

**The International Political Economy of  
Transnational Climate Governance in Latin  
America. Urban Policies related to Low Carbon  
Emissions Public Transportation in Lima - Peru  
and Mexico City - Mexico**

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## *Abstract*

The thesis aims to uncover and challenge the prevailing assumptions related to transnational networks in the field of climate change (TNCCs). TNCCs are often seen as promoters of a more horizontal model for global climate governance. Throughout the chapters, the thesis challenges this common conception. Focusing on the relation between the C40 cities network and two Latin American cities, Lima and Mexico City, I argue that transnational networks are actors facilitating access to cities by transnational companies instead of solely promoting the sharing of experiences and the support for a more inclusive global climate governance model. Put differently, based on the empirical evidence, the thesis claims that transnational climate networks work as an instrument for the transnational capitalist class (TCC, see Carroll, 2010) promoting market-based solutions and economic hegemony in climate politics.

Empirically, the thesis shows how the C40 operates as a facilitator to transnational corporate investment in a range of infrastructures in cities from the global South. In particular, the study focuses on the intervention in urban policies related to Low Carbon Emissions Public Transportation (LCEPT) infrastructures. Both directly and indirectly – through other Western Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., WRI, ITDP) - the C40 creates channels for transnational corporate actors to gain access to local policy-makers and, in that way, gain access to such transnational investments. As a result, these interventions impact the type of urban climate politics promoted in southern cities (a constant struggle between mitigation vs. adaptation policies) and the actors who benefits from these policies (private companies or the population).

The chapters in the first part help us to fill the gap in the conceptualization of the role of transnational networks in urban public policy. The literature survey shows that governance is conceptualized, for the most part, with an institutionalist framework undermined by the evidence given in the case studies. The theoretical chapters also reveal the misconceptions in the literature related to transnational networks, not as promoters of horizontal collaboration, but as facilitators for transnational companies and the private sector, promoting transnational corporate (TNC) developed solutions to climate change. Differing from the conceptions in the literature, transnational networks do not always promote an exchange of information and practices among its members. The transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multimillionaire companies such as C40, prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships, as well as the endorsement of technical and TNC-developed responses when addressing climate change. Likewise, like the C40, transnational networks encourage a transfer of climate policies from IOs (mainly from the global north), multinational and philanthropic foundations that involve technological and market-based solutions with a top-bottom approach. As shown in the empirical chapters, legislation in both cases – Mexico City and Lima - promotes private actors. Nonetheless, access to the design and decision-making process of climate politics for local NGOs and civil society in general, is not the same as for transnational NGOs and wealthy philanthropies.

What transnational networks have brought to cities in the global South is the expansion and the reinforcement of economic links among the TCC. As a result, these transnational actors have included cities in Latin America in the last decades, utilizing business relations and infrastructure projects aligned to this TCC network. In other words, transnational networks promote economic relations and economic globalization at the city level. The present study reflects the dominance of

Northern corporations and think-tanks in the ‘green sector’ as part of climate colonialism (Bachram, 2004; Katz-Rosene & Paterson, 2018; P. J. Newell & Paterson, 2010), indicating the way this transnational class drives the 'solutions' in urban climate politics.

The empirical section of the study shows the result from interviews performed between March 2017 and March 2018, and the analysis of the empirical evidence from official documents, legislation, and governmental programs until September 2018. The second part aims to illustrate the complexity of transnational governance through the observation, interpretation, and analysis of two representative cities in Latin America. The main goal is to show the *how* of transnational climate change relations in Latin American cities. For instance, how does the network C40 facilitate access to urban climate politics for other actors and how do they work as intermediaries between multinational corporations and cities?

The study further demonstrates this argument by analyzing the influence of transnational actors in Lima and Mexico City, who working within the network C40 promote the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in each city. The chapter on LCEPT describes how transnational actors influence public transportation policies mainly in two ways: by offering technical solutions or contacting those who have technical solutions with city officers. These transnational actors contribute to shaping different cities' strategies in the public transportation sector. Throughout the rest of the chapters, the study demonstrates where the most substantial influence comes from. By observing urban climate policies in each city, the thesis shows the level of influence from transnational actors in LCEPT politics.

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## *Acronyms and Abbreviations*

100RC – 100 Resilience Cities

AIDSESP – Inter-Ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle

APCI – Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional (Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation)

ARB – Regional Agency of Barcelona

BRT – Bus Rapid Transit

C40 – C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group

CAF – Development Bank of Latin America

CCI – Clinton Climate Initiative

cCCR – carbonn<sup>®</sup> Cities Climate Registry

CDP – Carbon Disclosure Project

CDKN – Climate and Development Knowledge Network

CEPG – Climate and Environmental Policy Groups

COFIDE – Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo (Development Finance Corporation of Peru)

COP – Conference of the Parties

DOT – Desarrollo Orientado al Transporte (Development approach Oriented to Transportation)

ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EU – European Union

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

FCPF – Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

FCPV – Foro Ciudades para la Vida (Forum of Cities for Life)

GEG – Global Environmental Governance

GHG – Greenhouse Gases

giz – German Agency for International Cooperation

HIC – Habitat International Coalition

ICLEI – International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives

IDB – Inter-American Development Bank

IDRC – International Development Research Centre

IFPRI – International Food Policy Research Institute

IHUDS – Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies

INECC – Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change)

INEI – National Institute of Statistics and Informatics

IPE – International Political Economy

IO – International Organization

ITDP – Institute of Policies for Transport and Development

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

LCEPT – Low-Carbon Emissions Public Transportation

LED – Light Emitting Diode

MINAM – Ministry of the Environment

MOCICC – *Movimiento Ciudadano frente al Cambio Climático* (The Citizens’ Movement against Climate Change)

NCCC – National Commission for Climate Change

NGO – Non-governmental organization

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PACCM – Programa de Acción Climática de la Cd. de México (Mexico City Climate Action Plan)

PEGUP – Programa de Educación en Gestión Urbana para el Peru (The Peru Urban Management Education Program)

PLAM – Plan Metropolitano de Desarrollo Urbano (Metropolitan Plan for Urban Development)

PUCP – Pontifical Catholic University, Peru

RO – Regional Organization

SEMARNAT – Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources)

SERPAR – Lima’s Parks Service

SNA – Social-Network Analysis

TCC – Transnational Capitalist Class

TCCG – Transnational Climate Change Governance

TNs – Transnational Networks

TNC – Transnational Companies

TNCC – Transnational Networks on Climate Change

UCCI – Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities

UCLG – United Cities and Local Governments

UN – United Nations

UNAM – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico)

UNASUR – Union of South American Nations

UNI – Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería (National University of Engineering)

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN-Habitat – United Nations Human Settlements Programme

USAID – U.S. Agency for International Development

WB – World Bank

WRI – World Resources Institute

WTO – World Trade Organization

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*Estoy hecho de retazos*

*Pequeños trozos de colores de cada vida  
que pasa por la mía y que coso en mi alma.*

*No siempre son hermosas, no siempre son  
felices, pero me agregan y me hacen lo que  
soy. En cada encuentro, en cada contacto,  
me hago más grande...*

*En cada parche, una vida, una lección, un  
cuidado, un anhelo...  
Eso me hace más persona, más humano,  
más completo.*

*Y creo que así es como la vida está hecha:  
de pedazos de otras personas que se están  
convirtiendo en parte de nosotros también.  
Y la mejor parte es que nunca estaremos  
listos, acabados...*

*Siempre habrá un nuevo parche que añadir  
al alma.  
Así que, gracias a cada uno de ustedes, que  
son parte de mi vida y que me permiten  
agrandar mi historia con los jirones que  
quedan en mí. Que también yo deje  
pequeños trozos de mí mismo en el camino y  
que sean parte de sus historias.*

*Y que así, de retazos en retazos, podamos  
un día convertirnos en un inmenso bordado  
de “nosotros”.*

*I'm made of patchwork*

*Little colorful pieces of every life that  
passes through mine and that I sew into my  
soul.*

*Not always beautiful, not always happy, but  
they add to me and make me who I am.  
In each encounter, in each contact, I get  
bigger...*

*In each patch, a life, a lesson, a nurture, a  
longing...  
That make me more of a person, more  
human, more complete.*

*And I think that this is how life is made: of  
pieces of other people that are becoming  
part of us too.  
And the best part is that we will never be  
ready, finished...*

*There will always be a new patch to add to  
the soul.  
So, thank you to each one of you, who are  
part of my life and who allow me to enrich  
my story with the shreds left in me. May I  
also leave little pieces of myself along the  
way and may they be part of your stories.*

*And thus, from patchwork to patchwork, we  
may one day become an immense  
embroidery of “we”.*

Cora Coralina [Anna Lins dos Guimarães Peixoto Bretas] (1889-1985)

José Manuel Leal  
Zapotlán el Grande  
August, 2020

# Introduction

*“I don’t see how he can ever finish, if he doesn’t begin.”*  
Chapter 9, *The Mock Turtle’s Story*  
*Alice’s adventures in Wonderland* (Lewis Carroll, 1875)

The thesis aims to uncover and challenge the common assumptions related to transnational networks in the field of climate change (TNCC). Usually, TNCCs are considered as promoters of a different and innovative global climate change governance. This thesis challenges this idea that argues networks promote a more horizontal climate governance. Throughout the chapters, I argue that transnational networks, more than promoting the sharing of experiences and the support for a more inclusive global climate governance model, they facilitate the access of transnational companies to influence urban. Put differently, the thesis claims TNCCs work as an instrument for the transnational capitalist class (TCC) (Carroll, 2010) to promote market-based solutions and economic hegemony in climate politics.

Likewise, the study focuses on the influence that networks have on urban public policies, as well as the transformative force that transnational governance represents in international governance structures. Additionally, the thesis includes a set of contextual questions to address the inquiry related to power dynamics and how they are represented in the Latin American context. For instance, what are the differences between Latin American megacities and cities from other regions within the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) in terms of decision-making participation? Does carbon shape power at a city level? If so, where does that ability come from? With this in

mind, the research analyzes common (and necessary) urban practices –public transportation- which systematically generates environmental change, and the way these practices are structured politically (Paterson, 2000). Through the case studies, the analysis addresses the following questions: What factors influence public transportation policies in Mexico City and Lima? Do they come from elsewhere within the network or are they a condition from external actors (e.g. IOs)?

Particularly, the thesis focuses on two cities from the global South and their participation in TNCC. Cities are centers for innovation, and most of the countries' population is concentrated in them. Such concentration of actors originate interesting dynamics, and source, of governance (Bulkeley, Broto, et al., 2014). These actors are at the forefront of political experimentation (Hoffmann, 2011). This characteristic gives them the capacity to exercise their agency and not be entirely limited by the constraints of sovereignty, providing them with a relative freedom to coordinate and act collectively across national borders and institutions. Cities are also increasing their participation in world politics, especially through Transnational Networks on Climate Change (TNCC). TNCCs are spaces where cities discuss a variety of issues of high politics. Commonly, networks are conceptualized as part of the public sphere, and as an embodiment of the agency of cities in global climate politics (Andonova et al., 2017; Beermann, 2014; Bellinson & Chu, 2019; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a; Gordon, 2016a; Hakelberg, 2014; Hsu et al., 2017; Khan, 2013; Lee, 2013; Toly, 2008; Yi et al., 2019a). However, contrary to this conception transnational networks are not promoters of a horizontal collaboration. More than facilitating and promoting the share of experiences as an alternative climate global governance, they facilitate the access to a wide diversity of actors –who can be public, private or hybrid from a local, national or international level

(e.g. Philanthropic organizations, Private Foundations and NGOs, Real Estate, construction and technology companies).

*A brief introduction to Latin American climate politics*

Studying Latin America is not an easy task. This region is perhaps, one of the most politically fragmented in the world (Edwards et al., 2015), where different visions and perspectives about politics co-exist. A region with so many historical contexts and organizational methods means that it would be difficult, and out of the scope of the study, to research about the origins of such distinctions. A continent with an ideological diversity results in a variety of perspectives when it comes to climate politics. However, despite such differences, there is a willingness and interest for collective experimentation, at least at city level.

The study of an individual region, such as Latin America<sup>1</sup>, is the study of a piece of a large system. The larger system cannot be understood without looking at its pieces and how they fit into the greater, encompassing system. National and regional studies constitute concrete and specific mapping (spatial and political) of the ways in which general tendencies of capitalism manifest themselves. In this sense, studies that do not take into consideration the larger system –the Latin American region- do not have different objects of investigation from other studies focusing only in one part of the system (Robinson, 2008, p. 49).

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
<sup>1</sup> In this work, the region of Latin America includes the northern border from Mexico to the southern border of Argentina, as well as the group of islands in the Caribbean. Simultaneously, the term "region" and "continent" will be used indistinctly to refer to the same group of countries.

The interest in studying climate politics in Latin America comes from three particular reasons. First is its high vulnerability to climate change, even though the region only contributes 13.7% of global GHG emissions (ECLAC, 2020). Several organizations agree that the region is particularly vulnerable to environmental problems caused by climate change (ECLAC, 2013; Nelson et al., 2010; United Nations Development Program, 2011; Vergara et al., 2013). Just in 2012, weather phenomena left 114,000 people dead, economic damages of \$227 billion and a further \$120 billion in financial losses. While the economic impact of natural disasters in the region has had a minimal effect on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there have been adverse effects at a local level (ECLAC, 2013). Likewise, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates annual damages caused by the physical impacts associated with a rise of 2° C. The consequences are expected to be over \$100 billion, or about 2% of the current GDP (Vergara et al., 2013). Secondly, the region represents a significant and diverse part of the world's natural resources with 31% of the world's fresh water, 23% of the world's forest (UNEP, 2012; Vergara et al., 2013). Finally, the region has shown a growing interest in global affairs, resulting in a considerable increase in its participation in the global forum, especially in those related to climate change and international environmental politics. For instance, Edwards et al. (2015, p. 139) mention that Mexican diplomacy resuscitated climate multilateralism at the 2010 UN climate negotiations in Cancun (COP 16), after the failure the previous year in Copenhagen. Additionally, in 2008, Peru was the first country to announce a voluntary emission-reduction pledge, offering to reduce the net deforestation of primary forests to zero by 2021. Additionally, in 2014, the country hosted the 20<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP20) in Lima prior to the COP21 in Paris where the replacement for the Kyoto Protocol was expected to be agreed (Idem).

*The importance of public transportation in climate politics*

According to the United Nations for Development Programme (Malik, 2013), the development of countries from the South sets out a panorama where production and consumption, due to economic growth, would increase, alongside the GHG emissions derived from such activities. Also, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects urban transport energy consumption to double by 2050 (van der Hoeven, 2013) as shown in the figure 1. Studies in the last 30 years have suggested that between 70% and 80% of CO<sub>2</sub> global emissions are concentrated in the world's largest cities. The concentration of energy use within urban areas means that cities are central to the ways in which GHG emissions, and particularly carbon dioxide, the most common GHG, are produced (Bulkeley, 2013). Such emissions are related to energy use, which comes from urban areas due to concentrated population and economic activities (Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012a).

**Figure 1. Expected urban motorized travel (in passenger kilometres)**



Source: International Energy Agency (2013). *A Tale of Renewed Cities. A policy guide on how to transform cities by improving energy efficiency in urban transport system*. Paris, France.

Lima and Mexico City – two of the largest cities in Latin America - register high rates of motor transportation in the region, which significantly impacts their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and energy consumption. If we observe the data from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) related to the increase in private motor transportation, it illustrates how such policies are focused on the promotion of private consumption instead of public goods like public transportation. Nonetheless, this economic growth combined with social advances, has brought specific risks and includes certain paradoxes in the regional context that suggest the current development style is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run, and that its underpinnings are already fragile and perhaps already being eroded (Galindo et al., 2014; Samaniego & Others, 2014). This is illustrated by the current consumption patterns in the region, which include the available technologies and infrastructure, the provision and quality of public goods and services, and various “aspirational” and cultural factors (Filgueira, 1981; Lluch, 1977; Sunkel & Gligo, 1980). These consumption patterns have a strong influence on economic dynamics and are associated with significant negative externalities, such as the generation of waste, air pollution, environmental deterioration or destruction, increased use of renewable and non-renewable resources, and emissions of the greenhouse gases that are driving climate change. The evidence shows that current consumption patterns and their corresponding public/private matrix, are not coherent with a sustainable form of development (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & van den Bergh, 2004). An example of such a tendency is shown in Figure 1, where the mentioned development pattern favors private transportation over public transportation. Additionally it illustrates that private automobiles are the mode of transportation of choice for the middle and upper classes and, increasingly, for lower-income strata. This pattern exhibits a public service matrix that provides incentives for unsustainable consumption patterns, in which middle and high-income groups prefer private modes

of transportation, leaving low-income groups to face the risks and costs associated with a lack of modern, safe, and high-quality public transit systems. The lack of public policies that provide incentives for investment in public goods toward more sustainable ones, brings important environmental consequences. For example, 70% of GHG emissions come from cities in the region (Bárcena et al., 2018), where 35% of GHG emissions comes from the public transportation system (Castellanos & Monter, 2019).

Also, literature in the field suggests a relation between the lack of public transportation policies and the increase of social inequality in Latin American cities. Unfortunately, the development of a low carbon public transportation infrastructure, as well as the use of renewable energies, has been limited by economic, financial and political obstacles in the region (Winchester, 2006).

### *Objectives*

Consequently, the study has two primary goals. Firstly, it aims to understand why Latin American cities have increased their participation in collaborative networks; in particular, the cities' participation in transnational networks (like C40) instead of focusing on the creation of regional networks or joining existing ones. Knowing the core logic and rationality behind their motivation, as well as the reasons encouraging the cities' decision to collaborate, helps identifying the underlying basis that shapes those decisions. In other words, the study aims to ascertain whether the cities' participation in various networks is influenced by other actors as part of economic rationality or, truly, solely a product of the city's initiative.

Secondly, the study aims to understand how these networks are changing climate governance structures. Through the analysis of the mechanisms that networks use in climate governance, the study aims to determine if transnational networks represent an alternative way of governance, which allows for the inclusion of other non-state actors, or if it only functions as a tool to reproduce discourses from transnational companies, philanthropic organizations, national governments and international organizations (IOs) with a green version of capitalism. Consequently, the research aims to show how transnational climate change relates to Latin American cities. Correspondingly, it aims to uncover and challenge the common assumptions related to transnational networks in the field of climate change (TNCCs).

### *Research questions*

In order to achieve these research objectives, the project pursues two specific research question:

- a) Why do Latin American cities collaborate with transnational networks regarding climate change?
- b) Can city networks change urban politics on climate change?

In this sense, regarding the case of Mexico City, why does the city participate in a higher number of networks, and with more frequency and intensity than other cities in the region? Which factors influence its level of involvement? Related to the example of Lima, why does it lack an influential role within networks related to climate politics? Why does the city participate with less frequency and less influence when we compare it to Mexico City? Consequently, it contributes to comprehending the underlying basis of their involvement in transnational climate relations.


Finally, the thesis includes a comparison between both case studies, presented in chapter 6.

According to Landman (2003) and Lijphart (1971), the comparative method is defined as one of the basic methods. In the field, a political scientist compares cases to verify the research questions formulated in the study. Thus, the field seeks to make inferences based on the empirical world it observes and, at the same time it seeks to maximize the certainty of these inferences (Idem). By comparing both cases, I am able to contrast how C40 influenced Low-Carbon Emissions Public Transportation (LCEPT) policies in each city and the differences in the process. By comparing both cases, I will be able to find similarities that illustrate the transnationality of the mechanisms used by intermediary actors<sup>2</sup> (INGOs, transnational companies, think-tanks, consulting companies, etc.) in urban climate policies. For instance, the comparison helps to illustrate the differences in C40's participation between cities, but also the similarities when executing LCEPT strategies, as I illustrated on Figure 2.

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<sup>2</sup> For this research, international and regional organizations, central governments, foreign and domestic research centers, philanthropic and non-governmental organizations (NGO), think-tanks and research centers, as well as private transnational corporations, are considered as hybrid and intermediary actors.

**Figure 2. Intermediary actors diagram**



Source: Author's elaboration

### *Limitations of the study*

By focusing on capital cities, or megacities according to the C40 classification (particularly two capital cities: Lima and Mexico City), the thesis excludes other large cities in the region, such as Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Medellin, as well as those with less than 10 million habitants in its metropolitan area. The reason is because, either they are not as involved as Mexico City in C40's activities, or their process is advanced enough to make it difficult to observe the motivations in participating with C40.

Consequently, the analysis excludes intermediate cities' participation in collaborative networks, as well as their role in transnational climate change negotiations. Furthermore, power dynamics within

networks and between capital and intermediate cities are not considered. Equally, the interaction between IC and IOs (e.g. United Nations (UN), EU, Mercosur, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), etc.) is not included in the present proposal. Additionally, the thesis combines a general analysis of C40's relations with Lima and Mexico City with a specific focus on public transport infrastructure low in carbon emissions. It does not include an analysis of urban land use policies, urban clean energies' generation, buildings regulation, urban forestry, urban-regional food systems, as well as its development in the region. Land use and urban-regional food systems, as well as regional tendencies, will be considered for future studies.

The research leaves some unanswered questions for each of the cases studied. Regarding Mexico City's case, the study is limited to the analysis of transnational relations between the capital city and the network C40, omitting the interactions with other transnational networks, IOs, national governments or other city with whom the city has a relation. Likewise, initiatives, policies and interaction with transnational networks after March 2018 are not included. Regarding Lima's case, the thesis is limited to the analysis of transnational relations between the municipal government and C40, excluding the interactions of the regional government with such networks. Similar to the Mexico City's case, initiatives, policies and interaction with transnational networks after March 2018 are not included.

### *Structure of the thesis*

Chapter one starts of by summarizing the body of literature that study cities' participation in transnational networks (TN) working on climate politics. The chapter shows what the literature says

about climate governance in Latin American cities, the participation in the network C40, and the influence of intermediary actors in urban climate politics. The literature review chapter shows how uncovering the underlying bases of cities participation in transnational networks results in the development of local foreign policies that take away the agency of other non-public actors involved, and gives more importance to the economic interests behind these relations. In this sense, the literature review chapter argues that the production of analysis with a variety of perspectives contributes to the enrichment of the debate on TCCG. Such diversity can contribute to the inclusion of these new institutional arrangements between public, private and hybrid actors.

The literature review chapter argues for the use of reflective approaches, that work more like theoretical and analytical tools and not as theoretical frameworks, thus contributing to a better understanding of transnational networks in the global South. The chapter aims to fill the gap in the conceptualization of transnational networks' role in urban public policy. The main argument is that more than facilitating and promoting the sharing of experiences as an alternative climate global governance, these networks enable the access of other actors, mainly private companies (e.g., philanthropic organizations, private foundations and NGOs, real estate, construction and technology companies), to policy-makers in southern cities. The literature survey presented in the previous chapter shows that the conception of governance focuses, on the one hand, on the institutional aspect. This tendency shows that the field presents a dominance of a liberal institutional approach, whereas the new institutional arrangements –where intermediary actors guide urban climate politics in Latin America- are not included in the analysis. On the other hand, the literature in the field approaches the study of climate governance from a functionalist aspect. At the same time, such

approaches leave aside the involvement of other actors<sup>3</sup>, who do not necessarily come from the public sphere. This narrow conceptualization of climate politics results in inefficient strategies, such as mitigation and adaptation. These discrepancies, mainly motivated by traditional theoretical approaches, considerably increase the risks to the climate in urban areas throughout the global South, particularly in Latin America. Additionally, these different conceptualizations raise several questions, especially when we observe the region's contribution to global GHG is minimum compared to countries in the global North, but its vulnerability to events caused by climate change is high, the region's adaptation capacity is limited, and their inability to be considered sufficiently in public policies design and planning. Here I argue for a diversity of approaches, which does not necessarily mean moving from traditional to alternative approaches, but encouraging the production of analysis with a variety of perspectives that enrich the debate in the field and produce more aligned analysis with the local reality.

Chapter two deploys a neo-Gramscian approach in the study of TCCG in the region. The chapter frames TCCG in Latin American cities from a critical International Political Economy (IPE) perspective. As described above, the core elements of a critical approach in International Relations (IR), the sections use Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, historic bloc, and Carroll's transnational capitalist class (TCC) as theoretical tools that help understanding the formation of global hegemony, and as evidence of the interaction among all the social forces involved in politics. With this aim, the chapter uses a neo-Gramscian approach supporting the argument with the concept of *trasformismo*. This concept is one of the major features in Gramsci's passive revolution, which

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<sup>3</sup> For other actors, I consider international and regional organizations, central governments, foreign and domestic research centers, philanthropic and non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks and research centers in the field, as well as private multinational corporations.

implies the promise of development through transformative politics, as I explain in more detail in the chapter.

Also, chapter three suggests a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, with more emphasis on the use of the latter, that contribute to the study of cities and transnational climate change relations. For instance, the thesis uses elite interviews performed *in-situ* as a source of information that allows an in deep analysis of connexions between actors. Thanks to fieldwork, I was able to uncover the political competition and, not very evident, institutional links, through undertaking semi-structured elite interviews. As for the analysis of the data collected, the thesis uses discourse and documentary analysis, as well as Social-Network Analysis (SNA) methodology. In this sense, chapter three shows the need for a diversity of approaches and methods that allows for in-depth observation of climate politics dynamics (such as the role of formal and informal actors at different levels involved in politics) that lead us to ask new research questions. For instance, the analysis and interpretation of the elite interviews alongside with the discourse analysis in the interviews and official documents, provided the necessary evidence to observe the relation among the different actors participating in climate governance. Throughout the chapters, the thesis uncovers the participation of intermediary actors in the decision-making stage of policies and strategies related to LCEPT at different levels during the process. In particular, the data collected show the associations between the city's governments and transnational actors where one transnational (foreign) network<sup>4</sup> had intervened. Likewise, the research includes the analysis of those relations, sometimes originating from, and others encouraged by, the transnational network C40, directly or indirectly, in policies related to LCEPT.

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<sup>4</sup> By foreign network here I understand as a city network that, the founders and main sponsors comes from a country in the global North.

As I argue in chapter 3, an emphasis in qualitative methods and a use of reflectivist approaches contributes to the inclusion and observation of other elements that may influence the political outcomes. Besides, qualitative methods help to explore new aspects of the phenomena studied, and to formulate new research questions that contribute to a better understanding of complex problems, such as climate change. Likewise, they allow the analysis of other aspects of climate politics besides the institutional ones, such as the role of formal and informal actors at different levels involved in politics. As I argue, the information collected in the interviews contributes to challenging the common conception of institutions and norms in the literature studying climate change governance.

Additionally, the purpose of the empirical sections is to disclose and confront the common assumptions related to TCCG, and the role of transnational networks in promoting an alternative model for global climate governance. In this sense, chapters four and five aim to uncover and challenge the common assumptions related to TCCG, and the role of networks in promoting an alternative model for global climate governance. By describing the transnational relations of both cities, and their origins and motivations to participate in the network's activities, the chapters contribute to uncover the economic rationality in urban climate politics in Latin America promoted by TNs. Also, through which mechanisms, and actors, cities in Latin America choose and implement LCEPT projects.

Chapter six shows how those transnational networks, with the support of philanthropic organizations and multimillionaire companies, prioritize the establishment of public/private partnerships, as well as the support of technical and market-based solutions. Likewise, transnational

networks encourage a transfer of climate policies from IOs (mainly from the global north), multinational and philanthropic foundations that involves technological and market-based solutions with a top-bottom approach. Additionally, chapters four, five and six show the results from fieldwork performed between March 2017 and March 2018. It included *in-situ* elite interviews, and the analysis of the empirical evidence from official documents, legislation, and governmental programs up to September 2018. The second part aims to illustrate the complexity of transnational governance. The main goal is to show the *how* of transnational climate change relations in Latin American cities. For instance, how the network C40 facilitates access to urban climate politics for other actors<sup>5</sup> working as intermediaries between them and cities.

The thesis concludes by arguing that transnational networks do not promote a democratic, horizontal way of governance. Their approach to climate politics is influenced by an economic rationality from transnational corporations, NGOs and philanthropic organizations, showing they are not self-governed, nor that the exercise of power is distributed among their members. Contrary to most of the literature studying TCCG, transnational networks do not promote an exchange of information and practices among its members, at least not in all cases. Those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multimillionaire companies, such as C40, prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships, as well as the endorsement of technical and market-based solutions against climate change (climate capitalism). Likewise, transnational networks encourage a transfer of climate policies from multinational and philanthropic foundations from the global north that involves technological and market-based solutions with a top-bottom

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<sup>5</sup> For other actors, I consider international and regional organizations, central governments, foreign and domestic research centers, philanthropic and non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks and research centers in the field, as well as private multinational corporations.

approach. Hence, they do not represent an alternative way of global governance.

# **Chapter 1 Literature Review: How does the city networks literature conceptualize intermediary actors' interaction within networks?**

## *1.0 Introduction*

Literature about Latin American climate politics often uses a liberal institutionalist approach, with a specific focus on the institutional aspects of climate governance. This approach attributes the origins of transnationalism to economic globalization, the creation of international regimes, and international institutions as an option to organize climate policies. Besides, the literature on cities' participation in transnational networks (TNs) focuses on the functional aspects, the economic motivations, or political reforms in Latin American countries, leaving aside economic interests or influence from intermediary actors. Likewise, studies from Latin American authors focus on the underlying bases of the city's participation in TNs and its international activities in general. The authors attribute a city's participation in TNs either to IOs, Regional Organizations (ROs) or economic interests, etc. However, these studies keep ignoring the intervention of intermediary actors in the networks' activities.

Following on the latter, the next sections briefly summarize the body of literature that pays attention to the aspects mentioned above. At the same time, the chapter<sup>6</sup> also aims to answer what the

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<sup>6</sup> To understand how our knowledge base developed, the chapter takes stock of the transnational climate governance literature that emerged over the last twenty years. It builds on a systematic review of 92 peer-reviewed journal articles, 20 books, two book chapters, 11 government and IOs' documents and two doctoral dissertations published in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish between 1999 and 2019. At the same time, the review includes some of the critical articles and books that mention the critical debates in the field. This part of the review builds on a systematic review of some epistemological and underlying debates in transnational governance. It includes a systematic review of 16 peer-reviewed journal articles, 15 books, and three book chapters published in English and Spanish. The review started in

literature says about climate governance in Latin American cities and discusses new approaches on climate change governance on a city level in the region. The chapter also aims to fill the gaps in the literature. The first one concerns the inclusion of new institutional arrangements in TCCG, where they do not seem to be included in the analysis, along with intermediary actors that guide urban climate politics. The second gap pointed out in the chapter refers to the geographical bias in the study of TCCG. Both gaps in the literature, I argue, could be filled with the encouragement of a diversity of perspectives, particularly the ones concerning the use of neo-Gramscian approaches. This does not mean merely moving from traditional to alternative approaches, but encouraging the production of analysis with a variety of perspectives that enrich the debate. Such diversity can contribute to a better understanding of these new institutional arrangements between public, private, and hybrid actors in Latin American climate politics.

### *1.1 What does the literature say about new institutional arrangements in transnational climate change governance?*

The end of the Cold War represented a transformation in the international system from a bi-polar to multi-polar sources of power. The technological developments in transportation and communication provided the basis for structural changes in the international system (Pattberg, 2006). In this context of large-scale transformation, several scholars focused on studying the growing interaction among

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2013, with a search on the University of Ottawa library web site and GoogleScholar to capture publications using combinations of keywords: transnational, governance, city, climate, climate change, public, transportation, networks, Latin America, urban, and policies. This set was complemented with relevant publications cited in the publications traced, recommendations from colleagues in the field, and those collected during fieldwork in 2017 and during conference participations from 2014 until 2019 to capture original publications in each year. All 161 publications traced were read, and notes (including the key insights reported, the area of study, and the type of research project undertaken) were kept in a working document. This document was coded to capture the “repetitiveness” and “rarity” of themes and findings reported across the various publications.

states and started to think about the concept of global and world governance. At the same time, during the emergence of the “Third Debate” within the discipline, some scholars started to see some inconsistencies caused by the realist approach that led to the generation of alternative approaches: e.g., the “world system theory” from Wallerstein (1974) and the “dependency theory” from Cardoso & Faletto (1979), facilitating the inclusion of multi-level analysis that helped understanding the complexity of an international system (Waever, 1996).

Parallel to the third debate, transnational governance represented a sign of evolution in IR theory due to the complexity of global issues. It can be argued that global governance literature, closer to the literature studying transnationalism in the 70s, derived from the liberal approach from Keohane & Nye (1977) and their *Theory of Complex Interdependence* as an attempt to theorize the complexity of international relations. According to Bulkeley et al. (2014), they tried to conceptualize transnational contracts where “movements of tangible and intangible goods” were included. Coalitions and interactions among actors were not considered new; simultaneously, they were increasingly shaping the costs and benefits that states faced when considering different courses of action. In other words, they challenged the state-centric assumptions prevalent in IR theory<sup>7</sup>. By the beginning of the 1980s, (R. Keohane, 1984) returned to a state-centric perspective, arguing that economic globalization and pollution pushed states toward more intensive cooperation. However, he still considered a state’s behavior was best conceptualized through classic interstate diplomacy (Idem). By the end of the decade, however, Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 3) challenged

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<sup>7</sup> A clear example of a state-centric approach in IR theory is Waltz (2001). He takes sovereignty as given and assumes world politics is organized hierarchically. By taking sovereignty as given, Waltz places the state above all other actors, and therefore, he does not recognize the vital role other actors in world politics can have. In the same sense, Schmidt (2005), in his analysis of the conceptions of power in IR, takes sovereignty as given to legitimize the existence of the state and justify the use of force against any non-democratic state. Therefore, the state for him is the only, if not the most important, actor in IR.

Keohane and Nye's institutional approach by defining transnational relations as "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization." Alongside these works, a growing body of scholars began to study transnational politics outside the state (Aldecoa, 1999; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Gómez Gil, 2008; Hafteck, 2003; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Lecours, 2002).

In the same sense, Krahmman (2003, p. 327) reflects a liberal approach when she refers to the fragmentation of governance and the evolution of the concept towards a multilevel and multipolar system seems pertinent; especially when the organizational and institutional tools of governance give the impression of being insufficient or inadequate. She argues that the blueprint of alternative governance models was provided by neoliberal ideologies, which advocated the introduction of competition and market principles into public and administrative systems. This new public management model proposed the introduction of competitive tendering, performance incentives, and internal auditing within a decentralized customer-oriented structure to increase accountability, transparency, and civil society participation. She explains that the main reason behind this idea of a fragmented, multilevel governance model was to increase state efficiency and effectiveness.

Rosenau (1992) also suggested a different approach to the fragmentation of governance. His idea about complex systems claims that the connection to similar or particular microstructures was able to influence the macro-structures to adapt to the changing environment and increase its survivability as a macro-structure. For instance, it gives the impression that the evolution of IR theory sets the basis for an evolution of the concept of global governance, where a disaggregated, fragmented but

coordinated international order is evident, not only to gain some benefits but also necessary to face complex and global problems.

Related to the optimism generated by the increasing interest in transnational relations, some scholars overemphasize the transformation of world politics, arguing for the “end of the state” (Strange, 1996). Despite this premature supposition, theoretical developments were made, focussed on the state acting transnationally through networks (Slaughter, 2004). According to Bulkeley et al. (2014), one of the most important contributions to the field in the last decade has been the development of a summary of how non-state and sub-state actors were involved through transnational relations in global governance. Furthermore, scholars realized that transnational actors were not only lobbying central governments and IOs, but that they were also trying to participate in the act of governance themselves. In other words, “transnational governance became a central component in world politics” (Idem: 7). Based on this tendency, much of the existing work on transnational climate governance in the past years has focused on the transnational character of networks, paying less attention to either the participation of other actors within local governments or their influence in such collaborative networks.

In regards to the idea of governance through networks, Newell & Bulkeley (2010, p. 58) argue that transnational networks can also undertake specific forms of regulation, by establishing standards and disclosing performance, developing memberships rules, and, on occasion, sanctioning those who fail to comply. Despite their voluntary nature and weak position, transnational networks can govern by shaping the ideas and behavior of their constituents following certain norms and goals for addressing climate change, suggesting that they warrant further exploration as part of the

contemporary landscape of climate governance. Simultaneously, Betsill & Bulkeley (2007) argue that networks play an important role in transnational climate governance. They attribute three critical themes in the research to this type of governance. First, they argue that the participation of cities and local governments in collaborative networks has been determinant in the development of climate governance at a city level. They recap the importance of transnational networking as a process of policy coordination, facilitating the exchange of information and experiences. A second key element in researching transnational climate governance according to them, is the role of knowledge in shaping policies (Idem). They suggest that technical knowledge has a strong influence when it comes to making a difference in local policies. The third element that has influenced the participation of cities in climate change governance over the past decades is related to the persistent gap between the encouraging discourse and the reality on the ground (Idem).

Within this group of authors, TNs are seen as instruments to global climate governance, and as a useful tool to bypass, and overcome the obstacles from the climate regime in IOs (Bellinson & Chu, 2019; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a; Castán Broto, 2017; Gordon, 2013, 2016b; Howes et al., 2015; Oddone & Granato, 2008). For instance, this group of authors attributes the participation of cities to international institutions, such as regional integration processes (e.g., Andean Community, Mercosur, SICA, NAFTA), as the leading cause of the international participation of local actors. Authors in this group attribute the capacity to interact with other cities outside their jurisdictions to the intervention of international institutions, or supra-national authorities (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a; Colacrai, 2013; de Coninck & Puig, 2015; Dias, 2011; Oddone, 2008, 2013; Oddone et al., 2011; Oddone & Rodríguez, 2015; Rhi-Sausi & Oddone, 2013). For example, in the Latin American context, Oddone & Rodríguez argue sub-regions, like Central America, have suffered

institutional instability for decades, representing an obstacle to development. In this sense, cross-border cooperation enhances regional integration in Latin America, which at the same time contributes to institutional stability and development in the region. Yet, this perspective keeps conditioning cities' –and another type of subnational government- agency to normative, exogenous and institutional aspects. Similarly, authors like Busch (2015) claim that TNs can act as platforms that help cities to be included in climate governance, as well as consultants, and brokers. Nonetheless, when networks are perceived as city advocates, studies in this group do not consider other actors apart from cities. In other words, this body of literature does not include the participation of private actors, their influence in urban climate politics, or hybrid mechanisms of governance in the analysis. Likewise, Johnson (2018) argues transnational city-networks and cities may be driving a coherent agenda that will contribute to address a more efficient climate governance. However, despite their active participation in climate governance, cities have been underestimated. Consequently, cities' international activity is framed under national governments, multilateral institutions, multinational corporations, and even transnational networks activity. This has contributed to form a perception of cities' international activity as something conditioned to other actors, and not to the power of cities<sup>8</sup>.

Also, other studies in the field have paid attention to the operational aspects of TNs. That is the case of Hsu et al. (2017), who developed an analytical framework to study the different modes of vertical

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<sup>8</sup> By power of cities Johnson (2018) argues that the power of cities to act and promote a change in global climate politics can be framed in four constellations of international power. First, is framed primarily in relation to the formal rules, norms and expectations. The second stems from the constellation of norms, knowledge, ideas and resources that manifest themselves in transnational city-networks. Furthermore is the ability of cities to accumulate and attract the labour, resources and capital that enable them to act and exert power at a global scale. The final form of power stems from the norms (of standardization, classification and evaluation) that render cities observable and comparable in global climate politics (Idem).

and horizontal alignment that sub-national actors (cities and TNs included) have employed to address climate change mitigation. The authors stress the importance to observe the interconnections of different mechanisms that catalyze climate actions at a local level, and how do multiple actors link or interact at multiple scales and domains. Similarly, Lee (2013, 2015) studies the role of membership features in network dynamics when he discusses how C40 focuses its membership on megacities, whereas others like ICLEI, accept local governments from different levels, and how these may influence TNs performance.

Other authors in this classification focus their analysis on the role of TNs in climate global governance, specifically in their interaction with international institutions (Bansard et al., 2017b; Dreyfus, 2013a; Hughes & Romero-Lankao, 2014; C. Johnson et al., 2015; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Taedong Lee & Jung, 2018a; Taedong Lee & van de Meene, 2012; Uzunboy, 2019a). For instance, Dreyfus (2013) discusses the role of networks in the incorporation of cities in the international regime, and how TMCNs work as a vehicle for cities to be included in the international climate regime. Also, Bansard, Pattberg, & Widerberg (2017) argue how TNs can be a substitute for the current climate governance regime, and how cities can be included in the current institutional infrastructure related to climate governance. Likewise, D'Almeida Martins & da Costa Ferreira (2011) and Uzunboy (2019) claim that TNs play a central role in the promotion and participation of cities in climate governance globally and even regionally, as is the case of the European Union (EU) (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009). Lastly, authors like Lee & Jung (2018) refer to TNs as “city-to-city” networks, emphasizing their role in strengthening the relationships between cities. Unfortunately, that is not always the case for Latin American cities as the empirical evidence shows.

All of the existing policies referred to in the literature reflect a strong influence from the liberal institutionalism approach, highlighting the need for an institutional framework where economic relations (e.g., trade and investment promotion) are seen as one of the main reasons for enhancing international participation of subnational entities. Similar to the comparison made by Rosenau (1995) between International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and what he calls “cross-border cooperation”, the policies that emerge from INGOs most likely occur through the collaboration of groups with the same or similar ideologies. Even when the members come from different countries, most of the time these organizations are brought together under umbrella organizations<sup>9</sup>. On the other hand, what Rosenau calls cross-border coalitions, consist of organizations that gather with a common purpose but do not do so under the tutelage of an umbrella organization (e.g., C40, ICLEI, UCGL). They are networks rather than organizations, a nascent form of issue regimes that usually form around problems based on the agenda of the communities (Idem). Finally, some authors use a critical approach to the study of TNs. This includes the operational limitations of networks and their lack of efficiency to implement some climate policies (Bansard et al., 2017b), the economic and political motivations of cities to get involved in TNs (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Davidson & Gleeson, 2015; Heikkinen et al., 2019; Strange, 1996), as well as, the role of other actors in urban climate politics (Bulkeley et al., 2012; Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., 2016).

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<sup>9</sup> In the Latin American context, two organizations can be considered as umbrella organizations; the Mercociudades and Observatorio de Cooperación Descentralizada UE-ALC.

## *1.2 Innovation and complexity of climate governance*

Despite the expansion in the research agenda during the last ten years, climate governance literature has remained focused on aspects of institutional innovation, making emphasis on the institutional aspects of governance: institutional linkages, material, and functional overlap, among other aspects. This particular group in the literature attempts to understand innovations on global climate governance through institutional complexity. For instance, Scott (2011) argues that [innovative] institutional connections, such as fragmented governance, orchestration, and multilevel governance, can be employed to overcome and manage the consequences of institutional overlapping and maximize the benefits of complex institutionalism in environmental governance. Following the same line of thought, Bauer & Steurer (2014) argue that policy innovations happen in three distinct ways: through collaboration among the partners, through scaling up of activities beyond the partnerships, and by supporting national adaptation politics. Similarly, Papin (2019) claims that TNs, in order to innovate in global adaptation governance, need to create original governance instruments instead of using the existing tools of international or other transnational actors. In a similar way, there is a body of literature which argues that fragmentation in global governance is inevitable and “innovative” because it reflects broader forces of change in global politics (Acharya, 2016). van Asselt (2014) for example, argues that it is due to the interrelationships between the existing climate regimes.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, with the wide variety of governance arrangements and actors outside of the institutional frameworks, it is necessary to move away from the narrow institutional view of environmental governance. In his book, van Asselt provides

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<sup>10</sup> The climate regimes are those established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They aim to regulate the interaction of human activity with the global climate system to mitigate climate change (Nishimura, 2015).

conceptual and empirical analysis with new insights into the [potential] consequences related to the fragmentation of global climate governance, aiming to contribute to the management of the fragmentation and complexity that global climate governance represents. Due to these interconnections among the different actors involved and the complexity caused by those connections to examine strategies for dealing with regime interactions in global climate governance, van Asselt aims to provide insights into the various consequences of regime interactions. Similarly, his book offers a critical discussion of the potential for legal techniques and institutional challenges to foster synergies and mitigate conflicts between regimes in the area of climate change.

With the exception of Orsini (2013)<sup>11</sup>, this body of work still does not consider governance outside international institutions (IOs, IROs, etc.) as being possible. For instance, Zelli & van Asselt (2013) consider that the concept of fragmentation “focuses on the *overall institutional setting* in which distinct institutions exist and interact”. For them, the concept of fragmentation neither implies a particular bias toward a state of universal institutional order, nor does it generally suggest that fragmentation is a negative quality. Still, literature using fragmentation to study climate governance has difficulty in conceptualizing the causes, consequences, and management of fragmentation outside institutions. Another example of the literature using the concept of fragmentation comes from Roberts & Weikmans (2017). By describing the fragmented system of national reporting of climate finance and how the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Rio Marker system is serving neither contributors nor recipients, they show the inefficiency and lack of functional definition and accountability of a fragmented system in climate governance.

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<sup>11</sup> In her analysis, Orsini focusses on the influence of Non-State Actors (NSAs) –which comprise a broad range of non-governmental actors, including arms, civil society organizations, experts, indigenous peoples, think-tanks, and others– that participate in several elements of a regime complex and fragmented climate governance system.

Related to the concept of orchestration, the literature using this concept argues that it is a subtype of governance where an authority moves towards shared social objectives. It is a mechanism where states and IOs guide transnational governance through non-state and/or sub-state actors (Hale & Roger, 2014). Similarly, according to Gordon & Johnson (2017), orchestration helps capture the different frequencies of power that operate as actors of various sorts, seeking to produce transnationally coordinated urban climate governance activities and efforts. Nonetheless, such initiatives can also be interpreted as a result of coercion from higher authorities, or “structural coercion.”

In a similar way, another group of scholars analyze TNs using a multilevel governance approach. The aim is to show the entanglement of levels and sectors in governance processes (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006a; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Hughes et al., 2018; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Marsden et al., 2014; Martins & Ferreira, 2011; Yi et al., 2019a). However, when studying networks –either municipal or city networks–, these group of authors do not go beyond public actors to explore the relations between cities and corporations, NGOs, etc. On the contrary, this group has often focused on the multilevel aspect, undermining the multi-sector characteristic. In line with multilevel governance theories, the literature has often observed the dispersion of power (Bulkeley & Schroeder, 2012b). Public actors are no longer the authoritative ones. It is increasingly hard to distinguish between public and private actors (Newell & Bulkeley, 2010). Indeed, several authors have underlined the importance of TNs’ partners; i.e., public or private actors surrounding TNs and taking part in their work in cities. A different classification for the literature comes from Betsill & Bulkeley (2007). They mention that current literature related to multilevel governance is commonly divided into two types: Type I emphasizes the multiple ties at which governance takes

place, typically differentiating between administrative units (e.g., cities, states, countries) where governments are the central governing authority. Type II emphasizes the formation of multilevel governance through networks, which involves public and private actors across levels of social organization (2007: 449). Literature from Latin America could be classified as Type I since most it focuses on transnational relations of public actors (Aldecoa, 1999; Dávila et al., 2008a, 2008b; Del Huerto Romero, 2004; Godínes Zuñiga & Del Huerto Romero, 2004; Oddone et al., 2011; Oddone & Rodríguez, 2015; Rhi-Sausi & Oddone, 2013; Schiavon, 2010). Type II literature in the Latin American context however, is limited with a few exceptions (Oddone et al., 2011). Thus, the literature that follows this line presents a monopoly of local public participation but does not include the interaction among actors, or how one can influence the other, limiting the scope of analysis.

