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THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF CANADIAN ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY 1942-1948

by

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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History

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RESUME

The purpose of this thesis is to show how atomic policy was formulated in Canada from 1942 to 1948. Factors which helped determine this process were Mackenzie King's personal attitudes on Canadian-American, Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American relations, as well as his taciturn relationship with the Department of External Affairs.

Since the Prime Minister chose to exclude Department of External Affairs officials from wartime atomic policy formulation, the responsibility for managing Canada's atomic program during this period devolved almost entirely to the Minister of Munitions and Supply, C. D. Howe, and the acting President of the National Research Council, C. J. Mackenzie.

Problems in the Anglo-American-Canadian atomic partnership arose when Great Britain and the United States could not agree on the level of collaboration that was required for the successful fruition of the atomic project. Howe and Mackenzie worked to resolve this impasse, hoping that a mutually satisfactory solution to the Anglo-American dispute might foster significant industrial benefits for Canada. Once the British and Americans worked out their differences, Howe and Mackenzie

oversaw the growth of a domestic atomic research and development program.

The end of the war and the use of the atomic bomb against Japan marked the entrance of officials from the Department of External Affairs into the atomic discussions. The professional diplomats encountered difficulty understanding the nature of the atomic relationship and therefore found it necessary to regularly seek the counsel of those who had administered Canada's atomic affairs during the war. As a result, Howe and Mackenzie continued to direct Canada's atomic policy in the postwar period long after representatives from the Department of External Affairs had officially assumed this responsibility.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several people assisted me in the course of researching Canada's early role in the development of atomic energy. John Hilliker and Dacre Cole of DEA's Historical Division guided me through the atomic energy files at External Affairs, while Carmen Carroll facillitated my research at the Public Archives of Canada. Without Brian Villa's constant encouragement and critical appraisals however, I doubt whether this study would have been completed; in a certain sense he instigated its writing. In 1976 I received my first grading from Professor Villa, a less than outstanding mark for an unusual term paper sympathetic to the 'humane' torture methods adopted by the Spanish Inquisition. One of his comments, and the one which I remember most vividly, suggested that I could do 'much better.' Under his tutorship I hope that I have. Everything else aside, this thesis is one 'quid pro quo' I will never regret.

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INTRODUCTION

William Lyon Mackenzie King was Canada's Prime Minister for twenty-two years. Sometimes overlooked is the fact that he was also Canada's Minister of External Affairs for twenty years. If Canadians have forgotten this second role it is through no fault of Mackenzie King. On the contrary, he left to Canadians a permanent reminder of how he wished to be remembered. In the hallway leading to the House of Commons in Ottawa there hangs a haunting portrait of the former leader. The soft light and long shadows capture the inner complexities and peculiarities that lay beneath the public facade of this unique politician. Indeed, the subject was thrilled with the artist's interpretation and commented to a friend shortly after its completion in October 1945 that "the painting is entirely in keeping with my own feelings as to how I should wish to be remembered by all who have known or may never have seen me."[1]

Mackenzie King had made it clear that he wanted to be portrayed and remembered as the international diplomat, as the personal interpreter between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, and most importantly, as Canada's Minister

of External Affairs. To convey this impression King held in his hand while sitting for the portrait several secret letters between himself and Prime Minister Attlee and copies of communications between the latter and President Truman (the official red seal of 10 Downing Street is clearly visible in the painting). King was very particular about which documents to use, for he wanted to be remembered not only as a diplomat, but a diplomat of the first order. He therefore selected a group of top secret papers with which to associate himself and which represented, in his opinion, "the largest problem that has yet faced the world."[2] For the Canadian Prime Minister that problem was atomic energy.

Canada would become involved in the wartime atomic energy project in 1942 when Great Britain, in consultation with the United States, would decide to move part of her atomic energy research team to Canada. While earlier American approaches towards cooperation had been rebuffed by the British, by the spring of 1942 the latter would appreciate the significant advances made by the Americans and that a pooling of Anglo-American resources might therefore facilitate earlier production of an atomic bomb for use, if necessary, in the war.

An early British lead in heavy water development, which was originally intended to be one of the methods for use in the production of weapons grade uranium, would be short-lived however, and by 1942 the Americans would contend that the British had little to offer to a joint atomic program. A compromise would be reached whereby the British would agree to relocate

their heavy water team in Canada under the scientific leadership of Professor Hans Halban, a French emigre who was considered to be an expert in heavy water technology. Although the level of cooperation with the Americans would never equal British expectations, the establishment of a joint Anglo-Canadian atomic research team in Montreal in the autumn of 1942 would nevertheless provide Canada with a unique opportunity to participate in the most important scientific endeavour of the Second World War.

British optimism for fruitful Anglo-American-atomic collaboration would be sobered in January, 1943 when James B. Conant, one of President Roosevelt's chief scientific adviser's, prepared a memorandum outlining the degree to which scientific and technical interchange was to be restricted between the American and Anglo-Canadian groups. Conant's memo would be based on the principle that interchange should occur only if the recipient of the information could make use of it before the war was over. The American belief that the Anglo-Canadian team in Montreal could not fulfill this requirement would result in sharply reducing the flow of scientific information and material from the United States to Montreal.

Negotiations among British, American and Canadian officials would lead to the signing by Roosevelt and Churchill of the secret Quebec Agreement on atomic energy in August, 1943 that would establish a Combined Policy Committee(CPC) to oversee atomic collaboration between the two countries. Though

not an official signatory to the Quebec Agreement, Canada would be given representation on the CPC because of her scientific and material contribution to the Montreal project and also her position as an important source of uranium. Furthermore, a Combined Development Trust(CDT) on which Canada would also be represented would be established in June, 1944. Reporting to the CPC, the CDT's role would be to survey and secure all known sources of uranium and thorium throughout the world. Once more however, the degree of collaboration as anticipated by the British would never be achieved, and the stormy atomic relationship would continue to sour Anglo-American relations throughout the war.

After the successful completion of the Los Alomos tests and the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, Truman, Attlee and King would meet in Washington to discuss the future of atomic energy. A public declaration of the three leaders on November 15, 1945 would call for the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to make recommendations for the international control of atomic energy, while in a seperate and secret agreement the following day the same three leaders would re-affirm their desire for 'full and effective cooperation' in the field of atomic research, emphasizing that the CPC and the CDT should be continued in a 'suitable form.'

Important related factors, such as the Gouzenko spy revelations and the widening Soviet-American rift would enter into the atomic equation, and much to the chagrin of British

atomic policy makers, postwar atomic collaboration with the United States would prove no less restrictive than it had been during the war. With the successful completion of the experimental heavy water project at Chalk River, Canadian atomic officials, notably C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie, would prefer to remain detached from Anglo-American quarreling, secure in the knowledge that they had at least assured for their country a prominent place in the portentous atomic age. Naturally the long and tortuous atomic relationship would leave bitter memories on both sides of the Atlantic and inspire much historical debate, mostly however, among British and American historians.

Several historians have studied Canada's involvement in atomic energy development during and immediately following the Second World War. Both James Eayrs and John W. Holmes have cursorily discussed Canada's participation in the tripartite atomic relationship, while Wilfrid Eggleston's Canada's Nuclear Story is an adequate if uncritical recounting of this country's scientific contributions to the atomic energy project.[3] Judith Lougheed's provocative thesis suggests that Canada's postwar position on the international control of atomic energy was predetermined by her wartime atomic relationship with Great Britain and the United States. Finally, Brian Villa has examined the truly significant efforts of C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie in directing Canada's early involvement in the atomic project although he, like the others, has ignored the fact that Mackenzie King retained ultimate

authority in atomic matters.[4] Indeed, all of these investigations, while acknowledging King's reluctance to deal with atomic issues, fail to explain why he chose to exclude his own department's officials while delegating so much authority to Howe and Mackenzie.

Any attempt to understand Mackenzie King's attitude towards atomic energy must begin with an exploration of the decision-making process that would determine the nature of Canada's atomic foreign policy during this period. The historians mentioned above have meticulously described the degree to which Howe and Mackenzie administered Canada's atomic policy during the war, yet they have not attempted to answer the ultimately more significant question of why this was the case. The purpose of this study is to fill this void.

As C. D. Howe noted in an article for the Montreal Standard shortly after the war, "it was only under the imperative needs of war that Canada as a nation began to play a major role" in the development of atomic energy.[5] John Holmes has identified three main reasons for Canada's inclusion in the atomic project. She possessed a substantial reserve of the essential natural resource, uranium; she had enormous space and provided sanctuary for experiment in a world at war; and she had the nucleus of an industrial and technological capacity.[6] Canada however, possessed another asset that was less tangible but no less important to her atomic partners. As Villa states, "another reason for Britain's interest in Canadian participation was some appreciation of the closeness

of the Canadian-American relationship and the possibility that Americans would be more receptive if things were said by Canadians."[7] American officials held a similar view of Canadian representation. Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development in Washington and chief scientific administrator of the American atomic energy project, noted that "it might be rather helpful in various ways to have the Canadians sitting in on the picture."[8] Bush probably sensed that negotiations with the British might be made easier if he could use his Canadian counterparts as intermediaries, a procedure which, as we shall see, he utilized during the war. It appears therefore that Canada's unique position vis-a-vis Great Britain and the United States was a major factor in determining her participation in the atomic energy project.

Canada's role as mediator between the two great English speaking democracies was nothing new. Vincent Massey recalled that as Canadian Minister in Washington during the 1920s "I did not take long to find that Canada had a rather special although unobtrusive role to play...as an occasional intermediary between Great Britain and the United States."[9] In effect, Massey performed almost twenty years earlier the same role that C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie would assume in the tripartite atomic relationship during the war.

Mackenzie King also saw himself as an interpreter in Anglo-American relations. He relished the opportunity to associate himself with the two great Allied leaders of the Second World War, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.

Though he valued his role as an interpreter, the Prime Minister never participated in Anglo-American strategy summits unless asked to do so, which was not very often. As a result Canada's role at wartime conferences was often one of subservience, and when Churchill and Roosevelt chose to meet behind closed doors, Mackenzie King seemed content to provide the whiskey and soda.[10]

The Prime Minister's unassertive demeanor irritated many of his associates, especially those within the Department of External Affairs. Yet cautious diplomacy suited Mackenzie King who believed that the younger and more vocal officials in his department would lead Canada into difficult international commitments. King therefore emerged as a very secretive diplomat who sought to maintain complete control over his country's foreign policy. Consultation and deliberation were anathema to the Prime Minister, and Canada's role in atomic energy development would be a secret he would be willing to share with very few people.

The completion of his portrait in October 1945 provided Mackenzie King with more time for official business in London. He had crossed the Atlantic in order to discuss atomic policy with Prime Minister Attlee, and more specifically, the embarrassing Gouzenko spy revelations. It was a heavy burden for the Prime Minister, yet it was one he chose to bear on his own. When his Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, suggested that King consult with his cabinet colleagues on the Gouzenko affair King rejected the advice.

> I told him [Robertson] I thought it would be inadvisable to be in haste about having my colleagues know anything that they do not already know. That I would have to take the decision myself. They would have to trust me as they have in the past and I knew would be prepared to do. I can see in Robertson always a tendency to get things into the hands of the permanent officials rather than to leave them to the judgement of the govt. That is all right enough but the two have to be kept in balance. I do not propose to yield my own judgement to any man living. I have not been given the place I occupy at the head of the country without the people trusting my judgement in their interests in these matters.[11]

Indeed, Mackenzie King seldom yielded his judgement on any political matter, and never on international issues. On atomic energy policy he would prove no less secretive and intransigent.

There are three basic ways of approaching the study of Canada's involvement in the development of atomic energy. The first method involves an examination of the intrinsic issues associated with this subject and the policies adopted by the decision-makers. This provides a substantive analysis or content study of the area under investigation. A second approach identifies the options available to the decision-makers in the broadest possible context and describes how the range and nature of the options ultimately determine the position taken by the responsible officials. Finally, a third type of study examines the interaction of specific personalities on the previous two processes and illustrates how the attitudes of the individuals involved, in combination with the related bureaucratic structures, affect and shape the final policy. The present investigation centres on the latter of

these three approaches, focussing on the way staffing shaped policy, with however, some sideward glances at the other two.

The first chapter describes how Mackenzie King's taciturn relationship with the Department of External Affairs determined the environment of atomic energy policy formulation in Canada. The following two sections examine the mediating efforts of C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie while managing Canada's wartime atomic program in the face of continuous Anglo-American quarreling, while chapter four illustrates the difficulties encountered by uninformed External Affairs officials who assumed in 1945 the responsibility of articulating Canada's postwar atomic policy. Finally, chapter five follows the tripartite atomic relationship through 1947 and shows how Canadian officials, assured by the success of their own atomic project at Chalk River, chose to remain detached from the acrimonious postwar Anglo-American atomic dispute.

NOTES

[1]Public Archives of Canada[PAC], William Lyon Mackenzie King Diary, MG 26, J 13, October 20, 1945. [Hereafter cited as King Diary followed by date]. The artist was Frank Salisbury, a noted British painter who also painted King's mother, General Montgomery, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.

[2]King Diary, October 18, 1945. For a detailed listing of the specific documents which King held in his hand see diary entry for October 22, 1945.

[3]See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. III: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 258-318, and John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 196-225. Also, Wilfrid Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto: Clark, Irwin and Co., 1965).

[4]Judith H. Lougheed, "Canada's Role in the Development of Atomic Energy 1942-1946" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1980); Brian Loring Villa, "Canada and Atomic Collaboration: 1941-43" paper presented to a conference sponsored by the Canadian Committee on the History of the Second World War, Ottawa, November, 1979.

[5]PAC, C. D. Howe Papers, MG 27 III, B 20, S-8-2 Atomic Energy, Vol. 5. [Hereafter cited as Howe Papers followed by volume number].

[6]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 196.

[7]Villa, "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," p. 20.

[8]Vannevar Bush to James B. Conant, September 2, 1943, National Archives of the United States[NARUS], Center for Polar and Scientific Archives, Office of Scientific Research and Development[OSRD] Files, RG 227, Records of the S-1 Committee, Bush-Conant Correspondence. [Hereafter cited as Bush-Conant Correspondence].

[9]Vincent Massey, What's Past Is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1963), p. 157.

[10]C. P. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1976), p. 58.

[11]King Diary, October 22, 1945.

I

MACKENZIE KING AND DEA:
THE ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY-MAKING ENVIRONMENT

A thorough understanding of Canadian atomic energy policy from 1942 to 1948 necessitates not only an examination of Mackenzie King's attitudes on Anglo-Canadian, Canadian-American and Anglo-American relations, but also a study of his uneasy relationship with the Department of External Affairs (DEA). The Prime Minister coveted his position as the sole director of Canadian foreign policy and as he approached the age of seventy he grew ever more distrustful of his counselors. No group of advisers attracted more suspicion than the senior officials in his own department.

On international and many other key issues Mackenzie King had consulted almost exclusively in the prewar period with his most trusted confidant, O. D. Skelton, an academic he had lured into public service in 1925 to become Canada's first Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.[1] Under Skelton's guidance DEA had assumed increased responsibilities; these new responsibilities had not included however, the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.

Skelton seemed to accept his advisory role, but the young

intellects he had selectively recruited to the department, men like Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson and Hume Wrong, were not so easily placated.[2] These future mandarins anticipated a more participatory role for Canada in the rapidly changing international forum that was far different from the one envisioned by their aging Prime Minister. They however, would be frustrated by Mackenzie King's personal diplomacy so that the young men who would eventually succeed him in the formulation and direction of Canada's postwar foreign policy would be excluded from important wartime secrets that would markedly affect Canada's international status in the postwar era. Not the least significant of these 'secrets' was Canada's role in the development of atomic energy.

The atomic issue arose after there had emerged during the interwar period a profound shift in Canada's relations with her two closest partners. At the Imperial Conference of 1923 Mackenzie King had made it clear that henceforth Canada intended "to pursue an independent foreign policy in matters which she considered exclusively her own business."[3] This unequivocal declaration of autonomy, coupled with expanding economic ties to the United States, signified an irreversible trend in Canada's international orientation.[4] Canada increasingly found herself awkwardly torn between historical allegiance and geographic reality.

Mackenzie King's personal attitudes toward Great Britain were, typically, rather ambiguous; "despite his suspicions of British aristocracy and his genuine distaste for honours and

distinctions in the dominions, he was neither anti-British nor anti-monarchy."[5] In fact, "he was...a Victorian Canadian from Ontario, whose inherited values were British, and who admired British ways, coveted British approval, and was devoted to the British connection."[6] But the Prime Minister did not allow his personal preferences, however strange, to influence his official policy on 'the mother country.' He cautiously strove "to end the de facto diplomatic unity of the Empire so that Canada would not be lumped in with British positions in foreign policy."[7] A contemporary career diplomat recounted King's hands-off policy toward Great Britain:

> Beware of consultations with Britain on foreign policy; do not attempt to influence British policy by commenting on it; above all do not get involved in a common foreign policy for the British Empire; the less the Canadian government comments on British policy, the less Canada is committed to it; the more the Canadian government comments, the more Canada is committed....[8]

This policy reflected not only the Prime Minister's reluctance to accept the notion of a unified Commonwealth foreign policy but also his ardent isolationism, a belief which many senior DEA officials did not share.

Canada's prewar relations with the United States on the other hand were enhanced through the personal rapport which Mackenzie King enjoyed with President Roosevelt. Although King may have exaggerated the cordiality of the relationship, it appears that the American leader was cognisant of the repercussions of a general European war and valued therefore the friendship of one "who might be useful as a Commonwealth

leader."[9] The Prime Minister's personal ties with Canada's southern neighbour ran deeper however. Graduate studies at Harvard and the University of Chicago, and later employment as an industrial relations consultant with the Rockefeller Foundation had earned King a special niche in the American establishment. Indeed, "no other Canadian prime minister had ever possessed the connections with American big business and big money that King came to have...."[10]

As Hitler's demands for German aggrandizement in Europe grew louder the United States gradually increased her interest in Canada's defence. Speaking to Queen's University students in 1938 Roosevelt stated that Americans would not 'stand idly by' if Canada was threatened by a foreign power. Two years later, with Canada already officially at war with Nazi Germany, he and Mackenzie King signed the Ogdensburg Agreement which committed the two countries to cooperative continental security and established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The signing of the Hyde Park Agreement the following year further committed the United States to the defence not only of Canada, but also of Great Britain. The seeds had now been sown for a more tangible wartime alliance.

The Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Agreements were high-water marks in Canadian-American relations but for Mackenzie King they also represented a personal achievement. It had been his goal to draw the United States and Great Britain into a closer relationship and the two agreements "provided...almost dramatic testimony of his success...."[11] The Prime Minister

no doubt believed his personal relationship with Roosevelt had not been an insignificant factor.[12] Others agreed. Arnold Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council, believed King "was acutely sensitive to the kinds of difficulties likely to characterize direct encounters between the United States and Great Britain, and....did much by personal intervention to avoid and reduce friction."[13] The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull agreed, noting moreover that Anglo-American relations during this period were "immeasurably aided by...Canada through the masterly leadership and sincere friendship of...Mackenzie King."[14] The Prime Minister seemed to be fulfilling his mission as an interpreter of Anglo-American relations.

If King enjoyed a warm friendship with the American President his relations with Great Britain's wartime leader were not quite as cordial, probably because Winston Churchill represented all of the Imperial Tory traditions for which the Canadian Prime Minister held such distaste. Nevertheless as he came to know him better King acquired a sincere admiration of Churchill, though their relationship was never as close nor as casual as the one he cultivated with Roosevelt.[15]

King's close association with the leaders of the two great English speaking democracies not only amplified his international stature but also strengthened his popularity with the Canadian electorate. Never a formidable heroic leader himself, with neither Rooseveltian charisma nor Churchillian resolution, King believed a close and visible relationship with his two counterparts would enhance his

public image.[16] Indeed, King considered his association with Roosevelt and Churchill "was a weapon which, if properly used, would win him a general election anytime."[17] His unparalleled success at the polls during this period would seem to confirm this notion.

The young intellectuals in the Department of External Affairs were not enamoured however, with Mackenzie King's private diplomacy and were even less concerned about his image with the Canadian public. Canada, they believed, was ready to play a more prominent role in the world, and they saw the non-interventionist policies of their Prime Minister as a detriment to achieving this end. As a result they felt frustrated and grew disillusioned and cynical about their role as foreign policy advisers. Tired of doing the pick and shovel work of diplomacy, Hume Wrong several times contemplated leaving "the service of my singularly stupid government."[18] For Wrong and his associates, the Department of External Affairs was not fulfilling its true purpose as a centre of policy formulation.

Although O. D. Skelton had been Mackenzie King's closest adviser on international questions during the period between the two world wars it was the Prime Minister himself who had continued to shape and direct Canada's foreign policy. Skelton's main responsibility had been overseeing the expansion of the Department of External Affairs and a testament to his success was his discriminate recruitment of several "of the ablest young men then available."[19] But the Under-Secretary's untimely death in January 1941 left the department in the hands

of the learned young scholars he had brought into the realm of professional diplomacy.

A change in DEA's policy-making responsibilities now seemed possible, for Skelton's heirs "were younger men, less troubled by the shibboleth phrases of the past, more certain of their abilities, and more confident of their country's worth and potential."[20] Moreover, "as the young liberals of their day they dismissed hidebound toryism with its automatic response to British concerns."[21] They held the belief that the time had come for Canada to be more independently assertive in world affairs. None held this belief more strongly than the three officials who would emerge in the Second World War as DEA's most articulate spokesmen: Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong and Lester Pearson. All were Oxford educated and admirers of the British propensity for empire building, yet each was aware that Great Britain's preferred position in the international community was rapidly eroding and that Canada would have to re-examine her place as the era of largely unquestioned Commonwealth solidarity was coming to an end.

After Skelton's death Mackenzie King chose Norman Robertson to succeed as Canada's new Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Robertson had been Skelton's understudy for six years and the Prime Minister "trusted him implicitly."[22] Furthermore, he possessed "encyclopedic knowledge and a fund of wisdom, but also compassion and the humility of true greatness: he was the thinker for the department."[23]

If Robertson was a superior intellect the same could not

be said of his administrative abilities. For these he relied heavily upon his Associate Under-Secretary, Hume Wrong. The latter had been perturbed when King had overlooked him as Skelton's replacement and he bore a degree of resentment towards Robertson for a period of time. The two soon learned to work harmoniously however, and a lasting friendship evolved between them. Wrong's cold efficiency, the trademark of a "polished technician and a supremely organized man," made up for his superior's administrative inadequacies.[24] He lived up to his personal adage that "members of the Canadian Foreign Service do not feel—they think."[25]

Like Wrong, Lester Pearson had been upset by King's selection of Norman Robertson as the new Under-Secretary. He "had wanted, and expected, Skelton's position, and had he been in Ottawa...he would have succeeded as undersecretary."[26] Unfortunately for Pearson, he was posted in London at the time of Skelton's death and did not return to Canada until after Robertson's appointment. But Pearson's disappointment soon evaporated and as the war continued he increasingly provided evidence of his valuable diplomatic skill. In Ottawa and later as Canada's representative in Washington he emerged as "essentially the diplomat, the one to give expression to...the policies of the department and to ensure that they were accepted."[27]

Pearson, Robertson and Wrong were all aware that the war might rapidly accelerate Canada's emergence as a strong middle power. In the first years of the conflict they worked to

erase the vestiges of King's isolationism by making "nationalism equal involvement. In effect, nationalism now marched hand in hand with internationalism."[28] But American and British recognition of Canada's substantial wartime effort would not be automatic and Pearson, for one, understood the problems of communicating with his country's two closest partners; "He could easily be enraged with British arrogance, snobbery, condescension...."[29] On the other hand, "he could equally be offended by American characteristics that did not appeal to him—brashness, crudeness, insensitivity."[30] His patience and affable nature would often be tested during the war.

