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Canada

Hostage Negotiations:
A Survey of Police
Negotiators Trained at the Canadian Police College

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Submitted to the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

1995

 Todd A. Zatwarnitski, Ottawa, Canada, 1995



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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	(i)
Acknowledgements.....	(iii)
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Methodology.....	14
Chapter 3: Results.....	26
Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion.....	52
References.....	65
Appendices A.....	70
B.....	78

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the interpersonal and situational dynamics of hostage negotiation situations through an analysis of responses to a survey. A brief historical overview is presented which provides the reader with information regarding hostage takings and the various responses employed by authorities in the past. The advantages and disadvantages of these responses are discussed. The literature clearly shows that for safety reasons, and the desire to minimize violent confrontations, hostage negotiations emerge as the tactic of choice amongst crisis intervention units in Canada.

Hostage negotiation tactics in North America were first developed by Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg, veterans of the New York City Police Department. From these beginnings, police departments developed and trained their officers to become hostage negotiators. A review of the academic literature in Canada and the United States provides information on various approaches researchers have employed when studying hostage negotiations. Negotiation processes, efficacy of negotiations, and officer suitability are subjects included in the review.

In order to identify the most practical tool for collecting data on hostage negotiations in this study, a review of data collection methods and their limitations was undertaken. A mail survey was deemed the most appropriate research tool. The survey contained 19 open-ended questions. Respondents were police officers who had first-hand experience with hostage negotiations.

The findings indicate that 70% of hostage-takings are of a domestic nature and that the majority of hostages taken are women and children. The hostage-takers are predominantly male and are normally known or related to the hostage. In cases where poor communications, and/or an escalated threat developed, the outcome usually ended in an assault. In cases where there was a

previous association between a hostage-taker and a member of the negotiating party, or when a suspect had a previous criminal record, negotiations had a higher probability of resulting in a peaceful outcome. A central problem in police negotiation strategies consists in identifying and classifying the hostage takers. Once this has been accomplished, an appropriate communication strategy can then be devised and implemented. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the results and recommendations for future negotiation strategies and training in the area of hostage-taking.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Historical Overview

While hostage-taking incidents have dominated the news in recent decades, this form of criminality is not unique to the 20th century. Its roots can be traced back as far as the 12th century. Rival armies at that time are known to have taken hostages to ensure an advantageous resolution to a conflict. For example, in 1158 Fredrich Barbarossa captured noblemen and military leaders to secure a favourable peace treaty with Milan. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, taking members of noble families hostage for monetary or political gain was one of the most common form of crime. Soldiers and mercenaries were well aware that a Duke or an Earl would fetch a significant ransom. For this reason noblemen were often spared in battle for use later as hostages (McCall,1979). Perhaps the most well-known historical example of hostage taking was the detention of the English King Richard I, who was detained for 10 years before being released in exchange for a ransom.

More recently, over the past few decades, in many Central American and Western European countries, hostage taking has become a tool to achieve certain political objectives (Poland,1988:124), as the following examples illustrate. On September 17, 1982, Leftist guerrillas seized over 100 hostages in the Chamber of Commerce building in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. They demanded the release of 80 political prisoners and threatened to kill the hostages if their demands were not met. By the time the deadline had passed, fifteen people had been released and another four had escaped, but the threats to kill were still not carried out. Negotiations continued, with the authorities persisting

in their refusal to release the 80 prisoners. After eight days of negotiations, the captors negotiated a flight out of the country in exchange for the remaining hostages (Scherer, 1982).

On November 3, 1982, Turkish terrorists seized the Turkish consulate in Cologne, West Germany. They held 80 hostages and demanded to have their political manifesto broadcast over the local media. Police rejected the demand. The hostage takers released 40 hostages and then another 19 hostages seven hours later. They agreed to surrender only after securing talks with the highest ranking Turkish diplomat in the Federal Republic. But early the next morning, 16 hours after the seige had started, police stormed the building and captured the terrorists (Scherer, 1982).

The incidence of hostage takings has increased dramatically in recent decades. Between 1967 and 1978, more than 1,700 people were injured and another 800 died as a result of hostage taking incidents world-wide. In New York city alone, during the early seventies, over 500 hostage-taking cases were reported in a five year span. Media exposure dramatizing the incidents may well have provoked some of these incidents. Among the incidents receiving considerable media attention were the capture of Israeli athletes by Palestinian nationalists during the 1972 Munich Olympics, the attempt by South Moluccan extremists to take as hostage, two trains, a school, and the Indonesian Consulate; the skyjacking of an airplane by Japanese terrorists in 1977, and a Israeli bus highjacking in 1978 (Cooper, 1981:7). Before the late sixties, hostage-taking was a relatively uncommon phenomenon used primarily by terrorist groups. Today, however, a broader range of offender resorts to hostage-taking when it seems to be a viable means to achieve a particular goal (Smith, 1978). In these cases (as in cases of political hostage takings), securing a hostage is not the primary goal of the abduction. The hostage-taking (planned or not) is only one link in a chain of events leading to some desired result. The result may be the fending off of police during a botched bank robbery, obtaining

the release of prisoners, or rectifying some real or imagined wrong. There is, always, for the perpetrators a desire of acquisition which may include material, moral, or ideological elements. These elements may not be mutually exclusive. Often one will be connected with another, or one may be used to disguise another. The killing of a hostage is only an unfortunate byproduct, which in some cases could have been avoided.

Consequences of Hostage-Taking

Hostage takings also generate social harm which extends beyond the impact on the immediate victims (the hostages). There is also the symbolic impact that hostage taking incidents have on society as a whole and on the image of the police. Crelinsten and Szabo (1979) argue that one of the most potent ancillary effects of hostage takings is the psychological and political impact of the notion that no person or institution is insulated from the possibility of becoming a hostage. This may cause the public to lose faith in the ability of law enforcement agencies to "serve and protect", thus creating images of incompetence and impotence of the police in the eye of the general public.

"The fear inspired by the possible use of hostages by very small groups to exert pressure on very large groups within the existing power structure is potentially one of the most disruptive forces of technologically advanced societies". (Crelinsten & Szabo, 1979:ix)

Although these remarks refer primarily to hostage takings at the international level, they also apply to domestic incidents that may receive far less media attention. One such example is an incident which occurred in Vancouver, where two men took a man and a woman hostage after police were called to a house to investigate a complaint about a demand for money. Police believed that the two men went to the house to collect an outstanding gambling debt. When the police arrived, the suspects

took the two people hostage and demanded 100,000 dollars. A Cantonese-speaking negotiator was required. Negotiations continued for 44 hours, in which time various negotiation strategies were used. Loud noises, intermittent sirens and flashing lights were also employed to unnerve the suspects. The suspects eventually surrendered to police without any further incident (Vancouver Sun, January 30, 1991, pg. A1,A2.).

Police Response Options to Hostage Takings

In their efforts to bring a hostage taking incident to a successful conclusion, the police have a number of methods that they can use to liberate the hostages. They can use various lachrymogens to evict the hostage taker and also the hostages. They can use a sharpshooter to kill the hostage taker. They can launch an all-out assault on the hostage taker or they can negotiate. All these methods have their benefits and limitations, which must be considered carefully in any decision that is made.

Chemical agents provide a margin of safety for the police, as they are able to administer the substance while remaining relatively protected (and at a distance). Consideration must be given to the possibility of the hostage taker or the hostages suffering from some respiratory disease which can be exacerbated by the chemicals, and the possibility that the chemicals could be lethal in confined spaces. Under these conditions, chemicals like hot gas produce fire if they come in contact with incendiary material. A third possibility to be considered is that once a chemical has been used the residence or building may require extensive cleaning, which will cost police departments a great deal of money. Some departments have even been forced to purchase chemically damaged residences. The fourth possibility is that its use can also cause injury or death by the projectile striking an

innocent victim in a lethal area or, by causing chemical pneumonia through damage to the recipient's lungs. In addition, cases have been reported where the gas was ineffective as the suspects were either prepared with masks or were able to handle more gas than was anticipated by the police. Clearly then, this response option carries a number of dangers.

The use of sharpshooters is also problematic. Target identification becomes critical since there is always the possibility that the sharpshooter may mistakenly shoot the wrong person. The hostage taker may also be equipped with explosives which could detonate when he is shot. In Kenora Ontario, for example, a suspect robbed a bank and took a police officer hostage as he left the bank. He instructed the police that he had a bomb wired to a clothes pin which was held open in his mouth. If the pin closed, the two contact points would detonate the explosive charge. A police sniper, not convinced of the authenticity of the claim, shot the man. The bomb however, did not detonate. (RCMP Hostage Negotiator course lecture Notes 1992). Another incident terminated by police snipers occurred on July 17, 1991, when a bank robber panicked after he saw a police cruiser pull up to the bank he was attempting to rob. He took one of the bank's employees hostage and barricaded himself in an office. After two and half hours of fruitless negotiations, the police lured the suspect out with the promise of relenting to his demand of 100,000 dollars. When the suspect came out to collect the money, he was shot and killed by police snipers. (Toronto Star, July 17,1991,pg.A1,A6)

A third police response option in hostage situations involves an all-out assault. Using force to overcome the hostage taker has numerous merits. An immediate assault ensures that the situation is not prolonged. Further, regardless of the outcome, the police are always the victors as they usually outgun and outnumber the hostage takers.

In the past, police have favoured use of the assault option to achieve quick results in hostage

situations. A review of Canadian hostage takings reported in the media reveals that most of these incidents were concluded through assaults which ended up as violent and dangerous confrontations. An international Rand Inc. study revealed that of 1,000 hostages who have been killed in a hostage taking situation, over 780 died as a result of an assault-rescue operation (Jenkins, 1976). Some police forces perform better than others. The Los Angeles police department for example, boasts a high success rate with its tactical unit. It attributes its success to high training standards and a great deal of experience (Smith, 1978).

Maier (1977) stresses the inherent danger of assault situations: "Counter fire, in most cases, has proven to be not only ineffective, but dangerous. There are cases in which police officers have been wounded by the inaccurate, unnecessary counter fire of brother officers." (Maier, 1977:7) The danger to police officers is particularly great if the situation turns out to be an armed barricaded person and not a hostage taking. In these cases, the suspect may encourage an assault in order to precipitate his own death. The same possibility exists in the case of political hostage takers. The death of the hostage taker at the hands of the police may cause him to be elevated to the status of a martyr, thus provoking further incidents from followers. Again, certain religious philosophies may revere dying for a cause as the ultimate sacrifice that a person can make for his/her belief, assuring them a distinguished place in the afterlife. Bolz (1990) points out another problem with the assault response. If the hostage taker suspects an impending assault, he may attempt to escape, forcing the hostages to stampede in front to shield his escape thus further jeopardizing their lives.

Emergency Response Team (E.R.T.) Training

Police emergency response teams (E.R.T.), are the primary agents responsible for dealing with hostage takings. Most larger police departments in Canada have an E.R.T. at their disposal. Rural areas rely on the support of larger surrounding centres if an occasion arises where an E.R.T. is required. The basic structure of any ERT consists of seven assault members and two snipers. A team leader is elected from within this group. The leader is in charge of overseeing and part of operational manoeuvres.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (RCMP) Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) is Canada's elite crisis intervention unit. The individuals in this unit undergo a vigorous selection process. To qualify for the selection process, an officer must be a five year veteran with operational experience and be in top physical condition. Candidates must also possess above average eye-sight and hearing. If they possess these qualifications, they are then subjected to a psychological test to determine their reaction to situations which cause high stress levels, and closed spaces. The RCMP SERT requires a mandatory interview with a psychiatrist as part of its entrance requirements. The selection process in other police departments is similar. Before the actual selection process, candidates are encouraged to participate in the monthly exercises of the ERT. This allows the other team members to "feel out" the candidate and assess his compatibility. If considered compatible, the candidate then undergoes the training to qualify. Recruitment is finally dependent on the votes of the existing ERT members. Each person of the existing ERT votes for the person they feel most suited to join the team. One negative vote from a team member can disqualify any candidate during the trial period. This reflects the importance of the confidence each member must have in the others of the team. Training for these units varies in intensity and specific tactical procedures, but they all contain

similar training.

The SERT assault course lasts five weeks. In this period, physical training is conducted daily and procedures in firearm training and marksmanship are conducted regularly. Trainees are instructed in shotgun, pistol and the RCMP standard MP5 Heckler and Koch sub-machine gun. Each officer must qualify annually to remain an active member of the team. Members selected for a sniper position attend an additional two week course where they are instructed in the use of high powered, long-range rifles. These members must qualify on the rifle range approximately every three months. They must retain a certain standard of grouping when firing at targets to remain on active duty.