From the field of public policy, the literature on Policy Transfer assumes governance (including its mechanisms, and governance tools) is transferred from one or a few dominant actor[s] to others. This means that policies get transferred between actors [cities], which suggests that it has the same institutional origin. In regards to the literature studying Latin American cities where liberal institutionalism shows a strong influence, it is pertinent to include literature from the field of public policy, particularly about policy transfer, to observe fundamental bases. In this sense, for Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, p. 344) policy transfer refers to “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place.” Additionally, Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) identify three reasons for the growth of policy transfer. Firstly, they argue that no nation –either developed or developing countries- can isolate its economy from global

economic pressures. Secondly, they attribute the promotion of policy transfer to the rapid development in communications, which facilitates the exchange of information at a lower cost. Finally, they point to the spread of policy transfer to IOs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These actors they argue, advocate and sometimes enforce similar policies across the countries. In the same sense, Berry & Berry (2014) argue that there are two principal forms of explanation for the adoption of a new program from the state: internal determinants models and diffusion models. The former suggests that the factors leading a jurisdiction to innovate have political, economic, or social characteristics, which could be internal or external to the state. While the policy diffusion model, they argue, is motivated to innovate by inherently intergovernmental reasons. They are often emulating previous experiences from other jurisdictions.

At the same time, Evans & Davies (1999) offer a different perspective to understand the concept. They suggest three questions related to the policy transfer process. First, why does policy transfer occur? Secondly, how are policies transferred? In identifying the mechanisms and the channels that are used to transfer the policy, as is the case for policy diffusion and policy transfer process, it is important to take into consideration that most of the time such processes can only happen within an institutional framework. In other words, by negotiating the norms' transfer happens in forums and international conferences (e.g., COPs), and through coercive power from national governments and IOs. Lastly, Evans & Davies ask about the importance of the effects of the transferred policies. In other words, how does the transferred policy influence the recipient jurisdiction, and what is the adaptation process involved?

Aiming to uncover the motivations and reasons behind the process of policy transfer in this regard, Dolowitz & Marsh (1996) argue for particular pathways through which governments learn from each other, while Evans & Davie focuses on the relationship between voluntary and coercive transfer, as well as the links between policy transfer and policy success or failure. A different perspective includes the work from Rose (1991, 1993), who focuses on the “idea-mongering” among elites. Similarly, Harrison refers to the work of Schneider & Ingram (1988) that focuses on the “systematic pinching of ideas” by policymakers in other jurisdictions. Finally, policy transfers can also happen through discourses and persuasion. In this sense, Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) talk about the coercive policy transfer from IOs to implement a specific set of economic policies from their agendas in the “international coalition” behind certain international economic rationalities.

In this sense, the reviewed literature on policy transfer shows ambiguity and presents important gaps in the concepts that need to be addressed. Such deficiencies can be illustrated in three different aspects: (1) the increasing diversity of the actors involved, emphasizing the inclusion of transnational actors, as well as the degree of involvement in the policy process, (2) a discussion that addresses the vagueness of the scope in policy transfer and makes a more explicit distinction between policy transfer and policy diffusion, and (3) an analysis that contributes to the development of an updated framework for policy transfer, resolving some of the aspects mentioned above. These ambiguities in the literature leave several questions unanswered in practice. For instance, when we observe the actors who lead, control, but most importantly, define which policies are transferred, and through which mechanisms, it is evident that such exchanges are not always motivated by common interests. This aspect is also linked to the debate about the relation between power and knowledge. For example, according to Miranda Sara & Baud (2014), is it policy transfer, innovation

and exchange of experiences? Or is it transfer of influence and particular interests? Therefore, further analyses in the field are necessary.

*1.3 Latin American cities and transnational networks in the literature, what have we learned about cities and transnational governance in Latin America?*

Since the beginning of the 1990s, literature related to the cooperation of local actors outside their borders attract a significant interest among scholars in Latin America. Influenced in part by the EU experience, the study of cities' participation in transnational networks became an object of study. At the same time, and also influenced by the tendency among states in Australia, United States, and Germany, the field has been strongly influenced by a liberal approach focusing on international economic relations of local governments in the region, as well as the Latin American structuralism and the economic aspects of their international activities (Del Huerto Romero, 2004; Durazo-Herrmann, 2000, 2003, 2007; Godínez, 1999; Malé, 2006; Schiavon & Velázquez Flores, 2008; Zapata Garesché, 2007; Zubiri, 2006). Thus, the literature on transnational governance in Latin America can arguably be classified into two different groups, although some authors and studies can fit into more than one classification.

The first group has a hidden agenda. The literature included in this category focuses its analysis on the origins of Latin American cities' participation in transnational networks. A clear example is an article by Oddone (2016). He classifies the study of Latin American cities' participation in transnational networks through 5 theoretical perspectives: as international actors, as a result of a democratization process in foreign policies, from a regional development perspective, from a

regional integration standpoint, and through a [global] governance approach. Likewise, authors included in this group use a normative approach aiming to provide solutions to the unarticulated legal and institutional framework of transnational relations persistent in each country. Typically, this body of literature attributes a causal relation of transnational relations to economic globalization and the decentralization process in public administration accredited to a neoliberal approach in public administration, where the state has minimum participation. The authors who fit into this classification depart from the idea for the need for a legal and institutional framework, where national governments' participation alongside supra-national institutions, is necessary in guiding and ensuring that the agendas are coordinated with the national foreign policy – and sometimes “authorize”- to subnational actors' into world politics. Most of the time such coordination limits the exposure of local actors to issues of low politics (e.g., cultural exchanges, economic promotion, etc.) and leaves high politics out of their agendas (Cors & Malé, 2015; De Mattos, 2001; Durazo-Herrmann, 2003; Ippolito, 2016; Keating, 1999; Lecours, 2002; Oddone, 2016; Russell, 2010; Soldatos, 1993). For instance, De Mattos (2001) argues that changes in the territorial distribution of economic activities, in part due to the economic globalization, is one of the main reasons local governments participate in world politics. Likewise, Keating (1999) argues that sub-national governments participate in transnational relations mainly for three reasons. Firstly, regions look for investments and the promotion of free trade. Secondly, those regions with their own language and culture look for support and recognition outside their territory, especially when their state is unsympathetic. Lastly, sub-national governments, particularly those with nationalist aspirations, such as Quebec in Canada and Catalonia in Spain, seek recognition and legitimacy in the international arena (p. 5).

The second group focuses on the analysis and evaluation of instruments through which local actors interact, in particular Sister-State Agreements and International Decentralized Cooperation (IDC)<sup>12</sup>. The latter captured academics' attention since its inception in the 1990s. Latin American scholars in this group have framed the international relations of local actors within an IDC framework (Del Huerto Romero, 2004; Durazo-Herrmann, 2003; Godínez Zuñiga & Del Huerto Romero, 2004; Gómez Gil, 2008; Malé, 2006; Unceta et al., 2011; Velázquez Flores, 2006b; Zeraoiu, 2011; Zubiri, 2006). However, IDC maintains a state-centric perspective, where the participation of other local actors, such as NGOs, universities, and companies from the private sector is considered as complementary. This is due, in part, because the analysis traditionally undertaken use a liberal institutionalist perspective of cooperation from mainstream IR schools, such as Keohane (1984) and Oye (1985), where economic interests play an important role. In this sense, the literature in the field presents a vast majority of analysis where the pursuit of cooperating with foreign actors and the growing involvement of cities in transnational networks, is attributed to economic interests. For instance, Velázquez Flores (2006) attributes the rise of IDC to economic globalization and the growing economic and environmental interdependence, which generates the need to increase competitiveness in international markets. Similarly, Godínez (1999) attributes the economic reforms in the 1980s, particularly the trade liberalization and the articulation of international markets of products and services, as the main reason for local governments to relate with other foreign local

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<sup>12</sup> International Decentralized Cooperation (IDC) is a term used mainly by European and Latin American scholars to describe collaborations among subnational entities in different areas (e.g., social cohesion, environmental protection, cultural exchange, and economic development). See more in (Malé, 2006) and (Del Huerto Romero, 2004). However, this analytical approach does not abandon an institutional liberalism approach of cooperation where economic interests play an important role. IDC places importance on the participation of other local actors, such as NGOs, universities, and companies from the private sector, maintaining a state-centric perspective (See more in (Del Huerto Romero, 2004). *Una aproximación contextual y conceptual a la cooperación descentralizada*. Godínez Zúñiga, Víctor Manuel y María del Huerto Romero, *Tejiendo lazos entre territorios. La cooperación descentralizada local Unión Europea-América Latina*. urb-al, Diputación de Barcelona, Municipalidad de Valparaíso.

governments and to endorse their engagement in international activities, such as joint projects, forums and networks affiliations. In the same vein, Romero (2004) argues that local authorities base their involvement in international activities on the economic aspect. Romero maintains that local governments' main goals are looking for financial aid, promoting foreign direct investment projects, or promoting trade relations. From a comparative politics perspective, Herrmann (2003) argues that the rationality of local authorities is primarily economic. Their activities, he argues, are based on economic promotion due to administrative faculties that were given by national governments, except for a range of separatist regions, such as the Basque Country and the Province of Québec. These faculties have contributed to a gradual replacement of political instruments to economic ones (p. 444). Even when authors, such as Zapata (2007), define IDC as “the set of initiatives of cooperation that, under local government’s leadership, aims to stimulate capacities of local actors<sup>13</sup> and encourage a more participatory development”, in practice, the concept focuses mostly on the economic promotion of local entities, or looks for cooperation in other areas through economic incentives or policies (e.g. DAI, 2013; Dávila et al., 2008a, 2008b).

Simultaneously, certain authors attribute the participation of local actors to changes and developments in international institutions, such as regional integration processes (e.g., Andean Community, Mercosur, SICA, NAFTA), as the main cause of the international participation of local actors. Authors in this group attribute the capacity to interact with other local actors outside their jurisdictions to the intervention of supra-national authorities (Colacrai, 2013; Dias, 2011; Oddone, 2008, 2013; Oddone et al., 2011; Oddone & Rodríguez, 2015; Rhi-Sausi & Oddone, 2013).

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<sup>13</sup> For this section, local actors or local authorities are understood as those known as municipal governments.

Influenced in part by the EU experience, such as the Observatory for Decentralized Cooperation<sup>14</sup>, and some regional cooperation programs such as Mercocities<sup>15</sup>, transnational relations became an object of study at the same time the subject attracted significant interest among scholars in the region. For example, Rhi-Sausi & Oddone (2013) argue that the regional integration process often gives specific motivations for the involvement and participation of subnational unities in the international realm. The assumption behind their argument is that transnational relations are a result of regional economic integration and economic globalization, and not an initiative of local actors. Similarly, Oddone & Rodríguez (2015) argue that sub-regions like Central America, have suffered institutional instability for decades, representing an obstacle to development. In this sense, cross-border cooperation enhances regional integration in Latin America, contributing at the same time to institutional stability and development in the region. This body of literature departs from the assumption of the need for a legal and institutional framework where national governments, alongside supra-national institutions, “authorize subnational actors” participation in the international realm, limiting local governments to issues of low politics and leaving out high politics. Nonetheless, this perspective continues conditioning cities, and other types of subnational government agencies, to institutional, normative, and exogenous aspects.

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<sup>14</sup> Integrated by the Barcelona Provincial Council and the municipality of Montevideo, the observatory was created in March 2005 in response to the need to collect, systematize, investigate, propose and announce conceptions and practices of decentralized public cooperation between the European Union and Latin America (Observatorio, 2020).

<sup>15</sup> The programme Mercociudades, or Mercocities, is a Mercosur Cities Network that unites a group of municipalities of the countries that participate in the Common Market of the South, whether they are members or associates (Mercosur, 2020).

#### 1.4 What does the literature says about public transportation policies in Latin America?

The literature on urban environmental politics and public transportation in Latin American cities is limited. Within this body of work, rational choice approaches keep dominating the subfield. For instance, in their book *Dos grandes metropolis latinoamericanas: Ciudad de México y Buenos Aires Una perspectiva comparative*, Schteingart & Pérez (2015) examine problematic public transportation policies from a “climate justice” dimension. They attribute the lack of inclusive politics on different aspects of climate mitigation and adaptation in both cities to have negative economic and social consequences, especially when the concept of justice in climate politics is neglected. Consequently, unsustainability and the inevitable increase of emissions, as well as other social inequalities, comes to light. However, this study does not consider participation from other actors outside of the public sector. Additionally, transnational relations are not considered in the analysis. Schteingart and Pérez’s approach fails to explain dynamics between public and hybrid [transnational] actors, focusing mainly on the institutional aspect. Additionally, in the case of Buenos Aires, Tella (2014) helps to illustrate the consequences of urban planning policies in Latin America –public transportation policies included- when they adopt a neoliberal perspective. It is through the structural changes during the 1990s<sup>16</sup> that many cities in the region lost the ability to develop their planning and development strategies (p. 29). Similarly, Guerra (2005) provides an example of neoliberal rationality represented in urban planning and public transportation politics. Following this neoliberal logic, the rationality behind the urban expansion strategy in Buenos Aires were the increase of mass rail transport lines and urban and suburban motorways. Economic globalization he argues, brings the lifestyles of many spatially distant groups closer together,

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<sup>16</sup> These structural changes included the privatization of state enterprises, deregulation of the economy, etc.

generating increasingly individual lifestyles. This principle of territorial fragmentation also determines dispersion in the infrastructure and other urban infrastructures.

With a few exceptions (Romero-Lankao, 2007), the literature survey presented above has not been able to understand or show the complexity of transnational city networks in the region. This is partly due to a current tendency to use a theoretical division to analyze transnational relations, between public (City, Municipal and Provincial governments) and private (universities, NGO's, corporations, etc.) (Zeraoiu, 2011).

### *1.5 Limitations from traditional approaches to the study of TN and urban climate politics*

Mainstream approaches within International Relations (IR) studying global environmental governance (GEG) exclude questions concerning the causes of environmental problems, which produce a gap in the conception of such problems and the analysis produced.

The absence of a multidimensional perspective<sup>17</sup> from traditional approaches narrows the conception of environmental problems. In this sense, Paterson (2000) argues that Regime Theory<sup>18</sup> is unstable, partly because Keohane is lumped together with several writers and perspectives into one, conflating for convenience what in practice are widely diverging perspectives. Mainstream

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<sup>17</sup> Related to the need of an intersectoral perspective, Paterson (2000) claims the politics of global environmental problems should be understood as phenomena internal to the logic of four leading, interrelated, power structures of world politics: the state system; capitalism; knowledge; and patriarchy.

<sup>18</sup> Regime theory's primary assumption is that the international system has a cooperative nature. Therefore, anarchy can be overcome through cooperation and international institutions. Keohane (1984a) analyzes the international institutions, or "international regimes," through which cooperation has taken place in the world political economy and describes the evolution of these regimes as American hegemony being eroded. Supporting Keohane's regime theory Oye (1986) argues that in an anarchical environment, mistrust will always be present. Nonetheless, cooperation is needed. In this sense, Oye claims international regime creation can increase the likelihood of cooperation on N-person games.

approaches in IR theory still identify the international system solely as an interstate system<sup>19</sup>, and ignore other aspects of global politics, as well as other actors influencing climate politics. Also, because the focus on norms and the reproduction of social meaning, studies in the field tends to undermine the positivist epistemological basis of IR theory to which Wendt, for example, remains committed (Idem).

### *1.6 Liberal institutionalism*

One of the approaches that reinforces this idea is liberal institutionalism. It argues that while international anarchy<sup>20</sup> is still the defining feature of international politics, it is not possible for states to cooperate in achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. However, liberal institutionalism fails to explain the content of the regimes themselves (what drives the specific characteristic of GEG) [actors' motivations within a regime] (Paterson, 2009, pp. 102, 103).

Drawing on Keohane's rationalist/reflectivist distinction, the rational choice version of regime theory is simply empirically implausible. In climate change negotiations, for example, states do not behave rationally in a sense understood by rational choice theorists. [National governments]

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<sup>19</sup> For instance, Structural Realists (Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 1979, 2001) have focused much less attention on global environmental change than liberal IR theorists. Mainly, there are two differences with the liberal school approaches to environmental problems. The first is simply a suggestion that liberals are overly optimistic concerning the achievement of cooperation on global environmental change. For instance, Grieco (1988) argues that neoliberal institutionalism misunderstands the realist analysis of international anarchy, and therefore it misapplies the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy. Secondly that, neoliberal institutionalism fails to address the significant constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate, which is generated by anarchy.

<sup>20</sup> Anarchy is one of the central concepts in International Relations (IR) theory. Different approaches and schools of thought in the discipline, particularly from a rationalist perspective, such as realism and liberal institutionalism, have offered theories that help to overcome anarchy in the international system. Nonetheless, reflectivist approaches do not use anarchy as a point of departure in their analysis, for example, constructivism. In the same sense, other reflectivist approaches, such as green politics, do not even consider anarchy in their studies of international relations.

practices can be more plausibly interpreted as searching collectively, that is, intersubjectively, for new norms to help generate actions to respond to climate change. [States] have had various other state goals which have infringed on the development of such norms, such as promoting growth, economic deregulation, etc., but these goals have themselves been disrupted by (and are perhaps undergoing some sort of transformation because of global warming) and it is by no means clear what state interests are concerning global warming (p. 15).

*1.6.1 Limitations when studying cities' network activities through complex interdependence  
(a branch of liberal institutionalism)*

As I mentioned above, there is a dominance in the use of mainstream approaches when studying cities' international activity. Among them, Keohane and Nye's work on complex interdependence is the dominant approach from which the literature analyzes cities' participation in network collaboration. Keohane & Nye (1989) suggest three main channels from which interdependence happened. One of them, they say, is the linkage strategy [...] by using their overall dominance (p. 26). Additionally, they claim independence happened through –material, structural, or coercive– power. In other words, the state goes from material power<sup>21</sup> to Strange's (1970) concept of structural power. Second is the agenda-setting. Since there is a lack of central authority in world politics, “strong” states will lead the agenda-setting process internationally. The assumption is that such states have the expertise to design and implement more accurate and efficient policies to solve problems (p. 27). Finally, transnational and transgovernmental relations contribute to explain the

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<sup>21</sup> For the realist, material power (which includes military and economic resources) is one of the aspects that the state must give importance to in order to survive the international anarchical system (Waltz, 1979). Equally, Schmidt (2005) claims that material resources are the means from which the defense of individual interests departs. The pursuit and increase of material resources are going to guide the state's behavior in IR.

complex interdependence in world politics, according to (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 29). They consider the involvement of non-state actors in their analysis, as long as those actors have economic rationality, such as transnational corporations. The argument behind this is how structural power (Strange, 1970) contributes to exercise power. As a result of the influence from Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence, several authors, including some of the most important Latin American authors, have used complex interdependence to explain the underlying bases of cities participation in transnational networks (Dávila et al., 2008a; De Mattos, 2001; Lara Pacheco, 2019; T. Lee, 2013; Oddone, 2016; Oddone et al., 2011, 2018; Oddone & Granato, 2008; Oddone & Pont, 2019; Oddone & Rodríguez, 2015; Jorge A Schiavon, 2010; Schiavon, 2010; Soldatos, 1993; Villarruel, 2010; Zeraoiu, 2011; Zubiri, 2006), which results in the development of local foreign policies that take away the agency of other non-public actors involved, and gives more importance to the economic interests behind these relations (CGAI, 2015; DAI, 2013; GDF, 2011; Gobierno de la Ciudad de México & AL-LAs, 2016; Rodriguez, 2004; Setzer, 2009; Vitali, 2009).

### *1.7 What are the knowledge gaps in the literature of transnational networks and cities in Latin America?*

The review that follows is structured by the two knowledge gaps for transnational climate governance that were identified by leading scholars at the end of the twentieth century. The first concerns the inclusion of new institutional arrangements. The literature reviewed claims public actors (e.g., national and local governments, IOs and ROs) are responsible for the design, as well as leading, coordinating, or executing climate politics in urban areas. Similarly, a subgroup in the literature argues that innovation on climate governance is guided by transnational networks, such as

C40, ICLEI, UCLG, etc. According to most of the articles reviewed, these transnational networks are responsible for taking the lead on climate governance innovation through the promotion and implementation of hybrid institutional arrangements. Yet, despite the expansion in the research agenda during the last ten years, the literature examined does not consider the role of transnational networks as promoters of other actors' participation (such as private companies, philanthropic organizations, and think-tanks) on urban climate politics. By limiting the analysis on public actors, the literature in this classification excludes the participation of non-governmental, private, hybrid and intermediary actors on climate politics. This assumption is challenged with the evidence presented in the empirical chapters. The data collected displays how these networks help influence local actors and gain access to other actors in the policy-making processes.

### *1.8 New hybrid institutional arrangements*

Even though the literature examined shows an overwhelming majority of studies focusing on transnational networks, cities, and the operational aspects involved in their interaction, there are few exceptions that show the participation of intermediary and hybrid actors in the design and implementation of climate politics. For instance, Betzold (2013) studies the participation of interest groups in multilateral climate negotiations. By comparing the advocacy behavior of different groups active in the climate change negotiations, and analyzing the effect of group characteristics, specific expertise and membership type, Betzold unraveled the motivations of domestic interest groups. His article contributes to the literature on the study of interest group strategies, at the same time these groups are relevant for debates on the legitimacy of the negotiations, as well as on the role of civil society in environmental governance.

Similarly, Mannke's (2012) analysis of the role of Latin American higher education institutions (HEIs) shows the influence they exercise in the technology transfer process of climate technologies. He argues that through networks bridging current knowledge and technology gaps between academia, businesses, authorities, and civil society, HEIs can drive the improvement of local adaptive capacity through international technology transfer (ITT) while contributing in the construction of capacities (research and development, consultancy, and human capital formation) in the field of climate technologies. Likewise, Plehwe (2014) observes a large number of think tanks and think tank networks involved in climate change policy. He claims such networks are designed to promote or to disrupt political discourse. The combination of powerful expert, consulting, and lobby/advocacy capacities that rely on organized think-tank infrastructures implies a growing need for closer attention to these types of hybrid actors and its role in the design and implementation of climate politics.

Although several authors do study TNs as structures made of cities and the role of intermediaries and hybrid actors in urban climate politics (with the exception of Acuto & Rayner, 2016<sup>22</sup>), few have attributed cities' participation on TNs to economic interest as the result of the influence from transnational corporations in the global South.

### *1.9 Geographical bias in the study of TCCG in the global South*

Also, the literature reveals a geographical bias (Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013) in the study of TCCG, where the attention is focused on cities from the global north. The absence of analysis on

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<sup>22</sup> Acuto and Rayner point out the need to study the involvement of business and other types of partners in these networks.

Latin American cities exposes the deficiency of studies focusing on cities from the global South. Simultaneously, the brief literature survey also shows a systematic marginalization in the literature that talks about Latin American cities' interactions with transnational climate change networks. For instance, the literature reviewed reveals an absence of studies about Lima, Peru. Also, there is a predominance of studies related to space (land use, urban planning, etc.), urban culture and identity instead of studies in governance and the international activity of local governments from a political science perspective. Additionally, studies on Latin American cities are included in the analysis alongside the rest of the regions from the global South. However, important changes in the global political economy generate different dynamics in global and regional geopolitics. This suggests a need to disaggregate in the analysis each of the regions from the peripheries of the global South.

Usually, studies related to transnational climate governance from Latin America are mostly included in the analysis alongside the rest of the regions from the global South (Dwivedi & Díez, 2008; Morgan & Cruz, 2015). However, important changes in the global political economy generate different dynamics in global and regional geopolitics, which suggests a need to disaggregate each of the different regions from the analysis. Despite the growing development in the field, there are still a limited number of works studying Latin American cities' participation in collaborative networks. Likewise, Latin American cities' participation in transnational networks is uneven when compared to cities in the global North (Bulkeley, Andonova, et al., 2014). As Betsill & Bulkeley (2007) argue, there is an existing gap when it comes to studying how cities in the global South are responding; what Castán Broto & Bulkeley (2013) refer to a "geographical bias." This means focusing attention on cities in more economically developed countries. This concentration in the literature related to capital cities from economically developed countries, generates a systematic marginalization of

other cities in the region, limiting the study of transnational relations to particular geographical contexts. This geographical bias also occurs within Latin American scholars and regional organizations.

Despite some efforts in the last years, the literature is still limiting its analysis to big cities from the region such as Buenos Aires (Guerra, 2005; Schteingart & Pérez, 2015; Tella, 2007, 2014), Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo (Lucon & Goldemberg, 2010; Nobre et al., 2010; Ribeiro, 2010; Setzer, 2009) and Mexico City (Cruz Núñez, 2013; Delgado Ramos et al., 2015; Escudero, 2001; Graizbord, 2008, 2014; Martínez Rivera & Trápaga Delfín, 2012; Pierard Manzano, 2016; Quiroz Benitez, 2011; Romero-Lankao, 2007; Romero-Lankao et al., 2005; Schteingart & Pérez, 2015). In relation to Mexico City, regional organizations such as the ECLAC, also show a geographical bias when it comes to the study of cities in Latin America (Bull, 2003; Cuervo G., 2003; Galindo et al., 2015; Kehew, 2015; Ruiz-Tagle et al., 2013). Thus, this geographical concentration when studying Latin American cities, limits the opportunity to study the evolution of urban politics when emerging megacities<sup>23</sup>, or any actors within them, begin to participate and interact in climate governance.

As shown above, there is an apparent concentration of the literature in studies about Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Mexico City, which creates a systematic marginalization of other cities in the region, such as Lima. Even though there are some exceptions within the literature (Krellenberg et al., 2014; Ruiz-Tagle et al., 2013; Samaniego et al., 2013), their analysis stems from

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<sup>23</sup> The term refers to cities that have experienced high rates of population, economic or territorial growth, or any other problems related to them. Also, the term includes cities that have started to experience some consequences related to change in the climate, such as droughts, floods, fires, etc. This could be the case of Guadalajara in Mexico and Lima in Peru.

an institutional framework or is financed by regional institutions (e.g., ECLAC, Inter-American Development Bank).

### *1.10 Conclusion*

The chapter illustrates that an overwhelming majority of studies in the field use a liberal institutionalist approach. This epistemological monopoly, I argue, is the main reason for the misconception of environmental issues on urban climate politics in Latin America, and one of the reasons why the field is unable to understand why Latin American cities participate with transnational networks on climate politics. The monopoly of studies with a liberal approach among other things, contributes to a lack of studies that delve into different issues questions, in addition to only asking which policies are better to tackle climate change in cities. As a result, there is an absence of studies analyzing Latin American cities and their dynamics with TNs. This narrow vision contributes to ignoring the role hybrid actors play, and the new institutional arrangements between cities and them that guide urban climate politics in Latin American cities.

Additionally, the literature survey presented above illustrates a current tendency in the literature to use a theoretical division to analyze transnational relations, among public (city, municipal and provincial governments), and private (universities, NGO's, corporations, etc.) (Zeraoiu, 2011). This results in a lack of understanding the complexity of transnational city networks in the region.

Despite the growing interest among scholars over the last decade, the literature reviewed demonstrates most of the studies is focusing attention on the institutional aspects of networks. This

way, the field limits the scope of analysis to institutional characteristics of TCCG. The liberal institutionalism approach considers innovation in climate governance where institutional linkages and material and functional overlaps (as a result of the formation of institutional complexity) are created. Nonetheless, this body of literature keeps placing public institutions in the center of the act of governance.

# **Chapter 2. A Theoretical Approach to Transnational Climate Governance in Latin America**

## *2.0 Introduction*

Climate governance is still a controversial concept. As discussed in the literature review chapter, sometimes it is seen as an institutionalized practice where only public institutions are considered as the ones exercising governance. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the existing literature on TCCG has not provided enough tools to understand the interactions between cities, NGOs –local and international-, and corporations, and how organisations like C40 work to enable these interactions. Hence the need for an alternative theoretical framework, such the neo-Gramscian approach.

In this chapter, I will show and deploy the Gramscian concepts of hegemony, historic bloc, and the neo-Gramscian concept of transnational capitalist class by William Carroll. Using a neo-Gramscian approach, despite the development in the literature as I discussed in the previous chapter, however still generates a limited framework. The chapter aims to contribute theoretically to the field of climate politics in Latin America. In terms of climate governance, literature in the field pursues a dominant tendency to use traditional approaches in international relations (IR) and global governance for climate change, as seen in chapter one. Still, as mentioned in the literature review chapter, I do not consider that the act of governance can occur only within formal international institutions.

As Jubas (2010) mentions, Gramsci himself recognized the connection between theory and methodology (and, for that matter, practice). Embedded in his work are suggestions and implications for social inquiry. In this sense, the thesis also recognizes the (strong) connection/relation between theory, methodology and empirical evidence [practice], represented in the three empirical chapters. In this sense, most of his critics argue Gramsci's contributions are mostly theoretical due to the fact that his most famous compilation, *The Prison Notebooks*, was written while he was imprisoned. Although it contains historical, social, and cultural analysis, it does not summarize what would be described as empirical research. Nonetheless, regardless of the limitations of Gramsci and *The Prison Notebooks*, there is an awareness of the connections between epistemology, theoretical framework, and methodology in his work.

Gramsci's ideas about hegemony, and his understanding of society-at-large and social movements as sites of ongoing learning which can be directed toward social transformation, have been influential. One of the reasons I decided to use a neo-Gramscian approach in the thesis was because it allows us to move away from the notion of power as residing in government, toward the notion of power relations, "so that power is diffused throughout civil society as well as being embodied in the coercive apparatuses of the state" (Simon, 1991, p. 28). In particular, Carroll's concept of TCC helps to conceptualize power relations outside the apparatus of the state through a limited group of actors conducting urban climate politics with an economic rationality. Compared to Foucault's concept of governmentality<sup>24</sup>, or Latour's Actor-Network Theory<sup>25</sup>, a Neo-Gramscian approach does not focus on the techniques of governance. Instead, it focuses in the

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<sup>24</sup> Broadly speaking, *governmentality* deals with how particular mentalities – ways of thinking and acting- are invested in the process of governing (Stripple & Bulkeley, 2013). Foucault's concept on *Governmentality* draws attention to the complex relationship between thought and government. It emphasises the co-constructive nature of agents and structures but suggests that this dynamic is fundamentally one of power relations shaping the subjectivities of agents (Bulkeley, Andonova, et al., 2014, p. 53) within the climate change governance system.

<sup>25</sup> Actor-Network Theory (ANT) sees power as the result of *associations* among actors, and not as product of material resources. This way, the 'social' becomes a much wider concept, but yet strictly limited to the tracing of new associations and to the designing of their assemblages (Latour, 2005). ANT scholars consider the act of governing will be a fragile and gradual collective accomplishment of extending actors network (Callon, 2009; Latour, 2005; Marres, 2007). This means power by associations is originated collectively. Not only one actor has it, applied it and uses it; but a group.

hegemony of dominant ideas and the social forces associated with them (expressed in the context of this thesis via the similarities of policies across cities), the way that [climate] politics functions through persuasion, and the policy transfer process [through TNs].

Aligned with the thesis' main argument, the chapter focuses on two concepts mentioned by Gramsci. These ideas are hegemony and historic bloc, which Cox refers as elements in the establishment of hegemony. From a neo-Gramscian approach, first, the section briefly describes the core elements of a critical approach in IR theory as a way to illustrate the limits of traditional IR schools<sup>26</sup>. It touches vaguely on the Marxist and neo-Gramscian approaches to build-up in the deconstruction of the state used by Gramsci. The chapter also describes the concepts of state and hegemony from Antonio Gramsci, and its application to world politics from Robert Cox, as elements that will help us understand the formation of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) (Carroll, 2010; Robinson, 2008) in the region.

The chapter also includes Carroll's concept of TCC as an analytical tool to understand how transnational networks, more than promoting the sharing of experiences and the support for an alternative climate global governance, facilitate the access of transnational companies in Latin American urban climate politics. In other words, this concept enables an analysis of how transnational networks work as vehicles of corporate elite power and hegemony in climate politics.

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<sup>26</sup> Among traditionalist approaches in international relations (IR), there is a general agreement to conceptualize the state as the main - and sometimes only- actor. For instance, different branches from the realist school argue that the state is the dominant actor in the international system, moved by self-interests (Grieco, 1988; Krasner, 1976; Lebow, 2010; Singer, 1961; Waltz, 2001). As opposed to most rational choice perspectives for some reflectivist approaches, states are still the main actors in IR studies (Abdelal et al., 2010; H. Bull, 2002; Walker, 1993; Wendt, 1992). Nevertheless, the difference between some rational choice approaches is the inclusion of other actors among the main ones. For instance, whereas the realist approach takes the state for granted, critical theory aims to rethink the political community's concept by analyzing the relation between state and society and, thus, recognizing it can take different forms (Devetak, 2013).

As Worth (2011) mentions, the concept of TCC is used as a method to explain how a particular order is constructed (p. 378). When using a neo-Gramscian approach, it is essential to remember that Gramsci's analysis does not deal with a final work that can perhaps be taken in quietly. In other words, there are more open questions than certainties and truths (Santucci, 2010, p. 138). Also, following the critical IPE perspective, Cox (1981) argues Gramsci's work is essential in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing world order, and questions how that order came about (p. 129). Put differently, he does not take institutions and the rest of social forces for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how these institutions might be in the process of changing (Idem). Similarly, critical approaches examine social conditions in order to uncover hidden structures and oppose the idea of "traditional" social theories that focus on the construction of absolute truths of the world (Zanetti, 2007). Carroll's (2010) concept of TCC also contributes to the study of how the transnational capitalist class is formed, beyond national forms of class organization into a global field. Through the methodology utilized in the study (briefly described in the next sections) the theoretical stances map the power dynamics generated by elite relations among the world's largest corporations and international, as well as regional organizations concerning climate adaptation politics.

### *2.1 A Marxist and neo-Gramscian approach to the study of TCCG in Latin America*

According to Devetak (2013), Marx and Engels writing raised vital questions about the tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces in capitalist societies. Both authors were dealing with fundamentally essential themes that have been ignored in mainstream IR. A critical approach in the study of international relations supports the idea that emancipatory politics should drive all analysis

related to capital societies. A critical approach applied to the study of IPE thus attempts to place the question of society at the center of the study of IR.

Marxism is also considered an essential resource in the study of the IPE, where scholars analyze the interplay between states and markets, the state system, and the capitalist world economy, the different spheres of power, and production (Idem). Marx believed that class struggle had been the main form of conflict and the “motor of history” (Linklater, 2005). He departs from the assumption that humans are not evil by nature; they are not the cause of conflict. Instead, [the capitalist] system and class struggle are the leading causes of conflict in a society (Idem). Marx argues that relations between states were essential but secondary or tertiary forces in social relations when compared with modes of production and their laws of development. Instead, he looks at the role of capitalist globalization in the class struggle (Idem). Marx also claims that technological innovation was the driving force behind profound changes in society. He comments that technology has had an in-built effect on the social relations of production, since capitalism seeks to replace labor with machinery to reduce labor costs (Idem). To do that, it is essential to challenge the common conception of the state in IR as well as its role in urban climate politics. New interpretations of Marxism argue that it has been an essential weapon in the critique of realism, and an innovative attempt to use its core arguments in the development of a more historically aware conception in the study of a modern IR discipline (Linklater, 2005). Authors using a neo-Marxist approach shift the analysis from capitalism to modes of production inequality and systematic poverty in world markets. It was the study of global inequality that brought the Marxist tradition into more direct contact with the field of IR.

A Gramscian approach is commonly related to the Marxist school of thought, in the way both analyze class relations and societal conflict. Drawing on Marx's ideas, Gramsci goes further and includes other actors besides the administrative state influencing forces of production. A neo-Gramscian approach considers transnational corporations as part of the community and their interactions with the rest of the community (cities, think-tanks, universities, central governments, etc.). Following this line, Robert Cox's analysis of social forces, states, and world order was one of the most ambitious attempts to use historical materialism to escape from the limitations of an IR state-centric theory (Cox, 1981). In his analysis, Cox makes particular emphasis on the internationalization of relations of production in the modern capitalist era and the new forms of global governance, which perpetuates inequalities of power and wealth.

In this sense, a neo-Gramscian approach to international political economy (IPE) takes particular interest in developing the study of the origins, development and possible transformation of world hegemony. Authors using a neo-Gramscian approach study how hegemony is maintained through forms of close cooperation between powerful elites inside [center] and outside [peripheral] the core regions of the world system, and through the growing network of [transnational] economic and political institutions that are driving global governance (Carroll, 2010). Related to the analysis of global governance, Cox considers the inclusion of the "political conditionality" as crucial, as well as international pressure to deregulate various sectors of the domestic economy. Put differently, a neo-Gramscian approach focuses on the role of counter-hegemonic political forces in the global order. In this regard, two analytical tools that help us understand the formation, influence and role of transnational actors in climate governance in the global South are Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and the historic bloc. Worth (2011) mentions Gramsci's concepts of *hegemony* and *historic blocs* as

being employed to provide a critical alternative to orthodox readings of state-centric power in IR theory. His main objective was to engage with Gramsci's conception of hegemony as a means to move beyond the narrow scope of structural realism that was prominent in IR at the time, and to develop new forms of normative understanding (Idem). Both elements contribute to a better understanding of the TCC concept better when applied to the study of Transnational Networks on Climate Change in cities from the global South. Relating both concepts to the thesis's topic, is crucial to remember Gramsci's perception of the state, briefly described in the next section.

In the same way, Marxist approaches use social classes as the unit of analysis, structuralists take transnational social classes as well as multinational and transnational corporations to explain inequalities in the world system (Burchill & Linklater, 2013). Nonetheless, differing from classical Marxist state theory, Gramsci's extended theory of the state takes a step further and includes the "private apparatuses of hegemony" in the analysis, which led him to distinguish two essential spheres within superstructures. First is the political society, where the state (understood in the narrow sense or the coercive administrative unit) is formed by the complex of mechanisms by which the dominant class keeps its legal monopoly. The second sphere considered by Gramsci is civil society, which is formed precisely by the group of those organizations responsible for the elaboration and/or spreading of ideologies, such as the school system, churches, political parties, unions, professional organizations, the material organization of culture (newspapers, mass-media), and the like (Coutinho, 2012, p. 81). To be meaningful, the notion of state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. In other words, an enlargement of the state's definition is needed since power is not only exercised by the administrative unit, but also by other actors within society (p. 164). Therefore, the state should be understood, not just as

the apparatus of government operating within the public sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the private sphere of civil society (e.g., church, media, private sector, education system) through which hegemony functions (Gramsci, 1971, p. 261). Gramsci did share the view that state and society together constituted a solid structure, and that revolution implied the development of another structure strong enough to replace the first. By limiting the state definition to the administrative aspect of it, the concept itself becomes meaningless. It is this combination of political and civil society that is the integral state through which ruling classes organize intellectual and moral functions as part of the political and cultural struggle for hegemony in an effort to establish an “ethical” state (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 258, 271). Additionally, Gramsci argues that the act of governing is exercised not only by the state as the administrative units, but also by other actors in society. Gramsci takes the state not as a distinct institutional category, or a thing in itself, but conceives it, instead, as a form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed.

## *2.2 Hegemony*

Hegemony, according to Gramsci, is founded by powerful states that have gone through profound social changes and economic revolutions, such as the Industrial Revolution. These changes in the social and economic system unleash various forces, which expand beyond the state’s boundaries. To better understand Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, it is necessary to conceptualize the state as an actor where multiple forces from a diversity of backgrounds, converge. As Cox (1983) mentions: “When the administrative, executive and coercive apparatus of government was in effect constrained by the hegemony of the leading class [...], it became meaningless to limit the definition

of the state to those elements of government” (p. 164). World hegemony was in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal hegemony established by a dominant social class<sup>27</sup>. The economic and social institutions, the culture, and the technology associated with this national hegemony, become a pattern for emulation abroad (Cox, 1983). Subsequently, an expansion of the hegemony, trespasses on the more peripheral countries through the transnational capitalist class (van der Pijl, 1998a).

Following on the same line, Gramsci questions the prevailing international order and how existing social or world orders have come into being, and how norms, institutions, or practices therefore emerge and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order (Bieler & Morton, 2004). Consequently, world hegemony, is then conceptualized as a social, economic, and political structure, and cannot be expressed only as any one of the three. Worth challenges Robinson when he argues that hegemony is generally used in four ways towards understanding the international: as a) a realist model of leadership; b) a state within the core, as argued by world-systems theorists; c) an ideological or consensual forms of control or d) the inspiration and leadership for a specific form of world order, within a historic bloc. While b) makes specific reference to Gramsci in its application, d) is generally the favored usage by Cox and by students of *World Order* and the transnational capitalist class. While it provides a novel and unique approach to understanding the processes of hegemony at the international level through a Gramscian lens, it does remain state-centric in its analysis. Subsequently, Worth’s claim that Robinson’s use of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony remains pre-occupied with understanding how

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<sup>27</sup> Contrary to the predominant state-centric approach in IR theory (e.g., Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1976; Singer, 1961; Waltz, 2001; Waltz, 1979), Gramsci conceptualizes hegemony in world politics not merely as an order among states, but as an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production, which infiltrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production (Cox, 1983).

class relations within national blocs and alliances are configured, so they conform to the hegemony instigated by the leading classes within the dominant state (or in terms of the trans-Atlantic alliance, *dominant states*). Nonetheless, his application of the concept remains the closest to the neo-Gramscian approach (at least in the national-civil generic sense) and has been developed in-depth outside the discipline in IR (pp. 381-382).

Gramsci suggests hegemony has a cultural component that contributes to its construction and preservation, contrary to authors using mainstream approaches in IR theory (Keohane, 1984; Snidal, 1985) where they claim hegemony is expressed as universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and all the social forces within it – rules that support the dominant class (Cox, 1983). In this sense, Gramsci's contribution to the hegemony concept lies in the fact that he conceptualizes hegemony as a social figure with its material base, and with autonomous and particular space for its manifestation (Coutinho, 2012). While political society has its material bearers in the repressive instruments of the state (controlled by the executive and police-military bureaucracy), Gramsci called the material bearers of civil society the “private apparatuses of hegemony”, that is, voluntary social collective organisms relatively autonomous in the face of political society (Idem, p. 82). Based on Gramsci's conception of hegemony, Carroll (2010) defines world hegemony as a social, economic and political structure that cannot be seen through one of those aspects at any one time, but must be all three (p. 37).

Different to the mainstream approaches in IR theory, a neo-Gramscian approach does not take institutions, social and power relations for granted, but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing (Cox, 1981, p. 129). Thus,

it is especially critical asking how existing social or world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions, or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order. Cox transfers Gramsci's notion of hegemony onto the international system as a whole, where he argues economic powers in the global North have created a world order that met their own interests, not only by coercion but also by generating broad consent for such an order. For Cox, liberal institutionalism contributes to the expansion and maintenance of global hegemony from the global North. Cox (1981) argues international institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy, since they participate as the representations of diverse interests and the universalization of policy (p. 137). In this sense, Cox (1983) mentions that one of the mechanisms through which the universal norms of hegemony are distributed are IOs. For him, IOs embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the dominant economic and social forces. In world politics, the rules governing money (money flows, investments, and movement of capital), and trade relations, such as all the international institutions from The Bretton Woods, are particularly significant to sustain world hegemony of the ruling class. Additionally, Cox argues IOs function as the process through which the institutions of hegemony, in which the social and transnational forces that conform them are included, and its ideologies are developed. For instance, he argues, IOs (1) embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order; (2) are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order, (3) ideologically legitimate the norms of the current world order; (4) co-opt the elite groups from peripheral countries; and (5) absorb, and restrain counter-hegemony ideas, and movements (Idem).

Concurrently, Robinson (2004) argues we need to move away from a statist conception of hegemony. This means to move from a state-centric conception to an unaltered Gramscian view of

hegemony, which includes a form of social domination exercised by social groups and classes operating through states and other institutions (p. 38). Likewise, Bieler & Morton (2004) bases on Overbeek's work to argue hegemony is better understood as a form of class rule linked to social forces acting as core collective actors, created by the social relations of production (Chase-Dunn et al., 1994). Hegemony at the international level is understood then, as an order within global capitalist economy actors and not states. In the same manner, Cox (1983, p. 171) mentions that the concept of world hegemony is based not only among inter-states relations but also between actors from civil society, which contributes to the construction of ties among social classes in countries. In this way, Gramsci's hegemonic conception needs to be seen beyond the state and its institutions. The concept is founded upon a globally-conceived civil society – in this case, a TCC- which creates links between social classes among countries (p. 172). These links, Cox argues, unleash forces beyond the state's boundaries. World hegemony is thus an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class (Idem).

Also, in his book *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci suggests hegemony has a cultural component that contributes to its construction and preservation (Cox, 1983). He adds that the world order is grounded in social relations and mentions that a significant inward change would be traceable through fluctuations in social relations and national political order (Idem). Fundamental changes in international power relations or world order, therefore, can be traced to basic changes in social relations. The Bolshevik revolution, for instance, not only modified the internal economic and political structures of the Italian state at the time but also unleashed forces, which expanded beyond the state's boundaries (Gramsci, 1971).

Additionally, Gramsci's concept of hegemony refers to different social relations of production engendering different fractions of social forces. This means that foreign capital, for example, is not merely represented as an autonomous force beyond the power of the state but it is instead, is represented by certain classes or fractions of classes *within* the constitution of the state's apparatus. Also, there are contradictory and heterogeneous internal relations within the state, which are induced by class antagonisms between nationally and transnationally-based capital and labor. The state is then understood as the condensation of a hegemonic relationship between dominant classes and class fractions. For instance, Death (2016) claims that the concept of hegemony helps observe the degree in which the state acts to reinforces capitalism as a social system; as when the state is willing to unleash diverse coercive forces in order to protect the capitalist interests being threatened by local or foreign environmental politics, either local or foreign. He argues that the role of the modern state, in supporting large developmental projects, is proof of the anti-environmental character from the state and its inclination towards the support of capitalism. These type of interventions from the modern state happen mainly in the global South. For example the construction of roads and airports and the support of the financial sector combined with the little consideration to environmental and social consequences, in addition to the scant attention paid to social and indigenous movements,

Similarly, Cox (1981) claims that institutions could become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and the universalization of policy (p. 137). This is what Gramsci (1971, p. 243) refers to as the "internal and international organizational relations of the state" having an "international" character while being rooted within the state's structure. He suggests that social forces may thus achieve hegemony within

a national social order as well as through world order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of a mode of production.

### *2.2.1 Structural power as an element of hegemony formation*

The concept of structural power can be related to Gramsci's hegemony since it is exercised within a wider social and political constellation of forces or "historic bloc" (Gill & Law, 1989). Barnett & Duvall (2005) develop a taxonomy of power divided into four types. Contrary to traditional conceptions of power in IR, they argue instead for the use of multiple conceptions that avoid overlooking the different forms of control outside the public sphere, allowing for the development of sophisticated understandings of how global outcomes are produced and how other different forms of power interfere in the exercise of power (Idem).