Hume Wrong also perceived the unique problems that Canadian diplomats would encounter in their efforts to be more assertive and noted in February 1942 that the recent attack on Pearl Harbour also had significant ramifications for Canada. He informed Pearson that "with the entry of the United States into the war we are not as well placed to influence the conduct of the war as we were when the United States was neutral.... Now we become only a junior member of the partnership."[31] DEA officials grudgingly accepted this turn of events but there remained throughout the war a residue of bitterness, an unfortunate development which did not escape the careful scrutiny of American State Department officials in Washington. One departmental report noted for example, that "since Pearl Harbor the limelight of North American endeavor has definitely shifted on to the United

States, and Canada feels slighted and pushed into the background."[32] The increased insulation of the Anglo-American alliance would make it even more difficult for Canadian diplomats to convince their American and British counterparts that Canada had interests and expectations of her own.

DEA officials were faced during the war with exclusion from important combined (U.S.-U.K.) war boards mainly because "both the British and the Americans preferred to have Britain represent the Commonwealth on the boards."[33] But Canada also suffered from inadequate representation in Washington and London. Firsthand experience in these two capitals had shown Pearson and Wrong that Mackenzie King held tight rein on his representatives abroad and rarely used their services for conduits of official Canadian external policy, a procedure which hindered the maturation of the department, not to mention the detrimental effect it had upon the morale of senior DEA officers whose duties more often included tedious clerical work rather than strategic policy formulation. According to Wrong, "it was horrifying to be sent to meetings and conferences with instructions to 'Say nothing and do nothing....'"[34] Since the tone of King's directives to the Washington Legation and the High Commission in London did not change when Canada entered the war, and since his control over policy was tight as ever, the rift between himself and the young men in his department widened considerably.

Mackenzie King's desire to play very close to the chest with regard to Anglo-Canadian and Canadian-American relations

was reflected in his appointments to the Head of the Legation in Washington and the High Commissioner's Office in London. In the spring of 1941 he sent to Washington as Canada's official representative Leighton McCarthy, a man inexperienced in diplomacy but perhaps more importantly, "an elderly [Liberal] Toronto lawyer who was friendly with President Roosevelt."[35] Hume Wrong, who was second in command in Washington, was not impressed with King's new appointee: "Leighton is very little use as a Minister. He's a nice chap but too ignorant and too old to learn. A foolish appointment. The British retire their diplomats at 60; we appoint ours at 71!"[36]

By the end of 1941 Wrong's patience with McCarthy was dwindling. In his view, the lack of Anglo-American consultation with Canadian officials in Washington derived "from the hard but established fact that Mr. McCarthy will take no initiative whatever in any direction except at the instigation of myself."[37] Wrong therefore took it upon himself to deal with British and American officials on the future political coordination of the war effort, emphasizing "that Canada would not be satisfied to be consulted via London on matters of high strategic importance...."[38]

The inefficiency of the Washington Legation also worried certain American officials who were becoming aware that successful continental defence coordination would necessitate closer communication with the Canadian Government. In March 1942 the American Minister in Ottawa, J. Pierrepont Moffat,

expressed to Norman Robertson his government's desire that "it might be possible to develop a closer and more intimate relationship between the Legation and the State Department than that now existing."[39] In response to Canadian complaints that the United States often ignored Canada's role in the war effort, Moffat countered that Canada's intentions were 'out of mind' because her representative in the American capital was 'out of sight'.[40]

The reclusive McCarthy was clearly uncomfortable in Washington, and in the spring of 1942 he confided to Wrong that he did no believe he could "last a second year" as Minister.[41] McCarthy subsequently appealed to the Prime Minister to relieve him of his duties, but Mackenzie King privately approved of his representative's unobtrusive style, possibly because it suited his own hands-off external policies.[42] The last thing he probably wanted was a high profile Canadian spokesman in Washington.

As it turned out, McCarthy retained his position in Washington until 1945 while Wrong, unable to work with the Minister, returned to Ottawa in 1942 to assist Robertson as Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Pearson assumed the vacant position at the Legation and soon discovered that Wrong's reports had been only too accurate. In October 1944 he informed Robertson that American officials were concerned that they "rarely saw McCarthy either at the [State] Department or at the Embassy."[43] With such a withdrawn representative in Washington, Mackenzie King's

singular control over Canadian-American relations was in little jeopardy.

The wartime Canadian representative in London, if more visible than Leighton McCarthy, was nevertheless just as ineffective at expressing official Canadian external policy. As others have noted, "while [Vincent] Massey was prominent and sometimes influential, he was not trusted by his prime minister who viewed him, correctly, as Anglophilic in the extreme."[44] Furthermore, King believed that Massey "was rather too close to the makers of British policy--even, it might be, too colonial-minded and too easily impressed by the majesty of imperial splendour."[45] Hence, "Massey was strictly ordered to abstain from any guesture that might give credence to Canadian participation in a common imperial policy."[46]

Even in the absence of specific directives from Ottawa Mackenzie King cast his ominous shadow across the Atlantic. "The disembodied presence of the Prime Minister brooded over us," Charles Ritchie later recalled. Furthermore, "it was not a benevolent influence. In the flesh he was thousands of miles away, but he needed no modern bugging devices to detect the slightest quaver of disloyalty to his person or his policies."[47] However, the lack of guidance effectively gagged the High Commissioner at official conferences in London. Concerning an August 1939 meeting of Commonwealth representatives to discuss the volatile Polish situation, Ritchie observed that...

> [Massey] had no role to play and no idea what he would do if he had such a role. He is as undecided as I am as to what is the proper line for the Canadian Government to take. He put the pros and cons to me without any idea of interpreting them....[48]

As was the case with Leighton McCarthy in Washington, but for different reasons, Vincent Massey emerged as a silent wartime Canadian representative in London, and similarly his ineffectiveness suited Mackenzie King.

What arises from an examination of King's personal attitudes towards his representatives in London and Washington is the clear image of a Prime Minister who "worked in a situation where all effective decision-making power was concentrated in his own hands...."[49] Moreover, "the government's willingness and ability to convey its thoughts on external policy was dependent entirely on the prime minister who alone could express the views of the administration. If he didn't, no one else could."[50] As a result, "neither the High Commissioner in London nor the minister in Washington was a very vital functionary in King's eyes, and he gave them little work to do."[51] The Prime Minister tended to look upon their offices as nothing more than 'decorative post-boxes'.[52] One suspects that important British and American officials may have shared his viewpoint.

Thus during the prewar years there surfaced in the expanding Department of External Affairs a small group of young intellectuals with common backgrounds and similar visions who might significantly affect the future direction

of Canadian foreign policy but who could do little about the present. Canada's significant contribution to the Allied war effort would strengthen the hands of senior DEA officials who would endeavour to push for a more prominent position for Canada in the postwar world, but their secretive Prime Minister was on his guard. He realized that after the war Canada would no longer be able to remain totally aloof from the world's problems, and feared that the internationalists like Pearson might lead Canada into troublesome world responsibilities. Though Mackenzie King recognized the intellectual potential of the most senior advisers in his department, he refused to share any part of the international limelight and chose to keep them in the dark as much as possible. Similarly, his singular diplomacy was reflected in his appointments of an elderly and reclusive Minister to Washington, and a capable but ostracized High Commissioner to represent Canada in London.

The outbreak of the war did not alter the Prime Minister's personal attitude towards senior officials in the Department of External Affairs. Rather, the untimely death of Mackenzie King's long time confidant, O. D. Skelton, caused the Minister of External Affairs to grow even more secretive, much to the chagrin of Lester Pearson, Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson, all of whom desired to play a more active role in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. As the war progressed however, and Canada's contributions to

the Allied victory increased, atomic energy would emerge as an international card that the Prime Minister would indeed hold very close to his chest.

When the atomic energy issue did arise, Mackenzie King would turn to C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie. These were ambitious men, but their ambitions were clearly economic and scientific, unlike the broader ambitions of the young men in External Affairs. Howe was an American expatriate who had received his engineering degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and who later taught at Dalhousie University before successfully entering politics in the 1930s. Recognizing Howe's innate genius for mobilizing Canada's resources for war, King appointed him Minister of Munitions and Supply in 1940.[53]

Like Howe, C. J. Mackenzie was also a graduate of a prominent American educational institution, Harvard University. He was appointed in 1939 as acting president of the National Research Council when General A. G. L. McNaughton was recalled to active military service. As Mackenzie would later observe, he and other Canadian scientists who would become involved in the atomic project realized that "the release of nuclear energy ...would open up prospects for peacetime applications of much more hopeful significance than the destruction wrought by bombs."[54] In other words he, like Howe, was interested in the industrial benefits which might be derived from atomic energy, not in producing atomic weapons. The Prime Minister knew which direction Howe and Mackenzie would steer Canada's atomic energy program and would therefore feel secure in letting them handle his country's atomic negotiations.

NOTES

[1]For an incisive discussion of Skelton's tenure as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs see Norman Hillmer, "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O. D. Skelton," in Peter Lyon ed., Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 61-84.

[2]As Hillmer notes, "Skelton did not formulate policy. Rather it was his ability to expose difficulties, to marshal evidence to meet the needs of the day, and to act loyally and efficiently that made him the closest approximation of Ottawa's indispensible man...." Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[3]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, p. 35.

[4]On the effect of war in increasing Canada's economic ties to the United States see R. D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, Ties that Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime from the Great War to the Cold War (2nd ed.; Toronto: Hakkert, 1977).

[5]Joy E. Esberey, Knight of the Holy Spirit (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 171.

[6]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, p. 21.

[7]J. L. Granatstein, Mackenzie King: His Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1977), p. 110.

[8]Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 163.

[9]H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, Vol. III: The Prism of Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 176.

[10]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, p. 5.

[11]Arnold Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 65.

[12]See Mackenzie King's letter to Vincent Massey, May 3, 1941, reprinted in Vincent Massey, What's Past Is Prologue, pp. 313-314.

[13]Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, pp. 64-65.

[14]Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), pp. 1479, 1480. King was very impressed with his own ability to influence world leaders; he believed for example, that his efforts to pacify Hitler

were surely part of God's plans. See C. P. Stacey, A Very Double Life: The Private World of Mackenzie King (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), p. 187.

[15]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, p. 53.

[16]Lester Pearson recalled that he and his colleagues (and perhaps many other Canadians) "often longed for some proud and inspirational words from a Canadian Churchill. Mr. King was wise...and far seeing; but he was not Churchillian." And Charles Ritchie observed that King "wasn't what you would call a very inspiring war leader." L. B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 197; Charles Ritchie as quoted in Mackenzie King: A Personal View, Canadian Issues 1, Number 2(Spring, 1977) A Publication of the Association for Canadian Studies, p. 72.

[17]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, P. 54. King relished the opportunity to have his picture taken at the side of Roosevelt and Churchill. Ibid., p. 58.

[18]Hume Wrong to Marga Wrong, September 29, 1936, as quoted in J. L. Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare: One Diplomat's Discovery of the Functional Principle," paper presented at the Sixth Royal Military History Symposium, March, 1979, p. 12.

[19]Massey, What's Past Is Prologue, p. 135.

[20]Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 20.

[21]R. J. Diubaldo and S. J. Scheinberg, A Study of Canadian-American Defence Policy (1945-1975) - Northern Issues and Strategic Resources Operational Research and Analysis Establishment: ORAE Extra-mural Paper No. 6 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1978), p.3.

[22]Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 20.

[23]Lord Garner, "Mike: an Englishman's view," International Journal, XXIX (Winter, 1973-1974), p. 37. One of his colleagues noted that Robertson had "displacement, as they say of ocean liners, displacement physical and intellectual...." Charles Ritchie, The Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974), p. 195.

[24]Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 20.

[25]Ritchie, The Siren Years, p. 27.

[26]Robert Bothwell, Pearson: His Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978), p. 30.

[27]Garner, "Mike: an Englishman's view," p. 37.

[28]J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft 1928-68 (Toronto: Deneau Publishers & Company Ltd., 1981), p. 137. As his son later noted, "Lester Pearson is remembered as an internationalist, but you can't be an internationalist without first being a nationalist." Geoffrey Pearson as quoted in Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1980), p. 15.

[29]Garner, "Mike: an Englishman's view," p. 35.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Wrong to Pearson, February 3, 1942, DEA Records, file 3265-A-40c, quoted in Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 19.

[32]U.S. State Department Research and Analysis Report entiltled "Changing Canadian-American Relations," March 5, 1942, OSS R&A No. 549, 097.3/Z1092, Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NARUS, Washington, D. C. [Hereafter cited as Department of State Records followed by file reference].

[33]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 30.

[34]Wrong to Pearson, April 6, 1938, Pearson Papers, N1, Vol. 3, as quoted in Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 12. According to Granatstein, Wrong, more often than anyone else, voiced the Canadian desire for representation on combined (US-UK) boards where Canada could make a considerable contribution. Ibid., p. 21.

[35]Granatstein, "Hume Wrong, Canada, and Coalition Warfare," p. 15.

[36]Wrong to Marga Wrong, April 27, June 8, 1941, as quoted in Ibid., p. 16.

[37]Wrong to Robertson, December 13, 1941, DEA Records, file 4-AH(s), Historical Division, Department of External Affairs[Hereafter cited as DEA Records followed by file reference]. Wrong had earlier surmised that McCarthy's reluctance to push for Canadian representation in pertinent discussions between Great Britain and the United States derived from the Minister's "modest conciousness of his own ignorance." Wrong to Robertson, December 4, 1941, Ibid.

[38]Wrong to Robertson, December 13, 1941, Ibid.

[39]Robertson's memorandum, March 13, 1942, Ibid. Robertson also noted that "it was quite clear from what [Moffat] said, and even more from what he left unsaid, that he hoped the Legation could, before long, be strengthened at the top."

[40]Ibid.

[41]Wrong to Robertson, March 13, 1942, Ibid.

[42]Wrong to Robertson, March 19, 1942, Ibid.

[43]Pearson to Robertson, October 30, 1944, PAC, L. B. Pearson Papers, MG 26, N1 Pre 48 Series, N. A. Robertson file[Hereafter cited as Pearson Papers followed by file reference]. Pearson also complained that "Mr. McCarthy has...not discussed policy questions with Mr. Hull or Mr. Stettinius; or indeed, anyone else [in the U.S. State Department]."

[44]J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, III (January, 1975), p. 214.

[45]Pearson, Mike, I, p. 100.

[46]Granatstein and Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty,'" p. 214.

[47]Ritchie, The Siren Years, p. 12.

[48]Ibid., p. 40. Ottawa's aloofness in the Polish crisis angered Ritchie who condemned King "as unworthy to hold office as Prime Minister." Ibid., p. 42.

[49]Granatstein and Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty,'" p. 214.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, p. 45.

[52]Granatstein and Bothwell, "'A Self-Evident National Duty,'" p. 214.

[53]Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C. D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), pp. 20-24.

[54]C. J. Mackenzie as quoted from his Foreword to Wilfrid Eggleston's Canada's Nuclear Story.

II

THE MANAGEMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY 1942-1943

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 served as the catalyst for nascent American war industries whose immense productive capabilities the European Allies had long appreciated. Peacetime factories were geared to the production of vital weaponry and increased government funding augmented every area of military research and development. In particular, soon after the United States entered the war atomic research in that country began to far outstrip similar studies that were being carried on in Great Britain.[1] By the summer of 1942 it became apparent to British officials that Great Britain could no longer finance atomic research on her own and therefore advocated a joint program with the United States. Sir John Anderson, head administrator of the British atomic project, advised Churchill accordingly.

> We must...face the fact that the pioneer work done in this country is a dwindling asset and that, unless we capitalise it quickly, we shall be rapidly outstripped. We now have a real contribution to make to a 'merger'. Soon we shall have little or none.[2]

Churchill agreed, and in August Anderson informed American officials of the British desire for increased Anglo-American collaboration in the field of atomic energy development.[3]

As seen earlier, Canada was drawn into the atomic project for a variety of reasons, one of which was her unique relationship with Great Britain and the United States. Inclusion in this adventurous undertaking provided Canada with a significant opportunity to capitalize on her relationship as a 'linchpin' vis-a-vis Great Britain and the United States in the most important Anglo-American wartime endeavour. Canadian officials would soon discover however, that this added responsibility did not come without inherent vicissitudes, for from its very conception the atomic 'partnership' was fraught with inconsistencies and misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. As one senior Canadian military official remarked: "Differences of geographical position, environment and history create differences in values and even where identity of purpose exists, differences as to the method may be adopted."[4] Nowhere was this more evident than in the area of Anglo-American atomic research, and Canada would often find it difficult to please both of her atomic partners.

Canadian involvement in the atomic project did not encompass, at least in its formative period, consultation with or participation by representatives from the Department of External Affairs. Though atomic collaboration required the measured application of subtle diplomacy, an area in which top DEA officials like Norman Robertson, Hume Wrong and Lester Pearson were well experienced, Mackenzie King chose to delegate atomic responsibilities to two men whose educational background and experience had ill prepared them for the intricacies of

diplomatic negotiation. Clearly, "not the least remarkable aspect of this story was the fact that Canada's 'diplomacy' was conducted by non-diplomats."[5] It does seem rather unusual, at least in retrospect, that C. D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, and C. J. Mackenzie, the acting Director of the National Research Council, emerged as Canada's principal policy formulators in an area that would significantly change Canada's international position in the postwar world. But King wanted to maintain complete control over the international side of atomic energy and was content to leave the day-to-day operations in the hands of his subordinates. Moreover, as Arnold Heeney observed, "King recognized [Howe] as uniquely equipped to develop the industry of war and gave him free rein."[6] In atomic energy development this was clearly the case. As a result the 'non-diplomats' assumed the difficult task of asserting an independent Canadian atomic policy without offending either one, or worse both, of Canada's closest allies.

Maintaining a nonpartisan position would prove most difficult however, for as we shall see, the Canadian officials would often be drawn into Anglo-American disputes in which they little desired to intervene and which were caused, with one notable exception, through no fault of their own mismanagement. Howe and Mackenzie would often be pressured, especially by certain members of the British group, to take sides, but the Canadians would try to avoid high-level disputes as long as Dominion interests could be protected without such intervention. More than once however, the mediating efforts of

Mackenzie, whose numerous trips to London, Washington and New York precursed the era of 'shuttle diplomacy', would moderate attitudes on both sides when it appeared hotter heads might prevail, and Anglo-American cooperation might be jeopardized.

The wartime atomic relationship between Great Britain and the United States was always a testy one. That both countries frequently questioned the sincerity of each other's motives suggests that an ingrained antipathy precluded amicable collaborative efforts. The British themselves were not oblivious to this problem. A report prepared by W. A. Akers, Director of Tube Alloys, noted "there was a general feeling prevalent in America that the British always got the best of any deal."[7] Akers' observation was not altogether untrue, as evidenced by American Vice-President Wallace's statement concerning atomic collaboration that the "British are trying to play their customary role of getting more than they are entitled to."[8] Unfortunately, this latent animosity pervaded wartime atomic discussions.

Canadian-American relations seem to have been much more harmonious, perhaps because Canadian participation presented no real threat to American dominance of the atomic project. Canadian officials were eager moreover, to remain on friendly terms with the Americans, for effective collaboration could only benefit the future of any Canadian postwar industrial ambitions in the field of atomic energy. Howe and Mackenzie realized "that the national interest lay in keeping on as good terms as possible with the country that was going to set the

pace."[9] By 1942 it was evident the United States was that country.

Although Howe and Mackenzie maintained friendly relations with their American counterparts there nevertheless existed on the Canadian side a distinct awareness that the channels of communication between the various people in Canada and the United States "while very pleasant, [were] rather vague."[10] This ambiguity occasionally fostered misunderstanding, but for the most part Canadian-American discussions flowed smoothly, due in no small part to the fact that "scientist administrators, like Vannevar Bush, were also influencing much of American policy."[11] In fact, Mackenzie considered Bush and his assistant James B. Conant extremely competent and believed that together they made "a grand team."[12]

If the Canadian-American relationship was amicable, the same could not always be said about Anglo-Canadian cooperation. All too often the reluctance of British authorities to treat the Canadians as equals hindered fruitful discussion. Invariably, certain British officials exhibited "a tendency to look on Canada as a Commonwealth territory and somewhat, therefore, at their disposal."[13]

Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council and the cabinet minister responsible for Great Britain's atomic program, most clearly exemplified this anachronistic attitude towards Canada. His vituperative accusations and pretentious magnanimity often served only to harden the resolve of Howe and Mackenzie who found little in common with someone whose

views seemed to reflect an ignorance of the fact that Canada's relationship with Great Britain had changed since the era of Victoria's Empire. Indeed, as one observer noted, "with his pin-stripe trousers, wing collar and gold watch-chain, his heavy face, carefully weighed words and air of a slightly sad blood-hound, he appeared to come from the age of the war before last."[14] After meeting Anderson for the first time Mackenzie noted:

> He is the type who sees only the good of England--people who don't act as good colonists must be actuated by sinister motives--
>
> He is the type of Englishman who makes me a good North American. The common people of England are simply marvelous--some of the rulers are asses.[15]

The Americans also found the Lord President antipathetical. Vannevar Bush described him as one "whose diplomacy is usually over-clever."[16] Clearly, Anderson's personality did not lend itself to favourable negotiations with either the Canadians or the Americans.

This animosity did not extend to all Britons involved with the atomic project however. Mackenzie believed that Akers, for example, was "absolutely first rate."[17] He also highly respected the British High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald, and truly appreciated his participation in atomic discussions. Arnold Heeney would later write that "his [MacDonald's] term in Ottawa was notably successful in the development and maintenance of a relationship that was not without serious difficulties at that time," and surely not the least of these was the tenuous atomic relationship.[18] Nevertheless, "so long as there was...an assumption of ultimate authority in London, there was bound to be trouble."[19] As we

shall see, the British presumption that they could depend upon Canadian support in disputes with the Americans served only to foster ill feelings between the two Commonwealth 'partners' when that support was not forthcoming.

Official Canadian participation in wartime atomic energy development began in June 1942 when a British delegation headed by Malcolm MacDonald urged Mackenzie King to have the Canadian Government take over control of Eldorado Gold Mines Limited, the company which owned the rich uranium deposits on Great Bear Lake. The Prime Minister referred the British emissaries to Howe and Mackenzie.[20] Howe subsequently stated that the proposed takeover of Eldorado was not only feasible, but also assured the British representatives that his personal friendship with the president of the company, Gilbert Labine, would considerably facilitate such a transfer. Malcolm MacDonald, evidently pleased with the minister's accommodating posture found it difficult to hide his exhuberance. "Howe expressed willingness to do anything we wanted," he promptly reported to London. "Immediate Canadian Government control of output and price is easily possible under the existing powers."[21] The High Commissioner's confidence was unfortunately to prove premature.

C. D. Howe was, according to one of his former colleagues, "a man who wanted to get things done with the least amount of talk."[22] This characteristic led Howe, and Canada, into problems in atomic energy matters. That the minister was an extremely capable administrator is without doubt; his

industrious spirit and persistent determination was an example for all Canadians to follow during the war. At times however, the trust and confidence that he showed in other people's administrative capabilities placed him in awkward positions. One such incident involved the Eldorado takeover. Howe's personal friendship with Gilbert Labine proved as much a handicap as an aid in the incipient uranium supplies dispute between Great Britain and the United States. The minister had exhibited considerable confidence in his friend, but he was soon to learn that "trust and friendship are not invariably the firmest foundations on which to build international relationships fraught with possible conflicts of interest."[23] The sloppy handling of the Eldorado problem would tarnish Howe's reputation in London and cause British officials to question the sincerity of Canada's commitments to Anglo-Canadian cooperation.