Officers must be prepared for any type of environment. Therefore, skills in extreme environmental conditions, orienteering, swimming, stealth, camouflage and concealment, climbing and rappelling from roof tops and helicopters are required. Drills are conducted in door and stairwell entry. Hand signals are taught where certain situations demand stealth and silence. Each member must memorize these motions and react in accordance with their preset commands.

ERT members are also trained to improve their ability to recall visual information with split second exposure to scenarios. This allows them to develop the ability to recall maximum vital information when performing reconnaissance duties which do not afford the luxury of long term exposure in hostile environments. Depending on the unit's experience, some teams have members that rotate through various positions. This however is not always the case with less experienced or seasoned personnel.

Larger police departments are able to train their ERT members in mock training facilities. Old houses are often purchased to be used for exercises in which the members practice assault procedures for house entry and clearing. These procedures include assaults involving chemicals, explosive

entries, stealth entries and sniper fire. The RCMP SERT members are especially fortunate as they have at their disposal a complete building which has interchangeable rooms where any number of combinations of floor lay-outs can be established. This is especially useful if they are preparing for an actual assault. If blue-prints of the target building are available, the interior of the training building can be arranged to simulate the target. Thus, the SERT members will be better prepared for the real assault. The value of this preparedness is stressed with the example of the Israeli assault at Entebbe. One of the primary reasons for the authorities' success on that occasion was the fact that the Israeli commandoes had simulated the entire hostage taking in a airport hangar in Israel and had trained relentlessly before actually executing the assault on the target aircraft (Cooper, 1981).

SERT members also regularly practice with various aircrafts. Since the Department of National Defence is mandated to supply support services for the SERT, officers train regularly with helicopters to gain access to roof tops, or in situations more suited to air insertion. Members also have access to and train in assault procedures in passenger jets. This is in preparation for a hostage taking that might occur at an airport. They train in conjunction with Transport Canada, Emergency Preparedness Canada and local airlines to perfect their techniques and the appropriate emergency drills.

In training, each member of the ERT is given the leadership role in mock scenarios. This opportunity allows the individual and the team's Officer in command to experience and observe how that person adapts to certain situations and their ability to be creative and innovative. Each member is encouraged to pursue and develop skills or interests for which they are particularly suited and which may also enhance the overall performance of the team.

Unfortunately even with stringent training, there is no guarantee that a hostage taking incident

will terminate with a minimum loss of life, or that it will not erupt into pandemonium and chaos. This is the inherent risk to E.R.T. members and to hostages when it is impossible to predict a hostage-taker's response during an assault. There is of course, the possibility of reflex action following the firearms training leading to the killing of innocent citizens.

The Negotiation Option

With increased experience from hostage-taking incidents, police have recognized the utility of hostage-negotiations, and this has now become the primary intervention strategy. In part, the shift away from assault operations may be attributed to unacceptable risks associated with an assault, such as higher casualties than with negotiations, and the public's increasing intolerance of violent confrontations.

Negotiation strategies became particularly popular after the Munich Massacre. The tragic consequences of that event made people realize that the authorities were ill-prepared when confronted with such a situation. Prior to this, most police agencies did not have any governing rules or procedures for hostage takings; each incident was treated as a new phenomenon. Most often, the police resorted to a tactical response. If the suspect did not surrender himself, the police would launch an assault. The results of this approach were often catastrophic. What was required was a systematic means of managing a hostage situation, where the police could maintain a certain amount of control and influence without relying on the sheer force of a tactical team to resolve a hostage situation, and negotiations fit that approach.

A great deal of ground-breaking work achieved in hostage negotiations was developed at the New York City police department by Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and Lt. Frank Bolz. In January, 1973,

an opportunity to test these techniques was offered by a hostage taking incident involving the rescue of thirteen hostages held by Moslem militants in a sporting goods store. The test met with unprecedented success: all the hostages were released unharmed and the hostage takers taken into custody (Smith, 1978).

However, not even the most skilled negotiator can prevent the death of a determined executioner, and it may become necessary, when the hostage situation appears to be getting out of hand, to launch an all-out assault. In some places like Los Angeles, negotiators are given a limited time to succeed. If there is no success within the first 30 minutes of negotiations, then an assault is launched. Other police forces are more flexible. Even at the risk of a violent confrontation finally occurring, officials continue to endorse negotiated peaceful resolutions. In many instances, negotiations have proven to be more fruitful than assaults. The New York City police department claims an impressive record of resolving hostage situations through non-violent negotiated means.

Negotiations most often occur between a representative of the police who has been trained to handle such incidents, and the captors or hostage takers. Although some incidents have been conducted through negotiators other than the police, (such as psychologists or psychiatrists) police negotiators are predominately utilized with psychological assistance as a useful resource. Mental health professionals have long been used to assist police in negotiation processes. Most often, they are called upon to assist the negotiator in establishing the individual's psychological profile and providing guidance and suggestions as to how that person should be handled or dealt with. In some countries such as Australia, psychiatrists are used on a regular basis to provide expert opinions on the mental state of the hostage taker. In some cases, these opinions form the basis of whether an assault will be executed.

According to Canada's National Counter Terrorism Plan, "Notwithstanding the political aims of terrorism, under Canadian law acts of terrorism are addressed in and are subject to provisions of the Criminal Code" (NCTP,1989:2(203)). This is an important distinction as, in Canada all hostage takers, regardless of their political objectives or demands, are treated as criminals. In Canada, taking people as hostages is a criminal act under section 279.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Martins Annual Criminal Code, 1992).

In preparation for the 1976 Olympics, fully conscious of the Munich incident, Canadian authorities began developing a training program for hostage negotiators. This program has evolved through the years and is offered to law enforcement officials on a regular basis at the Canadian Police College (please refer to appendix A for further information). Officers accepted into the course spend two weeks studying and role playing hostage negotiation techniques offered by a specialist in the field. Upon completion, they are sent back to their departments to fill a position as a negotiator as well as assuming their regular duties. In smaller and rural police departments, training in advanced or refresher exercises is largely left to the individual officer as departmental budgets often dictate resource allocation. Larger police departments however, often allocate resources for in-house training, workshops, and, or role-playing with their ERT units.

Purpose of Thesis

As will be shown in the following Chapter, there is little research on hostage negotiation incidents in this country. The present thesis has several aims. First, to address this void by presenting a descriptive portrait of hostage-taking incidents and the police response. Second, to identify those factors which appear to be related to a successful outcome. These goals were achieved by means of

a survey of police officers with experience responding to hostage-taking incidents. Finally, an attempt was made to relate the findings of the survey to police training in the area of responding to hostage-takings.

This thesis focuses on hostage negotiations above all other response options as its use provides a margin of safety to both the police and the public which other responses cannot achieve. This study is unprecedented as it represents a national survey of police negotiators who came from both large and small communities in Canada. Before describing the research however, it is useful to review the literature in the area of hostage negotiations. Chapter two begins by examining two studies which focus on the negotiation process. Next, research negotiator selection and training and a study on the efficacy of negotiations are reviewed. Finally, research methodologies appropriate for this study are discussed.

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Methodology

Previous Literature

Most of the literature on strategies for negotiations in hostage taking situations deals with practical aspects such as training (Danto, 1982; Miron and Goldstein, 1979; Stratton, 1978), organizations (Ebert, 1986), tactics (Reisler and Sloane, 1983, 1983; Maksynchuk, 1982; Davidson, 1981; Fuselier, 1981; Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979), the psychological well-being of personnel (Taylor, 1983; Mirabella and Trudeau, 1981) and the roles for civilian experts (Gunn, 1983; Soskis, 1983; Pearce, 1977). Negotiation strategies, consequently, have been designed to address the motivations of hostage takers. The strategies and techniques promoted in the F.B.I. hostage negotiator program, for example, are based on suicide crisis intervention techniques. They were developed by Schlossberg and Bolz, following the analysis of hundreds of hostage incidents which eventually led the F.B.I. to the conclusion that virtually all hostage takers could be considered suicidal, further proof for which has been adduced in the analysis of the experience of the New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiation Team. Since their inception in 1972, the team has not lost a single hostage (Bolz and Hershey, 1979). To date no attempt has been made to evaluate the efficacy of these strategies. They have been assumed to be effective because of the theory which underlies them.

The Negotiation Process

Some hostage negotiation strategies focus not on the hostage-taker but on the negotiation process. One such strategy was developed by Powell (1989). Rejecting the traditional medical model

of intervention as insufficient to deal with situational realities in certain instances, Powell claimed that negotiation strategies for hostage situations should be developed using theories of "negotiated encounters". Powell suggests that the key to investigating the negotiation process is in identifying relational structures, showing how they influence negotiations in progress and how the negotiations alter relations. He viewed the relationship between the actors as a process whereby the negotiator's position is to project shared futures of interdependence, establish meaningful disagreements, produce categorical, functional and personal identities, all the while exploring possible alternatives for action, constructing and executing exchanges and commitments and terminating negotiations.

Using Straus' (1978) negotiated order theory as the analytical tool and Sink and Couch's (1986) model of sequence extended to include a wider range of hostage negotiation encounters, Powell analyzed the data from ten tape recordings and transcripts of hostage negotiation incidents, supplementing them with data gathered from six interviews with police negotiators and 100 news documents, to explore how interactions unfold as the negotiation proceeds and to identify situations in which there were accomplishments from on-going activity. This analysis revealed how the police negotiator and the hostage taker had achieved mutual recognition of interdependence and identified negotiable objects and meaningful disagreements. The efficacy of the strategy is still a matter of conjecture. Powell stresses that the achievement of one of these elements does not necessarily ensure the achievement of the rest and that, at any point, the entire process can break down and erupt into pandemonium. One important factor - the ability to establish personal identities - Powell suggests, is contingent upon managing and controlling the environment outside the negotiations.

A second attempt focusing on the process examines hostage negotiation from the point of view of communication (Richardson, 1983). Negotiation, it is claimed in this study, achieves the

peaceful termination of a hostage situation through the change of the attitude of and the modification of the behaviour of the hostage-taker. Having a particular bearing on hostage negotiations are the different types of communication - threats, compliance-gaining, deception-detection, persuasion and miscellaneous conflict resolution paradigms. Analyzing data collected from F.B.I. training manuals, interviews with police negotiators and articles dealing with hostage-takers published in law enforcement journals, Richardson identifies the basic rules of negotiation as calming strategies, rapport building, information gathering and persuasive strategies. The order in which the strategies based on these rules should be used is not revealed. Here again, the effectiveness of the strategy remains a matter of conjecture.

Negotiator Suitability

An alternative method of evaluating hostage negotiations has been outlined by Mark Tatar (1982). He claims that a factor playing an important part in determination of success or failure of negotiation is the personality of the negotiator. He stresses the importance of effecting an optimal match between the task and the officer. Once the psychological characteristics of the negotiators have been identified, he suggests relating them to a delineated set of criteria of successful negotiator performance in the field. The first step in the process is to identify the psychological characteristics of the negotiators. For this, he contends that the officer's personality and psychological profile must be explored. The underlying personality dimensions of 214 New York State Troopers who volunteered to become hostage negotiators were determined through the use of standardized personality and motivational measures. The men were also required to make verbal responses to a series of hypothetical negotiating situations. Relating the basic dimensions to the adequacy of the

verbal responses, Tartar has identified the psychological characteristics which would ensure the selection of individuals who have the necessary characteristics which underlie effective performance as negotiators. No attempt has been made to relate the psychological characteristics to successful negotiator performance in the field.

Efficacy of Negotiations

Shoniker (1981) examined all alleged hostage taking situations to which the Metropolitan Toronto Police Emergency Task Force was required to respond. The goal was to evaluate the efficacy of negotiations as a response strategy to hostage-takings. During the five year period (1975 through 1979), there were a total of 93 such incidents. The police determined that sixty cases were "unfounded". The 33 "founded" cases were subjected to analytic induction to determine the effect on the final outcome of the following variables: the interaction between the hostage taker and the negotiator; the relationship between the hostage taker and the hostage; the mental state of the hostage taker; and the nature of the weapons in his possession.

With the examination of the first case, four hypotheses relating to these variables were formulated, so as to facilitate the determination of the presence of a definable pattern when the response was successful and, conversely, its absence when the response was unsuccessful. With the examination of each succeeding case, the consistency of the hypotheses with the facts of that case were assessed and if consistency was not achieved, these hypotheses were reformulated so that the hypotheses encompassed the facts of all the cases analyzed. The study revealed that the negotiation process had to vary from case to case, that all hostage taking situations could not be brought to a termination through negotiations and that there were some hostage taking incidents which had to be

terminated with an assault operation. The data for this study were collected from the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department from transcripts of calls to which the Emergency Task Force responded, personal memo books of officers who functioned as "control force" personnel during the 93 responses and, in four cases which were considered major incidents and consequently subjected to post-occurrence debriefings, from the files which contained the debriefing procedures and general synopses. These data were supplemented by information obtained in interviews with the 108 officers involved in the responses. In these interviews, the officers recounted the hostage situations after consulting their memo books.