Barnett and Duvall's multiple conceptions of power open the door to the inclusion of a diversity of non-state actors at the moment of conceptualizing power in IR, similar to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Firstly, they mention compulsory power, which refers to power with direct control over one actor. Secondly is institutional power, which refers to the indirect control over others through ambiguous relations or interactions. Then, it is the productive power that refers to the socially diffuse production of subjectivities in systems of meaning and signification. And lastly is the structural power, which refers to the constitution of subjects' capacities indirect structural relation to one another. Structural power also concerns the determination of social capacities and interests (Idem). In a global capitalistic system, the structure substantially determines the capacities and resources of actors. It also shapes their ideology that is the interpretive system through which they

understand their interests and desires. Drawing on Gill & Law (1989), Barnett & Duvall (2005) argue this ideology is hegemonic in the way it serves the objective interests of the capitalists [class] at the expense of the world's producing classes (such as the global South) thereby diverging action toward the reproduction, rather than the substantial transformation of the structure and its relations of domination. Additionally, Gill & Law (1989) argue that structural forms of power from the "extended" state are one of the engines that shape the relation between the state and power. Hegemony, they argue, is exercised within a wider social and political constellation of forces, or "historic bloc." The term includes the interaction between material forces, institutions, and ideologies. In other words, it involves an alliance of different class forces. Therefore, a historical bloc works as the link between the political sphere and civil society (Gramsci, 1971:366 in Gill & Law, 1989). It is through the "extended state" that Gill & Law integrate the domestic and international levels of analysis. Drawing on Cox's (1987) concept of social forces, Gill & Law provide a more flexible analysis of structural changes that helps understanding the complementary and contradictory relations between the power of states and the power of transnational capital. Furthermore, the historical bloc is politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas, sometimes called the "dominant ideology." That is how the structural power of transnational capital rises and expands.

Additionally, Strange (1996) claims that the impersonal forces of world markets<sup>28</sup> are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong (p. 4). Based on the USA hegemony, Strange (1989) argues that structural power –

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<sup>28</sup> The forces Strange refers to are integrated over the postwar period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade rather than by the cooperative decision of the governments.

beyond the material resources – is the bases upon which the USA is the epicenter of a transnational empire, a position that allows it to shape security, financial, productive and knowledge structures which operate to the advantage of the USA and foreclose opportunities to other countries. This structural power allows the USA to not depend on IOs or another country. (p. 59). It is through hegemony, Worth (2011) mentions, that a transnational class develops its hegemonic influence, supported, in part by the economic globalization process.

Although nation-state power and autonomy have indeed weakened concerning transnational power structures, this image is somewhat misleading. These transnational power structures are localized within each nation by real social forces that are materially and politically part of the new transnational power bloc. Transnational capital and its agents, therefore, acquire their newfound power vis-a-vis national states (p. 35).

### *2.2.2 Three elements for the construction of hegemony (passive revolution, caesarism, transformismo)*

Gramsci constructs the concept of hegemony with three elements. The first element is the *passive revolution* which refers to the introduction of change in which force, or coercive power, is not involved. The concept of passive revolution correlates the concept of hegemony as it describes the conditions of a non-hegemonic society; one in which no dominant class has been able to establish hegemony in Gramsci's sense of the terms.

In Latin America, the state-building process was essentially led by elites and structured from above and led by elites. In the development of the modern Italian state<sup>29</sup>, resembles the state formation process in Latin America where moderate sectors imposed themselves on the subordinate groups in the political direction of the struggle for national unification. In this context, the passive revolution, or revolution-restoration, designates a process of conformation from outside of a national state, utilizing moderate reformism and neutralizing the presence of the most radical popular elements, differentiating itself from a Jacobin-type revolution (Quevedo, 2019). As opposed to Gramsci's Italy (as well as in other regions of Europe), Quevedo argues that the installation of progressive governments produced of co-optation from the state apparatus that drained important sectors and groups of the popular movements and organizations. This phenomenon is central to explaining the passivity, subordination, social control, or controlled mobilization that characterized Latin American progressive experiences. Quevedo calls this process a "passive bourgeois revolution" (Idem). These governments promoted, encouraged and took advantage of pronounced passivation of social movements by undermining their fragile and emerging autonomy and opposed capacity, giving rise, by consequence, to a functional re-subordination to the stability of the new political balances. Quevedo mentions that the passive element became characteristic and decisive in the various Latin American processes, as well as a retreat from antagonistic politicization to subaltern depoliticization (Quevedo, 2019, pp. 133–134).

The governments that took part of the recent Latin American progressive cycle emerged while questioning and resisting the neoliberal wave that started in the 1980s but did not signify a response to an active revolution, or strong countermovement, that could threaten the region's political and economic order. The hostility that the Latin American [and transnational] ruling classes show to

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<sup>29</sup> Quevedo (2019) refers to the Gramscian concept of *translatability* that underlines the possibility that some historical experiences find an equivalence in other realities.

progressive governments does not seem to indicate that the processes are aimed at reconstituting order either (Idem, p. 139).

As I show in chapters 4, 5, and 6, the passivity of central governments accompanied and characterized Latin American progressive climate politics experiences. Even when national governments came to incorporate certain demands formulated from below, the changes and reforms were fundamentally driven by the state (by the government and, in particular, by the presidential power) which made use of institutionality and legality as an instrument of political initiatives (Idem, p. 139).

An accompaniment to state reforms in Gramsci's analysis is *caesarism*, which refers to a figure of a strong man who intervenes in order to resolve a conflict between different forces within society. According to Quevedo (2019), the passive revolutions in Latin America were associated with the phenomena of *transformismo* and progressive *caesarism*. These displacements were linked to processes of demobilization and social control, or, in some cases, controlled mobilization. The third major feature in Gramsci's passive revolution is what he calls *transformismo*, which refers to the possibilities of development through transformative politics, such as in the case of Latin America, as we will see in the following chapters. It can serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the [dominant] class. All these three elements –historic bloc, caesarism and transformismo- help understanding how hegemony can be created from specific classes in world politics. Concerning the element of *transformismo*, Modonesi (2013) points out that elements, groups or entire sectors of the popular movements were co-opted

and absorbed by conservative forces, alliances and projects, and specifically moved into the field of state institutions in the framework of the implementation of public policies aimed at redistribution. Today, the notion of passive revolution, together with its components, *caesarism* and *transformismo* are particularly pertinent when studying the “greening” of the global South (Cox, 1983, p. 167).

### 2.2.3 *Consent*

As opposed to the mainstream conceptions of hegemony in IR, where the leading argument is that the dominant classes exercise governance through coercion, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony<sup>30</sup> claims that dominant classes, via consent, is more effective and secure through consent. For Gramsci, consent is created and recreated by the hegemony of the ruling class in society. It is through them that the moral, political and cultural values of the dominant group become widely dispersed and accepted by the subordinate classes as their values (Cox, 1983). Such consensus is developed through institutions in society (e.g., think-tanks, research centers, NGOs, universities, etc.). When a given idea reaches strong levels of consent, it could be included in the socio-economic, political and cultural practices, or what he refers to as “superstructures.” As Worth (2011) argues, global hegemony is not only exercised by coercive power but also implemented through the consensual relationship constructed between the transnational elite class and some “national subordinate” classes. The consensual power is partly reinforced by organic intellectuals<sup>31</sup> within the state. The actors involved can persuade and influence the design and implementation of public policies on

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<sup>30</sup> Likewise, Gramsci’s idea of power goes beyond the conception of material power from the realism school in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 1989; Schmidt, 2005). Additionally, Worth (2011) refers to international hegemony as “a form of class rule based on consent rather than coercion and on accommodation of subordinate interests rather than on their repression” (p. 378).

<sup>31</sup> Gramsci refers to organic intellectuals as that social stratum that gives a given group ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own function’ prior to the heads-on clash with the dominant group (Filippini, 2017, p. 71).

climate change. In this sense, Gramsci claims in the process towards hegemony and an historic-bloc creation, he distinguishes two levels of consciousness: the economic-corporative and the solidarity or class-consciousness.

Following Gramsci's idea of consensual power and organic intellectuals, Worth (2011) argues the transnational elite has a vital role in the reproduction of international hegemony in world politics. The latter occurs because hegemony is processed through the consensual relationship forged between the transnational elites and respective "national subordinate" classes (p. 378). Worth uses the neo-Gramscian concept of transnational class and has extended his ideas to the study of international economic politics (Carroll & Sapinski, 2010; Robinson, 2008; Sapinski, 2015; van der Pijl, 1998a). This group of authors, using a neo-Gramscian concept of transnational classes, contribute to the expansion of the idea of international politics. Utilizing the concept of transnational classes, they facilitate the understanding of economic and political integration processes, such as the EU, and try to explain the rapid expansion of the neoliberal model of globalization. Worth's analysis provided a different approach that allows conceptualizing international hegemony beyond a state-system configuration and vis-à-vis the structure of transnational classes (Idem). In this sense, Worth's conception of hegemony suggests the observation of transnational classes when studying the evolution of hegemony in world politics. International hegemony, he adds, is processed through the consensual relationship between the transnational elites and respective "national subordinate" classes (p. 378). These, these social forces, in which the transnational elite and organic intellectuals are included, contribute to the formation of a transnational capitalist class (TCC). When it comes to the expansion of economic hegemony, Gramsci points out the only way a backward country can catch up in competition with

the more advanced industrial formations of countries (which monopolize raw materials and have accumulated massive capitals sums) is to modify the current economic organization in the corporate sense in order to accentuate the plan of production element (van der Pijl, 1998a, p. 84).

It is through consensual power, transnational elites and the constellation of [economic] interests, that hegemony expands and influences urban climate politics from the global North to cities in the global South. In particular, as I will demonstrate in the empirical section, the preference for a BRT as the public transportation modality over any other LCEPT system, is disseminated through the TCC and the constellation of its interests, without considering whether it is the most efficient, appropriate or sustainable model for cities in the global South.

### *2.3 Historic bloc*

The concept of historic bloc contributes to understand the influence from intermediary actors in TCCG since it contemplates social forces that are key and influential actors in the historical bloc formation. It also helps us understand the interaction of all the actors participating in the networks' constellation.

An historic bloc is a dialectical concept in the sense that its interacting elements create a large unit [the hegemonic state]. This hegemony of ideas, together with the organic intellectuals<sup>32</sup>, originate

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<sup>32</sup> According to Carroll (2010), a constellation of interests is what transnational corporate networks build. The term refers to an assemblage, collection, or group of usually related persons, corporations, NGOs, Philanthropic organization that have similar [economic] interests. These group of actors may collaborate to reach its goals and purposes. These group of actors are formed by top managers, whose interests are closely aligned with those of the firms (p. 6). In the same sense, Zweigenhaft & Domhoff (2006) note that large corporations share common values and goals, especially the profit motive, and are intricately interconnected through the overlapping membership of business leaders [...] and other elite vehicles for building consensus.

from transnational historical blocs. By forging links and a synthesis of interests and identities not only beyond national boundaries and classes but also by creating the conditions for the hegemony of transnational capital, the emergence of transnational social forces has not led to a retreat of the state. Instead, a restructuring of different forms of state has unfolded (Bieler & Morton, 2004). van der Pijl (1998a) analyzes the historical processes of transnational class formation, in which the link between TCC formation and the international economic structure at the time (including interest articulation, and political action) facilitated the development and expansion of TCC worldwide. In his analysis, van der Pijl emphasizes the consultancy phenomenon in the process of expanding TCC, as well as the relation between TCC formation and economic structure. As mentioned in the empirical chapters, management consultancies in Latin America have become prominent channels in creating the basis for control and transferring the norms of profitable management among both private and public establishments.

According to Cox (1983) an historic bloc is a necessary element for the construction of hegemony. Following on this idea, Gramsci claims an historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class, where the hegemonic class is the dominant class in a country or social formulation. The state maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture. Gramsci bases his analysis on two concepts; *historic bloc* and *hegemony*. The former refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies. It represents an alliance between different classes and social forces (Gill & Law, 1989). Gramsci considers this alliance as the “organic link” between the political realm and civil society, and the way in which leading social forces establish a relationship over other actors in society. It also indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society bringing about not only a

unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity on a “universal plane” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 181, 182), which he calls “organic intellectuals<sup>33</sup>”. Carroll (2010) uses Gramsci’s concept of “organic intellectuals”, and argues for the need to include these actors when studying IR. van der Pijl (1998a) also mentions how hybrid actors transfer and influence, policies within the system. For instance, he mentions the “consultancy phenomenon” which describes how management consultancies (e.g., private philanthropic organizations, NGOs, etcetera.) have become prominent channels for the promotion of norms that are eventually introduced into both the private and the public sector (Idem). These types of norms set the basis for a particular type of climate solutions aligned to the [economic] interests of corporations. It is through these intermediary actors that TCC is expanded and reinforced. Further, the influence of intellectuals and ideologies above all modes of production applied to the study of TCC formation study global governance and IPE (neo-Marxist). Following this neo-Gramscian focus on social forces, generated by production as the main actors, it is clear that the transnational restructuring of capitalism in globalization has led to the emergence of new social forces of capital and labor (Bieler & Morton, 2004). An historic bloc includes several elements that contribute to the consolidation of global hegemony and, therefore, the strengthening of TCC, such as the constellation of interests and the formation of organic intellectuals. In this way, a historic bloc becomes a mechanism for the strengthening of global hegemony (Carroll, 2010, p. 179).

For a new historic bloc to emerge, it must not only have power within the civil society and the economic system, but it also needs to persuade its ideas and arguments among its political network

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<sup>33</sup> Some examples of individuals in the role of organic intellectuals are Ira Magaziner, Chief Executive Officer and Vice-Chairman of the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI); Sthepan Schmidheiny, Swiss entrepreneur, philanthropist and advocate of sustainable development, and Michael Replogle, a recognized expert in the field of LCEPT, who will be mentioned in more detail in the following chapters.

and organizations involved (Gill & Law, 1989). In this sense, it can be argued that a historic bloc, in Gramscian terms, is formed by a constellation of interests. In the case of climate change politics, the historic bloc is formed by a TCC influencing the type of solutions in urban politics. Economic globalization facilitates the articulation of what Carroll (2010) calls a “constellation of interests” in the global economic system. By using a neo-Gramscian approach to understand the creation of a transnational capitalist class in world politics, Carroll claims that it is through a constellation of interests that transnational corporate networks (and therefore the current international hegemony) are built. For instance, Sapinski (2015) argues [transnational] networks are vehicles of corporate elite power and hegemony. Through these networks he claims, it is how [climate] governance is constructed, and further impacts climate capitalism in cities. He argues that it is through “economic interests” from transnational corporations, and corporate-funded climate and environmental policy groups (CEPG), that hegemony in climate governance is constructed. In the case of TCC expansion in Latin American cities, Robinson (2008) claims that global capitalism is aware of the need to globalize or perish. At the same time as the global circuit of capital subsumes through numerous mechanisms and arrangements, local capitals in the global South, which are integrated in the constellation of interests through several international institutional mechanisms and the local elites who manage the circuits, become swept up unto the process of transnational class formation (p. 30). There is however, an older tradition of IPE in the Latin American context developed by Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto in the late 1970s: Dependency theory emerge as part of a set of criticisms of the industrialization thesis that proposes alternative ideas in relation to the concept of development and underdevelopment (Rita Milani, 2019), were Cardoso and Faletto consider underdevelopment as a feature of the global development process (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979a).

Similarly, Dos Santos (1973) argues that Latin American countries are formed as a dependent due to the global expansion of capitalism.

Dependency theory refers to the role of foreign capital as one of the main causes of underdevelopment in Latin America. It also identifies external forces behind the region's dependency in the industrialized world. Dependency theory also attempts to explain the processes in Latin America from the colonial time until the 1970s. The cohesiveness of the analysis is provided by the historical spread of capitalism and its interactions with domestic society and politics (Caporaso, 1980)<sup>34</sup>. For these authors' point of view, dependency is based on the international division of labor that allows for industrial development in some countries, whereas in others (mainly in the global South) it establishes limitations for development.

#### *2.4 Transnational Capitalist Class*

Robinson (2001) argues that decentralization and fragmentation of the production process contributed to the expansion of the elite capitalist class, as well as formatting the process of transnational class formation. The declining ability of the national state to intervene in the capital accumulation process and to determine economic policies reflects the newfound power that transnational capital acquired over [the] nation-state (p.169). Based on the economic globalization process, Robinson (2008) develops the concept of TCC. This congregation of public and private

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<sup>34</sup> Among the critics of the Dependency Theory are Paul James (1997) and Ilan Kapoor. The later claims dependency theory chooses a structuralist and socio-economic perspective. The approach, he argues, sees imperialism as tied to the unfolding of capitalism. In the political aspect, Kapoor argues dependency politics is premised on state and class control of capitalism development. Similar to the postcolonial perspective, he argues both approaches neglect power dynamics among all the actors. They only attribute power to one source, a superstructure [countries in the global North], and don't contemplate other actors influencing the structure (Kapoor, 2002).

transnational actors, he adds, refers to the composition of the owners and managers of the transnational corporations (TNC) and the private transnational financial institutions that drive the global economy. It is a class group grounded in global markets and circuits of accumulation (p. 29) and a subjective collective class consciousness of itself. Usually, members of this class group socialize with each other within their private institutions, which ultimately promotes the development of transnational class consciousness. In this sense, TCC is a class-for-itself, whereas the global working class is a class in itself but not yet for itself, mainly due to the subjective consciousness of itself and its interests (p. 29, 31). These transnational power structures, Robinson claims, are localized within each nation by concrete social forces that are materially and politically part of the new transnational power bloc. (p. 35).

As pointed out, the concept of TCC challenges the liberal institutionalist assumption that international regimes, driven by states, are governing climate politics (Keohane & Victor, 2011). A neo-Gramscian approach thus helps us realize that climate change politics is ruled by transnational corporations and mainly motivated by economic rationality. Furthermore, this analytical tool allows us to include other actors involved in climate politics and not only those from the public sector, suggesting a hybrid type of governance (Moussu, 2017) not limited to a state-centric perspective on global governance. The TCC concept then helps revealing how TCCG is a hybrid governance system motivated by economic interests over society and the environment's needs, moved by transnational corporations and the particular interests from a reserved circle of people.

#### *2.4.1 Elements of TCC formation*

One crucial element of the transnational capitalist class is its geographical bias. Territorially restricted capital cannot compete with its transnationally mobile counterpart. In this sense, Carroll & Sapinski (2010) argue that the TCC is highly concentrated in the global North. They argue that a North Atlantic ruling class remains at the center of the process of transnational capitalist class formation. Similarly, Carroll (2010) argues that global corporate power is substantially organized on a regional basis (p. 229), which might be the reason why transnational networks are working in Latin American cities to expand their regional scope of influence. He suggests that transnational cities relation is monopolized by companies, families and individual relations (elite class, multimillionaires) and not institutional relations as some of the literature suggests. Capitalist relations in contrast, dominate transnational network relationships (pp. 57-80). This transnational corporate networks that Carroll (2010) refers to is built by a constellation of interests from top managers whose interests are closely aligned with those of the firms (p. 6). Furthermore, drawing upon Domhoff (1967), Carroll notes that large corporations share common values and goals, are particularly motivated by profit, and are intricately interconnected through the overlapping membership of business leaders [...] and other elite vehicles for building consensus. Global corporate power, he adds, is substantially organized on a regional basis. This could be the reason why transnational networks show an interest in working with Latin American cities in order to expand their regional scope of influence (p. 229).

Another essential element in the notion of TCC, is the concept of class. For van der Pijl (1998a), it denotes the aspect of an agency producing and reproducing the structures of a society based on

exploitation. Put differently, by embodying the structural inequalities of the social order, [transnational] classes constitute the living reality of these structures (p. 31). This evolution of the classes, even when it is a natural phenomenon occurring throughout history, acquires a specific meaning in a capitalist context (p. 32). The meaning shift is apparent when observing the historical process of TCC. According to van der Pijl, the historical formation of a capitalist class has its origins in the shift the aristocracy undergoes to commercial land-ownership and a merchant community investing in domestic production (p. 64), an idea similar to Teschke's (2003), when he deconstructs and demystifies the Westphalia Treaty. Sovereignty, Teschke argues, is not the product of divine mandate, nor it comes automatically, it is rather it is socially and historically constructed<sup>35</sup>. Likewise, Cox (1986, p. 205) argues that such complexes, rather than states per se, constitute the fundamental entities of international relations.

Equally important are the actors involved in TCC. Sapinski (2015) for example, maps out the constellations of corporate power. He claims that economic interests from transnational corporations and knowledge transfer through CEPG, are the means by which climate capitalism<sup>36</sup> is expanded. This is how the TCC, or the "constellation of corporate power" as he calls it, influence the expansion and conservation of hegemony. Similarly, Betzold (2013) points out the role of interest groups in climate negotiations. The article contributes to the literature on interest group strategies by looking at those at the international level. Comparing the advocacy behavior of

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<sup>35</sup> The Westphalian Treaty, far from indicating a breakthrough towards modern inter-state-relations, marked the recognition and regulation of international relations of absolutist and dynasties polities. According to Teschke, the treaty was directly influenced by the social dynamics of the time, with repercussions in economic relations. For instance, he describes that the political system being strongly influenced by family succession, regional geopolitics, or even an individual dimension (e.g., the king's whims, tantrums, and personal tastes).

<sup>36</sup> When talking about climate capitalism, Sapinski refers to the neoliberal attempt to mitigate climate change through market measures. The term also refers to the promotion of carbon markets, carbon taxes and other financial mechanisms as tools to redirect investment flows away from the fossil fuel sector and toward more climatically benign renewable electricity generation and energy-efficient initiatives as a way to reorganize investment patterns (Sapinski, 2015, p. 268).

different groups active in the climate change negotiations clarifies the role and influence of these different groups in the climate negotiations. Betzold emphasizes that the participation of non-state actors in GEG has increased tremendously over the past decades, both in terms of size and scope. Similarly, Custers (2010) claims the Club of Rome instead supports neo-Keynesian measures relying on direct large-scale state intervention to stabilize the climate and address other environmental issues, as we will see in chapter 5 with the involvement of the Club of Rome with the Mexican Senate.

#### *2.4.2 The role of the financial sector in TCC formation*

Meanwhile, Robinson (2008) mentions the importance of considering the central role of the financial globalization expansion in the emergence of the global economy. When Robinson refers about the process of financial globalization expansion, he talks about a predominant tendency towards deregulation of global finances with the support from the institutional architecture from the Bretton Woods Institutions. Such process, he argues, contributed to the transformation of the global financial system, is considered at the very heart of the economic globalization process (p. 257). Likewise, van der Pijl (1998b) argues that the internationalization of capital, alongside the development and expansion of TNCC, it is not the result of an economic globalization process in a fixed landscape of sovereign states (as the Keohane & Nye (1989) complex interdependence theory argues). The evolution of economic globalization is the result of a process of expansion of the state as well as society's complexities, in which capital crystalized under, what proved to be, the most favorable conditions. This process of economic globalization and the subsequent internationalization of

capital witnessed the emergence of transnationally interlocked institutions (e.g., the IMF, WB, IDB, etc.), as well as the expansion of transnational banking corporations around the world (Idem).

According to Gill & Law (1989), one of the four critical elements placed in the forefront of the construction of a post-1945 regime of economical accumulation that lead to a new international historic bloc of social forces, was the multinational bloc that included economic interests from the financial sector in the United States. Their argument brought together not only elements inside the state apparatuses but included the role of the financial sector outside the state (specifically in the transatlantic political community) as a critical element for the international historic bloc's formation (Gill & Law, 1989; van der Pijl, 1984). In the same vein, Gill & Law's (1989) concept of an international historic bloc means much more than an alliance of capitalist interests across national boundaries. It implies that elements of more than one class were involved, and their basis were more organic, rooted in material and normative structures of society. Hence, the alliance of social forces is seen as "natural", "organic", and "legitimate" among most of its members (p. 478). As Carroll & Sapinski (2010) mention, a North Atlantic [financial] ruling class remains at the center of the process of transnational capitalist class formation. In this process of transnational financial sector expansion, it is essential to remember the crucial role of deregulation and transformation of the global financial system in the expansion of TCC in Latin America (Robinson, 2008).

## *2.5 Conclusions*

As part of the theoretical contributions, chapter two argues for the study of TCCG using a neo-Gramscian approach. I use this approach to emphasize particular aspects of the cases studied.

Gramsci's concept of hegemony contributes to better understand the bases for TCCG. Gramsci and neo-Gramscians suggests the expansion of hegemony happens not only through inter-state relations but also through links among social [capitalist] classes. These analytical tools help to understand TCCG as a visible expansion of the internal hegemony from countries in the global North. They are thus supporting the expansion and reinforcement of a dominant transnational capitalist class in the global South. In this sense, a neo-Gramscian approach helps to understand why Latin American cities are collaborating with transnational networks, and how city networks are changing urban politics on climate change in Latin America.

Transnational governance challenges the dominant approach to climate governance and traditional conceptions in IR theory. Mainstream approaches lacks the analytical tools necessary to understand the complexity and innovative tendencies on environmental governance. Building on this critical perspective, the use of a neo-Gramscian approach enable us to focus on and comprehend empirical aspects of the cases studied, something that other theoretical approaches do not admit.

Gramsci suggests hegemony expansion occurs not only through inter-state relations, but through links among social [capitalist] classes. Thus, a world hegemony is a visible expansion of the internal hegemony from countries in the global North, and established by a dominant [transnational capitalist] class.

# **Chapter 3. Mixed methodologies for the study of Transnational Climate Change Governance in Latin America. Studying Latin America's climate politics differently**

## *3.0 Introduction*

The thesis aims to offer alternative epistemologies to the study of environmental politics in the global South. It suggests studying transnational governance by producing analysis using reflective approaches<sup>37</sup>, that function more like theoretical and analytical tools and not as rigid theoretical frameworks (as argued in the theoretical chapter). This derives from the fact that urban and environmental politics are usually studied through rational choice and functionalist approaches, such as liberal institutionalism.

Particularly, the chapter proposes the use of a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods, with more emphasis on the use of the latter. There are a few reasons why this is suggested: firstly, they are less commonly used in studies focused on Latin America; secondly, it allows for the obtainment of relevant data in the attempt to answer the research questions mentioned in the introduction; thirdly, as I consider the methods I use during fieldwork are the appropriate tools for addressing the research questions in the thesis. Due to the complexity of TCCG, methodological diversity capable of creating a more comprehensive account of the overall phenomena is required (Bulkeley et al.,

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<sup>37</sup> Reflectivist approaches (e.g. constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, and certain versions of Marxism) have shaped and expand our understanding of International Relations theory (IR). A reflectivist perspective allows the inclusion of social, environmental, and economic aspects to the study of IR besides the study of security and war (Hollis & Smith, 1990).

2014). Due to the diversity of actors participating in transnational relations, as well as the diversity (from public to private) of the actors involved, the thesis combines both qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. Since transnational governance suggests the inclusion of “new actors” in world politics, the need to implement mixed methodologies in the field of international relations takes on a new relevance. Besides, we cannot use the same tools as the market (or those who study the market) when we are questioning the implication and negative influence of the market tools in climate governance. In other words, an exclusively rationalist and quantitative methodology for this study does not align with the goals in the research. Likewise, when criticizing the institutionalist approach in climate politics we cannot take institutional discourses for granted.

This study applies Case Study Research methodology, using cities as units of analysis. Particularly, the research will proceed with a multi-case design, utilizing the embedded multi-case study (Yin, 2009) as each unit of analysis includes several subunits (e.g. NGOs, universities, etc.). Likewise, a “small sample” of Mexico City and Lima is considered. Since Latin America is a remarkably diverse and heterogeneous region, it can be argued that a small sample of cases studied may not be sufficient in describing the phenomenon in the region. Since the purpose is to provide a representative picture of urban policies in Latin America, the thesis considers the strategic importance of each of the cases in the region. Furthermore, I followed a mixed method with an emphasis on the qualitative aspect, such as elite interviews performed *in-situ*, as well as direct observation and documentary analysis. The aim is to utilize as much as possible a diversity of methods. The reason is based on the fact that many studies about the global South politics on climate change (as I argue in Chapter 1) present a high volume of analysis using quantitative analysis with a normative, problem-solving approach. Mixed methods such as qualitative *in-situ*

research, help exploring new aspects of the phenomena studied. They contribute to posing new research questions that contribute to a better understanding of complex problems, such as climate change. The thesis prioritizes the use of qualitative methods without the intention of underestimating the validity of those studies using quantitative methods. Through qualitative methodologies, the thesis aims to demonstrate the participation of intermediary actors in the decision-making stage of policies and strategies related to LCEPT at different levels during the process. In particular, I analyzed the links between the city's governments and transnational actors where one transnational (foreign) network<sup>38</sup> had intervened. Furthermore, the research includes the analysis of those relations, sometimes originating from, and others encouraged by, the transnational network C40, directly or indirectly, in policies related to LCEPT.

To illustrate the latter, I included interviews with staff and analytical documents from central governments and IOs. Both, interviews and documents, are central to the research strategy. This, since I argue that there is a link between transnational actors (IOs and TNs) with the TCC to influence urban politics on LCEPT. At the same time, this goes in symphony with Gramsci's idea of hegemony explained in Chapter 2, where he mentions IOs [and other foreign actors] are one of the mechanisms through which the universal norms of hegemony are diffused (Cox, 1983). In addition, I analyze strategic documents and policies to illustrate the role of transnational actors, in particular transnational networks, in the planning, design and implementation of policies related to LCEPT. Through the observation and analysis of such policies, I was able to observe whether that type of public transportation infrastructure project is relevant, pertinent and convenient for the cities included in this thesis. Furthermore, the study pays particular attention to the policies that led to

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<sup>38</sup> By foreign network here I understand as a city network that, the founders and main sponsors comes from a country in the global North.

choosing the BRT modality over other modalities of transportation, as well as the actors participating in segments of the decision-making process.

### *3.1 Why promote the use of qualitative methods over quantitative methods for this study?*

As mentioned in chapter one, the imbalance in the field between studies prioritizing qualitative methods over quantitative ones when studying Latin American cities is evident. For instance, the limited number of studies analyzing the new hybrid institutional arrangements in transnational climate change politics can be more easily observed with a qualitative methodology, since these unofficial links are not always mentioned or described with detail in official documents. As mentioned in chapter one, even though the literature examined shows an overwhelming majority of studies focusing on transnational networks, cities and the operational aspects involved in their interaction, there are only a few exceptions that show the participation of intermediary and hybrid actors in the design and implementation of climate politics.

When comparing the discourse on the official documents against the interviews (particularly the elite interviews in each of the cities), I noticed several disparities and gaps between both sources. For instance, GHG emissions have not diminished even when there are more institutional (and market-based) mechanisms than before. Thus, it is evident the existing studies are not considering certain aspects of the relationships. Similarly, my observations during the CC40's events I attended either complemented or contradicted the evidence in the documents and the existing literature in the field, as I mention in the following chapters.

Transnational governance in contrast, challenges the dominant approach to climate governance. Contrary to traditional approaches, which focus in building assumptions and predict outcomes, my aim is to provide an IPE perspective of the phenomenon of transnational governance in Latin American cities. By using the public transportation sector as a way to illustrate the involvement that transnational actors have in urban politics, the thesis aims to show the economic interests behind the recommendations that such actors make about climate politics in the region. The evidence that helps to uncover this economic rationality is presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

### *3.1.1 Interpretative approach*

For the most part, interpretative approaches study beliefs, ideas or discourses. This kind of study analyzes beliefs as they perform within specific frameworks, actions, practices and institutions. Bevir (2011) argues that interpretive approaches are mostly about a theoretical agenda that focuses on the actors, practices, intentions and social life. Interpretive theorists, Bevir argues, believe that meanings are constructive of actions. If people act on beliefs, thus, social scientists can explain actions only by appealing to the beliefs of the actors. Interpretive social scientists do not assume that reasons for action are always conscious and rational. Therefore, social science cannot take natural science as a model. Human life is intentional and historical in ways that differentiates it from the rest of nature (Idem). In this sense, interpretative approaches argue governance involves more than studying meanings. A rational, positivist approach does not correspond when studying TCCG, particularly when it is motivated by economic rationality.

### 3.1.2 Relation between the methodological choices and the theoretical framework adopted

Drawing on Jubas (2010) work, Gramsci outlines his epistemological stance, which is consistent with qualitative methodologies. “Knowledge,” in his view, emerges from the combined endeavors of intellect, emotion and engagement with “the people.” For Gramsci, knowledge is also based in the concrete rather than the abstract, and is developed in a social context (Idem), as the empirical evidence presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Flyvbjerg (2001) departs from the idea epistemic knowledge is the most pure and valuable, social scientists have largely abandoned the search for *phronetic*<sup>39</sup> knowledge in favor of abstract generalizations (Idem, 71). Part of Flyvbjerg’s value is how he argues that researchers adopting this approach need to be more methodologically diverse and sophisticated to be able to engage in this sort of phronetic research. In this sense, a multi-method approach fits with the objectives of the thesis. Gramsci conceptualizes knowledge as subjective and multiple rather than objective and singular, and assert that a connection between the researcher and marginalized groups yields deeper knowledge. Similar to the importance I give to my professional experience and a [mostly] qualitative methodology which allows me to yield deeper knowledge in TCCG.

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<sup>39</sup> Phronetic organizational research is an approach to the study of management and organizations focusing on ethics and power. It is based on a contemporary interpretation of the Aristotelian concept phronesis, usually translated as 'practical wisdom', sometimes as 'prudence'. The term also refers to contextual, experiential knowledge; *episteme*, or universal knowledge developed through “analytic rationality” (Thorpe & Holt, 2008).

For critical qualitative researchers exploring “the interplay between meaning and structure”, a very different methodological approach to social determination is required: one based on the nature of social relations (Jubas, 2010). In this sense, for the qualitative researcher, a Gramscian approach helps to illuminate the connections between theories and practices of social life and social research. Moreover, Gramsci’s flexible, rather than rigid, frame can contribute to the development of an inquiry which is conceptually, methodologically, and analytically coherent (Idem). Since a Neo-Gramscian analyzes hegemony with the use of non-coercive power, in other words through persuasion, those type of influences can only be observed with elite semi-structured interviews.

### *3.2 Research questions*

As mentioned in the introduction, the thesis is motivated by two research questions:

- a) Why do Latin American cities collaborate with transnational networks regarding climate change?
- b) Can city networks change urban politics on climate change?

These questions aim to understand the origins of cities’ motivations in participating in transnational networks. Meanwhile, the methods chapter shows how the thesis derives an operational approach to the research from the research questions. This chapter details how the research has been designed to address these two research questions. In other words, those immediate empirical aspects which contribute to better understanding the reasons of its network activities. Besides, this empirical aspect to be examined include one embedded research question with the goal to address the inquiry

related to power-dynamics and how they are represented in the Latin American context. To address these question, I analyze common (and necessary) urban practices (public transportation) which systematically generate environmental change, and the way these practices are structured politically (Paterson, 2000). Through the case studies, the analysis addresses the following questions: What factors influence public transportation policies promoting a BRT system in Mexico City and Lima? Do these factors come from elsewhere within the network or are they a condition imposed by external actors (e.g. IOs)?

Furthermore, the study focuses on the influence that transnational networks have on urban public policies, as well as the transformative force TNs represent in the international governance structures. To do so, the thesis observes the tools and techniques of governance used by transnational networks. It is through the observation and analysis of such mechanisms that we are able to illustrate the influence that transnational actors have on climate governance.

Finally, the thesis includes a comparison between both case studies, presented in chapter 6.

According to Landman (2003) and Lijphart (1971), the comparative method is defined as one of the basic methods in political studies. In the field, the political scientist compares cases to verify the research questions formulated in the study. Thus, the field seeks to make inferences based on the empirical world it observes, whilst seeking to maximize the certainty of these inferences (Idem).

By comparing both cases, I am able to contrast how C40 influenced LCEPT policies in each city and the differences in the process. At the same time, by comparing both cases, I am able to find similarities that illustrate the transnational character of the mechanisms used by intermediary actors

(TNs, INGOs, transnational companies, think-tanks, consulting companies, etc.) in urban climate policies. As an example, the comparison helps to illustrate the difference in C40's participation between cities, but also the similarities when executing LCEPT strategies.

### *3.3 Data collection*

Related to the data collection, and aligned to the interpretative methodology, I obtained the data from three different sources: elite interviews *in-situ*, collection of documentary materials and direct observation.

As part of the strategies for data collection, I used reflexivity as a strategy for marking knowledge as situated. Reflexivity in research involves reflection on self, process and representation, and critically examining power relations and politics in the research process, and researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation (Falconer Al-Hindi & Hope, 2002; Jones et al., 1997). A reflexive research process can open up the research to a more complex and nuanced understanding of issues (Sultana, 2007, p. 376). Furthermore, Sultana argues that it is important to pay greater attention to issues of reflexivity, positionality and power relations in the field to undertake ethical and participatory research (Idem). Reflexivity, for instance, “emphasizes the importance of self-awareness, political/cultural consciousness, and ownership of one’s perspective” (Patton, 2002, p. 64).

Likewise, I used positionality every time I collected information during fieldwork. This need to situate knowledge comes from the idea that the sort of knowledge obtained during fieldwork

depends on who carries out that fieldwork (Rose, 1997, pp. 306–307). Thus, positioned knowledge can no longer claim universality.

### *3.4 Fieldwork*

The fieldwork involved semi-structured interviews, direct observation, case studies and analysis of strategic documents. Through personal contacts, I established preliminary communication with senior officials in Lima and Mexico City and ensured the access to interviewees even before my arrival to each city. The fieldwork included interviews with policy-makers from the central government as well as city level; staff from former members of the Clinton Climate Initiative (now C40), NGOs, research institutions and academics. The research was conducted between March 2017 and March 2018.

The interviews and discussions were conducted in Spanish as I am Mexican and that is my native language. Conducting interviews in my native tongue allowed me to pick up and understand subtleties in the participant's answers. Most of the people interviewed were government officials, either from the city government, national or IOs (e.g. UN-Habitat, ECLAC). Before joining the Ph.D. program, I had the opportunity to work as the Coordinator for International Cooperation at the Foreign Affairs Office in the State of Jalisco, Mexico, as the IOs Coordinator at the University of Guadalajara, and as the General Coordinator of FIDALE, a Mexican-Spanish NGO. In each of the positions, my activities involved the management of projects that emerged from the State or Provinces agreements; the development and management of international cooperation projects between Europe and Mexico. Also, I was Responsible for the promotion of the relations between

the State of Jalisco and different foreign local governments, international cooperation agencies, and international organizations, plus the involvement of diplomatic activities and international events coordination. These experiences allowed me to collaborate with different IOs, as well as local and international NGOs, in several projects that included, among other activities, the development of policy briefings and strategic documents. These professional experiences allowed me to better understand gestures, ambiguous comments, expressions, and other kinds of subtleties during the interviews. Although my native language is Spanish, I am also fluent in English, 20 years having elapsed since I finished my English course. It is true that you never stop learning the second language. However, since then I have had the opportunity to practice my English in a different social and professional contexts; at school and in each job I have had (including conducting diplomatic meetings), giving me the opportunity to learn how to understand susceptibilities, to read between the lines, as well as to understand expressions in a conversation. Furthermore, moving to Canada eight years ago, and starting my Ph.D. seven years ago has provided me the necessary skills to minimize the possible ambiguities in the translations of interviews from Spanish to English. For practicality purposes, I will only be translating the most relevant quotes related to the topic mentioned in the interview, skipping the “small talk” prior to the question being asked.

One of the advantages of the fieldwork undertaken is the diversity of actors interviewed, analyzed and observed, which provided a broad perspective and different points of view to a complex phenomenon such as TCCG. The fieldwork stopped in March 2018, when I performed the last interview. Also, the documents analyzed referred to policies and positions from the governments before the stipulated end of the fieldwork. The research does not include the changes in climate politics after that date, nor the plans from the recently elected government (both national and local

level), given that Mexico had general elections in July 2018. As Sultana (2007, p. 377) mentions, what constitutes the “field” versus “home” is a problematic distinction. Doing fieldwork in those cities as a Mexican, as well as a Latin American studying for a Ph.D. in the global North, often raises the concern of being an insider-outsider. Automatically, my interviewees placed me in the category of an outsider and categorized me into certain stereotypes particular to academics, such as not being in touch with reality, being distracted, a bit naïve, and with little or no understanding of political and bureaucratic procedures, real-life situations or the capacity of certain actors – such as subnational governments - to participate in international relations<sup>40</sup>. Nonetheless, as a former government official, I gained empathy and understanding once I explained my background and professional hybrid experience to my interviewees. I was ultimately able to build a positive rapport and shift their initial perception away from the academic stereotypes. Additionally, many aspects in common with the interviewees, such as my nationality, gender, ethnicity, background and ability to engage in regular conversation in the local dialect, enabled me to reduce the cultural gaps and become well received over time<sup>41</sup>. The most important aspect was to be faithful to the relations in that space and time, to the stories that were shared, and the knowledge that was obtained through the research, however partial. In this sense, while the government officials and I did not share

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<sup>40</sup> At the beginning of my program, I struggled with fitting in in class, and my opinions not being recognized due to my constant challenging of what the theory says (or did not say), even when I knew and experienced that it was not entirely accurate. Coming from a job position where I did most of the things theory says a local (subnational) government could not do, it took me a few semesters to understand the non-written rules of academia. I learned to keep my opinions to myself until I had some credibility as a scholar.

<sup>41</sup> My basic knowledge about soccer opened several doors to me and contributed to gaining acceptance from my interviewees and making it safer to move around the cities. Every time I needed to take a taxi, I started a conversation with the driver about the World Cup classification rounds for the national team. As with my interviewees, the drivers immediately warmed to me and did not overcharge me for the ride (a common practice with foreigners). Similarly, every time I started a conversation with most of my interviewees related to the Peruvian soccer team’s classification for the World Cup in Russia, 2018, contributed to gain their trust and have more honest and open conversations. This aspect also raises an important point related to gender; in particular, about the disadvantages women face while doing fieldwork. As Herod (1993) argues, gender relations are an important dynamic shaping the interview process which can significantly influence the sorts of data obtained. Wolf (2018) also argues that fieldwork poses particular dilemmas and obstacles for women due to power relations inherent in the process of gathering data and implicit in the process of accessing and performing the interviews.

exactly the same identity, we were able to share affinities (Haraway, 1991) that helped me attain some common ground from which to speak (Nagar & Raju, 2003).

However, I found that while I was conscious of differences and hierarchies in the field and post-fieldwork analysis, I was also “othered” by those who were observing and analyzing me during the interviews. I realized that people also positioned me with ties to not only (privileged) educational institutions in the West (“You are educated in the global North and know more, what do we poor know?”), but also I was constantly associated with the USA and its global economic hegemony<sup>42</sup>. Contrasting such positionings were more frequent sentiments of acceptance (“Your research might be useful to us, the global South, particularly since you are getting the “real” knowledge, theories and techniques from the global North, so it is good that you are here.”) as well as scrutiny (“How can you help us get a solution to public transportation with the best technology?”), particularly when I was interviewing government officials in Peru. In this sense, it is important to be careful with the “academic power” mentioned by McDowell (1992). She points out that “there are real dangers that are inherent in our position within the powerful institutions of knowledge production.” As Staeheli & Lawson (2010, p. 332) mentions:

“[...] when Western [climate] social scientists enter [a] developing settings, they cannot escape the power relations that exist between those societies or between themselves as academics and their research subjects, even when they wish to do so. Western researchers are in a position of power by virtue of their ability to name the categories, control

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<sup>42</sup> During the interviews in Lima, I was classified as a representative of the hegemonic power in the region, and remarkably close to the (what they perceive as) evil hegemonic power, the USA. Firstly, because Mexico is closer to and strongly influenced by US politics, and secondly because I was studying in a Canadian university, in a country that is perceived as strongly influenced by the US.

information about the research agenda, define interventions, and come and go as research scientists.”

In the same vein, Sultana (2007) emphasizes that it is critical to pay attention to positionality and reflexivity, and the way knowledge is acquired and the power relations that are distinctive in the research processes in order to undertake ethical research, especially in international field research contexts. Acknowledging my position in the way the interviewees constructed the researchers’ identity contributed to a better engagement in reflexivity, which enables engagement with the research process in a more meaningful way (Idem). Additionally, she argues that while some scholars attest that acknowledging positionality, reflexivity, identity and representation in the research, does not necessarily result in politically engaged research and writing, and may not result in destabilizing existing power relations or bring about dramatic changes. Thus, the alternative of not heeding such issues is even more problematic. In the same sense, Rose (1997) argues for the need to situate knowledge based on the argument that the sort of knowledge obtained depends on the person acquiring it, since all knowledge is marked out by its origins, claiming that situated knowledge can no longer be universalized (p. 306-308).

### *3.5 Case study methodology*

Through the case studies, the thesis aims to understand the interactions between city governments and TNs, as well as the influence in urban climate policies related to LCEPT policies. The unit of analysis is the network activity of cities in the Latin American context. In other words, the present study analyzes the network collaboration of cities related to low carbon emissions in public

transportation politics. As Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 226) mentions: “*In social science [...] the strategic choice of case may greatly add to the generalizability of a case study.*”

One of the objectives of this research is to understand how and why Latin American cities participate in collaborative networks. With this in mind, I use Case Study Research Methodology, which includes an embedded multi-case study (Yin, 2009). As units of analysis, the thesis uses megacities in Latin America that includes several subunits (e.g. NGOs, universities, etc.). The study will focus on two cities: Lima in Peru and Mexico City in Mexico. For each city, I concentrate on the activities related to LCEPT policies within the C40 network in both cities over the last 15 years.

Yin (2009) focuses on the explanatory case study by emphasizing “how” and “why” questions, theoretical propositions, rival hypothesis and replication designs. In the same sense, Flyvbjerg (2006) states that the case study produces the type of context-dependent knowledge that affords the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction. He adds that the proximity to reality, which the case study entails, and the learning process that it generates for the researcher will often constitute a prerequisite for advanced understanding.

Lastly, the methodology applied in both cases follows some of the characteristics from an intense case study. The goal in intensive case studies is to provide a history, a detailed description or interpretation of unique and typical experiences or events. These case studies are used for developing a very intensive understanding of the events and practices of a particular person, group or organization. Additionally, the researcher becomes the eyes, ears and “feelings” for an in depth

understanding of the context in which certain events occurred. Similarly, they are known for their ability to describe important details (Cunningham, 1997).

### *3.6 Case study selection criteria*

I use a “small sample” of two cities, Lima in Peru and Mexico City. Both cities help illustrate the influence of network collaboration in urban climate politics in Latin America. Among the biggest metropolitan areas in Latin America, Lima and Mexico City present important political, economic and social aspects to be considered. In regards to the political aspect, both are the capital and headquarters of different levels of government. Both cities lean toward network collaboration, both transnational, regional and local city networks. Linked to economic factors, both show a high concentration of economic capital from different corporations, national and transnational. This position brings opportunities for lobbying, as well as involvement between the private and the public sector. Finally, concerning social factors, both cities have a concentration of universities (public and private), which provide the conditions for the creation and development of a critical population. Correspondingly, Lima and Mexico City are also the home of numerous local non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) headquarters. Additionally, the status of capital city facilitates the establishment of head offices from several IOs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which facilitate the interactions between the city government and IOs, as well as the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.