Malcolm MacDonald's report that 'immediate' acquisition of Eldorado's assets was 'easily possible' was based on Howe's false assumption that Labine actually owned or controlled the vast majority of stock in the company. This was not the case however, and the ensuing protracted Eldorado takeover did not endear Howe to the authorities in London whose confidence in the minister diminished in view of the unexpected delay. In fact, it would be eighteen months after the original approaches by MacDonald before the Canadian Government finally expropriated Eldorado.[24]

Gilbert Labine's operation of Eldorado soon caused more

embarrassment for Howe. On 12 June, 1942, Sir John Anderson had instructed MacDonald that it was imperative that the United States Government be informed before any definitive action was taken towards seeking Canadian governmental expropriation of Eldorado. In his telegram to the High Commissioner he stated the "Americans would no doubt require some assurances that control would not be used to deprive them of their fair share of output. We are prepared, so far as we are concerned, to give some such assurances."[25] Anderson need not have been troubled about American priorities, for unknown to him the United States Government, through U.S. Army contracts totalling 350 tons, had already gained control of Eldorado's uranium oxide production capabilities at the Port Hope, Ontario refinery.

Needless to say, British apprehension developed when they learned that their original request for twenty tons of refined uranium oxide would have to be postponed so that Labine could first fulfil his contractual obligations to the Americans. In November the British were making approaches to Howe and Mackenzie in order to ascertain the nature and extent of the U.S. Army contracts with Eldorado. By this time Great Britain had committed itself to the transfer of its heavy water research project to a laboratory in Montreal and British authorities were anxious that this team receive the required amount of uranium oxide to allow full-scale research and development. Despite their knowledge of the U.S. Army contracts however, "the British believed the Americans would ensure that the raw material needs of the Anglo-Canadian research team in Montreal

were met."[26] Authorities in Montreal and London were soon to be disappointed.

An American contract with another Canadian company would unfortunately further impede effective progress at the Montreal laboratory. In the summer of 1942 American officials had entered into agreement with the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company at Trail, British Columbia for the production of heavy water, known as an efficient moderator for use in atomic research.[27] Although it seemed that complete American control of heavy water supplies was certain, in September Akers expressed to Sir John Anderson his confidence "that we shall be able to...secure the heavy water produced at Trail."[28] Akers based his prediction on views expressed earlier to him by James Conant and other American scientists to the effect that heavy water development should be left to Dr. Hans Halban's team in Montreal, "provided work was being carried out by his group on a reasonable scale on the North American Continent."[29] An October meeting of Tube Alloys officials in London agreed on the utmost importance of obtaining firm assurances from the American Government "to the effect that Dr. Halban's team would be accorded high priority" with respect to the acquisition of heavy water.[30] Such official assurances had not yet been given.

C. J. Mackenzie recognized early the importance of guaranteed heavy water procurement from the United States. After meeting with British officials in late October he noted that "no one seems to take this difficulty seriously but

myself. I think that that agreement is the only major difficulty."[31] Heavy water supply was not the only problem, but Mackenzie was right when he suggested it was a major one, for the future of the Anglo-Canadian effort in Montreal depended on it. He stressed this fact to Vannevar Bush and James Conant when he travelled to Washington in November to discuss the future of the Montreal project. Mackenzie told Conant "quite frankly" that Canadian involvement in the project would be minimal until heavy water supplies could be secured.[32] Despite his efforts however, the Americans still refused to guarantee the supply of heavy water for the Anglo-Canadian team in Montreal.[33]

The difficulties encountered by Howe and Mackenzie in their attempts to secure from the United States adequate supplies of uranium oxide and heavy water were merely symptoms of the larger and ultimately more significant problem of reconciling British intransigence with American cutbacks in scientific and technical collaboration. Akers' assistant, M. W. Perrin, had predicted in the spring of 1942 that very soon the Americans would "completely outstrip us in ideas, research and application of nuclear energy and that then, quite rightly, they will see no reason for our butting in."[34]

By the autumn, Akers had come to view the U.S. Army takeover of the American atomic project as detrimental to effective collaboration. He noted in a letter to Mackenzie that "the incursion of the Army into this project has enormously restricted the activity and freedom of O.S.R.D."[35] A few

weeks later he observed, somewhat inaccurately, that "Bush and Conant have really been run right out of everything except pure laboratory work so that I am really wasting my time talking with them about most of the work."[36] Conant had apparently expressed previously to Akers his disenchantment with the restrictive measures that the Army was placing on the project but lamented "that as the Army [was] paying the piper, it [was] not unreasonable for them to try to call the tune."[37] British authorities subsequently let their American counterparts know that they would not be able to accept the restrictive policy "without some kind of fight."[38]

General Leslie R. Groves, the U.S. Army administrator responsible for the American atomic project, drew most of the British condemnation. His zeal for secrecy was viewed by many in London as fanatical but his fears were shared by other American officials. Conant for example, informed Mackenzie that he too felt there was "a danger in having too many people from the United Kingdom running around the United States on the same project."[39] Mackenzie however, remained unconvinced of the necessity of such 'stringent and obstructionist restrictions.'[40]

On 29 December, Vannevar Bush informed Mackenzie "that the programme for co-operative work as between Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, had been finally approved and he was very pleased about it."[41] Mackenzie was somewhat less enthused, for he had learned not to set one's hopes too high. His initial apprehension was confirmed when Conant

phoned him four days later to say that a forthcoming letter concerning the interchange impasse "might sound more harsh than was really intended."[42] Here was a clear example of how the Americans endeavoured to use Mackenzie as a buffer between themselves and the British. By letting him inform Akers and MacDonald of the nature of the American plan for 'cooperation' they relieved themselves of an unpleasant task, at the same time shifting this embarrassing responsibility, some might say unfairly, to C. J. Mackenzie.[43] London was not unaware that Washington might use Ottawa as a medium, for Akers and MacDonald both hounded Mackenzie in the first days of January hoping to hear word of the American proposal.

British reaction to the Conant Memo of January 7, 1943 which restricted the flow of information between the American and Anglo-Canadian teams was both swift and predictable. MacDonald, for one, believed it represented an attempt by the Americans to establish a monopoly in both the military and industrial applications of atomic energy.[44] He regarded the memo as a manifestation of "the somewhat high-handed and exclusive policy being adopted by some senior officers of the United States Army who are now in charge of these matters in the States."[45] He and Akers immediately attempted to solicit the support of Mackenzie, whom they knew was well respected by Conant and Bush. They first tried to convince him to send a highly critical letter of protest, written by Akers, to Conant. Mackenzie adamantly refused to do so, stating that both Conant and Bush would easily recognize that the sentiments expressed

in the draft were those of Akers.[46] MacDonald then asked Mackenzie, whom he regarded as "very wise and helpful about these things," to travel to Washington where he could "[take] advantage of his intimate, personal friendship with Conant... [and] talk with the latter to endeavour to discover what is behind all this apparent lack of co-operative spirit, and where responsibility for it lies."[47] Clearly, British authorities believed the Americans were more disposed to frank discussions with Mackenzie than they were towards anyone from Great Britain.

For his part, Mackenzie was less sympathetic towards Great Britain's position than the British officials thought he should be. Had they been reading his diary they would have been confirmed in their suspicions; after meeting with MacDonald and Akers to discuss the Conant Memo Mackenzie noted:

> I am not at all sure that their views are right and I am quite sure that there are other factors in the picture which have not been disclosed. I can't help feeling the United Kingdom group emphasizes the importance of their contribution as compared with the Americans and this attitude has been one of the real shortcomings of British diplomacy all through the war.[48]

C. D. Howe concurred with this appraisal, for when he met with Mackenzie to discuss the latter's impending trip to Washington he expressed his view that if the British "had left the negotiations to us we could probably have handled it more satisfactorily."[49] He cautioned moreover, that Canada "should not get into any high power disagreement as between the U.K. and the U.S.," an attitude which Mackenzie King would surely have approved.[50] Mackenzie would find it difficult however, to remain

neutral.

Mackenzie's subsequent discussions in Washington with Conant and Bush on 18 January served only to strengthen his conviction that the American restrictions on interchange were not as severe as the British would have him believe. He perceived and understood their reluctance to share technical know-how with the Montreal team since it could hardly be called an 'Anglo-Saxon' group and many of its top scientists were European emigres from several countries. Conant and Bush "felt there was no guarantee that the various nationals--French, Austrian, Russian, Czechoslovakian, German, Italian etc., could be guaranteed for any length of time."[51] Moreover, Mackenzie correctly discerned that General Groves was not acting alone, "but that the ultimate decision to segregate and limit exchange was the unanimous decision of the high policy body," of which Conant and Bush were highly influential members.[52] Mackenzie described his discussions as 'pleasant and profitable' and left the American capital convinced that there was 'a great deal to be said' for the American position. Such opinion would not go over well in London.

Upon his return to Ottawa, Mackenzie duly informed the High Commissioner and Akers of the American reasons for their steadfast posture on restricting interchange. As expected, the news pleased neither of the British officials who felt the American restrictions were "very unfair."[54] MacDonald subsequently reported to London the details of Mackenzie's discussions with Conant and Bush, particularly noting that American

reticence apparently derived from fears that postwar security problems might result from the disseminating of atomic know-how to various countries through the numerous foreigners which were on the Anglo-Canadian team.[55] MacDonald further observed that, contrary to what he had earlier believed, General Groves was not solely responsible for the interchange cutback. Rather, Mackenzie's trip to Washington revealed that this decision had originated at the highest echelon, the American Policy Committee.[56]

The increasingly serious consequences of American policy were now prompting still firmer responses in London. Sir John Anderson subsequently advocated that the Anglo-Canadian team in Montreal adopt a policy of restricted interchange similar to that of the Americans. Akers however, did not agree. In his opinion,

> Our best chance of convincing Americans of advantages of complete interchange is to get this working wherever there is a definite request for it to be done, from their side, by people who can assert that, without such exchange, quickest realization of full-scale [atomic] plants will be jeopardized.[57]

This line of thought was not welcomed in London however, and it was becoming evident to those involved in atomic matters that anyone who did not fully support the policies advocated by Sir John Anderson, whether it was Howe, Mackenzie or even Akers, were viewed in Great Britain as detrimental to the future success of British atomic energy development. Such seeming perfidy did not sit well at Whitehall. Indeed, some members of the British [Tube Alloys] Technical Committee believed

that Akers, "owing to his long absence [from London], is getting rather out of touch with developments here."[58] The Committee accordingly recommended to Anderson that Akers return to Great Britain, if even for only a short period of time, so that he could reacquaint himself with the 'correct' British attitude on American interchange restrictions.[59]

Anderson refused to yield any ground to the Americans despite the fact that some of his advisers privately admitted that "any withdrawal of co-operation on our part is likely to prejudice our efforts to clear the position with the Americans."[60] However, after discussing the interchange impasse with Churchill's personal adviser, Lord Cherwell, Anderson concluded the British team "should continue to give the impression of not withholding information from the Americans...but, at the same time, should be careful not to give away any important secrets until the position has been clarified."[61] Anderson stubbornly maintained his position, even after the chief scientist at the Montreal laboratory, Hans Halban, advocated acceptance of the terms set forth in the Conant Memo.[62]

Perhaps the Lord President's resolve was buoyed by his ill-conceived conviction that negotiations at the Prime Ministerial and Presidential level would end the dispute.[63] This became apparent when he informed MacDonald that Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the nature and extent of cooperation in the atomic energy project while at Casablanca and there were "some grounds for hoping that the President will... issue instructions to the effect that collaboration...should

be re-established on a basis of full reciprocity."[64] Upon hearing from Malcolm MacDonald of the possible breakthrough at the Casablanca Conference Mackenzie displayed far less optimism.[65] His reluctance to show similar faith in 'high-level' discussions reflected a keener understanding of how atomic policy was formulated in the United States, a process which few in London seemed to comprehend nearly as well.

An opportunity soon arose however, to reverse the British position on renewed collaboration. While in New York in February Mackenzie had been approached by Conant who requested that Halban be allowed to meet with Harold Urey and Enrico Fermi of the American atomic project to discuss questions the latter two had concerning the Frenchman's original heavy water research. Mackenzie welcomed the idea and assured Conant that "it would be quite easy to do."[66] After securing Halban's consent he informed MacDonald who agreed "that it was a very favourable break."[67] Mackenzie believed the request for Halban's advice represented "an attempt on the part of the scientific personnel to break down the rigid instructions which the Army have imposed on co-operation."[68] The High Commissioner duly informed Anderson of the American approach and reiterated Mackenzie's belief that the request indicated "a softening of the American attitude regarding co-operation."[69] The staging of such a meeting could possibly initiate a rapprochement between British and American authorities.

Unfortunately, Sir John Anderson did not share these sentiments and ordered MacDonald to cancel Halban's trip on

the grounds that it would weaken Churchill's position "by giving further valuable information [to the Americans] before satisfactory conditions for co-operation and exchange of information on a basis of full reciprocity have been restored."[70] The High Commissioner subsequently instructed Halban to call off his meeting with Urey and Fermi. Halban's immediate appeal to Anderson for reconsideration met with no success.[71] In fact, Anderson indicated that Halban should not only cancel his trip, but that MacDonald should specifically inform the Americans that Conant's memo of 7 January was the reason for the decision.[72] Clearly, Anderson wanted to let the Americans know exactly where he stood on the interchange dispute.

Needless to say, such obstructive behaviour did not impress Mackenzie, who called Anderson's move "a very unwise one."[73] MacDonald had earlier informed London that Mackenzie would be 'very disappointed' with the decision, but this came as no shock to Sir John who had come to see Mackenzie's views as unduly attuned to the American position.[74] He predicted "that Mackenzie will lend himself to this blatent attempt by Conant to divide ourselves and the Canadians in this matter."[75]

Mackenzie's fears were well founded however. After MacDonald informed the Americans that Halban would not be allowed to confer with Urey and Fermi in New York Conant suggested to Bush that the American heavy water project proceed independently of the group headed by Halban in Montreal.[76] As Anderson had suspected, and hoped, the absence of Halban's advice slowed down American progress in heavy water research.[77]

His tactic only increased however, American irritation with the British position. Conant let MacDonald know in clear language that American officials were upset with their counterparts in London but "that everyone understood that [the] decision had not been made by the Canadian Government but by London."[78]

Clearly, Anderson's cancelling of Halban's conference with the American scientists exacerbated the acrimonious situation. The Lord President's 'over-clever diplomacy' led Conant to suggest that the "whole controversy might never had arisen if the negotiations had been in the hands of British scientists comparable to [Bush]."[79] Deadlock had now set in however. The faint hope that an early solution could be found to the interchange impasse was extinguished by the cancellation of Halban's trip to New York.

As the summer of 1943 approached, the problem of uranium and heavy water supplies remained unresolved, the American restrictive policy on interchange continued to be a contentious issue, and Canadian officials found themselves enmeshed in the acrimonious Anglo-American dispute, the unfavourable position which C. D. Howe had sought to avoid. Department of External Affairs officials might have welcomed the opportunity to act as peacemakers, but Canada's professional diplomats were still ignorant of their country's involvement in atomic energy development. The animosity which pervaded Anglo-American atomic discussions at this time suggested it would be a busy summer indeed for Canada's 'non-diplomats'.

NOTES

[1]Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 122.

[2]Minute from Sir John Anderson to Prime Minister, July30, 1942, reprinted as Appendix 3 in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 437-438. The Americans had approached the British in the latter months of 1941 in effort to secure closer collaboration in atomic energy development but the British had reacted coolly to such a suggestion. Ibid., p. 123.

[3]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 145. As Gowing points out, Churchill had apparently discussed the possibility of merging the American and British programs with Roosevelt in June at Hyde Park, but British officials did not learn of the talks until much later. See also Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 374-381.

[4]Pearson Papers, M. A. Pope File No. 1, 1944-1946, Memorandum prepared by General Maurice Pope, January, 1945.

[5]Villa, "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," p. 24. It should be remembered however, that Mackenzie King served 'ex officio' as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs during this period and therefore qualified as a 'diplomat.'

[6]Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 60.

[7]PAC, National Research Council[NRC] Files, RG 77, Vol. 283, Report prepared by W. A. Akers entitled "Negotiations with the Americans after the signing of the Quebec Agreement," September 13, 1943. [Hereafter cited as NRC Files followed by volume number].

[8]John Morton Blum ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry S. Wallace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 152, quoted in Villa, "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," p. 13.

[9]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, p. 199.

[10]Letter, C. J. Mackenzie to Professor Hugh Taylor, Department of Chemistry, Princeton University, April 8, 1943, NRC Files, Vol. 283.

[11]Villa, "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," p. 24.

[12]PAC, Chalmers Jack Mackenzie Diary, MG 30, B 122, November 28, 1942. [Hereafter cited as Mackezie Diary followed by date]. Mackenzie observed that "of all the people I have met in Washington I would prefer to work with Conant as one would always know where he was at." Ibid.

[13]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 200.

[14]Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb (London: Phoenix House Ltd., 1961), p. 195.

[15]Mackenzie Diary, May 11, 1943. Original emphasis.

[16]Bush's Memorandum for File, November 13, 1945, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[17]Mackenzie Diary, November 19, 1942.

[18]Heeney, The Things That Are Caesar's, p. 91.

[19]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p.220.

[20]Accompanying MacDonald were Professor G. P. Thompson and M. W. Perrin of the Directorate of Tube Alloys, the secret name for Great Britain's atomic program.

[21]Malcolm MacDonald to Sir John Anderson, June 16, 1942, British Cabinet Documents presently being made available in the Cabinet Office[C.O.], London, England, copies furnished through Professor Brian Villa. [Hereafter cited as C.O. followed by reference file if available]. See also Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 259.

[22]Massey, What's Past Is Prologue, p. 221.

[23]Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 260.

[24]On January 28, 1944, Howe informed the House of Commons that as of the previous day the Government of Canada had acquired "all properties and assets of Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited by expropriating all the capital shares of the Company." Howe Papers, Vol. 5.

[25]Anderson to MacDonald, June 12, 1942, C.O., CAB 126/103.

[26]Mackenzie Diary, November 20, 1942; Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 183.

[27]As Villa points out, both Canadian and British atomic officials were made aware of the heavy water contracts before they were consummated. See "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," p. 11.

[28]Akers to Anderson, September 7, 1942, C.O., CAB 126/41.

[29]Ibid. Dr. Hans Halban, a French emigre and pioneer in heavy water research, directed scientific operations at the Montreal Laboratory.

[30]Record of a Meeting held in the Lord President's Room on October 12, 1942, Howe Papers, Vol. 11. Howe had attended this meeting while on government business in Great Britain.

[31]Mackenzie Diary, October 29, 1942.

[32]Ibid., November 28, 1942.

[33]Guaranteed supplies of heavy water did not materialize until the summer of 1944 with the decision to erect in Canada an experimental heavy water pile. See Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. I: The New World, 1939/1946 (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), pp. 280-284.

[34]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 139.

[35]Akers to Mackenzie, November 5, 1942, NRC Files, Vol. 284. The Office of Scientific Research and Development[OSRD] which Vannevar Bush directed, was established in June, 1941 "to serve as a center for mobilizing the scientific resources of the [United States] and applying the results of research to national defence." Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, p. 41.

[36]Akers to Perrin, December 21, 1942, C.O., AB 1/70, XC/A/3359.

[37]Akers to Perrin, November 16, 1942, C.O., AB 1/128, XC/A/3509.

[38]Akers to Perrin, December 12, 1942, C.O., AB 1/128, XC/A/3509.

[39]Mackenzie Diary, November 28, 1942. Mackenzie further gathered from Conant "that the clamping down of the Army on the interchange of information while he feels in its present form may be a bit extreme was probably a good move." Ibid. See also Conant to Bush, March 25, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[40]Mackenzie Diary, December 16, 1942.

[41]Ibid., December 29, 1942.

[42]Ibid., January 2, 1943.

[43]It must be noted however, that Vannevar Bush had hinted to Akers in December that the American proposals for renewed collaboration might be considered unsatisfactory by the British. See Akers to Perrin, December 29, 1942, C.O.

[44]MacDonald to Anderson, January 8, 1943, C.O.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Mackenzie Diary, January 7, 1943.

[47]MacDonald to Anderson, January 8, 1943, C.O. Mackenzie subsequently agreed to travel to Washington.

[48]Mackenzie Diary, January 7, 1943. Gowing suggests that "even well into 1943 the British tended to undervalue the American work compared with their own." See, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 174.

[49]Mackenzie Diary, January 7, 1943.

[50]Ibid. Howe's desire to remain detached from the Anglo-American atomic dispute was similar to King's hands-off posture in international affairs.

[51]Ibid., January 18, 1943.

[52]Ibid. The 'high policy group' to which Mackenzie referred was actually called the Top Policy Group, and was composed of Conant, Bush, Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Ibid., January 20, 1943.

[55]MacDonald to Anderson, January 22, 1943, C.O. Of Mackenzie's suggestion that the American decision to restrict scientific and technical interchange was actuated by the presence of foreigners in the Anglo-Canadian team MacDonald later noted that "this is a plausible reason, and not untypical of the way in which the American mind works." See MacDonald to Anderson, January 27, 1943, C.O.

[56]MacDonald to Anderson, January 27, 1943, C.O. MacDonald referred to the Top Policy Group as the 'American Policy Committee'.

[57]Akers to Perrin, January 22, 1943, C.O.

[58]A. Blok to Anderson, January 26, 1943, C.O. Mr. Blok was a senior patents expert assigned to Tube Alloys.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Blok to Anderson, attached to a copy of a letter from Perrin to Gorrell Barnes dated January 19, 1943, C.O.

[61]See Blok's Note For Record, January 22, 1943, C.O.

[62]See Akers to Gordon Munro, January 30, 1943, C.O., AB 1/128, XC/A/3509. Gordon Munro was Malcolm MacDonald's assistant at the British High Commission in Ottawa.

[63]In the course of his discussions in Washington Mackenzie had informed Conant and Bush that Great Britain would probably in the near future make approaches to Roosevelt through Churchill in an effort to have full collaboration reinstated. See Mackenzie Diary, January 20, 1943.

[64]Anderson to MacDonald, January 27, 1943, C.O.

[65]Mackenzie Diary, February 2, 1943.

[66]Ibid., February 25, 1943.

[67]Ibid., February 26, 1943.

[68]Ibid.

[69]MacDonald to Anderson, February 27, 1943, C.O.

[70]Anderson to MacDonald, [no date], C.O. At this time the British Prime Minister was negotiating with Roosevelt's personal adviser, Harry Hopkins, for an improvement in the interchange situation.

[71]See Halban to Anderson and Akers, March 3, 1943, C.O.

[72]Anderson to MacDonald, March 4, 1943, C.O.

[73]Mackenzie Diary, March 12, 1943.

[74]Anderson to MacDonald, March 26, 1943, C.O.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Conant to Bush, March 10, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[77]Conant informed General Groves that "as a result of his [Halban's] failure to appear at this meeting, we were considerably handicapped...in outlining our program for the future." Conant to Groves, March 11, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[78]Conant to MacDonald, March 10, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[79]Conant to Bush, March 25, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

III

THE TRAVAILS OF ATOMIC MEDIATION, 1943-1945

When C. D. Howe expressed to C. J. Mackenzie in January, 1943, his fears that Canada might be dragged into high level atomic disputes between the United States and Great Britain he had exposed his personal aversion to diplomatic mediation. If Canada was to emerge merely as a referee in the atomic relationship he wanted no part of it.[1] External Affairs officials might have viewed this matter differently, but as yet they were not involved. It would be two more years before anyone from DEA confronted the atomic issue. Consequently, with the professional diplomats as yet still out of the picture, Mackenzie King detached from the intricacies of the relationship, and Howe reluctant to take part personally in tedious arbitration, the responsibility for representing Canada devolved almost entirely to C. J. Mackenzie.