Shoniker's study resulted in the conclusion that not all hostage situations were amenable to negotiation and also in the identification of the characteristics of the hostage situation which rendered it amenable to conclusion through negotiation.

Methodological Considerations

Conducting research in the case of hostage taking presents a unique challenge to the researcher, for several reasons. First, the behaviour under scrutiny is a low frequency occurrence. That is, there are only a few cases of actual hostage-takings reported by the police per year in Canada, and these figures are blended in to a general category of abduction along with kidnapping. Hostage-taking in this respect is a crime unlike other serious offenses such as homicide and armed robbery. Even a low frequency offence such as homicide results in a larger number of incidents than hostage-taking. For instance, in the year 1993, statistics provided by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics reveal that 630 homicides and 8,044 armed robberies were recorded by police. No figures for kidnapping, or hostage-taking, were found under the general category of abductions (Canadian

Centre for Justice Statistics, 1994). The second problem confronting a researcher interested in the police response to hostage takings is that it is almost never possible to directly observe or participate in the police response. For obvious reasons, hostage-taking incidents are sealed off. Finally, police tend to be more reluctant about acceding to research requests relating to such a sensitive topic. Occasionally, it becomes necessary to utilize a negotiator as part of an assault operation. If such information was public knowledge, the primary function of a negotiator's role could be seriously compromised.

Quantitative vs Qualitative Approaches to Research

Before describing the methodology used in this study, it is worth briefly discussing alternative methods of research available to the researcher and the reasons why the qualitative survey design was chosen for this project.

The qualitative paradigm can be described as inductive, subjective, and process-oriented. Bogdan and Taylor (1975) characterize qualitative research as being concerned with understanding human behaviour from the actor's frame of reference. Researchers employing this method assume a process-oriented reality that can be influenced by a host of personal and situational elements which directly affect the outcome of a situation. Researchers working with qualitative methods are less concerned with the broader implication of a study's outcome and more interested in understanding how the outcome arose and what factors were responsible.

The quantitative and qualitative paradigms are not totally incompatible. In fact, both methods are equally important to research. In the research design and the procedures for collecting and analyzing data, the primary element necessary for the success of either approach remains with the

researcher's ability to adhere as closely as possible to the canons of the scientific method (Suchman, 1967).

Quantitative research employs data-collection methods that place the data into a pre-determined categorical infrastructure for analysis. The elements that describe a program and its outcomes are fitted into this infrastructure. Statistical techniques are then used to test hypotheses, and quantify the magnitude of relationships between variables. The focus is on reliability of measurement as evidenced by the replicability of the study and the generalizability of its findings.

In contrast, qualitative data are associated with the use of language identified as common to the area of study. Data comprise detailed descriptions of the researcher's beliefs, attitudes, and feelings as well as observations of interactions, behaviours, and events. The researcher does not attempt to fit the data into predetermined categories. Qualitative data are used to obtain unique anecdotal evidence of a subject's perception. Quantitative methodologies rely on an experimental or quasi-experimental design, use experimental and control groups, and test hypotheses using probability based statistical techniques. On the other hand, qualitative methodologies examine a phenomenon from the participant's perspective and attempt to generate hypotheses from the data.

By employing a qualitative research design, the researcher is able to investigate police hostage negotiations through collecting qualitative data from individual hostage taking accounts described by police negotiators.

Data Collection

There are several methods that could have been used for the collection of the data. One option would have involved the collection of data from official documents. Published documents,

available to the public, unfortunately, do not provide information on the number or nature of hostage taking incidents. The only category closely related to hostage taking for which statistical information is available in the Uniform Crime Reports published by the Canadian Government are kidnapping incidents. However, kidnappings differ from hostage-takings in that the whereabouts of a kidnapper and his hostage are unknown to police. Even if hostage takings were dealt with in these officially published documents, the detailed information necessary for this study would not have been available. Such information, however, is available in unpublished police documents which include written reports, verbal recordings and other information on hostage taking incidents. As most of the information in these documents would have been recorded shortly after the incident, the data would not only have a greater amount of information but they would also have been less likely to contain errors introduced by lapses of memory over time. Unfortunately, the public do not have access to this information and the police do not regularly open their departmental records to public scrutiny.

A second possible method of data collection is field observation. This method allows for the collection of very rich data, but there are practical limitations to this method. For example, it calls for the presence of the researcher or an assistant at each and every incident. However, as hostage taking incidents could occur in any part of the country and at any time of the day or night, it would not always be possible for the researcher or an assistant to be present on every occasion. Researchers are not always able to get to the site of the hostage taking at short notice. The distance to be travelled and flight schedules preclude this possibility. If the hostage incidents studied were in a circumscribed part of the country, it might have been possible to use this technique. A more potent impediment to the use of this technique lies in the fact that negotiators insist on isolation during the negotiations. Observers could jeopardize the negotiations.

A third method of gathering data consists of questioning the police negotiator. The researcher could set up personal interviews, interview over the phone, or receive information via mail surveys. Personal interviews have many advantages. Compared to mail surveys, they generate a higher response rate. With the respondent's permission, the use of a recording device greatly increases the amount of unbiased information available to the interviewer. During the course of the interview, the researcher has the benefit of being able to clarify any misunderstandings that the officer may have in interpreting questions. Personal contact between the researcher and subject enables the experienced interviewer to gauge the mood and willingness of the subject to respond to sensitive questions. Telephone interviews are another method of collecting data. The cost associated with conducting face-to-face interviews for a study that encompasses a large geographical area is greatly reduced if one has the budget to make long distance phone calls. Furthermore, less time is lost interviewing over the telephone than having to meet at a predetermined location. Telephone interviews, like face-to-face interviews, have the advantage of being able to record verbatim conversations as long as there is consent of the respondent. This assistance greatly enhances the volume of information which the interviewer would not normally be able to transcribe during conversation.

Although personal interviews and telephone interviews have distinct advantages, they also have certain limitations. Some of their disadvantages are that they may be both time-consuming and costly. Extensive travelling or lengthy long distance telephone interviews can become very expensive as well as time consuming if there is only one interviewer. Furthermore, without the aid of a tape recorder to corroborate written information, tabulated data may reflect interview bias or mistakes during documentation of an incident. As well, interviews and recording devices may not be appropriate if the respondent's desire is to remain anonymous. Overall, Hagan (1982) suggests that

perhaps the chief potential problem with interviewing face-to-face or via telephone lies in the quality, integrity, and skill of the interviewer, elements which may not be consistent throughout the survey.

Aside from the interviewer's competence, the logistical demands required by face-to-face and telephone interviews may make them less desirable. Mail surveys, however, provide a researcher with the ability to study wide geographical samples at a fraction of the cost, effort, and time. No field staff are required and the possibility of interviewer bias is reduced. Mail surveys have the additional benefit of affording respondent privacy as well as the opportunity for them to contemplate their answers, unencumbered by pressures associated with "live" interviews. This is an important consideration when asking questions that may require the respondent to check records to ensure that his response is accurate (Hagan, 1982).

In this study, time, financial resources, manpower and the assurance of respondent anonymity precluded the use of interview techniques. Mail surveys were considered the best technique for collection of the data. However, there are a number of problems associated with this method. One of the chief problems with mail surveys is their relatively low response rate. A sufficiently large body of data could, however, be obtained if a sufficiently large sample was surveyed. A second shortcoming exists in the possible misinterpretation of the questions asked. It is left to the respondent to place his own interpretation on the question and there is the possibility that the question may be misinterpreted. Though it may not be possible to completely eliminate misinterpretation, the likelihood of it occurring could be substantially reduced by careful wording of the questions. Here pre-tests with a small sample group as well as a review of the questionnaire by experienced negotiators and researchers are helpful. There is also the possibility that the responses reflect expressed attitudes rather than the behaviour itself.

Approximately 1,700 officers have undergone negotiator training at the Canadian Police College. A survey of all officers although desirable, was precluded by factors of time, cost, and deficient records. It was estimated that a sufficient corpus of data would be collected if a sample of 600 was surveyed. This figure was reached by taking into consideration the diversity of experience of the officers, the likely response rate and the fact that some would not be able to provide a usable response because they had not participated as a primary negotiator in a hostage situation after the training. The possibility of selection bias could have been eliminated by random sampling. Random sampling, however, was not possible because the names of the officers trained before 1986 were not available. The study was consequently limited to the use of a convenience sample.

Convenience sampling is used as a sampling technique when circumstances dictate it. Unlike a random sample, the convenience sample is not representative of the universe studied and hence, there is no possibility of generalizing the findings to the larger population. A convenience sample has the advantage of making allowance for the limited availability of candidate names.

To ensure a higher and quicker than average response rate, the study was endorsed by the Canadian Police College and the questionnaires were sent to the chief or officer in charge of the various police departments, who were requested to direct it to the appropriate negotiator. A covering letter explained the importance of the negotiator's response and the necessity of returning the questionnaire as soon as possible. Enclosed in the package was a postage pre-paid return address envelope. A follow up letter was sent out three months after the initial mail out to encourage those who had not yet responded to the study. A copy of the survey instrument can be found in Appendix "B".

Summary

Since the concept of using negotiators as an alternative method to deal with hostage situations became the primary response option for police, researchers have been studying hostage negotiations from many different perspectives. Powell (1989) emphasizes the importance of the negotiation process, and the oral exchange between the parties. Richardson (1983) also focuses on the process, but emphasizes the importance of changing the behaviour and attitude of an offender. Conversely, Tatar (1982) stresses that the outcome of a hostage-taking incident is often contingent upon the personality of the negotiator and his suitability for that role. Shoniker (1981) studied hostage negotiation efficacy. His conclusion was that the negotiation process varied from case to case and that not all incidents could be resolved by means of negotiation.

The impediments found when conducting research on hostage negotiations provides the researcher with limited research methodology options. It was therefore determined that by using a RCMP sanctioned, open-ended questionnaire which assured anonymity, respondents could provide an accurate representation of their experiences without the risk of exposure. Although there are certain limitations associated with mail-out surveys, it was deemed the only practical manner in which to conduct a national survey. The survey contained 19 open-ended questions which probed for information on: negotiator training and experience, hostages, hostage-takers, location of incident, communications and rapport between suspect and negotiator, police response time, suspect behaviour, surrounding circumstances, intelligence gathering, influencing factors, and incident outcome. The survey asked negotiators to recall one of their most recent or memorable hostage negotiation experiences. The next chapter reports findings from the survey.

Chapter Three

RESULTS

Survey Sample

Six hundred questionnaires were mailed to police negotiators across Canada. A total of 297 questionnaires were returned. A follow-up letter was sent three months later to encourage those who had not yet responded. The final response rate was 49.5 percent. This is a relatively high response rate for a survey of criminal justice professionals. In comparison, a survey of judges revealed that only 32% of the total population provided a response (Research Staff of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, 1988). It is possible that the officers who did not respond to the survey may not have received the questionnaire, did not have any experience and therefore did not bother to return it, or were not interested enough to respond to the study. Another possibility is that some officers did have experience in negotiations, but because the situation was classified as a barricaded incident, no hostage was present and their experience did not qualify for the study.

Of the 297 respondents, 158 officers reported having no hostage negotiation experience, 25 were returned to the addressee, 38 had experience in barricaded situations, two had retired, two had relocated, one resigned, and one was deceased. In total, 227 cases had to be rejected as being inappropriate for data analysis. There were usable responses from 70 officers, or 24% of respondents. It was not possible to provide information regarding specific identity, location or time of occurrence as respondent anonymity precluded revealing such data.

Negotiator Experience and Training

Over a five-year period, the 70 officers had participated in 246 hostage taking incidents, which means on the average, each officer had experienced 3.5 hostage-taking incidents. There was considerable variation in the number of incidents reported. One negotiator had 24 encounters. Others only experienced a single hostage-taking incident.

Negotiators were asked if they had acquired any further training since taking the negotiator course at the Canadian Police College. They were also asked to specify the nature of that training. Forty-five or, 64% of the respondents replied they had no further training and twenty-five or, 36% said they had some form of additional training. Of these 25 officers, three said they had routine training, and 22 officers said they were involved in "in-house training exercises".

Role of Negotiator

Police officers were asked if they had any experience as a secondary negotiator. This position assists the primary negotiator with listening and communication strategies during negotiation, as well as acts as an auxiliary negotiator. Thirty-three, or 47% of the 70 respondents had experience as a secondary negotiator.