However, compared to Mexico City, as well as other megacities in Latin America, Lima plays a limited role in the region. Despite its characteristics, size and contributions to GHG emissions, the

city does not play an influential role when it comes to network collaboration. In contrast, São Paulo and Buenos Aires are considered important financial and commercial centers in the region (D’Almeida Martins & da Costa Ferreira, 2011; Guerra, 2005; Lucon & Goldemberg, 2010; Nobre et al., 2010; Ribeiro, 2010; Schteingart & Pérez, 2015; Setzer, 2009; Tella, 2007, 2014) and their involvement in collaborative networks is notably larger than Lima’s. To illustrate Lima’s exclusion from network collaboration, we can observe the launch of the initiative G3<sup>43</sup>, an agreement led by Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Mexico City in March 2015. The agreement involves a program to improve all their public transportation systems to buses that use renewable energies by 2030. However, despite the importance that those two cities represent in the region, they will not be considered in this study.

Furthermore, the research focuses on the policies of collaboration, joint declarations and policies on public transportation in which Lima and Mexico City participate, as a result of collaborations among members from C40, as well as initiatives and exchange of experience focused on the development of public policies. Since Latin America is a diverse and heterogeneous region, it can be argued that a small sample of cases studied may not contribute to describing the phenomenon in the region. Nonetheless, due to Lima and Mexico City’s strategic importance in the region, each of the suggested cases provides a representative picture of urban policies in Latin America (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Each one is situated in countries where the central government mainly follows a neoliberal approach in different sectors of the public administration, and where a diversity of actors can influence urban climate politics. Consequently, the research focuses on analyzing public transportation public policies in Lima and Mexico City. Using public transportation policies as an

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<sup>43</sup> G3 refers to The Joint Statement between the Government of Mexico City, the Prefecture of São Paulo and the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (G3) signed by the three cities in March 2015.

empirical tool enables the research to illustrate the complexity of climate governance in the region, since the influence from foreign (transnational) actors in urban climate politics is more visible and tangible, compared for instance, to carbon markets. Likewise, studying LCEPT policies, and the influence of transnational actors in it, helps to “uncover” how power is shaped by carbon at a city level, and where this ability comes from.

### *3.7 Semi-structured Interviews*

As one of the sources of data collection, the fieldwork included the performance of elite interviews in a semi-structured format (Leech, 2002), with government officials from both cities and staff members from the C40 network (see table 1). I chose to use elite interviews because of the type of relations I aimed to observe. Since these links are not directly expressed in official documents, or even in the literature generated in the field, interviews are the most efficient, and sometimes the only way to access this type of information<sup>44</sup>.

Such interviews were done on-site, except for one interview that was carried out via Skype. Being physically present during the interview, or at least having visual contact with the interviewee, enables the interviewer to observe facial gestures during the question and answer process; what Gee (2011) refers to as the intonation tool in discourse analysis. What this tool means to do is ask how the exclamation and the voice tone give greater meaning to the answer that is given. What idea did the speaker make salient in terms of where the intonation focus is placed? Did the speaker’s background make the information given or related less salient? And how does this contribute to the

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<sup>44</sup> The access to such type of information is conditioned to professional status, some institutional restraints and lack of resources, or social capital as Bourdieu (1977) and Putnam (2000) calls it.

answer he or she is giving? At the same time, interviews performed *in-situ* increase the opportunity to talk with other interviewees as part of the snowfall effect.

Additionally, while the survey was structured according to the proposal defense and the ethics application, I followed a semi-structured interview format, also expressed in both the proposal defense and the ethics committee application. Contrary to semi-structured interviews, a structured and closed interview format would have limited exploring different aspects during the conversation. I decided also to follow a semi-structured format because I had no way of accessing the necessary information prior to the interview; this enabled me to better structure the questions. It was only when I heard the answers from the interviewees themselves that I then had access to the information required, since it is not the type of information distributed, or at least easily distributed, to the general public outside of each of the countries involved.

About half of the interviewees' contact information came from personal relations I cultivated during my professional trajectory<sup>45</sup>. The rest of the contacts were a product of the snowball effect while undertaking fieldwork *in-situ*. Regarding these contacts, my positioning and empathy as a former NGO staff member and former government official helped me gain their trust and obtain access to interviewees who, ordinarily, might have been difficult to get in contact with and, therefore, to obtain their approval for an interview. At the same time, the conversations developed in a more honest way due to the trust gained. That was the case with two of my most valuable insiders (one in each city), who provided extremely detailed interviews.

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<sup>45</sup> I initiated the communication with some of my interviewees thanks to the personal contacts I made during my time as General Coordinator for a Mexican-Spanish NGO and as International Cooperation Coordinator at the Foreign Affairs Office of the State of Jalisco in Mexico.

For this study, elite interviews provide the opportunity to see the origins and ways TCC is related to cities in Latin America, by also revealing other motivations for cities to participate in TCC. For instance, personal relations among elites play an important role in Latin American cities' participation in transnational networks, such as C40, as several interviewees expressed. Also, competition among key actors (as in the case between Michael Bloomberg, former New York City Mayor, and Marcelo Ebrard, former Mexico City Mayor) influences the promotion, encouragement, support and even speed of execution for certain projects. As I will show in the empirical chapters, these figures are self-proclaimed *messiahs* and charitable personalities that will “solve climate change” crisis but usually, these individuals are motivated by political and economic interests. In the same sense, institutional links, particularly with international institutions from the global North, also play an important role in resource appointment, projects design and implementation, decision-making processes, as well as priority-setting in both of the cities. In both cases, I was able to uncover the political competition and almost unnoticeable institutional links as a result of the semi-structured elite interviews. In regards to the diversity of interviewees, I was able to speak to at least one government staff member, one member from an NGO, a national official government and one C40 staff member who provided a more balanced perspective on transnational climate change relations in each city.

**Table 1. Interviewees' index from both case studies**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>LIM 1</b>	<b>Staff Member</b>	Peruvian Ministry of the Environment	May 2 <sup>nd</sup> , 2017
<b>LIM 2</b>	<b>Guiselle Castillo</b>	Climate Change Expert from the Lima's Municipal Government between 2011-2015	May 2 <sup>nd</sup> , 2017

LIM 3	<b>Gabriela Camacho</b>	Specialist in International Relations from the Deputy Office of International Technical Cooperation	May 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 2017
LIM 4	<b>Rossana Arauco</b>	Official from the Policies and Programs Office at the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI)	May 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 5	<b>Leonardo Mesa Reyes</b>	Official from the Policies and Programs Office at the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (APCI)	May 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 6	<b>Anna Zucchetti</b>	Director of the Lima Parks Service (SERPAR), Municipality of Lima (2011-2015)	May 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 7	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	March 7 <sup>th</sup> , 2018
LIM 8	<b>Gunthet Merzathal</b>	Deputy Manager of Environment of the Municipality of Lima (2011-2015)	August 25 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 9	<b>Susana Villarán</b>	Mayor of the Metropolitan area of Lima (2011-2015)	August 29 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 10	<b>Astrid Aguilar</b>	Specialist at the “Integrity in Climate Governance” Program - Proética	September 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 11	<b>Luis Gárate</b>	MOCICC ‘s Coordinator of Renewable Energies	September 4 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
LIM 12	<b>Liliana Miranda</b>	Director of the local NGO “ <i>Foro Ciudades para La Vida</i> ”	September 5 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 1	<b>Staff member #1</b>	WRI México	May 17 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 2	<b>Staff member #2</b>	WRI México	May 17 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 3	<b>Staff member #3</b>	WRI México	May 17 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 4	<b>Vania Montalvo</b>	Project Coordinator. Integrity Program in Climate Finance, Transparency International-Mexico	September 15 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 5	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	September 26 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 6	<b>Patricia Narváez García</b>	Foreign Affairs Coordinator Mexico City Ministry of Environment (2012-2018)	September 13 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 7	<b>Yerel Salcedo</b>	Cycling activist and member of the collective “ <i>GDL en Bici</i> ”	September 19 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 8	<b>Sayel Cortes</b>	Senior Analyst in Environmental Engineer and Economy, WRI Mexico (2009-2012)	November 23 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 9	<b>Anonymous</b>	<b>Anonymous</b>	September 21 <sup>th</sup> , 2017
CDMX 10	<b>Staff member</b>	Habitat International Coalition	March 6 <sup>th</sup> , 2018

<b>CDMX 11</b>	<b>Bernardo Baranda</b>	Regional Director for Latin America, Institute of Policies for Transport and Development (ITDP)	March 19 <sup>th</sup> , 2018
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Source: Author's elaboration

### *3.8 Documents and legislation related to climate politics*

Furthermore, the data analysis is complemented with the examination of institutional documents from both cities (Table 1). These set of publications came from recommendations from colleagues in the field, also collected during fieldwork in 2017. The 19 government and IOs' documents mentioned in table 1 includes publications in English and Spanish between 2011 and 2017. All the documents collected and analyzed were coded to capture the “repetitiveness” and “rarity” of themes and findings reported across the various publications. The documents selected represent the other half of the data that allowed me to apply discourse analysis methodology, along with the elite interviews and the direct observation. As mentioned in the introduction, the goal is to understand the motivations behind the decision to participate in transnational networks working on climate change, and the influence from those actors in LCEPT strategies.

It is important to properly select the tools of data collection, since it is not possible with my resources to analyze all documents related to climate politics in Lima and Mexico. Thus, I gave special attention to those in which transnational actors were involved, particularly on those where the C40 network, or any of its partners, participated in the document's elaboration. Likewise, I utilized the key documents and laws related to climate politics in each city to analyze if the influence from foreign actors was reflected in the city's legislation.

**Table 2. List of institutional documents in both cities**

<b>City</b>	<b>Document</b>	<b>Code</b>
<b>Lima</b>	<i>Ciudades Sostenibles y Cambio Climático. Experiencias y Desafíos</i>	<b>DOC 1</b>
	<i>Ciudades Sostenibles y Cambio Climático. Resumen de experiencias, procesos e iniciativas desarrolladas en Perú</i>	<b>DOC 2</b>
	<i>Transporte Urbano: ¿cómo resolver la movilidad en Lima y Callao?</i>	<b>DOC 3</b>
	<i>Estrategia Nacional ante el Cambio Climático, 2015</i>	<b>DOC 4</b>
	<i>Estrategia Regional de Cambio Climático de Lima, 2015-2021</i>	<b>DOC 5</b>
	<i>La economía de las ciudades bajas en carbono y resiliencia al clima. Lima-Callao, Perú</i>	<b>DOC 6</b>
	Hacia una Ciudad para las Personas. Propuesta. Hoja de Ruta para una Movilidad y un Transporte Sostenible en Lima y Callao al 2025	<b>DOC 7</b>
	Memorias del Foro Nacional de Ciudades Sostenibles: Agenda de Gestión Local	<b>DOC 8</b>
	Plan Metropolitano de Desarrollo Urbano. PLAM Lima-Callao 2035	<b>DOC 9</b>
	Memoria de análisis y diagnóstico. PLAM Lima-Callao 2035	<b>DOC 10</b>
	Ley Marco sobre Cambio Climático	<b>DOC 11</b>
<b>Mexico City</b>	<i>MEXICO CITY Resilience Strategy. Adaptive, inclusive and equitable transformation.</i>	<b>DOC 12</b>
	<i>Ciudad de México Internacional 2012-2015</i>	<b>DOC 13</b>
	<i>Constitución Política de la Ciudad de México</i>	<b>DOC 14</b>
	<i>Ciudad de México. Ciudad Global. Acciones Locales, compromiso internacional</i>	<b>DOC 15</b>
	<i>La Ciudad de México en el mundo. Hacia una política pública de acción internacional</i>	<b>DOC 16</b>
	<i>Estrategia Local de Acción Climática. Gobierno del Distrito Federal</i>	<b>DOC 17</b>
	<i>2do Informe de actividades. Secretaría del Medio Ambiente del Gobierno del Distrito Federal</i>	<b>DOC 18</b>
	<i>3er Informe de gobierno. Secretaría del Medio Ambiente del Gobierno de la Cd. de México</i>	<b>DOC 19</b>
	<i>4to Informe de gobierno. Secretaría del Medio Ambiente del Gobierno de la Cd. de México</i>	<b>DOC 20</b>
	<i>5to Informe de gobierno. Secretaría del Medio Ambiente del Gobierno de la Cd. de México</i>	<b>DOC 21</b>

Source: Author's elaboration

### *3.9 Data analysis*

To conduct the analysis in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), I developed coding criteria, using the software MAXQDA, to analyze the documents and laws related to the topic in the study (see table 1), as well as the transcripts from the interviews, described in the next subsection.

The methodology I used to analyze the data collected was SNA methodology. SNA contributes to highlighting the variety of actors among levels and sectors involved in transnational networks (TNs), and how the connections between intermediary actors (consultant companies, NGOs, transnational companies, IOs, etc.) and cities are developed. Most importantly, the analysis seeks to reveal the interactions of the distinct actors within TNs. The visual representation of networks and relations helps to understand how the idea of a BRT system in Latin America, along with specific ideas about how to implement it, has spread over time and space. In this case, SNA shows how the connections between the actors involved in the development of LCEPT are made, and through which actors these connections are constructed. As done with the discourse analysis, I applied SNA to analyze the strategic documents and laws, as well as the interview's transcripts where I obtained the participants, sponsors, organizers and influencers to feed the database. Once the data was collected in the database, I produced the visualization of the network through the UCINET software.

### 3.10 *Coding criteria (process)*

When carrying out each interview, I looked for evidence that led to discovering the origins, rationality, motivations and interaction with transnational actors. I was mainly interested in knowing the origins, motives (and its characteristics) that helped to illustrate the logic behind the motivations to participate in C40's activities. In this regard, the coding system I developed focused on the types of interactions with transnational actors, transnational companies (or national companies with a link with transnational companies), international or local NGOs, and international or regional organizations.

In particular, conversations in the interviews focused on finding out how the city's relation with C40, started, the intention in joining the network, the nature and characteristics of the relationship, the role that each city played, or yet to play in C40, as well as the interaction and nature of the relationship with each of the network's partners. Also, the conversations focused on establishing the origins of the participation for each of the cities in the network, the motivations that led the city's government to get involved in C40's activities, and the aspects at this stage, such as the political and economic implications behind the decision to join the network. Similarly, the discussions focused on the outcomes of that relationship, and the activities that the city had, or currently have, with the network C40 or some of its partners.

Furthermore, the questions were aimed at identifying the intermediary actors between networks and the city governments, what type of knowledge was transferred, the level of governments interacting in the LCEPT policies and initiatives, as well as IOs and ROs involved, and the way of its

involvement. Likewise, all the NGOs, local and international universities (through the results of studies), think-tanks, consulting companies, research centers and media involved in the process. Also, the actors involved in financing, planning and implementation of projects. The coding also included the detection of contradictions between actors. In other words, the inconsistencies between local and national/international policies illustrate how these initiatives are guided by economic rationality and do not necessarily meet the needs of the populace or tackle greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. At the same time, the coding system's intention was to detect key, individual figures who had (or have) a strong influence on each of the actors involved. This included universities, research centers, transnational networks, and sometimes even IOs, national governments, or transnational companies organize.

The coding process aimed to observe the interaction between the different government areas at various levels; central, provincial, regional (in the case of Lima) and municipal. Likewise, the code system attempted to see the limitations of such policies and initiatives, the contradictions or compatibilities between development policies and climate policies, as well as the imbalance between the policies focusing on mitigation and the ones focusing on adaptation. Also, C40's climate strategy incompatibility with the city's needs and the characteristics that reflect a conceptualization of development from the global North that is not always compatible with those from the global South, and how these concepts and ideas are transmitted through transnational actors. The coding shows the relation of each city with C40, how the relation started, how it developed, which projects were prioritized, who were the decision makers (through elite interviews), how the cities managed to develop the projects, what were the deciding factors (such as individual figures, events, contacts and technical reports), how the city got access to the funding for

such projects, and who ultimately funded them. Additionally, the coding shows the different stages of involvement in each of the administrations.

In regards to the relations with C40, the coding showed Bloomberg's involvement at a political level in C40's lobbying in Latin America, the "non-visible" mechanism to persuade cities to adopt certain LCEPT model, how, in other cases, C40 showed a lack of interest and why (which is directly linked with the imbalance between mitigation and adaptation), which methodologies the network uses to measure emissions (and who was behind it), and how that influenced the decisions in LCEPT policies, also linked to the role of intermediary actors. In general, the coding aimed to identify the nature of these relations, the influence and power from intermediary actors in climate policies that are not shown in documents or are not otherwise easily seen when using other data collection methods. At the individual level, the coding system uncovered which mayor gave more importance to the city's relationship with C40 and why, and how the professional profile, the personal and individual connections, as well as synchronizing interest were decisive factors in becoming more involved in the network's activities.

At a more structural level, the coding system helped to identify the reasons for the city governments' decisions in several debates related to climate politics, including the rationality that followed these decisions. In relation to the Development vs Climate Politics debate, the interviews showed the importance that a "green economic growth" rhetoric had in climate politics at a local and national level. For instance, in the Lima's case, the Peruvian Agency of International Cooperation (APCI for its acronym in Spanish), the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) climate strategies were influenced by the OECD. Similarly, for the Mexico City's case, the public

transportation projects was influenced by the Institute of Policies for Transport and Development (ITDP) and the World Resources Institute (WRI). Likewise, the TN C40 also played an important role in the climate strategy from both cases.

Concerning the mitigation vs adaptation debate, the coding system focused on determining the arguments and rationality behind many transnational actors, mainly networks, in prioritizing mitigation over adaptation in both cities. The coding also showed how IOs influenced urban policies in each of the cases, such as the reforms and institutional changes “suggested” to the Peruvian government by the OECD to gain membership, as well as the economic factor for cities looking for funding. Marked out as the urgency to mitigate more than adapt, OECD served as the justification to promote the construction of infrastructure in that aim, such as in the transportation sector. Similarly, the role TNs play in the climate change strategy for both cities, is strongly influenced by intermediary actors (NGOs, companies, think-tanks, consulting, etc.); and at the same time, these actors do not discuss or advertise their participation and involvement on urban climate politics. In this case, the coding system helped to uncover these actor’s involvement. Frequently, academia and other influential actors argue for the internationalization of cities as being necessary to attain economic development, social cohesion and to increase its political capital (which has a direct relation with the amount of economic power and capital the city has). However, it is not common to include it in the analysis, as well as to get access to this type of information.

Among the key intermediary actors are individual figures. In this regard, the coding system contributed to uncovering the role these personalities have on climate politics at a local, national and even at the international level. These figures are self-proclaimed as *messiahs* and charitable

personalities that will solve “climate change” but usually their actions are strongly motivated by political and economic interests. As mentioned in chapter 2, various neo-Gramscian authors refers to these individual figures as organic intellectuals (Carroll, 2010), also referred to by Gramsci as *caesarism* (Cox, 1983).

The coding system also helped uncovering the power dynamics involved in climate politics, more specifically, economic power and companies influencing decision-makers and key actors in climate politics. For instance, the case of Chinese company BYD Co Ltd sponsoring C40 annual meetings and, surprisingly, selling BRTs that cover the LCEPT systems in member cities of C40, as I describe it in the empirical chapters<sup>46</sup>.

### *3.11 Social-Network Analysis*

Social network analysis (SNA) refers to the formal study of social networks by defining networks with two concepts: nodes and links. Nodes typically refer to people, organizations or states, while links represent some form of connection or flow between the nodes (e.g. friendship, trade, contracts, agreements, etc.). The network connecting nodes via links represents patterns of relations between social, private or political actors. These relations can be understood as a type of structure (Ward et al., 2011). SNA reveals, often visually but also through quantitative measures, important aspects of social organization that are not fully explored by studies that focus on specific features of the case studied (Idem). It is through network analysis that we are able to “describe these patterns and use their descriptions to learn how network structures constrain social behavior and social change”

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<sup>46</sup> For more details about the involvement of this company in public transportation policies in both cities, see Chapter 6.

(Wellman, 1983, p. 157). The network analysis provides a broad overview of how the different actors relate to each other. It is meant to show the “big picture” of the interactions among them, rather than a detailed analysis of individual relationships (Green, 2017, p. 112).

Additionally, Hadden’s central argument is that the structure of transnational networks (i.e., the relations among network members) influences the way the networks perform and, therefore, their ability to influence policy. She claims networks soften the boundaries of organizations by facilitating the exchange of information, resources, and meanings. Likewise, Hadden considers two important structural characteristics of networks -size and connectivity- and links them to the networks’ ability to perform key tasks. In this sense, SNA can help us get inside the black box, revealing the internal connections within transnational advocacy networks [...]. By disaggregating networks we are better placed to characterize the dynamics of transnational organizing (Hadden, 2015). Hence, for the purposes of this research, SNA contributes to visually represent transnational networks’ involvement in the connection-making process. The network analysis presents a descriptive mapping for identifying the Low-Carbon Emissions Public Transportation (LCEPT) network structure and patterns over the last 30 years. It focuses on the relationships between individuals and organizations that participated in the events, studies, discussions and, therefore, in the design and operationalization of LCEPT policies in different governmental levels.

Complemented with semi-structured interviews and document analysis, SNA contributes to identifying how policies have traveled among C40 members and Latin American cities. The connections were made when listening to the interviews undertaken during the fieldwork, particularly when interviewees mentioned a joint project or collaboration between the city and one actor, either local or international, public, private or hybrid, or when reading documents or checking

programs of events in which each of the cities participated. Also, some of the connections were further revealed when reviewing C40's web page and the relations this network has with the different philanthropic organizations, transnational companies and INGOs, as well as the joint projects it has with each city.

I reviewed the documents related to climate change strategies and LCEPT policy development in Lima and Mexico City (presented in table 2). The intention was to see which actors were involved in those events related to climate change strategies and LCEPT, who organized these events, and sponsored them. Additionally, I made a list of all the participants involved in the city's transnational network activities that were mentioned during the interviews. Also, regarding the documents designated as nodes in the network, it is so because some transnational actor participated in its elaboration, or it is mentioned as participant in a project or event related to LCEPT in each of the cases. Lastly, the websites appearing in the network were included because they represent a connection or partnership C40 has with other organizations and through which the city is connected with them.

For the SNA I created a database of all the actors involved in the LCEPT strategies with the software Microsoft Excel, where the vertical column lists the name of actors alongside a code (the description of each actor can be found in the annexes). The database was then transferred into the UCINET software where the network's visual representation was generated. The squares represent the nodes: Lima, AVINA and C40; whilst circles represent its members and partners. Red circles signify the cities that have any type of relation or participation with each or some of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; light blue circles represent

transnational companies and consulting corporations; pink circles represent local NGOs, purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations with the exception of WRI; dark green represents universities and research institutes; yellow circles represent central governmental agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies; dark yellow represents international events; and orange points represent local and regional networks.

### 3.12 *Limitations of the methodological choices*

Among the two main limitations of the methodological chose is the period studied in the thesis and the number and types of interviewee. Related to the former, the timeline analysed in both cases is between 2011 and 2018, which provide us with just part of the changes within each city and its LCEPT policies. Regarding the later, the type of people interviewed is diverse: staff members from the Peruvian central government (e.g. MINAM and APCI), former, and current, staff members of both city's government, and staff members from international and local NGOs in both cities. Even when the number of C40, current and former, interviewees is very limited (only one former member of the network C40), the diversity of people interviewed contributes to get different perspectives of the phenomenon studied.

In this regard, Kincheloe (2001, 2005) outlines a new methodological option: bricolage. The intention is to combine a diversity of perspectives. Moreover, this option recognizes the limitations of a single method, the discursive strictures of one disciplinary approach, what is missed by traditional practices of validation, the historicity of certified modes of knowledge production, the inseparability of knower and known, and the complexity and heterogeneity of all human experience.

Put differently, a bricolage approach recognizes different perspectives in the region's political scenario. For instance, Mexico City has a more extensive and well recognized network activity compared to Lima. Likewise, the variety of actors interviewed, mention in Table 1, allows to overcome the limitations that could be implied in a reduced number of case studies, as in the present research. This mixture of perspectives contributes to accumulate the bricolage of approaches.

Similarly, Jubas (2010) claims all research is limited in its scope and ability to produce knowledge. In this sense, she suggests to employ "triangulation" by collecting multiple forms of data. These different forms bolster the contextual validity of a study, which is considered important in case study research (Meyer, 2001) and helps overcome the concern about "the credibility of what is seen as subjective research techniques" (Sturman, 1999, p. 109). "Disciplined subjectivity" (Wilson, 1977, cited in Sturman, 1999), Jubas adds, can also enhance credibility by opening evidence to scrutiny and reporting analysis "in a way capable of "conveying credibility" (Glaser and Strauss, 1968 cited in Sturman, 1999) and subjected to standards of "trustworthiness", that is, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Guba & Lincoln, 1998; Sturman, 1999, p. 109).

### *3.13 Methodological contributions to the study of cities and transnational climate change relations*

The chapter suggests the use of mixed methods with an emphasis on the qualitative. Also, the section suggest the use of some data collection tools (such as elite interviews performed *in-situ*) and how these type of methods can contribute to the analysis of TCCG. By showing the contribution of qualitative methods, my intention is to impel the subfield of Latin American climate governance to the more frequent use of a diversity of methods. As stated in the literature review chapter, a large number of researchers studying the global South politics on climate change, are dominated by

quantitative analysis with a normative, problem-solving approach. In this sense, an interpretive approach helps to explore new aspects of the phenomena studied, and formulate new research questions that contribute to a better understanding of complex problems, such as climate change.

Also, chapter three suggests an emphasis on the use of qualitative methodologies which contribute to a deeper study of cities and transnational climate change relations. The thesis encourage the use of qualitative methodologies in environmental politics, in which the inclusion of reflective approaches, that function more like theoretical and analytical tools and not as theoretical frameworks, can contribute to a better understanding of transnational networks in the global South. Qualitative methodologies can contribute to show why Latin American cities collaborate with transnational networks related to climate change. A deeper also helps to response the research question about city network's capacity to change urban politics on climate change.

Here, I argue for a diversity of approaches, which does not necessarily mean moving from traditional to alternative approaches, but encourages the production of analysis with a variety of perspectives that enrich the debate in the field and produce analysis more aligned with the local reality.

The application of interpretative approaches allows for an in-depth observation of climate politics dynamics, such as the role of formal and informal actors at different levels involved in politics that take us to pose new research questions. For instance, thanks to elite interviews, I was able to uncover the political competition and, not very evident, institutional links, through the undertaking of semi-structured elite interviews. As I argue, the information collected in the interviews

contributes to challenging the common conception of institutions and norms governing climate change. Furthermore, the section emphasizes the use of mixed methods which concentrate on the qualitative aspect. The chapter also highlights the use of some data collection tools (such as elite interviews performed *in-situ*), and how it can contribute to the analysis of TCCG. By pointing out the contributions of the application of mixed methods, I intend to encourage a more frequent use of a diversity of methods into the field of transnational climate change governance. As stated in the literature review chapter, a large number of researchers studying the global South politics on climate change are dominated by quantitative analysis with a normative, problem-solving approach.

## Chapter 4. Lima's Climate Politics

### *4.0 Introduction*

Considered as a “megalopolis”, Lima has a population of 9.83 million in the metropolitan area<sup>47</sup> (INEI, 2018), and represents three-quarters of the total population in the country. Located on mostly flat terrain in the Peruvian coastal plain, the valleys of the Chillón, Rímac and Lurín rivers, and desert zones surround some sections of the city. As Susana Villarán, former Mayor of Lima described the city, not as an isolated oil stain in the middle of the valleys but as a glove. Surrounded by a “green crown” of 70,000 ha, as part of the Andean branch called “Las Lomas”, it is provided with a particular flora and fauna from the region, making the city’s geography and ecosystem unique (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Additionally, according to the last C40 emission inventory, Lima emitted 15.43 millions of tons of which 48% of them came from the transportation sector (C40, 2017). Emissions from this sector are responsible for causing 75% of the air pollution, specifically privately-owned vehicles that are mainly old and lack proper maintenance (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). All these pressures on the environment have been created, in part, by the accelerated-urbanization process over the last decades, which puts further pressure on the surrounding ecosystems (Steinberg & Miranda, 2005).

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<sup>47</sup> The Lima metropolitan area is an area formed by the conurbation of the Peruvian city-provinces of Lima (the nation’s capital) and Callao. It is composed of six sub-regions: Northern Lima, Southern Lima, Eastern Lima, Residential Lima, Central Lima, and Callao. As of 2018, the population was estimated to be 12 million, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI for its acronym in Spanish) statistics.

Furthermore, in the case of Lima, it is important to differentiate the city's climate politics between the administrations of Luis Castañeda (2006-2010 and 2015-2019) and Susana Villarán (2010-2014), especially since both governments have a different, almost contradictory, approach. On the one hand, Luis Castaneda's government takes a modernist, market-based approach, prioritizing relations with networks from the north, following its policies and emphasizing mitigation over adaptation, this being closer to Bloomberg's perspective on climate politics. On the other hand, the government of Susana Villarán (2010-2014) took a social justice approach from the beginning of her administration, giving more importance to equal opportunities and the improvement of public goods over private modes of transportation. Her government established its priorities based on the city's needs, and tried to implement structural changes through collaboration with other cities. During her administration, the sub-direction of the environment, that was part of the direction of citizens' attention, was promoted to direction. Later on, after Castañeda won the elections again in 2015 the direction was returned to sub-direction, which reflected the relevance of environmental and climate change issues in Castaneda's government. Similarly, Castañeda limited its foreign relations strategy to maintaining relations with the most important transnational networks (e.g. C40, ICLEI) without getting involved in the decision-making process. Neither prioritized the establishment of relations with other cities in Latin America. While the latter was very active in the creation of networks that involved cities in Latin America and Europe, lobbying with cities in the C40's steering committee and, at the same time, developing its own international strategy based in the city's development plan (PLAM).

Furthermore, among cities in Latin America, Lima could be classified as a middle-influence city in the region. Given that the city is not considered as a central node in the networks in which it

participates, having a limited influence in the region and within transnational networks, studying Lima's transnational relations with regard to climate change helps to illustrate the "hidden" dynamics of TCCG. As a result, Lima's case contributes to seeing who plays a key role in TCCG, and if transnational networks are moved by other interests, rather than the promotion of an alternative, and more horizontal, climate governance. In other words, the chapter also aims to observe what the city's role is in transnational relations within collaborative networks, or with other cities; do they use transnational networks to adopt or to promote specific policies? Similarly, the chapter aims to answer how transnational relations may or may not influence urban politics. As it will be shown in the following paragraphs, most of the time, Lima's climate politics show up the influence from private transnational actors. Contrary to other cities in Latin America (such as Mexico City, Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires), Lima does not represent a point of reference for economic activities, nor does it have political influence in relation to climate policies, in particular, those related to infrastructure in LCEPT.

Additionally, the chapter aims to describe Lima's relations with foreign actors related to climate politics<sup>48</sup>. An analysis of cities' international activity related to climate change contributes to concluding at which point transnational actors influence urban politics. For instance, the SNA of Lima's transnational relations shows how Lima is connected to philanthropic organizations through transnational networks, and the role that these hybrid and intermediary<sup>49</sup> actors play in urban

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<sup>48</sup> For this section, the term "climate politics" is going to be used to refer to the legislation, programmes and policies aiming to address any activity related to mitigate or adapt (or both) to extreme climate phenomena and changes in the climate system.

<sup>49</sup> For the purpose of this research, the terms "intermediary" and "hybrid" actors refer to those key players interfering in urban climate politics, either by producing knowledge or promoting certain types of public policies. In the case of hybrid actors, I consider those who still play a key role in urban climate politics and who are a mix of public and private, local and foreign. The next sections describe some of these actors in Lima's climate politics, and their role in the policy process related to climate change and foreign affairs in the city.

climate politics. Put it differently, the section contributes to deploying the city's agency on climate politics and the role of these actors and their influence on Lima's climate politics. This type of analysis contributes to observing if urban politics respond to interest from external actors, if the urban policies and strategies related to climate change follow tendencies dictated by foreign actors, or at which point cities' climate politics are formulated, and driven, by endogenous actors.

Lastly, the section is a rough attempt to classify the interventions from each foreign actor involved with projects in the Lima metropolitan area. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that it becomes difficult to attribute each action on climate change, to locate each intervention in only one classification, and to attribute them to only one actor, due to the transversal nature and interconnectivity between the different actors; especially when the context and subjects require closer collaboration and coordination among the actors involved.

#### *4.1 Peru's Climate Politics*

Understanding how the institutional infrastructure is, as well as knowing how the Peruvian central governance is organized, helps to illustrate the complexity of urban climate governance in Lima when it comes to trying to implement changes, improvements, reforms and investments related to climate change politics.

Most of the regional strategies on climate change focus more on adaptation than mitigation (Staff Member from the Ministry of the Environment, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017), differing from the national strategy, which places more emphasis on mitigation. As opposed to other countries, Peru

has one more level of government (four instead of three) which could complicate trying to coordinate policies among the different levels of government. As some of the interviewees mentioned *La desarticulación de la información es una de las principales características de la administración pública Peruana* ([The] disarticulation of information is one of the main characteristics of the Peruvian public administration.) (Rosana Arauco, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Leonardo Mesa Reyes, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Additionally, there is absurd duplicity in the public management of Lima (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). According to another of the interviewees, one of the origins of the problem is the lack of coordination with the central government, which results in a wild environment in urban governance that represents an obstacle to policy improvement. For instance, since the beginning of the collaboration between the CCI –later C40- and the Lima’s government, the barriers were not technical nor financial, the challenges they faced being mainly social and political (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). These characteristics make it more difficult to generate and process the information. Therefore, it becomes more challenging to improve public policies in several areas of the government (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017), including climate politics.

#### *4.1.1 National legislation and institutional mechanisms*

Legislation related to climate change in Peru is limited. It was 2018 when the country passed and enacted its first climate change law. Even when there are three strategic documents about Lima’s climate change strategy, the central government overtake cities’ participation in each of the strategies. For example, in the organization of the COP20 in 2014, Lima was neither included in the decision-making project of the COP, nor in the national commission for climate change (Guiselle

Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017).

**Table 3. Peruvian legislation related to climate change**

Name of the document	Type of document (Law, Program)	Level (Municipal, Regional)	Year approved
<i>Plan Metropolitano de Desarrollo Urbano Lima-Callao 2035</i>	Planning	Municipal	2011
<i>“Estrategia de Adaptación y Acciones de Mitigación de la Provincia de Lima al Cambio Climático”</i>	Planning	Regional	
<i>Estrategía Regional de Cambio Climático de Lima 2015-2021</i>	Strategy	Regional	2015
<i>Estrategía Nacional ante el Cambio Climático</i>	Strategy	National	2015
<i>Ley Marco sobre Cambio Climático</i>	Law	National	2018

Source: Author’s elaboration

Furthermore, the law does not contemplate the participation of Peruvian cities in the law’s implementation. In fact, cities’ participation is barely mentioned and not included in the actions derived from the strategies. For instance, the climate change law’s regulations contemplate opening up spaces for local governments, but prefer to prioritize the participation of private enterprise in climate change strategies. Furthermore, in its chapter 2, the law does not contemplate other actors, besides the Ministry of the Environment.

While programs and laws at a national level prioritize investment in infrastructure, as well as the creation of institutional mechanisms to address climate change, the metropolitan government during Villarán’s term focused on territorial justice, as stated in the document “*Plan Metropolitano de*

*Desarrollo Urbano Lima-Callao 2035.*” (“Metropolitan Urban Development Plan Lima-Callao 2035”).

#### *4.1.2 Peru’s relation with IOs and cooperation agencies*

As mentioned in the previous section, Lima’s foreign and climate politics are strongly influenced by IOs and regional organizations, leaving the city’s government with little room for decision. This influence is notable in the central government’s agenda on climate change. Trapped in the institutional and legal complexity of the Peruvian political system, local actors, public and private, usually have no voice in climate change politics, despite the fact that they are more vulnerable to natural disasters, and the ones which cover all the environmental, political and economic costs in the end. Consequently, IOs have a strong influence on Lima’s climate politics, where such foreign actors have shaped the priorities of the cities. Likewise, their type of partnerships encourages the public/private partnerships in climate initiatives. In this sense, it is important to note the active participation, direct or indirect, from the OECD, the WB, regional organizations such as the CAF, as well as several different foreign governments through their embassies.

One way to illustrate the influence of IOs on national climate change policies, and consequently urban politics, is by observing how municipal politics prioritize mitigation over adaptation. As one of the interviewees explained, Lima [metropolitan area] is highly vulnerable to climate change and still the government focusses in mitigation and not [enough] on adaptation, even when Peru contributes only 1% to global emissions (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). Despite this, the strategy from the central government focuses mainly on mitigation (Barandiarán, Fajardo, et al., 2014; Barandiarán, Tantalean, et al., 2014; *Ley Marco Sobre Cambio Climático*, 2017; Gerencia

Regional de Recursos Naturales y Gestión del Medio Ambiente, 2015; MINAM, 2015). The reason, perhaps, is due to the influence of external actors. According to Castillo, the [climate change] strategy “would not be completed,” and would not fulfill the requirements [as well as the parameters] to become a member of the OECD (Idem). It would be worth asking why the Peruvian central government prioritizes mitigation over adaptation as a priority, at the same time allowing the OECD parameters to influence their climate politics? Is it the way to get access to funding or is it just an example of orchestration in global climate governance? In part, due to the influence of IOs, such as the OECD, most of its projects and funding focus on mitigation, and not on adaptation. For example, the law on climate change, as well as the upgrade for the national strategy, strongly influenced the OECD requirements to accept Peru as a member of the organization<sup>50</sup>. As one of the interviewees from the MINAM expressed when she referred to these changes: “To be part of the OECD, we need to change the state.”<sup>51</sup> (staff member from the Ministry of the Environment, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). Related to climate change policies, this means, among other things, a set of changes in the economic model that helps to promote a “green growth” including a transition to a clean energies system. Also, the necessary changes in the laws that facilitate foreign direct investment and trade to get access to such technologies.

Related to this, throughout the interviews and the documents revised, the conversation with staff members from the Peruvian government was always surrounding economic development and how

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<sup>50</sup> Among the criteria to gain the status as member to the OECD, the Framework for the consideration of Prospective Member stipulates a “Rules-based open market economy” which includes “*Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations: [...] minimizing restrictions to the movements of capital as well as the liberalization of cross-border trade in services*” (OECD, 2017; OECD & G20, 2015).

<sup>51</sup> In this context, the expression used by the interviewee “change the state” refers to the need of economic, political and law reforms that promotes an open market economy, and where the main engine for economic growth is direct foreign investment and trade. Nonetheless, according to several authors, these types of policies have proved to be a limited success, particularly in Latin American countries during the 1980s. To expand more on this see: Stiglitz, J. (2006).

to change the course towards a greener economic model, without mentioning the need for deep structural changes. The predominant discourse centers on modernization and marketization of solutions, a predominant approach in economic rationality and emissions reduction. However, contrary to the central government and transnational actors approach, Villarán's administration adopted an inclusive discourse to urban politics.

In the same sense, the staff from the APCI adopted a predominant approach to economic rationality, when talking about cooperation projects. Mentioned several times as one of the priorities, the APCI promotes the participation of INGOs, foundation and philanthropic associations in cooperation projects, where the main goal is to make profits from natural resources. As a mechanism to legitimize such policies, the agency includes the concept of reciprocity in the discourse as a way to justify the involvement of foreign actors. All these actions also include an aspirational aspect of reaching economic development levels and modernity, when I observed the intonation and the way the staff referred to such initiatives. Similarly, the intention to promote approaches dictated from the global North, that later on translates in policies, is evident; for example, the concept of circular economy<sup>52</sup>, which is contemplated among the Sustainable Development Goals from UN. APCI uses this concept to promote cooperation projects and propel green growth.

Another predominant concept throughout fieldwork among staff members from the central government was related to prioritize mitigation over adaptation in climate politics. The leading discourse moved around the idea to prioritize mitigation over adaptation in Lima's climate politics.

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<sup>52</sup> A circular economy is an economic system aimed at eliminating waste and the continual use of resources. Circular systems employ reuse, sharing, repair, refurbishment, remanufacturing and recycling to create a close-loop system, minimizing the use of resource inputs and the creation of waste, pollution and carbon emissions. See more in: (Ghosh, 2020; Lacy et al., 2020; Stahel, 2016, 2019).

In this case, the APCI and C40 use the same speech of mitigation, as a priority, over adaptation. As a result, the discourse also focused on emissions reduction. In order to do that, according to one of the interviewees, system thinking and the promotion of technology innovation is needed. The goal is to make profits in the decarbonization process. However, when I asked if the organization considered Lima's priorities in the climate strategy, the interviewee hesitated. Does that mean the "suggestions" [quotations added] from a foreign actor were final and did not accept modifications from the local government [Lima's government in this case], just because Villarán's administration was different from the transnational actor's priorities? In the same sense, among the key words repeated very often were "technical solutions", "decarbonisation", "efficiency" and "decentralization" (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). A clear example in which the discourse can be reflected is the case when this transnational actor cited, as one of the priorities, work on sanitation landfills in Lima. The main reason that project was a priority for the network was the fast and controlled GHG emissions, since it could give easy and quick results that could communicate (one of Bloomberg's priorities), even though the emissions were minimal compare to other areas, such as transportation. The evidence shown in the chapter demonstrates how transnational climate governance is facilitating transnational corporate access to Latin American cities. Consequently, the APCI (an agency that is part of the Peruvian Foreign Affairs Ministry) prioritizes relations with the private sector and transnational corporations. Similarly, the agency's projects have followed economic rationality in its cooperation policies for the last ten years (APCI, 2005, 2009, 2015). In other words, the agency shows a strong influence from the private sector in environmental cooperation planning, execution, and governance follows the footsteps of private interests. For instance, the agency supported a project between the local NGO "Aquafondo"<sup>53</sup> and

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<sup>53</sup> Aquafondo works as a multi-sectoral platform to connect agents from a different sector in society related to water management in the metropolitan area of Lima and Callao (See more in <http://aquafondo.org.pe/nosotros-2/>).

private companies related to the supply of water to produce sodas (Rosana Arauco, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Leonardo Mesa Reyes, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

This tendency raises the question about the role of external players influencing Peru's foreign policy. Likewise, one of the agency's priorities is to give tax benefits to private NGOs, as in the example described above (Leonardo Mesa Reyes, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). This kind of policy raises the question of the influence that transnational corporations may have on transnational governance, especially when actors, such as the Finnish Embassy, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Swiss Embassy, promoted the exchange of experiences and expertise between INGOs, IOs and local actors in the different regions of Peru for the evaluation of regional governments in their climate change strategy (Rosana Arauco, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Leonardo Mesa Reyes, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Furthermore, the WB, either directly or indirectly through INGOs or consulting companies, also participates in the design of Peru's climate policies. For instance, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society and indigenous peoples, focused on GHG mitigation through deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, also known as REDD+. The FCPF started operations in June 2008 and currently has 47 REDD countries participating (18 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 11 in Asia-Pacific). The Participants Committee is made up of 14 forested (REDD+) countries and 14 financial contributors. It also includes the participation of observers representing indigenous peoples, civil society, IOs, the UN-REDD Programme, the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat and the private sector. The WB assumes the functions of trustee and secretariat. The WB, the IDB and UNDP are Delivery Partners under the Readiness Fund<sup>54</sup>. Another international institution which has an essential role in the design of the Peru's climate change politics is the CAF<sup>55</sup>.

Similarly, it is worth observing the active role of regional organizations, such as the CAF, (CAF, 2016a) on infrastructure and investment programs related to public transportation in Latin American cities. In this regard, the project *Huella de carbono y huella de agua en tres ciudades andinas* (Carbon and water footprint in three Andean cities) in which the CAF participates in collaboration with the British NGO Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN)<sup>56</sup>. The project aims to support the implementation of municipal mitigation and adaptation strategies to climate change. Through the evaluation of both the carbon footprint and hydric footprint at municipal government and city level, it aims to promote mitigation policies and water management measures for adaptation (CAF, 2013). However, according to Guisselle Castillo, a climate change specialist from

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<sup>54</sup> See more in <http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/about-fcpf-0>

<sup>55</sup> The CAF was created in 1970, and it is owned by 17 countries in Latin America (Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panamá, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela), Spain, Portugal, along with 13 private banks in the region. According to their website, the bank promotes a sustainable development model through credit operations, non-reimbursable resources, and support in the technical and financial structuring of projects in the public and private sectors of Latin America (CAF, 2018).

<sup>56</sup> The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) was funded by the UK Department for International Development until March 2018. Since June 2018, the network has been mainly funded by the Canada's International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the Royal Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS). Led by the South Africa-based NGO SouthSouthNorth (SSN), the CDKN works closely with its partners Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (FFLA), ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, South Asia in Delhi, as well as the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London. Moreover, the network works in three main areas. The first is knowledge and learning which focus on making information and learning on climate compatible development easier to access and use, in support of ambitious climate action. The second area involves the technical assistance that provides tailored and demand-driven support to developing country decision-makers in the design and delivery of climate compatible development policies and practices. Finally, the CDKN's activities include research by supporting demand-led, policy-relevant, applied research, led and implemented by a wide range of universities, private sector partners, NGOs and international agencies related to capacity-building, climate resilience and investment in projects related to tackle climate change. See more in: [https://cdkn.org/about/?loclang=en\\_gb](https://cdkn.org/about/?loclang=en_gb)

the Natural Resource Office from the Municipality of Lima during Susana Villarán administration, the most important thing was not the calculation itself, but to propose solutions for the city, evaluating the impacts and the economic cost and benefit as much as possible (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). This coincides with the CDKN's approach to climate politics. According to their website:

*The goal of CDKN's country programme is to contribute to Peru becoming a low-carbon, sustainable, inclusive economy. CDKN is working to see climate adaptation and mitigation approaches mainstreamed into development, to increase Peru's competitiveness and the resilience of the most vulnerable groups (CDKN, 2018).*

Equally important is the participation of the ECLAC<sup>57</sup> of the UN. Since the beginning, the commission promotes among the countries members a sustainable development strategy where economic growth is one of the axes in the documents (e.g., ECLAC, 2013, 2014; Maquet, 2017; Vergara et al., 2013).

#### *4.2 Civil societies' participation in the Peruvian Climate Governance*

As a result of the authoritarian nature of Fujimori's government (1990-2000), civil society's involvement in Peru was fragmented and divided during subsequent decades. Such fragmentation

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<sup>57</sup> The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) - the Spanish acronym is CEPAL - was established by Economic and Social Council Resolution 106(VI) of 25 February 1948 and began to function that same year. ECLAC is one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations. It was established with the purpose of contributing to the economic development of Latin America, coordinating actions directed towards this end, and reinforcing economic ties among countries and with other nations of the world. The promotion of the region's social development was later included among its primary objectives. To see more, check <https://www.cepal.org/en/about-eclac-0>

included “...lacking a strong leadership capable of overcoming sectional interests and building a movement that was more than just the sum of its parts.” (Crabtree & Durand, 2017, p. 74).