As seen in the previous chapter, Mackenzie's early efforts to bring Great Britain and the United States together in a mutually beneficial and cooperative agreement met with little success. However, when others might have become discouraged and abandoned conciliatory endeavours, he appears never to have relinquished his desire to maintain discussion

between atomic officials in London and Washington. Speaking of the difficult negotiations during 1943, even the official British history has noted that Mackenzie "had been very helpful in smoothing relations at the working level and he, [Dr. James] Chadwick and Conant all got on well together."[2] Mackenzie's role in the atomic relationship cannot be overestimated, for his position between the American and British officials provided a buffer for inflamatory statements which otherwise would have had a sobering effect upon any future Anglo-American collaboration not only in the field of atomic energy, but also in other areas of cooperative research and development.

The future of atomic collaboration did not look promising in the spring of 1943, especially after Sir John Anderson had prevented Hans Halban from travelling to New York to consult with Harold Urey and Enrico Fermi of the American project. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic hardened their resolve not to give any ground to the other side. By the first few days of April atomic advisers in Great Britain were already contemplating the ramifications of a complete breakdown in cooperative atomic research and development.[3] Clearly, the probability of continued Anglo-American collaboration seemed further away than ever.

On 1 April, Malcolm MacDonald indicated to Sir John Anderson his reluctant agreement with the decision to suspend scientific interchanges with the Americans until the atomic collaboration question was resolved.[4] He also expressed his concern that Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's personal

adviser and confidant, might not be working as hard as was necessary towards a solution to the impasse.[5] Furthermore, he noted that he and Mackenzie had discussed the situation and they both favoured going to Washington to "sort out the problem and if necessary to urge [Hopkins] on."[6] When the High Commissioner formally requested permission to travel to the American Capital he also asked that Mackenzie accompany him. He was quite specific in describing the reasons for the latter suggestion.

> This would help greatly in keeping him [Mackenzie] well disposed to our present line of policy, in assuring him that we are doing everything we can to resolve the deadlock, and in satisfying him that we are treating Canada as a full partner in this whole matter. Moreover, his own contribution in these discussions is always helpful and constructive.[7]

Undoubtedly MacDonald valued the counsel of Mackenzie, who might be privy to certain American information and opinion that people like Conant and Bush would otherwise be reluctant to share with British authorities. The British were clearly anxious to benefit as much as they could from Mackenzie's 'friendship' with the American atomic policy-makers.

MacDonald's proposed mission to Washington with Mackenzie never materialized but the latter did make the trip by himself towards the end of April. During this visit Conant and Bush informed Mackenzie that the deteriorating situation was due to the British refusal to accept the American position on scientific interchange as outlined in the Conant Memo.[8] The American administrators also reiterated "that...the restriction regarding passing of information had their full support and the

support of the scientific committees and was not just a whim of the Army."[9] Furthermore, they considered the British protestations unjustified and believed that Akers, for one, "did not appreciate really the limitations and viewpoints which had taken place."[10] Finally, Conant and Bush confirmed Mackenzie's expressed belief that British attempts to have the restrictions rescinded through intervention at the Presidential level were fruitless. Mackenzie found little to dispute with the Americans and returned to Ottawa satisfied that the restrictive measures were not as intolerable as he had earlier believed.[11] Bush happily reported to Harry Hopkins that Mackenzie agreed "entirely that our decision is reasonable, and I believe that he will urge the British to withdraw their objections."[12]

Upon his return to Ottawa Mackenzie began preparations for a trip to Great Britain to discuss the atomic impasse with British authorities in London. He duly apprised Howe of his discussions in Washington and together they considered what effect his findings would have on his mission across the Atlantic. Howe agreed with Mackenzie's suggestion that they should apply as much pressure as possible on Sir John Anderson in an effort to have him acquiesce to the American proposals for restricted interchange as stipulated in Conant's January memo.[13] Furthermore, the minister, who by this time was growing quite perturbed with the self-righteous attitude of certain British officials, advised Mackensie to inform Sir John "that unless they would permit us to handle the entire negotiations from this end that he would not feel like

supporting the project any further."[14] With these instructions in hand Mackenzie headed across the Atlantic where attitudes were not nearly so compliant.

Mackenzie's meeting with Sir John Anderson in May provided some explosive moments as neither side pulled punches. But to suggest, as others have, that the meeting was totally unsuccessful is to ignore the true purpose of mediatory discussion: interchange and dissemination of contrasting information and opinion.[15] For although the meeting obviously fostered ill will between Mackenzie and Anderson, both acquired a more complete understanding of each other's position. Mackenzie, for instance, told Anderson flatly that "he [Anderson] did not understand the U.S. position or feeling--that they were as sure of their cause as he was [of his]."[16] Furthermore, he assured Sir John that the Canadian Government "would certainly not support a team in Canada to compete with the U.S.", and advised him that "his action in stopping Dr. Halban's visit was alienating the only good friends we had in the U.S."[17]

During an informal discussion later in his visit Mackenzie informed Akers that there was no hope of convincing the Americans to modify the restrictions advocated in the Conant Memo.[18] Hence, Mackenzie's May mission to Great Britain was not as fruitless as some would have us believe. Rather, the British authorities gained valuable information about the steadfastness of the American position and the unwillingness of the Canadians to participate in any rival atomic project that would jeopardize their relationship with the United

States. The discussions also confirmed the British fears that Canada would side with the United States if it came down to choosing sides. Commonwealth solidarity was evidently of lesser import to Mackenzie and Howe when the future of atomic energy development was involved. As for Mackenzie, after meeting Sir John Anderson face to face he realized now more than ever before that reconciliation of the two parties would not be an easy task.

At the same time Mackenzie had certainly not endeared himself to many top British officials. This animosity unfortunately precluded these same officials from accepting reasoned advice from Canada that might have ameliorated their position vis-à-vis the United States. For instance, on several occasions Mackenzie argued against attempting to override the top administrative officials in the United States by making direct approaches to Roosevelt through Churchill. Mackenzie contended that such manoeuvering served only to alienate the likes of Groves, Conant and Bush, and he informed Akers of this opinion while in London.[19] Akers shortly thereafter went to Canada under the impression that Roosevelt and Churchill had "fixed everything up...and that negotiations would be opened up."[20] Such was not the case however, and Mackenzie was quick to note that "it looks like Casablanca all over again—the usual promises given but nothing happening."[21] Malcolm MacDonald, for one, was cognizant of Mackenzie's keen awareness of the situation and in July informed Anderson accordingly.

Based on their experience in other cases, the

> Canadians definitly think that the President will not attempt to force any change in the present American attitude on this matter if there is stiff opposition from senior military or other officials. We believe such opposition has increased steadily over recent months.[22]

Unfortunately, Sir John Anderson and others chose to ignore such advice and continued to support efforts by Churchill to have Roosevelt reverse the American position on restricted interchange. Their confidence was perhaps unduly buoyed by the promises issued by Roosevelt during his May talks with Churchill in Washington.[23] Sadly, the British had apparently not yet understood that Roosevelt's promises were no iron-clad guarantee of results. Barely a month after the Prime Minister's mission to the American Capital Vannevar Bush advised Roosevelt that "we might as well sit tight on British relations, since our [atomic] program is not suffering for any lack of interchange."[24] Roosevelt, according to Bush, agreed.

To his credit however, Anderson did begin to perceive the nuances of American administrative operations when no substantial agreement evolved from Churchill's May talks with Roosevelt. In a message to MacDonald on 2 July Anderson concluded that the President was encountering obstacles "in securing implementation of his promise and that this necessarily precludes independent approach to those who are creating the obstacles."[25] Those who were 'creating the obstacles', the policy makers like Conant and Bush, were resentful of the British approaches to Roosevelt behind their backs.[26] The British officials throughout this period had failed to understand that, with respect to atomic energy policy, Roosevelt

did not constantly exercise direct influence in the United States as Churchill did in Great Britain. Mackenzie on the other hand had fully comprehended the power exercised by Conant, Bush and Groves, yet the British officials, partly out of personal animosity and partly as a result of their own misconceptions on how American policy was formulated, had callously disregarded his astute observations. Indeed, it was not until Churchill met with Bush and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in July and disclaimed any British interest in the postwar commercial aspects of atomic energy that the road to renewed collaboration was cleared.[27]

Mackenzie was not ignorant of his unpopularity among several of the top level atomic officials in Great Britain. He confided to his diary in July that "I am not so sure that my connection with radiology will make me persona grata with some people in England, particularly with Sir John Anderson, Cherwell and Churchill...."[28] Moreover, Mackenzie was concerned that the British authorities might see him as a causal factor in the collaboration breakdown.[29] Such fears were not merely evidence of chronic paranoia, but were well founded. As the official British historian has noted, Sir John concluded that "since Mackenzie was not wholeheartedly in favour of the British policy he seemed to be against it."[30] And Lord Cherwell went so far as to suggest that Churchill approach Mackenzie King to have Mackenzie assigned elsewhere "which would remove him from the field of Tube Alloys without putting him in a position where he could do us harm in other matters."[31]

This rather imperious suggestion showed the degree to which some British policy makers in Great Britain were totally misguided. Those officials closer to the difficult negotiations in North America, people like MacDonald and Akers, clearly valued Mackenzie's presence. Obviously, those who resided in London's ivory towers were not as appreciative.

Restricted interchange was not the only factor which was causing strain between Great Britain and the United States. As discussed earlier, the original British request for twenty tons of uranium oxide had had to be postponed so that Gilbert Labine could fulfill Eldorado's contractual obligations to the U.S. Army.[32] By the spring of 1943 however, the scientific team assembled in Montreal was anxious to commence operation but still had not received any uranium oxide. When, on 7 April, Malcolm MacDonald requested through Howe that Labine supply the Anglo-Canadian team with the original order of twenty tons the Eldorado president replied that he would not be able to accommodate this or any future orders because he had, without consultation with Howe, further "contracted to sell [to the U.S. Army] the entire output of the Eldorado mine for the foreseeable future."[33]

This revelation astounded the British who felt Howe had betrayed them. Indeed, the minister had been rather vague in his discussions with Labine. As a result, "what slight glimmering [Labine] had received of Howe's general policy in the matter of selling uranium ore had led him to think that it was a policy of America first."[34] Moreover, it was

later revealed that Labine had allowed his assistant, Carl B. French, to secure the controversial agreements with the U.S. Army. The postwar governmental report on Eldorado's operations concluded that "responsibility for secret negotiations with the U.S. Government and U.S. Army...should never have been allocated to one who was merely the secretary of the company."[35] In any case Howe's failure to counsel Labine created an atmosphere of ambiguity which allowed the U.S. Army to gain control of Eldorado's production, a development which understandably angered London and caused embarrassment in Ottawa.

A British memorandum prepared in May illustrated how the uranium supplies issue had placed the Anglo-Canadian project in Montreal in jeopardy.

> The fact that the U.S. Government has ordered from Eldorado a quantity of oxide which will exhaust their stocks and two years' production of the mine, means that, intentionally or otherwise, they have prevented the U.K. and Canadian Governments from obtaining any supplies of this essential material.[36]

Shortly hereafter Mackenzie was also drawn into the Eldorado Contracts dispute. On 14 June he met with Howe, Labine and two U.S. Army Engineers to discuss the proposed American contracts for 500 tons of uranium concentrate and oxide from the Port Hope refinery. At this meeting Howe "suggested that he would agree to the contract providing a clause was inserted stating that the needs of the United Kingdom would be protected."[37] It was too late for such bartering now however; the U.S. Army seemed unwilling to compromise their position.[38] Mackenzie, who had not been fully informed of Eldorado's contractual obligations, observed after the meeting that it was

"a very sticky subject."[39] Just how sticky he would soon discover.

The following day Mackenzie apprised Akers and MacDonald of the Eldorado situation and noted that "the supply of uranium is in a very confused position and we are not at all sure what contracts Labine has, how much the Americans have tied up, and whether or not there will be any available to us if we go on our own."[40] A week later Mackenzie, accompanied by Akers and MacDonald, visited Howe but this meeting also resolved nothing. Mackenzie lamented: "We all feel that we must get the correct information and it has become apparent that no one of us knows the complete story."[41] Again on 30 June he noted that confusion prevailed and it seemed "very difficult to get the exact information."[42]

Akers duly informed London that the uranium supplies issue was "still most confused owing to the lack of any definite knowledge by Howe or Mackenzie of [the] Eldorado production programme or of contracts actually signed."[43] Needless to say, British officials such as Sir John Anderson were not very pleased, despite the fact that MacDonald had informed them of Howe's effort to secure guarantees from the Americans with regard to uranium oxide allocation. In fact, rather than accept the U.S. Army contracts forthright Howe had proposed that "he should allocate the Eldorado production as it [became] available according to the advice given to him by Mackenzie...."[44] Their earlier experience with Canadian 'assurances' caused officials in London to view with some degree of cynicism

Howe's sincere efforts. Winston Churchill's remark that Howe had sold the British Empire down the river infuriated the minister. Mackenzie observed that his colleague was 'fed up' with such a suggestion "which of course is all nonsense."[45] MacDonald reported to Anderson that Howe was "very over tired and harassed" and euphemistically described his mood as 'difficult'.[46] Clearly, at this juncture flared tempers threatened the future of the Anglo-Canadian project.

Once again Mackenzie met with American officials in effort to resolve the uranium supplies situation. As he candidly observed, "we were in a mess and needed their help."[47] Mackenzie informed General Groves that "contracts with private firms in Canada," such as the one between the U.S. Army and Eldorado, "could easily be broken although [the General] also knew that we would never dream of interfering with such a contract."[48] Groves replied that a release of the requested uranium oxide to the Anglo-Canadian team might embarrass the American program and suggested the material might be acquired by increasing the output of the Eldorado refinery. Mackenzie agreed to look into such a possibility and came away from the meeting "very well satisfied that [the Americans] would do anything they could to help us out and more than ever convinced that had we Canadians been doing the negotiating from the start the picture would not have gotten bogged down the way it has."[49]

Upon his return to Ottawa Mackenzie informed MacDonald that chances of an "effective alleviation of the Eldorado position" were slim.[50] The High Commissioner duly relayed

this information to Sir John Anderson. Three days later Akers and MacDonald expressed to Mackenzie their concern that Gilbert Labine might be arranging further contracts with the U.S. Army and that Howe, who had just left for a brief holiday, should be informed so that he could dissuade Labine from doing so. Mackenzie replied that such action was both unnecessary and unwise since Howe, whose patience with the British was by this time at an end, "would tell [MacDonald] to go to hell and take his whole crowd back to England" which would have resulted in "a general break up in Canada in radiology."[51] MacDonald and Akers accordingly demurred. The uranium supplies issue remained in limbo, but Mackenzie's mediation had once more helped to prevent a complete breakdown in Anglo-Canadian collaboration.

By July Mackenzie had emerged as the prime spokesman for Canadian interests in the atomic project. Howe had less to offer to the negotiations now as he had been alienated from the British because of the Eldorado bungling. Mackenzie King had remained aloof from the atomic dispute throughout the early months of 1943. He only learned of the Anglo-American acrimony in May when Lord Cherwell, at Churchill's suggestion, met with the Canadian Prime Minister in Washington and gave the British side to the story. King listened sympathetically but offered no assistance to the British cause; he was still confident in Howe and Mackenzie's ability to safeguard Canadian interests. In fact, as Mackenzie later recalled, "I never once had an official conference with the Prime Minister. All of my dealings were through C. D. [Howe]."[52]

Though Mackenzie's role as an intermediary had been important, it was not until Churchill had assured Bush and Stimson that the British desire for collaboration was not merely an interest in the postwar industrial applications of atomic energy that an Anglo-American agreement seemed possible.[53] Roosevelt's July directive that Bush should "renew, in an inclusive manner, the full exchange of information with the British Government regarding tube alloys," also expidited the negotiations.[54] Shortly thereafter Sir John Anderson travelled to the United States to work out the specifics of a cooperative agreement.

Mackenzie first saw firm indications that the protracted atomic dispute might be terminated when he visited Washington in early August. There he met, among others, Sir John Anderson who in Mackenzie's opinion was "not as rigid as he was in London" and appeared "willing to compromise."[55] Conant confirmed Mackenzie's optimism when he stated that "things were going to break," although he cautioned that any renewed collaboration would not be "wide open."[56] In fact, Conant personally believed, although he did not indicate it to Mackenzie, that "complete interchange with the British...[was] a mistake."[57] Nevertheless, when Anderson visited Ottawa after leaving Washington he informed Dr. Halban and the other head scientists of the Montreal laboratory "that cooperation [was] going to be renewed in the immediate future."[58] Evidently some form of agreement was imminent.

The secret accord signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at

Quebec on August 19, 1943, officially committed the United States and Great Britain to renewed cooperation in the field of atomic research and development. The agreement provided, among other things, for the creation of a Combined Policy Committee[CPC] to oversee and approve all Anglo-American scientific and technical interchange. Although not an official signatory to the agreement, Canada was nevertheless granted representation on the CPC, along with the British and Americans because, as the official British historian has noted, "the British felt that the Canadians' contributions to the project would be so substantial that some way must be found of associating them with the project at the highest level."[59] The British motives for suggesting official Canadian participation were not totally unselfish however. As Sir John Anderson noted at the time, "this degree of recognition of the Canadian interest should ensure that the British work on [atomic energy] will not be held up through any lack of interest or energy on the part of the Canadian Government."[60]

The CPC was to be composed of six members; three from the United States, two from Great Britain, and one from Canada.[61] Mackenzie King, on Churchill's suggestion, nominated C. D. Howe as the Canadian representative and he was duly appointed. Others have suggested the Quebec Agreement signified an end to the bitter quarrelling of the previous seven months.[62] Such was not the case however. The laudable intentions expressed within the tranquil sanctum of the Citadel would never fully materialize.

The signing of the Quebec Agreement did not end Mackenzie's role as an intermediary. On the contrary, by the beginning of September, before the CPC had even had a chance to meet, Dr. James Chadwick, who had replaced Akers as the technical adviser to the British members of the CPC, was urging Mackenzie to set up a meeting with Conant and Bush to discuss specific areas of interchange.[63] Moreover, Mackenzie was appointed as the Canadian representative on the CPC technical sub-committee established to oversee the degree and flow of interchange. The first meeting of this sub-committee in September "quickly became an Anglo-American confrontation over whether what the Americans now proposed to release was sufficiently adequate and generous."[64] Needless to say it all sounded quite familiar to the Canadian representative. From his recent experiences in atomic negotiations Mackenzie realized that personal relationships would be an important factor in determining whether a mutually satisfactory arrangement could be engineered. He noted:

> ...the success of the collaboration and exchange of information will depend entirely on Chadwick and Groves. If they can get along well and establish a mutual confidence, which I think they will, the matter will go. If they disagree the matter will be bogged down until the war is over.[65]

At the subsequent technical sub-committee meetings Mackenzie was content to sit back and let the two major parties argue things out. His type of informal diplomacy was more effective during a lunch break or out on the golf course, not in the stuffy confines of a boardroom.

If Mackenzie was not prominent at formal discussions Howe

was even less vocal, for he attended very few meetings of the CPC. In fact, when Sir John Anderson had originally advised the appointment of Howe to the CPC, he had expressed his "doubt whether, if Mr. Howe were appointed a member of the Combined Policy Committee, he would often attend meetings."[66] In the course of discussions in September concerning the proposed structure and operations of the CPC, Howe apparently told a British official...

> ...that he was completely satisfied with the position of Canada and, if he were unable to come to Policy Committee meetings, would be quite content to leave the Canadian side of any question in the hands of the British delegates.[67]

If Howe did indeed make such a statement, and there seems no reason to doubt the veracity of the British official's report, then his guesture did not augur well for the future when Canadian DEA officials endeavoured to exhibit a more independent posture on the CPC. The minister's failure to attend CPC meetings may have contributed moreover, to the recurring American impression that Canadian interests were being looked after by the British representatives on the Committee.[68]

The fact that notices of CPC meetings were communicated to Howe through the British secretary (Canada did not have a secretary to the CPC) and Malcolm MacDonald raises the question of why Howe had to depend on British channels of communication when he might have utilized the offices of Canadian diplomatic officials, such as Lester Pearson, already stationed at the Canadian Legation in Washington. Mackenzie King provides the answer; his secretive diplomacy ruled out such a possibility.

Later, DEA officials would be drawn into the atomic negotiations and because there was a capable staff at Washington Canadian attendance at CPC meetings became more consistent. If Canada could have utilized earlier her own channels of communication she would have avoided her dependence on the British for information concerning CPC meetings, a procedure which served only to strengthen in the minds of the Americans the false impression that the British and Canadian positions were one and the same.

While the British were most anxious for a quick return to complete freedom of interchange the Americans were inclined to proceed cautiously. When Akers' advances towards increased cooperation were rebuffed by Vannevar Bush shortly after the signing of the Quebec Agreement, the British official complained that "if this really represents the official American view on co-operation, I do not see that we have advanced much."[69] This reaction would not have surprised Conant who believed that the renewal of interchange as outlined in the Quebec Agreement was "tantamount to an acceptance by the British of our original offer...."[70]

A British memorandum prepared in September suggested the American reluctance to fully cooperate "was largely due to the fact that they had put an enormous amount of money and effort into this project...."[71] Mackenzie also recognized the large expenditures that the Americans had made and noted the American program was "one hundred times greater" than any possible British effort, and the Americans could in any case "get along if necessary without the U.K., while the U.K. [could] do

nothing without the U.S."[72] In this respect the British appeared completely dependent upon the benevolence of the American negotiators. But Mackenzie, however impressed with the immensity of the American effort, fully intended to defend Anglo-Canadian interests.

As the negotiations dragged on toward Christmas the scientists at the Montreal laboratory grew increasingly impatient. An exasperated Mackenzie predicted that unless affirmative action was taken soon the laboratory would have to be shut down.[73] He suggested that if the Americans relinquished "the entire heavy water project to the Anglo-Canadian team then the scheme would make sense and we would fit into the general picture in an effective way."[74] Finally, at the February 17, 1944 CPC meeting Chadwick officially proposed that a large heavy water pilot plant be built in Canada. Almost two months later, and after the Americans had weighed all considerations, the CPC approved the recommendation 'to proceed immediately' with the construction of the plant. Moreover, heavy water and uranium supplies were finally guaranteed.[75] According to Mackenzie, Canada now had "a unique opportunity to become intimately involved in a project...which may revolutionize the future world."[76]

Shortly thereafter Dr. J. D. Cockcroft was dispatched by Sir John Anderson to assume directorship of the heavy water project.[77] A site for the plant was chosen at Chalk River, Ontario, and Howe contracted Defence Industries Limited of Montreal, a subsidiary of Canadian Industries Limited, to

design and construct, in consultation with the National Research Council, the heavy water pilot project.[78] Mackenzie travelled to Chicago in June to work out details of cooperation whereupon General Groves agreed to supply 'specific required materials' for the heavy water project at Chalk River.[79] Of the successful discussions in Chicago Mackenzie observed that both he and Chadwick felt that for the first time they had "everything on the rails so far as the negotiations [were] concerned."[80] Chadwick's greatest difficulty, Mackenzie believed, was "to try to keep Sir John Anderson on the rails."[81] They would again discover in the not too distant future this task was easier said than done.

Problems involving the actions of Anderson emerged again in November 1944 when he allowed Hans Halban to visit his former colleague, Professor Joliot-Curie in emancipated France. The status of the French nationals, including Halban, at the Montreal laboratory had always been a sticky problem. Halban had never been popular with Mackenzie, and Chadwick had confessed on an earlier occasion his apprehension about having the laboratory being "run by a group of foreign refugees."[82] The Americans also were not very happy about the cosmopolitan makeup of the 'Anglo-Canadian' team. General Groves, who had "no confidence whatsoever" in Halban, had been unwilling to support the heavy water project unless Cockcroft could replace the Frenchman as director of the plant.[83] Groves was concerned, understandably so, that France might unduly profit from Halban's knowledge acquired while head of the atomic project in Canada.