Location of Hostage-taking

Of the 70 cases, 60 incidents or 86% occurred in domestic dwellings, three incidents or 4% occurred in an office setting, two incidents or 3% occurred in a bar, one incident or 1% occurred in a store, one incident, or 1% occurred in a bank, one incident or 1% occurred in a car, one incident, or 1% occurred outdoors, and one incident or 1% occurred in a hospital.

Gender of Hostage taker

Respondents were asked to identify the hostage taker they dealt with. These responses provided information on the suspect as well as his or her relationship to the hostages. Sixty-nine, or 99% of the 70 hostage takers were male, and one individual or 1% of the suspects were identified as female.

Reason for Hostage-taking

Respondents were asked to identify the circumstances in which the hostage taking incident took place. Multiple explanations were provided by the respondents. Consequently, it became necessary to code each response. From this point, it was possible to place each of the hostage-taking incidents into one of three categories which were derived from both respondent answers and categories of hostage-takers commonly used by police officials. It was found that in 49 cases, or 70% occurred as a result of a domestic dispute, 15 or, 21% occurred as a result of a criminal act, and six or 9% of incidents occurred as a result of mental illness (see Table 1).

Table 1 Probable cause of Hostage-taking.

Reasons for Hostage Taking	# %	Number of Incidents and percentages
Domestic	# %	49 70
Criminal	# %	15 21
Mentally-ill	# %	6 9

Hostage Profile

Negotiators were asked to identify the number of hostages taken in each incident. Of the 70 hostage takings, a total of 137 hostages were taken. The number of people taken hostage per incident varied from one to six hostages, with an average of two. Of the 137 hostages taken, 40% or 55 were women, 34% or 46 were children, 18% or 24 were men, and 8% or, 12 were unidentified.

Table 2 summarizes these results.

Table 2 Type of hostage taken

Hostage Type	#	%
Women	55	40
Children	46	34
Men	24	18
Unidentified	12	8

Data on the 137 hostages were broken down according to the relationship between suspect and hostage. Eighty people or 58% of the hostages taken were identified as a relative of a hostage-taker. Thirty-four or, 25% of the hostages were friends or known associates and 23 or, 17% of the suspects taken hostage were unknown to the hostage-taker (See Table 3).

Table 3 Relationship between abductor and abductee.

Relationship between Hostage and Hostage-taker	#	%
Relative	80	58
Friend or associate	34	25
Stranger	23	17

Duration of Incident Prior to Police Contact

Negotiators were asked how long a hostage-taking incident had been in progress before a police negotiator arrived. In 63% of cases (44 respondents), negotiators arrived within one hour, 13 or 19% of the negotiators arrived within 2 hours, four or 6% arrived within 3 hours, two or 3% arrived within 4 hours and seven or 10% arrived in 4 or more hours. Table 4 summarizes these data.

Table 4 Time between the onset of a hostage-taking incident and negotiator arrival at scene.

Negotiator Response Time in 1 Hour increments	#	%
<1	44	63
1<2	13	19
2<3	4	6
3<4	2	3
4 or more	7	10

Note: total percentages exceed 100 due to rounding error.

Means of Communication

Police were asked how they organized communications with a hostage taker. In 56 cases, or in 80% of occasions, police initiated contact through the telephone. In six cases, (9%) of the negotiators spoke face to face with a suspect. Although, this form of communication is least desirable and indeed is discouraged due to the risk it places on the negotiator. Finally, in eight cases, or 11%, police used a loudspeaker.

Communication Tactics used by Police Negotiators

The data found in this section were coded by selecting key words used by respondents and concepts covered during the course of their negotiator training. It was found that in 44 cases negotiators utilized problem solving techniques, 34 negotiators used active listening, 25 negotiators provided advice, 25 implemented calming techniques, 24 negotiators appealed to a suspect's feelings. Twenty negotiators attempted to reason with a suspect, and 15 showed interest and concern for the hostage-taker. Further, 11 negotiators attempted to down-play a hostage-taking incident, nine officers attempted to identify with a suspect, five officers used a non-judgemental approach, and two attempted to stall a conversation. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the tactics and the frequency with which they were observed across the 70 incidents.

Table 5 Communication Tactics employed by police negotiators.

Communication Tactics		
Problem solving	#	44
	%	63
Active listening	#	34
	%	49
Providing advice to a suspect	#	25
	%	36
Calming a suspect	#	25
	%	36
Discussing a suspect's feelings	#	24
	%	34
Reasoning	#	20
	%	29
Displaying Interest and concern	#	15
	%	21
Down-playing the severity of an incident	#	11
	%	16
Attempting to identify with a suspect	#	9
	%	13
Stalling negotiations	#	2
	%	3

Note: figures exceed 100% due to multiple responses.

The data on communication tactics were then examined from a macro level perspective of rapport development to view the general negotiation strategy a negotiator assumed. The categories utilized were selected from current negotiation literature employed by the RCMP. These categories are: (a) emotional, (b) rational, and (c) a combination of an emotional and a rational approach. The

negotiator's written summary of the conversation between himself or herself and a hostage-taker were examined. Attention was focused on the variety of specific communication tactics used during the course of negotiations. Upon determining the combination of communication tactics employed in any given case, it was then possible to place the strategy a negotiator used into one of the three categories.

Police negotiators implementing an emotional approach tend to focus on the offender's feelings and attempt to "connect" on an interpersonal level where a common bond can be found. This engenders an atmosphere of acceptance and encourages the suspect to trust the negotiator. Using a rational approach, police negotiators appeal to the hostage taker's sense of reason. The negotiator attempts to "problem solve" with the suspect and to work with him in order to identify potential solutions that are of mutual benefit. The final strategy implemented by police negotiators combines components of both emotional and rational strategies. This combination appeals to a suspect's heightened emotional state while still focusing on the immediate realities of a hostage situation and the logical solutions available to both parties to end the incident. Police negotiators employed an emotional approach to negotiations on 29 or, 41% of incidents, a rational approach on 6 or 9% of occasions and a combination of an emotional and rational approach in 35 or 50% of the 70 hostage-takings (see Table 6).

Table 6 General Negotiation Strategy

Negotiation Strategy Employed	#	%
Emotional Approach	29	41
Rational Approach	6	9
Combination of Emotional/Rational	35	50

Hostage Taker Behaviour

In examining communications between a hostage-taker and a negotiator, it was possible to determine the type of behaviour elicited by a hostage taker. The categories used are derived from definitions commonly used by police negotiators and mental health professionals (Webster 1992, Schlossberg 1975, Samuels, 1975). Two types of behaviour were identified, with some individuals or groups vacillating between the two. Webster (1992) defines cathartic behaviour as "Those acts which serve only to communicate the power, significance, despair, or mission of the hostage taker" (Webster, 1992:2). Cathartic behaviour suggests that at some point in the hostage taker's life a problematic situation developed and the taking of a hostage was used as a vehicle to attract attention to that problem or issue. Acquiring behaviour is defined as "Any action on the part of the hostage taker which is aimed at recognizable goals that will clearly and constructively benefit him... This behaviour is a means to an end" (Webster,1992:2). The hostage taker here is considered to be more reasonable and therefore a rational negotiation strategy is preferred. Fifty-five or, 79% of the suspects were identified as eliciting cathartic behaviour, seven or 10% of suspects elicited acquiring behaviour and eight or 11% of suspects engaged in both acquiring and cathartic behaviour. Table

7 shows these findings.

Table 7 Type of behaviour elicited by a Hostage-taker.

Type of Behaviour Elicited by Hostage-taker	#	%
Cathartic	55	79
Acquiring	7	10
Cathartic/ Acquiring	8	11

Intelligence Gathering

Information was requested on the origins of background information obtained on a hostage taker. The categories found were derived from information obtained from: the hostage taker, prior association between negotiator and suspect, friends or family, physicians, the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), escaped hostages, and other police intelligence sources, which includes information gained by police detectives through questioning people in the immediate vicinity, and other police sources. Table 8 provides a breakdown of the figures for these categories.

Table 8 Origin of information gathered on a suspect by police

Source of Information gathered on a suspect	No. %	Frequency of Source
Questioning suspect	No. %	27 39
Friends/ family	No. %	29 41
Medical files	No. %	1 1
CPIC	No. %	30 43
Other sources	No. %	18 26
Negotiator's personal knowledge	No. %	10 14
Escaped hostages	No. %	3 4

Note: Figures exceed 100% due to multiple responses.

Variables Perceived by Respondents to be Related to Outcome

Respondents were asked to identify what they believed to be the primary factors which had influenced a hostage-taking outcome. Responses to this question also provided information on factors which appeared to influence decisions made by the police. This information was categorized into variables which appeared to have an impact upon the outcome of various hostage taking events. The categories found were derived from specific instances where they were mentioned by a negotiator or, where a variable could be inferred from the data.

A variable related to an outcome is defined as any element present at the scene of a hostage taking which appears to be related to the actions of the police and/or a hostage taker, during negotiations. The influence of alcohol or drugs in a hostage taking situation hinders communication and therefore the negotiating process. Negotiators recalled that the presence of either substances made negotiations more difficult, as inebriated hostage takers were found to be less articulate, prone to irrationality, or would fall asleep. This variable was found in 30 cases or, in 43% of the cases.

A suspect's fear of police reprisals also hinders negotiations and makes the hostage taker less trusting and more apprehensive about surrendering. This variable is related to the suspect's decision-making process. Some hostage-takers may surrender for fear of being shot, while others may stay inside for the same reason. The presence of paramilitaries in uniform often intensifies the already heightened level of fear and anxiety experienced by the suspect. In such situations, the negotiator expends a great deal of time assuring the suspect that no harm will come to him if and when he surrenders to police custody. The suspect feared police in thirty-five, or 50% of cases.

Suspect vulnerability is a condition in which the hostage taker is in a weakened psychological state, or in a vulnerable position, either by his own doing or through external forces which diminish or eliminate danger to a hostage and make the suspect vulnerable to a police assault. This condition was observed on 26 or, 37.1% of occasions.

An affiliation between a suspect and a member of a negotiating party is a conditional variable found to occur in 19, or 27% of cases. Affiliated hostage negotiations occur when the police would submit to a hostage taker's request for the presence of, or consultations with, a family member or a lawyer prior to surrendering. In accounts where neither of these conditions were present, the negotiator and suspect were familiar with each other.

An escalated threat is a condition where the lives of the police, hostage(s), and/or the hostage taker(s) are perceived to be in immediate peril. The threat may be indicated through the hostage taker's behaviour. Seven or 10% of the cases documented identified this phenomenon.

When negotiations between hostage taker and police negotiator lack sufficient substance to develop communications fostering rapport, a communication deficiency is said to occur. Communication deficiency was found in seven or 10% of incidents, resulting from either an uncooperative hostage taker and/or an inexperienced negotiator.

In seven or 10% of cases, negotiators suggested that the passage of time had an influence on a suspect's behaviour. In such cases, this was often due to the effects of alcohol or drugs wearing off. Acceding to a lesser demand and harbouring false beliefs were tactics used by police negotiators on three or 5% of occasions. Providing alternative solutions to a hostage-taker and cutting-off utilities to a building in which a hostage-taker was situated were each found in two situations, or 3% of incidents recorded. Finally, cold weather was found to be an influencing factor in one case. Table 9 shows these results.

Table 9 Variables perceived to be related to incident outcome.

Variable related to Outcome	#	%
Suspect consuming alcohol or drugs	30	42
Fear police reprisals	35	50
Suspect vulnerability to police	26	37
Presence of a person known to suspect	19	27
Escalated threat to police or hostage	7	10
Poor negotiations	7	10
Passage of time	7	10
Severing Utilities to a building	1	1
Inclement weather	1	1

Note: percentage exceeds 100 due to multiple responses.

Incident Outcome

Perhaps the most critical category of interest in this study is the outcome of an incident. After all, a peaceful outcome in which there is no loss of life is a reflection of a successful police response strategy. The outcome is defined by the manner in which a hostage taking was terminated. There are two subcategories defined. Peaceful termination is defined as no loss of life after negotiations are initiated and the suspect surrenders voluntarily. In this respect, 58 cases or 83% of the incidents were

resolved peacefully. An assault terminated outcome is when the police emergency response team forcefully apprehends and/or kills the hostage taker during the assault. In 12 or 17% of incidents, the police launched an assault operation. Regardless of how a hostage-taking incident concluded, no hostages were reported killed once the police had secured the hostage-taking scene and proceeded to negotiate or launch an assault against the assailant.