Furthermore, due to the impulse of neoliberal politics during Fujimori’s regime, the flourishing involvement of the civil society actors was led by NGOs and, in some cases, by INGOs, private consulting companies allied with governmental departments, as well as some private and foreign universities. Their participation includes several aspects of climate governance, both at a national and local level. Nonetheless, civil society’s involvement in climate governance, including NGOs and universities, present a fragmented and weak front, when private consulting companies increased their influence in the development of Peru’s and Lima’s climate politics.

#### *4.2.1 The participation of NGOs, INGOs, and philanthropic organizations*

Even when the COP20 helped to raise awareness from civil society, local NGOs in Lima did not participate in the decision-making process of urban climate politics. For instance, the climate change national commission (the primary institutional mechanism in Peru) discriminates against local NGOs in the decision-making process, even though the strategic documents and laws mention the intention to give voice to and involve all actors in the development of Peru’s climate strategies. As Liliana Miranda mentioned, the commission is more political; therefore, actors from civil society do not have much say in the decision making. There are some “privileged” NGOs that have complete access and can make suggestions and influence the national strategy for climate politics (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Despite these limitations, what the COP20 represented was an opportunity for local NGOs to get in touch with other NGOs from different parts of the world. Also, the conference motivated different NGOs and civil organizations in Lima to organize and coordinate their actions, together with the central government, related to climate politics. For instance, the NGO “Proética” – the Peruvian chapter for the International NGO, Transparency International - focuses on establishing how resources from international agents are used and implemented in the forestry sector, as well as in all the projects and initiative from REDD+. As Astrid Aguilar, specialist of the “Integrity in Climate Governance” Program – Proética, mentioned during the interview, after ascertaining the amount of money the central government received from IOs, Proética’s activities related to climate change focus on three primary axes. Firstly, they are involved in the design of the National Forest and Climate Change Strategy<sup>58</sup>, aside from the National Strategy for Climate Change. Secondly, the NGO participates in developing transparency mechanisms related to the FCPF<sup>59</sup> alongside indigenous associations in the country, such as the Inter-Ethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDSESP for its acronym in Spanish). Finally, the inclusion of the transparency aspect in the policies related to climate change; a mechanism against corruption. These efforts also included work related to the integration of non-governmental participants in institutional arrangements for climate governance, such as the National Commission for Climate Change (NCCC), along with five more actors from civil society (Astrid Aguilar, interview, September 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Related to the latter, Aguilar adds, when the organization started to map anticorruption mechanisms in the country, they realized there was a lack of institutional mechanism at a regional

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<sup>58</sup> The National Forest and Climate Change Strategy is an initiative presented by the Ministry of Environment from Peru during the COP 14 in Poznan, Poland. The strategy aims to promote forest conservation that contributes to mitigating GHG emissions. See more in (MINAM, 2016).

<sup>59</sup> Also known as REDD+, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society and indigenous peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. See more in <https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/peru>

level. This absence of institutional channels did not promote the dialogue and participation from different sectors and groups at a regional and local level, including the private sector, other NGOs and local governments with the institutions in charge of the climate policies at a national level (Idem).

Likewise, the local NGO, the Citizens' Movement against Climate Change (MOCICC for its acronym in Spanish), featured as another important actor involved in the Peruvian climate governance. This NGO was founded by a network of groups from civil society whose origins come from groups affiliated to the Catholic Church called "Red Jubileo" (Jubilee Network). Since its origins, groups belonging to the "Red Jubileo" have focused on advocating the cancelation of the external debt in Latin American countries, since such debt was negotiated with dishonest and corrupted terms from the financial institutions. After the UNFCCC designated Lima as the host city for the Conference of the Parties in 2014 (COP20), the network saw the need to create a space that allowed civil society to express their concerns and construct dialogue on climate policies. Through the foundation of MOCICC, as Luis Gárate Sánchez, Coordinator of Renewable Energies of the MOCICC mentioned during the interview, these groups aimed to articulate the voices and efforts around the country to express their concerns to national governments and IOs (Luis Gárate, interview, September 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Similarly, according to Guisselle Castillo, a climate change specialist from the Lima's Municipal Government between 2011-2015, the MOCICC collaborated with the municipality at the beginning of the Villarán government in the elaboration of the Municipal Climate Change Strategy for Lima, with its main focus on adaptation. The document, as Guisselle Castillo adds, pushed the city's climate change strategy towards what was required for the city. In the case of MOCICC, the NGO worked in the participatory section of the strategy,

organizing meetings, articulating all opinions and perspectives from the different actors but not in the methodology of the document's design (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017).

Another essential actor from civil society is the local NGO “Foro Ciudades para la Vida” (Forum Cities for Life), a network that brings together civil society organizations, local governments and universities, among others, as part of the Local Agenda 21 movement (Steinberg & Miranda, 2005).

The Forum focuses its activities on advocating and bringing technical support, training, capacity building and best practices dissemination among municipalities and agencies concerned with environmental issues. Since the early 2000s, the forum has placed a strong emphasis on capacity building, focusing on decentralized training and technical assistance to promote civil participation and the strengthening of existing local and national networks of local actors (Idem). One example is the Forum's participation in the development of the document *La economía de ciudades resilientes y de bajas emisiones de carbono: Lima-Callao, Peru* (The economy of resilient cities and low carbon emissions: Lima-Callao, Peru). This study was funded by the IDB together with the British Embassy in Peru. It included the participation of several academic institutions like the University of Leeds, UK; the Pontifical Catholic University, Peru (PUCP); the National Agrarian University La Molina, Peru; the University of the Pacific, as well as the private consultant group *Biopower Capital*<sup>60</sup>, and the MINAM (Gouldson et al., 2015). Furthermore, the Forum has actively participated in the process of the *National Strategy for Climate Change 2015* promoted by the Central Government (MINAM, 2015), as well as in the creation of the NCCC and the climate policies that the commission supports.

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<sup>60</sup> Created in 2013, Biopower Capital is a private consultant company dedicated to finance and develop renewable energy ventures in Latin America. The company utilizes project financing techniques to create private equity financial instruments and works with investors. Their project portfolio includes clean production proposals (solid waste, solar & small hydros) which are CO2 neutral and have strong business inclusive. See more in <http://www.biopowercapital.com/nosotros/>.

AVINA, a Latin American Foundation created in 1994 by the Swiss entrepreneur Stephan Schmidheiny<sup>61</sup>, also holds a critical position among actors from civil society involved in the process of the elaboration of Lima's climate change strategy. Considered as a gatekeeper in the network (see Figure 3), this philanthropic organization is responsible for connecting the city with a group of other foundations from transnational corporations. Additionally, AVINA focuses on the incubation and promotion of collaborative projects with actors from different sectors in areas related to sustainable development. The foundation has a presence in 21 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean. Related to climate change, AVINA prioritizes the transition to low-emission, resilient and inclusive development (AVINA, 2018). Likewise, it participated in the development of the methodologies and tools to measure Lima's carbon footprint, included in the document *Ciudades sostenibles y Cambio Climático: Seminario Internacional*, participated in preparation for the COP20 (*Ciudades Sostenibles y Cambio Climático: Seminario Internacional*, 2014). However, as opposed to the central government's vision, the municipal government during Villarán's administration, along with AVINA, focused the city's climate strategy mainly on adaptation. The reason was, according to Anna Zucchetti, that they believed at the time [and still consider it as of today] that, contrary to the national government and IOs strategies, adaptation is the central priority for Lima (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

As a result of the relation with AVINA, Lima is connected with several of the largest philanthropic organizations internationally. Even when this connection is indirect for most of the time, or through

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<sup>61</sup> Stephan Schmidheiny's fortune has its origins from his grand-uncle, who founded a company which built construction materials in 1912 (bricks and cement). In 1979, Schmidheiny became board president of his father's construction materials company Swiss Eternit Group. When his father divided the estate in 1984, Stephan inherited Eternit. In 2003 Schmidheiny placed \$1 billion in business assets into a charitable trust that helps entrepreneurs across both Central and South America (Forbes, 2018), and founded the NGO.

one of the two main actors in Lima's transnational relations, these actors add up to the diversity of participants in the urban climate politics. For instance, figure 3 shows how Lima is connected with several foundations from transnational corporations, such as the Coca-Cola Foundation, the Danone Foundation and the Ford Foundation, amongst others. Together with the vision from APCI and the central government, which gives priority to the participation of transnational corporations and economic development over social justice, these actors have easier access to participate in Lima's climate strategy.

#### *4.3 Consulting companies*

Although actors from civil society are included as members in the NCCC, not all of them have the same level of influence and access – either formally or informally- to participate in the decision-making process. From an historical perspective, Crabtree & Durand (2017) attributes the involvement and close participation of private entities in government reforms to Fujimori's government in the early 1990s. During that time, the Peruvian government implemented a profound change of the state, which involved privatization of state companies, the implementation of a new agricultural property regime, tax reforms, deregulation of trade policies and the financial sector, as well as in-depth reforms in education, health and the social and judicial systems. Such reforms were mainly orchestrated by experts and economists from the WB, as well as Peruvians economists educated at American universities. These reforms established the bases for public/private collaborations in which private actors, such as consulting companies, were given tax exemptions (Idem).

Based on her experience participating in the commission, the General Director of *Foro Ciudades para la Vida*, Liliana Miranda, mentions that not all actors from civil society are excluded from the decision-making process. For instance, even when they do not officially have the right to vote, private consulting companies, such as Libelula<sup>62</sup>, hold a better position, and have more power to influence the decisions in the commission (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017). For instance, Miranda claims that every time this consultant company takes a report to the commission, all the members approve the report, even though the document is not properly analyzed and discussed. These actors are deeply involved in Peru's, and consequently Lima's, climate policies (Idem). The way these actors are connected to the city is through TNs and INGOs. For the case of Lima, C40 and AVINA are the ones connecting the city with this section of the TCC.

Furthermore, she argues that one of the main reasons that Peru's climate policies focus on mitigation is due to the approach that the Direction for Climate Change from the MINAM takes with regard to climate policies in the country. As the representatives of the Lima's central government in each COP, the direction focuses their efforts in promoting policies addressing mitigation. In this sense, one of the reasons Peru focuses on mitigation is because, through this type of policy, it is easier to obtain funds from international agencies for any of the ministries in the central government. Contrary to adaptation policies, according to the Peruvian legislation, if they focused on funds for adaptation, the resources would go to the National Center for the Estimation, Prevention and Reduction of Disaster Risks (CENEPRED for its acronym in Spanish)<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> Libelula is a Peruvian private consulting company created in 2007. The field of expertise focuses on the articulation of private, public and civil society organizations in the design of climate policies. Since 2015, the company got the certification as *Empresas B*. This certification is part of a transnational group of consultant companies, called *Sistema B*, a transnational group of companies linked to the CAF, the IDB and the IDRC (Libelula, 2018).

<sup>63</sup> The CENEPRED is the institution in charge of providing specialized technical assistance to public and private entities in the processes of estimating, preventing and reducing disaster risk. The center is a public institution belonging to the Ministry of Defense. See more in: (CENEPRED, 2018).

Consequently, the Direction would lose both material and influential power within the government (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

#### 4.4 Universities

Universities are also involved in the design of climate politics in Peru, through the development of methodologies, diagnostics and strategies to address several issues in the national climate agenda. However, they are not as deeply involved in the design of policies compared to private consulting companies.

Alongside private consulting companies, this type of actors contributes to reinforcing the dominant approach on climate and sustainable politics, putting emphasis on emissions mitigation and technical solutions to environmental problems. Also, foreign universities are the ones spearheading academia's involvement. Even when their nature is to do research, transnational actors are the ones suggesting methodologies that helps to generate the strategies based on the data obtained. For instance, the project *La economía de ciudades resilientes y de bajas emisiones de carbono: Lima-Callao, Perú* (The economy of resilient and low-carbon cities: Lima-Callao, Peru), led by Leeds University, focused on the economic aspects of climate change mitigation in Lima-Callao (Gouldson et al., 2015). From an economic perspective, the study suggests more effective measures to mitigate GHG in the sectors of energy, housing, transport, industry, commerce, solid waste and water management in Lima's metropolitan area. However, it is important to note that the study does not only put forward public policies to address climate resilience, but explores economic

opportunities for Lima when it moves towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient development path that is more efficient regarding energy and water (Idem, P. 8).

Another important initiative that has contributed to the development of capacity building and technical assistance for the urban environmental management is the Peruvian Urban Management Education Program (PEGUP for its acronym in Spanish) (Steinberg & Miranda, 2005). Created in 1998 with the support of the local NGO FCPV, and the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHUDES), the initiative provides educational post-graduate programs or technical assistance systems to municipalities in Peru. The program is oriented to apply research to develop concrete solutions related to urban development problems, offering a platform where local governments can learn and build capacities that help them in the design of more, improved public policies on sustainable and climate issues. As Steinberg and Miranda mention, the PEGUP combines academic education with technical assistance to municipal development activities, which includes research oriented to concrete solutions of urban environmental issues. The program also offers information and distance learning services to the public (p. 178). In the case of Lima, higher-education institutions participating in the program, such as the National University of Engineering (UNI for its acronym in Spanish) in the example of Lima, were involved in the development of the production of the Environmental Atlas of Lima. Also, the Clean Air initiative promoted by the WB and supported by the FCPV and other local NGOs were among the actions in which the PEGUP participated in in Lima.

#### *4.5 Lima's network activity*

Lima's network activity presents a variety of actors that goes from national municipal networks to regional collaboration networks with South American cities and TNs (such as ICLEI, C40 and Cities Alliance) with a global scope that involves cities from all around the world. However, for the scope of the research, this chapter only focuses on the city's participation in regional networks, its involvement in the creation and organization of joint initiatives, and in Lima's relation and interaction with C40. As I will mention in the following paragraphs, Lima's intervention in the creation and involvement in regional networks during Villarán's administration was one of the priorities guiding the city's international strategy.

##### *4.5.1 Regional networks*

Lima's international relations during Susana Villarán's administration prioritize relationships with cities in South America and Spain in Europe. As Anna Zucchetti, former Director of Lima's Parks Service (SERPAR for its acronym in Spanish) mentioned during the interview, Barcelona, Spain and Medellín, Colombia were seen as references by the government. In some cases, they were the primary consultants and advisors regarding urban planning (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Likewise, individual relations, and not structural and institutional factors contributed to Lima's network activities. Personal relations between mayors contributed to the development of network activities, and replaced the lack of institutional support from the central government.

As in the case of South American cities, such as Bogota, Colombia, and Quito, Ecuador, those cities became the main allies during Villarán's administration when it came to network activities. Together with Lima, the three cities coordinated their positions, exchanged experiences and developed strong political solidarity that other cities in South America followed. For instance, the three cities founded the network *Red de Ciudades Sudamericanas* in 2012 (El Universal, 2012; La Prensa, 2012; REDCISUR, 2012). This network aimed to “[...] *identify issues and scenarios for the exchange of experiences in urban management, formulate a political agenda for the region and link cities in the networks and other international actor,*” (REDCISUR, 2012). According to Gabriela Camacho, a specialist in international relations from the Deputy Office of International Technical Cooperation during Susana Villarán's administration, the mayors from the three cities discussed the creation of REDCISUR based on the idea that cities in the region faced similar challenges. Due to their closeness at an individual level, members of the network developed robust political solidarity between cities in the same region. They considered the organization as a support network and a safe space where they could exchange information and experiences based on similar contexts, as well as support from the members when each city faced internal conflicts in their countries, mainly each time national governments tried to take over the cities' faculties (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017). Additionally, Camacho mentions that was the case when the Peruvian government tried to take over Lima's faculties in the preparation of the Pan-American Games in 2019. That time, the mayors of Bogota and Rio de Janeiro made some public declarations defending Lima's position. Unfortunately, after several changes in each of the local governments, the network lost leadership (Idem).

Many of the topics related to international cooperation start by individual or personal contacts, not necessarily as a product of a network collaboration, but sometimes through personal contacts between staff members or mayors. That is how the initiatives for cooperation projects are started and are easily developed. For instance, at the end of 2013, the city participated in a project called “City’s Carbon Footprint” in which the CAF and CDKN were involved. Initially, this project started with Quito (Ecuador), La Paz (Bolivia) and Lima as pilot cities. It was thanks to the close relationship between mayors and the close relationship with AVINA and one of the staff members in Lima that the cities were chosen (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017).

Another example of Lima’s network activity in the region was the *Red Latinoamericana de Ciudades Capitales* (RLACC) (Latin American Network of Mayors of Capital Cities). This network was founded by three Latin American mayors at the time, Gustavo Petro from Bogotá, Colombia; Augusto Barrera from Quito, Ecuador; and Susana Villarán in Lima in Peru. Additionally, four cities in South America joined the initiative; Santiago, in Chile, Buenos Aires in Argentina and La Paz and Sucre in Bolivia. The network is an extension of the regional organization UNASUR<sup>64</sup>. As Gabriela Camacho comments, several of these mayors met and concluded that they had a certain closeness or similar ideas that they wanted to push forward. That is the context in which they decided to create the network. Furthermore, she adds that Bogotá took the leadership in the

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<sup>64</sup> The UNASUR (sometimes referred to as the South American Union) is an intergovernmental organization with international legal personality, composed of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Its main objective is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, a space for cultural, social, economic and political integration and union among its peoples. The organization prioritizes the political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others. It also aims to eliminate socio-economic inequality, achieving social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthening democracy and reducing asymmetries within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of states. The treaty establishing UNASUR (TCU) was signed on May 23, 2008 in the framework of the Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State and Government, held in the city of Brasilia, Brazil. In April 2018, six countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru - suspended their membership, and in August of the same year, Colombia announced its withdrawal from the organization. In March 2019, Brazil announced its intention to withdraw from the organization. As of 2019, most of the members have withdrawn from the organization. See more in <https://www.parlamentomercosur.org/innovaportal/v/4503/2/parlasur/unasur.html>

formation and promotion of the network, because it already had an important international relations office and was already working on several things. In this sense Bogotá saw a window of opportunity and took advantage of it. Besides, the three mayors had a lot of ideas in common and were very close, ideologically speaking. Neither of them had a plan for the network, what motivated them at the beginning to position their cities in the regional and international scenario (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017). Furthermore, Lima was also involved in the constitution of the Latin American Network of Mayors of Capital Cities. The network started with Augusto Barrera, from Quito, Gustavo Petro from Bogotá and Susana Villarán from Lima. Later on the network gathered together 12 more cities in the region, including Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Brazil, and Mexico City (even when it is not considered as a South American city). The reason was principally that these cities contributed with an important portion of their national GDP. The network managed to have a voice, as a group, during their participation in the COP20 in Lima. Some of members who had an environmental agenda and a much deeper knowledge through their policies and also elaboration in relation to all climate change issues, shared their experiences with other cities during the parallel events. For instance, Gustavo Petro, Mayor of Bogotá, began with a policy of solid waste management, which broke the monopolies of some private groups. As a consequence, the attorney general from the national government tried to prosecute him, and even took him out of the mayor's office for a time. As the former Mayor expressed during the interview: “[it was a reflex of] factual powers intervening in urban politics.” (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

In the European context, Barcelona was the principal ally among European cities. As Susana Villarán, mentioned during the interview, Lima found great support from Barcelona every time her team contacted them. The relation between Lima and Barcelona focused the collaboration on promoting technical cooperation in different areas, which made the relation valuable and

represented more than simply a shared political view (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Similarly, the former SERPAR's Director differentiated the role of Barcelona as their principal tutor in the design process and elaboration of the Lima's *Metropolitan Plan for Urban Development 2035* (IMG, 2013), through collaboration with the Regional Agency of Barcelona (ARB for its acronym in Spanish). Furthermore, cooperation among Latin American and European cities sometimes included coordinating political positions on issues related to other networks. For example, as Camacho mentioned during the interview, cities of the Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities (UCCI for its acronyms in Spanish) discussed their preference regarding the C40 Chair's election (2013-2016), where Eduardo Paes, Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, was participating. Before the elections, members of the UCCI network lobbied in favor of Paes and agreed to support Rio's candidacy, which eventually won the election (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017). In the case of Lima, she adds, such decisions were first discussed among international offices in Lima and Bogota, agreed between both governments, and then made it public (Idem).

Regarding international and transnational networks, their involvement with Lima's government was limited. That is the case of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), C40 and ICLEI. For instance, the Natural Resource Office in Susana Villarán's administration was in close communication with ICLEI before the COP20 in Lima, mainly because the ICLEI wanted to include the issue of cities on the agenda of the COP and, although there was perhaps political support, there were not the financial resources to support (Idem). Nonetheless, as Guiselle Castillo, staff member from the Lima's Municipal Government between 2011-2015, mentioned during the interview, neither of these networks contributed with technical or financial support in the development of the organization of the cities' proposal, nor to the organization of the COP (Guiselle

Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). Perhaps the network in which Lima participated more substantially is C40. Nonetheless, as Camacho underlined, the city's involvement with C40 was more circumstantial than voluntary (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017). According to her, other factors, different than the government's interest, influenced Lima's addition to C40 at the time. For instance, the intention from the C40 Steering Committee to have a balance among its members between developed and developing countries influenced the decision to keep Lima as a member, and not necessarily an interest to contribute to climate politics in the region (Idem).

Coincidentally, after Lima started to participate more actively in C40, the city's agency and leadership's participation in other regional networks related to LCEPT decreased considerably. Plus, the inclination towards mainstream/market-based and technology-based solutions became more evident.

#### *4.5.2 Relation with C40*

Among the most influential transnational actors participating in Lima's climate politics is the network C40. More than just connecting Lima with other cities that facilitate the exchange of experiences, the network also worked as gatekeeper. This type of actor plays the role of a buffer between their own group and outsiders. They have the capacity to influence the access of information for the rest of the participants within the network.

In 2006, the CCI –later on C40- started to collaborate with the city on issues related to the implementation of a new public lighting system, and the development of the first BRT system in

Lima. By 2011, the C40 was awarded a multi-year grant from the Bloomberg Philanthropies, which contributed to position the network among the leading climate action organizations worldwide (C40, 2015). However, as mentioned in the previous section, back then C40 didn't have a central role, either in Latin America or in Lima's climate politics, especially during Villarán's administration. Instead, as one of the interviewees mentioned, the organization focused on gaining influence among the city's government officials that eventually created a profitable opportunity for transnational companies. Most of the initiatives were led by the private sector because there was profit to be made in decarbonizing (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). During the early days of the relationship, CCI was managed in a very decentralized way. In this sense, the interviewee mentions that the main concern at that moment was to get [the] emission reductions based on the city's priorities (Idem). This way, CCI worked as a facilitator for the private sector to participate in urban climate politics. The network played a key role in promoting private companies' participation in several areas related to climate politics. For instance, C40 was responsible for promoting the transition to Light Emitting Diode (LED) traffic lights, the implementation of traffic system controls, and to promote the capture of methane within the city and facilitate the participation of transnational companies. For example, through the Clinton Foundation, Castañeda's government implemented the installation of over 6,000 new LEDs across the city to increase Lima's energy efficiency and the reduction of approximately 2,500 tons of carbon dioxide (Clinton Foundation, 2010).

Likewise, according to Gordon (2016), the partnership between the CCI and the C40 between 2006 and 2010 was developed with the intention of providing operational support for the network but, in practice, they were interacting with little communication and coordination. Such discoordination

resulted in an active contestation between the two, where the CCI was trying to establish a specific configuration of governance, and the C40 challenged CCI claims of authority (p. 133). During that period, the administration limited activities with the CCI, including the assistance to a couple of international meetings (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Likewise, the CCI acted as a facilitator of information between Bogota, IOs such as the WB, and Lima's municipal government in the construction of the BRT first, and only, line called *Metropolitano* (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). Nonetheless, despite these projects having the support from C40, the network was not responsible for their implementation. They merely helped to build consensus among all the actors involved (Idem).

Additionally, the appointment of Bloomberg to the C40 presidency in 2012 represented the beginning of Lima's focus shifted as a result of CCI and C40's partnership, which included a series of changes in the network's strategy. These changes included, among other aspects, the adoption of a System Thinking Approach to the development of the cities' network. At the same time, the network focused its efforts on sharing experiences of successful policies. This meant giving preference to projects that offered technical solutions in a short and medium period, but did not represent a deep and structural change in urban politics. In relation to public transportation policies, this change of approach was reflected in the preference to support the construction of the *Metropolitano*, as I will mention with more detail in Chapter 6.

Lima joined the network at its creation in 2005. As opposed to other cities in Latin America, Lima entered as a “megacity<sup>65</sup>” defined by its population and GDP. Its status does not necessarily mean

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<sup>65</sup> The megacity category includes cities with a population of 3 million or more, and/or metropolitan area population of 10 million or more, either currently or projected for 2025. Also, the category could include cities with one of the top 25

the city has an active role and participation in the decision-making process (Gordon, 2016, p. 11). According to Gabriela Camacho, the addition of Lima to C40 was not an initiative that may have come from the municipal government at the time. Environmental issues [such as climate change], she adds, were not a priority in Castañeda's administration. In fact, it was a subject they had rather neglected. What Camacho suspects, is that the interest to include Lima in the C40 came from outside, based on the fact that there was not any public consultation or debate among the different departments within the government, nor between the executive and the municipal council. Additionally, Lima's addition to C40 did not represent a signature of any document, nor a membership payment (such as the case of ICLEI); in fact, the addition to the network represented a great opportunity for the city to gain legitimacy for their actions against climate change and, that way, obtain access to different sources of financing (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017).

In 2011 the C40 was awarded a multi-year grant from the Bloomberg Philanthropies, which helped to position the alliance as one of the leading climate action organizations (C40, 2015). Contrary to the CCI, the approach taken by the C40 was more focused on technical assistance. Additionally, both Clinton and Ira Magaziner<sup>66</sup> gave more importance to ideas and practices oriented toward market-oriented transformation, which eventually shaped the C40 policies after the merger. Likewise, the network endorsed the exchange of experiences in climate policies between cities in the global north and the global South. Such interactions emphasized a governance through a project-based, technology-oriented approach that included values and practices with a private sector

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global cities, ranked by current GDP output, at purchasing power parity (PPP), either currently or projected for 2025. See more in C40 (2012).

<sup>66</sup> Ira Magaziner was the second in command at the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI). Currently, he is the Chief Executive Officer and Vice Chairman of the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI). See more in <https://clintonhealthaccess.org/leadership/>

imperative: innovation, performance, efficiency, return of investment, as well as an emphasis on data and evidence-based action (Gordon, 2016). As one of the interviewees expressed:

*When Bloomberg came in, in 2012, that was when we started to make the whole shift from CCI to C40. A lot of the vision changed when C40 took its life. The technical assistance was scaled down, more of a platform for generating discussion, more platform for sharing and exchanging experiences. The direct technical assistance was a bit diminished after that, and so, there was a major transition in 2012. Most people left the organization because it was lining down toward less technical assistance and more about a discussion of issues, sharing experiences and direct funding from Bloomberg [an attraction to hook interests] (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018).*

In other words, C40 – persuaded by Bloomberg Philanthropies - was more interested in sharing experiences of successful policies, in order to gain influence in the policy design and “sell solutions” related to urban policies for climate change. Put differently, the network became more political and less technical and, apparently, set the basis for an orchestration process in cities (Gordon & Johnson, 2017; Hale & Roger, 2014).

Among the changes originated with Bloomberg’s arrival in 2012 was the adoption of a *System Thinking Approach* to the development of the cities’ network. As a result, the network focused on how the objects of study (cities) interact with the rest constituents of the system. In other words, the approach analyzes the rest of actors, as well as the interaction between them and the behavior resulting from such interaction. The adoption of such a perspective means that instead of isolating

smaller and smaller parts of the system being studied, systems thinking works by expanding its view to take into account larger and larger numbers of interactions as an issue is being considered (Arnold & Wade, 2015).

By the time Susana Villarán won the elections at the end of 2010, Lima was already a member of C40. As Gunther Merzathal, Deputy Manager of Environment for the Municipality of Lima during Villarán's administration argued, C40 did not have a central role in the [climate] strategy proposed [by Villarán's administration] (Gunther Merzathal, interview, August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2017), mainly because the C40 focus was on emissions mitigation. In contrast, Villarán's government focused Lima's climate politics based on their internal agenda, which centered on adaptation. During that period, Lima's government focused the Metropolitan Environmental Agenda on two specific actions; calculation of the carbon footprint and adaptation policies. As Anna Zucchetti argued during the interview, Lima needed to prioritize adaptation before mitigation (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Villarán's administration (which had a leftist ideology background), along with actors from civil society, took action and concentrated on designing politics to address adaptation to climate change (Fundación AVINA, 2017; Fundación Transitamos et al., 2013; *Ciudades Sostenibles y Cambio Climático: Seminario Internacional*, 2014; MINAM, 2015; Miranda Sara & Baud, 2014; Proética, 2016). The fact that Lima's government at the time, as well as local NGOs and the civil society, took the initiative and set its own priorities was the reason why C40 was not very interested in working with Lima's government during that period. According to Anna Zucchetti, when the C40 officials put forward their suggestions about the inclusion of issues related to climate politics were

not taken into consideration as they expected they would be, they decided to end the relation with the Lima's government during Villarán's administration (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). This decision made clear that each one had fundamental differences in the climate strategy. On the one hand, the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI), a program part of the Clinton Foundation<sup>67</sup> launched in 2006, carried a "sustainable development" agenda defined outside Peru by foreign, private players. The CCI prioritized the development and support of a series of projects in different areas which had a strong influence from actors outside Lima. As one of the interviewees mentioned, sometimes these foreign actors were schools, private sector early movers, or professional early movers (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). For example, the creation of an integrated solid waste plan was the only project Lima worked with the CCI in collaboration with the WB (World Bank, 2013), despite it not being among the city's priorities, perhaps because it involved financial resources for Lima (Idem). Furthermore, they helped in the development of a study to decentralize waste water treatment systems and the economics behind that later on resulted in the expansion of water coverage in the metropolitan area (Peruvian Time, 2013; WWI, 2012). Likewise, they supported an initiative to reduce energy use in buildings, which included several public buildings in Lima (CCI, 2007).

On the other hand, since the beginning, the municipality saw the relation with C40 as a support to concrete interventions or projects. For instance, as Anna Zucchetti expressed during the interview,

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<sup>67</sup> The Clinton Foundation (founded in 1997 as the William J. Clinton Foundation and from 2013 to 2015 briefly renamed the Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation) was established by former President of the United States Bill Clinton. In August 2006, the Foundation started a programme to fight climate change, the Clinton Foundation's Climate Initiative (CCI). The CCI runs various programmes to prevent deforestation and to rehabilitate forests and other landscapes worldwide, develop clean energy, and help island nations threatened by rising ocean levels. The same year of its creation, the Foundation entered into a partnership with the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), that provides resources and allows the participating cities to enter into an energy-saving product purchasing consortium, as well as to provide technical and communications support (C40, 2019; Clinton Foundation, 2019).

when Lima was preparing the development of the *Plan Metropolitano de Desarrollo Urbano* (PLAM 2035), the municipality contacted the C40 to express their interest in including several aspects, besides emissions mitigation (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Nonetheless, according to the Ddirector of the local NGO FCPV, the C40 had a limited participation in the elaboration of the PLAM and concentrated on the mitigation part of the strategy (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Furthermore, she adds, the network was part of a team lead by AVINA and included the municipal government, MINAM, the Ministry of Housing, some other local NGOs, private companies, experts from Peruvian universities, as well as FCPV, the local NGO. At the end, the C40, as well as the rest of transnational actors (e.g., ICLEI, the German Agency for International Cooperation, giz), participated in the presentation of the PLAM 2035 during the COP20, but only as a spectator. During the meeting, the C40 gave some opinions, but did not orchestrated the proposals, nor as the one that provide funds to projects. In the event, the mayors attending the COP20 presented the initiatives that all cities had in relation to climate change and public policies developed (Idem).

One of the reasons why C40 had a limited involvement in the development of the PLAM 2035 could be their emphasis on efficiency and their focus on projects with more visibility. As one of the interviewees expressed:

*Why is the mayor going to spend their capital on addressing invisible, odorless hard to measure gas that nobody is going to notice anyway, when there are civil security issues, when there is a lot of civil violence? Against these issues, you have to identify other*

*successes, other problems that have apparent success* (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

In the same sense, with the emphasis on gaining political visibility for the C40, the network focused its interventions in cities with the biggest GDP in the region, such as Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, etc., underestimating, in that way, Lima's potential to develop and share experiences. Similarly, according to the former Mayor, when she and Michael Bloomberg met during the event "City Lab: Urban Solutions to Global Challenges" organized by the Aspen Institute, the magazine "The Atlantic" and Bloomberg Philanthropies (Aspen Inst., 2013; Bloomberg, 2013; CityLab, 2013), he did not show any interest in Lima after realizing that her administration had its plan with defined and clear goals (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Contrary to foreign actors –including C40- Villarán's team had an inclusive discourse. From the mayoral office the administration followed a holistic approach to ecology and urbanization, and a decolonial approach to urban development. In other words, they tried to design urban politics in accordance with the local context, or in the words of the Mayor: "How we can work with what we have." Since Villarán's administration gave importance to geographical and social characteristics to design politics in accordance with the city's context, transnational actors, who have their own perspective and standardized solutions, could not influence Villarán's government. A way to illustrate the misconnection between the "solutions" [quotations added] coming from the outside and the city's needs is with a phrase the former Mayor mentioned during the interview: "*Nada estaba inventado, todo está en el territorio*" [Nothing was invented, everything is in the territory]. For instance, Lima's agenda at that time placed greater emphasis on adaptation policies and

“territorial justice” in the most vulnerable neighborhoods to extreme climate phenomena (like the risk management program on the slopes of Lima *BarrioMio*, PUCP, 2014). Instead, C40 suggestions focused more on the development of large infrastructure projects, and the attraction of major investors to finance such projects (Idem). Besides the lack of interest and disagreements with the network, the Villarán administration did not have the opportunity and resources to invest time in the relationship with C40. The limited resources and political capital at that moment represented a big obstacle in Lima’s foreign policies during Villarán’s government; in particular, the complicated local political context that the Mayor faced during her administration. As she mentioned, being an active member in the network required time and resources to participate in all their events and, at the same time, it was necessary to compete with other Latin America cities, as well as to lobby every two years in order to gain influence with the members. Therefore, the administration considered that it was pointless for Lima to have an active role (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

#### *4.6 Transnational actors participating in Lima’s climate politics*

To better understand Lima’s transnational relations when it comes to climate politics, the Social-Network Analysis (SNA) methodology helps to represent the city’s connections with the different actors becomes useful. The graphic illustration complements the data obtained in the interviews, which helps to get a closer picture of Lima’s transnational climate change relations. As mentioned in chapter 3, the connections were made when listening to the interviews and one of the interviewees mentioned a joint project or collaboration with an organization. Also, reading in documents or checking programs of events in which Lima participated proved useful and, finally, reading the organization’s web sites with all the partners and sponsors. I give special attention to the

role and the influence from hybrid and intermediary<sup>68</sup> actors who contribute to connect Lima with philanthropic organizations and other relevant transnational actors.

Lima's network analysis shows a diversity of actors participating in the city's climate politics. As three of the interviewees mentioned (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017c; Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018; Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017), C40 had the intention to be more involved but could not do it, at least during Villarán's administration. As mentioned before, her government was more concentrated in social justice and in the improvement the quality of life than the promotion of big infrastructure projects and lobbying in international fora. For that reason, during Villarán's administration the network did not represented a strong influence in Lima's climate politics. Nonetheless, C40 represent a potential point of entrance for transnational actors, but due to Villarán's approach, the network did not have much opportunity to influence (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018), neither any of the network's partners, except for CDKN.

As figure 3 illustrates, transnational networks' involvement in making the connection between Lima and actors from the private sector – either private companies or non-profit organizations - is evident. Lima's interaction with actors from civil society involves mostly INGOs, with a few exceptions of some local NGOs. Nonetheless, despite the diversity of actors involved in Lima's climate politics, the SNA shows inconsistencies in the official discourse when they talk about the importance of creating mechanisms that gives space to the Peruvian civil society's participation in the development and planning of the national climate change strategy. For instance, the climate change national commission is more political; therefore, actors from civil society do not have much

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<sup>68</sup> In the case of hybrid actors, I consider those who, still play a key role in urban climate politics and who are a mix of public and private, local and foreign, either by producing knowledge, promoting certain type of public policies.

voice in the decision making. As one of the interviewees mentioned, there are some “privileged” NGOs [referring to those international NGOs involved in Lima] that have complete access and can make suggestions that influence the national strategy for climate politics (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Despite the Peruvian government promoting the involvement of civil society in the country’s climate strategy, the SNA shows some inconsistencies in the discourse when we observe the predominance of philanthropic organizations, INGOs and private companies in Lima’s transnational relations related to climate change. Even when the participation of NGOs is included in the strategy and planning development, as figure 3 shows, the number of local NGOs is fewer compared to the number of INGOs, consulting companies and philanthropic organizations that are participating in the city’s climate politics. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, INGOs have an easier access to the decision-making process compared to local NGOs. Figure 3 shows the involvement of the AVINA, where at least three of the interviewees mentioned the NGO’s involvement in Lima’s climate politics. Additionally, among the INGOs participating in Lima’s climate politics is WRI. Even when they do not have as many projects compared to Mexico City, the institute participated in the organization of exclusive side events, where other philanthropic organizations and cooperation agencies participated. For instance, WRI held several side events during the COP20 in Lima with the governments of Peru and Lima (WRI, 2014). The Lima Climate Finance Series on the sidelines of COP 20 brought together a multitude of actors from different sectors and countries, where they shared their views, thinking and analysis related to climate change finance. Also, the series of events provided an opportunity to showcase their experiences and lessons, strengthen dialogue, collaboration and coordination, and share the latest discussions on the architecture of climate finance, the role of the Green Climate Fund, readiness for climate finance, transparency, scaling up climate finance, and engaging the private sector, among

others. WRI was among the leading organizers of dinner discussion, lunch and dinner events, and half a day of round tables and informal discussions. All of the events organized by the INGO were by invitation, limiting access to local NGOs or any other non-official actor or philanthropic organization (Idem).


Other actors responsible for connecting Lima with influential actors in climate politics are transnational relations besides C40, such as ICLEI, and UCLG. Villarán's team got in touch with ICLEI through UCLG, since both networks were closely linked. For the COP20, ICLEI's intention was to organize a meeting of cities in Lima and they wanted to promote the inclusion of cities on the COP's agenda, and although the financial resources were not available to support this, both networks gave political support to the issue (Guiselle Castillo, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017).

Similar to transnational networks, there are some cities that can be considered as influential actors in Lima's climate politics. On the contrary, actors from Latin America, play an important role and have a stronger influence in the city's climate politics. For example, as I mention in the sub-section 4.5.1, Lima's collaboration with Quito, Sao Paulo, Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro in the creation of RLACC helped to cement their relationship and have further joined in collaboration with C40's activities. Furthermore, Barcelona's participation in the elaboration of Lima's *Metropolitan Plan for Urban Development 2035* and the promotion of technical cooperation between the cities, also represents a factor that contributed to enhancing Lima's participation in C40. All these cities are active C40 members and have an important presence in Latin America, and are also connected with AVINA, the INGO also being involved in joint projects related to climate urban politics. Lastly, IOs and some influential cooperation agencies in the region, such as the WB, IDB, USAID and giz,

appear as important actors in Lima's transnational relations to climate politics. These actors, besides developing joint projects, also represents a point of entrance in connecting the city with each of the principal nodes in the network.

For instance, regional networks do prioritize the exchange of experiences among their activities, and sometimes form a united front in different forums in which they participate. That was the case of the C40's chair election in 2013 in which the Rio de Janeiro Mayor Eduardo Paes was elected for the term 2013-2016 (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Also, as a result of Peru's political system where they have 4, instead of 3, levels of government, is the exposure to the influence from IOs. These foreign actors can have a strong influence in urban politics due to the closeness with them, particularly for the case of Lima. Likewise, the participation in big international events, such as the COP20 in 2014 facilitates the exposure and interactions between staff members from the city and these actors. Due to the diversity and density of Lima's network, climate politics in urban politics is more contested. This diversity of actors is responsible for the inconsistencies and inconclusion of several initiatives.

**Figure 3. Lima's Climate Politics**



Source: Author's elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed in situ, and documents from the city's government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown square represent n interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; light blue circles represent transnational companies and consulting corporations; pink circles represent local NGOs, purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations; dark green are universities and research institutes; yellow circles represent central governmental agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies; dark yellow represent international events; and orange points represent local and regional networks.

#### *4.7 Lima and its relations with the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC)*


As mentioned in the previous section, due to the side events from COP20, many actors had the opportunity to meet in person or to concur in many of the events organized by the city government. Additionally, the events organized by INGOs, such as WRI, which were by invitation only,

contributed to connect Lima's government with CEOs and general directors from philanthropic organizations (WRI, 2014). Also, Susana Villarán met with Anne Hidalgo, who was Mayor of Paris at the time, and held the C40 presidency. During the informal meeting, both mayors discussed the possibility of a more active participation in the network. Likewise, Villarán met Michael Bloomberg when he was hosting his first C40 meeting as chair of C40 in Chicago. Unfortunately, due to internal political issues, Villarán could not attend the summit. Besides Bloomberg did not showed interest in follow up the relation with Lima (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). The rest of the connections in Lima's TCC network were the result of the city's relations with AVINA and C40, and its participation in three international events including the COP20 held in the city.

These individual figured are, as Gramsci calls, organic intellectuals, who participates in Lima's climate politics through consent. For the case of Lima, the TCC is represented by IOs, cooperation agencies and some INGOs (e.g. IDB, AVINA) more than individual figures. Likewise, Gramsci's concept of *transformismo* can be disclosed through the discourse from a member of the MINAM "To be part of the OECD, we need to change the state." (staff member from the Ministry of the Environment, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). As mentioned above, the interviewee used this expression to emphasize the need of economic, political and law reforms that promotes an open market economy, and where the main engine for economic growth is direct foreign investment and trade. As a fundamental element for the hegemony formation, Modonesi (2013) refer to these groups or entire sectors within society [in this case foreign actors] who persuades the rest of the members in society to implement public policies aimed at reform the state according to their perspectives and priorities. This way, for the case of Lima, hegemony is expanded through consent. As already

mentioned in chapter 2, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony claims that domination via consent is more efficient, than the use of force. He argues that domination of classes is more effective and secure through consent. Such consensus is constructed and recreated by the ruling class in society. It is through them that the moral, political and cultural values of the dominant group become widely dispersed and accepted by the subordinate classes as their values (Cox, 1983). As for the case of Lima, hegemony through consent is achieved through IOs and TNs, more than individual figures.

**Figure 4. Lima’s connections with the TCC on climate politics**



Source: Author’s elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed in situ, and documents from the city’s government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown square represent n interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; light blue circles represent transnational companies and consulting corporations; pink circles represent local NGOs, purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations; dark green are universities and research institutes; yellow circles represent central governmental

agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies; dark yellow represent international events; and orange points represent local and regional networks.

#### *4.8 Conclusions*

The chapter on Lima's transnational climate change politics shows the influence of transnational networks, considered as hybrid actors (a mixture between public and private, in the design and development of urban climate politics) and their role as facilitators for corporative actors in policies about LCEPT. The empirical evidence shown in this chapter helps us realize that transnational climate governance follows an economic rationality motivated by TNs.

Simultaneously, the chapter aimed to show the influence of transnational networks, considered as hybrid actors (a mixture between public and private, in the design and development of urban climate politics) and their role as facilitators for corporative actors in local climate politics.

Additionally, how these hybrid actors contribute to gain access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. Based on the information compiled, the question as to whether the participation of cities in transnational networks on climate politics facilitates the involvement of private actors in urban climate politics, becomes relevant. As shown in the chapter, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multimillionaire companies, follow an economic rationality and prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships at the same time they facilitate access to TNCs into Lima' climate politics.

Through the analysis, and interpretation of the empirical evidence compiled, we are able to observe an ongoing process of legitimation, from the different levels of government and from the

transnational actors as well. Even though local actors have the capacity to generate its own strategies, as in the case in Susana Villarán's administration, its participation seems limited by the Peruvian central government. It limits the access to local actors while, at the same time, transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments, contributing to the dominance of market-based approach in urban climate governance. As a result of the strong influence and privileged position of actors, such as the C40, urban climate governance is dictated by interests from transnational corporations and their market-based approaches.

## Chapter 5. Mexico City's Climate Change Politics

### *5.0 Introduction*

Studying a large and ancient city, such as Mexico City, has never been an easy task. As one of the biggest urban areas on the planet, there is a considerable number of endemic, as well as foreign, actors interacting in the urban politics context. Such diversity sometimes represents an obstacle, and other times an advantage.

Climate politics in Mexico City, especially concerning transnational networking aspects, are driven by a desire to attract international investment that then opens the door for transnational companies to get involved in designing climate policy for their own interests. This process is assisted by key western NGOs, like WRI, and led explicitly by Bloomberg via the network C40. Likewise, the TCC interacting with Mexico City also made an effort to prevent the city from leading alternative city networks that might deviate from this. This may be the reason for a decrease in interest from Mexico City in participating, and promoting activities, in regional networks, and the reason why some initiatives, such as the “Mexico City Pact,” did not succeed.

In terms of the city's participation in transnational networks, the chapter helps to understand how cities benefit from their participation in networks of climate politics which, facilitates the participation of private actors. Those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multimillionaire companies (such as C40) prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships, as well as the endorsement of technical and market solutions against climate change,

or what Newell & Paterson (2010) refer to as “climate capitalism”. Likewise, transnational networks, like the C40, encourage a transfer of climate policies from IOs (mainly from the global North) to multinational and philanthropic foundations that involve technological and market-based solutions with a top-down approach.

Likewise, the chapter aims to address the questions about who influences climate governance in Mexico City? Where does that influence come from, and what is the interest that motivates the involvement of such actors? Conversely, the chapter shows the variety of actors participating in the city’s climate governance. For instance, it is interesting to look at the broad representation some NGOs and private corporations involved in Mexico City’s climate politics have as part of the legitimizing urban governance (Paterson, 2014). Particularly, the chapter aims to illustrate how are transnational relations dominated by few actors, and how local actors (mostly from civil society) are ignored, while hybrid and transnational actors influence public policies agenda related to LCEPT.

### *5.1 Mexico’s climate politics at a national level*

The General Law on Climate Change<sup>69</sup> was approved in June 2012 by the Mexican Congress. In it, the Mexican government established the rules, guidelines and departments in charge of the countries’ climate governance. For instance, the law establishes a National Climate Change Policy, the National Climate Change System, the Inter-Secretariat Commission on Climate Change, and a Climate Change Council. Additionally, the law includes the planning instruments, such as the

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<sup>69</sup> Among its objectives, the law aims to establish the concurrence of powers of the federation, the states and the municipalities in the elaboration and application of public policies for the adaptation to climate change and the mitigation of greenhouse gas and compound emissions.

National Climate Change Strategy, National Climate Change Program, Climate Change Information System, Registry of Emissions Generated, the Climate Change Fund, as well as economic instruments<sup>70</sup>. These instruments show the economic rationality behind the legislation. Even when the Climate Change Council includes the participation of all actors in society, those actors participating in the council do not have the right to vote in the resolutions related to climate politics, or to propose aspects in the strategy (*Ley General de Cambio Climático*, 2012). In relation to the participation of local governments in activities related to climate politics, the law stipulates that local governments –including cities- should be involved in the design, establishment and application of economic, fiscal, financial and market instruments linked to climate change actions. However, they are not involved in the commission’s decision-making process (Idem).

