interview #4 (06/15/2017)
- Interview #5 (06/15/2017)
- Interview #6 (two people 06/16/2017)
- Interview #7 (06/16/2017)
- Interview #8 (07/03/2017)
- Interview #9 (07/05/2017)
- Interview #10 (07/06/2017)
- Interview #11 (07/10/2017)
- Interview #12 (07/12/2017)
- Interview #13 (07/25/2017)
- Interview #14 (07/25/2017)
- Interview # 15 (08/02/2017)
- Interview #16 (08/02/2017)
- Interview #17 (08/03/2017)
- Interview #18 (08/04/2017)

- Interview #19 (08/17/2017)
- Interview #20 (09/06/2017)
- Interview #21 (09/08/2017)
- Interview #22 (10/27/2017)
- Interview #23 (10/28/2017)
- Interview #24 (10/30/2017)
- Interview #25 (11/03/2017)
- Interview #26 (11/22/2017)
- Interview #27 (11/19/2017)
- Interview #28 (12/01/2017)
- Interview #29 (12/15/2017)
- Global Affairs Canada Focus Group (ten people 03/23/2018)
- Interview #30 (04/10/2018)
- Interview # 31 (07/30/2018)

USIP Interviews

U.S. Government Officials

- Interview #1: Interviewed 03/22/05 (172KB PDF)
- Interview #2: Interviewed 12/10/04 (280KB PDF)
- Interview #3: Interviewed 10/19/04 (384KB PDF)
- Interview #4: Interviewed 04/04/05 (116KB PDF)
- Interview #6: Interviewed 04/19/05 (120KB PDF)
- Interview #7: Interviewed 04/26/05 (116KB PDF)
- Interview #8: Interviewed 03/04/05 (112KB PDF)
- Interview #9: Interviewed 04/29/05 (80KB PDF)
- Interview #12: Interviewed 05/03/05 (168KB PDF)
- Interview #13: Interviewed 05/10/05 (20KB PDF)
- Interview #14: Interviewed 10/19/04 (152KB PDF)
- Interview #16: Interviewed 12/05/04 (132KB PDF)

- Interview #17: Interviewed 05/2005 (143KB PDF)
- Interview #18: Interviewed 06/01/05 (248KB PDF)
- Interview #19: Interviewed 05/05/05 (148KB PDF)
- Interview #20: Interviewed 06/07/05 (104KB PDF)
- Interview #22: Interviewed 05/19/05 (96KB PDF)
- Interview #23: Interviewed 07/07/05 (260KB PDF)
- Interview #24: Interviewed 07/07/05 (168KB PDF)
- Interview #26: Interviewed 05/19/05 (104KB PDF)
- Interview #27: Interviewed 06/24/05 (140KB PDF)
- Interview #29: Interviewed 06/21/05 (176KB PDF)
- Interview #30: Interviewed 06/09/05 (64KB PDF)
- Interview #31: Interviewed 06/08/05 (144KB PDF)
- Interview #32: Interviewed 07/20/05 (84KB PDF)
- Interview #35: Interviewed 04/15/05 (212KB PDF)
- Interview #36: Interviewed 07/29/05 (220KB PDF)
- Interview #38: Interviewed 07/19/05 (112KB PDF)
- Interview #39: Interviewed 07/31/05 (148KB PDF)
- Interview #41: Interviewed 08/02/05 (96KB PDF)
- Interview #44: Interviewed 09/21/05 (108KB PDF)
- Interview #46: Interviewed 08/31/05 (120KB PDF)
- Interview #47: Interviewed 08/31/05 (128KB PDF)
- Interview #48: Interviewed 09/19/05 (96KB PDF)
- Interview #49: Interviewed 09/30/05 (104KB PDF)
- Interview #52: Interviewed 09/27/05 (100KB PDF)

Military Officers

- Interview #5: Interviewed 04/13/05 (140KB PDF)
- Interview #10: Interviewed 05/26/05 (56KB PDF)
- Interview #11: Interviewed 04/11/05 (136KB PDF)
- Interview #15: Interviewed 05/04/05 (100KB PDF)

- Interview #21: Interviewed 04/27/05 (128KB PDF)
- Interview #33: Interviewed 07/13/05 (124KB PDF)
- Interview #37: Interviewed 07/22/05 (88KB PDF)
- Interview #40: Interviewed 08/18/05 (120KB PDF)
- Interview #42: Interviewed 07/19/05 (184KB PDF)
- Interview #43: Interviewed 08/11/05 (100KB PDF)
- Interview #45: Interviewed 09/20/05 (200KB PDF)
- Interview #51: Interviewed 08/24/05 (100KB PDF)

International Organizations and NGOs

- Interview #25: Interviewed 06/15/05 (104KB PDF)
- Interview #28: Interviewed 06/20/05 (228KB PDF)
- Interview #34: Interviewed 07/17/05 (104KB PDF)
- Interview #50: Interviewed 09/27/05 (92KB PDF)