Considerations for Negotiations Strategy

Upon reviewing the data, two areas of particular interest were chosen for further examination. Data that describe a hostage-taker's behaviour, motivation, and relationship to a hostage were examined to determine which of three hostage-taker categories he or she belonged. Categorization of this nature is useful for training and statistical purposes. Data on hostages will also be described. Information of this kind is useful for prospective negotiators in that background information gathered on the person(s) taken hostage assists a police officer in determining the focus of a particular negotiation strategy as well as outlining subject areas which may or may not be beneficial to discuss during the course of negotiations.

The second area of interest is in examining variables related to a hostage-taking outcome. Chi-square tests will be used to detect relationships between variables and the outcome of a hostage-taking incident. As well, using the same procedure, a hostage-taker's previous contact with the criminal justice system and the outcome of a situation will be examined. The utility of examining such relationships is two-fold. First, the presence or absence of variables beyond the authorities' control may provide an atmosphere more or less amenable to successful negotiations and therefore it is useful for a negotiator to be aware of such factors. Secondly, the possibility exists that some of the variables

found in the study could be controlled by police officials making the prospect of successful negotiations more likely.

Types of Hostage-takers Identified

It is common practice to "type" suspects involved in hostage taking incidents as a means of classifying a suspect (This practice is common to all Canadian and American police negotiators who have studied with the R.C.M.P. or the F.B.I.). Knowledge of various classifications of suspects ensures that the prospective negotiator is fully aware of the variety of possibilities which he or she may be confronted with. As well, classifying a hostage-taker assists the negotiator in devising a communication strategy. Three types of hostage-takers were identified within the 70 incidents. The categories used are terms found in the data as well as terms that the police commonly used to describe suspects. Three types of suspects were identified: domestic, criminal, and mentally-ill. These categories are defined by three characteristics. Suspect behaviour is one factor to be considered. A suspect's behaviour was classified into one of three categories. Hostage takers were considered to elicit cathartic behaviour, acquiring behaviour or a combination of the two. Second, the situation in which the hostage-taking took place also influenced the categorization of a suspect. Three categories of situations were defined which also parallel the categories assigned to determine hostage-taker type. The definitions found for the situational categories were previously outlined in this chapter. Finally, the relationship between the suspect and the hostage is another factor to be considered when classifying a hostage-taker. In this area two categories were found. Those suspects who knew or who were related to their captives and those suspects who had no prior affiliation with their victims. Depending on the presence of each of the three variables in any given incident, a suspect would be

classified into one of the three hostage-taker categories.

Domestic

The domestic hostage taker is characterised by knowing the victims he or she takes hostage and is normally involved in some form of conflict (domestic in nature) with the victim prior to the hostage taking. The suspect takes the victim hostage in the belief that such an act will ensure a more favourable position of power or control over a conflict or a problem which he feels helpless to control. The behaviour elicited is cathartic in nature. The act of taking hostages serves as a vehicle for attracting attention and securing a captive audience inside the dwelling and, as well, the expected or unexpected presence of an attentive police contingent outside.

Criminal

The criminal hostage-taker is often a recidivist and may already be known to the police. He may elicit acquiring or both cathartic/acquiring behaviour. The negotiator normally does not have any difficulty establishing contact and communicating with the criminal suspect as the hostage taker has a vested interest in bargaining with the negotiator to assure his personal safety. The criminal hostage taker, eliciting both cathartic and acquiring behaviours, often has an emotional attachment to, or some previous affiliation with their victim. In such cases, the taking of a hostage is often the consequence of a suspect's criminal activity compounded with domestic problems.

Mentally-ill

The mentally-ill hostage taker is characterised as such by medical documentation of mental

illness and or cathartic behaviour. Taking hostages may be a product of the individual's need to draw attention to himself or to gain control over a situation in which feelings of anxiety or confusion are experienced. Securing the attention of a hostage and the police ensures that the suspect's needs will be attended to.

In terms of assisting negotiator strategy, knowing the type of suspect being dealt with and his or her behaviour is critical to applying an appropriate negotiation strategy. Of the seventy hostage takings recorded, fifty-five hostage takers were reported to have elicited cathartic behaviour. These fifty-five suspects were placed into two hostage taker categories. Of these, forty-nine individuals were classified as domestic hostage takers and six were alleged by the respondent to be mentally ill. In the remaining fifteen cases, all of which consisted of criminal hostage takers, seven suspects elicited acquiring behaviour and eight suspects elicited both acquiring and cathartic behaviour. Table 10 shows these results.

Table 10 Suspect behaviour and type of Hostage taker

Elicited Behaviour	# %	Domestic	Criminal	Mentally Ill
Cathartic	# %	49 70		6 9
Acquiring	# %		7 10	
Acquiring/ Cathartic	# %		8 11	

Relationship between Suspect and Hostage

Identifying a hostage or hostages and their relationship to their abductors often provides

valuable information upon which a negotiator may use during opportune moments of conversation. In terms of negotiation strategy however, it is considered undesirable police practice to direct or focus any conversation or attention towards a hostage. By de-emphasizing the importance of a hostage, the hostage-taker's primary source of power over the police is diminished. The goal of such tactics is an attempt by the negotiator to get a suspect to focus and rely on the negotiator for leverage and compromises during negotiations, instead of a suspect relying on the use of coercive tactics by threatening the police with harm to a hostage.

As previously noted in Chapter three, hostages were classified in three categories: relatives, friends and/or associates, and strangers. Hostages were further classified by gender, and children were placed into a separate category. Results indicate that in 83% of the cases suspects were familiar with the people they took hostage. As well, the two most frequent categories of hostages taken were women and children, constituting 81% of identifiable hostages. These classifications generate valuable information which provides a negotiator with further insight into a suspect's motivation for taking hostages. In some instances - as in the case of a foiled bank robbery - the objective is clear. However, in cases of domestic hostage-taking incidents or situations involving mentally-ill suspects, the reasons for taking a hostage may not be as clear and therefore positively identifying a hostage and their relationship to a suspect could be critical.

Once a hostage has been positively identified, particular subject areas may be discounted or incorporated into a negotiator's repertoire of tactics. A negotiator may also use this information to determine the level of threat posed to a hostage. In the case of domestic incidents the hostage is often the focus of a suspect's anger and therefore is in greater danger. In the case of children, these hostages are often being used as pawns to incite or manipulate another family member. In either case,

dealing with topics pertaining to a suspect's problems with a significant other, spouse, or family is often critical to gaining insight into a suspect's personal dilemma. In cases however where a hostage is a total stranger to a suspect, and no criminal motivation for taking a hostage is evident, negotiators must rely on alternative sources of information to uncover a suspect's motivation.

Intelligence Gathering

During the initial confrontation between police and a hostage-taker, the police often have limited information on the kind of suspect they are dealing with. If a suspect is not barricaded in his or her home or is not registered on the CPIC, police have limited access to information regarding an individual's background. In 19% of the cases, the police had access to a suspect's previous involvement with the criminal justice system. This is to say that in a large proportion of cases, police had to rely on alternative sources. Two of the most common sources of information on a hostage taking were the hostage-taker himself and family or friends of the hostage-taker. These two sources accounted respectively for 39% and 41% of intelligence gathered by police. Each of these sources of information and others previously mentioned in Chapter three are equally as valuable. Each source provides a different perspective on a hostage situation. In situations where information is gathered from suspects (and/or their family and friends), negotiators are able to cross-reference and verify information to problem solve as well as detect, amongst other things, deceit or to discover a suspect's weaknesses.

Chi-Square Analysis on Variables

Related to a Hostage-taking Outcome

The next area of interest deals with variables which may have affected the outcome of a hostage situation. A chi-square test of statistical significance determines whether two methods of classifying observed events are independent. The null hypotheses of each of the following tests is that the two methods of classification in each test are independent, in other words, that the variables related to the outcome and the outcome are equally effective or ineffective in determining the outcome of a hostage situation. As each of the selected variables were defined in chapter three, no explanation will be provided.

Familiarity between a Suspect and a Member of the Negotiating Party

As Table 11 shows, when the negotiating party was familiar with the hostage taker, a successful (i.e. peaceful) resolution was more likely.

$$X^2=6.0, p<.05$$

Table 11 Hostage-taking outcome and suspect and negotiating party familiarity.

Familiarity of suspect and Negotiating party	Peaceful outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Familiar	19	0	=19
Unfamiliar	39	12	=51
Total	=58	12	=70

Alcohol and/or drugs

As noted earlier, a suspect who has ingested alcohol and/or drugs before or during a hostage-taking incident is considered by police officials to be unstable and consequently more difficult to negotiate with. These two variables were viewed to see if their presence or absence was independent or dependent on the outcome of a hostage-taking incident. As Table 12 shows, no statistically significant relationship exists between the presence of alcohol and/or drugs and the outcome of a hostage taking situation.

$$X^2=.24,p>.05$$

Table 12 Presence of substance abuse with Hostage-taking outcome.

Substance abuse	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Alcohol or Drugs	25	6	=31
No alcohol or Drugs	33	6	=39
Total	=58	=12	=70

Vulnerability of a Suspect to Police Assault

A suspect's vulnerability to a police assault was viewed to determine if a relationship existed through chance between a suspect's safety from police and a hostage-taking outcome. As Table 13 shows, a suspects's vulnerability to police did not influence the outcome (peaceful or assault) of a hostage situation .

$$X^2=1.26,p>.05$$

Table 13 Suspect vulnerability and Hostage-taking outcome.

Suspect Vulnerability	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Vulnerable	21	5	= 26
Not Vulnerable	37	7	= 34
Total	=58	=12	=70

Escalated threat

Cases were examined where it was determined that a suspect's actions or behaviour made a hostage situation more threatening to himself, a hostage, or police. This variable was chosen to view if such a situation was dependent or independent of situation outcome. Not surprisingly perhaps, when an escalated threat was present, an assault response was more likely, see Table 14 .

$$X^2=23,p<.01$$

Table 14 Presence of an escalated threat and a hostage-taking outcome.

Presence of an Escalated threat	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Escalated threat	1	6	=7
No threat	57	6	=63
Total	=58	=12	=70

Poor Negotiations

Poor negotiations between a suspect and a police negotiator was determined from the data. Insufficient dialogue and, or a lack of rapport development were indicators of poor negotiations. According to the respondents, poor negotiations were most often the result of an uncooperative

hostage-taker. However, the possibility does exist that unproductive negotiations could also be the result of an inexperienced negotiator and his inability to engage a suspect in dialogue. As table 15 illustrates, when poor negotiations occurred, an assault response was more likely.

$$X^2=14, p<.01$$

Table 15 Quality of negotiations and the outcome of a hostage-taking incident.

Quality of Negotiations	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Poor Negotiations	2	5	=7
Good Negotiations	56	7	=58
Total	=58	=12	=70

Hostage-taker's previous experience with the Criminal Justice System

The category of a hostage-taker's previous involvement with the criminal justice system and an incident outcome were analyzed. As Table 16 shows, when a suspect had previous contact with the criminal justice system, a successful resolution to the incident was more likely .

$$X^2=4.26, p<.05$$

Table 16 Hostage-taker's previous experience with the criminal justice system.

Presence of a CPIC File	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
CPIC File	28	2	=30
No File	30	10	=40
Total	=58	=12	=70

Table 17 Summary of variables related to a successful hostage-taking outcome.

Variable	Probability Level	Direction
Familiarity	P < .05	Positively associated
Alcohol/Drugs	N.S.	No apparent association
Suspect Vulnerability to police	N.S.	No apparent association
Presence of an Escalated Threat	P < .01	Negatively associated
Poor Negotiations	P < .01	Negatively associated
Hostage-taker has previous criminal record	P < .05	Positively associated

Additional Negotiator Training

The final area of interest is in determining if a relationship exists between supplemental training offered to police negotiators once they have returned to their departments and a hostage-taking outcome. It cannot be determined however if the additional training negotiator's received preceded or came after the hostage-taking they reported. If the training came before the incident, then the findings could be of some significance. However, if the training came after the reported incidents, the data are only useful indicating whether follow-up training was being implemented in various police departments. As table 18 shows, the presence or absence of additional negotiator training did not make the probability of a successful (i.e. peaceful) outcome more likely.

Table 18 Negotiator training and Hostage-taking outcome.

Negotiator Training	Peaceful Outcome	Assault Outcome	Total
Supplemental Training	20	5	=25
No Supplemental Training	38	7	=45
Total	=58	=12	=70

Summary

From the information reviewed in this chapter, a few observations can be made. First, domestic hostage-takers who were recorded as eliciting cathartic behaviour comprised 70% of hostage-takers found in this study. Secondly, 81% of victims taken hostage are women and/or children and in 83% of the cases, hostages were familiar with their captors.