Among the most relevant differences between Mexican and Peruvian politics is the institutional infrastructure in relation to climate politics. For instance, in the case of Mexico, the General Law on Climate Change stipulates the creation of the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change. Among its functions, the institute generates and integrates technical and scientific knowledge and increases qualified human capital for the formulation, conduct and evaluation of public policies that lead to environmental protection, ecological preservation and restoration, green growth, as well as mitigation and adaptation to climate change in the country (INECC, 2016). The institutional infrastructure provided by the Mexican government facilitates the generation of scientific

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<sup>70</sup> Article 92 of the law encourages the creation of regulatory and administrative mechanisms of a fiscal, financial or market nature, through which people assume the benefits and costs related to climate change mitigation and adaptation, encouraging them to carry out actions that favors the fulfilment of national policy objectives in this area. Economic instruments of a fiscal nature are considered to be those fiscal stimuli that provide incentives for the fulfilment of national policy objectives on climate change. The law also considers credits, bonds, civil liability insurance, funds and trusts to be financial instruments. Market instruments are considered to be concessions, authorizations, licenses and permits that correspond to pre-established volumes of emissions, or that provide incentives to carry out actions to reduce emissions by providing alternatives that improve their cost-effectiveness.

knowledge for the development of climate policies at urban level. This is in comparison to Lima, which needs to rely on private consulting companies and foreign universities for the generation of scientific studies.

Despite the mechanisms contemplated in the law, there is still a need for administrative resources to coordinate activities within a large governmental structure as the Mexican government. Equally, neither the law nor Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT for its acronym in Spanish) contemplate the coordination and support of climate politics at a municipal level. As one interviewee pointed out, one of the biggest challenges in the Mexican legislation was the lack of interinstitutional coordination, as well as harmonization among actors from different government levels. For instance, SEMARNAT has a general direction of public policies for climate change. The direction is the administrative unit that coordinates the activities from the rest of the institutional mechanisms contemplated in the law, as well as the institutional mechanisms within the different levels of government. The direction also administers the climate change fund, which is the financial mechanism established by the General Law on Climate Change. Additionally, the direction coordinates the policies and programs among the rest of the agencies from the federal government and state [provincial] governments (Vania Montalvo, interview, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Among the predominant discourses<sup>71</sup> at a local and national level in relation to climate politics centers around modernization and economic growth. At a federal level, two of the areas in the INECC's structure is the Department for Green Growth and the Department of Climate Change and Low Carbon Development. For instance, the General Coordination of Green Growth promotes and

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<sup>71</sup> Among the main characteristics of the official discourse in Mexico is the way that the aspects are embedded with each other. This dynamic creates synergies and makes it more complicated to separate one element from another.

encourages policies that support sustainable development, economic valuation of natural resources, along with economic analysis and environmental policy design (INECC, 2016). In the same sense, the General Law on Climate Change, apart from providing an extensive institutional infrastructure and pointing out the need for transversality throughout the whole of the Mexican political system, the predominant discourse focuses on economic growth. For instance, even when the law stipulates planning instruments, such as the National Climate Change Strategy, the National Climate Change Program, the Climate Change Information System, the Registry of Emissions Generated and the Climate Change Fund, Article 92 underlines the importance of creating economic instruments (e.g. fiscal stimuli, credits, bonds, civil liability insurance, funds, concessions, authorizations and licenses to manage natural resources) that contribute to enhancing an economically effective national climate policy. These instruments show the economic rationality behind the legislation.

### *5.2 Mexico City's climate politics*

Situated in a stair landing area and between high mountains, air pollution is one of the main environmental problems of Mexico City. Climate change is responsible for changes in rainfall patterns (more intense and frequent rain) and increasing floods and landslides. According to the city government, 40% of the population, as well as the marginal neighborhoods (approximately 1 million) live in high-risk areas. Additionally, changes in temperature patterns are increasing the frequency of droughts resulting in water shortages and fires in nearby forests to urban areas (Ryan, 2012). Unfortunately, for many years, the city did not have the faculties to promulgate and approve its own laws.

The political reform of the city<sup>72</sup> at the end of the 1990s provided local authorities with the legal faculty, as well as the freedom, to design, discuss and, eventually, approve its own laws. Likewise, the city mayors had the freedom to plan and take control of urban politics. The last political reform allowed the subsequent government to formulate its own politics and programs, as well as to articulate transversal policies related to urban governance. The following sections provide a brief description of some programs, strategies and legal mechanisms related to climate change mitigation and adaptation, formulated during the last three administrations of the Mexico City government, from 2000 until September 2018.

### *5.2.1 Local legislation, programs and institutional mechanisms*

During Andrés Manuel López Obrador's (AMLO) administration (2000-2006), the Ministry of the Environment received substantial political support and increased in importance during the administration. As a result, the ministry was commissioned with the execution of the most relevant projects of the administration, as well as the budget for the execution of those projects. As a matter of fact, according to one of the interviewees, AMLO's administration developed the first Climate

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<sup>72</sup> The political reform of Mexico City included the modification of federal and local laws. The purpose of the reform was to provide the entity with similar legal faculties as the rest of the states in Mexico (31 in total). Among other changes, the entity known as the Federal District ("DF" is its acronym in Spanish) changed its official name to "*Ciudad de México*" (Mexico City). Moreover, the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF) was substituted by a local congress, the delegations for mayoralties governed by mayors and a council, among other changes which allow the city to formulate, debate, and eventually approve their own laws. In January 31th 2017, the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City approved and published the Political Constitution of Mexico City. The promulgation of the Constitution marked the end of a long battle that started in 1917, after the promulgation of the first Mexican Constitution. Since then, several politicians and actors unsuccessfully tried to promote the elimination of elective offices in the Mexican capital due to the probable rivalry that would represent for the presidency. On September 10th, 1993, the first political reform of the Federal District took shape after the results of the 1992 plebiscite (Sánchez Mejorada & Cristina, 2000). As a result, in 1994 the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF), the Superior Court of Justice of the Federal District and the figure of Chief of the Federal District were created. By 1996, the second political reform of the Federal District took place, which allowed the population to elect the city mayor through a democratic voting process. Later on, in 2000, they also gained the right to elect their delegates (Hurtado González & Arellano Rios, 2009; Loeza, 1995).

Change Strategy of the city, but it was never diffused, either nationally or internationally (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017). In 2004, his administration formulated the first Local Climate Action Strategy Mexico City (Rodriguez, 2004), which was developed with the intention of functioning as a decision-making tool to develop climate politics that helped to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The document established an emission inventory of GHG for the city, as well as the identification and assessment of vulnerability factors, establishing the basis for localizing the emissions' mitigations and vulnerability policies (Quiroz Benitez, 2011). The document was sponsored by ICLEI (Romero-Lankao, 2007). The following administration took a more ambitious strategy in environmental politics and three years later, on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2007 Mexico City's *Plan Verde* ("Green Plan" in English) was adopted. As one of the most ambitious environmental protection policies in Latin America, the plan included energy efficiency projects, more sustainable public transportation system (such as the BRT system, or *Metrobus*, and the Bicycle Mobility Strategy), the recovery of urban waterways and set the basis for the Mexico City Climate Action Plan (PACCM for its acronym in Spanish). The PACCM (as the second version of the Green Plan was called) shared some core ideas from the Green Plan. It established two specific targets related to GHG reduction and mitigation to achieve in the period 2008-2012. Target 1 included a seven million-ton reduction in carbon dioxide equivalent for the period 2008-2012. Target 2 involved the design and implementation of a program for adaptation to climate change in Mexico City, to be executed by 2012.

The Green Plan became the guiding instrument in the government's environmental agenda that highlighted the priorities in the environmental issues of the city and set the tone for them to be translated into other plans and programs. According to Quiroz Benitez (2011), this absence of a

route was the reason why environmental politics at the time lacked financing specifications, and only proposed strategies to deal with the environmental problems mentioned in the document. Thus, the second version of the Green Plan represented an evolution in Mexico City's public policies in environmental issues. As part of the elements to follow up on the Program, in June 2010, the city government created the Interinstitutional Commission for Climate Change of the Federal District (CICC-DF) as a permanent body to monitor and evaluate the mechanisms stipulated in the Green Plan. Amongst its responsibilities was the coordination of the actions established in the PACCM, its evaluation, consideration of the subject as transversal with the policies and programs and plans in any of the Mexico City Public Administration bodies. Also, the Commission aimed to support the diffusion of the projects mentioned in the Program to civil society, as well as the design of financial strategies that generated resources for Mexico's City government. Additionally, the commission aimed to promote cooperation with IOs, companies, and the federal government, among others included in the PACCM (Idem).

Regarding the legislation associated with public transportation, in January 31th 2017, the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City approved and published the Political Constitution of Mexico City. The Constitution included the right to a clean and healthy environment (Art. 13, section A, fraction I, II and III). Correspondingly, the constitution also mentioned the city's international activity as one of the pillars of the city's strategy (Art. 20) (*Constitución Política de La Ciudad de México*, 2017). Additionally, the constitution stipulated the mechanisms and rules that involve the participation and involvement of other actors in transnational relations (besides the variety and professionalization of the 3<sup>rd</sup> sector). The project for the City's Constitution was one of the priorities of Mancera's administration. That is why, in 2014, his administration began to include

internationalization politics as part of environmental policies and institutions (SEDEMA, 2014, p. 160). This approach translated into an increase in relations with several cooperation agencies, as well as the active participation in events and transnational networks related to climate change (CDMX Resilience Office, 2016; GDF, 2011; Gobierno de la Ciudad de México & AL-LAs, 2016; Sánchez Díaz, 2011; SEDEMA, 2015, 2016, 2017).

### *5.3 Civil society's participation*

According to Vania Montalvo, Project Coordinator of the Integrity Program in Climate Finance, Transparency International-Mexico, there is an old and solid culture of involvement of civil society in Mexico. At the same time, groups from civil society are well prepared and trained to be politically active and sometimes interact and collaborate with governmental agencies and international NGOs for the development and evaluation of public policies (Vania Montalvo, interview, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Similarly, authors like Romero-Lankao (2007) argue that one of the main causes of environmental deterioration in the city is the institutional structure of urban governance. As a response, since the 1980s, IOs and programs, such as the WB and international fora and Agenda 21, have had a strong influence on the reforms in the governance structure of Mexico City (Escudero, 2001). Ironically, until recently, the city lacked a strong presence of environmental NGO grassroots movements and other groups pressing for regulations to be strengthened (Romero-Lankao et al., 2005). For instance, there is no network or institutional tool that gathers together all the local NGOs and organizations from civil society working in the field of climate change. Still, the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC for its acronym

in Spanish) only identifies 17 non-governmental organizations working in the area of climate change politics in the country (Pierard Manzano, 2016).

### *5.3.1 Local and international non-governmental organizations*

Mexico City's transnational relations include a diversity of NGOs and INGOs. As I describe in the following paragraphs, even when the city has a close relationship with other important NGOs, local and regional, the link and participation the city keeps with WRI cannot compare with the involvement they have with the other NGOs, even when each one of them works on different aspects of climate change. None of the NGOs mentioned in the next paragraphs influence urban public policies as strong as WRI does. Maybe the reason, as I mention in the following paragraphs, is because none of the three NGOs involve fundraising activities, but focus on the exchange of experiences and good practices.

Apart from those NGOs focussed on advocating for better climate policies, or defending the current ones, there are also organizations that function more like a scientific NGO, such as the Mario Molina Center (MMC)<sup>73</sup>. In fact, Ebrard's administration had the support of the MMC for the city's emissions inventory. After the administration finished the emissions inventory, they approached the center, looking to improve it. The MMC adjusted the inventory and said the government had mitigated 6.5 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>, and not 7 million tons like the inventory mentioned. In the

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<sup>73</sup> The Mario Molina Center is a research center that supports governments in Mexico, both federal and local, to develop and evaluate programmes and policies that address emissions mitigation and adaptation. Working more as a scientific NGO, its activities focus more on giving technical support to develop methodologies for GHG inventory, programme and strategies evaluation. Nonetheless, the NGO is not interested in influencing urban climate politics. See more in <https://centromariomolina.org>

Mexican context, this type of collaboration, and the fact that the government accepted the observations and corrected the report was, according to one of the interviewees, an extraordinary and unusual case in the country (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017). In a similar case, the MMC also supported collaboration with other NGOs in different areas related to emissions mitigation. For instance, according to another of the interviewees, the center collaborated with EMBARQ (later on WRI<sup>74</sup>) in projects related to Low Carbon Emissions Public Transportation (Sayel Cortes, interview, November 23<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Moreover, Mancera's administration also had the support of the MMC in the creation of the climate action program. According to the International Cooperation Coordinator from the Ministry of the Environment, the institutionalization of the city's climate politics had the support of the MMC. At the same time, it pushed for an open process, where a variety of actors were involved (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). As part of this institutionalization process of climate politics, the MMC performed several evaluations that helped to adjust the city's climate politics. For instance, through the MMC audits, the government realized that some measures for emissions quantification were inaccurate due to the absence of some variables in the calculation. Similarly, other actions contemplated in the Climate Action Plan showed more mitigation potential than those originally contemplated. For example, the 2008-2012 Climate Action Plan from the previous administration, the interviewee adds, was evaluated by the MMC in which it was determined that, from the 7 million CO<sub>2</sub> tons mitigation goal established in the Plan, the city reported they mitigated 7.7 million CO<sub>2</sub>. In other words, the city mitigated 10% more than was planned. That was the case for one of the new BRT system routes.

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<sup>74</sup> WRI Mexico is a branch of WRI international with headquarters in Washington DC. In the early 2000s WRI created the public transportation chapter in Mexico. With the support of Prof. Leon J. Schipper, co-founder of EMBARQ, and Claudia Sheinbaum, former student of Prof. Schipper, and current Mayor of Mexico City. That is how EMBARQ (Sustainable Transportation Center) became part of WRI (WRI staff member #1, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017a; WRI staff member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017b), as explained in chapter 6.

Having this type of evaluation is beneficial for the city in the sense that climate politics becomes much more transparent and precise because it is not only the government that says: “This [policy] mitigates 1 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub> and is the best action for the climate”, but it is an external and neutral actor that implements a verified and certified methodology, allowing us to have a better implementation of the policies (Idem).

Another good example of the city’s encouragement for more inclusive urban climate politics is the establishment of the Laboratory for the City<sup>75</sup> (Laboratorio para la Ciudad also known as “the Lab”). Created in 2013, the Lab is an experimental program from Mexico’s City government that aims to promote civic innovation and urban creativity. Not limited to one specific methodology, the Lab looks to encourage the creation of new and innovative solutions to urban problems through collective efforts. In order to do so, the Lab works as an incubator of pilot projects and a supporter of transversal projects among different departments within the government. Additionally, it supports the of research, collection, and translation of good practices and proven ideas in other places to adapt them to the local context. With this in mind, the laboratory also aims to be the link between the city government and citizens, and other cities around the world, with the objective to incentivize the exchange of good practices (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México & AL-LAs, 2016). The Lab is also a space in which the government aims to reflect and build a new narrative for the city in line with the campaign as an innovative and creative city. Within its actions, the Lab has developed important processes of consultation and dialogue with citizens’ organizations, local

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<sup>75</sup> The Laboratory is a space for speculation and testing, where actors from outside the city’s government propose new ways of approaching relevant issues for the city. It also works as an incubator for pilot projects and promotes multidisciplinary meetings around civic innovation and urban creativity. It also represents a bridge between the government, civil society, private initiative, and non-governmental organizations, that helps to create dialogues between them, with the purpose of reinventing and suggesting alternative approaches for urban politics. See more in <https://labcd.mx/labfortheconomy/>

NGOs, and members of academia from different universities in open, free and trustworthy formats, among which its workshops and “sobremesas” performed on the roof of a historic building in the center of the city. The document “*Dialogues for a Global Mexico City Process*” is an example of an alliance between the Lab and the General Coordination of International Affairs of Mexico City (GDF, 2011).

Also, since the beginning of Mancera’s administration, the city keeps a close relationship with the Euro-Latin American Alliance of Cooperation between Cities, or AL-LAs<sup>76</sup>. AL-LAs is a program financed by the EU that aims to strengthen cities and local governments in Latin America and Europe, and their networks and associations via their current international relations programs. The program is coordinated by the government of Mexico City. Among its objectives is the reinforcement of the city’s institutional capacity to establish a professional public policy of international relations, including the participation of civil society, and to accompany and advise local governments in the design and execution of international cooperation projects in three themes: sustainable city, inclusive city and attractive city. Lastly, the program aims to influence the international agenda as a network from a European and Latin American perspective (Gobierno de la Ciudad de México & AL-LAs, 2016). Nonetheless, due in part to neoliberal reforms implemented in the country during the 1980s<sup>77</sup>, there is also a high participation and involvement of private

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<sup>76</sup> Among the cities involved in the programme are: the government of Quito, Ecuador; Lima, Peru; Medellín, Colombia; Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro and the State of Minas Gerais in Brazil; the Mayor's Office of Madrid, Spain; the Mayor's Office of Paris, France and the city of Montevideo in Uruguay. Likewise, the network United Cities of France (CUF) and the Andalusian Fund of Municipalities for International Solidarity (FAMSI), in Spain are among the members. See more in <https://proyectoallas.net>

<sup>77</sup> The neoliberal reforms in Mexico during the 1980s included opening the door to private companies for the creation of foundations and philanthropic organizations that could get involved in philanthropic activities in the Mexican society, and, at the same time, gain tax benefits (Biglaiser & Derouen, 2004; Carter, 2003; B. Davis, 2000; Delgadillo, 2017; Eyzaguirre, 1995; Halebsky & Harris, 1995; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005; Vellinga, 1998).

foundations and NGOs in climate politics. For instance, the ClimateWorks Foundation<sup>78</sup> financed the Latin America Regional Climate Initiative, which focuses on promoting and increasing capacities from local actors that helps them obtaining finance to develop projects that catalyze climate policies and actions; in particular those in the energy, transport and solid waste management sectors. This INGO also contributes to connect the city's government with the TCC and philanthropic organizations mentioned in the following section.

However, despite the openness and willingness of any of the governments of Mexico City, civil society's participation in urban climate policies presents some limitations, as well as privileges, to some actors from the philanthropic sector. Any NGO or organization from civil society which is not related to IOs, or does not have a philanthropic organization, or company, behind it as a sponsor, has limited access to participate in the processes, as one staff member from the Habitat International Coalition (HIC)<sup>79</sup> mentioned in the interview. These asymmetries between actors from civil society and those related to the private sector translate into terms of access to venues where the negotiations are held, access to participate in the decision-making processes, and even sometimes to express an opinion or position on the subject (staff member from Habitat International Coalition, interview,

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<sup>78</sup> The ClimateWorks Foundation is a joint effort from a group of philanthropies and foundations to invest in projects that contribute to the generation of public policies that reduce GHG emissions. The initiative is financed by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, The Energy Foundation, The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, and The Joyce Foundation, and the Oak Foundation. This INGO was established in 2008 with the objective to help philanthropy meet the challenge of climate change (Delgado Ramos et al., 2015). See more in [www.climateworks.org](http://www.climateworks.org)

<sup>79</sup> Habitat International Coalition (HIC) is an independent, non-profit alliance with hundreds of organizations and individuals, which works in the area of housing and human settlements. The Coalition comprises social movements, community-based organizations, support groups, and academics. The Coalition is based on its worldwide membership in 117 different countries, in five continents. It brings together a range of civil society groups. Dedicated to advocacy and support for the poor, solidarity networking, popular mobilization, debate and analysis, its work focuses on defending and implementing human rights linked to housing and habitat, which includes land, housing, clean water, sanitation, a healthy environment, access to public goods and services (e.g., health, education, transport and recreation), access to livelihood and social protection, pluralism and the preservation of social, natural, historic and cultural patrimony. See more in <http://www.hic-gs.org>

March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018). Furthermore, the involvement and interaction between any branch of the government, either at a local or state level, and local NGOs is limited or almost inexistent. For instance, based on his experience, Yerel Salcedo, a long-time activist promoter of non-motorized transportation and part of the local NGO “*GDL en Bici*”, highlights an absence of institutional channels and means that contribute to articulate the participation of actors from civil society in the design and execution of public policies related to climate change (Yerel Salcedo, interview, September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017). However, these institutional barriers do not apply to everyone. For instance, INGOs working in Mexico, such as the WRI, play an important role in the city’s climate politics, particularly in those related to urban planning and non-motorized mobility. WRI’s influence is not limited to Mexico City, given that, in October 2017, WRI invited the former Mayor of Guadalajara, Enrique Alfaro<sup>80</sup>, to participate in the 9<sup>th</sup> edition of the Congress #CiudadesYTransporte (Cities and Transportation) (WRI México, 2018), and was involved in the development of Guadalajara’s *Partial Plans for Urban Development* (WRI staff member #3, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017c). This role provides them with direct access and the opportunity to influence the federal government in climate politics. Even though these three NGOs have an active role in the city’s policies, none of them represent a bridge that connects Mexico City with the TCC. It is through INGOs that the city relates with several philanthropic organizations, transnational companies and IOs, as shown in the figure 5. For instance, the non-profit organization WRI is placed as one of the important nodes in the network analysis together with C40. WRI is placed as a node in Mexico City’s SNA because, after analyzing the interviews and official documents from the city government, the participation of WRI in connecting Mexico City with important actors from the philanthropic sector is evident. As

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<sup>80</sup> Despite Enrique Alfaro winning the municipal elections of 2015 and assuming the position from October 2015 to December 2017, by the end of 2017, he asked for a license as Mayor of Guadalajara to participate in the election of July 2018, in which he was elected as Governor of the State of Jalisco. Since his administration as Mayor of Guadalajara, the city became involved in activities and programmes with C40.

the SNA shows, WRI plays an important role in the development of Mexico City's transnational relations, as well as in the direction it takes. It is through WRI that the city is connected with a diversity of foreign actors from the philanthropic sector. Its role is relevant for the development and direction its transnational relations take.

### 5.3.2 *Universities*

The participation of universities in Mexican politics can be described as superficial. For instance, the Secretary of Energy worked closely with the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM for its acronym in Spanish) and with the Polytechnic to generate studies related to the country's need in terms of energy reform. At the same time, both institutions undertook many studies which mentioned the risks of advancing with the reforms<sup>81</sup>, but the reform represented a key piece of the development model conceived by the federal government at a time that was not to be prevented by any studies from high education institutions (Vania Montalvo, interview, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

More directly related to climate politics, both institutions participated in a consultation for Mexico City's climate action program in 2014, (Patricia Narvez Garca, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Furthermore, they also participated in a study about climate scenarios with WRI and financed by the SEMARNAT (Sayel Cortes, interview, November 23<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

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<sup>81</sup> The energy reform of 2013 in Mexico featured, among its priorities, allowing private transnational companies to extract and invest in the oil, electricity and natural gas industries, giving control to transnational corporations. This way, the Mexican federal government created an obstacle to attaining the climate goals set in previous administrations (Guevara, 2018; Sosa-Nunez, 2015; The Economist, 2013).

### 5.3.3 Consulting private companies

When we compare the participation of Mexican universities in climate politics, with the role private companies played, we can observe major asymmetries in terms of access to planning and designing policies among local actors and private transnational companies, such as financial institutions, consulting companies and philanthropic organizations (staff member from the Habitat International Coalition, interview, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018). In the case of Mexico City, for instance, the multinational professional services company PricewaterhouseCoopers, or PwC<sup>82</sup>, audited Mexico City's climate action programs (Patricia Narváz García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Compared to the participation of the MMC, UNAM and the *Instituto Politécnico Nacional*, the participation of an INGO, one of its members being part of the TCC, obtains greater access for involvement in the design of urban politics for climate change. Through the elaboration of studies related to LCEPT, the offer of grants, or even social capital and connections from their directors, these hybrid actors are able to influence climate politics than local actors.

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<sup>82</sup> PricewaterhouseCoopers is a multinational professional services network of firms headquartered in London, United Kingdom, operating as partnerships under the PwC brand. PwC ranks as the second-largest professional services network in the world and is considered one of the Big Four accounting firms, along with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, Ernst & Young Global Limited and KPMG International Cooperative. The firm in its present form was created in 1998 by a merger between two accounting firms; Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse. Both firms had histories dating back to the 19th century. It is a coordinating entity for the global network of firms. It manages the global brand, and develops policies and initiatives to create a common and coordinated approach in areas such as risk, quality and strategy. As of 2019, PwC was the fifth-largest privately owned company in the United States.

#### *5.4 Network activity*

Despite the different existing institutions, both at a federal and local level, there is an interesting diversity of transnational actors interacting and influencing Mexico's city climate politics.

Meanwhile, all intermediary actors use TNs as a point of entry to get involved in urban politics. For instance, 100 Resilience Cities (100RC), founded by the Rockefeller Foundation, developed the program ARISE, an initiative to stimulate the alliances between city governments and the private sector. Through this initiative, the network facilitates the access of private companies to participate in projects with local governments (CDMX Resilience Office, 2016). This function performed by TNs, according to a staff member from WRI, is caused in part due to the complexity of the projects, and due to the variety of aspects to be covered, such as funding, technical, legal, evaluation, design, planning, etc. (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). The following paragraphs mention and describe some of these actors and their interaction with the city government.

In the late 1990's, the recently elected city government created the foreign affairs general coordination ascribed to the Mayor's office. Nonetheless, since its creation, and until 2006, the city had a low-profile participation in foreign affairs. According to Patricia Narváez, Foreign Affairs Coordinator from the Ministry of the Environment, the city's international relations during the AMLO administration (2000-2006) were not a priority. This low priority for international activity can be seen in the number of international trips he made during his government; only two official visits to the exterior and limited to receiving official delegations, and presenting the keys to the city as part of the protocol. Correspondingly, AMLO had a very limited participation in international networks. In fact, the coordination for foreign affairs, created in 1997, had only one person in

charge of the international politics (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Still, AMLO’s administration developed very few actions during where the foreign and environmental policies linked, such as the Retrofit program. In 2004 the Ministry of Environment during AMLO’s administration started the “*Programa de Retroadaptación de Equipos de Control de Contaminantes*” (Pollutant Control Equipment Program, Retrofit). The program included the installation of particle traps and catalytic converters certified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in urban buses, in order to reduce GHG emissions from public transportation. Also, it received \$350,000 USD from the US government and \$150,000 USD from the WRI (Schiavon, 2008, p. 185). Another example is the subscription to C40 in 2005. Even AMLO’s team developed a climate change politics. Nonetheless, besides those two actions, environmental politics were not linked yet with the international politics strategy (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017) the city did not participate, either with the network or with any of its members.

**Table 4. Mexico City’s network memberships**

<i>Network</i>	<i>Topics</i>	<i>Mexico City’s role</i>
<i>United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG)</i>	International agenda.	Executive Committee
	Local governance Cooperation Sustainable urban development.	Member
<i>Metropolis</i>	Governance	Member
	International agenda Cooperation	Regional Secretariat for North America
<i>Federación Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios<sup>[1]</sup> y Asociaciones de Gobiernos Locales (FLACMA)</i>	Social development	FLACMA-UCLG
	Environment and Climate change.	representative
	Cooperation Culture	
<i>C40</i>	Climate Change	Member for the Latin American Section

<i>ICLEI</i>	Sustainable development Environment and Climate change	Member
<i>RedCISUR</i>	Urban Planning Environment and climate change	Honorary Member
<i>WeGo</i>	e-government	Member of the Executive Committee
<i>100 Resilience Cities</i>	Urban Resilience	Founder member
<i>Alcaldes por la Paz (Mayors for Peace)</i>	Security	Vice-President
<i>Relagres</i>	Urban planning and management Solid waste management	First Secretary
<i>Unión de Ciudades Capitales Iberoamericanas<sup>[1]</sup><sub>SEP</sub>(UCCI)</i>	Culture Economic and social development Environment (Urban mobility) Governance	Vice-President
<i>Organización de las Ciudades del Patrimonio Mundial (OCPM)</i>	Protection and management of historical and cultural heritage	Member
<i>Fondo Mundial para el Desarrollo de las Ciudades (FMDV)</i>	Financing local development Municipal pooled financing Metropolitan governance	Headquarters of the Regional Office for Latin America.
<i>Asociación Internacional de Ciudades Educadoras</i>	Education Culture	Associated city

Source: Author's elaboration with information from the General Coordination of Foreign Affairs from Mexico's City government (CGAI, 2015).

With the change of government in Mexico City, there was also a radical change of approach when it came to the city's international politics. Marcelo Ebrard took all the policies and programs and shared them internationally. As mentioned in the document: *Ciudad de México. Ciudad Global. Acciones Locales, compromiso internacional* (Mexico City. Global City. Local Actions, international commitment) his administration looked to have a leadership role in networks. Also, he wanted to have a more active role for cities in international fora, as well as the promotion of

collaboration among cities (GDF, 2011, p. 27). His government aimed to position the city as an active member in transnational networks, particularly those networks working on climate change. According to a former staff member from Mexico's city government, Ebrard's administration had two motivations behind the internationalization strategy. First, was the city's context at the time. Since Mexico City is considered to be one of the most important cities in Latin America, as well as the third largest metropolis in the world, it represents an important economic pole. At the time, Ebrard's administration presented these arguments to the local assembly and asked for an increase in the number of the staff in the city's foreign affair office. As a result, the foreign affairs office went from one staff member to more than 40 and was divided into geographical regions and subjects (Patricia Narvez Garcıa, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Secondly, the interviewee, as well as some scholars, attributed his interest to the fact that Marcelo Ebrard has a Bachelor in International Relations (Davila et al., 2008b; Schiavon, 2008). According to them, this was an important reason why his administration promoted and encouraged the city's participation in networks (Idem). A brief summary of all the networks in which the city participates is presented in Table 5. For the purpose of this analysis, I will focus on the relationship and interaction with C40, as well as its role in Mexico's City climate politics.

#### *5.4.1 Relationship with C40*

It was during Ebrard's administration (2006-2012) when the city linked its foreign policy with the rest of the urban agenda. Ebrard had the intention to position Mexico City as a participative and influential actor in the global agenda, particularly that for sustainability and climate politics. It was then that Mexico City started to participate more actively in C40's events. Notwithstanding, with

Bloomberg's arrival to The Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) at the end of 2011, and the partnership between C40 and CCI (C40, 2015), the network gave more importance to ideas and practices aimed at market-oriented transformation. This new strategy promoted governance through a project-based, technology-oriented approach that included values and practices with a private sector imperative: innovation, performance, efficiency, a return of investment, as well as an emphasis on data-and evidence-based action (Gordon, 2016). Eventually, all those changes influenced the entire network strategy, as I illustrate in Chapter 6. As a consequence of these structural changes in the network, the functions of C40 focused more on the political aspect, rather than the share of experiences. In other words, C40 focused its resources on the organization of summits and lobbying among IOs (Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

As one of the interviewees explained, the framework that C40 has promoted and that has helped them to gain influence in recent years has to do with the fact that their work combines two things. Firstly, they have a diplomatic vocation because they seek to position cities on the issue of climate change. Also, the network has among its board members, individual figures from the TCC that allows them to give access to cities into international climate diplomacy fora, that way increasing their participation and influence in the decision-making process next to central governments and IOs (Patricia Narváz García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). C40 has developed inside different networks within the network. There is an adaptation network, a transport network, an air quality network, land use planning networks; also, within those areas, the technical teams of the cities get involved, and these technical teams receive training to develop best practices in a range of issues that are translated into policies (Idem).

As of the end of 2018, Mexico City participated with C40 in an initiative called *Cities Finance Facility*<sup>83</sup> (CFF), and the city is participating in the project for the first corridor zero emissions electric bus, a BRT but with an electric system. The project went through a selection process, in which Mexico City was selected to implement a pilot project. It consists of receiving technical assistance for its preparation so that, later on, it is eligible to receive funding. This means that C40 does not support the implementation of the project but rather supports how you prepare the project so that it is eligible for international funding, which is one of the main barriers cities face for the implementation of transport policies. One of the principal challenges that cities face is limited access to funds. In this sense, the CFF, together with C40, giz and USAID, facilitates the implementation of such projects. Another of the projects in which Mexico City participates with C40 is Metrobus, but in that case, the project focuses on the exchanging experiences. Among cities in Latin America, Mexico City is one that has a larger BRT network, so the city shares many experiences with other cities that are interested in implementing the BRT system.

The CFF's creation and goals concurs with Baranda's comments when he mentioned that C40 focuses on the search for financial resources. Its role is rather political, through the organization of these big meetings and it invites the mayors from the city members of the network, paying their expenses (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017). It is at these events that C40 takes advantages of the political context to promote technological solutions to some issues related to GHG mitigation which their reports and studies point to as being important. That was the case of

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<sup>83</sup> The C40 Cities Finance Facility (CFF, is an initiative from the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) that aims to facilitate access to finance for climate change mitigation and resilience projects in urban areas, by providing technical assistance in order to develop cities' sustainability priorities into bankable investment proposals. The CFF aims to deliver project preparation and capacity development, and to share knowledge and establish partnerships between cities and financiers. The CFF relies on a dedicated team of urban policy professionals in London and Berlin. The CFF also employs experts in the cities it supports to coordinate the provision of technical assistance. See more in: <https://www.c40cff.org/about>

the 2016 Mayors Summit in Mexico City where, after working on the issue of bus technology during the previous years, they introduced companies which, coincidentally, were working on the issue. Related to the subject of public transportation, for their 2016 annual summit, the network got resources from BYD Co Ltd<sup>84</sup>, a Chinese bus company in Mexico. BYD gave money to the C40 to organize that summit, or rather, it was from the principal sponsors, and gave them the opportunity to organize a large event. However, the rest of the local participants invited, particularly local NGOs and higher education institutions, complained about the admission fees and the extreme security measures for accessing the events (Idem).

#### *5.4.2 The Mexico City Pact*

Regarding climate politics, Ebrard gave complete freedom to the Ministry of the Environment and his team to develop strategies and policies that addressed climate change. Also, he prioritized climate change and environmental politics in his government, which contributed to the city's projection internationally. Nonetheless, despite his intention to position the city as an active member in network's events, the personal competition between Ebrard and Felipe Calderon (the Mexican President at the time) represented a significant obstacle. For instance, according to one of the interviewees, Mexico City was originally the city designated to host COP16, but when Calderon's administration received the news from the UNFCCC, they decided to move it to Cancun, where the venue had a more restricted and controlled access, and, at the same time, would

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<sup>84</sup> Build Your Dreams (BYD) Co Ltd, a Chinese manufacturer of automobiles, battery-powered bicycles, buses, forklifts, rechargeable batteries, trucks, etc. The company was founded in February 1995. Its corporate headquarters is in the city of Shenzhen, and it has two major subsidiaries, BYD Automobile, and BYD Electronic. Regarding the former, the subsidiary's principal activity is the design, development, manufacture and distribution of automobiles, buses, electric bicycles, forklifts, rechargeable batteries and trucks sold under the BYD brand. Regarding the latter, the company makes handset components and assembles mobile phones for its customers, which have included Nokia and Motorola. See more in <http://www.byd.com/en/CompanyIntro.html>

reduce Ebrard's projection internationally (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017). As a result, Ebrard and his team decided to organize a climate summit of cities in Mexico City, which was later called "The Mexico City Pact" and involved the signature of a legally binding agreement. According to the interviewee, the agreement was possible thanks to the willingness of cities to take actions against climate change.

In it, the signatory cities committed to:

1. *Reduce local greenhouse gas emissions voluntarily*
2. *Adopt and implement local climate mitigation measures designed to achieve their voluntary reduction targets*
3. *Develop local adaptation strategies to address the local impact of climate change*
4. *Register the emission inventories, commitments, climate mitigation and adaptation measures and actions in a measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) manner*
5. *Promote the involvement of civil society*
6. *Advocate and seek partnerships with multilateral institutions and national governments on our local climate actions; and*
7. *Promote partnerships and city-to-city cooperation (Sánchez Díaz, 2011).*

As part of the campaign to promote the Pact's signature, a delegation from Ebrard's Ministry of the Environment went to New York as part of the effort to gain support. According to the interviewee, after meeting with the ICLEI and the World Mayors Council on Climate Change (that later on nominated Marcelo Ebrard as the next Council's president), both organizations accepted

participation in, and support for, the initiative. During the same visit, Ebrard's team met with Bloomberg's government which, three weeks later, sent an e-mail expressing that neither the city of New York nor Bloomberg would sign the Pact or attend the event in Mexico City (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017). In the words of the interviewees, the main reason why Bloomberg was not interested in participating was that the initiative did not come from him, but from another city's mayor in the global South. "This attitude was clearly discriminatory" (Idem). Bloomberg's position toward the "Mexico City Pact" initiative, the interviewee adds, was the result of a rejection from the "first world" to accept ideas from the "developing world" (Idem). Coincidentally, C40 personnel adopted the same attitude when they approached Susana Villarán's administration in Lima, as I mentioned in the previous chapter. Despite their clarity for some, Bloomberg's biases were not easy to discern since they gained legitimacy in subsequent years during his time as Mayor of New York City. What is more, in 2014, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Bloomberg as his first Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change to help the United Nations work with cities to prevent climate change. Four years later, Ban's successor António Guterres appointed Bloomberg as UN Envoy for Climate Action (UN, 2018).

As a response to Bloomberg's denial to join the Mexico City Pact, Ebrard's team contacted Bertrand Delanoë, the Mayor of Paris at the time. Delanoë not only supported Ebrard's initiative of the Pact but also suggested the organization of the UCLG in Mexico City a few months before the COP16 in Cancun. Likewise, Delanoë involved Paris in the promotion of the event and the signing of the Pact among UCLG members and mayors from other cities. According to one of the interviewees, it was thanks to ICLEI and UCLG through Delanoë's endorsement that the event was able to reach enough quorum and visibility internationally (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>,

2017). Nonetheless, despite the success of the summit announcement, neither Bloomberg, Boris Johnson (Mayor of London 2008-2012) nor David Miller (Mayor of Toronto 2003-2010) (all former C40 presidents) attended the event in Mexico City, and not one of them signed the Pact (Idem). Despite all the attention gained during Ebrard's administration, according to one of the interviewees, the next administration in Mexico City [Mancera's] did not give importance to the leadership that the city had assumed over the previous six years. This means that it did not continue to promote a more horizontal governance, nor to include city's participation in the decision-making process in international fora in which the city is part of. The interest that the city showed in past years was not a priority anymore (Idem). In a nutshell, the role of Mexico City within C40 went from leader to follower. In other words, Mancera's administration focused its efforts and resources in attending the summits and other events that the network organizes. It also received technical support in some areas related to urban planning for climate change. For instance, this administration promoted the revision of climate action plans among the C40 members and exchanged recommendations to develop and adapt the urban planning strategies in respect of extreme changes in the rain patterns caused by climate change (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

The competition between Ebrard and Bloomberg was not at a personal level. Instead, it was the rivalry between the actors behind each one of the initiatives; in this case, organizations interested in implementing a certain kind of methodology to measure emissions, and the type of policies derived from them. For instance, after the first summit in 2010, according to the interviewee, C40 began to understand the relevance that the Pact was gaining among cities, including the mechanisms to

register emissions, such as carbonn<sup>®</sup> Cities Climate Registry (cCCR)<sup>85</sup>. In response to the competition, Bloomberg reached out to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)<sup>86</sup> to do work on cities and carbon accounting as a way to compete with the cCCR included in the Mexico City Pact. The difference, according to the interviewee, is that the cCCR offers free access to information to the public, while CDP does not share the information with the public. Also, one way the group supports cities in their process to reduce their environmental impact is by selling them “technical solutions” (Idem). As Bernardo Baranda, Regional Director for Latin America from ITDP mentioned during the interview, the function of C40 is more political. In other words, to advertise and promote public-private partnerships addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation. Their resources are focused more on organizing summits since they have access to extensive funding [a lot of money in Bernardo’s words] (Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

However, despite the projection that the city gained and its active participation in networks during Ebrard’s administration, Miguel Angel Mancera (2012-2018) did not intend, or show any interest, in taking up the leadership within C40 or in another network. Mancera’s government adopted a more reactive role and limited its international activities to attending conferences and following up the strategies suggested by the C40’s executive committee. As a consequence, there was a

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<sup>85</sup> The carbonn<sup>®</sup> Climate Registry is the leading global reporting platform for cities, towns and regions tackling climate change. It helps local and other subnational governments to track and report on their targets, actions and performance. This platform allows for exchange, learning and benchmarking among its 950+ registered entities, while providing data that is fed into global climate negotiations through ICLEI as a focal point for the local governments and municipal authorities constituency. See more in <https://carbonn.org>

<sup>86</sup> The CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) is an organization based in the United Kingdom which supports companies and cities to disclose the environmental impact of major corporations. The organization was originally created as a transparency mechanism for private companies to report its GHG emissions. It aims to make environmental reporting and risk management a business norm, and drive disclosure, insight and action towards a sustainable economy. This non-profit charity runs the global disclosure system for investors, companies, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts. Since 2002, over 8,400 companies have publicly disclosed environmental information through CDP. See more in <https://www.cdp.net/en>

substantial decrease in the city's leadership, and agency, within C40's activities. On the contrary, the network became a strong influence in the city's climate politics. As a result, Mexico's City focused its climate politics more on mitigation, instead of adaptation. Unfortunately, as Quiroz Benitez (2011) argues, international discussions in which the city's government participates are always focused on mitigation and adaptation bonds, due to the economic incentive they represented by the sale of bonds. The priority on mitigation over adaptation in the city's in climate politics is another predominant concept of the fieldwork. For instance, as Vania Montalvo, from Transparency International-Mexico explained during the interview: "*Mitigation always attracts more [financial] resources, or at least in the estimations that we made, it was mitigation like a 70% against a 30% in adaptation. Their resources go to the energy sector, to transport, and to agriculture.*" (Vania Montalvo, interview, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

At the same time, the discourse was focused on development and positioning the city at an international level. This could mean the concept of development not only as a means to increase a certain level of quality of life but, at the same time, to obtain a certain status in the international realm. Hence, the argument circulates around Mexican and Latin American cities. Thus, in order to reach development, cities from the global South see TNs as a vital tool to reach both goals. As one of the interviewees expressed:

*[the cities' positioning at the international level] is something that TNs also allows you to do. When I go abroad to talk about Guadalajara and you say, like the UNESCO candidacy, that we worked with the Rockefeller Foundation, or with Bloomberg, it gives you confidence and validation. So, it's like a gear that allows you to open doors,*

*and you don't need to work [in the relationship] from scratch* (Anonymous, interview, September 21<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

This effort to position the city at an international level, besides the attraction of foreign direct investment and other economic benefits, also contributes to opening doors and the ability to influence the international structure. That was one of the reasons behind Ebrard and Bloomberg's competition for the promotion of the Mexico City Pact. For instance, the reason behind Bloomberg's rejection of the Pact was that he saw Ebrard as a competitor to become Chair of C40 for the period 2010-2013. More specifically, Bloomberg saw Ebrard –and The Mexico City Pact- as the beginning of a potential rival organization. That is why he showed no interest in being part of the initiative, mainly because The Pact's initiative created competition between the two mayors. Specifically, Ebrard's activity created competition between the methodologies, agencies and other actors involved, between the Mexico City Pact initiative and the Clinton's Climate Initiative supported by Bloomberg. Additionally, the changes in the C40's approach that Bloomberg implemented once he became the Chair (emphasizing the branding, optic politics and events organization; similar to the strategies C40 followed in Lima after Bloomberg took position as chair) increased the "tension" between him and Ebrard (Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Nonetheless, contrary to the initiative put forward by the Mexico City government, Bloomberg had –and still has- the support of multimillionaire foundations and NGOs (e.g. Clinton Climate Initiative, Bloomberg Philanthropies) that gives them all the financial resources to cover all expenses of the mayors who participated in their events. Besides the competition between both initiatives, another reason that explained their rejection of Ebrard's initiative, was the difference in approaches that both have. Usually, local governments from the global North place more emphasis

on communicating politics. In other words, they put greater emphasis on diffusing and publicizing their ideas, and place less importance on the content of the policies, as well as the process in which they are developed, similar to Bloomberg's companies and any other company in the private sector. That is why the C40 Mayors Summit has more importance than the exchange of good practices among cities. Still, this does not mean that the leadership is shared among the members, but is concentrated among a few participants (Idem).

The competition between Ebrard and Bloomberg can be interpreted as an effort from the TCC, represented by the former Mayor of New York, to prevent Mexico City from leading alternative city networks that might deviate from the C40 model. This may be one of the reasons that impeded the Pact in becoming a world reference for urban climate politics. This competition may also be the reason why the subsequent administrations of the Mexico City government demonstrated a lack of interest in participating and promoting activities in regional networks. Nevertheless, behind this decolonial approach in Mexico City's documents and interviews, the intention is to position the city at an international level as a reference and political leader, as well as to project its image as a global city. Besides, behind Ebrard's intentions to place The Pact as a reference of international agreement for Climate Change, his intention was to run in the presidential elections in 2012, and then in 2018. Similarly, Bloomberg also had political interest besides contributing to fight climate change. In 2019, he campaigned to be the presidential candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 U.S. election. Yet, neither of them succeeded with their political aspirations.

### *5.5 Mexico City transnational relations on climate change*

Similar to the SNA in Lima's climate politics, the network in Mexico City, represented in figure 5, shows the involvement of transnational networks in the connections made with other agents in the network. Nonetheless, Mexico City's international activity presents a larger diversity of transnational private companies and philanthropic organizations involved in the city's climate politics. This means it includes a variety of actors, other cities, national government agencies, embassies, transnational corporations and some regional networks. Similar to the Lima's case, the graphic illustration complements the data obtained in the interviews, which helps to get a closer picture of Lima's transnational climate change relations. As I already mentioned in chapter 3, the connections were made when listening to the interviews and one of the interviewees mentioned a certain type of connection with a transnational actor (e.g. TNs, IOs, TCNs, cooperation agency, etc.) with which the city had a joint project or collaboration. Also, some other connections were made while reading documents or checking programs of events in which Mexico City participated. Lastly, reading the organization's web sites with all the partners and sponsors. I give special attention to the role and the influence from hybrid and intermediary<sup>87</sup> actors who contribute to connect Mexico City with philanthropic organizations and other relevant transnational actors. For instance, besides cities, the network's partners include several philanthropic organizations among its sponsors. It is through C40 that Mexico City interacts with foundations from transnational companies, such as the a Chinese manufacturer BYD Co., and the consulting company ARUP. Nonetheless, these resources are conditional to C40's approach to climate politics. As several interviewees suggested, those resources are conditional on applying the solutions that are taken into

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
<sup>87</sup> In the case of hybrid actors, I consider those who, still play a key role in urban climate politics and who are a mix of public and private, local and foreign, either by producing knowledge, promoting certain type of public policies.

consideration by the network, but not always the most appropriate and feasible to cities (Vania Montalvo, interview, September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Staff member from Habitat International Coalition, interview, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018; Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

After revising and analyzing WRI's website, most of its partners and sponsors are philanthropic organizations, followed by consulting and transnational companies and cooperation agencies from countries in the global North. Additionally, the organization is also responsible for connecting Mexico City with IOs, cooperation agencies and regional networks . By "responsible" I mean to keep the city and these actors in touch, coordinate joint programs or share technological solutions to different problems related to climate change. These solutions have the same approach as the ones suggested by C40: technological and economically efficient.