Although Anderson had consulted with American Ambassador Winant concerning Halban's visit to France, the American representative in London, despite being privy to several previous atomic discussions, clearly did not possess "the authority, nor the knowledge, to decide whether Halban should go to Paris or whether information he was to give to Joliot was objectionable or not."[84] To make matters worse, one of the conditions under which Groves had approved the visit of Halban to London was that under no circumstances should he be allowed to visit France.[85]

Needless to say General Groves was somewhat perturbed when he learned of Halban's unscheduled detour through Paris. He informed Mackenzie of his displeasure with the development when the two met in Montreal in early December, and "claimed this breach might seriously interfere with the flow of information to the Montreal Laboratory."[86] When Mackenzie told Howe on 20 December of Groves' complaints the minister "went off the deep end immediately" and phoned the British High Commissioner to make an appointment for that afternoon.[87] Once again Howe and Mackenzie were forced to arbitrate in a dispute between the United States and Great Britain.

MacDonald conveyed Anderson's defence which stressed that the placement of extreme restrictions on the French scientists on the team, or as he put it, to treat them like 'prisoners', would only serve to strengthen their desire to quickly disassociate themselves from the Anglo-Canadian project as soon as possible after the war in order to initiate their own program.[88] Anderson also endeavoured to use Howe as a buffer between himself

and the Americans, for he instructed the High Commissioner to apprise the minister of the British attitude towards the French scientists...

> ...and suggest to Howe that he should tell General Groves that he is not fully au courant with what has been going on, and that as he understands that the whole French problem is at present under discussion between the United States authorities and myself the best course would seem to be for General Groves to take the matter up with me.[89]

This request unfairly placed Howe in a rather uncompromising position, as it represented a blatent attempt on the part of Anderson to have the minister perform a task he found too unsavory to perform himself. In a pointed note to MacDonald Howe complained:

> I am placed in a most difficult position in matters of this kind. We are receiving a great deal of highly confidential information from the United States, on my personal assurance that all necessary secrecy will be preserved. In giving the assurance, I had understood that the staff in Montreal was subject to my direction. I was not informed that Halban had left Montreal for the United Kingdom nor that he had gone to France. Had I known of his intention in this regard, I would certainly have raised a vigorous protest.[90]

From the above it appears Anderson's suggestion that Groves had overreacted did not fall upon very sympathetic ears in Canada and that his attempt to use Howe as a conduit of unpopular British policy served only to increase the acrimony between the minister and British officials. MacDonald, perhaps caught in the middle as much as Howe, apologized, stating that he deeply regretted "that any action of [his] should have placed [Howe] in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis the Americans."[91] Such apologies were small consolation to Howe, who did not

want to become as unpopular in the United States as he was in certain circles in Great Britain.

When Mackenzie travelled to the United States in January, 1945, he noted that "the Halban affair had created deep resentment in Washington."[92] Indeed, the following month Vannevar Bush informed the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, that he "disapproved of the manner in which...Sir John Anderson seemed to be controlling matters from a distance."[93] Bush believed moreover, the entire French national problem "was dangerous to good Anglo-American relationships...."[94]

As a result of the Halban affair subsequent discussions among Howe, Mackenzie and MacDonald led to the drafting of a memorandum to guide future movements of personnel at the Montreal laboratory.[95] In March, Mackenzie went to Washington to present this proposal to the CPC. Accompanied by Chadwick, he met with General Groves before the official meeting whereupon the General accepted 'without question' Mackenzie's memorandum concerning the French nationals in Montreal.[96] The CPC duly approved the guidelines. Mackenzie had once again successfully diffused a volatile situation that had endangered the future of Anglo-American cooperation.[97] Such were the travails of conciliatory diplomacy.

The first three years of the atomic relationship had been difficult ones for everyone concerned. C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie had sought to protect Canada's vital interests in the pioneering project with little guidance from Mackenzie King and none from Canada's professional diplomats. But with the end of

the war in sight, thoughts were turned to the postwar relationship among the atomic collaborators. This shift in emphasis required the expertise of those well attuned to the nuances of 'Commonwealth solidarity' and 'continentalism'. In short, the inclusion of officials from Canada's Department of External Affairs in atomic discussions now became essential; their time had arrived.

NOTES

[1]Supra, p. 42.

[2]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 173. Dr. Chadwick was the technical adviser to the British members of the CPC.

[3]See W. A. Akers to H. Halban, April 2, 1943, in which the former stated: "I think that, if we do not get a reasonable reply from the States, within the next week or so, we will have to assume that they do not intend to collaborate and therefore decide our policy on that basis." Copy of letter included in memorandum entitled "Diary of Anglo-American Relations with T.A. 2," C.O., AB-129, XC-A-3509.

[4]MacDonald to Anderson, April 1, 1943, C.O.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]MacDonald to Anderson, April 1, 1943, C.O.

[8]Mackenzie Diary, April 24, 1943.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid. See also supra, pp. 45-46.

[12]Bush to Harry Hopkins, April 27, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[13]Mackenzie Diary, May 1, 1943.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Margaret Gowing for example, asserted that the talk "simply left a residue of bad feeling and the memory of it rankled on both sides." Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 197.

[16]Mackenzie Diary, May 11, 1943.

[17]Ibid.

[18]See Akers' "Note on talk with Dean C. J. Mackenzie," May 14, 1943, C.O.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Mackenzie Diary, June 15, 1943.

[21]Ibid.

[22]MacDonald to Anderson, July 18, 1943, C.O.

[23]For a provocative examination of the period from January to August, 1943 see Brian Loring Villa, "The Atomic Bomb and the Normandy Invasion," Perspectives in American History, XI (1977-1978), pp. 463-502, in which the author suggests that Roosevelt's apparent intransigence in atomic energy collaboration was being used as a lever to secure from Churchill British support for an early cross-channel invasion. Villa argues that "Roosevelt never made a step in the direction of the atomic partnership until Churchill had moved closer toward the Normandy invasion." Ibid., p. 500.

[24]Bush's "Memorandum of Conference with the President," June 24, 1943, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[25]Anderson to MacDonald, July 7, 1943, C.O. MacDonald had earlier expressed his opinion that the situation was "dangerously like it was after the Casablanca discussions." See MacDonald to Anderson, June 12, 1943, C.O.

[26]Bush made the British aware of this resentment when he and Henry Stimson met with Churchill and Anderson in July in London.

[27]See Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 166-169.

[28]Mackenzie Diary, July 8, 1943.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 197.

[31]See Arthur Blok to Anderson, June 29, 1943, C.O.

[32]Supra, p. 37.

[33]Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 262. See also Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, pp. 183-187.

[34]Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 262.

[35]Report on Eldorado Mining and Refining, February, 1946, p. 3, Howe Papers, Vol. 6. As Villa has also argued, Eldorado was financially desperate and therefore anxious for uranium contracts with anyone. See his "Canada and Atomic Collaboration," pp. 8-9.

[36]Memorandum entitled "Tube Alloy Project: Uranium Supplies," May 5, 1943, C.O.

[37]Mackenzie Diary, June 14, 1943.

[38]As Gowing states, the U.S. Army would maintain its position on uranium allocation until such time as a general agreement on collaboration with the Canadians and the British was worked out. See Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 187.

[39]Mackenzie Diary, June 14, 1943.

[40]Ibid., June 15, 1943.

[41]Ibid., June 21, 1943.

[42]Ibid., June 30, 1943.

[43]Akers to Perrin, June 23, 1943, C.O.

[44]MacDonald to Anderson, June 22, 1943, C.O.

[45]Mackenzie Diary, June 30, 1943.

[46]MacDonald to Anderson, July 1, 1943, C.O.

[47]Mackenzie Diary, July 7, 1943.

[48]Ibid. Wilfrid Eggleston observed that the Canadian Government would be reluctant to revert to such action "because of the close partnership with the United States in scores of other ways, and because of the fact that at the moment only the United States appeared to be in the position to make any practical use of uranium in winning the war." See Canada's Nuclear Story, pp. 79-80. Moreover, on 17 June Mackenzie had informed Akers "that it was impossible for the Canadian Government to resist any request from the Americans who had such powerful economic weapons in their hands for use, if necessary, against Canada." Akers to Perrin, June 17, 1943, C.O.

[49]Mackenzie Diary, July 7, 1943.

[50]MacDonald to Anderson, July 10, 1943, C.O.

[51]Mackenzie Diary, July 13, 1943. Furthermore, Mackenzie charged "that their position, in which they always implied that the other people were wrong and that they were virtuously right, was absolutely wrong."

[52]Quoted in "The Atom Secrets," The Globe Magazine (Toronto), October 28, 1943, as quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 270.

[53]Churchill had given these assurances to Bush and Stimson in July. See supra, p. 61.

[54]Roosevelt to Bush, July 20, 1943, NARUS, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy Files. [Hereafter cited as Harrison-Bundy Files].

[55]Mackenzie Diary, August 3, 1943.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Conant to Bush, July 30, 1943, Harrison-Bundy Files.

[58]Mackenzie Diary, August 9, 1943.

[59]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 171.

[60]Anderson to Churchill, August 10, 1943, C.O.

[61]John W. Holmes suggests that "King and Howe seemed happy to accept the 3-2-1 ratio...and recognize that these were basically Anglo-American bodies in which they had the right to speak." See his The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 201.

[62]See for example Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 271, and Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 174.

[63]Chadwick replaced Akers because the latter's association with Imperial Chemical Industries made him unacceptable to the Americans. Conant had earlier refused to meet with Chadwick when Akers had asked him to do so. Mackenzie subsequently "asked Conant to see Chadwick as one scientist to the other." Conant apparently appreciated Mackenzie informing him of the nature of Chadwick's and Akers' approaches. See Mackenzie Diary, October 9, 1943.

[64]Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 272. See also, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Combined Policy Committee"-First Meeting, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[65]Mackenzie Diary, September 12, 1943.

[66]Anderson to Churchill, August 10, 1943, C.O.

[67]Akers' memorandum entitled "Negotiations with the Americans after the signing of the Quebec Agreement," September 13, 1943, NRC Files, Vol. 283. As Holmes has suggested, "Howe regarded the CPC as a bilateral body with a Canadian specialist looking after particular Canadian interests. Ottawa asked no more questions and gave no advice." See The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 202.

[68]Howe missed the first three CPC meetings; September 8, 1943, December 17, 1943, and February 17, 1944. Hardly a commendable truancy record.

[69]Akers to Perrin, August 21, 1943, C.O., CAB 126/164.

[70]Conant to Bush, August 6, 1943, Harrison-Bundy Files.

[71]Akers' memorandum entitled "Negotiations with the Americans after the signing of the Quebec Agreement," September 13, 1943, NRC Files, Vol. 283.

[72]Mackenzie Diary, September 19, 1943. Also quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 264.

[73]Mackenzie Diary, December 8, 1943.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Minutes of CPC meeting held on April 13, 1944, point 4, Howe Papers, Vol. 14. See also, Mackenzie Diary, April 13, 1944.

[76]Mackenzie to Howe, April 10, 1944, Howe Papers, Vol. 14.

[77]See Howe to Anderson, April 14, 1944, NRC Files, Vol. 284. See also, Mackenzie Diary, April 19, 1944.

[78]See Howe to G. W. Huggett, President of Defence Industries Limited, May 29, 1944; Huggett to Howe, May 31, 1944; and Howe to Huggett, June 2, 1944, Howe Papers, Vol. 14.

[79]The 'specific required materials' were irradiated slugs of uranium. See Mackenzie Diary, June 8, 1944.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid., August 27, 1943.

[83]Groves to Stimson, December 24, 1944, Harrison-Bundy Files; Mackenzie Diary, December 8, 1943.

[84]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 294. Moreover, Halban had given his solemn word to Anderson that he would say nothing whatever to Joliot-Curie about the military aspects of the project. See Anderson to Churchill, November 17, 1944, C.O.

[85]See Blok's "Note For Record," November 22, 1944, C.O.

[86]Mackenzie Diary, December 6, 1944.

[87]Ibid., December 20, 1944.

[88]Anderson to MacDonald, December 21, 1944, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Howe to MacDonald, December 23, 1944, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[91]MacDonald to Howe, [no date], Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[92]Mackenzie Diary, January 8, 1945.

[93]Bush to Conant, February 13, 1945, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[94]Ibid.

[95]See Mackenzie Diary, January 17, 18, 19 and March 5, 1945.

[96]Ibid., March 8, 1945. According to the terms of the memorandum, Dr. Halban was to terminate his association with the Montreal project on April 1, 1945, after which time he would go to the United States where he would work on scientific research in an American university until January 1, 1946.

[97]Howe's role in the Halban affair was not however, insignificant. After the March CPC meeting Chadwick told Mackenzie that "until Mr. Howe took the matter into the meeting it was potentially a very difficult situation." See Mackenzie Diary, March 8, 1945.

IV

A NEW ENVIRONMENT

As early as February, 1944, the higher echelon in the Department of External Affairs had begun to contemplate Canada's waxing responsibilities. Lester Pearson's letter of that month to Norman Robertson noted the opportunity for Canada to assume 'middle power' leadership.

> Canada is achieving, I think, a very considerable position as a leader, if not the leader, among a group of States which are important enough to be necessary to the Big Four but not important enough to be accepted as one of that quartet. ...There is, I think, an opportunity for Canada, if we desire to take it, to become the leader of this group. This might be not only desirable in itself, but also would supply a useful corrective to those who think that we should exercise no influence except within the confines of the British Commonwealth.[1]

That Pearson made this comment in 1944 suggests that his aspirations for Canada would be buoyed by the revelation eighteen months later of his country's role in the development of atomic energy.

As documented in the two previous chapters Canada's involvement in atomic energy collaboration necessitated top-level 'diplomatic negotiations' with the representatives of two great powers who did not always see eye to eye, a problem

which C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie had painfully learned to appreciate.[2] During discussions with General Groves in July, 1945 Howe learned that the use of an atomic bomb by the United States against Japan was imminent.[3] The successful fruition of the atomic bomb project would mean that those countries who had been party to its development would soon be subjected to a severe scrutinization by the non-atomic nations of the world. Mackenzie King's statement to the press shortly after the annihilation of Hiroshima noted that "this new extension of man's power will profoundly affect international relations."[4] Hardly a profound statement in itself, but nevertheless significant because it reflected the beginning of a reappraisal of the atomic question. Hereafter the international implications of atomic energy would necessitate the involvement of the bright young mandarins who inhabited the offices of the East Block.

As the war drew to a close it became apparent to those responsible for the management of Canada's atomic program, notably Howe and Mackenzie, that the Department of External Affairs would shoulder the duty of formulating postwar atomic policy. To evaluate whether DEA was sufficiently prepared to assume this new and difficult task necessitates a backward look at the department's evolution in the years when Howe and Mackenzie were handling atomic affairs.

When the Canadian Government declared war in 1939 the Department of External Affairs was denied 'war department status', meaning that it did not qualify for the benefits

conferred on "a unit engaged exclusively in war work."[5] As a result, "the Department had to scramble for what was left over after the war departments had liberally helped themselves" to the available supplies and accommodation.[6] Furthermore, the Treasury Board froze all promotions, salary raises and reclassifications.[7] These restrictions were to handicap DEA officials throughout the war years who would frequently complain that their effectiveness was hindered by structural disorganization and unqualified personnel.

As we have already noted, Mackenzie King appointed Norman Robertson in January, 1941 to succeed O. D. Skelton as Canada's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Prime Minister considered Robertson an able successor: "With the exception of Skelton, he has the finest sense of duty of any man I have ever known. He will not accept the word of another, but verifies everything by himself, if there is the slightest possibility of error."[8] The new Under-Secretary was somewhat apprehensive upon assuming his new position, and confided to his parents that "...my own inability to organize my own work is an ominous note for a department desperately in need of organization."[9]

Lester Pearson also realized the necessity of structural reorganization. When he returned to Ottawa in 1941 after a posting in London "he found the Department still in 'a hive of unorganized activity.'"[10] Pearson shortly thereafter prepared a memorandum for Robertson in which he outlined the difficulties within DEA.

> Since the outbreak of the war there has been a net gain of only four among the senior staff in Ottawa, the majority of whom are now consumed in part or in whole by special war work. The net gain among junior officers is only four and three of these are still too junior to undertake any substantial responsibility.[11]

Changes were clearly required if the department was to successfully assume increased responsibilities during and after the war. Robertson finally persuaded a reluctant Mackenzie King to accept modest organizational changes in July, 1941 whereby the original ten divisions were transformed into ten sections administered by four divisions. Each division was to be headed by a separate Under-Secretary and Legal Advisor.[12]

Although these structural and administrative changes moderately improved the day to day operations of the department, they failed to solve what several officials believed was DEA's main problem, the absence of a minister solely responsible for External Affairs. Mackenzie King, as we have already noted, officially held this position, but he was often far too busy with other government and domestic political matters to devote sufficient time and effort to the department. His reluctance to regularly consult with departmental officials "most certainly distorted and detracted from the normal functions of a foreign office."[13] The problem troubled Pearson, who lamented in January, 1942, that he remained "somewhat discouraged by the political difficulties in the way of translating...views into action. If only we had a minister of our own!"[14] Finally, a few months later T. A. Stone, First Secretary at the Canadian Legation in Washington, complained to Robertson that

the state of disorganization which existed in Ottawa and the Legation had become unacceptable.[15] Clearly, the 1941 reorganization of the department had not had its desired effect.

Little was done to alleviate the problem and External Affairs was forced to carry on as best it could. The desires expressed by senior DEA officials for organizational change did not subside however. A memorandum written in February, 1943 by Hume Wrong suggested departmental officials were still quite unhappy with DEA's structural framework.

> The administrative organization has not been expanded or adjusted to balance the increase in the Department's size and responsibilities and the growth in the number of Missions abroad. It retains the same framework and methods that were adopted when the officers of the Department and of the Missions abroad could be counted on the fingers of both hands.[16]

Charles Ritchie later recalled that during the war policy was formulated "on a hand-to-mouth basis out of an overworked official by a tired politician with only half his mind on the subject."[17] Despite the obvious need for changes, these would have to wait until January, 1945, when Hume Wrong conducted another structural reorganization. One historian has stated that the latter changes "reflected new wartime responsibilities."[18] It seems rather inaccurate however, to term Canada's wartime responsibilities in 1945 as 'new'. By that time the war was drawing to an end and Canada had been engaged in the struggle for over five years. The timing of Wrong's 'wartime' changes serves merely to underscore the extent to which they were long overdue. In the meantime DEA had remained essentially leaderless and seriously disorganized.

Although organizational deficiencies continued to hamper operations within the department, officials were nevertheless able to formulate policy which reflected a shrewd perception of Canada's changing role in world affairs. DEA officials were well aware of the growing difficulties Canada faced as she emerged during the war as a 'linchpin' between the United States and Great Britain. The professional diplomats now began to appreciate problems similar to those encountered by Howe and Mackenzie in the atomic relationship, but Mackenzie King's secretive demeanor still prevented their participation in any tripartite atomic discussions during the war.

As American involvement in the war increased Norman Robertson complained that "the United States service departments have...been slow and reluctant to recognize the independent status of the countries of the Commonwealth."[19] Hume Wrong concurred, adding that "the misunderstanding of intra-Commonwealth relations which persists among the Governments and peoples of foreign countries is a complicating element in our external relations."[20] In Wrong's view the Commonwealth was not an alliance, as the United States sometimes apparently believed, "but a system whereby a group of states, in closer consultation with each other than any other group of states, pursues generally similar objectives."[21]

To some extent Canada had only herself to blame if other countries, especially the United States, perceived her as an appendage of Great Britain. For example, when world leaders and diplomats, including the President of the United States,

attended a Parliament Hill ceremony in August, 1943, the Peace Tower flew not a distinctly Canadian flag, but the Union Jack, and above the President's stand the British flag occupied the place of honour. Canadian Royalists would surely have overlooked such an incident, but a senior Canadian diplomat asked Hume Wrong: "How can we expect [foreign representatives] to understand that the placing of the flag is supposed to be a symbol of vestigial servitude unrelated to this year of grace 1943?"[22] DEA's Escott Reid possibly provided the most accurate description of the situation:

> The problem is not merely one of Ottawa and Washington. It is also one of Ottawa and London. Washington is unlikely to take Ottawa seriously unless London takes Ottawa seriously.... So far as the direction of the war is concerned, Ottawa has been content to be the capital of a colony.[23]

Reid's suggestion that Washington would take Ottawa seriously only when London took Ottawa seriously seems to have been close to the truth. For example, when Lester Pearson endeavoured in January, 1945 to discuss with the American Secretary of State Canada's position on various international organizations the latter interrupted:

> You people in Canada really have nothing to worry about in these things; you are in a sense part of us and you are also part of the British Empire. You are really very fortunate because you have such good and strong friends.[24]

This evidence of benevolent paternalism confirmed an earlier observation of Pearson's that "United States understanding of Canada's status and stature in the world in general, and the British Empire in particular, is certainly confused...."[25]

That a similar colonial attitude existed among many British diplomats and politicians made it only more difficult for Canadian DEA officials to express independent opinions in the course of discussions among the three countries. Of Canada's unique relationship with Great Britain and the United States, Pearson noted:

> If we don't exercise care, our role of 'interpreter' will result in bringing the United States and the United Kingdom together, but in such a way that we find ourselves uncomfortably squeezed in between.[26]

Clearly, DEA officials viewed with some trepidation the difficulties encountered when endeavouring to assert Canada's position to the Americans and British. As already noted, the problems of which the professional diplomats complained paralleled those experienced by Howe and Mackenzie throughout the atomic energy discussions. Mackenzie could certainly attest, for instance, to Pearson's concern that Canada's interpretive role could sometimes leave her uncomfortably squeezed between Great Britain and the United States.[27] The war's end meant however, that Pearson would soon be privy to the postwar atomic negotiations.

Not until the atomic bomb was used against Japan did anyone at External Affairs learn of Canada's role in its development. Incredibly, in the three years that Canada had been associated with the atomic project King and Howe had remained the only senior government officials to know of its existence.[28] Not once during this period did either of these two, or Mackenzie, involve their diplomatic representatives in London

or Washington. Contrarily the British, and to a lesser extent the Americans, utilized their diplomatic channels in the course of atomic negotiations. As discussed earlier, Malcolm MacDonald often provided valuable information for those British officials responsible for policy formulation in London.

Such was not the case however, for any of the Canadian diplomats. Due to Mackenzie King's secretive diplomacy the news of Canadian participation in atomic energy development came as much of a surprise to them as it did to the general public. Thus after August 1945 it was an ill-informed, understaffed and poorly organized Department of External Affairs which inherited from Howe and Mackenzie the difficult task of representing Canadian interests in atomic energy discussions with Great Britain and the United States.

As early as 1943 DEA had begun to examine postwar problems that Canada would face.[29] However, the revelation of Canadian involvement in atomic energy development introduced a new issue which they had not considered when formulating postwar policy. Less than two weeks after the destruction of Hiroshima Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson, in an effort to fill this void, advised the Prime Minister that the department "should attempt as a matter of some urgency to arrive at a careful appreciation of the results of this tremendous discovery as soon as possible."[30] Robertson believed, not surprisingly, that the first step toward acquiring the essential information on Canadian involvement in the atomic project was to contact C. J. Mackenzie.

Shortly thereafter Charles Ritchie authored a report which strongly advocated the establishment within DEA of a special committee to examine the atomic energy issue with particular regard to "the question of the future control of the atomic bomb and of its bearing on Canada's foreign policy."[31] In October Hume Wrong recommended to the Special Committee of the Cabinet on Defence Questions that a "small official committee" be established "for the formulation of recommendations."[32] Throughout this same period Lester Pearson also advocated the establishment of an atomic advisory committee, noting to Robertson that in September the United States Foreign Relations Committee had appointed a special subcommittee to confer with President Truman on the question of controlling the bomb.[33] Even the Canadian Ambassador to France observed that the French Government had "taken steps to set up a special Commission for the study of atomic energy."[34]

All of these reports principally discussed the position Canada should take with regard to the global control of the atomic bomb and reflected the professional diplomats' concerns for the international ramifications of atomic energy proliferation. But their exhaustive research and lengthy memoranda did not reveal an adequate understanding of the one official manifestation of Canada's wartime atomic relationship with Great Britain and the United States: the Combined Policy Committee. DEA's initial ignorance of CPC operations would prevent Canada's professional diplomats from expressing authoritative

policies at Committee meetings.