Through employing a chi-square analysis, an association between a hostage-taker and a member of the negotiating party was found to exist in a positive relationship with the outcome of an incident. The null hypothesis that an affiliation and a situation outcome are independent is therefore rejected. As well, a positive relationship can be said to exist between a hostage-taker's previous involvement with the criminal justice system and a situation outcome. Given the results of the categories involving poor negotiations and an escalated threat, the null hypothesis that these categories are independent of a situation outcome is rejected. Each variable has been found to have a negative relationship with successful hostage-taking outcomes. These results will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 Discussion & Conclusion

This chapter will discuss the results found in Chapter three. Its purpose is to determine how the results found in the data could be utilized to enhance existing negotiations training. This will be accomplished by viewing individual categories of data and providing potential lines of negotiation strategies which may be employed in situations where similar characteristics are found. The second purpose of this chapter is to identify areas of negotiation training that could be enhanced.

STRATEGY

Causal Factors

As mentioned earlier, male domestic hostage-takers exhibiting cathartic behaviour represent 70% of suspects reported by police negotiators. This figure represents a substantial portion of reported hostage-takers found in the study and therefore warrants further examination. Such information is valuable because it may assist in preparing police for negotiations with domestic hostage-takers. Numerous motives and circumstances were grouped together to distinguish the category of domestic hostage-taker. The most prevalent causal factors for hostage takings negotiators reported were that of a suspect's depression, financial problems, problems with child custody, infidelity, or quarrelling with friends, neighbours and or family. As well, the use of alcohol or drugs was frequent in these incidents. The setting was in a private residence and the hostages were always familiar with, if not related to, their hostage-taker.

Hostage Identification

The next aspect to examine is the nature of the individuals taken hostage. In domestic cases, women and children are the most common victims. The most common circumstances in which children were involved as hostages was when a suspect was using the threat upon them as a tool against someone who cares about them, which was most likely their mother, the suspect was depressed and wished to end all their lives, the presence of the children was coincidental to a suspect barricading himself in to protect himself from police, or, the children were used as protection. In such cases, there was no evidence to substantiate that the child had precipitated a hostage-taking.

It appears that the only scenario where a real threat is posed to children is when a suspect elicits fatalistic or suicidal behaviour. In such cases, a suspect is likely to condemn himself and his children by means of a murder/suicide act. It is therefore imperative that a negotiator establish a suspect's intentions and the nature of his mental health. At the Canadian Police College, police negotiators are encouraged to ask a hostage-taker if he feels suicidal, if the negotiator believes a suspect to be suicidal (Webster, 1992).

An example of a suicidal suspect is illustrated through a case provided within the study. A known male sex offender, armed with a pistol grip sawed-off shotgun, raped an ex-girl friend he had been stalking for several months. He proceeded to a hospital and took a nurse hostage, demanding to be taken to a private room. Communications took place with the negotiator speaking to the hostage taker through a door. The negotiator introduced himself and engaged in problem solving with the suspect. The hostage taker was hysterical and panic stricken. The negotiator calms the suspect and continues dialogue. Good rapport is developed through projecting a non-judgemental attitude towards the suspect. During a discussion involving feelings, the suspect expresses his desire

to commit suicide. The negotiator responds by reasoning that if the suspect wanted to commit suicide, the hostage is not necessary. The suspect raises his concern that if the hostage is released, the police would assault the room. The negotiator assures the suspect that if he agrees to release the hostage, the police will not enter the room, allowing time for the suspect to kill himself. The suspect then agrees to let the hostage free. The negotiator continues to talk to the suspect about his feelings, discussing his family and how they will feel about his actions, using guilt as a means to deter the suspect. Anticipating that the hostage taker is preparing for suicide, the police discuss plans to lure the suspect out at which point the ERT would apprehend him. The suspect is partially lured from the room but before he is apprehended, he returns inside at which point the ERT pursues. The suspect is killed after pointing his weapon at an ERT member.

Females also represented a large portion of victims taken hostage as in the above case. In these instances, in contrast to children hostages, it appeared that a great deal of the hostility a suspect elicited was focused against a hostage. Paying attention to where the emphasis of a suspect's hostility is focused is crucial to negotiators as it is a useful cue in assessing the possibility of a suspect becoming violent towards a hostage.

One example where a suspect became violent towards his hostage occurred in the following case. A male domestic hostage taker, displaying cathartic behaviour, consumes alcohol and takes his girlfriend hostage in a jealous rage with the intent of killing her and himself, in the basement of her house. The police negotiator spends half an hour attempting to establish communications with the hostage taker, by continually calling him by telephone.

Once contact was made, the negotiator introduced himself and attempted to problem solve with the suspect by discussing the events which led to the hostage-taking. The suspect replied by

insulting the negotiator and threatening to kill the hostage and anybody around the house. He instructed the police to leave and return in ten hours. He then requested that the police "give (him) a break", that he would come out in eight hours. The suspect tells the police that he is a "good guy" with no criminal record. The negotiator assures the suspect that the police will not harm him. The suspect recants on some of his demands and the police continue dialogue. He then demands food and that the ERT move away from the basement windows.

Upon withdrawal of the ERT, the suspect dowses the hostage with fuel oil and lights fuel soaked rags on fire. The police respond with an assault on the residence, the hostage is rescued and the suspect is killed by the assault team. In this case, although the suspect recanted some of his demands, he initially clearly voiced his threats. However, due to the lack of information available on the suspect and the suspect's own behaviour, the police did not realize the extent of his threat. Had the negotiator foreseen the suspect's intent, he may have had an opportunity to divert the suspect's hostility.

Situational Factors Influencing A Hostage-Taking Outcome

The next area to be examined from a strategic perspective involves the situational factors found during the scene of a hostage taking and the potential influence they have on the outcome of a hostage situation.

Third Party Negotiations

The presence of a member of the negotiating party with whom the suspect was familiar was found only where successful negotiations were concluded. This finding challenges contemporary law

enforcement practices and strategies of hostage negotiations which suggest that the introduction of any person other than a police negotiator during negotiations is considered risky, dangerous and too unpredictable to be considered an option (C.P.C. Lecture Notes 1991). During training, negotiators are advised that such actions may lead to unpredictable circumstances in which the negotiator has no control over what is being said between the two parties. Therefore, it is not recommended.

One argument against third party intervention is that the reason a hostage taker requests the presence of a third party is so that he can make amends with loved ones, or vent his anger and frustrations against persons he feels have wronged him before committing suicide. Consequently, by meeting the suspect's request for a person he is familiar with, the police may facilitate the suspect's suicide ritual.

Another argument against introducing a third party suggests that the third party may exacerbate the situation by engaging the suspect in quarrelsome dialogue. However, it is possible that the reason such cases are successful is that the familiarity between the two parties may encourage the suspect to have greater trust and confidence in the police. Another possibility for requesting an affiliated person is in the belief that the police will not cause harm to the suspect due to the fact that they will be held accountable for their actions by the witness.

Overall, it would seem that successful negotiations between parties that are familiar with each other could be contributed to in part to a bond or trust that had developed prior to the incident. It would seem then that if a negotiator was experiencing difficulty during negotiations with a suspect, the police may well consider locating a respected familiar face known to the suspect and use that person as a leverage to foster trust and rapport with a negotiator. Even the mere presence of that person may be used as a bargaining tool to encourage the suspect to come out and talk with that

person once he has surrendered. In situations where a suspect is primarily eliciting cathartic behaviour, the presence of a trusted person to whom he can voice his concerns is often enough to bring the suspect out.

Employing a person a suspect is familiar with can also assist in cases where a suspect feels that the police may harm him upon surrendering. Before an assault option is implemented, the use of a familiar face may be a last resort when a suspect refuses to communicate or is not willing to seriously engage a negotiator in dialogue. For example, case number 25 involved a male suspect who took his mother and her friend hostage after consuming alcohol and becoming irate with them. The police negotiator initiated problem solving, active listening, calming, and identifying with the suspect. Rapport developed, however the suspect was still fearful and apprehensive about giving up. He surrendered after the police contacted his father and allowed him to consult his son.

Poor Communications/ Escalated Threat

The presence of an escalated threat and/or poor communications were found to be associated with a higher probability that the incident will be terminated by a police assault. When alcohol or drugs were involved, poor communications usually were the result of an incoherent suspect, or one who fell asleep. Negotiators suggested that in these cases, time was their greatest ally as eventually the suspect would either sober up and become more rational or fell asleep and be susceptible to an assault. Case number 28 exemplifies a situation where a threat and poor communications existed. In this case, a male suspect took his common-law wife hostage and stabbed her in response to her intention to end their relationship. Their daughter escaped the house and contacted the police. Upon arrival, the negotiator identified himself and offered to help the suspect. The suspect would not

respond to any of the negotiators' questions. On two occasions in which the suspect did speak, he expressed concern for his own safety. Due to the injuries inflicted on the hostage, and the futility of negotiations, the tactical unit assaulted the house with tear gas and apprehended the suspect.

In cases where poor negotiations were observed, the outcome of the situation was largely resolved through an assault. It appears that for lack of a better alternative to entice a suspect to cooperate, police rely on their ERT units. As well, when a serious threat is perceived by the police, they most often respond with an assault. Negotiators should be especially aware of these two circumstances as they may be signs that a suspect has no serious intention of cooperating or that he feels that he has no other option than to kill the hostages and/or himself. In either situation, a negotiator's opportunity to prolong negotiations is largely based on the on-scene commander's confidence in allowing a negotiator to resolve a crisis situation through negotiations. It may take considerable time to encourage a suspect to talk, and if time is a concern, an assault may be a quicker way to resolve a situation. In such situations, when a tactical response is chosen, a negotiator may then play an integral role in setting a suspect up for an assault. (Certain items may be negotiated in such a fashion where a suspect is led into a vulnerable position, minimizing the possibility of harm to hostages during the siege, or a suspect is requested to talk with a negotiator in private, creating distance between the hostages and himself before an assault.) An example of the aforementioned situation is found in case number 44 in which a male suspect, wanted for the attempted murder of a police officer, takes his wife and four children hostage in a house. Initially the hostage-taker ignores the negotiator's attempts to make contact. Over time, the suspect begins to exchange dialogue and the negotiator is able to problem solve and reason with the suspect. The suspect is asked to specify the conditions which would lead him to surrender to the police. He requests three hours and a dozen

beer. In the survey response, the negotiator suggested that once the suspect knew there was only one person to talk with, there were no problems with communication between the two, and rapport developed. The negotiator's impression was that the beer was the most influential factor influencing the suspect's actions. This he suggests was due to the suspect's realization that he was going to jail and would not have access to beer in the future. The negotiator agreed to provide a six pack of beer, and one can was duly placed on the house porch. The negotiator coaxed the suspect to take the beer by commenting on the hot weather and how good an the ice cold beer would taste. Upon leaving the premises, the suspect was apprehended by the ERT.

Suspect's Previous contact with the criminal justice system

This factor appears to influence the outcome of a hostage situation. It may be that individuals with previous exposure to the criminal justice system have become desensitized to the stigma that is associated with people who come into conflict with the law. In this case, the notion of being subjected to the entire system does not instill greater fear as they have experienced previous exposure. However, for those who have not been exposed, the notion of being subjected to the criminal justice system instills fear and anxiety. The loss of liberty, court appearances, probing questions about one's personal life, a possible psychological examination, fear of police brutality, and losing contact with family may drive a person to reject the idea of surrendering to police. This is often one of the greatest hurdles a negotiator may encounter with a suspect and one which must be considered ever present.

Training

Currently, in any hostage-taking situation, responding police officials are directed to secure

the immediate area with emergency response team (ERT) members and establish an open line of communications with the suspect in order to initiate negotiations. From this point, negotiations continue until the suspect surrenders, or a situation occurs where the police must forcefully apprehend a suspect. Thus, police now rely on the skills of their negotiators to diffuse a potentially life-threatening situation instead of using forceful assault tactics which are dangerous and perhaps unwarranted in some occurrences. It could be said then that the fate of a hostage-taking situation often lies in the hands of the officer conducting the negotiations. This person has to act in several professional roles. First and foremost, he must be an officer of the law. His duty in this capacity is very clear: he must ensure the safety of himself, his fellow officers, the public and the hostages. Secondly, he must also be a diplomat, juggling the conflicting demands and interests placed upon him by a hostage-taker, as well as the demands placed upon him by his superiors. Thirdly, the negotiator must act in the role of a mental health professional, quickly identifying particular behaviours and attempting to modify that behaviour through persuasion or coercion. Finally, the officer must also be a counsellor, providing advice, and problem solving with a suspect to come to a mutually agreeable conclusion.