Figure 5 illustrates how six big philanthropic organizations are connected with both C40 and WRI. Firstly, Bloomberg Philanthropies is one of the strategic funders of the network (C40, 2018). It is also among the major sponsors of WRI (WRI, 2013), representing the major link between Mexico City and the TCC. Secondly, the Ford Foundation, the Citi Foundation (from the Citi Group) and the Rockefeller Foundation are among C40's major funders of the network (C40, 2018). As for the Citi Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation is also part of WRI recognized donors (WRI, 2013). Lastly, the Ford Foundation also supports WRI (WRI, 2013).

**Figure 5. Mexico City's Climate Politics**



Source: Author's elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed *in situ*, and documents from the city's government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown square represent interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; light blue circles represent transnational companies and consulting corporations; pink circles represent local NGOs, purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations; dark green are universities and research institutes; yellow circles represent central governmental agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies; dark yellow represent international events; and orange points represent local and regional networks.

As shown in table 7, the SNA from Mexico City also presents a low density network. As highlighted in the previous chapter, dense networks have more face-to-face relationships. Density also helps to demonstrate the overall level of connection within a network. At the same time, we can also look at ties within and between groups. Nonetheless, it is important to note the proximity

of the different actors to each, or some of the nodes. It does not represent closeness in the relationship in the SNA.

In figure 5, the numerical superiority from philanthropic organizations, INGOs and transnational corporations is represented in comparison with the number of cities connected. The nature of most of the connections in Mexico City's SNA illustrates the economic interest guiding climate politics in transnational relations. Therefore, a perspective that prioritizes an economic rationality in urban climate politics, modernization, and not profound and structural changes in the current economic, political and social system. In this sense, one of the major feature in Gramsci's passive revolution is what he calls *transformismo*, which, according to Quevedo (2019) it is promoted by the passive bourgeois revolution. As already mentioned in chapter 2, Gramsci uses the concept of *transformismo* to make reference of the promises of development through transformative politics. According to him, it can serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant class. Applied to the case of Mexico City, the participation of philanthropic organizations, transnational corporations, and transnational networks, or networks in general, contribute to the transmission of an economic rationality in the city's urban climate politics, instead of the support of a horizontal collaboration and exchange of experiences.

Likewise, similar to the case of Lima analyzed in chapter 4, international events also play a key role in the connections between the city and the two nodes in the network. Likewise, the events facilitated contact between Mexico City and the nodes' partners, at the same time they increased the city's exposure to philanthropic organizations and other transnational actors. There are five events

that also contributed to connecting Mexico City with a diversity of transnational actors in the LCEPT sector. The first one is the 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York. The second was the COP20 held in Lima in 2014, followed by the Mayors Summit 2016 in Mexico City and organized by C40. Fourthly was the EcoMobility 2015 event organized by ICLEI in Johannesburg and, finally, the 2016 International Transport Forum organized by the OECD and held in Leipzig, Germany every year. Each of these events contributed to increase the city's connection with philanthropic organizations and transnational companies in the public transportation sector, as well as with IOs, ROs and embassies from other countries, as figure 5 shows. Furthermore, at two of the events the main issue discussed was public transportation policies and new technologies in that sector. Therefore, all the participants from different sectors were actively working in that area, either developing new technologies, providing consulting services or selling technologies to public actors.

Even when the city interacts with a diversity of actors, its connections present a numerical superiority with the private sector (e.g. philanthropic organizations, TNCs), and a clear deficit in relations with other cities, particularly from Latin America. Regarding the latter, this tendency of interacting more with actors from the private sector and not with cities, may be interpreted as part of the expansion of hegemony through consent. Similar to the case of Lima, hegemony is reinforced through the consent with the private sector more than individual figures. It is mostly through the private sector (e.g. philanthropy organizations) in transnational climate change relations that this approach to climate politics is transmitted to a city level. About the former, by not prioritizing relations with its peers, the suggested policies to mitigate, or adapt to, climate change omits important factors from the local context that need to be taken into consideration. This can be noted

when we compared the number of cities and the number of philanthropic organizations and companies in the network.

In the same sense, it is also important to note the underrepresentation of organizations and institutions from the global South. The decrease of cities' participation in regional networks can be interpreted as a predominance from the global North in climate politics. With a numerical superiority of private actors in transnational climate politics, it is evident that the exchange of experiences between cities is no longer the priority. Lastly, figure 5 illustrates that each of Mexico City's connections with cities (except for Stuttgart, Germany) is made through C40, which means TNs are becoming the main vehicle through which cities are connecting with each other.

### *5.6 Mexico City and its relation with the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC)*


Figure 6 helps to illustrate how individual, institutional, political and economic factors play a role in the network's dynamic. Despite the city shows a higher activity in its transnational relations in general, the city does not show a high density in its connection with the TCC. Nonetheless, the connections showed in figure 6, represented a strong and key connection with the TCC. This is the case of Michael Bloomberg, Anne Hidalgo and Christina Figueres. Also, before his death in 2011, Schipper participated in several projects with the Minister of Environment for Mexico City at the time, Claudia Sheinbaum<sup>88</sup>. Both, Schipper and Sheinbaum, contributed to the involvement of the city in WRI's activities. Using neo-Gramscian terms mentioned in chapter 2, each of the members

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<sup>88</sup> As mentioned previously, after the elections in 2018, Claudia Sheinbaum was elected Mayor of Mexico City for the term 2018-2024.

in Mexico City’s TCC can be called *caesarism* figures. The term refers to a figure of a strong man who intervenes in order to resolve a conflict between different forces within society (Cox, 1983).

**Figure 6. Mexico City’s TCC of Climate Politics**



Source: Author’s elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed in situ, and documents from the city’s government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown square represent interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are people from city governments the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; and yellow circles represent people from central governmental agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies.

The density of Mexico City’s connection with the TCC network, showed in table 8, present a higher density than the general network. It can be argue, making much of network density is difficult as there is no real measure of a “normal” level of network density. However, comparing tables 7 and 8, shows that Mexico City has stronger links with TCC actors than it does with public actors (e.g. City governments, IOs and international cooperation agencies) in general. This shows the importance of

personal relations in the city's international activity. However, when comparing table 5, Lima's connections with the TCC, and table 8, Mexico City's connections with the TCC, we can infer the latter has stronger links with TCC actors than the former.

Furthermore, what is also interesting to observe are the subtle, and not so evident, connections each of the actors have with all the actors in the network. Even when these three actors do not show a connection in figure 5, at the moment of revising their projects and grants, the indirect connection with Mexico City, becomes clear. For instance, Cris DeCardy from the ClimateWorks participates with WRI-Mexico in the elaboration of LCEPT projects through the assignation of grants to WRI (ClimateWorks, 2020). Similarly, Greg Hodgkinson from the firm ARUP participates in three important real estate projects in downtown Mexico City (Arup, 2020). Lastly, Brandee McHale from the Citi Foundation was among the main sponsors for the 2016 C40 summit (Citi Foundation, 2020). All three are also connected with each of the three nodes in the network, but with issues related to public transportation).

### *5.7 Conclusions*

The chapters contribute to address one of the research questions related to cities motivations in participating with TNs in climate politics. The evidence presented in the chapters shows Mexico City's motivations to get involved in C40's activities was focused on development and positioning the city at an international level. This could mean the concept of development not only as a means to increase a certain level of quality of life but, at the same time, to obtain a certain status in the international realm. Hence, the argument circulates around Mexican and Latin American cities.

Thus, in order to reach development, cities from the global South see TNs as a vital tool to reach both goals.

Through the illustrations generated with the SNA methodology, the section also shows the influence of transnational networks, considered as hybrid<sup>89</sup> actors and their role as facilitators for corporative actors in gaining access to Mexico City's climate politics. Additionally, how these hybrid actors contribute to gain access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. Based on the information compiled, the question of whether the participation of cities in transnational networks on climate politics facilitates the involvement of private actors in urban climate politics, becomes relevant. As shown in the chapter, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multimillionaire companies, prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships. Through the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence compiled, an ongoing process of legitimation can be observed, from the different levels of government and from these hybrid actors as well. For instance, networks like C40 and 100RC promoting public/private partnerships and facilitating the access of such actors to participate in projects (CDMX Resilience Office, 2016; Gobierno de la Ciudad de México & AL-LAs, 2016).

As a result of their strong influence and privileged position, climate governance in the city is dominated by interests from transnational corporations and the market-based approaches from actors such as C40 and WRI. At the same time, governments limit access to local actors while

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<sup>89</sup> Hybrid actors are those considered as a mixture between public and private, in the design and development of urban climate politics.

transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments. As one of the interviewees expressed:

*“On one side, multilateral agencies (e.g. WB, IMF), and on the other side these transnational corporative actors who really are the ones taking the decisions about how to access the financial resources who gets them, how are distributed. In theory, all actors – locals, national, public and private - should participate in all these processes related to the global agendas. Even in the official discourse, IOs talk about multi-state holders, but there are some big asymmetries related to which actors occupy certain positions”* (Staff member from Habitat International Coalition, interview, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the difference with Lima (and the rest of the cities in Latin America) when it comes to intermediary actors, is that Mexico has strong and extensive institutional mechanisms for scientific and strategic design, both public and private (e.g. INECC, MMC, Lab, among others). Therefore, consulting companies don't play an important role compared to Lima's case. Knowledge transfer in the Mexico's case comes from NGOs and, to a lesser degree, from universities and national institutes, such as INECC. Still, the main reason why Mexico City collaborate with C40 is based on an economic rationality. As mentioned in the chapter, the network contributes to facilitate access for transnational companies to city's officials and sell its solutions to mitigate GHG.

## **Chapter 6. Urban policies related to Low Carbon Emissions Public Transportation in two Latin American cities.**

### *6.0 Introduction*

The concept of urban mobility includes several aspects (food, goods, people, etc.). Also, the question of urban mobility can be studied around different aspects, such as the social, political and economic. Paterson (2007) claims that by giving emphasis to, what he calls, the cultural political economy of mobility, can help us understand the relationship between urban transportation and climate politics (Idem). This section focuses on the aspect of transportation and mobility of people within an urban area –also known as commuting- and all the economic and political interests that guide public policies related to that. Furthermore, the chapter aims to show the dynamics involved in their design in two Latin American cities; Lima and Mexico City. The analysis also includes the interactions between, local, national and transnational actors involved in such a process.

LCEPT policies helps to illustrate the complexity of TCCG at an urban level, and how transnational actors -through TNs- may influence urban climate policies in Latin American cities. With this in mind, the chapter uses the public transportation sector as a way to illustrate the involvement of transnational actors in Latin American urban politics. Through the lenses of an IPE perspective, the chapter aims to show the economic interests behind the suggestions of such actors bring to climate politics in the region. Likewise, the section presents empirical evidence that helps to uncover this economic rationality behind LCEPT policies in Lima and Mexico City.

The chapter demonstrates how the transnational corporate actors –we have encountered in the previous two chapters- have used the city’s participation in C40 to shape public transportation policies to their own interests and vision. By offering technical solutions –or contacting those who have them- with city officials, transnational corporate actors have the power to influence public transportation policies in the big metropolis. These group of actors, as well as international institutions, contribute to shaping different cities’ strategy in the public transportation sector. Throughout the chapter, the study shows where the strongest influences come from. In terms of the level of influence from transnational actors in LCEPT politics, comparing the two cities, is more evident in Mexico City than Lima, as shown in figures 3 and 5. For the former, there are few and disperse actors participating in urban public transportation policies. Likewise, in Lima’s case, the strongest influence comes indirectly from IO’s, such as the OECD and the World Bank, through the central government and a few NGOs that, coincidentally share the same ideas with those IO’s. In the case of Mexico City, C40 is the link between transnational corporations and the city’s government. Additionally, NGO’s, such as WRI and ITDP, play an important role in the agenda-setting and decision-making process related to public transportation.

In this sense, the chapter does the work of demonstration by describing the influence from transnational actors in Lima and Mexico City (in particular from networks such as C40) to promote the implementation of a BRT system in each city. For instance, how these actors influenced the decisions of construction implementation, as well as the expansion of the BRT system based on the optics and the results its promoters can show. Specifically, the chapter aims to highlight the economic interests that motivate the development of BRT systems in each city. Furthermore, the illusion of GHG reduction through the use of natural gas has played a key role in the promotion of

BRT systems in Latin American cities. As the chapter shows, the idea about natural gas as an alternative source of energy affects the construction of low emissions climate politics at an urban level in Latin America.

### *6.1 The public transportation sector in Latin America*

Likewise, between 40% and 70% of GHG emissions in three of the largest cities in the region, came from the public transportation system in 2012 (Ryan, 2012). In the same sense, eight years ago the IEA expects urban transport energy consumption in Latin America to double by 2050, while the tendency in global transport emissions has been growing by nearly 2 billion tons annually of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub> eq.) since 2000 (International Energy Agency, 2012). Unfortunately, this tendency has not change. Global transport emissions in 2019 was still responsible for 24% of direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fuel combustion. Road vehicles – cars, trucks, buses and motorcycles – account for nearly three-quarters of transport CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (International Energy Agency, 2020). Likewise, according to the United Nations Development Programme, development of countries from the South sets a panorama where production and consumption, due to economic growth, would increase, alongside the GHG emissions derived from such activities (Malik, 2013).

Similarly, the ECLAC suggests that, in recent years, Latin America has shown a consumption pattern strongly influenced by various “aspirational” and cultural factors (Filgueira, 1981; Lluch, 1977; Sunkel & Gligo, 1980). Additionally, the organization argues that economic growth, combined with the aspirational variable, represent risks and includes certain paradoxes in the regional context, which suggest that the current development style is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run and that its underpinnings are already fragile and perhaps are already being eroded

(Galindo et al., 2014). Studies from the commission claim that public policies in the sector are concentrated on the increase in private motor transportation and demonstrate how economic policies focus on promoting private consumption instead of promoting investments in infrastructure related to public transportation. Additionally, the organization argues that these consumption patterns have a strong influence on economic dynamics and are associated with significant negative externalities, such as the generation of waste, air pollution, environmental deterioration or destruction, increased use of renewable and non-renewable resources, and GHG emissions that are driving climate change (Idem).

Based on the study from ECLAC, we can deduce that the current consumption patterns and their corresponding public/private matrix are not coherent with a sustainable form of development (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & van den Bergh, 2004). This pattern exhibits a public service matrix that provides incentives for unsustainable consumption patterns, in which middle and high-income groups prefer individual modes of transportation and low-income groups face the risks and costs associated with the lack of modern, safe, high-quality public transit systems.

## *6.2 The Public Transportation System in Lima*

As soon as you step outside Lima's international airport, you can see that mobility is one of the most significant challenges in the city. Growing up in Guadalajara, a city with one of the worst and most dangerous public transportation systems in Latin America (CAF, 2011), and after having experienced several times the traffic in México City during rush hour, Lima's traffic was still a big shock to me. When you arrive in a city that keeps you stuck in traffic at 1:00 am, several questions

come to your mind. As some of the interviewees expressed: “One of the biggest issues of Lima is transportation” (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). Also, Liliana Miranda, Director of FCPV, expressed that Lima is a city that has already collapsed. Also, that the negative implications that traffic represents, as well as the amount of GHG emissions, are evident (Liliana Miranda, interview, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

In this sense, it is not difficult to comprehend that urban politics related to public transportation in Lima present some particular challenges, which can help us to understand the reasons of its limitations and deficiencies in the service, as well as the negative impacts on the environment. First is the issue of a fragmented government which adds even more complexity to the matter and, most of the time, results in discoordination and inefficient actions taken. For instance, as one of the interviewees mentioned, you could say that there are 43 mayors in the greater area of Lima from each of the municipalities. There are also 43 departments of transportation, without taking into consideration all the informal buses and taxis (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Peruvian political system has one more level of government (four instead of three). In Lima’s case, the city has three levels of sub-national government. As Gabriela Camacho, Specialist in International Relations from the Deputy Office of International Technical Cooperation during Susana Villarán’s administration explained during the interview. First, is the district level which is the smallest level within the subnational governments and is embedded in the second level, which is the municipal one, this level being that of the whole metropolitan area. Last is the regional level. This division means each level has its own budget and, sometimes, have different strategies, needs and problems. At the same time, it implies each level has different

functions and faculties in the public administration, even if it covers the same geographical area (Gabriela Camacho, interview, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017).

Secondly, besides the local actors, several foreign actors have a strong influence on the strategies and policies related to LCEPT. Related to the former, the role of transnational actors in Lima related to public transportation, and how IOs –such as the WB- together with transnational networks –such as CCI (later C40)- along with the central government, persuade, and sometimes pressure, the metropolitan government of Lima, at the time, to prioritize the construction of the BRT system. As a result of this diversity of actors involved, the city faced a clash of approaches. On the one hand, during both Castañeda’s administrations (2003-2010 and 2015-2018), the Peruvian central government, the private sector, some universities and foreign actors pushed for more visible and quicker solutions (technological, infrastructure), missing the aspect of justice involved in transportation. For them, the implementation of a BRT system represented [and still does] the best option. On the other hand, the Villarán administration (2011-2014), as well as civil society, pleaded for a more accessible, affordable and safer public transportation system.

### 6.2.1 *Origins of the chaos*

During the *terrorismo era*<sup>90</sup>, the level of unemployment increased considerably. As a response, the central government allowed the importation of used cars from Korea. As a consequence, the flood of vehicles per capita grew exponentially, which contributed to aggravating the deterioration of

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<sup>90</sup> The internal conflict in Peru (also known as the *terrorismo era*) was an armed conflict between the Government of Peru, the Communist Party of Peru (also known as *Sendero Luminoso* or “PCP-SL”), and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The conflict started on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1980, and finished in November 2000. It is estimated that it resulted in nearly 70,000 deaths. See more in García-Sayán, 1990; Lucía Galleno, 2012; and Moller, 2017.

Lima's air quality. In addition to the increase of private vehicles amongst the population, Peru had a dirty fuel system. For instance, the diesel fuel available at the time was burning 3,000 to 4,000 carbon monoxide's parts per million (ppm). The following years, even though the government moved from diesel to three octane levels (mid-grade) type of gasoline, the parts per million of carbon monoxide in the air were still extremely high. Also, during that period, the city presented a high rate of informal units. As a consequence of both the low quality of gasoline consumed and the proliferation of informal units, together with the high rates of unemployment, the city experimented an exponential increase of taxis (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). The number of taxis per capita in Lima was one of the highest in the world and that was when a hierarchical informal system among the taxis was created. Consequently, the streets were saturated with cars, and public transportation in the metropolitan area developed a system with uncoordinated routes and a very disorganized transportation [informal] system. This type of informal organization meant that each municipal administration was coordinating the *combis*<sup>91</sup>, which made it very difficult for the regional government to try to reorganize the transportation systems (Idem).

### 6.2.2 *The Metro system in Lima*

Despite its size and the high levels of GHG emissions coming from the transportation sector, Lima has only one metro line. It started to operate in 2012, and covers approximately 33 kilometers, with a capacity to transport nearly 250,000 people per day. Even when the passengers demand projections, at the moment of building the first metro line, where calculated for 2030, this increase

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<sup>91</sup> Most of the units used by the people with a concession were Volkswagen Combis, instead of buses, with low standards of maintenance. Due to their limited space and the high demand for transportation, the number of units was extremely high. Up to today, a considerable number of "combis" are still circulating.

still does not cover the demand of passengers. Such predictions mean that the existing transportation system in the city has already been surpassed. Besides, the metro system is the only mode of transportation that incorporates the use of technology (pre-paid card system), and schedules punctual stops. However, so far, it only includes one metro line that goes from east-north to east-south. Ironically, it does not cover the transportation needs of the metropolitan city, since most of the traffic is from west-north to west-south and vice-versa. For instance, all the time I spent in Lima doing fieldwork, I did not use either the metro system or the BRT line. The reason is because government headquarters, universities, most of the [safe] urban areas, and even touristic attractions, are in the west part of the city.

In order to address transportation needs, the central government is planning to build a second train line. For this second metro line, the CAF announced it would invest \$600 million USD, out of the \$2 billion USD which is the estimated cost of the second line of the metro (CAF, 2016b).

### *6.2.3 The construction of the Bus Rapid Transit system in Lima*

The construction of the BRT system in Lima was characterized by the involvement of international financial institutions, such as the WB, and the constant promotion and encouragement from transnational networks which, in this case, was C40. This strong influence from foreign actors resulted in a clash of approaches between foreign and some national actors, and local authorities in Lima at the time.

In addition to the metro system, Lima currently has one BRT line, which is the only large-scale transportation modality owned by the state. The BRT project, called the “*Metropolitano*”, included the involvement of the WB, CAF and the Development Finance Corporation of Peru (COFIDE for its acronym in Spanish). This project, according to one of the interviewees, was one of the first examples where the WB lent money to a city government for local infrastructure (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). As opposed to other modes of large-scale public transportation, the BRT vehicles run on natural gas. This characteristic was considered an advantage by the financial corporations as well as the local government, due to the domestic source of natural gas in the country<sup>92</sup>. As one of the interviewees mentioned, compared to a metro system, the BRT is much cheaper to build. For instance, between 2004 and 2005, the Peruvian central government was not able to start the construction of the metro line, since the process required the fulfillment of much more complicated requirements and planning (Anonymous, interview, March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2018). But, despite the economic advantages that natural gas<sup>93</sup> may represent as an alternative fuels, the recent public transportation policies in Lima do not take into consideration some collateral damage from the natural gas extraction through fracking, such as water contamination. For instance, the extraction of natural gas from hard-to-reach reservoirs has shown up multiple environmental threats

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<sup>92</sup> Proven natural gas reserves in Peru were 15 trillion cubic feet in 2015, the fourth-largest reserves in Central and South America, following Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil. Dry natural gas production in Peru has grown rapidly since the Camisea field went on stream in 2004, from 30 billion cubic feet (Bcf) that year to 431 Bcf in 2013. The country became a natural gas exporter in 2010 when it commissioned South America's first liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant, Melchorita, owned by the Peru LNG consortium (U.S.-based Hunt Oil with 50%, SK Energy with 20%, Shell with 20%, and Marubeni with 10%). The plant currently has a capacity of 215 Bcf per year. Exports of natural gas were 202 Bcf in 2014 according to Bloomberg Philanthropies Statistical Review of World Energy. Peru's domestic consumption of natural gas has substantially increased from 12 Bcf in 2000 to 208 Bcf in 2013, driven by government incentives, economic growth, and the growing number of natural gas-fired electricity plants. In 2009, shale gas was found in the Devonian shale beneath the Santa Rosa 1X well, which was drilled by Maple Energy in its Block 31E. See more in: <https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/PER>

<sup>93</sup> Natural gas is the lowest emitting of the three main fossil fuels in CO<sub>2</sub>, and much lower for various other pollutants producing air pollution, but nevertheless a fossil fuel. Therefore, it is not an alternative to gasoline or diesel.

to surface waters<sup>94</sup>. Additionally, according to one of the interviewees from the Ministry of the Environment, one of the priorities from the Peruvian central government was to become a member of the OECD, one of the required criteria being the inclusion of a green strategy, as well as GHG mitigation goals, along with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (staff member from the Peruvian Ministry of the Environment, interview, May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2017). In that sense, the construction of a BRT system represented a fast and visible project in which the Peruvian government could demonstrate the reduction of GHG emissions and fulfill the requirements for the admission.

After Bloomberg took over as chair of the C40 network, the market and technological approach embedded in all the initiatives proposed by the network became stronger. At the same time, the promotion and support for the BRT line within the municipal government grew in parallel with Bloomberg's leadership. Also, the requirements from international and regional financial institutions (e.g. WB, CAF, IDB) and the Peruvian central government, all aligned together in support for the development of the BRT system in Lima. For instance, a report made between the British Embassy, the MINAM, the Municipality of Lima and the IDB in 2015, suggested the expansion of the BRT system in the city (Gouldson et al., 2015).

In general, there are three reasons mentioned in strategic documents, as well as in the official discourse, as to why Lima opted for the construction and development of a BRT system. Firstly, they argued that it was due to its low cost of construction compared to the cost of construction for the metro system. Secondly, the construction of a BRT system requires less time compared to other modes of transportation. Lastly, the buses used in the BRT system run on natural gas, of which Peru

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<sup>94</sup> See more in Andreassi, 2013; Davis, 2012; Entrekin, Evans - White, Johnson, & Hagenbuch, 2011; Howarth, Ingraffea, & Engelder, 2011; Osborn, Vengosh, and Warner, & Jackson, 2011.

has abundant reserves. These can be translated as optic politics and prove that governments are looking for short and medium term solutions. First, the cost is not that low, and second, the fact that buses run on natural gas imply other collateral effects, as described above. Despite all the advantages and benefits mentioned by its principal advocates, the BRT system in Lima still does not cover the city's transportation needs. A report in 2016 made by the Pacific University showed that only 1.2% of the daily trips in Lima and Callao are made on the BRT system, "*Metropolitano*" (Alegre Escorza & Alarcón Rodríguez-Paiva, 2016).

#### 6.2.4 *An issue of climate justice*

A transportation system that does not connect the different areas of a city, allowing all sectors of society to have fast and affordable access to different areas of the city, only contributes to reproducing social and economic inequality in cities. Likewise, geographical and physical characteristics are essential to understanding the link between transportation systems in cities and environmental, health, social and economic problems caused by air pollution, and need to be taken into consideration. In the case of Lima, the current public transportation system does not entirely help to reduce social inequalities. As Susana Villarán, former Mayor of Lima expressed during the interview:

*"due to its geographical characteristics, 20% of Lima's population lives in areas with a high risk of floods and landslides. Additionally, having access to these areas became more difficult and expensive due to the lack of an interconnected transportation system"*

(Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Winchester (2006) suggested a relationship between the lack of public transportation policies, the increase of social inequality, and the rise in environmental deterioration in each city. He also suggested the incorporation of new technologies, as well as the use of renewable energies in order to cover the transportation demand without having negative impacts on the environment. However, the efforts of city governments in the region have been limited, partly due to economic, financial and political obstacles. In this sense, during her administration, Susana Villarán and her team promoted a series of reforms in the public transportation sector, which included a social justice approach. The *Great Reform on Public Transportation* –or The “Great Reform” as they called it- faced several challenges from inside and outside the government, mainly because it looked to make deep structural changes that, for most of the time, did not match the interests and projects from transnational actors. Also, the changes proposed for the reform were expected to see in the long term and did not necessarily include large infrastructure projects.

#### 6.2.5 *The “Great Reform on Public Transportation.” A climate justice approach*

The reform in Lima’s public transportation system or, as they called it, “The Great Reform on Public Transportation” encouraged by Susana Villarán’s administration, included a social dimension. According to her, besides the environmental aspects of public transportation, the reform needed to prioritize the idea of territorial justice (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). This approach means a transportation system that is low in carbon emissions, at the same time contributing to connect people to a low cost and enabling them to get closer to their destination. The idea of social justice, which involves territorial justice, was the central axis of the reform. The proposal for an integrated transport system, included giving priority to the transport reform (which

was one of the key reforms of Villarán's government), and the creation of a mobility system formed by the network of the 5 subway lines included in the Ministry of Transport and Communications' Plan, the BRT's network, the buses in segregated lanes and all the pedestrian and bicycle mobility, is an integrated network, as the PLAM (IMG, 2013) stipulates (Anna Zucchetti, interview, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017c). What the administration considered important and fundamental of the transport reform, was the impact in GHG emission's reduction, but not only because of emissions' mitigation, but because of a sustainable, humane and justice public transportation model. From this perspective, a public transportation reform is relevant when constructing a city, with good services for citizens; a fair and safe city, with fewer traffic accidents, fewer hours spent on transport, at the same time contributing to a reduction in emissions that will result in the improvement of air quality, having positive implications for public health (Idem). As Ms. Villarán expressed during the interview:

*“[The reform] included both, an environmental and a social objective. On the one hand, our idea of territorial justice, in other words, the opportunities distributed in the territory, having a more just city, it is unacceptable that the poorer population in the city spends almost 30% of their income in transportation, while those who have more move around the city do it in a straight line and paying toll. [We must take into consideration that] people spend not only a big portion of their income but also an important part of their time [in transportation] compared to others.”* (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

The next step in the strategy, she added, was to change the transportation system from an affiliate commission system, that was a result of a series of neoliberal reforms during Alberto Fujimori's

administration<sup>95</sup> in the late 90s, to a concessions model. The concessions model represented an absolute liberation of the transportation sector, based on business consortiums that included drivers working by salaries, and not commissions, with a maximum of 9-hour shifts each. The reform also contemplated the replacement of 34,000 old units circulating [*combis*], for 16,000 buses. Once the business consortium was implemented, the administration planned to create synergies between the financial system and the transportation companies to finance the acquisition of new units, as well as to perform a series of reforms in the municipal legislation benefitting pedestrians, cyclists and public transport users instead of private automobile users. Furthermore, it included the construction of a light train system, as well as an urban train system that connected the suburbs surrounding Lima. Finally, it also included the expansion of the current metro system that would connect the rest of the transportation systems (Buses, BRT, light train and cycling). The construction and development of each modality were incorporated in the Metropolitan Plan for Urban Development (PLAM or its acronym in Spanish), alongside the implementation of a pre-paid system, the designation of stops and schedules for the buses, as well as the interconnection between each of the transport modalities mentioned; all of the above based on studies on traffic flows (Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima, 2013).

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<sup>95</sup> Alberto Fujimori is a former Peruvian politician who served as the President of Peru from 28 July 1990 to 22 November 2000. Some analysts state that some of the GDP growth during the Fujimori years actually reflects a greater rate of extraction of non-renewable resources by transnational companies; these companies were attracted by Fujimori by means of near-zero royalties, and, by the same fact, little of the extracted wealth has stayed in the country. Peru's mining legislation, they claim, has served as a role model for other countries that wish to become more mining-friendly. Fujimori's privatization program also remains shrouded in controversy and opposed by many Peruvians. A congressional investigation in 2002, led by socialist opposition congressman Javier Diez Canseco, stated that of the US\$9 billion raised through the privatizations of hundreds of state-owned enterprises, only a small fraction of this income ever benefited the Peruvian people. See more in (Atack, 2007; de Olarte, 1993; Walton, 2004; Wise, 2006).

Lastly, according to one of the interviewees, CCI also participated in an indirect way in Lima's Public Transportation Reform. For instance, CCI orchestrated the development and implementation of a bus scraping system project linking financial resources from the WB (World Bank, 2011) and the technical support of cities from Brazil, such as Gerdau and Sao Paulo (CCI, 2007). In addition, CCI supported COFIDE in the program, called "Mi taxi", which aimed to replace the use of diesel for natural gas in taxis (APN, 2008; La República, 2008). Additionally, the network helped in the exchange of information and technical support between Lima and Bogota, Colombia for the design and construction of the BRT line (CCI, 2007, 2013; Clinton Foundation, 2010). Nonetheless, the actions encouraged by CCI did not involve the social justice component, nor were deep structural changes suggested. On the contrary, the initiative proposed work on the same basis as the old system, reinforcing the use of cars and fossil fuels in the transportation sector.

### *6.3 A clash of approaches in Lima's public transportation system*

Based on the analysis in the previous sections, we could argue that Lima's climate policy related to LCEPT presented a clash of interests between the municipal government in Villarán's administration and transnational actors, such as CCI (later on C40), private consulting companies, and the Peruvian central government. As a result, Lima's public policies are divided into two different, and sometimes contradictory, visions regarding public transportation and climate change. The first is supported mainly by the central government and foreign actors which emphasize the need to mitigate emissions (CAF, 2016a, 2016b; giz, 2015; MINAM, 2015). In the debate between mitigations vs. adaptation politics (IOs, national government) with the variety of actors involved in the creation, design, and application of projects related to mitigation and adaptation, climate

governance becomes more complicated, especially due to the lack of coordination among all the actors. As I mention in Chapter 4, the case of the Peruvian Climate Politics helps to illustrate the influence of developmental discourse and economic rationality, from the different IOs, in shaping climate politics and questions.

The second perspective, from Villarán's administration, is more focused on social justice. The main idea behind this perspective was to build a public transportation policy based on territorial justice over the interests of real estate companies. According to Susana Villarán, what the administration wanted, at the time, was to prevent gentrification and, instead, to put the people at the center of the strategy, since they were aware of the influence on public transportation projects over the value of land (Susana Villarán, interview, August 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017). An example of this approach was the Great Reform on Public Transportation promoted by her administration, briefly explained in the previous section. Villarán's administration did not see climate change politics as something apart, but from a holistic perspective. In other words, she and her team saw emissions reduction policies as a parallel effect to more equitable policies.

In terms of Lima's policies related to public transportation, the polarization of urban politics in LCEPT may be initiated by transnational actors trying to plead for particular transportation modalities –in this case the BRT-, including the design and application of the policies involved. This polarization of approaches happens even when those policies suggested from the outside are not coherent with the needs or the geographical characteristics of Lima, as the strategies followed during both of the Castañeda's administrations (supported by transnational actors). These political rivalries can be better understood when we pay attention to the economic interests behind the

promotion of BRT systems. In particular, it is worth observing the interest from transnational actors implied in the promotion of BRT, since it represents a relatively fast solution to the transportation question, which presents the image of cities' efficiency when they participate in networks, such as C40. In the end, these economic interests from transnational actors did not allow the reform to move forward.

#### *6.4 The public transportation system in Mexico City*

Among the biggest urban areas in the world, Mexico City has more than 8.8 million habitants living in the city, and 21.4 million in the metropolitan area<sup>96</sup>. In 2016, the City's Ministry of the Environment (SEDEMA for its acronym in Spanish) registered 2.3 million vehicles circulating in Mexico City, and 5.7 million in the whole metropolitan area (CDMX, 2018; SEDEMA, 2018). Furthermore, according to the last emissions inventory, the transportation sector is responsible for the emission of more than 60% of the GHG in the metropolitan area. In other words, private automobiles and heavy units are responsible for most of those emissions (CDMX, 2018). The high levels of fossil fuels consumption in the transportation sector are responsible for several changes in the city's climate system, as well as in the decrease of air quality. For instance, according to Graizbord & González Granillo (2018), the air quality is not the only source of vulnerability originated by the emission of GHG. The "heat island" effect, as they call it, can be observed in the

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<sup>96</sup> The Mexico City metropolitan area is formed by 16 mayoralties (Álvaro Obregón, Azcapotzalco, Benito Juárez, Coyoacán, Cuajimalpa de Morelos, Cuauhtémoc, Gustavo A. Madero, Iztacalco, Iztapalapa, Magdalena Contreras, Miguel Hidalgo, Milpa Alta, Tláhuac, Tlalpan, Venustiano Carranza and Xochimilco); 60 municipalities from the State of Mexico and one from the state of Hidalgo. It is the largest metropolitan area in the country and the area with the highest population density. As of 2009, 21,163,226 people live in this urban agglomeration, of which 8,841,916 live in Mexico City proper.

increase of average temperature from 3 to 4 degrees, which will have an impact in the city's water reserves.

In terms of mobility, Mexico City has a diversity of modes of public transportation that goes from the metro system (subway) to suburban rail, light rail, regular buses, a BRT system, “*pesero*” (minibuses), and trolleybuses, to bike share. Furthermore, it is the Mexican city with the most extensive public transportation system. With 225.9 km of lines, the metro system is the most important form of LCEPT serving the whole metropolitan area, which makes it the largest in Latin America. The first portions were opened in 1969 and it expanded to 12 lines with 195 stations in 2012 (CDMX, n.d.). The second most important LCEPT modality is the BRT system. Officially known as “*Sistema de Corredores de Transporte Público de Pasajeros del Distrito Federal*, or *Metrobús*”, the BRT system began operating in June 2005, along Avenida Insurgentes<sup>97</sup>. As of February 2018, it consists of seven lines that cross the city and connect with other forms of transit. Until 2017, there were 568 buses, transporting an average of 1.1 million passengers daily (SEMOVI, 2016), which represented the reduction of emissions of 143,952 CO<sub>2</sub> tons (Metrobús, 2016).

#### *6.4.1 Transnational actors in Mexico City's Public Transportation Sector*

Besides the diversity of public actors participating in Mexico City's climate politics, the metropolis presents an important participation of corporate, private and transnational actors contributing to urban politics in a variety of subjects, but particularly in the LCEPT sector. By saying this, I do not

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<sup>97</sup> Av. Insurgentes is the longest avenue in Mexico City, with a length of 28.8 km (17.9 mi) on a north-south axis across the city.

intend to claim that urban climate politics excludes public actors. However, I consider that it is relevant to observe transnational companies' participation when their interests sometimes are above public interests and their economic interests rule the entire spectrum of urban climate politics, from design to implementation. Furthermore, when these dynamics in urban politics ignore local actors' opinion, leaving the right to decide to a small group. As one of the interviewees mentioned:

*“Part of the problem is that local agendas become an almost exclusive discourse between multilateral agencies, eventually some powerful national governments and corporative actors, not even the private sector in general but big transnational corporative actors, banks and financial agents, and all those mega holdings that decide global economy”* (Staff member from Habitat International Coalition, interview, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

However, this market approach to LCEPT policies from transnational actors is not exclusive to them. The local government also pursues the implementation of market-based, technological climate politics, given that the results from such measures can normally be shown in a shorter time than if they pursued structural changes. For instance, at the beginning of his administration, Marcelo Ebrard visited China where he promoted a series of infrastructure projects in the city. It is important to mention that this trip was sponsored by Sinosure, a Chinese export & credit insurance corporation. During the same trip, he met with the company ZTE<sup>98</sup> and signed an agreement to

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<sup>98</sup> ZTE Corporation is a Chinese technology company that specializes in telecommunication. Founded in 1985, ZTE is listed on both the Hong Kong and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The company operates in three business units: carrier networks (54%), terminals (29%) and telecommunication (17%). Their core areas are wireless, exchange, access, optical transmission, and data telecommunications gear; mobile phones; and telecommunications software. It also offers products that provide value-added services, such as video on demand and streaming media. It is one of the top five largest smartphone manufacturers in its home market. Initially founded as Zhongxing Semiconductor Co., Ltd in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, in 1985, ZTE was incorporated by a group of investors associated with

promote the company's participation in projects related to telecommunication and wireless internet infrastructure in the city (Schiavon, 2008, pp. 186–187). Differing from Ebrard's approach to international relations, Miguel Angel Mancera (the city mayor for the term 2012-2018) did not intend to take a protagonist role in Mexico's city network activity. Instead, his administration accepted the "status-quo" and the hierarchies already stipulated in the city's transnational relations. For example, one of the first official international visits Mancera made after he started his term was to meet with Michael Bloomberg (CGAI, 2015; López, 2013; Milenio, 2013) who, at the time, was still the New York City Mayor. Coincidence or not, the visit allowed, or at least facilitated, access from transnational companies (e.g. BYD, Volvo, Mercedes Benz, BMW, etc.) to compete for concessions related to the expansion of the BRT system in the city. For instance, Bernardo Baranda, Regional Director for Latin America, ITDP, expressed during the interview that the contact between BYD and the Mexico City's government was facilitated through C40 (Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

As one of the largest cities in Latin America, Mexico City's urban politics related to LCEPT exhibit a strong influence from transnational actors. In particular, the influence is clearly palpable when we observe the origins and process through which the BRT modality was promoted and implemented in the city. Seen as the fastest, cheapest and most suitable solution to cover the high demand for transportation in the metropolitan area, the BRT system in Mexico City grew faster than other existing transportation modalities. From 2005 to 2018, the network expanded by 6 lines, having 7 in total and covering 140 kilometers (Metrobús, 2019). However, this popularity was not only attributed to the viability of the BRT systems; there were also economic rationality and interests

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China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry. In March 1993, Zhongxing Semiconductor changed its name to Zhongxing New Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd. See more in <https://www.zte.com.cn/global/>

behind its popularity that contributed to the rapid expansion of the BRT network. In this section, I am going to briefly expound the role of three particular transnational actors who played an important part in the promotion of the BRT system in the city. The first influential actor is the ITDP. Founded in 1985 by Michael Replogle<sup>99</sup>, and other LCEPT advocates in the United States, the institute looks to promote non-motorized ways of transportation (e.g. biking, walking), as well as the inclusion of large-scale public transit in urban planning around the world (*History of ITDP*, 2014). Second is the WRI<sup>100</sup>, a global research organization with its headquarters in Washington D.C. (WRI, 2019). And third is the transnational network Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) which has the support of the Clinton Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies (ClimateWorks, 2007). Contrary to Lima, where the study shows a clash of approaches, the case of Mexico City shows an alignment of approaches, where transnational actors opt for the fastest technical solution to LCEPT, with the city government including these type of policies in their strategies.

#### *6.4.2 The participation of the ITDP in the development of a BRT system in Mexico City*

The first influential actor from civil society to participate in public transportation policies in Mexico City was the ITDP. As the Regional Director for Latin America mentioned during the interview, among the objectives of the institute is to try to influence public policy related to low [carbon] emissions public transport (Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018), such as the BRT or the

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<sup>99</sup> Michael Replogle is a recognized expert in the LCEPT sector. In 1984 he co-founded the non-profit organization Bikes Not Bombs, and next year also co-founded the ITDP. In June 2015, Replogle was appointed Deputy Commissioner for Policy of the New York City Department of Transportation, to develop strategy and advise the city on transportation issues. He manages DOT's Policy Division which prepared an agency-wide strategic plan, advancing Vision Zero efforts to eliminate road-crash related deaths and serious injuries, and shaping freight and parking strategy, climate change mitigation and resiliency, and shared mobility.

<sup>100</sup> The World Resources Institute (WRI) is a global research non-profit organization that was established in 1982 with funding from the MacArthur Foundation under the leadership of James Gustave Speth.

non-motorized form of public transportation, called ecobici<sup>101</sup>, and an automatic parking meter. For instance, the institute was one of the strongest supporters of the development and construction of bike paths around the city. At the time, ITDP proposed the design and construction of 400 km of bike paths in the city. Four years later, the city was given first place in the “Cyclocities Ranking” by the ITDP for the effort made to promote the development of policies that promote the use of a means of non-motorized and sustainable transportation. In coordination with the government of Denmark, ITDP donated the first cyclist counter in the country as part of the award (SEDEMA, 2014). Further to this, ITDP tried to influence other cities in Mexico. For instance, Yerel Salcedo, a long-time cycling activist and member of the collective *GDL en Bici*<sup>102</sup>, mentioned that ITDP was involved in the development of cycling policies in Guadalajara, a city in the North-West part of Mexico. In that case, Yerel mentioned that ITDP participated in the technical aspects of the cycling paths in the city, and even opened an office when they realized bicycle policies were popular, and lucrative, among local governments (Yerel Salcedo, interview, September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

#### 6.4.3 *The influence of the WRI in the construction of the BRT system*

The second influential actor is the WRI. According to one of the interviewees, the collaboration between the Mexico City’s government and WRI dates back to the beginning of the 2000s when

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<sup>101</sup> Currently, the public bike service is managed by Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings, Inc., a public subsidiary of iHeartMedia (formerly CC Media Holdings, Inc.). The company is one of the world's largest outdoor advertising corporations. Through their division “SmartBike”, the company offers cities a non-motorized form of public transport. See more in <http://clearchanneloutdoor.com/>

<sup>102</sup> Created in 2007, GDL en Bici is a local non-profit organization that works for the right to a safe, inclusive and efficient urban non-motorized mobility transportation. It is part of the Non-Motorized Mobility Citizen Council of the Municipality of Guadalajara. The collective works to influence public policy in this city from a state and municipal level. See more in: <https://gdlenbici.org/quienes-somos>

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO's<sup>103</sup>) was the city mayor. At that time, Claudia Sheinbaum<sup>104</sup> held the position of Minister of the Environment. Sheinbaum had a close relationship with Leon J. Schipper, co-founder of EMBARQ<sup>105</sup>, who met each other during Sheinbaum's studies in the early 90s at the University of California, Berkeley, where Schipper was a professor. Since then, both were interested in working on GHG mitigation policies and their relationship with public transportation, as one of the main axes in urban politics (WRI staff member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017b). Years later, WRI absorbed EMBARQ in their structure and transformed it into the division in charge of sustainable public transportation projects (Idem). From the beginning, the collaboration between the Mexico City government and WRI focused on two areas: 1) LCEPT policies, and 2) research and support in COP negotiations. At the beginning of 2000, and thanks in part to the support of Sheinbaum and Schipper, the WRI agenda for low emissions mobility started to develop which, at the beginning, was concentrated on the BRT system. It was between 2004 and 2005 when Mexico City and its first BRT system, called Metrobus, started to develop, as a former WRI staff member mentioned (Interview, interview, November 23, 2017). The institute not only advised the city's government, but they also guided the companies involved in the development of technical studies related to the *Metrobus* (WRI staff member #1, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017a).

Likewise, the organization helped the city's government to create links with transnational networks, such as C40, and it also supported the creation of new networks. For example, in 2009 the WRI office in Washington saw the opportunity to create a network that worked specifically in BRT

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<sup>103</sup> In the last presidential election that took place on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was elected as President of Mexico for the period 2018-2024.

<sup>104</sup> During the last general election in Mexico, held in July 2018, Claudia Sheinbaum was elected as the Mayoress of Mexico City for the period 2018-2024.

<sup>105</sup> EMBARQ is the sustainable transport center of the World Resources Institute. Soon, it became evident that the city lacked experts for the project, and that is when WRI saw the opportunity and created the Center for Sustainable Transport called EMBARQ. See more in <https://wriroscities.org>

systems, in part, due to the boom in popularity that this mode of transport was gaining in Latin America and Mexico. With the support of EMBARQ, the department within WRI in charge of public transportation, the network SIBRT (Network of Integrated BRT Systems in Latin America) was created. One year later, the network changed its name to SIMUS and dissociated itself from EMBARQ (WRI staff member #1, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017a).

Likewise, the institute supervises and advises on different aspects of climate politics. For instance, they developed studies that projected climate scenarios and informed the Mexican delegation at COPs about the possible settings for the country in order to help to define Mexico's position in the negotiations (Idem). Simultaneously, as other interviewees mentioned, WRI worked to bring the issue of mobility to the COPs. Along with other NGOs, the institute supported the initiative to incorporate LCEPT systems into the climate negotiations, at the same time contributing to establishing Mexico's position on the issue during climate negotiations (WRI staff member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017b). Specifically, WRI developed between 10 and 12 alternatives of policies that suggested the implementation of BRT systems in three Mexican cities, the support of public bike services, as well as an urban development approach oriented to [public] transportation ("DOT" for its acronym in Spanish) (Idem). The DOT strategy is aligned with the commitments included in the *Quito Implementation Plan for the New Urban Agenda* presented during the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) III, in Quito Ecuador in 2016 (UN-Habitat III, 2016). Such commitments promote the development of urban spatial frameworks that support compactness (art. 51), prevent and contain urban sprawl (art. 69), and are based on the principles of equitable, efficient and sustainable polycentrism, connectivity and compactness, amongst others (art. 98). At the same time, the strategy coincides with the vision from the relatively new Federal

Ministry in Mexico, the Secretariat of Agrarian, Land, and Urban Development<sup>106</sup> (SEDATU for its acronym in Spanish). In November 2016, Congress passed the General Law of Human Settlements, Territorial Ordination, and Urban Development. Coincidentally, between the compactness strategy from Quito's Urban Agenda, and the *National Strategy and Urban Development plans and programs* mentioned in the law, the article 89 fraction III specifies:

*“Support and develop programs of acquisition, habilitation, and sale of land to achieve metropolitan areas or more organized and compact conurbations, and to meet the different needs of Urban Development, following what is established for this in this Law and under the current regulations for public funds.”* (Ley General de Asentamientos Humanos, Ordenamiento Territorial y Desarrollo Urbano, 2016).