During September and October of 1945 Pearson communicated regularly with DEA officials in Ottawa concerning the growing debate in the United States on atomic energy.[35] His various memoranda dealt primarily with the broad international implications of atomic energy rather than Canada's special relationship with Great Britain and the United States in the bomb project. This was perhaps understandable since Pearson had only recently become aware of the CPC's existence. His ignorance of the CPC soon caused him embarrassment however, for his uncertainty of Canada's role in the Committee could not be disguised when it met on 13 October.

In fact, the confusion became apparent when it came time to decide who would represent Canada. C. D. Howe was somewhat miffed when Hume Wrong suggested to him that Pearson accompany George Bateman, Canada's member on the Combined Development Trust[CDT], to the October CPC meeting.[36] Howe wryly remarked that the occasion represented "the entry of diplomacy into atomic bomb discussions."[37] Bateman seemed even more upset that Howe was apparently being ungraciously shunted to the sideline. He insisted the minister clearly should have attended the CPC meeting since he, "as the Canadian member of the [Combined] Policy Committee...who is thoroughly familiar with the whole matter and who can best speak with authority, can best present the Canadian viewpoint."[38] Certainly Howe had much more knowledge of the CPC than did Pearson. Evidently however, the DEA officials in Ottawa who now assumed the

responsibility of formulating Canada's atomic policy, notably Robertson and Wrong, believed Canadian interests would be better served on the CPC if one of their own represented Canada at its meetings. Bateman remained unconvinced, especially after witnessing Pearson's embarrassing performance at the October CPC meeting: "It may be desirable that the diplomats should enter into the bomb discussions but I do not think that a matter of such importance should be left entirely in their hands."[39]

Bateman's reservations were not totally unfounded, for Pearson's attendance at the meeting proved little more than educational. Only two days before the scheduled meeting it had become apparent to Pearson that he was not as well informed as he should have been. Without knowing the facts he suggested that the upcoming meeting would provide a perfect opportunity to push for a more independent status for Canada on the CPC. Roger Makins, the British Joint Secretary to the CPC, was obliged to inform him that the issue was at that very time being discussed by Mackenzie King with top British officials in London.[40] This revelation evidently perplexed Pearson and he seemed resigned to allow the British representative to argue for a more clearly defined status for Canada on the CPC.[41]

Only two days earlier Pearson had strongly advocated that Canada's role in the CPC should be redefined in order to "adequately reflect" her position.[42] Yet when asked to comment at the meeting Pearson inexplicably stated that as far as he knew "the terms of Canada's membership on the Committee in the past

had been satisfactory."[43] This response completely contradicted Pearson's expressed observations of the previous two days and furthermore must have puzzled both the American and British representatives who were not unaware of his feelings.[44] Pearson added only that he would take up the matter with his government. His apparent reluctance to state his earlier opinion served merely to undermine both his credibility as an assertive diplomat and his expressed desire to secure for Canada a more prominent position on the CPC.

If Pearson was indecisive as Canada's representative to the CPC in Washington, his 'advisers' in Ottawa were no less vacillating. Hume Wrong for example, agreed with Pearson that Canada's position on the CPC should be enhanced but could only advise "that further action...should await the views of the Prime Minister" who was still in London.[45] This incident clearly exemplified the difficulties of a department without a minister, a problem about which Pearson himself had complained in 1942, and served to cloud Canada's atomic policy on the eve of the Washington Conference of Truman, Atlee and King. Moreover, it underscored the extent to which Mackenzie King still controlled Canada's atomic policy.

Immediately after and probably as a result of Pearson's inauspicious debut at the October CPC meeting Hume Wrong noted to the Special Committee of the Cabinet on Defence Questions that "policy affecting atomic energy would soon require serious decision in the international and probably domestic fields."[46] Furthermore, since Canadian participation in international

atomic energy discussions seemed probable, he advised that consideration be given to Canada's position on the CPC "and revision of its terms of reference."[47] Wrong's knowledge of atomic matters was however, no better than Pearson's, and in an effort to rectify this problem he sent to C. J. Mackenzie a questionnaire which he had drafted with the assistance of Arnold Heeney.[48] Wrong hoped that Mackenzie's answers would provide "guidance in considering the political problems which [were] arising."[49] The questionnaire indicated as clearly as anything could how Mackenzie King's exclusion of DEA from atomic discussions during the war had left officials unprepared to deal with crucial questions.[50]

In his response to the questionnaire Mackenzie noted that Canada was in a very strong position vis-à-vis Great Britain as the latter possessed no atomic energy plant and the heavy water pilot plant nearing completion at Chalk River represented the only atomic project in the entire British Commonwealth. Furthermore, Mackenzie expressed support for the plan advocated by some British officials that Canada should become the atomic energy research centre for the Commonwealth. With respect to the United States however, while the Americans valued Canada's present and potential uranium supplies, he believed they could have nevertheless completed the bomb project with the uranium which they had acquired from the Belgian Congo.[51] Mackenzie concluded that a new tripartite agreement should be drafted "in which Canada's place would be more definitely stated, and in which the actual authority of the Combined Policy Committee

would be more clearly defined."[52]

Shortly after the reception of Mackenzie's informative memo DEA officials began to prepare for the conference of Truman, Atlee and King that was scheduled for the middle of November in Washigton. The purpose of this summit meeting was to prepare a communique that would inform the other nations of the world of the atomic triad's plan for the international control of atomic energy. Moreover, the three leaders planned to discuss a recommitment to collaboration as outlined in the secret August 1943 Quebec Agreement.

As the date of the Washington discussions quickly approached the higher echelon of DEA found themselves scrambling for all available information on Canada's role in the development of atomic energy. The Mackenzie memo had substantially increased their knowledge of the matter, but the issue was still far from crystal clear. On 3 November Wrong confessed to Pearson that departmental officials in Ottawa had done "very little...in preparation for the Washington talks on atomic problems."[53] He quickly added however, that these same officials had "not been encouraged to do anything at all."[54] Norman Robertson, in London with the Prime Minister, noticed King's reluctance to discuss the atomic issue.[55] That Mackenzie King did not encourage effective policy formulation within DEA suggests that he was anxious that his personal policy on atomic energy not be altered by the young internationalists in the department.

Although DEA officials were given little, if any,

guidance from their Prime Minister, they nevertheless attempted to formulate their own policy from the available information on atomic energy development during the war. With regard to international control Pearson observed that the American administration's whole policy was based on the premise that the United States would never share the secret of the atomic bomb.[56] Because the United States was so far ahead of Canada and Great Britain in the developmental stage of atomic energy, the memoranda circulating within DEA necessarily reflected an American dominance in the atomic relationship. Not overlooked was the fact that Canada's participation in the project would attract more attention from her powerful southern neighbour. Charles Ritchie observed that "while it has always been true that the United States could not look with indifference on any major development of Canadian foreign policy, this will be much more the case in the future."[57]

The British also seemed to recognize the strong position of the United States, but they looked at American ascendancy more in relation to the negative effect it might have on the future of atomic collaboration rather than on the possibility of effective international control. Leading up to the November discussions in Washington British officials were expressing fears that their American counterparts were planning to argue for a cessation to collaboration on the grounds that the end of the war nullified the articles of the 1943 Quebec Agreement.[58] Their apprehension was to prove well founded.

Immediately prior to the Washington Conference Pearson

prepared a memorandum for Mackenzie King in which he stated the atomic bomb represented, ironically, "the greatest opportunity to realize world peace."[59] Not that this could be achieved by what seemed to be the American plan of "merely... sitting on the Bomb as a self-appointed 'sacred trustee'."[60] Rather, Pearson believed the solution to the problem lay in a compromise "on the broadest possible international basis."[61] Regardless of their good intentions, Pearson's hopes for international control of atomic energy were never to materialize, for as he well knew, the Soviet Union and the United States were already engaged in an atomic arms race.

Evidence to this effect had become all too apparent to DEA officials in September when they were informed that an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, had defected. His testimony, supported by documentation, revealed the existence of a clandestine Soviet spy ring in Canada which had infiltrated various levels of the Anglo-Canadian atomic project. Robertson and Wrong conveyed the news on 6 September to a startled Mackenzie King who said "it was like a bomb on top of everything else...."[62]

A few weeks later King sailed for Great Britain, but not before seeing President Truman in Washington. As the Prime Minister noted:

> My decision to see the President before leaving for Europe was the outcome of my feeling that we owed it to the U.S. as well as to the U.K. to let those highest in authority in these two countries to know all that we possessed in the way of information regarding R[ussian] E[spionage].[63]

Truman listened intently to King, but appeared not to be overly surprised by the story.[64] In London Prime Minister Attlee was somewhat more upset and wanted to make immediate arrests, but Truman had urged caution. Further discussion among the three leaders the following month in Washington resulted in a time-table for arresting the incriminated individuals.[65]

The Gouzenko revelations embarrassed Canadian officials immeasurably at precisely the period when they were advocating an increased role for Canada in the atomic relationship. The evidence of a spy ring operating under the noses of the Canadian Government seriously damaged the hopes for renewed collaboration with the Americans. Perhaps more importantly, it placed Mackenzie King in a very uncompromising position as he sailed back across the Atlantic. If he had been rather silent at wartime conferences at Quebec, the Gouzenko Affair would cause him to be even more taciturn in Washington.

November 11, 1945 saw the leaders of the three 'atomic nations' assembled in the American capital for the Armistice ceremonies. Lester Pearson found the observance that day particularly memorable.

> I had not missed an Armistice Day silence since 1919, but never had the two minutes seemed so long, so pregnant with meaning, so evocative of memories, or so challenging to a renewed and more resolute search for a better world.[66]

With respect to the imminent discussions among Truman, Attlee and King, he remarked that "never before had there been meetings of such import, with the fate of man and his world as the agenda."[67] But Pearson was less than impressed with what the

three leaders had to say on board the presidential yacht Sequoia that afternoon. He described their talks as discursive, unfocussed and "unrelated to any specific plan of action, or any concrete proposal."[68] Indeed, one of the British officials later recalled that "the meeting was hastily convened and ill-prepared, and was in fact rather a shambles."[69] Even Vannevar Bush described the conference as one that was "somewhat chaotic due to lack of preparation and lack of organization in carrying it on."[70] However, two more days of deliberation resulted in a tripartite declaration which called for the establishment under the United Nations Organization of a special Atomic Energy Commission to study the prospects of international atomic energy control.

A separate and secret agreement signed by the three leaders on 16 November stated that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust "should be continued in a suitable form."[71] However C. J. Mackenzie, who along with Howe had been asked by King to attend the Washington discussions, refused to sign the redraft of the agreement which outlined the responsibilities of the CPC and the CDT.[72] His impression of the new arrangement was unequivocal:

> As far as Canada was concerned, it was a one-sided bargain that gave all our uranium away and did not provide much assurance of cooperation for our laboratories. It seemed to me that the only thing the British gave was what belonged to Canada.[73]

The Canadian contingent returned to Ottawa with the question of Canada's role in the CPC and CDT still unresolved. On 17 November the Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet on

the discussions held in Washington, and following reports by Howe and Mackenzie, the Cabinet approved the Washington Declaration "and agreed that arrangements for the development and control of atomic energy within Canada were problems for further consideration."[74] That the Cabinet did not mention the control of atomic energy outside Canada's borders was not necessarily an oversight. Rather, its members more likely believed the international aspect of atomic energy would be better analysed within the Prime Minister's own Department, External Affairs. Indeed, the next few months would prove hectic for King's counselors in the East Block.

The summer of 1945 had witnessed the efforts of DEA officials to comprehend the complex atomic energy issue. Beleaguered by structural and administrative deficiencies during the war, they also had to contend with a secretive Prime Minister who seemed reluctant to relinquish any of his responsibilities as Canada's ubiquitous international representative. Instead of confiding in experienced diplomats like Robertson or Wrong, King chose to let Howe and Mackenzie formulate Canada's atomic policy during the war.

Some critics of Mackenzie King might argue that he handled Canada's atomic card rather carelessly. This was not necessarily true. Perhaps King realized that Canada might benefit more by assuming a passive role in the atomic relationship than by agitating the United States in pressing for stringent postwar international control or by embracing the British claim for increased scientific and industrial collaboration in

the field of atomic energy. The Prime Minister most likely feared that the inclusion of strong nationalists like Pearson and Wrong in wartime atomic discussions would have jeopardized this passive posture. If Canada's atomic policy was already determined by the end of the war, it was not by the hand of Howe or Mackenzie, but rather by a Prime Minister who coveted his highly visible conciliatory position in the Atlantic Triangle.

ENDNOTES

[1]Pearson to Robertson, February 1, 1944, Pearson Papers, N1 Pre 48 series, Vol. 2, N. A. Robertson file.

[2]That Great Britain still qualified as a 'great power' by the end of the war is arguable, but in the field of atomic energy development she at least maintained the vestige of great power status, a position which Canada never seems to have achieved.

[3]Mackenzie King had been informed by Malcolm MacDonald in February that the atomic bomb might be used against Japan. See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 274.

[4]NRC Files, Vol. 283, Atomic Energy file.

[5]Don Page, "Coping With A War: The Experience of the Canadian Department of External Affairs," paper presented to a conference sponsored by the Canadian Committee on the History of the Second World War, Ottawa, November, 1979, p. 3.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 4.

[8]Quoted in J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. II: 1944-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 141.

[9]Quoted in Page, "Coping With A War," p. 13. See also supra, p. 16.

[10]Page, "Coping With A War," p. 15.

[11]"Memorandum for the Under-Secretary," [no date], Pearson Papers, Vol. 1, file "DEA Organization 1929-1942."

[12]Page, "Coping With A War," p. 17. The four new Division heads were L. Beaudry, Diplomatic and Commercial; J. E. Read, Legal; L. B. Pearson, Commonwealth and European; and Hugh Keenleyside, American and Far Eastern.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Pearson to Vincent Massey, January 9, 1942, Pearson Papers, Vol. 1, file "DEA Organization 1929-1942."

[15]Page, "Coping With A War," p. 23. Surely compounding the problems in Washington during the war was the presence of the weak and vacillating head of the Legation, Leighton McCarthy. See supra, pp. 19-21.

[16]Memorandum entiled "Probable Expansion of Canadian Missions Abroad and Department of External Affairs," February 5, 1943, PAC, Hume Wrong Papers, MG 30 E 101, Vol. 4, file 24. [Hereafter cited as Wrong Papers followed by volume number and file reference].

[17]Ritchie, The Siren Years, p. 208.

[18]Page, "Coping With A War," p. 22.

[19]"Memorandum For The Prime Minister," December 22, 1941, Pearson Papers, Vol. 11.

[20]Memorandum entitled "Some Comments On Intra-Commonwealth Relations," August 17, 1943, Wrong Papers, Vol. 4. Wrong prepared this memorandum for Robertson in the event that problems which related to the perception of Canada and the Commonwealth were raised at the August, 1943 Quebec Conference. It was at this conference that Roosevelt and Churchill signed the atomic agreement establishing the CPC.

[21]Ibid.

[22]J. E. Read's "Supplementary Note," August 25, 1943, Wrong Papers, Vol. 4, file 24.

[23]Memorandum entitled "The United States and Canada: Domination, Cooperation, Absorption," January 12, 1942, Pearson Papers, Vol. 11.

[24]Pearson to Robertson, January 9, 1945, Pearson Papers, Vol. 2, N. A. Robertson File. Pearson went on to state that the attitude exemplified by the American Secretary of State "that there are never any problems between Canada and the United States...sometimes makes it difficult for us to ensure that proper consideration is given to our views on the highest levels."

[25]Memorandum entitled "Certain Developments in Canada-United States Relations," March 18, 1943, Pearson Papers, Vol. 11. Pearson also wrote in January 1944 that "most Americans are, of course, quite ignorant, not only of the position of Canada in the Commonwealth, but also of that of the King himself in relation to the Governments of the Commonwealth." See Pearson to Robertson, January 17, 1944, Pearson Papers, Vol. 2, N. A. Robertson File.

[26]Memorandum entitled "Certain Developments in Canada-United States Relations," March 18, 1943, Pearson Papers, Vol. 11.

[27]It is worth noting that DEA officials seem to have expressed a more xenophobic attitude toward the Americans than

did either Howe or Mackenzie. This difference of opinion probably represented nothing more than a concern of the 'non-diplomats' for the scientific and industrial potential of atomic energy, an issue which was not necessarily unrelated however, to the spectrum of Canada's external relations. The broader question of international control, where the United States clearly possessed more influence than Great Britain, would be left to the professional diplomats.

[28]Besides the various Canadian scientists involved in the project, the only other senior official in Canada privy to the atomic secret was General Maurice Pope, and his knowledge of the specific nature of the project was rather vague. C. J. Mackenzie, the Canadian most intimately involved in wartime atomic discussions, was not a 'government' official.

[29]See D. Munton and D. Page, "Planning in the East Block: the Post-Hostilities Problems Committees in Canada. 1943-45," International Journal XXXII (Autumn, 1977), pp. 687-726.

[30]"Memorandum for the Prime Minister," August 18, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[31]Memorandum entitled "Control of the Atomic Bomb by the United Nations Organization," DEA Records, file 50219-W-40(1).

[32]Memorandum entitled "Canadian Participation In Development and Control of Atomic Energy," October 16, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[33]Pearson to Robertson, September 20, 25, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[34]Georges Vanier to Robertson, October 31, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 11. All of these recommendations would eventually lead to the establishment in March 1946 of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy.

[35]See for example Pearson to Robertson, September 25, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[36]The Combined Development Trust had been established in June 1944 to secure and control all sources of uranium and thorium outside the control of Great Britain, the United States and Canada. The CDT reported to the CPC and although Canada was not an official signatory to the Trust agreement, she was nevertheless allowed to appoint a Canadian representative.

[37]Howe to George Bateman, October 12, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[38]Bateman to Howe, October 15, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[39]Ibid. Howe agreed with Bateman in this regard, noting there was a danger the project in Canada might suffer if he and Mackenzie were removed entirely from high policy discussions. See Howe to Bateman, October 18, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[40]Pearson to Wrong, October 12, 1945, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[41]Pearson to Wrong, October 13, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[42]As reported by Wrong to Arnold Heeney, October 11, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[43]Pearson to Wrong, October 13, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[44]Pearson had discussed this very matter with Makins shortly before the meeting. See Pearson to Wrong, October 12, 1945, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[45]Wrong to Pearson, October 23, 1945, PAC, DEA Records, Canadian Embassy in Washington File [CEW], Atomic Energy, 1945.

[46]Memorandum entitled "Canadian Participation in Development and Control of Atomic Energy," October 16, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[47]Ibid.

[48]This questionnaire had originally been suggested by Robertson. See supra, p. 92.

[49]Wrong to Mackenzie, October 22, 1945, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[50]Wrong informed Pearson in early November that he and Arnold Heeney had reverted to preparing the Mackenzie questionnaire as the result of "an inconclusive discussion [of a Special Cabinet Committee] of the problems posed to Canada by the development of atomic energy." See Wrong to Pearson, November 3, 1945, DEA Records, CEW, Atomic Energy, 1945.

[51]Mackenzie's memo entitled "Canada's Position in the Development of Atomic Energy," October 29, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[52]Ibid.

[53]Wrong to Pearson, November 3, 1945, DEA Records, CEW, Atomic Energy, 1945.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Robertson to Wrong, November 3, 1945, DEA Records, file 50219-W-40. See also evidence of King's attitude towards Robertson; supra, n. 11, p. 6.

[56]Pearson to Wrong, November 6, 1945, DEA Records, file 50219-W-40. The previous day Paul Tremblay, an assistant to Pearson in Washington, had observed that "the whole world knows that the United States do not intend to share the secret of the bomb with other nations." Memorandum entitled "U.S. Policy on International Control of the Atomic Bomb," November 5, 1945, DEA Records, CEW, Atomic Energy, 1945.

[57]"Memorandum on Mr. Attlee's Letter of September 25th to President Truman Regarding the Forthcoming Exchange of Views on the Atomic Bomb," November 6, 1945, DEA Records, file 50219-W-40(1). Ritchie also sagaciously predicted that "the unique position of Canada in relation to the United States and the United Kingdom will certainly not fail to attract the attention of the Soviet Union and may have important, though unforseeable, effects on the relations with that country."

[58]See Sir Ronald Campbell to Neville Butler, November 5, 1945, C.O., CAB 126/164. The British believed the secret aide memoire signed by Churchill and Roosevelt at Hyde Park in September 1944 provided for the continuance of atomic collaboration beyond the end of the war.

[59]"Canadian Memorandum on Atomic Warfare," November 8, 1945, DEA Records, file 50219-W-40(1).

[60]Ibid. The 'sacred trustee' referred to Truman's statement on 27 October that the United States regarded their possession of the atomic bomb as a sacred trust.

[61]Ibid. Pearson believed that, contrary to the opinion expressed by Truman, there existed no national solution to the problem of international atomic energy control.

[62]King Diary, September 6, 1945.

[63]Ibid., October 1, 1945.

[64]Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), p. 154.

[65]See Granatstein, A Man of Influence, pp. 171-182.

[66]Pearson, Memoirs, I, p. 263.

[67]Ibid., p. 262.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Lord Sherfield (formerly Sir Roger Makins), "On The Diplomatic Trail With LBP: Some Episodes 1930-1972," International Journal XXIX (Winter, 1973-4), p. 77.

[70]Bush's "Memorandum for the File," November 13, 1945, Bush-Conant Correspondence.

[71]Copy of secret Agreement in DEA Records, CEW, Atomic Energy, 1945.

[72]The new agreement was to replace the August 1943 Quebec Agreement.

[73]Mackenzie Diary, November 17, 1945. General Groves apparently agreed with Mackenzie. See Mackenzie Diary, November 16, 1945.

[74]"Cabinet Conclusions." November 17, 1945, DEA Records, Cabinet Conclusion Extracts. Mackenzie noted that King rather casually used the Washington Declaration 'as a vehicle for exposing the whole [atomic] project with its twenty million dollar cost to the cabinet." Mackenzie Diary, November 17, 1945.

V

'FULL AND EFFECTIVE COOPERATION': THE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION 1945-1948

"It is a mess. No one seems to have thought the thing would work out as it has. So I am the heir to a hell of a mess." Such was President Truman's description of the problems presented by the secret atomic energy agreement signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec in August 1943.[1] The uneasy period following the Truman-Atlee-King Washington Declaration of November 15, 1945 would witness the efforts of British officials to secure from their American counterparts a more liberal interpretation of 'full and effective cooperation' in the area of atomic energy development. The superficial Anglo-American goodwill which had pervaded the atomic discussions in the American capital would soon deteriorate into an acrimonious dispute over whether the United States was honouring her commitment to atomic energy collaboration with her wartime partners.

Nor would Canada be spared involvement in the protracted atomic quarreling which continued to sour Anglo-American relations in the postwar era. Once again Canadian officials would be asked to take sides in a dispute which threatened to

fracture the tenuous postwar Anglo-American accord at a time when Soviet divisions appeared, to some western leaders at least, poised for further action in Europe.[2] Once again Canadian atomic policy-makers would face the familiar and difficult choice of either embracing the cause of one of her atomic partners, thereby risking continued cooperation with the other, or assuming a calculated neutrality, which surely would anger both. In the postwar period DEA officials would continue their efforts to formulate a consistent Canadian atomic policy which would not only maintain Canada's special wartime relationship with Great Britain and the United States, but also reflect her increased international responsibilities. The attainment of such a policy would prove impractical.