Given the host of responsibilities a police negotiator is faced with and the fact that Canadian police officials rely on police negotiators as their first line of defence, one would think that in relation to training allocated to E.R.T. members, negotiations training would be given similar if not equal priority in police departments. However, the findings revealed in the data on negotiator training do not necessarily reflect the importance senior police officials have placed on negotiations over an assault option.

To obtain a general idea of the disparity which exists between ERT training and negotiator

training, one need only to look at the entrance requirements for both ERT members and police negotiators. As mentioned in chapter one, the ERT inductee must undergo rigorous training standards, a psychological examination, peer assessment, and then if he passes, a regular weapons training schedule to ensure his state of readiness. On the other hand, police officers assigned to attend the negotiations course offered at the Canadian Police College are selected by their individual departments. Officers are not tested on particular skills which would be beneficial during negotiations such as public relations or counselling skills, but are often offered the course due to their seniority or because the position of negotiator in their department is vacant. In fact, there are no entrance requirements whatsoever. As well, after their introductory course has been completed, future training must often be initiated by the negotiator as it is not given due status within their individual departments. Consequently, the negotiator, an individual who has one of the greatest responsibilities during the process of a crisis situation, is most often the least trained and prepared to deal with that situation.

Reflecting upon the course material covered in the hostage negotiations course and the data found in the study, it is not unreasonable to suggest that in the course material, more emphasis is being placed on responding to sophisticated hostage-takers than the average domestic hostage-taking. What is required therefore is a training approach that better fits the nature of the typical hostage-taker police are most likely to encounter.

Upon reviewing information from the data, five areas of training are recommended. First, a selection procedure for potential police negotiators which may take the form of an entrance examination. Second, due to the overwhelming amount of contact police have had with domestic hostage-takings, additional training in the area of family counselling is highly recommended. Thirdly,

police negotiators should undergo training with suicide intervention organizations such as hotlines, etc. Fourthly, where the lack of resources inhibit the possibility of regular negotiations training - such as in small rural communities - senior officials should share departmental resources to accommodate all active members of a crisis intervention team. Fifth, although regarded as the least desirable option, negotiators should be trained in tactical procedures and be aware of techniques to confuse or lure a suspect into a trap. This advantage greatly assists an assault team prior to the assault. Information gathered by the negotiator about a hostage situation greatly assists an assault team.

Speculation exists amongst mental health professionals and police supervisors that due to the rapport built between a suspect and negotiator, a negotiator may willingly or unwillingly provide information that may lead a suspect to believe that an assault is imminent thereby increasing the danger to the police and hostages (C.P.C. Lecture Notes, 1992). The results of such beliefs may be one of the reasons why negotiators are not necessarily involved in other parts of a crisis team intervention response. The data however have indicated that should an emergency rescue be undertaken, a negotiator can play an integral role in the rescue of a hostage.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to describe hostage-taking situations experienced by a sample of law-enforcement officers who had been trained in hostage negotiations at the Canadian Police College. There are two primary areas of weakness within this study. First there is a matter of internal validity in regards to the design and use of the research tool used to gather data. Some of the problems associated with using open-ended surveys are that the possibility exists that a respondent may misinterpret a question, the researcher may misinterpret a response or, a respondent may not have total recall of a hostage situation. As well, the information provided may be the expressed attitudes of a respondent and not exactly how the event may have happened. Second, another methodological problem is found when examining the external validity of the findings. Due to the limitations of employing convenience sampling techniques, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the sample population of police negotiators experiences represents the total population of hostage-taking incidents. The data may have a disproportionate portion of a certain kind of respondent which would generate a disproportionate portion of a certain kind of case.

Highlights of the survey revealed that most hostage-takers tend to be male, and that the majority of incidents arose as a result of a domestic conflict. The hostages were primarily female and/or children. Conditions which were favourable to a peaceful outcome involved the presence of a third party who was familiar with a hostage-taker or when a suspect had previous exposure to the C.J.S. Conditions that were conducive to an assault outcome were when poor communications existed and or when an escalated threat occurred. Although alcohol and/or drugs were commonly found present during hostage-taking incidents, there was no data found to support that either substance influenced the outcome of a situation.

Five areas of training were recommended to improve law-enforcement practices in hostage-negotiations. These areas are:

- Negotiator selection process;
- Family counselling skills;
- Suicide intervention skills;
- Collaborative training with other police units;
- Negotiator assisted assaults.

These recommendations however can only be implemented if senior police officials recognize the disparity that exists within the training of their crisis intervention units and incorporate hostage negotiations as an integral part of their training and response in critical incidents involving hostages or barricaded suspects.

Hostage-negotiations represent one of many functions assigned to crisis intervention units. Numerous officers in the study suggested that considerably more time and energy is spent dealing with barricaded suspects where no hostage is present. This area of research was beyond the parameters of this study and is recommended to researchers for further examination.

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APPENDIX A

Description of A Hostage Negotiation Training Program

Type of Hostage Taker

Dr. Webster suggests that effective negotiations are concluded through understanding three principles; (a) using a method of profiling which leads to a logical negotiator communication strategy; (b) defining a conceptual base to hostage taking incidents; (c) and utilising precise strategies based on the subject and the particular phase of the incident. (Webster, 1992)

Incorporating these principles in his "Diagnostic Approach to Hostage Negotiations", he stresses the importance of the knowledge of "different types of hostage takers in terms of the meaning of their behaviour." This he claims will "aid negotiators in understanding and communicating with the subject." The ability to correctly diagnose or recognize the personality type police are dealing with constitutes an integral part of the approach (Webster, 1992).

Generally, there are two types of hostage takers identified by the behaviours they elicit - cathartic and acquiring, with some individuals or groups vacillating between the two. Webster defines Cathartic behaviour as "Those acts which serve only to communicate the power, significance, despair, or mission of the hostage taker". (Webster, 1992:2) Cathartic behaviour suggests that at some point in the hostage taker's life a problematic situation developed and the taking of a hostage was used as a vehicle to address attention to that problem or issue. This type of behaviour generally calls for an emotionally based negotiation strategy. Acquiring behaviour is defined as "Any action on the part of the hostage taker which is aimed at recognizable goals that will clearly and constructively benefit him... This behaviour is a means to an end." (Webster, 1992:2) The hostage taker here is considered to be more reasonable and therefore a rational negotiation strategy is preferred.

Within this general framework, hostage takers fall into three main categories, each of which is further divisible. The first and most common category is the criminal type. The first subcategory of the criminal type is the antisocial offender. This person may be a trapped suspect, prison inmate, or an extortionist. He or she is identified as usually having a history of violence and crime, often very egocentric, lacking a conscience and comes across as a convincing individual. Police negotiators may expect that this type displays an insensitivity to the needs of others and has the propensity to kill. Impulsivity is another trait. However, as this person is a rational thinker, he is willing to bargain or negotiate with police.

The second criminal type police are likely to deal with is the inadequate individual. This person is characterised as: one who is a trapped suspect such as a kidnapper who underestimated his ability to complete a crime or a person who is having marital, financial or work problems and is ill equipped to handle the stress of every day life. He may have a history of failure in many facets of his life. He may issue unrealistic demands, or negotiate through a hostage. This person is indecisive and

uncertain and may offer apologies or make grandiose statements asserting his control or superiority over the situation. He displays immature behaviour characterised by poor judgement and offers simple solutions to complex problems. Furthermore, he may be impulsive and impatient. There is also potential for suicide if the hostage situation is perceived as another failure. Since his behaviour is acquiring, the person often wants his family to view a situation where he is in control and has become a "somebody". For this type of criminal hostage taker also, a police strategy involving bargaining, compromise and problem solving is desirable. A rational approach that fosters a give and take atmosphere creates the impression that a bargain may be struck which exchanges the hostages for safe passage.

The second major category of hostage takers are mentally disturbed individuals. The two most common types experienced by police officials in hostage situations are paranoid schizophrenics and manic depressives. Dr. Webster describes paranoid schizophrenics hostage takers as suspicious people, who may have delusions or hallucinations, request bizarre demands and display cathartic behaviour. Their behaviour often includes irrational dialogue. It is unpredictable and highly suspicious of other's actions and intentions. They may experience auditory and visual hallucinations, and an inability to hold their concentration or to remain attentive. Thought and speech patterns may appear interrupted and the individual may withdraw all together.

With the Manic depressive hostage taker two phases are identifiable: the manic phase and the depressive phase. In the manic phase the person is observed as being in an excited state, which is characterised by physical restlessness, forced speech, and rapid thoughts. Further, there is a sense of grandiosity and increased behaviour in "self defeating behaviour"(Webster pg. 9). In this phase the person elicits cathartic behaviour. In the depressive phase, the person has come out of his or her euphoric mood and interest in once pleasurable activities is lost. The person's speech and thought processes are slowed, speech is barely audible and there is a general loss of energy. The person is often plagued by feelings of worthlessness, and guilt. Further, there may be suicidal thoughts and gestures. Sleep and appetite patterns may also be disrupted.

Mentally Disturbed hostage takers require a negotiation strategy which utilizes an emotional approach. The negotiator should focus on the interest of the hostage taker's dilemma and acceptance of the individual to illustrate his effort to understand the captor's feeling which in turn encourages the hostage taker to ventilate his feelings.

The third category comprises politically motivated hostage takers. These hostage takers differ from the other two types in that they usually work in teams and have undergone some form of preparation for the task they plan to undertake. There are three sub types. The first sub type is called the ethnic nationalist a member of a distinct ethnic group who view themselves as suffering oppression and victimization at the hands of an oppressor and consider themselves freedom fighters. They are usually known to be from a working class background who identify and focus their efforts on people or items such as civil servants or government installations, which symbolize their oppression.

Then there are the ideological terrorists - those who are driven by either left or right wing ideologies. Left wing types are influenced by some form of Marxist doctrine while the right wing types are driven by their hatred for other groups. The left is considered more prone to massive indiscriminate violence, such as a bombing of a post office to ensure media coverage and conveyance of their message. Right wing groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan, are considered more discriminate and likely to attack non white or jewish individuals.

Third are the issue terrorists, classified by their interest and devotion to a particular cause. Animal activists, and environmentalists fall into this category. They are driven more by emotional factors than by ideological or political motives. They are usually small in numbers and do not have a large support network. Often they are involved in arson or bombing and may be easily apprehended due to insufficient skills and training.

In all three of the aforementioned cases, terrorists vacillate between cathartic and acquiring behaviours and partially for this reason their behaviour is generally uniform. They are dedicated to the cause and there is a great possibility to kill to facilitate their objectives. Some may kill beforehand to illustrate both their dedication and their commitment to a cause. These types are the most difficult to negotiate with, because they have preset tolerances and demands they wish fulfilled. They are often skilled in the manipulation of the media and law enforcement procedures.

Negotiators who deal with terrorists should employ a multifaceted strategy which incorporates both rational and emotional communication skills. On the one hand he must deal with the tangible demands set out by the group as well as dealing with philosophical or ideological viewpoints espoused by the cause. The sooner one is able to draw a composite of the person they are dealing with, the quicker they will be able to devise an effective strategy of communications.

Phases of a Hostage Taking Incident and Communication Strategies Employed

A second requisite for the development of an effective negotiation strategy is knowledge of the phase in which the hostage taking incident is. This knowledge is essential because of the need to tailor the strategy to changes in the situation identified on the basis of the hostage takers response. Strategies which may have worked at the onset may be totally different from what is required at the end of the confrontation. Webster (1992) sees the hostage taking situation as divisible into four unique phases: - alarm, crisis, accommodation and resolution.

ALARM

The first phase of a hostage taking is called the alarm phase. This is the most dangerous and traumatizing period of the four. In this phase emotions are running high, the captor displays desperate and aggressive behaviour and is usually in the process of barricading himself in especially if he perceives escape as futile, and the police are in the process of containing and isolating the scene. Initial contact between the police and the hostage taker are made in this phase. It may take minutes or hours, therefore patience is crucial.

The negotiator's first contact with the hostage taker will result in yelling and threats of harm if the police do not withdraw. Despite this, negotiators should identify themselves and as quickly as possible establish a first name basis rapport. In this dialogue the hostage taker must be made aware that he can deal only with the negotiator. If voice to voice communications are not possible, he must try to link up a closed telephone line or convince the captor to allow a hard line telephone box into the dwelling.

When contact is made anxiety levels are at their peak. Apart from the hostage taker's heightened emotional state which is often a precursor to the incident there are two other reasons for the captor's anxiety. First, there is the fear of the hostage taker that the police may use force to conclude the situation. Then, feelings of frustration run high as there is conflict in goal attainment through police intervention. Consequently, the negotiator must try to diffuse the situation and establish an open line of communication, allowing verbal release of stress built up from the fear and anxiety.