For instance, during the fieldwork, I participated in the colloquium *Reposicionamiento de las Ciudades ante desafios transnacionales, Globalopolis\_MX (Repositioning Cities in the face of Transnational Challenges, Globalopolis\_MX)* organized by the University of the Americas Puebla. Among the participants at the event was the Adjunct Director of Foreign Affairs from SEDATU. One of the main arguments in his presentation was the promotion of the DOT approach to a group of Mexican academics working in the field of urban politics urban planning and climate change.

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<sup>106</sup> This Secretariat was founded by reforms to the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration that were promulgated on January 2, 2013, and replaced the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform. The agency further oversees agriculture, urban development and living space policies. The Secretariat has the faculty to address regional and urban politics, among others. Its priorities include the support of local governments for a better, more sustainable, urban planning.

In addition to WRI's participation in technical studies related to urban climate politics, the NGO's personal connections play an important role in the city's participation in transnational relations on climate change. According to one of the interviewees, WRI has relations with all kind of actors: local and national NGOs, universities and agencies from the federal and local government, national and international. It is through these contacts that city governments connect with philanthropies, transnational companies, cooperation agencies, development banks and other IOs. Also, this is how collaborations and projects are originated; through personal and individual relations. For instance, it is more likely that an initiative will have the support [and resources] of one, if not most of, these institutional actors, if it is proposed by Jannette Sadik-Khan<sup>107</sup> rather than by a city government or any other local actor. She is well known among transnational actors and forums related at an international level to LCEPT, due to the fact that she was Director of the Department of Transportation in New York City during Bloomberg's administration. Her name produces dynamics and generates projects related to public transportation (WRI staff member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017b). By saying this, the interviewee meant Jannette Sadik-Khan's name facilitate the access of funding, contacts from international organizations related to LCEPT, project propositions and collaborations related to LCEPT projects. These dynamics, where personal connections play a key role in the design of urban climate policies, exacerbate the asymmetries between actors interacting in TCCG (WRI staff member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017a).

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<sup>107</sup> Jannette Sadik-Khan, worked in the New York City Department of Transportation during the administration of David Dinkins (1990-1993) and later became the mayor's transportation advisor. In 2007, Sadik-Khan was appointed Transportation Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation during Michael's Bloomberg administration (2007–2013). During her time as Transportation Commissioner, she promoted the creation of seven BRT routes across the city. At the end of Bloomberg's administration, Sadik-Khan joined Bloomberg Associates, a philanthropic consultancy established by former Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, to consult city mayors on transportation practices, including Mexico City. See more in <http://www.jsadikkhan.com>

Another project in which the WRI was highly involved was the agreement with the WB, the CAF, the IDB and the WRI. The agreement established the creation of a technical board (of which private companies form a part), the promotion of cooperation in the area, as well as an investment of \$150 million USD for the transformation and modernization of the LCEPT system (SEDEMA, 2015).

#### *6.4.4 The role of C40 in the installation of Mexico City's BRT system*

The participation of foreign private companies, philanthropies, INGOs and IOs increased considerably during Mancera's government. According to Bernardo Baranda, this change of strategy from the Mexico City government is a reflection of the changes inside C40 and Bloomberg's new approach to climate politics. Their function is more political. In other words, C40 focuses its efforts and resources on organizing summits, in which private companies that offer technical solutions (e.g. electric buses technology, LED technology, etc.) meet with city officials. As mentioned previously in Chapter 5, along with C40, ITDP helped the Clinton Foundation to contact private companies from the transportation sector and help them to gain access to the Mexican market. As an example, the contact between BYD and the Mexico City government, along with other member cities of the network, was facilitated through C40 during the summits (Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018). These events are mainly focused on helping Chinese companies to promote themselves with the city officials (Idem). For example, the C40 Mayors Summit in November 2016 hosted by Mexico City was sponsored by BYD Co Ltd<sup>108</sup> (WRI staff

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<sup>108</sup> Build Your Dreams (BYD) Co Ltd, a Chinese manufacturer of automobiles, battery-powered bicycles, buses, forklifts, rechargeable batteries, trucks, etc. The company was founded in February 1995. Its corporate headquarters are in the city of Shenzhen, and it has two major subsidiaries, BYD Automobile, and BYD Electronic. Regarding the former, the subsidiary's principal activity is the design, development, manufacture and distribution of automobiles, buses, electric bicycles, forklifts, rechargeable batteries and trucks sold under the BYD brand. Regarding the latter, the company makes handset components and assembles mobile phones for its customers, which have included Nokia and Motorola. See more in <http://www.byd.com/en/CompanyIntro.html>

member #2, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017b). However, due to the type of venue in which the event was held, the cost to attend was very high for all participants, except for city government officials, whose costs were covered by the company. Likewise, access to the venue was very restricted due to the security measures, making it more difficult for members from civil society to participate, as other interviewees from an international NGO expressed (Staff member from Habitat International Coalition, interview, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018). Another function these types of events have is to facilitate the access, and establish direct contact with city and transnational company officials to promote technical solutions related only to emissions mitigation (LCEPT for example) and emissions reduction. For example, the summits, such as the one held in Mexico City, facilitate contact between personnel from BYD Co Ltd, staff from the cities, and members of C40. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 5, Mexico City also participates with C40 in the initiative Cities Finance Facility (CFF), developing the first corridor zero emissions<sup>109</sup>, with a route of electric BRT buses. At the time of the interview, the project was still in the pilot phase, and consisted of receiving technical assistance for its preparation so that, later on, it could be eligible to receive funding. Additionally, the city constantly collaborates with other Latin American cities, through C40, in the exchange of experiences related to the management of BRT systems, since Mexico City is the Latin American city with the largest BRT network (Patricia Narváez García, interview, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

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<sup>109</sup> In November 2019, the government of Mexico City put into circulation 40 new electric buses as part of the transformation of the Eje Central Lázaro Cárdenas, one of the most important thoroughfares of the city, into a "Zero Emissions" corridor. By December, the government added 23 more units to the corridor (SinEmbargo, 2020). The project consists of allowing the exclusive service of transporting passengers in electric buses on lanes confined to the Eje Central. In August, 2020, the government is expecting to receive 130 more electric buses from the Chinese company Yutong Bus Co. Ltd (Escalona, 2020).

### 6.5 Lima's transnational connections regarding LCEPT


Figure 7 shows Lima's connections related to the LCEPT sector. Similar to figure 5 in chapter 4, Lima's transnational relations present a diversity of actors with different nature. In this case, most of the connections were the result of a side event organized during the COP20 in the city, and not by C40's intervention. Additionally, the network presents several connections between Lima and IOs. Likewise, figure 7 shows the connections with two cities, Barcelona and San Francisco. Regarding the later, the interaction was originated during the event *Ciudades Sostenibles y Cambio Climático. Experiencias y Desafíos* (Sustainable Cities and Climate Change. Experiences and Challenges). Related to the former, Lima already had a strong and dynamic relation, as I mentioned in chapter 4. In fact, Lima already had a close relationship with each one of them and with which it coordinated a common front for the C40 elections in 2013.

It is important to note that neither of those connections were not originated in Lima's participation in C40's activities. For both cases, it was the result of the city's previous international activity and the COP20. In other words, the network was not responsible for making the links between Lima and other cities. These relations already existed before, or were the product of, the interaction between cities in regional networks, as I mention in Chapter 4. In addition, figure 7 shows the connection with three important IOs (the WB, IDB and CAF), and one TNC (AVINA). These connections were made during one of the two international events in which the city participated. The other half of the connections in Lima's SNA shows the relationships with local NGOs working in diverse aspects of the public transportation sector. The nature of their relationship is linked with the evaluation and monitoring of traffic trends and the public transportation system, but neither of these actors are

involved in the development of LCEPT reforms. As I explained in Chapter 4, local actors, even when they are considered to participate in the NCCC, do not have the right to vote.

Lastly, figure 7 also shows the participation of two European actors. The first one is the French Cooperation Agency and the Covenant of Mayors and Sustainable Energy Action Plans from the EU (PAES for its acronym in Spanish). Together with the government of Barcelona shows a strong influence from European actors in Lima’s climate politics. The rest of the actors involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public transportation strategies are the ministries from the central government (the MINAM), and the Peruvian Development Finance Corporation from the central government.

**Figure 7. Lima’s transnational relations in LCEPT**



Source: Author’s elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed in situ, and documents from the city’s government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown square represent n interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent

transnational actors such as networks; pink circles represent local NGOs; purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations; yellow circles represent central governmental agencies, and IOs and cooperation agencies.


### *6.6 Mexico City's transnational connections on LCEPT*

In the case of the LCEPT systems in Mexico City, the majority of the connections with the private sector are a product of the relationship between C40 and Mexico City. For instance, BYD Co., WRI, ICLEI and ITDP played an important role in the introduction and proliferation of the BRT system. It was the same case for three of the events in which the city participated, such as the Mayors Summit 2016, the UN Climate Summit, the COP20 and COP21, as mentioned in Chapter 5. Each of them contributed to the construction and reinforcement of the historic bloc, or at least to the exchange of experiences from Paris, Bogota and IDB in the support of the BRT in Mexico City. As mentioned in chapter 5, it is through each of the transnational actors (C40, WRI and ITDP) in figure 5 that Mexico City was influenced to the development of the BRT system in the city, as several interviewees mentioned (WRI staff member #3, interview, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017c; Anonymous, interview, September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Sayel Cortes, interview, November 23<sup>th</sup>, 2017; Bernardo Baranda, interview, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2018).

In the case of Mexico City's SNA, the network presents an important presence of transnational actors, whose connection with the city is related to either WRI and ITDP. It is through these actors that important philanthropic organizations (HP Foundation, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation), three IOs (WB, UKAID and giz), and one regional network (SIBRT) – in which Lima also participates - and only one local NGO (MMC), interact with the city. It is important to note that the city has connections with two transnational companies, McKinsey and BYD Co Ltd.

Coincidentally, each connection was made through C40 during the C40 Mayors Summit 2016 in Mexico City, which had a significant impact in the development of the city’s LCEPT policies. The network in figure 8 shows the connections that Mexico City has with actors, foreign and local, participating in the public transportation sector. In this case, it is important to note that the connections show a majority of transnational actors, with no cities involved, contrary to Lima’s case illustrated in figure 7. On the contrary, figure 8 shows the predominance of IOs, philanthropic organizations and private corporations interacting in the public transportation sector, and the participation of only one local NGO, helping us to illustrate which type of actors have more incidence in LCEPT policies in the city.

**Figure 8. Mexico City’s transnational relation on LCEPT**



Source: Author’s elaboration with data obtained from the interviews performed in situ, and documents from the city’s government. The image representation was generated through the software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002). Brown

square represent interviewee, and the green squares represent documents collected during fieldwork. Red circles are the cities that have any type or relation or participation with each, or some, of the nodes; light green circles represent transnational actors such as networks; light blue circles represent transnational companies and consulting corporations; purple circles are international NGOs, think-tanks, philanthropic organizations and private foundations; and yellow circles represent central governmental agencies, IOs and cooperation agencies.

### *6.7 Comparing the two cities*

Compared to Mexico City's SNA, Lima's network shows more contestation, since there is more variety of actors intervening in climate politics with C40. Participants in Lima's transnational relations reveal a diversity of actors from local NGOs and agencies from the central government, to South American networks, Latin American private companies, transnational networks, philanthropic organizations and other cities, mostly European and Latin American. This diversity generates more contestation in the development of urban climate politics, at least during the period when Susana Villarán was Mayor of Lima, essentially because her team prioritized the design of policies based on local needs, taking an approach of social justice to urban planning, including LCEPT policies.

In the case of Lima, the SNA shows a greater participation of local actors, mostly local NGOs. Nonetheless, the data obtained during fieldwork shows that the participation of local actors is limited to the evaluation stage and to monitoring the performance of the existing transportation system. Their role does not include the suggestion, the planning or the proposition of a LCEPT model.

In respect of Mexico City, the SNA in the transportation sector presents a predominance of foreign actors, with the exception of MMC which, as with Lima's civil society participation, is only

included in the monitoring and evaluation stage, and not in the planning phase. Contrary to Lima, Mexico City's case shows an alignment of approaches, in which transnational actors opt for the fastest technical solution to LCEPT, while the city government, as with the rest of actors, adopted the suggested methods and included these type of policies in their strategies. This quick adoption of the BRT system was originated, in part, as a result of the closeness of the past two administrations with Chinese companies in the transportation sector. Additionally, both administrations had a close relationship with the New York mayor's office, including Michael Bloomberg's team, which later contributed to strengthening relations with C40. As a result, several Chinese companies were able to compete for concessions in the purchase of buses for the BRT system. For instance, through C40, the Chinese company BYD opened a dialogue with the Mexico City government. On the other hand, three influential actors played an important role in promoting and expanding the BRT system in Mexico City; the ITDP, the WRI, and the network C40. Each one of them participated in technical studies related to urban climate politics, and advised the city and the national government on different aspects of climate politics in preparation for the COPs while, at the same time, working together to bring the issue of mobility to the COPs. Finally, ITDP and WRI played a crucial role in bringing together transnational corporations with the city government, and the link through which the relationship was established.

Besides the difference in each city's relation to transnational actors, both cases highlight a predominance of an economic rationality behind the popularity of the BRT system that contributes to a better understanding of the rapid expansion of this mode of transportation. Additionally, the economic and political interests influencing its development helps us understand its construction in these two cities. In terms of policies related to public transportation, in the case of Lima, the

polarization of urban politics in LCEPT was the result of different perceptions in the transportation between transnational actors and the local government. This polarization of approaches happens even when those policies suggested from the outside are not coherent with the needs nor the geographical characteristics of Lima. These political rivalries can be better understood when examining the economic interests behind BRT systems' promotion in Latin American cities. In particular, it is worth observing the interest from transnational actors implied in the promotion of the BRT modality, since it represents a relatively fast solution to transportation, which presents the image of cities' efficiency when they participate in networks, such as C40. As an example of the political interest that contributed to the promotion of the BRT system in Lima, it is in the interest of the Peruvian government to become a member of the OECD. As mentioned in Chapter 4, one of the requirements from the organization is to include a green strategy, as well as GHG mitigation goals. In that sense, the construction of a BRT system represented a fast and observable project in which the Peruvian government could demonstrate the reduction of GHG emissions and fulfill the requirements for admission as soon as possible. This is an example of policies related to LCEPT being promoted by transnational networks, where economic interests are placed above social needs.

Lastly, through the analysis of each city's network activity, we can observe an evident decrease of agency participation in regional networks. As shown in figures 3 and 5, Lima and Mexico City prioritized membership of, and participation in, transnational networks, compared to the time and resources invested in regional networks. Related to TNs, their participation was minimal, due in part to the possibility of funding access, and the connections to access a TCC, as Chapters 4 and 5 show.

## *6.8 Conclusions*

The empirical analysis presented in the chapter, proceeds in two ways. First, I study the general dynamics of relations between Lima, Mexico City, C40, and the TCC, in how climate policy is formulated in the two cities. And second, I explore these relations via a particular case study of TNs in LCEPT policies. The public transportation sector represents an attractive opportunity to make profits and give access to the TCC.

Due to the sectors dynamic, urban public transportation involves the participation of a diverse constellation of actors behind, and usually infrastructure projects (seeing as crucial to mitigate GHG in cities) also involve transnational private companies as key actors to guaranty its rapid, and efficient implementation. There is where TNs play a role as intermediary actors.

Furthermore, there is economic rationality behind the popularity of the BRT system in Latin American cities that contributes to better understand the rapid expansion of this mode of transportation. Additionally, the economic and political interests influencing its development help us understand its construction in these two cities. In terms of policies related to public transportation, in the case of Lima, the polarization of urban politics in LCEPT was the result of different perceptions in the transportation between transnational actors and the local government. This polarization of approaches happens even when those policies suggested from the outside are not coherent with the needs or the geographical characteristics of Lima. These political rivalries can be better understood when observing the economic interests behind the promotion of BRT systems in Latin American cities. In particular, it is worth observing the interest from transnational actors

implied in the promotion of the BRT modality, since it represents a relatively fast solution to transportation, which gives the image of cities efficiency when they participate in networks such as C40. As an example of the political interest that contributed to the promotion of the BRT system in Lima, is that of the Peruvian government in becoming a member of the OECD. As mentioned in previous sections, one of the requirements from the organization was to include a green strategy, as well as GHG mitigation goals. In that sense, the construction of a BRT system represented a fast and observable project in which the Peruvian government could demonstrate the reduction of GHG emissions and fulfill the requirements for the admission as soon as possible.

Contrary to the case of Lima, where the study shows a clash of approaches, the case of Mexico City shows an alignment of approaches where transnational actors opt for the fastest technical solution to LCEPT, while the city government includes these types of policies in their strategies. On the one hand, the past two administrations in Mexico City formed relationships with Chinese companies in the transportation sector. For instance, López Arévalo et al. (2014) show an exponential increase of the intra-firms commerce in the automotive and auto parts industry (including bus parts manufacturing industry) between China and Mexico. At the same time, both administrations had a close relationship with the government of New York City, including the Michael Bloomberg administration, which later contributed to strengthening the relationship with C40. As a result, several transnational companies competed for concessions related to the expansion of the BRT system in the city. Also, through C40, the Chinese company BYD initiated contact with the Mexico City government. Could this mean a shift in the TCC structure? Specifically when Carroll (2010); Robinson (2008); Sapinski (2015); and van der Pijl (1984) have the notion of a, predominantly, Euro-American corporations involved. In particular when there is a change in the Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI) and trade trends in Latin America (Dussel Peters, 2013; Dussel Peters & Gallagher, 2013; López Arévalo et al., 2014).

On the other hand, three influential actors played an important role in the promotion and expansion of the BRT system in Mexico City; the ITDP, WRI, and C40. Each one of them participated in technical studies related to urban climate politics, advised the city and the national government in different aspects of climate politics in preparation for the COPs, and also worked together to raise the issue of mobility with the COPs. Finally, they played a crucial role in bringing the transnational corporations and the city government together in matters related to the sector of public transportation.

From both cases, we can conclude that there is a tendency in transnational networks working on climate change to promote market-based and technology-based solutions among its members, instead of endorsing cooperation and exchange of good practices. The empirical evidence from both cases study contributes to uncovering and challenging the common assumptions related to Transnational Climate Change Governance (TCCG), and the role of networks in promoting an alternative model for global climate governance.

Lastly, the chapter illustrates the ability of transnational capital class in shaping urban climate policy in Latin American cities, via partnerships with the network C40. That ability comes from the constellation of transnational actors, in partnership with C40, who contribute to framing the use of BRT systems, and consequently the use of natural gas, as an alternative mode of transportation that contributes to reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The argument claims that GHG emissions reduction,

through the use of natural gas, as well as its lower cost and relatively fast construction compared to other ways of LCEPT, plays a key role in the expansion of BRT systems in these two Latin American cities. Nonetheless, the risk and negative consequences of extracting and using natural gas, mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, are still ignored.

## Conclusions

*“Begin at the beginning, and go on till you come to the end: then stop.”  
The King of Hearts  
Alice’s adventures in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll, 1875)*

This thesis sought to answer two principal RQs and two subsidiary ones. These questions were:

- a) Why do Latin American cities collaborate with transnational networks regarding climate change?, and
- b) Can city networks change urban politics on climate change?

Table 5 shows the key elements of how the thesis has responded to these questions.

**Table 5. Response to research questions**

<p>a) Why do Latin American cities collaborate with transnational networks regarding climate change?</p>	<p><i>Lima</i></p> <p>Regarding Lima’s motivations to collaborate with TNs, the evidence shows they followed an economic rationality. In other words, C40 (and CCI) operated as a network through which Lima could get access to various sources of investment and financing. Furthermore, CCI –later on C40- worked as a facilitator for the private sector to participate in urban climate politics. The network played a key role in promoting private companies’ participation in several areas related to climate politics.</p> <p>The evidence supporting this statement was found in individual interviews, official documents, the network analysis of the city’s relations. For instances, climate politics in Mexico City, especially concerning transnational networking aspects, the data collected shows the city’s motivations are driven by a desire to attract international investment that then opens the door for transnational companies to get involved in designing climate policy for their</p>
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	<p>own interests. This process is assisted by key western NGOs, like WRI, and led explicitly by Bloomberg via the network C40.</p> <p>Likewise, one of the principal challenges that Latin American cities face is limited access to funds. In this sense, the partnership with C40 (among other foreign actors, e.g. giz and USAID) represent a way to obtain the necessary resources for the implementation of such projects. For instance, C40 focuses on the search for financial resources. It is at these events that C40 takes advantages of the political context to promote technological solutions to some issues related to GHG mitigation which their reports and studies point to as being important. Related to the subject of public transportation, for their 2016 annual summit, the network got resources from BYD Co Ltd<sup>110</sup>, a Chinese bus company in Mexico. BYD gave money to C40 to organize that summit, or rather, it was from the principal sponsors, and gave them the opportunity to organize a large event.</p> <p>Also, another of Mexico City's motivations to get involved in C40's activities was focused on development and positioning the city at an international level. This could mean the concept of development not only as a means to increase a certain level of quality of life but, at the same time, to obtain a certain status in the international realm. Hence, the argument circulates around Mexican and Latin American cities. Thus, in order to reach development, cities from the global South see TNs as a vital tool to reach both goals.</p> <p>The chapters contribute to address one of the research questions related to cities motivations in participating with TNs in climate politics. The evidence showed in the empirical chapters helps to illustrate what are the motivations behind Latin American interests to collaborate with TNs in LCEPT policies. Understanding its motivations, I conclude climate politics in the region are mainly guided by an economic rationality from a TCC. The evidence presented in the empirical chapters demonstrates how transnational climate governance is facilitating transnational corporate access to Latin American cities.</p>
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<sup>110</sup> Build Your Dreams (BYD) Co Ltd, a Chinese manufacturer of automobiles, battery-powered bicycles, buses, forklifts, rechargeable batteries, trucks, etc. The company was founded in February 1995. Its corporate headquarters is in the city of Shenzhen, and it has two major subsidiaries, BYD Automobile, and BYD Electronic. Regarding the former, the subsidiary's principal activity is the design, development, manufacture and distribution of automobiles, buses, electric bicycles, forklifts, rechargeable batteries and trucks sold under the BYD brand. Regarding the latter, the company makes handset components and assembles mobile phones for its customers, which have included Nokia and Motorola. See more in <http://www.byd.com/en/CompanyIntro.html>

<p>b) Can city networks change urban politics on climate change?</p>	<p>Both of the empirical chapters shows that transnational networks have changed urban climate politics in both cases by skewing the priorities away from adaptation and towards mitigation; shaping how public transport develops in ways that serve transnational corporate needs instead of local communities; designing policies in accordance with transnational epistemic norms provided by the WRI, ITDP (and others) instead of in response to local conditions. TNs are not self-governed with a horizontal approach, nor that the exercise of power is distributed among their members. Hence, they do not represent an alternative way of global governance. On the contrary, networks are hierarchical and are governed with a top-bottom approach. Furthermore, as shown chapters 4, 5 and 6, TNs do not represent an alternative type of climate governance, but a point of entrance for transnational companies. Contrary to the common assumption, urban climate politics in Latin America is guided by economic interests from a TCC. Such networks</p> <p>Moreover, the cases studied showed transnational networks, more than facilitating and promoting the sharing of experiences as an alternative climate global governance, they enable the access to other actors<sup>111</sup> (mainly private companies) to participate in urban climate politics. By encouraging the application of market-based and technology-based “solutions” to city governments, transnational networks stimulate the promotion of market-based solutions among cities. Likewise, these networks encourage the policy transfer from IOs and States to the local realm, moved mainly by economic interests.</p> <p>The chapter on Lima’s transnational climate change politics shows the influence of transnational networks, considered as hybrid actors (a mixture between public and private, in the design and development of urban climate politics) and their role as facilitators for corporative actors in policies about LCEPT. Additionally, in how these hybrid actors contribute to gaining access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. As shown in chapters 4 and 5, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multi-million dollar companies prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships. Through the analysis and interpretation of the empirical</p>
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<sup>111</sup> When referring to other actors, I include philanthropic organizations, private foundations, and NGOs, real estate, construction, and technology companies.

	<p>evidence compiled, we can observe an ongoing legitimation process from the different levels of government and transnational actors. The complexity of Lima's Transnational Climate Change Relations illustrates the hybrid nature of all involved in Lima's climate governance, even though local actors can generate their own strategies, as was the case in Susana Villarán's administration. As a result of TNs strong influence and privileged position, urban climate governance is dictated by interests from transnational corporations and their market-based approaches. Central governments limit access to local actors while, at the same time, transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments and contribute to the dominance of a market-based approach in urban climate governance.</p> <p>Additionally, chapter 6 showed how these hybrid actors contribute to gain access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. Based on the information compiled, the participation of cities in transnational networks on climate politics facilitates the involvement of private actors in urban climate politics. Similar to the case of Lima, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multi-million dollar companies prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships. Through the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence compiled, an ongoing process of legitimation can be observed, from the different levels of government and also from the hybrid actors. As a result of their strong influence and privileged position, climate governance in the city is dominated by interests from transnational corporations and the market-based approaches from actors such as C40 and WRI. At the same time, governments limit access to local actors while, at the same time, transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments.</p>
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Source: Author's elaboration

The first part of the thesis outlined the gaps in the literature in the field of TCCG in Latin America. As a result of a literature survey interpretation and analysis, chapter one shows that governance is conceptualized within an institutionalized framework, which is contradicted by the evidence shown in the empirical part of the thesis. Usually, the literature on TCCG sees networks as horizontal,

democratic institutions that represent an alternative to the state-centric, top-down current climate governance model. However, what most of the literature in the field does not consider is the origins and ownership of economic interests, as well as the process of generating knowledge out of which the guidelines for policy design arises. The literature review chapter demonstrates that, for most of the time, governance is conceptualized as an institutionalized practice, using a restricted framework, leaving aside the involvement of other actors who come from outside the public sphere.

From a theoretical point of view, the existing literature shows a strong tendency to conceptualize climate governance<sup>112</sup> as an institutionalized practice, which misses the role played by hybrid actors, as well as TNs, and how these actors influence urban climate politics in Latin America. This way, the thesis addresses the research question related to city networks change urban politics on climate change. This narrow conceptualization of climate politics results in inappropriate strategies, such as those related to mitigation and adaptation. As a consequence, these discrepancies (mainly motivated by foreign actors as the thesis shows) increase the climate risks considerably in rural and urban areas throughout the region. This raises several questions related to climate politics in the region. For instance, if we observe Latin America's contribution to global GHG emissions, it is minimal compared to other regions. Nonetheless, its vulnerability to events caused by climate change is high, and the region's adaptation capacity is limited, as well as not being considered as sufficiently important in public policy design and planning. Consequently, governments in the global South prioritize mitigation over adaptation, even when most of the countries in the region are responsible for 13.7% of total global GHG emissions (ECLAC, 2020).

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<sup>112</sup> Here, climate governance is understood as norms that shape our carbon conduct.

Related to the methodological contributions, chapter 3 showed the advantages of using, mostly, qualitative methodologies when studying TCCG in Latin America. For instance, the application of interpretative approaches allows for an in-depth observation of the dynamics of climate politics, such as the role of formal and informal actors at different levels involved in politics. Likewise, it encourages the use of qualitative methodologies in environmental politics, in which the inclusion of reflective approaches, that function more like theoretical and analytical tools and not as theoretical frameworks.

As part of the theoretical contributions, the thesis argues for the study of TCCG using a neo-Gramscian approach. I use these approaches to emphasize particular aspects of the cases studied that other theoretical approaches do not permit. Likewise, I use Gramsci's concept of hegemony to better understand the bases for TCCG. Gramsci and neo-Gramscians suggests the expansion of hegemony happens not only through inter-state relations but also through links among social [capitalist] classes. These analytical tools help to understand TCCG as a visible expansion of the internal hegemony from countries in the global North. They are thus supporting the expansion and reinforcement of a dominant transnational capitalist class in the global South. In this sense, a neo-Gramscian approach helps to understand why Latin American cities are collaborating with transnational networks, and how city networks are changing urban politics on climate change in Latin America.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show the results from interviews carried out between March 2017 and March 2018, and the empirical evidence from official documents, legislation, and governmental programs up to September 2018. Through the observation, interpretation, and analysis of two representative

cities in Latin America – Lima and Mexico City, chapters 4 and 5 shows the *how* of transnational climate change relations in Latin American cities. For instance, how does the network C40 facilitate access to urban climate politics for other actors<sup>113</sup> working as intermediaries between them and cities.

The thesis has shown how the network C40 operates in Latin American cities to facilitate transnational corporate investment in a range of infrastructures in cities from the global South. This occurs as a result of the way in which C40, through other western NGOs (WRI, ITDP), both directly and indirectly create channels for transnational corporate actors to gain access to local policy-makers. Also, the network influence urban policies related to LCEPT by putting pressure on those policy-makers to accept such transnational investments. This, then, has consequences for what types of climate policy are established in a southern city (the mitigation vs. adaptation imbalance) and who benefits from it (the type of transport infrastructure, social justice issues, etc.). The latter can serve to answer the second research question which enquires if city networks can change urban politics on climate change.

In this regard, the empirical chapters shows they are not self-governed with a horizontal approach, nor that the exercise of power is distributed among their members. Hence, they do not represent an alternative way of global governance. On the contrary, networks are hierarchical and are governed with a top-bottom approach. Contrary to the dominating conceptions in the literature, where networks are seen as promoters of a more horizontal governance, transnational networks do not

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<sup>113</sup> For other actors, I consider international and regional organizations, central governments, foreign and domestic research centers, philanthropic and non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks and research centers in the field, as well as private multinational corporations.

promote an exchange of information and practices among its members, at least not in all cases. As the empirical evidence showed, those transnational networks, such as C40, that have the support of philanthropic organizations or TNCs prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships, as well as the endorsement of technical and market-based solutions against climate change. Therefore transnational networks have shaped urban climate politics in Latin America.

Likewise, transnational networks, like the C40, encourage a transfer of climate policies from IOs (mainly from the global North) and multinational and philanthropic foundations that involve technological and market-based solutions with a top-bottom approach. As shown in the empirical chapters, legislation in both Mexico City and Lima promotes the participation of actors in the private sector. Nonetheless, access for local NGOs and civil society in general, in the designing and decision-making process of climate politics, is not the same as for transnational NGOs and wealthy philanthropies. Through this, the chapters contribute to address one of the research questions related to cities motivations in participating with TNs in climate politics. The evidence showed in the empirical chapters helps to illustrate what are the motivations behind Latin American interests to collaborate with TNs in LCEPT policies. Understanding its motivations, I conclude climate politics in the region are mainly guided by an economic rationality originated by foreign actors, in particular by a TCC which prioritizes economic interests. The evidence presented demonstrates how transnational networks, such as C40 facilitate the access of transnational corporate to influence Latin American cities urban climate politics. Furthermore, as shown in the empirical chapters, TNs do not represent an alternative type of climate governance, but a point of entrance for transnational companies. Contrary to the common assumption, urban climate politics in Latin America is guided

by economic interests from a TCC. Hence, cities are not able to substantially change urban climate politics on climate change.

Moreover, the cases studied showed transnational networks, more than facilitating and promoting the sharing of experiences as an alternative climate global governance, they enable the access to other actors<sup>114</sup> (mainly private companies) to participate in urban climate politics. By encouraging the application of market-based and technology-based “solutions” to city governments, transnational networks stimulate the promotion of market-based solutions among cities. Likewise, these networks encourage the policy transfer from IOs and States to the local realm, moved mainly by economic interests.

The chapter on Lima’s transnational climate change politics shows the influence of transnational networks, considered as hybrid actors (a mixture between public and private, in the design and development of urban climate politics) and their role as facilitators for corporative actors in policies about LCEPT. Additionally, in how these hybrid actors contribute to gaining access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. As shown in chapters 4 and 5, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multi-million dollar companies prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships. Through the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence compiled, we can observe an ongoing legitimation process from the different levels of government and transnational actors. The complexity of Lima’s Transnational Climate Change Relations illustrates the hybrid nature of all involved in Lima’s climate governance, even though local actors

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<sup>114</sup> When referring to other actors, I include philanthropic organizations, private foundations, and NGOs, real estate, construction, and technology companies.

can generate their own strategies, as was the case in Susana Villarán's administration. As a result of TNs strong influence and privileged position, urban climate governance is dictated by interests from transnational corporations and their market-based approaches. Central governments limit access to local actors while, at the same time, transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments and contribute to the dominance of a market-based approach in urban climate governance.

Compared to Mexico City's network, Lima's shows more contestation, since there is a greater variety of actors involved in relations with C40. Participants in Lima's climate politics show a diversity of actors, from local NGOs, agencies from the central government, to South American networks, Latin American private companies, as well as transnational networks, philanthropic organizations and other cities –mostly European and Latin American. This diversity reflects more contestation in the development of urban climate politics, at least during the period when Susana Villarán was Mayor of Lima. This was simply because her team prioritized the design of policies based on local needs, taking an approach of social justice to urban planning, including LCEPT policies.

The chapter on Mexico's City Transnational Climate Change relations illustrates the diversity of the city's relations. Similar to the chapter on Lima, chapter 5 showed the role of transnational actors in the connections between the city's government and transnational corporations in the sector of LCEPT. Additionally, both, chapters 4 and 5, showed how these hybrid actors contribute to gain access for transnational companies to promote climate solutions with a market-based approach, mainly on mitigation. Based on the information compiled, the participation of cities in transnational

networks on climate politics facilitates the involvement of private actors in urban climate politics. Similar to the case of Lima, those transnational networks that have the support of philanthropic organizations or multi-million dollar companies prioritize the creation of public/private partnerships. Through the analysis and interpretation of the empirical evidence compiled, an ongoing process of legitimation can be observed, from the different levels of government and also from the hybrid actors. As a result of their strong influence and privileged position, climate governance in the city is dominated by interests from transnational corporations and the market-based approaches from actors such as C40 and WRI. At the same time, governments limit access to local actors while, at the same time, transnational networks facilitate the access of private actors to governments.

From both cases, I conclude that there is a tendency in TNs to work on climate change to promote market-based and technology-based solutions among its members, instead of endorsing cooperation and exchanging good practices. The cases study also demonstrate this tendency not only ideological but also material. TNs activities also aim to get global South cities to grant access to transnational companies investing in their transit systems. The empirical evidence from both cases study contributes to uncover and challenge the prevailing assumptions related to TCCG, and the role of networks in promoting an alternative model for global climate governance, as most of the literature sustain. Climate politics in both cities, particularly its transnational networking aspects, is driven by desires to attract foreign investment, that then open the door for transnational companies to get involved in designing urban climate policy in their interests. These processes is supported by key western NGOs, like WRI or AVINA, and guided by Bloomberg via the network C40. This use of TNs also help understanding the centrality of C40 in each network, and why certain actors take the

leadership in the network, and the importance given to certain actors in the network, who are not necessarily cities but philanthropic organizations, consulting companies or transnational corporations, concur with the prioritization of economic interests. Consequently, why are some hierarchies stipulated in the network? Even when transnational networks are conceptualized as horizontal. Additionally, by not interacting with similar actors (from the same region or even from the same nature), the “solutions” suggested losses important factors from the local context that need to be taken into consideration. This can be noted in figure 3 and 5 when we compared the number of cities and the number of philanthropic organizations, and companies in the network. We can see that the priority of transnational networks is not the exchange of experience. Also, it is important to note the underrepresentation from organizations and institutions from the global South. Similarly, the numerical superiority from philanthropic organizations, INGOs, and transnational corporations, in comparison with cities, shows the economic interest guiding climate politics in Latin American Cities.

The data obtained shows it is through TNs that cities in Latin America, like Lima and Mexico City, are connected to philanthropic organizations. When analysing the SNA from each city, it can be observed the group of actors behind C40 is formed, mainly, by philanthropic organizations that, at the same time, are connected to other members of the TCC (multimillionaires, IOs, ROs, INGOs, TNCs, etc.). As I mentioned in each of the concluding sections on chapter 4 and 5, TNs are the link to TCC, and not entirely, or solely to other cities or networks. Besides, the SNA helps to illustrate how international events, which most of the time are organized by TNs, contributes to connect –or sometimes to maintain or reinforce the connections- with members of the TCC. The SNA shows that transnational actors (in green) are the point of entrance, of philanthropic and transnational

companies to city's LCEPT politics. One of the reasons why cities (governments) cannot change urban climate politics...simply because TCCG is moved by private actors. Furthermore, when comparing Mexico City's transnational climate change relations with Lima's, it can be observed that the latter is considered too marginal for the TCC to care that much about incorporating the city into the web.

Related to LCEPT in both cities, the data collected shows economic rationality behind the popularity of the BRT system in both cities that contributes to a better understanding of the rapid expansion of this modality of transportation. Additionally, the economic and political interests influencing its development helps us understand its construction in these two cities. In terms of policies related to public transportation, for the case of Lima, the polarization of urban politics in LCEPT was the result of different perceptions in the transportation between transnational actors and the local government. This polarization of approaches happens even when those policies suggested from the outside are not coherent with the needs nor the geographical characteristics of Lima. These political rivalries can be better understood when examining the economic interests behind BRT systems' promotion in Latin American cities. In particular, it is worth observing the interest from transnational actors implied in the promotion of the BRT modality, since it represents a relatively fast solution to transportation, which gives the image of cities' efficiency when they participate in networks such as C40. As an example of the political interest that contributed to the promotion of the BRT system in Lima, it is in the interest of the Peruvian government to become a member of the OECD. As mentioned in chapter 4, one of the requirements from the organization was to include a green strategy, as well as GHG mitigation goals. In that sense, the construction of a BRT system represented a fast and observable project in which the Peruvian government could demonstrate the

reduction of GHG emissions and fulfill the requirements for the admission as soon as possible. This is an example of policies related to LCEPT being promoted by transnational networks where economic interests are placed above social needs.

The research focused on the political conflicts in the policies of transportation, using the case of LCEPT policies to illustrate the complexity in the transition process. The cases study show how the way natural gas is framed gives the impression of important changes in the energy matrix. Using Gramsci's terms, this conceptualization of natural gas can be used as an example of *transformismo*, which means the promises of development through transformative politics by transnational actors (individuals, countries producers or extractors of natural gas, companies). Besides it focuses in the oil industry ignoring other aspects and industries causing climate change, such as the mining industry. Throughout the fieldwork, the vocabulary used by those actors that supports the idea of natural gas as an alternative fuel is used in a similar way to the one used for renewable energies: "transition to alternative sources of energy"; and "reduce GHG emissions." Same for the social language: accessibility, connectivity, modernity, in cities. Benefits to the internationalization of Latin American cities. Lastly, the arguments' construction that impacts climate politics' structures. These constructions are built by concepts, ideas and arguments from transnational actors with a direct channel to decision-makers on urban climate politics in Latin America.

Contrary to Lima's case, where the study demonstrates a clash of approaches, the case of Mexico City shows an alignment of approaches, in which transnational actors opt for the fastest technical solution to LCEPT while the city government includes these type of policies in their strategies. On the one hand, the past two administrations in the city's government had relations with Chinese

companies related to the transportation sector. At the same time, both administrations had a close relationship with the New York mayor's office, including Michael Bloomberg's team, which later contributed to strengthening relations with C40. As a result, several transnational companies competed for concessions related to the expansion of the BRT system in the city. Also, through C40, the Chinese company BYD opened a dialogue with the Mexico City government. On the other hand, three influential actors played an important role in promoting and expanding the BRT system in Mexico City. The Institute for Transportation & Development Policy (ITDP), the World Resource Institute (WRI), and the Transnational Network Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40). Each one of them participated in technical studies related to urban climate politics, and advised the city and the national government in different aspects of climate politics in preparation for the COPs while, at the same time, working together to bring the issue of mobility to the COPs. Finally, they played a crucial role in bringing together transnational corporations with the city government, related to the sector of public transportation.

I hope the thesis contributes with an international political economy perspective, to the study of new actors' participation in global governance for climate change that benefits our understanding of urban climate policies in Latin America that leads to the design and implementation of public policies that fits better cities in the global South.

During the Rio +20 Conference at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), former President "Pepe" Mujica from Uruguay said: "The big crisis is not environmental; it is political" (Leal, 2012), and I could not agree more with him.

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## Annexes

### Annex 1. Acronyms from figures 3 and 7

<b>CNCC</b>	Comisión Nacional del Cambio Climático
<b>MINAM</b>	Ministerio del Medio Ambiente
<b>CDKN</b>	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
<b>ICLEI</b>	Local Governments for Sustainability
<b>Leeds U.</b>	Leeds University, UK
<b>SASA</b>	Servicios Ambientales
<b>AFD</b>	Agencia Francesa de Desarrollo
<b>FFLA</b>	Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano
<b>MOCICC</b>	Movimiento Organizado de Ciudadanos por el Cambio Climático
<b>UCLG</b>	United Cities and Local Governments
<b>FCPV</b>	Foro Ciudades para la Vida
<b>CISUR</b>	Red CISUR
<b>AVINA</b>	Fundación AVINA
<b>ASDC</b>	Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación
<b>UCCI</b>	Unión de Ciudades y Capitales Iberoamericanas
<b>CAF</b>	Development Bank of Latin America
<b>SIBRT</b>	Network of Integrated BRT Systems in Latin America
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>Finland E.</b>	Finland Embassy
<b>ARB</b>	Agencia Regional de Barcelona
<b>Medellin</b>	Ciudad de Medellín
<b>EDU Medellín</b>	Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>COFIDE</b>	Peruvian Development Bank
<b>UN-Habitat</b>	UN-Habitat
<b>RLACC</b>	Red Latinoamericana de Alcaldes de Ciudades Capitales
<b>LA</b>	Luz ámbar
<b>Transitemos</b>	Transitemos
<b>CAN</b>	Andean Community
<b>FT</b>	Fundación Transitemos
<b>Luz Ambar</b>	Luz Ambar
<b>LCV</b>	Lima cómo vamos
<b>TRANSPerú</b>	Transporte Urbano Sostenible

<b>UK</b>	Embassy of Great Britain
<b>OAK Foundation</b>	Royal Oak Foundation
<b>Citi F.</b>	Citi Bank Foundation
<b>Dow</b>	Dow Company Foundation
<b>Clean Air</b>	Clean Air Fund
<b>CCC</b>	The Climate Change Collaboration
<b>WRI</b>	World Resources Institute
<b>Clinton F.</b>	Clinton Foundation
<b>ICCT</b>	The International Council for Clean Transportation
<b>ARUP</b>	Arup Consulting Engineers
<b>J&amp;J</b>	Johnson & Johnson
<b>KRF</b>	KR Foundation
<b>Velux</b>	Velux Group
<b>Rockefeller</b>	Rockefeller Brothers Found
<b>Cities Alliance</b>	Cities Alliance
<b>CDP</b>	CDP Global
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>La Paz</b>	La Paz, Bolivia
<b>MADSC</b>	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development of Colombia
<b>SUTRI</b>	Sustainable Urban Transport Initiative, Indonesia
<b>SFMTA</b>	San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency
<b>PAES</b>	Covenant of Mayors and Sustainable Energy Action Plans from the EU
<b>C40</b>	C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group
<b>Bogota</b>	Bogota, Colombia
<b>COP20</b>	Conference of the Partners Lima
<b>CAF</b>	Development Bank of Latin America
<b>UCCI</b>	Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities
<b>Rio de Janeiro</b>	Río de Janeiro, Brazil
<b>IDB</b>	Inter-American Development Bank
<b>CDMX</b>	Mexico City
<b>CAF</b>	Development Bank of Latin America
<b>Quito</b>	Quito, Ecuador
<b>Sao Paulo</b>	Sao Paulo, Brazil
<b>Red Jubileo</b>	Jubilee Neetwork
<b>giz</b>	German Agency for International Cooperation
<b>USAID</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

<b>CENEPRED</b>	National Center for the Estimation, Prevention and Reduction of Disaster Risks
<b>PUCP</b>	Pontifical Catholic University, Peru
<b>IIAP</b>	Peruvian Amazon Research Institute

## Annex 2. Acronyms from figures 5 and 8

<i>ICLEI</i>	Local Governments for Sustainability
<i>UCLG</i>	United Cities and Local Governments
<i>SIBRT</i>	Network of Integrated BRT Systems in Latin America
<i>Medellin</i>	Ciudad de Medellin
<i>WB</i>	World Bank
<i>ITDP</i>	The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy
<i>Ford F.</i>	Ford Foundation
<i>WRI</i>	World Resources Institute
<i>ARUP</i>	Arup Consulting Engineers
<i>Cities Alliance</i>	Cities Alliance
<i>CDP</i>	CDP Global
<i>COP20</i>	Conference of the Partners Lima
<i>ITF</i>	International Transport Forum
<i>ARISE</i>	Arise Initiative
<i>FMDV</i>	Global Fund for Cities Development
<i>COP21</i>	Conference of the Partners Paris
<i>Mayors Summit 2016</i>	C40 Mayors Summit 2016
<i>EcoMobility 2015</i>	EcoMobility Festival Johannesburgo 2015
<i>giz</i>	German Agency for International Cooperation
<i>IDB</i>	Inter-american Development Bank
<i>USAID</i>	U.S. Agency for International Development
<i>Bloomberg</i>	Bloomberg Philanthropies
<i>Bogota</i>	Bogota, Colombia
<i>Río de Janeiro</i>	Río de Janeiro, Brazil
<i>Paris</i>	Paris, France
<i>Google</i>	Google Inc.
<i>HP</i>	William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
<i>MMC</i>	Mario Molina Center
<i>Rockefeller</i>	Rockefeller Foundation
<i>BYD Co.</i>	BYD Co., Ltd.

<i>COP15</i>	Conference of the Partners, Copenhagen
<i>COP16</i>	Conference of the Partners, Cancun
<i>ALLA's</i>	Euro-Latin American Alliance for Cooperation between Cities
<i>UN Climate Summit</i>	United Nations Climate Summit
<i>Stuttgart</i>	Stuttgart, Ger
<i>Massachusetts</i>	Massachusetts, USA
<i>Wales</i>	Wales, UK
<i>Moscu</i>	Moscu, Russia
<i>La Paz</i>	La Paz, Bolivia
<i>C40</i>	C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group
<i>UNAM</i>	National Autonomous University of Mexico
<i>IPN</i>	National Polytechnic Institute
<i>UKAID</i>	United Kingdom Agency for International Development
<i>SEMARNAT</i>	Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources
<i>INECC</i>	National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change
<i>Montevideo</i>	Montevideo, Uruguay
<i>Madrid</i>	Madrid, Spain
<i>Barcelona</i>	Barcelona, Spain
<i>ITF</i>	International Transport Forum
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>RELAGRES</i>	Latin American Network of Solid Waste Management