After the November, 1945 Washington discussions DEA officials continued to familiarize themselves with Canada's wartime atomic energy partnership with Great Britain and the United States. Their job was not an easy one. As one historian has noted, "it was hard for them to get the feel of it, very hard even to find out the facts about Canadian participation."[3] Despite this recurring problem Norman Robertson advised C. D. Howe in late November, 1945 that Lester Pearson should accompany him to the forthcoming CPC meeting since it would probably include a discussion on the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations Organization.[4] Realizing that such international questions lay outside his area of expertise and perhaps also anxious to free himself from a responsibility

that had often proved unsavory during the war, the minister duly asked Pearson to represent him in Washington.[5]

Howe's decision to leave the atomic negotiations to Pearson was regretable, for at its 4 December meeting the CPC discussions concerned not only international problems but also the restructuring of the Combined Development Trust, an issue about which DEA officials were still quite confused. Because Pearson lacked sufficient background knowledge of CDT operations he floundered in his attempt at presenting a coherent Canadian position. His uncertainty was not totally inexcusable however, for Howe had instructed him to emphasize Canada's desire to maintain sovereignty over her uranium and thorium deposits as well as her commitment to refrain from any official membership in the CDT that would entail any further financial contribution.[6] George Bateman, Canada's representative on the CDT, suggested however, that "it would be difficult to write ourselves into the CPC and out of the CDT."[7]

The meeting was marked moreover by a tedious discussion of Bateman's official status in the CDT. Howe had apparently understood that Bateman had been appointed as a representative of Great Britain while the latter believed he represented Canada in the Trust.[8] Further discussion failed to resolve this apparent discrepancy and Pearson ascertained from the nature of the meeting that the CPC was "not likely to extend its activities as widely as I, for one, had expected."[9] Furthermore, Pearson's skeptical attitude toward Canada's

junior position on the body led him to suggest, based by his own admission 'on very sketchy knowledge' of its origins and activities, that Canada relinquish her membership in the CPC.[10] Otherwise he predicted, "as a junior third party in this Committee, Canada may be dragged along in directions where we might not desire to go but over which we would have little control."[11] The latter observation reflected Pearson's nationalistic desire for a more pronounced voice in atomic energy matters, a status which Mackenzie King never seems to have desired during the war.

Following the 4 December meeting Pearson repeatedly petitioned his superiors in Ottawa for specific policy decisions to guide him in discussions with the sub-committee which the CPC had commissioned to draft an agreement redefining the authority of the CPC and CDT.[12] The responses which he received from the East Block provided him with only minimal counsel however, for it soon became apparent that DEA officials were still quite confused with the atomic relationship. Norman Robertson, the only departmental official who conferred with the Prime Minister on atomic energy matters, admitted after reviewing Howe's CPC and CDT files that "the situation still remains rather complicated."[13] The difficulties which DEA encountered in grasping the complex atomic energy problem continually forced them to seek the advice of Howe who guided them in policy formulation. The minister clarified for example, Bateman's membership on the CDT as a Canadian, not a British representative, but noted that Canada had never

specifically asked for representation on the Trust.[14] Howe continued therefore, to play an important role in atomic energy policy formulation even after DEA had officially assumed the responsibility.

On 14 December, Hume Wrong met with Robertson, Bateman, Arnold Heeney and C. J. Mackenzie in an effort to devise a policy with which to guide Pearson at the CPC sub-committee meeting scheduled for that day in Washington. After a lengthy discussion Wrong instructed Pearson "not to press for a position which would be equivalent to our 'contracting out' from the CDT so long as our special relationship with it was spelled out."[15] The directive seemed simple enough, but Pearson's subsequent report of the meeting suggested he required much more information than Ottawa had provided. After observing that General Groves was "an energetic administrator with...some suspicion of diplomats and all 'unpractical' people" Pearson revealed his unfamiliarity with the issues at hand.

> I really had very little to go on in respect to the Canadian attitude. I was not even certain whether the amendments proposed by Mr. Howe...were to be maintained, though I gathered from Hume [Wrong] this morning that this was not to be the case. I was further handicapped at this meeting by not having a copy of the original [Quebec] Agreement and Declaration of Trust or a copy of the minutes of the last meeting....[16]

Pearson went on to state that Canada's unofficial relationship with the CDT had been satisfactory but both Groves and the British spokesman Makins expressed their desire that Canada become an official signatory to the revised CDT.

Moreover, "Groves added that he had always assumed that Bateman was already a member of the Trust for Canada and that all that was required was an alteration of the new Agreement to make that membership as valid in theory as it was in practice."[17] Importantly, the British and American members of the sub-committee accepted the principle that Canada's signing of the new Declaration of Trust would not obligate her to any new financial commitments. Pearson concluded his report by expressing his desire that very shortly Canada's "policy in respect of this matter will be somewhat more definite than it is at present."[18]

To Pearson's request for further guidance DEA officials could offer very little. Hume Wrong, in a subtle indication of who retained ultimate authority for atomic policy formulation, explained that both Howe and the Prime Minister were away from Ottawa. Furthermore, he confessed that remarkably, no one in DEA had as yet seen, let alone had a chance to study, either the original Quebec Agreement or the Declaration of Trust.[19] Wrong frankly admitted that his information was 'not very helpful', but added it was the best he could manage under the circumstances.[20] Norman Robertson could only suggest that Pearson return to Ottawa with the revised drafts of agreement so that Howe and King could study them before they were to be presented to the CPC for final approval.[21] However Pearson, who had the unenviable task of stating Canada's rather ambiguous position to the British and American representatives in Washington, was not so easily placated. Eager to avoid any

further embarrassing situations like his 14 December meeting with Groves and Makins, he reiterated the necessity of a clear policy decision 'as soon as possible.'[22]

The inability of Robertson and Wrong to provide Pearson with more precise policy guidelines in December 1945 revealed the extent to which King, Howe and Mackenzie continued to direct Canada's atomic relationship with Great Britain and the United States in the immediate postwar period. Although DEA officials enthusiastically undertook the question of international control, with respect to the CPC and CDT they continued to depend upon the counsel of those who had guided Canada's atomic energy program during the war years.

The CPC did not meet again until February 1946 which afforded Pearson the opportunity to consult with Mackenzie King in Ottawa. After discussing the issue with the Prime Minister Pearson concluded that "notwithstanding earlier doubts on the subject," Canadian interests lay in retention of official membership in the CPC and CDT.[23] Evidently Mackenzie King had dissuaded Pearson from his previous opinion of the two atomic bodies.[24] The Prime Minister, according to Arnold Heeney, was not necessarily more apprised however, of the CPC's operations than was his subordinate. Shortly after King's meeting with Pearson, Howe described to the full Cabinet the background and nature of Canada's relationship with the CPC and CDT, after which Heeney commented that "apart from Mr. Howe, none of the Ministers (including the Prime Minister) has any clear understanding of what is involved."[25] In view

of King's secretive demeanor however, one suspects that he was more knowledgeable of atomic matters than his principal secretary gave him credit for.

The problem which Heeney articulated did not go unnoticed by Norman Robertson, who was also aware that Canada's representative to the CPC in Washington was experiencing difficulty expressing a consistent Canadian position. To relieve the pressure on Pearson the Under-Secretary of State asked Howe to attend the scheduled February meeting of the CPC.[26] The minister replied however, that other commitments made it impossible for him to travel to Washington but added that Pearson "should have no difficulty in dealing with the subjects which will come before the meeting."[27] Pearson was not quite so confident, but he nevertheless informed Robertson that he felt qualified, "with guidance from Ottawa," to state Canada's position on the revised CPC and CDT agreements.[28] The acrimonious discussions at the subsequent meeting in Washington would cause the Ambassador to revaluate however, his knowledge of atomic energy matters.

The 15 February CPC meeting accentuated the growing rift in the tripartite atomic relationship. British expectations of continued collaboration with the Americans had been dealt a severe blow by the public revelation of the Soviet spy ring in Canada. The Gouzenko affair had confirmed the fears expressed by General Groves who had never advocated 'full and effective interchange' as a basis for cooperation with Great Britain and Canada. He duly communicated his apprehension to

American Secretary of State James Byrnes, the newly appointed CPC chairman.[29] Byrnes, whose Irish forebearance had not always endeared him to the British, concurred with the General, noting also that the possible publication of the secret tripartite atomic energy agreements (as was required under Article 102 of the UN Charter) might jeopardize the ongoing efforts to secure an agreement for international control.[30] Moreover, such a revelation would not only draw into question the sincerity of the atomic nations, but also provide evidence of embarrassing duplicity, a potential propaganda issue the Soviet Union would surely not fail to exploit.[31]

The American Congress also remained ignorant of the atomic relationship, and to the few government officials who knew of its existence, the Quebec Agreement "became increasingly a source of acute embarrassment."[32] When the American public became aware of the 'Canadian spy ring', their President hardened his position on atomic energy matters. Indeed, "under the glare of headlines Truman no longer took the casual attitude he had adopted in September when Mackenzie King had informed him of the spy ring."[33] The Gouzenko affair destroyed Canada's credibility as a guarantor of secrecy and served only to confirm American suspicions of the non-Anglo-Saxon composition of the Montreal labratory scientists. In light of the "nefarious" Soviet behaviour and the American reaction to it, the British would find it increasingly difficult to achieve more liberal interchange with the American atomic energy project.

Another factor which contributed to the ill feeling at

the February CPC meeting was Pearson's revelation to the British that "the withdrawal from Canada of British scientists ...directing the Chalk River project" would effectively terminate the 'partnership' between Canada and Great Britain.[34] Howe had only been made aware on the eve of the CPC meeting of the official British decision to recall Dr. John Cockcroft to Great Britain, and the minister immediately conveyed the Canadian response to his representative in Washington.[35] Both Howe and Mackenzie reacted negatively to what they considered a breach of earlier assurances given them to the effect that the British would do nothing to jeopardize the development of Chalk River after the war.[36]

The British were now anxious however, to revitalize their own atomic program in Great Britain and believed that Cockcroft was the only man capable of running the project.[37] As early as March 1945 James Chadwick had foreseen the difficulties that might arise if Great Britain tried to maintain a strong postwar atomic team in Canada while simultaneously endeavouring to develop her own domestic program. He feared that "the birth-pangs of...postwar co-operation may be severe," and emphasized that Great Britain "must have sufficient staff to run our U.K. [Atomic] Establishment properly."[38] But Howe and Mackenzie believed that Cockcroft's return to Great Britain would substantially slow down progress at Chalk River and therefore felt justified in assuming that Anglo-Canadian cooperation was at an end.

Lester Pearson undertook at the Feruary CPC meeting the difficult task of presenting to British officials the unpopular

Canadian position about which his knowledge was minimal. His report of the meeting revealed not only a growing Anglo-American split over the interchange issue, but also British puzzlement and shock over the Canadian intention to abrogate her 'official' atomic partnership with Great Britain. During an informal discussion with the British representatives before the meeting Pearson noted that Chadwick and Makins were visibly upset with the Canadian position and did not understand what his reference to any formal relationship was all about. At this point Pearson was forced to discontinue the discussion as he "had no knowledge of either the minutes of previous CPC meetings or of any such partnership arrangements."[39] In a restrained but obvious plea for guidance from Ottawa Pearson revealed a latent frustration with his calamitous predicament in Washington.

> I would appreciate some enlightenment on the details of this matter which would enable me to support the statement which we make.... I have only a superficial knowledge of this apparent difference of opinion between the United Kingdom and Canadian authorities, and if I am to continue to participate in discussions here it would be helpful if I were given the full background.[40]

It seems Pearson's earlier assertion that he could adequately represent Canada at CPC meetings was premature.

Two factors finally convinced DEA officials in Ottawa of the necessity for a new machinery soley responsible for atomic policy formulation. First, Pearson's irresolute atomic diplomacy in Washington was illustrating all too clearly the ambivalence of Canadian atomic policy; secondly, General A. G. L.

McNaughton, the recently appointed Canadian delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, would also soon require guidance with respect to Canada's position on international atomic energy control. In March 1946 Arnold Heeney suggested that Canada follow the lead of Great Britain and the United States who had already established advisory committees to deal with the atomic question.[41] The Cabinet subsequently approved the establishment of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy, a decision that was long overdue. The new body included representatives from the Departments of National Defence, Reconstruction and Supply and External Affairs, as well as Mackenzie from the NRC and General McNaughton.[42] At long last an official group existed in Canada specifically charged with the formulation of atomic energy policy.

If the February CPC meeting had been acrimonious, the discussions which occurred exactly two months later served only to further crystallize the differences between Great Britain and the United States. Knowing that the dialogue would probably involve the CDT's future role in allocating uranium supplies, Howe instructed Pearson and Bateman to safeguard Canada's special relationship with the Trust.

> While we would like to have the Trust buy our surplus material, the price for an agreement to do so is too high if to obtain it we must surrender all Canadian control of the output.[43]

The meeting on 15 April quickly deteriorated however, into an Anglo-American debate over the collaboration issue, and Bateman correctly perceived the crux of the dispute.

> The real pressure behind the British desire to have a firm agreement and a definition of 'full and effective cooperation' lies in the fact that they are designing a [nuclear] plant and need a good deal of information from the U.S. on engineering design, construction and operation.[44]

Bateman concluded that since both sides appeared firmly entrenched it seemed unlikely that a solution satisfactory to Great Britain was possible.[45] Indeed, the severity of the impasse would preclude any further collaboration discussions at CPC meetings until February 1947.[46]

If the CPC meetings in the spring of 1946 accomplished little, they at least indicated that events in Canada and the United States were alienating Great Britain from her North American atomic 'partners'. Shortly after the April meeting Howe gloated that Canada would "always find a market for her uranium regardless of the Trust," and refused to furnish Great Britain with technical plans of the Chalk River plant because of secrecy guarantees he had given the Americans.[47] Almost certainly the embarrassment which Professor Halban's visit to France in 1944 had caused him along with the more recent Gouzenko revelations influenced the minister's decision. Moreover, Howe was probably eager to express Canadian disapproval with the British decision to recall Dr. Cockcroft to Great Britain. Privately however, Howe was not totally dissatisfied with the move, for the British administrator's departure would cause the Chalk River project to become "a wholly Canadian project under Canadian direction."[48] C. J. Mackenzie agreed, noting that Chalk River could now progress as "a strictly

Canadian enterprise."[49] The successful Canadian atomic program for which Howe and Mackenzie had hoped during the war now seemed possible, only at the expense however, of Anglo-Canadian solidarity.

The official British historian called the whole Cockcroft matter "a sorry business, badly handled, but even now the British had not learned their lesson about the need for the fullest possible consultation with Canada."[50] Perhaps Canadian officials would have been more accommodating to their British counterparts if the latter had expressed more interest in developing a joint Commonwealth atomic energy program in Canada.[51] Mackenzie, for example, certainly advocated such a plan, as did Groves and most American officials, but once the British decided to proceed with their own full scale project in Great Britain, Canadians became more reluctant to embrace British causes that would in any way jeopardize their relationship with the United States.[52] When it came down to choosing sides, Canada preferred to ally herself with the partner who looked to be the leader in future atomic energy development. Canadian officials were not prepared to risk the future of their own program to save a sinking ship.

Nevertheless, requests for Canadian support continued to arrive from across the Atlantic. Immediately following the April 1946 CPC meeting Prime Minister Attlee solicited Mackenzie King's personal support in the Anglo-American impasse.[53] The Canadian Prime Minister did intervene, but only with a non-committal statement that was typical of the Delphic utterances

which had become familiar to all Canadian politicians. Even American officials characterized King "as a 'past master of evasion' and one who had elevated 'compromise' to the status of an art form."[54] King informed the Americans that his understanding of 'full and effective cooperation' in the field of atomic energy was "indicated by the fact that the Canadian authorities, both during the war and in the postwar period ...[had] provided the United States authorities with full information on all Canadian activities in this field."[55] Significantly, he did not explicitly suggest that the Americans should do likewise, but only offered the Canadian procedure as an example which the United States might or might not want to follow. Such ambivalent support did not please the British.

Meanwhile DEA officials in Ottawa continued their efforts to formulate policy from files which still failed "to give a complete and consistent picture of the complex problems involved."[56] A recommendation of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy reflected the ambivalence of Canada's atomic policy at this time. It advised that Canada "should not actively advocate the conclusion of new Agreements," which in effect meant that she should not forcefully support the British in their attempts to increase American scientific and industrial cooperation. The panel noted however, that Canada should not object "to a revision of the arrangements provided its terms did not prejudice Canadian interests."[57] Hence Canada assumed a familiar 'hands-off' posture, content to let the British and the Americans work out their differences between themselves. With

regard to the cooperation dispute, perhaps C. D. Howe most cogently articulated his country's position: "Canada should not be involved in this argument."[58] Canadian officials would endeavour to follow the minister's advice.

If British officials were unhappy with the Canadian position they were even more displeased with the apparent recalcitrance of the Americans. On 5 March, 1946 Dean Acheson told British representatives in Washington that "it was quite impossible to fulfill the obligation of the Groves-Anderson arrangement."[59] The Under-Secretary of State told them moreover, that "they must just resign themselves to the fact that, although we made the agreement, we simply could not carry it out; that things like that happen in the Government of the U.S. due to the loose way things are handled."[60] Understandably, the British were unimpressed with this reasoning. They believed that General Groves had committed the United States to renewed information exchange in the memorandum signed by himself and Sir John Anderson in Washington the previous November.[61]

An important factor contributing to the American position on postwar atomic cooperation with the British was the relationship of the President to the American Congress. Under the Constitution the President was obligated to inform Congress of signed agreements between himself and other heads of state. Moreover, the Atomic Energy Act which Truman signed on 1 August 1946 required the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) to keep the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy informed on all aspects of the atomic energy project, including

the specific nature of the tripartite relationship with Great Britain and Canada.[62]

Even if Truman had been disposed to cooperation with the British he would have been constrained by Congress where most of the elected representatives "felt a kind of panic at the thought of sharing the supposed secret of the bomb with any nation."[63] Truman was not unaware of the prevailing mood and "took pains not to venture beyond what Congress would approve."[64] Moreover, the President's chief military advisers considered it "imperative that [the U.S.] Government should, in so far as practicable and for as long as possible, withhold the secrets of the atomic bomb from all other nations."[65] Hence military and congressional forces contributed to Truman's position.

The Gouzenko affair also significantly affected the Congressional debate on the establishment of the USAEC. Indeed, "the revelation strengthened the hands of conservatives who were insisting that the military have a role in atomic energy."[66] The President was now more than ever obliged to mollify his conservative critics and therefore felt compelled to quell any rumours of renewed collaboration with the British. In any event, Truman believed he had little choice and noted to his diary:

> It was not possible for me to make any statement on atomic policy to Great Britain until the Congress had acted. But, in any case, it was already apparent that, whatever bill the Congress passed, it would seriously hamper and restrict our cooperation with the British in the atomic field.[67]

This news would not be met with enthusiasm in Great Britain.

As stated earlier, the April 15 CPC meeting had failed to resolve the Anglo-American impasse. British reaction had

been both swift and predictable; "within twenty-four hours Prime Minister Atlee had dispatched a protest to President Truman."[68] The latter's response was just as predictable; he informed Atlee that he never would have signed the Washington Agreement if he had known that by doing so he committed the United States to supplying Great Britain with information required to build an atomic energy plant.[69] Hereafter the Americans hardened their resolve and grew more reluctant to compromise, while the British only became more frustrated.

By January 1947 Roger Makins, British representative on the CDT, had learned from the USAEC that the Atomic Energy Act forbade the kind of partnership outlined in the Quebec Agreement. Shortly after he received this information Makins expressed to Dean Acheson London's view that the Americans seemed accomodating in raw materials cooperation where they had much to gain but seemed to shy away from scientific interchange which would benefit Great Britain.[70] After his frank discussion with Makins Acheson wrote to David Lilienthal, head of the USAEC, and Secretary of State George Marshall that action was "urgently needed."[71]

The deteriorating Anglo-American relationship did not go unnoticed by Acheson's Canadian counterpart. Towards the end of January Lester Pearson, now back in Ottawa as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, informed Hume Wrong, recently appointed Ambassador to Washington, "that some early decision would have to be reached as to the future of the Quebec Agreement."[72] It would be another year however, before

such a decision would be achieved.

In May 1947 Dean Acheson revealed for the first time to the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy the existence of the Quebec Agreement. Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper "were shocked and enraged" with the clause which prevented the United States from using the bomb without first receiving consent from Great Britain.[73] But the USAEC was growing concerned about future supplies of uranium. In its view, "without the stocks in Britain, without that Congo production allocated to Great Britain, the American production plants could operate only at a fraction of full capacity."[74] Hence in November the American members of the CPC, George Marshall, James Forrestal and David Lilienthal began to consider the possibility of exchanging certain specified information for the accumulated excess British and Canadian stocks of uranium.[75] Although such cooperation seemed to contradict the Atomic Energy Act the USAEC's general counsel Herbert S. Marks, suggested the Act could be circumvented "if it could be shown that exchanging information with the British advanced American Security."[76]

The question of American security had acquired a new meaning in the postwar period. As a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study observed in March 1946, the Second World War had "demonstrated conclusively that the defence of a nation, if it is to be effective, must begin beyond its frontiers."[77] Furthermore:

> The further away from our own vital areas we can

> hold our enemy through the possession of advanced bases and the better organized the nation is to resist, withstand and counteract an enemy employing the atomic bomb, the greater our chances of surviving successfully an attack by atomic weapons....[78]

The JCS report reflected an earlier Canadian observation that "without Britain and the Dominions the United States has no bastions for defence or bridgeheads for attack against any potential enemy."[79] American policy-makers did not want to risk the loss of such 'bastions' and 'bridgeheads' as a result of continued atomic collaboration quarelling.

Consequently, on 5 December Vannevar Bush informed the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy that the security of the United States could be enhanced "by appropriate interchange with the British in fields where we are both working" but emphasized that information would not be interchanged in areas where the United States alone was working.[80] With the subsequent approval of the Joint Committee the Americans were now prepared to provide the British with certain information in exchange for guaranteed future uranium supplies.

In late August Canadian officials had learned the Americans were anxious to reopen collaboration discussions.[81] As Arnold Heeney noted, the American-expressed intention to renew tripartite arrangements precipitated in DEA "one of those minor bursts of activity which seem to characterize the course of our consideration of atomic questions."[82] He

informed Pearson that "things [seemed] to be moving rather rapidly toward an invitation to tripartite discussions...."[83] Heeney's confidence was well founded. While attending meetings in Washington in November, C. J. Mackenzie observed that American intransigence had apparently evaporated and "it was obvious that all the [Atomic Energy] Commission from Lilienthal down were most anxious to cooperate in every way...."[84] Three weeks later George Kennan of the U.S. State Department informed Hume Wrong that the United States was indeed now willing to discuss a reworking of the wartime Quebec Agreement.

In preparation for the scheduled 10 December CPC meeting Mackenzie and Howe agreed they would have to 'play it by ear', while Arnold Heeney cautioned Hume Wrong to retain Canada's special status in any restructured CDT.[85] Canadian interest in the discussions lay, according to Heeney, "in the possibility that they may result in really useful information being made available to Canada and to the United Kingdom."[86] Canadian representatives would not however, bargain aggressively for extended information exchange if by doing so they risked antagonizing the Americans.