Because of the fear of police reprisal and the negotiator considered to represent the police, there is much hostility and mistrust directed at him. Part of this hostility and mistrust could be diffused by the negotiator getting himself into a position where he can disassociate himself from the police command structure and present the illusion that he is working for the hostage taker, essentially, creating a "we vs. they" image. Helpful here is the negotiator making it clear when demands are made, that he has no authority to authorize their satisfaction.

Encouraging ventilation of feelings is the most effective way of defusing an agitated individual. The negotiator should provide support and reassurance during this phase and either provide the hostage taker with rational as to why he should be calm or use an a more empathetic approach appealing to their emotional state. This activity promotes a future problem solving atmosphere. If successful it may bring the captor to view the situation in a more calm manner where both parties may be accommodated. Using phrases such as "If we look at this together I know we can work it out" fosters this outlook.

When deadlines are made, the negotiator should only address them upon the captor's request. The negotiator should not ask the hostage taker what his demands are. This only encourages deadlines and may provide ideas the suspect did not have initially. It is hoped that the person in all the confusion may forget the preset deadline. One tactic used to divert is to establish communication and attempt to sidetrack or the captor's attention away from the time and talk right through the specified time. This tactic again places the negotiator as the focus of attention and distracts the captor from carrying out threats against the hostages.

Webster (1992) suggests that it is very difficult for a captor to remain in a highly emotional charged state for extended periods. Thus, it is important to keep the captor talking about what ever is bothering him at the time. Restating content is one way to encourage prolonged dialogue. It involves repeating the facts of the conversation in the negotiator's own words. This is supposed to demonstrate interest, understanding, and attention. Further it also allows the negotiator to place

emphasis on certain points. His problem may be the situation, demands, viewpoint, or other factors, emphasis remains on extended dialogue. The person will eventually tire of talking in a hyped emotional state.

This initial period of contact may be best described as attention getting. The negotiator attempts to withdraw any attention or emphasis placed on the hostages and replaces himself as the centre of attention where the hostage taker redirects his energies towards venting his frustration and hostilities through the negotiator and away from the hostages.

CRISIS

The crisis phase is marked by the captor becoming more rational. He is, however still volatile and unpredictable. Frustration, unreasonable demands, and emotional outbursts are typical in this period. After some period anxiety levels will have decreased and the negotiator must attempt to develop some form of rapport with the hostage taker, this is the first step in creating an atmosphere of limited trust. Rapport building requires unique skills. The most fundamental skill required is to be an active listener. People are more likely to accept an individual if they sense a feeling of concern, regardless of its true nature or the listeners actual intentions. Part of being an active listener is to effectively demonstrate attending behaviour.

The way in which a negotiator attends depends upon his physical situation. In face to face situations, certain verbal and non-verbal cues can be elicited which indicate to the hostage taker that the negotiator is listening and has taken an interest and is concerned with the situation. A simple nod of the head or the occasional "uhh" conveyed is often enough. This however is often limited to verbal communication only as face to face contact is an exception to the rule and negotiators are encouraged not to engage in this activity due to safety precautions.

Conveying interest and understanding during negotiations is similar to active listening it differs however in the way it is received by the recipient. This approach uses more intuitive feelings, strong emotionally laden tones and non verbal cues to communicate understanding and interest. It is recommended with individuals who are extremely agitated and who do not have the patience or attention span to listen to extended dialogue. Thus, the negotiator is attempting to connect on a more emotional level than strictly verbal.

Modelling complements a negotiators emotional strategy through using the negotiator's calm and controlled manner to get the hostage taker to gradually personify the negotiator's mood . Most often this behaviour will be conveyed via telephone or in some cases in person. Words the negotiator uses, his tone, voice and physical gestures should display a picture of tranquillity. Modelling activity is intended to transfer the negotiator's behaviour to the captor, thus making conversation easier to conduct.

Another rapport building aid is for the negotiator to capture the emotional content of the offender's outbursts or dialogue and to reflect these implicit or implied feelings back. This process transcends the some what mechanistic role of the negotiator and provides the hostage taker with an

indicator that the dialogue is more than rehearsed words. Phrases such as "It sounds as if you feel frustrated" may be used.

ACCOMMODATION

After the crisis comes the phase of accommodation. It is typically the longest phase of all. Hostage takers responses during this phase may vary. Criminals tend to bargain, mentally ill ventilate and terrorists use the attention as a forum to express their cause. This period must be used to further the progress thus far made. The rapport between the negotiator and hostage taker should be strengthened, and this trust is built through the efforts to come to a mutually agreeable resolution in which the captor is convinced that the negotiator's word is sincere when agreeing upon issues or demands. Self disclosure can also be used as a means to develop a closer bond.

At frequent and appropriate intervals, the negotiator should paraphrase what the hostage taker has said. Mirroring the content of the hostage taker's dialogue assures the hostage taker that the negotiator is not misinterpreting what has been said. Further, it allows for the hostage taker to clarify any points and indicates that the negotiator is fully attentive. Then, it is often useful for the negotiator to pause and summarize key points brought out. These key issues often become the focus of future discussion. The apparent usefulness of this procedure is that it provides the negotiator with a tool which he is able to use to direct and focus on topics of conversation. Another communication tool useful for this purpose is the probe.

Certain responses may allow the police negotiator to ask questions which probe a particular issue or to examine a particular situation. Further, it also leads to exploring feelings. However, this tool must be used with caution. The consequences of a probe often depend on the stability of the hostage takers emotional condition. Highly agitated or suspicious persons may resent probing and become even more volatile.

Verbal or non verbal cues such as raised voice tone, quickening of speech, restlessness, clenching fists, dilated pupils, etc, are all indicators of heightened anxiety and frustration. These are signs which may prompt the negotiator to attempt a different approach such as diversion. In such cases, negotiators should attempt to distract the individual by side tracking, diverting the subject's attention from the topic, throwing him off guard with an unanticipated reaction, or changing the topic altogether.

Problem solving is a key factor in negotiating any dispute between two parties and hostage negotiations are no exception to this rule. The first problem solving prerequisite is the realization that is a problem to be solved. The negotiator must express a willingness and a desire to understand what the hostage taker's problems are, to assist in finding a solution to the problem, and in doing so to collaborate with the hostage taker.

A second prerequisite is a climate of compromise, essentially a willingness on the part of both parties to bargain. Paramount for bargaining is the definition of parameters which will establish what the negotiator is willing to support and discourage in the way of requests or demands.

A third prerequisite is an atmosphere free of judgement. Hostage takers are usually those who have had negative judgemental views placed upon them because of their life style, their psychological or physiological make up or their economic conditions and consequently, have developed a low self esteem and hostility towards the authorities who they feel persecute them.

Offenders trapped in a desperate situation may conceive their surroundings as offering very limited options. One of the jobs of the negotiator is to present options and outlooks on the situation no matter how desperate it may look. Taking an offender's perspective the negotiator could interpret the situation to the offender in a manner which provides him with more options than believed he had. Relating personal experiences, feelings, attitudes, and opinions which he has dealt with in his lifetime can establish the existence of common experiences and help change the offender's outlook of the negotiator and create a more trusting relationship. The object is to seem to agree with the offender's perspective and conciliate feelings which would normally incline the captor to oppose the negotiator.

Apart from effecting better communications and establishing a problem solving climate, negotiator must also engage in information gathering. Intelligence gathering represents a tactic which is conducted at the point of first contact and throughout the confrontation. Its primary function is to extract information pertaining to any and all knowledge of the hostage takers, hostages, building or vehicle, and psychological and physiological health of the occupants and any other information which helps the police. It may be used to create weaknesses the negotiator can use as part of his strategy or as a information source in preparation for an assault. As a part of this information gathering strategy the negotiator may want to confront the hostage taker with a certain issue or problem which he feels may yield important information or which he feels the hostage-taker may be avoiding. In doing so, however, it must be made to appear that the offender is in control of the conversation even though in reality is being manipulated by the negotiator.

If for any reason the negotiator feels suicide may appear to be a factor during any period in the incident, he should ask directly, "are you considering suicide". The hostage takers response will provide the negotiator with crucial information. For those contemplating suicide, the question will not alarm them and the negotiator can then direct his strategies towards addressing that issue. For hostage takers who have not considered suicide, experts suggest that by asking the question, the negotiator will not have fuelled any new ideas for the hostage taker.

With the emotional hostage taker many of the aforementioned tactics are identical however, how one approaches the individual during the alarm and crisis stages varies. Webster (1992) suggests that by definition this type of individual is less prone to be persuaded by a rational approach. Therefore, negotiators should focus their efforts on a more emotional level. This entails employing a strategy built on fostering a climate of acceptance and conveying interest in the individuals problem or situation. Such strategies are designed to allow for ventilation and show understanding. The negotiator should establish influence by building rapport through active listening. Attitudes should include unqualified acceptance of the person and attempting to establish a climate of interest.

Rational individuals are best dealt with by using skills which defuse anxiety and agitation or

hostility, and builds rapport. Active listening is the most effective way to achieve influence and rapport. During the accommodation phase the conversation should be diverted towards advancing problem solving activities, exploring alternative solutions to the apparent ones and promoting further compromise. This must be done subtly by guiding the captor in the general direction and allow him to come upon the solution himself. This strategy draws out time and facilitates a feeling of self determination for the hostage taker.

RESOLUTION

The resolution phase consists of the period where the hostage taking situation comes to an end. It may be initiated by the hostage taker who for various reasons has decided to surrender to the police. The negotiator should support the decision by emphasizing that he has done the right thing. There is however a certain amount of danger involved at this period as certain types of hostage takers are more likely to commit suicide than be apprehended. Some may kill themselves and their hostages or may have the police do it for them through forcing a confrontation which ensures their death.

SUMMARY

In a crisis situation, the police negotiator and all other officers primary responsibility is to ensure the safety of his fellow officers, the public at large, the hostages and the hostage taker. The second responsibility as a negotiator is securing release of hostage free from harm. This is best accomplished through ensuring effective communication with the captor as well as with fellow officers. This reduces tensions, hostilities and uncertainties which are present at the outset of a hostage taking. In order to do this, the negotiator must make first contact with the hostage taker and establish an open line of communications. Listening becomes the most useful tool as this is a time for the captor to ventilate. The police negotiator must be able to assess the mental and emotional condition of a hostage taker and then tailor a strategy to deal with that individual. Often people elicit both rational and emotional behaviours. It is up to the negotiator to overcome these obstacles and bring the person down to a level where dialogue may be exchanged. The negotiator should then ascertain the captor's motives or behaviour for the action and establish a problem solving climate meanwhile gathering intelligence on the individual and the situation. During this period, the negotiator should attempt to bring the conversation along to gradually come upon a solution that is mutually acceptable to both parties. Finally, if a surrender verdict is reached, it is crucial for the negotiator to prepare the captor for what he should expect as he comes out. This involves certain procedures and drills which ensures the safety of all parties involved. Ultimately, the negotiator is responsible for attempting to resolve the hostage taking through peaceful means which ensure the safety of all people involved. If however, the On-scene commander decides to launch an assault, the negotiator may then play a part in distracting or bringing the suspect to a position more vulnerable to attack.

APPENDIX B

Hostage Negotiations Questionnaire

**Canadian Police College and
The University of Ottawa's
Department of Criminology
Graduate Studies Program**

Hostage Negotiations Questionnaire

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Please use as much space as you feel necessary to complete the response to each question, (use additional paper if needed).

2. Each package contains a self addressed envelope with pre-paid postage for your mailing convenience.

Thank you for your participation.

1. Have you been involved in a hostage taking as the primary negotiator.

a. Have you been involved in a hostage taking as a secondary negotiator

2. With reference to your most recent hostage taking incident where you were the primary negotiator.

a. Where did the hostage taking occur. eg. house, bank, etc.

b. Who was the hostage taker/s

c. What were the circumstances surrounding the reason for taking a hostage

d. How many hostages were taken.

e. Who were the hostages

f. How long was the event in progress before you began to negotiate.

g. How did you organize communications with the hostage taker.

h. What was your first communication with the hostage taker.

i. What was his/her response.

3. The following questions require that you think of how you, as a negotiator, dealt with the hostage taker after communications were established and first contact had been made.

a. Discuss the dialogue initially exchanged between yourself and the hostage taker.

b. How did you come to obtain information on the hostage taker ie. What communications were involved to bring this information forth.

c. Describe the rapport between yourself and the hostage taker and the communications which developed it.

d. What was the most powerful influence on the hostage takers decisions and actions and in what manner did they come about.

e. How was the situation resolved.

4 a. How many hostage takings have you negotiated since taking the negotiators course.

b. Have you been involved in any hostage negotiations training since your course at the Canadian Police College.

c. Describe the nature of the training.