Because of the portentous nature of the December CPC discussions Canada was well represented, as were also Great Britain and the United States.[87] DEA officials had prepared for the meeting, but Wrong still felt it necessary "for someone fully conversant with the current status of atomic questions in Canada to come [to Washington] for the meeting sufficiently

in advance to prime [T. A.] Stone and myself on the issues."[88] As a result, Mackenzie travelled to the American capital where he "was impressed by the substantial change in [the American] attitude."[89]

At the 10 December meeting the CPC representatives agreed to create two sub-committees to formulate proposals for information exchange and raw material allocation.[90] After several days of negotiations all parties agreed to abrogate the Quebec Agreement and Hyde Park 'Aide Memoire' and replace them with a new memorandum of understanding that would be entered into the minutes of the CPC. Under the terms of the new agreement all Congo production of uranium ore (including Great Britain's share) as well as excess ore stockpiled in Great Britain would go to the United States while the latter would supply Great Britain with atomic information in nine specified areas.[91] Furthermore, the United States would no longer be obligated to acquire Great Britain's consent before using atomic weapons.

Mackenzie King, who had been kept fully apprised of the December atomic discussions, sent Heeney to Washington in the new year to ensure that his directives were followed.[92] On 7 January, 1948, five years to the day after the infamous Conant memorandum restricting interchange, representatives of Canada, Great Britain and the United States signed a 'modus vivendi' which appeared to terminate the years of animosity that had existed among the three atomic 'partners'. One of the American negotiators recorded in his journal that "the long year of uncertainty about British-American relations was ended

and a new chapter begins."[93] Unfortunately, the 'new chapter' would prove no less acrimonious than the previous one.

Following the signing of the modus vivendi the flow of useful information to the British increased only marginally, if at all. When an American scientific mission to Great Britain in June 1948 revealed that the British were going ahead with full-scale bomb production many USAEC officials became opposed to continued cooperation with Great Britain.[94] President Truman also grew wary, insisting to the head of the USAEC "that we certainly must try to see that the British do not have information with which to build...atomic weapons in England because they might be captured."[95] The nationalistic Cold War mentality which now pervaded Congress also caused the President to be less than enthusiastic about sending atomic 'secrets' across the Atlantic. As a result, any possibility for renewed cooperation soon diminished and the period following the January 1948 modus vivendi left the British, in the words of the American Secretary of State, "with a sense of having been ungenerously, if not unfairly treated."[96]

Canadian officials might still have had a mediating role to play, but the success of their own atomic program erased any tangible reason to support the British case for increased collaboration. Furthermore, perhaps both British and Canadian officials realized that cooperation with the Americans was a lost cause and that Canadian intervention could do little to change this fact. As a result, the modus vivendi was allowed to lapse at the end of 1949, and with it the ambiguous legacy

of the Combined Policy Committee.

As we have seen, the 'mess' which Harry Truman had inherited in 1945 was not his alone; Canadian officials faced similar problems of their own following the Truman-Atlee-King discussions in Washington. The Department of External Affairs assumed the difficult task of formulating atomic policy from unfamiliar, diverse and often non-existent files.[97] As a result, the inexperienced and ill-informed Lester Pearson was often given little guidance from his superiors in Ottawa and Canada's postwar representative on the CPC was often placed in an awkward and embarrassing position, while Canadian atomic policy emerged as haphazard and oscilating.

By 1947 DEA officials, through the establishment of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy, had marginally augmented their knowledge of atomic matters, although CPC records were still "pretty incomplete" and difficult to locate.[98] By that time however, the CPC had lost much of its raison d'etre as Great Britain and the United States retrenched into intransigence. The modus vivendi of January 1948 proved merely patchwork surgery on a serious injury to postwar Anglo-American relations, and as the British and Americans continued to disagree, Canadians preferred to remain detached, secure in the knowledge of their own successful atomic project at Chalk River. They had had their fill of Anglo-American 'cooperation'.

NOTES

[1]Robert H. Ferrell ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 107.

[2]As the British Ambassador in Moscow noted in December 1945, with the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union "could... from behind her matchless three hundred divisions...stretch out her hand and take most of what she needed and perhaps more." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 83, Kerr to Ernest Bevin, December 3, 1945. [Hereafter cited as FRUS followed by year, volume number, page number and document reference].

[3]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 211.

[4]Robertson to Howe, November 29, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[5]Howe to Pearson, November 30, 1945, included in King to Pearson, December 3, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[6]Ibid.

[7]Bateman to Howe, December 4, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[8]Pearson to Robertson, December 4, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s). Pearson added that "Bateman [had] always considered himself as a Canadian representative, and so [had] the other members of the Trust."

[9]Ibid. Pearson had envisioned that the CPC might be the forum for discussions on international control, but the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was obliged to inform him that such negotiations would likely continue through diplomatic channels. See FRUS, 1945, II, p. 89, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee," Washington, December 4, 1945.

[10]Pearson to Robertson, December 4, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[11]Ibid.

[12]The CPC sub-committee was comprised of General Groves from the United States, Roger Makins from Great Britain, and Lester Pearson (assisted by George Bateman) from Canada.

[13]Robertson to Howe, December 21, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[14]Howe to Bateman, December 11, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[15]Hume Wrong's "Memorandum for File," December 14, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[16]Pearson to Robertson, December 14, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Wrong to Pearson, December 20, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[20]Ibid.

[21]Robertson to Howe, December 21, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[22]Pearson to Wrong, December 22, 1945, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[23]Pearson to Robertson, January 18, 1946, reprinted in Donald M. Page ed., Documents in Canadian External Relations, Vol. XII: 1946 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1977). [Hereafter cited as DCER].

[24]Although King mentions in his diary that he had discussed atomic affairs with Pearson, he gives no details of this meeting. See King Diary, January 16, 1946.

[25]Heeney to Pearson, January 31, 1946, DCER, p. 413; also quoted in Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 223. At the 30 January cabinet meeting to which Heeney referred, Howe stated that according to the proposed re-draft of the Declaration of Trust Canada would be "a full member of the combined body but will be excluded from financial responsibility for the Trust's operations." The cabinet subsequently approved renewed Canadian participation in the CDT and the CPC. See "Memorandum for C. J. Mackenzie and G. C. Bateman"(written by Howe's assistant, W. J. Bennet), January 31, 1946, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[26]Robertson to Howe, February 8, 1946, Howe Papers, Vol. 5.

[27]Howe to Robertson, February 14, 1946, Howe Papers, Vol. 5.

[28]Pearson to Robertson, February 11, 1946, Howe Papers, Vol. 11.

[29]Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World, 1939/1946: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), p. 478.

[30]Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 166. According to George F. Kennan, the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, "saw in Byrnes only another cocky and unreliable Irishman.... [Byrnes], as the British saw it, had consistently shown himself negligent of British feelings and quite unconcerned for Anglo-American relations." George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 286.

[31]Acheson, Present At The Creation, p. 166.

[32]Ibid., p. 167. Acheson's fears that the existence of the Quebec Agreement would seriously injure the Administration's relations with Congress were later confirmed when he revealed the secret accord to Senator's Vandenberg and Hickenlooper of the Senate Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees. Vandenberg termed the Quebec Agreement "astounding" and "unthinkable." Ibib.

[33]Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 187.

[34]Howe to Pearson, February 14, 1946, NRC Files, Vol. 284.

[35]Ibid.

[36]See Sir James Chadwick to Mackenzie, October 16, 1944, NRC Files, Vol. 284; Malcolm MacDonald (Aide Memoire) to Howe, December, 1944, Howe Papers, Vol. 13. See also Mackenzie Diary, September 1, 1944.

[37]Mackenzie Diary, November 13, 1945.

[38]Chadwick's "Memorandum for File," March 23, 1945, C.O.; CAB 126/148.

[39]Pearson to Heeney, February 16, 1946, Howe Papers, Vol. 5.

[40]Ibid. Pearson also added that had George Bateman attended the meeting, he perhaps could have clarified Canada's position, but he was vacationing in Florida.

[41]Heeney to Howe, March 20, 1946, Howe Papers, Vol. 5. Howe, fully aware of DEA's difficulties, concurred with Heeney's suggestion; Howe to Heeney, March 23, 1946, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[42]Arnold Heeney acted as convener of the Panel and George Ignatieff was appointed secretary. DEA was well represented on the Panel with Robertson, Pearson and Wrong all being appointed. Ironically however, none of the three were present at its inaugural meeting in April; Charles Ritchie represented DEA instead. See DCER, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy, April 16, 1946, pp. 424-427.

[43]Howe to Bateman, April 15, 1946, DCER, p. 422.

[44]Bateman to Howe, April 15, 1946, DCER, pp. 422-424.

[45]Ibid.

[46]A CPC meeting was held in July 1946 to confirm an agreement on raw materials allocation. Bateman represented Canada at this meeting but did not participate in the discussions. See FRUS, 1946, Vol. I, p. 1256.

[47]Howe to Bateman, April 18, 1946, DCER, p. 428.

[48]Howe to Pearson, December 9, 1946, DCER, pp. 488-489. In August 1945 Howe had stated his determination "to strengthen our own [atomic] staff and be independent of outside help." See Howe to Bateman, August 17, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[49]Mackenzie Diary, September 14, 1946.

[50]Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 138.

[51]Mackenzie had earlier described the benefits which would accrue to Canada if Great Britain were to follow through on the plan to construct her atomic energy plants in Canada. See Mackenzie's memo entitled "Canada's Position in the Development of Atomic Energy," October 29, 1945; DEA Records, file 201(s).

[52]See Ronald I. Campbell to Anderson, May 31, 1944, C.O.

[53]Attlee to King, April 17, 1946, DCER, p. 427.

[54]"Memorandum for Visit of P.M. Mackenzie King, September 29-30, 1945," as quoted in Diubaldo and Scheinberg, A Study of Canadian-American Defence Policy (1945-1975), p. 5.

[55]T. A. Stone to Dean Acheson, April 29, 1946, DCER, p. 434. Only three days earlier Charles Ritchie had stated that among the important questions which remained for consideration was whether Canada should support Great Britain "in its case for obtaining from the United States further information on the know-how of industrial production." See Ritchie to Robertson, April 26, 1946, DCER, pp. 428-433. King's subsequent message indicated that the Prime Minister preferred to remain detached from such a dispute.

[56]Ritchie to Robertson, April 26, 1946, DCER, pp. 428-433.

[57]Advisory Panel "Memorandum on the International Aspects of Atomic Energy," May 7, 1946, DCER, pp. 435-441.

[58]Howe to Pearson, December 9, 1946, DCER, pp. 488-489.

[59]David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. II: The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 25.

[60]Ibid.

[61]For General Eisenhower's views on this issue see Ibid., pp. 218-219. He expressed for example, some empathy for the British position: "When you consider that they led us in radar and jet propulsion and made it freely available to us, and still lead in a number of other military fields...you can see how they feel and how costly it could be to us."

[62]Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. II, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), p. 263.

[63]John Morton Blum ed., The Price of Vision; The Diary of Henry A. Wallace 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 42.

[64]Ibid., p. 43.

[65]"Military Policy As To Secrecy Regarding The Atomic Bomb," October 19, 1945, NARUS, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, file 471.6 (8-15-45). [Hereafter cited as JCS followed by file reference]. See also "Memorandum for the President," October 23, 1945, Ibid.

[66]Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p. 171. Conservative Republican Senator Vandenberg subsequently introduced an ammendment to the McMahon Bill which created a Military Liaison Committee to advise the civilian Atomic Energy Commission. See also Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 132.

[67]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), p. 15.

[68]Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, p. 479.

[69]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. I3.

[70]Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 273.

[71]Ibid., p. 274.

[72]Pearson to Wrong, January 29, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s). Wrong had been appointed Canadian Ambassador to the United States in October 1946. That same month Pearson returned to take over Norman Robertson's old position as Under-Secretary of State. Mackenzie King had sent Robertson to London in September as Canada's new High Commissioner, and had also appointed Louis St. Laurent as the country's first Secretary of State for External Affairs who was not also Prime Minister. The latter had little to do however, with Canada's membership in the CPC and CDT.

[73]Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 275. Senator Hickenlooper described the agreement as 'intolerable'. Ibid. See also Hickenlooper to Acheson, August 29, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 833-834.

[74]Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 276.

[75]See "Minutes of a Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee," Washington, November 5, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 852-860.

[76]Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, p. 277.

[77]Memorandum entitled "Statement of Effect of Atomic Weapons on National Security and Military Organization," March 12, 1946, JCS Records, file 471.6 (8-15-45).

[78]Ibid.

[79]"Anglo-American Relations and Canadian Policy," Address given by Brooke Claxton, K.C., M.P., to the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs, Geneva Park, August 27, 1943, Pearson Papers, N1 Pre 48 Series, Vol. 11.

[80]Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, p. 267.

[81]See Wrong to Heeney, August 30, 1947; also copy of British memo, ANCAM 877, August 27, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s). Howe and Mackenzie were apprised of these developments on 8 September; see Heeney to Mackenzie and Howe to Heeney, September 8, 1947, Ibid.

[82]Heeney to Wrong, September 11, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[83]Heeney to Pearson, September 11, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[84]Mackenzie Diary, November 14, 1947. Also quoted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, p. 312.

[85]Mackenzie Diary, December 6, 1947; Heeney to Wrong, December 9, 1947, Howe Papers. See also Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, III, pp. 313-314.

[86]Heeney to Wrong, December 9, 1947, Howe Papers, Vol. 5.

[87]Representing Canada were Mackenzie, Bateman, Wrong, George Ignatieff and T. A. Stone.

[88]Wrong to Howe, December 2, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[89]Wrong to Heeney, December 11, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s). See also "Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister," December 18, 1947, Ibid.

[90]Mackenzie and Ignatieff represented Canada on the information sub-committee while Bateman and Stone were her representatives on the raw materials sub-committee.

[91]Under the new agreement the CDT was renamed the Combined Development Agency (CDA).

[92]See Heeney to Wrong, January 2, 1948, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[93]Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, p. 282.

[94]Ibid., pp. 383, 385.

[95]Ibid., p. 465.

[96]Acheson, Present At The Creation, p.168.

[97]DEA's John Starnes noted in June 1947 that "there are large gaps in our information concerning the exact position with regard to the C.D.T. and the C.P.C." Starnes to Heeney, June 18, 1947, DEA Records, file 201-F(s).

[98]Heeney to Wrong, February 1, 1947, DEA Records, file 201-F(s).

CONCLUSION

Canada's atomic energy policy from 1942 to 1948 was more than anything else an expression of Mackenzie King's personal conviction that Canadian interests were best served by remaining detached from volatile international issues that might divide public opinion in the country. His isolationist tendencies also contrasted with the internationalist ideals of the young intellectuals in the Department of External Affairs, and led one frustrated official to complain that "on matters of high policy in the realm of foreign affairs Canada does not make decisions; it has decisions forced on it. We take a positive pleasure in trying not to influence to course of history."[1] Mackenzie King seems to have been aware of this ideological gap between himself and his department, for he chose to exclude DEA officials from wartime atomic energy policy formulation.

The Prime Minister viewed atomic energy more in terms of its possible contributions to Canada's industrial development rather than as a diplomatic ace with which to bargain for a more pronounced voice for Canada in international affairs. As a result, he gave C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie 'free rein'

to manage Canada's day-to-day atomic affairs during the war, while retaining however, ultimate authority in determining his country's overall atomic policy. King knew that Howe and Mackenzie's interests lay in developing a successful domestic atomic program, not in entangling Canada in complex international responsibilities, thus explaining why the Prime Minister felt it unnecessary to regularly consult with the two officials who conducted Canada's atomic negotiations during this period.

In the spring of 1942 Howe and Mackenzie were thrust into the realm of atomic diplomacy with little experience in international bargaining, and though 'non-diplomats', they nevertheless strove to defend Canadian interests in the vexatious atomic relationship. Difficulties arose however, when British officials began to perceive that Canadian interests did not always coincide with those of Great Britain, and that Commonwealth solidarity was not inevitably a guarantee of Canadian support in atomic disputes with the United States.

Neither did the personal acrimony which existed between certain British officials, especially Sir John Anderson, and their Canadian counterparts, promote an amicable Anglo-Canadian atomic partnership. In fact, when Lord Portal visited Canada in May 1946 to confer with Canadian officials, Mackenzie noted that he (Portal) was "the only Englishman in top administration echelon of atomic energy that I have felt we could get along with."[2] Anderson and Lord Cherwell's mistrust of Howe and Mackenzie was not totally unfounded, especially in light of the Eldorado bungling. One suspects however, that

Howe and Mackenzie's personal detestation for the seemingly imperious attitude of some atomic policy-makers in London would have in any event hindered friendly Anglo-Canadian negotiations.[3]

The Canadian-American atomic partnership seems to have operated much more effectively, due no doubt to the fact that General Groves believed the Canadian-American connection was much more important to the future of the American atomic program than the Anglo-American partnership.[4] Not only was Canada a potential principal supplier of uranium, but American scientific administrators also came to value the Chalk River pilot project as an important source of information in heavy water technology.[5]

Howe and Mackenzie also seem to have established a more comfortable rapport with the personalities at the administrative level of the American atomic program than with those who directed Great Britain's atomic policy from Whitehall. This Anglo-Canadian rift widened when British officials abandoned the idea of permanently locating their atomic project in Canada. In fact, "Cockcroft and some of the scientists may have seen the possibilities of a joint enterprise, but no one in London seemed to have grasped that vision."[6] Hence, Howe and Mackenzie viewed Cockcroft's recall to Great Britain in the spring of 1946 as an opportunity for Chalk River to emerge as a truly independent Canadian project.

The Chalk River project had partially resulted from Great Britain's desire to relocate part of her atomic program

beyond the range of German bombers and near the expanding atomic research and development in the United States. Other factors were involved however. There existed an awareness on both sides of the Atlantic that the Canadians might be useful as intermediaries in any Anglo-American atomic disputes that might arise.[7] When difficulties did develop, it was often Mackenzie who surfaced as a peacemaker, an awkward role which did not endear him to many British atomic officials in London who thought that Canadian support should have been more forthcoming.

The August 1943 Quebec Agreement represented an effort to resolve the atomic impasse between Great Britain and the United States. But the secret accord, couched in ambiguous language and known only to select highranking officials in each country, did not spell an end to the Anglo-American quarreling. As one British official later remarked, "perhaps part of the explanation of this bizarre episode in inter-allied relations lies in the imprecise nature of the agreements and undertaking entered into by the President and the Prime Minister and the unusual character and secrecy of their discussions."[8]

Canadian DEA officials could certainly attest to the veracity of the latter observation, for they learned of Canada's involvement in the atomic project only after the ignominious destruction of Hiroshima. In the months that followed they endeavoured to apprise themselves of a complex relationship in which their country's role had not been minor. As we have seen, they found it difficult to get the complete facts on

Canadian participation, and Lester Pearson was consequently placed in an awkward position at CPC meetings in Washington.

Nevertheless, DEA officials prepared numerous and detailed memoranda on atomic energy for the November 1945 summit meeting of Truman, Attlee and King. Though Pearson and Wrong may have desired that Canada play a more prominent role in the discussions, their Prime Minister was less enthusiastic. The recent Gouzenko revelations had caused Mackenzie King extreme embarrassment, and as he sailed for the United States in November he noted that the atomic discussions would profoundly affect his future, something he 'had never sought and did not envy'.[9]

After the tripartite Washington Declaration on Atomic Energy DEA officials assumed increased responsibility for formulating atomic policy in Canada, but more often than not they were obliged to seek the guidance of Howe, Mackenzie or King. The earlier exclusion of Canada's professional diplomats from atomic negotiations expressed itself in their later inability to effectively formulate atomic policy in certain areas. As a result, Howe and Mackenzie continued to personally direct Canada's atomic relationship with Great Britain and the United States long after DEA had officially acquired the responsibility of atomic policy-making. Had DEA officials been brought into the picture at an earlier date this problem might have been avoided, but Mackenzie King's secretive demeanor had prevented this from occurring.

Many in the Department of External Affairs recognized the necessity of an official government body solely responsible for

the formulation of atomic energy policy in Canada. The establishment of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy in March 1946 was a step in the right direction, but at least one of its members was unconvinced of its effectiveness.[10] Indeed, by the summer of 1947, atomic energy policy formulation remained for many DEA officials "a very complicated matter."[11] Consequently, it was once again Howe and Mackenzie who determined Canada's position at the December 1947 Washington negotiations which resulted in the January 1948 modus vivendi.

By 1948 Canada's position in the atomic relationship had become more manifest than it had been during the war. Though Canada's contribution to the project had not been insignificant, she had not been an official signatory to any of the wartime atomic agreements between Roosevelt and Churchill. After the war however, Canada received official recognition as an 'atomic power' when Mackenzie King added his signature to those of Truman and Attlee when the three leaders signed the November, 1945 Washington Declaration on Atomic Energy. Under the guidance of C. D. Howe and C. J. Mackenzie Canada had emerged as a world leader in the development of heavy water technology, an important achievement which held great possibilities for the country's postwar industrial expansion.

To Churchill's charge that Howe had sold the British Empire down the river it can be argued that while the Americans had considered terminating all atomic collaboration with the British, they never seriously contemplated taking similar action against the Canadians. Certainly Conant's brusque manner with

the British as contrasted with his solicitous correspondence with the Canadians suggests as much. Selling the British Empire down the river in this context would have meant allowing the United States to cut off Great Britain from the atomic project entirely. This, which might easily have come to pass, was certainly opposed with considerable effort by Howe and Mackenzie, who, to this extent at least, were working for British interests as well as Canadian. DEA officials may have attempted to steer Canada on a more neutral course vis-a-vis Great Britain and the United States in atomic matters, but such posturing would merely have jeopardized Canada's participation in the heavy water project by antagonizing the Americans. It is in this sense that Canada may have been fortunate that her atomic negotiations were handled by 'non-diplomats' during this period.

Mackenzie King was indeed, to use Escott Reid's phrase, a diplomat who took 'a positive pleasure in trying not to influence the course of history.' The Prime Minister's awareness that his diplomatic advisers thought differently resulted in their exclusion from atomic energy discussions until after the war. His taciturn relationship with his own department was not evidence of an insouciant Minister of External Affairs however, but rather of a leader who wanted to maintain tight control over his country's atomic energy policy.

A young journalist once painted Mackenzie King as "a man

who conceals rather than exposes what he is seeking to accomplish."[12] The Prime Minister approved of the description, just as he approved of Frank Salisbury's revealing portrait which now hangs in the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. If King wished to be remembered as the skillful diplomat who personally ushered Canada into the atomic era, he need not have worried. He felt more assured however, when Salisbury had applied the final few strokes. After viewing the artist's completed work for the first time King was more than pleased.

> I now feel that under God's Providence, guidance and direction, part of the final chapter has been written, literally, in letters of gold. Of all the physical experiences of my life, this has been the greatest.... The portrait is now painted. The record is now there.

ENDNOTES

[1]Escott Reid's memorandum entitled "The United States and Canada: Domination, Cooperation, Absorption," January 12, 1942, Pearson Papers, Pre 48 Series, Vol. 11.

[2]Mackenzie Diary, May 24, 1946.

[3]Vincent Massey recalled the reticence on the part of many Canadian cabinet ministers to frankly discuss contentious issues with their British counterparts. He contributed this reluctance to a sincere awkwardness on the part of Canadians caused by their unfamiliarity with the 'rank and status' of people in Great Britain. During a visit by Howe to London in 1942 the High Commisioner noted the minister "was reluctant to talk...about the problem of our relation to the direction of the war effort." Massey, What's Past Is Prologue, p. 311.

[4]See Bateman to Howe, August 10, 1945, Howe Papers, Vol. 13.

[5]Memorandum entitled "A Review of Liaison Activities Between the Canadians and the United States Atomic Energy Commission," February 19, 1947, Harrison-Bundy Files.

[6]Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, I, p. 219.

[7]Supra, p. 4.

[8]Lord Sherfield, "On the Diplomatic Trail with LBP: Some Episodes 1930-1972," International Journal, XXIX (Winter, 1973-1974), p. 82.

[9]King Diary, November 5, 1945.

[10]See Mackenzie Diary, April 18, 1947.

[11]John Starnes to T. A. Stone, July 30, 1947, DEA Records, file 201(s).

[12]King Diary, October 18, 1945.

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